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A

PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION

TO

GREEK PROSE COMPOSITION.

PART II.

(THE PARTICLES.)

BY

THOMAS KERCHEVER ARNOLD, M.A.

RECTOR OF LYNDON,
AND LATE FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

FIRST AMERICAN EDITION, REVISED AND IMPROVED.

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PREFACE.

In preparing the present volume for use in American schools and colleges, the Editor has judged it most advisable to abridge somewhat the length of the Exercises, whilst retaining all the critical and grammatical apparatus for a thorough understanding of the use of the Greek Particles in Prose Composition. He ventures to hope that the volume has in this way lost none of its utility for students in general, but rather the reverse. The Editor has also given some (but by no means full) directions with reference to the arrangement of words in sentences, as well as some hints as to the position of particles in a sentence.

It has not been deemed expedient to attempt to supply an English-Greek Vocabulary, especially as the very excellent English-Greek Lexicon of Yonge, edited by Prof. Drisler, will shortly be accessible to students.

The Editor takes pleasure in acknowledging his indebtedness to his late coadjutor, Prof. Hyde, of Burlington College, for several suggestions tending to increase the value of the present volume.

J. A. S.

New-York, Sept. 1st, 1851.

PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION.

The following work is the completion of my "Practical Introduction to Greek Prose Composition,"—a completion that has been long announced, but long suspended in consequence partly of ill-health and partly of more pressing engagements.

I am happy in having this opportunity of bearing testimony to the general excellence of Mr. Dale's recent Translation of Thucydides, contained in Mr. Bohn's Classical Library. I have found it nearly always an extremely accurate, and very often an extremely happy version of that difficult author. The volumes of Plato that have hitherto appeared in that collection, are also, as far as my acquaintance with them enables me to pronounce an opinion, very creditable to their respective Translators, Mr. Cary (whose translation of the Gorgias has supplied me with many examples) and Mr. Davis. I need not say, that Mr. Kennedy's Translation of the Speeches of Demosthenes against Aphobus and Onetor is both accurate and elegant.

To the translators of a past generation my principal obligations are due to Spelman, the translator of the Anabasis, and Sir W. Jones, whose version of the Orations of Isæus is usually correct, and is accompanied with very instructive Introductions and Notes.

T. K. A.

Lyndon, Aug. 19, 1850.

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[1] ἆρα, the interrogative particle, stands first in its sentence.

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[1] It is only in Homer and Pindar that δή stands at the beginning of a proposition or clause. (M.)

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

ON THE ARRANGEMENT OF WORDS IN A SENTENCE.

I. In *Simple Sentences*, usually:

1. The subject stands first, the predicate (verb, or adjective with *εἶναι*) last. The object is placed before the predicate, the attribute after its substantive; as, *Κῦρος, ὁ βασιλεύς, καλῶς ἀπέθανεν. Κύπριοι πάνυ προθύμως αὐτῷ συνεστράτευσαν. ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός. ὁ παῖς ὁ μέγας. ὁ παῖς ὁ τοῦ Ξενοφῶντος. ὁ πόλεμος ὁ πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας.*

But the subject is often placed last; as, *ἀκούσας ταῦτα ἔλεξεν ὁ Κῦρος.* (See 10.)

2. When several objects belong to the same predicate, the most important one is generally placed next before the predicate, and the rest placed before it in the order in which each is supposed to have been added to the first object, those that entered the mind first being placed nearest to it; as, *οἱ Ἕλληνες τοὺς Πέρσας ἐνίκησαν. οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐν Μαραθῶνι τοὺς Πέρσας ἐνίκησαν. οἱ Ἕλληνες ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν Μαραθῶνι τοὺς Πέρσας ἐνίκησαν.*

3. Adverbs of place and time generally precede the

direct object; as, *τότε* or *ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν Μαραθῶνι τοὺς Πέρσας ἐνίκησαν.*

4. The object of a person, in the dative or accusative, precedes the object of a thing; as, *τὸν παῖδα τὴν γραμματικὴν διδάσκω. τῷ παιδὶ τὸ βιβλίον δίδωμι.*

5. The adverb of time precedes the adverb of place; as, *τότε ἐν Μαραθῶνι τοὺς Πέρσας ἐνίκησαν.*

6. The adverb of manner is generally placed next the predicate; as, *οἱ Ἕλληνες ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν Μαραθῶνι τοὺς Πέρσας καλῶς ἐνίκησαν. καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.*

II. *Compound Sentences.*

7. The position of a dependent sentence corresponds to that of the word of which it is the resolution; as, *ὁ δὲ φοίνιξ, ὅθεν ἐξαιρεθείη ὁ ἐγκέφαλος, ὅλος αὐαίνετο. ὁ δὲ Κῦρος, ἐν ᾧ συνελέγοντο, ἐθύετο· ἐπεὶ δὲ καλὰ ἦν τὰ ἱερὰ αὐτῷ, συνεκάλεσε τούς τε τῶν Περσῶν ἡγεμόνας καὶ τοὺς τῶν Μήδων.*

8. But a substantive sentence stands after the verb; as, *λέγουσί τινες, ὅτι πολλὰ ὑπισχνῇ νῦν, διὰ τὸ ἐν τοιούτῳ εἶναι τοῦ κινδύνου προσιόντος, κτλ.*

9. *Inverted position.*—The position of words in a sentence is said to be inverted, when the predicate is put before the subject, the attributive before its substantive, or the objective words, especially the adverb, after the verb; as, *οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω. καὶ γάρ, ἔφασαν, πολύχρυσος ὁ ἀνήρ. τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς κάλλος*, or more strongly, *τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ κάλλος.*

10. If particular emphasis is to be laid on the sub-

ject, it is placed last in the sentence; as, *οὕτω δὴ ἡγοῦντο μὲν οἱ Ἀρμένιοι· τῶν δὲ Χαλδαίων οἱ παρόντες, ὡς ἐπλησίαζον οἱ Ἀρμένιοι, ταχὺ ἀλαλάξαντες ἔθεον.*

11. If two words are to be distinguished as emphatic, one is placed first, the other last; as, *πασῶν ἀρετῶν ἡγεμών ἐστιν ἡ εὐσέβεια.*

12. ☞ The established rule is, that no sentence is placed out of its proper position, either first or last, but for the sake of emphasis.

13. If a thought is first to be expressed generally, and then applied to some particular object or case, so that emphasis is to be laid thereon, the end of the sentence is the proper place; as, *ἀλλὰ καὶ μισεῖ τις ἐκεῖνον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ δέδιεν καὶ φθονεῖ, καὶ τῶν πάνυ νῦν δοκούντων οἰκείως ἔχειν αὐτῷ.*

14. In dependent sentences, the inverted position is more usual than in the words which they represent, and is used as the sense and rhythm of the sentence may require.

15. A substantive sentence introduced by *ὅτι, ὡς, that*, is placed before the principal verb, when that which it expresses is to be brought more directly forward; as, *ὅτι μὲν δὴ μέγας ἐκ μικροῦ ὁ Φίλιππος ηὔξηται παραλείψω.*

16. Sometimes the position of the adjectival sentence is inverted to bring it prominently forward, while the substantive is little more than an adjective expressing some attribute of the adjectival sentence, and is in the case thereof; as, *ὃν εἶδες ἄνδρα, οὗτός ἐστιν. οἶδ' ἣν ἔθρεψεν Ἑρμιόνην μήτηρ εἰμι.*

17. Inverted position applies also to local adverbial sentences, introduced by relative adverbs of place, *οὗ, ἧ, ἵνα,* &c. In temporal and conditional adverbial sentences, no change of this sort takes place, as their proper place is before the verb.

18. If, in a dependent sentence (especially an adjectival sentence), any word is to be especially brought forward, it is placed sometimes before the conjunction; as, *τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τἆλλα, περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.*

19. If, in a number of clauses, the attention is to be particularly called to any one word, as the leading notion of the whole sentence, it is placed either at the beginning or end of the whole sentence; as, *τούτων ἐγὼ σοι, εὖ ἴσθι, ἕως ἂν ἀνὴρ δίκαιος ὦ, οὔποτ' ἐπιλήσομαι.*

20. Very frequently, a subject common to both the principal and subordinate clause is placed first; as, *οἱ δὲ Ἀσσύριοι, ὡς ἤκουσαν ταῦτα, πάντα ἐποίουν.*

21. In a sentence which stands with others in a paragraph, that word is most properly placed first which is most connected with the preceding sentence; as, *καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα· ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, ἀπαγαγέτω τις ταύτην οἴκαδε· καὶ ταύτην μὲν ἀπῆγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν τε καὶ κοπτομένην.*

22. An especial method of bringing a word or words more prominently forward, is by separating those which, as making up one notion, would naturally be joined together. Hereby, generally only one is marked as important, but sometimes two, especially

when they stand at the beginning and end of the sentence; as, *ἀξιῶ μηδεμίαν μοι διὰ τοῦτο παρ' ὑμῶν ὀργὴν γενέσθαι.* So the comparative is often separated from the words used to strengthen it.

23. When a negative is prefixed to an article or a relative, a conjunction, or a preposition, it may not be separated therefrom.

24. The relation between the same or cognate notions, especially if they are contraries, is signified by their being put beside one another; as, *παρ' οὐκ ἐθέλων ἑθελούσῃ.* Thus, *αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ. ἡ μὲν πόλις αὐτὴ παρ' αὑτῆς δίκην λήψεται.* Hence, *ἄλλος ἄλλο—ἄλλος ἄλλοθι—ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν—ἄλλην ἐξ ἀλλῆς πόλιν πολεως*, &c.

25. When in a sentence, or two co-ordinate sentences, there are two words joined together, which are opposed to two other words likewise joined together, the words which correspond to each other, correspond to each other in their position; the arrangement of the words of the one pair being exactly the opposite of the other pair of words. So: substantive, adjective; adjective, substantive. This figure is called *chiasma*, from its analogy with a Greek *X*; as, *πολλάκις ἡδονὴ βραχεῖα μικρὰν τίκτει λύπην.*

The Latins were very fond of this figure.

26. Sometimes the predicates of two co-ordinate sentences are placed contrary to their natural order, the one whose sense requires that it should follow the other, being placed before it (*ὕστερον πρότερον*). This latter takes place when the notion which should stand second is to be brought forward as the more important

of the two; as, *τὰς μὲν ἄρα (Νύμφας) θρέψασα, τεκοῦσά τε, πότνια μήτηρ, Θρινακίην ἐς νῆσον ἀπῴκισε τηλόθι ναίειν.*

27. Another method of calling attention strongly to a word, or the notion on which emphasis is to be laid, is by placing immediately after it some particle; as, *πέρ, δή, γέ,* or *ἄν*; or a parenthetical word, such as *οἶμαι,* &c.; and in a speech, *ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.*

☞ Two simple sentences are connected with each other either by the way of *co-ordination,* or by the way of *subordination.* Co-ordinate sentences = independent of each other, but united by a conjunction either *copulative, disjunctive,* or *adversative;* as, *καί, τέ*; *ἤ, εἴτε, οὔτε*; *ἀλλά, μέν, δέ,* &c. Subordinate sentences = dependent one on the other, so that the one is incomplete without the other; expressed by the subordinate conjunctions, *ὅτε, ὅτι, ὡς, γάρ, ἐπεί,* &c.

On the "Position of Words and Sentences," cf. Kühner's *Greek Grammar,* § 348.

PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION

TO

GREEK PROSE COMPOSITION.

PART II.

Chap. 1. Ἀλλά. § 1.

1. *a*) Ἀλλά (from ἄλλος, *other*) is an *adversative* particle denoting principally *difference* and *separation:* = *but* (in *direct opposition:* e. g. '*not* A, *but* B'), or *but, yet, however* (in *limitations* and *qualifying restrictions:* in such sentences, for instance, as, 'a good man, *but* rather weak').

Observe that ἀλλά is distinguished from ἄλλα (*alia*) by a change of accent.

2. *b*) In direct opposition ἀλλά usually follows a *negative;* which, however, may be implied by a *question.*

[*Direct* opposition.] *Οὐκ ἀνδρὸς ὅρκοι πίστις, ἀλλ' ὅρκων ἀνήρ* (*Æsch.*). *Τί δεῖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν; ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀναλογίσασθε* (*Dem.*).

[*Qualifying* opposition.] *Αἰσχρὰν γυναῖκ' ἔγημας, ἀλλὰ πλουσίαν. Gn.*

3. *c*) When a *universal negative* is meant to be followed by a *universal affirmative,* the affirmative notion is usually omitted, being understood by implication.

Thus, when ἀλλά [or δέ] follows οὐδείς or μηδείς, it is necessary to supply ἕκαστος as the *subject.*

Μηδεὶς φθόνῳ τὸ μέλλον ἀκούσῃ, ἀλλ' ἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ σκοπείτω [= *ἀλλ' ἕκαστος σκοπείτω*] (*Dem.*). *Ἐμοὶ οὐδεὶς δοκεῖ εἶναι, πένης ὤν, ἄνοσος ἀλλ' ἀεὶ νοσεῖν* (*Soph.*).

4. *d*) This idiom is found also in Latin:

Qui fit, Mæcenas, ut n e m o *quam sibi sortem*
Seu ratio dederit, seu fors objecerit, illâ
Contentus vivat? laudet [= *sed* q u i s q u e *laudet*] *diversa sequentes?*
(Hor. 1 Sat. 1, 1.)

5. *e*) The same kind of omission occurs in statements that we *ought not to do this, but that:* which would be, if fully expressed, '*we* ought not *to do this, but* we ought *to do that.*' See the first sentence of the following Exercise.

Exercise 1.

6. (1) It is not right, O Council, either to like or to dislike any man from outward appearance, but to try him by his actions: for many a man who converses but little and dresses with propriety, has been the cause of great evils; and others, though disregarding such (°proprieties of conduct), have done you many good services.

(2) From [13] all[a] that has been said then, Socrates, by what possible means can we contrive to bring a man[b] who has any power of mind, or wealth, or body, or birth, to honor justice, †and not rather[c] laugh at hearing it praised? †Although therefore[d] a man may be able even to show what we have said to be false, and knows well enough that justice is best, he is, I imagine,[e] very indulgent, and feels no resentment against the unjust; so that unless any man abstains from injustice, either from disliking it through an admirable nature, or from acquired experience,[f]—of all the rest not one is willingly just, but either through cowardice, old age, or some other weakness, condemns injustice, because unable to do it. †And that (°it is so),[g] is plain: for the first of these persons who arrives at power, is the first to commit injustice, as far as he is able.

[a] Strengthen this '*all*' by δή. [b] *Say:* 'what device (μηχανή) is there that a man should be willing to honor,' &c. [c] ἀλλὰ μὴ = *ac non potius*. See below, 19. [d] ὡς δή τοι εἰ. [e] πού (enclit.). [f] *Say:* 'having received experimental knowledge,' ἐπιστήμην λαβών. [g] ὡς δέ.

Chap. 1. § 2. (μὲν—ἀλλά.)

7. *a*) Ἀλλά sometimes follows μέν (= *quidem*), in both *direct* and *qualifying* oppositions.

8. *b*) When ἀλλά occurs in a *qualifying* opposition, the first or *conceded* notion being accompanied by μέν (*indeed*), the second notion is *negatived* by ἀλλ' οὐ.

Τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὠφέλιμον μέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ καλόν.

9. *c*) When ἀλλά follows μέν in *direct* oppositions, it must not be supposed equivalent to δέ: for it always marks a far *stronger opposition*, such as that between two *opposite notions*, a *denial* and an *affirmation*, and the like.

Αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ μενέω νηῶν ἐν ἀγῶνι,
ἀλλ' ἔταρον πέμπω, πολέσιν μετὰ Μυρμιδόνεσσιν,
μάρνασθαι (*Il.* 16, 239).

Exercise 2.

10. Having †then (τοίνυν) conveyed so much property from the house, having received the money arising from the sale of so large an estate, and having moreover laid hands[a] on the rents which became due in °all that interval, they imagine that they shall obtain possession of the remainder also: and to such a height of assurance have they advanced, that °though they did not indeed venture †to meet us in a direct form of action,[b] yet they entered a protestation of legitimacy in behalf of our opponents, that was at once false and inconsistent with their own previous conduct.

[a] Here διαφορεῖν = *to plunder;* with reference to the *dispersion* of the plundered property, by its being divided amongst the parties concerned.

[b] *Or,* 'to bring the cause to a fair issue:' εὐθυδικίᾳ εἰσιέναι, &c. opp. διαμαρτύρεῖν, διαμαρτυρίαι (*exceptions*).

CHAP. 1. § 3. (οὐ μόνον—ἀλλὰ [καί].)

11. *a*) '*Not only—but also*' is usually οὐ μόνον—ἀλλὰ καί. The second member is now and then strengthened by πρὸς τούτῳ or τούτοις. Ναυσικύδης οὐ μόνον ἑαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας τρέφει, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ ὗς πολλοὺς καὶ βοῦς (*Xen.*).

12. *b*) If the μόνον relates principally to a *particular notion*, which is to be excluded from being the *sole* thing, it is usually placed after that notion, instead of immediately after the οὐ.

Ἴσως ἀναλίσκουσιν οὐκ εἰς ἃ δεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς ἃ βλάβην φέρει (*Xen. Œc.* 3, 6).

c) Οὐ μόνον ἀλλά (without καί) is used when the *second* notion is so much the stronger that the first is virtually put aside as being unnecessary to be dwelt upon. (See *Arnold's Gk. Gram.* 1444, *g.*)

Exercise 3.

13. (1) A tyranny aims at three objects: the first being that the subjects of it should be mean-spirited, for a mean-spirited person will not plot against any man; the second that they should distrust each other, for a tyranny is not put down, till there are some persons who have confidence in one another; for which reason also it is that tyrants are ever at war with men of high character,[a] as being ill-suited[b] to their government, not only from their not choosing to be governed despotically, but also because they can be trusted both by their own associates[c] and by others, and do not

betray either their own friends or other persons. The third object is incapacity for public business, for no man attempts what is impossible.

(2) If any amongst you are angry with those who aspire to the conduct of state-affairs, but run away from danger, they cannot justly entertain this opinion of me; for I not only performed with alacrity what I was ordered to do, but also dared to expose myself °voluntarily to danger; and this I did, not as thinking it a trifling matter to fight against the Lacedæmonians, but in order that, if I should ever be brought into trouble without fault of mine, †I might find favor with you on account of such conduct,[d] and receive full justice at your hands.

[a] Here ἐπιεικής, which is used of persons, not only in the sense of *fair, kind, good, gentle, making allowances;* but also of those who keep within the bounds of *order* and *moderation*, &c. Cf. Pape. This meaning is omitted by Liddell and Scott. [b] βλαβερός. (πρός τι).

[c] For '*each other*' and '*their* own *associates*,' use ἑαυτῶν: '*others*,' ἄλλοι. On ἑαυτῶν = ἀλλήλων, cf. Gr. 1010 (791), § 654, 2. [d] *Say:* 'that being looked upon by you as a better °person on account of this conduct (διὰ ταῦτα), I might receive,' &c.

Exercise 4.

14. (1) The Lacedæmonians were †in those days[a] so far from acting as our ancestors did—†from warring, that is,[b] against the barbarians and benefiting the Greeks—that they would not even remain quiet; but though they had, not only a sufficient territory, but one so large as no other Grecian city possessed, they neglected agriculture, trades, and all other things, and never ceased to beset the Peloponnesian cities, and attack them unjustly one by one, till they had subdued them all except Argos.[c]

(2) Perceiving that the Thebans, †and I may almost add that you as well as they,[d] °influenced by[e] those of your respective citizens who managed the interests of Philip, and had been corrupted (°by his bribes), regarded with indifference and adopted not one single

measure of precaution against what was the most formidable danger of all, and needed extreme watchfulness—the suffering the power of Philip to increase—but were °ever prone to hostile feelings and angry collision, I labored with incessant vigilance to prevent this, not only from conceiving it, upon my own judgment, to be for your advantage, but because I knew that Aristŏphōn and again Eubūlus had all along desired to effect this friendship, and though (*γ*) they often opposed each other on[f] other subjects, were invariably agreed upon this.

[a] *περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον.* i. e. 'about the time we are speaking.' [b] *Say:* 'and from warring:' a clause that is really *explanatory*, being added *co-ordinately* by *καί*. [c] *Say:* 'except that of the Argives.' [d] *Say:* 'and almost you also.' [e] *ὑπό* (gen.). [f] *περί*.

Exercise 5.

15. (1) °Statements of this kind must not only be provided (°as so many) names for[a] the previous examination,[b] but must be shown to have really taken place, and be confirmed by the testimony of relations. Now (*τοίνυν*) when we challenged them to produce any of Euctēmōn's friends who knew that any female lived with him, or that Callippe was his ward, and to decide this by submitting to torture such domestics as were still alive, or, if any one of their own slaves asserted that he was aware of these facts, to deliver them up to us, they would neither receive °ours nor give up (°theirs to us).

(2) These things are not for[17] your glory, O Lacedæmonians—neither your offending against the common rights of Greece and against your forefathers, nor your destroying us your benefactors, † to gratify the enmity of others,[c] without having been wronged yourselves: but (°it will be for your glory) to spare, to relent[d] † from the influence of a prudent compassion,[e] considering not merely the † fearful character[f] of what

we shall suffer, but what manner of men we who are to suffer are.

[a] *Say:* 'for' (εἰς). [b] The ἀνάκρῐσις, or previous examination before the Archon, who determined whether an action should be granted. [c] *Say:* 'on account of the enmity of others.' [d] ἐπικλασθῆναι (= frangi) τῇ γνώμῃ. [e] οἴκτῳ σώφρονι λαβόντας: the (understood) acc. to λαβόντας being probably the whole state of the case, *matters*, &c. Others connect οἴκτῳ σώφρονι with ἐπικλασθῆναι, as if it were ἐπικλασθῆναι οἴκτῳ σώφρονι λαβόντας (οἶκτον σώφρονα), as in ἄγγελλε ὅρκῳ προστιθεὶς &c.—Soph. Elect. 47. [f] δεινότης, ητος, ἡ.

Chap. 1. § 4. (ἀλλὰ καί *without* μόνον *preceding.*)

16. *a*) Even without a preceding μόνον, we sometimes find ἀλλὰ καί in the sense of *but even, nay even*, after *negative* words and notions, οὐδέ, οὐδείς, &c. Thus: οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως ἥπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι διελέγετο .... ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυε (*Xen. Mem.* 1, 1, 11).

b) Frequently, however, the καί in ἀλλὰ καί belongs, in the sense of '*even*,' to the single notion that it precedes.

Exercise 6.

17. (1) For you must consider, not only whether you are not losing money, but whether you are not also losing your reputation, about which you are more solicitous than about money; and not you alone, but also your ancestors (°were so before you): a proof of which is, that when they formerly possessed great wealth, they parted with it all in the pursuit of honor; whereas, for the sake of their reputation, they never once declined any danger (°however great), but did not cease to spend even their private fortunes in addition (°to the public revenues).

(2) Have I not been deeply wronged from the beginning, and am I not °even now persecuted by them,

because I seek to obtain redress? Is there one of you who can help feeling an honest indignation against the defendant, and compassion for me; seeing that he, besides an estate of more than ten talents which he inherited, has got another of equal amount, belonging to me, while I have not only lost my patrimony, but am by the villany of these men deprived even of what they have returned me?

CHAP. 1. § 5. (ἀλλ' οὐ [ἀλλὰ μή].)

18. *a*) Ἀλλ' οὐ (ἀλλὰ μή) is either '*but not*' or '*and not.*' These particles are *very* often used where *we* use '*not*' only, in sentences of the form: '*A* not *B*.' A question with οὐ sometimes precedes:

Τῶν κακῶν ἀλλ' ἄττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν Θεόν (= *not* the deity). *Pl.*

19. *b*) When the proposition introduced by ἀλλ' οὐ (ἀλλὰ μή) is the second clause of a *question*, or follows a clause of comparison introduced by ὡς, ὥσπερ, it is equivalent to '*and not rather*' (ac non).

20. *c*) The particles ἀλλ' οὐ (ἀλλὰ μή) may often be translated by '*instead of*;' especially when they introduce the second clause of a question, where, in English, we should use the *participial substantive* (e. g. *διὰ τί παίζεις ἀλλ' οὐ σπουδάζεις*; *why are you jesting instead of being in earnest?*).

21. *d*) Ἀλλ' οὐδέ = *nay—not even.*

Exercise 7.

22. (1) If this (°our opponent) had not been thought to have perjured himself on that occasion, it is clear that his associate[a] would have succeeded in his protestation; and the woman who had been sworn[b] by him to be the legitimate daughter of my uncle [°she, I

say], not my mother, would have been declared his heiress.

(2) When[a] Philip had taken (*p*) Nicæa from the Thebans, and made it over to the Thessalians, then[d] did the Thebans, † now that (*ἐπεί*) the danger was come to their own doors, apply at once to the Athenians, and you marched out and entered Thebes, both infantry and cavalry, † in full military array,[e] before Demosthenes had written a single syllable about an alliance (°with them). And what introduced you into Thebes was the critical state of their affairs, their alarm, and their need of °some alliance; not Demosthenes.

(3) If you are talking about a strictly just proportion, in the first place you are ignorant that, as now, so in former times,[f] of those triremes that fought for Greece, which were three hundred in all, this state furnished two hundred; and, secondly, you gain little favor with this your audience by thus falsely accusing me: for why do you now tell us what we ought[g] to have done, and (°why did you) not rather propose the measures then [*or*, instead of proposing them then]; for you were (*p*) in the city and † attended our deliberations?[h]

(4) If, O judges! Leochărēs or Dicæŏgĕnes were only going to defend themselves from this charge, I should be satisfied with what has been already said; but, since they are prepared to enter into the whole question of (°my right to) the inheritance, I wish you to hear an account of the transaction from me as well as from them, that[i] being apprised of the truth and not deluded (°by our opponents), you may decide the cause as you think right.

[a] *ἐκεῖνος*, contrasted with the *οὗτος* that denotes the opposite party in court. [b] Here *διαμαρτυρηθῆναι*, to have been declared in his *protestation*. [c] *ἐπειδή* (= *postquam*) c. aor. [d] *ἐνταῦθ' ἤδη*. [e] *ἐν ὅπλοις παρεσκευασμένοι*. [f] *καὶ πρότερον*. [g] *ἐχρῆν*, with which *ἄν* is usually omitted. [h] Use *παρεῖναι* (= *interesse*) only. [i] What moods of the infin. follow *μέλλω*?

Chap. 1. § 6. (*ἀλλά inceptive.*)

23. Ἀλλά may also begin a speech when it is *opposed* to that of another person.

a) In this way it often introduces *answers* in a *quick, abrupt* manner, when they are of an *opposite character* to *what was just said*, or to some *previous thought* or *wish* of the speaker, or even to *some general view*, from which the speaker declares that, for his own part, he entertains a different opinion [= *nay but; well; why*].

b) In this way it often introduces *objections* [= *at*]: but (*c*) often *approbation* and *assent*[1] [*ἀλλὰ καλῶς μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν. Pl.*]: and (*d*) is used in *exclamations, exhortations*, &c., especially when the discourse is *suddenly interrupted*, and *something new introduced*. *ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον*, 'nay, but *it's impossible*' (or, 'why, *it's impossible*'): *ἀλλὰ βούλομαι*, 'well, *I will!*' (or, 'well then, *I will!*')[1]

[A messenger had told the Greek generals that Ariæus would wait for them the rest of that day, and, if they did not join him, set out without them the next morning.] Κλέαρχος δὲ τάδε εἶπεν· ἀλλ' ὤφελε μὲν Κῦρος ζῆν· ἐπεὶ δὲ τετελεύτηκεν, ἀπαγγέλλετε Ἀριαίῳ ὅτι κτλ. (*Xen.*)

It must be observed, that in very many instances where *ἀλλά* is used in this way, to introduce a remark in a spirited and abrupt manner, we should in English introduce it without any particle.

Exercise 8.

[The mark ‡ will be used to indicate that it will be best to use a particle in translating the clause into Greek.]

24. (1) Clearchus said thus much, and Tissaphernes replied[a] to this effect:—"Well, I rejoice,[b] O Clearchus, to hear sensible language from you; for as long as

[1] It often seems to denote little more than an *alacritas quædam respondentis*, as Klotz remarks.

you entertain (*p*) these opinions, it seems[76] to me, that if you were to devise any mischief against me, you would also at the same time be your own enemy.[c] But that you may learn, † if it may be so,[d] that you cannot justly distrust either the king[50] or me, listen in your turn to me."

(2) Phalinus, hearing this, smiled, and said: "Why, you seem to be a philosopher, young man, and speak not inelegantly; be assured, however,[e] that you are a foolish person, if you imagine that your courage will prevail over the power of the king."[50]

(3) Clearchus said in reply:[f] "‡ This[61] is what you say: but take back from us this answer; that it is our opinion, that if we should have to † act as[g] the king's friends, we should be more valuable friends with our arms, than if we had parted with them; and °so if we should have to go to war with him, we should fight better with our arms than if we had parted with them."

[a] ἀπ-ῆμείφθην: this passive form of the aor. mid. from ἀμείβεσθαι occurs only in this passage.—*Kr.* [b] Use μέν here; to be answered by δέ, with *but that* below. [c] Εἰ with opt. in a conditional clause may be followed by the *present* tense of δοκεῖν when an inf. with ἄν (= opt. with ἄν) is dependent on that verb. Just as '*if you were* ——, *you would* ——,' may become '*if you were*——, I think *you would*,' &c. [d] According to Hermann, this is the force of ἄν in ὡς ἄν ὅπως ἄν with subj., instead of the simple ὡς, ὅπως; but it is often used when no intimation of doubt appears appropriate.

[e] μέν ... followed, not by δέ, but by μέντοι (= *however*), which is stronger. [f] πρὸς ταῦτα. [g] *Say:* 'to be.'

Chap. 1. § 7. (ἀλλά in repeated *suppositions*, made interrogatively and rejected.)

25. The *inceptive* ἀλλά is used extensively in the introduction of *supposed reasons*, which are only stated to be *rejected*. The ἀλλά is employed both in the interrogative suppositions, and in the rejecting clauses.

Τίνα καὶ ἀναβιβάσωμαι δεησόμενον ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ;

τὸν πατέρα; ἀλλὰ τέθνηκεν; ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀδελφούς; ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰσίν· ἀλλὰ τοὺς παῖδας; ἀλλ' οὔπω γεγένηνται (*And.*).

Passages of this kind are very common in the orators. In English we should use with the *questions* after the first either '*or*' or '*well then*,' '*then*.' For instance: '*Was it A?*'—'No.' '*Well then, was it B?*' —'By no means.' '*C then?*' and so on.

Exercise 9.

26. (1) What then can induce you to admit his qualification? The belief that[a] he has not been guilty of any crime? Nay but he has committed the very greatest offences against his country:—or (° the persuasion) that he will come to be a better °citizen? [If so] then[b] let him first † have become (*ρ*) so, and not claim to sit as a member of the Council, till he has done some manifest service (° to the state), as he then inflicted upon it a manifest injury. For it is ever more prudent to show your gratitude to men for † actions (° really performed).[c]

(2) Do not, on any account, O senators, pronounce a sentence like this. For why should I meet with this treatment at your hands? Because[d] any one has ever been put upon his trial and lost his property through me? No man can prove this against me. Or because I am a busy-body and unruly and quarrelsome? Nay, but † I do not employ the little that I have in the indulgence of such tempers and habits.[e] Because then I am an exceedingly insolent and violent person? Why he would not even himself assert this, unless he chose to affirm what is false upon this point as upon all the rest. Well then, because I was in power in[19] the days of the four-hundred and ill-treated many citizens? Nay, but I fled with the people to Chalcis on the Eurīpus, and when I might without any apprehension have taken a part in their government, I chose † a life of danger with the great mass of yourselves.[f]

[a] Simply πότερον ὡς, c. acc. participii. [b] τοιγάρτοι. [c] ἔργα. [d] πότερον ὅτι. [e] *Say:* 'I do not employ such means (° as I have) for (πρός) such ° purposes.' [f] μεθ' ὑμῶν κινδυνεύειν ἁπάντων.

CHAP. 1. § 8. (ἀλλά· ἀλλ' οὖν· ἀλλ' οὖν—γε.)

27. *a*) Ἀλλά sometimes follows *conditional* particles, εἰ μή, &c., and may be construed by '*yet*,' '*yet at least*,' '*at least*' (= *saltem; certe; at certe*). Εἰ σῶμα δοῦλον, ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς ἐλεύθερος (*Soph.*). Εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ πολλά γε ἴστε (*Dinarch.*).—Just so '*at*' in: *si mihi bonâ republicâ frui non licuerit*, at *carebo malâ*.

28. *b*) Also when ἀλλά stands in the middle of its clause, it has this meaning of *at least* (*tamen, certe*): but *the opposed* notion may be readily supplied with an εἰ μή, '*if not*,' e. g. ὡς ἂν ἀλλὰ παῖδ' ἐμὴν ῥυσώμεθ' &c. (Eur. Or. 1561.) 'that we may *at least* save my daughter,' i. e. may *at least* save her [*if* we can do *nothing* more].

29. *c*) In this sense ἀλλὰ—γε,[1] ἀλλ' οὖν, ἀλλ' οὖν —(γε), are also found (either with or without a preceding εἰ, εἰ μή); the γέ, of course, renders the preceding notion emphatic. The *conclusive* οὖν here resembles our '*however*,' which refers, like it, to a preceding statement.[2]

30. *d*) The form ἀλλὰ νῦν (γε) = '*now at length*,' '*now at last*,' '*even now*,' is very common (i. e. *if* [or *though*] *not before, yet at all events now:* εἰ μὴ πρότερον, ἀλλὰ νῦν γε. Sometimes ἀλλὰ νῦν γ' ἔτι. *Dem.*). Αὐτή γε νοῦν σχὲς ἀλλὰ τῷ χρόνῳ ποτέ (*Soph.*). Βού-

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[1] In Soph. (El. 411), ὦ θεοὶ πατρῷοι συγγένεσθέ γ' ἀλλὰ νῦν. the first γέ belongs to συγγένεσθε (= *si nihil adhuc fuciatis, certe adeste*); ἀλλὰ νῦν (= *si non alio tempore, at nunc saltem*). Kl.

[2] In illo loco Isocratis: Εἰ δὲ καὶ προαπεῖπον, ἀλλ' οὖν τούς γε λόγους ὥσπερ χρησμοὺς εἰς τὸν ἐπιόντα χρόνον ἂν κατέλιπον οὖν particula hanc vim habet præter ἀλλά et γέ, ut legentes jubeat respicere ad ea, quæ facienda fuerunt; quæ si suscepta essent (hoc est, οὖν), hoc quidem certe, quod jam infert, illi reliquissent (*Kl.*).

λομαι αὐτὸν διδάξαι, ἄν πως ἀλλὰ νῦν παιδευθῇ (*Lys.*). *Ἐνόμιζον τοὺς ἄλλους ἀλλ' οὖν πειρᾶσθαί γε λανθάνειν κακουργοῦντας* (*Isocr.*). *Εἰ καὶ μὴ καθ' Ἑλλάδα Τεθράμμεθ', ἀλλ' οὖν ξυνετά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν* (*Eur.*). *Οἱ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιστατοῦντες, ἣν καὶ τὴν φύσιν καταδεεστέραν ἔχωσιν, ἀλλ' οὖν ταῖς γ' ἐμπειρίαις πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων προέχουσιν* (*Isocr.*). Kr.

[*Ἀλλά γε* probably never occur together, if Wolf is right in reading *ἀλλά τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον*, in Il. 1. *Kl.*]

Exercise 10.

31. (1) O soldiers, our present condition is indeed one of difficulty: but nevertheless we must not be faint-hearted, but strive that, if we possibly can, we may save ourselves by a victory (*p*): † but, if not,[a] may at all events die an honorable death.

(2) The Chalcidians,[b] though under such obligations to you, did not make you a suitable return: but (on the contrary), as soon as you crossed over into Euboea to assist Plutarchus, † at the commencement[c] (of the affair), they did indeed pretend to be your friends; but no sooner had we passed Tamynae, and were crossing the Cotyhean[d] mountain, as it is called, than Callias the Chalcidian, seeing our army inclosed in a difficult country from which we could not retreat without[e] a victory (*p*), assembled an army from[f] every (part of) Euboea, and his brother Taurosthenes brought over his Phoenian mercenaries, and (both of them) † came down upon us[e] to destroy us.

(3) It is my present opinion, that we ought to send (*p*) to Anaxibius, and tell him, that we have not entered the city to use any violent measures, but to obtain from you, if possible, some advantage to ourselves: and if not,[f] yet at all events to make it evident, that we do not quit (the city) † from trusting false representations, but because we are persuaded to do so.[g]

[a] εἰ δὲ μή. [b] Χαλκιδεῖς. [c] τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους.
[d] Κοτύλαιος. [e] ἐλθεῖν ἐπί τινα. [f] εἰ δὲ μή.
[g] *Say:* 'being deceived, but being persuaded.'

Chap. 1. § 9. (ἀλλὰ μήν.)

32. *a*) Ἀλλὰ μήν = 1) *at sane; at profecto; at vero* (*sed sane; sed vero, &c.*);—2) *atqui* (in the *minor premiss* of a syllogism).

33. *b*) The particles have an *adversative* force (that of ἀλλά) combined with a *strong affirmation* or *asseveration* (μήν = *vero*).

Ὁ πόλεμός ἐστιν ἤδη ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν κακῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου· ἀλλὰ μήν (*but assuredly*) ὅτι γε οὐ στήσεται δῆλον. (*Dem.*)

34. *c*) The ἀλλά in ἀλλὰ μήν is often used as an *inceptive* particle (as explained in 25). In this way ἀλλὰ μήν may occur in *answers of assent;* in *animated appeals;* and generally wherever a speaker bursts, as it were, into the conversation in a lively, abrupt manner.

Ἔοικας, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀρίσταρχε, βαρέως φέρειν τι· χρὴ δὲ τοῦ βάρους μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις· ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τι σε καὶ ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν. Καὶ ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος· Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν πολλῇ γε εἰμι ἀπορίᾳ &c. (*Xen. Mem.* 2, 7, 2.)

Here the ἀλλά denotes the '*alacritas quædam respondentis*' [cf. note 23, *b*]; and μήν adds an asseveration, = '*why, indeed—:*' or '*well, I am indeed—.*'

35. *d*) The μήν is often used to imply a *confident assumption* (just as our '*surely*' is). Hence the particles ἀλλὰ μήν frequently occur (α) in the *minor premiss* of a syllogism; and (β) whenever, in the progress of an argument, a statement is *assumed*. Ἀλλὰ μήν here = (*atqui*[1]); *but; but now, now.*

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[1] The Romans here sometimes use *autem*. *Si summo opere sapientia petenda est, summo opere stultitia vitanda est; summo autem* [illegible] *sapientia petenda est, summo igitur opere stultitia vitanda est* (Cic.). Hartung compares *sed vero:* e. g. *Non homines solum,* sed vero *animalia cuncta* (Lucr. 4, 983).

Εἰ γάρ εἰσι βωμοί, εἰσὶ καὶ θεοί· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσὶ βωμοί, εἰσὶν ἄρα καὶ θεοί (*Luc.*).

36. *c*) The statement which a speaker or writer *confidently* assumes, is often a *further development* of his argument: hence the particles *ἀλλὰ μήν* often mark a *transition to a new* (usually a stronger) argument (= *but further; but more than this; but besides this; nay more; moreover*). *Ταῦτα δὲ τίς ἂν ἄλλῳ πιστεύσειεν ἢ θεῷ; πιστεύων δὲ θεοῖς πῶς οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν; Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐποίει καὶ τάδε* (*nay more, he did this also . . . .*). *Xen.* *Ἐλπίζειν ἐποίει τοὺς συνδιατρίβοντας ἑαυτῷ μιμουμένους ἐκεῖνον τοιούσδε γενήσεσθαι. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ σώματος αὐτός τε οὐκ ἠμέλει τούς τ' ἀμελοῦντας οὐκ ἐπῄνει* (here there is a transition to quite a new branch of the subject. *Xen. Mem.* 1, 2, 4).

37. *f*) Occasionally *ἀλλὰ μήν* are employed *to terminate a digression*, the speaker assuming that he has *doubtless* said enough, and may *return* to his subject.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν περὶ τούτων τοσαῦτά μοι εἰρήσθω· πάλιν δ' ἐπάνειμι ὅθεν ἀπέλιπον (*Isæus*).

38. *g*) In *ἀλλὰ μήν—γέ*, the *γέ* does not belong to *ἀλλὰ μήν*, but adds *emphasis* to the interposed word: *ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκεῖνός γε ἀεὶ ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ* (*Xen. Mem.* 1, 1, 10).

39. *h*) Ἀλλὰ *μὴν—γέ* is also used when a speaker takes up the speech of another, and, approving of what he had said, adds *another* argument. *Ἔχοις ἂν . . . ὦ νεανία, εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν ὅτου ἕνεκα ἐπεθύμησας ἱππαρχεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ πρῶτος τῶν ἱππέων ἐλαύνειν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ γνωσθῆναί γε, ἐπεὶ κτλ.*

40. *i*) Various particles are found with *ἀλλὰ μήν*, but quite unconnected with them in sense.

Exercise 11.

41. (1) I am surprised, that if I have defended any (° of you) from the cold-of-winter or from an enemy, not one of you remembers this. Now surely it is right and just to remember good actions rather than evil ones.

(2) Nor assuredly (δή) will I assert this,′ that you are a disgrace to your ancestors. On the contrary, within[33] these few days, you stood in array before the descendants of those (° whom your fathers conquered), and defeated them, with the assistance of the gods, though many times as numerous as yourselves. And upon that occasion you quitted yourselves like brave men, † to gain a kingdom for Cyrus;[a] but now that your own safety is at stake, you ought, I may surely assume, to exhibit even greater courage and alacrity. But, besides this [*or*, nay more], you ought also to feel greater confidence in yourselves, † as compared with[b] your enemies, now (° than then): for then, though you had never tried yourselves against them, and saw no limit to their numbers, you still dared to attack them with the spirit of your ancestors: when then you already know by experience, that even when they outnumber you many times over, they still do not like to await your attack, why should you any longer fear them?′

(3) 'Have you not observed, † with reference to the arts,[c] as for instance (° with respect to) the children of potters, how long a time they help and look on before they meddle with the ° actual making of pots ° themselves?'—† 'Yes, indeed.'[d]—'Again [*or*, but further], every creature will fight′ too † with more than usual spirit[e] in the presence of its offspring.'—'It is so.'

[a] περὶ τῆς Κύρου βασιλείας. [b] πρός, c. acc.
[c] τὰ περὶ τὰς τέχνας. [d] καὶ μάλα. [e] διαφεούντως.

Chap. 1. § 10. (*οὐ μὴν ἀλλά· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλά = verumtamen.*)

42. *a*) In the combinations *οὐ μὴν ἀλλά, οὐ μέντοι ἀλλά* (which is far less common) there is always an

ellipse. Sometimes the verb of the preceding or following sentence may be supplied with *οὐ μήν*, &c. to deny the *previous assertion*, the *ἀλλά* introducing an *opposite statement:* it often, however, happens that the notion of opposition is too general and vague to be thus supplied. *Ὁ ἵππος πίπτει εἰς γόνατα, καὶ μικροῦ κἀκεῖνον ἐξετραχήλισεν· οὐ μὴν* (sc. *ἐξετραχήλισεν*) *ἀλλὰ ἐπέμεινεν ὁ Κῦρος μόλις πως, καὶ ὁ ἵππος ἐξανέστη, the horse fell on his knees, and very nearly threw Cyrus over his head:* he did not however [*throw him over his head*], but *Cyrus with great difficulty stuck on, and the horse got up again.*

43. *b*) In translating, we may, of course, proceed more simply, and translate *οὐ μήν* (or *μέντοι*) *ἀλλά*, '*however, nevertheless*' (*verumtămen, attamen*). *Ἀεὶ ... οἱ Ὑ ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι φιλοτίμως πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἶχον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ καλλίστων ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις ἐφιλονίκησαν* (*Isocr.*). *Τίς σοι διηγεῖτο; Ἀριστόδημος ἦν τίς, σμικρός, ἀνυπόδητος ἀεί· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ Σωκράτη γε ἔνια ἤδη ἀνηρόμην, ὧν ἐκείνου ἤκουσα, καί μοι ὡμολόγει καθάπερ ἐκεῖνος διηγεῖτο* (*Pl.* i. e. *οὐ μέντοι Ἀριστόδημος διηγεῖτο, R.*).

44. *c*) *Οὐ μὴν ἀλλά* may refer to a preceding *μέν*. *Καὶ τούτων ἐνεγκεῖν ἔχω παραδείγματα πλεῖστα μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν πραγμάτων· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μείζω γε καὶ φανερώτατα τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἡμῖν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις συμβάντων* (*Isocr.*).

45. *d*) The *μήν* may have a *concessive* force, the concession being *qualified* by the succeeding statement: *τούτων ἀληθῆ μέν ἐστι τὰ πολλά, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ ἡδέα ἀκούειν* (*Dem.: = οὐ μὴν ἡδέα, ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ ἡδέα*).

Exercise 12.

46. (1) In our days those who fill the high places of the state are busied about petty objects, and have left it to us who have hitherto stood aloof from state-politics, to tender you advice on subjects of this im-

portance. If, however, your foremost men are thus narrow-minded, the more ought the rest of us to consider boldly, how we may escape from our present state of °mutual hostility; for, as things now stand, it is in vain that we draw up the articles of a peace: for we do not terminate our wars, but only postpone them; waiting (*c*) each of us for the time when we may inflict some incurable wound upon the others.

(2) When the Lacedæmonians, then, were at such[a] a state of variance with the Athenians, those at Athens †who wished to do away with the treaty were also, †on their part,[b] immediately urgent (°against it). Amongst others who were so was Alcibiades the son of Clinias, a man who in age was still at that time a youth, †as he would have been considered in any other state,[c] but honored on account of the nobility of his ancestors. He did indeed really think it better to side with the Argives; but he also took a violent part in opposition (°to the treaty) †from °mortified pride,[d] as well (°as from conviction), because the Lacedæmonians had negotiated it through the agency of Nicias and Laches.

[a] *οὕτως δή.* [b] *αὖ.* [c] *ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει.* [d] *καὶ φρονήματι.*

Chap. 1. § 11. (*ἀλλὰ ... γάρ· ἀλλὰ γάρ.*)

47. *Ἀλλὰ ... γάρ· ἀλλὰ γάρ.*] Here each of the particles retains its proper force. The *ἀλλά opposes* something to what preceded; the *γάρ* introduces the *reason* which *occasions* or *justifies* that opposition. The particle *γάρ*, instead of being placed after a word or two of its own clause, was often placed immediately after the *ἀλλά*; so that *ἀλλὰ γάρ* became a regular formula.

The force of *γάρ* may always be explained; but it frequently refers to a statement that is only implied (see examples in the notes to Exercise 22).

48. The ἀλλά has frequently not its directly *adversative*, but its *inceptive* force (as already explained in 25). In this way ἀλλὰ γάρ may be an abrupt form of *assent*, accompanied by the reason of that assent.

49. An *objection* that would in Greek be introduced by ἀλλὰ γάρ, is often introduced in English by a single '*but*.' Hence the pupil should endeavor to obtain a clear notion of *when* the English '*but*' should or may be translated by ἀλλὰ γάρ.

a) '*But*' should be translated by ἀλλὰ γάρ when it combines an *objection* with the *grounds* upon which it is founded.

Thus in a sentence like this: 'She is perhaps one of the Furies' (ἴσως Ἐρινύς ἐστιν ἐκ τραγῳδίας· says Blepsidemus in the play, βλέπει γέ τοι μανικόν τι καὶ τραγῳδικόν)—'*But* she has no torches,'—is the objection of Chremylus: ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει γὰρ δᾷδας (Ar. Plut. 423) = ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν Ἐρινύς, οὐ γὰρ ἔχει δᾷδας (Devar.).

b) In a *restriction* or *drawback* that *renders useless*, *nullifies*, &c. some preceding statement.

Thus:

ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἔμοιγ' υἱὸς καλός τε κἀγαθός,
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθέλει γὰρ μανθάνειν (*Aristoph.*),

'I have a good and promising son, *but he will not study*:' i. e. *but* his good qualities are of little use, *for* he will not study (ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ὄφελος τοῦ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλει μανθάνειν. Devar.).

c) In *passing on* to another argument, *because* it is not necessary to dwell upon one that is either *begun*, or merely *mentioned* to be waived.

Thus: '*but you all know* (*remember*, &c.) these facts as well as I do; I will therefore proceed to' &c. (ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντες ἴστε, μέμνησθε, &c.

d) So, in *resuming* a line of argument that has been interrupted by a *digression*, with which it is not necessary to proceed.

Thus: '*But* it is unnecessary to dwell on this topic; I will therefore return' &c.

Exercise 13.

50. (1) I am well aware, that the king would grant even to the Mysians many guides, and many hostages, as a pledge to conduct them out of his territories without fraud. And I am very sure, that for us he would do this with three times the pleasure, if he saw us preparing to settle in his country. But[a] I am afraid, that if we once learn to live in idleness and plenty, we shall, like the lotus-eaters, forget the thoughts of a return home.

(2) If you are wise, your treatment of this man will be the reverse of that bestowed on dogs; for men tie up savage dogs in the day-time, and let them loose at night: whereas, if you act sensibly, you will tie this fellow up at night, and let him loose in the day. But[b] (°to pass on to another subject) I am surprised, that, if I have given offence to any of you, you bear it in mind and publish it; whereas if I have defended any from the cold, or from the enemy, or have relieved any one who was sick or in want, these things are not remembered by any one of you.

(3) † In which way[a] would the money spent amount to the larger sum, if these men were to receive the arrears due to them? or if, those arrears remaining unpaid, you should have to †engage and pay[b] another and more powerful (°body of) mercenaries? But Heraclīdēs, as you informed me, thinks that this money amounts to a very large sum. †Most assuredly,[c] both to obtain and to pay away †such a sum[d] is a far less (°difficult matter) now, than (°it would have been to obtain and pay) the tenth part of it before our arrival (*e*). For it is not the °mere numerical value that determines much and little, but the power both of the giver and of the receiver; and your annual revenues will now amount to more, than all your possessions (*v*) together were worth formerly.

[a] But *I will not do* (or *advise*) *this*, for &c. ad aliam rem (*Kr.*). [b] = *sed transibo* [c] ποτέρως. [d] *Say:* 'to hire:' μισθώσασθαι (mercede conducere). [e] ἢ μήν. [f] *Say:* 'this:' τοῦτο.

Chap. 1. § 12. ἀλλά (ἀλλ' ἤ).

51. The particles ἀλλ' ἤ (*praeterquam, nisi* = *except, but,* πλήν) are used after a *negative* or a word that expresses *separation*. Thus οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἀλλ' ἤ (*nemo alius nisi* or *praeter:* fully '*nobody else but than*'). Here properly the ἀλλά refers to the negative, the ἤ to ἄλλος.

52. This combination appears to be a *pleonastic form*, that has arisen from the two simpler forms: οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἀλλά, and οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἤ.

So Stallbaum: Orta est hæc locutio ex confusione duarum loquendi formarum, quarum altera *oppositionem* [ἀλλά], altera *comparationem* [ἤ] indicat. Itaque quum recte dici posset ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ τὸ σωματοειδές [sc. δοκεῖ ἀληθὲς, εἶναι], et quum recte etiam diceretur ὥστε μηδ. ἄλλ. δοκ. εἶν. ἀληθές, ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές, utrâque loquendi formâ in unum conjunctâ dici solitum, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές. Quæ quidem ratio quum ab initio in simplicibus enuntiatis usurparetur, postea etiam ad interrogantes sententias translata est. Eandem explicationem habet πλὴν ἤ, *praterquam* (Stallbaum).

53. But very frequently the ἄλλος falls away after the negative, so that the form becomes οὐδεὶς ἀλλ' ἤ.

Again the process of abridgment is carried on still further (by the omission of ἄλλος from either of the two forms in 52), and we have the rare forms οὐδεὶς ἀλλά or οὐδεὶς ἤ.

Hence the forms for *nemo alius nisi*, or *praeter*, are:

1) οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' ἤ.[1]
2) οὐδεὶς ἄλλος, ἀλλά.
3) οὐδεὶς ἄλλος, ἀλλ' ἤ.
4) οὐδεὶς ἄλλος, ἤ.

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[1] Since the full form with οὐδέν would be οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἀλλ' ἤ, and this might be abridged to οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἤ (= οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἤ) or οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἤ, it is

5) οὐδείς, ἀλλά.
6) οὐδείς, ἤ.

54. Instead of οὐδεὶς ἄλλος, the first clause may contain a negative particle with some adverbial form derived from ἄλλος (e. g. ἄλλως, ἄλλοθι, &c.); or from ἕτερος.

55. The preceding sentence may also be a '*rhetorical* question' or 'question of appeal,' which (when it contains no negative) is *virtually* negative.

56. Here, too, the ἀλλά or the ἤ may disappear from the second clause; or the ἄλλος from the first.

Thus the forms are:

τίς ἄλλος (*or* ἄλλος τις) ἀλλ' ἤ . . ;
τίς ἄλλος (*or* ἄλλος τις) ἀλλά . . . ; (rare.)
τίς ἄλλος (*or* ἄλλος τις) ἤ . . . . . ;
τίς . . . ἤ ;

Obs. τίς ἄλλος is, *Who else? What other person?*
ἄλλος τις is, *Does any one else? Does any other person?*

Οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον (*Pl.*). Ἐγὼ γὰρ δι' οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα (*Pl.*). Ἐν δὲ τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλη μὲν πόλις οὐδεμία οὔτε φιλία οὔτε Ἑλληνὶς ἀλλὰ Θρᾷκες οἱ Βιθυνοί (*Xen.*). Οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην ἡγούμην ἂν εἶναί μοι σωτηρίαν ἢ σὲ πεῖσαι (*Lys.*). Οὐδὲν ὄντας ἀλλὰ κωφούς (*Ar.*). Ἔκτεινε δ' αὐτὸν οὔτις, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μόνη. Εἰ μὲν μηδαμῶς ἄλλως οἷόν τ' ἦν δηλοῦν τὰς αὐτὰς πράξεις ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ μιᾶς ἰδέας, εἶχεν ἄν τις ὑπολαβεῖν, &c. (*Isocr.*) Σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δύξει. μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖ (*Pl.*). Δέον δ' αὐτὸν καταγορίσαι φορτία Ἀθήνηθεν μνῶν ἑκατὸν δεκαπέντε, ... οὐ κατηγόρασεν ἀλλ' ἢ πεντακισχιλίων καὶ πεντακοσίων δραχμῶν (*Dem.*). Τί

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obvious that it must be uncertain whether, in some passages, the correct reading should be οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἤ or οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἤ.

Kühner decides for οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἤ, where ποιῶ is to be supplied: = '*I do nothing but.*' Krüger says, that ἀλλ' ἤ appears to give *prominence* to the excepted notion; ἄλλ' ἤ (ἄλλο ἤ, ἄλλο γ' ἤ) merely introduces *an exception.*

ἄλλο τέλος ἔχετε λέγειν ἀλλ' ἢ ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας; (*Pl.*). Τοῦτο δ' ἄλλο τι ἢ θεοφιλὲς γίγνεται; Τί οὖν τούτων ἐστὶν αἴτιον ἢ ὅτι . . .; Τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος;

Exercise 14 (οὐδείς, &c.—ἀλλ' ἤ).

57. (1) The bee feeds upon[a] no °kind of food but what has (*p*) a sweet juice.

(2) For this reason all physicians forbid their patients to take any but the very smallest (°quantity of) oil in what they are going[b] to eat.

(3) It is manifest that the greater the number of those who were domiciled, and who visited a place, †the greater would be the increase of imports and exports, of rents and taxes.[c] Now,[d] †for the increase of revenue from such sources,[e] it is not even necessary to make any kind of outlay, but (°that of) a few †liberal and friendly[f] votes and attentions.

(4) In Cnidus the oligarchical constitution was altered after the nobility quarrelled amongst themselves, because °so few were capable of holding office °together; and, as has been said, if the father was in office, the son was not, nor even, if (°there were) several brothers, any but the eldest.

(5) Having done this, and summoned the Coreyræans to an assembly, they told them that this (°which they had done) was the best thing (for them), and that so †they would be in the least danger of being enslaved[g] by the Athenians; and (°they directed) that for the future they should receive neither party except †coming in a quiet manner[h] with a single ship, but should consider †a larger force[i] as hostile.

[a] *Say:* 'uses:' χρῆσθαι. [b] μέλλει sc. τίς, or ὁ ἀσθενῶν. There is a transition from the plural to the singular, since it is only *one patient* who desires, at any given time, to eat. [c] *Say:* 'the more would be imported, exported,' &c. [d] μὲν οὖν. [e] *Say:* 'for such increases of ° your revenues.' [f] φιλάνθρωπος, i. e. *drawn up* (or conceived) *in a friendly spirit towards men generally* (as opposed to *citizens*). [g] *Say:* 'they would least be enslaved.' [h] ἡσυχάζοντας. [i] τὸ πλέον.

Exercise 15 (οὐδεὶς &c.—ἀλλ' ἤ).

58. (1) † A vast multitude of depositions[a] having been read at the trial, some of the deponents[b] stating that they delivered to the plaintiff certain of my effects, others that they were present when he received them, others again that they had made purchases from him and paid him the prices, not one of them has he sued for false testimony; nor has he dared to proceed against any witness except this one individual, whose evidence he cannot show to have fixed him with the receipt of a single drachm.

(2) The mountain that we see, reaches above sixty stadia in length, yet we see no troops watching us †in any part of it,[c] except on the road itself. It seems, therefore, far more advisable to endeavor to win some part of the unguarded[d] mountain by stealth, and seize it before them,[e] if possible, than to fight against fortified posts and men prepared (°to resist).

[a] *Say:* 'more than very many depositions in all.' [b] In the Greek *say:* 'some of them,' i. e. *the depositions;* and so below. The verbs *to sue, to proceed against,* will have the *thing* (the *deposition*) for their object instead of the *personal object* (the *witness* or *deponent*).
[c] οὐδαμοῦ. [d] ἔρημος. [e] Use the participle φθάσας.

Exercise 16 (οὐδεὶς ἄλλος—ἀλλά).

59. (1) Many noble and important schemes did my country both form and happily effect by my means; and that it was not unmindful of this, take the following proof, Æschines: When the people came to elect a person to make the funeral oration over the slain, immediately after the disaster, they did not elect you, though you were proposed (μ), †and possess so splendid a voice;[a] nor Dēmadēs, though he had just concluded the peace; nor Hēgēmōn; nor any of your party: but [they elected] me.

(2) At the time that Aristarchus the son of Moschus was accused before the Council of having murdered

Nicodēmus,[b] we know that Midias, whom Demosthenes is now prosecuting, went before the Council, and said that nobody but Aristarchus was the murderer of Nicodemus, and that he had perpetrated this murder with his own hand; and (°we know) that he advised the Council to proceed to the house of Aristarchus and †have him arrested.[c]

[a] καίπερ εὔφωνον ὄντα. [b] *Say:* 'that the accusation was brought before the Council (ἐδόθη εἰς τὴν βουλήν) concerning (ὑπέρ) Aristarchus ——, that he had murdered Nicodemus.' [c] *Say:* 'and arrest him;' it being common to speak of a person's *doing* that, which he *causes to be done* by others.

Exercise 17 (οὐδεὶς &c. ἄλλος—ἤ).

60. (1) Cleon my opponent was the first cousin to the deceased by the father's side, and °so his son, whom he pretends that Astyphilus adopted, was his second cousin. But Cleon's father was removed by adoption into another family, and my opponents are still members of that family; so that by law they are no relations whatever to Astyphilus. Since then there could be no question on this head, they have forged a will, O judges (as I believe that I shall prove), and are now striving to rob me of my brother's property; and so confident Cleon both was then and is now, that no man but himself will obtain the estate in dispute, that no sooner was the death of Astyphilus announced, my father being then confined by illness and I absent from the city on foreign service, than he entered upon the occupation of the land, and claimed all my brother's effects, in right of his son, before you had determined any thing on the subject.

(2) It would be natural, I presume, to suppose, that whenever Astyphilus was in town, he would go to those sacrificial feasts which other Athenians usually attend,[a] accompanied by (°Cleon and) none but Cleon; being in the first place a member of the borough, and secondly his cousin, †and still further[b] the man whose

son he was going to adopt. Now[c] the clerk shall read to you the deposition made by the members of his borough, to the effect, that he never attended (°such sacrificial feasts) in company with him.

(3) Again, councillors, if I had served in the cavalry, I should not deny it, as if I had been guilty of some dreadful °fault, but should claim to be examined and passed, after proof given that no citizen had suffered wrong at my hands. And I perceive that you are of this opinion as well (°as myself), and I see many of those who were then in the cavalry °now sitting as members of the Council, and many °more of them who have been appointed (*ἀρ*) trierarchs or generals. Do not therefore[d] suppose that I make this defence from any other motive, than because the defendants have dared to state against me what is palpably false.[e]

(4) *οὐδεὶς* &c.—*ἀλλά.*] Though there are many causes from which changes (°of political constitutions) arise, he does not mention °any but one, that men, living prodigal lives, and overwhelming themselves in debt by taking up money at usury, thus become poor, as if at first all or the great majority were rich.

[a] *Begin:* 'To the sacrifices at (*ἐν*) which the other Athenians feast together (*ἑστιᾶσθαι*),' &c. [b] *ἔτι δέ.* [c] *τοίνυν.* [d] *Say:* 'so (*ὥστε*) do not suppose' &c. [e] *περιφανῶς καταψεύδεσθαί τινος.*

Chap. 2. § 1. Ἄλλως (*otherwise*). Ἄλλως τε καί.

61. Ἄλλως τε καί (*both otherwise and also* =) '*especially*' (praesertim). The phrase relates to some *condition* or *state of things* the existence of which is assumed. Such condition is, however, not always fully expressed (by *εἰ, ὅτε* or *ὅταν, ἐπειδή*, &c.), but often *implied* by a *participle* or even an *adjective* or (rarely) *substantive*. *Οὐδὲ καταλύεσθαι ἔτι καλόν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ δόξομεν ἄρξαι*

μᾶλλον τῆς διαφορᾶς (*Th.*). Οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς ἡσύχαζον ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐς οὐδένα οὐδὲν ἐνεωτέριζον (*Th.*). Ἱππικὸν στράτευμα ἐν νυκτὶ ταραχῶδές ἐστιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ βάρβαρον (*Xen.*). Ἐδορύβουν, ἄλλως τε καὶ οἴνου εἰληφότες (*Is.*). Πολλὰ ἂν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν (*Pl.*).——Also ἄλλως τε πάντως καί, ἄλλως τε εἰ καί, ἄλλως τε κἄν (*Wyttenbach*).

Exercise 32.

62. (1) It is manifest to the Olynthians, that they do not now fight for glory, nor for a part of their territory, but to defend their state from ruin and slavery; and they know both what he did to those Amphipolitans who betrayed their city to him, and to those inhabitants of Pydna who received him (°within their walls). And, as a general principle, an absolute monarchy is, I presume, an object of suspicion to free states, and especially if they occupy a neighboring territory.

(2) Even if you should succeed in passing the mountains unobserved, or in seizing them before the enemy, and should contrive to defeat in the plain both their cavalry and their foot, whose numbers amount to above twenty thousand men, you will °then arrive at the rivers; first, the Thermŏdōn, which is three hundred feet in breadth, which it will be a difficult matter, I imagine, to pass, especially with a numerous hostile army in front, and a numerous one following in your rear; and secondly, the Iris, which is also three hundred feet broad: in the third place, the Halys, not less than two hundred stadia in breadth, which you will not be able to pass without boats; and who will there be to supply you with boats? And so again the Parthĕnius is impassable, which you would arrive at, if you were to cross the Halys.

Chap. 2. § 2. (ἄλλως τε.)

63. *a*) Ἄλλως τε differs, especially in its origin, from ἄλλως τε καί.

b) Ἄλλως τε = '*alioque modo*,' id est '*majoreque modo*' (Hermann): that is, it *states* that the thing occurs in *another way*, and *implies* that it is a *greater*, a *more important way* (*praetereaque; adde quod*), '*and besides this*,' '*and more than this*,' '*moreover*.' Thus (Soph. (Ed. Tyr. 1110) (Œdipus, having said that he thought he saw the shepherd they had so long been looking for, adds a reason for this opinion, and goes on thus:

ἄλλως τε τοὺς ἄγοντας ὥσπερ οἰκέτας ἔγνωκ' ἐμαυτοῦ — *and moreover* (*and besides this*), *I recognize those who are conducting him as being like servants of mine.*

Καὶ παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς Ἑρμοκράτης ὁ Ἕρμωνος, —— ἐθάρσυνέ τε, καὶ οὐκ εἶα τῷ γεγενημένῳ ἐνδιδόναι· τὴν μὲν γὰρ γνώμην αὐτῶν οὐχ ἡσσῆσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἀταξίαν βλάψαι· οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτόν γε λειφθῆναι, ὅσον εἰκὸς εἶναι, ἄλλως τε τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐμπειρίᾳ ἰδιώτας, ὡς εἰπεῖν, χειροτέχναις ἀνταγωνισαμένους.—*Th.* 6, 72 (the only passage in which the form occurs in that historian).

c) When this ἄλλως τε is followed by a clause with ἐάν or ἐπειδή, it is equivalent to '*the more*' (if, since &c.); or '*especially*' (if, since &c.)

Here, though this ἄλλως τε is construed '*especially*,' like ἄλλως τε καί, yet it *gets* the meaning in a *different way* (as explained in *b*). The ἐάν or ἐπειδή may be followed by a καί, which, however, does not *belong* to these particles, but to the word or notion it precedes.

Δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους τῇ πόλει πεπραγμένων προσήκειν εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸν λόγον κατεστησάμην περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας τῆς ἐπ' ἐκείνους, *the more so* (or *especially*) *since* &c. (*Isocr.*)

Exercise 18.

64. (1) I have gone through these °points in the

belief that you, who are not one of the many but a king over numerous °subjects, †should not think like ordinary men,[a] nor judge of the merit either of things or persons by the °mere pleasure (°that they produce), but should try them by the test of useful actions; the more so, since all the professors of philosophy, though they differ with respect to the best means of training and educating the soul—some of them saying that their pupils will best attain to wisdom by controversial logical disputes, others by political training, and others by some third method of their own—yet do all agree in this, that the man of liberal education ought, as the result of all these methods, to prove himself able to give prudent counsel.

(2) †But as to the forming[a] your army for battle; the marching them, either by day or by night, by narrow or open ways, by mountainous paths or across plains;[b] how to encamp; how to place your guards and watches both by night and day; how to lead towards the enemy; how to retreat from them; how to march by a city belonging to the enemy; how to march up to a rampart, and to retreat from it; how to pass woods or rivers; how to be on the guard, either against cavalry or against men armed with javelin or bow: and if, when you are marching by way of either wing, the enemy should appear, how to form a front against them; and if you are marching by your front, and the enemy appear in another part and not in front, how to lead against them; †how to get the best intelligence[c] of the enemy's affairs, and how best to conceal your own from them: †in all these matters,[d] what can I say to you? for you have often heard from me all that I knew of them; and, besides, whenever you have thought any one an adept in any of these affairs, you have not neglected to apply to him for information, nor are you unskilled in them.

[a] Begin the clauses with ὅπως (Ὅπως δὲ χρὴ τάττειν &c.). [b] Use the adjectives ὀρεινός, πεδινός, in agreement with the preceding 'ᾗμις,'

and connect the subsequent clauses by ἢ ὅπως (= *or* how). [c] *Say:* 'or how a man may best get intelligence of' &c. (αἰσθάνεσθαι).

[d] *Say:* 'all these (° points) why should I tell you?' ταῦτα δὲ πάντα &c. (the δέ commencing the *principal clause*. See English-Greek Vocabulary).

Chap. 2. § 3. ἄλλως (*continued*).

65. Ἄλλως (properly '*otherwise*') sometimes stands before a substantive, and *seems* to have the force of '*useless*,' '*worthless*,' or '*mere*.' It perhaps gets this meaning from that of '*otherwise than as it should be*;' from which it obtained the meaning of *temere* (*rashly, recklessly*), and μάτην, *frustra*.

Διεβόων τὰς Φοινίσσας ναῦς μένοντες, ἄλλως ὄνομα (= *tantum* nomen, *non nisi* nomen: *a mere name*) καὶ οὐκ ἔργον, κινδυνεύσειν διατριβῆναι (*Th.*).

So τὴν ἄλλως (sc. ὁδόν) = *without purpose* or *aim; idly* [τὴν ἄλλως ἀδολεσχῶ, *Dem.*].

Exercise 19.

66. (1) I shall therefore acquaint you with all that I think proper for us to do during our stay. In the first place, we must supply ourselves with provisions out of the enemy's country; for there is here no sufficient market to supply us: besides, except some few of us, we have no money to buy with, and the country is inhabited by the enemy. We shall therefore run the risk of losing many of our men, if we go in search of provisions in a careless and unguarded manner; so that I am of opinion †that you should go out upon these expeditions in strong foraging parties,[a] and not wander about the country rashly, †and that the care of attending to this should be left to us[b] (i. e. the generals).

(2) †With respect then to the preparations[c] (° we

ought to make), the dangers we have to guard against, and the measures which are the most likely †in all human probability[d] to command success, †I have said, I believe, all that is necessary.[e] But to attend to the execution of them, day by day; to turn unexpected occurrences to the best account; to know the proper time for every (°step to be taken), and to judge correctly what may be gained over by †amicable discussion,[f] and what requires force: (°all this) is the task of the generals who command. And hence it is, that the statesman who advises political measures has the most difficult and trying post; for what has been wisely recommended, after being tested and approved with great zeal and labor, is oftentimes ruined by the perverse management of those who are intrusted with its execution.

[a] σὺν προνομαῖς λαμβάνειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. [b] *Say:* 'and that we should see to (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) this.' [c] *Begin:* 'The preparations then' &c.: *compare* note *c*. [d] *Say:* 'according to human calculation.' [e] *Say:* 'have pretty-nearly (σχεδόν) been said by me.' [f] ὁμιλία, i. e. *intercourse, discussion*, &c.

Chap. 3. § 1. "Αμα.

67. "Αμα = '*together*,' '*at the same time*,' '*at once*.'] Its principal use is to mark the occurrence of two events *at the same time* either (1) *actually* or (2) *virtually*, the first being *no sooner* over, than the second *commences*.

68. *a*) In ἅμα μὲν . . . ἅμα δέ (*simul . . . simul*) we have an instance of *anaphŏra* (that is, of the emphatic repetition of a word, which then, at least in the second and subsequent clauses, takes the first place). They are construed by '*at once . . . and; both . . . and*;' and sometimes '*partly . . . partly*.' Τὸ πείθειν οἷόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις ἐστὶν αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς

ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστῳ (*Pl.*).

69. *b*) *Ἅμα . . . καί* connects either single notions, like *ὁμοῦ* (*Σπανιώτατον εὐπαιδίας τυχεῖν ἅμα καὶ πολυπαιδίας* (*Isocr.*). *Ἐφόνευον ἄνδρας ὁμοῦ καὶ ἵππους, Xen.*], or whole propositions: in the latter case, it is equivalent to our '*no sooner—than;*' or '*as soon as ever;*' '*when once,*' '*the moment,*' followed by a principal clause, &c.; or by '*when at once*' &c., according to the view with which the speaker points out the *coincidence* in point of time.

70. *Ἅμα πλουτοῦσι καὶ ὑμᾶς μισοῦσι* (Lys.), '*they* no sooner *grow rich*, than *they detest you*' (or), 'the moment (as soon as ever, &c.) *they grow rich, they hate you.*'

Exercise 20.

71. (1) †Upon this occasion[a] the Greeks observed, that a square was not a proper disposition for an army when pursued by the enemy; for whenever the flank-columns are forced to close in either by the roads becoming narrower, or by mountains, or by a bridge, the heavy-armed troops must necessarily be forced out of their ranks, and march uneasily, being at once pressed together and disordered; so that of necessity they become useless for want of order. †On the other hand,[b] when the flanks come to be again extended, the men who before were forced out of their ranks, must spread themselves out, and consequently leave (°at first) an opening in the centre, which very much disheartens those who are thus exposed, when the enemy is behind them. Besides, when they had a bridge or any other defile to pass, every man was in a hurry,[43] wanting to be first, upon which occasion the enemy had a fair opportunity of attacking them.

(2) They manage their invasion of the country of the Cardūchi in the following manner,[61] (°and that for two reasons) both that their design might not be dis-

covered, and that they might put it into execution, before the enemy had taken possession of the heights. When it was about the last watch, and [a]only so much of the night was left, as to allow them to traverse the plain while it was yet dark, they struck their tents; and, marching at the word of command, came to the mountains by break of day. Cheirisŏphus commanded the vanguard with his own people, and all the light-armed troops; and Xenophon brought up the rear with the heavy-armed, having none of the light-armed, because there seemed no danger of the enemy's attacking their rear, while they were marching up the mountain.

[a] ἐνταῦθα δή. [b] αὖ.

Chap. 3. § 2. (*ἅμα with participles.*)

72. *a*) With a participle ἅμα may be resolved into a sentence with '*whilst*,' '*as*,' or (if it is a past participle) by '*when*,' or '*as soon as*,' with the pluperfect. Ἅμα ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἀνέστη (*Xen.*). Οἱ βάρβαροι καὶ φεύγοντες ἅμα ἐτίτρωσκον (*Xen.*).

b) Ἅμα μὲν . . . ἅμα δέ with participles introduce *two reasons* influencing the mind *at the same time*. Ἐπεί-θετο ὁ Καλάσιρις ἅμα μὲν τῷ Κνήμωνι χαριζόμενος ἅμα δὲ τὸν Ναυσικλέα τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ἕνεκεν ὑποποιούμενος.

73. Ἅμα is also = σύν, '*together with*,' '*with*.' The substantive belonging to it often takes a participle when *time* is expressed: ἅμα τῷ σίτῳ ἀκμάζοντι.

Exercise 21.

74. (1) The Thracians who had escaped, [a]now came together: and many of them had escaped out of the very hands ([a]of their pursuers), they being targeteers, and the Greeks heavy-armed troops.[b] After they were

[a]thus assembled in a body, they first attacked the division commanded by Smicrēs, one of the Arcadian generals, when he was already on his march to the place of rendezvous with a considerable sum of money. ‡† For some time[b] the Greeks fought as they marched on; but, as they were crossing a water-course, the Thracians put them to flight, and killed both Smicres himself and all his men. Of another division, which was under the command of Hēgēsander, one of the eight generals, they left but eight men alive; but Hegesander himself escaped.

(2) The rest of the generals †arrived at the place of rendezvous[c] some with difficulty, and others without any at all. But the Thracians, after they had gained this advantage, gave notice to one another, and assembled, with great resolution, in the night; and, at daybreak, great numbers both of horsemen and targeteers were drawn up round the hill on which the Greeks were encamped; and, their numbers continually increasing (*c*), they attacked the heavy-armed troops with great security; for the Greeks had neither archers, darters, nor horse; whilst they, advancing with their light-armed men and horse, hurled their darts, and, whenever the Greeks offered to attack them, retreated with ease: and others assailed them from some other quarter. Thus, whilst many of the Greeks were wounded, not a man was hurt on the side of the Thracians: so that the former could not stir from the place, and were at last debarred from water by the Thracians. Being reduced to great extremity, terms of accommodation were proposed; but[d] after the other points were settled (*c*), the Thracians †refused to give[e] hostages, which the Greeks insisted on. This put a stop to the treaty.

[a] When the ground of a statement depends in this way on the character or quality of the two persons (or each *being* what he is), it is usual to express this *antithetically* by making one the apposition to the subject, another the object. *Thus:* 'I am healthier than you because I am *tem-*

perate, you *intemperate*,' would become, 'I am healthier than you, a *temperate* [c] man than an *intemperate*.' Use this turn here. [b] τέως. [c] *Say:* 'came together' (συνέρχεσθαι). [d] καί. [e] οὐκ ἐδίδοσαν = *dare noluerunt*. (The Pres. and Imperf. of διδόναι have often the meaning of (*to give*), to *be ready to give*.)

Chap. 4. Ἄν. § 1. (*Repetition of ἄν.*)

75. The general construction of ἄν with the different moods has been already given in the first Part, and more will occur below under the particular particles. We here consider only the cases of its *repetition* and *omission:* which we state in Hermann's very clear explanation of these points in Attic construction.

76. *a*) Pervulgatum est, ἄν indicativo et optativo junctum iterari, ut bis terve in eadem sententia positum inveniatur. Eadem ratio cadit etiam in infinitivum et participium, quia hæ verbi partes nihil nisi conversam ex indicativo vel optativo orationem continent. Sed id non temere fieri posse, sponte patet.

77. *b*) Sunt autem *duo modi*, quibus repeti ἄν potest, (1) *unus*, quum pluribus verbis interpositis ab eo verbo, quicum conjungi debeat, longius avulsum est, quam ut non videatur concinnitas orationis repetitionem requirere, (2) alter, qui est longe frequentissimus, quum in parte aliqua sententiæ iteratur. Plane enim eadem hujus particulæ ratio est, quæ est negationum. Etenim quemadmodum, quum ad totam sententiam pertinet negatio, iterari in partibus quibusdam solet, ut οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδείς, sic etiam, quum *tota sententia conditionalis* est, refertur ea conditio etiam ad partes ejus primarias.

78. *c*) Sunt autem partes illæ tales, ut addant aliquid, quod illa principalis sententiæ ratione afficiatur.

1) Id modo est *participium*, ut,

ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἀπ᾽ ὠμοῦ ταῦτα δαίμονός τις ἂν
κρίνων ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ τῷδ᾽ ἂν ὀρθοίη λόγον;—(Ed. R. 828.)

2) modo *conditio* aliter expressa, ut

ὥστ' ἂν εἰ σθένος
λάβοιμι, δηλώσαιμ' ἂν οἷ' αὐτοῖς φρονῶ.—(Electr. 333.)

3) modo *affirmatio major*, ut

ὅστις γὰρ ἦν ἐκεῖνον ὁ κτανών, τάχ' ἂν
κἄμ' ἂν τοιαύτῃ χειρὶ τιμωρεῖν θέλοι;—(Œd. R. 139.)

4) modo *negatio*, ut

φωνὴν ἂν οὐκ ἂν εἶχον·—(Lysistr. 361.)

5) et in formula οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἄν.[1]
Tum, quæ par est negationi, in *interrogatione*, ut

1. τῷ γὰρ ἂν καὶ μείζονι
λέξαιμ' ἂν ἢ σοί;—(Œd. R. 772.)

2. πῶς ἄν ποτ' ἀφικοίμην ἄν;—(Aristoph. Pac. 68.)

6) Denique in *divisione* sententiæ, ut

1. ὥστ' οὐχὶ μαντείας γ' ἂν οὔτε τῇδ' ἐγὼ
βλέψαιμ' ἂν οὔνεκ', οὔτε τῇδ' ἂν ὕστερον·—
(Œd. R. 857.)

2. οἶμαι γὰρ οὔτ' ἂν Ἴστρον οὔτε Φᾶσιν ἂν
νίψαι καθαρμῷ τήνδε τὴν στέγην.—(1227.)

Harum rationum ubi nulli locus est, non potest iterari ἄν.

79. Cæterum hæc iteratio particulæ in primis usitata est Atticis. Rarius invenitur apud Herodotum, raro apud Epicos.

80. Geminatum ἄν Elmsleius[2] jure negavit conjunctivo consociari. Cur vero? Quia, ut jam ostendimus, hic modus verbi non *per se* adsciscit ἄν, sed ἄν *pertinet ad vocem, ex qua pendet conjunctivus.* Hujus vocis ea particula significatum quum mutet, nihil est in tali sententia, quod repeti possit. Neque enim ad prædicata pertinet ἄν, sed ad ipsam conditionem, ex qua pendet sententia, ut ὅς ἄν, ἐάν, ὡς ἄν. Quare etiam quum hæc per optativum in obliquam orationem vertuntur, non potest iterari ἄν.

81. To this we will only add, that the words to which ἄν, when it occurs singly, *frequently attaches itself* by a kind of preference, are naturally those which, when they stand early in their clause, take an ἄν, which is afterwards repeated before its proper verb.

[1] De qua vide Elmsleium ad Heracl. 721.
[2] Ad Æsch. Prom. 768.

82. Such words are, besides *negatives* and *interrogatives* (which Hermann mentions above):

a) *Affirmative adverbs*, denoting *degree, intensity*, and the like—μᾶλλον (μάλιστ') ἄν· σφόδρ' ἄν· εἰκότως ἄν, &c.

b) Adverbs of *place, time, manner*, &c.—ποῦ, τότε, ποτέ, τάχα, τάχιστα, ὧδε, ἔτι, ὡς, πῶς, ἡδέως, ἥδιστα, δικαίως, &c.

83. The participle to which an ἄν, that is afterwards repeated before the verb, attaches itself, is often one that *might itself* take ἄν: or, in other words, when, instead of two verbs with ἄν and the optative, a participle is used, and one verb, the participle naturally takes ἄν, as well as the verb. Very often, however, ἄν is appended to a participle, which *it does not modify*. Thus, as Hermann observes in *Soph. El. R.* 446—συθείς τ' ἂν οὐκ ἂν ἀλγύναις πλέον—the participle συθείς is *of itself* equivalent to εἰ συθείης. the ἄν being added, not to *give it* this meaning, but on account of the following verb.

Exercise 22.

84. (1) They say that these mountains are full of woods, so that there are hopes you will not be discovered. However, if you send before the rest of your army some light men equipped for expedition, who, both by their number and habit, may look like plunderers, these men, if they meet with any of the Armenians, will prevent those that they can take from giving an account of things; and, by driving away those they cannot take, will hinder them from seeing the whole army, and will cause them to take their measures only as against a band of thieves.

(2) Do you imagine that, if all of them had reasoned like Leōcrătes, and run away, any of these glorious actions would have been performed, or that you would still be dwelling in this land (° of ours)? As then, gentlemen, you praise and honor the good, so ought you also to detest and punish the bad, and especially[a] °this Leocrates, who neither feared nor stood in awe of you.

(3) As, where fighting is necessary, he is accounted the strongest and bravest, who has subdued the greatest number (° of his foes), so when we have to persuade, that man should be held to be the most eloquent and efficient, who has brought over the greatest number to our own way of thinking.[b]

[a] This is an instance of ἄλλως τε καί standing before a single substantive. [b] ποιεῖν τινα ὁμογνώμονα ἐμοί.

Exercise 23.

85. (1) When they had breakfasted, Cyrus called his captains together, and spoke to this effect: 'Friends! how many valuable things are we, in my opinion, perfectly throwing away, when the gods are offering them for our acceptance! for now you yourselves behold *that the enemy have fled for fear of us. And how can any body think that they *who, though possessed of an intrenched post, have left it and fled, will stand and look us in the face on fair ground? ‡They who did not stand, before they had made trial of us, how should such men stand after they are beaten, and have been so ill treated by us? ‡How should the worst of those men make up their minds to fight us, *of whom the best have been destroyed?'

(2) 'Is this then (*οὖν*),' said he, 'your meaning, that your father also, from being a foolish °man, is become †sensible and right-minded[a] in this one day's time?' 'Exactly so,' he replied. 'It is your opinion therefore (*ἄρα*) that †soundness of mind[b] is an emotion of the soul, like grief, not †the result of mental[c] discipline; for if he who is to be of sound mind, must °first become †thoughtful and prudent,[d] a man cannot, I presume, after being of unsound mind, become right-minded all in a moment.' 'How so (*τί δε*;), Cyrus?' said he: 'did you never observe an individual attempting from folly to fight with a stronger than himself, who, upon being defeated, was immediately cured of his folly with reference to that °adversary? And did you never see a city putting itself in array against another city, which, after a defeat (*ν*), it is presently ready to obey instead of fighting with it?'

[a] *σώφρων.* [b] *σωφροσύνη.* [c] *μάθημα*, a thing learnt: contrasted with *πάθημα.* [d] *φρόνιμος.*

* Means that this clause is to *precede* the other in the Greek order.

Cap. 4. § 2. *De omisso ἄν propter aliud ἄν* (*Hermann*).

86. Quemadmodum iteratur ἄν in una sententia, ita in oratione membris quibusdam distincta non raro in uno tantum membro ponitur, in altero autem omittitur. Quod si quæris qua lege fiat, res ipsa monstrat, sic demum posse, si utrumque membrum ad commune quiddam referri licet, ita ut, si præmittas ἄν, ad utrumque verbum pertineat.

87. Sit nobis pro fundamento hujus disputationis illud Xenophontis, *πῶς γὰρ ἂν τίς ποτε ἐξαρκέσειε τύραννος ἢ χρήματα ἐκτίνων ὅσους ἀφείλετο, ἢ δεσμοὺς ἀντιπάσχοι ὅσους δὴ ἐδέσμευσεν, ἢ ὅσους κατέκτανε πῶς ἂν ἱκανὰς ψυχὰς ἀντιπαράσχοιτο ἀποθανουμένας*;[1] Prius *πῶς ἄν* ad duo refertur verba, ideoque recte et ordine factum, ut, sequente deinde divisione, neutri de duobus, quæ proxima sunt, verbis, *ἐξαρκέσειεν* et *ἀντιπάσχοι*, additum sit, etsi potuit addi utrique. Sed quod deinde sequitur, *πῶς*, inversa orationis forma, novam incipit sententiam, neque est pars prægressæ; itaque etiam suum sibi *ἄν* adjici postulat.

88. Nunc videamus alia. In eodem libro scriptum est: *ὥστε οὐ μόνον φιλοῖο ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐρῷο ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων· καὶ τοὺς καλοὺς οὐ πειρᾶν, ἀλλὰ πειρώμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀνέχεσθαι ἄν σε δέοι.*[2] Scilicet id est, *ὥστ' ἂν οὐ μόνον φιλοῖο ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐρῷο.* Altera nova sententia est, novum sibi *ἄν* vindicans, *καὶ δέοι ἄν σε.*

89. Paullo difficilius judicium est de proximis verbis: *εἰ δέ τις κίνδυνος εἴη, οὐ συμμάχους μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ προμάχους καὶ προθύμους ὁρῴης ἄν, πολλῶν μὲν δωρεῶν ἀξιούμενος, οὐκ ἀπορῶν δὲ ὅτῳ τούτων εὐμενεῖ μεταδώσεις, πάντας μὲν συγχαίροντας ἔχων ἐπὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, πάντας δὲ πρὸ τῶν σῶν ὥσπερ τῶν ἰδίων μαχομένους· θησαυρούς γε μὴν ἔχοις πάντας τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς φίλοις πλούτους.* Addendum post *ἔχοις* censuerunt *ἄν* Schaeferus, Bremius, Reisigius, alii, nec sine probabilitate. Non videtur tamen necessarium esse, quia hoc in mente habebat scriptor, *κινδύνου δ' ὄντος μάλιστα μὲν αὐτοὺς προθύμους ὁρῴης, θησαυρούς γε μὴν ἔχοις τοὺς αὐτῶν πλούτους.*

[1] Hieron. 7, 12. [2] 11, 11.

Exercise 24.

90. (1) But what is the greatest proof, that it is on account of my affliction, and not from insolent pride, as this man asserts, that I ride on horseback, (° this proof I say) it is easy to see the force of.[a] For, if I possessed any property, † I should ride on a mule with a Spanish[b] saddle, and not ride other men's horses: whereas now, since I cannot procure myself a thing of this kind, I am often forced to make use of other men's horses.

(2) I would give a great deal, gentlemen, if, as judges in this cause, you would feel for me as you would feel for yourselves if you had experienced a similar treatment. For I am very sure, that if you were to entertain the same feeling, in a case that is not your own, that you would entertain in one that was, there would not be one amongst you, who would not be indignant at what has occurred, but you would all (° of you) deem that the penalties (enacted) are too light for[c] those who are guilty of such practices.

[a] μαθεῖν. [b] ἐπ' ἀστράβης ὀχεῖσθαι (to be put in the right tense): this was a *luxurious mode of conveyance* with which Midias was reproached. Buttmann, in an Excursus on Dem. in Midiam, shows that the word ἀστράβη, derived from ἀ. στρέφειν, and therefore implying *firmness*, relates properly to the *saddle*, but he thinks that very possibly this kind of *easy saddle* for *invalids*, &c. was usually placed upon a *mule*, as a quiet easy animal. Hence the grammarians sometimes make it a kind of *saddle*, sometimes a *mule*. [c] περί.

Chap. 4. Ἄν. § 3. (*ἄν omitted with* ἔδει, ἦν, &c.).

91. In statements of *what it would be* (or *have been*) *right* or *wrong*, *possible* or *impossible*, *praiseworthy* or *blameable to do*, the imperfect is usually found without ἄν, although it is implied that the thing so characterised has, in point of fact, *not been done*.

92. Such imperfects are ἐχρῆν, προσῆκεν, ἔδει,

ἥρμοττεν (καλῶς εἶχεν), ἐξῆν (ἦν, ὑπῆρχεν), and *adjectives* (often *gerundives*) with ἦν (κάλλιον, δίκαιον, κρεῖττον, ἀδύνατον, &c. ἦν). Cf. Gr. 790. Jelf. § 858, 3 (Madvig. § 118).

1) Εἰ ἅπαντες ὡμολογοῦμεν Φίλιππον τὴν εἰρήνην παραβαίνειν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔδει τὸν παριόντα (*an orator who came forward to speak*) λέγειν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἢ ὅπως ἀσφαλέστατα αὐτὸν ἀμυνούμεθα. *Dem.* 9, 6.

2) Καλὸν ἦν τοῖσδε, εἰ καὶ ἡμαρτάνομεν, εἶξαι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ὀργῇ (*Th.* 1, 8).

3) Εἰ αἰσχρόν τι αἱ γύναικες ἔμελλον ἐργάσεσθαι, θάνατον ἀντ' αὐτοῦ προαιρετέον ἦν (*Xen. Mem.* 2, 7, 10).

(So in Latin, *debebam, poteram, licebat, decebat; par, æquum*, &c. *erat.*)

Exercise 25.

93. (1) For the law enacted, that if a man gave true information, the offered pardon should be granted; but, if false, that he should die. †Now undoubtedly[a] you are all aware of this fact, that both I and my father escaped with our lives: whereas this was not possible, if I really did inform against my father, but either he or I must have died.

(2) †Herein consists the specious shunning of confederacies which they have put forward;[b] not that they may avoid committing injustice with others, but that they may be able to commit it by themselves; and that, wherever they have the power, they may act with violence; and where they escape observation, they may take unfair advantage; and, if in any case they have seized on something, they may not be put to the blush. And yet if they were, as they say (°they are), honest men, the more impregnable they were to their neighbors, the more manifestly might they have shown their virtue by †submitting the claims of either party to a friendly arbitration.[c]

[a] καὶ μὲν δή. [b] ἐν τούτῳ τὸ εὐπρεπὲς ἄσπονδον προβέβληνται. [c] διδόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι τὰ δίκαια.

Chap. 4. § 4. (ἔδει &c. ἄν).

94. Though the omission of ἄν with ἔδει, ἐχρῆν, προσῆκε (θαύμαστον &c.) ἦν, and the other forms mentioned in 92, is very common, yet these forms are also found, and that not uncommonly, with ἄν.

95. According to Hermann, ἄν *must* be added to them, whenever the *contrary* is *really the case*: for instance,

We must use	whenever we can add:
ἐχρῆν (ἔδει) &c. ἄν,	νῦν δὲ (*or* ἀλλ') οὐ χρή (δεῖ &c.),
οὐκ ἂν ἐχρῆν (ἔδει &c.).	νῦν δὲ (*or* ἀλλὰ) χρή (δεῖ &c.).

96. There are several passages, where a contrary statement of this kind is really added: e. g. οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐξῆν ὑμῖν τιμᾶν ὅ τι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτῖσαι (ἐν γὰρ τῷ παθεῖν καὶ ὁ δεσμὸς ἔνι· οὐκ ἂν οὖν ἐξῆν δεσμοῦ τιμῆσαι) ..... νῦν δὲ ταῦθ' ὑμῖν τεκμήρια ἔστω ὅτι ἔξεστι δῆσαι· παντελῶς γὰρ ἤδη ἄκυρ' ἂν ἦν τὰ τιμήματα (*Dem. in Timocr.* § 146).

Here the οὐκ ἂν ἐξῆν is followed by νῦν δὲ ... ἔξεστι. But in the ἄκυρ' ἂν ἦν τὰ τιμήματα, it is only *implied* that this could never be allowed (ἀλλ' οὔκ ἐστιν ἄκυρα).

Εἰ τοίνυν ἀπέχρη τοὺς τοῖς Διονυσίοις τι ποιοῦντας τούτων κατὰ τούτους τοὺς νόμους δίκην διδόναι, οὐδὲν ἂν προσέδει τοῦδε τοῦ νόμου· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπέχρη (*Dem. Mid.* § 35). The conclusion therefore to be drawn is, προσδεῖ οὖν τοῦδε τοῦ νόμου.

97. (1) As a guide for ourselves in writing Greek, it will be well to follow Hermann's rule, and to express the ἄν with ἔδει, &c., when the object is to *express*, or at all events *convey clearly*, the notion, that such *would* indeed have been the case, but *is not*, the *contrary* being in fact true.

98. (2) As a guide, however, to account for its insertion or omission

in all passages of the Greek writers, the rule will not serve. Of this Bäumlein gives, amongst several examples, this short one from Herodotus: *εἰ γὰρ ὑπ' ὀδόντος τοι εἶπε τελευτήσειν με—χρῆν δή σε ποιέειν τὰ ποιέεις, νῦν δὲ ὑπ' αἰχμῆς*. The conclusion to be drawn is this: *οὐκ οὖν χρή σε ποιέειν, τὰ ποιέεις*: hence by Hermann's rule we ought to have had *χρῆν ἄν*. Bäumlein observes, that the young man wishes to justify his father's conduct on a certain supposition: he therefore uses the indicative without *ἄν* to state it as *objectively true;* even though he goes on to point out that such conduct rested on a false interpretation of the dream. The fact is, that though the conditional meaning is usually, in the case of these verbs, expressed in Greek as *objectively true* (in the indicative), yet whenever the writer deems it advisable to point out, that this indicative is to be understood conditionally, he may add the *ἄν*, which *expresses* this. So, on the other hand, even in a case where the contrary is obviously true, he may, when he does not wish to imply this strongly, omit the *ἄν*, so as merely to assert, '*if that were so, this certainly was so.*'

Exercise 26.

99. (1) Since it happens that we are now to deliberate about subjects upon which these °orators have frequently spoken before °now, I am of opinion that I may fairly lay claim to your indulgence, even though I am the first to rise. For, if they had given you proper advice upon former occasions, it would not now be necessary for you to deliberate (°at all).

(2) Cĕphalus, the father of Pŏlemarchus, was likewise in the house; and he seemed to me to be considerably aged, for I had not seen him for a long time. ‡ He was sitting, with a crown on his head, † on a chair with a cushion upon it;[a] for it so happened, that he had been offering sacrifice in the court (°of his house). We sat down therefore by him, for some chairs were standing there in a circle. As soon, then, as Cĕphalus saw me (*ρ*) he saluted me, and said,—'It is not often, Socrates, that you come down to us in the Piræus: you ought however to do so, for, if I had strength enough left to walk to the city, there would be no need for you to come here, since I should go up to you; but now you ought to come (°to us) here more frequently; for, be assured, that with me (*dat.*) the more the pleasures of the body die away, the more

† does my desire for conversation and the pleasure that I take in it increase.[b]

(3) But they maintain that he was cast into the sea. From[c] what vessel? ‡ It is plain that the vessel was one of those that were then in the port. How then (° was it, that the body) was not found? Moreover, it would surely have been likely, that there should be some trace in the vessel, if a man had been killed in it, and was thrown overboard in the night. † But, as the case really stands,[d] my accusers assert that they did find traces in the vessel in which he was drinking, and from which he went on shore, (° the vessel) in which they themselves allow that the man did not die; but as to the vessel from which he was thrown overboard, they found neither the vessel itself nor any trace. I will call witnesses (° to prove the truth) of what I say.

[a] *Say:* 'on both a cushion and chair.' [b] *Say:* 'the more do the desires and delights about conversation (περὶ λόγους) increase.'

[c] *Say:* 'in what vessel.' The action of throwing him overboard was performed *in* the vessel, though he was thrown *out* of it. When an action may be considered in two ways, the Greeks are *fond* of using the preposition that suits the *assumed* or *implied* act or state with the verb that denotes the act or state *expressed*. Cf. *Grammar*, 1433. [d] νῦν δέ.

Chap. 4. § 5. (*On the omission or insertion of ἄν with ὤφελον, ἔμελλον, ἐβουλόμην, ἔφην.*)

100. With ὤφελον (= *debebam*) the particle ἄν is probably nowhere found, whether the ὤφελον introduces an *unfulfilled wish*, or stands in a simple categorical proposition.

101. The reason Hermann gives is, that since it signifies that the thing in question *ought* to be or have been, you can never oppose the contrary: '*but now it ought not*;' but only, '*now it* is *not*.'

102. With ἔμελλον the ἄν is very rare: its insertion is however admissible, since to ἔμελλον ἂν ποιή-

[illegible]

An instance occurs in Example 1 of the following Exercise.

106. Both ἐδόκουμεν δὲ καὶ (though very rarely) ἐδοκοῦμεν καὶ are found. The proper force of ἐδόκουμεν δὲ = οὕτω is that the speaker would utter the truth, if the circumstances were such as to give him any hope of its fulfilment. Since, however, this is not the case, he does not utter it.

Ἆρα δὲ ἄλλοις οὕτω φαίνεται ὡς ἐμοί; I would fain, as the [illegible] or [illegible] of it.

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔοικεν ἐκείνοις ἡ μάχη γενέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ [illegible] ἐκείνοις ἐστὶν ἐπιτήδεια. [illegible] ἐκείνοις ἐστὶν ἐπιτήδεια, [illegible] ἐκείνοις ἐστὶν ἐπιτήδεια, [illegible] ἐκείνοις ἐστὶν ἐπιτήδεια.

107. The word ἀνά is in the accented [illegible] ἀνά, but when [illegible] ἀνά is [illegible] ἀνά [illegible] ἀνά [illegible] ἀνά.

Ἐξόν [illegible] ἐξόν, the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

(ᵉquestion under discussion:—would, I say, that these regulations were still observed): for so in my opinion the State would be better governed than in any other way; and the lowest public trials would pass, whereas now, since every thing has been abolished, the value of which used formerly to be allowed that best and wisest proclamation has ceased to be made, 'who amongst those who are upwards of fifty years old wishes to address the assembly, and then of the other Athenians, each in his turn?'

(2) But come now, even if my father wished to remain, do you imagine that his friends would either have allowed him to stay (ᵉin the city), or have given security for him, instead of turning him from his purpose, and praying him to go away to a place, where he would be in safety himself without destroying me?

Chap. 5. § 1. Ἄρα.

107. Ἄρα (a particle whose origin and primary meaning is still undetermined) = *igitur; ut videtur; fere* (after conditional particles): *scilicet.*

108. The most probable derivation seems to be that from ἀρω, *to fit, to be adapted or suitable*: so that the particle properly denotes *conformity to the nature or end of things*. Hartung remarks that it comes from the same root as ἀρτίως, *in this respect and the further case*: so that it originally denotes *suddenness*, and hence *surprise*, &c.[1] Rost

[1] The latest explanation of Hartung's view is contained in his Greek Grammar, p. 300. "Ἄρα denotes *unimpeded development*. This may take place (a) first in the object itself, (b) secondly in the mind of the person who *perceives*; i. e. it may be either *subjective* or *objective*. In the first case, it is the *rapid development* of an action or event (*fortuitously*, which attracts our attention and causes surprise; or even, *forthwith*, it is the *unimpeded transition* from the first conception and relation of things to a sudden conjecture or perception and conclusion (*what, why then?*), or towards the very stands *correlative* and determining, which is imparted by the simple statement or representation of the thing to be explained."

refers it (not, I think, with more probability) to ἄϊρειν, *to raise*, with reference to its power of *raising* or *exciting the attention*. So that the particle would primarily mean '*attend!*' '*mark you!*' He observes, however, correctly, that though ἄρα may be used to introduce an *unexpected* or *startling* announcement, yet it may also stand just as well, where the announcement is of the directly opposite character, expressing the *fulfilment of an expectation*.

109. Krüger makes the primary meaning of the particle, that of denoting that the statement is *apparent* or *discernible* in a fact that is placed before us. And there is no doubt, that the force of the particle may generally be given by '*it seems*,' '*it would seem*,' '*we see*,' '*see you*,' and the like. If this were the original meaning, ἄρα (ἄρ, ῥά) might be related to the Hebrew *ra-ah, videre*.

110. In *questions* ἄρα denotes, according to Hartung, the *perplexity* or *embarrassment* of the person who asks the question, or *incredulity*, doubt as to whether the question can be satisfactorily answered, the being prepared to expect a surprising answer, or the like.—But Klotz is, I think, right in saying, that such questions always relate to a *present state of things*, either one that has been described, or one that is (as is often the case in dramatic narration especially) easily understood.

Τίς ἄρα ῥύσεται; τίς ἄρ' ἐπαρκέσει θεῶν ἢ θεᾶν; (*Æsch. Sept.* 91.)

Eur. Rhes. 135: νεῶν κατόπτην μολεῖν πέλας ὅ τι ποτ' ἄρα δαΐοις πυρὰ κατ' ἀντίπρωρα ναυστάθμων δαίεται! ('*from what* incomprehensible *cause!*' H.)

Soph. Œd. Tyr.: τίς σε, τέκνον, τίς σ' ἔτικτε τῶν μακραιώνων ἄρα ('*to our* astonishment, since we deemed you the son of mortal parents.' *H.*): to which Klotz replies: 'Non miratur, qui hoc dicit, sed *ratiocinatione quadam colligit*, videri sibi Œdipum generatum a deo immortali aliquo, et, quod summa vis esset in voce τῶν μακραιώνων, ad hanc vocem adjecit istam particulam.'

111. The formula ἦ που ἄρα; ἦ που—ἄρα; = *num forte igitur?* is not uncommon.

112. The particle may also stand in *dependent* interrogative clauses with pronouns, ὁπότερος, ὁποῖος, πότερος, οἷος &c.

Plutus (on recovering his sight) says: Αἰσχύνομαι δὲ τὰς ἐμαυτοῦ συμφοράς, οἷοις ἄρ' ἀνθρώποις ξυνὼν

ἐλάνθανον = "quum considero quales igitur homines isti fuerint. *Ἆρα* dicit *rebus ita comparatis*, quod visu recuperato, jam agnoverat quales essent." *Kl.* But we shall see that this use of the particle in the *after recognition* of a *past mistake* is very common. '*With what men* (*ἆρα* =), *as I now see, I unwittingly kept company with.*'

Exercise 28.

113. (1) 'Therefore,[a] my father,' said he, 'Cyaxares says that he will supply provisions to all that go from hence, however great the number may be.' 'Are you going then, my son, trusting entirely to this,[b] the wealth (°that is) of Cyaxares?' 'I °am,' said Cyrus. 'How!' said he, 'do you know what the amount of this wealth is?' 'No, by Zeus,' replied Cyrus, 'I do not.'[c] 'And are you,' said he, 'nevertheless, trusting to this, °this unknown °amount? Don't you know, that you will require many things, and that you must now of necessity spend much more?' 'I do know °that,' said Cyrus. 'If then,' he replied, 'the (°means of supplying this) expense should fail him, or he should even[d] be deliberately stating what is false, how then[e] (°tell me) will the affairs of the army stand?' 'Plainly, not well.'

(2) On the one hand,[f] † I produce all that I possess to form our joint stock:[g] and, on the other, you have added to that joint stock (°of ours) all the property you brought me. And we must not consider which of us (°under these circumstances) has contributed the greater numerical amount, but must be thoroughly convinced of this, that whichever of us proves the better partner, that (°is the one who) contributes what is of most value.

[a] *οὐκοῦν.* [b] *τούτοις δή.* [c] *οὐ μὲν δή* (sc. *οἶδα*). [d] *καί.* [e] = *rebus ita comparatis; how* if it should turn out so; if things should come to that pass. [f] *ἔγω τε . . . σύ τε.* [g] 'To produce and put it to the common stock,' *εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποφαίνειν.*

CHAP. 5. § 2. (*ἄρα in inferences; or its conclusive use.*)

114. In *inferences*, ἄρα (= ergo, '*then*') often, but by no means *always*, as Hartung would have it, relates to something *important* and *unexpected*, and is therefore connected with surprise.

Οὕτω κοινόν τι ἄρα χαρᾷ καὶ λύπῃ δάκρυά ἐστιν (*Xen.*). *Τί περὶ ψυχῆς ἐλέγομεν; ὁρατὸν εἶναι ἢ οὐχ ὁρατόν; Οὐχ ὁρατόν. Ἀειδὲς ἄρα. Ναί. Ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ σώματός ἐστι τῷ ἀειδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ* (*Pl.*). *Εἰ εἰσὶ βωμοί, εἰσὶ καὶ θεοί· ἀλλὰ μὴν* (= *atqui*) *εἰσὶ βωμοί, εἰσὶν ἄρα καὶ θεοί* (*Luc.*).

Exercise 29.

115. (1) How is it possible for a man to be more impious (°than the accused), or more of a traitor to his country? ‡In what way can a man more shamefully disgrace his arms than †by not choosing[a] to take up arms (°at all) and repel the enemy? Must not he have deserted his comrade and his post, who did not present himself (°at all) to have a post assigned him? In what case would he have fought in defence of what is holy and sacred, who has shrunk from every danger? To whom would he have left his country greater (°than he found it)?[b] for, as far as he is concerned, it is abandoned and brought into the power of its enemies. And will you not then[c] put this man to death, who is guilty of all these crimes? (°If not,) then whom will you punish? those who have committed some one of °all these °offences? Then will it appear a lighter matter to commit great crimes (°than small ones), if you are seen to exhibit more anger against small crimes (° than in the case of greater ones).

[a] *Say:* 'than if he did not choose.' [b] These clauses allude to the duties of a good citizen, as defined in the laws. [c] εἶτα = '*deinde*,' '*post talia*,' in indignant questions. See Gr. 1358.

CHAP. 5. § 3. (*ἄρα in the recognition of a past mistake.*)

116. *Ἄρα* is often used, like our *then* (or '*then after all*,' '*then it seems*'), in the *after recognition* of a *mistake*. In this way it often stands with an *imperfect* (especially in *ἦν ἄρα, οὐκ ἦν ἄρα*), to denote that now, from knowing better, one is *undeceived* with respect to an opinion hitherto entertained. This use is not, however, confined to the *Imperfect* (see the second Example in the Exercise).

Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ ὤου συγχωρεῖν, ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἦν (*it was true, then, after all,*) *τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὅσῳ περ αἴσχιον τοσούτῳ κάκιον* (*Pl.*).

In this usage, *ὡς ἄρα* (*ὡς* = *quam*) may be construed '*why, how* ——.' *Ὦ παῖδες ὡς ἄρα ἐφλυάρουμεν ὅτε τὰ ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ θηρία ἐθηρῶμεν· ὅμοιον ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εἶναι οἱόνπερ εἴ τις δεδεσμένα ζῶα θηρῴη* (*Xen.*).

Exercise 30.

117. (1) (°As to) gambling and bad company, it becomes evident, after a time, even to those who were deceived (°by these temptations), that, after all, they were only pains baited with pleasure, which, when they ensnare us, prevent us from (°the performance of) useful actions.

(2) Nay, said I, how can I with propriety correct you, a man whose character for goodness and virtue is established, especially when I am one who is reported to be a babbler, and to measure the air; and who, which is the most senseless charge of all, am called a poor man? † And yet I[a] should have been put quite out of heart by this appellation, if I had not seen a great crowd of spectators following a horse belonging to the foreigner Nicias, which I met lately, and heard some of them talking a great deal about him. And what did I do, but go up to the groom, and ask him

'whether the horse had a large fortune.' But he stared at me, as if my question proved that I could not possibly be of a sound mind, and said, 'Why,[b] how should a horse have any fortune?' † Then, indeed,[c] I looked up again, when I heard that even a poor horse may, it seems, be a good one, if it have naturally a good † spirit and temper.[d] Do you therefore give me a detailed account of your employments, being persuaded that even I am not disqualified from becoming a good man.

[a] καὶ πάνυ μεντἂν (= μέντοι ἂν) ἦν. [b] πῶς δέ. [c] οὕτω δή. [d] ψυχή.

Chap. 5. § 4. εἰ (ἐὰν) ἄρα.

118. The *inference* implied by ἄρα is sometimes weakened down into a *probable* or *merely possible conjecture;* so that ἄρα = *forte;* εἰ ἄρα,[1] ἐὰν ἄρα = '*if haply*,' '*if perchance*;' *si forte* (εἰ ἄρα also = *num forte*); εἰ (ἐὰν) μὴ ἄρα, *nisi forte* (ironically).

Ὁ νομοθέτης διδάσκει τιμᾶν τὸ γῆρας, εἰς ὃ πάντες ἀφιξόμεθα, ἐὰν ἄρα διαγιγνώμεθα (*Æschin.*). Πῶς ἂν οὖν τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ διαφθείροι τοὺς νέους; εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια διαφθορά ἐστιν (*Xen.*).

Exercise 31.

119. (1) I am obliged to call as witnesses neither my own friends, nor my opponents' enemies, nor persons who are not acquainted with either them or me, but friends of their own. And if perchance they should persuade even these to withhold their testimony (as I think they will not; at all events, not all of them), yet this they will never be able (to accomplish), to do away with the truth, and the character which Timar-

[1] In reason εἰ ἄρα may, of course, = *if then.*

chus bears in the city; °one which I have not procured for him, but he (°has gained it) for himself. For the life of a well-conducted man should be too pure for any charge of criminality to adhere to it.[a]

(2) This law, O judges, is a general one for us all; that if a man has no legitimate male children, he may dispose of his property (°as he pleases), unless it be that, when he makes the disposition, he is either insane, or his faculties are impaired by old age, or some other (°infirmity specified) in the law. Now that Philoctēmōn was not affected by any of these infirmities, I will prove to you in a few words.

(3) If then the Thebans should be conquered, as they ought to be, the Lacedæmonians will not be too powerful, since they will have opponents in these Arcadians, who dwell upon their borders; but if the Thebans should by chance recover (°their strength), and save themselves, yet at least they will be °all the weaker, if these men have been taken into alliance and saved by us. So that, upon every view of the case, it is expedient that we should not abandon the Arcadians, nor let them think, if perchance they should be preserved, that their escape is due to their own exertions or to any °nation but ourselves.

(4) Already, in consequence of the trickery of Demosthenes, you are admitting a shameful abuse into (°the practice of) our courts. ‡The prescribed rules of procedure[b] are confounded and perverted;[c] for it is the accuser who defends himself; the person impeached †acts the part of accuser;[d] and the jury at one time forget the points about which they are sitting as judges, and at another are compelled to give their votes upon questions that do not belong to their jurisdiction. And the defendant, if by any chance he should touch upon the °real question at all, declares, not that the decree he proposed was a constitutional one, but that some other person who had formerly proposed a similar decree, had already been acquitted:

(ᵉa line of defence) on which I am told that Ctēsiphōn relies with the greatest confidence.

[a] *Say:* 'so pure as not to admit of (ἐπιδέχεσθαι) the belief of a criminal charge (αἰτία πονηρά).' [b] τὰ τῆς πόλεως δίκαια, i. e. 'the just requirements of the state,' or 'the rules which the state has established, as being in her opinion just.' [c] 'To confound and pervert,' μεταφέρειν. [d] *Say:* 'accuses.'

Chap. 5. § 5. (ὡς ἄρα.)

120. (*a*) Ὡς ἄρα = *how that, that* with reference to a *state of things*, either then existing or about to be explained: (*b*) the ἄρα sometimes appears to have an ironical force; *that forsooth.*

[On ὡς ἄρα when ὡς = *quam*, cf. 116.]

ᵛΟτι ἄρα is less common.

a) Καὶ πρόκα τε δὴ κατ' ὁδὸν πυνθάνομαι τὸν πάντα λόγον θεράποντος, ὃς ἐμὲ . . . ἐνεχείρισε τὸ βρέφος, ὡς ἄρα Μανδάνης τε εἴη παῖς . . . καὶ Καμβύσεω (*Hdt.*).

b) Ἀκούω τινὰ διαβάλλειν . . ἐμέ, ὡς ἐγὼ ἄρα ἐξαπατήσας ὑμᾶς μέλλω ἄγειν εἰς Φᾶσιν (*Xen.*).

Exercise 32.

121. (1) But nevertheless, O judges, Demosthenes is so ready with his falsehoods and reckless assertions; so indifferent to shame, to conviction, to curses, that he will dare, I am told, even to affirm of me, that forsooth I too was formerly condemned by the Council; and that I am now, so he says, guilty of the most inconceivable inconsistency, because, whereas I formerly had to defend my own cause against the decision of the Council, I now appear as the adviser of the Council, assisting it in the prosecution of this defendant, with respect to the ᵒvery decision that was ᵒthen made,—in which he gets up a fictitious transaction,

one that never really took place at all, and[a] has the face to assert a falsehood in your presence.

(2) I, O soldiers, offer, as you see, what sacrifices I can, both for your interests and my own, that I may both say, and plan, and do what will be most for your credit and advantage, as well as for mine. And °even now I was consulting the gods by sacrifice, whether it would be more expedient to introduce this subject, and treat with you about it, or to have nothing at all to do with it. But Silanus the soothsayer, being aware (*e*) that I too, from being constantly present at the sacrifices, am not °wholly unacquainted (°with their nature), assured me indeed, which is the point of most importance, that the victims were favorable; but informed me (°at the same time), that they indicated some fraud and treachery (°about to be practised) against me,—as knowing, forsooth, that he was himself treacherously intending to accuse me before you.

[a] ἀλλὰ . . . τολμῶν. The ἀλλά is occasioned by the preceding οὐ γεγενημένον, though the construction is different; the two participles being in agreement with different words and in different cases.

Chap. 5. § 6. (ἀλλ' ἄρα.)

122. Ἀλλ' ἄρα, often (Klotz says more often than not) with a word or words interposed, exactly correspond to our '*but then*,' in objections, which are often (not necessarily) of an *unexpected* kind, but are always founded on a statement previously made as a state of things described or assumed, and the like.

123. The objection is often conveyed in the form of a question, which is *founded upon what has occurred*, the *state of things before the speaker*, &c. It often insinuates an objection, with something of irony.

Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη. ὦ Θεοδότη, ἔστι σοι ἀγρός;—Οὐκ ἔμοιγ', ἔφη.—Ἀλλ' ἄρα οἰκία προσόδους ἔχουσα; = *but then* [if not any land, as you say], *a house?* (Xen.).

(For ἆρα; (*num?*) see Part I. 312.)

Exercise 33.

124. (1) But absolute monarchs are not much given to attend at public exhibitions. For, as it is not safe for them to go, where they would not be superior in power to the assembled spectators, so the affairs of their kingdoms are not so firmly established, that they can intrust them to others and go abroad; for so they would be in danger of being at once deprived of their kingdoms, and of the power of avenging themselves on those who had injured them. But you may perhaps say: 'Well, but then[a] spectacles of this kind come to them, even when they stay at home.' 'Nay, by Zeus, O Simonides, but few out of many (°are thus brought to them); and these, such as they are, are sold so dear to monarchs, that the exhibitors of the most trifling spectacle expect, when they leave the presence of a king, to carry off more money, than they gain from all the rest of the world in their whole lives.'

(2) 'Do not warlike contests appear to require art?' 'Most assuredly,' said he. 'Ought we then to bestow more care upon the art of making shoes, than upon that of making war?' 'By no means.' 'But then we forbade the shoemaker to think of being at the same time either a husbandman, or a weaver, or a builder, †in order that the work of shoemaking might be well done; and in like manner we assigned to each of the other tradesmen one single business,—that for which each was naturally fitted, and which he would be likely to execute well, because he would abstain (*p*) from all other employments, and practise that one all his life without neglecting the proper seasons.'

[a] 'A sudden, unexpected objection' (*Hartung*). But Klotz explains it: '*sed rebus ita comparatis*, nempe ut non possint tyranni proficisci ad res spectandas, *adferuntur illis talia et domi manentibus*.'

Chap. 6. § 1. *Ἀτάρ.*

125. *α*) *Ἀτάρ* [= *αὖτε ἄρα*] retains the *emphatic* power of *ἄρα*, and thus gives *additional weight* to the word or notion introduced by it. *Οὐδ' οἰκέτας χρὴ κολάζειν ὀργῇ· ἀτὰρ ἀντιπάλοις τὸ μετ' ὀργῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ γνώμῃ προσφέρεσθαι ὅλον ἁμάρτημα* (*Xen.*).

126. *b*) In Attic Greek, *ἀτάρ* occurs principally when the speaker *suddenly breaks off* the discourse, and passes on to something else. *Ὁ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτε ἰατρός ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἐὰν ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων αἱρεθῇ. Ἀτάρ, ἔφη . . . λέξον ἡμῖν, πόθεν ἤρξατό σε διδάσκειν τὴν στρατηγίαν.*

127. *c*) Hence *ἀτάρ* is very common in questions, when any thing is suddenly opposed to something before said.

Οὔκουν δικαίως ἥτις οὐ στρατεύεται;
Ἀτὰρ τί ταῦθ', ἃ πάντες ἴσμεν, μανθάνω;
(*Ar. Nub.* 688.)

Exercise 34.

128. (1) It is easier to climb a steep ascent, when there is no fighting, than to march upon level ground, when the enemy are posted on both sides of us; and, when a man has not to fight, he can see what is before him better at night, than he can in the day-time whilst he is fighting; and a rough road is easier to the feet of men who are not fighting, than a smooth one to men at whose heads an enemy is hurling (*pass.*) his missiles. Nor does it seem to me impossible to steal (°such a march), since we can both choose the night for it, that we may not be seen; and take so large a circuit, that no sound will reach the enemy. I am also of opinion, that if we make a false attack † near where we now are, we shall find the rest of the mountain the more unguarded; for, in consequence of this, they will °be more (°likely to) keep their forces collected here. But

how is it that I am bringing forward (° this question) about stealing? for I hear that amongst you Lacedæmonians, Cheirisŏphus, †all who are of the highest rank[a] practise stealing from your very childhood; and that it is no disgrace, but a credit, to steal whatever the law does not forbid. And, to the end you may learn to steal with the greatest dexterity and secrecy imaginable, why[b] your very laws order that you should be publicly flogged, if you are caught stealing. Now then is your time to give proof of your education, and to take good care[c] that we are not caught stealing some of the mountain, for fear we should be well trimmed[d] (for our pains).

(2) That Zeus is a sophist, and that this art is a very honorable one, Homer shows in various passages, but especially in this (° before us). He says that Minos converses with Zeus every ninth year, and goes to be instructed[e] (*ρ*) by Zeus as if he were (*ρ*) a sophist.

(3) 'You do not, I take it, desire the excellence by which men become statesmen and qualified to govern?' 'I do indeed exceedingly wish for that excellence.' 'By Zeus, you desire an excellence of the noblest kind, and a very great art: for it is the qualification of kings, and is called royal. But have you considered whether it is possible for one who is not just † to be skilled in these matters?'[f]

[a] *Say:* 'as many of you as are (° of the) *ὁμότιμοι*:' the term for those who in oligarchical and highly aristocratical constitutions were admissible to the highest offices. Our term *peers* (= *pares*) had a similar meaning.

[b] The sort of *ironical* force given by the *why* and *very* is to be expressed by *ἄρα*. [c] *καὶ—μέντοι.* These particles, with an intermediate word, are *emphatic*. [d] *πολλὰς πληγὰς λαβεῖν*, with reference to the *actual* flogging at Sparta. [e] *παιδευσόμενος*, a partep. mid. with a passive meaning. [f] *ἀγαθὸν ταῦτα γενέσθαι.*

Chap. 7. § 1. *Αὖ.*

129. *a*) The original meaning of *αὖ* is *retro*, *retroversus* (*back*, *backwards*), as in *αὖ ἐρύω*, *retro trahere* (Hom.).

130. *b*) Its more usual meaning is, *rursus* (*again*), and sometimes *iterum*, not only in the repetition of the same thing, but also in the mention of a *new* action commencing after the completion of one with which it is connected ('as *rursus* is sometimes used,' *Kl.*) = *jam* (Ellendt).

Τί ποτ' αὖ μοι τὸ κατ' ἦμαρ ἔσται; (*Soph.*). *Ἐπεὶ δὲ τάχιστα διέβη τὰ ὅρια, ἐκεῖ αὖ καὶ Γῆν ἱλάσκετο χοαῖς, καὶ κτλ.* (*Xen.*).

131. *c*) A very common meaning is *vicissim*, *ab alterâ parte* (*on the other hand*), with reference to the similarity, not so much of an *action*, as of a *person* or *thing*.

Ταῦτα μὲν παρ' ἐμοῦ λέξει· τοῖς δὲ παρ' ὑμῶν ὑμεῖς αὖ ἐπιστέλλετε ὅ τι ὑμῖν σύμφορον δοκοίη εἶναι (*Xen.*). *Καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ γῆν πόλεμος οὕτως ἐπολεμεῖτο· ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπράττετο, τὰ κατὰ θάλατταν αὖ . . . διηγήσομαι* (*Xen.*).

So *rursum* (*rursus*): e. g. *aliâque ratione malevolus, aliâ amator, aliâ r u r s u s* (= again) *anxius, aliâ timidus corrigendus* (Cic.). *Kl.*

132. *d*) Hence arises the meaning *contra*, implying *opposition* between what follows and what precedes; the opposition being *not* in the particle *αὖ*, but in the *notions* brought together by *αὖ*.

Ὥστε πᾶσα κεντουμένη κύκλῳ ἡ ψυχὴ οἰστρᾷ καὶ ὀδυνᾶται· μνήμην δ' αὖ ἔχουσα τοῦ καλοῦ γέγηθεν (*Pl.*).

The most common combinations are *δ' αὖ* and *καὶ αὖ*: the latter frequently in immediate combination in Plato; but *usually* (in Thucyd. and Xen. *always*) with the opposed notion *between* the particles (*Kr.*).

Exercise 35.

133. (1) The whole of this sum he left in the house.

He left also seventy minas which were lent to Xūthus on a maritime adventure; twenty-four minas in Pasion's bank, six in that of Pylades, and sixteen in the hands of Dēmŏmĕlēs, the son of Dēmōn; besides friendly loans, to the amount of a talent, lent to different persons in sums of two and three minas. These last-mentioned sums amount to more than eight talents and thirty minas, which, together with those first mentioned, you will find amount to fourteen talents.

(2) The Medes and Hyrcanians spoke to this effect: 'And how can we,' said they, 'distribute these things without you and your people?' Cyrus, in return, made this answer: '† Is this then, my friends,' said he, 'your opinion,[a] that whatever is to be done, we must all of us upon every occasion attend? and shall not I be thought sufficient by you to transact any thing for you that may be necessary, nor you sufficient to transact any thing for us? By what other means can we possibly create ourselves more trouble, and do less business than by acting thus? But look,' said he, '‡ we have kept these things for you; and you have reposed a confidence in us that they have been well (° and faithfully) guarded. Do you, on the other hand, distribute these things, and we will repose a confidence in you, that they have been properly distributed. And, again, we on our side will endeavor to accomplish another public service.'

(3) Do not look upon it as a disadvantage, that the Barbarians belonging to Cyrus, who before fought on your side, have now forsaken you; for these are even worse soldiers, than those we have already overcome. At all events, they ran away from us and fled to our foes; and it is far better that those who are the first to fly, should be found in the enemy's ranks rather than in our own. If, again, any of you are disheartened, because we have no horse, in which the enemy abound, let them consider that ten thousand horsemen are no more than ten thousand men; for no one was ever

killed in an action by the bite or kick of a horse. It is the men who do every thing that is done in battle.

[a] Is this then your opinion? ἦ γὰρ οὕτως γιγνώσκετε, ὅτι . . . ;

Exercise 36.

134. 'If,' said Socrates, 'this path of life, as it leads neither through government nor slavery, so also did not lead through human society at all, there would perhaps be some meaning in what you say. If, however, you remain (*μ*) amongst your fellow-men, and, proposing neither to govern nor to be governed, you also refuse voluntarily to pay court to those who rule (° in the state), you perceive, I take it, how °well the stronger, both in public and private life, understand how to make the weaker sit down in tears, and to turn them into their slaves. Or do you °really not observe the men, who, whilst others are sowing and planting, both reap the corn, and cut down the timber, and beset those who being weaker will not pay them court, until they have brought them to choose rather to become the slaves of the more powerful, than to wage °perpetual war against them? And, again, in private life, are you not aware that the bold and strong enslave and make a gain of the cowardly and the weak?'—'Nay,' said he, 'but I, that I may escape from treatment of this kind, do not even † confine myself by any trammels of citizenship,[a] but am every where a foreigner.'

[a] *Say:* 'do not shut myself up in (= into) any citizenship,' κατακλείειν ἑαυτὸν εἰς πολιτείαν.

Chap. 7. § 2. *αὖ* (*πάλιν αὖ*).

135. *Αὖ* is also joined in various ways with the nearly synonymous particles *πάλιν* and *αὖθις*: e. g. *πάλιν αὖ* (less commonly *αὖ πάλιν*): also *αὖθις αὖ*, *αὖ-*

ϑις πάλιν, πάλιν αὖϑις, αὖ πάλιν αὖϑις, and even αὖϑις αὖ πάλιν (Pflugk ad Heracl. 488), combining *renewal*, *opposition*, and *return*.

136. *a*) Si conjunguntur hæ tres particulæ, videtur αὖϑις eam rem, a quâ proficiscentes repetitionem statuimus, efferre; αὖ contra repetitionem indicare; πάλιν autem, quod ipsum quoque ab *loci* significatione profectum est, id potissimum sibi velle, ut ad eam, in quâ jam fuerimus, rerum conditionem revocetur auditor (*Kl.*).

b) Contra si conjunguntur particulæ πάλιν αὖ (pro quo interdum dicitur etiam αὖ πάλιν) priore particulâ id potissimum, quod ante fuit, quoque id, quod nunc fit, referendum est, indicatur; posteriore autem particulâ omnino repetitio ejusdem rei aut similis certe significatur (*Id.*).

(πάλιν αὖ, *Xen. Hell.* 5, 1. αὖϑις αὖ, *Dem. Fals. Leg.* 346. αὖϑις αὖ πάλιν, *Soph. Œd. Col.* 1420. αὖ πάλιν αὖϑις, *Aristoph. Nub.* 975).

Exercise 37.

137. (1) I would therefore return to the measures I recommended immediately after this. ‡ When I saw (cf. 149), O Athenians, your navy falling to decay, when I saw the richer citizens purchasing a virtual exemption from public taxes at the expense of a small contribution, and the middle and lower classes losing all their property, and still more the state always losing the right season of action in consequence of these abuses, I proposed a law which compelled the rich to do their duty, relieved the poor from oppression, and, what was of most consequence, enabled the state to be prepared with her armaments and warlike preparations in time.

(2) When our unexpected preservation enabled him to return again to the city, at first indeed the fellow was timid and dejected, and, rising in the assembly, half dead (° with fear), desired you to appoint him a commissioner for the preservation of the peace. But when Philip was dead, and Alexander had succeeded to the throne, then once again beginning to practise his impostures, he erected altars to Pausanias, he loaded the Senate with the odium of offering sacrifices of thanksgiving for the good news, affixed upon Alexander the nickname of Margītēs, and dared to as-

sert that he would never stir from Macedonia, but would be contented to walk about in Pella, and observe the entrails of the victims.

Chap. 8. *Αὖθις.*

138. *a*) *Αὖθις* nearly resembles the particle *αὖ* from which it is derived, but has a more definite *demonstrative* force.

b) '*Αὖθις* a particulâ *αὖ* ita differre videtur, ut magis nos jubeat respicere ad eam rem unde omnis repetitionis significatio profecta est' (*Klotz*).

139. Like *αὖ*, it is used to denote the repetition of the same or a similar action; it points out however the connection of the two (the original and repeated action) more strongly than that particle.

140. Hence *αὖθις* is more common than *αὖ*, in connection with other adverbs of time (*πρόσθεν*, *πρῶτον* &c.).

Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται σωφρονήσαντα πρόσθεν αὖθις μὴ σωφρονεῖν; (*Xen. Mem.* 1, 2, 23.)

141. *Αὖθις* is also used, like our *again*, in the sense of *ever afterwards*, *ever hereafter*, in *negative* sentences, *questions*, &c.—*μηδὲ νῦν μηδ' αὖθίς ποτε γενήσεσθαι* (*Pl.*) Legg. 4, 711 c. So *ὁ αὖθις χρόνος* (*Pl.*).

It is doubtful whether the Attic form is properly *αὖθις* or *αὖτις*. Cf. Ellendt. Lex. Soph. Dindorf. ad Aristoph. Aves. 1326 (*Kl.*).

Exercise 38.

142. (1) To those who alleged this, Clearchus replied,—'I consider all these things, as well as the other bearings of the case; but I reflect that, if we now depart, we shall be looked upon as departing †with hostile intentions,[a] and as acting contrary to the terms of the truce. †And then,[b] in the first place, no one will

provide a market for us, nor (ᵉassign us any place) where we may supply ourselves with corn: and, again, we shall have nobody to guide us: and, whilst we are employed in these matters, Ariaeus will desert us: so that we shall have no friend left, but ᵉrather even those who were so before will ᵉthen be our enemies. And whether there is by chance any other river that we can cross I cannot say, †but, at all events,ᶜ we know that it is impossible to pass the Euphrates if an enemy tries to prevent it.

(2) When they arrived at a strong place, which had neither city nor houses (ᵉupon it), but where[d] great numbers of men and women, with their cattle, were assembled, Cheirisophus ordered it to be attacked the moment he came before it, and when the first company suffered, another went up, and another: for the place being surrounded by a river, they could not attack it on every side with all their forces at once. When Xenophon came up with the rear guard, the targeteers and heavy-armed men, Cheirisophus said to him, 'You come very seasonably, for this place must be taken; for, unless we take it, the army will obtain no provisions.'[e]

[a] ἐπὶ πολέμῳ = 'on condition of war: for war.' [b] ἔπειτα.
[c] — δ' οὖν. [d] *Say:* 'there,' αὐτόσε. Cf. Gramm. 1258, *a*.
[e] *Say:* 'unless we shall take the place, there are no provisions for the army;' this use of the present to describe the consequence as an *objective* fact actually occurring, gives great spirit to a narration. Cf. Gramm. 1295.

Chap. 9. *Αὐτίκα.*

143. *Αὐτίκα* (from αὐτός: cf. ἡνίκα, τηνίκα, &c.) = *eo ipso tempore, illico, statim*, to denote (1) the *immediately* present moment [strengthened in αὐτίκα νῦν, μάλ' αὐτίκα in Hom.: αὐτίκα μάλα in prose: τὸ αὐτίκα opp. τὸ μέλλον. *Th.*]—(2) The *immediately commencing future* (*mox*; opp. νῦν), νῦν μὲν οὖν, . . . τὴν εὐδαίμονα πλάττο-

μεν κτλ. . . . αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν σκεψόμεθα (*Pl.: nunc . . .* felicem fingimus . . . *mox* contrariam considerabimus).

144. (3) With participles it is used to denote the *immediate coincidence* of another action or event with that denoted by the participle. *Διόνῦσον . . . αὐτίκα γενόμενον ἐς τὸν μηρὸν ἐνερράψατο Ζεύς. the moment he was born* (*Hdt.*). [Cf. *ἅμα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, at the moment of our birth.* Pl. *ἅμα ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἀνέστη. τῷ δέξιῳ κέρᾳ εὐθὺς ἀποβεβηκότι ἐπέκειντο, the moment* (*as soon as ever*) *it had landed.*]—(4) *Αὐτίκα . . . καί* are joined (like *ἅμα . . . καί*: 1447, *b*) in the sense of *simulac* (*as soon as . . .*; or *no sooner . . . than: ἀλλ' αὐτίκα ἡ δίκη ἐξετέτιστο κτλ. . . . καὶ ἄγγελος ἦλθέ μοι* (*Dem.: simulac . . . nuntius venit*, &c.). So in Hdt. *αὐτίκα τε . . . καί.* (I have not found another instance of this construction.)

145. (5) *Αὐτίκα* is used (=*for instance*) in arguments, &c., when the *first instance that presents itself* is urged; e. g. *νὴ τὸν οὐρανόν, αὐτίκα γὰρ ἄρχει διὰ τίν' ὁ Ζεὺς τῶν θεῶν*; (*Aristoph.*) So: *ὥσπερ τὸν Οἰδίπουν αὐτίκα φασὶν εὔξασθαι* (=*as Œdipus, to take the first instance that occurs to me*, &c.). In such passages *αὐτίκα* is sometimes introduced by *γάρ, γέ τοι, δή*, and the like (*Kl.*).

Compare the Latin *vel;* e. g. *cujus sunt innumerabilia exempla*, vel *Appi majoris illius, qui* &c. (*Cic.*)

Exercise 39.

146. (1) Brasidas had just taken Amphipolis, and was within a night of taking Eïon; for if the ships had not quickly come to its aid, in the morning it would have been in his hands. After this Thucydides arranged matters in Eïon, so that it might be safe, both for the present time, if Brasidas should attack it, and in future, receiving those who had chosen to come there from the country according to the terms of the treaty.

(2) As all other arts when neglected sink in their worth; and, †as in the case of our bodies when in good condition, if we abandon them to a course of laziness and inactivity, they become unhealthy; so a discreet temper of mind, temperance, and the command of our passions and courage, when a man remits the prac-

tice of them, from thenceforward turn again into vice. We ought not therefore to be remiss, nor throw ourselves immediately on every present pleasure; for I think it a great thing to acquire a dominion, and yet a greater to preserve it when acquired. For to acquire often befalls a man who contributes nothing towards it but boldness in the attempt; but to preserve an acquisition that one has made, this cannot be done without discretion, nor without the command of one's passions, nor without much care.

(3) 'But my opinion is,' said he, 'that a governor ought to differ from the governed, not by a life of ease, but by care and circumspection, and by his readiness to undergo toil and labor.' 'But, my son,' said he, 'there are some matters wherein you are to contend not with men, but with circumstances;[a] and it is no easy matter †to come off triumphantly in a contest with these.[b] For instance, you know that if the army have not necessaries, your command is immediately dissolved, and falls to pieces.'

[a] αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα. [b] τούτων εὐπόρως περιγενέσθαι.

Chap. 10. *Γάρ.* § 1. (*γάρ at the commencement of narratives*, &c.)

147. *Γάρ* (= *γὲ ἄρα*) properly denotes an *explanatory affirmation;* the predominating notion being sometimes the *explanation*, sometimes the *affirmation.*

148. As *explanatory* it is used especially after *demonstratives*, and such sentences as *σημεῖον* (*τεκμήριον, μαρτύριον, δῆλον*) *δέ* [sc. *ἐστί*]· *δείκνυμι δέ, σκέψασθε δέ*, and the like. Also not uncommonly after such formulæ with the *superlative*, as: *ὃ δὲ μέγιστον* (*δεινότατον* &c.): *τὸ δὲ μέγιστον.*

After expressions of this kind, we seldom use a conjunction in English.

Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ χρηστῆς δόξης μᾶλλον ἐσπούδαζον ἢ περὶ χρημάτων. τεκμήριον δέ· χρήματα γὰρ πλεῖστα ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας ἀνήλωσαν (*Dem.*). *Οὐδὲν ἐπίστευον ἐκεῖνοι· σημεῖον δέ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δεῦρ' ἦκον ὡς ἡμᾶς* (*Dem.*). *Τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου· γονῆς γὰρ Ἔρωτος οὗτ' εἰσὶν, οὔτε . . . κτλ.* (*Pl.*). *Ἐβούλοντο τοὺς ἀμείνους τὰ ἄξια ἔχειν, τεκμήριον δὲ ὡς οὐ πολεμίως ἔπρασσον. οὐ γὰρ ἠδίκησαν οὐδένα* (*Th.*). *Κεφάλαιον τοῦ καλῶς ἀλλήλοις ὁμιλεῖν· αἱ γὰρ κτήσεις ἀσφαλεῖς ἦσαν* (*Isocr.*). *Αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ εἰρήνη τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων ὑψηλὸν ἦρεν* (*And.*). *Τὸ ἐχόμενον· στρατόπεδον γὰρ ἔτη δέκα κατέσχεν* (*Isocr.*).

149. It should also be observed, that when a speaker has stated what he is going to prove, or, generally, in the beginning of any *narrative* for which the hearers have been prepared, the statement or narrative is usually introduced by *γάρ*.

Thus Demosthenes, in his famous description of the consternation that prevailed at Athens, when the news arrived that Philip had occupied Elatea:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν, τὸν τότε συμβάντα ἐν τῇ πόλει θόρυβον ἴστε μὲν ἅπαντες, μικρὰ δ' ἀκούσατε ὅμως αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα.

Ἑσπέρα μὲν γὰρ ἦν, ἦκε δ' ἀγγέλλων τις ὡς τοὺς πρυτάνεις ὡς Ἐλάτεια κατείληπται (*It was evening*, &c.). De Cor. 284.

Exercise 40.

150. (1) When the Persians made a descent upon Attica, our forefathers did not wait for their allies, but, taking the general war upon themselves alone, they marched to encounter the army that looked down with scorn upon the whole of Greece, with none but their own national troops, a few against many myriads, as cheerfully as if they were only going to hazard the lives of others in the contest; and the Lacedæmonians no sooner received intelligence of the invasion of Attica, than they laid aside all other care, and came to

our assistance with as much haste and zeal as if it had been their own country that the enemy were ravaging. And this is a token of the dispatch and emulation (°of both nations): it is said that our forefathers, on the very day that they heard of the descent of the Persians, marched to the frontiers, gained a victory over the enemy, and raised a trophy; and that the Lacedæmonians, marching with their whole army,[a] accomplished twelve hundred stadia in three days and as many nights!

(2) I must also, it seems, defend not only myself but Lycinus, (°and show) that neither have they any grounds for accusing him. I assert then that his position, with respect to the murdered man, was the very same as mine; for there was no quarter from which he would have received money, if he murdered him, nor was there any danger whatever that he would have escaped by his death. And here is a convincing proof that he did not desire his destruction: when he had the means of bringing him to trial for his life, and destroying him by the instrumentality of your own laws, if he had felt bound to accomplish his destruction, thus both effecting his own purpose and laying the state under an obligation to himself, if he had proved him guilty, he did not choose to do so; nay, he did not even[b] stir in the matter at all.

[a] στρατοπέδῳ πορεύεσθαι. [b] ἀλλ' οὐδέ.

Exercise 41.

151. (1) Their shameless audacity and sordid avarice will be more clearly perceived by you, when you have heard the whole case, which I shall begin to relate from that part, whence you will soonest and most easily learn the state of our controversy. ‡ Dinias, our father's brother, was our guardian, he being our uncle, and we orphans; at which time, judges, a violent enmity subsisted between him and Cleonymus.

(2) I am sensible, then, that we shall have much more trouble, if you return by sea; for in that case we shall be obliged to supply you with ships;[a] whereas, if you go by land, you will have to fight (not we). Still, however, I must tell what I know; for I am well acquainted both with the country of the Paphlagonians and with their strength. ‡Their country contains both many very fair plains, and mountains of a great height. And, first of all,[b] I know the place where you must, of necessity, enter it; for there is but one pass, and that lies between two mountain-peaks, hanging over each side of the road, exceeding high. These a very few men, posted there, may defend; and, if the enemy are once masters of this pass, all the men in the world cannot force their way. These peaks I can even point out to any one you think proper to send along with me. On the other side of this pass, I know that there are plains, and upon them a body of horse, which the Barbarians themselves think exceeds all the cavalry the king is master of.

[a] *Say:* 'the ships;' i. e. *the* ships that *you will require.*
[b] εὐθύς; i. e. to begin with the first point.

Chap. 10. § 2. (*γάρ anticipative.*)

152. 'Sæpe in ratione reddendâ invertunt Græci ordinem sententiarum, causam præmittentes: quo genere loquendi sæpissime usus est Herodotus.' (*H.*) *Φέρε δή, ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φὴς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι, ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὖσα;* (*Pl.*) *Νῦν δέ, σφόδρα γὰρ καὶ περὶ μεγίστων ψευδόμενος δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, διὰ ταῦτά σε ἐγὼ ψέγω* (*Pl.*).

The *following* sentence is then often introduced by *οὖν*: *Ὁ Πρόξενος, ἔτυχε γὰρ ὕστερος προσιὼν . . . εὐθὺς οὖν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀμφοτέρων ἄγων ἔθετο τὰ ὅπλα* (*Xen.*).

Exercise 42.

153. (1) Whilst Sciōnē was invested, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian generals, and concluded an arrangement with the Athenians, from the hatred he entertained against Brasidas, in consequence of the retreat from Lyncus. And as Isagoras the Lacedæmonian happened to be then on the point of taking an army by land to join Brasidas, Perdiccas, partly because Nicias advised him, now that he had come to terms with the Athenians, to give them some conspicuous proof of his steady adherence to their cause, and partly also because he was himself anxious that the Lacedæmonians should never enter his territories again, won over to his views his friends in Thessaly (for he was always intimate with the principal men), and stopped the army and its equipments, so that they did not even try the mind of the Thessalians on the subject.

(2) I called Damnippus (to me), and spoke to him thus: 'You are a friend of mine, and I have been brought to your house: I have committed no crime, but am destroyed for the sake of my money. Do you then, seeing me treated in this way, zealously apply all your power to effect my preservation.' He promised to do so; but thought it best to mention the matter to Theognis, who he believed would do any thing whatever, if a man were to offer him money. Now I was acquainted with the house, and knew that it had two doors; whilst then he was conversing with Theognis, it occurred to me that it would be my best plan to attempt my escape in this way.

Chap. 10. § 3. (*γάρ in questions.*)

154. 'In omni interrogatione locus est particulæ *γάρ*, quia intelligitur semper *nescio* vel *dic mihi*, vel

simile quid. Unde et Latini *quisnam* vel *nam quis* dicunt' (*Hermann*). Reisig and Krüger make its interrogative use elliptical, referring to a preceding declaration, so that ὄλωλε *γάρ*; = ὄλωλεν; οὕτω *γάρ* λέγεις. (See Reisig En. ad Œd. Col. 1575.)

Ὁ νεανίσκος ἀναγελάσας εἶπεν· οἴει *γάρ*, ἔφη, ὦ Κῦρε, ἱκανὸν εἶναι κάλλος ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζειν τὸν μὴ βουλόμενον πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον; (*Xen.*)

155. Hartung says, that, if we except the case where the question is also a *reply*, the use of *γάρ* in questions carries with it an expression of *surprise*. Though this is not *always* the case, yet it often is. Such a question may be prefaced by *why? what?* in English.

Exercise 43.

156. (1) We remember when you, writhing and twisting your body round the Bema, used to say, as if you were engaged in a personal contest with Alexander, 'I confess that I prevailed on the Lacedæmonians to revolt, that I brought over the Thessalians and Perrhæbeans.' What! could you then induce a single village to revolt? Would you go near, I do not say a city, but even a single house where there is any danger? But if money is dispensed any where, then indeed you will beset it closely, but you will never do any action worthy of a man.

(2) I will also relate an anecdote that was told me about him by Hermogĕnēs the son of Hipponīcus. He said, that after Melētus had brought in his bill of indictment against Socrates, when he heard him converse on any subject rather than the approaching trial, he told him that he ought to be considering what defence he should make; and that Socrates at first replied, 'How? don't you think that I have spent all my life in preparing it?' and that, upon his asking him, how? he replied, that he had never ceased to inquire into the nature of justice and injustice, both doing what was just, and refraining from what was

unjust, (°a conduct) which he thought was the best method of preparing for his defence.

Chap. 10. § 4. (*Τί γάρ;*)

157. *Τί γάρ;* is used in various ways:

a) Sometimes (like *quid?*) it is used as a formula of *transition* to a new question.

Thus in Xen. Mem. iii. 10, the answer to one question being *ποιοῦμεν γάρ, ἔφη, οὕτως,* Socrates puts another thus: *Τί γάρ; ἔφη, τὸ πιθανώτατόν τε . . . ἀπομιμεῖσθε . . .; κτλ.*

b) Sometimes it has the force of *quid enim? quidni enim?* in reply to a preceding question or assertion; it is then a form of *assenting*, where we may understand *ἄλλο* (*S.*): so that the full force is '[*yes*]: *for what* [*else is it, if not as you say*]?' It may be construed by '*why not?*' '*certainly,*' '*undoubtedly*' (or, if the assertion or question was *negative*), '*certainly not.*'

Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν τὸ γράφειν λόγους.—Τί γάρ; (Pl.)

c) Sometimes it introduces a question expressing *emotion* (*quid ergo?*) Soph. Œd. Col. 539. 547:

Tyndareus. *Μενέλαε, προσφθέγγει νιν ἀνόσιον κάρα;*
Menel. *Τί γάρ; φίλος μοι πατρὸς ἐστιν ἔκγονος.*

Exercise 44.

158. (1) 'Tell me, Critobūlus,' said he, 'if we were in want of a good friend, by what test should we endeavor to try him? Ought we not first to look out for one who is master of his stomach, and (°has conquered) the love of drinking, gluttony, sleep, and laziness? for he who is the slave of these things will never be able to do what he ought either for himself or for his friend?' 'No, by Zeus, he will not,' replied he.

'We must then have nothing to do with one who is the slave of these propensities?' 'Certainly not,' said he. 'How,' said he, 'if a man is of expensive habits, and so, being unable to supply his own wants, is always requiring some of his neighbor's property, and who, when he receives any money, can never repay it, and when he is refused, hates him who refuses (to help him), don't you consider that a man of this character is a troublesome friend?' 'Decidedly,' says he. 'Must not we then keep aloof from him?' 'Certainly,' he replied, 'we must keep aloof from him.'

(2) 'How, again, if a man, though able to earn money, yet is greedy of it, and so is a hard man to deal with, delighting (*ἐ*) to receive, but not liking to repay?' 'In my opinion,' says he, 'this man is even worse than the other.' 'How now if a man, from the love of making money, has no leisure to do any one thing, but consider by what means he may put money into his pocket?' 'We must have nothing to do with him either, for he would be useless to any one, who tried to make a friend of him.' 'Well then! what if a man is factious, and anxious to raise up many enemies against his friends?' 'By Zeus, we must fly from this man also,' he answered.

Chap. 10. § 5. (*γάρ in replies.*)

159. In replies, *γάρ* is often used with an apparent ellipse of a '*yes*' or '*no*' (*ναί* or *οὐ*).

Τό γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταὐτόν; Ταὐτὸν γάρ, ἔφη (*Pl.*). *Αἱ μητέρες τὰ παιδία μὴ ἐκδειματούντων. Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη* (*Pl.*).

In all probability, as Klotz observes, there is not *really* a preceding ellipse, but rather a *following* one; that is to say, *γάρ* has its original power of making an

emphatic affirmation, from which an obvious *inference* is left to be drawn by the hearer.

Thus in Aristoph. Plutus, 1148, after Chremylus had asked,

Ἔπειτ' ἀπολιπὼν τοὺς θεοὺς ἐνθάδε μενεῖς;

Mercury replies,—

Τὸ γὰρ παρ' ὑμῖν ἐστὶ βελτίω πολύ, = *sane quidem* apud vos multo melius est (ex quo sequitur, ut *velit manere*). *Klotz.*

Exercise 45.

160. (1) Hereupon the Greeks made answer, Cleanōr the Orchomenian speaking in the name of the rest: 'O Ariæus! thou most wicked of all men, and the rest of you who were friends to Cyrus! have you no regard either to the gods or men? You who, after you have sworn to us to look upon our friends and enemies as your own, now conspire with Tissaphernes, the most infamous and deceitful of all men, to betray us; and having both destroyed those persons, to whom you gave your oaths, and deceived the rest of us, now come with our enemies to invade us?' To this Ariæus answered, 'But it first appeared that Clearchus was forming designs against Tissaphernes, Orontas, and all the rest of us.'

(2) 'What injury,' says Cyrus, 'have I done you, that you should now, for the third time, be found endeavoring to betray me?' Orontas saying that he was not provoked to it by any injury, Cyrus continued, 'You own then you have wronged me?' '‡I am under a necessity of owning it,' replied Orontas: upon which Cyrus asked him again, 'Can you yet be an enemy to my brother, and a friend to me?' 'Though I should,' says Orontas, 'O Cyrus! you would never think me so.'

Chap. 10. § 6. (*οὐ γὰρ ἄν*, &c.)

161. Such an *omitted* hypothetical clause as *we* represent by *otherwise* or *else* (either alone, or after *for*, *since*), is in Greek omitted altogether, after *ἐπεὶ* (*οὐκ*) *ἄν*, (*οὐ*) *γὰρ ἄν*.

Οὐ φιλεῖς με, ὦ Θύγατερ, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐμὲ ἀπεκρύπτου τὰ σὰ πάθη, non me amas, mea filia; neque enim dolores me tuos celares = *εἰ γὰρ ἐφίλεις με, οὐκ ἂν ἀπεκρύπτου κτλ.—Τούτου ἐνδεᾶ ἐφαίνετο· βίᾳ γὰρ ἂν εἶλον τὸ χωρίον* (*Th.*).

162. Two propositions introduced by *γάρ* are occasionally found together in the best Greek authors.

Exercise 46.

163. (1) If you make an order, that whoever of you happens to be present,[a] shall assist the commander in chastising those who are guilty of disobedience, it will be the most effectual means to frustrate the designs of the enemy; for, from this day, instead of one Clearchus, they will find a thousand, who will suffer no man to neglect his duty. But it is now time to make an end, for it is probable the enemy will presently appear; and, if you approve of any thing I have said, ratify it immediately, that you may put it in execution. But if any other person thinks of any thing more proper, though a private man, let him propose it, for our preservation is a general concern.

(2) Thēramĕnēs afterwards arrived from Lacedæmon; and when some of the Generals and Taxiarchs (amongst whom were Strombichides and Diŏnysŏdōrus), with some other citizens, who, as they afterwards proved, were your true friends, accosted him, they were exceedingly indignant, for he returned with a peace, the character of which we have learnt to know by experience; for it cost us the lives of many good

citizens, and our own banishment by the Thirty; and[b] the terms of it were, not that we should pull down ten stadia of the long walls, but entirely raze the whole of them; and, far from obtaining any other advantage, should deliver up our ships to the Lacedæmonians, and throw down the walls of the Piræus.

(3) I was observing, that we have many fair prospects of safety. ‡In the first place, we are observing the oaths which we called upon the gods to witness; whilst our enemies have committed perjury, and violated both the treaty and their oaths. Thus we may fairly expect that, under these circumstances, the gods, who are able quickly to make the mighty men weak, and, when they please, to save the weak with ease, though surrounded by dangers, will declare against them, and combat on our side. Again, that you may feel yourselves bound to acquit yourselves like brave men, knowing that the brave are preserved by the gods even in extreme perils, *I will call to your recollection the dangers that your forefathers encountered: ‡when the Persians and their allies came with that innumerable host, as if to annihilate Athens, the Athenians, having the courage to encounter them, gained the victory.

[a] ὁ ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνων. On this force of ἀεί, cf. Gram. 1521.
[b] *Say:* 'for ——.'

Chap. 11. § 1. Γέ.

164. *a*) Γέ[1] (*quidem, certe*) is a *restrictive* particle which, without *excluding* the notion to which it is opposed, gives that to which it is attached a degree of *emphasis* that *distinguishes* it from all others.

[1] Kühner says: 'γέ particula *non habet* ... vim *restrictivam*, sed *argumentativam* s. *explicativam*' (Xen. Mem. p. 215.)

b) Accordingly as γέ *distinguishes* its notion as *being less* than others, or *greater* than they, it may be construed by (*at least*) *quidem* (*certe*, *saltem*), or by *even*, *himself* (*itself*), *etiam*, *vel*, *adeo*.

c) The force of the γέ is often to be given in English by a mere *elevation of the voice*, adding emphasis to the word or notion to which the γέ belongs.—It does not connect sentences. *H.*

Ἐπίφθονον λίαν γ' ἐπαινεῖν ἐστιν (*Eur.*). *Μέμνημαι ἔγωγε. Καλῶς γε σύ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιῶν* (*Pl.*). *Φίλους ἐτίθεσαν τούς γε πολεμιωτάτους* (*Eur.*). *Τά γ' ἀρκοῦνθ' ἱκανὰ τοῖς γε σώφροσιν* (*Eur.*). *Ζητητέον ὅστις ἡμᾶς ἑνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ βελτίους ποιήσει* (*Pl.*).

165. With respect to the place of γέ, it follows, like δή, the notion to which it belongs. Yet both these particles may (1) stand between an article or preposition and its noun, or (2) separated from their notions by μέν or δέ. (1) *οἵ γε ἀγαθοί · σύν γε* (*τοῖς*) *ἀγαθοῖς.* (2) *ἐσώθη δέ γε ὁ πατήρ.*

Exercise 47.

166. (1) We are all of us aware, that up to a certain point[1] every man is, even against his will, restrained by shame from not doing what is just, and openly declares himself against the unjust, especially if certain persons are the sufferers; and we shall find that what is corrupting every thing, and is the beginning (°and root) of all evils, is the not choosing to do what is just †simply and universally.[a]

(2) 'Is not God[1] essentially good, and must we not assert him to be so?' '†Without doubt.'[a] 'Moreover, nothing[1] that is good is hurtful, †is it?'[c] 'I think not.' 'Does then any thing that is not of a hurtful nature °ever hurt?' 'By no means.' 'Does that which hurts not, do any evil?' 'Nor this either.' 'And what does no evil, cannot be the cause of any evil?' '†Of course not.'[d] 'Now what is good is beneficial, is it not?' 'Yes.' 'It is there-

fore the cause of prosperity?' 'Yes.' 'Good, therefore, is not the cause of all things, but the cause of those things only which are in a right state—not the cause of those things which are in a wrong state.' 'Entirely so,' said he. 'Neither then can God,' said I, 'since he is good, be the cause of all things, as most men affirm, but only the cause of a few things to men, but of many things not the cause; for our blessings are much fewer than our troubles, and no other must be assigned as the cause of our blessings; whereas, of our troubles we must seek some other cause, not God.'

(3) 'What[e] is it that must induce men to believe what is asserted? Is it not the testimony of witnesses?' 'I presume' (it is).' 'And what is it that must render their testimony credible? Is it not the rack?' 'Assuredly.' 'And what must cause us to disbelieve the allegations of my adversaries? Is it not their declining † the test of torture?'[f] '† Yes; beyond a doubt.'[g] 'By what kind of proof then is it possible to demonstrate to you more clearly than by this, that my mother was the legitimate daughter of Ciron?'

[a] ἁπλῶς, simply for its own sake; *per se:* 'to do what is just *because* it is just, and from no lower motive.' [b] τί μήν; [c] ἦ γάρ; = *nonne (ita est)?* [d] πῶς γάρ; *qui enim* [sc. esse potest]?

[e] *Say:* 'whence (πόθεν) must things asserted be believed?' *and continue the corresponding form:* 'is it not from (ἐκ) testimonies?'

[f] τοὺς ἐλέγχους. [g] ἀνάγκη μεγάλη.

Chap. 11. § 2. (γέ *in replies.*)

167. Γέ is also used in *replies* and *supplementary additions* that are *closely connected* with another person's speech, to *correct* or *complete* it. Πότερον ἀδελφὼ μητρὸς ἐστὸν ἐκ μιᾶς; Φιλότητί γ', ἐσμὲν δ' οὐ κασιγνήτω, γύναι (*Eur.*). Κἄπειτα τοῦ γέροντος ἡσσήθη χερί;—Αἰδοῖ γε, καὶ μ' ἔρημον οἴχεται λιπών (*Eur.*).

This use is a very frequent one, because it is natu-

ral that in an answer we should wish to give prominence and emphasis to a particular word or notion. The answer may be either *affirmative* or *negative*.

168. It sometimes happens that a preceding *yes* or *no* must be mentally supplied.

Ἀλλὰ μὴ κεκράγετε.—Νὴ Δί', ἐς τὸν οὐρανόν γε (*Aristoph. Vesp.* 401).

Exercise 48.

169. (1) 'Let us know then,' says Xenophon, 'what you have in your power to give to the army, the captains, and the generals, if we come; to the end that these may make their report.' He promised to every common soldier a cyzicene, two to the captains, and four to the generals; with as much land as they desired, besides yokes of oxen, and a walled town near the sea. 'If,' says Xenophon, 'I endeavor to effect what you desire, but am prevented by the fear that may be entertained of the Lacedæmonians, will you receive into your country any who shall be desirous to come to you?' He answered, '°Yes; and not only that, but (203) I will treat them like brothers, give them a place at my table, and make them partakers of every thing we shall conquer.'

(2) To this Hystaspes replied: 'By Hera (Juno), I am glad that I put the question to you.' 'How so?' said he. 'Because I too will endeavor to do this. There is but one point that I am in the dark about; how I can show that I rejoice at your successes: whether I must clap my hands, or laugh, or what I must do.' ‡Artabazus said, 'You must dance the Persian dance.' This caused a good deal of laughing.

(3) On this occasion,[a] Cyrus is said to have asked the young man if he would accept of a kingdom in exchange for his horse? and the young man is said to have replied thus: 'I would not indeed accept a kingdom, but I would give it to lay a brave man under

an obligation to me.' Then Cyrus said: 'Come, I will show you where you may throw blindfold, and not fail to hit a brave man.' 'By all means, then,' said Sacian, taking up a clod, 'show me where, for I will assuredly throw this clod [a]there.' Then Cyrus showed him a place where a great many of his friends were; and the man, shutting his eyes, threw his clod, and hit Pheraulas as he was riding by,—for Pheraulas happened to be carrying some orders from Cyrus,—and when he was struck he did not even turn back, but went on the business that was ordered him. The Sacian then, looking up, asked whom he had hit. 'None, by Zeus!' said Cyrus, 'of those that are present.' 'But assuredly,' said the young man, 'it was none of those that are absent.' 'Yes, by Zeus!' said Cyrus, 'you hit that man who is riding hastily on there by the chariots.' 'And how came he not to turn back?' said he. Then Cyrus said: 'Why, in all probability, it is some madman.'

[a] ἔνδα δή.

Chap. 11. § 3. (γέ *with pronouns;* ἐπεί, ὅπως, &c.)

170. *Γέ* is frequently attached to *pronouns*, and, from the emphasis they thus receive, the accent of ἐγώ, ἐμοί, ἐμέ, is moved back to the first syllable (ἔγωγε, ἔμοιγε, ἔμεγε; and so σύγε, σοίγε; but *always* ἐμοῦ γε, and it would not be easy to find σοῦγε in old MSS. *Klotz*).

171. With *relative* pronouns γέ adds emphasis to the whole relative clause, it being one that *confirms* or *completes* a preceding statement: ὅς γε (ὅστις γε). *quippe qui*, or *qui quidem*. Ἄτοπα λέγεις, . . . ὅς γε καλεύεις ἐμὲ νεώτερον ὄντα καθηγεῖσθαι (*Xen.*; = *qui quidem jubes*).

Exercise 49.

172. (1) Cyrus, on reading the letter, immediately commanded Orontas to be apprehended, and caused seven of the most considerable Persians about him to assemble in his tent; and, at the same time, gave orders to the Greek generals for bringing their heavy-armed men, and placing them round his tent with their arms in their hands. This they did, and brought with them about three thousand heavy-armed men. He also called Clearchus to the council, as being a man whom both he and the rest looked upon to be of the greatest dignity among the Greeks.

(2) The Mitylenæans ought all along to have received no more honor from us than all the rest, and °then they would not have come to such a pitch of insolence; for, †not only in this instance but in all,[b] it is the nature of man to despise †those who court him,[c] and to respect those who do not stoop to him. But let them even now be punished as their crime deserves, and do not lay °all the guilt upon the aristocracy, whilst you acquit the commons; for they all attacked us, seeing that they might now, if they had come over (*p*) to us, have been in possession of their city again; but they believed (*p*) the chance they ran with the aristocracy to be the safer, and °so joined them in the revolt.

[a] = *quippe quem*, &c. [b] καὶ ἄλλως.
[c] τὸ θεραπεῦον: so τὸ ὑπεῖκον below.

Chap. 11. § 4. (*γέ with pronouns, continued.*)

173. Γέ is used with the other *relative* pronouns in the same way as with ὅς, ὅστις (172), and even (though very rarely) with the interrogative τίς; when the principal stress of the question rests on the pronoun.

a) ὅσον γε χρῄζεις (*Soph. Œd. Rex.* 375). οἷόν γέ μοι φαίνεται (*Pl. Rep.* 1, 329, A).

b) τίνος γ' ὑπ' ἄλλου; '*from whom else, then, tell me?*' (*Eur. Hec.* 774).

Exercise 50.

174. (1) I joined, as my accuser asserts, with Philip in singing pæans, when the walls of the Phocian cities were levelled with the ground. And by what proof can this charge be satisfactorily established? ‡ I was invited to his table, together with the other members of the embassy; and the invited guests, who dined together on that occasion with the embassies from the Greek states, were not fewer than two hundred persons. But, amongst all these persons, I, it seems, made myself remarkable by joining in the hymn, instead of remaining silent (during the performance).—So Demosthenes asserts, though he was neither present himself, nor has called before you any one who was, to give his evidence. And to whom then did I make myself conspicuous, unless I forsooth acted as the leader does in a chorus? If then I was silent, you accuse me falsely; but if, our own country being uninjured, and no public calamity having fallen upon our citizens, I did join the other guests in singing the pæan, by which the goddess was honored, and no slight put upon the Athenians, I acted the part of a religious, not of an impious man, and ought to be acquitted.

Chap. 11. § 5. (γέ *in exclamations.*)

175. *Γέ* is very extensively used in *appeals*, and *exclamations* of every kind (Εὖ γε· Ὀρθῶς γε· Καλῶς γε· Πάνυ γε· Σφόδρα γε· Μάλα γε, and the like, are of constant occurrence); for instance, in *exclamatory commands* or *wishes:* e. g. Συλλάβετέ γ' αὐ-

τόν! *seize him, do!* (*Soph. Phil.* 1003.) Ἧ δ' εἵλεθ'—ὥς γε μήποτ' ὤφελεν λαβεῖν—Μενέλαον (*Eur. Iph. Aul.* 70).

176. In this way γέ is sometimes found appended immediately to the name of a deity in *an oath* that is equivalent to a vehement form of assertion.

Οὐδ' ἂν μὰ Δία γ' ἐντεῦθεν Ἐξηκεστίδης.
(*Aristoph. Av.* 11.)

(This use has been denied by some critics. Even Porson altered Aristoph. Eccles. 748, to get rid of Μὰ τὸν Ποσειδῶ γ'—.) See *Klotz, Devar.* p. 282.

177. In *questions* (*a*) γέ is naturally often used to add emphasis to a particular notion (e. g. ἵνα δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος ὠφελῆσαι, πῶς ἂν πολλούς γε δυνηθείη; *Xen. Mem.* 3, 6, 14); but (*b*) its use immediately after the interrogative word is *not* common, though instances are found: ποίου γε τούτου πλήν γ' Ὀδυσσέως ἐρεῖς; (*Soph. Phil.* 439.)

(See τίς γε above, 173, *b*.)

Exercise 51.

178. (1) 'Don't you know,' said Adeimantus, 'that in the evening there will be a torch-race on horseback in honor of the goddess?' 'On horseback?' said I; 'that is something new! Are they to have torches, and hand them on one to another, contending on horseback? or how do you mean?' 'Just so,' replied Polemarchus.

(2) For the reason, O Athenians, why the law is drawn up in these terms, 'that the Senate may not ask for the present if it has not built (*p*) the triremes' is this: that it might not be left to the people to be persuaded or deceived at their pleasure. For he who drew up[a] the law was of opinion, that he ought not to leave this matter in the power of the orators, but that the regulation, which was at once just and expedient for the interest of the people, should be prescribed by law. 'Have you built no triremes? then don't ask for the reward:' now where the law forbids (the one party) to ask, must it not emphatically forbid (the other) to bestow?'

[a] See *Gr.* 1148.

Chap. 11. § 6. (*γέ with other particles.—γὲ μήν.*)

179. In connection with other particles, when *γέ* stands first, it attaches itself in meaning to a preceding word, and the following particle retains its usual signification.

180. 'The only difference between *γὲ μήν* and the simple *μήν* is, that by the use of *γὲ μήν* the preceding word is brought prominently forward by a particular emphasis. In this case the Romans always use *vero* alone' (*Hartung*, vol. ii. 383).

Οὔκουν δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶν ἀνθρώπους ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ προσθεῖναι αὐτοῖς δι' ὧν αἰσθάνονται ἕκαστα, ὀφθαλμοὺς μὲν ὥσθ' ὁρᾶν τὰ ὁρατά, ὦτα δὲ ὥστ' ἀκούειν τὰ ἀκουστά; ὀσμῶν γε μήν, εἰ μὴ ῥῖνες προσετέθησαν, τί ἂν ἡμῖν ὄφελος ἦν; (*Xen. Mem.* 1, 45.)

Ut vero *colloqui cum Orpheo, Musæo, . . . liceat, quanti tandem æstimatis? Cic. Tusc.* 1, 41 (Hartung).

Of course the observation just quoted from Hartung must be understood with the limitation, that the *γέ*, if preceded by *ἐπεί*, &c., will have its usual force of adding emphasis to the *whole clause* which the *ἐπεί*, &c., introduces (196).

181. *a*) The particles *γὲ μήν* (= *quidem certe*) have also an adversative force (= *certe vero; tamen*), *however*, *nevertheless*, &c. This arises from the *strong affirmation*, which the *γέ restricts* to the statement made, to the virtual exclusion of some other supposition, or of all other conceivable suppositions.

Thus: *ὅτε δὲ χωρὶς ἦμεν ἀλλήλων, ἐκεῖνοι ἡμῖν ἐχρῶντο ὡς ἐκείνοις ἦν ἥδιστον, ἡμῖν γε μὴν ὡς χαλεπώτατον* (*Xen. Cyr.* 6, 1, 7).

b) Γὲ μὴν particulis tribuit Devarius vim quandam *adversativam*, idque rectissume fecit, si earum usum spectamus. Quamquam per se neutra particula adversativam vim habet. Γέ enim particula id agit etiam in his locis, ut ea res, ad quam referenda est ipsa, *cum restrictione efferatur*, *μήν* autem rem *ita profecto* dicit *esse*. Sed ut sæpe in aliis vocabulis hoc factum est, sic etiam in particula *μήν* per affirmationem nata est quædam oppositionis significatio, ut in hac quidem parte plane respondeat Latinæ particulæ *vero*, quæ ipsa quoque ex affirmativa vi nacta est adversativam potestatem. Itaque quum particulæ *γὲ μήν* primum significent aliud nihil nisi: *quidem certe*, tamen Latine recte verti pos-

sunt: *certe vero*, ut vertit G. Hermannus ad Vigerum p. 828, ed. tert., usus hoc Euripidis versu de *Electra* v. 754.

Μ. κρὰν γὰρ ἕρπει γῆρυς, ἐμφανής γε μήν,

quod reddas: *E longinquo enim accidit vox, clara quidem certe*, aut etiam, ut fecit Hermannus: *at vero clara*. Quamquam in particulis *at vero* adversativa vis magis exstare videtur quam in Græcis particulis: γὲ μήν (*Klotz*).

182. The *particular* or clause introduced by γὲ μήν is often the *last* of a series, and one the truth of which is *undeniable*, whatever may be thought of the preceding statements. Here the Romans use *jam vero*, as well as *vero* only: in English we may introduce the particular by '*and as to* ——.' Thus, in the first example (180), ὀσμῶν γὲ μὴν . . . , we may translate it: '*and as to smells, of what advantage would they have been to us, if no noses had been given to us?*'

Exercise 52.

183. (1) Upon that occasion, you heard, on one side, Aristarchus ordering you to go to the Chersonēsus, and, on the other, Seuthes proposing terms to engage you in his service, when all of you declared you would go with Seuthes, and all gave your votes for it. Say, then, if I committed any crime in carrying you whither you all resolved to go. If, however, when Seuthes began to break his promise concerning your pay, I then commended him, you would certainly have reason both to accuse and hate me; but if I, who was before his greatest friend, am now his greatest enemy, how can you any longer with justice blame me, who have given you the preference to Seuthes, for those very things about which I quarrel with him?

(2) His first expedition was against the Pisidians and Mysians, which he commanded in person; and those whom he observed forward to expose themselves, he appointed governors over the conquered countries, and distinguished them by other presents; so that brave men were looked upon as most fortunate, and cowards as deserving to be their slaves; for which reason, great numbers presented themselves to danger, where they expected Cyrus would take notice of them. And as for justice,[a] if he observed any man anxious to

get a high character for that [a]virtue, his chief care was, that such a one should enjoy a greater affluence, than those who aimed at raising their fortunes by unjust means.

[a] εἴς γε μὴν δικαιοσύνην.

Chap. 11. § 7. (γὲ μέντοι.)

184. *a*) **Γὲ μέντοι**, *certainly however; however* (the preceding word being rendered *emphatic*) is closely connected in meaning with **γὲ μήν**.

Particulæ γὲ μέντοι continent adfirmativam quandam restrictionem non sine majore quadam oppositione, quasi Latine dicas *certe tamen, tamen vero* (*Klotz*).

b) The particles γὲ μέντοι are also used, like γὲ μήν (180, 182), in transitions to a *final* and *undeniable* assertion; e. g. ὥστ' ἐν τῇ Κύρου ἀρχῇ ἐγένετο καὶ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάρῳ μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντι ἀδεῶς πορεύεσθαι ὅποι τις ἥδελεν, ἔχοντι ὅ. τι προχωροίη. Τούς γε μέντοι ἀγαθοὺς εἰς πόλεμον ὡμολόγητο διαφερόντως τιμᾶν (*An.* 1, 9).

Exercise 53.

185. Then Artabazus, he who had said heretofore that he was his relation, rose up after him and spoke: 'You have done very well, Cyrus,' said he, 'in beginning this discourse; for while you were yet very young, I set out with a desire to be your friend; but, observing that you were not at all in want of me, I was afraid to approach you. But when you afterwards requested even me to exert myself in diligently delivering Cyaxares' orders to the Medes, I thought to myself, that if I assisted you in this matter with zeal, I should become your intimate friend, and have the privilege of conversing with you as long as I pleased. Well, this commission was so effectually done, that I had your commendation. After this the Hyrcanians first became our friends, and this while we were in great distress for allies; so that, in our transport, we

almost carried them about with us in our arms. After this, when the enemy's camp was taken, you had not, I believe, any leisure for me, and I excused you: after this Gobryas became our friend, and I was rejoiced at it: then Gadatas too, and it was now become a difficult matter to get any share in you. When, however, the Sacians and Cadusians became your allies and friends, it was probably very fit for you to cultivate them and pay them attentions, for they did so to you. But when we came back again to the place from whence we set out, then seeing you taken up with your horses, your chariots, and your engines, I thought that, when you were at leisure from all this, then you would have leisure for me: when, however, the terrible news arrived, that all mankind were assembling against us, I felt that this was indeed a most important crisis: but, if things succeeded well here, I thought myself sure that you and I should then plentifully enjoy each other's company and converse.

Chap. 11. § 8. (γὲ δή. γὲ δήπου.)

186. *Γὲ δή.*—Here the particle δή simply adds a strong *asseveration* to the word or clause *restricted* (and so *emphasized*) by γέ.

Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἔρωτα οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Θεόν τινα ἡγεῖ;—Λέγεταί γε δή, dicitur quidem certe (*Kl.*).

187. Hermannus (Vig. p. 828, ed. tert.) recte ait, interesse hoc inter γὲ δή et γέ τοι, quod δή sententiam per γέ restrictam simpliciter confirmet, τοί autem eam sententiam indicet oppositam esse præcedentibus quodam modo.—Nunc hoc teneamus γέ restringere aliquam rem, δή autem eam quasi *planam* atque *apertam*, de qua jam dubitari nullo modo possit, ponere. Latine dicas *quidem aperte, quidem profecto, quidem certe*, quamquam hoc etiam pro γέ τοι alio quodam modo accipi potest. Differt enim aliquid, qua mente dicas *quidem certe*. Sed γὲ δή, ut indicavimus, est simplex illud *quidem certe*, sine ulla oppositionis significatione (*Kl.*).—The two particles are joined together in the Latin *què-dem* (Hartung).

188. These particles occur most frequently, when the emphasis and asseveration belong especially to a *single word.*

Ἀεί γε δὴ νηλὴς σὺ καὶ θράσους πλέως, *always*, *always* art thou pitiless, &c. (*Æsch. Prom.* 42.)

189. Γὲ δήπου has nearly the same force as γὲ δή; it does not, however, directly *assert* the truth of the statement, but *assumes* it with the kind of *appeal* to the person addressed that belongs to δήπου (=*opinor*). A word or words may be inserted between γέ and δήπου.

Ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνό γε δήπου, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐδεὶς οὔτε θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων τολμᾷ λέγειν, ὡς οὐ τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην (*Pl. Euthyphr.* 8, e).

Exercise 54.

190. (1) But with regard to your trouble in the war, lest you should fear that it may prove great, and we may still be none the more successful, let those arguments suffice you, with which on many other occasions I have proved the error of your suspicions respecting it. At the same time, I will also lay before you the following advantage, which yourselves do not appear ever yet to have thought of as belonging to you, respecting the greatness of your empire, and which I never urged in my former speeches; nor would I even now, as it has rather too boastful an air, if I did not see you unreasonably cast down. You think then that you only bear rule over your own subject allies; but I declare to you, that of the two parts of the world open for man's use, the land and the sea, of the whole of the one you are most absolute masters, both as far as you avail yourselves of it now, and if you should wish to do so still further; and there is no power, neither the king nor any nation besides at the present day, that can prevent your sailing [where you please] with your present naval resources.

(2) About the same part of the summer, when Brasidas, being on his march with one thousand seven hundred, heavy-armed, to the Thrace-ward countries, had come to Heraclea in Trachinia; and when, on his sending before him a messenger to his partisans in Pharsalus, and requesting them to conduct himself and his army through the country, there came to Melitia, in Achaia, Panærus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, who was *proxenus* to the Chalcidians; upon that he proceeded on his march, being conducted both by other Thessalians, and especially by Niconidas of Larissa, who was a friend of Perdiccas. For, on other grounds, it was not easy to pass through Thessaly without an escort, and with an armed force, especially to pass through a neighbor's country without having obtained his consent, was regarded with suspicion by all the Greeks alike.

Chap. 11. § 9. (γέ τοι. γέ τοι δή.)

191. The particles γέ τοι (= *quidem certe; certe tamen*) carry with them the notion, that the *assertion* made is *opposed* to what preceded. Γὲ δή *simply affirm;* but γέ τοι also imply, that the assertion made is the *least* that can be insisted on. Whatever else may be true or false, this *at least*, this *at all events*, cannot be denied. (See above on γὲ δή, 186, 187.)

> Κλέπτον τὸ χρῆμα τἀνδρός· οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ,
> ὠλεκτρυών; νὴ τὸν Δί', ἐπιμύει γέ τοι.
> (*Aristoph. Vesp.* 933.)

(quod rectissime Hermannus ita vertit: *adnuit quidem certe*, ut hoc hanc fere in se contineret ratiocinationem: *etsi non respondet, ita sibi quoque videri, certe tamen adnuit.*) *Kl.*

Ἴσως Ἐρινύς ἐστιν ἐκ τραγῳδίας·
βλέπει γέ τοι μανικόν τι καὶ τραγῳδικόν:

fortasse Erinys est ex tragœdia: tuetur quidem certe insanum quiddam et tragicum[1] (Kl.).—*Quidquid illud est, hoc manifesto saltem verum est, in vultu aliquid inesse furiale et tragicum* (Hoogeveen).

192. Sometimes δή is added to strengthen the particles γέ τοι: after *they* have excluded the notion of all opposition, δή adds a positive assertion.

Κείνου γέ τοι δὴ παῖς ἐκλήζεθ'· ἡ δ' ἔσω
κάλλιστ' ἂν εἴποι σὴ γυνὴ τάδ' ὡς ἔχει.
(*Soph. Œd. R.* v. 1164.)

193. The particles γέ τοι often occur in oppositions after εἰ—ἀλλά. Thus: *εἰ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις ἡττώμεθα, ἀλλὰ τό γέ τοι πῦρ τοῦ καρποῦ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν* (*Xen. An.* 2, 5, 19: ἡττώμεθα, not necessary. *Kr.*).

Exercise 55.

194. (1) 'Well, then,' said Simonides, 'if you are in a worse condition, with regard to the objects of sight, yet, at all events, you have greatly the advantage from the sense of hearing; since you are never without an abundant supply of that most delightful of all sounds, the hearing of your own praises. For all those who approach you applaud every thing you say, and every thing you do. And, on the other hand, you are never exposed to what is most painful, the hearing yourself censured or reproached; for no one ventures to rebuke a king to his face.'

(2) 'May we not then properly call this man's intellectual power, so far as he really knows, knowledge; but that of the other, opinion?' 'Certainly.'

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[1] Si dixisset poeta:

Βλέπει γε δὴ μανικόν τι καὶ τραγῳδικόν,

ista oppositionis vis nulla esset, et hoc tantum modo significaretur, quod per sese satis planum atque apertum esset (*Kl.*).

'But now, if the person who we say only opines things, and does not know them, becomes indignant, and raises a dispute, alleging that our position is not true, shall we have any method of soothing and gently persuading him, and yet at the same time concealing that he is not in a sound state?' 'At all events, we undoubtedly ought (°to have some such way),' replied he.

Chap. 11. § 10. (ἐπεί γε. εἴ γε.)

195. With *relative*, *temporal*, and *conditional* particles, γέ introduces a thought that *confirms* or *completes* a preceding one; e. g. by adding the *necessary limitation* or *restriction*.

Si quando particula γέ adjuncta est ad particulas relativas, quales sunt ὅπου, ἐπεί, εἰ, ἐάν, ἄν, ἤν, ἐπειδάν, ὅτε, ὁπότε, πρίν, πλήν, etc., eodem modo explicanda res est, uti in pronominibus relativis. Spectat enim ista vis, quæ est in particula γέ, ad omnem condicionem, quæ efficitur per istas particulas, ut etiam in his locis Latine commode reddi possit per particulam *quidem* (*Kl.*).

196. Εἴ γε (= si quidem, *if at least*, *if that is* (εἰ . . . γέ when the γέ distinguishes the *interposed* word, εἴ γε when its influence extends to the *whole clause*); ἐπεί γε (*quando quidem*, *quoniam quidem*); to which the remark just made also applies, as also to other combinations.

Οὐδείς, εἴ γε σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις) nemo, si quidem tu vera narras), *nobody*, *if that is* (or, *if at least*) *what you say is true*.

197. When a condition is introduced by εἴ γε, it is not necessarily implied that the condition really exists; it *may be* even an improbable or *impossible* one, since all that is asserted is, that *if* that condition really exists, *then assuredly* the consequence is also true.

Ἐπεί, εἴ γε πρὸς φίλους ἐστὶ φυλακή, πᾶσαν οἶδα ἡμᾶς φυλαξαμένους, ὡς μὴ παρασχεῖν τούτῳ πρόφασιν δικαίαν μὴ ἀποδιδόναι ἡμῖν ἃ ὑπέσχετο κτλ. Xen. An.

7, 6, 22 (= *nam si qua est ab amicis cautio, omnem novi a nobis sedulo adhibitam esse, ne hinc* &c. [intellige: *sed* non est *ulla ab amicis cavendi ratio, ut opinari videmini*]. Kr.

Exercise 56.

198. (1) On what reasonable argument, then, could we ourselves shrink from it; or on what plea addressed to our allies there could we refuse to succor them? For, since we have entered into league with them, we ought to assist them, and not to object, that they too have not assisted us. For we united them with us, not that they might come here to help us in their turn, but that, by annoying our enemies there, they might prevent their coming here to attack us. And it is in this way that empire has been won, both by us and by all others who have enjoyed it; I mean, by readily taking part with those barbarians or Greeks who from time to time called them to their aid; since, if all should remain quiet, or[a] nicely choose whom they ought to assist; we should make but slight additions to it, but should rather run a risk of losing even what it now is.

(2) Philip, king of the Macedonians, to the senate and people of Athens, health!—I have received three of your citizens in quality of ambassadors, who have conferred with me about the dismission of the ships commanded by Leodamas. I cannot but consider it as an extraordinary instance of weakness, if you imagine I can possibly believe, that these ships were destined to import corn from the Hellespont for Lemnos; and that they were not really sent to the relief of the Selymbrians, now besieged by me, and who are by no means included in the treaty of pacification, by which we stand mutually engaged.

(3) Fellow-soldiers! it is certain that the relations between us and Cyrus have undergone a corresponding change on both sides; for neither are we any longer his soldiers, since we refuse to follow him, neither does

he any longer give us pay. I know he thinks himself unjustly treated by us; so that, when he sends for me, I refuse to go to him, chiefly through shame, because I am conscious to myself of having deceived him in every thing; in the next place, through fear, lest he should cause me to be apprehended and punished for the wrongs he thinks I have done him. I am therefore of opinion that this is no time for us to sleep, or to neglect the care of ourselves, but to consult what is to be done. If we stay, we are to consider by what means we may stay with the greatest security; and if we resolve to go away, how we may go with the greatest safety, and supply ourselves with provisions; for without these, neither a commander or a private man can be of any use.

[a] Or, 'make distinctions of race in choosing,' &c.; according to the reading *φυλοκρινοῖεν*, which Poppo, Göller, and Bloomfield adopt (*Dale*).

Chap. 11. § 11. (δέ γε.)

199. *a*) When δέ γε occur together, the δέ is merely placed there as requiring another word to rest upon: the γέ still *belongs* to that *preceding* word, with the obvious exception, that if that word is the article, the γέ belongs to the *following* substantive.

200. *b*) These particles are sometimes employed (like *καί—γέ*, 203) to add emphasis to the *last member* of a series in *enumerations*.

Καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ δὲ ἀπέθνησκον, ὁ μὲν προβαλλόμενός τι, ὁ δὲ φεύγων, ὁ δέ γε καὶ ἀμυνόμενος ὅτῳ ἐδύνατο (*Xen. Cyr.* 7, 5, 30.)

201. *c*) So in other instances, when a statement is to be strongly affirmed, with *opposition* (*Kl.*); hence sometimes = (*but*) *on the contrary*, (*but*) *on the other hand*.

Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ κτλ.—Ἐμοὶ δέ γε, ἔφη ὁ Κλεάνωρ δοκεῖ κτλ. (*Xen. An.* 4, 5, 8.)

Exercise 57.

202. (1) Upon this Xenophon said, 'Of this'[a] we are all aware, that the king and Tissaphernes have caused as many of us as they could to be apprehended; and it is plain they design, by the same treacherous means, if they can, to destroy the rest. We' therefore ought, in my opinion, to leave nothing undone, that we may not fall under their power, but rather, if possible, subject them to ours.

(2) I hear there are Rhodians in our army, the greatest part of whom, they say, understand the use of the sling, and that their slings carry twice as far as those of the Persians, who, from throwing large stones, cannot injure their enemy at a great distance; whereas the Rhodians', besides stones, make use of leaden balls. If, therefore, we inquire who have slings, and pay them for them, and also give money to those who are willing to make others, granting at the same time some other immunity to those who voluntarily enlist among the slingers, possibly some will offer themselves, who may do us good service.

(3) In little cities, the same people make both the frame of a couch, a door, a plough, and a table; and frequently the same person is a builder too, and very well satisfied he is if he meet with customers enough to maintain him. It is impossible therefore for a man that makes a great many different things to do them all well. But in great cities, because there are multitudes that want every particular thing, one art alone is sufficient for the maintenance of every one; and frequently not an entire one neither, but one man makes shoes for men, another for women. Sometimes it happens that one gets a maintenance by sewing shoes together, another by cutting them out; one by cutting out clothes only, and another, without doing any of these things, is maintained by fitting together the pieces so cut out. He therefore that deals in a busi-

ness, that lies within a little compass, must of necessity do it the best.

[a] ταῦτα μὲν δή.

Chap. 11. § 12. (καὶ—γέ.)

203. *Καὶ—γέ* (= *et certe; etiam certe; et adeo.* Kr.) are used, as Devarius expresses it, to *superadd* a notion to what preceded; i. e. the notions are connected by the *copulative καί*, and the *γέ* adds emphasis to its own notion; implying that, whatever may be said of the rest, *this* at least is certain. Hence *καὶ—γέ* are sometimes virtually equivalent to *non modo—verum etiam.*

Κλ. Ὁμολογῶ κλέπτειν· σὺ δ' οὐχί.
Ἀλλ. Νὴ τὸν Ἑρμῆν τὸν ἀγοραῖον, κἀπιορκῶ γε βλεπόντων. (*Aristoph. Equit.* 296.)

204. The particles *καὶ—γέ* often occur (like *δέ γε*, 200) in connection with the *last* member of an *enumeration;* sometimes before one, which, though not the last, is to have the hearer's attention particularly called to it.

Ἕτεραι δέ γ' εἰσὶ τῶν τεχνῶν —, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ πεττευτικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι κτλ. (*Plat. Phæd.* 58.)

205. These particles also frequently occur in *answers* or other *replies* which *add more* than what was contained in the question, or other address. *Neopt.* Χωροῖς ἂν εἴσω. *Phil.* Καὶ σέ γ' εἰσάξω (*Soph. Phil.* 670).

Exercise 58.

206. (1) I indeed am of opinion that all men ought to feel grateful to those from whom they receive kindness. But you, before I did you any service, gave me a favorable reception by your looks, your words, and

your presents, and were never satisfied with promising what you would do for me. But now, that you have accomplished what you desired, and are become as considerable as I could make you, you have the heart to allow me to be thus disgraced amongst the soldiers. But I am confident, time will inform you that you ought to pay them what you promised, and also that †your own feeling[a] will not endure to behold those who volunteered their services to you, now loading you with reproaches. I have, therefore, only this favor to ask of you, that when you pay it, you will study to leave me in the same credit with the army, in which you found me.

(2) 'Does a man who practises gymnastic exercises, and applies himself diligently to them, pay attention to the praise and censure and opinion of every one, or of that one man only who happens to be a physician, or teacher of the exercises?' 'Of that one only.' 'He ought therefore to fear the censures, and covet the praises of that one, and not[b] those of the multitude.' 'Clearly.' 'He ought therefore so to practise and exercise himself, aye, and so to eat and drink, as seems fitting to the one who presides and knows, rather than to all others together.'

[a] καὶ αὐτόν γέ σε. [b] Supra.

Chap. 12. § 1. Δέ (μὲν—δέ).

207. *a*) The particle δέ *distinguishes* its notion from a *preceding* one, but without *excluding* that notion, or *contradicting* it as a direct opposition.

b) The other, or *conceded*, notion, is usually expressed by the particle μέν.

c) Particulæ μέν—δέ cum aliquâ *diversitatis* notione *copulant* (Buttmann).

d) Μέν is weakened from μήν, *vero*, and probably δέ from δή;

though Hartung refers μέν to μεῖς = εἷς (μία ἕν), so that μέν is its neuter; and δέ to δῖς = δύο, so that they would mean *firstly—secondly*.

208. In the connection of sentences, δέ is used adverbially, as a particle of *transition*, to introduce *any continuation* of a discourse, that does not require some other more definite adverb (as the *conclusive* οὖν, *therefore;* the *causal* γάρ, *for*, &c.). Here we generally either use *and*, or continue the discourse without a particle (*Madvig*).

This and the common connection of *disjunctive* clauses by μέν—δέ are so common, that we shall give no separate examples of these usages; but in the following Exercises *on this chapter*, we shall print in italics 'and,' and other English particles when they are to be translated by δέ.

On the position of μὲν—δέ.

209. *a*) The μέν—δέ are commonly placed *after* the words which are opposed to each other; yet they are often to be referred to the predicate or to the whole clause. Καὶ ἔλεγε μὲν Σωκράτης ὡς τὸ πολύ, τοῖς δὲ βουλομένοις ἐξῆν ἀκούειν (*Xen.*). Ἔπαθε μὲν οὐδέν, πολλὰ δὲ κακὰ ἐνόμισε ποιῆσαι (*Xen.*).

210. *b*) When a substantive or adjective is connected with the article or a preposition, μέν and δέ are very often placed between the article and the preposition, and between the preposition and substantive or adjective, e. g. πρὸς μὲν τοὺς φίλους—πρὸς δ' ἐχθρούς: but uniformity in this respect is by no means always observed. Τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπεια παρέντες, τὰ δαιμόνια δὲ σκοποῦντες ἡγοῦνται τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν (*Xen.*). Οὐδὲ τὴν παροῦσαν εἰρήνην, οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτονομίαν τὴν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις μὲν οὐκ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν δὲ ταῖς συνθήκαις ἀναγεγραμμένην ἄξιον ἐλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν ἡμετέραν (*Isocr.*).

211. *Μέν—δέ in anaphora.*]—*Anaphora* is the emphatic repetition of the same word in two consecutive clauses. (It may still be considered an *anaphora* when, instead of the *same* word, an *equivalent* one is emphat-

ically used.) In the case of *anaphora*, the repeated word *generally* has μέν the first time it occurs, δέ the *second*. Here *we* should use '*and*;' and very often *without* anaphora.

Ἐγὼ σύνειμι μὲν θεοῖς σύνειμι δὲ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, *I keep company with the gods* and *with good men* (*Xen.*).

Exercise 59.

212. (1) Do you imagine that the dangers which then filled the city with alarm, were of a trifling and ordinary character?—(° with alarm), in the midst of which this Leōcrates ran away from the city himself, carried with him what money he had, sent for the household gods of his fathers, and advanced so far in this betrayal of his country, that, as far as his will was concerned, the temples were deserted, the watch-posts on our walls deserted; our city and our country abandoned. And yet at that time, gentlemen, who would not have pitied the city; not merely what citizen (° would not), but even what foreigner who had ever in former days resided (° at Athens)?—*and* who was such a hater of the people, such a hater of Athens,[a] that he could bear to see himself without a post assigned him, when the defeat and the calamity that had befallen the people[b] was announced; *and* the city was in a state of universal excitement at the news, *and* ° all the hopes of safety for the people were placed in those who were above their fiftieth year?

(2) As therefore I am of opinion that such misunderstandings will be most easily removed by conferences, I am come with an intention of convincing you that you have no reason to distrust us; for to mention the first point, which is of the greatest moment, our oaths, to which we have called the gods to witness, forbid us to be enemies; *and* whoever is conscious to himself of having neglected these, that man I shall never consider a happy one. For, in the war that is

waged against the gods, I know no swiftness so great that it could enable him to escape; no darkness so thick that he could fly to it (°for concealment); †no place so strong that he could retire to it[c] (°for defence): for all things, in all places, are subject to the gods, and every where they are equally lords of all. Now,[d] this is my opinion concerning both our oaths, and the gods, whom, by our agreement, we have made the depositaries of our friendship. But, as to human advantages, I look upon you to be the greatest we can promise ourselves at this juncture; for while we are with you, every road is pervious, every river passable, and we are sure to know no want; but without you, our whole °homeward journey becomes obscure (for we are utterly unacquainted with it), every river impassable, every multitude terrible, *and* solitude the most terrible of all; for that is attended with the want of every thing.

[a] μισόδημος. μισαθηναῖος. [b] δῆμος · *people*, as opposed to the *aristocratical* or *oligarchical* party. [c] οὔθ' ὅπως ἂν εἰς ἐχυρὸν χωρίον ἀποσταίη, = οὔτε [οἶδα] εἰς ὅπως ἐχυρὸν χωρίον (lit. *ad quomodo munitum locum*) ἀποσταίη. Cf. Krüger, who compares for the ὅπως = ὡς: ὀδόντας ἐξέφηνε—πῶς ἂν εἴποιμί σοι ὅπως μὲν λευκούς, ὅπως δὲ συμμέτρους; (*Luc.*) The *order* is regular, as in ὅτι ἐν βραχυτάτῳ, &c. [d] μὲν δή, which *conclude* a subject, and prepare for a *transition* (with δέ).

Chap. 12. § 2. (μὲν—μέν—δὲ—δέ.)

213. When there is a *double opposition*, expressed in two relative clauses, each with its accompanying *demonstrative* clause (οἵ—οὗτοι · ὅπου—ἐνταῦθα, &c.), μέν and δέ are often, either *both* or *one* of them, *doubled;* the μέν being used with the first relative and its demonstrative, the δέ with the second pair.

214. This parallelism is, however, but seldom found so regularly carried out as in the following example:

Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, ὑμεῖς

εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὗ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον— καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν (Pl.).

Πρωταγόρας λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μέν ἐστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δ' αὖ σοί (Pl.).

215. In the following example the δέ is only *once* used: °Ὃν μὲν τότε παραχρῆμα ἐβασάνισαν. οὗτος μὲν οὐδὲν εἶπε περὶ ἐμοῦ φαῦλον· ὃν δ' ἡμέραις ὕστερον πολλαῖς ἐβασάνισαν,—οὗτος ἦν ὁ πεισθεὶς ὑπὸ τούτων (*Ant.* 5, 30).

Exercise 60.

216. *And*, besides these, he maintains garrisons in the citadels (°of his towns); and, although the garrison-troops receive their pay and rations from the officer who is appointed for this purpose, the king holds a review every year of the troops in his pay, and all of whose duty it is to appear under arms, appointing them all to march to the place of rendezvous, except the troops in the citadels at the place † for which[a] the review is fixed. And the king himself reviews those who are in the neighborhood of his own residence, *and* sends persons who are in his confidence to inspect those who dwell at a distance; and all those commanders of garrisons, chiliarchs, and satraps, who are found to have their full numbers, and produce them at the review, supplied with good horses and arms: these[b] governors he both distinguishes by honors (°conferred upon them), and enriches by presents of great magnitude; whereas[b] whatever governors are discovered to be either neglecting their garrisons, or making money by unjust means, these he punishes severely, and, deposing them from their governments, appoints other commissioners in their stead.

[a] ἔνθα δή. [b] Use μέν—δέ. cf. 253.

Chap. 12. § 3. (δέ = *autem*.)

217. A second *explanatory* or *completing designation* is usually appended to the first by δέ (= *autem*).

Εἴπερ γε Δαρείου ἐστὶ παῖς ἐμὸς δ' ἀδελφός (*Xen.*), 'meus *autem* frater;' but, in English, '*and* my brother.'

218. Δέ (= *autem*) is also very frequently used in *explanatory* (especially *parenthetical*) remarks, where *we* either use '*now*,' or, more commonly, no conjunction.

Πατρὸς μὲν δὴ ὁ Κῦρος λέγεται γενέσθαι Καμβύσεω, Περσῶν βασιλέως· ὁ δὲ Καμβύσης οὗτος τοῦ Περσειδῶν γένους ἦν· μητρὸς δὲ ὁμολογεῖται κτλ. (*Xen. Cyr.* 1, 2.)

Exercise 61.

219. (1) Dicæŏgĕnes, having sailed as captain of the Paralus, was slain in a sea-fight at Cnidus; *and*, as he left no children, Proxenus, the father of Dicæogenes (°the defendant), produced a will to our parents, which they believed to be a true one, and by virtue of it they divided the inheritance. ‡Dicæogenes the defendant was by it adopted by the deceased Dicæogenes, the son of Mĕnĕxĕnus *and* our uncle, and appointed heir to a third part of his property; *and* each of the daughters of Menexenus had a decree for her share of the residue: facts, for which I call before you as witnesses the persons who were present at the time.

(2) Consider [then] on what ground the parties who come before you respectively rest their claims. These men rely on a will which our uncle, who imputed no blame to us, made in resentment against one of our relations, but virtually cancelled before his death, having sent Posidippus to the magistrate (for the purpose of solemnly revoking it); but we, who were his nearest kinsmen, and most intimately connected with him, derive a clear title, both from the laws which

have established our right of succession on the score of relationship, and from Cleōnymus himself, whose intention was founded on the friendship subsisting between us; †not to urge that[a] his father *and* our grandfather, Polyarchus, had appointed us to succeed him, if he should die without children.

[a] ἔτι δέ (and still further).

Chap. 12. § 4. (καὶ—δέ.)

220. *Καί—δέ = et vero etiam: atque etiam.*

Since the Greeks used the same word (*καί*) both for *and* and *also*, they had no means of expressing *and also*, but that of combining the synonymous δέ with *καί* (*Hartung*).

This combination is common in Xenoph.; far less so in Thucyd. and Plato (*Kr.*). *Οἵ τε ἄλλοι προθύμως τῷ Τελευτίᾳ ὑπηρέτουν, καὶ ἡ τῶν Θηβαίων δὲ πόλις προθύμως ξυνέπεμπε καὶ ὁπλίτας καὶ ἱππέας* (*Xen.*). *Δαρεῖος Κῦρον σατράπην ἐποίησε, καὶ στρατηγὸν δὲ ἀπέδειξεν* (*Xen.*).

A *μέν* sometimes precedes: *Πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθι δῆλον . . . καὶ ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐδήλωσεν* (*Xen. Cyr.* 7, 1, 30).

Exercise 62.

221. (1) At this time, Xenophon, observing the numerous Hoplites of the Greeks, observing their numerous targeteers, and bowmen, and slingers, *and even* of horse, who now from practice were become right good troops, and °considering that they were in Pontus, where so large a force could not have been assembled for a trifling sum, thought it an admirable plan to procure for the Greeks a territory and (°increase of) power, by founding °there a city.

(2) Agasias the Stymphālian, and Aristōnymus the Methydrian, who were also captains of the rear-guard,

and others also, stood apart from the trees, for it was not safe for more than one company to be posted amongst them. †Then it was that[a] Callimachus devised (*pres. hist.*) a stratagem: he advanced two or three steps from the tree under which he was standing; *and* whenever the stones were thrown, he nimbly retreated, *and* at each advance (°of this kind) more than ten wagon-loads of stones were consumed.

(3) Cyrus then constituted different officers to take care of different affairs. He had his receivers of the revenues, his paymasters, overseers of his works, keepers of his treasures, and officers to provide things that were proper for his table. Nay, he even appointed as masters of his horse and of his dogs such as he thought would bring these animals into the best condition for his use. But, as to those whom he thought fit to have as joint guardians of his power and grandeur, he himself took care to have them the best; he did not give this in charge to others, but thought it his own business.

[a] ἔνθα δή.

Chap. 12. § 5. (δέ *in apodosi.*)

222. In the old Epic language, δέ (allied to δή) stands with a certain emphasis in the apodosis after *relative clauses* and *conjunctions*. In Attic prose this is rare, and is only found where the apodosis, after *conjunctions* or a *relative adverb of comparison* (ὡς, ὥσπερ), is denoted prominently by a *demonstrative* word [this is the most common case] or *personal* pronoun, which indicates an *opposition* to some other object; and, in the same way, after a *participial construction*, which contains an *opposition* to the principal sentence. *M.*

Εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ μὴ γιγνώσκω μήτε τὰ ὅσια μήτε τὰ δίκαια, ὑμεῖς δὲ διδάξατε με (*Xen. Hell.* 4, 1, 33). *Ἐπι-*

τιμῶ ταῖς μοναρχίαις ὅτι δέον τοὺς μονάρχους τὴν φρόνησιν ἀσκεῖν μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ δὲ χεῖρον παιδεύονται τῶν ἰδιωτῶν (*Isocr.*). *Ὁ δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώματος ἡγεῖ, τὴν ψυχὴν—περὶ δὲ τούτου ἐπεκοινώσω* (*Pl. Prot.* 313, A.).

Exercise 63.

223. (1) †As to my own particular (for[a] I hear Dexippus tells Cleander, that Agasias had never done this if I had not given him orders), for my part, I say,[b] I am ready to clear both you and Agasias of this accusation, if he will say that I was the author of any of these things, and to condemn myself, if I began throwing stones or any other violence, to the last of punishments, and will submit to it. My advice also is, that if Cleander should accuse any other person, he ought to surrender himself to him to be tried; by this means you will be free from censure. As things now stand, it will be hard if we, who expect to meet with applause and honor in Greece, should, instead of that, not even be in the same condition with the rest of our countrymen, but be excluded from the Greek cities.

(2) As to what you say, that we made our way by force to our present quarters, we called upon the inhabitants to receive our sick under their roofs; but, when they did not open their gates, then we did indeed march in where the place itself of its own accord offered us admission; and, though we have done no violence in any respect, our sick are (°we allow) quartered in the houses, yet at their own charges; and we place guards at the gates that our sick may not be at the mercy of your Harmost, but in our own power, to convey them wherever we please. *And* the rest of us live as you see in the open air, and continue in our ranks, prepared to reward kindness by kindness, and to defend ourselves against ill treatment. *And*, as to what you threaten (°us with), that, if you °once resolve to do so, you will make an alliance with Corylas and the Paph-

lagonians against us, ‡we then, if it must be so, will fight even against you both together—for before now we have fought with others many times as numerous as you—and, if we think well to do so, will also make the Paphlagonian our friend; *for* we hear that he is actually longing for your city and your coasts: we will endeavor, therefore, to make him our friend by assisting him to obtain what he desires.

[a] ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν—καὶ γάρ (= *etenim*).
[b] οὖν resumptive, though οὖν had preceded.

Chap. 12. § 6. (μὲν—δέ *resolved by* whereas *or* whilst.)

224. The Greeks often express *contrasted* notions by clauses co-ordinately connected by μέν—δέ, where *we* should rather point out the contrast more sharply, by connecting a subordinate clause introduced by *whereas*, *whilst* (or, sometimes, *although*), with a principal one.

Such clauses either contain a question whether the *two* suppositions can stand together, or depend on a negative that precedes them both, or are stated in a clause (with εἰ, ὡς, ὅτι, &c., or in the *acc. c. infin.*) that implies the *absurdity* or *inconsistency* of supposing both the notions to be true. *M.*

Τί οὖν; οἱ μὲν ἄρα νίκης ἕνεκα πάλης καὶ δρόμου ἐτόλμησαν ἀπέχεσθαι .... οἱ δὲ ἡμέτεροι παῖδες ἀδυνατήσουσι καρτερεῖν πολὺ καλλίονος ἕνεκα νίκης; (*Pl., Legg.* 8, 840.)

Τὸ εἶναι μὲν τὰς ἀναγκαιοτάτας πλείστας πράξεις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀγυμνάστως ἔχειν πρός τε ψύχη καὶ πρὸς θάλπη οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πολλὴ ἀμέλεια εἶναι; (*Xen.*)

Πῶς οὐ σχέτλιον τὴν μὲν πόλιν αὐτὴν ἡμῶν ἑκάστῳ δεδώκεναι ἄδειαν, αὐτὴν δὲ μὴ τετυχηκέναι ταύτης τῆς ἀσφαλείας; (*Dem.*)

Exercise 64.

225. (1) †It was owing to these things,[a] to the great injury which Decelēa inflicted on them, and the other expenses which fell heavily[b] upon them, that their pecuniary resources began to fail them; and it was at this time that they imposed upon their subjects the tax of the twentieth of all sea-borne commodities instead of the tribute, thinking that by this regulation they should raise a larger amount of money. For, the longer the war continued, the more were their revenues injured, whilst their expenses were not on the same scale as before, but much greater.

(2) When many dreadful events were taking place in the city, and all the citizens had suffered the most distressing misfortunes, a man would have especially grieved and wept for the afflictions of the state °itself, when he saw that the people had voted the freedom of the slaves, the admission of the foreign residents to the rights of citizenship, and the restoration of the disgraced to their forfeited privileges,—(°this people,) who before those days used to pride itself on being †of pure original race[c] and free; and so complete was the change, that *whereas* the city was accustomed to fight for the freedom of the other Grecian states, she was in those days contented if she could combat without loss for her own preservation.

(3) On this[d] they went to their tents, and in going discoursed among themselves how great a memory Cyrus had, and how he gave his orders, naming all the persons that he gave directions to. This Cyrus did out of his great care and exactness; for he thought it very strange that whilst mean artificers, each of them, know the names of the tools belonging to their art, and a physician knows the names of all the medicines and instruments that he uses, a general should be such a fool as not to know the names of the commanders

that are under him, and that he must necessarily use as his instruments.

[a] δι' ἃ καὶ τότε (the discourse is continued from what went before). [b] Use the *adjective* μέγας (as predicate). [c] αὐτόχθων. [d] Ἐκ τούτου δή.

Chap. 12. § 7. (δέ *in replies, questions, and personal addresses.*)

226. *a*) Δέ may *begin* a *reply* that is *opposed* to what has been said by another.

Μετὰ τοῦτον Χενοφῶν εἶπεν· Ἐγὼ δ' ἐπέρχομαι ὑμῖν ἐπικουρήσων κτλ. (*Xen.*)

(In Latin *vero* would be used with personal pronouns: *ego vero; mihi vero*, &c. Kl.)

227. *b*) In *questions*, δέ is sometimes used as an *adversative*, the interrogator giving vivacity to his question by omitting the concessive member; but sometimes it has a *copulative* force, and continues a question which had been interrupted by the answer given to it. The same principle holds good in answers.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, κύνας δὲ τρέφεις, ἵνα σοι τοὺς λύκους ἀπὸ τῶν προβάτων ἀπερύκωσι; (i. e. though *you will not keep a man to protect you from your enemies, will you* nevertheless,' &c.? *Xen. Mem.* 2, 9, 2.) *Οὔκουν οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὅτι πλήθει μὲν οὐδὲν μείους εἰσὶν Ἀθηναῖοι Βοιωτῶν*; *Οἶδα γάρ, ἔφη. Σώματα δὲ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ πότερα ἐκ Βοιωτῶν οἴει πλείω ἂν ἐκλεχθῆναι, ἢ ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν*; (*Xen.*)

In *adversative* questions introduced by δέ, we should use *then*, or *but—then:* sometimes in *resumptive* ones, *well—then; and—then;* sometimes merely *and.*

228. *c*) In addressing a person after his name, σύ (σοί, &c.) usually follows with δέ: this form indicates *emotion* (Cf. Herm. ad El. 147). *Μενέλαε, σοὶ δὲ τάδε λέγω κτλ.*

Exercise 65.

229. (1) Then Xenophon rose up, and spoke thus in behalf of the soldiers: 'We[a] are come hither, O men of Sinōpe! well satisfied with having preserved our persons and our arms; for, to secure and carry off any booty along with us, and at the same time to fight with our enemies, was impossible. And now, since we arrived among the Greek cities—at Trebisond[b]—we paid for all the provisions we had, because they supplied us with a market; and, in return for the honors they did us, and the presents they gave to the army, we paid them all respect, abstaining from those barbarians who were their friends, and doing all the mischief we are able to their enemies, against whom they led us. Inquire of them what usage they have received from us; for the guides, whom that city has sent along with us through friendship, are here present.'

(2) To this he made no objection, but said that he had brought some things necessary for the funeral, and had given earnest for them; he therefore exacted a promise from me to pay what they cost, and desired me to give him back the earnest-money, engaging to bring me to those who had received it of him: soon after, indeed, he affected to insinuate that Cyron died insolvent, though I had not then spoken a word about his fortune. Now, if he had not known me to be the grandson of Cyron, he would never have made such an agreement with me, but would rather have addressed me thus:—'Why, who are you? What concern have you with the burial? I know you not. You shall not come within my doors.'

[a] ἡμεῖς δὲ . . , i. e. ὑμεῖς μὲν οὕτω γιγνώσκετε ἡμεῖς δέ (*Kr.*).

[b] Here μέν is used, referring to Κοτυωρίτας δέ, in a clause not included in this extract.

Chap. 12. § 8. (δέ *as resumptive.*)

230. Δέ is also used *resumptively* after a parenthesis, but usually with reference to a preceding δέ.[1]

Denique particula δὲ sæpe etiam post parenthesin inferri solet, non solum ibi, ubi significatam jam antea per δέ particulam oppositionem rursus excipit, sed ibi etiam, ubi nihil ejusmodi erat significatum. In his enim locis nascitur interposita alia sententia oppositio quædam, qua quasi novum quiddam illud, quod jam antea indicatum erat, infertur, quoniam propter parenthesin neglectum videbatur. Apud Xenophontem quidem in *Disciplina Cyri*, ii. 5. § 19, hæc leguntur: Ταῦτα δ' ἀγασθεὶς ὁ Κῦρος, τοῦ μὲν ταξιάρχου τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, τῶν δὲ τὴν πειθώ, ὅτι ἅμα μὲν ἐγυμνάζοντο—ὁπλίσει· τούτοις δὲ ἡσθεὶς ἐκάλεσέ τε ἐπὶ δεῖπνον αὐτοὺς κτλ. et ibidem vii. 2, § 23: Νῦν δ' αὖ πάλιν ὑπό τε πλούτου τοῦ παρόντος διαθρυπτόμενος, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν δώρων, ἐδίδοσάν μοι, καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων, οἵ με κολακεύοντες ἔλεγον—, ὑπὸ τοιούτων δὲ λόγων ἀναφυσώμενος—ὑπεδεξάμην τὴν στρατηγίαν κτλ. (*Klotz.*)

Exercise 66.

231. But after the tyrants of the Athenians and those in the rest of Greece (which even at an earlier period was for a long time subject to tyrants), the most and last, excepting those in Sicily, had been deposed by the Lacedæmonians (for Lacedæmon, after the settlement of the Dorians, who now inhabit it, though torn by factions for the longest time of any country that we are acquainted with, yet from the earliest period enjoyed good laws, and was always free from tyrants; for it is about four hundred years, or a little more, to the end of this war, that the Lacedæmonians

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[1] Difficilior illa quæstio, num etiam ibi, ubi δέ non præcesserit, finita parenthesi poni δέ possit. Qua de re ego ita adfirmandum esse puto, ut si quando pluribus interjectis verbis aliqua notio ita comparata est, ut aliquo modo antecedentibus opponi posset, eam per particulam δέ recte inferri existumem, veluti in illo loco Herodoti, quem hic posuerunt grammatici, lib. viii. c. 67: Ἐπεὶ ὦν ἀπίκατο ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πάντες οὗτοι πλὴν τῶν Παρίων· Πάριοι δὲ ὑπολειφθέντες ἐν Κύθνῳ ἐκαραδόκεον τὸν πόλεμον κῇ ἀποβήσεται· οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ ὡς ἀπίκοντο ἐς τὸ Φάληρον, ἐνθαῦτα κατέβη αὐτὸς Ξέρξης, ἐπὶ τὰς νῆας κτλ., quo in loco facile apparet, cur οἱ λοιποί illatum sit per particulam adversativam.

have been in possession of the same form of government; and, being for this reason powerful, they settled matters in the other states also);—after, I say, the deposition of the tyrants in the rest of Greece, not many years subsequently the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and Athenians.

Chap. 13. § 1. Δή.

232. Δή (= *-dum*, *-dem*, *-jam*, as in *quoniam*, *quispiam*, and as used with *adjectives* and *adverbs*[1]) is a particle which intimates an *affirmation* on the part of the speaker, that he knows *the thing in question to exist at the moment actually present*, or *present to his mind*. Hence it also denotes, in general, *certain existence as a fact; an appeal to what is evidently before one's eyes*, &c.; it intimates that the assertion made is true *now*, or with reference to the thing of which it is asserted, whatever may be the case with reference to *other*[2] times or things.

It seems most probable that δή is a weakened form of ἤδη. Rost considers it related to δῆλος and δαῆναι. Klotz derives ἤδη, and therefore δή, from εἰδέναι.

The connections in which δή is of extremely frequent occurrence are:

233. *a*) With *adverbs of time;* denoting that the thing is limited to the *precise* time denoted by the adverb. ἐνταῦθα δή. νῦν δή = (ἄρτι) *just now*. πρὶν δή, *prudem*. ἔτι δή, οὐκέτι δή, ἀεὶ δή, πάλαι δή. Compare *nuncdum*, *etiamdum*, *vixdum*.

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[1] Cum adjectivis et adverbiis *jam* conjungitur, ut id quod his verbis dicitur *distinctione* lumen accipiat.—Græci usurpant δή, veluti πολλὰ δή. Dem. Cor. 32 (*Hand*).

[2] Thucyd. i. 74: Καὶ αὐτοὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ μάλιστα ἐτιμήσατε ἄνδρα ξένον, ubi διὰ τοῦτο δὴ sic dicitur, ut appareat *propter eam jam rem*, quum fortasse propter alias res minus hoc antea factum esset, honoratum esse virum peregrinum (*Kl.*).

(*Ἐνταῦθα δή* and *τότε δή* very frequently commence the *apodosis* after *ἐπεί, ἐπειδή*. Cf. *c*.)

b) It is frequently used with imperatives and hortatory subjunctives (with which *we* often use *now, then*). *Ἔχε δή, ἔφην ἐγώ. Ἄκουε δή.*[1] *Θώμεθα δὴ τὸ φορτίον.* Compare *dicdum, cedodum.*—[Also *adeo*. Propera *adeo* puerum tollere hinc ab janua. *Ter. Andr.* 4, 4, 20.]

c) With reference to *purposes of prevention, asseverations*, &c. it denotes the thing as *settled, completed, certain*, &c. *Ἦ δή, assuredly; μὴ δή* (c. *imper.* =), *hoc tantum te rogo, nihil amplius, ne.*

(On *μή τι δή*, &c. = *nedum*, cf. chapter on *μή*.)

d) In *explanations* it denotes an *immediate judgment of the mind, formed upon the obvious appearance of the thing*. So in *γὰρ δή, ὡς δή, οἷα δή* (*utpote*). Here there is often an admixture of *irony*, and sometimes of *false pretence*, as if the thing were *so obvious*, that it *may be assumed* as a fact without hesitation. *Εἰσήγαγε τὰς ἑταιρίδας δή, he brought in the* pretended *courtezans* (Xen. Hell. 4, 56). *ἐδίδαξαν ὡς κατ' εὔνοιαν δὴ λέγειν* (*Th.*). *ὁ σοφὸς δή, sapiens scilicet ille* (Pl.).

e) After *demonstratives* it denotes *limitation* to the thing in question, which it *distinguishes* as being the *very thing* meant, often as *remarkable, well known*. Here it may sometimes be construed *precisely, just*, sometimes *simply, merely*;[2] it often, however, cannot be construed, but must have its force given by *emphasis* added to the word. So *τότε δή, οὗτος δή, ἐκ τούτου δή, σὺ δή, τὰ αὐτὰ δὴ ταῦτα, οὕτω δή, ἔνθα δή*, &c. Compare *dumtaxat* and *demum*.

f) With *relative pronouns* and *adverbs* it either denotes *limitation* to the particular object (as with *demon-*

[1] Here it has also an *annective* force. *H.*

[2] Thus Cyrus, after stating that he wished for wealth that he might maintain troops, reward his friends, &c. adds: *Τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα βούλομαι ὡς ἀφθονώτατα χρήματα ἔχειν, merely for these purposes* [= *his* adeo *de causis. Kl.*].

stratives) or implies *decision*. ὃς δή,[1] οἷος δή, ἐπειδή (*quoniam*=*quum jam*), εἰ δή, ἔνθα δή. (See *h*.) [ἃ δή= *quæ, ut satis constat*. K.] So with ἵνα (both as a *local* and a *final* particle).

g) With *interrogatives* δή and δή ποτε imply (like δή in *commands*) *impatience*, as requiring an *immediate explanation*. Τίς δή; *who ever? who in the world?* τί δή; πῶς δή; *quidum? quid tandem?* πόσοι δή ποτε; It has the same meaning in *exclamations*: ὅσος δή! [ὅσα δὴ δέδηγμαι! *Aristoph.*]

Hand compares it with *autem*. 'Primum *autem* exprimit quærentis *impetum* et *vehementiam*, sive ea ab *admiratione* proficiscatur, sive ab *indignatione* et *iracundia*, maxime in *reprehensione*. Græci dicunt δή.' 1, 575.

h) 1. Its use with *indefinites*, including ὅστις, ὅσος, and the dependent interrogatives, ὁπόσος, &c., when used *indefinitely*; and the corresponding adverbs, ὅθεν, &c. Here, too, it denotes *haste* and *indifference*; *any one*, without *inquiring who*, or going further to take in others (= *-cunque*, *-vis*, *-libet*). So that in effect it *increases their indefiniteness*. ὅστις δή, *nescio quis* [but also *quicunque*]. ὅστις δή ποτε,[2] *quicunque tandem*; ὁποῖος δή. ὅσοι δή, *quotquot*: ἄλλος δή, *alius nescio quis*: εἴτε δή, *whether it be that*, &c. (= *sive*).

i) 2. With τίς, ποτέ, πού, the δή precedes (it cannot, of course, stand at the beginning of a clause); δή τις, *quispiam*, or *nescio quis*: δή ποτε (δήποτε[3]), *uspiam*; δή που (δήπου), *in some way surely* (as used in a *half-questioning* or *half-doubting* manner; = *opinor, ni fallor*. See below).—3. Ὅσος δή often means *any degree however small* (= *quantuluscunque*).

Ῥήγνυται ὁποία δὴ φλέψ (*Xen.*). Ἐς τὴν Ἀσπεν-

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[1] ὃς δὴ—εὑρήσει = *qui jam inveniet*, quod dici etiam potuit ὃς ἤδη εὑρήσει, quamquam sic . . . vis minus spectaret ad pronomen ipsum. *Kl.*

[2] Also ὅστις δή ποτ' οὖν.

[3] δή ποτε (*jam aliquando*) = *modo* (τὴν ἄνασσαν δή ποτ' οὖσαν Ἰλίου. Eur. Hec. 480); *unquam* (ὅσον τις . . . πλεῖστον δή ποτ' ἔδωκεν. *Xen.*).

δον ᾗ τινι δὴ γινώμῃ ἀφικνεῖται (*Th.*). Τὸ ζῆν ὁπόσον δὴ χρόνον τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἑαυτοῦ ἐστίν (*Pl.*). Θρασύμαχος διαβάλλειν τε καὶ διαλύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὅθεν δὴ κράτιστος γέγονεν (*Pl.*). Ἔνιοι τὰ μὲν φιλονεικίᾳ, τὰ δ' ἥτινι δή ποτ' αἰτίᾳ προάγονται λέγειν (*Dem.*). Τοῦτο πέπρακται νυνὶ ὅπως δή ποτε (*Dem.*). Ἐμισθώσατό με ὅστις δή ποτ' οὖν (*Æschin.*). Τῇ Κυνίσκᾳ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα ἐποίησε ὅστις δή (*nescio quis*).

k) After expressions of *number* and *degree* (e. g. *comparatives* and *superlatives*), it denotes *limitation* to the asserted magnitude or degree, which the thing *precisely* attains to. It may denote either that the number or degree is *not exceeded*, or that it is *fully* reached, i. e. is *not fallen short of*.

Μόνος δή, *quite alone*: τρεῖς δή, *no more than three*: πάντες δή, *all without exception*: ἀσθενὴς δή, *very weak*: βραχὺς δή, εὐθὺς δή, πάνυ δή, μέγα δή, πλεῖστα δή, μέγιστος δή (*the very greatest*).

Exercise 67.

234. (1) In consequence of this, Mello, taking with him six of the properest persons amongst the exiles, armed with daggers and no other weapon, goes in the first place by night into the territory of Thebes. In the next place, having passed the day in an unfrequented spot, at evening they came to the gates, *as if*[a] returning from the country, about the time that the last parties came in from their working in the fields. When they had thus got into the city, they passed that night in the house of one Charon, and moreover[b] spent the whole of the following day [c]there.

(2) But when, upon trial, they found the water came up above their breasts: that the river was rendered uneven by large slippery stones; and that it was not possible for them to hold their arms in the water; which, if they attempted, they were borne away by the stream, and, if they carried them upon

their heads, they were exposed to the arrows and the other missive weapons of the enemy;—then they retired, therefore, and encamped on the banks of the river. From hence they discovered a great number of armed Carduchians, who were got together upon the mountain, in the very place where they had encamped the night before. *Then indeed* the Greeks were very much disheartened, seeing on one side of them a river hardly passable, and the banks of it covered with troops to obstruct their passage, and, on the other, the Carduchians ready to fall upon their rear, if they attempted it.

(3) The final issue of all things is as the Deity wills; but the plan and intention does itself declare the mind of the statesman. Do not then, do not impute it as my offence, that it was Philip's good fortune to be victorious in the battle, for that event depended upon God, not upon me; but prove that I did not take every precaution which human prudence could suggest; that I did not exert myself with integrity, with assiduity, with toil even greater than my strength; that the conduct I pursued was not noble, was not worthy of the state, was not necessary: let this be proved, and *then at once*[c] accuse me.

(4) Gobryas then said: 'But if one has a mind to dispose of a daughter, whom must one tell it to?' 'This,' said Cyrus, 'must be told to me too; for I am a notable man in this art.' 'What art?' said Chrysantas. 'Why, in knowing what match will best suit each particular man.' Then Chrysantas said: 'In the name of all the gods, then do tell me what wife you think will best suit me!' 'First,' said he, 'she must be little, for you are little yourself; and if you marry a tall wife, and would kiss her as she stands, you must leap up as little dogs do.' 'Well, as to that,'[d] said he, 'you certainly provide with judgment; for I am †any thing but a good jumper.'[e] 'And then,' said he, 'a wife with a snub nose would suit you admirably.'

'And what in the world is this for?' 'Because,' said he, 'you have a hooked nose, †and a hooked nose would fit best into a flat and sinking one.'[f]

[a] Supra *d.* [b] Cf. 220. [c] *τότ' ἤδη.* [d] See 212, note *d.* [e] *οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν* (= ne tantillum quidem) *ἀλτικός.* [f] *Say:* 'and know that hook-nosedness would best suit (*or* fit into) snub-nosedness.' *προσαρμόζειν πρός· γυπότης· σιμότης.*

Exercise 68.

235. (1) I swear by all the gods and goddesses, that I have not even received from Seuthes what he promised me in particular. He is present himself, and, as he hears me, he knows whether I am guilty of perjury or not; and, that you may still have more reason to wonder, I also swear that I have not even received what the other generals have. †Nay, not even[a] so much as some of the captains. And why then, why did I act thus? I thought, fellow-soldiers, that the more fully I shared the poverty which he then suffered, the more would he show himself my friend when it was in his power. But now I no sooner see him in prosperity, than[b] I at once *thoroughly* understand his character.

(2) As soon as they began their retreat, the enemy sallied upon them in great numbers, armed with bucklers, spears, greaves, and Paphlagonian helmets; while others got upon the houses on each side of the street that led to the fort, so that it was not safe to pursue them to the gates of it, for they threw great pieces of timber from above, which made it dangerous both to stay and to retire; and the night coming on, increased the terror. While they were engaged with the enemy under this perplexity, some god administered to them a means of safety; for one of the houses on the right hand took fire on a sudden: who set fire to it is not known; but, as soon as the house fell in, all the enemy who were in the houses[c] on the right quitted them; and Xenophon, being taught this expedient by fortune,

ordered all the houses on the left to be set on fire. These being built of wood were soon in flames, upon which the enemy quitted them also.

[a] *μὴ τοίνυν μηδέ* (ac ne quidem), though the particles are probably not found elsewhere in this connection (*Krüger*). [b] Supra, 85. 86.

[c] Cf. Gram. 1435: imitating the *attraction of prepositions* there explained.

Chap. 13. § 2. (γὰρ δή, &c.)

236. With *declarative* particles (*γάρ, ὡς, οἷα*), and the *final particles*, *ὡς, ἵνα,* the particle δή denotes that the fact is *simply* and *precisely* as stated. When a reason is introduced by *γὰρ δή*, the δή adds to the statement the implied affirmation, that the reason given is *now* a *certain fact proved by experience.*

Οὐ γὰρ δή, non enim profecto, is of common occurrence.

237. Hartung observes, that sometimes the δή does not relate to the *γάρ,* but to the preceding word, from which it is separated by the intervening particle. He quotes *Πολλὰ γὰρ δή, Cyr.* 5, 3, 8; *Φράσω γὰρ δή, Eur. Rhes.* 340; *Κωφὴν γὰρ δὴ γαῖαν ἀεικίζει μενεαίνων, Il. ω.* 54.—Klotz says that he does not understand this remark; for that, for instance, in the first passage quoted, *Πολλὰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε κἀκεῖνος ἐπαῤῥησιασάμεθα πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, the *asseveration* expressed by the particle δή only relates to *πολλά*, because the *whole sentence* is affirmed by the particles *γὰρ δή.* I cannot but think, however, that Hartung's meaning is obvious and correct; namely, that the δή sometimes does not so much *affirm* the whole clause, as attach itself to one of those words which it usually accompanies, to heighten their meaning by fixing it down *precisely* to the proper nature of the word.—Thus with an *imperative:* e. g. *φέρε γὰρ δή, κτλ.* (*Antiph. Cæd. Her.* 723): here the δή has just the same kind and degree of reference to

the imperative φέρε that it would have if no γάρ intervened.

238. The second passage Hartung translates: '*the earth* all dumb [= *senseless*] as it is' (*die* ganz stumme *Erde*); Klotz: '*mutam enim jam profecto terram violat iracundus*,' referring the δή, not to κωφήν only, but to the whole affirmation. This is a point that can hardly be decided, as the stress may equally well rest on the *whole action*, or on the notion that the *object* he wreaks his anger upon is the *dumb* earth.

Exercise 69.

239. (1) But when the Paphlagonians and Spithridates brought in the booty they had taken, Herippidas, who had posted his officers for the purpose, took every thing away from Spithridates and the Paphlagonians, merely that he might enlarge the booty he himself should deliver in to the commissioners of sale. The Paphlagonians, however, did not put up with this treatment; but, as men who had been injured and disgraced, packed up their baggage and went off by night to Sardis, to offer their services to Ariæus, confident of a good reception from him, as he too had revolted from and was making war upon the king. Agesilaus[a] took nothing to heart during this expedition so much as this desertion of Spithridates, Megabates, and the Paphlagonians.

(2) The plaintiff is so cunning, and determined to affect ignorance of what is right, that, although he has preferred a charge of perjury, upon which you are sworn to give your verdict, he declined to question the slave as to the truth of the deposition (the point about which he ought to have been most anxious), and now falsely asserts that he requires him to be delivered up for a different purpose. Is it not monstrous that he should complain of my refusal to deliver to him a freeman (for such I shall clearly prove Milyas to be);

and should not consider my witnesses hardly treated, when I offer to him a person who is confessedly a slave, and he refuses to put their evidence to the test by examining him? for he surely cannot contend that the torture is for some purposes (which he himself desires) a certain criterion of the truth; and again, for other purposes, uncertain.

[a] Insert the *terminative* μὲν δή.

Chap. 13. § 3. (δή *retrospective and resumptive.*)

240. Δή has also an extensive use in *appending* a new notion, with an accompanying *reference* to what has *immediately preceded.*

Omnino usurpatur δή particula, ubi aliquid ad ea quæ præcesserunt ita adjicitur, ut hoc *statim* ac *vix absolutâ priore re* fieri videatur (*Kl.*).

Thus Xen. Cyr. 1, 5, 1: Ἔδοσαν δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ προσελέσθαι διακοσίους τῶν ὁμοτίμων, τῶν δ' αὖ διακοσίων ἑκάστῳ τέτταρας ἔδωκαν προσελέσθαι καὶ τούτους ἐκ τῶν ὁμοτίμων· γίγνονται δὴ οὗτοι χίλιοι· κτλ., (*now* these amount *at once* to a thousand men).

(Quibus in verbis particula propterea locum habet, quod *simulac* postrema electio facta est, *jam* erunt tot homines numero. *Kl.*)

241. The *retrospective* and *continuative* force of δή is shown principally in its employment as a *resumptive* particle, both after a *parenthesis* in the strict sense, and after all remarks of a more or less parenthetical character.

Thus, Plat. Gorg. 456, c.: Δεῖ μέντοι, ὦ Σ., τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. The speaker then goes on to explain the sense in which he understands this, and having done so proceeds: Ὁ αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς. Here *we* should often use *now*, or *then:* sometimes *so*, *thus.*

So also Thuc. 1, 128: The historian having stated

that the Lacedæmonians had called upon the Athenians to drive out the pollution of the goddess (*τὸ ἄγος ἐλαύνειν τῆς Θεοῦ*) proceeds to describe *what* this pollution was; and after this continues his narrative (in chap. 127) thus: *Τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἄγος οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλαύνειν ἐκέλευον* κτλ., *this pollution* then *the Lacedæmonians*, &c.

Exercise 70.

242. (1) When after this the second expedition took place, which Xerxes, quitting his palace, and daring to assume the chief command, and collecting all the forces of Asia, conducted in person—(°an expedition) about which what man, however desirous to use exaggerated language, has not fallen short of the truth?—for he advanced to such a degree of insolent pride, that, deeming it a light task to subdue Greece, and wishing to leave such a memorial of it as should be of absolutely superhuman magnitude, he never rested till he had devised and forcibly executed what is in all men's mouths, sailed, that is, with his army through the main land, and marched on foot through the sea, by yoking together (°the shores of) the Hellespont on the one hand, and digging through Athos on the other.—Against this monarch, *I say*, filled with pride like this, and who effected works of this magnitude, the Lacedæmonians and our ancestors marched, dividing the danger between them; the former, with a thousand picked men and a few allies, to Thermopylæ against the land forces, to oppose in that pass their further progress, and our fathers (°sailed) to Artemisium, having manned sixty triremes against the whole navy of their enemies.

(2) Having then thus palpably brought forward an illegal decree, he will endeavor, assisted by his confederate Demosthenes, to do violence to the law by subtle artifices, which I will explain and announce to you beforehand, that you may not be deceived for want of

knowledge. ‡These men will not have it in their power to deny that the laws expressly declare, that a crown conferred on any citizen by the people shall be proclaimed in no other place than the assembly; but they will drag into their defence, †the law by which the festivals of Bacchus are regulated,[a] and, making use of a certain part of the law, will entrap you to listen to them, and °so producing an enactment that has no bearing upon this action, will assert that there are in the state two laws enacted relative to proclamations: one is that which I have now produced, expressly forbidding the proclamation of a crown granted by the people to be made any where but in the assembly; but there is another law, they will say, which is contrary to this, which allows the liberty of proclaiming a crown so conferred in the theatre, when the tragedies are exhibited, 'provided the people shall have so determined by their votes.' It is *then*, in accordance with this law, they will maintain, that Ctēsiphōn founded his decree.

[a] ὁ Διονυσιακὸς νόμος.

Chap. 13. § 4. (*καὶ—δή as annective*).

243. In *καὶ—δή*, the two particles retain each its proper force. The *καί appends* what follows to what preceded, and the *δή* (with that *retrospective* force that often belongs to it [241]) intimates, that from that preceding statement what is now asserted *is known*, or *may obviously be inferred*. It conveys this information with the *life* and *spirit* that usually belong to it as a descriptive particle.

244. The particles *καὶ—δή* append in this way *obvious conclusions* where we should use *so*, *just so*, &c.) *particulars in an enumeration, which must not be overlooked* [compare *καὶ—γέ* in enumerations, supra [204];

and rapid *transitions* from a *general* statement to a *particular instance* of it, &c.

1. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διϊδεῖν, κτλ. (*Pl.*)

Respicitur particulis καὶ—δή, id quod recte Hartungius docuit, ad id, quod modo dictum erat, ut hoc significetur, cum quidem nos homines simus in aliqua custodia, *etiam* istud *jam* consentaneum esse, ut non discedamus ex ea injussu ejus, qui nos dedit in custodiam (*Kl.*).

2. Ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη· καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτῃ συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη. *Aristot.* (*Eth.* 10, 8, 7.)

Ubi ideo adjecit posteriorem enuntiationem per particulas καὶ—δή Aristoteles, quod, priore sententia concessa, hoc *jam* necessario ita existumandum esse videretur (*Kl.*).

3. Οἷον ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δὴ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ γόνιμα τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει ἀλλ' οὐ δόξῃ ἐστίν (*Pl. Rep.* 2, 367, D.).

Quo in loco ὑγιαίνειν ita accedit, ut significetur ceteris rebus positis hoc fere *jam declaratum* videri, quo alacrior ac jucundior est oratio (*Kl.*).

(Klotz observes, that when καὶ—δή are used in enumerations, the meaning is, not that the notion so adduced is true *rather* than the others, but only that it is one which must not be *overlooked* in the enumeration with the rest.—To denote a proper *ascensio ad majus*, καὶ—γὲ δή must be used: Τὴν γὰρ Θεσσαλίαν ἄλλως τε οὐκ εὔπορον ἦν διϊέναι ἄνευ ἀγωγοῦ, καὶ μετὰ ὅπλων γε δή. (*Th.* 4, 78.)

4. Λείπεται δὴ στρατηγεῖν τέχνας τινάς· καὶ δὴ τηρήσαντες ἔθος τι τῶν βαρβάρων . . . ἐπιτίθενται καὶ χειροῦνται πολλούς (*Strab.* 5, 3).

5. Καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δή πως με θάπτῃ (*Pl. Phæd.* 1157, C.).

245. Hartung compares this *lively* and *sudden selection* of a single instance with the use of *jam*, in adducing examples or instances in proof of an assertion: *Facula* jam *quo de genere est* (Lucret. 2, 430).

246. This καὶ δή may be followed by another καί (= *also*); the particles καὶ δὴ καί are often preceded by

ἄλλος τε (in the proper case of ἄλλος) to convey an *especial instance* of a general statement.

Ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἀπίκετο παρὰ Ἄμασιν καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐς Σάρδις παρὰ Κροῖσον (*Hdt.* 1, 30).

Exercise 71.

247. (1) 'For what purpose, with respect to the joint application of money, is the just man more useful than others?' 'When we wish to deposit it and have it kept safe, O Socrates.' 'You mean then, do you not, when we have no occasion to use it at all, but wish it to be left in deposit?' 'Exactly so.' 'When therefore our money is useless, (then it is that) justice is useful with regard to it.' 'It would seem so.' 'And *just so*, when we have to keep a pruning-hook safe, justice is useful both for a community and for a private individual; but, when we have occasion to use it, the art of vine-dressing is useful?' 'It seems so.'

(2) 'Indeed, my son,' said he, 'to a forced obedience this is the way; but to a willing obedience, which is much the better, there is another way, and a readier; for, whomsoever men take to be more knowing than themselves in what is for their interest and advantage, him they obey with pleasure. This you may know to be true in many other cases, and particularly in that of sick people, who are very ready to send for such as may prescribe what is fit for them to do: so too at sea, the people that are on board are very ready and zealous to obey their pilots; and travellers are extremely averse to part with such as they think know the roads better than themselves: but when men think that they shall be injured by their obedience, they will neither yield to punishments nor be raised by rewards; for even presents are not willingly received by any man to his own prejudice.'

Chap. 13. § 5. (καὶ δή.)

248. In καὶ δή the δή has often its *temporal* meaning (= *jam*), the καί having that of *etiam;* so that the καὶ δή = *even now; already;* less commonly *immediately*, which meaning, however, it always has with the *future*, and when any thing *is* to happen.

With respect to the καί, it is to be remarked that sometimes it is to be taken separately, in the sense of *and* or *also*, and sometimes in close connection with δή, as in the kindred forms, καὶ πρίν, καὶ πάλαι, when it may be rendered *even* (*Hartung*).

249. Hartung also observes, that in many instances the δή in καὶ δή may have what he calls its *metaphorical* meaning, of *lively* and *pointed annexation* with added *importance;* and that the meaning of καὶ δή is decidedly temporal, only when it stands in the middle of a clause, or begins the apodosis: Προτερέων δὲ τῆς ὁδοῦ ὥρα καὶ δὴ φεύγοντας τοὺς Πέρσας (already *in flight*), *Hdt.* 9, 66; Ἐπεί τε ἐξεμάθετε, . . . καὶ δὴ λόγον οὐδένα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ποιέεσθε (*you* at once *make no account*), *id.* 7, 2; Ἐν ᾧ δὲ ταῦτα ἐβουλεύοντο, καὶ δὴ βασιλεὺς παραμειψάμενος εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα κατέστησεν ἐναντίαν τὴν φάλαγγα (*Xen. An.* 1, 10, 10: = ἤδη. *Kr.*). Ὡς ἄν μοι βέλτιστα καὶ τάχιστα δοκεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι, καὶ δὴ πειράσομαι λέγειν, *I will* immediately (*or*, at once) *endeavor to state* (*Dem. Phil.* 4, 4, 44).

250. When this temporal καὶ δή is followed by another καί, the second καί does not belong in sense to the καὶ δή, but to one of the following words (*Hartung*), = *et jam etiam; atque jam etiam* (Kl.).

251. When καὶ δή occurs in replies, the καί denotes *readiness to meet the wishes* of the other party, the δή intimating *assent*. Here the force of δή belongs to what Hartung calls the *determinative* meaning of the particle.

Βλέψον κάτω. "Καὶ δή βλέπω." (*Aristoph. Av.* 175.)

Exercise 72.

252. (1) But so soon as Cleombrŏtus began to advance towards the enemy, in the first place, even before the bulk of the army was aware that he was in motion, the cavalry had *already* engaged, and that of

the Lacedæmonians had quickly been defeated, and in their flight had fallen in amongst their own heavy-armed; and moreover the heavy-armed of the Thebans were making their attack. However, that the body posted round Cleombrotus had at first the better in the fight, any man may have a certain proof from hence; for they could not have taken him up and carried him off yet alive, unless those who fought before him had the better of it at that time.

(2) Cyrus's men were thus occupied. But the Assyrians had *already* dined (*p*), and were forming themselves with a great deal of resolution. ‡The king was marshalling them himself, driving around in his chariot; and he exhorted them to this effect: 'Men of Assyria! now is the time for you to quit yourselves like brave men, for now you are fighting for your lives, for the country where you were born, for the houses in which you were bred, *aye and* for your wives and children, and for every thing valuable that you possess. If you conquer, you will remain masters of all these as before; if you are defeated, be assured that you will give them all up to the enemy.

(3) *Socr.* But, my dear Phædrus, I shall expose myself, if I, †who am no poet,[a] place myself in competition with a good one, and speak extempore on the same subject.

Phæd. Do you know how the case stands? Don't give yourself any more of these airs, for I have that to say, which will hardly fail to force you to speak if I utter it.

Socr. Then do not say it on any account.

Phæd. Nay, but here I do say it *at once*:—and the speech shall be an oath; for I swear to you—but by which, by which of the gods? shall it be by this plane-tree?—that, unless you make a speech to me before this very tree, I will never again either show or repeat to you another speech by any author whomsoever.

Socr. Ah, rascal, how well you have found out the

way to compel †a lover of speeches and arguments[b] to do whatever you bid him!

[a] ἰδιώτης. [b] ἀνὴρ φιλόλογος.

Chap. 13. § 6. (δή *in lively suppositions.*)

253. Δή, especially καὶ δή, is also used in making *suppositions* in a *lively, spirited* way. The δή, according to Hartung, here denotes *indifference.*

254. In suppositions, δή or καὶ δή is used in two ways:

1) With a conditional particle, and the *subjunctive* or *optative* mood.

"Οπως δὲ χρὴ τάσσειν εἰς μάχην στρατίαν . . . καὶ εἴ γε δή σοι . . . πολέμιοι ἐπιφανεῖεν, πῶς χρὴ ἀντικαθιστάναι, κτλ. (*Xen. Cyr.* 1, 6, 43.)

2) *In the indicative.* [καὶ δή = *fac, finge.*]

Καὶ δή σφεας ποιέω ἴσους ἐκείνοισι εἶναι (*Hdt.* vii. 10, 2), *Well, then, I set them down as equal in number to the former.*

Exercise 73.

255. (1) 'And how *pray*, father,' said he, 'shall one be best able to raise such an opinion of oneself?' 'My son,' said he, 'there is no readier way to appear wise and knowing in things wherein you desire to appear so, than to be in reality knowing in those things; and if you consider †each particular case by itself,[a] you will find that what I say is true: for if you would appear a good husbandman when you are not a good one, or a good horseman, a good physician, a good player on the flute, or (°a good) any thing else (°when you really are not so), consider how many contrivances you must use in order to appear so. And even suppose that you could even prevail with a great many people to commend you, that you might gain[b] a

reputation, and if you should purchase fine instruments, and furniture belonging to each of the arts, †scarcely would you have succeeded in deceiving them, when[c] presently, on coming some time or other to give proof of your skill, you would be convicted, and would appear an arrogant boaster.

(2) 'Listen then,' said Cyrus, '([o]to determine) whether you think my advice to the purpose. I have very often hunted on the borders of your territory and that of the Armenians, with all the Persians that were with me; and, more than that, I have gone thither †before now,[d] taking likewise from hence several horsemen from amongst my companions here.' 'Therefore,'[e] said Cyaxares, 'by doing just the same things now, you will pass unsuspected; but if a much greater force should appear than what you used to have with you in hunting, this at once[f] would excite suspicion.' 'But,' said Cyrus, 'one may also frame a pretext that would be very plausible, both here and there also, *if that is* any one should report it there that I intend to undertake a great hunting-expedition; and,' said he, 'I would openly desire from you a body of horse.' 'Excellent,' said Cyaxares; 'and I shall refuse to give you any but a very few, as intending to march myself to our garrisons that lie towards Assyria. †For indeed I do really,'[g] said he, 'intend to go thither, in order to strengthen them as much as possible.'

[a] καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον. as Dem. Cor. 230, 2: Βούλομαι δὲ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐξετάσαι·—the καθ' ἕν being *adverbial*. [b] 'Optativus λάβοις quoniam ab cogitatione Cambysis omnia pendent, legitimus est.' *Bornemann.* [c] ἄρτι τε ἐξηπατηκὼς εἴης ἂν καί, &c. Compare ἅμα—καί, 83; ἤδη τε . . . καί, &c. [d] ἤδη. [e] τοίνυν. [f] τοῦτο ἤδη, i. e. *without going on to other suspicious circumstances.* [g] καὶ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι.

Chap. 13. § 7. (μὲν δή. δὲ δή.)

256. *a*) **Μὲν δή** is generally a *concluding* formula, in which the force of μέν is *confirmative*, that of δή

retrospective; dismissing the statement made as now completed.

b) A *summing up* or recapitulation, introduced by μὲν δή, is usually followed by a *transition* to a new subject, or a new part of the same subject (usually a *fuller explanation* of it), introduced by δέ, or sometimes by δὲ δή.

Χρυσάντας μὲν δὴ οὕτως εἶπεν· ἀνέστη δ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ Φεραύλας Πέρσης (*Xen.*).

So in the common formula, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταῦτα, in Plato, &c.

c) In the progress of a narrative μὲν δή is often used, where *we* should employ *so, accordingly;* i. e. when the fact stated is *founded* upon what preceded.

d) In μὲν δή, as Klotz observes, each particle retains its usual force, and the μέν is usually followed by its correspon-ive δέ. But the two particles have a more blended meaning in the combinations ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ἦ μὲν δή, οὐ μὲν δή, καὶ μὲν δή, γε μὲν δή, in which Hartung and others would write μένδη as one word (= *vero;* the μέν having here an *adversative* force). Καὶ μένδη καὶ Τάνταλόν γε εἰσεῖδον, et *vero* etiam Tantalum videbam. *Pl. Protag.* 315, c. Βασιλικοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες οὐ μένδη ἐπιστήμονές γε. *Pl. Phædr.* 266, c.

257. The particles δὲ δή retain, in this combination, each its usual force, so that δὲ δή = *autem jam.*

Ἐρεῖ δὲ δή τις, ὦ κακὰ μαντεύματα (*Eur. Phœn.* 589).

258. As each of the particles, δέ and δή, often follows a particle or pronoun, to add emphasis to it, or give it prominence and distinction, so the *two particles* are often used together in the same way.

a) Thus, εἰ δὲ δή, *si vero jam;* ἐὰν δὲ δή, *quum vero jam;* νῦν δὲ δή, *nunc vero jam;* τοῦτο δὲ δή, *hoc vero jam.*

b) Here *we* should either merely pronounce the *if*, &c. with emphasis, or use a strengthening adverb of time or degree: εἰ (ἐάν) δὲ δή, *and if', and if indeed* (*really, now, after all,* &c.); *and now if.*

Exercise 74.

259. When there came to me a person who was going to Persia, and bade me give him the letter I had written home; and I told the captain, for[a] he knew

where the letter lay, to run and fetch it, he, accordingly, set off a-running; but that young man, armed as he was with corslet and sword, followed after his captain; nay more,[b] the rest of his company, seeing him run, ran off with him; and all of them came back again, and brought me the letter. 'Thus,' said he, 'at all events, this company of mine is very exact in executing all the instructions they receive from you.' ‡The rest, as was natural, laughed †at this guard and attendance on the letter;[c] †but Cyrus said: 'O Zeus, and all you gods! why what men then have we for our companions! They are so easily won by attentions, that many of them might be made one's friends for a little portion of meat; and they are such obedient persons,[d] that they obey before they understand what they are ordered to do. For my part, I do not know what sort of men we should wish the soldiers to be, unless it be just such!' Thus Cyrus, laughing all the time, praised the soldiers.

[a] Supra, 152. [b] Supra, 218. [c] ἐπὶ τῇ δορυφορίᾳ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς. [d] A new clause would follow with δέ.

Chap. 14. Δῆθεν, δήπου, δήπουθεν.

260. Δῆθεν (from δή and θέν, a weakened form of θήν[1] = *scilicet*) is properly an *affirmative* particle, but is mostly used either of a *false pretence* or *notion* (= πρόφασιν, or ὡς προσεποιοῦντο: *in appearance; as they [he, I] wished it to be thought*), or as an *ironical* affirmation (*scilicet, videlicet; quasi vero*). It is, however, sometimes, though seldom, used as a *simple explanatory* particle.

Ἀπεπεμψάμην τὸν υἱόν, μέγα φρονῶν, ὅτι δῆθεν (= *videlicet, scilicet*) τῆς βασιλέως θυγατρὸς ὑψοίμην τὸν ἐμὸν υἱὸν γαμέτην (*Xen.*). Τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἄγος οἱ Λακεδαι-

[1] As Æsch. *Prom. Vinct.* 928: Σὺ θην ἃ χρήζεις, ταῦτ' ἐπιγλωσσᾳ Διός.

μόνιοι ἐλαύνειν ἐκέλευον δῆθεν τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες, Περικλέα δὲ εἰδότες τὸν Ξανθίππου προσεχόμενον αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν μητέρα (*Th.*).

261. Δήπου (*opinor, ni fallor*), *I imagine, I suppose, surely.*

Οὐ δήπου τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων πονηρότερον προσήκει εἶναι (*Xen.*). On γὲ δήπου, cf. supra 189.

Δήπου often stands as the last word in a clause (e. g. in *Dem.*): Ὅτι γὰρ εἰς τοῦτο περιστήσεται τὰ πράγματα, ἐὰν τὰ παρόντα προώμεθα, σχεδὸν ἴσμεν ἅπαντες δήπου (*Dem.*).

262. Δήπουθεν (from δήπου and θήν: compare δῆθεν), *I hope, I suppose, surely* (*nempe*, ironically: *opinor*). Ἄνθρωπος εἶ δήπουθεν· οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδὲ εἷς ᾧ μὴ κακόν τι γέγονεν ἢ γενήσεται (*Phil.*). Ἐγὼ δὲ ἦν ἱππεύειν μάθω, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἵππου γένωμαι, τὰ τοῦ ἱππικεντούρου δήπουθεν διαπράξομαι (*Xen.*).

Exercise 75.

263. (1) But, after flinging away all these advantages, and all but assisting him in securing them for himself, by Heavens, shall we then inquire to whom these consequences are owing! Yes; for we shall not allow that we are ourselves in fault; that I well know: for even in the dangers of the field not one of those who run away accuses himself, but (every man) lays the blame on the general, on those about him, or any body rather than himself; but, for all that, the defeat of the army is due, I presume, to the fugitives collectively; for he who now accuses the rest might himself have stood his ground, and, if every man did this, they would be victorious.

(2) The Lacedaemonians, on hearing this, did not let their anger appear to the Athenians (for they had not sent their embassy to obstruct their designs, but to offer counsel, they said, to their state; and, besides, they were at that time on very friendly terms with

them, owing to their zeal against the Mede); in secret, however, they were annoyed at failing in their wish. So the ambassadors of each state returned home without any complaint being made.

(3) Meanwhile the Mantineans, and to those to whom the truce had been granted, going out under the pretext of gathering herbs and fire-wood, secretly went away in small parties, picking up at the same time the things for which *they professed* to have left the camp; but when they had now proceeded some distance from Olpæ, they began to retreat[48] at a quicker pace. The Ambraciots and the rest, as many as happened thus to have gone out with them in a body, when they found that they were gone away, themselves also pushed forward, and began running, on purpose to overtake them.

Chap. 15. Δῆτα.

264. *a*) Δῆτα[1] combines a *confirmatory* force with the notion of *approval* and *assent;* and serves, like δή, only in a higher degree, to *render prominent* and *more exactly define* the word which stands before it. It may be joined with all the parts of speech, in order to define them, whether by *extension* or *restriction* of their meaning.

b) After interrogatives it is either *consecutive* (i. e. relates to a preceding statement) = *then;* or *assumes* in an impatient vehement way the answer it confidently

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[1] *Krüger* considers the particle to come from δή or δέ. and εἶτα. Rather the τα in both words is of the same origin. *Klotz* thinks it related to the old *indefinite* pronoun τος; so that δῆτα = *jam aliquâ tenus; jam aliquâ ratione; = jam sane; jam quidem; jam profecto; jam certe;* since what we assert *to be true somehow or other* (though we can't tell how), we assert to be *certainly* true. Hartung thinks the τα identical with κα in αὐτίκα, &c., and τε in τότε, &c. (τα being Æolic, κα Doric), both being from the old *demonstrative* pronoun τος, as πότε, πόκα; ποῖος, κοῖος, &c.

expects: sometimes it has the force of *really, indeed* [ἔσωσα δῆτά σε; *Œd. T.* 558].

c) It is often used with *imperatives* (=*do, do pray*, &c.); and very often in *replies* (usually with the repetition of the word assented to), where it denotes *unconditional emphatic assent*. It frequently has an *ironical* force (=*forsooth*).

d) Also, ἦ δῆτα, *sane profecto; then—really; indeed;* οὐ δῆτα, *minime vero; nequaquam;* μὴ δῆτα, *nay do not*, &c.; *do not, do not;* καὶ δῆτα, *and indeed* (e. g. in a question which it suddenly occurs to the speaker to put with reference to the subject of discourse).

(Μὴ δῆτα *prohibitio est cum affectu asseverandi,* quemadmodum οὐ δῆτα *negatio cum asseveratione* (*Devar.*).

Electra: Δὸς δῆτα πατρὸς τοῖσδε τιμωρὸν δίκην (*Eur.*). Μὴ δῆτα δράσῃς ταῦτά γ' αἰτοῦμαί σ' ἐγώ. —Τί δῆτ' ἐν ὅλβῳ μὴ σαφεῖ βεβηκότες Οὐ ζῶμεν ὡς ἥδιστα μὴ λυπούμενοι; (*Eur.*) Ἀπ' ἐχθρῶν δῆτα πολλὰ μανθάνουσιν οἱ σοφοί (*Aristoph.*). Ταῦτα δῆτ' ἀνασχετά; (*Soph.*) Ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα, ἤ τι ἄλλο;—Κοινωνήματα δῆτα (*Pl.*).

Exercise 76.

265. *Socr.* What[a] you state is a marvellous fact and strange, O Hippias; and tell me °now, is not your wisdom able to improve in virtue those who associate with it and learn (°of you)?

Hip. Yes, and (°to improve them) greatly, O Socrates.

Socr. But then, *whilst* you were able to improve the children of the Inucēni, were you unable to improve those of the Spartiates?

Hip. Far from it.

Socr. Then are the Sicciots *really* anxious to become better, but the Lacedæmonians not anxious?

Hip. Assuredly, I imagine the Lacedæmonians also are anxious (°for improvement).

Socr. Did they then shun your company from want of money?

Hip. *Certainly not*, since they have money enough.

Socr. Then *how in the world* can it be, that, though they are anxious (°for improvement), and have money, and you are able to be of the greatest benefit to them, they have not sent you away loaded with riches?

[a] In this passage δῆτα occurs three times.

Chap. 16. Διό. διόπερ.

266. Διό (=δι' ὅ) is *wherefore; for which reason.* Διόπερ (=δι' ὅπερ) has the same meaning, rendered however more emphatic by the addition of the περ.

267. Διό is sometimes followed by καί, *wherefore also*, or δή; διὸ δή, *for which very reason.*

(A very rare meaning of διόπερ is *propterea quod*, because. Ἀλλ' οἶμαι μέγα τοῖς τοιούτοις ὑπάρχει λόγοις ἡ παρ' ἑκάστου βούλησις, διόπερ ῥᾷστον ἁπάντων ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἐξαπατῆσαι (*Dem. Ol.* 3, 19. So in *Xen. Mem.* 4, 8, 7).

Exercise 77.

268. I think that you have often admitted and acknowledged that[a] there is a twofold method of treatment, both with respect to the body and with respect to the soul; and that the one is ministerial, by which we are enabled to procure food, if our bodies are hungry; drink, if they are thirsty; and, if they are cold, garments, coverlids, shoes, and all other things which our bodies require. And I purposely speak to you through the same images, in order that you may understand the more easily. For when any one supplies these things, being either a retail tradesman or a merchant, or a manufacturer of any of them,

a baker, a cook, a weaver, a shoemaker, or tanner, it is not at all surprising that such a person should appear, both to himself and others, to be concerned in the management[b] of the body, †that is, to all who are ignorant[c] that, besides all these, there is a gymnastic and medicinal art, to which the °true management of the body really belongs, and whose duty it is to rule over all these arts, and to use their respective productions, through knowing what meats or drinks are good and bad for the health of the body, *whereas*[d] all those others are ignorant of this; *for which very reason* all those other arts are servile, ministerial, and base, as regards the management of the body, but the gymnastic art and medicine are justly the mistresses of these.

[a] ὡς ἄρα, supra 120. [b] θεραπεία, i. e. the true fostering and cultivating care of it. [c] παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότι. [d] δέ. Cf. 224.

Chap. 17. Διότι.

269. Διότι (= διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι) is (*a*) *because*, and (*b*) in indirect questions, *wherefore*, *why*.

a) Ὑμεῖς Μένωνα μὲν τὸν μυλωθρὸν ἀπεκτείνατε διότι παῖδα ἐλεύθερον ἐκ Πελλήνης ἔσχεν ἐν τῷ μυλῶνι (*Dinarch*).

b) Ἐάν τίς μοι λέγῃ, διότι καλόν ἐστιν ὁτιοῦν, κτλ. (*Pl. Phæd.* 100, c). But in this passage Baiter and Sauppe print δι' ὅτι.

c) In the sense of *that* (= ὅτι), διότι hardly occurs in the best writers, but stands Her. 2, 50: Pl. Ep. 1; 309. It is also found in a letter of *Philip's*, and in a *decree* in Dem. de Coron.

Exercise 78.

270. The next day the thirty Athenian ships, and as many of the Corcyræan as were sea-worthy, put out and sailed to the harbor at Sybŏta, in which

the Corinthians were anchored, wishing to know whether[a] they would engage.[b] But they, having put out with their ships from the land,[c] and formed them in line at sea, remained quiet; not intending voluntarily to begin a battle, since they saw that fresh ships from Athens had joined them; and that they themselves were involved in many difficulties, with regard to the safe keeping of the prisoners they had on board, † and because there were no means of refitting their ships[d] in so deserted a place. Nay, they were thinking of their voyage home, how they should return; being afraid that the Athenians might consider the treaty to have been broken, because they had come to blows, and not allow them to sail away.

[a] εἰ, which, like our '*if*,' is also used in the sense of *whether*. Cf. next Chapter. [b] Cf. Part I. [c] ναῦς ἄραντες. The *usual* form is ναυσὶν ἄραντες. [d] καὶ ἐπισκευὴν οὐκ οὖσαν τῶν νεῶν· the καί connecting *different* constructions.

Chap. 18. § 1. *Εἰ, if—whether.*

(The general construction of conditional clauses has been given in Part I.)

271. *a*) In Attic writers, when two conditional clauses are placed in contrast by εἰ (ἐὰν) μὲν . . . εἰ (ἐὰν) δὲ μή, in the first such a general apodosis as καλῶς ἐστι· ἡσυχάσω, &c. (*it is well; well and good; be it so.* or the like), is sometimes omitted, as containing a thought which may be easily supplied, and the discourse hastens on to the following more important thought.

b) The verb is sometimes omitted after εἰ, &c. Thus in εἰ μὴ διά = *if* it were *not for; if* it had not been *for*, as in εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν κύνα, *but for the dog.* The verb omitted is usually ἐκωλύθην (-θησαν, &c.) e. g. ἐκεῖνα δὲ τούτοις ἂν προσῆν, εἰ μὴ διὰ τούτους (= εἰ μὴ διὰ τούτους ἐκωλύθη προσεῖναι).

c) So too *εἰ μή* receives the meaning of *nisi*. *Οὐ κελεύσω, εἰ μὴ ξυμφέρον* (*Th.*). *Ἡμῖν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν ἄλλο εἰ μὴ ὅπλα καὶ ἀρετή* (*Xen.*).

Exercise 79.

272. (1) And now we have at length[a] both fought and won the decisive battle; we have both Sardis and Crœsus in our hands, have taken Babylon, and[10] borne down all before us; and °yet by[b] Mithras! yesterday if I had not used my fists against several persons, I should not have been able to get near you. †When[1] however[c] you had taken me by the hand, and bade me stay by you, then I was at once[d] an object of envy, because I passed the whole day with you fasting! Now, therefore, if it can be any how managed, that those who have been the most deserving may have the greatest share of you (°well and good); but, if not,[e] I am ready to make a proclamation once again[f] in your name, (°to the effect) that all should quit you except us, your original friends.

(2) Beginning from childhood, they both teach and admonish them as long as they live. For as soon as any one understands what is said, nurse, mother, pedagogue, and the father himself, vie with each other in this, how the boy may become as good as possible; in every word and deed teaching and pointing out to him that this is just, and that unjust; this is honorable, and that base; this is holy, and that unholy; and this you must do, and that you must not do. And if the boy obeys willingly, it is well; but if not,[e] like a tree twisted and bent, they make him straight by threats and blows.

[a] Now at length—*νῦν δή*. [b] '*μά* dixit non *νή*, quia *negat* . . . ad Cyrum accedere potuisse nisi pugnis cum multis certasset' (*Bornemann*).
[c] *ἐπεί γε* (196) *μέντοι* (184). [d] *ἤδη*. [e] *εἰ δὲ μή*. See 273.
[f] *πάλιν αὖ*, 136.

Exercise 80. (εἰ μὴ διά.)

273. (1) And from this delay, Archidamus incurred the greatest censure, though he had, †even while the war was gathering,[a] †been thought to show a want of spirit,[b] and to favor the Athenians, by not heartily recommending hostilities. And again, after the army was mustered, the stay that was made at the Isthmus, and his slowness on the rest of the march, †gave occasion for charges against him,[c] but most of all his stopping at Œnoe. For the Athenians during this time were carrying in their property, and the Peloponnesians thought, that by advancing against them quickly they would have found every thing still out, but for his dilatoriness.

(2) Again, tell me with respect to Cimon. Did not they whom he took care of, pass a sentence of ostracism upon him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years? And did they not do the very same to Themistocles, and beside punish him with exile? And did they not sentence Miltiades, the conqueror at Marathon, to be thrown into the pit;[d] and would he not have °actually been thrown into it but for the president of the Prytanes?[e]

[a] καὶ ἐν τῇ ξυναγωγῇ τοῦ πολέμου. [b] δοκῶν μαλακὸς εἶναι (the *infin.* and *partcp.* of the *present* (as they are usually called) belong to the *imperfect* also, and may have its meaning of a *pluperf. even* after the present. *Kr.* [c] διέβαλεν αὐτόν by *prosopopœia.* [d] βάραθρον, a *gulf* or *pit* at Athens, behind the Acropolis, into which prisoners were thrown. [e] The president (ἐπιστάτης) of the Prytanes is here called ὁ Πρύτανις.

Chap. 18. § 2. (εἰ δὲ μή.)

274. *a*) The form εἰ δὲ μή (*sin minus*), *but if not*, often occurs without a verb; e. g. after μάλιστα μέν (properly, *potissimum quidem* —) *if possible;* of the thing to be done *by preference*, if it *can* be done.

Μάλιστα μὲν εὑρετὴς γίγνου τῶν βελτίστων· εἰ δὲ μή, μιμοῦ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὀρθῶς ἔχοντα (*Isocr.*).

b) This *εἰ δὲ μή*, having become a *standing formula*, was often used after *ἐὰν μέν* (where one should expect *ἐὰν δὲ μή*). Also after *negative notions* it is found introducing the *opposite* supposition (though this is here *affirmative*, and would be introduced by *εἰ δέ*, if the verb were repeated); the strict opposition being neglected from its having become the regular office of *εἰ δὲ μή* to express, *but on the contrary supposition; otherwise.*

Ἐὰν μέν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ λέγειν ἀληθές, ξυνομολογήσατε· εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε (*Pl.*).

c) The notion indicated by *εἰ δὲ μή* is often not opposed to any preceding one stated in words (introduced by *εἰ* [*μέν*]), but to one that is merely *implied* by the statement previously made.

Ἀπῄτει τὰ χρήματα· εἰ δὲ μή, πολεμήσειν ἔφη αὐτοῖς (*Xen.*). *Πόλεμον οὐκ εἴων ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναγκασθήσεσθαι ἔφασαν φίλους ποιεῖσθαι οὓς οὐ βούλονται* (*Th.*).

Exercise 81.

275. (1) With respect to our own ancestors, no man can prove that in the long succession of previous ages they attempted to subject to themselves any city, whether small or great; whereas all men know, that the Lacedæmonians, ever since they came into the Peloponnesus, have, in all their actions and all their deliberations, made it their sole object to subject to themselves, if possible, the whole Greek nation, but at all events the Peloponnesians.

(2) After she had told me every thing, I said: '†Be sure not to tell a soul of this:[a] if you do, no part of our agreement will stand. But I expect you to give me ocular proof of your assertions; for I don't want

words, but [a]desire that the fact should be openly discovered, if[b] it is as you say.'

(3) These actions, O men of Athens, are noble actions to record, an honor to those who performed them, and the imperishable glory of our state: not [a]so however what Leocrates has done, but [a]rather he has voluntarily sullied with disgrace the glory that our city has accumulated from the earliest ages. If therefore you put him to death, you will be reputed by all the states of Greece to hate such actions, as much as they do; but, if not, you will both rob your forefathers of their ancient glory, and inflict a great injury upon your fellow-citizens.

[a] *Say:* '([a] see) that no man (*μηδεὶς ἀνθρώπων*) hears of this.' *ὅπως μή c. futuro indicativi.* Part I. 287. Gr. 799. [b] *εἴπερ.*

Chap. 18. § 3. (*εἰ μή.*)

276. The particles *εἰ μή* often stand without a verb, in the sense of *nisi.*

In this sense they may follow *negatives: οὐκ, οὐδείς, οὐδεὶς ἄλλος,* &c. (as *ἀλλ' ἤ, ἀλλά,* or *ἤ* do. Cf. 53); or an *interrogative* that *implies* a negation.

a) *Οὐ κελεύσω εἰ μὴ ξυμφέρον* (*Th.*). [Compare *our* use of *unless:* e. g. *don't do it* unless convenient to yourself.]

b) *Ἡμῖν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν ἄλλο εἰ μὴ ὅπλα καὶ ἀρετή* (*Xen.*).

Exercise 82.

277. The Athenians, therefore, when preparations had been made on each side, both by deeds and words, sailed in the night to Minōa, an island off Megara, with six hundred heavy-armed, under the command of Hippocrates, and posted themselves in an excavated

piece of ground, from which they used to make their bricks for the walls,[a] and °which[b] was not far off; while the troops, with Demosthenes, the other commander, consisting of light-armed Platæans, besides peripŏli,[c] placed themselves in ambuscade in the ground consecrated to Mars, which was at a less distance. Now no one was aware of this but those who were charged with the execution of it. When day was about to dawn, the traitors amongst the Megareans did as follows. They had for a long time past used means to secure the opening of the gates, and with the consent of the officer in command, in the guise of privateers, to carry on a cart during the night a boat worked by sculls, along the trench down to the sea, and so sail out; and before it was day they brought it again on the cart, and took it as far as the wall through the gates; that the Athenians in Minoa,[d] as they pretended,[e] might not know what precautions to take, no boat being visible in the harbor.

[a] *To make bricks for the walls*, πλινθεύειν τὰ τείχη, a construction hardly to be found elsewhere (*Kr.*). [b] καί without ὅ. [c] καὶ ἕτεροι περίπολοι. Cf. ἔχων ναῦς ἑτέρας Κύρου πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν (Xen. An. 1, 4) *alias naves quæ Cyri erant* = præterea Cyri naves (*Kr.*). The *Peripoli* were the young men from ten to twenty. Cf. Gr. Antiqq.
[d] Gr. 1433. Jelf, § 645. [e] δή supra, 233, *d*.

Chap. 18. § 4. (εἰ μὴ εἰ.)

278. When εἰ μή has the meaning of *except*, another εἰ is sometimes subjoined; thus εἰ μὴ εἰ = *nisi si; except if, unless:* the predicate of εἰ μή being omitted.

Ὁ χρηματιστικὸς πρὸς τὸ κερδαίνειν τὴν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τοῦ μανθάνειν οὐδενὸς ἀξίαν φήσει, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ (*Pl.*).

Exercise 83.

279. *Socr.* Well then, if these things are true, Polus, what is the great utility of rhetoric? For, from what has been now agreed on, every one ought especially to beware of acting unjustly, in the belief that (°by so acting) he will sustain great evil. Is it not so?

Pol. Certainly.

Socr. And if a man has committed injustice, either himself, or any one else for whom he has regard, he ought of his own accord to betake himself thither, where as soon as possible he will be punished, to a judge as to a physician, taking every pains lest the disease of injustice becoming inveterate should render the soul corrupt and incurable; †or what must we say,[a] Polus, if[b] our former admissions are to stand? Do not these things necessarily harmonize with the former in this, but in no other way?

Pol. For what else can we say, Socrates?

Socr. For the purpose, then, of excusing injustice, our own, or that of our parents, or friends, or children, or country, when it acts unjustly, rhetoric is of no use to us at all, Polus [nor *is* it of any use], unless any one supposes that he ought especially to accuse himself, and afterwards his relatives, and any other of his friends, who may have acted unjustly, and not conceal the crime, but bring it to light, in order that he may be punished, and restored to health; moreover, that he should compel both himself and the others to lay aside fear, and with his eyes shut, and in a manly way, deliver himself up, as to a physician, to be cut and cauterised, pursuing the good and the beautiful, without paying any regard to what is painful; if he has committed a wrong worthy of stripes, delivering himself up to be beaten; if of bonds, to be bound; if of a fine, to pay it; if of exile, to be banished; if of death, to die; being himself the first accuser of him-

self, and others his relatives; not sparing either himself or them, but employing rhetoric for this very purpose, that, the crimes being exposed, they may be freed from the greatest of evils, injustice. Shall we say thus, Polus, or not?

[a] ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; (πῶς λέγωμεν est *deliberantis*, quid dicendum sit; πῶς λέγομεν autem *quærentis*, quid dicatur ac statuatur. *Stallbaum.*)
[b] εἴπερ (= *siquidem*).

Chap. 18. § 5. (εἰ καί. καὶ εἰ.)

280. *Εἰ καί, etsi, although;* but sometimes, *even if.* *Καὶ εἰ = even if* (*etiam si; vel si; etiam tum, si*): here the *even*, preceding the *supposition*, marks it as an *improbable* and *extreme* condition, or, at all events, as the *most unfavorable* that can well be conceived.

281. Hartung says that in καὶ εἰ the καί (as in καίπερ) has a *heightening effect*, and this force affects only the hypothesis or conditional particle; whereas in εἰ καί the καί has not any heightening effect; the particles imply no *ascensio in majus;* and moreover the force of the particle affects *the whole contents of the concessive clause*, not merely the conditional particle.

282. Hartung also objects to Hermann's statement, that καὶ εἰ leaves it doubtful, whether the supposition really exists or is merely assumed, whereas εἰ καί signifies that the thing *really is as we say.* Klotz defends Hermann; but the example in the first extract of the following Exercise at once disproves the notion, for Demosthenes there uses εἰ καί, though the supposition is pointedly stated to be inconsistent with the fact.

283. *a*) Sauppe says: Utraque (καὶ εἰ et εἰ καί) exprimunt ei rei quæ periodo primariâ continetur aliquid repugnare, sed eam nihilominus vel esse vel fieri. *Καὶ εἰ* vero efficiunt, ut ea sola res, quæ periodo conditionali profertur, repugnare videatur:

præposita particula conditionali (*εἰ καί*) efficitur, ut res aliqua, quæ cum aliis compluribus (*καί*) vel sit vel esse possit, repugnare, sed nihil valere dicatur. Ita *καὶ εἰ* particulæ vim eorum, quæ sequuntur, valde adaugent, *εἰ καί* minus efferunt: quanquam apparet *εἰ καί* sæpe in locum particularum *καὶ εἰ* substitui posse (*Sauppe, ad Dem. Ol.* 2, 19).

Τῆς γῆς κρατοῦντες, καὶ εἰ θαλάττης εἴργοιντο, δύναιντ' ἂν καλῶς διαζῆν (*Xen.*). *Ἡγεῖτο ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ ὠφελεῖν τοὺς φίλους, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς μέλλοι εἴσεσθαι* (*Lys.*). *Καὶ εἰ μηδένα ἀνθρώπων ᾐσχύνου, τοὺς θεούς ἐχρῆν σε δεδιέναι* (*Lys.*). *Μὴ ἀτιμάσωμεν εἰπεῖν, εἰ καί τῳ σμικρότερον δοκεῖ εἶναι* (*Pl.*). *Τὰ δίκαια πάντες, ἐὰν καὶ μὴ βούλωνται, αἰσχύνονται μὴ πράττειν* (*Dem.*).

284. *b*) I own that I cannot perceive any certain distinction beyond this, that the *καί* in *καὶ εἰ* adds emphasis to the whole contents of the conditional clause; in the *καί* it usually points out a *particular notion* in the supposition, whether as opposed to the true state of the case or not.

In *εἰ καὶ* (like *etsi*) the *καί* (as also *μηδέ* after *εἰ*) often relates to some following notion: e. g. Herod. 5, 8: *εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, siquidem etiam Athenienses.*

Exercise 84.

285. (1) We must look to the truth, not to the contrivances by which men like you patch up a plausible story. Besides, good heavens! suppose it were ever so true that you had paid the portion (which you have not) who is to blame for that? Yourselves; for you took my property as a security. Did not Aphŏbus take possession of my estate (for which judgment was given against him) ten whole years before he became your brother-in-law? And was it right that you should recover every thing, while I, who have obtained a judgment, an oppressed orphan, and the loser of

a real portion, who alone of all mankind ought to have been exempted from the risk of costs, am thus reduced to distress, and have recovered nothing at all, though I have been ready to accede to any terms of your own proposing that were fair and reasonable?

(2) I know that the king would grant even the Mysians many guides, and give them many hostages, as a security to conduct them out of his territories without fraud; that would level roads for them, °aye even if they insisted upon being sent away in chariots. And I know °too that for us he would do all this with the utmost alacrity, if he saw us preparing to settle in his country.

(3) O Eryximachus, it is fair that you should either stop my hiccup or speak for me, till it is over. And (°they tell me) that Eryximachus replied: 'Well, I will do both; for I will speak in your turn, and you, when you have done °hiccuping, shall speak in mine. And, whilst I am speaking, hold your breath for a long time together, and if your hiccup chooses to stop, well and good, but if not, gargle your throat with water; but, if by chance it is very violent, take something to tickle your nostrils with, and (°make yourself) sneeze; and if you do this two or three times, even if it is exceedingly violent, it will stop.' 'You can't begin your speech too soon,' said Aristophanes; 'and I will do what you tell me.'

Chap. 18. § 6. (*οὐδ' εἰ. εἴ τις*, &c.)

286. *a*) In *οὐδὲ εἰ* (*ἐάν*), *μηδὲ εἰ* (*ἐάν*), it is only the *connective* particle which the *οὐδέ* or *μηδέ* involves, that belongs to the conditional particle; the *negative* belonging to the principal clause. So that, e. g. *οὐδ' εἰ* = *καὶ εἰ . . . οὐ*. In other words, the particles = *even if*, with a *not*, that must be carried to the verb of the *apodosis*.

Οἱ μὴ χρησάμενοι τοῖς καιροῖς ὀρθῶς, οὐδ' εἰ συνέβη τι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν χρηστὸν, μνημονεύουσιν (*Dem.*). *Οὐδ' ἂν δεκάκις ἀποθάνῃ Φίλιππος, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὑμεῖς γε κινήσεσθε* (*Dem.*).

287. *b*) The negative of *εἰ καί* is *εἰ μηδέ*.

There is often an ellipse of such a notion as *to see, to try*, &c. before *εἰ, εἴ πως, ἐάν πως* (*if any how*), *εἴ που* (*ποτε*, &c.), *if haply*.

Μελήσιππον . . . ἀποστέλλει εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας, εἴ τι ἄρα μᾶλλον ἐνδοῖεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κτλ. (*Th.*) *Προθυμίᾳ τε πάσῃ ἐχρῶντο . . . εἴ πως . . . ἕλοιεν τὸ τείχισμα* (*Th.*).

288. *c*) *Εἴ τις* (*τι*, &c.) frequently implies no *doubt* with respect to the existence of the object in question, but is nearly equivalent to *ὅστις* (*whoever, whatever*).

(Of course *εἴ τις may be*, and often *is*, used in the strict sense of '*if any*.')

Exercise 85.

289. (1) To this Phalīnus replied: 'The king is of opinion that he has conquered, since he has killed Cyrus; for who is there, who now contends with him for the empire? He looks upon you also as his property, since he has you in the middle of his country, surrounded by impassable rivers, and can bring against you such a host that, even if he were to allow you to slay them, you would not be able to do it.

(2) When Anaxibius arrived, by land he assembled a body of mercenary troops, and wrested some of the Æolian cities from Pharnabazus. He also requited the cities that had marched against Abȳdos by now marching against them, and proceeded to invade and lay waste their territory. Moreover, he manned three ships at Abydos, in addition to those he had, and put to sea with them, to try whether he could any where meet with and capture any vessel of the Athenians or their allies.

Chap. 19. *Εἴπερ* (*ἀλλ' εἴπερ*).

290. *Εἴπερ* (*si omnino*) is only *εἰ* strengthened by *πέρ*. It calls *attention* to the condition, and so adds emphasis to it. The condition introduced by *εἴπερ* may be one that is *doubted* (*if really, if indeed*); or a *restrictive* or *corrective* condition (*if, that is; at least if*); or it may be *strongly affirmed*, with a view to point out the certainty of the consequence that is said to follow the realization of the condition.

291. After *εἴπερ* (especially after *εἴπερ ποτέ*, and *ἀλλ', εἴπερ*), there is often an ellipse; which may always be supplied by a tense of the verb in the principal sentence, or by a verb expressing some *more general* notion suggested by it.

Φημὶ δεῖν ἐθελῆσαι, εἴπερ ποτέ, καὶ νῦν (*Dem.*). *Οὐδὲν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν. ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται, διά γε τοῦτο, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον* = *but at most only hurt* [i. e. *ἀλλ' εἴπερ τι πάσχει, βλάπτεται μόνον*]. *Arist. Eth.* v. 296. *Τὴν ἄμπελον οὔ φασι δεῖν ἢ ἀποκονίειν ἢ ὅλως ἅπτεσθαι περκάζοντος τοῦ βότρυος, ἀλλ', εἴπερ, ὅταν ἀπομελανθῇ*; i. e. *but* if at all, *only when:* [*quod si quando id faciendum sit, tum certe demum quum uva nigra jam fuerit.*] Theoph. Plant. 11.

Exercise 86.

292. (1) Gentlemen, you may infer from another strong circumstance, that Aphobus lived with his wife, and has continued to do so to this hour. ‡The lady, †before her union with him,[a] did not remain a day single, but left a living husband (Timocrates) to come to him; whereas now, we see that, in a period of three years, she has not married any other man. Now[b] who can believe, that on the former occasion she went straight from one man to another, to avoid living single; and that now (*if* she is *really* divorced) she

would have endured to remain single for so long time, when it was in her power to get a new husband, her brother possessing so large a fortune, and she herself being so young?

(2) This very thing was then mentioned, that there must always be in our state something that has the same regard for the constitution which you, the legislator, had, when you enacted the laws. 'Yes; that was mentioned,' said he. 'Yes; but,' said I, 'it was not made sufficiently clear, owing to the fear of what you objected, when you showed also that the illustration of this would be both tedious and difficult; for, indeed, it is not quite easy to discuss what remains.' 'What is that?' 'In what manner a state is to undertake the study of philosophy, so as not itself to be destroyed; for all great pursuits are dangerous; and, as the saying is, noble objects are difficult indeed.' 'But still,' rejoined he, 'let our demonstration be completed by making this evident.' 'Want of inclination,' said I, 'will not hinder me; but, *if any thing*, want of power [or, *but at most, want of power only*]; and now you shall at once be convinced of my readiness.'

[a] *Say:* 'before she came to (ὡς) Aphobus.' [b] καίτοι.

Chap. 20. *Εἶτα, ἔπειτα.*

293. *a*) ***Εἶτα, ἔπειτα,*** *then, thereupon:* in enumerations, = *deinde.* ***Πρῶτον*** (μὲν) . . . ***εἶτα*** (δέ), or ***ἔπειτα*** (δέ), &c.; the opposition being *sharper* when the δέ is omitted (*Kr.*), which it is more commonly than not.[1]

This seems to me a correcter view than that of Klotz, who says: 'Εἶτα simplex ordinem ac seriem tantummodo indicat, εἶτα δέ quandam oppositionis significationem in se continet.'

[1] Thus in Dem. it is *very rarely* expressed. *K.*

b) So also *εἶτα* (*ἔπειτα*) are sometimes without *δέ* in their *temporal* sense, = *and then;* e. g. *διφθέρας—ἐπίμπλασαν χόρτου κούφου, εἶτα συνῆγον κτλ.* (*Xen. An.* 1, 10.)

294. *Ἔπειτα, εἶτα* (= *next, in the next place*), sometimes refer to *μάλιστα μέν* (*principally, especially, above all*). Cf. *Soph. Œd. Tyr.* 647. In *Th.* 6, 16; *μὲν μάλιστα—ἔπειτα δέ. Μάλιστα μὲν—εἶτα μέντοι* (*Dem. de Cor.* 278).

295. *Εἶτα* and *ἔπειτα* (= *deinde, post talia*) are used in questions that imply *surprise* at what is felt to be *strange* and *inconsistent;* the ground of the surprise having been stated or implied in what precedes the question.

Εὖ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἰ νομίζοιμι θεοὺς ἀνθρώπων τι φροντίζειν, οὐκ ἂν ἀμελοίην αὐτῶν. Σ. Ἔπειτ' οὐκ οἴει φροντίζειν; οἳ πρῶτον μὲν μόνον τῶν ζώων ἄνθρωπον ὀρθὸν ἀνέστησαν κτλ. (*Xen.*)—Often *κᾆτα κἄπειτα,* which are more emphatic. *Κἄπειτα τοιοῦτον ὄντα οὐ φιλεῖς αὐτόν;* (*Xen.*)

296. After a participle, the particles *εἶτα* (*κᾆτα*), *ἔπειτα* (*κἄπειτα*) are often added to the predicate of the sentence (with the force of *nevertheless; notwithstanding; for all that; after all*). The *εἶτα, ἔπειτα* properly denote *sequence in time* (= *then*); but in this construction imply *strangeness* or *inconsistency* in the agent's doing the second action, *when* (or *after*) he had done the first.

Ὑποθέμενος σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν ἔπειτα οὐδέν φησι κωλύειν καὶ τοὺς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντας σωφρονεῖν (*Pl.*).

Exercise 87.

297. (1) First then, I will prove by witnesses that he made this will, not from having any cause of complaint against us, but in consequence of a quarrel between him and Dinias; next, that, when Dinias was

no more, he superintended all our affairs, and gave us an education in his house, to which he had removed us; and, thirdly, that he sent Pŏsidīppus for the magistrate, who, however, far from fetching him himself, °actually sent away Archōnidēs when he came to the door. Call those who will prove the truth of my assertion.

(2) Are you so clever, that you can make just what use you please of the laws; or so powerful as to feel sure that those you have wronged will never obtain satisfaction at your hands? *And* are you not *then* ashamed of being so senseless as to look for advantages, not from the actual services that you have rendered to the state, but from the injuries that you have inflicted upon it with impunity?

(3) Come, then, let me read you also the several attestations of those public offices[a] that I have discharged; and, in return, do you read those verses that you spoilt (°in the delivery)—

'Forth from the deep abyss behold I come,[b]
And from the gates of darkness ——;'

and

'Know that unwillingly I woes announce;'[c]

and

'O †in the first place and above all,[d] may the gods —and then may all these (°your fellow-citizens) cut you off by a miserable death, like a bad citizen as you are, and a traitor, and †an actor of third-rate characters!'[e]

[a] λειτουργίας λειτουργεῖν, i. e. 'to discharge the liturgies (state-burdens or public charges).' [b] *Say:* 'I am come, having left the abyss and gates of darkness.' ☞ This is to be expressed in *one* Iambic Trimeter. [c] *Say:* 'Know that I not willingly (μὴ ἑκὼν) bear ill tidings (κακαγγελεῖν).' To be an Iambic Trimeter. [d] μάλιστα μέν. [e] τριταγωνιστής, the third actor, whose parts, of course, were less important and difficult ones.

Chap. 21. *Εἴτε.*

298. *Εἴτε=sive:* ἐάν τε (ἤν τε or ἄν τε) being used where ἐάν (ἤν, ἄν) would be used for εἰ.

Εἴτε—εἴτε[1] (ἐάν τε—ἐάν τε)=*sive—sive* (the *whether —or; either—or*), of *indifference;* the speaker leaving it undecided which supposition he assumes to be the *true* one.

Δίκαιον εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε φαῦλον τὸ ἄρχειν, πάντας αὐτοῦ μετέχειν (*Aristot.*). *Ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ σώφρων ὢν καὶ δίκαιος εὐδαίμων ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριος, ἐάν τε μέγας καὶ ἰσχυρός, ἐάν τε σμικρὸς καὶ ἀσθενὴς ᾖ, καὶ ἐὰν πλουτῇ καὶ μή* (*Pl.*).

299. The particles are sometimes preceded by ὁπότερα: e. g. Xen. Hell. 3, 5, 9.

300. The following forms also are sometimes used: viz.: εἴτε—εἰ δέ (*sive—si vero*), when the second member contains something opposed to the first: εἴτε—ἤ.

Εἴτε Λυσίας ἤ τις ἄλλος πώποτε ἔγραψεν, ὄνειδος τῷ γράφοντι, εἴτε τίς φησιν εἴτε μή (*Pl.*).

Εἴτε but once for εἴτε . . . εἴτε is mostly poetic: λόγοισιν εἴτ' ἔργοισιν (*Soph. Œd. R.* 517); but ἐάν τις ἀσεβῇ λόγοις εἴτ' ἔργοις, ὁ παράτυγχάνων ἀμυνέτω (*Pl.*).

301. The particles εἴτε—εἴτε occur also in indirect questions. *Εἰ*—εἴτε is *rare* (Anab. 6, 4, 20; and Pl. Legg. 878, 952: cf. Crat. 424).

302. In the meaning *and if* it is better to write εἴ τε, which, like ἤν τε, sometimes refers to a preceding οὔτε (*Kr.*).

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[1] The second particle, or both, often take καί, οὖν, or δή. The following forms and combinations occur:—

εἴτε — εἴτε καί
εἴτε καί — εἴτε καί
εἴτε καί — εἴτε
εἴτ' οὖν — εἴτε
εἴτ' οὖν — εἴτ' οὖν
εἴτε — εἴτ' οὖν
} See οὖν.

εἴτ' ἄρα — εἴτε
εἴτε — εἴτ' ἄρα
εἴτε — εἴτ' ἄρ' οὖν
εἴτε δή — εἴτε (καί). [*Pl. Tim.* 21, B]
εἴτε — εἴτε δή.

εἴτε — ἤ
εἴτε — εἰ δ' αὖ
εἴτε — εἴτε — ἤ.

Exercise 88.

303. (1) They cannot say it was poverty that prevented their making an immediate transfer; for Timŏcrates has an estate of more than ten talents, and Onētōr above thirty; this then could not have been the cause. Nor can they allege that they had valuable property, but no ready money; or that the lady was a widow, and therefore they hurried on the marriage without paying her portion at once. For, in the first place, these men lend a great deal of money to other people; and, secondly, the lady was not a widow, but was living with Timocrates, and removed from his house, when they gave her away to Aphŏbus. This last excuse, therefore, it is plain, cannot be received. And I think, gentlemen of the jury, you will all agree upon this point,—that any man, contracting such an alliance, would rather borrow of another than not pay his sister's portion to her husband. For, in the latter case, he is esteemed as a debtor who is not certain to perform his engagements; whereas, if he gives away the lady and her money together, he becomes indeed a brother-in-law and a friend; he has then acted an honorable part, and is not looked upon with mistrust.

(2) Then Xenophon said: 'Would you consent (*pl.*), O Medosades, to leave it to the people in whose country we are (since you say they are your friends), to determine by their votes which party ought[a] to leave it, *you or we?* This he refused, but urged, *as the best thing to be done*, that the two Lacedæmonians should go to Seuthes themselves about the pay, and said it was his opinion Seuthes would hearken to them; *but, if they did not approve of that*, he recommended them to send Xenophon with him, assuring them of his co-operation; and he also begged they would not burn the villages. Upon this, they sent Xenophon with such persons as were thought most proper to attend him.

[a] *προσῆκεν*, which (according to Thom. Mag.) is an Attic idiom for *προσήκει*.

Chap. 22. *Ἐπεί, ἐπειδή.*

304. *a*) Ἐπεί, *ἐπειδή* [which become with *ἄν*, *ἐπάν* or *ἐπήν* and *ἐπειδάν*, of which the last is far the more common, and *ἐπάν* somewhat more common than *ἐπήν*, *Kr.*] are properly particles of time (*when; after; postquam*); but, like most particles of time, also denote cause, *since* (*puisque*), *quoniam*. Ἐπεὶ (ἐπειδή) *τάχιστα*, &c.=*as soon as; as soon as ever.*

b) Both are also *since* (*ex quo*) of *time*.

Οὐ πολὺς *χρόνος ἐπειδὴ χιτῶνας λινοῦς ἐπαύσαντο φοροῦντες* (*Pl.*) [See Part. I.].

305. "Particula *ἐπεί* cum aliis conjuncta particulis has fere significationes habet:

ἐπεί τοι,[1] *nam profecto.*
ἐπεί γε, *quandoquidem.*
ἐπεί τοι καί,[2] *nam certe quidem* (H.); [*nam profecto etiam; enim vero etiam* (S.)].
ἐπείπερ, *quum semel, quando semel.*
ἐπείπερ γε, *quandoquidem semel.*
ἐπειδή γε, *quoniam quidem.*" (H.)
ἐπεί γε δή, *quum quidem jam* (Kl.).

306. *Ἐπεί* (=*for if not; for otherwise; for if so*, &c.) is sometimes used argumentatively, where *εἰ δὲ μή*, or, after negative propositions, *εἰ δέ*, might be employed. The particle does not *really* change its meaning of *quando quidem*, but there is an *ellipse* of a conditional sentence, such as *if you doubt it; if you think so*, &c.

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[1] Most of these forms (which are placed here for convenience of reference) will be illustrated in later Exercises. On *ἐπεί γε*, cf. 195, sqq.

[2] "Facile concedimus Porsono (ad *Med.* 675) in hac quidem formulâ illud (*γέ*) arbitranti nusquam post *τοί* insertum reperiri" (*S. ad Hipp. Maj.* 288, c).

Οὐκ οἴει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς, ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἔρου τινὰ τούτων (*Pl.*). *Νόσον γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἀλλόκοτον αὐτοῦ νοσεῖ, Ἦν οὐδ' ἂν εἷς γνοίη πότ' οὐδ' ἂν ξυμβάλοι, Εἰ μὴ πύθοιθ' ἡμῶν, ἐπεὶ τοπάζετε* (*Aristoph.*).

Exercise 89.

307. (1) *Euc.* As I was going down to the port, I met with Theætētus, who was being carried from the camp at Corinth to Athens.

Ter. Alive or dead?

Euc. Alive, though scarcely so; for he is in a bad state from several wounds, though he suffers more from the disease that is prevalent in the army.

Ter. Is it dysentery?

Euc. Yes.

Ter. What a man you speak of as being in danger!

Euc. An honorable and good man, Terpsion; *for indeed even*[a] now I heard some persons highly extolling his conduct in the battle.

Ter. Nor is that surprising; but it would be much more wonderful if he had not behaved so. But[b] why did he not stop here at Megara?

Euc. He was hastening home; although I begged and advised him, yet he would not.

(2) They ratified these oaths by the sacrifice of a boar, a bull, a wolf, and a ram, whose blood being poured into the hollow of a shield,[c] the Greeks dipped a sword therein, and the Barbarians a spear. ‡ *When* they had pledged their faith, Clearchus said,—'Come now, O Ariæus! since your route and ours are the same, say, what is your opinion concerning our march? Shall we return the same way we came, or have you thought of any other more convenient?'

[a] *ἐπεί τοι καὶ νῦν* (the *instance* being given as a proof of the *fact*).

[b] What is the Greek particle for *but* when it introduces a question that suddenly occurs to a speaker? (126, 127.)

[c] *Say:* 'having slain a bull, &c. into a shield.'

Chap. 23. Ἔτι.

308. *Ἔτι, yet, still, further.*

309. *Οὐκέτι, μηκέτι, no more, no longer.* In the progress of an argument, these particles denote that what has been previously said *no longer holds good;* the case now arrived at being of a different character. The particles are then sometimes printed separately.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πάντα ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μάχεσθαι οὐκέτι (or *οὐκ ἔτι*) *ἀμφοτέρων* (*Xen.*). *Τοῦτο μὲν . . . πάνυ συγχωρῶ . . . ἀλλ', ὁρᾷς, ἐκεῖνό γε οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πείσαις ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα* (*Xen.*).

Exercise 90.

310. (1) It was on such grounds and with such reasons, Lacedæmonians and allies, that we revolted; sufficiently clear ones for those who hear them to judge that we acted rightly, and sufficiently strong ones to alarm us, and make us betake ourselves to some means of safety; which indeed we wished to do long ago, when we sent to you, while the peace yet lasted, on the subject of our revolting, but were prevented by your not receiving us into alliance. But now, when the Bœotians invited us, we immediately listened to their proposals, and thought that we should withdraw ourselves in a twofold manner,—from the Greeks, so as not to join in injuring them in company with the Athenians, but to join in giving them liberty; and from the Athenians, so as not to be ruined by them ourselves after the rest, but to be beforehand in acting [against them].

(2) On this account our crews have been wasted, and are still wasting; as some of our seamen, in consequence of their fetching wood, of foraging, and of distant watering, are cut off by their cavalry; while our servants, since we have been reduced to an equal footing, desert from us, and those of the foreigners

who went on board, as pressed men, straightway depart to the several cities; while those, again, who were at first elated by the high pay, and supposed that they were going to make money rather than to fight, since they have unexpectedly seen both the fleet and every thing else on the side of the enemy offering resistance to us, either leave us on finding some excuse for going over to the enemy, or in whatever way they severally can (and Sicily is a large country); while in some instances, by engaging in traffic themselves, after persuading the captains to take Hyccarian slaves on board in their stead, they have destroyed the perfection of our navy.

(3) And now Gylippus went away into the rest of Sicily for forces, intending to raise them both for sea and land service; and, at the same time, to bring over any of the cities that was either not hearty in the cause, or had hitherto stood entirely aloof from the war. Other ambassadors of the Syracusans and Corinthians were also sent to Lacedæmon and Corinth, in order that a fresh force might be sent over to them, in whatever way might answer best, whether in merchantmen or boats, or any how else; since the Athenians too were sending for reinforcements. Moreover, the Syracusans proceeded to man and practise a fleet, for the purpose of making an attempt in that way also, and were, in other respects, much more full of confidence.

Chap. 24. Ἦ.

311. Ἦ, 1) *aut, vel;* 2) *an;* 3) *quam.* Ἦ—ἤ, *aut—aut; vel—vel.*

a) The comparative ἤ is sometimes used after μᾶλλον omitted, or after a *positive*. This is the case after expressions of *willing, choosing*, and the like, because these contain the notion of *difference, separation*, or *preference:* Βούλεσθαι, ἐθέλειν, αἱρεῖσθαι, αἵρεσιν δοῦ-

ναι, ἐπιθυμεῖν, δέχεσθαι, ζητεῖν, λυσιτελεῖν (—*potius esse*).

Ζητοῦσι κερδαίνειν, ἢ ὑμᾶς πείθειν (*Lys.*). *Ἀγησίλαος ᾑρεῖτο καὶ σὺν τῷ γενναίῳ μειονεκτεῖν, ἢ σὺν τῷ ἀδίκῳ πλέον ἔχειν* (*Xen.*). *Τεθνάναι νομίζουσι λυσιτελεῖν, ἢ ζῆν* (*Andoc.*).

312. *b*) In the same way it stands not only after *comparatives*, but after words that express a *difference* (*ἄλλος, οὐδείς ἄλλος, ἀλλοῖος, ἐναντίος, ἴδιος, διαφέρω, διάφορος*), and after all words which have the force of a *comparative* (*διπλάσιος, πρίν, φθάνω*).

Οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν, ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι (*Pl.*). *Τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι ἐστὶν ἢ πεφυκέναι Κρεῖσσον κακῶς πάσχοντα* (*Æsch.*). *Ἔστι ψυχὴ πόλεως οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ πολιτεία* (*Is.*). *Πολὺ οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι ἀντίοι ἢ οὓς ἐγὼ ἤκουον* (*Xen.*). *Πάντα τἀναντία ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὰ σώματα εὖ ἔχουσιν ἢ τοῖς κακῶς* (*Xen.*). *Σκέψασθε τί δοῦλον ἢ ἐλεύθερον εἶναι διαφέρει* (*Dem.*). *Διάφορόν τι οἴει ποιεῖν τοὺς τοῖς νόμοις πειθομένους φαυλίζων ἢ εἰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις εὐτακτοῦντας ψέγοις ;* (*Xen.*) *Προσέβαλον ἐκ τοὔμπαλιν ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες αὐτῶν ὑπερέβαινον* (*Th.*). Kr.

313. *c*) The particle *ἤ* occasionally connects *different constructions* by which *similar notions* are expressed.

Ἐπαινούμενοι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι χαίρετε.—Ἐν ὀλιγωρίᾳ ἐποιοῦντο, ὡς ὕταν ἐξέλθωσιν ἢ οὐχ ὑπομενοῦντας σφᾶς ἢ ῥᾳδίως ληψόμενοι βίᾳ (*Th.*).

314. *d*) In *ἤ—ἤ* (as in *aut—aut*), the two members are *equal;* with a single *ἤ*, *unequal* (the *ἤ* = *aut etiam*); and there is generally a *descensus a majore ad minus: ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐκεῖνος ᾤετο δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ νικᾶν* (*Dem.*). 'Chabrias maluit pro honoribus sibi decernendis mori, aut, *si fieri posset*, vincere' (*Hand*[1]).

[The descent is here, not to a *less desirable*, but to a *less probable* event.]

[1] 'Formulæ *aut nihil aut paullo* et *parum aut nihil*, sicut *ἢ μηδὲν ἢ μικρά* (*Dem.*), et *ὀλίγον ἢ οὐδέν* differunt. In altero enim descensus apparet, nec facile quis dixerit *aut parum aut nihil*, nisi certâ causâ intercedente.' *Hand*, i. p. 537.

315. *c*) ἦ in questions, cf. Gr. 1360; in double questions, Gr. 1359. 1364: ἆρα . . . ἤ, 1359, *b*. Cf. also 1466. Sometimes after a *general* and *quite indefinite* question, ἤ introduces one which, in the opinion of the speaker, is probably very near the truth: *or—not.*

Πόθεν ἥκει; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐξ ἀγορᾶς; (*Pl.*) Τίς ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εὑρημένης; (*Pl.*) Cf. Elmsl. Soph. Œd. Col. 66 (*Kr.*).

On ἢ κατά, ἢ ὥστε (sometimes ἢ πρός· ἢ ὡς, cf. Gr. 1338).

Exercise 91.

316. (1) As in the persons of young people, who have shot up suddenly, so[a] as to be very tall, there yet appears something childish that betrays their youth; so in Cyrus, it was not an impudence and boldness that appeared through that talkativeness, but a simplicity and affectionate nature; so that one would desire rather to hear yet more from him, than to be with him while he held his tongue.

(2) 'If I had happened to ask you to what class of painters Xeuxis belonged, if you had said he is a painter of animals, should I not have properly inquired of you what animals he paints?' 'Yes.' 'And that, for this reason, that there are many other painters who paint many other animals?' 'Yes.' 'But if, on the contrary, no one but Xeuxis painted (°animals), you would have answered well °already? Certainly.

(3) Why does origanum, if thrown into the must, make the wine sweet? Two half-pints of it are thrown into a jar of wine. Is it perhaps because it abstracts the watery and feculent portions, which cause harshness (°in wines), by imbibing them itself? A proof that the harshness is thus caused is this: ‡wines are rendered less mellow by being mixed with water, and by being suffered to remain long upon the lees. And, when sweet wine is made, the bunches of grapes are

exposed to the sun for a long time, and the sun abstracts the watery particles and mellows all the rest. Now the origanum has the very same effect, for it is dry and hot.

[a] As—so, ὥσπερ—οὕτω καί. This καί is *usually*, but not always, added in comparisons of this kind. See below under καί.

Chap. 25. ἨΗ.

317. ἨΗ (*profecto*) expresses *confirmation*. To strengthen it, μήν is often added (= *assuredly*, in asseverations, promises, &c.).

Ἦ βαρὺ φόρημ' ἄνθρωπος εὐτυχῶν ἄφρων (*Æsch.*). Ἦ πού τι χαλεπόν ἐστι τὸ ψευδῆ λέγειν (*Men.*). Ὄμνυμί σοι ἦ μὴν μηδέποτέ σοι ἕτερον λόγον ἐπιδείξειν (*Pl.*). Ὁμολογήσας ἦ μὴν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς (*Pl.*).

318. ἨΗ[1] interrogat *cum conjecturâ verisimili* vel *persuasione* (Ellendt.).

Krüger says, 'it *indicates* a *doubt*, a *struggling* against the *acknowledgment* that the thing is so; partly, however, only from *urbanity;* so that, as in the case of the Latin *-ne*, the answer may be *affirmative* or *negative*.' In many examples I cannot perceive this force. Rost says, 'it indicates that the questioner takes a peculiar interest in making out the true state of the case.'—Ἦ οὗτοι, ἔφη, ὦ πάππε, πολέμιοί εἰσιν, οἳ ἐφεστήκασι τοῖς ἵπποις ἠρέμα; Πολέμιοι μέντοι, ἔφη (*Xen.*). Ἦ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκῶ, ἔφην, ἂν εἰπεῖν οὕτω λέγων, ἢ οὔ; Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη (*Pl.*).—Very often in connection with other particles, e. g. μήν, δή, δή που, δῆτα, ἄρα, γάρ, καί, πού, ποὺ ἄρα.

319. *c*) Ἦ που (= ὄντως που) nihil significat aliud

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[1] The use of ἦ in interrogations may be compared with that of our *surely*.

nisi ejus, qui loquitur, de re aliqua *conjecturam* cum *asseveratione* conjunctam' (*S. ad Lys.* p. 108).

᾽Η που; *surely?*—᾽Η που ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Λύσι, σφόδρα φιλεῖ σε ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς (Pl.) Κ. In Eur. Med. 695, ᾽Η που τετόλμηκ' ἔργον αἴσχιστον τόδε; (Κ.) Elmsley reads ἦ γάρ; Witschel οὔ που; Klotz and Pflügk defend the usual reading.

320. *d*) ᾽Η που (*surely, I imagine*) is also used as an affirmative asseveration. If there is an *ascensio a minori ad majus*, we might use *much more;* and hence Budæus gave *multo magis* as a *meaning* of the particles. If there is a *descensio a majori ad minus*, they might, in the same way, be rendered *multo minus;* but this kind of descent is always ironical.

321. *e*) ᾽Η γάρ; asks for information with respect to what the speaker *suspects* to be the case from what he has just heard. Of course it may often express *surprise:* sometimes it is used *ironically*, but the irony does not proceed from any force of the particles, but from the context.

Τί λέγεις, φάναι, ὦ Κῦρε; ἦ γὰρ σὺ ταῖς σαῖς χερσὶ τούτων τι ἐφύτευσας; (*Xen.*) did you *really* (or *actually*) *plant*——? ᾽Η γάρ, ὦ Ἱππία, ἐάν τι ἐρωτᾷ σε Σωκράτης, ἀποκρινεῖ; (*Pl.*) ᾽Η γάρ (=nonne ita est?), *is it not so?* often stands alone, to demand *assent* to an assertion just made.

Exercise 92.

322. (1) *Socr.* Do I understand what kind of art you wish to call it? but I shall soon comprehend it more clearly. However, answer me. We have arts, have we not?

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. Of all the arts, some, I think, consist principally in workmanship, and stand in need of but few words, and others of none at all, but their work may be accomplished in silence, as painting, statuary, and

many others. With such arts, you appear to me to say rhetoric has nothing to do? is it not so?

Gorg. You apprehend my meaning perfectly, Socrates.

Socr. On the other hand, there are other arts which accomplish all by means of words, and require no work at all, or very little, such as theoretical and practical arithmetic, geometry, the game of dice, and many other arts; some of which require almost as many words as actions, and most of them more; so that altogether their whole activity and efficiency is by means of words. You appear to me to say that rhetoric is among arts of this kind.

Gorg. You say truly.

(2) *Pol.* Surely he who dies unjustly is to be pitied, and is wretched, is he not?

Socr. Less so, Polus, than he who slays him; and less than he who dies justly.

Pol. How so, Socrates?

Socr. Thus; because to act unjustly is the greatest of evils.

Pol. What,' is this really the greatest of evils? Is it not a greater evil to suffer unjustly?

Socr. By no means.

Pol. Would you yourself then wish rather to suffer unjustly than act unjustly?

Socr. I should wish neither of these; but, if I must necessarily either act unjustly or suffer unjustly, I should choose rather to suffer unjustly than to act unjustly.

Pol. Does he, then, who slays whom he pleases, slaying him justly, appear to you to be wretched, and an object of pity?

Socr. Not at all; †nor yet indeed[a] is he to be envied.

Pol. Did you not say just now that he was wretched?

Socr. I said, my friend, that he is wretched who

slays another unjustly, and, more than that, to be pitied; but that he who slays another justly is not to be envied.

[a] οὐδὲ μέντοι.

Chap. 26. Ἤδη (*jam*).

323. *a*) With reference to *present* and *past* time ἤδη =*already, just*, and in a negative proposition, *hitherto* (*adhuc*), *as yet.*

Τοῖς μὲν πρὸς τὰς πύλας ἤδη ἦν ἡ ἅμαξα.

324. *b*) With reference to *future* time, *at once, immediately, forthwith*, stronger than τάχα, and opposed to the indefinite ποτέ, *at some time or other*, and ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ.

Ἔφη χρῆναι ἐναντίον ἁπάντων ἤδη λέγειν. Δύο ναῦς τοὺς Κορινθίους ἤδη ἐκέλευέν οἱ πέμπειν ἐς Ἀσίνην, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς παρασκευάζεσθαι.

325. *c*) With *commands* and *exhortations* it may be construed *at once:* it is also used in *impatient* questions, like our *now*, and like *quid jam?* in the Latin comic writers.

Θάρσει, Πάνθεια, καὶ χαῖρε καὶ ἄπιθι ἤδη (*Xen.*). *Κἀστὸν ἤδη ποῦ*; (*Aristoph.*).

326. *d*) With reference to *future* time *beginning* and *extending onwards* from the present, ἤδη=*henceforth* (*posthac*); ἤδη οὐκ,=*henceforth not*, or *no more.*

Ἤδη δεῖ με δουλεύειν πάλιν (*Eur.*). *Ἤδη τὰ τοῦδ' οὐ διατετίμηται θεοῖς* (*Æsch.*).

327. *e*) Ἤδη is also applied to *space*, and denotes *contiguity.*

Φωκεῦσιν ἤδη ὅμορος ἡ Βοιωτία ἐστίν (*Th.*).

328. *f*) Of unexpected or long expected events, ἤδη ποτε=*at last, at length* (*jam tandem, tandem aliquando*). But this combination has also the indefinite meaning of *several times already.*

Ἀναπαύσωμεν ἤδη ποτὲ τὴν πολλὴν φροντίδα Ῥω-

μαίων (*Plut.*). Οὐκ οἶδα εἴ τις ἑώρακε τὰ ἐντὸς ἀγάλματα. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἤδη ποτ' εἶδον (*Pl.*).

329. *g*) From this *temporal* meaning, ἤδη passes by a natural transition to its other use; that of denoting *immediate, present existence,* i. e. *present reality, certainty,* &c. In this way it often serves like our *at once,* to mark a *consequence* that immediately follows from a preceding statement, &c., or a state that commences *at once,* or is at once discovered *without going any further.*

Εἰ δὲ νέος ἢ πρεσβύτης ἢ δίκαιος, ἢ ἄδικος, ἤδη διαφέρει. Εἴ γε μὴν ὅσα εἴρηκα περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, μηδεὶς δύναιτ' ἂν ἐξελέγξαι με ὡς ψεύδομαι, πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἤδη δικαίως καὶ ὑπὸ θεῶν καὶ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων ἐπαινοίμην; (*Xen.*)

330. *h*) Ἤδη frequently attaches itself to demonstratives: οὗτος ἤδη, τότ' ἤδη, ἐνταῦθ' ἤδη, &c. Ὁ ἤδη is often = *present.*

331. *i*) It is frequently found with καί.

Κῦρε βασιλεῦ, καὶ ἐμοὶ ἤδη χρὴ ὡς πλουσίῳ χρῆσθαι (*Xen.*).

For examples of ἤδη see 255, notes *d, f.*

[Klotz refers ἤδη to εἰδέναι, and thinks that it is not properly a *temporal* particle, but *asseverative* of what is now *proved by the fact itself* to have really occurred.]

Exercise 93.

332. (1) Rhetoric comprehends under itself, one may almost say, all powers! And I will give you a strong proof of this. For I have often, ere now, gone with my brother and other physicians to various sick persons, who would neither drink their medicine, nor suffer themselves to be cut or cauterized by the physician; and, when the physician was unable to persuade them, I have done so by no other art than rhetoric.

(2) *Gorg.* I think, Socrates, that any one, if he did not know, would learn these things from me.

Socr. Stay; for you say well. If then you make any one a rhetorician, it is necessary that he should know what is just and unjust, either before or afterwards, from your instructions.

Gorg. Certainly.

Socr. What then? Is he who has learnt carpentering a carpenter or not?

Gorg. He is.

Socr. And is not he who has learnt music, a musician?

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. And he who has learnt medicine, a physician? And so, in the same way, with regard to other things, is not he who has learnt any particular art such a person as each science respectively makes its proficient?

Gorg. Certainly.

Socr. By the same reason, then, does it not follow that he who has learnt just things is just?

Gorg. Assuredly.

(3) He consented to do so, †out of regard for the Messenians, whom he favored,[a] and still more because he thought that, without employing the forces of Athens, with only continental tribes as his allies, and with the Ætolians, he would be able to go by land against the Bœotians, through the Locri Ozŏlæ to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right hand till he reached the Phocians, who, he thought, would eagerly join him[b] (for the friendship they had always borne the Athenians[c]), or might even be brought over by force; and to Phocis Bœotia is at once the bordering state. Starting, therefore,[d] with all his armament from Leucas, in opposition to the wishes of the Acarnanians, he coasted along to Solliium.

[a] *τῇ Μεσσηνίων χάριτι πεισθείς.* [b] The *inf. present* sometimes follows δοκῶ without ἄν (Gr. 1087), but only to denote an *infallible* result. [c] *κατὰ τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἀεί ποτε φιλίαν.* [d] *οὖν resumptive*, relating to *πεισθείς*.

Chap. 27. *Ἵνα.*

333. *Ἵνα*, with the *indicative of an historical tense*, expresses an *unattained result*, which, however, *would*

be (or *would have been*) *attained* on the supposition made by the speaker (in the form of a *wish*, of a question *implying* a wish, or of a declaration of *what should be* or *should have been*).

Ἐβουλόμην ἂν—Σίμωνα τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἐμοὶ ἔχειν. ἵν' ἀμφοτέρων ἡμῶν ἀκούσαντες ῥᾳδίως ἔγνωτε τὰ δίκαια (*Lys.*). *Ἵν' ἦν τυφλός, ut essem caecus: ἵν' ἐγενόμην τυφλός, ut caecus factus essem. Ἵνα ἀπηλλάγμεθα* (*pluperf.*), *ut liberati essemus.* H.

334. *a*) The Imperfect is used of a *continued effect* or *state* (as *the being blind*); also in the sense of *solere* (S.); the Aorist, of one considered, not as continuing, but as *having taken place* and being terminated.

335. *b*) *Ἵνα* is here virtually *conditional*: ubi = *quo statu, quâ conditione* (like our *then* = *if that were the case*): *that—so.* The Indicative without *ἄν* is used in just the same way that it may be used in *other conditional* sentences; the *consequence* being stated, not *as* the consequence of a conditional proposition, but as an *objective* fact: *e. g. εἰ μὲν λίθῳ ἢ ξύλῳ ἠμυνάμην αὐτόν, ἠδίκουν μὲν οὐδ' οὕτως.* This mode of explaining the construction is proved, I think, to be the true one by the actual occurrence of *ἄν* in the following passage of Isæus (274):—*καίτοι τόν γε πράττοντά τι δίκαιον οὐ προσῆκεν ἀπορεῖν ἀλλ' εὐθὺς λέγειν, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διόμνυσθαι καὶ τοῦ γένους παρέχεσθαι μαρτυρίας, ἵνα μᾶλλον ἂν ἐπιστεύετο ὑφ' ὑμῶν.*

(For the usual construction of *ἵνα*, see Part I.)

Exercise 94.

336. (1) I have many witnesses to speak to this point, and as many circumstantial proofs. In the first place, if he really never gave this testimony, he would have denied it, not now for the first time, but immediately upon its being read in court, when denial would better have served his purpose. In the next place, if I had without cause exposed him to a suit for false testimony against his brother (a charge on which men run the risk of degradation, besides pecuniary penalties), he would not have let the matter rest, but would have brought an action against me for compensation. Further, to sift the thing to the bottom, he would have demanded of me the slave who wrote the deposition, so that, if I refused to give him up, I might be deemed unworthy of credit.

(2) What they ought to have done was, immediately after my father's death, to have called in several witnesses, and requested them to seal the will, so that, in case of any dispute, the writing itself might have been referred to, and the whole truth ascertained. Instead of this, they thought proper to get certain other papers sealed, which were only memoranda, and did not specify all the assets; but the will itself, by virtue of which they became possessed of these same papers, and all the rest of the effects, and were discharged from responsibility for not letting the estate, they neither sealed nor delivered up. Very likely you should believe any thing they say about the matter!

Chap. 28. § 1. *Καί, and; also* (*principally from Krüger*).

337. *Καί* connects either *single notions* or *sentences*. Also *καί—καί, both—and*. Cf. *τέ*.

a) When three or more notions are connected, the *καί* is placed, not like our *and* merely between the two last, but also between the others, and sometimes also before the first.

Χρήματα ἐδωρήσατο αὐτοῖς καὶ οἰκίας καὶ ἀνδράποδα.

338. *b*) *Asyndĕton* (i. e. the mere apposition of notions, without any conjunction) is also often found in enumerations of this kind.

Συμβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον, ἀπέθνησκον (*Xen.*).

339. *c*) When *two* adjectives belong to one substantive, the Greeks *usually* connected them by *καί*, less commonly *τὲ καί*. Hence not *the good old times*, but *the good* and *old times*. This is especially the case after *πόλις*, but even here the conjunction is sometimes omitted.

Ἡ πόλις νόμους ὑπέγραψεν, ἀγαθῶν καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν εὑρήματα (*Pl.*). Διὰ πολλῶν (τε) καὶ δεινῶν πραγμάτων σεσωσμένοι πάρεστε (*Xen.*).

340. *d*) After *ὁ αὐτός, ἴσος, ὅμοιος, παραπλήσιος,*

and the corresponding adverbs *ὡσαύτως*, &c., *καί*=*as*. (Compare *idem atque*, &c.)

Τοῦτον ἂν μάλιστα φιλοῖ τις ᾧ ξυμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῷ (*Pl.*). *Ὁ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη* (*Th.*). *Αἱ δαπάναι οὐχ ὁμοίως καὶ πρίν, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μείζους καθέστασαν* (*Th.*). *Ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς παραπλήσια καὶ ἀντέλεγον* (*Th.*).

341. *c*) After *οὐ φθάνω, ἅμα, ἤδη*, and after sentences that denote the *passing of time*, *καί* introduces the *immediately following event*, where we should use *when*. *οὐκ ἔφθην* (or *ἔφθασα*)—*καί*, *no sooner—than*.

Ἤδη (*τε*) *ἦν μεσημβρία καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἠσθάνοντο* (*Pl.*). *Οὔπω τούτω δύ' ἢ τρεῖς δρόμους περιεληλυθότε ἤστην καὶ εἰσέρχεται Κλεινίας* (*Pl.*). *Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐκ ἔφθασαν τὴν ἀρχὴν κατασχόντες καὶ τοῖς Θηβαίοις εὐθὺς ἐπεβούλευσαν* (*Isoc.*). *Ἐνταῦθα ἔμειναν ἡμέρας τρεῖς, καὶ ἦκε Μένων* (*Xen.*).

(See an example of *e* in 255, 1, note *c*.)

Exercise 95.

342. (1) *Soc.* Whether is it more base to commit an injustice or to suffer one? Answer me.

Pol. To commit an injustice.

Soc. Is it not, therefore, worse, since it is more base?

Pol. By no means.

Soc. I understand. You do not think, as it seems, that the beautiful and the good, and the evil and the base, are the same?

Pol. Certainly not.

Soc. But what do you say to this? Beautiful things in general, such as bodies, colors, forms, sounds, and pursuits, do you call them severally beautiful, without reference to any thing else? As, for instance, first of all, with respect to beautiful bodies, do you not say that they are beautiful, on account of their usefulness, in reference to the particular thing for which each

is useful, or on account of some pleasure, if in being seen they give delight to the beholders? Have you any thing else besides this to say respecting beauty of body?

Pol. I have not.

(2) *Men.* Do you think that you should yourself be able to speak, if you were obliged to do so, and the Senate should select you (°for the office)?

Soc. °Certainly; and that I should be able to speak, O Menexenus, is nothing surprising, since I have no such bad preceptress in rhetoric, but the very same who has made many good orators, and one really distinguished one,[a] Pericles, the son of Xanthippus.

[a] Use καὶ—δὲ καί = *et sed* (*et*); i. e. 'she has made many good ones, *but* one *even* distinguished one.' 'Confertur hac ratione ea res, quæ aut magis vel imprimis valet, aut in locum alterius rei succedit.' *Hand*, ii. 533.

Exercise 96.

343. (1) They were constantly within a little of escaping, or of being destroyed. And thus amongst the troops of the Athenians, as long as they were fighting at sea on equal terms, every sound might be heard at once, wailing, shouting "they conquer," "they are conquered," and all the other various exclamations which a great armament in great peril would be constrained to utter. Those on board the ship were affected very much in the same way, †until at length,[a] after the battle had continued for a long time, the Syracusans and their allies routed the Athenians, and pressing on them in a decisive manner, with much shouting and cheering of each other on, pursued them to the shore.

(2) (*The same continued.*) Then the sea forces, as many as were not taken afloat, †put into the land[b] at different parts, and rushed from on board to the camp; while the army, no longer with any different feelings, but all on one impulse, lamenting and groaning, de-

plored the event, and proceeded, some to succor the ships, others to guard what remained of their wall; while others, and those the greatest part, began now (ἤδη) to think of themselves, and how they should best provide for their own preservation. Indeed, their dismay at the moment had been exceeded by none[c] of all they had ever felt. And they now experienced pretty nearly what they had themselves inflicted at Pylus; for, by the Lacedæmonians losing their ships, their men who had crossed over into the island were lost to them besides; and at this time for the Athenians to escape by land was hopeless, unless something beyond all expectation should occur.

[a] *πρίν γε δή*, with *indic.* Cf. Gram. [b] *κατενεχθῆναι*, usually applied to being *driven in by a storm* (Kr.). [c] Strengthen *οὐδείς* by *δή*.

Chap. 28. § 2. (*καί continued.*)

344. *a*) When a general remark is followed by a *particular instance* which illustrates its truth, *καὶ νῦν* = *and so now, and so in the present instance; καί τότε* = *and so then.* And generally a simple connection by *καί* is often found, where *we* should use *and so, and thus, and by so doing*, &c.

Ἐνίοτε ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθείη τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι· καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι (*Pl.*). *Τὸ γένος τὸ τῶν Θρᾳκῶν φονικώτατόν ἐστι. καὶ τότε ἐπιπεσόντες διδασκαλείῳ παίδων κατέκοψαν πάντας* (*Pl.*). *Ἄξιον ἐπιδεῖξαι ὡς τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας τιμωρεῖσθε, καὶ τοὺς ὑμετέρους ἄρχοντας βελτίους ποιήσετε* (*Lys.*).

345. *b*) *Καί* = *and also, too* (nearly = *καὶ*—*δέ*), when it introduces a clause in which the verb of the preceding clause is repeated, or a synonymous one used.

Πρὸ ἄλλων προβεβλημένος ἀπεχώρει· καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πρὸς τοὺς συντεταγμένους ἀπῆλθον (*Xen.*).

346. *c*) The Attics, as a general rule, never employ *καὶ—τέ* except when the *τέ* has *another καί* (or *τέ*) answering to it, so that the first *καί* connects with the preceding sentence a *twofold* clause connected by *τέ—καί* or *τέ—τέ*.

Τὸ πολὺ αὐτῷ ἀνατεταραγμένον ἐπορεύετο, καὶ ἤδη τε ἦν ἀμφὶ ἀγορὰν πλήθουσαν καὶ πλησίον ἦν ὁ σταθμός (*Xen.*).

Exercise 97.

347. (1) Now by sea, if they should wish to cross over the Crissæan gulf, the Athenians were ready to stop them, having sailed round with a fleet; while the march over Geranea did not appear safe for them, as the Athenians were in possession of Megara and Pegæ. For Geranea was both °naturally difficult to cross, and was always guarded by the Athenians; and so at that time they knew they were going to stop them that way, as well (°as by sea). So they determined to wait in Bœotia, and see in what way they might march across most safely.

(2) From this breach, where the ships came to land, the village is twelve stades off, the city of Corinth sixty, and the Isthmus twenty. The Corinthians, having heard long before from Argos, that the armament of the Athenians would come, went with succors to the Isthmus, all but those who lived above it: there were absent *two* in Ambracia and Leucadia five hundred of them, serving as a garrison; but the rest, with all their forces, were watching where the Athenians would make the land.

Chap. 28. § 3. (*καί continued.*)

348. *Καί* = *also*, *too*, *even*, not only adds a new notion to one *previously stated*, but also frequently refers to a notion *not expressed*, but more or less easily supplied; and in cases of this kind the Greeks reckoned

upon more *quickness of comprehension* in seizing upon the intended notion than we do. *Καὶ αὐτός, even himself, himself* (i. e. *as well as others*, or *certain others*). *Καὶ οὗτος = atque is, isque; καὶ ταῦτα, idque, and that too.*

Ἡ γεωργία πολλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ διδάσκει (*Xen.*). *Οἱ Κερκυραῖοι οὐδ' αὐτοὶ διενοοῦντο βιάζεσθαι* (*Th.*). *Ἀπόρων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτων πονηρῶν οἵτινες ἐθέλουσι δι' ἐπιορκίας πράττειν τι* (*Xen.*). *Εἰσὶν οἳ χρησιμώτερον νομίζουσι χρήματα ἢ ἀδελφούς, καὶ ταῦτα τῶν μὲν ἀφρόνων ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ φρονίμου* (*Xen.*). *Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα συνεβούλευε καὶ πράττειν ὡς ἐνόμιζεν ἄριστ' ἂν πραχθῆναι* (*Xen. Mem.* 1, 1, 6: the *καί* marks the opposition between *πράττειν* and *νομίζειν*). *Τῶν σωμάτων τῶν θηλυνομένων τῶν καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ πολὺ ἀῤῥωστότεραι γίγνονται* (*Xen.*). *Τὸ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν καὶ φιλανθρώπους ποιεῖ* (*Men.*). *Τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα καὶ φρονεῖν νομίζομεν* (*Eur.*).

349. *a*) In sentences of *comparison*, and in other sentences where notions are compared together, one being a *demonstrative*, the other a *relative* clause (*ὥσπερ, ὅσπερ*), the Greeks *very seldom* expressed *καί* in the *demonstrative* clause only, but either in the *relative* clause, or (most commonly) in *both* clauses.

[So *Krüger:* but if the clause with *ὥσπερ precedes, οὕτω καί* is very far from uncommon. A *personal* pronoun may stand in the non-relative clause: *ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ ἅπερ καὶ ἐμοί.* (P. O.)]

b) The case is the same with *ἤ* (*ἤ—ἤ*), *or*, and after *ἤ*, *than*, when a notion implying *difference* precedes; *οὐδέ, μηδέ* being used instead of *καί* if the notion is *negative.*

Δοκεῖ μοι (*καὶ*) *τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν σώματα ταὐτὰ πάσχειν ἅπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ φυομένων* (*Xen.*). *Ὥσπερ καὶ ὑπεσχόμην ὑμῖν, οὕτω καὶ ποιήσω* (*And.*). *Δίκαιον ἡ* (*καὶ*) *τῶν ἀγαθῶν κοινωνεῖν, ἢ μηδὲ τῶν ἀτυχιῶν ἀπολαύειν* (*Is.*). *Ἐζητεῖτο οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ καὶ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ* (*Ant.*).

350. In the same way *καί* appears in *εἴ* (or *ὡς*)

τις ἄλλος, where the καί often refers to a καὶ ἐγώ, σύ, οὗτος, to be mentally supplied.

Ἄρχεσθαι ἐπίσταμαι, ὥς τις καὶ ἄλλος (*Xen.*). Συμφέρει ὑμῖν εἴπερ τῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ νικᾶν (*Xen.*).

In many connections the καί does not belong to the single notion before which it stands, but to the whole proposition. So in ὁ δὲ καί—.

Οἱ μὲν ἄντικρυς πολεμοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτι ἡσυχάζειν δεχημέροις σπονδαῖς καὶ αὐτοὶ κατέχονται (*Th.*).

Exercise 98.

351. (1) *Men.* Perhaps the speaker will be obliged to speak extempore.

Soc. How so, my friend? They have each of them speeches ready prepared; and, moreover, even to speak extempore on such subjects is no difficult task. ‡If indeed one had to speak in praise of the Athenians before the Peloponnesians, or of the Peloponnesians before the Athenians, it would require an eloquent orator to persuade his hearers and win their applause; but when a man contends (for oratorical fame) before an audience whom he is extolling, it is no great matter to win the reputation of speaking well.

(2) *Gorg.* But indeed, Socrates, I profess myself to be such a man as you describe. Perhaps, however, it is right to attend to the wishes of the company who are present. For, some time since, before you came, I explained many things to the present company; and now, perhaps, we shall protract it too far if we continue the discussion. We must, therefore, respect their wishes, lest we detain any of them who are anxious to be doing something else.

Chap. 28. § 4. (*καί continued.*)

352. After an *interrogative* pronoun or adverb, καί denotes that the notion it precedes is the *particular* notion about which one requires full information. In English we should pronounce the following words with

emphasis. [Hermann explains it differently: *qui, τί χρὴ καὶ λέγειν, interrogat, is non solum quid, sed etiam an aliquid* dicendum sit, dubitat. Klotz says: *Si dico τί χρὴ καὶ λέγειν, proprie hoc quæro, quid sit dicendum, etiam si solum de dicendo cogitemus;* i. e. the questioner passes over all the particulars about which he *might* inquire, and confines himself to *this particular one.*]

Τί καὶ βούλεσθε, ὦ νεώτεροι; (*Th.*) *Ἐκέλευσεν εἰπεῖν ποῦ καὶ ἐπλήγη* (*Xen.*). *Εἶμι τηρήσουσ' ὅ τι καὶ δράσει ποτέ* (*Eur.*).

353. Hand says: 'Græci addito *καί* [Latini per *etiam*] interrogationi adjiciunt *aliquam asseverationem rei agendæ*, ideoque vim interrogationis augent.[1]—Qui interrogat *τί χρὴ καὶ λέγειν*; is præsumit nihil esse dicendum, additque suæ interrogationi affirmationem; quid re vera dicendum est? id est, nihil profecto.—Sed non semper exspectatur negatio' (*Hand*, ii. 576).

354. So, too, *καί* after *ἐπεί, ἐπειδή. ἵνα* (unless it belongs merely to some one following notion) adds emphasis to *the precise cause alleged*, omitting all the other possible accessory causes.

Ὅπως σώσεις μ', ἐπεὶ κἀπώλεσας (*Aristoph.*). *Πρωταγόρας ῥᾳδίως ἐπεκδιδάξει, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεδίδαξεν* (*Pl.*). *Μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα καί τι περαίνωμεν* (*Pl.*).

Exercise 99.

355. *Soc.* Come then, let us see now what in the world it is that we are saying of rhetoric; for I, indeed, am not yet able to understand what I should say. When an assembly is held in a city, for the choice of physicians, shipwrights, or any other kind of artificer, is it not the case, that the rhetorician will refrain from giving his advice? for it is evident, that in each election the most skilful artist ought to be chosen. Nor will he be consulted, when the question is respecting the building of walls, or the construction of ports or docks, but architects only. Nor, again, when a delib-

[1] Hermannus ad Vig. N. 320 indicari putat *quamdam dubitationem*, quæ prorsus abhorret ab his particulis (*Hand*).

eration occurs respecting the choice of generals, or the marshalling an army against enemies, or the occupation of posts,—but on such occasions those who are skilled in military affairs will give advice, and not rhetoricians. What do you say, Gorgias, on such points?

(2) The Mantineans and their allies were the first to join them, through fear of the Lacedæmonians. For a certain part of Arcadia had been reduced to subjection by the Mantineans, while the war with the Athenians was still going on; and they thought, that the Lacedæmonians would not allow their sovereignty over it, since they had now leisure[a] (to interfere); so that they gladly turned to the Argives, considering them to be a powerful state, and one which was always at variance with the Lacedæmonians, and under a democratical government like[b] themselves.

[a] i. e. 'not only inclination but also leisure.' [b] *πολλοὶ καὶ καλοί.* *Καί* to be expressed after the particle or comparison.

Chap. 28. § 5. (*καί continued.*)

356. When the notion that follows *καί* is one of great importance, *καί*=*even;* and often *very, indeed.* To this head may be referred the use of *καί* with adjectives and adverbs of *number* and *degree:* e. g. *καὶ πάντες, even all,* i. e. all without exception; *καὶ μάλα, very—indeed; καὶ πάνυ,* properly *quite entirely;* with a negative, *at all* [*καὶ πάνυ οὐδὲ εἶναι,* &c.]. The *καί* is here virtually = *idque. Καὶ πάνυ* ἐλλόγιμος = ἐλλόγιμος *καὶ πάνυ* ελλόγιμος. With superlatives *καί*=*vel.*

Καλόν γε καὶ γέροντα μανθάνειν σοφά (*Æsch.*). *Τὸ καλῶς ἔχον που κρεῖττόν ἐστι καὶ νόμου* (*Men.*). *Ἔστιν ἀξία ἡ χώρα καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων ἐπαινεῖσθαι, οὐ μόνον ὑφ' ἡμῶν* (*Pl.*). *Ἀμείνων ἂν εἴη ὁ ἑνὶ δυνάμενος ἀρεστοὺς ποιεῖν ἢ ὅστις καὶ πολλοῖς;* (*Xen.*) *Πολίτης προδότης καὶ τρίς, οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀπολωλέναι δίκαιος* (*Dem.*). *Οὗτος ὁ νόμος καὶ μάλα καλῶς ἔχει*

(*Æschin.*). *Δοκεῖ μοι πρὸ Ἕλληνος καὶ πάνυ οὐδὲ εἶναι αὕτη ἡ ἐπίκλησις* (*Th.*). *Τοὐμόν γε φράζω ὄνομα καὶ λίαν σαφῶς* (*Aristoph.*). *Οἷς πλεῖσται μεταβολαὶ ἐπ' ἀμφότερα ξυμβεβήκασι, δίκαιοί εἰσι καὶ ἀπιστότατοι εἶναι ταῖς εὐπραγίαις* (*Th.*).

357. *Καί* is often prefixed to participles used *adversatively*, to bring out their meaning more emphatically: *even when* or *if* = *even though*. [*Οὐδέ, μηδέ* = *not even though*.] This *καί* is often combined with *ὅμως* (*nevertheless*).

Αἱ συμφοραὶ καὶ βραχὺν ὄντα μακρὸν δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιοῦσι τὸν βίον (*Hdt.*). *Κύπρις οὐδὲ νουθετουμένη χαλᾷ* (*Eur.*). *Οὓς ἂν αἰσθάνωμαι ὅμως καὶ εὖ πάσχοντας ἔτι ἀδικεῖν πειρωμένους, τούτους ὡς ἀνηκέστους πλεονέκτας ὄντας ἤδη καὶ τῆς χρήσεως ἀποπαύω* (*Xen.*).

358. Hermann. on *Œd. Tyr.* 414, where *some* read *σὺ καὶ δεδορκὼς οὐ βλέπεις, κ. τ. λ.*, observes, that even in this (virtually) adversative construction *καί* is not *quamvis*, but *etiam*; there being a reference to a *less favorable condition* (*οὐ μόνον—ἀλλὰ καί*): *tu* [non modo si cæcus esses nihil cerneres, sed] *etiam videns nihil cernis.*

359. With *καὶ μάλα* (*λίαν*, &c.), there is sometimes a *trajection*, when a preposition precedes: *Καὶ μάλα κατὰ πρανοῦς ἵεντο* = *ἵεντο καὶ κατὰ μάλα πρανοῦς ἵεντο* (*Xen.*). *Καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ τοῖς μικροῖς* (*Xen.*). *Καὶ λίαν ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνῳ* (*Pl.*). Kr. 2d An. 1, 5, 8.

Exercise 100.

360. (1) Nicostratus, with all the rest of the army, advancing by a different approach, and from a more distant point, against the hill, which was difficult of access, was beaten back in utter confusion, and the whole force of the Athenians was within a little of being conquered. For that day then, as the Mendæans and their allies did not give way, the Athenians retreated and pitched their camp; and the Mendæans, when night came on, returned into the town.

(2) In the mean time the trumpet sounded, upon which the enemy fled much faster than before; and the Greeks facing about, passed the river in all haste. Some of the enemy, on seeing this, ran back to the

river, and wounded a few of our men with their arrows; but many of them, even when the Greeks were on the other side, were observed to continue their flight.

Chap. 28. § 6. (*καί continued.*)

361. When *καί* (=*even*) limits the notion of a word, by making an assertion of *that at least, if no more; even that, if no more;* it may be construed *if only; though but,* &c.: sometimes before an infin. by *mere, merely. Τὸ καὶ λέγειν τοῦτο, the merely saying this; the mere fact of saying this. Καὶ πάλαι* = *not only now, but long ago:* it may be construed in English by an emphatic *long.* Here also (as in 357) the corresponding forms that combine this meaning of *καί* with a *negative* are *οὐδέ, μηδέ.*

Τύραννον εἶναι μωρία τὸ καὶ θέλειν (*Eur.*). *Ὡς τοῖς κακῶς πράσσουσιν ἡδὺ καὶ βραχὺν χρόνον λαθέσθαι τῶν παρεστώτων κακῶν* (*Soph.*). *Οὐδὲ νοῦν ἔχει τὸ λέγειν ὧν μήτε τινὰ ἀνάγκην μήτε τὸν εἰκότα λόγον καὶ μετρίως ἄν τις εἰπεῖν εἴη δυνατός* (*Pl.*). *Ἐξὴν αὐτοῖς καὶ μηδενα λιπεῖν* (*Xen.*). *Δίκαι' ἔμοιγε καὶ πάλαι δοκεῖς λέγειν* (*Aristoph.*).

362. This *καί* (*even*) is often used to strengthen the *indefinites: ὁστισοῦν* (*any soever*); *ὁποιοστισοῦν* (*of any kind whatever*); *ὁποσοσοῦν* (*however much, however little*); and the corresponding adverbs *ὁπωσοῦν, ὁπωστιοῦν* (*in any manner, in any way*). With *οὐ, μή,* we shall have, not *καὶ οὐ* (*μή*), but *οὐδέ, μηδέ.*

Πῶς οὐκ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἡντινοῦν δίκην ἀπολιπεῖν; (*Lys.*). *Ἄνευ εὐνοίας τί ὄφελος καὶ ὁποιαστινοσοῦν ἐπιτρόπου ἐπιστήμης γίγνεται*; (*Xen.*). *Εἰ καὶ ὁποσονοῦν μᾶλλον ἐνδώσουσι, διαφθαρήσονται* (*Th.*) *Ἐπάκουε, εἰ νοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχεις* (*Pl.*). *Κύνωι παρ' ὑμῶν οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν ἀφορμὴν λαβὼν κατεναυμάχησε Λακεδαιμονίους* (*Dem.*). *Οἱ νικήσαντες τὰ πράγ*

ματα οὕτως ἐσφετερίσαντο, ὥστε ἀρχῆς μηδ ὁτιοῦν μεταδιδόναι τοῖς ἡττημένοις (*Pl.*). *Τοὺς ἰατροὺς σὺ ἀνδρείους καλεῖς; Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν* (*Pl.*).

363. *Καί—also, even*, may follow *καί—and*, if even a single word be interposed: *καί τις καί· καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν· καὶ δὴ καί.* On *καὶ εἰ* (*ἐάν*), *εἰ* (*ἐάν*) *καί*, see under *εἰ*.

364. *Καί* is also used, where it may be explained by *and so* (*καί οὕτω*); that is, to connect sentences of which the second contains a more *definite* exposition of the first; often to add a circumstance that follows from the preceding one, or is an instance of it. [Thus *et* for *et ita, et sic, et tum.* Hand, vol. ii. 484.]

Exercise 101.

365. I omitted in my former speech one point, as strong as any that were urged, to prove the non-payment of the marriage portion by these men to Aphŏbus. This I will now lay before you, and then proceed to expose the falsehoods you have heard from the defendant. You must know, gentlemen of the jury, when he first thought of putting in a claim to the property of Aphobus, he said he had paid, not a talent (which he now says was the amount of the portion), but eighty minas; and he set up tablets, on the house for twenty minas, on the land for a talent; wishing to preserve to Aphobus both the one and the other. Seeing, however, by the issue of the late trial, with what feelings an unscrupulous rogue is regarded by a jury, he comes to his senses, and thought how hard my case would appear if, after being so grossly plundered, Aphobus having all my estate, I had nothing of his to levy upon, and could show that I was hindered from levying by the defendant. *And so* what does he do? He removes the tablets from the house, and says the portion is only a talent, and for that the land is mortgaged.

CHAP. 28. § 7. (*καὶ γάρ.*)

366. *Καὶ γάρ* has several meanings: (1) *etenim*, so that the *καί* relates to the whole sentence: (2) *nam etiam*, so that the *καί*=*etiam*, relates to the notion that stands next after the *γάρ*: (3) *nam et*, the *καί* being followed by another *καί*. Thus *καὶ γὰρ συμμαχεῖν ἐθέλουσι* may mean: (1) *for they are also | resolved to aid them;* (2) *for they are resolved | even to aid them;* (3) *for they are resolved both to aid them (and also to do something else;* e. g. *προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν. Dem.*). In the second (and third) meaning the opposed notion may be inserted between the *καί* and the *γάρ*. It is only in the first and second meanings that the form becomes *negatively οὐδὲ γάρ*. To the [first or] second belong also *καὶ γὰρ εἰ* (*ἐάν*), and *οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ* (*ἐάν*). We also meet with *καὶ γὰρ καί*, *etenim etiam*, and *καὶ* (*οὐδὲ*) *γὰρ οὐδέ*.

Ἐξέλωμεν ἀλλήλων τὴν ἀπιστίαν· καὶ γὰρ οἶδα ἀνθρώπους οἳ ἐποίησαν ἀνήκεστα κακά (*Xen.*). *Οἶδ' ἐγὼ Ἄνδρ' ὄντα τὸν σὸν παῖδα· καὶ γὰρ ἐχθρὸς ὢν Ἀκούσεται τά γ' ἐσθλὰ χρηστὸς ὢν ἀνήρ* (*Eur.*). *Ξένους ξένιζε. καὶ σὺ γὰρ ξένος γ' ἔσῃ* (*Gn.*). *Οὐκ ἔστι πενίας οὐδὲν ἀθλιώτερον Ἐν τῷ βίῳ σύμπτωμα· καὶ γὰρ ἂν φύσει Σπουδαῖος ᾖς, πένης δέ, κατάγελως ἔσῃ* (*Men.*). *Δεινὸν τὸ τίκτειν ἐστίν· οὐδὲ γὰρ κακῶς Πάσχοντι μῖσος ὢν τέκῃ προσγίγνεται* (*Soph.*). *Οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖν οἰκίαν ἄνευ κακοῦ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ γῆμαι καὶ τὸ μὴ γῆμαι κακόν* (*Gn.*).

For *καὶ—δέ*, *καὶ δή*, *ἀλλὰ καί*, see *δέ*, *δή*, *ἀλλά*. *Καὶ τί*; *at cur tandem?* (*Pl.* Phil. 21, B.)

(In the following examples *καὶ γάρ*=*nam etiam*.)

Exercise 102.

367. (1) None can justly praise the Lacedæmonians for their concord any more than pirates, robbers, and men who are engaged in other unjust and violent

courses; for even they destroy others by agreeing among themselves. But if I seem to any of you to have made a comparison unworthy of their glory, I waive it, and instance the Triballi, who, as all allow, agree together better than all other men, and yet slay not only their neighbors and those who dwell near to them, but all others whom they can reach.

(2) Euctēmōn lived ninety-six years, the greater part of which time he passed with apparent prosperity; for he had both a considerable fortune and a wife and family, with a reasonable share of the other ingredients of happiness; but in his advanced age he met with a calamity of no trifling kind, which threw his whole family into disorder, consumed a great part of his estate, and occasioned a dissension between him and his most intimate friends: what was the source of this evil, and in what manner it happened, I will explain as concisely as I am able.

Chap. 29. *Καίπερ, καίτοι.*

368. *Καίπερ* is hardly ever found in Attic writers except with a participle or some virtually participial construction; whereas *καίτοι* (= *although*) is used only in independent sentences. Later writers use them even *vice versâ*. To the instance from Theophrastus, given in Gr. in 1340, of *καίπερ* with a finite verb, Krüger adds Pl. Symp. 219; and for *καίτοι* with participle quotes Pl. Rep. 511; Lys. 31. 34?

369. *Καίτοι* (*although*, *though*, *but*, *however*, &c.: in arguing = *now*) *quamquam*, especially the corrective *quamquam*; sometimes *verum*, *sed tamen*. *Καίτοι γε*, the same, with more emphasis on the following assertion (*quamquam quidem*). *Καίτοι τί φημι*; &c.

Ἀλλ' ἔπαυσε μὲν τούτων πολλοὺς ἀρετῆς ποιήσας ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ ἐλπίδας παρασχών, ἂν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιμελῶν-

ται, καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι. Καίτοι γε οὐδεπώποτε ὑπέσχετο διδάσκαλος εἶναι τούτου (*Xen.*). *Ὅμως πρός γε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας καίπερ οὕτω πραττούσης φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἀξίωμα μεγαλοπρεπέστερον καταλείπεται* (*Pl.*). *Συμβουλεύω σοι, καίπερ νεώτερος ὤν* (*Xen.*). *Διαπεπραγμένος ἦκε, καίπερ πάνυ πολλῶν ἀντιλεγόντων* (*Xen.*). *Οὐκ ἂν προδοίην καίπερ ἄψυχον φίλον* (*Eur.*). *Λέγεις ἀληθῆ, καίπερ ἐκ μακροῦ χρόνου* (*Soph.*). *Καὶ θνήσκουσ' ὅμως, πολλὴν πρόνοιαν εἶχεν εὐσχήμως πεσεῖν* (*Eur.*). *Πείθου γυναιξίν, καίπερ οὐ στέργων ὅμως* (*Æsch.*).

Of *καίτοι* = *now*, see an example in 292, note *b*.

Exercise 103.

370. (1) When they appeared before the Archon, they styled one of them the adopted son of Philoetēmōn, and the other of Ergamĕnēs, whereas they now protest them both to be the sons of Euctēmōn; yet had they been lawfully begotten, and had they been adopted, as they first alleged, not even then could they have been called the sons of Euctemon; for the law forbids a son by adoption to return into the family from which he was emancipated, unless he leave a legitimate son of his own in the family which adopted him; so that, even from their own behavior, it is manifest that their evidence is false.

(2) Thus that he was in his perfect senses when † he made the will in which he adopted him,[a] as the law permitted him, you have heard clearly proved; so that on this head at least it is proved that Andrŏclēs has given evidence that is false; but, as he has protested also that Antidōrus was the legitimate son of Euctēmōn, this too I will show to be untrue.

[a] *Say:* 'that he disposed (° of his property), and adopted ° him.'

Chap. 30. *Μά.*

371. *Μά, by*, a particle of *swearing*, taking the acc. of the *deity*.

a) It is principally used in *negative* asseverations, with *οὐ preceding* or *following*, or *both*.

Οὐ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, εἰ ἐπαιδοποιησάμην, οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἐκτησάμην παῖδά ποτ' ἄν, κ.τ.λ.

b) The negative is sometimes omitted.

Οὐκ ἐβάλλετο; Μὰ Δι' ἀλλ' ὁ δῆμος ἀνεβόα κρίσιν ποιεῖν.

c) In Attic prose, the name of the deity is sometimes omitted.

Φημὶ ἔγωγε. Μὰ τὸν—οὐ σύ γε.

d) *Ναὶ μὰ*—is *affirmative:* and sometimes even *μά* itself occurs affirmatively, if the context sufficiently implies the affirmation.

Μὰ τὴν τέλειον τῆς ἐμῆς παιδὸς Δίκην, Æsch. Ag. 1407: so *μὰ Δία, By Zeus* (*Jupiter*).

Exercise 104.

372. (1) Notwithstanding these imprecations, notwithstanding the oaths and the oracle, which stand recorded even now, the Amphissæan Locrians, or rather their magistrates, despisers of all law, cultivated the plain again, walled in and restored the devoted and accursed harbor, and demanded toll from those who entered the port.

(2) *Socr.* I say, then, that these are two questions, and I will give you an answer to both. For I affirm, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants have very little power in cities, as I just now said; for they do scarcely any thing that they wish, though they do what to them appears to be best.

Pol. Is not this, then, to possess great power?

Socr. It is not, at least as Polus says.

Pol. I say that it is not? On the contrary, I say it is.

Socr. By Jupiter, not you. For you said that to have great power is a good to him who possesses it.

Pol. And I °still do say so.[a]

[a] *Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.* In *γὰρ οὖν*, the *οὖν* denotes *certain assurance, a confidence that cannot be shaken.*

Chap. 31. *Μέν.*

373. *a*) *Μέν*, shortened from *μήν*, has properly the same asseverative power as that particle (= *certainly, indeed*). This it retains in some combinations, especially in *μὲν οὖν*, as used in *answers:* properly *quidem igitur, sane igitur, profecto igitur:* hence (*sane quidem* =) *immo, immo vero,* 'cum vi *augendi* et *corrigendi*' (S.).

Ὡς ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες! Εναργὲς μὲν οὖν (*Pl.*). *Οὐδὲν ἐπίστανται ποιεῖν. Πάντα μὲν οὖν, immo vero omnia:* nay, rather *they can do every thing* (Xen.).

The adverbs *πάνυ, παντάπασι, κομιδῇ* strengthen the affirmation of *μὲν οὖν.*

Φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν ἔσται ὁ μέλλων καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἔσεσθαι φύλαξ πόλεως; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν (*Pl. Decidedly.—By all means.—Certainly*).

374. *b*) In answers: *οὐ μὲν οὖν, non ita profecto; non sane.*

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐδ' ἔλεγεν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἔγραφεν ἡνίκα ἐργάσασθαί τι δέοι κακὸν ὑμᾶς; Οὐ μὲν οὖν ἦν εἰπεῖν ἑτέρῳ (*Dem.*).

375. *c*) *Μὲν οὖν* are also often used (like *μὲν δή* = *then; thus then; so*) as *conclusive* or *recapitulatory* particles to terminate a subject, after which a new one is introduced by *δέ.*

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μέχρι τούτου· περὶ δὲ τῶν γενομένων πειράσομαι κτλ.

376. *d*) Also *μὲν οὖν* (= *ac, atque*) 'in *continuando* sermone cum quadam conclusionis significatione usur-

patur, ut apud Latinos *et quidem.*[1] *Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ac primum quidem.*' (H.).

377. *c*) The *οὖν* appears sometimes to refer to the preceding statement like our *now* (or *indeed*) followed by *but* (*ὅμως δέ*, or *ὅμως δὲ μέντοι*).

Ὁ δ' ὡμολόγησε ταῦτα ποιήσειν. ἠπιστάμην μὲν οὖν, ὅτι οὔτε θεοὺς οὔτε ἀνθρώπους νομίζει, ὅμως δὲ —ἐδόκει μοι κτλ. (*Lys.*).

378. It must be remembered that the *μέν* has often (as indeed in the last example) its proper force, and is followed by *δέ*. [*He said so and so*]: *ἐκεῖνον μὲν οὖν ἐκέλευον βαδίζειν, ἐμὲ δὲ μεθ' αὑτῶν ἀκολουθεῖν, κτλ.* (*Lys.*)

379. *Μέν* also retains the asseverative force of *μήν* in the combinations *ἀλλὰ μὲν δή* (*at sane jam*), *καὶ μὲν δή* (*et jam sane, et profecto jam*), *οὐ μὲν δή* (*minime vero*). In these combinations *μήν* never appears.—After these particles a particular notion is often rendered emphatic by *γέ*.

Οὐ μὰ Δί', εἶπον ἐκεῖνοι, οὐ μὲν δή γ' ἔχαιρον (*Xen.*). *Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι κτλ.* (*Pl. Phæd.* 75, A.)

380. In *μέν γε* the *μέν* points out a relation to the following clause, or a following word or notion; the *γέ* adds emphasis to the whole clause in which it occurs, or to that particular word in it, to which it is attached; so that the force must be given in English by some *strengthening* or *restrictive* pronoun; *quite*, *only*, *at any rate*.[2]

The particles generally introduce an argument in confirmation of what precedes (Cf. *Cyr.* 2, 2, 2; 4, 3, 18. *K. ad Mem.* 3, 14, 6.)

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[1] Sometimes *igitur*: e. g. *νὺξ μὲν οὖν ἡμέρα τε γέγονεν οὕτω* (*Pl. Tim.*), which *Cic.* translates; *Nox* igitur *et dies ad hunc modum et ob has generata causas, &c.*

[2] "Particularum *μέν γε* is usus est, ut *γέ* ad præcedentia *confirmationis* causâ referatur, *μέν* autem ad illud ipsum, de quo sermo est, spectet." (*Herm.*)

Οἱ μέν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς κτλ.—*ὑμεῖς δὲ* κτλ. (*Th.* 1, 70.)

Often, however, there is no expressed *opposition*, as—

Ἀπόστασις μέν γε τῶν βίαιόν τι πασχόντων ἐστίν (*Th.* 3, 39): *τοῦτο μέν γ' ἤδη σαφές*, that is already *quite* clear (*Ar. Acharn.* 155).

On the difference between *μέν γάρ* and *μέν γε* Buttmann (*ad Mid. p.* 46, *cf. Kr. Th.* 1, 40) says: 'Cum quis uno argumento vel exemplo aliquid probat, potest hoc ut sufficiens adferre; quod fit particulâ *γάρ*: potest etiam significare, plura quidem posse desiderari, sed hoc unum satis grave esse; quod fit addito *γέ* (*certe, saltem*).' The *μέν γε* = *sane quidem.*

381. The notion opposed to or contrasted with that to which *μέν* belongs, is usually accompanied by *δέ* or *μέντοι*: less commonly by *τοίνυν, ἀτάρ, ἀλλά, μήν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλά.* (See *ὅμως μέντοι* in 386.)

If the adversative notion is quite suppressed, we have *μέν solitarium*[1] (Cf. *δέ*, Gr. 1458, *k*).

Exercise 105.

382. (1) These then being four, and always taking the best possible care, the former of the body, and the latter of the soul, flattery perceiving this, I do not say knowing, but sagaciously guessing it, and having divided itself fourfold, and having stealthily put on the garb of each of these divisions, feigns itself to be that which it has put on; and it is not in the least concerned for what is best; but by means of that which is most pleasant, captivates and seduces ignorance, so as to appear to be of great value. *And thus* cookery puts

[1] Sometimes the adversative particle is omitted (1) in consequence of a change of construction: (2) because it is *implied* by *εἶτα* or *ἔπειτα* [*Πρῶτα μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, δοκεῖ μοι* κτλ.—*ἔπειτα καὶ τὰς σκηνὰς συγκατακαῦσαι* (*Xen.*). *Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐδάκρυε—εἶτα ἔλεξε τοιάδε. Xen.*]: (3) because the writer passes from a *disjunctive* to a *conjunctive* structure of his sentence (*Kr.*). Ubi *μέν—καί* vel *μέν—τέ* dicitur, proprie anacolūthon est, quo a disjunctione, quae per *μέν* exprimitur, transitur ad *conjunctionem*, quam significant *καί* vel *τέ* (*H.*).

on the garb of medicine, and pretends that it knows the aliment best for the body. So that if a cook and a physician had to contend before boys, or before men as foolish as boys, which of the two was acquainted with good and bad aliments, the physician or the cook, the physician would die of hunger. This then I call flattery; and I say that a thing of this kind is base, Polus (for I say this to you), because it looks to what is agreeable without regard to what is best; and I affirm that it is not an art, but skill, †a skill acquired empirically,[a] because it has no knowledge of the things which it employs, what they severally are in their nature, so that it is unable to tell the use of each. But I do not call that an art which is a thing without reason. If you are doubtful about these things, I am willing to give you a reason for them.

(2) The flattery, then, pertaining to cookery, as I have said, is concealed under medicine; and, in the same manner, under gymnastics, personal decoration, which is mischievous, deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal; deceiving by means of gestures and colors, by smoothness and outward appearance, so as to make men put on an adventitious beauty, and neglect that which is their own, and is acquired by gymnastics. That I may not then be prolix, I wish to tell you, after the manner of geometricians (for perhaps you can now follow me), that what personal decoration is to gymnastics, that is sophistry to legislation; and that what cookery is to medicine, that is rhetoric to justice.

(3) Let us consider this too. Are we not agreed that it is sometimes better to do the things which we just now spoke of; to slay, to banish men, and deprive them of their property, and sometimes not?

Pol. Certainly.

Socr. This then, as it seems, is agreed on both by you and me?

Pol. Yes.

[a] ἐμπειρία.

Chap. 32. *Μέντοι.*

383. 1) *Μέντοι* = *sane, enimvero, certainly;* especially in affirmative answers. There is often an emphatic repetition of the verb:

Ἦ καὶ ἐμὲ—δεήσει ταῦτα ποιεῖν; Δεήσει μέντοι σε, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἔνδον μένειν (*Xen.*).

384. 2) = *tamen; but, however*, in objections and other oppositions.

Λέγουσι τοὺς κηφῆνας κηρία μὲν πλάττειν καθ' αὑτούς, μελιτουργεῖν μέντοι οὐδέν (*Arist.*).

3) 'In interrogationibus *μέντοι* sic dicitur, ut videatur aliquis rem negare, quo certius ea ab respondente affirmetur' (*H.*): e. g. *οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσι μέντοι; surely they oppose each other, don't they?*

385. 4) Ironically; = *scilicet.*[1]

Οἱ μέντοι ἀγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι, ὅταν τὸ πολλοῦ ἄξιον μικροῦ ἐξῇ πρίασθαι τότε φασὶ δεῖν ὠνεῖσθαι (*Xen.*).

386. *a*) *Μέντοιγε*, or *μέντοι γε, tamen; tamen certe* (H.): *γὲ μέντοι, certe tamen* (H.). 'Sed hic ordo tantum ibi videtur locum habere posse, ubi verbum præcessit, cujus vis voce *γέ* augeri possit; quod secus est in *articulo*.—Hinc numquam *οὔ γε μέντοι*, sæpissime *οὐ μέντοιγε* reperias.' (*Kr. ad Anab.* 1, 9, 14.)

b) *Ὅμως μέντοι, nevertheless:* sometimes opposed to a concessive *μὲν οὖν.*

Exercise 106.

387. (1) Since, then, he endeavored with his brother-in-law to deprive me of my property, and has come into court relying on the influence of his friends,

[1] 'Personus rarissime conjungi a tragicis *μὲν γέ* observat. Harum particularum is usus est, ut *γέ* ad præcedentia confirmationis causâ referatur; *μέν* autem illud ipsum, de quo sermo est, spectet.' (*H.*)

the only course left for me is to seek redress at your hands. I am aware, gentlemen, that I have to contend against ingenious pleading and witnesses prepared to give false evidence. I think, however, the justice of my cause will give me such advantage in argument over the defendant, that if any of you had a good opinion of him before, you will learn from his conduct towards me that he has all along been (unknown to you) the vilest and basest of mankind.

(2) *Socr.* If, therefore, he who acts unjustly does not meet with the punishment he deserves, according to your account he will be happy.

Pol. So I say.

Socr. But, according to my opinion, Polus, he who acts unjustly, and is unjust, is in every way miserable; though more miserable if he does not suffer punishment, and does not meet with chastisement for his unjust actions; but less miserable if he suffers punishment, and meets with his just deserts both from gods and men.

(3) *Cal.* Tell me, Chærĕphōn, does Socrates say this seriously, or is he jesting?

Chær. He appears to me, Callicles, to speak most seriously; but there is nothing like asking him himself.

Cal. You are right, by the gods, and I desire to do it. Tell me, Socrates, whether we must say that you are now speaking seriously or jesting? For, if you are speaking seriously, and if what you say is true, is not our human life altogether subverted, and are not all our actions, as it seems, contrary to what they ought to be?

Chap. 33. *Μή.*

388. On the apparently redundant *μή, μὴ οὐ*, see under *οὐ*, and in the Grammar; and especially in the Appendix (from Madvig) at the end of Arnold's edition of the Olynthiac Orations.

389. *Μή τί γε, μή τί γέ δη*[1] = *nedum* (where the *dum* = *demum* and *quidem*. Hartung); and, like it, may sometimes be construed by *much less*, sometimes by *much more* (or *not—but; not only—but*). It is properly = *ne dicam, ne quis dicat* (*μή τι λέγε*): the *τί* = *at all, in the last.*

Exercise 107.

390. (1) Hence the only thing that his accusers do is to warn every body to give him nothing whatever, since he is to be punished for going to commit crimes, *not* merely for having committed or completed any. For this is their meaning when they say: 'He is going to form sieges:' 'he is leaving the Greeks exposed.'

(2) I take it, that if he had been informed that those who then used this language before him, had been crucified the moment they returned, he would have acted exactly as the king of Persia did. And how (you will ask) was this?—When he was taken in by Timagoras, after giving him, it is said, no less than forty talents, as soon as he heard that he had been condemned and executed, and was consequently unable even to preserve his own life, much more to effect what he had promised him, he perceived that he had paid the money to one who had no[a] control whatever over the measures of the state.

[a] *μηδ' ὁτιοῦν.*

Chap. 34. *Μήν.*

391. *a*) *Μήν*[2] (= *vero*, both in its *concessive* and *adversative* power. *II.*) is partly *affirmative* (which is its

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[1] Also *μήτοι γε δή*, which Hermann was wrong in wishing to read every where for *μή τί γέ δη. εἰ δ' οὖν θεούς, μήτοι τόν γε μέγιστον τῶν θεῶν τολμῆσαι οὕτως ἀνομοίως μιμήσασθαι* (*Plin.*).

[2] Mr. Stephens says of *μήν*, that 'it indicates the progress of the mind from the subject under consideration to some other subject, some fresh topic or new idea; or, if not to another subject, to some ulterior

primary force) and partly *adversative;* commonly the latter, but *generally* with other particles.

392. *b*) *Μήν* is used in *appeals*, *questions*, and *solemn asseverations*. *Εἰ δ', ἄγε μήν, πείρησαι* (*Il. a*, 302). Cf. '*move* vero *ocius te*, nutrix' (*Hartung*). *Τί μήν; quid vero?* or *quid quaeso? ἦ μήν* (*profecto, verily, assuredly*): and without an oath, *ὦ Ζεῦ—ἦ μήν καὶ τὸ πρότερόν γε ὑμῖν ἐφάνη καλὸν τὸ ἐρώτημα* (*Pl.*).

393. *c*) *Μήν* is also *annective* and *adversative*, like *vero: σώφρων μὲν ὅ γε τοιοῦτος καὶ οὐδαμῇ φιλοχρήματος*, 'and *certainly* (*but undoubtedly* or *assuredly*) is temperate and by no means fond of money' (*Pl.*). *Ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς μέν ἐστι ὑπό τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μήν*, κτλ. (*this is certainly somewhat strange; it proves however*, &c. Pl. Gorg. 493.)

Ἀλλὰ *μήν*, *at vero* (and *atqui*), cf. 32, sqq. On *οὐ μὴν ἀλλά*, see 42, sqq. Γὲ *μήν* (*certe vero*): see *γέ*, 180, 181.

394. *d*) '*Καὶ μήν et vero, et sane* aut *atqui* significat' (*Herm.*). The *καί* (and so the *καί* implied in *οὐδὲ μήν*) sometimes only indicates the *correspondence* of the clauses as in *καὶ γάρ* in the sense of *etenim*, and *καὶ δή*; but sometimes has a *connective* force, so that the *καί* is to be referred to the word that follows the *μήν* (as in *καὶ γάρ* = *nam etiam*; *καὶ μὴν—γέ*, *certe quidem*).

395. *e*) This *καὶ μήν* (like *ἀλλὰ μήν*) often con-

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statement on the same subject.'—It differs from *ἀλλὰ καί* (with which it is often associated), 'in that it denotes a separation and distinction between the statement which it accompanies and the preceding statement' (p. 79).—This, however good as a description of the use of the particle, does not explain its primary meaning, which is certainly that of a *confident assertion.*

Hoogeveen says: 'Particula *μήν* in eo videtur differre a *τοί*, quod illud simpliciter affirmat partem, cui apponitur; a *δή*, quod in aliquâ re, quæ ad summum incrementum pervenerit, confirmata quasi triumphet; a *γέ*, quod urget sequentia sed remittendo priora; at *μήν* ita affirmat posteriora, ut e prioribus nihil remittat; qualem ipsius potestatem et usum fere observavi, si non constantem et perpetuum, nempe *quo nova rei confirmatæ asseveratio* accedit. Quicquid id est, primam ejus potestatem *βεβαιωτικήν* securus statuo, quia hanc quoque excerceat, quum adversativa dicitur' (p. 354).

nects a *new*, *further* particular with something of *opposition: moreover*, *but further.*

396. *f*) *Οὐ μήν* ['modo *non vero;* modo *non tamen;* modo simpliciter *sed* vertitur.' Hoog.] are often used *adversatively*, i. e. to *asseverate* a proposition that is *opposed* to a preceding one.

1) If the opposition is *real*, the particles = (*profecto tamen non*), but *yet not; but assuredly not; not however.*

Thus: Xen., after describing the attention paid by Socrates to his bodily health, says, *ἀλλὰ οὐ μὴν θρυπτικός γε*, &c. (*profecto tamen non* erat homo mollis et delicatus. *Kühn.*)

2) If there is no opposition between the sentence introduced by *οὐ μήν* and the preceding one, then the *μήν* in *οὐ μήν*, *οὐδὲ μήν*, has not a *confirmative*, but an *adauctive* force, like *vero* in *neque vero.*

397. *g*) *Οὐ μην οὐδέ* sometimes *carry on* a preceding negation, adding to it the denial of a *further* (usually a *more striking* or *important*) *particular.* Thus after the passage just quoted (396, 1), *οὐ μὴν θρυπτικός γε*, &c., there follows *οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐρασιχρημάτους γε τοὺς συνόντας ἐποίει, nor yet did he; no, nor did he*, &c. (*nor again did he; moreover he did not*).

3) But sometimes the particles have an *adversative* sense = *however—not; but yet —not.* 'At quum admista est vis *ἐναντιωματική* [*μήν*], redditur *tamen*, et utraque negatio pertinet ad sequentia, diversa tamen, ita ut *οὐ* neget *ἁπλῶς*, *οὐδέ* distincte, ut apud *Theocr. Idyll.* viii. 76. *οὐ μὰν, οὐδὲ λόγον ἐκρίθην ἄπο τὸν πικρὸν αὐτᾷ, Ἀλλά, κτλ.* Non tamen illi quicquam respondebam, ne verbum quidem amarum: ubi *οὐ* negat *τὸ ἀπεκρίθην* generalius, *οὐδέ* distinctius *τὸν*

λόγον πικρόν. Scholiastes explicat *οὐ μόνον λόγον ἡδὺν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λόγον τὸν πικρόν.*' (*Hoog.*)

398. *h*) *Μήν, καὶ μήν* are also used in dialogues (and especially in *plays*), when the approach of a person is pointed out = '*and lo!*' '*and see!*' [*Ὅδε μὴν Αἵμων!* (*Soph. Ant.* 626.)—*Καὶ μὴν τὸ μειράκιον τοδὶ προσέρχεται. Pl.*]

Γέ cannot follow *μήν* without the interposition of a word. *Οὐ μήν—γέ, non tamen—certe; non profecto—quidem.*

Exercise 108.

399. (1) *Socr.* Even at the beginning of our conference, Polus, I praised you, because you appeared to me to be well instructed in rhetoric, though you had neglected the art of dialectics. And now, is not this the reasoning by which (°as you asserted) even a child could confute me? and I, as you suppose, am now confuted by this reasoning of yours, when I said that a man who acts unjustly is not happy? How so, my friend? For assuredly I do not grant you any one of the things you assert.

Pol. Because you are not willing to do so; for you °really think as I say.

(2) *Socr.* Do you not, then, denominate all other things in the same manner beautiful, such as forms and colors, either on account of some pleasure, or utility, or both?

Pol. I do.

Socr. And is not the case the same as to sounds, and every thing that relates to music?

Pol. Yes.

Socr. And moreover, with respect to laws and pursuits, they surely are beautiful, for no other reason except that they are either useful, or pleasant, or both?

(3) 'It seems then that a cowardly and illiberal disposition will not have any portion of true philoso-

phy?' 'I do not think it will.' 'What then?' 'Will the well-disposed man, who has moderate desires, and is not a lover of money, nor illiberal, nor arrogant, nor cowardly, ever be in any case unjust, or a breaker of engagements?' 'It is impossible.' 'When then you are examining, whilst a soul is still young, whether it is a philosophical one or not, you will consider this also, whether it be just and gentle, or unsocial and savage.' 'By all means.' '*Neither*, as I think, will you omit this.' 'What?' 'Whether it learn easily or with difficulty: or, do you expect that a person will ever love a thing sufficiently, if he is uneasy in its performance, and makes but small progress?' 'It cannot be.'

Chap. 35. *Νή. Νῦν.*

400. *Νή* = *by*, in affirmative oaths (with *acc.*).

401. *a*) *Νῦν*, *now*.—*Νῦν δή*, (1) *now*; (2) with a *past* tense = *paullo ante*, *modo*, 'just now.'

Δὴ νῦν = *scilicet nunc* (S.). *Φῶς*—*ὃ δὴ νῦν κεκλήκαμεν τὸν ἥλιον. Pl.*

Καὶ νῦν, *etiam nunc*.—*Εἰ δὲ μή, ἐρχόμεθα καὶ νῦν βοηθήσοντες τούτοις, κτλ.* = *etiam post ea, quæ tu dixisti.* Kr.

402. *Νῦν δέ* = *nunc autem*, *nunc vero* (in *oppositions* between a rejected supposition and the *real state* of things).

Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐδόκει μοι Χαιρεφῶν ἡγεμονικώτερος εἶναι σοῦ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ταύτην, ἐκεῖνον ἂν ἐπειρώμην πείθειν—νῦν δέ (*but as the case really is*) *μοι σὺ δοκεῖς ἡγούμενος μᾶλλον ἂν ἐξεργάζεσθαι τοῦτο* (*Xen.*).

403. *Νύν*, *now*, *then*. It is the same word as *νῦν*, the *now* of *time*, but used quite unemphatically, so as not to refer the *whole sentence* to present time, but only the word which it follows as an *enclitic*. In this respect it corresponds exactly with our *unemphatic now*, and,

like it, is often used with *imperatives*. 'It occurs chiefly in the *dramatic* poets: the *υ* is *long* in Aristophanes, long or short in the *tragic* poets' (*Kr.*).

Σῶσόν νυν αὐτόν· μηδ' ἔρα τοῦ πλησίον (*Eur.*). *Ἴθι νυν, ἔφη, ἀφήγησαι τούτῳ τί σοι ἀπεκρινάμην* (*Xen.*).

Exercise 109.

404. (1) As Homer says, then, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, divided the government among themselves, after they had received it from their father. This law then respecting men was in existence in the time of Saturn, and always was, and still is, established among the gods, that a man who has passed through life justly and piously, should go, when he dies, to the isles of the blessed, to dwell there in happiness of every kind and in freedom from all that is evil; but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously, should go †to the place of punishment and justice as to a prison,[a] which place they call Tartarus.

(2) After he had said this, he put an end to the conference. And Pharnabazus mounted his horse, and rode away; but his son by Parapitē, who was still a handsome youth, remaining behind, ran up to him and exclaimed, 'O Agesilaus, I take you for my guest-friend!' 'And I accept you as such,' he replied. '*Now* remember,' said (°the youth), and immediately gave the javelin in his hand, ‡a beautiful one it was, to Agesilaus; and he, accepting it, took off the trappings from the horse of Idæus the painter, which were of great beauty, and presented them to him in return.

[a] *Say:* 'to the prison of punishment and (*τε καί*) justice,' since they are both predicated together.

Chap. 36. *Ὅμως.*

405. *Ὅμως*, properly *eodem modo:* then *tamen; nihilo minus* (*ἀλλ' ὅμως κτλ.* = *but for all that, but yet; nevertheless*).

In a principal sentence, ὅμως may refer to an apposition (an Assumptive Apposition) in the same sentence.

Κόλακι, δεινῷ θηρίῳ καὶ μεγίστῃ βλάβῃ, ὅμως ἐπέμιξεν ἡ φύσις ἡδονήν τινα οὐκ ἄμουσον (*Pl.*).

The following combinations also occur: δ' ὅμως· ὅμως γε μέντοι· ὅμως γε μήν (Ar. Nub. 626)· ὅμως δέ (*verum tamen*)· ὅμως δ' οὖν (*Pl. Ep.* 317). *Klotz.*

406. Ὅμως is also used to strengthen the *adversative relation* between a participle and another participle or verb. It may then either *precede* the participle or follow it; and the participle may itself be strengthened by καίπερ.

Οὓς ἂν αἰσθάνωμαι ὅμως καὶ εὖ πάσχοντας ἔτι ἀδικεῖν πειρωμένους, τούτους κτλ. (*Xen.*) *Ὃν μὲν χρόνον ἔζη ὁ πατήρ, ὅμως, καίπερ οἰκείως ἔχων τούτοις, ὁ Ἀυσιθείδης οὐκ ἐτόλμα κτλ.* (*Dem.* 1246, 10.)

Compare Curt. 4, 1, 30: 'qui *territi tamen* spem obtinendi Ægyptum non amiserunt.' Cf. also Cic. Cat. 3, 5 (*Kr.*).

Exercise 110.

407. (1) *Soc.* Come now, if I can, I will explain to you more clearly what I mean. As there are two subject matters, I say there are two arts; and that which relates to the soul I call political, but that which relates to the body I am not able to describe to you off-hand by one name; but of the culture of the body, which is one, I say there are two divisions, one gymnastics, the other medicine. But in the political art I lay down legislation, as corresponding to gymnastics, and the judicial to medicine. Now these respectively communicate with each other, as being concerned about the same subject, medicine with gymnastics, and the judicial art with legislation; yet they in some respect differ from each other.

(2) 'But we must proceed,' he said, 'first of all, remind me of what you said, if I should appear to have forgotten it. For Simmias, as I think, is in doubt,

and fears lest the soul, though more divine and beautiful than the body, should yet perish before it, as being a species of harmony. But Cĕbēs appeared to me to grant me this, that the soul is more durable than the body, but he argued that it is uncertain to every one, whether, when the soul has worn out many bodies, and that repeatedly, it does not, on leaving the last body, itself also perish, so that this very thing is death, the destruction of the soul, since the body never ceases decaying. Are not these the points, Simmias and Cebes, which we have to inquire into?'

They both agreed that they were.

Chap. 37. Ὁπότε.

408. Ὁπότε, (1) *when, whenever: in re sæpius factâ.* (2) *since:* as *quando, quandoquidem* are used for *quoniam* in Latin: and *now* (*that*) in English. See the second passage in the Exercise. ὁπότε γε, *quandoquidem.*

[On ὁπόταν with opt., cf. Gr. 1268. On ὁπότε μή, Gr. 1280.]

Exercise 111.

409. (1) If the assertion of the *defendants* were true, and there stood on the statute-books two laws on the subject of the proclamations [of crowns], the Thesmothĕtæ would, I presume, have discovered this, and the Prytanes referred them back to the Nomothĕtæ [legislative committee], so that one of the two would certainly have been abrogated, either that which allowed the proclamation, or that which forbade it. Since then nothing of this kind has been done, they stand convicted, I imagine, of affirming, not only what is false, but what is utterly impossible to be true.

(2) 'I have ordered,' said he, 'all to obey you in the disposition and order of this procession. And that they may attend to your orders with the more satisfaction, take these coats,' said he, 'and carry them to the

commanders of the guards; give these housings to the commanders of the horse, and these other coats to the commanders of the chariots.' On this he took them and carried them off. When the commanding officers saw him, they said to him: 'You are a great man, Phĕraulas, *now that* you are to order us what we are to do.' 'No, not only so, by Zeus!' said Pheraulas, 'but it seems I am to be a baggage bearer too: *at least* I am now bringing you these two housings; one for you, and one for another person; but do you take which of them you like best.'

Chap. 38. *Ὅπου.*

410. *a*) *Ὅπου*, (1) *where;* (2) seldom *causal = since, seeing that* (siquidem, quandoquidem).

Πῶς ἡμῖν οὐχ ἡδέως πρὸς τούσδε τοὺς ὁμοτίμους ἀγωνιστέον, ὅπου γε τὰ μὲν ἆθλα τῆς ἀρετῆς ἴσα πρόκειται κτλ.; (*Xen. Cyr.* 2, 3, 11). Cf. 195.

411. *b*) The *apodŏsis* is then often *ἦ που = surely I suppose:* so that *ὅπου—ἦ που*, or *ἦ που—ὅπου* (*where—surely = if*, or *since,—then surely*) may sometimes be construed *if—much more.*

Ὅπου γὰρ Ἀθηνόδωρος καὶ Καλλίστρατος—οἰκίσαι πόλεις οἷοί τε γεγόνασιν ἦ που βουληθέντες ἡμεῖς πολλοὺς ἂν τόπους τοιούτους δυνηθείημεν παρασχεῖν (*si enim* Apollodorus et Callistratus urbes condere potuerunt, *multo magis nos*—possemus. *Isocr.*). Its strict correlative is *ἔνθα* or *ἐνταῦθα.*

Exercise 112.

412. (1) When they had received what was then given them, some of them spoke of Cyrus in this manner: '*Surely* he must himself have great wealth, *since* he has given each of us so large a sum!' But some said: 'What do you mean by talking of much wealth? It is not Cyrus's nature to heap up treasures, but he

has more pleasure in giving away riches, than in getting them.'

(2) When they thought it right to exact punishment even for words, would they not much more certainly have visited with the severest punishment a man who in very deed betrayed the city into the hands of its enemies?

Chap. 39. § 1. *Ὅπως.*

413. *Ὅπως, quomodo;* properly a dependent interrogative adv. of *manner:* cf. Gr. 1304. 1365.

Ὅπως is but seldom *as* (in *prose*), as correlative to *οὕτως* or the like (expressed or understood); still less frequently is it (like *ὡς*) used for *ὅτι* [cf. Gr. 1214, *f*] (except in *οὐχ ὅπως.* See 418.)

Like the other adverbial and pronominal forms commencing with *ὁ-* (*ὁπόσος, ὁποῖος.* &c.), it is used in replies, when the speaker repeats with surprise a question asked by the corresponding interrogative adverb or pronoun.

414. *a*) = *as*], *Ὅπως ἕκαστος ὑμῶν χαίρει καὶ βούλεται, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον φερέτω τὴν ψῆφον* (*Is.*). *Ποίει ὅπως ἄριστόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι* (*Xen.*). *Χρὴ τοὐμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν οὕτως ὅπως ἂν ἡγῇ νόμιμον εἶναι* (*Pl.*).

415. *b*) = *that*], *Τοῦτον ἔχοι τις ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅπως οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀποθνήσκειν;* (*Xen.*)

416. *c*) = *on condition that. Ἐμισθώσατο μὲν τοῦτον εὐθέως, ὅπως—συναγωνιεῖται τῷ μιαρῷ Φιλοκράτει* (*Dem.* 185, 409, 2).

417. *d*) (*ut* =) *quum. Τὸν δ' ὅπως ὁρᾷ Ξέρξης, κτλ.* (*Æsch.*) *Ἐρρίγησαν ὅπως ἴδον αἰόλον ὄφιν* (*Hom.*).

On its use as a *final* particle (= *ut*) cf. Gr. 1305, sqq.

For the remaining constructions of *ὅπως*, see Part I. § 48, and Grammar, 1489, sqq.

Exercise 113.

418. He will say: 'Tell me, Socrates, do you think that you don't deserve stripes for having, after chaunting so magnificent a dithyrambus, so inharmoniously and discordantly wandered away from the question?' 'Pray how?' shall I reply. 'How!' will be his answer; 'cannot you remember that I asked you about the absolutely beautiful; which, whenever it is present in any thing, makes that thing to be beautiful; every stone, wood, man, and god; every action, and every study.'

Chap. 39. § 2. (*οὐχ ὅπως—ἀλλά* or *ἀλλὰ καί.*)

419. *a*) *Οὐχ ὅπως* is used elliptically, like *οὐχ ὅτι*, for *non dico, non dicam: οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅπως* (*I will not say that*); but appears to be found only in the sense of (*non modo*) *not only not*, or *nedum*. So *μὴ ὅπως* (*Xen. Cyr.* 1, 3, 10), where *μή* would be used, not *οὐ*: e. g. before an *infinitive*.

Οὐχ ὅπως τοὺς πολεμίους ἐτρέψαντο οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν ἐκάκωσαν (*Xen.*). *Οὐχ ὅπως χάριν αὐτοῖς* (*τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις*) *ἔχεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ μισθώσας σεαυτὸν κατὰ τουτωνὶ πολιτεύῃ* (*non modo non—sed etiam.* Dem.). *Τοὺς Θηβαίους ἡγεῖτο οὐχ ὅπως ἀντιπράξειν καὶ διακωλύσειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συστρατεύσειν* (*Dem.*). *Οὐχ ὅπως τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας μετέχομεν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ δουλείας μετρίας ἠξιώθημεν τυχεῖν* (*non modo non—sed ne—quidem.* Isocr.). *Μὴ ὅπως ὀρχεῖσθαι ἐν ῥυθμῷ, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὀρθοῦσθαι ἐδύνασθε* (*non modo non* saltare, *sed ne* rectis *quidem* pedibus stare poteratis. *Xen.*).

420. *b*) Observe that all these forms are followed by *ἀλλὰ καί* (in a negative sense, *ἀλλ' οὐδέ*) or *ἀλλά* only. The distinction is the same as between *οὐ μόνον ἀλλά* and *ἀλλὰ καί.*

Οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφοτέραις ἐφρῆτο (*ταῖς μοίραις*) *ἀλλὰ*

διαπέμπων οὐδετέραν αὐτῷ κατέλειπε. Isocr. [cf. the first example in *a*.]

Exercise 114.

421. (1) He will not only not refer the habit and nurture of his body to brutish and senseless pleasure, and direct his life with reference to this, but will not even look to health, or make it his great object how he may be strong, or healthy, or handsome, unless he be also likely to become temperate and sober-minded by these means.

2. Nor was he alone silent on this head; but even the present claimant of the estate advanced nothing in opposition to my right, till he was instigated by this fellow to dispute it; for when I carried the money on the following day, Diŏclēs refused to accept it, alleging that he had received it from my adversary; yet I was not prevented from joining in the funeral rites, but assisted at the whole ceremony; the expenses of which were not only borne by my opponent, but were defrayed out of the money which Cirōn left: now it would have become him, if the deceased had not been really my grandfather, to have thrust me out, to have expelled me, and to have hindered me from conducting the burial in conjunction with them.

Chap. 40. § 1. *Ὅτε. Ὅτι.*

422. *Ὅτε, when* (quum, quando), cf. Gr. 1260. 'Aliud est *ὁπότε*, quod *infinitum;* aliud *ὅτε*, quod finitum' (*H.*); *in re sæpius factâ*, 1263; *sometimes* = quandoquidem, 1279: *ὅτε μή, quando non; si non*, 1280. [When *ὅτε οὐ*, when *ὅτε μή*, 1161.] On *μέμνημαι ὅτε*, cf. 1276, *b*; *ὅταν* with *opt.*, 1268; *ὁτὲ μέν—ὁτε δέ*,[1] *sometimes—sometimes.* Its correlative is *τότε.*

[1] Whenever the forms *τότε, ὅτε* are used twice (sometimes only once) for *ποτέ—ποτέ, sometimes—sometimes*, they are accented *τοτέ—ὁτέ.* B.

423. Ὅτι (1), *that, quod.* (2) *because*, for διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι, i. e. διότι. [For the general construction of ὅτι see Part I. 320, sqq. and Gram.]

Ὅτι μή, after negatives (*nisi*), *except; but.*

Ὅτι γὰρ μὴ Ἀθῆναι, ἦν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πόλισμα λόγιμον (*Hdt.* 1, 143). *Hermann* (*Viy.* 846) explains the idiom thus: "Ὅτι μὴ inde ortum, quod recte dicebatur οὐδὲν ὅ τι μή. Οὐδὲν ὅ τι μὴ Ἀθῆναι *nihil quod non sit Athenæ*; i. e. *omnia Athenæ sunt; præter Athenas nihil est; nihil est nisi Athenæ.*"—Afterwards, the words passed into a standing formula, ὅτι μή = *nisi.*

Σωκράτης οὔτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτε ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθεν, ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἰσθμόν, οὔτε κτλ. (*Pl.*) 'As we should write δῆλον ὅτι (not δηλονότι)—[but cf. *Buttm.* Ind. ad Plat. Men. and *And.* 1, 30]—so οἶδ' ὅτι (εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι) is used almost *adverbially:* originally the preceding verb was repeated. Ποιήσεις οἶδ' ὅτι (*Aristoph.*).' Kr. (Cf. 1214.)

Exercise 114.

424. At Pylus, in the mean time, the Athenians were still blockading the Lacedæmonians in the island, and the Peloponnesian forces on the continent remained where they were. But the watch was kept by the Athenians with great trouble, through want of both victuals and water; for there was no spring but one in the citadel of Pylus itself, and that not a copious one; but most of them were drinking such water as they would be likely to find by digging through the shingle near the sea. They suffered too from want of room, being encamped in a narrow space; and as the ships had no roadstead, some of them took their meals on shore in their turn, while others lay off at anchor. But their greatest discouragement was caused by the time being prolonged beyond their expectation; for they imagined that they should reduce them to surrender in a few days, shut up in a desert island as they were, and having only brackish water to drink.

CHAP. 40. § 2. (μὴ ὅτι—ἀλλὰ [καί]. οὐχ ὅτι—ἀλλὰ [καί]).

425. *a*) *Μὴ ὅτι* is used elliptically for *μὴ εἴπω* (*εἴπῃς*) *ὅτι*, *μὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι*, or the like = *I will not say; not to say*, &c. *Οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα—ἂν εὑρεῖν* κτλ., '*I am of opinion, that not only an individual, but the Great King himself would find*,' &c.; or, '*I am of opinion, that*, I will not say *a private individual*, but *the Great King himself*,' &c.; or, '*I am of opinion, that even the Great King*, much more *a private individual*, would,' &c.

Οὐχ ὅτι (= *οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι*) is used in the same way, but less commonly (*M.*).

Οὐχ ὅτι μόνος ὁ Κρίτων ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ φίλοι αὐτοῦ (*Xen.*).

426. *b*) When a negative follows with the predicate which is common to both clauses, *μὴ ὅτι—ἀλλ' οὐδέ*, = *not only not—but not even*.

Ἀπατούριος μὴ ὅτι δικάσασθαι ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐγκαλέσαι μοι ἐτόλμησεν (*Isæ.*).

427. *c*) The common negative may also precede both clauses.

Τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὧν κέκτησαι, νομίζων ἀργυρίου ἄξιον εἶναι, οὐδενὶ ἂν μὴ ὅτι προῖκα δοίης, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας λαβών (*non modo non* gratis des, *sed ne* si minus *quidem* accipias, quam est illarum rerum pretium. *Xen.*).

428. *d*) After a negative clause, *μὴ ὅτι* = *non modo; nedum: οὐδ' ἀναπνεῖν, μὴ ὅτι λέγειν τι δυνησόμεθα* = *much less to say any thing* (*Xen.*).

429. *c*) Ἀλλά without *καί* is used after *μὴ ὅτι* (as after *οὐ μόνον*), when the second clause, from its greater importance or more general meaning, makes it quite unnecessary to dwell upon the first.

430. *f*) *Οὐχ ὅσον* is also used like *οὐχ ὅτι*: *οἱ μὲν οὐχ ὅσον οὐκ ἠυίναντο, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐσώθησαν* (*Th.*). For *οὐχ ὅτι*, we also find *οὐ μόνον ὅτι*. *Καὶ μὴν ὑπεραποθνήσκειν γε μόνοι ἐθέλουσιν οἱ ἐρῶντες, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες* (*non modo—sed etiam.* Pl.).—A particle like *γάρ*, *οὖν*, may be inserted between the *οὐχ ὅπως*, &c.

Exercise 116.

431. (1) I put questions, gentlemen of the jury, to each of these men, before many witnesses. I asked Onētor and Timōcrates if any persons were present when they paid the marriage portion; Aphobus I asked, whether any were present when he received it. They severally answered, that no witness was present, but that Aphobus was paid by instalments in such sums as he desired[a] from time to time. Now can any one of you believe (the portion being a talent), that Onetor and Timocrates put so large a sum into the hands of Aphobus without witnesses? Aphobus! against whom, though paying him in presence of a multitude, one would take every precaution, so as (in case of dispute) to be able to recover one's rights before a jury. In a transaction of such importance, nobody in the world would take steps without a witness, whomsoever he had to deal with, much less with such a person as Aphobus.

(2) I am sure you will all agree, that men who give false testimony are induced by one of three motives; either by a bribe to relieve distress, or by friendship, or by enmity to the adverse party. Not one of these motives can apply to my witnesses. Not friendship, certainly; as they are not men of the same pursuits or the same age with me, or even with each other. Not enmity to the plaintiff; for one of them was his brother, and pleaded for him; Phanus was his friend, and belonged to the same tribe; Philip was neither friend nor foe; so it is clear this motive cannot be alleged against them. Nor was it poverty; for they are all men of large fortunes, out of which they defray the charges of public offices, and cheerfully perform the duties imposed on them.

[a] 'In such sums as I desire,' καθ' ὁποσονοῦν δέομαι (ἂν δέωμαι, &c.).

Chap. 41. § 1. *Οὐ.*

432. *a*) *Οὐ, not*, is an *objective* negation, *μή* being *subjective;* or, as Hermann expresses it, "*οὐ* negat *rem ipsam*, *μή cogitationem* rei:" cf. Gr. 1157, sqq.; in dependent sentences, 1161, 1166 (and Part I. § 19, 50); with *infin.* (where *μή* is the usual neg.), 1165, 1167, 1168; *ὥστε οὐ* with *infin.*, 1173 (Part I. 297); *partcp.*, 1164; *relative clauses*, 1163); *οὔ φημι* (*ἀξιῶ*, &c.), 1172; (*ἡ*) *οὐ διάλῦσις = the non-destruction. οὐ μή*, see 797, 798. *τί οὐ*; 794. *οὐ* with *fut. = imper.*, 796. On position of *οὐ*, 1195. In *questions*, 1357.

Οὐ is used before consonants, *οὐκ* before unaspirated vowels, *οὐχ* before *aspirated* ones. But the original form *οὔ* (*cum acuto*) is used at the end of a clause even before a vowel. Προσεῖπε σὲ μὲν οὔ, Ἑρμογένη δέ. Οὐκ is however used in the form *οὐκ, ἀλλὰ* . . (because here scarcely any pause was made). So in *οὔκ, εἴ γ' ἐννοεῖς*.—The comparatively rare *οὐχί* is used with emphasis (*Kr.*). In answers *οὔ* (*οὔκ*) = *no.*

433. *Μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ* is sometimes found in the sense of '*rather than*,' the *οὐ* being apparently superfluous.

Εὖ δ' ἴστε ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῶν ἐμῶν ἰδίων μᾶλλον τιμωρήσασθε Πολυκλέα ἢ οὐχ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν (*Dem. Polycl.* 1226, 22).

Οὐ γάρ; are sometimes inserted as a parenthetical question; = *is it* (*was it*) *not* (*so*)*?*

Καλά γε, οὐ γάρ; *ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ χάριτος πολλῆς ἄξια, εἴ γ' ἦν ἀληθῆ* (*Dem. contr. Aris.* 673, 19).

Exercise 117.

434. (1) The Athenians sent a trireme to Paches with intelligence of their resolution, and commanded him to despatch the Mytilenæans as quickly as possible. The next day, however, they felt immediately a degree of repentance, and reflected that the resolution they had passed was a cruel and sweeping one, to put a whole city to the sword, instead of[a] those who were guilty. When the Mytilenæan ambassadors who were present, and those of the Athenians who co-operated

with them, perceived this, they got the authorities to put the question again to the vote.

(2) Here then is one public transaction of this young gentleman's which bears a striking resemblance —does it not?—to what he urges against me. Now, recall to mind a second. ‡ When Philip sent Python, the Byzantine, at the head of an embassy from all his confederate states, with a view to expose us[b] and convict us of injustice, I did not submit to the insolence of Python, or yield to the torrent of his abuse, but rose up in my place, and answered him. I did not[c] betray the cause of the city, but retorted the charge of injustice against Philip himself with such evidence, that even his own allies were forced to rise up and confess it. Whereas this fellow co-operated with Philip, and gave testimony, and that, false testimony, against his country.

[a] Say: '*rather than (not)*.' [b] Say: 'the *city*.'
[c] Use the *emphatic* form.

Chap. 41. § 2. μή (οὐ μή) *redundant;* μή c. participio.

435. After verbs that express or imply the notion of *denial, prevention*, or the like, and are followed by the infinitive (or *acc. c. inf.*), the infinitive usually takes an apparently redundant μή, or, if the principal verb is *negatived*, μὴ οὐ.

ἀρνεῖται μὴ λαβεῖν, *negat se accepisse.*
οὐκ ἀρνεῖται μὴ οὐ λαβεῖν, *non negat se accepisse.*

436. But *non negat se accepisse* is sometimes translated without any repeated negative; sometimes with μή only before the inf. So that the three forms are:

Non ego ita esse
1. οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι μὴ οὐχ οὕτως εἶναι (*usually*).
2. οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι οὕτως εἶναι.
3. οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι μὴ οὕτως εἶναι.

437. Hermann explains the *distinction between these three ways* thus: (1) sine negatione simpliciter significatur *non ego ita esse:* (2) cum du-

plici negatione *μὴ οὐ dubitantius* res *proponitur:* (3) cum solo *μή gravius res affirmatur; = contendo non ita esse.*—Hence *in re futurâ* (with reference to which it is natural to speak *doubtfully*) the use of *μὴ οὐ* is the *usual* one.

The verbs that admit of this construction are verbs of *denial* and *contradiction* (ἀρνοῦμαι, ἀπ-, ἐξ-αρνοῦμαι, ἔξαρνός εἰμι, ἀντιλέγω); of *forbidding* (ἀπαγορεύω, ἀπεῖπον, &c.); of *forbidding by a vote or decree* (ἀποψηφίζομαι, ἀποχειροτονῶ), &c.; of *changing* or *retracting* an *opinion* or *resolution* (ἀπογιγνώσκω, ἀποδοκεῖ, μεταγιγνώσκω, ἀνατίθεμαι, also ἀπεύχομαι); of *acquitting* (ἀπολύω, ἀφίημι); of *avoiding, hindering, restraining* (any body *from*—), or *setting* any body *free from*—(εὐλαβοῦμαι, φυλάττομαι, κωλύω, διακωλύω, ἐμποδών εἰμι, ἔργω, ἀπέχω, and ἔχω [= *retinere*], ἀφαιροῦμαι, ἀποστερῶ, σώζω, &c.); and verbs that express *doubt* or *distrust* (ἀπιστῶ, ἀπροσδόκητός εἰμι, &c.). [☞ For *μή* with *τίς* (*any body*) *μηδείς* is used.] *M.*

438. The apparently redundant *μὴ οὐ* is also used after expressions that *deny* (expressly or by implication) the *possibility* of doing any thing: *οὐ* (*οὐδεὶς*, &c.) *δύναται μὴ οὐ*—; *οὐχ οἷόν τε* (*ἀδύνατον* or *ἀδύνατα*) *μὴ οὐ*—(and the like), *τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐ*—; So *πολλοῦ δέω μὴ οὐ*—, or *τὸ μὴ*—.

Οὐδεὶς οἱός τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι (*Pl.*). *Εἰ ἀληθῆ ταῦτα, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι*; (*Pl.*).

It is seldom that *μή* is here used alone (*οὐ δυνήσονται μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς Θηβαίοις. Xen. Hell.* 6, 1, 1), unless the *article* is prefixed, when *τὸ μὴ*—and *τὸ μὴ οὐ*—are both found after a principal verb that is *denied.* *Τοῦ μή* (but *not τοῦ μὴ οὐ*) is also found. Also *ὥστε μὴ οὐ* after a principal verb with negative (*M.*). On these various constructions, cf. Grammar 1180—1183; and the Appendix to the Olynthiac Orations.

439. The particles *μὴ οὐ* are also found with the infin. after expressions that denote or imply the speaker's *disapprobation* of a particular action, since such expressions intimate a desire that such action *should not be* performed, or, if it be a course of action, persisted in. Such expressions are *δεινόν* (*αἰσχρόν, αἰσχύνη*) *ἐστιν, ἀνόητόν ἐστιν, πολλὴ ἄνοιά ἐστιν*, &c., also *αἰσχύνομαι.* (*M.*)

440. *Μὴ οὐ* (*=nisi*) also stand (but seldom in Attic prose) with participles and other *attributive* notions, or other notions of *closer specification* that form an excep-

tion to a *general denial*, or statement that *implies* or *leans* to a denial.

Αἱ πόλεις πολλαὶ καὶ χαλεπαὶ λαβεῖν—μὴ οὐ χρόνῳ καὶ πολιορκίᾳ. (*Dem.*) *M.*

441. Hermann observes that μή with a participle or noun = *si non*; μὴ οὐ = *nisi*, the latter implying *doubt* or *hesitation*, the former *simple assumption*. (Vig. p. 800.)

On the general rule for the choice of μή or οὐ with a participle, cf. Gr. 1164, and 1184—1192. I will add here that μή and its compounds are to be chosen, not only when μή may be resolved into a conditional clause, or into the notion of a *class of a particular kind* (= τοιοῦτος ὃς μὴ—), but whenever it is dependent on a *verb* (*infinitive* or *participle*) that would *itself* require μή (not οὐ) for its negative: for instance after an *imperative*, ὥστε c. *infin.* &c.

Exercise 118.

442. (1) Moreover,[a] O judges, just so have they dealt with the ivory and iron that was left me; †they do not produce it. Now it is impossible that one who possessed so many slaves engaged in cabinet-work, and so many in the manufacture of cutlery, should not have left some iron and ivory: ‡he must have had some, for, without any of these materials, what could the slaves have manufactured?

(2) *Socr.* Again, from the beginning, Theætetus, endeavor to tell me what science is; but never say that you are unable to do so; for if God wills, and you strive manfully, you will be able.

Theæ. Indeed, Socrates, when you are thus urgent, it would be disgraceful for one not to endeavor to the utmost of one's power to say what one is able. He, then, that knows any thing, appears to me to perceive what he knows, and, as it now seems, science is nothing else than perception.

Socr. Well and nobly said, my boy; for it is right thus to declare one's opinion. But come, let us consider this together, whether it is solid or empty.

[a] Supra, 394.

Chap. 42. *Οὐδέ.*

443. *Οὐδέ* (= *ne—quidem*) always relates to some *preceding* notion (expressed or implied); and when *οὐδέ—οὐδέ* are repeated, they are not *correlative* particles (like *neque—neque*), but the first *οὐδέ* has its own proper force (connecting the negative notion with what *preceded*), and the second adds to it a new notion in the same independent way: = *ne—quidem,—neque.*

Εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐδενὶ ἀγῶνι, οὐδὲ ἐν πράξει οὐδεμιᾷ μεῖον ἔξεις διὰ τὸ βέλτιον τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάσασθαι (*Xen.*).

444. *a*) *Οὐδέ* before a single notion = *ne—quidem.* [Before *ὁστισοῦν*, &c., cf. Gram. 1476, *s.*] *b*) *Οὐδ ὥς* (*ne sic quidem*), *not even so.*

445. *c*) *Οὐδὲ εἷς* (*ne unus quidem*) is stronger than *οὐδείς*, and so *οὐδὲ ἕν* than *οὐδέν*. To strengthen *ἀπ' οὐδενός, κατ' οὐδέν*, &c., the separate forms *οὐδ' ἀφ' ἑνός, οὐδὲ καθ' ἕν* are used. Cf. *Buttm. Mid.* p. 70 (note 93).

(Compare Chap. on *οὔτε.*)

Exercise 119.

446. This then is the first point about which I will endeavor to give you information, if you will be kind enough to listen to me with attention. I will show you that the estate never belonged to the defendants at all, but was my mother's property inherited from her father; and then that Aristarchus took possession of it by no law whatever, but (° on the contrary) is, in conjunction with his relations, injuring my mother in violation of all the laws (° upon the subject.)

Chap. 43. *Οὐκοῦν.*

447. *Οὐκοῦν· οὔκουν.* 'Particula *οὔκουν* scribenda est *οὐκοῦν* ubi significat, (1) *nonne ergo? nonne igitur?*

(2) *ergo* (*scilicet, nempe*[1]);—(3) οὐκοῦν vel οὐκ οὖν, *non ergo.* (4) οὔκουν ubi significat *non sane, non profecto, nequaquam.*' (Kühner.)

448. In οὐκοῦν = *ergo* the οὐκ *seems* to be superfluous, "but it intimates that the speaker claims, in a half-questioning manner, the assent of the person addressed: ἦ τοίνυν τούτων, ἔφη, κρείττους γενέσθε, ἢ μένετ' αὐτοῦ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἓν λείπεται, τὸ ἦν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς;" (*H.*)

Cf. Chap. on οὖν (where other examples are given in the Exercises).

Exercise 120.

449. (1) It argues great simplicity in any man to imagine that, when human nature is eagerly set upon doing any thing, he has any means of diverting it either by the rigor of the laws or by any other kind of terror. We must *not, therefore,*[a] either take bad counsel through trusting to the punishment of death as our security, or leave to those who have revolted no hope of being allowed to repent and wipe out their offence in as short a time as possible.

(2) The defendant and Theriippides paid me thirty-one minas, and charge me for payments to the property-tax eighteen minas. But I will put it at a higher sum than this, and make it thirty minas, that they may not have a single word to say against it. If then you take this talent from the eight, the remainder is seven; and so much they must have out of what they themselves allow that they have received; and therefore, even though they rob me of all the rest by denying that they have it in their possession, yet this at least they ought to have paid me, since they confess' (ρ) that they have received it out of my property.

[a] Οὔκουν = *non ergo:* a general negative thus standing at the head of (and relating to) the whole clause is followed by οὔτε—οὔτε for *either—or.*

[1] Οὐκοῦν, extra interrogationem, acerbam interdum habet ironiam (*Bremi*, Dem. p. 238).

Chap. 44. *Οὖν.*

450. *Οὖν*, (1) *thus, then, therefore, so, accordingly;* (2) *-ever.*

This particle denotes *conformity* with the state of things, a *consequence* drawn from it, &c.; or (according to Hartung) *identity* or *equivalence:* and is used in the following way:—

451. *a*) With *relatives* and *indefinites* it has the force of *-cunque: ὅστις οὖν, quicunque; ὅπῃ οὖν, quomodocunque* and *quocunque; οἱόσπερ οὖν, qualiscunque.*

452. *b*) In the combinations *ἀλλ' οὖν, ἀτὰρ οὖν, δὲ οὖν* (*δ' οὖν*), it has nearly the force of *ὅμως, nevertheless.*

Καὶ ἐλέχθησαν λόγοι ἄπιστοι μὲν ἐνίοισι Ἑλλήνων, ἐλέχθησαν δ' ὦν (=οὖν, Ion. Hdt.), but nevertheless they were reported.

453. *c*) In the combinations *εἴτ' οὖν, οὔτ' οὖν, μήτ' οὖν*, the particle denotes *indifference* with respect to *choice* (as if, whichever be taken, it will come to *the same thing*).

Εἴτ' οὖν θανόντος εἴτε καὶ ζῶντος πέρι Λέγω (*Eur.*). *Οὐκ ἀξιῶ οὔτ' οὖν σε Τροίας οὔτε σοῦ Τροίαν ἔτι* (*Eur.*). [Also *εἴτ' οὖν—εἴτ' οὖν: εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθής, εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος. Pl.* See note on 298.]

454. *d*) In the combinations *γοῦν, γὰρ οὖν, οὔκουν, μὼν* and *μὲν οὖν*,[1] [cf. Gr. 1479] the particle denotes the feeling of *certainty* raised to *indifference*, and that nothing can change.

Ἔχεις διδάξαι δή μ' ὅποι καθέσταμεν;—Τὰς γοῦν Ἀθήνας οἶδα, τὸν δὲ χῶρον οὔ (*Soph.*). *Πολλῶν δὴ ἕνεκα λεκτέον. Λεκτέον γὰρ οὖν* (*Eur.; assent* with *indifference* and *confidence*). *Μῆτερ, ἀλλά μοι σὺ χαῖρε.*

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[1] Sometimes, especially in Hdt., this particle, placed by *tmesis* between a preposition and its verb, denotes a *cool proceeding*, a rash or saucy action done with the utmost composure and indifference: *ἦν τις ψαύσῃ αὐτῶν παριὼν ὑός, αὐτοῖσι ἱματίοισι ἀπ' ὧν ἔβαψε ἑωυτόν, he coolly* (or *without more ado*) *plunges into the water, clothes and all.*

Χαρτὰ γοῦν πάσχω, τέκνον,' why assuredly what I suffer is a matter of rejoicing, my child (Eur.). *Τὸν δὲ λισσεσθαι, χρήματα μέν σφι προϊέντα ψυχὴν δὲ παραιτεόμενον· οὕκων δὴ πείθειν αὐτὸν τούτοισι* (*Hdt.*). *Τίς δ' ὁ κατθανών; μῶν ἢ τέκνων τις φροῦδος ἢ γέρων πατήρ*; (*Eur.*) *surely* (be it who it may) *none of his children, nor his aged father?* [On *μὲν οὖν*, see *μέν*, 375, 376.]

455. Καὶ *γὰρ οὖν* proprie est *etenim sane.*—Sed sæpe *γάρ* redit ad brevem, quæ reticetur, sententiam hujusmodi: *ὅτι δὲ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει* (*εἶχε*) *φανερόν.* Plerumque *καὶ γὰρ οὖν* in ejusmodi locis verti potest *igitur, itaque* (*Kr. ad An.* 1, 9, 8): *ἐπέδειξεν—αὐτὸν ὅτι περὶ πλείστου ποιοῖτο—εἴ τῳ ὑπόσχοιτό τι, μηδὲν ψεύδεσθαι. Καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἐπίστευον μὲν αὐτῷ αἱ πόλεις ἐπιτρεπόμεναι, ἐπίστευον δ' οἱ ἄνδρες.*

(See an example of *γὰρ οὖν* in Ex. on *μά*, 372.

456. *e*) *Consecutive* use of *οὖν* = *accordingly, thus, then.*] Here *οὖν* denotes the *identity* or *exact correspondence*, of the *conclusion* or *inference* with the premises from which it is drawn. Hence it is extensively used (as a *resumptive* particle) in returning to a previous statement after a *parenthesis* or any long and involved clause (= *I say, so, then*); e. g. *κατανοῶν δὲ ὁ Κῦρος ὡς κτλ.—ἐκ τούτων οὖν ἐπεθύμει* (*Xen.*).

457. So Homer uses *ὡς οὖν, ἐπεὶ οὖν*, when after a detailed statement he returns to his narrative.

Οἱ δ' ἄρα δόρπον ἐπισταδὸν ὡπλίζοντο—οἱ δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν παύσαντο πόνου κτλ.—Αὐτίκα δ' αἰετὸν ἦκε κτλ. —οἱ δ' ὡς οὖν εἶδονθ' ὅτ' ἄρ' ἐκ Διὸς ἤλυθεν ὄρνις κτλ. (*Hom.*).

This is the only use of the particle in Homer:—but in the common dialect *οὖν* is very frequently used to denote a *conclusion, inference*, &c.

On *οὐκ οὖν, οὐκοῦν, οὔκουν*, cf. *οὐκοῦν.*

458. [The above is from Hartung, who derives *οὖν* from *αὖν*, *acc.* of *αὖς* a Laconic and Cretan form of *αὐτός*. Hence his pressing the notion of *identity.* I think, however, that the meanings may be better deduced from the original meaning (*this*) *being*; *οὖν* being (according to this view) derived from *ἐόν, ὄν, neut.*

participle from *εἶναι*. Hence the particle refers to a *present state* of things; very much like our *thus, so, then*.]

Οὖν δή et δὴ οὖν . . . aliquoties a Græcis conjunctæ sunt eodem jure, quo Latini et *igitur jam* et *jam igitur* dixerunt. Quæ enim harum particularum aptius cum voce præcedenti conjuncta esse videretur, ea priorem locum obtinuit, posteriorem illa quæ minus apte cum illâ voce consociata erat. (*Kl.*)

459. In *τί οὖν δή*; *πῶς οὖν δή*; the δή is *connective;* if it precedes the *οὖν* and stands immediately after the interrogative particle, it affects *it*, and modifies the nature of the question. *Τί οὖν δή*; = *quid ergo? how so? how now? what then?* &c.

[" Verbis *quid ergo* instituitur interrogatio ex antecedentibus. Atque ea vel cum reliquâ interrogatione coeunt vel *per se constant*, sive sequatur nova quæstio sive non.—Ita et is loquitur, qui ex præcedentibus aliquid colligit, *quæ quum ita sint* (=*why then?*); et is qui distinctiorem rationem requirit eorum quæ ante dicta sunt; *quid his verbis tibi vis?* (=*how so?*) et is qui consequentia quærit: *what then?* et is qui miratur rem, quæ dicta erat antea, in consequentia haud probabilem *quid hoc est?* (*how so? how now?*), et is qui cum indignatione respondet, rem fieri de consequentia. In plurimis his comparari potest Græcum *τί οὖν.*" Vol. ii. p. 456.]

Exercise 121.

460. (1) *Socr.* Let us then recur to what was before agreed on. Did you say that to be hungry is pleasant or painful? I mean the very fact of being hungry.

Col. I said it was painful: though to eat when hungry is pleasant.

Socr. I understand you: *but still* to be hungry of itself is painful; is it not so?

Col. I admit it.

Socr. And also to be thirsty?

Col. Assuredly.

Socr. Whether, then, shall I ask you any more questions? Or do you allow that all want and desire is painful?

Col. I allow it; so do not ask.

Socr. Be it so.

(2) When Aristeus was returning from the pursuit, seeing the rest of the army conquered, he was at a loss which place he should risk going to, whether towards

Olynthus or to Potidæa. He determined, however, to draw his men into as small a space as possible, and at a running pace force his way into Potidæa; and he passed along the breakwater through the sea, annoyed by missiles [from the Athenian ships], and with difficulty; having lost a few men, but saved the rest.

(3) *Mer.* And in ships is a man a good commander of a vessel merely because he possesses nautical science, *alike* whether he be subject to sea-sickness or not? Or how shall we say?

Ath. He is by no means a good commander, if, besides his science, he is subject to the malady you mention.

Exercise 122.

461. (1) *Cal.* What! does it follow from this that Pericles was a bad man?

Socr. Be that as it may, a man of this kind would be thought a bad manager of asses, horses, and oxen, if having received them, neither kicking, nor butting, nor biting, he should make them do all these things through vice. Does not every trainer of any animal whatever appear to you to be a bad one, who, having received it gentle, has made it more vicious than he received it? Does he appear so, or not?

Cal. Certainly, that I may gratify you.

(2) Immediately after these things, in the very same winter, Tissaphernes proceeded to Caunus, wishing to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and after making still another convention with them, to give them pay, and not have them driven to absolute hostilities with him; being afraid that if they were without supplies for many of their ships, they might either be compelled to engage the Athenians and be defeated, or through their vessels being unmanned the Athenians might without his assistance attain the object of their wishes. And again, he was most of all afraid that they might ravage the continent in search

of supplies. From calculating then and forecasting all these things, in accordance with his wish to reduce the Greeks to a footing of equality with one another, he consequently sent for the Lacedæmonians, and gave them supplies, and concluded a third treaty with them, to the following effect.

(3) *Socr.* Tell me now, with respect to those men whom you a little before mentioned, whether they still appear to you to have been good citizens, Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Themistocles.

Cal. To me they do.

Socr. If, therefore, they were good citizens, it is evident that each of them made his fellow-citizens better instead of worse. Did they so, or not?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. When Pericles, therefore, began to speak in public, were the Athenians worse than when he addressed them for the last time?

Cal. Perhaps so.

Socr. There is no 'perhaps' in the case, my good friend, but this is a necessary consequence from what has been admitted, if he really was a good citizen.

Cal. But what then?

Socr. Nothing. But tell me this moreover, whether the Athenians are supposed to have become better through Pericles, or quite the contrary, to have been corrupted by him.

Chap. 45. § 1. Οὔτε.

462. Οὔτε ab οὐδέ differt notione *æquationis*, quæ in τέ inest, et οὐδέ negationem vel *alicui rei opponit* vel *disjunctam conjungit*, ut modo sit, *but not*, modo, *and not*. Illud οὔτε autem significat *atque non*, ideoque in disjunctione duarum rerum comparandarum ponitur οὔτε—οὔτε, quasi dicas *ut hoc non—ita illud non*, hoc est, *neither—nor*. Si ad originem particulæ

non ad usum respicis comparabis *οὐ-δέ* cum *ne-c*, *οὔτε* cum *ne-que*' (Hand, vol. iv. 96).

In connecting a *negative* clause with a preceding clause, the connection is made thus—

463. *a*) *Not—nor* by *οὐδέ* (*μηδέ*), when a *negative* member precedes.

Οὐκ ἂν οὖν τοξότας γε (*ἡ καλὴ παραίνεσις ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσειεν*)—*οὐδὲ μὴν ἀκοντιστάς, οὐδὲ μὴν ἱππέας* (*Xen.*).

464. *b*) [—*and not*] by *καὶ οὐ* (*καὶ μή*), when an *affirmative* member precedes: this is the regular form in Attic prose (in Ionic writers and the poets *οὐδέ* or *μηδέ* can also be used here. *K.*).

Διατείνου μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ σαυτῷ προσέχειν, καὶ μὴ ἀμέλει τῶν τῆς πόλεως (*Xen.*). *Φαίνομαι τοίνυν ἐγὼ χάριτος τετυχηκὼς τότε καὶ οὐ μέμψεως, οὐδὲ τιμωρίας* (*Dem.*). *Ἐπαμύνατε—καὶ μὴ πρόησθε ἡμᾶς* (*Th.*). *Ἐῶσιν ἄρα σε ἃ βούλει ποιεῖν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιπλήττουσιν, οὐδὲ διακωλύουσι ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμῇς* (*Pl.*) [On *ἀλλ' οὐ*, cf. 18].

465. *c*) by *οὔτε—οὔτε* (*μήτε—μήτε*), *neque—neque* (*neve—neve*), *neither—nor*, when the two or more successive members are negative.—Of this construction no examples are necessary.

[If a negative stands at the head of a clause, *either—or,—or*, &c., must be translated by *οὔτε—οὔτε—οὔτε* (or *μήτε—* &c.)].

466. *d*) *Οὔτε—τέ* (seldom *καί*) do not *exactly* agree with *neque—et*, for they connect notions of *equal importance*, whereas in *neque—et* there is an *ascent* to a *more important*, or a *descent* to a *less important* notion. [Hand, iv. 134.[1]]

Ὤμοσαν—μήτε προδώσειν ἀλλήλους σύμμαχοί τε ἔσεσθαι (*Xen.*). *Οὔτε γὰρ ἀγορά ἐστιν ἱκανή—ἥ τε χώρα πολεμία* (*Xen.*).

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[1] *Pape* thinks that there *is* especial emphasis on the affirmative clause.

467. *e*) Οὐδέ (= *ne—quidem*) always relates to some *preceding* notion (expressed or implied). Cf. 440.

Οὔτε—οὐδέ (= *neither—nor yet; nor—not yet*) oppose the notion which they connect disjunctively: cf. Martial, 6, 75, 4: *has ego* nec *mittam Pontia*, sed nec *edam* (*will neither send—, nor on the other hand—*). *Hand.* But Hermann observes that in οὔτε—οὐδέ there is no proper correlation, but the writer, dropping the construction οὔτε—οὔτε after the first οὔτε, appends the second notion, not correlatively to the first, but independently as a new sentence: "Quæ est re verâ grata quædam familiaris sermonis negligentia." (Ad *Œd. Col.* 1141).

468. When οὐδέ—οὐδέ are repeated, they are not *corresponsive* particles (like *neque—neque*), but the first οὐδέ has its own proper force (connecting the negative notion with what *preceded*), and the second adds to it a second notion in the same independent way: = *ne—quidem,—neque.*

Εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐδενὶ ἀγῶνι, οὐδὲ ἐν πράξει οὐδεμίᾳ μεῖον ἕξεις διὰ τὸ βέλτιον τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάσασθαι (*Xen.*).

469. The following connective forms are more rare, and belong mostly to poetry, viz. οὔτε—οὐ. οὐ—οὔτε. τὲ οὐ—τέ. οὔτε—τὲ οὐ, found also in prose. Ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει—, τήν τε πόλιν ἐφύλασσε (*Th.*). Οὔτε ἐκεῖνος ἔτι κατενόησε, τό τε μαντεῖον οὐκ ἐδήλου (*Th.*)]

Exercise 123.

470. (1) [*Call.*] "I will not prefer life to liberty; nor will I desert my leaders either alive or dead; but will bury all the corpses of our allies who shall have fallen in battle. And when I have conquered the barbarians, I will not destroy any of the cities that have fought on the side of Greece, but will decimate every one that has sided with the barbarians: and of the temples that shall have been burnt or pulled down by

the barbarians, I will not rebuild a single one, but will allow them to remain as a monument of barbarian impiety to those who come after us."

(2) It is not meet, gentlemen of the jury, that I should be refused redress, or my opponent retain the wealth he has plundered. With regard to myself, though you have no actual experience of my disposition towards you, it is fair to presume that I shall not be worse than my father. Of the defendant you have some experience; and you well know that, though he has inherited a large fortune, he has not only shown no liberality to the public, but even grasps at the property of his neighbor. Bear in mind this, with the other facts of the case, and give your votes according to justice.

(3) *Socr.* And I know that I should be treated just in the same way, if I came before a court of justice. For I should not be able to mention any pleasures which I had procured for them, which they consider as benefits and advantages; but I neither envy those who procure them, nor those for whom they are procured. And if any one should say that I corrupt younger men, by causing them to doubt, or that I revile the elder men, by speaking bitter words, either privately or publicly, I should not be able to say the truth, that 'I say and do all these things justly, and for your advantage, judges, and nothing else.' So that I should probably suffer whatever might happen.

(4) *Socr.* Then, secondly, we should consider this, whether we have ever constructed any private building, either for any one of our friends, or for ourselves, and whether this building is beautiful or ugly. And if, on examination, we found that our masters had been good and famous, and that we have constructed, in conjunction with our masters, many and beautiful buildings, and many privately by ourselves, after we had left our masters, in that case it would become men of sense to undertake public works; but if we were

not able to show that we had a master, nor any building at all, or many, and those of no account, it would surely in that case be foolish to attempt public works, and to exhort one another to undertake them. Shall we admit that this is well said, or not?

Cal. Certainly.

Chap. 45. § 2. Οὔτε—οὐδὲ (*continued*).

471. 'Οὔτ' ἄρα, οὐδ' ἄρα obviate a *prejudice* or a *false expectation*.' (Hartung.) The ἄρα may sometimes have its force rendered perceptible by considering it equivalent to: '*as the person* spoken of *thought, feared, expected*, &c.'

Thus Il. ε, 333:

γιγνώσκων, ὅτ' ἄναλκις ἔην θεός, οὐδὲ θεάων
τάων αἵτ' ἀνδρῶν πόλεμον κάτα κοιρανέουσιν,
οὔτ' ἄρ' Ἀθηναίη, οὔτε πτολίπορθος Ἐννώ—

neither for instance Athênê, *as he had feared*, nor, &c.

472. In οὔτ' οὖν—οὔτε the οὖν (according to Hartung: see 483) denotes *indifference with respect to choice*, i. e. both notions are denied *indifferently*, the confidence with which the denial is made not depending upon *which* of the two statements is thought probable by the person or persons addressed. The speaker denies them both, no matter whether others do or not.

473. In οὐδ' οὖν, the οὖν has the same force, but the δέ (of οὐδέ) refers to what precedes = *no, nor yet; nor yet* (is the following supposition *at all more true* than the preceding).

Exercise 124.

474. (1) Moreover we ought not[a] to be given to excessive laughter; for commonly where a man gives himself[b] to excessive laughter, such a disposition requires also a violent change.—I think so, said he. *If then* any one should represent men of worth and note as overcome by laughter, we must not accept this [c]rep-

resentation, ‡much less if he (°so represents) deities. Much less, he replied.

(2) What other sophist[c] then, or what private reasonings do you think will counteract these with success? I know none, said he. Certainly not, said I, but even the very attempt is excessive folly. For no other kind of feeling or disposition towards virtue either is or was, ay, or ever will be formed by the training of these men: any human one, I mean, my friend; for as to a divine one, let us, according to the proverb, leave that out of the question: for be assured that if under the present constitution of governments any thing *is* saved, and becomes such as it ought to be, you will not be wrong if you assert that a divine providence has saved it.

[a] Ἀλλὰ *μὴν οὐδέ* (the *οὐδέ* referring to what preceded, what follows being no more true than that). [b] *ἐφιέναι* as intrans. sc. *ἑαυτόν*.

[c] He has called the general body of citizens in the public assembly the worst and most ruinous sophists of all. Accordingly the citizens collectively are '*these men*' alluded to below.

Chap. 46. *Πέρ, πῆ, πλήν.*

475. *Πέρ* (enclit., *utique;* often adversatively: = *quamvis*). It comes from the preposition *περί, round*, denoting the *whole compass* of the notion, so that the word to which it is attached, is to be taken in its *whole extent*. As Krüger expresses it, it 'presses the *identity*' of notions (*ὁ αὐτὸς ὅσπερ = the very same, who*). In Attic Greek it is principally appended to *relatives*, and adverbs of *time* or *condition* (*ὅσπερ, ὅσοσπερ· οὕπερ, ὅπουπερ· εἴπερ*, &c.); and to *καί* in *καίπερ*. With the relatives it often has the force of our *ever, soever*.

Ἐθήρα *ὅπουπερ ἐπιτυγχάνοι, wherever.*

476. *α*) *Πῆ* (or properly *πῇ* as *dat. fem.*) is an interrogative particle. As a *local* (interrogative) particle it stands between *ποῦ* and *ποῖ*, and sometimes appears to denote *rest* in a place. But the difference is thus

explained by Reisig: "Πῆ a ποῖ differt eatenus, ut hoc sit *in quem locum versus,* illud *quâ in viâ:* unde intelligitur quo modo potuerit poeta variare dicendo: ποῖ, πᾷ φέρομαι; i. e. *quorsum, quâ viâ* feror? et cur πῇ dupliciter dicatur, vel de *motu* vel *de statu.* Eur. Hip. 877, πᾷ φύγω; Arist. Plut. 438, ποί τις φύγοι;" (ad *Œd. Col.* 23.) Πῆ *interrog.* is also *in what respect? how? why?*

477. *b*) Πή (enclit.): *indef.; any where, in any way, any how: οὕτω πη, εἴ πη ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι,* &c. (*Pl.*)

478. *c*) Πῆ μὲν—πῆ δέ, *partim—partim.* Hermann recommended πὴ μὲν—πὴ δέ· but the particle is invariably circumflexed in the MSS.

Πλήν, *except:* as *conjunction,* or *quasi-preposition* with *gen.: πλὴν εἰ, except if.* [Related to πλεῖν, πλέον, *more.* Kl.]

479. As a *conjunction,* it either has a complete sentence, or only a case appended to a preceding verb, so that properly the verb must be repeated with a negative (*Kr.*).

Πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἡδέως προσδέχονται τὰς ἑορτάς, πλὴν οἱ τύραννοι (*Xen.*).

Exercise 125.

480. (1) In the first place let them reverence the gods above, who regard the desolation of orphans, and then the souls of the departed, whose nature it is to take an exceeding interest in their own descendants; and still further †the souls of those who are alive indeed, but in (°extreme) old age, and in (°the possession of) the highest honors, *wherever* a state is flourishing under good laws: if they love these tenderly, their children's children live a happy life.

(2) *Socr.* You say truly. And on this account we ought to turn over all speeches again and again, and consider whether *any* easier and shorter way to it can *any where* be found, in order that we may not in vain go by a long and rough one, when we might have

taken a short and smooth one. If, therefore, you have heard of any thing that will assist us, from Lysias or any one else, endeavor to call it to mind, and tell it me.

Chap. 47. *Ποτέ, πού, πρίν, πώ, πώποτε.*

481. *Ποτέ* (enclit.), *at any time; at some time; once.* *Περικλέα ποτέ φασι παραινέσαι ὑμῖν κτλ.*

With interrogatives it expresses surprise: *τίς ποτε*; *who in the world?* (= *tandem*). *Ἀεί ποτε*, and, less commonly, *ἀεὶ δή ποτε* (where the *δή* adds emphasis to the *ἀεί*), are favorite expressions with Thucydides: = *always; all along.*

482. *Πού* (enclit.), (1) *somewhere;* (2) *perchance, perhaps;* (3) *I imagine* (*opinor*), used in conversation when any thing is assumed in a half-questioning way, that the speaker may build something on the *assent* of the person appealed to. *Δήπου*, 261. *Ἥ που*, 320.

483. *Πρίν* [cf. Gr. 1272—1276] : = *prius, potius*, Gr. 1276, *c.*

484. *Πώ* (enclit.), *Πώποτε*, } *till now, hitherto, yet, ever* (*yet*), *after negatives.*

Νόμους οὓς οὐδείς πω κύριος ἐγένετο καθελεῖν.

485. *a*) Without a *negative*, *πώ* occurs only in *questions* that are *virtually negative.*

486. *b*) *Οὔπω, μήπω* (*οὐδέπω, μηδέπω*), *never yet, not yet: πώ* = *dum* in *non dum* (*H.*).

Οὔπω πολλαὶ ἡμέραι ἀφ' οὗ—ἐνικᾶτε (*Xen. An.* 3, 2, 14). *Ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων* (*Pl.*).

487. *Πώποτε* is seldom annexed to the simple *οὐ, μή*, but usually to *οὐδέ, μηδέ* (*οὐδεπώποτε, μηδεπώποτε*). *Οὐδεπώποτε* usually with *aor.* (not with *pres.* and *fut.* except in late writers). *Lob. Phryn.* 458.

Both *πώ* and *πώποτε* may be separated from the negative particle by the interposition of other words.

488. *Πώ, πώποτε* occur in *virtually* negative questions (*τίς πω*; *τίς πώποτε*; *ἤδη πώποτέ του ἤκουσας*; *Pl.*); and *πώποτε* also after *εἰ.*

Εἴ που ξένον τις ἠδίκησε πώποτε (*Aristoph.*). *Ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐ πώποθ' οὗτος ὁ ποταμὸς διαβατὸς γένοιτο πεζῇ κτλ.* (*Xen. An.* 1. 4, 18).

Exercise 126.

489. (1) For the Corinthians, having their city situated on the isthmus, had always possessed an emporium; as the Greeks of old, both those within the Peloponnese and those without, had intercourse with each other by land more than by sea, through *their* country: and they were very rich, as is shown even by the old poets; for they gave the title of "wealthy" to the place. And when the Greeks began to make more voyages, having got the ships (I just mentioned), they proceeded to put down piracy; and rendered their city rich in income of money, as they afforded an emporium both ways.[a]

(2) *Socr.* What then? do you suppose that any one has ever proposed to consider within himself of five and seven, I do not mean seven and five men, or any thing else of the kind, but the numbers five and seven themselves, which we said were in his soul like impressions in wax, and that it is impossible to judge falsely respecting them,—has any man at any time considered these very things, speaking to himself and asking how many they are, and answered, one that he supposes they are eleven, and another that they are twelve, or do all men say and suppose that they are twelve?

[a] ἀμφότερα (Gr. 1516, 14), i. e. *both by sea* and land.

Chap. 48. § 1. *Τέ—καί.*

490. "*Καί* particula est *conjunctiva*, *τέ adjunctiva*" (H.).

491. *a*) *Τέ—καί* connect two notions so as to form one whole (the second is *often*, but not always, the

more weighty: cf. *ἄλλως τε καί*), whereas *καί—καί* rather separate them as two co-ordinate notions, upon each of which the mind is to dwell.

Κάλλιστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον (*Xen.*). *Εὖ τε λέγετε καὶ ἐγὼ τῷ νόμῳ πείσομαι* (*Xen.*).

492. *b*) *Καί—τέ* (*et—que*) is a freer *poetical* mode of connection (*M.*). But Hermann remarks: 'non magis *καὶ—τέ*, quam apud Latinos *et—que*[1] in partitione ponitur' (ad *Bacch.* 303); i. e. the members are not connected as *equal*, but the second is appended by *τέ* as an additional notion.

493. *c*) In *Thucydides τέ* is frequently used (like *que*, *Kr.*) as a particle of continuation: the statement introduced is, however, very often *an instance* or *result* of what has previously been stated (= *and so*;[2] *and thus; thus for instance*).

Καὶ μέχρι τοῦδε πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ νέμεται περί τε Λοκροὺς τοὺς Ὀζόλας καὶ——. Τό τε σιδηροφορεῖσθαι τούτοις τοῖς ἠπειρώταις ἀπὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς ληστείας ἐμμεμένηκεν (*Th.* 1, 4, Poppo observes: "Particula *τέ* apud Thuc. sæpe simplex est copula; atque hic usus multo latius spectat, quam ob Rost. Gr. § 134, A, 5, b, *γ*, credideris").

494. *d*) If more than two members succeed each other, they are connected in the following manner; (1) with the first member the connective is omitted, and the other members follow, connected by *καί* repeated; (2) *καί—καί—καί*, &c. (3) *τέ—τέ—τέ*, &c. (4) *τέ—καί—καί*, &c.

Ἄρκτοι τε πολλοὺς ἤδη πλησιάσαντας διέφθειραν καὶ λέοντες καὶ κάπροι καὶ παρδάλεις· αἱ δὲ ἔλαφοι καὶ δορκάδες καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι ὄϊες καὶ οἱ ὄνοι οἱ ἄγριοι ἀσινεῖς εἰσιν (*Xen.*).

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[1] I. e. in *Cicero;* for, as Hand shows, other writers were less careful in observing this difference.

[2] *Hand* compares *atque: Rhodum et Cyprum—petebat. Atque* (*and so*) *illum cupido incessit*, &c. Tac. Hist. 2, 2.—i. p. 478.

(5) τέ—τέ, &c., καί (Epic) Od. γ, 413. Ἐχέφρων τε Στρατίος τε Περσεύς τ' Ἄρητός τε καὶ ἀντίθεος Θρασυμήδης.

(6) τέ—τὲ καί—&c. (seldom): γυνὴ ὑποδεξαμένη τε φέρει τὸ φορτίον τοῦτο, βαρυνομένη τὲ καὶ κινδυνεύουσα—καί—καὶ κτλ. (*Xen.*).

(7) After καί two members, considered, as it were, one whole, may follow with τὲ καὶ (ἐπέταξε ἑκάστοισι) καὶ νέας τε καὶ ἵππους καὶ σῖτον καὶ πλοῖα (*Hdt.*).

(Κώμη) μεγάλη τε ἦν καὶ βασιλειόν τε εἶχε τῷ σατράπῃ, καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς πλείσταις οἰκίαις τύρσεις ἐπῆσαν (*Xen.*).

(8) τέ—καὶ δὴ καί, *quum—tum vero etiam.* K.

495. *c*) It is not, indeed, uncommon to find δέ corresponding to a preceding τέ; but an instance of this will hardly be found, except where the word or notion that precedes the δέ is to be emphatically brought out in contrast with what preceded (*Th.* 1).

496. *f*) Sometimes τέ is followed, not by καί, but by δέ, alone or with some other particle (ἔπειτα δέ, ἅμα δέ, ἅμα δὲ καί, ἔτι δὲ καί, ὡσαύτως δέ, πολὺ μᾶλλον δέ); the *copulative* connection with which the author began being given up for an *adversative* one, either for the purpose of giving prominence to the second notion, or because it is far removed from the τέ (*M.*).

Ἔν τε τῇ τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσει πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοθι (*Pl. Pol.* 3, 394). Ἔπεμψεν ἡμᾶς—ἐπαινέσοντάς τε ὑμᾶς, ὅτι κτλ.——ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ξυνησθησομένους, ὅτι κτλ. (*Xen. An.* 5, 4, 8.)

497. *g*) When Hartung says that τέ—τέ are often synonymous with ἤ or εἴτε (*vel*), or with μέν—δέ, of course he must be understood to mean that the *copulative* connection is used, when the other forms *might* be used; e. g. ἄξιος ὅ τε παρὼν ὅ τ' οὐ παρών, *might* be construed and expressed *whether present or not.*—Hence it is sometimes found irregularly in correspondence with ἤ, μέν (or δέ): ἡ πόλις βροτός θ' ὁμοίως.—Ἀλγῶ μὲν ἔργα καὶ πάθος γένος τε πᾶν.

498. *h*) On οὔτε (μήτε)—τέ, see chapter on οὔτε.

When two notions have a *common* predicate, τὲ καί are, as a general rule, not used, unless the predicate might be affirmed of *each of the notions separately.* If it is only true of the two when *taken together*, the simple καί is the regular connective particle.

499. To this rule, however, many exceptions occur: e. g. πῇ διαφέρει ὁ τυραννικός τε καὶ ἰδιωτικὸς βίος; (*Xen. Hier.* 1, 2), and ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἕν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστί, τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα; (*Pl. Theat.* 204, *d*).—Dissen lays down the rule thus: "Ponitur τὲ καί etiam ubi divisum est prædicatum aliquod inter duo subjecta, *si fortiorem accentum rhetoricum ambo vel patiuntur vel postulant.*"

500. "Ne ibi quidem ubi altero membro *non diversa* commemorantur τὲ καί ab loquendi consuetudine abhorrere verissime docuit Thiersch. comparans illa Homerica Il. *a.* 23: αἰδεῖσθαί θ' ἱερῆα καὶ ἀγλαὰ δέχθαι ἄποινα. *Ib. κ.* 121: Πολλάκι γὰρ μεθίει τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει πονέεσθαι" (*Stalb. ad Gory.* 460, D).

Exercise 127.

501. (1) Do you remember saying a little while ago, that we must not blame gymnastic teachers nor banish them from our cities, if a boxer does not use his skill in an honorable manner, but[a] behaves unjustly? And so, also, in the same way, if a rhetorician should employ his oratorical power to unjust purposes, we ought not to blame his teacher, nor drive him from the state, but should censure the person who acts unjustly, and makes a dishonorable use of his rhetorical skill?—Was this said, or not?

(2) *Socr.* You fight manfully, Theætetus. But is not this very all, the all when nothing is wanting to it?

Theæ. Necessarily so.

Socr. And will not the whole be this very same thing, when nothing is wanting to it? but when any

thing is wanting, it is neither the whole, nor all, each becoming the same thing from the same cause?

Theæ. It appears to me now, that the whole and the all do not ever differ from each other in any respect.

Socr. Did we not say, that where there are parts, the whole and the all † will make up[a] all the parts?

(3) You have apprehended my meaning quite correctly, said I, and I think that I can now make plain to you what before I could not, that in poetry and all fabulous writing one species of it is wholly imitative, as you say, namely, tragedy and comedy; another species is entirely a narration from the poet's own mouth,—a species you will principally find, I take it, in dithyrambics,—and, again, a third species, (° found) both in epic poetry and, indeed, † in many other sorts of composition,[b] is compounded of both modes.

[a] *Say:* 'will be.' [b] πολλαχοῦ ἄλλοθι.

Chap. 49. Τέως.

502. Τέως, *so long, until* [τέως—ἕως, but mostly ἕως only]. This is its proper meaning in the form τέως μέν ('*for a time*'), i. e., more precisely, *up to the time* which is then defined by the *opposed* statement.

Τέως μὲν ἡσύχαζον, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐγγὺς ἐγένοντο τοῦ χωρίου ἐκδραμόντες τρέπονται αὐτούς (*Xen.*).

503. Even in Attic prose τέως is sometimes found for ἕως (e. g. in Dem. Cf. Buttm. Ind. ad Mid. p. 187). *Kr.*

Exercise 128.

504. (1) Whether of the two had been the cause of the dissension, it is not, perhaps, my business to determine; but so far at least I may pronounce them both deservedly culpable, that, having *till then* been friends, and no just pretext arising for a breach of

their friendship, they so hastily became enemies on account of some idle words.

(2) We hold that the nearest of kin should marry the heiress, and that the property should be hers till[a] her sons are of full age,[b] but that they should then come into possession of it.

[a] *Say:* 'should be hers *for a time*, but when her sons,' &c. [b] ἐπὶ δίετες ἡβᾷν. Cf. Lid. and Scott.

Chap. 50. *Τοί.*

505. (1) Hermann derives the particle τοί from τῷ = *propterea, igitur*, and says that it denotes primarily a *necessity*, and then a *self-imposed necessity of thinking any thing to be* (or *not be*) *so and so.*

(2) Nägelsbach considers it to be the dative of τύ = σύ; and hence to denote a *confidential* intimation to the person addressed, that the assertion is certainly true: it involves, therefore, an appeal to the judgment of the person addressed.

[On this supposition the force of τοί may be given (though in an exaggerated way) by *look you, let me tell* (*beg*) *you*, &c.]

(3) Hartung, deriving one τοί from the demonstrative pronoun, refers the enclitic τοί to the Gothic *thauh*, and makes its primary meaning that of *satisfaction* or *acquiescence* in any thing: from whence he deduces its use in *proverbs*, &c.; in *pert* or *forward decisions* [εἰρήσεταί τοί· σύ τοί με πείθεις, &c.]; in *quieting assurances* [θάρσει· κάτει τοι καὶ σὺ πρὸς τέκνων ἔτι]; to denote the *exhaustion of one's patience*, so that if the thing must be so, it must [ἔκ τοι πέπληγμαι· ἔκ τοί με τήξεις· θαῦμά τοί μ' ὑπέρχεται]; and finally to denote the resolution to *put an end at once to delay, circumlocutions*, &c. [ταῦτά τοι σ' ἔχθει πόλις, *enough the state detests you for this reason:* οὗτος, ὦ σέ τοι καλῶ· φράσον δέ τοί μοι τὼ πτέρυγε ποῖ ναυστολεῖς (*tell me, do*—or, *tell me at once*).]

(4) Finally, *Klotz* considers the stronger (τοῖ accented) to have been *demonstrative* (= *in this way*); the weaker (enclitic) *indefinite* (τῴ=τινί, *in some way*, aliquo modo, nescio quomodo). The expression that the thing *is* so *some how or other*, is naturally an assertion of the fact, though the speaker does not pretend to know the means, by which it is or will be effected.

I am inclined to prefer, with Nägelsbach, the derivation from σύ, though that from τῴ=τινί has much to recommend it.

506. Its principal use is (*a*) with *personal, demonstrative*, and *relative* pronouns.

Ταύτης τοι γενεῆς χρὴ φάναι κτλ.—Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγώ τοι σὲ μὲν δίκαιον νομίζω, σοφὸν δ' οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.

b) In *maxims, proverbs*, and other general propositions.

Παῦροί τοι πολλῶν πιστὸν ἔχουσι νόον.

c) Also with verbs expressing *emotion.*

Ὡς ἥδομαί τοι &c.

d) It is sometimes (*apparently*) adversative.

Οἴμοι· τί δ' οἴμοι; θνητά τοι πεπόνθαμεν. Heu mihi! quid *heu mihi!* verum tamen humana passi sumus, ut conquerendum non sit. (If derived from σύ, it will be: *we have suffered*, I tell you, *the common lot of mortals.*)

e) It is also used *asseveratively* in *answers.*

Καὶ ὅσα ἄρα τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος κρατοῦν τῶν τὰ χρήματα ἐχόντων γράφει μὴ πεῖσαν, βία μᾶλλον ἢ νόμος ἂν εἴη; Μάλα τοι, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, κτλ. (*Xen.*)

It is combined with *adversative* particles (e. g. *καίτοι, tamen, quamquam; μέντοι, tamen; ἀτάρ τοι, ἀλλά τοι, at vero; at sane*). Also οὔτοι (μήτοι), *certe non; οὐδὲ γάρ τοι· μὴ γάρ τοι*, &c.; ἤτοι—ἤ, still stronger ἤτοιγε—ἤ, *aut sane* (*profecto*)—*aut; γὰρ τοί, nam omnino.* (*H.* Vig. p. 816.)

507. *Τοί, γέ, πέρ,* all add emphasis to the word they are attached to: *τοί* adds this force *asseveratively; γέ, intensively; πέρ, extensively.*

In giving the force of *τοί* with an imperative, Stallbaum represents it by *id quod dicere liceat.* (So in the third extract in the Exercise).

Exercise 129.

508. (1) Listen,[1] Gorgias, to what I am surprised at in what you are saying; for perhaps your assertions are correct, but I do not correctly apprehend your meaning. You profess to be able to make any one a rhetorician, if he is willing to learn of you?—I do.—That is, to be one who is believed upon all subjects, when he speaks before a multitude, not from instructing men but from persuading them?—Exactly so.[a]

(2) Such is the truth; and you will know that it is so, if, dismissing philosophy, you betake yourself to greater things. For, *look you*, philosophy, Socrates, is an elegant thing, if one handles it moderately in youth; but if one dwells upon it longer than is becoming, it is the ruin of men.

(3) *Soer.*[b] *Why*, most excellent Polus! it is for this very purpose, *let me tell you*, that we get ourselves friends and sons, that when we, through being advanced in years, fall into error, you that are younger, being with us, may correct[c] our life both in deeds and words. If, then, Gorgias and I have fallen into any error in our arguments, do you who are present correct us: you ought to do so. And if any thing that has been granted appears to you to have been improperly granted, I would wish you to retract whatever you please, only I beg you to attend carefully to one point.

Pol. What is that?

Soer. To restrain that prolixity of speech, which at first you attempted to employ.

Pol. What? shall I not be allowed to speak as much as I please?

Socr. You would indeed be very badly treated, my excellent friend, if, having come to Athens, where of all Greece there is the greatest liberty of speech, you alone should here be deprived of this liberty. But *let me beg you* to set this against it: if you speak in a prolix manner, and will not answer a question put to you, should not I be badly treated, if I am not allowed to go away and not listen to you?

[a] Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [b] ἀλλά τοι is used twice in this extract; μέντοι, once. [c] ἐπανορθοῦν, i. e. to *raise up* and *support* us by deeds in distress, and *set us straight* (= *correct* us) in argument. Bekker, with Baiter and Sauppe, gives the subjunctive here; Stallbaum the *optative;* saying, "optativus post particulas finales in hujusmodi enuntiatis usurpatur, si vel ex alienâ mente et cogitatione loquimur, vel nihil nisi finem et consilium significamus *adjunctâ notione optandi.*" So that the opt. here would = *ut nos,* id quod optamus, *sustentetis et erigatis.*

Chap. 51. *Τοίννν.*

509. *a*) *Τοίννν, igitur,—jam vero, porro; therefore, then;—now, so now.* It is also used, when a person proceeds with an argument; *now further, but now.* Besides this, it is frequently employed in lively replies: *why,* or *why then; well then,* "quum quis alterius orationem *celeriter* et *alacriter* excipit, eique prompto animo respondet." (*K.*) Very seldom as the first word of a clause. *P.*

510. *b*) *Τοίγαρ, ergo, proinde* [= *hac de causâ igitur.* Kl. Not from τοί, but the old τοῖ = τῷ, cf. 505].

511. *c*) *Τοιγάρτοι, quapropter sane.* τοιγαροῦν, *hac de causâ igitur; quapropter; quocirca* (more *syllogistical* from the addition of οὖν); *proinde igitur* (c. Imper.).

Exercise 130.

512. (1) *Socr.* Do you not say, then, that the wise and the foolish, cowards and the brave, rejoice and grieve in a equal degree, or cowards even more?

Cal. I do.

Socr. Now in common with me, draw the inferences that result from these admissions. For, they say, it is beautiful to repeat and consider beautiful things twice, and even thrice. We say, that the prudent and brave man is good; do we not?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. But that the foolish man and a coward is bad?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. I will, therefore, go through the matter under discussion, as it appears to me to be: but, if I shall seem to any of you to grant myself what is not true, he must take me up and confute me. For, *mind*, I do not say what I say as knowing it, but I am inquiring in common with you, so that, if he who disputes with me should appear to say any thing to the purpose, I shall be the first to give in to him. I say this, however, in case you think the discussion ought to be finished; but if you do not wish it, let us give it up and depart.

(2) After he had committed these wrongs, he was not aware that he had become most miserable,[1] and did not repent, but shortly afterwards, he did not wish to become happy by nurturing his legitimate brother, the son of Perdiccas, a child about seven years of age, to whom the government of right belonged, and by restoring it to him; but having thrown him into a well, and suffocated him, he told his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in in pursuing a goose, and so met with his death. Wherefore now, since he has committed the greatest wrongs of all in Macedonia, he is the most miserable of all the Macedonians, not the most happy (of them). And, perhaps, there are some among the Athenians, and you as likely as any body, who would rather be any other of the Macedonians than Archelaus.

[1] This is ironical; the speaker is mocking Socrates, who had asserted that the unjust man is not a happy or prosperous one, even though he has gained a throne by his injustice.

Chap. 52. Ὡς.

513. Ὡς (*quam; quasi, tamquam; ut*:—ᾠκί), *how*, *as* (both of manner and time), *that*, *in order that*. properly a *relative* adverb (from ὅς or from ὁ, which was originally both *demonstrative* and relative). Its original meaning therefore is *ut*, *quomodo*, *quam* (*how*).

Ὡς δή is used in *ironical* exclamations (=*as if!*), properly, *how very much forsooth* this would be so or so.

514. *a*) Ὡς corresponds to *quam*——

(1) In *exclamations*. Ὡς ἀστεῖος ὁ ἄνθρωπος! ὡς οὐδεν ἡ μάθησις, ἂν μὴ νοῦς παρῇ, *quam nihil est doctrina, nisi mens adsit.*

(2) With *superlatives* (especially *adverbs*) and some *positives*.

Ὡς τάχιστα, *quam celerrime;* ὡς λαμπρότατος, *quam splendidissimus;* ὡς ἀληθῶς, *quam vere* or *verissime* (properly *sic ut vere*, Kl.).

515. *b*) It corresponds to *quasi* and *tamquam;* (1) with *substantives:*=*as, for.*

Φυλάττεσθαι ὡς πολεμίους ἡμᾶς. ὡς φύλακα συνέπεμψεν αὐτόν.

(2) With *participles* (especially when used *absolutely* in *Gen.* or *Acc.*), to denote what *seems* or is *given out*. It has often the simple meaning of *as*, *as being*, &c. (=*quippe*, or *quippe qui*). [Gr. 1142.]

(3) The meaning of *as if* belongs also to ὡς, with *prepositions* (e. g. εἰς, ἐπί). This occurs in statements where *less* is *said* than is meant; e. g. to prepare himself, ὡς ἐπὶ μάχην, *as if for battle*, where there is no doubt that the person really *prepared himself for battle.*

Παρεσκευάζετο ὡς ἐς μάχην (*Th.*). Ἀνάγεσθαι ἔμελλεν ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν (*Xen.*).

(4) It is probably from this usage of ὡς, that it obtained the force of a *preposition* (but only before *personal* names or pronouns): e. g. ἥκειν ὡς ἐμέ=ἥκειν ὡς [πρὸς] ἐμέ.

Οὐχ ἥκει πρὸς σὲ κηρύσσων ὅδε, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐμέ (*Eur.*). *Kr.*

(5) From this notion of what *seems* to be the case, may also be derived the meaning of ὡς with (*definite* or *indefinite*) numerals: = *fere, circiter;* and such combinations as ὡς τὰ πολλά, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ = *nearly* (or *as it were*) *for the most part;* hence *mostly, generally, usually.*

Ἔδωκεν ὡς μυρίας δραχμάς (*Lys.*). *Εἰκάζετο δὲ εἶναι ὁ στίβος ὡς δισχιλίων ἵππων. Xen.* ['recte dici poterit etiam Latine, QUASI *bis mille equorum.*' Kl.] *Kr.*

516. *c*) As corresponding with *ut, uti,* ὡς is used:

(1) = *as:* ὡς οἶμαι, *ut* opinor.

(2) In *wishes:* ὡς ἔρις ἀπόλοιτο! *utinam* [uti-nam] *rixa pereat!*

Here we find also οὕτως (ὥς)—ὡς: the clause of comparison, introduced by ὡς, expressing the object of the protestation. [Cf. *ita* me dii ament, *ut* ego nunc lætor.]

(3) To denote an *effect* or *consequence:* καὶ γὰρ—τὰ μὲν συνεκτίκτει τῶν ζώων τοσαύτην τροφὴν ὡς ἱκανὴν εἶναι, &c.

In this use of ὡς, it occurs, though less commonly than ὥστε, with ἤ after a *comparative.*

It has sometimes a similar force after the *positive,* or a *substantive* denoting a *character* or *quality.* Here *we* can use the *infinitive:* e. g. *I know they are but ordinary* (or *ignorant*) *persons to contend with us,* ἐπίσταμαι ἰδίωτας ὄντας ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀγωνίζεσθαι.

(4) Like *ut,* and *as,* ὡς is also used of *time;* ὡς ἴδεν (*ut vidit*): it is also used *sometimes* (as other *temporal* particles are) of *cause;* 'Crœsus, *as it was summer,* did so and so,' ὡς θέρος ἦν (*Xen.*).

517. *d*) As a *final* conjunction, to denote a *purpose:* = *ut, ἵνα.* 'He killed him,' χρῦσον ὡς ἔχοι κτανών *ut haberet*).

On ὡς ἄν (ὡς as *final* conjunction) with *subjunct.,* see Pt. I.

518. *e*) Ὡς is also synonymous with ὅτι after *verba*

sentiendi et declarandi. Here the *infinitive* also occurs. As being properly *relative*, it also stands with reference to a preceding *demonstrative* or τί, or where one may easily supply *the circumstance* (*that*).

520. *f*) Ὡς (*ut*) in connection with a substantive (for which a predicate must be supplied from the principal clause) is used, like the Latin *ut*, in order to explain the predicate in the principal clause. It expresses either *comparison* or *limitation*, and in the first case is to be translated by *as*, in the latter by *for:* the former occurs, when the object *is assumed to possess in a high degree* the thing affirmed in the predicate of the sentence; the latter, when it is assumed *to possess it only in a small degree.*

Λαίου γὰρ ἦν, Εἴπερ τις ἄλλος, πιστὸς, ὡς νομεὺς ἀνήρ (*as being a shepherd.* Soph. Œd. R. 1118); but: ἦν δὲ οὐκ ἀδύνατος ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιος εἰπεῖν (*for a Lacedæmonian;* it being known *that they were no great orators*).

521. *g*) Special mention must be made here of parenthetical clauses, which often occur, and are apparently independent, and which are introduced by ὡς (seldom ὥστε) with the infin. A limitation is very often denoted by these clauses. That, of which such a subordinate clause gives the consequence or effect, must be supplied, e. g. τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ.

Ὡς μικρὸν μεγάλῳ εἰκάσαι (*Th.*).

So ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, *ut ita dicam, propemodum dixerim*, ὡς συνελόντι εἰπεῖν,[1] *ut paucis absolvam*, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖν, *ut mihi quidem videtur*, properly *tali modo ut mihi videatur*, ὡς ἐμὲ εὖ μεμνῆσθαι.

Such clauses are very often expressed in an abridged form without ὡς, e. g. οὐ πολλῷ λόγῳ εἰπεῖν, especially ὀλίγου, μικροῦ, πολλοῦ δεῖν, *ita ut paulum, multum absit*, and in the still shorter form, ὀλίγου, *prope, pene.*

[1] For which συνελόντι εἰπεῖν, and συνελόντι alone, are found.

According to the same analogy, *ὅσον, ὅσα, ὅ τι,* with infin., are used instead of *ὡς*, e. g. *ὅσον γέ μ' εἰδέναι, quantum sciam* (properly, *pro tanto, quantum scire possim*), *ὅ τι μ' εἰδέναι.*

522. *h*) Ὡς ἔνι (=*ὡς ἔνεστι, as it is possible*) is used with superlatives:

Ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα, *as far as it is in any way possible.*

523. *i*) Sometimes *ὡς* follows a comparative, *ἤ* being omitted:

Προθυμότερον πεποίηκα—ὡς ἠναγκαζόμην (*Lys. Brem.* p. 52).

Ὥς (with accent)=*οὕτως, thus.* It is common in the poets, especially the Ionians; but in prose is found only in *οὐδ' ὥς, καὶ ὥς.*

Exercise 131.

524. *Socr.* It turns out then that I was right, when I said that it is possible for a man to do what he pleases in a city, and yet not have great power, nor do what he wishes.

Pol. As if, Socrates, you yourself would not like to be allowed to do what you please in a city, rather than not, and would not be envious when you saw any one either slaying whom he pleased, or taking away his possessions, or putting him in bonds.

Socr. Do you mean justly or unjustly?

Pol. Whichever he should do, is he not in either case to be envied?

Socr. Good words, I pray you, Polus.

Pol. But why?

Socr. Because it is not right, either to envy those that are not to be envied, or the wretched; but to pity them.

Pol. † What say you?[a] Does such appear to you to be the case with the men of whom I am speaking?

Socr. How can it be otherwise?

[a] *τί δαί;*

Chap. 53. Ὥστε.

525. Ὥστε related to ὡς, as ὅστε to ὅς, connects the following notions more closely with the preceding ones.

In the sense of *as* in comparisons, it belongs to Homer and the Tragedians, though found *now* and *then* in the older Attic prose writers (*Lob. Phryn.* 427).

Ὥστε (c. infin.) is also sometimes = *eâ conditione ut*, e. g. εἰδὼς ἃ Τιμασίωνι—ἐπαγγέλλοιντο ὥστε ἐκπλεῖν (*Xen.*).

Ὥστε = *so, therefore, wherefore:* ὥστε (quocirca, igitur) οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς προύργου θύειν τε καὶ δῶρα τελεῖν μάτην (*Pl.*).

Ὥστε, *so that; so as.* On ὥστε with Inf., cf. Pt. I. § 50.

The infin. after ὥστε may be strengthened by καί.

Διὸς γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ὥστε καὶ κτείνειν (ἡ νόσος) οὐκ ἐπελάμβανεν (*Th.*).

On ὥστε μή, ὥστε οὐ, see Pt. I. 297, 298.

Exercise 132.

526. (1) "I was but a boy when he came here before. However,[a] Socrates, all men praise him, and say that he is the wisest man to speak. But why do we not go to him that we may find him within? He is staying, as I have heard, with Callias son of Hipponicus. Let us go then."

I said to him: "We will not go there yet, my friend, it is too early; but let us rise up and go into our court, and spend the time there walking about, until it is light; then we will go. For Protagoras stays mostly within; therefore be sure, we shall probably find him at home."

(2) Cleon and Demosthenes, aware that if they gave way even the least degree more, they would be

destroyed by the Athenian forces, stopped the engagement, and kept their men off them, wishing to take them alive to Athens, if by any means, in accordance with their proposals, they might be induced to surrender their arms, and yield to their present danger. And so they sent a herald, to ask if they would surrender their arms and themselves to the Athenians, †to be treated at their discretion.[b]

[a] Cf. 47. [b] *Say:* 'so that they should decide as they pleased.'

THE END.

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BY G. J. ADLER, A. M.,

Professor of the German Language and Literature in the University of the City of New-York.

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Extract from the Preface.

In preparing this volume, our principal aim was to offer to the American student of the German a work which would embody all the valuable results of the most recent investigations in German Lexicography, and which might thus become not only a reliable guide for the practical acquisition of that language, but one which would not forsake him in the higher walks of his pursuit, to which its literary and scientific treasures would naturally invite him. The conviction that such a work was a desideratum, and one which claimed immediate attention, was first occasioned by the steadily increasing interest manifested in the study of the German by such among us as covet a higher intellectual culture, as well as those who are ambitious to be abreast with the times in all that concerns the interests of Learning, Science, Art, and Philosophy.

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Morning Courier and New-York Enquirer.

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Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford, and Head Master of Rugby School.

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