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PLATO

AS A NARRATOR.

A

STUDY IN THE MYTHS,

BY

W. A. HARRIS.


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR
OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
JUNE, 1892.

315-0
27/10/95

RICHMOND:
WALTHALL BROTHERS.

3 1761 08693915 4





TO
MY PARENTS,
whose sacrifices and devotion have made the
life of a scholar possible.

ERRATA.

In spite of a double reading of the proof many errors have crept in. On page 7, line 14, for "s." read "S."

This mistake in the abbreviation for the German "Seit" has occurred with mortifying frequency. See page 8 line 34; page 10, foot-notes 1 and 2; page 11, line 21 and foot-note; page 14, foot-note; page 16, foot-notes 1 and 2; page 19, foot-note; page 22, foot-note; page 41, line 30.

Page 11, line 26, for "εἶσιν" read "εἰσιν."

Page 12, line 3, for "eliptical" read "elliptical."

Page 14, line 23, for "εἰρομένη" read "εἰρομένη."

Page 24, line 3, for "χαζιῶ" read "χαζῶ."

Page 26, line 23, for "δομηθεῖς" read "δομηθεῖς."

Page 30, line 20, for "σύννομος" read "συννομος."

Page 41, line 6, for "which" read "while."

One or two very obvious misprints have been passed without notice, such as "ἄγυυσα," page 35, line 16; "ἄν-ός," page 26, line 25, &c.

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PLATO.

Introduction.

Besides the many distinctive features of Plato's system of philosophy, we see a further peculiarity in his use of the myths which occur here and there throughout his dialogues. The part these play as an aid and embellishment to his dialectic, with their proper interpretation, has given rise to much discussion and caused infinite trouble to eminent philosophers, and in the number and variety of the views presented the subject is quite in keeping with the other topics of the interminable question of the Platonic canon. The chief difficulty of interpreting the myths lies in the fact that Plato is poet and artist as well as philosopher. How much of the myth is laden with deep philosophical thought, and how much is art, it is not always easy to determine. Very properly Zeller (Ph. d. Gr. s. 582) warns against pressing too much philosophical construction and confining too strictly poetical invention; for in the *Symposium*, *Politicus*, and in parts of other dialogues (*Phdr.*, *Repub.*), artistic considerations rather than philosophic necessity determines the use of the myth.

As a nation, the Greeks were thoroughly steeped in fable. In the nursery they doubtless learned the lore of birds and beasts; from their Bible—Homer—they recited the deeds of legendary gods and heroes; and these stories, altered and enlarged, were again and again presented from the stage. In *Aristophanes* (*Wasps* 1177, &c.,) we see what a hold fables and stories had on the popular mind. Since to the Greeks the myths were not a body of fixed dogma, but a living organism, Plato could easily and with propriety invent tales of "Egypt or any other country."

The term "myth" is of very wide application, including everything from the expression of a general truth, a natural law, a moral or religious idea to the concocting of a mere

fictitious story. Thus it borders closely on allegory, legend, fable, and sometimes even is made to include one or the other of these. To get a clearer idea of the myth we might attempt a distinction. In *allegory*, as in myth, some general idea is expressed; but in allegory the idea is grasped first and the form invented and adapted to this. It is conscious and reflective, while the myth is spontaneous, the thought and form springing into being together. *Legend*, like myth, is the unconscious embodiment of popular feeling, but it has to do rather with facts as concrete, with history and life; while myth deals more with facts as abstract, with speculation and thought. Between these two, however, we can often make no distinction, and it is needless to resort to much metaphysical refinement. The *fable* is a fictitious story contrived to inculcate a moral, and, like parable, is the result of conscious invention. According to Lessing the fable embodies a moral in a special case, which, being invested with reality, is narrated as a story. In form it is usually the simplest narrative, incident following upon incident in such a way as for the most part to dispense with the rules of art. Some of Plato's stories show one or the other of these elements. For the allegorical type of the myth, we may take Aristophanes' tale in the Symposium (189 D.) and the Birth of Erôs (*ib.* 203 A). The story in the Protagoras (320 C.) also has allegorical traits. As an example of pure allegory, we have "The Cave" (Repub. VII. 514 A. f.), which is no myth, though so considered by some, for the narrative form is lacking. In the story of Theuth (Phdr. 274 C.) and in the Critias we have a legendary vein: the story of Gyges (Repub. II. 359 D.), which is introduced by way of example, is almost pure legend. All the more philosophical myths, in so far as they have a moral purpose or assist in grasping truth, present points of similarity with the fable and the parable. Deuschle (Ueber pl. Mythen, s. 3), defines myth as "Eine der Volksreligion entnommene Form der Einkleidung für bestimmte Ideen," and he distinguishes between the myth of the people and the philosophic myth as follows: "Die Mythen des Volkes

schliessen dogmatische Sätze in sich; aber diese fassen sich zu einer einzigen Anschauung zusammen, welche ein Sein, eine vom Glauben erfasste Nothwendigkeit in der Form geschichtlicher Thatsachen, d. i. in der Form des Werdens und der Entwicklung sich zu versinnlichen und an der Stelle begrifflichen Zusammenhangs durch historische Verknüpfung zu erklären suchte." It is in Plato's use of this philosophical myth that we find his distinctive feature. Philosophy was the outgrowth of mythology, and the use of allegory as a popular manner of instruction was a legacy left to Plato by his predecessors, but he alone adopted the myth to seize and express conceptions which transcended experience—the origin of cosmos, the origin and destiny of man—conceptions out of the range of his dialectic. Thus from one side the myths are a proof of his artistic ability, but from a scientific point of view they show a limitation of his methodical thought and are a sign of weakness rather than of strength. As Zeller says, they show the point at which it becomes evident that as yet he cannot be wholly a philosopher, because he is still too much of a poet. Some of the myths are due to artistic considerations alone.

As to the philosophic worth of the myth, Aristotle distinguished between mythical poetry and narrative as mere art or fancy, and philosophic truth handed down *ἐν πολλοῖς ἀξιωματικῶς* (Metaph. 11, 8, 13). The former he considers unworthy of serious consideration, but from the latter he would collect what remnants there might be of an earlier true philosophy. So also the Platonic Socrates (Phdr. 275 B.) rebukes Phaedrus for thinking more of the source of the myth than of its truth. It was for the truth of the general scope of the myth Plato contended, not for the details (*cf.* Phaed. 114 D).

In addition to this philosophic element there is in the myth also a religious and poetic element. The Greeks were a religious people, but they were more concerned with worship than with doctrine. There was no uniform and universal system of theology, but a mythology handed down by tradition, and subjected to many variations both by the people

and the poets. The practice of certain philosophers of rationalizing this mythical religion, Plato (*Phdr.* 229 B.) disapproves as useless and ill-suited to the nature of the myth. He did not take lightly the popular religion, nor did he seek to overturn it as did some of the sophists, but his aim was to purify it and restore it to an ethic norm. As we see from the *Republic* (III. 377 A. f.) Hellenic myths are laid as the first foundation of instruction in his ideal state, only he would rid them of everything unworthy of the nature of God. His philosophy is moral conduct as well as theory and speculation, and for him the worth of the myth lies in its moral effect, rather than in its theoretic truth.¹ The myth is also a bond between his own philosophy and the mythical religion from which philosophy sprung. By his frequent appeal to tradition and antiquity for the authority and assurance of his myths, Plato strives to touch his hearers, not only through the intellect, but through the religious sense as well. Ackermann considers that what Moses and the prophets are for the evangelists, the god-inspired bards are for Plato.²

As to the poetic thought and elevated diction in Plato, much has been said both in antiquity and in modern times. Dionysius, it is true, finds fault with the highflown poetic diction of a certain passage in the *Phaedrus* and is greatly incensed at the disagreeably poetical style—a passage, however, which Aristotle, with more taste and insight, has amply defended in his *Rhetoric* (III. 7). It is not surprising that we find in Plato's philosophy so much that is poetical. Not only did Plato himself cultivate his poetic talent in his youth, but after the birth of philosophy, poetry was for a long while the only medium through which it might express its thought, and, even when prose was adapted to its needs, much of this mythical imagery and poetic symbolism still remained. It is mainly in the myths that Plato rises to his height of true poet.³

¹Zeller: *Phil. der Gr.*, s. 930 f. and cf. Fisher: *De Myth. Plat.*, p. 17.

²See Volquardsen, s. 13.

³Sybel (*Platons Symp.*, p. 50) says, the Plat. myth is not naïve religion, but conscious poetry, not properly myth, but poetically finished metaphor.

Here it is that his imagination is given full liberty, and he creates for us magnificent pictures in brilliant colors. It is natural that a poetic mind should seek to communicate with humanity through figures, since ordinary language is too feeble to express its thought, and from sheer poverty it is driven to a metaphorical dress, which alone can give some approximation to the intensity of its feeling. In Plato we have an expression of the poetic genius of the Greek nation.

The study of the myths has always been recognized as important for the proper appreciation of Plato. Novak¹ says of these myths: "Es gibt sich uns Platon auch eher darin so, wie er selbst war und dachte, als bei der nachahmenden dialektischen Manier, worin er gewiss seines Meisters Socrates Beispiel wahrte." Even though it were doubted that here we could perceive the true Plato better than in the short dialectic, a study of the myths would, nevertheless, commend itself, since in these we find Plato in his happiest mood. Many writers have treated the myths from a philosophic point of view, but none, it seems, have dealt with them solely for their literary merit. Since Dittenberger (*Hermes* 16, 1881, s. 321-345) applied the statistical method to the Platonic canon, an increased impetus has been given to the study of Plato's style. It is, therefore, the aim of the present dissertation to deal with the myths as narrative, to treat of the expression, considering the thought only because it is true *ὡς ἄρα τοὺς λόγους, ὧν περ εἶσαν ἐξηγηταί, τοῦτοιον ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐξηγηταὶς ἄριστος* (*Tim.* 29 B.) Narrative varies not only with the individual, but with the department as well. The epic narrative of Homer is a drama without actors (*Arist. Poet.*, 23. 1). It is a true drama with imaginary men, the poet concealing himself in the background and imitating by means of his language alone. Its most prominent feature is its elevation—elevation in diction, in thought, and also in conception. It is a "mirror of the universe."

As lyric poetry was to be sung instead of recited, we have

¹Platon u. die Rhetorik, *Jahrb. Phil. Sup.* XIII., 502. Compare also Hirzel: *Das Rhetorische bei Platon*, s. 74 f.

a fundamental difference between this and epic. The lyric poet does not conceal himself so completely, nor does he aim to give a clear and connected story; his narrative is elliptical and allusive, giving rather the *ζεζυιατα λόγων* (Pind. Pyth. IV. 116), but the charm of his music more than atones for any omission. As we see from Pindar—on whom we are dependent for lyrical narrative—first with broad strokes the general outline of the story is given and afterwards the details are painted in. It is anticipatory.

The dramatic narrative is a stirring narrative, and its greatest power is shown in depicting thrilling events. In this it has a certain mastery and is in many respects a model. The narrator is usually an eye-witness, or perhaps a participant in the scenes described, and either directly or by implication weaves into his story his own feelings and impressions, together with those of others. These are also anticipations, but they are different from lyric. The messenger must first deliver his message and then he may give the details. History, which is the prose representative of epic, divides itself into narration and speeches. The speech is usually connected with the narrative and serves to vivify as well as convey the deeper meaning of a period. The type of narrative is given by the epos but something is added from lyric and the drama. In his delineation of character Thucydides is dramatic, letting us form our own estimate of men through their words and deeds. He does not anticipate, but by a series of vigorous and lucid descriptions, lets his story unfold gradually from day to day, from event to event, without artificial arrangement or adornment. For oratory narrative is a variable but important element and may be as effective as argument itself. The orator aims to make a point and is at liberty to select and arrange his facts, making prominent that which is strongest. As is observable, especially in Lysias, the narrative is itself frequently a point, since it seeks to prejudice the hearer. Besides this the orator is limited in time, and consequently his narrative must be affected to a proportionate degree. Sometimes the argument and narrative are

one and cannot be separated; or they may run along side by side. Demosthenes is especially fond of this style of narrative, and other orators likewise split up the narrative when it is long. The pattern or basis of oratorical narrative will be found in the drama rather than in history. In Andocides, whose strength is in his narrative, we see the vivid, stirring narrative, with dramatic situations. Even the truthful simplicity of Lysias is but an artful simplicity.

For philosophical narrative we are dependent upon Plato, and since Plato is the department, a study of the myths is a study of philosophic narrative. It is, therefore, the purpose of this dissertation to present a study of these unique narratives, hoping that it may add something to an appreciation of the art of Plato. As these are a rhetorical element in Plato, an attempt has been made to point out some differences between them and our Attic oratorical models.

THE MYTHS.

All attempts at grouping the myths have proved unsatisfactory because of the manifold cross lines in substance and form which render classification almost or quite impossible. For the purposes of this dissertation these mythical narratives would naturally divide themselves into two classes—Socratic and Non-Socratic. The term "Socratic" here is intended to include, not simply those narratives put in the mouth of Socrates, but all which clearly belong to Plato himself; and in this sense the term is applicable to the story told by the stranger in the *Politicus*, or the Athenian stranger in the *Laws*, or Timæus in the dialogue of the same name. Of the Non-Socratic myths there are only three—*Protag.*, 320 C. f., *Symp.*, 189 D. f., *Repub.* II., 359 D. f.—and these may be considered first.

NON-SOCRATIC MYTHS.

Prometheus and Epimetheus. (*Protag.*, 320 C.—322 D.)

In the group under consideration, this story naturally comes first, since it is the oldest in form, and, moreover, if

we accept Dittenberger's¹ view of the order of Plato's dialogues, it is also oldest in time of all the myths. This story is put in the mouth of a sophist, and here the dramatic and mimetic art of Plato is clearly displayed. Up to this point, instead of coming at once to the question in hand, Protagoras could not refrain from self-laudation, giving a lengthy account of his principles and public career, with occasional thrusts at his rivals, and now in reply to the question whether virtue (*ἀρετή*) can be taught or not, he asks if he shall argue the point or use a myth *ὡς ποιητῶν τε εἶδος νεωτέρου*. Being given his choice, he chooses the latter, and begins in an old-fashioned, conventional way *Ὡς γὰρ ποτε χρόνος*— Then, based on the autochthonous origin of the Greeks, follows a story, which is brought forward as an answer to the first of the three points in the discussion, namely, why in a question of justice or any political virtue (*πολιτικὴ ἀρετή*) the Athenians allow every one to express an opinion, but permit only specialists in the case of carpentering and similar arts. This is in reality the starting point of the discussion, and its value for the final result of the dialogue is mainly negative, since it forms a part of a view which is to be controverted by Socrates. In structure the story is simple. The sentences are strung together loosely in the fashion of the *λέξις ἐπιρομένη*, and reminds us of the flowing style of Herodotus. Besides this similarity in style, there is a further similarity in point of tone between this narrative and the stories in which Herodotus abounds, though our sophist shows much more plainly his consciousness. In common with the rest of the sophists, Protagoras busied himself with Homer and the poets, so that it is not a mere accident that this story is epic in style and has a highly poetic coloring, but Plato gives us here the sophistic method of telling a story. In true sophistic fashion Protagoras undertakes to amuse his audience as well as to furnish a reply to the question at issue. Hence the narrative is given in the pleasing tone of the older stories. Moreover, we can-

¹Hermes, 16, (1881) s. 311 f. Schanz, however, places the Protagoras after Gorgias, but Zeller places it earlier, which is perhaps its true position.

not lose sight of the fact that it is Protagoras who is talking, his own consciousness, with a certain amount of affectation cropping out continually. As compared with the rest of the speech, the myth has a decided straining after archaisms and finery. This is shown by his many poeticisms, by his large use of the imperfect and the vulgar frequency of the historical present. In 321 C. and 322 A. we have good examples of polysyndeton, in 321 B. litotes occurs, in 322 C. *λόγμοι τε καὶ δεσμοί* has somewhat the effect of paronomasia, and the whole story shows a fondness for antithetical balance. In short, we have the same striving after beauty and richness of expression that is discerned in the Ionic fragment. (See Blass² I., 28.) In conformity with his habit as a sophist, Protagoras readily poses as teacher (cf. 320 C.), but he is a teacher with a showy and popular manner, who adopts from the people a commonly received opinion and expands and illustrates it. He does not stop to analyze his first step—he simply teaches in a more effective way the virtue which every one teaches (328 B.) The myth shows the verbosity of Protagoras.

Aristophanes' Tale. (Symp. 189 D.—191 D.)

In the Symposium, which is stylistically the most perfect and most finished of Plato's works, the philosopher becomes pre-eminently the dramatic poet, and this dialogue, consisting, as it does, of a series of speeches, is extremely interesting from a literary point of view. The theme is Erôs, and after Phædrus, Pausanias and Eryximachus had expressed their views, Aristophanes takes up the subject and continues the discussion. The opinions of those before him he does not accept, and begins *ab integro*. He considers that men have not praised Erôs worthily, since Erôs is the source of the greatest blessings to mankind; yet before telling of the power of this Erôs he proposes to treat of the early nature and condition of man. After this preamble Aristophanes launches into this fantastic story about the origin of the sexes, the nature of primal man, and why and in what way a change in this na-

ture was brought about. The exordium is simple, but as the story proceeds it is varied, enlivened and heightened by the introduction of Zeus; then again it falls back into the simple narrative style. The sentences are well constructed in accordance with the *λέξις κατεσχημμένη*. The diction is the simple, elegant diction of conversation, without forced parallelisms or over-adornment. As is seen in the large use of the imperfect, the story is almost wholly, or at least very largely, descriptive and didactic, with a vein of comedy running through the whole. The frequent comparisons assist in explaining the conception and are also employed here and there with comic effect. Very much in the manner of Plato himself, Aristophanes uses a concrete example to express an abstract conception, but true to the comic nature of the real Aristophanes, the form chosen is grotesque and fantastic, and is humorously yet accurately carried out to the minutest details. This speech of Aristophanes, therefore, though it may not be an exact representation of the genial comedian, is much in the vein of the "Birds," and Hug¹ points out several scenes drawn from the works of Aristophanes. The council of the Gods is truly Aristophanic in spirit. In spite of its seeming frivolity, this story is not all fun, for Aristophanes is a preacher in his way, and his view is a decided advance on those of his predecessors. It serves as an introduction to the rest of the speeches and furnishes a beautiful thought for his definition of Erôs: *τὸν ἔλθον ἐπιθυμία καὶ δῖος ἐστὶν* (192 E.)—a view afterwards touched on by Socrates. As Hug² observes, we have in the narration of the *παθήματα* of the human race (ch. xv.) a true model of a *διήγησις*.

The Ring of Gyges. (Repub. II: 359 D.—360 B.)

This story is simply a fictitious example introduced by Glaucon to illustrate the proposition that the just are just only because they have not the power to be unjust, for, if they had unrestrained liberty, they could not resist the temp-

¹ Platons Symposion, Einleitung s. LI. and cf. note.

² *Ib.*, Einleitung s. LII.

tation prompting to the gratification of their desires. The story, then, has no philosophical worth, but is intended solely to elucidate this proposition—a proposition which is afterwards to be overthrown by Socrates.

In style it is simple and straightforward, and is given wholly in indirect discourse. The compass is brief and within that brief compass the treatment is artistic. Such little touches as the way in which Gyges discovered and tested the magic power of the ring (360 A.), make it more real and pleasing. The version of the story given by Herodotus (I: 8-14) is very different, but there are certain resemblances. The two persons stand in the relation of sovereign and subject, and the result in each case is the same. In Herodotus the story is given fully, and is made as interesting as possible. In Plato, however, Glaucon is not telling his story simply for the sake of the story, but in order the better to explain a position, which, for the sake of argument, he has assumed. Consequently everything that does not bear on the point is suppressed, only enough being added to make the myth a story and not a statement. In moral tone this narrative is widely different from the Socratic narratives, but the healthy moral sentiment, which is always found running through the stories of Socrates, could not be expected here. Indeed, the Ring of Gyges should be classed under the head of fictitious examples rather than myths.

SOCRATIC MYTHS.

In the use of these myths we find the distinctive feature of Plato, for he uses them not simply as myths but as a part of his philosophy—they are a blending of *μῦθος* and *λόγος*. It is in the blending of these two, and not in the use of the myth, that Plato's originality consists. Yet, the Socratic myths, as we have defined them, include two stories found in the *Phaedrus* (259 A. and 274 C.) which have no value for Plato's philosophy, and must, therefore, be excepted from the above remarks. These, however, since they are given in the name

of Plato, are important as representing his artistic side, and may be considered before the philosophic myths.

The Cicadas (Phdr. 259 A.-D.)

Socrates has but lately emerged from his *παλινοῦδία* (257 A.) and the conversation now begins to lag. Phaedrus, who has evidently been dazzled by the magnificence of the recantation, is becoming drowsy, and to arouse his flagging spirits Socrates introduces this little story, ending with an exhortation to philosophical research. The use of the myth is purely artistic. Not only does it form an interlude between the two main parts of the work; but it also carries us back to the scenery of the dialogue, the plane-tree and the brook. (Thompson ad loc.) The first part of the story is really an introduction—a hint, which immediately arrests the attention of Phaedrus and, upon his solicitation, the story of the Cicadas is then given. “The story grows naturally out of the surroundings, and the graceful myth is made to carry a lesson and an appeal. The delight of the service of the muses prepares the climax, which is exceedingly effective. Calliope and Urania the elder of the muses, are the representation of philosophy and the example of the *φιλόμουσοι τέττιγες* urges the *φιλόμουσοι ἄνδρες* to discourse and not to sleep.”

Truth, or the Invention of Writing (Phdr. 274 C.-275 B.)

Up to this point Socrates has been disposing of a question preliminary to the theme proposed in 259 E. as the subject for the day's discussion, but he now returns to the original thread of the discourse; bringing forward the subject which has been kept in the back-ground—*ὅτι καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅτι μή*. In form the story is a legend and is used simply as an introduction to the discussion which follows. The story is started in the indirect discourse, but passes easily and naturally into the direct, after which it is further enlivened by a manner of dialogue between the god and the king, and ends with the more extended comments of the latter. In style it

is very compact, with many terse sentences and with frequent hyperbaton, there being about five examples.

The chief and largest group to be considered is the philosophic or truly Platonic myths. In presenting them, it will be endeavored to give them, as far as possible, in the order of time and development.

The Judgment after Death (Gorg. 523 A.-524 A.)

This myth is evidently to be put first in this class. It is the simplest and apparently the most naïve, forming a decided contrast to the elaborate myths of the Phaedrus and Republic. In the Gorgias Socrates has not simply been waging war against rhetoric, but there is a deeper moral question at issue, and he makes use of this story to show more clearly that happiness is not a matter of power but of the soul. As a part of the dramatic setting the story is natural and appropriate, and is framed in accordance with the persons of the dialogue. The key-note with which Socrates begins his narrative—ὥς ἀληθῆ γὰρ - - λέγετε—shows that the story is told for a moral purpose and that it bears on Plato's ethical theory. Though Socrates does not care whether the story itself be considered a μῦθος or a λόγος, he is very particular that the truth which underlies the scenic form shall fall with convicting power upon his audience, especially Callicles, and the myth is mainly a concrete illustration and application of principles already stated before. In conformity with Plato's plan of purifying mythology (Repub. III. 377 A.¹) Zeus gains his kingdom, not through violence, but by inheritance, and indeed, the moral import of the dialogue would not tolerate the commonly accepted story. In point of style this myth is straightforward and simple, but it does not lack elevation, and the flow of the sentence is majestic. But as if the style might be a snare, as if its very movement and its figurative language might distract the listeners, each figure is made so clear and simple that there can be no mistake. Thus Socrates is particular to explain each point, as for example ἀπερχόμενοι - - -

¹Teichmüller: Die Platonische Frage s. 95.

κρίνονται. ζῶντες γὰρ κρινοῦνται (523 C.) Owing to the exigencies of conversational style the narrative is broken and explanatory as in 523 C. D. and E. Also an ἔφρ or ἢ δ' αὖς is interjected to show that the speaker still continues the narrative, which is especially the case where Zeus appears on the scene. Here the repeated ἔφρ and the ἢ δ' αὖς strongly indicate the change to the direct form. Noticeable even in this short story is Plato's fondness for paronomasia—δίκαια δικάζονται, αἱ κρινομένηται κρινοῦνται, and μάρτυρες μαρτυροῦσιντες (523 C.) A poetic word here and there (σφεν 523 C., ἐπιπροσθεῖν ib. D.) is not out of place nor does Plato avoid the forms in—τέλον (523 D. E.), "which seem to have been colloquial in their origin, though we still want a perfect digest of their use as a mark of this sphere." Significant as bearing directly on the moral purpose of this story is the combination of the synonymous words δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως (523 A.), ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, and τίσιώς τε καὶ δίκης (ib. B.) In this way, by dwelling longer on the thought, he emphasizes it: here also one thought is put over against the other by an antithetical balance. Most of the story is enlivened by being put in direct discourse, the law once stated, the unfolding of the story is left to the gods.

Souls in the Lower World (Phaed. 107 D.—114 C.)

Though it is usual to place the Phaedo after some of the dialogues which follow in the list here presented, there is, however, some authority for the present position, and this myth most naturally follows the one in the Gorgias, with which it has points of similarity. It is considerably longer and more elaborate than the Gorgias myth, but, coming at the end of the discourse, it has a similar function, and also a resemblance in its moral tone. The scenery and situation of this dialogue is pathetic; the theme is courage in the face of death, and the argument turns mainly on the immortality of the soul. Socrates endeavors to show that one should necessarily be courageous, for, since the soul is immortal, there is no such thing as death. Having established this position, he employs this story to emphasize the necessity of giving proper

care and training to the soul during the present life. In form the story is complex, and its contents are drawn very largely from the popular religion. At first Socrates gives a brief sketch of the different condition of the untrained soul from that of the trained, but led on by the request of Simmias, he proceeds to enlarge upon the beauties of the real world and the wonders and horrors of the infernal regions. At the end the exhortation to philosophic virtue and the disavowal of dogmatism show the myth to be introduced mainly for its moral effect. The description forms a most fitting close to the last discourse of Socrates. In this story much of the beauty of language in the dialogue is concentrated. Here and there are rhythmical sentences with occasional touches of quiet and pathetic humor. On the whole the sentences are periodic, and care is taken for the proper emphasis of words, as is seen in the frequent occurrence of hyperbaton. A good example is afforded in 109 B.—*γῆν καθαράν ἐν καθαροῦ κελύθειαι κ. τ. λ.*—where we have the additional force of the alliteration. Also, synonymous words are combined with effect, *ε. γ. φέρει τε καὶ ὑπεχρῆσται* - - - (108 B.), *ἐκδὸς καὶ ἀνακρίψας* (109 D.), *φύμας τε καὶ μαντείας* - - - (111 B.) *ἴσοσσί τε καὶ χαλοῶσαν* - - - (114 A.), and similarly other examples could be cited, altogether more than twelve in number. Noteworthy is *πολὸν πῶρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμούςς* (111 D.), in which the alliteration also adds much to the effect. The *σχήμα ἐπιμοιολογικόν* occurs in 111 A. *θῆματα* - - - *θεατῶν*, in 112 B. *ἐκπνεῖ* - - - *πνεῦμα*, and in 113 E. *ἡμαρτηζένοι ἀμαρτήματα*. Polysyndeton is also frequent; as examples may be noted 110 D. and E., 111 B., 112 C., where in each case there is an enumeration of several objects. In the course of this story the narrator uses as many as twelve comparisons, which serve to explain the picture, and some add considerable vivacity. The chiasm *καλόν* - - - *μεγάλη* in the closing sentence is effective.

The Begetting of Eidos (Symposium 203 A.—204 A.)

The myth we are now to consider has a decided allegorical coloring, which is indicated by the personification of *πῶρος* and *πενία*. It is, however, used to help establish a point which is to

clear up the discussion, and so has a bearing on Plato's philosophy. Socrates opens his speech with a short argument, and by using a simple distinction which has escaped their notice, contravenes the views of his predecessors. Thereupon he proceeds to rehearse the tale which he has heard from the wise Diotima, to which is prefaced a portion of the conversation between them. As Hug¹ shows, this speech of Socrates as a whole is really a Platonic dialogue, and Diotima is none other than the true Platonic Socrates. The story is simple and is employed to explain the nature of Erôs as a *δαίμων*, as intermediate between the divine and the mortal, as neither wise nor ignorant. Since the latter part of the story gives the attributes of Erôs, it amounts almost to a definition. For this reason the myth has little description and the tenses are mainly tenses of statement. Also such expressions as *ἔρασταις ὄν* (203 C.), *χαίρειταις ὄν* (ib. D.), &c., show reflection on the part of the narrator. Worthy of note is the multiplication of participial clauses in 203 D., where the characteristics of Erôs are given.

The Winged Souls (Phdr. 246 D.—256 E.)

This story is one of the most poetical and magnificent to be found among the myths. In it Plato rises into the region of abstractions, and gives us glimpses of the marvellous scenery of the celestial firmament. It is almost dithyrambic in the fervor of its expression, and forms a most appropriate climax to the rich scenery of the Phaedrus—scenery such as can be found in no other dialogue of Plato. Like the myth just considered in the symposium, this also has a decided allegorical coloring, but it is grander and more elaborate. Like that, too, it is more than mere allegory, for, though in the beginning of the narration, a tripartite division of the soul is made, in the contemplation of divine and human souls, it becomes seemingly lost; so much so that before entering upon a new phase of the subject Socrates thinks it necessary to revert (253 C.) to the original division. Just before begin-

¹Platon's Symposium, Einleitung s. LVII u. LVIII.

ning this description of the winged steeds and the charioteer, Socrates give a short, but magnificent description of the "self-moved." This is the proem, forming a general introduction and outline for the whole, and from this, with the help of a figure, he passes to his description of souls, human and divine.

Especially noteworthy is the descriptive power shown in this narrative. Throughout the whole there are graphic touches. The train of Zeus (246 E. f.) furnishes an excellent example of description combined with rich music. In 247 D.-E. by a few strokes he gives a pleasing picture of the gods. Here we may notice how with the anaphora *καθορᾶ μὲν* - - - *διζαιοσύνην. καθορᾶ δὲ* *ζ. τ. λ.*, he lingers over the privileges enjoyed by divine intelligence. In the characterization of the good and the bad horse (253 D.-E.) we have a graphic enumeration of details to the effect of which the asyndeton and the antithetical balance contribute. Still more graphic is the rearing and pitching of the unruly horse (254 B.-E.) The turbulent character of the passage is shown in the excessive use of the participle. Throughout the style is largely descriptive, with occasionally a logical tone, which is especially noticeable near the end. Considering the large number of comparisons used in the Phaedo myth, we find a comparatively small number here, but we could hardly expect more in a story so wild and fantastic. There are about five in all. The sentences in structure are periodic and sometimes involved, but have a rhythmic flow, with frequent hyperbaton. Besides the usual combination of synonyms for stress, polysyndeton is frequent (248 B., 250 C., 252 A. and C.), and asyndeton occurs in 246 E., 255 E., also as mentioned above, in the description of the good and the bad horse (253 D.) and in that of the unruly horse (254 D.) The diction throughout the whole is in keeping with the elevated, sometimes grandiloquent style. As examples we might take *δαίτια καὶ* - - *θειόνην* (247 A.), *ἄγρων* - - - *ἀφ᾽ ἰδα* (247 B.) *ὑπαδῶν* (252 C.), *ὀδύνας ἔδοκεν* (254 E.) We may also notice the use of the following cases of paronomasia, *βίωσαν βίου* (249 B.), *τελέως* - - - *τελειώμενος, τέλειος* *ζ. τ. λ.* (249 C.), *Δίος Διον* (252 E.), *πάθος παθῶν* (254 E.), *γενῶν-αι. γενέσθαι* (256 E.)

Besides these many other cases of recurrent sound which add to the rhythm and emphasis might be added, such as *ὄν ὄντων* (248 E.), *πᾶσαν πάλτατος* (253 C.), *κατὸν κατῶν* (254 B.), and expressions of a similar character. Alliteration also is frequent.

The Three Classes of Men (Repub. III. 414 D.-415 C.)

This story Socrates himself designates a *ῥῆθος* (415 C.), and gives it with a display of his assumed modesty. In this respect it is different from the other myths; but it is truly Socratic, since it is employed to put forth in general terms the new principle of the transposition of ranks. Thus Plato avoids going into details. The story is short and vigorous, and told with gravity in spite of the profession of Socrates. Its resemblance to Greek tradition was a sufficient verification for it, although it seems a monstrosity. Like the other Greek states, the Platonic republic was to have a myth respecting its origin. On the whole the story is lacking in embellishment, which may be accounted for partly by the vein of seriousness pervading it. Plato applies it directly to the purpose for which he introduces it.

The Vision of Er (Repub. X. 614 B.-to end.)

This myth, though not so magnificent as that of the Phaedrus, has, nevertheless, a grandeur peculiarly its own, and forms a most appropriate close to the Republic¹. Here, as in Phaedo and Gorgias, the myth gives a view of the future life, as supplementary to a discussion with regard to the soul. In the story there is a strange mingling of symbolism, mysticism, astronomy and mythology, giving topographical arrangements which are not perfectly clear. It has also a decidedly original coloring. Socrates, having spoken of the recompenses which await the just and unjust in this life, now turns to those of the future life to show that the principles discussed are eternal and divine. The story opens with a pun, and is given as a report from Er. Sometimes, as in 615 D.,

¹See Stallbaum on Repub. X. 614 B.

617 D. and 619 B., Socrates enlivens his narrative with a verbatim report, and sometimes, as in 616 D. and 618 B., C., he interjects remarks of his own. In 615 D., where a description is given of things that Er did not behold, the direct narrative shades off so gradually into indirect that it is difficult to distinguish between Er and his informant. Similarly, in 616 D., it is hard to tell where the remarks of Socrates end and the account of Er is resumed. It makes no difference, since it is all "true."

Besides the pun in the opening of the story, we also have a play on Ἀτροπος in ἀμετάστροφᾳ (620 E.) Ἀθήνης πεδίων and Ἀμύλητα ποταμὸν, ὃ - - - στέγειν add touches of mysticism as well as of beauty. The story is for the most part given in a loose and flowing style, after the manner of the λέξις εἰρομένη. On this account the terseness and brevity of such a passage as 617 D.-E. is all the more effective. Throughout the myth there are touches of beauty, and the closing sentence has been much admired for its stately rhythm. The story has a naturalness and a degree of earnestness which makes it highly credible. This is especially apparent when compared with Cicero's "Somnium Scipionis," an imitation of this myth, but inferior in dramatic power. It lacks the ease and grace of its Greek model and does not carry the same weight of conviction. Here, also, we see Plato's use of synonymous words or equivalent expressions for emphasizing special points—614 E., 616 A., &c. Especially noteworthy are ἀγαπητός, ὅν χαλός (619 B.) and μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἐπώλετο (621 C.) In 618 D. we have a good example of polysyndeton, and in 617 D.-E. a good example of asyndeton. Paronomasia is frequent and the alliteration in γυναικὶ γεννηθεῖσων γενέσθαι (620 A.) seems to be intentional. We have an example of ἐπάνοδος (Volkmann s. 470) in τὸν τε χρεῖω καὶ τὸν ἀμείνω βίον, κείρω μὲν - - -, ἀμείνω δὲ - - - (618 D.-E.) Also, several instances of antithesis might be mentioned.

The Changing World-Periods (Polit. 269 C.-274 C.)

In this myth we have another phase of the earth-born race—a notion of which Plato is exceedingly fond—but the concep-

tion is unique in representing men to spring up full grown, to dwindle and pass away again. As is usual with Plato, the story is adapted to enforcing the lesson in hand. He wishes to impress the fact that we are not living in a "golden age," and under perfect conditions of life, but in an actual world, and under imperfect conditions, so that we shall not expect the true ruler to be more than a man pre-eminent among men. The entire myth is striking on account of its imaginative height, and in spite of its diverse elements— theological, cosmical, zoological and social—it is formed into one complete and artistic whole. However, since the myth is not confined to the question of human government, but touches on the larger aspect of the case, the Elean stranger admits that he has drawn out the discussion beyond what was necessary for the argument. Philosophically speaking, the discussion could have been carried on without the myth, but Plato preferred a concrete idea to an abstract conception. This story is characterized by a certain terseness of style, with a rhythmical flow of the periods. Hyperbaton is frequent, and there is also at times a certain fulness of expression, as τὸ τῶν νεκρῶν σῶμα (270 E.), ἐστὶ κατακοσμήσεως ἐπόμενα (271 E.), ἦν μετέχον (273 B.) Paronomasia occurs in 271 A. πάσχον παθήματα, and 273 A. ὀρμῆν ὀρμηθεῖς. Perhaps φορῶν - - - φέρεσθαι 270 B. should not be counted. The juxtapositions in ἕλαστος ἕλαστος (271 D.) and αὐτοῦς αὐτοῦς (271 E.) are forcible. In 270 C. there is a recurrence of similar sounds. The whole story shows evidence of careful composition, and, though highly imaginative, it lacks some of the freshness of the Phaedrus and Republic.

Atlantis (Tim. 21 A.-25 D. and Critias.)

The Timaeus is mythical throughout, and consists of two stories, the first of which is given by Critias. In the Timaeus, however, Critias does not give all the details of the story, but it is reserved for the work bearing his name to bring out in full the wealth and power of the wonderful island. The Timaeus begins with a summary of the Republic, then follows this story, in which the indefinite city of the Republic be-

comes a place with a local habitation, but in a distant age. In other words, this city is more concrete in the *Timaeus* than in the *Republic*. This story of Atlantis is one of unrivalled richness. Here we have the greatest profusion of detail, and the oriental splendor of the whole gives the impression of a grand epic singing the praises of Athens in her struggle with the Atlantidae. It is Athens idealized.

The Origin of the Universe (Tim. 27 D.—to end.)

Passing now to the second part of the *Timaeus*, we find a story not less magnificent than the former, but deeply overlaid with speculations in natural philosophy, physiology, astronomy, and theology. Plato is now no longer content with the vague fancies of his youth, but seriously applies the myth to the discovery of prehistoric truth. Since the things here discussed are beyond the range of sense perception, Plato professes to give only the probable account, τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον (29 D.), but he claims for it all the credibility which such a conception could have. For him it is truth. This story follows in the strain struck out by Critias and is as highly imaginative. *Timaeus*, however, has a more difficult subject with which to deal, and this of necessity reacts upon his style. Jowett (*Plato*, vol. III. 526, 527) finds much fault with the style of the *Timaeus*. The language he considers weighty and abrupt, though in some passages sublime. There is also a defective rhythm with obscure connection and a frequent use of apposition. On the other hand, Prof. Shorey (*A. J. P.* IX. 408, 409) finds the style rapid and flowing, but nothing of the elements so disagreeable to Jowett. To him unity, speed, moral unction, and religious awe are the keys to the art and thought: the difficulties of style lie within the problem with which Plato had to contend. On the whole, the criticism of Prof. Shorey is more just, for, considering the wide and diverse range of subjects which the *Timaeus* embraces, and also Plato's limited knowledge of the same, it is not strange that his style is often abrupt and perhaps heavy. No one except a genius like Plato could have produced a harmonious whole out of so discordant elements.

The Golden Age (Laws IV. 713 B.-714 A.)

In the *Laws* we have the work of Plato's old age. As such we might compare this short story here given of the happy life in the time of Kronos with the simple story of the *Gorgias*, with which we began. Here Plato is more mechanical and conscious, and there is a lack of that freshness and vigor which is seen in the *Gorgias*. His aim evidently is to instruct, and the story is introduced chiefly by way of example. Still there is present the usual moral tone which is peculiar to the true Platonic myths. As the tale draws to a close, the Athenian Stranger (713 E) urges the necessity of imitating the life which is said to have existed in the time of Kronos.

REVIEW OF THE MYTHS.

From the preceding list of myths it will be noticed that *Meno* 81 A-C. is lacking; for, though it has a philosophical value, it is not properly a narrative, but a quotation from Pindar. Similarly, also, *Republic* VII. 514 A-517 B. lacks the narrative form. The "name-giver" of the *Cratylus* (391-409), which has a mythical investiture, has been considered as without the limits of this dissertation, and in like manner also the many examples of extended metaphor, involving sometimes a short narrative.

In the dialogues of Plato we find the myth in almost every stage of development, from the old fashioned fictitious story to a somewhat mechanical use of the philosophic myth. The story of Protagoras is a *μῦθος* and not a *λόγος*, as Protagoras himself, who is proud of his logical ability, is particular to indicate (324 D.), and its fictitious character is clearly indicated by beginning with one of the stock expressions for legends. With its epic style and highly poetic coloring, it gives us Protagoras, the sophist, and is in a measure a view of the sophistic method of telling a story. In true sophistic fashion, Protagoras, who has evidently a feeling of superiority over his hearers, strives to amuse them as well as to furnish a reply to the question at issue. As compared with Socrates, we see

that the sophist does not aim so much at the conviction of truth, but rather to control his hearers with his rhetorical art; though he is a teacher, he is a teacher with a popular and showy manner, accepting the common sentiments of mankind without analysis or definition (Grote II. p. 73). In sharp contrast with the continuous discourse of Protagoras, is the short dialectic of Socrates, who, professing himself much pleased with the effort of the sophist, proceeds to analyze some of the fundamental principles. This myth is clearly distinguishable from the Platonic myths. Here there is little symbolical depth, and the lesson to be conveyed is given, not so much by the character of the narrated events, as by the arbitrary command of Zeus. The difference is readily seen by comparison with the *Gorgias* or any of the philosophic myths. In Aristophanes' story we have the comic and imaginative side of the myth, and the whole speech, though not an exact representation of the genial comedian, is much in the vein of the "Birds." While it gives us the comic side of the fictitious story, it gives us more—it gives a definition of Erôs, and so is an approach to the myth as used by Plato.

Of the Platonic or philosophic myths the one in the *Gorgias* is the simplest, and is supposed by Thompson to be the earliest. We may at least say it is earliest in form, whether it be in fact or not, and represents a stage when the Platonic Socrates was nearer the real Socrates. With its subdued tone and marked moral purpose we might easily imagine Socrates using it, if he had used the myth at all. In the *Symposium* (203 A.) we have the allegorical side of the myth, in the *Phaedo* the imaginative, and in the great *Phaedrus* myth a combination and intensification of these elements. Among the more artistic myths is the "Vision of Er," which, though not so elevated as the *Phaedrus* myth, is grand in its conception. The apology for its introduction, however, is considered a foreshadowing of the mechanical use which is seen in the later dialogues. For example, in the *Politicus* the Stranger is particular to give due warning when the change is to be made from the argument to the myth, and similarly at the end of

the myth he shows the lines on which the investigation is to be prosecuted. In this as in the other later dialogues, Plato is more mechanical and conscious, and lays more stress upon the outer side of the myth, aiming chiefly to instruct. In the *Laws* the Athenian Stranger is a teacher. Also, in these later dialogues Plato seriously applies the myth to the reproduction of past events. The *Timaeus* is a grand speculation in the physical sciences, but it is more than a physical theory—it is a “Hymn of the Universe.” Though it is poetical and highly imaginative, it lacks in common with others, the freshness and vigor of the earlier dialogues. In the earlier dialogues the myth is more artistic, showing not so plainly the effects of careful composition.

Rhetorical Tests.

In applying the rhetorical or oratorical test to our mythical narratives, the effort is to get a clearer idea of their scope and limitations by trying to see wherein they diverge from the oratorical standard and wherein they coincide, and if they fall short, to what extent.

The three essential properties of narrative as given by the grammarians are that it shall be *σαφής*, *σύντομος*, and *πειθαιή* (Volkman: *Rhet.* s. 153). This statement is, of course, based on models drawn from practical or forensic oratory, yet to a certain extent these same properties must characterize all forms of narratives, if they are to be artistic and effective.

The first requisite, is that the narrative shall be *clear*, *σαφής*. This clearness is dependent upon the contents and the form: the contents are to be given in the order of the circumstances and the time, that nothing may be left out or repeated, the form is to be appropriate, avoiding all unusual expressions, forced positions, long periods and whatever else will render the language obscure. On comparing the narratives of Plato with the models of Attic prose we find a very perceptible difference in respect to some of the points just mentioned. First, in regard to the contents, Plato accords perfectly with the law laid down, in that everything is given in the order in

which it would naturally occur. This is, indeed, one feature that is prominent in making the myths so real. Yet this must be taken with some modification, for Plato is not always perfectly clear as to the consistency of every detail. Having some general purpose in view, he does not care to clarify some of the minor details from a certain mysticism which surrounds them. Republic X. 614 C., 616 C., Phaedo 112 D., and several places in the Phaedrus will furnish instances of this. The topography of the places here described it seems impossible to picture definitely, and some think even consistently with the rest of the story. But the myth deals mainly with things beyond the range of human experience, so that we must not hope for as detailed and consistent a description as under other circumstances we should have a right to demand.

In language Plato is in keeping with the elevated and highly imaginative character of his narratives. He did not choose to avoid all unusual words and expressions, but indulged in poeticisms whenever he saw fit; e. g. *ἀπαθῶν* Phdr. 252 C., *ἀδύνατος ἔδωκεν* ib. 254 E., *ἐπέπροσθεν* Gorg. 523 D., *τὰ ἐπιζλωσθήεντα* Rep. X. 620 E., *γῆς ἔνδον* Protag. 320 D.,¹ &c. He did not sacrifice emphasis and rhythm, and so hyperbaton is frequent. Sometimes his sentences are involved (Phaedo 108 D., Polit. 271 C., Gorg. 523 B.), nor is he too particular about avoiding anacoluth (Rep. X. 614 C., Phdr. 249 D.) In examining these points we must bear in mind that his was a written language though conversational in form, while the words of the orator were addressed to the ear, and must make their impression then or never. For this reason, and because of the figurative and poetical nature of the myth, it would be unjust to demand of Plato the same plainness and simplicity that is characteristic of Lysias (see Prof. Shorey, A. J. P. IX. 409).

The characterization of a narrative as *concise*, *σύντομος*, is wholly relative; and to the statement that it must be rapid, Aristotle (Rhet. III. 16, 4) takes exception, for its excellence does not consist in the rapidity or conciseness, but in the ob-

¹The Protag. myth is full of such poetical expressions. For a collection see Sauppe's Protag. 320 C.

servance of the mean—that is, just so much as is necessary for the purpose is to be said, and no more. Thus conciseness in oratory is one thing and in history quite another. The orator gives nothing irrelevant, but the historian must tell all, both the relevant and irrelevant, if he is really giving history. In philosophy the myths grow out of the situation and so have nothing irrelevant. Every detail is a necessary part of the picture, and, though we cannot call Plato's narratives prolix, they have not the model oratorical terseness and brevity. In the leisurely narratives of Plato the sentences are looser in structure and often drawn out to a greater length than in oratory or even in history. This freedom in his periods is due to several causes: digressions and explanations (Rep. X. 615 A., 618 B. C., Symp. 203 B., Phdr. 250 D.), descriptions (Rep. X. 616 D. f., Phdr. 274 C., Phaedo 111 C. f., &c.), the many comparisons, various grammatical constructions such as epexegesis (Phdr. 253 B., Polit. 274 D.), or a succession of participles with others depending on them (Rep. X. 616 D. f.)—all of which tend to retard the rapid flow of the sentence to the end. The forensic art of the orator prefers the strong, rapid course, but the art of Plato allowed him to hasten rapidly or lingering to further amplify and explain as suited his mood and purpose. When he digresses, it is to explain a difficulty or point a moral—just as though an orator should stop in his narrative to clinch a point.

Another cause of fulness in Plato is the frequent accumulation of words either for explanation, for emphasis or for symmetry and elegance. With regard to Plato's elegance, Favorinus says, if you disturb a single word, you detract from it. Thus, giving a kind of *ὄγκος* quite in keeping with the magnificence of the Phaedrus, is the pleonasm in *πρὸς δαίτην καὶ ἐπὶ θούρηγ* (247 A.), *ρίπων τε καὶ βαρόνων* (ib. B.), *μαζαρίαν ἄφρον τε καὶ θέων* (250 B.) Somewhat similar is *τήν ἰσχὺν - - καὶ τήν ῥώμην* (Symp. 190 B.), *ἐγέννων καὶ ἔτιχτον* (ib. 191 B.) Fulness of this sort is not uncommon with Plato: *βίη καὶ μάχης* (Phaedo 108 B.), *φείγεται τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται* (ib.), *ποθμένα - - βίαν* (ib. 112 B.), *ἄθυρμαρένας τε καὶ*

¹See Gellius II. V., and cf. Jebb: Att. Or. vol. 1, p. 172, note.

λαιούσας (Rep. X. 614 E.), ζήτησις καὶ μαθητήτης (ib. 618 C.) Interesting is ἐπὶ κλήρωσίν τε καὶ ἀγροεσίῳ (Phdr. 249 B.), ἀκόλουθος καὶ θεράπων (Symp. 203 C.) Sometimes both sides are presented to emphasize the thought, as for example ἡ - - φήσεις ὄχι ἀόπει ἡν - - ἀλλ' ἀλλοία (Symp. 186 D.), ἀγαπητός, ὃν κακός (Rep. X. 619 B.), μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ ὄχι ἐπόλετο (ib. 621 C.) We know what an important factor in the style of Demosthenes is this use of two synonymous words, by which dwelling longer on a thought, he emphasizes it, and thus gains more in vigor than he loses in conciseness. Quite different is the occasional use of a genitive or participle redundantly, as in Politicus 270 E. and 271 E. (Campbell, Introd. XXXVI.) Periphrasis is also a source of fulness of expression. By its use the philosopher dwells longer on the thought, and that it should be common in so reflective an author as Plato is not surprising. Besides the more usual periphrases with εἰμί, the following may be mentioned: ὄβριε προσομιλῶν (Phdr. 251 A.), ἐραστής ὢν (Symp. 203 C.), μίμημα ἔχουσα (Laws IV. 713 B.) The frequent occurrence of the τρόπος ἐτυμολογικός is also noteworthy as it forms a contrast to the usage of Isocrates, who avoids the construction, though not so strictly as Blass asserts.¹ From the preceding we see that Plato preferred rhythm, emphasis, and elegance to brevity and rapidity. Yet Plato does not lack little devices for making the story appear shorter. A favorite manner is to warn his hearers that the tale is a little long (Symp. 203 A., Critias 113 B.), nevertheless he is willing to give it, and the inference is, as briefly as possible. Sometimes he professes to give simply the sum (Rep. X. 615 A.), or casting all minor details aside to proceed to the main question (Phdr. 274 E.) This reminds us of the oratorical ἵνα συντέμω and similar expressions of real or pretended brevity.

The third essential of a narrative is that it shall be *plausible*, πιθανή. To attain this, everything not in accordance with the nature of the narrative must be rejected, or, if seemingly strange, it must be explained. Thus Critias pauses in his story

¹ Att., Bered. III. B. 203 die dem Isocrates völlig fremde figura etymologica

to tell us why we need not be surprised at hearing Greek names given to foreigners (Crit. 113 A.), and in beginning (Tim. 21 A. f.) this wonderful story of Atlantis he is very particular to show how it reached his ears and how it was preserved from destruction in hoary antiquity. Like every true artist, our narrator wishes to make his fictions as natural and lifelike as possible, and we can frequently see what means he uses to accomplish this. The first thing which presents itself is his assertion of the truth of what he narrates. Even the dithyrambic Socrates cannot refrain from declaring the "truth about truth." (Phdr. 247 C.), in the Gorgias (523 A.) the story is not a *μῦθος* but a *λόγος*, and the "Vision of Er" (Rep. X. 614 B.), is the tale of a brave man (*ἀξιπρὸς ἀντίρ*). Critias (Tim. 26 A. f.) spends most of the afternoon and night in fixing clearly in his mind a story he had heard while a youth—a story for the truth of which Socrates afterwards vouches (Tim. 26 E.) Into the second part of his narrative Critias does not enter until he has invoked Mnemosyne (Crit. 108 D.); and in the description which follows he has to confess that the size of the ditch is incredible, still he "must tell the tale as he heard it." (Crit. 118 C.)

In addition to this, more subtle touches in the details themselves add greatly to the truthfulness of the narrative. The incidental reference to the behavior of the soul that made an ill choice (Rep. X. 619 C.), and the precision with which the soul that chose the twentieth lot (ib. 620 B.) is mentioned, may be taken as illustrations of this point. Even in so fantastic a story as that of Aristophanes in the Symposium, we may notice the plausibility of the third sex (189 E.); the reason why there were three sexes (190 B.); their insolence and why they were not destroyed (190 C.); the council, the plan of Zeus and its execution (190 E.)—the evidence of which is seen in the navel and wrinkles about the belly. Similarly in the Politicus explanations of ancient traditions are produced to support the historic truth of the story, and in the Timaeus (25 C. D.) the sinking of Atlantis is naturally made to account

for the supposed shallowness of the sea beyond the Pillars of Hercules. In fact, the whole story of Atlantis is clothed with the utmost probability, and so real is it that many cannot believe it existed only in Plato's imagination.

A further source of probability is found in the basis of the myths themselves. Apart from artistic considerations, it was perhaps with this in view that he founded his narratives upon the pliable mythology of his countrymen. "By appealing to the story of At.eus, or Deucalion, or Prometheus for confirmation of some part of his recital, he seemed to bridge the gulf between the known and unknown." (Campbell: Statesman, p. XXXIII.)

Vividness.

Of great weight in narrative is the descriptive power of the narrator, by which he presents accurately and forcibly an object before his hearers so that it may be seen. This power, which is defined by Dionysius (De Lys. C. 7) as *ὄναμις ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθησέων ἄρρηστα τὰ λεγόμενα*, is called vividness (*ξυάργεια*), and it may arise through a judicious use of detail, together with a perception of character. We may also have effective word-painting, as in the Phaedrus, 246 E. f. The vividness of the myths is dependent more on Plato's attention to details than to any distinct attempt at fine character-drawing, though he has no lack of delicate and subtle touches. Of this many examples may be furnished: some of the most striking, which we may mention, are: the proceeding of souls into the meadow (Rep. X. 614 D. f.); the choice of lives (ib. 619 C. f.), particularly the choice of the one having the first lot, and of Odysseus: the characterization of the good and the bad horse, especially the graphic description of the latter's unruliness (Phdr. 253 D. f.) In this last example we have at once the brilliant coloring of Isocrates and the accurate drawing of Lysias. Here we may notice the asyndeta and the massing of participles which add liveliness to the scene. From the Critias we might mention the primitive Acropolis (112 A. f.); the wealth of Atlantis (114 E.); the oaths of the kings (120 A. f.) Similarly other examples

might be cited from these and other myths, if it were necessary further to illustrate Plato's power of handling details. Indeed, this wealth and naturalness of detail is one of the most pleasing features of the myth. It gives to the imaginary picture a completeness and reality to which the mind is more susceptible than to general effects.

Another noticeable feature is Plato's fondness for bringing into his narratives persons speaking: and from the requirements of the case these were usually gods or some spiritual being. This same fondness for dramatizing his narrative is particularly noticeable in *Andocides*, and this element is also skilfully used by *Lysias* and *Demosthenes* to heighten the pathos. In addition to this, it lends variety to a speech and relieves the attention. Since in the myths there are no opponents to be combated, some of the more effective forms of this *προσωποποιία* are wanting. Here the words are always put into the mouth of some real person, whether it be man, god or spirit, and they are often given in a dignified tone. The examples are: the request of *Epimetheus* (*Protag.* 320 D.); the reply of *Zeus* to *Plato* and the overseers of the Blessed Isles (*Gorg.* 523 C. to end of myth); *Zeus* tells his plan (*Symp.* 190 C.-D.) In the *Repub.* III. 415 A., the story which *Socrates* has been telling passes over by an easy change, into direct discourse, as though he were talking to the men of his ideal state. More formal and dignified than the above is the speech of the *δημιουργός* (*Rep.* X. 617 D. and 619 B.); the address of the *Deimiurgus* (*Tim.* 41 A.-D.); and the *Critias* ends just as *Zeus* is about to speak.

Frequently we have dialogue, sometimes amounting only to question and answer. *Theuth* and *Thamus* (*Phdr.* 274 E. f.); *Zeus* and *Hermes* (*Protag.* 322 C. f.); the elder *Critias* and the clansman (*Tim.* 21 C. f.); *Solon* and the priest (*ib.* 22 B.) In the *Repub.* (X. 615 D.-616 A.) we have a direct reply to a question in the indirect. Sometimes, as in *Symp.* 203 A., the myth is a story in the person of another introduced into the speech.

Dramatic Propriety.

Under this head may be included two features: First, what might more properly be called *Ethopoia*, the adaptation of the story to the person who utters it, and second the adaptation of the story to the circumstances, to the tone and spirit of the particular dialogue. So in the *Phaedrus*, when a transition is to be made from the grandeur and sublimity of the *παλινορθία*, to the lighter though still poetic discussion which follows, the story of the Cicadas (259 A. f.) furnishes the dramatic motive for a continuation of the research (*Thompson: Phdr. ad loc.*)

In the *Protagoras* (320 C.) the myth is put in the mouth of a sophist¹ and is fashioned in a manner to represent the style of the sophists. It is given in the conventional archaic form and readily suggests an attempt on the part of the speaker to be elegant. Similarly *Aristophanes* in the *Symposium* (189 D.) is made to show his genius as a comedian, though his hypothesis is afterwards cast aside as of no value. The youthful *Critias* can tell what he has heard about the glories of the ancient Athenians (*Tim. 21 A.*), but the learned *Timaeus* must discourse on the wonders of creation. On account of this dramatic propriety we fail to find consistency in the myths, not simply in the lesser matters of description and detail, but even in matters more important. Thus the *Gorgias*, which emphasizes true happiness as a matter of the soul, has no mention of the "wings" of the *Phaedrus* nor of the "Lachesis" of the *Republic*. In the *Phaedrus* the soul is tripartite, in the *Phaedo* no such division is recognized, but soul is antithetical to body. In the *Symposium* *Erôs* is a *δαίμων* attendant upon *Aphrodite*. In the *Phaedrus* *Erôs* is a god and a son of *Aphrodite*. We have no future life in the *Symposium*, no reminiscence in the *Republic*, no creation in the *Phaedo*, little retribution in the *Timaeus*. From a philosophical point of view the myths cannot be reconciled, but

¹Zeller (*Phil. d. Gr. II. 580* note) and some others think this myth may have been drawn from the writings of *Protag.*, but see *Sauppe's Protag. Einleitung S. 19.*

when we consider the moral purpose of these stories and their conformity to the question in hand, all the discrepancies are easily accounted for. The moral as well as the dramatic purpose can be readily seen from Republic 612 B. where Socrates, having established that justice is best for the soul, proceeds, with this as an apology, to dwell on the subject of rewards. In the Gorgias, having a different audience before him, he makes no such apology, but by a short narrative further impresses the point that true happiness is a question of the soul.

Some Special Points.

HUMOR.—Irony and humor are subtle, and may be found where they were never intended, but in many of our narratives, beneath the solemn, matter-of-fact exterior, we cannot fail to see at times Plato's usual vein of humor and Socratic irony. Aristophanes' story in the Symposium is more comical than serious, but even in the Phaedrus, when the earnest, though dithyrambic, Socrates declares that he must "speak the truth, especially in speaking about truth" (247 C.); or when he quotes the apocryphal Homer, we feel there must have been a covert smile. In the Republic (III. 414 C.) we have a display of Socratic modesty. Here Socrates professes himself ashamed to tell an old Phœnician lie, and the humor is still further heightened by the remark of Glaucon after hearing a portion of the tale. Plato himself (Rep. X. 620 A.) declares it was laughable as well as pitiable to behold the souls making their choice of lives; and he must with equal pleasure have contemplated the dwindling forms of the earth-born race¹ (Polit. 271 f.) When Socrates Minor (Polit. 270 A.) answers promptly to a most astonishing fact, "all that you say seems extremely probable," and when Soerates (Tim. 26 E.) declares that the best thing about the story which Critias was so particular to call to mind exactly, is its truthfulness, we are obliged to concede to the myths a vein of humor as well as seriousness.

¹Campbell (Polit. XXXVI.) sees in the greatness of the supposed revolution "a deeper vein of humor."

COMPARISONS.—The myth is itself an extended metaphor and, when the figure is once chosen, it becomes an essential part of the narrative. Besides this we also find frequent similes, which are, however, introduced not merely for the purpose of ornament, but for clearness and vividness as well. This is shown by their abundance when Socrates discourses upon the ‘other world’ (Phaed. 107 D. f.), and particularly when Aristophanes undertakes to explain his wonderful phenomenon (Symp. 189 D.) In this latter example we have at least six similes within the compass of $2\frac{1}{2}$ pages (Teubr.), a fact which becomes significant when we remember that comparisons, though frequent in Homer, are scarce in the orators¹ and even comparatively few in Pindar. This is but another proof of the originality of Plato. In Homer, under the glow of poetical energy, the comparison is to introduce something which is rendered especially impressive;² in the myth it is used, as in Demosthenes,³ rather for clearness yet of necessity it does add vividness to the narrative and gives intensity to the thought. When Plato compares the windings of the infernal streams to serpents (Phaed. 112 D.), the column of light to undergirders of a trireme (Rep. X. 616 C.), the union of soul and body to an oyster in his shell (Phdr. 250 C.), and the torrent from heaven to a recurring disease (Tim. 23 A.), he aims at clearness, to explain the unknown by the known. The same is still more true of Phaedo 109 E., Repub. X. 616 D., Polit. 271 E., Laws IV. 713 D. Yet, when we see the charioteer of the winged steeds fall back like racers at the barrier (Phdr. 254 E.), or the souls at midnight shoot to the birth like stars (Rep. X. 621 B.), we cannot deny that Plato enhanced the beauty of his descriptions by using a simile for picturesqueness. Very pretty and picturesque is the figure of the bird (Phdr. 249 D.), and the Bacchic women (ib. 253 A.) The comparisons in Aristophanes’ story are very graphic, see especially

¹“In den Rednern nicht allzu häufig.” Volkmann: Rhet. S. 444.

²Jebb: Homer p. 27.

³Rehdantz: Index s. v. Gleichnis.

190 A. D., and 191 A. In all there are more than forty comparisons exclusive of the *Timaeus*—about as many as are* in the whole of the *Odyssey*—and drawn from a great variety of sources.

RHYTHM.—“In a famous passage of the *Brutus* (121) Cicero says: *Quis enim in dicendo uberior Platone? Jovem sic, aiunt philosophi, si graeca loquatur, loqui.* Plutarch, *Cic. c. 24*, attributes the saying to Cicero himself. Dionysius H., *De admir. vi Dem. c. 23*, refers to it as a current *mol* and gives no authority. But whoever first gave utterance to the thought that the language of Plato was meet for the gods, would doubtless have considered rhythm, as Dionysius considered it, one of the great features in the diversity of Plato’s style.”

Plato’s style exhibits in the highest degree those rhythmical changes, and that variety and elegance of figures which are so important in the perfection of style.

Dionysius (*De comp. verb. c. 18*), after showing the rhythm of a sentence from the *Menexenus* says: “*μοῖρα τοιαῦτά ἐστι παρά Πλάτωνι, ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ εὐρέλειόν τε καὶ εὐροθμίαν συνιδεῖν δαιμονιώτατος,*” and, he continues, had Plato been as excellent (*θεινός*) in the selection as in the composition of his words, he might have surpassed Demosthenes, or at least rendered his superiority doubtful. As an example of this excellence in Plato, we may take a few sentences from a myth where the rhythm is fresh and vigorous; for the Platonic Socrates having just emerged from his dithyrambs and his epics is doubtless still conscious of his power. We will take a few sentences from the *Phaedrus* (246 E.) chapter XXVI.:

1. a. ὁ μὲν * * * * * Ζεὺς
 - b. ἐλάττωον * * * πορρεύεται
 - c. διαζοσμητῶν * * ἐπιμελετόμενος
 2. a. τῷ δ' ἔπεται * * * δαιμόνων
 - b. κατὰ * * * ζελοσμημένῳ
 3. μὲνε γάρ * * * μόνη
- z. τ. ἔ.

An examination of the above passage, and of others also, will show the varied and majestic rhythm of Plato. In 1. a., we have almost an iambic line, the stately rhythm of tragedy, the effect of which is kept up through b. and c. by the iambic cadence. It may be noticed that b. ends in an iambic monometer (---) preceded by two long syllables, which c. is the same preceded by two short syllables. The beginning of 1. c. is the beginning of 1. b., (----) preceded by a short syllable. 2. a., and 2. b., each end in a dochmius, an ending which is a favorite with Plato:¹ e. g. $\chi\omicron\omicron\omicron\delta\tilde{\iota}\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\iota$, similarly $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\tilde{\pi}\tilde{\iota}\tilde{\nu}\tilde{\gamma}\tilde{\eta}\tilde{\nu}\tilde{\pi}\tilde{\epsilon}\tilde{\sigma}\tilde{\eta}\tilde{\nu}$ (248 C.), though this is not as good as the preceding example nor as $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\tilde{\tau}\tilde{\omicron}\tilde{\nu}\tilde{\mu}\tilde{\upsilon}\tilde{\rho}\tilde{\iota}\tilde{\omicron}\tilde{\nu}$ (248 E.) Frequently the dochmius terminates with a dissyllable separated from its immediate context, as in $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\tilde{\beta}\tilde{\iota}\tilde{\omicron}\tilde{\sigma}\tilde{\alpha}\tilde{\nu}\tilde{\beta}\tilde{\iota}\tilde{\omicron}\tilde{\nu}$. Sometimes the dochmius is varied by the rhythm -----, which, as in 1. b., may be considered a dochmius with an iamb added. 3 may be considered an iambic trimeter, though there is a considerable massing of heavy syllables towards the end. It is needless, however, to force it into any such scheme, the movement is iambic, closing with a dochmius (----), the first syllable of which is irrational. We have the same form of the dochmius occurring in the closing sentence of the chapter, $\xi\tilde{\xi}\tilde{\omega}\tilde{\tau}\tilde{\omicron}\tilde{\nu}\tilde{\omicron}\tilde{\iota}\tilde{\mu}\tilde{\rho}\tilde{\alpha}\tilde{\tau}\tilde{\omicron}\tilde{\nu}$. It is unnecessary to produce further examples from the same chapter showing the varied yet rhythmical intermingling of long and short syllables. Of course the forms produced are not the only ones to be found. Others might be deduced from these same sentences and still others from the sentences which follow. For example, he even uses the hexameter ending, $\xi\tilde{\chi}\tilde{\alpha}\tilde{\sigma}\tilde{\tau}\tilde{\omicron}\tilde{\varsigma}\tilde{\epsilon}\tilde{\tau}\tilde{\acute{\alpha}}\tilde{\gamma}\tilde{\theta}\tilde{\eta}\tilde{\nu}$, which is condemned by pedantic rhetoricians. (Volkman s. 526.) Like Isocrates he prefers iambs, trochees, and spondees to dactyls and anapaests, &c. (Blass² II. 156), but contrary to Isocrates he is fond of the iambic close. Also he rather avoids words of one syllable on the end of his periods and cola, though the position of Zeus at the end of the first clause above is very effective. In two-syllable words the

¹ Campbell: Soph. and Polit. (General) Introduction, p. XLI.

trochee and spondee is most frequent, but he is also fond of the iambus, which often, as mentioned above, is a part of the favorite dochmiac close.

The appreciation of the rhythm of an author is largely a matter of individual taste and experience, still one could hardly fail to see a certain grandeur and richness in the opening of this myth in the Phaedrus, or a certain solemnity in the speech of the *προφύτης* (Rep. X. 617 D.): *Ψυχὰ ἐφύμειρον - - γένοις ἀναπυφύουσι*, z. τ. ξ.—a portion of which has the sound of a religious formula. There is a stately dignity about the address of the Demiurgus, Tim. 41 A., and the pathos and exaltation of the close of the Republic would be hard to parallel. Campbell (Intr. p. XL.) has shown that Plato had an increasing fondness for dithyrambic and tragic cadences, which in the Timaeus and Laws occur almost perpetually.

Hyperbaton is one of the most important elements in this rhythm, as can be seen by the frequent transpositions, inversions, and alternations occurring in the myths. In this way the author regulates the words of his sentence with regard to sound or emphasis, and he can represent, in a measure, the rapidity of his thought by making one expression catch up another. Thus Plato secures emphasis by throwing a word to the head or end of a sentence, brings together words of similar sound, revives a thought, or avoids hiatus. This last is true especially of the Politicus, Timaeus, Critias, and Laws (Blass² II. 426). To show the extent and great variety of hyperbaton in the myths some examples will be given.

Particles affected by hyperbaton: *περί* (Phaed. 112 E., Rep. X. 615 C. &c.), *ἄν* (*ἐάν*) (Crit. 112 E.), *ἄν* anticipated (Tim. 26 B.) Noteworthy is *ἕνεκα* in *παυδοῦσ τε ὅς ἕνεκα* (Crit. 115 B.) where the relative is displacing as well as displaced.

Adverbs affected by hyperbaton: *πρῶτον* (Phaed. 113 B.), *εὐλόπως* (Rep. III. 415 A.), *ἰκανῶς* (Crit. 114 E.)

The intrusion of prepositions, as for example *ἐν* (Phaed. 110 C.), *περί* (Polit. 271 E.), *ἐν* (Crit. 115 C.), is due to grammatical necessity and hardly gives color.

Frequent is the hyperbaton of nouns: *δεινότητων* (Phdr. 251 A.), *χρόνων* (Polit. 269 C.), *τροπῆ* (ib. 270 D.), &c; or a genitive is far removed from its limiting word: *τίς . . . τῶν ἐνθάδε* (Phdr. 259 C.), *Ἰένησις . . . ζώων* (Polit. 271 A.)

Frequently an adjective is separated from its noun: *τῶντο δέ, ὃ βασιλεῦσιν, τὸ μάθημα* (Phdr. 274 E.), *ἄλλα . . . θουρομαστῶ* (Rep. II. 359 D.) More familiar is the type *εἰς τῶδε ἤξει τὸ στήναι* (Phdr. 249 B.), *πάσας ἐπιστρέφεισθαι τὰς περιφερούς* (Rep. X. 616 C. &c.), a type very common in Plato and which seems to increase in frequency in the later dialogues.

To be noted are grammatical governments intermingled by hyperbaton: *βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς χάριτος ἵππος μετέχων* (Phdr. 247 B.) Here we can see how in the rapidity of the sentence one thought runs into the other. Similarly also Phdr. 249 D., Phaedo 108 C., Rep. X. 618 B., Tim. 50 B. Sometimes also, owing to the freedom of conversational style and to the exigencies of dialogue, clauses are intermingled, as for example in Phaedo 108 D., where the narrative is interrupted for a moment.

In Phaedo 114 C. we have a clause postponed.

Selecting examples of these hyperbata, which seem to be sufficiently prominent to give color, the myths in the Phaedo, Symp., Protag., and Phdr.¹ appear to average about the same. In the great myth of the Phdr. (246 A. f.) hyperbaton is less frequent towards the end, where the tone is half narrative, half argumentative and explanatory, but where the unruly horse is described it increases. The myths in the Repub. show an average of a little less than those above, and the Gorgias (523 A. f.), which is one of the simplest and less passionate myths, has scarcely a single good example. In the Polit., Tim., Crit., and Laws there is a considerable increase over the others, and here also come in frequent inversions or alternations of words, as for example *ταῖς ἐν τῷς ἡμῶν κ. τ. ξ.* (Polit. 270 C.), and *πολλῶν μὲν οὖν δὴ κ. τ. ξ.* (Tim. 21 B.) Taking an average of hyperbata and such inversions from various parts

¹The story of Theuth (274 C. f.) shows a greater proportion than the others, being about one page long and having at least five examples.

of the *Timaeus*, it appears that they are more frequent in the story told by *Timaeus* than in the one by *Critias*. If this may be taken as fairly accurate, it would seem to indicate that *Timaeus* endeavored to make up in composition what he lacked in interest of theme.

In his use of hyperbaton Plato resembles *Demosthenes*, whom *Longinus* styles as *πάσιων κατὰσχεύματα* in this respect, and it is this which adds so much to the rhythm and force of his composition. Yet, what is a source of elegance in Plato's earlier dialogues, becomes by increased frequency, affected and artificial, and to this, in part, is due the stiffness of the later dialogues.

Sometimes *alliteration* is joined with the hyperbaton to further heighten the effect, as in *πολλά δὲ πολλά περὶ - - - πᾶσαι δὲ πολλὰν* ζ. τ. ξ. (*Phdr.* 248 B.); and he not unfrequently makes use of this popular element of speech to enhance his rhythm and to hold fast the aroused feeling. Some examples are: ζ (*Phaedo* 109 B.), τ (*Phdr.* 249 C.), and frequently the favorite π (*Phaedo* 111 D., *Phdr.* 253 C., and *Tim.* 21 B.)

Producing a somewhat similar effect is the *σχημα ἐπιμολωτικόν*, which he uses so abundantly, and he is also fond of throwing words similar in sound together, as for example *ὄντα ὄντως* (*Phdr.* 247 E.), *ἐπίσσωσαν βίωσι* (*ib.* 249 B.), *Λίδος Λίωσι* (*ib.* 252 E.), &c.

PARTICIPLES.—Since narrative is the home of the participle, it would be well to examine the myths with reference to this point. As would naturally be expected, we find the greatest variation in its use, not only between myth and myth, but also within the compass of a single myth, according as our author stops to paint in details or hurries on to draw the moral.

Of the myths examined, the story of *Prometheus* and *Epimetheus* (*Protag.* 320 C.) shows the lowest percentage of participles (24 per cent.), and may be called fairly *araïometochic*. *Protagoras* tells his story in a straightforward, old-fashioned manner. The tale of *Aristophanes* (*Symp.* 189 C.)

has 26 per cent.; a smaller proportion of participles than we might expect for so fantastical a story, but they are kept down by its didactic tone. For the whole, Diotima's tale (Symp. 203 A. f.) is oligometochic (30 per cent.) Though at first participles and verbs run side by side, the logical character of the end gives the supremacy to the verb. The myth in the Gorgias (523 A.) is also oligometochic (30 per cent.), with the participles pretty uniformly distributed. In the Tim.¹ the story of Critias starts with a sparing use of the participle, while the occasional interjection of $\xi\phi\eta$, $\gamma\delta$ $\delta\sigma$ swells the number of verbs, but as the speaker warms in his subject, the participles increase to equal proportions with the verbs, bringing up the average for the whole.

In the Phaedo the myth is fairly eumetochic (36 per cent.), and Republic X. 614 B. is fully eumetochic (40 per cent.) with occasionally polymetochia, and even pyknometochia (cf. 620 A.-E.) The nice grouping of verbs and participles in the opening sentence of the latter, $\delta\sigma$ $\pi\omicron\tau\epsilon$ α . τ . ξ , is especially noteworthy. The myth in the Phdr. (246 A. f.) shows the greatest amount of color. It is polymetochic (43 per cent.), though in some places it is oligometochic, or even araiometochic (e. g. 252 C.-E.) But especially to be noted is the massing of participles in turbulent passages (A. J. P. IX. 151). No better example can be given than the bounding and plunging of the unruly horse (254 B.-E.) Here there are almost twice as many participles as verbs. Plato knew well how to give color when the occasion demanded and how to pin down an argument with the finite verb.

TENSES.—Very important for narrative is the way in which an author handles his tenses—whether with the imperfect he dwells on the course of an event, or with the aorist merely states

¹ Prof. Shorey (A. J. P. IX. 410 note) says: "The Tim. is polymetochic and pyknometochic beyond any other Platonic composition, and, if I can trust to a hasty count, offers more participles to the page than any other important work in Greek prose, though Isocrates often maintains as high an average for several pages."

its occurrence. A narrator's use of the imperfect and aorist is, therefore, a norm of style (A. J. P. IV. 161 f.) Some of the myths (e. g. Gorg. 523 A., Symp. 203 A., Rep. III. 414 D.) are given for the most part in the direct form, others (e. g. Phdr. 246 D., Phaedo 107 D.) in the general or aoristic present, and so may be omitted in our consideration of this point. In most of the narratives the percentage of imperfects is quite high, as the style is conversational and leisurely. Besides, Plato loved to dwell on the images of his creation, and frequently, as in Rep. X. 614 D., where the souls proceed into the meadow, the description is heightened by a string of imperfects. The largest proportion of imperfect to aorist (about 6:1) occurs in the Symp. (189 C. f.)—a story which is highly picturesque. The Polit. (269 C.) shows the proportion of about 4:1, and also the large use of the imperfect (about 11:7) by Protagoras is evidently due to a desire on the part of that narrator to make his story as vivid and picturesque as possible. This is also shown by his large use of the historical present. Here within the space of about 2½ pages (Teub.) there are not less than seven distinct examples, including ten separate verbs.¹ Similarly Aristophanes (Symp. 189 C.) heightens the fun in his narrative by this use,² and even the sober Socrates (ib. 203 A.), under the influence of the banquet, does not hesitate to vivify the tale of Diotima.³ In the Timæus the use of the historical present⁴ is natural and perfectly in keeping with the elevated and poetic nature of that work. We would expect also the historical present in the grandiloquent myth of the Phaedrus, but, since the story is given in the present, it is excluded; yet the change from the present to aorist ἔστυγασαν. ἤλθεν (247 C. and E.)—and that from aorist

¹ τυποῦσι. νέμει (320 D), ἔρχεται--ἔρα (321 C.), κλέπτει--ἄωρειται (ib C. D.), εἰσέρχεται--διδῶσι (ib E.), πέμπει, ἐρωτᾷ (322 C.)

² λέγει (190 C), πορίζεται--μεταίθνησιν (191 B.)

³ κατακλύσεται (203 C.)

⁴ λέγει (41 A.), ἠγαγόντα--φωτίζουσι (77 A.)

to present ἐλλεξεῖ (254 D.)—are in accord with the elegance and the poetical character of the myth.

The Myths as Narratives.

The basis of philosophical narrative is epic. Like epic it is a leisurely narrative rather than rapid and stirring, although it does not lack a considerable amount of vivacity and vigor. In this it resembles largely the drama. That Plato, who is so dramatic in other respects, should also be dramatic in his narratives, is a thing most natural to suppose; and the large use that he makes of the drama can be seen in all the myths, especially in his fondness for dramatic situations, and for introducing into his story persons speaking. At times the narrative may even become stirring, though usually it is leisurely and explanatory. There is, of course, no room for lyric anticipation since in its very nature the myth is spontaneous, the thought and its form springing into being together. Yet lyric influence can be seen particularly in the *Phaedrus* (e. g. 246 E., 247 A.), where Socrates, on his own confession, is in a dithyrambic mood. In the *Republic*, the speech of the *προφύτας* (X. 617 D.—E.) is peculiarly lyric in its brevity and has the rhythmic flow of a religious formula. Other myths show here and there a lyric touch, and particularly is this true of the *Timaeus* (Campbell: *Soph. and Polit.*, Intrd. p. XL.) The myth has something in common with the oratorical narrative, in that it seeks to persuade and brings such evidence as it can to its support. Yet the facts at best are only probable facts and are duly recognized as such (*Phaed.* 114 D.) But although the object of these narratives is to persuade as well as instruct, the facts are not marshalled, as by an orator, but unfold themselves in pictures. Plato thinks in pictures and these images are as necessary for an expression of his poetic soul as words and phrases are for more prosaic minds. Not unfrequently does the narrator pause in his narrative to point a moral, explain something which the story suggests, or even

combat an idea that may be misleading. Thus far there is an analogy with oratory and, as Novák has shown, these myths have a practical bearing on Plato's rhetorical art, but in his moral purpose and its accompanying form, the allegorical element, Plato is unique. These are distinctive features which serve to differentiate philosophic narrative from all others. In oratory everything makes for effect, in philosophy everything for the moral purpose. In Plato we see not simply the artist, the philosopher, but likewise the moral reformer, and so even in the *Menexenus* he "rewrites the typical Athenian funeral oration and charges it with moral meanings of his own." (Shorey: *A. J. P.* IX. 401). It is this true ethical purpose, this constant reaching after the beauty of moral perfection, which gives to the myths their truly poetical character. They present to our view those ideal forms of excellence which are a poet's delight and which have a beauty to satisfy a moral nature.

In some myths the allegorical element is very apparent, Plato himself occasionally even explaining the symbolism; in others it is more subtle, yet there is something now and then to remind us that the story has a double meaning. Sometimes it is but a mere feeling, for when we start to analyze, it eludes our grasp. The naturalness of the myths, their unstrained parallelism even to the minutest detail makes it difficult to tell where the allegorical begins and where it ends.

Though Plato's narratives are not always clear, since they dealt with things still vague in the minds of men; though they have not always the requisite terseness, being conversational or preferring richness and elegance, they are yet natural, life-like, and nicely adapted to the persons and the situation. Frequent graphic touches, figures appropriately used, stately rhythm, sublime flights and subtle humor, make the myths the most pleasing of narratives.

