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# **POLICE ADMINISTRATION**



**By RAYMOND B. FOSDICK**

**PART III  
OF THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF  
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND**

**Price \$1.00**



# **POLICE ADMINISTRATION**

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# POLICE ADMINISTRATION

BY

RAYMOND B. FOSDICK

AUTHOR OF "AMERICAN POLICE SYSTEMS"



PART III

OF THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF  
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND

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## FOREWORD

**T**HIS is the third of eight sections of the report of the Cleveland Foundation Survey of Criminal Justice in Cleveland. The survey was directed and the reports edited by Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter. Sections which have been published are:

The Criminal Courts, by Reginald Heber Smith and Herbert B. Ehrmann

Prosecution, by Alfred Bettman

Other sections to be published are:

Penal Treatment and Correctional Institutions, by Burdette G. Lewis

Medical Science and Criminal Justice, by Dr. Herman M. Adler.

Newspapers and Criminal Justice, by M. K. Wischart

Legal Education in Cleveland, by Albert M. Kales

Criminal Justice in the American City, a Summary, by Roscoe Pound

The sections are being published first in separate form, each bound in paper. About November 10 the report will be available in a single volume, cloth bound. Orders for separate sections or the bound volume may be left with book-stores or with the Cleveland Foundation, 1202 Swetland Building.



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# POLICE ADMINISTRATION

## CHAPTER I

### THE PROBLEM

**A** CURSORY examination of the problem of crime in Cleveland produces some startling facts. For the year 1920 Cleveland, with approximately 800,000 population, had six times as many murders as London, with 8,000,000 population. For every robbery or assault with intent to rob committed during this same period in London there were 17 such crimes committed in Cleveland. Cleveland had as many murders during the first three months of the present year as London had during all of 1920. Liverpool is about one and one-half times larger than Cleveland, and yet in 1919 Cleveland reported 31 robberies for each one reported in Liverpool, and three times the number of murders and manslaughters. Practically the same ratio holds between Cleveland and Glasgow. There are more robberies and assaults to rob in Cleveland every year than in all England, Scotland, and Wales put together. In 1919 there were 2,327 automobiles stolen in Cleveland; in London there were 290; in Liverpool, 10.

Comparisons of this kind between Cleveland, on the one hand, and European cities, on the other, could be almost indefinitely extended. There is no gainsaying the fact that crime in Cleveland far exceeds, in point of volume, the crime of European cities of equal or larger size. And yet, compared with other American cities, Cleveland's record does not show to any special disadvantage. For the first quarter of 1921 there were four more murders committed in Detroit than in Cleveland, and nearly twice as many automobiles stolen in Detroit. During the first three months of 1921 St. Louis had 481 robberies, while Cleveland had 272; for the same period complaints of burglary and housebreaking in St. Louis numbered 1,106, as compared to 565 such complaints in Cleveland. For this same period the number of murders in Buffalo, a much smaller city, equaled those in Cleveland, and burglaries, housebreakings, and larcenies were almost as numerous. In 1919 Chicago, more than three times the size of Cleveland, had 293 murders and manslaughters,

compared with Cleveland's 55, so that the ratio was easily two to one in Cleveland's favor; the 1920 statistics of the two cities show an even better proportion for Cleveland.

On the other side of the scale, for the first three months of the present year Cleveland had more than twice the number of robberies and assaults to rob that Detroit had, and a similar large proportion of burglaries and housebreakings. During this period there were 296 automobiles stolen in St. Louis, as against 446 in Cleveland. Cleveland is approximately three times larger than Toledo, and yet in 1920 Cleveland had 87 murders, while Toledo had only 11.

Another basis of comparison is between the crime statistics of Cleveland in 1921 and Cleveland in former years. For the first six months of 1921, the period in which this survey was carried on, the number of murders committed in Cleveland was 15. For the same period in 1920 the number of murders was 30. Similarly, during this same period, there was a decrease of burglaries and larcenies from 573 in 1920 to 541 in 1921. On the other hand, robberies and assaults to rob increased, as between the two periods, from 454 to 534, and the number of automobiles stolen increased from 1,156 to 1,238. The following figures show the average number of complaints for the first quarter of each of the four years from 1917 to 1920 inclusive, classified according to four outstanding crimes:

Robbery and assault to rob	283
Burglary and larceny	418
Murder	17
Automobiles driven away	361

The following figures give the number of complaints of the same crimes for the first quarter of 1921:

Robbery and assault to rob	272
Burglary and larceny	265
Murder	6
Automobiles driven away	446

Obviously, there has been some improvement within the last four years.

All in all, crime conditions are no more vicious in Cleveland than they are in other American cities. In point of volume of crime in relation to size of population Cleveland is neither much better nor much worse than the other municipalities of the United States. It is when we compare Cleveland with cities like London, Glasgow, Liverpool, or almost any other European municipality that ominous contrasts are obtained. In this respect, therefore, Cleveland's problem is the problem of America,

for the same causes that are maintaining the high crime rate of Chicago, St. Louis, New York, Detroit, and San Francisco are operating here.

What are these causes? Here we can only hint at some of the deeper social and economic causes. The lack of homogeneity in our population and its increasing instability, the absence of settled habits and traditions of order, the breakdown of the administration of criminal law in the United States, and the many avenues by which offenders can escape punishment, our easy habit of passing laws which do not represent community standards or desires, our lack of cohesive industrial organization, our distrust of experts in the management of governmental enterprises—all these are undoubtedly contributing factors.

But there is another factor, still more potent: police machinery in the United States has not kept pace with modern demands. It has developed no effective technique to master the burden which modern social and industrial conditions impose. Clinging to old traditions, bound by old practices which business and industry long ago discarded, employing a personnel poorly adapted to its purposes, it grinds away on its perfunctory task without self-criticism, without imagination, and with little initiative.

From this general indictment the Cleveland police department cannot be excepted.

## CHAPTER II

### PRESENT CONDITIONS

**T**HE present police department of Cleveland dates from 1866. In that year the force, consisting of a marshal and 44 watchmen, was reorganized on a semi-military basis, with a superintendent, captains, sergeants, detectives, and patrolmen. In the next forty years there followed many modifications of the scheme for administering the force; but few changes, other than increases in numbers, occurred in the internal organization. In 1907 the force totaled 614: a chief, one inspector, four captains, 27 lieutenants, 28 sergeants, 550 patrolmen, a secretary, surgeon, and detective sergeant. Of the 550 patrolmen, 20 were designated as detectives. At the beginning of 1921 the authorized force of regular police totaled 1,381,<sup>1</sup> including—

- 1 chief
- 1 secretary
- 1 inspector
- 4 deputy inspectors
- 1 superintendent of criminal investigation
- 1 surgeon
- 1 veterinary surgeon
- 1 superintendent of civil investigation
- 1 superintendent of tailor shop
- 17 captains
- 53 lieutenants
- 99 sergeants
- 75 detectives
- 1,125 patrolmen

Since 1866 Cleveland has grown from a small town to the fifth city in the United States. It has grown not only in size, but in the heterogeneity of its population and in the complexity of its social and business life. From a town in which many people knew each other intimately and thus

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<sup>1</sup> Ordinance No. 52236 (Ordinances of 1920). The actual number of men employed has been below the authorized number.



furnished a substantial degree of self-protection and aid to the police, Cleveland has become, like all other communities of its size in modern times, a city of strangers.

In contrast with this complex growth of the city the police department of 1921 is little more than a physical enlargement of the department of 1866. Other branches of the municipal government have made marked progress along lines of scientific development. The school system, public utilities, fire fighting, business offices—all these have taken on a new character compared with their prototypes of a generation ago. The police department has shown no such vitality—no such capacity to make itself over on a new and improved pattern, no willingness to reshape its methods to modern demands. Instead, it has hewn to the line of tradition, ventured almost nothing in experiment, and copied very little from the experience of other private and public organizations. Today the patrol force is distributed and managed exactly as it was twenty or thirty years ago. There is nothing new in the detective service save faces and a few meager records. Traffic regulation has been developed, but this modern necessity has been met only by draining the department's resources for coping with crime. No new practices have been employed for ferreting out and removing conditions that produce crime. Practically the same methods are employed for combating crime that were used when Cleveland was just a big neighborhood in which the police knew everybody.

Let us look a little further. The department has never had and does not have today the trained and intelligent leadership which European police forces have long enjoyed. Cleveland's directors of public safety and her chiefs of police come and go, apparently with scant appreciation by the public of the fact that transient administration is fatal to success in any complex technical enterprise. Moreover, the line of authority between the director of public safety and the chief of police is so vaguely drawn that effective administration would be impossible even under the best of conditions. Lacking in leadership, the department lacks, too, in the quality of its working personnel. Machinists, motormen, truckmen, and other manual workers—these are the sources from which Cleveland takes the men upon whom she imposes tasks requiring a high degree of intelligence and technical skill, besides a keen appreciation of social values.

Similarly, we find adherence to a rigid organization applying to the entire force, regardless of the great difference in types of work attempted by the various divisions of the service. We find the department acting as the eyes and ears of other city departments in reporting on the physical

conditions of the city, promoting the safety of citizens in public places, arresting criminals, and preventing the commission of crimes, but using the same kind of man for all these tasks and clearing them through the same inelastic organization.

The department is trying heroically today to "catch up" in the apprehension of criminals and the prevention of crime. Its energies, however, are chiefly consumed in repairing damage that is not anticipated. Almost nothing is being done to find out the causes of crime, to learn the sources from which criminals are sprung, or to forestall their operations. The department takes no leading part in the study of criminals and their characteristics; it does not even avail itself of facilities for study and experiment that have been developed by schools, clinics, and other private and public organizations.

This lack of intelligence and imagination in Cleveland's police work is shown in the ragged character of the internal arrangements of the department. No private business whose affairs were carried on in such hit-or-miss fashion could escape bankruptcy. The record books of the department are poorly kept, sometimes showing erasures, changes, and additions. Nearly all reports made by patrolmen and detectives are written in pencil. There are no current consolidated reports showing summaries of operations, with comparative data for other periods which might be used for purposes of administrative control. Instead, there is a great mass of detailed matter passing over and lodging upon the chief's desk. On the other hand, not enough detailed material appears on the desks of commanding officers of the detective bureau, vice bureau, and precincts. Policemen are doing the work of clerks, and some, who might better have been employed as clerks, are doing the work of policemen. Most of the department's supervisory work is done on a memory basis, as in 1866, without even any regular order for making and receiving the verbal summaries of current business. Every one, from the chief down, appears to be engaged with the interesting things of the moment. Study and analysis of persisting or recurring problems and of results in the aggregate are hardly known.

Inadequate equipment adds to this appearance of raggedness. No private business which has to show results could work with the department's equipment. The headquarters building is wholly inadequate. Workers in every division are cramped for space, with resulting confusion and chaos. If the record bureau facilities are contrasted with those of a private enterprise having an equal volume of business, the disadvantages under which the police are working will be readily seen. There are no typewriters in the precincts save those privately owned. Supervising

inspectors do not have automobiles in which to cover the city. Members of the automobile recovery squad are frequently without a car, and must go on foot to search for stolen automobiles. The signal system is wholly inadequate for the ordinary needs of communicating with men doing field duty. No motor equipment is available for regular patrol duty.

A general picture of the police service in Cleveland gives the impression of a group of men, singularly free from scandal and vicious corruption, but working in a rut, without intelligence or constructive policy, on an unimaginative, perfunctory routine. As a matter of fact, this same indictment could be drawn against most of the police forces of America. The Cleveland department is no worse than many others; in some respects it is better. Official lethargy lies behind much that is distressing in this picture. There is another kind of lethargy, however, which cannot escape its share of the responsibility. It is the lethargy of public opinion, the community's easy habit of assuming that governmental machinery will somehow or other run itself, even in the face of meager equipment and inadequate funds.

## CHAPTER III

### THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE

**T**HE police service of Cleveland is organized as a division of the department of public safety. The department of which the police division forms a part is administered by a director appointed by the mayor and serving at his pleasure. The charter provides that "under the direction of the mayor the director of public safety shall be the executive head of the divisions of police and fire." The division of police is headed by a chief of police, who is appointed by the mayor, subject to civil service rules and regulations. The right to suspend the chief is lodged exclusively with the mayor. In case of such suspension, the charter provides that the mayor "shall forthwith certify the fact, together with the cause of such suspension, to the civil service commission, who within five days from the date of the receipt of such notice shall proceed to hear such charges and render judgment thereon, which judgment shall be final."<sup>1</sup>

The rank and file of the police service are appointed by the director of public safety. The chief of police has the exclusive right to suspend any officers or employees in the police division. In case of suspension the charter provides that a trial shall be held by the director, who is empowered to render judgment, "which judgment, if sustained, may be suspension, reduction in rank, or dismissal, and such judgment in the matter shall be final, except as otherwise hereinafter provided." The charter further provides that a member of the division of police may appeal to the civil service commission from the decision of the director of public safety within ten days after the date of suspension from duty, reduction in rank, or dismissal. In such appealed cases the civil service commission has the power to "affirm, disaffirm, or modify the judgment of the director of public safety, and its judgment in the matter shall be final."

All members of the professional force enter the department as patrolmen, after examinations conducted by the civil service commission. Promotions to the higher ranks, with the exception of the rank of chief of

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<sup>1</sup> Cleveland City Charter, Sec. 107.

police, are made as a result of competitive civil service examinations. In addition to these ranks of the professional police force there is a superintendent of criminal investigation (criminal identification), a surgeon, superintendent of civil investigation, veterinary surgeon, and superintendent of the tailor shop. Civilians are employed as matrons, chauffeurs, tailors, caretakers, janitresses, mechanics, and telephone operators.

The major part of the regular police personnel is distributed by types of work in four main divisions as follows: the uniformed patrol force, the division of traffic regulation, the detective division, and the vice squad. In addition to these main divisions are several small auxiliary units, such as the criminal identification bureau, information bureau, and record bureau, to which patrolmen and officers are assigned in the numbers required. Ranks and grades are not affected by assignment and transfer from one bureau or division to another, although some increase in salary is granted to sergeants who are detailed to the vice squad and to patrolmen assigned to serve regularly in the detective division.

For purposes of distributing the working force of the department geographically the city has been divided into 15 precincts, each having a precinct station house. The general administration of police affairs is carried on at police headquarters, which also includes the first precinct station, detective headquarters, vice squad, and all the special units.

#### SCOPE OF THE POLICE SURVEY

The subjects of study in this survey have been the relations between the civil service board, the public safety department, and the various police divisions and bureaus, the character of the supervision of police work in its many phases, the methods of procedure, the records and reports maintained for showing work accomplished, and the volume of crime dealt with.

In the main, appraisals of efficiency relate to methods of procedure and departmental organization viewed as an impersonal instrument of government. The relation of officials to one another and to their work in general has been looked at in the light of the office rather than of the individual. While this view of police administration has necessarily represented conditions prevailing during the period covered by the investigation, and is, therefore, an analysis of the practices and accomplishments of individuals who happened to be in office at that time, we have kept in mind throughout that it is *methods* rather than persons which form the permanent part of the organization, and it is the former, therefore, with which the larger purposes of the survey are concerned. Thus it has been the office of the chief of police, with its powers, duties, prac-

tices, and accomplishments, rather than Chief Frank W. Smith, that has been the subject of investigation. The present personnel will, in due course, be separated entirely from police administration, and any appraisal of their efficiency as individuals will then be of no value. But the practices employed and policies laid down by the present personnel must necessarily form the basis for the development of the future.

#### THE PROBLEM OF ADMINISTRATION

The task of the administration of police business in Cleveland consists in directing the daily activities of some 1,200 men. Keeping each of these men keyed up to his best is a problem in the management of human beings. Their work in turn consists in regulating human relations and thus promoting safety and good order in the community.

To achieve these ends in a city of the size of Cleveland a large organization with imposing equipment and record systems must be provided. It must be noted, however, that the ultimate end of this complex superstructure of organization is to be found in the acts of individual policemen, operating for the most part alone and initially unaided. The personnel of the department rarely moves in large units; the organization acts through individual members in performing the major part of the daily routine. The real police work is not done at headquarters or in stations, but on the beat.

Matters of organization, records, reports, and methods of procedure are merely convenient instruments to see that policemen are made available for duty and to provide some basis for estimating the effectiveness of these field forces. But *police* work itself, in its final analysis, is wholly personal. The sum of the generally isolated observations, investigations, and acts of individual policemen constitutes the primary police work of the department. The heart of the business of police administration, therefore, consists in training, stimulating, and directing *men* in the exercise of good judgment and initiative while on post or assignment in the field.

The work of a police department is, therefore, not readily reduced to well-defined standards of accomplishment. It involves such intangible and modifiable factors as good judgment, sympathy, patience, courage, and intelligence. Added to these there must be pride of profession, enthusiasm, and, above all, a spirit and willingness to take great pains in the prosecution of the work.

#### THE MACHINERY OF POLICE ADMINISTRATION IN CLEVELAND

Let us see how well the administrative machinery of the Cleveland police department fulfils its task of administering these personal relations.

Charter provisions covering the question of responsibility for the administration of police business are singularly confusing in terminology. The language is clear enough, however, to show that a deliberate attempt has been made to distribute specific powers between the director of public safety and the chief of police. Authority is apparently given to the chief by one provision of the charter, only to be taken away by another. Regarding general powers and duties in the department of public safety the charter reads: "*Under the direction of the mayor the director of public safety shall be the executive head of the divisions of police and fire. He shall also be the chief administrative authority in all matters affecting the inspection and regulation of the erection, maintenance, repair, and occupancy of buildings.*"<sup>1</sup> Thus, with regard to the division of buildings, which is coordinate with the divisions of fire and police in the department of public safety, the charter specifies that the director shall be the administrative authority, while his responsibility with regard to the police and fire divisions would seem to be of a different kind. The distinction here made apparently implies that in the police and fire divisions, as distinguished from the division of buildings, the chiefs of the respective divisions are the administrative heads, with the director as a sort of over-lord. The charter does not specifically state that the chief of police is to be considered the administrative authority of the division of police, but the prescriptions relating to his appointment and removal by the mayor and not by the director, and the powers and duties ascribed to him, would seem to indicate that such was the intention.

Another section of the charter reads: "*The chief of the division of police shall have exclusive control of the stationing and transfer of all patrolmen, and other officers and employees constituting the police force, under such rules and regulations as the director of public safety may prescribe. The director of public safety shall have the exclusive management and control of such other officers and employees as shall be employed in the administration of the affairs of the division.*"<sup>2</sup> Here again we are confronted by an apparent conflict. Where does the authority of the chief leave off and that of the director of public safety begin? An inquiry along historical lines reveals that the probable intention of the framers of the charter was to charge the chief with responsibility for carrying on police enterprise proper, while the director was to have full responsibility in purely business matters, such as the purchase of supplies and equipment, repair and upkeep of property. If this be true, it must be pointed out that the intention was not well fortified by later provisions in the charter, wherein

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<sup>1</sup> City Charter, Sec. 102.

<sup>2</sup> City Charter, Sec. 103.

the chief—or administrative head of the “police force”—is shorn of all final authority in important matters governing the selection, promotion, and discipline of the police force.

Again, “*The chiefs of the divisions of police and fire shall have the exclusive right to suspend any of the officers or employees in their respective division who may be under their management and control. \* \* \**” This is no more than the ordinary authority attaching to the office of an administrative head of a department. In the next sentence, however, this language occurs: “*If any officer or employee be suspended, as herein provided, the chief of the division concerned shall forthwith in writing certify the fact, together with the cause for the suspension, to the director of public safety who, within five days from the receipt thereof, shall proceed to inquire into the cause of such suspension and render judgment thereon, which judgment, if the charge be sustained, may be suspension, reduction in rank, or dismissal, and such judgment in the matter shall be final, except as hereinafter provided.*”<sup>1</sup>

Thus it appears that the chief is given wide powers,—wider than in most cities where there is a non-professional administrative head, such as the director of public safety, between the mayor and the chief,—that he is charged with the initiation of authority in administration, that is, has “exclusive” control under ordinary circumstances, while the director’s connection with the routine affairs of the police division is restricted to business matters or, as the charter vaguely calls it, “administration of the affairs of the division.” Yet, when the real test of “exclusive” control appears, it is found that the director and not the chief has all the power. The director makes all of the really important decisions, as, for example, in the matter of preparing the budget for police service, making rules and regulations, conducting disciplinary trials, and making the selections for appointment and promotions from the civil service lists. The director, however, is not required, nor does he have an opportunity, to establish immediate and constant contact with the actual administrative processes of police work.

There is another odd arrangement in connection with the distribution of powers and the establishment of a line of responsibility between the two heads of the police service. The director, while depending on the chief to exercise “exclusive” control up to the point where the director himself makes the really important decisions, does not have direct control over the chief, but merely over the facilities with which the chief has to work. The chief is appointed by the mayor and not by the director.

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<sup>1</sup> City Charter, Sec. 106.



Likewise the mayor alone has "*the exclusive right to suspend the chief of the division of police or fire for incompetence or any other just and reasonable cause.*" As a result, the chief is answerable to the director for his management of police work, but responsible to the mayor and not the director as far as his "incompetence" is concerned. Only confused notions respecting official responsibility can result from such a situation.

In the matter of disciplinary action, it should be pointed out here that there is another step in the scale of responsibility beyond the mayor and director. The municipal civil service commission alone has the power to pass on charges preferred against the chief of police, and it renders final judgment as well in all cases involving lower ranks which may be appealed to the commission from the judgment of the director.<sup>1</sup>

Under such a scheme of confused responsibility for police business as has been outlined above, to whom do the people at Cleveland actually look for results in policing the city? Who is held to account when a wave of robberies, burglaries, or automobile thefts occurs? Is it the director of public safety or the chief of police? Which of the two officials bears the final responsibility? The answer under the present charter is, neither. Whenever the question of efficiency is called up, the director can point to the chief and say: "There is the man who is running the department. I neither appoint him nor remove him; he is subject to civil service provisions. If he doesn't do the job satisfactorily, I am not to blame." A chief under the same conditions can reply by saying: "If I had the last word in matters of discipline, so as to weed out the unfit regardless of their political friends and influences, and keep all others on their toes; if I could make the rules and regulations governing the department and could select my men in accordance with my own standards of judgment, I could accomplish better results." The whole scheme is admirably suited to the favorite game of "passing the buck"—an especially useful game where public criticism is involved.

Moreover, the contention of each official, as suggested, would be absolutely correct so far as the charter goes. The director of public safety has wide general powers, but no specific contacts with the machinery he is controlling. The chief of police, on the other hand, is checked at a score of points where an administrator should have free initiative and complete authority. The chief's position at present is like that of a child driving a horse, while an adult sits beside him ready to grip the reins in front of his hands, whenever an important decision in the driving arises.

Naturally, under the present arrangement, the whole complexion of ad-

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<sup>1</sup> This subject will be reviewed in some detail in a later section of this report.

ministration changes with shifts in the offices of director and chief, and since neither officer is dependent on the other for appointment or continuance in office, such changes will be concurrent only by accident. Experience in the past has shown that with an aggressive type of man serving as chief the director will become a sort of fifth wheel whose exercise of his charter authority is likely at best to be a source of obstruction. With a less aggressive chief it is probable that the director will assume more influence in the disposition of members of the force than is intended in the charter, and more than he is fitted to assume by reason of the multiplicity of his duties and his remoteness from actual police operations. Unless the chief be especially aggressive, almost to the point of standing against the director, the suggestions of the latter, because of his superior position, will be tantamount to orders. The practice of a former director of suggesting the names of men whom he desired to have detailed to the detective bureau, and the famous Order 73,<sup>1</sup> are cases in point. With an aggressive chief of police, as at present, there is every opportunity of confusing the clear line of responsibility in a way which reacts against the chief as a penalty instead of reward for his attempted initiative.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The best escape from the difficulties inherent in the present scheme involves a complete overhauling of the whole administrative machinery. In the first place, there should be a direct line of responsibility, running from a single head down through the whole organization. There should be no such short circuits as now exist between the chief and mayor around the director, who is the chief's superior. Final authority, commensurate with responsibility, should be lodged exclusively with the single directing head. This single leader should be in immediate charge of directing the operations of the force.

2. To accomplish these ends it is recommended that the police service be disassociated from the department of public safety and established as an independent department, coördinate with the other combined divisions of the department of public safety, the finance department, or the department of public utilities.

From the police point of view, there is no good reason why the police service should be organically connected with the fire and buildings division. On the contrary, there are positive reasons why it should stand alone. Although both the police and fire divisions are established to

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<sup>1</sup> This order provided that the police were not to raid gambling houses or houses of ill fame without instructions from the director of public safety.

secure public safety, their fields of work differ widely. The fact that the personnel of the two divisions is organized on a semi-military basis is not sufficient justification for their common administration. The problems of fire extinguishment are physically definable and the work of fire prevention is highly specialized and easily reduced to mechanical standards; the uniformed force of the fire division deals with material elements. The police force deals largely with human relations; its problems are to a certain extent intangible. Firemen work in groups under the immediate direction of their superior officers; they respond to a fire in their properly assigned places and employ chemicals and other equipment as they are ordered by their officers in charge. The policeman's work is done largely on his own initiative, prompted by his own judgment.

Policies affecting fire administration relate almost entirely to the financial aspects of providing equipment and men that are necessary in the light of definitely known insurance rates and fire hazards. Policies of police administration involve social and moral needs which are far removed from such factors as the storage of inflammables, hose and water pressure, and building regulations. There is no divided opinion about the desirability of putting out fires; there is considerable room for division of opinion as to how much money the city should pay for the intangible returns of crime prevention to be achieved through an enlarged and better equipped police force, or even as to how far the police may go in curbing individual liberties in their efforts to prevent crime.

Thus, although these two forces are similarly organized, the objectives of their work are found to be wholly different and their methods of procedure widely dissimilar, while the values of their work are appraised on entirely different bases.

It may be contended that a combination of the police and fire divisions is necessary in order to assure active coöperation on the part of the police in looking for fires at night, assisting with rescue work, establishing fire lines, and enforcing the ordinances and regulations of the code of fire prevention and protection. These things the police must do, but a common administration of police and fire is not necessary to effect such coöperation. The duties of the police would remain the same if the two divisions were not connected by an overhead scheme of management. It is not reasonable to suppose that the police would neglect the performance of such specific duties merely because their directing head is not also the directing head of the fire force. One might as well expect them to neglect making arrests because the head of the police service is not also in charge of courts and prosecutions, or to fail to report broken

manholes or leaking hydrants because their division is not organically connected with the departments of public utilities and public service.

A saving in the expenses of administration may result from combining police, fire, and buildings, and the practice may be defended on the ground of economy in small cities where these divisions are not large. In Cleveland, however, the savings in the overhead cost of administration are more than overbalanced by the loss in efficiency. Moreover, it is hardly possible to find a man with qualifications of expertness in the supervision of the technical matters of fire fighting and building regulation who qualifies also in understanding the human problems incident to policing.

It may be sufficient to point out that Cleveland is one of the few large cities in the United States which still combine the administration of the police department with that of other branches of the municipal system. In most other cities the police force was long ago established as a separate entity under independent management. The same is true of all European cities. There the police function is regarded as so important that no attempt is made to confuse its administration by bringing other public activities under its leadership. The time has come for Cleveland to recognize the same principle and to give to the police department the administrative position which the importance of its work demands.

3. The department of police should be in charge of a single civilian administrative head, to be known as the director of police. The director should be appointed by the mayor with full responsibility for administering the police service, and should have the exclusive right to name his own immediate assistants, including the chief ranking officer of the uniformed force to correspond to the present chief of police. Such appointments should be terminated at the will of the director. It should be the director's duty to lay down a policy and program for police work, and to see that such policy is carried into effect by his subordinates. Under this arrangement the officer who develops the policies of police service will be subject to public reckoning, since his appointment and continuance in office depend on the mayor, who is subject to election. Undivided responsibility and authority would be reposed in a single officer at the head, and the line of responsibility and authority should continue downward direct and unbroken.

Such a director should be chosen from outside the professional ranks of the department, just as the director of public safety has always been chosen. The management of police business demands as able an administrator as can be obtained. Indeed, in a city like Cleveland, and in many cities of lesser size, the task of police administration is so great

that the best man obtainable is none too good, and in an endeavor to find him, no search can be too thorough. That such a leader can be found in the ranks of a police force is in the highest degree improbable. The officer who has walked his "beat" as a patrolman, investigated crime as a detective, and managed the technical routine of station house activity as lieutenant or captain, is not fitted by this experience to administer the complex affairs of a large police department. The chances are rather that he is unfitted for the task. Lacking in administrative experience, with scant appreciation of the larger possibilities of his position, often indeed without imagination or resourcefulness, he has little chance of success, and it would be unwise and cruel to saddle him with the responsibility. If police management were merely a matter of assignments, promotions, and discipline; if it had to do only with the ordering of a well-defined routine, any capable man who himself had been through the mill might be well adapted to handle it.

But the task, particularly in large cities, is so much broader than routine, and involves activities of such vital consequence, that only a high order of creative intelligence can cope with it. The director must deal with community problems in the large. He must be familiar with the underlying social forces which are responsible for the need of police service. Constantly before him must be the conception of the department as an agency for the prevention of crime, and the consequent relation of his work to all activities, social, economic, and educational, operating to that end. He must be able to interpret public opinion, to be a community leader, and, above all, he must be qualified to inspire a great force of policemen. In addition he must have a thorough understanding of the principles of administration.

These qualifications are not readily found in the uniformed force, nor, indeed, are they easily found in any walk of life. For that reason the search for the right man should be broadcast, and no artificial barriers of politics or residence should be interposed. If the best man cannot be found in Cleveland, other sources should be examined. A residential qualification in such cases is as irrelevant as it would be if applied to the managing director of a railroad or to the head of a medical school or an experimental laboratory. In European cities there has been no thought of applying such a test for the reason that no one would care to limit so narrowly the field of choice. With the talent of Great Britain to draw from, for example, why should Liverpool or Birmingham insist that its chief constable be recruited from its own population? Or what would be gained if Stuttgart were barred from inviting an experienced deputy commissioner from Munich to join its staff as com-

missioner, and had, instead, to employ some inferior man from its citizenship? This is the conception that governs the public service of European municipalities and to a great extent its application accounts for the difference in municipal administration here and abroad.

4. Once chosen because of his peculiar abilities, the director of police should be regarded as a permanent fixture. While the right of the mayor to remove him should remain unabridged, the exercise of that right for political causes or for reasons other than those relating to his efficiency should be checked by a public opinion strong enough to insist upon retaining a well-trying expert in an office as important as the directorship of police. A constantly shifting directorship of police can result in nothing but chaos. To gauge a well-trained administrator on the basis of his political faith is to introduce a factor as irrelevant and immaterial as his opinion on art or literature. When the right man is found for so highly developed a specialty, the city should cling to him as a business concern would cling to an indispensable employee. Only proved inefficiency or complete lack of sympathy with the police policies of the mayor should be sufficient cause for removal.

Here again we can find excellent example in the police departments not only of England and Scotland, but of France and Switzerland as well, to say nothing of several American cities where the principle of continuity in the police directorship has been followed with marked success. In Boston, Commissioner O'Meara served twelve years under four different administrations, both Democratic and Republican. The same situation today holds true in Milwaukee and in Berkeley, California, where over a long period of years the heads of the two police departments have served without interruption in spite of the kaleidoscopic changes in mayors and councils. Similarly, European cities always appoint their directors and commissioners of police as a board of directors selects a general manager or other official, not for a definitely established term, but on the basis of satisfactory work. Their task is to find men capable of serving indefinitely—men who have the ability and the willingness to devote a lifetime to the administrative problem. When such a man is found, there is no disposition to experiment with anybody else. No one would care to assume responsibility for jeopardizing an organization in which, as in all forms of business enterprise, continuity of administration is the best guarantee of effectiveness.

5. The director must have under him a chief executive officer who will serve as the superintendent or general manager of operations. Under such a scheme, what should be the relationship between the director and his chief subordinate?

The director should have the task of laying down the general program and policy of policing, and of determining the financial needs of the department. He should represent the department in all its external contacts, such as with the appropriating body, the other departments of government, as well as the schools, churches, and welfare and civic agencies. He should determine, as a matter of policy, how much of the available resources of the department should be devoted to the regulation of traffic, as against the necessity, for example, of carrying on preventive work in connection with crime. In all the welter of laws and ordinances he should decide where police emphasis is to be placed.

Once the policy in such matters is determined, it should then fall to the chief line officer in charge of actual operations to see that these policies are carried into effect. If there were a question of establishing one-way streets, for example, or of rerouting street-cars, to facilitate the movement of traffic, the director would deal with the street railway company and the commercial interests affected by the proposed changes, making the decision in cases of conflict between the needs of the general public and the private interests involved. He would, in the first instance, depend on the recommendation of subordinate experts in the traffic regulation. When the policy is decided, he would turn to the chief executive officer to see that the police carry out the new policy.

In short, the director would determine how much and what type of police service is needed, and the chief professional officer would see that such service is carried out to the best of his ability with the men and equipment given him for the purpose. The one asks for certain results and the other manages the machinery used in getting the results.

A policy may be laid down by the administrative head, but the manner in which the routine work is executed gives color to the policy. Hence the head must have a superintendent or general manager of operations who understands his policies and has sufficient sympathy with their accomplishment to go about his work with the enthusiasm of conviction. Half-hearted execution practically amounts to obstruction. It is especially important, therefore, for the head of the police department to be able to choose the man in whom he has personal confidence. On no other basis can true leadership be developed.

6. For this reason the superintendent or the chief of police—whatever his title might be—as the immediate subordinate of the director, should not be chosen as a result of competitive civil service examinations. The objection will at once be made that the present scheme, wherein the office of chief of police is surrounded by the protection of civil service regulations, makes for continuity of administration in the leadership of

the police, and that this continuity is the only protection against the ravages of politics. This assumes, in the first place, that continuity in this particular office is a guarantee of effective policing, and, in the second place, that Cleveland is hopelessly unregenerate in the matter of politics and inferior to other cities of a similar size. It is an open question how much is gained by an enforced continuity of service which is shorn of power by officers who are controlled by the fortunes of politics. Moreover, the non-political aspect of the chief's tenure in Cleveland—*i. e.*, guarantee against removal on account of politics—is a singularly weak argument in its form when it is considered that the appointments to the office have been surrounded by all of the manœuvering known to politics. In the not remote past the custom has been privately to avow candidacies for appointment to the office of chief whenever a vacancy occurred, or when it was known that a vacancy was about to occur. Thus some of the higher officers in the department have approached business men of Cleveland, newspaper editors, and friends to secure their influence and aid in getting the appointment. Accordingly, newspapers and other interests have had their candidates, though perhaps not openly avowed, in much the same way as if the office were an elective one.

The truth of the matter is that civil service protection in high administrative police positions does not guard the community, certainly in Cleveland, against politics. Politics can get around any artificial system. On the other hand, with public opinion on the alert, politics can be kept in control without any system at all. In Boston and Detroit the incumbent superintendents of police, who are the professional heads of the police force,—corresponding in that relationship to the chief of police in Cleveland,—have held office throughout successive changes in the terms of the administrative heads. Yet these officials are not subject to civil service provisions of any sort. Their appointment and dismissal rest in the discretion of their superiors. The same is true in London and other European cities. Such a continuity of service, based on freedom of choice, has real meaning, but a continuity based on the inherent difficulties of removal through a civil service trial nullifies responsibility and stultifies the work of any administrator, however enterprising.

What every police force needs is leadership—one official to whom the community can say, "Thou art the man!" and who has power corresponding to his responsibility. We shall never solve the police problem in America until we give honest and effective leadership an opportunity to show what it can do. Some time or other we have to make a beginning of trusting our public officials. Checks and balances to curb and minimize possible abuses of power have gotten us nowhere. Complex



systems to prevent bias and unfairness have brought nothing but confusion. It is time to take off a few of the yokes that have made public administration an impossible task, and put a new emphasis on positive qualities. The problem before us is not how to build up a structure that will circumvent the dishonest and incompetent official, but, after finding a competent and honest official, to surround him with conditions in which he can make himself effective.

Just as the community should, if necessary, go outside its own boundaries to get the best director possible, so the director should disregard all questions of residence in selecting his chief subordinate. Indeed, in view of the present demarcations in the police force in Cleveland, due largely to religious differences, such a step might be distinctly advisable. So long as there are in the department group-conscious Catholics and Masons, playing the part of the "ins" and the "outs," with discriminations practised by one group against the other as opportunity offers, just so long will it be difficult for a director to choose from the Cleveland force a chief who can command the unquestioned loyalty and support of his men. It will probably take the strong hand of an outsider, with no group to represent, with no old scores to settle, to put the final quietus to this factional nonsense. In any event the director, as the responsible head of his department, should be free to select his immediate subordinate on the basis of such qualifications as he himself determines.

## CHAPTER IV

### PROVISION OF PERSONNEL—ITS SELECTION AND TRAINING

THE charter provides that the police force shall consist of a chief of police and “*such officers, patrolmen, and other employees as may be provided by ordinance or resolution of the council.*”<sup>1</sup> In accordance with this provision, the city council determines what is known as the “authorized” number of police for each rank, from the rank of patrolman to inspector of police. The appointing authority is not compelled to recruit the force up to the authorized strength. He cannot, however, make appointments in excess of the number set by councilmanic action. The task of recruiting the force belongs to the civil service commission, original entrance to the department being by competitive examination. Actual appointments are made by the director of public safety from eligible lists certified by the civil service commission.

An analysis has been made of the original appointments to the department from 1914 up to and including the first two months of 1921, to determine the type of men who are drawn into police service. Particular attention has been given the appointments made in 1914 and 1921, since more nearly normal conditions prevailed in those years. The period between these two years presented unusual circumstances. Just prior to this country's entry into the war competition with industry seriously affected police recruiting, and from 1917 until after the completion of demobilization the scarcity of applicants made it difficult to keep up the authorized strength of the department. As a result, considerable modification of the standards governing entrance requirements was necessary. By 1921, however, conditions were normal in respect to the number of persons making application for police appointment.

#### PREVIOUS OCCUPATION

A review of the occupational sources from which policemen are recruited shows that they are drawn from a wide range of civil employ-

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<sup>1</sup> City Charter, Sec. 103.

ments. Considering the occupations of the 56 men appointed during 1914, it is found that, of the occupations engaged in prior to entering the police department, only six had furnished more than one representative. Machinists numbered six, carpenters three, shipping clerks, ship-builders, foremen (not further specified), railroad firemen, and street-car inspectors numbered two each. The remaining 37 came from as many occupations.<sup>1</sup> An analysis of the previous occupations of the first 133 men appointed in 1921 shows that there were 14 occupations from which more than one recruit was drawn, accounting for 87 men altogether. Of these, 19 were machinists and machinists' helpers, 12 truck drivers, 10 chauffeurs, eight electricians and electrical workers, six carpenters, six from the plumbing trades, five clerks, etc. Forty-seven other occupations were listed, including a physical director, tree surgeon, barber, chef, sailor, musician, farmer, draftsman, chocolate maker, etc. Those who might be classified generally as manual workers numbered 111, or 83 per cent., and the miscellaneous non-manual occupations accounted for 22 appointees, or 17 per cent.

The previous experience of new policemen is, therefore, diversified, and offers almost no common factors which may be utilized in planning their training. With many of these men the choice of work is largely a hit-or-miss matter. Most of them finally settle upon policing without giving much thought to its significance or to its possibilities as a career. They think of it as a job giving steady employment and compensation equal to or better than what they were able to obtain in commercial fields.

This raw material, possessing every sort of occupational experience, must be molded into as great a degree of uniformity as possible. The recruits must first be converted into patrolmen as a sort of common denominator. When this has been done, the same men must be reconverted into detectives and special investigators, such as those attached to the vice squad. Some must give special attention to work with juveniles, and in the absence of women police, others are required to do work which should naturally fall to a division of women police.

The large proportion of men who are drawn from the various types of

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<sup>1</sup> The 37 occupations were as follows: assembler, ball-bearing inspector, box-maker, brass finisher, brazing shifts, bricklayer, clerk, chauffeur, conductor (street-car), driver, electric crane operator, engineer, foundryman, gateman, glazier, hotel clerk, houseman, inspector (street), inspector (factory), iron-worker, laborer, meter-reader, mill worker, molder, mover, patternmaker, plate worker, presser, salesman, shoe clerk, stone assembler, trainman, tug fireman, tug despatcher, wire weaver, woodworker.

manual work is due to economic considerations and is not ascribable to any relation between police work and the manual occupations. While the physical demands of patrolling are considerable, the work does not in any sense involve skill or adaptability in the use of the hands. Physical prowess is required as a sort of incidental qualification, but mental alertness is the primary qualification. The routine manual occupations count for little as a basis of experience in making observations and exercising judgment in taking police action. Thus, men who have been trained to know *how* to do things are brought over into a new field, utterly foreign to their experience, where they are concerned with *what* to do.

Of course, the mere fact that a man has been a manual worker, often by force of accidental circumstance, does not mean that he cannot be the sort of brain worker that a policeman must be. Manual work need not be held to disqualify him. On the other hand, it in no way qualifies him for the more important phases of a policeman's task. The significant fact in Cleveland is that by far the largest percentage of its policemen are recruited from occupations whose character is as far removed from the character of police work as can be. Consequently there are bound to be many misfits, many instances of policemen whose total lack of qualifications for their work is altogether too obvious.

#### AGE OF APPOINTEES

The ages at which men enter Cleveland's police service is also worthy of our consideration. According to present civil service regulations, 21 is the minimum and 35 the maximum age at which men may be eligible for appointment to the police force. Of the 56 men appointed in 1914, only one was aged below 25 and 55 were twenty-five years of age or over. Out of the 186 men appointed in 1920, there were 73, or 39 per cent., aged below twenty-five, and 113, or 61 per cent., twenty-five or over. Similarly in 1921, of the first 134 men appointed, 55, or 41 per cent., were aged below twenty-five and the remaining 59 per cent. were twenty-five or over.<sup>1</sup> Considering the more recent appointments, it is found that approximately one-fourth of the 1920 appointees were thirty years of age and over. Somewhat more than one-fourth of the first group of 1921 appointees were thirty or over. We believe that the maximum age for appointment to the patrol force should not exceed thirty years, and that a special effort should be made to recruit, as far as possible, men between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five. It is said that men over twenty-five possess the advantage of maturity in their

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<sup>1</sup> The age of one appointee was not given: these figures and percentage calculations are for 133 men.

fund of knowledge and that they are, on the whole, more reliable than "boys" between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five. If the soundness of this position were to be fully admitted, it would be logical to conclude that the considerable number of men who have entered the department at an age below twenty-five have not been competent to do creditable police work. But this is not the fact. Indeed, it is only in a few isolated cases that criticisms of individual acts are laid to the youthfulness of policemen, and even then the criticism is made for want of a better reason.

Individual cases of failure to take proper police action are found to be due not so much to lack of maturity as to lack of *experience* in handling similar situations or faulty temperament. It is experience in the exercise of judgments required of policemen in the daily round that counts for most, and not the general maturity attaching to age. Nor is temperament a quality to be measured by age. True, the young man under twenty-five may become excited and lack self-composure in trying situations, and when such is the case, the criticism of incompetence is merited. The same may be true, however, of the man who is thirty. Higher police officials, whenever consulted on this point, agree that a man of twenty-five who has four years of actual police experience to his credit is almost invariably a better agent than the recruit of thirty or thirty-five who has had fewer years of experience.

On the other hand, there are distinct advantages to be had in recruiting the younger men to the service. In the first place, younger men are more readily trained and molded in response to the desires of the officers who direct them. Inspector Cahalane, who was, for a long time, in charge of the New York Police Training School, said: "Give me the boys in preference to the older men and I can more easily make policemen of them." In training men for the mounted service in New York, it has been found that the best results are achieved with men who have never ridden a horse. "They don't have to unlearn how to ride," said an officer in charge of the mounted squad. Men who know how to ride are accustomed to using the horse for the purpose of covering ground rapidly. Most mounted police work, however, is done with the horse in a walk or standing, and requires a different style of riding altogether. So it is with other types of police work. The fewer preconceived notions the police recruit has developed, the easier it is to train him in the peculiar requirements of police work generally. Mature men do not lend themselves to instruction and molding as readily as do the younger men, whose minds are more open and whose habits are less fixed.

It must be noted that the men who begin patrol work at an early age

have much the best chance of maintaining physical fitness until the end of twenty or twenty-five years of continuous service. Over 80 per cent. of the men of any police force continue in actual field work without promotion. Entering as patrolmen, they remain as patrolmen to the end. The man who enters the force at the age of twenty-one may be expected to measure up to the rigorous demands of his work until he has reached the age of forty-six, whereas allowances will likely be required for the man who begins at thirty or thirty-five and continues to the age of fifty-five or sixty. If for no other reason than to protect the city's investment in pension moneys allowed upon disability, there should be an effort to recruit the younger men in preference to the older ones. Field service in all hours and in all kinds of weather will much sooner bring disability to the man of fifty-five than to the man of forty-five.

The point that younger men are needed in the police department is strongly enforced by the experience of European cities. In London the minimum age for appointment to the force is twenty and the maximum twenty-seven. In Liverpool the minimum age is twenty-one and the maximum twenty-five. In Glasgow the maximum age is twenty-five, and in Manchester the maximum is twenty-eight. Paris has a maximum age of thirty, the higher limit being due to compulsory army service, which, under the old dispensation, took two years out of the young man's life.

#### TURNOVER IN THE PATROL FORCE

A further analysis of the histories of the men appointed during the years which we have been reviewing shows that the number of resignations during the first few years following appointment is excessive. Table 1 shows the record of voluntary separations from the service of men appointed in the given years.

The figures do not include the total number of separations. During this six-year period there were other resignations of men appointed in years prior to 1914 not included in the above calculation. These have not been included, as we are concerned only with showing the actual proportion of resignations for any one year's appointments. There are a few men dismissed from the department by order of the director of public safety who must be added to the voluntary resignations. The combined record of appointments, resignations, and dismissals for these years is given in Table 2.

This is a high turnover of personnel for a service supposed to be professional in character, one that is made attractive by reason of its guarantee against periods of unemployment and by offering retirement on pension after twenty-five years of continuous service. Notwithstanding

TABLE 1.—NUMBER OF APPOINTMENTS AND RESIGNATIONS OF MEN APPOINTED IN YEARS 1914, 1916, 1918, 1919, 1920

Year appointed		Resignations to the end of February, 1921												Grand totals
		During first year		During second year		During third year		After third year		Totals				
		No charges	Charges pending	No charges	Charges pending	No charges	Charges pending	No charges	Charges pending	No charges	Charges pending			
1914	56	4	3	3	1	5	7	19	4	23				
1916	28	4	..	4	..	3	3	14	1	15				
1918	72	15	2	3	4	..	..	18	6	24				
1919	206	36	4	8	5	..	..	44	9	53				
1920	186	27	10	..	..	..	..	27	10	37				

TABLE 2.—COMBINED RECORD OF APPOINTMENTS, RESIGNATIONS, AND DISMISSALS

Year appointed	Number appointed	Resignations to the end of February, 1921 <sup>1</sup>	Dismissals to the end of February, 1921 <sup>1</sup>	Percentages of separations by groups appointed in the given years	
				Exclusive of dismissals	Inclusive of dismissals
1914	56	23	2	41.0	44.6
1916	28	15	2	53.6	60.7
1918	72	24	1	33.3	34.7
1919	206	53	11	25.7	31.0
1920	186	37	6	19.9	23.1

<sup>1</sup> Figures include only persons appointed in the year designated, hence do not represent all resignations and dismissals in the department from 1914-1920.

these factors making for permanency of tenure, it is found that of the men appointed in 1914, 1916, and 1918, no less than one in three appointed in any one year had left the department by the beginning of 1921. Of the 1916 appointees, three out of every five resigned or were dismissed by 1921. Of the 1920 appointees, almost one-fourth of the number left the service for one cause or another within the first year of their appointment!

What are the causes of the large turnover of police personnel? In the first place, there may be cited the failure of a portion of the men to measure up to the demands of police work, resulting in dismissal or the initiation of disciplinary action leading to voluntary resignation. Approximately one-sixth of the 1916 group left the service for these reasons. The same was true of nearly one-fourth of the 1914 and 1918 groups, and slightly less than one-third of the 1919 and 1920 appointees. Again, rates of pay given to policemen during the years under review have not been sufficient to hold the men in the department. By 1920 it is true that the increase in salary brought police pay into line with salaries paid in many commercial employments. Whatever the rates of pay, it is safe to say that the salary schedules of the Cleveland force have never been determined on the basis of their adequacy to hold the men in contentment once they were drawn into the department. Moreover, salary schedules have been devised with the view to getting a given quota of men and not to getting men having personal qualifications particularly useful in police work.

A less tangible reason for the impermanency of tenure is that no adequate consideration of the nature of police work is given by the individual before entering upon it. As has been pointed out before, police employment is more often than not considered merely as a job to satisfy immediate needs. The resignations show that many recruits do not approach police work with any serious notion of beginning at the bottom round of a distinctive profession and developing a life career.

The police department is burdened, therefore, with a good proportion of men out of each group appointed, who are soon going to be discontented or who have no serious intention of performing creditable work as a basis for a career as policemen. The fault cannot properly be laid at the door of the men who apply for appointment. It is the business of the municipality, as the employer, to make its selections with thoroughgoing care rather than to pass out jobs to a given number of men who happen to want the job at the time and who have certain simple qualifications of physique and education. Yet there is no conscious effort on the part either of the civil service commission—which is primarily responsible— or of police officials to influence recruiting in this direction.



In this connection the practice in the London police department can well serve as a model. The utmost care is exercised by the London authorities in the selection of police recruits. Recruiting agents are constantly traveling from place to place in the country districts of England, and even in Scotland and Wales, looking for available men for the London force. They go about their business in workmanlike fashion, utilizing newspaper advertisements, and even bill-posters, and the greatest care is taken to weed out not only the unfit, from a physical and mental standpoint, but those who, in the judgment of the recruiting agents, give the impression that they are not looking upon the police service as a permanent profession.

In Cleveland, advertising for police recruits is of the most meager sort, consisting merely in a formal announcement in the papers that a competitive examination for entrance to the police department will be held on a date specified. For a while during the war some effort was made to use motion picture films to stimulate possible applicants, but this has been abandoned for the simple reason that there is now a sufficient number of applicants. The newspaper advertisement marks the end of the city's effort to attract men to the police service. Thereafter it is only a matter of measuring the men who present themselves. Whoever meets the requirements of residence, height, minimum and maximum weight and chest measurements, is entitled to continue in the examinations. These consist of a medical and physical examination as a qualifying test, and an educational examination, which is given to those who successfully pass the physical tests. The subjects of the examination, with the weights attaching to each one, are as follows: writing 1, spelling 1, arithmetic 1, practical questions 2, oral examination 1, muscular strength 1, military or naval experience in recent war and honorable discharge 1. Applicants making a final average rate of 70 per cent. or over are placed on a list of those eligible for appointment.

The examinations involve minimum standards. The tests really determine how far above the passable minimum standards the applicants stand and are not adjusted to measure the full capacity of the more capable applicants. Another evidence of the fact that the examinations are designed to accommodate minimum or qualifying standards rather than to measure maximum capacities is shown by the practice of giving the same kind of examination—not the same questions, however—regardless of whether there are 50 applicants or 1,000. Types of examination are not adjusted to changes in the supply of men nor is there any modification made in response to the need for selecting special types of men in the light of the department's requirements. Indeed, there is no

conversation between the officers of the civil service commission and of the police department on such matters.

As a result of the examinations applicants are divided roughly into two groups, the hopelessly unfit, who are promptly thrown out, and those who have made marks better than the minimum requirement. The latter are all retained on the eligible list, with certain technical limitations. The commission does not erect a sealing-wall which is heightened when applicants are many and which is made sufficiently difficult of scaling to measure the capacities of the superior competitors.

Finally, there is no effort, by either the civil service commission or the police department, to convey to prospective applicants any adequate notion of the prospects, demands, and possibilities of police service as a career. The men are taken as they come. If suitable men are not attracted, it is held to be regrettable. Standards of police work are then fashioned to fit the capacities of the men certified to the department by the civil service commission. There is never any attempt to set the standards in accordance with the actual demands of constructive and improved methods of policing, through special efforts to get the kind of men who measure up to these standards.

While the police department exercises no initiative in going after the men it wants, it does have some opportunity of looking into such personal qualifications of the applicants as are not shown in the civil service examination. Under the present arrangement the civil service commission requires the police department to make a report on a character investigation of each applicant who has successfully passed the examinations. This investigation is conducted by the commanding officers of the precincts in which the applicants have their residence, and is a more complete investigation than is conducted in most cities. This is the police department's sole opportunity, although in a limited and purely negative way, to set its own standards.

With the civil service list established, the appointing authority has an opportunity to exercise some choice in making selections, under the provision of the law which permits him to choose one out of three who are certified by the civil service commission as eligible. This privilege is generally waived, and the policy is followed of appointing in one, two, three order from the list. However, the wisdom of this discretion allowed the appointing authority has been abundantly justified in other cities, and as long as recruits to the department continue to come through the channel of the civil service commission, the provision should be maintained.

CIVIL SERVICE AS A SOURCE OF RECRUITS

As has been pointed out above, we are by no means satisfied with the way in which the civil service commission has discharged its obligations toward the police department. In spite of the fact that many of the commission's activities are prescribed by law in detailed fashion, its work has been too inelastic and stereotyped to obtain the best results. As a consequence, the department contains far too many men who are lacking in important qualifications necessary to a good policeman. It has been discouraging to examine the reports which the men are required to render in the course of their daily operations. Many of these reports show an utter lack of the ordinary intelligence demanded in making an observation the record of which becomes an official public document. A single illustrative example will suffice:

Nov. 16, 1920.

"First Precinct,  
Lieut. Huger.

"Sir: \* \* \* \* \*

"About 11:15 Sergt. Harwood went to the rear of the building & very shortly after that he came to the front again & that, that time a yong lady coming east was entering the building and I stoped her asking the questions as I was instructed to, this yong lady refused to give her name & the Sergt. interferred & said to this young lady to give me her name in which she did & about 11:30 or 11:40 a man coming west made an atempt to enter the hotel & this was Mr. —, we three stood there up till the time he left was about 12:05 a.m. & in the meantime about 11:50 another man came while the three of us were talking, this man I dont know his name & came there with a machine to my knowledge, & all of this time when Mr. — came, up till the time he left the sergt was still in the front of the — House, this is far as I can remember & about 12:15 or 12:20 A.M. I was ordered by Sergt Harwood to go to the rear of the building & tell the man in the rear to come to the front and that time this third man was still there.

"Respectfully,

\_\_\_\_\_  
"Patrolman."

However, we believe that as far as appointments to the force are concerned, the civil service commission can probably be more wisely employed than the police department itself. Generally speaking, civil service commissions, not only in Cleveland, but elsewhere, have done a great deal to raise the standards of eligibility in police appointments and to eliminate the unfit. Moreover, they relieve the police administrator of a vast burden of detail. The latter's whole concern is to secure raw recruits who can be turned into honest and intelligent policemen, and

any plan or machinery which will produce this material upon demand adds to the effectiveness of his administration. Arthur Woods, former police commissioner of New York, who cannot be charged with being overfriendly to civil service, defines its application to the problem of police appointments as follows: "It is undoubtedly about as good a method as any other for picking out qualified candidates, for the men come from all walks of life, and seemingly from every profession, trade, and job there is. No comparative record could be obtained, nor could the judgment of employers fairly be used to distinguish between one man and another, since there might be a thousand different employers for a thousand applicants, and as many varying standards as employers."

If, therefore, civil service could be looked upon as machinery for furnishing raw material, and if the police executive had the unchallenged right to reject, after probation, any candidates who proved unsatisfactory, there would be little in this phase of activity which could interfere with the principle of responsible leadership. Cleveland's civil service system needs a thorough overhauling and a keener appreciation of the tasks and responsibilities of the police department for which it selects recruits.

#### POLICE TRAINING SCHOOL

The department is to be commended for its full-time training course of eight weeks for recruits. A lieutenant of police, enthusiastic and ambitious for its successful promotion, is in immediate charge. One reason for the school's firmly established position is to be found in Chief Smith's healthy interest in its welfare. To him is due the credit for its original establishment a few years ago—a noteworthy achievement in the department's history.

Considering the resources that are available, the school for recruits is well conducted. There is need for better equipment, especially for physical training and for a larger staff of instructors. There is room, too, for considerable development or rather evolution of the school. In the first place, it should be more than a school for recruits. Indeed, it should be the department's university, providing instruction for veterans and officers, and such specialists as detectives and men of the mounted service. The idea should be to have a school in which all ranks should constantly be "freshening up"—to use Colonel Woods' expression—in police technique. The purpose of such courses should be to keep the officers from becoming "rusty," lest the recruits fresh from school be better versed in special subjects than their superiors. From time to time lectures might be given to members of various ranks by criminologists,

lawyers, identification experts, and other specialists in fields related to police work. Such special phases of police activity as discipline, preparation of records, and the giving of bail might also be discussed in occasional courses. To this plan was due the splendid efficiency of the New York force under Commissioner Woods, and its wide adoption in such cities as London and Liverpool proves its worth.

We suggest, too, that the school be developed in such a way as to become the staff agency of the department, serving as a personnel service division. The school is primarily engaged in converting into policemen the raw material furnished by civil service lists. What better agency is there for passing efficiently on the quality and adaptability of this raw material? If the personality tests, such as were recommended by the chief in his last annual report, are to be conducted, or psychological tests of one sort or another are to be held, the training school is the proper agency for conducting them.

In other words, the school should be constantly engaged in studying the problems relating to personnel. When the classes are not in session, specialists attached to the school might devote their time to working out efficiency record systems and doing other research work in connection with tests and instructions. Industrial concerns recognize the value of the investment in personnel service departments. The police department of Cleveland has a large enough force to justify an investment in the same sort of work.

CHAPTER V  
PROMOTION

THE SYSTEM OF PROMOTION

THE selection of recruits is but the first step in the provision of police personnel. Filling the quotas of special divisions in the department and filling the higher posts through promotion are the next steps. Regular assignment to the detective bureau is generally considered as a promotion by reason of the increased compensation allowed, but it is not technically a promotion since detectives are only detailed to the detective bureau and the men so detailed continue in the rank held at the time of their assignment.

Promotions are governed entirely by the rules and regulations of the civil service commission. These regulations provide that all promotions in the uniformed force of the police department—excluding only civilian employees—“shall be from class to class, from the lowest class to the highest,” within the force. Thus, promotion to any given rank in the department is restricted to the membership of the next lower rank, and it is, therefore, impossible to fill any post above the rank of patrolman by making appointments from outside the department.

All promotions are made as a result of competitive examinations conducted by the civil service commission. Eligible lists are furnished by the commission, and the director of public safety is obliged to make promotions from this list. Examinations given to applicants for promotion include the following subjects: “Writing, spelling, arithmetic, practical questions, as in the judgment of the commission pertain to the office to which said applicant seeks promotion; State laws and city ordinances pertaining to the duties of said office; rules and regulations of the department; seniority and record in the service of the applicant, and such other subjects or tests as the commission may prescribe.”<sup>1</sup>

A patrolman is not eligible to promotion to the rank of sergeant until after he has served three years as a patrolman. Sergeants and lieu-

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<sup>1</sup> Rule XVII, Sec. 5, of the Rules and Regulations of the Civil Service Commission of the city of Cleveland.

tenants must have served two years in their respective ranks before they are eligible for promotion to the next higher rank. A patrolman who has served as many as five years in the department is entitled to a marking of 100 per cent. on seniority as one of the subjects of the promotional examination. If a patrolman has served as many as three years, but less than five, his marking in seniority is reduced 10 per cent. for each year less than five. In a similar way sergeants who are examined for promotion to the rank of lieutenant are entitled to a marking of 100 per cent. on seniority after the completion of seven years' service in the department, two years of which must have been served in the rank of sergeant, and a reduction of 10 per cent. in the seniority marking is made for each year less than the seven served in the department. Applicants for promotion to captaincy must have served ten years in the department to obtain a marking of 100 per cent. on seniority, and 10 per cent. is deducted for each year less than ten years served.

The "record" of an applicant for promotion, another factor counted in promotional examinations, is determined solely upon the basis of the applicant's disciplinary record in the department. Thus, if the record shows that the applicant has not been charged with a violation of the rules and regulations of the department within a period of five years immediately preceding the date of application for promotion, he is entitled to a marking of 100 per cent. on record. The regulations further provide that if the applicant "shall have been within such five years under charges for and found guilty of any offense specified in articles 1 to 12 inclusive, of Rule XIII, of the rules of the department,<sup>1</sup> he shall have charged against him 20 per cent. (meaning 20 per cent. deduction from the record rating of 100 per cent.) for each of such charges; and for

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<sup>1</sup> Articles 1 to 12 inclusive, which are deemed specific cause for suspension from the department under charges, are as follows:

Art. 1. For intoxication while on duty or while in uniform.

Art. 2. For being a user of intoxicating liquor to excess.

Art. 3. For being engaged directly or indirectly as a vendor of intoxicating liquors.

Art. 4. For wilful disobedience of any order lawfully issued to him by a superior officer in the department.

Art. 5. For incompetency to perform the duties of his office.

Art. 6. For conviction of any crime or misdemeanor against the laws of the United States or the laws of the State of Ohio or for conviction of any violation of a lawful ordinance of the city of Cleveland.

Art. 7. For making known any proposed movement of the department to any person not a member of this department.

Art. 8. For unnecessary and unwarranted violence to a prisoner.

conviction of any offense specified in articles 13 to 21 inclusive<sup>1</sup> of said rule XIII, he shall have charged against him ten (10) per cent. for each of such charges.”<sup>2</sup>

### LIMITATIONS AND DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM

The practice of giving some credit for seniority is to be commended, and the markings for seniority ratings are reasonably scheduled. That portion of the examination which embraces the calculation of an applicant's "record" is a disguised attempt to permit the applicant's work and experience to have some weight in an examination looking to promotion. As a matter of fact, it is nothing more than a penalty schedule—wholly negative in character. It is nothing short of absurd to imply that the present civil service examination for promotion in the police service gives any credit for meritorious work performed by members of the department who are being examined.

A mere absence of disciplinary charges indicates nothing as to the character of work done by the applicant for promotion, nor, indeed, whether much of any sort of work was done. Under the present scheme of record rating the mediocre man, if he avoid an open breach of the rules, as most of them can do without great effort, is placed on an equal footing, as far as record goes, with the energetic, able, and efficient officer who has also kept out of trouble. No attempt is made to give credit in a

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Art. 9. For cowardice or lack of energy of such character as to amount either to incompetency or to gross neglect of duty.

Art. 10. For sleeping while on duty.

Art. 11. For wilfully or continually violating any of the rules or regulations of the department.

Art. 12. For habitually contracting debts which he is unable or unwilling to pay or for refusing or without reasonable excuse to discharge his lawful obligations.

<sup>1</sup> Articles 13 to 21 inclusive of Rule XIII are also specific causes for suspension. They are as follows:

Art. 13. For intoxication while not on active duty.

Art. 14. For indecent, profane, or harsh language while on duty or in uniform.

Art. 15. For disrespect shown to a superior officer in the department.

Art. 16. For any neglect of duty.

Art. 17. For absence without leave.

Art. 18. For gossiping about the affairs of the department.

Art. 19. For conduct unbecoming an officer, patrolman, or a gentleman.

Art. 20. For conduct subversive to the good order and discipline of the department.

Art. 21. For neglecting to report his change of residence to the officer in charge of his precinct.

<sup>2</sup> From rules and regulations of the civil service commission.



positive way for valuable work performed. Instead of allowing the mere absence of wrongdoing the highest mark that is given for police "record," a clean disciplinary record should be rated as a normal median. Failure to measure up to the least that is expected of every member of the department—compliance with the rules—should apply as a subtraction in the shape of demerits from the median rating. But demerits should be only a part of a man's record. Provision should be made for showing the converse side of the record by taking into account the opposite of neglectfulness, disobedience, and the performance of improper police action. In other words, credit for meritorious work should be given in the form of an addition to the normal median rating. It is only in this way that a premium can be placed on accomplishing more than the avoidance of wrongdoing.

Considering the promotional examination as a whole, we believed it is not well adapted for the wise selection of men possessing qualities fitting them for the tasks which promotion imposes upon them; that, as far as the mere attainment of promotion is concerned, no adequate reward, hence no adequate stimulus, is given for the accomplishment of superior police work; that opportunities for preparation and for obtaining high marks in the examination are unequal; that an examination for a rank where no knowledge is given the applicant of what specific duty he may be assigned to perform—whether patrol, traffic, detective, or crime prevention duty—is an unsound practice; and finally that responsibility for the appraisal of the personnel assets of the department and utilization of those assets through promotion are too far removed from the official who is responsible for directing the men.

The present scheme of having an independent body apply the tests which determine eligibility for promotion was devised primarily as a protection against a possible display of favoritism in making promotions. The plan has met with success in so far as it has minimized political, social, and religious influences as factors in determining promotion. This, however, is a purely negative achievement. On the positive side there is little if anything to show that there is an advantage to be gained in turning over the matter of promotions to an outside body. The written examination and the seniority and disciplinary record fall short in measuring the qualifications most needed in superior officers, for example, integrity, executive ability, and a natural disposition to assume the initiative. These qualities are all important to men filling the higher posts in a police department, yet they are not reckoned with in the promotional examinations conducted by the civil service commission. Instead, facility in arithmetic and spelling and ability to answer certain

commonplace practical questions are the measurements applied. The examination at present tests what an applicant knows. What he can do, what he has the *spirit* to do, and what he has done are significant considerations which are altogether neglected.

Judgment of fitness for promotion in work where initiative and zeal play so large a part must take into account the experience basis for determining differences between the hard workers and the lazy, between the thorough ones and the hasty or careless, between the backward-pulling, disgruntled dispositions and the enthusiastic, forward-looking men. Any method of selection which omits this test is inadequate and hence unfair to the men involved, and inimicable to the welfare of the department.

It is possible to cram for an examination, which is certain to be much like the examinations previously held for promotion to the same rank, and the applicants devote much time and thought in preparing for it. In this connection it is to be observed that the lieutenant, for example, who has an assignment in a quiet precinct or at some post which allows him considerable leisure, has the important advantage of time at his disposal during which he may prepare for an examination. In this way he may easily secure an advantage over a lieutenant who is energetically carrying on his work in a busy precinct and continuing it to such hours that he has neither energy nor time left for productive study. The latter man is building up an experience in the practical operation of the day's routine, but it stands him in no stead when he is called to compete in a promotional examination.

Under the civil service arrangement examinations for a given rank are held in advance of the actual need for making a promotion. The grades and standings on the eligible list for promotion to, and including the rank of captain of police, established as a result of the examination markings, remain in force for two years, although, after it has stood for one year, the commission has the right to abolish the list and hold another examination. Accordingly, the practical questions section of the examination must relate in a very general way to the requirements of the rank involved, for it is not known in what branch of the service the applicant will be employed. There is no opportunity, therefore, to weigh the specific needs of a given post of duty and pick a man then and there to fill it. This prevents the promotion of men within a single branch of specialized work, as in the vice bureau, detective bureau, or traffic squad. If, for example, it were determined that an additional captain of detectives was needed, the place would have to be filled either by transferring some captain from another branch of the service or by taking a man from

the list of lieutenants eligible for promotion to the rank of captain. If a lieutenant of detectives does not happen to be in one, two, or three order on the list, then there is no opportunity to promote a man with detective experience. Most of the captains recently assigned to commands in the detective bureau have been taken directly from commands of the uniformed patrol service. Some had never had any detective experience. The same would be true in making a promotion in any other branch of specialized work.

Perhaps the most serious objection to the present methods of making promotions is that the choosing of men to fill the higher posts is so far removed from the directing head of police operations. An independent body determines who the subordinate leaders of police business shall be after tests which, as has been shown, do not consider the more important personal attributes with which only the police administrators alone can be acquainted. Actual choice, with a range of one out of three eligibles, is left to the director of public safety. The chief of police, acting as the administrative head of the department, has nothing to say about it except in cases where there is such happy accord between the director and chief that the director may ask the chief for his recommendations of choice. The net result is that there is no one exercising the practical police point of view in looking out for evidences of ability in individuals who indicate fitness for promotion to particular posts of duty. Where the administrative head has no concern about naming the men who shall be promoted, he will spend no time in making appraisals. He will simply take the men who are given him by the civil service commission and do the best he can.

This situation relieves the head of the department of what should be one of the most important of his tasks, if not the most important, namely, the intimate supervision of the work of his subordinates with a view to developing the maximum use of whatever special abilities may be discovered in them.

Stephen O'Meara, who for many years served creditably as police commissioner of Boston, defined the situation as follows: "No written examination can possibly disclose the qualities and habits which are of vital importance in a police officer of rank and can be known only to his superiors. Among them are judgment, coolness, moral as well as physical courage, executive ability, capacity for the command of men, sobriety, and other moral qualities, standing among his associates and in the community, powers of initiative, temper, integrity, energy, courtesy."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> From a private memorandum.

Theodore Roosevelt, in his *Autobiography*, expressed himself in similar vein. "I absolutely split off from the bulk of my professional civil service reform friends when they advocated written competitive examinations for promotion. In the police department I found these examinations a serious handicap in the way of getting the best men promoted, and never in any office did I find that the written competitive promotion examination did any good. The reason for a written competitive entrance examination is that it is impossible for the head of the office, or the candidate's prospective immediate superior, himself to know the average candidate or to test his ability. But when once in office, the best way to test any man's ability is by long experience in seeing him actually at work. His promotion should depend upon the judgment formed of him by his superiors."<sup>1</sup>

### RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended, therefore, that the matter of promotions be put squarely up to the director of police. He should be enabled to make use of the civil service commission as a staff or agency equipped to make certain limited measurements. But he should be allowed to place his own valuations on the tests made by the commission and make any other tests he may see fit in order to arrive at his decisions regarding promotions. Under such an arrangement the civil service commission might be asked to conduct examinations which would really amount to qualifying examinations based on certain minimum qualification standards. The police head could then add to these results the estimates of a candidate's worth, based on lines not covered by the civil service examination.

It is further recommended that there be established a board, to be known as a board of promotion, consisting of three to five members of the higher ranks in the department. It should be the duty of this board to make recommendations for promotion to the director of police after thorough investigation and examination or series of examinations as may seem necessary. The members of this board should be designated by the administrative head of the department to serve in such capacity at his pleasure. We do not wish to recommend in too specific detail what the composition of this board should be. If the principle be established, there may be many modifications in a scheme designed to carry it out. It is suggested, however, that in addition to the chief line officer of the uniformed force the head of the police training school, as the depart-

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<sup>1</sup>*Autobiography*, p. 161.

ment's specialist in matters of personnel, be included in the membership of the board. Of course, it would be necessary to have the board composed only of members having a rank always equal to and generally higher than the rank to which promotion is to be considered. In the case of promotions in the detective service, the chief of detectives and possibly another detective officer should be included in the board's membership. For promotions to posts in the patrol service, officers of the uniformed force should be substituted for the detective officers. Similar substitutions should be made in designating the board's membership when considering promotion to other special branches of the service.

Preliminary to the examination made by the board of promotion, commanding officers of the various units in the department should be required to submit names of such members of their commands as are deemed worthy of consideration for promotion. These recommendations, together with such efficiency records of the candidates as may be available, should be reviewed by the board of promotions. Provision should be made for allowing any member of an eligible rank who may not be endorsed by his commanding officer to make application to the board to have his name considered for promotion. The board could establish weights for seniority and prepare a schedule of merits and demerits to apply in making its recommendations. There are no measurements now used by the civil service which could not be used by a board of promotion, but the board of promotion can employ measurements that are not and cannot be employed by an outside civil service commission.

Recommendations for promotion should be delivered by the board to the administrative head of the department, who should have unrestricted authority to accept or reject the board's recommendations.

We submit that the establishment of a board of promotion, composed of members of the professional force, whose duty it is to pass judgment on the quality of men as policemen and the quality of their work, will accomplish four highly desirable results: First, such a scheme would introduce expert appraisal of fitness for work with which the appraisers are themselves thoroughly familiar. Secondly, it would tend to stimulate a feeling of self-reliance in the police personnel and imbue the higher officers with a heightened sense of responsibility for promoting the best interest of their profession. Thirdly, it would be the first step in the direction of setting up machinery which would almost certainly evolve standards and means of measuring the efficiency of policemen. When all members of the force realize that what they do, as observed by their superiors who are competent to judge, alone counts for advancement, there will be a new tone in the whole department. Fourthly, a board of

promotion would eliminate favoritism in making choices for promotion perhaps more thoroughly than does the civil service commission. Policemen will be the first to welcome an escape from outside interference. They do not need barriers to keep them from rushing to influences which they know have always worked for demoralization and the disrepute of their activity. They have in the past affected alignments with outside political interests only because those interests had connections with elected officers who determined appointments, promotions, and assignments to favored posts. But once the whole job of policing is left to the personnel responsible for it,—including, of course, a civilian administrative head,—without the introduction of outside connections that make for interference, the professional force will show that it has a natural pride in its work, that it desires a good name and an efficient department, more, indeed, than other persons whose standing and interests do not rise and fall with the standing of the police department.

Lest it be thought that this recommendation for a board of promotion is of too radical a character, attention is called to the fact that this same system is now and has been for many years in operation in Boston and other American cities, where it has worked with unqualified success. Similarly in London the non-competitive system of promotions is the method in vogue. There the civil service commission enters the situation only upon the invitation of the police commissioner, to assist the department in weeding out men whose lack of education makes them unfit for promotion, and the examination which it gives is merely to test the general educational capacity of the applicant. A second examination in the elements of police duty, both oral and written, is given by a board of police officials, and those who emerge from these two tests are eligible to promotion, although the commissioner, of course, makes his own choices from the list.

Some such system as this is necessary if our police departments are to be saved from lifelessness and dry rot. With promotions the result of real excellence in police work under the watchful eye of superiors, much of the present inertia would disappear.

## CHAPTER VI

### DISCIPLINE

**T**HE term discipline as here used includes both its narrower and broader meanings. Discipline in its narrow sense relates only to punishment administered for some violation of the rules and regulations or dereliction of duty. This punishment may take the form of a cancellation of vacation days, suspension without pay, demotion, or dismissal from the department. In its wider meaning the word discipline embraces the conduct and bearing of members of the force in the performance of their duty and the manner in which the force responds to the leadership of the various officers in charge of operations.

In its wider meaning, therefore, the discipline of a police force is of far-reaching significance. The essential basis of all good police work is the character and physical power of the individual men. As Arthur Woods says: "They must be strong of body, stout of soul—sturdy, two-fisted specimens, knowing how to hold themselves in restraint even under severe provocation, yet prompt and powerful to act with force and uncompromising vigor when only that will maintain order and protect the law-abiding." In other words, alertness, keenness, self-restraint, and vigor are the essential earmarks of a good police force.

It would be impossible to claim that these characteristics are particularly noticeable in Cleveland. We have observed a sufficient number of instances of laxity in police work to warrant the general conclusion that something is radically wrong with the standard of discipline. No effort was made to spy on the men for the purpose of detecting flaws in their conduct, but many casual observations were made of the men as they went about their work on the streets, in station houses, and at police headquarters. It was not at all uncommon to find two policemen talking together while on post duty, and carrying on long conversations with citizens while on post seems to be a habit. Some conversation with citizens is, of course, necessary, but reference is here made only to those conversations the manner of which clearly showed that the discussion was not confined to lines of police duty. These conversations occurred on posts covering the busiest streets as well as in the more quiet districts.

On one occasion the traffic cornerman at the intersection of Superior

Avenue, N. E. and the Public Square was off duty from 11 A. M. until some time after 11.15 A. M. A gale was blowing at the time, so that there was some danger to pedestrians in crossing the street, as automobiles and street cars were moving without any regulation. During all of this time the patrolman who was on post at the southwest corner of the post-office building was engaged in conversation with a citizen, with his back turned to what really amounted to an emergency situation on the uncovered traffic post a few feet away. Many patrolmen while on post duty were observed leaning against posts or buildings as if too tired to stand erect. The frequency with which needlessly prolonged conversation and other forms of idling occur reflects discredit on the work of patrol sergeants. Either the sergeants are not aware of what constitutes alert patrol, or they are too lenient in their supervision.

On the afternoon of February 21 a building in process of demolition at East Sixth Street and Superior Avenue, N. E., collapsed, killing and injuring several men. A large crowd gathering to view the rescue work necessitated a considerable detail of policemen to keep the crowd back, so as to allow firemen to work and to protect the people against the danger of the unsafe building walls. Crowds were allowed to gather on the sidewalks across Superior Avenue from the building, and no adequate measures were taken to keep open passageways on the crossing sidewalks. A patrolman was stationed at the southwest corner of Sixth and Superior. He was watching the firemen at work about the wrecked building with the same sort of preoccupation as that manifested by the crowd blocking the sidewalk. He was not doing as well as the crowd, in fact, for he was chewing tobacco and violating the law by expectorating continually in the street. A sergeant forced his way through the crowd and instructed this patrolman to clear a passageway. The patrolman made a grimace, as if in disapproval of having his attention called to the fact that he was supposed to be policing the crowd. He started a few citizens moving, but never properly cleared the passageway.

At the same place, on the day following, two other policemen, one a foot patrolman and the other a horse-mounted man, were observed while they were policing a crowd which had gathered to witness a parade of the Cleveland Grays. Both men were facing the parade, and as the flag-bearers' detachment passed the policemen failed to salute the national emblem, in careless disregard of the instructions covering honors to be rendered by members of the force when in uniform and on duty.

One more example of slovenly attitude may be cited. A squad of nine men was observed at the 2.15 P. M. roll call assembly in a precinct station. While the officer who was holding the roll call read the orders



to this outgoing platoon, three of the men who were chewing tobacco stepped out of their line formation in order to expectorate. Another was seen whispering to the man standing in line beside him as the description of persons wanted and alarms giving information of all kinds was being read by the officer in charge. An attitude of this sort makes a joke of discipline. It makes the uniform a cheap pretense.

These instances have not been given in any captious spirit. It is submitted, however, that although these minor derelictions may be small in themselves, the very frequency of careless, slovenly, and inattentive actions indicates a general absence of good discipline. The whole force needs toning up. It needs to be infused with vigor and alertness. The men should be gotten onto their toes. The department's morale should be stiffened with the same spirit that Arthur Woods put into the New York force during his administration. This means discipline; it means the strict observance of the letter of the department's regulations; it means the exaction of a full measure of compliance with police duty. It brings with it no hardships. On the contrary, it promotes an esprit de corps that makes for the happiness and self-respect of the entire force.

#### RECORD OF FORMAL DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS

An analysis was made of major cases of disciplinary action which had resulted in suspension from duty on the order of the chief of police and subsequent trial by the director of public safety. There were 64 members of the force tried during the year 1920. One member was tried twice during the year and two other members were charged with a second offense within the year and dismissed from the department, having signed after the first trial a resignation to be accepted by the director at his pleasure. Thus, there were 67 offenses subject to the trial judgment of the director committed by 64 persons during 1920. In a number of cases more than one charge was preferred against a single offender. The nature of the charges preferred in the 67 trials is shown in the following tabulation:

Intoxication and drinking in uniform	23
Intoxicated while on duty	12
Intoxicated while off duty	8
Drinking in uniform while on duty	3
Neglect of duty (allowing prisoner to escape, not using due diligence, etc., etc.)	9
Off patrol (sleeping, sitting in stores, etc.)	11
Reporting late; failure to ring duty calls, etc.	11
Disobedience	9
Use of indecent language	5
Feigning sickness	3

Shooting craps or running crap game	3
Interfering with an officer on duty	2
Miscellaneous	9
Beating horse; offering to permit the making of whisky in return for payment of money; refusing to pay street-car fare while not in uniform; abusing pool-room keeper, etc.	

An examination of the previous record of the 64 men tried in 1920 shows that 25 of them had not been previously charged with offenses. The remaining 39 had been charged at one time or another with 99 offenses, as shown by the following tabulation:

Drinking and intoxicated	24
Off post	12
Neglect of duty	11
Late to roll call	10
Failure to ring duty calls	6
Indecent and abusive language	6
Disobedience	5
Failure to report to prosecute	4
Feigning sickness	3
Improper performance of duty	2
Miscellaneous	16

The results of the 67 trials held in 1920 were as follows: two members were reinstated without punishment, being found not guilty; in 38 trials some form of punishment was administered and the members retained in the department. Of the remaining 27 trials, 21 resulted in dismissal from the service of the persons tried, and six members resigned before the date for trial, while charges were pending against them. The nature of the punishment imposed in cases other than cases of dismissal is shown below:

Reprimanded, suspended four days, fined ten days' vacation and required to sign a resignation to take effect when accepted by the director	1
Reprimanded, suspended four to thirteen days, fined two to six days' vacation	2
Reprimanded, suspended four to six days' vacation	2
Suspended four to thirty-five days, fined four days' vacation to all vacation for a period of five months, and required to sign a resignation to take effect when accepted by the director	10
Suspended three to thirty days, fined one day's vacation to all vacation for nine weeks	17
Suspended five to forty-five days and demoted	2
Suspended nine to fourteen days	2
Fined three days' vacation to vacation for a period of one month, and required to sign a resignation	2

Considering the cases involving a charge of intoxication and drinking in uniform, it is found that out of 23 cases, only four resulted in dis-

missal from the department. One resigned while charges were pending; eight received a sentence of suspension from duty for a definite period, fine of days off or vacation, and in addition were required to sign a resignation to be made effective at the pleasure of the director. The remaining 11 were suspended and fined days off or vacation. Since some punishment was levied in all cases, it would appear that proof of the charges was furnished to the director in each case.

The record for the first five months of 1921 is much like that of 1920. Intoxication cases from January through May, 1921, numbered 11. The records show that in a majority of the cases the member accused was intoxicated or drinking while on active duty. These 11 trials resulted in the dismissal of four members. In the case of one member whose previous record showed charges of intoxication on several occasions, the penalty was suspension for five days, fine of two days' pay, and loss of the next four days off duty. In another case charging intoxication and being off post the punishment was suspension for ten days and fine of five days' pay. Intoxication is a very serious offense in police business. A policeman who has possession neither of his wits nor of his self-control is worse than useless. Indeed, it is nothing less than shocking for a policeman, with all the wide powers which his office implies, to be under the influence of liquor. A man who cannot resist the temptation to become intoxicated while on duty is not fit to wear the uniform, however insignificant the offense may appear, or however worthy the man may be for other employment.

The London police force long ago adopted the principle of making intoxication while on duty the occasion for immediate dismissal. No excuse is accepted. The same rule could wisely be adopted in Cleveland. Certainly the penalties imposed in Cleveland for intoxication by the civil service commission during 1920 were not sufficient to reduce the rate of offenses in 1921, nor will the punishments imposed in 1921 convey to the members of the force any adequate appreciation of the seriousness of their offense.

#### APPEALS

The decision of the director of public safety is not final in the event that the member tried desires to appeal his case to the civil service commission. No case resulting in a punishment less than dismissal or demotion was appealed to the commission during 1920. However, in something more than half of the cases resulting in dismissal or demotion such an appeal was taken, and with much success. The civil service commission affirmed the judgment of the director in seven cases, but

disaffirmed his ruling in six cases. Four patrolmen who had been dismissed from the service were reinstated, and two sergeants who had been demoted to the rank of patrolman were restored to the rank of sergeant by order of the civil service commission.

A brief résumé of the facts pertaining to the cases in which the commission disaffirmed the ruling of the director follows:

1. Patrolman — was dismissed after trial on the charge of refusing to arrest a woman who, he knew, had stolen a ring and of accepting custody of the ring. This patrolman's previous disciplinary record disclosed that he had been reported some 15 times—late, several times; off post, several times; having debts of long standing, slapping a news-boy, and failing in appearance to prosecute. He was reinstated by the civil service commission with a forfeiture of six weeks' salary. In other words, the civil service commission substituted its own judgment for the judgment of the director of public safety.

2. Patrolman — was dismissed after trial on a charge of having visited a known prostitute in a city hospital and interceding with an attending doctor on her behalf while in an intoxicated condition. Previous record shows charges of intoxication and ungentlemanly conduct. The civil service commission reinstated him in the service without penalty.

3. Patrolman — was dismissed on a charge of refusing to pay his street-car fare when not in full uniform. Doubtless this charge was viewed in the light of this patrolman's previous record, which follows: charged with undue use of blackjack; feigning sickness; twice failed to report to prosecute; received money for the performance of regular police duty; reporting late; making false report; using abusive language. He was reinstated by the civil service commission.

4. Patrolman — was dismissed after trial on a charge of failure to patrol and ring duty calls. His previous record shows: absence from post; late at roll call; feigning sickness; failed to charge another with violation of law; intoxicated; off patrol; failure to ring duty calls; drunk and picking fight; drinking; off patrol. The civil service commission reinstated him.

5. Sergeant — was suspended for six weeks and demoted to rank of patrolman as a result of charges of disobedience, leaving a post before he should, and failure to prefer charges against a patrolman. Restored by the civil service commission to rank of sergeant.

6. Sergeant — was suspended and demoted to rank of patrolman following charges of neglect of duty and unnecessary conversation with citizens. Restored by the civil service commission to rank of sergeant.

Incidentally, one of the cases above cited affords striking illustration of the present chaotic conditions in the police department due to divided leadership. The chief of police evidently felt that a violation by a superior officer of the department's rule in regard to the holding of unnecessary conversation with a citizen gave evidence of such officer's unfitness to do supervisory work. Accordingly, the chief, in preferring charges, recommended demotion. There was no disputing the technical guilt of the officer, and the director ordered demotion in compliance with the chief's recommendation. However, in delivering formal notice of judgment the director completely vitiated his attempt to uphold the chief when he stated in the letter which was made public that he did not approve of the judgment which he himself had rendered. The following is an extract from the letter: "While there may be some doubt as to whether the mere conversing with citizens for this period of time, when supervising detail policemen, constitutes neglect of duty within the meaning of the rules and regulations of the police department and the city charter, I am satisfied that you were indiscreet in your conduct on this occasion, and I therefore have resolved all doubts against you in the interest of strict discipline in the police department. My finding is that you are guilty of violation of Article 16 of Rule 13, as charged. Such finding is made for disciplinary reasons upon the recommendation of the chief of police, although I believe the punishment is severe for the offense committed."

It is small wonder that the disciplined member in the case just cited appealed to the civil service commission and that the commission reversed the judgment of the director when he himself believed it too severe. We have here, therefore, one head of the department determining that satisfactory standards are not being met and demanding a penalty; another head interpreting the issue without having standards of his own; and a third body in no way responsible for administration overruling both.

The record of cases appealed to the civil service commission in 1921 is even worse than that for 1920. At the time the survey tabulation was made, four cases had been appealed to the commission. Three of these cases involved dismissal from the service and one demotion in rank. Two of the dismissed members were reinstated, and the officer demoted was restored to rank by order of the commission. In only one case out of four was the judgment of the director sustained.

Obviously, the civil service commission must make its decisions without any thought of the defendant's value as a reliable policeman. It must confine its considerations, as would a court of law, to the single

charge at hand. From the police point of view the specific charge covering an offense may confirm a well-grounded distrust or lack of confidence in a certain policeman; the last charge may be the final proof of unfitness. The civil service commission, however, does not assume the point of view of the police official. Moreover, it brings no responsibility for achieving police results into its deliberations and measures offenses by standards which are bound to be more lenient than can reasonably be employed in police discipline. It views offenses as mistakes and transgressions that would not be so grave, perhaps, in other lines of work. It often appears to overlook the significance of such offenses in a policeman and the demand of good conduct and right morals which the policeman's peculiar tasks present.

So long as the civil service commission in Cleveland is permitted to impose its own standards of personal fitness for police work, good discipline in the department cannot be attained. Neither the chief of police nor the director can do away with the weak links in the department's chain under the present arrangement, whereby final authority in matters of discipline is given to an outside body having no connection with police work and no intimate appreciation of its problems.

It must be pointed out, moreover, that the difficulty of civil service usurpation extends far beyond the particular cases handled by the commission. Efforts on the part of the head of the police department to improve police discipline and standards of conduct are hindered in all of the border-line cases for the simple reason that fear of failure in being supported by the civil service commission makes for hesitation in initiating disciplinary action and for tolerance of much that it is desired to correct and improve. With the recent year's record of reinstatement of policemen whom the chief and director have adjudged to be unqualified for the performance of satisfactory police work, is it any wonder that the chief is hesitant in taking adequate measures to correct minor evidences of poor discipline? And what is the effect of a ruling by the civil service commission that while a policeman may be guilty of refusing to swear out a warrant as ordered by his superior officer, demotion in rank is too severe a penalty to be imposed? The obvious effect is that those members who are least valuable to the department can snap their fingers in the faces of their superiors and pay only so much allegiance and obedience to them as would be required by the civil service commission.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The remedy for strengthening the morale and improving the discipline of the department lies in transferring final authority in matters of discipline from an uninformed, irresponsible, politically appointed civil service commission to a single responsible, expert administrative head of the police force. As far as its disciplinary functions are concerned, the civil service scheme has been fully tried in Cleveland, and we submit that it has been found wanting. It is recommended, therefore, that full powers of disciplinary action be vested in the director of the department of police, and that a trial board, composed of officers of the professional force, be designated by the director to try delinquent members and submit findings, with recommendations to him. The director should have the power to accept, reject, or modify the recommendations of the trial board.

We recognize that objection will be made in some quarters that if so much power is given to a single police head in matters of promotion and discipline, he will abuse it by interjecting elements of political favoritism, and that giving members of the police force a share in determining these matters is dangerous. This danger is admitted, but we shall never solve the police problem in America until we give honest and effective leadership an opportunity to show what it can do. There is no chance for progressive improvement in a police department if the hands of the responsible executive are tied in his dealings with his men. Here again we must turn to Boston for an example of a rational system. As we have seen, complaints against members of the force are heard by a special trial board of three captains appointed by the police commissioner. The commissioner, however, is always supreme. He can at any time change the personnel of the trial board, order a new trial, or set aside the recommendations of the board in regard to the punishment to be imposed. His word is final, and from it there is no appeal to a higher civil authority. On no other basis can responsibility be centered and a police force be rid of useless or dishonest employees. To divide responsibility with a civil service commission, a mayor, a court, or any other authority, is to sow the seed of demoralization and to make real success impossible for any administrator, no matter how able.

Briefly, we do not believe that large strides in the improvement of the police service can be accomplished in Cleveland under the general assumption that:

1. Cleveland can only have public servants who are politically minded and whose natural dishonesty must be checked and guarded against at all times.

2. That members of the police force who do the work can never know their job as well as persons on the outside, for example, newspapermen and politicians, and that policemen have little or no natural respect for themselves or pride in the success of their work.

3. That the public service is only worthy of mediocre men, and no attempt need to be made to get superior men.

4. That power and authority necessary to do a given job well cannot be entrusted to a public servant.



## CHAPTER VII

### UNIFORM PATROL SERVICE

**P**OLICE operations will be discussed under four headings, representing four functions of a police department's work, viz., uniform patrol service, detective bureau operations, special activities, including crime prevention work, and the secretarial division.

Patrol by members of the Cleveland uniform force is a matter largely influenced by tradition. Little change in the method of distributing the patrol force or in supervising its operations has occurred within many years. Some improvements have recently been made in the reporting of work performed by the patrol force, although slight use is made of this information; for the most part it becomes merely a matter of record and is not employed for purposes of administrative control. While there have been substantially no changes in police patrol practices, or in the geographic distribution of the force by precincts, there have occurred many marked changes in conditions prevailing in Cleveland.

It is not unusual for a migration of population to occur which completely alters the police problem of a district. The influx of negroes, which has occurred in the Eighth Precinct, presents a new police problem, and so does the mixture of races in the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Precincts, lying southeast of the business center of the city. The character of these areas has so changed in a short time as to alter completely the demands made upon the police department. Again, there have been instances of rapid change from good residential districts, with a permanent population, to boarding-house and furnished-room districts, accommodating a transient population. This has been true in the Fourth Precinct, which has become in recent years a much livelier district as far as calls upon the police service are concerned. Then, on the other hand, there are changes in certain limited districts which tend to reduce the need of police attention. Some areas change from populous residential districts to manufacturing or warehouse centers. The police problem is greatly altered in a given precinct, as in the case of a portion of the Fifth, for example, when several rows of tenement houses are torn down and a factory erected in their stead.

Not only has the character of districts changed in the past twenty years, but changes in methods of transportation have altered the problem of police work. Years ago there was little traveling at night, and identification of those who did travel was comparatively easy, whereas now the number of people moving about after dark has increased a thousandfold. The use of the automobile alone has revolutionized the police problem. The movement of automobiles must be regulated to promote safety; they must be guarded from theft; and increasing vigilance is necessary because criminals make use of them in the commission of crimes.

Notwithstanding all of these changes in the objectives of policing, the means and methods of policing in Cleveland remain practically unaltered. There has been no modification of police arrangements to correspond with the kaleidoscopic changes brought about by shifting populations and new inventions. One gets the impression in Cleveland that police organization is merely a conventional arrangement, sanctioned by usage and traditions, but with little relation to needs or neighborhoods. It looks as if it had been wrenched from widely different surroundings and poorly fitted to its new environment. The admirable adaptation of means to end, of machinery to purposes, which one finds in many European departments, is conspicuously lacking. In brief, methods and organization are not fitted to new social and criminal conditions.

It is absurd to saddle on a single official the deficiencies due to so glaring a disparity between need and system. But the new system must be worked out and administered by a new head, capable of understanding the inadequacies of the antiquated existing system and sufficiently resourceful and commanding to afford Cleveland a police department adapted to its modern conditions.

A leadership of imagination and creative intelligence is urgently needed. Under such leadership one of the first steps in reorganization would undoubtedly be a restudying and recasting of the present patrol beat boundary lines. Many patrol beats have had the same boundaries for years. Indeed, most precinct stations do not have a beat map, and even the officers are often not familiar with the exact location of the patrol posts. When, after a thorough study of present conditions and present needs, the beats are revamped, they should be left open for future changes. A beat should not be reckoned as a permanently fixed area, but should be subject to readjustment at any time in the discretion of the captain of the precinct after approval by the chief of police. Patrol beats should be laid out in the light of the ordinary demands of

each particular beat for police protection, the number of patrolmen available for duty, and the methods of patrol that may be in use or may be put into use.

In laying out patrol beats all information in regard to street blocks should be available. Such information is not now to be had in the police department. It is recommended that a card record description of every block within each precinct be prepared under the direction of the captain of the precinct, giving the following information:

- Length of block
- Kind of paving
- Kind of traffic
- General description of buildings
- Kind of street lighting
- Population statistics as to total number, nationality, number of families, permanent population, transient population
- List of such important burglary risks as banks, jewelry-stores, warehouses, etc.
- List of places to be inspected by the police, as pool-rooms, clubs, dance halls, cigar-stores with back rooms, pawn shops, etc.

There should then be a space for entering the crime record on the block description card, showing separately the number of complaints of misdemeanors and felonies and the number of arrests classified by misdemeanors and felonies. These card records of blocks should be kept up to date by the precinct commanders, and from them information should be obtained for the determination of patrol beat boundaries.

#### NUMBER OF POLICEMEN NEEDED

Another matter which should be considered under a progressive leadership of the police is the number of policemen necessary for Cleveland. We cannot undertake to say in any confidence whether or not the police department needs more policemen. Certainly the crime rate in Cleveland affords plenty of opportunity for work by any additional men who might be appointed to the police force. Certainly, too, the addition of more men to the patrol force or to other branches of the service would show some returns in lessening the number of crime complaints and increasing the number of crimes solved. In this connection Detroit offers an illuminating experience. Complaints of robbery were steadily reduced for a period of four months, in which the police force was increased each month. An official bulletin of the Detroit Depart-

ment discloses that in September, 1920, with a shortage of 198 men, there were 98 robberies committed, as against an average of 55 for September of the four preceding years. In October, with a shortage of 170 men, there were 74 robberies against an average of 61 for the previous four months of October. In November, with the shortage entirely made up, there were 55 robberies, against an average of 92 for the same month of the four preceding years, and in December, with the number of patrolmen brought up to 132 in excess of the regular quota by December 31, there were 48 robberies, against an average of 93 for the same month of the previous four years.

A comparison of personnel quotas and police costs in Cleveland and Detroit shows clearly the superior resources possessed by the latter city. Approximately \$4,500,000 was appropriated for Detroit's police service during the fiscal year 1920-21, while the total estimated cost for police service in Cleveland for 1921 amounted to approximately \$2,500,000. The total authorized police force in Detroit for the year 1921-22 numbered 1,926, while the total authorized force in Cleveland for 1921 numbered 1,381.

On the other hand, the fact has to be borne in mind that Detroit is larger than Cleveland by nearly 200,000. Nevertheless it is found that Cleveland has only 174 men per 100,000 population, while Detroit has 194.

Similarly, a comparison between Cleveland's police resources and those of St. Louis shows to the disadvantage of Cleveland. St. Louis is slightly smaller than Cleveland, yet the estimated expenditure for the police department in 1921 exceeded Cleveland's police cost by \$500,000. The total strength of the St. Louis force exceeded Cleveland's total force by more than 500 men. St. Louis has 250 men per 100,000 population.

The question of increasing the number of men is one of public policy, involving chiefly the amount of money that can be spared for police protection. That more policemen will mean an improvement in crime conditions is not to be debated. Whether the resulting reduction in crime is worth the additional money required of a tax- and debt-burdened city is a question with which we have no proper concern. The questions that confront us are these: Is the city of Cleveland getting all the return it should from the money now spent on patrol service? If not, where does inefficiency lie or where does failure to make the best use of resources appear? We believe greater returns could be had from the number of policemen employed at present—(1) by greatly extending the use of motor vehicles, and, in some cases, bicycles, in doing patrol work; (2)

by reducing the number of daily assignments in the horse-mounted section of the traffic division; (3) by employing some of the men in a special service or crime prevention bureau. Whether these measures, which are discussed in later sections of the report, will of themselves, without adding to the force, achieve the desired results in reducing the volume of crime, is a question which only experience can solve.

### METHODS OF PATROL

At the present time regular patrol work is done on foot. The men who are equipped with horses confine their attention almost entirely to the regulation of traffic and enforcement of traffic ordinances. Special units, known as reserve squadrons, consisting of a sergeant and three uniformed men, are attached to nine of the 15 precincts. These squadrons operate in what are called, in newspaper fashion, "high-powered automobiles." They are held in reserve at precinct station houses during the day to answer emergency alarms, but at night are used in a limited way for general circulating patrol.

The results achieved by the squadrons in 1920 point clearly to the value of extending the use of motor equipment for doing regular patrol work, thereby replacing many foot patrolmen. In the sections of outlying residential districts which have good paving, motor patrol service can take the place of foot patrolmen entirely. In congested districts, however, where large numbers of people are passing on the street, it will, of course, be necessary to have patrolmen doing duty on foot and covering comparatively small beats, so that they can keep their posts constantly under eye.

The use of automobiles for patrolling the streets is in line with the best development in police work. New York, Kansas City, Detroit, and many other cities have adopted the idea, with marked success. In April of 1918 the Detroit department placed over 150 Ford automobiles on the streets to patrol beats formerly covered by foot patrolmen. Each machine carries two policemen—one in plain clothes and one in uniform. During the first month of the operation of these machines felony complaints were reduced from 654, reported in the previous month, to 528; in the second month there was a further decrease of 65 felony complaints over the previous month. "The innovation of the automobile as a preventive [of crime] has proven a great success," said an official of the Detroit department, "for two men can now do the work that formerly took four or five, and are able to do any kind of work with more success in residential districts than officers on foot."

Similarly other cities, such as St. Louis, Seattle, Los Angeles, and

Louisville, are making small beginnings in the use of automobiles for patrolling beats. The hesitation of many departments in taking up the automobile for patrol purposes is due to the expense involved in the initial outlay and maintenance charges. On the other hand, if two men equipped with an automobile can do the work of five, or perhaps eight, men on foot, a reduction in the patrol force is possible, and the saving in salaries would more than offset the cost of providing the necessary motor equipment.

The motor equipment to be used in patrol work should consist in medium-sized passenger automobiles of good quality, with perhaps a few of the smaller and cheaper cars and motor-cycles equipped with side cars. The number of men attached to a car or motor-cycle need not exceed two; they may both be uniformed, or one uniformed and one in citizen's dress. There is no work performed in the non-congested areas by patrolmen on foot which cannot be carried on in an automobile or motor-cycle. When the need for a close investigation is seen, the patrolman simply stops his vehicle and proceeds to do his work as formerly. On the other hand, much work that can be carried on successfully by using a vehicle cannot be done by the foot patrolman.

There are many positive advantages to be secured from motorized patrol service. In the first place, a patrolman riding an automobile or motor-cycle can cover from 12 to 15 times as much ground as a man on foot. Realization of this advantage can be measured in one of two ways—either by reduction of the number of men employed in patrol or in making more frequent observation of a given territory. On the present basis of the distribution of patrolmen it would be possible to cover more territory with even fewer men.

Again, patrolmen riding in cars can carry considerable equipment, often urgently needed by them, but which it is not possible for a foot man to carry. Police cars should include, as their equipment, lanterns and other bracket materials for safeguarding dangerous places, fire extinguisher for use on grass fires, towing rope, heavy firearms, and a first-aid kit. These cars can at once be converted into emergency ambulances if an occasion demands, or they may serve the purpose of a patrol wagon in taking prisoners to headquarters or precinct stations, thus cutting down the need for the present number of patrol wagons used.

Moreover, the increasing use of automobiles by criminals makes it important that policemen be equally equipped. Observations of suspected persons keeping automobiles can be effected from an automobile in a way that cannot be done from on foot. Pursuit of a fleeing auto-

mobile may be done only in another car. The greater possibilities of the unsuspected arrival of the police when equipped with an automobile is another advantage in dealing with criminal operations.

Finally, the use of motor equipment greatly promotes the physical fitness of policemen in covering large territories. In emergencies they can arrive at the scene of crime, disturbance, or accident more quickly and in better physical shape to do police duty. The protection which an automobile affords in severe weather is another item of great value to be reckoned in preserving the physical efficiency of the men.

In this connection attention must be called to an order of the Director of Public Safety, dated March 14, 1921, directing the chief to see that the use of the research squadrons be "limited to the investigation of such cases as are manifestly important." In partial explanation of what would not be "manifestly important," it was ordered that the squads do no work on crap-shooting complaints, street-corner loitering, etc. Quite apart from the fact that the director obviously overstepped his power as laid down by the charter in thus interfering with the functions of the chief, the order itself has little justification, and its results can only be to curtail the effectiveness of motor patrol. By using the squadrons in breaking up crap games and objectionable street loitering the number of serious complaints can undoubtedly be lessened, while the efficiency of the squadrons in important cases of murder or robbery will in no way be decreased.

#### PATROL BOOTHS

As an essential part of the system of motor patrol, patrol booths should be erected in the outlying districts of the city. This is a system which has been thoroughly tested in many cities, notably New York and Detroit. The patrol booth is in effect a miniature police station. Its chief advantage lies in the fact that a policeman in a given territory is made immediately available to citizens and headquarters alike. A proper operation of the booth system requires that not less than two men, equipped with motor-cycle or automobile, be attached to a booth at the same time. One man remains at the booth while the other circulates through the district, returning periodically to the booth. In case the booth man is absent on an emergency call, the other remains at the booth until his return. By this arrangement a district is given the benefit of patrol—in point of fact the motor-cycle or automobile man gives better patrol service than the foot patrolman, and at the same time a policeman can be had at once in case of need. Citizens naturally have a greater feeling of security in knowing that they can get a policeman immediately than in knowing that a foot patrolman is somewhere in

the district and that there is a chance that he is near enough to hear a call for help.

### PRECINCT STATIONS

Precinct stations, numbering 15 at the present time, have been developed as necessary means for distributing the patrol force. The districts served by these stations vary considerably in size, and some, due to topographical peculiarities, are very irregularly laid out.

The precinct stations were established to meet the needs of the old type of patrol. When men are sent out on foot to cover their beats, it is, of course, necessary to assemble them by groups at a point near where they are to patrol. As the city grew in size it became impossible to send men from headquarters to the outlying beats, hence the need for precinct stations. This need can be reckoned in terms of yards and miles from the station house to the farthest removed post, and the time required to cover this distance. Obviously, when men proceed from the station to their beats in automobiles or motor-cycles, not as many stations will be required as under the present system of foot patrol.

It seems probable that, upon the introduction of motorized patrol, precinct lines could be reestablished, so as to reduce the number of precincts from 15 to seven or eight, allowing two on the West Side and five or six in the eastern portion of the city. This calculation is but roughly made. It is based on the following suggestions for consolidations: combining the First, Second, and Third Precincts and the westerly tip of the Fourth into one precinct that will be housed in a new headquarters building; combining parts of the Fourth, Thirteenth, and Eleventh, to form a single precinct; providing one or possibly two stations to accommodate the needs of the southwest section of the city, beyond the limits of the Fifth and Sixth Precincts. One station should suffice for that territory lying north and east of Wade and Rockefeller Parks, since there is no chance for extension on the north, and any annexations on the east would present a new situation entirely, requiring complete rearrangement of station facilities. These suggestions would need further study, but they afford an illustration, at least, of the possibility of consolidation as a result of motorized patrol.

Combinations such as those suggested above will not only increase the efficiency of the force but will lessen the cost of police administration. Every precinct means additional overhead, both in record keeping and supervision. By combining two or more precincts into one this overhead can be reduced, thereby saving in expense and contributing to a greater uniformity in police practice. Officers now performing duplicate tasks of supervision could be freed for more productive work



in other special divisions of the department. An examination of the station records and reports in the Tenth and Twelfth Precincts showed that there is a very small volume of work, and yet a full complement of officers is required to supervise approximately 35 men in each of these precincts. Seventy men, or even as many as 125, distributed over four platoons, can easily be managed in a single command and the clerical duties incident to the work of such a number of men can well be handled without addition to the number of men employed in clerical work in a single precinct. On the whole, discipline is likely to be better under the business-like aspects of a large unit than in the home-like atmosphere of small, quiet precincts.

Again, emphasis must be laid on the fact that these improvements and others of a similar nature can come only as the result of a sustained, intelligent leadership of the police. They cannot be successfully installed by law or ordinance, or by any other legislative short-cut. They must be thoughtfully matured over a period of years. They must be the result of careful planning, of fearless initiative, and wise guidance. This means a leadership of brains, free from unwarranted interference. More than anything else the Cleveland force needs such leadership today.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The patrol service should be reorganized so as to accommodate the changes which the use of motor equipment demands. It is recommended, therefore, that—

- (1) Motor equipment be used in regular patrol work.
- (2) Patrol booths be established.
- (3) Police precincts be consolidated so as to reduce the number from 15 to seven or eight.
- (4) Patrol beats be rearranged.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE DETECTIVE BUREAU

**T**HE detective bureau is the second major division of the police organization. It is a bureau of specialized operations, involving not only the solution of crimes which have occurred despite the preventive efforts of all other divisions, but the apprehension of the perpetrators who have escaped after the commission of crime. Work on the solution of murder and manslaughter cases requires considerable time, but the investigation of complaints involving loss of property is by far the largest part of the detective bureau's work. These complaints include robbery, burglary, housebreaking, grand larceny, frauds, and swindles.

The bureau is commanded by a deputy inspector of police, who is detailed by the chief of police to serve as inspector of detectives. Similarly, he may be transferred from the detective bureau at the pleasure of the chief. Two captains of police are detailed to serve as captains of detectives, assisting the inspector in command. These commanding officers are generally drawn from commands of the uniformed patrol force, instead of being taken from the detective bureau membership.

The present inspector of detectives served as a captain in command of the Third Police Precinct prior to being detailed to head the detective bureau. However, he had had some previous experience in detective work as a member of the old detective bureau. One of the two captains of detectives was previously in command of a precinct station, and later had charge of the police training school, from which he was transferred to the detective service. The other captain was originally a patrolman detailed to the detective bureau. Upon receiving his promotion to the rank of sergeant, he was transferred from the detective service to a precinct to supervise uniformed patrolmen, afterward going to the traffic division. Upon being promoted to the rank of lieutenant he was transferred to desk duty in a precinct. Later he was promoted to the rank of captain and placed in command of a precinct station. From this post he was transferred to the detective bureau.

From records of this sort it is easy to see that no attempt is made to develop detective commanders from detective personnel. The de-

tective bureau in Cleveland is directed by men who have had no adequate training in the detective business, and whose promotion to leadership depended, in the first instance, on attaining a certain rank, and only secondarily on experience and fitness. Under the present system, if a patrolman, serving as a detective, obtains promotion to the rank of sergeant, he must leave detective work and take up uniformed patrol supervision merely because there is no rank of sergeant in the detective bureau. He must then continue in the uniformed patrol or traffic service until he has attained the rank of captain before he again becomes eligible for transfer to the detective service. The detectives who do not ascend through the uniformed ranks of sergeant and lieutenant to captain are barred from attaining a post of command in the detective bureau.

There are 81 patrolmen detailed to the detective bureau at the present time. They are assigned to various duties as follows:

- 4 assigned to desk duty
- 5 to office duty—clerical work
- 5 to the automobile squad
- 4 to the bureau of criminal identification
- 3 to the taxicab quad
- 2 to the pawnshop squad
- 1 to apartment house detail
- 1 to the hotel detail
- 1 to the bank detail
- 1 to the rooming-house detail
- 50 on general assignments

Of the 50 general men, five are carried on the detective bureau roll, but assigned outside of the bureau as follows: one as a clerk in the chief's office, one to the law department for investigation of civil action cases involving possible damages to the city, one in charge of the department's telephone exchange, one as a clerk in the office of director of public safety, and one to the mayor's office, serving as the mayor's bodyguard. These men are not doing detective work and there is no justification for carrying them as detectives.

All detectives are taken from the rank of patrolmen in the uniformed force. Detectives who have served in the bureau for ten years or more are paid a salary of \$2,406.80, which is slightly more than the salary paid to lieutenants of police in the uniformed force; those with less than ten years' service to their credit receive \$2,288, which is the same as the salary of a uniformed lieutenant. Detectives are selected by the chief of police. Whether he is permitted to exercise his own judgment without influence of any sort depends on the mayor and director.

Detectives may be returned to duty in the uniformed force in the discretion of the chief of police and by his order. The privilege, however, is rarely used. The detective assignment is considered as a promotion, and loss of the assignment occurs only in such extreme cases as would result in demotion in rank in the uniformed force as a result of charges of incompetency.

#### POOR QUALITY OF DETECTIVES

The detective personnel is supposed to be the "cream" of the uniformed patrol force. The superior type of work demanded of detectives and the greater compensation which they receive would seem to require that they be the ablest patrolmen in the service. We doubt the truth of the presumption that the detective personnel in Cleveland is entitled to rank as a group having superior abilities. In the first place, there appears to be no adequate provision for selecting detectives on the basis of proved worth in doing the type of work required. No particular standards are followed. Not infrequently policemen are detailed to the detective bureau in recognition of daring and as a reward for the performance of some unusually good bit of work in the uniformed force, such as making an arrest at the scene of a major crime. Daring and quick wit are valuable assets to the detective, but their display in a single case does not warrant the conclusion that the men have other qualities of perception and aptitude needed in detective work. The point is that there is no regularly pursued practice of looking out for detective material or of trying men out in an apprenticeship assignment in the detective service.

Another consideration on which we base our conclusion that the detective personnel is not of the uniformly high caliber which should characterize a detective force is the low rating of the detective group in the United States Army Alpha Test. It is a singular and significant point that the detectives as a group made a lower average rating in this standard psychological test than any other group in the police service. The range of scores made by 10 different groups is shown in Table 3.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>This psychological examination was made in connection with the present survey. The method of marking is as follows:

<i>Grade of intelligence</i>	<i>Explanation</i>	<i>Alpha score</i>	<i>Approximate mental age, years</i>
A	Very superior intelligence	135-212	..
B	Superior intelligence	105-134	..
C+	High average intelligence	75-104	..
C	Average intelligence	45- 74	..
C-	Low average intelligence	25- 44	11-13
D	Inferior intelligence	15- 24	9-10.9
E	Very inferior intelligence	0- 14	Below 9

TABLE 3.—MEDIAN SCORES AND RANGE OF SCORES OF POLICE DIVISIONS

Rank or division	Median	Range of scores of each division		
		Low third	Middle third	High third
Captains	98 C+	50-75	76-104	105-154
Lieutenants	95 C+	36-81	82-108	109-165
Sergeants	99 C+	28-79	79-109	110-166
Vice squad	75 C=	23-61	64- 84	84-134
Detectives	59 C	23-50	51- 71	72-131
Training school	63 C	25-56	57- 74	77-138
Traffic	61 C	5-56	56- 74	75-137
Mounted	78 C+	22-59	60- 91	92-155
Emergency	67 C	19-64	65- 80	83-150
Patrolmen	67 C	6-52	53- 82	82-170

From this record it is seen that the average of scores made by 63 detectives is 8 points below the average of scores made by 759 patrolmen doing duty in uniform, 16 points below the average score of 26 vice bureau operatives who were chosen from the uniformed force in the same way that detectives are, and 36 points below the average made by 46 lieutenants who are rated on approximately the same salary schedule as detectives.

Another basis of scoring which shows the number attaining different group ratings is given in Tables 4 and 5.

From this tabulation it is seen that no detective was rated in the A group, although all the other classes of the service had some percentage of their membership in this grouping. The percentage of detectives in the B group was less by one-half than that of any other class, and six to seven times smaller than the percentage of lieutenants, sergeants, and vice bureau operatives in the B group. Two detectives were in what is rated as the failure group, with a score of less than 25, while no member of the lieutenants, sergeants, or vice bureau classes fell so low.

Of course the Alpha test is not a complete measurement of ability. As has been pointed out, the ratings are useful as measures of general intelligence, but they do not include measurements of personality and character traits such as initiative, leadership, bravery, honesty, etc. They are measures to indicate the speed and accuracy with which persons are able to deal successfully with new situations and problems. But the comparison, even on this limited basis, is highly significant. The "cream of the uniformed force" serving as detectives should not fall below the uniformed force in a test involving general information and ability to meet new situations quickly and accurately.

TABLE 4.—DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE RATINGS

	Captains		Lieutenants		Sergeants		Detectives		Vice bureau		Training school		Traffic police		Mounted police		Emergency motorcycle		Patrolmen		
	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	
A	1	7.1	4	8.7	7	9.9	4	15.4	1	2.6	1	1.2	1	2.6	1	4.0	1	4.0	17	2.9	
B	5	35.7	13	28.3	24	33.8	9	34.6	3	7.7	3	10.0	6	15.8	4	16.0	4	16.0	52	9.0	
C+	4	28.6	18	39.1	20	28.2	8	30.8	9	23.1	18	22.5	13	34.2	6	24.0	6	24.0	168	29.1	
C	4	28.6	10	21.7	13	18.3	4	15.4	22	56.4	33	41.3	13	34.2	11	44.0	11	44.0	195	33.8	
C-	..	..	1	2.2	7	9.9	1	3.8	4	10.2	3	3.8	4	10.6	2	8.0	2	8.0	117	20.3	
D	..	..	..	..	2	3.2	..	..	..	..	..	3	3.8	1	2.6	1	4.0	1	4.0	22	3.8
E	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1.2	..	..	..	..	..	6	1.1	
	14	100.0	46	100.0	71	100.0	63	100.0	26	100.0	39	100.0	80	100.0	38	100.0	25	100.0	577	100.0	

TABLE 5.—SUMMARY OF DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE RATINGS

	All officers		Vice bureau		Detectives		All patrolmen		Total		Draft army	
	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.	No.	Per cent.
A	12	9.2	4	15.4	..	..	21	2.8	37	3.8	..	..
B	42	32.0	9	34.6	3	4.8	73	9.6	127	13.0	9	9.0
C+	42	32.0	8	30.8	15	23.8	214	28.2	279	28.5	16.5	16.5
C	27	20.6	4	15.4	30	47.6	274	36.1	335	34.2	25.0	25.0
C-	8	6.1	1	3.8	13	20.6	143	18.8	165	16.9	20.0	20.0
D	..	..	..	..	2	3.2	27	3.6	29	2.9	15.0	15.0
E	..	..	..	..	..	..	7	0.9	7	0.7	10.0	10.0
	131	99.9	26	100.0	63	100.0	759	100.0	979	100.0	100.0	100.0

## POOR WORK OF DETECTIVE BUREAU

One does not have to resort to psychological tests to prove the inefficiency of the detective personnel or the general run-down condition of the whole bureau. A glance at the organization or an examination of the reports of the men easily sustains the point. With the exception of the criminal identification section, which is ably managed, the whole bureau seems to be run on a small-town pattern. Poor office arrangements no doubt contribute in some measure to the appearance of disorder and confusion generally evident in the bureau. Clerks, officers, detectives, witnesses, and citizens shuffle around in a large room, and there is no appearance of system or method in the hurly-burly of the day's routine. Supervision of operations is poor when it is employed at all, and the records are inadequate and carelessly prepared.

Lest this be thought too sweeping an indictment of the work of the bureau, it may be well to quote some of the reports of the detectives. During the month of January, 1921, Detectives Callahan and Cowles, working together, handled 16 cases of burglary and larceny. The following are their own complete reports of their activities on burglary cases during this period:

1. "Detective Cowles and I investigated this complaint we were unable to locate the men suspected will continue on same."
2. "Detective Cowles and I investigated this complaint we were unable to get any trace of the thief or property."
3. "Detective Cowles and I investigated this complaint was unable to locate the man suspected."
4. "Detective Callahan and myself investigated above report, interviewed Mr. ——— also made inquiries in that vicinity, was unable to get any further information than original report."
5. "Detective Cowles and I investigated this complaint we were unable to learn anything on same."
6. "Detective Callahan and myself investigated above report, interviewed ——— manager also made inquiries in that vicinity was unable to get any trace off the thief or thieves. They do not suspect any one."
7. "Detective Cowles and I investigated we were unable to get any trace of the thief or property."
8. "Detective Cowles and I investigated this complaint we were unable to learn anything on same."
9. "Detective Cowles and I investigated the complaint was unable to get any trace of the thief or property."
10. "Detective Cowles and I investigated this complaint we were unable to get any trace of the thief or property this job evidently was done by boys."

11. "Detective Cowles and I investigated this complaint we were unable to learn anything on same."
12. "Det. Callahan and myself investigation above report. Interviewed Mr. — was unable to receive any further information or any trace of the Burglars."
13. "Det. Callahan and myself investigated above report, interviewed Mr. — Learned that the property stolen was insured for more than he valued it at. Satisfied this report is not Legidiment."
14. "Det. Callahan and myself investigated above report, interviewed Mr. —. Also made inquires in that vicinity, was unable to get any trace of Burglars & property. Will continue."
15. "Det. Callahan & myself investigated above report was unable to give any description. Does not suspect any one."
16. "Detective Cowles and I investigated this complaint we were unable to learn anything on same."

The above represents a whole month's work of two detectives on burglary cases. Reports of this type could be instanced almost indefinitely. In many cases they seem to show that the detectives merely verified the fact that a crime had been committed, and beyond asking a question or two of the neighbors, made no attempt to solve the mystery. Under such circumstances the wonder is not that crimes occur in Cleveland, but that any perpetrators are ever arrested.

#### INADEQUATE SUPERVISION OF DETECTIVE WORK

One of the significant causes of this situation just described is the lack of adequate supervision of detective operations. Apparently each detective determines for himself just how much he shall do on a given case and when he shall regard the case as closed. Of any adequate follow-up on individual cases, there is none. There is no administrative oversight to put enthusiasm and determination into the solution of individual crimes. The commanding officers of the detective bureau devote most of their time to important cases upon which newspaper comment is centered, and very little time to the less interesting task of management. Indeed, the rôle of detective officers is that of super-detective case workers rather than supervisors. The commanding officers lock their offices and go out into the field to assist in the investigation of murder cases, payroll robberies, and other important crimes. They have been accustomed also to make trips to other cities, sometimes as far away as California and New York, for the purpose of bringing to Cleveland fugitives held by the police in other jurisdictions. When the inspector of detectives makes such a trip, the detective bureau is managed by an assistant. This practice must be condemned without reserva-



tion. Ordinary detectives can be assigned to make such journeys. It is far more important that detective commanders stay on the job and keep in constant touch with the mass of less spectacular cases where the scrutiny of immediate supervision is needed. Otherwise the minor cases will slip by almost unnoticed except for a perfunctory examination by the detectives assigned to them.

Briefly, the detective bureau needs administration badly. It is impossible to spend days in solving particular crimes and at the same time supervise the operations of 80 men who are working on hundreds of cases.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

One approaches the subject of recommendations for the detective bureau almost with despair. The whole department needs overhauling; the methods of work require a complete shaking up; and much of the present personnel should be gotten rid of. However, the following recommendations are pertinent to our inquiry:

1. The director of police should be given the right to recruit detectives directly from civil life through original appointments. There is no good reason for restricting the selection of detectives so that none but members of the uniformed force are eligible. The uniformed patrol force may or may not have in sufficient number the sort of material that is demanded in detective work. The chances are that the patrol force does not have the best material available in the community. It is not here proposed that all members of the detective service be taken directly from civil life. When uniformed patrolmen are found to have the qualifications for detective work, they will be preferred because of their experience. But the department should not be compelled to limit its choice of detectives as at present.

Detective work requires some men of scientific training—men having the educational foundation that will permit them to develop scientific methods of operation. There are many principles of criminology, such as the examination of the physical evidence of crime, which can only be applied and developed by specially trained men. These men cannot be drawn exclusively from the uniformed patrol force for the reason that men having scientific training do not enter the patrol service. Aside from those with qualifications of this type there are men in private life specially trained in getting information and making investigations, who would be willing to enter the detective service at the rate of pay now given detectives, provided there were an opportunity for making a creditable career. But these men would not first serve an apprenticeship of walking beats as patrol watchmen.

Detective bureaus are the weak spots in all police departments of this country, chiefly for the reason that the choice of detectives is limited to men who are recruited and trained as patrolmen. In this connection August Vollmer, head of the police department of Berkeley, California, asks the following pertinent questions: "Where is there a business concern that compels applicants for various vacancies in the organization to submit to the same physical and mental examination; where the janitor, clerk, salesman, engineer, department heads, superintendents, and managers are all compelled to answer the same questions, measure up to the same physical standards as to health, height, weight, age, and sex, and all commencing their employment at the same occupational level and at the same pay? Where is there a business concern that limits the selection of men for technical positions to employees holding inferior positions in the same establishment?" It is obvious that police departments are alone in their indefensible practices in such matters. If any real progress is to be made in detective bureau efficiency, it must come after the removal of senseless bars to getting men who have the intelligence and training needed to perform the special tasks that daily confront detectives.

2. Under any circumstances, some of the personnel of the detective bureau, perhaps a majority of it, would be recruited to the detective service from other branches of the police organization. The present method of such recruiting, however, should be changed. Instead of detailing patrolmen to become full-fledged detectives at once, there should first be an apprenticeship assignment. Members of other divisions of the service who show signs of special fitness for detective work—an ability to remember faces, a knowledge of local thieves and their habits, an ability to get accurate information and to make coherent reports—should be detailed to the detective bureau to serve as junior detectives. To require a period of apprenticeship does not constitute a discrimination against members of the force as compared with civilians who might be appointed to full detective rank. The civilians will also have had their period of try-out in some civil pursuit. As a matter of fact, the member of the police force has every advantage in securing the detective posts which do not necessarily demand scientific training. The department affords the patrolman his qualifying experience, while the outsider has not such opportunity to develop it.

Members detailed to the detective bureau from other branches of the department should be classed as junior detectives for a period of possibly two years, during which time they should be tested and observed as candidates for appointment as senior detectives. During this period of apprenticeship members should receive the salary attaching to the

rank from which they are detailed. If their detective work proves satisfactory, appointment to full detective rank may be made permanent. If, however, junior detectives do not show themselves to be adapted to detective work, they should be remanded to duty in uniform. This would not be considered such a hardship as at present, for the reason that there would be no loss in pay upon being remanded.

3. After qualifying in the period of apprenticeship or probation, as it might be called, appointment to full rank of detective should follow. Two years will not always suffice to prove a detective's ability, hence provision should also be made for remanding senior detectives to uniformed duty whenever they do not measure up to the bureau's demands. There are no soft places in detective service where the lazy or inefficient man may be shelved. "Deadwood" can perhaps be used in posts which involve routine duties and little initiative, but "deadwood" is a total loss in the detective bureau. A detective should either show continuous advancement through energetic work and the accumulation of experience or he should be put out of the detective service altogether.

Accordingly, it is proposed that, as continuance in the detective service presupposes fitness, automatic increases in salary should be given. A salary schedule should be devised which would allow some five or six increases, ranging from the lowest, approximately the salary paid to a uniformed sergeant, to a rate equaling that received by a uniformed captain of police. The schedule should be so arranged that the last increase should come about three years before the pension service retirement.

The advantages of granting salary increases to detectives without regard to changes in rank are twofold. In the first place, it would make the detective service a career of itself and would permit advancement entirely on the basis of meritorious work. In the second place, it would do away with the present situation, wherein detectives, to secure advances in rank, must compete in examinations designed to cover types of work other than those which they have been doing. It would also do away with the absurd practice of sending back to duty in the uniformed force a detective who receives promotion to the rank of sergeant, with its corresponding decrease in pay.

4. Promotion to posts of command in the detective bureau should be made from among members of the bureau, and not, as at present, from the uniformed force. The determining consideration to date has been the rank—captain and inspector—desired for commanding officers of the detective bureau. The qualification of experience has been entirely overlooked. What is wanted is not rank, but brains and ability.

5. With well-trained men in the detective bureau, under competent leadership, constant attention would have to be given to the administrative problem. After all, running a detective bureau is like running any complicated business: it requires an intimacy with detail and continual follow-up, so that every individual feels the stimulus of the leadership. In this respect the Cleveland detective bureau is conspicuously lacking at the present time. What is needed is a man in charge who will live constantly with his cases and whose guiding principle will be that no case is settled until it is solved.

6. Members of the detective bureau should do only detective work. They should not be detailed as clerks, telephone operators, or to guard the person of the mayor. They should be technical men, well paid for their abilities, and not job-holders who can be assigned to any task.

## CHAPTER IX

### SPECIAL SERVICE DIVISION

**T**HE third major function of police work, crime prevention, is poorly developed in the Cleveland department. Of course, some measure of crime prevention work is aimed at by the uniformed force and detective bureau as well, but we are here considering the distinctly constructive efforts to prevent crime—efforts that cannot be employed by the uniformed force, the members of which must necessarily devote most of their attention to patrolling streets in the capacity of watchmen. Detectives are kept busy for the most part with solving crimes that have not been prevented, although they do some preventive work. The development of a special unit engaged in preventive work need not relieve the members of either the uniformed force or the detective bureau of any feeling of responsibility for taking action looking toward crime prevention. The members of a special service division, however, should be freed from the duties of watchmen, and should not have their time fully occupied with the apprehension of criminals and solution of crimes already committed. Such a division should investigate *conditions* that are known to lead to the commission of crime and should become an expert agency in handling persons who show themselves disposed to delinquency.

Inasmuch as there are practically no special facilities in the Cleveland department for undertaking constructive action in preventive work, our survey was confined to the *need* for such a service. The vice squad or bureau, as now organized, is the nearest approach to a specialized crime prevention unit in the department. This squad is organized as an independent unit under the direct supervision of the chief of police. Two lieutenants of police are assigned by the chief to command the bureau. Members of the squad are patrolmen who are detailed by the chief in the same way that patrolmen are detailed as detectives. No provision is made for recruiting directly from civil life. Members of the squad devote considerable time to the investigation of complaints referred to the vice bureau by the chief. Some of these complaints come from citizens and others originate with the uniformed force. These

complaints often relate to suspicious conditions which lead the complainants to believe that certain premises are being used for prostitution, gambling, sale of liquor, or illegal traffic in narcotics. Sometimes complaints are made against individuals, but in either case members of the vice squad must get new and additional evidence of a specific violation of law repeated some time after the violation referred to in the complaint. Thus, the vice bureau operatives are chiefly engaged in the investigation of general conditions. In their effort to develop specific charges of violation against individuals, much of their best work is done by way of anticipating the occurrence of new violations. The very investigations made by them often lead to an abandonment of activity on the part of the promoters of vice. In this respect the work of the vice squad takes on more of the aspect of crime prevention than does the work of other divisions. The vice bureau, therefore, may serve as a nucleus for building up a unit devoted to investigations of conditions and individuals with a view to forestalling criminal acts.

The attitude of police heads toward the vice bureau at present seems to be one of suspicion. The chief of police keeps in his office a complete record system, which provides a check on all complaints assigned to members of the vice bureau for investigation. Daily reports of the vice bureau's operations are submitted to the chief and the director. No other division of the police service submits such a report to the director. It was not disclosed what use, if any, the director makes of these reports. It is necessary to maintain a close check on the operatives who are subjected to such unusual temptations as are met with in combating prostitution, gambling, and traffic in liquor and drugs. But the chief should not be burdened with the details of checking 30 men in the vice bureau. Rather, he should depend on an officer of higher rank than now detailed to the vice bureau to do the checking and hold him responsible for general results as in other divisions of the service.

While complaints which are referred to the vice bureau cannot be thrown out without rendering a report of action taken thereon, it is *cases* that are supervised rather than the *methods* employed by operatives in working on the cases. An examination of the records maintained in the vice bureau discloses the fact that supervising officers do not keep adequate check on the cumulative operations of the men under their command. It would seem that too much reliance is placed on the automatic check which the mere submission of supplementary reports is supposed to afford. True, operatives are required to write up a summary of each day's work in books kept in the bureau for that purpose, and this enables the supervising officers to tell what was done by the

men on the day's cases, provided the men are always faithful in recording all cases. It does not, however, afford a means of keeping tab on complaints which are a few days or a week old. As a matter of fact, supervision in the vice bureau, as in the detective bureau, is conducted on the memory basis, which is bound to be wholly inadequate in a large department. It is simply impossible for two commanding officers to remember the multitude of assignments given to some 30 men extending over a period of weeks and months. It would be a laborious task to find out, from the record now kept, how many cases or complaints A or B is working on at any given time, or to learn from their reports what progress has been made on the cases which they have under investigation. As a result, old cases become dead cases, and are readily lost to the view of supervising officers in the shuffle of each day's new business.

#### OTHER CRIME PREVENTION UNITS NEEDED

As has been pointed out, the vice bureau should comprise but one section of the special service division, although it could well remain a more or less independent section. There is need for the immediate establishment of a woman's bureau, composed of not less than 10 police women. Cleveland is the only city of over a half million population that does not employ police women. The experience of such cities as London, New York, Detroit, St. Louis, Los Angeles, and Indianapolis has proved conclusively that women can perform police work of the highest order, often in a way that cannot be equaled by men. The Police Woman's Section should perform most of the duties now carried on by the Cleveland Woman's Protective Association, an organization privately financed and managed. Police women can do most effective crime prevention work in the inspection of dance halls, parks, moving-picture theaters, and other places of amusement. They can do good work in pre-delinquency cases with incorrigible girls and boys. They can also take under investigation the cases of adults who may possibly contribute to the delinquency of minors. The investigation of complaints of missing persons, which many times disclose runaway cases, can often be best handled by women. Women selected for this section of the crime prevention division should possess a strong sense of social service, and should have the training and outlook of the type of social worker employed by such private agencies as charity organizations, the Travelers' Aid Society, and the Woman's Protective Association.

At the present time dance halls are being supervised by a special unit known as the Dance Hall Inspection Bureau. This bureau is attached to the office of the director of public safety. The dance hall

inspectors, numbering about 40 deputies or special police, are not members of the police department. They are paid fees by the proprietors of the dance halls which they inspect. A clerk-patrolman detailed to the director's office assigns the inspectors and keeps a record of dance hall permits. The dance hall inspection division should be abolished and the work taken over completely by the police department, for the inspection of public dance halls is a duty which cannot properly be delegated to unofficial observers whose salaries are paid by the people they inspect. Much of this work should naturally fall to the division of women police.

A unit of welfare officers is another much-needed section of the special service division. This unit may be composed of both men and women. It should be the duty of this division to investigate the bad home conditions that make for delinquency and cases of destitution coming to the attention of the police. Another fruitful field of crime prevention service that can be performed by a welfare unit is that of giving counsel and aid to persons who are turned out of hospitals and other institutions, and who are often unwelcome in their former homes. Experience in other cities shows that such persons easily drift into a life of crime. The same field of valuable service is found in dealing with criminals who are released from institutions and prisons and thrown on the community, often without opportunity for making a living in a fair and honest way. A welfare unit should keep in touch with opportunities of employment for these persons. By helpful coöperation a sort of protective supervision may be established looking toward the redemption of many who would otherwise gravitate to vice and crime. It is a fact that parents of wayward children, and many persons who are on the verge of desperate helplessness, will frequently turn for aid to a welfare division of the police service when they would not approach the police through the ordinary channels which carry with them the idea of repression and even hostility toward those in distress.

An excellent precedent of such a unit of welfare officers exists in the system which Commissioner Woods established in New York during his term of office. Carefully chosen officers were assigned to the busier precincts of the city to ferret out conditions which seemed to be leading people astray. This experiment did not have time to prove itself before Commissioner Woods left office, but it illustrates the new technique in police work for diminishing crime.

The fourth section of crime prevention service needed is a unit of juvenile officers. Complaints of juvenile delinquency should be referred to specially selected officers, who may be chosen because of their



peculiar qualifications as experts in handling children's cases. This Juvenile Bureau or Section should coöperate actively with the Juvenile Court and make many of the investigations for the court which are now made by court probation officers. It is a police function, and the police department should not be relieved of responsibility for performing it. Juvenile officers should be distributed through the city by assignments to precincts, although general supervision of their work should be carried on by the special service division at headquarters. The work of juvenile officers attached to precincts in Chicago affords an excellent example of the value of such a division. The long-established juvenile bureaus in the Detroit and Los Angeles police departments likewise have proved the value of employing a special unit engaged in crime prevention among children.

All of the special activities mentioned above should be consolidated in a single division devoted to the more constructive features of crime prevention. One of the highest ranking officers in the service should be selected by the director of police to head this important division. His duty would be to survey general conditions in the city which indicate opportunity or need for corrective crime prevention measures. He should then see that the various sections of his division are well coordinated. Although the several fields of work are specialized, there is much opportunity for active coöperation. Thus, members of the vice bureau, in the course of their investigation of complaints of gambling and sex delinquencies, run across hangers-on and idlers against whom they may not proceed with formal charges, but who, nevertheless, may properly be investigated. Information regarding these border-line cases of delinquency should be handled by the Police Woman's Section, Welfare Section, or Juvenile Section, as the case may warrant. Similarly, the investigations conducted by the Police Woman's Division or Welfare officers will many times disclose conditions that should be investigated by the vice bureau. It is important that the common factors of a crime prevention program be recognized and that the agencies carrying out such a program be closely knit together. There should be a single head directing the development of a crime prevention program in its several aspects.

Members of the special service division who are not engaged on specific assignments should keep in constant touch with the breeding places of crime throughout the city. Insistent police surveillance of pool-rooms, cigar-stores having back rooms, hotels and lodging-houses, and the other places where there is customary idling will do much to prevent the commission of petty crimes on the spot and the hatching of

crimes to be committed elsewhere. The young criminal is a gregarious being, and idling with bad associates is the primary requirement for sending him or her on the road to some criminal act.

It is not necessary for the police to wield a club or even to proceed with a warrant in many cases. They can, wholly within their legal rights, so interfere with idling that it may be largely broken up in public places. By sending a boy home or questioning an idler or by making many inquiries of the origin and intentions of idlers, the police can make idling uncomfortable instead of interesting and at times profitable. It requires groups of idlers to keep alive the contacts of the underworld, which show the way to traffic in drugs, liquor, and prostitution. Crimes ordinarily produced by these associations cannot flourish when the police are ever questioning and scrutinizing.

The importance of having a separate division recognized as the responsible agency in the department for the promotion of facilities for constructive efforts of crime prevention cannot be overestimated. When such a division is established, there will be a logical place for inaugurating new practices and experiments in social service and pre-delinquency activities, thus avoiding haphazard creation of a number of small new units which are likely to be poorly organized and inadequately supervised. Finally, the special service division should become the police department's liaison division between schools, hospitals, and private charitable and correctional institutions. Because of the character of its work, such a division could readily secure a degree of coöperation with other agencies of social service that is not now usually had by any other branch of the police department.

It must be admitted that this whole idea is new in police work in America, but its basic idea gives shape to the police work of the future. There is as much room for crime prevention in our communities as for fire prevention or the prevention of disease, and in this endeavor to limit the opportunities of crime and keep it from claiming its victims the police department must take the leading part.

## CHAPTER X

### THE SECRETARIAL DIVISION

**T**HE work properly belonging to the office of a secretary of the police department is now scattered among several offices and divisions, with almost no coördination. There is a waste in men employed in the various tasks relating to record keeping, filing, and correspondence. Furthermore, the work that is being done is inadequate.

Personnel service records, payrolls, equipment, repair, and supply records are prepared and kept in the office of the director of public safety, and certain classes of permits, such as for dances and parades, are issued from that office. A detective and a patrolman are detailed there to care for a portion of the police work. Other clerks devote part of their time to clerical work which pertains to the administration of the fire department as well as police. All the correspondence and stenographic work of the police department is done in the office of the chief of police. One detective, two sergeants, and three patrolmen are detailed to do this work. Personnel records duplicating those kept in the director's office are also filed in the chief's office.

The bureau of records cares for the preparation and filing of pawnshop and lost property records, and all records relating to the license, ownership, and identification of automobiles. In this bureau also are filed all criminal complaints and copies of reports made by the various divisions of the department. Six patrolmen are detailed to serve as clerks in this bureau. There is no officer in command, the patrolmen severally assuming responsibility for the management of the bureau during the eight-hour period when they are on duty. The record bureau is cramped in a small room on the first floor of the police headquarters building. It is poorly ventilated and lighted by a single window opening on a court. Records are not protected from fire. The record bureau facilities of the police departments in Detroit, where the whole top floor of the headquarters building is given over to the record bureau, and in St. Louis, where an enormous well-lighted room is used for the record bureau, are in striking contrast to Cleveland's meager facilities.

A clear duplication of record keeping is found in an office known as

the bureau of information, which has no organic relation to any clerical division and no particular place in the scheme of organization. Three sergeants and three patrolmen are detailed to this office. Three additional men are attached to a telephone desk on another floor. These desk officers also belong to the bureau of information. A sergeant of police, known as the court sergeant, has an office adjoining the municipal court. This officer keeps a record of cases presented in court and also prepares statistics of daily crime complaints.

All of the offices mentioned above should be combined in a single division under the management of a secretary of the department. Civilian clerks and stenographers—most of them girls—should be employed to do the work in the place of policemen. Clerks trained and experienced in clerical duties can do the work better and at far less cost than at present. It is absurd to employ detectives and sergeants of police in activities of this kind.

The secretarial office should be organized in several sections, as, for example, the correspondence section, the filing section, the information desk, and the division of statistics. Combined in one bureau, all this work which is now scattered throughout the department could be coordinated in a way that would increase its effectiveness and greatly reduce its cost.







