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HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY
PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
ΓΙΑΤ
AND THE
OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
BY
GEORGE GROTH, me
AUTHOR OF THE ‘HISTORY OF GREECE’,
A NEW EDITION.
IN FOUR VOLUMES. Vou. III.
LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 1888.
The right of Translation is reserved.
RARE D-CoLifne γ.. FRG;.; THE piven - 3
HARVARD UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
HARVARD UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
MAR OS 1991
OONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXVI. ‘PHZDRUS—SYMPOSION.
PAGE
These two are the two erotic dia- logues of Plato. Phzedrus is the tor of both .
Eros as conceived by Plato. | Dif- ‘ferent sentiment prevalent in Hellenic antiquity and in
odern times. Position of
ty, th t int ran. , the oO pro: 5 n between Ἢ the world of sense and the world of Ideas. ual generalisation of the sen
All men love Good, as the means iness, but th arsue it Bros 18 co ‘cot fined to one special
con
variety
Desire “of ame men copulation and procreation, as the only attain- able li likeness of tof | pee » Te
sti-
Highest exaltation of the erotic impulse in a few
minds, when it ascends gra-
dually to baci of Beauty ia
c view of Eros
pith several different views act it previously enunciated e
other Kors ; closing with a
n Sokrates, by the
zn Alkibiades
Views of Eros presented by ῬΒω- drus, , Kryximachas, Aristophanes, Agathon ..
Discourse of Sokrates from reve- lation of Diotima. He describes Eros as not a God, but an inter- mediate Demon between rng to and men, cons divinity, Pak not atiaining it.
e erotic on with ths that of the Th
and thirsts for knowledge Erog as presented in the Phedrus
μὲ
adverse to selzed with remorse, and recanta in a high-flown panegyric on ros Pan c—Sokrates admite that the influence of Eros isa variety of madness, but distinguishes δ᾽ good and bad varieties of mad- ness, both coming from the Gods. Good madness is far better than sobriety
Poetical mythe delivered by So-
krates, describ the immor- 6| tality and pre-existence of -the soul, and its pre-nata] condition of compe anionship with
0 sand eternal Ideas . ial ‘expe peration of su o-natal expe- rience upon the intellectual fa-
7] culties of man—Comparisen and combination of particular sensa- tions indispensable — Reminis- cence ..
Reminiscence is kindled ‘up in the soul of the philosupher by the aspect of visible Beauty, which
8] is th link between the world οἱ 0
ay
sense and the world of 9 Elevating "influence ascribed, both
PAGE
10
ll
1$
14
~
vi
in Phedrus and Symposion, to Kros Philosophus. Mixture the mind of Plato, of retical fancy and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory ve
Differences between S posion and Phedrus. In-dwelling concep- tions assumed by the former, re-natal experiences. by the
atter Nothing but metaphorical immor- tality recognise Form or Idea of Beauty pr on ae and exclusively in Sym-
Eos recognised, both in Phdrus and Symposion, as affording the initiatory stimulus to philosophy —Not so ised in P on, Thesetétus, and elsewhere .. ..
Conelnd
Symposion— - aimee ie of Sokrates Ἐπ
biades and other handsome youths ee ΞΚΨ.Ε Perfect self-command of Sokrates —proof t every sort of Drunkenness ‘of others at the close
of the Symposion —Sokrates is not affec by it, but continues
Symposion and Pheedon—each is the antithesis and complement synposion of Plato οἱ pared with
ymposion o com wi
αὐδδῦ of Xenophon .. mall proportion of the serious, in enophontic Symposion
Platonis Symposion more ideal and transcel ndental than the Xeno- sepond half of the Phedrus— into a debate on Rhetoric.
is considered as a subject
, caer ber ὃν a UB logograp er y Motive “od itcians. Con ntempt convey: by the word. Sokrates declares that, the only uestion is, Whether’ ὃ man | wri
of ust be foun upon a’ knowledge e of the trath, ' and of gradations of resemblance tothe truth .. .. .. .. .-
in Symposion .
PAGE
ee ER ΚΒ
ib. | The
CONTENTS OF VOLUME III.
Comparison made by Sokrates be- tween the discourse of Lysias and hisown. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates defin what he meant by it:
did not define ... lo ical processes—Definition | and ivision—both of them exem- lified in the two discourses of krates
View of Sokrates — that ‘there is no real Art of Rhetoric, exce what is already comprised Dialectic—The rhetorical teach- ing is empty and useless...
What the ἡ rt of Piotoric ought to
ο ppo an the thee mnadicnt Ace
Art of Bhetoric ought to include
syste matic classification of
min with all their varieties,
and of discourses with all their
varieties. The Rhetor must
know I how to aE eo cack the eae to the o ther, ἃ suita
tic
The Rhetorical Artist: must, ree become possessed o > as well as that which his auditors believe to be truth. He is not sufficiently rewarded for this labour
Question about Writing—As an Art, for the purpose of instruc- tion, it can do little—Reasons
Wri may remind the
ΣᾺΣ τ of what he already knows
Neither written words, nor con- tinuous , will produce any serious effect in - Dia- lectic and cross-examination are
Lysias
| The Dialectician and¢ a's
man who can really teach. the writer can do this, he is more than a writer Lysias is is prot a a logograp pher: Iso-
me a phi- losophar” Date of the Pheedrus—not an early
dialogue Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses—His theory of Rhetoric is more Platonic ulates, in the Rhe- already assured— all the doubts
sitor, with knowledge and logical process, teaches minds un- occupied and willing to learn .. etor does not teach, but
PAGE
31
87
CONTENTS OF VOLUME III.
Ῥ persuades persons with minds
pre-occupied—guiding them me-
from error to truth .. He must then classify the minds to be pe: and the means
of persuasion or varieties of dis- course. He must know how to fit on the one to the other in
each particular case .. .. .. Plato’s Jdéal of the Rhetorical Art —involves in part incompatible conditions—the Wise man or phi- losopher will never be listened to by the public Taree The other part of the Platonic Idéal is d but unattainable— b th of psychological data and Ῥ classified a es of urse .. 8 grandeur compared with the rhetorical teachers— Usefulness of these teachers for the wants of an accomplished The Rhetorical teachers conceived the Art too narrowly : Plato con- ceived it too widely. The prin- ciples of an Art are not required to be explained to all learners .. Plato includes in his conception of Art, the application thereof to now
cases. can
piever be taught by role ie Bho. ’s charge against e- torical teachers is not made
AGE
in neglecting his greater works,
40| and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for a private circle
No fair com n can be taken between
Written matter is useful as a me- ‘morandum for persons who know —or as an elegant pastime... ..
Plato’s di eories are pitched too high to be realised ..
No one has ever been found com- petent to solve the difficulties raised So.
Karneades, and vein
of osophy.. .. .. +. Plato's ‘dal philosopher can only be realised under esis of a pre-existent and omniscient soul, stimulated into full remini- scence here .. .. .. «. «e- Different proceeding of Plato in the Timeus .. .. .. ων ce te tendencies co-existent in lato’s mind-—- Extreme of the ndental or Absolute— Extreme of i
tion to individuals and pocaslons
Ὁ
46
47
CHAPTER XXVIL PARMENIDES.
Character of dialogues immediatel receding — much transcen- ental assertion.
racter of the Parmenides ..
Sokrates is the juvenile defend-
ant — Parmenldes the veteran censor and cross-examiner. Par- menides gives a specimen of exercises to be performed by the philosophical aspirant... .. .. Circumstances and persons of the Manner in which the doctrine at Manner in which his n Zeno defended him .. .. .. Sokrates here impugns the doctrine of Zeno. He s the Platonic theory of ideas separate from sensible objects, yet participable by them
Parmenides and Zeno admire the philosophical ardour of Sokrates. enides advances objections
a inst the Platonic theory of What Ideas does Sokrates - nise? Of the Just and Good? Yes. Of Man, Horse, &? Doubtful. Of Hair, Mud, &c?
. (i ον φρο ων ον ως Parmenides declares that no object
δ᾽} in nature is mean to the philo- sopher.. .. .. .. «2 es ee Remarks upon this—Contrast be- tween emotional and scientific classification .. .. .. .. .. Objections of Parmenides—How can objects participate in the Ideas. Each cannot have the whole Idea, nor a part thereof ..
59 1 Comparing the Idea with the sen-
56
Ῥ Plato has not treated Lysias fairly,
47
49
61
ἐδ.
viii ONTENTS OF VOLUME IIL.
are never answered in any part ition of Parmenides—Nine of the Platonlo dialogues..." -. i deductions ot Demon Views of Stallbaum and Socher. "| strations, frst from Dnum Est ‘The latter maintains that Plato next from Unum non Bat a would never make such objeo- | The tions against his own theory, and ‘or Antinomies. denies ‘the anthenticity of the Plering entanglement Pilosophers ars diuaily “idvo- | “‘Retont ene ae rreemaaly cates, each of ἃ positive system Different judgm« ofhisown.. .. .. .. .. .. 70) critics respecting the Antinomies Different spirit of Plato in his and the logue generally.. .. 8% ‘of Search... ... ἐδ.} No dogmiatical solution or purpose The Parmenidis 8 the extreme ὀ ἴα wrapped up in the dialogue. manifestation of the ive The pi is παρέα, to clement. ‘That Platoshould er | make ἃ theorist keenly feel all Tae’ ggatn oo against te ‘This negative purpose ἴα πε ον rovcase agalna Theorpeot “ideas” ὧν not use __ | "anactaced Ἐν Bato himsafe al natoral .. .. -« eee TL extent Force of the case fn the is parely bi etticipetion of sensible objects iPdclared wih we a Dithorltice shout the Goguiastitiy "| "considered. They include much oo uboat tbe Oe they incledo| οἵ Ideas. ἐσ unwarranted assumption an they cannot be cognizable :
Whey Re cogatiatie they taust ‘| Flainod porpleriie or ἀπορίαι. 86
CONTENTS OF VOLUME IIL
Even if Plato himself saw through these subtleties, he might s choose to impose and to
more formidable than any of the sophisms or subtleties broached
Platonic Antinomies, we ought to have before us the problems the M and others.
assemblage of negative conclu- sions. Reductio Absurdwn of the assumption-— Unum non Multa... .. ..
Demonstra'
erage —Open offence canon—No logical aon oF tion boon laid dea
PAGE
91
“ὦ
Ῥ Demonstration third—Attempt to
ix AGE
recon the contradiction of Demonstrations IL and II... .. Plato's imagination of the Sudden or Instantaneous—Breaches or momentary stoppages in the course of O.. 2. ce ce oe Review of the successive pairs of Demonstrations or Antinomies in each, the first proves the Nei- ther, the second proves the Both 101 The third Demonstration is media- torial but not satisfactory—The hypothesis of the Sudden or In. stantaneous found no favour .. 102 Review of the two last Antinomies. Demonstrations VI. and VIL .. 108 Demonstration vil is founded w e doctrine Poraienidee e ee ee ee ee 104 Demonstrations VI. and VII. con- sidered — Unwarrantable ste tet jemi ety Es men erently r- preted, though the same wo ce ce we
100
42.
Analysis
Demonstration VIII. is very subtle and Zenonian .. .. .. .. .. 107
Demonstration IX. Neither fol- lowing Both oe ee ee oe oe
Conclu words of the Parme- nides— ration that he has demonstrated the Both and the Neither of many different pro- positions .. .. .. .. «. «.
Comparison of the conclusion of the Parmenides to an enigma of the Republic. Difference. The constructor of the eni adapted its conditions to a fore- known solution. Plato did not
: CHAPTER XXVIII. THEATETUS.
Subjects and personages in the
Question raised Sokrates— What is know or Cogni- tion? First answer of Theve- tétus, enumerating many e rent cognitions. Corrected by Preliminary conversation before the second answer is given. So- krates describes
teach, but he can evolve
t Parmenides .. .. .. .. knowledge out of pregnant minds 112 ' Plato here blends together three
110
111
Ethical basis of the cross-examina- tion of Sokrates— He is forbid-
den to by falsehood with- out challenge 7 oe ee ee ee 118 Answer of esetétus—Cognition
is sensible perception : Sokrates says that this is the same doc- trine as the Homo Mensura laid down by Protagoras, and that both are in close affinity with the doctrines of Homer, Hera- kleitus, Empedoklés, &., all ex- cep
PAGE
distinct theories for the 16 purpose of confuting them ;
professes to urge w St can be said in favour of them. Difii-
culty of following his exposition 114
oras is com-
pletely distinct from the other octrines. The identification of .
them as one and the same is only constructive—the interpretation of Plato himself
Explanation of the doctrine of Pro- tagoras—Homo M
The doctrine of Protag
ensura 116 Perpetual implication of Subject 118
Obj Relate and
Such relativity is no less true in to the ratiocinative com-
re
binations of each individ than in regard to to his percipien capacities Pp into
Evidence from P proving im plication of ταν ect and Object,
regard to the intelligible
world .
The Pro orean ‘measure is ‘even
more y shown in reference to the intelligible world than in reference to sense . Object always relative to ‘Subject ither without the other, impos- sible. Plato admits this in
phistes . Plato’s representation of the Pro- tagorean doctrine in intimate conjunction with the Heraklei-
126 Relativity of sensible facts, as de- scribed by him ib
Relations are no y in the ob ect pee he and d amply y withou
Relativit
Sa besides the one directly
scribed Statement of the doctrine of Hera- kleitus— ih 90 as to implicate it with that of Protag Agent t and Patient’ No Ὁ absolute
Arguments derived from dreams, fevers, &c., may be answered Exposition of the Protagorean doc- trine, as given here by Sokrates is to a great d ust. You cannot explain facts of con- sciousness by independent Sub- ject and Object behind the
nd ying aul d—to the compar. ject—to another object, de-
121
* 197
CONTENTS OF VOLUME IILf.
Arguments advanced by the Pla- tonic Sokrates against the Pro- tagorean doctrine. He says that it puts the wise and foolish ona par—that it contradicts the com-
PAGE
mon consciousness. Not every .
one, but the wise man only, is a m
easure In matters of present sentiment .
every man can judge for himself. Where future ee peat are
involved special knowledge is
required Plato, when be impugns ‘the doc- trine of Protagoras, wiates that that doctrine without the qualifica: alitices tive tothe condition of (he believing mind we “ie blage of f individes! j is an assemb 0 u ments and affirmations. This
Protagorean ualises all men and ow far true. Not true in the sense requisite to sustain Plato's objection .. . Belief on authority is true to the believer —The efficacy of authority resides in the believer’s Protagoreat formula—is false, to rean form those who dissent fromit .. Plato’s argument that the wise man al alone is a measure—Reply —
Plato’s nent as to the distinc- tion between present sensation | and anticipation of the future .
The formula of Relativity does no’ ἢ imply that every man believes himself to be infallible .
128] is true—Dialectic recogni the autonomy of the individual mind 129} Contrast with the Treatise De
Reference to double potentiality Subjective οι
and Objective
130
181
Legibus—Plato assumes infalli- ble on authority—sets aside dia-
Plato in "deny , the “Prot formula, constitutes
orean the
187
. 141
142
. 148
146
. 148
measure for all. Counter propo- »
Inport of the Protager n formula
of the orean form
iS best seen when we state ex.
| Uapopa the counter-proposition n yo e tagorean foraula—M Most believers insist
150
CONTENTS OF VOLUME 111. xl PAGE . PAGE upon themselves a mea- tion from experience, or from sure for ers,as well as for facts of sense, as either neces- themselves. Appeal to Abstrac- or possible se oe oe ee 168 tions .. .. .. .. .. .. ως 160] Second definition given by Thee- Aristotle failed in his attempts to tétus—That ition consists in refute the Protagorean formula right ortrueopinion .. .. .. &. —KEvery reader of Aristotle will Objection by Sokrates—This defini- claim the right of i for on assumes that there are false himself Aristotle’s canons of opinions. But how can false trath .. .. . .. .. «εὖ. 152} opinions be possible? How can Plato’s examination of the other we conceive Non-Ens; or con- doctrine—That knowledge is Sen- found together two distinct reali- sible P ion. He adverts to ties? .. .. 2. «ewe ow 0. ἐδ. sensible which are different Waxen memorial tablet in the with different Percipients .... 168] mind, on which past impressions Such is not the case with all the are engraved. False opinion facts of sense. The conditions of consists in wrongly identifying unanimity are best found among present sensations with past im- select facts of sense—weighing, ressions .. .. .. .. .. «- 160 measuring, &c. .. .. .. .. 154 Sckrates refutes this assumption. Arguments of Sokrates in examin- Dilemma. Either false opinion this question. Divergence is impossible, or else a man may between one man and another know what he does not know .. 170 arises, not merely from different He draws distinction between pos- sensual ressibility, but from sessing knowledge, and havin mental and associative differ- it actually in hand Simile o ence .. .. .. .. .._.. .. 166) the pigeon-cage with caught Argument —That sensible Percep- pigeons turned into it and flying on does not include memory— about .. .. .. .. .. «. ων (δ. Probabili those who held Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion the ἃ 9 meant to include of Thestétus—That there may memory .. .. .._.. .. 00. 157] benon-cognitions in the fnind as Argument from the analogy of see- well as cognitions, and that ing and not seeing at the same false opinion may consist in time .. .. .. .. «. «+ «+. δ. confoun one with the Sokrates maintains that we do not other. Sokrates rejects this .. 171 see with our eyes, but that the He b another argument to mind sees through the eyes : that prove t Cognition is not the -the mind often conceives and game as true opinion. Rhetors judges by iteelf without the aid persuade or communicate true of an bodily organ «. «e 0. 159} opinion; but they do not teach Indication several judgments or communicate knowledge . 172 which the mind makes by itself New answer of Thextétus—Cog- —It perceives Existence, er- nition is true opinion, coupled ence,&c. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1600] with rational explanation . .. 173 Sokrates maintains that knowledge Criticism on the answer by So- is to be found, not in the Sen- krates. Analogy of letters and sible Perceptions themselves, but words, primo elements and in the comparisons and computa- compounds. Elements cannot be tions of the mind respecting explained : compounds alone can them .. .. .. .. .. «._.. 161] beexplained .. .. .. .. .. &. Examination of this view—Dis- Sokrates refutes this criticism. If tinction from the views of the elements are unknowable, modern philosophers .. .. .. 162] the compound must be unknow- Different views given by Plato in ablealso .. .. .. «.. «- «+ 174 other dialogues .. .. .. .. 163| Rational explanation may have one Plato's discussion of this question of three different meanings. 1. here exhibits a remarkable ad- Description in appropriate lan- vance in analytical psychology. guage. 2. Enumeration of all The mind rises from tion, he component elements in the first to Opinion, then to Cogni- compound. In neither of these tion .. .. .. .. « ων 0. 164} meanings will the definition of — Plato did not recognise Verifica- Cognitionhold .. .. .. .. #&.
Ε-
CONTENTS OF VOLUME ΠῚ.
Exhottation Ὧ useless against this
lon chosen, being fabo ‘worst, mode. ot evil. "Oroas-ex- to that ΝΞ amination, the shock of the Method of logical Definition and | Elonchus,’ must be brought to ‘Division. bear upon it, ‘This is the sove- Sokrates tries relgn puriter αν ne ty this method, ‘The application of t subject, To: the work of the Sophist, looked deduction at on its best side. But looked Superior classes δὲ as he really is, he i division .. .. who teaches pupils to ite Such a 2 logical about every thing—who tio was at that time both novel | off falsehood for truth... 198 and instructive. . Doubt started by the Eleate. How nuals then oe can it be: ible either to think Pio dearibo the Sophitafand- "| orto peak fale? "7. 190 logous to an angler. He traces | He purtues. the investization Re Boptist by descending tab. ‘this problem by a series of ques- Alvision from’ the acquisitive i ὡς genusofart .... 0 Λε 19] ‘Tike Bophist traced ἄστη from the ‘mame, by a second and different subdivision ss τι ὩΣ . Also, by 5, sus ss 1, 12198] make ont ἃ rational theory, ex- ‘The ‘Sophist is traced down, from plaining Non-Ens Mae the genus of separating or dis: | The Eleato tums from Non-Ens to rinlaang at τὰ 10% ‘ana ἢ τ ἜΡΟΝ, of Yexicns Philo- logical Cinasifcaiion, 1ow Sophers about Ensse est. ἰδ, alger items deserve "as tauch | Diffiaities about ἘΠΕ are as great attention as grand ones. Con- asthoseabout Non-Ens .. .. 201 flict between emotional and sci- Whether Ens is Many or One? If entife lassifcation.. -. τὶ 105 | Many, how Many? Difsculties
CONTENTS OF VOLUME IIL.
PAGE about One and the Whole. The- orists about Ens cannot solve Theories of those who do not re- cognise a definite number of Entia or elements. Two classes thereof .. .. .. .. «- oe 1. The Materialist Philosophers.
2 The Friends of Forms or ealista, who recognise su Cree oe ee not the Materislists
en Θ —Justice must be som since it may be either resent or absen sensible dif- ference— at Justice is not a
incorporeal. equivalent to potentiality .. .. 204 Argument against the Idealiste— Fonte dad sy Cat me old Θ and say we ho communion with the former through our minds, with the latter through our bodies and
senses ee ee ee ee ee ee ee Ho communion—What? Im- plies Belatieity Ens is known y the mind It therefore suf- incl ἃ ‘oth th 2 heageable udes e un and the er Motion and are both of them Entia or realities. Both in Ens. Ens is a tertium qu distinct from both. But how can be distinct from both? .. .. .- 12 22 we ne Here the Eleate breaks off with- out solution. He declares his purpose to show, That Ens is as all of puzzle as Non-Ens ..
ib.
ἐδ.
munion with each other .. .. No intercommunion between any distinct forms. Refuted. Com- mon speech is inconsistent with Reciprocal intercommunion of all Forms—inadmissible .. .. .. Some Forms admit of intercom- muni only admissib logy of letters and syllables Art and skill are reyuired to dis- tinguish what Forms admit of in- tercoLimunion, and what Forms
Ῥ do not. This is the special in- telligence of the P who lives in the bright region of Ens: the Sophist lives in the darkness of Non-Ens .. .. .. 8308 He comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for examination five principal Forms—Motion— Rest—Ens—Same—Different .. Form of Diversum pervades all the Others... .. 2. 22 oe ce oe Motion is different from Diversum, or is not'Diversum. Motion is dif- ferent from Ens—in other words, it is Non-Ens. Each of these Ens and Non-Ens 210
42.
Forms is
203 | By Non-Ens, we do not mean any-
thing con to Ens—we mean only something different from Ens. Non-Ens is a real Form, aswellasEns .. ... .. .. .. The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to have shown both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also whatitis .. .. 211 The theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which justifies predication as a legitimate pro- cess, with a predicate different from the subject .. .. .. .. Engu whether the Form of on- can come into inter- communion with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Ju { 218 Analysis of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have a noun and a yerb—it mast be Proposi- on 0 Something. ΤΟ sitions, involve the Form of Non-
Ens, in tion to the i minsect J os ὦ. εἰ Fan τς on, Judgmen cy,
Dre akin to Proposition, and may be also false, by coming into rtnership with the Form Non- MBE 6g ee te te ee It thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is theoretically possible, and that there may be Sofie eat i nclag p a Logical distribution of Imitators— those who imitate what they know, or what they do not know—of these last, some sin- cerely believe themselves to know, others are conscious that they ode _not know, and de- a5 y impose upon others .. Last c class divided—Those who im- pose on numerous auditors by ong discourse, the Rhetor— Those who impose on select
ib.
ἐδ.
xiv
PAGE
auditors, by short question and answer, making the respondent contradict himself —the So- hist ee ee ee ed oe ee ae Dialogue closed. Remarks npon it. Characteristics ascribed to a hes charac teristics may have 0 oo other persons, bu προ in an
The conditions enumerated in the
other known person .. .. .. The art which Plato calis ‘the thoroughbred and noble Sophis- tical belongs to Sokrates and to no one else. The Elen- chus was to him. Prota-
oras and Prodikus were not
Sophiste in this sense .. .. Universal knowledge—was _pro- fessed at that time by all Philo- sophers—Plato, Aristotle, &. .. Inconsistency of Plato’s argument in the Sophistés. the So is a disputatious
tains false propositions to
be im ble .. .. «2 oe ee Reaso of Plato about Non-fns ane predications except iden-
the copula in predication .. .. No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No ana- lysis or classification of propo- sitions before the wor of
Aristotle .. .. 2. 6. ce ὦ. Plato’s declared purpose in the Sophistés—To confute the vari-
ous schools of thinkers—An- tisthenes, Parmenides, the Ma- terialists, &c.
Plato's refutation throws light
P 2 n the doctrine of Antisthenes ἐδ. 8 ἃ en i 6 Me rgum agains 1 ot
te ee ee ‘ ee ee Reply open to the Materialists .. Plato's argument against the Ideal- ists or Friends of Forms. Their point of view against him .. .. Plato argues—That to know, and be known, is action and passion, pe mode of relativity pared “with ato’s reasoning—com rite points of τον of both bo an 6 argument o goes to an entire denial of the Absolute,
215
216
CONTENTS OF VOLUME III.
PAGE and a full establishment of the Relative . 227
Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the Theetetus .. .. .. ..
The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were entirely tinchangeable and eternal. Plato
here denies this, and maintains
id - sblo, partly unchangeable -- "-
"| Plato’s reasoning against the Ma- except the taking of a fee) fit Babeatee better than any 211
Difference between Concrete and Abstract, Πάδον mac e con- cuous, mean ere given by Plato to Ens—com re- ending not only objects of
ception, but objects of Concep- eager oe ἊΝ . 229
Narrower meaning riven by Ma- terialists to Ens-they ineluded only Objects of Perception. Their reasoning as opposed to
Different definitions of Ens—by
Flato—the Materialists, the [de- Plato's views about Non-Ens exa- His review of the select Five
nothing more than different from
oe se ee oe oe ce 221] Communion of Non-Ens with pro- Misconception of the function of wo
position — possible and expli- ca
Imperfect analysis of a proposition not reco
—Plato does not gnise the redicate .. .. .. .. «+ ὦ. Plato’s explanation of Non-Ens is not satisfactory—Objections to it
Plato’s view of the negative is erroneous. Logical maxim of contradiction ..
Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato— ow do we know that one is true, the other false? .. .. .. Necessity of accepting the evi- dence of sense
. i.| Errors of Antisthenes—depended
partly on the imperfect formal ogicofthatday .. .. .. .. Doctrine of the Sophistés—contra-
ἐδ.
231
ἐδ.
Forms oe ee we ee ee we 938 220 | Plato's doctrine—That Non-Ens is
ib.
236
240
241
dicts that of other Platonic dia- 219
logues cece ee we wee The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms are those who held the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in Pheedon, Republic, &., .. .
. 246
CONTENTS OF VOLUME IIL
PaG The Sophistés recedes from the
Platonic point of of view, and ap- proaches telian . Aristotle assumes her that there are some pro true, others false Plato in the Sophistés has πρᾶος. taken an impossible task—He could not have Proved, ‘inst posed versary, there ane false propositions . What must be assumed in all dia- lectic discussion? . ee Discussion and theorising " pre- suppose belief and disbelief, ex- ressed in set forms of words.
They imply ly predication, which
Precepts and examples of logical
roof, tions
xv
PAGE partition, illustrated in the So-
p 258 247 | Recommendation of ‘logical bipar-
. 40.
262
tition
Precepts ‘illustrated by the Philé- ;
Importance of founding logical tion on resemblances per- ceived by sense__.. Province af sensible perception— is not so much narrowed by Plato here as it is in the Theetétus . Comparison of the Sophistés with the Pheedrus Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenidés Variety of method in dialectic re- search—Diversity of Plato .
CHAPTER XXX.
POLITIKUS.
The Politikus by iteelf, a from the Sophistés ve part .
Objects measured against
other. Objects compared with a common standard. each Art,
the purpose to be attained is the standard
Pu in the Sophistés and Poli- is—To attain dialectic apti- tude. This is the standard of comparison whereby to judge the means employed are suitable
Plato’s defence ‘of the Politikus t critics. Necessity that e critic shall declare explicitly what his standard of comparison
Comparison of Politikus with Pro- tagoras, Pheedon, Philébus, &. Definition of the statesman, or Go- vernor. Sokratic point of departure. Pro-
cedure 0
le—not so an Distinction of causes. Oe rincipal
and Causes Auxili The Kin is the onl Princi Conse, bu his a es pretend to be rinci
pal also to doos not admit the received classification of government. It does not touch the point upon which all true distinction ought
P
ἐδ.
. 362
to be founded—Scientific or Un- scientific
Unscientific governments are coun- terfoite. overnment by any numerous body must be counter- feit. Government by the one scientific man is the true govern-
ent
Fixed laws, limiting ‘the scientific Governor, are mischievous, as they would be for the physician and the steersman. Absurdity of determining medical practice by laws, and presuming every one to know it...
Government by fixed laws is better than lawless government by un- scientific men, but worse than lawless overnment by δι scientific men. It is a second
ib. | Comparison of aneclontie govern-
ments. The one despot is the worse. Democracy is the least
257 . 268 . 269
bad, because it is least of a government ἊΝ 270 The true governor distinguished
from the General, the
hetor, ἂς.
They are all properly his subordinates and auxiliaries . What the scientific Governor will do. He will aim at the forma- tion of virtuous citizens. He will weave together the ener- getic virtues with the gentle virtues. Natural dissidence be- tweenthem . 1 If a man sins by excess of the en-
. 271
ΟΟΝΤΕΝΤΒ OF VOLUME IIL
popbon, ‘The ‘aan of spocals; | Comparison of the Politikus with
‘The in the Politikus is the structive, science or art,’ com- contradiction ἐδ that theory mon to bot: applied ἴα the ‘which is assigned to Protagoras former to social in the Prot wee ae oe 474 sein the alter to tue formation 5 Points of the Protagoresn, theory name... = common sentiment 275 | Courage and Counter'Thoory in tho Pollikus, "| ‘sumed in the Pollukus” No ‘The of the Eleate in notice taken of the doubis and the Pofitikus go much farther difficulties raised in Lachés and The Hleata complains that indat | Purpose, of tho. ditnealuics in το ,ad- 8 Dialogues of Search—To verse allowed, The stimulate the intellect of the dissenter is either ‘hearer, His exposition does not ‘to silence or punished +] glvesolutions ww... es 286 CHAPTER XXXL Kparvivs.
Persons and subjects of the dia- Counter-Theory, which Sokrates logue’ jlus—Sokrates bas no hare seta forth and im
, different
CONTENTS OF VOLUME IIL
PAGE we different men and different
Protagoras did not ‘affirm, ‘that Belief depended upon the will or inclination of each individual but that it was relative to the circumstances of each individual mind ..
Facts of sense—some are the same to all sentient subjects, others are different to different sub- jects. Grounds of unanimity ..
Sokrates exemplifies his theory of the Absolute Name or the Name- Form. He attempts to show the inherent rectitude of man y ox: isting names. etymologi transitions.. ..
These transitions appear violent to
modern reader. They did not appear 20 80 to ines of Plato this century. Modern dis- covery, that they are intended as caricatures to deride the Sophists
Dissent from this theory — No
proof that the Sophiste ¢ ever Ὁ pro- ΝῊ
Plato to did mee ΤΡ ΟΝ
m ock-etymolog ogies, or “0 Pacride any one. Protagoras could not be ridiculed here. Neither Her- mogenes nor Kratylus under- stand the etymologies as carica-
Plato intended his theory as seri- ous, but his exemplifications as admissable guesses. He does not cite parti cases as proofs of a theory, but only as illustrating what h
Sokrates announces himself as Searcher. Other etymologists of ancient times admitted ety- mologies as rash as those of
Continuance of the dialogue—So- krates endeavours to explain how it is that the Names ori
right have become so and spoiled... ας ite tar er eir essen- tial rties, each must be
each Essentint significant aptitude con- sists in resemblance Sokrates assumes that the Name-
με the Hon eitean theory..
But the Name-Giver may be mis- taken or incompetent—the recti- tude of the name depends upon his knowledge ..
-. 808
ver was a believer .
Changes and transpositions intro-
295 duced in the name —hard to follow . Sokrates qualifies and attenuates
his original th Conversation of Sokrates with Kra- tylus; who upholds that original t esis without an qualification Sokrates goes still farther towards retracting it .. There are names better and worse
. 297
298
the theory of Horatloitaa some
are opposed to It is not true to say, That Thin
can an only be known through ὑμῖν
Unchangeable Platonic Forms — opposed t to the Herakleitean flux, ch is true only respecting senaible particulars Herakleitean theory must not be assumed as certain. We must not put implicit faith in names .. Remarks upon the dialogue. Dis- sent from the opinion of Stall- baum and others, that it is in- m6 tended to deride Protagoras and other Sophists - . | otter d down by Sokrates ἃ priori, in the first part— Great dimienity, and ingenuit sary, to bring it into facts . Opposite tendencies of Sokrates in last half of the dialogue—he disconnects his theory of Nam- $10 ing κο from the Herakleitean doc-
Ideal of the best system of naming —the Name-Giver ought to be familiar with the Platonic Ideas or Essences, and apportion his names according to resemblances amongthem .
Comparison of Plato's views about naming. with those upon social institutions. Artistic, system- atic construction — contrasted with unpremeditated unsyate- matic growth .. -
Politikus oc compared with Kratylus
. 3814] Ideal of Plato—Postulate of the One Wise Man—Badness of all
Conners of Kratylas, Thes. mparison Ὁ us, 68- tétus, and Kratylas, in treat-
302
nony
812
. 818
. 315
Xvil
PAGE
315 816
tb. . 317
. $18
. 319
321
ib.
. 822
. 824
825
398
829
XViii
PAGE ment of the question res Non-Ens, and the possibility o false propositions ..
Discrepancies and inconsistencies of Plato, in his manner of hand-
CONTENTS OF VOLUME III.
PAGE Hing the same subject .. .. .. 332
No common didactic purpose per- vading the Dialogues—each distinct compos sition, working out
its own pec argument -- &.
CHAPTER XXXII. PHILEBUS.
Character, Fersonages, and Subject of the Philéb
Protest against ‘the Sokratic Elen. chus, and the purely negative
p
Enquiry— What mental condition will ensure to all men a happy life? Good and Happiness—cor- relative and co-extensive. Philé- bus declares for Pleasure, So- krates for Intelligence
Good—object of universal choice and attachment by men, animals, and plants—all-sufficient—satis- fies all desires .
Pleasures are unlike to each other, and even opposite cognitions are so likewise... ..
Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, cor- responds to this description? Appeal to individual choice ..
Firat Question. submitted to Pro- tarchus—Intense Pleasure, with-
ence—He de-
clines to accept it .
Question Whether he will accepta lifeo ence pu without any pleasure or pain? Answer—No
It is agreed on both sides, That the d must be a Tertium Quid. But Sokrates undertakes to show, That Intelligence is more cognate with it than Plea- sure...
Difficulties about Unum et Multa.
One be Many?
e
greatest
. about Generic Unity—how it is distributed among species and individuals.
Active disputes upon ‘this ‘question atthetime ..
Order of Nature—Coalescence of the Finite with the Infinite. The One—The Finite Many — The Infinite Many .
Mistake commonly made—To look only for the One, and the Infi- nite Many, without looking for the intermediate subdivisions .. 841
837
$34 | Plato’s
himself 885 | It is nevertheless instructive
Illustration from Speech and Music 342 lanation does not touch culties which he had
recognised as existing ἰὰ 843
the
᾿ classifica
tion 844 At that time. little ‘thought had been bestowed upon classification asa logical process . ib ification — unconscious and
conscious
Plato's doctrine about classification is not necessarily connected with his Theory of Ideas...
Quadruple distribution of Exist- ences. 1 The Infinite. 2 The Finient. 8. Product of the two former. 4. Combining Cause or
Agency 846 Pleasure and Pain belong to the first of these four Classes—Cuy- nition or Intelligence belongs to
the fourth .. 847
Mood, combination, ential, to
ο ence Wi ea-
sure, Intelligence is the more
eu of the two constitu-
to logical division and
845
4,
“must be ex-
Pleasure and Pain plained together — Pain es rom the disturbance of the
ental harmony of the selon Pleasure from the res- toration of ὃ... .. ee
Pleasure presupposes Pain
Derivative pleasures of memory
and expectation belonging to
mind alone. Here you may find leasure without pain... e af Intelligence alone, with-
_ out pain and without pleasure, is conceivable. Some may pre- fer it: at any rate it is second-
Desire belongs to the mind, pre- supposes both a bodil want, and the memory of satisfaction pre-
Ali
CONTENTS OF VOLUME III.
viously had for it.
and body are here opposed.
true or pure pleasure therein . Can pleasures be true or false?
No
PA The mind
- 850
Sokrates maintains that they are $51
ven by Sokrates. "Plea- sures Reasons given by to true opinions,
are true pleasures. The just man
is favoured by the Gods, and will have true visions sent to him
Protarchus disputes this — He thinks that there are some plea- sures bad, but none false—So- krates does not admit this, but reserves the question ..
No means of truly estimating ples- sures and pains—False habitual — These are the false
pleasures
Much of what is called ‘pleasure is false. Gentle and gradual changes do not force themselves upon our notice either ag plea- sure or pain. Absence of pain not the same as pleasure
Olen phen, reat pleasure a! no
reality, ba but a mete juggle. There is no reality except pain, and the relief from pain
Sokrates agrees with them in part, but not wholly... .
Theory of the p easure-haters—We must learn what pleasure is by looking at the intense pleasures —These are connected with dis-
more pleasure, ὁ on the whole, enjoyed ina state of health ..
Sokrates acknowledges some plea- sures to be true. Pleasures of beautiful colours, odours sounds, smells, &c. Pleasures of acquir- ing knowledge
. ib Pure and moderate pleasures admit 957
of measure and proportion.. Pleasure is generation, not sub- stance or essence: it cannot therefore be an End, because all generation is only’ @ means substance — Pleasure therefore cannot be the Good . Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good Distinction and classification of the varieties of Knowledge or Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than others, ac- cording as they admit more or
852
we 358 re-hatin g phil-
. 854
ἐδ.
less of measuring andcomputation i.
fold: As studied by the philo-
sopher and teacher :
by the artisan . ectic is the truest and purest
of all Cognitions. Analogy be-
tween Cognition and Pleasure : in each, there are gradations of truth and purity oe
Difference with Gorgias, who claims superiority for Rhetoric. Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is
perior in usefulness and cele-
bn bat he claims superiority
r Dialectic, as satisfying the lover of truth .
Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal manifesta- tions of the Kosmos. They neg- lect the unc eable essences, respecting ΥΥ which alone _ pure truth can be obtained..
Application. Neither er Inte nor Pleasure se tely. the
, buta ure of the two -- Intelligence being the most importan How are they to be mixed
We mast include all Cognitions —not merely the truest, but the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both .. ..
But we must include no pleasures caer the true, pure, and neces-
The others are not com- patible with Cognition or Intel- y the intense sexual pleasures ..
What causes the excellence of this mixture? | It is try To" pre
ortion, Symme Ὁ these
Reason is more akin than Plea-
D
xix GE PAGE Arithmetic and Geometry are two-
As applied 859
. 361
$68 Quintup le gradation ‘in the Con-
stituents of the Good. Pa M
sure. ymmetry ligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right Opinions. 6. True and Pure Pleasures.
Remarks. Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of an Idea, but a ‘quasi-unity of analogy
Discussions of the time about Bo- num. Extreme absolute view, maintained by Eukleides: ex- treme relative by the Xeno- phontic Sokrates. Plato here
lends the two in part; an Ec- lectic doctrine .
Inconvenience of his method, blend- ing Ontology with Ethics ..
Comparison of Man to the Kos-
PAGE mos (which has reason, but no emotion) is unnecessary and confusing .. .. .. .. ων ον
Plato borrows from the Pytha- oreans, but enlarges their doc- rine. importance of his views
in dwelling upon systematic clas- Sification .. 0 .. 1. 00 wee
Classification broadly enunciated,
and strongly recommended — yet feebly applied—in this dia- e :
Οβὰθ .. 6. we te oe ete What is the Good? Discussed . both in Philébus and in Re- public. Comparison .. .. .. 870 Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it were known while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself wavers about it; gives different expla- nations, and sometimes professes
867
ignorance, sometimes about it confidently .. .. .. .. .. @® Plato lays down tests by which
Bonum may be determined : but the answer in the Philébus does not satisfy those tests .. .. .. Inconsistency of. Plato in his way of putting the question — The alternative which he tenders has no fair application we ce oe 872 Intelligence and Pleasure cannot be fairly compared—Pleasure is an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be compared with Pleasure, except some other End 878 The Hedonists, while they laid down attainment of pleasure and diminution of pain, postulated Intelligence as the governing agency oe ee oe we we 0, 874 Pleasures of Intelligence may be comp , and are com by Plato, with other Pleasures, an declared to be ὁ more value. is is arguing upon the He- donistic basis .. .. .. .. .. 875 Marked antithesisin the Philébus between pleasure and avoidance of pain a ree The Hedonists did not recognise this distinction—They included both in their acknowledged End bd.
877
CONTENTS OF VOLUME IIL
PAGE Argaments of Plato against the intense pleasures — The He- donists enforced the same rea- sonable view ce ee νερὸ ὦν Different points of view worked out by. ante in different dia-
ogues — Gorgias, Philébus—Trus and False Tea. gsureS .. .. .. we ce ee ὦν Opposition between the Gorgias and Philébus, about Gorgias and
e
878
810
TIC .. 1. «2 «e «2 «- 880 'Peculiarity of the Philébus—Plato
applies the same inciple of claseification—true and false— itions and Pleasures
to ee , |-Distincfion of true and false—-not
applicable to pleasures .... ἐδ. Plato acknowledges no truth and reality except in the Absolute— Pleasures which he admits to be true—and why.. .. .. .. .. Pilato could not have defended this small list of Pleasures, upon his own admission, i op- ponents—the Pleasure-haters, who disallowed pleasures alto- er ee e¢ ee ee . ee eo ee Soxrates in this dialogue differs little from these Pleasure- hHaters.. .. .. 0 2. 22 ee ae Forced conjunction of Hosmology and Ethics—defect of the Philé- Directive sovereignty of Measure i and applied in the Protagoras oe ne oe we How explained in Philébus—no statement to what items it is applied .. .. .. .. .. .. 898 Classification of true and false— how Plato applies it to Cogni- OMS .. .. oe ee ee ewe Valuable principles of this classifi- cation — difference with other Close of the Philébus—Graduated elements of te ee ee Contrast between the Philébns and the Phedrus, and Symposion, in respect to Pulchrum, and intense Emotions generally
887
391
2
3
ee oe ee
CHAPTER XXXIII. MENEXENUS.
Persons and situation of the dia- logue .. 6. 2. 62 oe ee ον Funeral harangue at Athens— Choice of a public orator—So-
krates declares the task of the public orator to be easy—Comic exaggeration of the effects of the harangue .. .. .. .. .. .. 401
CONTENTS OF VOLUME IIL
Sokrates professes to have learnt a uneral harangue from Aspasia, and to be competent to recite it himself. Menexenus entreata himtodoso .. . Harangue recited by Sokrates. Compliments of Menexenus after
Sokrates has finished, both to the
supposed seriou abot sheet ti u —sho 6 pac of Antalkidas
Custom of Athens about funeral
harangue ‘conforms to te δα μὴ τ] type—Topics on which he insists P solation and exhortation to surviving relatives .-
χχὶ
PAGE TAGE Admiration felt for this harangue,
both at the time and afterwards 407 Probable motives of Plato in com-
po sing it, shortly after he estab- . 402 ished himself at Athens as a 403| teacher—His competition with
Lysias—Desire for celebrity both as rhetor and asdialectician .. wb. | Menexenus compared with the view of rhetoric presented in wb. the Gorgias—Necessity for an orator to conform to established sentiments Colloquial portion of the Mene- xenus is probably intended as ridicule and sneer at Rhetorio— The harangue itself is serious, and intended as an evidence of Plato's ability .
404 ; 410 . 411
405 | Anachronism of the ‘Menexenus—
| Plato careless on this point
CHAPTER XXXIV.
KLEITOPHON.
Persons and circumstances of Klei- Ρ tophon__..
Conversation of Sokrates ‘with * Kleitophon alone: he alludes to observations of an unfavour- able character recently made by Kleito hon, who asks permission to exp
Explanation riven. Kleitophon ex-
gratitude and admiration
tor or the ber nefit which he has de
ved from long companionship with Sokrates ...
The observations made by: Sokrates have been most salutary and stimulating in awakening ardour
for virtue. ments and ana- logies couimor y used by Sokrates ἰδ. But Sokrates does not explain what
virtue is, nor how it is to be attained. Kleitophon has had enough of stimulus, and now wants information how he is to
Questions addressed _ by Kleito- phon with this view, both to the companions of Sokrates and to Sokrates
himself Replies made by the frtonets of So- ;
krates unsa
None of them could expiain’ what the special: work of justice ¢ or virtue was.. .. .
sepia hon. at length asked the estion from Sokrates himself. Sokrates did not answer clearly, Kleitophon _ believes that Sokrates knows, but will not tell 417 Kleitophon i is on the point of leav- ing Sokrates and going to Thra- symachus. But before leaving he addresses one last entreaty, that Sokrates will speak out clearly and explicitly .... 414 | Remarks on the Kleitophon. Why Thrasyllus placed it in the eighth Tetralo immediately before the Republic, and along with Kritias, the other frag- ment .. . 419 Kleitophon is genuine, “and per- fectly in harmony with a just theory of Plato 420 It could not have been published until after Plato's death... Reasons w hy the Kleitophon wis never finis It points out the defects of Sokrates, just as he himself confesses them in the Apology The same defects also confessed in many of the Platonic and Xeno- phontic dialogues ..... Forcible, ct respectful, manner in which these defects are set forth
418
415
416
ΧΧῚΪ CONTENTS OF VOLUME III:
PAGE PAGE in the Kleitophon. Impossible Sokratesand Plato .. .. .. 4% to answer them.in such ἃ way as The Kleitophon was originally to hold out against the negative tended as a first book of the Elenchus of a Sokratic pupil 423 Republic, but was found too The Kleitophon represents a point d to answer. Reasons why of view which many objectors the existing first book \ was 5 aub- must have insisted on against ι stituted oo ee .. ὦ
CHAPTER XXVI.
PLATO.
CHAPTER XXVL PH ZDRUS—SYMPOSION.
I rut together these two dialogues, as distinguished by a marked peculiarity. They are the two erotic dialogues of 0.5 two Plato. They have one great and interesting subject are the two common to both: though in the Phedrus, this subject foouee of is blended with, and made contributory to, another. Flato. Ehm- They agree also in the circumstance, that Phzedrus is, originator in both, the person who originates the conversation. °f 2° But they differ materially in the manner of handling, in the comparisons and illustrations, and in the apparent purpose.
The subject common to both is, Love or Eros in its largest sense, and with its manifold varieties. Under the totally different vein of sentiment which prevails in ceived bY modern times, and which recognises passionate love {ferent senti- as prevailing only between persons of different sex— ment prova- it is difficult for us to enter into Plato’s eloquent lenic an. exposition of the feeling as he conceives it. In the jiaulty and Hellenic point of view,! upon which Plato builds, the times: ΓΠΡ attachment of man to woman was regarded as a of women
natural impulse, and as a domestic, social, sentiment ; * Gree?
1 Schleiermacher(Einleit.zamSymp, ‘Epwrixds, Diogenes Laert. νυ. 22-24.
. 367) desctibes this view of Eros as See Bernays, Die Dialoge des Ari- ellenic, and as ‘‘gerade den anti- stoteles, p. 133, Berlin, 1863.
modernen und anti-christlichen Pol Compare the dialogue called Ἔρω-
der Platonischen Denkungsart”. Ari- τικός, among the works of Plutarch, p.
stotle composed Θέσεις "Epwrixai or 750 seq., where some of the speakers,
3—1
3 PHADRUS—SYMPOSION. Cuar. XXVL
yet as belonging to ἃ common-place rather than to an exalted mind, and seldom or never rising to that pitch of enthusiasm which overpowers all other emotions, absorbs the whole man, and aims either at the joint performance of great exploits or the joint prosecution of intellectual improvement by continued colloquy. We must remember that the wives and daughters of citizens were seldom seen abroad: that the wife was married very young : that she had learnt nothing except spinning and weaving : that the fact of her having seen as little and heard as little as possible, was considered as rendering her more acceptable to her husband :1 that her sphere of duty and exertion was
i ‘3 ξ 4 i PE
ἣ! καὶ εἰσι Siete ΕΣ τοῖς ἀρέσαι: τοῖς
ἐπ
δε i i
ie 4 ᾿ oe ᾿
ΠΝ ᾿
Ἐξ i
Ἢ oH i τῇ Re’
Ἷ τῇ τ ᾿ a
IL Ἱ i
th
Ἢ Ἢ TH
ut " ety ΠΕ ἐπ
sccording fo the above passage citod
comparing. from Demosthenes. In this point,
and on one side with the Athe- Plato differs from Xenophon, who, nians and Spartans on the other— in his CEconomicus, enlarges’ much
might wish to find proved. affectionate side of it, in the story of
theses a Noora Grhich sfalkot Ὁ δες the Coeonomleus οὐ Renopton, See the Cconomicus of
elortatfon about Athsolass manners), cap. iid 12, vit 6. enor!
CuaP. ΧΧΥΙ. EROTIC SENTIMENT IN GREECE. 3
confined to the interior of the family. The beauty of women yielded satisfaction to the senses, but little beyond. It was the masculine beauty of youth that fired the Hellenic imagination with glowing and impassioned sentiment. The finest youths, and those too of the best families and education, were seen habitually uncovered in the Palestra and at the public festival- matches ; engaged in active contention and graceful exercise, under the direction of professional trainers. The sight of the living form, in such perfection, movement, and variety, awakened a powerful emotional sympathy, blended with esthetic senti- ment, which in the more susceptible natures was exalted into intense and passionate devotion. The terms in which this feeling is described, both by Plato and Xenophon, are among the strongest which the language affords—and are predicated even of ‘Sokrates himself. Far from being ashamed of the feeling, they consider it admirable and beneficial ; though very liable to abuse, which they emphatically denounce and forbid! In their
ints), but had incurred great censure
1The beginning of the Platonic fi rom contemporaries of Maximus him-
Charmidés illustrates what is here
said, pp. 164-155; also that of the Protagoras and Lysis, pp. 205-206.
Xenophon, Sympos. 1. 811; iv. 11, 15. Memorab. f. 8, 8-14 (what Sokrates observes to Xenophon about Krito- bulus). D us (com on of Aristotle) disapproved the important _ influence which Plato assigned to Eros (Cicero, Tusc. Ὁ. iv. 84-71).
If we to the second century after the Christian Era, we find some speakers: in Athenzus blaming se- verely the amorous sentiments of So- krates and the narrative of Alkibiades, as recited in the Platonic Symposium (v. 180-187; xi. 506-508 Athenzus remarks farther, that Plato, writing in this strain, had little right to com-
lain (as we read in the Kepublic) of
9 licentious compositions of Homer and other poets, and to exclude them from his model city. Maximus Tyrius, in one of his four discourses (28-5) on the ἐρωτικὴ of Sokrates, makes the game remark as Athenzus about the inconsistency of Plato in banishing Homer from the model city, and com- posing what we read in the Sym- posion; he‘ farther observes that the erotic dispositions of Sokrates pro- voked no censure from his numerous enemies at the time (though they assailed him upon so many other
self, to os en replies—rovs νυνὶ κατηγόρους » 6-7). e comparisons which he institutes (23, 9) between the sentiments and phrases of Sokrates, and those of Sappho and Anakreon, are very curious.
Dionysius of Halikarnassus speak of the ἐγκώμια on Eros in the Sym- posion, as ‘‘unworthy of serious hand- ing or of Sokrates”. (De Admir. Vi Dic. Demosth. p. 1027.)
But the most bitter among all the critics of Plato, is Herakleitus—author of the Allegoris Homerice. Hera- kleitus repels,as unjust and calumnious, the sentence of banishment pronounced by Plato against Homer, from whom all mental cultivation had been derived. He affirms, and tries to show, that the poems of Homer—which he admits to be full of immorality if literally understood—had an allegorical mean- ing. He blames Plato for not having perceived this; and denounces him still more severely for the character of his own writings—éppi¢@w δὲ καὶ TIAd- των ὃ κόλαξ, μήρον σνυκοφάντης--ο Tovs δὲ Πλάτωνος διαλόγους, ἄνω καὶ κάτω παιδικοὶ καθυβρίζουσιν ἔρωτες, οὐδαμοῦ δε οὐχὶ τῆς αῤρένος ἐπιθυμίας μεστός ἐστιν ὁ ανήρ (HerakL Hom., c. 4-74, ed. Mehler, Leiden, 1851).
4 PHZDRUS-—SYMPOSION. Crap. XXVYJ.
view, it was an idealising passion, which tended to raise a man above the vulgar and selfish pursuits of life, and even above the fear of death. The devoted attachments which it inspired were dreaded by the despots, who forbade the assemblage of youths for exercise in the paleestra.}
Especially to Plato, who combined erotic and poetical imagina- tion with Sokratic dialectics and generalising theory
dered ge the —this passion presented itself in the light ofa stimulus sim introductory to the work of philosophy—an impulse fosopbical at first impetuous and undistinguishing, but after- communion. wards regulated towards improving communion and Beauty’ the colloquy with an improvable youth. Personal beauty St approxi (this 183 the remarkable doctrine of Plato in the Phe- mation be- drus) is the main point of visible resemblance between tween the the world of sense and the world of Ideas: the Idea Sense and οὗ Beauty has a brilliant representative of itself among e world of ς . Ideas. Gra- concrete objects—the Ideas of Justice and Temperance dual gene. have none. The contemplation of a beautiful youth, the senti- and the vehement emotion accompanying it, was the
only way of reviving in the soul the Idea of Beauty which it had seen in its antecedent stage of existence. ‘This was the first stage through which every philosopher must pass ; but the emotion of love thus raised, became gradually in the better minds both expanded and purified. The lover did not merely admire the person, but also contracted the strongest sympathy with the feelings and character, of the beloved youth : delighting to recognise and promote in him all manifestations of mental beauty which were in harmony with the physical, so as to raise him to the greatest attainable perfection of human nature. The original sentiment of admiration, having been thus first trans- ferred by association from beauty in the person to beauty in the mind and character, became gradually still farther generalised ; so that beauty was perceived not as exclusively specialised in any one individual, but as invested in all beautiful objects, bodies as. well as minds. The view would presently be farther enlarged.
ceiton which illustrate feeling, are recounted by Thucydides, vi. 54-57.
CHaPp. XXVI. SENTIMENT TOWARDS YOUTHFUL BEAUTY. 5
The like sentiment would be inspired, so as to worship beauty in public institutions, in administrative arrangements, in arts and sciences. And the mind would at last be exalted to the con- templation of that which pervades and gives common character to all these particulars—Beauty in the abstract—or the Self- Beautiful—the Idea or Form of the Beautiful. To reach this highest summit, after mounting all the previous stages, and to live absorbed in the contemplation of “the great ocean of the beautiful,” was the most glorious privilege attainable by any human being. It was indeed attainable only by a few highly yifted minds. But others might make more or less approach to it: and the nearer any one approached, the greater measure would he ensure to himself of real good and happiness.!
Such is Plato’s conception of Eros or Love and its object. He represents it as one special form or variety of the universal law of gravitation pervading all mankind. Every one loves, desires, or aspires to happiness : this is the fundamental or primordial law of human nature, beyond which we cannot push enquiry. Good, or good things, are nothing else but the means to happi- ness :* accordingly, every man, loving happiness, loves good also, and desires not only full acquisition, but fa*°.°.° perpetual possession of good. In this wide sense, love riety. belongs to all human beings : every man loves good and happi- ness, with perpetual possession of them—and nothing else.® But different men have different ways of pursuing this same
Alimen love Good, as the eons of appiness, but they pursue it by various means. The name Eros is confined to one special case of this
1 Plato, Sympos. pp. 210-211.
g the Beautiful, I tran- scribe here a passage from Ficinus, in his Argument prefixed to the Hippias melts, mucin i Pat
}pulchris, chrum vocat: formam in omnibus, pulchritu- dinem ; speciem et ideam supra omnia, ipsum pulchrum. Primum sensus at- it opinioque. Secundum ratio co- gitat. Tertium mens intuetur.
* Quid ipsum Bonum? Ipsum re- rum omnium principium, actus purus, actus sequentia cuncta vivificans. Quid ipsum Pulchrum? Vivificus actus e primo fonte bonorum effluens, Mentem a Rime Vv idearum or- dine infinité decorans, Numina deinde sequentia, mentesque rationum serie complens, Animas tertio numerosis dis-
cursibus ornans, Naturas quarto semi- nibus, formis quinto materiam.”
2 Plato, Sympos. Pp. 204-205. Φέρε, ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὲ ἐρᾷ; Τενέσθαι ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, αὐτῷ. Καὶ τί ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ἂν γένηται τἀγαθά; Τοῦτ᾽ εὐπορώτερον, hy δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔχω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι εὐδαΐ- μων ἔσται. Kroger γάρ, ἔφη, ἀγαθῶν, οἱ εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες - Καὶ οὐκέτι προσ- δεῖ ἐρέσθαι͵ ἵνα τί δὲ βούλεται εὐδαίμων εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενος, ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἥ ἀπόκρισις. . . . Ταύτην δὴ τὴν βούλησιν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον, πότερα κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ πάν- τας τἀγαθὰ βούλεσθαι αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἀεΐ, i, πῶς λέγεις; Οὕτως, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων.
3 Plato, Sympos. p. 206 A. ὡς οὐδέν
ε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὗ ἐρωσιν ἄνθρωποι ἣ τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ.
6 PHZDRUS—SYMPOSION. CuaP. XXVI.
object. One man aspires to good or happiness by way of money- getting, another by way of ambition, a third by gymnastics—or music—or philosophy. Still no one of these is said to love, or to be under the influence of Eros. That name is reserved ex- clusively for one special variety of it—the impulse towards copulation, generation, and self-perpetuation, which agitates both bodies and minds throughout animal nature. Desiring perpetual possession of good, all men desire to perpetuate themselves, and to become immortal. But an individual man or animal cannot be immortal: he can only attain a quasi-immortality by gene- rating a new individual to replace himself! In fact even mortal life admits no continuity, but is only a succession of .distinct states or phenomena: one always disappearing and another always appearing, each generated by its antecedent and gene- rating its consequent. Though a man from infancy to old age is called the same, yet he never continues the same for two moments together, either in body or mind. As his blood, flesh, bones, &c., are in perpetual disappearance and renovation, always coming and going—so likewise are his sensations, thoughts, emotions, dispositions, cognitions, &c. Neither mentally nor physically does he ever continue the same during successive instants. The old man of this instant perishes and is replaced by a new man during the next.? As this is true of the individual, so it is still more true of the species : continuance or immortality is secured only by perpetual generation of new individuals.
The love of immortality thus manifests itself in living beings Desire of through the copulative and procreative impulse, which
mental 80 powerfully instigates living man in mind as well as copulation . . . andprocrea- in body. Beauty in another person exercises an
pane asthe attractive force which enables this impulse to be ablelike- gratified : ugliness on the contrary repels and stifles mortality, it. Hence springs the love of beauty—or rather, of rede of per procreation in the beautiful—whereby satisfaction is sonalbeauty obtained for this restless and impatient agitation.*® nating a With some, this erotic impulse stimulates the body,
mulus. attracting them towards women, and inducing them 1 Plato, S 207 C. πτόησις γέγονε περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ 3 Plato, Sympos. Po. 207 -208. Ans Sites a ἀπολύειν τὸν ἔχοντα. Ἐστὶ
8 Plato, Sympos. p. 206 E. ὅθεν δὴ ydp ov τοῦ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρως, ἀλλὰ--τῆς γεν- τῴ κυοῦντέ τε καὶ ἤδη σπαργῶντι πολλὴ ἢ νήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκον ἐν τῷ καλῷ.
—
Cuap. XXVI. LOVE OF IMMORTALITY. 7
to immortalise themselves by begetting children : with others, it acts far more powerfully on the mind, and determines them to conjunction with another mind for the purpose of generating appropriate mental offspring and products. In this case as well as in the preceding, the first stroke of attraction arises from the charm of physical, visible, and youthful beauty : but when, along with this beauty of person, there is found the additional charm of a susceptible, generous, intelligent mind, the effect produced by the two together is overwhelming ; the bodily sympathy be- coming spiritualised and absorbed by the mental. With the inventive and aspiring intelligences— poets like Homer and Hesiod, or legislators like Lykurgus and Solon—the erotic impulse takes this turn. They look about for some youth, at once handsome and improvable, in conversation with whom they may procreate new reasonings respecting virtue and good- ness—new excellences of disposition—and new force of intel- lectual combination, in both the communicants. The attachment between the two becomes so strong that they can hardly live apart: so anxious are both of them to foster and confirm the newly acquired mental force of which each is respectively con- scious in himself.?
Occasionally, and in a few privileged natures, this erotic im- pulse rises to a still higher exaltation, losing its separate Highest ex- and exclusive attachment to one individual person, altation of and fastening upon beauty in general, or that which all beautiful persons and beautiful minds have in {ew privi- common. The visible charm of beautiful body, when it though it was indispensable as an initial step, comes Guallytothe to be still farther sunk and undervalued, when the ove of mind has ascended to the contemplation of beauty im genere. This genere, not merely in bodies and minds, but in laws, s)corp institutions, and sciences. This is the highest pitch sentimen of philosophical love, to which a few minds only are competent, and that too by successive steps of ascent : but which, when attained, is thoroughly soul-satisfying. If any man’s vision be once sharpened so that he can see beauty pure and absolute, he will have no eyes for the individual manifestations
1 Plato, Sympos. p. 209.
8. PHZDRUS—SYMPOSION. Caap. XXVL of it in gold, fine raiment, brilliant colours, or beautiful youths.? Herein we have the climax or consummation of that erotic aspiration which first shows itself in the form of virtuous attach- ment to youth.? |
It is thus that Plato, in the Symposion, presents Love, or
erotic impulse: a passion taking its origin in the
se of the y™Mpo- physical and mental attributes common to most men, ΧΡ and concentrated at first upon some individual person Fiatonic = _but gradually becoming both more intense and Eres with more refined, as it ascends in the scale of logical different generalisation and comes into intimate view of the previously pure idea of Beauty. é The main purpose of the Sym- enunciated posion is to contrast this Platonic view of Eros or ap ‘ers; ove—which is assigned to Sokrates in the dialogue, e oon rie and is repeated by him from the communication of a on Sokrates, prophetic woman named Diotima*—with different ἣν αὐ Views assigned to other speakers. Each of the guests
Alkibiades.
at the Banquet—Phedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Sokrates—engages to deliver a panegyric on Eros : while Alkibiades, entering intoxicated after the speeches are finished, delivers a panegyric on Sokrates, in regard to energy and self-denial generally, but mainly and specially in the character of Erastes. The pure and devoted attachment of Sokrates towards Alkibiades himself—his inflexible self-com- mand under the extreme of trial and temptation—the unbounded ascendancy which he had acquired over that insolent youth, who seeks in every conceivable manner to render himself acceptable to Sokrates— are emphatically extolled, and illustrated by singular details.
1 Plato, Symposion, p. 211.
2 Plato, Symposion, P. 211 B. ὅταν δή τις ἀπὸ τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδερασ- τεῖν ἐπανιὼν ἐκεῖνο τὸ καλὸν ἄρχηται καθορᾷν, σχεδὸν ay τι ἅπτοιτο τοῦ τέλονς, ἄς. .
3 Plat. Sympos. p. 201 D. γυναικὸς μαντικῆς Διοτίμας, ἢ ταῦτά re σοφὴ ἦν καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, καὶ ᾿Αθηναίοις ποτὲ θνσαμένοις πρὸ τοῦ λοιμοῦ δέκα ἔτη ava- βολὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νόσον, ἣ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἐδίδαξεν.
Instead of γνναικὸς μαντικῆς, Which was the old reading, Stallbaum and other editors prefer to write γυναικὸς
Mayrivinys, also 211 D. I cannot but think that μαντικῆς is right. There is no pertinence or fit meaning in Μαντι- νικῆς, Whereas the word μαντικῆς is in full keeping with what is said about the special religious privileges and revela- tions of Diotima—that she procured for the Athenians an adjournment of the plague for ten years. The Delphian oracle assured the Lydian king Kroesus that Apollo had obtained from the Μοῖραι a postponement of the ruin of the Lydian kingdom for three years, but that he could obtain from them no more (Herodot. i. 91).
CHaP. ΧΧΥ͂Ι. PURPOSE OF THE SYMPOSIUM. 9
: Both Phedrus! and Pausanias, in their respective encomiums upon Eros, dwell upon that God as creating within ἃ the human bosom by his inspirations the noblest self-denial and the most devoted heroism, together Phed with the strongest incentives to virtuous behaviour. Eryxima- Pausanias however makes distinctions: recognising i and condemning various erotic manifestations as abusive, violent, sensual—and supposing for these a separate inspiring Deity—Eros Pandémus, contrasted with the good and honourable Eros Uranius? or Coelestis. In regard to the different views taken of Eros by Eryximachus, Aristophanes, and Agathon ——the first is medical, physiological, cosmical’—the second is comic and imaginative, even to exuberance—the third is poetical or dithyrambic : immediately upon which follows the analytical and philosophical exposition ascribed to Sokrates, opened in his dialectic manner by a cross-examination of his predecessor, and proceeding to enunciate the opinions communicated to him by the prophetess Diotima.
Sokrates treats most of the preceding panegyrics as pleasing fancies not founded in truth. In his representation Discourse ΠΟ {cited from Diotima) Eros is neither beautiful, nor from revela- good, nor happy ; nor is he indeed a God at all. He {ion of Dio is one of the numerous intermediate body of Demons, describes | inferior to Gods yet superior to men, and serving as interpreting agents of communication between the two.* Eros is the offspring of Poverty and Resource
a God, but an inter- (Porus).® He represents the state of aspiration and
mediate Dszemon be- tween Gods and men,
1 Sydenham conceives and Boeckh fad Plat. Legg. iii. 694) concurs with
m, that this discourse, assigned to Phzdrus, is intended by Plato as an imitation of the style of Lysias. This is sufficiently probable. The enco- mium on Eros delivered by Agathon, especially the conclading part of it (p. 197), mimics the style of florid effeminate poetry, ove ged with balanced phrases (ἰσόκωλα, ἀντίθετα), which Aristophanes parodies in Aga- thon’s name at the beginning of the Thesmophoriazu se, Athensus, v. 187
3 Plato, Sympos. pp. 180-181. 3 Respecting this view of Eros or Aphrodite, as a cosmical, all-pervading,
rocreative impulse, compare Euripides, g. Incert. 3, 6, assigned by Welcker (Griech. Trag. p. 737) to the lost drama —the first Hippolytus ; also the beau- tiful invocation with which the poem of Lucretius opens, and the fragmentary exordium remaining from the poem of Parmenides.
4 Plato, Sympos. pp. 202-203.
5 What Sokrates says here in the Symposion about Eros is altogether at variance with what Sokrates says about Eros in Phzdrus, wherein we find him speaking with the greatest reverence and awe about Eros as ἃ powerful God, son of Aphrodité (Phzdrus, pp. 242 D, 243 D, 257 A).
10 PHAZDRUS—SYMPOSION. CHap. XXVL
constantly gtriving, with ability and energy, after goodness and divinity, | beauty, but never actually possessing them: a middle taining condition, preferable to that of the person who it. . neither knows that he is deficient in them, nor cares to possess them: but inferior to the condition of him who is actually in possession. Eros is always Love of something—in relation to something yet unattained, but desired : Eros is to be distinguished carefully from the object desired.1 He is the parallel of the philosopher, who is neither ignorant nor wise: not ignorant, because genuine ignorance is unconscious of itself and fancies itself to be knowledge: not wise, because he does not possess wisdom, and is well aware that he does not possess it. He is in the intermediate stage, knowing that he does not possess wisdom, but constantly desiring it and struggling after it. Eros, like philosophy, represents this continual aspiration and advance towards a goal never attained.?
It is thus that the truly Platonic conception of Love is brought Analogy of OU materially different from that of the preceding the erotic | speakers—Love, as a state of conscious want, and of.
aspiration | aspiration or endeavour to satisfy that want, by the philo- striving after good or happiness—Philosophy as the
onshis” like intermediate state, in regard to wisdom. And Oreo nod Plato follows out this coalescence of love and philo-
thirsts for sophy in the manner which has been briefly sketched
above: a vehement impulse towards mental commu- nion with some favoured youth, in the view of producing mental improvement, good, and happiness to both persons concerned : the same impulse afterwards expanding, so as to grasp the good and beautiful in a larger sense, and ultimately to fasten on goodness and beauty in the pure Idea: which is absolute—independent of time, place, circumstances, and all variable elements—moreover the object of the one and supreme science.®
1 Plato, Symposion, Pp. 199-200. Ὁ μήτε ot ἀμαθεῖς; . . Οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων Ἔρως ἔρως ἐστὶν οὐ δενὸς ἢ τινός ; Πάνυ ἀμφοτέρων, ὧν αὖ ᾿καὶ ὁ Ἔρως. ᾿Εστὶ
ν οὖν ἔστιν. . . . Πότερον ὃ Ἔρως ὩΣ δὴ τῶν καλλίστων ἡ σοφία, Ἕρως ἐκείνον οὗ ἔστιν ἔρως, ἐπιθυμεῖ αὐτοῦ ἢ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἔρως περὶ τὸ καλόν: ὥστε οὔ; Πάνυ γε. ᾿Ανάγκη τὸ ἐπιθν- ἀναγκαῖον Ἔρωτα ἐλόσοφον εἶναι, φιλό- pour. ἐπιθυμεῖν « οὗ ἐνδεές 2 ἐστιν, ἣ μὴ ἐπι- σοφον δὲ ὄντα μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ θυμεῖ Plato, ‘Soin μὴ ἐνδεὲς if. ἀμαθοῦς.
204 A. Τίνες . οὖν οἱ Bho gebones at εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφοὶ 5 Plato, Symposion, pp. 210.211.
Cuap. XXVI. PLATONIC CONCEPTION OF LOVE. ll
I will now compare the Symposion with the Phxdrus. In the first half of the Phadrus also, Eros, and the Self- Eros as pre- Beautiful or the pure Idea of the Beautiful, are [ented in brought into close coalescence with philosophy and drus—Dis- dialectic—but they are presented in a different Lysias, and manner. Plato begins by setting forth the case against Gisco Eros in two competing discourses (one cited from Sokrates, Lysias,’ the other pronounced by Sokrates himself as & competitor with Lysias in eloquence) supposed to be is seized addressed to a youth, and intended to convince him with re- that the persuasions of a calm and intelligent friend recants ina are more worthy of being listened to than the exag- high-flown gerated promises and protestations of an impassioned on Eros. lover, from whom he will receive more injury than benefit: that the inspirations of Eros are a sort of madness, irrational and misguiding as well as capricious and transitory: while the calm and steady friend, unmoved by any passionate inspiration, will show himself worthy of permanent esteem and gratitude.? By a sudden revulsion of feeling, Sokrates becomes ashamed of having thus slandered the divine Eros, and proceeds to deliver a counter-panegyric or palinode upon that God. ὃ
Eros (he says) is, mad, irrational, superseding reason and prudence in the individual mind.* This is true: yet Panegyric still Eros exercises a beneficent and improving in- gamits that fluence. Not all madness is bad. Some varieties of the influ- it are bad, but others are good. Some arise from isa variety human malady, others from the inspirations of the τὰς distin. Gods: both of them supersede human reason and the guishes orthodoxy of established custom 5—but the former bad varie- substitute what is worse, the latter what is better. ee ness, The greatest blessings enjoyed by man arise from bothcoming madness, when it is imparted by divine inspiration. Gods. Good
1 Plato, Phzedrus, Ὁ. 230 seq. 4 Plato, Phedrus, pp. 265-266. τὸ
2 Plato, Pheedrus, Ὁ. 237 seq. ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας ἕ ἕν τι κοινῇ € εἶδος. ..
3 Eros, in the P rus, is pro- τὸ τῆς παρανοίας ws ὃν ἐν ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς nounced to be a God, son of Aphrodité εἶδος. Com p. 286 A. (p. 242 Reo in the Sym ymposion he is not 5 Plato, Phsdrus, p. 265 A. Maviag ἃ God but'a Demon, offspring of Porus δέ ye εἴδη δύο - τὴν μέν, ὑπὸ νοσημάτων and Penia, and attendant on Aphro- ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δέ, ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς dité, according to Diotima and So- τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένην. Com- krates (p. 203). pare 249 D.
12 PHZDRUS—SYMPOSION.
Cuap. XXVI.
madness is And it is so imparted in four different phases and by than so- four different Gods: Apollo infuses the prophetic riety.
madness — Dionysus, the ritual or religious — The Muses, the poetical—and Eros, the erotic.’ This last sort of madness greatly transcends the sober reason and concentration upon narrow objects which is so much praised by mankind generally.2 The inspired and exalted lover deserves every preference over the unimpassioned friend. . -
Plato then illustrates, by a highly poetical and imaginative mythe, the growth and working of love in the soul.
myths de All soul or mind is essentially self-moving, and the Sokrates, cause of motion to other things. It is therefore im- describing mortal, without beginning or end: the universal or talityand cosmic soul, as well as the individual souls of Gods preexttne and men.* Each soul may be compared to a chariot soul, and its with a winged pair of horses. In the divine soul, prenatal : ° °
condition both the horses are excellent, with perfect wings: in cobnanion- the human soul, one only of them is good, the other ship with is violent and rebellious, often disobedient to the eternal charioteer, and with feeble or half-grown wings.* The
Gods, by means of their wings, are enabled to ascend up to the summit of the celestial firmament—to place themselves upon the outer circumference or back of the heaven—and thus to be carried round along with the rotation of the celestial sphere round the Earth. In the course of this rotation they contemplate the pure essences and Ideas, truth and reality without either form or figure or colour: they enjoy the vision of the Absolute—J ustice, Temperance, Beauty, Science. The human souls, with their defec- tive wings, try to accompany the Gods ; some attaching themselves
1 Plato, Pheedrus, p. 244 A. εἰ μὲν
ws ἀρετὴν τῇ φίλῇ ψυχῇ évrexovca, γὰρ ἦν ἁπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν εἶναι, κα- &C
λῶς ἂν ἐλέγετο" νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας, θείᾳ μέντοι δόσει διδομένης.
Compare Plutarch, ᾿Ερωτικός, c. 16. pp. 758-759, ὥς.
2 Plato, Pheedrus, p. 245 B. μηδέ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος θορυβείτω Sedirrépevos ws πρὸ τοῦ κεκινημένον τὸν σώφρονα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι φίλον.
P. 256 E: ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος οἰκειότης, σωφροσύνῃ θνητῇ κεκραμένη, θνητά τε καὶ φειδωλὰ οἰκονομοῦσα, ἀνελευθερίαν ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐπανουμένην
3 Plato, Pheedrus, pp. 245-246. Com- pare Krische, De Platonis Phzdro, pp. 49-50 (Géttingen, 1848).
Plato himself calls this panegyric in the mouth of Sokrates a μνθικός τις ὕμνος (Pheedr. p. 265 D
4The reader will recollect Homer, Nliad, xvi. 152, where the chariot and horses of Patroklus are described, when he is about to attack the Trojans; the mortal horse Pedasus is harnessed to it alongside of the two immortal horses Xanthus and Balius.
CHap. ΧΧΥῚ. PRE-NATAL EXPERIENCE—REMINISCENCE. 13
to one God, some to another, in this ascent. But many of them fail in the object, being thrown back upon earth in consequence of their defective equipment, and the unruly character of one of the horses : some however succeed partially, obtaining glimpses of Truth and of the general Ideas, though in a manner transient and incomplete.
Those souls which have not seen Truth or general Ideas at all, can never be joined with the body of a man, but only with that of some inferior animal. It is essential that . some glimpse of truth should have been obtained, in order to qualify the soul for the condition of man:1 for the mind of man must possess within itself the capacity of comparing and combining particular sensations, so as to rise to one general conception brought together by reason.? This is brought about by the process of reminiscence ; whereby it recalls ὃ those pure, true, and beautiful Ideas which it had partially seen during its prior extra-corporeal exist- ence in companionship with the Gods. The rudimentary faculty of thus reviving these general Conceptions—the visions of a prior state of existence—belongs to all men, distinguishing them from other animals: but in most men the visions have been transient, and the power of reviving them is faint and dormant. It is only some few philosophers, whose minds, having been effectively winged in their primitive state for ascent to the super-celestial regions, have enjoyed such a full contemplation of the divine Ideas as to be able to recall them with facility and success, during the subsequent corporeal existence. To the reminiscence of the philosopher, these Ideas present themselves with such brilliancy and fascination, that he forgets all other pursuits and interests. Hence he is set down as a madman by the generality of mankind, whose minds have not ascended beyond particular and present phenomena to the revival of the anterior Ideas.
3 Plato, loner Ὁ. 249-250. πᾶσα
εἰς τόδε ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα. Δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρω- μὲν ἀνθρώπον ψν ὕσει τεθέαται τὰ ἔδο 7
πον ξυνιέναι κατ᾽ εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ
res οὐκ ἂν ἦλθεν εἰς τόδὲ τὸ ζῶον - ἀναμιμνγήσκεσθαι δ᾽ ἐκ τῶνδε ἐκεῖνα ov
Hor ὁ ana re Pite, Phodras, p. 49 Β. οὐ γὰρ 3 nt , wore Booea pie ἀλήθειαν
πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἕν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον. Τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἅ wor’ εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ σνμπορ-
ευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νὺν εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὃν ὄντως.
14 PHZDRUS—SYMPOBSION. CuaP. XXVI.
It is by the aspect of visible beauty, as embodied in distin- Reminis- guished youth, that this faculty of reminiscence is cenceis first kindled in minds capable of the effort. It is inthe soul only the embodiment of beauty, acting as it does τα νας ee by powerfully upon the moet intellectual of our senses,
the aspect which has sufficient force to kindle up the first act
of visible
Beauty, or stage of reminiscence in the mind, leading ulti- which is mately to the revival of the Idea of Beauty. The link be, embodiments of justice, wisdom, temperance, &c., in
world of | particular men, do not strike forcibly on the senses, . the world or approximate sufficiently to the original Idea, to of Ideas. = effect the first stroke of reminiscence in an unpre- pared mind. It is only the visible manifestation of beauty, which strikes with sufficient shock at once on the senses and the intellect, to recall in the mind an adumbration of the primitive Idea of Beauty. The shock thus received first develops the reminiscent faculty in minds apt and predisposed to it, and causes the undeveloped wings of the soul to begin growing. It is a passion of violent and absorbing character ; which may in- deed take a sensual turn, by the misconduct of the unruly horse in the team, producing in that case nothing but corruption and mischief—but which may also take a virtuous, sentimental, imaginative turn, and becomes in that case the most powerful stimulus towards mental improvement in both the two attached friends. When thus refined and spiritualised, it can find its satisfaction only in philosophical communion, in the generation of wisdom and virtue ; as well as in the complete cultivation of that reminiscent power, which vivifies in the mind remembrance of Forms or Ideas seen in a prior existence. To attain such per- fection, is given to few ; but a greater or less approximation may be made to it. And it is the only way of developing the highest powers and virtues of the mind ; which must spring, not from human prudence and sobriety, but from divine madness or erotic inspiration.
1 Plato, Pheedrus, p. 256 B. of μεῖ- of which I have given some of the Gov ἀγαθὸν οὔτε σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη leading points, occupies from c. 51 to οὔτε θεία μανία δννατὴ πορίσαι ἀνθρώπῳ. Ο. 83 (pp. 244-257) of the dialogue. It —245 B: én’ evruxé τῇ μεγίστῃ παρὰ is adapted to the Hellenic imagination, θεῶν ἡ τοιαύτη μανία δίδοται. and requires the reader to keep before
The long and highly poetical mythe, him the palestre of Athens, as de-
CHap. XXVIL $REMINISCENCE—EROS PHILOSOPHUS. 15
Such is the general tenor of the dialogue Phsedrus, in its first half: which presents to us the Platonic love, conceived as the source and mainspring of exalted virtue—as the only avenue to philosophy—as contrasted, not merely with sensual love, but also with the sobriety of the decent citizen who fully conforms to the teaching of Law and Custom. In the Symposion, the first of these contrasts appears prominently, while the second is less noticed. In the Phedrus, Sokrates declares emphatically that madness, of a certain sort, is greatly preferable to sobriety : that the temperate, respectable, orthodox citizen, is on the middle line, some madmen being worse than he, but others better: that madness springing from human distemper is worse, but that when it springs from divine inspiration, it is in an equal degree better, than sobriety: that the philosophical estrus, and the reminiscence of the eternal Ideas (considered by Plato as the only true and real Entia), is inconsistent with that which is esteemed as sobriety : and is generated only by special inocula- tion from Eros or some other God. This last contrast, as I have just observed, is little marked in the Symposion. But on the other hand, the Symposion (especially the discourse of Sokrates and his repetition of the lessons of Diotima), insists much more upon the generalisation of the erotic impulse. In the Phedrus, we still remain on the ground of fervent attachment between two individuals—an attachment sentimental and virtuous, displaying itself in an intercourse which elicits from both of them active intelligence and exalted modes of conduct: in the Symposion, such intercourse is assimilated explicitly to copulation with pro- creative consequences, but it is represented as the first stage of a passion which becomes more and more expanded and compre- hensive : dropping all restriction to any single individual, and enlarging itself not merely to embrace pursuits, and institutions, but also to the plenitude and great ocean of Beauty in its largest sense.
The picture here presented by Plato, of the beneficent and elevating influence of Eros Philosophus, is repeated Elevating by Sokrates as a revelation made to him by the imfuence
ascribed,
prophetess Diotima. It was much taken to heart by both in
scribed in the Lysis, Eraste, and Char- like Sokrates and by men like Kritias midés of Plato—visited both by men (Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 29).
16 PHZDRUS—SYMPOSION. CuHap. XXVL Phedrus the Neo-Platonists.’ It is a striking manifestation of sion, to Eros the Platonic characteristics : transition from amorous Fhiloso impulse to religious and philosophical mysticism—- .tureinthe implication of poetical fancy with the conception of Pint ot the philosophising process—surrender of the mind to eperey metaphor and analogy, which is real up to a certain- religious point, but is forcibly stretched and exaggerated to with diate serve the theorising purpose of the moment. Now tic theory.
we may observe, that the worship of youthful mascu- line beauty, and the belief that contemplation of such a face and form was an operative cause, not only raising the admiration but also quickening the intelligence of the adult spectator, and serv- ing as a provocative to instructive dialogue—together with a de- cided attempt to exalt the spiritual side of this influence and depreciate the sensual—both these are common to Plato with Sokrates and Xenophon. But what is peculiar to Plato is, that he treats this merely as an initial point to spring from, and soars at once into the region of abstractions, until he gets clear of all particulars and concomitants, leaving nothing except Beauty Absolute—ré Καλὸν---τὸ atré-xartov—the “ full sea of the beauti- ful”. Not without reason does Diotima express a doubt whether Sokrates (if we mean thereby the historical Sokrates) could have followed so bold a flight. His wings might probably have failed
1 Porphyry, Vit. Plotini, 23. t Plato s way of combining, in these wo di: es—so as to pass by an easy thread of association from one to the other—subjects which appear to us unconnected and even discordant, is certainly remarkable. We have to recognise material differences in the
si différentes, sans s’ apercevoir lui- méme qu’il change de sujet. Les Orientaux ont cherché la solution de cette difficulté dans une interprétation mystique de toutes ses ies ; mais les textes s’ y refusent. Des critiques modernes ont voulu Yexpliquer en supposant une h isie de l'auteur,
turn of imagination, as between diffe- rent persons and ages. The following remark of Professor Mohl, respecting the Persian lyric poet Hafiz, illustrates his point. ‘‘Au reste, quand méme nous serions mieux renseignés sur sa vie, il resterait toujours pour nous le singulier spectacle d’un homme qui tantét célébre absorption de l’Ame dans l’essence de Dieu, tantdt chante le vin et amour, sans grossiéreté, il est vrai, mais avec un laisser aller et un naturel qui exclut toute idée de gymbolisie—et qui généralement glisse
e l'une dans l’autre de ces deux maniéres de sentir, qui nous paraissent
q lui aurait fait méler une certaine ose de piété mystique, & ses vers plus légers, pour les faire passer: mais ce
cul parait étranger ἃ la nature de YPhomme. Je crois qu’il faut trouver le mot de l’énigme dans Vétat général des esprits et de la culture de son temps: et la difficulté pour nous est seulement de nous réprésonter assez vivement l'état des esprits en Perse ἃ cette époque, et la nature de l’i:fluence que le Soufisme y exergait depuis des siécles sur toutes les classes culti- vées de la nation.”"—Mohl (Rapport Annael & la Société Asiatique, 1861, Ῥ. 89.
σμαρ. XXVI. DIFFERENT DIALOGUES COMPARED. 17
and dropped him : as we read in the Pheedrus respecting the un- prepared souls who try to rise aloft in company with the Gods. Plato alone is the true Dedalus equal to this flight, borne up by wings not inferior to those of Pindar '—according to the com- parison of Dionysius of Halikarnassus.
Various remarks may be made, in comparing this exposition of Diotima in the Symposion with that which we read in the Pheedrus and Pheedon.
First, in the Phedrus and Phedon (also in the Timseus and elsewhere), the pre-existence of the soul, and its ante- pifterences cedent familiarity, greater or less, with the world of between Ideas,—are brought into the foreground ; 80 as to and furnish a basis for that doctrine of reminiscence, qwelling — which is one of the peculiar characteristics of Plato. conceptions The Form or Idea, when once disengaged from the the former, appendages by which it has been overgrown, is said to By, erences be recognised by the mind and welcomed as an old bythelatter. acquaintance. But in the Symposion, no such doctrine is found. ‘The mind is described as rising by gradual steps from the con- crete and particular to the abstract and general, by recognising the sameness of one attribute as pervading many particulars, and by extending its comparisons from smaller groups of particulars to larger ; until at length one and the same attribute is perceived to belong to all. The mind is supposed to evolve out of itself, and to generate in some companion mind, certain abstract or general conceptions, correlating with the Forms or Concepta without. The fundamental postulate here is, not that of pre- existence, but that of in-dwelling conceptions.
Secondly, in the Phzedrus and Pheedon, the soul is declared to be immortal, ἃ parte post as well as ἃ parte ante. But Nothing but in the Symposion, this is affirmed to be impossible.? metaphori- The soul yearns for, but is forbidden to reach, im- tality robe: mortality : or at least can only reach immortality in nise in a metaphorical sense, by its prolific operation—by =e generating in itself as long as it lasts, and in other minds who will survive it, a self-renewing series of noble thoughts and
1 Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. in Demosth., p. 972, Reiske. 3 Plato, Sympos. pp. 207-208. 3—2
18 . PHAZDRUS—SYMPOSION. CHaPp. XXVI.
feelings—by leaving a name and reputation to survive in the memory of others. ;
Thirdly, in Pheedrus, Phedon, Republic, and elsewhere, Plato recognises many distinct Forms or Ideas—a world or Idea of ageregate of such Entia, Rationis'—among which sente ~ Beauty is one, but only one. It is the exalted privi- singly and lege of the philosophic mind to come into contempla- inSympo- tion and cognition of these Forms generally. But in ston. the Symposion, the Form of Beauty (τὸ καλὸν) is presented singly and exclusively—as if the communion with this one Form were the sole occupation of the most exalted philo- sophy. |
Fourthly, The Phedrus and Symposion have, both of them in common, the theory of Eros as the indispensable, nised, both initiatory, stimulus to philosophy. The spectacle of in Phedrus beautiful youth is considered necessary to set light posion,as to various elements in the mind, which would other-
ff . . . the initia. Wise remain dormant and never burn: it enables the tos te philo- pregnant and capable mind to bring forth what it has sophy—Not within and to put out its hidden strength. But if we nised in. look to the Phedon, Thestétus, Sophistés, or Re- προ, Public, we shall not find Eros invoked for any such andelse- function. The Republic describes an elaborate scheme for generating and developing the philosophic capa- city : but Eros plays no part in it. In the Theetétus, the young man so named is announced as having a pregnant mind requiring to be disburthened, and great capacity which needs foreign aid to develop it: the service needed is rendered by Sokrates, who possesses an obstetric patent, and a marvellous faculty of cross- examination. Yet instead of any auxiliary stimulus arising from personal beauty, the personal ugliness of both pérsons in the dialogue is emphatically signified.
I note these peculiarities, partly of the Symposion, partly of the Phedrus along with it—to illustrate the varying points of view which the reader must expect to meet in travelling through the numerous Platonic dialogues.
1 Plat. Repub. v. 476. He recog- as wel! as Forms of δίκαιον, ἀγαθόν, nises Forms of ἄδικον, κακόν, αἰσχρόν, καλόν, &C.
Cuap. XXVI. PECULIAR CHARACTER OF SOKRATES. 19
“ΤᾺ the strange scene with which the Symposion is wound up, the main purpose of the dialogue is still farther worked out. Concluding The spirit and ethical character of Eros Philosophus, scene and after having been depicted in general terms by Dio- Alkibiades tima, are specially exemplified in the personal history posion—Be- of Sokrates, as recounted and appreciated by Alki- Baviour of biades. That handsome, high-born, and insolent Alkibiades youth, being in a complete state of intoxication, breaks handsome in unexpectedly upon the company, all of whom are Youths. as yet sober : he enacts the part of a drunken man both in speech and action, which is described with a vivacity that would do credit to any dramatist. His presence is the signal for beginning to drink hard, and he especially challenges Sokrates to drink off, after him, as much wine as will fill the large water-vessel serving as cooler ; which challenge Sokrates forthwith accepts and exe- cutes, without being the least affected by it. Alkibiades instead of following the example of the others by delivering an encomium on Eros, undertakes to deliver one upon Sokrates. He proceeds to depict Sokrates as the votary of Eros Philosophus, wrapped up in the contemplation of beautiful youths, and employing his whole time in colloquy with them—yet as never losing his own self-command, even while acquiring a magical ascendency over these companions.! The abnormal exterior of Sokrates, re- sembling that of a Satyr, though concealing the image of a God within—the eccentric pungency of his conversation, blending banter with seriousness, homely illustrations with impressive principles—has exercised an influence at once fascinating, sub- jugating, humiliating. The impudent Alkibiades has been made to feel painfully his own unworthiness, even while receiving every mark of admiration from others. He has become enthusi- astically devoted to Sokrates, whom he has sought to attach to himself, and to lay under obligation, by tempting offers of every kind. The details of these offers are given with a fulness which cannot be translated to modern readers, and which even then required to be excused as the revelations of a drunken man. They present one of the boldest fictions in the Greek language— if we look at them in conjunction with the real character of
1 Plato, Sympos. p. 216 C-D.
20 PHZDRUS—SYMPOSION.. Cuap. XXVI.
Alkibiades as an historical person.1 Sokrates is found proof against every variety of temptation, however seductive to Grecian feeling. In his case, Eros Philosophus maintains his dignity as exclusively pure, sentimental, and spiritual: while Alkibiades retires more humiliated than ever. We are given to understand that the like offers had been made to Sokrates by many other handsome youths also—especially by Charmides and Euthydemus —all of them being treated with the same quiet and repellent indifference? Sokrates had kept on the vantage-ground as re- gards all :—and was regarded by all with the same mixture of humble veneration and earnest attachment.
Not merely upon this point but upon others also, Alkibiades Perfect self- recounts anecdotes of the perfect self-mastery of So- command of krates: in endurance of cold, heat, hunger, and fatigue heat were —in contempt of the dangers of war, in bravery on trial. the day of battle—even in the power of bearing more wine than any: one élse, without being intoxicated, whenever the occasion was such as to require him to drink: though he never drank much willingly. While all his emotions are thus described as under the full control of Reason and Eros Philosophus—his special gift and privilege was that of conversation—not less
1 Plato, Sympos. p. 219. See also, of Plotinus; who was much displeased, respecting the historical Alkibiades and directed Porphyry to compose a and his character Thueyd, vi. 15; reply. Xenoph. Memor. ἰ, 1; tisthenes, 3 Plato, Symp. p. 222 B. apud Athenzum, xii. 534. In the Hieron of Xenophon (xi. 11
The invention of Plato goes beyond —a conversation between the despo that of those ingenious men who re- Hieron and the t Simonides—the counted how Phryné and Lais had poet, exhorting Hieron to govern his failed in attempts to overcome the con- subjects in a mild, beneficent, and tinence of Xenokrates, Diog. L. iv. 7; careful spirit, expatiates upon the and the saying of Lais, ὡς οὐκ ax popularity and warm affection which he ἀνδρός, ἀλλ᾽ an ἀνδρίαντος, avacraiy. will thereby attract to himself from Quintilian (viii. 4, 22-23) aptly eno 4 them. Of affection one manifesta- compares the description given by tion will be (he says) as follows :— Alkibiades—as the maximum of testi. ὥστε οὐ μόνον φιλοῖο ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ mony to the ‘invicta continentia” of ἐρῷο, un’ ἀνθρώπων: καὶ τοὺς κα- Sokrates—with the testimony to the Aovs οὐ wetpgy, ἀλλὰ πειρώ- su ing beauty of Helen, borne by μενον tm αὐτῶν ἀνέχεσθαι such witnesses as the Trojan δημογέ, ἂν σε δέοι, ἄς.
οντες and Priam himself (Hom. iad These words illustrate the adventure Τῇ 156). One of the speakers in Athe- described by Alkibiades in the Platonic neus censures severely this portion Symposion.
of the Platonic Symposion, xi. 506 C, erakleides of Pontus, Diksearchus 608 D, v. 187 D. orph (in his and the Peripatetic Hieronymus, all life of Plotinus, 15) tells us that composed treatises Περὶ Ἔρωτος, espe- the rhetor Diophanes delivered an cially περὶ παιδικῶν ἐρώτων (Athens. apology for Alkibiades, in the presence xiii. 602-603).
CuHap. ΧΧΥ͂Ι. SOKRATES UNDISTURBED BY WINE.
21
eccentric in manner, than potent, soul-subduing,! and provocative
in its effects.
After the speech of Alkibiades is concluded, the ,close of the
banquet is described by the primary narrator. himself, with Agathon and Aristophanes, and several other fresh revellers, continue to drink wine until all of them become dead drunk. While Phedrus, Eryxi- machus, and others retire, Sokrates remains. His competency to bear the maximum of wine without being disturbed by it, is tested to the full. Although he had before, in acceptance of the challenge οὗ Alki-
He
Drunken- ness of othersatthe close of the ym on ~Sokrates is not af- fected by it, but con- tinues his dialectic process.
biades, swallowed the contents of the wine cooler, he nevertheless continues all the night to drink wine in large bowls, along with the rest. All the while, however, he goes on debating his ordinary topics, even though no one is sufficiently sober to attend to him. His companions successively fall asleep, and at day- break, he finds himself the only person sober,” except Aristodemus . (the narrator of the whole scene), who has recently waked after a long sleep. Sokrates quits the house of Agathon, with unclouded senses and undiminished activity—bathes—and then visits the
1 Plato, Sympos. pp. 221-222. Alkibiades recites acts ee cistin- courage perform y . at the siege of Potidsa as well as at the battle of Delium. About the potent effect produced by the conversation of Sokra upon companions, compare Sym p. TAO swophontin Apclory (2 e Xenophontic Apo 8. Sokrates adverts to the undisturbed equanimity. which he had shown dur- ing the jon blockade of Athens after e eof Agospotami, while others were bewailing the famine and other miseries. 2In Sympos. p. 176 B, Sokrates is as δυνατώτατος πίνειν, above all the rest: no one can be com with him. In the two first books of the Treatise De Legib we shall find much to illustrate what is here said (in the Symposion) about the power ascribed to him of drinking more wine than any one else, without being at all affected by it. Plato discusses the subject of strong potations (μέθη) at great length ; indeed he seems to fear t his readers will think he says too much upon it (i. 642 A). He con-
siders it of t advantage to have a test to apply, such as wine, for the purpose of measuring the reason and self-command of different men, and of determining how much wine is sufli- cient to overthrow it, in each different case (i. 649 C-E). You can make this trial (he argues) in each case, without any danger or harm ; and you can thus escape the necessity of making the trial in a real case of emergency. Plato insists upon the χρεία τῆς μέθης, as a genuine test, to be seriously em- ployed for the purpose of testing men’s reason and force of character (ii. p. 673). In the Republic, too (ili. p. 413 E), the φύλακες are required to be tested, in regard to their capacity of resisting pleasurable temptation, as well as pain and danger.
Among the titles of the lost treatises of Theophrastus, we find one Περὶ Μέθης (Diog. L. v. 44). It is one of the compliments that the Emperor Marcus Antoninus (i. 16) pays to his father—That he was, like Sokrates, equally competent both to partake of, and to abstain from, the most seductive enjoyments, without ever losing his calmness and self-mastery.
. 22 PHZDRUS—SYMPOSION. CHap. XXVL
gymnasium at the Lykeion ; where he passes all the day in his usual abundant colloquy.!
The picture of Sokrates, in the Symposion, forms a natural Symposion contrast and complement to the picture of him in the and Phe. , Phedon ; though the conjecture of Schleiermacher* theanti: —that the two together are intended to make up the panes fest Philosophus, or third member of the trilogy promised oftheother. in the Sophistés—is ingenious rather than convincing. The Phzdon depicts Sokrates in his last conversation with his friends, immediately before his death ; the, Symposion presents him in the exuberance of life, health, and cheerfulness: in both situations, we find the same attributes manifested — perfect equanimity and self-command, proof against every variety of disturbing agency—whether tempting or terrible— absorbing interest in philosophical dialectic. The first of these two ele- ments, if it stood alone, would be virtuous sobriety, yet not passing beyond the limit of mortal virtue: the last of the two superadds a higher element, which Plato conceives to transcend the limit of mortal virtue, and to depend upon divine inspiration or madness.® .
The Symposion of Plato affords also an interesting subject of Symposion Comparison with that of his contemporary Xenophon, of Plato as to points of agreement as well as of difference.‘ compared of Xenophon states in the beginning that he intends to Xenophon. describe what passed in a scene where he himself was
1 Plato, Sympos. p. 223. Symposia of Xenophon and Plato a
2 Einleitung zum Gastmahl, p. 859 dramatic variety of characters and 5606. smartness—finds fault with both, but Plato, Phsedrus, p. 256 C-E. ow- especially with Plato, for levity, rude- φροσύνη θνητή--ἐρωτικὴ μανία: owdpo- ness, indecency, vulgarity, sneering, σύνη avOpwrivn—Oeia μανία. Compare &c. The talk was almost entirely . 244 B. upon love and joviality. In the Sym- 4 Pontianus, one of the speakers in posion of Epikurus, on the contrary, Atheneeus (xi. 604), touches upon some nothing was said about these topics ; points of this comparison, with a view the guests were fewer, the conversation of illustrating the real or supposed was grave and dull, upon dry topics enmity between Plato and Xenophon; of science, such as the atomic theory an enmity not in itself improbable, yet (προφήτας ἀτόμων, Vv. 8, 187 B, 177 B. not sufficiently proved. *Extxovpos δὲ συμπόσιον φιλοσόφων Athenzus before him the - μόνον πεποίηται), and even upon ily posion of Epikurus (not preserved) as ailments, such as indigestion or fever well as those of Plato, Xenophon, and (187 C). The philosophers present Aristotle (xv. 674); and we learn from were made by Epikurus to carry on him some of its distinctive points. their debate in so friendly a spirit, that Masurius (the speaker in Athenzus, the critic calls them ‘‘flatterers prais- v. init.) while he recognises in the ing each other”; while he terms the
Cuap. ΧΧΥΙ. PLATO COMPARED WITH XENOPHON. 23 present ; because he is of opinion that the proceedings of excel- lent men, in hours of amusement, are not less worthy of being recorded than those of their serious hours. Both Plato and Xenophon take for their main subject a festive banquet, destined to celebrate the success of a young man in a competitive struggle. In Plato, the success is one of mind and genius—Agathon has gained the prize of tragedy: in Xenophon, it is one of bodily force and skill—Autolykus victor in the pankration. The Sym- posion of Xenophon differs from that of Plato, in the same manner as the Memorabilia of Xenophon generally differ from the Sokratic dialogues of Plato—that is, by approaching much nearer to common life and reality. It describes a banquet such as was likely enough to take place, with the usual accompani- ments—a professional jester, and a Syracusan ballet-master who brings with him a dancing-girl, a girl to play on the flute and harp, and a handsome youth. These artists contribute to the amusement of the company by music, dancing, throwing up balle and catching them again, jumping into and out of a circle of swords, All this would have occurred at an ordinary banquet : here, it is accompanied and followed by remarks of pleasantry, buffoonery and taunt, interchanged between the guests. Nearly all the guests take part, more or less: but Sokrates is made the prominent figure throughout. He repudiates the offer of scented unguents: but he recommends the drinking of wine, though moderately, and in small cups. The whole company are under- stood to be somewhat elevated with wine, but not one of them becomes intoxicated. Sokrates not only talks as much fun as the rest, but even sings, and speaks of learning to dance, jesting on his own corpulence.! Most part of the scene is broad farce, in the manner, though not with all the humour, of Aristophanes.?
Platonic guests ‘“‘sneerers insulting thinking about nothing but convivial
each other” (μνκτηριστῶν ἀλλήλους τωθαζόντων, 182 A), though this is much more true about the Xenophontic Symposion than about the Platonic.
e remarks farther that the Symposion of Epikuraus included no libation or offering to the Gods (179 D).
It is curious to note these peculiarities in the compositions (now lost) of a
hilosopher like Epikurus, whom many pistorians of philosophy represent as
and sexual pleasure.
1 Xenophon, Sympos. vii. 1; ii. 18- 19. προγάστωρ, &c.
2The taunt ascribed to the jester Philippus, about the cowardice of the demagogue Peisander, is completely Aristophanic, ii. 14; also that of An- tisthenes ing the bad temper of Xanthippé, 11. 10; and the caricature of the movements of the ὀρχηστρὶς by Philippus, ii. 21. Compare iii. 11.
94 PHZDRUS—SYMPOSION. Cuar, XXVI.
The number and variety of the persons present is considerable, greater than in most of the Aristophanic plays.! Kallias, Lykon, Autolykus, Sokrates, Antisthenes, Hermogenes, Nikeratus, Krito- bulus, have each his own peculiarity: and a certain amount of vivacity and amusement arises from the way in which each of them is required, at the challenge of Sokrates, to declare on what it is that he most prides himself. Sokrates himself carries the burlesque farther than any of them ; pretending to be equal in personal beauty to Kritobulus, and priding himself upon the function of a pander, which he professes to exercise. Antisthenes, however, is offended, when Sokrates fastens upon him a similar function : but the latter softens the meaning of the term so as to appease him. In general, each guest'is made to take pride in something the direct reverse of that which really belongs to him ; and to defend his thesis in a strain of humorous parody. Antis- thenes, for example, boasts of his wealth. The Syracusan ballet-master is described as jealous of Sokrates, and as addressing to him some remarks of offensive rudeness; which Sokrates turns off, and even begins to sing, for the purpose of preventing con- fusion and ill-temper from spreading among the company :3 while he at the same time gives prudent advice to the Syracusan about the exhibitions likely to be acceptable.
Though the Xenophontic Symposion is declared to be an Small pro. alternate mixture of banter and seriousness,® yet the ortion of |“ only long serious argument or lecture delivered is in the — that by Sokrates; in which he pronounces a professed coeno™ ~—-panegyric upon Eros, but at the same time pointedly posion. distinguishes the sentimental from the sensual. He denounces the latter, and confines his panegyric to the former —selecting Kallias and Autolykus as honourable examples of it.‘
1 Xen. Symp. c. 4-5. elate with wine—é re γὰρ οἶνος συνε- 2 Xen. Symp. vi. Αὐτὴ μὲν ἥ πα- παίρει, καὶ ὃ ἀεὶ σύνοικος ἐμοὶ ἔρως ροινία οὕτω κατεσβέσθη, Vii. 1-6, meupiges sis τὸν ἀντίπαλον ἔρωτα αὑτοῦ
Epiktétus insists upon this feature παῤῥησιάς εσθαι. in the character οἵ Sokrates— his e contrast between the customs of patience and power of soothing angry the Thebans and Eleians, and those of men ii. 12-14). the Lacedzmonians, is again noted by
en. Symp. iv. 28. ἀναμὶξ €axw- Xenophon, Rep. Laced. ii. 18. Plato ψάν τε καὶ ἐσπούδασαν, viii. 4 pate (Symp. 182) a like contrast into viii. 24. he mouth of Pausanias, assimila
ment. seainnt xt the sensual ise enforced the customs of Athens in this res with so much warmth that Sokrates is to those of Sparta. The comparison made to advert to the fact of his being between Plato and Xenophon is here
CHap. ΧΧΥ͂Ι. PERSONS IN THE SYMPOSIA. 25
The Xenophontic Symposion closes with a pantomimic scene of Dionysus and Ariadné as lovers represented (at the instance of Sokrates) by the Syracusan ballet-master and his staff. This is described as an exciting spectacle to most of the hearers, married as well as unmarried, who retire with agreeable emotions. Sokrates himself departs with Lykon and Kallias, te be present at the exercise of Autolykus.!
We see thus that the Platonic Symposion is much more ideal, and departs farther from common practice and senti- prronic ment, than the Xenophontic. It discards all the Symposion
ς . . more ideal common accessories of a banquet (musical or dancing and tran- artists), and throws the guests altogether upon their scendental own powers of rhetoric and dialectic, for amusement. Xeno-
If we go through the different encomiums upon Eros, Phontic.
by Phedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Diotima—we shall appreciate the many-coloured forms and exuberance of the Platonic imagination, as compared ‘with the more restricted range and common-place practical sense of Xeno- phon.? All the Platonic speakers are accomplished persons—a -man of letters, a physician, two successful poets, a prophetess : the Xenophontic personages, except Sokrates and Antisthenes, are persons of ordinary capacity. The Platonic Symposion, after presenting Eros in five different points of view, gives pre-emi- nence and emphasis to a sixth, in which Eros is regarded as the privileged minister and conductor to the mysteries of philosophy, both the lowest and the highest: the Xenophontic Symposion dwells upon one view only of Eros (developed by Sokrates) and cites Kallias as example of it, making no mention of philosophy. The Platonic Symposion exalts Sokrates, as the representative of Eros Philosophus, to a pinnacle of elevation which places him above human fears and weaknesses *—coupled however with that
curious; we see how much more copious and inventive is the reasoning of Plato.
1 Xen. Symp. viii. 5, ix. 7. The close of the Xenophontic Symposion is, to a great degree, in harmony with modern sentiment, though what is there ex- pressed would probably be left to be understood. The Platonic Symposion
departs altogether from that senti- A
ment.
2The difference between the two coincides very much with that which is drawn by Plato himself in the Pheedrus—6eca μανία as contrasted with σωφροσύνη θνητὴ (p. 256 E) Compare Athenens, v. 187 B.
3 Plato, Pheedrus, Ὁ. 249 D. νου- θετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ws παρα- κινῶν, ἐνθονσιάζων δὲ λέληθε τοὺς πολ- οὺς. . -- αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακεί- μενος.
26 PHZDRUS—SYMPOSION. Cuap. XXVL
_ eccentricity which makes the vulgar regard a philosopher as out of his mind: the Xenophontic Symposion presents him only as a cheerful, amiable companion, advising temperance, yet enjoying ἃ convivial hour, and contributing more than any one else to the general hilarity.
Such are the points of comparison which present themselves between the same subject as handled by these two eminent con- temporaries, both of them companions, and admirers of Sokrates:
and each handling it in his own manner.! I have already stated that the first half of the Phaedrus differs
Second half of the Phex- drus— into passes
a debate on Rhetoric. Eros is con- sidered as a subject for rhetorical "ὦ exercise.
materially from the second ; and that its three dis- courses on the subject of Eros (the first two depreciat- ing Eros, the third being an effusion of high-flown and poetical panegyric on the same theme) may be better understood by being looked at in conjunction with the Symposion. The second half of the Phedrus passes into a different discussion, criticising the discourse of Lysias as a rhetorical composition : examining the
principles upon which the teaching of Rhetoric as an Art either
1 Which of these two Symposia was latest in date of composition we cannot determine with certainty: though it seems certain that the latest of the two was not composed in imitation of the earliest.
From the allusion to the διοίκισις of Mantineia (p. 193 A) we know that the Platonic Symposion must have been composed after 385 B.C. : there is great probability also, though not full certainty, that it was composed during the time when Mantineia was still an aggregate of separate villages and not a gown —that is, between 385-370 B.C., in which latter year Mantineia was re-established as a city. The Xeno- phontic Symposion affords no mark of date of composition : Xenophon reports it as having been himself present. It does indeed contain, in the speech delivered by Sokrates (viii. 32), an allusion to, and a criticism upon, an opinion supported by Pausanias ὁ ᾿Αγάθωνος τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἐραστής, who discourses in the Platonic Symposion : and several critics think that this is an allusion by Xenophon to the Platonic Symposion. I think this opinion im- probable. It would require us to sup- pose that Xenophon isinaccurate, since
the opinion which he ascribes to Pau- sanias is not delivered by Pausanias in the Platonic Symposion, but by Pheedras. Athenzus (v. 216) remarks that the opinion is not delivered by Pausanias, but he does not mention that it is delivered by Phsedrus. He remarks that there was:no known written composition of Pausanias him- self: and he seems to suppose that Xenophon must have alluded to the Platonic Symposion, but that he quoted it inaccurately or out of another version of it, different from what we now read. Athenzeus wastes reasoning in proving that the conversation described in the Platonic Symposion cannot have really occurred at the time to which Plato assigns it. This is unimportant: the speeches are doubtless all composed by
lato. If Athenzeus was anxious to prove anachronism against Plato, Iam surprised that he did not notice that of the διοίκισις Of Mantineia mentioned in a conversation supposed to have taken place in the presence of Sokrates, who died in 399 B.C.
[incline to believe that the allusion of Xenophon is not intended to apply to the Symposion of Plato. Xenophon ascribes one opinion to Pausanias,
Crap. XXVL
WRITING AND SPEAKING, AS ART.
27
is founded, or ought to be founded : and estimating the efficacy of written discourse generally, as a means of working upon or
instructing other minds.
I heard one of our active political citizens (says Phedrus)
severely denounce Lysias, and fasten upon him with contempt, many times over, the title of a logographer. Active politicians will not consent to compose and leave behind them written discourses, for fear of ‘being called Sophists! To write discourses (replies Sokrates) is noway discreditable: the real question is, whether he writes them well.?, And the same ques- tion is the only one proper to be asked about other writers on all subjects—public or private, in prose or in verse. How to speak well, and how to write well Is there any art or systematic method,
—is the problem.®
Lysias is called a lo-
question is, hether a man writes well or ill?
capable of being laid down beforehand and defended upon principle, for accomplishing the object well? Or does a man succeed only by unsystematic knack or practice, such as he can neither realise distinctly to his own consciousness, nor describe
to others ?
Piato ascribes another; this is noway inconceivable. I therefore remain in doubt whether the Xenophontic or the tonic posion is earliest. m- pare the bat of Schneider to the ormer, pp 140-143. 1 Pla
2 Plato, Phzdrus, pp. 257 E, 258 D.
and σοφιστής---ΔΙὸ here coupled ther as terms of reproach, just as ey stand coupled in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. Ὁ. 417. It is plain that both a pellations acquired their dis- e import mainly from the col- circumstance that the persons
80 denominated took money for their compositions or . The dAoyn- γράφος wrote for pay, and on behalf of any client who could pay him. In the strict etymological sense, neither of the two terms would imply any re-
Yet Plato, in this dialogue, when he is discussing the worth of the reproach- ful imputation fastened on Lysias, takes the term λογογράφος only in this ety- mological, literal sense, omitting to notice the collateral association which
really gave point to it and made it serve the purpose of a hostile speaker. This is the more remarkable, hecause we find Plato multiplying opportuni- ties, even on unsuitable occasions, of taunting the Sophists with the fact that they took money. Here in the Pheedrus, we should have expected that if he noticed the imputation at all, he would notice it in the sense intended by the speaker In this sense, indeed, it would not have suited the purpose of his argument, since he wishes to make it an introduction to a philoso- phical estimate of the value of writing as a means of instruction.
Heindorf observes, that Plato has used a similar liberty in comparing the λογογράφος to the proposer of a law or decree. ‘‘Igitur, gquum solemne legum initium ejusmodi esset, ἔδοξε τῇ βονλῇ, &c., Plato aliter longé quam vulgo acciperetur, neque sine calumni& quadam, interpretatus est”
(ad B 258).
3 Plato, Phsedrus, p. 259 E. 6 καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν, καὶ ὅπῃ μή, σκεπτέον.---Ὁ. 258 D. Tis ὃ τρό- πος TOU καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν.
28
ῬΗΒΌΒΟΞΒ---ΞΥΜΡΟΒΙΟΝ, CuaP. XXVL
First let us ask—When an orator addresses himself to a
listening crowd upon the common themes— Good
spout and Evil, Just and Unjust—is it necessary that he teaching == should know what is really and truly good and evil, writing well just and unjust? Most rhetorical teachers affirm, well Can it that it is enough if he knows what the audience or upon system the people generally believe to be so: and that to or princi le? that standard he must accommodate himself, if he r does the .
successful wishes to persuade. ἢ
toad only, He may persuade the people under these circum- by unsyste- gtances (replies Sokrates), but if he does so, it will be knack to their misfortune and to his own. He ought to Theory of Know the real truth—not merely what the public Sokrales— vee whom he addresses believe to be the truth—respect- of persua- ing just and unjust, good and evil, &c. There can be sion must - no genuine art of speaking, which is not founded upon 8 upon knowledge of the truth, and upon adequate phi- of the rn losophical comprehension of the subject-matter.? The and of gra- rhetorical teachers take too narrow a view of rhetoric, resemblance when they confine it to public harangues addressed
to the assembly or to the Dikastery. Rhetoric em- braces all guidance of the mind through words, whether in public harangue or private conversation, on matters important or trivial. Whether it be a controversy between two litigants in a Dikastery, causing the Dikasts to regard the same matters now as being just and good, presently as being unjust and evil: or between two dialecticians like Zeno, who could make his hearers view the same subjects as being both like and unlike—both one and many —both in motion and at rest : in either case the art (if there be any art) and its principles are the same. You ought to assimi- late every thing to every thing, in all cases where assimilation is possible: if your adversary assimilates in like manner, concealing the process from his hearers, you must convict and expose his proceedings. Now the possibility or facility of deception in this way will depend upon the extent of likeness between things. If there be much real likeness, deception is easy, and one of them may easily be passed off as the other : if there be little likeness,
1 Plato, Pheedrus, p. 260 A. 2 Plato, Phedrus, pp. 260-261.
Cuap. XXVIL BSOKRATES COMPARED WITH LYSIAS. 29
deception will be difficult. An extensive acquaintance with the real resemblances of things, or in other words with truth, constitutes the necessary basis on which all oratorical art must proceed.}
Sokrates then compares the oration of Lysias with his own two orations (the first depreciating, the second extol- ling, Eros) in the point of view of art ; to see how far made by they are artistically constructed. Among the matters Sokratesbe- of discourse, there are some on which all men are discourse of agreed, and on which therefore the speaker may his own. assume established unanimity in his audience: there fovently un- are others on which great dissension and discord pre- derstood: vail. Among the latter (the topics of dissension), fined what questions about just and unjust, good and evil, stand [89 meant by foremost :3 it is upon these that deception is most did not easy, and rhetorical skill most efficacious. Accord- ingly, an orator should begin by understanding to which of these two categories the topic which he handles belongs: If it belongs to the second category (those liable to dissension) he ought, at the outset, to define what he himself means by it, and what he intends the audience to understand. Now Eros is a topic on which great dissension prevails. It ought therefore to have been defined at the commencement of the discourse. This Sokrates in his discourse has done: but Lysias has omitted to do it, and has assumed Eros to be obviously and unanimously apprehended by every one. Besides, the successive points in the discourse of Lysias do not hang together by any thread of necessary connec- tion, as they ought to do, if the discourse were put together ac- cording to rule.®
Farthermore, in the two discourses of Sokrates, not merely was the process of logical definition exemplified in the case yopica of Eros—but also the process of logical division, in the processes— _ case of Madness or Irrationality. This last extensive and Divi- genus was divided first into two species—Madness, Sion— both from human distemper—Madness, from divine inspi- exemplified ration, carrying a man out of the customary ortho- im the two doxy.* Next, this last species was again divided into οὗ Sokrates.
1 Plato, Phedrus, p. 262. 3 Plato, Phzedrus, pp. 268-265.
2 Plato, Pheedrus,p. 268 B. Com- 4 Plato’ Phedrus, p. 265 A. ὑπὸ pare Plato, Alkibiad. 1. p. 109. θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων.
30 PHEZDRUS—SYMPOSION. Cuap. XXVL
four branches or sub-species, according to the God from whom the inspiration proceeded, and according to the character of the inspiration—the prophetic, emanating from Apollo—the ritual or mystic, from Dionysus—the poetic, from the Muses—the amatory, from Eros and Aphrodité.1 Now both these processes, definition and division, are familiar to the true dialectician or philosopher : but they are not less essential in rhetoric also, if the process is performed with genuine art. The speaker ought to embrace in his view many particular cases, to gather together what is common to all, and to combine them into one generic concept, which is to be embodied in words as the definition. He ought also to perform the counter-process : to divide the genus not into parts arbitrary and incoherent (like a bad cook cutting up an animal without regard to the joints) but into legitimate species ;? each founded on some positive and assignable charac- teristic. ‘It is these divisions and combinations (says Sokrates) to which I am devotedly attached, in order that I may become competent for thought and discourse: and if there be any one else whom I consider capable of thus contemplating the One and the Many as they stand in nature—I follow in the footsteps of that man as in those of a God. I call such a man, rightly or wrongly, a Dialectician .”
This is Dialectic (replies Pheedrus) ; but it is not Rhetoric, as Thrasymachus and other professors teach the art.
What else is there worth having (says Sokrates), which these
view of professors teach? The order and distribution of a That there discourse: first, the exordium, then recital, proof, is no real .. second proof, refutation, recapitulation at the close :
toric except advice how to introduce maxims or similes: receipts
hat is al- . ς . ready com. for moving the anger or compassion of the dikasts,
1 Plato, Phzedrus, p. 265.
2 Plato, Phzedrus, pp. 265-266. 265 est.
D: εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῆ διεσπαρμένα, iv’ ἕκαστον ὁριζό- μενος δήλον ποΐῃ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ. 365 Εἰ : τὸ πάλιν κατ᾽ εἴδη δύνασ- θαι τέμνειν κατ᾽ ἄρθρα, Ff πέφνκε, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρον τρόπῳ χρώμενον.
neca, Epise. 89, p. 395, ed. Gronov. **Faciam ergo quod exigis, et philoso- phiam in partes, non in frusta, dividam.
Dividi enim illam, non concidi, utile 3 Plato, Phiedrus, p. 266 B. Τούτων
δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, iv’ οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν" ἐάν τέ rev’ ἄλλον ἡγήσωμαι δυνατὸν εἰς ἕν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφνκὸς ὁρᾷν, τοῦτον διώκω κατόπισθε μετ᾽ ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο. καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ δρᾷν εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἣἥ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θεὸς οἷδε" καλῶ δὲ οὖν μέχρι τοῦδε διαλεκτικούς.
Crap. ΧΧΥ͂Ι. RHETORIC AS A REAL ART. 3]
Such teaching doubtless enables a speaker to produce prised in considerable effect upon popular assemblies :! but it The rhetori- is not the art of rhetoric. It is an assemblage of pre- ; liminary accomplishments, necessary before a man can and useless. acquire the art: but it is not the art itself’ You must know when, how far, in what cases, and towards what persons, to employ these accomplishments : 5 otherwise you have not learnt the art of rhetoric. You may just as well consider yourself a physician because you know how to bring about vomit and purging—or a musician, because you know how to wind up or unwind the chords of your lyre. These teachers mistake the preliminaries or antecedents of the art, for the art itself. It is in the right, measured, seasonable, combination and application of these preliminaries, in different doses adapted to each special matter and audience—that the art of rhetoric consists. And this is precisely the thing which the teacher does not teach, but supposes the learner to acquire for himself.®
The true art of rhetoric (continues Sokrates) embraces a larger range than these teachers imagine. It deals with wii, mind, as the medical researches:of Hippokrates deal Art of Rhe- with body—as a generic total with all its species and joc ought varieties, and as essentially relative to the totality of logy of Hip-
. . . . . pokrates
‘external circumstances. First, Hippokrates investi- and the gates how far the body is, in every particular man, ™¢dic#lArt. simple, homogeneous, uniform: and how far it is complex, heterogeneous, multiform, in the diversity of individuals. If it be one and the same, or in so far as it is one and the same, he examines what are its properties in relation to each particular substance acting upon it or acted upon by it. In so far as it is multiform and various, he examines and compares each of the different varieties, in the same manner, to ascertain its properties in relation to every substance.* It is in this way that Hippo-
1 Plato, Phsedrus, pp. 267-268. δές ἐστιν, οὗ πέρι βονλησόμεθα εἶναι
2 Plato, | Phzdrus, p. 268 B. ἐρέσθαι αὐτοὶ τεχνικοὶ καὶ ἄλλον δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν; εἰ προσεπίσταται καὶ οὑστίνας δεῖ καὶ ἔπειτα δέ, ἐὰν μὲν ἁπλοῦν ἣ, σκοπεῖν ὁπότε ἕκαστα τούτων ποιεῖν, καὶ μέχρι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν ὁπόσον; εἰς τὸ δρᾷν ἔχον ἣ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν t ὑπὸ
3 Plato, Pheedrus, p. 269. τοῦ; ἐὰν δὲ πλείω εἴδη ἔχῃ, ταῦτα ἀριθμη-
4 Plato, Pheedrus, p. 270 Ὁ. *Ag’ σάμενος, ὅπερ ἐφ᾽ ἑνός, τοῦτ᾽ ἰδεῖν ἐφ᾽ οὐχ ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ὅτονουν ἑκάστου, τῷ τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἣ τῷ φύσεως; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἁπλοῦν ἣ πολνει- τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ ;
92 PHZDRUS—SYMPOSION. Cuap. XXVI.
krates discovers the nature or essence of the human body, dis- tinguishing its varieties, and bringing the medical art to bear upon each, according to its different properties. This is the only scientific or artistic way of proceeding.
Now the true rhetor ought to deal with the human mind in
like manner. His task is to work persuasion in the Art of Rhe- . . : τοτῖσ ought minds of certain men by means of discourse. He has to incluse® therefore, first, to ascertain how far all mind is one classifica and the same, and what are the affections belonging minds with to it universally in relation to other things: next, to varieties, distinguish the different varieties of minds, together and of dis- _ with the properties, susceptibilities, and active apti- courses with . oe e . all their tudes, of each : carrying the subdivision down until Tarietios. , he comes to a variety no longer admitting division. must know He must then proceed to distinguish the different toe" ons ΡΣ varieties of discourse, noting the effects which each is the other, calculated to produce or to hinder, and the different suitably to . a ag eae . . ς each parti- ways in which it is likely to impress different minds.* Cc case.
Such and such men are persuadable by such and
such discourses—or the contrary. Having framed these two general classifications, the rhetor must on each particular occasion acquire a rapid tact in discerning to which class of minds the persons whom he is about to address belong : and therefore what class of discourses will be likely to operate on them persuasively.? He must farther know those subordinate artifices of speech on which the professors insist ; and he must also be aware of the proper season and limit within which each can be safely em- ployed.*
1 Plato, Phzedrus, Ῥ. 277 B. ὁρισά- μενός τε πάλιν κατ᾽ gen μέχρι TOU ἀτμή- του Ἐ vey ἐπιστηθῃ
to, Ph edrus, p. 271 A. Ππρῶ- τον, erm ἀκριβείᾳ γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ψνχὴν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἕν καὶ ὅμοιον πέφυ- κεν ἢ κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολνειδές - τοῦτο γάρ φαμεν φύσιν εἶναι δεικνύναι.
Δεύτερον γε, ὅτῳ τί ποιεῖν ἣ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν.
Τρίτον δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενος τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη καὶ τὰ τούτων παθή- ματα, δίεισι τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ, καὶ διδάσκων οἵα οὖσα ὑφ᾽ οἵων λόγων δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ μὲν πείθεται, ἡ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ.
8 Plato, Pheedrus, p. 271 D. δεῖ μὴ ταῦτα ἑκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα θεώμενον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα, ὀξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἑπακολονθεῖν, ὧδ
‘Plato, Pheedrus, p. 272 A. ταῦτα δὲ ἥδη πάντ᾽ ἔχοντι, προσλαβόντε καιροὺς τοῦ πότε λεκτέον καὶ ἐπισχετέον, βραχνλογίας τε αὖ καὶ ἐλεεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως, ἑκάστων τε ὅσ᾽ av εἴδη μάθῃ λόγων, τούτων τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν διαγνόντι, καλῶς τε καὶ τελέως ἐστὶν ὦ τέχνη ἀπειργασμένη, πρότε- ρον
Crap. XXVI. ACQUIREMENTS OF A RHETOR.
33
Nothing less than: this assemblage of acquirements (says So-
krates) will suffice to constitute a real artist, either in speaking or writing. Arduous and fatiguing indeed the acquisition is: but there is no easier road. And those who tell us that the rhetor need not know what is really true, but only what his audience will believe to be true—must be reminded that this belief, on the part of the audience, arises from the likeness of that which they believe, to the real truth. Accordingly, he who knows the real truth will be cleverest in sug-
The Rheto- rical Artist must farther
truth. He is not suffici-
oad | for
gesting apparent or quasi-truth adapted to their “ts !sbour. feeliags. Ifa man is bent on becoming an artist in rhetoric, he must go through the process here marked out : yet undoubtedly the process is so laborious, that rhetoric, when he has ‘acquired it, is no adequate reward. We ought to learn how to speak and act in a way agreeable to the Gods, and this is worth all the trouble necessary for acquiring it. But the power of speaking agreeably and effectively to men, is not of sufficient moment to justify the expenditure of so much time and labour.!
We have now determined what goes to constitute genuine art, in speaking or in writing. But how far is writing, even when art is applied to it, capable of producing real and permanent effect? or indeed of having art applied to it at all? Sokrates answers himself—Only to a small degree. Writing will impart amusement and satisfaction for the moment: it will remind the reader of something which he knew before, if he Wt
may remind
uestion about Writ-
really did know. But in respect to any thing which thereader of he did not know before, it will neither teach nor already. knows.
persuade him : it may produce in him an impression or fancy that he is wiser than he was before, but such impression is illusory, and at best only transient. Writing is like painting— one and the same to all readers, whether young or old, well or ill informed. It cannot adapt itself to the different state of mind of different persons, as we have declared that every finished speaker ought to do. It cannot answer questions, supply de- ficiencies, reply to objections, rectify misunderstanding. It is
Plato, Phzedrus, pp. 273-274. 3—3
34 PHZDRUS—SYMPOSION. CaapP. XXVI.
defenceless against all assailants. It supersedes and enfeebles.
the memory, implanting only a false persuasion of knowledge without the reality.? ‘
Any writer therefore, in prose or verse—Homer, Solon, or Neither Lysias—who imagines that he can by a ready-made Words. nor composition, however carefully turned,? ¢f simply heard continuous or read without cross-examtnation or oral comment, pro- produce any duce any serious and permanent effect in persuading Sfectin OF teaching, beyond a temporary gratification—falls
teac ing. into a disgraceful error. If he intends to accomplish ectic . . . Ὁ
andcross- any thing serious, he must be competent to originate examina- spoken discourse more effective than the written.
necessary. “The written word is but a mere phantom or ghost of the spoken word : which latter is the only legitimate offspring of the teacher, springing fresh and living out of his mind, and engraving itself profoundly on the mind of the hearer. The speaker must know, with discriminative comprehension, and in logical subdivision, both the matter on which he discourses, and the minds of the particular hearers to whom he addresses him- self. He will thus be able to adapt the order, the distribution, the manner of presenting his subject, to the apprehension of the particular hearers and the exigencies of the particular moment. He will submit to cross-examination,* remove difficulties, and furnish all additional explanations which the case requires. By this process he will not indeed produce that immediate, though flashy and evanescent, impression of suddenly acquired knowledge, which arises from the perusal of what is written. He will sow seed which for a long time appears buried under ground ; but which, after such interval, springs up and ripens into complete
1 Plato, Phedrus, p. 275 D-E. rav- τῷ τρόπῳ re γίγνεται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἀμείνων τὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι (οἱ γεγραμμένοι). καὶ δννατώτερος τούτον φύεται; . . . - δόξαις μὲν ἂν ὥς τι φρονοῦντας αὐτοὺς Ὅς wer ἐπιστήμῃς γράφεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ λέγειν, ἐὰν δέ τι ‘en τῶν λεγομένων Bov- μανθάνοντος ψνχῇ, δυνατὸς μὲν ἀμῦναι λόμενος μαθεῖν, ἕν τι σημαίνει μόνον ἑαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμων δὲ λέγειν τε καὶ σιγᾷν ταὐτὸν ἀεί. Ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ γραφῇ, κυλιν- πρὸς οὖς δεῖ. Τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον δεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος ὁμοίως λέγεις ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον, οὗ ὁ γεγραμ- παρὰ τοῖς ἐπαΐονσιν, ὡς δ᾽ αὐτῶς παρ᾽ οἷς μένος εἰδωλον ἄν τι λέγοιτο δικαίως, ὥσ. οὐδὲν προσήκει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν 278 A. οἷς δεῖ γε καὶ μή. ~ . agf Plato, ‘Phedrus, p. 278 Ὁ. εἰ μὲν 2 Plato, Pheedrus, pp. 277-278. ὡς οἱ εἰδὼς of τἀληθὲς ἔχει συνέθηκε ταῦτα ῥαψῳδούμενοι (λόγοι) ἄνεν ἀνακρίσεως καὶ (τὰ συγγράμματα) καὶ ἔχων βοηθεῖν, εἰς διδαχῆς πειθοῦς ἕνεκα ἐλέχθησαν, Kc. ἔλεγχον ἰὼν περὶ ὧν ἔγραψε, καὶ λέγων 3 plato, Phsedrus, p. 276 A. ἄλλον αὐτὸς δννατὸς τὰ γεγραμμένα φαῦλα ἀπο- ὁρῶμεν λόγον τούτον ἀδελφὸν γνήσιον δεῖξαι de.
Cuar, XXVL QUALIFICATIONS OF A RHETOR, 35
-and lasting fruit.1 By repeated dialectic debate, he will both - familiarise to his own mind and propagate in his fellow-dialogists, full knowledge ; together with all the manifold reasonings bear- ing on the subject, and with the power also of turning it on many different sides, of repelling objections and clearing up obscurities. It is not from writing, but from dialectic debate, artistically diversified and adequately prolonged, that full and deep teaching proceeds; prolific in its own nature, communicable indefinitely from every new disciple to others, and forming a source of intelligence and happiness to all.?
This blending of philosophy with rhetoric, which pervades the criticisms on Lysias in the Phzedrus, is farther illustrated by the praise bestowed upon Isokrates in contrast with Lysias. Iso- ‘krates occupied that which Plato in Euthydémus calls “the border country between philosophy and politics”, Many critics declare (and I think with probable reason*) that Isokrates is the person intended (without being named) in the passage just cited from the Euthydémus. In the Phzdrus, Isokrates is described as the intimate friend of Sokrates, still young ; and is pro- nounced already superior in every way to Lysias—likely to become superior in future to all the rhetors that have ever flourished—and destined probably to arrive even at the divine mysteries of philosophy.‘
When we consider that the Phedrus was pretty sure to bring upon Plato a good deal of enmity—since it attacked, by name, both Lysias, a resident at Athens of great influence and ability, and several other contemporary rhetors more or less celebrated— we can understand how Plato became disposed to lighten this amount of enmity by a compliment paid to Isokrates. This latter rhetor, a few years older than Plato, was the son of opulent parents at Athens, and received a good education ; but when his family became impoverished by the disasters at the close of the Peloponnesian war, he established himself as a teacher of rhetoric at Chios: after some time, however, he returned to Athens, and followed the same profession there. He engaged himself also, like Lysias, in composing discourses for pleaders before the
1 Plato, Pheedrus, p. 276 A. 8 See above, vol. ii. ch. xxi. p. 227. 2 Plato, Phiedrus, pp. 276-277. 4 Plato, Phsedrus, p. 279 A. P
46 PHZDRUS—SYMPOSION. CHap. XXVI.
dikastery! and for speakers in the assembly ; by which practice he acquired both fortune and reputation. Later in life, he relin- quished these harangues destined for real persons on real occa- sions, and confined himself to the composition of discourses (intended, not for contentious debate, but for the pleasure and instruction of hearers) on general questions—social, political, and philosophical: at the same time receiving numerous pupils from different cities of Greece. Through such change, he came into a sort of middle position between the rhetoric of Lysias and the dialectic of Plato: insomuch that the latter, at the time when he composed the Pheedrus, had satisfaction in contrasting him favourably with Lysias, and in prophesying that he would make yet greater progress towards philosophy. But at the time when Plato composed the Euthydémus, his feeling was different.* In the Pheedrus, Isokrates is compared with Lysias and other rhetors, and in that comparison Plato presents him as greatly superior : in the Euthydémus, he is compared with philosophers. as well as with rhetors, and is even announced as disparaging philosophy generally : Plato then declares him to be a presump- tuous half-bred, and extols against him even the very philoso- pher whom he himself had just been caricaturing. To apply a Platonic simile, the most beautiful ape is ugly compared with man—the most beautiful man is an ape compared with the Gods :? the same intermediate position between rhetoric and philosophy is assigned by Plato to Isokrates.
From the pen of Isokrates also, we find various passages apparently directed against the viri Socratici including Plato
1 Dion. Hal. De Isocrate Judicium, p. 676. δεσμὰς wavy πολλὰς δικανικῶν λόγων περιφέρεσθαίΐί φησιν ὑπὸ τῶν βιβ-
tively, and with reference to a certain period of his life. But it is only to be received subject to much reserve and
λιοπωλῶν ᾿Αριστοτέλης, &C.
Plutarch, Vit. x. Oratt. pp. 837-838.
The Athenian Polykrates had been forced, by loss of property, to quit Athens and undertake the work of a Sophist in Cyprus. Isokrates expresses much sympathy for him: it was a misfortune like what had happened to himself (Orat. xi. Busiris 1). mpare De Permutation. Or. xv. s. 172.
The assertion made by Isokrates— that he did not compose political and judicial orations, to be spoken by in- dividuals for real causes and public discussions —-may be true compdra-
qualification. Even out of the twenty one orations of Isokrates which we
the last five are com to be spoken by pleaders before the dikas ry. They are such disco urses as the logographers, Lysias among the rest, were called upon to furnish, and paid for furnishing.
2 Plato, Euthydém. p. 806. I am in- clined to agree with Ueberweg in think- ing that the Euthydémus is later than the Phd eberweg, Aechtheit
rus. der Platon. Schriften, pp. 256-259-265.
3 Plato, Hipp. Major, p. 289.
CuHaP. XXVL SCHOOLS OF ISOKRATES AND PLATO. 37
{though without his name): depreciating,! as idle and worthless, new political theories, analytical discussions on the principles of ethics, and dialectic subtleties: maintaining that the word philosophy was erroneously interpreted and defined by many contemporaries, in a sense too much withdrawn from practical re- sults: and affirming that his own teaching was calculated to impart genuine philosophy. During the last half of Plato’s life, his school and that of Isokrates were the most celebrated among all that existed at Athens. There was competition between them, gradually kindling into rivalry. Such rivalry became vehement during the last ten years of Plato’s life, when his scholar Ari- stotle, then an aspiring young man of twenty-five, proclaimed a very contemptuous opinion of Isokrates, and commenced a new school of rhetoric in opposition to him.? Kephisodérus, a pupil of Isokrates, retaliated ; publishing against Aristotle, as well as against Plato, an acrimonious work which was still read some centuries afterwards. Theopompus, another eminent pupil of Isokrates, commented unfavourably upon Plato in his writings: and other writers who did the same may probably have belonged to the Isokratean school.?
This is the true philosopher (continues Sokrates)—the man who alone is competent to teach truth about the just, good,
1 Isokrates, Orat. x. 1 (Hel. Enc.); Orat. v. (Philipp.) 12; Or. xiii. (So- phist ) 9-24; Orat. xv. (Permut.) sect.
-290. φιλοσοφίαν μὲν οὖν οὐκ οἶμαι
plaints about unfriendly and bitter criticism refer to the Platonic School of that day, Aristotle being one of its members. See sections 48-90-276, and
δεῖν προσαγορεύειν τὴν μηδὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι μήτε πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μήτε πρὸς τὸ πράττειν ὥφελοῦσαν---την καλονμένην ὑπό τινων φιλοσοφίαν οὐκ εἶναι φημί,
8 Cicero, De Oratore, fii. 35, 141; Orator. 19, 62; Numenius, ap. Euseb. elie ἢ xiv. 6, 9. See. Stahr,
i. p. ὦ i. Ὁ. .
Schroeder's Questiones” Tsocrater
trecht, 1859), and Spengel’s work,
krates und Plato, are instructive in regard to these two contem lumi- naries of the intellect world at Athens. But, nnfortunately. we .can make out few ascertainable facts. When I read the Oration De Permut., Or. xv. (com d by Isokrates about fifteen years before his own death, and about five years before the death of Plato, near 353 B.c.), I am impressed with the belief that many of his com-
seq. He certainly means the Sokratic men, and Plato as the most celebrated of them, when he talks of οἱ περὶ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ἀποκρίσεις, οὖς ἀντιλο- γικοὺς καλοῦσιν --οἱ περὶ τὰς ἔριδας σπουδάζοντες--- [ὮΟ56 who are powerful in contentious dialectic, and at the same time cultivate geometry and astronomy, which others call ἀδολεσχία and μικρολογία (280)—those who ex- horted hearers to virtue about which others knew nothing, and about which they themselves were in dispute. When he complains of the περιττο- λόγιαε Of the ancient Sophistse, Em pedokles, Ion, Parmenides, Melissus &c., we cannot but suppose that he had in his mind the Timzus of Plato also, though he avoids mention of the
name. 3 Atheneus, iii. p. 122, ii. 60; Dionys. Hal. Epistol. ad Cn. Pomp. p. 757.
38° PHZXDRUS—SYMPOSION. CHaPp. XXVI.
The Dialec- and honourable.’ He who merely writes, must Cross) ποὺ delude himself with the belief that upon these the only. important topics his composition can impart any clear man who ΟἹ lasting instruction. To mistake fancy for reality teach. hereupon, is equally disgraceful, whether the mistake the writer _ be made by few or by many persons, If indeed the he is more writer can explain to others orally the matters written writer. —if he can answer all questions, solve difficulties, and supply the deficiences, of each several reader—in that case he is something far more and better than a writer, and ought to be called a philosopher. But if he can dono more than write, he is no philosopher: he is only a poet, or nomographer, or logographer.” In this latter class stands Lysias. I expect (concludes So- krates) something better from Isokrates, who gives Lysias is promise of aspiring one day to genuine philosophy.*
only a logo- er:
philoso- I have already observed that I dissent from the ‘ . hypothesis of Schleiermacher, Ast, and others, who Date of the regard the Phzedrus either as positively the earliest, ΠΑΝ early or at least among the earliest, of the Platonic dia- logues, composed several years before the death of Sokrates. I agree with Hermann, Stallbaum, and those other critics, who refer it to a much later period of Plato’s life: though I see no sufficient evidence to determine more exactly either its date or its place in the chronological series of dialogues. The views opened in the second half of the dialogue, on the theory of rhetoric and on the efficacy of written compositions as a means of instruction, are very interesting and remarkable. The written discourse of Lysias (presented to us as one greatly Criticism admired at the time by his friends, Phedrus among iven by = them) is contrasted first with a pleading on the same the three subject (though not directed towards the attainment Siethoory of the same end) by Sokrates (supposed to be impro-
1 Plato, Phsedrus, p. 277 D-E. Flato speaks of Isokrates 5 in the Phe: rus, see wha ve observ
2 Plato, Pheedrus, pp. 278-279. upon the Euthydémus, vol. ἢ ch. xxi.
3 Respecting the manner in which pp. 227-229.
CHap. ΧΧΎΙ.. ASSUMPTIONS OF PLATO. 39
vised on the occasion); next with a second pleading of Rhetoric of Sokrates directly opposed to the former, and in- more. tended as a recantation. These three discourses are than So- criticised from the rhetorical point of view,! and are
made the handle for introducing to us a theory of rhetoric. The second discourse of Sokrates, far from being Sokratic in tenor, is the most exuberant effusion of mingled philosophy, poetry, and mystic theology, that ever emanated from Plato.
The theory of rhetoric too is far more Platonic than Sokratic. ᾿ς The peculiar vein of Sokrates is that of confessed is theory ignorance, ardour in enquiry, and testing cross-exami- postulates, nation of all who answer his questions. Butin the Rhetor, Pheedrus we find Plato (under the name of Sokrates) me ton assuming, as the basis of his theory, that an expositor assured— shall be found who knows what is really and truly that all the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dis- doubts ι honourable—distinct from, and independent of, the already ᾿ς established beliefs on these subjects, traditional among his neighbours and fellow-citizens :? assuming (to express the same thing in other words) that all the doubts and difficulties, suggested by the Sokratic cross-examination, have been already considered, elucidated, and removed.
The expositor, master of such perfect knowledge, must farther be master (so Plato tells us) of the arts of logical m4, Expo- definition and division: that is, he must be able to Knowledge gather up many separate fragmentary particulars into and logical one general notion, clearly identified and embodied in Poers ἃ definition: and he must be farther able to subdivide minds un-
feature. This is the only way to follow out truth in a manner clear and consistent with itself: and truth is equally honourable in matters small or great.‘
Thus far we are in dialectic: logical exposition proceeding by
1 Plato, Phsedrus, p. 235 A. contemptible deserves to be sought out 2 Plato, Pheedrus, op. 259 E, 260 E, and proved as much as upon matters 262 B. and sablime, isa doctrine affirmed : Plato, Pheedrus, p. 266. in theSophistés, Politikus, Parmenidés : lato, Pheedrus, p. 261 A. Sophist. pp. 218 E, 227 A; Politik. 266 That truth upon haters small and D; Parmenid. 1 30 E.
40 PHEZDRUS—SYMPOSION. βαρ. XX VI.
way of classifying and declassifying: in which it is assumed that the expositor will find minds unoccupied and unprejudiced, ready to welcome the truth when he lays it before them. But there are many topics on which men’s minds are, in the common and natural course of things, both pre-occupied and dissentient with each other. This is especially the case with Justice, Good- ness, the Honourable, &c.! It is one of the first requisites for the expositor to be able to discriminate this class of topics, where error and discordance grow up naturally among those whom he addresses. It is here that men are liable to be deceived, and require to be undeceived—contradict each other, and argue on opposite sides: such disputes belong to the province of Rhe- toric.
The Rhetor is one who does not teach (according to the logical The Rhetor Process previously described), but persuades ; guiding doesnot {86 mind by discourse to or from various opinions or persuades sentiments. Now if this is to be done by art and persone methodically—that is, upon principle or system expli- pre-occu- cable and defensible—it pre-supposes (according to ingthem Plato) a knowledge of truth, and can only be per- methodi-- formed by the logical expositor. For when men are error to deceived, it is only because they mistake what is like
. truth for truth itself: when they are undeceived, it is because they are made to perceive that what they believe to be truth is only an apparent likeness thereof. Such resemblances are strong or faint, differing by many gradations. Now no one can detect, or bring into account, or compare, these shades of resemblance, except he who knows the truth to which they all ultimately refer. It is through the slight differences that decep- tion is operated. To deceive a man, you must carry him gradu- ally away from the truth by transitional stages, each resembling that which immediately precedes, though the last in the series will hardly at all resemble the first: to undeceive him (or to avoid being deceived yourself), you must conduct him back by the counter-process from error to truth, by a series of transitional resemblances tending in that direction. You cannot do this like an artist (on system and by pre-determination), unless you know
1 Plato, Pheedrus, p. 268 A. ἃ Plato, Pheedrus, ᾿᾿ 261 A. ἣ ῥητορικὴ τέχνη puxaywyla τις διὰ λόγων, Kc.
»
ΟΗΔΡ. XXVL IDEAL OF A PERFECT RHETOR. 4]
what the truth is. By any one who does not know, the process will be performed without art, or at haphazard.
The Rhetor—being assumed as already knowing the truth—if he wishes to make persuasion an art, must proceed in the following manner :—He must distribute the mul- then clas- tiplicity of individual minds into distinct classes,each minds to be marked by its characteristic features of differences, Petsuaded, emotional and intellectual. He must also distribute means of the manifold modes of discourse into distinct classes, or varieties each marked in like manner. Each of these modes oj discourse. of discourse is well adapted to persuade some classes know how of mind—badly adapted to persuade other classes : pea tothe” for such adaptation or non-adaptation there exists a other in
rational necessity,? which the Rhetor must examine ticular and ascertain, informing himself which modes of dis- “** course are adapted to each different class of mind. Having mastered this general question, he must, whenever he is about to speak, be able to distinguish, by rapid perception,*® to which class of minds the hearer or hearers whom he is addressing belong: and accordingly, which mode of discourse is adapted to their particular case. Moreover, he must also seize, in the case before him, the seasonable moment and the appropriate limit, for the use of each mode of discourse. Unless the Rhetor is capable of fulfilling all these exigencies, without failing in any one point, his Rhetoric is not entitled to be called an Art. He requires, in order to be an artist in persuading the mind, as great an assemblage of varied capacities as Hippokrates declares to be necessary for a physician, the artist for curing or preserving the body.‘
The total, thus summed up by Plato, of what is necessary to constitute an Art of Rhetoric, is striking and compre- pyato's hensive. It is indeed an zdéal, not merely unattain- /déal of the
able by reason of its magnitude, but also including enc
1 Plato, Phzedrus, pp. 262 A-D 278 Ὁ. 8 Plato, Phedrus, p. 271 D-E. δεῖ
2 Plato, Phedrus, pp. 270 E, 27 1 δὴ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα A-D. Τρίτον δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενος "πὰ θεώμενον αὑτὰ éy ταῖς πράξεσιν ὅ ὄντα τε λόγων τε καὶ ψνχῆς γένη καὶ τὰ τού- καὶ πραττόμενα, ὀξέως τῇ αἰσθή σει τῶν παθήματα, δίεισι τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρ- δύνασθαι ἑπακολον ety, ἣ “μηδὲ μόττων ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ, καὶ διδάσκων εἰδέναι πω πλέον αὐτῶν ὧν τότε ἥκονε οἵα οὖσα ὑφ᾽ οἵων λόγων δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίαν ἐξ λόγων ξννών. ἀνάγκης ἡ μὲν πείθεται, ἡ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ. 4 Plato, Pheedrus, p. 270 C.
42 ' _ PHADRUS—SYMPOSION. Cuap. XXVL
volvesin impracticable conditions. He begins by postulating patible con- a perfectly wise man, who knows all truth on the ditions— = moet, important social subjects; on which his country- man or men hold erroneous beliefs, just as sincerely as he philosopher + (145 his true beliefs. But Plato has already told us, be listened in the Gorgias, that such a person will not be listened public. to: that in order to address auditors with effect, the rhetor must be in genuine harmony of belief and character with them, not dissenting from them either for the better or the worse : nay; that the true philosopher (so we read in one of the most impressive portions of the Republic) not only has no chancé of guiding the public mind, but incurs public obloquy, and may think himself fortunate if he escapes persecution.1 The dissenter will never be allowed to be the guide of a body of orthodox believers ; and is even likely enough, unless he be prudent, to become their victim. He may be permitted to lecture or discuss, in the gardens of the Academy, with a few chosen friends, and to write eloquent dialogues: but if he embodies his views in motions before the public assembly, he will find only strenuous opposition, or something worse. This view, which is powerfully set forth by Sokrates both in the Gorgias and Republic, is founded on a just appreciation of human societies: and it is moreover the basis of the Sokratic procedure—That the first step to be taken is to disabuse men’s minds of their false persuasion of knowledge—to make them conscious of ignorance—and thus to open their minds for the reception of truth. But if this be the fact, we must set aside as impracticable the postulate advanced by Sokrates here in the Phedrus—of a perfectly wise man as the employer of rhetorical artifices. Moreover I do not agree with what Sokrates is here made to lay down as the philosophy of Error :—that it derives its power of misleading from resemblance to truth. This is the case to a certain extent: but it is very incomplete as an account of the generating causes of error.
But the other portion of Plato’s sum total of what is necessary The other Ὁ an Art of Rhetoric, is not open to the same objec-
τὸ οἱ the tion. It involves no incompatible conditions: and
1 ; as ; - jdéalis | Wwecan say nothing against it, except that it requires
1 Plato, Gorg. p. 513 B, see supra, ch. xxiv. ; Republic, vi. pp. 495-496.
᾿ ..... —
Cuar. ΧΧΥ͂;.Ὶ IMPRACTICABLE CONDITIONS. 43 a breadth and logical command of scientific data, far grand but greater than there is the smallest chance of attaining. “breadthot That Art is an assemblage of processes, directed to a psychologi. definite end, and prescribed by rules which them- classified | selves rest upon scientific data—we find first an- discouree
nounced in the works of Plato! A vast amount of scientific research, both inductive and deductive, is here assumed as an indispensable foundation—and even as a portion—of what he calls the Art of Rhetoric: first, a science of psychology, complete both in its principles and details : next, an exhaustive catalogue and classification of the various modes of operative speech, with their respective impression upon each different class of minds. So prodigious a measure of scientific requirement has never yet been filled up : of course, therefore, no one has ever put together a body of precepts commensurate with it. Aristotle, followin; partially the large conceptions of his master, has given a compre- hensive view of many among the theoretical postulates of Rhe- toric ; and has partially enumerated the varieties both of per- suadable auditors, and of persuasive means available to the speaker for guiding them. Cicero, Dionysius of Halikarnassus, Quintilian, have furnished valuable contributions towards this last category of data, but not much towards the first : being all of them defective in breadth of psychological theory. Nor he:
Science. The Science receives it, con- siders it as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and having investigated its
1TI repeat the citation from the Phx-
one of the most striking passages in Plate p. 271 D.
ἐπειδὴ λόγον δύναμις τυγχάνει ψν- χ ia οὖσα, τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἤσοσθαι ἄγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα εἴδη ἄχει. ἔστιν οὖν τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα" ὅθεν οἱ μὲν τοιοίδε, οἱ δὲ τοιοΐδε γίγνονται. τούτων δὲ δὴ διῃρη- μένων, αὖ τόσα καὶ τόσα ἔστιν «εἴδη, τοιόνδε ἕκαστον. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοίδε ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε λόγων διὰ τήνδε τὴν αἰτίαν ὃς τὰ τοιάδε εὐπειθεῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε διὰ τάδε δνσπειθεῖς, ἄο. Comp. Ῥ. 261 Α.
The relation of Art to Science is thus perspicuously stated by Mr. John Stuart Mull, in the concluding chapter of his System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Book vi. ch. xii. § 2 ):
*‘ The relation in which rules of Art stand to doctrines of Science may be thus characterised. The Art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the
causes and conditions, sends it back to Art with a theorem of the combina- tions of circumstances by which it could be produced. Art then exainines these combinations of circumstances, and according as any of them are or are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. The only one of the premisses, therefore, which Art supplies, is the original major premiss, which asserts that the attainment of the given end is desirable. Science then lends to Art the proposition (ob- tained by a series of inductions or of deductions) that the performance of certain actions will attain the end. From these premisses Art concludes that the performance of these actions is desirable ; and finding it also practi- cable, converts the theorem into a rule or precept.”
44 PHAZDRUS—SYMPOBION. Caap. XXVI.
Plato himself done anything to work out his conception in detail or to provide suitable rules for it. We read it only as an im- pressive sketch —a grand but unattainable tdéal — “qualem nequeo monstrare et.sentio tantum ”.
Indeed it seems that Plato himself regarded it as unattain- Plato’sideal able—and as only worth aiming at for the purpose grandeur = of pleasing the Gods, ποῦ with any view to practical with the benefit, arising from either speech or action among teachers— mankind.! This is a point to be considered, when we Usefulness compare his views on Rhetoric with those of Lysias teachers for and the other rhetors, whom he here judges unfavour- ὅδ wants of ably and even contemptuously. The work of speech plishedman. and action among mankind, which Plato sets aside as unworthy of attention, was the express object of solicitude to Lysias, Isokrates, and rhetors generally : that which they prac- tised efficaciously themselves, and which they desired to assist, cultivate, and improve in others: that which Perikles, in his funeral oration preserved by Thucydides, represents as the pride of the Athenian people collectively*—combination of full freedom of preliminary contentious debate, with energy in executing the resolution which might be ultimately adopted. These rhetors, by the example of their composed speeches as well as by their teaching, did much to impart to young men the power of ex- pressing themselves with fluency and effect before auditors, either in the assembly or in the dikastery: as Sokrates here fully admits. Towards this purpose it was useful to analyse the con- stituent parts of a discourse, and to give an appropriate name to each part. Accordingly, all the rhetorical teachers (Quintilian included) continued such analysis, though differing more or less ‘in their way of performing it, until the extinction of Pagan civi- lisation. Young men were taught to learn by heart regular dis- courses,“—to compose the like for themselves—to understand the difference between such as were well or ill composed—and to acquire a command of oratorical means for moving or convinc- ing the hearer. All this instruction had a practical value:
1 Plato, Phedrus, pp. 278-274. ἣν 2 Thucyd. ii. 30-40-41. οὐχ ἕνεκα τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν πρὸς 3 Plato, Ῥῃεοάγι, p. 268 A. ἀνθρώπονς δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι τὸν σώφρονα, 4 See what is said by Aristotle about ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῖς κεχαρισμένα μὲν λέγειν ἥ Topyiov πραγματεία in the last chapter δύνασθαι, ἄο. (273 ἘΣ of De Sophisticis Elenchis.
Cuap. XXVI. PLATO'S IDEAL GRANDEUR. 45
though Plato, both here and elsewhere, treats it as worthless. A citizen who stood mute and embarrassed, unable to argue a case with some propriety before an audience, felt himself helpless and defective in one of the characteristic privileges of a Greek and a freeman: while one who could perform the process well, acquired much esteem and influence.’ The Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias consoles the speechless men by saying—What does this signify, provided you are just and virtuous? Such consolation failed to satisfy : as it would fail to satisfy the sick, the lame, or the blind.
_The teaching of these rhetors thus contributed to the security, dignity, and usefulness of the citizens, by arming ho phe. them for public speech and action. But it was essen- torical tially practical, or empirical : it had little system, conceived __ and was founded upon a narrow theory. Upon these the Art too points Plato in the Phedrus attacks them. He sets Plato con- little value upon the accomplishments arming men widely. The for speech and action (λεκτικοὺς καὶ πρακτικοὺς εἶναι) --- prineiplesof and he will not allow such teaching to be called an notrequired Art. He explains, in opposition fo them, what he Hla ved to himself conceived the Art of Rhetoric to be, in the 811 learners. comprehensive way which I have above described.
But if the conception of the Art, as entertained by the Rhetors, is too narrow—that of Plato, on the other hand, is too wide.
First, it includes the whole basis of science or theory on which the Art rests: it is a Philosophy of Rhetoric, expounded by a theorist—rather than an Art of Rhetoric, taught to learners by a master. To teach the observance of certain rules or precepts is one thing : to set forth the reasons upon which those rules are founded, is another—highly important indeed, and proper to be known by the teacher; yet not necessarily communicated, or even communicable, to all learners. Quintilian, in his Institutio Rhetorica, gives both :—an ample theory, as well as an ample
17 have illustrated this point in my greatest service not only in procuring History of Greece, by the example of influence to himself, but also in con- Xenophon in his command of the ducting the arm through its many Cyreian army during its retreat. perils and difficulties.
His democratical education, and his See Aristot. Rhet. i. 1, 8, p. 13855, powers of public speaking, were of the Ὁ. 1.
46 PHZDRUS—SYMPOSION. Cuap. XXVI.
development of rules, of his professional teaching. But he would not have thought himself obliged to give this ample theory to all learners. With many, he would have been satisfied to make them understand the rules, and to exercise them in the ready observance thereof.
Secondly, Plato, in defining the Art of Rhetoric, includes not
Platoin- | Only its foundation of science (which, though inti- fis concep- mately connected with it, ought not to be considered tion of Art, as a constituent part), but also the application of it to tion thereof particular cases ; which application lies beyond the fo ney Par province both of science and of art, and cannot be —Thiscan reduced to any rule. “The Rhetor” (says Plato) taught by “must teach his pupils, not merely to observe the ce.
rules whereby persuasion is operated, but also to know the particular persons to whom those rules are to be applied—on what occasions—within what limits—at what pecu- liar moments, &c.' Unless the Rhetor can teach thus much, his pretended art is no art at all: all his other teaching is of no value.” Now this is an amount of exigence which can never be realised. Neither art nor science can communicate that which Plato here requires. The rules of art, together with many different hypothetical applications thereof, may be learnt : when the scientific explanation of the rules is superadded, the learner will be assisted farther towards fresh applications: but after both these have been learnt, the new cases which will arise can never be specially foreseen. The proper way of applying the general precepts to each case must be suggested by conjecture adapted to the circumstances, under the corrections of past ex- perience.? It is inconsistent in Plato, after affirming that nothing
1 Plato, Pheedr. pp. 268 B, 272 A.
2 What Longinus says about critical skill is applicable here 8180---πολλῆς ἔστι πείρας τελευταῖον ἐπιγέννημα. 180- krates (De Permut. Or. xv. sect. 290- 3812-316) has some good remarks about the impossibility of ἐπιστήμη respecting particulars. Plato, in the Gorgias, puts τέχνη, which he states to depend upon reason and foreknowledge, in opposi- tion to ἐμπειρία and τριβή, which he considers as dependant on the φύσις croxaonxy. But in applying the knowledge or skill called Art to parti- cular cases, the φύσις στοχαστικὴ 18
the best that can be had (p. 463 A-B). The conception of τέχνη given in the Gorgias is open to the same remark as that which we find in the Phxdrus. Plato, in another passage of the Phee- drus, speaks of the necetsity that φύσις, ἐπιστήμη, and μελέτη, shall con- cur to make an accomplished orator This is very true; and Lysias, Iso- krates, and all the other rhetors whom Plato satirises, would have concurred in it. In his description of τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη, and in the estimate which he gives of all that it comprises, he leaves no outlying ground for μελέτη.
CuHaPp. ΧΧΥΙ. PLATO'S CONCEPTION OF ART. 47
deserves the name of art! except what is general—capable of being rationally anticipated and prescribed beforehand—then to include in art the special treatment required for the multiplicity of particular cases ; the analogy of the medical art, which he here instructively invokes, would be against him on this point.
While therefore Plato’s view of the science or theory of Rhe- toric is far more comprehensive and philosophical pyato's than any thing given by the rhetorical teachers—he charge has not made good his charge against them, that what Hhetorical they taught as an art of Rhetoric was useless and Hot made illusory. The charge can only be sustained if we grant °° —what appears to have been Plato’s own feeling—that the social and political life of the Athenians was a dirty and corrupt business, unworthy of a virtuous man to meddle with. This is the argument of Sokrates (in the Gorgias,? the other great anti- rhetorical dialogue), proclaiming himself to stand alone and aloof, an isolated, free-thinking dissenter. As representing his sincere conviction, and interpreting Plato’s plan of life, this argument deserves honourable recognition. But we must re- member that Lysias and the rhetorical teachers repudiated such a point of view. They aimed at assisting and strengthening others to perform their parts, not in speculative debate on philo- sophy, but in active citizenship ; and they succeeded in this object to a great degree. The rhetorical ability of Lysias per- sonally is attested not merely by the superlative encomium on him assigned to Phedrus,’ but also by his great celebrity—by the frequent demand for his services as a logographer or com- poser of discourses for others—by the number of his discourses preserved and studied after his death. He, and a fair proportion _of the other rhetors named in the Phedrus, performed well the useful work which they undertook.
When Plato selects, out of the very numerous discourses be- fore him composed by Lysias, one hardly intended for Pilato has any real auditors—neither deliberative, nor judicial, not,treated
Lysias fairly, nor panegyrical, but an ingenious erotic paradox for 4 in neglect-
and a goed e of Sophistas, αι τα 1 Plato. Gorgias, ἐπι “464-465, De Compos. Verborum, in which that 2 Plato, Gorg PB rhetor remarks that καιρὸς ΟΣ oppor- 3 Plato, Phair p. 228 A.
48 PHADRUS—SYMPOSION. παρ. XXVE
ing his private circle of friends—this is no fair specimen of works, and theauthor. Moreover Plato criticises it as if it were selecting for a philosophical exposition instead of an oratorical eroticexer- pleading. He complains that Lysias does not begin
εἶα τος “ his discourse by defining—but neither do Demos- circle. thenes and other great orators proceed in that manner. He affirms that there is no organic structure, or necessary sequence, in the discourse, and that the sentences of it might be read in an inverted order : \—and this remark is to a certain extent well-founded. In respect to the skilful marshalling of the different parts of a discourse, so as to give best effect to the whole, Dionysius of Halikarnassus? declares Lysias to be inferior to some other orators—while ascribing to him marked oratorical superiority on various other points. Yet Plato, in specifying his objections against the erotic discourses of Lysias, does not show that it offends against the sound general principle which he him- self lays down respecting the art of persuasion—That the topics insisted on by the persuader shall be adapted to the feelings and dispositions of the persuadend. Far from violating this principle, Lysias kept it in view, and employed it to the best of his power— as we may see, not merely by his remaining orations, but also by the testimonies of the critics :* though he did not go through the large preliminary work of scientific classification, both of diffe- rent minds and different persuasive apparatus, which Plato con- siders essential to a thorough comprehension and mastery of the principle.
The first discourse assigned by Plato to Sokrates professes to No fair be placed in competition with the discourse of Lysias,
cenbetaken and to aim at the same object. But in reality it aims
1 Plato, Phedrus, pp. 268-264 - still more inferior in respect to δεινοτὴς
2 Dionysius (J udicium De Lysia, p and to strong emotional effects. 487-493) gives an elaborate critveismn δὰ 3 Dionys. Hal. (Ars Rhetorica, | ἢ. the πραγματικὸς χαρακτὴρ of Lysias. 881) notices the severe exigencies whic The special excellence of Lysias (ac- Plato here imposes upon the Rhetor, cording to this critic) lay in his judicial remarking that scarcely y any rhetorical orations, which were highly persuasive discourse could be produced which
ἃ plausibl e: the manner of present- came up tothem. The defect did not
ingt oughts wasingeniousand adapted belong to Lysias alone, but to all other to the aah nap the narration of acts rhetors also—omdre yap Kat Λυσίαν an e 5 ΘΒΡΘΟΙΒ, Υ͂, Was periorm ἐλέγχει, πᾶσαν τὴν ἡμετέραν ῥητορικὴν
with unrivalled skill Bat as to the ἔοικέν ἐλέγ ἔγχειν. Demosthenes almost marshalling Ὁ of the different parts ofa alone (in the opinion of Dionysius) discourse, Dionysius considers Lysias contrived to avoid the fault, because as inferior to some other orators—and he imitated Plato
Cuap. XXVL UNFAIR TREATMENT OF LYSIAS. 49
at a different object: it gives the dissuasive argu- between ments, but omits the persuasive—as Phadrus is made [his exer- to point out: so that it cannot be fairly compared bysias and with the discourse of Lysias. Still more may this be courses de- said respecting the second discourse of Sokrates : livered by which is of a character and purpose so totally dis- in the parate, that no fair comparison can be taken between Pheodrus. it and the ostensible competitor. The mixture of philosophy, mysticism, and dithyrambic poetry, which the second discourse of Sokrates. presents, was considered by a rhetorical judge like Dionysius as altogether inconsistent with the scope and purpose of reasonable discourse.' In the Menexenus, Plato has brought himself again into competition with Lysias, and there the com- petition is fairer:? for Plato has there entirely neglected the exigencies enforced in the Pheedrus, and has composed a funeral discourse upon the received type; which Lysias and other orators before him had followed, from Perikles downward. But in the Pheedrus, Plato criticises Lysias upon principles which are a medley between philosophy and rhetoric. Lysias, in defending himself, might have taken the same ground as we find Sokrates himself taking in the Euthydémus, “Philosophy and politics are two distinct walks, requiring different aptitudes, and having each its own practitioners. A man may take whichever he pleases ; but he must not arrogate to himself superiority by an untoward attempt to join the two together.” 5
Another important subject is also treated in the Phedrus. Sokrates delivers views both original and charac- goptinuous teristic, respecting the efficacy of continuous discourse discourse, —either written to be read, or spoken to be heard written or without cross-examination—as a means of instruction. SP0Ken, in- They are re-stated—in a manner substantially the 88 ἃ means same, though with some variety and fulness of illus- tion to the tration—in Plato’s seventh Epistle‘ to the surviving ‘sort. friends of Dion. I have already touched upon these views in my fourth Chapter, on the Platonic Dialogues generally, and have
1 See the Epistol. of Dion. Halikarn. baum, Comm. in Menexenum, pp. 10-
to Cneius Pompey—De Platone—pp. 11. 755- 65. pey PP 3 Plato, Euthydém. p. 806 A-C.
765. 2 Plato, Menexen. p 237 seq. Stall- 4 Plato, Epistol. vii. pp. 341-344.
50 . PHADRUS—SYMPOSION. σπᾶν. XXVL
pointed out how much Plato understood to be involved in what he termed knowledge. No man (in his view) could be said to Know, who was not competent to sustain successfully, and to apply successfully, a Sokratic cross-examination. Now know- ledge, involving such a competency, certainly cannot be commu- nicated by any writing, or by any fixed and unchangeable array of words, whether written or spoken. You must familiarise learners with the subject on many different sides, and in relation _ to many different points of view, each presenting more or less chance of error or confusion. Moreover, you must apply a different treatment to each mind, and to the same mind at different stages: no two are exactly alike, and the treatment adapted for one will be unsuitable for the other. While it is impossible, for these reasons, to employ any set forms of words, it will be found that the process of reading or listening leaves the reader or listener comparatively passive : there is nothing to stir the depths of the mind, or to evolve the inherent forces and dormant capacities. Dialectic conversation is the only process which can adapt itself with infinite variety to each particular case and moment—and which stimulates fresh mental efforts ever renewed on the part of each respondent and each questioner. Knowledge—being a slow result generated by this stimulating operation, when skilfully conducted, long continued, and much diversified—is not infused into, but evolved out of, the mind. It consists in a revival of those unchangeable Ideas or Forms, with which the mind during its state of eternal pre-existence had had communion. There are only a few privileged minds, however, that have had sufficient communion therewith to render such revival possible : accordingly, none but these few can ever rise to knowledge.'
Though knowledge cannot be first communicated by written Written matters, yet if it has been once communicated and matteris subsequently forgotten, it may be revived by written memoran- matters. Writing has thus a real, though secondary, Sorsone Usefulness, as a memorandum. And Plato doubtless whoknow accounted written dialogues the most useful of all
1 Schleiermacher, in his Introduc- —‘‘die icht Sokratische erhabene Ver. tion to the Phadrus, justly character- achtung alles Schreibens und alles red- ises this doctrine as genuine Sokratism nerischen Redens,” p. 70.
Crap. XXVI- USEFULNESS OF WRITTEN MATTER. δῚ
written compositions, because they imitated portions dlogeate of that long oral process whereby alone knowledge pastime. had been originally generated. His dialogues were reports of the conversations purporting to have been held by Sokrates with others.
It is an excellent feature in the didactic theories of Plato, that they distinguish so pointedly between the passive and Plato's active conditions of the intellect ; and that they pos- didactic tulate as indispensable, an habitual and cultivated ‘heorlesare mental activity, worked up by slow, long-continued, high to be colloquy. To read or hear, and then to commit to memory, are in his view elegant recreations, but nothing more. But while, on this point, Plato’s didactic theories deserve admira- tion, we must remark on the other hand that they are pitched so high as to exceed human force, and to overpass all possibility of being realised.! They mark out an tdéal, which no person ever attained, either then or since—like the Platonic theory of rhetoric. To be master of any subject, in the extent and perfec- tion required for sustaining and administering a Sokratic cross- examination—is a condition which scarce any one can ever fulfil: certainly no one, except upon a small range of subjects. Assuredly, Plato himself never fulfilled it.
Such a cross-examination involved the mastery of all the openings for doubt, difficulty, deception, or refutation, bearing on the subject: openings which a man is to N° one has profit by, if assailant—to keep guarded, if defendant. found com- Now when we survey the Greek negative philosophy, solve the as it appears in Plato, Aristotle, and Sextus Empiri- ‘mculties cus—and when we recollect that between the second Sokrates, and the third of these names, there appeared three Karneades, other philosophers equally or more formidable in the 224 the same vein, all whose arguments have perished (Arke- vein of hy silaus, Karneades, Ainesidémus)—we shall see that ” ΠΣ no man has ever been known competent both to strike and parry with these weapons, in a manner so skilful and ready as to
_1A remark made by Sextus Em- βάνομεν τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον piricus (upon another doctrine which τέχνην, ὑπερφθεγγομένων ἔστι
if discussing) may be applied to τὴν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν, καὶ _edxo- this view of to—ro δὲ λέγειν ὅτι μένων μᾶλλον ἢ ἀληθῆ λεγόντων (Pyrrk. τῷ διομαλισμῷ τῶν πράξεων καταλαμ- Hyp. iii. 244).
δ2 PHADRUS—SYMPOSION. CuHaPp. XXVI.
amount to knowledge in the Platonic sense. But in so far as snch knowledge is attainable or approachable, Plato is right in saying that it cannot be attained except by long dialectic practice. Reading books, and hearing lectures, are undoubtedly valuable aids, but insufficient by themselves. Modern times recede from it even more than ancient. Regulated oral dialectic has become unknown ; the logical and metaphysical difficulties —which negative philosophy required to be solved before it would allow any farther progress—are now little heeded, amidst the multiplicity of observed facts, and theories adapted to and commensurate with those facts. This change in the character of philosophy is doubtless a great improvement. It is found that by acquiescing provisionally in the axtomata media, and by applying at every step the control of verification, now rendered possible by the multitude of ascertained facts—the sciences may march safely onward: notwithstanding that the logical and metaphysical difficulties, the puzzles (ἀπορίαι) involved in phélo- sophia prima and its very high abstractions, are left behind unsolved and indeterminate. But though the modern course of philosophy is preferable to the ancient, it is not for that reason to be considered as satisfactory. These metaphysical difficulties are not diminished either in force or relevancy, because modern writers choose to leave them unnoticed. Plato and Aristotle were quite right in propounding them as problems, the solution of which was indispensable to the exigencies and consistent schematism of the theorising intelligence, as well as to any com- plete discrimination between sufficient and insufficient evidence. Such they still remain, overlooked yet not defunct.
Now all these questions would be solved by the tdéal philoso- Plato's idéal pher whom Plato in the Phedrus conceives as pos- philosopher sessing knowledge: a person who shall be at once a can only °° negative Sokrates in excogitating and enforcing all under the (Ὡς difficulties—and an affirmative match for So- olapre- krates, as respondent in solving them : a person com- Ornisciant petent to apply this process to all the indefinite soul, stimu- variety of individual minds, under the inspirations fullremini- of the moment. This is a magnificent wdéal. Plato sence here. firms truly, that those teachers who taught rhetoric and philosophy by writing, could never produce such a pupil:
CuaP. ΧΧΥ͂Ι. ANCIENT AND MODERN PROBLEMS. 53
and that even the Sokratic dialectic training, though indispen- sable and far more efficacious, would fail in doing so, unless in those few cases where it was favoured by very superior capacity —understood by him as superhuman, and as a remnant from the pre-existing commerce of the soul with the world of Forms or Ideas. The foundation therefore of the whole scheme rests upon Plato’s hypothesis of an antecedent life of the soul, proclaimed by Sokrates here in his second or panegyrical discourse on Eros. The rhetorical teachers, with whom he here compares himself and whom he despises as aiming at low practical ends—might at any rate reply that they avoided losing themselves in such un- measured and unwarranted hypotheses.
One remark yet remains to be made upon the doctrine here set forth by Plato: that no teaching is possible by pifferent means of continuous discourse spoken or written— Proceeding none, except through prolonged and varied oral dia- theTimaus. lectic.' To this doctrine Plato does not constantly conform in his practice : he departs from it on various important occasions. In the Timzus, Sokrates calls upon the philosopher so named for an exposition on the deepest and most mysterious cosmical subjects. Timzus delivers the exposition in a continuous harangue, without a word of remark or question addressed by any of the auditors : while at the beginning of the Kritias (the next succeeding dialogue) Sokrates greatly commends what Timeus had spoken. The Kritias itself too (though unfinished) is given in the form of continuous exposition. Now, as the Timzus is more abstruse than any other Platonic writing, we cannot imagine that Plato, at the time when he composed it, thought so meanly about continuous exposition, as a vehicle of instruction, as we find him declaring in the Phedrus. I point this out, because it illustrates my opinion that the different dia- logues of Plato represent very different, sometimes even opposite,
1 The historical Sokrates would not allow his oral dialectic process to be
called teaching. He expressly says “1 have never been the teacher of any
τὸν μανθάνοντα. The Platonic So- krates, in the Phedrus and Sy sion, differs from both; he recognises no teaching except the perpe genera-
one” (Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 33 A, 19 BE): and he disclaimed the possession of knowledge. Aristotle too considers teaching as a presentation of truths, ready made and supposed to be known, by the teacher to learners, who are bound to believe them, δεῖ yap πιστεύειν
tion of new thoughts and feelings, by meansof stimulating dialectic colloquy, and the revival in the mind thereby of the experience of an antecedent life, during which some communion has been enjoyed with the world of Ideas or Forms.
δ4᾽ PHZDRUS—SYMPOSION. CHap. XXVI.
points of view : and that it is a mistake to treat them as parts of one preconceived and methodical system.
Plato is usually extolled by his admirers, as the champion of Opposite the Absolute—of unchangeable forms, immutable tendencies truth, objective necessity cogent and binding on every in Plato's one. He is praised for having refuted Protagoras ; mind ἘΝ Who can find no standard beyond the individual Transcen- recognition and belief, of his own mind or that of Absolute— some one else. There is no doubt that Plato often Extra oor talks in that strain: but the method followed in his , adaptation dialogues, and the general principles of method which to ind and he lays down, here as well as elsewhere, point to a occasions. directly opposite conclusion. Of this the Phedrus is a signal instance. Instead of the extreme of generality, it pro- claims the extreme of specialty. The objection which the Sokrates of the Pheedrus advances against the didactic efficacy of written discourse, is founded on the fact, that it is the same to all readers—that it takes no cognizance of the differences of individual minds nor of the same mind at different times. So- krates claims for dialectic debate the valuable privilege, that it is eonstant action and re-action between two individual minds—an appeal by the inherent force and actual condition of each, to the like elements in the other—an ever shifting presentation of the same topics, accommodated to the measure of intelligence and cast of emotion in the talkers and at the moment. The indi- viduality of each mind—both questioner and respondent—is here kept in view as the governing condition of the process. No two minds can be approached by the same road or by the same interrogation. The questioner cannot advance a step except by the admission of the respondent. Every respondent is the measure to himself. He answers suitably to his own belief; he defends by his own suggestions ; he yields to the pressure of contradiction and inconsistency, when he feels them, and not before. Each dialogist is (to use the Protagorean phrase) the measure to himself of truth and falsehood, according as he him- self believes it. Assent or dissent, whichever it may be, springs only from the free working of the individual mind, in its actual condition then and there. It is to the individual mind alone, that appeal is made, and this is what Protagoras asks for.
Cuap. XXVL. OPPOSITE TENDENCIES IN PLATO'S MIND. 55
We thus find, in Plato’s philosophical character, two extreme opposite tendencies and opposite poles co-existent. We must recognise them both: but they can never be reconciled : some- times he obeys and follows the one, sometimes the other.
If it had been Plato’s purpose to proclaim and impose upon every one something which he called “ Absolute Truth,” one and the same alike imperative upon all—he would best proclaim it by preaching or writing. To modify this “Absolute,” according to the varieties of the persons addressed, would divest it of its intrinsic attribute and excellence. If you pretend to deal with an Absolute, you must turn away your eyes from all diversity of apprehending intellects and believing subjects.
56 - PARMENIDES, CuaP. XXVIL.
CHAPTER XXVIL PARMENIDES.
In the dialogues immediately preceding—Phedon, Pheedrus, Symposion—we have seen Sokrates manifesting his dialogues § usual dialectic, which never fails him: but we have jmmediate- iso seen him indulging in a very unusual vein of ing-much positive affirmation and declaration. He has un- dental folded many novelties about the states of pre-exist- Onposite ence and post-existence: he has familiarised us with character Jdeas, Forms, Essences, eternal and unchangeable, as Parme- the causes of all the facts and particularities of nides. nature: he has recognised the inspired variety of madness, as being more worthy of trust than sober, uninspired, intelligence: he has recounted, with the faith of a communicant fresh from the mysteries, revelations made to him by the prophetess Diotima,—respecting the successive stages of exalta- tion whereby gifted intelligences, under the stimulus of Eros Philosophus, ascend into communion with the great sea of Beauty. All this is set forth with as much charm as Plato’s eloquence can bestow. But after all, it is not the true character of Sokrates:—I mean, the Sokrates of the Apology, whose mission it is to make war against the chronic malady of the human mind—false persuasion of knowledge, without the reality. It is, on the contrary, Sokrates himself infected with the same chronic malady which he combats in others, and requiring medicine against it as much as others. Such is the exact charac- ter in which Sokrates appears in the Parmenides: which dialogue I shall now proceed to review.
The Parmenides announces its own purpose as intended to
Cuap. XXVIL EXERCISES FOR PHILOSOPHICAL ASPIRANTS. 57
repress premature forwardness of affirmation, in & gokrates is young philosophical aspirant: who, with meritorious the juvenile eagerness in the search for truth, and with his eyes Parmenides turned in the right direction to look for it—has ane Severan nevertheless not fully estimated the obstructions be- er Par. setting his path, nor exercised himself in the efforts menides necessary to overcome them. By a curious trans- §pecimon of position, or perhaps from deference on Plato’s part to exercises” the Hellenic sentiment of Nemesis,—Sokrates, who formed by in most Platonic dialogues stands forward as the phical aspi- privileged censor and victorious opponent, is here the rant. juvenile defendant under censorship by a superior. It is the veteran Parmenides of Elea who, while commending the specu- lative impulse and promise of Sokrates, impresses upon him at the same time that the theory which he had. advanced—the self-existence, the separate and substantive nature, of Ideas— stands exposed to many grave objections, which he (Sokrates) has not considered and cannot meet. So far, Parmenides performs towards Sokrates the same process of cross-examining refutation as Sokrates himself applies to Theztétus and other young men elsewhere. But we find in this dialogue something ulterior and even peculiar. Having warned Sokrates that his intellectual training has not yet been carried to a point commensurate with the earnestness of his aspirations—Parmenides proceeds to de- scribe to him what exercises he ought to go through, in order to guard himself against premature assertion or hasty partiality. Moreover, Parmenides not only indicates in general terms what ought to be done, but illustrates it by giving a specimen of such exercise, on a topic chosen by himself.
Passing over the dramatic introduction! whereby the per-
1 This dramatic introduction is ex- the , in order to justify the bring- tremely complicated. The whole dia- ing Sokrates into personal communica- logue, from beginning to end, is re- tion with Parmenides: for some un- counted by Kephalus of Klazomene; friendly critics tried to make out that who h it from the Athenian Anti- the two could not ssibly have con-
hon—who himself had heard it from versed on philosophy (Atheneus, xi. Pythodbrus, a friend of Zeno, present 505). Plato declares the ages of the when the conversation was held. A persons with remarkable exactness: 8 of circumstances are narrated Parmenides was 65, completely grey- by Kephalus, to explain how he came _ headed, but of noble mien: Zeno about to wish to hear it, and to find out Anti- 40, tall and graceful: Sokrates very
hon. Plato appears anxious to throw young. (Plat. Parmen. p. 127 B-C. the event back as far as possible into It required some invention in Plato
58 PARMENIDES. CHap. XXVIL.
Circum. j§ Sonages discoursing are brought together, we find So- stancesand krates, Parmenides, and the Eleatic Zeno (the disciple fee Parme- of Parmenides), engaged in the main dialogue. When nides. Parmenides begins his illustrative exercise, a person named Aristotle (afterwards one of the Thirty oligarchs at Athens), still younger than Sokrates, is made to serve as re- spondent.
Sokrates is one among various auditors, who are .assembled to hear Zeno reading aloud a treatise of his own composition, intended to answer and retort upon the opponents of his pre- ceptor Parmenides.,
The main doctrine of the real Parmenides was, “That Ens, Manner in the absolute, real, self-existent, was One and not Juich the many”: which doctrine was impugned and derided. of Parme- by various opponents, deducing from it absurd con- tmpugned. clusions. Zeno defended his master by showing that Manner in the opposite doctrine (—“That Ens, the absolute, partisan self-existent universe, is Many—”) led to conclusions fanode absurd in an equal or greater degree. If the Absolute him. Ens were Many, the many would be both like and unlike: but they cannot have incompatible and contradictory attributes: therefore Absolute Ens is not Many. Ens, as Par- menides conceived it, was essentially homogeneous and un- changeable : even assuming it to be Many, all its parts must be homogeneous, so that what was predicable of one must be pre- dicable of all; it might be all alike, or all unlike : but it could not be both. Those who maintained the plurality of Ens, did so on the ground of apparent severalty, likeness, and unlikeness, in the sensible world. But Zeno, while admitting these phenomena in the sensible world, as relative to us, apparent, and subject to the varieties of individual estimation—denied their applicability to absolute and self-existent Ens! Since absolute Ens or Entia are Many (said the opponents of Parmenides), they will be both like and unlike: and thus we can explain the phenomena of the sensible world. The absolute (replied Zeno) cannot be both like and unlike; therefore it cannot be many. We must recollect
to provide a narrator, suitable for re- ΑΙ have already given a short ac- counting events so long antecedent as count of the Zenonian Dialectic, ch. ii.
the young period of Sokrates. p. 93 seq.
Cuap. XXVII. MAIN DOCTRINE OF PARMENIDES. 59
that both Parmenides and Zeno renounced all attempt to explain the sensible world by the absolute and purely intelligible Ena. They treated the two as radically distinct and unconnected. The one was absolute, eternal, unchangeable, homogeneous, apprehended only by reason. The other was relative, temporary, variable, heterogeneous ; a world of individual and subjective Opinion, upon which no absolute truth, no pure objectivity, could be reached.
Sokrates, depicted here as a young man, impugns this doctrine of Zeno: and maintains that the two worlds, though naturally disjoined, were not incommunicable. He _ here im- advances the Platonic theory of Ideas: that is, an μας ἐμ of intelligible world of many separate self-existent 2e0°. He Forms or Ideas, apprehended by reason only—and a Platonic sensible world of particular objects, each participating Ideas sepa- in one or more of these Forms or Ideas. “What you Tt from say (he remarks to Zeno), is true of the world of objects, yet Forms or Ideas: the Form of Likeness per se can pable by never be unlike, nor can the Form of Unlikeness be ὅπ αι. ever like. But in regard to the sensible world, there is nothing to hinder you and me, and other objects which rank and are numbered as separate individuals, from participating both in the Form of likeness and in the Form of unlikeness.! In so far as I, an individual object, participate in the Form of Likeness, I am properly called like ; in so far as I participate in the Form of Unlikeness, I am called unlike. So about One and Many, Great and Little, and so forth: I, the same individual, may participate in many different and opposite Forms, and may derive from them different and opposite denominations. I am one and many—like and unlike—great and little—all at the same time. But no such combination is possible between the Forms themselves, self-existent and opposite: the Form of Like- ness cannot become unlike, nor vice versé. The Forms themselves stand permanently apart, incapable of fusion or coalescence with each other: but different and even opposite Forms may lend
1 Plato, Parmenid. p. 129 A. ov ἐναντίον, ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον; τούτοιν δὲ νομίξεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἶδός τι δνοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἃ ὁ Os, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὖ ἄλλο τι δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν, μεταλαμβάνειν ;
60 PARMENIDES. Cuap. XXVII.
themselves to participation and partnership in the same sensible individual object.”?
Parmenides and Zeno are represented as listening with surprise Parmenides 224 interest to this language of Sokrates, recognising andZeno _— two distinct worlds: one, of invisible but intelligible philosophi- Forms,—the other that of. sensible objects, partici- calardour . patinginthese Forms. “Your ardour for philosophy” Parmenides (observes Parmenides to Sokrates), “is admirable. Is objections this distinction your own ?”* against the = Plato now puts into the mouth of Parmenides—the thoory of advocate of One absolute and unchangeable Ens, sepa-
rated by an impassable gulf from the sensible world of transitory and variable appearances or phenomena—objections against what is called the Platonic theory of Ideas: that is, the theory of an intelligible world, comprising an indefinite number of distinct intelligible and unchangeable Forms—in partial rela- tion and communication with another world of sensible objects, each of which participates in one or more of these Forms. We thus have the Absolute One pitted against the Absolute Many.
What number and variety of these intelligible Forms do you What Ideas Tecognise—(asks Parmenides)? Likeness and Unlike- does 80 1- ness—One and Many—Just, Beautiful, Good, &.— nise? Of are all these Forms absolute and existent per se? Good? Yes. Sokr.—Certainly they are. Parm.—Do you farther recognise an absolute and self-existent Form of Man, Doubtful. apart from us and all other individuals ?—or a Form Madea of fire, water, and the like? Sokr—I do not well No. know how to answer :—I have often been embarrassed with the question. Parm.—Farther, do there exist distinct intelligible Forms of hair, mud, dirt, and all the other mean and contemptible objects of sense which we see around? Sokr.—No —certainly—no such Forms as these exist. Such objects are as we see them, and nothing beyond: it would be too absurd to suppose Forms of such like things*® Nevertheless there are
1 Plato, Parmenid. pp. 129-130. 3 Plato, Parmenid. p. 180 Ὁ. Οὐδα-
2 Plato, Parmenid. Ὁ. 180 A. °D μῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτην, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα Σώκρατες, ὡς ἄξιος εἶ ἄγασθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς μέν γε, ἅπερ ὁρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι - τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους" καί μοι εἰπέ, εἶδος δέ τι αὐτῶν οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς ἢ ἄτοπον.
λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἅττα, χωρὶς Alexander, who opposes the doctrine δὲ Τὰ πούτων αὖ μετέχοντα; of the Platonists about Ideas, treats it
Cuap. XXVIL ANTITHESIS OF EMOTION AND SCIENCE. 61
times when I have misgivings on the point ; and when I suspect that there must be Forms of them as well as of the others) When such reflections cross my mind, I shrink from the absurdity of the doctrine, and try to confine my attention to Forms like those which you mentioned first.
Parm.—You are still young, Sokrates :—you still defer to the common sentiments of mankind. But the time will parmenides come when philosophy will take stronger hold of you, feclares and will teach you that no object in nature is mean ject in na- or contemptible in her view.! he ori
to the philo- sopher.
Remarks upon this— This remark deserves attention. Plato points out Pontrastbe- the radical distinction, and frequent antipathy between tional and classifications constructed by science, and those which en oe grow up spontaneously under the associating influence tion. of a common emotion. What he calls “the opinions of men,”— in other words, the associations naturally working in an untaught and unlettered mind—bring together the ideas of objects accord- ing as they suggest a like emotion—veneration, love, fear, anti- pathy, contempt, laughter, &c.? As things which inspire like emotions are thrown into the same category and receive the same denomination, so the opposite proceeding inspires great repug- nance, when things creating antipathetic emotions are forced into the same category. A large proportion of objects in nature come to be regarded as unworthy of any serious attention, and fit only to serve for discharging on them our laughter, contempt, or antipathy. The investigation of the structure and manifestations of insects is one of the marked features which Aristophanes ridicules in Sokrates : moreover the same poet also brings odium on the philosopher for alleged study of astronomy and meteoro- logy—the heavenly bodies being as it were at the opposite emo- tional pole, objects of such reverential admiration and worship,
=")
as understood that they did not re- δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις " cognise Ideas of worms, gnats, and νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβὰ ἐ- such like animals. Schol. δὰ Aristot. πεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.
ally Plato, tect however, occasion: . y appeals πρὸς ἀνθρώπων δόξας, an 1 Plato, Parmenid. p. 180 Ε. Νέος becomes ἀτεχνῶς δημήγορος, when it yap εἶ ἔτι, καὶ οὕπω cov ἀντείληπται suits his argument; see Gorgias, 494
οφία ὡς ὅτι ἀντιλήψεται, κατ᾿ ἐμὴν C.
62 PARMENIDES. CuaP. XXVIL that it was impious to watch or investigate them, or calculate their proceedings beforehand.1 The extent to which anatomy © and physiology were shut out from study in antiquity, and have continued to be partially so even in modern times, is well known. And the proportion of phenomena is both great and important, connected with the social relations, which are excluded both from formal registration and from scientific review ; kept away from all rational analysis either of causes or remedies, because of the strong repugnances connected with them. This emotional view of nature is here noted by Plato as conflicting with the scientific. No object (he says) is mean in the eyes of philosophy. He remarks to the same effect in the Sophistés and Politikus, and the remark is illustrated by the classifying processes there ex- hibited :? mean objects and esteemed objects being placed sid
by side. :
Parmenides now produces various objections against the Platonic variety of dualism : the two distinct but partially inter- communicating worlds—one, of separate, permanent, unchange- able, Forms or Ideas—the other, of individual objects, transient and variable ; participating in, and receiving denomination from, these Forms.
1. How (asks Parmenides) can such participation take place ?
1 Aristophan. Nubes, 145-170-1490.
τί yap μαθόντ' és τοὺς θεοὺς ὑβρίζετον,
καὶ τῆς σελήνης ἀσκοπεῖσθε τὴν ἕδραν; Compare Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 11-18, iv. 7, 6-7; Plutarch, Perikles, 23; the second chapter of the first Book of Macrobius, about the discredit which is supposed to be thrown upon grand and solemn subjects by a plain and naked exposition. ‘‘ Inimicam nature nudam expositionem sui.”
2 Plato, Sophist. p. 227 B; Politik. p. 266 D; also Themtét. p. 174 Ὁ.
Both the Platonic Sokrates, and the
Xenophontic Sokrates, frequently illus- ε{8
L the | gigcation of men b rison © brin, up of young Paimals ne well as with ὁ e ning of horses : they also compare the educator of young men with the trainer of young
com-
horses. Indeed this comparison occurs so frequently, that it excites much dis-
leasure among various modern critics yrorchhammer Kochly, Socher, &. who seem to consider it as and inconsistent with ‘‘the dignity of human nature”. The frequent allu- sions made by Plato to the homely arts and professions are noted by his interlocutors as tiresome.
See Plato, Apolog. Sokr. p. 20 A. ὦ Καλλία, δὶ μέν δον τὼ vide πώλω ἣ μόσχω ἐγενέσθην, KE.
‘the Foological works of Aristotle exhibit a memorable example of scien-
c in ce, overcoming all the contempt and st usually associated with minute and repulsive organisms. To Plato, it would be repugnant to arrange in the same class the wolf and the dog. See Sophist. p. 281 A.
Caap. XXVIL OBJECTIONS TO PLATONIO THEORY.
Is the entire Form in each individual object? No:
63
Objecti for one and the same Form cannot be at the same of Parme- time in many distant objects. A part of it therefore can objents” inust be in one object ; another part in another. But participate | this assumes that the Form is divisible—or is not Eachcannot essentially One. Equality is in all equal objects : but whic tea, how can a part of the Form equality, less than the nor 8 part
whole, make objects equal? Again, littleness is in all little objects : that is, a part of the Form littleness is in each. But the Form littleness cannot have parts ; because, if it had, the entire Form would be greater than any of its parts,—and the Form littleness cannot be greater than any thing. Moreover, if one part of littleness were added to other parts, the sum of the two would be less, and not greater, than either of the factors. It is plain that none of these Forms can be divisible, or can have parts. Objects therefore cannot participate in the Form by parts or piecemeal. But neither can each object possess the entire Form. Accordingly, since there remains no third possibility, objects cannot participate in the Forms at all.
2. Parmenides now passes to a second argument. The reason why you assume that each one of these Forms exists,
is—That when you contemplate many similar objects, the | dea © one and the same ideal phantom or Concept is sug- With the | gested by all? Thus, when you see many great jects par- ς ° . ἢ taking in objects, one common impression of greatness arises the Idea, there i from all. Hence you conclude that The Great, or jixeness be- the Form of Greatness, exists as One. But if you tween them take this Form of Greatness, and consider it in com- be repre- parison with each or all the great individual objects, ietor b fod it will have in common with them something that —and soon ad infinitum.
makes it great. You must therefore search for some
higher Form, which represents what belongs in common both to the Form of Greatness and to individual great objects. And this higher Form again, when compared with the rest, will have
1 Plato, Parmenid. Ὁ. 181. A similar argament, showing the impossibility of such μέθεξις, appears in Sextus Em-
c. adv. Arithmeticos, sect. 11-20, p. Fab., p. 724 Bek. . - 3 Plato, Parmenid. Ὁ. 182. Otuai σε
ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἕν ἕκαστον εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι. Ὅταν πόλλ᾽ ἅττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἡ ad εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἕν τὸ μέγα nyet εἶναι. |
64 PARMENIDES. Cuar. XXVIL
sonicthing in common which must be represented by a Form yet higher: so that there will be an infinite series of Forms, as- cending higher and higher, of which you will never reach the | topmost.'
3. Perhaps (suggests Sokrates) each of these Forms is a Con-
Are the ception of the mind and nothing beyond : the Form rere is not competent to exist out of the mind? How? the mind (replies Parmenides.) There cannot be in the mind more? Ime any Conception, which is a Conception of nothing. posable. § Every Conception must be of something really exist-
ing: in this case, it is a Conception of some one thing, which you conceive as belonging in common to each and all the objects considered. The Something thus conceived as perpetually One and the same in all, is, the Form. Besides, if you think that individual objects participate in the Forms, and that these Forms are Conceptions of the mind,—you must suppose, either that all
1 Plato, Parmenid. Ὁ. 182A. See this process, of comparing the Form with particular objects denominated after he Form, described in a different meta- hysical language by Mr. John Stuart ill, System of Logic, book iv. ch. 2, sect. 3. ‘As the general conception {s itself obtained by a comparison of rticular phenomena, so, when ob- ined, the mode in which we apply it to other phenomena is by com. parison. e compare phenomena with each other to get the conception; and we then compare those and other phe-
the
This argument of Parmenides is the memorable argument known under the name of ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος. Θ Platonic εἴδη considered as χωριστά, it is a forcible argument. See Aristot. Metaphys. A. 990, b. 15 seq., where it is numbered among ot ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων. We find from the Scholion of
nomena with the conception. We get the conception of an animal by com: paring different animals, and when we afterwards see a creature resembling an animal, we compare it with our general conception of an animal: and { it agrees with our general concep- tion, we include it in the class. The conception becomes the type of com- parison. We may perhaps find that no considerable number of other objects
ee with this first ; general concep- tion: and that we must drop the con-
tion, and beginning n with a different individual case, proceed b fresh comparisons toa different gene conception.”
The comparison, which the argu- ment of the Platonic Parmenides as- sumes to be instituted, between 7d εἶδος and τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ, is denied by Proklus; who says that there can
Alexander (p. 566 Brandis), that it was advanced in several different ways by Aristotle, in his work Iepi'I8em»: by his scholar Eudemus ἐν τοῖς wept Δέξεως : and by a contemporary σοφιστὴς named Polyxenus, as well as by other hists.
2 Plato, Parmenid. p. 1382 μὴ τῶν εἰδὼν ἕκαστον τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσ- Hen ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι FH ἐν ψυχαῖς. ... Tioby; φάναι, ἂν éxa- στόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, οὐ- δενός; ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν. ᾿Αλλὰ τινός; Ναί. Ὅντος ἣ οὐκ ὄντος ; Ὅντος. Οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ γόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν;
ac.
Aristotle (Topic. ii. 118, a. 25) indi- cates one way of meeting this argu- ment, if advanced by an adversary in dialectic debate—e«i τὰς ἰδέας ἐν ἡμῖν
ἔφησεν εἶναι.
Cuap. ΧΧΥ͂ΙΙ. “THE THIRD MAN” OBJECTION. 65
objects are made up of Conceptions, and are therefore themselves Concipients: or else that these Forms, though Conceptions, are incapable of conceiving. Neither one nor the other is admis- sible.}
4, Probably the case stands thus (says Sokrates). These Forms are constants and fixtures in nature, as models He qdeas or patterns. Particular objects are copies or like- are empl, nesses of them : and the participation of such objects an objects in the Form consists in being made like to it.? In that case (replies Parmenides), the Form must itself being to be like to the objects which have been made like to them? Im- it. Comparing the Form with the objects, that in
em by.
possible.
which they resemble must itself be a Form: and thus you will have a higher Form above the first Form—and so upwards in the ascending line. This follows necessarily from the hypothesis that the Form is like the objects. The participation of objects in the Form, therefore, cannot consist in being likened to it.®
5. Here are grave difficulties (continues Parmenides) opposed to this doctrine of yours, affirming the existence of
self-existent, substantive, unchangeable, yet partici- exist, they pated, Forms. But difficulties still graver remain Fnowable behind. Such Forms as you describe cannot be cog- by us. We nizable by us: at least it is hard to show how they only what is can be cognizable. Being self-existent and substan- corneal tive, they are not in us: such of them as are relative, Individuals
' have their relation with each other, not with those to Indivi- particular objects among us, which are called great, ἄπαις, adeas
to Ideas.
lattle, and so forth, from being supposed to be similar to or participant in the forms, and bearing names the same as those of the Forms. Thus, for example, if I, an individual man, am in the relation of master, I bear that relation to another indi-
2 Aristotle characterises Platonic Ideas as mere xevoAoyia and poetical metaphor. See also the re- markable Scholion of Alexander, pp. 674-575, Brandis.
1 Plato, Parmenid. p. 182 Ὁ. οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ τἄλλα ὴς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέ- χειν, ἣ δοκεῖν σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον
εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἣ νοήματα ὄντα
ἀνόητα εἴ ναι 5
fetaphys. A. 991, a. 20): is way of presenting the
᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι,
“The word ἀνόητα here is used in its ordinary sense, in which it is the nega- tion, not of τός but of vonrixds.
There is a similar confusion, Plato,
klas (pp.
80 B. Pro OL 1. Beall.) is prolix but very obscure.
3 Plato, Parmenid. pp. 132-133.
This is again a repetition, though differently presented, of the same argu- ment—o τρίτος dv@pwros—enunciated
690- Ῥ. 132 A.
3—5
66 PARMENIDES. Caap. XXVIT.
vidual man who is my servant, not to servantship in general (ἑ 6. the Form of servantship, the Servus per se). My servant, again, bears the relation of servant to me, an individual man as master, —not to mastership in general (t.c. to the Form of mastership, the Dominus per se). Both terms of the relation are individual objects. On the other hand, the Forms also bear relation to each other. The Form of servantship (Servus per se) stands in relation to the Form of mastership (Dominus per se). Neither of them correlates with an individual object. The two terms of the rela- tion must be homogeneous, each of them a Form.
Now apply this to the case of cognition. The Form of Cogni- Formscan tion correlates exclusively with the Form of Truth : δ ΡΟ the. Form of each special Cognition, geometrical or the Form of medical, or other, correlates with the Form of Geo- Cognition, — metry or Medicine. But Cognition as we possess it, not possess. correlates only with Truth relatively to us: also, each special Cognition of ours has its special correlating Truth, relatively to us.2 Now the Forms are not in or with us, but apart from us: the Form of Cognition is not our Cognition, the Form of Truth is not our Truth. Forms can be known only through the Form of Cognition, which we do not possess: we cannot therefore know Forms. We have our own cognition, whereby we know what is relative to us; but we know nothing more. Forms, which are not relative to us, lie out of our know- ledge. Bonum per se, Pulchrum per se, and the other self-exis- tent Forms or Ideas, are to us altogether unknowable.®
6. Again, if there be a real self-existent Form of Cognition, FormofCog- apart from that which we or others possess—it must
nition, su . ° . τίου toour doubtless be far superior in accuracy and perfection
1 Plato, Parmenid. p. 188 E. 8° εἶδος πρὸς τὸ εἶδος δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι,
3 Plato, Parmenid. p. 184 A. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, αὐτὴ μὲν be ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια, αὑτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη; .ο ‘A. δὲ παρ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἂν ἀληθείας εἴη; καὶ «ἑκάστη ἡ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ὄγτων ἑκάστου ἂν ἐπι σύμβαινοι εἶναι;
Aristotle opica, vi. p. 147, a. 6) adverts to this as an urgument against the theory of Ideas, but without allud- ing to the Parmenides ; indeed he puts the argument in a different way—rd
μὴ
ὁ ον αὐτὴ ἐπιθυμία αὑτοῦ ἡδέος, καὶ αὐτὴ βούλησις αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Aristotle argues that there is no place in this doctrine for the φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, which nevertheless men often wish for, and he remarks, in the Nikom. Ethica, i. 4, 1096 Ὁ. 83—that the αὐτὸ-ἀγαθὸν is neither πρακτὸν nor κτητὸν ἀνθρώ-
v3 Plato, Parmenid. Ὁ. 184 C. "Αγνω- στον ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ὅστι, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὔσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.
67
σῆλρ. XXVIL HOW FORMS CAN BE KNOWN. to that which we possess.' The Form of Beauty and Cognition, the other Forms, must be in like manner superior to Polongs to that which is found under the same name in indivi- We cannot . . eae ΤΩ, dual objects. This perfect Form of Cognition must norean they now us.
therefore belong to the Gods, if it belong to any one.
But if so, the Gods must have a Form of Truth, the proper object of their Form of Cognition. They cannot know the truth relatively to us, which belongs to our cognition—any more than we can know the more perfect truth belonging. to them. So too about other Forms. The perfect Form of mastership belongs to the Gods, correlating with its proper Form of servantship. Their mastership does not correlate with individual objects like us: in other words, they are not our masters, nor are we their servants. Their cognition, again, does not correlate with indivi- dual objects like us: in other words, they do not know us, nor do we know them. In like manner, we in our capacity of masters are not masters of them—we as cognizant beings know nothing of them or of that which they know. They can in no way correlate with us, nor can we correlate with them.?
Here are some of the objections, Sokrates (concludes Par-
menides), which beset your doctrine, that there exist Sum total of substantive, self-standing, Forms of Ideas, each re- objections | spectively definable. Many farther objections might I eas is ut also be urged.* So that a man may reasonably main- if we do not tain, either that none such exist—or that, granting Sdmit ohat their existence, they are essentially unknowable by and that us. He must put forth great ingenuity to satisfy knowable, himself of the affirmative ; and still more wonderful there can be discussion.
ingenuity to find arguments for the satisfaction of others, respecting this question.
1 An argument very similar is urged
by Aristotle (Metaph. @. 1050, b. 34) εἰ dpa τινές εἰσι φύσεις τοιαῦται ἢ οὐσίαι οἵας λέγουσιν οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὰς ἰδέας, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιστῆμον ἄν τι εἴη ἡ αὐτοεπιστήμη καὶ κινούμενον ἡ κίνησις.
2 Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 A. Ταῦτα μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖο ν ἔχειν τὰ εἴδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων,
&e. 3 Plato, Parmenid. ἢ. 134 D-E. Ovx-
ouy εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἔστιν ἡ axpt- βεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἡ δεσποτεία ἡ ἐκείνων (i. 6. τῶν θεῶν) ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἂν δεσπόσειεν, our ἂν ἡἣ ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνοίη οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τ' ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχο- μεν τῇ Tap ἥμιν ἀρχῇ, οὐδε γιγνώσκομεν τοῦ θείον οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε αὖ (86. οἱ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτε δεσπόται ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε γιγνώσκονσι τὰ ἀνθρώ- πεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες.
68 PARMENIDES. Crap. XXVII.
Nevertheless, on the other side (continues Parmenides), unless we admit the existence of such Forms or Ideas—substantive, eternal, unchangeable, definable—philosophy and dialectic dis- cussion are impossible.'
Here then, Parmenides entangles himself and his auditors Dilemma in the perplexing dilemma, that philosophical and put by Par- dialectic speculation is impossible, unless these Forms:
meni
‘Acnteness OF Ideas, together with the participation of sensible Pc his ‘ob- . objects in them, be granted ; while at the same time
’ this cannot be granted, until objections, which appear at first sight unanswerable, have been disposed of.
The acuteness with which these objections are enforced, is remarkable. I know nothing superior to it in all the Platonic writings. Moreover the objections point directly against that doctrine which Plato in other dialogues most emphatically insists upon, and which Aristotle both announces and combats as cha- racteristic.of Plato—the doctrine of separate, self-existent, abso- lute, Forms or Ideas. They are addressed moreover to Sokrates, the chief exponent of that doctrine here as well as in other dia- logues. And he is depicted as unable to meet them.
It is true that Sokrates is here introduced as juvenile and
The doc- untrained ; or at least as imperfectly trained. And trine which
Parmenides accordingly, Stallbaum with others think, that this
attacks is 18 the reason of his inability to meet the objections : e genuine
Platonic § which (they tell us), though ingenious and plausible,
theory οὗ yet having no application to the genuine Platonic
objections doctrine about Ideas, might easily have been answered
answered in if Plato had thought fit, and are answered in other
᾿Αλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ἔφη (Sokrates), 7 ἢ θαυμα- mattres en théologie . . . condamna, de ards ὁ λόγος, εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀποστερήσειε concert avec eux, treize propositions τοῦ εἰδέναι. qui ne sont b presaue toutes que les The inference here drawn by Par- axiomes familiers de l’averroisme: menides supplies the first mention of a Quod intellectus hominum est unus. doctrine revived by (if not transmitted et idem numero. Quod mundus est to) Averroes and various scholastic eternus. Quod nunquam fuit primus doctors of the middle ages, so asto be homo. Quod Deus non cognoscit singu- formally condemned by theological laria,” &c. (Renan, Averroés, Ὁ. 213, meet M. Renan tells as En 2nd ed., p. 268.) 1 wtienne Tempier, évaque de Paris, ayant rassemblé le conseil des 1 Plato, Parmenid. p. 185 B.
CuaP. XXVII. PARMENIDEAN DILEMMA. 69
dialogues.! But to me it appears, that the doctrine Sny part of which is challenged in the Parmenidés is the genuine dialogues. Platonic doctrine about Ideas, as enunciated by Plato in the Re- public, Phedon, Philébus, Timezus, and elsewhere—though a very different doctrine is announced in the Sophistés. Objec- tions are here made against it in the Parmenidés. In what other dialogue has Plato answered them? and what proof can be fur- nished that he was able to answer them? There are indeed many other dialogues in which a real world of Ideas absolute and unchangeable, is affirmed strenuously and eloquently, with various consequences and accompaniments traced to it: but there are none in which the Parmenidean objections are elucidated, or even recited. In the Phedon, Phedrus, Timzus, Symposion, &c., and elsewhere, Sokrates is made to talk confidently about the existence and even about the cognoscibility of these Ideas ; just as if no such objections as those which we read in the Par- menidés could be produced.? In these other dialogues, Plato accepts implicitly one horn of the Parmenidean dilemma ; but without explaining to us upon what grounds he allows himself to neglect the other.
Socher has so much difficulty in conceiving that Plato can have advanced such forcible objections against a doc- trine, which nevertheless in other Platonic dialogues is proclaimed as true and important,—that he declares
Views of
the Parmenidés (together with the Sophistés and Po- litikus) not to be genuine, but to have been composed by some unknown Megaric contemporary. To pass over the improbability that any unknown author should have been capable of composing works of so much ability as these—Socher’s decision about spu- riousness is founded upon an estimate of Plato’s phi- iosophical character, which I think incorrect. Socher
maintains that Plato would never make such objections against his own theory, and denies the authen- ticity of the Par- menidés.
1 Stallbaum, Prolegom. pp. 52-286- 332.
2 According to Stalibaum (Prolegg. pp. 277-337) the Parmenidés is the only dialogue in which Plato has dis- cussed, with philosophical exactness, the theory of Ideas; in all the other dialogues he handles it in a popular and superficial manner. There is truth in this—indeed more truth (I think)
than Stallbaum himself supposed : otherwise he would hardly have said that the objections in the Parmenides could easily have been answered, if Plato had chosen.
Stallbaum tells us, not only respect- ing Socher but respecting Schleier- macher (pp. 3824-332), ‘‘ Parmenidem omnino non intellexit”. In my judg- ment, Socher understands the dialogue
70 PARMENIDES. Cuap. XXVII.
expects (or at least reasons as if he expected) to find in Plato a preconceived system and a scheme of conclusions to which every thing is made subservient.
In most philosophers, doubtless, this is what we do find. Eack Philoso. Starts with some favourite conclusions, which he be- phersare lieves to be true, and which he supports by all the ae tes, arguments in their favour, as far as his power goes. oncitive & — If he mentions the arguments against them, he usually system of answers the weak, slurs over or sneers at the strong : hisown. ‘at any rate, he takes every precaution that these counter arguments shall appear unimportant in the eyes of his readers. His purpose is, like that of a speaker in the public ‘assembly, to obtain assent and belief: whether the hearers under- stand the question or not, is a matter of comparative indifference: | at any rate, they must be induced to embrace his conclusion. Unless he thus foregoes the character of an impartial judge, to take up that of an earnest advocate ; unless he bends the whole force of his mind to the establishment of the given conclusion— he becomes suspected as deficient in faith or sincerity, and loses much in persuasive power. For an earnest belief, expressed with eloquence and feeling, is commonly more persuasive than any logic.
Now whether this exclusive devotion to the affirmative side of Different Ccettain questions be the true spirit of philosophy or spirit of | not, it is certainly not the spirit of Plato in his Dia- Dialogues logues of Search ; wherein he eonceives the work of of Search philosophy in a totally different manner. He does not begin by stating, even to himself, a certain conclusion at which he has arrived, and then proceed to prove that conclusion to others. The search or debate (as I have observed in a preced- ing chapter) has greater importance in his eyes than the conclu- sion : nay, in a large proportion of his dialogues, there is no con- clusion at all: we see something disproved, but nothing proved. The negative element has with him a value and importance of its own, apart from the affirmative. He is anxious to set forth what can be said against a given conclusion ; even though not prepared to establish any thing in its place.
better than Stallbaum, when he Platonic Ideas; though I do not agree (Socher) says, that the objections inthe with his inference about the spurious- rst half bear against the genuine ness of the dialogue.
CHaPp. XXVITI. NEGATIVE CASE AGAINST IDEAS.
71
Such negative element, manifested as it is in so many of
the Platunic dialogues, has its extreme manifestation in the Parmenidés. When we see it here applied to a doctrine which Plato in other dialogues insists upon as truth, we must call to mind (what sincere believers are apt to forget) that a case may always be made out against truth as well as in its favour: and that its privilege as a certified portion of “ rea- soned truth,” rests upon no better title than the
The Parme- nidés is the extreme manifesta- tion of the negative element. That Plato should em- ploy one dia- ogue in set- ting forth
the negative
superiority of the latter case over the former. Itis 45, against
for testing the two cases—for determining where the superiority lies—and for graduating its amount— that the process of philosophising is called for, and that improvements in the method thereof become desirable. That Plato should, in one of his many diversified dialogues, apply this test toa doctrine which, in other dialogues, he holds out as true—is noway inconsistent with the general spirit of these compositions. Each of his dialogues has its own point of view, worked out on that particular occasion ; what is common to them all, is the process of philosophising applied in various ways to the same general topics.
Those who, like Socher, deny Plato’s authorship of the Parme- nidés, on the ground of what is urged therein against the theory of Ideas, must suppose, either that he did not know that a nega- tive case could be made out against that theory ; or that knowing it, he refrained from undertaking the duty.! Neither supposi- tion is consistent with what we know both of his negative in- genuity, and of his multifarious manner of handling.
The negative case, made out in the Parmenidés against the
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 14, where the distinction taken coincides accurately enough with that which we read in Plato, Parmenid. p. 129 A-D.
Striimpell thinks that the Parmenidés was composed ata time of Plato’s life when he had become sensible of the difficultiesand contradictions attaching to his doctrine of self-existent Forms or Ideas, and when he was looking about for some way of extrication from thei: which way he afterwards thought that he found in that approxi- mation to Pythagorism—that exchange of Ideas for Ideal numbers, &c.—which
we find imputed to him by Aristotle (Gesch. der Griech. Phil. sect. 96, 8). This is not impossible; but I find no sufficient ground for affirming it. Nor can I see how the doctrine which Aristotle ascribes to Plato about the Ideas (that they are generated by two στοιχεῖα Or elements, τὸ ἕν along with τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν) affords any escape from the difficulties started in the Parmenidés.
Striimpell considers the dialogue Parmenidés to have been composed ‘ganz ausdriicklich zur dialektischen Uebung,” ib. s. 96, 2, p. 128.
72 PARMENIDES. Cuar. XXVIL
Force of theory of Ideas, is indeed most powerful. The hypo- thenegative thesis of the Ideal World is unequivocally affirmed Parme- by Sokrates, with its four principal characteristics. Difficulties 1. Complete essential separation from the world of ticipation sense. 2. Absolute self-existence. 3. Plurality of of sensible constituent items, several contrary to each other. 4. objects in Unchangeable sameness and unity of each and all of
Ideas. § them.—Here we have full satisfaction given to the Platonic sentiment, which often delights in soaring above the world of sense, and sometimes (see Phedon) in heaping con- temptuous metaphors upon it. But unfortunately Sokrates cannot disengage himself from this world of sense: he is obliged to maintain that it partakes of, or is determined by, these extra- sensible Forms or Ideas. Here commence the series of difficul- ties and contradictions brought out by the Elenchus of Par- menides. Are all sensible objects, even such as are vulgar, repulsive, and contemptible, represented in this higher world ? The Platonic sentiment shrinks ftom the admission: the Platonic sense of analogy hesitates to deny it. Then again, how can both _assertions be true—first that the two worlds are essentially separate, next, that the one participates in, and derives its essence from, the other ? How (to use Aristotelian language") can the essence be separated from that of which it is the essence? How can the Form, essentially One, belong at once to a multitude of particulars ?
Two points deserve notice in this debate respecting the doc- trine of Ideas :—
1. Parmenides shows, and Sokrates does not deny, that these Difficulties Forms or Ideas described as absolute, self-existent, Cogniza- | unchangeable, must of necessity be unknown and bility of, unknowable to ust Whatever we do know, or can Ideasare know, is relative to us ;—to our actual cognition, or
they cannot to our cognitive power. If you declare an object to
1 Arist. Met. A. 991, Ὁ. 1. ἀδύνατον, καὶ α μὰ τῆς παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἂν ἀληθείας εἴη;
χωρὶς εἶ εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὗ ἡ οὐσία. καὶ αὖ ἑκάστη ἡ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη τῶν
to, Parmenid. 138 B. et rig φαίη wap’ ἡμῖν ὄντων ἑκάστον ἂν ἐπιστήμη
μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γι νώσκεσθαι ὄντα ξύμβαινοι εἶναι; 184 C. ἄγνωστον ἄρα
τοιαῦτα οἷά φαμεν ὃ ety εἶναι τὰ εἴδη... ἡμῖν ἔστι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ é€ ἐστι, καὶ
ἀπίθανος ἂν εἴη ὁ ἄγνωστα αὐτὰ ἀναγκά. τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὑτὰς Gwy εἶναι. 184 A. ἡ δὲ wap’ ἡμῖν ἐπι- οὔσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.
CuaP. ΧΧΥΙ͂Ι. THE RELATIVE ALONE KNOWABLE. 73
be absolute, you declare it to be neither known nor be cogniz- knowable by us: if it be anncunced as known or they are knowable by us, it is thereby implied at the same chant
time not to be absolute. If these Forms or Objects ber relative. called absolute are known, they can be known only by of Homo an absolute Subject, or the Form of a cognizant Mensur Subject : that is, by God or the Gods. Even thus, to call them absolute is a misnomer : they are relative to the Subject, and the Subject is relative to them.
The opinion here advanced by the Platonic Parmenides asserts, in other words, what is equivalent to the memorable dictum of Protagoras—“ Man is the measure of all things—of things existent, that they do exist—and of things non-existent, that they do not exist”. This dictum affirms universal relativity, and nothing else: though Plato, as we shall see in the elaborate argument against it delivered by Sokrates in the Theztétus, mixed it up with another doctrine altogether distinct and independent—the doctrine that knowledge is sensible percep- tion.! Parmenides here argues that if these Forms or Ideas are known by us, they can be known only as relative to us: and that if they be not relative to us, they cannot be known by us at all. Such relativity belongs as much to the world of Conception, as to the world of Perception. And it is remarkable that Plato admits this essential relativity not merely here, but also in the Sophistés: in which latter dialogue he denies the Forms or Ideas to be absolute existences, on the special ground that they are known :—and on the farther ground that what is known must act upon the knowing mind, and must be acted upon thereby, t.¢ must be relative. He there defines the existent to be, that which has power to act upon something else, or to be acted upon by something else. Such relativeness he declares to constitute existence:* defining existence to mean potentiality.
2. The second point which deserves notice in this portion of the Parmenidés, is the answer of Sokrates (when em- Answer of of barrassed by some of the questions of the Eleatic That Ideas
11 shall discuss this in the coming This reasoning is put into the mouth chapter upon the Theetétus. of the Eleatic Stranger, the principal 2 Plato, Sophistés, pp. 248-249. person in that dialogue.
74
are mere conceptions of the mind. Objection of Par- menides correct, though undeve-
loped.
PARMENIDES.
Caap. XXVIL
veteran)—“ That these Forms or Ideas are concep- tions of the mind, and have no existence out of the mind”. This answer gives us the purely Subjective, or negation of Object : instead of the purely Objective (Absolute), or negation of Subject... Here we have what Porphyry calls the deepest question of philo- sophy? explicitly raised : and, as far as we know, for
the first time. Are the Forms or Ideas mere conceptions of the. mind and nothing more? Or are they external, separate, self- existent realities? The opinion which Sokrates had first givem declared the latter: that which he now gives declares the former. He passes from the pure. Objective (4.¢. without Subject) to the pure Subjective (4.e., without Object). Parmenides, in his reply, points out that there cannot be a conception of nothing: that if there be Conceptio, there must be Conceptum aliquid:*® and that. this Conceptum or Concept is what is common to a great many
distinct similar Percepta.
1 Plato, Parmenid. p. 182 A-B.
The doctrine, that ποιότητες were fi
ψιλαὶ ἔννοιαι, having no existence with- out the mind, was held by Antisthenes as well as by the Eretrian sect of philosophers, contemporary with Plato and shortly after him. Simplikius, Schol. ad Aristot. Categ. p. 68, a. 30, Brandis. See, respecting Antisthenes, the first volume of the present work,
Ῥ' 2 566. the beginning of Porphyry’s
Introduction to the Categories of Ari- th
stotle. βαθυτάτης οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης πραγματείας, ἄσ.--περὶ γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν, εἴτε ὑφέστηκεν, εἴτε καὶ ἐν μόναις ΕΝ ἐπινοίαις κεῖται, &c. Simplikius in Schol. ad Aristot. Categ. p. 68, a. 28, ed. Brandis) alludes to the Eretrian philosophers and Theopompus, who consideredl τὰς ποιότητας as Ψιλὰς μόνας ἐννοίας διακενῶς λεγομένας κατ᾽ οὐδεμίας ὑποστάσεως, οἷον ἀνθρωπότητα ἣ ἱππότητα, ἄς.
3Compare Republic, v. p. 476 Β. ὃ γιγνώσκων γιγνώσκει τὶ ἣ οὐδέν; Try- me The following assage in the learned work of Cudworth bears on the portion of the Parmenidés which we are now considering. Cudworth, Treatise of Immutable Morality, pp. 243-245.
‘But if any one demand here, where this ἀκίνητος οὐσία, im-
mutable Entities do exist? I answer, rst, that as they are considered for- mally, they do not properly exist in the Individ without us, as if were from them imprinted upon the Under- standing, which some have taken to be Aristotle’s opinion; because no Individual Material thing is either Universal or Immutable. ... . Because they perish not together with then, it is a certain argument that they exist independently upon them. Neither, in e next place, do they exist some- where else apart from the Individual Sensibles, and without the Mind, which is that opinion that Aristotle justly condemns, bat either unjustly or unskilfully attributes to Plato... . Wherefore these Intelligible Ideas or Essences of Things, those Forms by which we understand all Things, exist nowhere but in the mind itself; for it was very well determined long ago by Socrates, in Plato’s Parmenidés, that these things are nothing else but Noe- mata: ‘These Species or Ideas are all of them nothing but Noemata or Notions that exist nowhere but in the Soul itself’... .
*‘And yet notwithstanding, though these Things exist only in the Mind, they are not therefore mere Figments of the Understanding. oe
** It is evident that though the Mind
CHap: XXVII CONCEPTS AND PERCEPTS— RELATIVE. 75
This reply, though scanty and undeveloped, is in my judgment both valid, as it negatives the Subject pure and simple, and affirms that to every conception in the mind, there must corre- spond a Concept out of (or rather along with) the mind (the one correlating with or implying the other)—and correct as far as it goes, in, declaring what that Concept is. Such Concept is, or may be, the Form. Parmenides does not show that it is not so. He proceeds to impugn, by a second argument, the assertion of Sokrates—that the form is a Conception wholly within the mind : he goes on to argue that individual things (which are out of the mind) cannot participate in these Forms (which are asserted to be altogether in the mind): because, if that were admitted, either every such thing must be a Concipient, or must run into the contradiction of being a Conceptio non concipiens.' Now this argument may refute the affirmation of Sokrates literally taken, that the Form is a Conception entirely belonging to the mind, and having nothing Objective corresponding to it—but does not refute the doctrine that the Form is a Concept correlating with the mind—or out of the mind as well as in it. In this as in other Concepts, the subjective point of view preponderates over ‘the objective, though Object is not altogether eliminated : just as, in the particular external things, the objective point of view predominates, though Subject cannot be altogether dismissed. Neither Subject nor Object can ever entirely disappear: the one is the inseparable correlative and complement of the other: but sometimes the subjective point of view may preponderate, some-
thinks of these Things at pleasure, ret they are not arbitrarily framed by the Mind, but have certain, determinate, and immutable Natures of their own, which are independent upon the Mind and which are blown (quere not blown away into Nothing at the pleasure of the same Being that arbitrarily made τ."
It is an inadvertence on the part of Cudworth to cite this e of the Parmenidés as authenticating Plato’s opinion that Forms or Ideas existed only inthe mind. Certainly Sokrates is here made to express that opinion, among others; but the opinion is re- futed by Parmenidés and dropped by Sokrates. But the very different opt- nion, which Cudworth accuses Ari- stotle of wrongly attributing to Plato,
is repeated by Sokrates in the Pheedon, Republic, and elsewhere, and never refuted. 10n this point the argument in the dialogue itself, as stated by Par- menides, is not clear to follow. Striim- ell remarks on the terms employed y Plato. ‘Der Umstand, dass die Ausdriicke εἶδος und ἰδέα nicht sowie λόγος den Unterschied, zwischen Be- iff und dem durch diesen begriffenen ealen, hervortreten lassen -.sondern, weil dieselben bald im subjektiven Sinne den Begriff, bald im objektiven Sinne das Redle bezeichnen—bald in der einen bald in der andern Bedeu- tung zu nehmen sind—kann _ leicht eine Verwechselung und Unklarheit in der Auffassung veranlassen,” ἄς. (Gesch. der Gr. Philos. s. 90, p. 115).
6 ῬΑΒΜΈΝΙΡΕΒ, Car. XXVIL
times the objective. Such preponderance (or logical priority), either of the one or the other, may be implied or connoted by the denomination given. Though the special connotation of the name creates an illusion which makes the preponderant point of view seem to be all, and magnifies the Relatum 80 as to eclipse and extinguish the Correlatum— yet such preponderance, or logical priority, is all that is really meant when the Concepts are said to be “im the mind”—and the Percepts (Percepta, things perceived) to be “out of the mind”: for both Concepts and Per- cepts are “of the mind, or relate to the mind”) The question—What is the real and precise meaning attached of © abstract and general words?—has been debated
M
Abst act down to this day, and is still under debate. It seems Terms, to have first derived its importance, if not its origin, bated from from Sokrates, who began the practice of inviting times to the persons to define the familiar generalities of ethics P Different and politics, and then tested by cross-examination the rewsof , definitions given by men who thought that common Aristotle sense would enable any one to define.* But I see no
ground for believing that Sokrates ever put to himself
the question—Whether that which an abstract term denotes is a mental conception, or a separate and self-existent reality. That question was raised by Plato, and first stands clearly brought to view here in the Parmenidés.
If we follow up the opinion here delivered by the Platonic Sokrates, together with the first correction added to it by Par- menides, amounting to this—That the Form is a Conception of the mind with its corresponding Concept : if, besides, we dismiss the doctrine held by Plato, that the Form is a separate self-
1 This preponderance of the Ob- jective point of view, though without altogether eliminating the Subjective, inclades all that is true in the assertion of Aristotle, that the Perceptum is prior to the Percipient—the Percipien- dum prior to the Perceptionis Capaz. He assimilates the former to a Movens, the latter to a Motum. But he declares that he means not a priority in time or real existence, but simply a priority in nature or logical priority ; and he also declares the two to be relatives or reciproca. The Prius is relative to the
Posterius, as the Posterius is relative to the Prius.—Metaphys. I. 1010, Ὁ. 86 seq. ἀλλ’ ἔστι τι καὶ ἕτερον παρὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὃ ἀνάγκη πρότερον εἶναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως" τὸ γὰρ κινοῦν τοῦ κινουμένον φύσει πρότερόν ἐστι" κἂν εἰ λέγε- ται πρὸς ἄλληλα ταῦτα, οὐδὲν ἧττον.
See respecting the πρότερον φύσει Aristot. tegor. p. 12, b. 5-15, an Metaphys. A. 1018, b. 12. -ἁπλῶς καὶ τῇ φύσει πρότερον.
2 Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, Ὁ. 8. M. 1078, b. 18-82.
ABSTRACT AND GENERAL TERMS. 77
CuaP. XXVIL
existent unchangeable Ens (ἐν παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ) : there will then be no greater difficulty in understanding how it can be partaken by, or be at once in, many distinct particulars, than in under- standing (what is at bottom the same question) how one and the same attribute can belong at once to many different objects: how hardness or smoothness can be at once in an indefinite number of hard and smooth bodies dispersed everywhere.’ The object and the attribute are both of them relative to the same percipient and concipient mind : we may perceive or conceive many objects as distinct individuals—we may also conceive them all as re- sembling in a particular manner, making abstraction of the individuality of each : both these are psychological facts, and the latter of the two is what we mean when we say, that all of them possess or participate in one and the same attribute. The con- crete term, and its corresponding abstract, stand for the same facts of sense differently conceived. Now the word one, when applied to the attribute, has a different meaning from one when applied to an individual object. Plato speaks sometimes else- where as if he felt this diversity of meaning : not however in the Parmenidés, though there is great demand for it. But Aristotle (in this respect far superior) takes much pains to point out that
1 That ‘the attribute is in its sub-
ject,” is explained by Aristotle only by pple That it is in its subject, not as a in the whole, yet as that which
cannot exist a from its subject (Categor. 1, a. , & 30). Compare obbes, Comput. or Logic. iii. 8, viii. 3.
in e number of different modes τοῦ ἐν τινι εἶναι, see Aristot. Physic. iii. p. 210, a. 18 seq., with the Scholia, 10 Bran The commentators made out, variously, nine, eleven, sixteen distinct τρόπους τοῦ ἔν τινι εἶναι. In the language of Aristotle, genus, species, εἶδος, and even differentia are not ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, but are predicated καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένον (see Cat. p. 8, a. 20). The proprium and ac alone are ev ὑποκειμένῳ. Here is a difference be- tween his language and that of Plato, according to whom τὸ εἶδος is ἐν ἑκάστ τῶν πολλῶν (Parmenid. 131 A). But we remark in that same dialogue, that when Parmenides questions Sokrates whether he reco, εἴδη αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτά, he first whether Sokrates
. 818 Brandis, and p. 446, Sok
admits δικαίου re εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, καὶ καλοῦ, καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων. krates answers without hesitation, Yes. Then Parmenides pro- ceeds to ask, Do you recognise an εἶδος of man, separate and a from all of us individual men ?—or an εἶδος of fire, water, and such like? Here Sokrates hesitates: he will neither admit nor deny it (130 Ὁ). The first list, which rates at once accepts, is of what Aristotle would call accidents: the second, which Sokrates doubts about, is of what Aristotle would call second substances. We thus see that the con- ception of a self-existent εἶδος realised itself most easily and distinctly to the mind of Plato in the case of accidents. He would, therefore, naturally conceive τὰ εἴδη as being ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, agree- ing substantially, though not in terms with Aristotle. ‘It is in the case of accidents or attributes that abstract names are most usually invented ; and it is the abstract name, or the neuter adjective used as its equivalent, which suggests the belief in an εἶδος.
78 PARMENIDER.
Cap. XXVIT.
Unum Ens—and the preposition In (to be in any thing)—are among the πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα, having several different meanings derived from one -primary or radical by diverse and distant - ramifications! The important logical distinction between Unum numero and Unum specie (or genere, &c.) belongs first to Aristotle.*
Plato has not followed out the hint which he has here put into Plato never the mouth of Sokrates in the Parmenidés—That the
expected to Ideas or Forms are conceptions existing only in the Ideas fiton mind. Though the opinion thus stated is not strictly ve tne facts correct and is so pointed out by himeelf), as falling itistotle back too exclusively on the subjective —yet if followed
itand partly out, it might have served to modify the too objective succeeded. and absolute character which in most dialogues (though not in the Sophistés) he ascribes to his Forms or Ideas : laying stress upon them as objects—and as objects not of sensible per- ception—but overlooking or disallowing the fact of their being relative to the concipient mind. The bent of Plato’s philosophy was to dwell upon these Forms, and to bring them into har- monious conjunction with each other: he neither took pains, nor expected, to make them fit on to the world of sense. With Aristotle, on the contrary, this last-mentioned purpose is kept very generally in view. Amidst all the extreme abstractions
1 Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 1015-1016, I. 1052, a. 39 seq. τὰ μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐν ἥ συνεχὲς ἢ ὅλον τὰ δὲ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος εἷς T° τοιαῦτα δὲ ὧν ἣ νόησις μία, ἄς.
About abstract names, or the names of attributes, see Mr. John Stuart Mill’s ‘System of Logic,’ i. 2, oP. 30, edit. 5th. ‘‘ When only one attribute, neither variable in degree nor in kind, is designated by the name—as visible- ness, tangibleness, equality, &.— though it denotes an attribute of many different objects, the attribute itself is always considered as one, not as many.” Compare, also, on this point, p. 153, and a note added by Mr. Mill to the fifth edition, p. 203, in reply to Mr. Herbert Spencer. The oneness of the attribute, in different subjects, is not conceded by every one. r. Spencer thinks that the same abstract word denotes one attribute in Subject A, and another attribute, though exactly like it, in Subject B (Frinciples of Psycho- logy, p- 126 seq.) τ. Mill’s view appears the correct one; but the dis-
tinction (pointed out by Archbisho Whately) between vndistingwish ishable likeness and posttive identit mes in these cases impercepti
gotten.
Aristotle, however, in the beginning of the Categories ranks ἡ τίς yee ματικὴ 8 ἄτομον καὶ ἕν ἀριθμῷ . 1, 6, 8), which I do not understand ; and it seems opposed to another pas-
e, pp. 8, 6, 15.
e argument between two such able thinkers as Mr. Mill and Mr. Spencer illustrates forcibly the εἰς reme nicety 0 question respec the One and the Many, under certain supposable circumstances. We cannot be surprised that it puzzled the dialec- ticians of the Platonic Aristotelian age, who fastened by preference on points of metaphysical difficulty.
2See interesting remarks on the application of this logical distinction in Galen, De Methodo Medendi, Book fii. vol. x. p. 180 seq. Aristotle and Theophrastus both dwelt upon it.
le or for-
'Gnap. XXVII. EXERCISES REQUIRED FROM STUDENTS. 49
which he handles, he reverts often to the comparison of them with sensible particulars : indeed Substantia Prima was by him, for the first time in the history of philosophy, brought down to designate the concrete particular object of sense: in Plato's Pheedon, Republic, &c., the only Substances are the Forms or Ideas.
Parmenides now continues the debate. He has already fastened upon Sokrates several difficult problems: he now
Continua- proposes a new one, different and worse. Which way tion of the are we to turn then, if these Forms be beyond our Parmenides
knowledge? I do not see my way (says Sokrates) out sf of the perplexity. The fact is, Sokrntes (replies Par-
menides), you have been too forward in producing matu‘e in your doctrine of Ideas, without a sufficient preli- pean a minary exercise and enquiry. Your love of philo- without | sophical research is highly praiseworthy: but you preliminary
must employ your youth in exercising and improving yourself, through that continued philosophical discourse which the vulgar call wseless prosing: otherwise you will never attain truth." You are however right in bestowing your attention, not on the objects of sense, but on those objects which we can best grasp in discussion, and which we presume to exist as Forms.* What sort of exercise must I go through? asks Sokrates. Zeno (replies Parmenides) has already given you a
. ι What sort good specimen of it in his treatise, when he followed sxerc’
of exercise ? Parmenides
out the consequences flowing from the assumption— Gast
“That the self-existent and absolute Ens is plural”. When you are trying to find out the truth on any question, you must assume provisionally, first the affirmative and then the negative, and you must then follow out patiently the consequences deducible from one hypothesis as well as from the other. If you are enquiring about the Form of Likeness, whether it exists or does not exist, you must assume successively
1 Plato, Parmenid. Ὁ. 186 C. Πρῷ δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ 7%: πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες͵ ρέζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τά τι καὶ δέκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἣν ὅκαστον τῶν
wy... καλὴ μὸν οὖν καὶ θεία͵ εὖ ἴσθι,
e ἀλήθεια. ἡ ὁρμὴὸ ἣν opugs ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους" ἕλκυσον
bes: To assume provisional- ly both the affirmative and the negative
of many hypotheses about the most gene- ral terms, and to trace
γυμνάσαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστον εἶναι καὶ καλον- μένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλὼν ἀδολεσχίας, δως ὅτι νέος εἶ' εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ
2 Plato, Parmenid. Ὁ. 135 E.
80 PARMENIDES. Cuap. XXVII.
theconse- both one and the other ;! marking the deductions an which follow, both with reference to the thing directly assumed, and with reference to other things also. You must do the like if you are investigating other Forms—Unlike- ness, Motion, and Rest, or even Existence and Non-Existence. But you must not be content with following out only one side of the hypothesis: you must examine both sides with equal care and impartiality. This is the only sort of preparatory exercise which will qualify you for completely seeing through the truth.”
You propose to me, Parmenides (remarks .Sokrates), a work of
Impossible awful magnitude. At any rate, show me an example to do this of it yourself, that I may know better how to begin. numerous —Parmenides at first declines, on the ground of his gudience old age: but Zeno and the others urge him, so that topnen he at length consents.—The process will be tedious
imen— (observes Zeno); and I would not ask it from Par- After much menides unless among an audience small and select as he agrees. wearehere. Before any numerous audience, it would
be an unseemly performance for a veteran like him. For most people are not aware that, without such discursive survey and travelling over the whole field, we cannot possibly attain truth or acquire intelligence.®
It is especially on this ground—the small number and select character of the auditors—that Parmenides suffers
Parmenides
electshis_ himself to be persuaded to undertake what he calls ofthe Dinu, “amusing ourselves with a laborious pastime”.* He as the topic selects, as the subject of his dialectical exhibition, his tion—Ari- own doctrine respecting the One. He proceeds to
1 Plato, Parmenid. p. 186 A. καὶ αὖθις αὖ ἐὰν ὑποθῇ, εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης ἣ εἰ μή ἐστι, τί ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέ- σεως συμβήσεται, καὶ αὑτοῖς τοῖς ὕποτε-
marks (Computatio sive Logica, i. 8, 12): ‘‘ Learners ought to go h logical exercises silently and by them- selves: for it will be thought both
θεῖσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα.
2 Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 B.
3 Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 D. εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσ- θαι ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλὼν ἐναντίον λέγειν, ἄλ- λως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδον καὶ πλάνης, ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. Hobbes re-
ridiculous and absurd, for a man to use such lan, e publicly”. Proklus tells us, that the difficulty of the
μνασία, here set out by the Platonic Parmenides, is so prodigious, that no one after Plato employed it. (Prok. ad Parmen. p. 801, S .)
4 Plato, Parmenid. p. 137 A. δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὃ Ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοί ἐσμεν . .. ἣ βούλεσθε ἐπει- δήπερ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παι- διὰν παίζειν,
Cuar. ΧΧΥΙ͂ΣΙ. ANTINOMIES. 81
trace out the consequences which flow, first, from stoteles be- assuming the affirmative thesis, Unum Est: next, spondent. from assuming the negative thesis, or the Antithesis, Unum non Est. The consequences are to be deduced from each hypothesis, not only as regards Unum itself, but as regards Cetera, or other things besides Unum. The youngest man of the party, Ari- stoteles, undertakes the duty of respondent.
The remaining portion of the dialogue, half of the whole, is
occupied with nine distinct deductions or demonstra-
Exhibiti tions given .by Parmenides. The first five start from of Parme. the assumption, Unum Est: the last four from the ides~ Nine assumption, Unum non Est. The three first draw out ductions or
. . monstra- the deductions from Unum Est, in reference to Unum: tions, first the fourth and fifth draw out the consequences from {om Unum the same premiss, in reference to Cetera. Again, the from 1 ὕπωνι
sixth and seventh start from Unwm non Est, to trace
what follows in regard to Unum: the eighth and ninth adopt the same hypothesis, and reason it out in reference to Cetera. Of these demonstrations, one characteristic feature is, that
they are presented in antagonising pairs or Antino- mies: except the third, which professes to mediate between the first and second, though only by intro- ducing new difficulties. We have four distinct Anti-
The Demon- strations in antagonis- ing pairs,
or Antino- mies. Per-
nomies : the first and second, the fourth and fifth, the plexing en: sixth and seventh, the eighth and ninth, stand respec- of conclu- tively in emphatic contradiction with each other. Sethoet eny Moreover, to take the demonstrations separately—the explana-
first, fifth, seventh, ninth, end in conclusions purely
negative : the other four end in double and contradictory conclu- sions. The purpose is formally proclaimed, of showing that the same premisses, ingeniously handled, can be made to yield these contradictory results. No attempt is made to reconcile the contradictions, except partially by means of the third, in refer- ence to the two preceding. In regard to the fourth and fifth, sixth and seventh, eighth and ninth, no hint is given that they
1 See the connecting words between ὃν εἰ ἔστιν, dpa καὶ οὐχ οὕτως the first and second demonstration, pp. ἔχει τᾶλλα τοὺ ἑνὸς ἣ οὕτω 142 A, 150. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν ἤδη μόνον; Alsop. 163 B. ἐῶμεν ws φανερά, ἐπισκοπῶμεν δὲ πάλιν,
3—6
82 PARMENIDES. Cuap. XXVII.
can be, or afterwards will be, reconciled. The dialogue con- cludes abruptly at the end of the ninth demonstration, with these words: “We thus see that—whether Unum exists or does not exist—Unum and Cetera both are, and are not, all things in every way—both appear, and do not appear, all things in every way—each in relation to itself, and each in relation to the other”.' Here is an unqualified and even startling announce- ment of double and contradictory conclusions, obtained from the same premisses both affirmative and negative : an announcement delivered too as the fulfilment of the purpose of Parmenides. Nothing is said at the end to intimate how the demonstrations are received by Sokrates, nor what lesson they are expected to administer to him: not a word of assent, or dissent, or surprise, or acknowledgment in any way, from the assembled company, though all of them had joined in entreating Parmenides, and had expressed the greatest anxiety to hear his dialectic exhibi- tion. Those who think that an abrupt close, or an abrupt exordium, is sufficient reason for declaring a dialogue not to be the work of Plato (as Platonic critics often argue), are of course consistent in disallowing the Parmenides. For my part, I do not agree in the opinion. I take Plato as I find him, and I per- ceive both here and in the Protagoras and elsewhere, that he did not always think it incumbent upon him to adapt the end of his dialogues to the beginning. ᾿ This may be called a defect, but I do not feel called upon to make out that Plato’s writings are free from defects ; and to acknowledge nothing as his work unless | can show it to be faultless.
The demonstrations or Antinomies in the last half of the Par- Different menides are characterised by K. F. Hermann and judgments others as a masterpiece of speculative acuteness. Yet critics ree if these same demonstrations, constructed with care Antinomies and labour for the purpose of proving that the same Ginlorwe premisses will conduct to double and contradictory generally. conclusions, had come down to us from antiquity under the name either of the Megaric Eukleides, or Protagoras, or Gorgias—many of the Platonic critics would probably have
1 Plato, Parmenid. ad fin. Εἰρήσθω τἄλλα καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τοίνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ εἴτ᾽ ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὑτό τε καὶ φαίνεταί τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.
Cuap. XA VIT. COMMENTARY OF PROKLUS. 83
said of them (what is now said of the sceptical treatise remaining to us under the name of Gorgias) that they were poor produc- tions worthy of such Sophists, who are declared to have made a trade of perverting truth. Certainly the conclusions of the demonstrations are specimens of that “ Both and Neither,” which Plato (in the Euthydemus') puts into the mouth of the Sophist Dionysodorus as an answer of slashing defiance—and of that intentional evolution of contradictions which Plato occasionally discountenances, both in the Euthydemus and elsewhere? And we know from Proklus? that there were critics in ancient times, ‘who depreciated various parts of the Parmenides as sophistical. _ Proklus himself denies the charge with some warmth. He as ‘well as the principal Neo-Platonists between 200-530 a.p. (espe- cially his predecessors and instructors at Athens, Jamblichus, | Syrianus, and Plutarchus) admired the Parmenides as a splendid effort of philosophical genius in its most exalted range, inspired 80 as to become cognizant of superhuman persons and agencies. They all agreed so far as to discover in the dialogue a sublime ‘vein of mystic theology and symbolism: but along with this general agreement, there was much discrepancy in their interpre- tation of particular parts and passages. The commentary of Proklus attests the existence of such debates, reporting his own dissent from the interpretations sanctioned by his venerated masters, Plutarchus and Syrianus. That commentary, in spite of its prolixity, is curious to read as a specimen of the fifth century, A.D., in one of its most eminent representatives. Proklus dis- covers a string of theological symbols and a mystical meaning throughout the whole dialogue: not merely in the acute argu- mentation which characterises its middle part, but also in the perplexing antinomies of its close, and even in the dramatic
1 Plato, Eathydem. p. 800 C. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ταὐτόν, καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρόν, καὶ τὸ οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάντα σιγᾷ ἣ ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τὰν- λέγει; Ονδέτερα καὶ ἀμφότερα, avria ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἔφη ὑφαρπάσας ὁ Διονυσόδωρος" εὖ γὰρ οὗ τέ τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινός, ἄρτι οἶδα ὅτι τῇ ἀποκρίσει οὐχ ἕξεις 5, τι Χρῇ. τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος
2 Plato, Sophist. p. $59 B. εἴτε ὡς νεογενὴς wr. - τι χαλεπὸν κατανενοηκὼς xaipe, τοτὲ 3 Proklus, ad Platon. Parmen. p. μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τοτὲ δ᾽ ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς 953, ed. Stallb. ; compare Ὁ. 976 in the λόγους ἕλκων, οὐκ ἄξια πολλῆς σπουδῆς last book of the commentary, probably ἐσπούδακεν, ὡς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασίν.--- composed by Damaskius. F. ‘Her- Also p 259 Ὁ. Τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν ἕτερον mann, Geschichte und System der ἀποφαίνειν auy γέ πῃ, καὶ τὸ θάτερον Platon. Philos. p. 507. ᾿
-
84
PARMENIDES.
CHaPp. XXVIL
details of places, persons, and incidents, with which it be-
gins.’
The various explanations of it given by more recent com- mentators may be seen enumerated in the learned Prolegomena of Stallbaum,? who has also set forth his own views at consider- able length. And the prodigious opposition between the views.
1This commen is annexed to Stallbaum’s edition of the Parmenides. Compare also the opinion of Marinus (disciple and biographer of Proklus) about the Parmenid uidas v. Ma- ptvos. Jamblichusdeclared that Plato’s entire theory of philosophy was em- bodied in the two dialogues, Parme- nides and Timzus : in the Parmenides, all the intelligible or universal Entia were deduced from τὸ ἕν: in the Ti- meus, all cosmical realities were de- duced from the Demiurgus. Proklus ad Timeum, p. 6 A, p. 10 Schnei-
er.
Alkinous, in his Introduction to the Platonic Dialogues (c. 6, p. 159, in the Appendix Platonica attached to K. F.
ermann’s edition of Plato) quotes several examples of syllogistic reason- ing from the Parmenides, and affirms that the ten categories of Aristotle are exhibited therein.
Plotinus (Ennead. v. 1, 8) gives a brief summary of what he understood to be contained in the Antinomies of the Pla- tonic Parmenides ; ‘but the interpreta- tion departs widely from the original.
I transcribe a few sentences from the argument of Ficinus, to show what different meanin may. be discovered in the same words by different critics. (Ficini Argum. in Plat. Parmen. p. 756.) ‘‘Cum Plato per omnes ejus dia- logos totius sapientise semina sparserit, in libris De Republic& cuncta moralis philosophie instituta collegit, omnem naturalium rerum scientiam in Timo, universam in Parmenide complexus est Theologiam. Cumque in aliis longo
philosophos ante-
cesserit, in hoc tandem seipsum supe- rasse videtur. Hic enim divus Plato de ipso Uno subtilissimé disputat : quemadmodum Ipsum Unum rerum omnium principium est, super omnia, omniaque a Oo: quo ipsum extra omnia sit et in amni bus: omnia- que ex illo, per illud, atque ad illud. d hujas, quod super essentiam est, Unius intelligentiam gradatim ascendit. In iis que fluunt et sensibus subjici- untur et sensibilia nominantur : In iis
intervallo czteros
etiam qua semper eadem sunt et sensi- bilia nuncupantur, non sensibus am- plius sed so mente percipienda : Nec in iis tantum, verum etiam supra sensum et sensibilia, intellectumque et intelligibilia :—ipsum Unum existit. —T[llud insuper advertendam est, quod in hoc ogo cum dicitur Unum,.
oreorum more quaque substan- tia a materiA penitus absoluta signi- ficari potest: ut Deus, Mens, Anima. Cum vero dicitur Aliud et Alia, tam materia, quam illa quee in materiA fiunt, intelligere licet.”
The Prolegomena, prefixed by Thom- son to his edition of the Parmenides, interpret the dialogue in the same general way as Proklus and Ficinus: they suppose that by Unum is under- stood Summus Deus, and they discover in the concluding Antinomies theo- logical demonstrations of the unity, simplicity, and other attributes of God. Thomson observes, very justly, that difficult, dialogues in Plato (Prolegom.
ogues egom. iv.-x.) But in my judgment, his mode of exposition, far from smoothing the difficulties, adds new ones greater than those in the text.
3 Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Parnien. ii. 1, pp. 244-265. Com K. F. Her- mann, Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Phil pp. 507-668-670.
To the works which he has there. enumerated, may be added the Dis- sertation by Dr. Kuno Fischer, Stutt- gart, 1851, Deo Parmenide Platonico, and that of Zeller, Platonische Studien,
p. 169 seqq.
Kuno Tischer (pp. 102-108) after Hegel (Gesch. der Griech. Phil i. p. 202), and some of the followers of Hegel, extol the Parmenides as a. masterpiece of dialectics, though they complain that “der philosophirende Pobel” misunderstand it, and treat it as obscure. Werder, Logik, pp. 92-176, Berlin, 1841. Carl Beck, Platon’s Phi- losophie im Abriss ihrer etischen Entwickelung, p. 76, Reutlingen, 1852. Marbach, Gesch. der Griech. Phil. sect. 96, pp. 210-211.
Cap. ΧΧΥΙΙ.
DIFFERENT EXPOSITIONS.
85
of Proklus (followed by Ficinus in the fifteenth century), who extols the Parmenides as including in mystic phraseology sublime religious truths—and those of the modern Tiedemann, who despises them as foolish subtleties and cannot read them with patience—is quite sufficient to inspire a reasonable Platonic
critic with genuine diffidence.
In so far as these different expositions profess, each in its own
way, to detect a positive dogmatical result or purpose
No dogma-
in the Parmenides,! none of them carry conviction to tical solu-
tion or
my mind, any more than the mystical interpretations purpose is
naid that th up the considering e p se 0 Θ Parmenidesis nothing beyond γυμνασία, or exercise in the method and per- plexities of philosophising (Einl. p. ): but I do not agree with him, when he says (pp. 90-105) that the objections by parmenides (in the middle of the dialogue) i the se substantiality of Forms or Ideas, t ough noway answered in the dialogue i ἢ are sufficiently answered in other dialogues (which he considers later in time), ially in the Sophi (though, according to Brandis, db. r.-Rom. Phil. p. 241, the Sophistes is earlier than the Parmenides). Zeller, on the other hand, denies that these objections are at all answered in the Sophistes ; but he maintains that the second part of the Parmenides itself clears up the difficulties propounded in the first part. After an elaborate ana- lysis (in the Platon. Studien, pp. 168- 178) of the Antinomies or contradictory Demonstrations in the concluding part of the dialogue, Zeller pose of them to be “‘die richtige An- sicht von den Ideen als der Einheit in dem Mannichfaltigen der Erscheinung dialektisch zu begriinden, die Ideen- lehre méglichen Einwiarfen und Miss- verstandnissen gegentiber dialektisch zu den” (pp. 180-182). This solu- tion found favour with some sub- sequent commentators. See Susemihl, Die genetische Entwickelung der Platon. Philosophie, PP. 341-858 ; Heinrich Stein, Vorgeschichte und System des Platonismus, pp. 217- To me it appears (what Zeller him- self remarks in p. 188, upon the dis- covery of Schleiermacher that the objections started in the Parmenides are answered in the Sophistes) that it
the pur- p
requires all the acuteness of so able a writer as Zeller to detect any such result as that which he here extracts from the Parmenidean Antinomies — from what Aristeides calls (Or. xlvii. P. 430) ‘‘the One and Many, the mul- iplied twists and doublings, of this divine dialogue”. I confess that Iam unable to perceive therein what Zeller has either found or elicited. Objec- tions and misunderstandings (Kin- wiirfe und Missverstaindnisse), fur from being obviated or corrected, are ac- cumulated from the beginning to the end of these Antinomies, and are summed up in a formidable total by the final sentence of the dialogue. Moreover, none of these objections which Parmenides had advanced in the earlier part of the dialogue are at all noticed, much less answered, in the concluding Antinomies.
The general view taken by Zeller of the Platonic Parmenides, is repeated by him in his Phil. der Griech. vol. ii. pp. 304-415-429, ed. 2nd. In the first e, I do not think that he sets forth exactly (see p. 415) the reasoning as we read it in Plato; but even if that were exactly set forth, still what we read in Plato is nothing but an assemblage of difficulties and contradictions. ese are indeed suggestive, and such as 8, profound critic may meditate with care, until he finds himself put upon a train of thought conducting him to conclu- sions sound and tenable in his judg- ment. But the explanations, sufficient or not, belong after all not to Plato but to the critic himself. Other critics may attach, and have attached, totally different explanations to the same diffi- culties. I see no adequate evidence to bring home any one of them to Plato; or to prove (what is the main point to be determined) that any one of them
86 PARMENIDES. CHar XXVIL.
repped up which we read in Proklus. If Plato had any such logue. The purpose, he makes no intimation of it, directly or vogative,to directly. On the contrary, he announces another
negative, to
make bra purpose not only different, but contrary. The veteran feelallthe Parmenides, while praising the ardour of speculative difficulties research displayed by Sokrates, at the same time re- rising. proves gently, but distinctly, the confident forward-
ness of two such immature youths as Sokrates and Aristotle in laying down positive doctrines without the preliminary exercise indispensable for testing them.! Parmenides appears from the beginning to the end of the dialogue as a propounder of doubts and objections, not as a doctrinal teacher. He seeks to restrain the haste of Sokrates—to make him ashamed of premature affir-
was present to his mind when he com- po the dialogue.
Schwegler ives an account of what he affirms to be the purpose and meaning of the Parmenides—‘ The positive meaning of the antinomies contained in it can only be obtained by inferences which Plato does not himself expressly enunciate, but leaves to the reader to draw” (Geschichte der Philo- sophie im Umriss, sect. 14, 4 c. pp. 62-
A learned man like Schwegler, who both knows the views of other philo- sophers, and has himself reflected on
hilosophy, may perhaps find affirma-
ve meaning in the Parmenides ; just as Sokrates, in the Platonic Protagoras, finds his own ethical doctrine in the song of the poet Simonides. But I venture to say that no contempora reader of Plato could have found suc 8, meaning in the Parmenides; and that if Plato intended to communicate such a meaning, the whole structure of the dialogue would be only an elaborate puzzle calculated to prevent nearly all readers from reaching it.
By assigning the leadership of the dialogue Parmenides (Schwegler says) Plato intends to signify that the Platonic doctrine of Ideas is coincident wjth the doctrine of Parmenides, and is only a farther development thereof. How can this be signified, when the discourse assigned to Parmenides con- sists of a string of objections against the doctrine of Ideas, concluding with an intimation that there are other objections, yet stronger, remaining be-
in
The fundamental thought of the:
Parmenides (says Schwegler) is, that the One is not conceivable in complete abstraction from the Many, nor the Many in complete abstraction from the One,—that each reciprocally supposes and serves as condition to the other. Not so: for if we follow the argumenta- tion of Parmenides (p. 181 E), we shall see that what he princi insists. upon, is the entire im ility of any connection or participation een. the One and the Many—there is an im ble gulf between them. the discussion of τὸ ἂν (in the
closing Antinomies) intended as an example of dialectic investigation—or is it per se the special object of the dialogue? This last is clearly the truth (says Schwegler), ‘‘ otherwise the dialogue would end without result, and its two portions would be without any inte connection”. Not so; for if we read the dialogue, we find Par- menides clearly proclaiming and sing- ling out τὸ ἕν as only one among 8. great many different notions, each of which must be made,the subject of a bilateral hypothesis, to be followed out into its consequences on both sides (p. 186 A). Moreover, I think that
e “internal connection” between the first and the last half of the dia- logue, consists in the application of this dialectic method, and in nothi else. If the dialogue ends withou result, this is true of many other Platonic dialogues. The student is brought face to face with logical difti- culties, and has to find out the solu- tion for himself; or perhaps to find out that no solution can be obtained
1 Plato, Parmenid. p. 185 C.
Cuap. XXVIL. NEGATIVE PURPOSE. 87
mation and the false persuasion of knowledge—to force upon him a keen sense of real difficulties which have escaped his notice. To this end, a specimen is given of the exercise required. It is certainly well calculated to produce the effect intended—of hampering, perplexing, and putting to shame, the affirmative rashness of a novice in philosophy. It exhibits a tangled skein of ingenious contradiction which the novice must somehow bring into order, before he is in condition to proclaim any positive dogma. If it answers this purpose, it does all that Parmenides promises. Sokrates is warned against attaching himself exclu- sively to one side of an hypothesis, and neglecting the opposite : against surrendering himself to some pre-conception, traditional, or self-originated, and familiarising his mind with its conse- quences, while no pains are taken to study the consequences of the negative side, and bring them into comparison. It is this one-sided mental activity, and premature finality of assertion, which Parmenides seeks to correct. Whether the corrective exercises which he prescribes are the best for the purpose, may be contested: but assuredly the malady which he seeks to correct is deeply rooted in our human nature, and is combated by So- krates himself, though by other means, in several of the Platonic dialogues. It is a rare mental endowment to study both sides of a question, and suspend decision until the consequences of each are fully known.
Such, in my judgment, is the drift of the contradictory demon- atrations here put into the mouth of Parmenides re- ,, .. nega- specting Unum and Cetera. Thus far at least, we tive purpose are perfectly safe: for we are conforming strictly to 18 Pressly the language of Plato himself in the dialogue: we by Plato
. imself. All have no proof that he meant anything more. Those dogmatical who presume that he must have had some ulterior extending dogmatical purpose, place themselves upon hypotheti- farther, is cal ground : but when they go farther and attempt to vothetical, set forth what this purpose was, they show their in- and even in- genuity only by bringing out what they themselves with whatis have dropped in. The number of discordant hypo- theses attests! the difficulty of the problem. I agree with those
1 Proklus ad Platon. Parmen. i. pp. copious upon the subject of exercise in
482-485, ed. Stallb.; compare pp. 497- dialectic method. 498-788-791, where Proklus is himself Stallbaum, after reciting many dif-
PARMENIDES.
88 Cuap. XXVIL
early Platonic commentators (mentioned and opposed by Proklus) who could see no other purpose in these demonstrations than that of dialectical exercise. In this view Schleiermacher, Ast, Striimpell, and others mainly concur : the two former however annexing to it a farther hypothesis—which I think improbable— that the dialogue has come to us incomplete ; having once con- tained at the end (or having been originally destined to contain, though the intention may never have been realised) an appendix elucidating the perplexities of the demonstrations.’ This would have been inconsistent with the purpose declared by Parmenides: who, far from desiring to facilitate the onward march of Sokrates by clearing up difficulties, admonishes him that he is advancing too rapidly, and seeks to keep him back by giving him a heap of manifest contradictions to disentangle. Plato conceives the training for philosophy or for the highest exercise of intellectual force, to be not 1688 laborious than that which was required for the bodily perfections of an Olympic athlete. The student must not be helped out of difficulties at once : he must work his own way slowly out of them.
That the demonstrations include assumption both unwarranted The Demon- 224 contradictory, mingled with sophistical subtlety strations or (in the modern sense‘of the words), is admitted by
Antinomies most of the commentators: and I think that the real
ferenthypothetical interpretations from those in rpreters who had preceded
him, says (Prolegg. p. 265), “Ἐπ lus- travimus tandem ν interpretum de hoc libro opiniones. uid igitur?
icerem, tan-
verusne fui, quum supra tam fuisse hominum eruditorum ‘in eo explicando fluctuationem atque dis- sensionem, ut quamvis plurimi de eo disputaverint, tamen feré alius aliter judicaverit? Nimirum his omnibus cognitis, facilé alicui in mentem veniat Terentianum illud—Fecisti propé, multo sim quam dudum incertior.” Brandis (Handbuch Gr.-Rém. Phil 8. 105, pp. 257-268) cannot bring him- self to believe that dialectical exercise was the only purpose with which Plato composed the Parmenides. He then proceeds to state what Plato's ulterior urpose was, but in such very vague guage, that I hardly understand what he means, much less can I find it in the Antinomies themselves. He has some clearer language, p. 241, where
he treats these Antinomies as prepara- tory ἀπορίαι.
Ast, Platon’s Leben und Schriften, pp. 289-244; Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Parmen. PP. 94-99; Striimpell, Geschichte der Theoretischen Philo- sophie der Griechen, sect. 96, pp. 128-
I do not with Socher's con- clusion, that the Parmenides is not a Platonic composition. But I think he
is quite right in saying that the dia- logue as it now stands performs all that Parmenides promises, and leaves no ground for contending that it is an unfinished fragment (Socher, Ueber Platon’s Schriften, p. 286), so far as hilosophical speculation is concerned.
e dialogue as a dramatic or literary composition undoubtedly lacks a proper close; it is dwovs or κολοβὸς (Aristot. Rhetor. iii. 8), sinning against the strict exigence which Plato in the Pheedrus applies to the discourse of Lysias.
CHaP. XXVII. DEMONSTRATIONS OF BOTH AND NSITHER.
amount of it is greater than they admit. How far Plato was himself aware of this, I will not undertake to say. Perhaps he was not. The reasonings which have passed for sublime and profound in the estima- tion of so many readers, may well have appeared the same to their author. I have already remarked that Plato’s ratiocinative force is much greater on the
89
They in- clude much unwar- ranted as- sumption and sub- tlety. Col- lection of unexplained perplexities
ΟΣ ἀπορίαι.
negative side than on the positive : more ingenious in suggesting logical difficulties than sagacious in solving them. Impressed, as Sokrates had been before him, with the duty of combating the false persuasion of knowledge, or premature and untested belief, —he undertook to set forth the pleadings of negation in the most forcible manner. Many of his dialogues manifest this tendency, but the Parmenides more than any other. That dialogue 18 ἃ collection of unexplained ἀπορίαι (such as those enumerated in the second book of Aristotle’s Metaphysica) brought against a doctrine which yet Plato declares to be the indispensable condi- tion of all reasoning. It concludes with a string of demonstra- tions by which contradictory conclusions (Both and Neither) are successively proved, and which appear like a reductio ad absurdum of all demonstration. But at the time when Plato composed the dialogue, I think it not improbable that these difficulties and contradictions appeared even to himself unanswerable : in other words, that he did not himself see any answers and explanations of them. He had tied a knot so complicated, that he could not himself untie it. I speak of the state of Plato’s mind when he wrote the Parmenides. At the dates of other dialogues (whether earlier or later), he wrote under different points of view ; but no key to the Parmenides does he ever furnish.
If however we suppose that Plato must have had the key present to his own mind, he might still think it right
Vv to employ, in such a dialogue, reasonings recognised Fiato him. by himsélf as defective. It is the task imposed upon through Sokrates to find out and expose these defective links. tloties hee There is no better way of illustrating how universal might still is the malady of human intelligence—unexamined fmpoee and belief and over-confident affirmation—as it stands gimeatics proclaimed to be in the Platonic Apology. Sokrates in the way | is exhibited in the Parmenides as placed under the affirmative aspirant.
screw of the Elenchus, and no more able than others
90
᾿ PARMENIDES.
Caar. XXVII.
to extricate himself from it, when it is applied by Parmenides : though he bears up successfully against Zeno, and attracts to himself respectful compliments, even from the aged dialectician who tests him. After the Elenchus applied to himself, Sokrates receives a farther lesson from the “Neither and Both” demon- strations addressed by Parmenides to the still younger Aristotle. Sokrates will thus be driven, with his indefatigable ardour for speculative research; to work at the problem—to devote to it~ those seasons of concentrated meditation, which sometimes ex- hibited him fixed for hours in the same place and almost in the same attitude \—until he can extricate himself from such diffi- culties and contradictions. But that he shall not extricate him- self without arduous mental effort, is the express intention of Parmenides: just as the Xenophontic Sokrates proceeds with the youthful Euthydemus—and the Platonic Sokrates with Lysis, Theetetus, and others. Plausible subtlety was not unsuitable for such a lesson.2 Moreover, in the Parmenides, Plato proclaims
explicitly that the essential condition of the lesson is to be strictly private: that a process so roundabout and tortuous cannot be appreciated by ordinary persons, and would be un-
seemly before an audience.®
He selects as respondent the
youngest person in the company, one still younger than So- krates : because (he says) such a person will reply with artless simplicity, to each question as the question may strike him—not carrying his mind forward to the ulterior questions for which his reply may furnish the handle—not afraid of being entangled in puzzling inconsistencies—not solicitous to baffle the purpose of
1 Plato, Symposion, p. 220 C-D: compare pp. 174-175.
In the dialogue Parmenides (Pp. 1380 E), Parmenides himself is in- troduced as predicting that the youth- ful Sokrates will become more and more absorbed in philosophy as he advances in years.
Proklus observes in his commentary on the dialogue—o γὰρ Σωκράτης aya- ται τὰς ἀπορίας, &C. ἃ Vv. p. 252).
2 Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, ad fin.
3 Plato, Parmenid. pp. 136 C, 187 A. Hobbes remarks (Computatio sive Logica, Part I. ch. iii. s. 12), ‘‘ Learners ought to go through logical exercises
silently and by themselves: for it will be thought both ridiculous and absurd, for a man to use such lan-
guage ublicly ΗΝ . us tells us, that the difficulty
of the γυμνασία here enjoined by the Platonic Parmenides is so prodigious that no one after Plato employed it
ΚΙ. ad Parmenid. p. 306, p. 80
tallb.).
εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι. ἀπρεπὴ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ travtns τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀλη- θεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν.
1,
Crap. XXVII. OTHER ANTINOMIES BEHIND. 91
the interrogator.’ All this betokens the plan of the dialogue—to bring to light all those difficulties which do not present them- selves except to a keen-sighted enquirer.
We must remark farther, that the two hypotheses here handled at length by Parmenides are presented by him only as examples of a dialectical process which cises exhi- he enjoins the lover of truth to apply equally to Parme. many other hypotheses? As he shows that in the nides are case of Unum, each of the two assumptions (Unum only as est—Unum non est) can be traced through different Mustrative threads of deductive reasoning so as to bring out Qo #method double and contradictory results—Both and Neither: be applied so also in the case of those other assumptions which to many remain to be tested afterwards in like manner, anti- "mies. _ nomies of the same character may be expected: antinomies apparent at least, if not real—which must be formally pro- pounded and dealt with, before we can trust ourselves as having attained reasoned truth. Hence we see that, negative and puzz- ling as the dialogue called Parmenides is, even now—it would be far more puzzling if all that it prescribes in general terms had been executed in detail. While it holds out, in the face of an aspirant in philosophy, the necessity of giving equal presumptive value to the affirmative and negative sides of each hypothesis, and deducing with equal care, the consequences of both—it warns him at the same time of the contradictions in which he will thereby become involved. These contradictions are presented in the most glaring manner: but we must recollect a striking passage in the Republic, where Plato declares that to confront the aspi- rant with manifest contradictions, is the best way of pro- voking him to intellectual effort in the higher regions of speculation.®
I have already had occasion, when I touched upon the other wirt
1 Plato, Parmenides, p. 187 B; com- respondent by Aristotle, not merely in
pare Sophistes, p. 217 D. the Topica but also in the Analytica— To understand the force of this re- χρὴ δ᾽ ὁπερ φυλάττεσθαι παραγγέλλομεν
mark of Parmenides, we should con- ἀποκρινομένονς, αὐτοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας
trast it with the precepts given by πειρᾶσθαι λανθάνειν (Anal. Priora, ii.
Aristotle in the | Topica for plislectic p. 68, a. 33
ebate; prece teaching the ques- tioner μον to Dazzle, and the respon. 7 F lato, Parmenid. p. 136 B. ; dent how to avoid being puzzled. 3 Plato, Repub. vii. p. 524 BE, and in-
Such precautions are advised to the deed the whole passage, pp. 523-524.
99 PARMENIDES. Cap. XXVII.
These Pla. Socratici, contemporaneous with or subsequent to tonic Anti- Plato, to give some account of the Zenonian and more formi- Megaric dialecticians, and of their sophisms or logical dable than puzzles, which attracted so much attention from sophisms or speculative men, in the fourth and third centuries broached by B.C. These Megarics, like the Sophists, generally the Megaric yeceive very harsh epithets from the historian of philo- phers. sophy. They took the negative side, impugned affir- mative dogmas, insisted on doubts and difficulties, and started problems troublesome to solve. I have tried to show, that such disputanta, far from deserving all the censure which has been poured upon them, presented one indispensable condition to the formation of any tolerable logical theory. Their sophisms were challenges to the logician, indicating various forms of error and confusion, against which a theory of reasoning, in order to be sufficient, was required to guard. And the demonstrations given by Plato in the latter half of the Parmenides are challenges of the same kind: only more ingenious, elaborate, and effective, than any of those (so far as we know them) proposed by the Megarics—by Zeno, or Eukleides, or Diodorus Kronus. The Platonic Parmenides here shows, that in regard to a particular question, those who believe the affirmative, those who believe the negative, and those who believe neither—can all furnish good reasons for their respective conclusions. In each case he gives the proof confidently as being good : and whether unimpeachable or not, it is certainly very ingenious and subtle. Such demon- strations are in the spirit of Sextus Empiricus, who rests his theory of scepticism upon the general fact, that there are opposite and contradictory conclusions, both of them supported by evi- dence equally good: the affirmative no more worthy of belief than the negative.? Zeno (or, as Plato calls him, the Eleatic 1 : Seton μας
Categories of “Aristotle, there "were Schol, ad Τα aristot a ae oreral whose prncipal object it waa 22-30; Schol. | randis). David the } } grave and Armenian, in his Scholia on the Cate-
troublesome difficulties which they gories (p. 27, b. 41, Brandis), defends could think of. Simplikius does not the Topica of Aristotle as having been commend the style or these men, but com ἃ γυμνασίας χάριν, ἵνα θλι- presses his itude to them for βομένη ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερα
the pains which they had taken inthe ἐπιχειρημάτων ἀπογεννήσῃ τὸ exposition of the negative case, and for θείας bon. αἀπογεννήσῃ τῆς ἅλη-
the stimulus and opportunity which 2Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. t. i. 8-12. they had thus administered to ework Ἔστι δὲ ἡ σκεπτικὴ δύναμιν ἀντιϑετικὴ
Crap. XXVITI. PROBLEMS OF THE MEGARICS. 93
Palamédes ') did not profess any systematic theory of scepticism ; but he could prove by ingenious and varied dialectic, both the thesis and the antithesis on several points of philosophy, by reasons which few, if any, among his hearers could answer. In like manner the Platonic Parmenides enunciates his contradictory demonstrations as real logical problems, which must exercise the sagacity and hold back the forward impulse of an eager philoso- phical aspirant. Even if this dilemma respecting Unum Est and Unum non Est, be solved, Parmenides intimates that he has others in reserve: so that either no tenable positive result will ever be attained—or at least it will not be attained until after such an amount of sagacity and patient exercise as Sokrates him- self declares to be hardly practicable? Herein we may see the germ and premisses of that theory which was afterwards formally proclaimed by Ainesidemus and the professed Sceptics: the same holding back (ἐποχὴ), and protest against precipitation in dog- matising,? which these latter converted into a formula and vindicated as a system.
Schleiermacher has justly observed,‘ that in order to under- stand properly the dialectic manceuvres of the Par- 4, order to menides, we ought to have had before us the works of understand that philosopher himself, of Zeno, Melissus, Gorgias, Platonic and other sceptical reasoners of the age immediately Antinomies.
we ought to
preceding—which have unfortunately perished. Some have before reference to these must probably have been present blems of the
to Plato in the composition of this dialogue.’ At the Megarics same time, if we accept the dialogue as being (what it Uselessness declares itself to be) a string of objections and dia- for a posi-
lectical problems, we shall take care not to look for tve result.
φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων xa" oiovdy- τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν --- τὴν ποτε τρόπον, ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἐρχόμεθα, διὰ τὴν ἐν δογματικὴν προπέτειαν. Tols ἀντικειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις — 4 Schleiermacher, Kinleitung zum ἐσοσθένειαν, TO μὲν πρῶτον εἰς ἐποχὴν Parmen. pp. 97-99. δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο eis ἀταραξίαν. . . ἐσ ο- ΕΣ . σθένειαν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κατὰ πίστιν 5 Indeed, the second demonstration, καὶ ἀπιστίαν ἰσότητα, ws μηδένα μηδενὸς among the nine given by Parmenides προκεῖσθαι τῶν μαχομένων λόγων ὡς Φ». 143 A, 155 Ο), coincides to a great πιστότερον... σνστάσεως δὲ τῆς σκεπ- degree with the conclusion which Zeno τικῆς ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μάλιστα τὸ παντὶ is represented as having maintained in. λόγῳ λόγον ἴσον ἀντικεῖσθαι. his published disserta ion (p. 127 E); 1 Piato, Pheedrus, p. 261 Ὁ. and shows that the difficulties and con- 3 Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 C-D. tradictions belong to the world of in- 3Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 20-212. visible Ideas, as well as to that of
94
PARMENTDES.
ΠΑΡ. XXVIL
any other sort of merit than what such a composition requires and admits. If the objections are forcible, the problems in- genious and perplexing, the purpose of the author is satisfied. To search in the dialogue for some positive result, not indeed directly enunciated but discoverable by groping and diving— would be to expect a species of fruit inconsistent witb the nature
of the tree. Ζητῶν εὑρήσεις οὐ ῥόδον ἀλλὰ βάτον. It may indeed be useful for the critic to perform for himself the process which Parmenides intended Sokrates to .
tions of E Par-
menides in his Demon- strations convey the um of
perform ; and to analyse these subtleties with a view to measure their bearing upon the work of dogmatic theorising. We see double and contradictory con- clusions elicited, in four separate Antinomies, from
the same hypothesis, by distinct chains of interroga-
tory deduction ; each question being sufficiently plausible to obtain the acquiescence of the respondent. The two assumptions successively laid down by Par- menides as principia for deduction—St Unum est—St Unum non est—convey the very minimum of deter-
minate meaning. Indeed both words are essentially indeter- minate. Both Unum and Ens are declared by Aristotle to be not univocal or generic words,’ though at the same time not absolutely equivocal : but words bearing several distinct transi-
sensible iculars, which Sokrates had called in question (p. 129 C-E).
The Aristotelian treatise (whether by Aristotle, Theophrastus, or any other author) De Zenone, Melisso, Xeno- phane, et Gorgia—affords some curious com ns with the Parmenides of Plato. Aristotel. p. 974 seq. Bekk. ; also Fragmenta Philosophorum Greecorum, ed. Didot, pe: 273-309.
1 Aristot. Metaphys. iv. 1015-1017, ix. 1062, a. 15; . Poster. ii. p. 92, Ὁ. 14. τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι οὐκ οὐσία οὐδενί. ov γὰρ γένος τὸ dv.—Topica, iv. p. 127, a. 33. πλείω γὰρ τὰ πᾶσιν ἑπόμενα" οἷον τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ ἕν τῶν πᾶσιν ἑπομένων ἔστιν, Physica, i. p. 185, Ὁ. 6.
Siunplikius noted it as one among the differences between Plato and Aristotle —That Plato admitted Unum as havi only one meanin iB not being aware the diversity of meanings which it bore ; while Aristotle expressly poin it out as a πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον. Top: μενίδης yap ἕν τὸ ov φησι, Ἰλάτων δὲ
τὸ ἕν μοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, ὃ δὲ ᾿Αριστοτέ- Ans ἀμφότερα πολλαχῶς (Schol. ad Aristot. Sophist. Elench. p. $20, b. 8, Brandis). Aristotle farther remarks that Plato considered τὸ γένος as ὃν ἀριθμῷ, and that this was an error; we ought rather to say that Plato did not clearly discriminate ὃν ἀριθμῷ from ὃν εἴδει (Aristot. Topic. vi. 143,
. 80).
Simplikius farther remarks, that it was Aristotle «ho first rendered to Logic the important service of bringing out clearly and emphatically the idea of τὸ ὁμώννμον---( 6 same word with several meanings either totally distinct and disparate, or ramifying in different directions from the same root, so that there came to be little or no affinity be- tween many of them. It wasA tle who first classified and named these distinctions (σννώνυμον — ὁμώνυμον,
ted and the intermediate κατ᾽ ἀναλογίανν no
though they had been partially
by Plato and even by Sokrates. ἕως
Cuap. XVII. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT UNUM. 95
tional meanings, derived either from each other, or from some common root, by an analogy more or less remote. Aristotle characterises in like manner all the most indeterminate predicates, which are not included in any one distinct category among the ten, but are made available to predication sometimes in one category, sometimes in another: such as Ens, Unum, Idem, Diversum, Contrarium, ἄς. Now in the Platonic Parmenides, the two first among these words are taken to form the proposition assumed as fundamental datum, and the remaining three are much employed in the demonstration : yet Plato neither notices nor discriminates their multifarious and fluctuating significations. Such contrast will be understood when we recollect that the purpose of the Platonic Parmenides is, to propound difficulties ; while that of Aristotle is, not merely to propound, but also to assist in clearing them up.
Certainly, in Demonstrations 1 and 2 (as well as 4 and 5), the foundation assumed is in words the same proposition | 4.) pis. —St Unum est: but we shall find this same proposi- tonic De- tion used in two very different senses. In the first Monstt™™
: ἜΝ ° . tions the Demonstration, the proposition is equivalent to Sz same pro-
Unum est Unum :' in the second, to Si Unum est Ens, pers is 3 or δὲ Unum existit. In the first the proposition is bear very identical and the verb est serves only as copula: in different the second, the verb est is not merely a copula but meanings. implies Ens as a predicate, and affirms existence. We might have imagined that the identical proposition—Unum est Unum —since it really affirms nothing—would have been barren of all consequences : and so indeed it is barren of all affirmative conse- quences. But Plato obtains for it one first step in the way of negative predicates—S: Unum est Unum, Unum non est Multa: and from hence he proceeds, by a series of gentle transitions in- geniously managed, to many other negative predications re- specting the subject Unum. Since it is not Multa, it can have no parts, nor can it be a whole: it has neither beginning, middle, nor end : it has no boundary, or it is boundless : it has no figure, it is neither straight nor circular: it has therefore no place, being
Ἀριστοτέλους ov πάμπαν ἔκδηλον ἦν Schol. ad Aristot. Physic. p. 323, Ὁ. rd ὁμώνυμον " ἀλλὰ Πλάτων τε ἤρξατο 24, Brandis. περὶ τούτον ἣ μᾶλλον ἐκείνου Σωκράτης, 1 Plato, Parmenid. pp. 137 C, 142 B.
96 PARMENIDES. . CHap. XX VIL
neither in itself, nor in anything else: it is neither in motion nor at rest: it is neither the same with anything else, nor the same with itself :} it is neither different from any thing else, nor different from itself: it is neither like, nor unlike, to itself, nor to anything else : it is neither equal, nor unequal, to itself nor to any thing else : it is neither older nor younger, nor of equal age, either with itself or with anything else: it exists therefore not in time, nor has it any participation with time : it neither has been nor will be, nor is: it does not exist in any way: it does not even exist so as to be Unum: you can neither name it, nor reason upon it, nor know it, nor perceive it, nor opine about it.
All these are impossibilities (concludes Plato). We must First De. therefore go back upon the fundamental principle monstration from which we.took our departure, in order to see assemblage whether we shall not obtain, on a second trial, any of negative different result.?
conclusions. . . . Reductio ad Here then is a piece of dialectic, put together with
of the as" ingenuity, showing that everything can be denied, sumption and that nothing can be affirmed of the subject— Multa. Unum. All this follows, if you concede the first step, that Unum is not Multa. If Unum be said to have any other attribute except that of being Unum, it would become at once Multa. It cannot even be declared to be either the same with itself, or different from any thing else; because Idem and Diversum are distinct natures from Unum, and if added to it would convert it into Multa. Nay it cannot even be affirmed to be itself : it cannot be named or enunciated : if all predicates are denied, the subject is denied along with them: the subject is nothing but the sum total of its predicates—and when they are all withdrawn, no subject remains. As far as I can understand the bearing of this self-contradictory demonstration, it appears ἃ reductto ad absurdum of the proposition—Unum is not Multa. Now Unum which ts not Multa designates the Αὐτὸ Ἐν or Unum Ideale ; which Plato himself affirmed, and which Aristotle im- pugned.* If this be what is meant, the dialogue Parmenides
1 This part of the argument is the stration 1, and is stated pp. 139 D, extreme of dialectic subtlety, p. 139 140 A, compared with p. 187 C. C-D-E. 4 Aristot. Metaph. A. 987, b. 20; A. 2 Plato, Parmenid. p. 142 A. 992, 8.8; B. 1001, a. 27; I. 1053, b. 18. 3 This is the main point of Demon- Some ancient expositors thought that
Cuap. ΧΧΥΙ. FIRST DEMONSTRATION. 97
would present here, as in other places, a statement of difficulties understood by Plato as attaching to his own doctrines. Parmenides now proceeds to his second demonstration : pro- fessing to take up again the same hypothesis—Si second De- Unum est—from which he had started in the first 1— ™monstration. but in reality taking upa different hypothesis under the same words. In the first hypothesis, δὲ Unum est, was equivalent to, St Unum est Unum: nothing besides Unwm being taken into the reasoning, and est serving merely as copula. In the second, δὲ Unum est, is equivalent to, Ss Unum est Ens, or exists: so that instead of the isolated Unum, we have now Unum Ens? Here is a duality consisting of Unum and Ens: which two are con- sidered as separate or separable factors, coalescing to form the whole Unwm Ens, each of them being a part thereof. But each of these parts is again dual, containing both Unum and Ens: so that each part may be again divided into lesser parts, each of them alike dual : and so on ad infinitum. Unum Ens thus con- tains an infinite number of parts, or is Multa? But even Unum
the purpose of Plato in the Parmenides
is ὁ what Sokrates in the early was to demonstrate this Αὐτὸ“ Ἐν ; see
part of the dialogue (p. 129 B-D) had
Schol. ad Aristot. Metaph. p. 786, a. 10, Brandis. It is not easy to find any common
between the demonstrations Th
given in this dialogue respecting "Ἔν and IloAAa—and the observations which Plato makes in the Philébus upon "Ev and Πολλά. Would he mean to include the demonstrations which we read in the Parmenides, in the category of what he calls in Philébus ‘childish, easy and irrational debates on that vex question? (Plato, Philébus, p. 14 D).
rdly : for they are at any rate most elaborate as well as ingenious and sug-
tive. Yet neither do they suit the Geacription which he gives in Philébus of the genuine, serious, and difficult debates on the same question.
1 Plato, Parmenid. p. 142 A. Βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλθωμεν, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιοῦσιν ἀλ- λοῖον φανῇ;
3 This shifting of the real hypothesis, though the terms remain uncha is admitted by implication a little after- wards, ἢ. 142 B. νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἄστιν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἕν ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἕν ἔστιν.
3 Plato, Parmenfd. pp. 142-148. This
ed, cannot be assigned se
pronounced to be utterly inadmissible, vis, ; That ὃ ἔστιν ἐν should be πολλὰ —that ὃ ἔστιν ὅμοιον should be ἀνόμοιον. e essential ristic of the Platonic Ideas is here denied. How- ever, it appears to me that Plato here reasons upon two contradictory assump- tions ised oltwopartece Ens ‘is a total com oftwo y assign- able— Unum and Ens; next, that Jnum is not assignable separately from Ena, nor Bns from Unum. Proceeding upon the first, he declares Unum Ens to be divisible: proceeding upon the second, he declares that the division must be carried on ad infinitum, because you can never reach either the separate Ens or the separate Unum. But these two assumptions cannot be admitted both together. Plato must make his elec- tion ; either he takes the first, in which case the total Unum Ens is divisible, and its two a etratale a and ns, can assigned sepurately ; or he takes the second, in which case Unum and Ens parately—are not distinguishable factors,—so that Unum Ens instead of being infinitely divisible, is not divisible at all. The reaso: as it now stands is, in
” judgment, ic us.
98 PARMENIDES. Cuap. XXVIL
itself (Parmenides argues), if we consider it separately from Ens in which it participates, is not Unum alone, but Multa also. For it is different from Ens, and Ens is different from it. Unum therefore is not merely Unum but also Dwersum : Ens also is not merely Ens but Diversum. Now when we speak of Unum and Ens—of Unum and Diversum—or of Ens and Diverswm—we in each case speak of two distinct things, each of which is Unum. Since each is Unum, the two things become three—Lns, Dwersum, Unum—Unwm, Diverswum, Unum— Unum being here taken twice. We thus arrive at two and three—twice and thrice—odd and even—in short, number, with its full extension and properties. Unum therefore is both Unum and Multa—both Totum and Partes—both finite and infinite in multitude.?
Parmenides proceeds to show that Unum has beginning, Itendsin middle, and end—together with some figure, straight demon- —_ or curved ; and that it is both in itself, and in other Both of that things: that it is always both in motion and at rest :* first Demon- that it is both the same with itself and different from stration had itself —both the same with Cetera, and different from ed Neither. Czetera:* both like to itself, and unlike to itself— both like to Cetera, and unlike to Cetera :‘ that it both touches, and does not touch, both itself and Csetera :° that it is both equal, greater, and less, in number, as compared with itself and as compared with Cetera:® that it is both older than itself, younger than itself, and of the same age with itself—both older than Cetera, younger than Cetera, and of the same age as Cetera—also that it is not older nor younger either than itself or than Cetera :7 that it grows both older and younger than itself, and than Ceetera.* Lastly, Unum was, is, and will be ; it has been, is, and will be generated: it has had, has now, and will have, attributes and predicates : it can be named, and can be the object of perception, conception, opinion, reasoning, and cognition.®
1 Plato, > Parmenid p 164. AE, 145 A. 8 Plato, Parmenid. pp. 164 B, 165 C.
2 Plato, Parmeni Ἂ κατὰ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα, τὸ ἕν αὐτό τε 8 Plato, Parmenid. DD. 146-147 C. αὑτοῦ Kai τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ 4 Plato, Parmenid. p. 148 AD. νεώτερον ἔστι τε Kai cyverat, | καὶ οὔτε 5 Plato, Parmenid. p. 149 A πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν
6 Plato, Parmenid. pp. ΠΕ Ὁ. οὔτε γνεται οὔτε αὑτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων. 7 Plato, Parmen. pp. 2-158-154 A. lato, Parmenid. p. 165 C-D.
CHaPp. XXVIL SECOND DEMONSTRATION. 99
Here Parmenides finishes the long Demonstratio Secunda, which completes the first Antinomy. The last conclusion of all, with which it winds up, is the antithesis of that with which the first Demonstration wound up: affirming (what the conclusion of the first had denied) that Unum is thinkable, perceivable, nameable, knowable. Comparing the second Demonstration with the first, we see—That the first, taking its initial step, with a negative proposition, carries us through a series of conclusions every one of which is negative (like those of the second figure of the Aristo- telian syllogism) :—That whereas the conclusions professedly established in the first Demonstration are all in Netther (Unum is neither in itself nor in any thing else—neither at rest nor in motion—neither the same with itself nor different from itself, &c.), the conclusions of the second Demonstration are all in Both (Unum is both in motion and at rest, both δὴ itself and in other things, both the same with itself and different from itself) :— That in this manner, while the first Demonstration denies both of two opposite propositions, the second affirms them both.
Such a result has an air of startling paradox. We find it shown, respecting various pairs of contradictory prc- Startit positions, first, that both are false—next, that both paradox are true. This offends doubly against the logical pen canon, which declares, that of two contradictory pro- against positions, one must be true, the other must be false. canon— We must remember, that in the Platonic age, there No losical existed no systematic logic—no analysis or classifica- then been tion of propositions—no recognised distinction be- laid down. tween such as were contrary, and such as were contradictory. The Platonic Parmenides deals with propositions which are, to appearance at least, contradictory : and we are brought, by two different roads, first to the rejection of both, next to the admis- sion of both.!
1 Prantl (in his Geschichte der ‘Eine arge Tauschung ist es, zu Logik, vol. i. 5. 8, Pp. 70-71-78) main- glauben, dass das principium identitatis tains, if I rightly understand him, not et contradictio oberstes logisches only that Plato did not adopt the Princip des Plato sei . . Es ist gerade principium identitatis et contradictionis eine Hauptaufgabe, welche sich Plato as the basis of his reasonings, but that stellen musste, die Coexistenz der one of Plato’s express objects was to Gegensitze nachzuweisen, wie diess demonstrate the contrary of it, partly bekanntlich im Philebus und besonders in the Philébus, but especially in the im Parmenides geschieht.”
Parmenides :— According to this view, the Antino-
100 PARMENIDES. Omar. XXVIL-
How can this be possible? How can these four propositions Demonstra- all be true—Unum est Unum—Unum est Multa— Setampt ts Unum non et Unum—Unum non est Multa? Plato
le suggests a way out of the difficulty, in that which he gives as Demonstration 3. It has been shown that Demons Unum “partakes of time”—was, is, and will be. and I The propositions are all true, but true at different times : one at this time, another at that time? Unum acquires and loses existence, essence, and other attributes: now, it exists and is Unum—tfore, it did not exist and was not Unum : 80 too it is alternately like and unlike, in motion and at rest. But how is such alternation or change intelligible? At each time, whether present or past, it must be either in motion or at rest: at no time, neither present nor past, can it be neither in motion nor at- rest. It cannot, while in motion, change to rest—nor, while at. rest, change to motion. No time can be assigned for the change : neither the present, nor the past, nor the future: how then can the change occur at all ??
To this question the Platonic Parmenides finds an answer in Plato's ima. What he calls the Sudden or the Instantaneous: an
tion of anomalous nature which lies out of, or apart from, the orinsan. couree of time, being neither past, present, nor fu‘ure. feneous” ‘That which changes, changes at once and suddenly : momentary at an instant when it is neither in motion nor at rest. the course This Suddenly is a halt or break in the flow of time :* an extra-temporal condition, in which the subject has.
the contra- diction of ‘Demonstra-
ties in the Parmenides are all of them 3 Plato, Parmenid. p. 156.
Plato, Parmenid. Ἑ, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ
of them, summed up 88 they are in the τοπός entenceot the iota e,constitnte a ‘addition to the ve itive knowledge
Η ‘unintelligible. ai Ninderstand these Antinomies 88 ἀπορίαι to be cleared up, but in no other character. - ee es itt Parmenidess ‘ac. This i is the same eas that used by Zeller, upon mien have already rertarked.
1 This, ΓῊ 8 ‘distinction an yous to ξαίφνης- ἐξαίφνης ἅτο- aceite ans aoaoepa to ἐδ, bcd} Uden, i αἴ.
Sophistes between the finitesimal ; analogous to what is re- Seton’ of Grerakioitas and Empe- ogminad tn the thoy of the diferen- dokiés.
Cuap. XXVIII. NOTION OF THE SUDDEN. 101
no existence, no atiributes—though it revives again forthwith clothed with its new attributes: a point of total negation or annihilation, during which the subject with all its attributes dis- appears. At this interval (the Suddenly) all predicates may be truly denied, but none can be truly affirmed.’ Unum is neither at rest, nor in motion—neither like nor unlike—neither the same with itself nor different from itself—neither Unum nor Multa. Both predicates and Subject vanish. Thus all the nega- tions of the first Demonstration are justified. Immediately ‘before the Suddenly, or point of change, Unum was in motion— immediately after the change, it is at rest: immediately before, it was like—equal—the same with itself—Unum, &c.—immedi- ately after, it is unlike—unequal—different from itself—Multa, &c. And thus the double and contradictory affirmative predica- tions, of which the second Demonstration is composed, are in their turn made good, as successive in time. This discovery of the extra-temporal point Suddenly, enables Parmenides to uphold both the double negative of the first Demonstration, and the double affirmative of the second. | The theory here laid down in the third Demonstration re- specting this extra-temporal point—the Suddenly— Review of deserves all the more attention, because it applies not ἔπ Succes, merely to the first and second Demonstration which Demonstra- precede it, but also to the fourth and fifth, the sixth {o0Steeim
tinomies in
and seventh, the eighth and ninth, which follow it. each, the |
I have already observed, that the first and second theNeither, Demonstration form a corresponding pair, branching ‘he second
off from the same root or hypothetical proposition Both,
(at least the same in terms), respecting the subject Unwm; and destined to prove, one the Neither, the other the Both, of several different predicates. So also the fourth and fifth form a pair applying to the subject Cetera; and destined to prove, that from
1 This appears to be an illustration Herakleitus, especially i. p. 358, ii. of the doctrine which Lassalle ascribes p. 258. He scarcely however takes to Herakleitus; perpetual implication notice of the Platonic Parmenides.
of negativity and positivi y — des Some of the Stwics considered τὸ νῦν Nichtseins mit dem Sein: perpetual as μηδέν--ηπὰ nothing in time to be absorption of each particular into the real except τὸ παρῳχηκὸς and τὸ μέλ- universal ; and perpetual reappearance Aov (Plutarch, De Commun. Notitiis as an opposite particular. See the two contra Stoicos, p. 1081 D).
102 PARMENIDES. CHap. XXVII.
the same hypothetical root—S: Unum est—we can deduce the Neither as well as the Both, of various predicates of Cetera. When we pass on to the four last Demonstrations, we find that in all four, the hypothesis δὲ Unwm non est is substituted for that of Si Unum est: but the parallel couples, with the corresponding purpose, are still kept up. The sixth and seventh apply to the subject Unum, and demonstrate respecting that subject (proceed- ing from the hypothesis Si Unum non est) first the Both, then the Neither, of various predicates : the eighth and ninth arrive at the same result, respecting the subject Cetera. And a sentence at the close sums up in few words the result of all the four pairs (1-2, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9, that is, of all the Demonstrations excepting the third)—the Neither and the Both respecting all of them.
To understand these nine Demonstrations properly, therefore, τοῖα We ought to consider eight among them (1-2, 4-5, 6-7, Demonstra- 8-9) as four Antinomies, or couples establishing dia- diatorial, lectic contradictions: and the third as a mediator but not between the couples—announced as if it reconciled Ἐπ hypo: the contradictions of the first Antinomy, and capable the Sudden of being adapted, in the same character with certain or Instanta modifications, to the second, third, and fourth Antino- no favour. my. Whether it reconciles them successfully—in other words, whether the third Demonstration will itself hold good—is a different question. It will be found to involve the singular and paradoxical (Plato’s own phrase) doctrine of the extra- temporal Suddenly—conceiving Time as a Discretumr and not a Continuum. This doctrine is intended by Plato here as a means of rendering the fact of change logically conceivable and explicable. He first states briefly the difficulty (which we know to have been largely insisted on by Diodorus Kronus and other Megarics) of logically explaining the fact of change—and then enunciates this doctrine as the solution. We plainly see that it did not satisfy others—for the puzzle continued to be a puzzle long after—and that it did not even satisfy Plato, except at the time when he composed the Parmenides—since neither the doctrine itself (the extra-temporal break or transition) nor the very peculiar phrase in which it is embodied (τὸ ἐξαίφνης, ἄτοπός τις φύσις) occur in any of his other dialogues. If the doctrine were really tenable, it would have been of use in dialectic, and as such, would have
CHap. XXVII. THIRD DEMONSTRATION MEDIATES. 103
been called in to remove the theoretical difficulties raised among dialectical disputants, respecting time and motion. Yet Plato does not again advert to it, either in Sophistes or Timaus, in both of which there is special demand for it.' Aristotle, while he adopts a doctrine like it (yet without employing the peculiar phrase τὸ ἐξαίφνης) to explain qualitative change, does not admit the same either as to quantitative change, or as to local motion, or as to generation and destruction.*? The doctrine served the purpose of the Platonic Parmenides, as ingenious, original, and ‘provocative to intellectual effort: but it did not acquire any per- manent footing in Grecian dialectics.
The two last Antinomies, or four last Demonstrations, have, in common, for their point of departure, the negative proposition, Si Unum non est: and are likewise put together in parallel couples (6-7, 8-9), a Demonstration and a Counter-Demonstration —a Both and a Neither: first with reference to the subject Unuwm—next with reference to the subject Cetera.
Si Unum est—St Unum non est. Even from such a proposition as the first of these, we might have thought it difficult to deduce any string of consequences—which Plato pia‘ has already done: from such a proposition as the second, not merely difficult, but impoesible. Never- theless the ingenious dialectic of Plato accomplishes the task, and elicits from each proposition a Both, and a Neither, respecting several predicates of Unum as well as of Cetera. When you say Unum non est (so argues the Platonic Parmenides in Demonstration 6), you deny existence respecting Unum : but the proposition Unum non est, is distinguishable from Magnitudo non est—Parvitudo non est—and such like: propositions wherein the subject is different, though the predicate is the same: so that
1 Steinhart represents this idea of τὸ éfaidvys—the extra-temporal break or zero of transition—as an important
rogress made by Plato, compared with he Thesetétus, because it breaks down the absoluten Gegensatz between Sein and Werden, Ruhe and Bewegung (Einleitung zum Parmen. p. 809).
Surely, if Plato had considered it a progress, we should have seen the same dea repeated in various other dia- logues— which is not the case.
3 Aristotel. Physic. v. p. 235, Ὁ. 382,
with the Scholion of Simplikius, p. 410, b. 20, Brandis. The discussion occupies two or three es of Aristotle’s Physica. In regard ἀλλοίωσις or qualitative change, he ised what he called ἀθρόαν pera- Bodyv—a change all at once, which occupied no portion of time. It is plain, however, that even his own scholars Theophrastus and Eudemus had great difficulty in accepting the doctrine ; see Scho pp. 400-410-411, Brandis.
104 PARMENIDES. CHaP. xXvil.
Unum non Ens is still a Something knowable, and distinguishable from other things—a logical subject of which various other pre- dicates may be affirmed, though the predicate of existence cannot be affirmed.' It is both like and unlike, equal and unequal— like and equal to itself, unlike and unequal to other things.” These its predicates being all true, are also real existences: so that Unum partakes quodam modo in existence: though Unum be non-Ens, nevertheless, Unwm non-Ens est. Partaking thus both of non-existence and of existence, it changes: it both moves and is at rest: it is generated and destroyed, yet is also neither generated nor destroyed.? .
Having thus deduced from the fundamental principle this string of Both opposite predicates, the Platonic Parmenides reverts (in Demonstration 7) to the same principium (Si Unum non est) to deduce by another train of reasoning the Neither of these predicates. When you say that Unwm non est, you must mean that it does not partake of existence in any way—absolutely and without reserve. It therefore neither acquires. nor loses existence: it is neither generated nor destroyed : it is neither in motion nor at rest: it partakes of nothing existent : it is neither equal nor unequal—neither. like nor unlike—neither great nor little—neither this, nor that: neither the object of perception, nor of knowledge, nor of opinion, nor of naming, nor of debate.‘
These two last. counter-demonstrations (6 and 7), forming the Demonstra- third Antinomy, deserve attention in this respect— tion Vil. is That the seventh is founded upon the genuine Parme- uponthe nidean or Eleatic doctrine about Non-Ens, as not ene of doc- merely having no attributes, but as being unknow- menides. § gable, unperceivable, unnameable: while the sixth is founded upon a different apprehension of Non-Ens, which is ex- plained and defended by Plato in the Sophistes, as a substitute for, and refutation of, the Eleatic doctrine.® According to
1 Plato, Parmenid. pp. 160-161 A. καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετ- εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἑνὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ εἶναι. ye μὴ ἔστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν 2 Plato, Parmenid. p. 161 C-D. κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τό ye ἕν 3 Plato, Parmenid. pp. 162-168 A. ἐκεῖνο Kai μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι The steps by which these conclusions μήτε τὸ ἕν μήτ᾽ ἐκεῖνο μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ are made out are extremely subtle, and περὶ ἄλλον τον ὃ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι hardly intelligible to me. δεῖ οὐδέν - εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο 4Plato, Parmenid. pp. 168-164 A. ὑποκεῖται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἑκείνον 5 Plato, Sophistes, pp. 258-269.
Cuar. XXVIL THIRD ANTINOMY. 105
Number 7, when you deny, of Unum, the predicate exist- ence, you deny of it also all other predicates: and the name Unum is left without any subject to apply to. This is the Eleatic dogma. Unum having been declared to be Non-Ens, is (like Non-Ens) neither knowable nor nameable. According to Number 6, the proposition Unum est non-Ens, does not carry with it any such consequences. Existence is only one predicate, which may be denied of the subject Unum, but which, when denied, does not lead to the denial of all other predicates—nor, therefore, to the loss of the subject itself. Unum still remains Unum, knowable, and different from other things. Upon this first premiss are built up several other affirmations ; so that we thus arrive circuitously at the affirmation of existence, in a certain way: Unum, though non-existent, does nevertheless exist quodam modo. This coincides with that which the Eleatic stranger seeks to prove in the Sophistes, against. Parmenides.
If we compare the two foregoing counter-demonstrations (7 and 6), we shall see that the negative results of Demonat the seventh follow properly enough from the as- tions VL sumed premisses: but that the affirmative results 274 "Il of the sixth are not obtained without very unwar- —Unwar- rantable jumps in the reasoning, besides its extreme steps in the subtlety. But apart from this defect, we farther Thefunda- remark that here also (as in Numbers 1 and 2) the mental pre- fundamental principle assumed is in terms the same, rently in. in signification materially different. The significa- tetpreted, tion of Unum non est, as it is construed in Number 7, the same is the natural one, belonging to the words: but as construed in Number 6, the meaning of the predicate is alto- gether effaced (as it had been before in Number 1): we cannot tell what it is which is really denied about Unum. As, in Number 1, the proposition Unum est is so construed as to affirm nothing except Unum est Unum—so in Number 7, the proposi- tion Unum non est is so construed as to deny nothing except Unum non est Unum, yet conveying along with such denial a farther affirmation—Unum non est Unum, sed tamen est aliquid scibile, differens ab aliis.' Here this aliquid scibile is assumed as a
1 Plato, Parmenid. p. 160 C.
106 PARMENIDES. Cuar. XXVIII.
substratum underlying Unum, and remaining even when Unum is taken away: contrary to the opinion—that Unum was a separate nature and the fundamental Subject of all—which Ari- stotle announces as having been held by Plato. There must be always some meaning (the Platonic Parmenides argues) attached to the word Unum, even when you talk of Unum non Ens: and that meaning is equivalent to Aliquid scibile, differens ab aliis. From this he proceeds to evolve, step by step, though often in a manner obscure and inconclusive, his series of contradictory affir- mations respecting Unum.
The last couple of Demonstrations—8 and 9—composing the fourth Antinomy, are in some respects the most ingenious and singular of all the nine. Si Unum non est, what is true about Cetera? The eighth demonstrates the Both of the affirmative predicates, the ninth proves the Nesther.
Si Unum non est (is the argument of the eighth), Cetera must Demonstra- nevertheless somehow still be Cetera: otherwise you tion VIET. could not talk about Cetera? (This is an argument δα ΕΣ of like that in Demonstration 6 : What is talked about Demonstra- must exist, somehow.) But if Cetera can be named
and talked about, they must be different from some- thing,—and from something, which is also different from them. What can this Something be? Not certainly Unum: for Unum, by the Hypothesis, does not exist, and cannot therefore be the term of comparison. Cetera therefore must be different among themselves and from each other. But they cannot be compared with each other by units : for Unum does not exist. They must therefore be compared with each other by heaps or multitudes : each of which will appear at first sight to be an unit, though it be not an unit in reality. There will be numbers of such heaps, each in appearance one, though not in reality :* numbers odd and even, great and little, in appearance : heaps appearing to be greater and less than each other, and equal to each other, though not being really so. Each of these heaps will appear to have a beginning, middle, and end, yet will not really have any such :
1 Aristot. Metaph. B. 1001, a. 6-20. 3 Plato, Parmenid p. 164 Ὁ. Οὐκοῦν
2 Plato, Parmenid. p. 164 B. "Ἄλλα πολλοὶ ὄγκοι ἔσονται, els ἕκαστος φαινό- μέν πον δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι" εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα μενος, ὧν δὲ ov, etwep ἕν μὴ ἔσται. ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο. Οὕτως.
ΟΗΑΡ, XXVIIL CONTRAST OF REAL AND APPARENT. 107
for whenever you grasp any one of them in your thoughts, there will appear another beginning before the beginning,' another end after the end, another centre more centrical than the centre,— minima ever decreasing because you cannot reach any stable unit. Each will be a heap without any unity ; looking like one, at a distance,—but when you come near, each a boundless and countless multitude. They will thus appear one and many, like and unlike, equal and unequal, at rest and moving, separate and coalescing: in short, invested with an indefinite number of oppo- site attributes.?
This Demonstration 8, with its strange and subtle chain of inferences, purporting to rest upon the admission of p,monstra- Cetera without Unum, brings out the antithesis of the tion VIII. Apparent and the Real, which had not been noticed subtia and in the preceding demonstrations. Demonstration 8 is 220mlan. in its character Zenonian. It probably coincides with the proof which Zeno is reported (in the earlier half of this dialogue) to have given against the existence of any real Multa. If you assume Multa (Zeno argued), they must be both like and unlike, and invested with many other opposite attributes ; but this is impossible ; therefore the assumption is untrue.* Those against whom Zeno reasoned, contended for real Multa, and against a real Unum. Zeno probably showed, and our eighth Demonstra- tion here shows also,—that Multa under this supposition are nothing real, but an assemblage of indefinite, ever-variable, con- tradictory appearances: an Απειρον, Infinite, or Chaos: an object not real and absolute, but relative and variable according to the point of view of the subject.
To the eighth Demonstration, ingenious as it is, succeeds a countervailing reversal in the ninth: the Neither Demonstra. following the Both. The fundamental supposition is “on IX in terms the same. St Unum non est, what is to be- lowing Both,
1 Plato, Parmenid. p. 165 A. Ὅτι ἀεὶ αὑτῶν ὅταν ris τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὥς τι τούτων ὅν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη - aad φαίνεται ἀρχή, μετά τε τὴν τελευτὴν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομι νὴ τελευτή, ἕν τε τ
μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαΐτερα τον μέσον, σμικρό-
3 Plato, Parmenid. Ὁ. 165 E. Compare
. 158 E. τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ τοῦ ἑνὸς. ..
δὲ αὐτῶν φύσις καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν πάρεσχε).
8 Plato, Parmenid. p. 127 E;
τερα δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἑνὸς αὑτῶν ἑκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, Gre οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ
τισιν» Ὁ
Dem this with the close of the eighth emonstration, Ὁ. 165 E—ei ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ὅστιν.
108 PARMENIDES. Cap. XXVIL
come of Cetera? Cetera are not Unum: yet neither are they Multa: for if there were any Multa, Unum would be included in them. If none of the Multa were Unum, all of them would be nothing at all, and there would be no Multa. If therefore Unum be not included in Cetera, Cetera would be neither Unum nor Multa: nor would they appear to be either Unum or Multa: for Cetera can have no possible communion with: Non- Entia : nor can any of the Non-Entia be present along with any of Cxstera—since Non-Entia have no parts. We cannot therefore conceive or represent to ourselves Non-Ens as along with or be- longing to Cetera. Therefore, Si Unum non est, nothing among Ceetera is conceived either as Unum or as Multa: for to conceive Multa without Unum is impossible. It thus appears, δὲ Unum non est, that Cetera neither are Unum nor Multa. Nor are they conceived either as Unum or Multa—either as like or as unlike —either as the same or as different—either as in contact or as apart.—In short, all those attributes which in the last preceding Demonstration were shown to belong to them in appearance, are now shown not to belong to them either in appearance or in reality.
Here we find ourselves at the close of the Parmenides. Plato Concluding announces his purpose to be, to elicit contradictory pordsofthe conclusions, by different trains of reasoning, out of
the same fundamental assumption. He declares, in .
the concluding words, that—on the hypothesis of Unum est, as well as on that of Unum non est—he has succeeded in demonstrating the Both and the Neither of many distinct propositions, respecting Unum and respecting Ceetera.
The close of the Parmenides, as it stands here, may be fairly Comparison compared to the enigma announced by Plato in his of thecon- Republic—* A man and no man, struck and did not
Both and the Neither of many ferent pro- positions.
1 Plato, Parmenid. p. 166 A-B. Ἔν in the last note, another
dpa εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἄλλα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε δοξάζεται ἕν οὔτε πολλά. Οὔδ᾽ ἄρα ὅμοια οὐδὲ ἀνόμοια... Οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ αὐτά γε οὐδ᾽ ἕτερα, οὐδὲ ἁπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρίς, οὐδὲ ἄλλ᾽ ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρό- σθεν διήλθομεν (compare διελθεῖν, p. 166 E) ὡς φαινόμενα αὐτά, τού- των οὕτετι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται τἄλλα, ὃν εἰ μὴ ἔστ
2 Compare, with the passage cited
passage, p. 159 B, at the beginning of Demon- stration 5.
Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν ἤδη ἐῶμεν ὡς φανερά, ἐπισκοπῶμεν δὲ πάλιν, év εἰ ἐστιν, καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει τᾶλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἣ οὕτω μόνον;
Here the purpose to rove ov οὕτως, immediately on the heels o οὕτως, is plainly enunciated.
Cuap. XXVII. ENIGMATICAL CONCLUSION. 109
strike, with a stone and no stone, a bird and no bird, clusion of cage . . the Parme- sitting upon wood and no wood”.! This is an enigma, nides to an
propounded for youthful auditors to guess: stimu- oH ἘΝ
lating their curiosity, and tasking their intelligence lic. Duiffer- ‘ . . ence. The to find it out. As far as I can see, the puzzling anti- constractor
nomies in the Parmenides have no other purpose. orig They drag back the forward and youthful Sokrates ada. ted its from affirmative dogmatism to negative doubt and toa fore. embarrassment. There is however this difference be- Known golu- tween the enigma in the Republic, and the Anti- did not. nomies in the Parmenides. The constructor of the enigma had certainly a preconceived solution to which he adapted the con- ditions of his problem : whereas we have no sufficient ground for asserting that the author of the Antinomies had any such solu- tion present or operative in his mind. How much of truth Plato may himself have recognised, or may have wished others to re- cognise, in them, we have no means of determining. We find in them many equivocal propositions and unwarranted inferences —much blending of truth with error, intentionally or unin- tentionally. The veteran Parmenides imposes the severance of the two, as a lesson, upon his youthful hearers Sokrates and Aristoteles.
1 Plato, Republ. v. 479 Ὁ. Theallu- amount of tive philosophy which sion was fo an eunuch knoc down a commentator like Steinhart ex- a bat seated upon a reed. Αἷνός τις tracts from the concluding enigma ἔστιν ws ἀνήρ τε κοὺκ ἀνήρ, Ὄρνιθά re of the Parmenides, and which he κοὺκ ὄρνιθ᾽ ἰδών re κοὐκ ἰδών, Ἐπὶ ξύλον even affirms that no attentive reader re κοὺ ξύλον καθημένην Λίθῳ τε κοὺ λίθῳ of the dialogue can possibly miss . βάλοι re κοὺ βάλοι. . (Einleitung zum Parmenides, pp. 302- I read with astonishment the 303).
110 THEATETUS. CHap. XXVIII.
CHAPTER XXVIII. THEZATETUS.
In this dialogue, as in the Parmenides immediately preceding, Subject and Plato dwells upon the intellectual operations of ponées = mind : introducing the ethical and emotional only in Theetétus. ἃ, partial and subordinate way. The main question canvassed is, What is Knowledge—Cognition—Science? After a long debate, turning the question over in many distinct points of view, and examining three or four different answers to the question—all these answers are successively rejected, and the problem remains unsolved. -
The two persons who converse with Sokrates are, Theodérus, an elderly man, eminent as a geometrician, astronomer, &c., and teaching those sciences—and Thezxtétus, a young man of great merit and still greater promise: acute, intelligent, and inquisitive —high-principled and courageous in the field, yet gentle and conciliatory to all: lastly, resembling Sokrates in physiognomy and in the flatness of his nose. The dialogue is supposed to have taken place during the last weeks of the life of Sokrates, when his legal appearance as defendant is required to answer the in- dictment of Melétus, already entered in the official record.! The dialogue is here read aloud to Eukleides of Megara and his fellow-citizen Terpsion, by a slave of Eukleides : this last person had recorded it in writing from narrative previously made to him by Sokrates.? It is prefaced by a short discourse between
1 Plato, Thesetét. ad fin. p. 210. off the conversation for the purpose of 2 Plato, Theetét. i. pp. 142 E, 148 A. going to answer it: Eukleides hears Plato hardly kee up the fiction the dialogue from the mouth of 8o- about the time of ialogue with krates afterwards. ‘Immediately on perfect consistency. When it took getting home to Megara” (says Eu- place, the indictment of Melétus had kleides) ‘‘ I wrote down memoranda (of already been recorded : Sokrates breaks what I had heard): then afterwards I
Crap. XXVIII.
WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE ?
111
Eukleides and Terpsion, intended to attract our sympathy and admiration towards the youthful Theetétus. In answer to the question put by Sokrates—What is Know-
ledge or Cognition? Theztétus at first replies—That there are many and diverse cognitions :—of geometry, of arithmetic, of arts and trades, such as shoemaking, joinery, &c. Sokrates points out (as in the Menon, Hippias Major, and other dialogues) that such an answer involves a misconception of the question : which was general, and required a general answer, setting forth the characteristic common to all cogni- tions. No one can know what cognition is in shoe- making or any particular case—unless he first knows what is cognition generally.1 Specimens of suitable
answers to
general questions are then given (or of definition of a general term), in the case of clay—and of numbers square and oblong.?
called it back to my mind at leisure, and as often as I visited Athens I questioned Sokrates about such por- ns as I did not remember, and made corrections on my return here, so that now nearly all the dialogue has Bech ay ᾿ uld ire I & process wo uire longer time than is consistent with the short remainder of the life of Sokrates. Socher indeed tries to explain this by assuming a long interval between the indictment and the trial, but this is noway satisfactory. (Ueber Platon’s ten, p. 251.)
Mr. Lewis Campbell, in the Preface to his very useful edition of this dia- logue (p. Ixxi. 5 ders that the battle in which Thes- tétas is represented as having been wounded, is probably meant for that battle in which pt x tes and his
taste roy: e Spartan Mora, arn 300: if not that, then the battle at the Isthmus of Corinth t E fa bis Riu Siung’ to th τ την το
eitang Θ Θ (p. 185) seems to prefer the supposi- tlon of some earlier battle or ekirmish under Iphikrates. The int can hardly be determined. Still less can we fix the date at which the dialogue was written, though the mention of the battle of Corinth certifies that it was later than 8904 B.c. Ast 8 con: fidently that it was the firat dialogue
Oxford, 1861), consi- &
composed by Plato after the Phsedon, which last was composed immediately after the death of Sokrates(Ast, Platon’s Leben, &., p. 192). I see no ground for this tion. Most of the com-
been mentators rank it among the dialectical
dialogues, which they consider to be- long to a later period of Plato's life than the ethical, but to an earlier
riod than the constructive, such as
public, Timzeus, ἄς. Most of them place the Theztétus in one or other of he years between 393-383 B.c., though they differ much among themselves whether it is to be consi as later or earlier than other dialogues—Kra- tylus, Euthydemus, Menon, Gorgias, c. (Stalibaum, Proleg. Thest. pp. 6-10; Steinhart, Einleit. zam Theset. pp. 100-213.) Munk and Ueberweg, on the contrary, place the Thesetétus at a date considerably later, subsequent to 368 B.c. Munk assigns it to 358 or $57 B.C. after Plato’s last return from Sicily (Munk, Die nattirliche Ordnung der Platon. Schr. pp. 357-597: Ueber- es Ueber die Aechtheit der Platon. Schr. pp- 228-236). 1 Plato, Thesetét, p. 147 A.
Οὐδ᾽ apa ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνίησιν, ὁ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς; Οὐ
γάρ. 2Plato, Thextét. p. 148. Oblong προμήκεις) numbers are such as can produced only from two unequal factors. The explanation of this
119 THEEZTETUS, CuaP. XXVOIL
I have already observed more than once how important an object. it was with Plato to impress upon his readers an exact and ade- quate conception of the meaning of general terms, and the proper way of defining them. For this purpose he brings into contrast the misconceptions likely to arise in the minds of persons not
accustomed to dialectic. Theeetétus, before he attempts a second answer, complains how
Preliminary
conversa- tion before
much the subject had embarrassed him. Impressed with what he had heard about the interrogatories of
the second Sokrates, he had tried to solve this problem : but he. answer ig had not been able to satisfy himself with any attempted Krates de- solution—nor yet to relinquish the search altogether. own pecu- ‘“ You are in distress, Thesstétus” (oberves Sokrates), liar efficacy «because you are not empty, but pregnant.! You obstetric— have that within you, of which you need to be re- He ants lieved ; and you cannot be relieved without obstetric he can aid. It is my peculiar gift from the Gods to afford knowledge such aid, and to stimulate the parturition of pregnant pregnant minds which cannot of themselves bring forth what is.
within them.? I can produce no truth myself: but I can, by my art inherited from my mother the midwife Phe- nareté, extract truth from others, and test the answers given by others : so as to determine whether such answers are true and valuable, or false and worthless. I can teach nothing: I only bring out what is already struggling in the minds of youth: and if there be nothing within them, my procedure is unavailing. My most important function is, to test the answers given, how far they are true or false. But most people, not comprehending my drift, complain of me as a most eccentric person, who only makes others sceptical. They reproach me, and that truly enough, with alwaye asking questions, and never saying any thing of my own : because I have nothing to say worth hearing.*
difficult passage, requi us to keep in mind the geometri conception of numbers usual among the Greek mathematicians, will be found clearly
iven in Mr. Campbell's edition of this Finlogue, pp. 20-22. ᾿
3 Plato, Theetét. p. 149 A. οἱ δέ, Gre οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὗ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἁτοπώτατός εἷμι, καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. 160 B-C. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ὄνι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ, πότερον εἴδωλον ἣ ψεῦδος ἀποτέκτει τοῦ νέον ἢ διανοία, ἣ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές" ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις" dyovds εἰμι ias, ἄο.-
1 Plato, Theetét. p. 148 Ε. ὠδένεις, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς GAA’ ἐγκύμων εἶναι.
2 Plato, Thestat. p. 149 A, p. 150 A.
CuaP. XXVIII. RELIEF TO PREGNANT MINDS. 113
The young companions who frequent my society, often suffer long-continued pains of parturition night and day, before they can be delivered of what is within them. Some, though appa- rently stupid when they first come to me, make great progress, if my divine coadjutor is favourable to them: others again be- come tired of me, and go away too soon, so that the little good which I have done them becomes effaced. Occasionally, some of these impatient companions wish to return to me afterwards— but my divine sign forbids me to receive them: where such obstacle does not intervene, they begin again to make progress.” !
This passage, while it forcibly depicts the peculiar intellectual
gift of Sokrates, illustrates at the same time the Pla- tonic manner of describing, full of poetry and meta- phor. Cross-examination by Sokrates communicated nothing new, but brought out what lay buried in the mind of the respondent, and tested the value of his answers. It was applicable only to minds endowed and productive: but for them it was indispensable,
Ethical basis of the cross-exa- mination of Sokrates— He is for- bidden to
pasa by alsehood without
in order to extract what they were capable of pro- challenge.
ducing, and to test its value when extracted. ‘Do not think me unkind,” (says Sokrates,) “or my procedure useless, if my scrutiny exposes your answers as fallacious. Many respondents have been violently angry with me for doing so: but I feel myself strictly forbidden either to admit falsehood, or to put aside truth.”* Here we have a suitable prelude to a dialogue in which four successive answers are sifted and rejected, without
reaching, even at last, any satisfactory solution.
The first answer given by Theetétus is—“ Cognition is sensa-
tion (or sensible perception)”. Upon this answer So- krates remarks, that it is the same doctrine, though
in other words, as what was laid down by Prota- i
goras—“ Man is the measure of all things: of things existent, that they exist : of things non-existent, that they do not exist. As things appear to me, so they
1 Plato, Thestét. pp. 150 E, 151 A. ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει ξυνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ καὶ πάλιν οὗτοι ἐπιδιδόασιν.
We here see (what I have already Sokra adverted to in reviewing the Theagés,
9--
says that this is the same doc-
vol. ii. ch. xv. pp. 105-7) the character of mystery, unaccountable and unpredict- able in its working on individ which Plato invests the colloquy of
» With
tes. 2 Plato, Thesetét. p. 151 Ὁ.
114 THEATETUS. CHap. XXVIII.
are to me: as they appear to you, so they are
tri
the Homo to you.”1 Sokrates then proceeds to say, that these Mensura . ὁ : . ς :
laid down two opinions are akin to, or identical with, the be ei general view of nature entertained by Herakleitus, that both Empedoklés, and other philosophers, countenanced are in close , .
affinity with moreover by poets like Homer and Epicharmus. The the doc, philosophers here noticed (he continues), though dif- Homer, § fering much in other respects, all held the doctrine Heraklei- . . ‘
tus, Empe- that nature consisted in a perpetual motion, change, Siexcept’’ Of flux: that there was no real Ens or permanent Parme- substratum, but perpetual genesis or transition.2 These
philosophers were opposed to Parmenides, who main- tained (as I have already stated in a previous chapter) that there was nothing real except Ens—One, permanent, and unchange- able : that all change was unreal, apparent, illusory, not capable of being certainly known, but only matter of uncertain opinion
or estimation.
The one main theme intended for examination here (as So-
Plato here blends to- ether three istinct theories, for the purpose
1 Plato, Thesetét. pp. 151 E—152 A.
Thecet&t. οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἣ αἴσθησις. . ..
Sokrat. Κινδννεύεις μέντοι "λόγον ov φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ’ ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας" τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. Φησὶ γάρ πονυ--Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἷναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι -« τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. "Av κας γάρ πον;
Τλεαίδί. ᾿Ανέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.
Sokrat. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μέν ἐστιν ἐμοὶ---οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί" ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ.
Theetét, Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.
Here Plato appears to transcribe the words of Protagoras (compare p. 161 B, and the Kratylus, p. 386 A) which distinctly affirm the doctrine of Homo Mensura—Man is the measure of all things, θα do not affirm the doctrine, that knowledge is sensible perception. The identification between the two
ttis Plato whoasserts "Ὁ
doctrines is asserted by Plato himself. οὕ that Protagoras
krates ὃ expressly declares) is the doctrine—That Cognition is sensible perception. Nevertheless upon all the three opinions, thus represented as cognate or identical,‘ Sokrates bestows a lengthened comment
affirmed the same doctrine in another manner,” citing afterwards the manner in which he supposed Protagoras to affirm it. If there had been in the treatise of Protagoras any more ex- press or peremptory affirmation of the
octrine “ that knowledge is sensible perception,” Plato would probably have given it here.
2 Plato, Thesstét. p. 162 E. καὶ περὶ τούτον πάντες ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδον ἔἐνμφερέσθων, Πρω- ταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ ᾿'Εμπεδο- κλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέ os κωμῳδίας μὲν “Ent: χαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος.
3 Plato, Themtét. p. 163 A.
4 Plato, Theetét. p. 160 D. Sokrat. TlayxdAws ἄρα σοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἔστιν ἣ αἴσθησις" καὶ εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέπτωκε, κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοντον φῦλον, οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα.-- κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον, πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι---κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον, τούτων res ἐχόντων, αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην yiy- νεσθαι.
Caap. XXVIII. COGNITION IS SENSIBLE PERCEPTION. 115 (occupying a half of the dialogue) in conversation, of confuting . ς . . em ; yet principally with Thestétus, but partly also with he also pro- Theodérus. His strictures are not always easy to tape what follow with assurance, because he often passes with can be said little notice from one to the other of the three doc- them. Diff. trines which he is examining: because he himself, tulty of fol- though really opposed to them, affects in part to take exposition.
them up and to suggest arguments in their favour: and further because, disclaiming all positive opinion of his own, he some- times leaves us in doubt what is his real purpose—whether to expound, or to deride, the opinions of others—whether to en- lighten Theztétus, or to test his power of detecting fallacies.’ We cannot always distinguish between the ironical and the serious. Lastly, it is a still greater difficulty, that we have not before us either of the three opinions as set forth by their proper supporters, There remains no work either of Protagoras or of Herakleitus : so that we do not clearly know the subject matter upon which Plato is commenting—nor whether these authors would have admitted as just the view which he takes of their opinions.?
It is not improbable that the three doctrines, here put together by Plato and subjected to a common scrutiny, may The doc- have been sometimes held by the same philosophers. Protaporas Nevertheless, the language*®* of Plato himself shows is complete- us that Protagoras never expressly affirmed knowledge from the to be sensible Perception: and that the substantial other doc. identity between this doctrine, and the different doc- trine maintained by Protagoras, is to be regarded as a construction put upon the two by Plato. That the
identifica- tion of them theories of Herakleitus and Empedokles differed
as one and the same is only con-
structive—
1 See the answer of Thesetétus and
rhaps even to his words. How the words of Sokrates following, p.
teinhart can know this I am ata loss
157 C. 2It would be hardly necessary to remark, that when Plato professes to ut a pleading into the mouth of Pro- oras (pp. 165-166) we have no other real 8 er than Plato himself, if commentators did not often forget this. Steinhart indeed | tells us (Einleit. zum esetét. pp. 47) positively — Plato in this wloading keeps in the most accurate manner (auf das gen- aueste) to the thoughts of Protagoras,
to understand. To me it seems very improbable. The mere circumstance that Plato forces into partnership three distinct theories, makes it Probable that he did not adhere to the thoughts or language of any one of them.
3See Theetét. Ὁ. 152 A. This is admitted (to be a construction put by Plato himself) by Steinhart in his note 7, p. 214, Einleitung zum Thesetétus, though he says that Plato’s construc- tion is the right one.
116 : THEATETUS. CuaP. XXVIII.
theinter- materially from each other, we know certainly : the
rotation of theory of each, moreover, differed from the doctrine self. of Protagoras—“ Man is the measure of all things”.
How this last doctrine was defended by its promulgator, we cannot say. But the defence of it noway required him to main- tain—That knowledge is sensible perception. It might be con- sistently held by one who rejected that definition of knowledge.! And though Plato tries to refute both, yet the reasonings which he brings against one do not at all tell against the other. The Protagorean doctrine—Man is the measure of all things— Ἐχρίαπα: is simply the presentation in complete view of a. tion of the common fact—uncovering an aspect of it which the Poctagecas received phraseology hides. Truth and Falsehood mm have reference to some believing subject—and the words have no meaning except in that relation. Pro- tagoras brings to view this subjective.side of the same com- plex fact, of which Truth and Falsehood denote the objective. side. He refuses to admit the object absolute—the pretended thing in ttself—Truth without a believer. His doctrine main- tains the indefeasible and necessary involution of the per- cipient mind in every perception—of the concipient mind in every conception—of the cognizant mind in every cognition. Farther, Protagoras acknowledges many distinct believing or knowing Subjects: and affirms that every object known must be relative to (or in his language, measured by) the knowing Subject : that every cognitum must have its cognoscens, and every cognosctbile its cognitions capaz: that the words have no meaning unless this be supposed: that these two names designate two opposite poles or aspects of the indivisible fact of cognition —actual or potential—not two factors, which are in themselves separate or separable, and which come together to make -a com- pound product. A man cannot in any case get clear of or discard his own mind as a Subject. Self is necessarily omnipresent ;
1 Dr. Routh, in a note upon his sustulisse videtur.” edition of the Kuthydémus of Plato The definition here given by Routh - 286 ©) observes : — “ Protagoras is correct as far as it , though too. ocehat, {ἰάντων ρημάτων μέτρον Narrow. But it is cient to exhibit. ἄνθρωπον: εἶ ναι" τῶν ὧν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι. the Protagorean doctrine as q τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι. Qua distinct from the other doctrine, ἐὸν ὅτι quidem opinione qualitatum sensilium ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ αἷσθ sine animi perceptione existentiam σις.
΄σβαρ. XXVIIL HOMO MENSURA. 117
concerned in every moment of consciousness, and equally con- cerned in all, though more distinctly attended to in some than in others.1 The Subject, self, or Ego, is that which all our moments of consciousness have in common and alike: Object is that in which they do or may differ—although some object or other there always must be. The position laid down by Descartes—Cogito, ergo sum—might have been stated with equal truth—Cogtto, ergo est (cogitatum aliquid): sum cogitans—est cogitatum—are two opposite aspects of the same indivisible mental fact—cogitatio. In some cases, doubtless, the objective aspect may absorb our attention, eclipsing the subjective: in other cases, the subjective attracts exclusive notice: but in all cases and in every act of consciousness, both are involved as co-existent and correlative. That alone exists, to every man, which stands, or is believed by him to be capable of standing, in some mode of his consciousness as an Object correlative with himself asa Subject. If he believes in its existence, his own believing mind is part and parcel of such fact of belief, not less than the object believed in: if he dis- believes it, his own disbelieving mind is the like. Consciousness in all varieties has for its two poles Subject and Object: there cannot be one of these poles without the opposite pole—north without south—any more than there can be concave without convex (to use a comparison familiar with Aristotle), or front
1In regard to the impossibility of carrying abstraction so far as to discard the thinking subject, see Hobbes, Computation or Logic, ch. vii. 1.
“Τὴ the teaching of natural philo- sophy I cannot begin better than from privation; that is, from feigning the world to be annihilated. But if such annihilation of all things be supposed, it may perhaps be asked what woul remain for any man (whom only I except
this universal annihilation of things) to consider as the subject of philosophy, or at all to reason upon; or what give names unto for ratiocination’s sake.
“Tsay, therefore, there would remain to that man ideas of the world, and of all such bodies as he had, before their annihilation, seen with his eyes, or perceived by any other sense ; that is
say, the memory and i ination of magnitudes, motions, sounds, colours, &c., as also of their order and parts. All which things, though they be
nothing but ideas and phantasms, happening internally to him that imagineth, yet they will appear as if they were external and not at all depending upon any power of the mind.. And these are the things to which he would give names and sub- tract them from, and compound them with one another. For seeing that after the destruction of all other things I suppose man still remaining, and namely that he thinks, imagines, and remembers, there can be nothing for him to think of but what is past. ... Now things may be considered, that is, be brought into account, either as internal accidents of our mind, in which Manner we consider them when the question is about some faculty of the mind: or, as species of external things, not as really existing, but appearing only to exist, or to have a being without us. And in this manner we are now to con- sider them.”
118 THEATETUB. Cuap. XXVIII.
without back: which are not two things originally different and coming into conjunction, but two different aspects of the same indivisible fact.
In declaring that “ Man is the measure of all things ”—Prota-
iets goras affirms that Subject i is the measure of Object,
ication or that every object is relative to a correlative Sub-
with Object ject. When a man affirms, believes, or conceives, an oni’ ne object as existing, his own believing or concipient la mind is one side of the entire fact. It may be the dark side, and what is called the Olject may be the light side, of the entire fact : this is what happens in the case of tangible and resisting substances, where Object, being the light side of the fact, is apt to appear all in all :1 a man thinks of the Something which resists, without attending to the other aspect of the fact of resistance, viz.: his own energy or pressure, to which resist- ance is made. On the other hand, when we speak of enjoying any pleasure or suffering any pain, the enjoying or suffering Subject appears all in all, distinguished plainly from other Subjects, supposed to be not enjoying or suffering in the same way : yet it is no more than the light side of the fact, of which Object is the dark side. Each particular pain which we suffer has its objective or differential peculiarity, distinguishing it from other sensations, correlating with the same sentient Subject.
The Protagorean dictum will thus be seen, when interpreted Such rela- correctly, to be quite distinct from that other doctrine tivity isno with which Plato identifies it: that Cognition is regardto nothing else but sensible Perception. If, rejecting cinative this last doctrine, we hold that cognition includes combina- mental elements distinct from, though co-operating each indivi- with, sensible perception—the principle of relativity in regard to laid down by Protagoras will not be the less true. his perci: My intellectual activity—my powers of remembering,
pient capa- ΄ _ ΘΝ a cities. imagining, ratiocinating, combining, &c., are a part of
1 “*Nobiscum semper est ipsa quam being inseparable, either of them apart quzerimus (anima); adest, tractat, loqui- from the other must be an unknown tur—et, si fas est dicere, inter ista nes- quantity : the separation of either citar.” (Cassiodorus, De Animd, c. 1, must be the annihilation of both.’ ” P 594, in the edition of his Opera (F. W. Farrar, Chapters on Lan
mnia, Venet. 1729). c. 23, p. 292: which chapter contains
“In the primitive dualism of con- more on the same topic, well deserving sciousness, the Subject and Object of perusal.)
CuaP. XXVIII. RELATE AND CORRELATE.
119
my mental nature, no less than my powers of sensible percep- tion: my cognitions and beliefs must all be determined by, or relative to, this mental nature: to the turn and development which all these various powers have taken in my individual case. However multifarious the mental activities may be, each man has his own peculiar allotment and manifestations thereof, to which his cognitions must be relative. Let us grant (with Plato) that the Nous or intelligent Mind apprehends intelligible Entia or Ideas distinct from the world of sense: or let us assume that Kant and Reid in the eighteenth century, and M. Cousin with other French writers in the nineteenth, have destroyed the Lockian philosophy, which took account (they say) of nothing but the @ posterior: element of cognition—and have established the existence of other elements of cognition @ priori: intuitive beliefs, first principles, primary or inexplicable Concepts of -Reason.' Still we must recollect that all such ἃ priors Concepts, Intuitions, Beliefs, &c., are summed up in the mind: and that thus each man’s mind, with its peculiar endowments, natural or supernatural, is still the measure or limit of his cognitions, ac- quired and acquirable. The Entia Rationis exist relatively to
1 See M. Jouffroy, Préface &sa Tra- la méme, et demeure toujours insur-
duction des (Euvres de Reid, pp. xcvii.- montable,” Ὁ οτος, Compare p. xcvii. Ccxiv. of the same Preface.
M. Jouffroy, following in the steps M. Pascal Galuppi in his Lettres of Kant, declares these ἃ priori beliefs Philosophiques sur les Vicissitudes de or intuitions to be altogether relative la Philosophie, translated from the to the human mind. ‘Kant, con- Italian by M. Peisse, Paris, 1844)
sidérant que les conceptions de la raison sont des croyances aveugles auxquelles notre esprit se sent fatalement déter- miné par sa nature, en conclut qu’elles sont rélatives & cette nature: que si notre nature était autre, elles pour- raient étre différentes: que par con- séquent, elles n’ont aucune valeur absolue: et qu’ainsi notre vérité, notre science, notre certitude, sont une vérité, une science, une certitude, pure- ment subjective, purement hu e— & laquelle nous sommes déterminés & nous fier par notre nature, mais qui ne supporte pas l’examen et n’a aucune valeur objective” (p. clxvii.) . . . ‘*C’est ce que répéte Kant quand il soutient que l'on ne peut objectiver le subjectif : cest ἃ dire, faire que la vérité humaine cesse d’étre humaine, puisque la raison qui la trouve est humaine. On peut exprimer de vingt maniéres différentes cette impossibilité : elle reste toujours
though not agreeing in this variety of ἃ priori philosophy, agrees with Kant in declaring the @ priori element of cognition to be purely subjective, and the objective element to be ἃ posteriori (Lett. xiv. pe. 337-388), or the facts of sense and experience. ‘L’ordre ἃ priori, que Kant appelle transcendental, est purement idéal,et dépourva de toute realité. Je vis, qu’en fondant la con- naissance sur l’ordre ὦ priori, on arrive nécessairement au scepticisme: et je reconnus que la doctrine Ecossaise est la mére légitime du Criticisme Kantien, et par conséquent, du scepticisme, qui est la conséquence de la philosophie critique. Je considérai comme de haute importance ce probléme de Kant. 1] convient de déterminer ce qu'il y a d’objectif, et ce qu'il y ade subjectif, dans la connaissance. Les Empiriques n’admettent dans la connaissance d’ autres élémens que les objectifs,” dc.
190
THEATETUS.
Crap. XXVIIL
Ratio, as the Entia Perceptionis exist relatively to Sense. This is a point upon which Plato himself insists, in this very dialogue. You do not, by producing this fact of innate mental intuitions, eliminate the intuent mind; which must be done in order to establish a negative to the Protagorean principle. Each intui- tive belief, whether correct or erroneous—whether held unani- mously by every one semper et ubtque, or only held by a propor- tion of mankind—is (or would be, if proved to exist) a fact of our
1 See this point handled in Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. viii. 355-362. We may here cite a remark of Sim- plikius in his Commentary on the
ories of Aristotle (p. 64, a. in Schol. Brandis). Aristotle (De Animé, iii. 2, 426, a. 19; Categor. p. 7, Ὁ. 28 lays down the doctrine that in mos cases Relata or (τὰ πρός τι) are “simul Natura, καὶ cvvavatpet ἄλληλα": but that in some Relata this is not true: for example, τὸ ἐπιστητὸν is relative to ἐπιστήμη, yet still ἐὲ would seem prior to ἐπιστήμη (π Srepoy av δόξειε τῆς ἐπιστήμης iva). ere cannot be ἐπιστήμη without some ἐπιστητόν : but there may be ἐπιστητὸν without any ἐπιστήμη. There are few things, if any (he says), in which the ἐπιστητὸν (cognoscibile) is simul naturd with ἐπιστήμη (or cognitio), and cannot be "Goon which Simpliki remarks,
n whic us
What are these fow Ehings? Τίνα δὲ τὰ ὀλίγα ἐστίν, ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἅμα τῷ ἐπι Ἢ ἡ ἐπισφήμη ἐστίν; Τὰ ἄνεν ὕλης, τὰ νοητά, ἅμα τῇ Kar’ ἐνεργείαν ἀεὶ ἐστώσῃ ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν, etre καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστί τις τοιαύτη ἀεὶ ἄνω μένουσα, . . . εἴτε καὶ ἐν τῷ κατ᾽ ἐνεργείαν νῷ εἶ τις καὶ τὴν νόησιν ἐκείνην ἐπιστήμην ἕλοιτο καλεῖν. δύναται δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ὑπόστασιν εἰρῆσθαι, τὴν ef ἀφαιρέσεως " ἅμα γὰρ τῇ ὑποστάσει τούτων καὶ ἣ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν. ἀληθὲς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναπλασμάτων τῶν τε ἐν τῇ φαντασί καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν" ἅμα γὰρ χίμαιρα καὶ ἢ ἐπιστήμη χιμαίρας.
We see from hence that Simplikius recognises Concepts, Abstractions, and Fictions, to be dependent on the Con- ceiving, Abstracting, Imagining, Mind —as distinguished from objects of Sense, which he does not recognise as de-
mdent in the like manner. He
the doctrine of Protagoras as to the former, but not as to the latter. This illustrates what I have affirmed, That the Protagorean doctrine of ‘‘ Homo Mensura” is not only unconnected with
the other principle (that Knowledge is resolvable into sensible perception) to which Aristotle and Plato would trace it—but that thereis rathera repugnance between the two. The culty of roving the doctrine, and the reluctance admit it, is greatest in the case of material objects, least in the case of Abstractions, and General Ideas. Yet Aristotle, in reasoning against the Protagorean doctrine ( etaphysic. T. pp. 1009-1010, &c.) treats it like Pilato, as a sort of coro from the theory that Cognition is Sensible Percep- on. Simplikius farther observes. (Ὁ. 65, b. 14) that Aristotle is not accurate in ἐπι ὃν correlate with ἐπιστήμη : that in Relata, the potential correlates with the potential, and the actual with the actual. The Cug- noscible x ip μάλ, pot with actual cognition (ἐπιστήμη) but with potentia. Cognition, or with 8, potential Cog- noscens. Aristotle therefore is right in saying that there may be ἐπιστητὸν without ἐπιστήμη, but this does not prove what he wishes to establish.
Themistius, in another passage of the Aristotelian Scholia, reasoning against Boethus, observes to the same effect as Simplikius, that in relatives, the actual correlates with the actual, and the potential with the potential :—
Καίτοι, φησί ye ὁ Bonbds, οὐδὲν κωλύει τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι καὶ δίχα τοῦ ἀριθμοῦντος, ὥσπερ οἶμαι τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ δίχα τοῦ αἰσθανομένον: σφάλλεται δέ, ἅμα γὰρ τὰ πρὸς τί, καὶ τὰ δυνάμει πρὸς τὰ δυνάμει" ὥστε εἰ μὴ καὶ ἀριθμη- τικόν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀριθμητόν (Schol. ad Aristot. Physic. iv. p. 223, ἃ. p. 393, Schol. Brandis).
Compare Aristotel. Metaphysic. M. 1087, a. 15, about τὸ ἑπέστασθαι δυνάμει and τὸ ἐπίστασθαι evepyeiq.
About the essential co-existence of relatives—Sublato uno, tollitur alterum —see also Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathe- maticos, vii. 805, Ὁ. 449, Fabric.
RELATIVITY.
Cuar. XXVIIL 121
nature ; capable of being looked at either on the side of the -believing Subject, which is its point of community with all other parts of our nature—or on the side of the Object believed, which is its point of difference or peculiarity. The fact with its two opposite aspects is indivisible. Without Subject, Object vanishes: without Object (some object or other, for this side of the fact is essentially variable), Subject vanishes.
That this general doctrine is true, not merely respecting the facts of sense, but also respecting the facts of mental Evidence conception, opinion, intellection, cognition—may be ἡ
roving im- seen by the reasoning of Plato himself in other dia- plication of . . ubject and logues. How, for example, does Plato prove, in his Object, in Timeus, the objective reality of Ideas or Forms? Teeardto | He infers them from the subjective facts of his own gible world. mind. The subjective fact called Cognition (he argues) is
generically different from the subjective fact called True Opinion: therefore the Object correlating with the One must be distinct from the Object correlating with the other: there must be a Noumenon or νοητόν τι correlating with Nous, distinct from the δοξαστόν τι which correlates with δόξα. So again, in the Phe- don,’ Sokrates proves the pre-existence of the human soul from the fact that there were pre-existent cognizable Ideas: if there were knowable Objects, there must also have been a Subject
1 Plato, Timzeus, p. 51 B-E, compare Republic v. p. 477.
See this reasoning of Plato set forth in Zeller, Die Phil. der Griech. vol. ii. pp. 412-416, ed. 2nd.
Nous, eccording to Plato (Tim. 51 E), belongs only to the Gods and to a select few among mankind. It is therefore only to the Gods and ¢o these few men that Nonra exist. To the rest of man- kind Nonra are non-apparent and non- existent.
2 Plato, Pheedon, pp. 76-77. toy ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε (Ideas or Forms) εἶναι, καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας Wuxas πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι---καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε. Ὑπερφνῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλόν ye καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τήν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νὺν λέγεις.
Compare p. 92 E of the same dialogue with the notes of Wyttenbach and Heindorf—‘“‘ Hecautem οὐσία Idearum,
rerum intelligibilium, αὐτῆς ἐστὶν (se. τῆς Ψψυχῆς) ut hoc loco dicitur, est propria et possessio animz nostre,”
c. ;
About the essential implication of Νοῦς with the Νοητά, as well as of τὸ δόξαζον with ra δοξαζόμενα, and of τὸ αἰσθανόμενον With τὰ αἰσθητά, see Plu- tarch, De Anime Procreat. in Timeo,
p. 1012-1024; and ἃ curious passage rom Joannes Philoponus ad Aristot. Physica, cited by Karsten in his Com- mentatio De Empedoclis Philosophia, Σ 372, and Olympiodorus ad Platon.
heedon. p. 21. τὸν νοῦν φαμὲν axpe- Bos γινώσκειν, διότι αὐτός ἐστι τὸ νοητὸν.
Sydenham observes, in a note upon his translation of the Philébus (note 76, p. 118), ‘*Being Intelligent and Being Intelligible are not only cor- relatives, but are so in their very essence: neither of them can be at all, without the Being of the other”.
122 THEATETOS. Cuap. XXVIII.
Cognoscens or Cognitionis capax. The two are different aspects of one and the same conception: upon which we may doubtless reason abstractedly under one aspect or under the other, though they cannot be separated in fact. Now Both these two in- ferences of Plato rest on the assumed implication of Subject and Object.? |
In truth, the Protagorean measure or limit is even more plainly applicable to our mental intuitions and men-
The Pro- tagorean, (4] processes (remembering, imagining, conceiving, even more comparing, abstracting, combining of hypotheses, shownin transcendental or inductive) than to the matter of our reference —_ sensible experience.? In regard to the Entia Rationis, intelligible divergence between one theorist and another is quite yronid ‘han as remarkable as the divergence between one perci- sense.
pient and another in the most disputable region of Entia Perceptionis. Upon the separate facts of sense, there is a nearer approach to unanimity among mankind, than upon the theories whereby theorising men connect together those facts to their own satisfaction. An opponent of Protagoras would draw his most plausible arguments from the undisputed facts of sense. He would appeal to matter and what are called its primary
11 think that the inference in the Pheedon is not necessary to prove that conclusion, nor in itself just. For when I speak of Augustus and Antony as having once lived, and as_ having fought the battle of Actium, it is nowa necessary that I should believe myself to have been then alive and to have seen them: nor when I speak of civil war as being now carried on in the United States of America, is it neces- sary that I should believe myself to be or to have been on the spot as a per- cipient witness. I believe, on evidence which appears to me satisfactory, that both these are real facts : that is, if I had been at Actium on the day of the battle, or if I were now in the United States, I should see and witness the facts here affirmed. These latter words describe the subjective side of the fact, without introducing any supposition that I have been myself present and percipient.
2 Bacon remarks that the processes called mental or intellectual are quite as much relative to man as those called
sensational or
rceptive. **Tdola Tri- bas sunt fun mana,
ta in ips& natur&é hu- enim asseritar, Sensum humanum esse mensuram rerum : quin contra, omnes perceptiones, tam Senstis quam Mentis, sunt ex analogid hominis, non ex analogié Universi.”
Nemesius, the Christian Platonist, has a remark bearing u n this ques- tion. He says that the lower animals have their intellectual movements all determined by Nature, which acts alike in all the individuals of the species, but that the human intellect is not wholly determined by Nature; it has a freer range, larger stores of ideas, and more varied combinations: hence its manifestations are not the same in all, but different in different individuals --ἐλεύθερον γάρ τι καὶ αὐτεξούσιον τὸ λογικόν, ὅθεν οὐχ ἕν καὶ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν ἔργον ἀνθρώποις, ὡς ἑκάστῳ εἴδει τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων - φύσει γὰρ μόνῃ τὰ τοιαῦτα κινεῖται, τὰ δὲ φύσει ὁμοίως παρὰ πᾶσίν ἐστιν" αἱ δὲ λογικαὶ πράξεις ἄλλαι wap’ ἄλλοις καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἱ αὗται παρὰ τάσιν (De Nat. Hom., c. ii. p. 58. ed. 1
Cuap. XXVIII CONCIPIENT MIND NOT EXCLUDED. 123 qualities, as refuting the doctrine. For in describing mental intuitions, Mind or Subject cannot well be overlaid or ignored : but in regard to the external world, or material substance with ifs primary qualities, the objective side is so lighted up and magnified in the ordinary conception and language—and the subjective side so darkened and put out of sight—that Object appears as if it stood single, apart, and independent.
A man conceives objects, like houses and trees, as existing when he does not actually see or touch them, just as much as when he does see or touch them. He conceives them as existing independent of any actual sensations of his own: and he pro- ceeds to describe them as independent altogether of himself as a Subject—or as absolute, not relative, existences. But this dis- tinction, though just as applied in ordinary usage, becomes inadmissable when brought to contradict the Protagorean doc- trine ; because the speaker professes to exclude, what cannot be excluded, himself as concipient Subject.1 It is he who conceives
1 Bishop Berkeley observes :— argument is enforced in Berkeley's ** But, say you, surely there is no- First Dialogue between Hylas and thing easier than to imagine trees, for Philonous, pp. 145-146 of the same instance, in a park, or books existing volume. in a closet, and nobody by to perceive I subjoin a from the work them. I answer, you may so—there of Professor on Psychology, where
is no difficulty in it. But what is all this, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you your- self perceive or think of them all the while?
this difficult subject is carefully ana- lysed (The Senses and the Intellect, Ρ 870) ‘There is no possible know- edge of the world except in reference to our minds. Knowledge means a state of mind: the knowledge of ma- terial things is a mental thing. We
This therefore is nothing to the pur- pose. It only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind: but it doth no that you can conceive it possible the obje s of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, dt ts necessary that you conceive them ex- isting unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth con- ceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same me they are apprehended by or exist in tkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, sect. xxiii. p. 34, ed. of Berkeley’s Works, 1820. The same
show.
are incapable of discussing the exist- ence of an independent material world: the very act is a contradiction. We can speak only of a world presented to our own minds. By an illusion of language we fancy that we are capable of contemplating a world which does not enter into our own mental exist- ence: but the attempt belies itself, for this contemplation is an effort of
‘‘Solidity, extension, space — the foundation properties of the material world—mean, as has been said above, certain movements and energies of our own bodies, and exist in our minds in: the shape of feelings of force, allied with visible and tactile, and other sensible impressions. The sense of the external is the consciousness of parti- cular energies and activities of our own.”
124
THEATETUS.
CaaP. XXVITIL
absent objects as real and existing, though he neither sees nor touches them: he believes fully, that if he were in a certain
(P. 876). ‘‘We seem to have no better way of assuring ourselves and all mankind, that with the conscious movement of opening the eyes there will always be a consciousness of light, than by saying that the light exists as an independent fact, without any eyes to see it. But if we consider the fact fairly we shall see that this assertion errs, not simply in being beyond any evidence that we can have, but also in being a self-contradiction. We are affirming that to have an existence out of our minds, which we cannot know but as in our minds. In words we assert independent existence, while in the very act of doing so we contradict ourselves. Even a possible worid im-
lies a possible mind to conceive it, Jost as much as an actual world im-
lies an actual mind. The mistake of
he common modes of expression on this matter is the mistake of supposing the abstractions of the mind to have a separate and independent existence. Instead of looking upon the doctrine of an external and independent world as a generalisation or abstraction grounded on our particular experiences, summing up the past and predicting the future, we have got into the way of maintaining the abstraction to be an independent reality, the foundation, or cause, or origin, of all these experi- ences.”
To the same purpose Mr. Mansel remarks in his Bampton Lectures on “ The Limits of Religious Thought,”
e 62:
‘A second characteristic of Con- sciousness is, that it is only possible in the form of a relation. There must be a Subject or person conscious, and an Object or thing of which he is con- scious. There can be no consciousness without the union of these two factors; and in that union each exists only as it is related to the other. The subject is a subject only in so far as it is con- scious of an object: the object is an ob- ject only in so far as it is apprehended
y ἃ subject: and the destruction of either is the destruction of conscious- ness itself. It is thus manifest that ἃ consciousness of the Absolute is equally self-contradictory with that of the Infinite. . . Our whole notion of Existence is necessarily relative, for it is existence as conceived by us. But
Existence, as we conceive it, is but a name for the several ways in which objects are presented to our conscious- ness—®& eral term embracing a variety of relations. . . To assume Ab- solute Existence as an of thought is thus to suppose a relati existing when the related terms exist no longer. An object of thought exists, as such, in and through its relation to a thinker; while the Absolute, as such, is independent of all relation.”
Dr. Henry More has also ἃ passage which f am here insisting (Immor. whic am here r- tality of the Soul, ch. ii. p. 8. And Professor Ferrier, in his Institutes of M hysic, has given much valuable elucidation g the essential re- Though this note is already long, I
oug n Ἂ shall venture to add from an eminent German critic—Trendelenburg—a pas- sage which goes to the same point.
“‘Das Sein ist als die absolute Posi- tion erklirt worden. Der des Seins driicke blos das aus: es werde bei dem einfachen Setzen eines Was sein Bewenden haben. _ Es hat sich hier die abstracte Vorstellung des Seins nur in eine verwandte Anschau
ekleidet ; denn das Gesetzte steh in dem Raum da; und insofern fordert die absolute Position schon den lid des seiendem Etwas, das gesetzt Fragt man weiter, so ist in der absoluten Position schon derjenige mitgedacht, der un bhdngig on pn μηδ bee una ig aus sic timmt, sondern zur Erklarung ein Verhdltniss su der Thitigkeit des Gedankens her.
“Aehnlich wiirde jede von vorn herein versuchte Bestimmung des Den- kens ausfallen. Man wiirde es nur durch einen Bezug zu den Dingen erliutern konnen, welche in dem Den- ken Grund und finden. Wir begeben uns daher jeder Erklirung, und setzen eine Vorstellung des Den- kens und Seins voraus, in der Hoff- nu dass beide mit jedem Schritt der Untersuchung sich in sich selbst bestimmen werden.” ‘‘Indem wir Den- ken und Sein unterscheiden, fragen wir, wie ist es méglich, dass sich im Erkennen Denken und Sein vereinigt ? Diese Vereinigung sprechen wir vorldufg als eine Thatsache aus, die das Theore-
ion ᾿
CHap. ΧΧΥΙΠ. OBJECT RELATIVE TO SUBJECT. 125
position near them, he would experience those appropriate sensa- tions of sight and touch, whereby they are identified. Though he eliminates himself as a percypient, he cannot eliminate himself 88 ἃ conctpient: i.¢., as conceiving and believing. He can con- ceive no object without being himself the Subject conceiving, nor believe in any future contingency without being himself the Subject believing. He may part company with himself as per- cipient, but he cannot part company with himself altogether. His conception of an absent external object, therefore, when fully and accurately described, does not contradict the Protagorean doctrine. But it is far the most plausible objection which can be brought against that doctrine, and it is an objection deduced from the facts or cognitions of sense.
I cannot therefore agree with Plato in regarding the Prota- gorean doctrine—Homo Mensura—as having any de- pendance upon, or any necessary connection with, the always other theory (canvassed in the Thestétus) which pro- Trlative t nounces cognition to be sensible perception. Objects Either of thought exist in relation to a thinking Subject ; as the other, Objects of sight or touch exist in relation to a seeing impossible. or touching Subject. And this we shall find Plato mits this in himself declaring in the Sophistes (where his Eleatic Sophistes. disputant is introduced as impugning a doctrine substantially the same as that of Plato himself in the Phedon, Timzus, and else- where) as well as here in the Theetétus. In the Sophistes, certain philosophers (called the Friends of Forms or Ideas) are noticed, who admitted that all sensible or perceivable existence (yéveots—Fientia) was relative to a (capable) sentient or per- cipient—but denied the relativity of Ideas, and maintained that Ideas, Concepts, Intelligible Entia, were not relative but abso- lute. The Eleate combats these philosophers, and establishes against them—That the Cogitable or Intelligible existence, Ens Rationis, was just as much relative to an Intelligent or Cogitant subject, as perceivable existence was relative to a Subject capable of perceiving—That Existence, under both varieties, was nothing more than a potentiality, correlating with a counter-potentiality
tische das Praktische beherrecht.” ungen, sect. 8, pp. 103-104, Berlin, Trondelenburg, Logische Untersuch- 1840.
126 THEATETUS. ' Cuap. XXVIIZ.
(τὸ γνωστὸν with τὸ γνωστικόν, τὸ αἰσθητὸν with τὸ αἰσθητικόν), and never realised except in implication therewith.! This doctrine of the Eleate in the Platonic Sophistes coincides with the Protagorean—Homo Mensura—construed in Fiatosre- its true meaning : Object is implicated with, limited
nta- tion of the or measured by, Subject : a doctrine proclaiming the
doctrinein relativeness of all objects perceived, conceived, known, intimate. or felt—and the omnipresent involution of the per- witntheHe- ceiving, conceiving, knowing, or feeling, Subject : the object varying with the Subject. “As things appear to me, so they are to me: as they appear to you, so they are to you.” This theory is just and important, if rightly understood and explained : but whether Protagoras did so explain or under- stand it, we cannot say ; nor does the language of Plato enable us to make out. Plato passes on from this theory to another, which he supposes Protagoras to have held without distinctly stating it: That there is no Ens distinguishable in itself, or per- manent, or stationary : that all existences are in perpetual flux, motion, change—acting and reacting upon each other, combining with or disjoining from each other.? Turning to the special theory of Protagoras (Homo Mensura), Relativity 20d producing arguments, serious or ironical in its
of sensible defence, Sokrates says—What you call colour has no facts, as ; . . cays aL described § definite place or existence either within you or with-
by him. out you. Itis the result of the passing collision be- tween your eyes and the flux of things suited to act upon them.
1 Plato, Sophistes, PP; 247-248. words does not really refute what The view taken of this matter by Aristippus meant to affirm. Aristippus Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the third meant affirm the Relative, and to chapter of the first Book of his System decline affirming anything beyond ; of Logic, is very instructive; see espe- and in this Aristokles agrees, making cially pp. 65-66 (ed. 4th). the doctrine even more comprehen- Aristippus (one of the Sokratici viri, sive by showing that Object as well contemporary of Plato) and the Ky- as Subject are relative also; impli- renaic sect affirmed the doctrine—sr cated both with each other and in the μόνα τὰ πάθη καταληπτά. Aristokles πάθος. refutes them by saying that there can be no πάθος without both Object and 2 Plato, Thesetét. Ρ. 152 D. Subject—o.tv and πάσχον. And he Though Plato states the grounds of goes on to declare that these three are this theory in his ironical way, as if it of necessary co-existence or consub- were an absurd fancy, yet it accident- stantiality. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ἀνάγκη ye τρία ally coincides with the est views of ταῦτα σνννφίστασθαι--τό te πάθος modern physical science. Absolute αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν, Kai τὸ πάσχον (ap. rest is unknown in nature: all matter Eusebium, Prep. Ev. xiv. 19, 1s is in perpetual movement, molecular as I apprehend that Aristokles hy these well as in masses.
Cuap. XXVIIL RELATIVITY TWOFOLD. \ 127
It is neither in the agent nor in the patient, but is something special and momentary generated in passing between the two. It will vary with the subject: it is not the same to you, to another man, to a dog or horse, or even to yourself at different times. The object measured or touched cannot be in itself either great, or white, or hot: for if it were, it would not appear different to another Subject. Nor can the Subject touching or measuring be in itself great, or white, or hot: for if so, it would always be so, and would not be differently modified when applied to a different object. Great, white, hot, denote no positive and permanent attribute either in Object or Subject, but a pass- ing result or impression generated between the two, relative to both and variable with either.
To illustrate this farther (continues Sokrates)—suppose we have here six dice. If I compare them with three pirtions other dice placed by the side of them, I shall call the are nothing six dice more and double: if I put twelve other dice purely and by the side of them, I shall call the six fewer and ‘imply, half. Or take an old man—and put a growing youth comparing by his side. Two years ago the old man was taller than the youth : now, the youth is grown, so that the old man is the shorter of the two. But the old man, and the six dice, have remained all the time unaltered, and equal to themselves. How then can either of them become either greater or less? or how can either really be so, when they were not so before ? ?
The illustration here furnished by Sokrates brings out forcibly the negation of the absolute, and the affirmation of Relativity universal relativity in all conceptions, judgments, and fWofcld— to predications, which he ascribes to Protagoras and in Subject Herakleitus. The predication respecting the six dice Objet ba” denotes nothing real, independent, absolute, inhering Se direstly in them: for they have undergone no change. It is described. relative, and expresses a mental comparison made by me or some one else. It is therefore relative in two different senses :—1. To some other object with which the comparison of the dice is
1 Plato, Thesetét. pp. 158-154. ὃ δὴ 2 Plato, Thesetét. pp. 154-155. Com- ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ προσ- pare the reasoning in the Phedon, pp. βάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, 96-97-101. ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός.
Xn,
128 THEATETUS. Cnap. XXVIII.
made :—2. To me as comparing Subject, who determine the objects witn which the comparison shall be made.'—Though relativity in both senses is comprehended by the Protagorean affirmation—Homo Mensura—yet relativity in the latter sense is all which that affirmation essentially requires. And this is true of all propositions, comparative or not—whether there be or be not reference to any other object beyond that which is directly denoted. But Plato was here illustrating the larger doctrine which he ascribes to Protagoras in common with Herakleitus :. and therefore the more complicated case of relativity might suit his purpose better.
Sokrates now re-states that larger doctrine, in general terms, as follows.
The universe is all flux or motion, divided into two immense concurrent streams of force, one active, the other
Statement
of the doc- passive ; adapted one to the other, but each including Herakleitus Many varieties. One of these is Object : the other is, meoasi> sentient, cognizant, concipient, Subject. Object as wil h that of well as Subject is, in itself and separately, indeter-
minate and unintelligible—a mere chaotic Agent or Patient. It is only by copulation and friction with each other that they generate any definite or intelligible result. Every such copulation, between parts adapted to each other, generates. a twin offspring: two correlative and inseparable results in-
finitely diversified, but always
1 The Aristotelian Category of Rela- tion (τὰ πρὸς ri, Categor. p. 6, a. 36) designates one object apprehended an named relatively to some other object —as ished from object appre- hended and named not thus relatively, which Aristotle considers as per se καθ᾽ αὑτό (Ethica Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 21). ristotle omits or excludes relativity of the object apprehended to the percipient or concipient ‘subject, which is the sort of relativity directly noted by the Protagorean doctrine.
Occasionally Aristotle passes from relativity in the former sense to relativity in the latter; as when he
iscusses ἐπιστητὸν and ἐπιστήμη, alluded to in one of my former notes on this dialogue. But he seems un- conscious of any transition. In the Categories, Object, as implicated with
born in appropriate pairs:? a
Subj does not seem to have been distinctly present to his reflection. In the third book of the Metaphysica, indeed, he discusses professedly the
opinion of Protagoras ; and among his objections inst it, one is, that it. makes eve ng relative or
πρὸς τί (Metaph. I. p. 1011, a. 20, Ὁ. 5). This is hardly true in the sense which πρὸς τί bears as one of his Categories ; but it is true in the other sense to which I have adve
A clear and full exposition of what is meant by the Relativity of Human Knowledge, will be found in Mr. John Stuart Mill's most recent work, ‘ Exa- mination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, ch. ii. pp. 6-15.
2 Plato, Thesetét. p- 156 A. ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν, Kat ἀλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει
CHaPp. XXVIIL IMPLICATION OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT. 129
definite perception or feeling, on the subjective side— a definite thing perceived or felt, on the objective. There cannot be one of these without the other : there can be no objective manifestation without its subjective correlate, nor any subjective without its objective. This is true not merely about the external senses— touch, taste, smell, sight, hearing—but also about the internal,— hot and cold, pleasure and pain, desire, fear, and all the countless variety of our feelings which have no separate names.! Each of these varieties of feeling has its own object co-existent and correlating with it. Sight, hearing, and smell, move and gene- rate rapidly and from afar; touch and taste, slowly and only from immediate vicinity : but the principle is the same in all. Thus, ¢.g., when the visual power of the eye comes into reciprocal action with its appropriate objective agent, the result between them is, that the visual power passes out of its abstract and inde- terminate state into a concrete and particular act of vision—the seeing a white stone or wood: while the objective force also passes out of its abstract and indeterminate state into concrete— so that it is no longer whiteness, but a piece of white stone or wood actually seen.?
Accordingly, nothing can be affirmed to exist separately and by itself. AJ] existences come only as twin and corre- Agent and lative manifestations of this double agency. In fact Ἐμοῦ ο neither of these agencies can be conceived indepen- Ens. dently and apart from the other : each of them is a nullity with- out the other.* If either of them be varied, the result also will vary proportionally : each may be in its turn agent or patient, according to the different partners with which it comes into confluence. If is therefore improper to say—Such or such a
μὲν ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν
ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. "Ex δὲ τῆς
τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἅλ-
AyAa y Pras ἔκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἅ ἄπειρα,
δίδυμα έἐ--τὸ μὲν αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθη-
σις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητο
με Plato, Thesetet. p. 156 B.
2 Plato, Theetét. p. 156 E. ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὁρᾷ δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο οὔ τι ὄψις ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς δρῶν, τὸ δὲ ξυγγεννῆσαν τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος
περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγ vito οὐ λεν- τῆς αὖ ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἶτε ξύλον
εἴτε wenn εἴτε ὁτιοῦν ξυνέβη χρῆμα χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιού ρώματι.
Plato’s concoption of the act of vision was—That fire darted forth from eyes of the percipient and came into confluence or coalescence with fire ap-
roaching from the perceived object Plato, Timeus, pp. 45 C, 67 C).
8 Plato, ‘These i p. ‘187 A. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναί τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὖ τι ἐπὶ ἑνὸς νοῆσαι, ὥς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως. Οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστί τι, πρὶν ἂν τ πάσχοντι ξυνέλθῃ---οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι, KC.
4 Plato, Thesetét. p. 157 A.
τό τά
3—9
130 THEATETUS. Caap. XXVIII.
thing exists. Existence absolute, perpetual, and unchangeable is nowhere to be found : and all phrases which imply it are incor- rect, though we are driven to use them by habit and for want of knowing better. All that is real is, the perpetual series of ᾿ changeful and transient conjunctions; each Object, with a certain Subject,—each Subject, with a certain Object.! This is true not merely of individual objects, but also of those complex aggre- gates rationally apprehended which receive generic names, man, animal, stone, &.2 You must not therefore say that any thing ts, absolutely and perpetually, good, honourable, hot, white, hard, great—but only that it is so felt or esteemed by certain subjects more or less numerous.®
The arguments advanced against this doctrine from the pheno- Arguments mena of dreams, distemper, or insanity, admit (con-
derived tinues Sokrates) of a satisfactory answer. A man who dreams, ΠΟ is dreaming, sick, or mad, believes in realities different maybe’ from, and inconsistent with, those which he would
answered. believe in when healthy. But this is because he is, under those peculiar circumstances, a different Subject, unlike what he was before. One of the two factors of the result being thus changed, the result itself is changed.‘ The cardinal prin- ciple of Protagoras—the essential correlation, and indefeasible fusion, of Subject and Object, exhibits itself in a perpetual series of definite manifestations. To say that I (the Subject) perceive, —is to say that I perceive some Object : to perceive and perceive nothing, is a contradiction. Again, if an Object be sweet, it must be sweet to some percipient Subject : sweet, but sweet to no one, is impossible.’ Necessity binds the essence of the per- cipient to that of something perceived: so that every name which you bestow upon either of them implies some reference to
explanation which seems dictated by the last word εἶδος. Yet Iam not sure that Plato does really mean here the generic tes. He had before
τινι ξυνελθὸν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλῳ ad προσ- πεσὸν πάσχον ἀνεφάνη.
1 Plato, Thestét. p. 157 A. οὐδὲν elvas ἕν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, ἀλλά τινι ἀεὶ
γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι παντάχοθεν ἐξαιρε- τέον, &.
2 Plato, Thesmtét. p. 157 Β. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἄνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκασ- τον ζῶόν τε καὶ ε
OS. . In this passage I follow Heindorf’s
ega
talked about sights, sounds, hot, cold, hard, &c., the separate sensations. He may perhaps here mean simply indi- vidual things as aggregates or afpoic- ματα---ϑ, man, 8, stone, &c.
3 Plato, Thestét. p. 157 E.
4 Plato, Thestét. p. 159.
δ Plato, Thesetét. p. 160 A,
σῃδλρ. XXVIII.
THE PROTAGOREAN DOCTRINE.
131
the other ; and no name can be truly predicated of either, which implies existence (either perpetual or temporary) apart from the
other.'
Such is the exposition which Sokrates is here made the Protagorean doctrine. How far the arguments, | urged by him in its behalf, are such as Protagoras himself either really urged, or would have adopted, tago we cannot say. In so far as the doctrine asserts essential fusion and implication between Subject and Object, with actual multiplicity of distinct Subjects— denying the reality either of absolute and separate Subject, or of absolute and separate Object 2—I think We are reminded that when we affirm any thing about an Object, there is always
it true and instructive.
(either expressed or tacitly implied) a Subject or Sub- jects (one, many, or all), to whom the Object +s what it is dec to be. This is the fundamental characteristic of consciousness, feeling, and cognition, in all their actual varieties. All of them are bi-polar or bi-lateral, admitting of being looked at either on
1 Plato, Thestét. p. 160 B. ἔπειπερ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μέν, συνδεῖ δε οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλήλοις δὴ λείπεται συνδε- δέσθαι (i ε. τὸν αἰσθανόμενον and τὸ ποιοῦν αἰσθάνεσθαι). “Qore εἶτε τις εἶναι τί ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι, ἣ τινός, ἣ πρός τι, ῥητέον ad- τῷ, etre γίγνεσθαι' αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ᾽ αὑτοῦ τι ἣ ὃν ἣ γιγνόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον, ovr ἄλλον λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον.
mpare Aristot. Metaphys. Ir. 6, p. 1011, a. 23.
3 Aristotle, in a passage of the treatise De Anima (iii. 1, 2-4-7-8, ed. Trendelenburg, p. 425, b. 25, p. 426, a. 15-25, Bekk.), impugns an opinion of certain antecedent φυσιό whom he does _ not Ἐς δ which opinion seems identi with the doctrine of Protagoras. These philosophers said, that “‘there was neither white nor black without vision, nor savour with- out the sense of taste”. Aristotle sa: that they were partly right, partly wrong. ey were right in regard to the actual, wrong in regard to the potential The actual manifestation of the perceived is one and the same with that of the percipient, though the
two are not the same logical in the view of the reflecting ἃ (ἡ δὲ φτοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι ov Tavroy αὐταῖς). But this is not true when we speak of them potentially— διχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ Tov αἱ v, τῶν μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν τῶν δὲ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, ἐπί τούτων μὲν συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων οὐ συμβαίνει. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι ἁπλῶς ἐλε- γον περὶ τῶν λεγομένων οὐχ ἁπλῶς.
Ι think that the distinction, which Aristotle insists upon as a confutation of these philosophers, is not well founded. hat he states, in very just language, about actual perception is equally true about potential perception. As the present fact of actual perception implicates essentially a determinate percipient subject with a determinate perceived object, and admits of be ooked at either from the one point o view or from the other—so the concept of potential perception implicates in like manner an indeterminate perceiv- able with an indeterminate subject competent to perceive. The perceiv- able or cogitable has no meaning except in relation to some Capax Percipiendi or Capax Cogitandi.
182
THEATETUS.
CuaP. XXVIITC.
the subjective or on the objective side. Comparisons and con- trasts, gradually multiplied, between one consciousness and another, lead us to distinguish the one of these points of view
from the other.
In some cases, the objective view is brought
into light and prominence, and the subjective thrown into the dark and put out of sight: in other cases, the converse operation takes place. Sometimes the Ego or Subject is promi- nent, sometimes the Mecum or Object.!_ Sometimes the Objective is as it were divorced from the Subject, and projected outwards, so as to have an illusory appearance of existing apart from and
independently of any Subject.
In other cases, the subjective
view is so exclusively lighted up and conspicuous, that Object disappears, and we talk of a mind conceiving, as if it had no correlative Concept. It is possible, by abstraction, to indicate, to
1The terms Ὁ and Mecum, to express the antithesis of these two λόγῳ μόνον χωριστὰ, are used by Pro- fessor Ferrier in his very acute treatise, Institutes of Metaphysic, pp. 98-96. The same antithesis is otherwise ex- pressed by various modern writers in
he terms Ego and non-E le moi et le non-moi. I cannot think that this last is the proper way of expressing it. You do not want to negative the Ego, but to declare its essential implication with a variable correlate ; to point out the bilateral character of the act of consciousness. The two are not merely Relata secundum dici but Relata secun- - dum esse, to use a distinction recognised in the scholastic logic.
The implication of Subject and Object is expressed in a uliar manner (though still clearly) by Ari- stotle in the treatise De Anima, iii. 8, 1, 481, Ὁ. 21. ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα: ἣ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἣ νοητά. ἐστὶ δ᾽ ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπι- στητά πως, ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά. The adverb πως (τρόπον τινά, as Simplikius explains it, fol. 78, Ὅ. 1) here deserves attention. ‘The soul is all existing things in a certain way Gc looked at under a certain aspect).
things are either Percepta or Cogitata: lik
now Cognition is in a ce sense the Cognita—Perception is the Percepta.” He goes on to say that the Percipient Mind is the Form of Percepta, while the matter of Percepta is without: but that the Cogitant Mind is identical with Cogitata, for they have no matter
ii. 4, 12, vrantary ΑἹ
. 430, a. 8, with the com- Simplikius p. 78, b. 17, f. 19, ἃ. 12). is in other words the tagorean doctrine— That the mind is the measure of all existences ; and that this is even more true about. νοητὰ than about αἰσθητά. That doc- trine is gompletely independent of. the eory, πιστήμη 18 αἱ σις. τοῖν in conformity with this affirma- tion of Aristotle (partially approved even by Cudworth—see Mosheim’s Transl. faa Syst. Vol. II. ch. yill. pp. 27- ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι wa4vra—that Mr. John Stuart Milf makes the following striking remark about the number of ultimate Laws of Nature :— ‘It is useful to remark, that the ultimate Laws of Nature cannot ibly be less numerous than the tinguishable sensations or other feelings of our nature : those, I mean, which are distinguishable from one another in quality, and not merely in quantity or de For example, ce there is a phenomenon sui generis called colour, which our consciousness. testifies to be not a particular d of some other phenonienon, as heat, or odour, or motion, but intrinsically un- e all others, it follows that there are
ultimate laws of colour . . The ideal limit therefore of the lanation of natural phenomena would be to show
that each distinguishable variety of our sensations or other states of con- sciousness has only one sort of cause.” (System of Logic, k fii. ch. 14, 5. 2.)
Cuap, XXVIII THE PROTAGOREAN DOCTRINE. 133
name, and to reason about, the one of these two points of view without including direct notice of the other: this is abstraction or logical separation—a mental process useful and largely applicable, yet often liable to be mistaken for real distinctness and duality. In the present case, the two abstractions become separately so familiar to the mind, that this supposed duality is conceived as the primordial and fundamental fact : the actual, bilateral, con- sciousness being represented as a temporary derivative state, generated by the copulation of two factors essentially indepen- dent of each other. Such a theory, however, while aiming at an impracticable result, amounts only to an inversion of the truth. It aims at explaining our consciousness as a whole ; whereas all that we can really accomplish, is to explain, up to a certain point, the conditions of conjunction and sequence between different portions of our consciousness. It also puts the primordial in the place of the derivative, and transfers the derivative to the privi- lege of the primordial. It attempts to find a generation for what is really primordial—the total series of our manifold acts of con- sciousness, each of a bilateral character, subjective on one side and objective on the other: and it assigns as the generating factors two concepts obtained by abstraction from these very acts, —resulting from multiplied comparisons,—and ultimately exag- gerated into an illusion which treats the logical separation as if it were bisection in fact and reality.
In Plato’s exposition of the Protagorean theory, the true doc- trine held by Protagoras,! and the illusory explana- pyatorg at tion (whether belonging to him or to Plato himself), tempt to get
are singularly blended together. He denies expressly phenome.
1The elaborate Dissertation of Sir Sir W. Hamilton not only re-asserts the William Hamilton, on the Philosophy doctrine (‘‘Our whole knowledge of of the Unconditioned (standing first in mind and matter is relative, condi- his ‘ Discussions on Philosophy’), is a tioned —relatively conditioned. Of valuable contribution to metaphysical things absolutely or in themselves, be philosophy. He affirms and shows, they external, they internal, we ‘That the Unconditioned is incog- know nothing, or know them o as nisable and inconceivable: its notion incognisable,” &c.)}—but affirms farther being only 8, negation of the Condi- that philosophers of every school, with tioned, which last can alone be posi- the exception of a few late absolute tively known and conceived” (p. 12); theorisers in Germany, have alwa refuting the opposite doctrine as pro- held and harmoniously re-echoed claimed, with different modifications, same doctrine. both by Schelling and Cousin. In proof of such unanimous agree- .
In an Appendix to this Dissertation, ment, he cites passages from seventeen contained in the same volume (p. 608), different philosophers.
134 THEATETUS. Crap. XXVIII. Ref e Φ . . Ra ference | all separate existence either of Subject or Object—all
potentiality possibility of conceiving or describing the one as a
ante reality distinct from the other. He thus acknow- Objective. ledges consciousness and cognition as essentially’ bi-
lateral. Nevertheless he also tries to explain the generation of these acts of consciousness, by the hypothesis of a latens processus behind them and anterior to them—two continuous moving forces, agent and patient, originally distinct, conspiring as joint factors to a succession of compound results. But when we examine the language in which Plato describes these forces, we see that he conceives them only as Abstractions and Potentia- lities ;! though he ascribes to them a metaphorical copulation and generation. ‘“ Every thing is motion (or change): of which there are two sorts, each infinitely manifold : one, having power to act—the other having power to suffer.” Here instead of a number of distinct facts of consciousness, each bilateral—we find ourselves translated by abstraction into a general potentiality of consciousness, also essentially bilateral and multiple. But we ought to recollect, that the Potential is only a concept abstracted from the actual,—and differing from it in this respect, that it includes what has been and what may be, as well as what is. But it is nothing new and distinct by itself: it cannot be pro- duced as a substantive antecedent to the actual, and as if it afforded explanation thereof. The general proposition about motion or change (above cited in the words of Plato), as far as it purports to get behind the fact of consciousness and to assign its cause or antecedent—is illusory. But if considered as a general expression for that fact itself, in the most comprehensive terms— indicating the continuous thread of separate, ever-changing acts of consciousness, each essentially bilateral, or subjective as well
The first name on his list stands as follows :—‘‘ 1. Frotagoras (ae reported by Plato, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, &c.)—Man is (for himself) the measure of all things ”.
Sir William Hamilton understands the Protagorean doctrine as I under- stand it, and as I have endeavoured to represent it in the present chapter. It has been very generally misconceived.
I cannot, however, agree with Sir
William Hamilton, in thinking that this theory respecting the Unconditioned and the Absolute, has been the theory generally adopted by philosophers. The
es which he cites from other authors are altogether insufficient to prove such an affirmation.
1 Plato, Thesetét. p. 156 A. τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπει- ρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν.
Cuap. XXVIII. OBJECTIONS AGAINST PROTAGORAS. 135
as objective—in this point of view the proposition is just and defensible.
It is to be remembered, that the doctrine here criticised is brought forward by the Platonic Sokrates as a doctrine not his own, but held by others ; among whom he ranks Protagoras as one.
Having thus set forth in his own language, and as an advocate, the doctrine of Protagoras, Sokrates proceeds to impugn it: in his usual rambling and desultory way, but with great dramatic charm and vivacity. He directs his attacks alternately against the two doctrines: 1. Homo Mensura: 2. Cognition is sensible
perception.
IT shall first notice what he advances against Homo Mensura.
It puts every man (he says) on a par as to wisdom and intelligence : and not only every man, but every horse, dog, frog, and other animal along with him. Each man is a measure for himself: all his judgments and beliefs are true: he is therefore as wise as Prota-
1In that distinction, upon which Aristotle lays so much stress, between Actus and Potentia, he declares Actus or actuality to be the Prius—Potentia or potentis ity to be the Fosterius. See
etaphysica, ©. 8, 1049, b. ood i De Anima, ii. 4, 415, a. 17. The Po-
' tential isa derivative from the Actual
—derived by comparison, abstraction, and logical analysis: a Mental con- cept, helping us to describe, arrange, and reason about, the multifarious acts of sense or consciousness—but not an anterior generating reality.
Turgot observes (CEuvres, vol. iii. pp. 108-110; Article in the Encyclo- Pedio, Baistence) :—
‘‘ Le premier fondement de la notion de l’existence est la conscience de notre propre sensation, et le sentiment du moi Ry résulte de cette conscience. La tion nécessaire entre l’étre ap- percevant, et l’étre appergu considéré
ors du moi, suppose dans les deux termes la méme réalité. Il y a dans l'un et dans l'autre un fondement de cette relation, que )’homme, s'il avoit un langage, pourroit désigner
r le nom commun d’ezistence ou
e présence: car ces deux notions ne seroient point encore distinguées l'une de l'autre. ...
‘* Mais il est trés-important d’ob- server que ni la simple sensation des objets présens, ni la peinture que fait Timagination des objets absens, ni le simple rapport de distance ou d’activité réciproque, commun aux uns et aux autres, ne sont précisément la chose que Teeprit voudroit désigner par le nom général d’ existence; c'est le fondement méme de ces rapports, supposé commun au moi, ἃ Pobjet vu et a lobjet simple- ment ἴ, sur lequel tombe véri- tablement et le nom d’ existence et notre
tion, lorsque nous disons qu’une
. chose existe. Ce fondement n’est ni ne
peut étre connu immédiatement, et ne nous est indiqué que par les rapports differents qui le supposent : nous nous en formons cependant une espétce d'idée que nous tirons par voie d’abstraction
Ὁ témoignage que la conscience nous rend de nous-mémes et de notre sensa- tion actuelle: c’est-a-dire, que nous transportons en quelque sorte cette con- science du moi sur les objets extérieurs, Bar une espéce d’assimilation vague,
émentie aussitot par la séparation de tout ce qui caractérise le moi, mais qui ne suffit moins pour devenir le fondement d’une abstraction ou d'un signe commun, et pour étre l'objet de nos jugemens.”
136
THEATETUS. Crap. XXVIII.
ies sayathat goras and has no need to seek instruction from Prota- δὰ goras! Reflection, study, and dialectic discussion,
par thet it are superfluous and useless to him : he is a measure
contradicts to himself on the subject of geometry, and need not
conscious. therefore consult a professed geometrician like Theo-
ness. Not dérus.?
every one,
but
9 The doctrine is contradicted (continues Sokrates) by the common opinions of mankind: for no man esteems himself a measure on all things. Every one believes that there are some things on which he is wiser than his neighbour—and others on which his neighbour is wiser than he. People are constantly on the look out for teachers and guides.® If Protagoras advances an opinion which others declare to be false, he must, since he admits their opinion to be true, admit his own opinion to be false‘ No animal, nor any common man, is a measure ; but only those men, who have gone through special study and instruction in the matter upon which they pro- nounce.®
In matters of present and immediate sensation, hot, cold, dry,
moist, sweet, bitter, &c., Sokrates acknowledges that
In matte
of present. every man must judge for himself, and that what each very man man pronounces is true for himself. So too, about can judge honourable or base, just or unjust, holy or unholy— Where whatever rules any city may lay down, are true for soquences. itself : no man, no city,—is wiser upon these matters areinvolved than any other.6 But in regard to what is good, pro- knowledge fitable, advantageous, healthy, &c., the like cannot is requir
be conceded. Here (says Sokrates) one man, and one
city, is decidedly wiser, and judges more truly, than another, We cannot say that the judgment of each is true ;7 or that what every man or every city anticipates to promise good or profit, will necessarily realise such anticipations. In such cases, not merely present sentiment, but future consequences are involved. Here then we discover the distinction which Plato would
1 Plato, Thesetét. sg ol Plato, Kratyl Ῥ. same argument vaployed. 2 Plato, Thesetet. p. 169 A. 3 Plato, Thesetét. p. 170. 4 Plato, Thestét. p. 171 B. Οὐκοῦν
Compare τὴν αὑτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ & where the ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν. wey
p. 171 C. 6 Plato, Thestét. pp. 172 A, 177 E. 7 Plato, Theztét. p. 172.
ὡροῖ, εἰ THY τῶν εσθαι ὁμολογεῖ
HOMO MENSURA——DEFENDED.
CHap. XXVIII. 137
draw.! Where present sentiment alone is involved, as in hot and cold, sweet and bitter, just and unjust, honourable and base, &c., there each is a judge for himself, and one man is no better judge than another. But where future consequences are to be predicted, the ignorant man is incapable: none but the profes- sional Expert, or the prophet,? is competent to declare the truth. When a dinner is on table, each man among the guests can judge whether it is good : but while it is being prepared, none but the cook can judge whether it will be good.* This is one Platonic objection against the opinion of Protagoras, when he says that every opinion of every man istrue. Another objection is, that opinions of different men are opposite and contradictory,‘ some of them contradicting the Protagorean dictum itself.
Such are the objections urged by Sokrates against the Prota- gorean doctrine—Homo Mensura. There may have piss, when been perhaps in the treatise of Protagoras, which un- he impugns
fortunately we do not possess, some reasonings or the doctrine
ta- phrases countenancing the opinions against which sores states Plato here directs his objections. But so far as I can trine with- collect, even from the words of Plato himeelf when Sutines. he professes to borrow the phraseology of his oppo- ton pro-
nent, I cannot think that Protagoras ever delivered lo the opinion which Plato here refutes—That every ἴδια κε]. opinion of every man ἐδ true. The opinion really τ delivered by Protagoras appears to have been '—That
every opinion delivered by every man 1s true, to that man ing
1 Plato, Thesetét. p. 178.
2 Plato, Theetét. p. 179. εἴ πῃ τοὺς συνόντας ἔπειθεν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσ- Θθαΐ τε καὶ δόξειν οὔτε μάντις οὔτε τις ἅλ- Aos ἄμεινον κρίνειεν ἂν ἣ αὐτὸς αὑτῴ.
3 Plato, Thewtst. p. 178.
4 Plato, Theextét. p. 179 B.
Theodor. "Exeivy μοι δοκεῖ μάλιστα ἁλίσκεσθαι ὃ λόγος, ἁλισκόμενος καὶ ταύτῃ, ἧ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὗται δὲ ἐφάνησαν τοὺς ἑκείνον λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἡγούμεναι.
ϑοζταί. Πολλαχῇ καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τό τοιοῦτον ἁλοίη, μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληδὴ δόξαν εἶναι" περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατ ταύτας δόξαι γίγνονται . . . ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω, ἀνάλωτοι γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰσίν.
5 Plato, Thesetét. p. 152 A. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει (Protagoras), ὡς ola μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μέν ἐστιν ἐμοί---οἷα δὲ got, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί. 168 ἀν τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ φαίνεται. 160 Ο. ᾿ ὴς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἢ ἐμὴ αἴσθησις - τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεΐ ἐστι" καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοί, ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.
Comp. also pp. 166 D, 170 A, 177 C.
Instead of saying αἴσθησις (in the passage just cited, p. 160 D), we m ht with quite equal truth put ᾿Αληθὴς. ρα ἐμοὶ ἐμὴ νόησις’ τῆς yap uns οὐσίας, ἀεὶ ὅστιν. In this respect aic- θησις and νόησις Are ON 8 par. Νόησις
just as much relative to ὁ νοῶν as αἴσθησις to ὁ αἰσθανόμενος.
138 THEATETUB, Crap. XXVIII.
himself. But Plato, when he impugns it, leaves out the final qualification ; falling unconsciously into the fallacy of passing (as logicians say) a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter.' The qualification thus omitted by Plato forms the characteristic feature of the Protagorean doctrine, and is essential to the phraseology founded upon it. Protagoras would not declare any proposition to be true absolutely, or false absolutely. The phraseology belonging to that doctrine is forced upon him by Plato. Truth Absolute there is none, according to Protagoras. All truth is and must be truth relative to some one or more persons, either actually accepting and believing in it, or conceived as potential believers under certain circumstances. Moreover since these believers are a multitude of individuals, each with his own peculiarities—so no truth can be believed in, except under the peculiar measure of the believing individual mind. What a man adopts as true, and what he rejects as false, are conditioned alike by this limit: a limit not merely different in different individuals, but variable and frequently varying in the same individual. You cannot determine a dog, or a horse, or a child
Sextus Empiricus adverts to the doctrines of Protagoras (mainly to point out how they are distinguished from he himself belongs) in Pyrroa, Hypot,
e elongs) in on. Hypot, i. sects. 215-219; adv. Mathematicos, vii. 5. 60-64-388-400. He too imputes to Protagoras both the two doctrines. 1. That man is the measure of all things: that what appears to each
rson is, fo him: that all truth is
us relative. 2. That all phantasms, appearances, opinions, are true. Sextus reasons at some length (390 seq.) against this doctrine No. 2, and rea- sons very much as Protagoras himself would have reasoned, since he appeals to individual sentiment and movement of the individual mind (οὐχ ὡσαύτως yap κινούμεθα, 391-400). It appears to me perfectly certain that Frotagoras advanced the general thesis of Rela- tivity : we see this as well from Plato as from Sextus—xai οὕτως εἰσάγει τὸ πρός τι--τῶν πρός τι εἶναι τὴν ἀληθείαν (Steinhart is of opinion that these words τῶν πρός τι εἶναι τὴν ἀληθείαν are an addition of Sextus himself, and do not describe the doctrine of Pro- tagoras ; an opinion from which I dis- sent, and which is contradicted by
Plato himself: Steinhart, Einleitung note 8). If Protagoras also advanced. the doctrine—all opinions are true— this was not consistent with his car- dinal princi le of relativity. Either he himself did not take care always to enunciate the qualifications and limita- tions which his theory requires, and which in common parlance are omitted —Or his opponents left out the limita- tions which he annexed, and impugned the opinion as if it stood without any. This last supposition I think the most probable.
The doctrine of Pro ras is cor- rectly given by Sextus in the Pyrrhon. Hypot.
1 Aristotle, in comment on the Protagorean formula, falls into a simi- lar inaccuracy in sl over the re- strictive qualification annexed by Pro- tagoras. Metaphysic. IT. p. 1009, a. 6. Compare hereupon Bonitz’s note upon the e, p. 199 of his edition.
is transition without warning, a dicto secundum quid dictum simpliciter, is among the artifices ascribed by Plato to the Sophists Euthydémus and Dionysodérus (Plat. Euthyd. p. 297 D).
παρ. XXVIII. BELIEF BELONGS TO THE INDIVIDUAL. 139
to believe in the Newtonian astronomy : you could not deter- mine the author of the Principia in 1687 to believe what the child Newton had believed in 1647.1. To say that what is true to one man, is false to another—that what was true to an indi- vidual as a child or as a youth, becomes false to him in his ad- vanced years, is no real contradiction: though Plato, by omitting the qualifying words, presents it asif it were such. In every man’s mind, the beliefs of the past have been modified or re- versed, and the beliefs of the present are liable to be modified or reversed, by subsequent operative causes: by new supervening sensations, emotions, intellectual comparisons, authoritative teach- ing, or society, and so forth.
The fact, that all exposition and discussion is nothing more than an assemblage of individual judgments, deposi- tions, affirmations, negations, &c., is disguised from us Al by the elliptical form in which it is conducted. For example :—I, who write this book—can give nothing more than my own report, as a witness, of facts known to me, and of what has been said, thought, or done by others,—for all which I cite authorities :— and my own conviction, belief or disbelief, as to the true understanding thereof, and the conclusions de- ducible. I produce the reasons which justify my opinion : I reply to those reasons which have been supposed by others to justify the opposite. It is for the reader to judge how far my reasons appear satisfactory to his mind.? To deliver my
1 The argument produced by Plato to 2M. Destutt Tracy observes as fol- discredit the Protagorean theory—that lows:
it pute the dog or the horse on a level with man—furnishes in reality a forcible illustration of the truth of the theory.
Mr. James Harris, the learned Ari- stotelian of the last century, remarks, in his Dialogue on Happiness (Works, ed. 1772, pp. 148-168) :—
** Every particular Species is, itself to itself, the Measure of all things in the Universe. As things vary in their relations to it, they vary also in their value. If their value be ever doubtful, it can noway be adjusted but by recurring with accuracy to the natural State of the Species, and to those several Relations which such a State of course creates.”
‘*De méme que toutes nos proposi- tions peuvent étre ramenées ἃ la forme de propositions énonciatives, parce qu’au fond elles expriment toutes un jugement ; de méme, toutes nos propo- sitions énonciatives peuvent ensuite étre toujours réduites & n’étre qu’une de celles-ci: ‘je pense, je sens, ou je percois, que telle chose est de telle Manitre, ou que tel étre produit tel effet ’—propositions dont nous sommes nous-mémes le sujet, parce qu'au fond nous sommes toujours le sujet de tous nos jugemens, uisqu'ils n’expriment jamais
u'une impression que nous éprouvons.”
déologie : Supplément & la premiére Section, vol. iv. p. 165, ed. 1825 duodec.)
140 THEATETUS, Cuap. XX VIIL
own. convictions, is all that is in my power: and if I spoke with full correctness and amplitude, it would be incumbent on me to avoid pronouncing any opinion to be érue or false simply: I ought to say, it is true to me—or false to me. But to repeat this in every other sentence, would be a tiresome egotism. It is understood once for all by the title-page of the book: an oppo- nent will know what he has to deal with, and will treat the opinions accordingly. If any man calls upon me to give him absolute truth, and to lay down the canon of evidence for identi- fying it—I cannot comply with the request, any farther than to deliver my own best judgment, what is truth—and to declare what is the canon of evidence which guides my own mind. Each reader must determine for himself whether he accepts it or not. I might indeed clothe my own judgments in oracular and vehement language: I might proclaim them as authoritative dicta: I might speak as representing the Platonic Ideal, Typical Man,—or as inspired by a δαίμων like Sokrates: I might denounce opponents as worthless men, deficient in all the sentiments which distinguish men from brutes, and meriting punishment as well as disgrace. If I used all these harsh phrases, I should only imitate what many authors of repute think themselves entitled to say, about. THEIR beliefs and convictions. Yet in reality, I should still be proclaiming nothing beyond my own feelings :— the force of emotional association, and antipathy towards oppo- nents, which had grown round these convictions in my own mind. Whether I speak in accordance with others, or in oppo- sition to others, in either case I proclaim my own reports, feelings and judgments—nothing farther. I cannot escape from the Protagorean limit or measures.!
‘On peut méme dire que comme nous ne sentons, ne savons, ot ne con- naissons, rien que par rappo nous, Vidée, sujet de la proposition, est toujours en définitif notre moi; car quand je dis cet arbre est vert, je dis ~éellement je sens, je sais, je vois, que cet arbre est vert. Mais précisément parce que ce préambule se trouve toujours et nécessairement compris dans toutes noe propositions, nous le supprimons qua nous voulons ; et toute Tee peut étre le sujet de la proposition.” (Principes Logiques, vol. iv. ch. viii. p. 231.)
1 Sokrates himself states as much as this in the course of his reply to the doctrine of Protagoras, Theztét. 171 D.: ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη, οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν αὑτοῖς . .. καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεί, ταῦτα λέγειν.
The necessity (ἀνάγκη) to which So krates here adverts, is well expressed by M. Degérando. ‘En j t ce que pensent les autres hommes, en comprenant ce qu’ils éprouvent, nous ne sortons point en effet de nous- mémes, comme on seroit tenté de le croire. C’est dans nos propres idées
Cnap. ΧΧΥΙΠ. EACH 18 A MEASURE ΤῸ HIMSELF. 141
To this theory Plato imputes as a farther consequence, that it equalises all men and all animals. No doubt, the argument— measure or limit as generically described, bears alike That the upon all: but it does not mark the same degree in doctrine all. Each man’s bodily efforts are measured or Sq7alisee limited by the amount of his physical force: this is and ani- alike true of all men: yet it does not follow that the far true. physical force of all men is equal. The dog, the Not truein horse, the new-born child, the lunatic, is each a roquisite measure of truth to himself: the philosopher is so Plato's also to himself: this is alike true, whatever may be °bection. the disparity of intelligence: and is rather more obviously true when the disparity is great, because the lower intelligence has then a very narrow stock of beliefs, and is little modifiable by the higher. But though the Protagorean doctrine declares the dog or the child to be a measure of truth—each to himself—it does not declare either of them to be a measure of truth to me, to you, or to any ordinary by-stander. How far any person is 2 measure of truth to others, depends upon the estimation in which he is held by others: upon the belief which they entertain respecting his character or competence. Here is a new element let in, of which Plato, in his objection to the Protagorean doc- trine, takes no account. When he affirms that Protagoras by his equalising doctrine acknowledged himself to be no better in point of wisdom and judgment than a dog or a child, this inference must be denied.1 The Protagorean doctrine is perfectly consis- tent with great diversities of knowledge, intellect, emotion, and character, between one man and another. Such diversities are
ised in individual belief and estimation, and are thus com- prehended in the doctrine. Nor does Protagoras deny that men are teachable and modifiable. The scholar after being taught
que nous voyons leurs idées, leurs dont notre imagination a fait tous les maniéres d’étre, leur existence méme. frais; dont elle a créé tous les person- Le monde entier ne nous est connu nages, et dessiné, avec plus ou moins que dans une sorte de chambre ob- de vérité, tous les tableaux.” (Degé- scure : et lorsqu’au sortir d’une société rando, Des Signes et de l’Art de nombreuse nous croyons avoir lu dans Penser, vol. i. ch. v. p. 132.
les esprite et dans les cceurs, avoir 1 Plato, Theeetét. p. 161 D. ὁ δ᾽ dpa observé des caractéres, et senti (si je ἔγχανεν ὧν eis φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων puis dire ainsi) la vie d’un grand βατράχον γυρίνον, μὴ ὅτι ἄλλον Tov ἀν- nombre d’hommes—nous ne faisons en θρώπων. I substitute the dog or horse effet que sortir d’une grande galerie as illustrations
142 THEATETUS. Cuap. XXVIII.
will hold beliefs different from those which he held. before. Pro- tagoras professed to know more than others, and to teach them : others on their side also believed that he knew more than they, and came to learn it. Such belief on both sides, noway contra- dicts the general doctrine here under discussion. What the scholar believes to be true, is still true to him: among those things which he believes to be true, one is, that the master knows more than he: in coming to be taught, he acts upon his own conviction. To say that a man is wise, is to say, that he is wise an some one’s estimation: your own or that of some one else. Such estimation is always implied, though often omitted in terms. Plato remarks very truly, that every one believes some others to be on certain matters wiser than himself. In other words, what is called authority—that predisposition to assent, with which we hear the statements and opinions delivered by some other persons—is one of the most operative causes in determining human belief. The circumstances of life are such as to generate this predisposition in every one’s mind to a greater or less degree, and towards some persons more than towards others. Belief on authority is true to the believer himself, like all his other beliefs, according to the Protagorean doctrine : authority and in acting upon it,—in following the guidance of is trne 0 A, and not following the guidance of B,—he is still a himself— y measure to himself. It is not to be supposed that of authority Protagoras ever admitted all men to be equally wise, resides 5 though Plato puts such an admission into his mouth liever's own as an inference undeniable and obvious. His doc- mind. trine affirms something altogether different :—that whether you believe yourself to be wise or unwise, in either case the belief is equally your own—equally the result of your own mental condition and predisposition,—equally true to yourself, —and equally an item among the determining conditions of your actions. That the beliefs and convictions of one person might be modified by another, was a principle held by Prota- goras not less than by Sokrates: the former employed as his modifying instrument, eloquent lecturing—the latter, dialectical cross-examination. Both of them recognise the belief of the person to whom they address themselves as true to him, yet at the same tiie as something which may be modified and corrected,
Caap. XXVIII. BELIEF ON AUTHORITY. 143
by appealing to what they thought the better parts of it against the worse.
Again—Sokrates imputes it as a contradiction to Protagoras— “Your doctrine is pronounced to be false by many |, pcan persons: but you admit that the belief of all persons formu is true: therefore your doctrine is false”! Here also {alse to ἠφΛ Plato omits the qualification annexed by Protagoras dissent to his general principle—Every man’s belief is true— that is, true to him. That a belief should be true, to one man, and false to another—is not only no contradiction to the formula of Protagoras, but is the very state of things which his formula contemplates. He of course could only proclaim it as true to himself. It is the express purpose of his doctrine to disallow the absolutely true and the absolutely false. His own formula, like every other opinion, is false to those who dissent from it: but it is not false absolutely, any more than any other doctrine. Plato therefore does not make out his charge of contradiction.
Some men (says Sokrates) have learnt,—have bestowed study on special matters,—have made themselves wise upon piato’s ar- those matters. Others have not done the like, but #ment— remain ignorant. [6 is the wise man only who is a wise man measure: the ignorant man neither is so, nor believes “one isa himself to be so, but seeks guidance from the wise.? Reply to it.
Upon this we may remark—First, that even when the un- taught men are all put aside, and the erudites or Experts remain alone—still these very erudites or Experts, the men of special study, are perpetually differing among themselves; so that we cannot recognise one as a measure, without repudiating the authority of the rest.2 If by a measure, Plato means an infallible measure, he will not find it in this way: he is as far from the absolute as before. Next, it is perfectly correct that if any man be known to have studied or acquired experience on special matters, his opinion obtairs an authority with others (more or
1 Plato, Thesetét. p. 171 A. Sextus et indocti judicare potuissent (statuere Empiric. (adv. Mathem. vii. 61) givesa enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maximé vi- pertinent answer to this objection. detur esse sapicntis) ΠΡ Sed, ut Potue-
rint, potuerunt, omni rebus auditis,
3 Plato, Thestét. pp. 171 C, 179 B. cognitis etiam reliquorum sententiis: judt-
δ ΝΑΙ, quod dicunt omnino, se caverunt autem re semel auditd, atque credere ei quem judicent fuisse sa- ad unius se auctoritatem contweruni.” pientem—probarem, si id ipsum rudes (Cicero, Acad. Priora, ii. 8, 9.)
144 THEATETUS. Cuap. XXVIII.
fewer), such as the opinion of an ignorant man will not possess. This is a real difference between the graduated man and the non- graduated. But it is a difference not contradicting the theory of Protagoras; who did not affirm that every man’s opinion was equally trustworthy in the estimation of others, but that every man’s opinion was alike a measure to the man himself. The authority of the guide resides in the belief and opinion of. those who follow him, or who feel prepared to follow him if necessity arises. A man gone astray on his journey, asks the way to his destination from residents whom he believes to know it, just as he might look at a compass, or at the stars, if no other persons were near. In following their direction, he is acting on his own belief, that he himself is ignorant on the point in question and that they know. He is a measure to himself, both of the extent. of his own ignorance, and of the extent of his own knowledge. And in this respect all are alike—every man, woman, child, and -animal ;1 though they are by no means alike in the estimation of others, as trustworthy authorities.
1 Plato, Thestét. p.171 E. I tran- scribe the following from the treatise of Fichte (Beruf des Menschen, Desti- nation de l’'Homme; Traduction de Barchou de Penhoén, ch. i. Le Doute, pp. 54-55) :-
“De conscience de chaque indi-
- vidu, la nature se contemplant sous un point de vue différent, il en résulte que je m’appelle moi, et que tu vap-
lies tot. Pour toi, je suis hors de
i; et pour moi, tu es hors de moi. Dans ce qui est hors de moi, je me saisis d’abord de ce qui m’avoisine le
lus, de ce qui est le plus ἃ ma portée:
i, tu fais de méme. Chacun de notre cété, nous allons ensuite au dela. Puis, ayant commencé ἃ cheminer ainsi dans le monde de deux points de dé-
rt différens, nous suivons, pendant
e reste de notre vie, des routes qui se coupent cA et la, mais qui jamais ne suivent exactement la méme direc- tion, jamais ne courent parallélement
lane ἃ l'autre. Tous les individus pos- sibles peuvent étre: par conséquent aussi, tous les points de vue de con-
science possibles. Za sommie de ces con- sciences individuelles fait la conscience universelle: i n'y a pas d'autre. Ce n’est en effet que dans l'individu que se trouve & la fois et la limitation et la réalité. Dans lDindividu la con-
science est entisrement déterminée par la nature intime de l'individu. ἢ] n’est donné & personne de savoir autre chose que ce qu'il sait. I ne pourrait. davantage savoir les mémes choses ‘ane autre agon 4} ne les sait.”
The same doctrine is enforced with great originality and acuteness in a. recent work of M. Eugéne Véron, Du Pro Intellectuel dans l'Humanité, Supe riorité des Arts Modernes sur les Arts Anciens (Paris, 1862, Guillaumin). M. Véron applies his general doctrine mainly to the theory of Art and As- thetics: moreover he affirms more than I admit respecting human pro- gress as a certain and constant matter of fact. But he states clearly, as an universal truth, the relative point of view—the nece measurement for itself, of each individual mind—and the consequent obligation, on each, to allow to other minds the like liberty. We read, pp. 14-16-17 :—
‘Cela revient ἃ dire que dans quel- que cas que nous supposions, nous ne pouvons sentir que s la mesure de notre sensibilité, comprendre et joger que dans la mesure de notre intelli- gence; et que nos facultés étant en perpetuel developpement, les variations
e notre personnalité entrainent néces- sairement celles de nos jugemens,
CHap. XXVIII. FACTS PRESENT AND FUTURE. 145
A similar remark may be made as to Plato’s distinction be- tween the different matters to which belief may
; ᾿ : Plato’s ar- apply : present sensation or sentiment in one case ment as —anticipation of future sensations or sentiments, in tinction be- another. Upon matters of present sensation and tween pre- sentiment (he argues), such as hot or cold, sweet or tion and bitter, just or unjust, honourable or base, &c., one tion of the
ture.
man is as good a judge as another: but upon matters ™ involving future contingency, such as what is healthy or un- - healthy,—profitable and good, or hurtful and bad,—most men judge badly : only a few persons, possessed of special skill and knowledge, judge well, each in his respective province.
I for my part admit this distinction to be real and important. Most other persons admit the same.’ In acting upon ay osormnta it, I follow out my belief,—and so do they. This is of Relativity
δ᾽ general fact, respecting the circumstances which
does not im- ply that
determine individual belief. Like all other causes of ©very man
belief, it operates relatively to the individual mind, and thus falls under that general canon of relativity,
believes himself to beinfallible.
which it is the express purpose of the Protagorean formula to
méme quand nous n’en avons pas con- science. . . Chaque homme a son esprit particulier. Ce que l'un comprend sans peine, un autre ne le peut salsir; ce qui répugne ἃ lun, plait ἃ l'autre; ce qui me parait odieux, mon voisin l’ap- prouve. uelque bonne envie que nous semblions avoir de nous ope dans la foule, de dépouiller n in- dividualité pour emprunter des juge- mens tout faits et des opinions taill ἃ la mesure et ἃ l'usage du public—il est facile de voir que, tout en ayant Yair de répéter la legon apprise, nous ugeons ἃ notre maniére, quand nous ugeons: que notre jugement, tout en t étre celui de tout le monde, n‘en reste pas moins personnel, et n’est pas une simple imitation : que cette res- semblance méme est souvent plus ap- mte que réelle: que lidentité ex- eure des formules et des ex ons ne prouve pas absolument e de la . Rien n’est élastique comme es mots, et comme les principes géné- raux dans lesquels on pense enfermer les intelligences. C’est souvent quand le langage est le plus semblable qu'on est le plus loin de s’entendre. **Du reste, quand méme cette ressem-
blance serait aussi réelle guielie est fausse, en quoi prouverait-il lidentité n re des intelligences? Qu’y aurait-i] d’étonnant qu’au milieu de ce communisme intellectuel qui régit l'éducation de chaque classe, et déter- mine nos habitudes intellectuelles et moraies, les distinctions natives dispa russent ou s’atténuassent? Ne faut-il pas lutét admirer l’opinidtre vitalité ifférences originelles qui résistent ἃ tant de causes de nivellement ? Lidentité primitive des intelligences n’est qu'une fiction logique sans ἱκανός br simple ab ractl on de Ἂ ne repose que sur lidentit du mot avec lui-méme. Tout se reduit ἃ la possibilité abstraite des mémes développemens, dans les mémes con- ditions d’hérédité et d’éducation— mais aussi de développemens dif- férens dans des_ circonstances dif- férentes: c’est ἃ dire, que l’intelligence de chacun n’est identique ἃ celle de tous, qu’au moment ot elle n’est pas encore proprement une _ intelli- gence.”
1 Plato, Thesetét. p. 179 A. was av dpodoyot.
3—10
146 THEATETUS. ΠΑΡ. XXVIIL
affirm. Sokrates impugns the formula of relativity, as if it pro- claimed every one to believe himself more competent to predict the future than any other person. But no such assumption is implied in it. To say that a man is a measure to himeelf, is not to say that he is, or, that he believes himself to be, omniscient or infallible. A sick man may mistake the road towards future health, in many different directions. One patient may over-esti- mate his own knowledge,—that is one way, but only one among several : another may be diffident, and may undervalue his own knowledge : a third may over-estimate the knowledge of his pro- fessional adviser, and thus follow an ignorant physician, believing him to be instructed and competent : a fourth, instead of con- sulting a physician, may consult a prophet, whom Plato!’ here reckons among the authoritative infallible measures in respect to future events: a fifth may (like the rhetor Ailius Aristeides 3) disregard the advice of physicians, and follow prescriptions en- joined to him in his own dreams, believing them to be sent by Aisculapius the Preserving God. Each of these persons judges differently about the road to future health : but each is alike a measure to himself: the belief of each is relative to his own mental condition and predispositions. You, or I, may believe that one or other of them is mistaken : but here another measure is introduced—your mind or mine.
But the most unfounded among all Plato’s objections to the
Plato’sar. rotagorean formula, is that in which Sokrates is gument ἰδ made to allege, that if it be accepted, the work of That ifthe dialectical discussion is at an end : that the Sokratic fooeaforean Elenchus, the reciprocal scrutiny of opinions between admitted, two dialogists, becomes nugatory—since every man’s discussion opinions are right. Instead of right, we must add Σου be [ἢ requisite qualification, here as elsewhere, by read- The reverse ing, right to the man himself. Now, dealing with
1 Plato, Thesetét. p. 179 A, where Mr. Campbell observes in his note— “The μάντις is introduced as being ἐπιστήμων of the future generally just as the physician is of future health
d disease, the musician of future harmony
2 See The five discourses of the rhetor Aristeides—'Iepay Λόγοι, Oratt. xxiii.-
xxvii.—containing curious details about his habits and condition, and illus- trating his belief; especially Or. xxiii. p., 46 462 men The perfect faith which
@ re in his dreams, and the con- fidence ' with which he speaks of the benefits derived from acting upon them, are remarkable.
3 Plato, Thestét. p. 161 E.
Crap. ΧΧΥΠΙ. APPEAL TO INDIVIDUAL MINDS. 147
Plato's affirmation thus corrected, we must pronounce is true— not only that it is not true, but that the direct reverse
of it is true. Dialectical discussion and the Sokratic nowy of procedure, far from implying the negation of the the indi. Protagorean formula, involve the unqualified recogni- mind.
tion of it. Without such recognition the procedure cannot even begin, much less advance onward to any result. Dialectic ope- rates altogether by question and answer: the questioner takes all his premisses from the answers of the respondent, and capnot proceed in any direction except that in which the respondent leads him. Appeal is always directly made to the affirmative or negative of the individual mind, which is thus installed as measure of truth or falsehood for itself. The peculiar and characteristic excellence of the Sokratic Elenchus consists in thus stimulating the interior mental activity of the individual hearer, in eliciting from him all the positive elements of the debate, and in making him feel a shock when one of his answers contradicts the others. Sokrates not only does not profess to make himself a measure for the respondent, but expressly disclaims doing so: he protests against being considered as a teacher, and avows his own entire ignorance. He undertakes only the obstetric process of evolving from the respondent mind what already exists in it without the means of escape—and of applying interrogatory tests to the answer when produced : if there be nothing in the respondent’s mind, his art is inapplicable. He repudiates all appeal to autho- rity, except that of the respondent himself.! Accordingly there
1 Read the animated ein the goras, that it rather illustrates the conversation with Pélus: Plato, Gorg. Protagorean pointof view. The beliefs 472, and Theztct. 161 A, pp. 375, 376. and judgments of the man of the world
this ver ument of Sokrates are presented as flowing from his men-
the Thee tas} inst the Pro- talcondition and predispositions : those
orean theory, we find him uncon- of the philosopher, from his. The two sciously adopting (as I have already are radically dissentient: each
remarked) the very of that to the other mistaken and m ded.
theory, as a description of his own Here is nothing to refute .
ure, p. 171 D. Compare with Each of the two is a measure for him-
his a remarkable e in the col- self. loquy of Sokrates with Thrasymachus, Yes, it will be said; but Plato’s in Republic, i. 337 C. measure is right, and that of the man
Moreover, the long and stri con- of the world is wrong. Perhaps 7 ma trast between the philosopher and the think so. Asa measure for m Ν man of the world, which Plato em- I speak and act accordingly. But the bodies in this dialogue (the Thesetétas, opponents have not to accept from p. 172 to p. 177), is so far from me any more than Plato as their judge. assisting his argument against Prota- The case remains unsettled as before.
148 -THEATETUS. CHaP. XX VIII.
is neither sense nor fitness in the Sokratic cross-examination, un- less you assume that each person, to whom it is addressed, is a measure of truth and falsehood to himself. Implicitly indeed, this is assumed in rhetoric as well as in dialectic: wherever the speaker aims at persuading, he adapts his mode of speech to the predispositions of the hearer’s own mind ; and he thus recognises that mind as a measure for itself. But the Sokratic Dialectic embodies the same recognition, and the same essential relativity to the hearer’s mind, more forcibly than any rhetoric. And the Platonic Sokrates (in the Pheedrus) makes it one of his objections. against orators who addressed multitudes, that they did not dis- criminate either the specialties of different minds, or the special- ties of discourse applicable to each."
Though Sokrates, and Plato so far forth as follower of Sokrates, Contrast employed a colloquial method based on the funda- with the De mental assumption of the Protagorean formula— Legibus— autonomy of each individual mind—whether they sUmecinfal. accepted the formula in terms, or not ; yet we shall libleautho- find Plato at the end of his career, in his treatise De rity —sets : . : . . ‘ aside Dia- “Legibus, constructing an imaginary city upon the
- hectic. attempted deliberate exclusion of this formula. We shall find him there monopolising all teaching and culture of his citizens from infancy upwards, barring out all freedom of speech or writing by a strict censorship, and severely punishing dissent from the prescribed orthodoxy. But then we shall also find that. Plato in that last stage of his life—when he constitutes himself as lawgiver, the measure of truth or falsehood for all his citizens— has at the same time discontinued his early commerce with the Sokratic Dialectics.
On the whole then, looking at what Plato says about the Pro- Plato in tagorean doctrine of Relativity—Homo Mensura— denying the first, his statement what the doctrine really is, next
rean for- his strictures upon it—we may see that he ascribes to stitutes. it consequences which it will not fairly carry. He himself the
nee re for WMpugns it as if it excluded philosophy and argu- all, Coun. mentative scrutiny: whereas, on the contrary, it is the fer-Propos! only basis upon which philosophy or “reasoned truth”
formula. can stand. Whoever denies the Protagorean auto- 1 Plato, Pheedrus, p. 271 D-E ; compare 268 A.
CHaP. XXVIII. INFALLIBILITY ASSUMED.
149
nomy of the individual judgment, must propound as his counter theory some heteronomy, such as he (the denier) approves. If I am not allowed to judge of truth and falsehood for myself, who is to Judge for me? Plato, in the Treatise De Legibus, answers very unequivocally :—assuming to himself that infallibility which I have already characterised as the prerogative of King Nomos: “I, the lawgiver, am the judge for all my citizens: you must take my word for what is true or false: you shall hear nothing except what my censors approve—and if, nevertheless, any dissenters arise, there are stringent penalties in store for them”. Here is an explicit enunciation of the Counter-Proposi- tion,’ necessary to be maintained by those who deny the Prota- gorean doctrine. If you pronounce a man unfit to be the measure of truth for himself, you constitute yourself the measure, in his place: either directly as lawgiver—or by nominating censors according to your own judgment. As soon as he is de- clared a lunatic, some other person must be appointed to manage his property for him. You can only exchange one individual judgment for another. You cannot get out of the region of individual judgments, more or fewer in number : the King, the Pope, the Priest, the Judges or Censors, the author of some book, or the promulgator of such and such doctrine. The infallible measure which you undertake to provide, must be found in some person or persons—if it can be found at all: in some person selected by yourself—that-is, in the last result, yourself.?
1 Professor Ferrier’s Institutes of Metaphysic exhibit an excellent ex- ample of the advantages of setting forth explicitly the Counter-Proposi- tion—that which an author intends to deny, as well as the Proposition which he intends to affirm and prove.
2 Aristotle says (Ethic. Nikomach. ΣΧ. 1176, a. 15) δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι, τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. ‘That is, which appears to be in the judgment of the wise or virtuous man.” The ultimate appeal is thus acknowledged to be, not to an abstraction, but to some one or more individual persons whom Aristotle recognises as wise. That is truth which this wise man declares to be truth. You cannot escape from the Relative by any twist of reasoning.
What Platonic critics call ‘'‘ Der
Gegensatz des Seins und des Scheins” (see Steinhart, EFinleit. zum Thezetét. p. 37) is unattainable. All that is attain- able is the antithesis between that which appears to one person, and that which appears to one or more others, choose them as you will: between that which appears at a first glance, or ata distance, or on careless inspec- tion—and that which appears after close and multiplied observations and comparisons, after full discussion, &c. Das Sein is that which appears to the
rson or persons whom we judge to
e wise, under these latter favourable circumstances.
Epiktétus, i. 28, 1. Τί ἔστιν αἴτιον τοῦ συγκατατίθεσθαίτινι; Τὸ φαίνεσθαι ὅτι ὑπάρχει. Ty οὖν φαινομένῳ ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει, συγκατατίθεσθαι οὐχ οἷόν Te.
150
THEATETOUS. Cuap. XXVIIL.
It is only when the Counter-Proposition to the Protagorean
formula is explicitly brought out, that the full mean-
the Prota- ing of that formula can be discerned. If you deny gorean for: it, the basis of all free discussion and scrutiny is seen When withdrawn: philosophy, or what is properly called plicitly the reasoned truth, disappears. In itself it says little.
position Yet little as its positive import may seem to be, it Unpoou- clashes with various illusions, omissions, and exigen- larity of the cies, incident to the ordinary dogmatising process. Frotago- Τὺ substitutes the concrete in place of the abstract— mula—Most the complete in place of the elliptical. Instead of sist upon ‘Truth and Falsehood, which present to us the Abstract making 4, and impersonal as if it stood alone—the Objective ameasure divested of its Subject—we are translated into the real for others, _. world of beliefs and disbeliefs, individual believers and eal to disbelievers: matters affirmed or denied by some Abstrac- Subject actual or supposable—by you, by me, by him
or them, perhaps by all persons within our know-
ledge. All men agree in the subjective fact, or in the mental states called belief and disbelief; but all men do not agree in the matters believed and disbelieved, or in what they speak of as Truth and Falsehood. No infallible objective mark, no common measure, no canon of evidence, recognised by all, has yet been found. What is Truth to one man, is not truth, and is often Falsehood, to another : that which governs the mind as infallible authority in one part of the globe, is treated with indifference or contempt elsewhere.! Each man’s belief, though in part deter-
1 Respecting the grounds and con- ditions of belief among the Hindoos, Sir William Sleeman bles and
very egregious absurdity quoted from these books, he replies withthe greatest naiveté in the world, ‘Is it not written
Recollections of an Indian Official, ch. xxvi. vol. i. pp. 226-228) observes as
follows :—
‘‘Every word of this poem (the Ramaen, Ramayana) the people assured me was written, if not by the hand of the Deity himself, at least by his inspiration, which was the same thing, and it must consequently be true. Ninety-nine out of a hundred, among the Hindoos, implicitly believe, not only every word of this poem, but every word of every poem that has ever been written in rit. If you ask @ man whether he really believes any
in the book; and how should it be there written if not true?’ ... The greater the improbability, the more monstrous and preposterous the fic-. tion, the ter is the charm that it has over their minds ; and the greater their learning in the Sanscrit, the more are they under the influence of this charm. Believing all to be written by the Deity, or by his inspirations, and the men and thi of former days to have been very different from the men and things of the present day, and the heroes of these fables to have been demigods, or people en-
βαρ. XXVIII. CAUSES OF BELIEF VARIABLE. 151
mined by the same causes as the belief of others, is in part also determined by causes peculiar to himself. When a man speaks of Truth, he means what he himeelf (along with others, or singly, as the case may be) believes to be Truth ; unless he expressly superadds the indication of some other persons believing in it.
This is the reality of the case, which the Protagorean formula brings into full view ; but which most men dislike to recognise, and disguise from themselves as well as from others in the common elliptical forms of speech. In most instances a believer entirely forgets that his own mind is the product of a given time and place, and of a conjunction of circumstances always peculiar, amidst the aggregate of mankind—for the most part narrow. He cannot be content (like Protagoras) to be a measure for himself and for those whom his arguments may satisfy. This would be to proclaim what some German critics denounce as Subjectivism.
dowed with powers far superior to These authors both say, that the those of the ordinary men of their Protagorean canon, Rroperly under- own day, the analogies of nature are is right, bu Protagoras never for a moment considered; nor laid it down wrongly. They admit do questions of probability, or possi- the principle of Subjectivity, as an bility, according to those analogies, essential aspect of the case, in regard ever obtrude to dispel the charm with to truth; but they say that oras which they are so pleasingly bound. was wrong in appealing They go on through life and empirical, accidental, subjectivity of talking of these monstrous fictions, each man at Overy varying moment, which shock the taste and under- whereas he ought standing of other nations, without an ideal or universal subjectivity. once nestioning the truth οἵ one “ What ought to be μοὶ bre right, single incident, or hearing ues- »” (8a wegler) ‘‘ mus tioned. There was a time, and βου ἃ do tices not very distant, when it was the same far forth as a ratio and in nd and in every other Euro- being. Now my think my reason, pean nation; and there are, I am is not some specially belonging afraid, some parts of Europe where to me, but some common to it is so still. But the Hindoo faith, rational beings, something universal; so far as religious questions are con- so far therefore as I proceed as a cerned, is not more capacious or absurd rational and thinking person, my sub- than t of the Greeks and Romans jectivity is an universal subjectivity. in the days of Sokrates and Cicero; Every thi person has the con- the only difference is, that among the sciousness that what he regards as Hindoos a greater number of the right, duty, good, evil, &c., presents questions which interest mankind are itself not merely to him as such, but brought under the head of religion.” also to every rational person, and that, 1This is the objection en by consequently, his judgment possesses Schwegler, Prantl, and other German the character of universality, universal inkers, i Protagorean doc- validity: in one word, Objectivity.” trine (Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, vol. i. Here it is explicit! asserted, that . 12 seq.; Schwegler, Gesch. der wherever a number of individual men hilos. im Umrisa. s. 11, b. p. 26, ed. employ their reason, the specialities of Sth). I had transcribed from each of each disappear, and they arrive at the these works a e of some length, same conclusions—Reason being a but I cannot find room for them in guide impersonal as well as infallible. this note. d this same view is expressed by
152 THEATETUS. Cuap. XX VITIL
He insists upon constituting himself—or some authority wor- shipped by himself—or some abstraction interpreted by himself— a measure for all others besides, whether assentient or dissentient. That which he believes, all ought to believe.
This state of mind in reference to belief is usual with most men, not less at the present day than in the time of Plato and Protagoras. It constitutes the natural intolerance prevalent among mankind ; which each man (speaking generally), in the case of his own beliefs, commends and exults in, asa virtue. It flows as a natural corollary from the sentiment of belief, though it may be corrected by reflection and social sympathy. Hence the doctrine of Protagoras—equal right of private judgment to each man for himself—becomes inevitably unwelcome.
We are told that Demokritus, as well as Plato and Aristotle, Aristotle wrote against Protagoras. The treatise of Demokritus failed in his is lost: but we possess what the two latter said against
attempts to Α refutethe the Protagorean formula. In my judgment both
Prantl in other language, when he
reforms the Protagorean doctrine by
saying, ‘‘Das Denken ist der Mass der e 9
Ὁ me this assertion appears so
both of them keep in the saye obscurity of ana on—‘* Das Denken”— the Universal Reason. Protagoras re- cognises in each dissentient an equal right to exercise his own reason, and
distinctly at variance with notorious facts, that I am surprised when I find it advanced by learned historians of philosophy, who recount the very facts which contradict it. noe εν really be necessary to re Θ reason 0 one man differs most materially from that of another—and the reason of the same person from itself, at different times—in respect of the arguments ac- cepted, the authorities obeyed, the con- clusions embraced? The imperso Reason is a mere fiction ; the universal Reason is an abstraction, belonging alike to all particular reasoners, con- sentient or dissentient, sound or un- sound, &c. Schwegler admits the Pro- rean canon only under a reserve which nullifies its meaning. To say that the Universal Reason is the mea- sure of truth is to assign no measure at all. The Universal n can only make itself known through an inter- reter. The interpreters are dissen- ient; and which of them is to hold the privilege of infallibility? Neither Schwegler nor Prantl are forward to specify who the interpreter is, who is entitled to put dissentients to silence ;
to judge for himself. order to show how thoroughly
incorrect the lan e of Schwegler and Prantl is, when they talk about the Universal Reason as unanimousand unerring, I transcribe from another emi- nent historian of philosophy a descrip- tion of what philosophy been from ancient times down to the present.
Degérando, Histoire Comparée des Systemes de Philosophie, vol. i. p
nal 48:—‘‘ Une multitude d’hypothéses,
élevées en quelque sorte au hasard, et rapidement détruites; une diversité d’opinions, d’autant plus sensible que la philosophie a été plus développee ; des sectes, des partis méme, des dis- putes interminables, des spéculations stériles, des erreurs maintenues et transmises par une imitation aveugle ; quelques decouvertes obtenues avec lenteur, et mélangées d’idées fausses ; des réformes annoncées ἃ chaque sitcle et jamais accomplies ; une succession de doctrines qui se renversent les unes les autres sans pouvoir obtenir plus de solidité ; la raison humaine ainsi pro- menée dans un triste cercle de vicissi- tudes, et ne s’élevant & quelques épo-
σμαρ. XXVIII. RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 153
Protago- rean for- mulan— very reader of Aristotle the right of e 0 oxamnini for himself Aristotle’s
failed in refuting it. Each of them professed to lay down objective, infallible, criteria of truth and false- hood : Democritus on his side, and the other dogma- tical philosophers, professed to do the same, each in his own way—and each in a different way. Now the Protagorean formula neither allows nor disallows any one of these proposed objective criteria: but it , enunciates the appeal to which all of them must be trath. submitted—the subjective condition of satisfying the judgment of each hearer. Its protest is entered only when that condition is overleaped, and when the dogmatist enacts his canon of belief as imperative, peremptory, binding upon all (allgemeingultig) both assentient and dissentient. Iam grateful to Aristotle for his efforts to lay down objective canons in the research of truth ; but I claim the right of examining those canons for myself, and of judging whether that, which satisfied Aristotle, satisfies me also. The same right which I claim for myself, I am bound to allow to all others. The general expression of this compromise is, the Protagorean formula. No one demands more emphatically to be a measure for himself, even when all authority is opposed to him, than Sokrates in the Platonic Gorgias.?
After thus criticising the formula—Homo Mensura—Plato proceeds to canvass the other doctrine, which he pists oxa- ascribes to Protagoras along with others, and which mination of
he puts into the mouth of Thestétus—“ That know- doctrine—
ques fortunées que pour retomber bientét dans de nouveaux écarts, ὥς. . « - les mémes questions, enfin, qui
érent il y a plus de vingt siécles es premiers génies de la Gréce, agitées encore ajourd'hui aprés tant de volu- mineux écrits consacrés & les discuter”.
1 Plutarch, adv. Kolot. p. 1108. According to Demokritus all sensible perceptions were conventional, or varied according to circumstances, or accord- ing to the diversity of the percipient Subject; but there was an objective reality—minute, solid, invisible atoms, differing in figure, position, and move- ment, and vacuum along with them. Such reality was intelligible only by ἢ. Νόμῳ γλυκύ, νόμῳ πικρόν, νόμῳ θερμόν, νόμῳ ψυχρόν, νόμῳ χροιή" ἑτέῃ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν. “Amep νομί- ζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητά,
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατὰ ἁληθείαν ταῦτα" ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄτομα μόνον καὶ κένον.
Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii, 135-139; Diog. Laert. ix. 72. See Mullach, Democriti Fragm. pp. 204-208,
The discourse of Protagoras Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος, was road by Porphyry, who apparently ci rom a Θ verbatim, which citation Eusebius un- fortunately has not preserved (Kuse- bius, Prepar. Evang. x. 3, 17). One of the speakers in Porphyry’s dialogue (describing a repast at the house of Longinus at Athens to celebrate Plato’s birthday) accused Plato of having copied largely from the argu- ments of tagoras—mpis τοὺς ἐν τὸ ὃν εἰσάγοντας. Allusion is probably made to the Platonic dialogues Par- menides and Sophistes.
2 Plato, Gorgias, p. 472.
154
That know- ledge is Sen- sible Per- ception. He adverts to sensible facts which are different with diffe- rent Per- cipients.
THEATETOUS. CuaP. XXVIII.
ledge is sensible perception”. He connects that doc- trine with the above-mentioned formula, by illus- trations which exhibit great divergence between one percipient Subject and another. He gives us, as examples of sensible perception, the case of the wind, cold to one man, not cold to another: that of the wine, sweet to a man in health, bitter if he be sickly.?
Perhaps Protagoras may have dwelt upon cases like these, as best calculated to illustrate the relativity of all affirmations: for though the judgments are in reality both equally relative, whether two judges pronounce alike, or whether they pronounce differently, under the same conditions—yet where they judge differently, each stands forth in his own individuality, and the relativity of the judgment is less likely to be disputed.
But though some facts of sense are thus equivocal, generating
Such is not
Θ case with all the facts of sense. The conditions of unani- mity are best found among se- lect facts of sense— weighing, measuring, &c.
dissension rather than unanimity among different individuals—such is by no means true of the facts of sense taken generally.? On the contrary, it is only these facts—the world of reality, experience, and particulars—which afford a groundwork and assurance of unanimity in human belief, under all varieties of teaching or locality. Counting, measuring, weighing, are facts of sense simple and fundamental, and com- parisons of those facts: capable of being so exhibited that no two persons shall either see them differently
or mistrust them. Of two persons exposed to the same wind, one may feel cold, and the other not: but both of them will see the barometer or thermometer alike. Πάντα μέτρῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ
1 Plato, Theetét. pp. 2 Aristotle (Metaphysic. I. ἃ. 25 seq.) in arguing against Hera- kleitus and his followers, who dwelt upon τὰ αἱσ and undefin
ϑητὰ as ever fluctuating
152 A, 159 C.
oO one or other about αἰσθητὰ generally
you ought to predicate constancy and unchangeability, not flux and varia- tion, since the former predicates are true of much the larger proportion of
6, urges against them αἰσθητά. See the Scholia on the above
that this is not true of all αἰσθητά, but only of those in the sublunary region of the Kosmos. But this region is (he says) only an imperceptibly. small part of the entire Kosmos; the objects in the vast superlunary or celestial region of the Kosmos were far more numerous, and were also eternal and unchange- able, in constant and uniform circu
rotation. Accordingly, if you predicate
passage of Aristotle's Metaphysica, and also upon Book A, 991, a. 9.
3 Mr. Campbell, in his Preface to the Thezxtétus (p. ixxxiii. » while com- paring the points in the dialogue with modern metaphysical views, observes. ‘‘Modern Experimental Science is equajly distrustful of individual im- pressions of sense, but has found means of meas the motions by which
CONSTANT FACTS OF SENSE. 155
παρ. XXVIII.
καὶ oraOuo—would be the perfection of science, if it could be obtained. Plato himself recognises, in more than one place, the irresistible efficacy of weight and measure in producing unani- mity ; and in forestalling those disputes which are sure to arise where weight and measure cannot be applied! It is therefore among select facts of sense, carefully observed and properly com- pared, that the groundwork of unanimity is to be sought, so far as any rational and universal groundwork for it is attainable. In other words, it is here that we must seek for the basis of
knowledge or cognition.
A loose adumbration of this doctrine is here given by Plato as
the doctrine of Protagoras, in the words—Knowledge is sensible perception. To sift this doctrine is an- nounced as his main purpose ;? and we shall see how he performs the task. Sokr.—Shall we admit, that when we perceive things by sight or hearing, we at the same time know them all? talk to us in a strange language, are we to say that we do not hear what they say, or that we both hear
they are caused, through the effect of the same motions upon other things besides ‘our senses. When the same wind is blowing one of us feels warm and another cold (Thezxtét. p. 152), but the mercury of the thermometer tells the same tale to all. And though the individual consciousness remains the sole judge of the exact impression momentarily received by each person et we are certain that the sensation of eat and cold, like the expansion and contraction of the mercury, is in every case dependent on a universal law.”
It might seem from Mr. Campbell’s language (I do not imagine that he means it so) as if Modern Experi- mental Science had arrived at some- thing more trustworthy than “‘indi- vidual impressions of sense”. But the expansion or contraction of the mercury are just as much facts of sense as the feeling of heat or cold ; only they are facts of sense determinate and uniform to all, whereas the feeling of heat or cold is indeterminate and liable to differ with different persons. The certainty about “‘ universal law govern- ing the sensations of heat and cold,” was not at all felt in the days of
ato.
ents
of Sokrates
in examin- this
uestion. ve ce
between one man and another arises, not merely from different
When foreigners
1 Thus in the Philébus (pp. 55-66) Plato declares that numbering, measur- ing, and weighing, are the characteristic marks of all the various processes which deserve the name of Arts; and that
‘among the different Arts those of the
carpenter, builder, &c., are superior to those of the physician pilot, husband- man, military commander, musical com- poser, &c., because the two first-named employ more measurement anda greater number of measuring instruments, the rule, line, plummet, com , ἄς.
** When we talk about iron or silver” (says Sokratés in the Platonic Phedrus,
. 268 A-B) ‘we are all of one mind,
ut when we talk: about the Just and the Good we are all at variance with each other, and each man is at variance with himself”. Compare an analogous passage, Alkibiad. i. p. 109.
Here Plato himself recognises the verifications of sense as the main guarantee for accuracy ; and the com- pared facts of sense, when select and simplified, as ensuring the nearest ap- proach to unanimity among believers.
2 Plato, Thextét. p. 163 A. cis yap τοῦτό πον πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινε, καὶ τούτον χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν.
THEATETUS. Cuar. XXVIIL impress!- and know it? When unlettered men look at an bility, but inscription, shall we contend that they do not see the and sso. WYiting, or that they both see and know it? Theatét. ciative ,, —We shall say, under theee supposed circumstances,
that what we see and hear, we also know. We hear and we know the pitch and intonation of the foreigner’s voice. The unlettered man sees, and also knows, the colour, size, forms, of the letters. But that which the schoolmaster and the inter- preter could tell us respecting their meaning, that we neither see, nor hear, nor know. Sokr.—Excellent, Thestétus. I have nothing to say against your answer.!
This is an important question and answer, which Plato unfortunately does not follow up. It brings to view, though without fully unfolding, the distinction between what is really perceived by sense, and what is inferred from such perception : either through resemblance or through conjunctions of past ex- perience treasured up in memory—or both together. Without having regard to such distinction, no one can discuss satisfactorily the question under debate.* Plato here abandons, moreover,
1 Plato, Thesetét. Ὁ. 163 C. 81 borrow here a striking passage from Dugald Stewart, which illustrates both the passage in Plato’s text, and the general question as to the relativity Cogn p nition. ptiere, the fact of relative ition is bro out most conspi- cuously on its intellectual side, not on its perceptive side. The fact of sense is the same to all, and therefore, though really relative, has more the look of an absolute; but the mental associa- tions with that fact are different with different persons, and therefore are more obviously and palpably relative. —Dugald Stewart, First Prelimii Dissertation to Encycloped. Britan- nica, PP. 66, 8th ed.
“To this reference of the sensation of colour to the external object, I can think of nothing so analogous as the feelings we experience in surveying a library of boo We speak of the volumes piled up on its shelves as treasures or magazines of the knowledge of past ages ; and contemplate them with gratitude and reverence as inex- haustible sources of instruction and de-
ight to the mind. Even in looking at a e of print or manuscript, we are apt to say that the ideas we acquire
are received by the sense of sight; and we are scarcely conscious of a metaphor when we apply this language. On such occasions we seldom recollect that no- thing is perceived by the eye but a multitude of black strokes drawn upon white paper, and that it is our own ac- qu habits which communicate to ese strokes the whole of that - cancy whereby they are disti hed from the unmeaning scrawling of an infant. The knowledge which we con- ceive to be preserved in books, like the fragrance of a rose, or the gilding of the clouds, depends, for its existence on the relation between the object and the percipient mind : and the only dif- ference between the two cases is, that in the one, this relation is the local and temporary effect of conventional habits: in the other, it is the universal and the unchangeable work of nature. . . What has now been remarked with res to written characters, may be ex ended very nearly anguage. en we listen to the discourse of a public speaker, eloquence and persuasion seem to issue from his lips; and we are little aware that we ourselves infuse the soul into every word thatheutters. The case is exactly the same when we enjoy the
Crap. XXVIIL EKNOWLEDGE I8 NOT PERCEPTION. 157
the subjective variety of impression which he had before noticed as the characteristic of sense :—({the wind which blows cold, and the wine which tastes sweet, to one man, but not to another). Here it is assumed that all men hear the sounds, and see the written letters alike: the divergence between one man and another arises from the different prior condition of percipient minds, differing from each other in associative and reminiscent power.
Sokrates turns to another argument. If knowledge be the same thing as sensible perception, then it follows, 4 ument— that so soon as a man ceases to see and hear, he also That sen- ceases to know. The memory of what he has seen or ception does
heard, upon that supposition, is not knowledge. But pot incinde Theetétus admits that a man who remembers what Probability he has seen or heard does know it. Accordingly, the that those answer that knowledge is sensible perception, cannot ‘he doctrine be maintained.! include
Here Sokrates makes out a good case against the “°"°™ answer in its present wording. But we may fairly doubt whether those who affirmed the matter of knowledge to consist in the facts of sense, ever meant to exclude memory. They meant pro- bably the facts of sense both as perceived and as remembered ; though the wording cited by Plato does not strictly include so much. Besides, we must recollect, that Plato includes in the meaning of the word Knowledge or Cognition an idea of perfect infallibility: distinguishing it generically from the highest form of opinion. But memory is a fallible process : sometimes quite trustworthy—under other circumstances, not so. Accordingly, memory, in a general sense, cannot be put on a level with present perception, nor said to generate what Plato calls knowledge.
The next argument of Plato is as follows. You can see, and not see, the same thing at the same time: for you Argument may close one of your eyes, and look only with the from the other. But it is impossible to know a thing, and not seein οἵ
conversation of a friend. We ascribe such cases the words spoken contribute
the charm entirely to his voice and ac- to the intellectual and moral effect, I
cents ; but without our oo operation, its have elsewhere endeavoured to show.” cy would vanis ow very sinal
the comparative proportion is, whichin 7 Plato, Thesetét. pp. 168, 164.
168 THEATETUS. Cuap. XXVIIL not seeing to know it, at the same time. Therefore to know is at the same |
time. not the same as fo see.)
This argument is proclaimed by Plato as a terrible puzzle, leaving no escape.? Perhaps he meant to speak ironically. In reality, this puzzle is nothing but a false inference deduced from a false premiss. The inference is false, because if we grant the premiss, that it is possible both to see a thing, and not to see it, at the same time—there is no reason why it should not also be possible to know a thing, and not to know it, at the same time. Moreover, the premiss is also false in the ordinary sense which the words bear: and not merely false, but logically impossible, asa sin against the maxim of contradiction. Plato procures it from a true premiss, by omitting an essential qualification. I see an object with my open eye: I do not see it with my closed eye. From this double proposition, alike intelligible and true, Plato thinks himself authorised to discard the qualification, and to tell me that I see a thing and do not see it—passing ἃ dtcto secundum quid ad dictum stmpliciter. This is the same liberty which he took with the Protagorean doctrine. Protagoras having said— “Every thing which any man believes is true to that man”— Plato reasons against him as if he had said—“ Every thing which any man believes is true”.
1 Plato, Thesetét. Ὁ. 165 B. (Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Thest. pp. 12-
2 Plato, Toews p. 165 B. τὸ δεινό- τατον ἐρώτημα---ἀφύκτῳ ἐρωτήματι, ὅζο.
Mr. Campbell observes upon this passage :— Perhaps there is here a race of thespirit which was afterwards developed in the sophisms of Eubu- lidés”. Stallbaum, while acknowledg- ing the many subtleties of Sokrates in this dialogue, complains that other commentators make the ridiculous mis- take (“‘errore perquam ridiculo”) of accepting all the reasoning of Sokrates as seriously meant, whereas much of it (he says) is mere mockery and sar- casm, intended to retort upon the So- phists their own argumentative tricks and quibbles.—“‘ Itaqua seepe per petu- lantiam quandam argutiis indulget (Socrates), quibus isti haudquaquam abstinebant; ssepd ex adversariorum mente disputat, sed ita tamen disputat, ut eos suis ipsorum capiat ueis ; seeped denique in disputando iisdem artificiis utitur, quibus illi uti con- sueverant, sicuti etiam in Menone, Cratylo, Euthydemo, fieri meminimus”.
18, 22-29).
Stallbaum pushes this general prin- ciple so far as to contend that the simile of the waxen tablet (p. 191 and that of the pigeon house . 200 are doctrines of opponents, which So- krates pretends to adopt with a view to hold them up to ridicule.
I do not concur in this opinion of Stallbaum, which he reproduces in commenting on many other dialogues, and especially on the Kratylus, for the purpose of exonerating Plato from the reproach of bad reasoning and bad etymology, at the cost of opponents “inauditi et indefensi”. see no
und for believing that Plato meant
bring forward these arguments as paralogisms obviously and ridiculously silly. He produced them, in my jucdg- ment, as suitable items in a ogue of search : plausible to a certain exten admitting both of being supported an opposed, and necessary to be presented to those who wish to know a question in all its bearings.
Cuap. XXVIIL
UNTENABLE OBJECTIONS.
159
Again, argues Plato,! you cannot say—I know sharply, dimly, near, far, &c.—but you may properly say, I see sharply, dimly, near, far, &c.: another reason to show that knowledge and sensible perception are not the same. After a digression of some length directed against the disciples of Herakleitus—(partly to expose their fundamental doctrine that every thing was in flux and movement, partly to satirise their irrational procedure in evading argumentative debate, and in giving nothing but a tissue of mystical riddles one after another),? Sokrates returns back to the same debate, and produces more serious arguments, as
follows :—
Sokr.—If you are asked, With what does a man perceive white
and black? you will answer, with his eyes: shrill or grave sounds? with his ears. Does it not seem to you more correct to say, that we see through our eyes rather than with our eyes :—that we hear through our ears, not with our ears. Theetét.—I think it is more
1 Plato, Thesetét. p. 165 Ὁ. The here given by Plato from the mouth of Sokrates, are compared by Steinhart to the Trug-schliisse, whic in the Euthydémus he ascribes to that Sophist and Dionysodorus. But Stein- hart says that Plato is here reasoning in the style of Protagoras: an assertion thoroughly gratuitous, for which there is no evidence at all (Steinhart, Ein- leitung zum Theetét. p. 53).
2 Plato, Thesetét. pp. 179-188. The description which we read here (put into the mouth of the geometer Theo- dérus) of the persons oth Ionia, w
in the vein of Herakleitus—ts full of vivid fancy and smartness, but is for that reason the less to be as accurate.
The characteristic features ascribed to these Herakleiteans are quite unlike to the features of Pro ras, so far as we know them; tho Protagoras, nevertheless, throughout this dialogue, is spoken of as if he were an Hera- klei . These men are here depicted as half mad—incapable of continuous attention—hating all systematic speech and debate — answering, when ad- dressed, only in brief, symbolical, enig- matical phrases, of which they had 8, quiver-full, bat which they never condescended to explain (ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέ- τρας ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγματώδη ἀνασπῶντες
Sokrates maintains that we do not see with our eyes, but that the mind sees through the
ἀποτοξεύουσιν, see Lassalle, vol. i. pp.
82. ringing up by spontaneous inspiration, despis instruction, p. 180 A), and each looking down upon
orant. It we com-
the others as i ot ven by Plato
pare the picture thus of the Herakleitean th the picture which he gives of tagoras in the dialogue so called, we shall see that the two are as unlike as ible.
in his elaborate work on
é, ’ the philosophy of Herakleitas, attempts
to establish the philosophical affinity between Herakleitus and Protagoras: but in my judgment unsuccessfully. According to LassalJle’s own representa- tion of the doctrine of Herakleitus, it is altogether opposed to the most eminent Protagorean doctrine, Ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτῷ uérpov—and equally opposed to that which Plato seems to imply as Prota- gorean — Αἴσθησις ="Emorjuy. The elucidation given by Lassalle of Hera- kleitus, through the analogy of Hegel, is certainly curious and instructive. The Absolute Process of Heraklvitus is at variance with Protagoras, not less than the Absolute Object or Substra- tum of the Eleates, or the Absolute Ideas of Plato. Lassalle admits that Herakleitus is the entire antithesis
to Protagoras, yet still contends that he is the prior stage of transition towards tagoras (vol. i. p. 64).
160 THEATETUS. Chap. XXVIIL
es: that correct. Sokr.—It would be strange if there were in the mind Ὸ each man many separate reservoirs, each for a distinct ceivesand class of perceptions.’ All perceptions must surely feces wltn. converge towards one common form or centre, call it ont they soul or by any other name, which perceives through bodily or- them, as organs or instruments, all perceptible ob- gen jects.—
We thus perceive objects of sense, according to Plato’s lan- guage, with the central form or soul, and through various organs of the body. The various Percepta or Percipienda of tact, vision, hearing—sweet, hot, hard, light—have each its special bodily organ. But no one of these can be perceived through the organ affected to any other. Whatever therefore we conceive or judge respecting any two of them, is not performed through the organ special to either. If we conceive any thing common both to sound and colour, we cannot conceive it either through the auditory or through the- visual organ.”
Now there are certain judgments (Sokrates argues) which we make common to both, and not exclusively belonging to either. First, we judge that they are two: that each is one, different from the other, and the same with itself: that each +s something, or has existence, and that one zs not the other. Here are pre- dicates — existence, non-existence, likeness, unlikeness, unity, plurality, sameness, difference, &c., which we affirm, or deny, not respecting either of these sensations exclusively, but respecting all of them. Through what bodily organ do we derive these judgments respecting what is common to all? There is no special organ : the mind perceives, through itself, these common properties.*
Some matters therefore there are, which the soul or mind Indication apprehends through itself—others, which it perceives judgments, through the bodily organs. To the latter class belong which the the sensible qualities, hardness, softness, heat, sweet- by itself— ness, &c., which it perceives through the bodily or-
1 Plato, Theetét. p. 184 D. δεινὸν 2 Plato, Thesstét. pp. 184-185.
Gp πον, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπε A «ς ἣν δονρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις byee. _3 Plato, Thesetet. p. 185 Da δοκεῖ τὴν θηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, ἀρχὴν οὐδ᾽ εἶναι τοιοῦτον ov ν τόντοις etre ψυχὴν εἶτε ὅ, τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα Be oars ἴδιον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις, GAA αὐτὴ ταῦτα ξυντείνει, ἢ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργά" πε αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινά μοι φαίνεται νων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά. Ρ .
CHap. XXVIII. KNOWLEDGE IS NOT SENSIBLE PERCEPTION. 161
gans; and which animals, as well as men, are by I It arceives nature competent to perceive immediately at birth. Difference, To the former class belong existence (substance, es- ὅδ sence), sameness, difference, likeness, unlikeness, honourable, base, good, evil, &c., which the mind apprehends through itself alone. But the mind is not competent to apprehend this latter class, as it perceives the former, immediately at birth. Nor does such competence belong to all men and animals; but only to a select fraction of men, who acquire it with difficulty and after a long time through laborious education. The mind arrives at these purely mental apprehensions, only by going over, and comparing with each other, the simple impressions of sense; by looking at their relations with each other; and by computing the future from the present and past.1. Such comparisons and com- putations are a difficult and gradual attainment ; accomplished only by a few, and out of the reach of most men. But without them, no one can apprehend real existence (essence, or sub- stance), or arrive at truth: and without truth, there can be no knowledge.
The result therefore is (concludes Sokrates), That knowledge is not sensible perception: that it is not to be found in the perceptions of sense themselves, which do not appre- tains hend real essence, and therefore not trath—but in the {hat know- comparisons and computations respecting them, and be found, in the relations between them, made and appre- Sensible hended by the mind itself? Plato declares good Perceptions and evil, honourable and base, &c, to be among but in the matters most especially relative, perceived by the and compa.
Sokrates main
1 Plato, Thestét. p. 186 B. ν δέ παραγίγνηται. γέ οὐσίαν καὶ ὃ τι ἔστον καὶ 3 Plato, Thesetét. p. 186 C. ἐν μὲν softness) καὶ coals (Of bardnges ond ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἕνι ἐπιστήμη, τιότητος, ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπανιοῦσα ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων σνλ- καὶ ἔνμβ λλονσα πρὸς ἃ λ- λογεσμ ° οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ληλα κρίνειν πειρᾶται ἡμῖν. we axed δὲ μέν! ὡς οἶκε, ἐυνατὸν ἅψασθαι, Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι Ao is hore interesting, before It tard φύσει “αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θη: Yoco $ od that interesting, ore it ἢ a ρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος © παθήματα ἐ ἐπὶ has. ived ¢ from ‘Ari a ae w
ν Wuxhy τείνει' ra δὲ περὶ τούτων Μτ. bell pins *t ownwards. ἀναλογίσματα, πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ cn Camp nivalott to jt, Properly as ὠφελείαν μόγις καὶ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ear. a 6n Ἂν 8, straction anc ΡΣ Banna cree δείας παραγίγνεται, ols ἂν καὶ P note, p. 144),
3—11
THEATETOUS. CHaP. XXVIIL tations of mind computing past and present in reference to them. Such is the doctrine which Plato here lays down, Examine respecting the difference between sensible perception, view— and knowledge or cognition. From his time to the Distinction resent day, the same topic has continued to be dis- views of —_ cussed, with different opinions on the part of philo- philoso- sophers. Plato's views are interesting, as far as his
language enables us to make them out. He does not agree with those who treat sensation or sensible perception (in his language, the two are not distinguished) as a bodily pheno- menon, and intelligence as a mental phenomenon. He regards both as belonging to the mind or soul. He considers that the mind is sentient as well as intelligent: and moreover, that the sentient mind is the essential basis and preliminary—universal among men and animals, as well as coeval with birth—furnish- ing all the matter, upon which the intelligent mind has to work. He says nothing, in this dialogue, about the three distinct souls or minds (rational, courageous, and appetitive), in one and the same body, which form so capital a feature in his Timzus and Republic: nothing about eternal, self-existent, substantial . Ideas, or about the pre-existence of the soul and its reminiscence as the process of acquiring knowledge. Nor does he countenance the doctrine of innate ideas, instinctive beliefs, immediate mental
intuitions, internal senses, &c.,
1 Plato, Thestét. p. 186 A. καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. Kat τούτων [οι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μά- λιστα πρ ς-͵ ἄλληλα σκοπεῖ- σθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογι ζο- μένη (ἡ ῥνχὴ) ἐν ἑαντῇ τὰ γεγο- νότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα πρὺς τὰ μέλλοντα.
Base and honourable, evil and good, are here pointed out by Sokrates as most evidently and emphatically re- lative. In the train of reasoning here
rminated to
declares fagorean |
Pro- formula ? That formula, 80 far from being refuted, is actually sus-
which have been recognised by
tained and established by this train of reaso Plato has d οὐσία, ἀληθεία, ἐναντιότης, ἀγαθόν, κακόν, &., to be a distinct class of Objects not perceived by Sense. But he also tells us that they are apprehended by the Mind through its own working, and that they are apprehended always in tion to each other. We thus see that they are just as much relative to the con piené mind, as the Objects of sense are to the perci| jent and sentient mind. The Subject is the correlative limit or measure (to use Pro rean hrases) of one as well as of the other. This confirms what I observed above, that the two doctrines, 1. Homo Men- σθησις ΞΞ ᾿Επιστήμη, —are combletel wdistinct and independent, though Plato has chosen to implicate or identify them.
Crap. XXVIII. DIFFERENT VIEWS OF PLATO. 163
many philosophers. Plato supposes the intelligent mind to work altogether upon the facts of sense ; to review and compare them with one another; and to compute facts present or past, with a view to the future. All this is quite different from the mental - intuitions and instincts, assumed by various modern philosophers as common to all mankind. The operations, which Plato as- cribes to the intelligent mind, are said to be out of the reach of the common man, and not to be attainable except by a few, with difficulty and labour. The distinctive feature of the sentient mind, according to him, is, that it operates through a special bodily organ of sense: whereas the intelligent mind has no such special bodily organ.
But this distinction, in the first place, is not consistent with Timzus—wherein Plato assigns to each of his three pie. ent human souls a separate and special region of the yews ἢ ven bodily organism, as its physical basis. Nor, in the in other second place, is it consistent with that larger range of ‘ialogues. observed facts which the farther development of physiology has brought to view. To Plato and Aristotle the nerves and the nervous system were wholly unknown : but it is now ascertained that the optic, auditory, and other nerves of sense, are only branches of a complicated system of, sensory and motory nerves, attached to the brain and spinal cord as a centre: each nerve of sense having its own special mode of excitability or manifesta- tion. Now the physical agency whereby sensation is carried on, is, not the organ of sense alone, but the cerebral centre acting along with that organ: whereas in the intellectual and memorial processes, the agency of the cerebral centre and other internal parts of the nervous system are sufficient, without any excite- ment beginning at the peripheral extremity of the special organ of sense, or even though that organ be disabled. We know the intelligent mind only in an embodied condition: that is, as working along with and through its own physical agency. When Plato, therefore, says that the mind thinks, computes, compares, &ec., by itself—this is true only as signifying that it does so without the initiatory stimulus of a special organ of sense ; not as signifying that it does so without the central nervous force or currents—an agency essential alike to thought, to sensation, to emotion, and to appetite.
164
THEATETUS.
CHap. XXVITL
Putting ourselves back to the Platonic period, we must recog-
latter.
nise that the discussion of the theory Ἐπιστήμη = Αἴσθησις, as it is conducted by Plato, exhibits a re- markable advance in psychological analysis. In ana- lysing the mental phenomena, Plato displayed much more subtlety and acuteness than his predecessors—as far at least as we have the means of appreciating the It is convenient to distinguish intellect from sensation (or sensible perception) and emotion, though both of them are essential and co-ordinate parts of our mental system, and are so recognised by Plato. It is also true that the discrimination of our sensations
from each other, comparisons of likeness or unlikeness between them, observation of co-existence or sequence, and apprehension of other relations between them, &c., are more properly classified as belonging to intellect than to sense. But the language of psychology is, and always has been, so indeterminate, that it is difficult to say how much any writer means to include under the terms Sense 1—Sensation—Sensible Perception—AtcOnors. The
1The discussion in pp. 184-185- 186 of the Theetétus is interesting as the earliest attempt remaining to classify peychologi phenomena. What Demokritus and others proposed with the same view—the analogy or discrepancy between τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι and τὸ voetv—we gather only from the brief notices of Aristotle and others. Plato considers himself to have established, that ‘‘ cognition is not to be sought at all in sensible
rception, but in that function, what- ever it be, which is predicated of the mind when it busies itself per se (i.e. not through any special ily organ) about existences” (p. 187 A). We may here remark, as to the ute between Plato and Protagoras, that Plato here does not at all escape from the region of the Relative, or from the Protagorean formula, Homo Mensura. He ses from Mind Percipient to Mind Gogitant: put these new ΤΟΝ cogitationis (as his language implies μὰ still relative, though relative to the Cogitant and not to the Percipient. He reduces Mind Sentient to the narrowest functions, including only each isolated impression of one or other among the five senses. When
we see a clock on the wall and hear it strike twelve—we have a visual im- pression of black from the hands, of white from the face, and an audible impression from each stroke. But this is all (according to Plato) which we have from sense, or which addresses itself to the sentient mind. All beyond this (according to him) is apprehended by the cogitant mind: all di
tion, comparison, and relation—such as the succession, or one, two, three, &c., of the separate impressions, the likeness of one stroke to the i
the contrast or dissimilarity of the black with the white—even the simplest acts of discri tion or
tt ltt te use rh com n ng ’s view
to mental powers beyond and apart from sense; much more, of course, ap- prehension of the common properties of all, and of those extreme abstractions to which we apply the words Ens and Non-Ens(ré τ᾽ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις͵ ᾧὶ τὸ ἔστιν ἐπονομάζξεις καὶ τὸ οὐκ
ἔστιν, Ὁ. .
When Plato thus narrows the sense of αἴσθησις, it is easy to prove that ἐπιστήμη is not αἴσθησις; but I doubt whether those who affirmed this pro- position intended what he here refutes.
Crap. XXVIII.
propos
ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY
165
itions in which our knowledge is embodied, affirm—not
sensations detached and isolated, but—various relations of ante-
Neither unreflect theorizers, would pressions of sense from such impressions be tinct one another, στα
Mr. John Stuart Mill observes εἰς,
men, nor early Ὦ the im-
Book i chap. iii. sects. 10-13
simplest of all relations are those ex. pressed by the words antecedent and consequent, and by the word simul- taneous. we say dawn preceded sunrise, the fact in which the two things dawn and sunrise were jointly
concerned, co only of the two things themselves. No thi thing en- te into the fact or phenomenon at
all, unless indeed we choose to call the succession of the two objects a third thing ; but their succession is not some- thing added to the things themselves, it is something involved in them. To have two feelings at all, implies having them either successively or simultaneously. The relations of succession and simul- taneity, of likeness and unlikeness, not being grounded on any fact or pheno- menon distinct from the related objects themselves, do not admit of the same kind of analysis. But these relations, though not 6 other relations) grounded on s of consciousness, are themselves states of consciousness. Resemblance is nothing but our feeling of resemblance: succession is nothing but yall ordisas of (aon theoris )
y all o non-theorising sons, these relations, ἀρ ἢ νδὰ in the facts of sense, are conceived as an essential of αἴσθησις : and are so conceived by those modern theorists who trace all our knowl to sense— as well as ( bably) by those ancient
αἴσθησις wid against whom Plato here αι σις, AN wnom ere reas0 _yhese theorists would have saic (as ordinary language recognises e see the dissimilarity of the black hands from the white face of the clock ; we hear the likeness of one stroke of the clock to another, and the suc- cession of the strokes one, two, three, one after the other”.
The reasoning of Plato against these opponents is thus open to many of the remarks made by Sir William Hamilton, in the notes to his edition of Reid’s works, upon Reid’s objections against Locke and Berkeley : Reid restricted the word Sensation to a much narrower
) tite—rdo ὁρεκτικόν, κινητικόν, &.
meaning than that given to it by Locke and Berkeley. ‘‘ Berkeley’s Sensation” (observes S. W. Hamilton) ‘“‘ was equi- valent to Reid’s Sensation plus Percep- tion. This is manifest even by the pas sages adduced in the text” (ἢ ). But Reid in his remar “omits notice this difference in the m of the same word. The case is similar with Plato when he refutes those who held the doctrine Ἐπιστήμη = Αἴσθησις. The last-mentioned word, in his con- struction, includes only a part of the meaning which they attributed to it; but be takes no notice of this verbal difference. Sir William Hamilton re- marks, respecting M. Royer Collard’s
doctrine, which narrows ously the province of Sense,—‘ Sense he so limits that, itt orously carried out, no sensible ion, as no conscious- ness, CO ΗΝ rought to bear”. This is exactly ween about Plato’s doctrine
narrowing αἴσθησις. See Hamilton’s edit. of Reid, "quderstands” ete
one un rig ore evin - αἰσθητικὴ ωὡή---8
a larger sphe oe th re than that which veh Plate assigns to them in the Thestétus. Aristotle the five se αἰσθήσεις, 680 correla wit
perceiving its ἴδιον ai
recognises ἡ κοινὴ αἰσθητὸν -commnon sensation or perception—correlat with h Cor perceiving) ra κοινὰ αἰσθητά, which are » rest, magnitude, figure, number. The κοινὴ αἴσθησις is not a distinct or sixth sense, apart from the
five, but a pone wer inhering in ‘roe them. discriminating recognises
αἴσθησις ja
comparing, kecwing: this ‘character:
istic, τὸ κριτικὸν and γνωστικόν, is common to αἴσθησις, φαντασία, νόησις, and distinguishes them all from om appe-
the first and second chapters of the third Book of the Treatise De Anima,
bor aiid And Sir William Heniltos adopis a similar view, when he remarks, that Judgment is implied in every act of Consciousness.
Occasionally indeed Aristotle parti- tions the soul between νοῦς and opefcs
166
THEAZTETUS.
Cuap. XXVIII.
cedence and consequence, likeness, difference, &c., between two or more sensations or facts of sense. We rise thus to a state of mind more complicated than simple sensation: including (along with sensation), association, memory, discrimination, comparison of sensations, abstraction, and generalisation. This is what Plato calls opinion! or belief; a mental process, which, though pre- supposing sensations and based upon them, he affirms to be carried on by the mind through itself, not through any special bodily organ. In this respect it agrees with what he calls know- ledge or cognition. Opinion or belief is the lowest form, possessed in different grades by all men, of this exclusively mental process: knowledge or cognition is the highest form of
—Intelligence and Appetite —recog- nising Sense as belo to the head of Intelligence — see De Motu Ani- malium, 6, p. 700, Ὁ. 20. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ νῷ χώραν ἔχουσι" κριτικ ἀρκάνται Sompare also the Topica,
4, p- 111, a 18.
It will thus be seen that while Plato severs pointedly αἴσθησις from anything like discrimination, compari- son, judgment, even in the most rudi- mentary form—Aristotle refuses to adopt this extreme abstraction as his basis for classifying the mental phe- nomena. He i a certain measure of discrimination, comparison, and judgment, as implicated in sen- sible perceptions. oreover, that which he calls κοινὴ αἴσθησις is un- known to Plato, who isolates each sense, and indeed each act of each sense, as much as possible. Aristotle is opposed, as Plato is, to the doctrine ᾿Επιστήμη = Αἴσθησις, but he employs a different manner of reasoning against it. See, inter alia, Anal. Poster. i. 31, p. 87, Ὁ. 28. He confines ἐπιστήμη to one branch of the vonrexy.
The Peripatetic Straton, the disciple of Theophrastus, denied that there was any distinct line of demarcation between τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι and τὸ νοεῖν : maintaining that the former was im- possible without a certain measure of the latter. His observation is very worthy of note. Plutarch, De Solertia nimalium, iii. δ, Ῥ. 961 A. Καίτοι Στράτων ε τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστίν, ἀποδεικνύων ὡς οὐδ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοπα- ράπαν ἄνεν τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει" καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλάκις ἐπιπυρενόμενα
ὄψει, καὶ λόγοι προσπίπτοντες τῇ ἀκοῇ διαλανθάνονυσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ δεα- φεύγονσι πρὸς ἐτέροις τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας" εἶτ᾽ αὖθις ἐπαν- HAQe καὶ μεταθεῖ καὶ μετα- διώκει τῶν προϊεμένων ἔκα- στον ἀναλέγόμενος'’ ἢ καὶ λέλεκται. Νοῦς opp, καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφρά-" ὡς τοῦ περὶ τὰ ὄμματα καὶ Gra πάθους, ἂν μὴ παρῇ τὸ φρονοῦν, αἵσ- θησιν οὐ ποιοῦντος.
Straton here notices that remarkable fact (unnoticed by Plato and even by Aristotle, so far as I know) in the process of association, that impressions of sense are sometimes ed when they occur, but force themselves upon the attention afterwards, and are re- called by the mind in the order in which they occurred at first.
1 Plato, Theset. p. 187 A. Sokr. ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν ye προβεβήκαμεν, Gore μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν (ἐπιστήμην) ἐν αἰσθήσει τοπαράπαν, GAA’ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, ὅ, τι mor’ ἔχει ἡ ψνχή, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα. Theat. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, δοξάζειν. Sokr. ᾿Ορθῶς yap ovet.
Plato is quite right in distinguishin between αἴσθησις and δόξα, looking a the point as a question of psycholo- gical classification. Ita rs to me,
owever, most probable that those who maintained the theory ‘Emorjpy = Αἴσθησις, made no such distinction, but included that which he calls δόξα in αἴσθησις. Unfortunately we do not possess their own exposition; but it cannot have included much of psycho-
τῇ logical analysis.
βαρ. XXVIII. KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION. 167
the same, attained only by a select few. Both opinion, and cognition, consist in comparisons and computations made by the mind about the facts of sense. But cognition (in Plato’s view) has special marks :— ‘
1. That it is infallible, while opinion is fallible. You have it or you have it not—but there is no mistake possible.
2. That it apprehends what Plato calls the real essence of things, and real truth, which, on the contrary, Opinion does not apprehend.
3. That the person who possesses it can maintain his own con- sistency under cross-examination, and can test the consistency of others by cross-examining them (λόγον δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι).
This at least is the meaning which Plato assigns to the two words corresponding to Cognition and to Opinion, in the present dialogue, and often elsewhere. But he also frequently employs the word Cognition in a lower and more general signification, not
1 Schlelermacher represents Plato as discriminating Knowledge (the on of infallibility, you either possess it or not) from on (the region of falli- bility, true or false, as the case may be) by a broad and impassable line—
*‘ Auch hieraus erwidchst eine sehr entscheidende, nur ebenfalls nicht aus- driicklich gene, Folgerung, dass die reine Erkenn gar nicht auf demselben Gebiet liegen kinne mit dem Irrthum—und es in Beziehung auf sie kein Wahr und Falsch ἔων sondern nur ein Haben oder Nicht Haben.” (Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Thezet. Ὁ. 176.
Stein (in his Einleit. zam Theat. p. 94) contests this opinion of Schieier- macher (though he seems to give the same opinion himself, p. . He thinks t Plato does not recognise so very marked a separation between Knowledge and Opinion: that he con- siders Knowledge as the last term of a series of mental processes, developed gradually according to constant laws, and ascending from Sensible Percep- tion through Opinion to Knowledge: that the purpose of the Thestétus is to illustrate this theory.
Ueberweg, on the contrary, defends the opinion of Schleiermacher and maintains that Steinhart is mistaken (Acehthelt und Zeit. Platon. Schriften, P Passages may be produced from
Plato's writings to port both these views: that ofs ele all 808, Ὁ.
Rody (nih ere epson Bert ous (W ere represents ’Emcon} as contrasted with ἔδξα. But I think that Steinhart ascribes to the Thesx- tétus more than can fairly be discovered in it. That dial is purely nega- tive. It declares t ἐπιστήμη is not αἴσθησις. It then attempts to go a step farther towards the tive, by de- claring also that ἐπιστήμη isa mental rocess of computation, respecting the
pressions of aic@yors—that it is τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι, which is equivalent to τὸ δοξάζειν : compare P , 249 B. Bat affirmative attempt breaks down: for Sokrates cannot explain what τὸ δοξάζειν is, nor how τὸ δοξάζειν Ψευδὴ is possible ; in fact he says (Ὁ. 200 B) that this cannot be explained until we know what ἐπιστήμη is. The entire result of the dialogue is nega- tive, as the closing wo proc emphatically. On this point many of the commentators agree—Ast, er, Stallbaum, Ueberweg, Zeller, &c.
Whether it be true, as Schleier- macher, with several others, thinks (Hin), pp. 184-185), that Plato intends
atteck Aristippus in the first part of the dialogue, and Antisthenes in the latter part, we have no means of determining.
168 THEXTETUS. Cuar. XXVIIL
restricted, as it is here, to the highest philosophical reach, with infallibility—but comprehending much of what is here treated only as opinion. Thus, for example, he often alludes to the various professional men as possessing Cognition, each in his respective department : the general, the physician, the gymnast, the steersman, the husbandman, &c.' But he certainly does not mean, that each of them has attained what he calls real essence and philosophical truths—or that any of them are infallible. ,
One farther remark must be made on Plato’s doctrine. His remark—That Cognition consists not in the affections not - of sense, but in computation or reasoning respecting nise Verl- —_ those affections, (i. 6. abstraction, generalisation, &.) from expe- —is both true and important. But he has not added, nor would he have admitted, that if we are to decide of sense, whether our computation is true and right, or false and erroneous—our surest way is to recur to the simple facts of sense. Theory must be verified by observation ; wherever that cannot be done, the best guarantee is wanting. The facts themselves are not cognition: yet they are the test by which all computations, pretending to be cogni- tions, must be tried.?
We have thus, in enquiring—What is Knowledge or Cogni- Second def. 100? advanced so far as to discover—That it does nition given not consist in sensible perception, but in some variety ὃν eee of that purely mental process which is called opining, Cognition believing, judging, conceiving, &c. And here Thee- right or true tétus, being called upon for a second definition, °P answers— That Knowledge consists an right or true opinion. All opinion is not knowledge, because opinion is often false.®
Sokr.—But you are here assuming that there are false opinions?
necessary or possible.
1 Compare Plato, Sophistes, pp. 282 observers respecting the lunar motions E, 233 A. were for some time not in harmony
2 See the remarks on the necessity with it. Plato certainly would not of Verification, as a guarantee forthe have surrendered any συλλογισμὸς Deductive Process, in Mr. John Stuart under the same respect to observed Mill's System of Logi Book iii. ch. xi. facts. Aristotle might probably have 8. an Newton } puts aside his own com done | neice heat οὶ uncertain. It ts
utation or theory respecting . exet. ! B.
a the force whi hich kept the moon in in scarcely possible to Rranslats δοξάζειν its orbit, because the facts reported by always by the same Englis
Cuap. XXVIII. KNOWLEDGE I8 RIGHT OPINION. 169
How is this possible? How can any man judge or
opine falsely? What mental condition is it which De chcates bears that name? I confess that I cannot tell: though <Thisde- I have often thought of the matter myself, and de- sumes that bated it with others.1 Every thing comes under the {here are head either of what a man knows, or of what he does nions. But not know. If he conceives, it must be either the false opi- known, or the unknown. He cannot mistake either ona be, one known thing for another known thing: or a Sow canwe known thing for an unknown : or an unknown for ἃ Non-Ens;or known : or one unknown for another unknown. But Sonfound to form a false opinion, he must err in one or other of *wo distinct these four ways. It is therefore impossible that he
can form a false opinion.*
If indeed a man ascribed to any subject a predicate which was non-existent, this would be evidently a false opinion. But how can any one conceive the non-existent? He who conceives must conceive something : just as he who sees or touches, must see or touch something. He cannot see or touch the non-existent : for that would be to see or touch nothing : in other words, not to see or touch at all. In the same manner, to conceive the non- existent, or nothing, is impossible.* Theet.—Perhaps he conceives two realities, but confounds them together, mistaking the one for the other. Sokr.—Imposesible. If he conceives two distinct realities, he cannot suppose the one to be the other. Suppose him to conceive. just and unjust, a horse and an ox—he can never believe just to be unjust, or the ox to be the horse.‘ If, again, he conceives one of the two alone and singly, neither could he on that hypothesis suppose it to be the other : for that would imply that he conceived the other also.
Let us look again in another direction (continues Sokrates). We have been hasty in our concessions. Is it really ᾿ impossible for a man to conceive, that a thing, which morial tab-
he knows, is another thing which he does not know ? vind, ae Let us see. Grant me the hypothesis (for the sake of which past
illustration), that each man has in his mind a waxen are engrav-
1 Plato, Theeet. p. 187 Ὁ. 3 Plato, Theeet. pp. 188-189. 2 Plato, Thest. p. 188. 4 Plato, Theeet. p. 190.
170 . THEATETUS. παρ. XXVIIL
ed. niente tablet—the wax of one tablet being larger, firmer, elte in cleaner, and better in every way, than that of another: lien Cdontltying the gift of Mnemosyné, for inscribing and registering een- our sensible perceptions and thoughts. Every man Fations with pastimpres- remembers and knows these, so long as the impres- sions. sions of them remain upon his tablet : as soon as they are blotted out, he has forgotten them and no longer knows them.’ Now false opinion may occur thus. A man having inscribed on his memorial tablet the impressions of two objects A and B, which he has seen before, may come to see one of these objects again ; but he may by mistake identify the present sensa- tion with the wrong past impression, or with that past impression to which it does not belong. Thus on seeing A, he may er- roneously identify it with the past impression B, instead of A: or vice versd.? False opinion will thus lie, not in the conjunction or identification of sensations with sensations—nor of thoughts (or past impressions) with thoughts—but in that of present sensa- tions with past impressions or thoughts.®
Having laid this down, however, Sokrates immediately pro- Sokrates re- ceeds to refute it. In point of fact, false conceptions futes this are found to prevail, not only in the wrong identi- Dilemma. _ fication of present sensations with past impressions or opinion is thoughts, but also in the wrong identification of one
possible, past impression or thought with another. Thus a man ma man, who has clearly engraved on his memorial tablet KNOW wat the conceptions of five, seven, eleven, twelve,—may know. nevertheless, when asked what is the sum of seven and five, commit error and answer eleven: thus mistaking eleven for twelve.
We are thus placed in this dilemma—Either false opinion is an impossibility :—Or else, it is possible that what a man knows, he may not know. Which of the two do you choose ?*
To this question no answer is given. But Sokrates,—after He draws remarking on the confused and unphilosophical man- distinction ner in which the debate has been conducted, both he
tween
possessing and Thestétus having perpetually employed the
1 Plato, Thext. p. 191 C. κήρινον ‘Plato, Thert. p. 196 C. νῦν δὲ ἐκμογεῖο ἥτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὴς δόξα, ἢ ἅ τις οἷδεν, 2 Plato, Theet. pp. 193-194. οἷον τε μὴ εἰδέναι" καὶ τούτων πότερα
3 Plato, Thezt. Ὁ. 195 D. αἱρεῖ;
Cuap. XXVIIL. ARE FALSE OPINIONS POSSIBLE ? 171
words know, knowledge, and their equivalents, as if per bine the meaning of the words were ascertained, whereas it actually the very problem debated is, to ascertain their mean- ginie of ing \—takes up another path of enquiry. He dis- the pigeon- tinguishes between possessing knowledge,—and having caught it actually in hand or on his person: which distinc- Pigeon ΕΟ tion he illustrates by comparing the mind to a pigeon- itand fying cage. A man hunts and catches pigeons, then turns them into the cage, within the limits of which they fly about : when he wants to catch any one of them for use, he has to go through a second hunt, sometimes very troublesome : in which he may perhaps either fail altogether, or catch the wrong one instead of the right. The first hunt Sokrates compares to the acquisition of knowledge : the second, to the getting it into his hand for use A man may know, in the first sense, and not know, in the second : he may have to hunt about for the cogni- tion which (in the first sense) he actually possesses. In trying to catch one cognition, he may confound it with another: and this constitutes false opinion—the confusion of two cognita one with another.®
Yet how can such a confusion be possible? (Sokrates here again replies to himself.) How can knowledge be- tray a man into such error? If he knows A, and Sokrates re- knows B—how can he mistake A for B? Upon Suggestion this supposition, knowledge produces the effect of tus—That ignorance : and we might just as reasonably imagine 6 non-cog- - ignorance to produce the effects of knowledge.‘—Per- nitions in haps (suggests Thesetétus), he may have non-cognitions well as in his mind, mingled with the cognitions: and in that hunting for a cognition, he may catch a non-cognition. opinion may Herein may lie false opinion.—That can hardly be confound- (replies Sokrates). If the man catches what is really {7g one with ἃ non-cognition, he will not suppose it to be such, but to be a cognition. He will believe himself fully to know, that in which he is mistaken. But how is it possible that he should confound a non-cognition with a cognition, or vice
rejects this.
1 Plato, Theet. p. 196 D. 3 Plato, Theet. ms 199 C. ἡ τῶν 3 Plato, Theset. pp. 197-198. replies th Theestm p. 199 E.
172 THEATETUS. Cuap. XXVIII
vers ἢ Does not he know the one from the other? We must then require him to have a separate cognition of his own cogni- tions or non-cognitions—and so on ad infinitum.' The hypo- thesis cannot be admitted.
We cannot find out (continues Sokrates) what false opinion is : and we have plainly done wrong to search for it, until we have first ascertained what knowledge is.?
Moreover, as to the question, Whether knowledge is identical
He brings With true opinion, Sokrates produces another argu- another ὀ ὀ ment to prove that it is not so: and that the two are prove that widely different. You can communicate true opinion Cognition is without communicating knowledge : and the power- sameas true ful class of rhetors and litigants make it their special
etors business to do so. They persuade, without teaching, persuade or 4 numerous audience? During the hour allotted to catetrue them for discourse, they create, in the minds of the ἑ artery assembled dikasts, true opinions respecting compli- teach or ραίρα incidents of robbery or other unlawfulness, at cate ἅπον- which none of the dikasts have been personally pre-
sent. Upon this opinion the dikasts decide, and de- cide rightly. But they cannot possibly know the facts without having been personally present and looking on. That is essential to knowledge or cognition. Accordingly, they have acquired true and right opinions; yet without acquiring knowledge.
Therefore the two are not the
1 Plato, Theet. p. 200 B.
2 Plato, Thest. p. 200 C.
3 Plato, Thezt. Ὁ. 201 A. οὗτοι γάρ πὸν τῇ ἑαντῶν τέχνῃ πείθονσιν, ov διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται.
4 Plato, Thest. p. 201 B-C. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν ;
δΎΊΠΟ distinction between persuad-
and teaching—between creating opinion and impartin £g knowledge —has been brought to view in the Gorgias, and is noted also in the Timzeus. it stands here, it deserves notice, because Plato not only professes to affirm what knowledge is, but also identifies it with
same.®
sensible perception. The Dikasts (ac- cording to Sokrates) would have known the case, had they been present when it occurred, so as to see and hear it: there is no other way of acquiring knowledge.
Hearing the case only by the nar- ration of speakers, they can acquire nothing more than a true opinion. Hence we learn wherein consists the difference between the two. That which I see, hear, or apprehend by any sensible perception, 1 know: com- pare a passage in Sophistes, p. 267 A-B, where τὸ γιγνώσκειν is explained in the same way. Butthat which I learn from the testimony of others amounts to nothing more than opinion; and at best to a true opinion.
Plato’s reasoning here involves an admission of the very doctrine which
Chap. XXVIIL
RATIONAL EXPLANATION.
173
Thestétus now recollects another definition of knowledge,
learnt from some one whose name he forgets. Know- ledge is (he says) true opinion, coupled with rational explanation. True opinion without such rational ex- planation, is not knowledge. Those things which do not admit of rational explanation, areJnot knowable,!
Taking up this definition, and elucidating it farther, Sokrates refers to the analogy of words and letters. Letters answer to the primordial elements of things ; which are not matters either of knowledge, or of true opinion, or of rational explanation—but simply of sensible perception. A letter, or a primordial ele- ment, can only be perceived and called by its name. You cannot affirm of it any predicate or any epithet : you cannot call it existing, or this, or that, or each, or single, or by any other name than its own :* for if you do, you attach to it something extraneous to
New answer of Thesté- tus—Cogni- tion is true opinion, coupled
ith ra-
itself, and then it ceases to be an element. But syllables, words, propositions—. ¢., the compounds made up by putting together various letters or elements—admit of being known, explained, and described, by enumerating the component elements. You may indeed conceive them correctly, without being able to explain them or to enumerate their component elements: but then you do not know them. You can only be said to know
the road to Larissa; as from another man who, never having
that false propositions, as well as true propositions, are possible, and really occur, he selects as his cases, Θεαίτητος κάθηται, Θεαίτητος πέτεται. That one of these propositions is false and the other true, can be known only b aig@yois—in the sense of that wo commonly understood.
1 Plato, Thestét. p. 201 Ὁ. τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγον ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην
know the word ἐπι
© Words οὑτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων are
to Heindorf and to justify the use of z, which was then a
intended, Schleiermacher,
neolo Bo is definition, the elucidation of it which Sokrates proceeds to furnish, are announced as
rrowed from other persons not nam
3 Plato, Theet. pp. 201 E—202 A. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν, οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἔστιν, οὔθ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν" ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ ουδὲν προσ- φέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ" ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ αὑτό, οὐδὲ τὸ dxetvo, οὐδὲ τὸ ἕκαστον, οὐδὲ τὸ μόνον, οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο, προσοιστέον, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλα
174 THEATETUS. Cuap. XXVIII.
them, when besides conceiving them correctly, you can also specify their component elements '—or give explanation.
Having enunciated this definition, as one learnt from another Sokrates re. Person not named, Sokrates proceeds to examine and futesthis confute it. It rests on the assumption (he says), that criticism. If the primordial elements are themselves unknowable ; mentsare and that it is only the aggregates compounded of able,the | them which are knowable. Such an assumption can- compound not be granted. The result is either a real sum total, unknow. including both the two component elements : or it is "anew form, indivisible and uncompounded, generated by the two elements, but not identical with them nor including them in itself. If the former, it is not knowable, because if neither of the elements are knowable, both together are not knowable : when you know neither A nor B you cannot know either the sum or the product of A and B. If the latter, then the result, being indivisible and uncompounded, is unknowable for the same reason as the elements are so: it can only be named by its own substantive name, but nothing can be predicated re- specting it.*
Nor can it indeed be admitted as true—That the elements are unknowable, and the compound alone knowable. On the con- trary, the elements are more knowable than the compound.®
When you say (continues Sokrates) that knowledge is true Rational | opinion coupled with rational explanation, you may explanation mean by rational explanation one of three things. 1. one of three The power of enunciating the opinion in clear and meanings appropriate words. This every one learns to do, who 1. Descrip- is not dumb or an idiot: so that in this sense true
ropriate opinion will always carry with it rational explana- Language. tjon.—2. The power of describing the thing in ques- tion of all’ tion by its component elements. Thus Hesiod says nentele- that there are a hundred distinct wooden pieces in a compound. Waggon: you and 1 do not know nor can we describe Tn neither them all: we can distinguish only the more obvious
meanings fractions—the wheels, the axle, the body, the yoke,
πολλὰ τοιαῦτα" ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέ- 1 Plato, Thezet. p. 202. χοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, ἕτερα ὄντα 2 Plato, Theset. pp. 208-206, exeivey ols προστίθεται. Also p. 205 C. 8 Plato, Thesxt. p. 206.
Cuar. XXVIII. RATIONAL EXPLANATION. 175
&e. Accordingly, we cannot be said to know a will the ᾿ waggon : we have only a true opinion about it. Such of Cognition is the second sense of λόγος or rational explanation. ®°!4-
But neither in this sense will the proposition hold—That know- ledge is right opinion coupled with rational explanation. For suppose that a man can enumerate, spell, and write correctly, all the syllables of the name Theetétus—which would fulfil the con- ditions of this definition: yet, if he mistakes and spells wrongly in any other name, such as Theodérus, you will not give him credit for knowledge. You will say that he writes Theetétus correctly, by virtue of right opinion simply. It is therefore possible to have right opinion coupled with rational explanation, in this second sense also,—yet without possessing knowledge.'
3. A third meaning of this same word λόγος or rational expla- nation, is, that. in which it is most commonly under- Thirdmean- stood—To be able to assign some mark whereby the ins. Toas- thing to be explained differs from every thing else—. mar to differentiate the thing.? Persons, who nnderstand the thing the word in this way, affirm, that so long as you only ‘ be ex- seize what the thing has in common with other differs from things, you have only a true opinion concerning it: 4156. The but when you seize what it has peculiar and charac- definition teristic, you then possess knowledge of it. Such is hold. For their view: but though it seems plausible at first capi. sight (says Sokrates), it will not bear close scrutiny. tion, in this For in order to have a true opinion about any thing, 8 I must have in my mind not only what it possesses ἴῃ true in common with other things, but what it possesses opinion. peculiar to itself also. Thus if I have a true opinion about Thestétus, I must have in my mind not only the attributes which belong to him in common with other men, but 4180 those which belong to him specially and exclusively. Rational expla- nation (Adyos) in this sense is already comprehended in true opinion, and is an essential ingredient in it—not any new ele- ment superadded. It will not serve therefore as a distinction between true opinion and knowledge.®
1 Plato, Theat. pp. 207-208 B. ἔστιν ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον ἄρα μετὰ λόγον bee δόξα, ἣν οὕπω δεῖ εἰπεῖν ᾳ τῶν ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρω- ἐπιστήμην καλε τηθέ
2 Plato, Thesetét.. p. 208 C. Ὅπερ 3 Plato, Theeetét. p. 200.
176 THEAZTETUB. Cuar. XXVIII.
Such is the result (continues Sokrates) of our researches con- cerning knowledge. We have found that it is neither
Conclusion ς - .ς οὗ thedia- sensible perception—nor true opinion—nor true logue- nming Pinion along with rational explanation. But what
up by So- [{ is, we have not found. Are we still pregnant with Valueof any other answer, Thestétus, or have we. brought Sithough’ forth all that is to come?—I have brought forth pareve. (replies Thesetétus) more than I had within me,
through your furtherance. Well (rejoins Sokrates)— and my obstetric science has pronounced all your offspring to be mere wind, unworthy of being preserved!! If hereafter you should again become pregnant, your offspring will be all the better for our recent investigation. If on the other hand you should always remain barren, you will be more amiable and less. vexatious to your companions—by having a just estimate of your- self, and by not believing yourself to know what you really do not know.?
The concluding observations of this elaborate dialogue deserve particular attention as illustrating Plato’s point of the dia- ὀ view, at the time when he composed the Thestétus. logue. View after a long debate, set forth with all the charm of False per- Plato’s style, no result is attained. Three different knowledge explanations of knowledge have been rejected as Importance UNtenable.* No other can be found; nor is any of such suggestion offered, showing in what quarter we are to look for the true one. What then is the purpose or value of the dialogue? Many persons would pronounce it to be a mere piece of useless ingenuity and elegance: but such is not the opinion of Plato himself. Sufficient gain (in his view) will have been ensured, if Theztétus has acquired a greater power
1 Plato, Thestét. p. 210 B. οὐκοῦν Compare also an earlier passage in ταῦτα μὲν a ἅπαντα ἡ μαιεντικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη the dia ogue, p. 187 B.
ἀνεμιαῖά φησι γεγενῆσθαι Kai οὐκ afta 541 have already observed, however, the in
τροφῆς that in one 3 Plato, Theet. p. 210 C. ἐάν re geo carried on by Sourates(p. 201 A- Ἢ ἔγνῃ (ἐγκύμων), βελτιόνων ἔσει πλήρης h h yr, where he is distin between τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν" ἐάν Te κενὸς ἧς, persuasion and teachi ), con- ἧττον ἔσει βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι Kai ἡμερώ- sciously admits the identity between
τερον, φωφρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ἃ knowledge and sensible perception.
Cuap. XXVIII. CONCLUSION AND REMARKS. 177
of testing any fresh explanation which he may attempt of this difficult subject: or even if he should attempt none such, by his being disabused, at all events, of the false persuasion of knowing where he is really ignorant. Such false persuasion of knowledge (Plato here intimates) renders a man vexatious to associates ; while a right estimate of his own knowledge and ignorance fosters gentleness and moderation of character. In this view, false persuasion of knowledge is an ethical defect, productive of positive mischief in a man’s intercourse with others: the removal of it improves his character, even though no ulterior step towards real and positive knowledge be made. The important thing is, that he should acquire the power of testing and verifying all opinions, old as well as new. This, which is the only guarantee against the delusive self-satisfaction of sham knowledge, must be firmly established in the mind before it is possible to aspire effectively to positive and assured knowledge. The negative arm of philosophy is in its application prior to the positive, and indispensable, as the single protection against error and false persuasion of knowledge. Sokrates is here depicted as one in whom the negative vein is spontaneous and abundant, even to a pitch of discomfort—as one complaining bitterly, that objections thrust themselves upon him, unsought and unwelcome, against conclusions which he had himself just previously taken pains to prove at length.'
To form in men’s minds this testing or verifying power, is one main purpose in Plato’s dialogues of Search—and in Formation some of them the predominant purpose ; as he him- ing oF test self announces it to be in the Theetétus. I have fying power already made the same remark before, and I repeat it minds. here ; since it is absolutely necessary for appreciating γβίπθ οἵ the these dialogues of Search in their true bearing and 88 it exhi- value. To one who does not take account of the rates de- negative arm of philosophy, as an auxiliary without Molishing which the positive arm will strike at random—half gestions. of the Platonic dialogues will teach nothing, and will even appear as enigmas—the Thestétus among the foremost. Plato _ excites and strengthens the interior mental wakefulness of the
1 See the emphatic passage, p. 195 B-C. 3—19
178 THEATETUS. Caap. XX VII
hearer, to judge respecting all affirmative theories, whether coming from himself or from others. This purpose is well served. by the manner in which Sokrates more than once in this dia- logue first announces, proves, and builds up a theory—then unexpectedly changes his front, disproves, and demolishes it. We are taught that it is not difficult to find a certain stock of affirmative argument which makes the theory look well from a distance : we must inspect closely, and make sure that there are no counter-arguments in the background.! The way in which Sokrates pulls to pieces his own theories, is farther instructive, as it illustrates the exhortation previously addressed by him to Thesetétus—not to take offence when his answers were canvassed and shown to be inadmissible.*
A portion of the dialogue to which I have not yet adverted,
mperison iUlustrates this anxiety for the preliminary training of the Phi- of the ratiocinative power, as an indispensable quali- withthe fication for any special research. “We have plenty SBhetor Of leisure for investigation® (says Sokrates). We are enslaved not tied to time, nor compelled to march briefly and nionsof ‘directly towards some positive result. Engaged as we are in investigating philosophical truth, we stand in pointed contrast with politicians and rhetors in the public assembly or dikastery. We are like freemen; they, like slaves. They have before them the Dikasts, as their masters, to whose temper and approbation they are constrained to adapt themselves. They are also in presence of antagonists, ready to entrap and confute them. The personal interests, sometimes even the life, of an individual are at stake ; so that every thing must be sacri- ficed to the purpose of obtaining a verdict. Men brought up in these habits become sharp in observation and emphatic in expres- sion ; but merely with a view to win the assent and approbation of the master before them, as to the case in hand. No free aspirations or spontaneous enlargement can have place in their minds. They become careless of true and sound reasoning— slaves to the sentiment of those whom they address—and adepts in crooked artifice which they take for wisdom.‘
1 Plato, Theeetét. p. 208 E. λὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες, πάλιν ὁ ὅ- 3 Plato, Thesetét. p. 161 C. μεθ “ἃς; also p. 172. WW ewavarceye 3 Plato, Themt, Ὁ. 166. ὡς πάνν woa- 4 Plato, Themtét. pp. 172-173.
CHarp. ΧΧΥΙΠ. THE PHILOSOPHER AND ΤῊΣ RHETOR. 179
Of all this (continues Sokrates) the genuine philosopher is the reverse. He neither possesses, nor cares to posses, a. prio the accomplishments of the lawyer and politician. sopher is He takes no interest in the current talk of the city; his own nor in the scandals afloat against individual persons.
He does not share in the common ardour for acquiring power or money ; nor does he account potentates either happier or more estimable for possessing them. Being ignorant and incompetent in the affairs of citizenship as well as of common life, he has no taste for club-meetings or joviality. His mind, despising the particular and the practical, is absorbed in constant theoretical research respecting universals. He spares no labour in investi- gating—What is man in general? and what are the attributes, active and passive, which distinguish man from other things? He will be overthrown and humiliated before the Dikastery by a clever rhetor. But if this opponent chooses to ascend out of the region of speciality, and the particular ground of injustice alleged by A against B—into the general question, What is justice or injustice? Wherein do they differ from each other or from other things? What constitutes happiness and misery? How is the one to be attained and the other avoided ?—If the rhetor will meet the philosopher on this elevated ground, then he will find himself put to shame and proved to be incompetent, in spite of all the acute stratagems of his petty mind.’ He will look like a child and become ashamed of himself :? but the philogopher is
noway ashamed of his incompetence for slavish pursuits, while he is passing a life of freedom and leisure among his own dialectics.*
In these words of Sokrates we read a contrast between practice and theory—one of the moet eloquent passages in the οἱ dialogues—wherein Plato throws overboard the ordi- to nary concerns and purposes both of public and private quality tor 8 life, admitting that true philosophers are unfit for loeop ἔκ them. The passage, while it teaches us caution in
ive only an abstract of this elo- as the rhetors whom he depreciates— en pate tne tae Thosthe h he had also, besides, other lofty quent pa eitung zum Theeetét. p. in peculiarities of his own, rin “8, sublime Hymn” (einen beyond these rivals. Hymnus). It is a fine piece 5 Plato, Theet. pp. 175-176. of poetry or rh c, and shows that 3 Plato, Theeet. p. 177 B. Plato was by nature quite as rhetorical 3 Plato, Theset. p. 175 E.
180 THEATETUS. Cuar. XXVIII.
receiving his criticisms on the defects of actual statesmen and men of action, informs us at the same time that he regarded phi- losophy as the only true business of life—the single pursuit worthy to occupy 8 freeman.’ This throws light on the purpose of many of his dialogues. He intends to qualify the mind fora life of philosophical research, and with this view to bestow pre- liminary systematic training on the ratiocinative power. To announce at once his own positive conclusions with their reasons, (as I remarked before) is not his main purpose. A pupil who, having got all these by heart, supposed himself to have com- pleted his course of philosophy, so that nothing farther remained to be done, would fall very short of the Platonic exigency. The life of the philosopher—as Plato here conceives it—is a perpetual search after truth, by dialectic debate and mutual cross-examina- tion between two minds, aiding each other to disembroil that. confusion and inconsistency which grows up naturally in the ordinary mind. For such a life a man becomes rather disquali- fied than prepared, by swallowing an early dose of authoritative dogmas and proofs dictated by his teacher. The two essential requisites for it are, that he should acquire a self-acting ratio- cinative power, and an earnest, untiring, interest in the dialectic process. Both these aids Plato’s negative dialogues are well cal- culated to afford: and when we thus look at his purpose, we shall see clearly that it did not require the presentation of any positive result.
The course of this dialogue—the Thextétus—has been already Difficut described as an assemblage of successive perplexities oftheTher- without any solution. But what deserves farther ttusarenot notice is—That the perplexities, as they are not ἘΣ οὐδὸς solved in this dialogue, so they are not solved in any
other dialogue. The view taken by Schleiermacher and other critics—that Plato lays out the difficulties in one anterior dialogue, in order to furnish the solution in another posterior—is not borne out by the facta. In the Theetétus, many objections are propounded against the doctrine, That Opinion is sometimes true, sometimes false. Sokrates shows that false opinion is an impossibility: either therefore all
1 Plato, Sophistés, p. 263 C: ἡ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐπιστήμη.
Cuap. XXVIII. OBJECTIONS NEVER ANSWERED. 181
Opinions are true, or no opinion is either true or false. If we turn to the Sophistés, we shall find this same question discussed by the Eleatic Stranger who conducts the debate. He there treats the doctrine—That false opinion is an impossibility and that no opinion could be false—as one which had long embar- rassed himself, and which formed the favourite subterfuge of the impostors whom he calls Sophists. He then states that this doc- trine of the Sophists was founded on the Parmenidean dictum— That Non-Ens was an impossible supposition. Refuting the dictum of Parmenides (by a course of reasoning which I shall examine elsewhere), he arrives at the conclusion—That Non-Ens exists in a certain fashion, as well as Ens: That false opinions are possible : That there may be false opinions as well as true. But what deserves most notice here, in illustration of Plato’s manner, is—that though the Sophistés! is announced as ἃ con- tinuation of the Thesetétus (carried on by the same speakers, with the addition of the Eleate), yet the objections taken by Sokrates in the Theztétus against the possibility of false opinion, are not even noticed in the Sophistés—much less removed. Other objections to it are propounded and dealt with: but not those objections which had arrested the march of Sokrates in the Theetétus.? Sokrates and Theetétus hear the Eleatic Stranger
1 See the end of the Thestétus and the opening of the Sophistés. Note, moreover, that the Politikus makes reference not only to the Sophistés, but also to the Theetétus (pp. 258 A, 266 D, 284 B, 286 B
2In the Sophistés, the Eleate esta- blishes (to his own satisfaction) that τὸ μὴ ὃν is not ἐναντίον τοῦ ὄντος, but ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος (p. 257 B), that it is one γένος among the various γένη (p. 260 B), and that it (τό μὴ ov κοινωνεῖ) enters into communion or combination with δόξα, λόγος, φαν- τασία, &c. It is therefore possible that there may be ψευδὴς δόξα or Pevdns λόγος, When you affirm, r ting any given subject, ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων ΟΥ̓ τὰ
ὄντα ὡς ὄντα (p. ΒΟ Plato considers that the case is thus made out against the Sophist, as the impostor and dealer in falsehoods ; false opinion being proved to be possible and ex- plicable.
But if we turn to the Theetétus (p. 189 seq.), we shall see that this
very explication of ψευδὴς δόξα is there enunciated and impugned by Sokrates in along argument. He sit there ἀλλοδοξία, erepodofia, τὸ ἑτεροδοξεὶν (pp. 189 A, 190 E, 193 D). Ὁ man (he says) can mistake one thing for another; if this were so, he must be supposed both to know and not to know the same thing, which is im-
ssible (pp. 196 A, A). There-
ore ψευδὴς δόξα 18 impossible.
Of these objections, urged by Sokrates in the Thestétus, against the possi bility of ἀλλοδοξέα, no notice is en in the Sophistés either by Sokrates, or by Thestétus, or by the Eleate in the Sophistés. Indeed the Eleate congra- tulates himself upon the explanation as more satisfactory than he had expected to find (p. 264 B): and speaks with dis- pleasure of the troublesome persons who stir up doubts and contradictions (Ὁ. 259 C): very different from the tone of So- krates in the Theetétus φ 195, B-C).
I may farther remark that Plato, in the Republic, reasons about τὸ μὰ ov
182 THEARTETUS. Crap. KX VIIL
discussing this same matter in the Sophistés, yet neither of them allude to those objections against his conclusion which had appeared to both of them irresistible in the preceding dialogue known as Theetétus. Nor are the objections refuted in any other of the Platonic dialogues.
Such a string of objections never answered, and of difficulties without solution, may appear to many persons nuga-
lato sidered that tory as well as tiresome. To Plato they did not tie search appear so. Αὐ the time when most of his dialogues was the were composed, he considered that the Search after occupation truth was at once the noblest occupation, and the 8.
highest pleasure, of life. Whoever has no sympathy with such a pursuit—whoever cares only for results, and finds the chase in itself fatiguing rather than attractive—is likely to take little interest in the Platonic dialogues. To repeat what I said in Chapter VI.—Those who expect from Plato a coherent system in which affirmative dogmas are first to be laid down, with the evidence in their favour—next, the difficulties and ob- jections against them enumerated—lastly, these difficulties solved —will be disappointed. Plato is, occasionally, abundant in his affirmations : he has also great negative fertility in starting ob- jections : but the affirmative current does not come into conflict with the negative. His belief is enforced by rhetorical fervour, poetical illustration, and a vivid emotional fancy. These ele- ments stand to him in the place of positive proof ; and when his mind is full of them, the unsolved objections, which he himself. had stated elsewhere, vanish out of sight. Towards the close of his life (as we shall see in the Treatise De Legibus), the love of dialectic, and the taste for enunciating difficulties even when he could not clear them up, died out within him. He becomes
in the Parmenidean sense, and not in the sense which he ascribed to it in the Sophistés, and which he recognises in the Politikus, ὦ), 284 Β. (Republic, v.
pp. 477 A, 418 latter plainly and _ inten- Socher (Ueber Platon’s Schriften, pp. tionally. But I do not agree in hi 260-270) points out the di cy inference. He concludes that the So-
between the doctrines of the Eleate in the Sophistés, and those maintained by Sokrates in other Platonic dialogues ; inferring from thence that the Sophistés and Politikus are not compositions of Plato. As between the Thetétus and
phistés is not Plato’s composition: I conclude, that the scope for dissident views and doctrine, within the long philosophical career and numerous dia- ogues of Plato, is larger than his com mentators admit.
Caap. XXVIIL. KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION. 183
ultra-dogmatical, losing even the poetical richness and fervour which had once marked his affirmations, and substituting in their place a strict and compulsory orthodoxy.
The contrast between the philosopher and the man engaged in active life—which is so emphatically set forth in the Thezetétus }—falls in with the distinction between tween the Knowledge and Opinion—The Infallible and the Endthe Fallible. It helps the purpose of the dialogue, to Practical show what Knowledge is not: and it presents the dis- ΤΑ tinction between the two on the ethical and emo- and Opi- tional side, upon which Plato laid great stress. The ™" philosopher (or man of Knowledge, ¢.e. Knowledge viewed on its subjective side) stands opposed to the men of sensible perception and opinion, not merely in regard to intellect, but in regard to disposition, feeling, character, and appreciation of objects. He neither knows nor cares about particular things or particular persons: all his intellectual force, and all his emotional interests, are engaged in the contemplation of Universals or Real Entia, and of the great pervading cosmical forces. He despises the occupations of those around him, and the actualities of life, like the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias :? assimilating himself as much as possible to the Gods; who have no other occupation (according to the Aristotelian* Ethics), except that of contem- plating and theorising. He pursues these objects not with a view to any ulterior result, but because the pursuit is in itself a life both of virtue and happiness; neither of which are to be found in the region of opinion. Intense interest in speculation is his prominent characteristic. To dwell amidst these contem- plations is a self-sufficing life; even without any of the aptitudes or accomplishments admired by the practical men. If the phi- losopher meddles with their pursuits, he is not merely found incompetent, but also incurs general derision ; because his in- competence becomes manifest even to the common-place citizens. But if they meddle with his speculations, they fail not less dis- gracefully ; though their failure is not appreciated by the unphi- losophical spectator.
1 Plato, Thexté&t. pp. 173-176. Com- 3 See above, chap. xxiv. Ὁ. 355. pare Republic, v. pp. 476-477, vii. p. 9: 2 Ethic. Nikomach. x. 8, p. 1178, b. 617. .
184 THEATETUS. CHap. XXVITL
The professors of Knowledge are thus divided by the strongest lines from the professors of Opinion. And opinion itself—The Fallible—is, in this dialogue, presented as an inexplicable puzzle. You talk about true and false opinions: but how ean false opinions be possible? and if they are not possible, what is the meaning of true, as applied to opinions? Not only, therefore, opinion can never be screwed up to the dignity of knowledge— but the world of opinion itself defies philosophical scrutiny. It is a chaos in which there is neither true nor false ; in perpetual oscillation (to use the phrase of the Republic) between Ens and
Non-Ens.!
1 Plato, ublic, v. pp. 478-479. Gin rat Thee bus Seas in ayers erence a and em ἢ with the Republic, than with the histés and Politikus. In the Po- liti (p. 809 C) ἀληθὴς δόξα μετὰ βεβαιώσεως is placed very nearly on ἃ par with knowledge: in the Menon also, the difference between the two, though clearly declared, is softened in
Ἂ Pp. 97-98.
e Alexandrine physician Hero- philus attempted to draw, between πρόῤῥησις and πρόγνωσις, the same distinction as that which Plato draws between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη —The Fallible as contrasted with the In- fallible. Galen shows that the dis- tinction is untenable (Prim. Com- mentat. in Hippokratis Prorrhetica, Tom. xvi. p. 487, ed. Kuhn).
Bonitz, in his Platonische Studien (pp. 41-78), has given an instructive analysis and discussion of the Thex- tétus. I find more to concur with in his views, than in those of Schleier-
~
macher or Steinhart. He disputes alto- gether the assumption of other Platonic critics, that a purely n ive result is unworthy of Plato; and that the nega- tive apparatus is an artifice to recom- mend, and a veil to conceal, some great affirmative truth, which acute exposi- tors can detect and enunciate plainly Seren aso Finleit. Zam Thesetet. p. . nite recognises the re- sult of the Theztétus as purely nega- tive, and vindicates the worth of it as such. Moreover, instead of denounci the opinions which Plato combats, as they were perverse heresies of dishonest
retenders, he adverts to the great dif-
culty of those problems which both Plato and Plato’s opponents undertook to elucidate: and he remarks that, in those early days, the first attempts to explain psychological phenomena were attempts to explain. physical pheno- a p exp physi: pheno- mena (pp. 75-77). Such ition, of the real difficulty of a pro em, is rare among the Platonic critica.
SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS
185
CHAPTER XXIx.
SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS.
Task two dialogues are both of them announced by Plato as forming sequel to the Thertétus. The beginning of prsons the Sophistés fits on to the end of the Themtétus: and and circum. the Politikus is even presented 88 a second part or thetwo continuation of the Sophistés In all the three, the
1 At the
ft the Politikr Plato ταῦκος Soerares τ the
krates refer both to the
also (p. xpress reference is made toa the Theetétus. also the allusion in Sophistés fees, appearance of the younger So- ‘as respondent), p. 218 B. (in his worl a eta Sat Ci wire Sat nor the Parmenidés, are genuine works of Plato. He conceives the two dia- Jogaes to be contem} with the (which he holds to have deen written by Plato), but to have shiloso-
A
Plato'saathoranlp, the hypothesis of an ‘guthor belonging to the Megaric school fs highly itaprobable : the rather, since many critics suppose (1 think’ erro- neously) that the Megarici are among those attacked in the dialogue. The suspicion that Plato is not the author
of Sophistés and Polltikus has un- doubtedly more appearance of reason than the sate suspicion as appliod to other dialogues—though I think the reasons altogether insuificient. Socher observes, justly: 1. ‘That the two dia- Togues are peculiar, distinguished from other Platonic diglogues by the pro- fusion οἱ logical elassiieation, in prac fica as well asin theory, 5. That both, ani
advance icrepant
dialogues.—But these two reasons are not sufficient tomake me disallow them.
‘sameness of aut not counterbalanced by Socher’s ol tions. Why should a Mogarie aut embody in his two dialogues a false
186 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUB. Oaar. XXIX. same interlocutors are partially maintained. Thus Sokrates, Theodorus, and Thestétus are present in all three: and Theex- tétus makes the responses, not only in the dialogue which bears his name, but also in the Sophistés. Both in the Sophistés and Politikus, however, Sokrates himself descends from the part of principal speaker to that of listener : it is he, indeed, who by his question elicits the exposition, but he makes no comment either during the progress of it or at the close. In both the dialogues, the leading and expository function is confided to a new per- sonage introduced by Theodérus :—a stranger not named, but announced as coming from Elea—the friend and companion of Parmenides and Zeno. Perhaps (remarks Sokrates) your friend may, without your Knowledge, be.a God under human shape ; as Homer tells us that the Gods often go about, in the company of virtuous men, to inspect the good and bad behaviour of man- kind. Perhaps your friend may be a sort of cross-examining God, coming to test and expose our feebleness in argument. No (replies Theodérus) that is not his character. He is less given to
nischen Schriften, ΡΒ 87, seq., Breslau, 1855), who admits the Sophistés to be 8, genuine work of Plato, but declares the Politikus to be spurious ; composed by some fraudulent author, who wished other passages of the same treatise (vii. to give to his dialogue the false ap- 2, 1824, a. 20—vii. 7 B 1827, b. a) pearance of being a continuation of the Ueberweg (Aech eit der Platon. phistés: he admits (p. 93) that it Schrift. p. 162, seq.) combats with must be a deliberate deceit, if the Poli- much force the views of Suckow. It
premisses. It is noway impossible that Aristotle might allude to Plato some- times in this vague and general way: and I think that he has done so
tikus be really the work of a different author from the Sophistés ; for identity of authorship is distinctly affirmed in it. Suckow gives two reasons for be- lieving that the Politikus is not by Plato :—1. That the doctrines re - ing governinent are different from those of the Republic, and the cosmology of the long mythe which it includes dif- ferent from the cosmology of the Ti- meus. These are reasons similar to those advanced by Socher, and (in my judgment) insufficient reasons. 2. That Aristotle, in a passage of the Politica (iv. 2, p. 1289, b. 5), alludes to an opi- nion, which is found in the Politi- kus, in the following terms: ἤδη μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφήνατο καὶ τῶν πρότερον οὕτως, dc. guckow maintains that Aristotle could never have alluded to Plato in these terms, and that he must have believed the Politikus to be com- by some one else. But I think
is inference is not justified by the
would be rash to build so much nega- tive inference upon a loose phrase of Aristotle. That he should have spoken of Plato in this vague manner is much more probable, or much less impro- bable, than the counter-supposition, that the author of a striking and com- prehensive dialogue, such as the Poli- tikus, should have committed a fraud for the purpose of fastening his com- position on Plato, and thus abnegating all fame for himself.
The explicit affirmation of the Poli- tikus itself ought to be believed, in my judgment, unless it can be refuted by greater negative probabilities than any which Socher and Suckow produce.
I do not here repeat, what I have endeavoured to justify in an earlier chapter of this work, the confidence which I feel in the canon of Thrasyllus: a confidence which it requires stronger arguments than those of these two critics to overthrow.
Cuap, ΧΧΙΧ. PERSONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES. 187
dispute than his companions. He is far from being a God, but he is a divine man: for I call all true philosophers divine.!
This Eleate performs the whole task of exposition, by putting questions to Theztétus, in the Sophistés—to the younger So- krates in the Politikus. Since the true Sokrates is merely listener in both dialogues, Plato provides for him an additional thread of connection with both ; by remarking that the youthful Sokrates is his namesake, and that Thextétus resembles him in flat nose and physiognomy.?
Though Plato himself plainly designates the Sophistés as an intended sequel to the Theztétus, yet the method of Relation of the two is altogether different, and in a certain sense tho tvo die- even opposite. In the Thestétus, Sokrates extracts Thotstas. answers from the full and pregnant mind of that youthful re- spondent : he himself professes to teach nothing, but only to canvass every successive hypothesis elicited from his companion. But the Eleate is presented to us in the most imposing terms, as ἃ thoroughly accomplished philosopher : coming with doctrines established in his mind,? and already practised in the task of ex- position which Sokrates entreats him to undertake. He is, from beginning to end, affirmative and dogmatical : and if he declines to proceed by continuous lecture, this is only because he is some- what ashamed to appropriate all the talk to himself.‘ He there- fore prefers to accept Thestétus as respondent. But Thezxtétus is no longer pregnant, as in the preceding dialogue. He can do no more than give answers signifying assent and dissent, which merely serve to break and diversify the exposition. In fact, the dialogue in the Sophistés and Politikus is assimilated by Plato himself,’ not to that in the Theetétus, but to that in the last half of the Parmenides; wherein Aristotelés the respondent answers little more than Ay or No, to leading questions from the interrogator.
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 216 B-C. which he is only present as a listener 3 Plato, Politik. p. 257 E. —not to the first half, in which he 3 Plato, Sophist. p. 217 B. wei takes an active Compare the
διακηκοέναι ye φησιν ἱκανῶς καὶ οὐκ Parmenidés, p Cc. In this last-
νέειν. 4 Plato, Sophist. pp. 216-217. youth) and Aristotelés are the parallel δ Plato, Sophist. p. 217 C. The of Theetétus and the younger Sokrates words of Sokrates show that he alludes in the Sophistés and Politikus. (See to the last half of the Parmenidés, in p. 136 Ὁ.)
188 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cuap. XX1X.
In noticing the circumlocutory character, and multiplied nega- Platode- ἔνα criticism, of the Theetétus, without any ultimate his first pur- Profit realised in the form of positive result—I re- poseisto marked, that Plato appreciated dialogues, not merely alessonin as the road to a conclusion, but for the mental disci-
the line and suggestive influence of the tentative and special ques- verifying process. It was his purpose to create in his being su- ᾿ hearers a disposition to prosecute philosophical re- bordinate —_ search of their own, and at the same time to strengthen purpose. their ability of doing so with effect. This remark is confirmed by the two dialogues now before us, wherein Plato defends himself against reproaches seemingly made to him at the time.! “To what does all this tend? Why do you stray so widely from your professed topic? Could you not have reached this point by a shorter road?” He replies by distinctly pro- claiming—That the process, with its improving influence on the mind, stands first in his thoughts—the direct conclusion of the enquiry, only second : That the special topic which he discusses, though in itself important, is nevertheless chosen principally With a view to its effect in communicating general method and dialectic aptitude : just as a schoolmaster, when he gives out to his pupils a word to be spelt, looks mainly, not to their exactness in spelling that particular word, but to their command of good spelling generally.2 To form inquisitive, testing minds, fond of philosophical debate as a pursuit, and looking at opinions on the negative as well as on the positive side, is the first object in most of Plato’s dialogues: to teach positive truth, is only a secondary object.
Both the Sophistés and the Politikus are lessons and specimens Method of of that process which the logical manuals recognise logical Def- under the names—Definition and Division. What is Division. ἃ Sophist? What is a politician or statesman? What is a philosopher? In the first place—Are the three really dis-
1 Plato, Politikus, pp. 288 B, 286- τοῦ περὶ πάντα. , p. 286 D. τό τε αὖ πρὸς τὴν 3 Plato, Politikus, Ῥ. 285 Ὁ. τοῦ προβληθέντος ζήτησιν, ὡς ἂν ῥᾷστα Rev. - τί 8° av ; νῦν ἡμῖν n “περὶ τοῦ καὶ τάχιστα εὕροιμεν, δεύτερον ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πολιτικοῦ ζήτησις ἕνεκα αὐτοῦ τούτον πρῶτον ὁ λόγος ἀγαπᾷν παραγγέλλει, προβέβληται μᾶλλον H τοῦ περὶ πάντα πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον τὴν μέθοδον διαλεκτικωτέροις γίγνεσθαι; αὐτὴν τιμᾷν, τοῦ καὶ εἴδη δυνατὸν εἶναι Νέος ΞΣωκρ. γίγας αἱ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτε διαιρεῖν, &c.
Cuap. XXIX. FIRST PURPOSE OF THE TWO DIALOGUES. 189
tinct characters? for this may seem doubtful: since the true philosopher, in his visits of inspection from city to city, is con- stantly misconceived by an ignorant public, and confounded with the other two.! The Eleate replies that the three are distinct. Then what is the characteristic function of each? How is he distinguished from other persons or other things? To what class or classes does each belong: and what is the specific character belonging to the class, so as to mark its place in the scheme descending by successive logical subdivision from the highest genus down to particulars? What other professions or occupa- tions are there analogous to those of Sophist and Statesman, so as to afford an illustrative comparison? What is there in like manner capable of serving as illustrative contrast ?
Such are the problems which it is the direct purpose of the two dialogues before us to solve. But a large propor- tion of both is occupied by matters bearing only tries the indirectly upon the solution. The process of logical ὃ in subdivision, or the formation of classes in subordina- method, tion to each other, can be exhibited just as plainly in a val application to an ordinary craft or profession, as tO To find the one of grave importance. The Eleate Stranger even logical lace affirms that the former case will be simpler, and will tion of the serve as explanatory introduction to the latter.? He gates therefore selects the craft of an angler, for which to Cases πέτα, find a place in logical classification. Does not an Bisecting angler belong to the general class—men of art or “Vi#io2- craft? He is not a mere artless, non-professional, private man. This being so, we must distribute the class Arts—Artists, into two subordinate classes: Artists who construct or put together some new substance or compound—Artists who construct nothing new, but are employed in getting, or keeping, or employing, sub- stances already made. Thus the class Artists is bisected into Constructive—Acquisitive. The angler constructs nothing: he belongs to the acquisitive branch. We now bisect this latter branch. Acquirers either obtain by consent, or appropriate without consent. Now the angler is one of the last-mentioned class: which is again bisected into two sub-classes, according as
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 216 E. 3 Plato, Sophist. p. 218 E.
190 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cuar. XXIX.
the appropriation is by force or stratagem—Fighters and Hun- ters. The angler is a hunter: but many other persons are hunters also, from whom he must be distinguished. Hunters are therefore divided into, Those who hunt inanimate things (such as divers for sponges, &c.), and Those who hunt living things or animals, including of course the angler among them. The hunters of animals are distinguished into hunters of walking animals, and hunters of swimming animals. Of the swimming animals some are in air, others in water :' hence we get two classes, Bird-Hunters and Fish-Hunters ; to the last of whom the angler belongs. The fish-hunters (or fishermen) again are bisected into two classes, according as they employ nets, or striking instru- -ments of one kind or another, such as tridents, & Of the striking fishermen there are two sorts: those who do their work at night by torch-light, and those who work by day. All these day-fishermen, including among them the angler, use instruments with hooks at the end. But we must still make one bisection more. Some of them employ tridents, with which they strike from above downwards at the fishes, upon any part of the body which may present itself: others use hooks, rods, and lines, which they contrive to attach to the jaws of the fish, and thereby draw him from below upward.? This is the special characteristic of the angler. We have now a class comprehending the anglers alone, so that no farther sub-division is required. We have obtained not merely the name of the angler, but also the rational explanation of the function to which the name is attached.*
This is the first specimen which Plato gives of a systematic classification descending, by successive steps of bifur- lessonin eation, through many subordinations of genera and
oa ca. species, each founded on a real and proclaimed dis- on wae ne tinction—and ending at last in an infima species. He both novel repeats the like process in regard to the Sophist, the and instruc: Statesman, and other professions to which he com- logical pares the one or the other: but it will suffice to have
1 Plato, Sophist. P. 220 B. Nev- 3 Plato, Sophist. pp. 219-221. Ar μὴν τὸ μὲν πτηνὸν φῦλον ὁρῶμεν, 5 Plato, Sophist. p. 221 Α-Β. Νῦν
Tt deserves notice that Plato here eee eee τὸν λότον περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ: considers the air as a fluid in which γον, εἰλήφαμεν ἱκανῶς.
ΟΗΑΡ. XXIX. THE SOPHIST COMPARED TO AN ANGLER. 191
given one specimen of his method. If we transport manuals ourselves back to his time, I think that such a view isted. of the principles of classification implies a new and valuable turn of thought. There existed then no treatises on logic ; no idea of logic as a scheme of mental procedure ; no sciences out of which it was possible to abstract the conception of a regular method more or less diversified. On no subject was there any mass of facts or details collected, large enough to demand some regular system for the purpose of arranging and rendering them intelligible. Classification to a certain extent is of necessity involved, consciously or unconsciously, in the use of general terms. But the process itself had never been made a subject of distinct consciousness or reflection to any one (as far as our knowledge reaches), in the time of Plato. No one had yet looked at it as a process natural indeed to the human intellect, up to a certain point and in a loose manner,—but capable both of great extension and great improvement, and requiring especial study, with an end deliberately set before the mind, in order that it might be employed with advantage to regularise and render intelligible even common and well-known facts. To determine a series of descending classes, with class-names, each connoting some assignable characteristic—to distribute the whole of each class between two correlative sub-classes, to compare the different ways in which this could be done, and to select such membra condividentia as were most suitable for the purpose—this was in the time of Plato an important novelty. We know from Xenophon! that Sokrates considered Dialectic to be founded, both etymologically and really, upon the distribution of par- ticular things into genera or classes. But we find little or no intentional illustration of this process in any of the conversations of the Xenophontic Sokrates: and we are farther struck by the fact that Plato, in the two dialogues which we are here con- sidering, assigns all the remarks on the process of classification, not to Sokrates himself, but to the nameless Eleatic Stranger. After giving the generic deduction of the angler from the com- prehensive idea of Art, distributed into two sections, piato de- constructive and acquisitive, Plato proceeds to notice Stibes the
1 Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 12.
SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cuap. XXIX-
Sophistas the analogy between the Sophist and an angler: after toanangier. Which he deduces the Sophist also from the acquisi- a Sorbist tive section of Art. The Sophist is an angler for rich by descend- young men.' To find his place in the preceding ing sab: descending series, we must take our departure from fromiinitive the bisection—hunters of walking animals, hunters of genusofart. swimming animals, The Sophist is a hunter of walk-
ing animals: which may be divided into two classes, wild and tame. The Sophist hunts a species of tame animals — men. Hunters of tame animals are bisected into such as hunt by violent means (robbers, enslavers, despots, &c.),? and such as hunt by persuasive means. Of the hunters by means of persuasion there are two kinds: those who hunt the public, and those who hunt individuals. The latter again may be divided into two classes : those who hunt to their own loss, by means of presents, such as lovers, &c., and those who hunt with a view to their own profit. To this latter class belongs the Sophist: pretending to associate with others for the sake of virtue, but really looking to his own profit.
Again, we may find the Sophist by descending through 8 The Sophist “ferent string of subordinate classes from the genus traceddown —Acquisitive Art. The professors of this latter may rom tee, be bisected into two sorte—hunters and exchangers. second and Exchangers are of two sorts—givers and sellers.
descending Sellers again sell either their own productions, or the subdivision. Droductions of others. Those who sell the produc- tions of others are either fixed residents in one city, or hawkers travelling about from city to city. Hawkers again carry about for sale either merchandise for the body, or merchandise for the mind, such as music, poetry, painting, exhibitions of jugglery, learning, and intellectual accomplishments, and so forth. These latter (hawkers for the mind) may be divided into two sorts :
age respecting Claseifeation: when we see the great diversity of particulars which he himself, here as well as else- , Tanks ander the general name
Pipe, hunting—Oijpa γὰρ παμπολύ τι ay, ἐστι, : Wate reds ὀνόματι νῦν a évé Legg. viii. 822-
823-824, and Euthyd. p. 200 B). He includes both στρατηγικὴ and Sota. τικὴ ὃ ag varieties of θηρεντική,
Ρ Compare also the interesting con- yorsation abc about τὺ θήρα ἄνθρ. ἀνθρώπων between
Memorab. ΓΝ 11, 7; krates and K Kritobulus, it ii. 6, 29. 8 Plato, Sophist. p. 223
Cuap, XXIX. THE SOPHIST IS AN ANGLER. 193
thoee who go about teaching, for money, arts and literary accom- plishments—and those who go about teaching virtue for money. They who go about teaching virtue for money are the Sophists.! Or indeed if they sell virtue and knowledge for money, they are not the less Sophists—whether they buy what they sell from others, or prepare it for themselves—whether they remain in one city or become itinerant.
A third series of subordinate classes will also bring us down from the genus—Acquisttive Art—down to the infima also, bya species—Sophist. In determining the class-place of [δὲ third. the angler, we recognised a bisection of acquisitive art into acquirers by exchange, or mutual consent—and acquirers by appropriation, or without consent.? These latter we divided according as they employed either force or stratagem: contenders and hunters. We then proceeded to bisect the class hunters, leaving the contenders without farther notice. Now let us take up the class contenders. It may be divided into two: compe- titors for a set prize (pecuniary or honorary), and fighters. The fighters go to work either body against body, violently—or tongue against tongue, as arguers. These arguers again fall into two classes : the pleaders, who make long speeches, about just or unjust, before the public assembly and dikastery : and the dia- logista, who meet each other in short question and answer. The dialogists again are divided into two: the private, untrained antagonists, quarrelling with each other about the particular affairs of life (who form a species by themselves, since charac- teristic attributes may be assigned to them ; though these attri- butes are too petty and too indefinite to have ever received a name in common language, or to deserve a name from us*)—and the trained practitioners or wranglers, who dispute not about particular incidents, but about just and unjust in general, and
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 224 B. τυχεῖν ἄξιον.
3 Plato, Sophist. p. 219 Ε. Θεαιτητ.--᾿Αληθῆ" κατὰ σμικρὰ Ρ Ῥ. γὰρ λίαν καὶ παντοδαπὰ Sy
3 Plato, Sophist. p. 225 Ο.β These words illustrate pitts. view
, Hévos. —Tov δὲ ἀντιλογικοῦ, τὸ μὲν of an εἶδος or species. Any ὅσον περὶ τὰ ξυμβολαῖα ἀμφισβητεῖται able attributes, however ight he’ taken and μέν, εἰκὴ δὲ καὶ ἀτεχνῶς περὶ αὐτὸ however multifarious, m πράττεται, ταῦτα θετέον μὲν εἶδος, to form a species upon ; toot if they ἐπείπερ αὐτὸ διέγνωκεν ὡς ἕτερον ὃν ὃ no advant and multifarious, there was " ἀτὰρ ἐπωνυμίας οὔθ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν vantage in bestowing a specific ἄμπροσθεν ἔτυχεν, οὔτε νῦν ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν
3.13
194 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cuap. XXIX.
other general matters! Of wranglers again there are two sorts : the prosers, who follow the pursuit from spontaneous taste and attachment, not only without hope of gain, but to the detriment of their private affairs, incurring loss themselves, and wearying or bothering their hearers: and those who make money by such private dialogues. This last sort of wrangler is the Sophist.?
There is yet another road of class-distribution which will bring The Sophist 18 down to the Sophist. A great number of common
istraced =~ arts (carding wool, straining through a sieve, &c.)-have, wn,from . . ς
the genusof in common, the general attribute of separating matters separating confounded in a heap. Of separation there are two minating sorts: you may separate like from like (this has no
established name)—or better from worse, which is called purification. Purification is of two sorts: either of body or of mind. In regard to body, the purifying agents are very multifarious, comprising not only men and animals, but also inanimate things: and thus including many varieties which in common estimation are mean, trivial, repulsive, or ludicrous. But all these various sentiments (observes Plato) we must disre- gard. We must follow out a real analogy wherever it leads us, and recognise a logical affinity wherever we find one ; whether the circumstances brought together be vile or venerable, or some of them vile and some venerable, in the eyes of mankind. Our sole purpose is to improve our intelligence. With that view, all particulars are of equal value in our eyes, provided only they exhibit that real likeness which legitimates them as members of the same class—purifiers of body: the correlate of that other class which we now proceed to study—purifiers of mind.*
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 225 C. τὸ δέ ye ἔντεχνον, καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὑτῶν καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλως ἀμφισβητοῦν, dp’ οὐκ ἐριστικὸν αὖ λέγειν εἰθίσμεθα;
3 Plato, Sophist. p. 225 E.
3 Plato, Sophist. pp. 226-227. 227 A: τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἣ φαρ- μακοποσίας οὐδὲν ἥττον οὐδέ τι ν τυγχάνει μέλον, εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρά, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ καθαῖρον. Tov κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἕνεκεν νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ξνγγενὲς καὶ «τὸ μὴ ἔἐνγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πει-
ωὠμένη, τιμᾷ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται γελοιό- τερα, σεμνότερον δέ τι τὸν δι στρατημικῆς ἣ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν, GAA ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυ- νότερον. Kai δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὅπερ npov, τί προσεροῦμεν ὄνομα ξυμπάσας δυνάμεις, ὅσαι σῶμα εἴτε ἔμψυχον εἴτε ἄψυχον εἰλήχασι καθαίρειν, οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διοίσει, ποῖόν τι λεχθὲν εὐπρεπέστατον εἶναι δόξει" μόνον ἐχότω χωρὶς τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεων πάντα ἣσαν ὅσα ἄλλο τι καθαίρει. To main the
ὍΗΑΛΡ. ΧΧΙΧ COMMUNITY OF EMOTION. 195
This precept (repeated by Plato also in the Politikus) respect- ing the principles of classification, deserves notice. It ty g togical protests against, and seeks to modify, one of the ordi- Classifica- nary turns in the associating principles of the human and‘ mind. With unreflecting men, classification is often {tems de emotional rather than intellectual. The groups of objects thrown together in such minds, and conceived in immediate association, are such as suggest the same or kindred emotions: pleasure or pain, love or hatred, hope or fear, admiration, contempt, disgust, jealousy, ridicule. Community of emotion is a stronger bond of association between different objects, than community in any attribute not immediately interesting to the emotions, and ap- preciable only intellectually. Thus objects which have nothing else in common, except appeal to the same earnest emotion, will often be called by the same general name, and will be constituted members of the same class. To attend to attributes in any other point of view than in reference to the amount and kind of emo- tion which they excite, is a process uncongenial to ordinary taste : moreover, if any one brings together, in the same wording, objects really similar, but exciting opposite and contradictory emotions, he usually provokes either disgust or ridicule. All generalizations, and all general terms connoting them, are results brought together by association and comparison of particulars somehow resembling. But if we look at the process of associa- tion in an unreflecfing person, the resemblances which it fastens upon will be often emotional, not intellectual: and the gene- ralizations founded upon such resemblances will be emotional also.
It is against this natural propensity that Plato here enters his protest, in the name of intellect and science. For the purpose of obtaining a classification founded on real, intrinsic affinities, we
equal scientific position of στρατηγικὴ and φθειριστική, as two differen species
under the genus θηρεντική, is a strong j
illustration. Compare also Plato, Politikus, p.
A similar admonition is addressed (in the Parmenidés, p. D) by the old Parmenides to the you So- krates, when the latter cannot bring
himself to admit that there exist εἴδη or Forms of vulgar and repulsive ob- ects, such as θρὶξ and πῆλος. Neos γὰρ el ἔτι, καὶ οὕπω σοῦ ἀντείληπται φιλοσ fa ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ᾽ ἐμὴν
fay, οὐδὲν αὑτῶν ἀτιμάσεις " νῦν δ᾽ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.
See above, ch. xxvii. p. 60, in my review of the Parmenidés.
196
ΒΟΡΕΠΒΤΕΞ--ΡΟΙΣΙΤΙΚΌΒ,
CHap. ΧΧῚΤῚΧ
must exclude all reference to the emotions: we must take no account whether a thing be pleasing or hateful, sublime or mean :} we must bring ourselves to rank objects useful or grand in the same logical compartment with objects hurtful or ludicrous. We must examine only whether the resemblance is true and real, justifying itself to the comparing intellect: and whether the class-term chosen be such as to comprise all these resemblances, holding them apart (μόνον ἐχέτω χωρὶς) from the correlative and
opposing class.?
1 Compare Politikus, p. 266 D; Par- menidés, p. 130 E.
We see that Plato has thus both an- ticipated and replied to the objection of her (Ueber Platon’s Schriften, pp. 260-262), who is displeased with
e minuteness of this classification, and with the vulgar objects to which it is applied. Socher contends that this is unworthy of Plato, and that it was peculiar to the subtle Megaric philosophers.
It , on the contrary, that the purpose of illustrating the process of classification was not unworthy of Plato; that it was not unnatural to do this by allusion to vulgar trades or handicraft, at a time when no scientific
survey of physical facts had been
attempted ; that the allusion to such cal
vulgar trades is quite in the manner of Plato, and of Sokrates before him.
Stallbaum, in his elaborate Prolego- mena both to the Sophistés and to the Politikus, rejects the conclusion of Socher, and maintains that both dia- logues are the work of Plato. Yet he agrees toa certain extent in Socher’s premisses. He thinks that minuteness and over-refinement in classification were peculiarities of the Megaric phi- losophers, and that Plato intentionally pushes the classification into an ex- a me subtlety and minuteness, in order
parody their proceedings and turn themintoridicule. (Proleg. ad Sophist. pp. 32-36, ad Politic. pp. δ4.δ6.}
But how do Socher and Stallbaum know that this extreme minuteness of subdivision into classes was a charac- teristic of the Megaric philosophers? Neither of them produce any proof of it. Indeed Stallbaum himself say: most truly (Proleg. ad Politic. p. 55), ‘*Que de Megaricorum arte dialectica accepimus, sane quam sunt paucissima”, He might have added, that the little which we do hear about their dialectic,
” geems to have been wanting i
8, or cross-examining test,
is rather adverse to this supposed minuteness of positive classification, than consonant withit. What we hear is, that they were extremely acute and
subtle in contentious disputations—
able assailants of the tion of a logical opponent. ‘But talent nothing to do with minuteness of -
tive classification ; and is even in tive of a different turn of mind. More- over, we hear about Eukleides, the chief of the Megaric school, that he enlarged the ification of the Sum- mum Genus of Parmenides—the Ἔν καὶ Iladvy. Eukleides called it Unum, Bonun, Simile et Idem Soniper Deus, ἄς. But wedo not hear that Kukleides acknowledged a series of sae by loa enera or Species, expanding by - procession below this primary Unum. As far as we can j this
in hi- losophy. Yet it is exactly these subor- dinate Genera ar Species, which the Pla- tonic Sophistés and Politikus supply in abundance, and even excess, conform- ably to the recept laid down . by Plato in the Philébus (p. 1s) The words of the Sophist&s (p. 216 D) rather indicate that the Eleatic Stranger is declared not to Possess the character and attributes of Megaric disputation. 2 Though the advice here given by Plato about the principles of 68- tion is very judicious, yet he has him- self in this same dialogue set an ex- ample of repugnance to act mpon it. (Sophist. p. 231 A-B.) In following out his own descending series of parti- tions, he finds that the Sophist corre- spon with the great mental purifier— the person who applies the Elenchus to youthfui minds, so as to clear out that false per- suasion of knowledge which is the great bar to all improvement. But neh brought by own process to this point, Plato shrinks from ad-
CHap ΧΧΙΧ, THE PURIFYING ELENCHOS.
After these just remarks on classification generally, pursues the subdivision of his own theme. To purify the mind is to get rid of the evil, and retain or improve the good. Now evil is of two sorts—disease (injustice, intemperance, cowardice, &c.) and ignor-
ance. Disease, which in the body is dealt with by.
the physician, is in the mind dealt with by the judicial tribunal: ignorance (corresponding to ugli- ness, awkwardness, disability, in the body, which it
is the business of the gymnastic trainer to correct) its
falls under the treatment of the teacher or instructor.'
197
the Eleate
The purifier —a 8 under the.
Ignorance again may be distributed into two heads : one, though special, being so grave as to counterbalance all the rest, and requiring to be set apart by itself—that is—ignorance accom-
panied with the false persuasion of knowledge.’
To meet this special and gravest case of ignorance, we must
recognise a special division of the art of instruction or education. Exhortation, which is the common mode of instruction, and which was employed by our fore- fathers universally, is of no avail against this false persuasion of knowledge: which can only be ap- proached and cured by the Elenchus, or philosophical cross-examination. So long as a man believes him-
self to be wise, you may lecture for ever without to
making impression upon him: you do no good by supplying food when the stomach is sick. But the examiner, questioning him upon those subjects which
this worst modeof evil. Cross-exa-
mination, the shock of the Elen- chus, must be brought bear npon it. This is the sove- reign puri- fier.
he professes to know, soon entangles him in contradictions with himself, making him feel with shame and humiliation his own
mitting it. His dislike towards the SPE uscd Be tr ier IR p ” (he says “very like to this grand educato vat 80 also a wolf in ver very like to a ’ dog—the most savage of als to the most gentle. We must always be extremely careful about these likenesses : m whole body of them are most slippery . we cannot help admitting the ee
he had bee
extreme.
is the hugh and true bred Sophist: aye Θ and true οὖν α τί no pas It wil be seen that Place rer remark vat
here about ὁμοιότητες contradicts what e had himself
ἃ before (p. 227 B). κατειδότα τι, δοκεῖν εἰδέναι.
αὑτῆς ἀντίσταθμον μέρεσι. «
The reluctance to rank dog and wolf together, in the same class, is an exact specimen of that very mistake which n just pointing out for cor- rection. The scientific resemblan
ce
between the two animals is very close ; but the antithesis of sentiment, felt by men towards the one and the other, is
1 Plato, on pp. 228-229. ot does 229 C. ᾿Αγνοίας δ᾽ κῶ καὶ χαλεπὸν ἀφω-
ρισμένον ὁρᾷν εἶδος, πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις
. To μὴ
198
real ignorance. After having been thus disabused—a painful but indispensable process, not to be accomplished except by the Elenchus—his mind becomes open and teachable, so that positive instruction may be communicated to him with profit. The Elenchus is the grand and sovereign purification : whoever has not been subjected to it, were he even the Great King, is impure, unschooled, and incompetent for genuine happiness.!
SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. CHaP XXIX.
This cross-examining and disabusing process, brought to bear
Theapplica- tion of this
Elenchus is the work of th ;
e looked at on
about every thing—who off ood for trath.
upon the false persuasion of knowledge and forming the only antidote to it, is the business of the Sophist. looked at on its best side. But Plato will not allow the Elenchus, the great Sokratic accomplishment and
. Mission, to be shared by the Sophists: and he finds
or makes a subtle distinction to keep them off. The Sophist (so the Eleate proceeds) is a disputant, and teaches all his youthful pupils to dispute about every- thing as if they knew it—about religion, oronenys philosophy, arts, laws, politics, and everything else
He teaches them to argue in each department against the men of special science : he creates a belief in the minds of others that he really knows all those diffe-
rent subjects, respecting which he is able to argue and cross-
examine successfully : he thus both possesses, and imparts to his pupils, a seeming knowledge, an imitation and pretence of
reality. He is a sort of juggler:
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 230 D-E.
3 Plato, Sophist. p. 231 B. τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὃ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσο- φίαν γιγνόμενος ἐλεγχος ἂν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ ta παραφανέντι μ' ᾿ ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἡ γένει γενναία σοφισ-
hist. pp. 232-233 C, 235 lis us in the Platonic Apology at 23 A) that this was the exact effect which his own cross-exa- mination produced upon the hearers : they supposed him to be wise on those topics on which he exposed ignorance in’ others. The Memorabilia of Xeno- phon exhibit the same impression as made by the conversation of Sokrates, even when he with artisans on their own arts. Sokrates indeed fessed not to teach any one—an he certainly took no fee for teaching. But
an imitator who palms off
we see plainly that this disclaimer im- upon no one; that he did teach, phough gratuitously ; ; and that what he t was, theart of cross-examination and dispute. We learn this not merely from his enemy, Aristophanes, and from thep gs of his opponents, Kritias and Charikles (Xenoph. Memor. i. 2), but also from, his own Patatement in the Platonic A (pp. 330 a7 = 89 ΒΝ and from ne” D, @ 0 Xenophon throughout. Plato. is here puzzled to make out a clear line of distinction between the Elenchus of Sokrates, and the disputations arge ments of those Sophists whom he ΓῚ Eristic—a name deserved quite as much by Sokrates as by any of them. Plato here accuses the the Sop hists of talking upon &
subjects which they did not aN an many subjects whi eir pupils
Crap. ΧΧΙΧ. DIFFICULTIES RESPECTING NON-ENS. 199
upon persons what appears like reality when seen from a distance, but what is seen to be not like reality when contem- plated closely.
Here however (continues Plato) we are involved in a difficulty. How can a thing appear to be what it is not? How poubtstart- can a man who opines or affirms, opine or affirm οἷ by the falsely—that is, opine or affirm the thing that is not? can it be To admit this, we must assume the thing that is not possible (or Non-Ens, Nothing) to have a real existence. Such hoor al to an assumption involves great and often debated diffi- falsely. culties. It has been pronounced by Parmenides altogether inadmissible.*
We have already seen that Plato discussed this same question in the Thestétus, and that after trying and rejecting many suc- cessive hypotheses to show how false supposition, or false affirma- tion, might be explained as possible, by a theory involving no contradiction, he left the question unsolved. He now resumes it at great length. It occupies more than half* the dialogue. Near the close, but only then, he reverts to the definition of the Sophist. so
First, the Eleate states the opinion which perplexes him, and which he is anxious either to refute or to explain |. as away. (Unfortunately, we have no statement of the the investi- opinion, nor of the grounds on which it was held, feleproblem from those who actually held it.) Non-Ens, or Noth- by a series ing, is not the name of any existing thing, or of any questions. Something. But every one who speaks must speak something : therefore if you try to speak of Non-Ens, you are trying to speak nothing—which is equivalent to not speaking at all. Moreover,
to do the same. This is exactly what 4Plato, Sophist. p. 287 Ὲ The Sokrates passed his life in doing, and Eleate here recites this opinion, not as what he did better than any one—on his own but as entertained by others, the negative side. and as one which he did not clearly 1 Plato, Sophist. pp. 235-236. see through: in Republic (v. p. 478 ,? Plato, Sophist. pp. 236 E—237 A. B-C) we find Sokrates advancing 8 πάντα ταῦτά ἔστι μεστὰ ἀπορίας ἀεὶ similar doctrine as his own. So in the ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ Kai νῦν. Ὅπως Kratylus, where this same topic is dp εἰπόντα χρὴ ψενδὴ λέγειν ἢ δοξάζειν brought under discussion (pp. 429 D, ὄντως εἰναι, καὶ τοῦτο φθεγξαμενον 480 A), Kratylus is represented as ἐναντιολογίᾳ μὴ ξυνέχεσθαι, παντάπασι conten that false propositions were χαλεπόν... Τετόλμηκεν ὃ λόγος οὗτος impossible; that propositions, impro- ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὃν «εἶναι. ψευύδος γὰρ porly called false, were in reality com- οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ov. inations of sounds without any mean- 3 From p. D to p. 264 D. ing, like the strokes on a bell.
200 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. CHap. XXIX.
to every Something, you can add something farther: but to Non- Ens, or Nothing, you cannot add any thing. (Non-Entis nulla sunt preedicata.) Now Number is something, or included among the Entia : you cannot therefore apply number, either singular or plural, to Non-Ens: and inasmuch as every thing conceived or described must be either one or many, it is impossible either to conceive or describe Non-Ens. You cannot speak of it with- out falling into a contradiction. }
When therefore we characterise the Sophist as one who builds The Sophist up phantasms for realities—who presents to us what is not, as being like to what ἐδ, and as a false gubsti- tion and tute for what 7s—he will ask us what we mean? If, ethene. to illustrate our meaning, we point to images of things . epeak” in mirrors or clear water, he will pretend to be blind, falsely is | and will refuse the evidence of sense : he will require impossible. 45 to make out a rational theory explaining Non-Ens quireusto or Nothing.? But when we try to do this, we contra- rational dict ourselves. A phantasm is that which, not being aie a true counterpart of reality, is yet so like it as to be Non-Ens. mistaken for reality. Quatenus phantasm, it is Ens : quatenus reality, it is Non-Ens : thus the same thing is both Ens, and Non-Ens: which we declared before to be impossible.* When therefore we accuse the Sophist of passing off phantasms for realities, we suppose falsely: we suppose matters not existing, or contrary to those which exist : we suppose the existent not to exist, or the non-existent to exist. But this assumes as done what cannot be done: since we have admitted more than once that Non-Ens can neither be described in language by itself, nor joined on in any manner to Ens.*
Stating the case in this manner, we find that to suppose falsely, or affirm falsely, is a contradiction. But there is yet another possible way out of the difficulty (the Eleate con- tinues).
Let us turn for a moment (he says) from Non-Ens to Ens.
1 Plato, Sophist. pp. 238-239. 3 Plato, Sophist. p. 240 B..
2 Plato, Sophist. p. 239-240. κατα. 4 Plato, Sophist. p. 241 B. Eneworne, gov τῶν λόγων, ὅταν ὡς μὴ ὄντι τὸ Ψ προσάπτειν ἡμᾶτ᾽ P γὰρ λέποντι λέγῃς αὐτῷ, προσ ποιούμενος λάκις ἀναγκάζεσθαι διομολογησαμένους
οὔτε κάτοπτρα οὔτε ὕδατα γιγνώσκειν, οὔτε τὸ παράπαν ὄψιν" τὸ Bt ἐκ τῶν νῦν δή πον τοῦτο εἶναι πάντων ἀδυνατώ-
λόγων ἐρωτήσει σε μόνον.
Cuap. XXIX. DISSENTIENT VIEWS ABOUT ENS. 201
The various physical philosophers tell us a good deal a. mieate about Ens. They differ greatly among themselves. turns from Some philosophers represent Ens as triple, compris- ate he ing three distinct elements, sometimes in harmony, Ties of va- sometimes at variance with each other. Others tell losophers us that it is double—wet and dry—or hot and cold, *%oUt ἔπε. A third sect, especially Xenophanes and Parmenides, pronounce it to be essentially One. Herakleitus blends together the diffe- rent theories, affirming that Ens is both many and one, always in process of disjunction and conjunction : Empedokles adopts a similar view, only dropping the always, and declaring the process of disjunction to alternate with that of conjunction, so that Ens is sometimes Many, sometimes One.?
Now when I look at these various theories (continues the Eleate), I find that I do not follow or understand D them ; and that I know nothing more or better about about Ens Ens than about Non-Ens. I thought, as a young 819 85 reat man, that I understood both: but I now find that [ about understand neither. The difficulties about Ens are just as great as those about Non-Ens. What do these philoso- phers mean by saying that Ens is double or triple? that there are two distinct existing elements—Hot and Cold—or three? What do you mean by saying that Hot and Cold exst? Is existence any thing distinct from Hot and Cold? If so, then there are three elements in all, not two. Do you mean that existence is something belonging to both and affirmed of both ? Then you pronounce both to be One: and Ens, instead of being double, will be at the bottom only One.
Such are the questions which the Eleatic spokesman of Plato puts to those philosophers who affirm Ens to be w4,- plural : He turns next to those who affirm Ens to be Ensis Man singular, or Unum. Do you mean that Unum is Many, how identical with Ens—and are they only two names for Man the same One and only thing? There cannot be two about One distinct names belonging to one and the same thing: wh and yet, if this be not so, one of the names must be Theorists the name of nothing. At any rate, if there be only cannotsolve one name and one thing, still the name itself is aa
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 242 D-E. 3 Plato, Sophist. p. 243 B.
202 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cuar. XXIX. . Ι
different from the thing—so that duality must still be recog- nised. Or if you take the name as identical with the One | thing, it will either be the name of nothing, or the name of a name,!
Again, as to the Whole :—is the Whole the same with the Ens Unum, or different from it. We shall be told that it is the same : but according to the description given by Parmenides, the whole is spherical, thus having a centre and circumference, and of course having parts. Nowa whole divisible into parts may have unity predicable of it, as an affection or accident in respect to the sum of its parts: but it cannot be the genuine, essential, self-existent, One, which does not admit of parts or division. If Ens be One by accident, it is not identical with One, and we thus have two existent things: and if Ens be not really and essentially the Whole, while nevertheless the Whole exists—Ens must fall short of or be less than itself, and must to this extent be Non-Ens : besides that Ens, and Totum, being by nature distinct, we have more things than One existing. On the other hand, if we assume Totum not to be Ens, the same result will ensue. Ens will still be something less than itself ;—Ens. can never have any quantity, for each quantum is necessarily a whole in itself—and Ens can never be generated, since everything generated is also necessarily a whole.? |
Such is the examination which the Eleate bestows on the Theories of theories of those philosophers who held one, two, or those who a definite number of self-existent Entia or elements. recognise His purpose is to show, that even on their schemes, a definite Ens is just as unintelligible, and involves as many Entia or contradictions, as Non-Ens, And to complete the clomen ts. os same demonstration, he proceeds to dissect the theo- thereof. ries of those who do not recognise any definite or specific number of elements or Entia® Of these he distinguishes two classes ; in direct and strenuous opposition to each other, respecting what constituted Essentia.‘
First, the Materialist Philosophers, who recognise nothing
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 244 D. 4 Plato, Sophist. p. 246 A. ἔοικέ
. ἐν αντοις οἷον γιγαντομαχία TLE εἰνας 2 Plato, Sophist. p. 245 A-C. ἰὰ τὴν top ἥτησιν περὶ τῆς οὐσιας 3 Plato, Sophist. p. 245 E. πρὸς αλλήλους.
CuaP. XXiX. AGAINST THE MATERIALISTS.
as existing except what is tangible ; defining Essence as identical with Body, and denying all incorporeal essence. Plato mentions no names: but he means (according to some commentators) Leukippus and
203
1. The Ma- terialist Philoso- phers. 2.
e Friends of Forms or
ealists, who recog- nise stich Forms as the only real Entia.
Demokritus — perhaps Aristippus also. Secondly, other philosophers who, diametrically opposed to the Materialists, affirmed that there were no real Entia except certain Forms, Ideas, genera or species, incor- poreal and conceivable only by intellect: that true and real essence was not to be found in those bodies wherein the Materia- lists sought it: that bodies were in constant generation and dis- appearance, affording nothing more than a transitory semblance of reality, not tenable} when sifted by reason. By these last are understood (so Schleiermacher and others think, though in my udgment erroneously) Eukleides and the Megaric school of phi- losophers. |
The Eleate proceeds to comment upon the doctrines held by these opposing schools of thinkers respecting Essence | or Reality. It is easier (he says) to deal with the last-mentioned, for they are more gentle. With the —Justi Materialists it is difficult, and all but impossible, to deal at all. Indeed, before we can deal with them, we must assume them to be for this occasion better than they show themselves in reality, and ready to ἃ answer in a more becoming manner than they actually do.2 These Materialists will admit (Plato continues) ; that man existe—an animated body, or a compound %° of mind and body: they will farther allow that the mind of one man differs from that of another :—one is just, prudent, &., another is unjust and imprudent. One man is just, through the habit and presence of justice: another is unjust, through the habit and presence of injustice. But justice must surely be
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 246 B-C. νοητὰ μένων ῥᾷον" ἡμερώτεροι γάρ" παρὰ δὲ
ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἰδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν τῶν εἰς σῶμα πάντα ἑλκόντων Bia, ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώ- χαλεπώτερον: ἴσως δὲ καὶ σχε-
τα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν (i.¢ δὸν ἀδύνατον. ᾿Αλλ' ὧδέ μοι δοκεῖ the Materialists) ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ περὶ αὐτῶν δρᾷξβν . . . Μάλιστα μέν, διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς ἐς, γένεσιν εἴ πῃ δυνατὸν ἦν, ἔργῳ βελτίους avr οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγο- αὑτοὺς ποιεῖν" εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἐγχωρεῖ,
ρεύουσιν. λόγῳ ποιῶμεν, ὑποτιθέμενοι νομι- 2 Plato, Sophist. p. 346 C. παρὰ μὲν ύ Υ
μώτερον αὑτοὺς ἣ νὺν ἐθέλοντας τῶν ἂν εἴδεσιν αὐτὴν (τὴν οὐσίαν) τιθε: ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι.
204 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cuap. XXIX.
something—injustice also must be something—if each may be present to, or absent from, any thing ; and if their presence or absence makes so sensible a difference." And justice or injustice, prudence or imprudence, as well as the mind in which the one or the other inheres, are neither visible or tangible, nor have they any body : they are all invisible.
Probably (replies Theztétus) these philosophers would contend At least that the soul or mind had a body ; but they would be many of | ashamed either to deny that justice, prudence, &., concede existed as realities—or to affirm that justice, pru- this point, dence, &c., were all bodies? These philosophers all. is must then have become better (rejoins the Eleate): for the primitive and genuine leaders of them will incorporeal. 20t concede even so much 88 that. But let us accept Ens is equi- the concession. If they will admit any incorporeal potentia- reality at all, however small, our case is made out.
ty. For we shall next call upon them to say, what there is in common between these latter, and those other realities which have bodies connate with and essential to them—to justify the names real—essence—bestowed upon both.? Perhaps they would accept the following definition of Ens or the Real—of Essence or Reality. Every thing which possesses any sort of power, either to act upon any thing else or to be acted upon by any thing else, be it only for once or to the smallest degree —every such thing is true and real Ens. The characteristic mark or definition of Ens or the Real is, power or potentiality.*
The Eleate now turns to the philosophers of the opposite Argument | school—the Mentalists or Idealists,—whom he terms else the friends of Forms, Ideas, or species.© These men
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 247 Α. ᾿Αλλὰ τε τούτοις ἅμα καὶ en’ exeivors ὅσα ἔχει μὴν τό γε δυνατόν τῷ πα αγίγνεσθαι σῶμα ξυμφνὲς γεγονός, εἰς ὃ. βλέποντες καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι, πάντως elvat τι φή- ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγονσι, τοῦτο αὑτοῖς σουσιν.
2 Plato, Sophist. p . 247 B. ᾿Αποκρί- Ps Plato, Sophist. _P. 247 D-E. λέγω vovTas .. . THY μὲν Wuxi ν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν κεκτημένον 8 v- σφίσι. σῶμά τι κεκτῇ αι, φρόνησιν δὲ ναμιν, εἴτ᾽ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὧν ἠρώτηκας, ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτ᾽ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾷν ἢ μηδὲν τῶν ome ότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτον, way
ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν, ἣ παντ᾽ εἶναι νον εἰσάπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι. σώματα διΐσχνρ τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν τὰ ὄντα, ὡς Sp Plato, Sphist. p- p. 247 C-D. ei γάρ ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύ ναμις.
τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγ- 5 Plato, Sophist. p. 248 A. τοὺς τῶν χωρεῖν ἀσώματον, efapxat. τὸ yap ἐπί εἰδῶν φίλους.
CaP. XXIX. COMMUNION—RELATIVITY.
(he says) distinguish the generated, transitory and changeable—from Ens or the Real, which is eternal, unchanged, always the same: they distinguish gene- ration from essence. With the generated (according to their doctrine) we hold communion through our bodies and our bodily perceptions: with Ens, we hold communion through our mind and our intellec- tual apprehension. But what do they mean (con- tinues the Eleate) by this “holding of communion”? Is it not an action or a passion produced by a certain
205
who distin- ish Ens rom the generated, and say that we hold communion with the former through our minds, with the latter, through our bodies and senses.
power of agent and patient coming into co-operation with each other? and is not this the definition which we just now laid
down, of Ens or the Real.
No—these philosophers will reply—we do not admit your
definition as a definition of Ens: it applies only to the generated. Generation does involve, or emanate from, a reciprocity of agent and patient: but neither power nor action, nor suffering, have any application to Ens or the Real. But you admit (says the Eleate) that the mind knows Ens :—and that Ens is known by the mind. Now this knowing, is it not an action —and is not the being known, a passion? If to know is an action, then Ens, being known, is acted
upon, suffers something, or undergoes some change,— th
which would be impossible if we assume Ens to be
Holding communion Tmplies es
Relativity. Ens is known by the mind. It therefore suffers—or undergoes change. Ens in- cludes both
e un
changeable and the
eternally unchanged. These philosophers might re- °o#>sesble. ply, that they do not admit to know as an action, nor to be known as ἃ passion. They affirm Ens to be eternally unchanged, and they hold to their other affirmation that Ens is known by the mind. But (urges the Eleate) can they really believe that Ens is eternally the same and unchanged,—that it has neither life, nor mind, nor intelligence, nor change, nor movement? This is incredible. They must concede that Change, and the Change- able, are to be reckoned as Entia or Realities : for if these be not so reckoned, and if all Entia are unchangeable, no Ens can be an object of knowledge to any mind. But though the changeable belongs to Ens, we must not affirm that all Ens is changeable. There cannot be either intellect or knowledge, without something constant and unchangeable. It is equally necessary to recognise
206 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. " Cmap. ΧΣΙΣ.
something as constant and unchangeable — something else as moving and changeable: Ens or reality includes alike one and the other. The true philosopher therefore cannot agree with those “ Friends of Forms” who affirm all Ens or Reality to be at rest and unchangeable, either under one form or under many :— still less can he agree with those opposite reasoners, who main- tain all reality to be in perpetual change and movement. He will acknowledge both and each—rest and motion—the constant and the changeable—as making up together total reality or Ens Totum.
Still, however, we have not got over our difficulties. Motion and Rest are contraries; yet we say that each and Restare both are Realities or Entia. In what is it that they both of . : ς - them Entia both agree? Not in moving, nor in being at rest, but Goth agree simply in existence or reality. Existence or reality in Ens. Ens therefore must be a tertiwm quid, apart from motion ioe ferss™ and reat, not the sum total of those two items. Ens or the Real is not, in its own proper nature, either how can in motion or at rest, but is distinct from both. Yet aryiet® °° how can this be? Surely, whatever is not in motion, from both? must be at rest—whatever is not at rest, must be in motion. How can any thing be neither in motion nor at rest; standing apart from both?!
Here the Eleate breaks off his enquiry, without solving the pro- Herethe blems which he has accumulated. My purpose was eat, on (he says?) to show that Ens was just as full of diffi- without culties and embarrassments as Non-Ens. Enough has Hedeclares been said to prove this clearly. When we can once his w, get clear of obscurity about Ens, we may hope to be That Ensis equally successful with Non-Ens. puzzle as Let us try (he proceeds) another path. We know non-Ens. = that it is a common practice in our daily speech to Argument apply many different predicates to one and the same
who subject. We say of the same man, that he is far, prodication tall, just, brave, &c., and several other epithets. be legiti- Some persons deny our right to do this. They say cept{iden- that the predicate ought always to be identical with
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 250 C. 3 Plato, Sophist. p. 260 Ὁ.
Cuap. XXIX. INTERCOMMUNION OF FORMS. 207
the subject: that we can only employ with propriety (ical, How such propositions as the following—man is man— admit of good is good, &c.: that to apply many predicates to iMtercom- one and the same subject is to make one thing into with each many things.' But in reply to these opponents, as : well as to those whom we have before combated, we shall put before them three alternatives, of which they must choose one. 1. Either all Forms admit of intercommunion one with the other. 2. Or no Forms admit of such intercommunion. 3. Or some Forms do admit of it, and others not. Between these three an option must be made.?_,
If we take the first alternative—that there is no intercom- munion of Forms—then the Forms motion and rest can have no intercommunion with the Forms, essence communion or reality. In other words, neither motion nor rest betveenany exist: and thus the theory both of those who say Forms. that all things are in perpetual movement, and of Common those who say that all things are in perpetual rest, {Poe becomes unfounded and impossible. Besides, these with this very men, who deny all intercommunion of Forms, ype are obliged to admit it implicitly and involuntarily in their common forms of speech. They cannot carry on a conversation without it, and they thus serve as a perpetual refutation of their own doctrine.®
The second alternative—that all Forms may enter into com- munion with each other—is also easily refuted. If Reciprocal this were true, motion and rest might be put together: intercom. motion would be at rest, and rest would be in motion Munion of —which is absurd. These and other forms are con- we trary to each other. They reciprocally exclude and repudiate all intercommunion.‘
Remains only the third alternative—that some forms admit of intercommunion—others not. This is the real truth someForms (says the Eleate). So it stands in regard to letters Dimit of and words in language: some letters come together in munion, words frequently and conveniently—others rarely and This is
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 261 B. ὡς 3 Plato, Sophist. Ὁ. 251 E. ἀδύνατον τά Te πολλὰ ἕν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ 3 Plato, Sophist. p. 252 D. εἶναι, ἄς. 4 Plato, Sophist. p. 252 E.
208 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. CuaP. XXIX. the only ς awkwardly — others never do nor ever can come doctrine. together. The same with the combination of sounds Analogy of to obtain music. It requires skill and art to deter-
, syllables.
mine which of these combinations are admissible.
So also, in regard to the intercommunion of Forms, skill and
art are required to decide which of them will come
Ai are together, and which will not. In every special art aistin ito and profession the case is similar: the ignorant man what forme will fail in deciding this question—the man of special intercom- _ skill alone will succeed.—So in regard to the inter- munionand communion of Forms or Genera universally -with donot. This each other, the comprehensive science of the true cialintelli philosopher is required to decide! To note and gence of the study these Forms, is the purpose of the philosopher her, Who | in his dialectics or ratiocinative debate. He can bright trace the one Form or Idea, stretching through 8 region of ογραξ many separate particulars ; he can Sophist the it from all different Forms: he knows which Forms darkness of are not merely distinct from each other, but incapable
of alliance and reciprocally repulsive—which of them
are capable of complete conjunction, the one circumscribing and comprehending the other—and which of them admit conjunction partial and occasional with each other. The philosopher thus keeps close to the Form of eternal and unchangeable Ens or Reality—a region of such bright light that the eyes of the vulgar cannot clearly see him: while the Sophist on the other hand is also difficult to be seen, but for an opposite reason—from the darkness of that region of Non-Ens or Non-Reality wherein he carries on his routine-work.®
We have still to determine, however (continues Plato), what
Hecomes this Non-Ensor Non-Reality is. For this purpose we to enquae will take a survey, not of all the Forms or Genera, Ensis. He but of some few the most important. We will begin takes for . . .
examina- With the two before noticed — Motion and Rest
1 Plato, , Sophist. p. 253 B. dp’ οὐ per ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύεσθαι τὸν ὀρθῶς μέλλοντα δείξειν ποῖα ποίοις συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα ov δέχεται ;
, Sophist. p. 253 Ὁ-
2 Plato.
γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ Χογισμῶν προσκείμενος, ἰδέᾳ, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὖ τῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὐ πέτης ὀφθῆναι." τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ὄμματα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφορῶντα ὕνατα.
3 Plato, Sophist. p. 254 A. Ὁ δέ
CHap. XXIX. IDEM-—DIVERSUM. 909
(= Change and Permanence), which are confessedly tion five irreconcileable and reciprocally exclusive. Ens how- principal
ever enters into partnership with both: for both of Motion— ΚΡ them are, or exist.' This makes up three Forms or —Same— Genera—Motion, Rest, Ens: each of the three being Different. the same with itself, and different from the other two. Here we have pronounced two new words—Same—Different.? Do these words designate two other Forms, over and above the three before-named, yet necessarily always intermingling in partner- ship with those three, so as to make five Forms in all? Or are these two—Same and Different — essential appendages of the three before-named? This last question must be answered in the negative. Same and Different are not essential appendages, or attached as parts, to Motion, Rest, Ens. Same and Different may be predicated both of Motion and of Rest: and whatever can be predicated alike of two contraries, cannot be an essential portion or appendage of either. Neither Motion nor Rest there- fore are essentially either Same or Different: though both of them partake of Same or Different—i.e, come into accidental co-partnership with one as well as the other.* Neither can we say that Ens is identical with either Idem or Diversum. Not with Idem—for we speak of both Motion and Rest as Entia or Existences: but we cannot speak of them as the same. Not with Diversum—for different is a name relative to something else from which it is different, but Ens is not thus relative. Motion and Rest ure or exist, each in itself: but each is different, relatively to the other, and to other things generally. Accordingly we have here five Forms or Genera—Ens, Motion, Rest, Idem, Diversum: each distinct from and independent of all the rest.‘
This Form of Diversum or Different pervades all the others : for each one of them is different from the others, not porm of through any thing in its own nature, but because it Diversum partakes of the Form of Difference.’ Each of the five at the “ is different from others: or, to express the same fact thers
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 254 ἢ. τὸ δέ ye 3 Plato, Sophist. p. 255 B. μετέχε- ὃν ὃν μικτὸν ἀμφοῖν. ἐστὸν γὰρ ἄμφω τον μὴν ἄμφω ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρον oe
Μὴ τοίννν λέγωμεν κίνησίν ty ww? Plato, Sophist. p. 254 Ε. τί wor’ rary ἢ δάτερον, μηδ᾽ τῇ Shy, res
αὖ viv οὕτως εἰρήκαμεν τό τε ταὐτὸν Plato, Sophist. p. 255 D. καὶ θάτερον ; πότερα δύο γένη τινὲ αὐτώ, 5 Plato, Sophist. Pp. 255 E. καὶ διὰ τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἄλλω, ὥς. πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν εἶναι
3—14
210 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. __ Cusp. XXIX.
in other words, each of them 4s not any one of the others. Thus motion is different from rest, or ἐδ not rest: but nevertheless motion ἐδ or exists, because it partakes of the Form— Ens. Again, Motion is different from Idem: it is not the Same: yet nevertheless it 1s the same, because it partakes of the nature of Idem, or is the same with itself. Thus then both predications are true respecting motion: it 4s the same: it ts not the same, because it partakes of or enters into partnership with both Idem and Diversum.' If motion in any way partook of Rest, we - should be able to talk of stationary motion : but this is impos- sible: for we have already said that some Forms cannot come into intercommunion—that they absolutely exclude each other. Again, Motign is different not only from Rest, and from Idem, Motionis but also from Diversum itself. In other words, it is different both Diversum in a certain way, and also not Diver- oris sum: different and not different.? As itis different not Diver- , from Rest, from Idem, from Diversum—so also it is is different different from Ens, the remaining one of the five in other forms or genera. In other words Motion is not Ens, words, itis __oris Non-Ens. It is both Ens, and Non-Ens: Ens, Each of so far as it partakes of Entity or Reality—Non-Ens, Formsis 80 far as it partakes of Difference, and is thus different and Non. ‘rom Ens as well as from the other Forms. The same Ens. may be said of the other Forms,—Rest, Idem, Diver- sum: each of them is Ens, because it partakes of entity or reality : each of them is also Non-Ens, or different from Ens, because it partakes of Difference. Moreover, Ens itself is different from the other four, and so far as these others go, it is Non-Ens.*‘ Now note the consequence (continues the Eleate). When we By Non- Speak of Non-Ens, we do not mean any thing con- Ens, wedo trary to Ens, but only something different from Ens.
anything When we call any thing not great, we do not affirm it
διεληλυθυῖαν (τὴν θατέρον φύσιν) ἕν viv δὴ λόγον.
ἕκαστον γὰρ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, 3 Plato, Sophist. p. 266 Ὁ. οὐκοῦν "ov διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ δὴ σαϑῶς ἡ κίνησις ὅ ὄντως. οὐκ ὃν ἐστι καὶ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρον. ὃν, ἐπείπερ τοῦ ὄντος μετέχει;
to, Sophist. p. 256 Α. τὴν ‘Plato, Sophist. p. 257 A. καὶ τὸ
κίνησιν δὴ ταὐτόν τ' εἶναι καὶ μὴ ταὐτὸν ὅν ἄρ᾽ ἡμῖν, ὅσα περ ἔστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ ὁμολογητέον καὶ ov δυσχεραντέον, &C. τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὃν ἕν
2Ρ᾽αίο, Sophist. p. 256 C. οὐχ μὲν αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀπέραντᾳ δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἕτερον ἄρ᾽ ἐστι πῃ καὶ ἕτερον κατὰ τὸν τἄλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὖ.
Caap. ΧΧΙΧ. NON-ENS 18 EXPLAINED. 211 to be the contrary of great, or to be little: for it may contrary to perhaps be simply equal: we only mean that it is oes Gay different from great.! A negative proposition, gene- something rally, does not signify anything contrary to the pre- from Ens. dicate, but merely something else distinct or different NOt as well as
from the predicate.* The Form of Different, though
Ens.
of one and the same general nature throughout, is distributed into many separate parts or specialties, according as it is attached to different things. Thus not beautiful is a special mode of the general Form or Genus Different, placed in antithesis with another Form or Genus, the beautiful. The antithesis is that of one Ens or Real thing against another Ens or Real thing: not beautiful, not great, not just, exist just as much and are quite as real, as beautiful, great, just. If the Different be a real Form or Genus, all its varieties must be real also. Accordingly Diffe- rent from Ens-is just as much a real Form as Ens itself: * and this is what we mean by Non-Ens :—not any thing contrary to Ens.
Here then the Eleate professes to have found what Non-Ens is: that it is a real substantive Form, numerable among the other Forms, and having a separate con- stant nature of its own, like not beautiful, not great :4 that it is real and existent, just as much as Ens, beautiful, great, &c. Disregarding the prohibition of
The Eleate claims to haverefuted Parmenides, and to have shown both that Non-
Parmenides, we have shown (says he) not only that Ens isa real . “ae ‘orm, and Non-Ens exists, but also what itis. Many Forms or also what 1
Genera enter into partnership or communion with each other ; and Non-Ens is the partnership between Ens and
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B. Ὁπόταν τὸ μὴ ὃν λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ évav- τίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον μόνον . . . Οἷον ὃ ὅταν εἰπωμέν τι μὴ περι ἅττ᾽ ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα μέ γα, τότε μᾶλλόν τί σοι “φαινόμεθα τὸ ὕστερον τῆς ἀπο
σμικρὸν ἢ ἢ ἣ τὸ ἴσον δηλοῦν τῷ ῥήματι. 3 Plato, Sophi
μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τι μηνύει τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὐ προτιθέμενα τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων
σεως ὀνόματα.
t. p. 258 B. , ἥ τῆς
here means to imply that τὸ σμικρὸν is the real cont of τὸ μέγα. When we say μὴ μέγα, We do ποῦ neces- sarily mean σμικρόν — we yea mean ἴσον. Therefore τὸ μὴ μέγα does not (πὰ his view) imply the “tontrary of μέγα. Plato, Sophist, p. 267 Β. Οὐκ ép ἐναντίον, ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγηται, ση- μαίνειν συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ
θατέρον μορίον φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων ἀντί- θεσις οὐδὲν ττον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος ουσία ἐστίν" οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ἕτερον ἐκείνον.
4 Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B-C. τὸ μὴ ὃν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον
. ἐνάριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος ἕν.
212 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Diversum. Diversum, in partnership with Ens, is (exists), in consequence of such partnership :—yet ἐξ ἐξ not that with which it is in partnership, but different therefrom—and being thus different from Ens, it is clearly and necessarily Non-Ens : while Ens also, by virtue of its partnership with Diversum, is different from al] the other Forms, or +s not any one of them, and to this extent therefore Ens is Non-Ens. We drop altogether the idea of contrariety, without enquiring whether it be reasonably justi- fiable or not : we attach ourselves entirely to the Form—Diffe- rent.
Let those refute this explanation, who can do 80 (continues the Eleate), or let them propose a better of their own, if
Caap. XXIX.
now they can : if not, let them allow the foregoing as pos- pagorasd sible? Let them not’ content themselves with multi- fs swe plying apparent contradictions, by saying that the dicationasa same may be in some particular respect different, and exes that the different may be in some particular respect with a ΤΆ the same, through this or the other accidental attri- rent from bute.* All these sophisms lead but to make us believe
—That no one thing can be predicated of any other— That there is no intercommunion of the distinct Forms one with another, no right to predicate of any subject a second name and ‘the possession of a new attribute—That therefore there can be no dialectic debate or philosophy, which is all founded upon such intercommunion of Forms.‘ We have shown that Forms do
1 Plato, Sophist.
p. 258 E—259 A. a dilemma which the Sokrates of the ἡμεῖς γὰρ περὶ μὲν ἐναντίον τινὸς αὐτῷ
Theetétus, and other dialogues, would have declined altogether. The com-
χαίρειν πάλαι λέγομεν, εἴτ᾽ ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ. λόγον ἔχον ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἅλογον,
τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μετασχὸν τοῦ ὄντος ἔστι μὲν δια ταύτην τὴν μέθεξιν, οὐ μὴν ἐκεῖνο γε οὗ μέτεσχεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον, ὅτερον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ὃν ἐστι σαφέστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ dv, ἄς.
2 Plato, Sophist. p. 259 A-C. ὃ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ Ov, ἣ πεισάτω τις ὡς οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν ἐλέγξας, ἣ μέχρι περ ἂν ἀδυνατῇ, λεκτέον καὶ ἐκεί- νῷ καθάπερ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν .. . τὸ ταῦτα ἑάσαντα ὡς 8vvara....
The language of the Eleate here is al er at variance with the spirit of in his negative or Searchi
es. To say, as he does, ‘‘ Kither accept the explanation which I give
οἵ propose 8, of your own”—is
laint here made by the Eleate, against
isputants who did nothing but pro- pound difficulties—is the same as which the hearers of Sokrates made against him (see Plato, Phil&bus, p. 20 A, where the remark is put into the mouth, not of pare eae but ofa respectful young listener); and man a reader of the Platonic Parmenidés has indulged in the complaint.
5 Plato, Sophist. p. 269 Ὁ. ἐκείνῃ καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνο ὅ φησι τούτων πεπονθέναι πότερον.
_ 4 Plato, Sophist. p. 259 B, E. διὰ γὰρ THY ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν. : of μηδὲν ἐῶντες κοινωνίᾳ παθήματος ἑτέρον θάτε- βον προσαγορεύειν.
Cuap. XXIX. ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSITION. 213
really come into conjunction, so as to enable us to conjoin, truly and properly, predicate with subject, and to constitute proposi- tion and judgment as taking place among the true Forms or Genera. Among these true Forms or Genera, Non-Ens is in- cluded as one.!
The Eleate next proceeds to consider, whether these two Genera or Forms—Proposition, Judgment, Opinion, gnquiry on the one hand, and Non-Ens on the other—are whother the among those which may or do enter into partnership Non-Ens and conjunction with each other. For we have ad- into inter- mitted that there are some Forms which cannot come communion into partnership ; and the Sophist against whom we Forms of are reasoning, though we have driven him to concede Gnition that Non-Ens is a real Form, may still contend that Judgment. it is one of those which cannot come into partnership with Pro- position, Judgment, Opinion—and he may allege that we can neither embody in language, nor in mental judgment, that which as not.?
Let us look attentively what Proposition, Judgment, Opinion, are. As we said about Forms and letters, so about words : it is not every combination of words which is Proposition. possible, so as to make up a significant proposition. position A string of nouns alone will not make one, nor a must havea string of verbs alone. To compose the simplest pro- verb—it position, you must put together at least one noun and oat et one verb, in order to signify something respecting Something. things existing, or events past, present, and future. sitions in- Now every proposition must be a proposition about yolve the something, or belonging to a certain subject : every Non-Ens, in proposition must also be of a certain quality.‘ Thee- the parti- tétus is sitting down—Theetétus rs flying. Here are cular sub- two propositions, both belonging to the same subject, but with opposite qualities: the former true, the latter false. The true proposition affirms respecting Theztétus real things as they are; the false proposition affirms respecting him things
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 260 A. πρὸς τὸ 3 Plato, Sophist. pp. 261-262. τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν τῶν Srey ἕν τι γενῶν 4 Plato, Sophist. p. 262 E. λόγον εἶναι. 958 BS: τὸ μὴ ὃν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ὅταν περ Tl, τινὸς εἶναι λόγον - αὑτοῦ binvi ἔχ μὴ δέτινος ἀδύνατον . . . Οὐκοῦν καὶ 2 Plato, Sophist. p. 260 C-D-E. ποῖόν τινα αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ;
214 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cuar. XXIX.
different from real, or non-real, as being real. The attribute of fying is just as real in itself as the attribute of sttting: but as respects Theztétus, or as predicated concerning him, it is diffe- rent from the reality, or non-real.’ But still Thesetétus is the subject of the proposition, though the predicate flying does not really belong to him: for there is no other subject than he, and without a subject the proposition would be no proposition at all. When therefore different things are affirmed as the same, or non- realities as realities, respecting you or any given subject, the proposition so affirming is false.*
As propositions may be true or false, so also opinion or judg- Opinion, |§ ment or conception, may be true or false: for opinion Judgment, or judgment is only the concluding result of delibera- areakinto tion or reflection—and reflection is the silent dialogue great be of the mind with itself: while conception or phantasy
also, by into 18 the coalescence or conjunction of opinion with pre- partnership sent perception. Both opinion and conception are
‘Form Non- akin to proposition. It has thus been shown that . ᾿ Ens. false propositions, and false opinions or judgments, are perfectly real, and involve no contradiction : and that the Form or Genus—Proposition, Judgment, Opinion—comes pro- perly and naturally into partnership with the Form Non-Ens.
This was the point which Plato’s Eleate undertook to prove against Parmenides, and against the plea of the Sophist founded on the Parmenidean doctrine.
Here Plato closes his general philosophical discussion, and It thus ap- reverts to the process of logical division from which ears that he had deviated. In descending the predicamental iroitating steps, to find the logical place of the Sophist, Plato Truth,is had reached a point where he assumed Non-Ens, tc-
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 263 B. "Ὄντων Οὐκοῦν ἔπειπερ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἦν καὶ δέ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ. ψευδής, τούτων δ᾽ ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν hat is, ἕτερα τῶν ovrwy,—being the αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψνχῆς διάλογος, δόξα explanation given by Plato of ra μὴ δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, φαίνετᾶι δὰ ὄντα. ὃ λέγομεν ζφαντοσίο σύμμιξις αἰσθή- - σεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων
? Plato, Sophist. p. 263 Ὁ. τῷ λόγῳ ξυγγενῶν ὄντων ψευδῆ τε αὐτῶν
3 Plato, Sophist. pp. 263-264. 264A-B: ἔνια καὶ ἐνίοτε εἶναι;
CHap. XXIX. IMITATORS.
gether with false propositions and judgments affirm- ing Non-Ens. To which the Sophist is conceived as replying, that Non-Ens was contradictory and impos- sible, and that no proposition could be false. On these points Plato has produced an elaborate argu- ment intended to refute him, and to show that there was such a thing as falsehood imitating truth, or
passing itself off as truth : accordingly, that there.might be an
art or profession engaged in producing such falsehood.
Now the imitative profession may be distributed who know what they imitate—and those who imitate without knowing.! The man who mimics your figure
into those
cal dis- tribution of tors—
‘or voice, knows what he imitates: those who imitate Πα the figure of justice and virtue often pass themselves imitate
off as knowing it, yet do not really know it, having nothing better than fancy or opinion concerning it. Of these latter again—(1.c. the imitators with mere opinion, but no knowledge, respecting that which they imitate)—there are two classes: one, those who
sincerely mistake their own mere opinions for know- to
ledge, and are falsely persuaded that they really know : the other class, those who by their perpetual occupation in talking, lead us to suspect and appre- hend that they are conscious of not knowing things, which nevertheless they discuss before others as if they did know.’
Of this latter class, again, we may recognise two sections :
those who impose upon a numerous audience by long discourses on public matters : and those who in pri- vate, by short question and answer, compel the person conversing with them to contradict himself. The
man of long discourse is not the true statesman, but ἢ
the popular orator: the man of short discourse, but without any real knowledge, is not the truly wise
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 267 A-D.
Plato, Sophist. p. 268 A. τὸ δὲ 6a- τέρον σχῆμα, διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κυλίνδησιν, ἔχει πολλὴν ὑποψίαν καὶ φόβον ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸς τοὺς ζοντα τὸ σ ἄλλους ὡς εἰδὼς ἐσχημάτισται. γεῖν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ.
Last class divided— Those whe impose on numerous auditors by dis-
Those who
3 Plato, Sophist. p. 268 B. τὸν μὲν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλήθη δυνατὸν «ἱρωνεύεσθαι κ ῶ re δὲ ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ βραχέσι λόγοις ἀναγκά- ζοντα τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον ἐναντιολο-
αθορῶ " τὸν
SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cuar. XXIX.
man, since he has no real knowledge—but the imi- tator of the wise man, or Sophist.
We have here the conclusion of this abstruse and complicated dialogue, called Sophistés. It énds by setting forth, as the leading characteristics of the So- phist—that he deals in short question and answer 80 as to make the respondent contradict himself: That he talks with amall circles of listeners, upon a large variety of subjects, on which he possesses no real knowledge: That he mystifies or imposes upon his auditors ; not giving his own sincere convictions, but talking for the production of a special effect. He is ἐναντιοποιολογικὸς and εἴρων, to employ the two original Platonic words, neither of which is easy to translate.
I dare Bay that there were some acute and subtle disputants These cha- in Athens to whom these characteristice belonged, though we do not know them by name. But we
may hare know one to whom they certainly belonged: and that ocr was, Sokrates himself. They stand manifest and pro- belonged in Minent both in the Platonic and in the Xenophontic an especial dialogues. The attribute which Xenophon directly manner to predicates about him, that “in conversation he dealt himself.
with his interlocutors just as he pleased,”! is amply exemplified by Plato in the Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthyphron, Lachés, Charmides, Lysias, Alkibiadés I. and II., Hippias I. and II., &c. That he cross-examined and puzzled every one else without knowing the subjects on which he talked, better than they did—is his own declaration in the Apology. That the
1 Xen. Memor. i. 2, 14, rots δὲ διαλε- ομένοις αὐτῷ πᾶσι χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς Χόγοις ὃ ὅπως βούλοιτο.
Compare, to the same pu where we are told that Sokrates em- ployed his colloquial Elenchus as a means of chastis (κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα) those who thought that they knew every thing; and the conversation of Sokrates with the youthful Euthy- démus, especially what is said by Xenophon at the close of it (iv. 4,
se, i. 4,1,
The power of Sokrates to vanquish in dialogue the persons called Sophists, and to makethem contradict themselves in answering—is clearly brought out, and doubtless intentionally | rought out, in some of Plato’s most consum- mate dialogues. Alkibiades says, in the Platonic Protagoras (p. 836 ᾿ τὰν ἀγορὰ confesses himself no ma a or oras in long speaking. Protagoras on his side confesses him- self inferior to Sokrates in dialogue, Sokrates is satisfied.”
Crap. XXIX.
SOKRATES A SOPHIST.
217
Athenians regarded him as a clever man mystifying them— talking without sincere persuasion, or in a manner s0 strange that you could not tell whether he was in jest or in earnest— overthrowing men’s established convictions by subtleties which led to no positive truth—is also attested both by what he him- self says in the Apology, and by other passages of Plato and
Xenophon.!
Moreover, if we examine not merely the special features ed to the Sophist in the conclusion of the dia- he condi-
logue, but also those indicated in the earlier part of it, we shall find that many of them fit Sokrates as e well as they could have fitted any one else. If the ng ofa Sophists hunted after rich young men,? Sokrates did the same ; seeking opportunities for conversation with them by assiduous frequentation of the palestre, as well as in other ways. We see this amply attested
tions enu- merated in
better than any other known person.
by Plato and Xenophon :* we see farther that Sokrates announces
1 Plato, Apolog. p. 87 E. ἐαν re γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν tour’ ἔστιν καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, ov «είσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνενομέ
Xen. Memor. iv. 4, 9. (says Hippias to _Sokrates ἄλλων κατα τ ἐρωτῶν καὶ ἐ; ων» πάντας, ovr ς δὲ οὐδενὶ θέλων ὑπέχειν ν, οὐδὲ μην ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ eres. Soe’ alue Memorab. iii. BA.
mpare a striking passage in , Menon, p. 80 A; also Thezetét. p. 149; and Plutarch, ” Quest. Platonic. p.
10 The attribute εἰρωνεία, which Plato here declares as one of the main cha- racteristics of the Sophists, is applied to Sokrates in a ver, special manner, not merely in the Platonic dialogues but also by Timon in the fragmen of his 5111 remaining—Avrh ἐκείνη ἡ εἰωθυα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτονς (Plato, Repub. i. p. 337 A); and --προῦ ov ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσοις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον roe ots 7 ἀποκρί voto, εἴ τις ἷί σε ἐρωτᾷ. So also in the Sym- posion, p 216 EK, Alkibiades says about
εἰρωνενόμενος δὲ καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν βίον gins, τοὺς ἀνθρώ:
πονς διατελε. And Gorgi rian (
In another part of the By Kallikles phon, does Sokrates mean seriously
᾿ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ) ὅτι τῶν
ον
says, ‘ Tell me,
what he says, or is he banterin
σπουδάζει ταῦτα me Hig εὖ tagoras,
not seem to have been ραν ane ATE as
far 3 our scanty knowledge § goes.
6 WO εἴρων, εἰρωνικός, εἰρωνεία seem to include more is implied in our words irony, ironical. Schieier- macher translates the words ἁπλοῦν μιμήτην, εἰρωνικὸν μιμή ν, 2 6 en οἵ the Sophistés, by ‘“‘den ehrlichen,
n Schlauen, Nachahmer”’ ; ; which seems to me near the truth h, meaning one who either speaks what he does not think, or evades speaking what he does think, in order to serve some
special PSP lato, phist. p. 298.
cir καὶ ἐνδόξων θήρα.
3 In the opening words, of the Pla- tonic Protagoras, we read as a ques- tion from the friend or companion of Sokrates, Πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνει; 4 ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίον τοῦ περὶ τὴν
᾿Αλκιβιάδον ὦ See also the ning of the Char- midés, Lysis, “Albibiad s I., and the speech of Alkibiades in the Symposi Compare also Xenophon, emora iv. 2, 1-2-6, with the comnnencenent of the Platonic Protagoras ; in which the youth Hippokrates, far from being ran r by ras, described as an ont usiastic usiastic admirer of
9”
are
νέων wAov-
918 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cuarp. XXIX.
it as a propensity natural to him, and meritorious rather than otherwise. Again, the argumentative dialogue—disputation or eristic reduced to an art, and debating on the general theses of just and unjust, which Plato notes as characterising the Sophists! —belonged in still higher perfection to Sokrates. It not only formed the business of his life, but is extolled by Plato else- where,’ as the true walk of virtuous philosophy. But there was undoubtedly this difference between Sokrates and the Sophists, that he conversed and argued gratuitously, delighting in the pro- cess itself: while they both asked and received money for it. Upon this point, brought forward by Plato both directly and with his remarkable fertility in multiplying indirect allusions, the peculiarity of the Sophist is made mainly to turn. To ask or receive a fee for communicating knowledge, virtue, aptitude in debate, was in the view of Sokrates and Plato a grave enormity : a kind of simoniacal practice.*
We have seen also that Plato assigns to what he terms “ the thoroughbred and noble Sophistic Art” (ἡ γένει γενναία
The
which Plato σοφιστικὴ), the employment of the Elenchus, for the thorough. purpose of destroying, in the minds of others, that bredand false persuasion of existing knowledge which was the phi tical radical impediment to their imbibing acquisitions of longs to real knowledge from the teacher.‘ Here Plato draws
that Sophist from reputation alone, and lyricee poesoos asseclis, Simonide, Pin-
to Protagoras (Protag. pp. 810-311). 1 Plato, Sophist. p. 225 C. Τὸ δέ ye
ἔντεχνον καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλως ἀμφισ- βητοῦν.
Spengel says truly—in his Σνυναγωγὴ Texvav, p. 40—‘S Quod si sermo et locus hic esset de Sophistarum doc- triné et philosophid, odium quod nunc vulgo in eos vertunt, majore ex parte sine causa et ratione esse conceptum,
as erly soliciting Sokrates to pre- sent him ᾿ 1
2 Plato, Thesetet. Ὁ. 175 C.
810 is to be remembered, however, that Plato, though doubtless no fee, received presents from - mirers like Dion and Dionysius: and there were various teachers who found presents more lucrative than _ fees. ““M. Antonius Guipho fuisse dicitur ingenii magni, memorize si , nec minus Grecé, quam Latiné, doctus : preeterea comi facilique natur&, nec
st iets gle Guan, αν ΟΝ τ ce one os esse censendos — hau » multa cum oper& exponi posset. Sic, mat. 7.) (Sueton. De Mlustr. Gram-
quo proscinduntur convicio, juvenes non nisi magno pretio eruditos esse, levissimum est; immo hoc sophistas sux ipsorum scientiz satis confisos esse neque eam despexisse, docet: et vitium, si modo vitium dicendum, com- mune est vel potius ortum optimis
4 Plato, Sophist. p. 230 D. πρὶν ay ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἱσ- ύνην καταστήσας, τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμποδίονς δόξας ἐξελών, καθαρὸν awo- vy καὶ ταῦτα ἡγούμενον, ἅπερ οἷδεν εἰδέναι μόνα, πλείω δὲ μή.
CHap. XXIX. PRETENCE OF UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE. 219
a portrait not only strikingly resembling Sokrates, Sokrates but resembling no one else. As far as we can make one else. out, Sokrates stood alone in this original conception 7he Klen- of the purpose of the Elenchus, and in his no less peculiar to original manner of working it out. To prove to gorasand others that they knew nothing, is what he himself Frodikus represents to be his mission from the Delphian oracle. Sophists in Sokrates is a Sophist of the most genuine and noble pense. stamp: others are Sophists, but of a more degenerate variety. Plato admits the analogy with reluctance, and seeks to attenuate it." We may remark, however, that according to the characte- ristic of the true Sophist here given by Plato, Protagoras and Prodikus were less of Sophists than Sokrates. For though we know little of the two former, yet there is good reason to believe, That the method which they generally employed was, that of continuous and eloquent discourse, lecture, exhortation: that disputation by short question and answer was less usual with them, and was not their strong point: and that the Elenchus, in the Sokratic meaning, can hardly be said to have been used by them at all. Now Plato, in this dialogue, tells us that the true and genuine Sophist renounces the method of exhortation as un- profitable ; or at least employs it only subject to the condition of having previously administered the Elenchus with success, as his own patent medicine.* Upon this definition, Sokrates is more truly a Sophist than either Protagoras or Prodikus: neither of whom, so far as we know, made it their business to drive the respondent to contradictions.
Again, Plato tells us that the Sophist is a person who disputes about all matters, and pretends to know all matters : respecting the invisible Gods, respecting the visible ,nowledge Gods, Sun, Moon, Stars, Earth, &c., respecting tran- ; was Pro scendental philosophy, generation and essence—and that time by respecting all civil, social, and political questions— ,ophers— and respecting special arts. On all these miscel- Plato, Ari- laneous topics, according to Plato, the Sophists pre- tended to be themselves instructed, and to qualify their disciples for arguing on all of them.
1 Plato, Sopkist. p. 231 C. 3 Plato, Sophist. p. 280 E.
220 SOPHISTES—-POLITIKUS. Cuap. XXIX.
Now it is possible that the Sophists of that day may have pre- tended to this species of universal knowledge; but most certainly Plato and Aristotle did the same. The dialogues of Plato em- brace all that wide range of topics which he tells us that the Sophists argued about, and pretended to teach. In an age when the amount of positive knowledge was so slender, it was natural for a clever talker or writer to fancy that he knew every thing. In reference to every subject then discussed, an ingenious mind could readily supply deductions from both hypotheses—gene- ralities ratiocinative or imaginative—strung together into an apparent order sufficient for the exigencies of hearers. There was no large range of books to be studied ; no stock of facta or experience to be mastered. Every philosopher wove his own tissue of theory for himself, without any restraint upon his intel- lectual impulse, in regard to all the problems then afloat. What the theories of the Sophists were, we do not know: but Plato, author of the Timzus, Republic, Leges, Kratylus, Menon—who affirmed the pre-existence as well as post-existence of the mind, and the eternal self-existence of Ideas—has no fair ground for reproaching them with blamable rashness in the extent and diversity of topics which they presumed to discuss. They ob- tained indeed (he says justly) no truth or knowledge, but merely a fanciful semblance of knowledge—an equivocal show or imita- tion of reality.! But Plato himself obtains nothing more in the Timeus : and we shall find Aristotle pronouncing the like con- demnation on the Platonic self-existent Ideas. If the Sophists professed to be encyclopedists, this was an error natural to the age ; and was the character of Grecian philosophy generally, even in its most illustrious manifestations.
Having traced the Sophist down to the character of a man of Inconsis. “elusion and imposture, passing off appearance as if it tency of were reality, and falsehood as if it were truth—Plato
1 Plato, Sophistés, p. 233 Ὁ. δοξα- us about the impression made by his στικὴν ἄρα τινὰ wept πάντων ἐπιστήμην own dialectics or refutative conversa- ὃ σοφιστὴς ἡμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀληθείαν tion, Plato, Apolog. p. 23 A. . ἔχων ἀναπέφανται. 234 B: μιμήματα ἐκ ταύτησι δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως πολλαὶ καὶ ὁμώνυμα τῶν ὄντων. μὲν ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἷαι
When the Eleate here says about the χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται͵ ὥστε πολ- Sophists (p. 283 B), δοκοῦσι πρὸς ταῦτα Ads διαβολὰς ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν έναι, ὄνο- ἐπιστημόνως ἔχειν αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἅπερ μά τε τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σι εἶναι" οἵον- ἀντιλέγουσιν, this is exactly what So- rac yap pe ἑκαστοθ᾽ οἱ παρόντες ταῦτ᾽ krates, in the Platonic Apology, tells εἶναι σοφὸν ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω.
Caar. XXIX. DOCTRINE OF ANTISTHENES. 221
(as we have seen) suddenly turns round upon himeelf, Plato's a gu
and asks how such a character is possible. He repre- Sophistés. sents the Sophist as maintaining that no man could fete ehist speak falsely'—that a false proposition was self- [68 disputa- contradictory, inasmuch as Non-Ens was inconceivable who chal- and unutterable. I do not see how the argument lensesovery which Plato here ascribes to the Sophist, can be re- speaking conciled with the character which he had before given He says also of the Sophist—as a man who passed his life in dis- Sopbist ia putation and controversy : which involves the per- one who petual arraigning of other men’s opinions as false. A false pro- professed disputant may perhaps be accused of ad- Positions mitting nothing to be true: but he cannot well be possible. charged with maintaining that nothing is false.
, To pass over this inconsistency, however—the reasoning of Plato himself on the subject of Non-Ens is an inte- Reasoning resting relic of ancient speculation. He has made for οἵ Plato himself an opportunity of canvassing, not only the Ens—No doctrine of Parmenides, who emphatically denied Prodicstions Non-Ens—but also the opposite doctrine of other identical schools. He farther comments upon a different opinion, ad- vanced by other philosophers—That no proposition can be admitted, in which the predicate is different from the subject : That no proposition is true or valid, except an identical proposi- tion. You cannot say, Man is good: you can only say, Man is Man, or Good is good. You cannot say—Sokrates is good, brave, old, stout, flat-nosed, &c., because you thereby multiply the one Sokrates into many. One thing cannot be many, nor many things one.?
This last opinion is said to have been held by Antisthenes, one of the disciples of Sokrates. We do not know how Misconcep- he explained or defended it, nor what reserves he tion of the may have admitted to qualify it. Plato takes no theeopula in pains to inform us on this point. He treats the Predication. opinion with derision, as an absurdity. We may conceive it as one of the many errors arising from a misconception of the purpose and function of the copula in predication. Antisthenes
1 Plato, Sophist. pp. 240-241. Com- 2 Plato, Sophist. p. 251 B-C. Com- pare 200 E. pare Plato, Philébus, p. 14 C.
223 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cuap. XXIX.
probably considered that the copula implied identity between the predicate and the subject. Now the explanation or definition of man is different from the explanation or definition of. good : accordingly, if you say, Man is good, you predicate identity between two different things: as if you were to say Two is Three, or Three is Four. And if the predicates were multiplied, the contradiction became aggravated, because then you predicated identity not merely between one thing and another different thing, but between one thing and many different things. The opinion of Antisthenes depends upon two assumptions—That each separate word, whether used as subject or as predicate, de- notes a Something separate and existent by itself: That the copula implies identity. Now the first of these two assumptions is not unfrequently admitted, even in the reasonings of Plato, Aristotle, and many others: while the latter is not more re- markable than various other erroneous conceptions which have been entertained, as to the function of the copula.
What is most important to observe is—That at the time which No formal we are here discussing, there existed no such sciences Logie exist. as either grammar or formal logic. There was a edatthat copious and flexible language—a large body of litera- analysisor ture, chiefly poetical—and great facility as well as classifica- felicity in the use of speech for the purposes of com-
ns | munication and persuasion. But no attempt had yet worksof been made to analyse or theorise on speech : to dis- Aristotle. tinguish between the different functions of words, and to throw them into suitable classes: to generalise the conditions of good or bad use of speech for proving a conclusion : or to draw up rules for grammar, syntax, and logic. Both Pro- tagoras and Prodikus appear to have contributed something towards this object, and Plato gives various scattered remarks going still farther. But there was no regular body either of grammar or of formal logic : no established rules or principles to appeal to, no recognised teaching, on either topic. It was Aristotle who rendered the important service of filling up this gap. I shall touch hereafter upon the manner in which he pro- ceeded : but the necessity of laying down a good theory of predication, and precepts respecting the employment of proposi- tions in reasoning, is Lest shown by such misconceptions as this
CHap. XXIX. DIFFICULTIES RESPECTING ENS. 223
of Antisthenes ; which naturally arise among argumentative men yet untrained in the generalities of grammar and logic.
Plato announces his intention, in this portion of the Sophistés, to confute all these different schools of thinkers, to piato’s de- whom he has made allusion.’ His first purpose, in “red pur- reasoning againet those who maintained Non-Ens to Sophistas— be an incogitable absurdity, is, to show that there are the various equal difficulties respecting Ens: that the Existent schools of is just as equivocal and unintelligible as the Non- Antis- Existent. Those who recognise two co-ordinate and menides, elementary principles (such as Hot and Cold) main- δ Ma. | tain that both are really existent, and call them both, &. — Entia. Here (argues Plato) they contradict themselves: they call their two elementary principles one. What do they mean by existence, if this be not so ?
Then again, Parmenides—and those who affirm that Ens Totum was essentially Unum, denying all plurality—had diffi- culties on their side to surmount. Ens could not be identical with Unum, nor was the name Js, identical with the thing named Ens. Moreover, though Ens Unum was Totum, yet Totum was not identical with Ens or with Unum. Totwm necessarily implied partes: but the Unum per se was indivisible or implied absence of parts. Though it was true therefore that Ens was both Unum and Totum, these two were both of them essentially different from Ens, and belonged to it only by way of adjunct accident. Parmenides was therefore wrong in saying that Unum alone existed.
The reasoning here given from Plato throws some light upon the doctrine just now cited from Antisthenes. You piato’s retu- cannot say (argues Plato against the advocates of tation light duality) that two elements (Hot and Cold) are both of upon the them Entia or Existent, because by so doing you call doctrine of them one. You cannot say (argues Antisthenes) that thenes. Sokrates is good, brave, old, &c., because by such speech you call one thing three. Again, in controverting the doctrine of Par-
Δ Plato, Sophist. p. 251 C-D. “Iva καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅσοις ἔμπροσθεν τοίνυν πρὸς ἅπαντας ἡμῖν ὃ λόγος διειλέγμεθα, τὰ νῦν ὡς ἐν ἐρωτήσει τοὺς πώποτε περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὁτιοῦν λεχθησόμενα. ιαλεχθέντας, ἔστω καὶ πρὸς τούτονς
924 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cuar. XXIX.
menides, Plato urges, That Ens cannot be Unum, because it is Totum (Unum having no parts, while Totum has parts): but it may carry with it the accident Unum, or may have Unum applied to it as a predicate by accident. Here again, we have difficulties similar to those which perplexed Antisthenes. For the same reason that Plato will not admit, That Ens ς Unum— Antisthenes will not admit, That Man ts good. It appeared to him to imply essential identity between the predicate and the subject.
All these difficulties and others to which we shall come pre- sently, noway peculiar to Antisthenes—attest the incomplete formal logic of the time: the want of a good theory respecting predication and the function of the copula.
Pursuing the purpose of establishing his conclusion (viz. That Plato's Ens involved as many perplexities as Non-Ens), Plato argument comes to the two opposite sects:—1l. Those (the
terialists. Materialists) who recognised bodies and nothing else, as the real Entiaor Existences. 2. Those (the Friends of Forms, the Idealists) who maintained that incorporeal and intelligible Forms or Species were the only real existences ; and that bodies had no existence, but were in perpetual generation and destruc- tion.!
Respecting the first, Plato says that they must after all be _ ashamed not to admit, that justice, intelligence, &c., are some-
thing real, which may be present or absent in different individual men, and therefore must exist apart from all individuals. Yet justice and intelligence are not bodies. Existence therefore is something common to body and not-body. The characteristic mark of existence is, power or potentiality. Whatever has power to act upon any thing else, or to be acted on by any thing else, is a real Ens or existent something.”
Unfortunately we never know any thing about the opponents Reply open οἷ Plato, nor how they would have answered his ob- to the S jection—except so much as he chooses to tell us. But
it appears to me that the opponents whom he is here
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 246 B. ; τατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φανλοτάτον, κἂν εἰ μόνον 2 Plato, Sophist. p. 247 D-E. λέγω εἰσάπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι τίθεμαι δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν κεκτημένον δύνα: γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ
uty, εἴτ᾽ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν ἄλλοτι πλὴν δύναμις. πεφυκὸς εἴτ᾽ εἰς τὸ παφεῖν καὶ σμικρό-
Crap. XXIX. MATERIALIST REPLY. 225
confuting would have accepted his definition, and employed it for the support of their own opinion. “We recognise (they would say) just men, or hard bodies, as existent, because they conform to your definition: they have power to act and be acted upon. But justice, apart from just men—hardness, apart from hard bodies—has no such power: they neither act upon any thing, nor are acted on by any thing: therefore we do not recog- nise them as existent.” According to their view, objects of perception acted on the mind, and therefore were to be recog- nised as existent : objects of mere conception did not act on the mind, and therefore had not the same claim to be ranked as existent : or at any rate they acted on the mind in a different way, which constitutes the difference between the real and unreal, Of this difference Plato’s definition takes no account.! Plato now presents this same definition to the opposite class of philosophers : to the Idealists, or partisans of the in- Plato's corporeal—or of self-existent and separate Forms, Srgnment | These thinkers drew a marked distinction between Idealiats the Existent and the Generated—between Ens and of Forms, Fiens—ré ὃν and rd γιγνόμενον. Ens or the Exis- Their point tent was eternal and unchangeable: Fiens or the Generated was always in change or transit, coming or going. We hold communion (they said) with the generated or transitory, through our bodies and sensible perceptions: we hold commu- nion with unchangeable Ens through our mind and by intellec- tion. They did not admit the definition of existence just given by Plato. They contended that that definition applied only to Fiens or to the sensible world—not to Ens or the intelligible world.? Fiens had power to act and be acted upon, and existed only under the condition of being so: that is, its existence was only temporary, conditional, relative: it had no permanent or absolute existence at all. Ens was the real existent, absolute and independent—neither acting upon any thing nor being acted upon. They considered that Plato’s definition was not a defini- tion of Existence, or the Absolute: but rather of Non-Existence, or the Relative.
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 247 E. τὸ καὶ oro UV κε ένον δύναμιν, ἄς. 3 Plato, Sop 1 F248 C. WOLAVOUY κεκτημένον αμι
3—15
926 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cnoar. XXIX.
But (asks Plato in reply) what do you mean by “the mind Platoargues holding communion” with the intelligible world ? ~-That to, You mean that the mind knows, comprehends, con- sobekuown ceives, the intelligible world : or in other words, that is trthesion, the intelligible world (Ens) is known, is compre- amodeof hended, is conceived, by the mind. To be known or relativity. conceived, is to be acted on by the mind.? Ens, or the intelligible world, is thus acted upon by the mind, and has a power to be so acted upon: which power is, in Plato’s definition here given, the characteristic mark of existence. Plato thus makes good his definition as applying to Ens, the world of intelligible Forms—not less than to Fiens, the world of sensible phenomena.
The definition of existence, here given by Plato, and the way in which he employs it against the two different sects of philogo- phers—Materialists and Idealists—deserves some remark.
According to the Idealists or Immaterialists, Plato’s definition Plato's rea- Of existence would be supposed to establish the case soning of their opponents the Materialists, who recognised withthe nothing as existing except the sensible world: for points of Plato's definition (as the Idealists thought) fitted the both. sensible world, but fitted nothing else. Now these Idealists did not recognise the sensible world as existent at all. They considered it merely as Fiens, ever appearing and vanish- ing. The only Existent, in their view, was the intelligible world — Form or Forms, absolute, eternal, unchangeable, but neither visible nor perceivable by any of the other senses. This is the opinion against which Plato here reasons, though in various other dialogues he gives it as his own opinion, or at least, as the opinion of his representative spokesman.
In this portion of the present dialogue (Sophistés) the point which he makes is, to show to the Idealists, or Absolutists, that their Forms are not really absolute, or independent of the mind : that the existence of these forms is relative, just as much as that of the sensible world. The sensible world exists relatively to our senses, really or potentially exercised : the intelligible world
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 248 Ὁ. εἰ προσο- γινώσκειν ἣ γιγνώσκεσθαι φατὲ ποίημα ἣ ἀολογοῦσι τὴν μὲν ψνχὴν γινώσκειν, τὴν πάθος ἣ ἀμφότερον ; ὃ οὐσίαν γιγνώσκεσθαι... Τίδέ; τὸ
Cap. XXIX. THE IDEALISTS. 927
exists relatively to our intelligence, really or potentially exer- cised. In both cases alike, we hold communion with the two worlds: the communion cannot be left out of sight, either in the one case or in the other. The communion is the entire and fun- damental fact, of which the Subject conceiving and the Object conceived, form the two opposite but inseparable faces—the con- cave and convex, to employ a favourite illustration of Aristotle. Subject conceiving, in communion with Object conceived, are one and the same indivisible fact, looked at on different sides. This is, in substance, what Plato urges against those philosophers who asserted the absolute and independent existence of intelli- gible Forms. Such forms (he says) exist only in communion with, or relatively to, an intelligent mind: they are not absolute, not independent: they are Objects of intelligence to an intelli- gent Subject, but they-are nothing without the Subject, just as the Subject is nothing without them or some other Object. Object of intelligence implies an intelligent Subject : Object of sense implies a sentient Subject. Thus Objects of intelligence, and Objects of sense, exist alike relatively to a Subject—not absolutely or independently.
This argument, then, of Plato against the Idealists is an argu-
ment against the Absolute—showing that there can
The argu- be no Object of intelligence or conception without its nent Os obverse side, the intelligent or concipient Subject. toan entire The Idealists held, that by soaring above the sensible “enialof the world into the intelligible world, they got out of the and. ful region of the Relative into that of the Absolute. But ment of the
ive,
Plato reminds them that this is not the fact. Their
intelligible world is relative, not less than the sensible ; that is, it exists only in communion with a mind or Subject, but with a Cogitant or intelligent Subject, not a percipient Subject.
The argument here urged by Plato coincides in its drift and
result with the dictum of Protagoras—Man is the coincidenc measure of all things. In my remarks on the Thez- οἵ his argu- tétus,! I endeavoured to make it appear that the Pro- the doctrine tagorean dictum was really a negation of the Absolute, of Frotago-
Theetétus.
of the Thing in itself, of the Object without a Sub-
1See my notice of the Theetfétus, where I have adverted to Plato's rea-
in the chapter immediately preceding, soning in the Sop
228 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. CuaPp. XXIX.
ject :—and an affirmation of the Relative, of the Thing in com- munion with a percipient or concipient mind, of Object impli- cated with Subject—as two aspects or sides of one and the same conception or cognition. Though Plato in the Thestétus argued at length against Protagoras, yet his reasoning here in the Sophistés establishes by implication the conclusion of Protagoras. Here Plato impugns the doctrine of those who (like Sokrates in his own Theetétus) held that the sensible world alone was relative, but that the intelligible world or Forms were absolute. He shows that the latter were no less relative to a mind than the former ; and that mind, either percipient or cogitant, could never be eliminated from “communion” with them.
These same Idealist philosophers also maintained — That
The Idea-
changeable, y un- changeable.
Forms, or the intelligible world, were eternally the same and unchangeable. Plato here affirms that this opinion is not true: he contends that the intelligible
. world includes both change and unchangeableness,
motion and rest, difference and sameness, life, mind, intelligence, &c. He argues that the intelligible world, whether assumed as consisting of one Form or of many Forms, could not be regarded either as wholly changeable or wholly unchangeable: it must comprise both constituents alike. If all were change- able, or if all were unchangeable, there could be no
Object of knowledge ; and, by consequence, no knowledge.' But the fact that there ὦ knowledge (cognition, conception), is the fundamental fact from which we must reason ; and any conclu- sion which contradicts this must be untrue. Therefore the intelligible world is not all homogeneous, but contains different and even opposite Forms—change and unchangeableness—motion and rest—different and same.?
Let us now look at Plato’s argument, and his definition of
Plato’s rea- soning t the teria- lists.
existence, as they bear upon the doctrine of the opposing Materialist philosophers, whom he states to have held that bodies alone existed, and that the Incorporeal did not exist :—in other words that all
real existence was concrete and particular: that the abstract
1 Plato,
περὶ μηδενὸς
Sophist. p. 24 249 B. ξυμβαίνει δ᾽ οὖν ἀκινήτων τε ὄντων νοῦν μηδενὶ
2 Plato, Sophist. p. 249 Ὁ.
Cuap. ΧΧΙΧ. THE MATERIALISTS. 229
(universals, forms, attributes) had no real existence, certainly no separate existence. As I before remarked, it is not quite clear what or how much these philosophers denied. But as far as we can gather from Plato’s language, what they denied was, the existence of attributes apart from a substance. They did not deny the existence of just and wise men, but the existence of justice and wisdom, apart from men real or supposable.
In the time of Plato, distinction between the two classes of words, Concrete and Abstract, had not become 80 Difference clearly matter of reflection as to be noted by two Between appropriate terms: in fact, logical terminology was and Ab- yet in its first rudiments. It is therefore the less then made matter of wonder that Plato should not here advert to conspicu- the relation between the two, or to the different sense mean in which existence might properly be predicable of by Piato to both. He agrees with the materialists or friends of 's—com- the Concrete, in affirming that sensible objects, Man, not only Horse, Tree, exist (which the Idealists or friends of Pdjecta of the Abstract denied): but he differs from them by vt Objects saying that other Objects, super-sensible and merely tionbesides. intelligible, exist also—namely, Justice, Virtue, Whiteness, Hardness, and other Forms or Attributes. He admits that these last-mentioned objects do not make themselves manifest to the senses ;.but they do make themselves manifest to the intelli- gence or the conception : and that is sufficient, in his opinion, to authenticate them as existent. The word existent, according to his definition (as given in this dialogue), includes not only all that is or may be perceived, but also all that is or may be known by the mind; %.¢., understood, conceived, imagined, talked or reasoned about. Existent, or Ens, is thus made purely relative : having its root in a Subject, but ramifying by its branches in every direction. It bears the widest possible sense, co-extensive with Object universally, either of perception or conception. It includes all fictions, as well as all (commonly called) realities. The conceivable and the existent become equivalent.
Now the friends of the Concrete, against whom Plato reasons, used the word existent in a narrower sense, 88 COM- Narrower prising only the concretes of the sensible world. ivan be
They probably admitted the existence of the abstract, Materialists
230 SOPHISTES——POLITIE US. CaaPp. XXIX.
to Ens— along with and particularised in the concrete: but cluded only they certainly denied the separate existence of the priecttion, Abstract—i.c., of Forms, Attributes, or classes, apart Their rea- from particulars.) They would not deny that many opposed to things were conceivable, more or less dissimilar from Ρ the realities of the sensible world: but they did ποῖ admit that all those conceivable things ought to be termed existent or realities, and put upon the same footing as the sensible world. They used the word existent to distinguish between Men, Horses, Trees, on the one hand—and Cyclopes, Centaurs, Τραγέλαφοι, &c., on the other. A Centaur is just as intelligible and conceivable as either a man or a horse; and according to this definition of Plato, would be as much entitled to be called really existent. The attributes of man and horse are real, because the objects themselves are real and perceivable: the class man and the class horse is real, for the same reason : but the attributes of a Centaur, and the class Centaurs, are not real, because no indi- viduals possessing the attributes, or belonging to the class, have ever been perceived, or authenticated by induction. Plato’s Materialist opponents would here have urged, that if he used the word existent or Ens in so wide a sense, comprehending all that is conceivable or nameable, fiction as well as reality—they would require some other words to distinguish fiction from reality— Centaur from Man: which is what most men mean when they speak of one thing as non-existent, another thing as existent. At any rate, here is an equivocal sense of the word Ens—a wider and a narrower sense—which we shall find frequently perplexing us in the ancient metaphysics; and which, when sifted, will often prove, that what appears to be a difference of doctrine, is in reality little more than a difference of phraseology."
1 Plato here aspires to deliver one more or less remote, with each other. definition of Ens, applying to all cases. See Aristot. Metaphys. 4. 1017, a. 7, The contrast between him and Ari- οἱ ΥΨί. 1028,8.10. stotle is shown in the more cautious t is declared by Aristotle to be the procedure of the latter, who entirely question first and most disputed in renounces the possibility of giving any Philosophia Prima, Quid est Ens? one definition fitting cases. Ari- καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ stotle declares Ens to be an equivocal ζητούμενον καὶ ἀεὶ axopov ν, τοῦτο word (ὁμώνυμον), and discriminates ἔστι, τίς ἡ οὐσία (p. 1028, Ὁ. 2). Com- several different significations which pare, B. 1001, ἃ. 6, 31. it bears: all these significations having This subject is well treated by nevertheless an analogical affinity, Brentano, in his Dissertation Ueber
ΒΑΡ. XXIX. EQUIVOCAL MEANINGS OF &NS. 931
This enquiry respecting Ens is left by Plato professedly unsettled ; according to his very frequent practice. He pretends only to have brought it to this point: definitions that Ens or the Existent is shown to present as many by Piato— difficulties and perplexities as Non-Ens or the non- tie Mate existent. I do not think that he has shown thus the Idea- much ; for, according to his definition, Non-Ens is an ΤΥ δ impossibility : the term is absolutely unmeaning: it is equiva- lent to the Unknowable or Inconceivable—as Parmenides affirmed it to be. But he has undoubtedly shown that Ens is in itself perplexing: which, instead of lightening the difficulties about Non-Ens, aggravates them: for all the difficulties about Ens must be solved, before you can pretend to understand Non- Ens. Plato has shown that Ens is used in three different meanings :---
1. According to the Materialists, it means only the concrete and particular, including all the attributes thereof, essential and accidental.
2. According to the Idealists or friends of Forms, it means only Universals, Forms, and Attributes.
3. According to Plato’s own definition here yiven, it means both the one and the other: whatever the mind can either perceive or conceive: whatever can act upon the mind in any way, or for any time however short. It is therefore wholly relative to the mind: yet not exclusively to the percetving mind (as the Materialists said), nor exclusively to the conceiving mind (as the friends of Forms said): but to both alike.
Here is much confusion, partly real but principally verbal, about Ens. Plato proceeds to affirm, that the diffi- Plato's culty about Non-Ens is no greater, and that it admite fiews about of being elucidated. The higher Genera or Forms examined. (he says) are such that some of them will combine or enter into communion with each other, wholly or partially, others will not,
die Bedeutung des Seienden im Ari- Essence are graduated, according to stoteles. See pp. 49-50 seq., of that Aristotle: Complete, Proper, typical, work. οὐσία, stands at the h ; there are
Aristotle observes truly, that these then other varieties more or less ap- most general terms are the most con- p ing to this proper type: some venient hiding-places for equivocal of them which πικρὸν ἥ οὐθὲν ἔχει τοῦ meaning (Anal. Post. ii. 97, b. 29). ὄντος. (Metaphys. vi. 1029, Ὁ. 9.)
The analogical varieties of Ens or 1 Plato, Sophist. p. 250 K..
232 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. CHap. XXIX.
but are reciprocally exclusive. Motion and Rest will not enter into communion, but mutually exclude each other: neither of them can be predicated of the other. But each or both of them will enter into communion with Existence, which latter may be predicated of both. Here are three Genera or Forms: motion, rest, and existence. Each of them is the same with itself, and different from the other two. Thus we have two new distinct Forms or Genera—Same and Different—which enter into commu- nion with the preceding three, but are in themselves distinct from them.' Accordingly you may say, motion partakes of (or enters into communion with) Diversum, because motion differs from rest: also you may say, motion partakes of Idem, as being iden- tical with itself: but you cannot say, motion ts different, motion as the same ; because the subject and the predicate are essentially distinct and not identical?
Some things are always named or spoken of per se, others with reference to something else. Thus, Diversum is always different from something else: it is relative, implying a correlate? In
1In the Timseus (pp. 35-86-87), Plato declares these three elemente— Tavrév, @drepoy, Ovcia—to be the three constituent elements of the cos- mical soul, and of the human rational
soul.
3 Plato, Sophist. p. 255 B.
Meréxeroy μὴν ἄμφω (κίνησις καὶ ord- σις) ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρον. . ..
My τοίνυν λέγωμεν κίνησίν y εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἢ θάτερον, μηδ᾽ αὖ στάσιν. He had before said—'AAA’ οὔ τι μὴν κίνησίς
ε καὶ στάσις οὐθ᾽ ἕτερον οὔτε ταὐτόν y στιν (p. 255 A).
Plato here says, It is true that «- νησις μετέχει ταὐτοῦ, but it is not true t κίνησίς ἐστι ταὐτόν. Again, p. 369 A τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μετασχὸν τοῦ pyres ἔστ ‘, μὲν διὰ ταύτην τὴν μέθεξιν, ov μὴν ἐκεῖνό ye οὗ μετέσχεν ἀλλ᾽ érepov. He understands, there- fore, that ἐστι, when used as copula, implies identity between the predicate and the subj
This is the same point. of view from which Antisthenes looked, when he denied the propriety of saying ᾿Ανθρω- wos ἐστιν @ abs “ΓΑνθρωπὸς ἐστι κακός: and when he admitted only identical propositions, such as “Avépw- πός ἐστιν avOpwros—Ayabds ἐστιν ἀγαθός. He assumed that ἐστι, when intervening between the subject and
the predicate, implies identity be- tween them; and the same assump- tion is made by Plato in the
now before us. Whether Antisthenes would have allowed the proposition— ΓΑνθρωπος μετέχει κακίας, or other propositions in which ἐστι does not appear as copula, we do not know enough of his opinions to say.
Compare Anistotel Physic. i. 2, 185, b. 27, with the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 330, a. 381, b. 18-28, ed. Brandis.
3 Plato, Sophist. p. 255 C-D. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὑτὰ καθ᾿ αὑτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀεὶλέγεσθαει.. .. Τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον . . . Nov δὲ ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν 6, τι περ ἂν ἕτερον ἧἥ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρου τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι. These last words partly anticipate Aristotle's explana- tion of ra πρός τι (Categor. p. 6, ἃ.
Here we have, for the first time so far as I know (certainly anterior to Aristotle), names relative and names non-relative, distinguished as classes, and contrasted with each other. It is to be observed that Plato here uses λέγεσθαι and εἶναι as equivalent; which is not very consistent with the sense which he assigns to ἐστιν in predica- tion: see the note immediately pre-
ceding.
Cuap. XXIX. COMMUNION BETWEEN FORMS. 933
this, as well as in other points, Diversum (or Different) is a dis- tinct Form, Genus, or Idea, which runs through all other things whatever. Each thing is different from every other thing: but it differs from them, not through any thing in its own nature, but because it partakes of the Form or Idea of Diversum or the Different.1. So, in like manner, the Form or Idea of Idem (or Same) runs through all other things: since each thing is both different from all others, and is also the same with iteelf.
Now motion is altogether different from rest. Motion there- fore ts not rest. Yet still motion 1s, because it par- |... takes of existence or Ens. Accordingly, motion both of of the velect és, and is not. | ive Forms.
Again, motion is different from Idem or the Same. It is there- fore not the same. Yet still motion ts the same ; because every thing partakes of identity, or is the same with itself. Motion therefore both ts the same and ἐδ not the same. We must not scruple to advance both these propositions. Each of them stands on its own separate ground.? So also motion is different from Diversum or The Different ; in other words, it ts not different, yet still it “ὁ different. And, lastly, motion is different from Ens, in other words, ἐξ ts not Ens, or is non-Ens : yet still ὦ ts Ens, because it partakes of existence. Hence motion is both Ens, and Non-Ens.
Here we arrive at Plato’s explanation of Non-Ens, τὸ μὴ by: the main problem which he is now setting to himself. Non-Ens is equivalent to, different from Ens. It is the Form or Idea of Diversum, considered in reference to Ens. Every thing is Ens, or partakes of entity, or existence. Every thing also is different from Ens, or partakes of difference in relation to Ens: it is thus Non-Ens. Every thing therefore is at the same time both Ens, and Non-Ens. Nay, Ens itself, inasmuch as it is different from all other things, is Non-Ens in reference to them. It is Ens only as one, in reference to itself: but it is Non-Ens an infinite number of times, in reference to all other things.*
When we say Non-Ens, therefore (continues Plato), we do not
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 255 E. πέμπτον ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ov διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ δὴ τὴν θατέρου ὕσιν λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς εἶδε- φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς σιν οὖσαν, ἐν οἷς προαιρούμεθα . . . καὶ ἰδέας τῆς θατέρον. διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν Plato, Sophist. pp. 255-256.
«ναι διεληλυθνῖαν. ἕν ἕκαστον yap 3 Plato, Sophist. pp. 256-257. _
934 SOPHISTES—POLITIKOB. Cmap. XXIX.
Plato's doc. mean any thing contrary to Ens, but merely some- thing different from Ens. When we say Not-great, we do not mean any thing contrary to Great, but only diferent Something different from great. The negative gene-
Ens. rally, when annexed to any name, does not designate any thing contrary to what is meant by that name, but some- thing different from it. The general nature or Form of differ- ence is disseminated into a multitude of different parts or varieties according to the number of different things with which it is brought into communion : Not-great, Not-zust, &., are specific varieties of this general nature, and are just as much realities as great, just. And thus Non-Ens is just as much a reality as Ens being not contrary, but only that variety of the general nature of difference .which corresponds to Ens. Non-Ens, Not-great Not-just, &c., are each of them permanent Forms, among the many other Forms or Entia, having each a true and distinct nature of its own.!
I say nothing about contrariety (concludes Plato), or about any thing contrary to Ens; nor will I determine whether Non-Ens in this sense be rationally possible or not. What I mean by ‘Non-Ens is a particular case under the general doctrine of the communion or combination of Forms: the combination of Ens with Diversum, composing that which is different from Ens, and which is therefore Non-Ens. Thus Ens itself, being different from all other Forms, is Non-Ens in reference to them all, or an indefinite number of times? (4.e. an indefinite number of negative predications may be made concerning it).
Non-Ens being thus shown to be one among the many other Forms, disseminated among all the others, and entering into communion with Ens among the rest—we have next to enquire whether it enters into communion with the Form of Opinion and Discourse. It is the communion of the two which consti- tutes false opinion and false proposition : if therefore such com- munion be possible, false opinion and false proposition are pos- sible, which is the point that Plato is trying to prove.* ww print, Sophlst.p. 258.0. τι τὸ μὴ ἡμεῖς γὰς περὶ μὰν ἐναντίον rods αὐτῷ . . οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ λόγον ἔχον ἢ καὶ παντά- ἦν τε καὶ ἔστιν μὴ ὄν, ἐνάριθμον τῶν πολ- πασιν ἄλογον" ὃ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι
λῶν ὄντων εἶδος
ἕν. τὸ gov, ἢ 3 Plato, Sophist. pp. 258 E—259 A. lato, Sophist. ἢ. 269 B.
Cuap. XXIX. PLATO EXPLAINS NON-ENS. 235
Now it has been already stated (continues Plato) that some Forms or Genera admit of communion with each
. Co: ni other, others do not. In like manner some words of Non-Ens admit of communion with each other—not others. ΜΉΝ woe. Those alone admit of communion, which, when put Sa ΡΥ ΚΝ
together, make up a proposition significant or giving information respecting Essence or Existence. The smallest pro- position must have a noun and a verb put together: the noun indicating the agent, the verb indicating the act. Every propo- sition must be a proposition concerning something, or must have a logical subject: every proposition must also be of a certain quality. Let us take (he proceeds) two simple propositions : Theetétus 18 sitting down—Theetétus is flying.! Of both these two, the subject is the same : but the first is true, the second is false. The first gives things existing as they are, respecting the subject: the second gives respecting the subject, things different from those existing, or in other words things non-existent, as if they did exist.* A false proposition is that which gives things diffe- rent as if they were the same, and things non-existent : as if they were existent, respecting the subject.*
The foregoing is Plato’s explanation of Non-Ens. remark upon it, let us examine his mode of analysing & proposition. He conceives the proposition as con- sisting of a noun and averb. The noun marks the — logical subject, but he has no technical word equiva- not recog. lent to subject : his phrase is, that a proposition must Predicate. be of something or concerning something. Then again, he not only has nc word to designate the predicate, but he does not even seem to conceive the predicate as distinct and separable: it stands along with the copula embodied in the verb. The two essentials of a proposition, as he states them, are—That it should have a certain subject—That it should be of a certain quality,
Before we
anaiyaion ofa proposition to does
1 mae Sophist. p. 263 A. Θεαίτητος κά Θεαίτητος πέτεται.
2 Ῥιδίο, Sop hist. P 263 B. λέγει δὲ αὑτῶν (rev λόγων ot the two prepost- tions) ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἔστι περὶ gov . . .- Ὁ δὲ δὴ ψενδὴς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων .. ᾿ τὰ μὴ ὄντ᾽ ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει
. Ὄντων δέ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ. Πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμεν 6 ὄντα περὶ ἕκαστον elvai πον, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα.
3 Plato, Sophist. p. 263 Ὁ. Περὶ δὴ σοὺ λεγόμενα μέντοι θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὑτά, καὶ μὴ ovre ὡς ὄντα, παντάπασιν, ως ἔοικεν, ἥ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις ἐκ ἦι ῥημά- των γιγνομένη καὶ ὀνομάτων ὄντως τε
καὶ ἀληθῶς Ὑ εσθαι λόγος ψευδής. It is p t this acttanktion takes no acount of negative propositions: it ve proposi-
applies only to
236 SOPHISTES—-POLITIKUS. CuaPp. XXIX.
true or fualse.1 This conception is just, as far as it goes: but it does not state all which ought to be known about proposition, and it marks an undeveloped logical analysis. It indicates more- over that Plato, not yet conceiving the predicate as a distinct constituent, had not yet conceived the copula as such: and there- fore that the substantive verb ἔστιν had not yet been understood by him in its function of pure and simple copula’ The idea that the substantive verb when used in a proposition must mark existence or essence, is sufficiently apparent in several of his reasonings.
I shall now say a few words on Plato’s explanation of Non-Ens. It is given at considerable length, and was, in the judgment of Schleiermacher, eminently satisfactory to Plato himself. Some of Plato’s expressions? lead me to suspect that his satisfaction was not thus unqualified : but whether he was himself satisfied or not, I cannot think that the explanation ought to satisfy others.
Plato here lays down the position—That the word Not signifies Plato's ex. uothing more than difference, with respect to that
lanation of Other word to which it is attached. It does not Non'Ens is signify (he says) what is contrary ; but simply what tory— Objec- is different. Not-great, Not-beautiful—mean what is
different from great or beautiful: Non-Ens means, not what is contrary to Ens, but simply what is different from Ens.
First, then, even if we admit that Non-Ens has this latter meaning and nothing beyond—yet when we turn to Plato’s own definition of Ens, we shall find it so all-comprehensive, that there can be absolutely nothing different from Ens :—these last words can have no place and no meaning. Plato defines Ens so as to include all that is knowable, conceivable, thinkable.? One por- tion of this total differs from another: but there can be nothing which differs from it all. The Form or nature of Diversum (to
1Since the time of Aristotle, the quality of a proposition has been un- erstood to designate its being either affirmative or negative: tha ing formal, or belonging to its form only. Whether affirmative or negative, it may be true or false : and this is doubtlessa quality, but belonging to its matter, not
to itsform. Plato seems to have taken no account of the formal distinction, negative or affirmative. 2 Plato, Sophistés, p. 259 A-B. Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum So- histes, vol. iv. p. 184, of his trans- tion of Plato. 8 Plato, Sophist. pp. 247-248.
Cuap. XXIX. EXPLANATION UNSATISFACTORY. 237
use Plato’s phrase) as it is among the knowable or conceivable, is already included in the total of Ens, and comes into communion (according to the Platonic phraseology) with one portion of that total as against another portion. But with Ens as a whole, it cannot come into communion, for there is nothing apart from Ens. Whenever we try to think of any thing apart from Ens, we do by the act of thought include it in Ens, as defined by Plato. Different from great—different from white (i.e. not great, not white, sensu Platonico) is very intelligible: but Different from Ens, is not intelligible : there is nothing except the incon- ceivable and incomprehensible : the words professing to describe it, are mere unmeaning sound. Now this is just! what Parme- nides said about Non-Ens. Plato’s definition of Ens appears to me to make out the case of Parmenides about Non-Ens ; and to render the Platonic explanation—different from Ens—open to quite as many difficulties, as those which attach to Non-Ens in the ordinary sense.
Secondly, there is an objection still graver against Plato’s ex- planation. When he resolves negation into an affirmation of something different from what is denied, he effaces or puts out of ‘sight one of the capital distinctions of logic. What he says is indeed perfectly true: Not-great, Not-beautiful, Non-Ens, are re- spectively different from great, beautiful, Ens. But this, though true, is only a part of the truth ; leaving unsaid another portion of the truth which, while equally essential, is at the same time special and characteristic. The negative not only differs from the affirmative, but has such peculiar meaning of its own, as to exclude the affirmative: both cannot be true together. Not-great is certainly different from great: so also, white, hard, rough, just, valiant, &c., are all different from great. But there is nothing in these latter epithets to exclude the co-existence of great. Thee- tétus 1s great—Theetétus 1s white: in the second of these two pro- positions I affirm something respecting Theetétus quite different from what 1 affirm in the first, yet nevertheless noway excluding what is affirmed in the first. The two propositions may both
1 Compare Kratylus, 480 A. ae ai ἀποφάσεις tyyovot εἰσι τῆς ére- 2 Proklus, in his Commenta: ary on the os τῆς νοερᾶς " διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐχ Parmenidés (p. : 281, p. 785, Stallbaum) μαμὰ ὅτι ἕτερον---καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ says, with reference to the doctrine laid ἄνθ ρωπος, ὅτι ἄλλο. down by Plato in the Sophistés, oAws Proklus here adopts and repeats
238 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cuap. XXIX.
be true. But when I say—Theetétus ts dead—Theetétus ἐδ not dead : here are two propositions which cannot both be true, from the very form of the words. To explain not-greut, as Plato does, by saying that it means only something different from great,' is to suppress this peculiar meaning and virtue of the negative, whereby it simply excludes the affirmative, without affirming any thing in its place. Plato is right in saying that noét-great does not affirm the contrary of great, by which he means little. The negative does not affirm any thing: it simply denies. Pilato seems to consider the negative as a species of affirmative :* only affirming something different from what is affirmed by the term which it accompanies. Not-Great, Not-Beautiful, Not-Just—he declares to be Forms just as real and distinct as Great, Beautiful, Just : only different from these latter. This, in my opinion, is a conception logically erroneous. Negative stands opposed to affirmative, as one of the modes of distributing both terms and propositions. A purely negative term cannot stand alone in the subject of a proposition: Non-Entts nulla sunt predwata—was
Plato’s erroneous idea of the negative
here given in the Sophistes (Schol. ad roposition and its function. When I
Aristot. p. 186, a. 15 Brandis).
ony that Caius is just, wise, &., m de does not intimate simply that know him to be something different from just, wise; for he may have fifty diferent attributes, co-existent and consistent with justice and wisdom.
To employ the language of Aristotle (see a pertinent example, Physic. i. 8, 191, b. 15, where he distinguis 68 τὸ μὴ ὃν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ from τὸ μὴ ὃν κατὰ συμ- βεβηκός), we may say that it is not of the essence of the Different to deny or exclude that from which it is different : the Different may deny or exclude, but that is only by accident—cara συμβε- Byxos. Plato includes, in the essence of the Different, that which belongs to it only by accident.
Aristotle in more than one place distinguishes διαφορὰ from ἐναντίωσις —not always in the same language. In Metaphysic. I. p. 1055 a. 88, he considers that the root of all évar- τίωσις is ἕξις and στέρησις, understood in the widest sense, t.e. affirmative and negative. See Bonitz, not. ad loc., and Waitz, ad Categor. p. 12, a. 26. The last portion of the treatise Περὶ ἝἙρμηνείας was interproted by Syrianus with a view to uphold Plato's opinion
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B. οὐκ ἐν- avriov ἐκείνῳ σημαίνονσα, ἀλλὰ TOTOU- τον μόνον, ἕτερον ἐκεΐνον.
If we look to the Euthydémus, we shall see that this confusion between what is different from A, and what is incompatible with or exclusive of A, is one of the fallacies which Plato puts into the mouth of the two Sophists Euthyd@mus and Dionysodérus, whom
in that dia-
he exhibits and exposes logue. "AAAo τι οὖν ἕτερος, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς (Dionysod6rus), ὧν λίθον, οὐ λίθος ad; καὶ ἕτερος ὧν χρυσοῦ, ov χρυσὺς el; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὃ Χαιρέδημος, ἔφη, ἕτερος ὧν πατρός, οὐκ ἂν πατὴρ Χὰ ; (Plat. Euthydem. p. 298 A
2 Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B.
3 Plato, Sophist. pp. 257 E, 258 A.
Ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὃν ἀντίθεσις, ὡς ἔοικ᾽, εἶναι ξυμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν. ...-
Ὁμοίως ἄρα τὸ μὴ μέγα, καὶ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι λεκτέον.
Plato distinctly here Forms or Ideas τῶν ἀποφάσεων, Which the Platonists professed not to do, according to Aristotle, Metaphys. A. 990, Ὁ. 18—see the instructive Scholia of Alexander, p. 565, a. Brandis.
CHaP. XXIX. FUNCTION OF THE NEGATIVE. 239
the scholastic maxim. The apparent exceptions to this rule arise only from the fact, that many terms negative in their form have taken on an affirmative signification.
The view which Plato here takes of the negative deserves the greater notice, because, if it were adopted, what is Plato's view called the maxim of contradiction. would be divested of the nega of its universality. Given a significant proposition neous. Lo- with the same subject and the same predicate, each ΕἸΟΑΙ τροχί ™ taken in one and the same signification—its affirma- ‘ction. tive and its negative cannot both be true. Butif by the nega- tive, you mean to make a new affirmation, different from. that contained in the affirmative—the maxim just stated cannot be broadly maintained as of universal application : it may or may not be valid, as the case happens to stand. The second affirma- tion may be, as a matter of fact, incompatible with the first : but this is not to be presumed, from the mere fact that it is different from the first : proof must be given of such incompatibility.
We may illustrate this remark by looking at the two proposi- tions which Plato gives as examples of true and false. pyamina- Theeetétus ἐδ sitting down—Theetétus is flying. Both tion of th
. me -, illustrative the examples are of affirmative propositions : and it propositions seems clear that Plato, in all this reasoning, took no chosen by — account of negative propositions : those which simply do we know deny, affirming nothing. The second of these pro- teat $e fs positions (says Plato) affirms what ts not, as if it were, ber false. respecting the subject. But how do we know this to beso? In the form of the second proposition there is nothing to show it : there is no negation of any thing, but simply affirmation of a different positive attribute. Although it happens, in this parti- cular case, that the two attributes are incompatible, and that the affirmation of the one includes the negation of the other—yet there is nothing in the form of either proposition to deny the other :—no formal incompatibility between them. Both are alike affirmative, with the same subject, but different predicates. These two propositions therefore do not serve to illustrate the real nature of the negative, which consists precisely in this formal — incompatibility. The proper negative belonging to the proposi- tion— Theetétus is sitting down—would be, Theetétus is not sitting down. Plato ought to maintain, if he followed out his previous
210 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cuap. XXIX.
argument, that Not-Sitting down is as good a Form as Sitting- down, and that it meant merely—Different from Sitting down. But instead of doing this Plato gives us a new affirmative pro- position, which, besides what it affirms, conceals an implied negation of the first proposition. This does not serve to iHustrate the purpose of his reasoning—which was to set up the formal negative as a new substantive attribute, different from its corre- sponding affirmative. As between the two, the maxim of contra- diction applies: both cannot be true. But as between the two propositions given in Plato, that maxim has no application : they are two propositions with the same subject, but different predi- cates ; which happen in this case to be, the one true, the other false—but which are not formally incompatible. The second is not false because it differs from the first; it has no essential connection with the first, and would be equally false, even if the first were false also.
The function of the negative is to deny. Now denial is nota species of affirmation, but the reversal or antithesis of affirmation : it nullifies a belief previously entertained, or excludes one which might otherwise be entertained,—but it affirms nothing. In particular cases, indeed, the denial of one thing may be tanta- mount to the affirmation of another: for a man may know that there are only two suppositions possible, and that to shut out the one is to admit the other. But this is an inference drawn in virtue of previous knowledge possessed and contributed by him- self : another man without such knowledge would not draw the same inference, nor could he learn it from the negative proposi- tion yer se. Such then is the genuine meaning of the negative ; from which Plato departs, when he tells us that the negative is a - kind of affirmation, only affirming something different—and when he illustrates it by producing two affirmative propositions respecting the same subject, affirming different attributes, the one as matter of fact incompatible with the other.
But how do we know that the first proposition—Theetétus ἧς Necessity of sitting down—affirms what is :—and that the second accepting we proposition—Theetétus is flying—affirms what is not ? of sense. § If present, our senses testify to us the truth of the first, and the falsehood of the second: if absent, we have the testimony of a witness, combined with our own past experience
CHaP. XXIX. IMPERFECT FORMAL LOGIO. 241
attesting the frequency of facts analogous to the one, and the non-occurrence of facts analogous to the other. When we make the distinction, then,—we assume that what is attested by sense or by comparisons and inductions from the facts of sense, is real, or 4s: and that what is merely conceived or imagined, without the attestation of sense (either directly or by way of induction), is not real, or 7s not. Upon this assumption Plato himself must proceed, when he takes it for granted, as a matter of course, that the first proposition is true, and the second false. But he forgets that this assumption contradicts the definition which, in this same dialogue,’ he had himself given of Ens—of the real or the thing that 1s. His definition was so comprehensive, as to include not only all that could be seen or felt, but also all that had capa- city to be known or conceived by the mind : and he speaks very harshly of those who admit the reality of things perceived, but refuse to admit equal reality to things only conceived. Pro- ceeding then upon this definition, we can allow no distinction as to truth or falsehood between the two propositions—Theetétus ts sitting down—Theetétus is flying: the predicate of the second affirms what is, just as much as the predicate of the first: for it affirms something which, though neither perceived nor perceiv- able by sense, is distinctly conceivable and conceived by the mind. When Plato takes for granted the distinction between the two, that the first affirms what ts, and the second what ὧδ not —he unconsciously slides into that very recognition of the testi- mony of sense (in other words, of fact and experience), as the certificate of reality, which he had so severely denounced in the opposing materialist philosophers: and upon the ground of which he thought himself entitled, not merely to correct them as mis- taken, but to reprove them as wicked and impudent.?
I have thus reviewed a long discussion—terminating in a con- clusion which appears to me unsatisfactory—of the |. of meaning and function of the negative. I hardly Antisthenes think that Plato would have given such an explana- ve y nded tion of it, if he had had the opportunity of studying ἐδ imper- the Organon of Aristotle. Prior to Aristotle, the logic of that principles and distinctions of formal logic were hardly ἮΝ
1 Plato, Sophist. pp. 247 D-E, 248 D-E. 2 Plato, Sophist. p. 246 D. 3—16
Φ49 SOPHISTES—POLITIEKCS. Caap. XXIX.
at all developed ; nor can we wonder that others at that time fell into various errors which Plato scornfully derides, but very imperfectly rectifies. For example, Antisthenes did not admit the propriety of any predication, except identical, or at most essential, predication : the word ἔστιν appeared to him incompat- ible with any other. But we perceive in this dialogue, that Plato also did not conceive the substantive verb as performing the simple function of copula in predication : on the contrary he distinguishes ἔστιν, 85 marking identity between subject and pre- dictate—from μετέχει, 85 marking accidental communion between the two. Again, there were men m Plato's day who maintained
which puts them in the right—fails in stating what the true negative is—and substitutes, in place of simple denial, a second
1 Plato, ublic, v. . 477-478. stotle about τὸ μὴ ov, set forth in the ne . Pe menidés. instructive Commentary of M. Ra- étaphysique
pp. 160 C, 163 C. Euthydémus, p. ἹἙαπδὶ sar a M
p 21, a “Le now aires aP@tre, comme 32) briefly expresses i from pig: eget ce n'est donc non
same as what is given 45 ‘une chose simple ; δὲ
in the Platonic Sop τὸ y a de genres de 1᾿δῖτο, antant il faut ὅν is ὄν τι. He makes no mention le non Sire ait de, genres. Cepen- Plato, bat Ammonius in the Scholia ὁ Fopposition de ὕ' et du non- alludes to Plato (p. 129, Ὁ. 20, Schol nte, en realité, dans chacane
Sophistés, of Plato (in the Sophistés) respecting by its title, in passages τὸ μὴ Oy, as not being a negation τον Metaphysica—E. 1026, Ὁ. 14; K. 1 ὄντος, but simply a something ἕτερον Ὁ. 29: Ν. 1089, ἃ. 5 (see the note τοῦ ὄντος the different views of Ari- Bonitz on the latter passage)—perhaps
SOPHISTES CONTRADICTS REPUBLIC. 943
Cuar. XXIX.
sense as the negation of Ens: laying down the position that Non-Ens can be neither the object of the cognizing Mind, nor the object of the opining (δοξάζων) or cogitant Mind : that it is uncognizable and incogitable, correlating only with Non-Cogni- tion or Ignorance. Now we find that this doctrine (of Sokrates, in Thesetétus and Republic) is the very same as that which is affirmed, in the Sophistés, to be taken up by the delusive Sophist : the same as that which the Eleate spends much ingenuity in trying to refute, by proving that Non-Ens is not the negation of Ens, but only that which differs from Ens, being itself a parti- cular variety of Ens. It is also the same doctrine as is declared, both by the Eleate in the Sophistés and by Sokrates in the Thesetétus, to imply as an undeniable consequence, that the false- hood of any proposition is impossible. ‘A false proposition is that which speaks the thing that is not (τὸ μὴ ov). But this is an impossibility. You can neither know, nor think, nor speak, the thing that is not. You cannot know without knowing some- thing : you cannot speak without speaking something (ὦ. e. something that is).” Of this consequence—which is expressly announced as included in the doctrine, both by the Eleate in the Sophistés and by the Platonic Sokrates in the Theetétus—no notice is taken in the Republic."
also elsewhere (see Ueberweg, pp, 153- 154). Plato replied in one way, Leu- kippus and Demokritus in another, to Phe doctrine of Parmenides, who banished Non-Ens as _incogitable. Leukippus maintained that Non-Ens was equivalent to rd κενόν, and that the two elements of things were τὸ πλῆρες and τὸ κενόν, for which he used. the expressions δὲν and οὐδέν. Plato replied as we read in the So- hist&s: thus both he and Leukippus fried in different ways to demonstrate a@ positive nature and existence for Non-Ens. See Aristot. Metaph. A. 985, b. 4, with the Scholia, p. 538, Brandis. The Scholiast cites Plato ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ, which seems a mistake for ev τῷ Σοφίστῃ.
1 Socher (Ueber Platon’s Schriften, pp. 264-265) is upon this point more satisfactory than the other Platonic commentators. He points out—not only without disguise, but even with emphasis—the discrepancies and con- tradictions between the doctrines
ascribed to the Eleate in the Sophistés, and those ascribed to Sokrates in the Republic, Pheedon, and other Platonic dialogues. These are the main pre- misses upon which Socher rests his inference, that the Sophistés is not the composition of Plato. I do not admit his inference: but the premisses, as matters of fact, appear me un- deniable. Stallbaum, in his Proleg. to the Sophistés, p. 40 seq., attemp
to explain away these discrepancies— in my opinion his remarks are obscure and unsatisfactory. Various other com- mentators, also holding the Sophistés to be a genuine work of Plato, over- look or extenuate these premisses, which they consider unfavourable to that conclusion. Thus Alkinous, in his Eigaywyy, sets down the explana- tion of τὸ μὴ ὃν which is given in the Sophistés, as if it were the true and Platonic explanation, not adverting to what is said in the Republic and elsewhere (AiKin. c. 835, p. 189 in the Appendix Platonica annexed to the
944 SOPHISTES-—POLITIKUS. CHap. XXIX.
Again, the doctrine maintained by the Eleate in the Sophistés respecting Ens, as well as respecting Ideas or Forms, is in other ways inconsistent with what is laid down in other Platonic dia- logues. The Eleate in the Sophistés undertakes to refute two different classes of opponents ; first, the Materialists, of whom he speaks with derision and antipathy—secondly, others of very opposite doctrines, whom he denominates the Friends of Ideas or Forms, speaking of them in terms of great respect. Now by these Friends of Forms or Ideas, Schleiermacher conjectures that Plato intends to denote the Megaric philosophers. M. Cousin, and most other critics (except Ritter), have taken up this opinion. But to me it seems that Socher is right in declaring the doctrine, ascribed to these Friends of Ideas, to be the very same as that which is laid down by Plato himself in other impor- tant dialogues—Republic, Timzeus, Pheedon, Pheedrus, Kratylus, &c.—and which is generally understood as that of the Platonic Ideas.’ In all these dialogues, the capital contrast and antithesis edition of Plato by K. F. Hermann).
The like appears in the Προλ μετα τῆς Ἰλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας : 6. Hh
doctrine in the Sophistés Non-Ens; but by no means an ade- quate account.
915 of the same edition. Proklus, in his Commentary on the jProklus, ἐπ s Ks in much the same manner out τὸ μὴ Gy—considering the doc- trine advanced and defended by the
Eleate in the So ophistés, to to represent the opinion of Ρ . Stall- baum; see also the mmentary of
Proklus on the Timeeus, Ὁ. iii. p. 188 E, 448 ed. Schneid.). So likewise Sim- plikius and the commentators on Ari- stotle, appear to consider it—see Schol. ad Aristotel yhysich, P. 832, a. 8, 333, b., 334, a., 343, a. δ ¢ is plain from these Scholia that the commentators were much embarrassed in explaining τὸ μὴ ὄν. They take the Sophistés as if it delivered plato’ 8 decisive opinion
n that point (Porphyry compares
what Plato says in the Timezus, but not what he says in the Republic or in Theetétus, Ὁ. 333, Ὁ. 25); and I think that they accommodate Plato to Aristotle, in such manner as to ob- scure the real antithesis which Plato insists upon in the Sophistés—I mean the antithesis according to which Plato excludes what is ἐναντίον τοῦ ὄντος, and admits only what is ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος.
Ritter gives an account (Gesch. der Philos. part ii. pp. 288-289) of Plato’s
F. Hermann also omits (Geschichte und System der Pla tonischen Philos. pp. 604-506-507) to notice the discre pancy between the doctrine of the Sophis s, and the doc- trine of the Republic, and Thestétus, respecting τὸ μὴ ov—though he pro- nounces ΡΟΝ ΙΝ that the Republic is among the most in utably posi- tive of all Plato’s compositions (p. 586).
1 Socher, ΕΝ 366; Sete iat:
Einleitun p. Gtuvres de Sophistes vol. xi. ‘er’
Consin, notes.
Schleiermacher gives this as little more than a conjecture; and distinctly admits that any man may easily sup-
se the doctrine ascribed to these
iends of Forms to be Plato’s own doctrine—‘“‘ Nicht zu verwundern wire es, wenn Mancher auf den Gedanken kame, Platon meinte hier sich selbst und seine eigene Lehre,” &c.
But most of the subsequent critics have taken up Schleiermacher’s con- jecture(that the Megarici are intended), as if it were something proved and indubitable.
Teiscuriguathat whileSchiciermacher thinks that the opinions of the M philosophers are impugned and ted in the Sophistés, Socher fancies that the dialogue was composed by a Megaric
CuHaPp. XXIX.
DOCTRINE OF ΤῊ SOPHISTES.
245
is that between Ens or Entia on one side, and Fientia (the transient, ever generated and ever perishing), on the other: between the eternal, unchangeable, archetypal Forms or Ideas— and the ever-changing flux of particulars, wherein approximative likeness of these archetypes is imperfectly manifested. Now it is exactly this antithesis which the Friends of Forms in the Sophistés are represented as upholding, and which the Eleate
undertakes to refute.'
We shall find Aristotle, over and over
again, impugning the total separation or demarcation between Ens and Fientia (εἴδη---γένεσις----χωριστάλ, both as the charac- teristic dogma, and the untenable dogma, of the Platonic philo- sophy: it is exactly the same issue which the Eleate in the Sophistés takes with the Friends of Forms. He proves that Ens is just as full of perplexity, and just as difficult to understand, as Non-Ens :? whereas, in the other Platonic dialogues, Ens is
hilosopher, not by Plato. Ueberweg Paechtheit der Platon. Schr. pp. 275- 277) points out as explicitly as her, the ancy between. the Sophistés and several other Platonic ogues, in respect to what is said about Forms orIdeas. Buthe draws adifferent infer- ence : he infers from it a Ὁ change in Plato's own opinion, and‘he considers that the Sophistés is later in its date of composition than those other dialogues which it contradicts. I think this opi- nion about the late composition of the Sophistés, is not improbable ; but the
remisses are not sufficient to prove it.
My view of the Platonic Sophistés differs from the elaborate criticism on it given by Steinhart (Einleitung zum Soph. p. 417 sq) Moreover, there is one assertion in that Einleitung which I read with t surprise. Steinhart not only holds it for certain that the Sophistes was composed after the Par- menidés, but also affirms that it solves the difficulties propounded in the Par- menidés—discusses the points of diffi- culty ‘‘in the best possible way” (‘‘in der witinschenwerthesten Weise” (pp. 470-471).
I confess I cannot find that the dif- ficulties started in the Parmenidés are even noticed, much less solved, in the Sophistés. And Steinhart himself tells
us that the Parmenidés places us ina afte
circle both of persons and doctrines entirely different from those of the Sophistés (p. 472). It is plain also
that the other Platonic commentators do not with Steinhart in finding the Sophistés a key to the Parmenidés:
Zeller, Stallbaum, Brandis sider the Parmenidés to
composed at a later date than the Sophist€s (as Steinhart himself inti- mates; com his Einleitung zum Parmenides, p. 312 seq.). Ueberweg, the most recent enquirer (posterior to Steinhart), e Parmenidés as the latest of Plato’s compositions— if indeed it be uine, of which he rather doubts. (Aechtheit der Platon.
Schrift. pp. 182-183. M. Mallet (Histoire de I’Ecole de
Megare, Introd. . XlL-lviii., Paris, 1845) differs from af the three opinions of Schleiermacher, Ritter, and her. He thinks that the philosophers, de- signated as Friends of Forms, are 1Π- tended for the Ey aeoreans His reasons do not satisfy me.
1 Plato, Sophist. pp. 246 B, 248 B. The same opinion is advanced by Sokrates in the Republic, v. p. 479 ΒΟ. Phedon, ee 78-79. Compare Sophist. p. 248 C with Symposion, p 211 B. the former passage, τὸ
ἴσχειν is affirmed of the Ideas: in
the latter passage, τὸ εἰν μηδέν. 2 Plato, Sophist. p. et he rwards talks of τὸ λαμπρὸν τοῦ
ὄντος ἀεὶ 88 contrasted with τὸ σκο- τεινὸν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, p. 254 A, which seems not consistent.
246 SOPHISTES—POLITIKOUB. Cuar. XXIX.
constantly spoken of as if it were plain and intelligible. In fact, he breaks down the barrier between Ens and Fientia, by includ- ing motion, change, the moving or variable, among the world of Entia.' Motion or Change belongs to Fieri; and if it be held to belong to Esse also (by recognising a Form or Idea of Motion or Change, as in the Sophistés), the antithesis between the two, which is so distinctly declared in other Platonic dialogues, dis- appears.”
If we examine the reasoning of the Eleate, in the Sophistés, against the persons whom he calls the Friends of
The persons
whom Plato Forms, we shall see that these latter are not Parmeni- as Friends deans only, but also Plato himself in the Phsdon, te grms Republic, and elsewhere. We shall also see that the who held ground, taken up by the Eleate, is much the same doctrines 88 that which was afterwards taken up by Aristotle as Plato —_ against the Platonic Ideas. Plato, in most of his espouses, dialogues, declares Ideas, Forms, Entia, to be eternal Republic, ᾿ substances distinct and apart from the flux and move-
ment of particulars: yet he also declares, neverthe- less, that particulars have a certain communion or participation with the Ideas, and are discriminated and denominated according to such participation. Aristotle controverts both these doctrines:
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 249 B. “‘Ipsex idee per se simplices sunt et immuta- P biles: sunt stern, ac semper fuerunt
in the Kratylus, p. 489 D-E; also
hil@bus, p. 15. In the Parmenidés (p. 182 D) the
ab omni libere mutatione,” says Stall- baum ad Platon. Republ. v. p. 476; see also his Prolegg. to the Parmenidés, ΤᾺ Platonic Ideas are presented in the Timzus, Republic, Phedon, &c., and the way in which they are con- ceived by the εἰδῶν φίλοι in the Sophistés, whom the Eleate seeks to confute.
Zellers chapter on Plato seems to me to represent not so much what we read in the se dialogues, as the attempt of an able and ingenious man to bring out somet like a con- sistent and intelligible doctrine which will do credit to Plato, and to soften down all the inconsistencies (see Philos. der Griech. vol ii. pp. 394- 415-429 ed. 2nd).
2 See a striking e about the unchangeableness of Forms or Ideas
39-40. This is the way in which 1
supposition τὰ εἴδη ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει is one of those set up by Sokrates and impugned by Parmenides. Neverthe- ess in an er passage of that dialogue Sokrates is made to include κίνησις and στάσις among the εἴδη . 129 E). It will be found, however, that when Parmenides comes to ques- tion Sokrates, What εἴδη do you re- ? attributes and subjects only (the latter with hesitation) are in- cluded: no such thing as actions, pro- cesses, events—rd ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν (p. 130). In Republic. vii 629 Ὁ, we find mention made of τὸ ὃν τάχος and ἡ οὖσα βραδύτης, which implies κίνησις as among the εἰδη. In Theertét. Pp. 152 D, 156 A, κένησις is noted as the constituent and istic of Fieri—rd y:yvépevov—which belongs to the domain of sensible pe on. as distinguished from permanent and unchangeable Ens.
PLATO AND ARISTOTLE. 247
CHaP. XXIX.
first, the essential separation of the two, which he declares to be untrue: next, the participation or coming together of the two separate elements—which he declares to be an unmeaning fiction or poetical metaphor, introduced in order to elude the conse- quences of the original fallacy. He maintains that the two (Entia and Fientia—Universals and Particulars) have no reality except in conjunction and implication together; though they are separable by reason (λόγῳ χωριστὰ---τῷ εἶναι, χωριστά) or abstrac- tion, and though we may reason about them apart, and must often reason about them apart.? Now it is this implication and conjunction of the Universal with its particulars, which is the doctrine of the Sophistés, and which distinguishes it from other Platonic dialogues, wherein the Universal is transcendentalized —lodged in a separate world from particulars. No science or intelligence is possible (says the Eleate in the Sophistés) either upon the theory of those who pronounce all Ens to be constant and unchangeable, or upon that of those who declare all Ens to be fluent and variable. We must recognise both together, the constant and the variable, as equally real and as making up the totality of Ens.* This result, though not stated in the language which Aristotle would have employed, coincides very nearly with the Aristotelian doctrine, in one of the main points on which Aristotle distinguishes his own teaching from that of his master.
That the Eleate in the Sophistés recedes from the Platonic point of view and approaches towards the Aristotelian, The Sophis- will be seen also if we look at the lesson of logic which {48 Tecedes
he gives to Theetétus. In his analysis of a proposi- Platonic . : ΒΝ . Α . point of tion — and in discriminating such conjunctions of view, and
1 Aristot. Metaph
2 Aristot. Meta vi. 1038, a-b. The Scholion of lexander here (p. 36, Brandis) is clearer than
. A. 991-992. καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἴδη λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἑστηκὸς ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τε αὖ παν- ταχῇ τὸ ὃν κινούντων μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν
ἀκούειν - ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίξων
Aristotle himself, Td προκείμενόν ἐστι δεῖξαι ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλον οὐσία ἄστιν" οὔτε γὰρ 6 καθόλον ἄνθρωπος ἥἣ ὃ καθόλου ἑππος, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν" ἀλλ᾽ ἕκαστον αὐτὼν διανοίας ἀπό- μαξίς ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα καὶ πρώτως καὶ «μάλιστα λεγομένων ov- σιῶν καὶ ὁμοίωμ
3 Plato, Sophist. p. 249 C-D. Τῷ δὴ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τιμῶντι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα μήτε τῶν ἕν ἢ
εὐχήν, ὅσα ἀκίνητά τε καὶ κεκινημένα, τὸ ὅν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν, ξυναμφότερα
λέ
“Ritter states the result of this por. tion of the Sophist&s correctly. bleibt uns als Ergebniss aller dicae Untersuchungen iiber das Seyn, dass die Wahrheit sowohl des Werdens, 5, als auch des beharrlichen Seyns kannt werden miisse” (Gesc hte « der Philos. ii. p. 281).
248 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Cap. XXIX.
ἐὰς Arie words as are significant, from such as are insignificant
—he places himself on the same ground as that which is is travelled over by Aristotle in the Categories and the treatise De Interpretatione. That the handling of the topic by Aristotle is much superior, is what we might naturally expect from the fact that he is posterior in time. But there is another difference between the two which is important to notice. Aristotle deals with this topic, as he does with every other, in the way of methodical and systematic exposition. To expound it as a whole, to distribute it into convenient portions each illustrating the others, to furnish suitable examples for the general principles laid down—are announced as his distinct purposes. Now Plato’s manner is quite different. Systematic exposition is not his primary purpose: he employs it up to a certain point, but as means towards another and an independent purpose—towards the solution of a particular difficulty, which has presented itself in the course of the dialogue.—“ Nostt morem dtalogorum.” Ari- stotle is demonstrative: Plato is dialectical. In our present dialogue (the Sophistés), the Eleate has been giving a long explanation of Non-Ens ; an explanation intended to prove that Non-Ens was a particular sort of Ens, and that there was there- fore no absurdity (though Parmenides had said that this was absurdity) in assuming it as a possible object of Cognition, Opina- tion, Affirmation. He now goes a step farther, and seeks to show that it is, actually and in fact, an object of Opination and Affir- mation.’ It is for this purpose, and for this purpose only, that he analyses a proposition, specifies the constituent elements requisite to form it, and distinguishes one proposition from another.
Accordingly, the Eleate,—after pointing out that neither a string of nouns repeated one after the other, nor a string of verbs so repeated, would form a significant proposition,—declares that the conjunction of a noun with a verb is required to form one; and that opination is nothing but that internal mental process which the words of the proposition express. The smallest pro- position must combine a noun with a verb :—the former signi- fying the agent, the latter, the action or thing done.? Moreover,
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 261 D- 2 Plato, Sophist. p. 262 C.
Cuap. ΧΧΙΧ, PLATO'S ARGUMENT FAILS. 249
the proposition must be a proposition of something ; and it must be of a certain quality. By a proposition of something, Plato means, that what is called technically the subject of the proposi- tion (in his time there were no technical terms of logic) must be something positive, and cannot be negative: by the quality of the proposition, he means that it must be either true or false.?
This early example of rudimentary grammatical or logical analysis, recognising only the two main and principal , st oticas. parts of speech, is interesting as occurring prior to sumes with- Aristotle ; by whom it is repeated in a manner more out proof, enlarged, systematic,’ and instructive. But Aristotle vropositi ons assumes, without proof and without supposing that rue, others any one will dispute the assumption—that there are some propositions true, other propositions false : that a name or noun, taken separately, is neither true nor false :* that proposi- tions (enunciations) only can be true or false.
The proceeding of Plato in the Sophistés is different. He sup- poses a Sophist who maintains that no proposition
° ° Plato in the either is false or can be false, and undertakes to prove Sophistés : : we has under against him that there are false propositions: he taken an
farther supposes this antagonist to reject the evidence ἐπὶ of sense and visible analogies, and to acknowledge no could not ἢ _- proof except what is furnished by reason and philoso- ainst his phical deduction.‘ Attempting, under these restric- ΟΝ tions, to prove his point, Plato’s Eleatic disputant that there rests entirely upon the peculiar meaning which he pro iad professes to have shown to attach to Non-Ens. He
propo- sitions.
1 Plato, Sophist. Ὁ. 262 Ε. λόγον ἀναγκαῖον, ὅταν περ ἧ, τινὸς εἶναι λόγον, μὴ δέτινος, ἀδύνατον . . . Οὐκοῦν
ἀδύνατον cannot be affirmed. But if we take μή τις in its proper sense of negation, the ἀδύνατον will be so far
καὶ ποιόν τινα αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ; Compare p. 287 E. In the words here cited Plato un- consciously slides back into the ordi- acceptation of μή τι: that is, to μὴ tn the sense of negation. If we ado t that peculiar sense of μή, which the Eleate has taken so much pains to rove just before in the case of τὸ μὴ ν (that is, if we take μὴ as signifying not negation but simply diffe the above argument will not hold. If vis signifies one subject (A), and my τις 68 ly another subject (B) different from A (ἕτερον), the predicate
rence), 43
true that οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, οὐ Θεαίτητος, cannot be the subject of a proposition. Aristotle says the same in the begin- ning of the Treatise De Interpreta- tione (p. 16, a. 30).
2 Aristotel. De Interpr. init. with Scholia of Ammonius, p. 98, Bekk.
8 In the Kratylus of Plato Sokrates maintains that names may be true or false as well as propositions, pp. 885 D,
1
4 Plato, Sophist. p. 240 A. It de. serves note that here Plato presents to us the Sophist as rejecting the evidence of sense: in the Theetétus he presents
450 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. Caur. XXIX
applies this to prove that Non-Ens may be predicated as well as Ens : assuming that such predication of Non-Ens constitutes a . false proposition. But the proof fails It serves only to show that the peculiar meaning ascribed by the Eleate to Non-Ens is inadmissible. The Eleate compares two distinct propositions— Theeetétus is sitting down—Theetéitus is flying. The first is true :
the second is false. Why? Because (says the Eleate) the first predicates Ens, the second predicates Non-Ens, or (to substitute his definition of Non-Ens) another Ens different from the Ens predicated in the first.' But here the reason assigned, why the second proposition is false, is not the real reason. Many propo- sitions may be assigned, which predicate attributes different from the first, but which are nevertheless quite as much true as the first. I have already observed, that the reason why the second proposition is false is, because it contradicts the direct testimony of sense, if the persons debating are spectators : if they are not spectators, then because it contradicts the sum total of their pre- vious sensible experience, remembered, compared, and generalised, which has established in them the conviction that no man does or can fly. If you discard the testimony of sense as unworthy of credit (which Plato assumes the Sophist to do), you cannot prove that the second proposition is false—nor indeed that the first proposition is true. Plato has therefore failed in giving that dialectic proof which he promised. The Eleate is forced to rely (without formally confessing it), on the testimony of sense, which he had forbidden Theetétus to invoke, twenty pages before.2/ The long intervening piece of dialectic about Ens and Non-Ens is inconclusive for his purpose, and might have been omitted. The proposition— Theetétus ὁ 18 flying—does undoubtedly predicate attributes which are not as if they were,’ and is thus
to us the Sophist as holding the doc- is checked by the Eleate, trine ἐπιστήμη = αἴσθησις. ow these tt is in p. 261 A that the lea te begins ropositions can both be true respect- hi Sopbist_ in refutation of the supposed Ing the Sophists as a class I do not ist—that δόξα and λόγος may be understand. The first may be true The long interval between the respecting some of them; the second two is occupied with the reasoning
may be true respecting others ; respect- about Ens and Non.
ing a third class of them, neither may 3 Plato » Sophist. p. 268 E. τὰ μὴ
be true. About the Sophists ina body ὄντα ὡς ὄντα λεγόμεν, a, ἄς. there is hardly a single el The distinction between these two which can be safely affi propositions, the first as true, the second 1 Plato, Sophist. p. 263 as false (Theeet&tus is sitting down, 2 Theatétus makes this Cttempt and Thesetétus is flying), is in noway con-
ASSUMPTIONS NECESSARY IN DEBATE. 251
CHaP. XXIX.
false. But then we must consult and trust the evidence of our perception : we must farther accept are not in the ordinary sense of the words, and not in the sense given to them by the Eleate in the Platonic Sophistés. His attempt to banish the specific meaning of the negative particle, and to treat it as signifying nothin? more than difference, appears to me fallacious.?
In all reasoning, nay in all communication by speech, you must assume that your hearer understands the mean- woe must ing of what is spoken: that he has the feelings of be assumed belief and disbelief, and is familiar with those forms wu di of the language whereby such feelings are expressed : Cussion. that there are certain propositions which he believes—in other words, which he regards as true: that there are certain other propositions which he disbelieves, or regards as false: that he has had experience of the transition from belief to disbelief, and vice versd—in other words, of having fallen into error and after- wards come to perceive that it was error. These are the mental facts realised in each man and assumed by him to be also realised in his neighbours, when communication takes place by speech. If a man could be supposed to believe nothing, and to disbelieve nothing ;—if he had no forms of speech to express his belief, dis- belief, affirmation, and denial—no information could be given, no discussion would be possible. Every child has to learn this lesson in infancy; and a tedious lesson it undoubtedly is.? Antisthenes (who composed several dialogues) and the other
t καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι ἡπόρουν, ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν, ἄς. Compare respecting this paradox or θέσις οὗ Antisthenes, the scholia of
Φ nected with the distinction which Plato had so much insisted upon be- fore cting the intercommunion of Forms, Ideas, General Notions, &c.,
that some Forms will come into com- munion with each cther, while others will not (Pp. 252-253). .
There is here no question of repug- nancy or intercommunion of Forms: the question turns upon the evidence ‘of vision, which informs us that Thee- ἰδία is sitting down and not stand- ing uP or fiying. If any predicate be
ed of a subject, contrary to what is included in the definition of that subject, then indeed repugnancy of Forms might be urged.
1 Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B.
2 Aristotel. Metaphys. vii. 1043, b. 23. ὥστε ἢ ἀπορία ἣν οἱ ᾿Αντισθένειοι
Alexander on the passage of Aristotle’s Topica above cited, p. 259, b. 15, in Schol. Bekk. . If Antisthenes admitted only iden- tical predications, of course rd ἀντιλέ- ν e impossible. I have en- eavoured to show, in a previous note on this dialogue, that a misconcep- tion (occasionally shared even by Plato) of the function of the copula, lay at the bottom of the Antis- thenean theory respecting identical predication. Compare Aristotel. Phy- i. p. 185, Ὁ. 28, together with the Scholia of Simplikius, pp. 329- $30, od. Bekk., and Plato, Sophistés, p. 245.
252 SOPHISTES—POLITIEUS. Cuap. XXIX
disputants of whom we are now speaking, must have learnt the lesson as other men have : but they find or make some general theory which forbids them to trust the leason when learnt. It was in obedience to some such theory that Antisthenes discarded all predication except essential predication, and discarded also the form suited for expressing disbelief—the negative proposi- tion : maintaining, That to contradict was impossible. I know no mode of refuting him, except by showing that his fundamental theory is erroneous. Discussion and theorising can only begin when these processes, on partly intellectual, partly emotional, have become andtheo- established and reproducible portions of the train of mental association. As processes, they are common belief an to all men. But though two persons agree in having expressed _ the feeling of belief, and in expressing that feeling by of word * one form of proposition—also in having the feeling of imply disbelief, and in expressing it by another form of pro- which position—yet it does not follow that the propositions Antisthenes which these two believe or disbelieve are the same. How far such is the case must be ascertained by com- parison—by appeal to sense, memory, inference from analogy, induction, feeling, consciousness, &. The ground is now pre- pared for fruitful debate : for analysing the meaning, often con- fused and complicated, of propositions: for discriminating the causes, intellectual and emotional, of belief and disbelief, and for determining how far they harmonise in one mind and another : for setting out general rules as to sequence, or inconsistency, or independence, of one belief as compared with another. To a certain extent, the grounds of belief and disbelief in all men, and the grounds of consistency or inconsistency between some beliefs and others, will be found to harmonise: they can be embodied in methodical forms of language, and general rules can be laid down preventing in many cases inadvertence or erroneous com- bination. It is at this point that Aristotle takes up rational grammar and logic, with most profitable effect. But he is obliged to postulate (what Antisthenes professed to discard) predication, not merely identical, but also accidental as well as essential—to- gether with names and propositions both negative and affir-
Cuap, XXIX. GOOD LOGICAL PARTITION.
253
mative.’ He cannot avoid postulating thus much : though he likewise postulates a great deal more, which ought not to be granted.
The long and varied predicamental series, given in the Sophistés, illustrates the process of logical partition, as Plato conceived it, and the definition of a class- name founded thereupon. You take a logical whole, fopical ραν. and you subtract from it part after part until you tition, fas find the questtum isolated from every thing else.? the Sophis- But you must always divide into two parts (he says) (δε. wherever it can be done: dichotomy or bipartition is the true logical partition: should this be impracticable, trichotomy, or division into the smallest attainable number of parts, must be sought for.* Moreover, the bipartition must be made according to Forms (Ideas, Kinds): the parts which you recognise must be not merely parts, but Forms: every form is a part, but every part is not a form.‘ Next, you must draw the line of division as nearly as you can through the middle of the dwidendum, so that the parts on both sides may be nearly equal: it is in this way that your partition is most likely to coincide with forms on both sides of the line.© This is the longest way of proceeding, but the safest. It is a logical mistake to divide into two parts very unequal : you may find a form on one side of the line, but you obtain none on the other side. Thus, it is bad classification to distribute the human race into Hellénes + Barbari: the Barbari are of infinite number and diversity, having no one common form to which the name can apply. It is also improper to distribute Number into the myriad on side, and all other numbers on the other—for a similar reason. You ought to distribute the human
Precepts and exam- les of
18ee the remarks in Aristotel. Metaphys. I. 1005, Ὁ. 2, 1006, a. 6. He calls it ἀπκαιδευσία--ἀπαιδενσία τῶν ἀναλντικῶν---οὐ to be able to di tinguish those matters which can be proved and require to be proved, from hose matters which are true, but
uire no proof and are incapable of h being proved. But this distinction
n one of the grand subjects of controversy from his day down to the present day; and between different schools of philosophers, none of whom would allow themselves to deserve the epithet of ἀπαίδεντοι.
Aristotle calls Antisthenes and his followers ἀπαίδεντοι, in the passage cited in the preceding note.
2 Plato, Politikus, p. 268 D. μέρος ἀεὶ μέρους ἀφαιρουμένους ἐπ᾽ ἄκρον ἐφικ- νεῖσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον.
Ueberweg thinks that Aristotle, when e talks of αἱ γεγραμμέναι διαιρέσεις, alludes to these logical distributions in the Sophistés and Politikus (Aechtheit der Platon. Schr. PP. 153-154
3 Politik. p. 287 C.
4 Politik. p. 268 C.
5 Politik. pp. 262 B, 265 A. δεῖ μεσοτομεῖν ὡς μάλιστα, KC.
254 SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS. CuaPp. XXIX.
race into the two forms, Male—Female: and number into the two, Odd—Even.! So also, you must not divide gregarious creatures into human beings on one side, and animals on the other ; because this last term would comprise numerous particu- lars utterly disparate. Such a classification is suggested only by the personal feeling of man, who prides himself upon his intelli- gence. But if the classification were framed by any other intelli- gent species, such as Cranes,? they would distinguish Cranes on the one side from animals on the other, including Man as one among many disparate particulars under anunal.
The above-mentioned principle — dichotomy or bipartition Recommen- into two equal or nearly equal halves, each resting ost of upon a characteristic form—is to be applied as far as bipartition. it will go. Many different schemes of partition upon this principle may be found, each including forms subordinated one to the other, descending from the more comprehensive to the less comprehensive. It is only when you can find no more parts which are forms, that you must be content to divide into parts which are not forms. Thus after all the characteristic forms, for dividing the human race, have been gone through, they may at last be partitioned into Hellénes and Barbari, Lydians and non- Lydians, Phrygians and non-Phrygians: in which divisions there is no guiding form at all, but only a capricious distribution into fractions with separate names*—meaning by capricious, a dis- tribution founded on some feeling or circumstance peculiar to the distributor, or shared by him only with a few others; such as the fact, that he is himself a Lydian or a Phrygian, &c.
These precepts in the Sophistés and Politikus, respecting the Precepts process of classification, are illustrated by an impor- illustrated tant passage of the Philébus :‘ wherein Plato tells us Philébus. that the constitution of things includes the Deter- minate and the Indeterminate implicated with each other, and requiring study to disengage them. Between the highest One, Form, or Genus—and the lowest array of indefinite -particulars—
1 Politikus, p. 262 D-E. τῶν ισθέντων.
2 Politikus, p. 263 Ὁ. σεμνῦνον αὑτὸ Plato, Philébus, pp. 16-17. ἑαντό, &C. The notes of Dr. Badham upon this 8 Politikus, p. 262 E. Λυδοὺς δὲ ἢ passage in his edition of the P ilébus, Φρύγας ἤ τινας ἑτέρονς πρὸς ἅπαντας p. 11, should be consulted as a just τάττων ἀπόσχιζοι τότε, ἡνίκα, ἀποροῖ correction of Stallbaum in to γένος ἅμα καὶ μέρος εὑρίσκειν ἑκάτερον πέρας and τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων.
Cap. XXIX. INTERMEDIATE CLASSES. 955 -
there exist a certain number of intermediate Ones or Forms, each including more or fewer of these particulars. The process of study or acquired cognition is brought to bear upon these inter- mediate Forms: to learn how many there are, and to discri- minate them in themselves as well as in their position relative to each other. But many persons do not recognise this: they apprehend only the Highest One, and the Infinite Many, not looking for any thing between : they take up hastily with some extreme and vague generality, below which they know nothing but particulars. With knowledge thus imperfect, you do not get beyond contentious debate. Real, instructive, dialectic requires an understanding of all the intermediate forms. But in descend- ing from the Highest Form downwards, you must proceed as much as possible in the way of bipartition, or if not, then of tri- partition, &c.: looking for the smallest number of forms which can be found to cover the whole field. When no more forms can be found, then and not till then, you must be content with nothing better than the countless indeterminate particulars.
This instructive passage of the Philébus—while it brings to view a widespread tendency of the human mind, to pass from the largest and vaguest generalities at once into the region of particu- lars, and to omit the distinctive sub-classes which lie between— illustrates usefully the drift of the Sophistés and Politikus. In these two last dialogues it is the method itself of good logical distribution which Plato wishes to impress upon his readers: the formal part of the process! With this view, he not only makes the process intentionally circuitous and diversified, but also selects by preference matters of common sensible experience, though in themselves indifferent, such as the art of weaving,? &e.
The reasons given for this preference deserve attention. In these common matters (he tells us) the resemblances 1, ,ortance upon which Forms are founded are perceived by of founding sense, and can be exhibited to every one, so that the oeical form is readily understood and easily discriminated. ae The general terms can there be explained by reference perceived to sense, But in regard to incorporeal matters, the ἡ *°™**
1 He states this expressly, Politik. p. 286 D. 3 Plato, Politik. p. 285 D.
256 SOPHISTES—-POLITIKOUS. Caap. XXIX.
higher and grander topics of discussion, there is no corresponding sensible illustration to consult. These objects can be appre- hended only by reason, and described only by general terms By means of these general terms, we must learn to give and receive rational explanations, and to follow by process of reason- ing from one form to another. But this is more difficult, and requires a higher order of mind, where there are no resemblances or illustrations exposed to sense. Accordingly, we select the common sensible objects as an easier preparatory mode of a pro- ceas substantially the same in both.!
This explanation given by Plato, in itself just, deserves to be Province of compared with his view of sensible objects as know- ception ein able, and of sense as a source of knowledge. I noticed not so much jin a preceding chapter the position which Sokrates is by Pinte. made to lay down in the Thextétus,*—That (aicOnoxs) herons it sensible perception reaches only to the separate im-
pressions of sense, and does not apprehend the like- nom and other relations between them. I have also noticed the contrast which he establishes elsewhere between Esse and Fieri : 4.6, between Ens which alone (according to him) is knowable, and the perpetual flux of Fientia which is not knowable at all, but is only matter of opinion or guess-work. Now in the dia- logue before us, the Politikus, there is no such marked antithesis between opinion and knowledge. Nor is the province of αζσθησις ay atrictly confined; on the contrary, Plato here considers sen- sible perception as dealing with Entia, and as appreciating re- setnblances and other relations between them. It is by an attentive study and comparison of these facts of sense that Forms are detect, “When a man (he says) has first perceived by “πὴ the points of communion between the Many, he must not Aesiat. from attentive observation until he has discerned in that cnmmtnnunion all the differences which reside in Forms: and when
' Pato, Politik. pp. 286 H-286 A. ἀνθρώπους εἰργασμένον ἐναργῶς, οὗ δειχ- give a ill Aba wie ὅτι τοῖς μὲν τῶν θώτοῦν το. eo εἴδωλ ασμένο vow καγημαθοῖν αἰσθηταί τινες ut the εἴδωλον εἰ ν δναρ- hyashegrey nedunaasy, Aq οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν te: w is affirmed in one of these Awisv, hrav μὑτῶων t1y βονλήθῃ τῷ λόγον two cases and denied in the other, alriwives wapl του μὴ μονὰ πραγμάτων compare ἃ striking analogy in the AAAA χώρῳ λόγον ῥηδίωφ dvdelfarGa.: Pheedrus, p. 250 A-E. voig Anh μογίψιοιᾳ οὖσι καὶ τιμιωτά. ΔΡΙδαίο, Thest. pp. 185-186. See vuty σύμ lary εἴδωλον οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς above p. 161.
Crap. ΧΧΙΧ, UNIVERSALS AMIDST PARTICULARS. 257
he has looked at the multifarious differences which are visible among these Many, he must not rest contented until he has con- fined all such as are really cognate within one resemblance, tied _ together by the essence of one common Form.”?}
These passages may he compared with others of similar import in the Pheedrus.? Plato here considers the Form, not oon n as an Entity per se separate from and independent of of the as the particulars, but as implicated in and with the with the particulars: as a result reached by the mind through Ph@drus the attentive observation and comparison of particulars: as corresponding to what is termed in modern language abstraction _ and generalisation. The self-existent Platonic Ideas do not
appear in the Politikus:* which approximates rather to the Aristotelian doctrine :—that is, the doctrine of the universal, logically distinguishable from its particulars, but having no reality apart from them (χωριστὰ λόγῳ μόνον). But in other dia- logues of Plato, the separation between the two is made as complete as possible, especially in the striking passages of the Republic: wherein we read that the facts of sense are a delusive juggle—that we must turn our back upon them and cease to study them—and that we must face about, away from the sensible world, to contemplate Ideas, the separate and unchangeable furniture of the intelligible world—and that the whole process of acquiring true Cognition, consists in passing from the higher to the lower Forms or Ideas, without any misleading illustrations of sense.‘ Here, in the Sophistés and Politikus, instead of having the Universal behind our backs when the particulars are before our faces, we see it in and amidst particulars: the illustra- tions of sense, instead of deluding us, being declared to conduce,
1 Plato, Politikus, p. 285 B. δέον, ὅταν μὲν THY τῶν πολλῶν τις πρότερον . αἴσθηται κοινωνίαν, μὴ προαφίστασθαι
πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐτῇ τὰς διαφορὰς iby πάσας
and it is just, though I do not at all concur in his general view of the Politikus, wherein he represents the dialogue as intended to deride the
ὁπόσαι περ ἐν εἴδεσι κεῖνται τὰς δὲ ad παντοδαπὰς ἀνομοιότητας, ὅταν ἐν πλή- θεσιν ὀφθῶσι, μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι δυσωπού- μενον παύεσθαι, πρὶν ay ξύμπαντα τὰ οἰκεῖα ἐντὸς μιᾶς ὁμοιότητος ἔρξας γένους τινὸς οὐσίᾳ περιβάληται.
2 Plato, Pheedrus, pp. 249 C, 265 D-E.
8 This remark is made by Stallbaum in his Prolegg. ad Politicum, p. 81;
Megaric ilosophers. See the Republic, v. pp. 476-479, vi. pp. 508-510-511, and y the memorable simile about the cave and the shadows within it, in Book vii pp. 518-519, together with the περιαγωγὴ which he there prescribes—ard τοῦ γιγνομένον εἰς τὸ 6yv—and the remarks ing observations in astronomy and acoustics, p. 529.
3—17
258 SOPHISTES—POLITIKOUS. Crap. XXIX.
wherever they can be had, to the clearness and facility of the process.! Here, as well as in the Phedrus, we find the process of Dialectic emphatically recommended, but described as consisting mainly in logical classification of particulars, ascending and descending divisions and conjunctions, as Plato calls them *— analysis and synthesis. We are enjoined to divide and analyse the larger genera into their component species until we come to the lowest species which can no longer be divided: also, con- versely, to conjoin synthetically the subordinate species until the highest genus is attained, but taking care not to omit any of the intermediate species, in their successive gradations.* Throughout all this process, as described both in the Phsedrus and in the Politikus, the eye is kept fixed upon the constituent individuals. The Form is studied in and among the particulars which it com- prehends : the particulars are looked at in groups put together suitably to each comprehending Form. And in both dialogues, marked stress is laid upon the necessity of making the division dichotomous ; 88 well as according to Forms, and not according to fractions which are not legitimate Forms* Any other method, we are told, would be like the wandering of a blind man.
What distinguishes the Sophistés and Politikus from moet other dialogues of Plato, is, that the method of logical classifica- tion is illustrated by setting the classifier to work upon one ora few given subjects, some in themselves trivial, some important. Though the principles of the method are enunciated in general terms, yet their application to the special example is kept con- stantly before us; so that we are never permitted, much less required, to divorce the Universal from its Particulars.
As a dialogue illustrative of this method, the Politikus (as I
1 was Pare the eof the Phe- in the Phedrus for his attachment rus (p. 268 where Plato dis- to dialectics, that he may become ishes the 1 sensible particulars on competent in discourse and in wis- ch men mostly from the dom (ν᾽ olds re ὦ λέγειν καὶ φρο-
abstractions (Just van ‘Unjust, &e., νεῖν), is the same that which
corresponding with the ἀσώματα, κάλ- the Eleate assi in recommenda-
λιστα, μέγιστα, τιμιώτατα, Politikus, tion of the logical exercises in the PH 286 A) on which they are perpetu- olitikus
3 Plato, Pheedrus, pp. 27) Ὁ, 277 B.
3 Plato, Phedras, Ῥ. 266 B. τούτων spe σάμενός τε π ἄλιν κατ᾽ εἴδη μέχρι τοῦ
δὴ ε αὐτός τε ἐραστὴς τῶν διαιρέ- δὴ ever συναγωγῶν. . . τοὺς δυναμέ. ἁτμήτον τέμνειν ἐπιστήθῃ.
yous αὐτὸ δρᾷν γὼ . καλῶ διαλεκτικούς. 4 Plato, Ῥμεάσῃθ, pp. 265 E, 270 E. The reason which Sokrates gives ἐοίκοι ἂν ὥσπερ τνφλοῦ πορείς.
ΒΑΡ. XXIX. COMPARISON OF DIALOGUES. 259
have already pointed out) may be compared to the Comparison -Phedrus: in another point of view, we shall find of the Foli- instruction in comparing it to the Parmenidés. This the Parme- last: too is a dialogue illustrative of method, but of a 5.485. different variety of method.
What the Sophistés and Politikus are for the enforcement of logical classification, the Parmenidés is for another Variety of part of the philosophising process—laborious evolu- method in tion of all the consequences deducible from the affir- <‘alectic mative as well as from the negative of every hypo- Diversity thesis bearing upon the problem. And we note the of Plato. fact, that both in the Politikus and Parmenidés, Plato manifests the consciousness that readers will complain of him as prolix, tiresome, and wasting ingenuity upon unprofitable matters! In the Parmenidés, he even goes the length of saying that the method ought only to be applied before a small and select audience ; to most people it would be repulsive, since they can- not be made to comprehend the necessity for such circuitous - preparation in order to reach truth.?
1 Plato, Politikus, p. 288 B. πρὸς lixity fis unavoidable, pp. 285 Ὁ, δὴν τὸ donna τὸ τοιοῦτον, ant the 286 B-E.
ong series of questions and answers : .
which foliows to show that pro- * Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 D-E.
POLITIKOS.
CHAPTER XXX.
POLITIKUS.
I HAVE examined in the preceding sections both that which the
The Politj. SOphistés and Politikus present in common—(vis. a
kus by it —_ lesson, as well as a partial theory, of the logical pro-
from ¢ e _ ceases called Definition and Division)—and that which phistés.
the Sophistés presents apart from the Politikus. I
now advert to two matters which we find in the Politikus, but not in the Sophistés. Both of them will be found to illustrate the Platonic mode of philosophising.
I. Plato assumes, that there will be critics who blame the two
dialogues as too long and circuitous; excessive in
piers of respect of prolixity. In replying to those objectors, mensura» —_ he enquires, What is meant by long or short—exces- ion. Ob- . » . ς
jectsmea- sive or deficient—great or little? Such expressions sured ach denote mensuration or comparison. But there are ee com” two varieties of mensuration. We may measure two pared with objects one against the other : the first will be called standard. great or greater, in relation to the second—the second neat ΑΥῇ will be called little or less in relation to the first. to be at- But we may also proceed in a different way. We tained isthe may assume some third object as a standard, and then
measure both the two against it: declaring the first
to be great, greater, excessive, &c., because it exceeds the standard —and the second to be little, less, deficfent, &c., because it falls short of the standard. Here then are two judgments or estima- tions altogether different from each other, and yet both denoted by the same words great and ltttle : two distinct essences (in Pla-
1The treatment of this subject intimates that the coming remarks are begins, Politik. p. 283 C, where Plato of wide application.
Cap. XXX. DIALECTIC APTITUDE, THE STANDARD. 261
tonic phrase) of great and little, or of greatness and littleness.’ The art of mensuration has thus two varieties. One includes arithmetic and geometry, where we simply compare numbers and magnitudes with each other, determining the proportions between them: the other assumes some independent standard ; above which is excess, and below which is deficiency. This standard passes by different names according to circumstances : the Moderate, Becoming, Seasonable, Proper, Obligatory, &c.? Such a standard is assumed in every art—in every artistic or scientific course of procedure. Every art has an end to be attained, a result to be produced ; which serves as the standard whereby each preparatory step of the artist is measured, and pronounced to be either excessive or deficient, as the case may be.* Unless such a standard be assumed, you cannot have regular art or science of any kind ; neither in grave matters, nor in vulgar matters—neither in the government of society, nor in the weaving of cloth.‘
Now what is the end to be attained, by this our enquiry into the definition of a Statesman? It is not so much to Pu solve the particular question started, as to create in the Soph- ourselves dialectic talent and aptitude, applicable to ‘stsand | every thing. This is the standard with reference to ry attain which our enquiry must be criticised—not by regard aptitude, to the easy solution of the particular problem, or to Jule is the. the immediate pleasure of the hearer. And if an comparison objector complains, that our exposition is too long or judge our subject-matters too vulgar—we shall require him Whether the to show that the proposed end might have been plo are attained with fewer words and with more solemn ° illustrations. If he cannot show this, we shall disregard his censure as inapplicable.§
1 Plato, Politik. p. 283 BE. δίττας fessor Alexander Bain in his work ἄρα ταύτας οὐσίας καὶ κρίσεις τοῦ on The Senses and The In μεγάλου κ καὶ τοῦ σμικροῦ θετέον. edition, p. 98. This explanation forms
lato, Politik. p. 284 E. τὸ μέτ- an item in the copious enumeration
prov, τὸ πρέπον, τὸν καιρόν, τὸ δέον, given by Mr. Bain of the fundamental &e. sensations of our
The reader will find these two ἣν Plato, Politik. p. 283 D. κατὰ varieties of mensuration, here dis- τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀναγκαίαν οὐσίαν --- tinguished by Plato, illustrated in the 284 A-C. ate τοῦ μετ tov γένεσιν. “two distinct modes of ἃ preciating ae’ Plato, 1 oliti weight” (the Absolute and the Rela. δ Plato, Politik. ἢ 86 D, 287 A. tive), described and explained by Pro- Compare Plato, P us, p. 86 D.
262
POLITIEUS. Cuar. Xxx.
The above-mentioned distinction between the two varieties of
Plato’s de- fence of the Politikus inst cri- tics. Neces- sity that the critic shall
mensuration or comparison, is here given by Plato, simply to serve as a defence against critics who cen- sured the peculiarities of the Politikus. It is not pursued into farther applications. But it deserves notice, not merely as being in itself just and useful, but as illustrating one of the many phases of Plato’s philosophy. It is an exhibition of the relative side of
Plato’s character, as contra-distinguished from the absolute or dogmatical : for both the two, opposed as they are to each other, co-exist in him and manifest themselves alternately. It conveys a valuable lesson as to the apportion ment of praise and blame. ‘When you blame me” (he says to his critics), “you must have in your mind some standard of comparison upon which the blame turns. Declare what that standard is :—what you mean by the Proper, Becoming, Mode- rate, ἄς. There is such a standard, and a different one, in every different Art. What is it here? You must choose this standard, explain what it is, and adhere to it when you undertake to praise or blame.” Such an enunciation (thoroughly Sokratic") of the principle of relativity, brings before critics the fact—which is very apt to be forgotten—that there must exist in the mind of each some standard of comparison, varying or unvarying, well or ill understood : while at the same time it enforces upon them the necessity of determining clearly for themselves, and announcing explicitly to others, what that standard is. Otherwise the pro- positions, affirming comparison, can have no uniform meaning with any two debaters, nor even with the same man at different times.
To this relative side of Plato’s mind belong his frequent com- Comparison mendations of measurement, numbering, computation, of Politikus comparison, &c. In the Protagoras,® he describes the art of measurement as the main guide and protector of human life : it is there treated as applicable to the cc. correct estimation of pleasures and pains. In the Pheedon,? it is again extolled: though the elements to be cal- culated are there specified differently. In the Philébus, the
2 Plato, Protagor. Ὁ. 867 B.
1 Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 8, 7, iii. 0, 12 P 3 Plato, Pheedon, p. 69 B.
Cua’. XXX. WHAT CONSTITUTES A RULER ? 963
antithesis of Πέρας and “Ame:poy (the Determinant or Limit, and the Indeterminate or Infinite) is one of the leading points of the dialogue. We read in it moreover a bipartite division of Men- suration or Arithmetic,! which is quite different from the bipartite division just cited out of the Politikus. Plato divides it there (in the Philébus) into arithmetic for theorists, and arithmetic for practical life : besides which, he distinguishes the various practi- cal arts as being more or less accurate, according as they have more or less of measurement and sensible comparison in them. Thus the art of the carpenter, who employs measuring instru- ments such as the line and rule—is more accurate than that of the physician, general, pilot, husbandman, &c., who have no similar means of measuring. This is ἃ classification quite diffe- rent from what we find in the Politikus ; yet tending in like manner to illustrate the relative point of view, and its frequent manifestation in Plato. In the Politikus, he seeks to refer praise and blame to a standard of measurement, instead of suffering them to be mere outbursts of sentiment unsystematic and un- analysed.
II. The second peculiarity to which I call attention in the Politikus, is the definition or description there far- noanition nished of the character so-called : that is, the States- of of theBtates- man, the King, Governor, Director, or Manager, of vornor. Sci- human society. At the outset of the dialogue, this entific com: person is declared to belong to the Genus—Men of Kratic point Science or of Art (the two words are faintly distin- ture. M Pro-
‘are of
guished in Plato). It is possession of the proper tures amount of scientific competence which constitutes a sub-divid-
man a Governor: and which entitles him to be so
named, whether he actually governs any society or not.? (This point of departure is purely Sokratic: for in the Memorabilia of Xenophon,’ Sokrates makes the same express declaration.) The King knows, but does not act: yet he is not a simple critic or spectator—he gives orders : and those orders are not suggested
1 Plato, Philébus, pp. 25 C, 27 D, noticed in another, passage of the δῆ. δύο ἀριθμητικαὶ καὶ δύο μετρητι- Politikus, p. 258 D-E. mat... τὴν διδυμότητα ἔχουσαι ταύτην, ὁνόματος δὲ ἑκὸς κεκοινωμέναι. “ee 2 Plato, Politikus, pp. 268 B, 260 B.
This same bipartition, however, is 3 Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 9, 10.
264 POLITIEUS. Cuar XXX.
to him by any one else (as in the case of the Herald, the Keleus- tés, and others),' but spring from his own bosom and his own knowledge. From thence Plato carries us through a series of descending logical subdivisions, until we come to define the King as the shepherd and feeder of the flock of human beings. But many other persons, besides the King, are concerned in feeding the human flock, and will therefore be included in this definition : which is thus proved to be too large, and to require farther qualification and restriction.* Moreover the feeding of the human flock belongs to others rather than to the King. He tends and takes care of the flock, but does not feed it: hence the definition is, in this way also, unsuitable.*
Our mistake (says Plato) was of this kind. In describing the
King or Governor, we have unconsciously fallen u
tho Batar- © the description of the King, such as he was in ‘the of a period Saturnian period or under the presidency of Kronus ; superior 0 and not such as he is in the present period. Under notsoany the presidency of Kronus, each human flock was longer. tended and governed by a divine King or God, who managed every thing for it, keeping it happy and comfortable by his own unassisted agency: the entire Koamos too, with its revolutions, was at that time under the immediate guidance of a divine mover. But in the present period this divine superin- tendence is withdrawn: both the entire Kosmos, and each separate portion of it, is left to its own movement, full of imper- fection and irregularity. Each human flock is now tended not by a divine King, as it was then; but by a human King, much less perfect, less effective, less exalted above the constituent members. Now the definition which we fell upon (says Plato) suited the King of the Saturnian period ; but does not suit the King of the present or human period.* At the first commence- ment of the present period, the human flock, left to themselves without superintendence from the Gods, suffered great misery ; but various presents from some Gods (fire from Prometheus, arts from Hephestus and Athéné, plants and seeds from Démétér)
1 Plato, Politik. p. 260 C-E. τὸ μὲν 3 Plato, Politik. p. 268. τῶν βασιλέων γένος εἰς τὴν αὑτεπιτακ- 4 Plato, Politik. p. 275 D-E. Techy θέντες, ἄς. ᾿ “δ Plato, Politik. pp. 267 B, 268 C. 5 Plato, Politik. pp. 274 A—275 B.
Caap. XXX.
SATURNIAN AND LATER KINGS.
265
rendered their condition more endurable, though still full of
difficulty and hardship.*
1 Plato, Politik. p. 274 C.
Plato embodies these last-mentioned com ns in an elaborate and re- markable mythe—theological,cosmical, zoological, social whi occupies six pages of e Politikus (268 D—274 E).
einers and Socher (Ueber Platon’s
the theolo differs much from what we read in the Phsedon, Republic, &c.: and Socher insists upon such discrepancy as one of his arguments against the genuineness of the Politikus. I have already ob- served that I do not concur in his inference. I do not expect uniformity of doctrine in the various Platonic
dialogues: more especially on a subject
80 much beyond experience, and so completely open to the conjectures of
Soamogony. In the Sophistéa ep. 242. cosmogony. e 8 . 242- 8, Plate had talked in a’ port of contemptuous tone about those who dealt with philosophical doctrine in the way of mythe, asa p fit only for boys: (not unlike the manner of Aristotle, when he speaks of oi
νθικῶς σοφιζόμενοι--τὰ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς,
etaphys. B. 1000, a. 15-18, A. 1071, b. 27): while here, in the Politikus, he tes upon what he admits to be a
yish myth, partly because a certain portion of it may be made available in
ustration o osophical purpose, partly because he wishes to enliven the monotony of a long. continued classifica- tion. A in the Phzedrus (p. 229 C), the Platonic Sokrates is made tocensure as futile any attempt to find rational explanations for the popular legends (σοφίζεσθαι): but here, in the Poli-
tikus, the Eleate expressly adapts his dead
theory about the backward and for- ward rotation of the Kosmos to the explanation of the popular legends— about earthborn men, and about Helios turning back his chariot, in order to escape the shocking spectacle of the Thyestean banquet: which legends when so explained, Plato declares tha ple wonld be wrong to disbelieve οἱ νῦν ὑπὸ πολλῶν οὐκ wees ἀπισ- τοῦνται, Pp. ᾿ » Ὁ, The TTferences of doctrine and
han , between the various Pla- tonic es, are facts not less worthy to noted than the simi-
larities. Here, in the mythe of the
Politikus, we find a peculiar theolo- gical view, and a very remarkable cosmical doctrine — the rotation and counter-rotation of the Kosmos. The Timeus) to bes living and intelligent
mzeus a an n Subject ; hav: recetved these mental
ts from its Demiurgus. But the
osmos is also Body as well as Mind ; 80 that it is incapable of that constant sameness or uniformity which belongs to the Divine: Body having in itself an incurable principle of disorder (p. 260 D). The Kosmos is perpetually in movement; but its movement is only rotatory or circular in the same place : which is the nearest approximat on to uniformity of movement. It does not
alternately the one an e other. This Divine Steersman presides over its rotation for a certain , and along
with him many subordinate Deities or Demons; until an epoch fixed by some unassigned destiny has been reached (p. 272 E). Then the Steers- man withdraws from the to his own watch-tower (eis τὴν αὐτοῦ πε- ριωπὴν), and the other Deities along with him. The Kosmos, left to itself, ceases to revolve in the same direction, and ts counter rota- tion ; revolving by itself backwards, or in the contrary direction. By such violent revulsion many of the living inhabitants of the : osmos are de- . e enomena are suc- cessively re rons , but in an inverse on—the old men go back to ma- turity, boyhood, infancy, death: the are born again, and pass
their lives backwards from age to fa. fancy. Yet the counter-rotation brings about not simply an inverted repro- duction of past phenomena, but new henomena also: for we are told that the osmos, when left to itself, did toler- ably well as long as it remembered the Steersman’s direction, but after a cer- tain interval became forgetful and went wrong generating mischief and evil: so that the Steersman was at last forced to put his hand to the work, and to impart toit a fresh rotation in his own direction (p. 273 B-D). The Kosmos never goes satisfactorily, except when the hand of the Steersman is upon it.
266
POLITIKUS.
Caap. XXX.
The human King, whom we shall now attempt to define, tends
the human flock ; but there are other persons also who assist in doing so, and without whoee concurrent agency he could not attain his purpose. We may illustrate this by comparing with him the weaver of woollen garments : who requires many subsidiary and preparatory processes, performed by agents different ", from himself (such as the carder of wool, the spinner, and the manufacturer of the instruments for working the loom) to enable him to finish his work. In all
matters, important as well as vulgar, two separate processes or
arts, or contributory persons, are to be
ed: Causes
and Co-Causes, «¢., Principal Causes, and Concurrent, Auxiliary, Co-efficient, Subordinate, Causes.1 The King, like the Weaver, is distinguishable, from other agents helping towards the same end, as a Principal Cause from Auxiliary Causes? The Causes auxiliary to the King, in so far as they are inanimate, may be distributed roughly under seven heads (bipartition being here
Bat we are informed that there are
iod of Kronus or tof Zeus, ἂς. The period of Zeus (p. 272 B). weriod of us was one of spon- taneousand universal abundance, under the immediate su Deity. This Divine Ruler was infi- nitely superior to the subjects whom he ruled, and left nothing to be desired. But now, in the present period of Zeus, men are under human rule, and not divine : there is no such marked supe- riority of the Ruler to his subjects. The human se eact el hae only ween of becoming extinct ; and has onl saved beneficent presents from va- ods—fire from Prometheus handicraft fro from Hephsestas and Athéné All this rodigious bulk of mythical invention ᾧαυμεστὸς ὄγκος, Ῥ. Καὶ i B) seems to introduced here for the pu of illustrating the com tive ratio between the Ruler and sub- jects; and Cho thn terial difference in this respect between King and Shepherd— between the government of d by , and that of flocks and herds by the . Inattempting to ofa the True and Genuine er (he la
tendence of the put
it down), we can expect
ἃ man amo men; bat i ed above his fellows, so far as rpeepsien istic accom-
ty. There ib much in this poplous. i e cannot clearly un ἔμ μων ἄμε ἡγὴι : nor do I derive much profit ὦ
m the 1e long, sroleg, a Polit. of it given b
pp. 100.128). We cal cannot fairly demand either harmonious consistency or pro-
found meaning in the different feathres
of an ous fiction. The
of a counter-rotation of the
βαῖνον ποδὸς ἱέναι, inverted reproduction of past pheno- me appears to me one of the most singular fanci ancies in the Greek m logy. I cannot tell how far it may
n
ugh Egyptian or any other tales that you please ”.
1 Plato, Politik. p. 281 D-E. 2 Plato, Politik. p. 287 Ὁ.
Cap. XXX. DISTINCTION OF CAUSES. 267
impracticable)—Implements, Vessels, Vehicles, Protections sur- rounding the Body, Recreative Objects, Raw Material of every variety, Nutritive Substances, &c.! Other auxiliary Causes are, the domestic cattle, bought slaves, and all descriptions of serving persons ; being often freemen who undertake, for hire, servile occupations and low trades. There are moreover ministerial officers of a higher grade : heralds, scribes, interpreters, prophets, priests, Sophists, rhetors; and a great diversity of other func- tionaries, military, judicial, forensic, dramatic, &c., who manage different departments of public affairs, often changing from one post to another.2 But these higher ministerial functionaries differ from the lower in this—That they pretend to be themselves the directors and managers of the government, not recognising the genuine King: whereas the truth is, that they are only ministerial and subordinate to him:—they are Concurrent Causes, while he is the only real or principal Cause.®
Our main object now (says the Eleate) is to distinguish this Real Cause from the subordinate Causes which are plato does mistaken for its partners and equals:—the genuine potsdmit | and intelligent Governor, from those who pretend classifica- falsely to be governors, and are supposed often to be vernment. such. We cannot admit the lines of distinction, 1+ ἀ068 not which are commonly drawn between different govern- point upon ments, as truly logical : at least they are only subordi- phic ial nate to ours. Most men distinguish the government tinction of one, or a few, or the many: government of the founded— poor or of the rich: government according to law, Unscienti- or without law:—by consent, or by force. The 80. different names current, monarchy or despotism, aristocracy, or oligarchy, &c., correspond to these definitions. But we hold that these definitions do not touch the true characteristic : which is to be found in Science, Knowledge, Intelligence, Art or scien-
1 Plato, Politik. pp. 288-289. obscure jest deserves Stallbaum’s com- 2 Plato, Politik. Pp. 290-291 B. Plato pliment :—‘‘ Ceterum lepidissimi hc describes these men by
comparing them est istorum hominum irrisio, qui cum feoble end crafty” syns ie not very monstris t Plato repeats eeble and crafty. s is not very mo comparantur”. intelligible, pout _ resume that it it p. 303 C.
udes e variety of functions, : and the frequent alternation of func. °° F'!ato, Politik. p. 291 C tions. I cannot think that such an 4 Plato, Politik. p. 202 D.
288 POLITIKUS. Cuap. XXX.
tific procedure, &c., and in nothing else. The true government of mankind is, the scientific or artistic: whether it be carried on by one, or a few, or many—whether by poor or rich, by force or consent—whether according to law, or without law.1 This is the right and essential characteristic of genuine government :— it is government conducted according to science or art. All governments not conforming to this type are only spurious counterfeits and approaches to it, more or less defective or objectionable.*
Looking to the characteristic here suggested, the Eleate pro- Unscientific ZOUnces that all numerous and popular governments govern- must be counterfeits There can be no genuine ες counter. government except by One man, or by a very, small feits. Go- number at most. True science or art is not attain- byanynu- able by many persons, whether rich or poor: scarcely meroustod even by a few, and probably by One alonc; since counterfeit. the science or art of governing men is more difficult by the one than any other science or ἃ But the government of this One is the only true and right government, true govern. whether he proclaims laws or governs without law, whether he employs severity or mildness—provided | only he adheres to his art, and achieves its purpose, the good and — improvement of the governed.‘ He is like the true physician,
who cuts and burns pafients, when his art commands, for the - purpose of curing them. He will not be disposed to fetter him- self by fixed general laws: for the variety of situations and the fluctuation of circumstances, is so perpetual, that no law can possibly fit all cases. He will recognise no other law but his art. If he lays down any general formula or law, it will only be from necessity, because he cannot be always at hand to watch and direct each individual case : but he will not hesitate to depart from his own formula whenever Art enjoins it. That alone is base, evil, unjust, which he with his political Science or Art declares to be so. If in any particular case he departs from his
1 Plato, Politik. pp. 292 C, 293 B. 300 Plato, Politik. pp. 292 D-E, 297 B, 2 Plato, Politik. p. 208 E. ταύτην ῳ : τότε καὶ κατὰ τοὺν τοιούτους “ὄρους ς pintor Pome: BEER ον ον ρά,, ἥμὲν Hee, oO πολιτείαν ne ere! ματα τιθεὶς ἀλλὰ Thy τέχνην νόμον wape- ὄντως οὔσας λεκτέον. ΧΟ ΚΕΡῚ
lato, Politik. pp. 200 C, 296 ΒΟ.
Cuap. XXX. UNSCIENTIFIC GOVERNMENT—FIXED LAWS. 269
own declaration, and orders such a thing to be done—the public have no right to complain that he does injustice. No patient can complain of his physician, if the latter, acting upon the counsels of his art, disregards a therapeutic formula. All the acts of the true Governor are right, whether according or contrary to law, so long as he conducts himself with Art and Intelligence —aiming exclusively to preserve the people, and to render them better instead of worse.?
How mischievous would it be (continues the Eleate) if we prescribed by fixed laws how the physician or the steersman should practise their respective arts: if we held them bound to peremptory rules, punishing them whenever they departed from those rules, and making them accountable before the Dikastery, when any one accused them of doing so: if we consecrated these rules and dogmas, forbidding all criticism or 5,98 censure upon them, and putting to death the free enquirer as a dreaming, prosy,: Sophist, corrupting the youth and inciting lawless discontent!* How
Fixed laws, limiting the scientific Governor, are mischie- vous, as they would be for the physi-
of determin- ing medical practice by ws, and presumi
absurd, if we pretended that every citizen did. know, or might or ought to know, these two arts ; because the matters concerning them were enrolled in the
every one to know it.
laws, and
because no one ought to be wiser than the laws? Who would think of imposing any such fetters on other arts, such as those of the general, the painter, the husbandman, the carpenter, the prophet, the cattle-dealer? To impose them would be to render life, hard as it is even now, altogether intolerable. Yet these are the trammels under which in actual cities the political Art is exercised.®
Such are the mischiefs inseparable, in greater or less degree,
1 Plato, Politik. p. 296 C-D.
2 Plato, Politik. p. 297 A.
3 Plato, Politik. pp. 208-299. 299 B: Kat τοίνυν ἔτι δεήσει θέσθαι νόμον ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις, ἄν τις κυβερνητικὴν καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν ἢ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ ἰατρικῆς ἀλη- θείαν. . . ζητῶν φαίνηται παρὰ τὰ γράμ- ματα καὶ σοφιζόμενος ὁτιοῦν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, πρῶτον μὲν μήτε ἰατρικὸν αὐτὸν μήτε κυβερνητικὸν ὀνομάζειν, ἀλλὰ μετεωρόλογον ἁδολέσχην τινὰ σοφιστὴν εἶθ᾽ ὡς διαφθείροντα ἄλλους νεωτέρους καὶ ἀναπείθοντα ἐπιτίθεσθαι
κυβερνητικῇ, &c.
4 Plato, Polit. p. 2909 C. ἂν δὲ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα δόξ πείθειν εἶτε νέους εἴτε πρεσβύτας, κολά- ζειν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις. Οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖν τῶν νόμων εἶναι σοφώτερον" οὐδένα γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν τό τε ἰατρικὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν οὐδὲ τὸ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ναυτικόν" ἐξεῖ- ναι γὰρ τῷ βονλομένῳ μανθάνειν γεγραμ- μένα καὶ πάτρια ἔθη κείμενα.
5 Plato, Polit. p. 2909 D-E. ὥστε ὁ Bios, ὧν καὶ νῦν χαλεπός, εἰς τὸν χρόνον ἐκεῖνον ἀβίωτος γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν τὸ παράπαν.
270 POLITIKUS. Cuap. XXX.
from fixed and peremptory laws. Yet grave as these ment by mischiefs are, there are others yet graver, which such fixed lawsis laws tend to obviate If the magistrate appointed to lawless go- guard and enforce the laws, ventures to break or con- by unscien- travene them, simulating, but not really possessing, tife men, the Art or Science of the genuine Ruler—he will than law. make matters far worse. The laws at any rate are ment b such as the citizens have been accustomed to, and such acientific i, 88 give a certain measure of satisfaction. But the a second- arbitrary rule of this violent and unscientific Gover-
nor is a tyranny :' which is greatly worse than the laws. Fixed laws are thus a second-best :* assuming that you cannot obtain a true scientific, artistic, Governor. If such a man could be obtained, men would be delighted to live under him. But they despair of ever seeing such a character, and they there- fore cling to fixed laws, in spite of the numerous concomitant mischiefs.* These mischiefs are indeed so serious, that when we look at actual cities, we are astonished how they get on under such a system; and we cannot but feel how firm and deeply rooted a city naturally 18."
We see therefore (the Eleate goes on) that there is no true Comparison polity—nothing which deserves the name of a genuine fe pccome political society—except the government of one chief, ments. The scientific or artistic. With him laws are superfluous one despot and even inconvenient. All other polities are counter- Democracy feits: factions and cabals, rather than governments : ὅ delusions carried on by tricksters and conjurers. agovern. 4 But among these other polities or sham polities, there ment. is a material difference as to greater or less badness : and the difference turns upon the presence or absence of good laws. Thus, the single-headed government, called monarchy (assuming the Prince not to be a man of science or art) is the
1 Plato, Politik. p. 300 A-B, 301 5 Plato, Polit. pp. 302-303 B-C. τοὺς
B-C. κοινωνοὺς τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν,
2 Plato, Polit. p. 300 Ο. δεύτερος πλὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμονος, ἀφαιρετέον ὡς
πλοῦς. οὐκ ὄντας τολτικοὺς ἀλλὰ στασιαστι-
κούς, καὶ ε ν ἔστων π ἅτας
3 Plato, Polit. p. 801 Ὁ. ὄντας καὶ αὐτοὺς ε mi πριούτονς, μεγί-
4 Plato, Polit. p. 302 A. ἢ ἐκεῖνο στους δὲ ὄντας μιμητὰς καὶ γόητας
ἡμῖν θανμαστέον μαλλον, ὡς ἰσχυρόν τι μεγίστους γίγνεσθαι τῶν σοφιστῶν σὸο- πόλις ἐστὶ φύσει; φιστάς.
Cuap. XXX. COUNTERFEITS OF THE TRUE RULER. 271
best of all the sham-polities, if the Prince rules along with and in observance of known good laws: but it is the worst of them all, if he rules without such laws, as a despot or tyrant. Oligarchy, or the government of a few—if under good laws, is less good than that of the Prince under the same circumstances— if without such laws, is less bad than that of the despot. Lastly, the government of the many is less good under the one supposi- tion—and less bad under the other. It is less effective, either for good or for evil. It is in fact less of a government: the administrative force being lost by dissipation among many hands for short intervals; and more free play being thus left to indi- viduals. Accordingly, assuming the absence of laws, democracy is the least bad or most tolerable of the six varieties of sham- polity. Assuming the presence of laws, it is the worst of them.
We have thus severed the genuine scientific Governor from the unworthy counterfeits by whom his agency is mimicked in actual society. But we have still to vernor dis- sever him from other worthier functionaries, analo- fnguished gous and cognate, with whom he co-operates; and to Seneral, the show by what characteristic he is distinguished from They are persons such as the General, the Judge, the Rhetor or ἈΠ Properly Persuader to gcod and just objects. The distinction nates And is, that all these functions, however honourable func- tions, are still nevertheless essentially subordinate and minis- terial, assuming a sovereign guidance from some other quarter to direct them. Thus the General may, by his strategic art, carry on war effectively ; but he must be directed when, and against whom, war is to be carried on. The Judge may decide quarrels without fear, antipathy, or favour: but the general rules for deciding them must be prescribed to him by a higher authority. So too the Rhetor may apply his art well, to persuade people, or to work upon their emotions, without teaching them: but he must be told by some one else, when and on what occasions per- suasion is suitable, and when force must be employed instead of it.2 Each of these functionaries must learn, what his own art
heroes: Polit. p. 302 B. tis δὴ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν τούτων ἥκιστα χα- ἣν, πασῶν χαλεπῶν οὐσῶν, καὶ τίς βαρυτάτη; Also p. 3 Pinte Polit. pp. 904.306. ™ P
272 POLITIKUS. Cuap. XXX.
will not teach him, the proper seasons, persons, and limitations, among and under which his art is to be applied. To furnish such guidance is the characteristic privilege and duty of the scientific chief, for which he alone is competent. He does not act himself, but he originates, directs, and controls, all the real agents and agencies. Without him, none of them are available or bene- ficial towards their special ends. He alone can judge of their comparative value, and of the proper reasons for invoking or
restraining their interference.! The great scientific Governor being thus defined, and logically
distinguished from all others liable to be confounded
What the scientific with him, Plato concludes by a brief statement what Governor . . . . . ‘ willdo. He his principal functions are. He will aim at ensuring till aim at among his citizens the most virtuous characters and tion of vir the best ethical combinations. Like the weaver (to wee te. += whom he has been already assimilated) he will put together the together the great political web or tissue of improved energetic citizenship, intertwining the strong and energetic vir- the pentie Σ tues (the warp) with the yielding and gentler virtues virtues, i, (the woof).? Both these dispositions are parts or ataral dis- . . : sidence | be- branches of virtue ; but there is a natural variance or ween tiem.
repulsion between them.? Each of them is good, in proper measure and season: each of them is bad, out of measure and season. The combination of both, in due proportion, is indispensable to form the virtuous citizen : and that combinaticn it is the business of the scientific Governor to form and uphold. It is with a view to this end that he must set at work all the agents of teaching and education, and must even interfere to arrange the intermarriages of the citizens; not allowing the strong and courageous families to form alliance with each other, lest the breed should in time become too violent—nor the gentle and quiet families to do the like, lest the offspring should degene- rate into stupidity.*
All persons, who, unable to take on this conjunction, sin by an
1 Plato, Polit. p. 305 Ὁ. τὴν γὰρ w 2 ν ᾿ a ὄντως οὖσαν βασιλικὴν οὐκ αὑτὴν See πράττειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄρχειν τῶν δυναμένων πράττειν, γιγνώσκουσαν τὴν ἀρχήν τε καὶ ὁρμὴν τῶν μεγίστων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγκαιρίας τε πέρι καὶ ἀκαιρίας, τὰς δ᾽
ἄλλας τὰ προσταχθέντα δρᾷν. ;
2 Plato, Polit. pp. 306-307. τὴν βασι- λικὴν συμπλοκήν.
3 Plato, Polit. pp. 306 Α-Β, 307 C,
4 Plato, Polit. pp. 308-309-310.
CuHaP. XXX. SOKRATIC IDEAL.
excess of the strong element, manifesting injustice or irreligion—must be banished or put to death:! all who sin by excess of the feebler element, exhibiting
27:3
If a man sins by ex cess of the energetic element, he
stupidity and meanness, must be degraded into slavery. is to be
Above all things, the scientific Governor must himself dictate, and must implant and maintain, in the minds of all his citizens, an authoritative standard of ortho- dox sentiment respecting what is just, honourable, good—and the contrary.2 If this be ensured, and if the virtues naturally discordant be attempered with proper care, he will make sure of a friendly and har-
killed or banished ; if of the gentle, he is be made aslave. The Governor must keep up in the minds of the
monious community, enjoying as much happiness as standard
human affairs admit.$
I have thus given a brief abridgment of the main the Politikus, and of the definition which Plato gives
of the True Governor and his function. I proceed to Sokratic
make ἃ few remarks upon it.
Plato’s theory of government is founded upon the supposition of perfect knowledge—ascientific or artistic intelligence—in the person of the Governor : a partial approach, through teaching and acquired knowledge, to that immense superiority of the Governor over the
derived ex- clusivel from scien- tificeuperio-
Hay eon person
Governed, which existed in the Saturnian period. It is this, and this alone, which constitutes, in his estimation, the title to govern mankind, ‘The Governor does not himself act: he directs the agency of others: and the directions are dictated by his know- ledge. I have already observed that Sokrates had himself enunciated the doctrine—Superior scientific competence (the special privilege of a professor or an artist) is the only legitimate title to govern.
From Sokrates the idea passed both to Plato and to Xeno- phon: and the contrast between the two is shown Different forcibly by the different way in which they deal ‘} weys in this with it. Xenophon has worked it out on a large ideal is
1 Plato, Polit. p. 809 A. 3 Plato, Polit. pp 300 C, 310 E.
3 Plato, Polit. p. 311 B-C. 3—18
974 POLITIKUS. Caar. XXX.
worked out ecale, in the Cyropedia—on a small scale, in the byt Xeno- (Economicus. Cyrus in the former, Ischomachus in The the latter, knows better than any one else what is speculation to be done, and gives orders accordingly. But both man of the one and the other are also foremost in action, action. setting example as well as giving orders to others. Now Plato, while developing the same idea, draws a marked line of distinction between Science and Practice :—between direction and execution.! His scientific Governor does not act at all, but he gives orders to all the different men of action, and he is the only person who knows on what occasions and within what limits each agent should put forth his own special aptitude. Herein we discern one of the distinctions between these two υἱοὶ Socratic: : Xenophon, the soldier and man of action—Plato, the speculative: philosopher. Xenophon conceives the conditions of the True Governor in a larger way than Plato, for he includes among them the forward and energetic qualities requisite for acting on the feelings of the subject Many, and for disposing them to follow orders with cheerfulness and zeal :* whereas Plato makes abstraction of this part of the conditions, and postu- lates obedience on the part of the many as an item in his fundamental hypothesis. Indeed he perpetually presents us with the comparison of the physician, who cuts and burns for the purpose of ultimate cure. Plato either neglects, or assumes as a matter of course, the sentiments of the persons commanded, or the conditions of wrlling obedience ; while Xenophon dwells upon the maintenance of such sentiments as one of the capital difficul- ties in the problem of government. And we perceive a marked contrast between the unskilful proceedings of Plato, when he visited Dionysius IT. at Syracuse, illustrating his (Plato’s) inaptitude for dealing with a real situation—and the judicious management of Xenophon, when acting as one of the leaders of the Cyreian army under circumstances alike unexpected and perilous. Plato here sets forth the business of governing as a special art,
1 Plato, Polit. pp. 259 C-D, 305 D. we see the difference between the
2See the preface to Xenophon’s Xenophontic idea, and the Platonic Cyropeedia; alsu Cyroped. i. 6, 20; idea, of ὁ ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, οἱ θεῖοι cai and his Gécon. c. 21,and c. 13, 4,where ἀγαθοὶ καὶ émtaonjuoves ἄρχοντες.
ἱρὰ
CuHaP. XXX. COUNTER-THEORY OF GOVERNMENT. 975
analogous to the special art of the weaver, the steers- man, the physician. Now in each special art, the requisite knowledge and competence is possessed only by the one or few artists who practise them. The knowledge possessed by such one or few, suffices for all the remaining community ; who benefit by it, but are altogether ignorant on the matter, and follow orders blindfold. ΑΒ this one Artist is the only com- petent person for the task, so he is assumed qud Artist, to be infallible in the performance of the task—never to go wrong, nor to abuse his power, nor to aim at any collateral end.! Such is Plato’s theory of government in the Politikus. Butif we turn to the Protagoras, we shall find this very theory of government ex- plicitly denied, and a counter-theory affirmed, in the discourse put into the mouth of Protagoras. That Sophist is made to dis- tinguish the political or social art, upon which the possibility of constituting or keeping up human society depends, from all other arts (manual, useful, linguistic), by this express characteristic : All other arts were distributed among mankind in such manner, that knowledge and skill were confined to an exclusive few, whose knowledge, each in his own special department, sufficed for the service of all the rest, not favoured with the like knowledge—but the political or social art was distributed (by order of Zeus to Hermes) on a principle quite opposite. It was _ imparted to every member of society without exception. If it had been granted only to a few, and not to all, society could not have held together. Justice and the sense of shame (Temperance or Moderation), which are the bonds of the city and the fruits of the political art, must be instilled into every man. Whoever cannot take on and appropriate them (Zeus proclaims it as his law), must be slain as a nuisance or distemper of the city.?
Such we have seen to be the theory enunciated by the Platonic
The theory in the Poli- tikus is the
Protagoras (in the dialogue so-called) respecting the points of political or social art. It pervades all the members taporenn of society, as a common and universal attribute, theory— though each man has his own specialty besides. It Common” was thus distributed at the outset by Zeus. It stands sentiment.
1 Compare Plato, Republic, i. pp. 340-341.
2 Plato Protag. pp. $22, 325 A.
276 POLITIKUS. Cuar. XXX
embodied in the laws and in the unwritten customs, so that one man may know it as well as another. Every man makes open profession of knowing and possessing it:—which he cannot do with any special art. Fathers enforce it on their children by rewards and punishments, schoolmasters and musicians impart it by extracts from the poets: the old teach it to the young: nay every man, far from desiring to monopolise it for himself, is for- ward in teaching it to others: for it is the interest of every one that his neighbour should learn it. Since every one thus teaches it, there are no professed or special teachers: yet there are still some few who can teach it a little better than others—and among those few I (says Protagoras) am one.?
Whoever compares the doctrine of the Politikus* with the Counter. portion of the Protagoras® to which I have just re- qheory in ferred, will see that they stand to each other as theory kus. The and counter-theory. The theory in the Politikus sets ofthe Eleate aside (intentionally or not) that in the Protagoras. in the ss The Platonic Protagoras, spokesman of King Nomos,
omuch = represents common sense, sentiment, sympathies and sarther#han antipathies, written laws, and traditional customs Protagoras. known to all as well as reverenced by the majority : the Platonic Politikus repudiates all these, as preposterous fetters to the single Governor who monopolises all political science and art. Let us add too, that the Platonic Protagoras (whom many commentators teach us to regard as a person of exorbitant arro- gance and pretensions) is a very modest man compared to the Eleate in the Platonic Politikus. For the former accepts all the written laws and respected customs around him,—admits that most others know them, in the main, as well as he,—and only professes to have acquired a certain amount of superior skill in impressing them upon others: whereas the latter sets them all aside, claims for himself an uncontradicted monopoly of social science and art, and postulates an extent of blind submission from society such as has never yet been yielded in history.
The Eleate here complains of it as a hardship, that amidst a
1 Plato, Protag. pp. 327-328. trine of which I have given a bri Tt Politik p. 901 Ἐς ; abstract in the text. e of e portion of this dialogue, f:om p. 296 to p. 302, enunciates the doc- ὁ Plato, Protag. pp. 321-328.
Cnar. XXX. FREE CENSURE NOT TOLERATED. 277
community actually established and existing, directed by written laws, traditional customs and common sentiment (the Protagorean model),—he, the political that under artist, is interdicted from adverse criticism and out- tagorean spoken censure of the legal and consecrated doctrines, ‘ery ne If he talks as one wiser than the laws, or impugns criticism them as he thinks that they deserve, or theorises in The dissen- his own way respecting the doctrines which they ‘rs cithe eanction—he is either laughed to scorn as a visionary, ee > silence or prosing, Sophist—or hated, and perhaps punished, as a corruptor of youth ; as a person who brings the institutions of society into contempt, and encourages violators of the law.! The reproach implied in these phrases of Plato is doubtless intended as an allusion to the condemnation of So- krates. It is a reproach well-founded against that at Athens, proceeding of the government of Athens:—and would ποῦ 50 great have been still better founded against other contem- where. Plato porary governments. That the Athenians were in- of the as- tolerant, is not to be denied: but they were less ἔπεα ibility. intolerant than any of their contemporaries. No- in existing where else except at Athens could Sokrates have gone butexactsit on until seventy years of age talking freely in the S¢vorely in market-place. against the received political and reli- he himself gious orthodoxy. There was more free speech (map- constructs. pyoia)* at Athens than in any part of the contemporary world. Plato, Xenophon, and the other companions of Sokrates, pro- claimed by lectures and writings that they thought themselves wiser than the laws of Athens: yet though the Gorgias was in- tended as well as adapted to bring into hatred and contempt both those laws and the persons who administered them, the Athenian Rhetors never indicted Plato for libel. Upon this point, we can
1 Pie Politik. p. 209 B. ἄν τις 3 See Euripides, Ion, 671. καὶ δοξιὑόμενὸς busty παρὰ τὰ ira. ἐκ τῶν ᾿Αθηνῶν μ' ἢ τεκοῦσ᾽ εἴη γυνή, In the seventh book of Republic Ὁ" μο' γένοιτο μητρόθεν παῤῥησια.
(p. 520 B), Plato describes the position Also Euripid. Hippolyt. 424, and of the philosopher in an established Plato, Gorgias, Ρ. 461 K, where So. society, sp his own in- krates says to Polus—Seva μέντ᾽ ay
up by ternal force, against the opposition of πάθοις, εἰ ᾿Αθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς all the social influences—avréparoc γὰρ ‘EAAdbos πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ ἐμφύονται ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῃ (πόλει) λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτον μόνος πολιτείας, ἂς. ἀτνχήσαις, &C.
978 POLITIKCUS. car. XXX.
only speak comparatively : for perfect liberty of proclaiming opinions neither does now exist, nor ever has existed, any where. Most men have no genuine respect for the right of another to form and express an opinion dissentient from theirs: if they happen to hate the opinion, they account it a virtue to employ as much ill-usage or menace as will frighten the holder thereof into silence. Plato here points out in emphatic language,’ the de- plorable consequences of assuming infallibility and perfection for the legal and customary orthodoxy of the country, and prohibiting free censure by dissentient individuals. But this is on the sup- position that the laws and customs are founded only on common sense and traditional reverence :—and that the scientific Governor is among the dissenters. Plato’s judgment is radically different when he supposes the case reversed :—when King Nomos is superseded by the scientific Professor of whom Plato dreams, or by a lawgiver who represents him. We shall observe this when we come to the Treatise de Legibus, in which Plato constitutes an orthodoxy of his own, prohibiting free dissent by restrictions and penalties stricter than any which were known to antiquity. He cannot recognise an infallible common sense: but he has no scruple in postulating an infallible scientific dictator, and in enthroning himself as such. Though well aware that reasoned truth presents itself to different philosophers in different versions, he does not hesitate to condemn those philosophers who differ from him, to silence or to something worse.
It will appear then that the Platonic Politikus distinguishes Theory of three varieties and gradations of social constitution. the 5 Politi: 1. Science or Art. Systematic Construction from the
ished beginning, based upon Theory.—That which is directed tone ef pol by the constant supervision of a scientific or artistic ty. Gigantic Ruler. This is the only true or legitimate polity. force the Represented by Plato in Republic. Illustrated by worst. the systematic scheme of weights, measures, apportion- ment of years, months, and days, in calendar—put together on scientific principles by the French Convention in 1793—as con- trasted with the various local, incoherent, growths, which had obtained recognition through custom or arbitrary preference of unscientific superiors.
1 Plato, Polit. p. 299 E.
σβαρ. XXX. THREE GRADATIONS OF POLITY. 279
2. Common Sense. Unsystematic Aggregate of Customs, accepted in an Actual Soctety——That which is directed by written laws and fixed traditional customs, known to every one, approved by the common sense of the community, and communicated as well as upheld by the spontaneous teaching of the majority. King Nomos.
This stands for the second best scheme : the least objectionable form of degeneracy—yet still a degeneracy. It is the scheme set forth by the Platonic Protagoras, in the dialogue so called. Represented with improvements by Plato in Treatise De Legibus.
3. Gigantic Indwidual Force.—That in which some violent individual—not being really scientific or artistic, but perhaps falsely pretending to be so—violates and tramples under foot the established laws and customs, under the stimulus of his own exorbitant ambition and unmeasured desires.
This is put forward as the worst scheme of all: as the greatest depravation of society, and the greatest forfeiture of public as well as private happiness. We have here the proposition which Pélus and Kalliklés are introduced as defending in the Gorgias, and Thrasymachus in the Republic. In both dialogues, Sokrates undertakes to expose it. The great benefit conferred by King Nomos, is, that he protects society against the maximum of evil.
Another interesting comparison may be made: that between the Politikus and the Republic. We must remember |, parison that the Politikus is announced by Plato as having of the Poli- two purposes. 1. To give a lesson in the method of the Repub- definition and division. 2 To define the charac- lic. Points teristic of the person bearing the name of Politikus, and differ- distinguishing him from all others, analogous or dis- °"* parate.—The method is here more prominent than the doctrine.
But in the Republic, no lesson of method is attempted ; the doctrine stands alone and independent of it. We shall find how- ever that the doctrine is essentially the same. That which the Politikus lays down in brief outline, is in the Republic amplified and enlarged ; presented with many variations and under diffe- rent points of view, yet, still at the bottom, the same doctrine, both as to affirmation and negation. ‘The Republic affirms (as the Politikus does) the exclusive legitimacy of science, art, intelli- gence, &c., as the initiatory and omnipotent authority over all
480 POLITIKUS. Cuap. XXX.
the constituent members of society: and farther, that such intelligence can have no place except im one or a few privileged
The Republic (like the Politikus) presents to us the march of society with its Principal Cause—its concurrent or Auxiliary Causes—and its inferior governable mass or matter, the human flock, indispensable and co-esential as a part of the whole scheme. In the Republic, the Cause is represented by the small council of philosophical Elders : the concurrent causes, by the Guardians or trained soldiers: the inferior matter, by the remaining society, which is distributed among various trades, providing for the subsistence and wants of all. The explanation of Justice (which is the ostensible purpose of the Republic) is made to consist in the fact—That each one of these several parts does its own special work—nothing more—nothing less. Through- out all the Republic, a constant parallelism is carried on (often indeed overstrained) between the community and the individual man. In the one as well as in the other, Plato recognises the three constituent elements, all essential as co-operators, but each with its own special function : in the individual, he recognises three souls (encephalic, thoracic, and abdominal) as corresponding to Elders, Guardians, and Producers, in the community. Here are the same features as those given in outline in the Politikus : but the two higher features of the three appear greatly expanded in the Republic: the training and conditions proper for the philosophic Artist or Governor, and for his auxiliaries the Guardians, being described and vindicated at great length. Moreover, in the Republic, Plato not only repeats the doctrine! that the right of command belongs to every art in its own pro- vince and over its own subject-matter (which is the cardinal point in the Politikus)—but he farther proclaims that each individual neither can exercise, nor ought to exercise, more than one art. He allows no double men or triple men?*—“ Quam quisque novit artem, in e4 se exerceat”. He would not have respected the Xenophontic Cyrus or Ischomachus. He carries the principle of specialization to its extreme point. His Republic
1 Plato, Republ. i. p. 42 Ο. ᾿Αλλὰ B—395-307 E. οὐκ ἔστι διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ μὴν ἄρχουσι γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν wap’ ἡμῖν οὐδὲ ork ἐπειδὴ Exac-
rev οὗ οὗ wep εἰσὶ τέ τος ἕν πράττει (p. 397 ἐς Hepabl. ip pp. 370 B, 374 °
CHap. XXX. COMPARED WITH REPUBLIC—AND KRATYLUS. 281
is an aggregate of special artists and professional aptitudes : among whom the Governor is only one, though the first and rarest. He sets aside the common basis of social endowments essential to every man: upon which each man’s specialty is superinduced in the theory of the Platonic Protagoras. The only common quality which Plato admits is,—That each man, and each of the three souls composing each man, shall do his own business and his own business only: this is his definition of Justice, in the Republic.
Lastly, I will illustrate the Politikus by comparison with the
Kratylus, which will be treated in the next chapter. The conception of dictatorial science or art, which I have stated as the principal point in the Politikus, appears again in the Kratylus applied to a different subject—naming, or the imposition of names. Right and legitimate name-giving is declared to be an affair of science or art, like right and legitimate polity : it can only be performed by the competent scientific or artistic name-giver, or by the lawgiver considered in that special capacity. The second title of the dialogue Kratylus is Περὶ ’Ovopdrwy ᾿᾽Ορθότητος--- Οὐ the Recti- tude or legitimacy of names. What constitutes right and legitimate Name-giving? In like manner, we
Companison of the Poli- tikus with
the Kraty- lus. Dicta- torial con- structive, science or
lied in ‘the
ormer to social ad- ministra- tion—in the latter to the formation and modi- fication of names.
might provide a second title for the Politikus—Iept Πολιτείας ’OpOdrnros—On the rectitude or legitimacy of polity or sociality. What constitutes right or legitimate sociality ?? Plato answers— It is the constant dictation and supervision of art or science—or of the scientific, artistic, dictator, who alone knows both the End and the means. This alone is right and true sociality —or sociality as it ought to be. So, if we read the Kratylus, we find Plato defining in the same way right Name-giving—or name-
1 Plato, Republ. iv. p. 483.
2The exact expression occurs in Politikus, pp. 203 E, 204 A. νῦν δὲ ἤδη φανερὸν ὅτ: τοῦτο βουλησόμεθα, τὸ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἅνεν νόμων ἀρχόντων ὄρθό- Tyros διελθεῖν ἡ ἡμᾶς. δος ὀρθή, ἀληθινή, γνησία, πολιτεία,
hrases employed several times—
A-C, 293 B-E, 296 E, 297 BD.
300 D-E: ὃ aa wos, ὁ ὃ ἔντεχνος. E: τὴν ἀληθινὴν κείνην, τῆν τοῦ. ἑνὸς δε μτὰ τέχνης ἄρχοντος πολιτείαν.
Plato sometimes speaks as if a bad πολιτεία Were no πολιτεία at all—as if a bad νόμος were no νόμος δὺ 811. See above, vol. ii. ch. xiv. pp. 88, where I have touched on this point in re- viewing the Minos. This is a frequent
and perplexing con confasion, but us purely a Compare Aristotel.
. 1276, a. 1, where he deals with the ‘like confusion—dp’ εἰ ph δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης ;
282 POLITIKUS.
CHap. XXX. giving as it ought to be. It is when each name is given by an artistic name-constructor, who discerns the Form of the name naturally suitable in each particular case, and can embody it in appropriate letters and syllables.! A true or right name signifies by likeness to the thing signified? The good lawgiver discerns this likeness : but all lawgivers are not good: the bad lawgiver fancies that he discerns it, but is often mistaken.* It would be the ideal perfection of language, if every name could be made to signify by likeness to the thing named. But this cannot be realised : sufficient likenesses cannot be found to furnish an adequate stock of names. In the absence of such best standard, we are driven to eke out language by appealing to a second-best, an inferior and vulgar principle approximating more or less to rectitude—that is, custom and convention.‘
We see thus that in the Kratylus also, as well asin the Politi- kus, the systematic dictation of the Man of Science or Art is pronounced to be the only basis of complete rectitude. Below this, and far short of it, yet still indispensable as a supplement in real life—is, the authority of unsystematic custom or convention ; not emanating from any systematic constructive Artist, but actually established (often, no one knows how) among the com- munity, and resting upon their common sentiment, memory, and tradition.
This is the true Platonic point of view, considering human affairs in every department, the highest as well as the lowest, as subjects of Art and Science : specialization of attributes and subdivision of function, so that the business of governing falls to the lot of one or a few highly qualified Governors : while the social edifice is assumed to have been constructed from the beginning by one of these Governors, with a view to consistent, systematic, predetermined ends—instead of that inco- herent aggregate ἢ which is consecrated under the empire of law
1 Plato, Kratylus, p. 388 E. Οὔκ ἄρα παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ὄνομα θέσθαι ἔστιν, ἀλλά τινος ὀνοματουργοῦ" οὗτος δ᾽ ἔστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ νομοθέτης, ὃς δὴ τῶν δημιονρ-
ὧν σπανιώτατος ἐν ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται.
mpare Politik. p. 292 D.
2 Plato, Kratyl. pp. 430, 431 D, 433 C.
3 Plato, Kratyl. pp. 431 E, 436 B.
4 Plato, Kratyl. p. 435 B-C.
So in the Protagoras (p. 328 A) we find the Platonic Protagoras com. paring the self-originated and self- sustaining traditional ethics, to the traditional language—ris διδάσκαλός ἐστι τοῦ ‘EAAnvicecy;
δ ΤῊΘ want of coherence, or of re- ference to any common and distinct
Crap. XXX. DIFFICULTIES UNSOLVED. 283
and custom. Here in the Politikus, we read that the great purpose of the philosophical Governor is to train all the citizens into virtuous characters: by a proper combination of Courage and Temperance, two endowments naturally discordant, yet each alike essential in its proper season and measure. The inter- weaving of these two forms the true Regal Web of social life.? Such is the concluding declaration of the accomplished Eleatic expositor, to Sokrates and the other auditors. But this suggests to us another question, when we revert to some of the Platonic dialogues handled in the preceding pages. What are Virtue, Courage, Temperance? In the Menon, the Platonic Sokrates had proclaimed, that he did not himself know what virtue was: that he had never seen any one else who did know: that it was impossible to say how virtue could be communicated, until you knew what virtue was—and impossible to determine any one of the parts of virtue, until virtue had been determined as a whole. In the Charmidés, Sokrates had affirmed that he did not know what Temperance was; he then tested several explanations there- of, propounded by Charmides and Kritias: but ending only in universal puzzle and confessed ignorance. In the Lachés, he had done the same with Courage: not without various expressions of regret for his own ignorance, and of surprise at those who talked freely about generalities which they had never probed to the bottom. Perplexed by these doubts and difficulties—which per- plexed yet more all his previous hearers, the modest beauty of
End, among the bundle of established Νόμιμα is noted by Aristotle, Polit. vii. 2, 1824, Ὁ. δ: διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδην, ὡς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις, ὅμως, εἴ πού τι πρὸς ἕν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσι, τοῦ κρατεῖν στοχά- ζονται πάντες’ ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντέ-
siders such a provision dangerous and intolerable to the governed.
Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 1264, Ὁ. 6.
1 Plato, Polit. p. 8306 A. βασιλικὴ συμπλοκή, &.
Schleiermacher in his Introduction to the Politikus (pp. 254-256) treats r an
taxras σχεδὸν ἥ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πληθος.
Custom and education surround all prohibitions with the like sanctity—
th those most essential to the com- mon security, and those which emanate from capricious or local antipathy—in the minds of docile citizens.
σόν τοι κνάμους τε φαγεῖν, κεφαλάς Te τοκήων. Aristotle dissents from Plato on the point of always vesting the governing unctions in same hands. He con-
this βασιλικὴ συμπλοκὴ as & Poo insignificant function, for the political Artist determined and installed by so elaborate a method and classification. But the dialogue was already so lo that Plato could not well lengthen i by going into fuller details. Socher points out (Ueber Platon’s Schrift. Ρ'
74) discrepancies between the Poli- tikus on one side, and Pro ras and Gorgias on the other—which I think are really discoverable, though I do not admit the inference which he draws from them.
984 POLITIKUS. Cmarp. XXX.
Charmides and the mature dignity of Nikias and Laches—So- krates now finds himself in presence of the Eleate, who talks about Virtue, Temperance, Courage, &c., as matters determinate and familiar. Here then would have been the opportunity for Sokrates to reproduce all his unsolved perplexities, and to get them cleared up by the divine Stranger who is travelling on a mission of philosophy. The third dialogue, to be called the Philosophus, which Plato promises as sequel to the Sophistés and Politikus, would have been well employed in such a work of elucidation. This, I say; is what we might have expected, if Plato had corresponded to the picture drawn by admiring com- purpose οὗ entators: if he had merely tied knots in one dia- caltiesin| logue, in order to untie them in another. But we logues of find nothing of the kind, nor is such a picture of Search" Plato correct. The dialogue Philosophus does not the intellect exist, and probably was never written. Respecting hearer. His the embarrassments of the Menon, Lachés, Char- exposition midés, Alkibiadés 1., Protagoras, Euthyphron—So- ive solu. krates says not a word—odde ypt—to urge them upon the attention of the Eleate: who even alludes with displeasure to contentious disputants as unfair enemies. For the right understanding of these mysterious but familiar words— Virtue, Courage, Temperance—we are thrown back upon the common passive, unscientific, unreasoning, consciousness: or upon such measure and variety of it as each of us may have chanced to imbibe from the local atmosphere, unassisted by any special revelation from philosophy. At any rate, the Eleate fur- nishes no interpretative aid. He employs the words, as if the hearers understood them of course, without the slightest intima- tion that any difficulty attaches to them. Plato himself ignores all the difficulties, when he is putting positive exposition into the mouth of the Eleate. Puzzles and perplexities belong to the Dialogues of Search ; in which they serve their purpose, if they provoke the intellect of the hearer to active meditation and effort, for the purpose of obtaining a solution.
βαρ. XXXL
KRATYLUS.
285
CHAPTER XXXL
KRATYLUS.
THE dialogue entitled Kratylus presents numerous difficulties to the commentators: who differ greatly in their manner of explaining, First, What is its main or leading purpose? Next, How much of it is intended as serious reasoning, how much as mere caricature or parody, for the purpose of exposing and re-
_. ducing to absurdity the doctrines of opponents? Lastly, who, if
any, are the opponents thus intended to be ridiculed ? The subject proposed for discussion is, the rectitude or inherent
propriety of names.
tual usage of society.?
How far is there any natural adaptation, or special fitness, of each name to the thing named? Two disputants are introduced who invoke Sokrates as umpire. Hermogenes asserts the negative of the question ; contending that each name is destitute of natural significance, and acquires its meaning only from the mutual agreement and habi- Kratylus on the contrary
Persons and subject of the dialogue Kratylus— Sokrates has no formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others.
maintains the doctrine that each name has a natural rectitude
1In the arguments put into the mouth of Hermogenes, he is made to maintain two opinions which are not identical, but opposed. 1 That names are significant by habit and conven- tion, and not by nature. 2. That each man may and can give any name which he pleases to any object (pp. 384-385).
The first of these two opinions is that which is really discussed here : impugned in the first half of the dia- logue, conceded in the second. It is implied that names are to serve the purpose of mutual communication and information among persons living in
society ; which pt they would not serve if eac dividual gave a different name to the same object. The second opinion is therefore not a con- sequence of the first, but an implied contradiction of the first.
He who says that the names Horse and Dog are significant by convention, will admit that at the outset they might have been inverted in point of signification ; but he will not say that any individual may invert them at pleasure, now that they are esta-
lished. The purposes of naming would no longer be answered, if this were done.
286
KRATYLOUS.
Cuap. XXXL
or fitness for its own significant function :—that there is an inherent bond of eonnection, a fundamental analogy or resem- blance between each name and the thing signified. Sokrates carries on the first part of the dialogue with Hermogenes, the
last part with Kratylus.!
He declares more than once, that the
subject is one on which he is ignorant, and has formed no conclu- sion : he professes only to prosecute the search for a good conclu- sion, conjointly with his two companions.*
Sokrates, refuting Hermogenes, lays down the following doc-
Argument tines.
of Sokrates
against . or false also.* nee—all
proceedings
of nature
are con-
ducted ac-
cording to
fixed laws—
among thee our will and choice. rest.
1 The question between Hermo- genes and Kratylus was much debated among the philosophers and liter: men throughout antiquity (Aul. Gell.
x. 4). Origen says (contra Celsum, i. c. 24)—Adyos βαθὺς καὶ ἀπόῤῥητος ὁ περὶ φύσεως ὀνομάτων, πότερον, ὡς οἴεται ᾿Αριστοτέλης, θέσει εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα, ἣ, ὡς νομίζουσιν οἱ dro τῆς Στοᾶς, φύσει.
Aristotle assumes the question in favour of θέσει, in his treatise De Interpretatione, without any reasoning, against the Platonic Kratylus; but his commentators, Ammonius and Boethius, note the controversy as one upon which eminent men in antiquity were much divided.
Plato connects his opinion, that names have a natural rectitude of signification, with his general doctrine of self-existent, archetypal, Forms or Ideas. The Stoics, and others who defended the same opinion afterwards, seem to have disconnected it from this latter doctrine.
2 Plato, Kratyl. pp. 384 Ὁ, 301 A.
3 Aristot. De Interpretat. ii. 1-2: Ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνεν χρόνον . . . τὸ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην, ὅτι φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδέν ἐστιν,
If propositions are either true or false, names, which are parts of propositions, must be true Every thing has its own fixed and determinate essence, not relative to us nor varying according to our fancy or-pleasure, but existing per se as nature has arranged.5 All agencies either by one thing upon other things, or by other things upon it, are in like manner determined by nature, independent of
If we intend to cut or burn any
substance, we must go to work, not according to our
This is the same doctrine which Plato puts into the mouth of Hermo- nes (Kratylus, p. 384 E), and which okrates himself, in the latter half of the dialogue, admits as true to a large extent : th at is, he admits that names are significant κατὰ συνθήκην, though he does not deny that they are or may be significant φύσει.
Td ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου (p. 397 A) is ano- ther phrase for expressing the opinion opposed to ὀνομάτων ὀρθότης.
4 Plato, Kratyl. p. 385,
Here too, Aristotle affirms the con- trary: he says (with far more exactness than Plato) that propositions alone are true or false; and ta name taken by itself is neither. (De Interpret.
1 2.
6 mistake of Plato in affirming Names to be true or false, is analogous to that which we read in the Phil&bus, where Pleasures are distinguished as true and false.
5 Plato, Kratyl. p. 386 Ὁ. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι αὑτὰ αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντά τινα βέβαιόν ἐστι τὰ πράγματα, ov πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, ἑλκόμενα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαντάσματι, ἀλλὰ καθ᾿ αὑτὰ πρὸς τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἧπερ πέφνκεν. ᾿
Cuap. XXXL NAME A DIDACTIC INSTRUMENT. 287
own pleasure, but in the manner that nature prescribes: by attempting to do it contrary to nature, we shall do it badly or fail altogether.1 Now speaking is one of these agencies, and naming isa branch of speaking: what is true of other agencies is true of these also—we must name things, not according to our own will and pleasure, but in the way that nature prescribes that they shall be named.? Farther, each agency must be performed by its appropriate instrument : cutting by the axe, boring by the gimlet, weaving by the bodkin. The name is the instrument of naming, whereby we communicate information and distinguish things from each other. It is a didactic instrument: to be employed well, it must be in the hands of a properly qualified person for the purpose of teaching Not every man, but only the professional craftaman, is competent to fabricate the inatru- ments of cutting and weaving. In like manner, not every man is competent to make a name: no one is competent except the lawgiver or the gifted name-maker, the rarest of all existing artiste.‘
To what does the lawgiver look when he frames a name? Compare the analogy of other instruments, The qh. Name artisan who constructs a bodkin or shuttle for weav- is adidactic ing, has present to his mind asa model, the Idea or fabruared’® Form of the bodkin—the self-existent bodkin of eres, Nature herself. If a broken shuttle is to be replaced, of
δ it is this Idea or type, not the actual broken instru- Form ani
Plato between naming and material agencies, as if it were mere banter—
and even indifferent banter: Schleler- ism it serious); Meant and Platonic; and I fully agree P.
διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας, ὥσητρ κερκὶ δάάφματον. "Boo Boethius ap. Schol Ad Aristot, Interp. p. 108, a. 40. ΑΜ:
5 Inappropriate but modern writers
4 Plato, Kratyl p. 389 A. ὃ νόμο- ϑέτης, ὃς δὴ τῶν δημιουργῶν σπανιώτανος ἘΝ ἐν ἀνόρώποις γίγνεται.
288 KRATYLUS. Cuar. XXXI.
employed ment, which he seeks to copy. Whatever may be eppreci- the variety of web for which the shuttle is destined,
b he modifies the new instrument accordingly: but all sopher. of them must embody the Form or Idea of the shuttle. He cannot choose another type according to his own pleasure: he must embody the type, prescribed by nature, in the iron, wood, or other material of which the instrument is made.!
So about names: the lawgiver, in distributing names, must look to the Idea, Form, or type—the self-existent name of Nature —and niust embody this type, as it stands for each different thing, in appropriate syllables. The syllables indeed may admit of great variety, just as the material of which the shuttle is made may be diversified: but each aggregate of syllables, whether Hellenic or barbaric, must embody the essential Name-Idea or Type? The lawgiver* ought to know, enumerate, and classify all the sorts of things on the one hand, and all the varieties of letters or elements of language on the other ; distinguishing the special significative power belonging to each letter. He ought then to construct his words, and adapt each to signify that with which it is naturally connected. Who is to judge whether this process has been well or ill performed? Upon that point, the judge is, the professional man who uses the instrument. It is for the working weaver to decide whether the shuttle given to him is well or ill made. To have a good ship and rudder, it must be made by a professional builder, and appreciated by a professional pilot or steersman. In like manner, the names constructed by the lawgiver must be appreciated by the man who is qualified by training or study to use names skilfully: that is, by the dialec- tician or philosopher, competent to ask and answer ques- tions.*
1 Plato, Kratyl. p. 389 B-C. αὐτὸ ὁ pros εἶναι ὀνομάτων Orns... . ἔστι κερκίς . «. πάσας μὲν δεῖ τὸ τῆς Οὕτως ἀξιώσεις καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην τόν κερκίδος ἔχειν εἶδος. . . οὐχ οἷον ἄν τε ἐνθάδε καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς άροις, ἕως αὑτὸς νυλήθῃ, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ἐπεφύκει. ἂν τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος εἶδος ἀπο-
Ρ ἴο, ratyl. pp. 389 D, 390 A. διδῆῷ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἐν τὸ ἑκάστῳ φύσει πεφυκὸς ὄνομα τὸν ὁποιαισοῦν σνλλαβαὲς οὐδὲν νομοθέτην ἐκεῖνον εἰς τοὺς φθόγγους καὶ. χείρω νομοθέτην εἶναι τὸν ἐνθάδε 3 τὰς σνλλαβὰς δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι τιθέναι, ὁπονοῦν ἄλλοθι; καὶ βλέποντα πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο . ἔστιν ὄνομα, πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα 8 Plato, Kratyl. p. 424 D-K.
ποιεῖν τε καὶ τίθεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει nv- 4 Plato, Kratyl. p. 390 C.
Cnap. ΧΧΧῚ. FORMS OF NAMES. 289
It is the fact then, though many persons may think it ridicu-
lous, that names—or the elementary constituents and Names have letters, of which names are composed—have each an aptitude for intrinsic and distinctive aptitude, fitting them to sig- ing nify particular things! Names have thus a standard and thing with reference to which they are correct or incorrect, nother. If they are to be correct, they cannot be given either by the freewill of an ordinary individual, or even by the convention of all society. They can be affixed only by the skilled lawgiver, and appreciated only by the skilled dialectician.
Such is the theory here laid down by Sokrates respecting Names. It is curious as illustrating the Platonic Forms of vein of speculation. It enlarges to an extreme point Names, as Plato’s region of the absolute and objective. Not Forms of merely each thing named, but each name also, is in ings le his view an Ens absolutum; not dependent upon essence of
; . the Nomen, human choice—not even relative (so he alleges) to to signify ὦ e
_ human apprehension. Each name has its own self- οὐ its Nomi- existent Idea, Form, or Type, the reproduction or 0#tum.
copy of which is imperative. The Platonic intelligible world included Ideas of things, and of names correlative to them: just as it included Ideas of master and slave correlative to each other. It contained Noumena of names, as well as Noumena of things.? The essence of the name was, to be significant of the essence of the thing named : though such significance admitted of diversity, multiplication, or curtailment, in the letters or syllables wherein it was embodied. The name became significant, by imitation or resemblance : that name was right, the essence of which imitated the essence of the thing named. The vocal mimic imitates
1 Plato, KratyL PP. 425-426. συλλαβαῖς, dp’ ove av δηλοῖ ἕκαστον ὃ 2 Plato, Parmenid. p. 138 E. ἔστιν; Compare p. 433. 3 Plato, KratyL pp. 398 D, 432. The story given by Herodotus (ii. 2)
4 Plato, Kratyl. p. 422 Ὁ. τῶν ovo- about the experiment made by the μάτων ἣ ὀρθότης τοιαύτη τις ἐβούλετο Egyptian king Psammetichus, is εἶναι, οἷα δηλοῦν οἷον ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν curious. He wished to find out ’ ὄντων.--- 423 Ὦ : ov καὶ οὐσία whether the Egyptians or the Phry-
δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ gians were the oldest or first of man- χρῶμα καὶ & viv δὴ ἐλέγομεν; πρῶτον kind: he accordingly caused two αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ gor children to be brought up without οὐσία τις ἑκατέρῳ αὐτὼν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις having a word spoken to them, with a wag, ὅσα ἠξίωται ταύτης τῆς View to ascertain what langu they προσρήσεως τοῦ elvact;...Ti would come to by nature. At the age
vi εἰ τις αὑτὸ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι δύναιτο, of two years they uttered the Phrygian
οκάστου τὴν οὐσίαν, γράμμασί τε καὶ words gnifying bread. Psammetichus
3—19
290 KRATYLUS. CaaPp. XXXII.
sounds, the painter imitates the colours: the name-giver imitates in letters or syllables, the essence of colours, sounds, and every thing else which is nameable.
Another point here is peculiar to Plato. The Name-Giver must provide names such as can be used with effect by the dialectician or philosopher: who is the sole competent judge whether the names have genuine rectitude or not. We see from hence that the aspirations of Plato went towards a philosophical language fit for those who conversed with forms or essences: something like (to use modern illustrations) a technical nomen- clature systematically constructed for the expositions of men of science: such as that of Chemistry, Botany, Mineralogy, &. Assuredly no language actually spoken among men, has ever been found suitable for this purpose without much artificial help. | As this theory of naming is a deduction from Plato’s main Exclusive octrine of absolute or self-existing Ideas, so it also competence illustrates (to repeat what was said in the last chapter) leged law. his recognition of professional skil! and of competence giver, todis- vested exclusively in a gifted One or Few: which he essences, ranks as the sole producing cause of Good or the Best,
portion setting it in contrast with those two causes which he nae considers as productive of Evil, or at any rate of the
Inferior or Second-Best: 1. The One or Few, who are ungifted and unphilosophical : perhaps ambitious pretenders. 2. The spontaneous, unbespoken inspirations, conventions, cus-_ toms, or habits, which grow up without formal mandate among the community. To find the right name of each thing, is no light matter, nor within the competence of any one or many ordinary men. It can only be done by one of the few privileged lawgivers. Plato even glances at the necessity of a superhuman
was then satisfied that the Phrygians very different. See M. Renan, De were the first of mankind. YOrigine du Langage, ch. vi. p. 146, This story undoubtedly proceeds 2nd ed. upon the assumption that there is one 1 Plato, Kratyl. p. 390 Ὁ. ting name which naturally suggests itself the person called ὁ διαλεκτικός, Whom for each object. But when M. Renan Plato describes as grasping Ideas, or says that the assumption is the same Forms, Essences, and employing no- “88 Plato has developed with so much thing else in his reasoning—Adyov διδοὺς subtlety in the Kratylus,” I do not καὶ λαμβάνων τῆς ovcias—see Repub- e with him. The Absolute Name- lic, vi. p. 511 B, vii. pp. 533-534-537 C. orm or Essence, discernible only by ἃ Plato, Kratyl p. 426 A. ὁ περὶ the technical Lawgiver, is something ὀνομάτων rexvixds, ἂς.
σπλρ, ΧΧΧΙ. COUNTER-THEORY—RELATIVITY. 291
name-giver : though he deprecates the supposition generally, 88 ἃ mere evasion or subterfuge, introduced to escape the confession of real ignorance.!
In laying down the basis of his theory respecting names, Plato states another doctrine as opposed to it: vi, . the Protagorean doctrine—Man is the Measure of all Theory, ὁ things. I have already said something about this fates here doctrine, in reviewing the Theetétus, where Plato sets forth impugns it: but as he here impugns it again, by pogns—the arguments in part different—a few words more will sroeaporean not be misplaced. any
The doctrine of Protagoras maintains that all things are relative to the percipient, cogitant, concipient, mind: that all Object is implicated with a Subject : that as things appear to me, so they are to me—as they appear to you, so they are to you. Plato denies this, and says: “All things have a fixed essence of their own, absolutely and in themselves, not relative to any percipient or cogitant—nor dependent upon any one’s apprecia- tive understanding, or emotional susceptibility, or will. Things are so and so, without reference to us as sentient or cogitant beings: and not only the things are thus independent and abso- lute, but all their agencies are so likewise—agencies either by them or upon them. Cutting, burning, speaking, naming, &c., must be performed in a certain determinate way, whether we prefer it or not. A certain Name belongs, by Nature or abso- lutely, to a certain thing, whether we choose it or not: it is not relative to any adoption by us, either individually or collectively.”
This Protagorean theory is here set forth by the Platonic Sokrates as the antithesis or counter-theory, to that which he is himself advancing, viz.—That Names are significant by nature and not by agreement of men :—That each Nomen is tied to its Nominatum by a natural and indissoluble bond. His remarks imply, that those who do not accept this last-mentioned theory must agree with Protagoras. But such an antithesis is noway necessary : since (not to speak of Hermogenes himself in this very dialogue) we find also that Aristotle—who maintains that Names are significant by convention and not by nature—dis-
1 Plato, Kratyl. pp. 397, 425, 438.
KRATYLUS. Cnap. XXXL
292 sents also from the theory of Protagoras: and would have rested his dissent from it on very different grounds,
This will show us—what I have already remarked in com-. Objection menting on the Theetétus—that Plato has not been by pokrates very careful in appreciating the real bearing of the ᾿ Protagorean doctrine. He impugns it here by the same argument which we also read in the Theztétus. “Every one admits” (he'says) “that there are some men wise and good—others foolish and wicked. Now if you admit this, you disallow the Protagorean doc- trine. If I contend that as things appear to me, so they truly are to me—as things appear to you or to him, so they truly are to you or to him—I cannot consistently allow that any one man is wiser than any other. Upon such a theory, all men are put upon the same level of knowledge or ignorance.”
But the premisses of Plato here do not sustain his inference.
The Protagorean doctrine is, when stated in its most general terms,— That every man is and must be his own
ras puts men on a level as to om and folly, know- ledge and
ignorance.
nnfounced measure of truth or falachood—That what appears Protegeraan to him true, ts true to hvm, however it may appear te theory real- others—That he cannot by any effort step out of or
liefal- beyond his own individual belief, conviction, know- ἔχασε τα ledge—That all his Cognita, Credita, Percepta, Cogi- believer's tata, &c., imply himself as Cognoscens, Credens,
Percipiens, Cogitans, inseparably and indivisibly— That in affirming an object, he himself is necessarily present as affirming subject, and that Object and Subject are only two sides of the same indivisible fact!—That though there are some
1M. Destutt Tracy observes, Lo- sons de ces premiéres perceptions ou
gique, ch. ix. p. 347, ed. 1825:
‘‘ En effet, on ne saurait trop le redire, chacun de nous, et méme tout étre animé quelconque, est pour lui- méme le centre de tout. ΠῚ ne percoit par un sentiment direct et une con- science intime, que ce qui affecte et émeut sa sensibilité. Il ne concoit et ne connait son existence que par ce qu'il sent, et celle des autres étres que par ce quiils lui font sentir. 1] nya de réel pour lui que ses perceptions, ses affections, ses idées: et tout ce qu'il peut jamais savoir, n’est toujours que des conséquences et des combinai-
idées.”
The doctrine of the Sceptical philo- sophers, is explicitly announced by Sextus Empiricus as his personal be- lief : that which appears true to him, as far as his enquiry had reached. The passag e deserves to be gited.
Sextus Empir. . . i sect. 197-199. Ῥ mum ypowye _ Ὅταν οὖν εἴπῃ ὁ σκεπτικὸς “οὐδὲν ὁρίζω" ... τοῦτό φησι λέγωντὸ δαυ- τῷ φαινόμενον περὶ τῶν προ- κειμένων, οὐκ ἀπαγγελτικῶς μετὰ πεποιθήσεως ἀποφαινόμενος, ἀλλ᾽ πάσχει, διηγούμενος. . . . Καὶ ὥσπερ
ΟΗΑΡ. XXXL BELIEF ON AUTHORITY. 293
matters which all men agree in believing, there is no criterion at once infallible and universally recognised, in matters where they dissent: moreover, the matters believed are just as much relative where all agree, as where some disagree.
This doctrine is not refuted by the fact, that every man believes others to be wiser than himself on various points. A man is just as much a measure to himself believes when he acts upon the advice of others, or believes Visor on a fact upon the affirmation of others, as when he various judges upon his own unassisted sense or reasoning. If— He is a measure to himself when he agrees with suthority— others, as much as when he disagrees with them. ποῖ incon- Opinions of others, or facts attested by others, may the affirma- count as materials determining his judgment; but toooras. the judgment is and must be his own. The larger portion of every man’s knowledge rests upon the testimony of others ; nevertheless the facts thus reported become portions of his knowledge, generating conclusions in Avm and relatively to him. I believe the narrative of travellers, respecting parts of the globe which I have never seen: I adopt the opinion of Aa lawyer, and of B a physician, on matters which I have not studied : I understand facts which I did not witness, from the description of those who did witness them. In all these cases the act of adoption is my own, and the grounds of belief are relative to my state of mind. Another man may mistrust com- pletely the authorities which I follow: just as 1 mistrust the authority of Mahomet or Confucius, or various others, regarded as infallible by a large portion of mankind. The grounds of belief are to a certain extent similar, to a certain extent dissimi- lar, in different men’s minds. Authority is doubtless a frequent ground of belief; but it is essentially variable and essentially relative to the believer. Plato himself, in many passages, insists emphatically upon the dissensions in mankind respecting the question—“ Who are the good and wise men?” He tells us that the true philosopher is accounted by the bulk of mankind foolish and worthless.
ὃ λέγων “περιπατῶ," δυνάμει φησὶν λεγόμενον τοιοῦτον “ὅσα ἐπῆλθον “ἐγὼ περιπατῶ," οὕτως ὃ λέγων τῶν δογματικῶς ζητονμένων, 'πάντα ἐστὶν ἀόριστα" συσση- τοιαῦτά μοι φαίνεται, ὡς μηδὲν
μαίνει καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς τὸ ὡς πρὸς ἐμὲ 4 αὐτῶν τοῦ μαχομένον προὔχειν μοὶ δοκεῖν
ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται: ὡς εἶναι τὸ κατὰ πίστιν ἣ ἀπιστίαν".
KRATYLUS. Cuar. XXXL
Kratylus, Sokrates says (and I agree with him) that there are laws of nature respecting the processes of cutting and burning: and that any one who attempts to cut or burn in a way unconformable to those laws, appealed to Will fail in his purpose. This is true, but it proves nothing against Protagoras. It is an appeal to a generalization from physical facta, resting upon ex- perience and induction—upon sensation and inference which we and others, Protagoras as well as Plato, have had, and which we believe to be common to all. We know this fact, or have a full and certain conviction of it ; but we are not brought at all nearer to the Absolute (te, to the Object without Subject) which Plato’s argument requires. The analogy rather carries us away from the Absolute: for cutting and burning, with their antecedent conditions, are facts of sense: and Plato himself admits, to a great extent, that the facts of sense are relative. All experience and induction, and all belief founded thereupon, are essentially relative. The experience may be one common to all mankind, and upon which all are unanimous :! but it is not the less relative to each indi-
1 Proklus, in his Scholia on the Kratylus, p. 32, ed. Boisson. cites the argument used by Aristotle against Plato on this very subject of names— τὰ μὲν φύσει, παρὰ πᾶσι τὰ * τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα ov παρὰ πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά ὥστε τὰ φύσει ὄντα οὔκ ἐστιν ὀνόματα, καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οὔκ εἰσι φύσει. Ammonius ad Aristot. De Interpretat.
. 100, a. 28, Schol. Bekk. Sextus mpiricus adv. Mathemat. i. 146-147, p. 247, Fab.
Plato had assimilated naming to cutting and burning. Aristotle denies the analogy: he says that cutting and burning are the same to all, or are by nature: naming is not the same to all, and is therefore not by nature.
We find here the test pointed out to distin bh what is by nature (that which Plato calls the οὐσίαν βέβαιον τῶν πραγμάτων--Ὁ. 386 E),—viz. That it is the same all or among all. What it is to one individual, it is to another also. There are a multitude of different judging subjects, but no dis- sentient subjects: myself, and in m belief all other subjects, are affecte alike. This is the true and real Ob-
jective: a particular fact of sense, where ubject is not eliminated altogether but becomes a constant quantity, and therefore escapes separate notice. An Objective absolute (i.e., without Subject altogether) is an impossibility.
In the Aristotelian sense of φύσει, it would be correct to say that , or Naming in genere, is natural to man. No human society has yet been found without some e—some names—some speech employed and understood by each individual mem- ber. But many different varieties of speech will serve the purpose, not indeed with ual perfection, yet tolerably : enough to enable a society to get on. The uniformity (τὸ φύσει) here ceases. To a certain extent, the objects and agencies which are named, are the same in all societies: to a certain extent different. If we were acquainted with all the past facts re- specting the different lan es which have existed.or do exist on the globe, we should be able to assign the reason which brought each particular Nomen into association with its Nominatwan. But this past history is lost.
CHap. XXXL UNANIMOUS BELIEF IS UNCERTAIN. 295
vidual of the multitude. What is relative to all, continues to he relative to each: the fact that all sentient individuals are in this respect alike, does not make it cease to be relative, and become absolute. What I see and hear in the theatre is relative to me, though it may at the same time be relative to ten thousand other spectators, who are experiencing like sensations. Where all men think or believe alike, it may not be necessary for common purposes to distinguish the multiplicity of indi- vidual thinking subjects: yet the subjects are nevertheless multiple, and the belief, knowledge, or fact, is relative to each of them, whether all agree, or whether beliefs are many and divergent. We cannot suppress ourselves as sentient or cogitant subjects, nor find any locus standi for Object pure and simple, apart from the ground of relativity. And the Protagorean dictum brings to view these subjective conditions, as being essential, no less than the objective, to belief and dis- belief.
Protagoras would have agreed with Plato as to combustion— that there were certain antecedent conditions under which he fully expected it, and certain other condi- Protagoras tions under which he expected with confidence that tonic objec- it would not occur. Only he would have declared [4955 this (assuming him to speak conformably to his own theory) to be his own full belief and conviction, derived from certain facts and comparisons of sense, which he also knew to be shared by most other persons. He would have pronounced farther, that those who held opposite opinions were in his judgment wrong : but he would have recognised that their opinion was true to themselves, and that their belief must be relative to causes operating upon their minds. Farthermore, he would have pointed out, that combustion itself, with its antecedents, were facts of sense, relative to individual sentients and observers, remembering and comparing what they had observed. This would have been the testimony of Protagoras (always assuming him to speak in conformity with his own theory), but it would not have satisfied Plato: who would have required a peremptory, absolute affirmation, discarding all relation to observers or ob- served facts, and leaving no scope for error or fallibility.
Those who agree with Plato on this question, impugn the
ly of
396 KRATYLUE. Guar, XXXL
doctrine of Protagoras as effacing all real, intrinsic, of Belief distinction between truth and falsehood. Such ob- Hief,common jectors make it a charge against Protagoras, that he toall men does not erect his own mind into a peremptory and infallible measure for all other minds" He expressly disbelief, recognises the distinction, so far as his own mind is with diffe- concerned: he admits that other men recognise it and diffe also, each for himself. Nevertheless, to say that all rent ages. — men recognise one and the same objective distinction between truth and falsehood, would be to contradict palpable facta. Each man has a standard, an ideal of truth in his own mind : but different men have different standards. The grounds of belief, though in part similar with all men, are to a great extent dissimilar also: they are dissimilar even with the same man, at different periods of his life and circumstances. What all men have in common is the feeling of belief and the feeling of disbelief: the matters believed or disbelieved, as well as the ideal standard to which any new matter presented for belief or disbelief is referred, differ considerably. By rational discussion —by facts and reasonings set forth on both sides, as in the Pla- tonic dialogues—-opinions may be overthrown or modified : dissentients may be brought into agreement, or at least each may be rendered more fully master of the case on both sides. But this dialectic, the Platonic question and answer, is itself an appeal to the free action of the individual mind. The ques- tioner starts from premisses conceded by the respondent. He depends upon the acquiescence of the respondent for every step taken in advance. Such a proceeding is relative, not absolute : coinciding with the Protagorean formula rather than with the Platonic negation of it? No man ever claimed the right of individual judgment more emphatically than Sokrates: no man was ever more special in adapting his persuasions to the indivi- dual persons with whom he conversed.
Sentiments of Belief
1To illustrate the impossibility of siichlichen Typen des sissiegis. το ον 2nd obtaining any standard absolute and ed, Berlin, 1860, purely objective, without reference to i ὩΣ any judging Subject, I had transcribed Gorse, the ΑἿΣ 474 a ge from Steinthal’s work on the Theztétus, p. 171
Classification of Human Languages ; ; Also in in proclaiming the necessity of
but I find it too long for a no specialty, of adaptation to individual]
Steinthal, Charakteristik jee Haupt- ds—Plat. Phedr. pp. 271-272, 277 B.
CuHap. XXXI.
BELIEF NOT. DEPENDENT ON WILL.
297
The grounds of belief, according to Protagoras, relative to the individual, are not the same with all men at all times.
But it does not follow (nor does Protagoras appear to have asserted) that they vary according to the will or Plato, in impugning this doctrine, reasons as if these two things were one and the same—as if, according to Protagoras, a man This, however, is not an exact representation of the doctrine “Homo Men- sura”: which does not assert the voluntary or the arbitrary, but simply the relative as against the absolute. What aman believes does not depend upon
tnclinatton of the individual.
believed whatever he chose.
nation of each indi- vidual, but that it was relative to the circum- stances
of each individual mind.
his own will or choice: it depends upon an aggregate of circumstances, partly peculiar to himself, partly common to him with other persons more or fewer in number :? upon his
1 Plato, Kratyl. pp. 887-889, where πρὸς ἡμᾶς is considered as equivalent tO ws ἂν ἡμεῖς βουλώμεθα---ἦ ἂν ἡμεῖς βονλήθωμεν---Ὀοὐἢ of them being op-
to οἷον ἐπεφύκει---τὸ κατὰ φύσιν --ἰδίαν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἔχουσαι. _. The error here noted is enumerated by Mr. John Stuart Mill, among the Specimens of Fallacies of Confusion, ‘in his System of Logic, Book v. ch. vii. 81: ‘‘The following is an argument of Descartes to prove, his ἃ priori manner, the being of a God. The conception, says he, of an infinite Being proves the real existence of such a Being. For if there is not really any such Being, J must have made the conception: but if I could make it, I can also unmake it—which evidently is not true: therefore there must be, externally to myself, an archetype from which the conception was derived. In this argument (which, it may be ob- served, would equally prove the real existence of ghosts and of witches) the - ambiguity is in the pronoun J; by which, in one place, is to be under- stood my will—in another, the laws of my nature. If the conception, existin as it does in my mind, had no origi without, the conclusion would unques- tionably follow that J made it—that is, the laws of my nature must have somehow evolved it: but that my will made it, would not follow. Now
when Descartes afterwards adds that
I cannot unmake the conception, he
means that I cannot get rid of it by an act of my will—which is true, but is not the proposition required. I can as much unmake this conception as I can any other: no conception which I have once had, can I ever dismiss by mere volition: but what some of the laws of my nature have produced, other laws, or those same laws in other circumstances, may, and often do, sub- uently efface.”
2 To show how constantly this Pro- tagorean dictum is misconceived, as if Protagoras had said that things were to each individual what he was pleased or chose to represent them as being, I transcribe the following passage from Lassalle’s elaborate work on Herakleitus (vol. ii. p. $81):—‘‘ Des Protagoras Prinzip ist es, dass tiber- haupt Nichts Objektives ist; dass vielmehr alles Beliebige was Einem scheint, auch fiir ihn sel. Dies Selbst- setzen des Subjekts ist die einzige Wahrheit der Dinge, welche an sich selbst Nichts Objektives haben, son- dern zur gleichgtiltigen Fliche ge- worden sind, auf die das Subjekt willkiihrlich und beliebig seine Cha- raktere schreibt.”
eee en does not (as is here asserted deny the Objective: he only insists on looking at it in conjunction with, or measured by, some Subject ; and that Subject, not simply as desiring or preferring, but clothed in all its attributes.
298 KRATYLUS.
Cuarp. XXXI. age, organisation, and temperament—his experience, education, historical and social position—his intellectual powers and acquire- ments—his passions and sentiments of every kind, &c. These and other ingredients—analogous, yet neither the same nor com- bined in the same manner, even in different individuals of the same time and country, much less in those of different times and countries—compose the aggregate determining grounds of belief or disbelief in every one. Each man has in his mind an ideal standard of truth and falsehood: but that ideal standard, never exactly the same in any two. men, nor in the same man at all times, often varies in different men to a prodigious extent. Now it is to this standard in the man’s own mind that those reasoners refer who maintain that belief is relative. They do not maintain that it is relative simply to his wishes, or that he believes and disbelieves what he chooses.
When Plato says that combustibility and secability of objects
Facts of are properties fixed and determinate,’ this is perfectly someare rue, 88 meaning that a certain proportion of the facts the same to of sense affect in the same way the sentient and subjects, @ppreciative powers of each individual, determining others are the like belief in every man who has ever experienced different them. Measuring and weighing are sensible facts of Groands οἱ this character: seen alike by all, and conclusive proofs unanimity. to all. But this implies, to a certain point, funda-
1 When Plato asserts not only that Objects are absolute and not relative to any Subject—but that the agencies
telle disposition du sujet Mais savons- nous quelque chose de plus? et méme, vu ie caractére indéterminé des causes
or properties of Objects are also abso- lute—he carries the doctrine farther than modern defenders of the absolute. M. Cousin, in the eighth and ninth Lectures of his Cours d’Hist. de la Phi- losophie Morale au 18me Siécle, lays down the contrary, maintaining that objects and essences alone are absolute, though unknowable; but that their agencies are relative and knowable. ‘“*Nous savons qu'il existe quelque chose hors de nous, parceque nous ne uvons expliquer nos perceptions sans Tes rattacher & des causes distinctes de nous mémes: nous savons de plus que ces causes, dont nous ne connais- sons pas d’ailleurs l’essence, produisent les effets les plus variables, les plus divers, et méme les plus contraires, selon qu'elles rencontrent telle nature ow
que nous concevons dans les co patil uelque chose de plus & savoir ? -a-t-il lieu de nous enquérir si nous percevons les choses telles qu'elles sont ἢ Non, évidemment. . . Je ne dis pas que le probléme est insoluble: je dis qwil est absurde, et renferme une contradtc- tion. Nous ne savons pas ce que ces causes sont en elles-m&mes, et la raison nous défend de chercher ἃ les con- naitre: mais il est bien évident ὦ priori qu’elles ne sont pas en elles-mémes ce qu’elles sont par rapport ἃ nous, puisque la présence du sujet modifie nécessairement leur action. Supprimez tout sujet sentant, il est ce ee ces causes agiraient encore, puisqu’elles continueraient d’exister; mais elles agiraient autrement; elles seraient encore des qualités et des propriétés,
Cuap. ΧΧΧΙ. FACTS OF SENSE. ; 299
mental uniformity in the individual sentients and judges. Where such condition is wanting—where there is a fundamental difference in the sensible apprehension manifested by different individuals—the unanimity is wanting also. Such is the case in regard to colours and other sensations: witness the peculiar vision of Dalton and many others. The unanimity in the first case, the discrepancy in the second, is alike an aggregate of judg- ments, each individual, distinct, and relative. You pronounce an opponent to be in error: but if you cannot support your opinion by evidence or authority: which satisfies his senses or his reason, he remains unconvinced. Your individual opinion stands good to you; his opinion stands good to him. You think that he ought to believe as you do, and in certain cases you feel per- suaded that he will be brought to that result by future ex- perience, which of course must be relative to him and to his appreciative powers. He entertains the like persuasion in regard to you.
It is thus that Sokrates, in the first half of the Kratylus, lays down his general theory that names have a natural sokrates and inherent propriety : and that naming is a process ¢xemplifies which cannot be performed except in one way. He of the at the same time announces that his theory rests upon Name or & principle opposed to the “Homo Mensura” of Pro- the Name- tagoras. He then proceeds to illustrate his doctrine attempts to by exemplification of many particular names, which inherent are alleged to manifest a propriety of signification in ony tise reference to the persons or matters to which they are ing names. applied. Many of these are proper names, but some jogical tran- are common names or appellatives. Plato regards the sitions.
mais qui ne ressembleraient ἃ rien de drait encore admettre qu Θ nul corps ne
ce que nous connaissons. Le feu ne manifesterait ses propriétés autrement
esterait plus aucune des pro- qu’enrelation avec un sujet quelconque,
prictés que nous lui connaissons : que ot da dans ce cas ses propriétés ne seraient
vorait-il C'est ce que nous ne saurons encore que relatives: en sorte qu’il me
C’est d’ailleurs peut-étre un parait fo rt raisonnable d’admettre que
propriétés déterminées des corps
la nature de notre esprit "Quan ἂ n'existent pas indépendamment d'un stijet
Yessence m&me des choses. (2de Partie, Sme Lecon,
méme en offet on supp orunerait ἃ par la pp. 216-218, ed. Danton et Vacherot’ pensée tous les sujets sentants, ruxelles, 1841.)
900
KRATYLUS.
Cuap. XXXL
proper names as illustrating, even better than the common, the doctrine of inherent rectitude in naming : especially the names of the Gods, with respect to the use of which Plato was himself timidly scrupulous—and the names reported by Homer as em-
ployed by the Gods themselves.
We must remember that nearly
all Grecian proper names had some meaning: being compounds or derivatives from appellative nouns.
The proper names are mostly names of Gods or Heroes: then follow the names of the celestial bodies (conceived as Gods), of the elements, of virtues and vices, &c. All of them, however, both the proper and the common names, are declared to be com- pound, or derivative ; presupposing other simple and primitive
names from which they are formed.'
1See the Introduction to Pape’s Worterbuch der Griechischen Eigen- namen.
Thus Proklus observes :— ‘‘ The recklessness about proper names. is shown in the case of the man who gave to his son the name of Atha- nasius” (Proklus, Schol. ad Kratyl BS ed. Boiss.). Proklus adopts the
istinction between divine and human names, citing the authority of Plato in Kratylus. The words of Proklus are remarkable, ad Timezum, ii. p. 197, Schneid. Οἰκεῖα γάρ ἐστιν ὀνόματα πάσῃ τάξει τῶν πραγμάτων, θεῖα μὲν τοῖς θείοις, διανοητὰ δὲ τοῖς διανοητοῖς, δοξαστὰ δὲ τοῖς δοξαστοῖς. See Timeus, Ῥ. 29 B. Compare also Kratylus, p. 400 E, and Philébus, p. 12 C.
When Plato (Krdtylus, iN . 891-392 ; compare Phzedrus, p. 252 ἢ cites the lines of Homer mentioning appella- tions bestowed by the Gods, I do not understand him, as Grafenhahn and others do, to speak in mockery, but bond fide. The affirmation of Clemens Alexandrinus (Stromat. i. 104) gives a probable account of Plato’s belief :— Ὁ Πλάτων καὶ rots θεοῖς διαλεκτὸν ἀπονέμει τινά, μάλιστα μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνειράτων τεκ μενος καὶ τῶν χρησ-
oy See Grifenhahn, Gesch. der Klassischen Philologie, vol. i. p. 176.
When we read the views of some learned modern philologists, such as Godfrey Hermann, we cannot be sur- prised that many Greeks in the Platonic age should believe in an ὀρθότης ovo-
itwy applicable to their Gods an
eroes :—‘‘ Unde intelligitur, ex no- minibus naturam et munia esse cog-
Sokrates declares the
noscenda, Deorum: Nec Deorum tan- tum, sed etiam heroum, omninoque rerum omnium, nominibus que vocantur appellataram” che “ ο- logia Greecorum Antiquissima—in
» VOL ii. p. 167). **Bei euch, Ihr Herrn, kann man das
Wesen Gewohnlich aus dem Namen lesen,” Goethe, Faust.
See a remarkable passage in Plu- tarch, adv. Koldten, ὁ. 22, Be. 1119 E respecting the essential tade and indispensable employment of the sur- names and appellations of the Gods.
The supposition of a mysterious inherent relation, between Names and the things named, has found acceptance among expositors of many different countries.
M. Jacob Salvador (Histoire des Institutions de Moise, Liv. x., ch. ii. ; vol. iii. p. 186) says ing the Jewish Cabbala:—‘‘Que dirai-je de leur Cabale? mot signifiant aussi tra- dition. Elle se composait originaire- ment de tous les principes abstraits qui ne se répandent pas chez le vul- gaire ; elle tomba bientét dans la folie.
acher quelques idées metaphysiques sous les figures les plus bizarres, et prendre ensuite une peine infinie pour retrouver ces idées premiéres: s’ima- giner qu'il existe entre les noms et les choses une corrélation inévitable, et que la contexture littérale des livres
ἃ sacrés, par exemple, doit éclairer sur
l’essence mé&me et sur tous les secrets du Dieu qui les a dictés: tourmenter
CuHaP. ΧΧΧΙ.
fundamental theory on which
PLATONIC ETYMOLOGIES.
301
the primitive roots rest; and
indicates the transforming processes, whereby many of the names are deduced or combined from their roots. But these processes, though sometimes reasonable enough, are in a far greater number of instances forced, arbitrary, and fanciful. The transitions of meaning imagined, and the structural transformations of words,
are alike strange and violent.'
dés-lors chaque phrase, chaque mot, chaque lettre, avec la méme ardeur qu’on en met de nos jours ἃ décom r et ἃ recomposer tous les co e la nature: enfin, aprés avoir établi la corrélation entre les mots et les choses, croire qu’en changeant, disposant, com- binant, ces mots, on traverse de pré- tendus canaux d'influence qui 168 unissent & ces choses, et qu’on agit sur elles; voilA&, ce me sembie, les princi- pales prétentions de cette de science occulte, échappée de I’ te, qui a dévoré beaucoup de bons esprits, et qui, d’une part, donne la main ἃ la théplogie. d’autre part, ἃ l’astrologie et aux combinaisons magiques.”
1I cite various specimens of the etymologies given by Plato :—
1. ᾿Αγαμέμνων---ὁ ἀγαστὸς κατὰ τὴν ἐπιμονήν---ἶπ consequence of his pa- tience in remaining (μονὴ) with army before Troy (p. 395 A).
2. ᾿Ατρεὺς---κατὰ τὸ ἀτειρές, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄτρεστον, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀτηρόν (p. 805
8, Πέλοψ .---ὁ τὸ ἐγγὺς (πέλας) μόνον ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ παραχρῆμα (Ὁ. 895 D 4. Τάνταλος---ταλάντατος (Ὁ. 805 E). δ. Ζεὺς--Δέία---Ζῆνα--δι᾽ by ζῇν dei πᾶσιτοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει--ὐ proprieunum Gebuerit ease vocabulum Διαζηνα. Stall- Proklus admired
226, ed 6.
φρόνιμοι καὶ δαή- μονες οἦσαν, δαίμονας αὐτοὺς ὠνόμασεν (Hesiod) (p. 898 B).
sprung
human females: or from ἐρωτᾷν or eipecvy,—from oral or rhetorical attri- bates, as being ῥήτορες καὶ ἐρωτητικοί
9. Δίφιλος--Διῖ φίλος (p. 8399 B). 10. "Ανθρωπος ἀναθρῶν ἃ ὅπωπεν . 899 C).
ἥ ὅτι ἀεὶ
11. ὑυχὴ--ἃ double derivation is
proposed : first, τὸ ἀνάψυχον, next, a second, i.e. ux) = φνυσέχη, 4 vou dxet καὶ ἔχει, Which second is declared
to be τεχνικώτερον, and the former to be ridicw ous (pp. 899 E, 400 ames be. ματΞετὸ σῆμα τῆς PuXNS,
cause the soul is buried in the body. Or σῶμα, that is, preserved or guarded, by the body as by an exterior wall, in order that it may expiate wrongs of a preceding life (p. 400 C).
13. The first imposer of names was
a philosopher who followed the theory of Herakleitus — perpetual flux of everythi Pursuant to this theory he gave various Gods the names
Kronos, Rhea, Tethys, &c., all signify- flux (p. 402 A-D y
14. Various derivations of the names Poseidon, Hades or Pluto, Persephoné or Pherrephatta, &c., are given (Pp. 404-405) ; of Apollo, so as to fit on to the four functions of the last- named God, μουσική, μαντική, ἰατρική,
τοξική (p. 406) " 15. Μοῦσα --- μονσικὴ, from μῶσθαι (ροοξτδος AD Agro8inn how geet μάω Dp. ἔτη from ΩΝ aside harivatinn (p. 406
16. ᾿Δὴρ--ὅτι αἴρει τὰ awd τῆς γῆς-- ὺ αὑτοῦ γίγνεται ῥέ Αἰθὴηρ---ὅτ'
17. Φρόνησις--φορᾶς καὶ ῥοῦ νόησις, ps σιν ὑπολαβεῖν φορᾶς. This and the ollowing are ut as deriva- tives from the eitean theory . 411 D-E). Νόησις = τοῦ νέον ears. ροσύνη---σωτηρία φρονήσεως. This is recognised by Aristotle in the Nikom. Ethica, vi. 5.
18. ᾿Επιστήμη = ἐπιστημένη---ὡὩς φε- βομένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν ἑπομένης τῆς ψυχῆς (ρ. 412 A).
19. Δικαιοσύ ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ δικαίου συνέσει (p. 412 ὧν
_ 20. Κακία ΞΞ τὸ κακῶς ἰόν. Δειλία-- τῆς ψυχῆς δεσμὸς ἰσχυρός---ὃ δεῖ λίαν. *Apern = decpeirm—that which has an
Δ KRATYLUS. Caspr. XXXL Such is the licht in which these Platonic etymologies appear ἊΝ ἴκ' αὶ modern critic. Bui such war not the light m sitions Which thev appeared either to the ancient Platonists, ope of ἴο critics earlier than the last century. The amudern Platoniste even thought them full of mysterious They did aud recondite wisiom. Dionysius of Halikarnasus tote’ highiy commends Plato for hir speculations on ety- Gere οἵ ΠΩ] mology, especially in the Kratvius! Pintarch cites thiseen. some of the most singular etymologies m the Kraty- furs. ἐδο = lus as serious and instructive. The modesty of the they are cable: for ao complete has been the revolution of the δο- by most critics as too absurd to have been seriously phisie, = intended by Plato, even as conjectures. It is called ἂν τῇ ψυχῇ (87 Δ Νὰ ΝΑ τ ΤΕ τ ἀεὶ rer τὸν ῥοῦν Of peed attributes were founded on the & φνχῆς μετὰ τῶν pe (p. 417 also names of bed atiributes founded ὑτέλουν Ξ- τὸ τῆς φαρᾶς Avor τὸ on it.
τον» τὸν ῥοὺν.
The nawes of favourable i
Δαολασία = ἡ ἀκολουδία τοῖς updy-
import are auch us designate facility of the uni- | Sokrates contrasts the two theories
versal flux, acourding tv the Hers- of στάσις and , and says Chat he kleitean theury. The names of un- believer the first Name-Givers to have favourable import designate obstrac- i names to the Wan of the flux. theory of κίνησις, but that he thinks 21. Zvyor = ὀνογόν (p. 418 D). Vv were mi im adopting 22. Ἐνφρυσύνη -απο τοῦ εὖ τοῖς wpey- theory ἐδ δ μασι τὴν ψνχην ξυμφέρεσθαι = εὐφερο- 1 Dion De Comp. Verb. s. 16, σύνη (p. 419 D) p. 196, Schasfer τὰ κράτιστα δὲ wipes, 26. Gupus—-awe τῆς θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως ὧς πρώτῳ ὑπὲρ ἐτυμι. εἰσώ-
τὸ ὥνυμα. ᾿ᾧνομαστον = ὧν, οὗ μάσμα
΄
etymologies, cor. (Μάυμα = ζήτημα : μαίεσθαι = riously intended, see Plutarch, De Inide Qnrecy) (py 421 A). et Oxsiride. p. 375 C-D-E, with the note 20. ᾿Αληθείᾳ -Φεία ἄλη, οἵ ἢ θεία τοῦ Of Wyttenbach Harris, in his Hermes
ὄντως dopa.
ὑενόος frum εὕδειν, with (pp. 309-370-407), allades to the ety-
ψί prefixed, as Leing the ite of mologies of Plato in the Kratyius as movement aud flux (p. 427] BC). being ingenious, though disputable, YE Several derivations of names are but not at all as being Gerisory cari.
iven by Sukiates, ae fuuuded upon the catures. vppused ty Herakleitus—i.c., Scientia, which he ci ΑΚ, that things were not in δι B70. 18 quite as si flux, but stationary :— Kratvlos Ss
Ἐπιυτήμη ὅτι ἵστησιν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς the translation of Plato's
πράγμασι τὴν ψνχήν. . 85) calls the Kratylus “8 dialogue, ‘Lo ropia ~ore forage τὸν ῥοῦν. ye which is taught the nature of things, Llgrov—wotgy σαντάπασι σημαίνει. 88 well the permanent as the
CHaP. XXXI.
VARIABLE APPRECIATION.
303
“a valuable discovery of modern times” (so Schleiermacher? terms it) that Plato meant all or most of them as mere parody
from 8, su posed etymol of names and words’ ymoney
I find, in the very instructive com- ments of Bishop Colenso on the Pen-
tateuch (Part iv. ch. 24, p. 250), a ad
citation from St. Augustine, illustrat- ing the view which I believe Plato to have taken of these etymologies : ‘‘ Quo loco prorsus non arbitror preetereun- dum, quod pater Valerius animadvertit admirans, in quorundam rusticanorum {i.c., Africans, near Carthage] collocu- tione. Cum enim alter al dixisset Salus—quesivit ab eo, qui et Latiné nosset et Punicé, quid esset Salus: re- sponsum est, Tria. Tum ille agnoscens cum gaudio, salutem nostram esse Tri- nitatem, convenientiam linguarum non fortuitu sic sonuisse arbitratus est, sed occultissimé dispensatione divins pro- videntis—ut cum Latiné nominatur Salus, ἃ Punicis intelligantur Tria—et cum Punici.lingud sua nominant, Latiné intelligatur Salus . . . Sed hac
ἢ consonantia, sive provenerit sive provisa sit, non dum est ut εἰ
, which, with indulgent hearers, he reckons will be sufficient for proof: and which, even when not accepted as proof, will be pleasing to the fancy of unbelieving hearers, as they are to his own. There is no intention to cari- cature: no obvious absurdities piled up with a view to caricature.
1 Schleiermacher, Introduction to Kratylus, vol. iv. p. 6; , Dagegen ist viel gewonnen durch die Entdeckung neuerer Zeiten,” &c. To the same pur- pose, Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., ii. P. 402, edit. 2nd, and Brandis, Gesch. oe Rom. Phil., part ii. sect. cvii. p.
Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Platon. Cra- tylum, Ὁ. 4, says: ‘‘Quod mirum est non esse a animadversum, qui Platonem putaverunt de linguze et vocabulorum origine hoc libro suam sententiam ex- plicare voluisse. Isti enim adeo nihil senserunt irrisionis, ut omnia atque singula pro philosophi decretis ven- ditarint, ideoque ei absurdissima que. que commenta atfinxerint. Ita Me- nagius. ... Nec Tiedemannus Argum, Dial Plat. multo rectius judicat. .
f médi
sionem primi senserunt Garnierius et Tennemann.” &c. Stallbaum, more-
over, is perpetually comp. in his notes, that the Etymological Lexicons
opt Plato’s derivations as genuine. Ménage (ad Diogen. Laert. iii. 25) declares most of the etymologies of Plato in the Kratylus to be ψευδέτυμα, but never hints at the supposi that they are intended as caricatures. During the centuries between Plato and Ménage, men had become more critical on the subject of etymology ὃ in the century after Ménage, they me more critical ν a8 we may see by the remarks of Turgot on the etymologies of Ménage himself. Turgot, in the article * Etymologie e a 6 ‘ Etymologie ’ (Encycl. Franc. in Turgot’s collected works, vol. iii. p. 83): ‘‘ Ménage est un exemple frappant des absurdités dans lesquelles on tombe, en adoptant sans choix ce que suggére la malheureuse facilité de supposer tout ce qui est pos- sible: car il est trés vrai qu’il ne fait aucune supposition dont la possibilité ne soit justifiée par des exemples. nous avons prouvé qu’en multi- pliant ἃ volonté les altérations inter- aires, soit dans le son, soit dans la signification, il est aisé de dériver un mot quelconque de tout autre mot donné; c'est le moyen d'expliquer tout,
et sdene rien expliquer ; c'est le moyen aussi de justifier tous les mépris de ignorance.’
Steinhart (Einleitung rum Kratylus, Pp. 651-552) agrees with Stallbaum to a certain extent, that Plato in the Kratylus intended to mock and cari- cature the bad etymologists of his own day; yet also that parts of the Kra- tylus are seriously intended. And he eclares it almost impossible to draw
a line between the serious matter and the caricature.
It appears to me that the Platonic critics here exculpate Plato from the
e of being a bad etymologist, only by fastening u intellectual defect 8 te as serious.
Dittrich, in his Dissertation De Cra- tylo Platonis, Leipsic, 1841, adopts the opinion of Schleiermacher and the other critics, that the etymological examples given in this dialogue, though Sokrates announces them as provi and illustrating his own theory seri-
nm him another
304 | KRATYLUS. Cuar. XXXL
and caricature. We are now told that it was not Plato who mis- conceived the analogies, conditions, and limits, of etymological transition, but others; whom Plato has here set himself to expose and ridicule, by niock etymologies intended to parody those which they had proposed as serious. If we ask who the persons thus ridiculed were, we learn that they were the Sophists, Protagoras, or Prodikus, with others; according to Schleier- macher, Antisthenes among them.?
To me this modern discovery or hypothesis appears inadmiss- Dissent ible. It rests upon assumptions at best gratuitous, from this and in part incorrect: it introduces difficulties greater
ἢ he than those which it removes. We find no proof that Sophists the Sophists ever proposed such etymologies as those ety- which are here supposed to be ridiculed—or that they mologies. devoted themselves to etymology at all If they etymologised, they would doubtless do so in the manner (to our judgment loose and fantastic) of their own time and of times long after them. But what ground have we for presuming that Plato’s views on the subject were more correct ? and that etymo- logies which to them appeared admissible, would be regarded by him as absurd and ridiculous ?
Now if the persons concerned were other than the Sophists, scarcely any critic would have thought himself entitled to fasten upon them a discreditable imputation without some evidence. Of Prodikus we know (and that too chiefly from some sarcasms of Plato) that he took pains to distinguish words apparently, but not really, equivalent : and that such accurate distinction was what he meant by “rectitude of names” (Plato, Euthydém. 277 E.) Of Protagoras we know that he taught, by precept or example, correct speaking or writing: but we have no in- formation that either of them pursued etymological researches,
ously laid down, are really bitter Jests 1 Schleiermacher, Introd. to Kraty} and mockery, intended to destroy it— pp. 816; Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Krat. ‘*hanc sententiam en acotiseinis et irri- Pa Winckelmann suspects that sione plenis exemplis, dum compro- ermogenes in the Kratylus isintended bare videtar, roverA infringit ” (p. 12). torepresent Antisthenes(Antisth. Frag-
Dittrich admits that Kratylus, who ment. p. 49). holds the theory derided, understands Lobeck (Aglaophamus, p. 866) eae is acerbiasina irrisio that the reans were amon
nothing ὁ (p.
18). He “thinks that Protagoras, not earliest etymo ogising philoso Prodikus nor Antisthenes, i is? the person proposing such etymologies as now principally caricatured (pp. 32-34-38). appear very absurd.
CHap. XXXL
successfully or unsuccessfully.!
SUPPOSED CARICATURES.
305
Moreover this very dialogue
(Kratylus) contains strong presumptive evidence that the Pla- tonic etymologies could never have been intended to ridicule Protagoras. For these etymologies are announced by Sokrates as exemplifying and illustrating a theory of his own respecting names: which theory (Sokrates himself expressly tells us) is founded upon the direct negation of the cardinal doctrine of Protagoras.? That Sophist, therefore, could not have been ridi- culed by any applications, however extravagant, of a theory
directly opposed to him.*
1 See a good e of Winckel- mann, Prox . ad jaton. os emum, Ὁ. - respecting Oras and Prodikus, as writers and critics on
Θ. um says, Proleg. ad Krat. 11 :—“*Quibus verbis Aaud dubdié notantur phistes; qui, neglectis linguze elementis, derivatorum et com- positorum verborum originationem eré ad suum arbitrium tracta- bant”. Ibid. p. 4:—‘‘In Cratylo inept exhibentar, ita dubtiare Uceat,
In spite of these confident asser- tions,—first, that the Sophists are the persons intended to be ridiculed, next, Stalilbaum has another passage, Ὁ. 15, fuerint philosophi istl atque etyznologi
e osop ee qul in Cratylo Fientar of explodunter, vulgo parum exploratum habetur”. He goes on to say that neither Prodikus nor Antisthenes is meant, but Prota-
oras and the Protagoreans. To prove his he infers, from a passage in thi dialogue (c. 11, p. 391 Οὐ, that Prota- goras had written a book περὶ ὀρθότητος τῶν δνομάτων (Heindorf and eier- macher, with better reason, infer from the passage no more than the circumstance that ὀρθοιπείαν τοῦ correct ᾿ ; an ting Θ passage does not prove this; but if it did, what did ta- oras teach in the book? Stallbaum us (Ὁ. 16) :-—‘‘ Jam si queeras, quid tandem tagoras ipse de nominum ortu censuerit, fateor und j ni- tendum esse, ut de hdc re aliquid eruatur”’. He then proceeds to conjecture, from the little which we know respecting
they deserved to be so ridiculed— with
his 879-384) asse
Pro ras, what thatSophist must have laid down upon the origin of names; and he finishes the very
int which he ought to have proved bb. { igimus
εἰ cognoscimus, mox persequentes, non e verbis et nominibus mentis humans notiones elicere et
the Sophists posed etymol such e ΤῸ ologies su
as to make Them a sul ble butt for Plato on this occasion. talks
and shows very y that Protagoras cannot be the person intended to be represented by Plato under the name of Kratylus, or as holding the opinion of lus about names. Lassalle affirms t Plato intends Kratylus in the dialogue to
himself (p. 385) ;
ἃ represent Herakleitus
moreover he greatly extols the (ὅδ ; of Herakileitus for having laid down essere of things,” in which prisciais essence 0: » in w θ᾽ Lassalle (so far as I understand him himself concurs.
Assuming this to be the should intends to ri
case, we suppose that if Plato any one, by pre-
3—20
306 KRATYLUS. Cmar. XXXI
Suppose it then ascertained that Plato intended to ridicule and Plato dig umiliate some rash etymologists, there would stil notintend he no propriety in singling out the Sophists as his oor δ victims—except that they are obnoxious names, against logies, eras any. whom every unattested accusation is readily believed. one. one. Prete But it is neither ascertained, nor (m my judgment) guras coald J robable, that Plato here intended to ridicule or cued Be humiliate any one. The ridicule, if any was in- Hermogenes tended, would tell against himself more than against wor Kraty- others. For he first begins by laying down a general stand τα ΣΟ κω theory respecting names: a theory unquestionably as carica- propounded as serious, and understood to be so by the ture. critics :! moreover, involving some of his favourite and peculiar doctrines. It is this theory that his particular etymologies are announced as intended to carry out, in the way of illustration or exemplification. Moreover, he undertakes to prove this theory against Hermogenes, who declares himself strongly opposed to it: and he proves it by a string of arguments which (whether valid or not) are obviously given with a serious and sincere purpose of establishing the conclusion. Immediately after having established that there was a real rectitude of names, and after announcing that he would proceed to enquire wherein such rectitude consisted,? what sense or consistency would there be in his inventing a string of intentional caricatures announced us real etymologies? By doing this, he would be only dis- crediting and degrading the very theory which he had taken so much pains to inculate upon Hermogenes. Instead of ridiculing Protagoras, he would ridicule himself and his own theory for the benefit of opponents generally, one among them being Protagoras :
senting caricatured 6 tymologies as as Protagoras did what he imputes to
flowing from this principle them P. 400-401-403-422).
intended as butt must He rleitus M. rmant, in his recent edition ion of
himself. Not so Lassalle. He asserts the Kratylus (Comm. p. 7-9), main
as broadly as Stallbaum that it was also that neither the Sop nor rs
Protagoras and the other Sophists who Rhetors pretended to etymologize, nor
ly abused the doctrine of Hera- are here ridiculed. But he ascribes to
eitus, for the purpose of confusing Plato in the Kratylus a mystical and
and perverting tut by arbitrary δὲν. theol cal purp< rpose which I find it
mologies. His 5 language is even more diff t to fo
monstrous and extravagant than that = Schleiermacher Introd. to K
of Stallbaum; yet he does not produce rat.
(any more than Stallbaum) the least PP- 7-10; Lassalle, Herakleit. ii. p. 887.
ragment of proof that the Sophists or 2 Plato, Kratylus, p. 891 B.
nap. XXXL“ THEORIES IN KRATYLUS SERIOUS. 307
who (if we imagine his life prolonged) would have had the satis- faction of seeing a theory, framed in direct opposition to his doctrine, discredited and parodied by his own advocate. Her- mogenes, too (himself an opponent of the theory, though not concurring with Protagoras), if these etymologies were intended ‘as caricatures, ought to be made to receive them as such, and to join in the joke at the expense of the persons derided. But Her- mogenes is not made to manifest any sense of their being so © intended : he accepts them all as serious, though some as novel and surprising, in the same passive way which is usual with the interlocutors of Sokrates in other dialogues. Farther, there are some among these etymologies plain and plausible enough, accepted as serious by all the critica.’ Yet these are presented in the series, without being parted off by any definite line, along with those which we are called upon to regard as deliberate specimens of mock-etymology. Again, there are also some, which, looking at their etymological character, are as strange and sur- prising as any in the whole dialogue : but which yet, from the place which they occupy in the argument, and from the plain language in which they are presented, almost exclude the sup- position that they can be intended as jest or caricature? Lastly,
gzample, his derivation ogengs) are mere mockery and parody.
PRS Naar Soo zeae FPrentare to say that none of those Prey)
attra ety ΠΣ ΠΝ Platonic etymologies, which Lassalle
é Breer caricatures, absurd tet eaten M0) 8 TREE'ihowe wich be’ here aceon ἀα
Meteorol. 8, $99, Lexicon, an out heads, prota i B30, aay a abe, oP AST Pe Rone a Σ ἀπὸ tie δύντος τὸν ge ζέσεως τῆς ore ie Platonic obymoldgiee ta more The
strange than ‘that ‘of ψυχή, quasi
daa vol shy queue χων καὶ Res'ticinty"p. tony’ Yet Prox Fopresent passing ΕΞ [ἢ ας sons {cholia in "a backwards and forwards from mock
Jum, δ“ Bolssonnade. Plato, in to-earnest and from earnest to mockery,
ongh Lassa the τας in the first part of the ‘ser Gisiogae Costween Sokrates and Her- Followed host” cp by Hlastradions
KRATYLUB.
308 CHar. XXXL
Kratylus, whose theory all these etymologies are supposed to be intended to caricature, is so far from being aware of this, that he cordially approves every thing which Sokrates had said.*
I cannot therefore accept as well-founded this “discovery of modern times,” which represents the Platonic etymo- logies in the Kratylus as intentionally extravagant and knowingly caricatured, for the purpose of ridi- culing the Sophists or others In my judgment, Plato did not put them forward as extravagant, nor for the purpose of ridiculing any one, but as genuine illustrations of a theory of his own respecting names. It cannot be said indeed that he advanced them as proof of his theory: for Plato seldom appeals to particulars, except when he has a theory to attack. When he has a theory to lay down, he does not gene-
knowingly and intentionally carica- tured so as to e the doctrines ha instead of recommending them?
Is is surely less difficult to believe that Plato conceived as plausible and ἢ
Ἃ K. 74, we | νομά- ws 238 C,
admissible those etymologies which appear to us absurd. .
As a specimen of the view enter- tained by able men of the seventeenth century respecting the Platonic and Aristotelian etymologies, Institutiones Logicz of Burgersdicius, Lib. i. c. 25, not. 1. hrsch ie Sprachphilosophie der Alten, Part i. p. 84-85) agrees with the other com- mentators, that the Platonic etymo- logies in the Kratylus are caricatured to deride the boastful and arbitrary etymologies of the Sophists about
. But he too produces no evidence of such etymologies on the of the Sophists; nay, what is remarkable, he supposes that both Pro ras and kus in the Platonic doctrine that names were
φύσει (see Pp. 17-19).
1 Plato, Kratylus, 2. 429 C. Stein- ha:t (Einleit. zum Krat. pp. 549-550) observes that both Kratylus and Her- mogenes are represented as under-
standing serio these etymologies which are now affirmed to be meant as carica
tures. As specimens of Plato's view re- admissible etymologies, we d him in Timeeus, p. 48 C, deriving αἴσθησις from aicow: again in the same dialogue, p. 62 A, θερμὸς from
see the Aristo
tea. Aristotle derives ὄσφυς from ἰσοφυές, Histor. Animal. £ 138, p. 408, a. 22: also δίκαιον from δέχα, Rinio. Nikom. v. 7, 1182, a. 81 7 a τὸ Κόσμον
θύειν, Athenseus, telian treatise Περὶ 401, a. 15) adopts the Platonic etymo- logy of Δία-Ζῆνα as δι᾿ by ἐῶμεν. lutarch, De Primo iio, δ. 9, ᾿ς 948, derives κνέφας from κενὸν aous.
The Emperor Marcus Antoninus derives ἀκτίς, the ray of the Sun, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκτείνεσθαι, Meditat. viii. 57.
ἢ gists Stoics, who were fond of Seles ο , borrowed man 0. fon Pinions Kray, (ino e Theologi corum, Osann’s edition of Cornutus De Naturé Deorum, p. 512). 5 of the Stoic etymologies are given by the Stoic Balbus in Cicero, Nat. Deor. ii. 25-29 (64-73).
Dihne (in his Darstell der Judisch-Alexandrinischen ons- Philosophie, i. p. 78 seq.) on
the numerous e ologies not propounded, but, assumed as qqounds of reasoning by Philo Judzus in com-
menting upon the Pentateuch, etymo- logies Zotally inadmissible and often ridiculous
Cuap. XXXI. ILLUSTRATIVE PLAUSIBLE GUESSES. 309
rally recognise the necessity of either proving or verifying it by application to particular cases, His proof is usually deductive or derived from some more general principle asserted ἃ priori— some internal sentiment enunciated as a self-justifying maxim. Particular examples serve to illustrate what the principle is, but are not required to establish its validity.’ But I believe that he intended his particular etymologies as bond fide guesses, more or lees probable (like the developments in the Timmus, which he* repeatedly designates as εἰκότα, and nothing beyond): some certain, some doubtful, some merely novel and ingenious : such as would naturally spring from the.originating affatus of diviners (ike Euthyphron, to whom he alludes more than once*) who stepped beyond the ordinary regions of human affirmation. Occasionally he proposes alternative and distinct etymologies :
in_this in the Ki 997 Ὁ) due, Ere pps 486 Ey 47" Ι Saari ie a Plast oer
P. 406), a Spengel remarks (Art. Ser. B22, Typutieses of ths more
astonished mind. See oa 244 ΑἹ Timmons,
410 KRATYLUS.
CHaPp. XXX.
feeling assured that there was some way of making out the con- clusion—but not feeling equally certain about his own way of making it out. The sentiment of belief attaches itself in Plato’s mind to general views and theorems: when he gives particular consequences as flowing from them, his belief graduates down through all the stages between full certainty and the lowest probability, until in some cases it becomes little more than a fanciful illustration—like the mythes which he so often invents to expand and enliven these same general views.
We must remember that Sokrates in the Kratylus explicitly Sokratesan. 22nounces himself as having no formed opinion on
MOUNCOS the subject, and as competent only to the prosecution Searcher. οἱ the enquiry, jointly with the others. What he mologists of S2Y8 must therefore be received as conjectures pro- ancient. posed for discussion. I see no ground for believing mitted ety. that he regarded any of them, even those which mologies 88 anpear to us the strangest, as being absurd or extrava- thoseof § gant—or that he proposed any of them in mockery
and caricature, for the purpose of deriding other Etymologists. Because these etymologies, or many of them at least, appear to us obviously absurd, we are not warranted in believing that they must have appeared so to Plato. They did not appear so (as I have already observed) to Dionysius of Hali- _karnassus—nor to Diogenes, nor to the Platonists of antiquity nor to any critics earlier than the seventeenth century. By
1 J have made some remarks to this effect upon the Platonic mythes in my notice of the Phzedon, see ch. xxv. p. 415, ad Pheedon, p. 114.
4 Dionys. Hal De Comp. Verbor. c. 16, p. 96, Reiske ; Plutarch, De Isid. et Osir. c. 60, p. 375. ;
Preklus advises that those who wish to become dialecticians should i with the study of the Kratylus (Schol. ad Kratyl. p. 3, ed Boiss.).
We in the Phzdrus of Plato (p. 244 B), in the second speech as- cribed to Sokrates, two etymologies: —1l. μαντικὴ derived from μανικὴ by the insertion of +, which Sokrates declares to be done in bad taste, oi δὲ νῦν ἀπειροκάλως τὸ ταῦ ἐπεμβάλ- λοντες μαντικὴν ἐκάλεσαν. 2. οἱωνι- στικὴ, quasi οἰονοϊστικὴ, from οἴησις, νοῦς, ἱστορία. Compare the etymology
begin Sense, w
of Ἔρως, p. 288 C. That these are real word changes, which Plato believes to have taken place, is the natural and reasonable interpretation of the pas- sage. Cicero (Divinat. i. 1) alludes to the first of the two as Plato’s real opinion; and Heindorf as well as Schleiermac her accept it in the same e expressing surp at the want of etymological perspica- city in Plato. Ast and Stallbaum, on the contrary, declare that these two etymologies are mere irony and mock- ery, spoken by Plato, ex mente rum, and intended as a sneer at the rverse and silly Sophists. No reason ig produced by Ast and Stallbaum to justify this hypothesis, except that you
cannot imagine ‘‘Platonem tam cacum Suisse,’ &c. Tome this reason is utterly insufficient ; and I contend, moreover,
nar. ΧΧΧΙ. OPINION OF EARLY CRITICS. 311
many of these critics they were deemed not merely serious, but valuable, Nor are they more absurd than many of the etymo- logies proposed by Aristotle, by the Stoica, by the Alexandrine critica, by Varro, and by the grammaticé or literary men of anti- quity generally ; moreover, even by Plato himself in other dia-
partly because they had a larger knowledge of the etymologies proposed by Greek philosophers and grammatici than we possess —-partly because they had no acquaintance with the enlarged views of modern etymologists—which, on the point here in
uite out of place in uch boing Btnds’ sur πὶ oe oe
of 2 ry tude sur la vie οἱ τ
the οἵ ΠΕΣ Eros. de M. ‘Terentins Varron, &, 158, Far wl
άι in is {opiate = Biérry in, the, first cbtplar οἱ the Sl Toro applabis,
ns 3, remettons-} mented Flato for his alent, in, cari- of τος fe arene: it de son tems. caturing: ctrmologies others, ‘ne semble Ὁ on réclamat, expresses his surprise to find Aristotle de ‘cous qui rechivchslent les étymo- reproducing some of these very carica- logies, beaucoup d’exactitude et de tares as serious, see Stallbaum’s note sévérité, ‘On se piquait moins d'arriver ars ὁ catered es eae See: ses ee py ietaed μὰ εξ, Hoaal Wd reiticoas darts mine tau before the Ciceronian and Augustan consultes eux-mémes, malgré la gravité Alius Stilo, Varro, Labeo, Ni- de leur profession δὲ l'importance pra- pat xii το ΣΤ ᾿ ius
‘and st épor “Cai farronem trouvoit dans frater fer alt nt venlat” ἀνα, Sh Pothiatcetdeal dive on autre ot minor” ee
remark, alike ‘and τοῦ. Lobeck has similar tearks in his sonable, with still Aglaophamus (pp. 867-800) —"" Sané to the Kr 7. lus veteres Juris consul!
312 KRATYLUS. Guar. XXXI
question, are misleading rather than otherwise. Plato held the general theory that names, in so far as they were framed with perfect rectitude, held embodied in words and syllables a likeness or imitation of the essence of things. And if he tried to follow out such a theory into detail, without any knowledge of gram- matical systems, without any large and well-chosen collection of analogies within his own language, or any comparison of diffe- rent languages with each other—he could scarcely fail to lose himself in wonderful and violent transmutations of letters and syllables,?
Having expressed my opinion that the etymologies propounded by Sokrates in the Kratylus are not intended as cari- of the dia- catures, but as bond fide specimens of admissible δος. etymological conjecture, or, at the least, of diacover- endeavours able anglogy—I resume the thread of the dialogue. how ft is These etymologies are the hypothetical links where- Names by Sokrates reconciles his first theory of the essential nally wight” rectitude of Names (that is, of Naming, as a process 1 dlnguived which can only be performed in one way, and by an and spoiled. Artist who discerns and uses the Name-Form), with the names actually received and current. The contrast between the sameness and perfection postulated in the theory, and the confusion of actual practice, is not less manifest than the contrast between the benevolent purposes ascribed to the Demiurgus (in the Timzus) and the realities of man and society :—requiri intermediate assumptions, more or less ingenious, to explain or attenuate the glaring inconsistencies. Respecting the Name- Form, Sokrates intimates that it may often be so disguised by difference of letters and syllables, as not to be discernible by an
1 Gr&fenhahn (Gesch. ἃ. classichen § Lobeck remarks that the playing
Philclogie, voL ε sect. 36, pp. 151-164) and quibbling with words, widely
ἐπί out how common. was the hypo- diffused among the ancieh iteratt derivation of namesor generally, was especially
nee vv (ρει οὶ ποτὰ among the Greek belong to those who held the Platonic and how it passed from them to theory about :-— Ts in
he prose writers. He declares that necesse est, hoc versum genus ab-
the etymologies in Platonotonlyinthe antiquitatis ingenio non alienum, ei
Kratylus but in other dialogues are vero, qui imagines rerum in vocabulis
‘* etymolo e monstra,” but he pro- sic ut in cera expressas putaret, con-
fesses inability to distinguish which of venientissimum fuisse” (Aglaophamus,
them are serious (pp. 163-164). p. 870).
CHap. XXXL NATURAL SIGNIFICANT APTITUDE. 313
ordinary man, or by any one except an artist or philosopher. Two names, if compound, may have the same Name-Form, though few or none of the letters in them be the same. A physician may so disguise his complex mixtures, by apparent differences of colour or smell, that they shall be supposed by others to be different, though essentially the same. Beta is the name of the letter B: you may substitute, in place of the three last letters, any others which you prefer, and the name will still be appropriate to designate the letter B.!
To explain the foundations of the onomastic (name-giving or speaking) art,? we must analyse words into their primordial constituent letters. The name-giving well as Artists have begun from this point, and we must things must follow in their synthetical track. We must dis- guished | tinguish letters with their essential forms—we must essential also distinguish things with their essential forme— Properties, we must then assign to each essence of things that be adapted essence of letters which has a natural aptitude to signify it, either one letter singly or several conjoined. The rectitude of the compound names will depend upon that of the simple and primordial.* This is the only way in which we can track out the rectitude of names: for it is no account of the matter to say that the Gods bestowed them, and that therefore they are right: such recourse to a Deus ex machind is only one among the pretexts for evading the necessity of explanation.‘
Essential aptitude for signification consists in resemblance between the essence of the letter and that of the thing signified. Thus the letter Rho, according to significant Sokrates, is naturally apt for the signification of SPtitude rush or vehement motion, because in pronouncing it resem- the tongue is briskly agitated and rolled about. Several words are cited, illustrating this position. Jota natu-
1 Plato, , Ἐπ pp. 398-394 toric. You must first distinguish all
3 Plato, Kratyl p. 425 A. τῇ ὄνο- the different, forms of jnind—then all ts ἐστὶν ἡ the different forms of speech; you
μρστικῇ, ἢ ῥπτορικῃ, ἢ A must assign the sort of speech which
Ὁ Piato, Kratyl pp. 624 B-K, 496 A, is ἐνὶ for rticular yh PP. of ming. Phe Pheedrus, ῬΡ' 1-272. This extreme postulate of analysis Plato, Kratyl. p. 425 adaptation may be compared with 5 Plato, Kratyl ΠῚ 426 D E. κρούειν, that wil wwe Sokrates lays down, in the θραύειν, ἐρείκειν, ibnitz (Nou-
regard tothe artof Rhe- veaux Essais sur ΠΥ ἘΡΩ͂Ν Βυ-
314 KRATYLUS.
Caap. XXXL: rally designates thin and subtle things, which insinuate them- selves everywhere. Pht, Chi, Psi, Sigma, the sibilants, imitate blowing. Delta and Tau, from the compression of the tongue, imitate stoppage of motion, or stationary condition. Lambda imitates smooth and slippery things. Nu serves, as confining the voice in the mouth, to form the words signifying in-doors and qnierior. Alpha and Eta are both of them large letters:
e is assigned to signify size, the last to signify length. Omicron is suited to what is round or circular."
It is from these fundamental aptitudes, and some others analogous, that the name-giving Artist, or Lawgiver, first put together letters to compound and construct his names. Herein consists their rectitude, according to Sokrates.. Though in laying down the position Sokrates gives it only as the best which he could discover, and intimates that some persons may turn it into derision—yet he evidently means to be under- stood seriously.?
In applying this theory—about the fundamental significant aptitudes of the letters of the alphabet—to show the rectitude of the existing words compounded from them Name-giv. —Sokrates assumes that the name-giving Artists
g law’, were believers in the Herakleitean theory: that is, believer in -in the perpetual process of flux, movement, and
sitean transition into contraries. He cites a large variety theory.
of names, showing by their composition that they were adapted to denote this all-pervading fact, as constituting the essence of things. The names given by these theorists to that which is good, virtuous, agreeable, &c., were compounded in such
main, Book iii. ch. 2, p. 800 Erdm.);
The comparison of the Platonic and Jacob Grimm (in his Dissertation)
ulations on the primordial powers
Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache, Ber- lin, 1858, ed. 4) give views very similar to those of Plato, respecting the pri. mordial growth of language, and the 0 significant or symbolisin, wer sup to be inherent in each letter (Kein Buchstabe, “ ursprtinglich steht bedeutungslos oder ueberfltssig,” pp. 39-40). Leibnitz and Grimm say (as Plato here also affirms) that Rho designates the Rough—Lambda, the Smooth: see also what he says about Alpha, Iota, Hypsilon. Compare, be- sides, M. Renan, Orig. du Langage, vi. p. 187.
of letters, with those of a modern lin- i lar so illustrious as Grimm
oras.
1 Plato, Kratyl. pp. 426-427.
2 Plato, Kratyl. pp. 426 B, 427 D. C—402
3 Plato, Kratyl. pp. 401 B.
436 Εἰ : ὡς τοῦ παντὸς ἰόντος τε καὶ
ἐρομένου καὶ ῥέοντος φαμὲν ἵΐνειν ἡμὶν τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ ὀνόματα. Ῥ. 430 Β.
Char. XXXI. THE ARTISTIC NAME-GIVER. 315
δ manner as to denote what facilitates, or falls in with, the law of universal movement: the names of things bad or hurtful, denote what obstructs or retards movement.
Many names (pursues Sokrates), having been given by artistic lawgivers who believed in the Herakleitean theory, B will possess intrinsic rectitude, if we assume that Name Giver theory to be true. But how if the theory be not ™ay be mis- true? and if the name-givers were mistaken on this competent fundamental point? The names will then not be me right. Now we must not assume the theory to be pamede Ν true, although the Name-givers believed it to be so. his know- Perhaps they themselves (Sokrates intimates) having ledge. become giddy by often turning round to survey the nature of things, mistook this vertige of their own for a perpetual revo- lution and movement of the things which they saw, and gave names accordingly.2, A Name-Giver who is real and artistic is _ rare and hard to find: there are more among them incompetent than competent: and the name originally bestowed represents only the opinion or conviction of him by whom it is bestowed.’ Yet the names bestowed will be consistent with themselves, founded on the same theory.
Again, the names originally bestowed differ much from those in use now. Many of them have undergone serious Changes changes: there have been numerous omissions, addi- #24 frans- tions, interpolations, and transpositions of letters, introduced from regard to euphony or other fancies : insomuch so ard to that the primitive root becomes hardly traceable, follow. except by great penetration and sagacity.‘ Then there are some names which have never been issued at all from the mint of the name-giver, but have either been borrowed from foreigners, or perhaps have been suggested by super-human powers.°
1 Kratyl. pp. 415-416-417, &€. 3 Plato, Kratyl. p. 418 C. , Οἶσθα 3 Plate, Kratyl pp. 429-411 C. οὖν ὅτι μόνον τοῦτο δηλοῖ τὸ ἀρχαῖον Αἰτιῶνται δὴ οὐ τὸ ἔνδον τὸ παρὰ σφίσι ὄνομα τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ θεμένου ; i 7 Sens τῆς δόξης, ἀλλ᾽ Ὁ. . shake πὰ πράγματα οὕτω πεφυκέναι, ἄς. ee erat pp. 304 B, 899 B, “ Hee that ἐς εἰ Tye 5 the world δ Plato, Kratyl. pp. 397 B, 400 B.
316 _ KRATYLUS. παρ. XXXL
To this point Sokrates brings the question during his conver- sation with Hermogenes : against whom he maintains —That there is a natural intrinsic rectitude in Names,
" or a true Name-Form—that naming is a process which must be performed in the natural way, and by an Artist who knows that way. But when, after
laying down this general theory, he has gone acertain length in
applying it to actual names, he proceeds to introduce qualifica- tions which attenuate and explain it away. Existing names were bestowed by artistic law-givers, but under a belief in the
Herakleitean theory—which theory is at best doubtful : more-
over the original names have, in course of time, undergone
such multiplied changes, that the original point of significant resemblance can hardly be now recognised except by very pene- trating intellects.
It is here that Sokrates comes into conversation with Kraty- Converse lus: who appears as the unreserved advocate of the tion of same general theory which Sokrates had enforced
with Kre- upon Hermogenes. He admits all the consequences tyius : who οὗ the theory, taking no account of qualifications.
Moreover he announces himself as having already nal thes ΑΝ bestowed reflection on the subject, and as espousing qualifica- the doctrine of Herakleitus.?
If names are significant by natural rectitude, or by partaking of the Name-Form, it follows that all names must be right or true, one as well as another. If a name be not right, it cannot be significant: that is, it is no name at all: it is a mere unmeaning sound. A name, in order to be significant, must imitate the essence of the thing named. If you add any thing to a number, or subtract any thing from it, it becomes thereby a new number: it is not the same number badly rendered. So with a letter: so too with a name. There is no such thing as a bad name. Every name must be either significant, and therefore, right—or else it is not a name. So also there is no such thing as
fy
3 Plato, Krat pp. «28 B, Ho ἘΞ q thing and ont spikinay ad ATitot
It appears t this point if im likins rakl incided wi Be ΟΝ Ἐς Ῥ. ταν . $2, : opiniot i ae cits an 7 who held In general Horakleitas Be fered from that names were φύσει καὶ ov θέσει ts Pyt Tas, and is described as speak- and maintained as a corollary that ing of with bitter antipathy.
there could be only one name for cach
RETRACTION BY SOKRATES. 317
Chap. XXXI.
a false proposition: you cannot say the thing that is not: your words in that case have no meaning; they are only an empty sound, The hypothesis that the law-giver may have distributed names erroneously is therefore not admissible! Moreover, you see that he must have known well, for otherwise he would not have given names so consistent with each other, and with the general Herakleitean theory.* And since the name is by neces- sity a representation or copy of the thing, whoever knows the name, must also know the thing named. There is in fact no other way of knowing or seeking or finding out things, except through their names.*
These consequences are fairly deduced by Kratylus from the hypothesis, of the natural rectitude of names, as laid goyrates down in the beginning of the dialogue, by Sokrates : goes still who had expressly affirmed (in his anti-Protagorean towards re- opening of the dialogue) that unless the process of ‘ting it ‘naming was performed according to the peremptory dictates of nature and by one of the few privileged name-givers, it would be a failure and would accomplish nothing ;* in other words, that a
1 Plato, Kratyl p. 429 BC. -
Sokr, Πάντα dpa τὰ ὀνόματα ὀρθῶς κ Krat "Oa by6, ὅστι.
. α γε ματα
Sokr. Τί οὖν; ‘Eppoydve τῷδε πότερον μηδὲ prone τοῦτο κεῖσθαι φῶμεν, εἰ μή τι αὐτῷ Ἑρμοῦ ivews προσήκει, ἣ κεῖσθαι μέν, οὐ μέντοι ὀρθῶς γε; | Krat. Οὐδὲ κεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν κεῖσθαι, εἶναι δὲ ἑτέρου τοῦτο τοὔνομα, οὗπερ καὶ ἣ φύσις ἡ τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῦσα.
The critics say that these last words ought to be read ἣν τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῖ, as Ficinus has transla and Schleier- macher after him. They are probably in the right; at the same time, reason-
upon the theory of Kratylus, we might say without impropriety, that *‘ the thing indicates the name”.
That which is erroneously called a bad name is no name at all (so Kratylus argues), but only seems to ἃ name to ignorant persons. Thus also in the Platonic Minos(c. 9, p. 817): a bad law is no law in ty, but only seems to be a law to ignorant men, see ap Compare the like t about
mpare the like argument abou νόμος in Xenoph. Memorab. i 2, 42-47, and Lassalle, Herakleitos, vol. ii. p. 892.
2 Plato, Krat. p. 486 C. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχῃ, GAA’ ἀναγκαῖον 7, εἰδότα τίθεσθαι τὸν τιθέμενον τὰ ὀνόματα" εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὀνόματα εἴη. Μέγιστον δέ σοι éorw τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἔσφαλται τῆς ἀλη- θείας ὁ τιθέμενος - οὗ γὰρ ἄν ποτε οὕτω ξύμφωνα ἦν αὐτῷ ἅπαντα. ἣ οὐκ ἐνενόεις αὐτὸς λέγων ὡς πάντα kar αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ἐγίγ- vero τὰ ὀνόματα; vario oe particulas ee soleg “ nich
ous etymologies whic
had been enumerated ὃ krates as illustrations of the Herakleitean theory. They confirm the opinion above ex- pressed, that Plato intended his etymo- ogies seriously, not as mockery or caricature. That Plato should have intended them as caricatures of Prota- goras and Prodikus, and yet that he should introduce Kratylus as welcom- ing them in support of his ment, is a much greater absurdity ὁ the supposition that Plato mistook them for admissible guesses.
3 Plato, Krat. c. 111, pp. 485-486. με 4 Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 ed δὲ μή, ἑἐξαμαρτήσεταίζ τε καὶ ov ποιήσει. Compare p. 389 A. “we
318 KRATYLUS. Cuar. XXXL
non-natural name would be no name at all. Accordingly, in replying to Kratylus, Sokrates goes yet farther in retracting his own previous reasoning at the beginning of the dialogue—though still without openly professing to do so. He proposes a com- promise." He withdraws the pretensions of his theory, as peremp- tory or exclusive ; he acknowledges the theory of Hermogenes as true, and valid in conjunction with it. He admits that non- natural names also, significant only by convention, are available as a make-shift—and that such names are in frequent use. Still however he contends, that natural names, significant by likeness, are the best, so far as they can be obtained: but inasmuch as that principle will not afford sufficiently extensive holding- ground, recourse must be had by way of supplement to the less perfect rectitude (of names) presented by customary or conven- tional significance.?
You say (reasons Sokrates with Kratylus) that names must be significant by way of likeness. But there are degrees of likeness. A portrait is more or less like its ori- betterand inal, but it is never exactly like: it is never a dupli- morelike,or cate, nor does it need to be so. Or a portrait, which really belongs to and resembles one person, may be named: erroneously assigned to another. The same thing Namesare happens with names. There are names more or less butthey like the thing named—good or bad : there are names cannotal- oood with reference to their own object, but erro- Names neously fitted on to objects not theirown. The name significant does not cease to be a name, 80 long as the type or tough tn form of the thing named is preserved in it: but it is an inferior worse or better, according as the accompanying fea- tures are more or less in harmony with the form: If names are like things, the letters which are put together to form names, must have a natural resemblance to things—as we remarked above respecting the letters Rho, Lambda, &c. But the natural, inherent, powers of resemblance and significance,
1 Plato, Kratyl. p. 430 A. φέρε δή, τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ π ῆσθαι ξυν-
ἐάν π διαλλαχθώμει, ὦ Κράτυλε, ἊΝ , erin, εἰς ἕνομάτων ξρϑότηνα a ted sees 2 Plato, Krat. p. 435 Ὁ. ἐμοὶ μεν οὖν κατά ye τὸ δυνατὸν κάλλιστ᾽ ἂν λέγοιτο,
καὶ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκει μὲν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅταν ἢ πᾶσιν ἣ ὡς πλείστοις ὁμοίοις
ὅμοια vas τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν λέγηται, τοῦτο, δ᾽ ἐστὶ προσήκουσιν,
ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς γλισχρὰ ἢ ἢ ὁλκὴ αἴσχιστα δὲ τοὐναντίον.
αὑτὴ τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἢ μὰ lato, Kratyl. pp. 482-434.
CuoaPp. XXXL PRINCIPLE OF CONVENTION. 319
which we pronounced to belong to these letters, are not found to pervade all the actual names, in which they are employed. There are words containing the letters Rho and Lambda, in a sense opposite to that which is natural to them—yet nevertheless at the same time significant; as is evident from the fact, that you and I and others understand them alike. Here then are words significant, without resembling: significant altogether through habit and convention. We must admit the principle of conven- tion as an inferior ground and manner of significance. Resem- blance, though the best ground as far as it can be had, is not the only one.!
All names are not like the things named: some names are bad, others good: the law-giver sometimes gave names All names under an erroneous belief. Hence you are not war- 319 ποῦ con- ranted in saying that things must be known and the theory investigated through names, and that whoever knows kieitus the name, knows also the thing named. You say Smeare that the names given are all coherent and grounded ! upon the Herakleitean theory of perpetual flux. You take this as a proof that that theory is true in itself, and that the law- giver adopted and proceeded upon it as true. I agree with you that the law-giver or name-giver believed in the Herakleitean theory, and adapted many of his names to it: but you cannot infer from hence that the theory is true—for he may have been mistaken.? Moreover, though many of the existing names con- sist with, and are based upon, that theory, the same cannot be said of all names. Many names can be enumerated which are based on the opposite principle of permanence and stand-still. It is unsafe to strike a balance of mere numbers between the two: besides which, even among the various names founded on the Herakleitean theory, you will find jumbled together the names of virtues and vices, benefits and misfortunes. That theory lends itself to good and evil alike; it cannot therefore
1 Plato, Kratyl. pp. 434-435. καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω διανοηθῆναι-- 3 Ῥ]αῖο, Kratyl Ὁ. 43 BC. Ἔτι τὸ δ᾽, εἰ ἔτυχεν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, KC. τοίνυν τόδε σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ ἡμᾶς ese words appear to me to imply
τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ὀνόματα ἐς ταυτὸν that Sokrates is perfectly serious, and τείνοντα ἐξαπατᾷ, καὶ τῷ ὄντι μὲν οἱ not ironical, in delivering his opinion, θέμενοι αὐτὰ διανοηθέντες τε that the original imposers of names ἔθεντο ws idvrwy ἁπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ were believers in the Herakloitean pedvrwyw—dativorvrar. yap ἔμοιγε theory.
920 KRATYLUB.
Cuap. XXXL
be received as true—whether the name-giver believed in it or not.!
Lastly, even if we granted that things may be known. and It is not studied through their names, it is certain that there true to say, must be some other way of knowing them ; since
canonly the first name-givers (as you yourself affirm) knew
be known
through =—« things, at a time when no names existed.* Things theirnames. may be known and ought to be studied, not through names, but by themselves and through their own affinities.®
Sokrates then concludes the dialogue by opposing the Platonic Unchange- ideas to the Herakleitean theory. I often dream of Unchange- or imagine the Beautiful per se, the Good per se, and nic Forms such like existences or Entia* Are not such exis- tences real? Are they not eternal, unchangeable and stationary? Particular beautiful things—par- ticular good things—are in perpetual change or flux : but The Beautiful, The Good—The Ideas or Forms of these and such like—remain always what they are, always the same.
The Herakleitean theory of constant and universal flux is true respecting particular things, but not true respecting these Ideas or Forms. It is the latter alone which know or are known : it is they alone which admit of being rightly named. For that which is in perpetual flux and change can neither know, nor be ‘known, nor be rightly named. Being an ever-changing subject,
Hera-
kleitean flux, which. is true only
r sensible partic
it is mever in any determinate
1 Plato, Krat. pp. 437-488 C.
Sokrates here enumerates the parti- cular names illustrating his judgment. However strange the verbal tous and approximations may appear to us I think it clear that he intends to be understood seriously.
2 Plato, Krat. p. 438 A-B. Kratylng here en ests that the first names ma ve been imposed by a su ef
oman power. But Sokrates replies, that upon that supposition Αἱ the names must have been imposed upon
the same theory: there could not have been any contradiction between one name and another.
3 Plato, Krat. pp. 438-439. 438 E: - be’ ἀλλήλων͵ γεν a. wy ξνγγενῆ ἐστί, καὶ αὑτὰ δι' αὑτῶν
condition: and nothing can be
one Krat. p. 489 CD. one ὃ πολλάκις ὄνει pone τι εἶναι αὐτὸ wakby καὶ ἃ ipa κ καὶ ν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων οὕτως, ἥ
μὴ εἰ πρόσωπόν τί ἐστι καλὸν᾿ = τῶν τοιοῦτων; καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα α ῥεῖν" ἀλλ᾽ αν’ τὸ καλὸν οὗ τοιοῦτον det. ἐστιν οἷόν ἐστιν;
5 Plato _Kratyl p. 489 D—440 A. *Ap’ οὖν οἱ ὄν τε π οσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, ε εἰ ἀεὶ ὑπε έρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ἔπειτα ὅτι ποιοῦτον ; ἣ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξιέναι, καὶ μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν; ee
᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἂν γνωσθείη γε ὑπ᾽ οὐδενός...
᾿Αλλ’ οὐδὲ γνῶσιν εἶναι φάναι εἰκός, εἰ μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα καὶ μηδὲν μένει.
CHaPp. XXXI. PLATONIC FORMS. 321
known which is not in a determinate condition. The Form of the knowing subject, as well as the Form of the known object, must both remain fixed and eternal, otherwise there can be no knowledge at all.
To admit these permanent and unchangeable Forms is to deny the Herakleitean theory, which proclaims constant and universal flux. This is a debate still open and not easy to decide. But while it is yet undecided, no wise man ought to put such implicit faith in names and in the bestowers of names, as to feel himself Dich nith warranted in asserting confidently the certainty of in names. the Herakleitean theory.!_ Perhaps that theory is true, perhaps not. Consider the point strenuously, Kratylus. Be not too easy in acquiescence—for you are still young, and have time enough before you. If you find it out, give to me also the benefit of your solution.?
Kratylus replies that he will follow the advice given, but that he has already meditated on the matter, and still adheres to Herakleitus. Such is the close of the dialogue.
not put i im-
One of the most learned among the modern Platonic commen- tators informs us that the purpose of Plato in this dialogue was, “to rub over Protagoras and other u Sophists with the bitterest salt of sarcasm”. I have already expressed my dissent from this theory, which is opposed to all the ancient views of the dialogue, and which has.arisen, in my judgment, only from the anxiety of the moderns to exonerate Plato from the reproach of having suggested as admissible, etymo- logies which now appear to us fantastic. I see no ° derision of the Sophists, except one or two sneers
1 Plato, Kratyl. p. 440 C. Ταῦτ᾽ οὖν πότερόν wore οὕτως ἔχει, ἣ ἐκείνως ws οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτόν τε δ τ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, μὴ οὗ ῥᾷδιον ἐπισκέψασθαι, οὐδὲ πάνυ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπον ἐπιτρέψαντα ὀνόμασιν αὑτὸν καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχὴν θερα- πεύειν, πεπιστευκότα ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς
θεμένοις αὐτά, διϊσχυρίζεσθαι ὥς τι
εἰδότα, καὶ αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων κατα- γιγνώσκειν, ὡς οὐδὲν res οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ ντα eters al i» dee. 3 Stallbaum, ee L p. 18 —‘‘quos Plato hoc libro acerbissimo sale perfricandos sta ΤᾺΝ nie ieenleier-
macher also tells us 17-21) that “ Plato “had mt mntch delight
3—21
322 KRATYLUB.
CHap. XXXI.
against Protagoras and Prodikus, upon the ever-recurring theme that they took money for their lectures.| The argument against Protagoras at the opening of the dialogue—whether conclusive or not—is serious and not derisory. The discourse of Sokrates is neither that of an anti-sophistical caricaturist, on the one hand— nor that of a confirmed dogmatist who has studied the subject and made up his mind on the other (this is the part which he ascribes to Kratylus)2—but the tentative march of an enquirer groping after truth, who follows the suggestive promptings of his own invention, without knowing whither it will conduct him : who, having in his mind different and even opposite points of view, unfolds first arguments on behalf of one, and next those on behalf of the other, without pledging himself either to the one or to the other, or to any definite scheme of compromise between them.® ‘Those who take no interest in such circuitous gropings and guesses of an inquisitive and yet unsatisfied mind— those who ask for nothing but a conclusion clearly enunciated along with one or two affirmative reasons—may find the dialogue tiresome. However this may be—it is a manner found in many Platonic dialogues. ee opens his case by declaring the thesis of the Absolute laid (Object sine Subject), against the Protagorean thesis down by ἃ of the Relative (Object cum Subject). Things have priori,inthe an absolute essence: names have an absolute essence :4
in heaping a full measure of ridicule dependant on or relative to the know- upon his enemy Antisthenes; and that ledge or belief of the Name-givers. he at last became tired with the exu- Kratylus,
berance of his own
The κοινῇ σκεψοίμην μετὰ σοῦ.
Voie cannot put r notice how Plato, shortly after red against the Helati lativty δολερὰ by Pro. tagoras, f into that very track of Helativity when he comes to speak abou anguage, ng us that names are imposed on grounds
. - (see Leibnitz O
us, pp. 307 B, 899 A, 401 A-B,
411
The ‘ike doctrine is affirmed in the t Republic, vi p. 515 B. δῆλον ὅτι ὁ θέμενος πρῶτος τὰ ὀνόματα, οἷα ἡγεῖτο εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα ἐτίθετο καὶ
τὰ ὀνόματα.
nitz conceived an idea οὗ a ‘* Lingua Characterica Universalis, quse simul sit ars One es et ndi ot Judicandi »
163), and he alu es τὰ 8, Ὁ a conception af of * a Lingua Adamica or Natur spree ca or Na rach through which the essences of n might be contemplated and under- stood. ‘‘Lingua Adamica vel certé vis ejus, quam quidam se nosse, et τ ΩΝ ab ‘Adamo impositis cesem tias rerum intueri posse contendunt— nobis certé ignota est” (Opp. p. 93).
ΟΗΔΡ. XXXL THEORY AND FACTS OF LANGUAGE.
each name belongs to its own thing, and to no other : this is its rectitude: none but that rare person, the artistic name-giver, can detect the essence of each thing, and the essence of each name, so as to apply the name rightly. Here we have a theory truly Platonic: impressed upon Plato’s mind by a sentiment αἱ priori, and not from any survey or comparison of particulars. Accord- ingly when Sokrates is called upon to apply his theory to exist- ing current words, and to make out how any such rectitude can be shown to belong to them—he finds the greatest divergence and incongruity between the two. His ingenuity is hardly tasked to reconcile them : and he is obliged to have recourse to bold and multiplied hypotheses. That the first Name-Givers were artists proceeding upon system, but incompetent artists proceeding on a bad system—they were Herakleiteans who believed in the universality of movement, and gave names having reference to movement :' That the various letters of the alphabet, or rather the different actions of the vocal organism by which they are pronounced, have each an inherent, essential, adaptation, or analogy to the phenomena of movement or arrest of movement :* That the names originally bestowed have be- come disguised by a variety of metamorphoses, but may be
phistischen Sprachforscher” (August Arnold, Ein] in die Philosophie —durch die Lehre Platons vermittelt— p. 178, Berlin, 1841).
Proklus, in his Commentary, says
Leibnitz seems to have thought that it was ible to construct a philo- 80 language, based upon an ‘Alphabetum Cogitationam umana-
rum, through which problems on all subjects ht be resolved, by a cal- that the scope of this dialogue is culus like t which is employed for exhibit the imitative or generative the solution of arithmetical or geome- faculty which essentially belo to trical problems (Opp. p. 83; compare the mind, and whereby the mind (aided also p. 356). by the vocal or pronunciative imagi- This is very analogous to the affir- nation—rexrin) ξαντασίῳ constructs mations of Sokrates, in the first part names which are natural transcripts of of the Kratylus, about the essentiality the essences of things hol. of Names vered and declared by 9: Θ vo, ς τεχνικός. 1 Plato, Brat p. 436 Ὁ. 2 Plato, Krat. pp. 424-425. Schleier- 768), speaks much about macher declares this to be among the th sanctity of names, re-
greatest and most profound truths which have ever been enunciated about language | troduction to Kratylus, p. 11. 5 um, on the contrary, re- gards it as not even seriously meant,
ut mere derision of others (Prolegg. ad Krat. p. 12). Another commentator on Plato calls it ‘‘eine Lehre der So-
ised not merely by Pythagoras and Plato, but also by the bien ot Orien He treate the etymologies in the Kratylus as seriously intended. He says not a word about any inten- tion on the part of Plato to deride the Sophists or any other Etymologists.
o also Sydenham, in his transla-
294 KRATYLUS. Cuar. XXXL
brought back to their original by probable suppositions, and shown to possess the rectitude sought. All these hypotheses are only violent efforts to reconcile the Platonic ἃ priors theory, in some way or other, with existing facts of language. To regard them as intentional caricatures, would be to suppose that Plato is seeking intentionally to discredit and deride his own theory of the Absolute : for the discredit could fall nowhere else: We see that Plato considered many of his own guesses as strange and novel, some even as laying him open to ridicule. But they were indispensable to bring his theory into something like
coherence, however inadequate, with real language. In the second part of the dialogue, where Kratylus is intro- duced as uncompromising champion of this same
Upporite theory, Sokrates changes his line of argument, and of Sokrates impugns the peremptory or exclusive pretensions of n the last . ee
halfofthe the theory: first denying some legitimate corollaries dialogue from it—next establishing by the side of it the necte his counter-theory of Hermogenes, as being an inferior Naming though indispensable auxiliary—yet still continuing from the (0 uphold it as an ideal of what is Best. He concludes tean doc- by disconnecting the theory pointedly from the doc-
trine of Herakleitus, with which Kratylus connected it, and by maintaining that there can be no right naming, and no sound knowledge, if that doctrine be admitted. The Platonic Ideas, eternal and unchangeable, are finally opposed to Kratylus as the only objects truly knowable and nameable—and therefore as the only conditions under which right naming can be realised. The Name-givers of actual society have failed in their task by proceeding on a wrong doctrine: neither they nor the names
which they have given can be
tion of Plato’s Phil&bus (p. 33), de- signates the Kratylus as “8 dialogue in which is taught the nature of things, as well the permanent as the transient, by a supposed etymology of Names and Words”.
1 Plato, Kratyl. pp. 425 D, 426 B. Because Sokrates says that these ety- mologies may appear ridiculous, we are not to infer that he proposed them as caricatures; see what Plato says in the Republic, v. p. 452, about his own propositions respecting the training of
trusted.* The doctrine of per-
women, which others (he says) will think ludicrous, but which he proposes with the most thorough and serious conviction.
2 Plato, Kratyl p. 489 Ὁ. °Ap’ οὖν
οἷον re προσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ ἀεὶ
ὑπεξέρχεται;
3 Bato, Kratyl. p. 440 C. Compare pp. 436 D, 439 B. Lassalle contends that Herakleitus and his followers considered the know. ledge of names to be not only indis- pensable to the knowledge of things,
CHaPp. XXXL IDEAL OF NAMING. 325
petual change or movement is true respecting the sensible world and particulars, but it is false respecting the intelligible world or universals—Ideas and Forms. ‘These latter are the only things knowable : but we cannot know them through names : we must study them by themselves and by their own affinities.
How this is to be done, Sokrates professes himself unable to say. We may presume him to mean, that a true Artistic Name- giver must set the example, knowing these Forms or essences beforehand, and providing for each its appropriate Name, or Name-Form, significant by essential analogy.
Herein, so far as I can understand, consists the amount of positive inference which Plato enables us to draw from the Kratylus. Sokrates began by saying that reel οἱ the names having natural rectitude were the only ma- of naming— terials out of which a language could be formed: he Giver ought ends by affirming merely that this is the best and {2 be fami- most perfect mode of formation: he admits that the Platonic names may become significant, though loosely and sences, and imperfectly, by convention alone—yet the best scheme ®PPortion would be, that in which they are significant by in- acco herent resemblance to the thing named. But this blances cannot be done until the Name-giver, instead of pro- {ia,® ceeding upon the false theory of Herakleitus, starts from the true theory recognising the reality of eternal, unchange- able, Ideas or Forms. He will distinguish, and embody in appropriate syllables, those Forms of Names which truly re- semble, and have natural connection with, the Forms of Things.
Such is thd ideal of perfect or philosophical Naming, as Plato conceives it—disengaged from those divinations of the origin and metamorphoses of existing names, which occupy so much of the dialogue.' He does not indeed attempt to construct a body
but equivalent to and essentially em- the Herakleitean opinions, coincides bodying that knowledge. (Herakleitos, very much with the course of the vol. ii. 363-368-387.) See also a Platonic dialogue Kratylus, from its passage 0 proxi Proklus, in his Gommentary begi amin ἊΝ end (Aristot. Meta- on the Platonic Parmenidés, p. 476, phy. A. a-b). ed. Stallbaum. Deuschle te (Die Platonische Sprach- The remarkable passage in the eatery p. 57) tells us thatin this first book of Aristotle’s Metaph ‘Plato to intentionally presented wherein he speaks of Plato and P to's many of his thoughts in ἃ covert or early familiarity with Kratylus and contradictory and unintelligible man-
326
KRATYLUS.
CHar. XXXI.
of true names ἃ priori, but he sets forth the real nameable permanent essences, to which these names might be assimilated :
ner”. (Vieles absichtlich verhdllt oder widersprechend und missverstandlich
darges lt wird ) see no probability in such an " sspecti the origin and primordial ng the origin and primo fication of , 8 great variety of different opinions have been started. William von Humboldt (Werke, vi.
80) assumes that there must have been tains
some primitive and natural bond be- tween each sound and its meaning (i.e. that names were originally signi cant φύσει), though there are very few ticular cases in which such connexion can be brought to evidence or even divined. (Here we see that the larger know of etymology possessed at
t deters the modern philologer
m that which Plato undertakes in |
the Kratylus.) He dis es a threefold relation between the name and the thing signified. 1. Directly imitative. 2. Indirectly imitative or symbolical. 8. Imitative by one re- move, or analogical; where a name becomes transferred from one object to another, by virtue of likeness between the two objects. eber die Verschied- enheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Ent- wicklung des Menschengeschlechtes, p. 78, Berlin, 1836.)
Mr. Hensleigh Wedgwood, in his of the English Language Disc. p. 10 .), recog-
tries to apply the principle to particular English words. r. F. W. Farrar, in his recent interesting work (Cha ters on Language) has explained and en- forced copiously the like thesis—onoma- topeic origin for language generally. He has combated the objections of Pro- fessor Max Miiller, who considers the principle to be of little applicability or avail. But M. Renan gns to it not less importance than Mr. W ood and Mr. Farrar. (See sixth chapter of his ingenious rtation De Ir Origine du gage, pp. 185-146-148.) “L'imitation, ou l’onomatopée, parait avoir été le procédé ordinaire d’aprés lequel les premiers nomenclateurs for- mérent les appellations. . . D’ailleurs, comme le choix de l’appellation n’est point arbitraire, et que jamais "homme ne se décide ἃ assembler des sons au hasard pour en faire les signes de la
t affirmer que de tous les
Tote actae ὃ usités, il n'en est pas sufleante,
, price n'a, eu aucune - part dans la formation du langage. s doute, on ne t admettre qui
y ait une relation intrinsdque entre le nom et la chose. Le systéme que ton a si subtilement développé
dénominations naturelles, et 7 ane prop mots se
‘imitation plus ou moins exacte s‘appli-
Ions n’établit qu'une convenance. a n pas leur cause dans l'objet appedé (cans quel. elles seraient les mimes dans toutes
du sujet a nt. .. La raison qui 4 détermin le ΑΝ ΡΟΣ premiers
ommes peut nous per; mais elle a existé. La liaison du sens et du mot n’est jamais xédcessaire, arbi- traire; toujours elle est motivde.”
When M. Renan maintains the Pro- tagorean doctrine, that it is not the Object which is cause of the deno- through’ the personal. dispositions τὲ
oug Θ tions of the denominating Subject—he contra- dicts the reasoning of the Platonic Sokrates in the conversation with Hermogenes (pp. 386-887; compare 424 A). But he adopts the reasoning of the same in the su went con- versation with Kratylus; wherein the relative point of view is introduced for the first time (pp. 429 A-B, 481 E), and brought more and more into the fore- ground (pp. 436 B-D—437 C—489 C).
The distinction drawn by M. Renan between l’arbitraire and le motivé pears to me unfounded: at least, it requires a peculiar explanation of the two words—for if by le caprice and
CHap. XXXL GROWTH VER8US CONSTRUCTION. 327
the principles upon which the construction ought to be founded, by the philosophic lawgiver following out a good theory :' and he contrasts this process with two rival processes, each defective in its own way. This same contrast, pervading Plato’s views on other subjects, deserves a few words of illustration.
Respecting social institutions and government, there is one well-known theory to which Sir James Mackintosh gave expression in the phrase—“ Governments are not made, but grow”. The like phrase has been applied by an eminent modern author on Logic, to those, language—" Languages are not made, but grow”.? iustit One might suppose, in reading the second and third books of the Republic of Plato, that Plato also had adopted this theory: for the growth of a society, without any initiative or predetermined construction by a special individual, is there strikingly depicted.* tema But in truth it is this theory which stands in most of the Platonic works, as the antithesis depreciated and discredited by Plato. The view most satisfactory to him contemplates the analogy of a human artist or professional man ; which he enlarges into the idea of an originating, intelligent, artistic, Constructor, as the source of all good. This view is exhibited to usin the Timzus, where we find the Demiurgus, building up by his own fiat all that is good in the Kosmos: in the Politikus, where we find the individual dictator producing by his uncontrolled ordi- nance all that is really good in the social system :—lastly, here also in the Kratylus, where we have the scientific or artistic
Varbvitraire be meant the exclusion of all motive, such a state of mind could
Se seen ding nic
: aides différentes de leur ou du extérieur ue objet, les Tiocnetences restant
a eté susceptible d’une foule de dénominations: le choix qui a été
fait de Pane d’elles tient ἃ des causes impossibles ἃ saisir.”
1 Plato (in Timeus, 30 B) reco
sitions in which they become su jects of discourse.
3 See Mr. John Stuart Mill’s Logi Book i. ch. viil. *
3 Plato, Republic, ii. p. 8
striking way. ‘The (p. 369 Ὁ) oe Plato there prose Aristotelian rather than
328 KRATYLUS. Caap. XXXL
Name-giver, and him alone, set forth as competent to construct an assemblage of names, each possessing full and perfect rectitude. To this theory there is presented a counter-theory, which Plato disappruves—a Kosmos which grows by iteelf and keeps up its own agencies, without any extra-kosmic constructor or superin- tendent : in like manner, an aggregate of social customs, and an aggregate of names, which have grown up no one knows how ; and which sustain and perpetuate themselves by traditional force —by movement already acquired in a given direction. The idea of growth, by regular assignable steps and by regularising ten- dencies instinctive and inherent in Nature, belongs rather to Aristotle ; Plato conceives Nature as herself irregular, and as persuaded or constrained into some sort of regularity by a supernatural or extranatural artist.
Looking back to the Politikus (reviewed in the last chapter),
1M. Destutt de Tracy insists upon (De roOrigine du ch. ἢ the emotional initiative force, as ἃ 101; also ch. iv. δ 117.) Ὁ and more efficacious than the intel- The theory M. in this lectual, in the first formation of lan- ous treatise, is,
° is the product of “la raison oe Dans lorigine du langage d'action, tanée, la raison " wi un seul geste dit—je veux cela, ou reflexion. ‘“‘La n’y peut rien:
je vous montre cela, ou je vous demande _ les langues sont sorties toutes faites du secours; un seul cri dit, je vous ap- moule méme del'’esprit humain, comme pelle, ou je souffre, ou je suis content, Minerveducerveau de Jupiter.” ~Main-
3 sans distinguer aucune des tenant que la raison échie a rem- idées qui composent ses propositions. placé l’instinct créateur, ἃ peine le Ce n’est point par le détail, mais par génie suffit-il pour r ce que les masses, que commencent toutes Il’esprit des miers hommes enfanta nos expressions, ainsi que toutes nos de toutes piéces, et sans y songer” connaissan to
p possbdent des signes propres&exprimer me very doubtful ; as much as there is es idées isolées, ce n’est donc que par proved in it, is stated in good passage Yeffet de la décomposition qui sest cited by M. ‘Renan from Will von Haw- rée dans ces langages; et ces boldt (pp. 106-107). But there are
, ou noms propres d’idées, ne two remarks to be made, in comparing
sont, pour ainsi dire, que des débris, it with the Kratylusof Plato. 1. That des fragmens, ou du moins des éma- the hypothesis of a philosopher ‘qui
nations de ceux qui d’abord expri- compose un de sang-froid,” maient, bien ou mal, les propositions which appears a to Targot and tout entidres.” (Destutt de y, M. Renan (p. 92), did not appear
Grammaire, ch. i. p. 28, ed. 1825; see absurd to Plato, but on the contrary also the Idéologie of the same author, as the only sure source of what is good 2. That Plato,
ch. xvi. p. 215.) and right in language. M. Renan enunciates in the most in the Kratylus, account only of explicit terms this com ison of the naming, an not of the i ormation o language Θ gro structure o: language, w M. Renan and development of a germ:—‘‘Les considers the essential (p. 106; langues doivent étres comparées, non compare also pp. 208-209 Grammar, au cristal qui se forme par aggloméra- with ita es ished analogies, does tion autour d’un noyau, maisau germe not seem to have been present to qui se développe par sa force intime, Plato’s mind as an object οὗ reflexion ; et par l’appel ndcessaire de ses parties”. there existed none in his day.
CuaPp. XXXL WORSHIP OF ARTISTIC CONSTRUCTION. 329
we find Plato declaring to us wherein consists the Politikus rectitude of a social Form : it resides in the presiding cor ρα το and uncontrolled authority of a scientific or artistic lus. Ruler, always present and directing every one: or of a few such Rulers, if there be a few—though this is more than can be hoped. But such rectitude is seldom or never realised. Existing social systems are bad copies of this type, degenerating more or less widely from its perfection. One or a Few persons arrogate to themselves uncontrolled power, without possessing that science or art which justifies the exercise of it in the Right Ruler. These are, or may become, extreme depravations. The least bad, among all the imperfect systems, is an aggregate of fixed laws and magistrates with known functions, agreed to by con- vention of all and faithfully obeyed by all. But such a system of fixed laws, though second-best, falls greatly short of rectitude. It is much inferior in every way to the uncontrolled authority of the scientific Ruler.!
That which Plato does for social systems in the Politikus, he does for names in the Kratylus. The full rectitude of names is when they are bestowed by the scientific Ruler, considered in‘the capacity of Name-giver. He it is who discerns, and embodies in syllables, the true Name-Form in each particular case. But such an artist is seldom realised: and there are others who, attempting to do his work without his knowledge, perform it ignorantly or under false theories.* The names thus given are imperfect mames: moreover, after being given, they become corrupted and transformed in passing from man to man. Lastly, the mere fact of convention among the individuals composing the society, without any deliberate authorship or origination from any Ruler, bad or good—suffices to impart to Names a sort of significance, vulgar and imperfect, yet ade- quate to a certain extent.» The Name-giving Artist or Lawgiver is here superseded by King Nomos.
It will be seen that in both these cases the Platonic point of
See Plato, Politik: pp. 800-801 forth by Lucretius, who declares him-
2 Plato, Kratyl. p. 432 E. self opposed to the theory of an ori- 3 Plato, Kratyl. pp. 134 E, 435 A-B. ting Name- “River (v. τ Pp. 1021-1060). This unsystematic, spontaneous, ori- Jacob Grimm and M. Renan Ὁ espouse a
gin and growth of language is set theory, in the main, si
330 KRATYLUB. Cuap. XXXL
Ideal of view comes out—deliberate authorship from the Plato eof Scientific or artistic individual mind, as the only theOne source of rectitude and perfection. But when Plato Badness of looks at the reality of life, either in social system or allreality. in names, he finds no such perfection anywhere : he discovers a divine agency originating what is good ; but there is an independent agency necessary in the way of co-operation, though it sometimes counteracts and always debases the good.! We find either an incompetent dictator who badly imitates the true Artist—or else we have fixed, peremptory, laws ; depending on the unsystematic, unauthorised, convention among indivi- duals, which has grown up no one knows how—which is transmitted by tradition, being taught by every one and learnt by every one without any privileged caste of teachers—and which in the Platonic Protagoras is illustrated in the mythe and discourse ascribed to that Sophist ; 5 being in truth, common sense, as contrasted with professional specialty. In regard to social systems, Plato pronounces fixed laws to be the second-best —enjoining strict obedience to them, wherever the first-best cannot be obtained. In the Republic he enumerates what are the conditions of rectitude in a city: but he admits at the same time that this Right Civic Constitution is an ideal, nowhere to be found existing: and he points out the successive stages of corruption by which it degenerates more and more into con- formity with the realities of human society. As with Right Civic Constitution, so with Right Naming: Plato shows what constitutes rectitude of Names, but he admits that this is an ideal seen nowhere, and he notes the various causes which deprave the Right Names into that imperfect and semi-signifi- cant condition, which is the best that existing languages present.
1 Plato, Timseus, p. 68 E. have, though differently handled, the 2 See my remarks on the Politikus, same antithesis between the ethical] in the last chapter: also Protagoras, sentiment which grows and propa- p. 820 seq. gates itself unconsciously, without Compare Plato, Kriton, p. 48 A. 6 special initiative— and that which is ἐπαΐων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ deliberately prescribed and imparted εἷς. by the wise individual: common sense In the Menon also the same ques- versus professional ialty. tion is broached as in the Protagoras 3See the conditions of the ὁ whether virtue is teachable or not? πολιτεία, and its dual depravation and how any virtue can exist, when and degeneracy into the state of actual there are no special teachers, and no governments, in Republic, v. init. p. special learners of virtue? Here we 440 B, viii. 544 A-B.
CaP. XXXI. COMPARISON OF DIALOGUES. 331 One more remark, in reference to the general spirit and
reciprocal bearing of Plato’s dialogues. In three
distinct dialogues—Kratylus, Thestétus, Sophistés— of Kretylus one and the same question is introduced into the dis- and é Sophis- cussion: a question keenly debated among the con- [88,1 treat temporaries of Plato and Aristotle. How is a false question proposition possible? Many held that a false propo- Now tine” sition and 8 false name were impossible: that you Sree, could not speak the thing that ts not, or Non-Ens of false ® PrO-
(rd μὴ Sv): that such a proposition would be an empty sound, without meaning or signification: that speech may be significant or insignificant, but could not be false, except in the sense of being unmeaning.’
Now this doctrine is dealt with in the Thestétus, Sophistés, and Kratylus. In the Thestétus,? Sokrates examines: it at great length, and proposes several different hypotheses to ex- plain how a false proposition might be possible: but ends in pronouncing them all inadmissible. He declares himself in- competent, and passes on to something else. Again, in the Sophistés, the same point is taken up, and discussed there also very copiously.2 The Eleate in that dialogue ends by finding a solution which satisfies him (viz.: that τὸ μὴ ὃν = τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος). But what is remarkable is, that the solution does not meet any of the difficulties propounded in the Thestétus ; nor are those difficulties at all adverted to in the Sophistés. Finally, in the Kratylus, we have the very same doctrine, that false affirmations are impossible—which both in the Theetétus and in the Sophistés is enunciated, not as the decided opinion of the speaker, but as a problem which embarrasses him—we have this same doctrine averred unequivocally by Kratylus as his own full
1 Plato, Kratyl. p. 429.
καὶ δοκοῦν ἀποφαίνεται περὶ τῶν πραγ’
Ammonius, Scholia εἰς τὰς Κατη- μάτων, οὐκ ἐχόντων ὡρισμένην φύσιν γορίας of Aristotle (Schol. Brandis, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ «ὡς ἡμᾶς σχέσει τὸ εἶναι p. 60, a. 10). ἐχόντων.
Τινές φασι μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν πρός τι Vou, ἀλλὰ ἀνάπλασμα εἶναι ταῦτα τῆς μετέρας διανοίας, λέγοντες ὅτι οὕτως οὐκ
ἐστὶ φύσει τὰ πρός τι ἀλλὰ θέσει . .. Τινὲς δέ, ἐκ διαμέτρον τούτοις ἔχοντες, πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρός τι ἔλεγον. Ὧν εἷς ἦν Πρωταγόρας ὃ σοφιστής". . . διὸ καὶ λεγεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τινὰ ψευδῆ λέγειν" ἕκαστος γὰρ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ
2 Plato, Thestét. pp. 187 D to 201 D. The discussion of the point is continued through n pages of Stephan. edit.
3 Plato, Sophistés, pp. 237 A, 264 B, through twenty-seven pages of Steph. edit.—though there are some digres- sions included herein.
332 KRATYLUS. Cuar. XXXL
conviction. And Sokrates finds that a very short argument, and a very simple comparison, suffice to refute him.’ The supposed “aggressive cross-examiner,” who presses Sokrates so hard in the Thestétus, is not allowed to put his puzzling questions in the Kratylua.?
How are we to explain these three different modes of handling Discrepan- the same question by the same philosopher? If the cies and in- question about Non-Ens can be disposed of in the cicg of nig SWumary way which we read in the Kratylus, what mannerof is gained by the string of unsolved puzzles in the handling Thestétus—or by the long discursive argument in subject. the Sophistés, ushering in a new solution noway satisfactory? If, on the contrary, the difficulties which are unsolved in the Thezxtétus, and imperfectly solved in the Sophistés, are real and pertinent—how are we to explain the proceeding of Plato in the Kratylus, when he puts into the mouth of Kratylus a distinct averment of the opinion about Non-Ens, yet without allowing him, when it is impugned by Sokrates, to urge any of these pertinent arguments in defence of it? If the peculiar solution given in the Sophistés be the really genuine and triumphant solution, why is it left un- noticed both in the Kratylus and the Theetétus, and why is it contradicted in other dialogues? Which of the three dia- logues represents Plato’s real opinion on the question ?
_ To these questions, and to many others of like bearing, con- Nocommon nected with the Platonic writings, I see no satisfactory ourno ti so reply, if we are to consider Plato as a positive philo- pervading sopher, with a scheme and edifice of methodised logues— opinions in his mind: and as composing all his dia- distinct. logues with a set purpose, either of inculcating these tion work. opinions on the reader, or of refuting the opinions ing out its opposed to them. This supposition is what most lisrerga- Platonic critics have in their minds, even when pro- ment. fessedly modifying it. Their admiration for Plato is not satisfied unless they conceive him in the professorial chair as a teacher, surrounded by a crowd of learners, all under the obligation (incumbent on learners generally) to believe what
1 Plato, Kratyl. pp. 430-431 A-B. 2 Plato, Thestét. p. 200 A. ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος γελάσας φήσει.
Cuap. ΧΧΧΙ. NO COMMON. DIDACTIC PURPOSE. 333
they hear. Reasoning upon such a basis, the Platonic dialogues present themselves to me as a mystery. They exhibit neither identity of the teacher, nor identity of the matter taught: the composer (to use various Platonic comparisons) is Many, and not One—he is more complex than Typhos.?
If we are to find any common purpose pervading and binding together all the dialogues, it must not be a didactic purpose, in the sense above defined. The value of them consists, not in the result, but in the discussion—not in the conclusion, but in the premisses for and against it. In this sense all the dialogues have value, and all the same sort of value—though not all equal in amount. In different dialogues, the same subject is set before you in different ways : with remarks and illustrations sometimes tending towards one theory, sometimes towards another. It is. for you to compare and balance them, and to elicit such result as your reason approves. The Platonic dialogues require, in order to produce their effect, a supplementary responsive force, and a strong effective reaction, from the individual reason of the reader: they require moreover that he shall have a genuine interest in the process of dialectic scrutiny (τὸ φιλομαθές, φιλόλργον) 3 which will enable him to perceive beauties in what would appear tire- some to others.
Such manner of proceeding may be judicious or not, according to the sentiment of the critic. But it is at any rate Platonic. And we have to recall this point of view when dismissing the Kratylus, which presents much interest in the premisses and conflicting theories, with little or no result. It embodies the oldest speculations known to us respecting the origin, the mode of signification, and the functions of words as an instrument: and not the least interesting part of it, in my judgment, consists in its etymological conjectures, affording evidence of a rude ety- mological senee which has now passed away.
1 Plato, Pheedrus, p Θ Fheedon, 89-90. Phedrus, 2 Plato, Republic. v. “78; com: oe 230 Ε 230 E. PP.
334 PHILEBCUS. παν XXXII
CHAPTER XXXII PHILEBUS.
Tue Philébus, which we are now about to examine, is not merely a Dialogue of Search, but a Dialogue of Exposition,
with more or less of search made subservient to the exposition. It represents Sokrates from the first as advancing an affirmative opinion—maintaining it against Philébus and Protarchus—and closing with a result assumed to be positively established.}
The question is, Wherein consists the Good—The Supreme Character, G0od—Summum Bonum. Three persons stand be- Persomi fore us: the youthful Philébus: Protarchus, some- A the what older, yet still a young man: and Sokrates bus. Philébus declares that The Good consists in pleasure or enjoyment ; and Protarchus his friend advocates the same thesis, though in a less peremptory manner. On the contrary, Sokrates begins by proclaiming that it consists in wisdom or in- telligence. He presently however recedes from this doctrine, so far as to admit that wisdom, alone and per se, is not sufficient to cemstitate the Supreme Good : and that a certain combination of pleasure along with it is required. Though the compound total thus formed is superior both to wisdom and to pleasure taken separately, yet comparing the two elements of which it is com- pounded, wisdom (Sokrates contends) is the most important of the two, and pleasure the least important. Neither wisdom nor pleasure can pretend to claim the first prize ; but wisdom is fully entitled to the second, as being far more cognate than pleasure is, with the nature of Good.
1 Schlelermacher says, about the und tritt mit der ganzen Persdnlichkeit zusammenhingen-
Philébna (Kinleit. Β 136) "νι Das Ganze and Willkihr einer liegt fertig indem Haup Sokrates, den Rede heraus,” &c.
Cuap. XXXIL. WHAT IS THE SUPREME GOOD ? 335
Such is the general purpose of the dialogue. As to the method of enquiry, Plato not only assigns to Sokrates a dis- tinct affirmative opinion from the beginning, instead against the of that profession of ignorance which is his more usual Rienchus, characteristic—but he also places in the mouth of Pro- and the tarchus an explicit protest against the negative cross- gative pro- examination and Elenchus. “We shall not let you ced off” (says Protarchus to Sokrates) “ until the two sides of this question shall have been so discriminated as to elicit a sufficient conclusion. In meeting us on the present question, pray desist from that ordinary manner of yours—desist from throwing us into embarrassment, and putting interrogations to which we cannot at the moment give suitable answers. We must not be content to close the discussion by finding ourselves in one common puzzle and confusion. If we cannot solve the difficulty, you must solve it for us.” ?
Conformably to this requisition, Sokrates, while applying his cross-examining negative test to the doctrine of .Phi- Enquiry— lébus, sets against it a counter-doctrine of his own, What men- and prescribes, farther, a positive method of enquiry. fel co ont " “You and I” (he says) “ will each try to assign what cnsure to permanent habit of mind, and what particular mental happy life? condition, is calculated to ensure to all mena happy peppineas life.” Good and Happiness are used in this dialogue (correla. | as correlative and co-extensive terms. Happiness is extensive. that which a man feels when he possesses Good: Good FbiSbus ΔΓ is that which a man must possess in order to fee] Pleasure, Happiness. The same fact or condition, looked at for Intel- objectively, is denominated Good : looked at subjec- "ene tively, is denominated Happiness.
Is Good identical with pleasure, or with intelligence, or is it a Tertium Quid, distinct from both? Good, or The gooa—on- Good, must be perfect and all-sufficient in itself: the Ject of
1 Plato, Philébus, pp. 19 E—20 A. νατοῦμεν, σοὶ δραστέον.
παῦσαι δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦ- There is a remarkable contrast be- Tov ἐπὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα . . . εἰς awo- tween the method here proclaimed ρίαν ἐμβάλλων καὶ ἀνερωτῶν ὧν μὴ and that followed in the Thesetétus, νναίμεθ᾽ ἂν ἱκανὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τῷ though some eminent commentators παρόντι διδόναι σοι. μὴ γὰρ οἰώμεθα have represented the Philébus as a τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν νῦν τὴν πάντων ἡμῶν sequel of the Theztétus.
ἀπορίαν, add’ εἰ δρᾷν τοῦθ᾽ ἡμεῖς ἀδυ- 2 Plato, Philébus, p. 11 D.
336 PHILEBUS. Cuap. XXXII.
universal object of desire, aspiration, choice, and attachment, attachment by all men, and even by all animals and plants, who by men. a" are capable of attaining it. Every man who has it, is plante—all. satisfied, desiring nothing else. If he neglects it, and satisfies all chooses any thing else, this is contrary to nature : he does so involuntarily, either from ignorance or some other untoward constraint.! Thus, the characteristic mark of Good or Happiness is, That it is desired, loved, and sought by all, and that, if attained, it satisfies all the wishes and aspirations of human nature.
Sokrates then remarks that pleasure is very multifarious and - diverse : and that under that same word, different areunliketo forms and varieties are signified, very unlike to each eect other, other, and sometimes even opposite to each other. CPP tens Thus the intemperate man has his pleasures, while are so like. the temperate man enjoys his pleasures also, attached wine to his own mode of life: so too the simpleton has pleasure in his foolish dreams and hopes, the intelligent man in the exercise of intellectual force. These and many others are varieties of pleasure not resembling, but highly dissimilar, even opposite.—Protarchus replies—That they proceed from dissimilar and opposite circumstances, but that in themselves they are not dissimilar or opposite. Pleasure must be completely similar to pleasure—itself to itself.—So too (rejoins Sokrates) colour is like to colour: in that respect there is no difference between them. But black colour is different from, and even opposite to, white colour.? You will go wrong if you make things altogether oppo- site, into one. You may call all pleasures by the name pleasures: but you must not affirm between them any other point of resem- blance, nor call them all good. I maintain that some are bad,
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 11 ©. 20 C-D: ἦν ote Kai ζώοις aiperds, οἷσπερ δυνατὸν Τὴν τἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη ν οὕτως ἀει διὰ βίον ζῆν" εἰ oe τις ἄλλα τέλεον ἢ μὴ τέλεον εἶναι; Πάντων ἡρεῖθ᾽ ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν Τὴν τοῦ δήπον τελεώτατον. τί δέ" ἱκανὸν ἀληθοῦς aiperou ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ταγαθόν; Πῶς γὰρ ov; καὶ πάντων γε ἀγνοίας ἥ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὑδαί- εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὄντων. Τόδε γε μὴν, ὡς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαιότατον a Ὁ, 61 A. 61 E: τὸν ἀγαπητότατον εἶναι ,λέγειν, ὡς πᾶν τὸ γιγνῶσκον αὐτὸ βίον. 64 C: Τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονέναι προσ- θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται βονλόμενον ἑλεῖν φιλὴ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν. 67 A. καὶ περὶ αὑτὸ κτήσασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ‘‘Omnibus nature humans desi- οὐδὲν “Φροντίζει πλὴν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων deriis prorsus satisfacere” (S ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς. δὰ Philéb. p. 18 D-E,
ὁ. Ἐπ ἱκανὸς καὶ τέλεος καὶ πᾶσι = Plat. Philéb. p. 12 D-E. ᾿
CuHaP. XXXII. I8 IT PLEASURE OR WISDOM ? 337
others good. What common property in all of them, is it, that you signify by the name good? As different pleasures are unlike to each other, so also different cognitions (or modes of intelli- gence) are unlike to each other; though all of them agree in being cognitions. To this Protarchus accedes..—We must enter upon our enquiry'after The Good with this mutual concession : That Pleasure, which you affirm to be The Good—and Intelli- gence, which I declare to be so—is at once both Unum, and Multa et Diversa.?
In determining between the two competing doctrines—plea- sure on one side and intelligence on the other—So- Whether krates makes appeal to individual choice. “Would pleasure, you be satisfied (he asks Protarchus) to live your life or Wisdom,
corresponds
through in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures ? to this a Would any one of us be satisfied to live, possessing descri to. the fullest measure and variety of intelligence, reason, individual knowledge, and memory—but having no sense, great
or small, either of pleasure or pain?” And Protarchus replies, in reference to the joint life of intelligence and pleasure com- bined, “ Every man will choose this joint life in preference to either of them separately. It is not one man who will choose it, and another who will reject it: but every man will choose it alike.” §
1 Plat. Philéb. pp. 18 D-E, 14 A. tarchus believes him to be guch, that
ve may amoun an au-
2 Plat. Philéb. p. 14 B. thority, a Protarchus to
8 Plato, Philébus, p. 21 A. δέξαι᾽ accept or reject various opinions pro-
ἂν ov, Πρώταρχε, ζὴν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα pounded by Sokrates: but the ulti-
ἡδόμενος ἡδονὰς τὰς μεγίστας; 21 D-E: mate verdict must emanate from the
εἴ res δέξαιτ᾽ ἂν ad ζὴν ἡμῶν, &c. 22A: bosom of the acceptor or rejector. I
Πᾶς δήπου τοῦτόν ye αἱρήσεται πρότερον have already observed elsewhere, that
ἣ ἐκείνων ὁποτερονοῦν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις 8, large part of the conversation which οὐχ ὁ μέν, ὁ δ᾽ ov. 60 D: εἴ τις ἄνεν the
ww
γούτων δέξαιτ᾽ ἄν, ἂς. mouth of Sokrates, is addressed to
Here again in appealing to the indi- individualities and specialties of the vidual choice and judgment, the Pla- other interlocutors: that this very tonic Sokrates indirectly recognises power of discriminating between one what, in the Thesxtétus and other mind and another, forms the great dialogues, we have seen him formally superiority of dialectic colloquy as rej g and endeavouring to confute compared with written treatise or ~the Protagorean canon or measure. rhetorical discourse—both of which Protarchus is the measure of truth or address the same terms to 8, multitude falsehood, of belief or disbelief, to of hearers or readers differing among Protarchus himself: every other man themselves, without possibility of sepa- is 80 to himself. Sokrates may be a rate adaptation to each. (See above, wiser man, in the estimation of the ch. 7” pp. 50-54, on the Phe»-
rus.
3—22
338 PHILEBUS. Cap. XXXIL
The point, which Sokrates submits to the individual judgment of Protarchus, is—“ Would you be satisfied to pass
tion sub. your life in the enjoyment of the most intense plea- mitted to ΔΛ sures, and would you desire nothing farther?” The piuttense reply is in the affirmative. “But recollect (adds So- withoutany krates) that you are to have nothing else. The ques- intelligence tion assumes that you are to be without thought, sooept it intelligence, reason, sight, and memory: you are
neither to have opinion of present enjoyment, nor remembrance of past, nor anticipation of future: you are to live the life of an oyster, with great present pleasure?” ‘The ques- tion being put with these additions, Protarchus alters his view, and replies in the negative : at the same time expressing his sur-
prise at the strangeness of the hypothesis.’ Sokrates now proceeds to ask Protarchus, whether he will
Second nestion— ether he
8, life of Intelligence
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 21.
Such an hypothesis does indeed depart 80 to from the conditions of human life, that it cannot be con- sidered as a fair test of any doctrine. A perpetuity of delicious sensations cannot be enjoyed, consistent with the conditions of animal organization. A man cannot realise to himself that which the hypothesis promises ; much less can he realise it without those accompaniments which it assumes him to renounce. The loss stands out far more palpably than the gain. Itis no refutation of the theory of Philébus; who, announcing pleasure as the Sum- mum Bonum, is entitled to call for pleasure in all its varieties, and for exemption from all pains. Sokrates himself had previously insisted on the great variety as well as on the great
imilarity of the modes of pleasure and pain. To each variety of pleasure there corresponds a desire: to each variety of pain, an aversion.
If the Summum Bonum is to fulfil the conditions postulated—that is, if it be such as to satisfy all human desires, it ought to comprise all these varieties of pleasure. ought, ¢g., to com- prise the pleasures of self-esteem, and
accept a life of full and all-comprehensive intelligence purely and simply, without any taste either of plea- sure or pain. To which Protarchus answers, that neither he nor any one else would accept such a life.?
conscious self-protecting power, afford- ing security for the future ; it ought to comprise exemption from the
of self-reproach, self-contempt, and conscious helplessness. These are among the greatest pleasures and pains of the mature man, though they are aggregates formed by association. Now the alternative tendered by So- krates neither includes these pleasures nor eliminates these pains. It in- cludes only the pleasures of sense ; and it is tendered to one who has rooted in his mind desires for other sures, and aversions for other . besides those of sense. It does not therefore come up to the require- ments fairly implied in the theory of Philébus,
2 Plato, Philébus, pp. 21-22.
It is to be remarked, however, that there was more than one Grecian phi- losopher who described the Summum Bonum as consisting in absence of pain (cAumia); even without the measure of intelligence which Sokrates here promises, and without any i- tive pleasure. These men would of course have accepted the second alter- native put by Sokrates, which Protar- chus here refuses. ey took their
plea-
CHar. XXXIL QUESTIONS ABOUT ONE AND MANY. .309
‘Both of them agree that the Summum Bonum ought purely with- . ‘ ‘ ar . out to be sought neither in pleasure singly, nor in intelli- pleasure or gence singly, but in both combined. Pein? an _ Sokrates then undertakes to show, that of these two elements, intelligence is the most efficacious and on bo the most contributory to the Summum Bonum—plea- {ie Good . gure the least so. But as 4 preparation for this en- must be a quiry, he adverts to that which has just been agreed Quid | But ‘between them respecting both Pleasure and Intelli- Sokrates gence—That each of them is Unum, and each of them to show, at the same time Multa et Diversa. Here (argues tclligence Sokrates) we find opened before us the embarrassing 1s more
question respecting the One and the Many. En- wihit quirers often ask—“ How can the One be Many? than Plea-
How can the Many be One? How can the same thing be both One and Many?” They find it diffi- abont Unum cult to understand how you, Protarchus, being One $f Mult person, are called by different names—tall, heavy, the One white, just, ὅσ, : or how you are affirmed to consist How can of many different parts and members. To this diffi- ‘2¢Many culty, however (says Sokrates), the reply is easy. The diffi- You, and other particular men, belong to the gene- greatest rated and the perishable. You partake of many Boonie” different Ideas or Essences, and your partaking of one how it is sd among them does not exclude you from partaking also among
of another distinct and even opposite. You partake species and of the Idea or Essence of Unity—also of Multitude—
of tallness, heaviness, whiteness, humanity, greatness, littleness, ἃς. You are both great and little, heavy and light, &. In regard to generated and perishable things, we may understand this. -But in regard to the ungenerated, imperishable, absolute
standard of comparison from the ac- which are to be assumed as peremptory tualities of human life around them, and unalterable? What circumstances
which exhibited and suffering are we at liberty to suppose to be sup- universal, frequent, and unavoidable. pressed, modified, or reversed? Ac- They conceived that if painlessness cording "ai these fundamental Power
be dis In laying down any theory about the ns Rasy τῷ ρος τς to the invest: tos was Summum SBonum, prelim c considered by the ancient philo- question ought always to Θ settled sophers.
hat are the conditions of human life
410 PHILEBUS. CuHap. XXXIL
Essences, the difficulty is more serious. The Self-existent or Universal Man, Bull, Animal—the Self-existent Beautiful, Good —in regard to these Unities or Monads there is room for great controversy. First, Do such unities or monads really and truly exist? Next, assuming that they do exist, how do they come into communion with generated and perishable particular, infinite in number? Is each of them dispersed and parcelled out among countless individuals? or is it found, whole and entire, in each individual, maintaining itself as one and the same, and yet being parted from itself? Is the Universal Man distri- buted among all individual men, or is he one and entire in each of them? How is the Universal Beautiful (The Self-Beautiful— Beauty) in all and each beautiful thing? How does this one monad, unchangeable and imperishable, become embodied in a multitude of transitory individuals, each successively generated and perishing? How does this One become Many, or how do these Many become One?!
These (says Sokrates) are the really grave difficulties Active dis- the identity of the One and the Many: difficulties
utes * upon which have occasioned numerous controversies, and tion atthe are likely to occasion many more, Youthful specu- time. lators, especially, are fond of trying their first efforts of dialectical ingenuity in arguing upon this paradox—How the One can be Many, and the Many One.?
It is a primeeval inspiration (he says) granted by the Gods to man along with the fire of Prometheus, and handed Natore— οι down to us as a tradition from that heroic race who of the were in nearer kindred with the Gods—That all th things said to exist are composed of Unity and Multi-
Finite wi the Infinite. . “ The One— tude, and include in them a natural coalescence «οὗ
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 15 B. t expect t that Plato having so em- 2 Plato, Philéb Pp. 15-16. pal cally and announced In the difficulties thus started own sense of » would by Sokrates, we reeive themto be the proceed to suggest some mode of -
forth in the dialogue called Parmenidés, the vay caplantt he ¢ does not even
where they are put into the mouth of mise an ; in the Ρ ὩΣ,
the philosopher so-called ; as objections he seems to oe aes bat all the
be removed by Sok utes explanation w he ae es ignores or
ore the c theory o jam over ining
ὃ Ideas, universal, eternal and us to proceed in is no such dihenne unchangeable, can be admitted. We exis
. Caar. XXXII. FINITE AND INFINITE. 341
Finiteness and Infinity... This is the fundamental The Finite order of Nature, which we must assume and proceed Infinite” upon in our investigations. We shall find every- ™®"/ where the Form of Unity conjoined with the Form of Infinity. But we must not be satisfied simply to find these two forms. We must look farther for those intermediate Forms which lie between the two. Having found the Form of One, we must next search for the Form of Two, Three, Four, or some definite number: and we must not permit ourselves to acquiesce in the Form of Infinite, until no farther definite number can be de- tected. In other words, we must not be satisfied with knowing only one comprehensive Genus, and individuals comprised un- der it. We must distribute the Genus into two, three, or more Species: and each of those Species again into two or more sub- Species, each characterised by some specific mark: until no more characteristic marks can be discovered upon which to found the establishment of a distinct species. When we reach this limit, and when we have determined the number of subordinate species which the case presents, nothing remains except the indefinite mass and variety of individuals? The whole scheme will thus comprise—The One, the Summum Genus, or Highest Form: The Many, a definite number of Species or sub-Species or sub- ordinate Forms: The Infinite, a countless heap of Individuals. The mistake commonly made (continues Sokrates) by clever men of the present day, is, that they look for nothing yistar, beyond the One and the Infinite Many : one compre- commonly hensive class, and countless individuals included in P°fOnn° it. They take up carelessly any class which strikes for the One, them,? and are satisfied to have got an indefinite num- Infinite
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 16 C. ὡς ἐξ ἐστι μόνον ἴδῃ τις ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅποσα- τὴν ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλὼν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρον ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ λεγομένων εἶναι, τέρα δὲ δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν, πρὶν ἄν τις τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ξύμφντον ἐ ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδῃ τὸν μεταξὺ
3 Plato, Philabus, Ὅ. "16 Ὁ. δεῖν τοῦ ἀπείρον re καὶ τοῦ ἑνός" τότε ὃ οὖν ἡμᾶς, τούτων οὕτω διακεκο σ- Ἢ τὸ ὃν ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων eis τὸ μημένων, ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ ἄπειρον Hore τοῦς χαίρειν ἐᾷν παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένονς ζητεῖν" a Form of the εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν. ἐὰν οὖν tas Se ; again, p. 18 A,
αλάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πὼς ἀπείρον φύσιν. εἰσί, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ! ἥ τινα lato, Philébus, p. 17 A. οἱ δὲ ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ τὸ ἂν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἐν μέν, πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχρι περ ἂν τὸ κατ' ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, καὶ πολλὰ θᾶτ- ἀρχὰς ἕν μὴ ὅτι ἕν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά τον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος,
342 PHILEBUS. Cuap. XXXIL
Many, i ber of individuals under one name. But they never fortheinter- seek for intermediate sub-divisions between the twa, mediate 30 as to be able to discriminate one portion of the sions. class from other by some definite mark, and thus to constitute a sub-class. They do not feel the want of such inter- mediate sub-divisions, nor the necessity of distinguishing one portion of this immense group of individuals from another. Yet it is exactly upon these discriminating marks that the difference turns, between genuine dialectical argument and controversy without result.’
This general doctrine is illustrated by two particular casesa— Mlustration Speech and Music. The voice (or Vocal Utterance) fromSpeech is One—the voice is also Infinite: to know only thus ᾿ and Music. uch is to know very little. Even when you know, in addition to this, the general distinction of sounds into acute and grave, you are still far short of the knowledge of music. You must learn farthermore to distinguish all the intermediate gradations, and specific varieties of sound, into which the infinity of separate sounds admits of being distributed : what and how many these gradations are? what are the numerical ratiog upon which they depend—the rhythmical and harmonic systems ἢ When you have learnt to know the One Genus, the infinite diversity of individual sounds, and the number of subordinate specific varieties by which these two extremes are connected with each other—then you know the science of music. So too, in speech: when you can distinguish the infinite diversity of articulate utterance into vowels, semi-vowels, and consonants, each in definite number and with known properties—you are master of grammatical science. You must neither descend at once from the One to the Infinite Multitude, nor ascend at once from the Infinite Multitude to the One: you must pass through the intermediate stages of subordinate Forms, in determinate number. All three together make up scientific knowledge. You cannot know one portion separately, without knowing the re-
μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἂν ἄπειρα εὐθύς, passage certainly seems clearer with- τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐ , ἄς. them. 8 baum conjectures that the words 1 Plato, Philébus, p. 17 A. ols δια- καὶ πολλὰ after τύχωσι ought not to κεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ the text. He proposes to ex- τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλύή- punge them. The meaning of the λονς τοὺς λόγους.
Cuap. XXXIL EXPLANATION INSUFFICIENT. 343
mainder : all of them being connected into one by the common bond of the highest Genus.!
Such is the explanation which Plato gives as to the identity of One and Many. Considered as a reply to his Plato's ex-
own previous doubts and difficulties, it is altogether planation insufficient. It leaves all those doubts unsolved. touch the
The first point of enquiry which he had started, was, Whether any Universal or Generic Monads really had recognised existed: the second point was, assuming that they as existing. did exist, how each of them, being essentially eternal and un- changeable, could so multiply itself or divide itself as to be at the same time in an infinite variety of particulars. Both points are left untouched by the explanation. No proof is furnished that Universal Monads exist—still less that they multiply or divide their one and unchangeable essence among infinite particulars— least of all is it shown, how such multiplication or division can take place, consistently with the fundamental and ‘eternal same- ness of the Universal Monad. The explanation assumes these difficulties to be eliminated, but does not suggest the means of eliminating them. The Philébus, like the Parmenidés, recog- nises the difficulties as existing, but leaves them unsolved, though the dogmas to which they attach are the cardinal and peculiar tenets of Platonic speculation. Plato shows that he is aware of the embarrassments: yet he is content to theorize as if they did not exist. In a remarkable passage of this very dialogue, he intimates pretty clearly that he considered the difficulty of these questions to be insuperable, and never likely to be set at rest. This identification of the One with the Many, in verbal propo- sitions (he says) has begun with the beginning of dialectic debate, and will continue to the end of it, as a stimulating puzzle which especially captivates the imagination of youth.®
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 18 C-D. καθο-
τῶν λεγομένων ἀεὶ καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν.
ρῶν, δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ᾽ ἂν éy αὐτὸ
" αὑτὸ ἄνεν πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦ-
τον τὸν δεσμὸν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς ὄντα
ἕνα κ wéyra ταῦτα ἕν πως ποιοῦντα,
μίαν ἐπ' αὑτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχ! ν sto Phtlaba προσειπών. ' Plato biébus, p. 15 B-C.
3 Plato, Phil€bus, p. 15 D. φαμέν
πον ταὐτὸν ἕν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ λόγων γιγ-
νόμενα περιτρέχειν πάντῃ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσηταί ποτε οὔτε ἤρξατο νῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν ν αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖ The sequel (too long to transcribe) of this (οὐ μα "4 forth the man- ner in which is ap t paradox worked upon the imagination of youth- ful students) is very interesting to and shows (in my opinion) that Stall-
344 PHILEBUS. Cuar Xxx
But though the difficulties started by Plato remain unex- Its never- Pilained, still his manner of stating them is in iteelf in- valuable and instructive. It proclaims—1. The regard ©: hecessity of a systematic classification, or subordinate το ecale of species and sub-species, between the highest and classi- Genus and the group of individuals beneath 4. fication. That each of these subordinate grades in the scale must be founded upon some characteristic mark. 3 That the number of sub-divisions is definite and assignable, there being a limit beyond which it cannot be carried. 4 That full knowledge is not attainable until we know all three—The highest Genus— The intermediate species and sub-species; both what they are, how many there are, and how each is characterised—The infinite group of individuals. These three elements must all be known in conjunction: we are not to pass either from the first to the third, or from the third to the first, except through the second. The general necessity of systematic classification—of generalisa- tion and specification, or subordination of species and fee time sub-species, as a condition of knowing any extensive thoughthad group of individuals—requires no advocate at the stowedupon present day. But it was otherwise in the time of tionasa Plato. There existed then no body of knowledge, logical distributed and classified, to which he could appeal as oe an example. The illustrations to which he himself refers here, of language and music as systematic arrangements of vocal sounds, were both of them the product of empirical analogy and unconscious growth, involving little of predetermined prin- ciple or theory. All the classification then employed was merely that which is included in the structure of language: in the framing of general names, each designating a multitude of indi- viduals. All that men knew of classification was, that which is involved in calling many individuals by the same common name. This is the defect pointed out by Plato, when he remarks that
᾿ tation of it πῃ his note planation without full certainty or pnt the” ght one. Plato is here confidence: see p. 16 B. And when talking (in my judgment) about the we turn to pp. 18-19, we shall see that puzzle and ox itself: Stallbaum he forgets the original difficulty which represents Plato as about his had been pro (compare p. 15 B), pretended solution of it, which has not introducing ct place of it anothe
ded to. to dis difficulty, as if that had “ tos on at alt give his own ex- been Qn contemplation.
CuHaP. XXXII. CLASSIFICATION. 345
the clever men of his time took no heed except of the One and the Infinite (Genus and Individuals): neglecting all the inter- mediate distinctions. Upon the knowledge of these media (he says) rests the difference between true dialectic debate, and mere polemic. That is—when you have only an infinite multitude of . individuals, called by the same generic name, it is not even certain that they have a single property in common : and even if they have, it is not safe to reason from one to another as to. the possession of any other property beyond the one generic property—so that the debate ends in mere perplexity. All pleasures agree in being pleasures (Sokrates had before observed to Protarchus), and all cognitions agree in being cognitions. But you cannot from hence infer that there is any other property belonging in common to all.? That is a point which you cannot determine without farther observation of individuals, and dis- crimination of the great multitude into appropriate subdivisions. You will thus bring the whole under that triple point of view which Plato requires :—the highest Genus,—the definite number of species and sub-species,—the undefined number of individuals.
Here we have set before us one important branch of logical method—the necessity of classification, not simply cygssigca. arising as an incidental and unconscious effect of the tion—un. transitive employment of a common name, but under- and con. taken consciously and intentionally as a deliberate "οἴου". process, and framed upon principles predetermined as essential to the accomplishment of a scientific end. This was a conception new in the Sokratic age. Plato seized upon it with ardour. He has not only emphatically insisted upon it in the Philébus and elsewhere, but he has also given (in the Sophistés and Politikus) elaborate examples of systematic logical subdivision applied to given subjects.
We may here remark that Plato’s views as to the necessity of systematic classification, or of connecting the Sum- Plato's doc- mum Genus with individuals by intermediate stages ‘ine about of gradually decreasing generality—are not necessarily tion is not
1 Plato, Philébus, p.17 A. οἱ δὲ νῦν διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ὃν μέν, ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς Has ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς τύχωσι, καὶ πολλὰ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.
ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἄπειρα 4 3 θ ΄ς, τὰ δὲ μέσα αὑτοὺς ἐκφεύγει, οἷς Plato, Phil6bus, pp. 18 Β, 14 A.
846 PHILEBUS. CuaPr XXXIL
necewsarily connected with his peculiar theory of Ideas as Self- with his, eXistent objects, eternal and unchangeable. The two Theory of are indeed blended together in his own mind and
language : but the one is quite separable from the other ; and his remarks on classification are more perspicuous without his theory of Ideas than with it. Classification does not depend upon his hypothesis—That Ideas are not simply Concepts of the Reason, but absolute existences apart from the Reason (Entia Rationis apart from the Ratio)\—and that these Ideas correspond to the words Unum, Multa definité, Multa inde- finité, which are put together to compose the totality of what we seo and feel in the Kosmos.
Applying this general doctrine (about the necessity of esta- blishing subordinate classes as intermediate between the Geuus and Individuals) to the particular subject debated between So- krates and Protarchus—the next step in the procedure would naturally be, to distinguish the subordinate classes comprised first under the Genus Pleasure—next, under the Genus Intelli- gence (or Cognition). And so indeed the dialogue seems to promise! in tolerably explicit terms.
But such promise is not realised. The dialogue takes a diffe-
uadmplo Tent turn, and recurs to the general distinction already Cistributlon brought to view between the Finient (Determinans) ences. 1. and the Infinite (Indeterminatum). We have it laid nite. ἃ Tho own that all existences in the universe are divided Finiont. 8. into four Genera: 1. The Infinite or Indeterminate. tho two 2. The Finient or the Determinans, 3. The product foriner, ,. of these two, mixed or compounded together Deter- ing Cause minatum. 4. The Cause or Agency whereby they become mixed together.—Of these four, the first isa Genus, or is both One and Many, having numerous varieties, all ayrecing in the possession of a perpetual More and Less (without any limit or positive quantity): that which is perpetually in- creasing or diminishing, more or less hot, cold, moist, great, &c., than any given positive standard. The second, or the Deter- minans, is also a Genus, or One and Many: including equal, double, triple, and all fixed ratios.? ;
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 19 B, p. 20 A. ἃ Plato, Philébus, pp. 24-25.
Cuap. XXXII.. DISTRIBUTION OF EXISTENCES. 347
The third Genus is laid down by Plato as generated by a mixture or combination of these two first—the Infinite and the Determinans. The varieties of this third or compound Genus comprise all that is good and desirable in nature—health, strength, beauty, virtue, fine weather, good temperature: all agreeing, each in its respective sphere, in presenting a right measure or proportion as opposed to excess or deficiency.
Fourthly, Plato assumes a distinct element of causal agency which operates such mixture of the Determinans with the Infi- nite, or banishment and supersession of the latter by the former.
We now approach the application of these generalities to the question in hand—the comparative estimate of plea- sure and intelligence in reference to Good. It has and Pain been granted that neither of them separately is suf- the first of ficient, and that both must be combined to compose these four the result Good : but the question remains, which of ition or the two elements is the most important in the com- belongs to pound? To which of the four above-mentioned [89 fourth. Genera (says Sokrates) does Pleasure belong? It belongs to the Infinite or Indeterminate : so also does Pain. To which of the four does Intelligence or Cognition belong? It belongs to the fourth, or to the nature of Cause, the productive agency whereby definite combinations are brought about.?
Hence we see (Sokrates argues) that pleasure is a less important element than Intelligence, in the compound called Good. For pleasure belongs to the Infinite: but pain [nr thgcom-
belongs to the Infinite also: the Infinite therefore, essential ‘ being common to both, cannot be the circumstance of Intel- which imparts to pleasures their affinity with Good ; Ugeree κα. they must derive that affinity from some one of the sure, In- other elements.* It is Intelligence which imparts to is the more pleasures their affinity with. Good : for Intelligence OfProtwe belongs to the more efficacious Genus called Cause. consti In the combination of Intelligence with Pleasure, indispensable to constitute Good, Intelligence is the primary
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 26 A-B. obscure and difficalt to follow, Stall’ : um in his note even intima
? Plato, Philébus, pp. 27-28, p. 81 Α. pisto uses the word ἄπειρον in ἃ, sense
3 Plato, Phil€bus, BR 27-28. different from that in which he had
The argument of to is here very used it before: which I think doubtful.
348 PHILEBOUS.
CHap. XXXIL
element, Pleasure only the secondary element. Intelligence or Reason is the ruling cause which pervades and directs both the smaller body called Man, and the greater body called the Kosmos. The body of man consists of a combination of the four elements, Earth, Water, Air, and Fire : deriving its supply of all these elements from the vast stock of them which constitutes the Koamos. So too the mind of man, with its limited reason and intelligence, is derived from the vast stock of mind, reason, and intelligence, diffused throughout the Kosmos, and governing its yreat elemental body. The Kosmos is animated and intelligent, having body and mind like man, but in far higher measure and perfection. It is from this source alone that man can derive his supply of mind and intelligence.?
Sokrates thus arrives at the conclusion, that in the combination
Intelligence constituting Good, Reason or Intelligence is the regu- lating en lating principle: and that Pleasure is the Infinite or ciple= blea- Indeterminate which requires regulation from with- Indetermi- out, having no fixed measure or regulating power in Ine to bs” itself? He now proceeds to investigate pleasure and
intelligence as phenomena : to enquire in what each
of them resides, and through what affection they are generated.? We cannot investigate pleasure (Sokrates continues) apart from
pain : both must be studied together. Both pleasure
ρας and pain reside in the third out of the four above- miatned tor mentioned Genera : 4 that is, in the compound Genus other— formed out of that union (of the Infinite with the fem ine” Determinans or Finient) which includes all animated disturbance bodies, Health and Harmony reside in these ani- damental mated bodies: and pleasure as well as pain proceed pe avatone from modifications of such fundamental harmony. 7 pleesure ~=When the fundamental harmony is disturbed or dis- rom the ΗΝ ;
restoration solved, pain is the consequence : when the disturb-
ance is rectified and the harmony restored, pleasure
1 Plato, Philébus p. Ὁ Ως Ὁ Αἱ νχὴν φησο-
Τὸ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν σῶμα οὐ
μεν ἔχειν; .« . - Πόθεν λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ
τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψνχον ὃν ἐτύγ-
χανε, ταὐτά γε ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντη
καλλίονα; 2 Plato, Philébus, p. 81 A. .
3 Plato, Philébus, p. 81 B. δεῖ δὴ τὸ
μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τέ ἐστιν ἑκάτερον αὑτοῖν καὶ διὰ τί πάθος γίγνεσθον, ὁπόταν yly- νησθον, ἰδεῖν ἡμᾶς.
4 Plato, Philébus, p. 8 Ο. ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένει ἅμα φαίνεσθον λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονὴ γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν... κοινὸν τοίνυν ὑπακούωμεν ὃ δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τρίτον ἐλέγομεν. Com-
949
CHAP. XXXII. PLEASURE AND PAIN.
ensues.‘ Thus hunger, thirst, extreme heat and cold, are painful, because they break up the fundamental harmony of animal nature: while eating, drinking, cooling under extreme heat, or warming under extreme cold, are pleasurable, because they re- store the disturbed harmony.
This is the primary conception, or original class, of pleasures and pains, embracing body and mind in one and the pare same fact. Pleasure cannot be had without antece- dent pain : it is in fact a mere reaction against pain, or a restoration from pain.
But there is another class of pleasures, secondary and deriva- tive from these, and belonging to the mind alone without the body. The expectation of future plea- sures is itself pleasurable,? the expectation of future pains is itself painful. In this secondary class we find pleasure without pain, and pain without plea- sure: 80 that we shall be better able to study pleasure by itself, and to decide whether the whole class, in all its varieties, be good, welcome and desirable,—or whether pleasure and pain be not, like heat and cold, desirable or undesirable according to circumstances—4.e. not good in their own nature, but sometimes good and sometimes not.*
In the definition above given of the conditions of pleasure, as a re-action from antecedent pain, it is implied that if
ἜΝ
Derivative
there be no pain, there can be no pleasure: and that te ligenco a state of life is therefore conceivable which shall be ont hdinied without both—without pain and without pleasure. without
The man who embraces wisdom may prefer this third ronceivable. mode of life. It would be the most divine and the Seale it at most akin to the nature of the Gods, who cannot be any’ rateitis
supposed without indecency to feel either joy or sorrow.‘ At any rate, if not the best life of all, it will be the second-best.
pare Ὁ. 82 A-B: τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρον καὶ τὸς κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονὸς
Plato had before said that ἡδονὴ belonged to the Infinite (compare p. 41 Ὁ), or to the first of the four above- mentioned genera, not to the third. 1 Plato, Phil&bus, p. 31 Ὁ. 2 Plato, Phil€bus, p. 82 C.
ἡδονῆς
καὶ λύπης ἕτερον εἶδος, τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος αὑτῆς τῆς ψνχῆς διὰ προσδοκίας γιγνόμενον. 3 Plato, Phil&bus, p. 82 Ὁ. , 4 Plato, Philébus, p. 33 Β. Οὐκοῦν
εἰκός ye οὔτε χαίρειν θεοὺς οὔτε τὸ ἐνα»- ΄ La ° μ - τίον; Idvv μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰκός - ἄσχημον - 2 - a 4 id γοῦν αὑτῶν ἑκάτερον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν.
350 PHILEBUB. Cuar. XXXIL
Those pleasures, which reside in the mind alone without the Desire be- Ody, arise through memory and by means of reminis- longs tothe cence. When the body receives a shock which does mind. Ps πος go through to the mind, we call the fact insensi- bility. In sensation, the body and mind are both
me- affected :! such sensation ie treasured up in the recon memory, and the mental part of it is recalled (with- previously out the bodily part) by reminiscence* Memory and The mind reminiscence are the foundations of desire or appetite. and body = When the body suffers the pain of hunger or thirst, opposed. No the mind recollects previous moments of satisfaction, pleasure and desires a repetition of that satisfaction by means of food or drink. Here the body and the mind are
not moved in the same way, but in two opposite ways: the desire belongs to the mind alone, and is turned towards something directly opposed to the affection of the body. That which the body feels is emptiness : that which the mind feels is desire of replenishment, or of the condition opposed to emptiness. But it is only after experience of replenishment that the mind will feel such desire. On the first occasion of emptiness, it will not desire replenishment, because it will have nothing, neither sen- sation nor memory, through which to touch replenishment : it can only do so after replenishment has been previously enjoyed, and through the memory. Desire therefore is a state of the mind apart from the body, resting upon memory.? Here then the man is in a double state: the pain of emptiness, which affects the mind through the body, and the memory of past replenish- ment, or expectation of future replenishment, which resides in the mind. Such expectation, if certain and immediate, will be a state of pleasure: if doubtful and distant, it will be a state of pain. The state of emptiness and consequent appetite must be, at the very best, a state of mixed pain and pleasure : and it may
1 Plato, Philébus, pp. 33 E—34 A. 3 Plato, Phil6bus, p. 35 © THY ψυχὴν ἀναισθησίαν ἑπονό ov . . . τὸ δὲ ἐν dpa τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεσθαι Acumen, ἑνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ τῇ μνήμῃ δῆλον ὅτι" τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἔτ᾽ ἄλλῳ
ἰγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην ἐφάψαιτο;
I: αὖ τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἴσθησιν D. ἐπάγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ em-
οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπον φθέγγοι᾽ ἄν. ϑυβούμενα Ἧ μοβείβας μνήμην, é λόγος 2 Plato , Philébus, Ῥ. 84 Α-Β. σωτη- ψνχῆς ξύμπασαν τήν τε ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐπι-
ρίαν αἰσθήσεως ; τὴν μνήμην. θυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζῶον παντὸς
οὐ Μνήμη and ἁ ἀνάμνησις are pronounced ἀπέφῃνεν.
.:}
Cuap. XXXII. DESIRE—FALSE PLEASURES. 351 perhaps be a state of pain only, under two distinct forms.! Life composed of a succession of these states can afford no true or pure pleasure.
What do you mean (asks Protarchus) by true pleasures or pains? How can pleasures or pains be either true or false? Opinions and expectations may be true or false ; but not pleasures, nor pains.
That is an important question (replies Sokrates), which we must carefully examine. If opinions may be false or true, surely pleasures may be so likewise. When a man holds an opinion, there is always some Object of his opinion, whether he thinks truly or falsely : so also when a man takes delight, there must always be some Object in which he takes de- light, truly or falsely. Pleasure and pain, as well as opinion, are susceptible of various attributes ; vehement or moderate, right or wrong, bad or good. Delight sometimes comes to us along with a false opinion, sometimes along with a true one.
Yes (replies Protarchus), but we then call the opinion true or
false—not the pleasure.?
‘You will not deny (says Sokrates) that there is a difference between the pleasure accompanying a true opinion,
and that which accompanies a false opinion. Where- gen by in does the difference consist? Our opinions, and $okrates. our comparisons of opinion, arise from sensation and attached to memory :* which write words and impress images nions, are upon our mind (as upon a book or canvas), some- ‘ve ples. times truly, sometimes falsely,‘ not only respecting just man is
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 86 A-B. pleasure
easure, as Plato pointed out in the This analysis of Niesire is in the
main just: antecedent to all gratifi- cation, it is simple uneasiness: gra- tification havi ΒΟΟΣ supplied, the memory thereof remains, and goes along with the uneasiness to form the complex mental state called desire.
But there is another case of desire. While tasting a pleasure, we desire the continuance of it: and if the ex-
tation of its continuance be assured, his is an additional pleasure : two sources of pleasure instead of one. In this last case, there is no such con- junction of opposite states, pain and
2 Plato, to, Philébus, p. 87. : 2 Plato, Philébus, Ὁ. 88 ai κ μνήμης τε καὶ ai ἦσεως α ἡμῖν καὶ Τὸ ᾿διαδοξάξειν ὁ ἐγχειρεῖν γίγνεθ᾽ Ved.
" Piato, Philébus, pp. 38 ΒΕ, 39. δοκεῖ μοι τότε ἡμῶν ἡ Ψυχὴ βιβλίῳ τινὶ προ- σεοικέναι . .. ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ξυμπίπτονσα εἰς ταὐτόν, κἀκεῖνα ἃ περὶ ταῦτά tore τὰ παθήμα a, φαίνονταί μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε λόγονς. ..
‘Aro éxov δὴ καὶ ἕτερον δημίου ὃν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψνχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνω
352 PHILEBUS. Cuap. XXXII
favoured by the past and present, but also respecting the future. and will To these opinions respecting the future are attached have true . the pleasures and pains of expectation, which we have to him. already recognised as belonging to the mind alone,— anticipations of bodily pleasures or pains to come—hopes and fears. As our opinions respecting the future are sometimes true, sometimes false, so also are our hopes and fears : but throughout our lives we are always full of hopes and fears... Now the just and good man, being a favourite of the Gods, will have these visions or anticipations of the future presented to him truly and accurately : the bad man on the contrary will have them pre- sented to him falsely. The pleasures of anticipation will be true to the former, and false to the latter :* his false pleasures will be a ludicrous parody on the true ones. Good or bad opinions are identical with true or false opinions: so also are good or bad pleasures, identical with true or false pleasures: there is no other ground for their being good or bad.
I admit this identity (remarks Protarchus) in regard to
Protarchus opinions, but not in regard to pleasures. I think disputes there are other grounds, and stronger grounds, for thinks that pronouncing pleasures to be bad—independently of some plea- their being false. We will reserve that question burnome’ (says Sokrates) for the present—whether there are f S or are not pleasures bad on other grounds.* I am krates does .
notadmit ΠΟΥ͂ endeavouring to show that there are some plea- this, but ¢ sures which are false: and I proceed to another way question. οὗ viewing the subject.
We agreed before that the state, called Appetite or Desire,
γιγνόμενον . . . Ζωγράφον, ὃς μετὰ τὸν
ἂν εἴη περὶ φόβην τε καὶ θυμῶν͵, &c. γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγυμένων εἰκόνας ev Also 40 Ὦ. ,
UX] τούτων γράφει. ἐμ seems odd that Plato here puts the painter after the scribe, and not ore him. The images or phantasms of sense must be painted on the mind before any words are written upon it (if we are to adopt both these metaphors). The comparison of the mind to a sheet of paper or a book begins with the poets (Aschyl. Prometh. 790), and into philosophy with Plato. 1 Plato, Philébus, ἡ. 39 E. ἡμεῖς δ᾽ αὖὗ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίον ἀεὶ γέμομεν ἐλπίδων. 40 E. οὐκοῦν ὁ αὑτὸς λόγος
pe lato, Philébus, . 40 A-B. phets and prophecies, inspired the Gods, were Thenomens received oy frequently in the Plato.
8 Plato, Philébus, 5 μεμι- μημέναι μέντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιό- τερα.
‘Plato, Philébus, pp. 40 E—41 A. Sokr. Οὐδ᾽ ἡδονάς γ᾽, οἶμαι, κατανοοῦμεν ὡς ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον εἰσὶ πονηραὶ w.
ῥ ψευδεῖς εἶναι. Protarch. Πάνν δὴν
ν τοὐναντίον εἴρηκας, EC.
Cuap. XXXIL FALSE PLEASURES. 353
was a mixed state comprehending body and mind: wo means the state of body affecting the mind with a pain of of trul emptiness,—the state of mind apart from body being pleasures either a pleasure of expected replenishment, or ἃ pain jraise osti- arising from our regarding replenishment as distant mate habi- | or unattainable. Appetite or Desire, therefore, is are the false sometimes mixed pleasure and pain; both, of the genus Infinite, Indeterminate. We desire to compare these pleasures and pains, and to value their magnitude in relation to each other, but we have no means of performing the process. We not only cannot perform it well, but we are sure to perform it wrongly. For future pleasure or pain counts for more or less in our comparison, according to its proximity or distance. Here then is a constant source of false computation : pleasures and pains counted as greater or less than they really are: in other ‘words, false pleasures and pains. We thus see that pleasures may be true or false, no less than opinions.’
We have also other ways of proving the point that much of what is called pleasure is false and unreal?—either yoch of no pleasure at all, or pleasure mingled and alloyed what is ; with pain and relief from pain. According to our gure is false. previous definition of pain and pleasure—that pain arises from derangement of the harmony of our changes do nature, and pleasure from the correction of such themselves derangement, or from the re-establishment of har- Pie our mony—there may be and are states which are neither either as painful nor pleasurable. Doubtless the body never remains the same: it is always undergoing change: sence of but the gentle and gradual changes (such as growth, same as &c.) escape our consciousness, producing neither pain nor pleasure : none but the marked, sudden changes force them- selves upon our consciousness, thus producing pain and pleasure.’ A life of gentle changes would be a life without pain as well as
1 Plato, Philébus, pp. 41-42. follow, down to p. 51 A: πρὸς τὸ τινὰς 3 Plato, Philébus, p. 42 C. Τούτων ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὖσας δ᾽ οὐδαμῶς" τοίνυν ἑξῆς ὀψόμεθα, ἐὰν τῇδε ἀπαντῶμεν καὶ μεγάλας ἑτέρας τινὰς ἅμα καὶ πολλὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ψευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον ἣ φαντασθείσας, εἶναι δ᾽ αὑτὰς συμπεφυρ- ταύτας φαινομένας τε καὶ οὔσας ὃν τοῖς μένας ὁμοῦ λύπαις τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεσιν ζώοις. ὀδυνῶν τῶν μεγίστων περί τε σώματος καὶ This argument is continued, thou wx nS ἀπορίας. in a manner desultory and difficult Plato, Philébus, pp. 42-43.
3—23
354 PHILEBUS. Cmar. XXXII
without pleasure. There are thus three states of life \—painfal —pleasurable—neither painful nor pleasurable. But xo pain (absence of pain) is not identical with pleasure : it is a third and distinct state.*
Now there are some philosophers who confound this distinc- Opinion of tion:* Philosophers respectable, but stern, who hate sure hating the very name of pleasure, deny its existence as a philowo- separate state per se, and maintain it to be nothing Tat plea- more than relief from pain: implying therefore, per- sureisno § netually and inevitably, the conjunction or ante- 5. mere cedence of pain. They consider the seduction of nef ca. pleasure in prospect to be a mere juggle—a promise never realised. Often the expected moment brings relief from no pleasure at all: and even when it does, there are pain. constant accompaniments of pain, which always greatly impair, often countervail, sometimes far more than countervail, its effect. Pain is regarded by them as the evil— removal or mitigation of pain as the good—of human life.
These philosophers (continues Sokrates) are like prophets Sokrates Who speak truth from the stimulus of internal tem- agrees with perament, without any rational comprehension of it. part, but | Their theory is partially true, but not universally.‘ not wholly. It is true of a large portion of what are called plea- sures, but it is not true of all pleasures. Most pleasures (indeed all the more vehement and coveted pleasures), correspond to the description given in the theory. The moment when the supposed intense pleasure arrives, is a disappointment of the antecedent hopes, either by not bringing the pleasure promised, or by bringing it along with a preponderant dose of pain. But there are some pleasures of which this cannot be said—which are really true. and unmixed with pain. Which these are (continues Sokrates), I will presently explain: but I shall first state the case of the pleasure-hating philosophers, so far as I go along with it.
1 . s went a τοὺς βίους, ἔρμα μάν Pie ne ὃ "κα “ δεινοὺς Meelis oe φασιν e enti λντηρόν, τὸν δ᾽ ἕνα μηδέτε λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγάς,
. 2 Plato, Philébus, p. 48 Ὁ. οὐκ ἄν ἃς νῦν οἱ περὶ Φίληβον ἡδονὰς ἐπονομά. εἴη τὸ μὴ λνπεῖσθαί ποτε ταὐτὸν τῷ Cover
χαίρειν. . 4 Plato, Philébus, p. 44 C. ὦ ‘Pp lato, Philébus, p. 44 B-C. καὶ μάντεσι προσχρῆσθαί τίσι, μαντενομένοις
Caap. XXXII. PLEASURE-HATERS. 355
When we are studying any property (they say), we ought to examine especially those cases in which it appears most fully and prominently developed : thus, if we the plea- are enquiring into hardness, we must take for our — we must first objects of investigation the hardest things, in learn what preference to those which are less hard or scarcely by looking hard at all! So in enquiring into pleasure generally, intense we must investigate first the pleasures of extreme pleasures— intensity and vehemence. Now the most intense connected pleasures are enjoyed not ina healthy state of body, epered but on the contrary under circumstances of dis- body and temper and disorder: because they are then preceded by the most violent wants and desires. The- sick man under fever suffers greater thirst and cold than when he is in health, but in the satisfaction of those wants, his pleasure is propor- tionally more intense. Again when he suffers from the itch or an inflamed state of body, the pleasure of rubbing or scratching is more intense than if he had no such disorder? The most vehement bodily pleasures can only be enjoyed under condition of being preceded or attended by pains greater or less as the case may be. The condition is not one of pure pleasure, but mixed between pain and pleasure. Sometimes the pain preponderates, sometimes the pleasure: if the latter, then most men, forgetting the accompanying pain, look upon these transient moments as the summit of happiness? In like manner the violent and insane man, under the stimulus of furious passions and desires, experiences more intense gratifications than persons of sober disposition : his condition is a mixed one, of great pains and great pleasures. The like is true of all the vehement passions—love, hatred, revenge, anger, jealousy, envy, fear, sorrow, &c.: all of them embody pleasures mixed with pain, and the magnitude of the pleasure is proportioned to that of the accompanying pain.‘
ov τέχνῃ, ἀλλά τινι δυσχερείᾳ, φύσεως 3 Plato, Philébus, p. 47 A. οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς, &c. Also p. δ] , * Plato, Philébus, pp. 49-50 Ὁ. Plato 1 » Philébus, p. 44 E. ὡς εἰ here introduces, at some length, an βονλήθειμεν ὁτονοῦν εἰδους τὴν φύσιν anulysis of the mixed sentiment of ἰδεῖν, οἷον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον pleasure and pain with which we re- εἰς τὰ σκληρότατα ἀποβλέποντες οὕτως gard scenic representations, tragedy ἂν μᾶλλον συννοήσαιμεν ἣ πρὸς τὰ πολ- and comedy—especially the latter. λοστὰ σκληρότητι; Answer: πρὸς τὰ The explanation which he gives of the πρῶτα μεγέθει. sentiment of the ludicrous is curious, Plato, Philébus, pp. 45-46. and is intended to elucidate an obscure
356 PHILEBUS. Cuap. ΧΧΧΤΙ.
Recollect (observes Sokrates) that the veh om the here is not whether more pleasure is enjo on whole, in a pleasures state of health than in a state of sickness—by violent state of rather than by sober men. The question is, about sickness; |, the intense modes of pleasure. Respecting these, I more pleas have endeavoured to show that they belong to a whole,en- distempered, rather than to a healthy, state both of Joyed in a body and mind :—and that they cannot be enjoyed health. pure, without a countervailing or preponderant ac- companiment of pain." This is equally true, whether they be pleasures of body alone, of mind alone, or of body and mind together. They are false and delusive pleasures: in fact, they are pleasures only in seeming, but not in truth and reality. To-morrow I will give you fuller proofs on the subject.*
Thus far (continues Sokrates) I have set forth the case on Sokrat behalf of the pleasure-hatera Though 1 deny their acknow- [Ὁ]] doctrine,—that there is no pleasure except ces- ledges some sation from pain—I nevertheless agree with them wo be true. and cite them as witnesses on my behalf, to the beautiful § extent of affirming that a large proportion of our so- perp called pleasures, and those precisely the most intense smells, &c. are false and unreal: being poisoned and drenched Pleasures of . . . acquiring im accompaniments of pain.® But there are some knowledge. pleasures, true, genuine, and untainted. Such are those produced by beautiful colours and figures—by many
objects) Ww baum intellectual and moral infirmities of the definition of φθόνος were the same persons with whom he is in friendly in both. intercourse, when such persons are not 1 Plato, Philébus, p. 45 C-E. yas make their defects of displensure 7H, διανοούμενον éourgy σε, εἰ πλείω regnant with dangerous consequences. δναινόντων, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον péveOee me The laugher is amused with exagge- chat, ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ C608 pa wen rated self-estimation or foolish vanity τοῦ τοιοῦτον ποῦ ποτὲ yiywero, dak. displayed by friends, δοξοσοφία, 8ofo- Srore ὅδ, ΥῪ « καλία, ἂς. (9 E). But how the laugher 2 ᾿ , can be said to experience a mixture of Plato, Philébus, p. 50 Ε. τούτων and pleasure here, or how he can γὰρ ἁπάντων αὔριον ἐθελήσω σοι λόγον said to feel φθόνος, I do not clearly δοῦναι, cc. see. At least φθόνος is here used in 3 Plato, Philébus, p. S1 A
Cuap. XXXII. PLEASURES, INTENSE AND MODERATE. 357
odours—by various sounds: none of which are preceded by any painful want requiring to be satisfied. The sensation when it comes is therefore one of pure and unmixed pleasure. The figures here meant are the perfect triangle, cube, circle, ἄς. : the colours and sounds are such as are clear and simple. All these are beautiful and pleasurable absolutely and in themselves— not simply in relation to (or relatively to) some special antece- dent condition. Smells too, though less divine than the others, are in common with them unalloyed by accompanying pain. To these must be added the pleasure of acquiring knowledge, which supposes neither any painful want before it, nor any subsequent pain even if the knowledge acquired be lost. This too is one of the unmixed or pure pleasures; though it is not attainable by most men, but only by a select few.?
Having thus distinguished the pure and moderate class of pleasures, from the mixed and vehement—we may pureand remark that the former class admit of measure and moderate proportion, while the latter belong to the immea- admit of surable and the infinite. Moreover, look where we and prot will, we shall find truth on the side of the select, tom small, unmixed specimens—rather than among the large and mixed masses. A small patch of white colour, free from all trace of any other colour, is truer, purer, and more beautiful, than a large mass of clouded and troubled white. In like man- ner, gentle pleasure, free from all pain, is more pleasurable, truer, and more beautiful, than intense pleasure coupled with
ἢ 3
There are yet other arguments remaining (continues Sokrates) which show that pleasure cannot be the Summum Pileasvre is Bonum. If it be so, it must be an End, not a Means: Seneration, it must be something for the sake of which other stance or things exist or are done—not something which itself it cannot exists or is done for the sake of something else. But therefore be pleasure is not an End: it is essentially a means, as cause all we may infer from the reasonings of its own advocates. only 2
1 Plato, Philébus, p.51 E. τὸ δὲ περὶ τοίνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς τὰς ὀσμὰς ἧττον μὲν τούτων θεῖον γένος ἀμίκτους τε εἶναι λύπαις ῥητέον, καὶ ἡδονῶν " τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμεμίχθαι ἐν αὐταῖς οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαίους λύπας, ἄσ. 5 ὦ
τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων. 2 Plato, Philébus, p. 62 Β. ταύτας 3 Plato, Philébus, p. 58 ΒΟ.
458 PHILEBUS. Cuap. XXXIL means to. They themselves tell us that it is generation, not wtal ds sub- ‘substance :—essentially a process of transition or Plea change, never attaining essence or permanence.' cannot be But generation or transition is always for the sake of
the thing to be generated, or for Substance—not substance for the sake of generation: the transitory serves asa road to the permanent, not vice verad. Pleasure is thus a means, not an End. It cannot therefore partake of the essential nature and dignity of Good: it belongs to a subordinate and imperfect category.”
Indeed we cannot reasonably admit that there is no Good in bodies and in the universe generally, nor anywhere
Other rea-
sons why except in the mind :—nor that, within the mind, pleasure is . .
not the pleasure alone is good, while courage, temperance,
&c., are not good:—nor that a man is good only while he is enjoying pleasure, and bad while suffering pain, whatever may be his character and merits.®
Having thus (continues Sokrates) gone through the analysis of
pleasures, distinguishing such as are true and pure,
Distinction from such as are false and troubled—we must apply cationofthe the like distinctive analysis to the various modes of varieties of . . . ° ge
Knowledge knowledgeand intelligence. Which varieties of know- or aoe, some ledge, science, or art, are the purest from hetero- aremore © geneous elements, and bear most closely upon truth ? exactthan Some sciences and arts (we know) are intended for others, ac’ special professional practice: others are taught as theyadmit subjects for improving the intellect of youth. As more or less . . . . of measur- Specimens of the former variety, we may notice music, ing andcom- medicine, husbandry, navigation, generalship, joinery,
ship-building, &c. Now in all these, the guiding and directing elements are computation, mensuration, and statice— the sciences or arts of computing, measuring, weighing. Take away these three—and little would be left worth having, in any
1Plato, Philébus, p. 53 Ὁ. dpa τὸ μὲν σεμνότατον ἀεὶ πεφυκός, τὸ δὲ
περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὡς αεὶ γένεσίς ἔστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς" κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες 2 - a“ ΄ αὖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μηνύειν ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν. . . . , 68 D: ἐστὸν δή τινε δύο, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, τὸ δὲ ἀει ἐφιέμενον ἄλλον . ..
ἑλλιπὲς ἐκείνον.
2 Plato, Philébus, p. 64 D. ἡδονὴ εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, εἰς ἄλλην ἣ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὑτὴν ἔντες ὕρϑως θήσομεν.
3 Plato, Philébus, p. 55 B.
CuaP. XXXIL VARIETIES OF COGNITION. 359
of the sciences or arts before named. There would be no exact assignable rules, no definite proportions: everything would be left to vague conjecture, depending upon each artisan’s knack and practice which some erroneously call Art. In proportion as each of these professional occupations has in it more or less of computation and mensuration, in the same proportion is it exact 'and true. There is little of computation or mensuration in music, medicine, husbandry, &c.: there is more of them in joinery and ship-building, which employ the line, plummet, and other instruments: accordingly these latter are more true and exact, less dependent upon knack and conjecture, than the three former.' They approach nearer to the purity of science, and include less of the non-scientific, variable, conjectural, ele- ments. |
But a farther distinction must here be taken (Sokrates goes on). Even in such practical arts as ship-building, . which include most of computation and mensuration and | Geome- —these two latter do not appear pure, but diversified fold: As and embodied in a multitude of variable particulars. *tudied by Arithmetic and geometry, as applied by the ship- herand builder and other practical men, are very different applied by from arithmetic and geometry as studied and taught ‘he artisan. by the philosopher? Though called by the same name, they are very different ; and the latter alone are pure and true. The philosopher assumes in his arithmetic the exact equality of all units, and in his geometry the exact ratios of lines and spaces : the practical man adds together units very unlike each other— two armies, two bulls, things little or great as the case may be : his measurement too, always falls short of accuracy. There are in short two arithmetics and two geometries‘—very different from each other, though bearing a common name.
1 Plato, Philébus, pp. 55-56. 7, p. 1098, a. 30.
2 Plato, Philébus, p- 66 D-E. ᾽"Αριθ- 3 Plato Philébus p. 56 D-E. οἱ μὲν μητικὴν πρῶτον ap’ οὐκ ἄλλην μέν τινα 6) πον μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται
" λλῶν φατέον, ἄλλην δ᾽ αὖ τὴν VeP μοὶ A cea δύ τὴν τῶν πὸ ὕ “ἢ τῶν περὶ ἀριθμόν, οἷον στρατόπεδα Svo τῶν φιλοσι οὐντων apneic ἡ κατὰ τεκ- καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ rysnpérara ἣ καὶ K aes - . Ta πάντων tora’ οἱ οὐκ av
τονικὴν καὶ κατ᾽ ἐμπορικὴν τῆς , κατὰ αὑτοῖς συν ἀἰκοζουθη. σειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα Gehacopian γεωμετρίας τὰ καὶ λογισμὰν Novae” ἀκάστης, ror μυρίων! μηδεμίαν τέρα λε κτέον, ἣ δύο τιθῶμεν; με ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει.
Compare Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. i. 4 Plato, Philébus, Ὁ. 67 D.
360 PHILEBUS. Cuar. XXXII
We thus make out (continues Sokrates) that there is a differ- ence between one variety and another variety of Dialectic is science or knowledge, analogous to that which we and rest’ have traced between the varieties of pleasure. One of ee. pleasure is true and pure; another is not so, or is inseparably connected with pain and non-pleasurable μ᾿ elements—there being in each case a difference in each, there degree. So too one variety of science, cognition, or aregrada- art, is more true and pure than another : that is, it is trathand ess intermingled with fluctuating particulars and ; indefinite accompaniments. A science, bearing one and the same name, is different according as it is handled by the practical man or by the philosopher. Only as handled by the philosopher, does science attain purity : dealing with eternal and invariable essences. Among all sciences, Dialectic is the truest and purest, because it takes comprehensive cognizance of the eternal and invariable—Ens semper Idem—presiding over those subordinate sciences which bear upon the like matter m partial and separate departments.!
Your opinion (remarks Protarchus) does not agree with that of Gorgias. He affirms, that the power of persuasion with Gor- (Rhetoric) is the greatest and best of all arts: inas- claims supe. much as it enables us to carry all our points, not by riority for = force, but with the free will and consent of others. I should be glad to avoid contradicting either him or
etoricis yOu. superior, in = There is no real contradiction between us (replies and cele- Sokrates). You may concede to Gorgias that his art heclaims OF cognition is the greatest and best of all—the most superiority in repute, as well as the most useful to mankind. I tic, as satis. do not claim any superiority of that kind, on behalf fying ie of my cognition.? I claim for it superiority in truth truth. and purity. I remarked before, that a small patch of unmixed white colour was superior in truth and purity to a large mass of white tarnished with other colours—a gentle and
1 Plato, Philébus, pp. 57-58 ἀλλὰ τίς wore τὸ σαφὲς Kai τἀκριβὲς καὶ 3 Plato, Philébus, p. 58 B. Ov τοῦτ᾽ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, κἂν σμικρὰ ἔγωγε ἐφήτουν πω, τίς τέχνη ἥ τίς ἐπισ- καὶ σμικρὰ byivaga. Τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὃ νῦν τήμη πασῶν διαφέρει τῷ μεγίστη καὶ δὴ ζητοῦμεν. ἀρίστη καὶ πλεῖστα ὠφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς.
ΒΑΡ. XXXII. DIALECTIC THE PUREST COGNITION. 361
unmixed pleasure, in like manner, to one that is more intense but alloyed with pains. It is this superiority that I assert for Dialectic and the other sister cognitions. They are of little positive advantage to mankind: yet they, and only they, will satisfy both the demands of intelligence, and the impulse within us, in so far as we have an impulse to love and strain after
truth.!
As far as straining after truth is concerned (says Protarchus), Dialectic and the kindred sciences have an incontestable supe-
riority.
You must see (rejoins Sokrates) that Rhetoric, and most other
arts or sciences, employ all their study, and seek all their standard, in opinions alone : while of those who study Nature, the greater number confine their in- vestigations to this Kosmos, to its generation and its phenomenal operations—its manifestations past, pre- sent, and future.? Now all these manifestations are in perpetual flux, admitting of no true or certain cognition. Pure truth, corresponding to those highest mental endowments, Reason and Intelligence—can be found only in essences, eternal and unchangeable, or in matters most akin to them.®
We have now (continues Sokrates) examined plea- sure separately and intelligence separately. agreed that neither of them, apart and by iteelf, comes up to the conception of Good ; the attribute of which is, to be all sufficient, and to give plenary satisfaction, so that any animal possessing it desires nothing besides.‘ We must therefore seek Good in a certain mixture or combination of the two—Pleasure and Intelligence : and we must determine, what sort of combination of these two contains the Good which we seek. Now, to mix all pleasures, with all cogni-
1 Plato, Philébus, . 58 D. ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ δύναμις ἐρᾷ ἂν
τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ ἕνεκα τούτον
- oa ταύτην εἴπωμεν, εἰς: PS Pla Phltebus,"p.
wepi φύσεως ἡ ἡγεῖταί ἂν ri, οἷσθ᾽ ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ὅπῃ τε γέγονε καὶ ὅπῃ πάσχει τι καὶ ὅπῃ ποιεῖ, ταῦτα
Saree, διὰ βίον; ‘ Plato, Philébus, p
εἰ δὲ καὶ λων...
τατον ἔχειν.
We have A
Plato, Philébus, p. 59.
p. 60 C. τὴν τἀγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν ἄλ- ᾧ παρείη τοῦτ' ἀεὶ τῶν ζώων διὰ τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντῃ, μηδενὸς ἑτέρον ποτὲ é ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεώ-
Most men look to opinions only, or
study the phenomenal manifesta- tions of the Kosmos. They ne- glect theun- changeable essences,
respectin which alone truth
2602 PHILEBCS. παν. XXXII tions, at once and indiscriminately, will hardly be safe. We will first mix the truest and purest pleasures (those which include pleasure in its purest form), with the truest or purest cognitions (those which deal altogether with eternal and unchangeable essence, not with fluctuating particulars) Will such a combina- tion suffice to constitute Good, or an all-sufficient and all-satis- factory existence? Or do we want anything more besides?! Suppose a man cognizant of the Form or Idea of Justice, and of all other essential Ideas : and able to render account of his cogni- tion, in proper words: Will this be sufficient ?? Suppose him to be cognizant of the divine Ideas of Circle, Sphere, and other figures ; and to employ them in architecture, not knowing any- thing of human circles and figures as they exist in practical life??
That would be a ludicrous position indeed (remarks Protar- Ww chus), to have his mind full of the divine Ideas or 9 must vue include all cognitions only. copniicn What! (replies Sokrates) must he have cognition the tru » not only of the true line and circle, but also of the others also. false, the variable, the uncertain?
Life cannot ~—_— Certainly (says Protarchus), we all must have this on without farther cognition, if we are to find our way from both.
hence to our own homes.‘
Must we then admit (says Sokrates) those cognitions also in music, which we declared to be full of conjecture and imitation, without any pure truth or certainty ?
We must admit them (says Protarchus), if life is to be worth anything at all No harm can come from admitting all the other cognitions, provided a man possesses the first and moat perfect.
Well then (continues Sokrates), we will admit them all. We Butwemust have now to eonsider whether we can in like manner
intisures’ 8dmit all pleasures without distinction. The true except the and pure must first be let in: next, such as are
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 61 E.
3 Plato, Philébus, Ὁ. 624. Ἔστω δή τις ἡμῖν φρονῶν ἄνθρωπος αὑτῆς περι δικαιοσύνης, 6, τι ἔστι, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἑπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν
ν ἁπάντων τῶν ὄντων ὡσαύτως διανοούμανος ἐ ;
to, Philébus, p. 62 A. °Ap’ οὖν
οὗτος ἱκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἄξει κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, τὴν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνην ταύτην
ραν καὶ τοὺς κύκλους τὸ ἀγνοῶν,
4 eater Philébus, p. 62 B. "Avey- ν γάρ, εἰ μέλλει τις ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἑκάστοτε ἐξευρήσειν οἴκαδε.
CHaP. XXXII. ALL COGNITIONS ARE INCLUDED. 363
necessary and indispensable : and all the rest also, if true, pure, any one can show that there is advantage without sary. The mischief in our enjoying every variety of pleasure.1 others are We must put the question first to pleasures, next to tible wi cognitions—whether they can consent respectively to Intelligence live in company with each other. Now pleasures τ ϑ
will readily consent to the companionship of cogni- sexual plea- tions: but cognitions (or Reason, upon whom they depend) will not tolerate the companionship of all pleasures indiscriminately. Reason will welcome the true and pure plea- sures: she will also accept such as are indispensable, and such as consist with health, and with a sober and virtuous disposition. But Reason will not tolerate those most intense, violent, insane, pleasures, which extinguish correct memory, disturb sound re- flection, and consist only with folly and bad conduct. Excluding these violent pleasures, but retaining the others in company with Reason and Truth—we shall secure that perfect and har- monious mixture which makes the nearest approximation to Good.?
This mixture as Good (continues Sokrates) will be acceptable to 8118 But what is the cause that it is so? and 18 whatcauses that cause more akin to Reason or to Pleasure? The the excel: answer is, that this mixture and combination, like mixture? It every other that is excellent, derives ita excellence Proportion’ from Measure and Proportion. Thus the Good be- 8 comes merged in the Beautiful: for measure and pro- Reason is portion (Moderation and Symmetry) constitute in than akin every case beauty and excellence. In this case, sure. Truth has been recognised as a third element of the mixture: the three together coalesce into Good, forming a Quasi-Unum, which serves instead of a Real Unum or Idea of Good. We
1 Plato, Philébus, Pp. 68 A. εἴπερ καταπέφενγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τἀγαθοῦ δύναμις πάσας ἡδονὰς ἥδεσθαι διὰ βίον συμφέρον εἰς τὴν τον καλοῦ de # μετριότης τε ἡμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀβλαβὲς ἅπασι, πάσας καὶ χοῦ Fo κάλλος ὃ ἥπου καὶ rm vee κρατέον. πάντα ov ξυμ aivet yiyve Pinto, Philébus, pp. 68-64. 4 E—€5 A. 8 Plato, Philébus, Ῥ. 64 Ο. Τί δῆτα οὐκοῦν εἰ ἭΝ μιᾷ ξευνέμεδα ἰδέᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει τιμιώτατον ἅμα καὶ θηρεῦσαι, σὺν τρισὶ ντες, κάλλει. μάλιστ᾽ αἴτιον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἡμῖν, καὶ ξυμμετρίᾳ καὶ @, λέγωμεν ὡς τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονέναι προσφιλη τοῦτο οἷον ἐν ὀρθότατ ‘a αἰτιασαίμεθ᾽ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν; ἂν τῶν ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει; καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς 4 Plato, Philébus, p. 64 E. νῦν δὴ ἀγαθὸν ὃν τοιαύτην αὑτὴν γεγονέναι.
9261 PHILEBUS. Cuap. XXXII
must examine these three elements separately —Truth—Mode- ration—Symmetry (Measure—Proportion) to find whether each of them is most akin to Reason or to Pleasure. There can be no doubt that to all the three, Reason is more akin than Pleasure : and that the intense pleasures are in strong repugnance and antipathy to all the three.’ We thus see (says Sokrates in conclusion), in reference to the debate with Philébus, that Pleasure stands neither im first nor second in the scale of approximation to Good. tbe Consti- First comes Measure—the Moderate—the Seasonable the —and all those eternal Forms and Ideas which are 2 Symme- analogous to these.” Secondly, come the Symmetrical iclligeace” —the Beautiful—the Perfect—the Sufficient—and 4 Pr Practical other such like Forms and Ideas.* Thirdly, come Right Opi- Reason and Intelligence. Fourthly, the various nions. ng Sielces, cognitions, arts, and right opinions—acquire- Pure Plea- ments embodied in the mind iteelf. Fifthly, those saree. pleasures which we have discriminated as pure plea-
It is not necessary to trace the descending scale farther. It has been shown, against Philébus—That though neither Intelli- gence separately, nor Pleasure separately, is an adequate embodi- ment of Good, which requires both of them conjointly—yet
Dionysius of Halikarnassus, while blaming the highflown metaphor and poetry of the Phedrus and other Platonic dia- logues, speaks with great admiration of Plato in his appropriate walk of the Sokratic dialogues ; and selects specially the Philé- bus, as his example of these latter. I confess that this selection
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 65 C. φύσ 3 Plato, Philébus, Ῥ. 66 Α. ὡς ἡδονὴ 3 Plato, Philébus, p. 66 B. δεύτερον κτῆμα οὐκ dor. πρῶτον οὐδ δ᾽ αὖ δεύτερον, μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ἱκανὸν, κα καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὁπόσα τῆς μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα γενεᾶς αὖ τα τα ταύτης ἐστί χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν τὴν ἀΐδιον ἠρῆσθαι bus, p. 66 C.
σΒαρ. XXXII. CONSTITUENTS OF THE GOOD. 365
surprises me: for the Philébus, while it explicitly renounces the peculiar Sokratic vein, and becomes didactic—cannot be said to possess high merit as a didactic composition. It is neither clear, nor orderly, nor comparable in animation to the expository books of the Republic.' Every commentator of Plato, from Galen downwards, has complained of the obscurity of the Philébus.
Sokrates concludes his task, in the debate with Protarchus, by describing Bonum or the Supreme Good as a complex aggregate of five distinct elements, in a graduated
‘scale of affinity to it and contributing to its compo- sition in a greater or less degree according to the order in which they are placed. Plato does not intimate 14 that these five complete the catalogue ; but that after the fifth degree, the affinity becomes too feeble to deserve notice.* According to this view, no Idea of Good, in the strict Platonic sense, is affirmed. Good has not the complete unity of an Idea, but only the quasi-unity of analogy between its diverse elements ; which are attached by different threads to the same root, with an order of priority and posteriority.*
In the discussions about Bonum, there existed among the con- temporaries of Plato a great divergence of opinions. ) Eukleides of Megara represents the extreme absolute, ontological, or objective view: Sokrates (I mean the historical Sokrates, as reported by Xenophon) enun- ciated very distinctly the relative or subjective view. “Good (said Eukleides) is the One: the only real, d eternal, omnipresent Ens—always the same or like tive by the
1 Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. ap. Demosth. p. 1025.
Schleiermacher (Kinleit. p. 136) admits the comparatively tiresome character and negligent execution of the Philébus.
Galen M4 composed & special treatise, Περὶ τῶν ἐν Φιλήβ a βάσεων. now lost (Galen, De. Libris
riis, 18, vol. xix. 46, ed. Ktthn).
e have the advantage recent editions of the P excellent lish scholars, Dr. : ham and Mr. Poste ; both are valuable and that of Dr. Badham is distinguished by sagacious critical remarks and con-
- on by Aristotle, between ra
the obscurity of the ns incorrigible. Plato, Philébus, p. 66 C. 3 Plato, Philébus, p. 65 A. The passage is cited in note δ, p. 363. About the difference, recognised partly by Plato but still more insisted λεγόμενα καθ᾿ ἕν (κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν) and τὰ λεγό- μενα πρὸς ἕν (πρὸς μίαν τινὰ φύσιν), see my note towards the close of the Lysis, vol. ii. ch. xx.
Aristotle says about Plato (Eth. Nikom. i. 6): Ot δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην, οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν ols τὸ πρότε- ρον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, ὧς.
jectures, but ori
PHILEBUS. Caarp. XXXIL
Xenophon- itself—called sometimes Good, sometimes Intelligence, ieratos. and by various other names: the opposite of Good has Plata here no real existence, but only a temporary, phenomenal, two in relative, existence.” On the other hand, the Xeno-
etic. Ρμοπίίο Sokrates affirmed —“The Good and The doctrine. Beautiful have no objective unity at all; they include a variety of items altogether dissimilar to each other, yet each having reference to some human want or desire: sometimes relieving or preventing pain, sometimes conferring pleasure. That which neither contributes to relieve any pain or want, nor to confer pleasure, is not Good at alL”* In the Philébus, Plato borrows in part from both of these points of view, though inclining much more to the first than to the last. He produces a new eclectic doctrine, comprising something from both, and intended to harmonise both ; announced as applying at once to Man, to Animals, to Plants, and to the Universe.?
Unfortunately, the result has not corresponded to his inten- tions. If we turn to the close of the dialogue, we enceof find that the principal elements which he assigns as bleic°® explanatory of Good, and the relation in which they Ontol stand to each other, stand as much in need of expla- ' nation as Good itself. If we follow the course of the dialogue, we are frequently embarrassed by the language, because he is seeking for phrases applicable at once to the Kosmos and to Man : or because he passes from one to the other, under the as- sumption of real analogy between them. The extreme generali- ties of Logic or Ontology, upon which Sokrates here dwells— the Determinant and Indeterminate, the Cause, &c.—do not con- duct us to the attainment of Good as he himself defines it—That which is desired by, and will give full satisfaction to, all men, animals, and plants. The fault appears to me to lie in the very scheme of the dialogue. Attempts to discuss Ontology and
1 Diogen. Laert. 12. 106; Cicero, Philébus:—‘‘ Dieses also lag ihm Academic. ii. 42; Xenophon, Memorab. (Plato) am Herzen, das Gute ru iii. 8, 8-6. . _ bestimmen nicht nur fdr das Leben
2 Plato, Philébus, p.64 A. ἐν ταύτῃ des Menschen, sondern auch zumal μαθεῖν πειρᾶσθαι, τί ποτε ὄν re ἀν- fiir das ganze Gebiet des gewordenen θρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφνκεν Seins,” &. ἀγαθόν, καὶ τίνα ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναί The partial affinity between the wore eutéov. Kosmos and the human soul is set Schleiermacher observes about the forth in the Timszus, pp. 87-43-44.
παρ. XXXIL PLATO’S ECLECTIC DOCTRINE OF GOOD. 367
Ethics in one and the same piece of reasoning, instead of eluci- dating both, only serve to darken both. Aristotle has already made a similar remark : and it is after reading the Philébus that we feel most distinctly the value of his comments on Plato in the first book of the Nikomachean Ethics. Aristotle has discussed Ontology in the Metaphysica and in other treatises : but he pro- claims explicitly the necessity of discussing Ethics upon their own principles : looking at what is good for man, and what is attainable by man.' We find in the Philébus many just reflec- tions upon pleasure and its varieties : but these might have been better and more clearly established, without any appeal to the cosmical dogmas. The parallelism between Man and the Kosmos is overstrained and inconclusive, like the parallelism in the Re- public between the collective commonwealth and the individual citizen.
Moreover, when Plato, to prove the conclusion that Intelli- gence and Reason are the governing attributes of Comparison man’s mind, enunciates as his premiss that Intelli- of) Kosmos, gence and Reason are the governing attributes in which has the Kosmos *—the premiss introduced is more de- no emotion, bateable than the conclusion ; and would (as he him- neg self intimates) be contested by those against whose confusing. opposition he was arguing. In fact, the same proposition (That Reason and Intelligence are the dominant and controlling attri- butes of man, Passion and Appetite the subordinate) is assumed without any proof by Sokrates, both in the Protagoras and in the Republic. The Kosmos (in Plato’s view) has reason and intelli- gence, but experiences no emotion either painful or pleasurable: the rational nature of man is thus common to him with the
1 See especially Ethic. Nikom. £ 4, ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ᾽ 1006-1097. Aristotle reasons there ἐπισκεψώμεθα, Ethic. Nikom. viii. 1, directly t the Platonic ἰδέα 1165, b. 10. ἀγαθοῦ, but arguments have full ap e like contrast δ to the exposition in the Philé- (though less clearly) in the Eudemian
He « hes pointedly the Ethics, viii. 1, 1285, a. 30. ethical from the physical point of view. He animadverts upon Plato on the In his discussion of friendship, after same ground in the Ethica Magna, i. 1, touching upon various com ns of 1182, a. 23-30. ὑπὲρ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων the physiological poets, and of Plato καὶ ἀληθείας λέγοντα, οὖκ ἔδει ὑπὸ himeelf repeating them, he says:—ra ἀρετῆς φράζειν" οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτῳ «a- μὰν οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων παρα- κείνῳ κοινόν. ω ov οἰκεία τῆς παρούσης A σκέψεως ° ὅσα ᾿ ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικά καὶ ? Plato, Philébus, pp. 20-80.
is brought out
368 PHILEBUS. Cur. XXXII
Kosmos, his emotional nature is not so. That the mind of each individual man was an emanation from the all-pervading mind of the Kosmos or universe, and his body a fragmentary portion of the four elements composing the cosmical body—these are propositions which had been laid down by Sokrates, as well as by Philolaus and other Pythagoreans (perhaps by Pythagoras himself) before the time of Plato.! Not only that doctrine, bat also the analysis of the Kosmos into certain abstract constituent principia—(the Finient or Determinant—and the Infinite or In- determinate)—this too seems to have been borrowed by Plato from Philolaus.?
But here in the Philébus, that analysis appears expanded bor. into a larger scheme going beyond Philolaus or the
rows from Pythagoreans: viz. the recognition of a graduated the Pyrite. scale of limits, or a definite number of species enlarges = and _sub-species—intermediate between the One or
trina. Im- Highest Genus, and the Infinite Many or Individuals portance , —and descending by successive stages of limitation in dwelling from the Highest to the Lowest. Whatis thus de- maticclassi- scribed, is the general framework of systematic logical
prescribed as essential to all real cognition ; if we conceive only the highest Genus or generic name as comprehending an infinity of diverse particulars, we have no real cognition, until we can assign the intermediate stages of specification by which we de- scend from one to the other.* The step here made by Plato,
1 Cicero, De Nat. Deor. 1. 11, 27: tic and expository style, the dialogue De Senectute, 21, 78; Xenophon, se only as form to the exponent , Nat. Deor. ii. So he thinks
at. 6, 18; Plato, Timseus, pp. 37-38, ὧς,
In the Xenophont: dialogue here them to that manner of conceiving referred to, Sokrates inverts the pre- the doctrine of Ideas which Aristotle mise and the conclusion: he ers ascribes to Plato in his
0
3 we ee Re shee
of man govern the body of man. μικρόν. This last argument seems 3 See Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Philéb. me far-fetched. I
, 41-42, PP, Ueberweg (Aichtheit und Zeitf. Platonic doctrine of the στοιχεῖα Platon. Schriften, pp. 204-207) con- the Ideas: at least, the is siders the Philébus, as well as the vague, that one can y make it Sophistés and Timmus, to be com- basis of reasoning. But the didactic positions of Plato’s very late age— tone is undoub a characteristic of partly on the ground of their di the Philébus, and seems to indicate
a, ἕξ > τὰ =i Pg ce 53) Β "3 eres
CuaPp. XXXII. SYSTEMATIC CLASSIFICATION. 369
under the stimulus of the Sokratic dialectic, from the Pytha- gorean doctrine of Finient and Infinite to the idea of gradual, systematic, logical division and subdivision, is one very important in the history of science. He lays as much stress upon the searching out of the intermediate species, as Bacon does upon the Axiomata Media of scientific enquiry.
Though there are several other passages of the Platonic dialogues in which the method of logical division
is inculcated, there is none (I think) in which it tion broadly is prescribed so formally, or enunciated with such andstrongly eomprehensive generality, as this before us in the Mepdeq— Philébus. Yet the method, after being emphatically yet foebly
announced, is but feebly and partially applied, in the in distinction of different species, both of pleasure and of ‘i#logue. cognition.2 The announcement would come more suitably, as a preface to the Sophistés and Politikus: wherein the process is applied to given subjects in great detail, and at a length which some critics consider excessive : and wherein moreover the par- ticular enquiry is expressly proclaimed as intended to teach as well as to exemplify the general method.*
that the didlogue was com after satisfactory method, it is somewhat
Plato had been so long established in strange that both the original pro-
his school, as to have uired a peda- c ostentation. at
mediis proposi- co:
quas per singulas scientias tradidit et docuit experientia.” 2The pu of discriminating the different sorts of pleasure is intimated, yet seemingly not considered as indis- pensable, by Sokrates ; and it is exe- cuted certainly ina very unsystematic and perfunctory manner, compared with what we read in the Sophistés and Politikus. (Philébus, pp. 19 B, C, 82 B-C.) Mr. Poste, in his note on p. 55 A resses surprise at this point; and notices it as one among other grounds for suspecting that the Philébus ia 8 composition of two distinct f ents, rather carelessly soldered together :—
‘* Again after Division and Generaliza- ad
tion have been propounded as the only
blems are solved by ordinary Dialectic without any recourse to classification. All this becomes intelligible if we as-
. sume the Philébus to have arisen from
a pela executed junction of two ori- separa ogues.” Acknowledging the want of coher- ence in the dialogue, I have difficulty in conceiving what the two fragments could have ἢ, out of which it was compounded. Schleiermacher (Einleit. pp. 186-187) also points out the negli- ent execution and heavy march of e dialogue. 3See Politikus, pp. 285-286; Phs- drus, p. 265; Xenoph. Memor. iv. I have already observed that Socher eber Platon. Pp. 260-270) and Stall- aum (Proleg. Politik. pp. 62-54- 65-67, d&c.) agree in condemning the extreme minuteness, the tiresome mo- notony, the useless and petty com- isons, which Plato brings together the multiplied bifurcate divisions of the So histés and Politikus. Socher duces as one among his reasons for rejecting the dialogue as spurious.
ὃ---24
370 PHILEBUS. Cuar. XXXII
The same question as that which is here discussed in the Whatis the Philébus, is also started in the sixth book of the Good? Dis Republic. It is worth while to compare the diffe- in Philébos rent handling, here and there. “ Whatever else we
blic. possess (says Sokrates in the Republic), and whatever
mparison. else we may know, is all of no value, unless we also possess and know Good. In the opinion of most persons, Plea- sure is The Good: in the opinion of accomplished and philo- sophical men, intelligence (¢péenois) is the Good. But when we ask Intelligence, of what? these philosophers cannot inform us: they end by telling us, ridiculously enough, Intelligence of The Good. Thus, while blaming us for not knowing what The Good is, they make an answer which implies that we do already know it: in saying, Intelligence of the Good, they of course presume that we know what they mean by the word. Then again, those who pronounce Pleasure to be the Good, are not less involved in error ; since they are forced to admit that some Pleasures are Evil ; thus making Good and Evil to be the same. It is plain therefore that there are many and grave disputes what The Good is.” }
In this passage of the Republic Plato points out that Intelli- Mistake of 8606 cannot be understood, except as determined by or referring to some Object or End: and that those num conf. Who tendered Intelligence per se for an explanation of dently,as The Good (as Sokrates does in the Philébus), assumed kn as known the very point in dispute which they pro- subject of fessed to explain. This is an important remark in constant = regard to ethical discussions : and it were to be wished Plato him. that Plato had himself avoided the mistake which he self ite” here blames in others. The Platonic Sokrates fre- gives diffe. quently tells us that he does not know what Good is.
1 Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 B-C. ot Love must be Love of som : the τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥ term is relative. You confound Love τις φρόνησις, GAA ἀναγκάζονται with the object loved. See Plato, τελεντῶντες τὴν TOU ἀγαθοῦ φάναι. . . Symposion, pp. 199 C, 204 C. ὀνειδίζοντές ye ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν, en we read the objection here λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσι: φρόνησιν γὰρ advanced by Plato (in the above pas- αὐτό φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αὖ συνιέντων sage of the Republic) as conclusive ἡμῶν 3, τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ against the appeal to φρόνησις abso- ἀγαθοῦ φθέγξωνται ὄνομα. lutely (without specifying φρόνησις of
In the Symposion, there is a like what), we are surprised to see it tenor of questions about Eros or Love. is not even mentioned in the Philébas.
Cuap. ΧΧΣΤΙΙ. WHAT 15. THE GOOD 1 371
In the sixth Book of the Republic, having come toa rent expla, point where his argument required him to furnish a sometimes positive explanation of it, he expressly declines the onal obligation and makes his escape amidst the clouds of sometimes, metaphor.’ In the Protagoras, he pronounces Good it conf- to be identical with pleasure and avoidance of pain, ‘4.
in the largest sense and under the supervision of calculating Intelligence? In the second Book of the Republic, we find -what is substantially the same explanation as that of the Pro- tagoras, given (though in a more enlarged and analytical manner) by Glaukon and assented to by Sokrates ; to the effect that Good is tripartite,? vie.: 1. That which we desire for itself, without any reference to consequences—e. g., enjoyment and the innocuous pleasures. 2. That which we desire on a double account, both for itself and by reason of its consequences—e. g., good health, eyesight, intelligence, &c. 3. That which we do not desire, perhaps even shun, for itself: but which we desire, or at least accept, by reason of its consequences—such as gymnastics, medi- cal treatment, discipline, &c. Again, in the Gorgias and else- where, Plato seems to confine the definition of Good to the two last of these three heads, rejecting the first: for he distinguishes pointedly the Good from the Pleasurable. Yet while thus wavering in his conception of the term, Plato often admits it into the discussions as if it were not merely familiar, but clear and well-understood by every one.
In the present dialogue, Plato lays down certain characteristic marks whereby The Supreme Good may be known. These marks are subjective—relative to the feelings down tests and appreciation of sentient beings—to all mankind, by which and even to animals and plants. Good is explicitly be deter- defined by the property of conferring happiness. the answer The Good is declared to be “that habit and disposi- inthe Phile, tion of mind which has power to confer on all men satisfy those a happy life”: * it is perfect and all sufficient: every *“* creature that knows Good, desires and hunts after it, demanding
1 Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 E. τοιαῦτην ὃ αν ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην Compare also Republic, vii. p. γίγνεσθαι; μόλογ omen 583 Ο. ¢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὃ μὴ οἷδε, 2 Plato, Protagoras, pp. 356-7. τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ 3 Plato, Republic, ii. p. 357 B. οἷδε σνυμπέπλεκται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν 4 Plato, Philébus, p. 11 E.
372 PHILEBUS.
Cuap. XXXIL
nothing farther when it is attained, and caring for nothing else except what is attained along with it:! it is the object of choice for all plants and animals, and if any one prefers any thing else, he only does so through ignorance or from some untoward neces- sity :? it is most delightful and agreeable to all.* Thisis what Plato tells us as to the characteristic attributes of Good. And the test which Sokrates applies, to determine whether Pleasure does or does not correspond with these attributes, is an appeal to individual choice or judgment. “Would you choose? Would any one be satisfied?” Though this appeal ought by the con- ditions of the problem to be made to mankind generally, and is actually made to Protarchus as one specimen of them—yet Sokrates says at the end of the dialogue that all except philo- sophers choose wrong, being too ignorant or misguided to choose aright. Now it is certain that what these philosophers choose, will not satisfy the aspirations of all other persons besides. It may be Good, in reference to the philosophers themselves: but . it will fail to answer those larger conditions which Plato has just laid down.
In submitting the question to individual choice, Plato does
Inconsist- not keep clear either of confusion or of contradiction. ency ot his L this Summum Bonum be understood as the End way of comprising the full satisfaction of human wishes and putting the imaginations, without limitation by certain given ‘he alter. actualities—and if the option be tendered to a man which he _— already furnished with his share of the various desires ertreppl: generated in actual life—such a man will naturally cation.
demand entire absence of all pains, with pleasures such as to satisfy all his various desires: not merely the most intense pleasures (which Plato intends to prove, not to be plea- sures at all), but other pleasures also. He will wish (if you thus
1 Plato, Philébus, pp. 20 D-E, 61 C, 67 A. avrepxeia, Sydenham, Translation of Philébus, note, p. 48, observes—* Whether Hap- iness be to be found in Speculative
sure, than it is, that only the soul is capable of knowledge, and of thinking
either foolishly or 2 Plato, Philébus, pp. 22 B, 61 A.
Visdom or in Pleasure, or in some other possession or enjoyment, it can be seated nowhere but in the soul. For Happiness has no existence any- where but where it is felt and known. Now, it is no less certain, that only the soul is sensible of pain and plea-
8 Plato, Philébus, pp. 61 E, 64 C. τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται. se naturam mov
τὸν a απητότοτον lov wage . Aristo e, Ethic. Nikomach. init. istol. 118. “‘Bonum eat quod ad impetum animi secundum
Cnar. XXXII PLEASURE V#RSUS INTELLIGENCE. 373
suppose him master of Fortunatus’s wishing-cap) to include in his enjoyments pleasures which do not usually go together, and which may even, in the real conditions of life, exclude one another: no boundary being prescribed to his wishing power. He will wish for the pleasures of knowledge or intelligence, of self-esteem, esteem from others, sympathy, &., as well as for those of sense. He will put in his claim for pleasures, without any of: those antecedent means and conditions which, in real life, are necessary to procure them. Such being the state of the question, the alternative tendered by Plato—Pleasure, versus Intelligence or Knowledge—has no fair application. Plato himself expressly states that pleasure, though generically One, is specifically multiform, and has many varieties different from, even opposite to, each other: among which varieties one is, the pleasure of knowledge or intelligence itself. The person to whom the question is submitted, has a right to claim these pleasures of knowledge among the rest, as portions of his Sum- mum Bonum. And when Plato proceeds to ask—Will you be satisfied to possess pleasure only, without the least spark of intelligence, without memory, without eyesight t—he departs from the import of his previous question, and withdraws from the sum total of pleasure many of its most important items: since we must of course understand that the pleasures of intelligence will disappear along with intelligence itself,? and that the pains of conscious want of intelligence will be felt instead of them.
That the antithesis here enunciated by Plato is not legitimate or logical, we may see on other grounds also. Plea- ἫΝ sure and Intelligence cannot be placed in competition and Plea- with each other for recognition as Summum Bonum : be fail which, as described by Plato himself, is of the nature compared— of an End, while Intelligence is of the nature of a an End, means or agency—indispensable indeed, yet of no Mlelligence value unless it be exercised, and rightly exercised Nothing towards its appropriate end, which end must be sepa- compared rately declared.* Intelligence isa durable acquisition "ive παν stored up, like the good health, moral character, or some other established habits, of each individual person: it isa "
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 12 D. 3Compare Plato, Republic, vi. p. 2 Plato, Philébus, p. 21 C. 505 D (referred to in a previous note):
374 PHILEBUS. . . CHap, XXXII
capital engaged in the production of interest, and its value is measured by the interest produced. You cannot with propriety
put the means—the Capital—in one scale, and the End—the
Interest—in the other, so as to ascertain which of the two weighs
most. A prudent man will refrain from any present enjoyment
which trenches on his capital: but this is because the mainten-
ance of the capital is essential to all future acquisitions and
even future maintenance. So too, Intelligence is essential as a
means or condition to the attainment of pleasure in its largest
sense—that is, including avoidance or alleviation of pain or
suffering : if therefore you choose to understand pleasure in a’ narrower sense, not including therein avoidance of pain (as Plato. understands it in this portion of the Philébus), the comprehensive end to which Intelligence corresponds may be compared with
Pleasure and declared more valuable—but Intelligence itself
cannot with propriety be so compared. Such a comparison can
only be properly instituted when you consider the exercise of
Intelligence as involving (which it undoubtedly does?) pleasures
of its own; which pleasures form part of the End, and may fairly
be measured against other pleasures and pains. But nothing can
be properly compared with Pleasure, except some other supposed
End : and those theorists who reject Pleasure must specify some
other Termienus ad quem—otherwise intelligence has no clear
meaning.
Now the Hedonists in Plato’s age, when they declared Pleasure The Hedo- to be the supreme Good, understood Pleasure in its nists, while widest sense, as including not merely all varieties of downat- pleasure, mental and bodily alike, but also avoidance pleasure, of pain (in fact Epikurus dwelt especially upon this and ean, last point). Moreover, they did not intend to depre-
tion of
postulated’ ciate Intelligence, but on the contrary postulated it
also Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. i. 3, 1095, i φυλακτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικά: b. 80; i. 8, 1099, a. 1. Plato lf makes the same ting the value of Intelligence Gistinetion at the beginning © of the or Cognition, when the end towards second book of the Republic. But which it is to be exercised is undeter- though it is convenient to draw atten- mined, see the dialogue between So- tion this distinction, for the clear krates and Kleinias—Plato, Euthy- understanding of the subject, you can- dém. 289-292 B-E. not ask with propriety hich of the Arte votle, in the Nikomach. Ethic. two lots is most valuable. The value i. 4, 1096, Ὁ. 10), makes a distinction of the two is equal: the one cannot be etween—1. τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ διωκόμενα had without the other. καὶ ayamwpeva—2. τὰ ποιητικὰ τούτων 1 Plato, Philéb. p. 12 D.
CHaP XXXIL THE HEDONISTIC DOCTRINE. 375
as ἃ governing agency, indispensable to right choice Intetligence ‘and comparative estimation between different plea- governing — sures and pains. That Eudoxus,! the geometer and %8°"°!- astronomer, did this, we may be sure: but besides, this is the way in which the Hedonistic doctrine is expounded by Plato himself. In his Protagoras, Sokrates advocates that doctrine, against the Sophist who is unwilling to admit it. In the expo- sition there given by Sokrates, Pleasure is announced as The. Good to be sought, Pain as The Evil to be avoided or reduced ta ἃ minimum. But precisely because the End, to be pursued through constant diversity of complicated situations, is thus defined—for that very reason he declares that the dominant or sovereign element in man must be, the measuring and calculating Intelligence ; since such is the sole condition under which the End can be attained or approached. In the theory of the Hedonists, there was no antithesis, but indispensable conjunction and implication, between Pleasure and Intelligence.? And if it be said, that by declaring Pleasure (and avoidance of Pain) to be the End, Intelligence the means,—they lowered the dignity of the latter as compared with the former :—we may reply that the dignity of Intelligence is exalted to the maximum when it is enthroned as the ruling and controuling agent over the human mind.
In a scheme of mental philosophy, Emotion and Intellect are properly treated as distinct phenomena requiring to Tntelligen sures of be explained separately, though perpetually co- may be existent and interfering with each other. But in an compared, ethical discourse about Summum Bonum, the anti- com mared thesis between Pleasure and Intelligence, on which by plato other the Philébus turns, is from the outset illogical. Pleasures. What gives to it an apparent plausibility, is, That the to be of exercise of Intelligence has pleasures and pains of its This is
1 Eudoxus is cited by Aristotle εἴπερ ai μὲν τῆς σεως αἱ Perit (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2) as the great τὰς γθικάς ὧς Monies § ς, ἀρ chainpion of the Hedonistic theory. τῶν ,᾿θικῶν κατὰ τὴν Φρένησιν. ραν He is raced by Aristotle as τημέναι δ᾽ αὗται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ διαφ «ρόντως σώφ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν αἱ δὲ τοῦ συν-
e implication of the intelligent O¢rov ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί. καὶ ὃ Bios and emotional is well stated by Ari- δὴ ὁ κατ᾽ αὐτὰς καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ stotle (Eth. Nikom. x. 8, 1178, ἃ. 16). TOU vou κεχωρισμέ Compare συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ also the first two or three Sentences of ἦθονς ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, the tenth Book of Eth. N
376 PHILEBUS.
spon tee
Cap. XXXIL
own, and includes therefore in iteelf a part of the edonistic End, besides being the constant and indispensable basis. directing force or Means. Now, though pleasure ἐπ genere cannot be weighed in the scale against Intelligence, yet the pleasures and pains of Intelligence may be fairly and instructively compared with other pleasures and pains. You may contend that the pleasures of Intelligence are superior in quality, as well as less alloyed by accompanying pains. This comparison is really instituted by Plato in other dialogues ;* and we find the two questions apparently running together in his mind as if they were one and the same. Yet the fact is, that those who affirm the pleasures attending the exercise of Intelli- gence to be better and greater, and the pains less, than those which attend other occupations, are really arguing upon the Hedonistic basis.? Far from establishing any antithesis between
1See Republic, ix. 681-682, if it should that in this t where he the Ly of the were of the same the three different lives. Ὃ φιλόσοφος controversy them would be οἵ φ . 2 Ὸ φιλότιμος. 8. Ο ἃ mere y, or contention
ts. t words (as bet
Again in the Phadon, he tells us Sgainat woul bo the same kind as that
are not to wo pleasures, or pains ieee οἵ whom asserted. that at to ἃ a musical of them esis distin the proper and true (p. 69 A- Harmony, the other τοὶ ΤΑ contradict w what ui appear ee affine in inthe lay not in the Harmony Protagoras. But when we iteclt, “Ὁ in the pleasure which the an of the Phedon ©
is a very different proposition : Σ Plato proba- mind.
Sydenham, tion of the Philébus (pp. 42-43), ob- serves—‘ If Protarchus, when he took on himself to be an advocate for plea- sure, had included, in his meaning of the | "word, all such pleasures as are mental, his opinion, fairly and Pony understood, could not have been ἃ ifferent in the main, from what Sokrates here professes—That in every particular case, to discern what is best in action, and to perceive υ what is true in speculation, is the chief man: unless, indeed, it shoul efter: wards come into question which of the two kinds of pleasure, the sensual or the mental, was to be preferred. For
musical ear felt from hearing it: or like a controversy ware ne
wo former by sa those animals were thus hly b blest neither by the Sun, nor by the warmth which his rays afforded a ney bat it by the icy or pleasure which return of the Sun and ΚΑ ι δε
under a different point of view, as one case of a general law. variety of pleasure belongs to, and is consequent
377
CuHaPp. XXXII. EQUIVOCAL SENSE OF PLEASURE.
Pleasure and Intelligence, they bring the two into closer con- junction than was done by Epikurus himself.
Another remark may be made on the way in which Plato argues the question in the Philébus against the He- Marked donists. He draws a marked line of separation antithesis between Pleasure—and avoidance, relief, or mitiga- Philébus tion, of Pain. He does not merely distinguish the Pleasure two, but sets them in opposing antithesis. Wherever ance of there is pain to be relieved, he will not allow the title pain. of pleasurable to be bestowed on the situation. That is not true pleasure : in other words, it is no pleasure at all. He does not go quite so far as some contemporary theorists, the Fastidious Pleasure-Haters, who repudiated all pleasures without exception.! He allows a few rare exceptions ; the sensual pleasures of sight, hearing, and smell—and the pleasures of exercising Intelligence, which (these latter most erroneously) he affirms to be not dis- entitled by any accompanying pains. His catalogue of pleasures is thus reduced to a chosen few, and these too enjoyable only by a chosen few among mankind.
_ Now this very restricted sense of the word: Pleasure is peculiar to Plato, and peculiar even to some of the Platonic
dialogues. ‘Those who affirmed Pleasure to be the
Good, did not understand the word in the same
restricted sense. When Sokrates in the Protagoras
affirms, and when Sokrates in the Philébus denies,
that Pleasure is identical with Good,—the affirmation ®ckn
and the denial do not bear upon the same substantial
meaning.?
a certain ἐνέργεια of the . health or Each variety ΟἿ pleasure promotes
and consuimmates its own evépvea, but impedes or crreste other erent évepyeias. Thus the pleasures of hunt- ing, of gymnastic contest, of hearing or pla music—cause each of these ἐνεργείαι, upon which each pleasure
good perty; but if a man study, he will perfo better fruit an
This is a juster view of ἡδονὴ than what we read in the Philébus. The illogical antithesis gf Pleasure in genere,
against Intelligenfe, finds no coun-
tively de depends, to be more com- pletely developed ; but are unfavour- able to diffrent 2 ἐνεργεῖαι, mettical, y heart, or solving a metrical problem. The Diecsure'be. nging to these latter, is un-
again, foreueble to the performance of the former évepyetax. Study often hurts
such as
tenance from Aristotle. .0 35 Ethic. Nikom. vii. 18, 11538, a. » p. 1176 ; also Ethic. Magna, itp 008, a. 8 Plato, Philébus, p. 4B. 3 Among ents employed by Sokrates i in mene hilébus to disprove the identity between ἡδονὴ and ἀγαθόν,
978
PHILEBUS.
CuaPp. XXXII.
Again, in the arguments of Sokrates against pleasure in genere,
view.
we find him also singling out as examples the intense pleasures, which he takes much pains to discredit. The remarks which he makes here upon the intense pleasures, considered as elements of happiness, have much truth taken generally. Though he exaggerates the matter when he says that many persons would rejoice to have itch and irritation, in order that they
might have the pleasure of scratching \—and that persons in a fever have greater pleasure as well as greater pain than persons in health—yet he is correct to this extent, that the disposition to hanker after intense pleasures, to forget their pain- ful sequel in many cases, and to pay for them a greater price than they are worth, is widely disseminated among mankind. But this is no valid objection against the Hedonistic theory, as it was enunciated and defended by its principal advocates—by the
one is, that ἡδονὴ is a γένεσις, and is therefore essential y & process of imper- fection or transition into some ulterior οὐσία, for the sake of which alone it existed (Philébus, pp. 53-55); whereas Good is essentially an ovcia—perf complete, all-sufficient—and must not be confounded with the process where- by itis brought about. He illustrates this by telling us that the species of éveors called shi building exists only Jor the sake of the shi Θ οὐσία in which it terminates; but that the fabri- cating process, and the result in which it ends, are not to be confounded together. The doctrine that pleasure is a γένεσις, Plato cites as laid down by others: certain κομψοί, whom he does not name, but whom the critics suppose to be Aristippus and the Kyrenaici. Aristotle (in the seventh and tenth books of Ethic. Nik.) also criticises and impugns the doctrine that pleasure is 8 γένεσις : but he too omits to name the persons by whom it was propounded. Possibly Aristippus may have been the author of it: but we can hardly tell what he meant, or how he defended it. Plato derides him for his incon- sistency in calling pleasure a γένεσις, while he at the same time maintained it to be the Good: but the derision is founded upon an assumption which Aristippus would have denied. Ari- stippus would not have admitted that
all γένεσις existed only for the sake of οὐσία : and he would have replied to
ill exam of ship-building, b ore Tbe Ate ares te!
ect, only for the sake of the services which
it was destined to render in transport- : that if γένεσις
ing ms and existed for the 6 of οὐσία, it was no less true that οὐσία existed for the sake
of γένεσις. Pilato therefore had no foundation for the sarcasm which he throws out against Aristippus.
The reasoning of Aristotle (EB. N. x. 34; com Eth. Magn. ii. 1204- 1206) inst the doctrine, that plea- sure is γένεσις or κίνησις, is drawn from a different point of view, and is quite as unfavourable to the opinions of Plato as to those of Aristippus. His language however in the Rhetoric is somewhat different (i. p. 1870, Ὁ. 83).
tippus is said to have defined pleasure as λεία κίνησις, and pain as τραχεῖα κίνησις (Diog. L. ii. 86-89).
8 word κένησις is so vague, that one can hardly say what it means, without some words of context: but I doubt whether he meant anything more than ‘‘a@ marked change of consciousness ”. The word γένεσις is very obscure : and we are not sure that Aristippus employed it.
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 47 B.
Cuap. XXXII. THE INTENSE PLEASURES. 379
Platonic Sokrates (in the Protagoras), by Aristippus, Eudoxus,’ Epikurus. All of them took account of this frequent wrong tendency, and arranged their warnings accordingly. All of them discouraged, not less than Plato, such intense enjoyments as produced greater mischief in the way of future pain and dis- appointment, or as obstructed the exercise of calm reason.? All of them, when they talked of pleasure as the Supreme Good, understood thereby a rational estimate and comparison of plea- sures and pains, present and future, so as to ensure the maximum of the former and the minimum of the latter. All of them postulated a calculating and governing Reason. Epikurus un- doubtedly, and I believe the other two also, recommended a life of moderation, tranquillity, and meditative reason : they depre- cated the violent emotions, whether sensual, ambitious, or money-getting.© The objections therefore here stated by So- _krates, in so far as they are derived from the mischievous conse- quences of indulgence in the intense pleasures, do not avail against the Hedonistic theory, as explained either by Plato himself (Protagoras) or by any theorists of the Platonic century. We find Plato in his various dialogues working out different points of view, partly harmonious, partly conflicting, pigerent upon ethical theory. Thus in the Gorgias, Sokrates pointe of
kom. x. 2).
he felt in scientific pursuits is marked by a story in Plutarch (Non Posse Suaviter Vivi; see Epicur. p. 1004 A).
2 The equivocal sense of the word Pleasure is the same as that which Pilato notes in the Symposion to attach to Eros or Love (p. 205). When em- ployed in philosophical discussion, it sometimes is used (and always ought to be used) in its full extent of generic comprehension: sometimes in a nar- rower sense, so as to include only a few of the more intense pleasures, chiefly the physical, and especially the sexual; sometimes in a sense still more peculiar, partly as opposed to duty, business, work,
these: narrower and special senses, to make ohjections tell against the theory
which employed the word in ita widest
generic sense.
3 See the beautiful lines of Lucretius, Book ii. init. When we read the three acrimonious treatises in which Plutarch attacks the Epikureans (Non Posse Suaviter Vivi, adv. Koloten, De La- tenter Vivendo 5 ire. find him com.
ining, not t pikurus thoug TOO much about leasures, or that he thought too much about the intense
leasures, but quite the reverse. Epi- Eurus (he says) made out too poor a catalogue of pleasures: he was easily satisfied with a small amount and variety of pleasures : he dwelt too much upon the absence of pain, as being, when combined with a very little pleasure, as much as man ought to look for: he renounced all the most vehement and delicious pleasures, those of political activity and contempla- tive study, which constitute the great charms of life (1097 F—1098 E—1092 E— 1098-1094). Plutarch attacks Epikurus upon grounds really Hedonistic.
πεπεσε, Caar. XXXIL
al} tee wrt πυπηῦν divrrentiizs com the antthess between the faa 4 ImmeSus an? Transient om the ome hand, which he Gifeest cos Peer: τ Paim—and the Distant and Perma- Gages, χρη" on the :ther, which be calle Good or Profit, ποτε Horta Excl In the Pretagoeas, Sokrates acknow- Tree τοῦ τοῖχος the same amtithests: bet he points out that the (set co Profs, Hurt or Evil, resolve themselves into
pleasures and pains in every giver case. In the Philébus, So- krates takes a third Ene, distinct from both the other two dia- logues : he insists upon a new antithesss, between True Pleasures —and False Pleasures. If a Pleacure be asmociated with any proportion, however small, of Pai or Uneasiness—or with any false belief or impression—he denounces it as false and im- postrous, and strikes it out of the list of pleasures. The small residue which is left after such deduction, consists of pleasures recommended altogether by what Plato calls their truth, and addressing themselves to the love of truth in a few chosen minds. The attainment of Good—the object of the practical aspirations— is presented as a secondary appendage of the attainment of Truth —the object of the speculative or intellectual energies. How much the Philébus differs in its point of view from the Gorgias,' is indicated by Plato himself in a remark- between the able passage. “I have often heard Gorgias affirm ” Piles, (says Protarchus) “that among all arts, the art of aboat τὰ persuasion stands greatly pre-eminent: since it en- sures subservience from all, not by force, but with their own free consent.” To which Sokrates replies—“I was not then enquiring what art or science stands pre-eminent as the greatest, or as the best, or as conferring most benefit upon us— but what art or science investigates clear, exact, and full truth, though it be in itself small, and may afford small benefit. You
1 Hokrates in the Gor insists be good, pain cannot be evil (Gorgias, upon the constant eit ἐπα of . 496-497). But he distinguishes pleasure with pain, as an argument to pleasures ‘into the good and the bad ;
prove that pleasure cannot be identical not into the true and the false, as they with good: pleasure and pain (he says) are disti shed in the Philébus
go together but good and evil cannot the Republic (ix. pp. 583-585).
yo tugethor: therefore pleasure cannot
CHap. XXXIL OPPOSITION TO THE GORGIAS. 381
need not quarrel with Gorgias, for you may admit to him the superiority of his art in respect of usefulness to mankind, while my art (dialectic philosophy) is superior in respect of’ accuracy. I observed just now, that a small piece of white colour which is pure, surpasses in truth a large area which is not pure. We must not look to the comparative profitable consequences or good repute of the various sciences or arts, but to any natural aspira- tion which may exist in our minds to love truth, and to do every thing for the sake of truth. It will then appear that no other science or art strives after truth so earnestly as Dialectic”!
If we turn to the Gorgias, we find the very same claim ad- vanced by Gorgias on behalf of his own art, as that which Protarchus here advances: but while Sokrates here admits it, in the Gorgias he repudiates it with emphasis, and even with contumely : ranking rhetoric among those employments which minister only to present pleasure, but which are neither in- tended to yield, nor ever do yield, any profitable result. Here in the Philébus, the antithesis between immediate pleasure and distant profit is scarcely noticed. Sokrates resigns to Gorgias and to others of the like stamp, a superiority not merely in the art of flattering and tricking the immediate sensibilities of mankind, but in that of contributing to their permanent profit and advantage. It is in a spirit contrary to the Gorgias, and contrary also to the Republic (in which latter we read the memorable declaration—That the miseries of society will have no respite until government is in the hands of philosophers *), that Sokrates here abnegates on behalf of philosophy all effica- cious pretension of conferring profit or happiness on mankind generally, and claims for it only the pure delight of satisfying
i woot αῖο, Philébus, p. 58 B-D-E. Οὐ Here, as elsewhere, I translate the ἔγωγε ἐζήτουν πω, τίς τέχνη ἢ substance of the , ado the ris τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν διαφέρει τῷ μεγίστη amendments of Badham and Mr.
καὶ ἀρίστη καὶ πλεῖστα ὠφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς, ste (see Mr. Poste's note), which
ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε Td σαφὲς καὶ τἀκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, κἂν εἰ σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ dvivaca . ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὅρα" οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπεχθήσει Τοργίᾷ, τῇ μὲν ἐκεί- νον ὑπερέχειν τέχνῃ διδοὺς iran χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, πρὸς ἀκριβε Ba a εἶπον ἐγὼ viv πραγματείᾳ. . . “μήτ᾽ εἷς τινας ὠφελείας ἐπιστημῶν βλέψαντες μήτε τινὰς εὐδοκιμίας, ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τις πέφυκε
ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμες ἐρᾷν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντα ἕνεκα τούτον πράττειν.
apposr to me valuable improvements 8, confused te
It seems probable enough that what is here said, con 80 large 8, mea- sure of credit to Gorgias and his art, may be intended expressly as a mitiga- tion of the bitter polemic assigned to Sokrates in the Gorgas. This is, how- ever, altogether conjecture.
3 Plato, Republ. v. 478 Ὁ.
382 PHILEBUS. σαν XXXII
the truth-seeking aspirations. Now these aspirations have little force except in a few chosen minds; in the bulk of mankind the love of truth is feeble, and the active search for truth almost unknown. We thus see that in the Philébus it is the specu- Jative few who are present to the imagination of Plato, more than the onlinary working, suffering, enjoying Many.
Aristotle, in the commencement of his Metaphysica, recom- Peonllarit ty mends Metaphysics or First Philosophy to the reader, ofthe Dhilt- by affirming that, though other studies are more applies t the useful or more necessary to man, none is equal to it ple at ΜΝ . iD respect of truth and exactness,! because it teaches eer -- us to understand First Causes and Principles. The falsee—to =‘ like pretension is put forward by Plato in the Philé- Cognition’ bus on behalf of Dialectic ; which he designates as aures. the science of all real, permanent, unchangeable, Entia. Taking Dialectic as the maximum or Verissimum, Plato clansifies other sciences or cognitions according as they approach closer to it in truth or exactness—according as they contain more of precise measurement and less of conjecture. Sciences or cognitions are thus classified according as they are more or less true and pure. But because this principle of classification is fairly applicable to cognitions, Plato conceives that it may be made applicable to- Pleasures also. One characteristic feature” of the Philébus is the attempt to apply the predicates, true or fulse, to pleasures and pains, as they are applicable to cognitions or opinions: an attempt against which Protarchus is made to proteat, and which Sokrates altogether fails in justifying,® though he employs a train of argument both long and diversified.
In this train of argument we find a good deal of just and
1 Ariatotel. Metaphys. A. p. 983, a. ἡδονῶν ai μέν εἰσι ψενδεῖς, ai δὲ ἀληθεῖς. ,v. 1 ψενδεῖς μέν, ὅσαι per’ αἰσθήσεως γί- 3 Plato, Philéb. pp. 67-68. Compare ονται καὶ ova οὐκ ἀληθοῦς, καὶ Republic, vii. pp. “SBE ose. 8 Plato, Philébus, pp. 86 C, 88 καθ᾽ ὅσαι τη ὧν ἣν εἰσ μόνῃ νοῦ καὶ The various arguments, ree iba to φρονήσεως, καθαραὶ al ἀνεπίμικτοι rove this conclusion, are continued λύπης, αἷς οὐδεμία μετάνοια rom Ὁ. 86 to p.61. The same doctrine θεῖ ποτέ. in advocated by Sokrates in the Re- A brief but clear abstract of the ar- public, ix. pp. . 688-584. ment will be found in Dr. Badham’s The doctrine is briefly stated by the face to the Philébus (pp. viii.-xi.). Platonist Nemesius, De Natur. Homi- Compare also Stallbaum’s legg. ch. nis, Ὁ. 228. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ Πλάτωνα τῶν Vv. p. 50, 560.
OuaP. XXXII. NO FALSE PLEASURES OR FALSE PAINS. 383
instructive psychological remark: but nothing at all pjstinction which proves the conclusion that there are or can be of true and false pleasures or false pains. We have (as Sokrates applicable
shows) false remembrances of past pleasures and pains ‘Pleasures. —false expectations, hopes, and fears of future: we have plea- sures alloyed by accompanying pains, and pains qualified by accompanying pleasures: we have pleasures and pains dependent upon false beliefs: but false pleasures we neither have nor can have. The predicate is altogether inapplicable to the subject. It is applicable to the intellectual side of our nature, not to the emotional. A pleasure (or a pain) is what it seems, neither more nor less; its essence consists in being felt.’ There are false beliefs, disbeliefs, judgments, opinions—but not false plea- sures or pains. The pleasure of the dreamer or madman is not false, though it may be founded on illusory belief: the joy of a man informed that he has just been appointed to a lucrative and honourable post, the grief of a father on hearing that his son has been killed in battle, are neither of them false, though the news which both persons are made to believe may be totally false, and though the feelings will thus be of short duration. Plato ob- serves that the state which he calls neutrality or indifference appears pleasurable when it follows pain, and painful when it results from an interruption of pleasure: here is a state which appears alternately to be both, though it-is in reality neither: the pleasure or pain, therefore, whichever it be, he infers to be faise2 But there is no falsehood in the case: the state described
πο δ greats, means when pt ste action u n the senses fails SAYS :-- τῆς ns δ᾽ ἐν οὖν ve any perception w ver. e . τῶν ὅλων τι the motion of the earth about its axis and through space, whereby we are
1174, b. 4). whirled with immense velocity, but at 3 Plato, Philébus, pp. 48-44; Repub- a uniform pace, being utterly insen- Moy Coby the following passage from chauge from rest to motion ihat wekens copy the follo rom ὁ m motion wakens Professor Bain’s work on ‘“‘The Emo- our Snnaibility, and, conversely, from tions and the Will,” the fullest and motion to rest. A uniform condition, most philosophical account of theemo- as respects either state, is devoid of tions that I know (pp. 615-616; 8rd ed., any quickening influence on the mind. pp. 550 seq.) :— . . - We have repeatedly seen plea- Ὅς isa general law of the mental sures depending for their existence on constitution, more or less recognised previous pains, and pains on pleasures by inquirers into the human mind, that experienced or conceived. Such are change of impression is essential to the contrasting states of Liberty and ousness in every form. .. There Restraint, PowerandImpotence. Many
are notable examples to show, that one pleasures owe their effect as such to
384
PHILEBUS.
Caar. XXXII.
is what it appears to be—pleasurable or painful: Pilato describes it erroneously when he calls it the same state, or one of neu-
which have no reality ”.!
mere cessation. For example, the pleasures of exercise do not need to be by pain: it is enough that has been a certain intermission, coupled with the nourishment of the exhausted parts. These are of course our best pleasures. By means of this class, we ht have a life of enjoy- ment without pain: although, in fact, other is more or less mixed up in every one’s experie pose. the pleasures of the different nses to alternate, so as to give a constant succession of pleasure: each being safficiently dormant during the exer- cise of the others, to reanimate the
nee. Exercise, Re- an
and Emotions, might be made course
consciousness when ita turn comes. It hind.
also happens that some of those modes of delig t are increased, by being pre- ceded by a certain amount of a opposite. Thus, confinement adds to e pleasure of exercise, and protracted xertion to that of re creases the enjoymen ing much chilled prepares us for a higher zest in the accession of warmth. It is not necessary, however, in those cases, that the privation should amount to positive pain, in order to the exist- ence of the pleasure. The enjoyment of food may be experienced, although the previous hunger may not be in any way painful: at all events, with no more pain fban the, certainty of the coming meal can effectually appease. There jt cui another. class of our delig epending entirely upon pre- vious suffering, as in the sudden cessa- tion of acute pains, or the sudden relief from great depression. Here the re- bound from one nervous condition to another is a stimulant of positive plea- sure: constituting a small, but alto- ther inadequate, compensation for Θ prior misery. e pleasurable sen- sation of good health presupposes the opposite experience in a still larger measure. Uninterrupted health, though an instrumentality for working out many enjoyments, of itself gives no sensation.”
se. Fasti of meals ; and ᾿
is an
ble extension of e lays down in the Ethics, leasure is an accessory or adjunct of ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος πε a τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, Eth. N. vit 18, 1158, a. 16), without any view to obtain any separate extraneous pleasure or to
relieve any eous pain (καθ᾽ αὑτὰς δ᾽ εἰσὶν i, ἀφ ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν vay, E. N. x. 6, 1176, b. 6).
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 51 A. πρὸς rd τινὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι voas, οὔσας δ᾽ οὐδαμῶς, ἄς. τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ δι ἐς ἐιηταις think) in the :
r exp i note of r Sian in of Mr.
oste.
Mr. Poste observes justly, in his note on p. 40 C:—“ The anticipated pleasure in mistaken Ho may. be called, as it is here called, False ea- sure. This is, however, an inaccurate expression. it is not the Pleasure, but the Imagination of it (ie the Imagination or Opinion) that is false. Sokrates therefore does not dwell upon
this point, though Protarchus allows the expression pass.” The last hrase of the which I have
us transcribed (‘« Sokrates therefore
Cuap. XXXII. ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE. 385
What seems present to the mind of Plato in this doctrine is the antithesis between the absolute and the relative. He will allow reality only to the absolute: the rela- knowledges tive he considers (herein agreeing with the Eleates) Dotrmthand
y ex-
Plato ac-
to be all seeming and illusion. Thus when he comes cept in fhe to describe the character of those few pleasures which Pleasures he admits to be true, we find him dwelling upon their Fhichhe | absolute nature. 1, The pleasures derived from ὑπο ἀπά
perfect geometrical figures: the exact straight line, square, cube, circle, &c..: which figures are always beautiful per se, not by comparison or in relation with any thing else:! and “which have pleasures of their own, noway analogous to those of scratching ” (1. ¢., not requiring to be preceded by the discomfort of an itching surface). 2. The pleasures derived from certain colours beautiful in themselves: which are beautiful always, not merely when seen in contrast with some other colours. 3. The pleasures of hearing simple sounds, beautiful in and by themselves, with whatever other sounds they may be connected. 4, The pleasures of sweet smells, which are pleasurable though not preceded by uneasiness. 5. The pleasures of mathematical studies : these studies do not derive their pleasurable character from satisfying any previous uneasy appetite, nor do they leave behind them any pain if they happen to. be forgotten.?
does not dwell u this point ma; be a lied to pleasures and pain, less accurate than that which precedes: xt or imal, dura urable or transient, &c. for it seems to 6 imply time the the! Sokrates You * amit ὃ an opinion may be of Philébus admits the inaccuracy of correct or mistak ita object, and
expression, which seems tom me not borne out by the text of th dialogue. Both here and sisowhere in the logue, the doctrine, that many pleasures also , is maintained by Sokrates distinctly —rs ἥδεσθαι is put upon the same footing as τὸ 80 ἄζειν, which
may be either ἀληθῶς or Ψ ‘When Sokrates (p. 87 are yr uta the question, “You 8 a may ther ἀληθὴς or Ψψενδής : how then
dicate nor the other ‘ts proper] Υ appl
cable to it: we can onl
by a s metaphor, altog altogether misleading in. philoso
krates further argues iD ὩΣ You admit that some qualif redicates
ve false ”(p. 88 A 1 Plato, , Phldbes, p. 61 Ὁ. ταῦτα ὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πὶ τι καλὰ λέγω, καθά- με GAN’ ἀεὶ καλὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ πεφυκέναι καί τινας ἡδονὰς οἰκείας ὑ ἔχει, οὐ οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κνήσεων προσ- epet¢.
51 Ὁ: τὰς τῶν φωνῶν τὰς λείας καὶ λαμπράς, ras ¢ ὅν τι καθαρὸν i ἑείσας μέλος; οὐ π ἕτερον καλὰς ἀλλ᾽ αὑτὰς καθ τ τὰς εἰν εἶναι, καὶ τούτων ξυμφύτους ἡδονὰς
πὸ Piato, Philébus, Ὁ. 52 B. We may iNustrate the doctrine of
3—25
386
PHILEBOUS.
CHaPp. XXXI1L
These few are all the varieties of pleasure which Plato admits as true: they are alleged as cases of the absolutely pleasurable (Avro-78v)—that which is pleasurable per se, and always, without relation to any thing else, without dependence on occasion or cir- cumstance, and without any antecedent or concomitant pain. All other pleasures are pleasurable relatively to some antecedent pain, or to some contrasting condition, with which they are com-
the Philébus about pleasures and
, by reference to a dictum of krates quoted in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (iii. 18
that he lost his appetite—that he no longer ate with any pleasure (ὅτι ἀηδῶς ἔσθιοι). ‘‘The physician Axku- menus (so replied Sokrates) teaches us δ food rem in such a case. Leave off eating : u have left off, you will come back into a more pleasura. , and healthful condition.”
Now let us suppose the like complaint to be addressed to the Platonic Sokrates. What would have been Ais answer?
TheSokrates of the Protagoras would have regarded the complainant as suf- f under a misfortune, and would have tried to suggest some remedy: either the prescription of Akumenus, or any other more promising that he could think of. The Sokrates of the Pheedon, on the contrary, would have congratulated him on the improvement in his condition, inasmuch as the mis-
guiding and exercised by his y over his min ‘was suppressed in one of its most in- finential channels; just as Kephalus, in the Republic (i. $29), is made to announce it as one of the blessings of old age, that the sexual appetite has left him. The Sokrates of the Phi- 1ébus, also, would have treated the case as one for congratulation, but he would have assigned a different reason. He would have replied: ‘‘The leasures of eating are altogether false. You never really had any pleasure in eating. If you believed yourself to have any, you were under an illusion. You have reason to rejoice that this iliusion has now away: and to rejoice the more, because you have come a step nearer to the most divine scheme of life.”
Speusippus (the nephew and suc- cessor of Plato), if he had been present would have re-assured the complainant in amanner equally decided. He would
g ascendancy, this
have said nothing, however, about the difference between true and false piea- sures: he would have acknowledged them all as true, and denounced them all as 1 evous. He would have said (see Aul Gell. ix. δ): ‘“‘ The con- dition which you describe is one which I greatly envy. Pleasure and Pain are both e and equally, forms of Evil I eat, to relieve e pain of h : but unfortunately, I out experiencing some I thus incur evil in the other
m Svert one evil, pain,
ters, indicated b Aristotle, would have warml applauded ureethical doctrine of Speus pus ; not from real agreement with it, but in order toedify the audience. They would say to one another aside: ‘“‘ This is not true; but we must do all we can to make le believe it. Since every one is ond of pleasures, and suffers himself to be enslaved by them, we must pullin the contrary direction, in y
order that we ma: ereby bring people into the middle line.” taristoe h. Nikom. x. 1, 1172, a 80.)
It deserves to be remarked that Aristotle, in alluding to these last theorists, disapproves their scheme of Ethical Fictions, or of falsifying theory in order to work upon men's minds by edifying imposture; while Plato ap- proves and employs this scheme in the
public, totle even recognises it as a fault in various persons, that they take too little delight in bodily plea- sures—that_ 8 man is τοιοῦτος οἷος
ττον εἰ τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρων (Ethic. Nikom τῇ itis bee
PLATONIC TRUE PLEASURES. 387
CaP. XXXII.
pared : accordingly Plato considers them as false, unreal, illu- sory: pleasures and not pleasures at once, and not more one than the οἶμον. Herein he conforms to the Eleatic or Parmenidean view, according to which the relative is altogether falsehood and illusion : an intermediate stage between Ens and Non-Enzs, be- longing as much to the first as to the last.
The catalogue of pleasures recognised by Plato being so narrow (and much of them attainable only by ἃ piato coud few persons), the amount of difference is really very not have de- small between him and his pleasure-hating oppo- small -list of nents, who disallowed pleasure altogether. But small τεὴν as the catalogue is, he could not consistently have defended it against them, upon his own principles. his His opponents could have shown him that a consider- able portion of it must be discarded, if we are to dis- allow all pleasures which are preceded by or inter- mingled with pain—or which are sometimes stronger, sometimes feebler, according to the relations of contrast or simi- larity with other concomitant sensations. Mathematical study " certainly, far from being all pleasure and no pain, demands an irksome preparatory training (which is numbered among the
1 Com ng this Platonic from it, and declared to be of superior
view, Republic, Υ. ΒΡ, 478-479, and ix. order. pp. 588-585, where Plato contrasts the The pleasure of gaining a victory παναληθὴς Or γνησία ἡδονή, which in the stadium at Olympia was ranked
arises from the acquisition of know- ledge (when the mind nourishes itself wi S67 'B) essence), with ine re Or ἐσκι ομνή,
ἜΤ Es
εἰδωλον τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἡ ing from the pursuits of wealth, power, and other objects of desire
The comic poet Alexis adverts to this Platonic doctrine of the absolutely pleasurable, here, there, and every- where,—71d δ᾽ ἡδὺ πάντως ἡδύ, κἀκεῖ κἀνθάδε, Athens. viii. 354; Meineke, Com. . p. 453.
In the Phzedrus (258 E), we find this same class of pleasures, those which cannot be enjoyed unless preceded by some pain, asserted to be called for that reason slavish (ἀνδραποδώδεις), and de- preciated as worthless. Nearly all the pleasures connected with the body are said to belong to this class; but those of rhetoric and dialectic are exempted
by Greeks generally as the maximum Solrates (Republ.'v, 405 D) speaks ts Ὁ]. v. n concurrence with this o inicn. But this pleasure ought in Plato's view to pass for a false pleasure ; since it was variably p ed by the most pain- ful, long-continued training.
The reasoning of Sokrates in the Philébus (see especially pp. 46-47) against the intense and extatic plea- sures, as being never pure, but always adulterated y = wcompanying pain, misfortune, disappointment, &c., is much the same as that of Epikurus and his followers afterwards. The case is nowhere more forcibly put than in the fourth book of Lucretius (1074 seq.): where that poet deprecates passionate love, and points out that pure or un- mixed pleasure belongs only to the man of sound and healthy reason.
385 ταπαῦκα. Cuar. XXXII.
‘Jason οἱ and if he had exa- Phere: was heard to say that he felt
1158, a
hurts the
mined the lives’ of mathematicians, hungry so long as he was not in pos-
‘especially that of Kepler, he woald session of supreme power—reuyjy, Gre ‘have imagined that mathema- μὴ τυραννοῖ, Aristot. Politic. ili. 4,
tical inve have no ‘at 1277, ἃ. 24;'thus intimating that the tached to them "He probably meena fired appetin δὲ ambifon had’ tn
Ho cq ‘that they preceded by painful his d reached the itensit ope etal Ὁ ΝΕ fut they are. - Polgee or desires, ‘which in reference pete Paes, 4142. In the the present question are upon the Phmdon (p. 60 B) ‘makes a sere footing oe nataral ites. seriking καὶ on the ole SrogulsrLfeand nensy cacusistasees, gensrallye , Pain
CuHap. XXXII. _ NO EMOTIONS ALLOWED. 389
How little the Sokrates of this dialogue differs, at the bottom, from the fastidious pleasure-haters, may be seen by Sokrates in the passage in which he proclaims that the life of in- this dia- telligence alone, without the smallest intermixture of Ἰοι e differs pleasure or pain, is the really perfect life: that the these Plea. Gods and the divine Kosmos have no enjoyment and ΤΡ τα no suffering.’ The emotional department of human nature is here regarded as a degenerate and obstructive appendage: so that it was an inauspicious act of the sons of the Demiurgus (in the Timeus Ὁ when they attached the spherical head (the miniature parallel of ‘the Kosmos, with the rotatory movements of the im- mortal soul in the brain within) at the summit of a bodily trunk and limbs, containing the thoracic and abdominal cavities : the thoracic cavity embodying a second and inferior soul with the energetic emotions and passions—the abdominal region serving as lodgment toa third yet baser soul with the appetites. From this conjunction sprang the corrupting influence of emotional impulse, depriving man of his close parallelism with the Kosmos, and poisoning the life of pure exclusive Intelligence—regular, unfeeling, undisturbed. The Pleasure-haters, together with Speusippus and others, declared that pleasure and pain were both alike enemies to be repelled, and that neutrality was the condi- tion to be aimed at. And such appears to me to be the drift of
mente preeditus, non mallet nullas Plato, Timsus, pp. Ἐξ A, 44 D, omnino nobis ἃ natura voluptates esse 60 Ὁ, 70-71. The same fundamental datas?” This is the same doctrine as idea though embodied in a different what is ascribed to Speusippus. n, ap in the P: 8 Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. vii. 14, don ; where Sokrates depicts life as a p. 1168, Ὁ. 5; x. 2, p. 1178, a. 8; od of imprisonment, to which the Aulus Gellius, ix. 5. ‘‘Speusippus ortal rational soul is condemned, in vetusque omnis Academia volupta 8 corrupt and defective body, with per- et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt oppo- petual stream of disturbing sensations sita inter se: bonum autem esse quod and emotions (Phsedon, pp. 64-65). utriusque medium foret.” istotle observes, De Anima, i. p. Compare Plato, Philébus, pp. 48 407, Ὁ. 3:--πίπονον δὲ καὶ rd μεμίχθαι D-E, 33 B. τῷ σώματι μὴ δυνάμενον ἀπολυθῆναι, To whom does Plato here make καὶ προσέτι φευνκτόν, εἶπερ βέλτιον ὦ allusion, πάθος the gener) title of the ῥ μὴ μετὰ σώματος εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴ astidious (οἱ δυσχερεῖς easure- re Ady σθαι Kai πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ. haters? Schleiermacher (note to his ὁ find in one of the Fragments of translation, p. , um, and Cicero, quoted by Augustin from the most critics down to Dr. Badham in- lost work Hortensius (P- 485, ed. clusive, are of opinion, that he alludes Orelli):—‘‘ An vero, inquit, voluptates to Antisthenes—among whose dicta we corporis expetends, que veré et certainly read declarations expressing graviter dicts: sunt ἃ Platone illecebree positive aversion to pleasure—paveiny et esces malorum? Quis autem bonA μᾶλλον ἥ ἡσθείην Diog. L. vi. 8;
PHILEBCS.
Cap. XXXIL
Plato's reasonings in the Philébus : though he relaxes somewhat the severtiy of a1: requirements in favour of a few pleasures, to- wards which he feels the same indulgence as towards Homer in
44 C). I think it not likely that would have spoken thus of Antis-
fe
re τ generally, declare Sophistae +6 ae. passage in ae
histés represents, in my judgmen the ble f Plato to-
Ρ Philébus, are the persons from whom his nephew and successor Speusippus derived the doctrine declared in the first portion of this note. The “‘vetus omnis Academia” of Aulus Gellius is
Cmap. XXXII KOSMOLOGY AND ETHICS. 391
the Republic.1 When Ethics are discussed, not upon principles | of their own (οἰκεῖαι ἀρχαὶ), but upon principles of Kosmology or Ontology, no emotion of any kind can find consistent place.
In my judgment, this is one main defect pervading the Pla- tonic Philébus—the forced conjunction between Kos- gorced con- mology and Ethics—the violent pressure employed junction of to force Pleasures and Pains into the same classifying ana Ethics framework as cognitive Beliefs—the true and the ἑοῖο οἵ false. In respect to the various pleasures, the dia- bus. logue contains many excellent remarks, the value of which is diminished by the purpose to which they are turned.? One of Plato’s main batteries is directed against the intense, extatic, momentary enjoyments, which he sets in contrast against the gentle, serene, often renewable? That the former are often purchaseable only at the cost of a distempered condition of body and mind, which ought to render them objects shunned rather than desired by a reasonable man—this is a doctrine important to inculcate : but nothing is gained by applying the metaphorical predicate false, either to them, or to the other classes of mixed pleasures, &c., which Plato discountenances under the same epithet. By thus condemning pleasures in wholesale and in‘ large groups, we not only set aside the innocuous as well as others, but we also leave unapplied, or only half applied, that principle of Measure or Calculation which Plato so often extols as the main item in Summum Bonum.
In this dialogue as well as others, Measure is thus exalted, and exalted with emphasis, at the final conclusion : but it Directive is far less clearly and systematically applied, as far as sovereignty
) of Measure human beings are concerned, than in the Protagoras. —how ex-
These hagorisin Platontci ht pended much eloquence. Dr. Camp- well oe hoor δεινοὶ περὶ φύσιν. mee bell maintains the just distinction be- d much attention to the interpreta- tween the Emotions and Will on one on of nature, though they did so side, and the Understanding on the
according to a numerical and geome- other. trical symbolism. ‘* Passion ” (he says) “ig ithe mover 1 Plato, Republic, x. p. 607. to action, Reason is the θ.
is the object of the Will; Truth the
2 We read in Campbell’s Philosophy object of the Understanding.” of Rhetoric (Book i. ch. 7, pp. 168-170) 3 Plato, Philébus, p. 45 D. ἐν ὕβρει some very good remarks on the erro- μείζους ἡδονάς, οὐ πλείονς λέγω, . neous and equivocal assertions which o in the Republic, also, ἡδονὴ identify Truth and Good—a thesis on ὑπερβάλλουσα is declared to be in- which various Platonists have ex- consistent with σωφροσύνη (iii. 402 E).
392 PHILEBUS. CaaP. XXXII.
plained and The Sokrates of the Protagoras does not recognise
Prote. any pleasures as false—nor any class of pleasures as goras absolutely unmixed with pain : he does not set plea- sure in pointed opposition to the avoidance of pain, nor the intense momentary pleasures to the gentle and more durable. He considers that the whole course of life is a perpetual inter- mixture of pleasures and pains, in proportions variable and to a certain extent modifiable : that each item in both lists has its proper value, commensurable with the others ; that the purpose of a well-ordered life consists, in rendering the total sum Οὗ" pleasure as great, and the total sum of pain as small, as each man’s case admits: that avoidance of pain and attainment of pleasure are co-ordinate branches of this one comprehensive End. He farther declares that men are constantly liable to err by false remembrances, estimates, and comparisons, of pleasures and pains past—by false expectations of pleasures and pains to come : that the whole security of life lies in keeping clear of such error —in right comparison of these items and right choice between them : that therefore the full sovereign controul of each man’s life must be vested in the Measuring Science or Calculating Intelligence. Not only all comprehensive sovereignty, but also ever-active guidance, is postulated for this Measuring Science : while at the same time its special function, and the items to which it applies, are more clearly defined than in any other Platonic dialogue. If a man be so absorbed by the idea of an
intense momentary pleasure or pain, as to forget or disregard
1 This argument is carried on by Sokrates from p. δε ‘antil the close of the Protagoras, p. 557 A. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὀρθῇ TH, aipe- cet ἐφάνη ἡμὶν y σωτηρία τοῦ βίον οὖσα, τοῦ τε πλέονος καὶ ἐλάτ- τονὸς καὶ μείζονος καὶ σ ρον καὶ καὶ ἐγγντέρω, πρῶτον μετρητικὴ φαίνεται, ἐνδείας σα καὶ
ον ἧς τε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψις; "Ere δὲ μετρητική, ἀνάγκῃ τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη Yet Plato in the Philébas, imputing to the Hedonistic theory that it seta
μὲν ὑπε
aside all idea of measure, tion, limit, advances as an t in the case, Pleasure and Pain in their
own nature have no annie ΠΥ
B, 27 Ἑ Com Dr. Bad- Pete no note, p. 30 of his edition
The imputation is unfounded, and the argument without application, in regard to the same theory as expounded by Sokrates in the Protagoras.
At the end of the Philébus (p. 67 >
Plato makes Sokrates exclaim, ‘ cannot put Pleasure first among the items of Good, even though all oxen, horses, and other affirm it” This rhetorical flourish is altogether misplaced | in the Philébus: for Plato had already specified it as one of the conditions vf the Good, it
to all plante (pp. 22 B, 60 C), as well as to men.
CuHaP. XXXII PHILEBUS AND .PROTAGORAS. 393
accompaniments or consequences of an opposite nature, greatly overbalancing it—this is an error committed from default of the Measuring Science : but it is only one among many errors arising from the like deficiency. Nothing is required but the Measuring Science or Intelligence, to enable a man to make the best of those circumstances in which he may be placed: this is true of all men, under every variety of place and circumstances. Measure is not the Good, but the one condition which is constant as well as indispensable to any tolerable approach towards Good.
In the Philébus, too, Measure—The Exact Quantum—The Exact Moment—are proclaimed as the chief item in How ex. the complex called—The Good.! But to what Items Pl#ined in does Sokrates intend the measure to be applied? Not no state- certainly to pleasures: the comparison of quantity what items between one pleasure. and another 1s discarded as ‘tisapplied. useless or misleading, and the comparison of quality alone is admitted—+. ¢, true and false: the large majority of human pleasures being repudiated in the lump as false, and a small remnant only being tolerated, on the allegation that they are true. Nor, again, is the measure applied to pains: for though Plato affirms that a life altogether without pains (as without pleasures) would be the truly divine Ideal, yet he never tells us that the Measuring Intelligence is to be made available in the comparison and choice of pains, and in avoidance of the greater by submitting to the less. Lastly, when we look at the con- cession made in this dialogue to Gorgias and his art, we find that ~ Plato no longer claims for his Good or Measure any directive function, or any paramount influence, as to utility, profit, reputa- tion, or the greater ends which men usually pursue in life :? he claims for it only the privilege of satisfying the aspiration for truth, in minds wherein such aspiration is preponderant over all others. -
Comparing the Philébus with the Protagoras, therefore, we see that though, in both, Measuring Science or Intelligence is pro- claimed as supreme, the province assigned to it in the Philébus is comparatively narrow. Moreover the practical side or acti- vities of life (which are prominent in the Protagoras) appear in
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 66 Α. μέτρον---τὸ μέτριον---τὸ καίριον 2 Plato, Philébus, Ὁ. 68 B-D.
394 | PHILEBUS. Cuar. XXXIL
the Philébus thrust into a corner ; where scanty room is found for them on ground nearly covered by the speculative, or theo- rising, truth-seeking, pursuits. Practical reason is forced into the same categories as theoretical.
The classification of true and false is (as I have already re- marked) unsuitable for pleasures and pains. We have now to see how Plato applies it to cognitions, to which it really belongs.
The highest of these Cognitions is set apart as Dialectic or Class Ontology : the Object of which is, Ens or Entia, tion of true eternal, ever the same and unchangeable, ever un- and false mixed with each other: while the corresponding Cpenitions. Subject is, Reason, Intelligence, Wisdom, by which
it is apprehended and felt. In this Science alone reside perfect Truth and Purity. Where the Objects are shifting, variable, mixed or confounded together, there Reason cannot apply herself ; no pure or exact truth can be attained... These unchangeable Entities are what in other dialogues Plato terms Ideas or Forms—a term scarcely used in the Philébus.
Though pure truth belongs exclusively to Dialectic and to the Objects thereof, there are other Sciences which, having more or less of affinity to Dialectic, may thus be classified according to the degree of such affinity. Mathematics approach most nearly to Dialectic. Under Mathematics are included the Sciences or Arts of numbering, measuring, weighing—Arithmetic, Metrétic, Static—which are applied to various subordinate arts, and im- part to these latter all the scientific guidance and certainty which is found in them. Without Arithmetic, the subordinate arts would be little better than vague guesswork or knack. But Plato distinguishes two varieties of Arithmetic and Metrétic : one purely theoretical, prosecuted by philosophers, and adapted to satisfy the love of abstract truth—the other applied to some department of practice, and employed by the artist as a guide to the execution of his work. Theoretical Arithmetic is charac- terised by this feature, that it assumes each unit to be equal, like,
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 59 C. ws ἢ περὶ τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα πάντα δεύτερά τε καὶ ὕστερα ἐκεῖνα ἔσθ᾽ ἡμῖν τό τε βέβαιον καὶ τὸ λεκτέον. 62 A: φρονῶν ἄνθρωπος καθαρὸν καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ὃ δὴ λέγομεν αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὃ, τε εἰλικρινές, περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔστι, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἑπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν ὡσαύτως ἀμικτότατα ἔχοντα--ἢ Seuré- . . . κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς pws ἐκείνων ὃ τι μάλιστά ἐστι ξνυγγενές" θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων.
Cuap. ΧΧΧΤΙ. TRUE AND FALSE COGNITIONS. 395
and interchangeable with every other unit: while practical Arithmetic adds together concrete realities, whether like and equal to each other or not.'
It is thus that the theoretical geometer and arithmetician, though not coming up to the full and pure truth of Dialectic, is nevertheless nearer to it than the carpenter or the ship-builder, who apply the measure to material objects. But the carpenter, ship-builder, architect, &c., do really apply measure, line, rule, &c.: they are therefore nearer to truth than other artists, who apply no measure at all. To this last category belong the musical composer, the physician, the husbandman, the pilot, the military commander, neither of whom can apply to their pro- cesses either numeration or measurement : all of them are forced ΄ to be contented with vague estimate, conjecture, a practised eye and ear.”
The foregoing classification of Sciences and Arts is among, the most interesting points in the Philébus. It coincides vajuable to a great degree with that which we read in the sixth principles of and seventh books of the Republic, though it is also sification— partially different: it differs too in some respects from difference other doctrines advanced in other dialogues. Thus we find dialogues. here (in the Philébus) that the science or art of the physician, the pilot, the general, &c., is treated as destitute of measure and as an aggregate of unscientific guesses : whereas in the Gorgias? and elsewhere, these are extolled as genuine arts, and are em- ployed to discredit Rhetoric by contrast. Again, all these arts are here placed lower in the scientific scale than the occupations of the carpenter or the ship-builder, who possess and use some material measures. But these latter, in the Republic,‘ are dis- missed with the disparaging epithet of snobbish (βάναυσοι) and deemed unworthy of consideration.
Dialectic appears here exalted to the same pre-eminence which is assigned to it in the Republic—as the energy of the pure Intellect, dealing with those permanent real Essences which are the objects of Intellect alone, intelligible only and not visible. The distinction here drawn by Plato between the theoretical and
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 66 E. 3 Plato, Philébus, p. 56 A-B. 3 Plato, Gorgias, pp. 501 A
Compare Republic, i. pp. 41-842. 618 A. “ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 622 B.
396 PHILEBUS.
Chap. XXXII.
practical arithmetic and geometry, compared with numeration or mensuration of actual objects of sense—is also remarkable in two ways : first, as it marks his departure from the historical So- krates, who recognised the difference between the two, but dis- countenanced the theoretical as worthless :! next as it brings clearly to view, the fundamental assumption or hypothesis upon which abstract arithmetic proceeds—the concept of units all per- fectly like and equal. That this «san assumption (always de- parting more or less from the facts of sense)—and that upon its being conceded depends the peculiar certainty and accuracy of arithmetical calculation—was an-observation probably then made for the first time ; and not unnecessary to be made even now, since it is apt to escape attention. It is enunciated clearly both here and in the Republic.?
The long preliminary discussion of the Philébus thus brings us to the conclusion—That a descending scale of value, relatively to truth and falsehood, must be recognised in cognitions as well as in pleasures: many cognitions are not entirely true, but tainted in different degrees by error and falsehood : most plea- sures also, instead of being true and pure, are alloyed by con- comitant pains or delusions or both : moreover, all the intense
and N Truth (System of Logic,
1 Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 7, 2-8. Book ii. ch. vi. sect. 8).
The contrast drawn in this chapter of
the Memorabilia appears to me to coincide pretty exactly with that which is taken in the Philébus, though the preference is reversed. Dr. Bad- ham (p. 78) and Mr. Poste (pp. 106- 118) consider Plato as pointing to a contrast between pure and applied Mathematics: which I do not under- stand to be his meaning. The distinc- tion taken by Aristotle in the cited b does di ate Pure and Applied Mathematics. r. Poste would have found a better comparison in Ethic. Nikom. i. 7, 1098, a. 29.
2 Plato, Philébus, p. 56 Ε. οἱ δ᾽ οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολονθήσειαν, «6 μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἑκάστης τῶν μνρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρονσάν τις 6yoe.—where it is formally proclaim as an assumption or postulate. See Republic, vii. §25-526, vi. Ὁ. 610 Ὁ.
τ. John oar Mill thus calls
attention to the same remark in his instructive chapters on Demonstration
passage Mr. Poste is different, and eq
“The inductions of Arithmetic are of two sorts : first, those that we have just expounded, such as One and One are Two, Two and One are Three, &c. which may be called the definitions o: the various numbers, in the improper
geometrical sense of the word
ion; and, secondly, the two follow- Axioms. The sums of Equals are equal, the differences of Equals are
“These axioms, and likewise the so-called Definitions, are (as already shown) results of induction: trae of all objects whatsoever, and as it may seem, exactly true, without the ἢ
thetical assumption of unqualified truth where an approximation to it is all that exists. On more accurate
or fini ing
ed investigation, however, it will be found
that even in this case, there is one hypothetical element in the ratiocina- tion. In all propositions concerning numbers a condition is implied with- out which none of them would be
DESCENDING SCALE OF COGNITIONS. 397
CHap. XXXIL
pleasures are incompatible with Measure, or a fixed standard,’ and must therefore be excluded from the category of Good.
. In arranging the quintuple scale of elements or conditions of the Good, Plato adopts the following descending
Close of the order : I report them as well as I can, for I confess Philébus— that 1 understand them very imperfectly. elements
oO Goo Φ
1. Measure ; that which conforms to Measure and to proper season : with everything else analogous, which we can believe to be of eternal nature.—These seem to be unchangeable Forms or Ideas, which are here considered objectively, apart from any percipient Subject affected by them.’
2. The Symmetrical, Beautiful, Perfect, Sufficient, &c.—These words seem to denote the successive manifestations of the same afore-mentioned attributes ; but considered both objectively and subjectively, as affecting and appreciated by some percipient.
3. Intelligent or Rational Mind.—Here the Subject is brought in by iteelf.
4, Sciences, Cognitions, Arts, Right Opinions, &.—Here we
true, and that condition is an assump- tion which may be false. The condi- tion is that 1=1: that all the numbers are numbers of the same or of equal
uantitative. Quality, including all the elementary forces, is the sub- stratum that has to receive the quanti- tative determination. Just, however,
units. Let this be doubtful, and not one of the propositions in arithmetic will hold true. How can we know that one pound and one pound make two pounds, if one of the pounds may be troy and the other avoirdupois? They may not e two pounds of either or of any weight. How can we know that a forty-horse power is always ual to itself, unless we assume that horses are of equal strength? One actual pound weight is not exactly equal to another, nor one mile’s lengt to another; a nicer balance or more exact measuring instruments would always detect some difference.”
1 Plato, Philébus, pp. 62 D—57 B.
2 Plato, Philébus, p. 66 A.
The Appendix B, subjoined by Mr. Poste to edition of the Philébus (pp. 149-165), is a very valuable Dis- sertation, comparing and explainin the abstract theories of Plato an Aristotle. He remarks, justly con- trasting the Philébus with the Ti- mseus, as to the doctrine of Limit: ‘In the Philébus the limit is always
as Quality underlies quantity, we can conceive a su tum underlying quality. This Plato in the Timeus calls the Vehicle or Receptacle (τὸ δεκτικόν), and Aristotle in his writings the primary Matter (πρώτη ὕλη. The Philébus, however, does not carry the analysis so far. It regards ty as the ultimate matter, the substratum to be moulded and measured out in due quantity by the quantitative limit” (p. 160).
I doubt whether the Platonic idea of τὸ μέτριον is rightly expressed by Mr. Poste’s translation—a mean 158). It rather implies, even in Poli- tikus, p. 306, to which he refers, some- thing adjusted according to a positive standard or conformable to an assumed measure or perfection: there being un- doubtedly error in excess above it and error in defect below it—but the standard being not necessarily mid- way between the two. ‘The Pytha- goreans used καιρὸς in a very large sense, describing it as the First Cause of Good. Proklus ad Plat. Alkib. i. Ῥ. 270-272, Cousin.
398 PHILEBOS. Caap. XXXII
have the intellectual manifestations of the Subject, but of a cha- racter inferior to No. 3, descending in the scale of value relatively to truth.
5. Lastly come the small list of true and painless pleasures — These, being not intellectual at-all, but merely emotional (some as accompaniments of intellectual, others of sensible, processes), are farther removed from Good and Measure than even No. 4— the opining or uncertain phases of the intellect.
The four first elemente belong to the Kosmos as well as to man: for the Kosmos has an intelligent soul. The fifth marks the emotional nature of man.
I see no sufficient ground for the hypothesis of Stallbaum and some other critics, who, considering the last result abrupt and unsatisfactory, suspect that Plato either intended to add more, or did add more which has not come down to us.? Certainly the result (as in many other Platonic dialogues) is inconsiderable, and the instruction derivable from the dialogue must be picked out by the reader himself from the long train of antecedent rea- soning. The special point emphatically brought out at the end is the discredit thrown upon the intense pleasures, and the ex- clusion of them from the list of constituents of Good. If among Plato’s contemporaries who advocated the Hedonistic doctrine, there were any who laid their main stress upon these intense pleasures, he may be considered to have replied to them under the name of Philébus. But certainly this result might have been attained with a smaller array of preliminaries.
Moreover, in regard to these same intense emotions we have to remark that Plato in other dialogues holds a very dif-
Contrast be- tween the ferent opinion respecting them—or at least respecting and the some of them. We have seen that at the close of the nesympo. Philébus he connects Bonum and Pulchrum princi- sion, inre- pally, and almost exclusively, with the Reason ; but spect to Pul . - - chrum, and we find him, in the Phedrus and Symposion, taking 1 Neither the Introduction of mentators who have preceded ‘him,
observes respecting the explanations which they have given: “Ea sunt adeo varia atque inter se diversa, ut tanquam adversa fronte inter ipsa pug-
Schleiermacher (p. 134 seq.), nor the elucidation of Trendelenburg (De Phi- lebi Consilio, Pp. 16-23), nor the Pro- legomena of Stallbaum (pp. 78-77 seq.),
succeed in making this obscure close of the Philébus clearly intelligible. Stallbaum, after indicating many com-
nare dicenda sint” (p. 72). 2 Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 10.
CuaPp. XXXII. COMPARED WITH SYMPOSION. 399
a different, indeed an opposite, view of the matter; intense ἐκ
and presenting Bonam and Pulchrum as objects, not generally.
of the unimpassioned and calculating Reason, but of ardent aspiration and even of extatic love. Reason is pronounced to be insufficient for attaining them, and a peculiar vein of inspira- tion—a species of madness, co nomine—is postulated in its place. The life of the philosophical aspirant is compared to that of the passionate lover, beginning at first with attachment to some beautiful youth, and rising by 8 gradual process of association, 80 as to transfer the same fervent attachment to his mental com- panionship, as a stimulus for generating intellectual sympathies and recollections of the world of Ideas. He is represented as ex- periencing in the fullest measure those intense excitements and disturbances which Eros alone can provoke.’ It is true that Plato here repudiates sensual excitements. In this respect the Pheedrus and Symposion agree with the Philébus. But as be- tween Reason and Emotion, they disagree with it altogether: for they dwell upon ideal excitements of the most vehement charac- ter. They describe the highest perfection of human nature as growing out of the better variety of madneas—out of the glowing inspirations of Eros: a state replete with the moet intense alter- nating emotions of pain and pleasure. How opposite is the tone of Sokrates in the Philébus, where he denounces all the intense pleasures as belonging to a distempered condition—as adulterated with pain, and as impeding the tranquil process of Reason—and where he tolerates only such gentle pleasures as are at once un-
1 See in the Symposion the doctrines of the hetess Diotima, as recited by 80 » Pp. 204-212: also the
the second ἐγκώμιον deli- vered by Sokrates upon Eros, . 36-60, repeated briefly and con y Sokrates, pp. 77-78. these with the latter por- tion of the Philébus ; the difference of spirit doctrine appear very manifest.
To illustrate the contrast between the Phsedrus and the Philébus, we may observe that the former compares the excitement and irritation of the inspired soul when wings are w-
to ascend to Bonum and Pulchrum, the κνῆσις or irritation of the
ms Ἢ a child is cutting teeth— εἴ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ὅλη καὶ ἀνακηκίει, καὶ
ὅπερ τὸ τῶν ὁδοντοφνούντων πάθος περι τοὺς ὁδόντας γίγνεται ὅταν ἄρτι φνώῶσι κνῆσίς τε καὶ ἀγανάκτησις περ. τὰ οὖλα, ταὑτὸν δὴ πέπονθεν ἡ τοῦ πιερο- φυεῖν ἀρχομένον ψυχή’ ζεῖ τε καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ γαργαλίζεται φύουσα τὰ πτερά hedras, Ρ. 251 C) ese are specimens ὁ strong metaphors used by Plato to describe the emo- tional condition of the mind during its fervour of aspiration towards Bonum and Pulchrum. On the other hand, iu the Philébus, κνῆσις and γαργαλεσμὸς are noted as manifestations of that
pered condition which produces indeed moments of intense pleasure, but is quite inconsistent with Rea- son and the attainment of Good. See Philébus, pp. 46 E, 61 D, and Gorgias, p. 494.
400 PHILEBUS. Caap XXXII
mixed with pain and easily controuled by Reason! In the Phe- drus and Symposion, we are told that Bonum and Pulchrum are attainable only under the stimulus of Eros, through a process of emotion, feverish and extatic, with mingled pleasure and pain: - and that they crown such aspirations, if successfully prosecuted, with an emotional recompense, or with pleasure so intense as to surpass all other pleasures. In the Philébus, Bonum and Pul- chrum come before us as measure, proportion, seasonableness : as approachable only through tranquil Reason—addressing their ultimate recompense to Reason alone—excluding both vehement agitations and intense pleasures—and leaving only a corner of the mind for gentle and unmixed pleasures.’
The comparison, here made, of the Philébus with the Pheedrus and Symposion, is one among many proofs of the different points of view with which Plato, in his different dialogues,? handled the same topics of ethical and psychological discussion. And upon this point of dissent, Eudoxus and Epikurus, would have agreed with the Sokrates of the Philébus, in deprecating that extatic vein of emotion which is so greatly extolled in the Pheedrus and Symposion.
2 Lato, Philébus, p- 66. the ἐρωτικὴ of Sokrates. Οὐδὲν
2 Maxim Ὡς of Sokrates. πων yyze
diference een the erotic dia- τῷ σωφρονοῦντι, καὶ ὁ ἐκπληττόμενος es of Plato and many of the τοὺς καλοὺς τῷ ἐλέγχοντι τοὺς us ἄφρονας,
ers) in one of his discourses about ἄς. (Diss. xxiv. 5, p. 466 ed. Reiske).
CHap. XXXIIL MENEXENUB. 401
CHAPTER XXXIII. MENEXENUS,
In this dialogue the only personages are, Sokrates as an elderly man, and Menexenus, a young Athenian of noble Personsana family, whom we have already seen as the intimate fituation of friend of Lysis, in the dialogue known under the logue. name of Lysis.
Sokr.—What have you been doing at the Senate-house, Me- néxenus? You probably think that your course of rFauneral education and philosophy is finished, and that you are barangue at qualified for high political functions. Young as you Choice of are, you aim at exercising command over us elders, a8 orator— your family have always done before you! Menex, Sokratesde- —TI shall do so, if you advise and allow me, Sokrates: task of but not otherwise. Now, however, I came to learn orator to who was the person chosen by the Senate to deliver be easy— the customary oration at the approaching public tion o funeral of the citizens who have fallen in battle. οὐ the The Senate, however, have adjourned the election until to-morrow: but I think either Archinus or Dion will be chosen. Sokr.—To die in battle is a fine thing in many ways.? He who dies thus may be poor, but he receives a splendid funeral: he may be of little worth, yet he is still praised in pre- pared speeches by able orators, who decorate his name with brilliant encomiums, whether deserved or not, fascinating all the hearers: extolling us all—not merely the slain warrior, but the city collectively, our ancestors, and us the living—so admirably that I stand bewitched when I hear them, and fancy myself a
1 Plat. Menex. p. 234 B-C. 3 Plat. Menex. p. 285 A-B. 3—26
402 MENEXENUS. Cuap. XXXTIT.
greater, nobler, and finer man than I was before. I am usually accompanied by some strangers, who admire 4s much as I do, and who conceive a lofty estimation both of me and of the city. The voice of the orator resounds in my ear, and the feeling of pride dwells in my mind, for more than three days; during which interval I fancy myself almost in the islands of the blest. I hardly come to myself, or recollect where I am, until the fourth or fifth day. Such is the force of these orators. Menex.—You are always deriding the orators, Sokratea! Sokratea However, on this occasion I think the orator chosen rofesses Will have little chance of success: he will have no bare = time for preparation, and will be obliged to speak funeral impromptu. Sokr.—Never fear : each of these orators from Aspa- has harangues ready prepared. Besides, there is no be compe. difficulty here in speaking impromptu. If indeed the tenttore- purpose were to praise the Athenians in Pelopon- self. Me- nesus, or the Peloponnesians at Athens, an excellent ontreata orator would be required to persuade or to give satis- him to faction. But when he exhibits before the very hearers whom he praises, there is no great difficulty in appearing to be a good speaker. Menex.—Indeed ! What! do you think you would be competent to deliver the harangue yourself, if the Senate were to elect you? Sokr.—Certainly : and it is no wonder that I should be competent to speak, because I have learnt rhetoric from Aspasia (an excellent mistress, who has taught many eminent speakers, and among them Perikles, the most illustrious of all), and the harp from Konnus. But any one else, even less well-trained than me—instructed in music by Lamprus, and in rhetoric by Antiphon—would still be fully competent to succeed in praising Athenians among Athenians. Menex.— What would you have to say, if the duty were imposed upon you?* Sokr.—Probably little or nothing of my own. But it was only yesterday that I heard Aspasia going through a funeral harangue for this very occasion: partly suggestions of the present moment, partly recollections of past matters which had
1 Plat. Menex. p. 285 C. ᾿Αεὶ σὺ as being a true remark made by Σω-
προσπαίζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, TOUS ῥήτορας. κράτης ἐν τῷ ᾿Επιταφίῳ, Rhetoric, iL 9, 2 Plat. Menex. p. 235 D. Ὁ. 1367, Ὁ. 8, iii. 14, p. 1415, Ὁ. 80. Aristotle refers twice to this dictum 3 Plat. Menex. p. 236 A.
Caap. ΧΧΧΙΙ. ASPASIA, TEACHER OF RHETORIC. 403
occurred to her when she composed the funeral harangue de- livered by Perikles. Menex.—Could you recollect what Aspasia said? Sokr.—I should be much to blame if I could not. I learnt it from herself, and was near being beaten because I partly forgot it. Méenex.—Why do you not proceed with it then? Sokr.—I fear that my instructress would be displeased, if I were to publish her discourse. Menex.—Do not fear that, but proceed to speak. You will confer the greatest pleasure upon me, whether what you say comes from Aspasia or from any one else. Only proceed. Sokr.—But perhaps you will laugh me to scorn, if I, an elderly man, continue still such work of pastime.’ Menez. —Not at all: I beseech you to speak. Sokr.—Well, I cannot refuse you. Indeed, I could hardly refuse, if you requested me to strip naked and dance—since we are here alone.?
Sokrates then proceeds to recite a funeral harangue of some length which continues almost to the end. When e he concludes—repeating his declaration that the har- recited by angue comes from Aspasia—Menexenus observes, By Sokrates. Zeus, Sokrates, Aspasia is truly enviable, if she, a woman, is com- petent to compose such discourses as that.
Sokr.—If you do not believe me, come along with me, and you will hear it from her own lips. Menex.—I have often oynpii- been in company with Aspasia, and I know what sort ments of of person she is. Sokr.— Well then, don’t you admire after her? and are you not grateful to her for the har- krates has angue? Menex.—I am truly grateful for the har- both to the angue, to her, or to him, whoever it was that prompted itself end you : and most of all, I am grateful to you for having ἴ Aspasia. recited it. Sokr.—Very good. Take care then that you do not betray me. -I may perhaps be able, on future occasions, to recite to you many other fine political harangues from her. Menex.— Be assured that I will not betray you. Only let me hear them. Sokr.—I certainly will. |
The interval between these two fragments of dialogue is filled up by the recitation of Sokrates: a long funeral 5 ἃ harangue ir honour of deceased warriors, whom the period—
1 Plato, Menex. p, 286 C. ‘AAA’ 2 Plat. Menex. pp. 284 C, 236 C.
iows μον καταγελάσει ἄν σοι δόξω πρεσ- . . Burns ὧν ἔτι παίζειν. ρε 3 Plat. Menex. pp. 236 C, 249 C.
104 MENEXENUB. Caar. XXXL
shortly _city directs to be thus commemorated. The period is peaceof § supposed to be not long after the peace concluded by Antalkidas Α ntalkidas in 387 B.c. That peace was imposed upon Sparta, Athens, and the other Grecian cities, by the imperative rescript of the Persian king: the condition of it being an enforce- ment of universal autonomy, or free separate government to each city, small as well as great.!
It had been long the received practice among the Athenians to honour their fallen warriors from time to time by Athens this sort of public funeral, celebrated with every de- sbout | monstration of mournful respect : and to appoint one of the ablest and most dignified citizens as public
es orator on the occasion.2 The discourse delivered by. athens. Perikles, as appointed orator, at the end of the first composed year of the Peloponnesian war, has been immortalised guished by Thucydides, and stands as one of the most impres- fortera,” sive remnants of. Hellenic antiquity. Since the hers—Es- occasion recurred pretty often, and since the orator type ofthe chosen was always a man already conspicuous,? we harangue. may be sure that there existed in the time of Plato many funeral harangues which are now lost: indeed he himself says in this dialogue, that distinguished politicians prepared such harangues beforehand, in case the choice of the citizens should fall upon them. And we may farther be sure, amidst the active cultivation of rhetoric at Athens—that the rhetorical teachers as well as their pupils, and the logographers or paid composers of speeches, were practised in this variety of oratorical compositions not less than in others. We have one of them among the re- maining discourses of the logographer Lysias: who could not actually have delivered it himself (since he was not even a citizen}—nor could ever probably have been called upon to pre- pare one for delivery (since the citizens chosen were always eminent speakers and politicians themselves, not requiring the aid of a logographer)—but who composed it as a rhetorical exercise to extend his own celebrity. In like manner we find
1 See respecting the character of the 2 Thucyd. ii. 34. peace of Antalkidas, and the manner 3Thucyd. ii. 32, ὃς ἂν γνώμῃ τε in which its conditions were executed, δοκῇ μὴ ἀξύνετος εἶναι, καὶ ἀξιώματι my History of Greece, chap. 76. προήκῃ.
CuHap. XXXIII. FUNERAL HARANGUE. , 405
one among the discourses of Demosthenes, though of very doubtful authenticity. The funeral discourse had thus come to acquire an established type. Rhetorical teachers had collected and generalised, out of the published harangues before them, certain loct communes, religious, patriotic, social, historical or pseudo-historical, &€., suitable to be employed by any new orator.’ All such loct were of course framed upon the actual sentiments prevalent among the majority of Athenians ; furnish- ing eloquent expression for sympathies and antipathies deeply lodged in every one’s bosom.
The funeral discourse which we read in the Menexenus is framed upon this classical model. It dwells, with emphasis and elegance, upon the patriotic common- harangue places which formed the theme of rhetors generally. conforms ¢o Plato begins by extolling the indigenous character lished type of the Athenian population ; not immigrants from which he abroad (like the Peloponnesians), but born from the insista. very soil of Attica:? which, at a time when other parts of the earth produced nothing but strange animals and plants, gave birth to an admirable breed of men, as well as to wheat and barley for their nourishment, and to the olive for assisting their bodily exercises? Attica was from the beginning favoured by the Gods ; and the acropolis had been an object of competition between Athéné and Poseidon.‘ She was the common and equal mother of all the citizens, who, from such community of birth and purity of Hellenic origin, had derived the attributes which they had ever since manifested—attachment to equal laws among themselves, Panhellenic patriotism, and hatred of barbarians.° The free and equal political constitution of Athens—called an aristocracy, or presidency of the best men, under the choice and
1 Aristotel. Rhetoric. i. δ, Ὁ. 1860, ληνες, σννοικοῦσιν ἡμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ “EA- Ὁ. 81, i. 9, p. 1867. Dionys. . Ars Anves, ov μιξοβάρβαροι οἰκοῦμεν, He. Rhetoric. c. δ, PP. 260-267. 3 Plat. Menex. pp. 237 Ὁ, 238 A.
est, ut’ a enta inveniremus; sed ‘ Plat. Menex. p. 237 C. dicta sunt omnia, antequam preci- ὃ Plat. Menex. pp. 238 Ὁ, 289 A, 245 perentur : mox ea scriptores observata C-D. 239 A: καὶ ἰσογονία ἡμᾶς νυ κατὰ et collecta ediderunt” (Quintilian, φύσιν ἰσονομίαν ἀναγκάζει ζητεῖν κατὰ Inst. Or. v. 10 νόμον, καὶ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπείκειν ἀλ- 3 Plat. Menex. pp. 287-245. 246 D: λήλοις ἢ ἀρετῆς δόξῃ καὶ φρονήσεως. οὗ γάρ Πέλοπες οὐδε Κάδμοι οὐδὲ Αἴγυπ- 246 D: ὅθεν καθαρὸν τὸ μῖσος ἐντέτηκε tol τε καὶ Δαναοὶ οὐδὲ ἄλλοι πολλοί, πόλει τῆς ἀλλοτρίας φύσεως (fe of φύσει μὲν βάρβαροι ὄντες, νόμῳ δὲ “EA- the βάρβαροιλ ᾿
408 MENEXENUS. Crap. XXXII
approval of the multitude—as it was and as it always had been, is here extolled by Plato, as . result of the common origin. Alluding briefly to the victories over Eumolpus and the Amazons, the orator passes on to the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and Platsza, which he celebrates with the warmth of an Hellenic patriot.’ He eulogizes the generous behaviour of Athens towards the Greeks, during the interval between the Persian and the Peloponnesian wars, contrasting it with the unworthy requital which she received from Sparta and others. He then glances at the events of the Peloponnesian wars, though colouring them in a manner so fanciful and delusive, that any one familiar with Thucydides can scarcely recognise their iden- tity—especially in regard to the Athenian expedition against Syracuse? He protests against the faithlessness of Sparta, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war; in allying herself with the common anti-Hellenic enemy—the Great King—against Athens: and he ascribes mainly to this unholy alliance the conquest of Athens at the end of the war.* The moderation of political parties in Athens, when the Thirty were put down and the democracy restored, receives its due meed of praise: but the peculiar merit claimed for Athens, in reference to the public events between 403 B.c. and 387 B.c., is—That she stood alone among Greeks in refusing to fraternise with the Persian King, or to betray to him the Asiatic Greeks. Athens had always been prompted by generous feeling, even in spite of political interests, to compassionate and befriend the weak.‘ The orator dwells with satisfaction on the years preceding the peace concluded by Antalkidas ; during which years Athens had recovered her walls and her ships—had put down the Spartan superiority at sea— and had rescued even the Great King from Spartan force.5 He laments the disasters of Athenian soldiers at Corinth, through '
1 .M . pp. 240-241. towards βάρβαροι, as standing features
Plat. Menex. pp in the ἢ μανοΝ character (sect. 59- 5 Plat. Menex. pp. 242-248. 184) The points touched upon in 3 Plat. Menex. pp. 243-244. reference to Athens by Isokrates are
4 Plat. Menex. pp. 244-245. 244 E: in the main the same as those brought εἴ τις βούλοιτο τῆς πόλεως κατηγορῆσαι out by Plato in the Menexenus, only δικαίως, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν μόνον λέγων ὀρθῶς av that Isokrates makes them subservient κατηγοροίη, ὡς ἀεὶ λίαν φιλοικτίρμων to a special purpose, that of bringing ἐστί, καὶ τοῦ ἥττονος θεραπίς. - about an expedition Persia krates also, in the Oratio Panegyrica under the joint headship of Sparta (Or. iv.), dwells upon this point, as and Athens. well as on the pronounced hatred 5 Plat. Menex. p. 245.
Caap. XXXUI. POPULARITY OF THE HARANGUE. 407
difficulties of the ground—and at Lechxum, through treachery. These are the latest political events to which he alludes.’
Having thus touched upon the political history of Athens, he turns to the surviving relatives—fathers, mothers, oopsolation children, &c.—of the fallen warriors: addressing to andexhorta- them words of mingled consolation and exhortation. viving rela. He adopts the fiction of supposing these exhortations tives to have been suggested to him by the warriors themselves, immediately before entering upon their last battle? This is the most eloquent and impressive portion of the harangue. The orator concludes by a few words from himeelf, inculcating on the elders the duty of resignation, and on the youth that of forward and devoted patriotism.*®
That this oration was much admired, not merely during the lifetime of Plato, but also long after his death, we Admtration know from the testimony of Cicero ; who informs us felt for this that it was publicly recited every year on the day Parangne, Ἐκ when. the annual funeral rites were celebrated, in time and honour of those citizens collectively who had been afterwards. slain in the service of their country. The rhetor Dionysius δ recognises the fact of such warm admiration, and concurs gene- rally therein, yet not without reserves. He points out what he considers defects of thought and expression—ostentatious con- trasts and balancing of antithetical clauses, after the manner of Gorgias. Yet we may easily believe that the harangue found much favour, and greatly extended the reputation of its author. It would please many readers who took little interest in the Sokratic dialectics.
When Plato first established himself at Athens as a lecturer (about 386 B.c., shortly after the peace made by propane Antalkidas), he was probably known only by So- motives of kratic dialogues, properly so called: which Diony- composing
1 Plat. Menex. pp. 245 E, 246 A. est Athenis landari in concione 008, 2 Plat. Menex. pp. 247-248. qui sint in pre ecti : que sic 3 Plat. Menex. p. 249 A-C. probata est, ut eam au eam quotannis, ut scis,
“Cicero, Orator. c. 44, 151. “At See Plato, Menex. | Ρ. 249 B, about non Thucydides : ne ille uidem, haud_ these yearly funereal rites, and "Lysias, paullo major ἃ scriptor Plato : nec solum Epita h. s. 80.
his sermoni us, qui dialogi dicuntur, onys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. in ubi etiam de vndwetria id faciendum Demos p. 1027, compared with Ars fuit, sed in populari oratione, qu& mos Rhetoric. δ. 6, pp. 260-
proper department,
MENEXENUS.
CHapP. XXXIIL
sius specifies both as his earliest works and as his
wherein he stood unrivalled.'
In these, his opposition to the Rhetors and Sophists was proclaimed: and if, as is probable, the Gorgias had been published before that time, he had already declared war, openly as well as bitterly, against the whole art of Rhetoric. triumph for his genius, if, after standing forward as the representative of Dialectic, and in that character
But it would be a double
heaping scornful derision on the rival art of Rhetoric, as being nothing better than a mere knack of juggling and flattery *—he were able to show that this did not proceed from want of rhetorical competence, but that he could rival or surpass the Rhetors in their own department. Herein lies the purpose of the Menexenus. I agree with Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and some other critics,? in thinking that it was probably com- .posed not long after the peace of Antalkidas, in competition with the harangue of Lysias now remaining on the same subject. Though the name of Lyeias is not mentioned in the Menexenus, yet the rivalry between him and Plato is clearly proclaimed in the Platonic Phedrus: and the two funeral harangues go so completely over the same ground, that intentional competition
1 Dionys. Hal. ad Cn. Pomp. De Platon. p. 762. τραφεὶς μὲν ἐν τοὺς Σω- κρατικοῖς διαλόγοις drow οὖσι καὶ ἀκριβεστάτοις, οὐ μείνας ὺ ἀλλὰ τῆς Topyiov καὶ Θουκυδίδον κατασ- κευῆς ἐρασθείς. Compare p. 761, the
e immediately p , and Adm. Vi Dicendi in Demosthene, pp. 1025-1031.
To many critics Plato appeared suc- cessful in the figurative and meta- horical style—Se.vds περὶ τὸ rpowexdy. ut Dionysius thinks him very inferior to osthenes even on this point, though it was not the strongest point of Demosthenes, whose main purpose was ὃ ἀληθ wos ἀγών (Dionys. ibid. p. 2 Teokrates, in his last composition (Panathen. Or. xil) written in very old age, shows how keenly he felt the aspersions of jealous rivals—Sophists less successful than . ublicly complained that he despised
— who
he lessons of the poets, and tho no teaching worth having except
δ' ἐν αὑτοῖς, Ae
own --- ἀποδεξαμένων δὲ τῶν περιεστῴ-
των ν διατριβὴν αὑτῶν, ἕνα τὸν τολμ' ρον χειρῆσαι ἐμὲ διαβάλ- cy, ° ᾧς » πάντων xara
φρονῶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τάς re φιλοσο- tas τὰς τῶν καὶ τὰς παιδείας ἁπάσας ἐναιρῶ, καὶ φημὶ πάντας ληρεῖν
πλὴν τοὺς σχηκότας τῆς é διατριβῆς (sock 22... That which Iso. kra complains of these teachers for the ehe- mently complain of in Plato, when he expressed forcibly his contempt for rhetoric in the Go and the Phex- drus. One way of expressing their Plato could ποῦ compose a regaias co not com a
rhetorical discourse ; which atime tion Plato would best contradict by com one in the received manner.
3 e Einleitung of Schleier- macher to his translation of the Me- nexenus ; also Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Menex. p. 10, and Westermann, Gesch. der Beredtaamkeit, sect. 66, p. 134.
Cuarp. XXXII. PLATO'S RIVALRY WITH LYSIAS. - 409
on the part of the latest, is the most natural of all hypo- theses.
Here then we have Plato exchanging philosophy for “the knack of flattery ”"—to use the phrase of the Gorgias. wonexenus Stallbaum is so unwilling to admit this as possible, compared that he represents the Platonic harangue as a mere view of rhe- caricature, intended to make the rhetorical process “TC ὈΓΘ- ridiculous. I dissent from this supposition; as I the Gorgias have already dissented from the like supposition of for an ora- the same critic, in regard to the etymologies of the ἴοσ t0,con- Kratylus. That Plato might in one dialogue scorn- established fully denounce Rhetoric—and in another, compose ᾿ an elaborate discourse upon the received rhetorical type—is noway inconsistent with the general theory which I frame to myself, about the intellectual character and distinct occasional manifestations of Plato.’ The funeral harangue in the Menexe- nus proves that, whatever he thought about Rhetoric generally, he was anxious to establish his title as a competent rhetorical composer: it proves farther that he was equal to Lysias in the epideiktic department, though inferior to Perikles. It affords a valuable illustration of that general doctrine which the Pla- tonic Sokrates lays down in the Gorgias—That no man can succeed as a rhetor, unless he is in full harmony of spirit and cast of mind with his auditors; or unless he dwells upon and enforces sympathies, antipathies, and convictions, already esta- blished in their minds.? A first-rate orator like Perikles, touching the chords of cherished national sentiment, might hope, by such a discourse as that which we read in Thucydides, “adjecisse aliquid receptz religioni”.* No public orator ever appointed
1 Com also the majestic picture you praise Athens among Athenians which resents. of the ancient —though Aristotle commends the character and exploits of the early observation. Assuredly Perikles did Athenians, in the mythe commen not think so (Thucyd. ii. 85). You have in the Timsus (pp. 23-24), prosecuted a popular theme, dut unless you have in the Kritias (pp. 113-114 seq.), but oratorical talent to do justice to it, you left by the author incomplete. are likely to disappoint and o
2 Plato, Gorgias, p. 510 C; seeabove, especi among auditors like the ch. xxiv. p. 878. Athenians, accustomed to food speak-
This appears to me the real truth, ing. Compare Plat. Kritias, p. 107
subject to very rare exceptions. But E. I do not think it true to say, as the ὃ ΤῸ employ the striking expression Platonic Sokrates is made to declare of Quintilian (xii. 10) res ng the in the Menexenus, that it is an easy statue of Zeus at Olympia by matter to obtain admiration when Pheidias.
end,
410 MENEXENUS. Cuap. XXXIII.
by the Senate to pronounce the funeral harangue, could have expatiated more warmly than Plato has here done, upon the excellence of the Athenian constitution, and upon the admir- able spirit which had animated Athenian politics, both foreign and domestic. Plato falls far short, indeed, of the weight and grandeur, the impressive distinctness of specification, the large sympathies, intellectual as well as popular—with which these topics are handled by Perikles in Thucydides: but his eulogy is quite as highflown and unreserved. In understanding fully the Menexenus, however, we have Colloquia! to take account, not merely of the harangue which rtion of _ forms the bulk of it, but also of the conversation nus whereby it is commenced and concluded. Plato, tend speaking always through the mouth of Sokrates, has as ridicule to invent some fiction excusing the employment of at Rhetoric his master in the unprecedented capacity of public harangue orator. What Stallbaum says (in my judgment, itself erroneously) about the harangue—appears to me intended as perfectly true about the conversation before and an sridence after it. The introductory observations, interchanged ability. between Sokrates and Menexenus, certainly tend to caricature (as Aristophanes! does in the Acharneis and the Equites) the strong effects produced by this panegyrical oratory on the feelings of hearers; and to depreciate the task of the orator as nothing better than an easy and amusing pastime. To praise Athens among Athenian auditors (we are told) is a matter in which few speakers can fail to succeed, however poor their abilities. Moreover, the great funeral harangue of Perikles is represented as having been composed for him by Aspasia2—a
1 Aristoph. Acharn. 615, Equit. 640- 35-43: which is the real 887.
speech, ported a rted and drest up p by Thucydides i ‘ia The comic exaggeration of Sokrates, manner.
in the colloquial portion of the Men- bably ὦ the clean harangue "vas exenus (235 BC C), goes as far as that preserved separately and in other re- of Aristophan ports, so that Plato may have known
2 By the language of Plato here, it without knowin e history of he seems plai bring his own Thucydides. When I see the extreme harangue into com etition not merely liberty which Plato takes th history with that of L ut also with that his harangue in regard to t of Perikles. ut we must not sup- of the "past, I can y believe the
se, for that reason, that he necessa y he ever read Thucydides ; if he ever fas i in view the Periklean harangue read the history, he certainly disre- which we now read in Thucydides, ii. garded it altogether, and threw him-
CHap. ΧΧ ΧΤΙΙ͂Ι. SCOPE OF THE DIALOGUE. 411
female, though remarkable among her sex—who is extolled as holding the highest place among rhetorical teachers, and is introduced here, as Aristophanes introduces her in the Achar- neis, when he is putting a construction of discreditable ridicule on the origin of the Peloponnesian war.' To make a good funeral harangue (Sokrates says) requires little or no prelimi- nary preparation: besides, the Rhetors have harangues ready prepared at home. All this persiflage, in harmony with the polemics of the Gorgias, derides and degrades the Rhetors col- lectively. But when Plato takes the field against them as a competitor, in his own rhetorical discourse, he drops the ironical vein, and takes pains to deliver one really good and excellent in its kind. His triumph is thus doubled. He tells the Rhe- tors that their business is a trifling and despicable one: at the same time showing them that, despicable as it is, he can surpass them in it, as he professes to surpass Lysias in the Phe- drus.?
Such I conceive to be the scope of the dialogue, looked at from Plato’s point of view. In order to find a person suitable in point of age to be described as the teacher of Sokrates, he is forced to go back to the past gene- ration—that of Perikles and Aspasia. But though he avoids anachronism on this point, he cannot avoid the anachronism of making Sokrates allude to events long pos- terior to his own death. This anachronism is real, though it has been magnified by some critics into a graver defect than it is in truth. Plato was resolved not to speak in his own person, but through that of Sokrates. But he is not always
Anachron- ism of the Menexenus
careless on this point.
deserving of attention: especially as he had before him many writers now lost, either contemporary with Plato or of the succeeding generation. He notices not only Plato’s rity in ridiculing most of his distinguished
self ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον : like the λογογράφοι of whom Thucydides speaks, i. 21, Lysias among them, though in a less degree than Plato. Aischines So- kraticus had composed among his
dialogues one entitled ᾿Ασπασία. See Xenophon, C£conom. i. 14; Cicero de Inventione, i. 31: Plutarch, Perikles, c. 24-32: also Bergk, De Reliquiis Comeed. Attic. Antiq. p. 237.
1 Aristoph. Acharn. 601.
2 The remarks of Dionysius of Hali- karnassus (in the Epistle to Cn. Pom- pey about Plato, pp. 754-758) are well
contemporaries, but also his marked feeling of rivalry against Lysias.
ἦν γάρ, ἦν μὲν τῇ Πλάτωνος φύσει πολλὰς ἀρετὰς ἐχούσῃ τὸ φιλότιμον, ἂς. (p. 756)
See this subject well handled in an instructive Dissertation by M. Lebeau (Stuttgart, 1863, Lysias’ Epitaphios als acht erwiesen, pp. 42-46 seq.).
412
MENEXENODS.
CaaP. XXXITI.
careful to keep within the limits which consistent adherence
to such a plan imposes.!
' Lis Platoni ety 1s § ad mts ca, 1 ve bt ths carelessness ἘΠ πο ut exact es Platonic critics
the | Menexenus as a genuine Platonic dialogue. Ast, however, includes it among the numerous dialogues which he disallows as Totecwns, - and Suckow,
are also in-
Steinhart, and clined to disallow it. “Deberwog,
Die Aechtheit der Platonischen Schrif- ten, pp. 143-148. These critics make ht of the allusion of Aristotle in the etvoric — ἄτης eV πιταφιῳ —which appears to me, 7 confecs, of more weight than all unds
of sumpicion adduced by them prove Θ spurious. The p- tion in favour of the ogue of llus counts with them, here as elsewhere, for nothing.
Cuap. XXXIV. KLEITOPHON 413
CHAPTER XXXIV. KLEITOPHON.
THe Kleitophon is an unfinished fragment, beginning with a short introductory conversation between Sokrates and Persons Kleitophon, and finishing with a discourse of some %24 circum length, a sort of remonstrance or appeal, addressed by Kieitophon. Kleitophon to Sokrates ; who makes no reply.
Some one was lately telling me (says Sokrates) that Kleitophon, in conversation with Lysias, depreciated the conversation of So- krates, and extolled prodigiously that of Thrasymachus.
Whoever told you so (replies Kleitophon), did not report accurately what I said. On some points, indeed, I conversa- did not praise you ; but on other points I did praise fon of you. Since, however, you are evidently displeased with Kleito- with me, though you affect indifference—and since fealludesto we are here alone—I should be glad to repeat the observa- same observations to yourself, in order that you may unfavour- not believe me to think meanly of you. These in- able char- correct reports seem to have made you displeased cently made with me, more than is reasonable. I am anxious to phon, who speak to you with full freedom, if you will allow Ssk*permis- εἰ. explain.
It would be a shame indeed (rejoined Sokrates), if, when you were anxious to do me good, I could not endure to receive it. When I have learnt which are my worst and which are my best points, I shall evidently be in a condition to cultivate and pursue the latter and resolutely to avoid the former.
1 Plato, Kleitoph. p. 406.
414 KLEITOPHON Cuap XXXIV Hear me then (says Kleitophon).
As your frequent companion, Sokrates, I have often listened
Explana- to you with profound admiration. I thought you Hopton superior to all other speakers when you proclaimed expresses = your usual strain of reproof, like the God from a dsdmira- dramatic machine, against mankind.! You asked tion for the them, “ Whither are you drifting, my friends? You which he do not seem aware that you are doing wrong when from long. you place all your affections on the gain of money, companion- and neglect to teach your sons and heirs the right
p with .
krates. use Οὗ money. You do not provide for them teachers of justice, if justice be teachable ; nor trainers of it, if it be
acquirable by training and habit; nor indeed have you studied the acquisition of it, even for yourselves. Since the fact is ob- vious that, while you, as well as your sons, have learnt what passes for a finished education in virtue (letters, music, gym- nastic), you nevertheless yield to the corruptions of gain—how comes it that you do not despise your actual education, and look out for teachers to correct such disorder? It is this disorder, not the want of accomplishment in the use of the lyre, which occasions such terrible discord, and such calamitous war, be- tween brother and brother—between city and city.2. You affirm that men do wrong wilfully, not from ignorance or want of train- ing: yet nevertheless you are bold enough to say, that wrong- doing is dishonourable and offensive to the Gods. How can any one, then, choose such an evil willingly? You tell us it is because he is overcome by pleasures: well then, that again ‘comes to unwillingness—if victory be the thing which every man wishes: so that, whichever way you turn it, reason shows you that wrong-doing is taken up unwillingly, and that greater precautions ought to be taken upon the subject, both by indivi- duals and by cities.” 3
Such, Sokrates (continues Kleitophon), is the language which
1 Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 A. ἐγὼ π γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ συγγιγνόμενος, πολλάκις ἐξεπληττόμην ἀκούων: Kai μοι ἐδόκεις παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους
οι; &C. 2 Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 B-C. 3 Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 D-E. ὥστε
ἐκ παντὸς τρόπον τό ye ἀδικεῖν ἀκούσιον
κάλλιστα λέγειν, ὁπότε ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ μηχανῆς τραγικῆς θεός, ὑμεῖς, λέγων, ποῖ φερεσθε, ἄνθρω-
ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ, καὶ δεῖν ἐπιμέλειαν τῆς νῦν πλείω ποιεῖσθαι πάντ᾽ ἄνδρα ἰδίᾳ θ᾽ ἅμα καὶ δημοσίᾳ ξνμπάσας τὰς πόλεις.
Cap. XXXIV. REMONSTRANCE OF KLEITOPHON. 415
I often hear from you; and which I always hear ; ' with the strongest and most respectful admiration. vations
You follow it up by observing, that those who train their bodies and neglect their minds, commit the have been
ing themeelves about the subordinate tary and” mistake of busying themselves about the subordin tary and
and neglecting the superior. You farther remark, ;.awaken- that if a man does not know how to use any object ing ardour rightly, he had better, abstain from using it alto- ments gether: if he does not know how to use his eyes, his ears, or his body—it will be better for him mon! used neither to see, nor to hear, nor to use his body at 750
all: the like with any instrument or article of property—for whoever cannot use his own lyre well, cannot use his neighbour's lyre better. Out of these premisses you bring out forcibly the conclusion—That if a man does not know how to use his mind rightly, it is better for him to make no use of it:—better for him not to live, than to live under his own direction. If he must live, he had better live as a slave than a freeman, sur- rendering the guidance of his understanding to some one else who knows the art of piloting men: which art you, Sokrates, denominate often the political art, sometimes the judicial art or justice.’
These discourses of yours, alike numerous and admirable— showing that virtue is teachable, and that a man put 50. should attend to himself before he attends to other krates does objects—I never have contradicted, and never shall what virtue contradict. I account them most profitable and {#70 how stimulating, calculated to wake men as it were out attained. of sleep. I expected anxiously what was to come has bad afterwards, I began by copying your style and ask- Cnovgh of ing, not yourself, but those among your companions and now whom you esteemed the most *—How are we now to mation how understand this stimulus imparted by Sokrates to- he is toact. wards virtue? Is this to be all? Cannot we make advance towards virtue and get full possession of it? Are we to pass
1 Plato, Kleitoph. p. 408 B. ἣν δὴ τούς τι μάλιστα εἶναι δοξαζομένους σὺ πολιτικήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀνομάζεις γὰρ σοῦ πρώτους ¢ ἱπαγορώτων, sivBare πολλάκις, τὴν ᾿αὑτὴν δὴ ταύτην δικαστι- μενος τίς 6 μετὰ ταῦτ᾽ εἴη λόγος, καὶ κήν τε καὶ δικαιοσύ σύνην ὡς ἔστι λέγων. κατὰ σὲ τρόπον τινὰ ὑποτεί-
3 Plato, Kleitoph. p. 408 C. τούτων νων αὐτοῖς, ἄς.
416 KLEITOPHON. CmaP. XXXIV.
our whole lives in stimulating those who have not yet been stimulated, in order that they in their turn may stimulate others? Is it not rather incumbent upon us, now that we have agreed thus far, to entreat both from Sokrates and from each other, an answer to the ulterior question, What next? How are we to set: to work in regard to the learning of justice 1" If any trainer, seeing us careless of our bodily condition, should exhort us strenuously to take care of it, and convince us that we ought to do so—we should next ask him, which were the arts prescribing how we should proceed? He would reply—The gymnastic and medical arts). How will Sokrates or his friends answer the corresponding question in their case ?
The ablest of your companions answered me (continues Kleito- phon), that the art to which you were wont to allude was no other than Justice itself. I told him in re-
onwith Ply—Do not give me the mere name, but tell me tnis view, what Justice ia? In the medical art there are two companions distinct results contemplated and achieved: one, that ond of keeping up the succession of competent physicians ‘Sokrates —another that of conferring or preserving health: himself. this last, Health, is not the art itself, but the work
accomplished by the art. Just so, the builder’s art, has for its object ‘the house, which is its work—and the keeping up the continuity of builders, which is its teaching. Tell me in the same manner respecting the art called Justice. Its teaching province is plain enough—to maintain the succession of just men: but what is its working province? what is the work which the just man does for us ?
To this question your friend replied (explaining Justice)—it Replies is The Advantageous. Another man near him said, toade by t the The Proper: a third said, The Profitable: a fourth, Sokratesun- The Gainful.? 1 pursued the inquiry by observing, satisfactory. that these were general names equally applicable in
1 Plato, Kleitophon, p. 408 D- E. 4 δὲ μοῦ, Μή μοι τὸ ὄνομα μόνον εἰπῇς, δεῖ τὸν Σωκράτην καὶ ἥλους ἡμᾶς ἀλλὰ ὧδε---Ἰατρική πού τις λέγεται τέχνη, τὸ μετὰ TOUT ἐπανερωτᾷν, ὅὃμο
σαντας τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτέον 3 Plato, Kleitoph. p. 409 B. τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι: Τί τοὐντεῦθεν; πῶς ἄρ- ἕτερον, ὃ ᾿δύναται ποιεῖν ἡμῖν ἔργον ὁ χεσθαι δεῖν φαμὲν δικαιοσύνης περὶ δίκαιος, τί τοῦτό φαμεν; εἶπε. τὸς μαθήσεως μέν, ὡς οἶμαι, τ συμφέρον͵ awe- lato, Kleitoph. p. 409 A. εἰπόντος κρίνατο’ ἄλλος δέ, τὸ δέον" ἕτερος
Crap. XXXIV. WHAT IS JUSTICE ? 417
other arts, and to something different in each. Every art aims at what is proper, advantageous, profitable, gainful, in its own separate department: but each can farther describe to you what that department is. Thus the art of the carpenter is, to perform well, properly, advantageously, profitably, &c., in the construc- tion of wooden implements, &. That is the special work of the carpenter’s art: now tell me, what is the special work, cor- responding thereunto, of the art called Justice ?
At length one of your most accomplished companions, So- krates, answered me—That the special work peculiar None of to Justice was, to bring about friendship in the com- capa munity.! Being farther interrogated, he said—That what the friendship was always a good, never an evil: That special work the so-called friendships between children, and be- © was. tween animals, mischievous rather than otherwise, were not real friendships, and ought not to bear the name: That the only genuine friendship was, sameness of reason and intelli- gence: not sameness of opinion, which was often hurtful—but knowledge and reason agreeing, in different persons.?
At this stage of our conversation the hearers themselves felt perplexed, and interfered to remonstrate with him ; observing, that the debate had come round to the same point again. They declared that the medical art also was harmony of reason and intelligence: that the like was true besides of every other art: that each of them could define the special end to which it tended: but that as to that art, or that harmony of reason and intelli- gence, which had been called Justice, no one could see to what purpose it tended, nor what was its special work.®
After all this debate (continues Kleitophon) I addressed the same question to yourself, Sokrates—What is Justice? Kleitophon You answered—To do good to friends, hurt to enemies azked he
δέ, τ ὠφέλιμον" ὁ δέ, τὸ λνσι- ἴδιον ἔργον, ὃ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεμιᾶς, φιλίαν τ ἢ A guy. ἐπ ειν δὴ ἐ w λέγων ὅτι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ποιεῖν. κάκειν. € ὀνόματα ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ev ἑκάστῃ τὸν νῶν, ὀρθῶς πράττειν, 5 Plato, Kleitophon, p. 400 E. λυσιτελοῦντα, ὠφέλιμα, καὶ τἄλλα τὰ 3 Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 A. καὶ τοιαῦτα" ἀλλὰ πρὸς 6, τι ταῦτα πάντα ἔλεγον (i.e. the hearers said) ὅτι καὶ ἡ τείνει, dpec τὸ ἴδιον ἑκάστῃ τέχνῃ, ἰατρικὴ ὁμόνοιά τίς ἐστι, καὶ ἅπασαι αἱ τέχναι, καὶ περὶ ὅτον εἰσίν, ἔχουσι
, Δ Plato, Kleitoph. p. 409 Ὁ. TedAev- λέγειν. τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγομένην τῶν ἀπεκρίνατό τις, ὦ Σώκρατες; μοὶ δικαιοσύνην ἣ ὁμόνοιαν, ὅποι τείνονσά τῶν σῶν ἑταίρων, ὃς δὴ κομψότατα ἔδοξεν ἐστι, διαπέφενγε, καὶ ἄδηλον αὐτῆς ὅ, τι εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοῦτ᾽ εἴη τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης πότ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔργον.
3—27
418 KLEITOPHON. CHap. XXXIV.
uestion §§ But presently it appeared, that the just man would krates him- never, on any occasion, do hurt to any one :—that he elf. ϑυ. .Ν. would act towards every one with a view to good. It not answer is not once, nor twice, but often and often, that I Kieitophon have endured these perplexities, and have importuned pellevesthat vou to clear them up.’ At last I am wearied out, knows, bat and have come to the conviction that you are doubtless 8 consummate proficient in the art of stimulating men to seek virtue ; but that as to the ulterior question, how they are to find it—you either do not know, or you will not tell In regard to any art (such as steersmanship or others), there may be persons who can extol and recommend the art to esteem, but cannot direct the hearers how to acquire it : and in like manner ἃ man might remark about you, that you do not know any better what Justice is, because you are a proficient in commending it. For my part, such is not my opinion. I think that you know, but have declined to tell me. «1 am resolved, in my present embarrassment, to go to Thrasymachus, or any one else that I can find to help me; unless you will consent to give me some- thing more than these merely stimulating discourses.* Consider me a8 one upon whom your stimulus has already told. If the question were about gymnastic, as soon as I had become fully stimulated to attend to my bodily condition, you would have given me, as a sequel to your stimulating discourse, some positive direction, what my body was by nature, and what treatment it required. Deal in like manner with the case before us: reckon Kleitophon as one fully agreeing with you, that it is contemptible to spend so much energy upon other objects, and to neglect our minds, with a view to which all other objects are treasured up. Put me down as having already given my adhesion to all these views of yours. Proceed, Sokrates—I supplicate you—to deal with me as I Kleitophon ave described ; in order that I may never more have
is on the occasion, when I talk with Lysias, to blame you on feaving: So- some points while praising you on othera I will
1 Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 B. Ταῦτα ταῦτα δὴ καὶ πρὸς Θρασύ Ἂ δὲ οὐ ἅπας οὐδὲ δὶς Baa πολὺν δὴ πορεύσομαι, καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι, δύναμαι ὑπομε μας χρόνον καὶ λιπαρῶν ἁἀπεί- “ile ἤδη nee εἴ γ᾽ ἐθέλοις σὺ τούτων ϑηκα ἐν ἤδη παύσασθαι πρὸς é λόγω 3 Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 Ο διὰ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν, co μὲ τῶν "
CuHap. XXXIV.
becoming happy.’
Timzus, Kritias.*
PLACE OF KLEITOPHON IN TETRALOGY. 419 repeat, that to one who has not yet received the mines necessary stimulus, your conversation is of inestim- fr yma- able value : but to one who has already been stimu- Cou, But lated, it is rather a hindrance than a help, to his ing he ad. |
ising the full iti f virt d th . realising the acquisition of virtue, an us last on out clearly . Sitly expli- The fragment called Kleitophon (of which I have Remarks on given an abstract comparatively long), is in several the Kleito- ways remarkable. The Thrasyllean catalogue places phon. Why it first in the eighth Tetralogy; the three other placed it in members of the same Tetralogy being, Republic, Tetralo 1 Though it is both short, and jteforethe abrupt in its close, we know that it was so likewise in Republic, antiquity : the ancient Platonic commentators ob- with ἘΠ serving, that Sokrates disdained to make any reply to δεν μος ment.
the appeal of Kleitophon.* There were therefore in
this Tetralogy two fragments, unfinished works from the begin-
ning—Kleitophon and Kritias.
We may explain why Thrasyllus placed the Kleitophon in immediate antecedence to the Republic : because 1. It complains
1 Plato, Kleitophon, PB. 410 oh 4
τον τοῦ πὶ τέλος a.
3 Diog. L. fifi. 59. The Kleitophon vindicated the
also was one of the dialogues by some students of Plato as pro be studied first of . 1.
est, quod spurium Clitophontem pleri-
que omnes mutilatum putant;
ex auctoris manibus tm truncam exci
inde intelligitur, |
acre Platonici p nifosophi, quibus anti- exemplaria ad manum erant,
Habuerunt integriorem. fProclus in
Time. i. p. 7. rode 8¢ ὁ Πλα-
τωνικὸς Κλειτοφῶντα αὐτὸν οἴεται εἶναι.
ἐν τῷ ὁ
es selected dialogue, though many of 0:
uod ne vetusti qui- dial
ough di ocet not consider it spurious.
Plotarchus in Solone.” Boeckh here characterises the Kleitophon as spurious, in which opi- nion I do not concur. Yxem, Dissertation, Ueber Platon’s Kleitophon, Berlin, 1846, has
uineness Ὁ of this ments are such as T caniot subucrib Ὁ He shows farther, that the first idea of distrusting the uineness of the Kleitophon arose the fact that the 6 was printed in the Aldine edition o: 1518 along with the spurious Aldin editi altho dito at resaly 8 on nee rs 6 announce tha that this μα δὺς Ἄρτα and that the dial ialogue ought. to have been printed as t as f the eighth tetralogy. Y 82-38. Subsequent editors follow the Aldine in printing the dialogue among the spurious th eclaring ey did
490 KLEITOPHON. Cuap. XXXIV.
bitterly of the want of a good explanation of Justice, which Sokrates in the latter books of the Republic professes to furnish. 2. It brings before us Kleitophon, who announces an inclination to consult Thrasymachus : now both these personages appear in the first book of the Republic, in which too Thrasymachus is introduced as disputing in a brutal and insulting way, and as humiliated by Sokrates: so that the Republic might be con- sidered both as an answer to the challenge of the Kleitophon, and as a reproof to Kleitophon himself for having threatened to quit Sokrates and go to Thrasymachus.
Like so many other pieces in the Thrasyllean catalogue, the Kleitophon Kleitophon has been declared to be spurious by
and perfect Schleiermacher and other critics of the present cen-
ly in aan tury. I see no ground for this opinion, and I believe Fast lneory the dialogue to be genuine. If it be asked, how can of Plato. we imagine Plato to have composed a polemic argu- ment, both powerful and unanswered, against Sokrates,—I reply, that this is not so surprising as the Parmenidés: in which Plato has introduced the veteran so named as the successful assailant not only of Sokrates, but of the Platonic theory of Ideas defended by Sokrates.
I have already declared, that the character of Plato is, in my judgment, essentially many-sided. It comprehends the whole process of searching for truth, and testing all that is propounded as such: it does not shrink from broaching and developing speculative views not merely various and distinct, but sometimes even opposite. |
Yet though the Kleitophon is Plato’s work, it is a sketch or It could not fragment never worked out. - In its present condition, havebeen it can hardly have been published (any more than the published = Krritias) either by his direction or during his life. I Plato's conceive it to have remained among his papers, to
have been made known by his school after his death, and to have passed from thence among the other Platonic manu- scripts into the Alexandrian library at its first foundation. Possibly it may have been originally intended as a preparation for the solution of that problem, which Sokrates afterwards undertakes in the Republic: for it is a challenge to Sokrates to explain what he means by Justice. It may have been intended
Cuap. XXXIV. WHY NOT FINISHED ? 421
as such, but never prosecuted :—the preparation for that solution being provided in another way, such as we now read in the first and second books of the Republic. That the great works of Plato—Republic, Protagoras, Symposion, &c.—could not have been completed without preliminary sketches and tentatives—we may regard as certain. That some of these sketches, though _ never worked up, and never published by Plato himself, should have been good enough to be preserved by him and published by those who succeeded him—is at the very least highly probable. One such is the Kleitophon.
When I read the Kleitophon, I am not at all surprised that Plato never brought it to a conclusion, nor ever pro- pessons vided Sokrates with an answer to the respectful, yet why tae on emphatic, requisition of Kleitophon. The case against was never Sokrates has been made so strong, that I doubt fmished. It whether Plato himself could have answered it to his he dofecte own satisfaction. It resembles the objections which just as he he advances in the Parmenidés against the theory of If con- Ideas : objections which he has nowhere answered, in the and which I do not believe that he could answer. “P87 The characteristic attribute of which Kleitophon complains in Sokrates is, that of a one-sided and incomplete efficiency—(qguors povdxwodos)— You are perpetually stirring us up and instigating us: you do this most admirably : but when we have become full of fervour, you do not teach us how we are to act, nor point out the goal towards which we are to move”.!_ Now this is precisely the description which Sokrates gives of his own efficiency, in the Platonic Apology addressed to the Dikasts. He lays especial stress on the mission imposed upon him by the Gods, to apply his Elenchus in testing and convicting the false persuasion of knowledge universally prevalent :—to make sure by repeated cross-examination, whether the citizens pursued money and worldly advancement more energetically than virtue :—and to worry the Athenians with perpetual stimulus, like the gadfly exciting a high-bred but lethargic horse. Sokrates describes this
1Ι have in an earlfer chapter (ch. roms bya is the lan ad- vill. vol. i. p. 406) cited the passage— y Cicero to Varro coin- ‘*Philosophiam multis locis inchoasti: ciding Gabntantially with that o of Klei- ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum tophon here.
422 KLEITOPHON.
CHap. XXXIV.
not only as the mission of his life, but as a signal benefit and privilege conferred upon Athens by the Gods! But here his services end. He declares explicitly that he shares in the uni- versal ignorance, and that he is no wiser than any one else, except in being aware of his own ignorance. He disclaims all power of teaching :? and he deprecates the supposition,—that he himself knew what he convicted others of not knowing,—as a mistake which had brought upon him alike unmerited reputation and great unpopularity. We find thus that the description given by Sokrates of himself in the Apology, and the reproach addressed to Sokrates by Kleitophon, fully coincide. “My mission from the Gods” (says Sokrates), “is to dispel the false persuasion of knowledge, to cross-examine men into a painful conviction of their own ignorance, and to create in them a lively impulse towards knowledge and virtue: but I am no wiser than. they : I can teach them nothing, nor can I direct them what to do.”—That is exactly what I complain of (remarks Kleitophon) : I have gone through your course,—have been electrified by your Elenchus,—and am full of the impulse which you so admirably communicate. In this condition, what I require is, to find out how, or in which direction I am to employ that impulse. If you cannot tell me, I must ask Thrasymachus or some one else. Moreover, it is not merely in the declarations of Sokrates him- The same Self before the Athenian Dikasts, but also in the Pla- defects also tonic Sokrates as exhibited by Plato in very many of coeae of the his dialogues, that the same efficiency, and the same Platonic deficiency, stand conspicuous. The hearer is con- phontic dia- victed of ignorance, on some familiar subject which he believed himself to know : the protreptic stimulus is powerful, stinging his mind into uneasiness which he cannot appease except by finding some tenable result : but the didactic supplement is not forthcoming. Sokrates ends by creating a painful feeling of perplexity in the hearers, but he himself shares
‘eat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 28 E, 29 D-E, 80 A 80 E: προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ πὸ "θεοῦ ὥσπερ ἵππῳ
μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γωναίῳ, ὑπὸ μ
μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ conde ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός Tivos ° οἷον δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς
ρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὁνειδίξων ἕνα
ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύο τὴν ἡ ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. 86 Ὁ, 41 E.
2 Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 21 D—22 Ὁ 88 A: ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος οὐδενὸς πώποτ᾽ ἐγενόμην.
3 Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 28 A, 28 A.
CHap. XXXIV. NEGATION AND STIMULUS. 423
the feeling along with them. It is this which the youth Protar- chus deprecates, at the beginning of the Platonic Philébus ;! and with which Hippias taunts Sokrates, in one of the Xenophontic conversations *—insomuch that Sokrates replies to the taunt by giving a definition of the Just (τὸ δίκαιον, upon which Hippias comments. But if the observations ascribed by Xenophon to Hippias are a report of what that Sophist really said, we only see how inferior he was to Sokrates in the art of cross-questioning : for the definition given by Sokrates would have been found altogether untenable, if there had been any second Sokrates to apply the Elenchus to it.? Lastly, Xenophon expressly tells us, that there were others also, who, both in speech and writing, © imputed to Sokrates the same deficiency on the affirmative side.*
The Platonic Kleitophon corresponds, in a great degree, to these complaints of Protarchus and others, as well as to the taunt of Hippias. The case is put, however, | yet respect. with much greater force and emphasis: as looked at, jn which not by an opponent and outsider, like Hippias—nor these de- by a mere novice, unarmed though eager, like Pro- forth in the tarchus—but by a companion of long standing, who oroenbie” has gone through the full course of negative gym- to answer nastic, is grateful for the benefit derived, and feels such a way that it is time to pass from the lesser mysteries to the %*' hold greater. He is sick of perpetual negation and stimu- the ve lus: he demands doctrines and explanations, which will hold good against the negative Elenchus of Pupil Sokrates himself. But this is exactly what Sokrates cannot give. His mission from the Delphian God finishes with the negative : inspiration fails him when he deals with the affir- mative. He is like the gadfly (his own simile) in stimulating
1 Plato, Philébus, p. 20 A. γράφουσί re καὶ λέγονσι περὶ αὑτοῦ
3 We need only compare the obser. wove int ἀρίτὴν τρόσεστον ἰχεγονάναν,
vations made by Hippias in that dia- προαγαγεῖν δὲ ἐπ’ αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανόν--- logue, to the objections raised So- σκεψάμενοι μὴ μόνον, ἄς. krates himself in his conversation with ee also Cicero, De Oratore, i. 47 Euthydémus, Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 2, and 204, in which Sokrates is represented to the e of the youthful Alki- as saying that concifatio (xporpo ἢ) was biades (evidently borrowed from So- all t uired ; di krates) with Perikles, ib. i. 2, 40-47. need dance : would find out 4Xenoph. Memor. i. 4, 1. εἰ δέ the way for th ves: and Yxem, τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν, ὡς evo. Ueber ’s Kleitophon, pp. 6-12.
424 KLEITOPHON. Cuap. XXXIV.
the horse—and also in furnishing no direction how the stimulus is to be expended. His affirmative dicta——as given in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, are for the most part plain, home- bred, good sense,—in which all the philosophical questions are slurred over, and the undefined words, Justice, Temperance, Holiness, Courage, Law, &., are assumed to have a settled meaning agreed to by every one: while as given by Plato, in the Republic and elsewhere, they are more speculative, high- flown, and poetical,! but not the less exposed to certain demo- lition, if-the batteries of the-Sokratic Elenchus were brought to bear upon them. The challenge of Kileitophon is thus unanswerable. It brings out in the most forcible, yet respect- ful, manner the contrast between the two attributes of the Sokratic mind : in the negative, irresistible force and originality : in the affirmative, confessed barrenness alternating with honest, acute, practical sense, but not philosophy. Instead of this, Plato gives us transcendental hypotheses, and a religious and poetical ideal ; impressive indeed to the feelings, but equally inadmissible to a mind trained in the use of the Sokratic tests.
We may thus see sufficient reason why Plato, after having The Kleito. τᾶ Up the Kleitophon as preparatory basis for a phon repre- dialogue, became unwilling to work it out, and left it sentsa point a, an unfinished aketch. He had, probably without Stoo intending it, made out too strong a case against So- must have krates and against himself. If he continued it, he insisted on would have been obliged to put some sufficient reason krates and into the mouth of Sokrates, why Kleitophon should
Ι abandon his intention of frequenting some other teacher : and this was a hard task. He would have been obliged to lay before Kleitophon, a pupil thoroughly inoculated with his own negative estrus, affirmative solutions proof against such subtle cross-examination: and this, we may fairly assume, was not merely a hard task, but impossible. Hence it is that we possess the Kleitophon only as ἃ fragment.
Yet I think it a very ingenious and instructive fragment :
1The explanation of Justice given Justice furnished by (or ascribed to) by Plato in. in the Re Republic deserves to the poet Simonides bed much in the same wo
vigaro, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Σιμωνίδης wocy- Ἢ Sokrates employs (Bepub, i ip. 882 s ral τὸ Bixasov ὃ εἴη.
CHap. XXXIV. FIRST PURPOSE OF THE KLEITOPHON. 425
setting forth powerfully, in respect to the negative The Eleito- philosophy of Sokrates and Plato, a point of view phon was which must have been held by many intelligent Tio das contemporaries. Among all the objections urged 4 first book against Sokrates and Plato, probably none was more public, but frequent than this protest against the continued fe ioure, negative procedure. This same point of view— answer. that Sokrates puzzled every one, but taught no one Beestne any thing—is reproduced by Thrasymachus against ἐκ ἐπε Sokrates in the first book of the Republic :! in which was substi- first book there are various other marks of analogy tated.
' with the Kleitophon.? It might seem as if Plato had in the
first instance projected a dialogue in which Sokrates was to discuss the subject of justice, and had drawn up the Kleitophon as the sketch of a sort of forcing process to be applied to Sokrates: then, finding that he placed Sokrates under too severe pressure, had abandoned the project, and taken up the same subject anew, in the manner which we now read in the Republic. The task which he assigns to Sokrates, in this last-mentioned dialogue, is far easier. Instead of the appeal made to Sokrates by Kleito- phon, with truly Sokratic point—we have an assault made upon him by Thrasymachus, alike angry, impudent and feeble ; which just elicits the peculiar aptitude of Sokrates for humbling the boastful affirmer. Again in the second book, Glaukon and Adeimantus are introduced as stating the difficulties which they feel in respect to the theory of Justice: but in ἃ manner totally different from Kleitophon, and without any reference to previous Sokratic requirements. Each of them delivers an eloquent and forcible pleading, in the manner of an Aristote- lian or Ciceronian dialogue: and to this Sokrates makes his reply. In that reply, Sokrates explains what he means by Justice ; and though his exposition is given in the form of short questions, each followed by an answer of acquiescence, yet no
1 Plat. Repub. pp. 336 D, 887 A, ing—rd δέον--τὸ ὠφέλιμον---τὸ Avar- Ao P PP th πλοῦν τ τὸ εἶν έρον ---τὸ κερδάλεον, 2 ΕῸΣ example, That it is not the ub. i. p. 336, C-D. province of the just man to hurt any These are exactly the unsatisfactory one, either friend or foe, Repub. p. definitions which leitophon describes 885 Ὁ. If (p. 409 C) as having received Thrasymachus derides any such from the partisans of Sokrates. definitions of τὸ δίκαιον as the follow-
496 KLEITOPHON. Cuap. XXXIV.
real or serious objections are made to him throughout the whole. ‘ The case must have been very different if Plato had continued the dialogue Kleitophon ; so as to make Sokrates explain the theory of Justice, in the face of all the objections raised bya . Sokratic cross-examiner.!
1 Schleiermacher (Einleitung, v. pp. the Truth: is, That it is repelled in 453-455) considers the Kleitophon not none, confirmed in many, and tho- to be the work of Plato. But this only rou ‘ratified by Sokrates himself shows that he, like many other critics, in the Platonic Apology. attaches scarcely the smallest -im- Schleiermacher thinks that the portance to the presumption arising Kleitophon is an attack upon Sokrates rom the Canon of Thrasyllus. For and the Sokratic men, Plato included, the grounds by which he justifies his made by some opponent out of the isallowance of the dialogue are tothe best rhetorical ools. He calls it last degree trivial. “8, parody and caricature” of the I note with surprise one of his Sokratic manner. To me it seems no assertions: ‘‘ How” (he asks) “ΟΣ caricature at all. It is a very fair from what motive can Plato have application of the Sokratic or Platonic introduced an. attack upon Sokrates, manner. Nor is it conceived by any which is thoroughly repelled, both means in the spirit of an enemy, but seriously and ironicall: ἢ almost all in that of an established companio the Platonic dialogues?” res and grateful, yet dissatisfi As I read Plato, on the contrary: at finding that he makes no progress.
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not only as the mission of his life, but as a signal benefit and privilege conferred upon Athens by the Gods! But here his services end. He declares explicitly that he shares in the uni- versal ignorance, and that he is no wiser than any one else, except in being aware of his own ignorance. He disclaims all power of teaching :* and he deprecates the supposition,—that he himself knew what he convicted others of not knowing—as a mistake which had brought upon him alike unmerited reputation and great unpopularity. We find thus that the description given by Sokrates of himself in the Apology, and the reproach addressed to Sokrates by Kleitophon, fully coincide. “My mission from the Gods” (says Sokrates), “is to dispel the false persuasion of knowledge, to cross-examine men into a painful conviction of their own ignorance, and to create in them a lively impulse towards knowledge and virtue : but I am no wiser than. they: Ican teach them nothing, nor can I direct them what to do."—That is exactly what I complain of (remarks Kleitophon) : Thave gone through your course,—have been electrified by your Elenchus,—and am full of the impulse which you so admirably communicate. In this condition, what I require is, to find out how, or in which direction I am to employ that impulse. If you cannot tell me, I must ask Thrasymachus or some one else, Moreover, it is not merely in the declarations of Sokrates him- ‘the same Self before the Athenian Dikasts, but also in the Pla- defects also tonic Sokrates as exhibited by Plato in very many of ΒΩ οἰ δος his dialogues, that the same efficiency, and the same Platonic" deficiency, atand conspicuous. ‘The hearer is con- [βομείρ dia. vioted of ignorance, on some familisr subject which he believed himself to know : the protreptic stimulus is powerful, etinging his mind into uneasiness which he cannot appease except by finding some tenable result : but the didactic supplement is not forthcoming. Sokrates ends by creating a painful feeling of perplexity in the hearers, but he himself shares
1 Plat. Apol. Sokr. BE, 2D-E, ἕκαστον οὐδὲν SPOR BD ΤΟΣ ccs alee
eat Bl ag edie, BALE οὐδενὸς πώποτ᾽
Fxiev καὶ πείθων καὶ ἐνειλίζων ἵνα 5 Plat, Apol. Sokr. pp. 28 A, 28 A.
“™
fp, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δ) νωϑεστέρῳ καὶ ΕΣ ΣΟ “bint, Apel. Sokr, pp. δ Ὁ δὲ Ὁ