




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
PLATONICA

BY

HERBERT RICHARDS, M.A.

FELLOW AND TUTOR OF WADHAM COLLEGE, OXFORD

δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.—XENOPHANES




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PREFACE

THE notes on the *Philebus* form the only part of this book which is entirely new. The other Platonic sections appeared at different times from 1893 to 1909 in the *Classical Review* or *Classical Quarterly*. But all of them, and especially the notes on the *Republic*, have now been revised and often considerably enlarged, though at the same time some things have been omitted. Included in an appendix, as being in some degree akin, are emendations of the text of Marcus Aurelius (1905), Epictetus (1905), and Diogenes Laertius (1904). The notes on the *Violetum* of Arsenius were first published in 1910.

In textual criticism it is often the case that suggestions on this or that passage cannot be judged by themselves singly, but must be taken along with those made on other passages. A conjecture which, standing alone, will not appear sufficiently probable may easily assume a new aspect, when it is seen that in

other cases too where error is likely or certain a similar suggestion seems to set things right. The hypothesis which suits half a dozen passages recommends itself much more strongly than that which explains one. It is only by long and minute study that a scholar becomes so familiar with possible mistakes that he can estimate fairly the chances of their occurrence. But the indexes to this book, to *Notes on Xenophon and Others*, and to *Aristophanes and Others*, will often aid judgment on the proposal put forward as to a particular passage by indicating others, sometimes not a few, to which the same remedy may apply, and occasionally others again in which it is generally allowed, or actually known, to be right.

I am once more indebted to my printers and their reader for the care which they have given to a piece of work involving no small amount of trouble.

HERBERT RICHARDS.

OXFORD, *January*, 1911.

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PLATONICA

EUTHYPHRO

5 C σὲ μὲν οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως ὀξέως ἀτεχνῶς καὶ ῥαδίως κατείδεν ὥστε κ.τ.λ.

ἀτεχνῶς is absent from the Bodleian MS. and bracketed or omitted by recent editors. Burnet suggests that it may represent ἀτενῶς. It is not clear whether he means that in that case Plato wrote ἀτενῶς and that ὀξέως is a gloss on it. This seems unlikely. Ἀτενῶς is probably not a word that would be used to qualify καθορᾶν, when καθορᾶν is used transitively. It expresses fixity and intensity of gaze (βλέπειν εἰς, θεᾶσθαι), whereas καθορᾶν is only to see, descry, etc. Matthew Arnold could write of Sophocles that 'he saw life steadily,' but no one would say 'he saw me steadily.' ὀξέως on the other hand, which is not the same thing, is often coupled with καθορᾶν in Plato and elsewhere.

Is it possible that ἀτεχνῶς would really be in place before or after οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν? Cf. *Polit.* 287 E εἶδος . . . τῇ ζητουμένῃ . . . προσῆκον οὐδὲν ἀτεχνῶς ἐπιστήμη : *Ar. N.* 425 οὐδ' ἂν διαλεχθείην ἀτεχνῶς.

7 C περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροί γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἶμεν ;

Schanz *τινα* for *τίνα*. Perhaps it should be *τίνος*. Cf. D κρίσιν αὐτῶν : B ἢ περὶ τίνων διαφορά ; 13 D ἢ ἰατροῖς ὑπηρετικῇ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ὑπηρεσίαν τυγχάνει οὔσα ὑπηρετικῇ ; etc. Cf. p. 86.

11 B The old ὑποθώμεθα, though it seems to have no MS. authority, is surely more suitable to the context than προθώμεθα. It is however not mentioned by either Schanz or Burnet. Cf. ὑποθέμενος 9 D : ὑποθέσεις 11 C, and see p. 150.

APOLOGY

18 B οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς . . . ἐπειθὸν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ [μᾶλλον] οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστιν τις Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνὴρ τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστῆς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς πάντα ἀνεξήτηκῶς κ.τ.λ. 23 C λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαιώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους.

If in 23 C ἐστὶ were only the copula, could τις stand first? should it not then be μιαιώτατός τις ἐστι? This reflexion and the comparison of 18 B (cf. Dem. 21. 58) seem to show that it is ἔστι, not ἐστὶ; 'there is a very objectionable person named Socrates.' But then Plato cannot have gone on καὶ διαφθείρει. Probably the last letters of the adjective have absorbed a relative pronoun, and we should read Σ. τις ἔστι μιαιώτατος, <ὅς> καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. In *Theaet.* 152 E: Lys. 7. 10: Xen. *An.* 1. 8. 26: [Ar.] 'Αθ. Πολ. 33. 1 like insertions (ὅς after -ος) have been made and are either necessary or extremely probable.

For τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστῆς, which there is no sufficient reason to suspect, the best parallel is Ar. *Poet.* 4, 1448 b 34 ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητῆς Ὅμηρος (Vahlen *ad loc.*). Another good prose parallel is Xen. *R. L.* 13, 11 ἱερεῖ μὲν τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι, στρατηγῶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. Add App. *B.C.* 4. 67 τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ διδάσκαλος ἐγένετο τῷ Κασσίῳ, Perhaps we might also add Plato *Symp.* 196 E ποιητῆς ὁ Ἔρως ἀγαθὸς πᾶσαν ποίησιν, but there ἀγαθός may determine the construction.

ibid. C εἰσὶν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν ἧ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε παῖδες ὄντες.

In his edition of 1893 Schanz reads δῆ for ἄν. Certainly ἄν is curious, for with an indicative tense its regular use is to express that something would have happened under other circumstances but in the actual circumstances did not. Adam makes ἄν ἐπιστεύσατε iterative, but that is very improbable here. Antiphon 6. 11 ὥσπερ ἂν ἡδιστα καὶ ἐπιτηδειώτατα ἀμφοτέροις ἐγίνετο, ἐγὼ μὲν ἐκέλευον καὶ ἠτούμην, οἱ δέ . . . ἐπεμπον (Goodwin, *M.T.* 244) seems an exact parallel, and the two passages may stand or fall

together. I think the construction is due to a certain confusion between two possible modes of expression, e.g. 'in the pleasantest way (that was) possible' and 'in such a way that no other would have been pleasanter': ἄν is really proper only in the second case. If it should be thought that both passages are wrong, though Antiphon would hardly have written ὥσπερ ἥδιστα . . . ἐγίγνετο, we might think of πιστεύσαίτε, which would be possible Greek, though referring to past time (see my *Aristophanes and Others*, p. 15). Cf. *Euthyphro* 5 c, where MSS. vary between ἐγένετο and γένοιτο: Xen. *Cyrop.* 2. 1. 9, where they vary between ἐποιούμην and ποιούμην. But I incline to think the text right.

19 c καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστιν—μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φεύγοιμι (not φύγοιμι)—ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.

I have not found anywhere, though it has probably been given, what seems to me the right explanation of μή πως κ.τ.λ. Setting aside the view that μή is here final, we take the words as expressing a wish. But what is the exact meaning of τοσαύτας δίκας? 'So grave a charge' (Jowett) it cannot mean, even if that made satisfactory sense under the circumstances, because δίκη, not δίκαι, is invariably used, at any rate in prose, for a single suit or action. It must then be 'so many actions.' This is sometimes explained to mean (1) an action for contempt of ἐπιστήμη as well as one on the charge on which Socrates is now actually arraigned. But 'so many actions as that would amount to' seems very feeble, when only two are meant; and there is also the objection to be stated in a moment. Then we have the view (2) indicated by Heindorf and developed by Schanz that τοσαύτας refers to the number of separate branches of knowledge, in this case of natural science, which he might be arraigned for slighting or insulting. Schanz adopts this explanation in his commentary (1893), but feels bound to alter Μελήτου to Μελήτων, a number of Meletuses or persons like Meletus. But at least three objections present themselves to this theory. First Socrates does not distinguish the various

branches, so as to lead up to the plural *τοσαύτας*: he says *τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην*. The sciences were not at that time so differentiated. Then why in such a connexion should Socrates put it all upon Meletus, when he takes pains to assert that, as it was, there were other accusers representing in a way (23 E) separate professions or sets of people? (This, I suppose, is the sort of reason for which Schanz would read the plural *Μελήτων*.) Finally what sort of verisimilitude or propriety is there in suggesting that he could ever be indicted by Meletus or anyone like him for contemning science? Need it be pointed out that no action would lie for anything of the kind, and still further that the Meletuses would according to Socrates be the last people to bring such an action, if it did lie? The prejudice against Socrates, on which he dwells, was that he knew too much and that he busied himself too much with these scientific speculations. That is the very source (he says) of the feeling against him. And yet he is supposed to think of Meletus as actually arraigning him for not treating such speculations with due respect. This last objection seems quite fatal to any interpretation of the passage that makes contumelious treatment of science a possible charge.

What explanation then remains? I think simply this. 'I don't speak thus by way of casting any reflexion upon such knowledge, if anyone really has it. I hope Meletus may never bring actions against me enough to make me do that.' If accused of science, a man might in self-defence not only disclaim it, but court the goodwill of his judges by speaking of it with a cowardly affectation of contempt.

20 A ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐστὶ Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφός, ὃν ἐγὼ ἤσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

After *ἐνθάδε* the words *ὃν . . . ἐπιδημοῦντα* seem so poor by themselves, that I cannot but suspect an error. Perhaps something has been lost, such as 'the other day' or 'by accident.' Perhaps *ἐνθάδε* should be transferred to the relative clause. As it stands, it seems to imply that the three men just named were all then in Athens: is that Plato's meaning?

22 A δει δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς ποιοῦντος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γένοιτο.

I think those critics are right who from Stephanus downwards have wished to insert a *μή* in the final clause, reading ἵνα *μή* μοι κ.τ.λ., and whose proposal now gains support from the old Armenian version. Without this insertion the words mean 'that the oracle might be made irrefutable.' It is perhaps questionable whether you can properly be said to make a thing irrefutable by unsuccessful attempts to refute it. *Γένοιτο* is not quite the same thing as *φανείη οὔσα*. Moreover this hardly represents Socrates' real state of mind, as he describes it. He was perplexed by the oracle and set to work, not to prove its truth—that was not his direct object—but to test its truth and ascertain its exact meaning. He thought it must be true (21 B), but he wanted to make sure. His object was to verify (in the proper sense of that word) and to understand, not to demonstrate. He therefore began with an instance which was likely, if any, to upset the proposition that the god had laid down: 21 B ἦλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα εἶπερ πον ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι οὔτοσι ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα. In other words his object was, not directly ἐλέγχειν τὸ μαντεῖον in the sense of refuting or exposing it, but to test it and thus possibly refute it. Having then started according to his own statement with the idea of possibly refuting the oracle, not indeed expecting to do so but contemplating it as a thing that might happen, how can he describe himself as labouring to make or prove the oracle irrefutable? It is true that presently he speaks of himself as βοηθῶν τῷ θεῷ (23 B) in exposing the pretence of knowledge. But this is at a much later time, when he has long found out the meaning of the oracle and is perfectly satisfied as to its truth. Ἐλέγχειν refers to his first immediate perplexity, βοηθεῖν to the settled conviction of his after-life.

We are then to read ἵνα *μή* for ἵνα and understand that he set out on his labours in order that he might not leave the truth of the oracle untested, that he might not too readily take it for granted as true in its first and most obvious sense. His labours were rewarded by the

discovery that it was true, but not in this sense, and he had therefore good ground for rejoicing that he had not left it unexamined and untested.

This view seems fully confirmed by a passage in the *Philebus*, which as far as I know has not been quoted in this connexion and which is really my justification for this long note. In 41 B we read *τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα, ἕως ἂν κέηται παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον ἀνέλεγκτον δήπου γίνεσθαι*, where Badham writes as follows: 'the sense of the passage thus becomes plain: *But until this judgment (of mine) is approved and established in us both, it is impossible for it to escape (or become exempt from) examination.* I have endeavoured to give the force of the word *γίνεσθαι*, which, as will be seen, signifies a great deal more than *εἶναι*.'

23 A *κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτον λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρησθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν <εἰ> εἴποι κ.τ.λ.*

τοῦτον is admittedly wrong and either *τοῦτο* or *τοῦτ' οὐ* is usually read for it. But neither is at all satisfactory. (1) *τοῦτο*, if read, means that human knowledge is a mere pretence. But it is quite untrue to say that the oracle *appears* to say this of Socrates, and, if *φαίνεται λέγειν* could mean *is found in reality to say*, it is also untrue that the oracle really said this of Socrates. The oracle did not even *mean* it (*λέγειν* in another sense) of Socrates: it meant it of all mankind, Socrates of course included. (2) *τοῦτ' οὐ* is equally unsatisfactory. *Τοῦτο* is now explained to mean, and must mean, the being wise or possessed of genuine knowledge (*τὸ σοφὸν εἶναι*). But it is most unlikely that *τοῦτο* in *τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν* should be something quite different from the *τοῦτο* in *τοῦτο λέγειν* just before: the *σοφὸν εἶναι* is not in reality quite obvious to supply; and the very repetition of the phrase *τοῦτο λέγειν* is inartistic. *τοῦτο* in this case cannot be the unreality of knowledge, because *φαίνεται οὐ λέγειν*, meaning *turns out not to say*, would imply that at first sight it seemed to say, which it did not. The sense required certainly appears to be 'the oracle does not really mean that Socrates has knowledge.'

and I do not see how to get this without rather larger change. Two possible lines of emendation occur to me, but I do not mention them with any confidence. One would be καὶ φαίνεται τοιοῦτον λέγειν τὸν Σ., προσκεχρήσθαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'The god seems to call Socrates wise, but really he has just made use of my name.' Or we might read something like τοιοῦτον οὐ λέγειν . . . προσκεχρηῆσθαι δέ . . . *i.e.* 'it appears that he does not really call Socrates wise, but has only made use' etc. Another possible form of sentence would be κινδυνεύει . . . σοφὸς εἶναι καί . . . τοῦτο λέγειν ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγον τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός, καὶ ν φαίνηται (ὅρ εἰ καὶ φαίνεται) τοιοῦτον λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρηῆσθαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. In this latter form προσκεχρηῆσθαι would depend on κινδυνεύει. It may be noticed that an εἰ has obviously fallen out two lines lower before εἴποι.

25 E εἰ διαφθείρω might be omitted as a whole and not the εἰ only.

26 D Ἄναξαγόρου οἶει κατηγορεῖν κ.τ.λ.

I cannot see any sufficient reason for doubting, with Schanz and others, the correctness of Ἄναξαγόρου, though it must be admitted that Socrates' meaning is not expressed as clearly as it might have been. Possibly the want of clearness is intentional, for, beautiful as the *Apology* is, any logical reader must detect in it certain defects of reasoning which, if Gorgias or Protagoras were the speaker, might be called sophistry. But the meaning appears to be this. Meletus taxes Socrates with irreligious ideas about the sun and the moon. Socrates rejoins that in the *first* place he does not hold any such views and Meletus must be confounding him with Anaxagoras who did, and that in the *second* it would be absurd to tax him with having propounded such ideas as original views of his own, when everybody knew that they had been put forward fifty years ago by Anaxagoras. (It will be observed that Meletus is not made to charge Socrates with propounding them as original. Socrates is ridiculing an accusation that Meletus had not brought.) The want of clearness consists in the fact that the two points are not put markedly enough as distinct: 'I don't hold any such opinions, and,

if I did, I certainly should not claim originality for them.' But it is the first point which is really important, though more space is given for the moment to the second. The main thing is that he does not hold the opinions in question. Now the omission of 'Αναξαγόρου (Schanz) or the substitution of Σωκράτους (Baiter) would drop the first and important point altogether. Meletus would say 'he thinks the sun is only stone,' and Socrates would answer 'well, there is nothing new in that.' But, if he does not deny the charge here, he does not deny it at all, for the argument beginning in 26 Ε ἀλλ', ὧ πρὸς Διός, κ.τ.λ. has no reference to this charge specifically. He may believe even in gods and yet hold this offensive theory about the sun. (It might be thought that 'Αναξαγόρου is likely to be wrong because of the addition of τοῦ Κλαζομενίου to 'Αναξαγόρου immediately afterwards. Cf. however the *Clouds*, where Chaerephon is mentioned just by his name in 144 and then in 156, as though not already mentioned, referred to as X. ὁ Σφήτιος.) This argument, if sound, will show that καί is right as well as 'Αναξαγόρου and not to be altered to ἤ. All three main clauses are to be made interrogative, and not with Schanz affirmative.

I should like to add a remark on the much disputed words ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελαῖν. The use of ἐνίοτε has been turned against the bookselling theory of the passage. The use is indeed somewhat odd, at any rate at first sight, but as far as I can see it is equally a difficulty on either interpretation; or rather perhaps, when examined, it is more of a difficulty on the old view. If we take the words as uttered, so to speak, in a breath, *sometimes* is certainly hard to understand: *doctrines which you can sometimes buy for a drachma at most*. We should rather say *which you can buy any day, always*. But ἐνίοτε . . . δραχμῆς is a sort of little parenthesis or semi-detached group of words: *which it is open to you—sometimes, if unusually dear, they may cost you a drachma—to buy in the orchestra*. Leaving out of sight the fact, which we may really regard as established, that there were no drachma seats in the theatre of Dionysus, I hardly see what would be the point of saying that a man might

possibly have to give as much as a drachma for a seat. There were undoubtedly plenty of two-obol seats, as Demosthenes remarks, even if there were also dearer ones. But for a book on a stall, if he wanted it, a man might very well have to give a drachma.

27 Ε ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἄνθρωπον, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἠγγείσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μῆτε δαίμονας μῆτε θεοὺς μῆτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστίν.

Schanz in his commentary completely alters this sentence by insertions and omissions. In his text of 1877 he had inserted nothing, but omitted the second τοῦ αὐτοῦ and μῆτε ἥρωας. Even Adam would make insertions here, though not the same, and Burnet follows Rieckher in omitting οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. Μῆτε ἥρωας is unimportant, and for the rest is it clear that any change is necessary? 'You will never persuade anybody that the same man will not believe in both δαιμόνια and θεῖα' (that is, a man must believe in θεῖα, if he believes in δαιμόνια): 'or again that the same man will not disbelieve in both δαίμονες and θεοί' (that is, he must disbelieve in δαίμονες, if he disbelieves in θεοί). There is a slight objection to the form of the latter clause, as μῆτε θεοὺς μῆτε δαίμονας would seem the more logical order. It is possible that Plato really wrote the words so, and μῆτε ἥρωας would then come in better, in immediate sequence on δαίμονας. But, even if he did not, the meaning may fairly be got from the words, when we know from the context what it is. There is also a slight objection to the substance of the former clause, for, though Socrates seems here to be recapitulating, he has not previously argued directly from δαιμόνια to θεῖα, only from δαιμόνια to δαίμονες and from δαίμονες to θεοί. But the slipping in of the θεῖα is very easy and the point is virtually implied in the parallel inference of θεοί from δαίμονες.

In the sentence almost immediately preceding this those scholars are, I think, equally wrong who would omit τοὺς ἡμιόνοους, necessary as it is not exactly to the logical justice of the illustration but to its artistic finish. Just as the offspring of gods are not gods but δαίμονες, so the offspring

of horses are not horses but mules. On the other hand the contention that in this case Plato ought to have mentioned a possible denial of nymphs, to balance exactly the supposed denial of donkeys, seems to ask for too much. This is a small point that the reader can easily supply, and after all it is the gods who are in question. The nymphs do not matter.

I am not even sure that in εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἤγοῖτο ἢ καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἡμιόνους we need omit ἢ. A man may be thinking or speaking of mules as offspring of horses *or* as offspring of donkeys. We may call them offspring of horses, as Simonides did when it was made worth his while. We may also call them offspring of donkeys. It is only when we want to be exact that we need specify both parents. But ἢ and καί are often confused, and one may very well have grown out of the other.

28 A ἃ δὴ καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἤρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσει· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή.

After οὐδέν I should prefer γάρ to δέ. The two words are apt to get interchanged.

29 C ὥστ' οὐδ' εἴ με νῦν ἀφίετε . . ., εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε . . ., εἰ οὖν με, ὥσπερ εἶπον, ἀφίετε, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν κ.τ.λ.

Was not Stephanus right in wishing to change ἀφίετε to the optative? Be it remembered that, though ἐὰν ἀφήτε can refer and usually does refer to future time, εἰ ἀφίετε cannot. It is not like our *if you acquit*, i.e. *if you shall acquit*, but it would ordinarily mean *if you are now acquitting*. It can only stand here, if at all, in the sense *if you are feeling inclined to acquit*, which is not really very suitable. What is really wanted is *if you were to feel inclined, were to propose, to acquit*, and that is εἰ ἀφίοιτε.

31 D φωνή τις γιγνομένη ἢ ὅταν γένηται ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με.

Read γίγνηται for γένηται, which would mean 'after its occurrence.' Cf. the note below on *Phaedr.* 256 E. In *Phil.* 26 E τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τιν' αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι and *Laws* 687 C τὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς ἐπίταξιν τὰ γιγνόμενα γίνεσθαι we might just as well read γενόμενα as keep

γένηται here. Cf. *Meno* 100 A and B (παραγιγνομενη . . . παραγίγνηται). In the parallel passage *Theages* 128 D the same change should be made twice, as the present tense ἀνακοινῶται helps to show.

32 A ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπέικων δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἅμα ἂν ἀπολοίμην.

For ἅμα καὶ ἅμα, which is unintelligible, the Venetian codex has καὶ ἅμα. Many slight changes have been proposed. I add the suggestion ἅμα καὶ αὐτὸς ἂν ἀπολοίμην, taking the second ἅμα as an accidental repetition of the first. αὐτὸς would be added, because παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον suggests, as in the cases he quotes, unjust or illegal executions.

34 A νῦν παρασχέσθω—ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ—καὶ λεγέτω.

Perhaps ἐγὼ <γὰρ> παραχωρῶ. γαρ and παρ are almost undistinguishable.

ibid. E ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \tauῷ \text{ Σωκράτει B} \\ \tauὸν \text{ Σωκράτη T} \end{array} \right\}$ διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.

So Burnet reports the readings of the Bodleian and the Venetus, adding 'τὸ Σωκράτη al.' He himself reads τῷ Σωκράτη. I think we might read τοὶ Σωκράτη, τοὶ being quite suitable with ἀλλ' οὖν—γέ.

36 B ἀμελήσας ὧνπερ οἱ πολλοί.

It is certain that the sense required is *disregarding what most men regard*. I should call it equally certain that by Greek usage the idea to be supplied with ὧνπερ is the idea which precedes it. For instance in ἐπιθυμῶ ὧνπερ οἱ ἄλλοι we can only understand ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. I should therefore feel quite sure that some such word as φροντίζουσι (not οὐ, as Schanz thinks) had been omitted here by accident, if it did not seem just possible that ἀμελήσας might be resolved into οὐδὲν ἐπιμεληθείς. οὐδὲν μέλει μοι ὧνπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις would be unimpeachable, and possibly ἀμελήσας might be regarded only as an equivalent. Is there any example of a positive word, verb, substantive, or adjective, being thus as it were supplied out of the privative

compound?¹ I do not think the common cases where *πᾶς* is supplied to a new clause from *οὐδεὶς*, *φησί* from *οὐ φησί*, etc., help us much, especially as the clauses are always antithetic in form.

ibid. D οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι.

Schanz (1893) cuts out *μᾶλλον*, and so Burnet; others οὕτως. *μᾶλλον* may be due to the same word coming in the next line, but there is no obvious reason why anyone should have put it in. 30 B is quite different. It may stand for *ἄλλο* used along with *ἔσθ' ὅτι* as in *Phaedo* 94 B *ἔσθ' ὅτι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν*; Xen. *Oecon.* 3. 12 *ἔστιν ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ τῶν σπουδαίων πλείῳ ἐπιτρέπεις ἢ τῇ γυναικί*;

37 B ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, τούτου τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ; . . . ἀλλὰ χρημάτων καὶ δεδέσθαι;

Schanz and Burnet seem right in following Baumann and reading *τι* for *ὅτι* with one inferior MS. Adam reads *ἔχωμαι*, but (1) this would be a misuse of *ἔχεσθαι*, which is not to *take hold*, but to *keep hold*; (2) *ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων* is impossible Greek. The parenthetic use of *οἶδ' ὅτι* is nothing to the point, for it *is* parenthetic and can be removed without affecting the construction, e.g. *πάντων [οἶδ' ὅτι] φησάντων ἄν* (Adam's instance), whereas here *κακῶν ὄντων* would be governed by it. The Greek expression would be *ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακά ἐστι*. Cf. *Rep.* 465 D *διὰ σμικρὸν μέρος ὧν τούτοις ὑπάρχει*; Herod. 1. 78 *οὐδέν κω εἰδότες τῶν ἦν περὶ Σάρδεις*; Thuc. 7. 67 *ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν παρεσκευάσται*; Ar. *Rhet.* 1. 5, 1361 b 14 *τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὧν τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται*; C.I.A. ii. 281. 12 *περὶ πάντων ὧν γέγονε*. In *Hipp. Min.* 363 D *ὅτι ἄν τις βούληται ὧν ἄν μοι εἰς ἐπίδειξιν παρεσκευασμένον ἢ* I do not see how anything but *παρεσκευασμένον ἢ* could be right,

¹ I have noticed an instance in the letters of Horace Walpole. See letter to Pownall of Oct. 27, 1783: 'I myself do not pretend to be unprejudiced. I must be so' (i.e. prejudiced, partial) 'to the best of fathers: I should be ashamed to be quite impartial.' The *Spectator* of June 26, 1909, has in a quotation the words 'It is impossible anywhere and least of all' (i.e. least possible of all) 'in a country like India.'

like *παρεσκευάσται* in Thucydides. Stallbaum's *παρεσκευασμένων* would be as bad as *ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων* here. Riddell *Digest* § 26 c takes a different view of the passage before us, but he ignores *ὅτι*.

Possibly Meiser's *τοῦ* for *τούτου*, whereby *τοῦ τιμησάμενος* becomes a distinct question, like *τί δείσας* above, is to be preferred. It accounts better for the genitives *δεσμοῦ* and *χρημάτων*, which might be expected otherwise rather to follow the construction of *τι*, if *τι* is right, after *ἔλωμαι*.

The omission of the article before *δεδέσθαι* is very unusual, nor do I know anything in prose quite like it. It may be due, if right, to there being no article with *χρημάτων*. Cf. however *Ar. Ach.* 196-7, where *μὴ 'πιτηρεῖν* represents a genitive, unless 197 and 198 are to change places.

38 D *ἀπορία μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν λέγειν κ.τ.λ.*

'*μὴ* T Arm. : om. B' Burnet, who retains it. No doubt Thucydides 2. 49 has *ἡ ἀπορία τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχάζειν*, where *μὴ* is superfluous, but the interposition of *τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας* here alters the case. Anything added further should be as positive as they are. Cf. however Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* 6. 13 (251) *χρημάτων ἀπάγων αὐτὸν καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπαινεῖν τὸ ἐξ ἅπαντος κέρδος*. I do not feel sure that *τῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν*, parallel to *ἀπορία*, is not what Plato wrote.

39 B *καὶ ἵν' ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι . . . καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὔτοι.*

ἐμμενῶ will be better both in sense and in conformity to *ἄπειμι*. He does not mean that he and they are now abiding or disposed to abide by the judgment, but that in the future they will have to accept it and acquiesce. In *Crito* 50 c *ἐμμενεῖν* is now read and 53 A *ἐμμενεῖς*. Perhaps we ought to read *ἄ λέξω* for *ἄ λέγω* (*ἄν λέγω* Schanz) in 17 c.

CRITO

45 C τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ σπεύσαιεν.

I do not know whether ὅσπερ is elsewhere used in correlation with τοιοῦτος. If not, we might write οἰάπερ, like τοιούτων οἰάπερ just below. οἱ would easily be lost after αἱ.

ibid. Ε αἰσχύνομαι μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρα πεπρᾶχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης . . ., καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν . . ., καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, ὥσπερ κατάגעλως τῆς πράξεως, κακία τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρία τῇ ἡμετέρα διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν.

In spite of the length of the sentence it is difficult to believe that Plato wrote what comes to μὴ δόξῃ τουτί δοκεῖν διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς. Δοκεῖν being intolerable, I am inclined to think that Plato wrote δοκοῦν or δοκῶν. It might also be δόξει. Each step in the change (δόξει to δοκεῖ, δοκεῖ to δοκεῖν) is quite frequent. The future would be slightly irregular but very much in Plato's manner.

51 C ἡμεῖς γὰρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, κ.τ.λ. ὁμῶς προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ . . . ὃ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται.

'We proclaim by having given leave to any Athenian who likes that he has leave' etc. Is this good sense or what Plato was likely to write? There seems also to be a certain want of connexion between the personal touch of σε γεννήσαντες κ.τ.λ. and the quite general bearing of προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι κ.τ.λ. Both these

faults might be removed by reading σοι for τῷ. It may be said of course that ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι ἐξεῖναι ἀπιέναι is grossly pleonastic, and so it is. But ἐξεῖναι (like δειν) is often put in quite pleonastically. Cf. Dem. 22, 8 οὐκ ἐῶντος ἐξεῖναι . . . αἰτῆσαι : 59. 106 οὐκ ἐῶ γίγνεσθαι Ἀθηναῖον ἐξεῖναι and 113 ἄδειαν . . . τοῦ ἐξεῖναι παιδοποιήσασθαι : Plat. *Rep.* 555 c εἴργειν νόμῳ . . . μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτοὺς ἀναλίσκειν : Isaeus 10. 10 ὁ νόμος . . . κωλύει μὴ ἐξεῖναι. For repetition of practically the same word in such a pleonasm cf. *Laws* 839 c μὴ δυνατόν εἶναι δύνασθαι . . . πόλιν ζῆν πράττουσαν τοῦτο.

CHARMIDES

153 C καὶ ἄμα με καθίζει ἄγων παρὰ Κριτίαν.

I suggest καθίζειν or ἐκάθιζεν. Plato makes next to no use of the historic or graphic present. Even φησί is scarcely used by him, ἔφη and ἦ δ' ὅς being his regular expressions.

155 D μοῖραν αἰρεῖσθαι in the quotation certainly seems wrong for *claiming* or *trying to get* a share. Cobet αἰτεῖσθαι. Perhaps it should be μοῖραν ἄγεσθαι, a quite proper use. αἰρ and αγ are certainly sometimes confused.

156 A ἀπογράψομαι τοίνυν, ἔφη, παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ἐπωδὴν. Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴαν με πείθῃς ἢ κἂν μή; γελάσας οὖν Ἐάν σε πείθω, ἔφη.

Read πείθῃς and πείσω, the proper tense and habitual in this phrase, e.g. *Rep.* 327 C ἐλλείπεται τὸ ἦν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς: *Meno* 100 C εἴαν πείθῃς τοῦτον, etc. The mistake is frequent.

ibid. B ὥσπερ ἴσως καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν . . λέγουσί που ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε . . . ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶη ἄμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν.

Schanz after Madvig ἀναγκαῖον <ἂν> εἶη, but this is a mistake. The optative, though not really grammatical after the present tense λέγουσι, is due to the perfect ἀκήκοας preceding, as though the words had been ἀκήκοας λεγόντων ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον εἶη. Further on in the same page we have an even stronger case of the same confusion: Ζάλμοξις, ἔφη, λέγει . . . ὅτι . . . τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον εἶη . . . πάντα γὰρ ἔφη ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ὠρμηθῆσαι, where the ἔφη following makes it clear that the earlier words are constructed as if

not λέγει but ἔλεγεν had been used. It is of course possible that Plato really wrote ἔλεγεν, but there is no adequate reason for change.

157 C εἰν βούλη . . . τὴν ψυχὴν πρῶτον παρασχεῖν ἐπάσαι ταῖς τοῦ Θρακὸς ἐπωδαῖς.

The regular accusative after ἐπάδειν is the charm, not the person. I would therefore write τὰς τοῦ Θρακὸς ἐπωδάς. It is true that in 176 B we seem to have the personal passive ἐπάδεσθαι, but such passive uses do not guarantee a corresponding active use, e.g. ἐπιβουλεύομαι, ἐπιτάττομαι, ἐπιτιμῶμαι do not prove that ἐπιβουλεύω, etc. can take an accusative of the person. Nor does the construction require the object of παρασχεῖν and of ἐπάσαι to be the same. It seems unlikely that ταῖς ἐπωδαῖς is governed directly by παρασχεῖν. For the corruption cf. *Lach.* 190 B ἀρετὴ παραγενομένη τὰς ψυχὰς (or ταῖς ψυχαῖς) ἀμείνους ποιήσῃ, where Schanz gives ψυχὰς from a Vatican MS. but B and T have the dative.

160 E δοκεῖ . . . αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ αἰσχυντηλὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ εἶναι ὅπερ αἰδῶς ἢ σωφροσύνη.

It is very harsh for ποιεῖν to take first the infinitive and then the adjective after it. Cf. note on *Laches* 178 B. Unless parallels are forthcoming, I think something like παρέχειν *render* should be added with the adjective (αἰσχυντηλὸν παρέχειν), or εἶναι (ποιεῖν . . . αἰσχυντηλὸν εἶναι).

161 E δοκεῖ ἂν σοι πόλις εὖ οἰκείσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ νόμου τοῦ κελεύοντος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἰμάτιον ἕκαστον ὑφαίνειν καὶ πλύνειν, καὶ ὑποδήματα σκυτοτομεῖν, καὶ λήκυθον καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τῶν μὲν ἀλλοτριῶν μὴ ἄπτεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐργάζεσθαι τε καὶ πράττειν ;

The deficiency of proper government for λήκυθον etc. might pass, something being supplied out of the previous infinitives. But the asyndeton of τῶν μὲν κ.τ.λ. makes it probable that we ought to remedy both defects by adding something like ποιῶντα after or before κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. A certain similarity between πάντα and ποιῶντα might lead to the omission. Or is πάντα itself an error for ποιῶντα? Cf. on *Ion* 530 B.

163 D δῆλον δὲ μόνον ἐφ' ὅτι ἂν φέρῃς τοῦνομα ὅτι ἂν λέγῃς.

We shall get not only more elegant but more correct Greek, if we write ἐφ' ὅτι δὴ φέρεις, availing ourselves of the frequent confusion of ἂν and δὴ, or simply ἐφ' ὅτι φέρεις. The indirect interrogative is more proper here than the relative, and the double ὅτι ἂν is very awkward. Many editors write φέροις, but Schanz does not record any MS. variation from φέρῃς. The optative does not seem quite in place.

164 A ἀλλὰ λέγε εἰ δοκεῖ τίς σοι ἰατρὸς ὑγιᾶ τινα ποιῶν ὠφέλιμα καὶ ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὃν ἰῶτο.

The optative ἰῶτο would hardly be used unless an ἂν with ποιεῖν preceded. Perhaps ὠφέλιμ' ἂν; but the ἂν would be very likely to be placed with δοκεῖ.

166 B ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἧκεις ἐρευνῶν, ὅτῳ διαφέρει πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ σωφροσύνη.

I do not see how ὅτῳ can be justified, as the sense is relative, not interrogative. Read ἐπ' αὐτό . . . τὸ ψ. So for instance *Phaedr.* 247 E τὴν ἐν τῷ ὃ ἐστὶν ὃν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν: *Lach.* 185 D περὶ τοῦ ὃ ἔνεκα ἄλλον ἐζήτει (MSS. οὐ ἔνεκα ἄλλο: the error there too caused or helped by the unusual construction).

173 A εἰ γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα ἡμῶν ἄρχοι ἢ σωφροσύνη. οὖσα οἶαν νῦν ὀριζόμεθα, ἄλλο τι κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἂν πράττειτο;

Stallbaum lightly translates, *nonne secundum artium scientiam agatur?* But there is no impersonal πράττεται like *agitur*. *Meno* 96 E πράττεται τὰ πράγματα. Something therefore is wrong or missing. <πάν> ἂν πράττειτο? [I did not know that Stobaeus had πάντα πράττειτο. Burnet πάντ' ἂν πράττειτο.]

ibid. C εἰ δὲ βούλοιό γε, . . . ξυγχωρήσωμεν.

Probably βούλει. Cf. on *Alcib. ii.* 144 D.

174 A τίνα; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἄρα μὴ τὸν τοιόνδε, εἴ τις πρὸς τοῖς μέλλουσι καὶ τὰ γεγονότα πάντα εἰδεῖη καὶ τὰ νῦν ὄντα καὶ μὴδὲν ἀγνοοῖ; φῶμεν γάρ τινα εἶναι αὐτόν.

Does *τίνα εἶναι αὐτόν* make any sense? Should not αὐτόν be τοιοῦτον?

LACHES

178 B ἡμᾶς δὲ ἡμεῖς ἡγησάμενοι καὶ ἱκανοὺς γινῶναι καὶ γνόνας ἀπλῶς ἂν εἰπεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ ὑμῖν, οὕτω κ.τ.λ.

The adjective and the infinitive are very awkwardly paired. Cf. on *Charm.* 160 E. Has εἶναι dropped out before or after γινῶναι? or should we read καὶ ἱκανῶς γινῶναι?

182 E οἶμαι ἐγὼ τοῦτο . . οὐκ ἂν λεληθέναι Λακεδαιμονίουσ . . . εἰ δ' ἐκείνους ἐλελήθειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τούτους γε τοὺς διδασκάλους αὐτοῦ λέληθεν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Schanz writes αὐτοῦ 'λελήθειν, but we must add ἂν, probably before αὐτό. 'If it had escaped the Lacedaemonians, the fact would not have escaped etc.' The previous οὐκ ἂν λεληθέναι and εἰ δ' ἐλελήθειν show λέληθεν to be wrong, and οὐκ ἂν λ. shows the meaning of εἰ δ' εἰ.

184 A ἐπειδὴ βαλόντος τινὸς λίθῳ παρὰ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ κατάστροφμα ἀφίεται (-ετο? Cf. on *Charm.* 153 c) τοῦ δόρατος, τότε ἤδη κ.τ.λ.

Is the dative λίθῳ right? To say nothing of the want of an expressed object for βαλόντος, 'having struck (him) with a stone' does not harmonise with παρὰ and ἐπί, which point to a verb of motion. Surely βαλόντος τινὸς λίθον is what Plato wrote. The confusion of -ον and -φ is not very uncommon. In *Anthol.* 7. 378

ἄμφω δ', ὡς ἄμ' ἔναιον, ὑπὸ πλακί τυμβεύονται
ξυνὸν ἀγαλλόμενοι καὶ τάφον ὡς θάλαμον

we seem to need the reverse change, καὶ τάφῳ ὡς θαλάμῳ, for ἀγάλλομαι has no business with datives. Probably ξυνῶ also, but it is just possible to make ξυνόν adverbial, though it and κοινόν are not, I think, known in that sense.

ibid. B εἰ μὲν δειλός τις ἂν οἴοιτο αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι, θρασύτερος ἂν δι' αὐτὸ γινόμενος ἐπιφανέστερος γένοιτο οἶος ἦν.

Αὐτόν should be αὐτό, as in the next clause, *i.e.* the μάθημα; and ἦν must be a mistake for εἶη, an easy and not infrequent error. Cf. p. 90.

185 C εἴτε χρὴ αὐτὸ (the φάρμακον) ὑπαλείφεσθαι εἴτε μή.

I suspect we should read either αὐτῶ or ἐπαλείφεσθαι. So in *Ar. Probl.* 38. 3. 967 a 4 ὑπαλειφθέν might very well be ἐπαλειφθέν.

ibid. D There seems no reason for the imperfects ἐσκόπει and ἐζήτει, and we should probably read σκοπεῖ, ζητεῖ. *Charm.* 157 D should certainly have δοκεῖ, not ἐδόκει.

ibid. E εἰ μή . . . ἔργον ἔχοιεν ἐπιδειξάι εὔειργασμένον καὶ ἐν καὶ πλείω.

The double καὶ is illogical, as the two cases exclude each other. Should it not be a double ἦ? Cf. 191 D E where a similar question arises.

187 E ὃς ἂν ἐγγύτατα Σωκράτους ἦ λόγῳ ὥσπερ γένοι καὶ πλησιάζῃ διαλεγόμενος.

Much difficulty has been found in this and some surprising changes proposed (see Schanz). I do not know whether the parallel of *Soph.* 265 A has been adduced, τοῖς (masc.) ἐγγυτάτω γένοι τῆς τοιαύτης μεθόδου πεφυκόσιν, which seems to show that there is nothing wrong.

189 C Probably τά <γ'> ὑμέτερα or τὰ ὑ. γε.

191 B καὶ σὺ τὸ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἱππέων πέρι λέγεις.

τό and περί do not go well together in this case. Read καὶ σύ τοι.

192 C There seems something wrong in the two clauses both ending with φαίνεται. The word is almost certainly a mistake in one or other of the two.

ibid. E εἴ τις καρτερεῖ . . . τοῦτον ἀνδρείον καλοῖς ἂν;

καρτεροῖ or -οίη, as a few lines below? So in 199 D I suspect προσήκει should be προσήκοι.

199 D οὕτως αὖ μετατίθεσθαι ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

μετατίθεσαι would be much neater.

LYSIS

205 A τούτων δέ τι, ἔφη, σταθμᾶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν ὅδε λέγει;

This sense and construction of σταθμᾶσθαι, *take into account, value*, are apparently unparalleled. Should we not fall back on the usual dative and read τινί, *go by, judge by*, or, keeping τι, read ὧ in the same sense for ὧν?

207 B προσῆλθον δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

Probably ἄλλοι without οἱ.

208 A ἦν ἐπιθυμήσης ἐπί τινος τῶν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀρμάτων ὀχεῖσθαι λαβὼν τὰς ἡνίας ὅταν ἀμιλλᾶται, οὐκ ἂν ἐφέν σε ἀλλὰ διακωλύοιεν; Μὰ Δί' οὐ μέντοι ἄν, ἔφη, ἐφέν. Ἄλλὰ τίνα μὴν; Ἔστιν τις ἡνίοχος παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μισθὸν φέρων.

Schanz seems right in altering τίνα μὴν to τί μὴν. But, unless I mistake his meaning, he intends ἀλλὰ τί μὴν to be said by Socrates. It is really said by Lysis in continuation of the words preceding and means 'of course they wouldn't'; 'how could you expect it?' In the following twelve lines Lysis twice says ἀλλὰ τί μὴν in a similar sense.

ibid. c Should παιδαγωγός be omitted?

209 A οὐκ ἀναμένουσιν ἕως ἂν ἡλικίαν ἔχης.

σχηῖς *attain*? But ἔχης may be right. See note on *Phaedo* 74 c.

210 A ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέποι ἂν . . . , περὶ ὅσων ἂν δόξωμεν αὐτῷ σοφώτεροι ἐκείνων εἶναι;

In this purely hypothetical case ὅσων ἂν δόξωμεν does not seem right. We want the optative δόξαιμεν or δοκοῖμεν. Perhaps, therefore, περὶ ὅσων δὴ δόξαιμεν may be suggested. Cf. on *Charm.* 163 D.

ibid. C οὔτε σὲ ὁ πατήρ οὔτε ἄλλος ἄλλον, not οὐδέ . . . οὐδέ.
Cf. three lines below.

ibid. D οὐδ' ἄρα μεγαλόφρων εἶ . . . Μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗ μοι δοκεῖ. Rather οὗ μοι δοκῶ. In *Gorg.* 509 A I suggest δόξειαν for δόξειεν.

211 E ὁ μὲν γὰρ τις ἵππους ἐπιθυμῆι κτᾶσθαι, ὁ δὲ κύνας, ὁ δὲ χρυσίον, ὁ δὲ τιμάς· ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα πρῶως ἔχω, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν φίλων κτῆσιν πάνυ ἐρωτικῶς.

For the unusual sense of πρῶως, which I formerly doubted, cf. *Plut. Solon* 12 περὶ τὰ πένθη πραοτέρους and *Demosth.* 22 : *Mor.* 77 C μέτριος . . . καὶ πρῶος ἐν τῷ παρεῖναι καὶ συμφοροσοφεῖν : perhaps ἠπίως εἶχε *Timol.* 7.

212 B Read μόνον (not μόνος μόνον) for μόνος.

214 B For ταῦτα αὐτά Schanz follows Heindorf in reading ταῦτα ταῦτά, but the invariable order is ταῦτὰ ταῦτα.

Just below I would add a μὲν after the second ἴσως (ἴσως μὲν . . . ἴσως δέ).

ibid. E δυσχεραίνω τί γε should be δυσχεραίνω γέ τι.

ibid. ὁτιοῦν ὁμοῖον ὁσφοῦν ὁμοίῳ τίνα ὠφελίαν ἔχειν ἢ τίνα βλάβην ἂν ποιῆσαι δύναίτο ὃ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ;

The neuter ὃ seems indefensible and ἦν necessary.

216 D πρὸς ἃ δὲ λέγων μαντεύομαι ἄκουσον.

In spite of Heindorf βλέπων should probably be read for λέγων.

Such phrases as πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις ; are quite different. They mean 'what is the bearing of that?' 'how do you apply that?' Here the sense is rather 'the things that make me surmise that' 'the observations my surmise is based on.' Cf. *Lach.* 195 A πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες βλέψας ; 197 E ἄξιος ἐπισκέψεως ὅποι ποτὲ βλέπων τοῦνομα τοῦτο τίθησι : *Meno* 89 D and 96 E : *Hipp. Ma.* 299 E : etc.

218 B φαμὲν γὰρ αὐτό. Perhaps οὔτω.

221 A ἡ πείνη μὲν ἔσται, εἰάνπερ ἄνθρωποι τε καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα ἦ.

εἰάνπερ should, I think, be ἕωσπερ ἄν. In *Hellenics* 1. 7. 35 the MSS. give us ἐγγνητὰς καταστήσαι, εἰὰν κριθῶσιν, but the emendation of Stephanus, ἕως ἂν κριθῶσιν, is universally adopted. Cf. on *Phaedo* 74 c.

ibid. c Read οὐ τᾶν for the first οὐκ ἄν. Also ἀδύνατόν που ἦν seems to lack an ἄν.

HIPPIAS MAIOR

281 A Ἴππίας ὁ καλός τε καὶ σοφός, ὡς διὰ χρόνου ἡμῖν κατῆρας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας.

The first words are, I imagine, taken to be a nominative doing duty as vocative, like *Symp.* 218 B οἱ οἰκέται . . . πύλας τοῖς ὡσὶν ἐπίθεσθε : *Ar. Ach.* 242 προῖθ' εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ὀλίγον, ἢ κανηφόρος. But, though the grammars fail to tell us so, this nominative with the article (quite distinct from ὦ φίλος, ὦ κάκιστ' ἀπολούμενος, etc. and also distinct from e.g. *Ar. Av.* 30 ὄνδρες οἱ παρόντες ἐν λόγῳ, *Plato Prot.* 337 C ὦ ἄνδρες οἱ παρόντες) is only used with an imperative, expressed or understood, or with something equivalent to an imperative, or now and then with a question. Examples with the imperative expressed are given above. The imperative is understood in *Ar. Ach.* 54 (οἱ τοξόται), 61, 94 (something like ἔλκετε αὐτόν in 54 and προῖτε in 61, 94). In *Ach.* 824 ἀγορανόμοι, τοὺς συκοφάντας οὐ θύραζ' ἐξείρξετε; and 864 οἱ σφῆκες, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν θυρῶν; *Theocr.* 5. 102 οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς δρυός, οὗτος ὁ Κώναρος ἄ τε Κιναίθα; the equivalence of οὐ with the second person of the future to an imperative is familiar. The second passage therefore should not be written οἱ σφῆκες οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν θυρῶν; as though the verb understood was in the third person. *Theocr.* 1. 151 αἱ δὲ χίμαιραι, οὐ μὴ σκιρτασεῖτε and *Ar. Eccl.* 128 ὁ περιστῆραρχος, περιφέρειν χρῆ τὴν γαλῆν are imperatival. So is *Theocr.* 4. 45 σίτθ', ὁ λέπαργος, etc. Finally, just as πρὸς θεῶν goes with an imperative, but goes also with a question, where we may if we like supply mentally something like *tell me*, so we may occasionally find such a phrase as *Ar. Av.* 1628 ὁ Τριβαλλός, οἰμῶζειν δοκεῖ σοι; *Ran.* 40 ὁ παῖς, . . . οὐκ ἐνεθυμήθης; where ὁ παῖς

may go with the question or may be taken as a sort of hail. What is common to all these varieties of phrase is that some one is addressed suddenly. In the passage before us, which is neither imperatival nor interrogatory nor a mere hail, the presence of the nominative Ἱππίας, and that coming first, certainly makes a difference. At the same time the words are by no means equivalent to an ordinary vocative (ὦ Ἱππία everywhere else in the dialogue). They seem rather to be a wondering question (familiar in comedy, e.g. Ter. *Andr.* 4. 5. 6), *Is this Hippias?* and should perhaps be punctuated off from what follows. At the beginning of the *Symposium* the words of the friend are probably ὁ (not ὦ with the best MSS.) Φαληρεὺς οὗτος Ἀπολλόδορος, οὐ περιμενεῖς; like *Ach.* 824 and 864 quoted above, or Theocr. 5. 147 οὗτος ὁ Λευκίτας ὁ κορυπτίλος, εἴ τιν' ὀχεύσεις τῶν αἰγῶν, φλασῶ τυ (though this last almost = a prohibition). But the presence of οὗτος makes a difference.

ibid. Elis chooses Hippias as envoy, ἡγουμένη δικαστήν καὶ ἄγγελον ἰκανώτατον εἶναι τῶν λόγων οἳ ἂν παρὰ τῶν πόλεων ἐκάστων λέγωνται.

δικαστήν is obviously wrong, and neither Burges' *δαιτητήν* nor Naber's *δοκιμαστήν* is a satisfactory correction. I venture to suggest *ἀκροατήν*, though it is further from the MSS., and though I cannot account for the corruption, unless *δικαστήν* was the conjectural emendation of a half-erased word. Hippias seems to be alluding to his retentive memory (285 E). The word ἄγγελον shows that his functions are mainly those of a reporter. In the *argument* of the *Acharnians* δικαστάς (πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς διαλέγεται, i.e. ὁ χορός) is a mistake for ἀκροατάς or θεατάς.

283 A The old conjecture, ἀνόνητα for ἀνόητα, well deserves consideration.

290 B εἶπερ χρυσοῦν γε δὴ ὄν κ.τ.λ. Stallbaum explains the neuter, referring to τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, by saying it is as though τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς preceded. The simple explanation is that Athena is a statue, ἄγαλμα, like αὐτὴ ἢ θεός Thuc. 2. 13. 5. Cf. *ibid.* 5. 23. 5. In speaking of statues Pausanias constantly violates strict concord the other way, e.g. 4. 31. 7 Διοσκούρων ἀγάλματα, φέροντες κ.τ.λ.

295 D ἀποβλέποντες πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἢ πέφυκεν ἢ εἵργασται ἢ κεῖται. Should it not be *διάκειται*? cf. 286 A.

298 C κινδυνεύομεν γάρ τοι, ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἐμπεπτωκότες ἀπορία περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐν ἧπερ νῦν δῆ, οἶεσθαι ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ εὐπορία εἶναι.

The supposed reference to 297 E οἶμαι ἄρτι ἠὺπορηκέαι really makes no sense of this, for at the present moment they feel a difficulty and not *εὐπορία* at all. *εὐπορία* should be *ἀπορία*, the point being that the difficulty is not new but the same as before. After some intervening talk and the digression, or incidental argument, of 300 B-302 E this is said again plainly in 303 E εἰς τὸν πρότερον λόγον ἤκει ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος. The confusion of *εὐ-* and *ἀ-* is familiar.

299 A εἰ φαῖμεν μὴ ἡδὺ εἶναι φαγεῖν (that a thing was not *pleasant* to eat) ἀλλὰ καλόν, καὶ ὄζειν ἡδὺ μὴ ἡδὺ ἀλλὰ καλόν (that a thing has *not* a *pleasant* smell). *Delete* the ἡδὺ after ὄζειν.

301 E φοβοῦμαι γάρ σε σαφῶς λέγειν, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνεις, ἐπειδάν τι δόξης σταντῶ λέγειν.

Heindorf bracketed *σε*, reading also *σὺ αὐτός* for *σταντῶ*: Stallbaum suggested *σοι*. There seems to me to be no sense in saying that Hippias is angry whenever he thinks he has said something good and true (*λέγειν τι*), and I would suggest the possibility of *δόξω ἐμαυτῶ* for *δόξης σταντῶ*. Whenever Socrates thinks he has made a real contribution to the discussion, he finds Hippias irritated.

HIPPIAS MINOR.

363 D See note on *Apology* 37 B.

φύγοιμι here and *φύγοι* in 373 B ought, I think, to be *φεύγοιμι* and *φεύγοι*.

ION

530 B ἔν τε ἄλλοις ποιηταῖς διατρίβειν πολλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν Ὀμήρῳ, τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ θειοτάτῳ τῶν ποιητῶν.

Should ποιητῶν be πάντων? Cf. on *Charm.* 161 E.

ibid. c Should not ὡς οὔτε be ὥστ' οὔτε? ὡς can hardly have the sense of ὥστε here, and ὡς *since* takes the thing too quietly for granted.

532 A τὸν μὲν εὖ γε, τοὺς δὲ χεῖρον.

γε is quite out of place and should be omitted as in the *Marcianus*.

ibid. D σοφοὶ μὲν πού ἐστε ὑμεῖς . . ., ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τᾶληθῆ λέγω, οἷον εἰκὸς ἰδιώτην ἄνθρωπον. ἐπεὶ . . . θέασαι ὡς φαῦλον καὶ ἰδιωτικόν ἐστι καὶ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς γνῶναι ὃ ἔλεγον.

τᾶληθῆ cannot be right. *Hipp. Mai.* 288 D is not parallel, though we might be tempted to argue from it. The meaning obviously required here is *commonplace*, *trivial*, corresponding to the φαῦλον etc. following. Schanz reads εὐήθη, but that means *foolish* and goes much too far. Madvig's τὰ πλήθη, though at first sight tempting, is not really quite what we want, especially with οἷον εἰκὸς ἰδιώτην ἄνθρωπον. I would propose what is farther from the MSS. but more in place here, εὐτελεῆ or τὰ εὐτελεῆ. In Xen. *Cyneget.* 12. 7 I have suggested that ἐν ἀληθείᾳ (παιδεύεσθαι) should be ἐν εὐτελείᾳ. Cf. Antony's 'I only speak right on: I tell you that which you yourselves do know' (*Julius Caesar* 3. 2. 227).

536 B ἐπειδὴν μὲν τίς <τι> ἄλλου του ποιητοῦ ἄδη.

Schanz is probably right in inserting τι, but *Wasps* 269 may be quoted in support of the ellipse: ἡγεῖτ' ἄν ἄδων Φρυνίχου.

539 B πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἰλιάδι οἶον καὶ ἐπὶ <τῆ> τειχομαχίᾳ? Notice τει following.

MENEXENUS

234 A Omit *καί* before *ἀπό*, and 237 A insert *τήν* before *τροφήν*.

237 C In this very carefully composed oration it is difficult to accept such an anacoluthon as the infinitive *κείσθαι*. It seems much more probable that a participle parallel to *ἀποφνηαμένη* and governing *κείσθαι* has been omitted, e.g. *παρέχουσα* or *έώσα*. Or we might insert *ὥστε* before *καί νῦν*.

238 C Omit the first *ἀριστοκρατία* (after *καί νῦν*). The force of the passage will be greatly enhanced by the name being kept to the end.

239 A *ἡ ἰσογονία ἡμᾶς ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἰσονομίαν ἀναγκάζει ζητεῖν κατὰ νόμον*.

Plato can hardly have fallen into such tautology as *ἰσονομίαν κατὰ νόμον*. He wrote some other compound (*ἰσοτιμίαν*? *ἰσηγορίαν*?), which has been altered under the influence of *νόμον*.

ibid. C *τούτων πέρι μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἐπιμνησθῆναι ἐπαινοῦντά τε καὶ προμνύμενον ἄλλοις ἐς ᾧδὰς τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν αὐτὰ θεῖναι πρεπόντως τῶν πραξάντων*.

Should not *ἄλλοις* be *ἄλλους*? Jebb *ad Soph. O.C.* 1075 explains these words to mean 'commending them and wooing them for others (i.e. for the poets), with a view to their putting them into verse.' But does Plato (if it is Plato) mean that the poet woos the subject or that the subject woos the poet? He has just said that the subject

ἔτι ἐστὶν ἐν μνηστείᾳ (if we are not to read ἀμνηστιά), which I suppose in point of Greek might mean either. If the poet woos the subject, then the speaker ought to mean that a certain number of poets are actually addressing themselves to it, which it is plain was not the case. Also the orator's 'wooing for others' would consist (I suppose) in his giving a sort of rhetorical treatment by way of anticipation of the more elevated poetical treatment to come. But how forced, obscure, and false all this is! and how awkward the infinitive θείναι! Surely it is the subject that woos or invites poets to treat it. It has been courting poetical treatment for a long time past and is courting it still (ἔτι ἐστὶν ἐν μνηστείᾳ; the *Persae* seems strangely forgotten or undervalued). The orator will add his efforts and on its behalf woo the poets to put it into verse. This certainly seems the sense and the accusative ἄλλους would then appear to be necessary, as there is no reason why the person wooed or invited should be mentioned in the dative. In *Xen. An.* 7. 3. 18 τοιαῦτα προὔμνωτο ἐκάστῳ προσίων the dative may very well go with προσίων.

The apparent imitation of our passage in *Aristides de Rhet.* 142. 3 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προξενεῖν φησι καὶ προμνᾶσθαι εἰς ᾧδὰς τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν θείναι suggests another possibility, namely that καὶ προξενούντα has been lost between προμνῶμενον and ἄλλοις.

ibid. Ε τῷ αὐτῷ (not αὐτοῦ) φρονήματι. αὐτοῦ gives poor sense and is due to τοὺς αὐτοῦ πολίτας.

241 C τρίτον δὲ λέγω τὸ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς ἔργον καὶ ἀριθμῷ καὶ ἀρετῇ γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς σωτηρίας.

It does not seem possible that the genitive σωτηρίας can depend either on τρίτον or ἔργον. Did Plato write τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς <ἐνεκα> σωτηρίας and similarity of letters lead to loss? We might think of αἴτιον, but it will not quite fit into the sentence.

244 C διανοουμένη δὲ ἡ πόλις μὴ ἂν ἔτι ἀμῦναι μήθ' Ἑλλησι κ.τ.λ.

On ἂν Schanz remarks *addubito*. There is probably no example forthcoming of ἂν with a tense after διανοοῦμαι *resolve, be minded*, for we must distinguish this from the

sense *think, suppose*. If then *ἄν* is wrong, we might perhaps substitute the emphatic *δή*. Cf. *Iliad* 10. 447 *μὴ δὴ μοι φύξιν γε, Δόλων, ἐμβάλλεο θυμῶ*: Dem. 18. 11 *οὐ δὴ ποιήσω τούτο*: Thuc. 7. 71. 7 *ἦν τε . . . οὐδεμιάς δὴ . . . ἐλάσσων ἐκπληξίς*. The confusion of AN and ΔH is familiar.

245 A *Μαραθῶνι καὶ Σαλαμῖνι καὶ Πλαταιαῖς*.

Perhaps *κάν Σαλαμῖνι*. *Σαλαμῖνι* and *Πλαταιαῖς* are probably never used as locatives like *Μαραθῶνι*. The locative of *Πλαταιαί* is *Πλαταιᾶσι*.

ibid. B *τειχισαμένη δὲ καὶ ναυπηγησαμένη, ἐκδεξαμένη τὸν πόλεμον, ἐπειδὴ ἠναγκάσθη πολεμεῖν, ὑπὲρ Παρίων ἐπολέμει Λακεδαιμονίοις*.

ὑπὲρ Παρίων is a great difficulty, as Athens certainly did not wage war at the time referred to on behalf of Paros. The only states that could very well be mentioned here are Thebes and Corinth, and it is not apparent how *Θηβαίων* or *Κορινθίων* could have been so corrupted. But it is not really very natural to say that Athens waged war *on behalf of* anybody, if she was forced into it (*ἠναγκάσθη*). The two things are not exactly incompatible, but they do not go very readily together. I should therefore look rather for something descriptive of the war or its conduct, and *ὑπὲρ Παρίων* might disguise an adverb in *-ως*. It has however occurred to me whether the words are not a corruption of *ὑπερόριον*. If the *π* had been repeated by error, *ὑπερπόριον* might easily change into *ὑπὲρ Παρίων*. But this is a mere possibility. Cf. Dem. 2. 21 and 18. 241 *πόλεμος ὄμορος*.

248 C *τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμέτερα τελευτην ἤδη ἔξει*.

There is no reason for the future. Read *ἔχει*.

249 A B The anacoluthon of the infinitive *ἄρχεσθαι* is quite as awkward as that of *κείσθαι* in 237 C and, like that, calls for the addition of a participle, e.g. *βουλομένη*. In any case the sentence is a cumbrous one, the participles being already in excess.

The last letters of *ἐπιτηδεύματα* seem to have absorbed a *τά* which is necessary to *ὄργανα*. Cf. p. 32.

ALCIBIADES I.

110 B σὺ δ' εἰ τύχοις ἀγνοῶν εἴτ' ἀδικοῖο εἶτε μὴ τότε λέγεις τί σε χρὴ ποιεῖν ;

This refers to past time. 'Do you mean, what were you to do if (*i.e.* whenever) you did not know?' Read therefore χρῆν for χρῆ. τότε goes with it.

112 B ταῦτα <τὰ> ποιήματα.

So in 117 D probably τὰ ἀμαρτήματα <τὰ> ἐν τῇ πράξει.

117 A For διὰ ταῦτα read διὰ τοῦτο.

So τοῦτ' αἴτιον just above.

119 E Socrates says ironically πάνυ σοι ἄρα ἄξιον ἀγαπᾶν, εἰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν βελτίων εἶ, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἡγεμόνας ἀποβλέπειν, ὅποτε ἐκείνων βελτίων γέγονας σκοποῦντα καὶ ἀσχοῦντα πρὸς ἐκείνους.

The last clause is obviously wrong, and Schanz cites two or three essays at emendation, *e.g.* Heindorf's ὅπη τε ἐκείνων βελτίων γένοιο, which would need an ἄν. I think the error is in ἐκείνων or ἐκείνους, one being an accidental repetition of the other. We should read either ὅποτε τούτων or πρὸς τούτους. The meaning is 'since you are now better than the former, thinking of and training yourself for the latter.' Alcibiades' rejoinder is λέγεις δὲ τίνας τούτους ; which is, I think, consistent with either change, though it may seem to favour the second.

122 c Read φιλοτιμίαν for φιλοτιμίας. The incongruous plural is an error due to τὰς following.

123 B πρὸς τοὺς Περσικοὺς (πλούτους) καὶ <τὸν> τοῦ ἐκείνων βασιλέως.

124 B οὗτοι εἰσὶν <οἱ> ἀντίπαλοι ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗς σὺ οἶει.

ibid. D ἐπιμελείας δεόμεθα, μᾶλλον μὲν πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀτὰρ νῶ γε καὶ πάνν σφόδρα.

μᾶλλον μὲν is devoid of meaning, and I conjecture μᾶλλον to be a mistake for πολλῆς. 'We need care, a good deal all of us, but you and I very much indeed.' Cf. *Symp.* 178 A θαυμαστός . . . πολλαχῆ μὲν καὶ ἄλλη, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ κ.τ.λ. : *Theaet.* 172 C πολλάκις μὲν γε δὴ καὶ ἄλλοτε . . . ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν : *Thuc.* 3. 37. 1 πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη ἔγωγε . . . μάλιστα δ' ἐν τῇ νῦν κ.τ.λ. The same sense would be given by μάλα for μᾶλλον, and perhaps that would be preferable as involving less change. So for instance in Hippocrates (*Kuehlewain*) 2 p. 19 one MS. has μᾶλλον wrongly for μάλα.

126 D ἄρα ἤπερ (ὁμόνοια) πόλει, αὕτη καὶ ἰδιώτη ; Probably ἢ αὐτή.

127 B δοκεῖ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ' <αὐτ'> αὐτοῖς φιλία ἐγγίγνεσθαι.

ibid. D εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ἦσθου πεπονθῶς <ῶν> πεντηκονταετής?

134 C οὐκ ἄρα ἐξουσίαν σοι οὐδ' ἀρχὴν παρασκευαστέονσαντῶ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούλη.

ἐξουσία can take an infinitive after it (*power to do*) as in E below and 135 A twice, not so ἀρχήν. The two words should therefore change places, οὐκ ἄρα ἀρχήν σοι οὐδ' ἐξουσίαν. Cf. on *Gorg.* 496 E. The meaning of ἀρχήν seems fixed by ἄρξιν preceding.

ALCIBIADES II

138 B οὐκ οἶει τοὺς θεούς, ἃ τυγχάνομεν εὐχόμενοι καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία, ἐνίοτε τούτων τὰ μὲν διδόναι, τὰ δ' οὐ, καὶ ἔστιν οἷς μὲν αὐτῶν, ἔστιν δ' οἷς οὐ;

αὐτῶν is incompatible with the first person τυγχάνομεν. Should we read αὐ? We might think of αὐ τῶν <εὐχομένων>, but this seems unlikely.

A few lines below αὐτοί also seems wrong, because quite pointless. Perhaps αὐτῶ. So in 146 B ἂν μὲν πράττη ἃ τις οἶδεν the subject of πράττη anticipates τις.

143 E ἐλθόντα ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας εἰπεῖν εἰ ἔνδον ἐστί.

Nothing is wrong here, but εἰπεῖν is used in the late sense of *ask*, and this is one of the indications of date.¹ That sense is for instance found several times in Diogenes Laertius. *Ar. Rhet.* 2. 23. 1398 b 26 and *Pol.* 8. 11. 1313 a 31 are doubtful instances of it.

144 D εἰ βούλει . . . ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἄποπον ἂν ἴσως σοι δόξειεν εἶναι.

Read βούλοιο. Cf. on *Charm.* 173 c.

145 B οὐδ' εἴ τις τινα ἀποκτείνουσι οἶδεν οὐδὲ (read οὐδ' εἰ) χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.

146 B C οὐκοῦν καί, ἂν μὲν πράττη ἃ τις οἶδεν ἢ δοκεῖ εἰδέναι, παρέπηται δὲ τὸ ὠφελίμως, καὶ λυσιτελούντως ἡμᾶς ἔξειν καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτῶ. παρέπηται B, παρέπεται T' Schanz, whose punctuation I have reproduced.

¹ Others are the words σκεπτομένῳ 140 A: κεκυρηκότα 141 B: ἥπερ for ἥ 141 D, 142 C, 149 A: φάμενοι 142 D and φάντες 146 B: κτήμα for κτήσις 144 D and 146 E: ἀποκριθῆναι 149 A: perhaps τυχόν = ἴσως 140 A and 150 C, and τὸ παρῆκον the present 148 C: also ὅποτεν ὀρώς 146 A, if the author wrote this and not ὅποτε.

This gives very indifferent sense, and I should conjecture *παρέπεται* (or *παρέπεσθαι* governed by what precedes) *δὲ τὸ ὠφελίμως καὶ λυσιτελούντως κ.τ.λ.*, only that *ἡμᾶς* is impossible. Possibly *ἡμῖν* as a *dativus ethicus*.

147 A B ἄρ' οὐχὶ τῷ ὄντι δικαίως πολλῷ χειμῶνι χρήσεται, ἅτε οἶμαι ἄνευ κυβερνήτου διατελῶν ἐν πελάγει, χρόνον οὐ μακρὸν βίου θέων (so Stephanus : βίον θέων B : βίον θεῶν T).

Schanz reads *πλέων* for *θέων*, mentioning *πρὸς βίαν θέων* and *βιοτεύων* as other conjectures. I would suggest that *θέων* is quite right but should change places with *διατελῶν*. For *θεῖν* of persons at sea cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6. 2. 29 *θέοντες ἅμα ἀνεπαύοντο*, and Xenophon several times has *διατελεῖν* as a transitive verb with *βίον*, *χρόνον*, *ἔτη*, etc.

148 A *μάργον τί μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολλῆς φυλακῆς.*

μάργον is absurdly out of place. I conjecture *ἀργαλέον* *difficult*, a word rare in prose, but we may go again to Xenophon and to Aristophanes, nor in this dialogue does it much matter. (Dobree thought *ἔργον* or *μέγα ἔργον* might do.)

ibid. c Write *δή* for *αὖ* after *κελεύοντες*.

150 c *ἵνα μηδ'* should, I think, be *ἵνα μή*.

HIPPARCHUS

226 A *γιγνόμενον* should be *γενόμενον*.

ibid. E The construction of *γλίχασθαι* with an accusative is so questionable that perhaps an infinitive, *e.g.* *κτήσασθαι*, has been omitted, governing the accusatives and itself governed by *γλίσχονται*.

229 C The death of Hipparchus did not come about (Socrates says) *διὰ τὴν τῆς ἀδελφῆς ἀτιμίαν τῆς κανηφορίας*. Whose sister? Grammar would point to Hipparchus, and Harmodius has not even been mentioned so far. Has not *Ἄρμοδιόν* been omitted?

230 A Socrates offers to withdraw various propositions. Of the last of them, that gain is good, his friend says *οὔτι πᾶν γε τουτί μοι ἀνάθου*. I cannot find that any editor has had scruples about either the sense or the grammar of this. Yet *οὔτι* is impossible with an imperative, nor in the context does such a sentence make proper sense, since what the man wants to say is not that some gain is good, but that some is not. Can anything be clearer than that we should point it *οὔτι πᾶν γε τουτί μοι ἀνάθου*?

ibid. B Read *ταῦτόν* (for *ταῦτὰ*) *ὄντα* just as *ταυτό* stands two lines below.

ERASTAE

133 B ἡ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε <ἄν> εἶναι εἰδέναί . . . ὃ μὴ εἰδείη κ.τ.λ.

εἰδείη points very clearly to the common loss of ἄν.

ibid. E If the words ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ ὀρθῶς are to be kept in the text at all, γάρ should, I think, be changed to δέ.

134 A οἱ μέτριοι πόνοι εὔ ποιοῦσιν ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, πόθεν δὴ οὐχὶ ἄνδρα ἄγρυπνόν τε καὶ ἄσιτον . . . καὶ λεπτόν ὑπὸ μεριμνῶν ;

The meaning seems to be that moderate exercise is good for the body, and most certainly so (πόθεν οὐχί;) in the case of an attenuated student with poor appetite (ἄσιτος) and given to lying awake. But the Greek seems hardly clear, unless we read something like (say) εὔ ποιοῦσιν ἔχειν <πάντας> τὰ σώματα. It is good for everyone: how then can it fail to be good for the man who is leading an unhealthy life?

ibid. E Read καὶ τούτου <πέρι> τὸν γεωργὸν ὠμολογοῦμεν, or possibly τοῦτον τόν.

135 A Read neither ἄττα with T nor αὐτά with B, but ταῦτα.

ibid. B εἶπεν ὅτι κάλλιστα ταῦτ' εἶη τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ <μάλιστα> προσήκοντα ?

ibid. C ἄρα μὴ τοιοῦτον λέγεις ;

ἄρα μὴ seems to give just the wrong meaning. ἄρ' οὐ is what Attic requires.

137 C ἡ αὐτὴ δέ should probably be ἡ αὐτὴ δὴ.

THEAGES

122 D τί καλὸν ὄνομα τῷ νεανίσκῳ ; τί αὐτὸν προσαγορεύομεν ;

Schanz with Baiter omits καλόν. Is it not more probable that we should read καί? καί was confused with καλ and a symbol for ον, or ον may be a dittography. So in *Symp.* 197 E Schanz after Madvig reads καὶ ψῆδης for καλῆς (or καλῶς) ψῆδης. Here καλόν γε just below would make the mistake still easier.

Who are the *we* in προσαγορεύομεν? There seems no one present besides Socrates, Theages, and Theages' father (observe ἐδεόμην ἄττα σοι ἰδιολογήσασθαι at the beginning), and Socrates would not ask the father 'what are you and I to call your son?' Should we read προσαγορεύω? It may however mean 'I and other people,' now that he is growing up and mixing with men.

126 D τί οὖν ἄν, ᾧ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, χρήσαιο αὐτῷ, εἴ σοι ἐπειδὴ γένοιτο υἱὸς τοιαῦτα πράγματα παρέχοι καὶ φαίη μὲν ἂν ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι ζωγράφος καὶ μέμφοιτο σοὶ τῷ πατρὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλεις . . ., τοὺς δὲ δημιουργοὺς . . . ἀτιμάζοι.

It is I think clear that καὶ φαίη κ.τ.λ. is not an independent clause but follows upon εἰ. That being so, ἄν cannot be right and should probably be changed to δῆ, φαίη μὲν δῆ being very suitable here. τοιαῦτα should probably be τοσαῦτα and ἐθέλεις perhaps ἐθέλοισ.

128 B ὄρας, ᾧ πάτερ, ὅτι Σωκράτης οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τι ἐθέλειν ἐμοὶ συνδιατρίβειν ;

Cobet would write ὄρας; and omit ὅτι. Leave the punctuation as it stands and omit μοι.

ibid. D See note on *Apol.* 31 D.

PROTAGORAS

311 A The third ἔνδον (after εἰκός) might be better omitted. So perhaps σοφόν after σέ in 310 D: cf. *Euthyd.* 271 D.

312 D Perhaps ὅτι ἂν εἴπωμεν, echoing the question. Cf. *Euthyphro* 2 C: *Laws* 662 A. Or τί, ἂν εἴπωμεν; as in *Rep.* 337 D etc.

327 C ὅστις σοι ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις τετραμμένων . . ., εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους οἷς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶν μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε νόμοι κ.τ.λ.

Besides the awkwardness of ἄνθρωπος (which Plato could quite well have omitted) with ἀνθρώποις, it will be seen that νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις is a curious combination, which could only be justified by a contrast with animals or other infra-human creatures, whereas Plato goes on to give as the antithesis men of a lower kind without laws, etc. You cannot contrast νόμοι καὶ ἄνθρωποι with ἄνθρωποι οἷς μὴ εἰσὶ νόμοι. Schanz cites the suggestions ἐν ἐννόμοις ἀνθρώποις, ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἐννόμοις ἀνθρώποις, ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἐν τρόποις, himself adopting the first.

It would seem to me most likely that ἀνθρώποις has been substituted for some other word by the accident common in all writing of putting one word for another, the word actually used being in the writer's mind for some other reason.¹ Thus here ἀνθρώποις is due to ἄνθρωπος preceding

¹ See my *Notes on Xenophon and Others*, p. 307, and the index to this volume s.v. *Repetition*.

and perhaps also to *ἀνθρώπους* which is coming. In such a case the two words confused need not resemble one another, though no doubt some resemblance facilitates the error. It is therefore harder and often impossible to restore the right word with any confidence. Here we may perhaps conjecture *ἐν νόμοις καὶ παιδείᾳ* (or possibly *δικαστηρίοις*) *τεθραμμένων*. Cf. the words *οἷς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶν μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε νόμοι*.

328 A οὐ ῥάδιον <ἀν> οἶμαι εἶναι.

ibid. E There is no point in *αὐτῶν τούτων*, *this very question*. Read *τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων*, meaning that, if he raised the same question, he would be told the same things. Cf. on *Rep.* 586 c.

333 B σοφία <τ'> ἐναντία καὶ σωφροσύνη αὐ φαίνεται, ἢ <ῥ τε> σοφία.

ibid. C συμβαίνει . . . καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ <σὲ> τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι?

334 A πολλὰ οἷδ' ἂ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ ἐστὶ, καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ φάρμακα, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ δὲ γε ὠφέλιμα· τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις μὲν οὐδέτερα, ἵπποις δέ· τὰ δὲ βουσὶν μόνον, τὰ δὲ κυσίν.

Read *ἀνθρώποις <τοῖς> μὲν ἀνωφελῆ . . . , τοῖς δὲ γε ὠφέλιμα*, the *τοῖς* having dropped out through its likeness to the syllable preceding, and *τοῖς δὲ* having then been assimilated to the *τὰ δὲ* thrice following. The successive distinctions of Protagoras are (1) some men, (2) some animals, (3) some plants? namely trees, (4) some parts of a tree.

337 A ἐγὼ μὲν <οὖν>?

341 D I do not myself feel much difficulty in the superfluous *δοκεῖν* after *οἶμαι* (*οἶμαι . . . παίζειν καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι*). If any exists, we might get over it by reading *παίζει καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖ πειρᾶσθαι*. But cf. for instance the *δοκεῖ* in *Dem.* 15. 11.

349 B πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε ὄντα ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ ἐνὶ πράγματι ἔστιν . . . ; ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἐνὶ εἶναι ἀλλ' ἕκαστον ἰδίῳ πράγματι τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἐπικεῖσθαι.

Is it not clear that with οὐκ ὀνόματα we want some word to express plurality, 'a number of names for one thing'? I suggest that before the ε of ἐπί or εἶναι an ε' = πέντε has dropped out.

352 C ἄρ' οὖν καὶ σοὶ τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλόν τε εἶναι ἢ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἷον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καί . . . μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενός . . . ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν (= ἐπιστήμην) βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ;

There is little force here in καλόν. The point is the strength, not the beauty or fineness of knowledge: whether it can control action, whether it can be defeated in the control by something else. Here as elsewhere (cf. on *Euthyd.* 276 E) καλός and ἱκανός seem to have been confused. The latter is the word we want, as both the sense of the passage and ἱκανήν following indicate.

353 D ἢ κἄν εἴ τι τούτων εἰς τὸ ὕστερον μηδὲν παρασκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον ποιεῖ, ὅμως δ' ἂν κακὰ ἦν, ὅ τι μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὀπρῶν ;

In the apodosis ὅμως δ' ἂν κακὰ ἦν most recent editors read εἴη for ἦν against all the MSS. Adam defends ἦν, saying 'the imperfect is used because the answer "no" is expected and desired . . . See Goodwin *M.T.* p. 190, § 503'; but there is no such principle known to Greek grammar and Goodwin affords, I think, no parallel to this passage. Surely ὅμως δὲ κακὰ ἔστιν; would equally have invited the answer 'no.' I do not however think we should read εἴη. I would retain ἦν but read παρεσκευάζε and ἐποίει. The imperfects, a very slight change, give a good, if not a better, sense, because excess in pleasures constantly does entail subsequent evil and therefore a supposition to the contrary goes naturally into the imperfect. In 350 B ἔλεγες has been rightly restored for λέγεις.

In view of other passages where ὅ τι μαθόν occurs, ὅ τι μαθόντα seems sound here, but I should make it accusative

singular, not with Adam nominative plural. That would personify food and drink too much.

355 A ἡ ἀρκεῖ, as a question, may be right, if a full stop is put before it. An alternative, which seems to me not improbable, is ἡ <μῆ> ἀρκεῖ governed by the εἰ preceding, like εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μὴ ἔχετε following.

ibid. C ἠττώμενος—ὑπὸ τίνος; φήσει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φήσομεν νῆ Δία.

So punctuate all the books I have looked at. But I would join νῆ Δία with τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

357 A τί ἂν ἔσφζεν ἡμῖν τὸν βίον; ἀρ' ἂν οὐκ ἐπιστήμη; καὶ ἀρ' ἂν οὐ μετρητικὴ τις, ἐπειδήπερ ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη; ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου, ἀρα ἄλλη τις ἢ ἀριθμητικὴ;

The use of ἐπειδὴ here seems to deserve notice. It is never used, I think, with the indicative, like ὅτε, to mean *when, whenever*. It cannot therefore here mean simply that, *whenever* it is a matter of more and less, it is μετρητικὴ, and, *whenever* of odd and even, ἀριθμητικὴ. Nor on the other hand does *since* make sense here, because only one of the two propositions (that it deals with more and less, and that it deals with odd and even) can be true. It seems rather, if I understand it, to mean *when once, after we have once settled that*, or something similar. But I do not know any exact parallel. Perhaps *postquam* might be so used.

εἴπερ δὴ ὑπερβολῆς . . ., εἰ δὲ δὴ περιττοῦ κ.τ.λ. may naturally occur to one as possibilities, but they are hardly probable.

ibid. E Agreeing that in οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε τοὺς ὑμετέροισ παῖδας παρὰ τοὺς τούτων διδασκάλους . . . πέμπετε a verb is missing after αὐτοί, I should conjecture it to be something like *μανθάνετε* rather than the *ἴτε, φοιτᾶτε*, etc., that have been suggested. I take it that as a rule the pupils of the sophists were young men, not fathers of families.

358 B αἰ ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις ἅπασαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἠδέως, ἀρ' οὐ καλαί;

It does not appear that ἐπί with a genitive is used to express *end* and *object*, except in the case of actual movement, *ίέναι ἐπί* etc. Can it be applied to action aiming at a particular end? If it cannot, then either some word expressive of metaphorical movement (such as Adam's ἄγουσαι) has been lost, or we might suggest that a dative or accusative case should be written in both places, *τούτῳ* and *τῷ* or *τούτῳ* and *τό*.

360 D οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὐτ' ἐπινεύσαι ἠθέλησεν ἐσίγα τε.

Read οὐδ' ἐπινεύσαι ἠθέλησεν, ἐσίγα δέ. 'He would not now even nod assent but remained silent.' I cannot think οὐτε . . . τε is good Greek after οὐκέτι, which would certainly negative the τε clause. In the context too οὐδέ *not even* is much more pointed.

ibid. Ε χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι καὶ λέγω ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

λέγω may be right enough, but in view of the frequent corruption of futures λέξω is worth suggesting. Cf. on *Gorg.* 506 A.

361 C βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας ἡμᾶς ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅ τι ἔστιν.

ἐξελθεῖν seems an erroneous repetition of δι-ἐξελθεῖν. Read ἐλθεῖν or ἐπελθεῖν.

MENO

71 A ὦ ξένε, κινδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν μακάριος εἶναι, ἀρετὴν γούν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἶθ' ὅτῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι.

I entirely agree with Naber and Thompson in thinking the γούν clause to be wrong. But I would not follow them in bracketing ἀρετὴν . . . εἰδέναι. The omission of words is seldom safe, unless we can see pretty clearly how they came to be inserted by a later hand. γούν is the difficulty here, and it seems likely to be the corruption of a participle in the nominative, agreeing with the subject of κινδυνεύω and governing εἰδέναι. Some word in the sense of *being able* or *thinking* would be natural enough in the context. The letters preceding or following a corrupt word sometimes help one to restore it by suggesting something that may have been lost through similarity to them. When we look again at the passage with these two ideas in our minds, we think without much difficulty of ἀρετὴν ἠγούμενος . . . εἰδέναι. The loss of the first letter is due to the ην of ἀρετὴν (H and N are very similar), and that of ενος to the frequent omission or abbreviation of terminations. μακάριος ironically used, and justified by ἠγούμενος . . . εἰδέναι, makes excellent sense.

72 A καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων . . . ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐστίν ὡσαύτως δέ . . . καὶ ἡ κακία. In both cases ἡ should be omitted as giving a wrong sense. There is a goodness or badness in each action or kind of action.

76 D ἔστι γὰρ χροῖα ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὅψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός. For σχημάτων we find the variant χρημάτων, approved by Diels. But is not the right word σωμαίων,

which occurs in the parallel passage *Timaeus* 67 c φλόγα τῶν σωμάτων ἐκάστων ἀπορρέουσιν, ὅψει ξύμμετρα μόρια ἔχουσιν? σῶμα and σχῆμα are quite apt to get confused.

78 c ΣΩ. ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἶον ὑγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον; MEN. καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς; μὴ ἄλλ' ἅττα λέγεις τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

Such appears to me the best way of giving these words. I do not think it at all plausible to assign καὶ χρυσίον . . . ἀρχάς to Meno. One sufficient reason against that is that it makes him ignore health very pointedly. καί . . . κτᾶσθαι seems indeed rather superfluous in the mouth of Socrates as an explanation of πλοῦτον, but it would be not less so in that of Meno.

79 c δέιται, like δέισθαι and δεήσεσθαι following, is no doubt right, as against δέι, but δέιται and δέισθαι are not to be taken as impersonal. The subject understood is either *the case, the matter*, or more probably *your answer*, though that word has not been actually used. Cf. *Prot.* 312 D ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἢ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν δέιται: *Symp.* 204 D ἔτι ποθεῖ ἢ ἀπόκρισις ἐρώτησιν τοιάνδε. δέιται thus loosely used (*Rep.* 340 A?: *Alcib.* ii. 149 c?) is quite different from δέι.

ibid. Ε τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ λέγων.

The proper order is τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ.

80 c In the second ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν, it would be a gain to drop the ἀπορεῖν.

ibid. Ε ὁρᾶς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις.

Perhaps κατάγεις may be compared with καταπεφόρηκας in *Rep.* 587 Ε ἀμήχανον, ἔφη, λογισμὸν καταπεφόρηκας τῆς διαφορότητος τοῖν ἀνδρῶν. We may add to the references sometimes given there the σφοδρὸν καὶ καταφορικὸν λόγον of Hermogenes (*Walz* 3. 199. 3), ὁξὺς ὧν ἐν τῇ καταφορᾷ of a river *Diodorus* 19. 18. 3, and perhaps *Μενέσθιον ἑαυτοῦ προπάτορα καταφέρων* *Heliodorus Aethiop.* 2. 34.

81 C ἄτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος οὕσα κ.τ.λ.

ἡ ψυχὴ must be either omitted or put elsewhere in the sentence. The words are at present as impossible as it would be in English to say 'as being the soul immortal' for 'the soul, as being immortal.' Cf. the order of words just below, where ἄτε is again used. Here the subject is easily supplied from what preceded the quotation, and ἡ ψυχὴ is a natural adscript to point it out.

87 D τὴν ἀρετὴν appears to be an adscript explanatory of αὐτό, unless αὐτό itself is somehow wrong. The strong sense of αὐτό would not be in place here.

ibid. E It is difficult to believe in the abrupt interrogative οὐχί; Whether there is any MS. evidence for ἢ οὐχί; or not, that seems better. Or we might read πάντα γὰρ τὰγαθὰ οὐχὶ ὠφέλιμα;

90 A Ἀνθεμίωνος an adscript?

ibid. C ἐπέμπομεν should perhaps be πέμπομεν. Observe πέμπομεν and βουλοίμεθα before, σωφρονοῖμεν and πέμπομεν afterwards. Cf. p. 3.

ibid. E τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους διδάξειν τὴν τέχνην.

Perhaps διδάσκειν. Cf. 91 B τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι and the use of ὑπισχνούμενος in 95 C.

91 D See end of note on *Phaedo* 108 A.

92 B ΣΩ. ἄπειρος ἄρ' εἶ παντάπασι τῶν ἀνδρῶν. AN. καὶ εἶην γε.

Schanz after Heindorf καὶ <ἀεί> εἶην γε, but ἀεί is hardly more needed than a ποτέ in Ar. *Ran.* 1045 (EYP. μὰ Δί', οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης οὐδέν σοι. ΑἰΣ. μηδέ γ' ἐπέειη) or Theocr. 10. 11.

93 A ἔμοιγε καὶ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν ἐνθάδε ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ γεγονέαι ἔτι οὐχ ἥττον ἢ εἶναι.

Should ἔτι be τινές? καί—ἔτι is not, I think, an Attic phrase.

95 B *καί* certainly seems necessary for *ἦ* before *διδασκόν*. *H is not equally necessary for *καί* before *ἐπιστήμη* in 98 B, though we might expect it on comparison of *ἄλλοιόν ἦ* in 87 B. *Symp.* 186 B illustrates the statement here that two things are *ἄλλοιόν τι*.

ibid. E Read *εἰ δ' ἦν ποιητόν <τε>*, as metre and the text of Theognis indicate.

97 E *τῶν ἐκείνου <τι?> ποιημάτων λελυμένον μὲν ἐκτῆσθαι οὐ πολλῆς τινος ἄξιόν ἐστι τιμῆς . . . , δεδεμένον δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον*.

The similarity of *τι* to *π* is well known, and something seems rather wanted here. Cf. Shilleto's note on *Thuc.* 1. 72. 5.

98 E *ὁμολογοῦμεν* should probably be *ὠμολογοῦμεν*. It is preceded by *ὠμολογήκαμεν* (twice), *ἔδοξεν*, *ἔσκοποῦμεν*. Cf. the change from *ὠμολογήκαμεν* in *ὠμολογοῦμεν* in 97 A.

99 A *ῶ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἡγεμών ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθῆς καὶ ἐπιστήμη*.

Certainly Stobaeus' *ῶν* and not *ῶ* is right, the singular *ῶ* being inconsistent not only grammatically with *δύο ταῦτα* (which would need *οἷς*) but argumentatively with the emphasis laid on the distinction between the two things. *ῶν* is the natural genitive after *ἡγεμών*, and *δύο ταῦτα* is the subject of *ἡγείται* understood. Throughout the argument sometimes a man, sometimes one of his faculties is said *ἡγεῖσθαι*. Here the two expressions are brought together: one or other of the two faculties is a *ἡγεμών* to him and he to other men.

ibid. C *ὀρθῶς ἄρ' ἂν καλοῖμεν θείου τε οὓς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμοδούς καὶ μάντις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θείου τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν*.

The first *θείου τε* is not the occasional hyperbaton of *τε* (as though *τε* would naturally have followed *χρησμοδούς*), because it does not come in the proper clause. Had Plato written *ἐλέγομέν τε κ.τ.λ.*, that would have been the

legitimate hyperbaton in question. More plausible, I think, is the view that the later *θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν* shows him to have had *καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν* or *ἐνθουσιάζοντας* in his mind here. But I would suggest that *θείους, οὓς τε* is possibly what he wrote, *τε* joining *οὓς . . . μάντις το καὶ τοὺς ποιητικούς* or the whole of this to *καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς κ.τ.λ.*

EUTHYDEMUS

271 c The $\omega\varsigma$ $\xi\gamma\omega\gamma\epsilon$ of T is to be adopted, except that probably we should write $\omega\sigma\tau'$ for $\omega\varsigma$. The use of $\omega\varsigma = \omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$, though so common in Xenophon, is very rare in Plato. Sometimes one MS. gives us warning, e.g. F in *Meno* 71 A, by writing $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$ against a common $\omega\varsigma$.

The words a little below $\tau\acute{\omicron}\upsilon\tau\omega$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\nu$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\tau\hat{\omega}$ $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\iota$ $\delta\epsilon\iota\nu\omicron\tau\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega$ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\mu\acute{\alpha}\chi\eta\eta$ η $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}$ (not in B) $\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu$ are a difficulty. Their sense is unsatisfactory, because (1) $\mu\acute{\alpha}\chi\eta\eta$ $\kappa.\tau.\lambda.$ is not a clear description of a physical contest as distinguished from the intellectual one next mentioned; (2) it is really absurd to say that by fighting $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\acute{\omicron}\pi\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma$ a man can beat everyone, when other people may fight $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\acute{\omicron}\pi\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma$ too. Also the datives $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\iota$ and $\mu\acute{\alpha}\chi\eta\eta$ are questionable, as the words stand, for the context makes it fairly certain that $\delta\epsilon\iota\nu\omicron\tau\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega$ means skilful. Did not Plato write $\tau\hat{\omega}$ $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\iota$ $\delta\epsilon\iota\nu\omicron\tau\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega$ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\mu\acute{\alpha}\chi\eta\eta\nu$ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu$ $\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu$? $\eta\nu$ takes the place of η and $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}$ of $\kappa\alpha\iota$, both familiar changes.

273 c $\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\pi\acute{\omicron}\lambda\epsilon\mu\omicron\nu$ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\theta\omicron\nu$ $\acute{\omicron}\sigma\alpha$ $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu\tau\alpha$ $\sigma\tau\rho\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\xi\sigma\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ $\tau\epsilon$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ $\eta\gamma\eta\mu\omicron\nu\acute{\omicron}\nu\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\sigma\tau\rho\alpha\tau\omicron\pi\acute{\epsilon}\delta\omega\nu$, $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\acute{\omicron}\sigma\alpha$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\acute{\omicron}\pi\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma$ $\mu\acute{\alpha}\chi\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ $\delta\iota\delta\alpha\kappa\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu$.

Schanz and Burnet bracket the latter $\acute{\omicron}\sigma\alpha$ and $\delta\iota\delta\alpha\kappa\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu$. I would rather write $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\acute{\omicron}\sigma\alpha$ < $\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ > $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\acute{\omicron}\pi\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma$ $\mu\acute{\alpha}\chi\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ (i.e. $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu\tau\alpha$) $\delta\iota\delta\alpha\kappa\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu$. Perhaps it should be $\mu\alpha\chi\acute{\epsilon}\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, like $\xi\sigma\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$. $\delta\iota\delta\alpha\kappa\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu$ might be dispensed with, but not $\acute{\omicron}\sigma\alpha$.

274 B $\acute{\epsilon}\mu\omicron\iota$ $\delta\omicron\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu$ is perhaps not quite in its proper place.

275 E There is no reason for changing ὠφελεῖ to a future. Cf. the present tense 295 A ἡδιστα ταῦτα ἐξελέγχομαι, referring to the very same thing. The cross-questioning itself is the ὠφέλεια.

276 E ὦ Ζεῦ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἧ μὴν καὶ τὸ πρότερόν γε καλὸν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη.

καλόν should, I think, be ἱκανόν, a word often confused with it (probably in 275 c, as Badham conjectured, and cf. on *Prot.* 352 c). The point is that one such dialectical display and victory was quite enough: they are described just above as ἐκπεπληγμένοι. Cf. 278 D ταῦτα μὲν οὖν . . . πεπαίσθω τε ὑμῖν καὶ ἴσως ἱκανῶς ἔχει.

277 C πότερον οὖν εἰσὶν οἱ λαμβάνοντες ὅτιοῦν οἱ ἔχοντες ἤδη ἢ οἱ ἄν μὴ; οἱ ἄν μὴ ἔχωσιν.

Schanz writes 'ἔχωσιν delevi, post ἢ οἱ ἄν μὴ transposuit Badham.' Another alternative would be to leave ἔχωσιν alone, but in the preceding sentence to write ἢ οἱ μὴ, omitting ἄν.

279 A ἢ οὐ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ σεμνοῦ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ τι οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔοικεν εἶναι εὐπορεῖν;

B has εὐπορεῖν, T εὐρεῖν. Considering that εὐρεῖν and εἰπεῖν are apt to get interchanged (See my *Aristophanes and Others*, Index), is it not probable that εὐπορεῖν is a mixture of the two and that we ought to read εἰπεῖν, the most proper word of the three? After εὐπορεῖν the accusative is questionable.

280 E For καλῶς δέ read rather καλῶς δῆ than καλῶς γε. 290 D δέ is given by B, δῆ rightly by T.

282 E For ὥσπερ Hermann writes ὡς γάρ, Schanz ὡς ὥσπερ. I would suggest ὡς ὅπερ. Cf. 305 A.

283 D καίτοι πολλοῦ ἄν ἄξιοι κ.τ.λ.

The irony of πολλοῦ ἄν ἄξιοι εἶεν is not compatible with καίτοι. It might quite well stand as an ironical comment, but it would have to be introduced in some quite different

way, e.g. by ἤ, the adversative καίτοι being entirely out of keeping. Hence I infer that καίτοι <οὐ> πολλοῦ should be read.

286 c θαυμαστός τις δοκεῖ εἶναι (ὁ λόγος) καὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν.

ἀνατρέπειν Heindorf. Possibly καί before τοὺς should be ὡς, the confusion being well known. But the words may be right as they stand.

In the parallel phrase 288 A ἔοικεν . . . ὁ λόγος ἐν ταύτῳ μένειν καὶ ἔτι ὡσπερ τὸ παλαιὸν καταβαλὼν πίπτειν should we read the present participle καταβάλλων, like ἀνατρέπων? It seems more descriptive and graphic than the aorist.

289 B ἐν ἧ συμπέπτωκεν ἅμα τό τε ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι τούτῳ.

As ἐπίστασθαι should govern both the other infinitives, it ought probably to follow, not precede, χρῆσθαι.

ibid. c διήρηνται seems probable.

290 B οὐδεμία, ἔφη, τῆς θηρευτικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστὶν ἢ ὅσον θηρεύσαι καὶ χειρώσασθαι.

αὐτῆς has been changed, not very plausibly, to δύναμις, ἄσκησις, etc., or some such word as χρεῖα has been added to it. But I think the construction is defensible. If we find *Symp.* 209 A πολὺ μέγιστη καὶ καλλίστη τῆς φρονήσεως ἢ περὶ κ.τ.λ., *Crat.* 391 B ὀρθοτάτη τῆς σκέψεως, *Rep.* 394 C τῆς ποιήσεως ἢ μὲν . . . , ἢ δέ . . . , *Ar. Eth.* 3. I. 1110 b 22 τοῦ δὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν (πράξαντος) ὁ μὲν . . . , ὁ δέ . . . , we can hardly be sure that along with such partitive genitives οὐδεμία τῆς θηρευτικῆς is not legitimate.

294 A ὡς θαυμαστὸν λέγεις καὶ ἀγαθὸν μέγα πεφάνθαι.

Waiving any other objection, we ought to feel that λέγεις ἀγαθὸν μέγα πεφάνθαι is inappropriate. Dionysodorus has not said so. He may have shown it, but he has certainly not said that it has been shown or that it has appeared. I had thought of πέφανται before I found that Heindorf proposed it long ago, omitting ὡς.

296 D <ὁ> αὐτὸς ἀεὶ ἐπιστήσει? so *e.g.* Soph. *Phil.* 119
σοφός τ' ἂν αὐτὸς κάγαθὸς κεκλήῃ ἅμα: Thuc. 3. 21. 4 καὶ οἱ
αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐς τὸ ἔξω.

299 E εἰ ἔχοι χρυσοῦ μὲν τρία τάλαντα ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ, τάλαντον
δ' ἐν τῷ κρανίῳ.

Surely μὲν cannot follow χρυσοῦ in this sentence. It
would stand naturally after τρία.

300 B οὐκ οὖν (σιγῶντα λέγω), εἴ γε . . . παρέρχομαι ἐν τοῖς
χαλκείοις, ἀλλὰ φθεγγόμενα καὶ βοῶντα μέγιστον τὰ σιδήρια
λέγεται, εἴαν τις ἄψηται.

In this context λέγεται is unmeaning. It cannot be
considered as corresponding to λέγω in σιγῶντα λέγω, but is
quite unnatural. Ast's λέγει is not satisfactory, and as
λέγομαι is often confused with γίγνομαι (see p. 239) I
suggest the very suitable γίγνεται here. Participles are
sometimes combined with γίγνομαι, as they are quite
commonly with εἰμί.

301 C οὐδ' ἂν παῖδα ᾤμην τοῦτο ἀπορῆσαι.

The ἂν may go with ἀπορῆσαι. Otherwise we need
either τοῦτ' <ἂν> ἀπορῆσαι οἱ τοῦτο ἀπορήσειν.

ibid. ἐπεὶ τὰ ἄλλα μοι δοκεῖτε, ὥσπερ οἱ δημιουργοὶ ἂ
ἐκάστοις προσήκει ἀπεργάζεσθαι, καὶ ὑμεῖς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι
παγκάλως ἀπεργάζεσθαι.

Heindorf was inclined to omit the first ἀπεργάζεσθαι.
Rather alter it to ἀπεργάζονται, which has been accidentally
assimilated to the other. To say nothing of any other
objection, the cacophony is intolerable.

302 D οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτοι σοὶ θεοὶ ἂν εἶεν;

Add οἱ before θεοί, which is no part of the predicate.
So just below καὶ ζῶα εἰσὶν οὗτοι οἱ θεοί. Perhaps there
should be a γε after πρόγονοι.

303 D τούτους τοὺς λόγους πάνν μὲν ἂν ὀλίγοι ἀγαπῶεν· οἱ
δ' ἄλλοι οὕτω $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{νοοῦσιν} \quad \text{B} \\ \text{ἀγνοοῦσιν} \quad \text{T} \end{array} \right\}$ αὐτοὺς ὥστε κ.τ.λ.

Neither νοοῦσιν nor ἀγνοοῦσιν makes any sense and various substitutes have been proposed. (δυσχερ)αίνουσιν would be very suitable.

304 E τί οὖν ἐφαίνοντό σοι (οἱ ἄνδρες); τί δὲ ἄλλο, ἢ δ' οὖς, ἢ οἰάπερ ἀεὶ ἂν τις τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούσαι ληρούντων;

There is not in the answer, I think, any such confusion as the editors suppose of men and things said. I take the full sense to be τί δ' ἄλλο ἐφαίνοντο ἢ τοιαῦτα ληρούντες οἰάπερ ἀεὶ ἂν τις τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούσαι ληρούντων;

305 C οὗτοι γὰρ εἰσὶν μὲν, ὧ Κρίτων, οὓς ἔφη Πρόδικος μεθόρια φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ, οἷονται δ' εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων.

οὓς should probably be ὡς. That will give the point better, and with οὓς ἔφη we should certainly look for εἶναι. οὓς ἔφη can hardly stand for 'whom he called.'

306 E ὅπως ὡς πλουσιώτατοι suggests ὅπως <ὡς> ἐκ γενναιοτάτης ἔσσονται μητρός.

GORGIAS

448 A ΓΟΡ. πάριστι τούτου πείραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν.

ΠΩΛ. νῆ Δί'. ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ.

There should be no stop after νῆ Δία. It does not assent to what precedes, but goes with what follows, just as *e.g.* in 463 D, μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνίημι ὅ τι λέγεις, the μὰ τὸν Δία must go with οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνίημι, because there is nothing preceding for it to refer to. Cf. 458 D. So often in Aristophanes νῆ or μὰ Δία etc. goes with what follows, in spite of some word (ἀλλά etc.) intervening: see Blaydes on *Plut.* 202, *Lys.* 594: and Gilbert on Xen. *Mem.* 2. 7. 4.

ibid. C πολλὰ τέχνη ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ἡρῆμέναι.

Not only is the adverb ἐμπείρως somewhat oddly used, but it adds nothing to ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν. The Schol. on Hermogenes (Walz 4. 44, cited by Thompson) gives ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπειρίας, which increases our doubts. Should we read ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπειρίας? (Cf. Thompson's *Gorgias* Appendix p. 181, n. 1, and compare *Gorgias* (?) *Hel.* 18 πολλὰ πολλοῖς πολλῶν with ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως here.)

450 B περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ τούτους οἱ τυγχάνουσιν κ.τ.λ. Read τοιοῦτους

453 C Can the unintelligible καὶ ποῦ; stand for ἡ που, to be joined with πάνυ γε as Gorgias' answer? ἡ που occurs in 448 A, 469 B. But I do not recall it in an answer with πάνυ.

456 A Adopting Madvig's insertion of τί, I should like to add δέ and read τί δ' εἰ.

ibid. B Read κἂν (for καὶ) εἰς πόλιν. Cf. Schanz, *Novae Commentationes* p. 102. Cf. on 482 B.

457 C οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρακένας ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥαδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσι διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους . . . οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνοουσίας.

To provide a subject for δύνανται, λόγων has been altered to λογίων (Madvig), ἀνθρώπων (Cobet), φιλολόγων (Schanz). But ἔμπειρος with a genitive of persons is very unusual, whereas λόγων ἔμπειρος is a combination that Plato uses more than once elsewhere. I should rather suggest that τινές, πολλοί, οἱ πολλοί, or something similar, has been lost in the clause beginning with ὅτι.

458 E ῥητορικὸν φῆς ποιεῖν οἴός τ' εἶναι, ἐάν τις βούληται παρά σου μαθάνειν; Ναί. οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστ' ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι;

For ὥστε, which has no propriety here and is distinctly awkward, read ὡς γε, ὡς γ' ἐν ὄχλῳ having a limiting sense. ἐν γε ὄχλῳ (πιθανώτερος) occurs immediately after. In *Prot.* 348 C the Bodleian codex has ὥστε μοι ἔδοξεν for ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ ἔδοξεν, and so *Rep.* 352 D, 602 D: Stobaeus' text has ὥστε in *Symp.* 202 D. Cf. note below on *Rep.* 350 E.

464 D In the fancy of a physician and a cook contending before a jury of children πότερος ἐπαίει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν I should have thought that some word like βέλτιον was necessary with ἐπαίει.

465 D ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποικῶν.

If τῶν ἰατρικῶν has ὑγιεινῶν added to it, the balance of the sentence seems to require that <καὶ ἠδέων> be inserted after ὀψοποικῶν. Dobree wished to omit ὑγιεινῶν καί.

467 B ΠΩΛ. οὐκ οὖν ποιούσιν ἃ βούλονται. ΣΩ. οὐ φημί.
ΠΩΛ. ποιῶντες δὲ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς; ΣΩ. φημί.

There is some authority for omitting δέ and some for reading ποιούσι δέ. But possibly ποιῶντές γε is what Plato wrote. Cf. 496 E ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις; ΚΑΛ. μάλιστα. ΣΩ. διψῶντά γε; ΚΑΛ. φημί.

ibid. C εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὅτι ψεύδομαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅ τι λέγεις.

Should not ἔχεις be ἐθέλεις? Written ἔθεις or ἔλεις by accident, it might be corrected to ἔχεις.

469 A οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς ἀθλίους <εὐδαιμονίζειν>? cf. 473 C.

470 A It seems clear that we must either omit the first τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι with Thompson or substitute for it something like τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ.

472 A-C In C ἔστιν μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου . . . ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλος Cobet thought we should read εἰς for τις, and certainly either εἰς or εἰς τις seems preferable to simple τις. It occurs to me whether in A ἐνίστε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθείη τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι we ought not also to read εἰς. Cf. the ἕνα τινά just before and the εἰς ὧν in B.

ibid. B ἐγὼ δ' ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγον μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἦ· οἶμαι δ' οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγὼ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἰς ὧν μόνος.

There seem to be here two noticeable things: (1) the apodosis οὐδὲν οἶμαι κ.τ.λ. ought to contain some sort of future (Hirschig proposed οὐδὲν <ἂν> οἶμαι): (2) in οἶμαι δ' οὐδὲ σοί we should like to find the sense *you will not be satisfied either*, whereas it can only mean *I think you will not have succeeded either*, and the repetition of οἶμαι is

quite pointless and weak, when οὐδ' αὖ σοί would have been enough. From these two considerations may we not infer that Plato wrote a δόξει or δόξειν with πεπεράνθαι and that the same is understood with οὐδὲ σοί? He wrote, that is, something like οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι <δόξειν> πεπεράνθαι.

473 E-474 A Omit the second ἐπιψηφίζειν. So in 523 c the second κρίνονται is pretty clearly an adscript.

476 D ΣΩ. τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποιεῖν; ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν.

This may stand, though awkwardly, for ἀνάγκη (αὐτὸ) πάσχειν (εἶναι). But we shall perhaps do better to write ἀνάγκη. Cf. *Prot.* 357 B ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητικὴ (ἐστίν), ἀνάγκη δήπου τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη; [Xen.] *R.A.* 3. 7 ἀνάγκη τοίνυν . . . ὀλίγοι ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἔσσονται τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. Cf. on *Rep.* 410 B.

478 c Should εὐδαιμονέστατος be εὐδαιμονέστερος? The ἀθλιώτερος following strongly suggests it, and MS. evidence on this point is worth very little. Cf. the variations in 473 c and 490 E. The εὐδαιμονέστατος in D, followed as it is by δεύτερος κ.τ.λ., proves nothing.

480 A ὡς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἔξοντα.

ἱκανός here and in 485 E ἐλεύθερον καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι has been called in question as weak and inadequate in meaning, but cf. on *Philebus* 52 D.

ibid. B μενεί for μένει.

ibid. C παρέχειν μύσαντα εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κἀκὶν ἰατρῷ.

In view of Bergk's <μη> μύσαντα cf. Aristides 43. 34 ἀπαλγήσαντας ἔαν καί, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον, μύσαντας φέρειν.

481 c εἰ . . . τις (πᾶς τις Cobet) ἡμῶν ἰδιόν τι ἔπασχεν πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι.

Cf. on *Rep.* 335 A.

482 BC οἶμαι . . . καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρείττον εἶναι ἀναρμωστῆν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην καὶ πλείστους ἀθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι κ.τ.λ.

Thompson notices the irregularity of the optative. It is strange that he did not see what must have happened, namely that an ἄν has been lost, probably after κρείττον or the first καί (read *κᾶν*). Cf. on 456 B.

483 A φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

For πᾶν, which gives no sense here, when τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι is attached to it, πᾶσιν and παντί have been suggested. Does it not stand for που, a word which is plausibly restored for πολὺ in 488 E?

484 A καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπωδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας.

For γράμματα Valckenaer conjectured περιάμματα, Cobet πλάσματα. Observing just above κατεπαδόντες τε καὶ γοητεύοντες, I think γοητεύματα may be the word, if any change is really needed. Cf. Hesychius (quoted in Thompson's note) μάγγανα· φάρμακα, δίκτυα, γοητεύματα. Plato is fond of γόης and its derivatives.

485 B ἔγωγε ὁμοιώτατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον ἴδω, ᾧ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω, ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παίζον, χαίρω τε καὶ χαρίεν μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ πρέπον τῇ τοῦ παιδίου ἡλικίᾳ. ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγόμενον παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρόν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρῆμα εἶναι καὶ ἀνιᾶ μου τὰ ὄτα καὶ μοι δοκεῖ δουλοπρεπές τι εἶναι. ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις ψελλιζόμενου ἢ παίζοντα ὄρα, καταγέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ ἀνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον· ταῦτόν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας.

In this Morstadt proposed to bracket καὶ παίζοντας, καὶ παίζον, and ἢ παίζοντα ὄρα. Schanz brackets καὶ παίζοντας and (after Cobet) ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παίζον.

It is plain, I think, that παίζειν in this passage cannot be taken in the general sense of playing games. The two clauses, ᾧ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω and ὅταν σαφῶς διαλεγόμενον παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, without a word being said

about games, make it clear that *παίζειν* cannot refer to games generally, but must be taken in the very closest connexion with *ψελλίζεσθαι*, referring to the same thing. Moreover Plato would surely not have condemned all games in this wholesale manner, nor have laid it down that any grown man who played a game deserved a beating. *Παιδιά* is not limited in its sense to children's games, and both Plato and Aristotle distinctly recognise the legitimacy of the thing for men.

Understanding *παίζειν* then to refer to the same thing as *ψελλίζεσθαι*, I presume Morstadt's reason for his omissions was the inappropriateness of the word. When a child lisps and stammers, it is not doing so in play. Yet *παίζειν* is actually used here twice over to describe the child's trick of speech, as well as a third time in reference to the grown man, where it is hardly suitable either, for in him it is affectation, folly, or a natural defect, not *παιδιά*. I think it probable that in the three passages we have to read *πταίοντας*, *πταῖον*, and *πταίοντα*. In the Aristotelian *Problems* 3. 31 the question is *διὰ τί τῶν μεθύνων ἡ γλῶττα πταίει*; and the word occurs there several times over. It may be said that the use of *ἡ γλῶττα*, as the subject, makes all the difference, and that to speak of a child as *πταῖον* would suggest quite another meaning. By itself it would; but *πταίω* coming after *ψελλίζομαι* is fairly clear. We should certainly not say simply 'a child trips' in this sense, but we could quite well say 'a child stammers and trips,' leaving 'in speech' to be understood, just as we say that a man 'wanders' or 'rambles,' that is, in speech or in mind, or that he is 'absent.' With the corruption of *πταίω* to *παίζω* perhaps I may compare the corruption which I have conjectured in Xen. *Cynegeticus* 9. 5 of *πτήξας* to *πιέσας* (*πιέσας ὡς ἐπὶ γῆν*). In *Rep.* 604 c *προσπαίσαντας* is a *v.l.* for *προσπταίσαντας*, in the *Pro-metheus* 885 the MSS. vary between *πταίουσ'* and *παίουσ'*, and in the *Rhetorica ad Alex.* 1425 a 38 *πταίσωσιν* has been restored with great probability for *πίσωσιν*: cf. D. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 8. 26. 6, where MSS. have both. In *Bacchae* 1141 *πτήξασα* is recognised as a blunder for *πήξασα*.

If it be said that *ἡ πταίοντα ὄρα* can hardly be right,

because we do not see an imperfection of speech, the answer seems to be that, though the expression is certainly odd, it occurs above also in *ὅταν . . . παιδίον ἴδω . . . ψελλιζόμενον καὶ πταῖον*, where *ἴδω ψελλιζόμενον* at least is unquestioned. *ἀκούω*, which is also used, seems a much more suitable word, but *ἴδω* and *ὄρα* confirm one another. We might however have expected *ἴδη* in the latter case, matching *ἀκούσῃ*, and *καί* (as before) rather than *ἦ*. The strange use of *ὄρα* and *ἴδω* seems to have escaped the notice of editors, nor does it help us in dealing with the other question.

ibid. Ε ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς. 'Fairly friendly' is a little lacking in warmth. ἐπιεικῶς <καὶ> φιλικῶς? Isocr. 15. 4 ἐπιεικῶς ἔχειν πρὸς πάντας.

486 B Perhaps *μή τι αὐτὸν αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ.*

ibid. C παῦσαι δ' ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ' εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν.

The second *ἄσκει* may be right, but it looks to me like one of those unintentional repetitions of a word, by which we all sometimes go astray in writing, and perhaps especially in copying. Cf. on 509 B. Now in 526 D all the MSS. give *σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι*, which is certainly right, but T has *γρ. ἀσκῶ*; and for *σκοπῶν*, which follows two lines later, the text of Eusebius has *ἀσκῶν*, which Burnet adopts. Cf. Cobet *N.L.* p. 629 on Xen. *Symp.* 4. 42 and Marchant's note *ad loc.* Should we read *σκόπει* here? *σκόπει ὁπόθεν* would closely resemble *σκοπῶ ὅπως*.

490 c After *ἐκτέον* it would be better to put merely a comma to show that subsequently *τῷ βελτίστῳ* depends directly upon it, and that it is not to be supplied over again.

491 c νῦν δ' αὖ ἕτερόν τι ἦκεις ἔχων· ἀνδρειότεροί τινες ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους.

For *ἔχων* read *λέγων*, comparing 518 A ἦκεις δὲ ὀλίγων ὕστερον λέγων κ.τ.λ.

In *Phaedrus* 232 A Badham's ἔχειν for λέγειν is adopted by Schanz, and the latter himself changes ἔχοιμ' ἄν *ib.* 272 C to λέγοιμ' ἄν. So in *Menex.* 243 A λέγουσι has been plausibly conjectured for ἔχουσι, and in Menander *Fragm.* 482 (Kock) παύσασθε νοῦν λέγοντες for παύσασθε νοῦν ἔχοντες. Cf. p. 65.

492 C ἡ πῶς οὐκ ἄν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες εἴησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης ;

τὸ καλὸν τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης seems to me not very Platonic. I would suggest τοῦ καλοῦ τούτου with τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης in apposition. The confusion is a well-known one. Notice the use of ταῦτα τὰ καλλωπίσματα just below.

493 A This passage will be greatly improved if we insert ὅτι or something similar before τυγχάνει and put a comma instead of a full stop after κάτω. τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο is then resumed in καὶ τοῦτο and becomes the object of ὠνόμασε. The words τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς . . . κάτω, as they stand, are very pointless as something that Socrates learnt from a wise man along with the doctrine of σῶμα σῆμα. What he learnt is contained in διὰ τό . . . πίθον, a play upon words parallel to the other.

495 B The πολλά coupled with αἰσχροῦ is an erroneous anticipation of πολλά at the end of the sentence and has thus taken the place of some other word.

496 C ἔλεγες should perhaps be λέγεις, just as ἔφησ in 496 E should probably be φῆς. Cf. on *Prot.* 353 D.

ibid. E λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς . . . ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει ;

If we read χρόνον καὶ τόπον, the genitives will have something to depend upon. Cf. on *Rep.* 579 D.

499 A οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός ;

κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθός seems to make no sense. Omit κακὸς καὶ and read ἀγαθός only, to which the preceding questions

lead up. *κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς* may be due to *τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν* just before.

506 A λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρήναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἑώμεν δὴ χαίρειν.

Both the context and the form of this sentence call imperatively for λέξω, like δίδειμι five lines above. Or it might be ἐρῶ, which is also confused with λέγω.

509 A δόξειαν ?

ibid. B πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν, μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν μήτε αὐτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὐτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκείοις.

It is not difficult to see what has happened here, and the extensive omissions proposed are not at all necessary. The copyist has been misled by the coming *βοηθεῖν* into writing *βοήθειαν* for another word, which word can hardly be anything but *ἀδυναμίαν*. See 492 A ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὐτῶν ἀδυναμίαν : 522 D εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἑμαντῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἄν . . . καί, εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνήσκοιμι, ἀγανακτοίην ἄν. Cf. on 486 c and *Prot.* 327 c.

510 B φίλος . . . ὄνπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ.

Read ὄπερ for ὄνπερ. Hirschig ὡσπερ.

513 B τούτοις ὁμοιώτατον. The words in A and E, ὡς ὁμοιώτατον and ὡς βελτίστους, suggest strongly that after οἷς here ὡς has been lost.

ibid C τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἦθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτριῷ ἄχθονται.

The dative ἦθει seems a little questionable, unless indeed a word is lost. But perhaps we should read (ὁμο)λογουμένων. In *Lysias* 12. 71 ὁ ὁμολογημένος ὑπ' ἐκείνων καιρὸς seems fairly certain for ὁ λεγόμενος, where the tense is wrong.

ibid. D δύο ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕκαστον θεραπεύειν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν.

ἐκάστου has been suggested. We might also think of reading *κατά* for the first *καί*.

514 A Perhaps *δημοσίᾳ* <τι> *πράξοντας τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων*. Without something to depend on the genitive is unusual, though not impossible.

517 D The *εἶναι* after *ποριστικόν* is really ungrammatical, for *ποριστικόν* goes in construction with the subsequent *ὄντα*. Should we read *τινά* for *εἶναι*?

518 A *ἐδόκει*s and *ὁμολόγει*s would seem more proper than *δοκεῖ*s and *ὁμολογεῖ*s.

519 B Insert *εἰ*, either, as Heindorf suggested, after *πάσχουσιν* or before *ἄρα*.

521 C *ἐάνπερ εἰσὶ εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων* (-*εύσων*?).

522 E *εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἐγὼ ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι*. *σοὶ* seems to receive undue emphasis from its position. Should we read *ἐγὼ σοι* or *εἰ δὲ βούλει σύ*? Or has a word been lost before it?

525 B *οἱ μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων*.

The stress being on *ὠφελούμενοι*, the fact that punishment is for their own good, it would seem that we ought to omit *τε καὶ* and make *δίκην διδόντες* subordinate to *ὠφελούμενοι*, 'benefited by receiving punishment' (cf. *Phaedo* 61 B, where *καὶ* in a like case is marked in T for omission), or read something like *ὠφελούμενοι <κολαζόμενοί> τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες*.

ibid. E Is not something lost after *ἐξῆν αὐτῷ*?

CRATYLUS

384 B εἰ μὲν οὖν ἤδη ἠκηκόη παρὰ Προδίκου τὴν πεντηκοντά-
δραχμον ἐπίδειξιν . . . , οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκώλυε κ.τ.λ.· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα,
ἀλλὰ τὴν δραχμιαίαν.

Probably according to a common idiom οὐκ ἀκήκοα ἀλλ'
ἢ τὴν δραχμιαίαν.

ibid. D οὐ γὰρ φύσει ἐκάστω πεφυκέναι ὄνομα οὐδὲν οὐδενί,
ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει τῶν ἐθισάντων τε καὶ καλούντων.

ἐθίζειν cannot mean *establishing a usage*, and its regular
sense of *accustoming* is here out of place. There is a *v.l.*
with slight authority, μεθιστάντων, which Schanz adopts;
but in this sentence *changing* is quite unsuitable. Probably
Plato wrote something like θέντων or ὀνομασάντων, and it
has been altered under the influence of ἔθει.

395 B ὃ τε γὰρ τοῦ Χρυσίππου αὐτῷ φόνος καὶ ἄ πρὸς τὸν
Θυέστην ὡς ὠμὰ διεπράττετο κ.τ.λ.

I doubt whether this could mean anything but 'what
he did as being cruel,' implying that its cruelty was its
attraction. τὰ for ἄ would be an improvement, but even
then ὡς (*how*) hardly harmonises with the rest of the
sentence, and perhaps we should read ὅσ' in its place: ἄ
might then be omitted.

ibid. C δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τῷ Πέλοπι τὸ ὄνομα ἐμμέτρως
κεῖσθαι.

Rather ἐμμελῶς, or possibly μετριως.

398 D A word *σμικρὸν παρηγμένον ἐστὶν ὀνόματος χάριν*.

Burnet cites Peiper's suggestion of *στόματος* for *ὀνόματος*. I had myself thought of *εὐστομίας* (cf. *εὐστομίας ἕνεκα* 412 E, 414 c), taking *ὀνόματος* to be not a corruption of *εὐστομίας* but due to *ὄνομα* coming in the previous line.

399 B *ἄλλων δὲ τοῦναντίον ἐμβάλλομεν γράμματα, τὰ δὲ βαρύτερα ὀξύτερα φθεγγόμεθα*.

I do not see how the genitive *ἄλλων* (*other words*) can be justified. We should expect *ἄλλοτε*, *ἄλλοις*, or perhaps <ἐπ'> *ἄλλων*, in *other cases*. *ἄλλω* has been conjectured, but is unlikely.

Write *ὀξύτερα*, not in addition to *βαρύτερα*, but in its place. The mistake is due to *βαρεῖαν* preceding.

405 E *τὸ δὲ πολὺ κ.τ.λ.*

Editors now usually bracket *πολύ* (*πou Hermann, πολύ τι ὄν Heindorf*) without showing whether they see how the insertion, if it is an insertion, came to be made. Stallbaum at any rate did not see it. *πολύ* surely represents the syllable *πολ*, or something like it, supposed to be common to the designations and characteristics of Apollo given in the context. I do not know therefore why Plato himself may not have written the letters in some form from which *πολύ* has arisen. But they may also have been an adscript to *τὸ δέ*.

408 E *ἔοικε τοίνυν κατάδηλον γεγόμενον ἂν μᾶλλον εἰ τῷ Δωρικῷ τις ὄνοματι χρῶτο*. The use of a nominative participle with *ἔοικα* is so doubtful and discredited that we ought rather to read *καταδήλω γεγομένω*. Cf. *ἔοικε δηλοῦντι* a few lines below (MSS. *δηλοῦν τι*). In 419 c *κεκλημένη* is now written for *κεκλημένη*. So *δηλούση προσέοικεν* 420 c. Both dative participle and infinitive occur often in the dialogue.

409 A Read *τοῦτο δή* for *τοῦτο δέ*.

420 B *τί ἔτι σὺ (οὐ MSS.) λέγεις ὅτι σκοπῶμεν*;

Is not *λέγω* here, as elsewhere, confused with *ἔχω*? Read *τι . . . ἔχεις ὅτι σκοπῶμεν*; as in 425 D *οὐ γὰρ ἔχομέν τι βέλτιον εἰς ὅτι ἐπανενέγκωμεν κ.τ.λ.*, and so get much more ordinary Greek. Cf. p. 60.

420 D EPM. ταῦτα ἤδη μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πυκνότερα ἐπάγειν. ΣΩ. τέλος γὰρ ἤδη θεῶ (θεῶ T: θεω B: θεῶ vulg.: θέω Adam. Burnet).

θεῶ, imperative of θεῶμαι, seems to yield no proper sense. Schanz reads θεῶ, but it is hard to see what that can mean. Adopting the old reading or conjecture σὺν θεῶ, I think a verb must be added, e.g. τέλος γὰρ ἤδη <ὀρῶ σὺν> θεῶ. They are as a matter of fact just at the end of the derivation of particular words. Cf. Diog. L. 6. 38 μακράτινος ἀναγιγνώσκοντος . . . θαρρεῖτε, ἔφη, ἄνδρες· γῆν ὀρῶ.

423 D Should not ὀνομάσειν be ὀνομάζειν? Notice ὀνομαστική εἶναι, not ἔσσεσθαι, just below.

425 D ὥσπερ οἱ τραγωδοποιοὶ ἐπειδὴν τι ἀπορῶσιν ἐπὶ τὰς μηχανὰς καταφεύγουσι θεοὺς αἴροντες.

Cicero's words in *N.D.* 1. 53 *ut tragici poetae, cum explicare argumenti exitum non potestis, confugitis ad deum*, suggest the question whether τὰς μηχανὰς and θεοὺς should not change places. The conjecture is perhaps supported by three things: (1) in the familiar line of Antiphanes' Ποίησις we have αἴρουσιν ὥσπερ δάκτυλον τὴν μηχανήν: (2) Plutarch in several places, e.g. *Them.* 10 and 32, uses the phrase μηχανήν αἶρειν: (3) greater emphasis is thus given to θεοὺς, as is suitable to the context. But Aristides in 45. 2 has θεοὺς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς αἶρειν.

426 C εἰ οὖν τις τὸ παλαιὸν αὐτῆς εὔροι ὄνομα εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν φωνὴν συμβαῖνον, ἴεσις ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖτο.

εἴποι would be much more suitable here than εὔροι, and the two words are exchanged elsewhere. Cf. pp. 50 and 71.

428 E οὐκοῦν φῶμεν καὶ ταύτην τέχνην εἶναι καὶ δημιουργοὺς αὐτῆς;

The two parts are not parallel, and the expression is awkward until we write ταύτης. There is an art of teaching (διδασκαλίας) and men who practise it.

429 C μὴ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῦτ' αὖ ἤ.

αὖ should, I think, be αὐτό.

430 E <τῶ> αὐτῶ τούτῳ.

432 D οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν οὐδέτερον, ὁπότερόν ἐστι τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα.

Rather εἰπεῖν οὐδέτερον ὁπότερόν ἐστι, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ <ὄν>, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα, or something similar.

440 E (last words) ταῦτ' ἐσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ πειρῶ ἔτι ἐννοεῖν ταῦτα ἤδη.

Badham seems right in demurring to ἤδη, which has little meaning in itself and is also incompatible with ἔτι. He suggested ἦ δὴ ἔχει. Possibly ἤδη is only out of its place and should go either with ταῦτ' ἐσται or in Socrates' words preceding.

SYMPOSIUM

178 A ἀ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ὧν ἔδοξέ μοι ἀξιωμακόμενον (εἶναι *add.* T and W), τούτων ὑμῖν ἐρῶ ἐκάστου τὸν λόγον.

In the Bodleian MS. a later hand gives ἀξιωμακόμενων, and perhaps this deserves more favour than editors have for some time shown it. It is not easy to see how Plato could get at the neuter singular. There is nothing for it to agree with, nor would the phrase ἀξιωμακόμενον ἐστὶ with a genitive seem admissible. The meaning probably is 'when the things said or the persons seemed to me worth remembering or recording,' and this would be fairly given by ἀξιωμακόμενων, out of which ἀξιωμακόμενα is of course supplied as a predicate to ἀ: 'notable things and notable persons who spoke,' literally 'notable persons to whom utterances belonged.'

183 A φιλοσοφίας τὰ μέγιστα καρποῖτ' ἂν ἐνείδη.

Many conjectures have been offered in place of φιλοσοφίας, and it is often altogether omitted. The latter resource is unsatisfactory, for who would have inserted out of his own head so unsuitable a word? Possibly φιλοτιμίας, in a general bad sense of too strong desire, too great anxiety to get something.

184 A ἀπὸ (for ὑπὸ) ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας, as in *Soph.* 265 E.

ibid E δεόμενος εἰς παίδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτᾶσθαι.

Schanz ἴστασθαι. Perhaps ἐνάσθαι, a favourite word with Plato. *ον* was lost after *αν*.

185 B πᾶν ἂν παντὶ προθυμηθείη.

For the dative, if the words are complete, cf. Ar. *Wasps* 291 ἐθελήσεις τί μοι οὖν, ὦ πάτερ, ἦν σοῦ τι δεηθῶ ;

188 B It seems possible that γίγνεται, which comes so strangely as the verb to πάχναι καὶ χάλαζαι καὶ ἐρυσίβαι, should be γίγνεσθαι, governed like γίγνεσθαι in the preceding sentence by φιλοῦσι. The terminations ται, σθαι sometimes get confused. We might also think of ἐρυσίβη. Cf. p. 266.

191 A ποθοῦν ἕκαστον τὸ ἥμισυ τῷ αὐτοῦ ξυνεῖναι.

192 B and 205 D E (cf. 191 D) show pretty clearly that something like τῷ αὐτοῦ <ἡμίσει> should be read. τῷ αὐτοῦ alone is hardly possible.

194 B ἀναβάντος for ἀναβαίνοντος ?

195 B μετὰ δὲ νέων ἀεὶ ξύνεστί τε καὶ ἔστιν.

Sauppe's ἔστιν <νέος> is not to me very satisfactory. I have thought of ξύνεστί τε καὶ <ἡδέως> ἔστιν. Cf. *Rep.* 372 B ἡδέως ξυνόντες ἀλλήλοις, and on the simple ἔστιν see Schanz *Novae Comm.* p. 103.

ibid C τὰ δὲ παλαιὰ πράγματα <τὰ> περὶ θεοῦς.

ibid E ἀπτόμενον οὖν ἀεὶ καὶ ποσὶν καὶ πάντῃ ἐν μαλακωτάτοις τῶν μαλακωτάτων ἀπαλώτατον ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

There are two difficulties here : ἀπτόμενον lacks an object, and ἐν μ. τ. μ. is a phrase, especially without τοῖς, to which it would be hard to find a parallel. Perhaps we should omit ἐν, regarding it as due to the similarity of H and N, and then we can govern τῶν μ. by ἀπτόμεθα. μαλακωτάτοις will be half an adjective and so joined with ποσὶν (cf. ἀπαλοὶ πόδες in D), half a substantive. πάντῃ is almost = πᾶσι μέρεσιν.

197 B οὗτος Ἔρωτος ἂν εἴη μαθητῆς καὶ Μοῦσαι μουσικῆς καὶ Ἥφαιστος χαλκείας καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ ἱστουργίας καὶ Ζεὺς κυβερνᾶν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

The sense is that the Muses learned μουσική and so on from Eros, the other genitives going with μαθητῆς in a somewhat different way from Ἔρωτος : that is, μαθητῆς

takes a double genitive. There is a difficulty in κυβερνᾶν standing as a genitive without τοῦ, and inferior MSS. have κυβερνήσεως. It may be worth while therefore to quote *Apol.* 37 C ἀλλὰ χρημάτων καὶ δεδέσθαι (τιμήσωμαι); *Ar. Ach.* 197 αὐται μὲν ὄζουσι' ἀμβροσίας καὶ νέκταρος καὶ μὴ ἐπιτηρεῖν σιτί' ἡμερῶν τριῶν; *Aesch. Ag.* 788 τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι προτίουσι, cf. 602-4; *Eur. Alc.* 879 τί γὰρ ἀνδρὶ κακὸν μείζον ἀμαρτεῖν πιστῆς ἀλόχου; and three passages of *Herod.* (1. 210: 6. 32: 7. 170) in which ἀντί is followed by a simple infinitive. But the anomaly of κυβερνᾶν taking a genitive, like ἄρχειν, ἡγείσθαι, etc., still remains.

199 B I do not see how ἀνομολογησάμενος παρ' αὐτοῦ can be right. Perhaps πρὸς αὐτόν.

200 A <τὸ> ὅτου, explaining τοῦτο? Cf. p. 18.

ibid D οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνου ἐρᾶν ὃ οὐπω ἔτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σωζόμενα καὶ παρόντα.

Schanz follows Badham in omitting τό . . . παρόντα. Hug regards it in a way which I do not understand as explanatory of ὃ οὐπω ἔτοιμον. What it ought to explain is τοῦτο, and it will do that properly if we insert a βούλεσθαι somewhere in the clause, say immediately after τό. See the βούλομαι κ.τ.λ. just before.

204 A αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἰκανόν.

Various attempts have been made to get rid of the difficulty of ἀμαθία. I would suggest ἐν ἀμαθία. The ἐν fell out after the *on* of χαλεπόν.

206 D ὅταν μὲν καλῶ προσπελάζη τὸ κνουῖν, ἱλεών τε γίγνεται καὶ εὐφραϊνόμενον διαχεῖται . . . , ὅταν δὲ αἰσχρῶ, σκυθρωπὸν τε καὶ λυπούμενον συσπειρᾶται.

σκυθρωπὸν τε <γίγνεται> Usener. Certainly some change is needed, for the adjective cannot stand side by side with the participle as though it were σκ. γιγνόμενον. But perhaps σκυθρωπάζον may be suggested.

209 C ὥστε πολὺ μείζω κοινωνίαν τῆς τῶν παιδῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἴσχουσιν καὶ φιλίαν βεβαιοτέραν, ἅτε καλλιόνων καὶ ἀθανατωτέρων παιδῶν κεκοινωνηκότες.

Rohde's τῆς τῶν πολλῶν (for παιδῶν) is likely enough to be right, but τῆς τῶν ἄλλων would be equally natural. Hug's <ἄλλων> παιδῶν seems to me much inferior to Rohde's suggestion. This is one of the many passages in which by error a word soon coming (here παιδῶν) is anticipated or a word that has been used repeated.

212 A ὑπάρχει should perhaps be ὑπάρξει, following the tense of γενήσεται just before. There is however also γίγνεσθαι before that.

ibid D ἐρωτῶντος ὅπου Ἀγάθων.

We should certainly expect an εἶη in the indirect question. Should we read a direct τοῦ Ἀγάθων; in which the verb is less needed?

ibid E ἦκω...ἵνα ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμῆς κεφαλῆς τὴν τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ καλλίστου κεφαλὴν ἐὰν εἴπω οὕτως ἀναδήσω.

ἐὰν εἴπω is meaningless, and many unsatisfactory conjectures have been put forward. Remembering that εἰπεῖν and εὐρεῖν are apt to get confused, I have little doubt that ἐὰν εὕρω if *I find him* is to be read here. For the confusion see my *Aristophanes and Others*, p. 186. Cf. also p. 66 above.

215 E πολὺ μου (for μοι) μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιώντων ἢ καρδία πηδᾶ. Cf. *Ion* 535 C.

217 D ἐν ἧπερ ἐδεδειπνήκει?

218 D κινδυνεύεις τῷ ὄντι οὐ φαῦλος εἶναι, εἶπερ ἀληθῆ τυγχάνει ὄντα ἃ λέγεις περὶ ἐμοῦ, καὶ τις ἔστ' ἐν ἐμοὶ δύναμις δι' ἧς ἂν σὺ γένοιο ἀμείνων. ἀμήχανόν τοι κάλλος ὀρέγῃς ἂν ἐν ἐμοὶ κ.τ.λ.

How all this shows that Alcibiades is οὐ φαῦλος I do not know. Read κινδυνεύω.

219 E Insert γάρ or γοῦν after ὁπότε.

220 Ε τῶν στρατηγῶν...βουλομένων ἐμοὶ δίδόναι τἀριστέϊα, αὐτὸς προθυμότερος ἐγένου τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐμὲ λαβεῖν ἢ σαυτόν.

Is it possible for προθυμότερος to have dependent upon it first τῶν στρατηγῶν and then ἢ σαυτόν? We might either omit ἢ σαυτόν, as put in by some one who blundered over the meaning, or possibly change ἢ to οὐ. If the text is really right, we should probably not connect ἢ σαυτόν with προθυμότερος, but compare such passages as Herod. 9. 26 ἡμᾶς δίκαιον ἔχειν τὸ ἕτερον κέρας ἢπερ Ἀθηναίους: Andoc. i. 125 τεθνάναι νομίσασα λυσιτελεῖν ἢ ζῆν: Menand. *Monost.* 680 καλὸν τὸ νήφειν ἢ τὸ πολλὰ κραιπαλᾶν with Pseudo-Phocylidea 81: Soph. *Aj.* 1357 νικᾶ γὰρ ἀρετὴ με τῆς ἔχθρας πολύ: *Anthol. Pal.* 9, 284, 408, etc. In other words we have to supply a μᾶλλον from our own minds = ἐμὲ λαβεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ σαυτόν. But with another comparative in the sentence this is very awkward.

222 A For γιγνόμενος read γενόμενος to match ἰδών.

PHAEDO

In several passages which are still obscure I am inclined to think that the solution of the difficulty is the supposition of a word, or sometimes more than one word, lost. Indeed in Greek books generally this loss has probably happened more often than is commonly supposed. We all know how easy it is to leave out a word in writing or copying. In the *Phaedo* Heindorf pointed out long ago that οὐδὲν μεντὰν ἦττον ἀκούοιμι (73 B) ought to have a ἡδέως added (cf. 57 A, 70 B), but he pointed it out in vain.

For instance, in 66 B we read παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε to genuine philosophers, that they say to one another : κινδυνεύει τοι ὡσπερ ἀτραπὸς τις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, ὅτι, ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν κ.τ.λ., οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησώμεθα ἰκανῶς οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν. Here ἀτραπὸς τις, a metaphorical expression, hardly admits of being explained by ὅτι κ.τ.λ. 'as it were a path, that, as long as etc.': yet ὅτι κ.τ.λ. cannot itself be the subject of κινδυνεύει ἐκφέρειν. What again is the combination of ἀτραπὸς τις and μετὰ τοῦ λόγου? They do not cohere, and this has led to μετά . . . σκέψει being placed after ἔχωμεν : cf. however Clem. Al. *Strom.* 518. What really guides us as a sort of track in our enquiry along with reason is an *idea, inkling, conjecture, surmise*, to the effect that we shall never get what we want while we are cumbered with the body. In other words something like δόξα, εἰκασία, στοχασμός, πίστις has been lost, e.g. after ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς, Observe the παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε just before and in 67 B τοιαῦτα οἶμαι . . . πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς.

So again in 82 B εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῶ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ (ἄλλω

ἢ T) τῷ φιλομαθεῖ the only possible meaning is the absurd one that none but lovers of knowledge are admitted in an impure and unphilosophical condition. Possibly ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ should, as someone has suggested, be omitted altogether, but how did the words get in? To me it seems more likely that something, perhaps a whole line, has been lost before them.

83 D (ψυχῇ) οἷα μηδέποτε εἰς Ἄιδον καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι.

The adverb καθαρῶς is quite impossible as qualifying the action of the verb, and Heindorf made the obvious correction καθαρά, which is likely enough to be right (cf. καθαρῶ ἀπίόντι in 82 B above quoted, etc.). But, when we compare the phrase αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι (81 D), we see that it is perhaps just as likely that Plato wrote something like εἰς Ἄιδον καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσα (or ἀπηλλαγμένη) ἀφικέσθαι. The two compounds with ἀπο- might lead to the mistake.

In 91 D Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχῇν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ κ.τ.λ. it may be that we are to understand an ᾤετο or an ἔφη εἶναι with τόδε ἄδηλον, but is it not more likely that we ought to add it?

In 108 A οὐ γάρ πού τις ἂν διαμάρτοι οὐδαμῶσε μιᾶς ὁδοῦ οὐσης, until I come across a parallel to διαμάρτοι οὐδαμῶσε I shall think that we ought perhaps to read οὐδαμῶσε <ιών>. Putting ὁδοῦ earlier than οὐδαμῶσε would also make the sentence intelligible, ὁδοῦ being then governed by διαμάρτοι, and οὐδαμῶσε by ὁδοῦ.

There are two or three places where I think ἂν has to be inserted. One is 86 B ἀλλὰ φαίη ἀνάγκη (if ἀνάγκη for ἀνάγκη is right) ἔτι πού εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν. Certainly ἂν cannot be supplied to φαίη from οὐδεμία μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη above, for the two sentences are not coordinate, οὐδεμία κ.τ.λ. being part of what the man would say. Neither, I think, can φαίη be joined on to δυσχρρίζοιτο (εἴ τις δυσχρρίζοιτο . . . ἀλλὰ φαίη). To this there are two objections: (1) the illogical substitution of ἀλλά for καί, hardly to be justified by what intervenes: (2) the great awkwardness of resuming the construction with εἰ at such a distance and

with the distinct sentence οὐδεμία γάρ . . . ἀπολομένη coming between to cut the connexion and make the reader forget. It was probably this difficulty that made Cobet wish to omit φαίη. I think an *αν* has fallen out either before the *αν* of ἀνάγκη (so in 62 c where Heindorf restored it, as he did also before ἀναγκάσης in *Theaet.* 169 B) or after ἀλλά. Cf. 87 A and D. In 87 E ἐπιδεικνύοι seems also to need a new *αν*.

Again in 95 D the optatives ζῶη and ἀπολλύοιτο cannot be regarded as *oratio obliqua* after a past tense. There is no past tense. The argument is being quoted in the present tense (οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῆς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μῆ, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον τέ ἐστὶν ψυχὴ κ.τ.λ. and again φῆς, λέγεις, λέγω in D and E) and these optatives refer as clearly to the future as ἦν and ἦδει etc. do to the past. Consequently we have either to read *αν* for δῆ before τοῦτον or to insert *αν* somewhere in the sentence, e.g. after τοῦτον (*αν* after *ον*).

Finally, there seems to me a great want of clearness in the antithesis as to pleasure and pain (60 B), unless we add a word in the way here indicated: τὸ ἅμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δέ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι αἰεὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον <ὔστερον>, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς ἡμμένω δὴ ὄντε. Is not a *ὔστερον* needed to bring out the contrast with ἅμα? After ἕτερον it would fall out very easily. Cf. the ἐπακολουθεῖ ὔστερον and ἐπακολουθοῦν a few lines further on.

I have sometimes thought that the description of the weaver in 87 c needed a similar supplement, πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος <ἕτερα>, since, taken as a *ὔστερον πρότερον* for ὑφηνάμενος καὶ κατατρίψας, the words are very harsh. We might indeed reverse the order. But a sentence further on (*ib.* D) suggests another remedy. Keeping to the image of the weaver, Plato writes εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἔτι ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀλλ' ἢ ψυχὴ αἰεὶ τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνοι, ἀνυγκαῖον μέντοι ἂν εἴη κ.τ.λ. Had he not used the very apposite compound ἀνυφαίνειν in the earlier sentence too, writing πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ἀνυφηνάμενος, perhaps κἀνυφηνά-

μενος? cf. Herwerden's very plausible correction of *τείχει πεπτωκότει καὶ οἰκοδομουμένῳ* (Thuc. 4. 112. 2) to *κάνοικοδομουμένῳ*. It may be said that there is a series of new and distinct garments, whereas *τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνειν* means the repair of an old body, not the taking of a new one, and that therefore *πολλὰ ἱμάτια . . . ἀνυφηνόμενος* would not be a correct expression. But *τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνειν* is immediately preceded by the phrase *πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν*, relating to the same case. Plato therefore was not careful to describe it with absolute exactitude and, if *ἀνυφαίνοι* could be used in ε for the taking of a new body, *ἀνυφηνόμενος* would be equally admissible in c.

In Meno 91 D I have sometimes thought we should read *οἱ μὲν τὰ ὑποδήματα <ἀν> εργαζόμενοι τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια ἐξακούμενοι*, though *ἀνεργάζομαι* is not known to have been in use. Neither is *ἀνυφαίνω* found elsewhere.

57 A οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφίκται χρόνου συχνοῦ ἐκείθεν ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἀγγέλαι οἶός τ' ἦν περὶ τούτου, πλὴν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὼν ἀποθάνου· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχεν (Baumann εἶχον) φράζειν.

ἂν here must mean *would have been able*, whereas we want *was able*. *Would have* makes no sense, and *εἶχεν* or *εἶχον* also shows what is required. Hence *ἂν* must be either altered or omitted.

62 A ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανείται (I should prefer *φανέται* both here and in the next sentence: Schanz writes *φανέται* in both) *εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἔστιν καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν*.

All serious difficulty seems to me to disappear, if we only recur to an old punctuation, *ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς*, 'just as all other things on some occasions and to some people (are better away).' The ellipse, which must indeed be supposed even with the current punctuation, is easily supplied.

69 C *ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι*. Need we perpetuate the probably accidental disturbance of order for *πολλοὶ μὲν ναρθηκοφόροι*?

74 C διαφέρει δέ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐδέν· ἕως ἄν (ἕως γὰρ ἄν T) ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὀψέως ἄλλο ἐννοήσης, εἴτε ὁμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι.

It is strange that editors can go on printing ἕως ἄν . . ἐννοήσης here. They must understand it to mean 'as long as you conceive,' but it is really incapable of meaning anything but 'until you have conceived.' The rule for the use and meaning of ἕως is a very simple one, though it has not as far as I know found its way into Greek grammars. ἕως (ἕως ἄν) with aorist indicative or subjunctive invariably means *until* and never *while*. ἕως (ἕως ἄν) with present or imperfect indicative or present subjunctive almost invariably (when applied to single occasions) means *while*, not *until*. The very idea of *while* precludes the use of the aorist. On the other hand *until* almost always means *until something has happened* (aorist) e.g. ἕως ἄν νῦξ γένηται, but occasionally we need to say *until so and so is happening*, e.g. ἕως ἄν νῦξ γίγνηται. Hence ἕως *until* does now and then take the present or imperfect tense, for instance in Thuc. 1. 90. 3 ἕως ἄν τὸ τεῖχος ἱκανὸν αἴρωσιν, if αἴρωσιν, and not ἄρωσιν is right: Xen. *Cyrop.* 3. 3. 18 οὐκ ἀναμένομεν ἕως ἄν ἡ ἡμετέρα χώρα κακῶται: Plat. *Charm.* 176 B ἕως ἄν φῆς σὺ ἱκανῶς ἔχειν, *Lys.* 209 A ἕως ἄν ἡλικίαν ἔχης (? see note above *ad loc.*) and 211 B ἕως ἄν οἴκαδε ὦρα ἦ ἀπιέναι: Ar. *Vesp.* 1441 ἕως ἄν τὴν δίκην ἄρχων καλῆ: Dem. 8. 59 ἕως ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ τὸ στράτευμα παρῆν ἔχων. For the same reason πρὶν (πρὶν ἄν) usually takes the aorist, but not quite invariably: see e.g. Thuc. 1. 118. 2 πρὶν δὴ ἡ δύναμις . . ἤρετο καὶ . . ἤπτοντο: Soph. *Phil.* 1410 μήπω γε, πρὶν ἄν τῶν ἡμετέρων αἰτῆς μύθων: Plat. *Phaedr.* 271 C πρὶν ἄν . . λέγωσί τε καὶ γράφωσι. The rule for ἕως therefore is roughly this: ἕως *while* with present or imperfect, ἕως *until* (of single occasions) with aorist; and with the aorist it always means *until a thing has or had happened*, not *is* or *was happening*. But, when such conjunctions as ἕως, μέχρι ἄν, πρὶν, though meaning *until*, are applied to a number of cases occurring in future time or time treated as present and indefinite, the present seems to be sometimes used, e.g. *Laws* 953 A χρή . . ἐπιμελείσθαι . . ἕως ἄν τὸν μέτριον ἐπιμείναντες χρόνον . . ἀπαλλάττωνται.

It is possible that in some cases the use of the present is

due to the fact that the verb has no aorist in ordinary use, e.g. ἦ and αἴης above. Cf. the present occasionally used for this reason with οὐ μή.

Phoenicides (Kock *C.A.F.* 3. 334) has the odd combination μέχρι ἂν διδῶ τις ἢ λάθῃ διαρραγείς, in which, if the words are right, μέχρι ἂν means *while* with διδῶ and *until* with λάθῃ.

Shall we then in the *Phaedo* read ἕως ἂν . . ἐννοῆς? I think not. To my feeling it would come too near giving ἕως ἂν the semiconditional sense that *so long as*, etc. bear in other languages, a sense probably never present in the Greek (see however the notes of Stallbaum and Cron). This was, I suppose, the ground on which Heindorf suggested ὡς, ἐὰν ἄλλο, or, what he preferred, ὅταν γὰρ (or γοῦν) ἄλλο. The former would seem preferable, unless indeed ἕως ἂν is only a mistake for ἐάν, as in Xen. *Hell.* 1. 7. 35 ἐάν stands unmistakably for ἕως ἂν (Stephanus). Cf. on *Lysis* 221 A. ὅταν ἐννοήσῃ occurs however a few lines below. [Shilleto on Thuc. 1. 90. 3 takes very much the same view and reads ἐννοῆς here. When I first published this note, I had overlooked his remarks.]

76 C οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀναμνησκονται ἄρα ἃ ποτε ἔμαθον; Ἀνάγκη. Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν;

Can the last words be right, seeing that the subject of ἀναμνησκονται must, as the sentence stands, be πάντες or *men* in general understood from it? Contrast 74 B ἢ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; where πόθεν λαβόντες agrees quite properly with the subject of the preceding verb. Perhaps we should put αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν into the sentence before, say after ἔμαθον.

ibid. E ὑπερφυῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, <ὡς> δοκεῖ μοι ἢ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

Cf. 66 A, 95 A, 99 D, 102 A. Or ὡς may have been lost immediately after ὑπερφυῶς, just as T omits it in *Theaet.* 155 C.

77 A καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἰκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται. Read ἀποδεδείχθαι, as a few lines below.

80 B Perhaps the order either of *καὶ νοητῶ καὶ μονοειδέϊ* or *καὶ πολυειδέϊ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ* should be inverted to make the two agree. All the other points are put in like order in the two cases.

82 C ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες.

Is this a possible expression? We might read *δόξαν μοχθηρίας* (cf. *Euthyphro*, 12 C *δέδοικεν ἅμα δόξαν πονηρίας*) or before *μοχθηρίας* insert *ἐκ*.

ibid. D ἐκείνοι, οἷς τι μέλει τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματι (or σώματα) πλάττοντες ζῶσι.

Heindorf's *σώματι λατρεύοντες* is at present the only plausible emendation of this passage, but it would appear from Ast's *Lexicon* that *λατρεύω* does not occur in Plato and that *λατρεία* is only used by him in its proper religious sense (*Apol.* 23 C: *Phaedr.* 244 E). Perhaps *ὑπηρετοῦντες* is the word that he used here. Aelian *V.H.* 3. 11 οἱ περιπατητικοὶ φασι μεθ' ἡμέραν θητεύουσιν τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι περιπλέκεσθαι suggests the possibility of *θητεύοντες*, which is however not very likely, and in any case favours the general sense conveyed by *λατρεύω* or *ὑπηρετῶ*.

84 A Πηνελόπη for Πηνελόπης? ἐναντίως seems to want a case.

87 B ὥσπερ ἂν <εἰ> τις, as in 98 C, 109 C, etc. εἰ is easily lost before τι.

ibid. C λέγοι for λέγει?

ibid. D τὴν αὐτὴν δέ, οἶμαι, εἰκόνα δέξαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα.

τὴν αὐτὴν may possibly not be right, for it is clearly illogical. Plato means *this* illustration or comparison, not *the same*, as though he had already applied the comparison to something else. But more probably he is half thinking of ταῦτὸ δὲ πάσχοι ἂν.

88 D τίνοι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὢν, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν.

ὡς as an exclamation is unsatisfactory. Cobet follows Heindorf in accepting instead ὃ (which seems to have no

MS. authority) and omitting λόγον. As ὡς and καί are sometimes confused, might we read καὶ γάρ . . . ὄν, *for, though very plausible?*

89 A τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅτι λέγοι ἐκείνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον.

The nominative ἐκείνος is surely impossible when the same person is the subject of ἔχειν. Would anyone defend τὸ ἔχειν ὅτι λέγω ἐγώ for τὸ ἔχειν ἐμὲ ὅτι λέγω? ἔχειν ὅτι λέγοι is so much of a set phrase, making one idea, that Heindorf's objection to ἐκείνον following λέγοι, not ἔχειν, seems unfounded, especially as ἐκείνον may well be emphatic.

92 E ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην . . . ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαί.

Is ἱκανῶς an adverb appropriate to ἀποδέδεγμαί, or should we read (what is sometimes confused with it) καλῶς? καλῶς and ὀρθῶς go well together.

94 B Read ἔλκει for ἔλκειν. Cf. ὀρῶμεν following.

97 D ἄσμενος ἠύρηκέναι ᾧμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἔμαντῶ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν.

Perhaps τὸν Ἀ. should be omitted. If not, it might be better to make it the immediate object of ἠύρηκέναι, taking διδάσκαλον predicatively.

ibid. E Socrates thought Anaxagoras ἐπεκδιηγῆσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν (*i.e.* τὴν γῆν) ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι.

τὸ ἄμεινον and ὅτι ἄμεινον ἦν are surely very flat together. I conjecture Plato to have written ΚΑΙΔΙΟΤΙ, καὶ <δι> ὅτι, *why* it was better. So 100 C καλόν τι and the question δι' ὅτι καλόν ἐστίν. In *Phaedr.* 235 A by a contrary error ΔΙ has been inserted after ΑΙ and the MSS. give εἶναι δικαιοῦν for εἶναι καὶ οὖν.

98 B <τὸν> ἄνδρα (in spite of *Ast Lex. Plat.* 1. 175).

100 B εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκείνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων. Read ἄρξομαι.

101 D εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο.

ἔχοιτο in the sense of *fastening on, attacking*, is certainly wrong; and Madvig's *ἔφοιτο*, which seems to have found some favour, is open to the objection that *ἐφίεσθαι* does not carry the required meaning either. As we have *ἐχόμενος* two lines before in its proper sense of *keeping fast hold of*, I should conjecture that this is another instance of the accidental repetition of a word to the displacement of the word really intended. I should suppose Plato to have written *λάβοιτο* or *ἐπιλάβοιτο* and this to have been altered to *ἔχοιτο* through the copyist having the previous *ἐχόμενος* in his mind. Cf. *Laws* 637 C ταχὺ γάρ σου λάβοιτ' ἂν τις.

This is independent of the question whether the whole sentence is genuine. See Archer-Hind's note, in which he does not point out that οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο ἕως ἄν . . . σκέψαιο is bad Greek. Ἄν is however easily omitted, or altered to δῆ, ἕως δῆ being proper enough.

102 B For τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι read αὐτῷ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι.

104 D τάδε εἶη ἂν ἃ ὅτι ἂν κατασχῆ μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ιδεάν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου αὐτῷ $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ἀεί B} \\ \text{δεῖ T} \end{array} \right\}$ τινος.

δεῖ is meaningless, ἀεί leaves αὐτῷ without construction, as it certainly does not depend on ἐναντίον. Perhaps the verb ἐπιφέρει, which is used subsequently in this connexion, should be added here at or before the end of the sentence. So in E τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἀεί αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει. Cf. 105 A.

105 B εἶπερ ἔπει τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως. Πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἔπομαι.

Both on grounds of logic (for following, *i.e.* understanding, must precede concurring) and to harmonise with the clause that goes before I should like to read καὶ ἔπομαι, ἔφη, καὶ συνδοκεῖ.

ibid. D ἦκει (twice) should certainly be ἦξει and ἔχει perhaps ἕξει. Observe two or three futures preceding and οὐ μὴ ποτε δέξεται following.

ibid. Perhaps τοῦτο (ταῦτα B) ὠνομάζομεν.

109 B ὡσπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους, περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας.

As it is not clear what ants have to do with a marsh, we ought perhaps to change the order here too. περὶ τέλμα might be put before or after βατράχους, or it might be περὶ τέλμα βατράχους ἢ μύρμηκας. The first would suit the following words (π. τ. θ. οἰκοῦντας) best.

ibid. D τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταῦτόν seems to me unobjectionable, though it has been altered or partly omitted. It means 'whereas the case is the same (as in the illustration just given).'

116 C οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις.

Archer-Hind says 'some read χαλεπανεῖς, but the present is found in the best MSS. and gives the best sense.' I venture to question the last statement, though I presume that Schanz and Burnet concur in it, as they both read the present and do not even mention the future as an alternative. The gaoler has just said 'other men are angry with me when I tell them they must now drink the poison. But,' he goes on, 'I am sure you *will not be* angry with me,' *i.e.* when I tell you, as he proceeds virtually to do in the words νῦν οὖν, οἶσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον ἀγγελῶν, χαῖρέ τε κ.τ.λ. These last words are the intimation that the time has come, and χαλεπαίνεις, if right, would therefore refer to the time before the intimation was made, and would fail to correspond to the case of other men. In 117 A the MSS. have just in the same way οἶμαι κερδαίνειν for οἶμαι κερδανεῖν (ἄν κερδαίνειν is Burnet's slightly less probable correction); and so perhaps (Schanz) a line or two previously.

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328 Ε πότερον χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου ἢ πῶς σὺ αὐτὸ ἐξαγγέλλεις.

χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου is an obscure and difficult expression. It is very unlikely to be partitive. In such phrases as Xen. *Mem.* 1. 6. 4 (compared by Adam) ἐπισκεψώμεθα τί χαλεπὸν ἦσθῆσαι τοῦμοῦ βίου the genitive depends on τί. The alternative is to make it 'difficult in respect of living.' But that construction, mostly poetical, is all but confined to adjectives such as εὐδαίμων, ἄθλιος, μέλεος, expressing good or bad fortune, so that χαλεπὸν would be an unusual extension of it. Only two passages at all parallel to the present are known to me: the curious Xen. *Mem.* 3. 8. 3 εἴ τι οἶδα πυρετοῦ ἀγαθόν, *good for fever*, where it seems just possible that ἀγαθόν is substantivalised, and Ar. *de Part. An.* 2. 10. 656 a 1 οὐ πολυειδῆς ἐστὶ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν, in which we might say that πολυειδῆς easily suggests the substantive εἶδη. Plato *Laws* 648 c γυμνασία θαυμαστὴ ῥαστώνης ἂν εἶη seems due to the construction with θαυμάζω. In Eur. *Hipp.* 785 τὸ πολλὰ πράσσειν οὐκ ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ βίου the expression ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ = ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ, and Phoen. 968 ἐν ὠραίῳ γὰρ ἔσταμεν βίου is really partitive, like ἐν τῷ ἀχρείῳ τῆς ἡλικίας Thuc. 2. 44. 4. The occurrence of βίου in these places is only a coincidence. In our passage the suggested χαλεπὸν <τὸ> τοῦ βίου (Doederlein) is very plausible, for τό would easily fall out before τοῦ and Plato is fond of the periphrasis with τό. (Cf. *Ast Lex.* ii. p. 407.) τὸ τοῦ βίου would be of course *life then, life at that age*. But I think the matter must be left doubtful.

330 Α οὐτ' ἂν ὁ ἐπιεικῆς πάνν τι ῥαδίως γῆρας μετὰ πενίας ἐνέγκοι οὐθ' ὁ μὴ ἐπιεικῆς πλουτήσας εὐκόλος ποτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ

γένοιτο. Πότερον δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, ὦν κέκτησαι τὰ πλείω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω; Ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; μέσος τις γέγονα χρηματιστῆς κ.τ.λ.

In the first sentence for εὐκολος . . . ἐαυτῷ (a very doubtful expression) read εὐκολος . . . ἐν αὐτῷ. Some mention of old age seems required in the clause: otherwise the statement is too general. In 331 A and 574 D the MSS. vary between ἐν αὐτῷ and ἐαυτῷ, in *Phaedrus* 266 A between ἐν αὐτοῖς and ἐαυτοῖς, in *Timaeus* 81 c between ἐαυτῆς, αὐτῆς, and ἐν αὐτοῖς: in Dio Chrys. 36. 9 between ἐαυτοῖς and ἐν αὐτοῖς: in Ar. *Met.* 984 a 29 between ἐαυτοῖς, ἐν ἐαυτοῖς, ἐν αὐτοῖς.

For ποῖ' (A has ποῖ) I formerly conjectured πότερον, 'do you ask whether?' I am now inclined to think that πόσ' or ὀπόσ' is what Plato wrote, 'do you ask how much?' Socrates did not ask that directly, but his question involved the assumption that Cephalus had made something. The direct πόσα is quite as legitimate as the direct τίς or πῶς which we sometimes find (instead of ὅστις or ὅπως) echoing a question in Aristophanes, e.g. *Frogs* 1424. Cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 766. Moreover here πόσα does not occur in the original question. ποῖα, which Adam defends, would mean either *what sort of*, or *which* out of some definite number, and is quite unsuitable. We often find οἶος and τοιοῦτος standing by mistake for ὅσος and τοσοῦτος.

ibid. c συγγίγνεσθαι for συγγενέσθαι? Cf. 488 A below. The confusion is very common.

ibid. E τότε δὴ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν (οἱ μῦθοι) μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὄσιν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἦτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρως ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὦν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλον καθορᾶ αὐτά: ὑποψίας δ' οὖν καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίγνεται κ.τ.λ.

The *weakness* of age could hardly enable a man to descry more correctly what is to follow after death (τὰ ἐκεῖ). We must suppose a word or two to have been lost, in which the real effect of failing powers was expressed.

[Since the above was written, various views have been taken of the text. Adam considers that 'the verb is to be

supplied by a sort of zeugma . . . or rather the predicate is accommodated to the second alternative.' Jowett and Campbell, followed by Burnet, make ἤτοι . . . αὐτά parenthetical, so that it refers to ὑποψίας κ.τ.λ. Tucker would read ὥσπερ <εἰ> ἤδη, but deals with the general meaning and structure of the sentence in the same way. Is ὥσπερ εἰ with the present indicative really possible? An optative, a past indicative tense, or a participle would seem required. It seems to me a considerable objection to J. and C.'s view, over and above the awkwardness of the finite verb καθορᾶ, which should properly be καθορῶν, that it probably involves a confusion of ὥσπερ with ὡς. ὥσπερ is used always of something which is not actually the case, ὡς (in prose) of something which is, or is supposed to be. Since therefore, at any rate in the obvious and natural sense, an old man is undoubtedly ἐγγυτέρω τῶν ἐκεῖ (if there is anything ἐκεῖ), ὥσπερ seems wrong or at least very awkward. Cf. Goodwin's remark in *M.T.* 874, which does not get over the difficulty in any satisfactory way. But the same objection lies to other views, including my own above given; and, if it is sound, I do not see how it can be surmounted except by bringing ὥσπερ into relation not with ὤν but with καθορᾶ, 'as though he saw.' This would be the effect of Tucker's change, which on another ground we have to reject. Perhaps then the real error is in καθορᾶ and that word has been inadvertently substituted for καθορῶν, to which ὤν would be subordinate. With that change we could easily accept the general view of the sentence, a very natural and satisfactory one, which takes the weakness of old age as a suggested reason for ὑποψίας κ.τ.λ.

For the fanciful idea that an old man or one otherwise near death sees further into things cf. Cic. *de Sen.* 21. 77 of death, *eo melius mihi cernere videor quo ab ea propius absum*, and such passages of modern poetry as Waller's well-known lines,

The soul's dark cottage, battered and decayed,
 Lets in new light through chinks that time has made
 Stronger *by weakness*, wiser men become,
 As they draw near to their eternal home,

and Arnold's (*A Wish*)

that undiscover'd mystery
Which one who feels death's winnowing wings
Must needs read clearer, sure, than he.

332 A οὐ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἀποδίδωσιν ὅς ἄν τῷ χρυσίον ἀποδῶ κ.τ.λ.

Should not this be ἀποδιδῶ?

333 B ἀλλ' εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ κιθαριστικοῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρουμάτων; Εἰς ἀργυρίου, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

εἰς κρουμάτων and εἰς ἀργυρίου forcibly suggest that we should read εἰς τίνος. Cf. *Euthyphro* 13 D E.

ibid. πλὴν γ' ἴσως πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι ἀργυρίῳ ὅταν δέη ἀργυρίου κοινῇ πρίασθαι ἢ ἀποδόσθαι ἵππον.

As this is only one instance of the use of money and another is given immediately afterwards, is it not probable that before ὅταν we should insert οἶον, a very similar word?

335 A κελεύεις δὴ ἡμᾶς προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν.

I proposed formerly to insert πλέον before ἢ, feeling as others have done great difficulty about προσθεῖναι ἢ. But so many rather curious uses of ἢ may be quoted that I now think the text right. Perhaps the most noticeable is to be found in Plato himself, *Gorg.* 481 c D ἰδίον τι ἔπασχεν πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι. But consider also the following: φθάνω ἢ (*Pl.* 23. 445: *Od.* 11. 58: *Herod.* 6. 108): ὁμοῖος ἢ (*Pausan.* 7. 16. 4, if right: *Liban.* 16. 8 οὐχ ὁμοῖον ἢ, and I think elsewhere): ἀνόμοιος ἢ (*Plat. Crat.* 435 A): ἡμισυς ἢ (*Xen. Hell.* 5. 3. 21: *Strabo* 15. 1. 23): διπλοῦς (330 c) and διπλάσιος ἢ, πολλαπλάσιος ἢ, etc. often: παρὰ δόξαν ἢ (*Herod.* 1. 79. 3 παρὰ δόξαν ἔσχε τὰ πρήγματα ἢ ὡς αὐτὸς κατεδόκεε and 8. 4. 1): διαφέρειν, παραλλάττειν παραφέρειν, ἢ: χωρὶς ἢ (*Herod.*), παρέξ ἢ, ἔμπαλιν ἢ: *Parthen.* 3. 4. οὐ μετὰ πολὺν χρόνον ἢ (*i.e.* οὐ πολὺ ἕστερον ἢ).

336 B συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἦκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς.

Adam's idea that ἦκεν is here an intransitive aorist from *ἵεναι* is most improbable. ἦκειν ἐπί of hostile movement, attack, was a familiar phrase (*e.g.* Dem. *Phil.* 3. 9 and 27) and ἦκεν ἐπί could suggest nothing else to the Greek ear. Hartman's ἦπτεν (would not ἦξεν be better?) is quite unnecessary. If any change were made, I would rather read ἦλθεν (as in 352 C, *Phil.* 3. 34 and 72, and very often). The words do get interchanged.

337 A εἰ τίς τί σε ἐρωτᾷ. The mood of the verb is inconsistent with the context. We need an optative, probably ἐροίτο.

ibid. E See below, p. 90.

341 C νῦν γοῦν, ἔφη, ἐπεχείρησας, οὐδὲν ἂν καὶ ταῦτα.

There is no reason for taking καὶ ταῦτα in any but its usual sense of 'and that.' Though καὶ ταῦτα and similar phrases (καὶ οὗτος, etc.) usually come first in the clause, another place is sometimes given them, and in later Greek this is quite frequent. Cf. not only Ar. *Ran.* 704 and *Plut.* 546 (perhaps *Vesp.* 1184), Diodor. *Com.* 3. 5, and perhaps Lysias 31. 13 (*u. v.* Thalheim), but also many passages in Lucian, *e.g.* 44. 15 : 51. 24 : 54. 1 : 66. 25 : 73. 47 and 50 : Strabo 6. 3. 10, 15. 1. 53, 15. 2. 5, 16. 4. 23 : Aristides not seldom : and above all Heliodorus, who revels in it (1. 3, 8, 16, 22, 30, etc.).

347 D ὥστε πᾶς ἂν ὁ γινώσκων τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἔλοιτο ὑπ' ἄλλον ἢ ἄλλον ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν.

Τό is seldom or never added to the infinitive after αἰροῦμαι, and is especially awkward when added to one infinitive and not to the other. Omit it here.

349 A πάντα προσθήσεις ἃ ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετίθεμεν.

As there is nothing to which the past tense can be made to refer, should we read προστίθεμεν?

ibid. B Perhaps it should be οὐδὲ τῆς πράξεως (not οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας), the wrong word having been repeated.

350 C D ὁ δὲ Θρασύμαχος ὠμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα, οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ῥαδίως λέγω, ἀλλ' ἐλκόμενος καὶ μόγις, μετὰ ἰδρωτὸς θανμαστοῦ ὄσου.

As the words stand, μὲν has nothing answering to it, for ἀλλά must be taken in close connexion with οὐχ ὡς . . . λέγω, and the sentence is therefore very imperfect. I suggest a slight change of order, ὠμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ἐλκόμενος καὶ μόγις, οὐχ ὡς κ.τ.λ.

ibid. E 'εἶεν' ἐρῶ καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι. Μηδαιῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, παρά γε τὴν σαντοῦ δόξαν. Ὡστε σοι, ἔφη, ἀρέσκειν.

For ὥστε Greek idiom requires rather (I think) ὡς γε. Cf. on 394 E below. The confusion occurs elsewhere: e.g. 352 D where A has ὥστε for ὡς γε. Cf. on *Gorg.* 458 E.

ibid. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ ὅπερ ἄρτι.

Probably ταῦτό.

353 D ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν καὶ φαίμεν ἴδια ἐκείνης εἶναι;

ἐκείνης is certainly indefensible, as Adam admits. Some read ἐκείνου: Madvig would omit it altogether. I suggest that καί should be ἢ and φαίμεν φαμέν (as two or three lines below), reading ἢ φαμεν ἴδια ἐκείνης εἶναι; φαμέν is actually given here by F and by Stobaeus, and the confusion of the two forms is quite frequent (352 E, 357 c, 490 c), as is that of ἢ and καί.

359 D In the vexed passage about Gyges nothing but Γύγη τῷ Κροίσου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ, with or without a τῷ before Γύγη (or put Γύγη before προγόνῳ), seems satisfactory. With so many articles and proper names the accidental omission of τῷ Κροίσου is in no way improbable. The hypothesis of a second and distinct Gyges, mentioned nowhere else, is surely desperate.

360 B οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο ὡς δόξειεν οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος ὅς ἂν μένειεν κ.τ.λ.

No plausible defence of the simple optative δόξειεν has been made, and probably none is possible. To treat it as

a sort of *oratio obliqua* (Schneider, Adam : cf. the latter's note on 361 E) is not only quite unjustifiable, but ignores the fact that even in *oratio obliqua* an optative must depend on a past tense, expressed or understood, whereas here there is no hint or even possibility of any such thing. Nor again can we understand ἄν, as Riddell thought, from the preceding words ; but ἄν might easily fall out, as notoriously in very many places, and all the more easily perhaps between εἰν and οὐ. Read therefore with Ast ὡς δόξειεν <ἄν>, comparing for instance *Gorg.* 509 A ὡς γοῦν ἄν δόξειεν οὐτωςί : in both places δόξειεν ἄν may be roughly said to refer to present time. ὡς δόξειεν <ἄν τις> (423 D) would give the same sense, but the loss of ἄν τις is much less likely. So is the corruption of δοκεῖ to δόξειεν, though the other optatives might possibly cause it.

It is curious that 361 c has another very difficult optative: ἄδηλον οὖν εἴτε τοῦ δικαίου εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν ἕνεκα τοιοῦτος εἴη. The *oratio obliqua* theory, the idea that Glaucon is expressing an opinion not as his own but only as held by others, breaks down for the same two reasons as before, that there is no trace of any such *oratio obliqua*, and still more that there is no past tense to account for the optative mood : as a matter of fact the main predication, represented by ἄδηλον, is future, 'it will be uncertain.' It may be right to omit εἴη, but it does not seem likely that so erroneous a form simply got in by accident, nor that both ἄδηλον and τοιοῦτος should lack a verb. A verb is the more necessary to ἄδηλον just because the sense is future, not present. I incline therefore to add ἄν here too, reading ἄν εἴη or εἴη ἄν, joining that with ἄδηλον, and with τοιοῦτος understanding ἐστίν or εἴη. The separation of ἄν εἴη from ἄδηλον may seem awkward, but, if the words are read with a pause after τοιοῦτος, it becomes much less so.

It is again very difficult to believe that the text can be sound in 490 A, where the future tense οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα ὅτι is followed by a series of dependent optatives. When the editors say that the construction goes on as though the words were ἀπολογησόμεθα ὃ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὅτι κ.τ.λ., they may possibly be right (cf. note on *Charm.* 156 B above), but there is absolutely nothing in the context to suggest such words, and little, if anything,

of what follows has actually been said before, one line at most out of seven. It is at any rate admitted that such optatives can only be justified as depending on a past tense either expressed or in the mind. We might think of οὐ μετρίως <ἂν> ἀπολογησαίμεθα, but it is doubtful in the extreme whether this would admit of optatives following by assimilation.

There is yet another troublesome εἴη in 337 E πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις ἀποκρίναιτο πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδῶς μηδὲ φάσκων εἰδέναι, ἔπειτα, εἴ τι καὶ οἶεται, περὶ τούτων ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἴη ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖ ὧν ἡγείται ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου. εἴη after ἀπειρημένον has no construction whatever. To the proposals for dealing with it I would add the suggestion that it may be a corruption of ἦν, since εἰ and η, η and ν are often confused. There would then be a slight change in the sentence from the general and hypothetical ἀποκρίναιτο μὴ εἰδῶς to the statement of particular past fact in ἀπειρημένον ἦν.

362 C φασίν . . . τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευασθαι τὸν βίον ἄμεινον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ.

Read perhaps ἀμείνον' or ἀμείνονα. 443 A some MSS. have οὐδέν for οὐδέν' or οὐδένα.

364 B ὡς ἄρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς δυστυχίας τε καὶ βίον κακὸν ἔνειμαν, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις ἐναντίαν μοῖραν. I formerly demurred to this, writing πολλάκις τοῖς for πολλοῖς, on the ground that τοῖς ἐναντίοις was too general. But in Solon 15. 1 (Theogn. 315) πολλοὶ μὲν πλουτοῦσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται the force of πολλοί lasts into the second clause.

365 B τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα δικαίῳ μὲν ὄντι μοι, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ, ὄφελος οὐδέν φασιν εἶναι, πόνους δὲ καὶ ζημίας φανεράς· ἀδίκῳ δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης παρεσκευασμένῳ θεσπέσιος βίος λέγεται.

(1) There is no satisfactory construction for τὰ λεγόμενα :
 (2) μὲν emphasises it too much, for no doubt of what is said being true is really suggested by the supposed speaker. As λεγόμενος and γιγν(γεν)όμενος are certainly sometimes confused (see p. 239), it may be worth considering whether τὰ μὲν γὰρ γιγνώμενα should not be read. Observe the uses

of τὰ γιγνόμενα or some part of γίγνομαι in 366 Ε δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γιγνομένης : 361 C τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς γιγνομένων : 358 Β τοὺς μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν : 357 Β-Δ : etc. On the other hand we have φασίν and λέγεται (γίγνεται ?) in this sentence, and τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα a little above, as well as ὁ . . . λεγόμενος λόγος in 366 Β. But these might facilitate a mistake. My suggestion requires the second μὲν to be taken as only repeating the first ; this, as being uncommon, is perhaps rather against it. Cf. p. 226.

366 Α δίκαιοι μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀζήμιοι ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐσόμεθα, . . . ἄδικοι δὲ κερδανουμέν τε καὶ λισσόμενοι ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες πείθοντες αὐτοὺς ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν.

Plato is fond of accumulating participles, but the accumulation here is very confused. Perhaps Plato wrote κερδανουμέν τε ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες καὶ λισσόμενοι πείθοντες αὐτοὺς ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν. No doubt he is thinking of the verse he quoted in 364 Ε λισσόμενοι ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβῆῃ καὶ ἁμάρτη, but that does not justify the present order of words. It contains aorists, ὑπερβῆῃ and ἁμάρτη, and Plato would naturally have written ὑπερβάντες καὶ ἁμαρτόντες, had he wished the order to remain the same.

ibid. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἄιδου δίκην δώσομεν ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ παῖδες παίδων.

Should not the double ἢ be a double καί ? Though punishment in this world was thought to fall sometimes not on the sinner but on his posterity, in the other world he would not escape. Why too, as the words stand, should his own immediate children be so pointedly omitted ? With καί the omission is much easier : 'both himself and his children's children,' *i.e.* himself and descendants to the second generation. Cf. *Il.* 20. 308.

It may be thought that 372 C εὐλαβούμενοι πεινίαν ἢ πόλεμον also calls for καί, not ἢ, as both were to be guarded against. Logically it does, but probably the illogical expression arises from the idea that *either war or poverty* (or both) might ensue.

ibid. Β ὡς ὁ <ὑπό> τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων λεγόμενος λόγος? Otherwise λεγόμενος drags very much.

ibid. Ε οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἔψεξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδ' ἐπήνεσε δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς γιγνομένας.

Insert *διά* before *δόξας*, like *διὰ δόξαν* 358 Α, or add some participle, such as *ἰμνῶν*.

368 Α οὐ κακῶς εἰς ὑμᾶς, ᾧ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐλεγείων ἐποίησεν ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής, εὐδοκιμήσαντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῦ μάχην, εἰπὼν

παῖδες Ἀρίστωνος κλεινοῦ θεῖον γένος ἀνδρός.

This passage has to be taken along with *Philebus* 36 D, where Socrates, preparing to enter on a large question, says to Protarchus, his interlocutor, ἀλλ' εἰ πρὸς τὰ παρεληλυθότα, ᾧ παῖ ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, προσήκοντα, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.

Adam gives in his adhesion to Stallbaum's theory that in both these places the phrase *παῖ* (*παῖδες*) κ.τ.λ. has no reference to the real father, but means metaphorically in the *Republic* that Glaucon and Adeimantus are stating in a way the views of Thrasymachus, and in the *Philebus* that Protarchus has taken over from Philebus the advocacy of pleasure. Thrasymachus and Philebus therefore are ἐκείνος ὁ ἀνὴρ in the two dialogues respectively, and the speakers are styled their *παῖδες* as being what in modern language we might term their 'spiritual children.' It seems very dubious whether this theory is tenable. At any rate a few considerations may be urged against it.

Supposing it to be true, it is still pretty clear that ᾧ παῖ ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός cannot be used to express directly and quite properly the intellectual relation of Protarchus to Philebus, but would have to be taken as the adoption and application to their special case of some set phrase. First, as Philebus is present all the time, he cannot properly be indicated by the pronoun ἐκείνος. οὗτος or ὅδε should be used, as in the parallel phrase (Bury) used by Soph. *Trach.* 1017 ᾧ παῖ τοῦδ' ἀνδρός. Secondly, Philebus is apparently not ἀνὴρ, a man: he is only a boy or stripling. In 16 Α Β stress is laid upon the youthfulness (*νέοι* and

παῖδες) of the company generally, Socrates of course excepted, and there is no reason to think Φίληβος ὁ καλός older than the rest. We may think of him as like the young Theaetetus, who is a παιδίον (*Theaet.* 166 A : 168 C D, where contrast τῷ ἀνδρί just preceding) and compare ὁ παῖδες *Phil.* 16 B with ὁ παῖδες *Theaet.* 148 B. If not strictly a παῖς, he is certainly in agonistic phrase ἀγένειος rather than ἀνήρ. I think we may add thirdly that, as he and Protarchus are apparently of about the same age and he would seem, if anything, to be the younger, it would be eminently out of place to call Protarchus his child.

It may be concluded then that, even if the general meaning be what Stallbaum and Adam say, Plato was not using a new phrase of his own, but only employing a more or less current expression, of which we seem to have another variety in the passage of the *Trachiniae*. But, if we once take it to be, what it probably is, an established phrase, it follows, I think, that it was commonly used in its obvious and literal reference to a real father, and this makes it more than ever unlikely that it should be used metaphorically in the way suggested, at any rate without some clearer indication of the metaphorical meaning. In the *Philebus* there is nothing at all to indicate such a use. At first sight the words εἰ πρὸς τὰ παρεληλυθότα . . . προσήκοντα may seem to do so, as referring to Philebus' supposed conduct of the argument before our dialogue began. But there is no reason to think that they do, for τὰ παρεληλυθότα means quite naturally the preceding parts of the conversation, as we have it, between Socrates and Protarchus. In the *Republic* we have indeed mention in the immediate context of the way in which Glaucon and Adeimantus are for the time representing Thrasymachus ; but it is extremely difficult to suppose that ὁ παῖδες κ.τ.λ. refers to that. For the reason stated above it would be improbable in any case, and the rest of the sentence makes it almost incredible. When in the very same sentence the fame of their real father is emphasised, called as they are by the poet κλεινοῦ θεῖον γένος ἀνδρός, can we conceive that the hearers would understand ὁ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός in an entirely different sense, so that one ἀνδρός would refer to Thrasymachus and the other to Ariston, and that when

it was probably a current phrase in its literal meaning? and what of a writer's skill and felicity of expression, who in one equivocal sentence confounded real and figurative parentage?

Even then on Stallbaum's hypothesis the phrase must be a current one, adopted by Plato for the occasion, much for instance like the cry of 'man overboard' raised on the falling of a *boy* into the sea; and the metaphorical use of it, while obscure in the *Philebus*, would be awkward in the extreme in the *Republic*. But, if it is to be taken in its straightforward sense, why is it used just at these points in the two dialogues? The occasion and the reason seem to be the same in both cases. Glaucon and Adeimantus are showing in the field of argument the same spirit and resolution which they have shown in the field of battle and are again proving themselves sons worthy of their sire. In like manner Protarchus is reminded in the name of his father that he must not shrink from the effort required for the adequate discussion of an important matter. We know nothing of his father, but there is no need to suppose any greater distinction than in the case of that 'famous man,' Ariston. A creditable performance of duty is all that need be ascribed to either.

Without denying therefore that the metaphorical meaning is in itself possible, and without forgetting 'my father Parmenides' (*Soph.* 241 D) and other such uses of πατήρ (πατήρ τοῦ λόγου, τῆς σοφίας) in Plato, we may still ask why the obvious meaning in these two passages should not be the right one.

372 E εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε καὶ φλεγμαίνουσιν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει.

Though βούλει or βούλεσθε in a directly interrogative sense is often followed by a verb in the subjunctive (βούλει, βούλεσθε ἴωμεν; etc.) there would appear to be no other example of such a construction as we have here, where βούλεσθε is not interrogative. In βούλει ἴωμεν; the ἴωμεν is really itself deliberative and interrogative; the βούλει is only added to it by a sort of brevity of expression, and in no way governs it or causes it to be in the subjunctive. Εἰ βούλεσθε θεωρήσωμεν would be an entirely different

construction, very strange in itself, probably unparalleled in Greek, and needing much more support than this passage can give it. In Goodwin *M.T.* §§ 287–8, where I think a wrong view is taken, it will be noticed that all the instances are interrogative, for which on the theory that βούλομαι governs the subjunctive there seems to be no reason. In *Crat.* 425 D εἰ μὴ ἄρα βούλει . . . ἀπαλλαγῶμεν the βούλει is only conjectural and cannot be right. To Goodwin's instances add *Epinomis* 980 B ἢ δοκεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμνοῦντες σφόδρα τιμῶμεν; The *Append. Planud.* to the *Anthology* gives us (4. 174) an indicative, θέλεις οὕτως ἐς κρίσιν ἐρχόμεθα; and so perhaps we should write in *Anthol.* 11. 134.

It is quite as easy here to read εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε, καὶ φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν· οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει. No γάρ is needed after οὐδέν, because οὐδὲν κωλύει or ἀποκωλύει is a stereotyped expression. Cf. esp. *Ar. Eq.* 972.

373 B οὐκοῦν μείζονά τε αὖ τὴν πόλιν δεῖ ποιεῖν.

Unless something (*e.g.* καὶ ποικιλωτέραν) has been lost, τε must be regarded with great suspicion. γε would do fairly well.

376 A οὐδὲν δὴ κακόν? A and other MSS. have οὐδὲν δέ, not οὐδέν.

ibid. D ἵνα μὴ ἐῶμεν ἱκανὸν λόγον ἢ συχρὸν διεξίωμεν.

After some doubt I think these disputed words yield a satisfactory sense and need no alteration. But that sense is not exactly what is given by Jowett and Campbell with Adam's approval, 'leave unsaid what is *required* for completeness.' Rather 'leave out what is sufficient,' what will as a matter of fact answer the purpose, brief as it is. The account is to be sufficient without being lengthy.

377 A οὐκοῦν οἴσθ' ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέψ καὶ ἀπαλῶ ὀψων; μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος ὃν ἂν τις βούληται ἐνσημῆσθαι ἐκάστῳ.

Read ἐνδύεται τύπον. The subject of πλάττεται and ἐνδύεται is evidently τὸ νέον. L. and S. give no instance of a real passive ἐνδύεσθαι 'to be put on,' while the middle ἐνδύεσθαι is common.

378 B οὐδὲ λεκτέον κ.τ.λ.

Perhaps δέ should be γάρ (οὐ γὰρ λεκτέον) or δῆ, as these words only expand what precedes.

383 A ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας . . . μήτε ἡμᾶς ψεύδεσι παράγειν.

Terminations (often abbreviated) were so easily corrupted that we ought surely to read παράγοντας, unless indeed we prefer to add ἐθέλοντας or βουλομένους. Kühner-Gerth § 488. 1 compare *Laws* 626 B and *Charm.* 164 D E, but the former is not really parallel and in the latter δεῖν = δέον.

387 D ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα αὐτὸς αὐτῷ αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἥκιστα ἐτέρου προσδεῖται.

διαφερόντως τ. ᾗ. and ἥκιστα ought not to go together in one clause. Perhaps ὦν should be inserted, say after αὐτῷ or τῶν ἄλλων.

ibid. E ἥκιστ' ἄρα καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι. There is no proper or easily to be supplied construction for the infinitive. ὀδύρεσθαι <ἔοικε> is possible.

390 B ἡ Δία . . . ὡς μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς ἃ ἐβουλεύσατο τούτων πάντων ῥαδίως ἐπιλανθανόμενον.

To suppose with Stallbaum that this stands for ἃ ἐβουλεύσατο ὡς μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς is to attribute to Plato a very awkward order and very indifferent sense. I conjecture ὅσα μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς ἐβουλεύσατο and suppose ᾗ to have been inserted after ὡς as written for ὅσα. τούτων πάντων rather points to ὅσα. Schäfer *ad Greg. Cor.* p. 184 remarks on the frequent confusion of ὡς and ὅσα. Cf. p. 64 above. In Democritus *Fr.* 199 (Diels) ἀνοήμονες τὸ ζῆν ὡς στυγέοντες ζῆν ἐθέλουσι δείματι αἰδεῶ we might read ὅσοι for ὡς.

393 B περί τε τῶν ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰθάκῃ καὶ ὄλη Ὀδυσσεΐα παθημάτων.

Is there not a difficulty in carrying on ἐν, which with Ἰθάκῃ has a strict local meaning, to go with Ὀδυσσεΐα in a semi-figurative sense? It would be a sort of zeugma. Perhaps κἂν (or καὶ ἐν) ὄλη Ὀ., or καὶ ὄλης Ὀδυσσεΐας.

394 E πάντων ἀποτυγχάνοι ἄν, ὥστ' εἶναι που ἐλλόγιμος.

Read ὡς γ', as I have suggested also above in 350 E.

397 A ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος . . . πάντα τε μᾶλλον διηγῆσεται καὶ οὐδὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον οἰήσεται εἶναι, ὥστε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μιμῆσθαι σπουδῇ τε καὶ ἐναντίον πολλῶν.

διηγῆσεται, which has almost all the MS. evidence, does not bring out the sense. μιμῆσεται on the other hand has very little evidence, and Plato could never have written πάντα . . . μιμῆσεται . . . ὥστε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μιμῆσθαι. Madvig's μᾶλλον μιμῆσεται ἢ διηγῆσεται . . . ὥστε κ.τ.λ. is open to the same objection. Probably Plato wrote neither διηγῆσεται nor μιμῆσεται, but some such word as ἀποδέξεται *approve of*, which will fit καὶ οὐδὲν κ.τ.λ. very well and was perhaps accidentally altered through διήγησις playing so large a part in the context.

ibid. C διὰ τὸ παντοδαπὰς μορφὰς <ἐκ> τῶν μεταβολῶν ἔχειν. Or possibly παντοδαπὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν μορφῶν.

398 A προσκυνοῖμεν ἄν αὐτόν . . . , εἴπομεν δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Perhaps προσκυνοῖμεν <μὲν> ἄν.

399 D λύρα δὴ σοι . . . καὶ κιθάρα λείπεται καὶ κατὰ πόλιν χρῆσιμα.

καὶ *non legit Demetrius* says Burnet who brackets it. Should we read ὡς, which is often confused with it? I have sometimes thought that in 400 E ὡς εὐήθειαν (bracketed by Burnet after Herwerden) might be καὶ εὐήθειαν, but καὶ *also* would not be very natural there.

402 A οὐτ' ἐν σμικρῷ οὐτ' ἐν μεγάλῳ ἠτιμάζομεν αὐτά, ὡς οὐ δέοι αἰσθάνεσθαι.

Read ὡς οὐ δέον. The verb lacks construction, and ὡς δέον, ὥσπερ δέον, are very common.

403 B τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὕτως ὁμιλεῖν (νομοθετήσεις) πρὸς ὃν τις σπουδάζοι, ὅπως κ.τ.λ.

The optative σπουδάζοι is quite ungrammatical. Read σπουδάζει with a few MSS. Just below, if ὑφέξοντα instead of ὑπέχειν is right, it seems added as though in place of

ὅπως . . . συγγίγνεσθαι we had something like ὡς μηδέποτε βουλόμενον μακρότερα τούτων συγγίγνεσθαι.

405 B ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν . . . τὸ ἐπακτῶ παρ' ἄλλων . . . τῶ δικαίῳ ἀναγκάζεσθαι χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀπορία οἰκείων ;

Adam mentions many proposals for dealing with the last words, but, rejecting them all, holds that χρῆσθαι ἀπορία = εἶναι ἄποροι. I think he is right in rejecting them. The Greek is however indefensible ; Plato wrote not καὶ ἀπορία but κατ' ἀπορίαν. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 51 D χήτει οἰκείων.

407 A ὁ δὲ δὴ πλούσιος, ὡς φαμεν, οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον ἔργον προκείμενον, οὗ ἀναγκαζομένῳ ἀπέχεσθαι ἀβίωτον. Οὐκ οὖν δὴ λέγεταιί γε. Φωκυλίδου γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἀκούεις πῶς φησι δεῖν, ὅταν τῷ ἤδη βίος ᾗ, ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν. Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἔφη, καὶ πρότερον.

I think both the main sentences here should be taken as interrogative, that is not as couched in a directly interrogative form, but as statements made in an interrogative tone of voice. 'The wealthy man has no special business?' and 'You have never heard then of the saying of Phocylides?' (ἀκούεις certainly = our perfect, as ἀκούω, πυνθάνομαι, κλύω often do). There are probably many such questions in the *Republic* and elsewhere, though the editors as a rule do not recognise them. For instance 435 B καὶ δίκαιος κ.τ.λ. and again καὶ τὸν ἕνα κ.τ.λ. may very well be so understood.

ibid. E πολιτικόν, ἔφη, λέγεις Ἀσκληπιόν. Δῆλον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν, οὐχ ὁρᾶς ὡς καὶ ἐν Τροίᾳ ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐφάνησαν ;

By translating ὅτι 'because' it is just possible to make poor sense of this. Some inferior MSS. add δεικνύοιεν ἂν before ὅτι. Madvig proposed δῆλον . . . καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ ὅτι τοιοῦτοι· ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾶς κ.τ.λ. I would rather suggest that the words have got slightly disarranged, as elsewhere, and read δῆλον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν· καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ οὐχ ὁρᾶς ὡς κ.τ.λ. For the position of οὐχ ὁρᾶς ὡς cf. 421 A. [Schneider had already suggested this.]

409 D ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόνῳ ἅμα αὐτῆς τε καὶ πονηρίας ἐπιστήμην λήψεται.

Perhaps παιδευομένη agreeing with ἀρετή.

410 A αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσι.

Although αὐτοί is found in all MSS. and in Stobaeus, who quotes this passage, it is probable that we should read αὐταί, referring to αἷ which is the subject of the various future tenses. Plato would not change the subject so awkwardly.

ibid. B ὥστε μηδὲν ἰατρικῆς δεῖσθαι, ὅτι μὴ ἀνάγκη.

Perhaps ἀνάγκη, and also in 441 A. See pp. 57.

411 A οὐκοῦν ὅταν μὲν τις μουσικῇ παρέχῃ καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς (καταντλεῖν [καὶ καταχεῖν] τῆς ψυχῆς Cobet) διὰ τῶν ὧτων ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης ἄς νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν τὰς γλυκείας τε καὶ μαλακὰς καὶ θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίας, καὶ μινυρίζων τε καὶ γεγανωμένος ὑπὸ τῆς ῥῥῥῥ διατελῆ τὸν βίον ὅλον, οὗτος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, εἴ τι θυμοειδὲς εἶχεν, ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξε καὶ χρήσιμον ἐξ ἀχρήστου καὶ σκληροῦ ἐποίησεν· ὅταν δ' ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνιῆ ἀλλὰ κηλῆ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη τήκει καὶ λείβει, ἕως ἂν ἐκτῆξῃ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ἐκτέμῃ ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ποιήσῃ μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν.

The difficulty of this passage lies in the words ὅταν δ' ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνιῆ ἀλλὰ κηλῆ. I very much doubt whether ἐπέχων and κηλῆ are right. There is no sufficient evidence for ἐπέχειν meaning either 'to attend' or 'to continue,' and the latter sense would be very feeble just before μὴ ἀνιῆ. *Theaet.* 165 D ἤλεγχεν ἂν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς looks like a close parallel, but it is far from certain that ἐπέχων there means 'continuing': it may very well be 'attacking,' 'pressing on,' *instans*. As for κηλῆ, it wants an object and is joined very awkwardly to the neuter verb ἀνιῆ. What is worse, it introduces between ἐμάλαξε and τήκει καὶ λείβει a quite incongruous metaphor. I doubt still whether ἐπέχων should not be παρέχων, repeated from ὅταν . . . παρέχῃ above. For κηλῆ Warren's κηλῆται seems to me now better than διατελῆ, which I formerly suggested, but it is not altogether convincing.

ibid. D E βία δὲ καὶ ἀγριότητι ὥσπερ θηρίον πρὸς πάντα διαπράττεται.

If Adam, who suggested θηρίον πρὸς <θηρίον> πάντα, was right in conjecturing the loss of a repeated word, <πάντα> πρὸς πάντα may be thought of.

412 C οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν πρεσβυτέρους τοὺς ἄρχοντας δεῖ εἶναι, νεωτέρους δὲ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, δῆλον; Δῆλον. Καὶ ὅτι γε τοὺς ἀρίστους αὐτῶν; Καὶ τοῦτο. Οἱ δὲ γεωργῶν ἄριστοι ἄρ' οὐ γεωργικώτατοι γίνονται; Ναί. Νῦν δ', ἐπειδὴ φυλάκων αὐτοὺς ἀρίστους δεῖ εἶναι, ἄρ' οὐ φυλακικωτάτους πόλεως; Ναί.

In the first place is there any proper construction or sense for τοὺς ἀρίστους αὐτῶν, unless we add something like ἄρχειν after ὅτι? The rulers are to be older men; but not all the older men, only the best of them, are actually to rule. Secondly, has it ever been noticed that οἱ δὲ γεωργῶν κ.τ.λ. gives just the inverse of the sense required? The point is not that the best husbandmen become most capable, but that the most capable make the best husbandmen: the other would be nonsense. In other words γεωργικώτατοι has somehow to be subject and γεωργῶν ἄριστοι predicate. What should be read is not quite clear; perhaps simply οἱ δὲ γεωργικώτατοι ἄρ' οὐ γεωργῶν ἄριστοι γίνονται. In the next sentence we understand of course δεῖ εἶναι over again with φυλακικωτάτους: as they have to become the best possible guardians, they must be by nature the best fitted for this. The φυλακικώτατοι become the φυλάκων ἄριστοι.

413 B κλαπέντας μὲν γὰρ τοὺς μεταπεισθέντας λέγω καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλανθανομένους, ὅτι τῶν μὲν χρόνος, τῶν δὲ λόγος ἐξαιρούμενος λανθάνει.

No doubt the words are as Plato wrote them, but how can λανθάνει be properly affirmed of λόγος? When my opinions are altered by reasoning, I cannot be unaware of it.

414 A λαγχάνοντα seems impossible. Read λαγχάνοντι.

ibid. D λέγ', ἔφη, καὶ μὴ φοβοῦ. Λέγω δὴ· καίτοι οὐκ οἶδα

ὅποια τόλμη ἢ ποίοις λόγοις χρώμενος ἐρῶ· καὶ ἐπιχειρήσω πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ.

Read ἐρῶ καὶ ἐπιχειρήσω with no stop after ἐρῶ.

421 A εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν φύλακας ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιούμεν ἥκιστα κακούργους τῆς πόλεως, ὁ δ' ἐκείνο λέγων γεωργούς τινας καὶ ὡσπερ ἐν πανηγύρει ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν πόλει ἐστιάτορας εὐδαίμονας, ἄλλο ἂν τι ἢ πόλιν λέγοι.

In Madvig's εὐδαιμον ἄλλο ἂν τι ἢ πόλιν λέγοι, adopted by Baiter, I see no advantage, and the εὐδαίμονες ἐστιάσεις of 612 A supports the MS. reading. There seems however to be a corruption in the word γεωργούς. The critic cannot be said to be making the guardians γεωργοί. Socrates has indeed just pointed out that οὐθ' ὁ γεωργὸς γεωργὸς ἔσται οὔτε κ.τ.λ. If even the husbandmen will not be real husbandmen, why should the guardians be so? The critic does not want to give them any work to do at all. The truth is, γεωργούς is quite out of place and unmeaning here. Possibly Plato wrote ἀργούς τινας. Notice how often ἀργός and ἀργία occur: 421 D, 422 A, 426 A. In Plut. Mor. 795 F γεωργεῖν is corrected to γε ἀργεῖν. λέγων immediately preceding might cause or help the mistake. ἄλλο ἂν τι ἢ πόλιν λέγοι is 'he must be speaking of something else': cf. Dem. 23. 30, etc.

423 B τίς, ἔφη, ὄρος; Οἶμαι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τόνδε· μέχρι οὗ ἂν ἐθέλῃ αὐξομένη εἶναι μία, μέχρι τούτου αὔξειν, πέρα δὲ μή. Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη.

Is καλῶς used thus by itself, like ὀρθῶς to express assent, or should we read καλός γ', agreeing with ὄρος? Perhaps also τίς, ἔφη, <ὁ> ὄρος;

ibid. E τὴν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτῆσιν καὶ γάμων καὶ παιδοποιίας.

Read γάμους. So in Plut. *Philopoemen* 17 Schäfer wrote περὶ γάμους (for γάμων) καὶ παρθένων ἔρωτας.

424 A πολιτεία εἰάνπερ ἄπαξ ὀρμήσῃ εὖ ἔρχεται ὡσπερ κύκλος αὐξανομένη.

Editors have not been at all successful in explaining this. Adam points out well enough that κύκλος cannot

mean either a wheel or a circle in water made by something thrown in, and himself understands 'grows like a circle' to refer to a circle in process of being drawn on paper or otherwise: the circle seems to expand and grow under the hand of the person describing it. He seems to forget that, if this can fairly be said of a circle when being described, it can equally well be said of any other figure, e.g. a square, so that there was no reason why Plato should say 'circle' and not 'figure' in general. But I doubt whether it could naturally be said at all, that is, whether *αὐξάνεται* is a fit word to express this meaning. Would it not properly signify the extension, the growing greater, of an already complete circle? I do not think *ὥσπερ κύκλω* has been suggested. Plato proceeds to explain, though not very clearly nor perhaps logically, in what way the growth may be called circular, namely that good rearing and education secure goodness of nature and then improved nature reacts on rearing and education, making them more efficacious and productive of still better natures; and this goes on constantly and progressively. Action and reaction—which I think he means—make up the circle. So we have not a circle which grows, but things growing in a circular way.

425 B *σιγᾶς τε τῶν νεωτέρων παρὰ πρεσβυτέροις, ἃς πρέπει.*

Ἄς is not good grammar, and ὡς, which Stallbaum reads after a few inferior MSS., is rather doubtful grammar. Probably Plato wrote οἷς (*i.e.* παρ' οἷς) πρέπει, just as Dem. 57. 24 wrote ὑπὸ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ φρατέρων καὶ δημοτῶν καὶ γεννητῶν, ὧν προσήκει: Xen. *Mem.* 2. 1. 32 παρ' ἀνθρώποις οἷς προσήκει: Thuc. 1. 28. 2 παρὰ πόλεσιν αἷς ἂν ἀμφοτέροι ξυμβῶσιν. Cf. 402 A ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς (*i.e.* ἐν οἷς) ἔστι περιφερόμενα: 520 D ἐν πόλει ἧ, etc. Οἷς πρέπει is put in, because it is only 'to elders of their own class that it becomes the young aristocrats to show this respect. Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 1. 9. 5 τοῖς τε πρεσβυτέροις καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ὑποδεεστέρων μᾶλλον πείθεσθαι. In the *Ethics* 9. 2. 1165 a 27 παντὶ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ we must not press παντί.

426 A *ιατρεινόμενοι γὰρ οὐδὲν περαίνουσιν, πλήν γε ποικιλώ-*

τερα καὶ μείζω ποιοῦσι τὰ νοσήματα, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐλπίζοντες, ἐάν τις φάρμακον συμβουλευέσῃ, ὑπὸ τούτου ἔσεσθαι ὑγιεῖς.

The confusion of this passage seems to admit of remedy by transposition. Put καὶ αἰεὶ . . . ὑγιεῖς after *ιατρευόμενοι γάρ*. If the words were in the right order, we might expect καὶ <ταῦτα> αἰεὶ ἐλπίζοντες.

ibid. C προαγορεύουσι . . . τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν τῆς πόλεως μὴ κινεῖν . . . ὅς ἂν σφᾶς . . . θεραπείῃ . . . οὗτος ἄρα ἀγαθός τε ἔσται ἀνὴρ καὶ κ.τ.λ.

Read οὗτος <ὄς> ἄρα, comparing for the order 377 E ὁ τε αὖ Κρόνος ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτὸν : Xen. *Anab.* 2. 2. 20 προαγορεύουσιν . . . ὅς ἂν κ.τ.λ. ὅτι λήψεται μισθόν : 7. 1. 11 προσανείπεν ὅς ἂν κ.τ.λ. ὅτι αὐτὸς αὐτὸν αἰτιάσεται and *ibid.* 36 ἐκήρυξεν ὅς ἂν κ.τ.λ. ὅτι πεπράσεται.

ibid. D E Should we write οἶόν τ' <ἂν> εἶναι (or οἶόν τ' εἶναι <ἂν>) ἀνδρί, and οὐκ ἂν in the answer ?

428 A The words οὐκ ἄλλο ἔτι ἦν ἢ τὸ ὑπολειφθέν seem also to need the addition of ἂν. They refer to what *would have been* in an imaginary case.

ibid. πρῶτόν γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ κατάδηλον εἶναι ἡ σοφία.

There is nothing whatever preceding for ἐν αὐτῷ to refer to. Perhaps we may read ἐν αὐτῶν, just as we have a few lines above εἰ ἐν τι ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτῶν and 429 A τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἐν τῶν τεττάρων. *Laws* 882 A ἐν τοῦτο is now read for ἐν τούτῳ, and below in 436 A τούτῳ is certainly a mistake for τούτων, τούτῳ being meaningless.

[The *schol.* on Ar. *Wasps* 120 runs—εἰς τὸ καινὸν ἐμπεσόν : τόπος ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ οὕτω λεγόμενος· εἰσὶ δὲ δ', Παράβυστον, Καινόν, Τρίγωνον, Μέσον. Should we not read τόπος (?) ἐν τῶν δικαστηρίων οὕτω λεγόμενον ? The singular τῷ δικαστηρίῳ can hardly be right, and εἰσὶ with the neuters following must refer to δικαστήρια, not to τόποι.]

ibid. D For αὕτη ἡ φυλακική read αὐτή. It has not been mentioned before.

430 B τίθεμαι, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις. 'Ἄλλ' οὐδέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, λέγω.

ἀλλ' may be right (cf. c) but should we not read ἄλλο οὐδέν?

ibid. D Socrates proposing to omit the discussion of temperance and go on at once to justice, ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, says Glaucon, οὔτε οἶδα οὔτ' ἂν βουλοίμην αὐτὸ πρότερον φαῖναι, εἴπερ μηκέτι ἐπισκεψόμεθα σωφροσύνην.

As the question is not of taking justice first, but of omitting temperance altogether, πρότερον is illogical and should perhaps be omitted.

ibid. E κόσμος πού τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια, ὡς φασι, κρείττω δὴ αὐτοῦ φαίνονται οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινα τρόπον, καὶ ἄλλα ἅττα τοιαῦτα ὡσπερ ἴχνη αὐτῆς λέγεται.

Paris A has φαίνονται with γρ. λέγοντες in the margin. Some edd. have written κρείττω δὴ αὐτοῦ λέγοντες on the strength of this and of a few MSS. which actually have that reading. Madvig's proposed φαίοντα, though of course grammatically possible, is most awkward in sense. It is clear that we need a participle, not a verb, and probable, I think, that ἀποφαίνοντες is the word wanted. Λέγοντες does not account for the appearance of φαίνονται. The use of ἀποφαίνειν in the sense of 'making out,' 'representing,' needs no illustration.

432 C ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, εἴαν μοι ἐπομένῳ χρῆ καὶ τὰ δεικνύμενα δυναμένῳ καθορᾶν, πάνν μοι μετρίως χρήσει. Ἔπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐξάμενος μετ' ἐμοῦ. Πουήσω ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ μόνον, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἡγοῦ. Καὶ μὴν, εἶπον ἐγώ, δύσβατός γέ τις ὁ τόπος φαίνεται καὶ ἐπίσκιος· ἔστι γοῦν σκοτεινὸς καὶ δυσδιερεύνητος· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁμως ἰτέον.

πάνν μοι μετρίως χρήσει (μοι is found only in A and one or two other MSS.) would naturally mean 'You will treat me very fairly,' as in *Erp.* 3. 314 D, while the sense needed is 'You will find me a very fair companion, as companions go.' Cf. 474 A ἴσως ἂν ἄλλον του ἐμμελέστερόν σοι ἀποκρινοίμην. That sense would be given more clearly and perhaps more correctly, if we were to read πάνν μοι μετρίῳ χρήσει,

like the *ἐάν μοι ἐπομένῳ χρῆ*. Cf. Plut. *Alcið.* 14 (198 A) *εἰ βούλεσθε χρῆσασθαι μετρίοις Ἀθηναίοις*. The verb *ἔπον* seems to call for an *οὖν* to follow it, and the repetition of *ου* accounts for the omission.

The words *ἔστι . . . δυσδιερεύνητος* are so entirely a repetition of those preceding that I formerly proposed to omit them. I would suggest now that they be given to Glaucon as a remark in assent. Then Socrates goes on with *ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.*

433 A *καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν*.

As the text stands, it would certainly seem that the inference announced in *τοῦτο τοίνυν κ.τ.λ.* is already stated in *καὶ μὴν ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*, which from its form (*καὶ μὴν*) is yet evidently only a step in the reasoning. What in the later sentence is said to be *ἡ δικαιοσύνη* is already said to be *δικαιοσύνη* in the earlier. Now it is quite true that the use of the article expresses a more close correspondence and identity of things than the predication of a substantive without the article; but it seems hardly likely that Plato meant to lay so much stress on the article here. The meaning certainly is that, whereas doing your own work has often been described as just (*i.e.* one just thing among many), we may now take it to be absolutely coextensive and identical with justice. It is justice, and justice consists in it. Doubting whether Plato would have trusted to the absence and presence of an article to make this distinction plain (cf. *Ar. Anal. Priora* 1. 40) I suggest that we should read *δίκαιόν ἐστι* for *δικαιοσύνη ἐστί*. [Adam's *σωφροσύνη* for *δικαιοσύνη* seems less likely.]

ibid. D *ἐνὸν καὶ ἐν παιδὶ καὶ ἐν γυναικὶ καὶ δούλῳ καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ καὶ δημιουργῷ καὶ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἄρχομένῳ*.

Here we have three pairs and *δημιουργῷ* standing alone. Obviously *καὶ γεωργῷ* is to be inserted and the omission put down to homoeoteleuton. For the antithesis of *γεωργοί* and *δημιουργοί* see 415 A and C (where very curiously one MS. omits *ἢ εἰς γεωργοὺς* and Stallbaum omits it too without comment): 466 B, etc. In Plut. *Mor.*

853 E οὔτε τις ἰμάτιον ἅμα ταῦτὸν ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ μειρακίῳ καὶ γέροντι καὶ οἰκότριβι πρέπον ἐποίησεν is not a pair for καὶ οἰκότριβι, e.g. καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ οὔ καὶ δεσπότη, missing? See my *Aristophanes and Others*, p. 321.

434 A Codex *q* seems to me right in reading ἧ before πάντα τᾶλλα and therefore probably also in τὰ γε τοιαῦτα after τᾶλλα.

ibid. D μηδέν πω πάνυ παγίως αὐτὸ λέγωμεν, ἀλλ' εἴαν μὲν ἡμῖν καὶ εἰς ἓνα ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἰόν τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο ὁμολογῆται καὶ ἐκεῖ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι, συγχωρησόμεθα ἤδη.

It is not the εἶδος which goes or turns to individual men. It is they, the inquirers, who turn to individuals to see whether the same εἶδος constitutes justice there. For ἰόν read ἰοῦσιν. So we have in E ἐπαναφέρωμεν εἰς τὸν ἓνα (again εἰς, because literal going to a man is not meant) and ἐπανιόντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν. Add *Phaedo* 65 E. Cf. to some extent Badham's correction of εἶδος . . . ἰόν in *Phaedrus* 249 B and my own suggestion that in *Dem.* 23. 143 we should read εὖ ποιούσιν for εὖ ποιούν.

436 D ὡς οὐ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἑαυτῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα τότε μενόντων τε καὶ φερομένων.

I formerly proposed to read τῶν τοιούτων, but should, I think, now be content to explain τὰ τοιαῦτα as *in such cases*. Cf. τὰ πολλά *in most cases*, τὰ πρότερα *in former times* (*Thuc.* 1. 2. 1), etc. Against Adam's explanation is the fact that the precise parts or aspects, τὸ εὐθύ and τὸ περιφερές, have not yet been mentioned.

437-38 On this section of the dialogue the commentators are very unsatisfactory, and I do not find one who treats two essential points in what seems to me the right way. Nettleship probably meant it, but his meaning is not made clear.

First why does Plato go into the difference between simple and qualified desires at all? The question is not—as Adam supposes—why desire, thirst in the instance taken, should be or ought to be restrained. The only thing considered is the analysis of what takes place in the mind,

when desire is restrained. But what is the point of the analysis, and why does Plato lay so much stress upon it? I should have thought this fairly clear, if it were not so often missed. He has to insist on taking the desire to drink *simpliciter* and not a desire for some particular kind of drink, that he may get a clear issue. If the desire were for some particular drink, it might be said that the cause of the man's not drinking was that he could not get the exact drink he wanted, *e.g.* that he could only get water, when he wanted wine. But if it is simply for drink, that is, if he is simply thirsty, and yet does not drink, it is no accidental hindrance of this kind, no external circumstance, but the action of his own reason, which (according to Plato, or rather, in the dialogue, to Socrates) stops him from indulging his desire. The object then of drawing the distinction between simple and qualified desires is to get an instance in which accidental external hindrances do not exist. It is not a case of a man being at once thirsty and hot, so that he wants something cold, or thirsty and cold, so that he wants something hot: he is simply thirsty and only wants drink.

The second point is the *ἀγαθόν* (439 A) or *χρηστὸν ποτόν* (438 A), which seems generally understood of drink that is really good for us. It is not that, but merely drink good of its kind, whatever its kind may be, or drink good as drink. The reason why Plato will not allow us to say that thirst is a desire for good drink is the same as before. The epithet *good* confuses the issue. It might be said that the real cause of the man's not drinking was that the drink available was not good of its kind. But, if a man is really thirsty, he does not much care whether it is good of its kind or not. Cf. 475 c. Thirst pure and simple is for drink pure and simple, not for good drink any more than for this or that special kind of drink. The whole argument leads up to the intervention of reason as distinct from any other check or obstacle.

438 A μήτοι (μὴ τοίνυν?) τις, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἀσκέπτους ἡμᾶς ὄντας θορυβήσῃ, ὡς οὐδεὶς ποτοῦ ἐπιθυμῆί ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ ποτοῦ, καὶ οὐ σίτου ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ σίτου. πάντες γὰρ ἄρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.

Probably λόγος should be added to τις in the first part of this. Cf. 465 E οὐκ οἶδα ὅτου λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπέπληξεν: *Phaedr.* 245 B μηδέ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος θορυβεῖτω ὡς κ.τ.λ.: *Phil.* 13 A λόγος οὐδέεις ἀμφισβητῆ: *Dem.* 21. 141 τάχα τοίνυν καὶ τοιοῦτός τις ἕξει πρὸς ἡμᾶς λόγος. Without λόγος the ὡς is wanting in construction. ὁ ταῦτα λέγων below is fairly implied in λόγος. The last words would give a much clearer sense, if we might read πάντες γὰρ ἄρα πάντων ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν: 'anyone desiring anything desires it good.' Unless ἀγαθῶν can be made a predicate, the point is lost. In *Herod.* 3. 89 ἀγαθά σφι πάντα ἐμηχανήσατο some good MSS. have τά for πάντα.

439 A τὸ δὲ δὴ δίψος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τούτων θήσεις τῶν τινὸς εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστίν; ἔστι δὲ δήπου δίψος. ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, πώματός γε.

One or two plausible conjectures have been offered on the first part of this; it is with the later part I am now concerned. ἔστι δὲ δήπου δίψος is very flat as a statement and entirely superfluous. Burnet prints it after Jowett and Campbell as an incomplete statement, interrupted by Glaucon, but Adam asks reasonably why Glaucon should be in such a hurry. I conjecture that something is lost after these words, e.g. ἐπιθυμία τις, giving in part the ὅπερ ἐστίν of thirst. ἐπιθυμία and ἐπιθυμῶ have been used from 437 B onwards. Cf. *Philebus* 34 E ἀρ' οὖν τὸ δίψος ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία; ναί, πώματός γε, the resemblance of which to our passage is very marked. In 437 D ἀρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. it is possible that one δίψα should be ἐπιθυμία.

Especially in view of the *Philebus* passage, I should not be surprised to find that Plato really put these sentences in a different order: τὸ δὲ δὴ δίψος οὐ τούτων θήσεις . . . ὅπερ ἐστίν; ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς. ἔστι δὲ δήπου δίψος <ἐπιθυμία>; (cf. on 407 A above) Πώματός γε.

ibid. E ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τούτῳ, ὡς ἄρα κ.τ.λ.

'τούτῳ A F D: τοῦτο M Galenus Stobaeus' Burnet. Perhaps τοῦτο is nearer the truth and we should read τοιοῦτον, referring (as it sometimes does) to what is coming. τούτῳ seems against Greek idiom, which usually governs a

word by the participle and leaves the verb without any direct object expressed.

440 C τί δὲ ὅταν ἀδικεῖσθαι τις ἡγῆται; οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ ζεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει καὶ συμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ, καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τὸ ριγῶν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν, καὶ ὑπομένων νικᾶ καὶ οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων, πρὶν ἂν ἢ διαπράξῃται ἢ τελευτήσῃ ἢ ὥσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτῷ ἀνακληθεῖς πραῦνθῇ;

In this there are at least two considerable difficulties, (1) the meaning of καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν κ.τ.λ., (2) the reading and the sense in καὶ ὑπομένων νικᾶ κ.τ.λ. As to (2), what does ὑπομένων refer to? and how can it be said generally of such a case that the man conquers (νικᾶ), when it is immediately added that he sometimes loses his life in the struggle and sometimes is appeased? Difficulty (1) is well got over by Adam's proposal to transpose καὶ διὰ . . . πάσχειν, so that those words shall follow χαλεπαίνει. They are obviously inappropriate to συμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ, but suit the earlier words, just as in the preceding sentence a man conscious of being in the wrong was said *not* to resent cold and hunger as punishments. Here no doubt hunger and cold constitute the ἀδίκημα done to himself which makes him indignant. Should not difficulty (2) be removed by another transposition of words? ὑπομένων καὶ νικᾶ should, I think, follow διαπράξῃται (*i.e.* πρὶν ἂν ἢ διαπράξῃται ὑπομένων καὶ νικᾶ ἢ τελευτήσῃ), ὑπομένων meaning that he maintains the struggle. It may be thought that νικήσῃ would be more proper than νικᾶ, if this were the order of words, but we may remember that the present tense of this verb is often used in preference to a past tense in the sense of *being the victor*.

If these transpositions are approved, they will perhaps make a third less improbable. I conjecture that τῶν γενναίων (for which, as being very feeble, I formerly suggested ἀγανακτῶν) should be put in the first clause of the sentence after ἡγῆται. It will then be masculine depending on τις, and will correspond pretty closely to ὄσφ ἂν γενναίότερος ἢ (*i.e.* τις) in the sentence preceding.

The whole passage will then run: τί δ' ὅταν ἀδικεῖσθαι τις ἡγῆται τῶν γενναίων; οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ ζεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει καὶ διὰ

τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τὸ ῥιγῶν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν, καὶ οὐ λήγει πρὶν ἂν ἡ διαπράξῃται ὑπομένων καὶ νικᾷ ἢ τελευτήσῃ ἢ ὡσπερ κύων . . . πραῦνθῇ ;

442 B ἐπόμενον δῆ (for δέ)? Possibly the οὐδέ in 328 c should be οὐ δῆ, but I am not convinced that οὐδέ is wrong.

443 A πόλεων may be right, but πόλεως would seem more natural, as he is speaking of one man (οὗτος). The plural may be due to ἐταίρων preceding.

445 B ὅσον οἶόν τέ κ.τ.λ. Should ὅσον be ὡς? Cf. on 390 B above.

449 B τί μάλιστα, ἔφην, ὑμεῖς οὐκ ἀφίετε ; Σέ, ἦ δ' ὅς. *Ἐτι ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί μάλιστα ;

The first τί μάλιστα should surely be τίνα μάλιστα, *να* having fallen out perhaps through *μα* following ; just as in *Laws* 682 c, where *τι μακρὸν χρόνον* stands for *τίνα μακρὸν χρόνον*. *Gorg.* 448 B τί and τίνα both have authority and *ibid.* 489 D τί must be corrected with Routh to τίνας. τί μάλιστα is the common phrase, but other parts of the pronoun are found : *Soph. O.C.* 652 τοῦ μάλιστ' ὄκνος σ' ἔχει ; *Antiphanes* 202. 3 ἐν τίνι τόπῳ μάλιστα ; *Lucian* 41. 2 Ὀρέστην . . . τίνος μάλιστα θαυμάσαντες κ.τ.λ. ; *Ar. Met.* 996 b 3 τίνα μάλιστα τοῦ πράγματος ἐπιστήμονα (but perhaps μάλιστα goes rather with ἐπιστήμονα).

ibid. D μέγα γάρ τι οἰόμεθα φέρειν καὶ ὄλον εἰς πολιτείαν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενον.

Read γιγνομένην, agreeing with κοινωνίαν.

450 B μέτρον δέ γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαῦκων, τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούειν ὅλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσι.

Read <τοῦ> τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούειν, or possibly <ὡς> τ. λ. ἀ. The cause of either omission is obvious.

ibid. D ἐν γὰρ φρονίμοις τε καὶ φίλοις περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε καὶ φίλων τάληθῆ εἰδῶτα λέγειν ἀσφαλές καὶ θαρραλέον.

Perhaps φιλιτάτων, though φίλων may be defended as corresponding to φίλοις.

452 A μουσική μὲν ἐκείνοις τε καὶ γυμναστική ἐδόθη.

Both μὲν and τε are here misused. Either μουσική μὴν ἐκείνοις γε οἱ ἐκείνοις μὲν <οὖν> μουσική τε would give a good sense. As ἀποδίδωμι, and not the simple verb, is used over and over again in the context, and seems moreover the verb required, we should probably read ἀπεδόθη.

ibid. C ἐδόκει αἰσχρὰ εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα . . . γυμνοὺς ἄνδρας ὀρᾶσθαι, καὶ, ὅτε ἤρχοντο τῶν γυμνασίων πρῶτοι μὲν Κρήτες, ἔπειτα Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἔξῃν κ.τ.λ.

Herwerden has pointed out that τῶν γυμνασίων is not enough to express the idea intended, and has suggested τῶν <τοιούτων> γυμνασίων. It occurs to me as possible that Plato wrote τῶν <γυμνῶν> γυμνασίων. Just above (A B) we have γυμνάς . . . γυμναζομένας. Cf. Ar. *Problem.* 38. 3 οἱ γυμνοὶ δρόμοι : Pind. *P.* 11. 49 γυμνὸν ἐπὶ στάδιον : Mart. 7. 72. 9 *de trigone nudo* : and λιπαρὰς παλαίστρας Theocr., *nitida* and *uncta palaestra* Ovid. But most of these are from poets.

454 D Socrates propounds the paradox that men and women ought to have the same occupations, and that difference of sex should not entail any difference of work. He then proposes to see what can be said on the other side. Surely (some one may say) such a system would be inconsistent with the great pervading and fundamental principle laid down by ourselves for our state, that different natures should have different kinds of work to do. Men and women evidently differ in nature : how then can it be right to set them both to the same work without making allowance for sex? This is apparently a forcible argument ; but it may be met (he continues) as follows. When we said that difference of nature should entail difference of work, of course we did not mean every conceivable natural difference, however trifling or however immaterial under the circumstances it might be. In a sense there is a difference of nature between a bald man and a man with a good head of hair. But no one would contend that, if bald men are engaged in the work of making shoes, men with plenty of hair are unfit for shoe-making and must have some other work found for them.

The difference in the person which requires a difference in the employment is some really material difference bearing upon the employment in question, not a difference in some irrelevant respect. In his own words, τότε οὐ πάντως τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν ἐτιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀλλοιώσεώς τε καὶ ὁμοιώσεως μόνον ἐφυλάττομεν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ τεῖνον τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα. After some words apparently intended to illustrate what sameness and difference of nature really are, he goes on to say: If men and women really differ as regards employments, of course we must find different employments for them; but, if the difference is purely one of sex, it does not follow that the same employments are not suitable for both. Now, as a matter of fact, there are no employments in which women are preeminent. Certain women may do certain things better than certain men; but, speaking generally, men excel women at everything, even at occupations deemed especially feminine. In a word, men are more εὐφυεῖς (455 B) for everything than women. Women therefore should have no especial work of their own, but do just the same things as men, only leaving to men those things or parts of things that require great bodily strength.

In all this argument, though perhaps not sound logically, there is no difficulty. The difficulty is in the words containing what seems meant as an illustration of sameness and difference in nature, and following immediately on the Greek words quoted above: οἷον ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ἐλέγομεν ἢ οὐκ οἶει; Ἔγωγε. Ἰατρικὸν δὲ καὶ τεκτονικὸν ἄλλην; Πάντως που. For ἰατρικὸν μὲν the first hand in A has ἰατρικῶν μὲν. On ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα Baiter's note is 'ἰατρικὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα codices aliquot interpolati: ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα accommodationis errore A: ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα alii: ἰατρικὴν (mulierem) τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντας H' (i.e. K. F. Hermann).

Hermann's reading cannot be right, because it assumes the very point that Socrates is concerned to prove—the identity of the male and female natures as regards a given occupation. The words almost immediately following, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν γένος, seem in themselves to show that women have not yet been mentioned, for the first καί is *also*. So too 455 E ἀλλ' ἔστι γάρ, οἶμαι, ὡς

φήσομεν, καὶ γυνὴ ἰατρική. Bekker's ἰατρόν for the first ἰατρικόν (adopted by Stallbaum) must be wrong, because there is no plausibility in identifying the ἰατρός and the ἰατρικός, the medical man and the man with a turn or taste for medicine. An ἰατρός is not necessarily ἰατρικός nor *vice versa*. There may seem more plausibility in ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα, for the ἰατρικός and the ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων are indeed the same. But they are so completely and so obviously the same that their identity need not be stated, throws no light on the subject, and suggests no inference. Just the same may be said of ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα. Schneider found a difference between the two men thus described, and Baiter, who gave this reading, presumably saw some difference also. But the two expressions mean just the same thing. We might of course say that ἰατρικός referred to body as well as mind; but then the two men would be different, and Socrates could not say they were the same.

Let us try to see what Plato might naturally give as an instance to the point. An ἰατρικός (he says) and a τεκτονικός, a man with a turn for medicine and one with a turn for carpentering, are different in nature; but an ἰατρικός and *x* are in nature the same. What is *x* likely to be? An ἰατρικός, I think, who has some characteristic which does not alter his ἰατρικὴ φύσις into something else, or some characteristic which has no bearing upon it of any kind. Socrates might, for instance, keeping his former illustration, have said that an ἰατρικός and a τεκτονικός were different, but an ἰατρικός and an ἰατρικός with a bald head the same, the same that is for the purposes of ἰατρική, the same when you were considering to what employment to put them. This is only one illustration among many that might be imagined; but it seems probable that Plato here mentioned some species of ἰατρικός, saying that an ἰατρικός and an ἰατρικός of such and such a kind were for our purpose the same, while men with different bents were for our purpose different.

I believe however that we can go further than this and fix with some probability on the precise word that is missing. Plato probably wrote ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν <εὐφύα> τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα. εὐφύης, which the hearers of

Socrates would think he used casually and without ulterior object, is exactly the right word to lead up to the subsequent argument founded on the *εὐφύια* of men as against women. If *εὐφύια*, added to a natural bent or fitness, does not alter the nature of it, then men and women, who only differ in *εὐφύια* (455 B-D), have not that difference of nature which calls for a difference of employment. But, while there is this intrinsic fitness about the word *εὐφύης* if inserted here, it also seems distinctly implied in 455 B that the word *εὐφύης* has already been used in the course of this particular argument. The passage runs thus: *βούλει οὖν δεώμεθα τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀντιλέγοντος ἀκολουθήσαι ἡμῖν, εἴαν πως ἡμεῖς ἐκείνῳ ἐνδειξώμεθα ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἐπιτήδευμα ἴδιον γυναικί πρὸς διοίκησιν πόλεως; Πάνυ γε. Ἴθι δὴ, φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀποκρίνον· ἄρα οὕτως ἔλεγες τὸν μὲν εὐφύᾳ πρὸς τι εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἀφύᾳ, ἐν ᾧ ὁ μὲν ῥαδίως τι μαθήσεται, ὁ δὲ χαλεπῶς κ.τ.λ.*; The imperfect *ἔλεγες* and *ᾠρίζου* six lines later must refer to something said, implied, or meant in a former passage. Now the imaginary objector (*ὁ ἀντιλέγων*) has not actually been supposed to speak before, but Socrates has done it for him (453 A), and the reference in *ἔλεγες* can only be to something that has been said between 453 A and 455 B. Within these limits the word *εὐφύης* is not used nor hinted at, as the text stands; but, if inserted before *τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα*, it would make *ἔλεγες* perfectly intelligible. There is another imperfect in the very sentence I am proposing to emend (*οἷον ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν <εὐφύᾳ> τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ἐλέγομεν*) which at first sight tells against the proposal. It too refers to something preceding, and seems at first sight to say that the proposition (whatever it may be) has already been laid down. But *ἐλέγομεν* does not really mean as much as this. It only means 'when we talked of natures different and the same, we meant for instance that an *ἰατρικός* and *x* were the same in nature, while an *ἰατρικός* and a *τεκτονικός* were different.' It would of course be easy to read *λέγομεν* for *ἐλέγομεν*, but *ἐλέγομεν* will bear this meaning and there is no occasion for change.

Perhaps it may be thought that the *ἰατρικός* and the *ἰατρικός εὐφύης τὴν ψυχὴν ὢν* are not clearly distinct persons—any more than, as I have argued above, the *ἰατρικός* and

the *ιατρικὸς τὴν ψυχὴν*. I am not sure whether *εὐφνᾶ*, if right, refers to general or special ability and fitness, but in either case there is a clear difference between the two men. In the first case a man may have some turn and taste for medicine without being an able man. This is a matter of common experience. In the second case the *ιατρικός* and the *εὐφνὴς πρὸς τὴν ιατρικὴν* differ as the positive and superlative differ, as the politician from the statesman and the poetaster from the poet.

For *εὐφνὴς τὴν ψυχὴν ὧν* compare 409 E *τοὺς μὲν εὐφνεῖς τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς* : 491 E *τὰς ψυχὰς . . . τὰς εὐφνεστάτας* : and other passages.

Finally some slight confirmation of the proposal to insert *εὐφνᾶ* may perhaps be found in Aristotle, who writes in *Met.* 3. 1. 1003 b 1, distinguishing various senses of *ιατρικός*, as follows : *τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ιατρικὴν λέγεται ιατρικόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ εὐφνὲς εἶναι πρὸς αὐτήν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ἔργον εἶναι τῆς ιατρικῆς*. The distinction between *τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ιατρικὴν* and *τὸ εὐφνὲς εἶναι πρὸς ιατρικὴν* is apparently not the same as that I suppose to be drawn by Plato, but Aristotle is so often indebted to Plato, even for his illustrations, that he might very well be thinking of the passage before us. On the other hand, his use of the words may be pure accident, as he is always fond of illustrations drawn from medicine.

ibid. *εἰάν μὲν πρὸς τέχνην τινὰ ἢ ἄλλο ἐπιτήδευμα διαφέρουν φαίνεται.*

Read *διαφέρειν*, as in the next sentence, or *διαφέροντα*. *διαφέρον* cannot be used of two subjects.

455 D *ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὅτι πολὺ κρατεῖται ἐν ἅπασιν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τὸ γένος τοῦ γένους.*

Unless some other example can be given of *κρατεῖσθαι* with a genitive, *κρατεῖ* for *κρατεῖται* would seem probable. It also keeps the two sexes in the order in which they were previously mentioned. In Isocr. 18. 17 all the MSS. have *ἐκρατεῖτο* for *ἐκράτει*.

457 B *τιθέντες*? But the accusative is sometimes irregularly used. See for instance 547 B C, if right.

ibid. c λέγε δῆ, ἴδω.

I formerly suggested ἄγε (Cobet φέρε) for λέγε, but now would read λέγε δῆ, <ἴν'> ἴδω, supposing similarity to have caused omission.

458 B σκέψομαι . . . πῶς διατάξουσιν . . . καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Should ὅτι be εἰ? It is *whether* the fact is so that he is going to consider. But there may be a confusion of considering with maintaining.

459 C ἴσμεν ὅτι ἀνδρειότερον δεῖ τοῦ ἱατροῦ.

How ἀνδρεῖος can be used of wholly intellectual qualities (a difficulty which the editors do not explain and which formerly led me to think alteration necessary) may be seen perhaps from *Soph.* 306 E, where it is explained that all the more active and vigorous faculties fall generically under the head of ἀνδρεία.

ibid. E foll. Plato gives us the arrangements which are to take the place of marriage in his state. On certain festival days men and women covertly chosen by the guardians, though seemingly selected by lot, are to be joined in a union not lasting longer than the festivals themselves. There will not be more unions than are sufficient, taking one thing with another, to maintain the number of the male population; but nothing is said at first about prohibiting unions between near relations. The children are to be taken from their mothers and so brought up by the state that relationship to particular parents shall remain unknown. No child will know its parents, no parents their children. Men are to be eligible for these regular and legal unions between the ages of 25 and 55, women between 20 and 40. When they have passed these ages and ceased 'bearing children to the state' (τίκτειν τῇ πόλει or γεννᾶν τῇ πόλει), they are to be at liberty to form irregular unions, any possible offspring of which is to be suppressed.

It is at this point that restrictions on the ground of relationship are first mentioned. A man, it is said, may form one of these irregular unions with any woman he pleases except daughter, granddaughter, mother, and

grandmother ; and a woman with any man she pleases, not being son, grandson, father, or grandfather.¹ Brothers and sisters are not mentioned in this particular sentence, where the forbidden degrees are first given.

Hereupon Glaucon naturally asks how, considering the arrangements made, father and daughter, mother and son are to be known. Socrates answers that all the children born in the tenth or seventh month after one of the festivals are to count as children of all the men and women who took part in the regular unions on that occasion, and that relationship in the second generation will follow accordingly. He then proceeds to define brother and sister, who have not hitherto been mentioned, as τὰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γεγονότα (ἔκγονα) ἐν ᾧ αἱ μητέρες καὶ οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν ἐγέννων. It seems to me that these words are usually mistranslated, and in any case they give rise to great difficulty.

They are commonly taken to mean that a man's sister will be any woman born about the same time as himself, that is, within a certain time of a certain festival. But a pupil of mine has pointed out to me, what is certainly true, that under the arrangements above stated children born about the same time are exactly those who, except in the case of twins, could not be brothers or sisters. At the festival one man was united to one woman and the children born must be children of different fathers and different mothers. If therefore it was with a view to the prevention of real incest that Plato defined relationships and prohibited unions, he was not likely to prohibit them to persons who could not be relations and permit them to persons who could. He would be granting full liberty of incest while hindering an innocent union.

If however we look again at the Greek, we shall see that this was not Plato's meaning. The use of the imperfect tense ἐγέννων and the absence of αὐτοῦς after it suggest rather that the words mean not 'the time at which their

¹ Plato says daughter, daughter's daughter, mother and mother's mother, and then again son, son's son, father and father's father. But these make up among them all grandchildren and grandparents: e.g. if a woman cannot marry her father's father, a man cannot marry his son's daughter.

parents brought them into the world,' but 'the time within which their parents were having children,' *γεννᾶν* being used in the same sense in which it has been used two or three times before in this and the previous page. It refers therefore to the whole time of life during which father and mother were allowed, if the lot fell upon them, to take part in the regular unions; and brothers and sisters will be all persons born, roughly speaking, within thirty years of one another, that being the period of time during which a man might be having children as the issue of regular unions, so that a man and a woman born within that period might possibly both have him for father. This meaning is also clearly conveyed by a passage in the *Timaeus* (18 D), in which the arrangements of the *Republic* are mentioned: νομοῦσι δὲ πάντες πάντας αὐτοὺς ὁμογενεῖς, ἀδελφὰς μὲν καὶ ἀδελφοὺς ὅσοιπερ ἂν τῆς προεπούσης ἐντὸς ἡλικίας γίνωνται, τοὺς δ' ἔμπροσθεν κ.τ.λ., where ἡλικία naturally refers to a considerable period of life, not to a few weeks.

But, if it was Plato's intention under ordinary circumstances to forbid all unions between brothers and sisters thus defined, he would thus have rendered all unions whatever practically impossible. Under the various conditions of age now stated a man could not be united with any woman who had been older or younger than himself by less than thirty years, because she might be his sister, nor with one thirty years younger than himself, because she might be his daughter; while a woman thirty years older than himself might be his mother and would also be beyond the legal age for a regular union.

This then cannot have been Plato's meaning. After the definitions of relationship, he adds in 461 E ὥστε, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀλλήλων μὴ ἄπτεσθαι ἀδελφοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀδελφὰς δώσει ὁ νόμος συνοικεῖν ἔαν ὁ κληρὸς ταύτῃ συμπύπτῃ καὶ ἡ Πυθία προσαναίρῃ. I understand the words ὥστε . . . ἄπτεσθαι to refer to the irregular unions which were the last mentioned. Although in 461 C brothers and sisters are curiously omitted from the list of persons forbidden to form irregular unions, we seem obliged by these words to include them; and Plato would seem absolutely to forbid irregular unions between persons who may possibly

be near relations. With regular unions the case is different. 'Brothers and sisters,' he says, 'the law will allow to be united, if the lot so fall, and if the Pythian priestess also sanction it by oracle.' In these words brothers and sisters seem to be distinguished from parents and children (whose union would indeed also be prevented by the limits of age laid down), and the reference to the law and the lot shows that the regular unions only are here intended. It is strange that Plato should say 'if the lot so fall,' because it could not fall otherwise, possible brothers and sisters being the only persons eligible for these unions, as all other adults would be possible parents and children. As to the sanction of the oracle, we can hardly suppose that it was to be obtained separately for each particular couple after the lots had been cast, although the order of the clauses and the *πρός* in *προσαναιρηῆ* would render this the natural meaning. The oracle would have to sanction these unions once for all. But perhaps Plato had not fully seen in detail all the consequences of his own legislation, and meant the *ἐάν* κ.τ.λ. in its natural sense. We may notice that, if the oracle refused to sanction such unions, no unions at all could take place.

No doubt there are some difficulties in this interpretation of Plato's arrangements, but there can be no doubt as to the real meaning of the words in which brothers and sisters are defined, and Plato would seem not to have thought out all the consequences that would or might ensue.

462 A ἔχομεν οὖν τι μεῖζον κακὸν πόλει ἢ ἐκείνο ὃ ἂν κ.τ.λ. ;

ἔχομεν seems to need the addition of *εἰπεῖν*, as a few lines above *τί ποτε τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν* ;

ibid. C Ἐν ἧτινι δὴ πόλει πλεῖστοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταῦτα τοῦτο λέγουσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμὸν, αὕτη ἄριστα διοικεῖται ;

Read *ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ*, for the accusative is not Greek. Cf. 470 B : 493 C : 559 A.

463 D αὐταί σοι ἢ ἄλλαι φῆμαι . . . ὑμνήσουσιν εὐθὺς περὶ τὰ τῶν παίδων ὄτα ;

Can this intransitive use of *ὑμνωῖν* be right, or should we

read the usual βομβήσουσιν? Cf. 564 D *περὶ τὰ βήματα . . . βομβεῖ*, 573 A *περὶ αὐτὸν βομβοῦσαι αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμῖαι*, *Crito* 54 D *ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ ἢ ἡχῇ . . . βομβεῖ*.

464 D *διὰ τὸ <μηδένα> μηδὲν ἴδιον ἐκτῆσθαι?*

Cf. 416 D twice, 458 C, 543 B twice.

466 E *ἄξουσι . . . ἵνα . . . θεῶνται ταῦτα, ἃ τελεσθέντας δέησει δημιουργεῖν πρὸς δὲ τῇ θεᾷ διακονεῖν καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν πάντα τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον*.

I do not think the infinitives can be accounted for by anything understood, though they may possibly depend on *ἄξουσι*. Perhaps we should insert something like *διδάσκονται* before *διακονεῖν*.

469 A *διαπιθόμενοι ἄρα τοῦ θεοῦ, πῶς χρῆ τοὺς δαιμονίους τε καὶ θεῖους τιθέσθαι καὶ τίνι διαφόρῳ, οὕτω καὶ ταύτῃ θήσομεν ἢ ἂν ἐξηγήται;*

Read *<θήκη>* τίνι διαφόρῳ, comparing *Laws* 947 B *τελευτήσασι δὲ προθέσεις τε καὶ ἐκφορὰς καὶ θήκας διαφόρους εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν*.

470 B *φαίνεται μοι, ὥσπερ καὶ ὀνομάζεται δύο ταῦτα ὀνόματα, πόλεμός τε καὶ στάσις, οὕτω καὶ εἶναι δύο, ὄντα ἐπὶ δυοῖν τινῶν διαφοραῖν. λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο, τὸ μὲν οἰκείον καὶ ξυγγενές, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον καὶ ὀθνεῖον*.

It is clear, I think, that the words have got slightly out of their proper order and should run thus: *ὥσπερ καὶ ὀνομάζεται δύο ταῦτα ὀνόματα, πόλεμός τε καὶ στάσις, ὄντα ἐπὶ δυοῖν τινῶν διαφοραῖν, οὕτω καὶ εἶναι δύο*. [Or *ὄντα . . . διαφοραῖν* may follow *ὀνόματα*.] *ὄντα ἐπὶ* can only refer to names, not to things. Cf. *Phil.* 60 A B.

ibid. C *φημὶ γὰρ τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν γένος αὐτὸ αὐτῷ οἰκείον εἶναι καὶ συγγενές, τῷ δὲ βαρβαρικῷ ὀθνεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον*.

τὸ δὲ βαρβαρικόν? μὲν and δέ point to this.

471 C D In the very awkward sentence beginning with *ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε* I cannot but think *ὁμολογῶ*, or some similar word should be inserted after *ἢ γένοιτο*. Its omission might be due to the *λέγω* occurring almost immediately after.

472 D οἶε ἂν οὖν ἤπτόν τι ἀγαθὸν ζωγράφον εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

Read οἶε δὴ οὖν.

473 C ἐπ' αὐτὸ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶμι δ' τῷ μεγίστῳ προσεικάζομεν κύματι. εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωτί τε ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κύμα ἐκγελῶν καὶ ἀδοξία κατακλύσειν.

But Socrates does not go to the wave: it is the wave which approaches and threatens to deluge him. Cf. 472 A τὸ μέγιστον καὶ χαλεπώτατον τῆς τρικυμίας ἐπάγεις and *Theaet.* 163 C ὄρα δὴ καὶ τότε ἄλλο προσιόν, καὶ σκόπει πῆ αὐτὸ διωσόμεθα.

Read ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ . . . εἶμι δ' κ.τ.λ. For the error cf. note on 462 C above: for the construction cf. 490 D ἐπὶ τούτῳ νῦν γεγόναμεν, τί ποθ' οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί: 506 D μὴ . . . ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὦν ἀποστῆς: 532 B ἐπ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει: *Polit.* 274 B οὐ δὴ ἔνεκα ὁ λόγος ὠρμηκε πᾶς, ἐπ' αὐτῷ νῦν ἐσμὲν ἤδη: *Soph. O.T.* 1169 οἴμοι, πρὸς αὐτῷ γ' εἶμι τῷ δεινῷ λέγειν: and many other passages. Cf. Stallbaum on *Crat.* 422 A. (Burnet now reads αὐτῷ with his codex F.)

ἐκγελῶν also may fairly be regarded with great suspicion. The only parallel cited for such a use of the word is in reality no parallel at all. In *Eur. Tro.* 1176, when the remains of the young Astyanax are brought to Hecuba, she speaks of his curly head, ἔνθεν ἐκγελαῖ ὀστῶν ραγέντων φόνος, ἢ' αἰσχροῖα μὴ λέγω. But it is quite clear that ἐκγελαῖ there refers to the appearance of what Shakspeare calls 'bright hair dabbled in blood,' and not to any violent rush of blood now taking place. The time for any such rush of blood is supposed to have gone by. Ἐκγελαῖν there gives therefore no support to ἐκγελαῖν here, and it remains to be shown that ἐκγελαῖν could be used of a bursting wave. Observe further the great infelicity of combining in the same phrase γέλως in a literal and ἐκγελαῖν in a figurative sense: cf. p. 94 above.

In *Soph. Phil.* 1149–50 Jebb emended φνγᾶ μ' οὐκέτ' ἀπ' αὐλίων πελάτε by reading μηκέτι . . . πηδάτε, and it seems possible that we should in like manner read ἐκπηδῶν here (ΕΚΠΗΔΩΝ for ΕΚΓΕΛΩΝ). Compare such expressions as *Virg. Aen.* xi. 624 'alternò procurrrens gurgite pontus: *Ov. Fast.* iii. 591 'assiliunt fluctus': Tennyson's

Coming of Arthur 'the fringe | of that great breaker, sweeping up the strand, | *lash'd at* the wizard, as he spake the word.' For the corruption cf. also Schol. Ar. *Peace* 241, where R has ἀποπηδώντων for the right reading preserved in V ἀποτιλώντων.

ἐκπηδᾶν occurs 495 D: *Tim.* 68 A ἐκπηδῶντος πυρός: [*Ep.* 7] 341 C πηδήσαντος with v.l. πηλήσαντος.

ibid. D καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταῦτον ξυμπέση, δυνάμεις τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία. Surely τοῦτο should be ταῦτα.

474 E μελιχλῶρους δὲ καὶ τοῦνομα οἷε τινὸς ἄλλον ποίημα εἶναι ἢ ἔραστοῦ κ.τ.λ. Obviously μελιχλῶρον. Cf. *Plut. Mor.* 45 A, 56 D.

476 D οὐκοῦν τούτου μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς γιγνώσκοντος γνώμην ἂν ὀρθῶς φαίμεν εἶναι.

Since γνώμην does not appear to be used elsewhere in this way, and in 477 A, 478 c, and 480 A we find γνώσις, is it too much to think that γνώσιν must have been the original word here?

478 D ἔφαμεν . . . εἴ τι φανείη κ.τ.λ., τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταξὺ κείσθαι . . . καὶ . . . ἔσεσθαι.

The future ἔσεσθαι strongly suggests (cf. 490 D below), what we might suspect even without it, that ἂν should be inserted somewhere to go with κείσθαι: probably τὸ τοιοῦτον <ἂν>. ἔφαμεν refers definitely to 477 A where ἂν appears (ἂν κέοιτο).

479 A τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν ὃ οὐκ αἰσχροὺν φανήσεται;

ὃ οὐ κ<αὶ> αἰσχροὺν φανήσεται? καὶ is almost necessary to the sense, which is that both impressions will exist together. Without καὶ the αἰσχροὺν aspect alone would be given, for a thing might be καλόν without appearing so. καὶ, if once used, would not need to be repeated in the other cases following.

486 C ἢ προσδοκᾶς ποτέ τινά τι ἱκανῶς ἂν στέρξει ὃ πράττων ἂν ἀλγῶν τε πράττοι καὶ μόγις σμικρὸν ἀνύτων;

Is not the ἂν before ἀλγῶν a mistake, perhaps arising

from αλ? The meaning is probably not that he *would* suffer, *if* he were to do it, but that he habitually suffered when he did it.

488 A νόησον γὰρ τοιουτοῦ γεγόμενον εἴτε πολλῶν νεῶν περὶ εἴτε μιᾶς.

Read γιγνόμενον. The participles following in apposition to this are all in the present tense, and the situation is summed up in 488 E by the words τοιούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς ναῦς γιγνομένων. Cf. 572 D τίθει . . . γιγνόμενα. MSS. constantly vary between the two. The same correction should probably be made in 548 D and 574 E, and in 330 C I should prefer συγγίγνεσθαι.

ibid. C πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπαινοῦντας ναυτικὸν μὲν καλοῦντας καὶ κυβερνητικόν . . . ὃς ἂν ξυλλαμβάνειν δεινὸς ἦ . . . , τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ψέγοντας ὡς ἄχρηστον.

Cobet wished to omit ἐπαινοῦντας, but ψέγοντας supports it, and we might read μὲν ναυτικὸν instead of ναυτικὸν μέν. But μέν is sometimes put in somewhat irregular places: cf. 490 C πᾶς μὲν κ.τ.λ.

ibid. D τοῦ δὲ ἀληθινοῦ κυβερνήτου περὶ μηδ' ἐπαίοντας, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῆσθαι ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ὥρων κ.τ.λ. εἰ μέλλει τῷ ὄντι νεὼς ἀρχικὸς ἔσεσθαι, ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει εἰάν τε τινες βούλωνται εἰάν τε μή, μήτε τέχνην τούτου μήτε μελέτην οἰομένους δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν.

Almost all MSS. (including A) have the nominatives ἐπαίοντες and οἰόμενοι in spite of ψέγοντας in the previous line, but the accusatives must be accepted. H. Sidgwick pointed out (*Journal of Philology*, v. p. 274) that the sense of the latter part of this passage is extremely faulty. It attributes to the crew in general the true opinion, not at all natural to them, that a man can never learn the art of inducing or forcing other people to accept him as steersman at the same time that he learns the art of steering. [Of course the κυβερνήτης was more than a mere steersman: cf. 341 c.] This is a truth which they, who know nothing about the true steersman, would certainly not understand. Aristotle also (*Politics* 4. 2. 1324 b 30) statēs it, or something like it, probably with a recollection of this passage:

οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἢ πείσαι ἢ βιάσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους, τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτήρας. But the ignorant and self-confident sailors are the last people in the world to admit the principle, and 488 D (ὅς ἂν ξυλλαμβάνειν κ.τ.λ.) has in point of fact almost ascribed to them the opposite belief. It is however impossible to accede to Sidgwick's proposal to read οἰομένῳ for οἰομένους. The sentence would be most clumsy in form, nor is it to the point what the true steersman thinks. Plato is describing the state of mind of the crew (ἐπαινοῦντας, ψέγοντας, ἐπαίοντας, οἰομένους). The simple remedy for the corruption of the text is, I think, to read ἀδύνατον for δυνατόν. The crew deem it by no means as impossible as it really is that, while a man acquires κυβερνητική, he should at the same time acquire this other art, whether it is an art proper or only a knack got by practice. [Or do τέχνη and μελέτη mean the theoretical and practical parts of the art?] Grote's usual strong sense showed him (*Plato* 3. 80) that this was the meaning required, but he seems not to have seen that it could not be extracted from the Greek.

[I have left this note standing, because I should still maintain most of it. But I incline now to find a different remedy and to read ποιουμένῳ for οἰόμενοι (thus getting rid of the ungrammatical nominative), *that, if a man makes an art or practice of this, he cannot at the same time acquire also the art of controlling the vessel.* π is the more easily added, because the word before ends with ν, a letter apt to be confused with it. In *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* 9. 146. The Charito papyrus lines 48, 49 has ποιούμενος for οἰομενος. In *Phaedrus* 234 A the Bodleian MS. has the nominative γερόμενοι for the dative γενομένῳ. It is however very doubtful whether the infinitive δυνατόν εἶναι can depend on ἐπαίοντας and I should suppose it to follow on ἀνάγκη or rather perhaps on some general idea suggested by it, such as συμβαίνει.]

490 C ἡγουμένης δὲ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἂν ποτε, οἶμαι, φαίμεν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθήσαι.

Goodwin (*Moods and Tenses*, § 159) cites this as an example of a 'gnomic aorist' in the infinitive and so Jebb

on *Ajax* 1082. I think that we should read ἀκολουθήσειν, like the future tense μετέσται just preceding, and in the *Ajax* ποτ' ἄν. In 443 A δράσαι should probably be δράσειν.

ibid. If ἀναγκάζοντα is wrong, ἀνακαλοῦντα would be a plausible substitute. But probably no change is called for.

ibid. D ὅτι πᾶς μὲν ἀναγκασθήσεται ὁμολογεῖν οἷς λέγομεν, εἰσάσας δὲ τοὺς λόγους, εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀποβλέψας περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, φαίη ὁρᾶν κ.τ.λ.

It is strange that editors have acquiesced so long in φαίη after ἀναγκασθήσεται. The future tense would be enough in itself (cf. 478 D above) to show that Plato wrote φαίη <ἄν>: but, as a matter of fact, he is repeating the words of 487 C νῦν γὰρ φαίη ἄν τις . . . ὁρᾶν κ.τ.λ.

491 A τὸδε μὲν οὖν, οἶμαι, πᾶς ἡμῖν ὁμολογήσει, τοιαύτην ψυχὴν . . . ὀλιγάκις ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι καὶ ὀλίγας, ἣ οὐκ οἶει; Σφόδρα γε. Τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων σκόπει ὡς πολλοὶ ὄλεθροὶ καὶ μεγάλοι.

For the ungrammatical ὀλίγας read ὀλίγοις, comparing note on 425 B for the corruption of οἱ to α. ὀλίγοις is implied in τούτων τῶν ὀλίγων following. Cf. *Ar. Eth.* vii. 9. 1151 b 30 διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι φανεράν. Stephanus proposed ἐν ὀλίγοις here; if ἐν is necessary, as perhaps it is, we might read κἂν ὀλίγοις. καί and κἂν or κἂν are several times confused in the *Republic*.

492 C ἣ ποίαν ἂν αὐτῷ παιδείαν ἰδιωτικὴν ἀνθέξει (οἶει);

If ἂν is not a mere dittography, it may not improbably be a corruption of δὴ: see note on 472 D.

ibid. E οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται ἄλλοῖον ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ᾧ ἑταῖρε· θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου.

τὴν τούτων παιδείαν must be understood to limit the statement to present conditions, while οὔτοι and their education exist. Otherwise Socrates would be pronouncing his own scheme of a better education to produce a better character incapable of success.

Stallbaum translates παρά by 'juxta' (Davies and Vaughan 'in close contact with'), but παρά obviously would mean not this but 'besides,' or rather 'in contrariety to,' as in 529 c, etc. The sense 'because of' is inadmissible, as παρά τὴν τούτων παιδείαν must go with πεπαιδευμένον. For ἀλλοῖον suggestions of τέλειον and ἀξιόλογον have been made. Neither however is sufficient to make good sense of the passage. I strongly suspect that Plato wrote οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται ἀληθινὸν ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένον. For ἀληθινόν, which occurs often in this part of the *Republic*, e.g. 499 c, cf. *Critias* 121 B ἀληθινὸν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν βίον: *Meno* 100 A ἀληθὲς πρᾶγμα πρὸς ἀρετὴν: *Phaedo* 69 A ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν: and for the general sense *Laws* 696 A οὐ γὰρ μήποτε γένηται παῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς διαφέρων πρὸς ἀρετὴν.

493 D ὅτι μὲν γάρ . . . ἡ Διομήδεια λεγομένη ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν οὗτοι ἐπαινῶσιν.

There is nothing to explain ὅτι. Unless something has been accidentally omitted, we might read ἔστι μὲν γάρ, for ἔστί and ὅτι are sometimes confused.

494 D ἄρ' εὐπετὲς οἶε εἶναι εἰσακοῦσαι διὰ τοσούτων κακῶν; Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς. 'Ἐὰν δ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διὰ τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς τῶν λόγων εἰς αισθάνηταί (εἰσαιοσθάνηταί F) τέ πη καὶ κάμπτηται κ.τ.λ.

εἰς can hardly be right. Madvig εἴσω. Is it too rash to suggest εἰσακούων or εἰσακούσας? τις again would be more natural than εἰς, and these two words are sometimes confused.

ibid. E οὐ πᾶν μὲν ἔργον, πᾶν δ' ἔπος λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας.

There is no possible construction for the participles. Insert διατελεῖν before or after λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας.

495 D Perhaps we should insert εἰσίν after φύσεις (*i.e.* πολλοὶ εἰσίν *there are many*), where from similarity of letters it would easily be lost.

496 D οἶον ἐν χειμῶνι κοινοροῦ καὶ ζάλῃς ὑπὸ πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ τειχίον ἀποστάς.

Read ἐν χειμῶνι καὶ κοινορτοῦ ζάλη or ζάλη κοινορτοῦ. I doubt whether χειμῶν κοινορτοῦ is Greek, for δορὸς ἐν χειμῶνι (Soph. *Ant.* 670) is both poetical and different, and so too Callim. *Ep.* 47 χειμῶνας μεγάλων ἐξέφυγεν δανέων. The writers of the imitative passages given in Stallbaum's note evidently found the genitive governed by ζάλη in their texts.

498 A νῦν μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ καὶ ἀπτόμενοι (φιλοσοφίας) μειράκια ὄντα ἄρτι ἐκ παίδων τὸ μεταξὺ οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ πλησιάζουσιν αὐτοῦ τῷ χαλεπωτάτῳ ἀπαλλάττονται.

This can hardly mean 'in the intervals of business,' because that sense is certainly inappropriate here. μεταξὺ is however sometimes used in a peculiar way. Instead of a thing being between A and B, it is sometimes said to be between B, so that μεταξὺ practically means 'on this side of,' 'short of,' 'before reaching.' See Shilleto's note on Dem. *F.L.* 181, where several illustrative passages are quoted. So too with ἐν μέσῳ. Plato therefore seems to mean that youths just dabble in philosophy after emerging from boyhood and before they begin to manage property or conduct business, when in Malvolio's phrase 'it is with them in standing water between boy and man.'

ibid. B προϊούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἐν ἧ ἢ ψυχῇ τελειοῦσθαι ἄρχεται.

ἐν ἧ is probably a blunder for ἐν φ̄, corresponding to the ἐν φ̄ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδροῦται (τὰ σώματα, just preceding. 'Ἡ ἡλικία is here 'their years,' not any particular time of life. In 486 A ἧ and φ̄ are variants.

501 A ἀλλ' οὖν οἶσθ' ὅτι τούτῳ ἂν εἶθὺς τῶν ἄλλων διενέγκοιεν, τῷ μῆτε ιδιώτου μῆτε πόλεως ἐθελῆσαι ἂν ἄψασθαι μηδὲ γράφειν νόμους πρὶν ἢ παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν (πίνακα) ἢ αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαι.

Baiter μηδ' ἐγγράφειν νόμους after Cobet. It would perhaps be better to omit μηδέ . . . νόμους altogether, or at any rate νόμους, for the words involve a most awkward and inartistic confusion of the figure (painting) with the thing figured (legislation). Ἐγγράφειν, as far as I can see, only makes the matter worse by actually supposing laws to be put into the picture.

ibid. C ἕως ὅτι μάλιστα ἀνθρώπεια ἦθη εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται θεοφιλή ποιήσιν.

Instead of θεοφιλή we certainly expect some word meaning 'of divine kind' parallel to ἀνθρώπεια and like θεοειδής, θεοείκελος above. ἀνθρώπεια ἦθη may themselves be θεοφιλή and therefore there is no antithesis in the word. Badham conjectured θεοειδῆ here. I would suggest θεοφνῆ. The word is apparently not found, but ἀνθρωποφνῆς occurs. Cf. ὁμοφνῆς in 439 E.

ibid. E ἔτι οὖν ἀγριανούσι . . . ; Ἴσως, ἔφη, ἦττον. Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ ἦττον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ παντάπασι πράγους γεγονέναι . . . ;

I formerly proposed ἀγρίους for αὐτούς, but I think now that a slighter change will restore the proper form of the sentence. Read μηδ' ἦττον.

502 B After the clear distinction just drawn between γενέσθαι and σωθῆναι the words εἰς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος seem hardly enough. I suggested formerly γενόμενός <τε καὶ σῶς γενόμενος>. That or something like it, e.g. Adam's περιγεγόμενος (which he does not recommend), seems almost necessary.

ibid. C D λεκτέον τίνα τρόπον ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τίνων μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων οἱ σωτήρες ἐνέσονται τῆς πολιτείας.

Read ἐγγενήσονται or simply γενήσονται for ἐνέσονται. The question is not how they will live, but how they are to be obtained. In 521 C we have the parallel question, τίνα τρόπον οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐγγενήσονται. Cf. 552 E, 557 C, etc. In Thuc. 7. 21. 4 Vat. has περιγενησομένους against the περιεσομένους of other MSS.

503 B ὄκνος γάρ, ἔφην, ᾧ φίλε, ἐγώ, εἰπεῖν τὰ νῦν ἀποτετολμημένα.

The verb can hardly be omitted, when the time is past. Read ἔφην, <ἦν> or <ἦν>, ἔφην.

504 E ὃ μέντοι μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ περὶ ὃ τι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἶε τιν' ἂν σε, ἔφη, ἀφεῖναι μὴ ἐρωτήσαντα τί ἐστίν; Οὐδὲ πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐρώτα. πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἀκήκοας.

περὶ ὃ τι αὐτὸ λέγεις cannot be harmonized either with the ὃ preceding or with the τί ἐστίν which follows. I conjecture that σταντο is a corruption of τοιαῦτα: 'which you speak of as the greatest and as concerned with the greatest questions.' For τοιαῦτα = μέγιστα after μέγιστον μάθημα see the instances cited by Riddell in *Platonic Idioms* § 54 b, e.g. *Phaedo* 80 c ἐὰν μὲν τις χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ 'where τοιαύτη simply means χαριέσση', or *Rep.* 424 E. Τῶν μεγίστων occurs in our passage two lines above, and cf. 377 E τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων. For the corruption cf. 516 E, where A has ὄτι οὔτος wrongly for ὁ τοιοῦτος, and the note below on 592 B.

I conjecture further that for καὶ σὺ ἐρώτα we should read καὶ σὺ ἐρωτᾶς; Socrates feels or affects surprise that the question should come from Adeimantus, who has often heard about the μέγιστον μάθημα.

507 D ἐνούσης πον ἐν ὄμμασιν ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ, παρούσης δὲ χροίας ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεφυκός, οἶσθα ὅτι ἡ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄψεται τά τε χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα.

Commentators have been considerably puzzled by ἐν αὐτοῖς, but it ought to be abundantly clear that it cannot refer to the eyes. It can only refer to the δεύτερον γένος, external objects. Read ἐν αὐ τοῖς <ὄρατοῖς> or <αἰσθητοῖς>. The omission is due to homoeoteleuton. For the running of αὐ τοῖς into αὐτοῖς cf. 550 A, where Paris A has αὐτούς for αὐ τοῦς, *Politicus* 287 D, etc. The confusion is indeed very frequent. For the position of αὐ after the preposition compare 371 D τοῖς δὲ ἀντὶ αὐ ἀργυρίου διαλλάττειν: 577 B καὶ ἐν αὐ τοῖς δημοσίοις κινδύνοις, etc.

509 D In support of ἄνισα τμήματα it may be added that τετμημένην ἀν' ἴσα τμήματα involves a doubtful use of ἀνά, whereas the simple accusative after τέμνω is idiomatic.

510 B τὸ δ' αὖ ἕτερον τὸ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν κ.τ.λ. The second τό, sometimes bracketed, may stand for τι. The two words get interchanged sometimes. For the article and τις together cf. *Phileb.* 13 C τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινὰς ἀγαθὰς, τὰς δὲ

τινας ἐτέρας αὐτῶν κακὰς: Soph. *O.C.* 288 ὅταν δ' ὁ κύριος παρῆ τις and *O.T.* 107 τοὺς αὐτοέντας . . . τιμωρεῖν τινας.

511 A εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσι καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκείνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις.

There is so much difficulty in ἐκείνοις that I venture to suggest the possibility of its having accidentally changed places with αὐτοῖς.

515 B εἰ οὖν διαλέγεσθαι οἰοίτ' εἶεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐκ αὐτὰ ἡγεί ἂν τὰ παριόντα αὐτοὺς νομίζειν [ὀνομάζειν] ἅπερ ὀρῶεν;

So Baiter, adopting Madvig's οὐκ αὐτὰ and Ast's παριόντα for the οὐ ταῦτά and παρόντα of MSS., and bracketing ὀνομάζειν with Cobet. Perhaps it would be better to read νομίζειν <καὶ> ὀνομάζειν. Cf. 443 E ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἡγούμενον καὶ ὀνομάζοντα δικαίαν μὲν καὶ καλὴν πράξιν ἢ ἂν κ.τ.λ. The use of ἅπερ seems to me much in favour of ταῦτά, to which it is so often correlative.

ibid. D εἴ τις αὐτῷ λέγοι ὅτι τότε μὲν ἑώρα φλναρίας, νῦν δὲ μᾶλλον τι ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸς μᾶλλον ὄντα τετραμμένος ὀρθότερα βλέποι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν παριόντων δεικνὺς αὐτῷ ἀναγκάζοι ἐρωτῶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἔστιν.

Read ἐγγυτέρω <ῶν>, as in 330 E ὥσπερ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὦν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλον τι καθορᾶ αὐτά. Baiter prints βλέποι, but βλέπει is almost certainly right. Schneider, when he defends βλέποι by the ἀποθάνοι in *Phaedo* 57 B, fails to notice that the optative there refers to past time. The right mood here is preserved in ὅ τι ἔστιν.

516 D For ὅτιοῦν ἂν πεπονθέναι read ὅτιοῦν δὴ πεπονθέναι, unless something like δέξασθαι (as in the rejoinder) should be added. It depends on βούλεσθαι and is not the same as the ἂν πεπονθέναι preceding.

517 C Read <ῆ> αὐτῇ κυρία.

518 E The other excellences of the soul are adventitious: ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι παντὸς μᾶλλον θειοτέρου τινὸς ὡς ἔοικε

τυγχάνει οὐσα, ὃ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς χρήσιμον καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἄχρηστον αὐτὴ καὶ βλαβερὸν γίγνεται.

In a clause containing a comparative adjective or adverb (here *θειοτέρου*) παντὸς μᾶλλον can hardly have a place. (In 595 A it goes with οὐ παραδεκτέα, while ἐναργέστερον belongs to φαίνεται.) Its proper use is illustrated by such passages as 520 E παντὸς μὴν μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν ἕκαστος εἶσι τὸ ἄρχειν, or 595 A, where it occurs twice. Itself a comparative expression, it cannot be combined with another comparative without great awkwardness. In 595 A the words are much more distinct. Madvig, raising other objections, proposed πλάσματος or ὑφάσματος μᾶλλον θειοτέρου. I would rather suggest that παντός is a corruption of ὄργανου (ΓΑΝτος of οργΑΝου). Not many lines above (518 c) we have τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἐκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος . . . περιεκτέον εἶναι: cf. the περιαγωγή here. So (527 d) in the mathematical sciences ἐκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεται τε καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται . . . κρείττον ὄν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὄμματων. Cf. further 508 B τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὄργανον: 582 D ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ δι' οὗ γε δεῖ ὄργαίον κρίνεσθαι, οὐ τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς τοῦτο ὄργανον οὐδὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου ἀλλὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου: *Theaet.* 184 D and following pages: *Phaedrus* 250 B. I read therefore ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι ὄργανον μᾶλλον θειοτέρου κ.τ.λ. For μᾶλλον added to a comparative see Ast's *Lexicon* or Riddell's *Digest* § 166 c.

520 D τὴν δ' ἐναντίους ἄρχοντας σχοῦσαν (πόλιν) ἐναντίως.

Probably ἔχουσαν, altered under the influence of σ preceding.

522 A μουσικὴ ὄσσην τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν.

μουσικῆς? Cf. 595 A τὸ μηδαμῇ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὄση μιμητικῆ.

524 C μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα.

Should we not transpose and read μέγα μὴν καὶ σμικρὸν καὶ ὄψις ἑώρα?

527 DE As to the latter part of the argument Adam remarks that 'the logical sequence is somewhat difficult.' As the text stands, it seems to be not merely difficult, but desperate. Everything however will come right, if we may assume that two sentences have got transposed. ἄλλην γάρ . . . ὠφελίαν should follow immediately upon οἷς μὲν οὖν . . . δόξεις λέγειν and precede ὅσοι δέ . . . οὐδέν. The meaning of ἄλλην then becomes clear. Certainly δόξεις λέγειν must be connected with μὴ δοκῆς κ.τ.λ., i.e. with the requirement of astronomy, not with the very beginning of D, in which this requirement is rested upon wrong grounds. The grounds would not be known and δόξεις λέγειν cannot properly apply to them.

528 C ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολουόμενα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητούντων λόγον οὐκ ἔχόντων καθ' ὅτι χρῆσιμα, ὅμως . . . αὐξάνεται.

It is impossible for ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητούντων to depend on the participles as the words stand, and they have therefore been altered in various ways, for which see Adam's appendix. I may suggest that καὶ κολουόμενα should perhaps be placed after χρῆσιμα or after ζητούντων.

The stress laid in the context on the action of a πόλις in the matter suggests τῶν πόλεων for τῶν πολλῶν, but of course τῶν πολλῶν may be right.

ibid. E Should not ὑπαρχούσης be ὑπαρξούσης? It refers to the future. Cf. 541 A below.

529 C κἂν ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῆ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ μανθάνῃ.

Most MSS. seem to have νέων (with ναίων and νεῶν as variants), but A and one or two others have μέν, while μὴν and μὴ are also found (Schneider). Pollux vii. 138 has νεῖν δ' ἐξ ὑπτίας μάθημα κολουμβητῶν εἶρηκεν Ἀριστοφάνης καὶ Πλάτων, which seems at first sight to show that he found νέων in his text, but perhaps this is not certain. ἐξ ὑπτίας and ἐν θαλάττῃ would justify his citation. Madvig proposes to read ἢ (κἂν ἐξ ὑπτίας ἢ ἐν γῆ) and Baiter follows him. The conflicting readings of the MSS. might be to some extent reconciled, if we were to read ἐξ ὑπτίας θεώμενος, a word which would be very much to the

purpose here, as the long sentence began with *κινδυνεύεις γὰρ εἴ τις ἐν ὀροφῇ ποικίλματα θεώμενος κ.τ.λ.* and *ἐξ ὑπτίας* is certainly the better for going with a participle. I have also thought of *κείμενος*, and Ficinis actually has *iacens*.¹ In D. Hal. A.R. 9. 3. 1 *μενον* is all that remains in one MS. of *κεχαρισμένον*, and so *μέν* may be the remains of a participle here.

ibid. (δεῖ) ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, ἐπεὶπερ ἐν ὀρατῷ πεποικίλται, κάλλιστα μὲν ἡγείσθαι καὶ ἀκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεῖν, ἄς τὸ ὄν τάχος καὶ ἢ οὐσα βραδυτῆς ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχήμασι φοράς τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόητα φέρει· ἃ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοίᾳ ληπτὰ, ὅψει δ' οὐ.

With τῶν ἀληθινῶν we must of course understand *ποικιλμάτων*. These *ποικίλματα* are contrasted with the visible *ποικίλματα* of the sky, and to the former ἃ δὴ λόγῳ κ.τ.λ. refers. There is however no construction left in the sentence for ἄς . . . φοράς . . . φέρεται κ.τ.λ. Moreover, as Ast pointed out, it is strange to speak of swiftness and slowness as themselves moving or being carried along (*φέρεται*) and still more so to speak of them as carrying their contents (τὰ ἐνόητα) with them. What contents has swiftness? The subject of the verbs *φέρεται* and *φέρει*, as of *ληπτὰ* (ἔστιν), should be τὰ ἀληθινὰ ποικίλματα. To obtain this sense Ast proposed to read ὦν τὸ ὄν τάχος καὶ ἢ οὐσα βραδυτῆς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ . . . φέρεται καὶ . . . φέρει, thus changing ἄς to ὦν and inserting καὶ before ἐν τῷ, 'of which absolute swiftness and slowness are the properties, and which move etc.' I believe this to be in essence right, and have only to suggest that instead of ὦν we might read οἷς, which is nearer to the ἄς of the MSS. (cf. 425 A, where I have suggested οἷς πρέπει for ἄς πρέπει, and 491 A where ὀλίγοις is necessary for ὀλίγας), and perhaps ἔν τε τῷ, not καὶ ἐν τῷ.)

¹ Mr. Marindin, pointing out that Pollux may also be thinking of *Phaedrus* 264 A *ἐξ ὑπτίας ἀνάπαλιν διανεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον*, suggested to me that Plato wrote here *κἂν ἐξυπτιασμένος ἐν γῆ*, and perhaps his suggestion is better than my own. Cf. Lucian's use of *ἐξυπτιάζων*.

ibid. Ε ἠγήσαιο γὰρ ἄν . . . κάλλιστα μὲν ἔχειν ἀπεργασία, γελοῖον μὴν ἐπισκοπεῖν ταῦτα σπουδῇ κ.τ.λ.

It looks as though an εἶναι were omitted before or after ἐπισκοπεῖν.

530 Β οὐκ ἄτοπον ἠγήσεται τὸν νομίζοντα γίγνεσθαι τε ταῦτα ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδὲν παραλλάττειν, σῶμά τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὀρώμενα, καὶ ζητεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν;

For ζητεῖν, which can hardly be right, Madvig suggests ζητήσῃ (which seems to me to give a wrong sense, for αὐτῶν must refer to ταῦτα) or ζητεῖν δεῖν (which gives an awkward number of infinitives). Read rather ζητοῦντα. Cf. note on 383 A.

532 Ε αὐτῆς for αὐ before ὁδοί? A common confusion.

533 C οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτη πορεύεται τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἵνα βεβαιώσῃται, καὶ κ.τ.λ.

For ἀναιροῦσα read ἀνάγουσα, which had occurred to me before I found that Canter proposed it long ago, and that it has some authority from Stobaeus. 'Αναιροῦσα could only mean 'doing away with,' and 'doing away with (provisionally) in order to establish (again ultimately),' is a very unlikely meaning. 'Αναίρουσα of course suggests itself, but ἀναίρειν is unknown to Plato and extremely rare. Read therefore τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀνάγουσα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν. We have ἀνάγειν again a couple of lines further on (ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω), and for its use in connexion with ἀρχή cf. *Laws* 626 D τὸν λόγον ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ὀρθῶς ἀναγαγόν and many uses of the word in Aristotle. Not quite the same, but similar, seems its sense above in 529 A ὡς μὲν νῦν αὐτὴν μεταχειρίζονται οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες, where it certainly does not mean 'those who embark upon philosophy,' but makes an antithesis with the κάτω βλέπειν following.

ibid. Ε An ordinary ἐπιστήμη (says Socrates) may perhaps be better called διάνοια. "Ἔστι δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς

τὴν ἕξιν σαφηνεία λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ. (A has λέγεις written above λέγει as an old correction.) Ἄρέσκει γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.

Baiter after Madvig writes λέγ', εἰ ἐν ψυχῇ and translates *sed quod modo declaret ad rem tenendam perspicuitate, dic, si intra animum tibi versatur*. See his *Adnotatio Critica* for some other suggested readings, only one of which I will quote here, because it is the only one which gives anything like a satisfactory sense. Bywater proposes ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ τὴν ἕξιν, πῶς ἔχει σαφηνείας ἃ λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ, in which τὴν ἕξιν and ἃ λέγεις do not seem to go very well together. I should rather suggest ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πῶς αὐτὴν ἔχειν σαφηνείας λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ, 'whatever will just show what degree of clearness in the mind you think it (the ἐπιστήμη or διάνοια, already referred to in the text three lines above as αὐτήν) possesses.' I also concur in the view that ἀρέσκει should probably be ἀρκέσει and be read twice over, for I cannot see how properly to construct ὃ ἂν κ.τ.λ. with οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις. The passage will then run thus: ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πῶς αὐτὴν ἔχειν σαφηνείας λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ ἀρκέσει. Ἄρκέσει (or perhaps we might here keep Ἄρέσκει) γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ. A possible alternative for πῶς αὐτὴν ἔχειν is πῶς ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν, thus keeping the τὴν ἕξιν of the MSS. For the question with λέγεις, as I suppose it to be put, cf. 562 B Ἄρ' οὖν καί, ὃ δημοκρατία ὀρίζεται ἀγαθόν, ἢ τούτου ἀπληστία καὶ ταύτην καταλύει; Λέγεις δ' αὐτὴν τί ὀρίζεσθαι; Τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, εἶπον.

535 A τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκείνας τὰς φύσεις οἶον δεῖν ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι.

It is surprising that δεῖν has been so long allowed to stand side by side with ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι. Unless it is a corruption of something else, e.g. ἀεὶ or δῆ, it must be removed altogether.

536 A καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην <οὖν>, ἦν δ' ἐγώ κ.τ.λ. ?

538 A εἴ τις τραφεῖη κ.τ.λ., τοῦτον ἔχεις μαντεύσασθαι, πῶς ἂν διατεθείη . . . ἐν ἐκείνῳ τε τῷ χρόνῳ, ᾧ οὐκ ἤδει τὰ περὶ τῆς ὑποβολῆς, καὶ ἐν ᾧ αὐτὸ ἤδει;

Can the pluperfect indicative ἤδει stand in such a sentence? I think it should be εἰδείη, and we have that form in the parallel clause of the sentence following, ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὴ εἰδείη. Cf. note on 515 D.

541 A ἀ καὶ οἱ γονεῖς ἔχουσι.

The verb here, like the participle in 528 E above, refers to the future. It should therefore be ἔξουσι.

543 B οὐδὲν οὐδένα ῥόμεθα δεῖν κεκτηῖσθαι ὧν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι.

With οἱ ἄλλοι cf. 419 A οἶον ἄλλοι (οἱ ἄλλοι conj.) ἀγρούς τε κεκτημένοι κ.τ.λ. and 420 A οὐδὲ μισθὸν πρὸς τοῖς σιτίοις λαμβάνοντες ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. In all three passages the meaning is (I think) the same: not other men in general, nor other men in the Platonic state, but others like themselves, that is rulers and guardians in their respective communities. τῶν ἄλλων in C here is different.

544 C δευτέρα <ἦ> καὶ δευτέρως ἐπαινουμένη?

All parallel words in the passage have an article. Hermann substituted ἦ for καί.

546 A οὐ μόνον φυτοῖς ἐγγείοις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζῴοις φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωματῶν γίνονται, . . . γένους δὲ ὑμετέρου εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἀφορίας, καίπερ ὄντες σοφοί, οὓς ἡγεμόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λογισμῷ μετ' αἰσθήσεως τεύξονται, ἀλλὰ πάρεσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ γεννήσουσι παῖδάς ποτε οὐ δέον.

In spite of the φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία preceding I am inclined to think that we should read εὐφορίας for ἀφορίας, the occurrence of ἀφορία before accounting for the error. τεύξονται naturally, though perhaps not necessarily, refers to the right time only, and πάρεσιν can only have the right time, not the wrong, for its subject. So in Arist. *Eth. Nicom.* vi. 10. 1142 b 34 εὐσυνεσία seems right for ἀσυνεσία. Indeed the confusion of α and εῦ is a recognised cause of error in MSS., e.g. εὐπαιδευσίαν and ἀπαιδευσίαν in 560 E. For τε καί coupling synonyms cf. 571 C λελυμένον τε καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένον: 575 B ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ: etc. Perhaps ἐν should be added before φυτοῖς or omitted before ἐπιγείοις.

ibid. C ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικὸς τοιούτου κύριος.

Would not τοσούτου be more appropriate?

547 B It is odd that Plato should use the historical tenses εἰλκέτην, ἠγέτην, ὠμολόγησαν among so many futures preceding and following. No doubt the reason is that for a moment his thoughts revert to the Homeric prayer which they put up to the Muses (545 D E) to tell them ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον στάσις ἔμπεσε. But there is some awkwardness in it.

ibid. E τῷ δέ γε φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγειν, ἄτε οὐκέτι κεκτημένη ἀπλοῦς τε καὶ ἀτενεῖς τοὺς τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μικτούς, ἐπὶ δὲ θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ ἀπλουστέρους ἀποκλίνειν, τοὺς πρὸς πόλεμον μᾶλλον ὑπεφυκότας ἢ πρὸς εἰρήνην, κ.τ.λ.

ἀπλουστέρους is manifestly wrong, and no doubt due to ἀπλοῦς preceding, but none of the suggested words is satisfactory. Stallbaum's πολλαπλουστέρους, though *prima facie* plausible from its antithesis to the ἀπλοῦς preceding, is not really suitable. Madvig's ἀνουστέρους does not strike me as good. I had at first thought of ἀγριωτέρους, as ἄγριος is a word which Plato uses in this connexion (cf. 410 D : 411 E : 486 B) and we have τιμῶντες ἀγρίως ὑπὸ σκότου χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον a few lines below. I believe however that Plato really wrote ἀμουσοτέρους. In 548 E the individual character corresponding to the timocratic state is called ὑποαμουσότερον. Cf. λόγου μουσικῆ κεκραμένου in 549 B and τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης (or μουσικῆς) in 548 B. Add 546 D ἀμουσότεροι γενήσονται ὑμῖν οἱ νέοι : 411 D μισόλογος . . . καὶ ἄμουσος.

ibid. τό, not τῷ, δέ γε? The case should be the same as that of τὰ πολλά. τῷ has been repeated here from D.

548 D Read probably πῶς τε γιγνόμενος for πῶς τε γενόμενος.

549 C ὅταν πρῶτον μὲν τῆς μητρὸς ἀκούη ἀχθομένης, ὅτι οὐ τῶν ἀρχόντων αὐτῇ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἔστι, καὶ ἐλαττουμένης διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις γυναιξίν, ἔπειτα ὁρώσης μὴ σφόδρα περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζοντα μηδὲ μαχόμενον καὶ λοιδορούμενον ἰδίᾳ τε ἐν

δικαστηρίοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ῥαθύμως πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα φέροντα, καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα ἀεὶ αἰσθάνηται, ἑαυτὴν δὲ μήτε πᾶνυ τιμῶντα μήτε ἀτιμάζοντα, ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων ἀχθομένης τε καὶ λεγούσης ὡς κ.τ.λ.

One is unwilling to believe that such a sentence proceeded from the careful pen of Plato. *Αἰσθάνηται* ought in grammar to be *αἰσθανομένης*. But I feel little doubt that we should read *κᾶν*, or *καὶ ἑάν*, *ἑαυτῷ*, either being an easy change. Cf. E. Observe that the construction is not *ἀκούη . . . ἑάν*: but first *ὅτι . . .*, then *ἐλαττουμένης* and *ὀρώσης*, and lastly *ἄν* or *ἑάν . . .* are attached to *ἀχθομένης* (presently repeated with *ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων*) to give the reasons for her annoyance. I think however that *καί* before *ἐλαττουμένης* should be *ὡς* (cf. *Index*), for this explains how she is affected by her husband's not being a public man.

550 E οὐχ οὕτω πλούτου ἀρετὴν διέστηκεν, ὥσπερ ἐν πλάστιγγι ζυγοῦ κειμένου ἑκατέρου, ἀεὶ τοῦναντίον ῥέποντε;

Madvig *κείμενον ἑκάτερον*. Read rather *κειμένω ἑκατέρω* (547 B *εἰλέκτην ἑκατέρω*), constructed as though the words before were *πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετὴν διεστᾶσι* or *διεστήκατον*.

551 C *πονηράν, ἧ δ' ὅς, τὴν ναυτιλίαν αὐτοὺς ναυτίλλεσθαι*.

For *ἧ δ' ὅς* Ast suggests *εἰκός*, which I had thought of independently. It might be either substituted or added. *πονηράν ἀνάγκη, ἧ δ' ὅς* is also possible.

ibid. D *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε καλόν, τὸ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι ἴσως πόλεμόν τινα πολεμεῖν*. *ἴσως* (given by A and some other MSS., but not found in all) is feeble. Baiter after Badham *σῶς*: but we need an adverb. A very suitable word would be *ισχυρῶς*. Cf. Thuc. i. 69, 6 *ισχυρῶς ἐγκείσονται*, and *μάχη ἰσχυρά* *ibid.* 7. 72. 1: Herod. 5. 119. 1: 9. 62: Thuc. i. 49. 2 *ἦν ἡ ναυμαχία καρτερά*. Plutarch has once or twice the opposite expression *ἀργῶς ἀμύνεσθαι*. *ικανῶς* is also likely enough: in *Euthyphro* 14 C *ἴσως* is given for *ικανῶς* by T, and so by Theo in *Epinomis* 977 E.

552 E οὓς ἐπιμελεία βία κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί.

Cf. 359 C νόμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται.

554 B εὖ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ· τόδε δὲ σκόπει.

εὖ is not at all appropriate ; also we should expect εὖ γε. Read εἶεν, which is quite in place and often followed by δέ. ἣν may be responsible for the loss of εν.

ibid. Ε ὁμονοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἡρμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ κ.τ.λ.

τῆς is hardly possible with the adjective preceding (the participle of course would not matter). Should it not be omitted ?

556 C οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι ὅταν παραβάλλωσιν ἀλλήλοισι οἱ τε ἄρχοντες καὶ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι ἢ ἐν ὁδῶν πορείαις ἢ ἐν ἄλλαις τισὶ κοινωνίαις, ἢ κατὰ θεωρίας ἢ κατὰ στρατείας, ἢ ξύμπλοι γιγνόμενοι ἢ ξυστρατιῶται, ἢ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινδύνοις ἀλλήλους θεώμενοι μηδαμῇ καταφρονῶνται οἱ πένητες ὑπὸ τῶν πλουσίων, κ.τ.λ.

We notice two curious things in this passage. There is the anacoluthon by which ἀλλήλους θεώμενοι, referring to both parties, is immediately followed by a verb which has only one of them for its subject, and there is the very faulty balance of meaning in the clauses 'when they meet one another on various occasions or in actual battle the poor are not condemned by the rich, then—.' We should expect ἢ θεώμενοι like the other participles to go with παραβάλλωσιν, and μηδαμῇ καταφρονῶνται to be attached in some other way. Both difficulties may be removed at a stroke by adding (say) καί before μηδαμῇ, 'when they see one another this way or that way or in actual battle, and when the poor etc., then —.'

A long time ago I suggested the change of θεώμενοι to θεωμένων, which might have been accommodated to the other participles ; but, while removing the first difficulty, this would leave the second. The words may possibly be right as they stand, but their extreme awkwardness, more than their want of regular construction, is much against them.

557 C κινδυνεύει καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι ὥσπερ

ἰμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλμένον, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἦθεσι πεποικιλμένη καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο.

‘ποικίλον = *many-coloured* is cancelled by Herwerden and J. J. Hartman.’ Adam defends it as ‘thoroughly harmonizing with Plato’s characteristic fullness of style’ and as found in every MS. Is it not a corruption of *που καλόν*? ὥσπερ ἰμάτιόν που καλόν . . . , οὕτω καὶ αὕτη . . . καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο.

ibid. Ε τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἄρχειν . . . , μηδ’ ἂν ἦς ἱκανὸς ἄρχειν, μηδ’ αὖ ἄρχεσθαι . . . , μηδὲ πολεμεῖν . . . , μηδ’ εἰρήνην ἄγειν . . . , μηδ’ αὖ, ἐάν τις ἄρχειν νόμος σε διακωλύῃ ἢ δικάζειν, μηδὲν ἦττον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν, ἐὰν αὐτῷ σοι ἐπίη, ἄρ’ οὐ θεσπεσία . . . ἢ τοιαύτη διαγωγῆ;

It is plain that the latter part of this from *μηδ’ αὖ ἐάν* onwards is really made unmeaning by dependence upon *μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην*. What we want negatived is not compulsion to rule, but exclusion. It seems impossible to supply this idea as the sentence stands, and therefore I cannot but think something lost, probably between *αὖ* and *ἐάν*. If we were to insert there something like *ἀδυναμίαν*, parallel and antithetic to *ἀνάγκην*, we should get a clear sense. It may be noticed that *αὖ* and *ἐάν* have some considerable resemblance in letters to *ἀδυναμίαν*, and it is used in 359 B and 532 B, but I do not wish to insist on the particular word.

558 A τί δέ; ἢ πρῶτης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή; ἢ οὐπω εἶδες ἐν τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς οὐδὲν ἦττον αὐτῶν μερόντων τε καὶ ἀναστρεφόμενων ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ ὡς οὔτε φροντίζοντος οὔτε ὀρώντος οὐδενὸς περιουστὲι ὥσπερ ἦρος; καὶ πολλοὺς γ’, ἔφη.

(1) It is inconceivable that Plato can here be attributing *πρῶτης* to the men condemned: it must certainly be ἡ εἰωθυῖα τοῦ δήμου *πρῶτης* ([Ar.] Ἀθ. Πολ. 22. 4 with many passages of Demosthenes, e.g. 19. 104: cf. *Euthyd.* 303 D, *Menex.* 244 E), which suits here admirably and is confirmed, if confirmation were needed, by *συγγνώμη αὐτῆς* (i.e. *τῆς πολιτείας*) immediately following. How then are we to take *ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων*? It is improbable that the

genitive means 'towards some condemned men,' and therefore we seem obliged either to read *δικασάντων* (as by a rather smaller correction *ἀπολέσαι* has long been read for *ἀπολέσθαι* in Lysias 19: 54) or to add (say) *περί* to govern the genitive case. It is not certain that a personal passive of *δικάζω* is legitimate, but Lysias 21. 18 *οὐδ' αἰσχροῦς δίκας δεδίκασμαι* certainly looks like it. The passive of a judgment given occurs in 614 c and d.

(2) There is a similar question about *καταψηφισθέντων*, whether the participle can be a personal passive. No precise parallel is cited, but Eur. *Heracl.* 141 *ἐψηφισμένους θανεῖν* supports it. Cf. *οἱ κατηγορούμενοι* Andoc. 1. 7. The genitives *θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς* would be a further difficulty, and Adam suggests accusatives. An alternative would be to take *θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς* as the subjects of *καταψηφισθέντων*, a plural verb being sometimes used of two or more singular subjects with the disjunctive *ἢ* or *οὐδέ* between them. Of this there are many instances (e.g. *Laws* 796 A and 838 A), but I know only one, and that in the dubious decree Dem. 18. 74, where the plural verb precedes its subjects. This may however be an accident. Madvig read *καταψηφισθέντος*, and it is possible that the termination was assimilated by mistake to that of *ἀνθρώπων*. But I think it means *condemned to death*, the genitive being like that in *κρίνειν* or *διώκειν θανάτου*.

(3) There remains the great difficulty of the sentence as a whole. It can perhaps just be understood: 'have you never seen (*i.e.* the case), when men have been sentenced to death and exile, when they remain in the city and show themselves, and a man goes about as though no one minded or saw him?' On this view *εἶδες* would be constructed loosely with the genitive absolute *αὐτῶν μεόντων* much as *μέμνημαι, οἶδα, ἀκούω (ὄρω?)* are sometimes followed not by a case but by a clause with *ὅτε* ('I remember when he said so and so'). But this is unlikely in itself, especially after another genitive absolute, and the addition here of an independent clause with *καί* makes the whole sentence very unusually irregular. The *καί* is bracketed by Weil and Burnet, so that *ὥς* becomes (I suppose) *how*, *i.e.* *have you never seen in these cases how?* This gets rid of the difficulty of *αὐτῶν μεόντων* and its relation to *εἶδες*, but

can hardly be right. It is true that nobody minds; it is not true that nobody sees, and therefore we want *ὡς* with *ὀρῶντος οὐδενός* to mean *as though* or *assuming* that nobody sees, unless *ὀρῶντος οὐδενός* is to be taken as a rhetorical expression. If the sentence as a whole is wrong, which seems most likely, some words may have been lost after *ἐν μέσῳ*, e.g. 'have you never seen, when all this happens, how nobody troubles about acting on the judgment and the man goes about unconcerned?' In any case there is no difficulty about the change of number from *αὐτῶν* to *περισσοτεῖ ὥσπερ ἤρως*, for the variation is common enough, e.g. *τοῖς τυράννοις* and *ἐκείνου* in 578 D.

559 B ἡ μὲν γέ που τοῦ σίτου (ἐπιθυμία) κατ' ἀμφοτέρα ἀναγκαία, ἧ̄ τε ὠφέλιμος ἧ̄ τε παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή (codex Mon. μὴ παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή, q and Flor. Ὑ παῦσαι μὴ δυνατή (Adam), Hermann παῦσαι οὐ δυνατή).

Adam thinks *μὴ* impossible here, but it may be defended on whatever principle we defend *Laws* 733 B πάντα ἐστὶ . . . διαφέροντά τε καὶ μηδὲν διαφέροντα, Thuc. 1. 118. 2 οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι . . . ὄντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς ἰέναι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους, probably as generic, *such as cannot*. Although the theory of the words (without the negative), *capable of causing death*, is quite tenable, the usual one (with the negative), *not possible for a man to stop while he lives*, seems more probable in the context, *παῦσαι* corresponding closely to *ἀποτρέψαι* and *δυνατὴ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι*. But the accusative *ζῶντα* can hardly be defended in this construction and, if we adhere to it, *ζῶντι* should almost certainly be read. Cf. Xen. *Ἰν.* 4. 1. 24 αὐτὸς δ' ἔφη ἠγγήσεσθαι δυνατὴν καὶ ὑποζυγίοις πορεύεσθαι ὁδόν.

561 E παντάπασιν, ἧ̄ δ' ὅς, διελέλυθας βίον ἰσονομικοῦ τινος ἀνδρός. Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἧ̄ν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ παντοδαπὸν τε καὶ πλείστων ἡθῶν μεστόν, καὶ τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ ποικίλον ὥσπερ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι.

Thompson proposed τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ποικίλων: a more certain correction in my eyes is παντοδαποῦ τε καὶ πλείστων ἡθῶν μεστοῦ. Surely the words are parallel to ἰσονομικοῦ. Cf. 398 A ἄνδρα δυνάμενον ὑπὸ σοφίας παντοδαπὸν γίγνεσθαι.

562 A φέρε δὴ, τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος, ὃ φίλε ἑταῖρε, γίγνεται; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας μεταβάλλει σχεδὸν δῆλον. Δῆλον. Ἄρ' οὖν τρόπον τινὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκ τε ὀλιγαρχίας δημοκρατία γίγνεται καὶ ἐκ δημοκρατίας τυραννίς;

τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος γίγνεται cannot give that meaning of 'how does tyranny come into being?' which the words following show to be required. Cf. 563 E αὕτη μὲν τοίνυν . . . ἢ ἀρχή . . . ὅθεν ἢ τυραννίς φύεται: 565 D τίς ἀρχή οὖν μεταβολῆς κ.τ.λ. Probably Plato wrote here ἀρχή or some equivalent word and a copyist substituted τρόπος under the influence of τρόπον τινά following. Or there may have been a double genitive, τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος <καταστάσεως>. Cf. 557 A.

567 E Perhaps all in one sentence τί δέ; αὐτόθεν ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐθελήσειέν πως τοὺς δούλους ἀφελόμενος κ.τ.λ.;

569 A γνώσεται γε τότ' ἤδη ὁ δῆμος οἶος οἶον θρέμμα γεννῶν ἡσπάζετό τε καὶ ἠῤῥξεν.

Can οἶος stand alone without ὦν? It is quite unusual, but here and in *Symp.* 195 A λόγω διελθεῖν οἶος οἶων αἴτιος ὦν τυγχάνει περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ἦ I think Plato omitted ὦν because of the awkwardness of using it along with a second participle, that participle being in the *Symp.* another ὦν.

572 E Should not παραβοηθοῦντας be ἀντιπαραβοηθοῦντας, like ἀντικαταστήσωμεν in 591 A? παρα cannot very well suggest the opposition, and παραβοηθῶ is habitually used in the sense of *bringing aid* simply.

573 B ἐπιθυμίας λάβῃ ποιουμένας χρηστὰς καὶ ἔτι ἐπαισχυνομένας.

The difficulty about ποιούμενος *thought, reputed*, in this and three other passages (498 A, 538 C, 574 D) of the *Republic* is at least threefold: (1) the use of ποιῶμαι for *I deem*, etc. is decidedly restricted and we should be rather surprised to find ποιῶμαί τι χρηστόν in such a sense, though quite prepared to accept it: (2) ποιῶμαι passive does not appear to be found in this sense anywhere but in these four places of one book, neither Plato himself nor

other writers being cited for it: (3) the sense *thought, reputed*, though it fits 498 A and 538 C very well, is surely pointless here, and in 574 D even suggestive of a wrong meaning, for in that context at any rate to speak of opinions as *reputed just* seems to throw doubts on their real justice, just as the *reputed relations* (ποιουμένων οἰκείων) of 538 C are meant not to be real relations. On the other hand it is most unlikely that four passages should be wrong, and Xen. *Symp.* 4. 23 ἀλλ' ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ πρὸς σοῦ ποιῶ τὸ περιδεῖν κ.τ.λ. seems to give us one instance of the active verb from which the passive use would come. *Theages* 128 B ποιῶμαι δεινὸς εἶναι, if right, seems unique in meaning or construction, *I account myself clever* (οἶομαι, etc. suggested).

574 E ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος ἀεὶ γενόμενος.

Read γιγνόμενος, as ἀεὶ requires. Cf. 488 A above.

575 A τυραννικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἔρως . . . ζῶν, ἅτε αὐτὸς ὢν μόναρχος, τὸν ἔχοντά τε αὐτὸν ὡσπερ πόλιν ἄξει ἐπὶ πᾶσαν πόλμαν, ὅθεν αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτὸν θόρυβον θρέψει, τὸν μὲν ἕξωθεν εἰσεληλυθότα ἀπὸ κακῆς ὀμιλίας, τὸν δ' ἔνδοθεν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀνεθέντα καὶ ἐλευθερωθέντα.

Stallbaum explained that the *θόρυβος* of thoughts and desires is set free by its (their) own character and by itself (themselves), supposing (1) τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων = τῶν τρόπων αὐτῶν (in which case write αὐτῶν), and (2) αὐτῶν = αὐτοῦ, since *θόρυβος* is a noun of multitude, or αὐτῶν might be an actual error for αὐτοῦ, for which there seems to be some slight MS. evidence. What would be the practical difference here supposed between the character of the *θόρυβος* and the *θόρυβος* itself he did not explain. Interpreters are now divided between two views: (A) *by the same character and by the passion itself*, (B) *by the same character in the man himself too* (Jowett in his translation, Adam). But in (A) the *θόρυβος* would really be described as set free by its own agency (coupled with that of the great passion) and this is hardly sense. Also it is plain that the passion itself too needed to be set free. Like the other desires, it had previously been kept under restraint. (B) rests on a clearly wrong notion of the

meaning of *ἑαυτοῦ*, which does not refer to the man but to the passion, the *ἔρως*, in him. The pronouns preceding, *αὐτός*, *αὐτόν*, *αὐτόν*, *περὶ αὐτόν* all refer to the *ἔρως*, and *ἑαυτοῦ* or *αὐτοῦ* must do the same. Nor would there seem to be much point in carefully distinguishing between what comes from outside and what arises within, if after all it is the same, *οἱ αὐτοὶ τρόποι*. But both these explanations thus failing us, as *καὶ ἑαυτοῦ* appears to have no meaning, I would suggest that Plato really wrote *ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ ἑαυτόν*, *i.e.* liberated by the same character as himself. This means that the same general character in such a man as Socrates is describing allows free scope both to the master passion and to the tribe of minor desires that exist side by side with it. For the phrase cf. 412 D *ὃ συμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῷ*.

τε after *τὸν ἔχοντα* seems also indefensible. I suggested once *τὸν ἔχοντά τε <καὶ τρέφοντα>*. Perhaps it should be *γε*, but that rather lacks force.

576 D *μὴ ἐκπληττώμεθα πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἓνα ὄντα βλέποντες μηδ' εἴ τινες ὀλίγοι περὶ ἐκείνον, ἀλλ' ὡς χρὴ ὄλην τὴν πόλιν εἰσελθόντας θεάσασθαι καταδύντες εἰς ἅπασαν καὶ ἰδόντες οὕτω δόξαν ἀποφαινόμεθα*.

Adam discusses in an appendix the difficulty of the *ὡς* clause. His view that *ὡς* is *since* fails to satisfy, because the assumption contained in *since* is not explained and justified. No doubt 420 A B and 421 C bear upon it and still more 545 C *εἰς τυραννικὴν πόλιν ἔλθόντες καὶ ἰδόντες*, but these distant passages do not really make *ὡς* natural, as though the thing had been recently said or implied. I would suggest that a participle has been lost, on which the *ὡς* clause depended, *e.g.* *μεμνημένοι, γιγνώσκοντες, ἡγούμενοι, bethinking ourselves, considering, that*.

577 A *ἐν τε ταῖς κατ' οἰκίαν πράξεσιν, ὡς πρὸς ἐκάστους τοὺς οἰκείους ἔχει, ἐν οἷς μάλιστα γυμνὸς ἂν ὀφθείη τῆς τραγικῆς σκευῆς*.

ἐν αἷς? As *ἐν*, referring to things, occurs three times in the three or four lines, Plato would probably have written *παρ' οἷς* for variety's sake, if he had wanted to refer to persons.

ibid. B βούλει . . . προσποιησόμεθα ἡμεῖς εἶναι τῶν δυνατῶν ἄν κρῖναι καὶ ἤδη ἐντυχόντων τοιούτοις.

I do not think τῶν δυνατῶν ἄν can be defended by the parallel of Eur. *Alc.* 182 σὲ δ' ἄλλη τις γυνὴ κεκτήσεται, σῶφρων μὲν οὐκ ἄν μᾶλλον, εὐτυχῆς δ' ἴσως and the parody in Ar. *Eq.* 1252. In prose it is surely impossible to attach ἄν to an adjective. We have τοῦ δυνατοῦ μὲν κρῖναι a few lines above, which tells against the genuineness of ἄν here. It is probably, as often (see my *Xenophon and Others*, pp. 282 foll.), a mistake for δῆ, here not so much emphatic as indicating the assumption of something in itself doubtful. Cf. on *Laws* 816 E.

578 E Write πόσῳ for ὀπόσῳ. In an indirect question either may stand, in a direct only πόσος.

579 A ἀναγκάζοιτο ἄν τινὰς ἤδη θωπεύειν αὐτῶν τῶν δούλων . . . καὶ ἐλευθεροῦν οὐδὲν δεόμενος.

The correction δεόμενος should certainly be received. It would not mean, as Adam thinks, that they have no need of it, but, as often, that they do not wish, or as we say *want*, it at all. Such is the sense of οὐδὲν δεόμενον in 581 E. I have noticed the phrase οὐδὲν δεόμενος in this sense as a favourite expression in Plutarch's *Lives*.

ibid. D δοῦλος τὰς μεγίστας θωπείας καὶ δουλείας.

Surely we ought with two MSS. (Schneider) to read δουλείας καὶ θωπείας. The only thing that could make δοῦλος θωπείας tolerable would be that δοῦλος δουλείας should lead up to it. Cf. on *Gorg.* 496 E.

585 A ὥσπερ δὲ πρὸς μέλαν φαῖν ἀποσκοποῦντες ἀπειρία λευκοῦ, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην ἀφορῶντες ἀπειρία ἠδονῆς ἀπατῶνται;

Thompson was undoubtedly right in principle when he proposed καὶ πρὸς λύπην οὕτω τὸ ἄλυπον: but I should rather incline to write καὶ τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω πρὸς λύπην. One or the other is absolutely necessary.

ibid. C ἡ οὖν αἰεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσίας οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει;

Is οὐσία a mistake for φύσις, perhaps an inadvertent anticipation of οὐσίας? Logically οὐσία cannot be said μετέχειν οὐσίας, and φύσις is often employed by Plato in a semi-periphrastic way, as Ast's *Lexicon* will show. Cf. 588 c and 589 b. In D. Hal. A.R. 4. 34. 3 οὐσίαν is an almost certain restoration for the MS. φύσιν, and in Heraclitus *Alleg. Homer.* 22 φύσιν is a v.l. for οὐσίαν. On the other hand οὐσία οὐσίας may be a deliberate antithesis.

ibid. D εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων ἡδὺ ἐστι, τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρως χαίρειν ἂν ποιοῖ ἡδονῇ ἀληθεῖ.

For ποιοῖ I think we should read δοκοῖ. There is no question of a particular part of the soul causing the man to feel pleasure: the pleasure belongs to the part itself. So in the second half of the sentence: τὸ τῶν ἡττων ὄντων μεταλαμβάνον . . . ἡττων (ἂν ἡδονῆς) ἀληθοῦς μεταλαμβάνοι.

586 c ὅς ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαπράττηται.

The sense seems to require something like ταῦτο τοῦτο or αὐ τοιοῦτον, referring to a πλησμονὴ ἄνευ λογισμοῦ καὶ νοῦ. So in 590 b we should probably read τῇ <τοῦ> αὐτοῦ τούτου χαλάσει, just as we have τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο immediately following.

587 e See on *Meno* 80 e.

592 b ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὄρᾳν καὶ ὄρωντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίσειν.

I formerly proposed to add something like αὐτόσε to κατοικίσειν, but Adam's objection is well founded, that this does not tally with the idea of the celestial state as a παράδειγμα, not a residence, and the context clearly refers to earthly states. On the other hand I cannot agree with him in treating ἑαυτὸν κατοικίσειν as = πολιτείαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ κατοικίσειν. The phrase would be unplatonic and also would not even express the sense he wants of 'founding himself accordingly.' The meaning really needed seems to be that of founding a similar state, not that of a man moulding himself and himself alone upon the model. This is what the previous sentences lead up to, and this we

get without much difficulty by observing that *ἐαυτόν* is preceded by the termination *τι* and turning it into *τοιαύτην*. I had thought of this for some time before noticing what I think almost proves it to be right, that *τοιαύτην* actually occurs in the parallel passage *Laws* 739 E παράδειγμά γε πολιτείας οὐκ ἄλλη χρὴ σκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ ἐχομένους ταύτης τὴν ὅ τι μάλιστα τοιαύτην ζητεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν. With this reading too we should have a very close parallel in 557 D ὅς ἂν αὐτὸν ἀρέσκη τρόπος, τοῦτον ἐκλέξασθαι ὥσπερ εἰς παντοπόλιον ἀφικομένῳ πολιτειῶν καὶ ἐκλεξαμένῳ οὕτω κατοικίξειν. In Xen. *Cyrop.* 7. 5. 15 one MS. has *ἐορτὴν τοιαύτην* against *ἐορτῇ* (*sic*) *ἐαυτῶν* of others. Still more similar would be my correction, if right, of Xen. *R.L.* 6. 2 ὅτι οὗτοι πατέρες τοῦ ὅτι τοσοῦτοι πατέρες. Cf. also 504 E above, where I have suggested *περὶ τοιαῦτα* for *περὶ ὅτι αὐτό*.

597 E τὸν τοῦ τρίτου ἄρα γεννήματος ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως μιμητὴν καλεῖς ;

It would be very awkward to understand *δημιουργόν* from the previous sentence, in which the *δημιουργός* and the *μιμητής* are expressly distinguished. But *τὸν τοῦ τρίτου γεννήματος* can hardly be an expression complete in itself, and I therefore suggest that *ποιητὴν* has fallen out before *μιμητὴν* owing to the similarity of the terminations. Cf. just before *δημιουργὸν καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ τοιούτου* and 601 B ὁ τοῦ εἰδώλου ποιητής, ὁ μιμητής.

598 E πότερον μιμηταῖς τούτοις οὗτοι . . . ἐντυχόντες ἠπάτηνται.

It would suit strict logic better, if for *τούτοις* we read *τοιούτοις*, since it has not yet been shown or said that all imitators are ignorant about the things they imitate. 599 A still puts it as an open question. Strictly therefore it is not enough that these men (*τούτοις*) should be imitators : they need to be such imitators as are ignorant of things. But Plato does not always adhere to strict logic, and, as he subsequently adopts the view that all imitators are ignorant, he may have anticipated it here.

601 D πολλὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τὸν χρώμενον ἐκάστῳ ἐμπειροτάτον τε εἶναι καὶ ἄγγελον γίνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ

ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ χρεία φ' χρῆται οἷον αὐλητής που ἐξαγγελεῖ (here and below the MSS. have ἐξαγγέλλει) περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν οἷ ἂν ὑπηρετώσιν ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν καὶ ἐπιτάξει οἷους δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὁ δ' ὑπηρετήσῃ. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν εἰδὼς ἐξαγγελεῖ περὶ χρηστῶν καὶ πονηρῶν αὐλῶν, ὁ δὲ πιστεύων ποιήσῃ; Ναί.

Though A and some other MSS. have οἷ ἂν, the majority have οἷα ἂν, and this was the common reading of editors before Bekker (Schneider). It is to be observed that οἷ ἂν ὑπηρετώσιν ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν for οἷς χρῆται is feebly verbose, and that we seem to want something here after ἐξαγγελεῖ closely corresponding to the οἷα κ.τ.λ. after ἄγγελον γίνεσθαι in the preceding sentence. This would lead us to write οἷα ὑπηρετοῦσιν or οἷ' ἂν ὑπηρετώσιν. I cannot however believe that Plato used ὑπηρετοῦσιν here, and then ὑπηρετήσῃ differently applied in the next line of the same sentence. The occurrence of ὁ δὲ πιστεύων ποιήσῃ immediately afterwards might suggest ποιήσῃ in the place of ὑπηρετήσῃ. On the other hand οἷα ποιοῦσιν would be closely parallel to οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ, and οἷα ὑπηρετοῦσιν would seem a less natural construction than πῶς ὑπηρετοῦσιν. Believing therefore that one use of ὑπηρετεῖν grew by a copyist's error, an inadvertent repetition, out of the other, I should prefer to read οἷα ποιοῦσιν (or ἀποτελοῦσιν, or some such word) and to keep ὑπηρετήσῃ; but οἷα ὑπηρετοῦσιν and ποιήσῃ would be much better than the received text.

602 A οὐτε ἄρα εἴσεται οὐτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει ὁ μιμητὴς περὶ ὧν ἂν μιμῆται πρὸς κάλλος ἢ πονηρίαν. Οὐκ ἔοικεν. Χαρίεις ἂν εἶη ὁ ἐν τῇ ποιήσῃ μιμητικὸς πρὸς σοφίαν περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῆ. Οὐ πάνυ.

χαρίεις κ.τ.λ. needs a particle of connexion, and οὐ πάνυ is not quite in harmony with it. Both these faults may be removed by reading <οὐκ οἷα> χαρίεις. οὐκ οἷα fell out from its likeness to ἔοικεν, and its restoration will give us a pair of negative sentences just like the pair preceding.

ibid. C καὶ ταῦτὰ καμπύλα τε καὶ εὐθέα ἐν ὕδατι τε θεωμένοις καὶ ἔξω, καὶ κοιλὰ τε δὴ καὶ ἐξέχοντα διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ χρώματα αὐτῶν πλάνην τῆς ὀψεως καὶ πᾶσά τις ταραχὴ δῆλη ἡμῖν ἐνοῦσα αὕτη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.

Perhaps we should read $\pi\hat{\alpha}\sigma\iota$ for $\pi\hat{\alpha}\sigma\alpha$, which hardly harmonizes with $\tau\iota\varsigma$. In Aristotle's *Poetics* 6, 1449 b 37 $\pi\hat{\alpha}\sigma\iota\nu$ is a very probable correction for $\pi\hat{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\nu$, and in Aristotle. *Ecccl.* 172 I suggest $\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\rho\theta\acute{\omega}\sigma\alpha\sigma\iota$ for $-\sigma\alpha\sigma\alpha$.

ibid. $\eta\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ has no business after a question, and that a negative one. Put it a line or two earlier after $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$, where $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\nu\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \omicron\upsilon\tilde{\nu}$ answers it.

ibid. Ε τούτῳ δὲ (i.e. τῷ λογιστικῷ) πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι μείζω ἅττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ἐτέρων ἢ ἴσα τάναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταῦτά. Ναί. Οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ ταῦτά ἐναντία δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι; Καὶ ὁρθῶς γ' ἔφαμεν.

I see no way out of the difficulty of this passage except by reading the genitive τούτου δὲ π. μετρήσαντος καὶ σημαίνοντος and supposing that the dative was due to a misapprehension. The words as they stand compel us to take the dative with φαίνεται, and give a sense which is not only false but flatly contradicted by the immediately following sentences. It is not to the rational part that the contrary impression is conveyed, but to another.

603 C ὧδε δὴ προθώμεθα· πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμῆται ἢ μιμητικῆ κ.τ.λ. μή τι ἄλλο παρὰ ταῦτα; Οὐδέν. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐν ἅπασιν τούτοις κ.τ.λ.

For προθώμεθα I suggest ὑποθώμεθα as more suitable.

604 B οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῷ νόμῳ ἕτοιμον πείθεσθαι, ἢ ὁ νόμος ἐξηγεῖται.

In view of the words preceding (λόγος καὶ νόμος) I suggest τῷ λόγῳ for τῷ νόμῳ. Cf. D οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, τὸ μὲν βέλτιστον τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ ἐθέλει ἔπεσθαι: 607 A ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῆ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου: and the use of λόγος in 606 A and C, 442 C, etc. with ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ in 604 C, 607 B. In 365 E νόμων is a v.l. for λόγων. Cf. p. 337.

606 A οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ εὐλόγῳ ἔοικεν. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ἐκείνη γε αὐτὸ σκοποῖης.

I think Jackson and Adam are wrong when they take ναί as assenting to οὐκ εὐλόγῳ. It refers to εὐλόγῳ only.

The proceeding is reasonable, if you look at it in the way Socrates goes on to state. It is not really right, he means, but it is reasonable and plausible enough, if you do not look far into the thing; λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ὀλίγοις τισὶν μέτεστι κ.τ.λ. With ναί referring to the thing negatived, not to the negation, in the sentence preceding cf. 608 c d οἷε ἀθανάτω πράγματι ὑπὲρ τοσούτου δεῖν χρόνον ἐσπουδακέναι ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἔφη, where οἶμαι refers to the negatived ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός; 336 E οἶον γε σύ, where οἶον refers to the just negatived σπουδάζειν. and some of the uses of οἴεσθαι γε χρή, e.g. *Phaedo* 68 B: *Phileb.* 39 D περὶ μὲν τὸν γεγονότα καὶ τὸν παρόντα χρόνον ἐστίν, περὶ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα οὐκ ἔστιν; Σφόδρα γε, where σφόδρα affirms the negatived περὶ τὸν μέλλοντά ἐστιν: *Crito* 47 C ἄρ' οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; *Euthyd.* 293 E οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπίστασθον; Καὶ μάλα. In *Phaedo* 79 B, *Gorg.* 453 D [*Demod.* 386 A] will be found some other answers notable in respect of negatives, but they are different.

ibid. For τότε ἐστὶ τοῦτο Madvig would read αὐτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτό. Τότε is clearly wrong after the previous τότε in the same sentence, and αὐτό seems clearly right. But I think the order should be inverted and we should read τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό, which has the advantage of putting both words in the right place.

ibid. B καταφρονήσας should perhaps be καταφρονήσαν. It is of course possible that Plato has forgotten or passed away from the original subject of the sentence, τὸ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, but a copyist's carelessness is more probable.

ibid. C ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου; ὅτι, ἂν αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοιο γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κωμωδικῇ ἢ καὶ ἰδία ἀκούων σφόδρα χαρῆς καὶ μὴ μισῆς ὡς πονηρά, ταῦτὸν ποιεῖς ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις;

I have written this as it stands in the texts of Adam and Burnet, the MSS. having not ἂν but ἄν. It is surely impossible for ἄν to do what Adam styles 'double duty' in this way, first with the optative and then with the subjunctive. Something like Hermann's remedy of inserting εἰάν before σφόδρα and also (with Madvig and Baiter)

reading δῆ for δέ seems to me much the best way of dealing with the passage, *if you enjoy hearing from others what you would be ashamed to say yourself*. The εἰν or ἄν may have dropped out between ὦν (κωμωδοποιῶν) and ἐν. Cf. 604 A δ εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἀκούει αἰσχύνειτ' ἄν. The ὅτι is confirmed by ὅτι in D ὅτι τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ. χαρῆς is open to much doubt, for there is (I think) only one other passage in good prose where this aorist occurs, Xen. *Cyneg.* 1. 2 (sometimes thought not Xenophontean), and the tense is neither in harmony with μισῆς nor in itself appropriate. Read χαίρης.

607 C καὶ ὁ τῶν διασόφων ὄχλος κρατῶν.

The quotation from an author unknown is given in this form by Baiter after Schmidt. Most MSS. have διὰ σοφῶν: A apparently δία σοφῶν, from which many scholars have written Δία σοφῶν, some (Schleiermacher, Stallbaum) thinking Δία could depend on σοφῶν, others (Schneider, Bywater) governing it by κρατῶν. No one seems to have seen that the δία of A is nothing but an easy corruption of λίαν (ΔΙΑ for ΛΙΑ). Cf. Eur. *El.* 296, γνώμην ἐνεῖναι τοῖς σοφοῖς λίαν σοφῆν: *Med.* 295, παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφοῦς, 305 εἰμὶ δ' οὐκ ἄγαν σοφή, and 583 ἔστι δ' οὐκ ἄγαν σοφός: *Hipp.* 518: *I.A.* 924: Plato *Gorg.* 487 D and *Phaedr.* 229 D. [When I wrote the above note, a few of the references excepted, I did not know that Herwerden had already proposed λίαν. Burnet writes διασόφων, I do not know in what sense, some MSS. having διασοφῶν.] As we are dealing with a mere fragment, it would probably be unwise to alter κρατῶν, but κριτῶν is an obvious conjecture.

608 B σύμφημί σοι ἐξ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ὄντινόν.

Should not καί be κἄν? *I think any one else would* is the natural phrase.

In 614 B again, λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, ὡς οὐ πολλὰ ἄλλα ἥδιον ἀκούοντι, I would read πόλλ' ἄν or ἥδιον ἄν.

ibid. E Does not the sense require that with κακὸν ἐκάστω τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν λέγεις we should read some such word as ἴδιον (610 B) or οἰκέιον (609 C: 610 E)? Perhaps it preceded οἶον and fell out through likeness to it.

609 B οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτὸ λύνει ἀπολλύον.

The verb and participle seem to stand in the wrong relation. Dissolution is the cause or manner of destruction, not *vice versa*. Cf. A διέλυσεν καὶ ἀπόλεσεν and C διαλύει τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσι, the order being significant. Perhaps therefore we ought to read λύνον ἀπολλύναι (ἀπολλύειν?).

ibid. οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὴν κακὴν.

Perhaps ὃ τι, for (οὐκ) ἔστιν ὅστις is the regular phrase. τι is known to fall out easily before π, which it much resembles.

Plato's curious argument here may be thus illustrated. The badness of a picture consists in its being somehow bad as a work of art. But badness as a work of art does not tend to destroy the material picture. It therefore lasts for ever. The fallacy, conscious or unconscious, is much the same as in 335 c.

ibid. C ἀλλ' ὧδε ποίει.

It is difficult to accept Adam's view that ποίει means *represent* or *picture*. No Greek could have understood the words to mean anything but 'do thus.' Ast's σκόπει is strongly supported by καὶ ψυχὴν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον σκόπει just below and by the similar error (ποιεῖν for σκοπεῖν) which I have pointed out in Dem. 5. 24, where however δεῖν ποιεῖν may be due to δεῖ ποιεῖν a few lines before.

611 E περικρουσθεῖσα πέτρας τε καὶ ὄστρεα ἃ νῦν αὐτῇ . . . γεηρὰ καὶ πετρώδη πολλὰ καὶ ἄγρια περιπέφυκεν.

I think we should get rid of the tautology by omitting πέτρας τε καὶ ὄστρεα, as having got in from ὄστρεά τε καὶ φυκία καὶ πέτρας in 611 D, or should at least read <καὶ> ἃ νῦν.

614 C τῆς τε γῆς δὴ εἶναι χάσματα ἐχομένω ἀλλήλοις καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὖ ἐν τῷ ἄνω ἄλλα καταπικρῆ.

The latter part of the sentence would naturally specify 'two others.' Should we change αὖ to δὴ (AΥ to ΔΥ), or add δὴ to αὖ?

615 c εὐθὺς γενομένων is indefensible and Cobet's ἀπογενομένων extremely plausible.

ibid. D οὐχ ἤκει, φάναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἤξει. Read οὐδὲ δὴ ἤξει or simply οὐδ' ἤξει, δη and αν being confused in either case. Cf. *Index*.

616 A τοῖς ἀεὶ παριοῦσι σημαίνοντες ὧν ἔνεκά τε καὶ εἰς ὃ τι τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσοῦμενοι ἄγοιντο.

The MSS. and old *testimonia* vary between εἰς ὃ τι, εἰς ὅτι, ὅτι εἰς. Some editors bracket τὸν Τάρταρον as a gloss. But is it certain that Plato could have written of a place εἰς ὃ τι, instead of οἱ or ὅποι? ὅτι εἰς seems best. Cf. 497 A ὧν ἔνεκα διαβολὴν εἴληφεν καὶ ὅτι οὐ δικαίως, . . . δοκεῖ μετρίως εἰρησθαι: Thuc. 1. 69. 5 ἐπιστάμεθα οἷα ὁδῶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὅτι κατ' ὀλίγον χωροῦσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς πέλας. There is some awkwardness in the latter passage, as here; but does Cobet avoid all awkwardness by bracketing καὶ ὅτι? If we want to do that, we must bracket καὶ ὅτι κατ' ὀλίγον. Cf. *ibid.* 70. 1: Dem. 43. 2 and 47. 41.

618 D ὥστε ἐξ ἀπάντων αὐτῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι συλλογισάμενον αἰρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀποβλέποντα τὸν τε χεῖρω καὶ τὸν ἀμείνω βίον.

For αἰρεῖσθαι, which gives wrong sense here (it is rightly used both above and below), read διαιρεῖσθαι. Cf. διαιρούμενα in c and βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα. Ar. *Poet.* 24. 6. 1460 a 5 has διαιρεῖσθαι by error for αἰρεῖσθαι.

619 c Probably δαίμονας should be δαίμονα, as in 617 E (where Proclus has δαίμονας, wrongly, as δαίμων shows), 620 D, etc. One man, one δαίμων is the rule.

ibid. D διὸ δὴ καὶ μεταβολὴν τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πολλαῖς τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεσθαι καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ κλήρου τύχην· ἐπεὶ εἴ τις ἀεὶ . . . ὑγιῶς φιλοσοφοῖ καὶ ὁ κλήρος αὐτῷ τῆς αἰρέσεως μὴ ἐν τελευταίοις πίπτει, κινδυνεύει . . . εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν κ.τ.λ.

Though the quotation in the text of Proclus (Kroll ii. p. 302) agrees with this, not only is διὸ δὴ . . . καὶ διὰ κ.τ.λ. awkward in expression, but it really makes no sense with what follows. ἐπεὶ is the key to the meaning and to the

true reading, which is certain γκαὶ <οὐ> διὰ τὴν τοῦ κλήρου τύχην. To say that the change of good and evil is due or partly due to the chances of the lot, because a man who goes the right way to work may always, except in a few extreme cases, do fairly well, is almost a contradiction in terms. His being sure to do fairly well is a proof that it does not depend on the chances of the lot, but on himself. Given a sensible choice at starting and proper use of the reason afterwards, a man may in most cases laugh at the lot. Indeed in 619 B the very last soul to choose is said to be able to find a good enough sort of life, and in 620 C the soul of Odysseus, though coming last, actually does so.

621 B ἐπειδὴ δὲ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι, βροντὴν τε καὶ σεισμόν γενέσθαι.

Is Plato really responsible for the clumsy and ill-sounding repetition of γενέσθαι? As καί and κατά are often confused, perhaps we should write ἐπειδὴ δὲ κοιμηθῆναι, κατὰ μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι βροντὴν τε καὶ σεισμόν. καὶ μέσας νύκτας εἶναι is also possible, γενέσθαι being due to anticipation of the γενέσθαι following.

ibid. ἐξαίφνης ἀναβλέψας ἰδεῖν ἕωθεν αὐτὸν κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ.

A's marginal ἄνωθεν for ἕωθεν commends itself to me, though no editor seems to have favoured it. The marginal correction or alternative in 576 D seems certain and that in 607 D very plausible.

ibid. C καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καί . . . διαβήσομεθα καί . . . οὐ μίανθησόμεθα.

καὶ ἡμᾶς δὴ σώσει (for ἂν σώσειεν) would fit the futures better and give us a more positive assurance than the weaker optative. Cf. p. 146 above.

ibid. τῆς ἄνω ὁδοῦ αἰεὶ ἐξόμεθα καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιτηδεύσομεν, ἵνα καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς φίλοι ὦμεν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, αὐτοῦ τε μένοντες ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐπειδὴν τὰ ἄθλα αὐτῆς κομιζόμεθα, ὥσπερ οἱ νικηφόροι περιγαγείρομεν, καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τῇ χιλιέτει πορεία, ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, εὖ πράττωμεν.

Schneider, who objects on grounds of logic to joining ἵνα . . . φίλοι ὦμεν . . . τοῖς θεοῖς . . . ἐπειδὴν τὰ ἄθλα αὐτῆς κομιζόμεθα, connects αὐτοῦ τε . . . περιαιρούμενοι with εὖ πράττωμεν. But his logical objection, though not unfounded, seems to tell with equal strength against saying ἵνα . . . ἐπειδὴν τὰ ἄθλα αὐτῆς κομιζόμεθα . . . εὖ πράττωμεν, and in his construction the repetition in καὶ ἐνθάδε is very weak. I conclude therefore that αὐτοῦ τε . . . περιαιρούμενοι goes with φίλοι ὦμεν, and indeed the τε and καί almost necessarily form a pair. But the meaning would be much more clearly and symmetrically expressed, if we might suppose a τε to have been lost, reading καὶ ἐνθάδε <τε> καὶ ἐν τῇ χιλιέτει πορεία . . . εὖ πράττωμεν. Plato does not avoid such a combination of short syllables: cf. 602 C ἐν ὕδατι τε. For the omission of τε cf. note on 614 B, and here it is made easier by δε preceding.

CLITOPHON

406 A ΣΩ. Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἀριστωνύμου τις ἡμῖν διηγείτο ἔναγχος, ὅτι Λυσία διαλεγόμενος τὰς μὲν μετὰ Σωκράτους διατριβὰς ψέγοι, τὴν Θρασυμάχου δὲ συνουσίαν ὑπερεπαινοῖ.

ΚΛΕΙ. ὅστις, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπεμνημόνευσέ σοι τοὺς ἐμοὶ περὶ σοῦ γενομένους λόγους πρὸς Λυσίαν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπήνουν σε, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπήνουν.

On ὅστις, which cannot be right, Burnet's note is 'ὅστις ἦν Hermann: ὅστις * * Schanz.' Of the two I prefer Hermann's conjecture, but I would suggest a smaller change instead, namely to read the exclamation ὡς τις . . . οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπεμνημόνευσε, *how wrongly he stated!* For ὡς *how* with a negative cf. Menander 555 κ ὦ γῆρας βαρύ, ὡς οὐδὲν ἀγαθόν, δυσχερῆ δὲ πόλλ' ἔχεις, and other comic fragments: *Il.* 21.273.

408 B Read δικαστική τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη.

There is no possible construction for the accusative.

408 c Should we read προτρεπτικωτάτους δέ?

ibid. D For ὅπως δεῖ we should expect ὅπως δὴ δεῖ or ὅπως ἂν δέη.

PHAEDRUS

227 D ἦ γὰρ ἂν <ἄμ'> ἀστεῖοι καὶ δημοφελεῖς εἶεν οἱ λόγοι?

230 B τοῦ τε ἄγνου τὸ ὕψος καὶ τὸ σύσκιον πάγκαλον, καὶ ὡς ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἀνθης, ὡς ἂν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι τὸν τόπον.

καὶ ὡς has always been found a difficulty, for the exclamatory ὡς is very awkward here and no other sense seems possible. Is it possible that under the disguise of καὶ ὡς lurks καλῶς (καλῶς τ' ἀκμὴν ἔχει or even καὶ καλῶς)?

ibid. D ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰ πεινῶντα θρέμματα θαλλὸν ἢ τινα καρπὸν προσείοντες ἄγουσιν, σὺ ἔμοι λόγους οὕτω προτείνων . . . φαίνη περιιάξειν.

There is evidently something wrong with the first clause. Does not Clement's reproduction of the words (*Strom.* 2. 20. 176), οἱ ἀπελαύνοντες τὰ θρέμματα θαλλὸν προσείοντες, suggest that we should read ἄγοντες? Plato does not dislike subordinating one participle to another.

ibid. On Lysias' speech, see p. 288.

234 A παυσαμένῳ would be a trifle nearer to the παυσάμενοι of MSS. than παυσαμένου, which is often adopted. A line or two before one of the two best MSS. has γενόμενοι and the other γενομένῳ, the latter being right.

ibid. E οἶε ἂν τινα ἔχειν ἄλλον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἕτερα τούτων μείζω καὶ πλείω περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος;

μείζω is quite the wrong word to use with regard to the plain everyday style of Lysias and of the ἐρωτικὸς λόγος here ascribed to him. It would be much more in keeping with the style of such a λόγος as begins with p. 244, a style which is indeed elevated and great. It would not be

difficult in any case to see what word Plato must have used, but the parallel passages within a page or two indicate it very clearly. 235 B μηδέν' ἄν ποτε δύνασθαι εἰπεῖν ἄλλα πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια: *ibid.* C ποῦ συ βελτίω τούτων ἀκήκοας; and παρὰ ταῦτ' ἄν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χείρω: *ibid.* D μὴ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰπεῖν: 236 B ἕτερα πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια εἰπὼν τῶν Λυσίου. Plato wrote ἀμείνω. [Dr. Postgate points out to me that, though the Bodleian MS. (B) has ἕτερα τούτων μείζω, the Venetian (T) has ἕτερα μείζω τούτων. If this was the order of words, the error would be still easier.] See my *Aristophanes and Others* p. 233 for other instances of this interchange. In Theocr. 27. 59 Cobet's ἀμείνονα seems preferable to μείζονα.

237 B καὶ ποτε αὐτὸν $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{αἰτῶν} \\ \text{ἐρῶν} \end{array} \right\}$ ἔπειθεν τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὡς μὴ ἐρῶντι πρὸ τοῦ ἐρῶντος δέοι χαρίζεσθαι, ἔλεγέν τε ὧδε.

Neither αἰτῶν nor ἐρῶν seems quite the right word, nor does either of them exactly account for the other. ΛΕΓΩΝ may perhaps account for both and is very suitable.

238 B γαστριμαργία τε <ἔσται> οἱ <κεκλήσεται> ?

239 A τοσοῦτων <οὖν> κακῶν ?

241 D καίτοι ὦμην γε μεσοῦν αὐτὸν (*i.e.* τὸν λόγον) καὶ ἐρεῖν τὰ ἴσα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος, ὡς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον, λέγων ὅσα αὐτὸν ἔχει ἀγαθά.

Besides the great difficulty of the nominative λέγων (which Thompson does not even notice) there is the minor one that a σε is wanted as subject to ἐρεῖν. It cannot be understood. Hermann σε (for γε) μεσοῦν αὐτοῦ, but γε is very proper after καίτοι and with ὦμην. As an alternative to λέγοντα (Schanz after Stephanus), should we read καὶ <ὡς> ἐρεῖς . . . λέγων ? The frequent confusion of καὶ and ὡς in MS. writing would facilitate the error. Cf. on 267 B below.

242 A B οἶμαι . . . μηδένα πλείους (λόγους) ἢ σὲ πεποιηκέναι γεγενῆσθαι ἢτοι αὐτὸν λέγοντα ἢ ἄλλους . . . προσαναγκάζοντα . . . καὶ νῦν αὐτὸν δοκεῖς αἰτιός μοι γεγενῆσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥηθῆναι.

Badham has altered the second γεγενῆσθαι to γενήσεσθαι, I think with reason, as the λόγος is still in the future. But the first γεγενῆσθαι seems to me more clearly wrong. Surely after πεποιηκέναι we could not have another perfect, but only the aorist γενέσθαι. Not unfrequently, e.g. Thuc. 8. 17, Isocr. 2. 49, MSS. vary between the two forms.

ibid. C καί τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἣ με οὐκ ἐᾶ ἀπιέναι.

I think ἐᾶ should be εἶα. So a little below (243 A) in ἔγνω τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ ποιεῖ εὐθύς, οὐκ ἔστ' κ.τ.λ. the imperfect ἐποίει seems called for.

244 C τὴν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων ζήτησιν τοῦ μέλλοντος διὰ τε ὀρνίθων ποιουμένων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σημείων.

Schanz brackets ποιουμένων, which is certainly a very awkward word. The expedient of separating ζήτησιν from τὴν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων and supplying τέχνην with the latter words seems forced and difficult. The old conjecture ποιουμένην would be attractive, if it were not tolerably certain that Plato would have written not ποιουμένην but γιγνομένην, γίγνομαι being the usual passive of ποιῶ. I am inclined to suggest διὰ τε ὀρνίθων πετομένων. Cf. Liban. 15. 29 δι' ὀρνίθων πετομένων . . . μηνῦσαί τι τῶν κρυπτομένων.

247 D αὐτ' οὖν θεοῦ διάνοια νῶ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀκηράτω τρεφομένη καὶ ἀπάσης ψυχῆς ὄση ἂν κ.τ.λ.

αὐτε cut off thus from νῶ τε . . . τρεφομένη being impossible, there is much to be said in favour of the conjecture ἦ τε. But, as the corruption is not a very probable one, and as αὐτ' οὖν begins another sentence in 255 A, some other error may have been made. Words sometimes get by accident out of their order, and, if we put θεοῦ διάνοια after τρεφομένη, everything would be proper. Cf. on *Phaedo* 81 c.

249 D Should ἦν be changed to τῆς and ἔχει to ἔχη? For τῆς ὅταν cf. 239 B τῆς ὅθεν ἂν φρονιμώτατος εἴη and 259 B τῶν πρὶν Μούσας γεγονέαι. In 255 A the MSS. have ἀπωθεῖ for ἀπωθῆ.

250 C καθαροὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀσήμαντοὶ τούτου, ὃ νῦν σῶμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν, ὁστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι.

ἀσήμαντοι is explained with reference to the σῶμα σῆμα of *Crat.* 400 c, *Gorg.* 493 a. 'It means,' says Thompson, '(1) unmarked, *i.e.* unpolluted, and (2) unentombed, unimprisoned, according to the two senses of σῆμα.' But is this quite satisfactory? There is nothing in the context to indicate that Plato has σῶμα σῆμα in his mind, and how is the reader to find it out? Also 'without *mark* of the body' is perhaps not quite the happiest way of expressing the supposed effect of body on soul. Although therefore the common view may be right, it seems just worth while to suggest ἀπήμαντοι as an alternative reading. Parallel to these words we have two or three lines above ὀλόκληροι μὲν αὐτοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀπαθειὺς κακῶν. The words of 248 c must also be taken into account; θεσμὸς δ' Ἀδαστείας ὄδε· ἥτις ἂν ψυχὴ θεῶ ἑξυνοπαδὸς γενομένη κατίδη τι τῶν ἀληθῶν, μέχρι τε τῆς ἐτέρας περιόδου εἶναι ἀπήμονα, καὶ αἰεὶ τοῦτο δύνηται ποιεῖν, αἰεὶ ἀβλαβῆ εἶναι. As we read on, we find that the πῆμα and βλάβη which these souls escape is entrance into a human body. Those words strongly suggest ἀπήμαντοι here. Add the παλαιὸν πένθος of Pindar, quoted *Meno* 81 c. But I do not make the suggestion very confidently.

252 D Something like τὸν τε οὖν Ἐρωτα <σέβων ἓνα γέ τινα> τῶν καλῶν πρὸς τρόπου ἐκλέγεται.

254 D ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ἤκουσιν or ἤδη εἰσίν (Buttmann εἰσίν).

256 E καὶ ὁμοπτέροισι ἔρωτος χάριν, ὅταν γένωνται, γενέσθαι.

Read γί(γ)νωνται, for ὅταν γένωνται can only mean 'when they have become,' not 'when they become.' This is a principle in the use of aorists after ὅταν, ἐπειδάν, εἰάν, etc. which scholars still fail to recognise. Cf. on *Apol.* 31 d. Read also γίγνεσθαι, comparing with ὅταν γίνωνται γίγνεσθαι the regular combination of the two forms, *e.g.* *Rep.* 373 E γίγνεται ὅταν γίγνηται, 537 E κακὸν γιγνόμενον ὅσον γίγνεται: *Euthyphr.* 7 d: *Theaet.* 186 c: *Prot.* 323 c: *Phil.* 31 b: *Laws* 780 c, 791 c, 821 a: and elsewhere.

257 D τὸν λοιδορούμενον αὐτῷ οἷε $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{νομίζοντα} \\ \text{ὀνειδίζοντα νομίζοντα} \end{array} \right\}$
λέγειν ἃ ἔλεγεν. Νομίζοντα by itself will not do for

'thinking it true,' 'believing it.' Read *ὄνειδίζειν νομίζοντα*, 'thinking it was a reproach.' Cf. 258 C *οἶει τινὰ οὖν . . . ὄνειδίζειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι συγγράφει*; ΦΑΙ. οὐκ οὖν εἰκός γε ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμία, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὄνειδίζοι, where for αὐτό we should read either αὐτῷ or αὐτῶ αὐτό, and perhaps for τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμία the accusative. [Dr. Postgate suggests to me, I think rightly, that 257 C (*ὄνειδίζει*) and 258 C are in favour of reading simply *ὄνειδίζοντα*.]

261 A *τούτων δεῖ τῶν λόγων* gives quite a wrong sense. Add *ἀκροᾶσθαι*, unless B's *δή* for *δεῖ* indicates that some further change is needed.

263 A *οὐ παντὶ δῆλον τό γε τοιόνδε, ὡς περὶ μὲν ἔνια τῶν*
 { *τοιούτων* } *ὁμοιοητικῶς ἔχομεν, περὶ δ' ἔνια στασιαστικῶς; . . .*
 { *ὄντων* } *ὅταν τις ὄνομα εἴπῃ σιδήρου ἢ ἀργύρου, ἂρ' οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες*
διανοήθημεν;

τοιόνδε should no doubt be *τοσονδέ*. Of the readings *τοιούτων* and *ὄντων* the latter (preferred by Thompson) seems certainly better in itself, though its authority is very inferior. *Τοιούτων* is meaningless, and *ὄντων* may be thought to be confirmed by 263 DE *ἠνάγκασεν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν Ἐρωτα ἐν τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ αὐτὸς ἐβουλήθη*. Is it possible that *ὀνομάτων* was the real word?

ibid. C *καλὸν γοῦν ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶδος εἶη κατανενοηκῶς ὁ τοῦτο λαβών*.

Is not *εἶδος* an erroneous repetition of *εἶδους* above, just as in B it stands also by error for *πλήθος*, which comes between? It is hardly suitable and after *εἶδους* in another sense seems out of the question. The right word need not bear much, if any, resemblance to *εἶδος*. Something like *βοήθημα* would give the meaning.

Possibly in 268 BC *ἀξιώ τὸν ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθόντα αὐτὸν οἶόν τ' εἶναι ποιεῖν ἃ ἐρωτᾶς* the account of *ποιεῖν* may be the same, that it is due to *ποιεῖν* occurring twice a little before. It is certainly wrong, and if the error arose in this way it is almost useless to attempt to restore the actual word. If we take it only as a partial corruption, Schleiermacher's

ἐπαίειν seems not perfectly adapted to οἶόν τ' εἶναι, though it might pass. πορίζειν may perhaps be suggested, though we should rather look for πορίζεσθαι, as in 269 c and d.

266 c μαθόντα.

267 A and B Is it certain that ἄγομεν and λέγομεν ought not to be ἄξομεν and λέξομεν, corresponding to ἐάσομεν in A? The present tenses seem to me doubtful, and the confusion is a very common one.

In B I do not feel sure that the unmeaning ὡς before διπλασιολογίαν should not be καί. Cf. on 241 D.

ibid. B Το καινά τε ἀρχαίως τά τ' ἐναντία καινῶς add the λέγουσι which Heindorf saw to be wanted, or something equivalent.

I do not know why Ast's ὀφθαλμίαν in 255 D and his τὸ εἶναι in *Rep.* 395 c have not been universally adopted. So with Stallbaum's ἐξαγγελῶ in 279 B, the same correction which I have made in *Ep.* 13. 362 c. In 236 E B and T agree in giving ἐξαγγέλλειν, though the second hand in the latter gives the necessary ἐξαγγελεῖν.

ibid. C τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογῶων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἐλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος (τὸ τ. X. σθ. being Thrasymachus).

ἐλκομένων ἐπί with accusative ought to mean, like εἴλκυσεν ἐπί in 270 A, that they are drawn from some other source or quarter, which would here have to be some other subject, and then applied to age and poverty. But this gives no proper sense. From what other subject did Thrasymachus transfer to these topics the use of lamentation? What else had speakers been in the habit of choosing as subjects for lamentation? Perhaps we might read ἐπὶ γῆρα καὶ πενία, understanding ἐλκομένων in the sense of *drawn out, protracted*, the orator dwelling on his topic in sentence after sentence. Cf. the use of ἔλκω for the evolutions of a dance: *Theaet.* 57 D δεινὸς περὶ λόγων ὀλκῆν: Eubulus 107. 3 νόμον ἐκ νόμου ἔλκων: the phrase προφάσεις ἔλκειν, etc. I have sometimes thought οἰκτρογῶων ought rather to be οἰκτρογῶως, or that the article should be repeated after it.

275 A τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθόντων λήθην ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἀμελετησίᾳ, ἅτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἔξωθεν ὑπ' ἄλλοτρίων τύπων, οὐκ ἔνδοθεν αὐτοὺς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀναμνησκομένους.

Anacolutha in Plato are by no means to be condemned wholesale. His characters are only talking, and the Greeks were no more likely to talk with unerring grammatical accuracy than ourselves. But an anacoluthon ought to be such as a man talking might easily slip into, and the accusatives αὐτοὺς ἀναμνησκομένους hardly satisfy this condition. Masculine datives would be the least change, the men and their souls being treated as identical (so in poetry, *Od.* 11, 91 : *Bacchyl.* 5. 78 : *Eur. Alc.* 902). Cf. on c D below.

ibid. c καταλιπεῖν should surely be καταλείπειν, 'thinks he is leaving.' I do not see how the aorist can be right: it would be applicable properly only to a dead man, who cannot think anything. [καταλείπειν *Stobaeus Burnet.*]

ibid. c D πλέον τι οἰόμενος εἶναι λόγους γεγραμμένους τοῦ τὸν εἰδότα ὑπομνήσαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἦ τὰ γεγραμμένα.

Thompson's defence of εἶναι will not hold water. Perhaps ἐνεῖναι (*Heindorf* εἶναι ἐν) λόγους γεγραμμένους; or did Plato write λόγου γεγραμμένου, 'something more, some greater advantage, in writing'? Cf. the genitive in 271 E μηδὲν εἶναι πω πλέον αὐτῷ ὧν τότε ἤκουεν λόγων συνών.

276 D οἷς λέγων παίζων MSS. ἐν οἷς λέγω παίζων *Heindorf.*

Alii alia. Perhaps οἷς λέγω ἐμπαίζων. This might account for λέγων, if that is not due only to the termination of παίζων.

ibid. E All the editors I have looked at, including *Badham*, seem satisfied with the accusative μυθολογούντα, but it ought grammatically to be the genitive and I very much doubt whether the accusative admits of defence or has good parallels.

277 B κατ' αὐτό should perhaps be καὶ αὐτό.

ADDENDUM

On the authorship of the λόγος ascribed to *Lysias*, see p. 288.

THEAETETUS

143 A ὁσάκις Ἀθήναζε ἀφικοίμην, ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτη
ὃ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην.

ὃ μὴ μεμνήμην seems much more likely and these perfect optatives are very liable to corruption.

144 A τὸ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ' ἂν ψόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὀρώ
γιγνόμενον.

Other questions arise about this sentence, but I am only concerned now with οὔτ' ἂν ψόμην γενέσθαι. When we find one ἂν with such a word as ψόμην and an infinitive, scholars seem sometimes to think that they may translate it twice over, as though it went both with the finite and with the infinitive verb. So Campbell here: 'I should not have thought there could have been an instance.' But, if ἂν goes with ψόμην, its force is then exhausted and γενέσθαι must not be taken to mean *could occur* or *could have occurred*. For those senses the infinitive must either be in the future tense or have a second and separate ἂν, though I think the latter case is rare. In such phrases as Thuc. 8. 66 οὗς οὐκ ἂν ποτέ τις ψέτο ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν τραπέσθαι, of which there are many, ἂν goes solely with the infinitive and not at all with the other verb, which is categorical. See many instances of various kinds in Blaydes' notes to Ar. *Thesm.* 526 : *Lys.* 257. It follows that in our passage either ἂν has nothing to do with ψόμην or we must read γίγνεσθαι, and so in some other cases. Burnet's critical notes on 143 D and 148 A show how easy the confusion of γίγν and γεν is, but there seems no sufficient reason for assuming it here.

148 C εἶ σε πρὸς δρόμον ἐπαινῶν μηδενὶ οὕτω δρομικῶ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντετυχηκέαι, εἶτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἠττήθης, κ.τ.λ.

τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου seems an impossible expression. 'The swiftest runner' is right enough, because in any given set of people one will probably be the swiftest. But 'the grown man' is not right, because any number of them may be grown men. We cannot take the words as generic, 'a grown man and very fast runner': Plato could never use the article so in such an expression, and it must not be defended by ἂν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον κτείνῃ (Dem. 23. 41, etc.), ἂν τις τὸν ἐλεύθερον κακῶς λέγῃ ('Ath. Pol. 59. 5), and similar technical forms. Adopt then Burger's του and read εἶτα διαθέων του ἀκμάζοντος, καὶ <τούτου> ταχίστου, ἠττήθης, for ταχίστου is an awkward addition without something like τούτου.

ibid. Ε οὐ μὲν δὴ αὖ οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι (δύναμαι) τοῦ μέλειν.

For τοῦ the Vienna MS. has τούτου: Burnet writes τοῦ τούτου.

In this sentence μέλειν could not represent μέλει μοι, but only μέλω. Such a use of μέλω however is not found, as far as I know, in prose, which always employs the other form. A unique use of μέλω on Plato's part is surely less likely than that some copyist wrote μέλειν by error for μελετᾶν. Cf. 174 C οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελητέκναι. In Xen. *Hipparch.* 4. 7 μεμελητέκναι is admitted to be a mistake for μεμελητητέκναι.

149 D καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ (ποιεῖν δύνανται) τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον ὄν δόξῃ ἀμβλίσκειν ἀμβλίσκουσιν.

νέον ὄν, used of an embryo, is recognized by the scholiast in the Berlin papyrus, but seems open to great doubt. It has given rise to many conjectures, none quite satisfactory (δέον Heindorf, ἀναγκαῖον Stallbaum, ἄμεινον Madvig, νόμιμον Schanz, and others). But I think that by combining two of them we may not improbably arrive at the right reading. Naber has proposed καὶ νᾶνον ἂν δόξῃ, which though infelicitous as to νᾶνον has the merit of suggesting ἄν for ὄν. If with this we unite Madvig's ἄμεινον, which is

a most suitable word, we get *καί, ἄμεινον ἂν δόξῃ ἀμβλίσκειν*, the position of ἂν (*ἐάν*) being quite unobjectionable. When we put side by side ΚΑΜΕΙΝΟΝΑΝ and ΚΑΝΝΕΟΝΟΝ, we see that one would have no difficulty in passing into the other.

150 D *πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὐρόντες τε καὶ κατέχοντες.*

καί and *κατ* are perhaps duplicates and we might read *καὶ ἔχοντες*. *ἐκόντες* has in fact slight MS. authority, and *τεκόντες* better.

152 E *καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου συμφέρεσθον, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμωδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγωδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος, <ὄς> εἰπὼν κ.τ.λ.*

‘*συμφερέσθων* B (*ut videtur*): *συμφερέσθον* TW: *συμφέρονται* Stobaeus’ Burnet, who with Campbell adopts the imperative. *συμφερέσθον* is now found also in the Berlin papyrus, which comments on the passage, though not on the difficulty of this word. Surely in such a context the imperative, *let us say, let us assume, that they all agree*, is singularly out of place. Why should it be assumed, if it is not the fact? The very point of the whole is the weight of actual authority on that side: hence the names of philosophers and poets that follow. Heindorf was content to adopt *συμφέρονται*; but this leaves the other form or forms quite unexplained, while it is itself easily explained as an obvious correction or inadvertence. I quite agree that the philosophers cannot be here spoken of in the dual: that is impossible, especially as the actual subject of the verb is not *Πρωταγόρας κ.τ.λ.* but *πάντες*. Nor, I think, can the dual come from the dual idea of philosophers and poets side by side. But in the next clause we have the dual division of poetry into comedy and tragedy with two poets mentioned. Surely this suggests that the verb belongs there and has only got out of its proper place. As *οἱ ἄκροι* means two men, *συμφερέσθον* would be admissible, I think, after *ἑκατέρας*, even if *ἑκατέρας* itself did not give a dual notion. After Ὅμηρος it would be awkward, if we were sure that *ὄς*, there added by Heindorf, was right. No doubt the last letters of Ὅμηρος would account for the

omission of $\delta\varsigma$, but, if it were thought probable that *συμφέρεσθον* stood there, we could find some other word or words of connexion to insert instead of $\delta\varsigma$. The fact that *something* is certainly lost after "Ομηρος may be thought in favour of this. (For misplacement of word cf. the notes on 155 B and 201 C and many others in different parts of this book.)

153 A *δοκοῦν* can hardly be right. Should we omit it and read *ικανὰ <δοκοῦντα>* just before ?

155 A Perhaps *ὦν <πέρι> πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες*. *ὦν* is certainly odd in construction, and *πέρι* might easily be lost before *πρῶτον*.

Probably *μήτ' <ἀν> αὐξάνεσθαι* (*αν* lost before *αυ*) as in the preceding sentence : the optatives point to this.

ibid. B ΣΩ. *ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ὕστερον ἀλλὰ τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον ;* ΘΕΑΙ. *δοκεῖ γε δῆ.*

No sense can be made of *ἀλλά* where it stands. I incline to think that, like *συμφέρεσθον* in 152 E, it has got into the wrong line. Read Theaetetus' answer as *ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ γε δῆ*, which is perfectly good. See Ast's *Lex. Plat.* 1. 101 *ἀλλά . . . γε*, and in 153 D, 157 D, etc. see answers beginning with *ἀλλά* in a very similar way. Badham has shown us, I think, how *γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι* should be treated (*εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι ἄνευ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον*). It cannot very well be parallel to *Laws* 849 A *τῶν δ' ἐν ἄστει κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν ἀστυνόμων ἀρχήν*, where no doubt the aorist refers to the first regulation of details and the present to the subsequent continuous control.

ibid. D *χάριν οὖν μοι εἶση ἐάν σοι ἀνδρός, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερηνήσωμαι αὐτῶν* (*αὐτήν* has slight authority).

These words have given the critics some trouble. The remedy is not really far to seek, and the appearance of *αὐτήν* in a Vienna MS. might have suggested it. We have here the not very uncommon occurrence of two words having exchanged their terminations. Instead of *ἀποκε-*

κρυμμένην . . . αὐτῶν read ἀποκεκρυμμένων . . . αὐτήν. Cf. 180 c παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων μετὰ ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλούς.

156 A Should we read εἶ μάλ' ἄμουσοι for μάλ' εἶ ἄμουσοι? The inversion of μάλ' εἶ for εἶ μάλα is hardly made out. In 169 B μάλ' εἶ ξυγκεκόφασιν there is no need to take it so, and in Herod. 3. 150 κάρτα εἶ παρεσκευασμένοι the εἶ certainly goes with the participle, not as Heindorf says with κάρτα.

157 A πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ (read ὑπὸ) τῆς κινήσεως.

ibid. τό τέ τιμι συνελθὸν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλω αὖ προσπεσὸν πάσχον ἀνεφάνη.

καί should be omitted, as συνελθὸν is subordinate like προσπεσὸν: 'what acts when it meets one thing is acted upon when it comes across another.' Cf. 160 A οὗτ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μήποτ' ἄλλω συνελθὸν ταῦτόν γεννήσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται. This insertion of καί with a participle, the relation of which has been misunderstood, is found in other places.

ibid. B τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι συγχωρεῖν οὔτε τοῦ οὔτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο οὔτ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα ὅτι ἂν ἰσθῆ.

We must not allow (he says) any word that imports any sort of fixity and permanence as contrasted with constant flux and change. The difficulty in the words quoted is in οὔτε τοῦ οὔτ' ἐμοῦ, for which οὔτε σοῦ οὔτ' ἐμοῦ, οὔτε τοῦτο, οὔτε τοῦτ' εἶναι have been proposed by good critics. του adds nothing to τι, just as the proposed τοῦτο would add nothing to τόδε. The genitives do not seem suitable (I suppose *in* or *belonging to*) nor the mention of persons (ἐμοῦ or σοῦ and ἐμοῦ) at all called for or even in keeping with the general course of the argument, in which *you* and *I* play another part. We want then probably two words suggestive of fixity in things, external things. Though τοῦτο, meaning the same as τόδε, will not do, ταῦτό(ν) is appropriate, distinct, and likely enough. Cf. 202 A. What to do with ἐμοῦ I hardly know, but perhaps ἐν may

serve and the *ou* be taken to come from the *οὔτε* following. *ἐν* is clearly suggested by the words just before, *οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό* (cf. 152 D), which also suggest the possibility of *αὐτό* (not *ταυτό*) for *του*. Without much confidence therefore I suggest that we might read *οὔτε τι οὔτε ταυτό οὔθ' ἐν οὔτε τὸδε οὔτ' ἐκείνο*: 'we must not admit such expressions as *some thing, same thing, one thing, this thing, that thing.*'

ibid. Ε λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε περί . . . καὶ μανίας, ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν ἢ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται.

The *τε* after *ὅσα* is awkward: so is it to find *μανία* as the subject of these verbs. Should we read *ὅσα τις*?

A little further on in 158 B there is another odd *τε*: ὡς οἱ μαινόμενοι ἢ ὄνειρώττοντες οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτηνοὶ τε καὶ ὡς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ διανοῶνται. Here it is explained that after *πτηνοὶ τε* we supply *οἴωνται εἶναι*. Did Plato write *οἱ δὲ ὡς πτηνοὶ τε καὶ πετόμενοι . . . διανοῶνται*?

161 Ε τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἐκάστου οὔσας.

ἐκάστω?

162 Α εἰ ἀληθὴς ἢ Ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγξατο.

Is *τῆς βίβλου* an adscript?

ibid. Β τῷδε δέ for τῷ δὲ δὴ? ὄντι rather points to this.

ibid. Ε τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ᾧ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμερεῖν ἄξιος οὐδενὸς μόνου ἂν εἴη.

οὐδενὸς μόνου, though supported (as οὐδ' ἐνὸς μόνου) by the scholiast, has been found a difficulty, since *μόνου* seems meaningless. Perhaps we should turn it into *μῶν οὐ* and read *ἄξιος οὐδενὸς μῶν οὐκ ἂν εἴη*; For the postponement of *μῶν οὐ* cf. *Laus* 896 D *ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν κ.τ.λ. μῶν οὐ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναί*; Or *μέντοι*?

167 Β C φημὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτους (τοὺς γεωργοὺς) τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντι

πονηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῆ, χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς ἐμποιεῖν.

It seems clear that (1) ἀληθεῖς is unmeaning in relation to plants, and also hardly consistent with what precedes, for it implies the possibility of false perceptions or sensations: (2) αἰσθήσεις τε καί points to another substantive, for which reason ἀληθείας has been suggested: (3) the word should be parallel to αἰσθήσεις in expressing some affection or state: (4) again like αἰσθήσεις, the thing should be in itself neutral, admitting of both good and bad. πάθας, a Platonic word, satisfies these conditions, and might I think pass by error into ἀληθεῖς. πάθος and πλῆθος certainly get interchanged sometimes. In *Philebus* 31 B and 41 C for instance one of the two best MSS. has πάθος and the other πλῆθος. A and Λ being much alike, it would not be difficult for πάθας to become, say, πλῆθας, and that might be corrected to ἀληθεῖς.

168 c The very imperfect sentence beginning ἐνενόησάς που would recover a clear and satisfactory construction, if we read ὡς for καί before χαριεντισμόν. It is well known that they are liable to confusion.

170 A σωτήρας σφῶν προσδοκῶντας <ἔσσεσθαι>? Without the infinitive, the words should mean 'expecting saviours,' not 'expecting them to prove saviours.'

172 B καὶ ὅσοι γε ἂν μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγωσιν, ὧδέ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι.

τὴν σοφίαν (*this is the philosophy of many* Jowett: cf. Stallbaum and Campbell) does not mean philosophy, or the philosophy of ὅσοι, κ.τ.λ. The question has been in what sense or in what applications one man can be called σοφώτερος than another, what in fact real σοφία is; and it is quite clear here that the general meaning must be *this is what they make, this is their view, of σοφία*. Whether ἄγουσι can bear this sense or Badham's λέγουσι should be substituted, may be uncertain, but the text seems to me right. The use of ἄγω is exactly like Polyb. 2. 41. 9 ἐναντίως τὸ συμφέρον ἄγειν ἀλλήλαις *take contrary views of expediency*, if not just like Soph. O.T. 784 δυσφόρως

τοῦνειδος ἦγον. This and kindred uses of ἄγω are very common in late Greek, and the dictionaries fail to do them justice.

173 C ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε χορεύοντες.

Both the use of χορεύοντες and that of ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε, which wants a substantive, are very questionable. Badham suggested ἐν τῷδε τῷ χορῷ ὄντες (not mentioned by Burnet, though he records very many of Badham's acute conjectures). I think χορῷ ὄντες certainly right (cf. *Protag.* 315 B, 327 D; *Plut. Mov.* 78 E); but as to τῷδε, what would 'this chorus' mean? The few people present cannot take themselves as constituting the entire company of philosophers. It would seem better to retain ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε. (I have sometimes thought of ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ δὴ χορῷ ὄντες.)

ibid. D σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιριῶν ἐπ' ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδ' ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς.

We could reconcile ourselves to the anacoluthon, if it were somewhat differently worded, e.g. τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττειν. But πράττειν seems incapable of referring straight to the substantives preceding. σπουδὰς πράττειν, κῶμους πράττειν, etc. are not Greek expressions. I do not know whether anyone has suggested that a whole line has got lost after κῶμοι, e.g. <οὐδ' εἰ γίγονται ἴσασι, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα> οὐδ' ὄναρ κ.τ.λ.

174 A Perhaps ἀρκεῖ should be ἀρκέσει. I see no need for ἦκει.

175 B τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν.

Badham was perhaps right in reading τὰ μὲν ὑπερήφανα ἔχων. But I would urge it on a different ground from his, namely that τὰ ἐν ποσὶν requires a corresponding expression, as in *Diog. L.* 1. 34 τὰ ἐν ποσὶν . . . τὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ: τὰ μὲν and τὰ ἐν ποσὶν are not a pair. We might possibly keep ὑπερηφάνως ἔχων, if something, e.g. οὐράνια, were added to τὰ μὲν. Cf. *Ar. Eth.* 6. 7. 1141 b 6 as to Thales etc., περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἶδέναι αὐτοῦς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δέ.

ibid. C ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ τί ἐγὼ σὲ ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ ἐμέ; εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας. . . , ἢ ἐκ τοῦ εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων κεκτημένος τ' αὖ χρυσίον βασιλείας πέρι καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν.

The εἰ before βασιλεὺς is wanting in a few MSS. (though found in B and T) and often omitted by editors. Burnet after Campbell reads ἦ. I would myself retain εἰ here and also substitute it for τί before ἐγώ. The two things are naturally thrown into the same form. In the first question εἰ is distinctly more proper than τί (just as in Lysias 10. 4 οὔτε εἰ ἔστιν ὀλιγαρχία ἠπιστάμην the suggested τι or ὅτι is more proper than εἰ). The issue in a court is likely to be not *what* wrong one party has done, but *whether* he has done any. In the second case it is objected that only a philosopher would ask with doubt εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων, and that popular ideas assume it. Strictly speaking, this is no doubt true. But we may take εἰ as conveying one of those questions which hardly expect an answer or which at any rate make sure of an answer in the affirmative, *i.e.* as meaning 'Is he not happy?' And we must bear in mind that the bare affirmation 'He is happy,' especially if supported by a reason, 'with all that money,' is itself argumentative and consciously presents a theory which might be combated. The omission of εἰ therefore does not altogether remove a difficulty, the existence of which I quite admit: namely that the words in any form seem to suggest, however faintly, the same question about human life that is then put in contrast with them (βασιλείας πέρι κ.τ.λ.). One thing I feel, and that is that by analogy to the previous question and indeed on general grounds we should expect this question too (εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων) to be of a more personal, individual kind. All the books I have looked at take βασιλεὺς as *a king*, which does not merely imply a general theory, but openly and at once propounds it. I should have thought βασιλεὺς might well be *the Great King*, introducing something of that personal element which popular talk loves and philosophical discussion excludes. Cf. *Gorg.* 470 E ΠΩΔ. δῆλον δῆ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γινώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα. ΣΩ. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ. οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης: *Euthyd.* 274 A : *Apol.* 40 D : with the curiously

close parallel in Horace *C.* 2. 2. 17 *redditum Cyri solio Phraaten | dissidens plebi numero beatorum | eximit virtus* and *ib.* 3. 9. 4. Whatever difficulty remains seems due not to any error in the text but to inadvertence on the part of Plato.

As to the very uncertain *κεκτημένος τ' αὖ χρυσίον*, in which Madvig and Schanz read *ταῦ* from a gloss in Hesychius, *ταῦς· μέγας, πολὺς : ταύσας· μεγαλύνας, πλεονάσας*, while Burnet has (with Iamblichus) *τ' αὖ πολὺ*, I make with very great hesitation the following suggestions. In inscriptions *τ* often stands for *τάλαντον* (*ττ* two talents and so on). Is it possible that *τ* here stands for *τάλαντα*, the letters *av* giving or rather concealing a number? What number of gold talents popular imagination held the Great King to be master of, I would not attempt to say. Cf. Plut. *Alex.* 36. I need hardly remind anyone that *α* stands for a thousand. With *τάλαντα* we should of course need to read *χρυσίον*. But *τ' αὖ* and still more *τ' αὖ πολὺ* also suggest the possibility that Plato wrote *κεκτημένος τὸ Ταντάλον χρυσίον*, for *τὰ Ταντάλον τάλαντα* (see Menander 301 with Kock's references) was a proverbial expression; and perhaps this is more likely than the other. In spite of the very strong case established by Hesychius' gloss I feel the use of such an out-of-the-way word as *ταῦ* to be questionable.

177 B ὅταν ἰδίᾳ λόγον δέη δίδόναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι.

The last word may be right. Bad men have a sort of theory of life and criticize the foolish virtue of the good. But this is so far from obvious, *ψόγος* not conveying very well what precedes, and the occasional confusion of *ψέγω* with *λέγω* is so well known, that perhaps *περὶ ὧν λέγουσι* should be read. Those precise words occur three lines below, which tells at once for and against my suggestion, as the repetition would be a trifle weak.

182 B ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ μὲν ποι' ἄττο γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

'The text is not grammatical, but neither is it really

open to suspicion, and Madvig's conjecture, ἀποτεχθέντα, makes nonsense' Campbell. Plato probably wrote ἀποτικτόνων, as the sense requires. Otherwise there is a double anacoluthon. The termination has got accommodated to those near it. The other participle, συγγιγνομένων, is subordinate to ἀποτικτόνων and therefore no καί is needed: cf. on 157 A above.

184 E καὶ ἕξεις κ.τ.λ.

As this is an alternative course and as ἦ and καί are often confused, we might read ἦ ἕξεις here, keeping τοῦδε at the beginning of the sentence. This is better than omitting καί with Madvig and Schanz. σῶμα answers to αἰσθήσεις in the sentence before, τῷ αὐτῷ to μίαν ἰδέαν . . . ψυχῆν.

190 C ἄλλον δέ τινα οἶει ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον τολμῆσαι κ.τ.λ.

It is of course impossible that τολμῆσαι can = τολμήσειν, though the words seem to have been sometimes taken so (perhaps even by Heindorf). But, if they refer to the past, we want a ποτέ, as we can hardly carry on to this sentence the ποτέ of the previous question, an answer to which has intervened. I conclude therefore that ἄν is to be inserted after τινά or elsewhere.

192 A δεῖ ὧδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομένους, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

It is hardly credible that with the passive λέγεσθαι there can be at once joined διοριζομένους, as though the verb were λέγειν. Badham's διελέσθαι is very likely to be right. But we might also think of διαλέγεσθαι (not perhaps very probable, but the δια or Badham's δι would be easily lost after δε) or of ὁμολογεῖσθαι, the middle, which is sometimes used in the active sense. In *Laus* 901 E ὁμολογοῦμεν and λέγομεν are alternative readings, the former with most authority. Cf. p. 62.

ibid. E Probably Σωκράτης εἰ γινώσκει is right, but εἰ may have been lost after η in ἐπίσπη, as it may in 197 B before ι in ἰμάτιον.

193 C τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὄψεως πάθη δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταρρεούσης.

The construction of δεξιὰ is highly questionable, and Buttman proposed μεταφερούσης. Possibly μεταιρούσης, though the word is rather poetical. αἶρω does not always imply raising.

196 B οἶμαι γάρ σε περὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν.

μᾶλλον, which is wanting in one MS., makes no good sense and seems due to μᾶλλον before σφάλλεται. Perhaps we should read ὁμοίως.

199 B Perhaps παρ' αὐτῷ for ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. Notice the *a* preceding.

201 B The μέν in πείσαι μέν is unmeaning. Read μόνον, for the two words are easily confused.

ibid. C οὐκ ἄν, ὦ φίλε, εἴ γε ταῦτόν ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ δικαστήρια καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθά ποτ' ἂν δικαστῆς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης.

The transference of καὶ δικαστήρια to follow δικαστῆς ἄκρος seems the best method of dealing with those words that has been proposed. Cf. on 152 E above. But is ἐδόξαζεν right? 'If true opinion and knowledge were the same thing, no judge could ever have held a right opinion without knowledge.' This is insipid, being indeed an identical proposition. Socrates had just said that dicasts ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν. Surely then he said here not ἐδόξαζεν but ἐδίκαζεν (or ἐδίκασαν): 'if they are identical, no judge ever gave right judgment without knowledge.' This is much more pointed. Of course on analysis it comes to the same thing as ἐδόξαζεν, but it by no means follows that ἐδόξαζεν was as likely to be used by a writer of discrimination. The imperfect ἐδίκαζεν seems admissible, but the aorist may be preferred.

ibid. ὁ γε ἐγώ . . . ἐπελελήσμεν, νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ.

Read ὁ γάρ . . . νῦν ἐννοῶ. The other gives quite a wrong turn to the words.

202 A One would think <τὸ> τοῦτο, if right, should come close to τὸ ἐκείνο. Ought it to change places with τὸ αὐτό? Cf. 157 B.

205 E εἴπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.

Probably εἴπερ . . . πεισόμεθα, if we are to follow, as in 203 D εἴπερ ἀμφοτέρᾳ τις γνώσεται.

207 B πρὶν ἂν . . . ἕκαστον περαίνῃ τις should according to the regular usage be περάνῃ. In *Laws* 893 A μέχριπερ ἂν . . . διαπεράνῃται the tense has escaped corruption.

209 A ᾧ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἠπτόμην.

Not only is the grammar of ᾧ . . . τούτων doubtful, but the singular ᾧ is objectionable in itself, as the points of diversity are clearly many. Read therefore ὧν. But can this stand by attraction for οἷς? Certainly it can. Cf. 144 A ὧν δὴ πρόποτε ἐνέτυχον . . . οὐδένα with *Rep.* 531 E, *Gorg.* 509 A, etc.: Aeschines 2. 117 παρ' ὧν μὲν βοηθεῖς οὐκ ἀπολήψει χάριν: Xen. *Mem.* 2. 2. 5 μεταδιδούσα τῆς τροφῆς ἧς καὶ αὐτὴ τρέφεται: perhaps Thuc. 1. 1. 3 ἐκ τεκμηρίων ὧν . . . μοι πιστεῦσαι συμβαίνει.

PARMENIDES.

128 c Perhaps ἐπικρυπτόμενον is due to διαπραττόμενον following and should be ἐπικρύπτεσθαι.

131 D should, I think, be printed with more notes of interrogation. Besides that after ἴσον τῷ ἔσται, I would put others after ἔξει, μείζον ἔσται, and πρίν. On the other hand in 134 c the sentence beginning οὐκοῦν εἴπερ is not a question.

133 D Read ἐκείνου δοῦλος <ὁ δοῦλος> like δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης in the next line.

135 B διευκρινησάμενον ought to be διευκρινησαμένου. Waddell seems half to suggest this in his edition.

ibid. C τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἡσθήσθαι. μᾶλλον is meaningless by itself. Perhaps μᾶλλον <ἐτέρων>.

ibid. E οὐκ εἷας ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν.

I think τὴν πλάνην <ποιούμενον> or something similar is needed.

137 C ἔτοιμός σοι . . . τοῦτο needs a <ποιῆσαι> added.

140 E τί δέ, πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τὸ ἐν δοκεῖ τῷ δυνατὸν εἶναι;

As πρεσβύτερον and νεώτερον are predicates with εἶναι, which is itself governed by δυνατὸν, it is clear that ἔχειν should be ἔχον to correspond. So in 141 A οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη νεώτερον οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον τὸ ἐν.

There is nothing uncommon in a participle with εἶναι, especially if the participle is coordinate with adjectives.

141 B τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται, εἴπερ μέλλει ἔχειν ὅτου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται.

The last γίγνεται should probably be γίγνηται, the common construction after ἔχειν.

143 A ἴθι δὴ καὶ τῆδε ἔτι <σκόπει> ?

156 D ἄρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ τότ' ἂν εἴη ὅτε μεταβάλλει; τὸ ποῖον δὴ; τὸ ἐξαίφνης;

The first sentence seems devoid of meaning. Heindorf, followed by Stallbaum, thought Parmenides was going to put τὸ ἐξαίφνης at the end of his sentence, when he was interrupted by the question τὸ ποῖον δὴ. I should be inclined to read μεταβάλλει <τὸ τοιόνδε>; and to suppose that the loss was due to the great similarity between τὸ τοιόνδε and τὸ ποῖον δὴ. Just below should not ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις be ἡ <τοῦ> ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις?

163 c Read ὁ (for ᾧ) ἂν φῶμεν with one Paris MS. (Bekker): and for πῶς οὐκ εἶναι read πῶς <μὲν> οὐκ εἶναι.

SOPHIST.

216 C καὶ τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τοῦ μηδενὸς τίμιοι, τοῖς δ' ἄξιοι τοῦ παντός.

Madvig omits τίμιοι; Cobet, doing the same, transfers ἄξιοι to its place. I should much prefer to read *τιμητέοι*. Abbreviated terminations account for many mistakes.

ibid. D τοῦ μέντοι ξένου ἡμῖν ἡδέως ἂν πυνθανοίμην κ.τ.λ.

Surely ἡμῖν. He is *their* ξένος; or, if we connect the dative closely with the verb, ἡμῖν is *with your leave*. Cf. *Theaet.* 143 E καὶ σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πάνν ἄξιον οἷφ ἡμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μειρακίῳ ἐντετύχηκα.

The two pronouns are, I think, again confused in 217 B λόγων ἐπελάβου παραπλησίον ὧν καὶ πρὶν ἡμᾶς δεῦρ' ἐλθεῖν διερωτῶντες αὐτὸν ἐτυγχάνομεν, where I would read πρὶν ἡμᾶς (Socrates and his party) δεῦρ' ἐλθεῖν. ἡμᾶς is (1) unsuitably emphatic, (2) in strict grammar wrong, for it should be the nominative: but this licence is sometimes taken, *e.g.* *Thuc.* 8. 63. 4, *Ar. Eth.* 3. 5. 1114 a 4. It may be thought that at the opening of the dialogue Socrates is already on the scene and that Theodorus and his companions are just arriving, but this does not seem quite certain. Cobet ὧν καὶ ἡμεῖς πρὶν δεῦρ' ἐλθεῖν.

217 A καθ' ἐν ὄνομα γένος ἐκάστῳ προσήπτον.

For ἐν read ἕκαστον or ἐν ἕκαστον.

218 A Theaetetus ought hardly to strike in with such words (δρᾶ τοίνυν κ.τ.λ.). He waits to be spoken to by the stranger. Give them to Theodorus.

219 C τέχνη τις κτητικὴ λεχθεῖσα ἄν διαπρέψειεν. ΘΕΑΙ.
ναί, πρέποι γὰρ ἄν.

διαπρέπω is not used anywhere else by Plato; nor is any writer at all cited as using it in the sense of *be becoming, suitable*: it means *be conspicuous*. Coupling this with the fact that Stobaeus gives the words ἄν διαπρέψειεν in the form ἀντρέψειεν, may we not read ἄν πρέψειεν? δια, perhaps corrupted from δῆ, may be a dittograph for ἄν. In 223 E πωλοῦν διὰ νομίσματος ἀλλάττεται it would not be surprising if διὰ were an error for δῆ.

ibid. D ἐν κτητικῇ ποῦ δῆλον <ὅτι>.

δῆλον cannot stand alone in this sense.

221 E τὰ νευστικὰ τῶν ἐνύδρων.

This has been written by a common blunder for τὰ ἐνυδρα τῶν νευστικῶν οἱ τῶν νευστικῶν τὰ ἐνυδρα. Cf. 220 B νευστικοῦ μὴν τὸ μὲν πτηνόν . . . τὸ δὲ ἐνυδρον. Very similar is the blunder in 228 A διαφορᾶς διαφθοράν for διαφορᾶς διαφθοράν and that pointed out above in *Theaet.* 155 D.

222 A I have sometimes thought that λειμῶνας, which is rather hard to harmonize with ποταμούς, might stand for λίμνας, a word associated with ποταμούς a line or two above. But on the whole I should not venture to propose the change.

ibid. E τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐρωτικῆς τέχνης ἔστω <τὸ> εἶδος?

The τέχνη is the εἶδος. Cf. 223 C τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης . . . εἶδος.

223 B Perhaps ἢ <διὰ> τέχνης.

224 B οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα συνωνόμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταῦτὸν προσερεῖς ὄνομα;

There is no construction for νομίσματος. (Campbell governs it by ἀμείβοντα, leaving πόλιν without construction; for γῆν πρὸ γῆς ἐλαύνομαι is quite different. Besides, compare *Apol.* 37 D ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένην: *Polit.* 289 E πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως ἀλλάττοντες.) I suspect a subordinate participle has dropped out and we should read

νομίσματος <πωλοῦντα> ἀμείβοντα, which gives the sense needed. Cf. 228 c, where B has θέμενα, T with Galen and Stobaeus θέμενα πειρώμενα, which is no doubt right.

ibid. c Read τῷ γε with the Vienna MS. for τό γε and in the next line τῷ δέ. Compare *e.g.* 225 A and 262 D.

225 A The answer ἔστιν should, I think, be ἔστω. Cf. ἐχέτω 227 c.

226 c περὶ ταῦτά, not ταῦτα?

ibid. Theaetetus, asked if he can see how to divide a certain genus into two species, says ταχεῖαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψιν ἐπιτάττεις. It is unsatisfactory either to take this ironically (Jowett) or to make it mean 'that is rather a rapid enquiry for my small powers' (Heindorf). I suspect the loss of a negative, οὐ ταχεῖαν, or possibly οὐ βραχεῖαν, ταχύς and βραχύς being liable to interchange. Cf. below 226 E ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τό γε καθαρτικὸν εἶδος αὐτὸ διπλοῦν ὃν πᾶς ἂν ἴδοι. ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, κατὰ σχολήν γε ἴσως· οὐ μέντοι ἔγωγε καθορῶ νῦν, which perhaps favours (οὐ) ταχεῖαν as against (οὐ) βραχεῖαν. But the use of ταχύς seems strange, especially as the stranger has said nothing about time.

228 c For αὐτὰ πάσχειν read τοῦτο, or possibly ταῦτα, πάσχειν.

ibid. D ἔστι δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ὡς φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν αὐτῇ (the soul) γένη.

Rather κακιῶν. Cf. κακίαν and δύο εἶναι γένη κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ immediately following: also 227 E δύο εἶδη κακίας περὶ ψυχῆν ῥητέον. Cf. p. 319.

229 D Should τὸ μὲν ἄλλο be τὰ μὲν ἄλλα? That suits better the plural διδασκαλίας.

231 B It is difficult to get any meaning out of ὁπόταν ἱκανῶς φυλάττωσιν, nor does Heindorf's φυλαχθῶσιν or Schanz' φυλάττωμεν satisfy one. Madvig probably gave the meaning rightly in his φωραθῶσιν (*i.e.* οἱ σοφισταί), but I would suggest that φανῶσιν is what Plato wrote. φαίνομαι or some kindred word appears over and over again

throughout the dialogue in the sense that the nature of the sophist is ascertained by the discussion: e.g. 224 D: 231 D (ὀπόσα ἡμῖν ὁ σοφιστῆς πέφανται), etc. φυλάττωσιν, which is not very much like φανῶσιν, may be due to the influence of φυλακῆν two lines before and be a 'false echo' of it not quite in the sense Campbell intends.

232 E Read ὑπολείπειν for ὑπολιπεῖν. Since Heindorf editors always adopt λείπειν for λιπεῖν in 227 D,

234 A ΘΕΑΙ. παιδιὰν λέγεις τινά. ΞΕ. τί δέ; τήν τοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι πάντα οἶδε κ.τ.λ. μῶν οὐ παιδιὰν νομιστέον;

I do not see how Campbell can be right in supplying τέχνην with τήν τοῦ λέγοντος, as the word has not occurred recently enough (233 D). We certainly must not supply παιδιάν from what precedes, but it is just possible that the gender (τήν for τό: Schanz alters τήν to τό) is due to the predicate παιδιάν which is coming. This is probably what Stallbaum meant, but he fails to make it clear. Such an attraction however, though common in some uses of pronouns, is not known to me in the article, and some parallels would be welcome. Pending their discovery, we might consider whether a substantive such as ὑπόσχεσιν has not been omitted. The verb ὑπισχνούμαι occurs just below and twice in 232 D. It might be put in either after λέγοντος or after χρόνῳ.

ibid. E παραγενομένων. Probably παραγινομένων.

235 A νῶν τῆς παιδιᾶς μετεχόντων ἐστὶ τις μερῶν.

μερῶν is bracketed by Schanz, marked as corrupt by Burnet. Should we not read γενῶν? Cf. a few lines below τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματοποιῶν τις εἷς. In Thuc. 2. 37. 2 Herwerden's οὐκ ἀπὸ γένους for οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους is certainly attractive.

236 E εἰπόντα is hard to explain. Perhaps it should be εἰπεῖν, 'say that it is really possible to speak or think what is false.' εἶπον occasionally takes accusative and infinitive, e.g. Gorg. 473 A.

237 A οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε τοῦτο δαμῆ, εἶναι μὴ ἔοντα.

So Simplicius gives the verse of Parmenides, though the MSS. of Plato (here and in 258 D) and Aristotle (*Met.* 13. 2. 1089 a 4) agree in τοῦτ' οὐδαμῆ. δαμῆ is at first sight strange and has provoked many doubts and suggestions. But, when we recall the similar use of αἰρεῖν for *prove*, and compare Pindar's ἀγῶνα δαμάσσας, we may very well acquiesce in it. Of course to Parmenides it meant rather *won*, *gained*, than *proved*, or the point is spoken of as a difficulty *overcome*. Cf. also *Polit.* 284 B καθάπερ ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ προσηναγκάζομεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, *Theaet.* 153 C, 196 B?, *Rep.* 611 B. Perhaps we may compare νικᾶν γνῶμην and Hor. *S.* 1. 3. 115 *nec vincet ratio hoc*.

239 C ἕως ἄν τινα δυναμένῳ δρᾶν τοῦτο ἐντυγχάνωμεν.

If right, this can only mean 'until we find ourselves talking with.' If it were 'until we meet,' the verb would have to be in the aorist.

241 E αὐτῶν. ὄντων? αὐ?

242 C εὐκόλως μοι δοκεῖ Παρμενίδης ἡμῖν διειλέχθαι . . . μῦθον . . . φαίνεται διηγείσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν.

εὐκόλως, *good-humouredly*, is hardly the right word. Badham οὐχ ὄλως, *did not even argue*. Did not Plato write εὐχερῶς? *Theaet.* 154 B θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν: *Dem.* 18. 70 ὃ λέγων εὐχερῶς ὅτι ἂν βουλευθῆς. In *Phaedo* 117 C εὐχερῶς and εὐκόλως are joined together, but that is far from showing that the latter can stand here.

243 A Some infinitive going with χαλεπόν, e.g. εἰδέναι or εἰπεῖν, seems wanted.

244 A ἵνα μὴ δοξάζωμεν μαθάνειν μὲν τὰ λεγόμενα.

μὲν seems in a very questionable place. Perhaps μαθάνειν μὲν δοξάζωμεν or δοξάζωμεν μὲν μαθάνειν. There is no objection to μὲν after -μεν. Cf. *Polit.* 281 D λέγομεν μὲν: *Rep.* 353 A θήσομεν μὲν: even Isocrates 6. 85 ἀνορθώσομεν μὲν: 15. 311 ἐπαινοῦμεν μὲν.

247 E λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιαοῦν κερτημένον δύναμιν εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὅτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου . . . τίθεμαι γὰρ ὄρον ὀρίζειν τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις.

τι seems needed either before or after ποιεῖν. It would fall out easily before π, which is often almost indistinguishable from it. ὅτιοῦν seems to go with ἕτερον and correspond to φαυλοτάτου.

ὀρίζειν and ὀρίζειν τὰ ὄντα have been bracketed. Boeckh wrote ὀρίζων.

It does not seem likely that Plato said τὰ ὄντα themselves were δύναμις, nor does 248 c support it. It is οὐσία which is δύναμις, and I cannot but think οὐσία (with ὡς ἔστιν) or οὐσίας (with ὄρον) has been lost. But what to do with ὀρίζειν τὰ ὄντα, unless it should be simply omitted, I do not know.

251 A καί, ἐὰν αὖ μῆδέτερον ἰδεῖν δυνώμεθα, τὸν γοῦν λόγον ὅπηπερ ἂν οἰοί τε ὤμεν εὐπρεπέστατα διωσόμεθα οὕτως ἀμφοῖν ἄμα.

Campbell and Badham defend διωσόμεθα in different ways. Others have proposed emendations, but nobody what seems to me a certain correction, namely διαδυσόμεθα. If they cannot satisfy themselves (says the stranger) about either being or not-being, at any rate they will with the utmost credit *escape, make their way through*, the difficulties of both. The very same expression occurs in this dialogue 231 c ἀπορεῖν ὅπη ποτὲ ἔτι διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον. διαδύεσθαι τὸν λόγον can be contrasted with what is called in *Phil.* 43 A ὑπεκστῆναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον. Cf. also *Polit.* 284 B κατὰ τοῦτο διέφυγεν ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος.

253 E τό γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλω δώσεις.

This use of the neuter does not seem like Plato. Perhaps διαλεκτικὸν <εἶναι>.

255 E ἐν οἷς προαιρούμεθα <σκοπεῖν>, as in 256 D. The sense is otherwise incomplete.

259 C ταῦτα ἐάσαντα ὡς δυνατά.

ἀνήνυτα for δυνατά Badham, and that gives very good

sense. But we might also think of ἀνόνητα, which seems to me to suit the context better, as the stranger goes on to say that these things are not an ἔλεγχος ἀληθινός and that they argue a novice.

265 D διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν πολλάκις ἀμφοτέρα μεταδοξάζω.

The sense certainly requires δοξασόντων for δοξαζόντων immediately below, and, that being so, I would read μεταδοξάζω here too. It also agrees better with ἴσως.

ibid. E The stranger will not argue a point, because he sees that Theaetetus is sure shortly to adopt it: χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ γίγνεται ἄν.

Heindorf seems inclined to read λόγος for χρόνος, and there should, I think, be no doubt that it is necessary to do so. Nobody in such a case would say that time was superfluous. Argument is superfluous, because time by itself will produce the desired result. For the mistake see my *Aristophanes and Others*. *Index*, s.v. χρόνος.

267 A ὅταν οἶμαι τὸ σὸν σχῆμά τις τῷ ἑαυτοῦ χρώμενος σώματι προσόμοιον ἢ φωνὴν φωνῇ φαίνεσθαι ποιῆ, μίμησις τοῦτο τῆς φανταστικῆς μάλιστα κέκληται πον.

The difficulty of this has perhaps not been sufficiently noticed. The sense required is 'makes his body or voice like yours,' while the words actually mean 'makes your figure or voice like his,' an impossible inversion. Who ever wrote or deliberately spoke like this? Perhaps the same accident has occurred that we seemed to find in 224 B and another participle governing τὸ σὸν σχῆμα has been lost. 'Representing your figure,' 'having your figure in his mind,' etc., would make good enough sense. Τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα would be the object of ποιῆ, put in the dative after the participle according to the ordinary rule, though this would certainly be harsh. I suggest then the insertion of (say) ἀπεικάζων, or even μιμούμενος itself, which would perhaps be more likely to fall out near χρώμενος. Cf. B τὸ σὸν σχῆμα . . . μιμήσαιο and *Crat.* 432 B εἴ τις . . . τὸ σὸν χρώμα καὶ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσειεν. We might also think of <κατὰ> τὸ σὸν σχῆμα, or perhaps of the considerable inversion τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα and τῷ σῷ χρώμενος σχήματι.

POLITICUS.

258 D Some τέχναι have nothing to do with action and give knowledge only: αἱ δέ γε περὶ τεκτονικὴν αὖ καὶ σύμπασαν χειρουργίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐνοῦσαν σύμφυτον τὴν ἐπιστήμην κέκτηνται καὶ συναποτελοῦσι τὰ γιγνόμενα ὑπ' αὐτῶν σώματα πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα.

The last clause as it stands would seem to mean that these arts help to produce the things which are produced by them. Campbell makes better sense of it only by straining the meaning of ἀποτελῶ ('perfect') and making αὐτῶν refer to πράξεσι when it would naturally refer to the subject of συναποτελοῦσι. Reflection will lead us, I think, to substitute συναποτελοῦσαν. This practical ἐπιστήμη is described as ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐνοῦσα and συναποτελοῦσα τὰ γιγνόμενα σώματα, and αὐτῶν are the arts in question.

ibid. E πότερον . . . θήσομεν ὡς ἐν πάντα ταῦτα προσαγορεύοντες ;

The words seem insufficient, unless we read something like ταῦτα <ταὐτὸ> προσαγορεύοντες, 'put them down as one, giving them all the same name.' Cf. 259 D εἰς ταὐτὸν ὡς ἐν πάντα ταῦτα ξινηθήσομεν, where perhaps we should read ὡς ἐν ὄν.

264 E τὸ πολιτικὸν οὐ . . . ζητητέον ; would give the best sense if we might substitute οὐ περὶ (not Heindorf's ἢ περὶ) for ὥσπερ (B and T), εἰ περὶ, and one or two other MS. readings. In the next line perhaps ἄν should be added.

266 E παραδοῦναι τὰς τῆς πόλεως ἡνίας ὡς οἰκείας καὶ αὐτῇ ταύτης οὔσης τῆς ἐπιστήμης.

It would seem as though we ought to omit καί, as

Stephanus after one MS. did, or to insert after it something like *ιδίας*.

268 E ἀλλὰ δὴ τῷ μύθῳ μου πάνυ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν, καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες· πάντως οὐ πολλά ἐκφεύγεις παιδίας (*sic* B T) ἔτη.

Editors have usually been divided between *παιδιάς* a *game*, *play* and *παιδίας* *childhood*, either of which would be a genitive following on ἔτη, for ἐκφεύγειν requires an accusative. Campbell rightly points out that, to make sense with this, πολλά would have to be πολὺ; and we should expect τὰ τῆς before the genitive. He himself reads by his own slight alteration *παιδιάς* *games*, and Burnet follows him. But after παῖδες surely παιδία, not παιδιά, is the word we want, and therefore I should suggest *παιδιάν*: *it is only a few years since you emerged from childhood*. Cf. the correction of *πολεμίας* in 307 c to *πολεμίαν*.

ibid. ἦν τοίνυν καὶ ἔτι ἔσται τῶν πάλαι λεχθέντων πολλά τε ἄλλα καὶ κ.τ.λ.

I think we should read ἔστι for ἔσται, and understand the words somewhat differently. They are usually taken to mean that various other things in ancient story and the great portent of the sun's changing its course did occur and will yet occur again. But at this point it does not seem proper to bring in the statement that this and other things will occur again. The speaker comes to that presently. At starting he has only got to refer to this as an old legend. Also ἔτι ἔσται means rather *will still exist* than *will occur or exist again*. Reading ἔστι, I understand him to say that among other things belonging to old legend there used to be and still is the story of this portent, and he goes on ἀκήκοας γάρ που κ.τ.λ. This certainly seems the sense in which his interlocutor understands him. The confusion of ἔστί and ἔσται is not uncommon, but it usually works the opposite way.

269 A αὐτό should perhaps be αὐτά. Badham αὐτόν.

270 A διὰ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον ὄν καὶ ἰσορροπώτατον ἐπὶ μικροτάτου βαῖνον ποδὸς ἰέναι.

For ἰέναι read εἶναι. βαῖνον ἰέναι is very pleonastic, while the resolution of verbs into participles with εἶναι is a

marked feature of Plato's later style. Cf. in this dialogue 257 A ἀκηκούτες εἶναι, 273 B ἦν μετέχον, 289 A, 296 C, etc.

272 B ὄν λόγος ἐπὶ Διὸς εἶναι.

For ὄν B and T have ὡς, other MSS. ὄν ὡς. Perhaps ὄν καί. See *Index*, s.v. καί ὡς.

273 A ὁ δὲ (κόσμος) μεταστρεφόμενος καὶ συμβάλλων ἀρχῆς τε καὶ τελευτῆς ἐναντίαν ὁρμὴν ὁρμηθεὶς κ.τ.λ.

Both συμβάλλων and the genitives are obscure. Read συμβάλλων ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτήν, *bringing together beginning and end*. The end of one system is the beginning of another. Cf. note on 268 E above, where παιδίαν is proposed for παιδίας. [So Postgate.]

ibid. θορύβων τε καὶ παραχῆς ἤδη πανόμενος καὶ τῶν σεισμῶν γαλήνης ἐπιλαβόμενος.

It will be an improvement in every way to read κάκ τῶν σεισμῶν, just as in 292 B we have κάκ τῆς ἐπιστατικῆς. In Aristotle *Hist. An.* 5. 5. 541 a 27 αἱ δὲ πέρδικες, ἂν κατ' ἄνεμον στῶσιν αἱ θηλείαι τῶν ἀρρένων, ἔγκυοι γίνονται· πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τῆς φωνῆς, ἂν ὀργῶσαι τύχῳσι, καὶ ὑπερπετομένων ἐκ τοῦ καταπνεῦσαι τὸν ἄρρενα it is plain that κάκ τῆς φωνῆς should be read, and in Aesch. *Eum.* 280 I suspect Aeschylus wrote

βρίζει γὰρ αἶμα κάκμαραίνεται χερός,

for the genitive χερός seems almost to require it. The substitution of καί for κάκ or κὰν is fairly common.

274 D ὅλος ὁ κόσμος, ᾧ συμμιμούμενοι καὶ συνεπόμενοι . . . ζῶμεν.

ᾧ συνεπόμενοι καὶ συμμιμούμενοι? So in A ἀπομιμούμενα καὶ ξυνακολουθοῦντα τῷ . . . παθήματι.

277 A πλείω καὶ μείζω τοῦ δέοντος <εἰς> ἕκαστα τῶν ἔργων ἐπεμβαλλόμενοι?

ibid. E ἐν <μὲν> ταῖς βραχυτάταις.

278 D ἡ ψυχὴ . . . τότε μὲν ὑπ' ἀληθείας περὶ ἐν ἕκαστον ἔντισι συνίσταται, τότε δὲ . . . φέρεται.

The compound συνίσταται does not seem right. In

contrast with *φέρεται* we want *ἴσταται*. *συν* is perhaps a repetition of the last letters of *τισί* (*τισίν*).

He goes on *καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀμῆ γέ πη τῶν συγκράσεων ὀρθῶς δοξάζει*, where the genitive is odd. Should not *τὰ μὲν* be *τὰς μὲν*, *αὐτῶν* agreeing with *τῶν συγκράσεων* and contrasting them with the *στοιχεῖα*? Cf. however 290 E *τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ μάλιστα πάτρια τῶν ἀρχαίων θυσιῶν*.

281 C *δοκεῖν χρή . . . προσποιήσασθαι*.

The future *προσποιήσεσθαι* is necessary, like *ἀμφισβητήσουσιν* a few lines before.

282 B *ταλασιουργικῆς δύο τμήματά ἐστων, καὶ τούτοις ἐκάτερον ἅμα δυοῖν πεφύκατον τέχναις μέρη*.

The expression will be much more exact, if we insert *κατά* after *καί*, i.e. *καὶ <κατά> τούτοις ἐκάτερον*. The two words are much alike and sometimes confused.

284 B *καθάπερ ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ προσηναγκάσαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τοῦτο διέφυγεν ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος*.

Surely *διέφυγεν*. ὁ λόγος *διέφυγεν ἂν*, if they had failed to vindicate not-being. Cf. 275 D and see p. 26.

287 B *τῶν πολλῶν* and *πασῶν* seem to call for the insertion of *τεχνῶν*, which can hardly be supplied from anything in the context.

ibid. D *τούτων δ' αὖ* should, I think, be *τούτων δ' αὐτῶν*.

293 C For *καὶ ἐκόντων* read *καὶ εἰ* or *κἂν ἐκόντων*, as in A *ἐάντε . . . ἐάντε . . . καὶ ἐάν . . .* The awkward construction of the whole passage might be mended by putting a considerable stop at *μόνον* and reading *ἐάντε <δέ>*.

ibid. D *ἐάν τε . . . καθαίρωσιν . . . εἴτε καὶ . . . ποιῶσιν ἢ . . . αὐξῶσιν*.

'Εάν can hardly carry on its force over the *εἴτε*, so as to make subjunctives possible. Must we not read *ποιούσιν* and *αὐξοῦσιν*?

296 E *τούτων δεῖ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὸν ὅρον εἶναι τὸν γε ἀληθινώτατον ὀρθῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως, ὃν ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς*

ἀνὴρ διοικήσει τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων ; ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης τὸ τῆς νεὸς καὶ ναυτῶν ἀεὶ συμφέρον παραφυλάττων κ.τ.λ.

So this passage is written in all the editions I have consulted. Stallbaum translates τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων *res civium*, Campbell *the condition of his subjects*, Jowett *the affairs of his subjects*. But in reality τό goes with the συμφέρον which is coming in the next clause governed by παραφυλάττων. τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων συμφέρον is compared to τὸ τῆς νεὸς καὶ ναυτῶν συμφέρον. The mark of interrogation should therefore be deferred and put after σῶζει τοὺς συνναύτας at the end of the ὥσπερ clause, though the sentence is really anomalous, Plato forgetting that he began with a question and after the ὥσπερ clause rambling into another which takes it up with a οὕτως.

297 B Transpose the words and read καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πρὸς ἐκείνα ἀντιρρητέον.

ibid. c Should not ἄν be κὰν (cf. 293 c above)? The sense requires not *if* but *even if*.

298 c ἐξείναι δὲ καὶ ιδιωτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν . . . γνώμην ξυμβαλέσθαι.

Insert ὄψοῦν or τῷ βουλομένῳ or something similar. The genitive cannot stand alone.

302 B The stranger proposes to consider a certain point, καίπερ πρὸς γε τὸ νῦν προτεθὲν ἡμῖν πάρεργον λεγόμενον.

For λεγόμενον read γιγνόμενον or perhaps <ἄν> γενόμενον. λεγόμενον is not suitable and the two words are liable to confusion. See. p. 239.

ibid. c τὴν αὐτὴν τοίνυν (i.e. ἀρχὴν) φάθι τριῶν οὐσῶν χαλεπὴν διαφερόντως γίγνεσθαι καὶ ῥάστην.

ῥάστην I take to be a mere blunder for ἀρίστην, encouraged no doubt by the opposition of χαλεπὴν. See further on in E μοναρχία (which is what he means here) ζευχθεῖσα μὲν ἐν γράμμασιν ἀγαθοῖς, οὓς νόμους λέγομεν, ἀρίστη πασῶν τῶν ἔξ' ἄνομος δὲ χαλεπὴ καὶ βαρυτάτη συνοικῆσαι : and again 303 B ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ (ζῆν) πρῶτόν τε καὶ ἄριστον. The question all through is about goodness

and badness : see especially 303 A. ῥᾶστοι is a very plausible conjecture for ἄριστοι in Thuc. 3. 38. 5.

303 C With εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι there must have gone some word now lost like λεκτέον or νομιστέον.

ibid. τοῦτο μὲν ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν ὡσπερ δράμα.

Is there some such word lost as πεπέρανται? Cf. *Rep.* 451 c. It may be that the sentence only loses itself and that ἐχωρίσθη represents the proper verb.

306 C D As in 303 c, only more decidedly, a verb seems needed in the sentence beginning with ὀξύτητα καὶ τάχος, to go with εἶτε γέγονας κ.τ.λ. Perhaps μνημονεύεις or μνήμην ἔχεις.

PHILEBUS

11 c The difficulty of the singular number in ὠφελιμώτατον might be avoided by reading ὠφελιμώτατ' ἄν.

13 B κακὰ δ' ὄντα αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν, ὁμῶς πάντα σὺν προσαγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ αὐτά.

How are the words καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ to be understood? Bury has no comment on them, nor—strange to say—has Badham. αὐτῶν refers to τὰ ἡδέα, and, if the Greek were capable of meaning that these were a mixed mass, some good, some evil (as Stallbaum, Jowett, Jackson seem to understand), the sense would be satisfactory. But it can only mean that most of them are good as well as bad, which is not only not Socrates' contention but inconsistent with a protest against Protarchus' calling them good. καί—δέ is a familiar phrase enough, though not frequent in Plato, and means simply 'and so and so also.' What we want therefore here is some further predicate of most pleasant things, going along with or a little beyond badness. If the book were Aristotle's, I should suggest φευκτά. Some word more or less with that sense would be suitable. ἀγαθὰ seems due to the ἀγαθὰ of the next line, unintentionally anticipated. τὰ πολλὰ and πάντα αὐτά are not logically quite right, but that is another matter.

In the sentence following we can either correct ἐνόν to ἐνορῶν or ἐννοῶν or read something like ἐνὸν εὐρών or ὄρῶν. Cf. 16 D εὐρήσειν γὰρ ἐνούσαν.

Badham would not have proposed the excision of συγχωρήσεται, if he had read the words, as they should probably be read, with a pause after either συγχωρήσεται

or τὰγαθόν. It is also possible that ἀνέξεσθαι (or ἀνέχεσθαι?) depends directly on συγχωρήσεσθαι, like συνεχώρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι or -εἶσθαι in *Prot.* 333 D.

ibid. c In view of the present tense φερόμεθα it seems needless to alter τιτρώσκει with Jackson to a future.

14 B τὴν τοίνυν διαφορότητα, ὃ Πρώταρχε, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ τ' ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ σοῦ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, κατατιθέντες δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον τολμῶμεν, ἄν πη ἐλεγχόμενοι μηνύσωσι πότερον κ.τ.λ.

No doubt ἐλεγχόμενοι, if right, requires the omission with Bury and Burnet of τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, so that ἐμοῦ and σοῦ may agree with λόγον as in the preceding sentence, but this seems to me a little awkward. The alternative is ἐλεγχομένω, the dual, for Stallbaum's ἐλεγχόμεναι, meant to agree with a plural διαφορότητες, surely cannot stand. It would be just possible to write λόγον for ἀγαθοῦ. It is however τολμῶμεν I am concerned with. The word makes no sort of sense here and has nothing in common with τολμῶ λέγειν ὡς in 13 D. Badham's τὸ λόγω, ὀρῶμεν is too great a change, and Madvig's τολμῶμεν <μετιέναι> not more than possible. ὁμολογῶμεν, a word used hereabouts very often, seems to me more likely. If ογ were lost, as after two similar syllables it might well be, ὁμολῶμεν would pass into τολμῶμεν with no great difficulty.

ibid. c ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῆ Πρώταρχον ἕνα γεγονότα φύσει πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις.

Does not the antithesis require <τὸν> ἐμέ to match τοὺς ἐμέ?

ibid. E ποῖα . . λέγεις ἂ μῆπω συγκεχωρημένα δεδήμενται.

One would expect δεδημευμένα συγκεχώρηται. They become common and familiar first, and matters of general agreement only in consequence of that. The exchange of terminations is always possible.

15 A ἐνταυθοῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔν . . συγκεχώρηται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἐλέγχειν· ὅταν δὲ τις ἕνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῆ τίθεσθαι καὶ βούν ἕνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἢ πολλὴ σπουδὴ μετὰ διαίρεσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται.

Madvig suggests σπουδῇ the dative. But, while that would come in awkwardly and be indeed doubtful in point of grammar, μετὰ διαιρέσεως is and would be quite out of place. ἡ πολλὴ ἀμφισβήτησις is all we need and all we ought to have. I would therefore, adopting σπουδῇ, propose to put σπουδῇ μετὰ δ. with ἐλέγχειν three lines above. The words would be as appropriate there as they are disturbing and perplexing where they occur.

ibid. B Concurring in the view that πρῶτον μὲν . . . εἶτα . . . μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο convey three distinct points and that there must be something wrong with ὁμῶς in the statement of the second, I find the suggested ὄντως (Susemihl, perhaps Bury: ὅλως one view of Badham's) not very satisfactory, as being awkward by the side of βεβαιότατα. Might we read μηδαμῶς, going with the words preceding? νην before it would facilitate the loss of μηδ.

ibid. C ἀπάσης ἀπορίας αἷτια μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογηθέντα καὶ εὐπορίας ἂν αὖ καλῶς.

Probably ἂν is εἰάν and we are to understand ὁμολογηθῆ with it.

ibid. D πόθεν οὖν τις ταύτης ἄρξεται πολλῆς οὔσης καὶ παντοίας περὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα μάχης;

Does not ταύτης need a τῆς? Either insert one or read τοιαύτης.

16 A Badham's ὀλίγον δ' οὐδέ for ὀλίγον δὲ καί is unnecessary, I think, because Plato probably was not thinking of φειδόμενος οὔτε . . . οὔτε κ.τ.λ., which would certainly call for οὐδέ, but going back in his mind to τὸν ἐχόμενον.

ibid. B οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο ἧς ἐγὼ ἐραστής εἰμι αἰεί.

Madvig wrote ἧ before ἧς, but there is probably no reason why the genitives should not do double duty, first as dependent on the comparative, secondly as dependent on ἐραστής. Cf. Xen. *R.L.* 9. 1 ἐπισκοπῶν τις ἂν εὔροι μείους

ἀποθνήσκοντας τούτων τῶν ἐκ τοῦ φοβεροῦ ἀποχωρεῖν αἰρουμένων, where τῶν . . αἰρουμένων is at once governed by μείους and partitive. There too Heindorf proposed to insert ἦ after τούτων, and of course after ν it might easily fall out.

ibid. D τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων.

There is no difficulty in regarding ἐν as indeclinable and a potential plural. Cf. 15 C περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν καὶ πολλά and 17 E ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ὀτιοῦν.

ibid. E οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἐν μὲν ὅπως ἂν τύχῃσι καὶ πολλά θάπτῃσι καὶ βραδύτερον ποιῶσι τοῦ δέοντος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἄπειρα εὐθύς.

καὶ πολλά is often bracketed as unintelligible, which indeed it is. τὰ πολλά *plerumque* has also been substituted for it. Might not πολλακίς get corrupted? For καί before βραδύτερον we might be tempted to read ἦ, but in this sort of use Greek often has *and* where we say *or*.

17 B τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ γραμματικὸν ἕκαστον ποιῶν ἡμῶν. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ὃ τυγχάνει ποιῶν τοῦτ' ἔστι ταυτόν.

Bury seems to agree with Paley that τό before μουσικόν is an inadvertent repetition from τὸ γραμματικόν. 'Otherwise,' he says, 'we must take it as a demonstrative rather than article.' But this is surely impossible. τὸ ὄ could stand like τῶν ὄσα in 21 C, but not with μουσικόν coming between. We might think of ὄν for ὄ, *i.e.* ὄν τυγχάνει, *any one*.

Is τοῦτ' ἔστι ταυτόν right? The almost invariable order is the reverse, ταὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, etc. In 38 E I would make a similar change.

He goes on φωνῇ μὲν που καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην ἔστι μία ἐν αὐτῇ, in which words καὶ τό is absent from the Bodleian, though found in T, the Venetian codex, and some scholars prefer to omit it or at any rate the τό. If we keep it, I would take τὸ κατὰ closely together, as in τὸ καθ' ἡμᾶς, τὸ κατὰ τοῦτον εἶναι, etc. It is curious how often the adverbial phrase τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο occurs in this dialogue (29 D, etc.). There is no reason, as Badham saw in his second edition, why ἐκείνην should not refer to μουσικόν.

18 A ὥσπερ γάρ, ἐν ὁτιοῦν εἴ τις ποτε λάβοι, τοῦτον ὡς φαμεν οὐκ ἐπ' ἀπείρου φύσιν δεῖ βλέπειν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινα ἀριθμὸν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὅταν τις τὸ ἀπείρον ἀναγκασθῆ πρῶτον λαμβάνειν, μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν τινα πλῆθος ἕκαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν τελευτῶν τε ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἓν.

Great difficulty has been found in ἐπ' ἀριθμὸν . . . κατανοεῖν, so much so that Burnet follows Liebholt in expunging ἐπ' and Bury inclines to the same course. For other views and proposals see Bury's note. I suggest ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν τινα πλῆθος ἐκάστων ἔχοντα, εἰ κατανοεῖς. Cf. 51 E ἀλλ', εἰ κατανοεῖς, ταῦτα εἶδη δύο and *ibid.* C εἴ μόν μανθάνεις: 26 C τὰ μὲν δὴ τρία ταῦτα εἶρηκα, εἰ συννοεῖς. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλ' οἶμαι κατανοεῖν: *Rep.* 510 A εἰ κατανοεῖς: *Polit.* 280 B εἰ ξυνοεῖς τὴν οἰκειότητα. The change of ἕκαστον to ἐκάστων would also, I think, be an improvement, ἐκάστων referring to the species contained in the genus. Cf. 17 E τὸ δὲ ἀπείρου ἐκάστων καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις πλῆθος and 19 A ἀπειρα αὐτῶν ἕκαστα γεγονέαι, though the use of ἕκαστα may not be quite the same.

19 C Is μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτόν complete without something like <ἀγνοοῦντα> added?

ibid. σὺν τήνδε ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν . . . ἐπέδωκας πᾶσι καὶ σεαυτὸν πρὸς τὸ διελέσθαι κ.τ.λ., but in E ἔδωκας εἰς ταῦθ' ἡμῖν σαντόν. Badham brackets καὶ σεαυτόν here, but this kind of pleonasm can at any rate be illustrated from Latin poetry, e.g. *Lucr.* 1. 6 *te, dea, . . . adventumque tuum* and 12 *te, diva, tuumque significant ininitum*: *Virg. Aen.* 8. 144 *me, me ipse meumque obiecti caput* (where Conington compares *Soph. O.C.* 750 *αἰεὶ σε κηδεύουσα καὶ τὸ σὸν κάρα*): Cf. *ibid.* 377: 10. 672, etc. The expression below in 64 c ἐπὶ τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ . . . προθύροις καὶ τῆς οἰκίσεως . . . τῆς τοῦ τοιοῦτου is very similar. *Spenser F. Q.* 5. 10. 12. 3 *himself and service to her offered*.

20 C τῶν δέ γε εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς οὐδὲν ἔτι προσδεησόμεθα.

τὰ εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν are things contributing or relating to the distinction of kinds. Cf. *Xen. Oecon.* 9. 6 *κόσμος ὁ εἰς ἑορτάς*.

ibid. D διαφέρον or διαφέρει for διαφέρειν ?

In the same section, though the infinitive λέγειν can be explained by an anacoluthic construction with οἶμαι, it may be only a mistake for λέγεις.

When Socrates says that a man aims at the good καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν φροντίζει πλὴν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς, I do not understand him to mean by the last words 'such things as involve goods in the process of their development,' (Bury: Badham would omit πλὴν), but 'such things as are brought about along with things good,' or in other words that we are indifferent to anything not compatible with real good, e.g. to pleasure that does not go along with good.

21 A ἔχεις should be ἔχῃς, as the other optatives show and as grammar requires.

22 A κοινὸς γιγνόμενος (not γενόμενος) ?

ibid. πᾶς δήπου τοῦτόν γε (τὸν βίον) αἰρήσεται πρότερον ἢ ἐκείνων ὀποτεροῦν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὔ.

Some very unsatisfactory attempts to deal with καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε (γε is wanting in T) may be found recorded in Bury's note, and I cannot regard his own γε(νήσεται) or ἔσται as more plausible. The phrase εἶναι πρὸς τινι is not really in place here, for it does not usually express more than a temporary occupation or absorption; and why should it be τούτοις, not τούτῳ? Surely καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε must be used in its ordinary sense, and further, just like πρὸς δέ γε τούτοις in 37 c. I infer therefore the loss of some word or words like those of 20 D θηρεῖ καὶ ἐφίεται βουλόμενον ἐλεῖν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ κτήσασθαι. Not a man here and there, but everyone will choose it, and not only choose it but actively pursue it. The emphasis of πρὸς τούτοις γε seems to point to the loss of more words than one.

ibid. B πᾶσι . . . αἰρετὸς οἷσπερ δυνατὸν ἦν οὕτως . . . ζῆν.

ὄσοισπερ would match πᾶσι better, and the last letters of αἰρετὸς may account for the loss. *Rep.* 615 A MSS. vary between οὖς and ὄσους, the latter being necessary: *ibid.* 349 D τοιοῦτος . . . οἷσπερ εἰκεν Madvig very plausibly suggests οἷσπερ. εἶχε just above (εἶχε τὰγαθόν) should probably be ἔχει.

ibid. Ε ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν μὲν ἡδονή σοι πεπτωκέναι . . . , τὸν δὲ νοῦν, ὡς ἔοικε, λεκτέον ὡς κ.τ.λ.

Is there any meaning in νῦν μὲν? The antithesis seems really to be between ἡδονή and νοῦς. I conjecture the loss of η after the final ν of νῦν, a not uncommon thing, and read δοκεῖ νῦν ἡ μὲν ἡδονή . . . , τὸν δὲ νοῦν κ.τ.λ.

23 Β καὶ γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται δεῖν ἄλλης μηχανῆς ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ νοῦ πορευόμενον οἶον βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων.

Burnet, who puts a comma after μηχανῆς, agrees presumably with Badham's first view, that δεῖν governs μηχανῆς and then in an explanatory way ἔχειν. In his later edition Badham expunged not only λόγων but ἄλλης μηχανῆς altogether. Is not the true solution to be found in reading ἄλλη μηχανῆ? Terminations such as ης, η (ηι), ην are constantly confounded. See for instance 48 Ε, where there is evidence for ἀρετῆ, ἀρετῆς, and ἀρετήν. For the phrase cf. Herod. 3. 83 δεῖ ἕνα γέ τινα ἡμέων βασιλέα γενέσθαι ἥτοι κλήρω γε λαχόντα ἢ . . . ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ μηχανῆ. With πορεύεσθαι there is a slight mixture of metaphors (31 Β ταύτη χρῆ πορεύεσθαι gives the proper expression), but that need hardly trouble us.

ibid. Δ εἰμὶ δ' ὡς ἔοικεν ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις ἱκανός (Bodl., ἱκανῶς T) κατ' εἶδη διστάς καὶ συναριθμούμενος.

Though Bury and Burnet adopt his suggestion in their text, I think Badham showed less than his usual insight in supposing ἱκανός to be a corruption of τις ἄνθρωπος (τισανός), for surely ἄνθρωπος would be feeble here. A word even more likely to be corrupted into ἱκανός or ἱκανῶς and much better in sense is κακῶς, going with the participles. In Lysias 13. 66 ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ ὑμῶν ἀπάντων μεμαρτύρηται is now read for κακῶς, and in Dio Chrys. 18. 4 ὥσπερ τις ἔφη τῶν παλαιῶν αὐτῷ κακός εἶναι μάντις, κἀγὼ ἐξαρκεῖν ᾧμην ἐμαυτῷ the conjecture ἱκανός for κακός or κακῶς is clearly necessary to the sense. Cf. *Index*, s.v. καλός

24 Α τὸ δὲ πέρας ἔχον ἡμᾶς περιμενέτω.

ΠΡΩ. μένει.

No doubt μενεῖ. Cf. 31 Α μεμνώμεθα δὴ κ.τ.λ. and the rejoinder μεμνησόμεθα.

ibid. δ' τὸ δέ is only the ordinary Platonic τὸ δέ but really (e.g. *Apol.* 23 A), not very common out of Plato.

25 DE Without discussing this passage at length I question the necessity of any transposition or even of changing *συναγομένων* in any way. οὐ *συνηγάγομεν* means that there was in 25 AB (*πρῶτον μὲν . . . μέτρον*) no good summary of the things contained in the class, giving their nature in a lucid intelligible way; no such summary in fact as Socrates goes on to give at the end of 25 D in the words *ὁπόση . . . ἀπεργάζεται*. This description of them taken along with the parallel description of the other class at the end of 24 E suggests in itself a combination and communion (*ὀρθὴ κοινωνία*) of the two classes, and this obvious suggestion along with τὸ τρίτον τὸ μεικτὸν ἐκ τούτων ἀμφοῖν in 25 B and *συμμίγνυ* κ.τ.λ. in 25 D fully accounts for the *φαῖνη γάρ μοι* κ.τ.λ. in E. *κάκείνη* in D refers to τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ μεικτὸν κ.τ.λ., modified in gender by τὴν τοῦ πέρατος γένναν and τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου.

26 B ὕβριν γάρ που καὶ σύμπασαν πάντων πονηρίαν αὕτη κατιδοῦσα ἢ θεός, ᾧ καλὸν Φίληβε, πέρασ οὔτε ἡδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ τάξιν πέρασ ἔχοντ' (so T: ἐχόντων B) ἔθετο.

A good deal has been written about this difficult sentence. I think *πέρασ . . . αὐτοῖς* is to be taken predicatively with *κατιδοῦσα*, as though an *οὔσαν* or by attraction ὄν had been added, and the reason why it was not is perhaps to be found in ἐνόν, side by side with which it would have been very awkward. The meaning is therefore 'perceiving that ὕβρις etc. consisted in the absence of any limit.' I would then understand ἔχοντ' ἔθετο as 'caused them to have' law and order as a limit. This is a fairly common use of τίθεσθαι in tragedy and other poetry (*τιθέναι* being poetical for *ποιεῖν*, *τίθεσθαι* for *ποιεῖσθαι*, quite regularly), and, though in prose the middle voice is not often so used, the active voice in this sense is well known.

αὕτη ἢ θεός—which we are not to amend to αὕτη ἢ σὴ θεός with Badham, but to understand rather as a deliberate antithesis to the θεός of Philebus—is a personification and apotheosis of the principle of the limit or of its practical application (ἢ ὀρθὴ κοινωνία 25 E).

ibid. D ἀλλὰ τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν, ἐν τούτῳ τιθέντα, τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων μέτρων.

Bury has contributed to the understanding of these words by his suggestion of ἀπειργασμένην, which I would accept, comparing *Frogs* 1282 στάσιν μελῶν | ἐκ τῶν κιθαρωδικῶν νόμων εἰργασμένην. He does not however point out, what must, I think, be the case, that the words γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν are not here to be understood as going together. Taken together, they make no sense in this context. γένεσις would be a process and Socrates is speaking, not of a process (Badham's γένεσιν οὔσαν quite ignores this), but of a class of things, γένεσις in another sense altogether, family, race, etc., just as the mainly poetical words γέννα and γενεά are used in this dialogue for the same purpose. γένεσις is used in this sense a few lines above (τῆς τοῦ τρίτου γενέσεως) and Ast's lexicon furnishes parallels. εἰς οὐσίαν then is dependent, not on γένεσιν, but on ἀπειργασμένην, brought into being, though Plato may have been half playing on the contrast of οὐσία and γένεσις.

Though μέτρων makes sense in a way, I cannot think that τὰ μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος μέτρα is a very natural or probable phrase for Plato to use. μετά seems questionable. Moreover τὰ μέτρα would be only one of the two indispensable elements, πέρας and ἄπειρον. ἐκ ought to introduce the two together, as in 32 A τὸ ἐκ τῆς (?) ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμφυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος. ἄπειρος is certainly his usual word, but it seems possible that he here wrote ἀμέτρων. Cf. 65 D οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων πεφυκὸς ἀμετρώτερον and ἀμετρία in 52 C along with ἔμμετρία, ἔμμετρος, and ἄπειρος: and μέτρον is eventually the paramount element in the good (64 D: 66 A).

28 C ἐν τῷ παίζειν. What is meant by this and by the reference to παιδιὰ in 30 E?

ibid. E οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν can only mean that the two alternatives are very different in character; one arguable, the other not: one worthy to be entertained, the other not, etc. The two hypotheses do not belong to the same class and order. The following are to some extent

parallel: *Rep.* 408 D οὐχ ὅμοιον πρᾶγμα τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ἦρον: *Xen. Symp.* 8. 34 οὐδὲν τοῦτο σημεῖον λέγοντες ὅμοιον: *Ar. Lys.* 594 μὰ Δί' ἄλλ' οὐκ εἶπες ὅμοιον.

29 B Should *σμικρόν τε* be *σμικρόν τι*, as in C?

30 A B οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γε κ.τ.λ.

I think the solution of the difficulty here is, not that Plato fell into a very clumsy anacoluthon (Stallbaum) nor that *πέρας . . . κοινόν* has taken the place of some entirely different words (Badham), but the much simpler hypothesis that a participle agreeing with the subject of *δοκοῦμεν* and governing the accusatives has fallen out. It may have been *διελόμενοι*, or any other of half a dozen words that could easily be suggested. Cf. 27 B *διωρισμένων τῶν τετάρων*.

The correctness of *ψυχὴν τε παρέχον* (see Badham and Bury) is attested by *βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν . . . ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν* in D.

31 D Are the words *τῆς ἁρμονίας μὲν λυομένης* (= *λυομένης μὲν* and followed by *πάλιν δὲ ἁρμοστομένης*) in the right order?

ibid. E *διῦπος δ' αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη καὶ λύσις*.

Instead of bracketing *καὶ λύσις* with Bury after Schleiermacher we ought perhaps to write *λύσις καὶ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη*, or possibly *φθορὰ καὶ λύπη ὡς λύσις* (*ὡς* for *καί* as elsewhere). *λύσις* seems from the context an essential word, and *φθορά* will not quite take its place. In the same sentence *ἡ* should probably be inserted after *παρὰ φύσιν*. Cf. on 22 E.

32 A *τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονός εἶδος*.

τῆς is given by B and T and also in the text of Stobaeus, but there is nothing to account for the feminine. *τὸ ἀπείρον* is of course the regular expression. When we compare 18 A *ἐπ' ἀπείρου φύσιν βλέπειν* and 24 E *τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως*, it seems possible that *ἐκ τῆς <τοῦ>? ἀπείρου <φύσεως>* should be read. *κατὰ φύσιν* in the same sentence need not prevent this.

ibid. B δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τινα ἔχειν.

Read δοκῶ. So *Rep.* 491 C ἔχεις γὰρ τὸν τύπον ὧν λέγω and in this dialogue 61 A τινὰ τύπον αὐτοῦ ληπτέον.

ibid. C Whether we keep, omit, or alter λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, it is difficult to make any sense of the description of wholly mental pleasures and pains as εἰλικρινέσιν . . . καὶ ἀμείκτοις, since they are clearly shown by Socrates subsequently to admit in some cases of coexisting elements of pain and pleasure respectively, just as the so-called bodily pleasures and pains do.

As to the construction of τότε μὲν ἀσπαστέον αὐτὰ κ.τ.λ. I think we must accept in principle Badham's insertion of ὡς (i.e. δοτέον ὡς) or Bury's ὅτι. Perhaps τὸ ὅτι was lost before τότε. Cf. *Phaedo* 102 C ὑπερέχουσαι τῷ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Or an εἶναι may be missing, governed by δοτέον: cf. 58 c.

ibid. D ὀρθότατα λέγεις ὅτι ταύτη πη δεῖ διαπορευθῆναι τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον.

Did Plato write διαπορευθῆναι? The text can hardly be right.

ibid. E εἴπερ ὄντως ἔστι τὸ λεγόμενον, διαφθειρομένων μὲν αὐτῶν ἀλγηδῶν, ἀνασφζομένων δὲ ἡδονῆ.

There is nothing in the context for αὐτῶν to refer to and Badham proposed to omit it. In my *Aristophanes and Others*, p. 174 and elsewhere I have pointed out passages in which it seems probable that αὐτοί or its cases should be corrected to πάντες or the cases corresponding. So here πάντων would make excellent sense and is supported by the πᾶν a few lines below, by B above τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονῆν, and by 42 C τῆς φύσεως ἐκείστων διαφθειρομένης μὲν κ.τ.λ.

In the epigram ascribed to Lucian (*Anthol.* 10. 31),

θνητὰ τὰ τῶν θνητῶν καὶ πάντα παρέρχεται ἡμᾶς·
ἦν δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ παρερχόμεθα,

I suspect the author wrote not αὐτὰ but πάντα. αὐτὰ is hardly strong enough for its place in the verse.

33 A B τῷ τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐλομένῳ βίον οἶσθ' ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν . . . ἐρρήθη γάρ . . . μηδὲν δεῖν μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν χαίρειν τῷ τὸν τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίον ἐλομένῳ.

Neither dative is possible as the words stand. It wants more than a passage or two in the poets and one doubtful sentence in Xenophon (*Anab.* 3. 4. 35, for the citation by L. and S. of *Oecon.* 7. 20 is a mistake) to make us believe that Plato could put a dative thus with δεῖ. May we not make it possible by reading μηδὲν δεῖν μήτε <τοῦ> μέγα κ.τ.λ. ? One τοῦ will probably be enough. In the earlier sentence I would read something like ἀποκωλύόν <έστι> ζῆν, or perhaps like <ἐλλείπον> ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.

34 B ἀναπολήση should, I think, be ἀναπολή, like ἀναλαμβάνη just before. Scribes (and, I am afraid, modern editors) do not always know the difference in meaning between an aorist and a present after ὅταν, ἔάν, etc. Cf. p. 161.

ibid. μή has been altered conjecturally in various ways. Badham's ἄμα would be attractive, did it not lay too much stress on ἐπιθυμίαν, for which the other ἄμα is quite enough. Possibly Plato wrote ἡμεῖς.

ibid. foll. It may be worth noting that throughout this passage κενοῦται, κενούμενος, etc. are mostly used not in a really present but rather in a perfect sense. κενούμενος here is *when empty*, not *when beginning to be empty*. Cf. the regular use of στερόμενος (e.g. 67 A) and a few similar present tenses, e.g. λείπεται *it remains, it is left* (so 55 E καταλειπόμενον and λείποιτ' ἄν).

36 D See p. 92.

38 c Badham demurs to ἐστάναι φανταζόμενον, and certainly φ. does not appear to govern an infinitive anywhere else. But we may observe (1) that φαινόμενον would give a wrong sense, and (2) that occasional infinitives after verbs and participles not usually taking them are fairly numerous, even in prose. Cf. Plato's own practice with ὀνομάζω, καλῶ, and προσαγορεύω, and the infinitives that occur after καταφρονῶ, σκοποῦμαι, πείθομαι. The construction in 38 D τάχ' ἂν ὡς ἔστι κ.τ.λ. προσείποι has

been questioned, but there *προσείποι* perhaps takes a *ὡς* clause as elsewhere it takes an infinitive. *ἄγαλμα* however is difficult in construction.

39 DE *πότερον οὖν τὰ γράμματα . . . περὶ μὲν τὸν γεγονότα καὶ τὸν παρόντα χρόνον ἔστιν, περὶ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα οὐκ ἔστιν;*

ΠΡΩ. *σφόδρα γε.*

At first sight *σφόδρα* seems to assent to the whole of the preceding question, but on looking into it we see that it really means *σφόδρα ἔστι περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα*. See note on *Rep.* 606 A. The general meaning therefore is like that of the question with *μὲν* and *δέ* and the answer in 41 E-42 A.

40 E *τί δέ; πονηρὰς δόξας καὶ χρηστὰς ἄλλως ἢ ψευδεῖς γιγνόμενας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν; ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἄλλως.*

There are here two difficulties. One is that *good* opinions ought not to be mentioned at all, just as good pleasures are not in the next words (*οὐδ' ἡδονὰς γε . . . πλὴν τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι*); and that, if they are, then we need *καὶ ἀληθεῖς* in addition to *ψευδεῖς*. Hence *καὶ χρηστὰς* is sometimes omitted. The other is that *ἄλλως ἢ ψευδεῖς γιγνόμενας* is an imperfect and impossible expression for *ἄλλως γιγνόμενας ἢ τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι*, as in the next sentence. Should we not read *πονηρὰς . . . ἄλλῳ ἢ ψεύδει γιγνόμενας* and *οὐκ ἄλλῳ*? So indeed we actually have a few lines below, *σχεδὸν γὰρ τῷ ψεύδει μὲν οὐ πάνυ πονηρὰς ἄν τις . . . θείῃ. ψευδῶς* (which we might think of) would not give the right meaning.

When Socrates says that pleasures too are only bad through falsity, Protarchus rejoins *πάνυ μὲν οὖν τούναντίον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴρηκας*, where *τούναντίον* is oddly used to express the opposite of the truth, and Bury seems to agree with Paley that something like *ἢ* (or *οἷς*) *εἴρηκας* should be read. In a fragment of Antiphanes (233 Kock: Meineke III. p. 149) there is a very similar use, unless the context altered the case:

ὁ διδοὺς τὸν ὄρκον τῷ πονηρῷ μαινεται.
 τούναντίον γὰρ νῦν ποιούσιν οἱ θεοί.
 ἔαν ἐπιορκήσῃ τις αὐτούς, εὐθέως
 ὁ διδοὺς τὸν ὄρκον ἐγένετ' ἐμβρόντητος, ὡς
 οἶμαι δικαίως, ὅτι πεπίστευκέν τινα,

for *τὸναντίον* there appears to be the opposite, not of anything specific preceding, but of what a man might expect. We cannot however altogether trust a fragment. For the brief and probably colloquial rejoinder in our passage cf. the note above on 28 E.

41 B τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα ἕως ἂν κέηται παρ' ἡμῶν ἀδύνατον ἀνέλεγκτον δῆπον γίγνεσθαι.

It cannot, I think, be right to say that *ἕως ἂν κέηται* means 'as long as it is proposed as a thesis for discussion.' Can any such use of *κείσθαι* be adduced from the Platonic dialogues? Over and over again it is used of a proposition taken, not itself to be discussed, but as the foundation of some argument to follow. The proposition in question is not always necessarily true, though it will usually be so, but its truth is at any rate assumed for the time being. *κείσθαι* answers to *τιθέναι* in the sense of *laying down*, *assuming*, *putting the case that*, etc. So in this dialogue Socrates repeatedly says *θές*, *τίθει*, etc., and Protarchus replies *κείσθω* (32 B, 33 D, 43 E, 56 C). In this very page we have at D a remarkably clear instance of its real meaning, *οὔκουν καὶ τόδε εἴρηται καὶ συνωμολογημένοι ἡμῶν κείται*; The sense here is therefore certainly not 'while it is before us' merely, but, as Badham maintained, 'until it is agreed, taken as true.' The sentence is not quite straightforwardly expressed, for Socrates does not mean so much that he will allow it to be *ἀνέλεγκτον*, when Protarchus has admitted it, as that, since Protarchus does not admit it, he must insist on its being examined. But there ought to be no doubt of its general sense. Cf. the note above on *Apol.* 22 A *ἴνα <μῆ> μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γένοιτο*, and on the sense and construction of *ἕως ἂν* that on *Phaedo* 74 C.

ibid. C τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλγηδόνα ἢ τινα διὰ πάθος ἡδονὴν τὸ σῶμα ἦν τὸ παρεχόμενον.

τό before *παραχόμενον* must certainly not be omitted. That would make *παραχόμενον* go with the τό before δέ, which from τὸ σῶμα ἦν intervening is quite impossible. If τὸ δέ is right, either Plato constructed his sentence a little

loosely, repeating τό, or we must read something like τὸ δέ . . . ἡδονὴν παρεχόμενον τὸ σῶμα ἦν, or τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἦν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα . . . τὸ παρεχόμενον.

ibid. D, E ΣΩ. τίς οὖν μηχανὴ ταυτ' ὀρθῶς κρίνεσθαι; ΠΡΩ. πῆ δὴ καὶ πῶς; ΣΩ. εἰ τὸ βούλημα ἡμῖν τῆς κρίσεως τούτων ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ διαγνώσθαι βούλεται ἐκάστοτε τίς τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλας μείζων καὶ τίς ἐλάττων καὶ τίς μᾶλλον καὶ τίς σφοδροτέρα, λύπη τε πρὸς ἡδονὴν κ.τ.λ.

Accepting Badham's εἰ <τόδε> τὸ βούλημα with a colon at τούτων (unless we should write εἰ τὸ βούλημα . . . τούτων <τοῦτο>), I would not omit καὶ τίς σφοδροτέρα (a very arbitrary method) or change μᾶλλον to μαλακωτέρα (Madvig) but rather hold that ἡσυχος has been lost. ἡσυχος is the proper antithesis to σφοδρός (24 c etc.) and ἡσυχος μᾶλλον is quite admissible for ἡσυχαιότερος. πρὸς ἀλλήλας for πρὸς ἄλλας is not logical but probably right. The subject of βούλεται with Badham's punctuation is not necessarily ἡ κρίσις: it might be a man, the subject vaguely implied in βούλημα τῆς κρίσεως. I have sometimes thought that τισί may be an error for τις.

42 B Perhaps <αἰ> λῦπαι δ' αὖ (αἰ lost after σφοδροτέρα).

43 E οὐδ' ἄρα ὁ μέσος βίος ἡδὺς ἢ λυπηρὸς λεγόμενος ὀρθῶς ἂν ποτε οὐτ' εἰ δοξάζοι τις δοξάζοιτο οὐτ' εἰ λέγοι λεχθείη.

The suggestion of γενόμενος for λεγόμενος should be accepted, except that I think γιγνόμενος would be better. λεγόμενος is incongruous and awkward with δοξάζοι and δοξάζοιτο. But Badham perhaps failed to see the real construction of the participle. It should be taken with δοξάζοιτο and λέγοιτο as almost = γενέσθαι, 'thought or spoken of as having happened.' Cf. 42 c οὐτ' αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς φαινόμενον ἐρεῖς, where φαινόμενον nearly = the more usual φαίνεσθαι. Cf. perhaps the reverse use of infinitive instead of participle 38 c above. λέγω, ἀγγέλλω, etc. sometimes take a participle; δοξάζοιτο here is helped by λέγοιτο. (Aesch. *Suppl.* 60 δοξάσει τις ἀκούων is easily changed, and in any case is poetry, not prose.)

I do not feel sure that λεγομένας in 45 A should not be in like manner γιγνομένας.

45 A Neither αἴπερ nor the conjecture εἴπερ makes good sense. Perhaps we should omit it and read ὄπερ for ὄ in the next line.

ibid. B The precise subject of ἀποπληρουμένων is not quite easy to fix. It may be the same as that of the main verb ἴσχοισι (cf. *Rep.* 458 D ὁμοῦ δὲ ἀναμειγμένων . . . ἄξονται : Thuc. 3. 13. 9 βοηθησάντων ὑμῶν . . . πόλιν τε προσλήψεσθε κ.τ.λ.) but its proximity makes this unlikely. It may pluralise the σώματος just preceding. But my impression is that ἀποπληρουμένων here refers to the food, drink, etc. themselves in another sense of πληροῦν and its compounds. The accusative after these verbs is sometimes not the thing filled, but the thing supplied, that with which it is filled, e.g. Eur. *I.T.* 954. Cf. Burns' 'fill it' (the wine) 'in a silver tassie' and Virgil's *vina bonus quae deinde cadis onerarat Acastes and onerantque canistris dona*, *Aen.* 1. 195 and 8. 180.

47 D αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν <ἐν> αὐτῇ?

So Burnet reads τὸ <ἐν> τοῖς θυμοῖς a few lines below, and after ἦν the loss would be still easier here.

ibid. E ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.

The editors do not seem to notice that here and twice in 50 B and C θρῆνος appears as a λύπη, in Aristotle's language a πάθος, side by side with πόθος, ἔρωτος, etc. Nor do L. and S. mention the use. Aesch. *P.V.* 388 may be an instance of it.

48 C ΣΩ. ἰδὲ τὸ γελοῖον ἦντινα φύσιν ἔχει. ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον. ΣΩ. ἔστιν δὴ πονηρία μὲν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον, ἕξως τινὸς ἐπίκλην λεγομένη τῆς δ' αὖ πάσης πονηρίας ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.

The editors are very unsatisfactory on this passage. Badham writes 'The genitive ἕξως τινὸς does not depend on πονηρία,' as Stallbaum makes it do, 'but upon ἐπίκλην. There is a certain πονηρία in general, called after (the) name of a particular habit : that is, called so from πονηρός, which denotes a particular habit.' It is curious he failed

to see, if I understand him, that *πονηρία* itself, not *πονηρός*, is the habit and cannot possibly be said to be *called after* it.

I take it in the first place that the subject of *ἔστιν δὴ* is *τὸ γελοῖον*. Absurdity is *πονηρία* or a *πονηρία*. Plato gives the genus first, and then proceeds to the species. Surely the *τις* with *πονηρία* must mean this. But the real difficulty, which I do not know how to solve, is what follows. In the regular sense of *ἐπίκλην*, *called after*, how can *πονηρία* or *τὸ γελοῖον* be described as *called after* a *ἕξις*? I say *τὸ γελοῖον*, for Plato uses it here evidently in the abstract sense, *absurdity*, not in the concrete, *anything absurd*, and *λεγομένη* is feminine by attraction to *πονηρία*, its real subject being *τὸ γελοῖον* (= *γελοῖότης*, a word probably not then in use). Unless there is something wrong with the Greek, I can only suppose that *ἐπίκλην* means here, though not elsewhere, *as a name*. (In *Critias* 114 B its use is very hard to follow, and there is authority there for *ἐπίκλησιν*. Are the words confounded here?) *τὸ γελοῖον* then is used as the name of a certain *ἕξις* and connotes a particular badness or faultiness. So Aristotle says *τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἔστι τὸ γελοῖον μῦθον τὸ γὰρ γελοῖόν ἐστιν ἀμάρτημά τι καὶ αἰσχος ἀνώδυνον κ.τ.λ.* (*Poet.* 5. 1449 a 33).

50 CD Either *λαβόντα . . . ἀφείναι* goes on from *πίστεως χάριν*, as though some part of the verb *πείθω* had been used, or some such word as *χρή* or *εἰκός* is missing. *δεῖν* certainly follows, not precedes, *ἀφείναι* in construction.

51 A *τοῖς φάσκουσι λυπῶν εἶναι παῦλαν πάσας τὰς ἡδονάς*.

Perhaps *παύλας*. Cf. *ἀναπαύσεσιν* just below and *λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγὰς* in 44 C. In 59 A the MSS. vary between *δόξαν* and *δόξας*.

In the previous line Bury and Burnet can hardly be right in adopting *ἡμῖν* as against *ὑμῖν* in the words *πειράσομαι . . . σημαίνειν ἡμῖν (ὑμῖν) αὐτάς*, though B and T give it. It is no more good Greek than 'I will try to show it to us' would be respectable English. Read *ὑμῖν*, which corresponds to Protarchus' *ὅσα λοιπὰ ἡμῖν διέξελε* just above. *ὑμεῖς* are Protarchus and the other youths

whose presence is indicated at the beginning of the dialogue 16 A B, where also Socrates uses ὑμεῖς, and at the end (67 B) in φαμὲν ἅπαντες.

ibid. C ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πρὸς τι καλὰ λέγω, καθάπερ ἄλλα, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι καὶ τινὰς ἡδονὰς οἰκείας ἔχειν . . . καὶ χρώματα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα καλὰ καὶ ἡδονάς.

For the last unintelligible words Bury proposes ἔχοντα καθαρὰς ἡδονάς, while Burnet brackets καλὰ καὶ ἡδονάς as spurious, herein following Stallbaum and Badham. Yet the smallest of changes will put the sentence right and retain the obnoxious words. Read καὶ χρώματα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τύπον καλὰ καὶ ἔχοντα ἡδονάς or ἡδονὰς ἔχοντα, the very phrase ἡδονὰς ἔχειν occurring in the previous line, as it does in *Rep.* 538 D, *Tim.* 64 E, and no doubt elsewhere. τοῦτον τὸν τύπον will be adverbial, though we do not find another example of this, just as Herod. 9. 66. 3 has τὸν αὐτὸν κόσμον and several times οὐδένα κόσμον, and Plato himself *Symp.* 207 D τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, and as many other words are now and then used (καιρόν, μέρος, τάχος, γνώμη, etc.).

ibid. D λέγω δὴ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων τὰς λείας καὶ λαμπράς, τὰς ἔν τι καθαρὸν ἰείσας μέλος.

For the first τὰς Madvig suggested the rare and probably quite poetical ἰάς, Bury ἡχάς, which Burnet adopts into his text. Is it quite certain that a *sound* could be said ἰείναι μέλος? A voice could, but the sound is itself the μέλος and the expression seems questionable. If my doubt is justified, it may point to φωνῶν (which has been suggested) or φθογγῶν, though φθογγή seems not to be found elsewhere in prose, and then perhaps we might read τινάς for the first τὰς, or even καί, which seems almost wanted. But it need not be the first τὰς that is wrong: perhaps we should change or omit the second.

ibid. E ταῦτα εἶδη δύο λεγομένων ἡδονῶν.

Both Bury and Burnet adopt Jackson's ὧν λέγομεν for λεγομένων. I should have thought that <τῶν> λεγομένων ἡδονῶν in the same sense was more simple and obvious.

There is no difficulty about τῶν λ. meaning 'the pleasures that we are speaking of' or 'that we spoke of.' Cf. 39 B τῶν λεγομένων εἰκόνας τούτων: 41 C αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμίαι: and apparently 46 D τὰς τῆς ψώρας λεγομένας νῦν δὴ (ἡδονάς).

52 D τί ποτε χρῆ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι; τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ εἰλικρινὲς ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ ἱκανόν;

For ποτέ read πρότερον, as Badham once suggested. τί ποτε; (*what in the world? what ever?*) is not appropriate here, but much too strong, as we may see from the very next words of Protarchus, τί ποτ' ἄρα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτᾶς βουλόμενος; in which it is natural enough. With πρότερον πρὸς ἀλήθειαν cf. 44 E τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθει: *Laches* 183 B πολλοὺς σφῶν προτέρους εἶναι πρὸς τὰ τοῦ πολέμου.

τί stands, as elsewhere, for πρότερον, *which of the two*.

καὶ τὸ ἱκανόν has been much called in question, Badham reading καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλόν, Apelt suggesting *μανικόν* for *ικανόν* and Burnet reading *ιταμόν* from his own conjecture. The truth seems to be that *ικανός* is not unfrequently used in a stronger sense than *enough*. It often means (notably in the *New Testament*, where *ικανοί* is also used for *many*, e.g. *Acts* 12. 12: 18. 18) *much, considerable, large*, etc. Notice for instance Antiphon 2. 1. 6 *ικανόν μέρος τῶν ὄντων ἀποβέβληκε*: 2. 2. 2 *ικανὰς λύπας . . . προσβέβληκε*: Dem. 42. 21 *ικανόν χρόνον δὲ οὐσίας καρπούμενος*: *Gorgias* 480 A *ικανόν κακὸν ἔξοντα* and 485 E *ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανόν μηδέποτε φθέγγασθαι*, where *καλόν* and *νεανικόν* have been conjectured: *Lysis* 204 A *οὐ φαῦλός γε ἀνὴρ, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸς σοφιστής, a good deal of a sophist*. There is therefore no sufficient reason for doubting the word here. Cf. p. 57. But perhaps τὸ σφόδρα should be τὸ σφοδρόν as above in C τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρόν. 37 c is no justification for the adverb, as it there qualifies the adjective.

53 A πῶς οὖν ἂν λευκοῦ καὶ τίς καθαρότης ἡμῖν εἴη; πότερα τὸ μέγιστόν τε καὶ πλείστον ἢ τὸ ἀκρατέστατον;

After either πότερα or πλείστον insert λευκώτατον. Without that the sense is very halting and τὸ μέγιστον

κ.τ.λ. is given not as λευκότετον but as καθαρότης. Observe that a few lines below λευκότερον καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον stand together in a way which almost necessitates their having occurred together before, just as we have ἡδίων καὶ ἀληθεστέρα καὶ καλλίων a little further on.

ibid. E After twice asking for explanation Protarchus is made by the MSS. to say τὸ τρίτον ἐτέρω λέγε σαφέστερον, which Badham emended excellently to τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐρῶ; λέγε σαφέστερον, followed by Bury and Burnet. Very probably that is right (or the same without interrogation). Cf. 65 E ὁμως δ' ἔτι λέγε τὸ τρίτον. But I venture to suggest the possibility of ἐπερῶ, just as I have suggested that for τούτοις αὐδῶ καθίς ἀπαυδῶ καὶ δὴ τό τρίτον μάλ' ἀπαυδῶ (*Frogs* 369) we should in both places, ἀπαυδῶ being palpably wrong, read ἐπαυδῶ. I would not make ἐπερῶ a question.

55 D καθαρώτερα, matching ἀκαθαρότερα?

56 A οὐκοῦν μεστή μὲν που μουσικὴ πρῶτον, τὸ σύμφυτον ἀρμόττουσα οὐ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτης στοχασμῶ, καὶ σύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητικῆ, τὸ μέτρον ἐκάστης χορδῆς τῷ στοχάζεσθαι φερομένης θηρεύουσα.

Bury seems right in proposing to make αὐλητικῆ and μουσικῆ change places. σύμπασα and the words that follow point strongly to this. Probably, as he says, αὐτῆς should be transferred along with αὐλητικῆ, so as to read μεστή μὲν που αὐτῆς αὐλητικῆ, though this is perhaps not absolutely necessary and there are in the *Philebus* some very involved arrangements of words. But I do not think he or any one has dealt satisfactorily with φερομένης. Ought we not to take it as one of the many instances in which a word has been accommodated in case to a word or words close by (67 B λόγων is perhaps a similar error for λόγους) and read φερομένη? The one participle would be, as often in Plato, subordinate to the other (θηρεύουσα). For μουσικῆ . . . τῷ στοχάζεσθαι φερομένη cf. *Phaedo* 99 A τὰ νῦρα καὶ τὰ ὄσῳ . . . ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου. In sense φερομένη goes fairly along with θηρεύουσα: I hardly see how it can be applied to a chord. Badham φθεγγομένης.

ibid. D Should the οὖν after διορισάμενος be ἄν? οὖν is a little out of place. It and ἄν sometimes get confused, e.g. *Frogs* 488, where οὐκ ἄν is necessary but MSS. give οὐκουν.

ibid. E ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα εὖ λέγεις οὐ σμικρὰν διαφορὰν τῶν περὶ ἀριθμὸν τευταζόντων, ὥστε λόγον ἔχειν δὴ αὐτὰς εἶναι.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; λογιστικὴ καὶ μετρητικὴ <ἦ> (not in B or T: added as correction in Ven. 189) κατὰ τεκτονικὴν καὶ κατ' ἐμπορικὴν τῆς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν καταμελετωμένων — πότερον ὡς μία ἑκατέρα λεκτέον ἢ δύο τιθῶμεν;

ΠΡΩ. τῆ (B T: τῆς Coisl.: τοῖς Bekker Burnet) πρόσθεν ἐπόμενος ἔγωγ' ἄν δύο . . . τιθείην.

What is the construction of the genitives τῆς κ.τ.λ.? Badham—though not on the ground of this difficulty—reads τί δὲ λογιστικὴ . . . τῆ κ. φ. γεωμετρία τε καὶ λογισμῶ, bracketing καταμελετωμένων, and understanding the words to mean ‘what is the relation of one to the other?’ But it is hardly possible for the dative to be so used: we should expect πρὸς with the accusative. I suggest very doubtfully τί δὲ λογιστικῆ (or τί δέ; λογιστικῆ) καὶ μετρητικῆ τῆ κατὰ τεκτονικὴν . . . τῆς . . . γεωμετρίας κ.τ.λ.; This might be translated roughly ‘and what about practical arithmetic differing from scientific?’ That is to say, the notion of the διαφορὰ in the previous words is carried on, as though he asked ἔστι διαφορὰ τῆ λογιστικῆ τῆς γεωμετρίας; just as we have a genitive after διαφορότης in *Parmen.* 141 c τό γε πρεσβύτερον διαφορότης νεωτέρου ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλον. For the confusion of nominative and dative cf. e.g. *Rep.* 521 D γυμναστικῆ μὴν καὶ μουσικῆ, where some MSS. have nominatives. ἦ would then have to be τῆ, if read at all.

58 A τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς (γνώσιν).

The difficulty about τὸ ὄντως might perhaps be removed by reading τὸ <ἀεὶ> ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως, in which case ὄντως would have ὄν to go with.

ibid. C D In this long and difficult sentence has it been observed that even without Badham's changes (ὑπερέχειν

and κρατεῖν δ' ἦ) we can construe the words very fairly and have no need to introduce any idea of an anacoluthon? We must put a full stop or colon after τῷ ἀληθεστάτῳ and understand τούτῳ . . . ἀληθεστάτῳ to go with κρατεῖν supplied again in the second part of the antithesis. The πραγματεία in question κρατεῖ τῷ ἀληθεστάτῳ just as the other κρατεῖ πρὸς χρείαν. Or we might possibly even join διαφέρειν with αὐτῷ . . . ἀληθεστάτῳ, though this is much less likely. ὑπάρχειν, to which Badham takes exception as superfluous, seems not out of keeping with the clumsy style of the whole dialogue. The general scheme of the sentence resembles that of 32 D, which is certainly imperfect. At the beginning there ought not to be much doubt that εἶναι should be added to τῷ μεγίστῳ κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Rep.* 501 A and *Theaet.* 170 B for τῷ and infinitive with διαφέρω.

59 A εἴ τε καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἡγείται τις ζητεῖν.

Badham ἤρηται, which is no doubt the sort of sense required. But there are many places in Greek, where ἡγοῦμαι, οἶμαι, etc. take an infinitive, in which we cannot escape introducing the notion of ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν, οἶμαι δεῖν, and it may be a moot point at present whether this notion of rightness can be conveyed by the two words or whether a δεῖν should be inserted. Without discussing that here I would only say that ἡγείται τις ζητεῖν is to be dealt with in whatever way we deal with Lysias 12. 26 οὐκ οἶει ἐμοὶ καὶ τουτοισὶ δοῦναι δίκην: Dem. 22. 5 οἶμαι . . . περὶ τούτων τὰ προβουλεύματα ἐκφέρειν μόνων: Xen. *Hell.* 4. 7. 4 οἱ δ' ἄλλοι στρατιῶται ᾤοντο ἀπιέναι and *ibid.* 5. 1. 15: Thuc. 2. 42. 5 (?), Aesch. in *Ctes.* 196, and very many other passages.

ibid. C ἢ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔσθ' ἡμῖν τό τε βέβαιον καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν κ.τ.λ. ἢ δεύτερος (δευτέρως corr. Ven. 189 Burnet) ἐκείνων ὅτι μάλιστά ἐστι συγγενές: τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα δεύτερά τε καὶ ὕστερα λεκτέον.

It is plain of course that δεύτερος has no construction, and the occurrence of δεύτερα in the next sentence has led to its being often bracketed for omission. It is however difficult to see how it got in by error, and the correction δευτέρως gives satisfactory sense. On the other hand we cannot suppose that Plato wrote δευτέρως and then δεύτερα:

they are indeed inconsistent. Should we retain δευτέρως and then write ἕτερα τέ καὶ ὕστερα? δεύτερος, πρότερος, ὕστερος, ἕτερος are all liable to get confounded in MSS.

ibid. D ταῦτ' ἄρα . . . ἐστὶν ἀπηκριβωμένα ὀρθῶς κείμενα καλεῖσθαι appears to me to be right as it stands, if we take ἐστὶν ἀπηκριβωμένα as the main predicate with ὀρθῶς κ. κ. thrown in epeexegetically, ὀρθῶς going perhaps more with καλεῖσθαι than with κείμενα, as in ὀρθῶς τεθέντ' ἔχειν 60 A.

60 E ταῦτὰ δὲ λεγέτω καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, εἴ τις ἄνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτ' ἂν φρόνησιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ τινων ἡδονῶν ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως αὐτίνος.

I am not sure that Bury here feels the real difficulty which leads Badham to omit a number of words. Socrates has no business to recur to 'pleasure without wisdom' and ask if any one would wish for it. That was disposed of in the sentence before, and this sentence should take up only 'wisdom without pleasure,' as ταῦτὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. shows. Who would write 'Let any one say whether a man would choose A without any B; and then in the same way about B let him say if any one would choose B without any A or A without any B'? Surely it is clear that the last five words would be illogical and confusing, as going back to what had been already put in the first half of the sentence. I do not however agree with Badham, who fails here, as he often does, to ask himself, or at any rate to show, why any one should have put in the words he proposes to leave out (ἢ μετὰ τινων ἡδονῶν and χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ). Though in my short sentence above it is wrong to say 'if any one would choose B without A or A without any B,' it would be quite logical, right, and natural to say 'if any one would choose B without any A *any more than* A without any B,' and, as the Greek ἢ can mean both *or* and *than*, I suspect this is what Plato really intended: that is, the ἢ before πάσας ἡδονὰς means *than*. This is no doubt awkward with μᾶλλον ἢ occurring twice besides in the sentence, but it is the best account perhaps that can be given: 'who would wish for wisdom without pleasure rather than wisdom with some pleasures any more than he

would wish for pleasure without wisdom rather than pleasure with some wisdom?' But before we can give this (the second) ἢ the meaning of *than* we must find a comparative word for it to depend upon, and this is the difficulty. It would be intolerable to insert a third μᾶλλον, but it is possible that some other comparative adverb has been lost. There is however a possible explanation which I incline to think better. δέχεσθαι, like αἰρεῖσθαι, βούλεσθαι, and one or two other verbs, admits of so much comparative meaning in itself that without any other word it is sometimes followed by ἢ. We have an example of this only a few pages further on at 63 B μῶν οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε οἰκεῖν μετὰ φρονήσεως πάσης ἢ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν; almost the same question as here, where δέξαισθε = *prefer*. Cf. Lysias 10. 21 ἐγὼ γοῦν δεξαίμην ἂν πάσας τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐρριφέναι ἢ τοιαύτην γνώμην ἔχειν περὶ τὸν πατέρα: Diog. L. 2. 49 τυφλὸς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων δεξαίμην ἂν ἢ Κλεινίου ἐνὸς ὄντος γενέσθαι. In spite therefore of the awkwardness of style, characteristic of the whole dialogue, I think that Plato in this sentence combined a δέξαιτ' ἂν ἢ, *would choose rather than, would prefer to*, with the double μᾶλλον ἢ. If any one will read the words to himself as bearing that sense, he will see that it is really possible.

Protarchus' reply is οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ ταῦτά γε πολλάκις ἐπερωτᾶν, with which also Badham quarrels. Probably he did not quite realize the force of οὐκ ἔστιν, used sometimes to say that a thing is wrong, out of the question, morally impossible, and so on. Thus Soph. *Aj.* 470 οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα: *Ant.* 289 οὐκ ἔστι: *Ar. Eth.* 3. 1. 1110 a 26 ἐνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι: *Il.* 13. 114 ἡμέας γ' οὐ πῶς ἐστι μεθιέμεναι πολέμοιο: 14. 212 οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδὲ ζοικε τεὸν ἔπος ἀρνήσασθαι. So it means here 'such a position is inconceivable,' 'no one could say that.'

61 B ἐλπίς μὴν πλείων ἐν τῷ μειχθέντι καλῶς τὸ ζητούμενον ἔσεσθαι φανερώτερον ἢ ἐν τῷ μῆ.

With this rather unusual form of the double comparative cf. *Xen. R.L.* 2. 5 and 9. 2.

ibid. D ἦν ἡμῖν ἡδονή τε ἀληθῶς, ὡς οἴομεθα, μᾶλλον ἐτέρας ἄλλη καὶ κ.τ.λ.

Surely ὡόμεθα. So ἡγησάμεθα a few lines below.

62 A ἄρ' οὖν οὗτος ἰκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἕξει, κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, τὴν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνην ταύτην σφαῖραν καὶ τοὺς κύκλους τούτους ἀγνοῶν, καὶ χρώμενος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως κανόσι καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις ;

I will not dwell upon the difficulty of the last clause or on the attempts that have been made to surmount it by changes small or great. They all more or less connect together χρώμενος and τοῖς κύκλοις, and, as long as this is done, I doubt if any satisfactory sense can emerge. The idealist described knows nothing of κύκλοι in the plural, καινοὶ κύκλοι (Wohlrab), or even θεῖοι κύκλοι (Heindorf). He knows only the κύκλος αὐτὸς ὁ θεῖος in the singular, the αὐτόκυκλος of the mind or of real being. Plato would therefore never describe him as making use of κύκλοι. This strikes me as the key to the very obscure words we have before us, and, if I am right, the solution may be very simple, such as passages apparently desperate sometimes admit of. There is no simpler and on occasion no more satisfactory solution than the insertion of a negative. Let us try that here, and also make a slight change of punctuation. Let us write τὴν δέ . . . σφαῖραν καὶ τοὺς κύκλους τούτους ἀγνοῶν καὶ <οὐ or μὴ> χρώμενος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως κανόσι καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις, taking τοῖς ἄλλοις κανόσι to be dependent on οὐ χρώμενος and joining together ὁμοίως καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις, making no more use of rules and measures in building than of circles, just as he does not use the common everyday circles. For ὁμοίως καὶ cf. *Theaet.* 154 A ἄλλω ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὅτι οὖν; and perhaps *Crito* 48 B. It is common enough in Greek generally. So ταῦτόν καὶ in 65 D. ἄλλοις would be used according to the Greek idiom, κύκλοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι κανόνες, because κανόν must, I think, be taken definitely as the carpenter's rule (51 C, 56 B) or things very closely akin to it: the κύκλος is not itself a κανόν. It is however possible that καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις should go with οἰκοδομίᾳ and that the remaining words need some addition. I do not therefore feel very confident of my suggestion, but it seems worth making. Just below καὶ τοῦ κύκλου reads oddly. καὶ κύκλου, καὶ τοῦ <ψευδοῦς> κύκλου, or some other small change seems needed.

64 A μαθεῖν τίνα ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναί ποτε μαντευτέον.

Should we read αὐτοῦ for αὐτὴν? It ought not to be called itself an ἰδέα and the gender is dubious. The termination was corrupted by τίνα ἰδέαν.

ibid. c Allowing for an involved order of words, such as we frequently note in the Philebus, need we demur to what Badham and Burnet would excise here, καί and τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου? The οἴκησις and its inhabitant are expressly distinguished in 61 B, and who would have put the suspected words in? Cf. on 19 c.

66 A φράζων ὡς ἡδονὴ κτήμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὅποσα χρή τοιαῦτα νομίζειν τὴν αἰδίων ἡρῆσθαι.

ἡρῆσθαι Stobaeus: ηρῆσθαι B: εἰρῆσθαι φάσιν T: εἰρῆσθαι φύσιν vulg.: ἡύρῆσθαι φύσιν Badham' Burnet.

There can be little doubt that ἡύρῆσθαι φύσιν is right, though the last word has disappeared altogether from the Bodleian MS. τὴν αἰδίων needs something to agree with, φασί and φύσις are confused elsewhere, and the accent in T points to some error. ἡύρῆσθαι fits the context far better than either ἡρῆσθαι or εἰρῆσθαι: they have found by enquiry that measure, etc. possess the attribute or attributes in question. But in αἰδίων there remains a great difficulty, which I cannot think that Bury in his elaborate appendix has surmounted. No such defence can make αἰδίων natural. What we want is some word directly or indirectly meaning *good*. That is the subject of the whole dialogue. From first to last they have been discussing in what the good consists or consists most, and it is inconceivable that in the final statement of the result of the discussion Socrates should substitute the *everlasting* and say 'we have found then that the everlasting is' primarily so and so. He is bound to say either explicitly the *good* or some equivalent, such for instance as *what we have been seeking*. Nothing but this would bring the conclusion of the dialogue clearly to the precise point required. To start out in search of the *good* and arrive at the *everlasting*

would be to miss the good altogether, or at any rate to miss stating it with the necessary precision.

We must hold then that *αἰδιον* is out of the question, but what it stands for is very difficult to see. Burnet's *μίαν* or *πρώτην* *ιδέαν* is not satisfactory on close examination, though ingenious. The only suggestion I can make after much thought and with much hesitation is that it may be a resultant of two words accidentally run into one, *τὴν ἀγαθοῦ* (or *τάγαθοῦ*) *ἴδιον* (or *ιδίαν*) *ἡρῆσθαι φύσιν*, just as in *Theaet.* 185 D the MSS. have *ὄργανίδιον* for *ὄργανον ἴδιον*. See my *Aristophanes and Others* p. 221 for some other cases of a like nature, where two words have been made into one. But in none of them has the first word disappeared to such an extent as would be the case here if my conjecture were right. The similarity to each other of the two first syllables of *ἀγαθον* might contribute to it. In support of the conjecture, that is of the expression *ιδία φύσις*, may be quoted *Crat.* 387 D *αὐτῶν τινα ιδίαν φύσιν ἔχουσαι*: *Phaedo* 101 C *μετασχὸν τῆς ιδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστον*: *Protag.* 349 B *ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειται τις ἴδιος οὐσία*. In the *Philebus* itself we have (though without *ἴδιος*) 60 B *τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺν διάφορον ἀλλήλων φύσιν ἔχειν*, and again *τὴν τάγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν ἄλλων* (*i.e.* in something which is *ἴδιον*), and 64 E *νῦν δὲ καταπέφευγεν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν*, where *δύναμις* = *φύσις*.

ibid. D *Φίληβος τάγαθὸν ἐτίθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ παντελεῆ*.

παντελεῆ cannot mean of all sorts, but only complete, and 'pleasure of every kind and complete' gives no good sense. Badham *πάντη*, but is not *παντελῶς* more likely? The adjoining accusatives amply account for the change. *παντελῶς* is a common word in Plato: cf. for instance 21 A and 46 A.

67 A *καὶ μετὰ ταῦτά γε πάντων ἰκανώτατα* (T, *ικανώτατον* B) *τούτοις οὐδέτερον ἰκανὸν ἐφάνη*.

For *ικανώτατα* I would read *φανερώτατα* (though L. and S. do not cite the adverb from good Greek) or an equivalent, *e.g.* *σαφέστατα*. This will be one of the many places where

a neighbouring word (*ικανόν*) has been in the copyist's mind. This is more likely than that Plato is half playing on the word, 'neither of them is *ικανόν*, but our argument to show that is.'

It is remarkable that in four or five passages of the *Philebus* there are references to things, as having been previously stated, which we do not find anywhere in the dialogue as we have it.

31 C ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑγίειαν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἀρμονίαν, ἐτίθεσο. No previous mention of harmony.

34 D νυνδὴ πείνην τε καὶ δίψος καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἔφαμεν εἶναί τινας ἐπιθυμίας. I cannot find any such statement.

41 B εἶπομεν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα, ὀλίγον ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς κ.τ.λ. Nothing has been said before about conflicting feelings of a purely physical kind.

47 D ἦν αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν . . . πολλάκις λαμβάνειν ἔφαμεν. Here Badham may be right in reading *φαμέν*, but cf. 34 D above where *νυνδὴ* attests *ἔφαμεν*.

62 C μουσικὴν ἣν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν ἔφαμεν στοχάσεως τε καὶ μιμήσεως μεστὴν οὖσαν καθαρότητος ἐνδεῖν. In this dialogue there has been no mention whatever of *μίμησις* in connexion with music, though elsewhere, e.g. in *Crat.*, music is called mimetic.

TIMAEUS.

20 E ἦν μὲν οὖν οἰκείος καὶ σφόδρα φίλος ἡμῖν Δρωπίδου τοῦ προπάππου.

Perhaps ἡμῶν, but the dative may be right. Should Δρωπίδου τ. π. be omitted?

23 B τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον γένος ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ τῇ παρ' ὑμῖν οὐκ ἴστε γεγονός.

I have no change to propose with regard to ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους, but we ought to notice the great peculiarity of its use. This ἐπί of *extension over* is elsewhere in passages akin to ours attached to a word expressive or suggestive of something that extends, such as *rumour, report*, etc. Archer-Hind for instance illustrates it in verse from *Il.* x. 213, μέγα κεν—κλέος εἶη πάντας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους, and in prose from Plato's own *Critias* 112 E ἐπὶ πᾶσαν Εὐρώπην καὶ Ἀσίαν . . . ἐλλόγμοι ἦσαν. But it is one thing to say κλέος ἐπί, ἐλλόγμος ἐπί, and quite another to say ἄριστος ἐπί, because the latter phrase gives nothing that can be thought of as extending. Cf. however *Il.* 23. 742 κάλλει ἐνίκα πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν and 24. 535 πάντας γὰρ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκαστο.

25 D The island Atlantis was sunk in the sea by an earthquake, διὸ καὶ νῦν ἄπορον καὶ ἀδιερεύνητον γέγονε τὸ ἐκεῖ πέλαγος, πηλοῦ κάρτα βραχέος ἐμποδῶν ὄντος, ὃν ἡ νῆσος ἰζομένη παρέσχετο.

It has of course been noticed that the mud can only be called βραχύς by a strange confusion of terms. It would be the water above the mud that was really shallow. Can Plato have used such an expression? Codex A indeed

has *βαθείος*; but this gives an unsatisfactory sense, because the depth of the mud when reached is immaterial. <ἐκ> *βραχείος* would yield the sense we really require, *near the surface*, like *ἐξ ὀλίγου*, etc., and may be worth considering. ἐκ would of course fall out most easily between *πηλοῦ* and *κάρτα*, but an Attic writer might prefer *κάρτα ἐκ βραχείος* to *ἐκ κάρτα βραχείος*.

For the insertion of a preposition cf. on 80 E below.

29 B C τοὺς δὲ (λόγους) τοῦ πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνο ἀπεικασθέντος, ὄντος δὲ εἰκόνας, εἰκότας ἀνὰ λόγον τε ἐκείνων ὄντας.

εἰκότας and *ἀνὰ λόγον ὄντας* are predicates, if the words are right, to some such phrase, not quite clearly shaped in Plato's sentence, as *τοὺς λόγους εἶναι δεῖ*. But can *ὄντας* stand as part of a predicate? I should have thought not, and that *ἀνὰ λόγον*, the real predicate, would repudiate an *ὄντας*. If this is so, read *γε* for *τε*. In the next words should *γάρ* be added after *περ*, where it would easily fall out?

33 D χειρῶν δέ, . . . μάτην οὐκ ᾔετο δεῖν αὐτῷ προσάπτειν οὐδὲ ποδῶν οὐδὲ ὄλως τῆς περὶ τὴν βᾶσιν ὑπηρεσίας.

A difficulty has been felt about the genitive *χειρῶν*. Archer-Hind supposes an anacoluthon: Stephanus suggested *τὴν . . . ὑπηρεσίαν* to govern it: Stallbaum made it depend on an understood *τι*. In reality it depends on *δεῖν*, the infinitive *προσάπτειν* being thrown in idiomatically, as in c of this very page *οὐδ' αὖ τινος ἐπιδεῖς ἦν ὀργάνου σχεῖν*: *Rep.* 459 B *δεῖ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων*: *Xen. Oecon.* 21. 11 *δεῖν φημι . . . φύσεως ἀγαθῆς ὑπάρχειν*: *Herod.* 1. 73. 1 *γῆς ἡμέρω προσκτήσασθαι*: *Thuc.* 5. 15 *ἐμιθυμία τῶν ἀνδρῶν . . . κομίσασθαι*: *Eur. Med.* 1399 *χρήζω στόματος παίδων . . . προσπτύξασθαι*.

46 E ὅσαι δὲ <τῶν> ὑπ' ἄλλων μὲν κινουμένων, κ.τ.λ.

The partitive genitive seems to need the article.

48 B προσῆκον αὐτοῖς οὐδ' ἐν συλλαβῆς εἵδεσι μόνον εἰκότως . . . ἀπεικασθῆναι.

The phrase is always *ἐν*—*εἶδει* (see Ast's lexicon *s.v.*), and the plural seems unsuitable. Cf. the common *ἐν*—*μέρει*.

ibid. D πειράσομαι μηδενὸς ἦττον εἰκότα, μᾶλλον δέ, καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς περὶ ἐκάστων καὶ ἑμπάντων λέγειν.

It is difficult to make any sense of καὶ ἔμπροσθεν. We might perhaps read μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ <τῶν> ἔμπροσθεν, *more probable even than what went before*. Cf. on 46 E above.

49 E Nothing which *becomes* (γίγνεται) has permanence enough to be spoken of as *this* or *that*: φεύγει γὰρ οὐχ ὑπομένον τὴν τοῦ τόδε καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν τῶδε καὶ πᾶσαν ὄση μόνιμα ὡς ὄντα αὐτὰ ἐνδείκνυται φάσις.

τῶδε is very unintelligible here, and Burnet cites Cook Wilson's conjecture, τὴν τοῦ ᾧδε. I had thought of τὴν τῆδε, and that might perhaps stand. Of course the thing, not the point of space, would be in question.

52 C οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐφ' ᾧ γέγονεν ἑαυτῆς ἐστίν.

Archer-Hind is right, I think, in saying that the genitive ἑαυτῆς depends on the whole phrase αὐτό—γέγονεν, but why did he not illustrate the construction from the well-known *Rep.* 438 A foll. ὅσα γ' ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναι του? The genitive there is our genitive here.

53 E τούτου γὰρ τυχόντες (they have not done so yet) ἔχομεν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

ἔχομεν, though not absolutely necessary, is very probable.

66 B Burnet ignores Stallbaum's proposed introduction of ἀνάγκη to give accusative and infinitive some construction. Without binding myself to ἀνάγκη—συμβαίνει for instance is just as likely—I think something is certainly needed.

69 B ταῦτα ἀτάκτως ἔχοντα ὁ θεὸς ἐν ἐκάστω τε αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμετρίας ἐνεποίησεν.

Stallbaum calls ταῦτα—ἔχοντα 'absolute'; Archer-Hind governs it 'by the compound phrase συμμετρίας ἐνεποίησεν, as though Plato had written ξηνηρμόσατο'; Kühner-Gerth ii. 2, p. 90 style it an anacoluthon. I should conjecture that the participle παραλαβόν is to be inserted, probably before or after ὁ θεός. So a few lines below οἱ δὲ μμούμενοι παραλαβόντες ἀρχὴν κ.τ.λ. : 30 A πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὄρατον

παραλαβόν: 68 Ε ταῦτα πάντα . . . ὁ . . . δημιουργός . . . παρελάμβανέν.

80 c Stephanus' change of τὸ δέ . . . τό τε το τῷ δέ . . . τῷ τε seems absolutely necessary to give construction and is a most easy correction. Cf. for instance the readings in *Rep.* 547 D τῷ μὲν τιμᾶν.

ibid. Ε ἡ δ' ἐρυθρὰ πλείστη περὶ αὐτὸ χροῖα διαθεῖ, τῆς τοῦ πυρὸς τομῆς τε καὶ ἐξομόρξεως ἐν ὑγρῷ δεδημιουργημένη φύσις.

Construction and meaning are very difficult until we read <διὰ> τῆς. Cf. on 25 D above.

86 D καὶ σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα, ὅποσα ἡδονῶν ἀκράτεια καὶ ὄνειδος ὡς ἐκόντων λέγεται τῶν κακῶν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὀνειδίζεται.

Archer-Hind comments on the odd juxtaposition of ἀκράτεια and ὄνειδος, for which however he can see 'no plausible correction.' Did not Plato write κατ' ὄνειδος? The confusion of καί and κατά is familiar: cf. *Index*. I have doubted whether ἀκρατεία might not be an improvement, but probably the nominative is right.

87 D ἀξύμμετρον γὰρ ταῖς μεγίσταις ξυμμετρίαις.

We ought perhaps to substitute accusatives for datives here. Cf. the phrase immediately following, ἢ καὶ τινα ἄλλην ὑπέρεξιν ἄμετρον, which, to tell the truth, also gives me an uneasy feeling that ἀξύμμετρον . . . ἀξύμμετρίαις (or ἀξύμμετρίαίς, for the dative would be better in this phrase than in the other) was Plato's real expression.

88 Δ σῶμα . . . μέγα καὶ ὑπέρψυχον.

ὑπέρψυχον has been noticed as a strange compound, though there are parallels. Perhaps ὑπὲρ ψυχὴν ὄν may be worth considering.

Sufficient notice has perhaps not been taken of the remarkable discrepancy between the exordium of the *Timaeus* and the *Republic* of which (or part of which) it is a summary. Socrates in the *Timaeus* gives the chief points laid down in the *Republic* faithfully enough: it is the implication involved in his references to it that

presents the peculiarity. Not only is there no explicit mention of the *Republic* having been a narrated dialogue, that is, of Timaeus and the others now present having only heard from Socrates the narration of a dialogue supposed to have taken place the day before (that is two days before the *Timaeus*); but his language would certainly imply according to any ordinary method of interpretation that they had been present and taken part in the dialogue itself. This would seem to be the natural meaning of the repeated first persons plural, *διειλόμεθα, ἔπομεν, ἐλέγομεν*. It is not natural, though of course possible, to understand the *we* contained in these words to be *I and the people I was talking with* rather than *you and I*. Anyone who read all this without knowing the *Republic* would certainly think Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates were then present.

The fiction of a fifth person who was to have been present at the *Timaeus* dialogue is no doubt only introduced as a little detail to give verisimilitude and reality to the scene. Similar, I suppose — for there does not seem to be any other reason for it — is the pretence in the *Philebus*, another late dialogue, that Philebus has handed over to Protarchus the defence of his position, so that the dialogue is named after one who takes next to no share in it. We naturally ask why Philebus has done this: that is, we fall into Plato's trap and take the thing seriously. So here we want to know who the absent man is. The disturbance of the order of speeches in the *Symposium* by Aristophanes' hiccup is another such device.

CRITIAS.

107 E ἐκ δὴ τοῦ παραχρήμα νῦν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρέπον ἂν μὴ δυνώμεθα πάντως ἀποδιδόναι, συγγιγνώσκειν χρεών.

The first words (ἐκ . . . λεγόμενα) are curiously devoid of construction, much more so than the accusatives we occasionally find at the beginning of sentences, which the writer vaguely meant to provide with a construction as he went on, but finally left without one. In such a case we can usually see pretty clearly what he had in his mind. But here the turn of the sentence is so harsh and clumsy, that I cannot but suspect error. Did not Plato add to λεγόμενα some participle governing it and standing as a sort of subject to συγγιγνώσκειν, such as ἀκούοντας or σκοποῦντας? The omission of any τὰ with λεγόμενα (τὰ δὴ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα νῦν λεγόμενα) seems to make the case especially doubtful. Contrast the otherwise more or less parallel openings of sentences in 109 A and 110 B. Cf. p. 90 above.

108 B εἰ μέλλεις αὐτὰ δυνατὸς γενέσθαι παραλαβεῖν.

I hardly know to what those who are satisfied with αὐτὰ suppose it to refer. There is nothing definite in the context with which it can be associated, nor does it seem possible to make it mean vaguely *the speaking, the turn to speak* (παραδίδομεν . . . τὸν ἐξῆς λόγον 106 B). Probably we should write αὐτό and refer it to θέατρον, the audience, whom Critias is about to take over from Timaeus.

109 C ἄλλοι μὲν οὖν κατ' ἄλλους τόπους κληρουχῆσαντες θεῶν ἐκεῖνα ἐκόσμου.

(1) Elsewhere κληρουχεῖν is transitive: (2) ἐκεῖνα is strange. We should get over both difficulties by reading

<τὰ> κατ' ἄλλους τόπους. The dialogue contains many examples of this periphrastic use of the article, e.g. 114 B τὸ τῆς χώρας : 114 E τὰ περὶ τὰ ζῶα : 117 A τὸ τῆς ἐργασίας. Plato is indeed always fond of it. For τὸ κατὰ so used see Ast *Lex.* ii. p. 145.

110 A I think *τουτων περι* needs a δέ or τε added.

111 C χρόνος δ' οὐ πάμπολυς ὅτε δένδρων αὐτόθεν εἰς οἰκοδομήσεις τὰς μεγίστας ἐρεψίμων τμηθέντων στεγάσματ' ἐστὶν ἔτι σᾶ.

Burnet marks this as wrong and gives in a note the words which Cobet proposed to insert after ὅτε. It does not seem to me, especially considering the involved order of words often adopted in the *Critias* and other late dialogues, that there is any real need for suspicion. In sense ὅτε and τμηθέντων should be taken closely together, as though Plato had said χρόνος οὐ πάμπολυς ὅτε (*since*) ἐτμήθη στεγάσμαθ' ἃ ἐστὶν ἔτι σᾶ.

ibid. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ὕδωρ ἔκαρπούτ' ἐκ Διὸς (ἢ χώρα), οὐχ ὡς νῦν ἀπολλύσα ἀπὸ ψιλῆς τῆς γῆς εἰς θάλατταν, ἀλλὰ πολλήν ἔχουσα καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν καταδεχομένη.

Stallbaum wished to read πολὺ for πολλήν, and Jowett in like manner understands it of abundance of water, reading I suppose also αὐτήν. But this is quite a mistake. πολλήν is *much soil*, into which the water is received. But what exactly is ἀπὸ ψιλῆς τῆς γῆς? If γῆ is *soil*, it surely cannot be called ψιλῆ. The rock, the land, the place can be called ψιλός, but not the soil itself. It would be an odd epithet for γῆ in almost any case; but, if γῆ is removable soil, as πολλήν seems to show, it becomes almost impossible. Perhaps then we may consider whether ψιλῆς does not agree with ἑαυτῆς or χώρας implied in the subject of the sentence, so that τῆς γῆς would depend on ψιλῆς and not have ψιλῆς agreeing with it. This is the construction a little further on, 112 A γῆς αὐτήν (*i.e.* τὴν ἀκρόπολιν) ψιλὴν περιτήξασα πεποιήκε.

112 A σεισμῶν ἅμα καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἐπὶ Δευκαλίωνος φθορᾶς τρίτου πρότερον ὕδατος ἐξαισίου γενομένου.

Scholars have to some extent boggled over τρίτου, but I

do not find that any one has suggested that we should read *τρῖς*. Cf. on *Laus* 664 D.

Just below should ἀποβεβηκῦα be καταβεβηκῦα? Cf. 110 E, etc. No such use of ἀποβαίνειν is cited.

ibid. D τὸ δυνατὸν πολεμεῖν ἤδη καὶ τὸ ἔτι (i.e. δυνατὸν πολεμεῖν) certainly seems right: *those who were old enough and those not too old.*

113 A Should τὸ δ' ἔτι be τόδε δ' ἔτι?

116 B τοῦ δ' ἐντός should be τὸν δ' ἐντός like the τὸν δέ following.

117 A ταῖς δὲ δὴ κρήναις, τῇ τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῇ τοῦ θερμοῦνάματος, πλήθος μὲν ἄφθονον ἐχούσαις, ἡδονῇ δὲ καὶ ἀρετῇ τῶν ὑδάτων πρὸς ἑκατέρου τὴν χρῆσιν θαυμαστοῦ πεφυκότος, ἐχρῶντο κ.τ.λ.

Burnet indicates no doubt about this passage, but it is difficult to see what he makes the subject of πεφυκότος. If we put ἑκατέρου before or after πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν, we shall provide it with a proper subject. ἑκατέρου might either refer to νάματος or go with ὑδάτων, and it might either govern ὑδάτων or be added in an appositional way and determine the number of the participle (like *Rep.* 346 D αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται, and many other passages in verse and prose).

I cannot make out whether Stallbaum wishes to take ἑκατέρου in this way. His translation is against it.

118 B ὕλην δὲ καὶ πλήθει καὶ γένεσι ποικίλην σύμπασιν τε τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ πρὸς ἕκαστα ἄφθονον.

As the words stand, πλήθει must be constructed with ποικίλην, but what can πλήθει ποικίλη mean? Another slight transposition will help us. Read ὕλην δὲ καὶ γένεσι ποικίλην καὶ πλήθει . . . ἄφθονον.

ibid. E διάπλους ἐκ τῶν διωρύχων εἰς ἀλλήλας τε πλαγίας καὶ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τεμόντες. The editors ceremoniously record a *v.l.* πλατείας, but what sense πλαγίας makes they fail to tell us. Read πλαγίους.

120 C νόμοι δὲ πολλοὶ μὲν ἄλλοι . . . ἦσαν ἴδιοι, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα μήτε ποτὲ ὄπλα ἐπ' ἀλλήλους οἴσειν βοηθήσειν τε πάντας . . . , κοινῇ δέ, . . . βουλευόμενοι τὰ δόξαντα περὶ πολέμου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πράξεων.

πράξειν is not, I think, to be added after *πράξεων*, as has been suggested, but to be substituted for it. *πράξεων* is quite superfluous. *βουλευόμενοι* should of course be *βουλευομένων*, unless Plato was confusing in his mind *νόμοι ἦσαν* and *ᾤμοσαν*, as the futures *οἴσειν* and *βοηθήσειν*, which are quite irregular after *νόμοι*, suggest. But the next sentence, *θανάτου δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, goes on properly from *νόμοι* with *μηδενὸς εἶναι κύριον*.

MINOS.

317 D τίς ἐπιστήμων διανεῖμαι ἐπὶ γῆ τὰ σπέρματα ;

Read γῆν. Similar accusatives with ἐπί and the idea of distribution occur immediately below two or three times and again twice in 321 C D, nor is the dative natural.

ibid. τίς δὲ κρονμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ μέλη ἀγαθὸς νομεὺς καὶ τὰ ἄξια νεῖμαι ;

It is hardly possible to govern νεῖμαι by ἀγαθός. Boeckh νέμει, but probably Plato wrote something like <ἄριστος> νεῖμαι. Cf. διανεῖμαι ἄριστος in E and νέμειν κράτιστος twice in 318 A.

318 A οὗτος τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀγέλην τοῦ σώματος νέμειν κράτιστος ;

Something like τοῦ σώματος <πέρι> οἱ τοῦ σώματος <ἄρχων> seems wanted. Cf. 321 C ὁ τῷ σώματι ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης τε καὶ νομεύς.

LAWS.

625 C τὴν τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν ὁρᾶτε. Is not Κρήτης a gloss on τῆς χώρας?

628 B πότερα δὲ ἀπολομένων αὖ τῶν ἐτέρων [εἰρήνην τῆς στάσεως γενέσθαι], νικησάντων δὲ ποτέρων δέξαιτ' ἂν τις μᾶλλον ἢ κ.τ.λ. ;

εἰρήνην . . . γενέσθαι is bracketed by Schanz after Badham, and I am not now concerned with it. What I would ask is whether the use of ποτέρων in the second half of the antithesis is a natural one, and whether it should not change places with τῶν ἐτέρων. It means of course *one side*, and this expression would naturally come in the first of the two clauses. Also αὖ seems to me hardly justified, and I would suggest ἂν.

629 E The words mainly taken from Tyrtaeus (10. 11–12) οἱ μὴ τολμήσωσι μὲν ὄρᾶν φόνον αἱματόεντα | καὶ δητίων ὀρέγοντ' ἐγγύθεν ιστάμενοι can hardly be right as they stand. As quoted by Stobaeus the lines had εἰ μὴ τετλαίη μὲν ὄρῶν and ὀρέγοιτ'. Plato seems to adapt them a little in quoting, but he would not have given them such a clumsy and ungrammatical form. Subjunctive and optative cannot very well go together, and for the optative as he quotes it there is no construction. A second grave fault is that the aorist τολμήσωσι *who have dared* does not harmonize with the present ὀρέγοντο. It is easy to read οἱ μὴ τολμῶσι μὲν ὄρᾶν, but this does not get over the difficulty of the moods. τολμῶσι and ὀρέγωντ', or τολμῶεν and ὀρέγοιτ' might do.

630 D τὸν νομοθέτην ἡμῶν ἀποβάλλομεν εἰς τοὺς πόρρω νομοθέτας.

Stallbaum says *qui longius absunt a sapientiae laude*: Jowett to a rank which is far beneath him. Did not Plato write τοὺς πόρρω νομοθεσίας, those far from understanding or being fit for legislation? So *Theaet.* 151 c πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι: *Soph.* 234 c πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφεστῶτας: Aesch. *Eum.* 414 πρόσω δικαίων: Aristot. *H.A.* 2. 12. 504 b 11 οὔτε σάρξ ἐστὶν οὔτε πόρρω σαρκός.

ibid. E κατ' εἶδη ζητεῖν αὐτῶν τοὺς νόμους, οὐδὲ ἄπερ οἱ τῶν νῦν εἶδη προτιθέμενοι ζητοῦσιν.

There is nothing for αὐτῶν properly to refer to, and οἱ τῶν νῦν is unintelligible. We may conjecture something like ἄπερ αὐτῶν οἱ νῦν εἶδη, doing away with αὐτῶν after ζητεῖν.

ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλα ἅττα μυρία τοιαῦτα.

Perhaps μόρια, a word which occurs just before and just afterwards.

631 c πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλὸς ἀλλ' ὁξὺ βλέπων, ἀνπερ ἄμ' ἔπηται φρονήσει.

The point should be that wealth sees well enough, not if it accompanies wisdom, but if wisdom accompanies it. In other words we seem to need φρόνησις, not φρονήσει.

633 A καὶ σὲ δέ for καὶ σέ τε? Cf. 637 c καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν δέ.

ibid. c καὶ ἄνευ θεραπόντων αὐτοῖς ἑαυτῶν διακονήσεις.

This, which is the ordinary text, seems bad Greek. Ast's αὐτοῖς αὐτῶν is much better, but I should prefer αὐτῶν ἑαυτοῖς. The terminations, as sometimes happens, have got interchanged. So for instance in Plutarch *Morals* 844 B ὃν τινες . . . αὐτῶ has long been corrected to ᾧ τινες . . . αὐτόν, and *Lives* 670 c αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοις to αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναίους.

634 B ποῦ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ταῦτὸν κ.τ.λ ;

ταῦτόν (or αὐτ') ἐστὶν τοῦτο seems probable. See p. 196.

636 B Perhaps καὶ δὴ καὶ <κατὰ> παλαιὸν νόμον, καί and

κατά much resembling one another and being often confused.

640 D μεθύνοντων γὰρ μεθύων καὶ <νέων> νέος ἄρχων?

ibid. Ε ἢ οὐ ξινοοεῖς τοῦθ' ὅτι μεθύων κυβερνήτης καὶ πᾶς παντὸς ἄρχων ἀνατρέπει πάντα . . . ὅ τι ποτ' εἶη τὸ κυβερνώμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

The optative εἶη ought not perhaps to be considered impossible along with the present indicative ἀνατρέπει. Plato has a few examples of the indefinite generalizing optative, taking the place of the usual subjunctive with ὅς ἂν, ὅταν, etc. (see 759 B, 778 A, 927 C, *Lys.* 207 E, *Rep.* 332 A), and so Xenophon a few times. But <ἂν> ἀνατρέποι might easily be corrupted (or ἀνατρέψει?), and perhaps the case is better put hypothetically, 'a drunken man in command *would be* ruinous.'

642 E παθόντες δέ, not τε. A contrast with πράξαντες οὐδέν is needed.

645 D ΚΑ. πρὸς τί δὲ σκοπούμενος αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτᾶς;
ΑΘ. οὐδέν πω πρὸς ὅτι.

With οὐδέν πω πρὸς ὅτι nothing is, as I once suggested, lost, but certainly Stallbaum is wrong in understanding ἐρωτῶ to govern οὐδέν. οὐδέν πρὸς ὅτι is short for οὐδέν πρὸς ὅτι (σκοπούμενος τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ), and οὐδέν πρὸς ὅτι σκοπούμενος is like οὐδέν' ὄντιν' οὐ κατέκλασε and other such phrases.

646 E φοβούμεθα πολλάκις δόξαν, ἡγούμενοι δοξάζεσθαι κακοί.

Stephanus was, I think, right in principle in demanding δοξασθήεσθαι like γενήεσθαι just before. But δοξάζεσθαι <ἂν> will do just as well. In 648 E editors now add ἂν to σωφρονοῖ.

δοξάζεσθαι would seem also possible. It is not found in the passive sense, but the Thucydidean passive futures κωλύσομαι, τηρήσομαι probably do not occur elsewhere. In Aeschines 3. 6 I have suggested the possibility of σώσομαι.

656 C νόμοι . . . <περὶ> τὴν περὶ τὰς Μούσας παιδείαν τε καὶ παιδιάν.

So Schanz. But for more than one reason νόμοι . . . τῆς . . . παιδείας τε καὶ παιδιᾶς would seem preferable. Cf. 684 A κατὰ νόμους οὓς ἔθεντο τοῦ τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. The dative would also be possible, going in a causal sense with ἐξέσεσθαι.

657 A τῶν νῦν δεδημιουργημένων οὔτε τι καλλίονα οὔτε αἰσχίω, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ τέχνην ἀπειργασμένα.

Read τῇ αὐτῇ δὲ τέχνῃ.

ibid. C τὴν τῇ μουσικῇ καὶ τῇ παιδιᾷ χρεῖαν.

χρεία is not verbal enough to take a direct dative. Read τῆς μουσικῆς καὶ τῆς παιδιᾶς. In 667 C Schanz has corrected τί δὲ τῇ ἐργασίᾳ . . . το τῆς ἐργασίας.

658 A B In this very imperfect sentence it seems to me that an infinitive, governed by προείποι and parallel to ἦκειν, has been lost after γεγονέναι. I suggest the insertion there of στεφανωθῆναι.

659 C δέον γὰρ αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ βελτίω τῶν αὐτῶν ἡθῶν ἀκούοντας βελτίω τὴν ἡδονὴν ἴσχειν, νῦν αὐτοῖς δρῶσι πᾶν τοῦναντίον ξυμβαίνει.

Should τοῦναντίον be repeated? δρῶσι πᾶν τοῦναντίον <τοῦναντίον> ξυμβαίνει.

661 C Probably ταῦτά for ταῦτα. Cf. 660 A. In 838 C the same change is probable.

663 C τὴν δ' ἀλήθειαν τῆς κρίσεως ποτέραν κυριωτέραν εἶναι φῶμεν; τὴν τῆς χείρονος ψυχῆς ἢ τὴν τῆς βελτίονος;

Is not the sense of these words as they stand somewhat absurd? They imply that both the inconsistent judgments are true, but that one truth is more authoritative than the other. It is most likely that an exchange of terminations has taken place, such as was spoken of above at 633 C, and that we should read τὴν δὲ κρίσιν τῆς ἀληθείας; but other expressions are possible, e.g. τῆς δ' ἀληθείας τῶν κρίσεων.

664 D λέγεις δὲ τίνας τούτους τοὺς χοροὺς τοὺς τρίτους ;

Three choruses being the meaning required, we may presume that τρίτους is a mistake for τρεῖς, arising from γ', which would stand for either. τὸν τρίτον χορὸν is used rightly in 665 B. Cf on *Critias* 112 A.

665 A ὁ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ τῶν Μουσῶν χορὸς εἴρηται, τὸν δὲ τρίτον κ.τ.λ.

Can we dispense with ὁ before τῶν Μουσῶν? Cf. 634 A ὁ Διὸς οὖν δὴ καὶ ὁ Πυθικὸς νομοθέτης οὐ . . . νενομοθετήκατον.

666 B Διόνυσον παρακαλεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τελετὴν ἄμα καὶ παιδιάν, ἣν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ γήρωσ ἀσστηρότητος ἐδωρήσατο τὸν οἶνον φάρμακον.

I do not know if Schanz, printing the passage thus, agrees with Stallbaum, who put commas before and after τὸν οἶνον, explaining that those words are in apposition to ἣν. Such a view seems quite untenable. Read ἣς and the construction at once becomes easy. Cf. on 656 c and 736 A.

667 C ἦν δὲ ὀρθότητά τε καὶ ὠφελίαν (προσείπομεν ἄν, as to what we should call rightness and utility), ὅπερ ὑγιεινὸν τῶν προσφερομένων λέγομεν ἐκάστοτε, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ ὀρθότατον.

Schanz marks τὸ ὀρθότατον as wrong, and Badham actually conjectured something like τὸ παρεχόμενον, governing ὀρθότητα and ὠφελίαν. τὸ ὀρθότατον is indeed wrong, but only in that it ought not to stand alone. It is abundantly evident that Plato must have written τὸ ὠφελιμώτατον καὶ τὸ ὀρθότατον (or καὶ τὸ ὀ. καὶ τὸ ὠ.). The two things are coupled together throughout.

669 A Dele ἄν before εἴη. It cannot stand, for the construction is εἰ γιγνώσκοιμεν κ.τ.λ., ἀρά γε ἀναγκαῖον (i.e. ἄν εἴη) ἦδη . . . γιγνώσκειν εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε ὄπη ποτὲ ἐλλιπὲς εἴη κάλλους, to know whether it was, not whether it would be. Cf. 700 E below.

ibid. D γέλωτ' ἂν παρασκευάζοιεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄσους φησὶν Ὀρφεὺς λαχεῖν ὄραν τῆς τέρψιος.

The meaning is 'to those men who' etc. Hence Badham proposed <τοῖς> τῶν ἀνθρώπων. The simple dative ὄσοις (governed of course by λαχεῖν, of which ὄραν would then be the subject, as is quite possible) would have the same effect.

671 C καὶ εἰσιόντι τῷ μὴ καλῷ θάρρει τὸν κάλλιστον διαμαχόμενον φόβον εἰσπέμπειν.

We need the future participle διαμαχοῦμενον to *fight against proud thoughts*.

679 D πρὸς τε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικάς, ὅσαι τε πεζαὶ καὶ ὅσαι κατὰ θάλατταν γίνονται τὰ νῦν, καὶ ὅσαι δὴ κατὰ πόλιν μόνον αὐτοῦ, δίκαι καὶ στάσεις λεγόμεναι.

Stallbaum, putting the comma before αὐτοῦ, takes it apparently as *there* (*in singulis tantum civitatibus ubi lites et seditiones vocatae* etc.), which with λεγόμεναι it certainly could not mean. This is the mistake about αὐτοῦ which is only too common: see *Xenophon and Others*, p. 298.

In the text as above κατὰ πόλιν αὐτοῦ *in the city itself* is contrasted with the idea of war outside, and this may be right. But, as the antithesis is not made very clear, we might consider whether αὐτοῦ has not taken the place of αὐτῶν. Ritter suggests αὐτῶν.

684 E ἐπαρᾶται γῆς ἀναδασμοὺς εἰσηγούμενον.

εἰσηγουμένῳ? An accusative can hardly stand.

686 D τὸ δὲ νῦν γε ἡμεῖς τάχ' ἂν ἴσως . . . οὔτ' ὀρθῶς διανοοίμεθα οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντες πάντα, περὶ ὧν ἂν οὔτω διανοηθῶσιν.

The context makes it very probable that the optative is wrong, the present indicative being what we want, and this is, I think, confirmed by περὶ ὧν ἂν διανοηθῶσιν, which ought to be optative if the main verb is so. We ought then probably to read διανοοῦμεθα and to add this to the Platonic instances of τάχ' ἂν used as a phrase = simple τάχα

(Goodwin, *M.T.* 244), cf. 629 A: *Phaedr.* 265 B and probably 256 B C: *Soph.* 255 C: [Ep.] 2. 313 B.

688 A τὸ μὲν σφῶν ἦν παρακέλευμα ὡς χρεῶν εἶη κ.τ.λ., τὸ δὲ ἐμὸν ἔλεγον (ἔλεγεν!) ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Cf. 840 D φημί τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον νόμιμον δεῖν . . . πορεύεσθαι λέγον ὡς οὐ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.

692 B μετριάσαι should be μετριάσειν or have an ἄν added. The existing ἄν goes with ὠήθησαν.

694 C σκέψιν τούτου, not τοῦτο.

695 C Δαρεῖος . . . ἐλθὼν εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ λαβὼν αὐτὴν ἔβδομος διείλετο ἑπτὰ μέρη τεμόμενος.

Do we not need ἔβδομος <αὐτός>? Cf. 751 E κατοικιεῖν δέκατος αὐτός. The phrase does not necessarily imply a premier position. ἔβδομος alone would naturally mean seventh in succession.

700 E εἶτε βελτίων εἶτε χείρων ἂν εἶη τις.

There is no place here for ἄν. Read perhaps αὖ or δῆ, consulting Ast's *Lexicon s.v.* εἶτε, or omit altogether as in 669 E above.

701 E ἐπισκοποῦμεν νυνί, ποτέρα τούτων ὀρθῶς πολιτεύεται.

The question is not which is right, but whether either is. Read ἐπισκοποῦμεν νῦν εἰ ποτέρατ. ὁ.

702 A αὐτῶν γ' ἔνεκα should be τῶν αὐτῶν or τούτων γ' ἔνεκα.

705 B συγχωροῦμεν τότε <τε> λέγειν ἡμᾶς ὀρθῶς καὶ τὰ νῦν?

714 D οἶε . . . θήσεσθαι ἐκόντα πρὸς ἄλλο τι πρῶτον τοὺς νόμους ἢ κ.τ.λ.;

For πρῶτον read πρότερον.

719 D ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν γυνή μοι διαφέρουσα εἶη πλούτῳ καὶ θάπτειν αὐτὴν διακελεύοιτο ἐν τῷ ποιήματι, τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα ἂν τάφον ἐπαινοίην, φειδωλὸς δ' αὖ τις καὶ πένης ἀνὴρ τὸν καταδεᾶ, μέτρον δὲ οὐσίας ἐκτημένους καὶ μέτριος αὐτὸς ὢν τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν ἐπαινεῖσαι.

For the impossible *ποιήματι*, various unsatisfactory proposals have been made. Something like *προσῆκοντι* or *δέοντι μνήματι* seems meant.

The speaker passes somewhat awkwardly from what *he* would approve in one case (*ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν . . .*) to what in other cases the people themselves would approve, but apparently the text is right in this respect.

τὸν αὐτόν however seems wrong. By Greek usage it would mean (I think) *τὸν καταδεᾶ*. Probably Plato wrote *τοιούτον* or *τὸν τοιούτον* = *μέτριον*, a use of *τοιούτος* on which see p. 129 above.

722 A *τὸ περὶ πολλῶν ἢ ὀλίγων γραμμάτων ποιήσασθαι τὸν λόγον λίαν εὔηθες· τὰ γὰρ οἶμαι βέλτιστα ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ βραχύτατα οὐδὲ τὰ μήκη τιμητέον.*

Plato loves variety, but after two superlatives *μήκη* jars upon one. It is obvious to suggest *μήκιστα*, but I should rather prefer the unobvious *τὰς βραχύτητας*. So *Rep.* 400 B *μήκη καὶ βραχύτητας προσῆπτε*. Ast gives a dozen instances of *μήκη* in Plato.

723 D *οὐ χρηστέον <ἐν> ἅπασιν.*

728 B *τὴν γὰρ λεγομένην δίκην τῆς κακουργίας τὴν μεγίστην οὐδείς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν λογίζεται, ἔστιν δ' ἡ μεγίστη τὸ ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς οὔσιν κακοῖς ἀνδράσιν.*

This is rather a tenet of Plato's own than a commonplace (*λεγομένην*). Indeed in *Theaet.* 176 D it is almost explicitly stated as such: *ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἀγνοεῖν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἣν δοκοῦσι κ.τ.λ.* May one suggest that the confusion of two words has here taken place, of which examples may be found elsewhere, and that for *λεγομένην* we ought to read *γι(γ)νομένην*? The *ἔστιν* which follows takes up *γιγνομένην* better than *λεγομένην*; otherwise we should expect *λέγεται δέ*, as in 739 C. It is also almost a contradiction in terms to call it *τὴν λεγομένην δίκην* and yet say that no one takes it into account.

There are one or two other passages in the *Laws*, where I rather suspect the same corruption. In 783 A after speaking of three great and over-mastering pleasures the Athenian goes on *ἃ δὴ δεῖ τρία νοσήματα τρέποντα* (or *τρέποντας*) *εἰς τὸ βέλτιστον παρὰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἥδιστον τρισὶ*

μὲν τοῖς μεγίστοις πειρᾶσθαι κατέχειν, φόβῳ καὶ νόμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ, 'turning them away from that which is called pleasantest to the best,' as Jowett rather loosely renders it. παρά means of course 'contrary to,' 'ignoring,' etc., but how weak here is λεγόμενον, 'what is called pleasantest.' παρὰ τὸ γινόμενον ἥδιστον would be much more forcible as well as candid. Plato quite grants the pleasure: he does not want to throw doubt on it.

Again in 717 A he speaks metaphorically of certain weapons. σκοπὸς μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν οὗτος· βέλη δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ οἷον ἢ τοῖς βέλεσιν ἔφεσις τὰ ποῖ' ἂν λεγόμενα ὀρθότατα φέροιτ' ἂν; Here λεγόμενα makes no sense at all. Ast actually held that λεγόμενα φέροιτ' ἂν = φέρεσθαι λέγοιτ' ἂν: Stallbaum weakly translates *si quis de iis mentionem iniiciat*, as though mention of them were a condition of their hitting the mark; Jowett more wisely omits it in his translation altogether. Schanz writes φερόμενα. Let us rather have recourse to a *vera causa* and write γινόμενα or γενόμενα. Of course φέροιτ' ἂν is adapted to βέλη only, not to ἔφεσις; but, if the words καὶ . . . ἔφεσις are right, it may be some advantage that γινόμενα suits ἔφεσις too.

In 723 C τὸ μέντοι μεγάλων περὶ λεγομένων νόμων καὶ σμικρῶν εἰ ὁμοίως προοιμιάζεσθαι προστάττοιμεν I can see no force in λεγομένων and suggest γινομένων. So in 934 C τῶν κλοπαίων τε καὶ βιαίων πάντων τὰς ζημίας λεγομένας οἷας δεῖ γίγνεσθαι we seem to want γινομένας, for λεγομένας can hardly be translated. Plato is fond of the repetition γιγνόμενος . . . γίγνεται: see Ast's *Lex.* 1. 395 and p. 161 above.

For the confusion of the two words cf. 671 B, where the MSS. have γινομένων, Eusebius λεγομένων: *Rep.* 601 B: *Ar. De An.* 1. 4. 407 b 29: *Thuc.* 8. 14. 2: *Lys.* 13. 20: *D. Hal. de Comp.* V. 20 (γενέσθω one MS. for λεγέσθω): and see *Index* to this book, *s.v.* λεγόμενος.

730 B ὅσα <γὰρ> ἂν? Something must have been lost, which joined ὅσα . . . ταῦτ' ἐστὶ . . . ῥητέον to the words preceding. Stobaeus ὅσ' οὖν (Schanz).

736 A τούτοις (*these men*) ὡς νοσήματι πόλεως ἐμπεφυκῶτι δι' εὐφημίας ἀπαλλαγὴν ὄνομα ἀποικίαν τιθέμενος . . . ἐξεπέμψατο (ὁ νομοθέτης).

For ἀπαλλαγὴν, which has no construction, read ἀπαλλαγῆς depending on ὄνομα. Ast suggested the dative, but with τούτοις that would be very awkward. Cf. on 666 B.

737 B ἀνεγκλήτους γὰρ δεῖ τὰς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους κατασκευάζεσθαι ἄμῳς γέ πως . . . οἷς ἂν ἦ παλαιὰ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν μετῆ· οἷς δέ . . . ὁ θεὸς ἔδωκε κ.τ.λ.

οἷς ἂν ἦ Schanz after Ast. But A has ἦ and no ἂν. Perhaps ἦ stands for ἦν and μετῆ for μετῆν, as it may in *Frogs* 1163? The imperfect is perfectly in place, for the passage means not simply that there should be no disputes about property, but that, where there used to be such disputes, they should now be terminated (ἀνεγκλήτους . . . κατασκευάζεσθαι). The imperfects are also supported by ἔδωκε, for which with ἦ and μετῆ we might rather expect δέδωκε.

751 B Write τὸ (for τῷ) πόλιν εὖ παρεσκευασμένην κ.τ.λ.

753 E οὐκ ἔστι <δῆλον>? οὐκ ἔστιν <εἰπεῖν>?

754 D τῶν γραμμάτων <δί> ὧν ἂν ἕκαστος ἀπογράψῃ . . . τὸ πλήθος τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας, οἷς ὡς ἂν?

757 C ἔστιν γὰρ δήπου καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἡμῖν αἰεὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον.

Apparently τὸ δίκαιον is considered to be added here in a sort of explanatory apposition to τὸ πολιτικόν. But this is awkward and obscure. Perhaps the two adjectives have exchanged places, and we should read ἔστιν . . . τὸ δίκαιον . . . τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτικόν, *this is political justice*. I do not remember the phrase πολιτικὸν δίκαιον elsewhere in Plato (*Ep.* 7. 326 A τὰ πολιτικὰ δίκαια), but it is familiar in the *Ethics*. The same sense might be got by omitting τό before δίκαιον, as repeated from αὐτό.

757 D τούτοις παρωνυμίοις χρῆσθαι.

The meaning is *these π.*, e.g. *ισότης* in an unusual sense, not *these as π.* Add therefore τοῖς.

ibid. E Read αὐτοῖς for αὐτούς.

760 A καὶ τὰ μὲν αὖ περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ταῦτα γιγνέσθω.

There seems no propriety in αὖ, and it is probably a mistake for δὴ, like the much commoner confusion of δὴ and ἄν.

766 B ὄντιν' ἄν ἕκαστος ἡγήται κάλλιστ' ἄν τῶν περὶ παιδείαν ἄρξαι γενομένων.

I do not see how γενομένων is to be defended. If the things have already been done, there is nothing now to control. Hug proposes to omit the word. But, if only we alter it to the present tense γιγνομένων, it makes good enough sense. So in 784 A εἰ τίς τινα ὄρᾳ πρὸς ἄλλ' ἄττα βλέποντα . . . ἢ πρὸς τὰ τεταγμένα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τοῖς γάμοις θυσῶν τε καὶ ἱερῶν γενομένων read γιγνομένων, *ordained by the celebrations that take place*, for ὑπό does not mean *to the accompaniment of*, as Stallbaum and Jowett suppose. γενομένην should certainly be γιγνομένην in 844 D: probably also in 895 B.

777 A οἱ μὲν πιστεύουσί τε οὐδὲν γένει οἰκετῶν.

Perhaps οὐδὲν <οὐδενὶ> γένει, and 943 C μὴ περὶ προτέρου πολέμου <μηδενὸς> μηδὲν παρεχόμενον.

ibid. B δύσκολόν ἐστι τὸ θρέμμα ἄνθρωπος.

For τό substitute the τι so common with adjectives in such cases. So just below in D ὁ . . . γιγνόμενός τις ἀμείαντος.

778 C οἰκήσεις τε ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων.

Probably δικαστήρια, corrupted into conformity with ἀρχόντων.

ibid. E μαλθακὴν ἕξει ταῖς ψυχαῖς . . . εἴωθε ποιεῖν.

εἴωθεν ἐμποιεῖν would be more usual.

781 C Should γε be put after ἔργω instead of coming before it? οὐδ' ἕξει ποτέ γε τελευτήν is less strange, for οὐδέ . . . γε is a regular phrase.

782 C Write τό γε μὴν for τὸ δὲ μὴν. δέ and μὴν are not, I think, found together.

783 A B After the last letters of θεοῖς it is possible that

ὡς has been lost. It would ease the construction of the genitive,

784 C δέκα τῶν νομοφυλάκων ἐλομένους, οἷς ἂν ἐπιτρέψωσιν οἷδε καὶ τάξωσι, τούτοις ἐμμένειν.

So the vulgate, but A has no καί and τάξωσι is a correction of τάξουσι. Schanz follows Hermann in deleting it, but I take it as meant (*i.e.* ἐπιτάξωσι) for a correction of ἐπιτρέψωσι, and as such I think it should be adopted. ἐπιτρέπω is a less natural word than ἐπιτάττω in regard to the authorities, especially in combination with ἐμμένειν.

792 B Add ἂν to ἀπεργάζεσθαι. This is in itself necessary, and the ἂν in the answer confirms it. Cf. 812 B, where ἂν has been inserted.

796 D ἦν <οὔν> εἶπον γυμναστικὴν?

797 A Read δῆ, not δέ, after ἀκούσατε. In 800 B I think it should be δῆ after κείσθω, in 802 D after ἀκούων, in 824 B after τοῖς ἄλλοις, and in 916 D after κιβδηλείαν. On the other hand write δέ for δῆ after πολεμικὴν at the end of 814 E.

ibid. B After νέων has ὡς = ὥστε, or ὥστε itself, been lost? The construction seems entirely to break down without something of the kind? For ὡς so used see 798 B.

ibid. D ἀκούσωμέν τε ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὕτως εἴπωμεν.

As ἡμῶν αὐτῶν clearly = ἀλλήλων, this is mere tautology. For ἀλλήλους read ἄλλους, as in 820 C corrected below.

ibid. D μεταβολὴν πάντων πλὴν κακῶν πολὺ σφαλερώτατον εὐρήσομεν . . . ἐν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δ' οὔ, πλὴν, ὅπερ εἶπον νῦν δῆ, κακοῖς. Surely ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν and πλὴν κακοῖς require the presence of πᾶσιν or ἅπασιν, dependent on ἐν, to explain them, just as πάντων precedes πλὴν κακῶν. They could not be appended to οὐ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δ' οὔ. Insert it therefore before or after ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.

800 A καθ' ὑπνον δὲ οἶόν ποῦ τις ἢ καὶ ὑπαρ ἐγρηγορῶς ὠνειρωξέε μαντευόμενος αὐτό.

Can οἶον stand thus *after* καθ' ὑπνον? and, even if it can, does this give any good meaning? Perhaps οἶον should be ὄρων, for ι and ρ are apt to be confused. Badham ἰόν.

801 A In γρόντας δεῖ is δεῖ a mistake for δῆ? δεῖ δῆ follows immediately and δῆ bears repetition better than δεῖ, especially as it would emphasize different words in the two cases.

802 B ἐπαναιρούμενον?

803 A δρᾶν . . . καταβάλλεσθαι . . . σκοπεῖν cannot be all right together, and Badham wished to leave out δρᾶν. It would be a gentler measure to read σκοπῶν.

805 E ἢ τὸ τούτων δῆ διὰ μέσου φῶμεν, ᾧ Μέγιλλε, τὸ Λακωνικόν.

φῶμεν should be θῶμεν, like θεῖμεν ἄν in D. The confusion is found elsewhere.

808 D που for πω?

810 B τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων, τοῖς δὲ ἄνευ ῥυθμῶν (ῥυθμικῶν?) τμημάτων.

814 A <τοῦ> τοὺς φυλάξοντας παῖδας . . . ἱκανοὺς εἶναι?

Schneider substitutes τοῦ for τοῦς. As the text stands, there is no construction for the infinitive, and τοῦ is used thus in 816 E.

ibid. E δύο μὲν αὐτῆς (*i.e.* κινήσεως) εἶδη χρῆ νομίζειν εἶναι, τὴν μὲν τῶν καλλιόνων σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνὸν μιμουμένην, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσχιόνων ἐπὶ τὸ φαῦλον.

If the text is right, there is a bold anacoluthon in μιμουμένην coming after δύο αὐτῆς εἶδη, as though διττὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι had been used. Perhaps we should read τὴν μὲν <τὴν> τῶν καλλιόνων κ.τ.λ. and understand another τὴν with τῶν αἰσχιόνων. μιμουμένης for μιμουμένην is also possible.

815 A The clause ἔν τε ταῖς . . . μιμείσθα seems almost desperate. Adopting Badham's ἐπιχειροῦσαν, we might

read κινήματα for μινήματα. In *Ar. Poet.* 24. 1459 b. 40 A^c has κίνησις by error for μίνησις.

816 E ἄνευ γελοίων τὰ σπουδαῖα . . . μαθεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνατόν, εἰ μέλλει τις φρόνιμος ἔσσεσθαι ποιεῖν δὲ οὐκ ἂν δυνατόν ἀμφότερα.

It would be difficult to justify the omission of εἷη in the last clause. Cf. what was said above on the similar question as to *Rep.* 577 B. I do not however propose to insert εἷη here, but for ἂν to read αὖ. In 804 E ὡς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπον ἂν εἶη, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπον we should read οὐκ ἂν πρέποι or οὐκ αὖ πρέπον.

818 B τῶν γε ἀνθρωπίνων <πέρι>? There is no construction for the genitive.

820 C προβάλλοντα ἀλλήλοις.

ἀλλήλοις cannot go with a singular participle. Read ἄλλοις. Cf. on 797 D.

822 E λέγοντες should, I think, be λέγοντας (like τιθεμένους), and πειθόμενον a few lines below πιθόμενον.

823 E Has not a verb been lost, on which the datives ἐρηγορόσι and εὐδοουσι depended? The sentences following suggest ἐπέλθοι, but some other word, e.g. ἐμπέσοι, may have been used.

824 A In ἡ τῶν διαπαύματα πόνων ἔχουσα Stallbaum thought something agreeing with πόνων to be missing after τῶν. Perhaps the words are only out of their right order, διαπαύματα τῶν πόνων or τῶν πόνων διαπαύματα.

829 A ταῦτόν δὴ τοῦτ' ἔστι καὶ πόλει ὑπάρχειν . . . βίος εἰρηνικός.

The nominative βίος is hard to justify, unless we should read ὑπάρχον. ἔστιν ὑπάρχον, would be an instance of a construction very common in Plato's later writings.

830 B εἶτε τις ἡμῖν συγγυμναστῶν συνέβαινε ἀπορία πλείων.

There is no meaning in πλείων. πλείονων must be what Plato wrote.

831 D *πρᾶξιν πράττειν ὄσιόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον.*

The editors and the dictionaries seem satisfied with ὄσιον, but better evidence is needed to persuade us that ὄσιαν should not be substituted. ἀνόσιον no doubt caused the slip.

833 E *συννομοθετεῖν, τίς νικᾶν ἄρα δίκαιος . . . , καὶ τὸν ἠπτώμενον ὡσαύτως τίς διακρίνει τάξις.*

Evidently διακρινεῖ *is to decide*. So in 848 B *νέμομεν* should be *νεμοῦμεν*.

834 A *διαθεμένους αὖ περὶ τούτων νόμου.*

The case is like that of 831 D. Not to mention other authors, Plato in many dialogues has over and over again to speak of laying down laws, and the word is never *διατίθεσθαι*, but always the simple *τίθεσθαι*. Which is the more likely, that *διαθεμένους* is a mistake, or that he for once used the word in a sense it never bears elsewhere either in him or (apparently) in any one else? Should we transfer *δια* to the word immediately preceding and make it, what Plato uses twice in the *Laws*, *διαμλλωμένων*?

ibid. B *ὥστε τούτου μὲν* (the chariot-race) *ἀγωνιστὰς οὐκ ἐπιχώριον ἔσται τιθέντας νοῦν μήτε ἔχειν μήτε δοκεῖν κεκτηῖσθαι.*

No one has made much of *οὐκ ἐπιχώριον*. I would suggest *οὐκ ἐπιχωρίον <όντος>*, or more probably *οὐκ ἐπιχώριον <όν>*, as in Thuc. 4. 17. 2. Cf. 899 A below. *ἀγῶνα* for *ἀγωνιστὰς* might be thought of, but the corruption is very unlikely.

842 D *οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡμῖς αὖ γίνονται νόμοι μέτριοι.*

There seems no force in *αὖ*. *αὐτῶ*? *αὖ* and the parts of *αὐτός* are apt to be confused.

843 A *καταφρονήσας δέ* ought in strictness to have *ὁ* before it, but Plato may have been irregular here.

844 D Write *γινομένην* for *γενομένην*.

845 C *δίκην δ' εἶναι ἐλευθέρῳ τῶν τοιούτων πληγῶν μηδεμίαν.*

Certainly not, as Jowett puts it, 'No freeman shall have any right of satisfaction for such blows,' as though a slave

might, though a freedmen might not. The words must bear the unusual sense that no freedman is to be punished or have an action brought against him for such blows. Cf. *δίκην ἔχω Rep.* 529 c *I am punished.*

846 B ἀδικήματα εἰς τὰ κοινὰ δικαστήρια ἐπανάγειν τὸν βουλόμενον ἐκάστων τῶν ἐγκλημάτων.

The genitive has puzzled scholars, but it seems to be the one common with *διώκειν*, *φεύγειν*, and other legal words relating to accusations and trials. Such a genitive is found, for instance, with *ἀπάγω*. Cf. p. 141.

848 B τῷ μὲν τοίνυν τοιούτῳ τῶν μερῶν, τριῶν ὄντων, μηδὲν πλεόν ἐχέτω.

τῷ τοιούτῳ certainly cannot mean, as Stallbaum and Jowett take it, *such being the case*. That would be ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ. Ast τοῦ τοιούτου with πλεόν, *more of such produce*. Possibly τῶν . . . τοιούτων μερῶν, though I confess that τούτων τῶν μερῶν is rather what one would expect. Does τῷ τοιούτῳ go with πλεόν and mean 'some advantage for this sort of reason'? The sense is not very clear.

νέμομεν just above ought, I think, to be νεμοῦμεν. Cf. *Phileb.* 65 B.

849 C τρίτη δ' εἰκάδι τῶν ζῶων ἔστω πρᾶσις is probably right, not in Jowett's sense of *on the twenty-third day*, which the Greek could not mean, but in the sense of *thirdly on the twentieth*, literally *on the twentieth as third day (of sale)*. But *τρίτη* may be worth suggesting.

854 A τὸν τῶν ἱεροσύλων, περὶ νόμον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὅσα δυσίατα.

The neuter ὅσα shows that we should read *ἱεροσυλιῶν*. Cf. 880 E below.

ibid. E τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους παράδειγμα ὀνήσει γενόμενος ἀκλεῆς καὶ ὑπὲρ τοὺς τῆς χώρας ὄρους ἀφανισθεῖς.

Badham omits *παράδειγμα*. I would rather omit *καὶ*, taking the construction to be *ὀνήσει παράδειγμα γενόμενος, ἀφανισθεῖς ἀκλεῆς ὑπὲρ . . . ὄρους*, or suppose *ὡς* to have been lost after *γενόμενος*.

856 E τρίτος εἷς ἔστω νόμος περὶ δικαστῶν τε οὓς δεῖ δικάζειν αὐτοῖς καὶ <τίς> ὁ τρόπος τῶν δικῶν.

858 D οὐ χρὴ τὸν νομοθέτην μόνον τῶν γραφόντων περὶ καλῶν . . . ξυμβουλεύειν ;

Is it possible to use μόνος in this way for διαφερόντως, *more than others*, etc., which is all it could mean here? Cf. in E πάντων γραμμάτων . . . κάλλιστά τε καὶ ἄριστα, referring to the same thing. When εἷς is so used, a superlative is always added. There is reason to think that μόνον is sometimes confused with μᾶλλον: has it here taken the place of μάλιστα?

860 D Should εἰ καὶ be καὶ εἰ, or εἰ δὲ καί? *And if* seems the sense required.

861 D εἰ μὴ τῷ τε ἀκουσίῳ καὶ τῷ ἔκουσίῳ διαφέρετον ἑκάτερον, ἀλλὰ ἄλλῳ τινὶ δήποτε.

Is it legitimate to attach δήποτε to τις? Perhaps ἄλλῳ ᾧτινι δήποτε.

ibid. E μὴ τοῖνν τις . . . οἴηται, being the present tense, cannot mean 'let no one think,' 'I would have no one think.' Nor is Goodwin's view (*M.T.* 264) that it means 'I am afraid some one may think' at all probable, any more than his similar interpretation of two other Platonic passages, *Euthyd.* 272 c and *Symp.* 193 B. Take μὴ as final = ἵνα μὴ, a use that sometimes occurs in Plato and Xenophon. The sentence is then a little broken by the interposition of βλάβαι γάρ . . . ἔκουσίῳ and resumed with σκοπεῖσθε δὴ (not δέ: cf. on 797 A above).

864 B δόξης τῆς <οὐκ> ἀληθοῦς? It seems impossible that true belief, or even the pursuit of it, can be spoken of as a kind or cause of error and wrong (εἶδος τῶν ἀμαρτανομένων).

866 B τὴν πάθην should probably be τῆς πάθης, depending on μίασμα.

ibid. D E The μὲν after ἐξαίφνης seems entirely out of place. Put it back a few words to follow θυμῷ at the

beginning of the sentence, and we get the regular form *θυμῷ μὲν, θυμῷ δέ*. The *ὄσοι* after *θυμῷ δέ* needs an *ἄν*.

868 E Assuming the unusual construction of *στερῶ* (as in D) to be right, we seem to need *ὧν <δὲ> ἀδελφούς . . . τούτων δὴ* (for *δὲ*) *ξυνέστιος κ.τ.λ.* The words are not at all an explanation of the preceding sentence, and therefore some connecting particle is required.

869 E Read *ἐπιβουλήν* for *ἐπιβουλῆς*. Cf. on 866 B.

870 E Instead of *τοιαύτη* I should prefer to read the more precise *τῇ αὐτῇ*.

872 D Add *περί* to *φόνους*.

873 D If we are not with Badham to omit *τῶν* before *ὄσα*, it would seem a mistake for *τοῖς*, due to the genitive *μερῶν* before it.

877 A *τούτῳ δὴ χάριν τῷ δαίμονι διδόντα.*

Read *τούτου*.

ibid. B *μετάστασιν εἰς τὴν γείτονα πόλιν.*

Why *the* neighbouring state? Read *τινά*.

ibid. E *ὅταν τις ἅμα δυστυχηθῆ καὶ ἀσεβηθῆ τῶν οἴκων.*

Such a passive use of *δυστυχῶ* seems to me impossible. It is in no way supported by such uses as *τὰ δυσ-, εὐ-ἀ-τυχηθέντα*, any more than *τὰ ἀμαρτηθέντα, αἱ ἡμαρτημένοι πολιτεῖαι*, etc. would justify *ἀμαρτάνομαι* *I am wronged*. *ἀσεβηθῆ* is different, for *ἀσεβῶ* is sometimes a transitive verb (Aesch *Eum.* 271 *ἦ θεὸν ἢ ξέρον τιν' ἀσεβῶν*: Lys. (?) 2. 7 *τοὺς θεοὺς ἀσεβέεισθαι*) and the 'house,' like the gods, may be regarded as the object of an impious act, the person or personified thing outraged by it. I would therefore read *δυστυχήσῃ καὶ ἀσεβηθῆ*. The one form has corrupted the other. In Plut. *Dion. et Brut. Comp.* 4 *πιστεύσαντας* is now corrected to *πιστευθέντας*. In [Arist.] *Physiogn.* 805 b 21 *τὰ μὲν οὖν κοινὰ τῶν σημείων οὐδὲν ἂν διασαφηθείη τῷ φυσιογνωμονοῦντι* we should surely read *διασαφήσειε*, answering to *σημαίνειν* just before, while *Eth. Eud.*

1248 b 31 οὐδὲν ἂν ὀνήσειε χρώμενος αὐτοῖς calls for ὀνηθείη. The case of Polybius 3. 109. 12 ὧν ὑμεῖς αὐτὴν μὴ διαψεύσθητε (read διαψεύσητε) is a little different.

880 E μήτε τῶν ἄνω δείσας θεῶν μῆνιν μήτε τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς τιμωριῶν λεγομένων. τιμωρῶν will be much neater. Indeed with μῆνιν the abstract τιμωριῶν is hardly possible. Cf. 854 A above.

881 A παρανομεῖ should, I think, be παρανομεῖν, parallel to ἄψασθαι. The tense prevents it from matching τολμήσει.

ibid. E προσάπτηται should, judging by the other verbs, be προσάψηται.

885 C ἐπακούσωμεν αὐτῶν πρῶτον ἃ . . . λέγειν μαντεύομαι. μαντεύομαι and ἂν εἴποιεν following point to λέξιν.

ibid. D The nominative λέγοντες is quite unjustifiable. Read λέγοντας, as in E. Cf. 822 E above.

ibid. E οὐκοῦν, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖ ῥάδιον εἶναι ἀληθεύοντας λέγειν ὡς εἰσὶ θεοί; The question is not whether it is easy to affirm this with truth, but whether it is easy to adduce evidence. τεκμήρια λέγειν is the phrase in D and in 886 D, and it must surely have been used here.

In the next sentence some verb or equivalent has been lost. The subjects lack a predicate.

886 D προφέροντες ought apparently to be προφερόντων. The intervention of λέγωμεν will account for the mistake.

ibid. E If the ὄντες of some MSS. is right, read νῦν δέ . . . ὄντες <γὰρ> κ.τ.λ.

887 C Should we read κατ' εὐχὴν for εὐχῆν, which lacks construction? Badham's ἐπ' εὐχῆν seems to me less proper.

ibid. E Seeing that the gods themselves are the subject of ἐνδιδόντων (οὐδαμῆ ὑποψίαν ἐνδιδόντων ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ θεοί), θεοί should presumably be omitted.

889 A Is ζοικε *it seems* used elsewhere with accusative and infinitive? If not, nominatives should be read.

ibid. D Perhaps τῆς πολιτικῆς for τὴν πολιτικὴν (see on 657 C above), but cf. Thuc. 6. 62. 2 τὴν Σικελίαν τὸ μέρος. If the accusative were right, κοινωνοῦν ought by the rules of grammar to be feminine.

891 E οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι.

ψυχὴ cannot be used for a state of mind, a ψυχῆς ἕξις. It may be an erroneous anticipation of the ψυχῆν which occurs a line or two further on; in which case it has displaced some such word as δόξαν or γνώμην.

892 D The use of the active φυλάττω in the sense proper to the middle, *beware of*, is extremely doubtful, the examples alleged by Liddell and Scott not being by any means satisfactory. Probably therefore for φυλάττωμεν we should read φυλαττώμεθα, as in the contrary way Stallbaum seems justified in reading ποιούντων for ποιουμένων (ἄσκησιν τῶν ἀρχόντων) in 865 A.

ibid. D χρῆναι is perhaps only an error for χρή, due to φανῆναι following.

896 B δευτέρα τε καὶ ὀπόσων ἀριθμῶν βούλοιτ' ἂν τις ἀριθμεῖν αὐτὴν πολλοστήν τοσοῦτων.

Probably πολλοστή.

ibid. C τὰ <τῆς> ψυχῆς?

897 A ὄσαι τούτων ξυγγενεῖς ἢ πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις.

Would not καί give better sense than ἢ?

898 C εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μὲν ἐστὶν ἢ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, τὴν δὲ οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιάγειν φατέον . . . ἦτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν.

It is quite impossible that μὲν should stand in the πρότασις or dependent clause and δέ in the apodosis or main one. δέ may conceivably be right, though this is unlikely and δῆ naturally suggests itself: see on 797 A above. μὲν is not easily corrected, but it may stand for μόνη.

899 A αὐτοῦ δὲ ἄμεινον <ὄν>, as a dozen lines above ἀναίσθητον <ὄν> is conjectured? If αὐτοῦ is doubted, we

might think of παντός. See *Aristophanes and Others*, p. 203.

ibid. E I am not sure that there is any proper construction for the adverbs *ἴδια καὶ δημοσία*? Why not *ἴδιαι καὶ δημόσιαι*, which is no real change?

901 E *δειλίας γὰρ ἔκγονος . . . ἀργία, ῥαθυμία δὲ ἀργίας καὶ τρυφῆς.*

Read *τρυφή*. So in 903 E *ἥπερ ἂν ἔχοι ῥαστώνης ἐπιμελείας θεοῖς τῶν πάντων*, if this form of the first words is right, we should probably read *ἐπιμέλεια*. In both cases the genitive would be due to a genitive immediately preceding.

909 A *μηδέν'* for *μηδέν*?

913 A *μήτ' οὖν τις τῶν ἐμῶν χρημάτων ἄπτοιτο εἰς δύναμιν, μηδ' αὖ κινήσειε μηδὲ τὸ βραχύτατον ἐμὲ μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς πείθων.*

Read <*μή*> *πείθων*. That is undoubtedly the sense, and it cannot be got out of the Greek as it stands, for *μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς* must go with the verb. *ἐμέ* seems governed by *κινήσειε*: otherwise what is the difference between *κινεῖν* and *ἄπτεσθαι* emphasized by *μήτε . . . μηδ' αὖ*?

915 D *ἀναγέτω . . . εἰς ξενικὴν παράδοσιν πέντε μηνῶν (within five months), ἧς μέσος ὁ μὴν ἐν ᾧ κ.τ.λ.*

It is certain that *ἧς* does not refer to *παράδοσιν*, as Stallbaum would have it do, for that gives no sense, and it cannot grammatically refer to *μηνῶν*. *ἀναγωγή* supplied out of *ἀναγέτω* would not make sense either. Was *προθεσμία* in Plato's mind. Cf. 954 D.

920 A *ἐφ' ἐκάστης ἀλώσεως τοὺς δεσμοὺς μὴ πανέσθω διπλασιάζων τὸν ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον.*

To other suggestions I may add *τοῖς δεσμοῖς*.

924 D *τὸν ἐπιτηδεῖον* may perhaps be taken as in apposition to *ὅπερ* governed by *διασκέψαιτο*. Otherwise we might read *τοῦ ἐπιτηδείου*, but this would probably necessitate *υἰοῦ* and *νυμφίου* too.

925 B ἔτι δὲ πολλὰ πολλῶν καὶ πλείων ἀπορία τῶν τοιούτων γίγνοιτ' ἄν.

For πολλῶν read πολλῶ going with πλείων: for πολλὰ perhaps που δῆ (Madvig που.διά, Ast πολλή).

ibid. D μὴ λανθανέτω . . . ὡς χαλεπῶς . . . προστάττει . . . , μὴ δοκεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἂ μὴρία . . . γίγνεται.

Has it escaped notice that μὴ δοκεῖ is impossible grammar for οὐ δοκεῖ? Read μὴ σκοπεῖν δὲ δοκεῖ, unless δοκεῖ δὲ μὴ σκοπεῖν appears more probable. μὴ can hardly be joined with σκοπεῖν, if δοκεῖ comes between. Cf. τούτων δὴ μηδὲν φροντίζειν τάχ' ἄν . . . δόξειε following.

928 C ἄμα δ' ἂν ἠβήσῃ τις κ.τ.λ.

ἄμα as a conjunction cannot be right, (1) because there is no other evidence of the word being so used, like *simul* in Latin, (2) because the sense *as soon as* is hardly appropriate to the context. But one does not see how ὅταν or ἐπειδάν can have been so corrupted.

929 B εἰ μὲν πείθῃ ὁ πατήρ καὶ συμψήφους λάβῃ.

The aorist λάβῃ points clearly to πείσῃ (cf. on 881 E), and the mistake is common enough. *Epinomis* 989 B is a still clearer case, μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς ποτε πείθῃ, where the present tense is not even good grammar. In *Ar. Eq.* 712 πείσεται is required, and probably in *Nub.* 1422 ἔπεισε.

930 C αὖ after ζῆν is not suitable. Read ἄν, comparing for a somewhat similar use 879 D ἵνα πόρρω γίγνηται τοῦ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ἂν τολμήσαι ποτε πατάξει.

932 C γυναῖκες δὲ δέκα πλείοσιν ἔτεσι κολαζέσθωσαν ταῖς αὐταῖς κολάσεσιν.

Though the dative is sometimes used in late Greek, like the Latin ablative, to express duration of time, it is very improbable here. Perhaps <έν> δέκα, though that would not be usual.

933 A ὑπὸ τούτων <τῶν> δυναμένων?

941 A εὖν ὡς πρεσβευτῆς τις ἢ κήρυξ καταψευδόμενος τῆς πόλεως παραπρεσβεύηται πρὸς τινα πόλιν ἢ πεμπόμενος μὴ τὰς οὔσας πρεσβείας ἐφ' αἷς πέμπεται ἀπαγγέλλη.

Is it possible that πεμπόμενος has strayed from its proper place? It is superfluous where it stands, whereas ὡς πρεσβευτῆς seems to want its support.

944 A B ὁπόσοι...ἀπώλεσαν ὄπλα ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν ἢ χειμώνων ἐν τόποις ὑποδεξαμένης αὐτοὺς ἐξαίφνης πολλῆς ῥύσεως ὕδατος.

Stallbaum κόποις or πόνοις for τόποις, Madvig χειμάρρων for χειμώνων. I have suggested elsewhere that in D. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4. 7. 3. τοῦτο τὸ μῆκος τῶν βίων οὐ φέρουσιν οἱ καθ' ἡμᾶς τόποι we ought to read χρόνοι for τόποι. Should the same correction be made here?

ibid. D Read σκοπῶν for σκοπεῖν, and the genitive will give no trouble. πλημμελεῖν for -ῶν seems necessary in 941 B.

ibid. οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ δρᾶν τοῦναντίον ὥς ποτε θεὸν φασὶ δρᾶσαι.

This might pass for one of the supposed uses of ὡς = ἢ, *than*, of which there are a few (very doubtful), after comparatives. Some editors read ὦν, which is likely enough. But I would rather read τοῦναντίον <ἢ> ὡς, since (1) ἢ ὡς is quite a common phrase, (2) the loss of ἢ may well be due to ν preceding it.

949 C ἢ has been lost after the ν of λητουργιῶν, N and H being very similar.

952 B Read ἦκει, not ἦκοι, which is hardly grammatical.

953 C ἀξίων τι καλὸν ἰδεῖν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι διαφέρον ἐν καλλοναῖς ἢ καὶ δεῖξαι τι κ.τ.λ.

καλόν and διαφέρον ἐν καλλοναῖς are awkwardly tautological. Perhaps we should read merely καὶ for καλόν. The confusion is found elsewhere. Cf. pp. 38, 158.

ibid. D πιστεύων ἰκανῶς εἶναι ξένος τῷ τοιούτῳ ξένῳ.

ἰκανός for ἰκανῶς? In 879 B MSS. vary between the two. In 951 C τελέως seems a mistake (Badham) for τέλεος.

956 A ἀπολελοιπότης ψυχὴν σώματος.

ἀπολωλεκότης Badham. But compare Virg. *Aen.* 3. 140 *linquebant dulces animas* and, still more remarkable, 4. 385 *cum frigida mors anima seduxerit artus*.

958 D ἡδίκηκει should be ἡδίκηκε.

962 E εἰς ἐν δὲ <οὔ>, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως κ.τ.λ.

963 D αὐτοῖν must be written αὐτοῖν, if it is to mean ἀλλήλοιν.

964 E Some word like δεῖ or δέον seems lost, on which the clauses τοὺς μὲν νέους . . . ὄρᾶν, τοὺς δὲ κ.τ.λ. depended. Also I think τῆς κεφαλῆς (say) is missing after φυλάκων : it is needed to balance τοῦ κύτους. ὄρᾶν is used oddly with περί. Should it be φρουρεῖν?

968 D ὅτε for οὗς

969 C ἢ τὴν πόλιν ἑατέον τῆς κατοικίσεως ἢ τὸν ξένον τόνδε οὐκ ἀφετέον.

What is the construction of the genitive? Two alterations suggest themselves: one to transfer τῆς κατοικίσεως to the next clause, so that it will be governed by ἀφετέον, the other to read τὴν κατοίκισιν ἑατέον τῆς πόλεως, supposing an exchange of words or endings to have taken place.

EPINOMIS.

973 C οὐκ ἔσται should be οὐκ ἔστι. The future is not appropriate. *Ibid.* κάλλιστ' ἄν should be κάλλιστα, for ἄν is impossible with ζῆν, and cannot be connected with προθυμοῖτο.

THE PLATONIC LETTERS.

I.

The *Letters* have not received very great attention from scholars, and they therefore still contain many things to be set right. I have been helped not only by the ordinary editions, but by Hercher's *Epistolographi Graeci*, the translation (by Müller) and notes in vol. 8 of Steinhart's *Plato*, a few notes by Badham in *Mnemosyne*, vol. 10, and very greatly by H. T. Karsten's *Commentatio Critica* (1864), a valuable study of both the language and the contents.

1. 310 A In the verses quoted, οὐδ' ἀδάμας οὐδ' ἀργύρου κλίνει πρὸς ἄνθρωπον δοκιμαζόμεν' ἀστράπτει πρὸς ὄψεις, the πρὸς ἄνθρωπον can hardly be right, especially with πρὸς ὄψεις following. πρὸς ἀνθρώπου (or ἀνθρώπων) going with δοκιμαζόμενα seems most probable: possibly we should read πρὸς ἀνθρώπων...προσόψεις, and for προσόψεις there actually is some insignificant MS. authority.

2. 310 C νῦν δὲ μέγας ἐγὼ εἶμι ἐμαντὸν παρέχων τῷ ἐμῷ λόγῳ ἐπόμενον.

μέγας is almost unmeaning in the context and should probably be μόνος. ε and ο, γ and ν are liable to be confused with each other. Perhaps μόνος ἐγὼ εἶμι <ὁ> ἐμαντὸν παρέχων.

310 E The intercourse of Plato and Dionysius will not be forgotten, τοιοῦτοι οἱ παραδεδεγμένοι εἰσὶν αὐτήν. Read τσοῦτοι. It is not the quality, but the number, of

the people who have heard of it that will make its memory last. Cf. 320 D.

So in 11. 358 Ε κινδυνεύειν...οἶα ἀπαντᾶ we should alter οἶα to ὄσα.

311 A The easiest supposition to make in this difficult passage is that before ὡς σοφούς one or two names have dropped out, names of wise men supposed to have been friends and advisers of Cyrus. But I do not know that there is any tradition or legend of such friends. In 4. 320 D Cyrus is taken along with Lycurgus as himself a man in whose single person power and wisdom were united, and this would seem the natural view. But what follows here in 311 A certainly seems confused.

ibid. C οὐκ, ἐπειδὴν ἡμεῖς τελευτήσωμεν, καὶ οἱ λόγοι περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν σεσιγήσονται.

αὐτῶν can hardly be right, but it is difficult to correct. Possibly αὐτοί or εὐθύς.

312 A Plato, when he went to Syracuse, aimed at getting philosophy honoured in his person among the people: τοῦτο δ' οὐκ εὐαγές μοι ἀπέβη. In view of 8. 357 C μὴ ἀποστήτε πρὶν ἂν τὰ νῦν ὑφ' ἡμῶν λεχθέντα, οἷον ὀνειράτα θεῖα ἐπιστάντα ἐγρηγορόσιν, ἐναργῆ τε ἐξεργάσησθε τελεσθέντα καὶ εὐτυχῆ, I suggest ἐναργές for εὐαγές. Compare also the obscure passage in 3. 319 B as to the ὑβρισμα which ὑπαρ ἀντ' ὀνειράτος γέγονεν. The regular meaning of εὐαγής, *pure, holy*, is quite inappropriate here, and I do not see how Ast and others can twist it into meaning *successful* or *favourable*. Εὐαγής or εὐανγής comes nearer to the sense we need, but does not appear really to give it. It may be noticed that ἐναργής and ἐναργῶς occur frequently in these letters.

313 B οὐ μὴν ἄλλω γέ ποτ' ἔφην ἐντετυχηκέναι κ.τ.λ. According to Attic usage ποτέ should be πώποτε, as in C just below and 314 C. See however L. and S. *s.v.* οὐδέποτε.

314 A Transfer ἀεί, which is out of place with ἀκούμενα, to follow πολλῆς.

ibid. C διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πώποτ' ἐγὼ περὶ τούτων γέγραφα οὐδ' ἔστι σύγγραμμα Πλάτωνος οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἔσται, τὰ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενα Σωκράτους ἐστὶ καλοῦ καὶ νέου γεγονότος.

The exact sense of the last clause is obscure. One thing however is clear, and that is that we should distinguish *γεγονότος* from *όντος* and not translate, for instance, with Grote 'in his days of youthful vigour and glory.' In the spurious Xenophontean letter (1 in Sauppe), where the expression is quoted, *όντος* is actually used, but the two words have not the same meaning. I understand the phrase as meant to suggest the assumption of Socrates' person and character in the dialogues by one who was really *καλὸς καὶ νέος*, that is, Plato himself. Socrates, though young or comparatively young in some of the Platonic dialogues, can never have been imagined as *καλός*, which certainly refers to personal good looks and not, as Grote takes it, to 'glory.' Plato then was a *καλὸς καὶ νέος Σωκράτης*: Socrates became young and good-looking when Plato identified himself with his old master by putting his own ideas into his master's mouth.

There is perhaps a further point in the words. Athenaeus 505 E tells a story about Plato and Gorgias. Once when Gorgias visited Athens, *εἰπόντος τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὅτε εἶδεν αὐτὸν 'ἦκει ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς τε καὶ χρυσοῦς Γοργίας,' ἔφη ὁ Γοργίας 'ἦ καλὸν γε αἱ Ἀθῆναι καὶ νέον τοῦτον Ἀρχίλοχον ἐγνόησαν.'* Is it a mere coincidence that Plato should apparently be both a *καλὸς καὶ νέος Σωκράτης* and a *καλὸς καὶ νέος Ἀρχίλοχος*, or is the former an intentional adaptation of the latter? On the other hand it is of course also possible that the latter grew out of the former. Some connexion between them there must be.

Athen. 702 C *κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα οὐ Σωκράτους νέου καὶ καλοῦ παίγνια* is a reference to our phrase.

314 E *ἂν τις ἀδικῆ ἢ τοῦτον ἢ ἐκείνους καὶ σὺ αἴσθη. ἀδικήση* to match *αἴσθη*?

3. 315 D <ὡς> *μέλλοντος*.

316 B *οὐκ ἐμὴν ταύτην εἶρηκας συμβουλήν οὐδὲ διακώλυσιν.* Ἀληθῶς seems to have dropped out after *οὐκ* or elsewhere in the sentence. The necessary meaning can hardly be got without it.

316 D μετὰ πονηρῶν καὶ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων,

πολλῶν καὶ πονηρῶν in the more usual order? or is πολλῶν a mistake for some other word, say φαύλων? ἄλλων would not have much point.

316 E τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ξυντείνων οὐκ ἀνῆκα πρόποτε. Perhaps a preposition (εἰς, πρὸς, ἐπί) should be added before τοῦτο.

317 E Should not a σε be added to ἡξίουν...κατάγειν? The subject of κατάγειν can hardly be Plato himself. So in 7. 349 E με seems necessary with ἐκέλευε...σοι φράζειν.

318 D καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ περὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ κοινωνίας τῆς ἐμῆς καὶ σῆς. Perhaps περὶ <τῆς εἰς> τὰ πολιτικά. Or ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ <τῆς> π. τ. π. κοινωνίας might be defended on the analogy of such genitives as Riddell illustrates in his *Digest* 27 E, e.g. *Ar. Pol.* 1. 4, 1253 b 27 ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ὄρισμέναις τέχναις...οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν. To his examples add *Laws* 804 E: *Ar. Phys.* 8. 8, 263 a 1, and *Met.* 1. 993 b 17: *Eur. Suppl.* 465. Cf. Kühner § 417, 5 *Anm.* 11. The omission of τῆς after ταύτῃ would be easy.

ibid. καὶ εἴ τινα ἑτέραν ἀλλοτριότητα ἐνείδες ἐν ἐμοὶ πρὸς σέ, εἰκότως οἶε ταύτῃ πάντα ταῦτα γεγονέναι. καὶ μὴ θαύμαζε. οἶε ought, I think, to be οἶον. The εἰκότως here answers to the εἰκότως of 316 B. He is showing that his own conduct was natural, not saying what interpretation Dionysius naturally put upon it. The imperative μὴ θαύμαζε also points directly to οἶον. For οἶον cf. e.g. *Rep.* 339 E, if not 336 E.

319 B εἶπες δὲ καὶ μάλ' ἀπλάστως γελῶν, εἰ μέμνημαι, ὡς παιδευθέντα με ἐκέλευες ποιεῖν πάντα ταῦτα ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν. The sense clearly requires ὡς to precede, not follow, εἰ...μέμνημαι, for εἰ...ποιεῖν are the quoted words of Dionysius, as the comment ἔφην ἐγὼ κάλλιστα μνημονεύσαι σε shows. The words should therefore be transposed, unless indeed ὡς is an error for ἢ (ἢ παιδευθέντα...ποιεῖν...ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν). Karsten, p. 99, seems to fall into some confusion here.

Editors have disregarded the μάλα πλαστῶς of one Vatican MS. (Bekker's Ω), and it may well have been an

accident there. Yet surely it is right. Dionysius answered Plato μεμνημένως καὶ ὑβριστικῶς, and his laugh was much more likely to be very forced than perfectly natural.

‘You laughed,’ says Plato, μεμνημένως καὶ ὑβριστικῶς εἰς ἐμέ, ὡς ᾧον· διὸ τὸ τότε σοι ὑβρισμα νῦν ὕπαρ ἀντ’ ὀνείρατος γέγονεν. The phrase is obscure here and seems unskilfully used. I suppose the meaning is that D.’s sneer at παιδεία, which he thought (ᾧον) told against P., has in the end, through his neglect of παιδεία and true philosophy, recoiled on himself. It was ὄναρ as regards P., ὕπαρ as regards himself. With ὑβριστικῶς... ὡς ᾧον compare 7. 335 B καταγελῶν, ὡς οἶεται.

The writer goes on κἀγὼ τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ὃ ἐπῆει μοι εἰπεῖν οὐκ εἶπον, φοβούμενος μὴ σμικροῦ ῥήματος ἔνεκα τὸν ἔκπλουν ὃν προσεδόκων μὴ μοι στενὸς γίγνοιτο ἀντ’ εὐρυχωρίας. The conjectures στενός and στενόν rest, I fancy, on the mistaken idea that τὸν ἔκπλουν is the accusative after φοβούμενος, which it cannot be unless we banish the first μὴ. Nor is there any anacoluthon, as though he had meant to say τὸν ἔκπλουν... στενὸν ἐμαντῶ ποιήσαιμι and then changed to a μὴ στενὸς γίγνοιτο. The proper antecedent ὃ ἔκπλους is attracted into the case of the relative, as often happens, e.g. Lys. 19. 47 τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν κατέλιπε... οὐ πλείονος ἀξία ἐστίν: Ar. Pol. 2. 9, 1271 a 9, τὴν αἵρεσιν ἣν ποιοῦνται... ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης: Plat. Pol. 271 c τὸν βίον ὃν ἐπὶ τῆς Κρόνου φῆς εἶναι δυνάμειος πότερον· ἐν ἐκείναις ἦν ταῖς τροπαῖς ἢ ταῖσδε, and very many other passages, verse and prose. As a rule, the attracted case comes more prominently at the beginning of the sentence or clause, but it need not; cf. Plat. Meno 96 c: Xen. An. 3. 1. 6: Hell. 1. 4. 2: Dem. Ol. 2, 2, (?): Ar. Plut. 200. This being so, there is no difficulty about the repetition of μὴ: see Kühner § 514, 1 Anm. 2, who cites among other passages Anab. 3. 2. 25 δέδοικα μὴ, ἀν ἅπαξ κ.τ.λ., μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ λωτοφάγοι ἐπιλαθώμεθα τῆς οἴκαδε ὁδοῦ. But it is just possible that the first μὴ should be δὴ. Finally ἀντ’ εὐρυχωρίας is not ‘instead of ample sea-room,’ as though εἰ, like στενός, was a possible predicate of ἔκπλους, but ‘instead of my enjoying ample sea-room.’ Words with ἀντί are often to be expanded in this sort of way, e.g. Wasps 1268 ἀντὶ μῆλου καὶ ροῆς δειπνοῦντα μετὰ Δεωγόρον: Ar. Poet. 1449 a 4 ἀντὶ τῶν

ιάμβων κωμωδοποιοὶ ἐγένοντο, οἱ δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τραγωδοδιδάσκαλοι.

4.—320 C *ξυμφαίη τις ἂν τοὺς ἀντιποιουμένους τὰ τοιαῦτα τιμᾶν εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρειν*. The point should be, not that they do excel in the qualities specified, but that they may reasonably be expected to do so. In that case ἂν should be inserted after *εἰκότως*. It is very likely that it ought to be inserted also in 319 D in the words *ὡς ἦν ταῦτ' ἄριστα πραχθέντα*, but in such a phrase Greek idiom sometimes dispenses with it. In 7. 347 E Bonitz was certainly right in adding it after *οὐδὲν γάρ*.

ibid. If *τοὺς οἶσθα δήπου* is right, it would be better to write it *τοὺς—οἶσθα δήπου*, showing that *οἶσθα δήπου* takes the place of a participial phrase or other description. In 3. 318 A we have *οὓς οἶσθα σύ*, and so it might be here. Why the persons in question should not be plainly specified here, does not appear.

321 A Competitors (actors?) in theatres are loudly encouraged by children, *μήτι δὴ ὑπό γε τῶν φιλων, οὓς ἂν τις οἴηται μετὰ σπουδῆς κατ' εὔνοϊαν παρακελεύεσθαι*.

οὓς ἂν τις οἴοιτο would (I think) give a better sense.

5.—322 B With Stephanus, insert *περί* before *τὴν ἐμὴν ξυμβουλὴν* (which means of course 'about giving advice to me'; cf. *ἡ διαβολὴ ἣ ἐμὴ Arol.* 24 A). Possibly *δράσαι* for *δρᾶσαι*.

6.—322 D *οὔτε ἵππων πλήθος οὔτε ἄλλης πολεμικῆς συμμαχίας οὐδ' αὖ χρυσοῦ προσγενομένου γένοιτ' ἂν μείζων εἰς τὰ πάντα δύναμις*. We seem to need either Müller's *πλήθος... προσγενομένου* or *πλήθος... προσγενόμενον*.

323 D *ἐπομνύτας* twice over indicates that something is wrong. The first is perhaps to be simply omitted, or it arose from the mistake, which we are apt to make in writing, of putting too soon a word we are going to use later, and the real word was, *e.g.* *λαμβάνοντας*.

7.—324 B *τίς δ' ἦν ὁ τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἀπάξιον ἀκοῦσαι νέφ καὶ μὴ νέφ*. The precise meaning of this may

easily be missed, and has actually been missed by some scholars. It is important for the structure of the letter. Plato's correspondents have written to him that their views are those of Dion. He answers (or is made to answer) that he can himself say better than anyone what those views were, and in the words above quoted he adds that it is worth while to set forth how Dion came by them. αὐτῆς here refers to ἡ ἐκείνου διάνοια καὶ ἐπιθυμία nine lines above, and γενέσεως has nothing to do with the γενέσθαι just before it. The same is the force of the aorist in ἦν ἔσχε τότε δόξαν: cf. 327 B ταύτην τὴν διάνοιαν ἣν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀρθῶν λόγων ἔσχευ, 'the views that Dion then acquired.' Plato's point is that he himself had indoctrinated Dion with these views by sound teaching (ὀρθοὶ λόγοι), and that they were exclusively his own to start with. So he says (327 A) 'it would seem that I did not know I was unconsciously in some sort contriving a future overthrow of tyranny'; i.e. his first intercourse with Dion in 387 led to the eventual overthrow of the younger Dionysius thirty years later. This is the reason and the justification, such as it is, for the long letter that follows, purporting to be an account of the way in which Dion came to think as he did, but really forming (if genuine) a decidedly egotistical narrative of Plato's own part in the Syracusan story, while Dion remains quite in the background. This narrative is meant partly for the young Hipparinus, whom Plato hopes to inspire as he inspired his father Dion: hence νέω καὶ μὴ νέω. We must in justice to the writer, whether Plato or not, take the letter as meant not to be read only or chiefly by Dion's own friends and comrades, to whom much of the story would be already known, but by others, partly younger, partly less familiar with Dion and the facts. Of course, too, Plato is justifying himself to his own circle, perhaps to his own mind.

A German translator is actually driven by the want of clearness in all this to argue that ἐκείνω (324 B) means 'me,' because by ἐκείνον in 334 B Plato means himself.

326 C σώφρων δ' οὐδ' ἂν μελλήσαι ποτὲ γενέσθαι. ἐθελήσαι need not have been suggested for μελλήσαι if other passages had been kept in mind: Aristot. *Eth.* 2. 4, 1105 b 11 ἐκ

δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γενέσθαι ἀγαθός: Aristoph. *P.* 196?: *Pl.* 551: Thuc. 5. 98. 1: Dem. 54. 40.

326 D διαπονουμένας (passive) is perfectly right. The men are indolent at everything except a few things which are elaborately attended to.

ibid. ἀναγκαῖον δ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ. There is no construction for the infinitive εἶναι, and it may be conjectured that we should read εἴη ἄν or ἂν εἴη, just as in 337 C (ἀριθμὸν δ' εἶναι) εἶεν ἄν has been conjectured and seems necessary. It will be observed that there are four optatives with ἂν, one of them εἴη, preceding the clause we are now concerned with. In *Tim.* 17 B codex A has εἶναι for εἴη ἄν.

327 C ὧν καὶ Διονύσιον ἠγήσατο ἓνα γενέσθαι τάχ' ἂν ξυλλαμβανόντων θεῶν, γενομένου δ' αὖ τοῦ τοιούτου κ.τ.λ. Read αὐτοῦ for αὖ τοῦ. Cf. the index in Adam's *Republic* 2. 523.

327 E καταλέγων δέ. Read δή. The participles look back to ἔφη.

328 C αἰσχυρόμενος μὲν ἑμαυτὸν τὸ μέγιστον μὴ δόξαιμι κ.τ.λ., κινδυνεύσειν δὲ προδοῦναι πρῶτον μὲν τὴν Διώνος ξενίαν κ.τ.λ. The infinitive κινδυνεύσειν has no construction. Sense forbids it to depend on δόξαιμι: moreover the δέ clearly answers to the μὲν with αἰσχυρόμενος. Perhaps a participle has dropped out, e.g. κινδυνεύσειν δὲ <νομίζων> προδοῦναι. Nothing ever answers formally to πρῶτον μὲν τὴν Διώνος κ.τ.λ., but the antithesis in E shows what was in the writer's mind when he wrote πρῶτον μὲν. So, if in 331 D μὲν is a correct alteration of μέντοι, its force does not really appear until we reach 332 D E.

329 B τῆς φιλοσόφου ἀνεγκλητον μοίρας is a curious phrase. Compare however 332 D ἀνομιλήτῳ μὲν παιδείας, ἀνομιλήτῳ δὲ συνουσιῶν, and still more [Dem.] 61. 54 κἀμὲ τῆς σῆς φιλίας ἀνεπιτίμητον ποιεῖν. τ. φ. μ. is only a somewhat awkward periphrasis for τῆς φιλοσοφίας: see Ast, *s.v.* μοῖρα.

329 E πέμπων αὐτὸς τὸν κελεύοντα. Attic idiom would be in favour of κελεύσοντα, and no mistake is commoner than the substitution of present for future, when the two forms are very similar.

330 B καὶ ὁ πρῶτος δὴ χρόνος τῆς εἰς Σικελίαν ἐμῆς ἐπιδημήσεως τε καὶ διατριβῆς διὰ πάντα ταῦτα ξυνέβη γινόμενος. These words cannot mean either 'my first time of visiting, my first visit, was due to these causes,' or 'the earliest part of my stay was spent in this way.' χρόνος never means *time* in the above sense (first *time*, second *time*, etc.), and διὰ ταῦτα certainly does not mean 'in these occupations, circumstances, etc.' Plato's stay with the younger Dionysius is looked at as one whole, though a return to Athens broke it into two distinct parts. It seems to me that the predicate to ξυνέβη γινόμενος is missing, and that the words were 'the earliest part of my stay in Sicily turned out for all these reasons *what I have described* (<τοιούτος>) or *useless* or some such expression.

330 C ἵνα μὴ τὰ πάρεργα ὡς ἔργα μοι ξυμβαίη λεγόμενα. Why λεγόμενα? Clearly we should read the common ξυμβαίη γι(γ)νόμενα or γινόμενα, a phrase which occurs many times in these letters, *e.g.* in the sentence last quoted, as it does in the *Laws*. In 341 E Bonitz has, I find, anticipated me in reading γινομένην (γινομένην?) for λεγομένην (οὔτε ἀνθρώποις ἡγοῦμαι τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν περὶ αὐτῶν λεγομένην ἀγαθόν): Karsten suggests the change of γινομένων in 352 A to λεγομένων; and the occasional confusion of the two words is well known; *e.g.* in Thuc. 8, 14, where *Vat.* alone has γινομένων against the λεγομένων of other MSS. Cf. p. 239 and the *Index*.

331 A περὶ τίνος τῶν μεγίστων περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον. Perhaps the double περὶ would be less awkward if we might suppose that a τῶν had fallen out after the last letters of μεγίστων.

331 B ἂν μὲν μοι τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν ἔν τινι τρόπῳ δοκῆ ζῆν. Unless there is any reason for thinking that ἔν (τινι) τρόπῳ was used in a sense like that occasionally belonging to κατὰ τρόπον (*rightly, regularly*; so in 330 D), an epithet to τρόπῳ seems missing. The parallel expression ten lines below, εἰάν τινα καθεστῶτα ζῶσι βίον, suggests καθεστῶτι or μετρίῳ.

331 D βίαν δὲ πατρίδι πολιτείας μεταβολῆς μὴ προσφέρειν

may quite well be right, but perhaps βία...μεταβολήν is worth suggesting. μεταβολή has also been proposed.

I rather suspect that before the first ὅπως in this section a participle like μηχανώμενον or σκοπούμενον has dropped out. It would make the double ὅπως less disagreeable.

332 B κατοικίσαντες πολλὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων πόλεις ὑπὸ βαρβάρων ἐκβεβλημένας. Should it be ἐκβεβλημένων? Men can be ejected, not cities or states.

333 E ἦν (ἑταιρείαν) ἐκ τοῦ ξενίζειν τε καὶ μυεῖν καὶ ἐποπτεύειν πραγματεύονται. ξενίζειν and μυεῖν are transitive verbs, but ἐποπτεύειν is only known as neuter, and τὸ ἐποπτεύειν is not in itself a basis for friendship. ξυνοπτεύειν would make sense: or is it possible to give ἐποπτεύειν an active meaning parallel to that of μυεῖν? I do not think this probable.

334 A καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀνόσιον οὔτε παρίεμαι ἔγωγε οὔτε τι λέγω . . . τὸ δ' Ἀθηναίων περὶ λεγόμενον, ὡς αἰσχύνῃ οὔτοι περιῆψαν τῇ πόλει, ἐξαιρούμαι φημί γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ὥστε οὐκ ἀξίῳ ὀνειδούς γεγόνατον τῇ πόλει τὸ Δίωνα ἀποκτείναντε. In these ten lines there are, I think, three mistakes, which seem to have escaped the notice of editors and critics. In the first place παρίεμαι is not used in this way (Dem. 15. 15 is another thing), and the word is certainly a mistake for προσίεμαι. So in this same letter (346 A) οὐδὲν με τοῦ καταμένειν προσιέμενον. Xen. Mem. 2. 6. 18 has the very words of this passage, πόλεις αἰ . . . τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἦκιστα προσιέμενα: so Cyr. 7. 1. 13 κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδ' αἰσχρὸν ἐκὼν εἶναι προσήσομαι. Secondly ἐξαιρούμαι, very strangely used, should be altered to ἐξαρνοῦμαι, somewhat as reversely in Plutarch's Lives 317 B ἀρνεῖσθαι is now corrected to αἰδεῖσθαι. Finally for ἀξίῳ we should read αἰτίῳ, which is equivalent to the αἰσχύνῃ περιῆψαν above. Cf. 339 E αἴτιον γενέσθαι...ὀνειδούς. In the same way we have to read αἴτιος for ἄξιος with Bentley in Ar. Ach. 633 (as 641 shows) and 1062 and with Blass in Andoc. 2. 12. Cf. D. Chrys. 31, 12 and 34, 22.

The text of Pausanias 2. 28. 2 runs: ἐς δὲ τὸ ὄρος ἀνιούσι τὸ Κόρυφον ἔστι καθ' ὁδὸν στρεπτῆς καλουμένης ἐλαίας φυτὸν, αἰτίου τοῦ περιαγαγόντος τῇ χειρὶ Ἡρακλέους ἐς τοῦτο τὸ σχῆμα.

For αἰτίου (some MSS. αἴτιον), which is deficient in construction and in point, should we not read ἄξιον? As it stands, αἰτίου τοῦ is wholly superfluous.

334 c λέγων should probably be λέγω.

334 D Read πιθόμενος for πειθόμενος in both places. The error is common.

335 A The sense and grammar are much obscured by the usual punctuation. Put a colon or full stop after δρᾶσαι, and understand ὧν to refer to the ἱεροὶ λόγοι or their contents.

335 D ἐν ἧθεσι τραφεῖς τε καὶ παιδευθεῖς ἐνδίκως.

Read ἐνδίκους. ἐν ἧθεσι is poor by itself.

335 E It may be worth considering whether instead of bracketing ἐπὶ τό we should read ἐπὶ τόδε and take the words that follow as explanatory. Cf. 351 A when properly punctuated. With ἄν Badham's κοσμηῆσαι is impossible.

336 B αὔτη, for which Badham proposed αὔθις, should perhaps be ταύτη. Just below, where he would omit Δίωνα, I suggest Δίωνος.

336 C τὸν δὲ μὴ δυνάμενον ὑμῶν Δωριστὶ ζῆν κ.τ.λ. We must take ὑμῶν as meaning not 'you friends of Dion' but in a wider way 'you Sicilians.' So apparently in 352 c ὑμῖν is used in the narrower, ὑμῶν in the wider sense. Otherwise we should expect here ὑμῖν.

ibid. Something like <πάντ'> ἀπέσωσε seems wanted. Cf. πάντα . . . ἀνέτρεψε below and πάντ' ἔσται σωτηρίας . . . μεστά in 337 D.

337 A φόβῳ μὲν διὰ τὸ κρείττους αὐτῶν εἶναι δεικνύντες τὴν βίαν, αἰδοῖ δὲ αὐτὸν διὰ τὸ κρείττους φαίνεσθαι περί τε τὰς ἡδονὰς κ.τ.λ. To get rid of the rather questionable phrase δεικνύντες τὴν βίαν and to secure parallelism with the next clause, I am inclined to read not εἶναι δεικνύντες but ὄντες δεικνύναι or δεικνύναι ὄντες, *i.e.* 'show that they are.' There are several instances forthcoming of such accidental

inversion. The nearest known to me is in *Ar. Ach.* 91, where the Ravenna codex has ἤκοντες ἄγομεν for ἄγοντες ἤκομεν.

337 B στάσεις καὶ ἔχθραι καὶ μίση καὶ ἀπιστίαι... γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ. The singular verb is supported by the parallel of *Symp.* 188 B καὶ γὰρ πάχναι καὶ χάλαζαι καὶ ἔρυσίβαι... γίγνεται, but it is extremely unusual *after* even one plural substantive. ἀπιστία is made improbable by all the other nouns being plural. Cf. p. 69.

ibid. For αὐτούς read τούτους or τοιούτους.

337 C νέμειν should be νεμεῖν. It follows ὁμόσαντας.

337 E Before ξυμβουλή insert the article, which perhaps fell out through the η of τύχη.

338 A Omit ἔφη and make μεταπέμψεσθαι (so we should read for μεταπέμψασθαι : cf. 317 A) depend on ξυνωμολογήσαμεν, which is otherwise incomplete in meaning. In the second clause ὁμολόγησα is actually inserted.

338 D οἱ δοκοῦσί μοι Διονυσίω πειρᾶσθαι διαλέγεσθαι τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Rather than adopt Hercher's διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων I would have recourse to the less heroic measure of assuming an omission, e.g. διαλέγεσθαι <ζητοῦν-τές τι> τῶν κ.τ.λ. A simple τι could hardly stand. περὶ τῶν περὶ τ. τ. is possible, though clumsy. Cf. 331 A above.

339 B ἦν παρεσκευασμένη τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα ἢ ἐπιστολῆ, τῆδ' ἐπεὶ φράζουσα. Perhaps παρεσκευασμένην or (with Müller) φράζουσαν, or even both.

339 C οὐδέν σοι τῶν περὶ Δίωνα ἔξει πραγμάτων . . . κατὰ νοῦν γιγνόμενον.

ἔξει cannot stand thus alone. We might have <εὔ> ἔξει, or οὐδέν σὺ . . . ἔξεις, or other things that naturally occur to one, e. g. ἦξει. Just before comes τὰ περὶ Δίωνα ὑπάρξει ταύτῃ γιγνόμενα ὅππῃ ἂν αὐτὸς ἐθέλῃς.

339 E If καὶ πάλιν is right, καί seems to emphasize πάλιν, as it so often (e.g. 340 B) does μάλα. But perhaps read καὶ <γὰρ> πάλιν. A few lines below, a comma should be

placed after ἀνθρωπον, so as to get the three points needed as a minimum in such an asyndeton: νέον ἀνθρωπον, παρακούοντα ἀξίων λόγου πραγμάτων, εὐμαθῆ: unless there is something wrong with the words, e.g. ὄντα lost. For αὐτό just following should we read αὐτόν? τούτου in 340 B is however neuter.

340 A μαντευόμενος οὐ πάνυ καλῶς, ὡς ἔοικεν.

Rather κακῶς. The point, as ὡς ἔοικεν makes clear, is that his fear was well founded.

340 B δεικνύναι δὴ δεῖ . . . ὅ τι ἐστὶ πᾶν τὸ πρᾶγμα οἷόν τε καὶ δι' ὅσων πραγμάτων καὶ ὅσον πόνον ἔχει.

This is rather a jumble of words, δι' ὅσων πραγμάτων especially being without construction. Perhaps something like ὅ τι ἐστὶ πᾶν τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ δι' οἷων πραγμάτων (? μαθημάτων) οἷόν τε ἔχειν (οἱ ἔχειν αὐτό). πρᾶγμα . . . πραγμάτων is very awkward. Cf. in D ὅσα μαθήματά ἐστι καὶ ὁ πόνος ἡλικός, and perhaps ἀδύνατον there with οἷόν τε here.

341 A οὐδὲν ἔτι δέονται τινων πραγμάτων. With τινῶν πραγμάτων an adjective (καινῶν? μειζόνων?) seems wanted.

ibid. ἡ μὲν δὴ πείρα αὕτη γίνεται ἡ σαφῆς τέ καὶ ἀσφαλεστάτη. Read ἡ σαφεστάτη καὶ ἀσφαλεστάτη.

341 C Insert ὅτι or ὡς after αὐτοί, as in D.

ibid. The parallel of 340 B suggests changing ἀπὸ πυρός . . . ἐξαφθὲν φῶς to ὑπό.

342 A ἔστι γάρ τις λόγος ἀληθῆς ἐναντίος τῷ τολμήσαντι γράφειν. Perhaps τολμήσοντι. It may refer to Dionysius and others who had written (341 B), but with ἐναντίος and much of the last page the future seems more suitable.

343 D ἀναγκάζωμεν ἀναγκαζόμεθα?

343 E The construction is (τὰ μὲν) πέφυκε, τὰ δὲ διέφθαρται.

344 A Something like μαθεῖν seems lost after ποιήσειε. Cf. μάθωσιν below.

344 C Agreeing in principle with Karsten, I would write <οὐ> τῇ καλλίστη.

344 E Insert *ἐκ* or *διά* before *τῆς μετοχῆς*.

345 A Write *δέ* for *τε* after *πλεονάκις*.

345 B ἡ φαῦλα εἶναι τὰ λεχθέντα. Something like *οἶεται* seems to have fallen out. *ικανῶς οἶδεν* coming between makes it impossible to carry on the force of *οἶεται* above.

345 C τοῦ υἱέος, ὄντος μὲν ἀδελφιδοῦ αὐτοῦ, κατὰ νόμους ἐπιτροπεύοντος. Read *ὄντος μὲν ἀδελφιδοῦ, αὐτοῦ δὲ κ.τ.λ.*

345 D τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τῆς Διονυσίου φιλοσοφίας. For *τῆς* read *τῆν*, as in 328 A.

346 A οὐδέν με τοῦ καταμένειν προσιέμενον ὄρων should have *τό*, not *τοῦ*.

346 B ὡς αὐτῷ καὶ δεῦρο ἐξὸν ἀποδημεῖν. As the point is not his leaving Greece, but his visiting Syracuse, *ἐπιδημεῖν* would seem more proper. [Dem.] 59. 37 has *ἐπιδημήσαντα . . . εἰς τὰ Μέγαρα*.

347 C Should *ἀρκεῖ* be *ἀρέσκει* as in 346 C?

348 A ὁμως δὲ ἔφαμεν ἐταῖροί γε εἶναι πρὸς πᾶσαν Σικελίαν. Is there any meaning in *γε* so placed? *ἔφαμέν γε*?

348 E There should be no stop after *συγχωρῶ*.

350 B ἐδεῖτο Διονυσίου περὶ ἐμοῦ λέγων ὅτι βουλοίμην ἀπιέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποιεῖν.

As the subject of *ποιεῖν* is evidently Dionysius, it is entirely wanting in construction, if *καί* is right. A verb that governed it may be missing, or *ποιεῖ* imperative seems just possible, or *ἐδεῖτο λέγων ὅ τι βουλοίμην ἀφιέναι* as *ἀφίημι* is used in 338 A and 347 A.

350 C Perhaps we should read *βούλοιτο* for *βούλονται* and '*ἐμὲ δὲ* *εἶπον* <οἶσθ'> *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*'

350 D οὐ πειθόμενοι ταῖς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ διαλέξεσι. Instead of the very improbable *διαλέξεσι* (with which too we should expect *ἐμαῖς*, not *ὑπ' ἐμοῦ*) ought we not to read *διαλλάξεσι*, 'my attempts to reconcile them'? Cf. *κατηλλάγη* two lines below and *πρὸς ἀλλήλους δεηθέντες φιλίας* above.

351 A is probably not quite sound in its text, but by the most perverse punctuation the editors have made it appear worse than it is. In the first sentence a colon should be put after *πόλεως τῆς αὐτοῦ*. In the second the comma should follow not *ποιήση*, which leaves *ἑταίρους* and *πόλιν* without construction, but *πόλιν*. The words *τὰ μέγιστα ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις* can hardly be right as they stand: *τὰ μέγιστα* is too much cut off from *εὐεργετῶν*. Perhaps *τὰ δὲ μέγιστα*. If the long sentence beginning with *ἔστι δέ* stands as it was written, it is anacoluthic, since *διαφορῆ* and *παρακελεύηται* ought to be participles. So in the words *ταῦτὸν δέ... μὴ κατὰ δίκην*, though the grammar is not faulty, *διανέμη* ought in logic to be a participle, like the *διανέμων* just above it, and subordinate to *τιμᾶται*.

351 C *οὔτω μὲν γὰρ οὔτε Δίῳ οὔτε ἄλλος ποτὲ οὐδείς ἐπὶ δύναμιν ἐκὼν εἶσιν ἀλιτηριώδη ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ γένει εἰς τὸν αἰὶ χρόνον, ἐπὶ πολιτείαν δὲ καὶ νόμων κατασκευὴν τῶν δικαιοτάτων τε καὶ ἀρίστων, οὗ τι δι' ὀλιγίστων θανάτων καὶ φυγῶν γιγνομένην.*

If a word like *μέτριος* has not fallen out with *οὐδείς*, we must at any rate understand that the limiting force of *ὅστις μέτριος* above in A is carried on to this sentence.

I do not see how *οὗ τι δι' ὀλιγίστων* can be right. It could only mean, if anything, 'not by a very few deaths,' *i.e.* by a good many, and this is the very reverse of the sense wanted. The phrases *ἄνευ σφαγῶν καὶ θανάτων* (327 D) and *ἄνευ φυγῶν καὶ σφαγῆς ἀνδρῶν* (331 D) indicate what that sense is. No great change is needed to obtain it. Instead of *οὗ τι δι' ὀλιγίστων* read *ὅτι δι' ὀλιγίστων through as few deaths and exiles as possible*. *Er.* 8. 352 E *ὅτι σμικρότατα*: *Thuc.* 3. 46 *ὅτι ἐν βραχυτάτῳ* and *ὅτι ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον*.

8.—353 E *ἐάνπερ τῶν εἰκότων γίγνηται τε καὶ ἀπευκτῶν*. So all editions I have consulted except Bekker, whose *τι* for *τε* is of course right. But neither he nor anyone else says anything on the subject.

354 A *ὃ δὲ μοι φαίνεται . . . πειράσομαι πάσῃ παρρησίᾳ καὶ κοινῷ τινι δικαίῳ λόγῳ χρώμενος δηλοῦν. λέγω γὰρ δὴ διαιτητοῦ τινα τρόπον διαλεγόμενος, κ.τ.λ.*

Should not *τινα* be *τινος* and *δικαίῳ* probably *δικαίως*?

354 D οἱ γὰρ πρὸ Διονυσίου καὶ Ἰππαρίνου ἄρξάντες Σικελιώται τότε ὡς ῥόντο εὐδαιμόνως ἔζων . . . οἱ καὶ τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς κατέλευσαν . . . κατὰ νόμον οὐδένα κρίναντες, ἵνα δὴ δουλεύοιεν μηδενὶ μήτε σὺν δίκῃ μήτε νόμῳ δεσπότη. It is strange that, when common sense suggests and Paris A actually gives (Bekker) ἀρξάντων for ἄρξάντες, editors have all adopted the latter. It would be absurd to say that οἱ ἄρξάντες stoned the generals, and it is perfectly clear that the whole sentence refers to the mass of the people, to whom Plato is now tendering advice. With πρὸ Δ. καὶ Ἰ. ἀρξάντων cf. *Pl.* 24. 575 μετὰ Πάτροκλόν γε θανόντα: *Thuc.* 6. 3. 3 μετὰ Συρακούσας οἰκισθείσας: *Herod.* 1. 9. 4 μετὰ δ' ἐμὲ εἰσελθόντα: *Plat. Rep.* 451 C μετ' ἀνδρείον δρᾶμα παντελῶς διαπερανθέν: *Laus* 781 A διὰ τούτου μεθειμένον: *Dem.* 15. 22 πρὸ ἡλίου δύντος. This construction of the participle, so familiar in Latin, is a good deal commoner in Greek than grammars indicate.

The sense of μήτε σὺν δίκῃ μήτε νόμῳ δεσπότη is very unsatisfactory, until we read μήτε <ἀνθρώπῳ> σὺν δίκῃ, comparing 334 C μὴ δουλοῦσθαι Σικελίαν ὑπ' ἀνθρώποις δεσπόταις . . . ἀλλ' ὑπὸ νόμοις, and even then σὺν δίκῃ seems out of place.

355 A After φίλοις I think ὡς has fallen out, as it easily might. Four lines below ὑμῖν should be ἡμῖν, if it is a quotation of the words of τις.

355 C δεξαμένοις for -οι would give us good grammar, but the words may have been anacoluthic.

356 B ἐλεῶν δὲ πατρίδα καὶ ἱερῶν ἀθεραπευσίαν καὶ τάφους.

I think τάφων has been altered under the influence of the accusative before it.

356 E ὅσα <περὶ> θανάτου καὶ δεσμοῦ?

357 B ταῦτα δὲ σχεδόν. Should not δέ be δὴ? cf. note on 327 E. Add ἄν to ξυνδοκεῖν just below in c, and perhaps to ὀνομάζειν in 10. 358 c.

10. 358 C ἀκούω Δίωνος ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ἑταῖρον εἶναι τέ σε νῦν καὶ γεγονέναι διὰ παντός, τὸ σοφώτατον ἦθος τῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν παρεχόμενον.

σοφώτατον hardly seems the right word and *τό* looks doubtful. I conjecture that *τος* has been duplicated by error and that the original was *διὰ παντός, εὐφυνέστατον*.

11. 358 E *οἶα ἀπαντᾶ*: see on 310 E.

359 A Put a comma after *ἀνδρική*.

ibid. *δόξαι ἄν. δόξει δῆ?*

359 C *διαπράξασθαι* should of course be *διαπράξεσθαι*: cf. 338 A above.

13.—360 A *Πλάτων Διονυσίῳ τυράνῳ Συρακουσῶν εὖ πράττειν. Ἄρχῃ σοι τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἔστω*. All the editions I have looked at punctuate in this curious way, but it is perfectly clear that *Πλάτων . . . πράττειν* is the subject of *ἀρχῇ ἔστω* and that there must be no stop between them. Compare the beginnings of letters 3 and 8.

362 C *οἱ προσαγγέλλοντες ἐκάστοτέ σοι, ὃ τι ἂν οἴωνται ἀνάλωμα εἰσαγγέλλειν, οὐκ ἐθέλουσι προσαγγέλλειν*. On grounds of both sense and euphony read *εἰσαγγελεῖν* for *εἰσαγγέλλειν*.

14. The *ἂν* after *μόλις* seems wrong and should probably be *δῆ*. *ψυχῆς λαμβάνειν* ought, one would think, to be either *ψυχὴν λαμβάνειν* or *ψυχῆς λαχάνειν*.

II.

I do not feel that I have much, if anything, which is new to say about the authorship of the *Letters*. But, since the question is difficult, since they are not much read, and since I happen to have given some time to the study and emendation of them, it may be desirable that I should record my impression. The opinion which I hold has not been formed without a good deal of hesitation, but it is now clearly against genuineness. The difficulty may be stated at once and in one sentence to be this. If we went only by the purity of the Greek and by the largely Platonic character of it, we should have no reason for

disputing the traditional ascription; whereas, when we have regard to the contents, we are very unwilling, perhaps unable, to acquiesce in it.

I will first make a few comments on the letters one by one, then briefly discuss the question in general terms. Many of the considerations now to be mentioned have of course been put forward by others, *e.g.* Ast, Karsten, Steinhart, Zeller, who are all against genuineness. Cobet, who pronounced definitely in favour of letters 7 and 8, and Blass, who appears to accept almost all of them, have not argued the question.¹ I have been the more ready to repeat what has been said before, because I do not know where in English any statement of the case is to be found.²

1. Plato (or Dion) to Dionysius. Most MSS. including A say Plato, a few Dion. But the opening words do not really suit either of them. The writer speaks of himself as *διατριψας παρ' ὑμῖν χρόνον τοσοῦτον καὶ διοικῶν τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀρχήν*, and again as *αὐτοκράτωρ πολλάκις τὴν ὑμετέραν πόλιν διαφυλάξας*. These expressions are evidently inapplicable to Plato, nor was he sent away with the contumely to which the writer goes on to refer. On the other hand *διατριψας παρ' ὑμῖν* could hardly be said of Dion living in his own home. The *ἐφόδιον* (309 c) seems to suit Dion after his dismissal best, but cf. 350 B. The whole tone of the letter is of an artificial literary kind, not at all like Plato. Dion, who was no doubt something of a pedant (see the curiously priggish speech attributed to him in the forty-seventh chapter of Plutarch's *Life*), might have put such flowers of style into an angry letter, but they more resemble the literary exercises of a later time.

¹ Cobet held that no one but Plato himself could possibly have written letter 7. He might have applied to it what an epigram in the Anthology makes the *Phaedo* say, *εἴ με Πλάτων οὐ γράψει, δύνω ἐγένοντο Πλάτωνες*.

² The chief books referred to in this article are Ast, *Platons Leben und Schriften* and *Lexicon Platonicum*; Karsten, *Commentatio Critica*; Grote, *Plato*; Müller and Steinhart, *Platons Sämmtliche Werke*; C. Ritter, *Untersuchungen über Plato*; Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit* (2nd edition) 3. 2. 386; Lutoslawski, *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*. See also Susemihl in *Litt. Alexandr.* 2. 579. Bentley in his *Remarks, etc.* (*Works*, III. 411) accepted the letters, but the question had not then been raised.

It is hard to make out who are the *ὑμεῖς* of the letter. We might suppose they would be Dionysius and his father, but the words *πάντες οἱ συμπολιτευόμενοι μεθ' ὑμῶν ὑπάρχουσι μοι μάρτυρες* seem to confine the reference to recent years. In the Greek we notice that *διότι* (309 D), *that not because*, seems to be unplatonic (Ast), though it is found in Isocrates. *'Απανθρωπότερον* (*ib.* B) is too highly coloured a word. *συνθέλω* (*ib.* A) occurs in Antiphon and Xenophon. Hiatus is on the whole avoided in the letter, but in 310 A we find *σπάνει ἀπολλύμενον*.

2. Plato to Dionysius. Beginning with a rather querulous protest that he cannot control his friends, Plato passes on to his own relations with Dionysius. Power and wisdom (he says) have often come together thus in history and men are fond of talking about such pairs as Hiero and Simonides (cf. Xenophon's *Hiero*), Pericles and Anaxagoras (cf. *Phaedrus* 270 A). This may pass for Plato's, though in the *Republic* he rather dreams of the possibility of power and wisdom being united in the same person (502 A), and this passage seems founded on that with some amount of difference or confusion. But could Plato have gone on in this context to couple Creon and Tiresias : Polyidus and Minos : Agamemnon and Nestor : Odysseus and Palamedes : finally Zeus and Prometheus? Then a new argument for immortality is found in the fact that the best men think a good deal of what future ages will say about them. It behoves them therefore to be very careful what they do, and Dionysius must honour philosophy signally in the person of Plato, who here displays a very petty and unplatonic desire for external distinction. He declares indeed that it was his anxiety to see philosophy properly esteemed that brought him to Sicily, but there is at least as much personal vanity in the matter as solicitude for philosophy, while the real Plato never (we may be sure) thought that either philosophy or he himself needed the recognition of a Dionysius. The epistolary Plato is most anxious for honour. He will reciprocate it, but Dionysius must begin.

The tyrant had asked for further information about *ἡ τοῦ πρώτου φύσις*, on which he had not been sufficiently informed (*οὐχ ἰκανῶς ἀποδεδείχθαι*). Instead of the plain

exposition that his perplexity (*ἀπορούμενος*) required, Plato answers δι' αἰνιγμῶν (312 D) and treats him to a little philosophical puzzle, which we should be sorry to think Platonic and which would certainly convey no sort of instruction to Dionysius. He then proceeds in a vein of pomposity and mystery, concluding with the well-known διὰ ταῦτ' οὐδὲν πώποτ' ἐγὼ περὶ τούτων γέγραφα, οὐδ' ἔστι σύγγραμμα Πλάτωνος οὐδ' ἔσται· τὰ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενα Σωκράτους ἔστι καλοῦ καὶ νέου γεγονότος (314 C : cf. 7. 341 C and *Phaedr.* 257 D). I cannot think that Blass explains this adequately when he refers it to the Νέος Σωκράτης of *Sophist* and *Politicus*. Why should τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα mean only those two dialogues? and why should they be mentioned more than others? See p. 257 above. Here the writer stops, but another disconnected paragraph has by some accident been added. It does not appear to be a postscript.

In this letter, *tyranno digna, indignissima philosopho*, as Lobeck justly calls it (*Aglaoph.* p. 162), the Greek contains nothing, as far as I see, that Plato might not have written. 311 E καί τοι περὶ τούτου ἡμεῖς ἐπιμελούμενοι οὐδὲν ἂν εὐσεβέστερον πράττομεν is a little curious. We should rather expect οὐδὲν ἂν εὐσεβέστερον πράττομεν τοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, or ἐπιμελούμενοι εὐσεβέστατ' ἂν πράττομεν, but it is only a slight confusion of expression. Cf. *Symp.* 178 E (omitting ἦ) and *Ar. Plut.* 505–6. ἐπιμελεῖσθαι περὶ τίνος is itself unusual, but cf. *Laws* 932 B, etc. ἐθέλω (312 A) *wish* occurs a few times in Plato. ἐμπορευσάμενος (313 D) for ἐμπορευθείς is a suspicious form : see Veitch *s.v.* πορεύω. Exception need not be taken to ἐκπεσεῖν (314 A) *transpire, leak out*. For the impersonal construction ὡς δεῖ γίγνεσθαι (311 E) cf. below on 7. 325 E. In this letter no particular care seems taken to avoid hiatus.

3. Plato to Dionysius. This is a curiously self-contradictory composition. No doubt Plato might contradict himself like other people, if he had a bad case : but would he have done it so very palpably? Dionysius (he says) has alleged that Plato, after preventing him from settling new Greek cities in Sicily and from converting his tyranny into a kingdom, is now instigating Dion to do these very things. In answer Plato declares first that he never took

part at all in Dionysius' political affairs, except to the extent of writing preambles to some of his laws (here Blass finds the germs of the work known as *Laws*), and in self-defence he narrates the incidents of his intercourse with Dionysius down to the time of the expulsion of Heraclides. This is a brief version of what is set forth at length in letter 7. So far so good. But secondly he proceeds to tell a rather pointless story of an old conversation between Dionysius and himself, which is quite inconsistent with the first part of his answer. Dionysius had asked him whether he remembered that on first coming to Sicily he had urged Dionysius to found or refound these Greek cities, and Plato had replied in the affirmative. It is a calumny to say (μή με διάβαλλε λέγων 319 c) that he had prevented it. The truth was ἐγὼ μὲν ἐκέλευον, σὺ δ' οὐκ ἤθελες πράττειν αὐτά. It appears therefore that Plato *had* taken part in Dionysius' affairs and had not confined himself to the writing of philosophical preambles. But this is not all. Plato had also told Dionysius—and he claims to have reminded him of it in this same conversation, witnesses of which can be brought – that he must not try to carry out these schemes till he had been educated (παιδευθέντα...ποιεῖν πάντα ταῦτα ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν 319 c : cf. *Alcib.* 1. 123 d, 124 c). Therefore, as far as his advice went, he *had* prevented Dionysius from taking the steps in question. This is an obvious and double contradiction. Are we to put down such a shuffling and halting plea to Plato? It is as poor intellectually as it is morally.

But in this letter again the Greek hardly offers anything to strike us. ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν (316 d) though unusual is used in *Laws* 709 e. ὡς ἢ ἐμὴ δόξα μαντεύεται (317 e) is a little odd, like τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν...εἶχε φόβος in 7. 328 b. Cf. *Eur. Tr.* 788 : *Hor. Sat.* 1. 2. 32. In 318 d πεισθείς...τὸν μὲν παλαιὸν φίλον...μηδὲν σοῦ χεῖρω, ἵνα οὕτως εἶπω. . , προδοῦναι Steinhart says the use of ἵνα οὕτως εἶπω for ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν is not classical. But it is not the equivalent of ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. That would mean that one man was roughly or *almost* as good as the other ; this means that he is *at least* as good, *to say nothing more*. λυκοφιλία (318 e : cf. *Phaedrus* 241 c d ὡς λύκοι ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ') is perhaps not found again before M. Aurelius. If that were the case with many

words in the letter, it would be serious, but in the case of just one word or two it is nothing. Consider the words to be found in most books of Thucydides. *μεμηνημένως* (319 B) is perhaps a *ἄπαξ εἰρημένον*, but there are plenty of parallel adverbs. *πλαστῶς* *ibid.*, if I am right in reading it, occurs in *Sophist* and *Laws*. The phrase 319 B διὸ τὸ τότε σοι ὑβρισμα νῦν ὑπαρ ἀντ' ὀνειράτος γέγονεν is strange, but the fault is not in the Greek: cf. *Politicus* 278 E (Ast) and p. 259 above. *ἔρρω* (πόλεις ἐρρούσας *ib.* c) is rare in prose. Cf. 8. 355 D. *ὦ τᾶν* *ib.* D is found in *Apol.* 25 c. The writer avoids hiatus.

4. Plato to Dion, presumably at the time of Dion's expedition, but it is not plain whether Dionysius is already overthrown. The letter contains nothing noticeable either way. Steinhart says that ὀρῶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς ὑπὸ τῶν παίδων παροξυνομένους, μήτι δὴ ὑπὸ γε τῶν φίλων (321 A) is unclassical, because no negative precedes μήτι. What then of Dem. 8. 27 ὡς καὶ τοῦ μελλῆσαι δώσοντι δίκην, μήτι ποιήσαντί γ' ἢ καταπραξαμένῳ? The accusative of space traversed (320 D *πλανηθῆναι πολὺν τόπον*) is not common in prose: see my *Xenophon and Others*, p. 113. Euripides *Helen* 598 has *πλανηθεῖς...χθόνα*, and Plut. *Mor.* 592 c the same phrase as here. (Plutarch refers to the letters several times.) I do not know that Plato has anything like it. Hiatus occurs occasionally.

5. Plato to Perdiccas, recommending to him Euphraeus (cf. Dem. 9. 59, etc.), who will be useful because he knows the voices or utterances (*φωναί*) belonging to each form of government, and therefore that of monarchy. If any one says 'Plato professes to understand democracy, but gave his own *demos* no counsel,' Perdiccas may answer 'that was because the *demos* of Athens was incurable. Under like circumstances he would treat me in the like way.' This seems very pointless, especially as it is Euphraeus, not Plato, who is to help. The *φωναί* may be compared with *Rep.* 493 A B, where the word is much more natural. I notice nothing in the Greek. Hiatus is mostly avoided.

6. Plato to three friends, urging them to help and trust one another and, if they have any dissensions, to refer to him. The ending is mystical, τὸν τῶν πάντων θεὸν ἡγεμόνα

τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων τοῦ τε ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πατέρα κύριον ἐπομνύτας, ὄν, ἂν ὄντως φιλοσοφῶμεν, εἰσόμεθα πάντες σαφῶς εἰς δύναμιν ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμόνων. Hiatus seems avoided.

7. Plato to the friends and comrades of Dion. This, much the most important and best known of the letters, is of great length (about equal to the First Book of the *Republic*), and carefully composed, but not always clear in its drift, and very ill arranged. It starts with a narrative, suddenly breaks off to give advice which is itself interspersed with narrative in a rambling way, and reverts to narrative again. The advice actually given is of the most trifling amount, but it is true that the letter does not exactly, like 8, profess to be one of advice. Indeed it would be difficult to say what it was meant to be. What it is is a vain, egotistic, ineffective bit of autobiography, which, if genuine, would do little credit to the character or practical sense of the philosopher. We are however hardly entitled to make this an argument against Platonic authorship, though we should be sorry to see Plato making no better figure. His character may have been much below his writings, like Pope's. Cf. Athenaeus pp. 505-507, and on the other side Philostratus *Ep.* 73. The literary defects and the total absence of anything really good or striking are safer grounds to argue from.

But here again we are met by the recollection that Plato's later work, notably the *Laws*, is far inferior in skill and force to that of his earlier years, and by the fact that there really are considerable resemblances between his later style and that of this prolix letter. They may be traced in details of construction and vocabulary as well as in the general effect. They are however equally compatible with identity of authorship and with deliberate or even unconscious imitation.

The digression at 334 E on the subject of immortality is quite uncalled for and the passage is very clumsily worded in comparison with the fine raptures of the dialogues. But the great, the perhaps insuperable difficulty is the extraordinary rigmarole about ἐπιστήμη in pp. 342, 343. One cannot believe it possible for Plato to have written

anything so ridiculous. However little many of the arguments in his dialogues will bear examination, and however fanciful we may pronounce many of his ideas to be, they are never without the stamp of genius. But this is as worthless as anything that anyone who could write Greek ever put together, mere pretentious nonsense. The author has been dwelling on the difficulty of understanding such deep subjects, and on the absurdity of anyone writing about them who knows so little as Dionysius. He then straightway plunges into such skimble-skamble stuff as Dionysius himself might have been ashamed to compose. Well may C. Ritter, who believes in the rest of the letter, try to excise this part of it on an improbable hypothesis of subsequent interpolation.

In 324 c we have to note the extraordinary confusion by which the Athenian board known as 'the Eleven' are assimilated to the board of ten men set up in Piraeus at the time of the Thirty ('*Αθ. Πολ.* 35, 1 : *Plut. Lysand.* 15), and by which still further both boards are made to discharge the functions of agoranomi and astynomi.¹ An Athenian and one who had himself gone through the evil days in question could hardly have written in such terms. The odd description of Socrates' accusers as *δυναστεύοντες τινες* (325 B) has been remarked; compare the statement ascribed in *Diog. L.* 2. 106 to Hermodorus, that after the death of Socrates Plato and the rest betook themselves to Dionysius, fearing *τὴν ὀμότητα τῶν τυράννων*. In 328 A the younger brothers of Dionysius, who were children at

¹ We are reminded of the verse of Alexis: *ἔργον τυράννων, οὐκ ἀγορανόμων λέγεις*. The words of the letter are *ὕπὸ πολλῶν γὰρ τῆς τότε πολιτείας λαιδορουμένης μεταβολῆ γίγνεται καὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς εἰς καὶ πεντήκοντά τινες ἄνδρες προῦσθησαν ἄρχοντες, ἕνδεκα μὲν ἐν ἄστει, δέκα δ' ἐν Πειραιεῖ, περὶ τ' ἀγορὰν ἑκάτεροι τούτων ὅσα τ' ἐν τοῖς ἄστεσι διοικεῖν ἔδει, τριάκοντα δὲ πάντων ἄρχοντες κατέστησαν αὐτοκράτορες*. It should be noticed that (1) though we are familiar with 'the Thirty,' no other writer speaks of Fifty-One: (2) the functions of agoranomi and astynomi seem here regarded as not supplementary to the other business of the two boards, but as constituting their main employment: (3) although the city and Piraeus are first distinguished, the writer then goes on to speak of them together as 'the cities,' a description which is probably unique. The plural of *ἄστυ* is by no means common, but it occurs several times in the *Laws*.

the time, are apparently said to have been able to encourage him in philosophical pursuits. The curious language about Darius and Persia (332 A B), when compared with *Laws* 693–697, is significant too (Karsten), strongly suggesting someone who had read the passage in the *Laws* but had either misunderstood or forgotten its drift, for Plato takes the contrary view to that in the letter. In trifling things what could be more inept than the phrase (344 A) ‘Lynceus himself could not make such men see,’ as though the possession and the communication of sharp sight went together. Πότερον διδακτὸν ἢ ὄψις ;

But the Greek is extremely good to be a later imitation of Plato’s style. When we have made allowance for some corruptions of the text, taken into account Plato’s time of life, and realized that it is with the *Philebus* and the *Laws*, not with the *Republic* and the *Theaetetus*, that the letter must in fairness be compared, we shall probably find nothing in the style properly so called or in the grammar and vocabulary that is at all inconsistent with genuineness. If Cobet was able to say (*Variae Lectiones*, 2nd edn. 1873, p. 235) that no one but Plato could have written it—in which I suppose he was thinking only of the Greek and surely thinking too well even of that—we shall need some very searching investigations before we dismiss the language as unplatonic. Such investigations are still mainly in the future, for the observations of C. Ritter in his *Untersuchungen*, p. 105, are confined to about a dozen small things, though as far as they go they are quite consistent with genuineness. In the various observations carefully collected and instructively put together by Lutoslawski in the first part of his valuable book on the logic of Plato the letters do not (I think) appear at all. Pending any fresh light that may be obtained from these minute but most important inquiries, I am not aware of anything really suspicious in the language of the seventh letter, and in a composition of such length this is of course on the hypothesis of spuriousness very remarkable. Over and over again a reader may be struck by some little point of language which he will think unusual. Looking it up, he will find that it is indeed unusual, but that the later dialogues of Plato, especially the *Laws*, do offer parallels

for it. Probably we might make out a long list of such coincidences, and also my impression, whatever it may be worth, quite confirms Ritter's remark, '*überhaupt klingt die ganze Sprache des Briefes nicht anders als die der Leges.*'

I will run very rapidly through the letter, noticing expressions that seem remarkable in any way and adding a comment here and there. It should be understood that many of them have been noticed previously by other scholars. But Karsten's objections are not always well founded, e.g. his objection to ἀνασοβήσοι (348 A), in which ἀνά has the quite legitimate sense of *back*. I shorten the references, e.g. from 324 A to 24 A.

24 A τὴν ἡλικίαν ἦν . . . γέγονε is an unusual phrase. Cf. Pausan. 10. 28. 3 ἡλικίαν ἐφήβου γεγονώς and Philostr. *Heroic*. 291.

B. εἴ τις θεῶν καὶ τοῦτον εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν περὶ πολιτείας ἐκείνω γενέσθαι σύμφρονα ποιήσῃσι: εἰς δόξαν is harsh. For οὐκ ἀπάξιον cf. *Laws* 645 C. τανῦν or τὰ νῦν, which occurs repeatedly, is one of the marks of Plato's later style. *Ibid.* εἰ θάττον ἐμαντοῦ γενοίμην κύριος. See Liddell and Scott for ἐπειδή etc. with θάττον in the sense of *as soon as* (*Protag.* 325 C): ἐὰν θάττον in the same sense occurs *Alcib.* 1. 105 A and more than once in Xenophon: ὡς θάττον often in Polybius: I do not know another example of εἰ θάττον.

24 E Σωκράτη δὲ ἐγὼ σχεδὸν οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνοίμην εἰπὼν δικαιοτάτην εἶναι τῶν τότε. For αἰσχυνοίμην εἰπὼν which seems practically = δκνήσαιμι εἰπεῖν cf. *Phaedr.* 245 E ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον τοῦτον αὐτόν τις λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνέεται and *Lycurg.* in *Leocr.* 50 οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθείην εἰπὼν στέφανον τῆς πατρίδος εἶναι τὰς ἐκείνων ψυχάς. 3. 317 B has αἰσχύνομαι εἰπεῖν in the same sense.

25 E πῆ ποτ' ἄμεινον ἂν γίγνοιτο περὶ τ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ κ.τ.λ. This impersonal use of γίγνεται occurs again 30 A and 31 A, also 2. 11 E and βέλτιον ἂν ἔσχε 3. 17 E. It is found in Herodotus (1. 8 χρῆν Κανδαύλη γενέσθαι κακῶς), but is certainly not common in Attic (*Dem.* 19. 285): does it occur in Plato?

26 D δικαίου feminine. This use is quoted only from Euripides. Plato however has similar feminines, ἴδιος, ῥάδιος, etc. E ἔοικε μὴν τότε μηχανωμένῳ τινὶ τῶν κρειπτόνων ἀρχὴν βαλέσθαι κ.τ.λ. Like γίγνεται above, ἔοικε is impersonal, 'it looks like some god planning etc.'

27 B *περὶ πλείονος ποιῆσθαι*, occasionally *ἡγεῖσθαι*, is familiar: but does *περὶ πλείονος ἀγαπᾶν* or any such verb occur elsewhere? C The author is very fond of the

somewhat pleonastic *ξυμβαίνειν γιγνόμενον, ξυμβῆναι γεγόμενον*, etc., here found. Ast's *Lexicon*, 3, p. 298 furnishes several parallels from the later dialogues. D *ἐξεργάζομαι* with

infinitive quite unusual. 28 B *τὴν δ' ἐμὴν δόξαν ... εἶχε φόβος. δόξαν* put for himself or his mind, as in 3. 317 E, is odd. Cf. Hor. *Sat.* 1. 2. 32 *inquit sententia dia Catonis*. In the same section the words *τὸ δὲ Δίωνος ἠπιστάμην τῆς ψυχῆς περί φύσει τ' ἐμβριθῆς ὄν ἡλικίας τ' ἤδη μετρίως ἔχον* carry the use of *τό* with a genitive (Ast 2, p. 407) rather far: *τὸ τοῦ Δίωνος* is Dion. There is some MS. authority for *ἦθος* inserted after *Δίωνος*, but with this *ἡλικίας* would not harmonize. E *ἀτίμως φέρεσθαι* is

Herodotean, and *τὸ σὸν μέρος*, not *κατὰ τὸ σὸν μέρος*, the common expression. 30 B *παραποδίζω* is a rare word,

but it occurs *Laws* 652 B. E *τοῖς ἔξω τὸ παράπαν βαίνουνσι τῆς ὀρθῆς πολιτείας*. Ast gives several instances of *ἐκτὸς βαίνειν* with gen. from *Laws* and one from *Protagoras*.

31 B *ἀφοσιωσάμενος* *Laws* 752 D. 32 C *πένης* with gen. unusual (*Eur. El.* 38). 33 A For *ἔτοιμον* and infinitive cf. *Rep.* 567 A.

35 B *ἀνοσιουργία*, and the adj. 8. 52 c: the vb. *Laws* 905 B. *ὡς οἶται* oddly used: cf. 3. 319 B

35 C *νοστεῖν* apparently not found in Plato. 36 B *ἀλιτήριος* of a supernatural power: Antiphon several times. *ibid.* *ἀθεότης*: *Polit.* 308 E: *Laws* 967 C.

C *ὄρνιθες ομνens*. 38 A etc. *καθάπερ = ὥσπερ*, often in Plato's later work. So 5. 22 B: 8. 57 A etc.

D *παρακόσμημα* (to which L. and S. are wrong in giving the notion of *falsity*): so 40 B: *παρακοή* 41 B: *παρακούω* 39 E. Not in Plato in this sense. *ibid.* *ἔμμεστος* elsewhere?

E *φιλοτιμηθῆναι μὴ κ.τ.λ.*: construction with final conjunction unusual. 39 C *ἄνευ καιροῦ*. 40 C *ποδηγείν*: *Laws* 899 A.

D *ὄντως*, one of Plato's later words, frequent here. 41 A *ὡς (= ὥσπερ)* with infinitive unusual in any Attic prose but Xenophon's: cf. however *Prot.* 330 E, *Rep.* 365 D, and a few other places in Plato. I do not know whether *βάλλειν τινα ἐν αἰτία* occurs elsewhere in prose. Cf. *Soph. O.T.* 656. B *ἄλλους μὲν τινὰς οἶδα γεγραφότας περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων, οἷτινες δὲ οὐδ' αὐτοὶ αὐτούς*.

I presume αὐτοὶ αὐτοῦς means *one another*, but even so there seems not much point.

43 A κύκλος ἕκαστος τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι γραφομένων ἢ καὶ τορνευθέντων. For this use of ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, which contrasts them with purely ideal circles, cf. *Phaedr.* 271 D: *Soph.* 234 E. 44 A gen. with προσφνεῖς, but perhaps due rather to ξυγγενεῖς. 44 C πολλοῦ δέι μῆ. . . καταβάλλῃ or -εῖ, a very unusual construction, but cf. *Gorg.* 517 A πολλοῦ γε δέι . . . μῆ ποτέ τις . . . ἐργάσῃται: *Rep.* 378 C πολλοῦ δέι γιγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ ποικιλτέον: *Dem.* 23. 34 ὁ δέ . . . πολλοῦ γε δέι διώρισεν.

45 E ὅτι τάχος. Ast gives no other example from Plato, nor does it seem to occur in Xenophon. But Herodotus has it at least once.

46 A ἀπόστολα πλοῖα. 47 B τὰ νῦν ὑποφαίνοντα: so *Soph.* 245 E. E βεβοηθημένον ἐγεγόνει (impersonal) is an awkward periphrasis. Cf. *Laws* 857 C γέγονεν ὀρθῶς διαπεπονημένα, and see Ast I. 395.

48 A ὀλιγομισθοτέρους ποιεῖν παρά τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔθῃ. Ast gives no Platonic example of this use of παρά with comparatives, but it is added to a superlative in *Clit.* 407 A.

B οὗ used of *time* must be very rare. It occurs several times in Thucydides.

D Διονύσιον δ' ἀξιῶ καὶ δέομαι. . . μηδὲν ἄλλο αὐτῷ φλαῦρον γίνεσθαι. The accusative of the person (Διονύσιον) and then the μηδὲν γίνεσθαι make a quite unusual construction with ἀξιῶ and δέομαι.

E τῇ μετὰ ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν, expression unusual, but cf. *Apol.* 37 D ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ: *Laws* 785 B εἴκοσι μέχρι τῶν ἐξήκοντα ἐτῶν: *Soph.* *O.T.* 75 ἄπεισι πλείω τοῦ καθήκοντος χρόνου: *Eur.* *Hipp.* 19, *Tro.* 679.

49 C κυνηγεῖν = κυνηγετεῖν, and ἐπικράτεια, a Xenophontean word.

50 A ὑπηρεσίαι *Laws* 956 E. C ξεναπατία elsewhere? 51 D ἐξάσιος in *Laws*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*.

Throughout the letter hiatus is infrequent.

8. Plato to the same: a letter definitely and entirely of advice. There has been constant strife of parties and Sicily is in danger of becoming Phoenician or Oscan. Plato's advice is (1) to the royal family, to turn tyranny into constitutional monarchy (cf. letter 3), following Lycurgus in restricting royal power: (2) to the people, not to push liberty too far. Dion's advice would have been—and Plato conveys it in an imaginary speech—first to pass good laws, then to compromise things and accept as kings,

subject to various laws and special conditions, (a) Dion's son Hipparinus, (b) the other Hipparinus, son of the elder Dionysius, (c) the younger Dionysius. (Thus there would be three kings, as Sparta had two.)

Letters 7 and 8 have almost the air of being two prize exercises on the same theme, *Plato to the friends of Dion*. Letter 8 is much the shorter, simpler, and more straightforward; 7 longer, more literary, and more ambitious. Cobet thought oddly that they were two parts of one letter; but each is complete in itself, and 8 could not possibly be tacked on to 7, as he seems to have wished, without some change in both. Letter 8 is all advice; the advice of 7 is awkwardly packed into the middle. As a matter of fact, the assumption or ὑπόθεσις of the two is slightly different, for 7 seems to presuppose a more decided advantage gained by Dion's friends, i.e. a later date (Karsten, p. 104). The idea of letting Dionysius remain in power, checked by two other kings and various laws, is singularly unpractical, but perhaps we have no right to call it unplatonic. A serious difficulty is the fact which seems almost, if not quite, proved, that Dion had only one son, who died before him. Plato could not therefore have now suggested raising this son to one of the three thrones. See Karsten p. 152, and on the other side a note in answer to Ast in the eighty-first chapter of Grote's *History*. If this is so, it is one of the things most damaging to the letters, though it is not immediately fatal to any but 8. Very unlikely, too, is the statement (353 B) that the elder Dionysius and Hipparinus, when first raised to power, were expressly styled ἀυτοκράτορες τύραννοι.

The Greek of the letter is good enough. 352 D the pleonastic δειν is quite Platonic. μετέπειτα in 353 C (which according to L. and S. occurs in Attic only here and Ar. *Eth.* 10. 4. 1175 a 9) and εὐδαιμόνισμα (354 C, and Appian) may be noted: also μυθολογεῖν (352 E) in the sense of *narrating* facts, not fables, θεσμός = νόμος 355 C, ἀρμόττει with accusative and infinitive 356 D (see Stallbaum on *Minos* 314 E). τίνειν δίκας (353 C) is Platonic: cf. *Laws* especially. With τὸν ζυγόν (354 D) cf. *Timaeus* 63 B. In 357 A ἐπὶ νῶ γίγνεσθαι appears = κατὰ νοῦν γίγνεσθαι and is unusual. But ὁ δέ μοι φαίνεται πῆ τανῦν (354 A), where

φαίνεται apparently as in later Greek = δοκεῖ as an expression of opinion on a practical question, is certainly noticeable. Hiatus is, I think, less rare than in 7.

Of the remaining 5 letters the 13th, written to Dionysius in a quite friendly tone, is of some length: 9, 10, and 12 are very short, 11 of some thirty lines. They do not call for special notice. Neither in language nor in contents is there anything remarkable, except one passage in 11. 358 D E. There it is stated that at a date when Socrates is still alive Plato is prevented by age from travelling (οὐδὲ τῷ σώματι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἰκανῶς ἔχω πλανᾶσθαι), which betrays gross ignorance on the part of the writer. Perhaps ξενικαὶ ἐρινύες (9. 357 A), ξυμβάσεις chances (11. 359 B), τὰ ἐμὰ ἀναγκαῖα (13. 361 E), πολιανομεῖν (13. 363 C) are just worth noting.

The oldest indubitable evidence of ancient opinion about the letters is the fact that Cicero quotes or refers to three (5, 7, 9) out of the thirteen as Plato's and that he gives no hint of their authenticity being called in question. Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Demosth.* 23. 1027 also mentions 'the letters,' hinting that they are rather of the nature of *δημηγορίαι*, which might very well be said of 7 and 8. But it is probable that we may go back to a much earlier and no doubt better critic than either, namely Aristophanes of Byzantium. Diogenes Laertius writes in 3. 61 ἐνιοι δέ, ὧν ἔστι καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικός, εἰς τριλογίας ἔλκουσι τοὺς διαλόγους. καὶ πρώτην μὲν τιθέασιν, ἧς ἡγείται Πολιτεία, Τίμαιος, Κριτίας· δευτέραν Σοφιστής, Πολιτικός, Κρατύλος· τρίτην Νόμοι, Μίνως, Ἐπινομίς· τετάρτην Θεαίτητος, Εὐθύφρων, Ἀπολογία· πέμπτην Κρίτων, Φαίδων, Ἐπιστολαί· τὰ δ' ἄλλα καθ' ἓν καὶ ἀτάκτως. (He does not specify how many letters.) This ought to mean that Aristophanes concurred not only in the trilogy arrangement of the dialogues, but in making one trilogy consist of the somewhat ill assorted *Crito*, *Phaedo*, *Letters*. Perhaps he thought that, as three tragedies with no internal bond of union were sometimes thrown together, so might three Platonic works be, though it was going rather far to regard the letters as one work. In any case they received similar treatment from Thrasyllus (or Thrasyllus) in the time of Tiberius—this is the only other

recognition of them that it is worth while to quote—who gave them a place as one work in his division of Platonic writings into tetralogies. This is explicitly stated by Diogenes *ib.* 60, 61, who gives the number of letters recognized by Thrasyllus as what we have, thirteen. But with regard to Aristophanes it is possible Diogenes did not mean to say, or was mistaken in saying, that the letters came into his scheme. If any of Plato's works were left out of it, as if we have a full statement the majority were, we should certainly have expected the letters to be so, especially if no better company could be found for them than *Crito* and *Phaedo*. But the other trilogies are not always happy either, *e.g.* the fourth. We had better therefore assume Diogenes to mean that Aristophanes recognized the (thirteen?) letters, and it is likely enough that he even regarded him as the real author of the classification. This, if a fact, takes us back to about 220 B.C., which is still considerably more than 100 years after Plato's death and leaves plenty of time for mistakes.

There seems to be no evidence of any doubt felt in ancient times, unless it be a *νοθεύεται* said¹ to be written in some MSS. against letter 13 and an *ἀντιλέγεται ὡς οὐ Πλάτωνος* sometimes attached to 12 (thought by Ast to be meant for 13). If we find Aelius Aristides referring to *the* letter of Plato, meaning the 7th, we are not to infer that he rejected the others. The 7th is preeminently *the* letter.

No account is here taken of the letters sometimes printed as 14, 15, 16, which come from the 'Socratic,' not the ordinary 'Platonic' collection, and which no one supposes to be genuine. But they are not altogether without significance as a parallel.

Grote has argued in his solid and forcible way in favour of the Thrasyllian canon. He contends that it was founded on that of Aristophanes, which in turn rested upon trustworthy information obtained from the Platonic school at Athens, where not only the tradition but the actual MSS. of the master would remain. Each of these propositions is open to some doubt, and no one of them, I think, can be

¹ By Karsten. I do not find it explicitly stated in critical editions.

called more than a presumption. Aristophanes and Thrasylus are divided by a couple of hundred years. We know very little as to the working either of the Platonic school or of the Alexandrian library. The guarantee too is worth less for the letters than for the dialogues. The latter were published works of a quite different character, being those on which Plato's fame as a writer rested. About these the school and the library would no doubt be well informed : not necessarily quite secure against error, if fresh writings were produced as Platonic, but still in possession of the best available means of knowing and judging. As to the letters, or most of them, the case was different. They were private communications, of which no copy need have been kept, so that there was no reason why the school should have them. In our own day a man's family and friends may have his MSS. and are likely to know a great deal about his published works, but they are not equally good authorities as to his correspondence. If some one produces an alleged letter from him, they, certainly in a generation or two, know little or nothing more than anyone else. This, I admit, will not quite apply to so considerable and semi-public a letter as 7 and perhaps 8 in the Platonic collection, but it applies to all the others.

The letters, if spurious, may have originated either in the Platonic school or outside it. (I speak of most of them and the most important : obviously they may not all be of the same age and source.) There is no need for them to have been deliberate forgeries. It was half suggested above that 7 and 8 are specimens of a sort of prize exercise on a given theme. Members of the school or other students of Plato, interested in his relations with Dionysius and the party of Dion, set themselves to the task of composing letters which should at once explain his ideas, as they understood them, and demonstrate their own command of Platonic Greek. They are just such compositions as university prizes call forth, and, like them, not free from mistakes. We need not even exclude the possibility that they contain things suggested by unpublished memoranda of Plato himself or by hearsay of what he had actually written to this or that person, just as they contain things undoubtedly connected with passages in his published

writings. In such a case we might perhaps compare them to some extent with the *Fourth Philippic*. The authors perhaps never meant to impose upon anyone and might be both amused and annoyed, if we could tell them of the unexpected success of their literary exercises.

The letters may on the other hand have been composed with the object of making money. Galen tells us that many forgeries were offered to the competing libraries of Alexandria and Pergamum. These may have been things composed in the way just described, or quite *bona fide* works though not written by the authors to whom their vendors ascribed them, or again things written to be sold. No doubt many were rejected by sagacious librarians, but equally without doubt some mistakes would be made. The dialogues included in the Platonic canon are certainly not all above suspicion, and we have six or seven others that could not find their way in, though with many people they passed for Plato's.

Although then the letters must be earlier than the great mass of spurious things in the *Epistolographi*, they may very well not be Platonic. They must be early work, not only because it seems likely that they were recognized at Alexandria, but because the Greek in which they are written is so good. But at or even before the date which we should give them we know fabrications of one kind or another to have been produced. Pausanias 6. 18. 5 tells how Anaximenes composed and published the *Τρικάρωνος* in the name of Theopompus, imitating Theopompus' style so skilfully as to bring great odium on him. Diogenes 5. 92 quotes Aristoxenus as relating that Heraclides Ponticus composed tragedies and ascribed them to Thespis : he adds that Heraclides was himself deceived by another man who wrote a *Parthenopaeus* and said it was the work of Sophocles. According to the same authority (10. 3) Diotimus the Stoic passed off fifty licentious *letters* as written by Epicurus.

There is probably no evidence that will enable us to fix the time when composition of false or imaginary letters began in Greece. We may distinguish letters composed for real from those composed for imaginary persons. The first would probably be the earlier, and they may be divided again into letters entirely imaginary and letters having or

thought to have some foundation in fact. In the latter case the only fact known or supposed might be the sending of a letter, its contents being matter of more or less probable conjecture or inference, and its very existence sometimes having no greater certainty. In this class we may probably rank the letters which according to Thucydides were addressed to the Persian king by Themistocles and Pausanias and by the king to Pausanias in answer. It is hardly conceivable that the real terms of these letters, if indeed such letters were actually written at all, could be known to Thucydides, though for the letter of Pausanias he does refer in vague terms to some authority. He believed the letters had been sent. He believed he knew their import—or could tell it roughly. He therefore did not hesitate to compose something appropriate and give it as the precise words used, just as he composed speeches partly from information, partly from his own sense of what would have been proper and striking to say.

Most opposed to the half real or quasi-real letters of real people are the imaginary letters of imaginary people. The *ἔρωτικὸς λόγος* ascribed to Lysias the orator in the *Phaedrus* and there given at length has sometimes been taken for a letter. It is however never called a letter, always a *λόγος*, and so with the answers to it, the second of which there is a sort of pretence that the boy actually hears (243 E : cf. with regard to the original *λόγος* the *ἀκήκοας* of 230 E and the *ἔρωτα* of 234 C. See Stallbaum's preface, p. lix : Spengel *Art. Script.* 126). Suidas ascribes erotic letters to Lysias, while Plutarch (?) *Mor.* 836 B speaks both of letters and of *Ἐρωτικοὶ (λόγοι)*. Read also with Sylburg *ἔρωτικῶν* for *ἑταιρικῶν* in D. Hal. 459. It is not therefore quite clear that we are justified in attributing to Lysias the use of the epistolary form in these works of imagination, but it seems very probable and has generally been assumed. Whatever may have been the case with the lost letters or *λόγοι*, the speech in the *Phaedrus* does not purport to be Lysias himself speaking or writing. Both parties are apparently understood to be imaginary : 227 C *γέγραφεν γὰρ δὴ ὁ Λυσίας πειρώμενόν τινα τῶν καλῶν, οὐχ ὑπὸ ἔραστοῦ δέ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ κεκόμψεται κ.τ.λ.* They are feigned just

as all the parties are feigned in the tetralogies of Antiphon (the authorship of which I do not think there is any sufficient reason for doubting), and as they were no doubt habitually in similar legal and rhetorical exercitations.

If Plato has unintentionally misled later times as to the authorship, and if his own reputation has suffered from a similar mistake about the Platonic letters, the coincidence is curious. But it is probably the fact, though certainly some ancient writers took the other view. To take a real published work of Lysias and insert it entire in the dialogue would have been both unnecessary and inartistic. The manner must be that of Lysias, but no doubt the words are those of Plato. We should perhaps not compare it with such speeches, put by Plato into the mouths of Agathon, Gorgias, and others, as do not purport to be reproductions of written or elaborately prepared works, though they do show the skill and the zest with which the severe critic of imitation sets about the task of imitating. It may be compared doubtfully with Protagoras' myth in *Protag.* 320 D-322 D, but better with the reproduction in the *Memorabilia* of the *σύγγραμμα* of Prodicus on the Choice of Heracles. We can see there that the language is Xenophontean; yet it is a version of a real composition by another man, a composition which might perhaps be read by anyone who wished in the original author's own words. On this point cf. Philostratus *Vit. Soph.* 496 and *Ep.* 73. So we may fairly assume in the *Phaedrus*. Lysias had written on these themes, perhaps on the very one there taken. Plato however writes his theme for him over again, puts into it the very essence of Lysias, makes it more like Lysias than Lysias himself; then he proceeds to criticize and contrast.

Intermediate between quasi-real letters of real people and imaginary letters of imaginary people come imaginary letters of real people, and these form the bulk of the large Greek collection gathered from all sorts of sources and best to be studied now in Hercher's *Epistolographi*. Of course all the letters in it do not stand on the same footing. Critics have, for instance, usually passed the letters of Isocrates and condemned without hesitation

those of Aeschines.¹ But most of them are admittedly fabrications, whether we think that the fabricators had now and then some materials to go on or that they simply forged them out of their own heads. The composition of such letters became a common thing, and we do not approach the Platonic question in a proper frame of mind, unless we remember this and are on our guard from the beginning. The presumption is against the genuineness of any Greek letters ascribed to good times.

From the external evidence therefore and from what we know of the century that elapsed after Plato's death it would certainly not appear that we need hesitate much about condemning the letters, if good positive grounds are shown. Do such good grounds exist?

The writer of letter 1 describes himself as having administered with absolute authority the government of Dionysius. We know this cannot be true of Plato. The letter is therefore demonstrably not his. But Dion too would hardly have spoken of himself in these terms, and the description of the writer as 'having stayed so long a time' (*διατρίψας*) is only applicable to a visitor. Therefore the letter was not written by Dion either. Even supposing it to be Dion's, we see that almost all the MSS. give it to Plato, and that it is apparently one of the 13 Platonic letters which figure in the canon. It is not even as though it were part of Plato's correspondence in the sense of being a letter written to him in connexion perhaps with some letter of his own. If it is not by him, it has no connexion with him at all. Here then is one letter with just as good external evidence as the rest, yet not his.

Letter 11 represents Plato at some date during the lifetime of Socrates as prevented by age from travelling. Now Socrates was put to death when Plato was about thirty years old. Letter 7 falls into egregious blunders about the internal arrangements of Athens and Piræus at the time of the Thirty. Letter 8 assumes Dion's son Hipparinus to have outlived him. We know a son of

¹ In one of these Aeschines is made to refer to the pleasantries of Demosthenes, 'at which no one ever smiled but Ctesiphon.' We should like this jeer at any rate to be genuine, and possibly it is.

Dion's to have died before him and there is strong reason for thinking that he had no other.

May it not be said that these mistakes as to matters of fact condemn 1 and 11 absolutely, 7 and 8 almost certainly? Looking to another sort of internal evidence, we find in 7 a passage of great importance on which the writer himself lays much stress: a passage which purports to be profound philosophy and turns out to be nonsense. It is not a question here of a disputed philosophical point, of a difficult statement that we may perhaps not understand, or of a possibly corrupt text. The passage is simply foolish. Can we believe that this rubbish was written by the author of the *Theaetetus* and the central books of the *Republic*, where the same problem is handled with such power? Letter 2 again contains a most dubious philosophical passage. In several of the letters we have to believe that Plato assumed a tone of mysticism and made a profession of occult knowledge to which there is no parallel in his writings. In 3 he contradicts himself like a child and does not see the contradiction. Finally most readers of Plato would deem him too high-minded to be capable of the vain and petty spirit displayed in many passages of the letters. But this we cannot prove and therefore must not press.

On the other hand there is the language, whose value as evidence I should be among the last to impugn. There can be no doubt that in general character it is remarkably Platonic. Even when it will strike some readers as wanting in Platonic grace and skill, that is rather because we sometimes form our idea of Plato entirely from his best writings, the *Phaedo*, the *Gorgias*, the *Republic*, and leave out of sight the later dialogues, especially the *Laws*. The avoidance of hiatus in most of the letters, though they are not uniform in this respect, also falls in with what seems to be Plato's later practice. Bearing this in mind, I still cannot feel that the Greek is enough to outweigh the other considerations or even that the chief letters are well enough written for Plato. Tedious as the *Laws* is, there are plenty of striking and well-written things in it, things that reveal not only the philosopher but

the great writer. In the letters there is nothing of the kind: only a sort of shell without fruit, semblance without reality, the style or some of it without the man. There is probably nothing there that a fairly skilful writer steeped in Plato's later writings could not have composed.

It is true then that if we judged by the Greek alone we should have no reason for doubting. But, if we take into account the tone and spirit of the letters, we hesitate. When we weigh the extraordinary things they contain, we give judgment against them. The spuriousness of some does not of course necessarily entail the spuriousness of all. But, if the important letters are false, the trifles are probably false too, and in any case it matters little whether they are or are not.

ΤΑ ΝΟΘΕΥΟΜΕΝΑ.

"ΟΡΟΙ.

412 B ἐγκράτεια δύναμις ὑπομενητικὴ λύπης, ἀκολουθήσις
 τῷ ὀρθῷ λογισμῷ· δύναμις ἀνυπέβλητος τοῦ ὑποληφθέντος ὀρθῷ
 λογισμῷ.

ἀκολουθήσις, which has most MS. authority, may very well be right, though it expresses an action or course of conduct rather than a condition of mind. But ἀκολουθοῦσα would seem possible. Is not some word lost parallel to ὑπομενητικὴ and governing the genitive τοῦ ὑποληφθέντος, e.g. ἀποτελεστικὴ, which occurs a few lines below (φιλοπονία ἕξις ἀποτελεστικὴ οὗ ἂν προέλθῃ)? The genitive has at present no construction.

ibid. D ἐλευθεριότης ἕξις πρὸς τὸ χρηματίζεσθαι ὡς δεῖ· πρόσθεσις καὶ κτήσις οὐσίας ὡς δεῖ.

Were πρόσθεσις right, only one part of liberality would be given, and that the less obvious part. Read πρόεσις, comparing Ar. *Eth.* 2. 7. 1107 b 12, 13, where πρόεσις and λήψις are contrasted.

ibid. E μεγαλοπρέπεια ἀξίωσις κατὰ λογισμὸν ὀρθὸν τὸν σεμνότατον.

The latter words can hardly mean anything. Read τοῦ σεμνοτάτου, depending on ἀξίωσις.

A little below (under ἀγχίνωια) prefix ἐν to ἐκάστῳ. Cf. for instance Ar. *Eth.* 2. 9. 1109 a 24, where στοχαστικὴ occurs just before.

413 A ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκεν <αἰρετόν>?

ibid. B αἴρεσις δοκιμασία ὀρθή <ἢ μή>? <ἢ ψευδής>? A αἴρεσις is not bound to be right, and the word came, as we know, to imply error. On the other hand, in C (ἀλήθεια ἕξις ἐν καταφάσει καὶ ἀποφάσει· ἐπιστήμη ἀληθῶν) we seem to need the addition of ὀρθή to ἕξις.

ibid. ὁμόνοια κοινωνία τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων· συμφωνία νοημάτων καὶ ὑπολημμάτων.

τῶν ὄντων, which would mean *property*, is palpably wrong. τῶν ἐν νῶ ὄντων would make sense; or τῶν ὄντων may be a mistake for τῶν νοημάτων. Cf. on *Phaedrus* 263 A.

414 C αἰσθησις ψυχῆς φορά· νοῦ κίνησις· ψυχῆς διὰ σώματος εἰσάγγελσις εἰς ὥρας ἀνθρώπων, ἀφ' ἧς γίγνεται ψυχῆς ἄλογος δύναμις γνωριστικὴ διὰ σώματος.

εἰς ὥρας is not very intelligible, and there is good evidence against εἰς. Perhaps we should read εἰσάγγελσις φορᾶς and perhaps too ἀνθρώπων.

ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ.

372 A τὸ δίκαιον would hardly be defined as τὰ νομιζόμενα δίκαια. Should not the last word be omitted?

373 A Greater and less are distinguished by measure (μέτρον) and μετὰ τοῦ μέτρον by the measuring art: light and heavy by weight (σταθμός) and μετὰ τοῦ σταθμοῦ by the weighing art: τί δὲ δῆ; τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα τίνι σκοποῦντες διαγιγνώσκωμεν ὄργανω; καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ὄργανου τίνι τέχνη πρόσθεν;

I hardly know what the editors suppose πρόσθεν to mean, but it is tolerably clear that the real word was πρόσθες, *add, tell me also*.

374 B οὗτος ἀοιδός is not possible, though ἀοιδός at the end of the dialogue is. We should add ὁ (perhaps in both places) or write ἀοιδός. At the end of the περὶ ἀρετῆς read <τοῖς> κτωμένοις, the loss of τοῖς being possibly due to the ται of the verb.

DEMODOCUS.

382 C τῶν ἀνθρώπων δέ τινα (not τίνα) will suit τοῦτο ξυγχωρεῖν best.

ibid. D ὑπάρχει should be ὑπάρξει, as μεταμελήσει shows. So in 383 E the repeated ἐμφανιοῦσι proves that we need λέξουσι. It is remarkable how blind editors are to this common error of MSS., the putting of presents for futures.

384 D E Three times προσήκει might with advantage, I think, be turned into προσῆκεν; but none of the three cases absolutely requires it.

386 B εἰν οὖν τοῖς μὲν οἰκείοι ὦσι, τοῖς δ' ἄγνωτες, πῶς οὐ δεήσει τοὺς αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον αὐτῶν (so Schneider for αὐτῶ) πιστοὺς νομίζειν; οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως πιστοὺς αὐτοὺς δεῖ νομίζειν τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ τοὺς ἄγνωτας.

I can make no sense of the central clause in this, πῶς οὐ δεήσει κ.τ.λ. Words such as πῶς οὐ δεήσει τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἦττον, τοὺς δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτῶν πιπτοὺς νομίζειν; would be intelligible, though I am not sure about τοὺς αὐτοὺς and αὐτῶν; or such as πῶς οὐ δεήσει αὐτοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον, τοὺς δὲ ἦττον πιστοὺς νομίζειν;

SISYPHUS.

387 C ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ δεδόξασαι εὐβουλος εἶναι εἰς τῶν Φαρσαλίων.

Perhaps τις for εἰς. It is not meant that he is the only or the most sagacious citizen.

ibid. E σχεδιάζοντα λέγειν ὅτι ἂν τύχη, εἰκάζοντα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὐτῶ, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἀρτιάζοντες κ.τ.λ.

καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὐτῶ seems to need some addition to give it a sense. κατὰ ταῦτα <χρώμενον> αὐτῶ ὥσπερ?

388 B The ἂν in ὥσπερ γὰρ ἂν is out of place. Read γὰρ δῆ, a common combination.

ibid. D οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἐζήτει, ὅπου ἦν ἐξευρεῖν αὐτόν, εἰ ἦδει, ἀλλ' ἐξηῦρεν ἂν εὐθέως.

Here on the other hand we need *ἄν* with *ἐξήτει*, as with *ἐξηῦρεν*, and it must be inserted.

So again in 389 C *ἀρά γε νομίζεις οἷόν τέ τι εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ μουσικῆς βουλευέσθαι . . . ὅπως ἢ κιθαριστέον εἴη αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλο τι . . . ποιητέον*, the optative *εἴη* shows that *ἄν* must have stood somewhere in the first clause (unless indeed we add it to *εἴη* itself); and in *Eryxias* 393 E *ἔχοιτ' ἄν εἰπεῖν μοι τί ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπῳ πλείστου ἀξίον κτῆμα; ἀρά γε τοῦτο δ' κτησάμενος ἄνθρωπος ἄριστα βουλεύοιτο περὶ τούτου ὅπως ἄν βέλτιστα διαπράττοιτο κ.τ.λ.* it is required with *ἄριστα* (probably *ἄριστ' ἄν*) *βουλεύοιτο*. Perhaps it should also follow *εὐπορίαν*, *ibid.* 392 D, but there it is not indispensable.

388 E *σκόπει δῆ*, not *δέ*.

390 B *ἔδοκεῖτε . . . καθῆσθαι* should be *δοκεῖτε*, *it seems to me you sat*.

ibid. ταῦτα ἐμοί τε εἶναι πεπαιγμένα πρὸς σέ . . . σοί τε οὐκ ἐσπουδασμένως ἀποδεδεῖχθαι.

Surely *ἀποδεδέχθαι*, the rare passive use. Otherwise there is no new point in the clause, such as the antithesis of the two persons with *τε* and *καί* requires.

ibid. C οὐδὲν ἐξευρίσκειται ἄλλοῖον (τὸ βουλευέσασθαι) ἢ ὅπερ ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ εἰκασία καὶ σχεδιασμός.

ἐπιστήμη gives exactly the wrong sense, as 387 E tells us *totidem verbis*, *ὅπερ τὸ μὴ ἐπιστάμενόν τινα . . . διαμαντευόμενον καὶ σχεδιάζοντα κ.τ.λ.* (quoted above) and 388 A *μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενον*. As *εἰκασία* and *σχεδιασμός* are repeated from 387 E, so possibly this should be *μαντεία* answering to *διαμαντευόμενον*.

ibid. D Omit *τε* between *αὐτοί* and *αὐτῶν*. The repetition of *ὥσπερ* shows that *οἱ τε ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ ἅπαντες* is the subject of *διαφέρουσιν*, and that there should be no comma after *ἅπαντες*.

ERYXIAS.

393 A καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ ἔστι πλέον πάντων πονηρότατος ἢ ὄσω πλουσιώτατος, οὕτως ὥστ' εἰ κ.τ.λ.

πλέον should certainly be πλέονι (corresponding to ὄσω), and οὕτως, I think, τοσοῦτω, τος- having been absorbed in the ending of πλουσιώτα-τος.

394 E ἢ τούτου μὲν καταφρονεῖν <οἷε> τοὺς ἀνθρώπους?

397 E Omit ἀγαθόν after τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

400 E οὐκ οὔ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι χρώμεθα seems needed.

402 A (init.) εἴ τι δεόμεθα, not δεοίμεθα, and D ἐκποριζόμεθα.

ibid. c As the text stands, Eryxias is made to say 'I am quite persuaded that what is useless cannot be money (οὐδὲ χρήματά ἐστιν) and that useful money is one of the most useful things for this purpose (καὶ ὅτι τῶν χρησιμωτάτων ἐστὶ πρὸς τοῦτο χρήματα τὰ χρήσιμα); but not that money is useless for practical purposes (τὸν βίον), as by its means we provide ourselves with things we want (τὰ ἐπιτήδεια).' The words in italics seem mere nonsense. What is *useful money*? what is *this purpose*? If too the sentence meant anything, it would simply anticipate 'but not that money is useless,' to which it is formally opposed. I can only infer that we must omit it, and am unable to suggest how it got in. It has no appearance of being a corruption of something else, nor can it be put later in the sentence without considerable changes.

403 E The imperfect κατεχρῶντο is as inappropriate as ἔδοκεῖτε in *Sisyphus* 390 B above. What we want is the optative καταχρῶντο, like ἐργάζοιντο two lines below.

αὐτῶν cannot be right either, as there is nothing for it to refer to. Perhaps αὐτοῖς, as we have just below αὐτοῖς οἷς (an inversion of order for οἷς αὐτοῖς) καταχρώμεθα and 402 B οἷς μὴ αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα.

404 A πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν ἐργασίαν is neither grammar nor sense. Read τὴν αὐτήν, as in B and several other places.

τὴν τούτων would not, I think, make sense. There is nothing τούτων could refer to.

ibid. Ε ἐπιστήμην ἣ δύναται ἀκούειν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ οἴου τε.
οἴου τ' <εἶναι> ?

ibid. φαίνοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἐνίοτε μοχθηρὰ πράγματα πρὸς ἀγαθόν τι χρήσιμον εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου ἂν φανερὰ γένοιτο.

Apparently the two adjectives have exchanged terminations. We want *χρήσιμα* and *φανερὸν*.

405 B After a remark made by Socrates we find instead of an answer or comment from Eryxias the strange words *ἔφη γὰρ οὕτως, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ* (quite unmeaning in the context), and then Socrates continues his argument. Does not this stand for the assenting *οὕτω γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ*? *ὡς* and *καί* are liable to interchange. I doubt whether *οὕτω γάρ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ* would be idiomatic. *ὅσων ἄνευ μὴ οἴόν τε γίγνεσθαι* needs a *τι* after *τε*, as in 402 B. *τοῦτο* refers to it.

AXIOCHUS.

366 D *φράσαιμι ἂν σοὶ ταῦτα ἃ μνημονεύσω.*
Probably *ἂν* for *ἄ*.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

MARCUS AURELIUS

The following notes were published (1905) before the appearance of Leopold's Oxford text.

1. 6 τὸ γράψαι διαλόγους ἐν παιδί (*while a boy*).

Considering that Marcus congratulates himself more than once in this first book (§§ 7 and 17) on having given little time to σοφιστική and ῥητορική, it is somewhat surprising that he should count having written dialogues an advantage. Should we read τὸ <μῆ> γράψαι? He mentions a good many negative advantages he has to be thankful for, e.g. 4 τὸ μὴ εἰς δημοσίας διατριβὰς φοιτῆσαι, 7 τὸ μὴ ἐκτραπῆναι εἰς ζῆλον σοφιστικὸν μηδὲ τὸ συγγράφειν περὶ τῶν θεωρημάτων ἢ προτρεπτικὰ λογάρια διαλέγεσθαι.

8 διὰ ταῦτα should perhaps be δι' αὐτάς or διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

15 τὸ πάντας αὐτῷ πιστεύειν περὶ ὧν λέγοι ὅτι οὕτως φρονεῖ, καὶ περὶ ὧν πράττοι ὅτι οὐ κακῶς πράττει.

οὐ κακῶς has been questioned and is certainly unsatisfactory. Perhaps οὐκ ἄκων may be proposed. Maximus never said what he did not mean, nor acted reluctantly against his own judgment or feeling. So 3. 5 μῆτε ἀκούσιος ἐνέργει . . . μῆτε ἀνθελκόμενος: Epict. *Ench.* 1. 3 ἄκων πράξεις οὐδὲ ἐν: Zeno (quoted in Philo *Quod omn. prob.* 14. p. 460 M) θάπτον ἂν <τις?> ἄσκον βαπτίσει πλῆρη πνεύματος ἢ βιάσαιο τὸν (?) σπουδαῖον ὄντινόν ἄκοντα δρᾶσαι τι τῶν ἀβουλήτων (perhaps β. τὸν σπ. ὅτιοῦν ἄ. δ. τ. ἄ.).

In Isocr. 5. 25 οὐ κακῶς is a *v. l.* for οὐκ ἀλόγως, and that too might perhaps stand here.

16 παρέχει should probably be παρέχοι, referring to his father's lifetime.

ibid. φαρμάκων καὶ ἐπιθεμάτων <τῶν> ἐκτός?

ibid. τὸ ἔμφρον καὶ μεμετρημένον ἔν τε θεωριῶν ἐπιτελέσει (ἐπιτελέσει;) καὶ ἔργων κατασκευαῖς καὶ διανομαῖς καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις πρὸς αὐτὸ [δὲ] τὸ δέον πραχθῆναι δεδορκότες, οὐ πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς πραχθείσιν εὐδοξίαν (δέ wanting in the two best MSS). ἀνθρώποις is obviously wrong. I conjecture that the original was <ὡς> ἀνθρώπου, and that ὡς having fallen out after οἱς in τοιούτοις, ἀνθρώπου was then accommodated to the datives before it. A converse case is perhaps to be found at the beginning of the §, where τὸ ἀπαρατρέπτως εἰς τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπονεμητικὸν ἐκάστω looks meant (Reiske) for τὸ ἀπαρατρέπτως τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπονεμητικὸν ἐκάστω.

17 εὐποία should I think be the dative. Cf. on 5. 35 below.

ibid. χρῆζειν μήτε ἐσθήτων σημειωτῶν μήτε λαμπάδων καὶ ἀνδριάντων τοιῶνδὲ τινων καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου κόμπου.

If τοιῶνδε is not to be expelled altogether, it would seem necessary to write <καὶ> τοιῶνδὲ τινων. Or is that too much like καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου κόμπου?

ibid. (end) ὅπως τε ἐπεθύμησα φιλοσοφίας, μὴ ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τινα σοφιστήν.

So Stich, but there is good authority for οὕτως instead of ὅπως. Perhaps we might read οὕτως τε ἐπεθύμησα φιλοσοφίας <ὡς> μὴ ἐμπεσεῖν. Cf. above on 16.

2. 3 ταῦτά σοι ἀρκείτω, εἰ δόγματά ἐστι.

There is authority for αἰεὶ δόγματα ἔστω instead of εἰ δόγματά ἐστι. Perhaps καὶ δόγματα ἔστω.

2. 6 ὕβριζε, ὕβριζε αὐτήν, ᾧ ψυχῇ. τοῦ δὲ τιμῆσαι σεαυτὴν οὐκέτι καιρὸν ἔξεις· βραχὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ἐκάστω.

Surely Gataker was right in wishing to read ὑβρίζεις, ὑβρίζεις for the imperative, which is intrinsically absurd. Cf. 16 ὑβρίζει εἰς αὐτὴν ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆ, μάλιστα μὲν ὅταν κ.τ.λ. Moreover the οὐκέτι καιρὸν ἔξεις with a δέ points distinctly by antithesis to a statement of something being done, not to an imperative.

14 κἂν τρισχίλια ἔτη βιώσεσθαι μέλλης καὶ τοσαντάκις μύρια, ὅμως μένησο κ.τ.λ.

In the first place write another κἂν (or ἢ) for καί. In the second can τοσαντάκις μύρια be right, 3000 years or as many times ten thousand? Who ever used such an expression instead of ten thousand times as many, μυριάκις τοσαῦτα? Plato *Rep.* 546 c ἑκατὸν τοσαντάκις is not clear and Adam understands it quite differently.

3. 1 τὸ δὲ εἰ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι καὶ τοὺς τοῦ προσήκοντος ἀριθμοὺς ἀκριβοῦν κ.τ.λ.

I do not think εἰ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι by itself means anything. Some adverb or adverbial expression = καλῶς is needed in addition.

4 ἦτοι γὰρ ἄλλου ἔργου στέρη, τουτέστι φανταζόμενος τί ὁ δεῖνα πράσσει, κ.τ.λ.

ἦτοι is quite meaningless and ἄλλου can hardly be said to have any meaning. I have thought doubtfully of οὕτω γὰρ πολλοῦ ἔργου στέρη, which gives good sense itself and improves the meaning of τουτέστι, as explaining in part οὕτω.

ibid. ὁ γὰρ τοι ἀνὴρ ὁ τοιοῦτος, οὐκέτι ὑπερτιθέμενος τὸ ὡς ἐν ἀρίστοις ἤδη εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.

ὡς ἐν ἀρίστοις is I think a phrase of an unknown kind as an equivalent for ὡς ἄριστος. Perhaps ὡς ἐν ἄριστος (as *e.g.* Xen. *Mem.* 4. 5. 9 ὡς ἐν ἡδιστα), or ὡς ἂν ἄριστος, if the ἂν is admissible, of which I am not sure.

6 τῷ λογικῷ καὶ ποιητικῷ ἀγαθῷ.

Read ἀγαθοῦ, as in 3. 11 μεγαλοφροσύνης ποιητικόν : 6. 52 : 8. 14 : 9. 1 twice. Cf. on 1. 16 above.

8 In the purified man there is nothing δοῦλον οὐδὲ κομψὸν οὐδὲ προσδεδεμένον οὐδὲ ἀπεσχισμένον οὐδὲ ὑπεύθυνον οὐδὲ ἐμφωλεῦν. Would not ἀνυπεύθυνον give a better sense? There seem three pairs of opposed terms.

12 τῇ ὧν λέγεις καὶ φθέγγῃ ἥρωικῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀρκούμενος.

ἥρωικῇ is quite out of place, and Dr. Rendall's εὐροϊκῇ (which he translates *even truth*) does not recommend itself very much. The first letter may be a dittograph of the last in φθέγγῃ. Can we make anything of ῥωικῇ? Ῥωμαϊκῇ occurs to me as just a possibility. Cf. 5 ὁ ἐν σοι θεὸς ἔστω προστάτης ζῶου ἄρρενος καὶ πρεσβύτου καὶ πολιτικοῦ καὶ Ῥωμαίου καὶ ἄρχοντος : 2. 5 φρόντιζε στιβαρῶς ὡς Ῥωμαῖος καὶ ἄρρην : Martial xi. 20. 10 *qui scis Romana simplicitate loqui* : etc.

15 οὐκ ἴσασι πόσα σημαίνει τὸ κλέπτειν, τὸ σπείρειν, τὸ ὠνεῖσθαι, τὸ ἡσυχάζειν.

It is not easy to correct κλέπτειν, but surely ὠνεῖσθαι must be κινεῖσθαι.

4. 3 πάντα ταῦτα ὅσα ὄρας ὅσον οὐδέπω μεταβάλλει καὶ οὐκέτι ἔσται.

ἔσται and the parallel passage in 7. 25 prove that we should read μεταβαλεῖ. Cf. ὅσον οὐδέπω with future in 10. 11, with μέλλω in 7. 70.

12 He speaks of a readiness to change, εἰ ἄρα τις παρῆ διορθῶν καὶ μετὰγων ἀπὸ τινος οἰήσεως.

παρῆ does not seem very suitable. Would παρίη, *comes forward, presents himself*, be better? Cf. Plat. *Rep.* 494 D τῷ δὴ οὕτω διατιθεμένῳ εἰάν τις ἡρέμα προσελθὼν τὰληθῆ λέγῃ, ὅτι νοῦς οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ.

16 ἐντὸς δέκα ἡμερῶν θεὸς αὐτοῖς δόξεις οἷς νῦν θηρίον καὶ πίθηκος, εἰ ἀνακάμψῃς ἐπὶ τὰ δόγματα καὶ τὸν σεβασμὸν τοῦ λόγου.

This is of course a reference to the saying ascribed in *Hippias Maior* 289 B to Heraclitus, ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν (in comparison with God or a god) πίθηκος φανείται. Rendall has in consequence conjectured that

we should read here θεὸς <θεοῖς> αὐτοῖς δόξεις. But why should they admire him so much as to account him one of themselves? Surely merely reverting to principles and revering reason would not move them to such enthusiasm. Let us rather read θεοῖς for θεός and for αὐτοῖς probably ἄνθρωπος, to which (1) the antithesis of θηρίον, (2) the use of the word by Heraclitus agree in pointing. ἄνθρωπος, written in its shorter form ἄνος, is certainly corrupted sometimes, e.g. into ἄλλος (cf. on 10. 10), but I cannot quote a case of confusion with αὐτός.

17 μὴ ὡς μύρια μέλλον ἔτη ζῆν.

‘Do not live as though you had a thousand years before you,’ Rendall. ‘Do not act,’ Long. Probably some such word as διανοοῦ is lost. Cf. 2. 11 ὡς ἤδη δυνατοῦ ὄντος ἐξιέναι τοῦ βίου, οὕτως ἕκαστα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν καὶ διανοεῖσθαι.

19 ὁ περὶ τὴν ὑστεροφημίαν ἐπτοημένος οὐ φαντάζεται ὅτι κ.τ.λ. . . . μέχρι καὶ πᾶσα ἡ μνήμη ἀποσβῆ δι’ ἐπτοημένων καὶ σβεννυμένων προϋούσα.

ἐπτοημένων is quite unmeaning as well as wrong in tense, and is evidently nothing but an accidental repetition of ἐπτοημένος above. I conjecture the true word to have been ἐξαπτομένων, which matches σβεννυμένων, as in 7. 24 ἀπεσβέσθη, ὥστε ὄλως ἐξαφθῆναι μὴ δύνασθαι (cf. *Republic* 498 A B). Cf. also 21 and 9. 9 : D. Hal. *Ars Rhet.* 236. Nauck’s μεμνημένων is not happy.

20 τί τούτων διὰ τὸ ἐπαινέσθαι καλόν ἐστιν ἢ ψεγόμενον φθείρεται; σμαράγδιον γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ χεῖρον γίγνεται, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπαινῆται; τί δὲ χρυσός; κ.τ.λ.

φθείρεται and still more χεῖρον γίγνεται point to reading κάλλιον for καλόν, and a few lines above we have οὔτε γοῦν χεῖρον ἢ (?) κρεῖττον γίγνεται τὸ ἐπαινούμενον. Read also δέ for γάρ after σμαράγδιον, and four lines above τὸ δέ γε for τό γε δῆ.

50 ὄλον μικρόν ἐστι τὸ διάστημα (the difference in length of life), καὶ τοῦτο δι’ ὄσων καὶ μεθ’ οἷων ἐξαντλούμενον καὶ ἐν οἷῳ σωματίῳ.

Read δι' οἶων which is much more natural in itself and confirmed by the double use of οἶος in the words following. Cf. also 6. 59.

5. 4 πορεύομαι διὰ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν μέχρι πεσῶν ἀναπαύσομαι.

Is the future indicative found after ἕως *until* or μέχρι? Should we not read ἀναπαύσομαι? I suspect on the other hand that πορεύομαι should be πορεύσομαι.

6 One man makes a merit of any service he may do. Another is at any rate conscious of having done it. A third seems all unconscious: ἄνθρωπος δ' εὖ ποιήσας οὐκ ἐπιβοᾶται ἀλλὰ μεταβαίνει ἐφ' ἕτερον. ἄνθρωπος here is much too general. It is not *a man*, that is, the ordinary man, who is thus described, but the man of rare character. Read therefore ἄνθρωπον, governed by εὖ ποιήσας. Cf. 9. 42 (near end) τί γὰρ πλέον θέλεις εὖ ποιήσας ἄνθρωπον;

There is something wrong in the description of the second character too. The sentences run: ὁ μὲν τίς ἐστιν, ὅταν τι δεξιὸν περὶ τινα πράξῃ, πρόχειρος καὶ λογίσασθαι (*imputare*) αὐτῷ τὴν χάριν. ὁ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο μὲν οὐ πρόχειρος, ἄλλως μέντοι παρ' ἑαυτῷ ὡς περὶ χρεώστου διανοεῖται καὶ οἶδεν ὃ πεποιήκεν. There is no plausible suggestion for ἄλλως κ.τ.λ. I have thought of ὅλως for ἄλλως (a confusion found I think elsewhere); also of <οὐκ> ἄλλως. . <ἦ> ὡς περὶ, or <οὐκ> ἄλλως περὶ αὐτοῦ ἦ περὶ. The first seems the best.

9. μὴ ὡς πρὸς παιδαγωγὸν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπανιέναι, ἀλλ' ὡς οἱ ὀφθαλμίωντες πρὸς τὸ σπογγάριον καὶ τὸ ῥόν, ὡς ἄλλος πρὸς κατάπλασμα, ὡς πρὸς καταιόνησιν. οὕτως γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐπιδείξῃ τὸ πειθαρχεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ προσαναπαύσῃ αὐτῷ (*find rest and refreshment in it*).

Rendall translates the last words 'not a question of outward show but of inward refreshment': Long (reading I can hardly tell what) 'thou wilt not fail to obey reason and thou wilt repose in it.' Coray conjectured ἔτι δήξει for ἐπιδείξῃ. I would suggest οὐδὲν ἐπιδείσει, or οὐδὲν ἔτι δεήσει, τοῦ πειθάρχειν, 'there will be no need then to obey reason, *i.e.* with more or less constraint and reluctance: conformity to it will be natural and pleasant. Cf. Wordsworth's well known lines in the *Ode to Duty*.

Perhaps we should read ὡς <ἄλλος> πρὸς καταιόνησιν, or ἤ for ὡς without adding ἄλλος. αὐτό a line or two below should be αὐτά, as τούτων following and ἄ preceding combine to show.

12 ἐξακούσεται should probably be ἐπακούσεται, both as the fitter word and to harmonize with ἐπακούσαι just before.

23 πῶς οὖν οὐ μωρὸς ὁ ἐν τούτοις φυσώμενος ἢ σπώμενος ἢ σχετλιάζων ὡς ἔν τινι χρόνῳ καὶ ἐπὶ μακρὸν ἐνοχλήσαντι; (v.l. ἐπὶ μικρόν. Reiske ἐνοχλήσασι.)

It is surely clear that the last word should be future, not aorist. But we might think either of ὡς ἔν τ. χ. καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἐνοχλήσοντι as in some space of time which will trouble him even for a little, or, better perhaps, of ὡς ἔν τ. χ. καὶ ἐπὶ μακρὸν ἐνοχλήσοντα, as though they would trouble him in (a certain period of time) and for long. For the latter interpretation the dative (ἐνοχλήσουσι) is not necessary; ὡς with the accusative is quite admissible.

26 Certain affections (πείσεις) of ours should be confined to the parts immediately affected: ὅταν δὲ ἀναδιδῶνται κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν συμπάθειαν εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν, ὡς ἐν σώματι ἠνωμένῳ, τότε κ.τ.λ. The translators make no sense of ἑτέραν. Did not Marcus write ἡμετέραν? The first two letters might be lost after the ην of τήν. So in Alciphron 1. 4 Dobree saw that τὴν ἀκτὴν stands for τὴν ἡλακάτην.

28 θεραπεύσεις should perhaps be θεραπεύσει. *he will attend to it.* We should remember that θεραπεύω, like *curo*, does not mean *to cure*.

29 ὡς ἐξελθὼν ζῆν διανοῆ, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα ζῆν ἔξεστιν. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπωσι, τότε καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἔξιθι.

Read ἐξελθὼν <τοῦ> ζῆν: 'as you think to exist after quitting life, even so you can live here.' Even when ἐξιέναι is repeated in the second sentence, τοῦ ζῆν is added to it. ἐξελθὼν might perhaps stand alone (like ἐξάγειν, ἐξαγωγή), but ζῆν could hardly be used thus of a state after death. Out of ζῆν ἔξεστιν it is easy to supply another vaguer infinitive.

31 The first sentence with its πῶς is no more a direct question than the second with its εἰ. In both cases we supply something like 'ask yourself.' Observe ἀναμνησκου δέ following.

35 εἰ μήτε κακία ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἐμῆ μήτε ἐνέργεια κατὰ κακίαν ἐμῆν.

Read κακία . . . ἐνέργεια . . . ἐμῆ (ἐμῆν).

6. 10 Why care to live? τί δέ μοι καὶ μέλει ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ τοῦ ὅπως ποτέ αἶα γίνεσθαι;

αἶα seems quite impossible. Ménage's γαῖα γενέσθαι is better (cf. 3. 3, where the body is called γῆ καὶ λύθρος, and *Il.* 24. 54 κωφὴν γαῖαν ἀεικίζει), but the poetical form is much against it. I have sometimes thought that we might repeat the last two letters of ποτέ and for τειαυα read τέφρα or τέφραν. ρ and ι are very often confused. Cf. 4. 3 πόσοι ἦδη . . . ἐκτέτανται καὶ τετέφρωνται: *ib.* 48 κατιδεῖν αἰεὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ὡς ἐφήμερα καὶ εὐτελεῆ καὶ ἐχθρὸς μὲν μυξάριον, αὔριον δὲ τάριχος ἢ τέφρα, and σποδός in 5. 33: 12. 27. Also Herodas 1. 38 and 10. 2. Theocr. *Ep.* 6. 6. The construction of ὅπως . . . γίνεσθαι is of course faulty.

12 εἰ μητρὶάν τε ἅμα εἶχες καὶ μητέρα, ἐκείνην τε ἀνθεράπευες καὶ ὁμως ἢ ἐπάνοδος σοι πρὸς τὴν μητέρα συνεχῆς ἐγίγνετο. τοῦτό σοι νῦν ἐστὶν ἢ αὐτὴ καὶ ἢ φιλοσοφία. ὧδε πολλάκις ἐπάνιθι καὶ προσαναπαύου ταύτη.

The general sense seems to indicate that ἐστὶν should be ἐστί, and the imperatives following confirm this. Possibly ταυτό for τοῦτο.

13 ὅπου λίαν ἀξιώπιστα τὰ πράγματα φαντάζεται, ἀπογυμνοῦν αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν εὐτέλειαν αὐτῶν καθορᾶν καὶ τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐφ' ἣ σεμνύνεται περιαιρεῖν. Δεινὸς γὰρ ὁ τῦφος παραλογιστῆς καὶ . . . καταγοητεύει.

For ἱστορίαν, which is manifestly wrong, Reiske conjectured and Nauck approved τερθρείααν. Rendall would read ὑψηγορίαν. I would rather think of ῥητορείααν, which is nearer to ἱστορίαν than either and harmonizes well enough with παραλογιστῆς and καταγοητεύει. The word occurs in 10. 38. For ρ and ι cf. above on 10.

14 τὰ ὑπὸ ζέξεως ἢ φύσεως συνεχόμενα are contrasted first with τὰ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς and then with τὰ ὑπὸ λογικῆς ψυχῆς (cf. 10. 2) in such a way that it is clear they are inanimate things and plants (λίθους . . . ἐλαίας). But, to give this meaning, ζέξις, if not φύσις, must have some qualifying word such as σωματική or ὑλική added to it. Standing alone, it might just as well be mental (11. 18 under τέταρτον and 12. 16) as material.

16 ἐπί τι should perhaps be ἐπὶ τοῦτο. τό, which is at times confused with both, might be the *tertium quid*.

27 πῶς ὡμόν ἐστι μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν κ.τ.λ.

We should expect ὡς, as in 5. 2 ὡς εὐκολον κ.τ.λ. and elsewhere in exclamations. But a similar mistake, if it is one, occurs in several places, e.g. 8. 3: 10. 19 and 36: 11. 7.

30 ὡς ὀλίγοις ἀρκούμενος, οἶον οἰκήσει, στρωμνῇ, ἐσθῆτι, τροφῇ, ὑπηρεσία.

These things fairly exhaust the requirements of the most luxurious and exacting among us; cf. 12. 2. The question should rather be of the *kind* of food, clothing, etc. Ought we for οἶον to read οἶα, harmonizing very well with ὡς?

38 Speaking of the bond that holds all things together, he says τοῦτο δὲ διὰ τὴν τονικὴν (or τοπικὴν) κίνησιν καὶ σύμψνοιαν καὶ τὴν ἔνωσιν τῆς οὐσίας.

τονικὴν hardly makes sense: perhaps γενικὴν. For κίνησιν there are such conjectures as σύννησιν and κοίνωσιν.

44 The obscure sentence εἰ δ' ἄρα περὶ μηδενὸς βουλευόνται will come out right, if we see that the parenthesis is not πιστεύειν μὲν οὐχ ὄσιον, as Stich gives it, where μὲν would be unmeaning, but πιστεύειν . . . βουλευόνται. The second εἰ . . . βουλευόνται resumes the first, and the δέ in it answers to the μὲν after πιστεύειν. We must take ἢ, not ἥ, the meaning being 'or, if we do believe, let us not offer sacrifice,' etc., and (I think) read μήτε for μηδέ throughout. In the Didot text the Greek is improperly punctuated, but the Latin translation gives the right sense. Rendall seems to miss it.

46 *πάσχειν* should apparently be *πάσχεις*.

47 *αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπικήρου καὶ ἐφημέρου τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζωῆς χλευασταί.*

It looks as though *αὐτῆς* should be *ταύτης*. The adjectives do not suit *αὐτῆς*: 'mockers even at our brief and calamitous life' is hardly sense.

50 *πειρῶ μὲν πείθειν αὐτούς· πράττε δὲ καὶ ἀκόντων, ὅταν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὁ λόγος οὕτως ἄγῃ.*

Perhaps *αἰρή*, for the confusion is found elsewhere. Cf. 2. 5 *τοῦ αἰροῦντος λόγον*: 10. 32 *οὐδὲ γὰρ αἰρεῖ λόγος (ζῆν) μὴ τοιοῦτον ὄντα.* But *ἄγῃ* may not be wrong.

55 *εἰ κυβερνῶντα οἱ ναῦται ἢ ἰατρούοντα οἱ κάμνοντες κακῶς ἔλεγον, ἀλλῶ τινὶ ἂν προσεῖχον ἢ πῶς αὐτὸς ἐνεργοίη τὸ τοῖς ἐμπλέουσι σωτήριον ἢ τὸ τοῖς θεραπευομένοις ὑγιεινόν;*

Rendall translates this: 'If the sailors abused the pilot, or the sick the physician, would they have any other object than to make him save the crew or heal the patients?' Long, adopting the other punctuation, 'would they listen to anybody else? or how could the helmsman secure the safety of those in the ship?' etc. I do not see the point of the passage on either of these interpretations, nor why with *ἂν* past tenses of the indicative should be used rather than optatives. One would expect too *τὸν κυβερνῶντα* and *τὸν ἰατρούοντα*. The article is omitted because the participles refer to the subject of *προσεῖχον*, which is in reality first person singular, not third plural. 'If the crew had spoken ill of me when I commanded a vessel, or my patients when I was doctoring them, should I have given my mind to any thing but'—what? 'how I was myself to do what their preservation required?' Read *ἐνεργοίην*. Marcus means that he does not any more than the doctor or the navigating officer allow himself to be distracted by complaints and discontent.

7. 3 *κυνιδίους ὀστάριον ἐρριμμένον.*

Perhaps a verse. Why else should *κ.* come first?

30 *συμπαρεκτείνειν τὴν νόησιν τοῖς λεγομένοις. εἰσδύεσθαι τὸν νοῦν εἰς τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιοῦντα.*

Read probably τοῖς γενομένοις or γιγνομένοις. γερόμενος and λερόμενος are well known to be sometimes confused. τοῖς γιγνομένοις makes excellent sense and is confirmed by the next sentence, whereas most of τὰ λερόμενα call for no mental strain and τοῖς λερομένοις would be too complimentary to other people.

34 ἴδε τὰς διανοίας αὐτῶν οἶαι καὶ οἶα μὲν φεύγουσαι, οἶα δὲ διώκουσαι may be right, but I suspect we should read φεύγουσι and διώκουσι, as in 4. 38 : 10. 13. The confusion may be found in other places.

55 τούτων οὖν ἐχόμενον τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εὐθέα περαινέτω καὶ ἔχει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ.

After an imperative Greek idiom needs the future ἔξει. In 11. 16 we should certainly read ἔσται for ἔστω with Gataker (χαῖρε αὐτοῖς καὶ ῥάδια ἔσται σοι).

58. θέλε σεαυτῷ καλὸς εἶναι ἐπὶ παντὸς οὗ πράσσεις.

Coray conjectured καλῶς εἶναι. I would rather suggest ἱκανὸς εἶναι, the confusion of καλός and ἱκανός being quite familiar. See *Index*.

64 λανθάνει goes with πόνω ταῦτὰ ὄντα, not with δυσχεραίνουμενα, as the last words of the § show.

8. 3 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ καὶ Γάϊος καὶ Πομπήϊος τί πρὸς Διογένη καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ Σωκράτην; οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἶδον τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὰς αἰτίας καὶ τὰς ὕλας, καὶ τὰ ἡγεμονικὰ ἦν αὐτῶν ταῦτά· ἐκεῖ δὲ ὄσων (or ὄση) πρόνοια καὶ δουλεία πόσων;

πρόνοια is a good quality and the word could hardly be used in this disparaging sort of way. M. Causaubon παράνοια. περίνοια (cf. 1. 7 : 8. 36 : Ar. *Frogs* 958) might be more suitable. One would think πόσων ought to be ὄσων, but cf. on 6. 27.

8. Ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὐκ ἔξεστιν· ἀλλ' ὕβριν ἀνείργειν ἔξεστιν· ἀλλ' ἡδονῶν καὶ πόνων καθυπερτερεῖν ἔξεστιν κ.τ.λ.

Rendall suggests πάντα γινώσκειν. But a comparison of Epictetus 4. 4 fully confirms ἀναγιγνώσκειν. The whole of that fourth chapter is devoted to answering the complaints of a man who finds that he has not leisure for reading—

κακῶς μοί ἐστιν· οὐκ εὐσχολῶ ἀναγνῶναι. The Stoic points out that he is perhaps just as well occupied otherwise. Renan therefore also misconceives the meaning of the words before us, when (*Marc-Aurèle*, p. 464) he supposes the emperor to have written them *un jour qu'il dut déposer par fatigue le livre qu'il tenait à la main*.

Cf. the references to books in 2. 2, though obscure: 2. 3 τὴν δὲ τῶν βιβλίων δίψαν ῥῖψον: 4. 30 (in which passage I have sometimes thought the two last clauses should be written as questions).

16 μέμνησο ὅτι καὶ τὸ μετατίθεσθαι καὶ ἔπεσθαι τῷ διορθοῦντι ὁμοίως ἐλευθέρον ἐστι.

I should prefer ἐλευθέρον. Cf. on 11. 9.

22 δικαίως ταῦτα πάσχεις· μᾶλλον δὲ θέλεις ἀγαθὸς αὔριον γενέσθαι ἢ σήμερον εἶναι.

Write γάρ for δέ.

30 λαλεῖν καὶ ἐν συγκλήτῳ καὶ πρὸς πάνθ' ὄντινούν μὴ περιτρανῶς· ὑγιεῖ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι.

περιτρανῶς has been doubted, and I was myself disposed to alter it, until I read in Longinus (*Rhetores Graeci*, Teubner I. ii. p. 216) χρῆ τὸν παραμυθούμενον μὴ μετὰ σοφιστικῆς τρανότητος ἀλλὰ μετὰ συμπεπονθυίας λέγειν ἀπλότητος.

32 συντιθέναι δεῖ τὸν βίον κατὰ μίαν πρᾶξιν· καὶ εἰ ἐκάστη τὸ ἑαυτῆς παρέχει ὡς οἶόν τε ἀρκεῖσθαι· ἵνα δὲ τὸ ἑαυτῆς παρέχη, οὐδὲ εἰς σε κωλύσαι δύναται.

(1) I am inclined to suggest κατὰ μίαν <ἐκάστην> πρᾶξιν. κατὰ μίαν πρᾶξιν cannot mean that, and, if it meant *like (so as to form) a single action*, the ἐκάστη following would be intolerable. (2) Should μή be inserted in the last words after ἵνα δέ or τὸ ἑαυτῆς, or is it a case of the abuse of ἵνα?

35 ὥσπερ τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἕκαστον (ἕκαστος, ἐκάστῳ) τῶν λογικῶν σχεδὸν ὅσον ἢ τῶν λογικῶν φύσις, οὕτως καὶ ταύτην παρ' αὐτῆς εἰλήφμεν.

I suggest something like ἐκάστῳ...σχεδὸν δίδωσιν ἢ τῶν ὁλῶν φύσις, believing λογικῶν to be a mere inadvertent

repetition of the λογικῶν preceding. For ἡ τῶν ὄλων φύσις cf. 6 ἡ τῶν ὄλων φύσις τοῦτο ἔργον ἔχει: 12. 23 τὸν ὄρον δίδωσιν ἡ φύσις . . . ἡ τῶν ὄλων, etc.

45 Should συνδυομένη, which means nothing, be ἀναδυομένη, matching ὀρεγομένη?

48 οὐδὲν ὀχυρότερον ἔχει ἄνθρωπος ἐφ' ὃ καταφυγὼν ἀνάλωτος λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη· ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἑωρακῶς τοῦτο ἀμαθής, ὁ δὲ ἑωρακῶς καὶ μὴ καταφυγὼν ἀτυχής. Should ἀμαθής and ἀτυχής change places? The second at any rate seems odd where it stands.

52 τίς οὖν φαίνεται σοι ὁ τὸν τῶν κροτούντων ἔπαινον φεύγων ἥδιον, οἱ οὐθ' ὅπου εἰσὶν οὐθ' οἵτινές εἰσι γιγνώσκουσι;

There is no sense to be got out of this, nor is Gataker's bold conjecture (τὸν τῶν κροτούντων ἢ ψόγον φεύγων [as though οἱ κροτοῦντες could blame] ἢ ἔπαινον διώκων οἷ), or Dübner's modification of that (τὸν τ. κ. ἔπαινον διώκων οἷ), satisfactory. Perhaps οὖ should be read for ὁ (as in 10. 25: cf. on 12. 8 below) and ἂν added so as give the meaning *who would not prefer to avoid?*

Cf. the change proposed in 12. 8 below.

I have also thought of τί σοι φαίνεται τοῦ τὸν τ. κ. ἔπαινον φεύγειν ἥδιον;

55 ὁπότεν πρῶτον οὗτος θελήσῃ. αὐτός?

58 ὁ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενος ἦτοι ἀναισθησίαν φοβεῖται ἢ αἰσθησιν ἑτεροίαν. ἀλλ' εἴτ' οὐκέτι αἰσθησιν, οὐδὲ κακοῦ τινος αἰσθήσῃ· εἴτ' ἀλλοιοτέραν αἰσθησιν κτήσῃ, κ.τ.λ.

For οὐκέτι αἰσθησιν read οὐκέτι αἰσθήσῃ or αἰσθησιν <ἔξεις>. We can hardly understand ἔξεις out of the coming κτήσει.

9. 9 ὥστε χρῆζειν τῶν διειργόντων καὶ βίας.

Rather διειργόντων by Greek idiom, and possibly βία.

21 ἐνεργείας ἀπόληξις, ὀρμῆς <καὶ> ὑπολήψεως παῦλα καὶ οἷον θάνατος, οὐδὲν κακόν.

καί is due to Gataker. Perhaps a substantive has been lost, parallel to ἀπόληξις and παῦλα.

41 Epicurus used to ask himself πῶς ἢ διάνοια συμμεταλαμβάνουσα τῶν ἐν τῷ σαρκιδίῳ τοιούτων κινήσεων ἀταρακτεῖ, τὸ ἴδιον ἀγαθὸν τηροῦσα.

Rather <οὐ> συμμεταλαμβάνουσα. The very point is that it did not share in the κινήσεις. οὐ would easily fall out before σν. τοιούτων may be right, but seems rather pointless. Qy. τούτῳ?

At the end of the § πράσσει wants a subject and should probably be πράσσεις.

10. 6 μέρος εἰμὶ τοῦ ὄλου, ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικουμένον.

Perhaps διοικούμενον or even -ος. Cf. 2 τί σου ἢ φύσις ἐπιζητεῖ, ὡς ὑπὸ φύσεως μόνον διοικουμένον.

7 εἰ δὲ φύσει κακόν τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τοῦτο αὐτοῖς (i.e. for the parts to perish), οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὄλον καλῶς διεξάγοιτο, τῶν μερῶν εἰς ἀλλοτριώσιν ἰόντων καὶ πρὸς τὸ φθειρεσθαι διαφόρως κατεσκευασμένων.

I am puzzled by the combination of κακόν and ἀναγκαῖον, nor can I, if the text is right, make any coherent sense of the whole §, especially of the πότερον γὰρ ἐπεχείρησεν ἢ φύσις αὐτὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς μέρη κακοῦν, which immediately follows the words quoted. But other readers do not seem to have felt any difficulty. At present my impression is that κακόν and καλῶς should be changed to καλόν and κακῶς respectively. What is good and necessary for the parts cannot be bad for the whole, for nature never set about injuring her own parts.

9 μῆμος, πόλεμος, πτοία, νάρκη, δουλεία καθ' ἡμέραν ἀπαλείψεται σου τὰ ἱερὰ ἐκείνα δόγματα, ὅποσα ὁ φυσιολογητὸς (ὅποσα ἀφυσιολογήτως Gataker, ὅποσα οὐ φυσιολογητῶς, Rendall) φαντάζει καὶ παραπέμπεις.

μῆμος and πόλεμος, πτοία and νάρκη appear to be contrasted respectively, but δουλεία stands alone without a contrast. Is it possible that its proper antithesis ἀρχή has fallen out after the very similar letters of νάρκη?

10 ἀράχιον μυῖαν θηρᾶσαν μέγα φρονεῖ, ἄλλος δὲ λαγίδιον, ἄλλος δὲ ὑποχῆ ἀφύην, ἄλλος δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Should the first ἄλλος be $\overline{\alpha\nu\omicron\varsigma}$, *i.e.* ἄνθρωπος? Cf. on 4. 16 above.

19 οἰοί εἰσιν ἐσθίοντες, καθεύδοντες, ὀχεύοντες, ἀποπατοῦντες, τᾶλλα· εἶτα οἰοὶ ἀνδρονομούμενοι καὶ γαυρούμενοι ἢ χαλεπαίνοντες καὶ ἐξ ὑπεροχῆς ἐπιπλήττοντες. πρὸ ὀλίγον δὲ ἐδούλευον πόσοις καὶ δι' οἶα, καὶ μετ' ὀλίγον ἐν τοιούτοις ἔσσονται.

For ἀνδρονομούμενοι, which is meaningless, there are conjectures such as ἀβρυνόμενοι, Reiske; ἀνδριζόμενοι, Coray; ἀνδρογυνούμενοι, Rendall. Of these the first is the best, both as being nearest and because some word seems wanted that may be coupled with γαυρούμενοι as the other two expressions are coupled together in sense. I would suggest as alternatives, and coming perhaps even nearer, either φαιδρυνόμενοι or λαμπρυνόμενοι. It is hard to see the meaning of ἐν τοιούτοις. Perhaps ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, *i.e.* ἐν δουλείᾳ. For ἐν πόσοις καὶ δι' οἶα (cf. 9. 34) see above on 8. 3.

23 ἐναργὲς ἔστω αἰὲ τὸ ὅτι τοιοῦτο ἐκείνο ὁ ἀγρός ἐστι, καὶ πῶς πάντα ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἐνθάδε τοῖς ἐν ἄκρῳ τῷ ὄρει ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ ἢ ὅπου θέλεις.

Rendall's translation 'take for your axiom the old truth—the field is where you make it' is difficult to connect with the Greek, and his idea that the field 'signifies the place of seclusion and retirement, as in iv. § 3' seems fanciful. Long's 'that this piece of land is like any other' gives a better sense, though hardly the right one and not quite to be got out of the Greek either. I do not feel at all sure what Marcus is saying, but I should like to suggest τοιοῦτο (or ταῦτὸ) ἐκείνῳ ὁ ἀγρός ἐστι, his field is to another man much as your court, your empire, is to you; things here and on the mountain-top or seashore are all in reality the same. ἐκείνος would also give a similar sense. Cf. 27, including the words quoted from it below; also 15. πῶς should perhaps be πως.

25 ὁ τὸν κύριον φεύγων δραπέτης· κύριος δὲ ὁ νόμος· καὶ ὁ παρανομῶν δραπέτης.

The last words want a connecting particle, οὖν (lost after ων) or ἄρα (lost before δρα).

27 πάντα γὰρ ἐκεῖνα τοιαῦτα ἦν, μόνον δι' ἐτέρων.

Probably ταῦτα ἦν, for μόνον δι' ἐτέρων wants something stronger than τοιαῦτα, with which it does not contrast sufficiently.

31 οἶαν should surely be ποίαν.

33 οὐ πρότερον παύση στένων πρὶν ἢ τοῦτο πάθης, ὅτι, οἶόν ἐστι τοῖς ἡδυπαθοῦσιν ἢ τρυφή, τοιοῦτό σοι κ.τ.λ.

Read μάθης for πάθης.

34 τῷ δεδηγμένῳ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν δογμάτων ἀρκεῖ καὶ τὸ βραχύτατον καὶ ἐν μέσῳ κείμενον εἰς ὑπόμνησιν ἀλυσίας καὶ ἀφοβίας· οἶον Φύλλα τὰ μὲν τ' ἄνεμος χαμάδις χέει . . . Ὡς ἀνδρῶν γενεή.

'When once true principles have bitten in,' 'to him who is penetrated by true principles' say the translators. Gataker, who cannot stomach (*concoquere*) either δεδεγμένῳ or δεδειγμένῳ, which he found in some editions, suggests δεδευμένῳ (not δεδιδυγμένῳ which Stich ascribes to him), quoting Plato's δόξα δευσοποιός: such a use is however improbable. According to Stich's critical note one MS. has τῷ δεδογμένῳ and one has τῶν δεδηγμένων. The genitive in the latter may very well be a mere accident, but it falls in with what I think the true reading. Δ and Λ being so often confused, it is probable that we should read τῶν λελεγμένων ἀπὸ τῶν ἀ. δ., the genitive depending on and giving an improved meaning to τὸ βραχύτατον καὶ . . . κείμενον.

36 μὴ ἔσται cannot mean 'will there not be?' as the translators take it. It looks like a non-Attic construction, equivalent to the Homeric and occasional Attic use of μὴ and μὴ οὐ with subjunctive in independent sentences (Goodwin *M.T.* 261-264): 'I fear there will be.' But μὴ is wanting altogether in Stich's codex A.

ibid. τὸ ἴδιον ἔθος διασφύζων, φίλος καὶ εὔνοος καὶ ἰλεως.

Read ἦθος.

11. 9 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀσθενές, τὸ χαλεπαίνειν αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ.

Perhaps ἀσθενοῦς, as in 18 ὥσπερ ἡ λύπη ἀσθενοῦς, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ὀργή. Cf. on 8. 16 above.

11 εἰ μὲν should apparently be omitted. Does it arise from ὤμεν concluding the § before?

16 Perhaps κάλλιστα δῆ, or καλλίστη δῆ, ζῆν δύναμις αὐτή.

18 (under ἔννατον) ἐὰν διατελῆς εὐμενῆς αὐτῷ καί . . . πρῶτος παραινῆς καὶ μεταδιδάσκης εὐσυχλῶν.

For εὐσυχλῶν, which is quite inappropriate, read εὐκόλως.

ibid. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ μὴ βλαβῶ· σὺ δὲ βλάβῃ, τέκνον.

The sense and the οὐ μὴ point clearly to βλάβῃ for βλάβῃ. Cf. on 9. 9, etc.

ibid. δεῖ δὲ μήτε εἰρωνικῶς αὐτὸ ποιεῖν μήτε ὄνειδιστικῶς ἀλλὰ φιλοστόργως καὶ ἀδήκτως τῇ ψυχῇ.

τῇ ψυχῇ, could hardly be added in this way. Read φιλοστόργῳ καὶ ἀδήκῳ τῇ ψυχῇ.

12. 1 μὴ τὸ παύσεσθαι ποτε τοῦ ζῆν φοβηθῆς. ἀλλὰ τό γε μηδέποτε ἄρξασθαι κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν.

παύσεσθαι should of course be aorist, like ἄρξασθαι.

2 ὁ θεὸς πάντα τὰ ἡγεμονικὰ γυμνὰ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀγγείων καὶ φλοιῶν καὶ καθαμμάτων ὄρᾳ.

καθάμματα are strange things indeed to be 'bare' of. Is it not clear that we should read καθαμμάτων?

5 οὐκ ἂν δ' οὕτω διελεγόμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς, εἰ μὴ ἄριστοι καὶ δικαιοτάτοί εἰσιν.

Is εἰσίν a mistake for ἦσαν? It may be right, but I do not recall a parallel in Greek, or in Latin either, for such constructions as *carmina ni sint, ex umero Pelopis non nituisset ebur* take the subjunctive.

8 θεάσασθαι . . . τί θάνατος, τί δόξα, τίς ὁ ἑαντῷ ἀσχολίας αἴτιος, πῶς οὐδεὶς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἐμποδίζεται.

The third point here suggested, 'who is the man that involves himself in disquiet and trouble,' seems hardly natural or in keeping with the others. I would suggest that for ὁ we should read οὐ or rather οὐχ, meaning that a

man is always responsible for his own ἀσχολία. It goes along with the next words πῶς . . . ἐμποδίζεται. ἐαυτῷ and ὑπ' ἄλλου, τίς οὐ and οὐδείς match one another. For the correction of ὁ to οὐ cf. on 8. 52 above.

12 The use of μήτε and not οὔτε shows something to be wrong or missing. Should the first μεμπτέον be μέμφεσθαι?

16 ἐπὶ τοῦ φαντασίαν παρασχόντος ὅτι ἤμαρτε τί δαὶ οἶδα εἰ τοῦτο ἀμάρτημα; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἤμαρτεν, ὅτι κατέκρινεν αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν, καὶ οὕτως ὅμοιον τοῦτο τῷ καταδρῦπτει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ὄψιν.

Rendall and Long follow Coray, rightly I think, in adding an οὐ before κατέκρινεν: 'how do I know that he did not condemn himself?' But what is the point of the comparison that follows? 'How do I know that he did not condemn himself?' is a suggestion in the man's favour, whereas the comparison to scratching your own face would tell against him. I do not feel very sure of the drift, but am inclined to suggest οὐ κατέκρινον. 'Even if he did do wrong, in condemning him for it was I not condemning myself (since I do the same or similar things) and scratching my own face?' ἑαυτόν may of course = ἑμαντόν.

27 ὑπὸ ἀτυφία. ἐπί for ὑπό?

31 τί ἐπιζητεῖς; τὸ διαγίνεσθαι; ἀλλὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι; τὸ ὀρμᾶν; τὸ αὔξεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. τί τούτων πόθου σοι ἄξιον δοκεῖ;

Rendall removes the note of interrogation after ἐπιζητεῖς and so gets a better general sense, 'why hanker for continuous (continued?) existence?' though then τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, etc. seem to have no proper construction and ἀλλά no meaning. For ἀλλά we should, I think, read ἄρα, which is sometimes confused with it: for the rest one would expect something like <ἐν> τῷ διαγίνεσθαι, or τῷ δ. without ἐν: τί ἐπιζητεῖς τῷ διαγίνεσθαι; ἄρα τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ ὀρμᾶν, τὸ αὔξεσθαι;

EPICTETUS.

1. 2. 36 Ἐπίκτητος κρείσσω Σωκράτους οὐκ ἔστιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ οὐ χείρων, τοῦτό μοι ἰκανόν ἐστιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ Μίλων ἔσομαι καὶ ὅμως οὐκ ἀμελῶ τοῦ σώματος.

εἰ δὲ μὴ οὐ χείρων is supposed to mean 'if I am no worse.' But (1) this takes no account of the οὐ: (2) Epictetus would never have claimed to be 'no worse' than Socrates, and this is apparent even from the parallels he goes on to give, 'I shall never be a Milo, a Croesus, etc.' Perhaps we should read μὴ του χείρων 'not worse than my neighbour,' as in *Apol.* 29 B εἴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, *Midias* 66 καὶ ἀμεινον ἀγωνίσωμαί τινος, and often.

1. 1. 27 Θρασείας εἰώθει λέγειν 'σήμερον ἀναιρεθῆναι θέλω μᾶλλον ἢ αὔριον φυγαδευθῆναι.' τί οὖν αὐτῷ Ροῦφος εἶπεν; 'εἰ μὲν ὡς βαρύτερον ἐκλέγη, τίς ἢ μωρία τῆς ἐκλογῆς; εἰ δ' ὡς κουφότερον, τίς σοι δέδωκεν;'

τίς ἢ μωρία cannot I think = the exclamation ὄση ἢ μωρία, nor yet do I see how else to explain it. Has a word dropped out, e.g. <μεγάλη> τις (i.e. ἐστίν)? λέγη and μεγάλη resemble each other.

1. 4. 10 τί δ' ἀπάγεις αὐτὸν τῆς συναισθήσεως τῶν αὐτοῦ κακῶν;

The context points plainly to κακιῶν. Cf. p. 182.

1. 4. 16 ὁ οὖν ἐξηγούμενος αὐτὸ (τὸ βιβλίον) δοκεῖ ὅτι πλείονος ἀξιός ἐστιν ἢ πέντε δηναρίων;

Read δοκεῖς. So in 25 δοκεῖτε ὅτι κ.τ.λ. and often.

1. 5. 5 ἂν μὲν ἦ <τις> οὕτω διακείμενος?

1. 7. 26 τίς ἔτι ἄλλος ἐστὶ λόγῳ χρηστικὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει;

<έν> or <ἐπ'> ἐρωτήσει? So γάρ seems omitted a few lines below after ἄτοπα.

1. 9. 11 οὐ τοῦτο μηχανώμενον ὅπως μὴ κ.τ.λ., ἀλλὰ μή τινες ἐμπίπτωσιν τοιοῦτοι νέοι, οἷ . . . ἀπορρίψαι θέλωσι.

Grammar requires θέλουσι. The subjunctive seems an error due to the influence of ἐμπίπτωσιν, not a latinism.

ibid. 26 ὅτι (twice) should be ὅτε.

ibid. 27 ἐδόκει τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡτυχηκῶς καὶ πρότερον μὲν ἐπιφανῆς ὢν καὶ πλούσιος, ὕστερον δ' ἐκπεπτωκῶς ἀπάντων.

Should not the first καί be ὡς, a word with which it sometimes gets confused? The words from καί to ἀπάντων go poorly with ἐδόκει.

1. 10. 10 ὅμοιον οὖν ἐστὶν . . . ἀναγιγνώσκειν 'παρακαλῶ σε κ.τ.λ.' ἢ 'παρακαλῶ σε κ.τ.λ.'; ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὁμοιά ἐστιν;

This is not the only place where ὅμοιος ἢ occurs, but is it right? ἢ like ὡς gets confused in MSS. with καί and perhaps this is the real origin of the strange phrase. ὅμοιος καί is of course familiar. Cf. the next note but one.

1. 11. 19 ἀποφαινόμεθα should be ἀποφαινόμεθα or ἀποφανόμεθα. Observe the answer ἔστω.

ibid. 23 ἔδει . . . ἀβοήθητον ἀπολειφθῆναι τὸ παιδίον . . . ἢ . . . ἀποθανεῖν;

A clear case of ἢ for καί.

1. 13. 3 οὐκ ἀνέξῃ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ σαντοῦ, ὃς ἔχει τὸν Δία πρόγονον, ὥσπερ υἱὸς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σπερμάτων γέγονεν.

Remedy the asyndeton by reading <ὃς> ὥσπερ.

1. 16. 3 ὄρα οἶον <ἂν> ἦν and *ibid.* 20 εἰ γοῦν ἀηδὼν ἦμην, ἐποίουν <ἂν> τὰ τῆς ἀηδόνας.

1. 17. 17 ποία οὖν ἐνθάδ' ὀφρὺς τοῦ ἐξηγουμένου; ('why should the interpreter be conceited?') οὐδ' αὐτοῦ Χρυσίπ-

που δικαίως, εἰ μόνον ἐξηγεῖται τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως, αὐτὸς δ' οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ. πόσω πλέον τοῦ ἐκείνου ἐξηγουμένου;

πλέον should logically be ἤττον. Yet it would be unsafe to alter the text, for writers do fall into these mistakes. In the *Fairy Queen* 5. 6. 26 Spenser writes *ne lesse* for *ne more*, and I have noticed the same slip twice in J. A. Symonds (*Greek Poets* 1. p. 257 'nor are the enemies of Aristophanes less insensible': *Revival of Learning* p. 449 (ch. 8 *ad init.*) 'the phrases of Petrarch are not less obsolete').

1. 18. 11 Read χαλεπανεῖς twice for χαλεπαίνεις: 19. 27 λέξεις for λέγεις: 23. 6 πολιτεύσεσθαι for πολιτεύεσθαι: *ibid.* 7 probably ἀπολείψει for ἀπολείπει. But in 25. 18 ἐξέρχομαι shows that μενῶ should be μένω, though this mistake is much less common.

1. 20. 11 οὕτως ὅπου διαφέρειν οἰόμεθα τὸ πλανᾶσθαι τοῦ μὴ πλανᾶσθαι (*e.g.* in money matters), ἐνταῦθα πολλὴν προσοχὴν εἰσφέρομεν· ἐπὶ δὲ τάλαιπώρου ἡγεμονικοῦ χάσκοντες καὶ καθέδοντες πᾶσαν φαντασίαν παραπροσδεχόμεθα· ἡ γὰρ ζημία οὐ προσπίπτει.

I think we ought to restore here a Thucydidean word and read ἀταλαιπώρον. Our indolence and indifference in the one case are contrasted with our keenness in the other. Schenkl's index shows that ἀταλαίπωρος occurs half a dozen times in these *Discourses*.

1. 22. 16 There seems something lost after ἀγάλματα.

1. 25. 17 μόνον μηδὲν βαρούμενος ποίει, μὴ θλιβόμενος μηδ' ὑπολαμβάνων ἐν κακοῖς εἶναι.

μη should apparently be μηδέ or μηδέν.

1. 29. 62 μέχρι δ' ἂν οὐ τινα ἀνοχὴν ἀπὸ τούτων ἔχω.

The sense is 'until I get some relief': we must therefore read σχῶ.

2. 1. 32 ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐδύνατο ἔχειν αἰετὸν τὸν ἐλέγχοντα αὐτοῦ τὰ δόγματα ἢ ἐλεγχθησόμενον ἐν τῷ μέρει, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἤλεγε.

The future ἐλεγχθησόμενον makes quite plain what might otherwise have been denied, that ἐλέγχοντα should be

ἐλέγξοντα. So 12. 2 δός . . . ἰδιώτην τινὰ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον the participle should be future, and 14. 21 εὐθὺς ἀπαλλάσση the verb; 17. 20 ἀποκτείνω μὲν τὰ τέκνα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔμμαντὴν τιμωρήσομαι the parallel clause again proves the present tense wrong. 18. 25 οἴχεται may be right, but οἰχήσεται would be much more natural. It is not at all clear that κρινῶ in 5. 29 should not be κρίνω.

2. 2. 7 τοῦτό σοι προοίμιον, τοῦτο διήγησις, τοῦτο πίστις, τοῦτο νίκη, τοῦτο ἐπίλογος, τοῦτο εὐδοκίμησις. Transfer τοῦτο ἐπίλογος to precede τοῦτο νίκη. ἐπίλογος must not be cut off from προοίμιον, διήγησις, πίστις, nor νίκη from εὐδοκίμησις.

2. 3. 3 Just as the judge of coins says 'give me any drachma you like and I'll tell you if it's a good one,' so with syllogisms we ought to be able to say 'φέρε ὃν θέλεις καὶ διακρινῶ σοι τὸν ἀναλυτικόν τε καὶ μὴ.' But ἀναλυτικόν is not at all the word we want: it is clearly a mere mistake for ἀποδεικτικόν (λόγον ἀποδεικτικόν 2. 25. 2). What is the origin of the mistake? The words immediately following show us: διὰ τί; οἶδα γὰρ ἀναλύειν συλλογισμούς. The coming ἀναλύειν is reflected in the erroneous ἀναλυτικόν.

2. 5 17 In the game of ball ὁ μὲν ἐρεῖ 'βάλε,' <ὁ δὲ> 'μὴ βάλης.' ὁ δὲ 'μὴ ἀνέλαβες' or, as a correction in codex S has it, μίαν ἔλαβες. Possibly we should read μὴ ἀναλάβης.

2. 6. 2 μῆτ' must be μηδ', if the preceding μὴ is right.

ibid. 7 μὴ γὰρ σὸν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον ἦν ἀλλ' ἐκείνου.

Read μὴ γὰρ <οὐ> σόν.

2. 8. 7 ἄλλως γὰρ <ἂν> περιπατεῖν οὐκ ἐδύνατο.

2. 13. 13 Nothing else changes a man's colour οὐδὲ τρόμον ποιεῖ οὐδὲ ψόφον τῶν ὀδόντων οὐδὲ

μετοκλάζει καὶ ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρους πόδας ἴζει.

The verbs in the quotation should be infinitives after ποιεῖ.

2. 14. 22 <αἰ> ἐπιβολαί. The four other substantives have an article apiece.

2. 16. 30 Speaking of men complaining about this, that, and the other, he goes on ἄλλος ἐλθὼν ὅτι οὐκέτι τὸ τῆς Δίρκης ὕδωρ πίνειν μέλλει· τὸ γὰρ Μάρκιον χεῖρόν ἐστι τοῦ τῆς Δίρκης.

ἐλθὼν gives no particular sense. Is it perhaps a corruption of ἐνθεν ἐλών? Cf. my note on the *De Sublim.* 34 in *Aristophanes and Others* p. 256.

2. 16. 31 ζήτηι στίχον ὁμοιον τῷ Εὐριπίδου ποιῆσαι
θερμάς τε τὰς Νέρωνος Μάρκιόν θ' ὕδωρ.

The unmetrical Μάρκιον seems due to τὸ Μάρκιον a few lines above. It may therefore stand for anything. But Pliny's words (*N.H.* 31. 3. 24) *Marcia . . . vocabatur quondam Aufeia . . . rursus restituit Marcus Agrippa* suggest the possibility of Αὐφέϊον or Ἀγρίππου. Μάρκιον might indeed be a gloss on it.

2. 17. 26 Omit the καί before τί ἐτι.

2. 22. 24 μὴ αὐτόθεν ἀποφαίνῃ is ungrammatical. Read ἀποφαίνου or ἀποφήνη. In 3. 24. 5 μὴ . . . ἡδέως αὐτὸ ἄρξῃ ποιεῖν καὶ λοιπὸν ὡς κακὸς ἀθλητῆς περιέρχῃ we should surely read περιέρχου.

2. 23. 8 κἂν πύθη . . . , τίνος πυνθάνῃ ;

I do not see how πύθη, if you have enquired, can be right. We seem to need πυνθάνῃ in both places. So in 3. 10. 12 ἂν καλῶς πυρέξῃς, ἔχεις τὰ τοῦ πυρέσσοντος read πυρέσσης.

3. 1. 6 τί οὖν ποιεῖ ἄνθρωπον καλὸν ἢ ὅπερ τῷ γένει καὶ κίνα καὶ ἵππον ; τοῦτο, ἔφη.

Divide the question into two, the first ending at καλόν, and write ἦ.

ibid. 11 Write κἂν for ἂν.

3. 5. 9 μὴ οὐ προσῆλθόν σοί ποτε φαιδρῶ τῷ προσώπῳ ἔτοιμος εἶ τι ἐπιτάσσεις, εἶ τι σημαίνεις.

Should not the two last verbs be optatives or future indicatives?

ibid. 17 εἰ λάχανά τις ζητῶν ἐλήλυθεν, πρὸς τὸν κηπουρὸν ἄν αὐτὸν ἀπήγαγεν.

ἐληλύθει? or ἦλθεν?

Is it possible that the καὶ γάρ which introduces this illustration is a mistake for καθάπερ or ὥσπερ (cf. on 1. 9. 27 above)?

3. 9. 8 ὅτε παῖς ἦς, ἐξήταζες τὰ σαντοῦ δόγματα; οὐχὶ δ' ὡς πάντα ποιεῖς ἂ ἐποίεις; ὅτε δὲ μειράκιον ἦδη . . ., τί σοι λείπειν ἐφαντάζου; κ.τ.λ.

ὡς πάντα ποιεῖς makes no sense, the general drift being that at every stage of his life he was quite well pleased with himself and thought nothing wanting. It seems to me that ποιεῖς is merely due to the ἐποίεις which is about to come twice (cf. on 2. 3. 3 and 2. 16. 31) and that we should read something like ὡς πάντα εἰδώς.

3. 14. 14 ἦ should be ἦς, and 21. 12 αὐτό should be αὐτά.

3. 21. 7 ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐξηγήσομαι τὰ Χρυσίππεια ὡς οὐδεὶς, τὴν λέξιν διαλύσω καθαρῶτατα, προσθήσω ἄν που καὶ Ἀντιπάτρου καὶ Ἀρχεδήμου φοράν.

Once or twice elsewhere in these *Discourses* ἄν appears with the future. Here however it is suspicious as not being added to the other verbs, and που increases the suspicion. Is ἄν που the remains of another proper name or possibly a dittograph of Ἀντιπάτρου?

3. 22. 14 If λέγε were right, we should have εἰμί and σχολάζω. Read therefore λέγει.

ibid. 59 τί for ὅτι would seem better than Upton's ἐπὶ τίνι.

3. 23. 10 πρῶην ψυχρότερόν σου τῶν ἀκροατῶν συνελθόντων. The adverb is hardly suited to the verb. Read ψυχροτέρων.

4. 3. 10 εἰ γὰρ ἤθελεν, ἀγαθὰ πεποιήκει αὐτὰ ἄν ἐμοί. ἄν can hardly be in its proper place. ἀγάθ' ἄν?

4. 4. 14 ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ καταλήγομεν μαθεῖν τί λέγεται <ἐν τῷ> μαθεῖν?

ibid. 38 *κακείνον θεραπεύειν ὡς κακοδαίμονα.*

Should we write *κακὸν δαίμονα*? Neither *κακοδαίμων* nor *ἀγαθοδαίμων* is cited in the use here required. *Ar. Eq.* 112 is certainly not an instance of the former.

Fragm. 1 (end) Put mark of interrogation after ἢ μή.

6 τῆ . . . φαντασίᾳ for τῆς . . . φαντασίας?

Encheir. 12 (end) ὅταν δὲ καλῆς τὸν παῖδα, ἐνθυμοῦ ὅτι δύναται μὴ ὑπακούσαι καὶ ὑπακούσας μηδὲν ποιῆσαι ὧν θέλεις, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ἐστὶν αὐτῷ καλῶς ἵνα ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ ἢ τό σε μὴ παραχθῆναι.

The last part of this is quite unmeaning, but it seems to suggest something like ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ἐστὶν αὐτὸν καλεῖν ἵνα ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ ἢ τό σε παραχθῆναι ἢ μὴ παραχθῆναι. The καί before ὑπακούσας should possibly be ἢ (1. 10. 10 above).

LAERTIANA.

It does not appear when we are to have a trustworthy text of Diogenes Laertius (who according to some authorities now should be called Laertius Diogenes). Cobet's edition with all its improvements was an early, not very congenial, and quite imperfect piece of work; yet none has been published since. A new text founded on real knowledge and sound judgment of the MSS. and in other ways brought abreast of present-day scholarship is in every way a desideratum. The man was foolish enough, but the book is of extreme value for the history, especially the literary history, of Greek philosophy. It is also, though little read, full of good things in the way of anecdotes, epigrams, and pregnant sayings—not the author's own, be it well understood. Montaigne wished there were a dozen of him. Finally there can be now but few Greek books, whose text is in a more neglected and faulty condition and about the MSS. of which we have less reliable material to go upon. In such a state of things textual criticism is very insecure. I have therefore in the following paper confined myself mainly to minutiae with which it seems comparatively safe to deal. No doubt some of the suggestions have been anticipated.

Omissions of a word.

Diogenes introduces the story of the tripod which the Delphic oracle ordered to be sent to the wisest living man with the words τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν τρίποδα φανερά τὸν εὐρεθέντα κ.τ.λ. (l. 27). It is hardly possible to make φανερά mean

generally known, but, if not that, what does it mean? It may be noticed that the details of the story varied very greatly according to D., who gives a number of different forms. Perhaps therefore this is one of the many places where a negative has been lost and we should read οὐ φανερά, meaning that the true story is hard to get at.

It is well known how often ἄν is lost, especially before or after letters identical with it or resembling it. There is no need therefore to do more than indicate the following cases: 2. 35 τῆς γυναικὸς εἰπούσης (to Socrates) Ἄδικως ἀποθνήσκεις, Σὺ δέ, ἔφη, δικαίως <ἄν> ἐβούλου (or σὺ δ' <ἄν> [In Xen. *Apol.* 28 there is evidence both for and against the ἄν.]: 2. 74 πρὸς τὸν αἰτιώμενον ὅτι ἐταίρα συννοικεῖ, Ἄρά γε, εἶπε, μή τι διενέγκαι <ἄν> (or <ἄν οἶει>) οἰκίαν λαβεῖν ἐν ἧ πολλοὶ πάνυ ᾤκησαν ἢ μηδεὶς; 3. 45 (*Anthol. Pal.* 7. 108) in one of D.'s own wretched epigrams,

καὶ πῶς, εἰ μὴ Φοῖβος ἄν' Ἑλλάδα φῦσε Πλάτωνα,
ψυχὰς ἀνθρώπων γράμμασιν ἠκέσατο;

add ἄν at the end. In 1. 48 τοῦ δὴ λοιποῦ προσεῖχον αὐτῷ ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἠδέως καὶ τυραννέσθαι ἤθελον παρ' αὐτοῦ the second καί should be κἄν, and so in 2. 24 καί, εἰ ὑποδημάτων ἔδει, βύρσαν μοι ἐδίδους ἵν' ἐμαντῷ ὑποδήματα ποιησαίμην: possibly in 5. 31 κἄν (for καί) συμβιῶναι, but see below. On the other hand omit ἄν in 2. 76 ἀλλ' ὄρα μὴ, ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων παρὰ τοῦτό τι ἐλαττοῦται, οὕτως οὐδ' ἄν ἄνθρωπος (though we can supply ἐλαττοῦτο) and 6. 50 ἐρωτηθεῖς . . . ποῖος ἄν εἶη ἀμείνων (ἄριστος?) χαλκὸς εἰς ἀνδριάντα ἔφη Ἄφ' οὗ Ἀρμόδιος καὶ Ἀριστογείτων ἐχαλκεύθησαν. In such a passage—and there are several—as 5. 21 ἐρωτηθεῖς πῶς ἄν τοῖς φίλοις προσφεροίμεθα ἔφη Ὡς ἄν εὐξαίμεθα αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν προσφέρεσθαι it is plain on a moment's reflection that ἄν has no place. The question was πῶς προσφερώμεθα, which in the oblique becomes προσφεροίμεθα. Of course it might have been couched in such terms as πῶς ἄν κάλλιστα προσφεροίμεθα, and then it would have remained in the oblique unchanged, but this could not be without an adverb like κάλλιστα. Such a question as 9. 113 φασὶ δέ . . . , πυθέσθαι πῶς τὴν Ὀμήρου ποίησιν ἀσφαλῶς κτήσαιο is possible both with and without an ἄν, but the account of the optative is not the

same without as with it. 4. 48 ἐρωτηθεῖς εἰ γῆμαι, where γῆμαι has no subject, should perhaps be εἰ <δεῖ> γῆμαι.

The answer of Pittacus to some one who said δεῖν ζητεῖν ἄνθρωπον σπουδαῖον, namely ἄν λῖαν ζητῆς, οὐχ εὐρήσεις (1. 77), needs a καί (κἂν λῖαν ζητῆς) to give it effect. So in the well known story of Aristippus (2. 68 : Hor. *Ep.* 1. 17. 13) παριόντα ποτὲ αὐτὸν λάχανα πλύνων Διογένης ἔσκωψε καὶ φησιν Εἰ ταῦτα ἔμαθες προσφέρεσθαι (eat), οὐκ ἂν τυράννων αὐλὰς ἐθεράπευες· ὁ δέ, Καὶ σύ, εἶπεν, εἴπερ ἦδεις ἀνθρώποις ὀμιλεῖν, οὐκ ἂν λάχανα ἔπλυνες we should read ἔσκωψε καὶ <Σύ> φησιν εἰ ταῦτα ἔμαθες προσφέρεσθαι. This is shown (1) by καὶ σύ, which without a σύ preceding would be σύ δέ: (2) by φησίν, which without a σύ before it would be a past tense like ἔσκωψε. The statement about Aristippus a little before (2. 66) ἦν δὲ ἱκανὸς ἀρμόσασθαι καὶ τόπῳ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ προσώπῳ is I think hardly Greek without a παιτί added. Ὡς seems lost in 2. 95 ἀνήρουν τὰς αἰσθήσεις <ὡς> οὐκ ἀκριβούσας τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν: 3. 95 ὅταν δεομένῳ παραβοηθήσῃ τις <ὡς> εἰς χρημάτων λόγον εὐπορήσῃ: ἐν in 5. 1 Aristotle's father συνεβίω Ἀμύντῃ τῷ Μακεδόνων βασιλεῖ <ἐν> ἰατροῦ καὶ φίλου χρεία and 9. 62 ἀκόλουθος δ' ἦν καὶ (read κἂν) τῷ βίῳ. In the words of 4. 62 about Carneades, οὗτος τὰ τῶν Στωικῶν βιβλία ἀναγνούς, ἐπιμελῶς τὰ Χρυσίππου, ἐπικεικῶς αὐτοῖς ἀντέλεγε there seems a gap before or after ἐπιμελῶς, which I should suggest filling up by reading <ἐν οἷς> ἐπιμελῶς. I think too the words of the introduction 6 ἀποφαίνεσθαι τε περὶ τε οὐσίας θεῶν καὶ γενέσεως οὓς καὶ πῦρ εἶναι καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ might run <ἐν> οἷς καὶ πῦρ εἶναι, for οὓς cannot well be right. (Cf. 2. 111 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι διακηκοότες Εὐβουλίδου, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ἀπολλώνιος and *ib.* 133 πλείω συνάγων συμπόσια, ἐν οἷς καὶ ποιητῶν καὶ μουσικῶν.) We should add ὦν to 7. 3 ἦκουε τοῦ Κράτητος, ἄλλως μὲν εὐτονος <ὦν> πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, αἰδήμων δὲ κ.τ.λ.: δεῖν perhaps to 6. 38 ἔφασκε δὲ <δεῖν> ἀντιτιθέναί τυχῆ μὲν θάρσος: μόνοι to 9. 6 ἐπιτηδεύσας (Heraclitus) ἀσαφέστερον γράψαι, ὅπως οἱ δυνάμενοι <μόνοι> προσίοιεν αὐτῷ (*i.e.* τῷ βιβλίῳ), where the loss of μόνοι after δυνάμενοι would be especially easy. There is neither sense nor grammar in 8. 66 ὅπου δὲ ἀλαζόνα καὶ φίλαντον ἐν τῇ ποιήσει ἴδοι ἂν τις, until we see that <ἔστιν> ὅπου is what the author wrote. Plato's reputed saying (5. 2) Ἀριστοτέλης ἡμᾶς ἀπελάκτισε, καθαπερὲ τὰ πωλάρια γεννηθέντα τὴν

μητέρα can hardly be in its right form. We want something like <μεγάλα> or? <ἀπογάλακτα>? γενηθέντα. Cf. Aelian *V.H.* 4. 9. 7. 19 ἠρώτησεν εἰ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἀρμόττοντα εἶναι ὅψει τοιαύτη ζητήματα needs a τοιαῦτα after τοιαύτη. 1. 101 οὗτος ἐποίησεν τῶν τε παρὰ τοῖς Σκύβαις νομίμων καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν, εἰς εὐτέλειαν βίου καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, ἔπη ὀκτακόσια has in the same way no construction until we insert περί after ἐποίησεν, and 6. 23 βακτηρία δὲ ἐπηρείσατο ἀσθενήσας· ἔπειτα μέντοι καὶ διὰ παντὸς ἐφόρει seems to call for a ποτέ or πρῶτον with ἐπηρείσατο, if the force of the aorist is not to be very much strained (πρῶτον may have been represented by α' and that lost before the first letter of ἀσθενήσας).

The article is probably lost in 2. 30 δείξας αὐτῷ <τοὺς> τοῦ κουρέως Μίδου ἀλεκτρούνας: *ib.* 33 ἔλεγε θαυμάζειν τῶν τὰς λιθίνους εἰκόνας κατασκευαζομένων <τὸ> τοῦ μὲν λίθου προνοεῖν . . ., αὐτῶν δ' ἀμελεῖν: *ib.* 137 ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἀσκληπιάδην συμπνοίας οὐδέν τι διαφορούσης <τῆς> Πυλάδου φιλοστοργίας: 4. 47 ταῦτ' ἔστι <τὰ> κατ' ἐμέ: 6. 14 τοῦτον μόνον ἐκ πάντων <τῶν> Σωκρατικῶν Θεόπομπος ἐπαιεῖ. In 3. 103 on the other hand τῶν should be omitted from ἐὰν μὴ ὄντων τῶν νόμων κατ' ἔθη καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα χρηστῶς πολιτεύονται.

3. 61 καὶ οὗτος μὲν οὕτω διαιρεῖ καὶ τινες calls out for <ἄλλοι> τινές, unless indeed something else has been lost: so 2. 43 καὶ τοὺς μὲν <ἄλλους> ἐφυγάδευσαν, Μελήτου δὲ θάνατον κατέγνωσαν. 3. 51 should perhaps be καὶ περὶ μὲν διαλόγου, τί ποτ' ἔστι καὶ τίνες αὐτοῦ διαφοραί, ἀπόχρη <τοσαῦτα> λέγειν.

Less obvious additions are 1. 74 καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἀχιλλείτιδος χώρας μαχομένων Ἀθηναίων καὶ Μυτιληναίων ἐστρατήγει <Μυτιληναίων> μὲν αὐτός, Ἀθηναίων δὲ Φρύνων: 2. 34 πρὸς τὸν (for τὸ) οὐκ ἀξιόλογον πλῆθος <αἰδούμενον> ἔφασκεν ὁμοιον εἶ τις τετράδραχμον ἐν ἀποδοκιμάζων τὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σωρὸν ὡς δόκιμον ἀποδέχοιτο (cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3. 7. 5 foll., who uses αἰδεῖσθαι, φοβεῖσθαι, αἰσχύνεσθαι): and 4. 60 ὅψε δ' αὐτῷ γεωμετροῦντι λέγει τις εἶτα νῦν καιρός; <καὶ ὅς> εἶτα μηδὲ νῦν; where a reason for the loss of καὶ ὅς is obvious. 8. 34 perhaps ὅτι ὀλιγαρχικὸν <τὸ ἀπέχεσθαι>, for these words can hardly be understood from the context as it at present stands: perhaps simply <οὐκ> ὀλιγαρχικόν. 5. 31 Aristotle's tenets are stated in a very puzzling way: καὶ ἐρασθήσεται

δὲ τὸν σοφὸν καὶ πολιτεύσεσθαι, γαμήσειν τε μὴν καὶ βασιλεῖ συμβιώναι. There is no such phrase possible as *τε μὴν*, and, if it is meant that the philosopher will according to Aristotle marry and frequent a court, we must omit *μὴν* and write *καὶν* for *καί*, though the change from future to aorist with *αῖν* is very harsh. Were it not for the facts of Aristotle's life, we might be inclined to read something like *γαμήσαι γε μὴν καὶ βασιλεῖ συμβιώναι* <οὐκ ἐθελήσειν>, and this would account for the order of the four things mentioned, which is now very strange. Why is *γαμήσειν* divided off from *ἐρασθήσεσθαι*? Two pairs of things contrasted we could understand.

Terminations corrupted.

1. 48 ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκοίη βία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκη τὴν Σαλαμίνα κεκτῆσθαι, κ.τ.λ. But it was not Solon who owned Salamis: it was the Athenian people. Read therefore *δοκοῖεν*. So in 4. 8 (λέγεται τὸν στέφανον) ἐξίοντα θείναι πρὸς τὸν ἰδρυμένον Ἐρμῆν, ἔνθα περ τιθέναι καὶ τοὺς ἀνθινούς εἴωθεν the last word has been corrected to *εἰώθει*, but should it not be *εἰώθεσαν*? On the other hand in 3. 56 Θεόστις ἓνα ὑποκριτὴν ἐξηῦρεν . . . καὶ δεύτερον Αἰσχύλος, τὸν δὲ τρίτον Σοφοκλῆς, καὶ συνεπλήρωσαν τὴν τραγωδίαν it is obvious that the last verb should be singular, *συνεπλήρωσεν*, referring to Sophocles only, just as he goes on to say *τρίτον δὲ Πλάτων τὸν διαλεκτικὸν (λόγον προσέθηκε) καὶ ἐτελεσιούργησε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν*. In 6. 52 again, *ιδὼν ποτε γυναῖκας ἀπ' ἐλαίας ἀπηγχονισμένας*, the last plural is due to the other two: why should more than one woman be hanging there? Read *γυναῖκ'* . . . *ἀπηγχονισμένην*.

1. 62 ἤκμαζε περὶ τὴν τεσσαρακοστὴν ἕκτην Ὀλυμπιάδα, ἧς τῷ τρίτῳ ἔτει ἤρξεν Ἀθηναίων καθά φησι Σωσικράτης· ὅτε καὶ τίθησι τοὺς νόμους, ἐτελεύτησε δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the incongruous present *τίθησι* I would read *τιθέναι*. Often in Diogenes, as in Herodotus, side by side with finite verbs we find infinitives depending on a *λέγεται*, or something similar, understood. In the same way *ξυνακολουθῶν* in 9. 61 should be *ξυνακολουθεῖν*. 4. 3 ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ Σπεύσιππον ἐμάνθανον ὦδε θανείσθαι. The future infinitive is absurd, nor does *μανθάνω* properly take an infinitive at all. Read *θανόντα*. 7. 17

ὡς δὲ Κυνικός τις οὐ φήσας ἔλαιον ἔχειν ἐν τῇ ληκίθῳ προσήτησεν αὐτόν, οὐκ ἔφη δώσειν· ἀπελθόντα μέντοι ἐκέλευε σκέψασθαι ὁπότερος εἴη ἀναιδέστερος. Read ἀπελθόντος. The bystanders, not the now absent Cynic, were bidden to consider the question. In the well-known story about the disappearance of Empedocles (8. 68) καταβὰς ὁ Πανσανίας ἐπεμψέ τινας ζητήσοντας· ὕστερον δ' ἐκωλύθη πολυπραγμονεῖν, φάσκων εὐχῆς ἄξια συμβεβηκέναι καὶ θύειν αὐτῷ δεῖν the passive ἐκωλύθη makes no sense and ought surely to be ἐκώλυσε. In 6. 96 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔσσεσθαι κοινωνός, εἰ μὴ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων γενηθείης, it looks as though we should read γενηθείη and κοινωνόν. 10. 119 ἀλλὰ καὶ πηρωθεὶς τὰς ὄψεις μεθέξειν αὐτόν (τὸν σοφὸν) τοῦ βίου read κὰν πηρωθῆ and ἰδ. 126 δοξάζει for δοξάζεται, which may be due to φοβεῖται and προσίσταται preceding it; but 6. 99 φέρει seems a mistake for φέρεται (as for instance ἰδ. 98). In 2. 114 Φρασίδημον . . . προσήγαγε the middle προσηγάγετο is probably required, and ἰδ. 11 πρῶτος δ' Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ βιβλίον ἐξέδωκε συγγραφῆς for the unintelligible συγγραφῆς I suggest συγγράφας.

The corruption of future tenses to present is abundantly illustrated in the text of Diogenes. To cases already corrected add 2. 103 where ἔχειν should be ἐξείν: 6. 10 ἀμνηεῖσθαι: 7. 14 λέξειν καὶ γράψειν: 7. 189 εἴξειν (compare ἔσται following): and ἔσται for ἐστί in 7. 7. In 2. 97 the present infinitives ἀποδέχεσθαι, etc. may be right, but I do not feel very sure. Εὐδαιμονήσει in 2. 96 and δόξει in 6. 35 should be infinitives.

A very common mistake in Greek texts and one to which editors and grammar-writers have a wonderful way of blinding themselves is the confusion of comparative and superlative forms. Several cases have been detected in Diogenes (e.g. 6. 5 and the instructive case of πρῶτον for πρότερον in 2. 43), and the following are equally certain: 1. 104 ἐρωτηθεὶς τίνα τῶν πλοίων εἰσὶν ἀσφαλέστερα ἔφη τὰ νεωλωκημένα (read ἀσφαλέστατα): 5. 64 διατρίψας ἐν παντὶ λόγων εἶδει καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ φυσικῷ, ὅπερ εἶδος ἀρχαιότερόν τε καὶ σπουδαιότερον (-ότατον in both): 7. 22 πάντων ἔλεγεν ἀπρεπέστερον εἶναι τὸν τῦφον καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῶν νέων (ἀπρεπέστατον). I have mentioned above (p. 327) the much more curious case of 6. 50, where ἀμείνων seems

to stand for ἄριστος (ποῖος εἶη ἀμείνων χαλκὸς εἰς ἀνδριάντα).¹ In 4. 48 ἐρωτηθεῖς ποτε τίς μᾶλλον ἀγωνία ἔφη ὁ τὰ μέγιστα βουλόμενος εὐημερεῖν we should certainly read μάλιστα: the two words are often interchanged.

I take a number of substantival, adjectival, pronominal cases as they come. 2. 66 ἀπέλαυε μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς (read ἡδονήν) τῶν παρόντων. *ib.* 134 τῶν δὲ διδασκάλων τῶν περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ξενοκράτην, ἔτι τε Παραιβάτην τὸν Κυρηναῖον κατεφρόνει. Here the second τῶν is no doubt due to the first and should be τούς: the accusative following is enough to show this. In 3. 18 ὀργισθεῖς γὰρ οἱ λόγοι σοῦ φησι γεροντιῶσι καὶ ὃς Σοῦ δέ γε τυραννιώσι the second σοῦ cannot be right. We might think of σοί, but I hardly think σοί could stand here unless we read it for the previous σου too. Perhaps οἱ σοὶ δέ γε is more likely. *ib.* 107 μεριστὰ δ' ὅσα ἔκ τινος σύγκειται: obviously ἔκ τινων. 4. 52 ἦν δὲ θεατρικὸς καὶ πολὺς ἐν τῷ γελοίῳ διαφορῆσαι: read γελοίως. 5. 20 ἐρωτηθεῖς τί ἐστι φίλος ἔφη Μία ψυχὴ δύο σώμασιν ἐνοικοῦσα. This is a definition however not of a friend but of friendship, which indeed Aristotle was much more likely to be asked to define (but cf. 7. 23); and therefore we should read φιλία. *ib.* 54 ὅπως δὲ συνείρηται . . . <τὰ> περὶ τὸ ἱερόν κ.τ.λ., συνεπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ Πόμπυλον τοῦτον ἐπικοινωντα αὐτόν: read τούτων for the quite inappropriate τοῦτον. *ib.* 58 ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπὶ τὴν θεωρίαν ταύτην διατετριφέναι. Cobet περί for ἐπὶ, but why not ἐπὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ ταύτῃ? 6. 66 πρὸς τὸν λιπαροῦντα τῇ ἑταίρᾳ: usage points to τὴν ἑταίραν. *ib.* 68 ἐρωτηθεῖς εἰ κακὸς ὁ θάνατος, Πῶς, εἶπε, κακός, οὐ παρόντος οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα; usage points as distinctly to κακόν. 6. 70 συνεχεῖ for

¹ In the well-known oracle (*schol. ad Theocr.* 14. 48):

Γαίης μὲν πάσης τὸ Πελασγικὸν Ἄργος ἄμεινον,
Ἴπποι Θρητικαί, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ γυναῖκες,
Ἄνδρες δ' οἱ πίνουσιν ὕδωρ καλῆς Ἀρεθούσης·
Ἄλλ' ἔτι καὶ τῶνδ' εἰσὶν ἄμεινονες, οἷτε κ.τ.λ.

ἄμεινον would seem to be a mistake for ἄριστον, but this may be due to the ἀμείνονες of line 4. In Philemon (Kock 203: Meineke *Incert.* cix.) θανεῖν ἄριστόν ἐστιν ἢ ζῆν ἀθλίως the opposite error has been made.

[I find now that Plut. *Mor.* 833 B actually has ἄριστος in the same story as is told in Diog. 6. 50. In [Demosth.] *Ep.* 4. 9 τῶν μὲν ἀντιστάντων ἄριστα πράττειν. . . τῶν δὲ συνηγωνισμένων ἐνδοξότεραν εἶναι should not ἄριστα be ἄμεινον?]

συνεχεῖς? 7. 14 ἐνίους δὲ καὶ χαλκὸν εἰσέπραττε τοὺς περισταμένους τὸ δίδοναι μὴ ἐνοχλεῖν. Cobet reads (I do not know how far on conjecture) τῶν περισταμένων ὥστε δεδιότας τὸ δίδοναι μὴ ἐνοχλεῖν. I suggest in any case ἐνίετε for ἐνίους, just as τότε and τοὺς get confused. *ib.* 85 αὐτῶ after οἰκειούσης should probably be αὐτό. *ib.* 169 ἐκέλευεν ὀβολὸν φέρειν ἀποφορᾶς. The genitive is impossible in Greek: read ἀποφοράν, as μισθοῦ has been corrected to μισθόν in 7. 25. So again in 8. 13 τοῦτον γάρ (φασι) καὶ τὸ φονεῦν ἀπαγορεύειν, μὴ ὅτι γεύεσθαι (so Cobet for μὴ ὅτι γε ἄπτεσθαι) τῶν ζῶων, κοινὸν δίκαιον ἡμῖν ἐχόντων τῆς ψυχῆς the last words should surely be τὴν ψυχὴν. The ψυχὴ of plants was to Pythagoras their δίκαιον: their right and claim consisted in it. 9. 13 ὥστε . . . διαπορέισθαι τῆς ὀρθῆς δοκούσης γεγράφθαι παρά σοι διηγήσεως. It may be questioned whether the genitive without περί is right after διαπορέισθαι, but there can hardly be a doubt that we should read ὀρθῶς. *ib.* 18 γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ἐν ἔπεισι καὶ ἐλεγείας καὶ ἰάμβους καθ' Ἑσιόδου καὶ Ὀμήρου: put datives for the accusatives. *ib.* 51 πρῶτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος . . . οἷς καὶ συνηρώτα. In the special sense a man is said ἐρωτᾶν λόγον, etc.; read therefore οὖς.

Confusion of prepositions, particles, pronouns, etc.

1. 73 καὶ τῆνον τυράννων εὐδαιμονίζω ὅστις καὶ οἶκοι ἐξ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ καθάνη should, I presume, be ἐν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ according to the familiar idiom, e.g. Ar. *Lys.* 1070 εἰς ἑαυτῶν, Plat. *Theaet.* 206 A ἐν κιθαριστοῦ; and 1. 116 ἀνιόντα εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἐς Μεσσήνην must of course be ἐκ Μεσσήνης. 5. 66 καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς στέφανον πολλοὺς ἀπιέναι. There seems no meaning in ἀπ-. Read ἀν-, παρ-, or προς-. So again *ib.* 83 τοὺς φίλους ἐπὶ μὲν τὰγαθὰ παρακαλουμένους ἀπιέναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς συμφορὰς αὐτομάτους. I do not see how the ἀντι- can be justified in 7. 34 ὃς καὶ ἐκτμηθῆναι φησιν ἐκ τῶν βιβλίων τὰ κακῶς λεγόμενα . . . εἴτ' ἀντιτεθῆναι αὐτά. ἀνατεθῆναι were put back seems likely, though I do not find that meaning given to ἀνατίθημι in Liddell and Scott. *ib.* 181 ἡ παρεδρεύουσα πρεσβύτις αὐτῶ is an obvious blunder for πρῶσεδρεύουσα, the old woman who waited on him.

I should like to write ἀλλά for ἄρα in 2. 13. In 8. 75

καὶ μὴν can hardly have escaped correction by some one to καὶ μὴν. 7. 2 γοῦν is found by a very common error for δ' οὖν. In 2. 41 ὅτ' οὖν κατεδικάσθη, editors seem to suppose that ὅτε is more or less the same as τότε. I would read ὁ δ' οὖν, which the context makes quite suitable. It is surprising how often δ' οὖν was corrupted, usually to γοῦν or οὖν.

An epigram of Diogenes' own (3. 45) on Plato has already been quoted, but it is necessary here to give the whole of it :

καὶ πῶς, εἰ μὴ Φοῖβος ἀν' Ἑλλάδα φῦσε Πλάτωνα,
 ψυχὰς ἀνθρώπων γράμμασιν ἠκέσατ' <ἄν>;
 καὶ γὰρ ὁ τοῦδε γεγώς Ἀσκληπιός ἐστιν ἠτήρ
 σώματος, ὡς ψυχῆς ἀθανάτιο Πλάτων.

It may strike the reader, and it is certainly true, that in the last couplet things are put in the wrong order and relation. Asclepius should not be compared to Plato, but Plato to Asclepius : not body to mind, but mind to body. Even Diogenes knew this. What has happened is probably the following. It is well known that καί and ὡς often get interchanged, as do καί and ἦ, from similarity in the abbreviations by which they were written. Here then καὶ γάρ is for ὡς γάρ, and we have only to read ὡς γάρ . . . ὡς ψυχῆς ἀθανάτιο Πλάτων. Ἡ seems to have got substituted for καί in 6. 32 τοῦτο δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικρατεῖν ἤδη τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἢ ἐκ ταπεινῶν ὑψηλοὺς γίνεσθαι. In 3. 78 αὖ should be αὐτόν (another common mistake) and in 10. 126 οὔτε γάρ should be οὐδὲ γάρ. The occasional error of a double οὐδέ for a double οὔτε I need not point out. 1. 122 ἐπὶ μᾶλλον is ἔτι μᾶλλον.

At the end of the *Anaxagoras* we read (2. 15) γεγόνασι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι τρεῖς Ἀναξαγόραι, ὧν ἐν οὐδενὶ πάντα· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἦν ῥήτωρ κ.τ.λ. For πάντα, which is unintelligible, we may perhaps read ταῦτά, *the same characteristics*, i.e. devotion to philosophy, etc., though even that seems rather an odd expression. Ταυτό should also be read for τοῦτο in the verse quoted in 1. 29 and perhaps in 2. 73 ταὐτὸ καὶ ἡμίονος, though there τοῦτο may stand. In the *Antisthenes* 6. 10 διδακτὴν ἀπεδείκνυε τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐγενεῖς τοὺς καὶ ἐναρέτους we shall be safe in changing τοὺς to οὓς.

Diogenes (6. 54) ἐρωτηθεὶς ποίῳ καιρῷ δεῖ γαμεῖν ἔφη τοὺς μὲν νέους μηδέποτε, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους μηδεπώποτε. It is plain that the temporal particles have here got into some confusion. Without good MS. evidence the right reading can hardly be restored with certainty, but τοὺς μὲν νέους μηδέπω (?), τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους μηδέποτε (?) or μηκέτι would give the right sense. Cf. Lys. 2. 53 οἱ μὲν οὐκέτι τοῖς σώμασιν, οἱ δ' οὐπω δυνάμενοι. σου in 7. 17 τὸν ὑποκάτω σου should be μου. *Prooem.* 13 καὶ οἱ μὲν σοφοί wants perhaps οἶδε either added after σοφοί or put instead of οἱ.

Antisthenes' remark to Plato (6. 7) ἐδόκει μοι καὶ σὺ ἵππος ἂν εἶναι λαμπρυντής is in the wrong tense and requires δοκεῖς. On the other hand Zeno's self-congratulation (7. 5) εὔ γε ποιεῖ ἡ τύχη προσελαύνουσα ἡμᾶς φιλοσοφία refers to the past and needs ἐποίει, and in 8. 85 and 9. 43 δοκεῖ should no doubt be ἐδόκει (cf. 8. 76 : 9. 7, 45, 57, etc.). δουλῶται in 1. 113 stands for δεδούλωται.

Words out of order.

A clear and simple instance occurs in 3. 69, where it is said that Plato δύο τῶν πάντων ἀπέφηεν ἀρχάς, θεὸν καὶ ἕλην, ὃν καὶ νοῦν προσαγορεύει καὶ αἷτιον. θεὸν and ἕλην have of course changed places. So in 2. 50 ἐχθρῶς δὲ διέκειτο πρὸς Μένωνα τὸν Φαρσάλιον περὶ τὸν χρόνον τῆς ἀναβάσεως, τὸν ξεναγόν we may presume that τὸν ξεναγόν was first accidentally omitted and then inserted in the wrong place. In the summary of Aristotle (5. 32, 33) we read καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν δὲ ἀσώματον, ἐντελέχειαν οὖσαν τὴν πρώτην· σώματος γὰρ φυσικοῦ (? τὴν πρώτην σώματος φυσικοῦ) καὶ ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. διττὴ δ' αὕτη ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτόν. λέγει δ' ἐντελέχειαν ἧς ἐστὶν εἶδος τι ἀσώματον· ἡ μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν . . . , καθ' ἕξιν δὲ λέγεται ἐντελέχεια κ.τ.λ. This exposition is enough to puzzle anyone, until we see that διττὴ . . . κατ' αὐτόν should follow εἶδος τι ἀσώματον and refers to ἐντελέχειαν. Zeno 7. 24 ἐν συμποσίῳ κατακείμενος σιγῇ τὴν αἰτίαν ἠρωτήθη. ἔφη οὖν τῷ ἐγκαλέσαντι ἀπαγγεῖλαι πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὅτι παρῆν τις σιωπᾶν ἐπιστάμενος. ἦσαν δὲ οἱ ἐρωτῶντες παρὰ Πτολεμαίου πρέσβεις ἀφικόμενοι καὶ βουλόμενοι μαθεῖν τί εἶποιεν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα. The third sentence ἦσαν . . . βασιλέα

should of course precede the second ἔφη... ἐπιστάμενος. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 504 A. In 2. 95 the words καὶ μὴ μισήσειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μεταδιδάξειν must be put a little earlier or a little later.

Miscellaneous.

The difference between ἀνείπον, ἀνειπεῖν, used of heralds, etc., and ἀνείλον, ἀνελεῖν, used of gods and oracles, is often lost in MSS. It is quite certain that Hipponax said of Myson (1. 107), not ὃν Ἀπόλλων ἀνείπεν ἀνδρῶν σωφρονέστατον πάντων, but ἀνείλεν, and the same change must be made in 1. 30 twice, and in 5. 91. [Make it also twice in Dio Chrys. 31. 97 (M. 340) and once in Musonius (Hense, p. 59. 15).] In 2. 37 the right form ἀνελούσης has survived. On the other hand the aorist of αἰρεῖν has itself perhaps taken the place of another word in 1. 26 πάμπλειστα συνεῖλε χρήματα where συνῆγε (or συνήγαγε) seems probable. In 1. 64 again κὰν τῇ πόλει χάριν κατάθοιτο ἐξευρών, where the context is conspiracy against a tyrant, ἐξευρών seems to stand for ἐξαιρών or ἐξελών, *removing, killing*. The aorist εἶπε is foolishly repeated, as though it was emphatic, in Diogenes' verse 1. 85 εἶπε γάρ, εἶπε δίκην ἐτάρου τινός. It seems a mistake for εὔτε γὰρ εἶπε, the εὔτε being answered by the εἶτα following as often by ἔνθα, τότε, etc. 1. 104 gives us a saying ascribed to Anacharsis: καὶ τοῦτο ἔφη θαυμασιώτατον ἑωρακεῖν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν καπνὸν ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι καταλείπουσι, τὰ δὲ ξύλα εἰς τὴν πόλιν κομίζουσιν. I can make no sense of καπνόν and conjecture καρπόν. There was a regular Greek expression ξύλινος καρπός, *tree-fruit* (see Liddell and Scott, and add Diod. 3. 63. 2: Artem. *Oneir.* 2. 37, p. 133), which we may remember in relation to ξύλα. In 4. 16 μεθύων εἰς τὴν Ξενοκράτους ἦξε σχολήν, ὃ δ' οὐδὲν διατραπέις ἦρε τὸν λόγον ὁμοίως the sense required, that Xenocrates went on with his lecture, is plain enough, but ἦρε cannot convey it. εἶρε has been suggested. I rather incline to ἦγε, though I cannot adduce an example of λόγον ἄγειν. In a saying of Bion the Borysthenite (4. 48 τὸ γῆρας ἔλεγεν ὄρμον εἶναι τῶν κακῶν . . ., τὴν δόξαν ἐτῶν μητέρα εἶναι, τὸ κάλλος ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν κ.τ.λ.) it is difficult indeed to see in what sense δόξα could be called a *mother of years* I think a slight

addition will give us Bion's real phrase. *αρ* has dropped out after *αν*: what we should read is *τὴν δόξαν ἀρετῶν μητέρα εἶναι*. The sentiment is too familiar to need illustration, but it is put briefly and appositely in a fragment of Plutarch (Bernardakis 7. 162, *fragm.* 106) οὐδεὶς φροντίζων δόξης ἀγαθῆς γένοιτ' ἂν ἀνὴρ φαῦλος. Since thinking of this emendation I have come across the phrase *μήτηρ ἀρετῆς* in Philostr. *Heroic.* p. 667 *μὴ τιμῶν ἀλήθειαν, ἣν ἐκείνος μητέρα ἀρετῆς ὀνομάζειν εἴωθεν*. 8. 46 *τελευταῖοι γὰρ ἐγένοντο τῶν Πυθαγορείων οὓς καὶ Ἀριστόξενος εἶδε Ξειόφιλος τε . . . καὶ Φάντων κ.τ.λ.* should I suppose be οὓς καὶ Ἄ. οἶδε οἱ ἤδει (a very common mistake). 5. 65 Lycon is called *φραστικὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ περὶ παιδῶν ἀγωγῆς ἄκρως συντεταγμένος*, but of course Diogenes wrote *συντεταμένος*.

The familiar confusion of *λόγος* and *νόμος* (see for instance *Ar. Eth.* 5. 6. 1134 a 35) has, I think, taken place in 1. 102, where the dying Anacharsis says *διὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος σωθῆναι, διὰ δὲ τὸν φθόνον ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἀπολέσθαι*. There is no sense in *λόγον*. He means that he had returned home (*σωθῆναι*) *διὰ τὸν νόμον*, though he was said (see just before) *τὰ νόμιμα παραλύειν τῆς πατρίδος*. 3. 29 Aristippus *φησὶν αὐτὸν (Plato) Ἀστέρος μαιρακίου τινός . . . ἐρασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ Δίωνος τοῦ προειρημένου. Ἔνιοι καὶ Φαίδρου φασί*. Remove the stop after *προειρημένου*. 4. 4 *πρὸς τὸν ἐρώντα πλούσιον ἀμόρφου ἔφη Τί δέ σοι δεῖ τούτου; ἐγὼ γάρ σοι δέκα ταλάντων εὐμορφοτέραν εὐρήσω*. There is absolutely no point in this; but there will be some humour in it, if we read *ἀμορφοτέραν*, or rather, as *τούτου* shows, *ἀμορφότερον*. The joke is partly the same as in the Oxford story of the tutor, who, hearing another express his surprise at So-and-So's giving such bad lectures for so high a stipend, rejoined that he was himself ready to give much worse lectures for half the money. 5. 1 *περιπατοῦντι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συμπαρῶν διελέγετο ἄττα. περιπατῶν* is suggested; perhaps *συμπεριῶν* (sometimes written with only one *ι*) would be better. 5. 36 Theophrastus was *συνετώτατος* and *φιλοπονώτατος*, Menander's teacher, and *ἄλλως τε καὶ* (omit?) *εὐεργετικὸς καὶ φιλόλογος*. *εὐεργετικός* seems, if not poor in sense, at any rate rather out of place among the other adjectives; did Diogenes write *ἐνεργητικός*? (In M. Aurel 1. 7 *φαντασιοπλήκτως τὸν ἀσκητικὸν ἢ τὸν εὐεργετικὸν ἄνδρα ἐπιδείκνυσθαι*

the same suggestion is an old one.) 6. 11 Antisthenes held τὴν ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων. No doubt we should read λόγων πλαστῶν : so Herod. 1. 68 ἐκ λόγου πλαστοῦ. 7. 20 λέγοντος δέ τις αὐτῷ περὶ Πολέμωνος ὡς ἄλλα προθέμενος ἄλλα λέγει, σκυθρωπάσας ἔφη Πόσον γὰρ ἠγάπας τὰ διδόμενα ; this is nonsense and πόσον seems a mistake for πῶς οὐ, 'why weren't you content?' 9. 73 καὶ Ἴπποκράτην ἔπειτα ἐνδοιαστῶς καὶ ἀνθρωπίνως ἀποφαίνεσθαι. There is no meaning in ἔπειτα. I have thought of ἔστιν ἃ or ἔνια or ἐνίοτε. There is an equally impossible ἔπειτα in 8. 58, where he is speaking of tragedies attributed to Empedocles : Ἱερώνυμος δέ φησιν αὐτὸν (αὐτὸς conjectured : αὐτῶν ?) τρισὶ καὶ τετταράκοντα ἐντετυχηκέναι (probably read). Νεάνθης δὲ νέον ὄντα γεγραφέναι τὰς τραγωδίας καὶ αὐτὸν (?) ἔπειτα αὐταῖς ἐντετυχηκέναι. Here ἔπειτα might be ἐνίοτε, but the context suggests the mention of some specific number of plays. 9. 104 οὐ γὰρ τὸ ὄραν ἀναιρεῖν (they do not do away with sight) ἀλλὰ τὸ πῶς ὄραν ἀγνοεῖν. πῶς ὄρᾳ ? πῶς ὄρων ὄρᾳ ? τὸ πῶς ἀγνοεῖν ? 7. 86 τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῖς λογικοῖς κατὰ τελειότεραν προστασίαν δεδομένου, τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν ὀρθῶς γίνεσθαι τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν. He is speaking of the various forms of animation (plants, animals, rational creatures) and the life κατὰ φύσιν for them on the Stoic theory. The point of this sentence seems to be exactly inverted, like that of 3. 45 above noticed. It should not be that rational creatures living κατὰ φύσιν will live κατὰ λόγον ; but that, if they live κατὰ λόγον, then, being rational creatures, they will be living κατὰ φύσιν. In other words λόγον and φύσιν should change places. An understanding of this suggests the correction of the preceding sentence too. Speaking of animals, which as distinguished from plants have ὄρμη impulse, he says τοῦτοις μὲν τῷ (or τὸ) κατὰ φύσιν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὄρμην διοικεῖσθαι, where similarly the sense should be that for them ζῆν κατὰ τὴν ὄρμην is ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν : read therefore τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὄρμην διοικεῖσθαι.

I will mention finally three or four passages, where the mistake seems to be of one type, and that a type fairly well recognized now. The type I mean is the substitution of one word for another because the former or something

akin to it occurs in the context and is in the writer's mind. In l. 59 ἡξίωσε τ' Ἀθηναίους τὰς ἡμέρας κατὰ σελήνην ἄγειν, καὶ Θεσπιν ἐκώλυσε τραγωδίας ἄγειν τε καὶ διδάσκειν this surely accounts for the second ἄγειν. There is no such phrase as τραγωδίας ἄγειν (we must not be misled by *agere*) and, if there were, it would be the same with regard to Thespis as διδάσκειν. Probably the real word was ποιεῖν. Again in the lines to Dion ascribed to Plato (3. 30: *Anth. Pal.* 7. 99)

σοὶ δέ, Δίῳ, ῥέξαντι καλῶν ἐπινίκιον ἔργων
δαίμονες εὐρείας ἐλπίδας ἐξέχεαν,
κείσαι δ' εὐρυχόρῳ ἐν πατρίδι κ.τ.λ.

εὐρείας is a strange epithet for ἐλπίδας and no skilful writer would have used it just before εὐρυχόρῳ. The lost word need not of course have resembled it. Then in 5. 57 he says αἱ διαθῆκαι κείνται ἀντίγραφα (<κατ'> ἀντίγραφα?) τῷ Θεοφράστου δακτυλίῳ σεσημασμένοι, μία μὲν παρ' Ἠγησία . . ., τὴν δ' ἑτέραν ἔχει Ὀλυμπιόδωρος . . ., τὴν δ' ἑτέραν ἔλαβεν Ἀδείμαντος, where it is difficult not to think that the second ἑτέραν should be τρίτην. Lastly in l. 102 Anacharsis is said παραγενόμενος εἰς τὴν Σκυθίαν καὶ νομίζων τὰ νόμιμα παραλύειν τῆς πατρίδος to have been killed by his brother. δοκῶν has been suggested for νομίζων. It seems likely enough, νομίζων being probably due to νόμιμα. But νομιζόμενος is also possible.

ARSENII VIOLETUM.

THIS medley of proverbs, stories, and sayings, put together by a fifteenth century archbishop, was edited by Walz, then engaged on the *Rhetores Graeci*, in 1832. It has not appeared again since and, as far as I know, little attention has been paid to it, though in addition to much that is contained also in other books, the *Paroemiographi*, *Stobaeus*, *Diogenes*, etc., it has a good deal not to be found elsewhere. The text of these latter parts has been but little corrected, and that is why I write about it now. From the point of view of textual criticism the following notes, which I have made very brief, may present some interest, because they will show over again the working of certain almost uniform tendencies to error which beset Greek books. The cases in *Arsenius* are often unusually clear, and for that reason are worth pointing out. When a critic of *Demosthenes* or *Plato* assumes and proceeds upon one of these tendencies, the general reader doubts its existence.

There are eight or ten cases of the comparative adjective for the superlative, and one or two the other way. In the eight or ten I ascribe the fault to careless copying rather than change of idiom. My references are to the pages of *Walz*. *πρεσβύτερον* 100, *μακαριώτερον* 107, *βαρύτερον* 208, *χαλεπώτερα* 209, *ἐπισημότερος* 254, *χαλεπώτερος* 507, *πλουσιώτερος* 510. 189 should probably be *φανλοτέραν τὴν ὑπόκρισιν παρεχόμενον*, not *φανλοτάτην*. 502 the imperfect verse *ἔξω ὄργης πᾶς ἀνὴρ σοφώτατος* would be better with *σοφώτερος*, and 148 read *χρὴ πρότερον* (not *πρῶτον*) *αὐτὸν ἐμβλέψαντα* (*after looking at yourself*) *πράττειν* <καὶ> *εἰ κ.τ.λ.* 497 οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τάχιστα γηράσκει ὡς χάρις : read *τάχιον*. ὡς = ἦ, as elsewhere, if not a mistake for it. 149 *ποῖος τῶν θανάτων κακός* stands for *κάκιστος*.

Present tenses put wrongly for futures: 97 and 503 καταλείπω . . . τέκνα (Alexander is not dying), 127 οὐδὲν ἀνδρείας χρήζομεν, ἔαν πάντες ὦμεν δίκαιοι, 265 ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ . . . γράφειν προτρεπτικόν, 360 ἐγὼ σε τρέφω μαχόμενον ἀλλ' οὐ λαιδορούμενον (λαιδορησόμενον, unless we are to read μαχόμενον) Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, 420 παραμένοντας, probably 481 εἰ μὲν πονηρὰ πολιτεύηται (-εται!), τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπάρεσκει (ἀπαρέσει!).

Small errors in case endings: 101 τῶν θεῶν . . . τιμιώτατος, not τιμιώτατον. 127 τοσούτους . . . ἀπολώλεκεν ὅσους ἀρκεῖ (read ὅσοις ἄρκει or ἤρκει) τοὺς βαρβάρους νικᾶν ἅπαντας. 148 αὐτός should be αὐτόν (καταδικάζων). 346 ἂν ἐκλογισθῆ τῶν δραμάτων ἕκαστον ὅσον κατέστη: read ὅσον, *what it cost*. 401 Οἰνοπίδης εἶπε τὸν νοῦν παραίτιον δαίμονα: τοῖς μὲν πεπαιδευμένοις ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ ἀπαιδευτοῖς κακὸν εἶναι: read παραίτιον δαίμονα τοῖς μὲν . . . ἀγαθῶν, τοῖς δὲ κακῶν εἶναι. 460 read σύντροφον ἀρρωστίαν. 479 πείρας δευτέρας should be πείραν, *trial of a second wife*. 499 ἡδονὴν οὐ πᾶσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν αἰρεῖσθαι δεῖ: read ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ, but *ibid.* ὅσῳ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει πάντες ἐσμὲν πλούσιοι, ὅσῳ δὲ κ.τ.λ. should on the other hand be ὅσον. 501 τῷ (τοῦ) λαμβάνειν <γὰρ>? πάντες ἡτῶνται βροτοί. 503 ἔαν . . . ἀμορφίαν (-ία) νοσῆ. 505 διὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τούτου (τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον?) ἀπολλύμεθα. 506 ὅταν σαυτὸν ἀσθενέστερον θέλῃς γίγνεσθαι: read σαυτοῦ ἀσθενέστερος. 508 κατέγνω γὰρ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφιλίας (-ίαν). 511 φίλων (φίλον) φιλάργυρον ἰδών. Adjective stands for adverb in 124 πρᾶος (πράως) καὶ μειδιῶν εἶπε. 108 διδακτικὴν ἀπεδείκνυε τὴν ἀρετὴν: read διδακτὴν.

Mistakes in forms of verbs: 112 ὡς ὑπέρπολυ ἤτημαι: rather ἤτησαι *you have asked*. 194 φέρεσθαι δέ . . . δινουμένας καὶ οὕτω πάντα τὰ συγκρίνοντα γεννᾶν, πῦρ, ὕδωρ κ.τ.λ.: read συγκρινόμενα. 294 ἀπολοίμεθ' ἂν should be ἀπωλόμεθ' ἂν, as in Plutarch. 307 διττοὺς ἤτησε μισθοῦς: τοῦ δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν πυθόμενον, ἕνα μὲν, ἔφη, ἵνα λαλεῖν μάθῃς, τὸν ἕτερον <δὲ> ἵνα σιγᾶς: read σιγᾶν. 454 ἔλεγεν οὖν ὁ Τιμόθεος, ὁ τηλικαύτας πόλεις λαμβάνων καθεύδων, τί με οἴεσθε ποιήσειν ἐργηγορότα; read εἰ (for ὅ) and λαμβάνω.

Confusions of similar words: 108 ἀπεδείκνυε τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐγενεῖς τοὺς καὶ ἐναρέτους: τοὺς should be οὓς. 110 ἀρπαζε τὸ καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν, ὅτε ἕξεισι, μὴ κατὰ μικρὸν τὸ μὲν ἀποθνήσκειν σοι παρῆ, τὸ δὲ καλῶς μηκέτι ἐξῆ: read μετὰ μικρὸν, *soon*. 118 εἰπόντος (*having asked*) ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ

αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ., ἢ is εἰ. So in 203 τί γάρ, εἶπεν, ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν we should read τί γάρ, εἶπεν, εἶ; ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν; 265 ἔλεγε μὴ δεῖν ζητεῖν . . . οὔτινες ἐκ μεγάλης πόλεως εἰσιν, ἀλλ' εἰ μεγάλης πόλεως ἄξιοι: for οὔτινες read εἴ τινες, like εἰ following. On p. 505 εἰ actually appears in the same saying. 267 δεῖν δὲ ἔλεγε τοὺς νέους πάσῃ κοσμιότητι χρῆσθαι καὶ πορεία καὶ σχήματι καὶ περιβολῇ: the first καὶ at least should be κἀν or καὶ ἐν. 296 ἢ σύγκειται should be ἦ, and 299 read δεῖται γὰρ οὐδενὸς (ὁ θεὸς) οὐδὲ παρὰ τῶν κρειττόνων ἤπερ (not ἦπερ) ἡμεῖς. 374 Ξενοκράτης ἐρόμενος τὸν (read τινὰ) παρ' αὐτῷ φιλοσοφεῖν νέον βουλόμενον κ.τ.λ. 438 τὸ ἐμὸν ἱμάτιον ἐμβιῶναι (μὲν not ἐκβιῶναι) ἐπιτήδειον. 455 Χάρητα προσ-αγόντων καὶ τοῦτον (not τοιοῦτον) ἀξιούντων εἶναι τὸν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγόν. 500 ἐπενδύεσθαι (ὑπ-?) δεῖ τῷ μὲν θώρακι χιτῶνα, τῇ δὲ λύπῃ νοῦν. 502 ἢ δὲ (not γὰρ) κακῇ βουλῇ κ.τ.λ. (verse). 503 μητρὸς ἐν δάκρυον πολλὰς διαβολῶν ἐπιστολὰς ἀπαλείφει only needs a change of accent to διαβόλων. 507 ὁ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν στρατηγός probably Ἀθηναίων. 508 αὕτη (not αὐτῇ) τοῖς ἔργοις ἀναγκάζει.

Confusions of a more noticeable kind: 98 Alexander προσέτασσε τοῖς στρατιώταις ξυρεῖν τὰ τῶν Μακεδόνων γένεια. As the soldiers were themselves Macedonians, read στρατηγοῖς. 99 τὸν ποιητὴν οὕτω σεμνῶναι τὰ ζῶα καὶ πονῆσαι αὐτὰ τῷ Διὶ τὴν ἀμβροσίαν κομίζειν: πονῆσαι should be ποιῆσαι. 122 τοὺς τὰ ἐνεργῇ πράγματα πειρωμένους δεικνύναι (lighting a candle to show the sun) should of course be ἐναργῆ. 176 δαπανώμενος ἐφ' ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ὀλίγος ἔσῃ ἐφ' ἃ δεῖ: ὀλίγος should be λιτός, as in 511 διὰ τί λιτὸς εἶ ἔχων χρήματα πολλά; and in the lines of Moschion 363. 191 οἱ ἀπαίδευτοι καθάπερ οἱ ἀλιεύμενοι ἰχθύες ἐλκόμενοι σιγῶσιν shows the common confusion of ἀ- and εὐ- (οἱ εὐπαίδευτοι), and the same reversed occurs in 306 πῶς ἂν τις εὐτυχιᾶν (read ἀτυχιᾶν) ἄριστα φέροι. 193 στάσις ἐμφύλιος εἰς ἑκάτερα καλόν· καὶ γὰρ νικέουσι καὶ ἡσσωμένοις ὁμοίῃ φθορά: read κακόν: and again 497 ἀνοήτων τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι κακῶς ἄρχεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ κακῶς ἄρχειν clearly from the context should be καλῶς ἄρχειν. 268 Zeno said that τὸ καθήκον was ἐνέργημα ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν παρασκευαῖς ὠκειαῖς: I suppose ὠκειαῖς stands for οἰκεῖον. 295 an argument is introduced by the words το ἀκόλουθον οὕτως ἑώρα, where ἑώρα represents a word for arguing common in post-classical Greek, ἡρώτα. It occurs again

in 296 and 298. 298 σὺ μόνος is evidently οὐ μόνον, and 329 καὶ σύ γε probably μὴ σύγε. The well-known confusion of λέγω and ἔχω appears in 369 Νικοκλῆς κακοῦ τινος ἰατροῦ λέγοντος ὅτι μεγάλην ἔχει δύναμιν ἔφη 'πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλεις λέγειν (ἔχειν), ὅς τοσούτους ἀνηρηκῶς ἀνεύθυνος γέγονας;': and in 422 εἶπε πενίαν ἡγητέον εἶναι μὴ τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐλάττω ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τὸ τὴν ἀπληστίαν πλείω probably ποιεῖν is a corruption of εἶναι, ποι being τω repeated. 346 οὕτω γάρ should be αὐτὸς γάρ. 426 ρεῖται γὰρ καὶ παρέχεται (παρέρχεται) ὡς χόρτος πᾶσα φύσις. *ibid.* ἀγνὸς δὲ ῥήτωρ εὐκρατος ἀρμονία, though it may be right, looks like a pentameter (εὐκροτος ἀρμονία). In 498 are two rather puzzling sentences: ὑπ' οὐδενὸς δοκήσει φιλεῖσθαι τις μηδένα φιλῶν, where for δοκήσει the sense suggests δίκαιός (ἔστι!), and ἰατρὸν καὶ φίλον οὐ τὸν ἰδιώτην ἀλλὰ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον δεῖ ἐκλέγεσθαι, in which it seems probable that ἰδιώτην is a perversion of ἡδίω. 500 εἰ, ὅτε οὐδέπω ἦν, οὐκ ἐλυποῦ, μηδὲ νοῦ (only a misprint for νῦν!), ὅτε οὐκ (οὐκέτι!) ἔστι, λυπηθῆς. 507 Μένανδρος τὸν φθόνον πρόνοιαν τῆς ψυχῆς εἶπεν (Kock 935) Nauck proposed the insipid πονηρίαν, Kock παράνοιαν, which is not very pointed either. ψυχὴ and τύχη being constantly confused, I think Menander may have said that envy was ἀπόνοια (or -γνοια) τῆς τύχης, *despair of good luck*, i.e. arose from a man's despair of equalling what he envied. 506 Theocritus, being asked τί θεῖον, answered τὸ μήτε ὄργην μήτε τελευτήν ἔχον: ὄργην must be ἀρχήν. 511 Φίλιππος τὸν πλούσιον καὶ ἀπαιδέοντες ἔφησε πλούτος περιηργυρωμένος. The last two words should of course be accusatives, but πλούτος π. is nonsense. Should we not read πηλὸν περιηργυρωμένον, understanding πηλός of the clay from which Prometheus made man?

Words omitted, sometimes from recurrence or partial recurrence of letters. 94 εἰπόντος <ὡς>. 109 ἐκ πάντων <τῶν> Σωκρατικῶν. 111 περὶ πολιτικά διατρίβοντι 'εἴθε' ἔφη ἡ γυνή 'τὰ μὲν ἴδια κοινὰ ἐνόμισας, τὰ δὲ κοινὰ ἴδια.' This is puzzling until we see that μή has been lost, probably after νη in γυνή. 112 Hunger and thirst are able μεγάλας <ἐνοχλεῖν> τοῖς σωφροσύνην διώκουσι. 148 οὔτε γὰρ ζυγράρον <τὸν!> εὐχόμενον εἶναι. 196 ὁ αὐτὸς ἔλεγε πονηρίαν μὲν ἀρχομένην κωλύσαι τάχ' ἂν τις κολάζων δυνηθείη, ἐγκαταγεγρακῦϊαν δὲ καὶ γεγενημένων (or -ην) τῶν εἰθισμένων

τιμωριῶν ἀδύνατον εἶναι [ἔλεγεν]. Read καὶ <μείζω> γεγενημένην. 294 μήτ' ἐκείνον <ἂν> γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ. 375 ὁ αὐτὸς διαιρῶν <μέρος> ἕκαστον τῆς ἡμέρας εἰς πρᾶξίν τινα καὶ τῇ σιωπῇ μέρος ἀπένειμεν. 420 τούτους ἔφη <δεῖν> καθιστάναι ἀρχόντας and καὶ <γυναικα> καὶ ἄνδρα (probably only a printer's omission). 422 ἔφη πῖόντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἴλεω <μᾶλλον> τότε πρότερον γενέσθαι (γίγνεσθαι?), and so too 508 τοῖς παισὶ συνεβούλευεν αἰδῶ καταλιπεῖν <μᾶλλον> ἢ χρυσόν, where παισὶ depends on καταλιπεῖν. 436 πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα 'ἀποθανοῦμαι εἰ μὴ σε τιμωρησαίμην' ἔφη 'ἀποθανοῦμαι εἰ μὴ σε φίλον ποιήσω': the version of this on 500 shows conclusively that to each ἀμνοῦμαι we must prefix οὐκ. 438 θαυμάζειν ἔλεγε τῶν τὰς λιθίνους εἰκόνας κατασκευαζομένων <τὸ> τοῦ μὲν λίθου προνοεῖν κ.τ.λ. 496 ἐν μὲν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν χρυσὸς <λογισμοῦ> κρείττων, ἐν δὲ τῷ ζῆν λογισμὸς πλούτου. 499 πάντα ἄλλα should be πάντα τᾶλλα. 504 ὦ <νεανίσκε>, σπούδασον, and above ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἂν (?) εἴη ἀριστον ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶπε συνείδησις <ἀρετῆς ἢ ἀγαθῆς?>. 505 οὐδὲ (οὔτε ?) τὰ <τοῦ> Μήδου οὔτε τὰ Κροίσου χρήματα. 511 ἰδὼν νεανίαν <παιδείαν ἢ γράμματα> φιλοῦντα ἔφη 'κάλιστον ὄψον τῷ γήρατι ἀρτύεις.'

118 ἔχων τοὺς τῶν φευγόντων Περσῶν represents τοὺς φεύγοντας τῶν Περσῶν or possibly τ. τ. Π. φ. 124 εἶπεν ὅτι πλῶ ἔοικε τῷ παρὰ γῆν ὁ τῶν πενήτων βίος, ὁ δὲ τῶν πλουσίων τῷ διὰ πελάγους· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ῥαδίον ἐστι καὶ πείσμα βαλεῖν καὶ προσχεῖν (read προσσχεῖν) καὶ νεωκῆσαι, τοῖς δ' οὐ. πενήτων and πλουσίων have clearly exchanged places. 95 ὁ μὲν γάρ (his father Philip) τοῦ γενέσθαι, ὁ δέ (his teacher Aristotle) τοῦ καλῶς γενέσθαι αἴτιος. The second γενέσθαι is certainly a mere blunder, due to the first, for ζῆν. Cf. 511 οἱ μὲν γονεῖς τοῦ ζῆν μόνον, οἱ δὲ διδάσκαλοι τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν αἴτιοι γεγόνασιν and the same in Plut. *Alex.* 8. 297 ἀρά γε, Θεόδωρε, θεὸς εἶναι φῆς, τοῦτο καὶ εἶ; ἐπινεύσαι τοσ δέ, φῆς δ' εἶναι θεός; . . . θεὸς εἶ ἄρα, ἔφη. The same story is in Diog. L., and there the second θεός has been duly corrected in modern times to θεόν. I quote the passage here, because the first θεός is a mere anticipation in writing of the second and third. The real word was ὁ or ὅτι (εἶναι φῆς), as the text of Diogenes shows. 466 οὐ μετ' οὐ πολὺ is a jumble of μετ' οὐ πολὺ (just below) and οὐ μετὰ πολὺ. 500 σοφὸς οὐδεὶς πλὴν ὃν ἂν τιμῆσθαι θεός is an unmistakable

inversion of σοφὸς <γὰρ ?> οὐδεὶς πλὴν ὃς ἂν τιμᾷ θεόν. Transposition will turn 497 οὐδεὶς ἐλευθέρου ὁ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ κρατῶν into another iambic, οὐδεὶς ἑαυτοῦ μὴ κρατῶν ἐλεύθερος, and 502 read οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν κρείσσον οἰκείου φίλου for φίλου οἰκείου. Transposition is also needed 506 ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστι φίλος ' ἄλλος οἶος ἐγώ,' which should of course be οἶος ἄλλος ἐγώ.

I add one or two miscellaneous difficulties : 111 (Aristides) ἐμοὶ μὲν ἢ πενία οὐδὲν ἱστορήσει κακόν, σοὶ δὲ ὁ πλοῦτος παραχὰς οὐκ ὀλίγας. Should ἱστορήσει be συνιστορεῖ ? 211 Diogenes said ὅτι, ἂν μὲν κύνες αὐτὸν σπαραξῶσιν, Ὑρκανία ἔσται ἢ ταφή· ἂν δὲ γῦπες, ἀπτέον· ἂν δὲ μηδεὶς προσέλθῃ, ὁ χρόνος καλλίων τῇ ταφῇ διὰ τῶν πολυτελεστάτων, ἡλίου καὶ ὄμβρου. There are many puzzles in this : I would suggest τῶν πολὺ εὐτελεστάτων and perhaps χῶρος for χρόνος. 296 Theodorus the Cyrenaic held κλέψει τε καὶ μοιχεύσει καὶ ἱεροσυλήσει (τοὺς σπουδαίους), μηδὲν τούτων φύσει αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τῆς ἐπ' αὐτῆς δόξης αἰρουμένων : this seems to conceal something like μηδὲν τούτων φύσει αἰσχρὸν εἶναι <ἄνευ ? χωρὶς ?> τῆς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς δόξης ἡγουμένων. 371 Νεοπτόλεμον τὸν τῆς τραγωδίας ὑποκριτὴν ἤρετό τις τί θαυμάζοι τῶν ὑπ' Αἰσχύλου λεχθέντων ἢ Σοφοκλέους ἢ Εὐριπίδου· οὐδὲν μὲν τούτων, εἶπεν. This is of course pointless and incomplete or wrong. In these Greek anecdotes a question like 'what is most so and so?' occurs so constantly, as though people devoted themselves to giving an eminent man the opportunity of saying something quotable, that we ought probably to read τί θαυμάζοι <μάλιστα>, and to take it that the great actor answered in effect : 'I don't admire anything most : there are too many fine things in them all for that.' But I do not know what we are to do with οὐδὲν μὲν τούτων.

Owing to the nature of the compilation, I fear I may in places have been correcting what appears elsewhere and has been corrected already or in a better form needs no correction.

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
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