



AN
ADDRESS
TO THE
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES,
ON THE
POLICY OF MAINTAINING
A
PERMANENT NAVY.

BY AN
AMERICAN CITIZEN.

PHILADELPHIA:

PRINTED BY JAMES HUMPHREYS FOR E. BRONSON

1802

TARRYTOWN, NEW YORK

REPRINTED

WILLIAM ABBATT

1921

BRING EXTRA NUMBER 71 OF THE MAGAZINE OF HISTORY WITH NOTES AND QUERIES

EDITOR'S PREFACE

OUR first article is particularly timely, when we look back to the period of only four years ago, when we were straining every nerve to construct a great navy.

In 1802 our Navy was on a scale which now appears incredibly petty; yet small as it was, the debates in Congress show how bitterly fought by the "Little America" party was the proposed increase, of six frigates—and even then the favorable vote had a "string" to it, providing that in the event of peace being made with the Barbary Powers, work on the six should stop at once. For a full understanding of what "unpreparedness" then cost us, our readers should consult the "Life of General William Eaton" by Charles Prentiss, where the shameful story of our humiliating treatment by the Barbary pirates, because of our weak navy, is told at length.

The "Address" is one of the rarest items of Americana—but one copy having appeared for sale in many years. It is not found mentioned in Allibone or Sabin, and its author's name has not been suggested, as far as we know, until now. We believe it was written by Enos Bronson, editor of "The Union." "The United States Gazette," etc., and who was for years a publisher and bookseller in Philadelphia, but in his later years a teacher of the classics. His name appears in the Directories from 1805 to 1824, in which latter year he apparently died, as in the 1825 Directory his widow's name succeeds his own.

We regret not being able to give full particulars of his life; the story of a man of such ability as his ought to be fully set forth, but we fail to find him even mentioned in any biographical dictionary or encyclopedia, nor can we trace any of his descendants. What he has said in his "Address" would apply with equal force to our navy and merchant marine, at any time up to four years ago, and a single phrase from it might almost serve as the creed of our Navy League: "When we relinquish our navigation (Navy) we shall virtually relinquish our independence."

Our second item is a very rare poem by an anonymous author. It is a satire on the British Ministry of 1765, and others high in authority, regarding their treatment of the American colonies, and is especially severe on Lord Bute. In a catalogue before us it is priced at \$15.

It is particularly interesting from the fact that it contains the first known use of the term YANKEE. Sabin refers to the author's use of the phrase "Portsmouth Yankey," saying: "No earlier use of the term within my knowledge. See the *Monthly Review*, vol. 32, page 392." In the poem it is applied to an expatriated native of Portsmouth, N. H., John Huske (1721-73), who became a member of Parliament and was active in support of the Stamp Act.

It is interesting to note that the first use of the word destined to become so famous was its application to a renegade American, naturalized as an Englishman and noted as a Tory.

ADVERTISEMENT

THE Observations contained in the following Address were written in the winter of ninety-eight. They were prepared for public delivery in the autumn of eighteen hundred, and are now submitted to the people of the United States with an ardent though not sanguine hope, that they may contribute to unite public opinion on a question upon which the author fears that it cannot be divided without the most imminent hazard of our national union and happiness.

Two previous questions are discussed in considering the chief subject, the utility of a Permanent Navy. An establishment intended to guard our *foreign commerce* evidently presupposes the importance of that commerce. And, as the necessity of providing a Navy to defend it has been supposed to depend on the *mode* of conducting it, where its utility was even admitted, the importance of our *navigation* naturally arose as the second question in order, though in magnitude perhaps equal to the first. The introductory observations on the nature of commerce and its beneficent operation in refining and exalting human nature, may be deemed foreign to the chief design of the essay, by those who have not thought the contrary opinions deserving of serious refutation. They have found advocates, however, in every age, and have been recently applied to the existing circumstances of the United States, by Price, Mably, and Mirabeau. Although they have not often found their way into our public councils, they are introduced into private discussions without them, and are not unfrequently relied on by the ardent friends of liberty.

The Notes which the author now annexes to this address are liable to unavoidable imperfection for the want of materials. In the *calculations* of the expence which may be incurred, or which may be precluded by a permanent Navy, little more has been done than suggest the mode in which they should be pursued, and to repel the unfair inferences which have been deduced from the facts already ascertained and published.

AN AMERICAN.

AN ADDRESS, &c.

THE Period has arrived, fellow-citizens, when the approach of peace calls upon us to decide on the policy of maintaining a *permanent* Navy. Its enemies, fertile in ingenious argument, have not only opposed our present armament in every stage of its progress, but have laboured to prove the comparative uselessness of the commerce and navigation which it was designed to protect. To trace the whole of their reasoning through the mazes of subtilty and refinement, would extend my observations beyond the limits which, I fear, your patience has already prescribed.

Permit me, however, to solicit your indulgence while I endeavour to expose its most striking delusions. Among those, the glowing pictures of the happiness of states exclusively agricultural merit particular examination, since the importance of commerce is an inquiry which properly precedes any consideration of the mode of conducting it, or the means of affording it adequate protection.

Let it be remarked that those opinions of national happiness, drawn indeed from a few of the ancient commonwealths, but in themselves erroneous, are wholly visionary when applied to the United States. National, like individual happiness, must be sought for in activity: and activity cannot exist without a motive to produce it. Whether this motive be found amidst the impetuous movements of war and the ardour of military glory, or in the tranquil pursuits of peace and the indulgence of a refined taste, must depend on the relative situation of a state and the prevailing habits of its people.

Were the Atlantic, which separates us from Europe, no wider than the Eurotas or the Tyber, and the countries which bound us on the West, powerful empires, we might, like Sparta or Rome, look for employment in arms. But, remote from the common theatre of war, to realize a military spirit, we must dissolve

the Union; give to each state a military form; and, renewing the early ages of the world, derive activity from perpetual rivalships and contentions among ourselves. Such, from the beginning of time, has been the happiness of states purely agricultural; which are indeed but a single remove from barbarism. Hunting and arms constitute their chief amusements. They seek employment in the chace, in gratifying a spirit of rapine and revenge, or in the noisy and disgusting carousals of a brutal festivity.

History, divested of fable and romance, informs us that this was the early condition of Greece, before commerce had wafted to her shores the arts and sciences of Phœnicia and Egypt. At a much later period we behold a similar state of society in the forests of Germany, and in France, Italy, and Spain, when the barbarians, pouring from their woods, bore down the towering empire of Rome, and laid waste the refinement of the civilized world. The magnanimity which, in the progress of man from this rude state, darts a few solitary rays through the gloom that envelopes it, is too apt to surprise and dazzle the fancy; and, in dwelling on a few illustrious achievements, the mind insensibly wanders from the path of sound philosophy. Let the enthusiastic, or with more truth, the pretended admirers of uncultivated nature, who have amused themselves by collecting its scattered virtues into a single picture, recollect that it is to their imagery it owes its only beauty. Leave barbarism but for a moment, and slavery or commerce must arise. The consequent distinction of professions, and especially in modern times, the very expensive profession of arms, must be supported either by a servitude which compels a part of every society without any other motive than fear, to furnish subsistence to the other; or by commerce, which stimulates the various departments of industry, by the enlivening prospect of exchanging their respective superfluities.

Placed at a distance from the warlike nations of Europe, and taught rather to fear than to solicit an enlargement of territory by conquest, the American politician must guard against national apathy, by allowing the principles that promote activity in peace an unrestrained operation. He must awaken the industry of the farmer by opening a market for the surplus fruits of the earth. The manufacturer he must invigorate by the certainty of obtaining subsistence in the exchange of his wrought materials. He must permit the man of taste to indulge his desire of refinement, and that desire to gain strength from the arts which it creates. Until the structure of the mind be changed, it must be thus provoked to exertion. Happy might it be for man, if a spirit descending from heaven would hallow the soul, and prescribing to it boundaries of indulgence, prevail on wealth to employ her superfluities in extending to the poor the comforts of life. Here would be a motive to industry independent on the gratification of taste or appetite. When this period arrives it will be time to legislate for it. But were the foreign commerce of the United States to be annihilated, it would leave even this disposition without an object. It would leave a people who, in the midst of indolence, could procure the necessaries of life, and who would have no motive to industry, because industry could do no more. Is it said that the arts would arise among ourselves? Their progress in most states has been extremely slow, even when accelerated by the inventions and discoveries which commerce communicates from nation to nation. Like China, whose arts, however rude¹ and contracted, are the result of the

¹Among the Literati of Europe there were two parties, respectively the advocates of ancient Egypt and modern China. They never extolled the glory of the one without detracting from that of the other. The travellers who speak of the latter concur in the opinion here advanced. Not to speak of the fine arts, in machinery of every description, except that employed in agriculture, they are totally deficient. The cheapness of labour, a result of causes peculiar to themselves and the other eastern natives, supplies indeed the want of it, but renders the application of principles deduced from their circumstances to our own dangerous as well as absurd.

uninterrupted labour of four thousand years :² Like China, which has been so often selected for imitation, did America contain within herself all the sources of national vigor, disregarding the connection of foreign commerce with the advancement of science and literature,³ she might like China contemn it, as un-

²The history of some of the arts of China which pre-supposes the existence of many others is as old. The commerce of India, which resembles China so much, is known, on the authority of both sacred and profane history, to be nearly so; and as far back as the reign of the Emperor Justinian, silk was introduced into Europe from the latter country. The authority of Marco Polo, a Venetian, who five centuries and an half ago travelled through and named the country, is referred to by the celebrated Author of the Wealth of Nations (vol. 1, page 108) to prove that it has not altered its appearance during the whole of that period in which Europe has resumed her career, overtaken and surpassed China wherever nature did not oppose her competition. The conquest of China by the Tartars did not, like the inundation of the northern Barbarians, their brothers in Europe, overwhelm the arts and sciences. The eastern conquerors with more wisdom adopted, with a few alterations, the laws, languages, manners, and fashions of the conquered. See Voltaire's Universal History—Grosier—Du Halde, and Staunton.

³The defective language of China, which renders it necessary to employ a whole life in acquiring a vehicle of thought, so that a man dies just as he has learned to speak, would be almost sufficient to account for the rudeness of the liberal arts in that country, and for the superstition which every where abounds,—a superstition descending from idolatry to all the offices of life,*—to the position of their houses and doors, and boiling of their rice. Their printing resembles their language. The types employed on a single volume will fill a house, and can be used for no other work. To this cause of the present rudeness of the liberal arts and their slow progress in China, Voltaire adds their immoderate attachment to institutions and usages. A secondary cause may we not pronounce it, which is itself the result of a contempt of foreign commerce. Is it not owing to this disposition, common indeed to all the eastern nations, that Asia contains more apparently distinct languages than any other quarter of the globe, that her greatest states mutually despise one another, and regard with indifference the rest of the world? It is certainly from no profound calculation of interest, that they neglect exterior commerce (*vide* Wealth of Nations, vol. 3, pages 30, 31, 32, 33). Superstition which has made the ocean an object of detestation to some, and

necessary, at least to her internal energy. But while she is compelled to search abroad for the class of manufacturers, and finds there the only market she can obtain for an immense fund of superfluities, it will be difficult to decide whether her foreign commerce is not as important to her,⁴ as it is by its enemies ad-

taught others to adore the elements of fire and water, must explain the foundation of that policy which we are invited to imitate. The Chinese have the honor of having invented the mariner's compass, but they have the ignorance not to know its use. Sir George Staunton (page 213, Staunton's Embassy, vol. 1) could not prevail upon them to trust their safety to it by crossing, instead of tediously coasting, their own Yellow Sea.

*M. Grosier tells us that if an imprudent person has built a house close to that of a Chinese so that the angle formed by its roof flanks the wall or the roof of the other, the unhappy Chinese ever after lives in dread of utter destruction from the malignant influence of that angle. An implacable hatred instantly commences between the two families which often produces a lawsuit and sometimes furnishes employment to the superior tribunals of the nation. The same writer gives an account of a man who, having ineffectually paid a sum of money to the Bonzes (priests) of a certain idol for the cure of his daughter, brought a formal accusation against the idol itself, and, in spite of all the Bonzes could say in its behalf, got its worship suppressed throughout the province.

⁴China, although without foreign commerce, is notorious for craft and disingenuousness. Candour, friendship, and benevolence, says M. Grosier, must, in China, be sought, not in cities (which contain about 100,000,000 of people, or a third of the population of the whole nation) but in the bosom of the country, among that class of men who have devoted themselves to labour and agriculture. The lower class of people are distinguished for the most abject servility to their superiors (Sir George Staunton, vol. 1, page 263) and for imposition on one another. They are dexterous, says M. Grosier, in adulterating and counterfeiting everything they sell. A merchant of Canton, as Du Halde relates, gravely replied to a Captain who passionately reproached him for dishonesty in selling him bales of damaged goods, "Blame, Sir, your knave of an interpreter, he assured me that you would not suspect the bales." To strangers, above all, they exercise an insatiable rapacity. That they are luxurious the most respectable travellers assure us (Staunton's Embassy, chap. xi, vol. 1.) They have their tobacco, araca nut, their tea, their ginseng. Add to these their profuse repasts, their splendid festivals and illuminations, their magnificent robes of office, their pompous pageantry. Brissot, who recommends exterior commerce to the United States, advises us to relinquish our navigation on account of the luxury which it may introduce. May we not answer, that the cargo of the foreign ship, the articles which minister to the excessive refinement of taste; and not those who navigate the vessel are the cause of luxury?

mitted to be, to the nations with whom it connects her. And indeed if the arts arise at home, domestic⁵ as well as foreign arts will minister to that luxury so much, and so justly deprecated. If they be sought for abroad, the proportion of agriculturalists at home will be greater, and that happiness said to belong exclusively to agricultural states will, in a degree, be realized. As agriculture excels all other arts in enlarging the understanding, by the variety⁶ of its occupations, in purifying and ennobling the heart, by the innocence, the simplicity, and the independence of its pursuits, and their connection with all social and honorable affections, our foreign commerce, which permits us to employ almost our whole population in the culture of the earth, is more favourable to morals and public virtue than the domestic arts which might arise out of its ruins. In proportion moreover, as our foreign commerce annually extends an exchange of the necessaries of life, on our part, for its comforts, its conveniences, and its luxuries on that of other nations, does this commerce tend, in a small degree, to increase their dependence on us; a dependence to which its enemies have avowed their willingness to confide its protection and the tranquillity of our country.

Nature herself, seems to have contemplated an union of mankind, in a commercial intercourse, embracing all the nations of the earth. She has provided the means of communication between the most distant countries, and laid the foundation of their use in the various wants inseparable from human nature. Under her maternal auspices, the superfluities of one land are made to support the inhabitants of another. What in one region is neglected or contemned, in another ministers to the necessities or furnishes the conveniences and comforts of life. The

⁵*Vide* Wealth of Nations, vol. 2, pages 58 and 432, and vol. 3, pages 17 and 18.

⁶*Vide* Wealth of Nations, page 9 of vol. 1, and page 78 of vol. 2.

sugar and coffee of the Antilles; the spices of the Moluccas; the tea, the silk, the porcelain of China; the muslins and cottons of Asia; the woollens, linens and cutlery of Europe; the drugs, the dyes, the tobacco and grain, the silver and gold of Africa and America: whatever the various soils and climates of the earth engender, whatever industry, driven by necessity or fired by genius, has discovered or invented, all contribute, through an extensive commerce, to the civility, the refinement, and the happiness of man. Diseases and their remedies often spring from different climates, and the peasant of the remotest corner of Europe is frequently indebted to India, Mexico, or Peru for the preservation of a blessing, without which life itself would no longer be prized. But why need I say more. Is it not commerce which breaks down those barriers to the extension of knowledge that men have themselves created, by a diversity of manners and customs, of religions, laws, and languages? Is it not commerce which directs the labours of man to one common and illustrious object, the perfection of the species? If it create luxury, it corrects barbarity. And had I to chuse where I should live and perish in that round which connects the rise, progress and decline of empires, I would rather enjoy the sunshine of the arts and the endearments of social intercourse, than waste my days amidst the stupid indolence, the ferocious yells or the frantic orgies of the wilderness.

To restrain luxury, let the whole force of education be employed; education, the most important amidst so many objects of national concern; the only one neglected by the legislators of America. Let it be recollected however, that luxury cannot prove as pernicious to a large as to a small republic. In the United States it will be confined to the sea coast, and the rivers, whose navigable waters intersect the lower country; the inhabitants beyond the mountains and remote from cities will escape the contagion; and constituting the great body of the people, will

serve as an impregnable bulwark to freedom. The southern states, unfortunately for themselves, and yet more so for the general prosperity of the Union, have fancied that, from a peculiarity of situation, their interest was to be found in a system unfavourable to foreign commerce. The immediate effect of this opinion on the largest of those states, from its connection with my subject, I would exhibit to your view did not my time forbid. Its consequences on the Union have been, and I fear will continue to be fruitful of calamity. If the inhabitants of the south entertain doubts concerning the utility of foreign trade, a very large proportion of their fellow citizens elsewhere have a fixed opinion on that object. Can it be supposed that the immense country bordering on the Ohio and the Mississippi will assent to its annihilation? Has it, after the most urgent supplication to the general government, and subsequent remonstrances to the court of Spain, obtained an access to a foreign market that it will surrender for the sake of Union? Will the people to the east relinquish the conveniences and ornaments of life and their lucrative occupations to preserve an Union which would no longer have an object? Our Union, fellow citizens, gloriously triumphed over all the obstacles which opposed its origin, and is I trust rising to maturity on the only solid basis, the enlightened affection of the American people. Next to the loss of our liberty, of which indeed it is the only certain security, we should dread its untimely dissolution as the greatest calamity which could befall us. Ought then a system of policy to be proposed which has a tendency to excite distrust and jealousy, which has already opened a gulf that threatens to devour whatever we hold most dear? Antifederalism sprung from an imaginary difference of interest between the members of the Union supposed to be incompatible with its existence. The parties which now sour social intercourse, and which have made the hall of our legislative council ring with invective, have assumed various aspects with various titles; and doubtless, we are to look

abroad for the causes which have embittered their zeal. But to this supposed diversity of interest, their origin must ultimately be traced. The period is not remote, when they were marked out by geographical as well as political boundaries; when they were designated as much by the territory which they inhabited as the policy they advocated. Some of the members of the Federal Legislature are even now so deluded by this false theory, or so unguarded in their language, as to speak of an agricultural interest, distinct from if not opposed to, that of foreign commerce, and of the propriety of promoting the one to the neglect of the other. But it is vain to contemplate a destruction of our foreign trade. The population of the country is too slender to admit of it. It would endanger the whole fabric of society. The manners and habits, the interest, opinions and affections of the people, all rise in opposition to the measure—a measure which could not be effected without destroying that Union which every honest American will guard as the palladium of his country.

It is urged however, and with much confidence, that the importance of our foreign commerce does not imply the necessity of establishing a Navy for its protection. Our productions, it is said, are of universal demand. It is necessary only to open our ports in order to have them crowded with the flags of every land. We may therefore safely withdraw our seamen from the ocean, and permit other nations to transport our commodities.

When we relinquish our navigation, fellow citizens, we shall virtually relinquish our independence. We shall surrender to the most powerful nation of Europe a monopoly of our productions, and invest it with the dangerous privilege of controlling our industry and commanding our resources. The navigation which we surrender will become a firebrand of discord. Avarice will endeavour to grasp it as a source of opulence, ambition as an engine of power. In the lust of rivalry, each state will endeavour to exclude her competitor from the American market.

To effect this purpose, commercial wars will be waged. The command of the ocean being the object of the contest, it must be decided by naval superiority. Should the weaker state attempt an ineffectual struggle, her enemy will line our coast with his ships. Stationed at the legal distance from the mouths of our bays and harbours, they will intercept every hostile flag which shall dare to appear. In vain do we proclaim to the world: our ports are open to the commerce of every land—our numerous rivers, our capacious bays, our wants which you have the means of gratifying, invite you to bring hither the produce of your industry. All access to our harbours is cut off by a barrier erected beyond our jurisdiction, not under our control. Thus has a single nation in the exercise of the lawful rights of war, and without affording us even a shadow for complaint, limited us in our supplies to what it can itself furnish, and contracted the demand for our commodities to the narrow extent of its own wants. It rests with the state become our carrier, to stamp what value it pleases on the motives of our industry, or our industry itself.

Let us reverse this scene. Retaining our navigation, we continue to transport our own commodities. We hold, by an imprescriptible right, the prize for which Europe had been contending. Her wars, instead of diminishing, extend the demand for our productions. The freight for transportation, the ships, the artists who build them, and the hardy seamen who direct them are the property of the nation. Bearing aloft a neutral flag, we are no longer in jeopardy from the avarice or ambition of every nation who might chuse, for the gratification of either, to disturb the tranquility of the world. If the war be as extensive as I have contemplated, it will transfer to America the navigation of Europe. The contrary policy would not only be a dishonorable surrender of the independence which Nature acknowledges in every free state, an independence which we once nobly asserted; but what would be deemed important by those who

profess to ridicule efforts to preserve any thing but money, it would violate the soundest principles of economy. It would destroy an extensive home market for the most bulky commodities. In its various relations to agriculture and manufactories, it would occasion incalculable injury. And to those who do not dream of universal peace and perfection I add, that it would drive from us a class of expert artists, and annihilate a body of sixty thousand enterprising sailors, whose services might hereafter be required in vain by the pressing emergencies of war. Other nations have striven to multiply the sources of external security, by giving to their artists at home a monopoly of this valuable art. In violation of the rights of nature, they have endeavoured to enlarge this nursery for seamen by forcing its extension abroad, and shall America improvidently yield the advantages which Nature has given her?

So much, fellow citizens, for the policy of this, the favourite measure of the enemies of our Navy. But it is moreover, impracticable on principles of union to surrender our navigation. That our population is extremely slender when compared with the immense extent of our whole territory, is true; but it is not equally true when considered in reference to every part of the country by which it is actually supported. The Eastern states contain a people who seek subsistence, not only by transporting the articles of commerce, but from the bottom of the ocean. You are told that they may be withdrawn from their present avocations, and employed in the culture of the soil. Extremely easy is this, in theory, but not so in practice. In vain will you compare the barrenness of a rocky soil, and the rigour of a northern clime, with the fertility of the milder regions of the West. In vain will you bid the fisherman of Nantucket to quit his inclement skies, and his precarious employment, to seek an easier subsistence on the banks of the Ohio or the shores of Ontario. Grasping his harpoon, from the helm of his vessel he points to

his native rocks, and exclaims, with the ardour of patriotism, "there are my treasures, *this* is my delight."

If it be impracticable, as well as impolitic, to relinquish our navigation, we must, fellow citizens, afford it adequate protection. A defenceless commerce offers to avarice and ambition temptations which they are incapable of resisting. Responsible to conscience and heaven alone, and urged by a policy which is callous to remorse, can that spirit which aims at universal empire, or the avarice and jealousy which spring from a false idea of a balance of trade, be taught, through a sense of justice, or the remote connection of policy with virtue, to respect the rights of nations? When have these principles directed the conduct of independent states? How inadequate have they ever proved to restrain individuals bound together by the affectionate ties and amendable to the awful tribunals of society. And can it be supposed that powerful nations, mutually jealous, and rivals of each other, accountable to God alone, will listen to their dictates when they come in competition with their interest? An unprotected commerce will have to enter foreign ports under restrictions which will, sometimes, amount to actual prohibition. Interest being the only rule to which power will deign to submit, where that can be promoted, no regard will be paid to reciprocal obligation. Besides the motives to restrict or prohibit an unprotected trade, which are common to all nations, there are some who avowedly subsist by plunder. It will not be declamation to assert on the authority of the most respectable writer on the law of nations,⁷ that the piratical states of Barbary are even employed by the powerful nations of Europe, to distress the commerce of their weaker rivals. Insecure is that commerce which, when the world is at peace, relies for its freedom on the wisdom

⁷Vattel, book 2, chap. vii, sec. 78.

of the cabinets of the Princes, which has in so few instances been capable of discerning, or willing to promote the happiness of mankind. War, however, which changes the pre-existing, and establishes new relations between states and empires, naturally produces a policy unfavourable to the freedom of commercial intercourse. Laws, oppressive on the commerce of neutral nations, become here the obvious interest of the belligerent powers. Neutrality is even odious to nations at war. They will court its secret aid by intrigue, or they will fret it into open violence by unwarrantable insults. An enraged competitor would destroy that sun which shines with equal fervour on his rival as on himself. Fear alone will compel a nation calmly to permit its enemy to receive, through the commerce of a neutral state, the sinews of war. Unless we possess the means of exciting this fear, in vain may we desire to retain our navigation. A powerful state will tell us "*these* ports you may enter, *those* you shall not." Disregarding the rights of neutrality, while she dispatches her squadrons to another quarter she will proclaim a whole country to be blockaded, in order to starve its inhabitants into terms. Where there is no plausible pretext for actual blockade she will, by fraudulent constructions of the law of nations, a law which is made, at once, every thing and nothing, as the authority of force may please to interpret it, or by more fraudulent evasions of existing compacts, extend the list of contraband articles. She will finally tell us, "with this nation you are permitted to trade, but with that you shall hold no commercial intercourse. You shall not import the manufactures of this state, to that, you shall not export your own commodities." She will specify not only the channels of our commerce, but the burthen of vessels which we shall employ, and the articles that shall compose their cargoes. Do we submit to the encroachments of one nation, our submission will not only invite the rapacity, but will be conceived to justify or be urged to excuse, the spoliation of all. To redress our wrongs, should we withhold our favours from the

nation who has commenced the injury, she will plunder us to the full amount of her wants. The only alternative then left us is, by a *general embargo*, to blend our friends with our enemies. To seek through a miserable retirement within our *shell*, to repair one loss by incurring a greater, and punish the plunderer of three or twenty millions of our property, by an annual sacrifice of sixty. And shall the expense which would attend the preservation of our independence, be deemed a sufficient reason for abandoning it altogether? Had such been the policy of Seventy-six, we should have continued the humble instrument of foreign greatness, as we now are the sport of foreign cupidity.

But may not this argument, the strongest that has been advanced by the enemies of our Navy, and the most frequently adduced because the most popular, be turned against them on a liberal and comprehensive view of political economy? I trust it can. It has already been adverted to. Permit me, for a moment, to direct your attention more particularly to it. When the hazard to be encountered in commercial intercourse is increased, whatever be the cause, whether the wars of other nations or our own, the price of insurance is proportionably augmented. The risk of capture is added to the ordinary accidents of the sea, and forms a part of the standard by which the insurer regulates his premium. And by whom is this premium paid? Certainly by the consumer of the articles insured. Is it conceived that the merchant pays it? He must make a certain profit on his capital, proportionate to its amount. Where a duty is imposed on any commodity imported, its price is enhanced to the consumer. The merchant advances the duty, but the consumer ultimately pays it. In like manner, where the losses sustained at sea are increased, or the danger^s of incurring them is magnified, an additional

^sWhat may be hereafter the consequence of insecurity arising from the wars of other nations may be ascertained by a recurrence to past experience.

In 1793, insurance from Philadelphia to the West Indies was from two and

charge is laid upon every commodity by the merchant, in order to repay himself the price of its insurance, together with a profit on its advancement. And as, in the first instance, it is immaterial whether the consumer pays the duty as a tax or as

an half to three and an half per cent.—To the West Indies and back five and an half per cent.—From Philadelphia to New Orleans and back six per cent.—Philadelphia to Europe generally three and an half, sometimes two, seldom four per cent.

In June 1794—To the West Indies five per cent.—West Indies and back eight and an half per cent.—To New Orleans five per cent.—To London and back ten per cent.

In June 1795 and 6—nearly the same to the West Indies—To Europe rather less.

In June 1797—To the West Indies and back twelve and an half, fifteen, and twenty per cent.—To Europe ten, seldom nine or eight per cent.

In June 1798—To the West Indies twelve and an half to seventeen and an half per cent.—To Europe twenty per cent.

In June 1799—To Europe and back seventeen and an half to twenty—To Europe ten to twelve and an half—To the West Indies ten per cent.

The above was copied from the books of one of the first houses in Philadelphia. I annex to it a list of premiums established in the Insurance Company of North America, on the 7th of March, 1794.

To Great Britain and Ireland	12½	
Holland and Ostend	15	
Ports in France out of the Streights	20	
Spain in the Bay of Biscay	20	
Ocean, Portugal and Gibraltar	30	
Sweden and Denmark	15	
Russia	17½	
Hamburg and Bremen	12½	
All Western and Canary Islands	20	
All British, Spanish, and Dutch Isles and Ports in the W. Indies	12½	12½
Swedish and Danish Islands	7½	7½
French Islands	20	30
New Orleans	12½	
East Indies and China, to one Port	20	
Home, to sail before the 1st of March	15	
The Isle of France and the Mauritius	25	25

The two following lists are from the speeches of Mr. Gallatin on the 7th of February, 1799. The report of the committee from which they were taken is not in my possession.

a part of the price of the commodity, so is it, in the last, as immaterial on the score of expense, though all-important on every other, whether he pays a certain sum when he purchases an article as its insurance against the danger of capture, or contributes that amount through a direct tax or an additional duty on consumption towards the maintenance of a Navy that will remove the danger. The instrument⁹ of commercial inter-

“The committee stated that about the time of the sailing of our ships of war, the rate of insurance in Philadelphia, stood as followeth,

	In 1799.			
	Out	Home	Out	Home
To Russia	22½	22½	12½	12½
Sweden	20	12½	12½	12½
Denmark & Hanse towns	17½	17½	10	10
Holland	20	17½	15	12½
Great Britain	17½	17½	10	10
Spain	17½	17½	12½	12½
France	—	—	—	—
Portugal	15	15	10	10
Morocco	20	20	12½	12½
Italy	27½	27½	17½	17
China and the East Indies	20	15	10	10
West Indies	17½	17½	12½	12½
Africa	20	20	12½	12½

The foregoing facts are not adduced for the purpose to which the select committee applied the last of them, and the inferences I shall draw from them will not be affected by the reasoning opposed to that of the committee. I mean to exhibit, not a particular effect produced by our present armament in any period of its existence, but the general effect of a state of insecurity, arising from wars in which we either bore no part, or confined our efforts to repel aggression. The greatest expence of this insecurity, whether incurred in insuring against real or imagined danger, is the difference between the insurance against the risk of the sea, and the risk of the sea together with that of capture. Assuming the insurance of 1793 as the first, we have about 6 per cent for insurance out and in, to and from Europe and the West Indies, and nearly 36 per cent for the highest insurance before 1799, for the last. Consequently 30 per cent is the amount of the extraordinary premium paid, in consequence of the real or apprehended danger of a voyage out and in, to and from the West Indies or Europe. About one half of that, or 15 per cent must be charged on our *exports*, and the other half, or 15 per cent. on our imports.

course is also rendered more expensive by the risk to which a defenceless commerce is exposed. The freight of a vessel may be resolved into a profit upon the sum which she has cost her owner and the expenses of the voyage. And the first is regulated by the profit of stock in other directions of industry, with the additional consideration of the perishable nature of the

⁸Since the report of the select committee, the *former* have been augmented to more than 70,000,000 of dollars. From an increase of population, the latter must also have increased. As a part of our exports consists of articles imported from abroad, and afterwards exported to pay for other imports, in what is called an indirect trade of foreign consumption (a trade not as advantageous as the *direct*, though not a mere *carrying trade*, as it has been represented to be*) I

*It would not be an improper digression from my subject to defend this part of our commerce from the unjustifiable attack which has been made upon it by a respectable authority. One-half of our exports have been stated to consist of foreign imports, and to give rise to a species of commerce in which the American consumer, or cultivator, has no interest. If I can prove, on the contrary, that this trade is necessarily connected with the rest of our commerce, that the former merely disposes of the superfluous returns of the latter, that the price of the former is another name for that of the latter, that without the power of disposing of the former the value of the latter must sink; that every risk which affects the value of the one, either in importing or exporting, must regulate also the price of the other; then must it be deemed equally entitled to protection with the rest of our commerce, and all additional expense incurred in importing and exporting the articles which enter into this portion of our trade is equally chargeable on the consumer or farmer, with the additional expense attending the exportation of his own produce or the importation of foreign manufactures. Permit me to give only a single statement and to refer, for a confirmation of my argument, to Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. Our exports were admitted to amount to 30,000,000, which the merchant exports on the credit of importing sugar and coffee from the West Indies or manufactures from Europe. The thirty millions of American we will say, for the sake of brevity, are sold in the West Indies at an advance of 66 $\frac{2}{3}$ per cent and vested in the produce of the islands to the amount of 50,000,000. Of the fifty millions of West India produce the United States require for their own consumption no more than twenty, and to Europe, consequently, where they can find a market for the surplus, they export the remaining thirty millions. They are, perhaps, disposed of in Europe at an augmented price, and the European manufactures imported in return for them may furnish another surplus of a different species of goods proper for the West India market. It must be perceived from this statement that besides the encouragement given by this trade to our artists who build the vessels employed in it, besides the various productions which it consumes in our home trade, the profit of the merchant, the freight of the owner, and the nursery which it creates for seamen, in which circumstance it resembles a carrying trade, it is immediately connected with our direct trade of foreign consumption and equally entitled to protection. Where perfect liberty exists as in America, to every class of industry, and every direction of labor and stock, distinctions between the various fountains of opulence, intended to recommend some more than others to the care and protection of the Government, cannot but be *invidious*. They are not made in the spirit of the admirable author of the *Wealth of Nations*, to whom they some times very uncandidly refer. He wrote, not to disturb, but to restore the freedom of commerce, and to evince the impolicy of those restraints upon nature which a delusive and jealous sense of utility had produced. In a word, he was not the member of a party. See chap. V of book II, and especially the 62nd page of vol. II, of Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, edition 8, octavo.

subject in which it is here invested, or the danger of losing the capital itself. In peace this is great from the casualties of the sea and the rapid decay of the materials of which the vessel is constructed. In war it may be yet greater, from the frequency of capture. The owner insures against this new risk and charges the premium on the use of his vessel; the merchant returns it and charges it on the commodities. Both, the consumer eventually pays.⁹ Of the second constituent of freight, or the expenses of the voyage, which may be subdivided into various items, I select only the wages of the seamen, because the only one affected by the risk of capture. The wages of the crew of a vessel are affected, not only by the price of labor in

will assume 100,000,000, the amount proposed by the select committee in 1799, as the basis of calculation. I am therefore warranted in stating 15,000,000 of dollars, as the loss which we should annually sustain in the present circumstances of our commerce, from an insecurity, either real or imaginary, equal to that of 1799, when we were provided with some defence (however incompetent) for our trade, when the only depredator upon it was not deemed to be at open war with us, and his means of injury were, moreover, controlled by a superior force.

⁹On this part of the calculation I have proposed to pursue, I am very sensible of a defect of materials. Having made this assurance, I offer the following:

Present amount of American tonnage	950,000 tons.
Internal trade which I except as not equally exposed,	} 150,000

Foreign trade and fisheries,	- - - -	800,000
------------------------------	---------	---------

Value according to Mr. Coxe (*View of the United States* page 184) at 34 dollars per ton, 27,200,000.

According to Lord Sheffield (*On American Commerce*, page 87) at about 40 dollars per ton, 32,000,000.

According to respectable private information of the rates during the war, at 45 dollars per ton, 36,000,000.

A medium of the two first will be 29,600,000, and of the two last 34,000,000, and of the two averaged values 31,800,000.

The first exceeds by but 200,000, the value assumed by the select committee in 1799: Deducting from the last averaged value 1,800,000, for the sake of round numbers and to avoid objections, and we have 30,000,000 for the value of our foreign tonnage. At the premium established in the last note for a voyage out and in, viz. 30 per cent. we have nine millions of dollars as the annual expence of insecurity, added to the freight of our vessels, and borne by the American consumer. The risk, it must be observed, is that of 1799.

other avocations, but by the peculiar hazard accompanying this. War adds to this hazard, painful detentions in foreign ports, the loss of liberty, or death from the hands of an enemy. And the compensation for it constitutes a part of the augmented price of freight.¹⁰ Moreover, the owner of the vessel insures his freight and charges the insurance as a part¹¹ of the freight

¹⁰Assuming 800,000,000 tons, as before, for our foreign trade, and allowing 100 tons* to each vessel, we have eight thousand vessels. Allowing a master or captain, and a mate, and an average of four sailors to every vessel, and we have eight thousand captains, eight thousand mates, and thirty-two thousand sailors, for the whole number, whose wages were affected by the risk of 1799, or would be hereafter affected by a similar hazard.

The wages of a captain or master before 1793 were from twenty to twenty-five dollars per month. In 1799, sixty dollars.

The greatest difference of wages per month before and during the war, forty dollars; the least, thirty-five dollars; average thirty-seven and an half dollars; \times 8000 the whole number of captains, or masters, gives a monthly expence of 300,000 dollars, incurred, in consequence of insecurity, for the wages of the captains, or masters.

The wages of a mate before 1793 were from fourteen to sixteen dollars per month: In 1799 from thirty-six to forty dollars: One half of $14 + 16 = 15$; one half of $36 + 40 = 38$; difference 23, which multiplied by 8000, the whole number of mates, gives a monthly expence of 184,000 dollars incurred, in consequence of insecurity, for the wages of mates.

The wages of common sailors before 1793 were from eight to twelve dollars per month; during 1799 from twenty to twenty-six dollars: One half of $8 + 12 = 10$; and one half of $20 + 26 = 23$, the difference is 13, which multiplied by 32,000, the whole number of common sailors, gives a monthly expence of 416,000 dollars incurred, in consequence of insecurity, for the wages of seamen.

These three items added together make 900,000 dollars, which multiplied by 12 for the annual wages, give the sum of 10,800,000 dollars for the annual augmentation of the wages of seamen, or the second item of freight, by the hazard of capture in 1799.

¹¹I shall not pretend to estimate this amount, or those arising from the additional primage, which is a commercial term for the sum which the merchant allows the captain on the whole freight of the vessel which he commands, and which is about 5 per cent.—and the additional brokerage, which is a sum paid by the underwriter to the broker who negotiates a policy for him, and which is about one per cent. on the premium. It will be sufficient to state, that the hazard of

*This number is assumed on a comparison of various articles in Dr. Morse's *Gazetteer* and on private information. It is not confidently relied on. The number of seamen allowed to a vessel, and especially their wages before and during the war, are believed to be accurate.

itself. The captain receives a primage proportionate to the whole amount of the freight. The broker, for negotiating the several policies, a profit upon all the premiums. And inasmuch as all those expenses together render it necessary to employ a greater capital in a certain number of vessels they limit the extension of navigation, and by destroying a former or preventing a new competition, augment the price of freight. The instrument by which commercial intercourse is maintained is thus rendered more expensive, by various causes resulting from a state of insecurity. But the whole expense is borne by the consumer. By the merchant, no farther than as he himself holds this character. In fine, as the cultivator of the soil disposes of his productions at a price reduced by the accumulated expense of exportation abroad, their nominal value is depressed. He purchases manufactures at a price enhanced by the additional charge on the food which supports the manufacturer, and the rude materials of which they are wrought, as well as the extraordinary risk attending their importation. The real value of his productions, which is to be estimated by the wants which they will enable him to gratify, is sunk yet lower. The possibility of transporting our commodities to a foreign market, where, according to their general character, they comprise a small value in a great bulk, is rendered precarious.

1799, (whether real or imaginary, I must, contrary to a respectable authority, deem altogether immaterial as to the immediate loss) applied to our present circumstances, would produce an annual expence of 15,000,000 of dollars, for the insurance of the articles of commerce, 9,000,000 for the insurance of the vessels engaged in it, and 10,800,000 for the augmentation of seamen's wages beyond the peace rates. In all nearly 35,000,000 of dollars for the annual expence *which would* be incurred by the United States of America, in consequence of the commission of depredations as extensive as those of 1798, 1799, and 1800, on their commerce.

I ask if this sum would support a Navy powerful enough to command respect from other nations while we are engaged in a lawful commerce? For the motives which those nations must ever feel to respect us, motives which must however be unavailing while we are unarmed, I refer to Jefferson's *Notes*, pages 258, 259, and 260, new edition of 1801.

It is not, let me add, our own wealth alone which we put in jeopardy by this absurd system of economy. We are, under certain circumstances, responsible for that of our allies. A belligerent power is bound, by the law of nations, to hold sacred the property of his enemy, provided it be within the territorial jurisdiction of a neutral state. This jurisdiction extends to the distance of one league from the sea-shore, and over all bays, rivers and harbours within her territory. And the same law declares that if a belligerent power capture the vessels of his enemy within these limits, the neutral state shall indemnify her ally for the loss which she sustains. What, let me ask, avails the acknowledgement of a law where it can be violated with impunity?

But if the risk arising from the wars of other nations; if the depredations which belligerent powers are prone to commit on the unprotected commerce of a neutral state; if the spoliations [I speak not here of the indignities to which we have so patiently submitted for more than six years] are to be deprecated, on an extensive view of political economy when contrasted with the price of commercial security [and I insist that they are], yet more deplorable would be the calamities of a commercial war, to which, without the means of defence, we should be ourselves a party. Let them not be estimated by the events of a period when the world contributed, by the most destructive havoc, to encourage our industry, and the misfortunes of other nations gave to our seamen the navigation of the richest commerce. Nor should they be measured by the feeble efforts of the crippled marine of France during the last three years of that period. It had been previously humbled by the naval power of Great Britain. Her numerous squadrons deterred its shattered remnant from tempting the ocean. It will not be deemed candid by those who differ from me in opinion to estimate them from the transac-

tions of the revolutionary war, mingled as they then were with peculiar and complicated misfortunes. Let it be recollected, however, that our population has since progressed more rapidly than our arts. That our tonnage has been tripled; our exports quadrupled. That vast forests have been opened to the light of cultivation by an industry which is cheered by the prospect of distant markets. That the arts which we possess are intimately connected with, have in some instances grown out of, our foreign commerce, which supplies their basis or furnishes a demand for their products. That our hardy and enterprising countrymen of the north have converted the Banks of Newfoundland into a mine of wealth, of population and, if rightly used, a formidable safeguard of independence. That we have, moreover, incurred an immense debt, the price of the political blessings procured by that war, and which all these resources are to discharge. On these fountains of opulence, of enjoyment, of independence, what would be the operation of a commercial war, in which we should oppose our imbecility to the naval strength of a powerful enemy? How are our harbours, our maritime cities, defended? Many of our rivers present no other obstacles to a foe, from their mouths to their sources, than the rocks which terminate their navigation. A fleet of twenty sail properly distributed would block up every harbour in the United States. Half that number would shut up the Narrows of New York, the entrance of the Sound, the ports of Boston and Charleston, and the mouths of the Delaware and Chesapeake. A single armed ship would intercept every bark that is carried down the Mississippi. A stroke is aimed at our industry, whose paralytic power would be felt through every department of the community. The sinews of labour are withered. The husbandman neglects the harvest field, his ploughshare rusts in the furrow. The disconsolate mariner beholds the sails of his vessel idly flapping in the wind, or indignantly sees her led away by a rapacious enemy. The fisherman of the north no longer fre-

quents the Banks of Newfoundland, or courses the whale in the Southern Ocean. He turns to the Atlantic, and with hopeless dejection beholds the avenues of an employment to which nature had conducted him in childhood, which she had made the honour and support of his maturity, closed up. The silence of desolation reigns in our cities. Perhaps even the flames of war fill them with the cries of their defenceless inhabitants.¹² Flying from their paternal abode, they curse the wealth which invited the rapacity of their enemy, and their government which surrenders them a helpless prey to his power. Public credit calls in vain upon the empty treasury for the sums destined for the national debt. The necessary violation of private contracts undermines the morals of society. The government itself, hitherto accustomed to rely almost exclusively, upon the duties on imports for revenue to fulfil its engagements, sees the public confidence deserting it, and all its operations delayed or defeated. Before the loss of its old can be supplied by a new revenue, it institutes expensive loans without funds to pledge as a security for their redemption. Perhaps, at this awful crisis, it swells its expenditures by appropriations for defence, for that very Navy which it recently spurned. It establishes a new system of taxation, not only more expensive in collection, but from its drawing directly on the purse of the citizen, and from its necessary or fancied inequality, calculated to excite the clamour of the turbulent and the discontented. A clamour, the more alarming from the period at which this new system is called into operation, at the moment when an enemy is on the coast, when the channel of commerce is obstructed and the capacity of the citizen for discharging even the ordinary expenses of the government is restricted or utterly destroyed. Gold and silver disappear. The banks are shut up. A circulating medium consisting of their protested securities,

¹²Will such a calamity be deemed impossible after the recent bombardment of the capital of a brave people by a British squadron? One of the strongest cities in the world!

of the depreciated certificates of the public debt, of a new paper currency issued on the verge of national bankruptcy, generates, in its perpetual and rapid fluctuations, swarms of speculators who intercept the blood of the nation before it has performed its natural office, and glitter amidst her ruins. And shall we hazard a situation so deplorable and trust our security, I had almost said, our existence, to the mercy of every nation capable of equipping a fleet of twenty sail? Can we expect succour from abroad, when we cease to confide in ourselves? It has been often urged, that those nations from whom we have the greatest danger to apprehend, are most dependent on us for the employment of their artists and subsistence of their distant colonies; and that to this necessary dependence we may safely trust the protection of our trade. It is not the first time it has been discovered, that if nations would consult their true interests, the world would no longer be disturbed by their broils. Were the policy of European governments founded always upon a virtuous concern for the happiness of their respective subjects alone, were they always capable of discerning the means of promoting that happiness, we might venture to rely for security on the nature of our commerce. But I will select the most commercial of those states and pursue this reasoning. Great Britain, together with her dependencies, receives from the United States a greater quantity of food and materials than any other power in Europe. From the superior excellence of her government, public interest must be more frequently respected in her councils than in those of any other foreign nation. The dependence so much relied on must therefore operate here with peculiar force. When plundered by her cruisers or by those of other nations, turn here then, Americans, and address her interest or supplicate her humanity. Your addresses to her interest will be opposed by her pride. She possesses the most powerful Navy in Europe. Her painters, poets and orators have leagued her with Neptune and together

with his trident have transferred to her the empire of the waves. Supplicate her humanity! Whom do you supplicate? Not the people of Britain, but a committee of her Peers. They regulate the spirit of British commerce and the voice of the nation is that of the merchants of Bristol, Liverpool, and London, of the Board of East India Directors: the philanthropists who have dragged from Africa to a miserable servitude thousands of helpless wretches, whose only crimes were a capacity for labour and the complexion of a burning climate. Behold their humane policy deluging the plains of Indostan with the blood of her children, and with a rapacity equally capricious and unrelenting, desolating the most populous region of the globe! Will you judge of the protection which you are to derive from their humanity? They have avowed that it will be good policy in the nations of Europe to let loose on you the rovers of Sallee and the corsairs of Algiers. Infernal policy! It is but a few years since two hundred Americans returned from a cruel servitude. On the Southern shores of the Mediterranean I behold a land fertilized with the blood of my countrymen. I behold the chains which bound them to the instruments of labour and the bloody scourge just fallen from the hands of their inhuman tyrants. Their cries still vibrate in my ears. I hear them in the agony of despair abjure their country and their God. Americans, extend your protecting arms to the adventurous mariner. Do not, I conjure you, add to the thousand hidden dangers of the deep, to the howling tempest and the desert coast, the horrors of an Algerine captivity. Had you yourselves witnessed the scoffs of the infidels and the tortures they inflicted on your countrymen, your cannon would long since have thundered on the coast of Africa. Told of their sufferings, your infant Navy struggled for life. Faction however stifled her early efforts and you were content to purchase a shameful treaty stipulating a price for the freedom of American citizens. It is unfortunate indeed for Repub-

lican governments, that they are too prone to act from the impulse of the moment and too seldom pursue the most important objects with firmness. We are plundered by the states of Barbary, and order six frigates to be built for the protection of our trade. We buy a treaty and determine to build but three. Could we tell how long this faithless people would *think it convenient* to fulfil their contract? Again, our commerce is plundered by the greatest naval powers of Europe, and its chief spoiler adds insult to injury, proudly spurns our proffered reconciliation and turns a deaf ear to our remonstrances. All parties at length concur in ascribing these outrages and indignities to the same cause, the want of a Navy sufficiently powerful to protect our rights. And yet, when it is proposed to build six ships of the line, it is urged that they cannot be finished before the present hostilities are over. Fellow citizens, these hostilities will never cease while our imbecility, the lamentable cause of them, exists. Should the usurpation of France be limited or crushed, France whom, if you remember, we once considered our national ally, what may we not apprehend from the unrivalled Navy of Britain? Experience has told us that it is not on national friendship; it is not on the sanction of natural law, it is not on the faith of treaties, however solemnly ratified, but on a resolute determination to defend our rights, that we are to found the hope of security. When this resolution is blown about by the gale of faction, when our resources ¹³ cease to be confided in,

¹⁷In two speeches delivered in Congress by the present Secretary of the Treasury on the 7th and 11th of February, 1799, our permanent resources (including *internal duties, land and stamp taxes*, which he there estimates at 2,600,000 dollars) are rated at 10,000,000 of dollars. In a report lately issued from the same quarter, they are estimated, *without the land or stamp tax*, at 10,600,000! Such is the difference between our resources under the management of O(liver) W(olcott) and A(lbert) G(allatin)!

To serve a particular purpose, our expenditures for 1801, and 1802, were in 1799, calculated at 15,450,000, and 16,750,000 dollars respectively. In 1801, to

when national honor is decried and disgraceful submission recommended, then all that renders dear the sounds of country, of liberty, of independence is about to vanish forever. For when you have prostrated your national character, when you have tamely submitted to insults from foreign nations, and refused your protection to a large part of the community, where will your calamities terminate? Not in the mere destruction of foreign commerce or the miserable slavery of thousands of your

serve another purpose, they are shrunk to about 7,000,000, including the expenditures for our persecuted Navy, and the interest on our public debt!

Adam Smith tells us, that the high interest of money in the United States (then British provinces) is a proof of their rapid progress to opulence. The public prints teemed with abuse of the government for borrowing at 8 per cent. Six per cent stock was then selling at 16s. The new eight per cent stock did not rise above par till a twelvemonth after it was issued! Profound Financiers, wise Statesmen!

Debate in the House of Representatives March 29th, on the State of the Union.

Mr. Giles said "that when he found the law for building the frigates would pass, he stated it as his consolation, that the trees from which the frigates were to be built were still growing." Again, "Perhaps, Gentlemen may say, what will you do if France carries her injuries farther? I would, said he, draw ourselves within our shell."

In his last speech, on that day, in reply to Mr. Harper, he concluded with the following remarkable declaration: "As to the frigates, he gloried in his vote against them; but with respect to the use of them, the gentleman (Mr. H.) was mistaken. They were *intended* to be sent against the *Algerines only*."

In a committee of the whole, on the State of the Union, April the 17th, 1798, Mr. Nicholas owned "it would be a painful thing to see our commerce carried on by other nations; but we have no choice, if it is not in our power to give equal protection. The southern states, he said, had acted very liberally in this respect when they had any thing in their power. They have consented to lay a burthen upon themselves to increase the navigation of the United States; but when they were called upon to support additional burdens, they would expect to see that the expence must conduce to some public advantage."

Mr. Baldwin, in a debate on Thursday, Jan. 17, 1799. "The operation of building the frigates had been the subject of more particular enquiry, and more *pointed censure* from all parts of the house, than any other; It had always been his opinion that it was less exposed to such censure than most of the other measures."

countrymen. True, to be reduced to want is a great national misfortune, and a generous people would feel the strongest repugnance at so glaring a violation of justice. But you will have done even more. You will have humbled the American spirit, extinguished the sacred fire of patriotism enkindled by the Revolution, and opened an easy avenue for despotic power. What maintained the ancient republics—those famous seats of science and liberty whose history is yet an inexhaustible mine of knowledge; at whose very names a sublime emotion thrills in our veins? It was PUBLIC SPIRIT. A feeling in the whole republic, of the wrongs of the most obscure citizen—an unconquerable elevation of soul in each citizen, springing from a love of country which could not quietly bear the indignities offered to her glory. It was this which so long defeated the arts of intriguing demagogues. It was an heroic valour derived from this sacred feeling, which like the lightning of Heaven, kindling on the Grecian armour, blasted and dispersed the effeminate hordes of Xerxes; which triumphantly bore the Roman Eagles from the Western Ocean to the shores of the Euxine and the Caspian, from the burning sands of Libya to the frozen glooms of Scythia. When this spirit expired, liberty also expired, never more to revive. Those once favoured states contained only the empty traces of their former happiness; phantoms which their orators endeavoured to call up from the grave of oblivion, in order to rouse a degenerate race. But in vain. Even their repentant tyrants and conquerors, who while restricted by this virtue found it so difficult to rob them of their freedom, were unable to restore it. Sylla yielded to Rome her rights and she transferred them to a succession of tyrants. Rome publicly proclaimed liberty to Greece whom she had enslaved, but found her incapable of receiving it. Greece and Rome finally fell a prey to Barbarians. The vestiges of their former glory lie half concealed beneath the rubbish of ages. The lonely traveler amidst wastes and mouldering ruins, beholds them with solemn awe. They present a

melancholy picture at which the moralist heaves a sigh and the patriot turns with apprehension to his native land.

The voice of modern is an echo of ancient experience. We have recently beheld a nation, who, in the midst of despotic, powerful, and ambitious neighbours, maintained her independence and liberty, by upholding to the world the conviction that they were prepared and resolutely determined to defend them. Once happy Switzerland, with a territory small when compared with ours, with not half the resources which replenish the coffers of America, with your natural enemies at your doors, while the ocean separates us from ours, how far did you outstrip us in the path of Glory! Sensible of the importance of national honor, by repelling insults you prevented their repetition. Conscious that the rights of nations will be respected only as they are defended, by being always prepared for war, you secured to your citizens the enjoyment of an almost uninterrupted tranquillity. You attracted the admiration of the world. Awed by the heroic valour and patriotism of your citizens, insatiable avarice learnt to moderate her desires. Ambition rolled his gloomy course around your mountains without daring to aspire to their summits. Whilst surrounding nations were convulsed with war, and alarm spread along the banks of the Rhine, the Danube and the Rhone, the citizens of Helvetia slept undisturbed at their source. Resting on his arms, he could from his cottage securely behold the desolation of the tempest, and listen with composure to the distant rumblings of war. Such, Americans, was the glorious triumph of valour and patriotism. It is now no more. Those mountains which were crowned with cheerful cottages and the peaceful vine, now gleam with hostile arms. Their streams are stained with blood, their rocks which had yielded to industry are struck with barrenness. Those happy vallies which resounded only *the horn of the shepherd* and *the lowings of innumerable herds* are filled with the roar of cannon, the shouts of murderous

pursuit, and the groans of the dying. Oh! Zimmerman, when you wrote with the wisdom of a statesman and the fervour of a poet on that national pride which distinguished your country, little did you think that she was so soon to perish amidst its ruins. Yes, my countrymen, Switzerland, by deserting the early maxims of honor and independence on which she rose to glory, has sunk into the melancholy list of dependent and degraded nations. She fell a prey to indecisive counsels—to the love of a repose by which she had been enervated, and to the dread of war, the calamities of which were exaggerated by those whose political principles concurred with her enemy to complete her ruin. Six years of condescension to a foreign power, and of confidence in a treacherous security wasted her virtue and her strength and finally surrendered her, a defenceless victim of unrelenting perfidy and ambition.

Fellow citizens, listen to the voice of history; take warning from the fate of other nations. Do not waste, in unprofitable submission to the insults offered to your independence, the glory acquired by those martyrs whose blood so recently streamed as a sacrifice at her altars. Nature has given you rights, let not lawless power violate them with impunity. Unfortunate, indeed, we should be, if Providence, who blessed our efforts for independence, had left us without the means of preserving it. Do her not the injustice to believe that she has tantalized us with a blessing which we can never enjoy. She has planted the live oak, the cedar, the pine and the fir tree along our coast, from St. Mary's to St. Croix. She has deposited in our mountains rich mines of copper and iron. In the moist vallies between them, she cherishes the flax and the hemp plant. She extends our commerce through every ocean and to every clime. With the enterprise of freedom, she quickens the industry and improves the skill of our naval artists. She braces the nerves and hardens the sinews of our seamen, and fires them with an intrepidity which difficulties serve only to confirm, and no dangers can appal.

And shall we spurn these advantages, and by neglecting to improve, cease to deserve, and ultimately lose them?

But it has been said that "a Navy when established may be made use of as an argument for extending our power." If by "power" we are to understand the means of enforcing a respect for our neutral rights, which it is acknowledged have been "shamefully violated," it is indeed the professed object of a permanent Navy. But if by this expression we are to learn that when strong enough to render ourselves respectable in the eye of other nations, we shall be tempted to abuse our power, then, I would compare this argument with the consolation which a sick man would derive from being told that although his enemies were plundering his house, and desolating his fields, he should be content, since, if Heaven should please to renew his strength, and raise him on his feet again, he might be tempted to pursue and punish the robbers. Would not a child laugh if he were told that manhood was not to be desired because its vigor might be abused? And what is not liable to abuse? Let us, fellow citizens, dissolve our Union, and return to the dependent condition from which we so recently passed, and to which so many illustrious states have been more recently reduced, for ambition and avarice may yet possess us, and our freedom to think and act for ourselves lead us to violate the rights of others! It is not to connect us with the balance of Europe, nor to involve us in the destructive wars which its adjustment cost her; it is to keep out of her turmoils that a Navy is desired. It is to add to the many and powerful motives which foreign nations already have to respect us, another, that would stamp on the rest an almost irresistible force, and prevent them from being forgotten amidst calculations of convenience and the violence of war.

All the complicated terrors of foreign conquests, of which we are in no need, and which the whole nation, to a man, concur in deprecating, and of domestic tyranny, of which we are in no

danger, but in the heated zeal or the artful misrepresentations of the leaders of a party, have been brought to bear their whole force against the establishment of a permanent Navy. Its advocates have been openly charged with a desire of accumulating power in the hands of the executive and a few other persons, in order to increase our weight in Europe, and to feed the ambition of a few individuals. Fellow-citizens, the usurpers of exclusive patriotism have not always proved themselves the purest or the wisest defenders of liberty. It is the quality of true friendship, to which this sacred principle may without degradation be compared, to admonish us of our errors and to be more solicitous for our happiness than our applause. The supporters of the administration have been satisfied to permit their enemies to assume the title of Republicans, while they retained only that of Federalists. Because they believed your liberty to be safe, and your union, an object in few minds so intimately allied to the passions, to be in danger. Monarchy in the United States of America! It is absurd. It would not exist a day. The Federalists would be the first to pull it down. Fellow-citizens, I beg of you, not to judge the plain, the independent citizens of New England, where the first blood was spilt in the cause of Freedom, by the few foreigners whom commerce has conducted to our shores, and who preserve a natural attachment to the country and the institutions which they have left abroad. This would be as uncandid as to blend with the refugees from Ireland, the temperate and respectable Democracy of the south. The Federalists, if they can be supposed to disapprove of that constitution which they ratified, and which they have ever believed they were zealously defending, are yet too well informed on the subject of gov-

¹⁴Peter the Great, Montesquieu informs us, produced an insurrection in his empire by an edict to shave the beards of the Russians. He was obliged to desist. The Tartars succeeded although not without blood-shed, in shaving the heads of the Chinese. Is it supposed that men prize their hair more than their liberty?

ernment, on the necessity of suiting the political institutions of a people to their spirits,¹⁴ to desire a constitution whose administration should be more permanent than our own. It is the possibility of tranquilly changing our officers, that alone can save us from anarchy, the forerunner of despotism. Fortunate will it be if, as in a foreign country, the discontent which each administration must necessarily create, shall always cease with the political character of the members who compose it. A good citizen has little to care who holds the reins of government, while the constitution of his country is maintained inviolate, and her interests promoted. Banish suspicion, fellow-citizens, and you will perceive that the Executive can never derive a dangerous strength from a Naval Armament. It is here indeed, that a Navy is wholly unlike a standing army. If it be ever converted into an engine of ambition, its objects must be in a foreign country; and the will of your legislature must be previously perverted. A Navy can be employed to protect, but never to destroy, our liberty. To be useful it must, however, be permanent. It is not the work of a day, as its enemies have assured us; nor can the time at which its services may be required be always foreseen. It is a sword, which, to be useful in war, must not be permitted to rust in its sheath. Our enemies will behold its brightness at a distance, and conspire with our love of tranquility to keep it unemployed. To anticipate danger will ever prove the surest means of averting it. As a permanent Navy will afford the only adequate protection to our commerce, so will it also prove a formidable bulwark of national defence. Fellow-citizens, do you confide in the width of the ocean which separates you from Europe, to guard you from foreign invasion? You have not measured the strides of ambition. Without a Navy this distance is only apparent. Believe me, it will prove a delusive security. A single month will transport an army across the Atlantic; the period it would consume on land in marching from Charlestown to Washington. Consider the comparative ease of

transporting provisions, artillery, ammunition, and camp equipage, on the ocean. The numerous delays to which an army on land must be exposed, while pursuing a devious and untried route over mountains and rivers, through almost impenetrable forests, in continual alarm from the nightly fires and the frequent skirmishes of a vigilant and vindictive enemy. The distance does not exceed half what I have stated. Would you deem your new Capital in safety, were an army of veteran troops, although at the distance of six hundred miles, in full march against it. What a journey for an ambitious general inflated with conquest! Shall I trace the route of Alexander from Macedon to the Indian Ocean? It was three thousand miles, over swollen torrents and through parched deserts, amidst numerous nations whom, in the frenzy of ambition, he made his enemies, that he might conquer them. They knew of his march and were prepared to receive him. They fought and were vanquished. Our enemy, on the contrary, would be borne on the surface of the ocean, impelled by the winds. His arrival would be announced by his cannon. But Alexander, you would tell me, overcame nations effeminated by sloth! My countrymen, what may be our situation when enervated by long peace? We were but lately aroused by the alarm of invasion. Had the enemy actually arrived on our coast, were we ready to meet him? Was our army enlisted? No! Even when recently disbanded, after a period of two years had elapsed, but three thousand men had been recruited, and those the sweepings of our villages and cities. But, then, "the militia is regularly trained and amply provided with arms and accoutrements." Are they so here? It is fortunate. Go to the South and behold them parading without a single musket, with not so much as a fowling-piece. Every gentleman is an officer, and few officers are better equipped than the men whom they command.¹⁵ If such be our present preparation, what resistance shall we offer

to an enemy when time, whose unsparing hand has already snatched from us the sword of Washington, shall have robbed us of the remaining experience of our Revolutionary war? When, lulled into a final security, the militia of the North is no better than that of the South; when shining with the splendour of opulence we shall attract the eye of avarice; when promising an easy conquest we shall fire the breast of ambition! Alexander, you say, triumphed over states sunk in luxury and indolence. Behold Annibal on the plains of Italy! He has crossed the Mediterranean, traversed Spain, vanquished the ferocious Gauls, climbed the frozen Alps, descended into Italy, and defeated those brave and hardy legions destined one day to conquer, to give law to the world. Rome itself is at length saved, for Annibal's reinforcements are cut off. The expensive victories of the Carthaginian general have literally overcome him. Pause here, my countrymen, and behold the probable effect of your Navy in frustrating an invasion. It has been stated by the enemies of this establishment, "that it would not furnish a *sure defence* to our country, for it would not guard our extensive coast from invasion. That it is not a *necessary defence*,

¹⁶I am not disposed to decry what is the natural defence of every country, and the safest defence of a free state. But under the present militia system of the United States, or any which has been contemplated, there is little ground for the hope that it will ever be able to cope with the veteran armies of Europe. May I be allowed here to ask a question which would not have been deemed fanciful among the wisest nations of antiquity; it is, whether our militia system can ever be improved while its offices are unconnected with those of the civil administration? Where the military character of a people is lost in the civil, in habits necessarily pacific, how can military duties be made respectable, but by associating them with the civil, and by making a military office the necessary avenue to the highest honors which the nation can confer. When the *road* to glory is conducted through this department, by the laws, the military character will be dignified. The civil offices which terminate *it* will reflect a lustre on the military from which *it* leads. The only remaining alternative, to pay the citizen for discharging his duty as a soldier, is not congenial to the spirit of our constitution, nor as likely to produce the end intended.

since we have waded through a bloody contest without its assistance." No! my countrymen, it would be impossible for the Navy of Great Britain to guard her coast from invasion. But if a Navy will not always prevent an enemy from landing on our coast, it will at least render his invasion fruitless. Aided by the militia on shore, it may shut him up in a seaport town. Hovering around the point on which he has disembarked, it may deprive him of succours from abroad and rest his fate on the issue of a single battle. Like the conquest of Scipio in Spain, it may deprive the invader of the reinforcements necessary to support his early success and render his most splendid victories insidious overthrows.

A prudent general will never leave an enemy's fortress in his rear. He will be ever careful to keep open a secure retreat and to provide the means of obtaining timely succour. But the Navy of an invaded country is a fortress in the rear of the invader which he cannot control. When he is marching to an attack, it may pour a host on his rear. When he is defeated it leaves him no hope, no other alternative, but to surrender or perish. At the end of a successful campaign, if the war be not concluded, he may sit down within his entrenchments and lament his victories. Is it not surprising that the last American war should have been adduced to prove the inutility of a Navy? Let the escape of the enemy from Boston; let all that was left undone in the commencement of that contest, for want of a powerful Navy; let the correspondence of the American commander with the French admiral; above all, let the last brilliant achievement of that war, the capture of the British army at York, attest the contrary. Yes, Americans, it is to a permanent Navy you are to look for the protection of your commerce and the preservation of that tranquility which you so highly estimate. It is to a Navy you must trust for security from invasion and for success in war. Happy are we in being able to main-

tain our honor and independence by an institution which can never endanger our liberty. While the nations of the other continent have been compelled to guard against the encroachments of each other, by standing armies which have drained their treasuries, loaded them with debts, corrupted their morals and subverted their liberty, we can found our independence on the instrument by which our resources will be preserved and our rights defended.

—:0:—

ON THE NAVY.

EVERY day's experience evinces the utility and necessity of a *Navy* to the United States.

The hostilities of some, and the threatened depredations of others of the Barbary Powers, should remind us of the state of our own defence, and our ability to repel their aggressions. It is feared, the appropriations for the support of the Navy made by the last Congress, will not be found sufficient for its exigencies for the current year. So early as *June*, and not six months after the grant of appropriations, the Secretary of the Navy complains of their scantiness:—From this we may conclude they are now nearly exhausted. The appropriation of Fifty Thousand Dollars for the "*Improvement of Navy Yards, Docks, &c.*" was so inconsiderable, that all operations for this purpose have been suspended; and should any untoward event render the building of seventy-four gun ships necessary, there is not at present in the United States a single public building yard prepared and ready for the purpose. When can there be a more proper period than a time of peace for the founding Naval Arsenals, and for completing Wharves, Dry Docks, &c., necessary for the building, repairing and securing a Navy?—It is at this time that labor is at the lowest rate; when the most skilful workmen, and all materials of the best kind may be leisurely sought

for;—the works constructed upon the best principles, and completed with the greatest care and fidelity, to render them durable. Should this necessary part of our defence be delayed, until our country is precipitately hurried into a war, we shall then have to begin, what should have been completed.—A Navy will be loudly called for, but called for in vain.—Our frigates are yet to be built, but through improvidence no preparations have been made. From the hurry and confusion incident to a state of war, our arrangements will be hasty, expensive and but illy executed:—And the delay, additional expence and inevitable consequences to the United States will be incalculable.

FINIS

