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ART. I.—PRIMITIVE GREEK RELIGION.

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THE earliest traceable link between the Greek Mythology and the primitive Patriarchal Monotheism must be looked for in the grove of Dodona, on the Western coast, afterwards called Epirus. Long before the war of Troy, a Deity was worshipped there of whom Homer seems to speak with awe, as of one belonging to an antiquity transcending the theology of his day, and whose religion carried with it a more hoary sacredness: "O Dodonæan, Pelasgian, Zeus, τηλόθι ναίων —αἰθέρι ναίων—dwelling afar, dwelling on high." It seems to convey the idea of something separate, holy, unapproachable. There were two peculiar features in this very early Dodonæan religion. One was the worship of Zeus alone, as unassociated with any other divinity; the other, the esteemed sacredness of the oak. Both testify to its primitive character. As far as can be known this feeling of regard for the oak never degenerated into an idolatry of its object, although it early became the vehicle and fosterer of a gloomy superstition. It gave character to this primitive oracular seat, and inspired that marked reverence for it which is so evident in the Homeric and the earliest Grecian poetry. It is certain that, from the first, a great impression had been made by something in the history and in the local surroundings of Dodona. The seat of the oracle was, originally, not a temple but a grove. Natural causes here, as well as elsewhere, lent

their aid. It was a very solemn place. The loneliness and gloom of the forest, the weird grandeur of the oak, with its wild, fantastic forms, presenting such a contrast to the straightness and regularity of the oriental palms, all aided the imagination, predisposed, as a roving life would predispose it, to the hearing of voices and oracular communications. If trees could talk to us, it would be the whispering, moaning, sighing oaks. To this place, in her long wanderings, comes the transformed mysterious Io, that insolvable enigma of the Grecian mythology. In this deep grove there is heard a voice addressing her as the bride of Heaven, the future mother of the Great One who was destined to be the deliverer and benefactor of mankind. Though supernatural it seems to issue from the very bosom of nature:

τέρας τ' απιστον αἱ προσήγοροι δρύες.*

In the same passage Æschylus gives us another characteristic by which this shrine differs from the other oracular marvels. It consists not only in the outward mode, and in the outward surroundings, but in the very style of the communications. It was part of the wonder that they were made so clearly and significantly,

λαμπρῶς νοὐδὲν αἰνικτηριώς.†

It had no ambiguity about it, as was the case with the other and later oracles. And in fact this continued to be, more or less, the character of Dodonæan predictions, as compared with those of Delphi, which were remarkable for their double senses.

Herodotus tells us a strange story (II. 54, 55), which he learned in Egypt, concerning the simultaneous origin of the oracle of Dodona in Greece, and that of Jupiter Hammon in the desert of Libya: "Two sacred women were once carried off from Thebes by the Phœnicians, one of whom was

* "*A sign incredible, the speaking oaks.*"—Prom. Vinct., 831.

† "*Clearly and without enigma.*" This is what is claimed for the Divine oracles, Isaiah xlviii. 16, in distinction from the darkness, deceptions and concealments of the Heathen: "*Come nigh unto me*,"—that is, approach with confidence—"Listen to me: I have not spoken in secret,"—*in occulto*; lxx., ἐν τόπῳ γῆς σκοτεινῷ—*in a dark place of the earth.*

sold into Libya, the other into Greece, and these were the first founders of the oracles in the two countries." He heard this from the Egyptian priests at Thebes. "At Dodona itself there was another tradition," he tells us, "thus related by the priestesses who there deliver the oracle: Two black doves took their flight from Egyptian Thebes, and while one flew to Libya, the other came to them. Having alighted on an oak, she began to speak with a human voice, and told them that on that spot there should thenceforth be an oracle of Jove. The dove which flew to Libya bade establish there an oracle of Hammon. *This is likewise an oracle of Jupiter.* The persons from whom I received these particulars, were three priestesses of the Dodonæans, the eldest Promeneia, the next Temareté, and the youngest Nicandra; and what they said was confirmed by the other Dodonæans who dwelt around the temple." In the very style of this narrative, as elsewhere in Herodotus, we see the subjective truthfulness of the historian, his carefulness in obtaining information from every source, and his minute attention to all particulars that might aid him in his inquiries. He was credulous, undoubtedly, but there is more of inward truth sometimes in such a state than in the skeptical spirit. It shows that he is, at all events, most trustworthy in everything that he relates from his own personal knowledge. The writer next proceeds to give his own opinion respecting the story, and its real meaning. This however is hardly worth citing. One thing that inclines him to a partial belief in it, when divested of the fabulous aspect of the dove story, is the fact, as he gives it from his own alleged knowledge, that "the character of the oracle at Thebes and Dodona is very similar" (57). Little reliance however, can be placed on this, since the historian, though remarkable for his religious honesty, was ever intent upon marvellous coincidences, and would, therefore, be easily led away by the most general features of resemblance, even though it consisted only in the common oracular claim. A fact of more consequence is the one stated by him, and well known otherwise, that the oracle of Hammon, as well as that of Dodona, was dedicated to Jove, or the Supreme God, by

whatever name he might be called, and received its predictions directly from him. It points us to the still more important fact that both these oracles indicate a very early stage of belief and worship, when the monotheistic idea was still predominant, if not exclusive, both in the Hamitic and Javanic races, or when the knowledge of the future was ascribed to no other being than the Most High, omnipresient because all-knowing and all-mighty. It is the prerogative which the prophet so loftily asserts: "Who, as I, shall call, and shall declare it, and set it in order, since I appointed the ancient people? and the things that are coming and shall come; is there a God beside me" (that doeth this)? Isaiah xliv. 7, 8. So also Isaiah xlvi. 10: "Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done; My counsel shall stand; for I am God and there is none beside me."

As the origin of the temple of Dodona is lost in the most remote antiquity, so its subsequent history is involved in great obscurity. This is accounted for from the fact of its being a most holy and secluded place, devoted to a most austere worship, repulsive to worldly visitors, and separating it from the more secular or political life of Greece. The temple was destroyed B. C. 219, by Dorimachus, general of the Æolians, as we are told by Polybius, iv. 67. No remains of it now exist. It stood at the base of Mount Tomarus, or Tmarus, (Strabo vii. 476) on the borders of Thesprotia, and was said to have been founded by Deucalion. (See Rawlinson's note, vol. ii. p. 85 of Rawlinson's Herodotus.) In commenting on the story above given, this very able archæologist says, "The Greeks would scarcely have attributed the origin of the oracle and the temple to a foreigner, unless there had been some foundation to the story, and Herodotus maintains that there was a resemblance between the oracles of Thebes and Dodona." He lays too much stress on the alleged resemblance, but the inference to which he seems to attach importance is all the other way. With all their national vanity and boasting, the Greeks of the later historical ages always felt themselves to be a more modern people, a younger people, as compared with the Oriental and

Egyptian nations. To them, these were "the old countries," as the nations of Europe are to us. They were the old home lands, and the Greeks had a similar feeling of interest, if not of pride, in holding to a connection of their literature and mythology with those of these earlier peoples. This was carried even into their philosophy, and hence the stories of Thales, Pythagoras, and even Plato, having travelled and learned in the East.

In the origin of the Dodonæan oracle, we trace a connection between earliest Greece and the nearest descendants of Noah immediately after the great dispersion, which was preceded by the supernatural division of languages. In this latter aspect, the descendants of Javan belonged to the Aryan branch, but their connection with the Shemitic, the Phœnician, and the Hamitic, was ever closer than with India or the remotest East. We cannot, therefore, agree with the learned Ritter, who ascribes the founding of Dodona to a sacerdotal colony from India, and thinks that they brought the Buddha worship into Greece along with the germs of civilization. This is worse than mere conjecture; for it is opposed to the most obvious inferences arising from geographical position, whilst it is disproved by the silence of history, and the absence of all intervening ethnological traces, both of which would be incredible unless the migrations from India to Greece had ever been through the far North, avoiding altogether the countries lying between and which had been better known than either Greece or India from the earliest dawning of the human race. Writers who are so fond of tracing everything to the farther East, and all religions to a Buddhist origin, seem wholly to ignore this intervening territory, and the striking geographical fact that outweighs all their real or conjectured learning. If Indian Buddhists ever came to Dodona, and founded colonies there, their route must have taken them around the southern streams of the Nile, or north of the Danube. They could not have come through Palestine, Syria, or Egypt, without leaving some historical traces on the road. But none such have been ever found, either in language, myth, or tradition. Still more far-fetched would seem to be Ritter's

derivation of the name. Dodona, he says, is *βωδωνη (Bod)* which is the same with the Hindu *Bud, Budda*, and this, he adds, *is sufficiently obvious*. In view of such an etymology, one who still holds to a connection between Dodona and the Japetan Dodan, or Dodanim, ought not to be contemned as unlearned or absurd.

The idea entertained of the great antiquity of Dodona, is shown from its traditional connection with the Flood of Deucalion. This is unmistakably the Greek mythological representation of the great cataclysm recorded in the Bible. They localised it, as all other national traditions have done, by making it central in their own geography, and connecting it with their early legends; but this only confirms the fact as proved by other features of resemblance. In their traditions of the Flood, every people, from Palestine and Greece to the Mexicans and Pacific Islanders, have ever made it a part of their own territorial and ancestral history. It took place, or had its beginning or ending in their country, and the man saved was the founder of their nationality, or one of the heroes of their local mythology. The story too has almost always a moral ground. Men had become very wicked; the most unnatural crimes prevailed; the patience of Heaven was exhausted.* There is ever, too, the mention of one *righteous man*, "who found grace," as the Bible expresses it, or was favored by the gods, as the one exception to an utterly

* There has doubtless been much extravagance in the endeavor to connect the principal features of the early Greek mythology with some of the scriptural narrations, such as the building of Babel with the war of the Titans, the sacrifice of Iphigeneia with the story of Jephthah's daughter, Samson with Hercules, etc., but the resemblance in this account of the Flood, especially as given by Ovid, and in a few graphic touches by Plato, *De Legibus*, iii. 607 A. B. is unmistakable. The "higher criticism," as it calls itself, transforms the Greek story into a most refined mode of setting forth in the forms of a mythical idealism, certain geographical facts. The story itself is an "idea;" Deucalion and Pyrrha are "ideas"—personifications of fire and water. They represent "volcanic action giving rise to certain rivers in Thessaly." These early rude people, who are represented, too, by the same theologists as hardly above the beasts, are full of "ideas," and have nothing else to do but to make mythical representations of them. And so also does this "higher criticism" interpret the Bible.

evil and incurable generation; as Ovid describes Deucalion and his wife Pyrrha:

> Non illo melior quisquam, nec amantior æqui
> Vir fuit, aut illa metuentior ulla Deorum.

These features, however, only show the deep impression which the great event had made upon the human mind. They also clearly reveal another fact, namely, that the story, like that of Hercules the Great Deliverer, belonged to the whole human race, and was carried away by each particular gens after some great dispersion, which broke up the local, historic and linguistic unity of the primæval humanity. The connecting the oracle of Dodona, therefore, with this Greek story of the Flood, carries back its sacredness to the early Javanic migrations, and furnishes an argument not to be slighted for the view which derives the name from the Dodanim mentioned Gen. x. 4. It was the Shemitic, or rather, the Noachic idea of oracles, theophanies, divine or angelic voices speaking to men. It was an attempt to preserve some of the ideas of the old patriarchal religion, having, in this respect, an aim similar to that which gave rise to the early "mysteries" styled Orphic, and the worship of the Cabiri, כבירים, the Mighty ones, the אלהים, the supreme God and his angels, *θεοὶ μεγαλοι, δυνατόι,* as they were called by the Greeks at a later period, to distinguish them as something more ancient, powerful, and holy than the rabble of the post-Homeric polytheism. These *τελεται,* or secret rites, were like old land-marks set up from time to time that they might not wholly lose, in their far wanderings, the primitive light, the grand yet simple religion of the patriarchal period. In this way it was carried far up the Mediterranean, and these attempts at localizing it, as in the temple or grove of Dodona, may be compared to the acts of the tribes of Reuben, Gad and Manasseh, (Josh. xxii. 21, 34,) who built an altar to keep in mind their connection with the ancient God, and the ancient religion of Israel.

A peculiar feature of the Dodonæan religion, to which we have elsewhere alluded, consisted in the devotion and austere lives of the Selli, the officiating priests, or rather, the monks,

or religious men, who formed a holy college of recluses separated from the world, and given up wholly to devout and philosophic contemplation. The origin and primitive significance of the name are lost, but the way in which they are spoken of by Homer and the dramatic poets, shows that it denoted a peculiar class of men, of an exceedingly sacred character, instead of being a mere geographical term, like Helli and others, with which it had been confounded. Thus in the Trachiniæ of Sophocles, 1145, Hercules is represented as speaking of them in words that indicate the deepest reverence :

> *μαντεῖα καινά, τοῖς πάλαι ξυνήγορα,*
> *ἃ τῶν ὀρείων καὶ χαμαικοιτῶν ἐγὼ*
> *Σελλῶν ἐσελθὼν ἄλσος εἰσεγραψάμην :*
>
> Predictions new agreeing with the old,
> Which from the men who make the earth their bed,
> The mountain roaming Selli, I received,
> Beneath the old prophetic oak.

A life of such austerity denotes a religion deeper than polytheism, and having a more powerful hold upon the soul. It is consistent with superstition, but not with the ease and frivolity, and sometimes utter licentiousness, that marked the mere æsthetic religion of the other Greeks. A polytheism in which the supreme God, if there be one who can be regarded as such, rises but little in the scale above the others, loses all true religious fear, and is wholly alien to the true idea of sacrifice or self-mortification. Hence, from the kind of life it produced in those devoted to it, we may conclude that the Dodonæan religion was mainly monotheistic, or far more so than that of any other oracle or temple. They worshipped Zeus alone, the old "Pelasgian Dodonæan Zeus," as Homer styles him, *τηλόθι ναίων, ὑψόθι ναίων, dwelling afar, dwelling on high*, the Zeus of the ancient patriarchal land, the אל עליון or Jove Most High of the book of Genesis, "Lord of hosts," *ἀγγέλων τε καὶ θεῶν*, "Father of gods and men," as he is described in the ante-Homeric epithets, *Ζεὺς αἰθέρι ναίων*,*

* The *æther* (*αἰθήρ*) denotes the upper region of Light and Fire rather than the atmosphere. In the Orphic, or more pantheistic representations, even as they

Jove who dwells in the æther, the sky, illimitable space, in distinction from the god who had his seat on Mount Olympus, or the later historical, apotheosized Zeus of the Cretan fable.

This comparatively pure monotheism, or this almost exclusive Jove-worship, was a characteristic of the Dodonæan cultus. Taken in connection with the two other features, the gloomy austerity and the reverence for the oak, it furnishes no light proof of a fact which we deem of highest importance. The old Dodonæan religion was Druidical, or rather the Druidical religion was Dodonæan; if not derived from it, yet coming in the same channel, and from the same influences that so early manifested themselves in the extreme Western Greece. The worship and belief which formed so striking a characteristic of the earliest inhabitants of Gaul and Britain, and which continued long after the same territory had been reached by other peoples coming by a different route, was essentially the same with this Pelasgian or Javanic cultus of Dodona that had been set up as a memorial of one still more pure and primitive. If this view be correct, we may regard both manifestations—the one in Western Greece, the other in extreme Western Europe—as remains of the primitive monotheism, with its higher religious awe. And thus may it be rationally held, that though very dark in their own views, and surrounded by a darkness still more dense, the Selli and the Druids were witnesses for the holier aspects of ancient truth. In this respect they may be regarded as bearing something of the same

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are sometimes found in the dramatic poets, it is the peculiar seat of the divine intelligence, or as though it were, in some way, the divine *sensorium*, through which came all motions of sentient things to the divine mind. See Sophocles, Œdipus Tyrannus, 865:

ὧν νόμοι πρόκεινται
ὑψίποδες, οὐρανίαν δι' ΑΙΘΕΡΑ
τεκνωθέντες, ὧν Ὀλύμπιος
πατὴρ μόνος.

The laws sublime *of heavenly æther born*,
Whose Father is Olympian Jove alone.

Tho expression *dwelling in the æther*, strongly calls to mind the words of the civ. Psalm, "Who coverest thyself with light as with a garment," or the Apostle's language 1 Tim. vi. 16, φῶς οἰκῶν ἀπρόσιτον, "inhabiting the inaccessible light."

relation to the degraded Occidental, that the Hebrew or Shemitic monotheism held to the false Oriental beliefs, whether polytheistic or pantheistic.

We anticipate the objection that at once arises from the more commonly received views in ethnology. The Celts, whether of Gaul or Britain, among whom this Druidical worship was found, belonged to another stock; they were from another branch of the Japhetan ancestry; they were descendants of Gomer, and their genealogy, as well as their geographical position, put them far away from any Javanic influences. Even if we admit, however, that the Celts, as descendants of Gomer, were the first settlers of Western Europe, the latter conclusion is by no means warranted. There would be nothing irrational in the idea of a worship introduced among them from an early Mediterranean source. Why might not certain religious ideas have found their way to Gaul and Britain from Western Greece, as well as from India, the region whence some are so fond of deducing every thing? As for the name, there can hardly be a doubt of its connection with the Hellenic word for oak, and which was primitively the general name for *tree*, afterwards coming to be used for *oak* as the most magnificent representative of the whole genus. *Drus*, *Druid*; the etymology seems very easy. But, says one, "it is hard to imagine how the Druids should come to speak Greek." On this head, however, all difficulty vanishes, when we bear in mind that the old British *dru* (for *oak*, or *tree*) and the Saxon *tree* itself (dr, tr), are the same radical, whether derived from the Greek, or regarded as equally belonging to all the early branches of the great Aryan family of languages. Δρυ, *dru*, δορυ, (spear, lance, *stick*, *wood*, or *timber* generally) together with *tree*, are all one word, whether in Epirus, or India (so far as it can be traced in the Sanskrit), or regarded as indigenous with the earliest settlers of Gaul or Britain.

But whence came the *first* inhabitants of extreme Western Europe? On this question, a glance at the map furnishes an argument superior to all others. It has not been much made use of, if referred to at all, but when attentively con-

sidered it seems to have a force that can not be overlooked. The past history and the present condition of the human race are strongly opposed to the idea of sporadic, indigenous origin, whether from a few centres or many, whether from creation or development. The appearances of migration show themselves everywhere, and in all the peculiarities of language, culture, progress, or degeneracy. Almost every people present evidence of having come originally from some region different from that which they now inhabit, or in which their earliest recorded history found them. Every thing points to a radiation from some one quarter of the earth, and all historical as well as biblical facts tend toward the great fact, that some part of that region we style Western Asia, was the earliest home of the human race. On any theory we may adopt in respect to its exact location, it is clear, from other evidences as well as from the Bible, that after a period of comparative gregariousness confining men to the primitive region, there somehow commenced the roving tendency, or a migrating impulse, sudden, extraordinary, and well entitled to be called supernatural, if such a term can be applied to human movements. History opens with men in a swarming condition, we may say, exploring new regions, settling colonies, founding cities, empires, states, and, for these purposes, rapidly dispersing themselves in all directions. The Bible explains it most sublimely, yet most concisely: "He beheld and drove asunder the nations"—"from thence did he scatter them upon the face of all the earth." On any hypothesis, then, a leading feature of these early departures would be *two* great streams of Western migration, to say nothing of other movements to the East and to the South. Though taking very different routes, they would both flow steadily on until stopped by physical limits. We might determine these routes without the aid of history; it could be done *a priori*, or simply by looking at the map. One branch would take its way North and West, between the Black and Caspian seas, through middle Europe; the other by the more direct and easier route, or the great highway of the Mediterranean, which would seem as though it had been in-

tended from the beginning as the channel for the most important, the most powerful, the most progressive, and, at the same time, the most conservative of human influences. The first of these would find in their way most formidable obstacles. The long march, devious and toilsome under the most favorable circumstances, would be rendered still longer by the fact of its passing through what must have been, originally, the most difficult to traverse of all the regions of the then unknown earth. They had to encounter the densest forests, the roughest mountains, the most impassable fens and marshes. Instead of gliding along from island to island, or from headland to headland, through the liquid air of Ionian and Italian seas, their way was, for the most part, against the current of rivers, and in the face of the severest climate. While such was ever the hindering and discouraging prospect before them, they left in their rear few or no facilities for keeping up intercourse with the older, and more religious, and more enlightened parts of the world from which their ancestors had departed. Hence its remembrance would be soon and irrecoverably lost; they would early become unknown to history, as we know was the case for many centuries. Like men bewildered in the woods and deserts, their march would be extremely irregular, or only as the advance pioneers were pushed on by succeeding waves of migration. The result would inevitably be such as has been ever found in similar cases. A degeneracy, rapid and universal, would, in a few centuries, sink them to the lowest savagism, or that most debased and almost irrecoverable condition which Herodotus and Tacitus describe as characterizing some of these Northern hordes. If such tendency were ever reversed, it would only be by some reviving influence meeting them, earlier or later, from the more favored Mediterranean route, or from the older light with which that southern stream of migration had ever maintained some connection.

Far different must it have been with the Javanic or Pelasgian branch that took the way of Asia Minor and "the Isles of the Sea." Besides the facilities which this route afforded to their onward march, it kept open their communications,

more or less, with the old "countries whence they had come out." This was greatly aided by that remarkable Phœnician people so early established on the extreme Mediterranean East, whither they had come, as Herodotus and Strabo maintain, from the Persian Gulf. These, although not themselves the settlers of foreign countries to any noticeable extent, were the common carriers of the nations, keeping up a constant intercourse between the countries left and the new settlements, even to the remotest extent, or until they reached the Atlantic north and south. For the sons of Gomer, lost in the Northern wilds, there were no such messengers to and from the old ancestral lands. It was this intercommunication which kept up the chain of history, never wholly broken, as it existed between the earliest Oriental and the earliest Mediterranean people. It is thus that the Pelasgi are traced through Asia Minor, Greece proper, Italy, and even into Spain and Gaul. They were the aboriginal Greeks, of the same wide stock, though differing much, it may be, from subsequent waves of migration, or bearing as near an affinity to them as the early Scythians, Celts and Goths to the later Teutonic and Saxon races. The proper names which the Pelasgi left in their passage through the Mediterranean countries show a similar affinity of language. The Pelasgian was old Greek, though it seemed unintelligible, and, therefore, barbarous, to the later inhabitants.

Now from this general view, so consonant with the great genealogical table of Gen. x, and with all the light that history sheds on these dark places, there are to be drawn certain plain, and, we think, irrefragable conclusions. The northern stream, as has been said, would become early lost to history, and would remain so for ages until met again, in later days, by influences coming from the other. Again, a glance at the map would be sufficient, it would seem, to determine the question: By which of these two routes would the Western Atlantic coast be earliest reached? Would it be by the Scythian stream, if we may so call it, the one through northern and middle Europe, or by the earlier and easier highway of the Mediterranean? The answer, we say, is furnished

by the map. Those who went by sea, or by a route combining the still greater facilities of both sea and land, would get there first. Can there be a doubt of it? They would be in Asia Minor, Ionia, and even in Italy, before the others had surmounted the rivers of ancient Scythia, or had gone round the stormy Euxine sea; they would have been in Spain, along the Western Atlantic coast of Gaul, and even in Britain, before the others had penetrated the forests of Germany. The extreme probability then is, that the earliest settlers in Western Europe were of the Pelasgian or Javanic stock, if we may use this as a general name for the great Mediterranean stream of migration that first settled "the Isles of the sea,"—or the coasts that resembled islands, and which, therefore, suggested that name in the Scriptures as a general epithet for Southern and Western, in distinction from Northern and Middle Europe. It is certain that the Tyrians very early made voyages to the Atlantic; and as they were traders rather than settlers, or founders of colonies, their presence would be proof that there had preceded them a still earlier people, whom they visited for purposes of commerce, and of whom they had some knowledge as having come originally from the same Eastern world.

If the first settlement of Gaul and Britain was from this Mediterranean stream, before the Celt was in the land, it becomes easy to attribute to the same source the origin and introduction of something like the Druid religion, with its strong resemblance to some of the features that characterized the worship of Dodona. The peculiar nature of Druidism, its deep solemnity, its severe austerity, the strong hold it maintained, so much more tenacious than that of any frivolous idolatry, or mere æsthetic worship, give evidence of its great antiquity. Now it could never have come across the wide continent of Europe by the other route. We may be certain of this, because there are no traces of any such passage, no remains of religion and language such as it could not have failed to leave behind it. It is found strongest and purest in the extreme West. There were very faint indications of it in Germany, if we judge from the little Tacitus says about it, and these seem to have come from the Gauls; whilst in

Sarmatia and Scythia there were none at all. It could not have come by that route; if it did not arise indigenously in this far Western land. It must, therefore, have been there anterior to the arrival of the Celts, or the Gomeric pioneers; unless we may suppose that the Celts themselves were from this earlier stream, or, at least, so modified by earlier contact with it as to make the striking difference between them and the other branches of the Gomerites whom they preceded. There are, certainly features of the Celtic life, and not a few things in their languages, which would indicate Javanic and Phœnician, as well as Germanic affinities.

But here, again, some would refer us to India, that inexhaustible source of everything we find difficult to explain, or that we love to ascribe to a distant and mysterious origin. "Druidism," they boldly affirm, "is Brahminical, the names of its deities are from the Sanskrit." There is no proof of this that will stand the test of close examination. The question may well be asked: How did it get from India? When, and how, and by whom, was it carried across the wide continents from the Ganges to the British Channel, without leaving any marks or words by which we could trace its course? Geography stands in the way, and history is profoundly silent. The credulity and incredulity of some minds present a strange problem. It appears especially marvellous, in this tendency to refer everything to a Hindu origin. Men who shake their heads at the legend, as they would call it, of the Magi coming from Persia at the birth of our Saviour, can readily believe in this far more distant and difficult journey, or rather this sudden leap, that has left such a void in its mysterious, if not miraculous passage. They find no difficulty in believing their own story, or their own fancy, of Brahminic missionaries travelling in the earliest day, from the Indus to Dodona, or to Ireland, and planting in those places a very marked and peculiar religion, without leaving any traces of it in the wide intervening regions. There is reason, however, to believe that the extravagant views that not long ago prevailed in respect to the Hindu antiquity, and the claim that has been made for it as the origin of all

that was most serious in the religions of the West, have received a check. The bubble so inflated by Sir William Jones and other over-zealous Orientalists has reached its maximum, and of late years has exhibited strong evidence of a subsiding tendency. It is less unscholarly than it was a score of years ago, to trust the scriptural ethnologies, and the views they suggest in respect to the dissemination and the perversion of the early religions of the world; yet still this Indomania, as we may call it, meets us in almost every archæological inquiry. It draws the most important conclusions from the most trifling premises, and does not hesitate to use as proofs and illustrations what it would only deem worthy of a sneer if employed by the more biblical school. Thus says one: "The importance which the Druids attached to bulls and oxen forms another very striking mark of coincidence; so, too, in the magic rods of the Druids we likewise discern the sacred staff of the Brahmins; both made lustrations, both wore linen tiaras," etc., etc. This is a specimen of the reasoning commonly employed. It proves nothing. It might be used to show a connection between almost any systems of religion that ever existed on the face of the earth. The wand is a sacred symbol of authority, like Moses' rod, or a modern bishop's crosier; lustrations, such as belonged so copiously to the Mosaic ceremonial law, as well as linen robes, are emblems of purity, pertaining more or less to all rituals. We might as well refer to the wand of Mercury as proving a connection between the Greek and Druidical religions on the one hand, or the Greek and Brahminical on the other. Above all this, and directly in its face, is the geographical argument, in itself unanswerable, and supported by all the light that comes from the little history we have of those remote times. If men were not indigenous in Gaul and Britain, the very first migrations from the East that reached those shores must have been by the route of the Mediterranean, and some considerable time, too, before even the head of the other column had emerged from the woods, or made its appearance in history. By the same route, too, must have come the first ideas having any power, or any tenacious hold upon the soul. Their

quickest and easiest passage was by this highway of the nations along which the most precious truth has always marched, and from which, as the light of Heaven has again and again fallen upon it, it has streamed forth in collateral branches to revive decay and degeneracy in less-favored regions of the earth.

Among the Druidical tenets was that of the transmigration of souls, and, therefore, it is again alleged, it must have had an Eastern origin. But this doctrine was maintained by Pythagoras, and there is no evidence of his having received it from India, or of his having made a journey there, as was asserted centuries after his time, by Jamblichus and those wonder-loving theosophists, the Alexandrian Platonists. Such a view is about on a par with the declaration, sometimes made, that this great thinker, who first analyzed the musical proportions and discovered some of the most valuable theorems of elementary geometry, derived his doctrine of numbers from the Phœnicians, who were led to the knowledge of arithmetic from their commercial wants. All this is nothing better than sheer gossip. The mode of thinking which led to the idea of the metempsychosis, or the transmigration of souls, belongs as much to the Hellenic as to Oriental speculation. In its earliest stages, the doctrine had two aspects characteristic of two different styles of thought and feeling. One was predominantly physical, or cosmological. It was connected with the idea of the great cycle, or the coming round of all things to some primæval state, by means of successive transitions of everything through every variety of life or form of being. The other was predominantly moral. It was connected with the idea of retribution, as, more than any other, satisfying that notion of fitness which is inherent in it. It seemed thus eminently proper and righteous, that the great sins of sensuality and cruelty should, in another life, receive their most appropriate doom through those animal forms that their perpetrators had most resembled in this. The *first* aspect of the doctrine was mainly Oriental; the *second* mainly Occidental, as held by Pythagoras,

and more particularly set forth in some of the Dialogues of Plato. This, too, was the way in which it was most probably held and taught by the Druids. It was most consonant with their rigid moral austerity, and their extreme sense of justice. Thus regarded, there is more reason in ascribing it to a Hellenic than to an Indian origin.

The names of the Druidic divinities, as before remarked, have been supposed to be derived from the Sanskrit; but of these divinities and their names, we have the scantiest, if any knowledge. In the very place where we should expect it of him, Cæsar says nothing about them, though giving an interesting account of the Druids in other respects—their doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and its transmigrations as connected with the idea of *retribution, quo maxime ad virtutem excitare putant; Cæsar De Bello Gallico, VI.* 14. All this favors the idea of a monotheistic belief, even if we were not assured of the fact from other researches, derived through direct documentary and traditional evidence existing in the very countries primitively characterized by this form of religion. It was this that enabled Higgins, the most elaborate writer on the subject, to say that "the Druids held the worship of *One* Supreme Being," as well as the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. They may have assigned a subordinate place to some other class of superhuman beings, or may have thus personified, if not deified, certain powers of nature, but this would not affect their substantial monotheism. The awe of the one Great God, the avenger and the Saviour, was manifest in their worship, and their religion, in all its aspects, presented that deeper feeling which is ever associated with such a tenet, whilst ever absent from the æsthetic, the festive, or the merely fanciful polytheistic rites. The resemblance between them, in this respect, and the Dodonæan worship is most suggestive. It reminds us at once of the old Pelasgian Zeus, whom Homer addresses with so much reverence as belonging to a purer, a higher, a more ancient theology. We think of this rather than of Brahma, or of any thing else, in that strange mixture of polytheism and pantheism, which we ever associate with the

Eastern cultus, as distinguished from the religious ideas most prevalent in the West.

To say nothing, however, of the Dodonæan worship, with its reverence for the oak, and its unworldly austerity, it may be maintained that the religious ideas of the Druids were nearer to the Greek cultus, even in its grossest polytheism, than to the misty impersonalities of the Eastern beliefs. Of these latter it may be said, generally, as their common and pervading characteristic, that they had no true religious fear. They had wonder, wildness, grotesqueness, monstrosity, strange theories of nature, irrational psychologies, fanciful cosmologies, weird transformations, and over all a pantheistic mysticism, with such awe and confusion of soul as may come from these, but no "fear of the Lord" in the Bible sense, no dread of God, or gods, as retributive powers, as executive agents, whether prime or secondary, of an eternal law of righteousness. Sunken and degraded as was the Greek religion, extravagant as had become its polytheism, greatly as it had declined from some older, purer state, there was still one pervading idea that ever distinguished it from these physical, pantheistic, morally-powerless, Eastern systems. It was the idea suggested by that dread word, *nemesis*, the inevitableness of justice slow but sure, the certainty that wrong doing would be punished, sooner or later, and that, too, at the hands of some personal, divine power. It may sometimes have the look of a physical fate, and occasionally some of the strong language of the dramatic poets may assume that aspect, but it never wholly loses the personal, retributive character. God hates iniquity; "He is of purer eyes then to look upon evil;" "He is the jealous God"—jealous for his own holiness, and for the awe in which this righteousness-loving, wrong-abhorring attribute was to be held by all rational beings. Such is the Scriptural representation. The Greek follows it at a great distance, but in language that reveals its descent from a purer, primitive source. There is vast significance in that most ancient or ante-Homeric representation of Diké, Themis, Nomos, or Nemesis,—sometimes the one, sometimes the other, but ever the same idea of Justice or Retribution—as sitting at the

right hand of Zeus, or being the partners, the *σύνεδροι*, the consessors, or judicial associates of his high judgment seat.* These personifications are all older than the Homeric Heré, or Juno, the mere physical conception that afterwards takes their place, and deforms the later mythology. The more ancient ideas belong to that moral representation which seems strikingly akin to much of the scriptural language: "Righteousness and Judgment (*Themis and Diké*) are the habitation (the support) of His throne." The meaning cannot be mistaken: Justice is God's darling attribute; Law is his unerring minister. The physical is but the servant of the moral: "Forever, O Lord, thy Word is settled in the heavens; from age to age thy *faithfulness* (אמונתך, thy *security*, the stability of nature as assured by thee); all things stand according to thine ordinances, for they *are all thy servants*;" Ps. cxix. 89–92. Though found in the later Psalms, it is an ante-Mosaic strain, reminding us of the ancient song recorded in Deuteronomy xxxii. What but an echo of it, faint though it be and far off, is the language in which Æschylus (Supplices, 667) describes the ancient Zeus, the Great Zeus, *Ζῆνα μέγαν*, the supreme God, *Δί' ὑπέρτατον*, or Jove most high:—

ὃς πολιῷ νόμῳ αἶσαν ὀρθοῖ

With hoary Law all destiny directing.

In what may be called the Greek festival religion, with its processions and games, its purely æsthetic accompaniments, and the poetry that may be regarded as devoted chiefly to its representation, the polytheistic spirit, and the polytheistic language, are predominant; but almost invariably in the expression of high thought, and deep emotion, the monotheistic idea comes out in all its strength and clearness. Earnest appeals to the protection of the divine providence banish every other conception but that of one "great God," omniscient, almighty, the only "help in time of trouble." Thus Sophocles (173) represents the chorus as saying to Electra in the extremity of her distress,—

* So in other places, *Νόμος*, *Law*, is assigned to the same position. "Heavenly, all-ruling Law" is a favorite personification of Pindar.

Θάρσει μοι, θάρσει, τέκνον.
ἔστι ΜΕΓΑΣ ἐν οὐρανῷ
Ζεὺς, ὃς ἐφορᾷ πάντα καὶ κρατύνει.

Cheer up, my child, cheer up;
Great Zeus still dwells in heaven on high,
All seeing, all controlling.

Every reader of the Greek dramatic poetry must have noticed such passages as these, and been struck with their almost scriptural earnestness and purity.

It is a remark of Plutarch that, in periods of great danger, men call upon God in the singular. Other names disappear, only one great power is thought of. Virgil, whether consciously or not, gives a touching illustration of this in the speech which Æneas makes to his companions after their disastrous shipwreck. Æn. I, 199:

O passi graviora, dabit DEUS his quoque finem.

O ye who have endured more grievous woes!
To these too GOD will make an end.

The writer well remembers how he was struck by this as he read it in his boyhood, among his first Latin exercises. How much Æneas talks like the Bible! was the impression immediately conveyed. The pathos is in that word Deus, so used for Deity alone as distinguished from all other powers "that are called gods." It reveals a soul subdued, delivered for the moment from all "vain imaginations," and feeling that One alone could help. It is the poet sharing in his hero's sorrows that leads him to put into his mouth language so tender and so religious.

The same religious phenomenon, as exhibited by the ancient mind, is noticed by the Christian father Lactantius, quoted by Cudworth, Int. Sys. III. p. 396: Cum jurant et cum optant, non deos multos, sed Deum nominant; adeo ipsa veritas, cogente natura, etiam ab invitis pectoribus erumpit: "When they swear, when they strongly desire, they name not many gods, but God only; the truth thus, under the compulsion of nature, breaking from their hearts." Still more strongly does he present the idea in a passage following: Ad Deum confugiunt, a Deo petitur auxilium; si quis ad extre-

mam mendicandi necessitatem redactus, victum precibus exposcit, Deum solum obtestatur, et per ejus divinum atque unicum numen hominum sibi misericordiam quærit: "They flee to God for refuge; his aid alone is sought. If one is reduced to the extremity of beggary, he implores for God's sake; on account of his sacred and sole divinity, he asks compassion from his fellow men." Lactantius is speaking of the heathen, yet how little distinguishable is the language from that which Christianity prompts under like circumstances. It may, indeed, have become formal, but it must have had an impassioned origin. There is one thing here which deserves special notice. It is the language of mendicancy with its appeals, its invocations, its obtestations, its warm benedictions. How strikingly similar to what is heard now from the same class in modern Protestant countries. If it is not so in the Romish districts, it is because a blinding saint-worship has, in some respects, debased men below those instincts of heathenism which led them in distress to think of God alone, and to implore charity for his sake. Minutius Felix gives the same testimony. So also does Tertullian, specially instancing certain forms of speech which would be commonly regarded as peculiarly biblical and Christian: *God sees—God knows—God judge between us—if God will, Deo Volente—ἐὰν θεὸς θελήσῃ*—the very expression which St. James prescribes to all Christians. Similar phrases abound in the Greek Dramas. We cannot read them, as thus brought out in impassioned moments, without feeling that there was something in the idea of the divine unity, and of the one protecting, judging, and avenging providence, nearer to the souls, even of the heathen Greeks, than their superficial polytheism, or the vain festive religion which was its natural product.

If this instinctive or innate idea of the divine unity comes out strongly in seasons of great distress, it is still more vividly called forth by the fear of retribution, and in prayer for vindication against threatened wrong. In the one case, the appeal is to God as the great and only helper; in the other, He is addressed as the sole judge and avenger. The examples are numerous, but there is one class of them to which we

would especially call attention. Their object is this *nemesis*, or divine *jealousy*, to which we have already referred as giving a shadow of the holier scriptural idea conveyed by similar language. The Greek is a marring and a perversion of this, far below it in purity, but still retaining something of its fearful strength and majesty. In the Scripture, the divine jealousy is not envy of man, or an arbitrary purpose to thwart his prosperity,—an aspect which the degenerate heathen idea sometimes seems to take—but God's most just displeasure at human pride and human boasting, empty, vain, and utterly irrational, as they always are. He hates it, not only as he hates everything that is false, but also as most hostile to human happiness, as well as to the purest human dignity and worth. He will not "give his glory to another, or his honor to any vain idols" of earthly vanity. "No flesh shall glory in his presence;" "He resisteth the proud but giveth grace to the humble:" the doctrine is connected with the best good of the universe, and its acknowledgment is essential to the truest exaltation of humanity. In the best Greek theology it takes a much lower place than this. As sometimes expressed, it would seem to be a jealousy of human happiness merely, or without reference to any accompanying moral quality. It is used to indicate the danger of wealth and great outward prosperity in general, or irrespective of the evil state which such circumstances have a tendency to produce, and from which they are seldom dissociated. Still such ideas, or those which would make it akin to the scriptural language, do, in most cases, lie latent in the context, and unmistakably reveal its better origin. A curious illustration of this extreme view, or of this Greek modification of the idea, may be found in the long story which Herodotus gives us (vii. 39, 44) of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, doomed to destruction, and abandoned by his nearest friends through fear of the great calamities with which he was threatened in consequence of his long unbroken prosperity. These calamities came upon him to the uttermost, and the historian seems to be mainly occupied in contrasting them with his former greatness; but he by no means loses sight of the tyrannies and crimes which finally brought

upon him the long impending φθόνον θεῶν, or "Envy of the Gods." Plutarch takes an unfavorable view of this in one of his treatises entitled: *The Malignity of Herodotus.* He ascribes it to his κακοήθεια, his evil disposition, or fondness for telling evil stories, representing him as the slanderer of great men, and as placing in a bad light their great deeds. But this is contrary to the voice of all antiquity, and to that character for truthfulness and reverence which pervades the whole work of this great historian. Compare with it the story of Pheretime, iv. 205, her great success, her crimes, and her fearful death by worms, which the same writer relates in a style of seriousness and religious fear reminding us of Acts xii. 28. The parallel between it and the story of Herod smitten for his pride, and with the same dire disease, is most striking. The same may be said of the death of Antiochus Epiphanes as recorded in 2 Maccabees, ix. 9.* As compared with both cases, the moralizing remark of Herodotus is in consonance with the style and the judgment of the Scriptures: ὡς ἄρα ἀνθρώποισι αἱ λίην ἰσχυραὶ τιμωρίαι πρὸς θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι γίνονται: "Thus the strong vengeances taken by men (their proud acts of tyranny) make them the objects of the divine jealousy." He seems, too, to intimate that this peculiar disease, of which there are two such awful examples in the Scriptures, has a remarkable fitness from its pain, its loathsomeness, and its humiliation, to be the punishment of impious pride, especially of that which insults the majesty of heaven by claiming any of its prerogatives.

The expression φθόνος θεοῦ—frequent in the plural, but taking the singular form in the most serious cases—is very common in the Greek dramatic poetry. Thus in Æschylus Persæ, 363, there is a sublime fitness in the representation of this jealousy of heaven taking part against the boasting

* In these cases, the connection of this peculiarly painful and humbling visitation with the sin of pride, is made most prominent. Thus the author of 2 Maccabees says of Antiochus: "He who would have laid his commands upon the sea in superhuman boasting—he who thought to weigh the mountains in scales,—he is cast down to earth, and carried forth upon a horse litter, a manifest proof to all of the power of God."

Persian armament at the battle of Salamis. They rush on in their pride, "having little thought," says the poet, "of the valor of the men they are going to encounter, and still less of the φθόνος θεοῦ which is there to turn back the *temple-destroying* hosts (See Æsch. Persæ, 809) and utterly confound the sacrilegious arrogance of their haughty King. This was the rock on which their ships were wrecked. Compare Euripides, Iphigeneia, A. 1103 :

μή τις θεῶν φθόνος ἔλθῃ—
Injustice over law prevails,
And hence to men a common dread,
Lest Heaven's jealousy come forth ;

as it may be rendered in connection with the context. See also Euripides, Suppliants, 334 :—

With words persuasive I'll redeem the dead,
Without the need of Heaven's jealousy.

κοὐχὶ σὺν φθόνῳ θεῶν.

In the Philoctetes of Sophocles, 776, there occurs, in connection, a still more remarkable phrase as a form of propitiation :

τὸν φθόνον δὲ πρόσκυσον ;

"Worship the jealousy," propitiate it, avert it by acts of humility and reverence, bow down before it ; kiss it lest it be angry with you. It is the advice of Philoctetes to Neoptolemus, when he gives him the fatal arrows of Hercules, the prize so dangerous, because so rare, and conferring such a perilous advantage upon its possessor. There is the same idea, Æsch. Prom. Vinct., 933, except that Adraste (*the inescapable Justice*) is there used instead of φθόνος, but evidently to be regarded as synonymous with it. That the Latins had a similar thought, and a similar form, may be learned from Livy V. 21.

Sometimes the single word φθόνος is used for the whole expression—the divine name being understood, as in one of the previous examples. The ellipsis only shows how common this kind of language had become, the abbreviation being as significant as the full form, or having even more terror in it, as denoting something too awful to be expressed in plainer

speech. Thus *φθόνος*, standing alone, comes to be used as a sort of proper name, or as some personified divinity. It is *the Envy*, the great and fearful *Jealousy*, as distinguished from the human or any other form of the emotion. It is that attribute of Deity which cannot bear with human pride; as though such a state in man were ever challenging it to come forth in vindication. In this personifying way, the term enters into oaths, protests, and vehement assertions. It makes a short propitiatory formula in the expression of great joy, when accompanied by the thought of great intended crime. Thus Clytemnestra (Æsch. Agam. 904) in the midst of her extravagant professions, on meeting her betrayed husband cries out, *φθόνος δ' ἀπέστω*, "*be the envy absent.*" It is a sudden twinge of remorse, or of superstitious fear, which compels her thus to speak *aside*, as it were, in the midst of her exuberant affectation of happiness. It thus becomes a word of deprecation, as when in a boastful or impious speech one checks himself by using the phrase as part of an avertive interjaculatory prayer. Sophocles gives a striking example of this in the Electra, 146. At the sight of a veiled dead body supposed to be that of his slain enemy Orestes, but which turns out to be really the corpse of his guilty paramour, the wretch Ægistheus thus breaks out triumphantly, but suddenly checks his exulting strain—

Ὦ Ζεῦ, δεδορκα φάσμ', ἄνευ ΦΘΟΝΟΥ μὲν, εὖ
Πεπτωκός, εἰ δ' ἔπεστι ΝΕΜΕΣΙΣ, οὐ λέγω:

O Zeus! The sight I see!
Without the ENVY, it were well—but hold!
If NEMESIS be here, I say it not.

A most singular exhibition of human feeling, disclosing a strange mixture of crime, of conscience, and of superstition. The murderer and adulterer is about to burst forth in exclamations of joy, but suddenly struck with this haunting idea of the divine jealousy as ever nearest in times of highest exultation, especially if it be in view of crimes committed, or about to be committed, he suddenly retracts the impious boast before it is wholly finished. "Well fallen out" (*εὖ πεπτωκός*), *bene*,—*bravissimo*—were the words upon his lips, but

straight he bethinks himself, and adds, "If Nemesis be here, I say it not." It is to be observed, too, that in this passage φθόνος and Νέμεσις are used as equivalents; and this is enough to refute the argument of those who would represent the first as that merely arbitrary jealousy of human happiness, of which we have spoken, and the second as the purer divine justice that punishes human crime and pride. See the note of Wunder on the passage, who maintains this false view in opposition to Brunck who contends for their identity. The Greek doctrine is set forth in a most striking manner, in a fragment from one of the lost dramas of Euripides (clxxxi. Edition of Dindorf):

ὅταν ἴδῃς πρὸς ὕψος ἠρμένον τινά,
λαμπρῷ τε πλούτῳ καὶ γένει γαυρούμενον,
ὀφρύν τε μείζω τῆς τύχης ἐπηρκότα,
τούτου ταχεῖαν NEMEZIN εὐθὺς προσδοκα.
ἐπαίρεται γὰρ μεῖζον, ἵνα μεῖζον πέσῃ—

When thou beholdest one exalted high,
In splendor, wealth and noble birth exulting,
With brow erect, even higher than his fortune;
Look out,—for speedy Nemesis is near.
That man is only lifted high that he
May have the deeper fall.

And so it is in the Scripture. It is ever pride that is represented as most offensive to God. Sensuality is odious to Him, but the sins of the flesh do not call out that deep indignation which is exhibited toward *soul-sins*, as they may be called, or the "lusts of the mind," as they are styled by St. Paul. Nothing impure "shall dwell with him, but he maketh allowance for our carnal infirmities;" "He knoweth our frame, he remembereth that we are dust." He is even represented as finding a ground for his compassion in the sore temptations of our earthly nature, and as declaring that on that account alone he will no more smite the human race as he had done in the flood. (See Gen. viii. 21.) But pride, ambition, vain glory, boasting, accompanied as they always are, by forgetfulness of God, ever arouse his *wrath*, the חרון אף, the burning *jealousy*, as the Scriptures so significantly and so emphatically style it. "He resisteth the proud;" "He knoweth them

afar off," is the language used to express the highest degree of repulsion, or the utter aversion of the divine mind to this most irrational exhibition of our fallen humanity. The examples of this in the Bible are most sublime,—far loftier and purer than the Greek expressions, though sometimes presenting a strange resemblance to them as unmistakably derived from an ancient holier source. "Is not this the great Babylon that I have built for the house of the kingdom, by the might of *my* power and for the honor of *my* majesty?" So spake Nebuchadnezzar; but how speedy the Nemesis! "Whilst the word was in the king's mouth, there came a voice saying, The kingdom is departed from thee, and they shall drive thee from men, and thy dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field!" Most appropriate, too, the penalty, that for such an irrational sin, and in the very act of committing it, his "reason departed from him." So, too, in the case of Herod (Acts xii. 22): "And the people gave a shout, saying, the voice of a God, and not of a man. And immediately the angel of the Lord smote him, *because he gave not God the glory;* and he was eaten of worms, and gave up the ghost." This, too, was the sin of David, so severely punished by the pestilence. The exact nature of the offence is not so expressly stated as in the other cases, but there is no mistaking it. David's repentance, too, affects its character, though leaving still the lesson elsewhere taught. God had greatly prospered the Jewish monarch. For the first time in the Israelitish history, had the old patriarchal promise received its full accomplishment. He reigned from the river of Egypt to the waters of Damascus. In this flourishing state of his kingdom, the author of the penitential psalms forgets God, the source of all his wealth and power; he loses his confidence in the promise that his people shall be as "the sand upon the shore, and as the stars of heaven for multitude." He is seized with an insane desire to know the extent of his own greatness, not for any statistical use, or political need, but through sheer pride and vain glory. In this state of soul Satan tempted him to number Israel (1. Chron. xxi. 1). The result is most impressively told: "And God was displeased with this thing" which David

had done. The curtain of nature, which conceals the Nemesis in other cases, is for the moment withdrawn, and there is seen "the destroying angel, standing between the earth and the heaven with his sword drawn, and stretched out over Jerusalem." As is the way in God's mysterious dealings, the people suffer for the ruler's sins, whether themselves the acting political power, or represented by a single or collective national will in whose deeds they insanely *glory*. A memorable feature in this remarkable account is David's bitter repentance, in connection with his pathetic prayer: "Let me now fall into the hands of the Lord, *for very great are his mercies*; but let me not fall into the hands of man." This, however, though it relieves some of the severity, really heightens the sublime effect, and gives force to the doctrine, so vividly taught in the heathen as well as in the Scriptural theology, that "pride was not made for man." There is no other state of soul that presents such a strange spiritual phenomenon. It is not the appeasing of a craving want, or the gratification of a strong desire, but the sheer worship of the idea of self. There is to it no drawing of the flesh; it is a pure soul-sin, such as devils may commit, or beings who have no bodies, if there are any such. It is the mysterious, incomprehensible sin by which the angels fell. "Why is earth and ashes proud?" asks the wise son of Sirach. No answer can be given to such a question. Pride is the sin which cannot be explained. It is its utter irrationality that constitutes its moral hideousness.

The prevalence, among the Greeks, of this idea upon which we have been dwelling, or the deep impression made by the thought that Heaven *resists* pride, is shown by the fact of its having assumed a proverbial form. In this state, too, it is worthy of note, that it is invariably monotheistic, or always in the singular. It is not Zeus who is named, or even θεός, but the Numen or Deity in general. Φθονερὸν τὸ Θεῖον, they said, or φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμόνιον—"the Divine is jealous, the Supernatural," the one great fearful Power above us. He is not indifferent to human conduct. Insignificant as we are physically, there is attached to man a

moral importance; a holy eye is observing us, and noting our foolish pride; if nothing else "our sins shall give us consequence."

Examples of this proverbial kind abound chiefly in Herodotus. The reader is referred to Lib. I. 32, III. 40, vii. 46, and especially to VII. 10, § 5, 6, where the idea assumes a form that may be called almost scriptural in its loftiness and purity. Compare also VIII. 109, where the doctrine is the same, though the language is plural. The reason is that in that case it is not the language of the historian, but of Themistocles, in a speech in which he recounts the arrogant impieties of Xerxes, "unholy and doomed," as he calls him (*ἀνόσιόν τε καὶ ἀτάσθαλον*),—his heaven-defying frenzy in scourging the sea with rods, his claiming a divine imperium over the disobedient element, and, above all, his desecrating and burning the temples of the Grecian gods. It is this latter thought here that leads to the adoption of the plural form *θεοί*, and even to the joining with it of the *ἥρωες*, the old sainted dead, who were regarded as subordinate guardians of the land: "It is not we who have made this overthrow," continues the orator, "but the gods and heroes who were *jealous* that one man like this should be, at the same time, king of Asia and of Europe."

The first of the passages cited (I. 32) is from the famous interview between Solon and the rich man, Crœsus, who was so soon to experience a terrible reverse of fortune. In some parts of it we might almost imagine ourselves reading a chapter of the Old Testament: "Seventy years," says Solon, "I regard as the allotted life of man; the whole number of the days contained therein may be reckoned to be twenty-six thousand, two hundred and fifty, of which no two have events alike." They are full of vicissitudes, as we may paraphrase what follows, the rich reduced to poverty, the lowly exalted, the powerful cast down, &c., very much as the Bible expresses it. "For know, O Crœsus, that there is a Power above us, *τὸ θεῖον φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες*, jealous of human conduct, and filling our life with change and disappointment." The other passages bear the same testimony. It is ever the downfall of pride and guilt, which, in the use

of such language, the grave historian would set before us.

"This φθόνος of God," says Rawlinson, in a note to the above, "is a leading feature in Herodotus' conception of the Deity, and no doubt is one of the chief moral conclusions which he drew from his own survey of human events, and intended to impress on us by his history." We think, however, that in condemning Herodotus, as he does, this able critic and translator mistakes the import of the phrase, and the design of its use. Dahlmann takes a juster view, in comparing it to the *Deus ultor* of religious Romans, and the Jealous God of the Scriptures, which last idea Rawlinson repudiates. "The idea of an avenging God," he admits, "is *included* in the Herodotean conception, but is far from being the whole of it; prosperity not pride, eminence not arrogance, provokes him." And then he adds what strikes us as still more unfair to the ancient historian: "What is most remarkable is, that with such a conception of Deity Herodotus could maintain such a placid, cheerful, child-like temper. Posssibly he was serene because he felt secure in his mediocrity." This is most unjust. It might be said, on the contrary, that such a belief in an all-surveying power above us, is the very thing to inspire a serene trust, whatever changes may take place in the human condition, either high or low. Granting, too, that Herodotus means no more by his maxim than the danger of prosperity, it is not far from our Saviour's teaching: "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of heaven?" The place which Rawlinson had mainly in view, and which best supports his opinion of Herodotus, is, perhaps, the speech of Artabanus, vii. 46. But this is to be judged by the context. The design there is to dissuade Xerxes from his rash enterprise by the most melancholy picture that could be drawn of human affairs, the sport of fortune, or of some great power we cannot resist. It includes the affecting story, true or false, of Xerxes surveying his immense host from the shores of the Hellespont. "At first," says the historian, "he congratulated himself, but after that he wept." "How is this," said his uncle, "why this sudden change?" The reply of the monarch is well known: "There came into my mind," says he, "a sudden feeling of

compassion, when I thought how brief the life of man, and that of all these, numberless as they are, not one, a hundred years hence, would be in existence." "And yet," says the other, "there are sadder things than that;" and then follows a most mournful recital of the woes of human life; the object evidently being to dissuade him from the war as a most cruel, as well as most unnecessary addition to the calamities of a life so short and full of sorrow: "Misfortunes are continually falling upon us, diseases harass us, so severe, that they make life seem long though really short. Thus it is that death becomes a refuge to our race; and God himself, after having given us a sweet taste of existence, *γλυκὺν γεύσας τὸν αἰῶνα*, seems to be jealous of our enjoying it." The passage is to be judged by its dramatic proprieties. It is like some of the desponding language to be found in Job, in the Psalms, and occasionally in the Prophets: "Remember, O Lord, how transient our life; why hast thou made all men in vain;" or, "to what vanity hast thou created us?" "Upon such a one dost thou open thine eye, and bring him into judgment with thee." It is one of those orientalisms which are to be found in Herodotus more than in any other Greek writer.

Thus we may concede Rawlinson's view, to some extent, but it does not exclude the more ancient and purer idea. Herodotus certainly uses the language, for the most part, in what he deems a truly religious, in distinction from a superstitious or fatalistic sense. This pious historian, for we may well call him so, in comparison with any of the ancients, and many of the moderns—seems to have God in view in all he writes. He almost tells us, in so many words, that his object is to illustrate the dealings of divine providence, or, to use a well known phrase, to exhibit "God in history." He may see a Nemesis, sometimes, where none exists, but there is more of the great Bible truth in him than in some modern writers, professedly Christian, who go to the opposite extreme,—who can babble about "natural laws" when God is shaking the earth, and who see no intervention of his hand in a fire that almost swept out of existence one of our mightiest cities. Hence he ever stops to moralize, and to show the danger of

great prosperity, as leading to those things which necessarily draw down the vengeance of heaven; as though "the divine" *must* assert itself, against the unbelieving pride and wickedness of men. This appears most sublimely in that interview between Artabanus and Xerxes previous to the one to which we have already referred. It is to be found in the vii. book, section 10, and, especially, divisions 5 and 6. At the conclusion of a long discourse, the prophet, as we may almost call him, thus addresses the monarch whom his bold and fearful language has awed to silence, even though it fails in persuading him to desist from his destructive enterprise: "Seest thou how God smites, with his thunderbolt, the towering beasts; how his lightnings strike the greatest buildings, and the tallest trees? For God loves to bring down every high thing that exalts itself before Him. So is it that a mighty host is destroyed by a small band of men, when the jealous God (ὁ θεὸς φθονήσας, or, to give the force of the aorist participle, God in the sudden rousing of his jealousy) sends upon them panic or the thunder storm, and they perish miserably. For God suffers no one to indulge in proud thoughts (μέγα φρόνειν) or to feel great in his presence." In his note to I. 32, Rawlinson renders this last sentence: "He does not like any one to be great or happy but himself." Such a translation may favor his condemnation of Herodotus as representing human prosperity, merely, to be the object of the divine jealousy, but it certainly is not in harmony with the Greek, or with the spirit of this striking passage. The comparative form is like the Hebrew idiom, as we find it in the first commandment: "No other Gods before me," that is, "no other God than me." How strongly does it call to mind Paul's declaration, 1 Cor. i. 29, "That no flesh may glory in his presence," or the commanding announcement of Habakkuk ii. 20, "The Lord is in his holy temple, let all the earth keep silence before Him."

The rich orientalism of the passage would warrant the belief that it was an actual utterance of Artabanus, which had some way come to the knowledge of Herodotus, instead of a personation by the historian, according to the common as-

sumption. If so, it would almost seem as though the Persian had been reading the prophet Isaiah; his imagery of "the high things," the towering beasts, the tall trees, the lofty palaces, bearing such a strong resemblance to what we find chap. ii. v. 12, 17: "For the day of the Lord of hosts shall be upon every one that is proud and lofty, and upon every one that is lifted up, and he shall be brought low; and upon all the cedars of Lebanon that are high and lifted up, and upon all the oaks of Bashan; and upon all the high mountains, and upon all the hills that are lifted up; and upon every high tower, and upon every fenced wall; and upon all the ships of Tarshish, and upon all the pleasant pictures. And the loftiness of man shall be bowed down, and the haughtiness of man shall be made low; and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that day."* If the charge made by Rawlinson holds good against

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* This form of Orientalism, as we have called it, reminding us so strongly of the Bible language, is not confined to Herodotus. The denunciation of pride and boasting, as specially offensive to Deity, is to be found also in Æschylus, the oldest and sternest of the dramatic poets. There, too, is it ever associated with the monotheistic idea. It is not Apollo, nor Athene, in any case, but Zeus ever, who rules over the empire of retribution. It is Zeus to whom it specially belongs "to bring down every one that is proud and lofty, and every thing that exalteth itself." See the Persæ, 827:

> Ζεὺς τοι κολαστὴς τῶν ὑπερκόμπων ἄγαν
> φρονημάτων ἔπεστιν εὔθυνος βαρύς.
>
> Zeus the chastiser of presumptuous pride;
> Of boasting words the arbiter severe.

It is said in reference to the same Persian invasion which is made the ground of the language in Herodotus; and the effect is here greatly heightened by its being ascribed to the ghost of Darius, who comes upon the scene as a messenger or interpreter of events from the Hadean world. We have also similar language in the Antigone of Sophocles, 127:

> Ζεὺς γὰρ μεγάλης γλώσσης κόμπους
> ὑπερεχθαίρει—
>
> The proud tongue's empty vauntings Jove abhors.

Compare with this Ps. xii. 4: "The Lord will cut off the tongue that speaketh great things." There is, too, the same idea, though differently represented, in the Septem adversus Thebas, 440, when Kapaneus is struck by the lightning of Zeus in consequence of his impious speech:

> A mortal man, in exultation wild,
> Against the heavens his impious mouth unbarring:

Herodotus, it is equally maintainable against the Hebrew prophet: "Wherefore, cease ye from man whose breath is in his nostrils, for wherein is he to be accounted of?" How strikingly suggestive, too, is that other language of the Persian counsellor: "For oft times a mighty host is destroyed by a small band, when God sends panic upon them, or the thunder storm." Had Artabanus read it in the Magian writings, or received the idea from some still more ancient source? Be this as it may, there immediately rises to the mind the strong resemblance it bears to well-known passages in our own Scriptures: "For God can save by few or by many," 1 Sam. xiv. 6. "Then should one chase a thousand, and two put ten thousand to flight," Deut. xxxii. 30. "When the Lord thunders in the heavens, when he sends forth his lightnings and scatters them," Ps. xviii. 13, 14.

The Greek dramatic poetry gives us the popular rather than the philosophical view of the divine attributes, and yet, with all its perversions, the former is more suggestive of scriptural ideas than the latter. There is something more akin to the spirit of the Old Testament in Æschylus than in Aristotle, or even Plato. We do not hesitate to affirm that, in their predominant characteristics, the Greek Tragedies have an ethical and religious seriousness beyond all other human writings, and placing them, in these respects, next to the Holy Scriptures. The idea most prominent in them, most vivid, and most pervasive, is that of the eternal and inevitable justice,—*Δίκη, Νέμεσις, Ἀδράστεια* (Adrasté, from whom there is no escaping or *running away*.) There is hardly a drama in which it does not in some form appear and constitute an important, if not the central element. Justice, slow but sure. For a full exposition of this Greek idea, we would refer the reader to Plutarch's treatise *De Sera Numinis Vindicta*, a very complete edition of which, with most instructive notes, and Bible parallelisms, was published at

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ἀπογυμνάζων στομα . . . . ἐς οὐρανον. It is almost the very words of Ps. lxxiii. 9: "*They put their mouth against the heavens*, and their tongue walketh through the earth." For similar ideas and representations, compare also Eurip. Phœn., 1179, Eurip. Bacchæ, 385, and Sophocles Antigone, 1321.

Andover, 1844, by Prof. Hackett of the Newton Theological Seminary. In consequence of this idea of certainty it is also called the *sworn* Justice of Jove, as in the Medea, 211 :

τὰν Ζηνὸς ὁρκίαν Θέμιν

Or the justice by which he swears, "confirming it by an oath," as Paul says in respect to the divine, oath-established covenant, Heb. vi, 17. So, also, in the same drama the poet represents Medea as invoking Θέμιν εὐκταίαν, Themis the *oft supplicated*, who is also addressed in direct connection with Zeus. Indeed, nothing is more remarkable than the manner in which the monotheistic feeling comes out in association with every lofty idea, and deep emotion. Other deities are forgotten, and Zeus, or some name representative of the one Numen who reigns supreme in the realm of law and providence, alone appears. The appellations to which we have referred are ever personifications merely. They have no temples and altars dedicated to them, as was the case with the Latin personified divinities. They are simply vivid representations of divine attributes, having, for the mind, no more objective reality than "the right hand," or "the stretched out arm," or the all-seeing "eye of Jehovah" in the Scriptures.

This representation of the dramatic justice and its inevitableness, is greatly heightened by the scenic pictures of the Furies. These, indeed, were regarded as real beings, and had religious rites commemorative of them as such ; but, in the main, they were symbolical, not only of human remorse, as is commonly supposed, but of the great fact to which we have referred, that there is no escaping retribution for crime, especially great crimes, or the "awful deeds" which form the subjects of the Grecian tragedies. The "swart hounds" of Adrasté, to use the terrific language of Æschylus in the Eumenides, are on the track of the homicide. There is no refuge for him in this world, and if he flees to Hades, it is only to meet the deeper doom.

καὶ τῷ κτανόντι ποῦ τὸ τέρμα τῆς φυγῆς ;
ὅπου τὸ χαίρειν μηδαμοῦ νομίζεται.

O ! where's the boundary of the murderer's flight ?
'Tis in that world where joy is never known.

"There is no darkness, no shadow of death where the workers of iniquity may hide themselves." Job xxxiv. 22.

Closely connected with this inevitableness of justice, is another doctrine found in the Scriptures, and receiving some of its most powerful illustrations from the Grecian drama. It is the idea of the hereditary taint of crime, the "visiting of the sins of the parents upon the children," as the Bible expresses it, an evil in the blood, commencing in some atrocious deed, and thus going down, generation after generation, as though it could never be got out, until some supernatural expiation, or some overwhelming catastrophe, burying all beneath it, finally terminates its long career of death and crime. Two families especially, in the early Greek mythical history, furnish subjects for this fearful dramatic representation. They are the houses of Atreus and of Laïus, as they may be briefly styled, or the Peloponnesian and the Theban horror. The deep impression made by this dark record of ancient crime is shown from the great space its representation occupied upon the Grecian stage. Of the three great tragedians, we have preserved entire only thirty-four dramas. Of that number no less than fourteen are connected, more or less directly, with the one or the other of these old families, or their descendants. They are the Œdipus Tyrannus, the Œdipus Coloneus, the Antigone and the Electra of Sophocles, the Septem contra Thebas, the Agamemnon, the Choephori, the Eumenides of Æschylus, the Orestes, the Electra, the Suppliants, the two Iphigéneias, and the Phœnician Virgins of Euripides. In most of them, this idea of hereditary retribution is set forth with almost terrific power. The sins of the fathers involve the destinies of the children, even to the third and fourth generation. So is it also presented in the Bible; and we can no more object to the representation in the one case, than in the other. In respect to both we are estopped by the fact that such retribution most evidently exists in nature, whether coming from some divine ordinance originally impressed upon it, or from some strange course of things to which we may give the still stranger name of "natural selection." There it is; there is no arguing against it; we must adopt it as a physical if not

a moral fact; the children are involved in the crimes of the parents. Even when the former are innocent, we are compelled to admit it as a consequential evil. But the Bible doctrine, as well as that of the Greek drama, goes deeper than this. It is truly retributive, because the sin, the moral taint, descends as well as the penalty. As we have elsewhere said, when dwelling upon a kindred subject (*Biblical Repository*, July, 1843): "Sin begets sin, and nothing can stay the plague, or make atonement, but the direct interposition of Heaven." Plutarch, too, in the treatise referred to, makes an exception similar to that of the prophet Ezekiel: "A virtuous son," says he, "may, by repentance, escape the punishment which threatens the whole descent, but otherwise, just as they are heirs to their father's estate, so do they succeed to the punishment of their father's iniquities; for Dike still pursues the likeness of the sin." We see in this, and in other remarks of the same writer, what is indeed a prominent idea of the ancient ethics, namely, the representative character of human relations and institutions. It is the direct opposite of the extreme modern individualism. It is the responsibility of one unbroken continuous being, maintaining a moral identity. Thus Prof. Hackett admirably paraphrases Plutarch's argument here: "A state has a continuous existence (συνεχές); it remains one and the same through successive generations as really as a man remains the same individual through the different periods of his life; hence the social crime of one age is left to work out its legitimate social results in another, since the Deity is dealing still with the *same agent*, and holding the offender responsible for his acts." So is it with families; so is it with the race as represented by the one spiritual and natural head in whom we all are fallen, and all held responsible.

This attribute of the divine justice is, indeed, most prominent in the Grecian drama, and its representations, sometimes, are so stern as almost to shock our modern sensibilities. Viewed only on this side we might be led to regard the dramatic religionism as gloomy and terrific. It is not, however, Dike alone that appears upon the stage. There are other representations, at times, that relieve the picture. They

are, indeed, not so common, and, therefore, when we meet them, we are all the more surprised at their tenderness and beauty. Of this kind are expressions of trust in the all-seeing and all-guarding providence, such as we have cited, p. 449, from Soph. Electra, 173. Again Mercy, too, as well as Justice, is personified, and, in like manner, represented as sharing the throne of Zeus. It is another example of the way in which all deep emotive thought, whether of the sterner or the tenderer kind, associates itself with the monotheistic conception. A beautiful expression of this may be found in that mournful drama;* Soph Œd. Col. 1267:

> *Ἀλλ', ἔστι γὰρ καὶ Ζηνὶ ΣΥΝΘΑΚΟΣ ΘΡΟΝΩΝ*
> *ΑΙΔΩΣ ἐπ' ἔργοις πᾶσι, καὶ πρὸς σοὶ, πάτερ*
> *Παρασταθήτω· τῶν γὰρ ἡμαρτημένων*
> *ἄκη μὲν ἔστι.*
>
> For MERCY also sits
> Sharing the throne of Jove, o'er all his works
> Presiding gracious. To thy soul, my Sire,
> Let her be present now. For errors past
> There still is healing.

Αἰδώς here is a very striking word. It does not denote *pity* merely, in the sense of compassion, such as might be felt at the sight of any severe suffering, whether of man or beast. It carries with it the idea of regard, respect, *reverence*, not only of man to God, but also, though in a different way, of God towards man. It is pity mingled with reverence, as though there was something in severe human suffering that called out such a feeling in One who had created man for happiness and glory. "There is forgiveness with thee, that thou mayest be feared." The suggestive power of such passages, and their suggested ideas, may be well deserving of notice, without any undue exaltation of the Greek poetry, or any undervaluing of the Holy Scriptures.

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* It is in the speech of Ismene, who travels with her old blind father, giving the drama a great resemblance, in some respects, to Shakspeare's Lear.

Art. II.—THE LABOR QUESTION IN ITS ECONOMIC AND CHRISTIAN ASPECTS.

By Lyman H. Atwater, D.D.

That the conflict between capital and labor is growing to a magnitude and universality, in itself and its threatened consequences, which make it one of the portents of the time, is only too evident. It is quite time that it receive the serious attention of all earnest and thinking men, especially such as reach the public mind, and have any vocation to enlighten it on questions of duty. We therefore make no apology for asking the attention of our readers to some thoughts on this great subject.

What, then, is labor, and what is capital? Labor is not every form of human activity or exertion. But it is human effort intentionally applied to natural objects so as to produce utilities not otherwise existing, i. e. to supply some want or gratify some desire of man. There are several elements in this definition. It must not only be human effort, but intentional, that is with an intelligent design to produce some result beyond itself. It must not terminate merely in itself or its own pleasurable sensations, like games, dances, or mere sport. It must produce some result beyond itself, either transient or enduring, coveted by man. This may be the sensations which immediately follow it and then vanish, as the exhilaration consequent on friction of the body, or enduring, as the granite monument. And this result is still further some desired, and, in this sense, useful modification of natural objects of more or less duration. There is no form of labor without these marks, and whatever activity possesses them is labor. The only seeming exception is intellectual effort, in some form of acquiring or imparting knowledge or mental discipline. But practically this is no exception. For it enters not into the labor involved in the great contest between labor and capital now under consideration. Withal, this sort of effort contributes immensely to the efficiency of

that labor on material objects with which we are immediately concerned. Besides, considering the mind or spirit as a natural object, which it surely is, effort for the purpose of increasing the knowledge, or vigor, or purity, of one's own or other's minds, surely comes within our definition of labor.

Now of the results or utilities so produced by labor, as already intimated, there are two kinds, the one evanescent or transient, the other more or less enduring, because embodied in natural objects more or less enduring. These latter are products or commodities, which, with respect to their form as thus modified, are the creations of labor. All food, raiment, fuel, buildings, tools, farm improvements, are of this description. It is these products more or less, that survive the effort of making, which constitute the property, wealth and capital of society. Nothing else is wealth or capital but natural objects so modified by human labor as to have a new utility not otherwise inhering in them, whereby they will exchange for other equivalent labor or product of labor, be this product money, gold, silver, iron, or whatever else. Paradoxical as this may seem to those who have not studied the subject, it is capable of apodictic proof, because nature works gratuitously for all who will take her works and products, and it is not till some human effort increasing their natural utility has been put upon them, that they will exchange for other labor or products of labor. What more useful than air and water and land? What more gratuitous, till in some form human labor has been expended in putting them in the condition or place in which we want them, as in water-works, ventilating apparatus, the masts and sails which catch the winds, or the roads and vehicles which render land accessible? The lands adjacent to the North Pacific Railroad have been wholly unsaleable because inaccessible. They are now fast becoming marketable. Why? Just because of the human labor, in itself or as embodied in capital expended on that railway. All Manhattan Island is said to have been purchased from the Indians for about a hundred dollars. What makes it now worth a thousand or thousands of millions? Just the labor upon it and in the avenues of com-

munication with it, which make it the great centre of American commerce. Moreover, it is worth noting, because it is a most pregnant as well as simple truth, that the effort of labor consists solely in moving things in such a way that they serve us, or enlist the powers of nature in gratuitously serving us, more effectually than were otherwise possible. This statement will stand every possible test.

This being so, we are prepared to answer the questions, What is wealth? What is capital? Wealth is the sum total of commodities or of natural objects endued with new utility to man by human labor. The further and longer we search, we shall find no wealth which does not answer to this description. In other words it is the savings of labor: just that and that only. It is that portion of the products of labor which the laborer forbears to use and enjoy at the time of production, and reserves for his own or other's future disposal and enjoyment. It is simply the reward of his forbearance to spend all he produces or earns, or of his putting it to use in further production. We cannot further expand this prolific truth. We pass to say that:

Capital is that portion of wealth, or of the accumulated savings of labor, which is devoted to the support and assistance of the laborer in future production. This is the strict meaning, although it is often used loosely for all property or wealth, or for principal as distinguished from income or interest. But without stopping to vindicate this definition, it is enough that, at any rate, it precisely defines capital so far as it has to do with the present discussion. It is that wealth which employs, supports, and coöperates with labor in production, that we are now dealing with. It is with this only that labor has relations whether of harmony or conflict. Wealth consisting in ornaments, paintings, and most luxuries, is not of this nature, although it may be exchanged by its owner for what he may use as capital in employing and aiding labor. The same person is often capitalist and laborer too. This is almost universally so with small farmers, mechanics, and tradesmen. They labor in production and distribution. But the food, raiment, fuel and shelter which sustain life meanwhile, the stock

in trade, the tools, seed, animals, agricultural improvements, buildings, fences, etc., are their own. The saw, axe, beetle and wedges of the woodman, as also his food and raiment while working, are his capital. Of course in such cases there can be no conflict between labor and capital. And this affords a clue to our solution of the problem before us: that in all great manufacturing establishments requiring an aggregate of capital vastly beyond the possible accumulations of laborers, as far as possible, the laborer should in some form and degree, however small, be made a capitalist or sharer in the fortunes of the business.

From all this it appears that labor, in order to any productiveness beyond the rude subsistence of the first savage who picks up a hand-to-mouth subsistence on berries, roots, and nuts, must be sustained and reinforced by capital, either circulating or fixed; the former being that which must be immediately consumed in the very process of production in order to be at once reproduced with interest, by exchange for it of the commodities it and the laborer have combined to produce. Such circulating capital includes the laborer's means of subsistence, together with the raw material consumed in production. Fixed capital, on the other hand, is what permanently abides to aid in producing a long series of commodities. It consists of such things as buildings, tools, machinery, fences, whatever, in short, is not exhausted in any single commodity or commodities simultaneously produced, but continues to aid in the repeated production of commodities. It is consumed only gradually, and is replaced not by the profits of the products of any one time, but by the cumulative profits of a larger or shorter series of productions. Now, it is obvious that without the support and coöperation of such capital, both fixed and circulating, labor must be comparatively unproductive and fruitless. And this capital must be furnished in larger quantities than is practicable for the bulk of individual laborers. Nay, it must be supplied in ever increasing quantities in order to enlist the greatest aid or coöperation of the powers of nature, and secure the largest advantages of the most complete division of labor. In proportion as we enlist steam, water, the

most powerful machinery, and the number of hands required for the most profitable division of labor, the amount of capital needed ever augments. Witness this in the great railways, mines, and factories of our country. All this immensely increases the productiveness, and even the rewards of labor. For, after all that goes to the profit of capital so enlisted, the laborer gets a larger fruit of his labors than would be possible without the coöperation of this capital which, in the form of tools, machinery, and needful structures, so largely subsidizes the powers of nature. The axe-maker will earn more by working in an immense axe-factory at the wages there allowed, than by hammering axes out by hand in his own smithy. So of the spinner at the spinning-jenny as compared with the hand-wheel. And so of all handicraft whatsoever, in which large capital successfully brings in natural forces to enable one hand to do the work of many, or at least of more than one.

Hence it is one of those natural laws, which it is not in the power of man, or combinations of men, to alter or abrogate, that labor is absolutely dependent on capital, in some amount at least, for its very possibility and sustentation; and in still larger and ever increasing ratios for its success and rewards. Capital is the natural ally, support, and coadjutor of labor. It can not be otherwise, except in distempered misconceptions, or through some strange and monstrous mal-adjustment.

But if labor is dependent on capital for its success and reward, capital is no less dependent on labor for its own compensation, which is technically called profit. This is too evident to need proof. Let labor cease and capital at once becomes unproductive and worthless. Tools, machinery, farms, animals, railroads, mines, when once the hand of human labor is withdrawn from them, are unproductive and at once incur loss and injury. There is not only no gain, there is constant loss. "By much slothfulness the building decayeth, and by idleness of hands the house droppeth through." "He that is slothful is brother to him that is a great waster." "The hand of the diligent maketh rich." The sociology and economics of Scripture, like all else of it, are infallible. It is true

that in a drawn battle, in which labor and capital both bring each other to a dead-lock, the capitalist may at once lose the most and hold out the longest, simply because his resources are greater. After all his losses up to the time when the laborer is brought to the verge of starvation, something is likely to remain to the capitalist for his continued subsistence.

Hence it follows that capital and labor are mutually dependent and auxiliary. Neither can say to the other "I have no need of thee," any more than the members of the human body. Nor are they, certainly they should not be, any more antagonistic than these. It is only a genius of evil that can place them in such an unnatural attitude.

It is next to be observed, that labor and capital must each be compensated, or have a fair prospect of compensation, or they will be withheld from productive employment. So far as labor is concerned, it not only violates our natural sense of justice that it should not be compensated, for "the laborer is worthy of his hire," but from the very constitution of human nature men will not work for nothing. Nay, they cannot. For they must be fed, clothed, and sheltered up to the working point. And beyond this, the laborer will ordinarily require, and justly require, as much more as he can command in the existing state of the labor market—exceptional cases of extortion, whether by the laborer or capitalist, aside. He demands, and justly, when the labor market will afford it, not a bare subsistence, but a comfortable and decent support for himself and his family; and this not merely as animals, but as suited to their position and destiny as rational, accountable, and immortal beings, with their manifold capabilities, tastes, and aspirations. And it is his right and duty, on the other hand, to make his labor as effective for these ends as possible, without infringement of the rights and just claims of others.

On the other hand, capital must have reward or the prospect of reward, else it cannot be had. Men will not save it, or forbear to consume it upon their own pleasures, or guard it against waste, or risk it in production, if they can have no benefit of it or reward for it. This is self-evident. Moreover

it is equally evident from the principles of human nature, that, exceptions aside, so far as men act intelligently, there is a certain normal rate at which they must be compensated, in order to be induced thus to save wealth, and then to use it as capital to sustain and coöperate with labor in further production. That rate includes the following elements: 1, The prevailing rate of interest which it will command, if securely loaned. There is no motive to incur the risk and trouble of managing it in business, for a compensation which can be secured without them. 2, An additional compensation for the risk of the capital, at least to the extent of the cost of insurance, and still more for all further risk of loss, unless it may be offset by proportionate chances of gain. But before the capitalist can be in a position to be willing, after risking his capital in production, to share the profits with the laborer to whom he has already ensured his wages, he must first be compensated for his risk in addition to the interest he would receive without risk. 3, He must be paid for the labor of superintendence whether performed by himself or others. This, really, is one department of the labor involved in production, which is requisite to the efficiency of all other labor, and is of course entitled to a reward proportioned to its value. But as it is often performed by the capitalist, so its reward is often confounded with the profit of capital. Now, in order to find a motive to embark capital in production, there must be a fair prospect of a return beyond simple interest, the cost of insurance, and the wages of superintendence, all which give the capitalist no better reward than if his money were securely loaned, unless he find some inducement in the profit of insurance, by being his own insurer, or chooses to put his capital to this use in order to furnish himself congenial and remunerative employment, or, from benevolent motives, to provide such employment for others.

From all this it follows that all laborers, or those who have labor to supply, constitute a proportionate demand for capital to employ it efficiently and remuneratively, and all capital constitutes a proportionate demand for labor in order to its remunerative employment; that the greater the quantity of either seeking employment the more bidders it furnishes and

the better terms must it make for the other: that the increase of each is for the gain of the other: that the increase and mutual co-operation of both serves in a still higher proportion to increase the produce of both and the consequent reward of each, or the amount of useful and enjoyable things respectively provided for the usufruct of each: that all stoppage of labor, whether by strikes or other causes, and all inaction of capital, whether from strikes, distress, timidity, or stagnation of business, involve so much diminution of the produce of both labor and capital for the reward of each: that the average wages of labor, making all allowance for circumstantial variations, will be the quotient of the labor-fund of community divided by the number of laborers seeking employment: that the greater this labor-fund, the greater their wages: that all war of labor against capital to destroy it or its profits is insane and suicidal: that the conflict between labor and capital so industriously fanned, blindly by some and basely by others, is simply a contest between labor in making commodities and labor already performed and embodied in commodities, which, instead of being spent, have been saved to sustain the labor thus arrayed against them; in short a war of labor against labor: labor now doing against labor already done to sustain and help the labor which is doing and to be done: that labor cannot succeed in breaking down capital without breaking down itself; and, per contra, that the more adequate the reward of labor, the more elevated, thrifty, buoyant, and productive it becomes. And as there is a profound and stubborn skepticism in regard to the advantages derived by labor from the increase and accumulation of capital, we ask the patience of our readers for a few words more on the subject. This appears (*a*) from the fact that the laborer can only be paid from the capital provided for this purpose and in proportion to that capital; (*b*) from the fact that it is only in proportion to the capital saved and invested in them, that the tools, machinery and motors can be had that render labor effective; (*c*) from the further fact that, other things being equal, while the absolute rewards of both labor and capital are augmented by the in-

crease of the latter, the rewards of labor are increased from this source in a greater ratio than the rewards of capital. The smaller the capital in existence, the greater its proportionate reward, i. e., the greater the demand for it, the bids for it, and the reward of it, with a given amount of labor. Thus suppose the first hand-wheel for spinning yarn, or any other newly invented labor-saving implement; suppose that only one is owned in a region where a hundred could be profitably employed. Now, since, with the aid of this, one person can spin, say fifty times the thread he could without it, it follows that every laborer will be the gainer if he pays the capitalist owning it four-fifths of what he saves by it. The latter will find abundant employment for it at this exorbitant rate. But now suppose from the savings thus made twenty such wheels are procured for the use of that community, and that they can all be employed to advantage. It is plain that they can only find employers at much lower rates, as they will compete for such employment, say for one-fifth of the labor they save. Now the capitalist receives a fourfold greater absolute compensation than before, at one-fourth the rate. But how immensely is the reward of the laborer increased absolutely and relatively? There is an increase of twenty times the former product, and of all this increase he gets three-fourths. How immensely is all this multiplied in geometric ratio in our great cloth mills and spinning jennies? In our childhood as much was paid first for spinning, and again for weaving by hand the linen fabrics then in use among farmers and laborers, as is now paid for the completed cotton cloth which better serves the same purpose. This, too, aside of all cost of raw material, bleaching, dyeing, or otherwise finishing for use, and when money was of more than twice its present value, certainly would exchange for more than twice as much labor as now.

There is scarcely room for doubt that while the vast increase of capital devoted to cloth making has received an increased absolute amount of profit, yet the ratio of this gain bears no proportion to the gains of labor from this source.

A given amount of labor will obtain in return at least four times as much cotton cloth as half a century ago.

Hence it results still further, that the law of liberty is the true condition for the highest efficiency and productiveness of labor and capital. All restrictions upon the use of capital or labor by monopolies, strikes, trades-unions, or other artificial obstructions, impair the united product of both, just as much as manacles impair the working power of the human body. Let capital be at liberty to enter that field of honest employment in which its owners see their way to the largest profits, without legislative, trades-union, or other artificial obstacles, and it will surely be employed in the broadest and most profitable scale, with the largest competition, demands, and remuneration for labor. Then let labor be perfectly free to follow its chosen occupation, to find its own sphere, cultivate and exercise its own special gifts and endowments to the best advantage, fix its own terms, prices, hours, and other conditions, without let or hindrance from legal obstructions, or illegal violence from individuals or combinations. Then labor and capital will both find the spheres, modes and conditions of working in which they are most productive; bring the highest rewards to both parties, and the largest accumulations for their future increase. This, of course, is subject to any qualifying exception in behalf of such legislation as may prevent the over-straining of the young, or secure their proper mental education or industrial training and on hygienic, sanitary, and moral grounds ; or to give a fair encouragement to tentative efforts to introduce new branches of industry.

An obvious and common criticism on the foregoing views of the intrinsic harmony of the interest of capital and labor is, that, while they may be true in the general and in the abstract, they fail in their application to any actual concrete case. It is alleged that, after all, it still remains true that in any particular case the interest of the laborer is to get as high wages as he can, and of the capitalist to give as low wages as he can, and that hence the contest arises as to what relative share of gain shall go to the compensation of labor

or of capital respectively. Thus antagonism is inevitable. This, however, does not invalidate any of the principles we have laid down as to the mutual oneness of interest between labor and capital in the long run and on the broad scale. It is none the less true that labor and capital are most productive and most helpful to each other, when they are both most fully and skilfully employed in the largest amounts. And this is so in each particular case. It is for the interest of labor that the business should be prosperous and profitable to the capitalist. In proportion as it is so, he will be able and disposed to augment it, and to attract the best laborers to it by the offer of the best remuneration. It is only by such laborers that in the final issue his business will be most thrifty. On the same principle, it is for the interest of the laborer that by his skill and fidelity, he should make the business of his employer so prosperous that he can afford to pay, and make it his interest to pay, the highest wages; and be enabled by the superiority and cheapness of his fabrics, made by such workmen, to command at all times a remunerative market, and afford remunerative employment to his operatives when other establishments manned by inferior artizans and under inferior management are obliged to suspend work.

It cannot be denied that the feeling among laborers of dissatisfaction with their relations to capitalists and employers is deep and wide-spread, whether with or without reason. It is impelling to a vague unrest and uncertainty; to efforts more or less blind or intelligent, organized and unorganized, lawful and lawless, to rectify supposed wrongs, and assert the rights supposed to be denied them. Out of these come combinations, first local, or in particular trades, then general and in all trades; now state-wise, now national, now international. They are often assuming a portentous aspect. They have taken their opportunity in the old world to place Paris for a time under the reign of terror of the Commune and make it a temporary pandemonium. Whatever looks to the abolition or invasion of private property unquestionably tends towards a similar goal, in whatever country. That the thoughts of the more radical labor reformers drift in this direction is omi-

nously evident. We will close this discussion by a brief exposure of the fallacy of some of the more prominent and popular of their remedies for existing evils, real or supposed, followed by a suggestion of the Christian and only true remedy.

1. Here come all schemes for the relief of laborers through the forcible seizure by the state of the private property now in the possession of individuals, and the tenure and use of it by society for the equal possession, use and enjoyment of all its members. In short, it is some form of Agrarianism or Communism. Such proposed seizure and distribution may be partial or total; immediate or gradual; direct or indirect; tentative and provisional, or complete and permanent; under the form and pretence of taxation tending or amounting to confiscation, or by downright spoliation, whether intended and avowed, or undesigned and disavowed. But some favorite watch-words of Mr. Wendell Phillips and other demagogic agitators on this subject, mean this, however intended, or they are absurd shams, as discreditable to the discernment of their authors as intrinsically infamous. These are such as, that "labor creates all the property, and therefore it of right belongs to the laborers." "It is unjust that the idle should live on the earnings of the industrious," etc., etc. Now this means that the property of society ought to be distributed to its laborers, and that all ought to be put on the footing of laborers, or it is nonsense. But what labor has made the property now in existence? Is it not the past labor of those who have saved a portion of their earnings, and embodied them in the commodities which now constitute property? And if they saved instead of spending them, by forbearing to use and enjoy the fruits of their labor, are they not entitled to the use, enjoyment, and disposal of them, provided they do not use them to the injury or ruin of the state? And if they are not allowed this possession, use, and disposal of their savings, will they make and husband them? Will any property or capital be accumulated? Will men toil and deny themselves to lay up what they can neither possess, control, or dispose of? Where will be the labor-fund of society to sustain the

laborer, and the additional capital in improvements, materials, machinery and the like, so indispensable to render that labor effective? Nay, however some small abnormal communities, made up of eccentric voluntary recruits, may establish and maintain a police which guard their labor and commodities, and ensure thrift, yet how is this possible in society at large when private property is abolished? Will not each one seize what he can, and while he can, before it is grasped by others? Will they not thus pluck fruits, seize crops and fabrics, while yet unripe, raw, unfinished? In short, it is universal devastation. Every project of reform aiming at the destruction of private property, does with equal certainty aim at the destruction of all property, all means of sustaining labor, or rendering it productive. It drives back society to the poverty and privations of savagism. It destroys the family, merging it in a common herd, gregarious, indeed, like the brutes that perish, but not social according to the constitution of men whose society, civilization, culture and refinement begin "solitary in families," as their first spring and centre. Without the liberty of gathering, keeping, using and securing earnings, for the benefit and comfort of wife and children, and giving what has so been accumulated for their support and advantage when the head is passed away, the very foundation and cement of the family are gone. Free-love usurps its place. In short, instead of the amenities of Christian civilization we have unbridled licentiousness and the abomination of desolation.

2. Labor cannot ameliorate its condition by any eight or nine-hour laws or by any mere legislation whatever. Legislation cannot alter the laws of nature, of man, of political economics. It is impossible for eight hours' work to produce what ten hours' work will. If it does not, it cannot deserve or command the wages of ten hours' work. Suppose all occupations to come into the eight-hour system. It is plain, that unless eight hours exhaust their working faculty, they can thus produce only four-fifths as much as if they worked ten hours. There will then be only four-fifths as much for all consumers to enjoy. If then the laborers receive as much of

this as when working ten hours per day, the deficit must be borne by the capitalist. It is obvious that in all ordinary cases this would be sufficient not only to consume the profit of capital, but to eat into the capital itself. The consequence must be, first, that the capital which sustains and reinforces labor would gradually be consumed, even if still employed in its support. But it would not be so employed. It would be withdrawn, and placed at interest, or hoarded unproductively, or used for the pleasure of its owner. Men will not employ their savings or property, whether the fruit of their own labor and self-denial, or of their ancestors bequeathed to them, in business, merely to exhaust and lose it. This scheme, therefore, universally carried out, must frustrate itself. There cannot be less work without less wages, or gradually repelling and destroying the capital that gives wages. For like reasons, if some trades succeed in reducing the hours, and keeping up the wages of their labor, while others do not, it can be only by enhanced prices for the products of their labor. That is paid by a tax levied upon all other laborers who consume these products. Surely such a scheme will work out its own failure in due time. The only qualification of the foregoing views is, when in employments that use up the strength in less than ten hours, as railroad engineers, glass-blowers, or when capital invested in new and increasingly effective appliances for bringing the powers of nature to the aid of labor enables it to accomplish in eight hours more than heretofore in ten, besides affording a due profit to this capital. Then eight hours' work may gain the wages or more than the wages before awarded to ten hours' work. A greater advance in wages than this has thus been achieved within the past twenty years. We may look for further advances from this source in the future. Already the day's work has been reduced to nine hours in many British factories without destroying the profit of capital. But this is due to the increase, reward and encouragement of capital, not to repelling, warring against, or destroying it. No legislation can annul the laws of God and nature. It cannot make four-fifths of a day's work accomplish a day's work, or deserve its wages, or exchange for them. Laborers must be

rewarded in proportion to what they do. Otherwise it is no longer true that the "laborer is worthy of his hire;" or that masters are bound to "render unto their servants that which is just and equal." The true solution of this matter in the end must be working by the hour or piece. This is too obviously just to satisfy the extreme labor reformers and trades-unions. Hence some of them are vehement against it. The demagogic vote in Congress to make eight hours' work entitled to the pay which ten hours' work usually commands in this country, is simply a vote to tax all other laborers of the country to pay extra rates to those who, through political favor or other devices, can elbow themselves into government employ.

Here, as elsewhere, the moral and economic principles coincide. That men should enforce as much compensation for less work as for more, for less products as for more, is in contravention of eternal justice. It is just like saying a dollar is entitled to buy as much as five, i. e., is worth five; eight hours can never permanently receive the wages of ten hours till capitalists can afford to pay it and still make a profit.

3. The next remedy which laborers are blindly applying to redress their supposed grievances is strikes—the combination of laborers to refuse work in some given occupation or group of occupations until they can thus enforce from capitalists or employers their demands for increased wages or other privileges. Upon this it may be observed generally, 1. That it is essential to the success of such efforts, not only that those in the combination stop laboring, but that they prevent others from laboring in their place; otherwise the combination is thwarted at once. In order to this, lawless violence is often necessary to be used to prevent those from working who are disposed to work. This is an outrageous infraction of the fundamental rights of man—the right to labor and to support himself by labor. Such violence should be repressed, and the right of each man to the free use of his own powers vindicated at whatever cost. The state is faithless to its supreme trust if it do not put forth its utmost power to repress such violent interference, and secure to every man the

inalienable right to exert his powers in useful service. All who interfere with, or conspire to despoil men of this God-given right should find the whole power of the state put forth to thwart them as enemies of the human race. 2. During the period for which strikes render capital and labor unproductive, laborers and capitalists alike must subsist by consuming and diminishing capital previously accumulated, and detracting so much from the labor fund, and therefore indirectly from the wages of labor in society. A part of this diminution is suffered by the laborers themselves during the continuance of the strike when they get no wages. A part is borne by other laborers who consume the products they make in the enhanced prices they are compelled to pay for them. The recent coal strikes in Pennsylvania involved a tremendous and cruel levy on all the laborers elsewhere dependent on anthracite for their fuel, or motive power in manufacturing. The fearful price they were obliged to pay for it was their contribution to make up in part the loss of the coal capitalists and laborers from their long enforced strike. But it repaired the loss of the capitalist more than of the miner, because the enhanced prices went rather to him as the owner of what coal remained to command them. The losses to the miners of their own capital, consisting of previous savings laid up in provident institutions, and spent in supporting themselves and families during the suspension of labor, were not made good. Nor, after their long idleness and consequent losses, did they gain their demand or obtain any increase of wages adequate to compensate for their losses. Consequently, exceptional cases aside, in the long run and on a large scale, strikes must cost the laborer more than he gains by them. 3. In the end, there is no way in which the laborer can realize so much for his labor as from the unrestricted competition of capital for his services in its various modes of employment, and the exercise of the greatest possible skill, fidelity and assiduity on his part as a laborer. Thus will it be for the advantage of the capitalist to give him the highest wages; he will be free to give them, and have the highest motive to give them. On the other hand the mo-

ment strikes or eight hour laws render it unprofitable or extra-hazardous for capital to employ labor in any department, it will find its way elsewhere. No strikes can permanently alter the normal rate of wages determined by the relation of supply and demand—the supply being the number of laborers seeking employment, and the demand for them being the amount of capital seeking laborers to use and work it at a profit to its owners. The most that strikes can do is to produce the loss resulting from the idleness of labor and capital caused by them and from other derangements indirectly resulting, as from the stoppage of manufacturing in 1871, caused by the want of coal to produce the necessary motive power. All this resulted in unmitigated loss to labor and capital in all quarters, and by consequence, so far forth to the labor-fund of community and the universal reward of laborers. While strikes thus work unmitigated evil, they, at the best, accomplish nothing which the free competition of capital for labor would not better accomplish without them. They may, for reasons already given, depress wages below this normal average. Nothing can permanently raise them above this standard. Here the laws of economics and ethics coincide in demanding the completest fidelity in behalf of all interests and all parties.

4. Another remedy closely connected with the last is the institution of Trades Unions, which include all the members of any given trade who can be persuaded to enter them, for the purpose of exacting a certain rate of wages from employers in that calling. The object is to enforce a much higher rate of wages than the normal standard that would arise from the law of freedom in the choice of occupation, and between laborer and employer. Now to associations for mutual protection and improvement between tradesmen or craftsmen of a given kind, or of several kinds, there can be no objection; everything is in their favor so long as they do not trench upon the fundamental principles of morality, economics, the rights and welfare of men and of society. But it is impossible to accomplish the objects at which many of these unions aim without such infringement of sacred rights and fundamental principles. In order to com-

pel employers to give the compensation they demand, they not only must refuse to work for less, which they have a right to do so long as they can support themselves without labor, but they must prevent others from so working who otherwise might do it. This can be only by coercion, lawless terror, and violence. Their method commonly is to refuse to work for any who employs persons not of their guild : to bring so large a proportion of their particular craft into their society, as to overawe outsiders who attempt to labor for their employers : to render it thus impracticable for any master mechanics to prosecute business except on the terms they dictate : to compel them to pay equal wages to all of their order, good, bad and indifferent : to refuse to work for those who have apprentices, or any but the smallest percentage of apprentices in proportion to other laborers in training : and thus to diminish the number of laborers skilled in their kind of work so as to ensure for themselves a virtual perpetual monopoly and enormous wages.

We can say nothing better of combinations thus conducted than that they are conspiracies against the laws of God, the rights of man, and the welfare of society. By what right do they employ violence and terror to prevent any man from working, or any employer from hiring and paying for his work, as they may both please ? By what right do they conspire to prevent rising youth from developing and training the gifts with which God hath endowed them, for their own welfare and that of society ? By what right do they compel all other laborers to pay a forced tribute to themselves ? If they are paid more, all things considered, than other employments command, or than they themselves could get under the law of freedom, is it not wrung from laborers in other branches who directly or indirectly consume, and thus pay the enhanced price for their products ? By what right do they compel employers to put the best and worst workers on one level of compensation ? What is this but to level all downward to the lowest, and rob society of the benefits of the highest skill and efficiency in production ? What is the effect of all this but to deprive society of any adequate future supply of skilled la-

bor; to crowd into other occupations those unnaturally driven from that so monopolized by a few, thus sinking their wages below the normal standard as much as their own are forced up above it? How demoralizing, too, the effect upon the growing youth who swarm in our towns and cities, of thus forbidding them to learn useful trades? What then can they do? What but to swell the number and lower the wages of common laborers, or to fall into some sort of dishonest livelihood, if excluded from an honest one, or still further increase the fearful competition for clerkships, and the like, or the ominous growth of vagabonds, desperadoes, thieves, robbers, who live only by preying upon the life, the earnings and savings of others? We hesitate not to say that society should put forth its extremest power to repress those dangerous movements that thrive only by forcibly preventing men from using or developing their gifts and faculties. It is only one form of sheer, unmitigated robbery.

No kind of labor, even with such tactics, can permanently maintain its compensation at a rate, quantity and quality considered, above the average compensation of other kinds of labor, unless by the help of some special government bounty not awarded to the latter. The law of free competition will inevitably bring all industries, quantity and quality considered, upon a virtual level of uniform compensation, that are not kept at an unequal height by special gratuities. Or if any succeed by the terrorism of such trades-unions as we have considered, in parrying domestic competition, they will be frustrated by the importation of foreign fabrics at rates which render it impossible to pay such extravagant wages for the labor required to make them. This will forthwith remedy the evil and counter-work these terrible monopolies, unless interfered with by an excess of protection, which forces up the price of the foreign fabric so high that it cannot interfere with the monopoly of labor, against which it should be a natural defence. When protection is turned to such purposes, we do not hesitate to say that it is perverted from its true end. Instead of being used for the encouragement, it is prostituted to the discouragement and forcible repression of home

industry. We make no question that duties for revenue on imports should be so laid as to give our manufactures reasonable support during those tentative beginnings, which require some risk in testing their capacity to maintain themselves, *at the average remuneration which American labor and capital find in other pursuits.* But to protect any branch to a degree and for a period which permanently enable the workers in it to conspire successfully to compel all other laborers, and society at large, to pay them a special monopoly tax, is not what the country imposes tariffs for; and it outrages the first principles of political economy urged by their advocates in their favor. The gradual, but certain, and not slow operation of a system which enables combinations to extort monopoly prices for their labor, and prevents the training of apprentices to a practical skill in their art, is a process which, under the guise of protecting, must soon extinguish some of the most important branches of industry. A manufacturer noted for his munificence, lately said to us that the present system of trades-unions would, in ten years, nearly exterminate all skilled labor from the country. Another, who has become wealthy by the successful manufacture of articles which sell at a profit all over the globe, volunteered the declaration to us that the only way to neutralize those combinations which, by violence and terrorism, compel the rest of society to pay monopoly prices for their labor, and prevent that increase and replenishment of the ranks of skilled work without which it must needs die out, is to withdraw that excessive protection without which no business could endure the payment of such monstrous wages.

Coming now to positive methods of ending this war between labor and capital, the true solution of the problem is to be found in the perfect harmony between the fundamental principles of political economy and of Christian ethics.

1. Let the principles of Christianity be earnestly insisted on with reference to the respective compensations of labor and capital. Let the capitalist remember that, whatever be the requirements of the civil law, he is bound by every moral and

Christian obligation to give the laborer a fair and righteous share of the rewards of production. No matter if the law give him absolute despotic control over the person and services of the laborer, he is still under the most solemn bonds to the Lord of all to give him righteous wages. The laborer is worthy of his hire, whatever legal power the master has to make him work for little or nothing. And so the charge is explicit and unequivocal to masters who had despotic power over their slaves, to give unto their servants that which is just and equal, remembering that they also have a master in heaven. All oppression, extortion, fraud, grinding the faces of the poor in any way, by exacting extravagant interest for capital, are visited with unsparing condemnation.

On the other hand, laborers are no less under the most stringent obligations to their employers, which, if well discharged, will make most employers all the more able and willing to pay them righteous and even generous wages. The constant demand of Scripture only reaffirms and explicitly enforces the imperative of conscience, that we serve faithfully and cheerfully those whom we undertake to serve at all, applying all that diligence, fidelity and skill, that hearty and cheerful devotion to their interests, which we would exercise if working for ourselves. Even the slaves are charged to serve their masters, not with eye-service as men-pleasers, but with good will to do service as unto the Lord. If this obligation is upon the subjects of involuntary servitude, how much more should those who labor upon their own free contract for a stipulated reward, with alacrity and cheerfulness do their best for those whom they have stipulated to serve?

Still further: those who labor for wages ought to be willing and desirous that they who furnish the means of rewarding, sustaining, and energizing their labor unto due efficiency and productiveness, should be duly rewarded therefor. It is simply right that it should be so. As has been shown, capital is nothing but past labor saved and embodied in the commodities it has produced, and applied to the support and assistance of present and future labor. The reason why some possess it while others do not is, that they have forborne to spend

and enjoy it when earned, so that they or their families and offspring might reap its rewards in future. Is not labor thus saved and applied to assist other labor, as fully entitled to its reward as the labor it sustains? This is clearly the doctrine of Scripture. It is the duty of those who have talents to put them to use, that they may receive their own with usury. The denunciations of usurers in the Bible refer to the taking of usurious, oppressive, and extortionate interest, and the want of liberality and charity to the poor. Not only are men denounced who provide not for their own, but it is declared to be the duty of parents to lay up for their children as God gives opportunity. Indeed, to lay up in store against the time to come, the time of infirmity, disablement for supporting ourselves or others justly dependent on us, is impossible unless the products of labor saved or unspent now can be possessed, enjoyed, and rewarded in the future. Moreover, it is not only just, but for the interest of the laborer, that capital be well paid, otherwise it will not come forth freely for the support and reward of labor. And no less is it the interest of capital to secure to labor as well as itself generous compensation. The application of the very first principles of Christian morality and eternal justice to the relations of capital and labor tends to diminish all collision, and, like the very elements of political economy, to make them friendly coadjutors.

2. Laborers will be both content and efficient in proportion as they are made directly to share the profits which remain after paying fair wages to labor, interest on capital, compensation for risk, insurance, cost of superintendence. This would stimulate both the laborer and capitalist to task their utmost powers to secure the largest production and profit, because this secures the largest reward to both. Instead of conflict and jealousy, it stimulates cordial coöperation. And in place of reluctant, dull, inefficient eye-service, it brings in faithful, zealous, and effective exertion. This system has had an extensive trial in Great Britain, with almost uniformly happy results. It has there been the best antidote to or preventive of stubborn and desolating strikes yet discovered. It has not, however, thus far had any considerable trial in this country.

A still more perfect method, however, of identifying the interest of capital and labor, so as to bring it more to the consciousness of the laborer, is to make him at once both laborer and capitalist, a sharer in the capital upon which he is laboring, and, so *consciously* interested, to render that capital as productive as possible, by the efficiency of his labor. In the earlier and simpler forms of labor, this is largely so in the natural and normal working of things. The shoemaker, working alone, or with one or two apprentices, owns tools and the few sides of leather necessary for his business till he obtains a new supply. So of the blacksmith, the tailor and carpenter, and, even now, the small farmer. But as society advances, and labor-saving machines are introduced, which impress the powers of nature in a large scale into the service of man, immense masses of capital become requisite to the most efficient and economical production. Vast outlays of capital are required for the necessary buildings, steam-engines, machinery, fuel for motive power, raw material, wages of labor, before a dollar can be realized in return. All this is utterly beyond the reach of laborers. It is very much owing to this that the chasm and antagonism between capital and labor now become so portentous.

The device for enabling people of small means and savings to be owners of capital so situated, is the familiar one of dividing it into shares, as in the case of most of the banks, railways and great manufacturing corporations of the civilized world, particularly in this country. The very vastness of the capital required has necessitated a combination of the means of many persons in one enterprise, in order to make it possible. And hence it has been easier to invest small savings in such shares, than in almost any form of property except savings-banks. Vast numbers have their small savings invested in this way. It is wonderful how many holdings of stock in banks and great railway corporations are in small amounts, of from one to ten shares. All this may be, however, and mostly has been on the part of laborers, without investing in the stock of the corporations employing them. They have placed their savings mostly in

savings-banks and other provident institutions, which are invaluable as affording means and inducements for first accumulations, and for all who have no special reason for investing small sums elsewhere. But, until recently, few laborers have put their savings in the very capital which at once supports their labor, and is rendered productive by it. It is obvious, however, that this more perfectly identifies capital and labor, and, what is specially important, in the consciousness of the laborer himself, than any other conceivable system, in our present colossal establishments, which require such immense capital, in order to the highest economy of labor, and utilization of the powers of nature.

Of late this system has been initiated in some manufacturing towns of Massachusetts with the happiest results. The North American Review for January, in its article on the "Butler canvass," states that in Fall River, where this method has been most largely tried, manufactures have had an astonishing prosperity and unexampled development. An equivalent statement is going the rounds of the newspapers. We believe that in this direction lies the solution of that portentous conflict between capital and labor, which has arisen from the immensity of the capital involved in modern production being set over against and insulated from the laborers. The great productive establishments should be so organized as to encourage, facilitate, and invite the laborers to place their savings in the concern, and thus identify themselves with its prosperity. This of itself will form a powerful inducement to the frugality and economy which will enable them to save.

This beautifully harmonizes the principles of economics with those of Christian ethics. It makes all parties mutually interdependent. If one suffers all suffer. If one rejoice all rejoice. Like all organisms, all the parts are mutually means and ends: all working for each, and each for all. Thus the material and economical interests of men conform to the Christian ideal, whereby all are brethren, and not enemies. The address of the old Roman orator to the populace when revolting against the higher and governing classes, because the former were kept in servitude to the latter, comparing their

movement to a conspiracy of the other members of the body no longer to minister to the stomach, because they were thus its servile drudges, is quite as pertinent to the uprising of laborers against capital. So the Christian church, as a social organism, when conformed to the apostolic ideal, becomes the ideal type of all other rightly constituted societies.

What could more beautifully represent this feature of it than the Apostle's description of it as a "body fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, making increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love." Eph. iv. 16.

3. The power of Christian love should smooth and sweeten all the relations of capitalists and labor. Let all obey the injunction to do good unto all men, as they have opportunity, especially unto the household of saints; let masters thus deal with laborers, and laborers with masters, and with each other, and with men of every sort and condition, and we should soon see the irritation and clashing between these various classes brought to an end. Here capitalists and employers are under special and urgent obligations. They should so let their Christian love radiate in kindly and blessed ministries to their employés and their families, in all feasible ways, as to disarm hostility, extinguish jealousy, and provoke not envying and malice, but to love and good works. Seldom have employers manifested this benignity to their employés, without breaking down the wall of separation between them, and kindling an affectionate confidence which was proof against all venomous combinations and strikes.

And especially should the Church generally, and employers and capitalists particularly, make it a paramount concern to christianize the laboring masses, and first of all those so intimately related to them as employés. This, after all, is the grand specific which is sure to succeed, and without which all others are unavailing. It has, indeed, a supreme reference to God and eternity, but godliness hath the promise of the life that now is, and that which is to come. It is

only by celestial objects, that we can guide aright our earthly course. The Christian virtues rightly adjust all relations, parties, and duties, and the anointing of the spirit so lubricates all the parts and movements of society, that friction and collision disappear.

Moreover the Christian, and even the moral and prudential virtues, have such tendencies to thrift and prosperity as very much to dry up the springs of discontent, irritation and malignity. Improvidence, intemperance, prodigality, and various forms of vicious self-indulgence all tend to that poverty and degradation, which foment discontent, and an inclination to inpute their calamities to the injustice of other classes, especially capitalists, toward them; and tempt to organized movements to wring from their employers what they have forfeited by their own crimes. But let the Christian virtues of industry, temperance, frugality, fidelity and reasonable self-denial prevail, and their own prosperity will be only too delightful to allow them to be clamoring and banding together to extort from others privileges in the possession of which they already rejoice. This is the sovereign remedy.

The opulent should never forget that the greater the wealth in their stewardship, the more fearful their accountability. They hold it as a trust for the support of those great charitable and religious interests which cannot otherwise be adequately sustained. It is not only right and Christian that vast riches should be lavishly applied to such objects, but this beneficent use of them does very much to soothe and win the less favored classes, to quench the envy, jealousy and hate of the poor. The ordinary schemes of religious charity and benevolence must draw largely upon those who are laden with an overflowing abundance; as will instantly appear if we remember that a man worth a million and a half dollars with an annual income of $100,000, and a single family to support, must have more than a hundred times the annual surplus of thirty men, each worth $50,000, and from their labor and property having each an annual income of $5,000, with a dependent family. But preëminently must we depend upon those who have accumulated vast piles of wealth, worse than

useless for any but benevolent and religious purposes, for the founding and endowment of great religious, educational, charitable and reformatory institutions which are so essential to Christian civilization and evangelization. It is from these sources that colleges, theological seminaries, public libraries, great classic training schools, adequately endowed Christian infirmaries, hospitals, suitable institutions for the worthy poor, helpless and suffering, and the unworthy too, whose anguish is but the fruit of their crimes, and much more the like, must be mainly endowed. And it is when great wealth is freely but wisely used for such purposes that it excites the love and confidence of the less fortunate classes, instead of that envy and hate which it naturally kindles when sturdily withheld from all worthy charitable and public objects, and prostituted wholly to selfish greed and selfish indulgence.

J. S. Mill has taken notice of a tendency to such use of wealth as in some measure an honorable peculiarity of Americans, especially Bostonian millionaires, with whom it has long been a recognized fashion to leave memorials of themselves in gifts or bequests to Harvard or other colleges. It is certain that the most notable example of devising liberal things in this way, both in England and his native country, has been Mr. Peabody, an American. Many others are nobly showing how great wealth, so often the curse of its possessor who makes Mammon his God, may become an unspeakable blessing to its owner, by being made a blessing to the Church and society. It is only necessary to recall such names as Lawrence, Williston, Sheffield, Lenox, Green, Pardee, Dodge, and others, to show that the number is increasing who not only know how to get wealth, but how to use it for the noblest ends. God grant that their number may indefinitely increase! Upon this, as upon every other ethical and Christian aspect of this subject, it is the duty of the clergy to be faithful and explicit in its inculcations to all parties involved; especially to "charge them that are rich in this world, that they be not high-minded, nor trust in uncertain riches, but in the living God, who giveth us all things richly to enjoy; that they do good, be rich in good works, ready to distribute,

willing to communicate, laying up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on eternal life." 1 Tim. vi. 17–19.

Last of all, but not least, the incessant and universal dissemination of light, and exposure of error and delusion on the subject are of the utmost moment. The evils under which the industrial interests of society now suffer, largely arise from the prevalence of such ethical and economical delusions as we have attempted to expose in the preceding discussion. There is no subject in respect to which there are so many who mistake narrow and superficial views for knowledge, and so few that have that broad, profound and accurate insight which alone fits them to proffer light and guidance, as on political economy. Hence so many movements of some of the laboring classes for the redress of supposed injuries are like the struggles and throes of a blind giant, the aimless, helpless staggering of those who walk in darkness and know not at what they stumble. Therefore it is indispensable to spread light on the subject through every channel which gives access to the public, especially to the parties most intimately concerned; by the press in all its forms of periodical and other publication, the pulpit, the forum, line upon line, precept upon precept, here a little and there a little. For in this as other things, "where no vision is, the people perisheth."

Is it said all this is true but unavailing, because the parties concerned and society at large acknowledge no allegiance to Christ? This makes it none the less our duty to do our utmost to apply the true remedy. If it be spurned because the rulers and people rebel against God and his Anointed, then we see no way of averting those social and national convulsions which the dread conflict now beginning portends. Those who defy God must reap the doom to which their madness tends. They sow the wind and shall reap the whirlwind, and become their own executioners. May God deliver the people from such suicidal infatuation! Let them walk in God's way. So shall "the rich and the poor meet together. The Lord is the maker of them all."

Art. III.—EVOLUTION, AS ADVOCATED BY HERBERT SPENCER.

By Professor John Bascom, Williamstown, Mass.

The philosophy of Herbert Spencer is well fitted to exert a wide and commanding influence. His style is clear and pleasing, and his mode of treatment more intelligible and popular than is common in metaphysical productions. Metaphysics assumes with him a scientific character, which makes it acceptable to a school who have in theory foresworn it. There is, moreover, a fulness, patience, and apparent thoroughness of discussion, well fitted to mislead any but the most penetrating minds, and to give a sense of completeness and certainty to his conclusions which do not belong to them. This effect is farther heightened by a sufficiently modest, yet real assumption of unmistakable correctness in the methods pursued, and principles evolved. The views of others are rarely controverted, or even referred to, except as they sustain the authors in his opinions; difficult and vital points, involving the integrity of the entire system, are passed lightly by, or wholly overlooked; and the proof, owing a large share of its impressions to its continuity, is neither arrested nor embarrassed by opposing considerations. The fairly penetrative mind of average indolence is thus floated down what seems to it a magnificent stream of thought, finds no place to pause, and, soon out of sight of familiar land-marks, glides away into the great ocean of speculation, under the guidance of one who has quietly and with unmistakable confidence taken the helm.

Spencer also preserves the language of reverence, when he has lost all ground for its application; reproaches the pious for their impiety in making God personal, thus irreverently pushing pretended knowledge beyond its real bounds; and gives capitals to that "Unknown Reality," out of whose being, however, he deduces nothing but force, physical force. He would seemingly be more devout than the devout in de-

nying devotion to God, since God, the Unknown Reality, is so inscrutable a being, that it is limitation and irreverence to say that devotion is pertinent to his character. Farther, Spencer owes much of his influence to the materialistic affinities of his system. He claims, indeed, that his philosophy is indifferent to either view, a midway point between materialism and idealism; but this is by no means a fair statement of the facts, as we shall be able easily to show. Closely united with this ground of influence is the farther ground, that his methods, illustrations, lines of thought, are scientific, dealing largely with physical facts, and present examples of magnificent generalizations; and, within a limited field, of sound conclusions. We need, therefore no apology for discussing a system thoroughly wrought out, extensively influential, yet always partial, often radically wrong, and sure to blight the spiritual life, as we understand the words, of those who receive it.

This philosophy finds its outline and general statement in the work entitled "First Principles." The title of this work, as designating the larger part of its contents, is a misnomer. The first principles, the foundations of proof in philosophy and science, are treated incidentally and hastily, while the theories dwelt on, and chiefly urged, are those which gather up and close investigation, rather than those which open it. It is the object of the work to present and establish evolution, in the most rigid definition of the word, as the universal controlling law of all things. By evolution, Spencer means a necessary development of all things, organic and inorganic, physical and mental, individual and social, from a primitive force or forces, whose first phenomena are matter and motion. This force, essentially one in all points, is unknown in its nature, eternal in its being, may be written with a capital if you choose, and evolves, necessarily, the universe, with all its occupants. His definition of evolution is, "A change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; through continuous differentiations and integrations."

The ground or basis of this evolution is found in the uni-

versal substructure, force, and in the consequent indestructibility of matter, and continuity, that is perpetuity, of motion, its first and essential form or phenomenon. The correlation or equivalence of forces thus follows from the nature of force, impossible of extinction, whatever may be the appearance assumed. This force, presenting itself under the various kinds of matter, and those varieties of motion to which matter is liable, can not find equilibrium in the homogeneous. Homogeneity is the accidental, diffused, unorganized distribution of forces, such as is presented by nebulous matter. In this state, unbalanced and unrelated forces must begin to act on each other, and produce a rearrangement of parts, and definite conditions and compensations. The initiation of such changes is explained by the want of equilibrium in homogeneous, and hence so far, chaotic forces. The direction and ultimate harmony of the results are explained by the conditions under which they are reached. Matter, under the conflicting forces of the chaotic, the homogeneous, necessarily takes up that motion which combines and harmonizes the most of these forces, since that is the line of least resistance and greatest traction. Each new force, to which the moving body at any time becomes subject, begins at once to equilibrate itself with all the other forces then acting, and thus to incorporate its effects into an orderly movement of the body. No rectilinear, uniform motion can be established, since this would imply continuous, unresisted force in one direction, a supposition at war with our initiatory conception of unrelated, conflicting forces; and also, as Spencer seems to think, at war with the mind's conception of force, as "universally co-existent forces of attraction and repulsion." Farther, motion necessarily assumes a rhythmical or periodic form. An excess of force in one direction, by the change of relations incident to motion, is met, and in time corrected, by opposite tendencies, which in turn prevail, till, by prevalence, they are exhausted, leaving again in excess the counter forces which they have evoked. Motion thus ever combines the forces from which it proceeds, and, if free development is granted it, unites them in rhythmical interplay. A perpetual differ-

entiation and integration, both of matter and of motion, will take place. Material of like kinds will be segregated under motion, as the sand, the gravel, and the boulders of the seashore; and like motions will disclose their unity, being separated from associated motions, when all are subjected to common conditions; as when a ray of light is passed through a prism and is parted into the colors of the spectrum. Of this differentiation and integration there is no end, since the actions and relations of force and matter ever assume new complexities; yet every likeness in conditions returns a unity or likeness of results, and every unlikeness of causes a corresponding separation of effects. All interactions are thus a sifting process, leading to new differentiations and integrations, likenesses and unlikenesses equally disclosing themselves in the result.

This theory of evolution, nakedly stated, has but little hold on the mind; but thoroughly elaborated, patiently dwelt upon, and illustrated by a great variety of apt examples, it seems to many a masterly piece of generalization. Evolution is to be distinguished from development. Many accept the latter who feel compelled to reject the former. Development implies a steady progression of plan, an unfolding of old forces and an addition of new ones as the exigencies of the growing purpose requires. It excludes neither oversight nor addition, but rests back on an intelligent and controlling agency. Evolution presents no occasion for oversight, denies intervention, and finds no need of additions. The germs of force first accepted by it are sufficient, under this theory, for the entire product that depends, or ever shall depend, from them. A necessary, inevitable, irresistible movement has belonged to all past growth, and must give character to all further changes. There are many facts, let it be granted at once, which this theory will cover; but there are many more which it entirely fails to explain.

First among these are those of society, and of individual, rational life. Spencer gives us no reasons for identifying mental and physical phenomena; indeed he touches the point hastily and feebly, yet everywhere assumes the absolute one-

ness of mental facts with those of motion. Mental, and hence social, movements proceed, like physical movements, along the lines of least resistance, and this, not in a figurative, but in a literal way. The correlation of forces extends to the processes of mind. Thought-force is with Spencer strictly a correlative of the brain-forces, chemical, thermal, nervous, expended in its production. The only proof offered is the well known fact, that thought is attended with a consumption of brain-tissue. This fact not only fails, as it seems to us, to sustain the conclusion made to rest on it, but leads to the opposite conclusion. There is incident to thought, volition, feeling, a change in form of the forces lodged in the brain and nervous tissue; chemical force disappears, and is replaced by thermal force and motion. There is a decomposition of delicate chemical compounds, which process evolves heat and motion. Is there any proof that these evolved forces are not the full equivalent of the force consumed, and that, therefore, a third element, thought-force, must be introduced to restore the equation? Not the least; the reverse rather is true, that these physical forces seem among themselves to exhaust and measure each other. Are then the very motion and the very heat, produced, the thought? Spencer would seem to be willing to say yes; though to us the answer seems evident, our thoughts are the incidents of something entirely different from these forces, and are not at all involved in their chain of dependence and equivalence.

Spencer, in consistency with his theory, interprets the facts of individual and social life as the results, in the most literal, gross way, of the necessary action of physical forces. The desire which prevails in the mind at any time is the greatest force present, and the action it occasions is along the line of least resistance. The grounds or causes of activity come from without, affect the mind by their own force, as when tickling produces laughter, and combine themselves, as do physical forces elsewhere, in the accomplishment of their own results. Men seek the best market with the same necessity with which water flows down hill, or the cow is attracted by the green grass. When the objector urges, such language is met-

aphorical, Spencer replies, "It is to be interpreted literally, the processes described *are* physical ones."

These explanations, that over-rule the intrinsic character of the phenomena, are utterly futile and worthless. They must be preceded by a sufficient and complete identification of the facts thus covered by common terms, in this instance of the facts of matter and mind, or the whole process is pure logomachy, word-solutions without corresponding thoughts. Indeed, it is doing from an opposite side exactly what Spencer and those of his school vigorously complain of, as the former habit of metaphysicians. The explanation given of the fact that water follows the rising piston in a pump, by saying nature abhors a vacuum, is ridiculed as metaphysical, as expounding phenomena of one class by the ideas and language of another class with which the first has no correspondence. What other than this does Spencer do, when he interprets the emigration of nations as motion in the lines of least resistance; or the division of trades as the separation and integration of like forces? Till the identity of mental and physical forces is established, it is as censurable to explain the first in the language of the second, as it is to refer the latter to causes that affect only the former. The scientist reverses the error of the metaphysician, and congratulates himself on the result as a noteworthy step of progress.

This whole method proceeds, moreover, on a false idea of what constitutes progress in knowledge. There is, indeed, attendant on it new unities, wider principles, more universal laws; but there is also, from beginning to end, a thorough recognition of differences. Agreement amounts to nothing except in connection with difference; generalization is a formal rather than a substantial union, a connection of accordance rather than identity. Science, therefore, which, in reaching its higher unities, sweeps away the distinctions which give them character and force, is a false science, that in losing one element of true knowledge has lost its correlative element. Real science starts with valid differences, holds fast to these, and then inquires what relations group and combine them. A science that combines mental and physical

facts in unities, in laws, which disregard the inherent and distinctive character of the facts, has simply reached a false, deceptive generalization, which must disappear again as soon as it is tested. The one class of events can not be used or controlled as the other, and nothing is gained but a confusion of ideas by applying to each the same language. Till Spencer has established the identity of thought, feeling, volition with motion, or some other phase of physical force, it is merely a verbal generalization to include the two classes of facts under one law of evolution.

If it be asked, how happens it that this can be done with so much admitted plausibility, if, after all, the two realms are radically diverse? We answer, easily enough, since the two departments are united by many resemblances, since the language of the one is based upon that of the other; and since progress in thought, in the intellectual world, is the correlative of evolution in the mechanical, physical world. By a choice of illustrations, one may make the facts of society conform, in a general figurative way, to the facts of physical evolution. The diversity, however, is very obvious from time to time, even under the skillful presentation of Spencer. Thus heat, as favoring the mobility of matter, is conducive to its rapid re-adjustment, easy evolution; but what has heat to do with thought, mental progress, or social development? Spencer instances the increasing exactness of meaning which words acquire, as an illustration of the increasing definiteness incident to evolution. But this bent of language stands connected with an opposite one. If science and philosophy tend to explicit, definite use, poetry and common speech tend as truly to a metaphorical and widening application of words. Language grows under these two equally weighty and significant tendencies, only one of which can be brought forward as an instance of integration. The view of society presented is open to a like criticism. Attention is drawn to the fact, that ranks, classes, civil and religious offices, are multiplied and nicely defined by the integration which accompanies social evolution. There is a measure of truth in this, but by no means that complete truth there should be, if evolu-

tion is necessary to society, and fixed in its laws. The later stages of progress undo much of this earlier work. A democratic society is exceeding homogeneous in the relation of its members, indeed, aims at absolute homogeneity. The same is true in the growth of Christianity; each man stands theoretically on the same footing before God, and most of those offices and rites, which would practically distinguish men in their religious life, have disappeared or are disappearing. Compare, for instance, America with India, in reference to this social integration. If Spencer's theory were true, India would present the more advanced nationalities, as the integrations of society are there, many, sharp and firm; while with us, every effort is made to abolish them as fast as they arise.

Thus has this magician of words filled the mental horizon with specious and broad generalizations, that hide, for a little, the stubborn, hard-faced facts over which they lie, but no more alter and unite them than does the glowing light of sunset the clouds and hills which for a moment it blends in one common transfiguration. We can no more travel from these peaks of granite to those pinnacles of vapor than we could before.

When we pass to the phenomena of life, the case is the same; we have an apparent, and no real, unity between these and the mechanical facts with which they are collocated. Differentiation, integration, equilibration are good words, yet they go but a very little way in accounting for the precise organic structure of man, of any one member of the animal kingdom, much less of all its members. We may strive to believe that organs are the results of functions, that each distinct action tends to establish a distinct instrument, that the nervous system is largely due to the actual transmission of nervous energy, first forcing a way for itself, and then establishing a line of easy transmission, as the stream its bed; yet there will remain such a vast preponderance of organic facts, unexplained by this mechanical theory, as to render of slight value what seems to have been accomplished. When other forces, sufficient to interpret these farther, unexplained

results shall be granted, it is probable that they will render of little significance this partial intrusion of physical forces within the realm of life ; and we shall see that we have been urging up from below, in a very insufficent way, laws and forces, which after all, are to be gathered in, and expounded in conjunction with quite other powers, descending on them from above.

Even chemical facts, one grade lower, are not clearly covered by this view. It is only probable, not certain, that the diversity of compounds is due to different molecular arrangement and lines of homogeneous force; and by no means clear, how the primitive forms of matter preserve their distinctive properties, if all are to be referred, in final composition, to one form of force, to that which we know as mechanical force. This generalization evidently does not cover the entire case, since it leaves diversity of properties unexplained. Force in oxygen is not, in all particulars, what force is in hydrogen ; for if it were, the two gases would be identical. So also when we speak of a correlation of forces, thermal force displacing mechanical force, and chemical force thermal force, we deceive ourselves, if we suppose that this language involves the absolute identity of the three. They are still varieties, and have their unexplained differences, and there is thus included in these transitions something beyond bare transfer.

The only class of facts which remain to this theory of evolution are those of mechanical transfer and change. Here, with a few important reservations, we are willing to grant its applicability ; indeed, it has long found general acceptance. Granted matter, with its present properties and proportions, its divisions in kind and quantity, and this matter in a diffused, nebulous form, and systems, like the solar system, and planets like its planets, will doubtless be the final result. Let one of these, as the earth, be detached in a molten form, and we are prepared to believe that a series of geologic changes will be established issuing in a physical structure like that of our globe. But observe how broad the postulate is : matter in its present properties and divisions. In these the entire mystery of creation and plan take refuge. The design is given in the

character and propositions of the elements that work it out. The constituents of the earth's solid crust, and of its oceans and atmosphere, must, from the very outset, have determined the result in its leading features; and yet more in those secondary ones, on which the presence of vegetable and animal life depend.

Moreover, in this very region of physical force—of force most simple and determinate in its manifestation—its independent existence, its indestructibility, are not altogether manifest. The force of gravity is peculiar in its mode of acting. It differs in degree with every new disposition of matter. If the material of the solar system were in a diffused form, reaching far beyond the orbit of its outermost planet, the force of gravity in actual exercise would be much less than if the same material were gathered within the earth's orbit, and less than it now is under the present distribution of matter in globes through the system. There is no proof, that this increased force is due to the heat or other forces that have been expended in gathering in this material toward one or several centres. The force of gravity varies with every change of position of bodies on the earth's surface. If a block of granite is carried from the summit of a mountain to the valley below, or from the valley to the summit, the changes of this force have nothing to do, by way of equivalence, with the forces expended in the movement. The block has gained weight in the one instance, and lost it in the other, though in both equally there has been a large expenditure of power. Gravity stands by itself among forces, and varies every moment in degree by an independent law. No amount of mechanical force, lodged as momentum in a moving body, can, in any line of antagonism, overcome gravity, since however far a body may fly, this force will pursue it, and forever abate its speed. The fleeing body secures easier conditions every instant, yet each instant loses an increment of power.

Thus, within the very field of simple forces, there is one form of force which holds to no definite quantity, and can not, at the point at which, and under the degree in which, it exists, be altered, cannot be shifted or correlated, with any

other. When, therefore, the perpetuity of force is insisted on, as a necessary conception, a something involved in the very nature of thought, we are prompted to ask, Where are these storehouses of gravitating force to which it returns, and whence it is springing in ever-variable amounts? A force so simple, almost mechanical, in its action, as that of gravity, assumes a law and relation altogether unique, is not included in the correlation of forces, but holds on in its own peculiar fashion. It thus fails to conform to the fundamental idea of evolution, that of the persistence of force, its indestructibility in all its forms.

There thus remain to the theory of evolution, as completely explained by it, only those physical changes which attend the transfer of matter, endowed once for all with its original qualities, and put under that permanent, inscrutable medium of connections known as gravity. Thus this theory, which Spencer has stretched, first on this side, then on that, till it has been made to cover every class of phenomena, with elastic recoil returns to its own narrow disk the moment it is set at liberty, by testing the strength of its new attachments. Merely this and nothing more, becomes the almost ludicrous refrain, when we have raised successively, in each department, the still unsettled questions which render the generalization involved in evolution to be not merely premature but extravagant.

We turn now to inquire into the nature of our knowledge, according to Spencer, of this force which underlies matter and motion, and through these, both the physical and the spiritual universe; this force, the conception of which is so necessary that Spencer resolves every step of the theory of evolution, untenable as it is, into an *a priori*, an axiomatic, act of mind. Peering through this perfect, orbicular conception of force, Spencer sees the universe clear as crystal, from the beginning to the end, and thus and not otherwise, becomes the unmistakable tread of his thought henceforth. Surely this force must be known in some thorough and complete way, or so much, so very much, could hardly be predicated concerning it. Those conclusions of each chapter, by which

the stages of proof are resolved into a demonstration, arising from the nature of force, would have been omitted.

The thinking power is exclusively the knowing power in Spencer's philosophy, and hence all knowledge is relative. Thought is the institution or discernment of relations, and cannot exist, therefore, with less than two objects. The sensations occasioned in one by lifting a chair, can only be an object of knowledge—of consciousness, in Spencer's use of that word—by being taken with some antagonistic force, to wit, the weight of the chair, which makes them intelligible. A thing is intelligible only as it is a subject of thought, and it is a subject of thought only as it is thrown into definite, fixed relations with something besides itself. That with which the mind, by a universal fact or law of mind, throws "the relative reality" of our sensations of force into connection, is an "absolute reality." This "absolute reality" therefore, being involved as a universal condition of all thought, that is, all knowledge, comes itself to have an *a priori* force or necessity to the mind, whose thinking it perpetually initiates. The notion and persistence of force are due to this universal law of mind that its knowledge is relative, a knowledge of relations, and that the thoughts therefore throw, and must throw, every experience of force into connection with an absolute force, which enters as a condition of its comprehension. He says: "Our inability to conceive matter becoming non-existent, is immediately consequent on the very nature of thought. Thought consists in the establishment of relations. There can be no relation established, and therefore no thought framed, where one of the related terms is absent from consciousness. Hence it is impossible to think of something becoming nothing, for the same reason that it is impossible to think of nothing becoming something—the reason, namely, that nothing cannot become an object of consciousness." Thus a relation, that is thought, that is again, as the author uses the word, consciousness, is impossible under these conditions, since the mind has no two terms between which to institute it. In every act of knowledge, the mind must rest on two supports, and to take away one is virtually to take away

both; the mind lapses thereby out of the region of knowledge.

This grounding our knowledge of the unknown force, that underlies all facts, on the form of thought is, in the first place, unsatisfactory, because it gives an insufficient reason for this knowledge. We should indeed, on this supposition, find both our thought and language involved in the contradiction of speaking of a knowledge of the unknown. Thought only unites terms, it does not furnish them. I am aware of muscular resistance. I think of it in connection with a force that has called it out. The two things united by the thought have an independent origin, the one as much as the other. The feeling, which is one member of the synthetic judgment, Spencer, in common with others, would refer to the sense which reports it; but the presence of the idea of force, the other member of the judgment, he leaves without explanation. All that the thought-process, the judgment, does is to unite the two. It is no more capable of furnishing the one than the other. To bring forward ultimate ideas is not an office of the understanding, the judgment, but of some intuitive, direct faculty. The thinking power, being one of relations, clings to relations, and institutes these between objects, ideas, given it by other powers. The union of the idea of force with certain sensations is explained by the nature of thought; not so the fortunate presence of this fit, ultimate idea, that of force. Here is manifestly incomplete analysis, and one step more would yield, and must yield, the idea of cause as furnished intuitively by the mind.

If Spencer were right in referring the recognition of forces to the form of the mind's action, then, as this form is necessary and universal, so ought the reference to be. Yet forces are constantly attributed to volition, and were thought till recently to have, many of them, their complete origin in the human will. Now that we refer muscular energy to chemical or molecular forces, the initiation and control of this strength are still ascribed to the will, and in the divine will is still found by many the sufficient source of physical forces. These conclusions would not be merely false, but impossible, if the

persistence of force is due to the universal form of thought. This ground of conviction would coërce opinion into one invariable channel; a uniformity it has not shown.

That the human mind has some other insight into axioms, some other ground for the conviction that attends them, than this momentum of its own ever returning experiences, is evident from the fact that some statements are regarded, on their first enunciation, as axioms; and others, though often repeated, and never contradicted, in experience, are not so accepted. That straight lines, parallel through a portion of their extent, will be so through their entire extent, is axiomatic, yet a fact that may have gained very little force over the mind by virtue of any reiteration of it in experience. On the other hand, the fact that robins have a red breast may have been one of most familiar and constant observation, without ever gathering the conviction of an axiom. The forms of the mind's judgment, therefore, whether original, or the results of uniform experience, do not give or explain the proof of axioms.

Nor is it true, as regards the mere form of thought, that nothing cannot constitute one member of the judgment by which any phenomena are explained. The inquiry, Whence came this light? may be answered correctly, that is intelligently, so far as the forms of expression are involved, in saying it came from nothing. Something comes from nothing, is an expression as perfectly filling the forms of thought as the truth, nothing comes from nothing. The difference between them lies deeper than the form, and is found in the mind's intuitive grasp of causes.

A further difficulty in this explanation of our knowledge of force is found in the admitted truth of things which the mind cannot conceive. Spencer illustrates this incapacity of the mind by its inability to conceive of the passage of a body from a state of motion to one of rest. Between every measure of motion and rest there is an infinite number of degrees. We cannot conceive any body as taking on each of these in succession, and through them all seeking a state of rest. Hence the forms of conception are no law to the facts, and if

it were admitted that these forms demand the idea of force to fill them out, this would not be a sufficient proof of its existence. The form of thinking neither conforms to nor controls facts, as seen in the above example, and in other examples. Forms of thought, like forms of expression, or the appearances of the senses, may need correction, evidently do need correction, and are not to be offered as a proof of the real, the ultimate nature of the facts. Says Spencer: "It is absurd to think of a force as in itself like our sensation of it, and yet necessary so to think of it if we realize it in consciousness, that is in thought at all." The modes of thought then afford no proof of the modes of being, and the Unknown Force, out of whose *a priori* and necessary character Spencer builds up his entire system, is left without any established existence.

A third insufficiency of the theory is seen in the fact, that if we overlook this want of proof as to the very being of force, we have, nevertheless, no *a priori* knowledge of its nature. The *a priori* deductions of Spencer are entirely illusive. In order to make them just, we must have an original, intuitive insight into the nature of force. Yet force, under this theory, is only an idea which the mind supplies for the formal completion of its judgment, and must be wholly explained and interpreted by what may be called the nearer and known member, to wit, the sensations elicited. What then is more plain than that a force so furnished and known, can give no law to the sensations themselves, but must receive its law from them; that our knowledge of it must be wholly empirical, and thus incapable of furnishing any *a priori* outlook whatever. Force is defined, in nature and manifestation, by the phenomena to which it gives rise, and hence, in these phenomena alone can we study either force or the laws of force. None of these laws then are truly *a priori*, otherwise the mind has some other hold on force, than this habit by which it puts it in perpetual counterpoise with the physical phenomena that it interprets. Spencer, then, in all his *a priori* proofs, drawn from the nature of force, has fallen into a deceptive method not justified by his philosophy, by the

mode of entrance into the mind which he assigns to the idea of force.

The objection which gathers up every other to this view is, that all knowledge is not relative. Relativity is characteristic of the judgments, the products of the thinking powers, but not of the action of the senses or of the intuition. It is not a right use of the word *knowledge* to limit it to the results of thought, and to deny it to sensations. He says, "There can be no cognitions, even by an adult, of an object never before seen; in so far as it is not assimilated to previously seen objects, it is *not* known." By this definition of words, the sensation as a sensation is lost to knowledge, and only reappears when the mind begins to classify in thought the matter presented by it. The sensations and intuitions conjointly furnish all the material of knowledge, and there can be no relations, till these objects to be related are present to the mind. Moreover, if either of them were absent, there would be no ground or occasion of thought, since it is the very office of thought to unite the two in appropriate connections. Sensations as sensations are complete; nothing more can be done to them by the thoughts. Intuitions as intuitions do but give conditions, and are only called for and understood in connection with the phenomena conditioned by them. But the two together immediately set the mind in action; furnish the material of relations, and spring upon it a sense of its need of them, for the comprehending and handling of the facts before it.

If the views now urged are correct, the philosophy of Spencer, his method of reaching the existence and nature of force, is as defective and over-strained as the theory of evolution which he builds upon it. That we may not be thought to have misconceived the final ground on which he places our knowledge of force, we quote the following passage, containing a succinct statement of the conclusions reached by him, and their reasons:* "First—We have an indefinite consciousness—that is, knowledge—of an absolute reality transcending relations, which is produced by the absolute persistence in

* First Principles, page 297.

us of something which survives all changes of relation. Second—We have a definite consciousness of relative reality, which unceasingly persists in us under one or other of its forms, and under each form so long as the conditions of presentation are fulfilled; and that the relative reality, being thus continuously persistent in us, is as real to us as would be the absolute reality could it be immediately known. Third—Thought being possible only under relation, the relative reality can be conceived as such only in connection with an absolute reality; and the connection between the two being absolutely persistent in our consciousness, is real in the same sense as the terms it unites are real." This passage, interpreted in harmony with the entire work, seems unequivocally to ascribe our knowledge of absolute reality to a persistence in us, that is, in our thought, of something which survives all changes of relation: to explain the presence of this absolute reality by the relativity of thought, and its reality by the persistence of the relation in which it appears. We close the article with a few detached criticisms.

The first of these is in the use of the word *consciousness*, which Spencer, in common with Hamilton and other metaphysicians, employs to designate processes of thought. It ought rather to be confined to the meaning in which it expresses the knowledge the mind has of its own states. This fact of consciousness is the peculiar, the controlling characteristic of all mental phenomena, one to which we have occasion often to revert, and for which, therefore, a special word should be reserved. This is the more important, as an appeal taken to consciousness, used in the one meaning, is quite diverse in its authority from the appeal when the term is employed in the other signification. Consciousness is a final witness for the facts of mind as mere facts, but by no means a sufficient witness to the correctness of any of its conclusions. In this limited and right use of the term, there still remains one unavoidable ambiguity. We are compelled, by the ease and directness of expression, to speak of consciousness as if it were a faculty, reporting the states and acts of other faculties. It is to be conceived rather as a primitive

condition or characteristic of all mental states, in short as the regulative idea of mental phenomena, that which, as an antecedent condition, determines their nature, the grand category to which they belong.

Again, we are weary of that fruitless criticism of a portion of our ideas, as, for instance, that of the infinite, as inconceivable, unthinkable, hence psuedo-ideas. All that can be meant by this language is, that the ideas under discussion are not of a phenomenal nature, and, therefore, presentable under the imagery of the imagination; nor the result of a logical, a thinking process, and hence able to be thrown into complete, measured relations with other things. As these ideas are not thought to be of the nature which the power to conceive or think them would imply, but entirely beyond this nature, quite transcendent, this criticism would seem to be feeble and lame indeed. The true point of discussion is, not whether these notions are conceivable or inconceivable, thinkable or unthinkable, but whether we have any valid and sufficient notions which do not respond to these tests of direct conformity to the sensuous imagination, or to the judgment revolving in the circle of phenomenal relations. It would seem as if these two faculties should be able better to cover and clear up their own field before they are established as umpires in the region of intuition. The idea of the infinite, for instance, as applied to space, is a more exact and complete idea than that of a bushel of sand, or a cubic foot of timber; and one that can be handled as safely and as serviceably. There is more homogeneity of character in the first case than in the second, and as great distinctness as regards limits. So, too, the mathematical ideas of points, lines, surfaces, which transcend the imagination, are, for that reason, all the more exact and positive in the results they yield. If these are insufficient, false ideas, where are our sufficient and true ones? Certainly not in our conceptions of objects which pertain to the senses; for all sense observation is most superficial and partial. Far from gaining completeness and reliability by bringing the subject-matter of the mind within the compass of experience, we, by this process, lose these qualities. Herein

exactly lies the difference between pure and applied mathematics. Not only is our idea of God as distinct and reliable as that of a man, it is in many directions more manageable and certain in the conclusions to which it leads us. It is easier, oftentimes, to predicate what Infinite Wisdom and Justice will do than what partial knowledge and wayward tendencies will issue in. The staple which goes to make up personality is not altered by a transfer of it to God. Only those shifting and unknown limitations which belong to it in each man are removed. Under this form, we can handle it as an ultimate element of thought, as safely as under the other. The images with which we overlay the conception of a neighbor do not touch or exhaust his inner personality, nor enable us to use it as a settled, final factor in our calculations.

Spencer says of that proof by causes through which we reach the being of a God, that we end in accepting the very idea, the denial of which, in the outset, led us to institute the argument. If he had made this as a criticism on a form of proof, that by causes, through which we reach a first cause we would have accepted it as just and undeniable. As a general assertion, however, applicable to any and all proof of the being of God, it is very far from the truth. Spencer is led to make it because his own philosophy rests on so narrow a basis, that there would remain to him but one method of reaching a First Force, that of passing backward from force to force, and of at length arbitrarily arresting the movement with an *eureka*, which would mean nothing but the weariness of the traveler. If, however, he could only find a place in his spiritual universe for a true personality, centered in spontaneity, in liberty, then might he place such an independent source of rational power over against the entire universe, and find in this an adequate, primeval fountain of the unfailing procession of physical forces, which now sweep over the topmost limit of his thought, like waves of the sea. If we lose liberty in man, we have no occasion for a Ruler; nor can we, in proof, reach one; since it is true that our First Cause, as a cause, is identical in constitution with those causes with which we start the argument, and, therefore, cannot be put

over against them, as their final explanation. One must come down out of heaven to be able to climb up to heaven. Use yourself so harshly as to deny yourself liberty and ethical law, and you extinguish those eyes by which it was designed you should see God, and find your way to him. Having sold our birthright of powers, we cannot enter into the blessings they were designed to confer. He who cannot believe in himself, cannot believe in God. We hold fast by our divine extraction and heavenly destination, through faith in ourselves, and thus in the God who made us what we are.

Spencer staunchly denies that his doctrines are materialistic, and this, because identifying, in final analysis, physical and mental facts, it is as possible to him to say, that all are mental, as that all are physical. To this statement the grave exception is to be made, that the law, which Spencer introduces into the facts of whichever class, is that of force, force defined in its nature and laws by the most mechanical, physical interpretation. If the nature and connections of the phenomena are those of matter, then the philosophy that reaches this result is, for all purposes of ethical and theistic interest, materialistic; and none the less so, because the starting point permitted an idealistic development, with an equally rigid enslavement of the conjoint facts to the logical connections of thought. When we speak of Spencer as a materialist, we do it to mark the character and drift of his principles in the moral world. It is no sufficient answer to this allegation, as regards the tendency of his philosophy, to say that he was at liberty, in the outset, to have issued on the other side, and that his fundamental position commands both directions. He has taken his departure toward material laws, and striven long and laboriously to spread a network of forces, such forces as glow in the forge, impel the hammer, and come ringing forth from the anvil, over all the actions of man and society, till these subtilest factors in the common evolution are seen none the less to spring from it, as the vapor from the earth it enwraps, or the fire from the collision that ignites it.

Art. IV.—ASSYRIAN CUNEIFORM INSCRIPTIONS.*

By Prof. Wm. Henry Green, D.D., Princeton.

Hi – si – ar – si *sarru* *rabu* *sar* *sarri*

Xerxes rex magnus, rex regum,

habal *Da – a – ri – ya – vus* *sarru* *A – ha – ma – an – nis – si – '.*

filius Darii regis Achæmenides.

Xerxes, the great king, the king of kings, the son of Darius the king, the Achæmenid.

Thirty years ago our knowledge of the great Assyrian empire and of its splendid capital was almost a total blank. Vague memories survived of its power and magnificence, but almost nothing whatever was definitely known respecting it. The very names of its long line of monarchs and their once famous deeds, the whole history of the empire, its literature, its art, everything was and had been for ages buried in oblivion. Other cities, which had perished, as Palmyra, Persepolis, and the Egyptian Thebes, had at least left ruins to mark their sites and to attest their former greatness. But of imperial Nineveh not a vestige remained, not even a broken column or a sculptured stone, and the very place on which it stood was matter of conjecture.

The Bible records the names of Pul, Tiglath-Pileser, Shalmaneser and Sargon, and their encroachments upon the territory of Israel; also Sennacherib's invasion and his sudden

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* Monument de Ninive découvert et décrit par Botta, mesuré et dessiné par Flandin, 5 vols. folio. Paris: 1849–50.

Expedition Scientifique en Mésopotamie exécutée par ordre du gouvernement de 1851 á 1854, publiée par Jules Oppert. 2 vols. 4to. Paris: 1859 and 1863.

Les Ecritures Cunéiformes, Exposé des travaux qui ont préparé la lecture et l'interpretation des Inscriptions de la Perse et de l'Assyrie, par M. Joachim Ménant. Seconde Edition, 8vo. pp. 310. Paris: 1864.

miraculous overthrow, and Jonah's visit to Nineveh, and its timely repentance. A few paragraphs incidentally referring to Assyria occur in classic authors. And that was all.

Nineveh was destroyed six centuries before Christ—while Tarquin the First was king in Rome, a hundred years before Greece was invaded by the Persians, a century and a half before the Greek father of history; and from this time it drops quite out of sight. Xenophon led the famous retreat of the ten thousand directly past its site without apparently suspecting the fact or once mentioning its name.

This was the condition of things and this the state of our knowledge of Assyria, when in 1845 the profound sensation, which all remember, was created in Europe and the West by the announcement that M. Botta, the French consul at Mosul, had discovered traces of the long lost capital. The results of his explorations under the patronage of the French Government, and those which quickly followed of Mr. Layard, aided by the Trustees of the British Museum, are familiar to the public from Mr. Layard's fascinating volumes, as well as from other sources. Palace after palace was uncovered with their decorations and their sculptured slabs, revealing the life and manners of this ancient people—their dress and habitations and implements, their arts of war and peace, the magnificence of their monarchs, the forms of their religion, the style of their architecture, their proficiency in sculpture and drawing. Stores of Assyrian and Babylonish monuments now occupy a conspicuous place in the great museums of Europe, particularly in those of London and Paris; and the forms of Assyrian art and the style of Assyrian life have become as distinct and well known as those of any nation of antiquity.

But in addition to this vast variety of figured representations which tell their own story, and were at once intelligible, multitudes of accompanying or separate inscriptions were also brought to light. These were written in an unknown and complicated character, and the only clue to their contents was what might be conjectured from the figures with which they were connected, or the situation in which they

were found. Their importance was naturally at once suspected, and they were copied with care. Volumes of them have been published; and it was some years ago affirmed that the Assyrian texts then accessible were fully equal in extent to the Old Testament Scriptures.

The Assyrian character has now been deciphered; large numbers of these inscriptions have been read, and their contents spread before the public. A copious grammar has been published by Prof. Ménant, and a dictionary by Norris. On the basis thus furnished, Assyrian and Babylonian history has been reconstructed, lives of monarchs have been traced for 1,500 years; in the case of some of them full accounts are possessed of their reigns:—e. g., of *Assur-bani-pal*, identified with the Asnapper of the book of Ezra, son of Esarhaddon and grandson of Sennacherib, a detailed autobiography of whom has just been published in a large and handsome volume, containing upwards of 300 pages devoted to the original text and an interlineal translation. The headings of the fifteen chapters, into which this life is divided, will give some notion of its extent and minuteness.

They are, i, The introduction, genealogy and accession of the monarch; ii, The first Egyptian war; iii, The second Egyptian war; iv, The siege of Tyre, and affairs of Lydia; v, The conquest of Karbit; vi, The war with Minni; vii, The war with Urtaki, king of Elam; viii, The war with Te-umman, king of Elam, and the conquest of Gambuli; ix, The revolt of Saul-mugina, brother of Assur-bani-pal; x, The first war with Umman-aldas, king of Elam; xi, The second war with Umman-aldas; xii, The Arabian war; xiii, The final triumph over Elam; xiv, The buildings of Assur-bani-pal; xv, Later notices of his reign, and sketch of the chronology.

Among these various inscriptions there has been found an Assyrian canon, nearly complete year by year, for 250 years, in which the date is noted at which each successive monarch ascends the throne, and some of the principal events of different reigns are recorded. The time to which this belongs seems to be determined by certain eclipses which are mentioned in it, and which have been carefully computed by the

royal astronomers at Paris and Greenwich. On the basis of this, Prof. Oppert, of Paris, published two years ago a biblical chronology from the death of Solomon, to the destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, as fixed by Assyrian inscriptions. Jerusalem, Samaria, Damascus, Lebanon, Sarepta, Lachish, Sidon, Ashdod, Askelon, Tyre, Hezekiah, Jehu, and other familiar names of persons and places mentioned in the Bible, are reported to occur upon these monuments; and events are there referred to which have been identified with facts recorded in scriptural history. Apparent or real discrepancies and methods of reconciliation are freely discussed. The importance of these inscriptions to the student of ancient history, and to the student of the Bible, can no longer be overlooked. And it becomes a serious question, What credit is to be attached to these alleged translations? Upon how secure a basis does the affirmation rest, that these inscriptions have been deciphered, and that their contents are now understood? Is this really the case, or are Assyriologists deceiving themselves and us with what is after all no real translation, but a creation of their own fancy?

In the hope of putting together a few facts which may help to answer these questions, we shall here give a brief account of the process of decipherment, and the results which have been reached, so far as the written character and the language are concerned. The investigation before us is purely elementary. We shall not occupy ourselves at present with any inquiry into the contents of the Assyrian inscriptions. We have only to do with the preliminary question, Can they be read, and if so, how?

We come back again to the year 1845, when Nineveh was first restored to the knowledge of European scholars by the successful excavations of Botta. Upon the sculptured walls of its palaces he found multitudes of inscriptions, in a style of writing which embraced, according to Botta's own computation, made at the time, nearly 700 distinct characters, not a word of which could be read, and the language itself was unknown. It was even a matter of dispute among scholars

to which family of tongues the Assyrian language belonged.

Providentially, however, a key had for a long time been preparing, although those who had been engaged upon it had little suspicion of the extensive and important use to which it was to be put. As the Rosetta stone, upon which Ptolemy carved his decree, in three different characters, in parallel columns, first gave the clue to the interpretation of the hieroglyphics and the writing on the papyrus rolls of Egypt, so there were trilingual texts at the service of scholars to open the way to the understanding of this perplexed Assyrian character.

The Persian monarchs, Darius, Xerxes and their successors had carved inscriptions recording their names and ancestry, their deeds, their edicts, and their religious faith, not only upon their palaces and their sepulchres, but on the rocks in various parts of their empire. And particularly at Behistun, the whole mountain side had been smoothed, and a long legend cut of more than a hundred lines, at such an elevation that Major Rawlinson, who was the first to copy it, was only enabled to do so by aid of a telescope. It was out of the reach, therefore, of injury from human hands and any form of damage except the washing of rains, which has unfortunately defaced it to some extent. In these inscriptions, in order to make themselves intelligible to their subjects, the conquerors were obliged to employ and thus perpetuate the language of the conquered. The same mingled populations, which prevail in the East now, existed in the Persian dominions, the Aryan, Turanian and Semitic. And the monarchs, addressing themselves to these several populations, were obliged to make their inscriptions trilingual. They employed, therefore, three columns. Above both the others, or, when they were ranged side by side, before both the others, stood the language of the monarchs themselves, the Persian, which thus held the first place, the place of honor. The column next to this, and consequently the second in order, was occupied by what has been called the Medo-Scythic language, and is supposed to represent the tongue of those Medes who

had not adopted the Persian, but spoke a Scythic or Turanian dialect, kindred to the Turkish, Magyar or Tartar languages. Third and last in this invariable order was what was suspected to be the language of Babylon, then prostrate beneath the power of Persia; and this suspicion was entertained long before the actual discovery of Babylonian and Assyrian inscriptions heightened it into certainty. A brief specimen of this third or Assyrian species of the cuneiform writing is given at the head of this article.

The existence of these trilingual inscriptions had been long known in Europe. The oriental traveller, Peter della Valle, first saw and described them in 1621. The characters are totally unlike any other mode of writing known, and apparently stand in no relation to any existing alphabet. They are uniformly composed of two simple elements, a wedge and an angle; or, as this last is itself composed of two wedges joined at the head, the one element of the whole is the wedge variously arranged and combined so as to form significant characters. When these were analyzed and classified, according to their constituent parts, it appeared that the combinations were different in each of the columns. In the first or Persian column there were between 30 and 40 distinct characters; in the second, or Medo-Scythian, upwards of 100; in the third, or Babylonian, nearly 400. This, taken in conjunction with the different lengths of the several columns, which it was assumed contained identical inscriptions in three languages,—the first being uniformly the longest, and the third the shortest,—led to the conjecture that the first was alphabetic, the second syllabic, and the third ideographic. Although this requires some modification in the case of the last two columns, it is perfectly correct in the case of the first.

Scholars accordingly devoted their first and principal attention to the Persian column, and by a series of steps of the utmost ingenuity, and yet of the most rigorous scientific accuracy, succeeded at last in unravelling the enigma. The narrative of this, the most brilliant literary feat on record, is of great interest, but cannot here be detailed. We merely

state the result :—the alphabet is completely made out ; the inscriptions are read with as much certainty and accuracy as a passage in a Greek or Latin author ; and the language of this first column now has its regular place in comparative grammars of the Indo-European tongues, along with the other dialects of that great family.

Meanwhile no progress whatever had been made toward solving the mystery of the second and third columns ; not a word was made out, and the phonetic value of a single character was not known.

The direction of the writing was ascertained to be from left to right. This was early suspected from the direction of the characters, which all pointed to the right, none in a reverse direction. Next it was found that in the third column the characters were sometimes crowded together toward the right end of the line, so as even occasionally to encroach upon the margin ; whereas on the left the ends of the lines were exactly vertical ; from this it was further inferred, and as is now known correctly, that in this species of writing words were not divided at the end of lines.

Again, when the Persian text came to be understood, it was possible to divide the second and third columns into groups of characters, which corresponded group by group to the several words of the first column. This not only determined, beyond a question, the direction of the writing, but established further, that the last two columns were translations of the first, containing the same text in other languages ; for wherever the same word or the same proper name reappeared in the Persian, there the identical group of characters was found corresponding to it in the Medo-Scythic and the Babylonian. Thus it happened that the meaning of certain groups was known, although it was beyond the power of any one to conjecture what words were represented by them, or what was the phonetic value of even a single character.

It was further ascertained by a comparison of various inscriptions that names of men in the second and third columns were regularly preceded by a vertical wedge, indicative of the

fact; so that these could be readily picked out from any text, even though its contents were unknown. These preliminary facts were ascertained, but this was all. The puzzle of the Assyrian character had hitherto defied the most persistent attempts to unriddle it.

Matters were in this condition when news was brought of Botta's excavations and his astounding discoveries. The prompt identification of the Ninevite inscriptions with those of the third column of the trilingual texts, directed attention renewedly to this intricate character, and satisfied European scholars of the necessity of reducing it as the only means of gaining the mastery of those treasures locked up in these newly-discovered legends.

The attempt, accordingly, was made without delay. In the very same year in which Botta's discoveries first came to light, Löwenstern, a Swedish scholar, attacked the problem. But, as Prof. Ménant justly remarks, "heads of columns commonly fall in the assault, which their valor has rendered successful for others." His paper is of no other value now than as showing the difficulties which embarrassed the very first step, and the hopelessly inextricable perplexities which encompassed the matter. He endeavored to ascertain the value of certain characters by comparing their forms with those in other known alphabets. The result was necessarily unsuccessful, for no graphic relation obtains between the cuneiform systems of writing and any others which are now known.

The only sure point of beginning, as was soon recognized by Löwenstern himself, De Saulcy and others in France, as well as by Rawlinson, Hincks and their coadjutors in Great Britain, was that afforded by the proper names. It was first necessary, by a careful analysis of all accessible texts, to identify the groups corresponding to the various proper names. These, it might be assumed, would have substantially the same sound in any language. The Assyrian pronunciation would not differ materially from that supplied by the Persian column. By a minute and laborious collation of these the endeavor must be made to ascertain the phonetic value of each character to be found in them. And these, thus fixed,

must be applied to reading the remainder of the text. This slow and toilsome process is the necessary foundation for safe and trustworthy results. The more extensive the base of comparison, the more certain will be the conclusions reached. The more frequently the same character is discovered in different names, in which it uniformly preserves the same phonetic value, the more surely is that value determined.

In all the trilingual texts taken together, there are one hundred and fifteen proper names. These are all extant in the Medo-Scythian text, which contains in addition nine names of months, and twenty-three other words, connected with matters of government, which are transcribed from the Persian, and consequently lend their aid in settling the signification of the characters. In the Assyrian column, which has unfortunately been the most damaged by the lapse of ages, nine names of persons, and sixteen names of cities and countries, have been so far effaced as to be no longer legible. This leaves ninety names which are available, containing ninety separate characters. Only a small portion of these, however, were at the disposal of those who led the way in this investigation. The great Behistun monument, though already copied by Major Rawlinson, was not yet published. Its Persian text did not appear till 1847, in the journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. Its Assyrian text was not given to the public for some years later; before this but ten proper names were possessed by those who were engaged in the work of deciphering.

Grotefend, who has the honor of having made the first successful effort toward a solution of the first or Persian species of cuneiform writing, had long since noticed that the group of characters representing the same Persian name in the Assyrian was often reproduced with variations. Thus in the name, Auramazda, applied to the supreme divinity, as written in different places, four different characters were found, answering to the letter *r*. And in the specimen given on a preceding page, the sign of *r* in Hisiarsi, the Assyrian pronunciation of Xerxes, is quite distinct from that in Dariyavus (Darius). This led to the hypothesis of *homophones*, or dis-

tinct characters representative of the same sound. This assumption appeared the more plausible from the analogy of the Egyptian hieroglyphics, where their existence was a recognized fact. The hieroglyphic symbol stood for the initial sound in the name of the object which it represented. And as various objects might be pictured whose names began with the same sound, distinct hieroglyphs were employed having the same phonetic value. This seemed to be further confirmed by the multitude of the characters, which were vastly more numerous than could be demanded by the exigencies of any alphabetic system, actual or supposable. It was impossible to adapt them to any conceivable alphabet, without the assumption that several were of the same signification.

Dr. Hincks of Dublin, however, noticed that these supposed *homophones* are not precisely convertible, but seem to have a determinate law in their employment. Thus the character representing *d* in Darius reappears twice in Dadarses, is the second in Mada (Media), and the last in Auramazda; but a different *d* is found in Diglat (Tigris), and a third in Kundurus. In fact wherever the Persian text places the vowel *a* after *d* the first form of the character is used; where *d* is followed by *i*, the second form; and where it is followed by *u* the third form. And so in regard to other letters; *k* in Cappadocia and Carthage differed from *k* in Kuras (Cyrus). *Ma*, as above in Ahamannissi is the same as in Mada, Magus, Gomata, but differs from *mi* in Mithra and *mu* in Umurga (Amyrgii). He hence inferred that the character is not alphabetic but syllabic, including the vowel as well as the consonant in its signification: and this not as though the character were capable of being decomposed, as in Ethiopic, where the body of the letter represents the consonant, which is slightly modified or has subordinate appendages attached to indicate the accompanying vowel. The character is one and indivisible, and can no more be separated into constituent parts than the Roman letters which we employ. It represents a stage in the history of writing in which the analysis of sounds was still imperfect. Words had been divided

into syllables, but syllables had not yet been resolved into the simple sounds of which they are composed.

There are fifty-four distinct characters, denoting simple articulations of the kind just described, consisting of the vowels *a*, *i*, *u*, either separately noted (as in *a-hamannissi*), or preceded by a single consonant, e. g., *da* (as in *Da-riyavus*), *di*, *du*; *ra*, *ri*, *ru*. In addition to these there are others in which the order of sounds is reversed, and which denote a vowel followed by a consonant. Thus the sign for *ar* in *Hisiarsi* (Xerxes) is found again in the first place in Artaxerxes and Arbela, in the second place in Parthia, Parsa (Persia), and in the third place in Dadarses. So the sign for *an* in *Ahamannissi* reappears in Tritantæchmes, Zazana and Zarangia. This yields a fresh series like *ar*, *ir*, *ur*; *an*, *in*, *un*, amounting in all to thirty-three. The number is smaller than before, because surd and sonant consonants, though distinguished at the beginning of a syllable, are not distinguished at the end; thus *ba* and *pa* are represented by different characters, but there is only one character for *ab* and *ap*, one for *ag* and *ak*, one for *ad* and *at*. A like confusion of these sounds at the end of syllables exists in Turkish and German: comp. *Brod* pronounced *Brot*.

The two series already spoken of constitute together a complete syllabarium of eighty-seven characters. Of these sixty-seven are found in the proper names of the trilingual texts, and their phonetic value is consequently capable of determination from that source. Many of them occur with such frequency and in so many different names that no doubt whatever can remain as to their genuine sound. Thus, of the characters in the specimen text above, *hi* is found in 2 names, *si* (which here occurs three times) is found in 8, *ar* in 13, *da* in 10, *a* in 16, *ri* in 11, *ya* in 7, *ha* in 4, *ma* in 12, *an* in 5.

In combining these articulations, like vowels may go together but not those which are diverse: thus *da-a=da*, *di-i=di*, *du-u=du*; *ma-an=man*, *mi-in=min*, *mu-un=mun*; but we never find *da-i*, or *di-a*, *ma-in* or *mi-an*, unless the sign of hiatus is interposed as in *Hisi'arsi*.

These eighty-seven characters would have been sufficient,

so far as appears, for all the necessities of Assyrian writing; and if this had been limited to these, it would have been a comparatively easy matter to decipher the inscriptions. Another series of characters, however, was employed to represent compound syllables, or those which both begin and end with a consonant sound. These are far more numerous than the preceding and it is much more difficult to determine their true signification. A complete syllabarium of of this kind would require 684 signs; twenty-three of these are found in the proper names of the trilingual inscriptions. A large proportion of the others has been made out by the elaborate comparison of variant texts. The same inscription is often found several times repeated, and, in consequence of the liberty offered to the scribe or engraver by this multitude of characters, the same words may be variously written. A compound syllable, which is in one place represented by a single unknown character, may in others be resolved into its simple elements, which are already known, and thus the meaning of the former be ascertained. Thus the last character in *Dariyavus* was the occasion of much perplexity, until this syllable was found elsewhere written *vu-us;* and in *Ahamannissi, man* is sometimes represented by one character instead of two, and *nis* by two *ni-is* instead of one.

But with the determination of all these syllabic characters, the work of deciphering is still far from being accomplished. Many of the characters are not phonetic but ideographic, representing not sounds or words but objects or ideas. They convey their meaning directly to the eye, like a picture or a symbol, rather than through the medium of the ear. Thus the Arabic numerals, 1, 2, 3, etc., are ideographs. They directly represent the numerical relation which they signify, and in a manner altogether independent of the words by which that relation is expressed. The figure 3 conveys the same idea to an Englishman, a Frenchman and a German, though each would utter a different sound if he were to read it in his own language. The meaning of the ideographs may accordingly be settled irrespective of the language of the inscriptions. The character denoting "king," which occurs

four times in the specimen text above (once followed by the ideographic sign of the plural), is readily singled out as soon as the meaning of the inscription is known; but the Assyrian word represented by it is not so easily ascertained. Grotefend suspected an abbreviation, as generally wherever single characters corresponded to whole words in the Persian column. Luzzatto, who thought the language Sanskritic, read this symbol *nara;* Rawlinson, calling the Hebrew to his aid, read it *melek*. And it was not until a text was found, in which the phonetic equivalents were substituted for this ideograph, that its true pronunciation was discovered to be *sarru*, answering to the Hebrew *sar*, a "prince." And this, we are inclined to suspect, explains the peculiar expression, "king of princes," (*sarim)*, Hos. viii, 10, applied to the Assyrian monarch, which would seem not to be an arbitrary or merely poetic variation of the lordly title "king of kings," but to contain a designed allusion to the native Assyrian word. And a like allusion may be found in the words attributed to Sennacherib, Isa. x. 8, "Are not my princes (*sarai*) altogether kings?" The ideogram for "son," in the above inscription, has also been variously read, though its meaning is perfectly clear; authorities are still divided whether it should be pronounced *pal*, *bal* or *habal*.

The perplexity arising from this use of ideograms is prodigious. The signification of such as occur in the trilingual inscriptions is readily fixed by the Persian translation. And the meanings hence obtained can of course be transferred to other inscriptions in which they are found unaccompanied by a translation. But how shall other ideographs be distinguished? or if known to be such, how shall their meaning be ascertained?

And the puzzle is greatly increased by the fact that the same characters are used both phonetically and ideographically; and these two values are totally distinct and stand in no sort of relation to each other. Thus the symbol for "son" read *habal*, is identical with the sign for *a*, occurring in *Dariyavus* and *Ahamannissi;* and the sign for *an* in this last

word is also the symbol for "God," and is then read *ilu*. Comp. in Hebrew *el* and *eloah*.

The intermingling of ideographic with phonetic symbols in the same text is a familiar fact to the Egyptologist; but it is not encumbered by the same embarrassments as in the Assyrian. The Egyptian hieroglyphic is the delineation of an object, which is for the most part still capable of being recognized. Its phonetic value is in all cases the initial sound of the Coptic name of this object. Its ideographic value is linked with that object by some natural symbol or ready association. The limits left for conjecture are thus greatly narrowed, and there are fixed principles by which the signification is to be determined.

The Assyriologist unfortunately has no such helps to lean upon. It seems, indeed, to be proven that the Assyrian characters have their origin in hieroglyphic emblems. They are not random combinations of wedges and angles, to which meanings have arbitrarily been assigned. But each was originally the representation of some sensible object, although by the graphic modifications of ages they have been so changed that their primary forms can rarely be recognized; just as in the Roman letters which we employ, A has lost its resemblance to the head of an ox, and B to a house, from which they were primarily derived.

A careful comparison of all accessible monuments has led to the distinguishing of several graphic varieties in the characters employed. There are, first, mere variants, slight modifications of form in the same character, such as may occur in the same insciption or in different inscriptions belonging to the same place and time. Secondly, there are local varieties, differences regularly occurring in the style and formation of the same character, according as it is found, for example, in Nineveh or in Babylon. But besides these there are varieties of formation which mark successive epochs. There is an archaic character deviating considerably from that which prevailed at a more recent period. And there is one more ancient still, to which the name of hieratic has been given. This consists of simple lines, the cuneiform or wedge-like

stroke of later times not having yet been assumed. And back of all these is the proper hieroglyphic, some monumental indications of which are still extant in rude figures set in parallel columns with their cuneiform derivatives. The character *ha* in *Ahamannissi* has also the meaning *nun*, a fish, to which in its archaic form it bears a striking similarity, its head, fins and tail being clearly apparent. So *an*, which, as has been said before, is likewise the sign for "God," in its archaic form resembles a beaming star, which was doubtless taken as the symbol of the deity. And the sign for "king" can be traced back to a form which seems intended to represent a bee, the symbol of order and productive power.

But how then does it happen, that the phonetic and the ideographic values of the characters are wholly unrelated, instead of being intimately linked together as in the Egyptian hieroglyphics? For the same reason precisely that the sound of A has no relation to an ox, or B to a house; because the people using the characters are not, as in the case of the Egyptians, the people that invented them. We use an alphabet derived from the Phœnician, and the bond which links the sound of the letter to the object which it was designed to represent, exists in the Phœnician language but is lost in ours.

The fact now under consideration plainly shows that the Assyrians used a character not their own. They must have derived it from some people speaking a different language from themselves. The Anarian character, as the cuneiform writing of the second and third columns is called, in distinction from the Aryan or Persian character of the first column, is known to have been used in several different languages. There is monumental evidence of its having been employed in five. Now, if there shall be found among all these a language, in which the phonetic and ideographic values of the characters uniformly coincide, that, beyond all question, is the tongue spoken by the inventors of this species of writing.

In the scantiness of our information on this subject, it can scarcely be said, perhaps, that a positive conclusion has yet been reached, but there are indications pointing to a proba-

ble solution of a most unexpected and interesting kind. Prof. Oppert has demonstrated the original oneness of the Medo-Scythic and the Assyrian species of writing. Out of 109 characters employed in the former, he has identified 96 with such as are found in the latter, and the differences of form are no greater than in admitted variants of the same species. The phonetic and the ideographic values of the characters are the same in both columns. The sign for *an* is identical in both, and in both is equally the symbol for "God," which in Assyrian is *ilu*, but in Medo-Scythic *anap*, the first syllable of the latter yielding its phonetic value. The same phenomenon is repeated in other cases equally striking, and suggests the inference that the Assyrian writing, which can be traced back to an early period in the history of that empire, was borrowed from a Turanian people, whose language either was the Medo-Scythic, or was closely akin to it. This seems to imply that the Assyrian civilization was preceded by one of Turanian origin; that learning had been cultivated in what has been supposed to be the barbarous north, and that letters were there invented by a people of whose existence we here have a glimpse and a tangible proof, but of whom nothing besides is known. This Medo-Scythic column presents formidable difficulties in point of language, which have not yet been satisfactorily overcome. If the tongue embodied in it shall be successfully restored, or some other can be found that closely resembles it, an aid may be discovered for cuneiform interpretation, as serviceable as the Coptic has been in hieroglyphics; and a light may be shed upon mysteries which can now be but partially illustrated by Turkish, or Magyar or Uralian analogies.

In addition to individual ideograms already spoken of, or those which consist of a single character, there are composite ideograms. These are groups of characters, whose phonetic values are known, and which constantly serve when occurring in the same order to express a given idea; and yet the phonetic transcription of this group yields an entirely different pronunciation from that which was actually given to it. In the trilingual tablets no difficulty whatever is found in making out the great majority of the ninety proper names.

ut the six Babylonish names, Nebuchadnezzar, Nabunaita, (Nabonned), Babylon, Euphrates, Tigris and Susiana are totally irreducible. When meanings obtained elsewhere, and verified in repeated instances, are applied to the group of characters in the Assyrian text corresponding to Nebuchadnezzar in the Persian, they yield *An-pa-sa-du-sis;* it is only on the bricks of Babylon that the name is phonetically spelled *Nabiukudurriusur*. So for Nabunaite we find *An-pa-i*, and for Babylon *Din-tir-ki*. The explanation of this strange phenomenon is, that these characters are not used phonetically but as an ideogram. In the names of these monarchs the first two characters represent the god Nebo (*Nabu* or *Nabiu*), not because a new phonetic value is here attributed to them, as though *an* had also the sound *na*, and *pa* were used for *bu*. But the character whose phonetic value is *an*, is also the symbol of divinity and stands regularly before the names of gods. *Pa* denotes some attribute by which this particular deity is characterized. It has been variously explained as representing a sceptre, or the vial used in anointing; so that the combination is not the name Nebo, but describes the god so called as the divinity which protects the government of kings or presides at their consecration. This is in exact analogy with the hieroglyphic mode of representing different divinities. There stands first the general sign for divinity, a man seated Egyptian fashion; then follows something indicative of the particular god intended, a hawk's head for Osiris, a jackal's for Anubis, an eye, a whip, or the *pschent* with two ostrich feathers, for Osiris.

This emblematic way of writing names, particularly those of the monarchs of Nineveh and Babylon, makes it an almost hopeless task to unravel their true pronunciation, and makes their true identification extremely uncertain. Oppert confesses that it is impossible to read names so written with any confidence, unless they are likewise found in phonetic characters, or are known from Greek or Hebrew writers.

A like perplexity embarrasses the reading of other words. Thus the symbols of the several months are known but not the name of one of them. And there are numerous instances

in almost every inscription in which ideograms are suspected, because the characters, taken phonetically, yield non-Semitic forms or combinations of sound, and these characters are elsewhere replaced in like connections by others which are unmistakably Semitic. Thus, in the specimen above given, the word "great" is read *ra-bu* (Heb. *rab*) by the substitution of an Assyrian word of this sense found in other passages, though the phonetic value of the characters here used is *galu*. In like manner in Xerxes' inscription at Van, "heaven" is spelled *ani* but read *sami* (Heb. *shamayim*); "earth" is spelled *kiti* but read *irtsit* (Heb. *erets*); "men" spelled *un* with the plural sign, but read *nisi* (Heb. *anashim*). These cases are open to doubt, not however as respects the meanings of the words, but solely as to their pronunciation, and as to the nature of the signs by which they are represented. They may be ideograms, that are to be read independently of the sound of their constituent elements; as in the numbers 10 and 12 we read the separate figures one, nought, one, two, but when set in combination we pronounce them ten, twelve. Or they may be what Ménant calls allophones, that is to say, Turanian words employed by those who originally made use of the cuneiform characters, and transferred along with this system of writing to the Assyrians, who retained them as convenient graphic symbols, but constantly substituted for them in reading the proper equivalents in their own language. Or, finally, they may be Turanian words adopted into the Assyrian speech. Thus *etc.*, occurring in an English sentence, may be read "et cætera," or "and so forth;" and A.D., "anno domini," or "in the year of our Lord;" the Latin words which these symbols originally denoted may be retained, or they may be rendered into equivalent English.

Some of the perplexities which beset the path of Assyrian interpretation have been exhibited. But the grand stumbling-block has not yet been adverted to. It is the multiple sense attributed to each character, whether phonetic or ideographic. This is quite distinct from the fact previously noticed, that the same character may have two species of values, being used in different connections as representative

of sound, or as representative of an object or idea. But in addition to the liability of being employed in either of two capacities, its function under each is affirmed to be indeterminate, or at least to vary with the circumstances of its employment.

Rawlinson was the first to announce the startling fact of the existence of polyphones, or the union of different and totally unrelated phonetic values in the same written character. And this seems to be established in a manner quite incontrovertible. The sign denoting *vus* in Dariyavus must be read *sir* in Misir (Egypt); the sign for *nis* in Ahamannissi is also used for *man* in writing this very word; the same symbol is *par* in Parsu (Persia) and Parthia, and *tav* in Gumatav (Gomates).

But the extent to which these multiple values have been assumed by Assyriologists is totally destructive of anything like intelligible writing. Oppert gives the following example in illustration of the facts of polyphony, as he conceives them, and of his theory of their origin. A character intended to represent an open hand (in Scythian *kurpi*, has attached to it the metaphorical signification "to take," in Medo-Scythian *imidu*, also meaning "to possess, to extend," and thus obtains the two phonetic values *kur*, *mat*. The resemblance between these two sounds and other Scythic words gives it four additional significations: *kur* meaning "mountain" and "sun-rise, and *mat* "earth" and "to go." It is now transferred to Assyrian with its two phonetic and seven ideographic values already acquired: to the latter, the fortuitous coincidence of *kur* with the Assyrian word for "furnace," and *mat* with the Assyrian word "to die," adds these two further significations, while the Assyrian terms for its other senses enrich it with three more sounds; so that in the end it stands for any one of five different sounds or nine different ideas. The majority of the characters are held to represent at least two different sounds, many of them three or four, and some even five or six; and to these are to be added their various ideographic senses.

The ambiguity resulting from the different senses attached to the same ideogram is supposed to be resolved in certain

cases by a peculiar expedient termed the phonetic complement; this is a phonetic character taken from the word which the ideogram is intended to represent and added to this latter to indicate its true interpretation. Thus a symbol having the various phonetic values of *ut, tam, par, tas, lih,* may also denote the sea (in Assyrian *tihamti*), or the sun (*samsi*), or the light (*nara*), or sun-rise (*sadu*), or day (*zumu*), or days (*zumi*), or to go out (*atsu*). When this symbol is followed by the syllable *ti*, this is understood to suggest that it is to be read *tihamti*, and means the sea; followed by *si*, it is read *samsi*, and means the sun; followed by *ra*, it is read *nara*, and means the light, and so on for the rest. This may be illustrated by our reading Dwt., pennyweight, and Dth, five hundreth; 8th, eighth, and 8vo., octavo; Xian, Christian, and Xroads, cross-roads.

It is further alleged that complex ideograms may occasionally be distinguished as such by the circumstances that phonetic values attributed to the characters would violate fixed laws of Assyrian orthography, or would result in impossible forms. But beyond these vague and dubious indications there is nothing to fix the value of a character in any given connection; it may have any one of several values supposed to be ascertained elsewhere, or it may have another altogether new. There is no test of the accuracy of an interpretation; there is no check upon the most random and arbitrary guesswork. To the question which of its several phonetic values is to be attributed to a character in any given case, Oppert has no better answer than try them all in succession and take that which does best. It is manifest that the puzzle is not yet entirely solved, while so much guessing remains to be done.

It would be presumptous to undertake to affirm in advance what the Assyrian writing was or what it was not. Any antecedent improbability is, of course, instantly outweighed by any clear evidence deducible from the inscriptions. But we have an undoubted right to assume that, whatever it was, it must have been intelligible. And a first condition of intelligible writing is that the characters must have fixed and de-

terminate values. If these are not absolutely invariable, there must at least be some settled law of their employment. It would be plainly impossible to interpret a page of English written in a character so indeterminate and fluctuating as the Assyrian is supposed to be. And when to this is coupled the consideration, that the language of the inscriptions is totally unknown, and our only hope of recovering it lies in the use of these characters, which range from two to ten or more significations, the impracticability of the task is perfectly apparent. There are more unknown quantities in the equation than it is possible to eliminate.

In speaking thus we do not mean to decry the most brilliant literary feat of modern times, nor to detract from the credit due to the amazing ingenuity and patient toil and varied learning, which have been brought to bear upon the unravelling of these inscriptions, nor to deny that essential progress has been made and important results obtained. A solid and impregnable basis has unquestionably been laid. Much has been accomplished towards a solution of this most complicated problem. Many of the readings are doubtless correct, and will stand the test of all future scrutiny. In others the general sense may remain in spite of minor inaccuracies. But it must be remembered that twenty years have not elapsed since the first successful beginning was made. And when the herculean nature of the task is considered, the marvel is not that the end is not yet reached, but that anything reliable has been done.

We must, however, abide by our conviction that the time has not yet come for reconstructing our knowledge of the East in conformity with the revelations made by the monuments. The results are still too insecure, too much chaff is mingled with the wheat, to justify us in accepting it in the mass; and there is no possibility yet of accurately discriminating the conjectural from the certain, the genuine from the false. We wait, however, in the confident expectation that the remaining mystery of these intricate characters will yet be cleared up; that the march of discovery will in due time rectify all errors, whether of methods or results; that the need-

ed clue will be found, and the right method ascertained of disentangling all remaining complications, and giving to the Assyrian characters that fixedness and accuracy which must belong to a medium of recording thought which was found sufficient for the needs of a great empire through fifteen hundred years.

Art. V.—"THE ORDER OF SALVATION."

By Rev. Robert E. Willson, Havana, N. Y.

The treatise of Diaconus Schröder,* under this title, by its extended references to the various opinions of other times, has brought fresh to the writer's mind the great diversity of conflicting, and consequently, to some extent, erroneous views, which still prevail upon this subject. We will not take space, nor ask attention for the formal statement of these opinions. It may be assumed, that all who take any interest in subjects of this nature are aware of this diversity and discrepancy. And these differences of opinion among good men and teachers in the church, are proof that the subject about which they differ is not generally well understood. We fairly judge, that no statement of it has been so clear and convincing as to command general acceptance. There can, however, be no difference of opinion, as to the question whether greater harmony of views, respecting what is so closely connected with the salvation of mankind, is highly desirable. Great diversity of opinion, in respect to the "Order of Salvation," will naturally confirm the doubting in the suspicion, that the subject of salvation is in some respects unsettled and uncertain. We well remember, that when we became earnestly desirous to learn definitely about the way of salvation, some statements respecting its order were a very serious obstruction. And we now believe that

* Translated by Rev. G. W. Sheldon, in the *American Presbyterian Review*, Jan. and April, 1871.

those statements were the result of mistaken views of the truth. Who, indeed, will presume to affirm that many are not kept away from Christ by a misconception of what they should expect, in the order of psychological facts, and of the application of divine principles, in that great change which we may here call conversion?

If a sinner of acute mind is taught that he cannot submit to God in true penitence until after God, in the exercise of creative power, shall have made him a new creature, he will be likely to say, "I must then wait until that divine work is done; it would be folly to attempt what is known to be impracticable." And he may add with some sincerity, "I am very desirous to have that great transforming work done; I wish it might be done now, but I am compelled to wait."

It is not our purpose to allude expressly to any class of teachers, or any school of theologians, or to go extensively into the examination of opinions that are held and taught in the church; but rather to submit a brief statement upon this subject, which in our judgment accords with Scripture teaching, with the nature of things, and with the experience of those who have been saved. If even some little obscurity can be removed from the things pertaining to salvation, or some little light can be thrown upon the path of some inquirers for the way, the writer will feel that all is accomplished which he had reason to expect.

Our attention will be chiefly given to the facts and principles of that great radical change, in which men pass from condemnation to justification, and from a supreme love of the world, self and sin, to the supreme love of God. We are aware that the order or process of salvation is more extensive, and may be said to begin with conviction, and to end in the resurrection and ascension to glory. And since our theme comprehends the whole process, we will notice briefly what precedes and follows the great transition.

Conviction prepares the way and leads to it, and is a work of the Spirit as truly as the great change itself. The Spirit begins the work of salvation, when he gives a sense of the reality and importance of divine and eternal things, and when

he gives the sinner clearer views both of the love and the terrors of the Lord. This conviction may not always result in salvation. The sinner may so resist that the Holy Ghost will cease from this gracious work and leave him to hardness of heart and blindness of mind. But when true conversion actually takes place, it is consequent upon such conviction.

Conviction and the resurrection being the two extremes in the process, their order is manifestly settled. The last thing done is the destruction of death itself,—the saving of the body with the soul, when the mortal shall put on immortality and the full glory of heaven shall begin.

In respect to the order of justification and sanctification, it seems marvellous that there is any disagreement. Justification being promised to faith, being made the certain result of faith, it must immediately follow the beginning of faith. Otherwise the promise of God is not kept; a man may believe and yet not be justified. To cite the many Scripture passages which makes justification sure to every one who believes, and of course as soon as he believes, would be like quoting whole chapters of the Bible. Sanctification must obviously be the development of that which has a beginning with faith and justification. It is a growth of what is implanted in conversion. After justification takes place, sanctification goes on to the end of life. From the state of new-born babes, we grow to spiritual manhood. "First the blade, then the ear, and then the full corn in the ear."

But some very good men have strangely reversed this order and made justification to depend on, and in the order of nature to follow, sanctification. Sometimes they appear to make no clear distinction between the two. Again they seem to regard the two as moving on *pari passu*, arm in arm. While they do not deny that justification is by free grace, yet they cannot look upon a denying Peter, or any wayward, erring believer, as in any important sense in a justified state. They hold that justification depends on personal holiness, and faith (according to their view) is concerned in securing justification, only as it works sanctification. It works love and obedience and so becomes the means of justification. Thus they seem

in reality to hold to the doctrine of justification by works, although they strenuously deny it. Indeed, their views appear to us exceedingly confused and unscriptural. Dismissing this point, we pause a moment to notice an error that verges toward the other extreme.

Some have been so far from confounding justification with sanctification, or from making the latter a condition of the former, that, more strangely, they have made justification, as well as the faith which secures it, precede the conversion of the soul, the renewing of the heart. They have taken what is said of justifying the ungodly in a sense absolutely literal, and held that the faith which brings justification is simply a belief of the gospel account of Christ, which indeed leads to repentance (they say), but really precedes it and all radical change of character. They have supposed that justification is thus, and only thus, set forth as wholly of grace. They deem it a felicity of this view, that the sinner is represented, not only as not justified by his own righteousness, but as justified when he is still impenitent and unregenerate. This theory has been ascribed to some eminent Scotch divines. But to refute it we need only say, that it imposes upon those who receive it the necessity of maintaining that the sinner is forgiven and owned as a friend, though still at emnity with God, and having the heart of a rebel.

These errors, however, in respect to the place held by justification in the gospel system, have been so ably exposed and are so unlikely to gain currency, that there is no occasion for dwelling upon them. It does not need to be proved again, that justification is an act of grace, following immediately the very beginning of that faith which involves loyalty of heart toward God and trust in Christ as a Saviour from deserved wrath. It is no less clear that sanctification is a progress in holiness, begun at conversion and continued to the end of life, with more or less irregularity and interruption it may be, but on the whole with progress.

To say these things, however, was not the object of this article. As already stated, our main purpose is to present the scriptural and rational conception of that great change, which takes place

when a sinner becomes a penitent believer and a child of God.

And here we step at once *in medias res* by asserting that repentance, faith, conversion and regeneration have no invariable order among themselves, either of occurrence or of dependence. In relation to what precedes and follows them in the process of salvation, they have, indeed, an order both as to time and nature, but in relation to one another they have no such order. These terms are but names for different aspects of the same event—an event embracing a variety of elements.

It has often been a question of earnest discussion, whether faith precedes repentance, or repentance faith. It is made prominent in the treatise by Schröder. It was discussed in the days of Calvin, and is agitated still. Indeed we see not how it is possible to settle this point, so long as it is assumed that one or the other must precede. Against giving the precedence to faith, it has been asserted that an *impenitent* sinner has no *right* to trust in Christ; there is no warrant for such trust. And so it is inferred, that in the order of thought and purpose true faith cannot precede repentance. On the other hand, if we say that repentance precedes faith in any sense, we have in the same sense a penitent, and of course a forgiven sinner, who has never trusted in Christ.

Now is there no solution of this difficulty? May it not be that men have brought too much wisdom to the consideration of this greatest event that ever marks the history of an individual man? "The world by wisdom knew not God." Possibly the church sometimes fails in the same way to understand well the things of the Spirit. Human wisdom is wont to overlook the great simplicity of the gospel. May it not be, that what is in reality very simple and intelligible has become involved and tangled in the hands of those who have brought to the study of gospel truth too much human philosophy?

The idea that either faith or repentance is first, in any sense, involves, it seems to us, gross error, if not absurdity. If faith precedes repentance in time, then we have an impenitent believer,—a sinner, accepted, who is in rebellion against God. If repentance precedes faith, in the same

sense, then we have a pardoned sinner, who is not justified and is not a Christian, because he has not believed in Christ. But, if this error is so gross that it seems idle to mention it, does it relieve the case essentially to suppose that one *depends* upon the other, or comes into existence by means of the other? Can they be related to each other as cause and effect, when it is impossible to conceive that one can begin to be without the existence and presence of the other? Each is *equally* the necessary condition of the other. A sinner repents and believes by one single act of the soul. To believe unto justification is not merely to believe certain facts and doctrines, but also and mainly to trust in Christ, to venture entirely on him. And this trust in Christ is a trust which implies that he *rules* as well as *saves* us; and this involves submission to Christ. And a hearty submission to Christ has in it all the essential elements of repentance. These elements are subsequently developed in forms which cannot at first appear. To take Christ to rule and save is *one act;* and the one act involves or comprehends both repentance and faith. Neither of the two can be peculiarly the condition of the other; for, think what must be the mental process when a sinner repents and believes. While awakened and under conviction, he has before his mind his sins and his danger, his interests and his duty, and with all the motives of the Gospel pressing him to action, there is just one simple question for him to decide, "Will you have Christ to rule and save you?" Now suppose, dividing the question, he says in his heart, "I will have Christ to save me," he says nothing obviously that involves any change of character. He does not receive Christ at all. Or suppose he says, "I will begin to do better, and will keep the commandments of Christ with the greatest care;" this also amounts to nothing, and less than nothing. There is no repentance and no faith until by one single act of the soul the sinner says heartily, "I will—I do trust in Christ, both to save and to rule; I accept him as what he is, a Prince and a Saviour. And all this is quite consistent with various experiences in different persons. One may have to struggle against one

giant passion and another against another. Each individual may have his own besetting sin. One may be more averse to submission, and another more disinclined to cry for mercy as a criminal and a beggar. But when the decision comes, it is essentially the same thing in every case. It is simply a decision to have Christ, on his own terms and as what he is.

It may be objected here that believing must precede all rational action, and be a cause of that action. Nothing can be more true. Faith is the main-spring of action in all pursuits, temporal as well as spiritual. Through our believing, God must govern us, if at all, as moral agents. Through believing, truth affects mind, and not a word has been said in conflict with what is so obviously true. The receiving of Christ to rule and to save proceeds from believing. But *this* believing, which precedes actually receiving Christ, is that which precedes the beginning of saving faith. The sinner puts his trust in Christ because he *believes* his eternal welfare and his sacred duty demand it. This believing which precedes conversion is just as really the cause of *saving faith* as it is of repentance, and no more. The two alike depend immediately upon it, as an instrumental cause. Both alike proceed from it, whatever the relation of one to the other. Hence, there is not the least occasion to say, that, because we must be actuated by what we believe, repentance must therefore result from justifying faith.

Again, it may be said, that repentance and faith are mentioned in succession and separately as two distinct things; how, then, can they constitute but one event? It will be at once admitted by the objector himself, that when the two are named in the same connection, they must be named in succession, whether in occurrence they have any order or not. And it is proper here to notice, that, if the order in which they are named favors any order of occurrence, or of dependence, repentance has the precedence. Jesus preached "Repent ye and believe." It is nowhere written believe and repent. But we read "Repentance toward God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ." If there is any precedence, the Scripture surely gives it to repentance. But many believers

in a precedence would sooner discard it altogether than ascribe it to repentance. Their philosophy demands, that repentance shall be deemed a consequence of faith. How much better to shun all such difficulties, by attaching no importance to the order in which they are named. The gospel is not written in a philosophical form. Most wisely is it ordered, that it should not be cumbered with the scholastic modes and forms of facts and doctrines.

And yet we are bound to recognize a natural order of naming repentance and faith. We naturally think of repentance as the first thing which a sinner ought to do. It seems out of place to talk of seeking a refuge, or trusting in a Saviour, until the sinner comes to realize his guilt and danger, and is disposed to make his escape. This accounts abundantly for the order of stating the two, and for the prominence given to repentance in the preaching of John the Baptist and also in that of Christ himself. But we are by no means to infer, that men ever repent without at the same time trusting in the mercy of God. The two are not only coincident as to time, but they are phases of one event.

The fact that the two are so often named separately, as if each by itself were the certain and sole condition and way of being saved, favors rather than militates against the idea that both are comprehended in one event, that they are alike in some sense conditional upon each other, at all events alike involve each other. No other view makes it so intelligible and natural, that each should so often be mentioned as being all that is necessary to salvation. This view accounts for what would otherwise seem to be a loose and fragmentary way of stating what involves infinite interests.

We now pass to consider regeneration, or the renewing of the heart by the Holy Ghost. How does this stand related to repentance and faith? Is it an antecedent or a consequent, or neither? We say neither: an answer which may surprise some readers much more than anything which has been said respecting the relation of repentance and faith to each other. Possibly it may at first seem like an alarming departure from the sound teaching of the Church. Many have re-

garded it as a part of the evangelical system, that sinners are first born again, made new creatures; and then, when this work of God is accomplished by his sovereign and creative power, the subjects of this change repent and believe. Thus they make an order, both of occurence and dependence, in the relation of repentance and faith to regeneration. This dogma, this teaching, though sanctioned by great and good men, we call in question as erroneous. As sometimes presented it seems to us to have wrought much evil. It cuts the sinews of responsibility. It serves to give quiet and ease to the sinner's conscience, while he is waiting for God to give him a new heart. Who can tell how many have thus been led to indulge false expectations of what God would do for them, until their day of mercy has passed?

We look in vain for any authority in Scripture or any demand of reason, to separate regeneration as an event from repentance and faith. The same event, it is true, is often called by different names, arising from different relations and from the different standpoints from which it may be viewed. Different agents, too, may be concerned in bringing the same event to pass. How natural that what is done by the different agents in such a case should be named according to its nature. Two agents may act widely different parts in producing one event. Why not, then, suppose that the great change which occurs when the sinner passes out of nature's darkness into God's marvellous light, or from death unto life, is called regeneration, in relation to the divine agent, while at the same time it is called repentance and faith, with reference to the human agent? God is concerned in the production of repentance and faith; they are the gifts of God. Why should not the working or producing of repentance and faith by the divine Spirit be called *regeneration?* What possible honor can it give to God, or what good can it bring to man, to suppose anything else to be regeneration? What can be asked more, than that in some way, beyond the reach of consciousness, the sinner is made willing to repent and believe in the day of God's power? This view fulfils the language of Scripture as completely as the idea that the Spirit first completes the work

of regeneration, before the sinner acts at all in repenting and believing. We think it does much better. The term regeneration is figurative and denotes simply the origination of a new life, and nothing at all as to the *manner* of its accomplishment. It is quite gratuitous to suppose otherwise, than simply that God works in the sinner to will and to do at the very time the sinner wills and does, as when he heartily receives Christ to rule and save him. There would be no radical change without this mysterious and mighty agency of God, and we know of no such change irrespective of and apart from the human agency. The whole change is both what God does and what the sinner does.

In this way we escape the strange conclusion, otherwise inevitable, that no sinner ever does really comply with the call of mercy and the command of God, by breaking off from his sins in repentance; that no sinner ever turns from the pursuit of sin and from a rebellious state; but when a sinner is converted, he is transferred, by the power of God alone, from that state in which his heart rose in hatred and rebellion toward God, into a condition essentially different, in which he is disposed to obey God and accept of mercy on the terms prescribed. Now, were this the true history of the sinner's conversion, it would be unspeakably more agreeable to him than it is actually found to be. To repent and believe would be little else than the acting out of the new nature thus given. No painful exertion would be required; the sinner would not turn from his supreme devotion of heart to the world; he would be taken from it by the power of another. He would be saved the struggle, so manifestly contemplated by the Saviour's charge, "Strive to enter in at the straight gate." There would be no voluntary tearing away of the heart from the world and sin, of which the repenting sinner is now so conscious. His heart would be separated from the world by a foreign power, and he would have nothing to do, but to keep and cherish and act out what his heart had thus become. Such a theory greatly dishonors the divine author of the Scriptures, because it necessarily implies that sinners are not expected to do, and never do, what they are invited

and commanded to do, and what is expressly made the condition of eternal life. And not only so, when the sinner by a desperate struggle, in which his heart is dreadfully rent and broken, turns away, as he supposes, from the world to Christ, he must account his own consciousness a delusion, and conclude that he only *seems* to do what the gospel requires, viz. break away from his idols and give himself to the Lord.

But taking the view now contended for, how apt and significant are the words, "Of his own will begat he us, with the word of truth." God uses his word in bringing the new spiritual life into existence: a fact entirely inconsistent with the idea that regeneration is wrought by divine power acting alone and not through and with the activity of the sinner. How is it possible for God to use the truth in regeneration but by applying it to the reason, conscience and heart to induce men to feel, to will and to do as in repenting and believing? And how well this accords with those passages of Scripture which evidently hold the sinner responsible for the occurrence of the new birth? How well, too, it chimes in with this Scripture, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God that worketh in you to will and to do of his good pleasure." And does not this relieve the gospel message of those reserves and implications which often serve to neutralize the truth and puzzle the hearer? It gives the sinner to understand that he is expected to do, and must do, exactly the thing which is commanded, or fail of the great salvation. While he may look for divine grace to work in him, he is given to understand that he must turn by the choice of his own soul from his devotion to the ways of sin, just as really and consciously as if no divine influence were exerted. He is thus saved from the delusive expectation of a wonderful change to come over him, and render it easy for him to forsake the world and follow Christ.

How perfectly also this view harmonizes with the Scriptures which represent that faith and repentance are the sure conditions of eternal life. How could it be said so unqualifiedly, and so many times, that if the sinner will only believe he shall be saved, if another thing which he cannot do must

first take place? But all is fair and consistent and natural when we come to regard regeneration as the work of God in disposing the sinner to repent and believe, or the work of God in producing repentance and faith.

Possibly the thought may here arise in some mind that, granting the identity of regeneration (as an event) with faith and repentance, it must nevertheless be conceded that the divine agency must lead and dispose the human, and thus constitute an order of precedence and dependence. And we are far from questioning this general order of nature in the two agencies. Fallen man would originate nothing good were not God to work in him and dispose him. This, however, is rather a *seeming* than a real objection to the view we present. The Spirit acts upon the sinner before he begins to act. It awakens him, gently moves him, but there is no essential moral change until the sinner acts in believing and repenting. Then the two agencies acting conjointly result in the conversion of the sinner, which, in respect to God, is called regeneration, and, in respect to the sinner, repentance and faith. By the very same divine act that produces regeneration, God produces repentance and faith, and of course there can be no order of precedence as there is but one event.

There is a class of thinkers who may urge as an objection to these views, that the laws of mind render it impossible for a sinful creature to turn from evil to good without being first created anew, or having a new heart put within him; that there is a moral fountain within, back of all voluntary action, which necessarily determines all the streams of affection and conduct. Now, while the entirely depraved soul of fallen man will never turn to the way of holiness unless divinely moved upon, it will not be so because of any absolute necessity or natural impossibility. Otherwise God plainly requires natural impossibilities of men. God certainly commands the wicked to turn to what is good; and philosophically there is no more difficulty in conceiving how an evil man may turn to what is good, than how a good man can turn to what is evil. As Adam, when good, could be affected by motives to evil, so depraved

men, through conscience, sympathy and love of life, can be affected by motives to become good. The philosophy which makes something back of volition the necessary cause of the character of all volitions, involves the conclusion that the heart of Adam must have been changed by creative power before he could have sinned. And the ultimate conclusion must be, that if God is the author of holiness he is also the author of sin.

So far as any of these thoughts differ from opinions commonly received in the Church, the responsibility rests with no particular school of Theology. And so far as any of these views are peculiar, they are not new, having been fixed in the mind of the writer more than a quarter of a century. Their presentation in this form is occasioned, as already intimated, by the appearance of the treatise which has given a name to this article.

Art. VI.—PREACHING CHRIST.

By Lyman H. Atwater, D.D.

The learned article of Dr. Schröder on "The Order of Salvation," which appeared in the January and April numbers of the *American Presbyterian Review* for 1871, translated by the Rev. G. W. Sheldon, gave quite an exhaustive resumé of European modes of treating the topic. It was quite natural that some American discussions of the subject should have eluded the author's notice. The article by the Rev. Mr. Willson, which precedes, well represents the difficulties and the manner of solving them, accepted with more or less modifications, by numerous American divines. In order to give our readers a fuller view of the drift of discussions, and to show them the *status questionis*, among us, from another standpoint, we shall follow Mr. Willson's article with an extract from an article on "The Matter of Preaching," in the *Princeton Review* for October, 1856, which, though written by the author of these lines, derives an importance not intrinsically belong-

ing to it, from the fact that it was attributed to the late Dr. J. W. Alexander, and as such was by mistake incorporated in his posthumous volume of essays, entitled "Thoughts on Preaching."

"The effect of preaching the law faithfully will not be to encourage men to attempt to gain life by keeping it, but to show them their utter inability to keep it, and their hopeless condemnation by it. Convincing them of their ruin, it fills them with a sense of their need of a Redeemer. This is the great central truth of revelation and the foundation of true religion. For "other foundation can no man lay." Therefore, while, as we have shown, God must be set forth, first of all and above all, in preaching, he must be preëminently set forth as "God in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses." It were a poor and unworthy work to smite, and not to heal; to tear, and not bind up; to kill, and not make alive. Hence, since He, who by death overcame him that hath the power of death, alone can deliver us from sin, our paramount office is to declare Him, who is the way, the truth, and the life. As for us, our mission is to "preach Christ and him crucified; to the Jews a stumbling-block, to the Greeks foolishness, but to them who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God." We need not labor to prove to the Christian, that

"Christ and his cross are all our theme."

All else converges towards him, or radiates from him. It tends to lead us to him, or flows from our union to him. All unfoldings of God, in his perfections and glories; all exhibitions of the character, condition, and duties of man; all inculcations of doctrine and practice, if true and scriptural, lead the soul directly to the Lord Jesus Christ, for wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. "Ye believe in God," says Christ, "believe also in me." True faith in God involves faith in Christ, as soon as he is set before the soul; for in him all the fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily.

"The first archangel never saw
So much of God before."

We behold his glory in the face of Jesus Christ. Faith in

God then is implicitly faith in Christ; it is a germ which will unfold itself as such, as soon as Christ is presented to it. The law slays, thus showing us that Christ is our only life. So every doctrine, every duty, all legitimate matter of preaching, of whatever sort, culminates in Christ, in whom all things shall be gathered into one, and who filleth all in all. All duty leads to him, to discharge the debt incurred by its non-performance, to obtain strength for its future fulfilment; while the wisdom, power, and love displayed in Christ, evoke the highest love and adoration, and incite, while they enable us to render, grateful and devoted obedience.

But upon this general view there is no cause to dwell. Few Christians will deny that Christ should be the centre and substance of all preaching. It is only upon some of the consequences and bearings of this truth, that there is occasion for remark.

1. We apprehend that preachers are in little danger of excess in setting forth Christ objectively to their hearers. He, God in him, is the great object towards which their faith, love, hope, obedience, and devotion, are to be directed. They are Christians only as they thus bow to that name which is above every name. They are complete in Him who is the Head of all principality and power. Without him they can do nothing. Life, faith, love, hope, come of looking to him, not to themselves, or to anything which they or other men can spin out of themselves. It should never be forgotten that Christianity, although working an inward renovation by the immediate operation of the Holy Ghost, develops this change in accordance with the laws of our rational and moral nature. No Christian affections can arise except in view of their proper objects. These objects are found in Christ, the God-man, our Saviour, in his person, offices, and works. Of course, we do not mean to advocate any monotonous repetition of any single or isolated truth in regard to him. There is no need of this. One of the most remarkable treatises in our language is that of Bell, showing how much of God is evinced in the human hand. A friend of ours has in contemplation a similar treatise in regard to the honey-bee. If

these diminutive objects require volumes to show the extent of divine imprint upon them, can there be any lack of variety, any need of monotony, in exploring the infinite compass and relations of the Redeemer and his work? All life contains inexhaustible variety in unity which never tires by monotony. How much more He who is the Life, and combines in his own person a divine life, a human life, and the source of all life, out of whose fulness we all receive, and grace for grace! The endless sides and aspects in which he stands related to his people, enable us to view him in relations ever fresh and diversified, while yet he remains the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.

2. It hence follows, that the way and grounds of vital union to Christ should be thoroughly and abundantly set forth and cleared up in preaching. The nature of saving faith, as distinguished from all counterfeits of it; its simplicity, as distinguished from all the entanglements with which unbelief would embarrass it; its naked essence, as simple trust in Christ and his righteousness, should be, in one form and another, a frequent theme of preaching, and habitually inwoven with the whole texture of our discourses. This must be done, even if it incur the danger of seeming repetition. It is the grand requisite to the birth of the soul into the kingdom of God. Simple and rudimentary as it is in Christian teaching, free justification is an article in which men born under the covenant of works are dull learners. There always are those in every congregation who are thinking and inquiring on the subject of religion, but who have never known what it is to believe on Christ to the saving of the soul. They are always babes in Christ, and weak believers, who tremble and stumble in their Christian walk, because they have no adequate view of the free, gratuitous, and full justification which faith embraces and insures merely for the taking. At this point, too, not a few older Christians, "when, for the time they ought to be teachers, have need that one teach them which be the first principles of the doctrine of Christ." Many ministers have been surprised, in conversations with the sick and dying, to find persons who

have been their hearers all their days, in a mist on this simple and vital question, How can a sinner be justified before God? They know, indeed, in general, that it is not by their own, but by Christ's righteousness; yet, until the Spirit takes the scales from their eyes, they will be found, in some form, to be working up a righteousness of their own. They will think they must in some way make themselves better before they can be fit to go to Christ or he can receive them. Many believers often waver at this point. They doubt whether persons so unworthy have any warrant to appropriate to themselves the Saviour's righteousness. It is of great importance, that all inquiring, doubting, trembling souls be brought to see clearly the true nature of justification, which inures to those that believe on Him that justifieth the ungodly, that so they may stagger not at the promise, but be strong in the faith, giving glory to God. Nor can the preacher well expend too much of his strength here. All the liberty wherewith Christ maketh free; all filial confidence, love, and devotion; all holy strength and courage to serve God without fear, in holiness and righteousness, all the days of our lives; all that is sweet, genial, and buoyant, in our spiritual state, depend upon it. Thus there is peace and joy in believing. Thus we obtain righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost. Thus alone can we be delivered from the spirit of bondage and slavish fear, or feel ourselves in such a relation toward God as enables us to serve him with a true heart and right spirit. To the carnal eye, it indeed seems impossible that free justification should not encourage licentiousness. To the spiritual eye, it is the purifying spring from which good works must flow, and cannot but flow. We are not to get life in order to come to Christ, but to come to Christ that we may have life.

There is a class of theologians and preachers who involve this whole subject in perplexity, by the theory that love precedes and is the spring of evangelical faith, and that none but penitents are warranted to trust in Christ. The effect of this is to make men feel that, until they can find within themselves evidences of penitence and love, they must consider

the mercies of the gospel, as Boston says, "forbidden fruit," which it is unlawful for them to touch. On this subject, confusion of mind is the easiest of all things, and the clear truth among the most important. It is true, that no faith is genuine without repentance and love. So faith without works is dead. It is also true, that faith, although in the order of time simultaneous with commencing love, repentance, and good works, is, in the order of nature, before, conditional to, and causative of them. Love can only arise from faith's perception and belief of the excellence and glory of Christ and his cross, and of God as shining through them. It arises as they see,

> "What wisdom, power, and love,
> Shine in their dying Lord."

But we must discern and believe in this loveliness before it can excite our love. And when we believe and see it, it cannot but draw the heart. Another consideration is, that until we are in that friendly relation to God in which justifying faith places us, we cannot confide ourselves to him. We feel that our sins subject us to his righteous displeasure, and that we merit and must receive vengeance at his hands. Now love is impossible toward those whom we dare not trust, because we are subjects of their righteous wrath. So faith is indispensable to love. And since all works not inspired by faith and love are slavish, dead works, it follows, that although there be no faith without repentance, love, and holiness, yet faith is their antecedent and cause, as truly as the sun of its beams, and life of breath. We apprehend that a clear view of this point is of great moment in guiding inquiring souls. He is paralysed in making the gospel offer, who cannot, without conditions, bid every thirsty soul come and welcome; who is constrained to tell sinners that they must get rid of their inward distempers and maladies before coming to Christ, instead of going to him at once for the removal of sin and guilt. This is preaching a fettered gospel, and it produces a fettered piety. It gendereth to bondage. It is alien from the sweet and simple faith, the filial confidence and freedom, the buoyant yet humble hope, the cordial love and genial devotion of

the gospel; all which result from going at once to Christ for all, receiving all as a free gift from him, and thence giving all in love and gratitude to him. We think this view is sustained by the whole drift of scriptural representations. According to these, faith purifieth the heart: it works (exerts its energies) by love; it is the victory that overcometh the world. This view fully accords with the absolute necessity of love, repentance, humility, and good works, to salvation. Faith, which does not exert and evince itself in these, is not saving faith. Though we have all faith and have not charity, it profiteth nothing. Nor do the calls to repent, with the promise of pardon annexed, conflict with, they rather corroborate, this view. On what is this pardon based? On Christ. How apprehended and applied? By faith. When the wicked are exhorted to forsake their way, and the unrighteous their thoughts, and turn to God, who hath mercy, and to our God who will abundantly pardon, it is only a form of teaching, that faith in God's pardoning mercy is prerequisite to true repentance. The definition to the Catechism is a true summation of scriptural teachings on this subject. "Repentance unto life is a saving grace, whereby a sinner, out of a true sense of his sin, *and apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ*, doth, with grief and hatred of his sin, turn from it unto God, with full purpose of, and endeavor after, new obedience."

The mistaken theory to which we have adverted, of deriving faith from love, and not love from faith, has, we are persuaded, a strong tendency to generate error on the subject of the sinner's inability. The preacher does not see his way clear to direct the sinner immediately to Christ for deliverance from this, and all other evils and miseries of sin. If he cannot bid the sinner go out of himself at once to a strength which is made perfect in his weakness, nor till he has procured penitence, or love, or some other robe of clean linen with which to go, the question arises, "How shall he get all this? How can he be incited to work and strive for it? The answer is, the preacher must be prepared to tell him he is able to accomplish it, or else he is hopelessly paralysed, and can do nothing, but leave the inquirer passively awaiting the

sovereign afflatus of the Spirit. Hence various fictions of natural, and we know not what other, ability, have been devised to bridge over this chasm. But the inability of the sinner though moral, is real, and inconsistent with anything that can properly or safely be called ability. All modes of teaching which have any other effect than to lead men, under a sense of their own helplessness, to cast themselves on Christ for strength to lead a Christian life, are delusive and mischievous. We are not sufficient for anything, as of ourselves; our sufficiency is of God. When we are weak, then are we strong in the Lord and the power of his might. This is the whole theory of the Christian life. The just shall live by faith; not faith in their own ability, but of the Son of God, who loved us and gave himself for us. The whole may be summed up by adding to the article of the Catechism on repentance, those on faith and effectual calling. "Faith in Jesus Christ is a saving grace whereby we receive and rest upon him alone for salvation, as he is offered to us in the gospel." "Effectual calling is the work of God's Spirit, whereby convincing us of our sin and misery, enlightening our minds in the knowledge of Christ and renewing our wills, he doth persuade and enable us to embrace Jesus Christ, freely offered to us in the gospel."

If we add Art. 2, of Chap. X, of our Confession to what we have already quoted from the article in the *Princeton Review*, it will complete our own view, and the representation of our standards, and, as we think, of the Scriptures on the general subject. "This effectual call is of God's free and special grace alone, not from anything at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, until being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed by it." 2 Tim. i. 9; Tit. iii, 4, 5; Rom. ix, 11; Eph. ii, 4, 5, 8, 9; 1 Cor. ii, 14; Eph. ii, 5; John vi. 37; Ezek. xxxvi, 27, etc., etc.

ART. VII.—"THE ONLY TRUE LIKENESS OF OUR SAVIOUR."

During the past two or three years, a pretended likeness of Christ, in various styles has had considerable circulation in this country. It claims to be a true portrait of Christ, and the only one. It is taken from a photograph published in Munich, of which a fuller account is given below. The Munich photograph professes to be a copy of a bust of our Saviour, copied from an ancient medal. The best form in which this bust has been produced is by P. H. Van Clef, Paris, dated 1858. It bears the following inscription:

"Fait d'aprés un Camée
existant à Rome
et commandé par
l'Empereur Tibère
César contemporain
de Jèsus Christ.
Ce Camée
a été donné par
l'Empereur des Turcs
au Pape Innocent VIII
pour le rachat de son
frère captif des Chrétiens."

How it stands with the antiquity and authenticity of this "only true likeness" will be seen from the following article,* prepared by a thoroughly competent archæologist and critic, Dr. Julius Friedländer, Director of the Royal Cabinet of Medals in Berlin. The article is as follows:

THE LIKENESS OF OUR SAVIOUR, FROM CONSTANTINOPLE.

In South Germany, particularly in Augsburg, a photograph has been widely circulated, representing the bust of the Saviour, with this inscription printed beneath: "The only true likeness of our Saviour, taken from one cut on an emerald, which Pope Innocent VIII. received from the Sultan

* Published in the Theologische Studien und Kritiken, Berlin, the leading theological quarterly of Germany.

as the ransom of his brother, then a captive of the Christians."

The truth of the matter is this. The foundation of the whole is an old medal cast, about three inches in diameter, on which is the bust of our Saviour, with the inscription: IHS. XPC. SALVATOR MUNDI. The reverse bears this legend: Presentes figure ad similitudinem domini Jhesu salvatoris nostri et apostoli Pauli in amiraldo impresse per magni Theucri predecessores antea singulariter observate misse sunt ab ipso magno Theucro s. d. n. pape Innocentio octavo pro singulari dono ad hunc finem ut suum fratrem captivum retineat.

The bust on this medal, a copy of which lies before me, with one of that of the apostle Paul, mentioned above, is, according to the inscription (presentes figuræ), a casting from the emerald, and the original of the Augsburg photograph. But the portrait on the emerald is evidently, from its style, a work of the fifteenth century, and not of an earlier date. Since it came from Constantinople, we may conjecture that the stone was cut by the order of the Sultan Mohammed II., who, as is well known, was a friend of art, calling painters and bronze-founders from Italy, and, contrary to the Koran, allowing his own likeness to be taken, and even paintings to be made from Christian subjects, as, for example, the beheading of John the Baptist.

The medal, a casting from the emerald, was made in the time of Pope Innocent VIII., who is here styled *sanctus dominus noster papa*, an expression which would hardly have been used in reference to a pope not living.

If the antiquity of the emerald fares so badly, the case is still worse in regard to the Augsburg photograph, for this is not even taken from a copy of the medal, but from a modernized, inaccurate drawing after the medal, which entirely changes its character. Even the inscription under the photograph is false, while that of the medal tells the truth.

It was not for the redemption of his brother that the Sultan sent the two emeralds to the Pope, but, on the contrary, that he might be retained a prisoner.

After the death of Mohammed II., his sons, Bajazet II. and Djem (called in Europe Zizim), strove for the throne. Djem, who, notwithstanding his youth, bore the honorable title of *Pehlivan* (conqueror), was defeated and fled to Rhodes. As Aubusson, the Grand Master of the Order of St. John, would not give him up, Bajazet paid to the Order 45,000 ducats annually to secure the retention of his brother as a prisoner. Djem was afterwards sent to France, and, finally, in 1489, was delivered up to Pope Innocent VIII., Aubusson receiving a cardinal's hat in reward. Bajazet must at that time have sent the two emeralds to the Pope, *ut fratrem suum captivum retineat.* Later, Alexander VI. made use of Bajazet's fear of Djem to extort large sums of money from the Sultan, after negotiations for the murder of Djem had failed, on account of the exorbitant demands of the Pope. When Charles VIII. was in Rome, fighting against the Pope, it was agreed that the unfortunate captive should be given up to him. Cæsar Borgia, however, had just before given him poison, so that he died in Naples, whither he accompanied the king, in the thirty-sixth year of his life and the twelfth of his captivity.

Hence, the emerald with the likeness of our Saviour is by no means of great antiquity; the medal, a cast from this emerald, is not truly reproduced in the Augsburg photograph; and the inscription under the photograph is entirely false.

NOTE.—Gieseler, in his "Church History," vol. iii., p. 297 (Harper's edition), says that "when Djem, the brother and rival of the Turkish Sultan Bajazet, was delivered up in 1489 by the Knights of Rhodes to Innocent VIII., the latter, instead of sending him (as he had implied he would) at the head of an army against the Turks, chose rather to detain him in prison in consideration of an annual tribute from the Turkish Sultan.". Djem fled to Rhodes in 1482; and was kept a prisoner in France by the Knights till they handed him over to the Pope in 1489. The Sultan immediately began to negotiate with the Pope for his purchase. The King of Hungary also wanted to have Djem's aid in his war against the Sultan, and he made high counter offers; but he was told he could not get him from the Pope " for 200,000

ducats as the Sultan had already bid 600,000." And the Pope actually kept Djem from engaging in the war against the Sultan, receiving large sums from the latter, as well as various costly gifts :—among others, "the only true likeness of Christ." See VonHammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, ii., s. 250, seq.

Art. VIII.—ALLIBONE'S DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE.*

By Henry B. Smith.

Dr. Allibone's Dictionary of English Literature is the most valuable and important work upon the subject ever written. It really has no competitor in Great Britain or in this country. The only works with which it can be compared are Robert Watt's "Bibliotheca Britannica," and Lowndes' "Bibliographer's Manual" and "British Librarian." But the work of Watt, published in 1824, contains only about half as many names of authors, 22,500 (of whom one or two hundred are Americans); while the volumes of Lowndes are chiefly for the use of librarians and book-collectors, and do not pretend to be complete in either biography or bibliography. In fact, the literature of British authorship was in a most imperfect, not to say chaotic state, when Dr. Allibone projected his great dictionary on a comprehensive, and even original plan. There was no one in England to be named with the great bibliographers of the continent of Europe. And it is greatly to the honor of our American literature, that this vast project has here been conceived and completed with such wonderful fidelity and patience, and such indisputable

* A Critical Dictionary of English Literature, and British and American Authors, Living and Deceased, from the Earliest Accounts to the Latter Half of the Nineteenth Century: Containing over Forty-six thousand Articles (Authors), with Forty Indexes of Subjects. By S. Austin Allibone, LL.D. 3 vols., imp. 8vo., pp. 3,139. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

The Union Bible Companion. By S. Austin Allibone. Philadelphia: Am. Sunday-school Union. 12 mo. pp. 315.

success. Lord Macaulay declared as to the first volume, published by Mr. Childs in 1858, "I have no hesitation in saying that it is far superior to any other work of the kind in our language." It is indispensable not only for every scholar and every library, but also for any one who has anything to do with English books beyond the momentary pleasure of reading. It has already won deserved repute at home and abroad; and its merits are so various and conspicuous that it will long maintain the highest place in this branch of literature.

The plan is felicitous, and in some respects novel. It is intended to be for the literature of the English tongue what a dictionary of words is to the language itself. One of its distinguishing merits is, that it combines bibliography with biography. The large collections of works in both these departments are here comprised in one book, uniting the advantages of both. Four closely printed pages of the preface are occupied with a list of these dictionaries: *e. g.*, Bayle's General Dictionary, 10 vols., fol.; the Biographia Britannica; Wood's Athenæ Oxonienses; Nichols' Literary Anecdotes, etc.; the volumes of Dr. Watt, of Dibdin, and of Lowndes; Chalmers', Rose's, and Gorton's Biographical Dictionaries, as well as the more recent ones: the Biographie Universelle; Brunet's Manuel du Librarie; Wright's Biographia Britannica Literaria; and the special works on particular authors, periods and subjects, as well as the whole round of English and American periodical literature. The materials are gathered from all accessible sources; sifted, condensed, and put into exact form. The accuracy of the work is one of its most extraordinary features: we have rarely found it at fault even in trivial matters. Of biography, enough is given to satisfy all reasonable demands; and very often, especially upon recent writers, there are details and anecdotes which could only have been obtained from out-of-the-way sources, private correspondence, or personal knowledge. The reader is perpetually coming upon happy bits of knowledge. We hardly ever take a volume of it in hand to look up some book or author, without being led off into

tempting by-paths, and lighting unexpectedly upon welcome notices of things new and old. There are also frequent references to what enthusiastic bibliomaniacs much delight in—rare and costly editions, with their prices at various times, and sometimes the names of their fortunate possessors.

We can only briefly refer to several articles, taken almost at random, as specimens of the extent and minuteness of the research. To Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam, about seven closely printed pages are given: two of these are devoted to his life; then follow, in order, an account of his various works, with citations from Bacon himself indicating their scope, and criticisms on each work from such writers as Voltaire, Condorcet, Morhof, Camden, Raleigh, Bp. Nicolson, Rushworth, Grotius, Addison, Dugald Stewart, Prof. Playfair, Thos. Fuller, Macaulay, Hallam, and many others. Striking passages and thoughts of Bacon are interspersed; the various editions of his chief works are noticed, etc. About Roger Bacon there is an excellent summary in two pages. Of Dr. Joseph Bingham there is a fair biographical sketch, with accounts of the various editions of his learned theological works, and the comments of Augusti (here printed Auguste), Walch, Orme, Bishop Short, and others. Burke has six pages, with condensed critical citations from eminent writers. The article on Pope would fill over sixty 12mo. pages; that on Sir Walter Scott is quite as long; the Shakespeare article would make a respectable volume of 250 pages, and it includes indexes to editors, commentators, translators, and Shakespeariania, the latter alone numbering 1,040 printed volumes and tracts. The account of William Cowper comprises an instructive biography, with extracts from numerous celebrated authors, and a reference to leading periodicals. The notice of Oliver Goldsmith is a model of copious and condensed information, with the best published comments on each of his noted works. That on Jeremy Taylor "the Homer of Divinity," includes an account of each of his works, with the several editions of them, down to the present time, and a formidable series of references to periodicals and works of literary history. Right after this comes the fullest account

we have seen of John Taylor, "the Water Poet," and an enumeration of his 138 works, embracing such odd titles as, "Bull, Beare and Horse, Cut, Curtaile and Longtaile;" "Rebels Anathematized and Anatomized;" "The Essence, Quintessence, Insence, Innocence, Lifesence and Magnificence of Nonsence upon Sence;" "Sir Gregory Nonsence, his Newes from no Place," etc. Afterwards comes the famous Thomas Taylor, "the Platonist," the solitary idealist of his times, with notices of his 41 writings and translations. Jeremy Collier has some three pages devoted to his polemic career. Among scientific men, Dr. Thos. Young is celebrated as "one of the most illustrious philosophers and scholars of all ages and nations;" "I venture," says the author, "this prediction in 1870:" his works are analyzed with the usual fulness of reference. If any one wishes to look up the literature on Scotch philosophy, he will find it more fully gathered than almost anywhere else under the names of Hume, Reid, Stewart, Brown, Hamilton, etc. The works in the great religious controversies of England on the Trinity, the Church, the Episcopacy, etc., and in the long deistic struggle, can easily be gathered under the leading names. An epitome of the whole Junius controversy contains a list of the most celebrated works upon the authorship of these "Letters," with the arguments for and against the various hypotheses. But it is needless to protract these cursory illustrations of the character and scope of this dictionary. Hardly any inquiry of literary interest can be raised, as to the books and authors of our language, on which some useful and exact information may not here be found. The only general exceptions are as to anonymous or pseudonymous writings, and as to translations into English of the works of writers in foreign tongues. Upon these subjects, it has recently been stated in English journals that the late Samuel Halkett, Keeper of the Advocates Library, Edinburgh, left in manuscript, "A Dictionary of the Anonymous and Pseudonymous Literature of Great Britain," including also the "the works of foreigners written in or translated into the English language," and that this is

now in preparation for the press. It will contain about 20,000 articles, in two quarto volumes.

We have already incidentally referred to one feature, almost peculiar to this undertaking, and which not only adds greatly to its utility, but gives the work a special charm; and that is, the fulness and pertinency of the interspersed comments and criticisms, by some of the most eminent English and foreign authors upon their fellows. This characteristic pervades the volume, and extends to all the departments of literature. We see how each writer is judged, and by those most competent to pass such a judgment. It is the verdict of his peers. It is literature deciding upon itself. And this is, in fact, not only the most laborious, but the most remarkable part of the work. It must have cost infinite toil, and it demanded wisdom and felicity of choice. A mere librarian or bibliographer might have collected all the names, titles, dates and facts, and so given the externals of the task with tolerable completeness and accuracy; and Mr. Allibone has done all this exceedingly well; but he has done much more than this. He has, as it were, set every author into the frame-work of his critics, and shown him to us as he is esteemed by the best men of his high craft and calling. Excellent examples of this may be found in the article on Edmund Spenser, and especially in that on John Milton, which extends to 38 closely printed pages. Such citations and criticisms require an amount of reading and research which few men are capable of; and a certain largeness and discrimination are also needed, of which there are not many examples. Biographies, literary and scientific histories, rare works on special topics, periodical literature in its various branches, have been laid under contribution. We do not say that Mr. Allibone has been equally successful in this respect as to all men and all subjects, for no mortal man can be omnivorous and omniscient; but any scholar will be profoundly grateful to one who has done so much and so well in such a difficult and delicate task. His work is conspicuous for its generosity and hospitality.

This suggests a word upon the comparative fulness of

treatment of the different branches of literature. It would be difficult to conjecture whether the author were more anxious to do justice to general literature, or theology, or law, or the sciences, or belles lettres. At the end of the work there are forty indexes, which are subdivided into eight or ten times as many sub-indexes: these all designate the different topics under which the whole of the literature is distributed. Under each of the forty indexes are then given merely the names of all the writers upon these subjects. Some of the names, of course, occur under several heads. The total number of authors is 46,499; the whole number of names in all the indexes, including repetitions, is 75,118. Divinity has the largest number of names, 12,829; next in number is Poetry, 5,194; Biography and Correspondence, 4,596; History, 4,189; Essayists, 3,490; Medicine, 3,805; Education, 3,119; Law, 3,175; Travels, 2,775; Politics, 2,557; Philology, 2,018; Fiction, 2,257; Antiquities, 1,501; Moral and Mental Philosophy, 1,412; Morals and Manners, 1,365; Drama, 1,404; Fine Arts, 1,312, etc., etc. The number of authors under each letter is given: S. has the most, 6,219; W. comes next, 5,168; B, 3,647; P, 3,603; M, 3,341; R, 3,098; C, 3,011; H, 2,983; T, 2,726; . . . X, 5, etc. Then there is a list of names of authors of common occurrence: Smith, of course, takes the lead—810; the next highest, *longe intervallo*, is Wilson, 330, closely followed by his neighbor, Williams, 325; Taylor, 251; White, 202, etc. We miss in this enumeration the name of Allen, Allan—of whom there is a goodly number. Seventy-two names are distributed among 7,890 persons; "average about 110." The name of Allibone is found only on the title-page, and subscribed at the close of the book to the following statement: "I read this last proof-sheet of the Dictionary of Authors on the last day of 1870." There is, it seems, only one Allibone in literature; but he has done the work of many men, and identified his name with the whole of English Literature.

We have space to note only one other special merit of this elaborate production: and that is, the comparative fulness and completness of his accounts of recent authors, English

and American, including the living as well as the deceased. His work, better than any other, serves the purpose of a contemporary literary biography and bibliography. Take any recent name, for example that of the amiable, high-minded and learned Professor F. D. Maurice, just deceased, and in the article devoted to him will be found a full list of his works: so of Dickens, Tennyson, Herbert Spencer, Mackintosh, Hugh Miller, John Stuart Mill, Richard Owen, John Tyndall, Dean Stanley, Pusey, J. H. and F. W. Newman, etc., etc. Our American authors, deceased and living, also have on the whole, justice done them. Consult, for example, the articles on Bryant, Longfellow, Hawthorne, Lowell, Bancroft, Everett, Prescott (12 pages), Irving, Kent, Story, Moses Stuart, Silliman, Dwight, Alexander, Lieber, Whittier, the Websters,—in fact almost any name of note. The facts, especially for recent literature, must have been collected to a large extent by correspondence, or by the assiduous consultation of all sorts and kinds of publications. Many of them are here printed for the first time. And any one who knows how difficult it is to get at just this kind of information, will duly appreciate the enormous labor that all these details must have imposed upon the writer. There is, of course, an inequality in the treatment of so many subjects and writers; but this is well nigh inevitable in a critical work of so extensive a scope, prepared by a single author. But its tone is impartial; there is nothing that looks like intentional bias or prejudice. In consulting it, too, it must be remembered that the first volume was published fourteen years ago, so that the literature of the earlier half of the alphabet could not be brought down to recent dates. Such books always need supplementing.

We must not omit a reference to the Preface of the first volume, which explains the aim and character of the work and its uses, and contains an account of early English literary history, and a chronological table of English authors, from A. D. 500 to A. D. 1500, as well as hints about a course of English reading.

This large undertaking was planned, says the author, in

1850, and completed Dec. 31, 1870. "It could not have been completed thus early, if at all, had not Dr. Allibone been at once fortunate and happy in his amanuensis—his wife—by whom the manuscript, which occupied about 20,000 pages of foolscap, was copied from his notes."* The price of such an amanuensis is indeed "above rubies" . . . "her works praise her in the gates." In his valedictory, Dr. Allibone writes: "My first emotion is a feeling of profound gratitude to that Almighty Being, 'without whose help all labor is ineffectual, and without whose grace all wisdom is folly,' by whom my life has been prolonged and my health preserved until I have thus brought to a happy consummation the object of so much deep solicitude, absorbing labor, and anxious care." It is indeed twenty years well spent. The wonder is that it was done in so short a time. *Finis coronat opus.*

The first volume is dedicated to its publisher, Mr. George William Childs. The others are dedicated to Mr. Joshua B. Lippincott. They both deserve well of their generation; and one of their best services has been their great liberality and enterprise in entering upon so costly an undertaking, and bringing out these noble volumes in so solid a style.

Besides this *opus magnum*, Dr. Allibone has contributed articles to various periodicals, and prepared several works for the American Sunday School Union (whose publications he has edited since December, 1867). "The Union Bible Companion" is the largest of these; it is a clear, judicious, and popular introduction to the study of the Scriptures, "with a copious Analytical Index." And "Indexes," we must add, are great favorites of our author; he commends them by word and deed, and in all his epistles. His favorite motto, from Fuller, is, "An *Index* is a necessary complement to a book." We heartily wish that there might be some sufficient means of enforcing this literary statute.

We cannot avoid expressing our wish, shared by so many others, that Dr. Allibone, in addition to his present useful labors, might find time to do the work which, of all our Am-

* Chambers' Encyclopædia; article, Allibone.

erican scholars, he is best fitted to do, in which in truth he is above comparison. We refer to an English bibliography by subjects, giving the works as well as the names of authors; this would for many, if not most, students, be quite as useful as a bibliography under the names of authors. But we are proposing, it may well be suggested, what no one man in a long life-time could accomplish. This may be true; but Dr. Watt devoted two volumes of his "Bibliotheca" to this part of the work. A new attempt can only be made by some one who has the requisite knowledge, resources and industry, —by a bibliographical genius. And such is Dr. Allibone. A really great bibliographer comes hardly once in a generation; and he should make the most of himself, for he is the helper of many generations.

Art. IX.—TENURE OF THE ELDER'S OFFICE.

By Alexander T. McGill, D. D., Princeton.

The Ruling Elder is an officer of the Presbyterian Church. In this capacity he is a representative of the people, and more. He has a gift from God, on which the office is founded; this gift has been formally recognized in his call to the exercise of its functions; these functions have been, of course, inaugurated by the authority of God; this authority binds him in the formula of solemn vows; and these vows are always indefinite as to the time of their continuance. Such must be said of any New Testament office that is ordinary and perpetual in the church. The faithful exercise of its functions must be a bounden duty, lasting as the gift itself. As the incumbent himself may not, without censure, put his gift in abeyance, so may not the people he serves limit or abridge, by any vote of theirs, what God has commissioned, without limitation of time. If both these parties, the officer and the people, concur in the divestment, there is a third party whose approval must be had, the Author of the gift and Founder of the office. His intervention is found only

in one or both of two ways—providence and discipline—the hand of God interposing a disqualification, or the ordinance of God ascertaining a forfeiture, by reason of offence. These are the principles which belong to all the ordinary ascension gifts of our Lord. And there is not in all his word an example of office for a term of years, according to the mere conventionalities of men.

If these conventionalities, not daring wholly to dispense with what the Head of the Church has instated, will venture to void his appointment, indirectly and partially, saying to the officer he gave, Thus long shall you exercise your gift, and no longer, without our ballot, they arrest a divine commission, put in chains the gift of God, compel the incumbent to stop in his faithfulness, and render useless, at their pleasure, what was appointed to be used above and beyond the mere pleasure of man.

But it is objected: this officer is a representative of the people, and as such must return to them for a renewal of their suffrage, at regular intervals. We answer, that so is the teaching elder himself a representative of the people; if we take the consistent view, that his great commission rests on the bosom of the Church, rather than a line of individual men, which must be historically traced and blindly believed in, when the track is invisible. It is not necessary that a true representative be more than once elected by the people's vote, and more especially when he is one of themselves, in his pursuits and sympathies and local connections. There have been truly, as well as nominally, representative men who were never elected formally by the votes of their constituents. Indeed, the frequent election of a true representative only tends to reduce the high character of representation, in which the man answers to his own conscience in serving the people, to that of the mere delegate or deputy, whose conscience the people must have to reflect themselves, alone.

In view of all these principles, there is not only no warrant for making any spiritual office a rotary one; but no reason or making the ruling elder, and not the teaching elder also,

a rotary one. And, as we may see in a subsequent paragraph, there is even less warrant, and far less expediency, in making the ruler a rotation in the church, than making "those who labor in the word and doctrine" a rotation and itinerancy; as in the Wesleyan system.

2. As an officer of the church, he is properly called *Elder*. Otherwise he has no name, and no list of qualifications in Scripture. The qualifications are enumerated distinctly, in Titus i. 6–9; compared with 1 Tim. iii. 2–7. The first thing which strikes us in this enumeration is, the little stress that is laid on oratorical qualifications. From the calling of Aaron to this present day, the need of these has been the chief requirement in the preacher; and if preachers are the only kind of elders ordained in the New Testament Church, it is inexplicable that almost nothing is said in the most formal account of qualifications we have here, of ability and soundness and zeal, in "the word and doctrine." The forecast of inspiration must have seen, what is realized more and more as the culture of the world advances and the relations of religion are multiplied, that "the word" would be all-embracing, and the qualification of its teachers would engross the learning and skill and persuasion of "the eloquent orator," as chief characteristics in the distinct institution of his office. Accordingly, we find in the pastoral epistles, and elsewhere, a plenary and diversified requirement, of fitness for the work of public instruction, and pastoral administration of the ordinances in every way; predicated of the minister as an evangelist, messenger, ambassador, steward, preacher, pastor, teacher, workman, etc.; but not as an elder; and, as elder and bishop are used interchangeably for the same office, not even as a bishop. And why not? Unless we make the elder generic, embracing two classes, or one large class, with a portion of it distinguished from the others by a specified particularity, we have no satisfactory answer. Elders are not furnished with the distinctive qualification of preachers.

But, on the supposition that the Scottish reformers, in framing the Second Book of Discipline, and the Westminster Divines, not to speak of subsequent interpreters beyond

number, within and without the Presbyterian communion, have rightly accepted the notable text, 1 Tim. v. 17: "Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine," as indicating two classes of elders, we can turn to the catalogue of an elder's qualifications, with clear understanding that it belongs to the root or trunk of a great office, which has two branches, and see at once how fairly our ruler is called an elder, and why so little is said, and that so vaguely, respecting the elder's endowment for public ministrations of the word. "Apt to teach," in the sense of the original, may be taken either actively or passively, (see 2 Tim. ii. 24,) and mean either public and formal, or private and social teaching; and thus be generalized, as the word elder itself. So also, the corresponding requirement in Titus i. 9, "Able by sound doctrine, both to exhort and to convince the gainsayers." The deacon Stephen could do this.

The ruler is necessarily a teacher, to some extent, in the Christian Church. As all his authority is declarative alone, and its enforcement consists in the application of divine words to the offences of men, from the first admonition to the last excommunication, he must be a teacher, in one important sense, at least. And then, the use of the keys by the bench of authority, in every particular church, in admitting and excluding members, must make every man on the bench a catechist, and of course a teacher; so that ruling includes teaching, as certainly, if not as much, as teaching includes ruling. These two elements, in different proportions, are found inseparably connected, in each of the two branches, called the teaching and the ruling elder; and all the qualifications of an elder, found in the Scriptures, belong to these two in common, and characterize the genus of this institution in the Church of Christ.

This ruler comes fairly by the name of elder, not merely in coming to the only enumeration of his qualities, found in the New Testament, which are expressly those of an elder; but also by an original claim, in which the teaching elder himself derives from him the title. The church of the Old Testament

handed this denomination to the New. And it is remarkable that, while we have the other officers, both ordinary and extraordinary, indicated at their beginning, in the New we have no formal institution of the eldership; and read nothing about Christian elders until we find Paul and Barnabas ordaining a plurality of them in every church. At the very time of these ordinations, the new church was full of preachers, who had been sent by a Pentecostal commission; which would last only as long as the extraordinary gifts continued. At the cessation of such gifts, we have the inspired apostle directing the deputies he sent, to "set in order the things that are wanting," to devolve the permanent instruction of the church and the world upon this old ecclesiastical institute; whose original occupation was mainly that of ruling; whose province in the apostolic age was rather to judge of others that came to exercise their gifts among the people; and whose office in its very nature implied the exercise of teaching, which was to be made more or less prominent and signal, as the exigencies of the church would call for this gift, and classify its functions, from age to age. The ruling elder is then the aboriginal elder; the teaching elder inherits from him; the supervenient commission, to "preach the gospel to every creature," which now calls for those of his class that the Spirit and Providence of God assign to the ministry of the word, cannot, obviously, either annihilate the residuary bench, or take away its name; which has been as a thread of unity for the visible church through three dispensations.

Now, in all this indefeasible right of the ruling elder to the name by which we familiarly call him, we may see how unwarrantable it is to make him temporary in the term of his office; and compel him, and not the teaching elder, to suspend the operations of what God has endowed him with, at the arbitrary dictation of man's will, as to the number of months he shall be permitted to work. It is to make empirical what God has made old and stable. It is to make a ball at the feet of popular whimsey, what God has made a rock for the surges to break on. It is to root up every planting which our fathers have made, in the fundamental warrant for

the office itself, and expose to every vicissitude of wind and weather, what the mere idea of lay representation will never suffice to protect and perpetuate, as an office in the church. The question must go to the foundation of this office.

3. The ruling elder is a local officer. He does not belong to the church at large, as the teaching elder does, by virtue of the great commission, devolved on him especially, to preach the gospel to every creature. Although as representative, appointed from time to time, he may appear beyond his place, to exercise authority in jurisdiction over a wider field than that of a particular church, his power of order, as distinguished from that of jurisdiction (which is the power of assemblies), cannot be carried beyond the boundary of one particular congregation. This localization of the office we have in every hint of elders in Scripture; which speaks of a plurality ordained, as often as it speaks of any special organization. "In every church," Acts xiv. 23. "In every city," Titus i, 5. "And from Miletus he sent to Ephesus, and called the elders of the church," Acts xx. 17. "To all the saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi, with the bishops and deacons," Phil. i. 1. Accordingly our own book, Form of Government, chapter 13th, section 2, requires that, in all cases, persons elected to this office be "male members in full communion in the church in which they are to exercise their office." And again, section 6, it speaks of the ruling elder as belonging to the particular church he serves, "the congregation to which he belongs." We never speak of the teaching elder in this way, as belonging to one congregation, however much it may be identified with his name. He, in distinction, belongs to the whole Church of Christ. In the nature of things, a ruling elder is local, as a teaching elder is not. The art of government is so particular in dealing with the circumstances of individuals and communities, the traditions, usages, prejudices and pursuits of the governed, that the elder who rules well in one church may be entirely unfit to rule in another. The teacher may instruct that one as well as he might a hundred others; while as a ruler he can guide and govern it as he could no other in the whole visible church. Hence the

silence of our Book on the installation of Ruling Elders; that is, the reinstatement in some particular place, of one who is already an officer, without the actual exercise of his functions, in any special relation. It evidently identifies, in their case, the solemnities of ordination and installation under the phrase "set apart." These elders are no longer set apart when they cease to act, by some formal regulation of the church. The express mention of installation, in the case of teaching elders, makes it more certain that no such distinct solemnity was intended in the case of ruling elders. And any partial action of the General Assemblies, in legislating on this subject, without reference to the Presbyteries by overture, must of course fail to modify the organic law, by which we now study this important office.

It follows fairly, that the specious plea for setting aside periodically the acting elder, that he is not divested of office, but only relieved of its duties for a time, to be installed without ordination again, if desired by the people, is of no force, having no foothold in our constitution. The letter is violated, without a color of relief, in following the spirit of our Book. Rotation to the local elder is blank divestment. The gift of God to a particular church, and not to the church at large, is thrown aside, under a pretext of transferability, which has no existence in the nature of the thing, either to another place, or another time in the same place. We have no "Grand Consistory," to which we may turn over an elder of whom the people are tired, and recall him to counsel and action, on special occasions, like that of choosing a pastor for the people. This, in a measure, saved the Reformed Church of Holland from the miserable fiction of law to which we must resort when we deprive the elder of his ministry, without even ostensible cause, and cheat the sensibilities of his nature, and the solemnities of his consecration, with the subtlety of a spiritual character, which is said to remain indelibly under a total repression of its functions.

Our own admirable form of government, chap. 13, specifies the only case in which one who is not an acting elder can be considered an elder at all; and it is a transaction within the

session itself. And it is for good cause, shown upon a record, when he is willing, and a semi-judicial process besides when he is unwilling to retire. Summary as it may seem, it is a process open and equitable, initiated by his peers, and enforced by a superior court; an eminently Presbyterian way, in singular contrast with the loose Congregational method, now permitted to supersede it, in which the people are at once accusers, witnesses, and judges; removing him from office without a record, or a libel, or a process, other than what is hidden in their ballot-box. The enforced demission of his office in this way, by a tribunal which has no responsibility for its acts, may be a life-long punishment for a mere inadvertence of good intentions and good capability in office. The best of ruling elders may serve them only for a definite time, and yet be punished by them through indefinite duration. A term of two or three years will measure his probation, and a life time afterwards will be required to measure the penalty which their displeasure inflicts, alike on great offences and small. Truly, this rotary system is a turning of things upside down! A life service they call "iron-clad tyranny;" but a life suspension of God's own officer, at the whim of the people, they call "liberty" and "progress!"

4. The local officer needs, more than any other, permanence of tenure in the exercise of his functions. The teaching elder, who is general in the commission he holds, and its relation to the Church, is given "wholly" to the work of his office. But the ruling elder, whose calling in office confines him to a particular church, does not "live of the gospel," in his separation to its service; and must follow the ordinary industries of life for a living. Consequently, he requires much longer time to study the nature and duties of the office. Called to "provide things honest in the sight of all men," by the work of his hands, he is called to a duration of time in the tenure of office, which must be long in its lapse as it is narrow in its space; or, in other words, continued in its term, as it is contracted in its leisure and opportunity. Otherwise, its demands on fidelity and skill would be unreasonable. Hence the Second Book of Discipline, which has

been the "Book of Policy," for almost 300 years, in all the Presbyterian bodies ot Scotland and Ireland, so wisely provided, along with a life-tenure of the office, that the ruling elders might relieve one another interchangeably "as was among the Levites under the law in serving of the temple." This provision had no sense in it, if the strange interpretation forced upon this Book at present, by the advocates of "term service," be admitted.

Thorough and mature study of this office, in its exercise, as well as its nature and warrant, must be acknowledged as indispensable. Every particular church has an individuality of life and character, by which it is distinguished from all others, even of the same neighborhood and name. It has traditions of its own, antecedent impress of its ministry, characters among its people, affinities and feuds, changes of surrounding influence, experiences of inner life; and, even if but newly organized, the derivation of its elements, and tendencies with which they are gathered together; and all these must be well known, or that church cannot be well governed. And it is seldom that the teaching elder adequately understands these things, in his habits of study and associations remote from the cares and occupations which mould his people. As a matter of fact, his attempt to govern at all, with the exercise of discipline, usually results in ousting himself from the place; wherever he has no bench of elders, wiser than himself, to know the place and the people by a long identification with their families and pursuits. The most stupid and stubborn elder at his side, who has the experience, may be an oracle to save him. And are we now to consider such experience of no value? Shall the most difficult of all arts in the world, and unspeakably more difficult in the church than in the world, that of governing minds, be now rolled out from its time-honored shelter, to be hackneyed on the level to which liberty for the sake of liberty is dragging church and state, with contempt for age and experience uplifted, as the chief livery in its drive?

We had hoped to find in our bench of ruling elders, the great expediency of our system for this age, and its progress

in every way; the ruler, who, as the Second Book of Discipline said, "sould be cairfull in seiking the fruit" of what the pastor has sown; the teacher, who would guide the intermediate instruction between pastor and people, without which no congregation will thrive, and with which, under the name of class-leader, the Methodist Church has covered the land. The Sabbath-school visitor, also, to see that the covenanted family is there, and that household religion is not lost in the communism which reduces every day the solid religion of our fathers to a superficial flippancy, on which Presbyterianism will perish. In short, we had long dreamed, fondly and confidently, that our "seniors of the people," with their life-long education and treasured wisdom, kept aloof by our constitution from the intrigues and mutations of political canvass, would be the fixed feature which could turn to everything that turns, with all the versatility that is safe, and be itself a stake which will never be removed. But the triumph of a rotary system, over the letter and spirit of of our Book, dashes the dream and darkens our hopes.

5. Discipline, as an ordinance of God, is compromised and avoided by such a change. Of course, as we have seen already, discipline over elders themselves, for unfaithfulness in office, will be at an end, so far as its regular and equitable forms are concerned. Indeed, the trouble of this, even the slight formality required in our Book, to rid a particular church of an unacceptable elder, by the action of the session itself, is avowed as one of the reasons for making chap. 13, sec. 6 and 7, a dead letter. The moral cowardice which evades an ordinance of God, because it is an inconvenience at all, must augur badly for the conservation of any other ordinance. Far as a weakness of this kind may be at present from the men who champion this innovation, it will hardly be denied that in every corner the wishes which propagate an interest on this behalf, are excited more or less by the example of some ugly and impracticable elder, whom they would rather roll back on the people than lead out of office, by the door of our constitution.

And yet, this very man, by the life tenure he has had, may

have a memory of the utmost value to the session and people, if not the pastor, he troubles. We know that cases of discipline are nearly always long; equity and mercy themselves prolonging them. And more than the steps of process, which are righteously slow, the effects on offenders, the fruits meet for repentance, to justify the restoration of the erring, must have long time to evince their true nature. One case, at least, is known to the writer, which lasted thirty years in one particular church, and came to an ultimate issue, that was wise and just, only by the counsel of an elder who had been thirty-five years on that bench. It was an important case, which would have been utterly marred by the rolling stone that is now set in motion.

But discipline is also delicate, as it is chronic. Few cases can be managed well without retreating far from the gaze of a crowd; "go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone." It is the beauty of our bench that it wears a veil which no congregational meeting could put on. But if its consecrated judges must come down, every two or three years, to the canvass of a popular election, must there not be a rude revelation of every case for the scrutiny of voters? Just as often as that election returns must come a ventilation, at the pleasure of the people, of what will not fail to destroy in the exposure many a fair and gentle administration of an ordinance truly divine.

And who, among the best qualified men for such administration, will then be willing to undertake it? No fact is more familiar, in our best churches now, than the difficulty of persuading the right men to accept this appointment. Even its sheltered responsibilities, with the longest guaranty of time to learn them, weigh heavily on the sensibilities of good men. But if it be known that experience may be nipped in the bud, and before he has time to correct a mistake, he may be thrust aside, by a popular vote, as incompetent or unfaithful, who will venture on the precarious honor? Who will not prefer to remain among the people, a true congregationalist, where the rulers abide; when our *ruling* elders are in reality the *ruled* elders; and the very title of this noble office turns

to a positive misnomer? We mourn the almost universal aversion of our well-qualified countrymen to suffer nomination for offices of state; because the passage must be made so often through the buffetings of popular election. How much more must we come to grief, in the house of God, to see the meritorious decline a spiritual office on the same account, and the charlatan, who is ambitious and vain in proportion as he has not the gift, bear the keys and represent the people.

6. These principles and reasons of expediency, among many others which might be mentioned, may at least incline us to believe that our Book means what it says, when it declares the office is "perpetual and cannot be laid aside at pleasure. No person can be divested—but by deposition." And then, to make it, if possible, stronger, we have an exception following, to confirm the rule, giving every church a safe and liberal provision against the evil of an incapable and unacceptable elder, Chap. 13th. Prof. Hamilton, in this Review, of October last, while advocating a change of our constitution, demonstrated unanswerably the necessity of this, by showing how plainly the "time service" is inconsistent with the Book as it now stands. To say that the word "mode" means time, in the 2d section, because, forsooth, it happened accidentally in 1835 that an inadvertent writer of the Assembly's minute, that year, condemning the rotary system as unconstitutional, said it was not the right *mode*, is about the most marvellous criticism ever made on our venerable constitution. And why not argue from the same minute, that the word "perpetual," taken from our Book, must mean a life tenure, as that writer used it to mean?

Over and over again, it has been settled in our courts, that *mode* is something different from *time*. In one church the existing elders nominate and recommend persons to be chosen as additional; and in another this will not be allowed by the people. In one church only the heads of families have been allowed to vote in the election of elders; and in another, all the communicants are allowed. In one, males only; in another, females as well. This is "mode," left to the will and usage of the churches. Let John Knox himself speak to

these brethren a word on the subject, as they are still quoting his obsolete First Book of Discipline, for the law of the church; allowing us to translate his orthography a little. "Their election shall be yearly, where it may be conveniently observed. How the votes and suffrages may be best 'resavit' with every man's freedom in voting, we leave to the judgment of every particular kirk." Here is authority from the beginning for distinguishing, *when and how*, "time service" from the "mode" of election.

But even were we to concede that these two very different things are jumbled in our Book of Government, as well as Minutes of the Assembly, shall we beg the question, that "mode" may mean this thing as well as another, in order to set aside the most explicit and precise words of law in the Constitution?

7. We are told, however, that back of the constitution are usages in all times and all countries, from which Presbyterians came, to form our government of the church; and these must be assumed as interpreters, to prove that our Book does not mean what it says so plainly; because it did not expressly forbid those antecedent customs. Admitting for a moment, that such contrary usages did exist as asserted, must a new symbolic formula, in a new country, and among new institutions of civil government, be constrained forever to abide under old and superseded senses, because these are not specifically annulled in the instrument itself? "Offer it now unto thy governor." Try it on the constitution of the United States, or any other civil ordinance of organic law, and see how futile this pretence must appear. It is legislative, and not constitutional statute, that is wont to abolish expressly what had been to the contrary before.

But the assertion of such antecedent usage must be denied. English speaking Presbyterians came to this country, and constructed our constitution, with a life tenure in the ruling eldership, as the universal usage of them and their fathers for seven generations, before we had a General Assembly. The First Book of Discipline for the Church of Scotland is, without exception, among historians,

considered a mere experiment, a temporary expedient, "to begin with," prepared by six ministers, during the sessions of the first General Assembly, December, 1560. The only sanction it ever had, either in church or state, was the irregular subscription of its authors, personally, and others, ministers and laymen, who favored reform. That it was adopted by the General Assembly itself, is only a matter of conjecture, not of record. And this is the only document to be found in all Scottish history which favors a periodical election of elders by the people, as it was done by the Council at Geneva; "tinged with the times," and confessedly crude and imperfect in many of its provisions.

The great "Book of Policy for the Kirk" was the Second Book of Discipline, the only true development of Presbyterianism; as it arose from the cradle of the first Reformation, as it grew up to be confirmed at the second Reformation, as it settled down, with the sanction of an empire, in the "Revolution Settlement" of 1690. Unlike the First Book, the Second was one of long deliberation, through successive Assemblies, three at least; committed to seventeen of the best ecclesiastics in Europe, one of whom, John Row, had been ten years at Rome, renowned even at the Papal court for his unrivalled skill in canon law. Every circumstance about this book makes it the original, independent and perfect masterpiece of the Presbyterian system. To say, as has been said of late, that the Second Book was intended to be no more than "explanatory" of the first, on certain points, is an amazing contradiction of the facts, which are patent in history. To say that the Scottish people could not have permitted, without struggle or protest, the work of John Knox, within six years of his death, to be overturned or discarded, is to speak against that reformer himself, who favored the preparation of another book; and to overlook the palpable changes, confessedly made in many another part of his own book; such as the abolition of superintendents, the restoration of "laying on of hands" in ordination, and the rescue of the ministry from a censorship by the elders and deacons over the pastor himself, which the first book had ordered.

Now, the following items are precisely the words of this great book (in our spelling) on the tenure of office by the ruling elder.

"4. Their office, as it is ordinary, so is it perpetual, and always necessary in the kirk of God.

"5. The eldership is a spiritual function, as is the ministry.

"6. Elders once lawfully called to the office, and having gifts from God, meet to exercise the same, may not leave it again.

"7. Albeit such a number of elders may be chosen in certain congregations, that one part of them may relieve another for a reasonable space, as was among the Levites under the law in serving of the temple."

Our limited space compels us to leave out other parts of the chapter (6th), which only reflect a stronger light upon the truth of our interpretation, if any interpretation is needed.

If a life tenure of office be not implied in item 4, as above, then there is a mere tautology in its diversified phrases, unworthy of the penmen, inconsistent with the style of the whole Book, and which the committee were expressly charged by the Assembly to avoid. Yet, according to the advocates of a rotary eldership, each of the three phrases mean exactly the same thing, that the office itself only is permanent in the church! Of course, the same phrases, elsewhere used of preaching elders, must mean the same thing: that theirs is not investment for life. Unfortunately, however, for this late-learned construction, we have the original Minutes of that General Assembly, in which this Book was finally adopted, 1578. Though the ravages of Adamson's hand, Bishop of St. Andrews, tore away leaves from that ancient manuscript, enough is left to give us the key which we are seeking for now. As we read the transactions of the Assembly, in adopting the Book, we come to this 6th chapter, and find that the honest Clerk calls it and the action thereon, "The perpetuitie of *the persones of the elders* aggriet conforme," etc. If this caption by the Clerk, approved by the Assembly, has any meaning at all, it is that a life tenure was the main thing of interest and change on the head of the eldership: perpetuity

in *persons* as well as offices. See Acts of the Assembly, published by the Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1840, as well as the Booke of the Universall Kirk.

But even this cleric signal, so conclusive in itself, is not needed to assure us of what we have asserted elsewhere, that the obvious meaning is the true meaning of the words. We have the fact of a life tenure traced back indefinitely; and no man can tell when it began or how, unless we say that it began with this Book, in 1578. The world knows that the track of Scottish Church history is not a blind one. We have the fact also that successive departures from the Kirk of Scotland by seceding bodies, were all, as Dr. McCrie, the great historian affirms, for the purpose of returning honestly and rigidly to this Book of Discipline, as well as doctrinal purity. And the world knows, the seceders have zealously and without exception adhered to this permanent tenure of elders. And, to crown all, we have the great manual of Scottish ecclesiastical lawyers, Steuart of Pardovan, without one word concerning a rotary eldership, and with many a word implying life tenure. If we have the disadvantage of proving a negative, we have a pile of negations, which need hardly be continued, against a bald assertion, so new and unfounded.

And what if Scottish history should afford the sparse and sporadic acts of Assembly, which are cited to sustain the assertion, that annual or quadrennial elections continued after the Second Book of Discipline, and under its operation? Does that prove the rotary system to have been the regular one, against the face of that venerated Book, any more than the extraordinary vote of our late Assembly proves to posterity, that now, and ever since we had an American book, formed on its model, we must have had a similar mode of turning in and out our elders, at the pleasure of the people?

But no such acts are to be found. It is not shown, and cannot be shown, that any act of the Scottish Assembly ever attempted or allowed any other kind of rotation, than that alternate working and resting which item "7," quoted above, from the Book of Discipline, allowed, as an arrangement among the elders themselves. This, of course, implied a per-

manency of tenure, and no return to the people for votes. Abuses doubtless crept in from time to time, and the correction of these, by successive Assemblies, comprehends everything that the acts cited by Messrs. Moore and Agnew can purport. Never did the Church of Scotland have a rotary eldership, after she tried it for eighteen years at the confused beginning of her structure. Never had the Second Book of Discipline any other to succeed it or modify it, in one iota, (the Westminister Directory being essentially coincident), until 1842; and the slight modification, explanatory and particular, made in that year, was certainly not in the direction of this new system. Why was not this last action, confirmed constitutionally, cited at all? And here we must pause, with deep regret and humiliation, to notice what has probably never had a parallel on the pages of this journal, or the floor of our General Assembly, in the perversion of historical facts, for the apparent purpose of gaining a victory. That "Act of 1705," which has been flaunted so conspicuously and often, by both the debaters referred to, does not contain one word in favor of election, and much less periodical election, by the people! It is the eldership that is to nominate and choose elders; and the only vote of the people mentioned is "tacit consent thereto." When elections in this way, adding some new men to the existing session, had become "annual," it was advised that this be "rectified," and that "new elections of elders, expressed in cases of great necessity, should only be within the compass of four years, and that especially in burghs where there are plenty of persons to choose upon." All this to regulate the elders themselves, in adding more men or new men to the bench, without one hint of rotation, or election by the people, in the whole document!

And what have we had, both written and spoken, by Messrs. Moore and Agnew, respecting this so-called "Act of 1705?" That it is "law," "nine years" in preparation, and "finally ratified by the Assembly, 1705;" that it is "the third Book;" "New Book of Discipline," "answering to our Form of Government and Book of Discipline combined;"

binding until 1771," "never repealed;" "Dr. Milligan tells me it never was repealed," etc. Now will the church listen to us, when we declare, that the whole thing is *apocryphal?* It is even so! There is no such "act," no such "book." If the "Revised Book of Discipline" gotten up by the Old School General Assembly, through their committee, continued from 1857 to 1864, had happened to be spread on the Minutes of the Assembly, when reported, or published in the Appendix, by order of the Assembly, without one enacting clause ever appearing on the records, and should now or hereafter be quoted as "law," etc., it would be just the illustration we need, to express the truth in regard to this vaunted document. There is no such law. Well might the honored delegate from the established Church of Scotland tell Mr. Agnew it was never repealed; for it was never enacted.

The document is indeed published, along with the laws of the Scottish church, but it is accompanied with the following "Advertisement": "These overtures were never read in the General Assembly, nor any of the Commissions thereof, only revised by committees; so that the same is not to be looked upon as the deed of the Church of Scotland, nor any judicatory therein; and yet it may be very useful for advice and direction, though not as a binding rule; and, no doubt, it will have weight with many, as having come through the hands of so many learned, judicious, grave, and pious ministers, who have been at great pains in the matter," etc. This preface goes on to say that portions of it had never been sent down to the Presbyteries at all, and never had appeared in print before. See "Acts of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland," published under "the superintendence of the Church Law Society, Edinburgh, 1843."

Again, Mr. Agnew is reported as saying, after Mr. Moore had in effect written the same thing, "The Second Book of Discipline adds still further, 'their election shall be yearly, where it may be conveniently observed.'" Where did these brethren find their Second Book of Discipline? Why torture and misrepresent the glorious old covenanted Book of the Melvilles, etc., in a cause of such "doubtful disputation" as the

defeat of that complaint before them? No such passage, nor anything like it, is to be found in manuscript, print, or even misprint of that standard! Our brethren have allowed themselves to be deceived and misled by Heylin, a mendacious calumniator of the Presbyterian Church. He, and Spottiswoode, and others, were always artfully jumbling the First and Second Books together, that they might make an image, part iron and part clay, for the mark of their obloquy.

Again, we are told, "There was not a Presbyterian church in all the old world but practised the mode of holding periodical elections." Of course, the speaker meant elections of elders *by the people*, periodically. Now, we assert, that throughout "all the old world," in all its ages, there never was such a plan as this rotary system, just inaugurated in our church, save the transient experiment at Geneva and Edinburgh, under a theocratic dream of Calvin and Knox. We might add to this exception a few independents in England, contrary to the averment of Mr. Moore. Dr. John Owen, the giant among them, speaking of them, says, "Others also have given advantage by making this office annual or biennial, in them that are chosen unto it; which, though they plead the necessity of their churches for, as not having persons meet for this work and duty, who are willing to undertake it constantly during their lives, without such a contribution for their maintenance as they are not able to afford; yet the wisest of them do acknowledge an irregularity in what they do, and wish it remedied." Let these words of the greatest light in the 17th century be well weighed by our churches. They have many edges, and are a significant warning. Owen's works, vol. 19, p. 535.

There is not a particle of evidence that the Waldenses and the Bohemian Brethren ever chose their elders in this way. On the contrary, our own Dr. Baird, for many reasons the best authority on the subject, says of the Waldenses, "The elders are first nominated by the congregation, and then elected by the consistory;" not elected by the people at all, even at the first, and much less every one, two, or three years. We have seen already, that the churches of the Reformed (Dutch) have

always had a salvo in their system, which makes it entirely different from this innovation of ours, in having another bench, to which ex-elders may be transferred, and where they may act as officers on occasion.

And let us now look honestly at "the martyr Church" of France, that carried its model to South Britain and wherever else it was scattered by the sword of persecution. Quick's Synodicon, vol. 1. gives us "The Discipline of the Reformed Churches of France," from which we quote: "CHAPTER 3rd, *of Elders and Deacons*, CANON 1. In those places where the order of our discipline is not yet set up, elders and deacons shall be chosen by the joint suffrages of pastors and people; but where it hath been already established, the power of choosing them shall reside in the consistory (session) together with the pastors, and they shall be nominated with an audible voice in the said consistory, that they may know in what business they are to be employed. . . .

Canon 7th. The office of elders and deacons, as it is now in use among us, is not perpetual; yet because changes are not incommodious, they shall be exhorted to continue in their offices as long as they can, and they shall not lay them down without having first obtained leave from their churches.

Canon 8th. Neither elders nor deacons shall claim any primacy or jurisdiction over one another, whether in nomination unto the people, or in precedency, or in order of voting, or in any matters depending upon their offices.

Canon 9th. Elders and deacons shall be deposed for those very crimes and causes, for which the Ministers of God's word are. . . .

Canon 10th. Elders and deacons being deposed shall not be restored in any other manner or form than is used in the readmission of deposed ministers."

These canons need no comment. Instead of a rotary system, like ours, approved in 1872, it is the very opposite; precluding and discouraging such a system; resembling the Scotch of 1642 in electing new members by the consistory itself, not by the people; exhorting elders to continue in office indefinitely; making discipline, and not ballots, the way of

ejecting bad elders; hinting plainly, that when they say "not perpetual," they mean a peculiarity of the French Church, expressed "as it is now in use among us"; and yet meaning palpably, by the word "perpetual," the opposite of what Messrs. Moore and Agnew try to make it mean in the Discipline of Scotland. Beyond a question, the Huguenots meant by the term, permanent in personal tenure of the office; and their difference from our own Book is but nominal, a word only, meaning by the monosyllable "not," what we mean by nearly two whole sections (6 and 7) of our chapter 13th in the Form of Government. Like the Church of Scotland, and our own, and nine-tenths of the Presbyterian name in every age and country, that illustrious Reform in France made the elder a spiritual officer, and not a mere representative, to be reduced to a mere delegate by spontaneous and frequent elections of the people. Their "growing church," like our growing churches, "in burgh and land," found it unspeakably better to add new material, as it came in, to the experienced nucleus already on the bench, than to roll it all out, when the people pleased, and tantalize the divested elder with an abstraction for his office, when its functions have been taken from him without cause, all the remainder of his life.

But our space is full. We have no room for a review of all the mistakes, ingeniously and zealously woven up, for the first time in all Presbyterian history, to antagonize the Westminster divines; whose great deliverance on the subject was positively an ecumenical Presbyterianism, answering to Waldensian, French, Dutch, English, Scotch, and Irish symbols and usages. "When any ruling elder is to be chosen where an eldership is constituted, let it be done by them with the consent and approbation of the people of the congregation; and *that not for a limited time.*"

The outcry of "liberty," "let us have liberty," and the menacing audacity which demanded a judicial decision, to suit a spreading leaven among the churches, along with an ultimate refusal of petitions, to allow the Presbyteries an overture on the subject, will hardly be taken yet by the Presbyterian Church as a conclusive argument for giving up this

landmark of our fathers. But they fill us with sorrow and disquietude. Liberty for the sake of liberty is licentiousness. And, with grave concern over one success, we must anxiously ask, what next? We had hoped, from the agitations which preceded the late reunion, and the unanimity with which "the standards pure and simple" were taken as a basis, to allay them all, that we would have these well-tried symbols conserved for one generation at least; or if altered, it would be done "decently and in order," as the constitution directs; and not be made first a dead letter in any part, and then a deaf ear in the dignity which deadened it, that would not hear the Presbyteries, when Presbyteries were begging at the moment, rightfully and respectfully, for the privilege of considering the question. The disappointment of this hope is a vexation, which cannot be silent, although it would not "speak evil of dignities;" and will not yield to any others, the theory and practice both of revering our General Assembly. But we wish that some George Gillespie would reappear among the young men who guide our beloved Church, and that, until he comes, our honored guides would read his works and try his "armor" on.

Art. X.—CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE.

Theology.

The Works of Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. A new Translation. Edited by the Rev. Marcus Dodds, M. A. Vol. III. Writings in Connection with the Donatist Controversy. Translated by Rev. J. R. King. Vol. IV. Anti-Pelagian Works. Translated by P. Holmes, D.D. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner, Welford & Co. These writings of Augustine are here, for the first time, translated into English. The volume on the Donatists discusses at length the two subjects of schism and re-baptism. The latter topic is best handled, and the argument of Augustine against it is full and able. The volume on the Pelagian controversy is particularly well translated and edited by Dr. Holmes. The treatises on the Desert and Forgiveness of Sin and the Baptism of Infants, on the Spirit and the Letter, on Nature and Grace, on Man's Perfection in Righteousness, go to the very heart of theology. They are still worthy of attentive study. For the Augustinian theology, to be understood, must be traced back to its sources: and Pelagianism is using many of the same arguments which Augustine so ably met fourteen hundred years ago. The Messrs. Clark are doing a good service by bringing out these translations in so good a style. The volumes are sold by Scribner & Co., at the low rate of $3 each. The Clarks also announce translations of Chrysostom's works, in a series, of Winer's book on the Confessions, Hagenbach's Encyclopædia of Theology, Beck's System of Christian Doctrine, and Christlieb's Apologetics.

Cyclopædia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature. Prepared by the Rev. John McClintock, D. D., and James Strong, S. T. D. Vol. IV. H., I., J. New York: Harper & Brothers. In spite of the lamented loss of Dr. McClintock, the projector of this comprehensive work, it is continued, on the basis of his materials, and with great diligence and faithfulness, by Dr. Strong, aided by Professors Schem and Worman, who are both well fitted for their office. The excellencies of Dr. Strong and Professor Schem are well known; and the articles prepared by Professor Worman, Librarian of Drew Seminary, show unusual capacity and diligence. Eminent scholars of different denominations are among the contributors, and free the undertaking from the charge of undue ecclesiastical or theological bias. Such a largely-planned work is not to be judged as if it were a scientific treatise; its inconsistencies are sometimes to its credit, and increase its usefulness. It is a book for use in all departments of theological learning. Accuracy as to facts and dates, fulness of material, careful statement of differing opinions, and ample lite-

rary references, are the chief conditions of its success. These conditions, on the whole, are well met. See, for example, the articles on Inspiration, Incarnation, Inscriptions, Infallibility, etc. Sometimes the literature is insufficient, *e. g.*, on Infinite, Hamilton, Independency, the Jesuits. Too much reliance is occasionally put upon secondary sources; as, for example, on Blunt's Dictionary in matters which lie outside of the Anglican horizon; and even on Knapp, in respect to Imputation. The printing is in general very accurate; we do not often find such errors as *Mansell* for Mansel, and *Frohshammer* for Frohschammer. We cordially recommend the work anew, as the best general Cyclopædia on all parts of theology. It will probably extend to at least eight volumes.

The Ecclesiastical Polity of the New Testament. By the REV. J. A. JACOB, D. D. New York: Randolph & Co. In our last number Dr. Adams gave a sufficient account, and a deservedly strong commendation, of this able and impartial treatise. We are glad that it has been republished in such an excellent style, and at so low a rate—$2 instead of $7 for the English edition. It ought to have a wide circulation. It shows the inevitable drift of the best modern scholarship as to the real constitution of the New Testament Church.

R. A. Lipsius, Chronologie, etc. (Chronology of the Roman Bishops to the Middle of the Fourth Century.) Kiel, 1869. pp. 280. Professor Lipsius has thoroughly examined all of the historical catalogues and documents on the succession of the early bishops of the See of Rome. There are two series of these catalogues: the Oriental or Greek, and the Occidental or Latin. The Greek are those of Hegesippus, Irenæus, two of Eusebius (which differ considerably), Jerome, the Syrian Chronicle of 636, Syncellus, Theophanes, Nicephorus, Eutychius, Elias of Nisibi, and the "Chronographeion Syntomon." The Latin are the *Catalogus Liberianus* (with a confused text, made up at different periods), and the *Liber Pontificalis* in its various editions. All of these are critically sifted in the first half of the volume.

Dr. Lipsius then proceeds to state the results. He rejects as wholly unhistorical the legend that Peter was Bishop of Rome for twenty-five years. The examination of the alleged evidence is acute and satisfactory. He cannot even find satisfactory evidence that Peter was ever at Rome. As to those that follow next in the Roman Catholic lists, he shows that the historical evidence only proves that Linus, Anacletus (Cletus), and Clement were Roman Presbyters about the end of the first century; that Evaristus and Alexander were Roman Presbyters (or Presbyter bishops) near the beginning of the second century; that Sixtus I. (Xystus) was in office some ten years, and died not before 124 nor after 126. Eleutherus is more sure; he ruled 15 years and died A.D. 189, the tenth year of Emperor Commodus. The next certain dates are those of Cal-

listus, from 217 to 222 (died Oct. 14). For all the bishops from Sixtus to Callistus there is an uncertainty of from one to two years. After Callistus there is more exactness. Lipsius ends with Liberius, A. D. 352.

The Life of the Lord Jesus Christ: a Complete Critical Examination of the Origin, Contents, and Connection of the Gospel. By DR. J. P. LANGE, of Bonn. Translated by Sophia Taylor and J. E. Ryland. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1872. 4 vols., 8vo. Dr. Lange is better known is this country by his Bible Commentary than by his Life of Christ; but many rank the latter, on the whole, higher than the former. It was first published in 1843, and translated in 1864. The present edition is a new issue of this translation. It was written in the midst of the controversy that followed the publication of Strauss' Life of Christ, and has constant respect to the questions, both critical and speculative, that were then rife and are still perpetuated. It is unquestionably an able as well as comprehensive production, viewing the earthly history of our Lord in its manifold relations, and treating the whole subject with insight and breadth. In some respects it is the most complete of all the lives of Christ written within the last thirty years. It has the exuberance and even prolixity of all of Lange's writings; but it likewise contains wealth of thought and depth of spiritual discernment. The theological and speculative sides of Christology are treated with special fulness.

The First Book (introduction) contains, 1. The Fundamental Ideas of the Gospel History; 2. The more General Records of the Life of Jesus; 3. The Historic Records; 4. Criticism of the Testimonies to the Gospels; 5. Their Authenticity; 6. Their Origin; 7. Relation of the Four Gospels to the Gospel History. Second Book: The Historical Delineation of the Life of Christ, in four main parts, which take up two volumes. The Third Book—quite peculiar to the author—is entitled: The Life of the Lord Jesus unfolded in its Fulness, according to the various Representations of the Four Evangelists: 1. Matthew, or Christ as symbolized by the Sacred Bullock; 2. Mark, or Christ as symbolized by the Lion; 3. Luke, or Christ as symbolized by the Form of a Man; 4. John, or Christ as symbolized by the Eagle. This third book occupies more than a volume, and it develops the various characteristics, as well as the unity, of the Four Gospels with great ingenuity.

We bespeak for this work the careful attention of those who are studying the Life of our Lord. They will be richly repaid.

In a new edition such a manifest blunder should not be allowed to remain as that on p. 11 (vol. i.), where the "self-examination" of Christ stands instead of "self-inanition" or self-emptying.

The Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ. By J. A. REUBELT, D. D., Professor in Indiana University. Based on the German of W. F. GESS. Second edition. Andover: W. F. Draper.

Christi Person und Werk nach Christi Selbstzeugniss und den Zeugnissen der Apostel. Von W. F. GESS, Prof. in Göttingen. First Division: *Christ's Self-Testimony.* Basel: 1870.

The last of these works is the first portion of a new and very much enlarged edition of the volume published in 1856, on which Dr. Reubelt has based his treatise. It is in fact, thus far, substantially a new book, fifty pages on Christ's testimony about himself being expanded to 350. This special theme, the proper basis of the whole construction of the doctrine of Christ's Person, is more carefully treated by Dr. Gess than it has been by any recent writer on Christology. His merits are decided. He enters upon the true path of investigation, resting the doctrine on the self-testimony of the Son of God. And the results, on the whole, are eminently sound and satisfactory. A great deal of irrelevant matter is swept away by thus putting the whole question in its true and simple light. While we cannot accept all the author's conclusions, especially as to the Kenosis, "the self-emptying act of the Logos," yet his method and spirit are to be highly commended.

The volume of Dr. Reubelt is for the most part a translation from the first edition of Gess; though he "has sometimes modified the text, so that what is now offered exhibits the translator's Christology." We think it would have been much better to translate the original, and express the variations in notes. The translation itself appears to be well done. It reads easily in English, with an occasional novel word. The theory of the "self-emptying act" of the Logos is carried out even further than in the original. As here put, it is liable to grave exceptions, especially in its bearing upon the eternal and internal relations of the persons of the Godhead. But the tone of the discussion is scholarly and candid; and certain undeniable difficulties of the great mystery are forcibly presented. Yet even greater difficulties emerge from the author's theory than are found in the generally accepted doctrine of the Christian church as a whole. We prefer to leave the mystery where the church has left it, rather than to venture with a speculative chart upon an unknown sea.

A Dissertation on the Eternal Sonship of Christ. By JAMES KIDD, D.D. A new edition. With an Introduction by R. S. CANDLISH, D.D. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. Aberdeen: A. & R. Milne. Rev. James Kidd, "*the* Doctor" of Aberdeen, also, as he liked to be styled, LL. OO. P. (Professor of Oriental Languages), stood almost alone, among the Scotch divines of the first quarter of this century, in attempting anything like an *a priori* construction of the Trinity. He was in every way a remarkable character. Dr. Candlish has incorporated into his Introduction an instructive and entertaining sketch of his life by Professor Masson. His education began at Philadelphia. He struggled through great obstacles, and at last won a high position. His work on the Trinity was

published in 1815, and the above Dissertation in 1823. Both are still worthy of being studied. They show great vigor of thought, though at times somewhat intricate; and speculative insight, resting, however, on the basis of revelation. Even for the Trinity and the Sonship, he says, rational grounds may be found, as well as Scriptural authority. And herein Dr. Candlish, now the Principal of the New College, Edinburgh, agrees with him. He has avowed the same in several of his works. Conceding that the Bible alone can give adequate, as it does sufficient, evidence of these fundamental truths, he also claims that reason may to some extent corroborate them. Like Julius Müller, he affirms that the Eternal Sonship shows us, and this alone fully shows us, how the Divine Love can have an adequate internal object.

The argument of Dr. Kidd covers a wider ground. It is ingenious and able. The Scriptural argument for the Sonship is cogently developed, even though all his interpretations of particular passages may not hold good. The objections, logical and philological, are fairly met. In many speculations about the Trinity, this radical idea of the Sonship is too much obscured. It is vital to a thorough apprehension of the doctrine. No abstract formula can take its place without serious loss. Dr. Candlish well implies that without it, "it seems extremely difficult to guard against this doctrine of the Three Persons in the Trinity becoming, after all, nominal rather than real." We hope Dr. Kidd's book may find many readers. At present we cannot give a fuller account of it.

JESUS. By CHAS. F. DEEMS, Pastor of the "Church of the Strangers," New York. United States Publishing Company. pp. 756. We welcome every new contribution to a candid and reverential study of the Life of our Lord on earth. The battle with modern skepticism centres here. And to meet all classes of objections, and all questions of inquirers, there is needed a great variety of works. Dr. Deems, in the midst of his varied labors, has found time to write this full and instructive biography of Christ, upon a plan adapted to a large class of readers. He takes the Gospels as he would any other books, examines them patiently and minutely, and states the results in a simple way; though the work is not destitute of force and sympathy. After going over all the ground, he just asks the question, "Who is this Jesus? . . . What is he who can so live and so die as to produce such intellectual and moral results? Reader, you must answer." And there can be but one answer. We trust this excellent volume may reach the very large class for whom it is specially designed. It is brought out in a substantial style, and fully illustrated.

God-Man. By L. T. TOWNSEND, D. D., Professor in the Boston School of Theology (Methodist). *Search and Manifestation.* Boston: Lee & Shepard. This book is in some sort a continuation of the "Ecce Homo" discussion. The author's plan includes another volume, *Strife*

and Harmony, on present scientific and philosophical questions about Christ and Christianity. The main drift is just, and the general argument is well sustained. Man seeks for God and salvation; in the God-man the object of his search is revealed. The First Part, *Search*, is on Comparative Theology, and Essential Theology: the Second Part, *Manifestation*, is divided: 1, New Era; 2, Records; 3, Humanity of Christ; 4, Divinity of Christ. This second part is much better treated than the first. The review of the different religions lacks both precision and completeness, though it contains many interesting data. The general idea of Dorner, that in the God-man the human longings were satisfied, yet in an original way, is successfully elaborated. Frequent beautiful citations, culled from a wide range of literature, add greatly to the interest of the volume. In the appendix a variety of incidental yet important points are further illustrated.

The Doctrine of the Trinity underlying the Revelation of Redemption. By the Rev. GEORGE PATTERSON, Pictou, N. S. This volume is peculiar, not so much in its array of the ordinary proof-texts which expressly assert the whole or the several parts of the doctrine of the Trinity, as in its minute and exhaustive exhibition of the manifold implications of, and correspondencies with it, found in all parts of the Bible. It is shown that it everywhere underlies and interpenetrates the scriptural representations of redemption. In this particular it is a fresh and valuable contribution to this department of theology. The author adheres closely and wisely to the Catholic definitions of the doctrine, avoiding all extravagance on either side. He shows that "while the Bible is the most monotheistic book in existence, yet from the first page of Genesis to the last of Revelations, its monotheism is not the cold and sterile monotheism of Mahomet or Socinus, but one which admits three divine hypostases in one infinite nature."

Unity and Variety. By GEORGE W. WELDON, A. M. New York: Whitaker & Co. The laudable object of this thoughtful little volume is to exhibit the evidence of unity and variety as found in nature, in the human mind, and "in the inspired history of religion;" and to draw the appropriate conclusions as to matters theological and ecclesiastical. It is well written. Its motto, "Mobilis Constantia," has a curious history. It is from Bacon's "Thema Cœli," and was for a long time printed "nobilis constantia," until happily changed by Mr. Ellis in the last edition of Bacon's works. "Variable constancy" suits the context much better than "noble constancy," and has a deeper meaning.

BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek. By HERMANN CREMER, Prof. in Griefswald. Translated by D. W. Simon, Ph.D., and Wm. Urwick, A. M. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York:

Scribner, Armstrong & Co. This admirable lexicon of Professor Cremer, the fruit of ten years of study, has already reached a second edition in Germany. It is translated with due care. It stands midway between an ordinary lexicon and a commentary. Its object is to trace out the signification of those Greek works which have received a deeper and higher meaning from the power and influence of revelation. To each word is first assigned its classic sense; then, its modifications in the Septuagint version; and, lastly, its New Testament import. Later patristic usage is sometimes noticed, though not as fully as it might be.

This plan of the work indicates its importance and value. It is, in fact, as the English Preface says, "one of the most important contributions to the study of the New Testament Exegesis that has appeared for many years." A translation is to be published in Holland. The object of the author is to exhibit what Schleiermacher happily termed "the language-moulding power of Christianity." He has done his work exceedingly well, with tact and sufficient fulness. Every student of theology will find it well nigh indispensable as a supplement to the ordinary lexicons, and often as a substitute for commentaries.

Lectures Exegetical and Practical on the Epistle of James; with a New Translation of the Epistle, and Notes on the Greek Text. By the REV. ROBERT JOHNSTONE, LL.B., Arbroath. Randolph & Co., New York. The material of this volume consists mostly of expository discourses and lectures originally prepared and delivered by the author in the course of his ordinary ministrations to his own flock. They are excellent of their kind. They bring out the real meaning of the epistle in its doctrine and its practical applications. The new translation exhibits the good taste and judgment of making the slightest possible variations from the received version consistent with accuracy. Our Scotch brethren, on the average, greatly excel us in the art of expository preaching. This volume will be suggestive to preachers, and edifying to private Christians.

Mr. W. F. Draper, of Andover, publishes, in his usual excellent style, another welcome commentary on the *Book of Leviticus, with a New Translation*, by JAMES G. MURPHY, LL.D., Professor of Hebrew in Belfast. (pp. 318, 8vo.) The author's previous works, on Genesis and Exodus, have been received with great favor. This new volume is written on the same general and convenient plan. The whole book is clearly distributed into its main divisions, with appropriate introductions. A new translation of the original is given at the head of each page; and the notes and explanations are in smaller type. The Book of Leviticus is viewed as a figurative description of the way of salvation. The first part ch. i to xvi.) exhibits the Entrance into Life: the second part (ch. xvii. to xxxvii.) the Progress in Life. The sacrificial system is considered in its

true significancy, and in its relation to the atonement of our Lord. This simple arrangement gives unity to the volume. It is an able and valuable commentary.

REV. ALBERT BARNES' *Notes on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, and on *Galatians*, are published in a revised edition by the Harpers. Their continued usefulness perpetuates his name and memory.

REV. W. H. VIBBERT, Professor of Hebrew in the Berkeley Divinity School, (Episcopal), has prepared an excellent *Guide to Reading the Hebrew Text*, for the use of beginners. It is clearly and simply arranged. Andover: W. H. Draper, publisher.

Scribner, Armstrong & Co. publish, in two substantial volumes, *Bible Notes for Daily Readers*, by EZRA M. HUNT, M. D. (Price $6; bound in one vol. for $5; pp. 1370, royal 8vo). The typographical execution is very clear. It is all in English. The comments are brief and pertinent. Without any parade of learning, the author comes right to the point. We have been favorably impressed with the general character and aim of the work. For a large class of readers it is much better fitted than are the volumes overloaded with cumbrous learning, or verbose practical observations. It goes over the whole of the Bible.

The Books of the Kings. The lack of a good modern commentary on these two difficult books of the Old Testament is now abundantly supplied by two very able works, both of them translated from the German. The largest of these is in LANGE'S *Commentary on the Bible*, edited by Dr. Schaff, and published by Scribner, Armstrong & Co.—a solid volume in two parts. Part I., *First Kings*, is by DR. BÆHR, of Carlsruhe, translated by DR. HARWOOD, a learned Episcopal clergyman of New Haven: the work on Second Kings, also by Dr. Bähr, is translated by REV. W. G. SUMNER, of New Jersey. (The title page, instead of Book II., should read Part II., or both should be termed Books). Dr. Bähr is a thorough scholar, familiar with the most recent researches in Biblical history, and a man of critical insight. The work of the translators is well done, on the general plan pursued in the American edition of this popular and prolix commentary. The literature is fully given.

The other work on *The Kings* is published in "Clark's Foreign Library," Edinburgh; for sale by Scribner. It is by Professor C. F. KEIL, translated by REV. JAMES MARTIN, and forms a part of his and Delitzsch's "Commentary on the Old Testament." It is only about half as bulky as the previous work; but it contains less of literary and homiletical additions. It is a clear and careful commentary, intended for scholars rather than for general readers.

Both works labor diligently upon the reconciliation of the sacred history with new explorations and discoveries. Many difficulties are successfully cleared up.

The Desert of the Exodus: Journeys on Foot in the Wilderness of the Forty Years' Wanderings. By E. H. PALMER, M. A., Professor of Arabic, Cambridge. New York: republished by Harper & Brothers. Pp. 470. Mr. Palmer's journey through the desert was undertaken, 1868 to 1870, in connection with the Ordinance Survey of Sinai and the Palestine Exploration Fund. His object was "to give an exhaustive account of the scenes of Israel's Wanderings;" and he says, in his Preface, "that no one has hitherto attempted a complete exploration of the Desert of the Exodus." And he does not say, in his Preface, that Dr. Robinson went over the same ground, with the same object, and with remarkable success. On the most important points Mr. Palmer, too, agrees with, and in fact follows Dr. Robinson,—to whose great work, so thoroughly appreciated in Germany, he makes an occasional reference, but without any fitting recognition of its authority and value.

Apart from this, Mr. Palmer has produced an exceedingly interesting volume. He and Capt. Warren have performed an excellent work in their careful explorations,—including many points south of Mt. Sinai, and east of the Dead Sea, which have never been so faithfully investigated. The work is abundantly illustrated by well-executed maps and numerous wood-cuts. The accounts of Jebel Músa, Serbál and Feirán are clear and accurate. The track of the Israelites, in the main, is undoubtedly identified,—according to the scheme of Dr. Robinson. The geography and topography of the country, its monuments and ruins, its scenery and people, the manners and customs of the present inhabitants, are graphically depicted. Upon the whole, it is the most valuable and accurate narration of Palestine Explorations which has been recently published. The increased interest in this subject in our country creates a new demand for works of this character.

General Literature.

History of English Literature, by H. A. TAINE. Translated by H. Van Laun. 2 vols. 8vo. New York: Holt & Williams. M. Taine's work, in many respects, deserves the eulogiums lavished upon it. It is keen, witty, brilliant, graphic, critical: but at the same time it is one-sided, imperfect in respect to fulness, thoroughly French in its defects as well as its excellencies, and dogmatic in its positivism. It appears to have been first written in parts, and then made into a whole by an artificial process. It is the most interesting book on English Literature yet written: though this is little to the credit of English authorship.

M. Taine is a critic of the modern school—in fact of the school of the Positivists. He sees sharply, describes admirably, and judges according to the theories of Comte and Littré.

He cannot thoroughly understand what does not somehow tend to enhance the peculiar glories of French literature, especially in its most

recent critical and scientific phases. Shakespeare is far below Racine; the last words of his book are, that he "prefers Alfred de Musset to Tennyson;" even John Stuart Mill is lauded because he "imported French positivism into English." He revels in Swift's satires, and cannot understand Dryden's real genius. Such writers as Coleridge, Arnold, Hare and Maurice he barely notices in a parenthetical way. He speaks of Reid with contempt, and of Dugald Stewart and Hamilton by bare allusions: "Scotch philosophy has dried up." He has studied Byron, Dickens, Thackeray, Macaulay, Carlyle and Mill—and heard about the rest of modern authors. He knows the name of Bishop Berkeley, but does not know the names of J. H. Newman and Archbishop Whateley: Coleridge is called "a poor fellow," "a Pittite journalist," and "a dreamy poet." The names of "Bentley, Clark and Warburton" are just strung along in a note.

No Frenchman ever yet thoroughly understood either Lord Bacon or Shakespeare, and M. Taine is no exception. His criticism of Shakespeare is not quite so ludicrous as Voltaire's description of his tragedies "as monstrous farces," but it is essentially the same in a less stupid form. He prates about "his mechanical imagination," says that he "gives his own tone" to all his chief characters! but lacks true French wit! He describes his style as made up of "furious expressions," so that "he seems, to *my* fancy, as though he never writes a word without shouting it."

The whole criticism of the work is based on a partial French theory about the traits and tendencies of the English race. The excesses and oddities of Englishmen are drawn in bold and sharp outlines. But the inevitable refrain always is, that any English author is eminent when he is almost equal to some French writer.

LUCRETIUS *on the Nature of Things*. Translated into English Verse, by CHARLES F. JOHNSON, with Introduction and Notes. New York: De Witt C. Lent & Co. The translation of a work written more than eighteen hundred years can seldom be said to be timely; but such is eminently the case with this version of the great poem of Lucretius. Some of our modern scientific men, in reconstructing philosophy and theology, have advanced just so far, in their ultimate theories, as Lucretius did B. C. 50, and no farther. His physical Epicureanism is just about their theory, only all of them do not state it quite as clearly and honestly. Sir Henry Holland, in his entertaining "Recollections," says, that "this wonderful poem ought to be in the hands of all who are now working at the development of the atomic and and molecular theory;" for "they have scarcely made a step in advance which has not in some sort been shadowed forth by this great poet." No one can read the fifth and sixth books without seeing the truth of this. They are in the grandest manner of this grandest of Roman poets. The Latin language nowhere appears more majestic. Law, necessity, force, rule over all; the gods are exiled;

all the forms of earth are depicted as coming from atoms and force by irresistible sequences.

Mr. Johnson's translation is, on the whole, faithful, though unequal. Some parts of it are exceedingly well done; but at times the metre limps, and some expressions are too colloquial, (*e. g.*, "did'nt man," at the end of a line).

We can give only one specimen of the theory:

"For sure, not by design the elements
Took order, marshalled by sagacious mind,
That preordained what motions each should have.
But atoms infinite for unmeasured time,
Wrought on and vexed by impulses and weight,
In every mode excited to cohere,
All possible assemblages essayed,
And every motion, combination tried,
They fell at length on those that could endure—
Thus rose the first faint outlines of the world."

Have Darwin and Huxley really done any better than this?

Three Books of Song. By HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW. Boston: Osgood & Co. Several of these beautiful and musical poems have been before published, and are most welcome in this new form. "The Legend Beautiful," "The Baron of St. Castine," and others, are already famous. The largest piece, "Judas Maccabæus," is admirably sustained in its tragic grandeur. The minor poems almost uniformly show consummate skill. Mr. Longfellow is devoted as is no other of our authors to poetry as a high art.

Scribner & Co. have published another volume of the well-known ERCKMANN-CHATRIAN tales,—*The Plebiscite, a Miller's Story of the War.* By one of the 7,500,000 who voted "Yes." It tells in graphic scenes the story of the late War, and is in sympathy, not with the Germans, but with the downfall of the Second Empire.

Wilfred Cumbermede. An Autobiographical Story. By GEORGE MACDONALD. Scribner & Co. pp. 498. This no commonplace novel like most novels written in these days. It is quiet in tone, original in cast, full of intellectual wealth, and deals with the great problems of life in a truly reverent and earnest spirit. It might be called a religious story; certainly it could have been written only by a man of an intense religious nature, with whom God, sin, redemption and eternity are realities of the utmost consequence, and whose soul has found peace in believing only after many and severe spiritual conflicts. A captious or superficial critic might condemn portions of it, and denounce the author as a heretic on some points. But, read intelligently, and judged as a whole with candor, it is not obnoxious to severe criticism. Certainly its teachings are incomparably superior to those of most novels; indeed to

very much that is called religious literature. No Christian can read it through and not feel that truth and goodness and God alone are worth living for. No evil passion or principle will find any food in its pages. None but a master of fiction, aiming to instruct and better man in the highest elements of his being, could have wrought out this powerful story. The work has its faults, viewed either from an artistic or rational point of view. It sins against the laws of probability, common-sense, nature itself, in the construction of the narrative, and one is amazed at the folly and weakness of the author. But these blemishes do not blind us to the real and great merits of the work. Macdonald, in our judgment, is the ablest living writer of fiction; and, while he sometimes runs counter to orthodox belief as expressed in the formulas of the church, he is yet sound to the core in regard to the central and fundamental teaching of the gospel. J. M. S.

Bede's Charity. By HESTER STRATTON. Dodd & Mead. pp. 311. The name of this story is taken from an Institution in England for the relief of poor widows. The author has won golden opinions on the other side of the Atlantic by her writings, and we are glad that this house has arranged with the author to reproduce her writings here. "Bede's Charity" tells, in a very simple yet beautiful and touching way, the story of an unselfish, noble, Christian life, enduring much and waiting long, but in the end reaping the precious reward of faith and well-doing.

J. M. S.

Memoir of Robert Chambers, with Autobiographic Reminiscences of William Chambers. Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 12mo. pp. 313. The names of these Scotch authors and publishers are familiar to all acquainted with modern English literature. It would be difficult to name two persons who, during the last forty years, have done more and better service in behalf of a pure and instructive literature for the million. Not only did they produce the kind of literature needed in exhaustless supply, and adapt it to the various tastes and demands of the age with extraordinary skill, but they so cheapened it as to bring it within the means of the poorest. Theirs may be said to be the first successful effort to create and diffuse a wholesome and original popular literature. "Chambers' Edinburgh Journal," which began in 1832, "a weekly sheet at three-halfpence," wrought a revolution, and one that has been productive of great good wherever the English tongue is spoken. It was nobly conceived and grandly executed, and its success from the very start far exceeded all expectation or experience in this line. The movement thus happily begun, was followed up by the brothers with wonderful industry, with rare tact and enterprise and enthusiasm, and with ever increasing success.

The sketch of such a man as Dr. Robert Chambers, by his brother William, who was also his life-long associate and co-laborer, with

"reminiscences" of his own no less remarkable history, can not be otherwise than intensely interesting and instructive. J. M. S.

Treasury of Thought. Forming an Encyclopædia of Quotations from Ancient and Modern Authors. By MATURIN M. BALLOU. Boston: J. R. Osgood & Co. Unlike many similar collections of wise sayings, this one is, to a large extent, the fruit of the author's own readings of the books from which he cites. It is the result of twenty years of literary recreation. About a thousand authors are quoted under half as many subjects. The stock citations are comparatively few; and there is very little poetry laid under contribution. The frequent reference to later writers, English and American, gives an air of freshness to the volume. Almost any one can derive interest and profit from consulting its pages. Uniform good taste presides over the selections.

Music and Morals. By the Rev. H. R. HAWEIS, M. A. New York: Harpers. The title hardly suggests the real character of this well written volume. It is partly a theory, and in part a history, of music, in four books. 1. Philosophical; 2. Biographical; 3. Instrumental; 4. Critical; not a very scientific division. It looks somewhat like separate essays on musical topics, put together but not systematized. The "philosophical part" is not a strict analysis, but rather a tracing out of the effect of music in relation to emotions and morals. The most interesting book is the biographical—on Handel, Glück, Haydn, Schubert, Chopin, Mozart, Beethoven, Mendelssohn. The "critical" part is only on music in England, somewhat sketchy. But it contains incidentally a good deal to interest the students and lovers of music.

Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada. By CLARENCE KING. Boston: J. R. Osgood & Co. Mr. King has rapidly won distinction as an adventurous explorer, and this record of some of his hazardous performances shows that he has also the gift of a capital narrator. His style, though unequal, is generally clear and bright. It is the most interesting book of "mountaineering" in the West that has been yet written, at times it is difficult to stop long enough to take breath. The ascent and descent of Mount Tyndall are admirably told; the doing is just put into words. Kaweah's Run is a spirited account of a wild escape. Yosemite, Shasta and Mount Whitney are well described; the "attack" on the latter mountain is quite equal to many celebrated Alpine exploits. The geology of the region is made prominent.

"*Una and Her Paupers.*" *Memorials of* AGNES ELIZABETH JONES, *by Her Sister. With an Introduction by* FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE, *and a Preface by* HENRY WARD BEECHER. First American Edition. New York: George Routledge & Sons. Miss Nightingale in her Introduction says: "One woman has died—a woman, attractive and rich, and young and witty; yet a veiled and silent woman. . . . She died,

as she had lived, at her post, in one of the largest infirmaries in the kingdom—the post in which trained nurses have been introduced. She is the pioneer of work-house nursing." "I give a quarter of a century's European experience when I say that the happiest people, the fondest of their occupation, the most thankful for their lives, are, in my opinion, those engaged in sick nursing." Miss Jones from her early years was prepared for this work; the poor and sick attracted her; she had her training at Kaiserswerth; and then she lived her happy, blessed, self-denying life—at last as Superintendent of a Work-house of twelve to fifteen hundred persons in Liverpool, when she died of fever at the age of thirty-five. Her letters and journals are most instructive. This is a rare record of a rare life. How many need to spend just such a life, and know it not, or see not the way! This American edition has a chapter on Hospital Training and Nursing in the United States.

Olrig Grange, edited by HERMANN KUNST, Philol. Professor. Boston: Osgood & Co. This anonymous poem has excited a good deal of attention, and there have been various conjectures as to its authorship. It seems to be by some new aspirant for poetic fame, and shows real vigor and talent, though in parts somewhat immature. The humors of the day are well depicted; and the whole is graphic. Its religious drift is of a very liberal school.

Old Town Fireside Stories. By MRS. H. B. STOWE. Osgood & Co. These racy stories are capitally told, and illustrated to the life.

PANSIES: . . . "*For Thoughts.*" By ADELINE D. T. WHITNEY. Boston: Same publishers. Mrs. Whitney is one of the very best of our story writers; and her many admirers will welcome this little volume, beautifully got up, as showing that she also excels in the poetry of sentiment and description. Many of these pieces, like "Under the Cloud, and Through the Sea," are already deserved favorites.

The Masque of the Gods. By BAYARD TAYLOR. Same publishers. Mr. Taylor has here attempted a higher theme than in any other of his productions, and with a fair degree of success. Man's longing for God, and the responses of the various deities, are the themes. The verses move at times in a lofty measure. The full revelation of Immanuel is hardly reached. The whole ends in an indefinite aspiration.

Saunterings. By Charles D. Warner, author of "My Summer in a Garden." Osgood & Co. Mr. Warner's book is brimful of humor. The poorest places yield the best entertainment. Rainy days glitter with sunshine. A good deal of it would do for any part of the world as well as Europe. It is an entertaining offset to almost any guide book.

The Sacrifice of Praise, with Tunes. Psalms, Hymns and Spiritual Songs, designed for Public Worship and Private Devotion; with Notes

on the Origin of Hymns. New York: Randolph & Co. This volume was prepared by a Committee of the Brick Presbyterian Church of New York. The pastor, Dr. Murray, has excellent qualifications for such a work. It has about 600 psalms and hymns, with a tune for each, selections for chanting, and a valuable appendix on the authors of certain hymns. It is prepared with great skill and care, not overloaded as are so many of our books. Almost all the best hymns are there, though we miss Faber's "O Gift of gifts," and some others; but everybody is always missing something in a hymn-book. The tunes are said by competent persons to be very well selected.

The Messrs. Harper have begun the publication of a beautiful *Household Edition of the Works of* CHARLES DICKENS, in a small 4to form, with clear type and numerous illustrations: *Oliver Twist* and *Martin Chuzzlewit* have been issued. Their 12mo edition of MISS MULOCH'S *Works* will be welcome to the numerous readers of these unexceptionable tales: *Mistress and Maid*, *Hannah*, and *A Brave Lady*, are the latest of these out: her *Twenty Years Ago*, in "Books for Girls," is a very attractive narrative. They are also issuing a new edition of Shakespeare's Works, carefully edited, in nice vols., by Wm. J. Rolfe, with Introductions and Notes, somewhat expurgated for family use: *King Henry the Eighth* and *Julius Cæsar* have been recently brought out. Among the best of their recent novels are Farjeon's striking tales, *Joshua Marvel*, *Grif*, and *Blade o' Grass;* Trollope's *Durnton Abbey;* Charles Lever's *Lord Kilgobbin*, in its special traits only surpassed by himself. They have also added to their "Library of Novels" *The Lovels of Arden*, by Miss Braddon; *Patty*, by Katharine S. Macquoid; *Maud Mahan*, by Annie Thomas; *A Bridge of Glass*, by F. W. Robinson. For the Monthly Magazine, still the first periodical of its class, they have secured the famous Spanish orator, Castelar, as a contributor.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

Historical Essays. By EDWARD A. FREEMAN, M. A. Hon. D. C. L., late Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. By his remarkable *History of the Norman Conquest*, Mr. Freeman has not only won a proud name among English historians, but has thrown new and unexpected light upon English history and its continuity. And this series of essays, collected from various periodicals where they were published during the last twelve years, untics various twisted knots of English and Continental history, and gives real help in solving some intricate historical problems. The style is simple, compact and straightforward,—refreshing to read after the ambitious descriptions of less disciplined writers. The method is properly historic, the arranging of the facts after their own laws,—welcome in contrast with the illusive generalities of the theorizing schools. Mr. Freeman says (p. 50): "We

confess that we are not up to the last lights of the age; we have not graduated in the school of M. Buckle. We still retain our faith in the existence and the free will both of God and of man."

The first three Essays, devoted to English history, are on the Mythical and Romantic Elements in Early English History, the Continuity of English History, and the Relations between the Crowns of England and Scotland. There has been, he claims, a continuous evolution in England since the Latin, and not merely since the Norman, conquest. The latter was overborne at last by the older elements. The relations of Scotland and England are admirably analyzed; the former in its independence being shown to be comparatively modern. The "three elements of the modern Scottish nation were the Irish (Celtic) Scots; the Welsh of Strathclyde or Cumberland; the English of Lothian; from these arose the Scottish nation." The character of St. Thomas of Canterbury is, next, fairly estimated. The paper on "The Franks and Gauls," and their early relations, presents in a clear and condensed manner the general views which German historians have long been advocating, but which have only slowly made their way into English and French literature. The confounding of modern France with ancient Gaul is a palpable geographical and historical blunder. The differences of the maps of mediæval and modern Europe are set in distinct relief. "The Early Sieges of Paris," first published as an article in the British Quarterly, 1871, has attracted a good deal of attention. The other papers are on Edward III. of England, the Holy Roman Empire, Frederick I., King of Italy, Frederick II., and Charles the Bold. The last essay, on Presidential Government, carefully defines the Presidency (particularly that of the United States), in contrast with the English King and Prime Minister, and the Swiss Council. It is candid in judging us, while criticising what the author views as the defects of our system. Theoretically, he does not decide between King and President. "The American system, as we have seen, is open to objections of the gravest kind, yet there can be little doubt that it will bear transplanting better than either of the other two (English and Swiss), and that it is better suited than either of the other two to the circumstances of those new commonwealths that are arising in distant corners of the world."

These Historical Studies should be studied by the historian and the statesman. They are the work of a real master in his art.

The History of Greece. By Professor ERNST CURTIUS. Translated by A. W. Ward. Revised after the last German edition by W. A. Packard, Ph. D., Prof. of Latin in the College of New Jersey. Vol. III. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. The great Peloponnesian War is the subject of this volume (Book Fourth). The work itself we have repeatedly recommended. It is of the highest merit. Professor Packard's

revision and index increase the value of this edition. It is of course published in the best style by Scribner & Co.

Princeton College during the Eighteenth Century. By SAMUEL DAVIES ALEXANDER, an Alumnus. New York: Randolph & Co. Out of 894 graduates of Princeton College in the 18th century, Dr. Alexander has noticed 646. Many of the facts here appear for the first time in print, gathered with much pains from a variety of sources. The author modestly speaks of "the imperfection" of his useful labors; but few works of the kind have been prepared with more care. Incidentally, this illustrious record shows how much Princeton did in founding the Presbyterian Church, in securing our national Independence, and for the progress of general learning. We wish we could quote the whole of the author's preface, in which he brings out the facts that establish these positions. For instance, the Mecklenburg Declaration was penned by Brevard, a graduate of 1768, and signed by two other graduates, Balch and Avery. President Witherspoon turned the scale about the Declaration of Independence. Twenty-four graduates were members of the Continental Congress. The only extant specimens of the Boston Harbor tea came from the shoes of Thomas Melville, of the class of 1769. Three Princeton men signed the Declaration of Independence. Of its first class, five became Presbyterian ministers, and the sixth was a staunch Presbyterian. In the second class of seven, six became Presbyterian ministers, and the seventh was an elder. The first President of Brown University, the first two of Union College, the first of the University of Pennsylvania, the first two of Hampden Sidney, the first two of Jefferson College, and the chief men in founding the first two medical colleges of America, were Princeton graduates.

The Life and Times of LORD BROUGHAM, *Written by Himself.* Vol. III. Harpers. Here ends the autobiography of Lord Brougham, A. D. 1834, with the Melbourne Reform Cabinet: leaving thirty and more years of his multifarious doings and sayings still to be described by somebody else. It is in most respects a very attractive volume, in spite of the egotism and prejudices of the author. There are palpable mistakes and lapses which the executor could not correct, on account of the instructions of his lordship. The whole Reform movement and its actors are described to the life. The narrative has the special value which always attaches to the account of great events by the great men who figured in them.

The Harpers also publish Lord Brougham's only novel, *Albert Lunel*, written in 1844, which is chiefly valuable as another illustration of his wonderful versatility. His inveterate prejudice against this country comes out in spiteful diatribes against our easily besetting sins, which are recounted without any attempt at excuse or palliation. The style has a strong flavor of the Johnsonese dialect, in the mouths, too, of all the characters.

Ancient America, or Notes on American Archæology. By JOHN D. BALDWIN, A. M. New York: Harpers. With many Illustrations. This is such a book as we have often wished to find. It gives a clear and simple summary about the old civilization of this continent, facts without theories. It is well done. Mr. Baldwin traces the Mound Builders to the Toltecs, and contends that the civilization of Central America was not transplanted here, but grew up on the soil.

The Life of HENRY DUNSTER, First President of Harvard College. By REV. J. CHAPLIN, D.D. Boston: Osgood & Co. President Dunster was an excellent, amiable, "learned and conscionable" man, distinguished for his attainments in oriental literature. He changed his views on Infant Baptism, and was removed from the Presidency of the infant college. Dr. Chaplin has collected all that remains concerning him, and made out a valuable biography, with interesting notices about the college. The authorities of the Theocracy were undoubtedly strict and summary in their proceedings. Church and State were one. And, if the President of a Baptist College should even now, with all our light, advocate sprinkling and infant baptism, how long would he be retained in his office?

Lectures on the History of the Church of Scotland. Delivered in Edinburgh in 1872. By DR. STANLEY, Dean of Westminster. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. These Lectures were delivered with a purpose. The Dean urges the established churches of England and Scotland to come together on a broad platform, and save the establishment, because an established church must allow great latitude of doctrine. This was a famous argument to be delivered in the Scotch capital. How many of the Episcopal Establishment of England will really fraternize with the Presbyterian Establishment of Scotland? How many of the latter will consent to the dogmatic indifference which distinguishes the Dean? We fear the labor is lost. There are great difficulties on both sides, to say nothing about the whole question of an Establishment. The Lectures, in fact, are not a history of Scotch Presbyterianism, but of its opposites and reactions. The Moderates were indifferent to all that makes the strength of Presbyterianism. Nor can we exactly see the connection between the Established Kirk and Burns' poetry, Scott's novels and "the exquisite and unrivalled humor" of the people. Meanwhile, we hope we may soon have a reprint of Dr. Rainy's reply. The Professor knows more about Scotland than the Dean.

A Memorial of SAMUEL HARVEY TAYLOR. Compiled by his last Class. Andover: W. F. Draper. The late Principal of Phillips Academy had the reputation of being the most thorough and successful teacher of the classics in any Academy of the land. He did indirectly as much as any one to raise the grade of Greek and Latin scholarship in our colleges. He was a strong man, of a strong stock; decided and fervent, yet conser-

vative, in his convictions; hating all sham and pretense; severe to the careless and indolent, but also kind and just. His loss is deeply felt. This beautiful memorial is a worthy tribute to his rare merits. The address of Dr. Park is, of course, comprehensive and felicitous, distinguished for its accurate delineation of the man and his characteristics. Professor Churchill's sermon is also excellent. We hope that we are to have a fuller biography of him who may well be styled the Arnold of our New England Rugby.

The Life of ABRAHAM LINCOLN; from His Birth to His Inauguration as President. By Ward H. Lamon. With Illustrations. Boston: Osgood & Co. pp. 547. This is one of the most plain-spoken biographies that was ever written. There is not a bit of poetry or sentiment in it. It is in fact quite homely. Everything that can belittle Mr. Lincoln is carefully and minutely detailed. We do not know with what intent it was written; but if it was written with the purpose of degrading Mr. Lincoln in the public estimation, it must be pronounced a success. He is depicted as a coarse, vulgar, intriguing politician, vacillating in his views, ungainly and boorish, fond of low company and vile stories; an infidel all his life, and, at last, a hypocrite for the sake of the presidency. Those who give a different view of his religious opinions are pretty plainly told that they know better. The writer does not seem capable of understanding the really great traits of President Lincoln's character and conduct. He makes him out to be one of the most unhappy and superstitious of men. He allows that he was frugal, temperate, honest and kind. But he can hardly ascribe to him a virtue without a sneer, or a fault without exaggerating it. He says he had all the materials for a biography, and he has made the worst use of them.

France in 1870–71. An Address delivered before the Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and Art, New York, February 10, 1872. By ELLIOT C. COWDIN. 8vo. pp. 60. Mr. Cowdin is a New York merchant, who has resided in Paris the greater part of the time since 1866. Four years ago he addressed the Cooper Union on the subject of the Paris Universal Exposition of 1867. Now he tells the story of the Franco-Prussian war, Communism, and the doings of the Internationals. Those who heard the address will be glad to see it in print. Mr. Cowdin endured all the horrors of the siege, and the worse horrors of the insurrection that followed. He sympathises very strongly with the French people, who are not to be blamed, he thinks, for the war which has so crippled and humbled them. And he thinks that Americans ought to be more hopeful than they are about the future of Republicanism in France. The Internationals are handled without gloves. American labor is advised not to declare war against American capital. In short, a more instructive, modest, and sensible address, is seldom listened to, and seldom printed. R. D. H.

PHILOSOPHY.

Creator and Creation : or the Knowledge in the Reason of God and His Work. By Laurens P. Hickok, D.D., LL.D. Boston: Lee & Shepard. This is a fresh presentation of the great subject treated by the author in his work entitled "Rational Cosmology," published years ago, which evoked some elaborate criticism and vehement controversy. We are happy to say that, as compared with its predecessor, it shows all the advantage of the matured study, the persistent thinking, and thorough digestion which he has been able meanwhile to give to the subject. The difference between the two volumes seems to us very much the same as that between fruit unripe and ripe. The consequence is that some of the most important objections raised against the earlier treatise are wholly or partially obviated in this.

Beyond almost any writer we remember, who, in maintaining a system or theory of his own, is obliged earnestly to combat opposing systems, Dr. Hickok preserves a calm and elevated tone in matter and manner, such as befits the height of his great argument. Although constantly traversing the great systems of philosophy which have had, or now have, power with men, he is so completely impersonal that we recall but a single instance of his naming an antagonist author. To a remarkable degree he sustains the bearing of one who abides in the pure upper air of serene, philosophic contemplation. While this is true, we think Dr. H. weakens the power and influence of his productions by a style, which, if always stately, and sometimes rising to the sublime, is also apt to be needlessly stiff, abstract, encumbered with newly coined words, or hard combinations of old ones, such as, "percur," "discede," "outsending expulses," &c. These peculiarities of his vocabulary, phraseology, and whole way of putting things, remind us of Kant. This, however, is a minor, yet, for his own success, not unimportant matter. His expositions too often need expounding, e.g. inter alia, pp. 74–5.

Dr. Hickok candidly avows that his "plan carries him up to the highest sphere of speculation," and that it is "an adventurous undertaking," which is quite evident without such testimony.

Coming now to the special features of the book, we are embarrassed for want of space, and can barely touch upon a few of the points which need an extended article or even volume to do ourselves or the author any justice in setting them forth—such is the necessary abstruseness in which they are enveloped from the causes already mentioned. We begin by noting some positions of the author which command our warm sympathy and approbation. In regard to a portion of these he has improved upon some of his former modes of statement, which seemed to us obnoxious to just and earnest criticism.

First, we hardly need say that we rejoice in the author's strong exposure and denunciation of all forms of materialistic or merely sensuous phi-

losophy, showing how they are compelled furtively to smuggle in a super-sensual reason to carry on their own processes. He is equally conclusive in his proofs that the Philosophy of Common-sense also incorporates into itself the higher reason-powers and truths. The only mistake is in the implication, that the philosophy of common-sense, at any rate in the hands of its representative defenders, pretends to do otherwise. In "common-sense" it includes a higher as well as lower element, the former of which is identical with reason, or the power of knowing and thinking in the light of self-evident, super-sensual truths. This is far from being the only instance in which the author vigorously contends for something as a peculium of his system, which equally belongs to systems he is opposing.

Next, although we confess it requires deeper study than we now have time for, to become sure that we understand his exhibition of the Critical Philosophy as worked out by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, we most heartily endorse his statement of the grand conclusion it reaches, viz., "All knowing is but thinking; and all that thinking can get is the thought it posits." "What is it worth intrinsically, as philosophy of *knowing overt realities?* The only true answer is, it is worthless; for it is not such knowing. It thinks and *seems* to know, but in knowing that its thinking is but a seeming, it makes all knowing empty." Pp. 79–80. The italics are the author's.

Dr. Hickok is also very pronounced in his condemnation of every form of Pantheism, of an Impersonal Absolute, of confounding God and nature, the Creator with creation. Whether he sufficiently guards his doctrine of force and matter, so as to furnish no premise for pantheistic reasonings, is a question on which we shall yet say a word. But he explicitly and earnestly maintains that the ultimate atoms of matter are substances made by the act of God and yet distinct from God; that life is also a distinct creation which cannot be developed from the inorganic; and that Reason is an additional created endowment of man which could not, without a special and distinct creation, be evolved from any lower form of being.

We are also most earnestly with Dr. Hickok in his strong opposition to the founding morality in happiness or the mere pursuit of happiness. On this point he is strenuous, and quotes for the first and only time, so far as we remember, an adversary. He says, "It can never be morality to say, 'I do this that I may be happy,' but only to say, 'I do this that I may be worthy.' Nor is this open to the inconsiderate objection that such ground of morality involves the absurdity of making 'the highest good of a man to consist in his choosing as an ultimate end his own choice of an ultimate end.'" (President Hopkins' Lectures on Moral Science, p. 57.) "There are distinctions of worthiness, and thus of good, in all considerations of morality, and no statement should be permitted to confound them. To be endowed with reason is a dignity and a good; and

so also to conform to reason is a dignity and a good, one an imparted and the other an attained worthiness and good." Pp. 355–6.

Nor can our author be more strenuous than ourselves, in behalf of a reason or reasoning power in the soul of man, which is a faculty for knowledge above sense and all possible deductions from sense by "any faculty judging according to the sense," a power by which we discern supersensual, self-evident truths, the True, the Beautiful and the Good, the Infinite and the Perfect, not merely as shadowy abstractions, but as ever-living realities concrete in the Eternal I Am. It is in the light of such truths that all our knowledge by sense and above sense, whether intuitive or discursive, becomes rational knowledge, above that of the brutes that perish. We only differ from Dr. Hickok, as to the scope and reach of this power in man. And here emerges the starting point of our disagreement with this volume.

We cannot believe that Reason, in the measure of it vouchsafed to man, can begin to see what this volume appears to attribute to it; that, except perhaps in regard to the fewest rudiments, it can see how God must create, if he create at all; how it must be by antagonistic, diremptive, or revolving force; how such force can or must work out all the forms of inorganic being and energy; how life superinduced upon this, can or must work out the manifold forms of organic being; how the Supreme Reason must be tri-personal, and much more the like which makes up a great part of his book. Dr. Hickok doubtless is assured of all this, but we do not think he furnishes the light in which others can see it; certainly without his glasses, we can go but a little way here with *a priori* determinations of what must be. Not a step till we find out *a posteriori*, some existing conditions or contents of actual being, to which these *a priori* and formal principles apply. But we cannot expatiate upon this.

We observe that Dr. Hickok, though intensely opposed to all Pantheism, still, as has been the case with many eminent divines, retains one elementary principle which, in our view, furnishes a logical premise for it. It is that formula which many physical and metaphysical philosophers have been taking up, viz., "Matter is force." Change a single monosyllable here, and all is right. Say, Matter *has* force. All its properties are modes of force, potential or actual. This we assent to and maintain, even with respect to its very inertness, which is a VIS *inertiæ*. But to say that "Matter *is* force," is, according to the universal *usus loquendi* of men, to imply that it is not a substance, an *ens per se*. Force is but energy *in actu* or *in posse*, and it must be the energy of some thing or some being. All specifications and examples of its meaning in the dictionaries imply this. Whose energy then is it? If it be merely force, but not that which *has or exerts force*, must it not be His from whom it proceeds, a property, or phenomenon of God? Dr. Hickok says "The force, though the product of God, is not God." Surely; so any divine act, "though

the product of God, is not God." But is it, therefore, an entity separate from God? The wave is of the ocean, but not the ocean, though consubstantial with it. Such, pantheists maintain, is the relation of man and nature to the Absolute ground of being. We think, therefore, that Dr. Hickok will not be entirely on *terra firma* till he modifies that definition of matter.

While we thus feel bound to record our objections to this formula as a wrong and perilous definition of matter, we feel it to be simply just to add, 1, That Dr. Hickok here is in company with a large number not merely of skeptical and destructive, but even of Christian philosophers, who have, incautiously as we think, adopted it. 2, That it no more lays a premise for pantheistic reasonings than many statements of celebrated divines in some hyper-calvinistic statements of the divine agency and sovereignty—such as may be found not only in Augustine, in mediæval and Reformed theologians, but in Edwards' analysis of personal identity, and Emmons, when he resolves all acts, principles, and faculties of the human soul, yea, the soul itself, into a mere chain of divine exercises. Nay, we think the favorite definition of the laws of nature given by so many, as mere "uniform modes of divine action," open to like objections. 3, Dr. Hickok by elsewhere characterizing force as an *enduring* somewhat produced by God, yet separate from Him, which exerts power, virtually makes it a substance or *ens per se* having properties. This brings all into accord with his antipantheistic views. But it is a "non-natural" use of the word "force" which is adapted to mislead and confuse. 4, In the face of the pantheism and materialism of our day, it is of the last importance to be sharply discriminating and exact in statement, and to correct inaccuracies and inadvertencies, harmless under other circumstances, but now liable to be put to bad service. Hence these suggestions.

Another circumstance that perplexes some of Dr. Hickok's readers, as having a pantheistic savor, is his failure to recognize, in some of his phraseology, the distinction between reason subjective as a faculty in man, and reason as the objective standard, or sum of rational truths, so discerned or discernible by man's reason as a created faculty. These truths have indeed their original seat and source in the infinite reason of God, and in the holding and insight of them his reason consists. Thus he says: "Reason is not made." "Above and beyond all of nature, reason is and must be eternally the same." Now this is true of reason considered as the Infinite Reason, or as the sum or body of truths which are the objects and standard of all rational insight; but it is not true of reason as a faculty in man. Nor can it be said of reason as a human faculty without so far identifying it with the Infinite reason. This would tally with Cousin's pantheistic formula, that "Reason is impersonal," the very contradictory of Dr. Hickok's principles.

It is just here that the strong repugnance felt by many to the author's analysis of the nature of virtue, as founded on the "deference which each

one owes to his own spirit's excellency," emerges. This, as explained in this volume, means the excellency of reason within us. Now, that virtue consists in deference or conformity to the Infinite Reason and to the moral standards or truths which have their first source and seat therein, and which are discernible by the moral reason, or conscience within ourselves, when duly enlightened and purified from the bedimming vapors of sin, is undeniable. So far as our author means this all is well. But "the deference due to our own spirit's excellency" has another sound, like attributing to it the excellency of the Infinite reason or God himself. What this amounts to we need not say. But wherein consists the excellency of man's spirit except in its own conformity to the behests of the Infinite Spirit? So far as it swerves from this it sinks from excellency to baseness. Logically, therefore, such a definition of the nature of rectitude runs in a vicious circle. Virtue consists in the deference due to the spirit's own excellency; and the excellency of each one's spirit consists in its virtuousness. We think such difficulties would be avoided by a rigid adherence to the distinctions we have indicated.

Another unfortunate and misleading use of a term, which Drs. Hickok, Bushnell, and others, have adhered to, since it was first introduced to our vernacular from Germany by Coleridge, is in the word "supernatural." Its true purport is to denote, not what is done by created beings, forces, powers, or laws, but by a divine energy above them all. By nature is meant the sum of creature objects and forces; but, in the scheme and nomenclature of Coleridge, nature is used to denote what is comprised under the law of necessity, or physical cause and effect; consequently these writers use the word "supernatural," to characterize reason and free-will in man, no less than the really supernatural in redemption, regeneration, and miracles. This, very naturally, leads many to suppose that our author is more naturalistic and rationalistic than he really is.

We had intended some analogous suggestions in regard to the author's Coleridgian use of the terms judgment, logical judgment, logical understanding as a "faculty judging according to sense," in contrast with reason, as also some comments on what he says of our knowing phenomenon and noumenon, or thing in itself. But we have already been tempted beyond our space. We await with interest the next work announced by our author, on the "History of Man, through his Trial, Fall, Redemption, and Resurrection to Eternal Life." L. H. A.

Half Hours with Modern Scientists. HUXLEY, BARKER, STIRLING, COPE, TYNDALL. New Haven: Chatfield & Co. This volume is a collection of tracts by the authors, which have been severally published in separate form, under the title of "University Scientific Series," the aim being "to place in a cheap form the advanced thought of the scientific world." The first is Huxley's famous "Physical Basis of Life," which has been so largely discussed, and finds in some kind of matter named

"protoplasm," the primordial elements and formative forces which generate all grades of material, and so far as appears, certainly for ought we know, of mental phenomena. The second, by Prof. Barker, of Yale College, on the "Correlation of the Vital and Physical Forces," evinces great ability, but is also strongly materialistic in its leanings. It maintains that "force in the dead forms of inorganic nature appears identical in the living forms of animal and vegetable life." As to whether "this curiously fashioned body encloses a soul, God-given and to God returning," he tells us science is mute. "No word but His who formed us can break the awful silence." We rejoice, however, that he adds, "in presence of such a revelation science is dumb, and faith comes in joyfully to accept that higher truth which can never be the object of physical demonstration." The third paper is entitled, "As regards Protoplasm, etc." by James Hutchison Sterling. It is a strong refutation of Huxley. He well characterizes the loud boasts now made of "Revulsion" towards materialism, as a boast of reaction "by some 'bolder' spirits,—the Buckles, the Mills, and to the old illumination or enlightenment of a hundred years ago, in regard to the weakness and stupidity of man's pretensions over the animality and materiality that limit him." The fourth tract, by Prof. Edward D. Cope, is on "the Hypothesis of Evolution, Physical and Metaphysical," and is simply an ingenious plea for Darwinism, with suggestions for debasing Christianity into accord with it; e. g. it explains the Fall thus: "Man's growth to maturity saw the development of all the qualities inherited from the irresponsible denizen of the forest. . . .His corruption is that of his animal progenitors, and his sin is the low and bestial instinct of the brute creation. Thus, only, is the origin of sin made clear—a problem which the pride of man would have explained in any other way had it been possible."

The fifth of the series consists of three articles from Prof. Tyndall, all able and characteristic, one on the "Methods and Tendencies of Physical Investigation," another on "Haze and Dust," and a third on the "Scientific use of the Imagination." With much that is fine and brilliant he appears to be in the "haze and dust" of indeterminateness on the great issue. He thinks the position of the Materialist tenable, "that the growth of the body is mechanical, and that thought, as exercised by us, has its correlative in the physics of the brain." But he is not yet ready to affirm more.

Altogether, the volume gives us ready access to what fairly shows the drift of the higher sort of materialism now so fashionable among the physicists. It is well saturated with this poison. It has much less than we could wish of the antidote.

Instinct—Its Office in the Animal Kingdom, and its Relation to the Higher Powers in Man, by P. A. CHADBOURNE, LL.D. New York: G. P. Putnam. This book is made up of a course of "Lowell Lectures,"

delivered in Boston in 1871. Apart from their intrinsic merit, they possess an added interest for many on account of the recent elevation of the author to the Presidency of Williams College, a seat so long renowned by the incumbency of Griffin and Hopkins. The manner in which he discusses such a subject will give some clew to one class of his qualifications for such a post. So far forth, this volume will prove him not wanting. It shows a large acquaintance with Natural History and the various departments of Zoology, together with their points of contact and relationship with the Mental Sciences. He sketches with a graphic pen the various processes in inorganic nature, and among plants and animals, that simulate Instinct while they fall below it; those ongoings, too, in the rational human soul that rise above it. He thus reaches its differential features, as the faculty in men and animals which voluntarily employs rational means to accomplish rational results necessary to their own sustentation and propagation, but without any insight of their rationality. In men, however, as reason is developed, it gains, as in duty bound, more or less ascendancy over Instinct, which it aims to understand, and ought always to control. On the other hand, man's instincts alone are able to carry him but a short way onward toward the ends of his being. These must be discovered by the due exercise of reason. Hence man is ever a progressive and improveable being, except in that state of savagism in which reason relegates her proper sway to mere brute instincts. On the other hand, while the intelligence of the higher brutes modifies instinct in some degree, and they are capable of learning something from experience, yet they have nothing of that comprehensive insight that discerns the proper end of existence or the due relation of means to that end; no proper moral faculty; no properly rational and responsible choice. It is evidence enough of this, that though some slight and abnormal exceptions seem to occur under human training, or in exceptional cases, yet brutes remain essentially unprogressive and unable to discover or invent any means of becoming otherwise. The most sagacious of them, the dog, much as he loves cooked meat and has seen it cooked all his days, never has learned the art of cooking it himself. Other animals may be intelligent, and may reach some rude mimicry of reason. Man alone is a *rational* animal, a moral being. We should be glad to make some extracts from Dr. Chadbourne's admirable volume. Our readers, however, will do better to consult the work itself.

The Blazing Star; with an Appendix treating of the Jewish Kabbala. Also a tract on the Philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer, and one on New England Transcendentalism. By WILLIAM B. GREENE. Boston: A. Williams & Co. These disquisitions contain much that is mystical or fanciful; much also that is acute, profound and solid. Parts of the volume will repay study. The author is evidently no novice in philosophy.

ART. XI.—THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

A new theological journal has been started in Elberfeld, called *Theologische Arbeiten*. Drs. Fabri, Hundeshagen and Krafft are among its editors. The first number, pp. 192, contains articles on the Evangelical Movement on the Lower Rhine in the 16th century; the Doctrine of the Church as to the Inspiration of the Bible; the Supralapsarianism of the Reformers; and the Latest Philosophical System (Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious).

A new Universal Bibliography of Theology was begun last October, edited by Erlecke. Its plan includes Germany, France, England, Holland, Italy and Scandinavia. It costs about a dollar a year.

Theologische Studien und Kritiken. Heft 3, 1872. 1. Romang, The Metes and Bounds of Christianity. 2. Klostermann on the Song of Moses. 3. Rauke, on an old Latin MS. of Luke recently discovered. 4. Fauth, Lotze's Philosophy as applied to Theology. 5. Braudes, the Christian's Assurance of Eternal Life—a thoughtful essay.

Dr. M. Heidenheim, English Chaplain at Zürich, publishes a *Quarterly* (*Vierteljahrsschrift*) *for German and English Theological Studies*. It is chiefly noted for its publication and translation of Samaritan documents. The fourth volume for 1871 contains articles by the editor on the apocryphal *Ascensio Moysis*, and other Legends of Moses; the Textual Criticism of Proverbs, and Ancient Jewish Interpretation of the Psalms; the Christology of the Karaites, which furnishes new material; on the Samaritan Doctrine of the Logos; besides translations of various Samaritan Hymns and Prayers. Scheuchzer contributes two articles on Assyrian Investigations; Zingerle, on the "Apocalypse of the Apostle Paul." English theological works are reviewed. One object of the editor is to unite Germans and English in certain theological investigations.

Professor Zeller of Heidelberg, just called to Berlin, is writing a History of German Philosophy for the great Munich work on the History of the Sciences; Dorner's Protestant Theology was published in this Series.

The tenth volume of the new edition of Calvin's Works in the *Corpus Reformatorum*, has been published at Brunswick. It contains the Geneva Ecclesiastical Ordinances, 1537–1561; treatises on points of doctrine, discipline and worship—quite a number not before published; the Apologia pro Falesio, addressed to Charles about 1546. Falais had been banished from Belgium for his confession of the Reformed faith. The eleventh volume will contain the continuation of Calvin's Letters.

Professor Paul Hinschius, of Kiel, is engaged upon a work on the "Canon Law, Protestant and Catholic, in Germany." It has constant reference to the new status of the Roman Catholic Church. Two volumes are out.

The original manuscript of Luther's *Table-Talk*, by Deacon Lauterbach, of Wittenberg, 1538, has been published by Naumann, of Dresden. The MS. is in the Dresden Library, not in Lauterbach's handwriting, but copied from his notes about 1546. It is edited by Pastor J. K. Seidemann. The most complete edition of Luther's *Colloquies*, *Table-Talk*, etc, is that of Bindseil, 3 vols. 1863-6.

FRANCE.

Revue Chrétienne. Edited by E. D. Pressensé. Jan. to May. Profcssor Chas. Bois, on the Social Question, in two articles, discusses the theories of Socialists and Communists. S. Cadéue writes ou the awakening of the Reformed Church, and the work before it, in view of the meeting of the General Synod, formerly authorized by the present Government. M. de Presseusé contributes several interesting papers on his services with an ambulance during the war. He praises the discipline and valor of the Prussians, while bitterly censuring their crusade. He tells one good story: "A Prussian Geueral wanted a diuner served for twelve, right off. M. L. . . . . replied: 'General, only God can work such miracles, and we shall not ask him to do it for you.'" B. Hollard criticizes quite sharply Renan's last work on the "Reform of France." Micheli, Christianity and Vice; Roller, The Catholic Reform at Rome; Dassier, the Blockade of Metz.

The new Archbishop of Paris, Mgr. Guibert, formerly an opponent of the Ultramontanes, is enforcing the new dogma. Abbé Michaud, Vicar of the Madeleine, a learned priest of considerable influence, has flatly refused submission, and given up his charge. In his Letter to the Archbishop, he writes: "According to you and your adepts, Catholicism is Papacy. The Universality of the Church of Christ is the universality of one man alone. For you it is no longer a question of Jesus Christ, but of his Vicar; and his vicar becomes Master." He is organizing a new church.

M. Ernest Renan has, to the surprise of many, published a work on *The Intellectual and Moral Reform of France*, denouncing the Republic as well as the Internationals, and advocating Monarchy as necessary to the salvation of France. Apart from this he tells his countrymen some plain truths: "Presumption, childish vanity, lack of discipline, of a serious mind and of honesty, incapacity for grasping several ideas at once, the absence of scientific qualities, puerile and gross ignorance,—such is the résumé of one year of our history." "Let us cure ourselves of democracy. Let us re-establish royalty: let us, in a certain degree, reëstablish nobility: let us found a solid system of elementary and superior national instruction." He pleads for Bonapartism rather than for Bourbonism.

A new edition, the 7th, of the great *Dictionnaire de l'Academie* is announced, in 2 vols. 4to. greatly enlarged. The first volume, including E, is promised for the middle of this year; in three or four years it is hoped that the whole may be published. M. Patin is the editor, aided by M. de Sacy, M. Sandean, M. C. Doucet, and M. Mignet. The first edition was begun in 1639 and completed in 1694; Voltaire worked on the fourth; the sixth was published in 1836.

Gustave Masson announces in the *Notes and Queries* that there is at last to be a complete edition of the works of Theodore Agrippa d'Aubigné—an original and vigorous writer. It is to be edited by Reaume and F. de Caussade. Numerous manuscripts will be used from the library of the late Colonel Tronchin of Switzerland, and some from the British Museum. His Memoirs were republished in Paris in 1854.

Some of the more important recent works on the Internationals are: Edmond Villetard, "History of the Internationals, 1871; Oscar Testut, "The Blue Book of the International," 1871; G. de Molinari, "The Red Clubs during the Siege of Paris," and the "Socialistic Movement," 1871. These show that this society is animated with an intense hatred to God and religion, to all existing governments, and especially to the bourgeois. One of their speakers said: "The good Lord has had his time." "We are force and right." "We make war against the legal, economic and religious order."

The third and last volume of the 2d edition of Garcin de Tassy's "History of the Hindu Literature" is published: this is a standard work. F. Huet "The Philosophic Revolution of the Nineteenth Century," posthumous fragments. Pierotti, "The Song of Songs illustrated on the soil of Palestine." Judge Obey (of Amiens) "Jehovah and Agni: Biblical and Vedic Studies on the Religions of the Aryans and the Hebrews." Fasciculi, 1 and 2, 1869–'70.

The most noteworthy articles in the *Revue des deux Mondes*, are Thierry on the Council of Chalcedon; Renan on Guillaume de Nogaret (three articles) and his services in the controversy between Philip the Fair and Boniface; Sorel, Prussia and the two Empires; Pressensé on Ultramontanism since the War,—forcibly put; Albert Réville on the Old Catholic Church of Holland (the Jansenists); Fustel de Coulanges, the German Invasion in the Fifth Century,—to prove that the Gauls were not then really conquered by the Germans.

England.

The British and Foreign Evangelical Review. April. 1. Life and Times of Dr. Cooke, by Dr. R. Smith, Magee College. 2. Rev. W. Fraser, The Natural and the Supernatural. 3. Dr. Wordsworth on the Church of England. 4. Prof. Lorimer on Zwingli. 5. Dr. Gloag, The Lost Epistles of Paul, claiming that the Epistle to the Laodiceans, and another Epistle to the Corinthians, have been lost. 6. Rev. W. G. Elmslie, The Perspective in Prophecy. 7. Rev. J. Gemmel, Our English Bible. In its notices of periodicals it says of the union of our Reviews: "In such a union we can not but rejoice. It was right that it should take place. Henceforth we shall miss from the title the name of the venerable Dr. Hodge, who has gained for himself the renown of being the greatest theologian of the age." In a notice of Dr. H.'s Theology it says: "The statement is always that of a master, and is remarkable for moderation as well as decision."

The Clarendon Press is bringing out a new work on the Councils, and Ecclesiastical Documents relating to Great Britain and Ireland, edited, after Spel-

man and Wilkins, by A. W. Haddan, B. D., and Prof. Stubbs. The 1st vol. was published in 1869; the third is just out; the second is delayed by the illness of one of the editors. The third contains 400 documents from 595 to 1066; Letters of Popes, beginning with Gregory the Great; Letter to Candidus, prior to Augustine, with ten letters sent by Augustine; records of Councils and Synods, Laws, etc. Spurious documents are retained, but printed apart.

Mr. F. W. Newman's "Dictionary of the Modern Arabic" is said by *The Academy* "to be as useless for practical as for scientific purposes," being badly arranged, and not based on the best helps.

George Smith, *History of Assur-bani-pal,* translated from Cuneiform Inscriptions. Assurbanipal, the son of Esar-haddan, was the Sardanapalus of the Greeks, and the greatest of the Assyrian monarchs, B. C. 668 to 626. Mr. Smith, of the department of Oriental Antiquities, British Museum, gives for the first time anything like a complete account of his reign. The work is highly recommended. The Author has also published an essay on the "Phonetic Values of Cuneiform Characters." The Syllabary contains 379 characters —about 200 being compounds.

The ninth volume of Dean Hook's "Lives of the Archbishops of Canterbury" is given up to the Life of Archbishop Parker.

The Theological Review, Jan. and April 1872, London, is in the interest of the English liberals in Theology. *Jan.* 1. On the Development of Opinion in the Early Christian Church, by the late Rev. J. J. Tayler, who wrote on John's Gospel, etc. 2. Frances Power Cobbe on Auricular Confession in the Church of England. 3. E. S. Howse on Saint Simon and Enfantin. 4. The Old Catholic Movement in Germany, by "a Liberal Catholic," a good summary of the matter, rather favoring Döllinger's passive policy. 5. T. Worthington, Church Designs for Congregations, with plans drawn. 6. The Denominational Difficulty, i. e., in education. The theological position of this quarterly is seen in a remark on p. 156: "The time is past at which a doctrine of Atonement, which rests upon the actual existence of Adam and the historical fact of the Fall, can receive serious attention." *April.* 1. A continuation of Mr. Tayler's article. 2. Herder as a Theologian: Part 1, Biographical. 3. Colenso on the Pentateuch. 4. Conway on Theism, Atheism, and the Problem of Evil. 5. A good account of Islam in India, by A. C. Lyall. 6. C. J. Munro on St. Paul and the Nero Legend, etc.

J. P Mahaffey, Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Dublin, has published a volume on Kant's Æsthetic, with Notes on J S. Mill's Derivation of Space. It is the first part of a work in 3 vols on Kant's system.

United States.

The Harpers' have in press a reprint in one volume, of the works of Trench, Ellicott, and Lightfoot, on the revision of the English Bible, with a full introduction by P. Schaff, D.D

Messrs. Dodd & Mead will soon publish a translation of Döllinger's Fables about the Popes, and of his Essay on the Prophecies of the Middle Ages; the former translated by Wm. Plummer of England, the latter by Henry B. Smith, who adds an introduction and notes.

We are obliged to defer the publication of several valuable articles, and we hope our contributors will have patience with the delay. The union of the two reviews, and the necessity of discussing various subjects of immediate interest, have given us a surplus of matter. As a general rule, concise articles will have the preference.

We are also compelled to put off the publication of sundry notes upon subjects discussed in our late General Assembly. Some of these topics have already been discussed at length in our pages; others will receive attention in future numbers, for example, the Form of Admission to the Church, the Relation of Baptized Children to the Church, Unemployed Ministers, the Support of Theological Students, the Cultivation of a Missionary Spirit in our Seminaries, etc.

Two important reviews, by valued correspondents, we are obliged to omit for want of space. One is upon George MacDonald's "Unspoken Sermons," which clearly proves that, along with a tone of sentiment generally pure, he teaches the pernicious doctrine of Restorationism, against which all his readers should be on their guard. The other is a careful examination of the excellent work by Dr. Alvah Hovey, entitled "God with us, or the Person and Work of Christ," recently published by Gould & Lincoln, Boston. The reviewer shows that Dr. Hovey ably maintains the orthodox church doctrine on these subjects, while he gives due attention to the peculiar views of Christ's humanity, advanced by Dr. Bushnell and Mr. Beecher, and to the κενωσις set forth by Dr. Crosby.

We have also notices prepared of several volumes, and of quite a number of addresses, sermons, and other pamphlets, which we cannot now print. Among these are a review by Dr. Cooper, of Macdill's "The Bible a Miracle," and one by Dr. Gillett, on Tyerman's "Life of Wesley;" Dr. McCorkle's able and timely discourse on "The Divine Law concerning Marriage;" "Anniversary Sermons," by Rev. Thomas Creigh, D.D., and Rev. George Hill, D.D.; Lanman's "Japanese in America;" Rev. T. De Witt Talmage's "Sermons;" Dr. Nott's "Discourses on the Resurrection of Christ;" Prof. J. D. Dana's "Corals and Coral Islands;" Dr. John S. Hart's excellent "Manual of English Literature;" Dr. E. D. G. Prime's "Around the World;" Dr. S. I. Prime's "Walking with God," written in the author's best style; the Addresses at the Inaugurations of Presidents Porter and Welling, and of Dr. Harris at New Haven; Elder's "University, Mediæval and Modern;" Dr. Speer's "Great Revival of 1800," and other publications of our Presbyterian Board.

ERRATA.

On page 516 the italics should be more accurately adjusted to the inscription, thus:



Hi-si - ' - ar - si sarru rabu sar sarri

Xerxes rex magnus, rex regum,



habal Da-a - ri - ya - vus sarru A-ha-ma-an-nis-si - '.

filius Darii regis Achæmenides

Xerxes, the great king, the king of kings, the son of Darius the king, the Achæmenid.