LIBRARY OF PRINCETON
MAY
PER BR 1 .P624 v.2
The Presbyterian and
reformed review


Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016 with funding from
Princeton Theological Seminary Library

https://archive.org/details/presbyterianrefo1039warf

THE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW

No. 39—July, 1899.

I.

THE CRISIS IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

ON "Good Friday" of April, 1898, there occurred an episode in one of the churches of London (St. Cuthbert's, Philbeach Gardens), which was in some respects a reminiscence of the Jennie Geddes incident in Scottish Church tradition. The ritualistic service called "The Veneration of the Cross" was in progress. A processional had filed through the aisles, a wooden crucifix borne at the head. This was then laid on the floor at the chancel steps, and, at the bidding of the minister, the people going forward prostrated themselves and kissed the piece of wood with its sorrowful image. In the congregation sat a Mr. John Kensit, a sturdy Protestant, a bookseller of Paternoster Row, a member of the Church of England, though not of that particular parish. With him was a small party of friends, men and women, like-minded with himself. He, too, went forward, but it was only to seize the crucifix in his hand and face the people and dramatically declare, "In God's name I denounce this idolatry in the Church of England!" There was instant confusion and not a little of hysteria and screaming and undignified scuffling in the aisles, and cries of "police" and "murder" were heard. Thus, as in Jennie's case, along with the serious import of the occurrence, there was also a grim comicality. Mr. Kensit was afterwards indicted on the charge of "brawling in a church," but the prosecution failed to convict.

The report of the incident spread like wildfire, and, despite its amenability to criticism, it aroused the people everywhere. The searchlight of inquiry was turned upon other parishes and clergy.

This led to the discovery and exposure through the daily papers of multitudes of similar and even more aggravated instances of ritualistic practices, and served to open the eyes and to touch the strong Protestant instincts of the nation. Had Mr. Kensit attempted the same kind of disturbance in a Roman Catholic Church, it is probable he would not have had a single supporter. But what gave effect to his crude remonstrance, and drove it home to the thoughts of the English people, was the fact that it was directed against a system of religious service in a Church of the State, known as Protestant and established by law. While the method of Mr. Kensit's protest was generally disapproved by the more thoughtful, yet credit was given him for zeal and honesty of motive. It was further recognized in his behalf that the more canonical method of redress by representation to the diocesan authorities gave little prospect of success. The retort, too, was naturally made that if it was illegal to disturb a congregation, the service protested against was itself an extreme instance of lawlessness in the Church. And the Bishop of Hereford, almost alone of the bishops, had the fidelity to remind some who had memorialized against such disturbance of a religious service, that they had strangely failed to deprecate the practices which had given occasion to the action of which they complained. Mr. Kensit continued his crusade, but generally by organizing popular meetings and by frequently memorializing the Bishop of London concerning illegal practices in his diocese. Dr. J. Guinness Rogers, the leader of the Non-Conformists, thus writes in the *Nineteenth Century* for March last:

"The more closely the phenomenon is studied the more remarkable will it appear. There could not well be any greater folly than the attempt to meet Mr. Kensit with supercilious contempt. The feebler the instrument the more remarkable is the result attained."

The controversy has raged ever since. It has figured in the daily papers, and notably in the great London *Times*, often in its editorial columns, and by communications in almost every issue, from clergy and laity, under a standing head line, "The Crisis in the Church." It has formed the chief staple of reading matter in the religious weeklies, those of the non-Episcopal Churches as well as of the Establishment. It has been discussed in the magazines and in the quarterly reviews. It has been the topic of pressing interest in bishops' conferences, in diocesan conventions, in great popular meetings and in parish life throughout the whole nation. Likewise it has entered Parliament, the House of Lords as well as the Commons. Lord Salisbury, the Premier, and Mr. Balfour, the leader of the Government in the other House, have

been obliged to recognize it. Sir William Harcourt, the ex-leader of the Liberals, besides most vigorously speaking on the subject from his seat in Parliament, has been, for nearly a year past, a frequent writer in the *Times*, voicing, and at the same time forming, a great weight of public protest against the tolerated "lawlessness in the Church." He has been treating the question, not so much as a churchman, as from the standpoint of the State by which the Church in its organic relations is, by the law of the realm, established and controlled. Hence, he says, it is not a cry of "No Popery" he is raising so much as the cry of "No treachery." He charges that hundreds of the parish clergymen have been systematically and contumaciously violating the ecclesiastical laws of the realm and the Prayer Book rubrics and orders, and that the bishops have been supinely tolerant of it.

It is not to be understood that all this agitation of the past year was due to the *outré* demonstration made by Mr. Kensit, much less that the startling ritualistic excesses in the churches are of so recent an origin. Ever since the era of Tractarianism, known as the Oxford movement, of near three-score years ago, this type of ecclesiasticism has been crystallizing, and the line of cleavage has been running through the Church. The laity, however, by the form of the English Church, is not so primary a factor as in Non-Conformist bodies, and ritualism in its full significance was rather a badge of clergy schools and a question of the Consistory Courts and the Privy Council, than of any general or intense popular interest. Shortly prior to the St. Cuthbert's incident there had been published Mr. Walter Walsh's *Secret History of the Oxford Movement*, a most surprising revelation of the Newman, Pusey and Faber work, and of its succession as an evil leaven in clerical circles ever since. Nearly contemporaneous, too, with the Kensit affair, appeared *An Indictment of the Bishops*. This is a goodly pamphlet of 120 pages, issued by "The Church Association," representing the Evangelical and Low Church wing, as a counterpart to the very active "Church Union" which abhors the name Protestant and devotes itself to the furtherance of every Romeward tendency. But since "Good Friday" of 1898, the Church question, as perhaps never before since the Reformation period, has disseminated itself in the public mind and has taken hold of the people of all classes.

There have long existed three classifications among the English clergy—the Low Church, also labeled the Evangelicals and Protestants; the Broad Church, known for laxity and toleration in doctrine, indifferent if not contemptuous toward much of the advanced ritualism of the time, while yet, perhaps, as a whole,

disposed to yield to it rather than cast lot with the Evangelicalism of the Low Church; and, finally, the High Church. The "High" is the largely prevailing type, with gradations, however, among its representatives.* It embraces those who like to be known as churchly and as Anglicans, who see in The Church dignity, antiquity and authority, and who magnify its "grace of orders" as handed down in the Apostolic succession. Their interest in ritualism and symbolism is not so much, perhaps, for their doctrinal import as for their supposed beauty and impressiveness as accessories of worship. To this classification also belong many of the most devout and scholarly of the English Church, and some of its ablest preachers, commentators and religious writers in general authorship of our day—men whose names are cherished on this side of the Atlantic and whose work has made the whole Christian world their debtor. This section of High Churchmen, and particularly as they were known a decade or two ago, while holding an exalted view of the sacraments and of Church government, strongly condemned the Romeward tendencies of Pusey and his party. But the High Church division also includes all the extreme or advanced Ritualists, known as High Sacramentarians, Puseyists, Sacerdotalists and Romanizers. This is the party of which we have now more particularly to speak. They have left behind them the name and the attitude of Anglicans, if not also the name Churchmen, which formerly were such favorite designations, and now want to be known as nothing other than Catholics.† Thus, while all Ritualists are of the High Church, not all of the High Church are Ritualists—at least in the present technical and party sense of the word. With many of the clergy the fondness for "churchliness" and for stately ceremonial in worship, and for vestments, altar lights, processionals, etc., is not so much from any Romish proclivity, as from a love of the sensuous and spectacular and scenic, and the halo of mystery, and separateness and professional importance it gives them in the eyes of the people, and sometimes from a mystical enthusiasm without very well-defined convictions of any sort. The minds of many of these brethren laboriously wrestle over what seem like the merest fringes and ravelings of subjects. I saw most seriously discussed in an English

* The apothegm has gone the rounds: "The Ritualists have digested the Broad Church party and ejected the Evangelicals."

† A Church of England minister is thus reported in *The Church Times* in a speech at a meeting of the English Church Union at Bradford, last September, in which he sought to bring over other members of the High Church wing to the Ritualistic or "Catholic" view point: "A few words to our friends who call themselves Anglicans. I was an Anglican once myself. Indeed I was a Protestant once myself. Why, Catholics are fighting your battles; that is what I have to say to Anglicans."

Church magazine the question of "The proper position of the Processional Cross when in its place of repose in the church." What was the place of honor within the chancel in which it should stand when unused? This, the writer said, connected with the further question, which is the more dignified side of the chancel, the Decani (the Dean's side) or the Cantoris (the Precentor's side), and he proceeded to weigh the reasons for each. In favor of the north position was the circumstance that the Gospel for the day was read at that side. Also, the bishop's throne stood on that side. But, on the other hand, the writer was staggered by the fact that the communion candles are first lighted from the south end of the altar, and in administering the communion the celebrant always begins at the south end of the altar steps. So he was in a quandary and knew not how to decide the mighty question, and appealed to others to furnish beams of light on the subject. Of course, in the case of many of the parishioners who are attracted by the pomp and sensuous effect of the ritualistic excesses, the same explanation holds good. A Roman Catholic priest in England tells the following story: "A lady who attended a fashionable ritualistic church came to him desiring to become a Catholic. He told her that it would be necessary that she should first receive some instruction, at which she seemed surprised. She did not return again for some considerable time, and when at length she came, it was to say that as they had now started incense at her church she thought she would stop where she was."

This is a specimen of the subjects which receive the gravest attention. It is not surprising that we learn of complaints made that many of the clergy are not studying, and that their preaching is weak. Dr. Marcus Dods quotes a remark as made not long since by an influential English Churchman: "The Church of England has ceased to be an intellectual power in England; it is not at the centre of intelligence." It may be added also, that numerically, as to church sittings and communicants, it is exceeded by the figures shown by the Non-Conformists and Dissenters.

Much of this kind of scrupulosity, and this fussing over "words and names," is quietly laughed at, especially by the more thoughtful and educated men of the parish. The story is told that Lord Beaconsfield, the famed Disraeli of late years, entertaining a friend over Sunday at his country seat, took him to his parish church, and remarked on the way, "Now, my friend, the vicar, this morning, will take what I call a collection and he calls an offertory; and afterwards what I call a plate and he calls an alms-dish will be placed on what I call a table and he calls an altar." With all such triviality there is constantly manifested by this class of clergy,

even apart from any serious ritualistic excess, an offensive ecclesiastical arrogance toward Non-Conformist and dissenting folds, regarding them as aliens and strangers to the Christian commonwealth without any ordained ministry or power of sacraments and only the "uncovenanted mercies of God" to which to look.

But if it were only these features of High Churchism, and this triviality and pettiness and frippery, and this arrogance in regard to others not of their fold, the situation in the English Establishment would not be so serious. We have heretofore proudly regarded it as one of the sister Churches of the Protestant Reformation. We are forced now to recognize that, as respects a large section at least of that Church, it is a body estranged, unlike to and out of sympathy with almost all that the world understands by the great movement of the sixteenth century. By the advanced ritualistic section the very name Protestant is abhorred. They want to be known as Catholics—not merely in the sense in which we all believe in the Holy Catholic Church, but as in form and organization a part of the ancient Church, unchanged by the Reformation movement. They draw the line always between themselves as Catholics and the other wing of their Church whom as a term of opprobrium they style Protestants.* Dr. Littledale, a prominent representative and trainer of the ritualistic school, whose writings on this subject are still in vogue to-day, thus wrote about thirty years ago: "Some may look on the Reformation as a Pentecost. I look on it as a flood, an act of divine vengeance, not of divine grace, a merited chastisement, not a fresh revelation." The Reformers he labels as "utterly unredeemed villains," for the most part, and says they were deservedly executed by Queen Mary. In the same spirit the leading Church paper of that party once declared that "the large majority of Mary's victims, from Cranmer down, most richly deserved their fate." Another of their leaders has remarked in a spirit of cruel humor, "Cranmer burnt well, and that is all the good I know about him." Lord Halifax, the President of the "English Church Union," a society which labors for a corporate reunion of the Anglican and Roman Churches, in a public speech not very long since, termed Martin Luther a "needless and noxious rebel." Rev. S. Baring-Gould describes Protestantism as a "new religion invented by Luther and

* Sir William Harcourt remarked last summer, "The very name of the Reformation is odious to the priestly party;" and the London *Times*, editorially, that to that party "the term Protestant is a sign of reproach." The *Spectator* refers to a book which bears on the title-page the recommendation of a very venerable name, and which has reached its hundredth thousand, as teaching that "No faithful member of the Church of England could call himself Protestant."

Calvin and other malcontents," and asserts that in England the Church was corrupted by Protestantism.*

This drift began about sixty years ago in what is known as the "Oxford Movement"—a circle of clergymen, Newman, Pusey, Ward and others, undertaking to de-Protestantize their Church, and to put it back in its ideas of Churchmanship, its doctrines, its modes and practices of worship, to where it was in pre-Reformation times. This work within the Church was first known as Tractarianism, then as Puseyism. It is now designated as Ritualism, and it would seem logically the next new terming would be Romanism. Many of the leaders during these two generations past have anticipated the goal, and have quietly fallen into the arms of the pope.

The Secret History of the Oxford Movement, by Walter Walsh, is a notable volume which appeared in the latter part of 1897, and which in successive popular editions, especially since the Kensit incident, has been circulating throughout all England, everywhere astounding and arousing the people. The painstaking writer had been gathering material for his work for twenty years. Stress is laid on the qualifying "Secret" in the title. The revelations in large part are an uncovering of what before had no publicity. The author has been reviled. Attempts have been made to belittle the book, and to exculpate those whom it so seriously involves. But the main facts it alleges have not been denied. First showing from their own writings that the originators of the movement taught, and themselves practiced, the principle of "Reserve and Economy of Truth"—a principle akin to what is suggested by the portentous word Jesuitism—the author devotes himself principally to the history and mission of the secret societies which, as outgrowths of the original Tractarian seed, have been carrying certain sections of the Church perilously near to Rome. These are such as the Society of the Holy Cross, the Order of Corporate Reunion (with the Romish Church), the Confraternity of the Blessed Sacrament (to promote the doctrine of the "Eucharistic Sacrifice" and of the Real Presence in that sacrament), the Guild of All Souls (holding to a form of Purgatory and observing Requiem Masses), Order of the Holy Redeemer, etc. To these are added various Ritualistic Sisterhoods after the Romish model of such institutions. The object of all these societies has been to promote, each in its special line, the work of de-Protestantizing the Church of England, and to bring it into practical likeness to the Church of Rome, whose bishop, as some of the zealous and

* From his *Golden Gate*, as quoted by Walsh, in *Secret History of the Oxford Movement*.

courageous ones of this school do not hesitate to declare, is "the lawful primate and president of Christendom."

Thus, during the half century past, there has been growing within the Established Church of England, a compact and well-drilled party, which has lately come to be known as the "Romanizing" party. Little by little they have been ignoring the rubrics of the Prayer Book, and introducing new services, often taken bodily from the Roman Catholic Missals and other books, until now there are certain of their churches where a stranger would think he was in a Roman Catholic sanctuary. Pictures on the walls representing the seven stations of the cross, pictures or images of the Virgin Mary, often with lights before them, holy water stoups, confessional boxes, smoking incense, the perpetual light at the altar indicating the "host," symbolical vestments of different varieties, each with its different significance, bowings and genuflexions at the altar, the frequent signing of the cross—such sights can be seen to-day in many churches of Protestant England. A reredos has been set up over the altar in St. Paul's Cathedral which the Roman Catholic prelate of England, Cardinal Vaughan, is reported to have welcomed as "an enthronement of the Queen of Heaven in the natural centre of England's worship."

An American stranger, studying the English Church, especially if he be of non-Episcopal training, is struck by the great degree of unlikeness to all he had ever been accustomed to at home, in the nature and methods of worship and in the nomenclature employed. In the church buildings he learns of screen, chancel, altar, "minor altars," credence, table, sacristy, bishop's throne, Lady Chapel, etc. Then the clergy, in its grades, archbishop, bishop, dean, canon, prebend, vicar, rector, curate, deacon, and subdeacon, and archdeacon. The clerical vestments make a varied and intricate wardrobe. There are certain colors which are to be used, canonical colors, perhaps, or at least "liturgical colors." This does not indicate a mere love of finery, nor is it a thing of artistic taste or "man millinery," as it is often slurringly described, but is a matter of symbolical meaning and of reverent scrupulosity as far, especially, as the Ritualists are concerned. The variety in style and dimensions and ornamentation of the vestments has its significance in the variety of functions in which the clergyman engages. The vesting includes also the attendants who assist at the altar. There is the cotta, the cassock, the long surplice and the short surplice, the stole, the dalmatic, the alb, the tunicle, the cope, the chasuble, the biretta for the head, the bishop's mitre, etc. Sometimes the stole is adorned with crosses and the keys of Peter. Especially in the "administration of the Lord's Supper"

(a phrase very repugnant to the Ritualist's ear),* are we struck by the variety and strangeness of terminology. I speak now of the service after the approved ritualistic conception. We have the celebrant, the acolytes, the thurifers, the crucifers. Then the furniture and vessels used in the service, articles which have been dedicated, and have an awesome significance, and are as reverently touched and handled as we may suppose the Shekinah-covered ark to have been. They are such as the candles, the altar, the super-altar, the credence table, the altar cloth, the paten, the chalice, the cruets, the napkin, the pall, the thurible, the purificator, the incense-boat and spoon, the sacring bell, and the pyx or tabernacle, for the "reserved sacrament." Still more novel and painful to the uninitiated stranger is the celebration itself. The large candles on the altar are solemnly lighted, the act of lighting always beginning at the south end (the "epistle end") and never at the north. In several features of the altar service this careful observance of the compass points is of extreme importance, ritualistically considered. The celebrant is vested in a different style of robing from that which he wore when reading the prayers and preaching his sermon. There are low bowings many times repeated, and falling on the knees before the elements and before the cross, or crucifix, as it may be, which hangs over the altar. The thurifer swings his censer of burning incense. The celebrant, with his back to the people, reads inaudibly certain prayers, moving his hands over the elements ("oblations" is their word), then elevates them above his head and slowly puts them down again. He uses a wafer instead of bread. He moves from one side of the altar to the other. He makes the sign of the cross frequently. He has the sacring bell rung at the supreme moment of consecration.

The Very Rev. William Lefroy, D.D., the dean of Norwich Cathedral, recently in the New York *Tribune*, gave the following as the description of a service which took place in a London church, on a Sunday morning last February:

"Here there is the assumption of vestments, there there is removal; here they are held up, there they are let down; here the stole, the book, the altar are kissed. The clergy bless the incense, they cense the altar, they cense the elements, they cense each other, they cense the congregation. Mysterious movements mark the officiants. The celebrant glides to the south of the altar, washes his fingers, then glides to the centre; then suddenly faces the people with uplifted hands, and as suddenly reverses his position. Meanwhile the thurifer is busy censing the deacon, the subdeacon, the servers or acolytes, the choir and finally the people. Candles are lighted. They are borne by acolytes. The Sanctus is sung. The sacring bell

* Celebration, High Celebration, Divine Liturgy, Holy Eucharist, Eucharistic Sacrifice, Mass—such are the preferred designations.

is rung. The Benedictus is sung next. At last—the prayer of 'Humble Access' being omitted—the prayer of consecration is reached. Nearly every word is inaudible. The manual acts are completely hidden. But at the words, 'This is my body,' the sacring bell is again rung and the bell in the church tower is tolled. The bread is elevated. So is the wine. The Agnus Dei is sung. The celebrant then proceeds to the oblations. There are no communicants. Secretæ are then offered at the north, south and centre of the altar, after which the performers leave the church."

At sight or thought of all this, how can one refrain from Paul's word of protest, "This is not to eat the Lord's Supper!" The services of last Easter Sunday at St. Cuthbert's, the church in which Mr. Kensit made his demonstration a year before, I find thus reported in *The Guardian*, a London Church paper, of April 5, 1899:

"The minutiæ of ritual were of the most complex character. The constant bowings of the celebrant, the deacon and subdeacon, the kissing and moving of the Office-book and the book of the Gospels, the kissing of the altar, the censing of persons and things—the congregation was not censed—and the frequent use of the sign of the cross, would bewilder those not versed in ritual. Yet to the congregation every movement was familiar and had a solemn symbolical meaning. The scene at the consecration was a picturesque and remarkable one. During the Comfortable Words nearly fifty candles had been lit on the altar—up to that time there had been but six—and the celebrant, supported by the assistant clergy, went through many ceremonies, while at the altar steps knelt seven acolytes in scarlet cassocks and lace cottas, holding seven large candlesticks, which, at the actual words of consecration, they presented, as soldiers do arms, while, besides the ringing of bells, a startling blast from the trumpet announced the supreme moment of the service. The ceremonies at the close were very elaborate. It should be remarked that this service has been in use for seven or eight years at this church, with the tacit, if not express, approval of the late Bishop (the present Primate), and that none of the ceremonial, save incense and candles, will be brought before the Archbishop next month."

Underlying the whole ground of the Ritualists is the sacerdotal idea. That is, that he who is generally known as preacher, minister of the Gospel, clergyman, pastor, in virtue of his ordination by the laying on his head of a bishop's hands has become a priest. An instruction quite commonly given to the people, it is said, is, "You should never speak of your priest as a minister or a clergyman." The English Prayer Book uses Minister and Priest interchangeably. In the light of subsequent development it was unfortunate that the latter designation was employed. But neither the Prayer Book nor the New Testament recognizes the minister of the Word as a priest in the ἱερεύς or *sacerdos* sense as implying sacrificial functions. The English word as thus employed does not necessarily signify more than presbyter, "presbyter writ small." But the Ritualists, taking the term in the sense of ἱερεύς, ascribe to the clergy the power to offer sacrifice. This transforms the communion table into an altar. Christ is

therefore offered as a sacrifice. After, and by means of the words of consecration and certain manual actions of the priest, to which an air of mystery is made to attach as he stands with his back to the people, there comes a presence of Christ in the bread and wine; not a spiritual presence simply as realized by the communicant who partakes in faith, but a real and objective presence of the humanity of the Lord; "His body and blood under the form of bread and wine," as is extensively taught.*

The teaching that in this sense Christ is on the altar, and is partaken of, explains from the ritualistic standpoint several things in connection with this service. For instance, flowers are always found on the altar, not merely as being pleasant to the æsthetic taste of the beholders, but to beautify the place of that Presence. Candles are lighted, not to aid the worshiper's vision (as I have seen them thus burning when the sun of noonday was flooding the house with light), but to express the sense of gladness in the coming of the Heavenly Guest. Hence, bowing and genuflecting before the altar find their explanation. A vestment is worn by the celebrant different from that in use when he reads the prayers or preaches his sermon—a rich and highly ornamented vestment to do honor to that Presence, just as an officer of the English realm when admitted to the queen's reception appears in a more courtly and magnificent apparel than his ordinary robe of office. There must be great carefulness in putting the bread into the hands of the communicant and the cup to his lips, lest any particle should fall to the floor. This perversion of the Lord's Supper also explains why "fasting communion," as it is called, is so strongly urged. Eat nothing on communion day until after you have partaken at the altar. Why? Because, as one of their tracts explains, "Your body is about to become a tabernacle for the most sacred flesh and blood of Jesus, God Incarnate." It is founded on the materialistic notion that the communion elements ought to meet with no other food in the stomach, but have first and honored place there; that as the bread and wine are taken within the body, likewise, as I read in a sermon preached last summer, there is "actually infused into the souls of the faithful the very substance of the glorified body and blood of Christ." And that, "with the exception that the Latins use scholastic phraseology to express the mystery of the sacrament, and the

* I have seen the following as taken from *Six Plain Sermons*, by Richard Wilkin, Priest: "Bowing to the altar at all times, not so much because it is so much wood or stone put together in a certain shape, covered with handsome cloths, decked with flowers and lights; not for this, were it ten times as gorgeous, not for this, but because the altar is the throne of God Incarnate, where daily now, thank God, in many a Church in the land, He deigns to rest."

English do not, there is, thank God, no difference whatever between the Latin and English provinces of the Church as to the adorable fact of the real Presence of our Lord in His body and blood under the forms of bread and wine." This, of course, is nothing short of transubstantiation. It is thus taught to young children in manuals of instruction :

> "Now Jesus Christ's true flesh and blood
> Will be our Sacrifice divine,
> The same on altar as on cross,
> Though under forms of bread and wine."*

And again :

> "Here upon Thy holy altar,
> Where the tapers brightly shine,
> Thou as God and Man art present,
> Under veils of bread and wine."†

The following instruction is also given the children in reference to the act of consecration :

"This is the most solemn part of the service—try and be very still—Jesus is now coming—the angels are around the altar."†

"Fasting Communion" connects with another principle earnestly advocated by the Ritualists, namely, the impropriety and evil of "Evening Communions." There is a society among them which prescribes on all its members the duty of praying that such custom may cease. This society declares that "evening communion is an act of schism, in the gravest sense of the term," and that it is "spiritually and morally dangerous." As they ignore in reference to fasting, in that connection, the fact that the Lord's Supper was instituted immediately after the disciples had partaken of the Passover Feast, likewise do they disregard the fact that the original service of the Supper was when "even was now come."

"Non-communicating attendance" is another point involved. If this service is an altar sacrifice offered for sins in the mysterious and effective prerogative of a priest, then it is of avail even if offered at times when none of the people partake. So it is in certain celebrations of the Mass (the "Solitary Masses") in the Roman Catholic Church. But the Prayer Book, never contemplating such a view of the sacrament, and regarding it strictly as a communion, contains a rubric which plainly directs that there shall be no ministration "except four (or three at least) communicate with the priest."‡

* *The People's Mass Book, or Children's Service Book.*

† *Altar Book for Children*, Mowbray & Co., Oxford.

‡ The *Directorium Anglicanum*, called by the *Cotemporary Review* the "elaborate text-book of high ritualism," in its directions pertaining to the communion

Growing out of their "Real Presence" view is another favorite practice—the "Reservation of the Sacrament." That is to say, the communion elements having been sanctified, or *magicalized*, if the word may be coined, according to the Ritualists' conception of the consecration act, a portion is reserved in a small vessel called a pyx or tabernacle. The contents of the little vessel are reverently spoken of by some as "the divine prisoner of the tabernacle," and its place in the church near the altar is indicated by a lamp kept constantly burning. It is for use when the clergyman is called to administer the sacrament to the sick and the dying.* A further reason for it, as surmised by some, is thus to provide for the "Adoration of the Host" in the church. This reverence, it is desired, shall also be shown to the little vessel and its "prisoner" as it passes on the street. It is reported of one clergyman that he requests his congregation to "kneel when the Host is carried in procession to the sick." Another vicar of the same kind, in a public speech last September, as reported in *The Church Times*, said :

"Why is this so fought against? Why is it disputed? I will tell you. It is because it involves the Catholic teaching of the Real Presence—that our Lord is really there ; that the consecration really effects a change. That is the reason it is opposed at the present time. You will find that what is aimed at is doctrine."

For this practice is even claimed the authority of certain canons of Archbishop Peckham of the twelfth century, alleged to have never been repealed, which speak of "the King of Glory carried under the cover of bread," and which direct that the people prostrate themselves and make humble adoration as it passes.

If he is a sacrificing priest, it follows that the Ritualistic clergyman should consider himself a father confessor, clothed with the power of granting absolution of sins. One of their number has said that "in the sacramental system without confession there is a link missing." Hence auricular confession followed by absolution has obtained an alarming hold in the English Church. Dr. Pusey heard confessions for forty years. It is stated that in the city of Brighton there had been ten thousand confessions heard in a single year. In the London newspaper communications, along

service, thus suggests how this drastic rule may be met—evaded rather : "A sufficient number of the faithful ought always to be encouraged to stay, whether they actually communicate or not, which will not be discovered until afterwards, so as to make a quorum in the sense of the rubric ; even if they go out after the prayer of the oblation or exhortation, it will be too late for the priest to stop. Absent sick persons, who communicate spiritually, ought also to be counted in. Thus there can be no great difficulty in offering the Holy Sacrifice daily."

* They are fond of the word *viaticum* in such use of the Sacrament.

with many denouncing the practice, I have frequently seen letters from laymen, sometimes women, advocating it and apparently boasting of it as a custom in their own religious life. A communication in *The Spectator* last winter thus puts it:

"A man's conscience is troubled. A general amnesty is one thing. Individual restoration to favor, personal consolation and comfort is another. In a word, he desires the ministry of reconciliation. Well, it is his right. His priest was ordained for this very purpose."

Another way of putting it is this: The penitent goes to the priest, not for spiritual counsel merely, but to get divine absolution for sins. It is not the priest who absolves, but the power of God working in him. The priest is, as it were, an agent authorized to give a receipt. More than twenty years ago a book entitled *The Priest in Absolution* was issued by one of the secret societies already referred to. It was intended for secret circulation only, as a guide to young father confessors, but was discovered and exposed to a degree of publicity sufficient to secure its reprobation. Such was the character of questions to be addressed in the confessional to women penitents that the book might deservedly have been classed as of immoral literature. Lord Redesdale, who was described as a "High Churchman of the earlier sort," denounced it in the House of Lords, and the then Archbishop of Canterbury said it was "a disgrace to the community that such a book should be circulated under the authority of clergymen of the Established Church," and that it would be the duty of any father whose family had been exposed to such an examination to warn such clergyman "never to approach his house again." But the principle of confession is strenuously upheld by the Ritualists as not only "the soul's medicine, but its food." And a certain clergyman is charged with saying that "confession to God is good, but confession to a priest is better." Lord Halifax, the president of the English Church Union, extols confession and priestly absolution as "the ordinary means of forgiveness for post-baptismal sin." In *A Catechism for Catholics in England*,* the teaching is given:

"When I confess with contrite heart
My sins unto the priest,
I do believe from all their guilt
That moment I'm released."

The practice has become fixed and regular in certain of the churches. Bulletin boards at their doors announce the particular days and hours of the week when confessions will be heard. Moreover, this is not always a voluntary matter, but is sometimes

* Published by Robert Browning, Paternoster Row, London, p. 31.

made a requirement in order to have the privilege of the communion service. Cases are reported where parish members, when near death, were refused the sacrament of the Supper because declining to make confession and receive absolution at the hands of the clergyman. Similar instances occur in boarding schools, or orphanages and other charity institutions where compulsion can be more readily exercised.

Prayers for the dead and "Requiem Masses" is another article in their program. This as a practice, and its inculcation among the people as a doctrine, has been made a special object by the "Guild of All Souls."* It is freely taught in manuals of devotion. The same class of books, which have obtained wide circulation, furnish invocations of the angels, of the Virgin Mary, and of well-nigh the whole company of saints, martyrs, holy monks, etc., ever canonized by the Church of Rome. The ceremonial use of incense has a strong fascination for the Ritualistic mind. Some of them defend it by an astounding interpretation of Malachi i. 11: "In every place incense shall be offered unto my name;" and when recently the bishops forbade its further use, they had conscientious scruples about obeying lest they should be found "fighters against God."

The Asperges—sprinkling holy water on the altar and in the church—is another fond practice. A man last winter was prosecuted in the courts for vocally protesting in time of service against water being thrown on him by one of the officiating clergy. Other puerilities, of which many of the Ritualists are fond, are such as imposition of the ashes, blessing of the palms, blessing of the salt, blessing the water, veneration of sacred objects, exorcism, etc.

Let it be borne in mind that all this while these exploitings of extreme Ritualism are at variance with the Book of Common Prayer and the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church, with former admonitions of bishops, with decisions rendered in the courts appointed for ecclesiastical judicatory, and with the almost uniform traditions and history of the English Church for three hundred years prior to the last half-century. But what do the promoters and devotees of these practices say in justification of their course? First, they make the utmost possible of certain ambiguities of expression in the Prayer Book, and certain remnants of Romish terms and phrases, such as the word Priest (although the word "Altar" is not used); the suggestion of confession and absolution in the pre-commmunion exhortation to any one of a "dis-

* Mr. Walter Walsh, writing in the *National Review* for last March, speaking of the Guild of All Souls, says: "From its official documents I have ascertained that under its auspices in England and Wales, during the year 1897, no fewer than 5185 masses for the dead to get them out of Purgatory were offered in the Church of England places of worship."

turbed conscience," and as found also in the Visitation of the Sick; the quibble as to the difference between the "north side" and the "north end" of the Lord's table, on which hinges the question of the "eastward position" as far as any rubric direction pertains to it. Further, they deny the principle that the omission in the book to prescribe points of ritual is equivalent to their prohibition; and that arguments founded on non-user, however long and continuous, can be legitimately adduced as evidence of what the Church of England forbids or enjoins. This assumption ignores the fact that at the Reformation Settlement a whole new conception of the Church and of the spiritual functions of its clergy was embodied in the law of the realm, and that in the revised forms of worship these Romish ceremonies and doctrines were deliberately rejected from the Prayer Book and are condemned in the Thirty-nine Articles. The variance between some of the cherished views and practices of the Ritualists and the sentiments of the Book of Common Prayer is especially manifest in certain of the rubrics given in the "Order of Administration of the Lord's Supper." These rubrics evidently discountenance a communion service without communicants partaking, also the Reservation of the Sacrament. The provision that "every parishioner shall communicate at least three times in the year" would seem to give little ground for pressing on the conscience of the people the extreme importance of partaking at least once a week, if not daily. The note appended to this service form, as expressing the mind of the authorizers of the Book, explains that the only significance in the kneeling attitude when receiving the communion is to make humble acknowledgment of the benefits of Christ therein received. Moreover, to guard against any possible misconstruction, it is explicitly added, "that thereby no adoration is intended, or ought to be done, either unto the sacramental bread or wine there bodily received, or unto any corporal presence of Christ's natural flesh and blood; that such adoration would be idolatry, and is to be abhorred." Further, the intent, it would seem, is made clear beyond all doubt by the language of the Prefaces to the Prayer Book respecting services: "Here are left out many things whereof some are untrue, some uncertain, some vain and superstitious." And again, as to the abolition of ceremonies, it is explicitly stated:

"Some at the first were of godly intent and purpose devised, and yet at length turned to vanity and superstition; some entered into the Church by indiscreet devotion, and such a zeal as was without knowledge; and for because they were winked at in the beginning, they grew daily to more and more abuses, which, not only for their unprofitableness, but also because they had much blinded the people and obscured the glory of God, are worthy to be cut away and clean rejected."

The Book of Common Prayer, as the *Edinburgh Review* puts it, "enjoys the double sanction of a deliverance of the Church and a statute of the realm." But despite its authority and its many excellencies in structure and character, we hear far less now than formerly of its praises. Times have changed since the day when "incomparable" was the favorite adjective applied to it, and when any suggestion of its revision was thought almost sacrilegious. We find the priest party speaking of its "shortcomings," its "defects" and its "faults;" of its "grievous and presumptuous rubrics;" that "heresy has been practically triumphant for three hundred years through the Prayer Book;" that it "sadly obscures the oblation," uses the title The Lord's Supper, and "represents the communion service as something generically different from the mass, whereas it is nothing less than the same thing in another form." To an extent, although not so much on these grounds, the limitations of the Prayer Book have been felt by other parties in the Church; and the old Act of Uniformity was so far amended in 1872 that the preparation of additional services was authorized, provided they should contain nothing which was not part of Holy Scripture or the Book of Common Prayer, except as to anthems and hymns. Much of the trouble of late years has grown out of this matter of "additional services." The liberty has been taken to the full by the Ritualists, while the restrictions on the liberty have been ignored. Hence the introduction of devotional forms from Romish missals, and from books of the "societies," or of private authorship, utterly repugnant to the intent of the Prayer Book.

As to the Thirty-nine Articles, their testimony is specifically declared against Purgatory, the adoration of images, transubstantiation, elevation of the sacrament, reservation and the sacrifices of masses.* Nor, when adverse to these earnest Ritualists, are Acts of Parliament, or judgments of the Courts and of the Privy Council, or deliverances and orders which the bishops may have made, always heeded.

Not only do the Ritualists determinedly maintain their own course, but they bring counter-charges against the other parties in the Church. They charge against the Low Church evangelicals the omission, sometimes, to read the commandments at the communion service, the omission of the daily prayer service in the church, the practice of evening communion, the neglect of saints' days, the custom of prayer meetings in which extempore prayers

* Equally notorious, too, is the indifference which is manifested throughout the English Church (not alone by the Ritualistic clergy), toward these Articles of subscription, which, to use a current phrase, "all accept and none remember."

are offered, etc. Such charges have been made as if they stood on the same footing with the practice of turning the communion into a high mass at which none but the priest communicates, the worship of the Virgin, the invocation of the saints, and masses for the dead! They also urge, and with more justice, that the Broad Church clergy are undisturbed in their perilous laxity of doctrine—denying, sometimes, all real authority of the Scriptures, the reality of miracles, the incarnation of Jesus Christ, His resurrection and ascension. To a considerable extent, however, this class of clergy throw their influence in favor of full ritualistic freedom. I heard the sermon of an eminent canon in London in which he reprobated emphatically the protesting movement against the Romanizing party, and at the same time preached sentiments which made incarnation an ever-continuing process in the world, which it was difficult to distinguish from Pantheism.

The whole question of the Ritualists' attitude looks like a puzzle in morals, but many of them are earnest, godly men, holding their convictions as a sacred behest, and ready to endure reproach and persecution for what they consider their duty as priests of God. From their point of view, the continuity of the Church's visible organization, with an unbroken succession of its ministry and ordinances, is an essential. Accordingly, great stress has been laid not only on apostolic succession and its communicated powers, but on all the various particulars of ritual which marked the earlier Church and the observance of which they consider necessary in order to keep the Church of to-day in close touch with antiquity. The Reformation in their view did not sever this organic continuity. It simply severed the English Church from the bishop of Rome, and left it still an integral part of the Church of the fathers and of the early Councils, before the rise of an Italian pope and the Western Church. Some of the English reformers, they urge, were unprincipled or at least mistaken, and under the influence of the Continental Protestantism greatly erred in modifying or eliminating much of the ancient ritual. Under the fascination and dominancy of the early Church idea, they have bent all their energies for two generations past for a "Catholic revival," as they fondly term the movement. Hence, any rite or ceremony that was in general practice in ancient times has a sanction and an authority in their minds which make it a behest of conscience, and which has claims superior to Acts of Parliament and Privy Council decisions and injunctions of bishops. Often these rites involve doctrines, and gradually the acceptance of the rites led to an acceptance of the dogma which it shadowed forth. The whole question agitating England now, I may say, is at bottom one of

doctrine. It is not the adoption of certain ceremonies because of their picturesque effect, nor in gratification of æsthetic tastes, nor for the beauties of holiness nor the "holiness of beauty." With these earnest men all their forms are expressive of theological beliefs.*

When confronted by Prayer Book rubrics, the earnest Ritualist does not hesitate to say that above the Prayer Book there is the higher law of Catholic usage; that if he should be required by his bishop to refrain from any parts of his sacred ritual on the ground that they were unlawful, this would be putting a strain on his conscience to which he could not submit. His position is thus expressed with great candor by *The Church Times*, in an editorial significantly headed, "The Limitation of Obedience:"

"The Church of England, as a part of the Catholic Church, has laws and customs which are not explicitly expressed in her own special formularies. They who contend that their laws are restricted to those which have been enacted by her own local authority, at or since the Reformation, both deny her own claims and statements, and are guilty of the profanation of attempting to reduce her to the level of a Protestant sect."

Thus, primary allegiance is due to that mysterious something which the Ritualist calls "the law of the Church," as he conjures it out of the traditions and customs of the earlier centuries. The adverse decisions of the courts of the realm or any attempt at interference by Parliament is called "Erastian tyranny," and an encroachment on a jurisdiction not theirs—sublimely ignoring the fact that the English Church is established by law and endowed by the State.

Lord Halifax, speaking for the Church Union, says:

"We deny the right of the Crown of England or Parliament to determine the doctrine, the discipline and the ceremonial of the Church of England."

This leads Sir William Harcourt to describe him as the ecclesiastical Jack Cade, and to say:

"What is the use of 'We' denying anything of the sort? 'We' might as well deny the right of the Crown and Parliament to tax the people. The only reply to

* Lord Halifax, in a speech last winter, freely acknowledged: "The agitation begun about ritual has ended, where we knew it must end, with doctrine. It is the sacramental system and belief as to the powers conferred on the apostles and their successors, which lie at the root of the present controversy." Mr. Frederick Harrison, the English Positivist, writing last summer of the struggle with the Established Church, said: "It is not about vestments, candles, ritual and genuflexions. These points are merely the trappings and symbols of the real point. The real point is whether or not there can be introduced into the Church of England the Sacrifice of the Mass." Said Dean Hook in 1866: "The whole principle of the Reformation consisted in changing the Mass into a communion; whereas, at present, the whole object of the ritualist is to change the communion into a Mass."

this nonsense which it is necessary to give is that the Crown and Parliament when they enacted the Prayer Book in the teeth of the bishops and the clergy did determine all the conditions of the Church of England as established by law, and have continued to do so for more than three centuries."

And the London *Spectator* retorts in a similar vein:

"That Parliament is sovereign—that is, that it can and does control the Church and every other body and person within the kingdom—is a fact so obvious that its denial worries us no more than the denial of gravitation."

But what have the bishops been doing? The London *Times* has described their policy as "masterly inactivity relieved by epigrams." They have thought to minimize and belittle the gravity of the situation in a manner that borders on apology, if not defense, of the things complained of. They have shut their eyes to much and have shown reluctance to pass censure or disapproval. The deep and widespread feeling they have likened to previous excitements of the people over such petty questions as a surpliced choir and the abandonment of the black Genevan gown in preaching. They have emphasized the comprehensive character of the National Church and the elasticity of its rules. Referred to the many illegal rites habitually practiced in the churches, some of the bishops have condoned them as merely illustrating the "freedom and variety of the Church's worship," and as a desire to "enrich the service" and to make it applicable to the "changing devotional needs;" and also by their extolling the purity of life and the earnestness in parish work exhibited by many of these offenders. Further, it is alleged that when aggrieved parishioners have made written complaints the bishops have too often disregarded them, and thrown them into the waste basket; and that when a formal presentment has been made of parish clergymen for investigation and trial, the bishop's right of veto has been exercised to stay all proceedings. The Archbishop of Canterbury could mildly refer to this class of clergy, whose unlawful and heinous course was arousing the nation, as "slipping into irregularities." The Bishop of London, presented with a memorial of protest, signed by over 15,000 Churchmen, directing his attention to the illegal practices in a multitude of churches in his own diocese, replied that the modes of public worship were minor matters, and that toleration should be observed. That while some things were done contrary to the large liberty allowed in the Church, yet to draw the line was difficult, and it was unwise to enforce uniformity of worship. In one instance, in reference to a man who remonstrated against the lawless and Romish course of his clergyman, the bishop is reported to have curtly told him if he did not like it he was free to go to another parish!

At the same time it must be remembered that the bishops are under great embarrassment and difficulty as respects any efforts at repression of these ritualistic excesses. In the first place, an active interference now would involve to a degree a condemnation of themselves. For years past, in a spirit of easy tolerance, they have permitted, and some of them have approved and participated in, services and ceremonials which to-day they are urged to root out. Again, what might have been easily accomplished some years since is now seen to be a greater task. The reluctance to resort to civil prosecution is very natural—even Bishop Ryle, at the utmost remove in sympathy from the ritualistic school, being opposed to such course. The difficulty is increased by the bishops finding that it is not with an individual recalcitrant here and there they would have to deal, but with powerful societies banded to defend and promote the daring aim of securing for their doctrines and modes of worship an unchallenged place in the Church of England. The bishops who would be faithful in this crisis have also to face the hostility of certain sections of the aristocracy and the socially fashionable. Charles Kingsley, thirty years ago, said the ritualistic school was an "aristocratic movement in the fullest sense." It is evident, too, that in a considerable section of the general public the non-interference policy is favored. With superficial convictions in religious truth and under the influence of the Laodicean spirit which prevails to-day, they cry for peace and quiet —that peace which comes from ignoring danger and acquiescing in error. They claim that the Church of England was a compromise from the first; that at the Reformation it took its stand at the crossroads; that the present-day anomalies are only what is inherent in its position, if not necessary to its well-being. They extol its comprehensive character.* They protest against a hard-and-fast policy; that the Church must not be regarded as a regiment of soldiers, or as under a "petrifying" discipline, nor allow its forms of activity to be "stereotyped" or "Hebraized." At the same time these apologists are quick to oppose the only practicable measures which have been suggested in lieu of civil prosecution, viz., (1) to deprive the bishop of his right of veto, thus requiring him to issue cases properly brought to his attention; and (2) to clothe the bishop with the power of depriving of his charge any recalcitrant clergyman who refuses to obey a judgment, in place of the present penalty of sending him to prison.

Last January the bishops, through the Archbishop of York,

* "The Church's comprehensiveness is defined and prescribed in the formularies, and to contend that it is to comprehend the doctrines and practices of the Church of Rome is nonsense" (Sir William Harcourt in the *Times*).

issued a pastoral condemning to some extent certain of these practices. The Church Union replied defiantly, and Lord Halifax, its president, openly declared, especially in regard to reservation of the sacrament and the use of incense, that these will not be surrendered, and that if such restrictions are to be enforced, "the consequences will be far-reaching, and the residuary legatee who will profit by them will be the Roman Communion in England." Since then it has been announced that the bishops will constitute themselves a special spiritual court to hear representations and arguments on these points and then give judgment. The Ritualistic party are not satisfied with this, and some have given notice in advance that they will not consider themselves bound if the judgments should be contrary to their own sentiments. The Evangelical party, too, are dissatisfied, inasmuch as they claim the law in the case is already definite, and that the bishops have no authority to reopen the question.

It is not surprising that this condition in the English Church should suggest the subject of disestablishment. This may yet become a question for the hustings and for Parliament, the Church being in one sense at least the creature of the State, and the crown, by the coronation oath, committed to the Protestant faith. The people of the realm generally have a right and a responsibility in the matter, as well as the members of the particular Church concerned. This can only be effectively expressed by the legislative body of the land. This principle of Church establishment having been chosen and embodied in law, and the Church people having accepted and utilized whatever vantage points it has brought them in the past, it seems puerile to urge scruples of conscience and to cry "Erastianism" only when the working of the principle is not to their liking. Why should it be thought unreasonable or a hardship if Parliament should demand that the Church shall conform to the condition of its connection with the State?

Of course the principle of the Non-Conformists against a State Church has only been strengthened by recent developments. Furthermore, many of them think that the seeds of ritual trouble are inherent in the whole Prayer Book and liturgical system, and that even if suppressed now they would develop again, and that the nation, as such, can exonerate itself only by withdrawing all formal and official connection with the Church. Dr. Guinness Rogers says that "while the Prayer Book remains as it is, Sacerdotalism and Sacramentarianism are its natural products." While the mass of the Church might desire no alterations, it is altogether probable that if either the Low Church party or the Ritual-

istic wing should ever become predominantly representative, a decided revision would be made, either toward a less ambiguous Protestantism, or, on the other hand, toward a greater assimilation of mediæval theology.

The Non-Conformist leaders also represent that as they were doomed to political and social inferiority because they would not conform to the terms of the law in the Prayer Book, their demand is only reasonable that they who accept the privileges of an Establishment should conform to the terms on which these privileges are granted. And if now the obligations to the National Church are disregarded by its adherents and beneficiaries it is time their special privileges be forfeited.

Among English Churchmen, generally speaking, the thought of disestablishment is obnoxious. The idea of Church dignity, authority, orders, succession, stateliness, superiority and precedence have in the history of centuries become associated in their minds with the sovereignty and glory of the English throne. Then the Moderate High Church party, together with the Low Church, regard the relation to the State and the coronation oath as at least a formal committal of the nation to Protestantism, and they deprecate the proposal to disestablish. But the Ritualists, by reason of the widespread feeling of the people, are becoming restive under the conditions of a Church established and regulated by law. The rising tide, which may express itself in Parliament, has modified their view of Church and State union. They say the establishment of the Church may be purchased at too dear a cost, and that it would be a fatal error to lose one jot or tittle of the doctrine or discipline of the Church for the sake of being established. One of their writers in the *Nineteenth Century* for last February boldly declared that if a Parliament should "lay its profane hands on the eucharistic faith and worship of the Church, or upon the ministry of reconciliation, the demand for disestablishment will be heard in such a volume of voices as will shake the Episcopal bench with unwonted tremors." And Lord Halifax speaks to the same effect: "No loyal Churchman will barter the principles of the Church for the sake either of establishment or endowment."

At the time of this writing it is too early to attempt to forecast the solution of this grave problem. The extreme and advanced Ritualists are a minority of the clergy. But I think it may be said that they, plus those who are ritualistically inclined and whose manifest trend is in their direction, together with those of the Moderate High Church party, who, disliking ritualistic extravagances, yet dislike more any interference, under popular clamor, with the

dignity and development of the Church—that these constitute a majority as far as the clergy and the bishops are concerned. The Low Church clergy and the mass of the laity stand against this drift of the Church. And, as it has become a national question, the non-conforming public generally stands with them. The bishops, goaded by popular sentiment, may be forced into a more pronounced attitude of disapproval of the Romanizing section. But I fear it will only be such as heals slightly the hurt of the daughter of Zion. The laity are not clothed with any authority in the affairs of their dioceses. They are represented, in respect to ecclesiastical authority in the National Church, only in the National Parliament. And it begins to look as if it is from that body that redress and correction of evils must finally come.

St. Louis, Mo. MEADE C. WILLIAMS.

II.

HERBERT SPENCER—"OUR GREAT PHILOSOPHER"—*VERSUS* THE KNOWN GOD.

III. Mr. Spencer's Universal System.

THE task that Mr. Spencer set for himself and that he proposed to accomplish by aid of the working principles considered in two former articles,* is best stated by himself, in language that has been already cited in another connection. It is

"to formulate the whole series of changes passed through by every existence in its passage from the imperceptible to the perceptible, and again from the perceptible to the imperceptible."†

The formula sought is to *explain all existences;* for he says of philosophy:

"If it begins its *explanations* with existences that already have concrete forms, or leaves off while they still retain concrete forms, then, manifestly, they had preceding histories, or will have succeeding histories, or both, of which no account is given. And as such preceding and succeeding histories are subjects of possible knowledge, a philosophy which says nothing about them falls short of the required unification."‡

According to one view, the problem is the unification of all knowledge. The aim is to formulate a statement that shall *express* all the changes of every existence in the universe. Genetically, the aim is not simply to formulate such a statement, but to furnish a principle or set of principles that shall *explain* all the changes of the universe, without a break in the immensities or eternities. In the former sense, the result aimed at is a descriptive statement: in the latter, to secure, to use Mr. Spencer's own phrase, an "explanation" by a "dynamic principle." The latter is, manifestly, what such a scheme must aim at, if it is to be of any great value; in short, if it is to furnish any basis at all for a philosophy,—not only to *construct ideally*, but also *to account for dynamically*, all the changes of the universe.

The formula of evolution claims to be the required formula and to furnish and express the required dynamic principle. The formula propounded by Mr. Spencer runs thus:

"Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion;

---

* See Presbyterian and Reformed Review for January and April.

† Spencer, *First Principles*, p. 541. ‡ *First Principles*, p. 541.

during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."*

Or in abridged and more familiar form:

"Evolution is a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity through continuous differentiations and integrations."

This formula furnishes two original factors only, *matter* and *motion*, or *matter in motion*. Everything is to be the outcome of the "redistribution of matter and motion," and must therefore proceed on the strictest principles of physics, *i. e.*, of mechanics.

The general statement of the aim of philosophy, by bringing in the "imperceptible," seems to add, by implication at least, a third factor, the "power of perception," or, in Mr. Spencer's language, "consciousness." As "matter" is simply "persistence in consciousness," there could be no matter without consciousness, or a percipient soul. But waiving this objection, drawn from the point of view of "transformed realism," we may take the stand of natural realism and conceive of what existed before any perceiving being came into existence. The term "existence" must be understood as embracing not only concrete material existences, as common people think of them—solid, liquid and gaseous—but every form of *matter* and *motion*, as these last are the fundamental existences.

It is proposed, in the present paper, to show briefly, that Mr. Spencer's construction must be adjudged a failure, whether tested by his own so-called principles, or by the principles of sound logic and philosophy.

I. In order to any intelligent criticism of a system of philosophy there must be clear understanding of the *conception and method of philosophy*. Hence the preliminary statements following.

Philosophy has been defined to be "the science of principles."† It is not occupied, according to the same author, as in the case of other sciences, "with any special, limited province of things, nor yet with the sum of these provinces taken in their full extent, but with the nature, laws, and connection of whatever actually is."

1. If Philosophy is "the science of principles," a first question is, *What is to be understood by "principles?"*

Starting out from the historical side, With what has Philosophy dealt in the great historical systems? Too often, doubtless, with abstractions, at least when made use of by speculative minds—with speculations concerning substance, cause, being, essence, "the thing in itself." This may be considered the province of Meta-

* *First Principles*, p. 396.

† Ueberweg, *History of Philosophy*, Vol. i, p. 1.

physics proper. So far forth as it has cut loose from common sense, it may perhaps well deserve the ridicule of Pope, when he makes Martinus Scriblerus pronounce the essence of a "smoke-jack" to be its *meat-roasting quality;* or of Prof. Huxley, when he illustrates it by suggesting *aquosity* as the explanation of the properties of water. But genuine Philosophy has always dealt with the *principles* that explain knowledge and being, and with these not in the abstract, but as in the *concrete reality*. From the earliest period till the present day, it has grappled with the profoundest problems of nature, man and God. The aim of the great comprehensive philosophies, from Socrates to Hegel, has been to construct a system of principles that should furnish a rational solution of these universal problems, and thus afford the ultimate explanation of things as we find them, or of the universal reality.

The philosopher pushes his investigation beyond the surface *facts* or *phenomena* that constitute the materials of Empirical or Positive Science; back of the *proximate principles* or *forces* that constitute the matter of Rational Science; back to the *ultimate principles* or *causes* that underlie and explain all these, and furnish the subject-matter of Philosophy. In examining the historical course of Philosophy, it will be observed that three main and fundamental significations of "principle" emerge—often confused or confounded, often inadequately grasped—but nevertheless in themselves distinct and definite, and demanding attention in order to completeness in philosophic conception and discussion: that of the substance or material cause that constitutes the ultimate principle as the *essential elements* at the basis of each and every thing and entering into its make-up; that of the moving force or efficient cause that constitutes the ultimate principle as the *force* or *power* outworking in the manifestations of each and every thing; and that of the final cause, which arises out of the relation of the movement to its ends, and which constitutes the ultimate principle as the *law* expressing the outworking of ultimate causes from the essential elements toward the *end*.

When, therefore, Philosophy is defined to be "the science of principles," it is meant that it is the exact and systematic knowledge of the ultimate elements or realities, of the basal forces or causes, and of the universal truths or laws, that underlie and explain the manifestations of the great realities, nature, man and God; and their scientific application to the explanation of these realities.

2. If Philosophy is defined as a "science," a second question is, *What is the meaning of the term, and what is the scientific method in Philosophy?*

"Science," in the broad sense of that term, is "knowledge gained and verified by exact observation and correct thinking, especially as methodically formulated and arranged in rational system." It therefore includes (1) Science Proper, embracing, in the nomenclature of Sir William Hamilton, (*a*) exact knowledge of *facts* (historical or empirical science), (*b*) exact knowledge of *laws* reached by generalizing from facts (nomological science), and (*c*) exact knowledge of *proximate causes* (rational science); and (2) *Philosophy*, or the exact knowledge, in scientific system, of the ultimate *rational principles*—elements, causes and laws—that underlie and explain all real existences or the universal reality.

According to this conception, "Science" is not to be confined to the facts and laws of mind and matter, much less to those of matter only; but reaches out and embraces the entire range of ultimate principles at the basis of all material and spiritual existences. In short, Philosophy is as truly scientific as Science proper. The subject-matter is different in the two, but each has as its aim exact knowledge of that subject-matter as a reality constructed in rational system according to the law of the true.

The difference in subject-matter determines the difference in the scientific methods of Science Proper and of Philosophy. The former, so far as it deals with *facts*, employs the *method of inductive science*, and proceeds according to its principles—exact observation, rational explanation and scientific construction—to organize a rational system that shall exactly correspond with the natural system it attempts to interpret and express. The latter, starting with reality, but dealing with *principles*, employs the method of *inductive verification* applicable to such principles. That method embraces (1) exact observation of the region of thought under consideration—in universal philosophy, consideration of the universal system—in order to get at the essential facts and principles; (2) critical analysis of the observed materials, in order to bring to light and separate the ultimate principles—elements, causes, laws; and (3) the testing of these principles by the canons of intuition—self-evidence, necessity and catholicity—to decide which are philosophical principles in the proper sense. With this gathered, sifted and verified material, the universal philosopher proceeds to construct—by the same laws of scientific construction applicable to Science Proper—the rational system of principles that shall correspond with the natural system of principles underlying and explaining all existences, and that shall therefore constitute a Natural Philosophy.

3. If Philosophy is a scientific system of principles, constructed according to certain laws of scientific construction, a third ques-

tion is, *What are the rules by which the system as such is to be criticised and tested?*

What has already been said carries with it the further implications, that there is in man a power of rational construction by means of which systems of Science and Philosophy are produced; and that philosophical systems may therefore be tested by the laws of the constructive power itself, just as the products of deductive reason may be tested by the principles of the Aristotelian logic, and the products of inductive reason by the Baconian logic. A true and rational philosophy can never result from the fortuitous concourse of a mass of principles, any more than a world of order can result from a fortuitous concourse of atoms.

It is possible here barely to suggest the main tests of philosophic systems, without entering into any detailed exposition of them. They are as follows :

1. The *Test of Totality*, requiring completeness in the sphere of principles dealt with. If one have before him some philosophy, or section of philosophy, to test, the first thing should be to examine into its completeness of sphere. Has it the quality of totality or completeness, absolute or relative? Or is it fragmentary or incomplete—from lack of grasp and comprehensiveness, or from failure in observation and critical analysis? If the Philosophy proposed is a universal one, has the philosopher taken in the universe of reality?

2. The *Test of Organization*, requiring that the system—embracing all the essential principles and facts of the sphere of investigation—be shaped and organized into unity by a structural principle or organic idea. One must inquire whether the philosopher has fixed upon some organic idea by means of which he proposes to organize his system of principles. If he have such a principle, has he organized his system—embracing all the essential features reached in his investigation and analysis—by means of it? Or has he failed in that supreme task, because he is lacking in organizing capacity, or in the ability to use his structural principle with sustained power; or because his work has been too hasty and superficial, perhaps for the reason that he has attempted to cover too vast a field; or because, perhaps unconsciously to himself, some second principle has taken possession of his mind and swayed him as a "dominant idea," so marring or rendering false the results of his constructive effort? This is the supreme test of a philosophy as a construction.

3. The *Test of Naturalness*, requiring truthfulness or correspondence with reality. This is the crucial test of philosophical systems. Any system is truly scientific so far, and only so far, as it

interprets and reproduces in thought nature or the actual. It should be the aim of philosophical genius to seize upon the key to the true nature-system and by means of it to read the truth from nature or the world of reality itself. The aim of the critic of philosophy should be to enter into his spirit and by aid of his constructive work to read the secret of nature after him, and then test the one system by the other, thereby reaching assured truth.

The famous speculative philosophies are gigantic constructions, but as scientific views of the ultimate principles of all existences they break down before this final test. Some of them have unity and totality of sphere, but their so-called principles are factitious and fictitious, mere abstractions. Some of them are marvelous specimens of logical coherency of parts, but there is nothing outside of them to which this consistency corresponds. Some of them exhibit masterly organization of vast ranges of thought, but the structural principle has no counterpart in reality, and the system, like "faith without works," is "dead, being alone." So the old philosophies have been practically buried with their authors: as the old sciences were buried with their authors, until Newton and Boyle and Davy and Brewster and Faraday and their coadjutors learned to follow humbly and reverently in the footsteps of the Maker, in the way pointed out by Bacon, and thus began to give mankind a NATURAL SCIENCE. And so doubtless the new philosophies will perish with their fabricators, until the philosophers become willing—in accordance with the suggestion of Mivart, based on scientific and rational principles—to seek to follow humbly and devoutly in the footsteps of the same Maker, in understanding and interpreting to men the ultimate principles underlying the great realities of man, the cosmos and God, and thus give men a NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.*

II. In the light of the foregoing statements some of the *fundamental failures* of Mr. Spencer in his attempted philosophy of transformism may now be suggested.

Limitations of space render it impossible to enter into an elaborate and complete application of the tests to the half-score of thick volumes of his philosophy. Such application must be left for the patient reader to make for himself. So, too, must be left to him the carrying out of the further suggestions now to be made.

1. Mr. Spencer fails to take in *the totality* of the universal sphere with which he proposes to deal and the facts of which he proposes to explain. He excludes the main element in the universal reality, by reducing everything to matter and motion.

* St. George Mivart, *Nature and Thought, An Introduction to a Natural Philosophy*. p. 261.

The cosmos or universal system in which the philosopher finds himself, apparently embraces matter and its properties and minds and their properties, the two elements, matter and mind, being absolutely distinct and characterized by contradictory attributes. Of the existence of mind and of its qualities there is far more—and far more certain—knowledge, than of the existence and qualities of matter. To ignore the former, or to attempt to express it in terms of matter, is therefore both unscientific and illogical. Natural realism or dualism is not only the natural philosophy reached by the consensus of common humanity, but the only possible adequate philosophy. The ignoring of the main element in the universe, the element of mind, by which alone any explanation of it is possible, is the first fatal defect of this erstwhile new philosophy. Without this factor the whole region of conscious activity in man remains unaccounted for, as well as the whole order—an order of exact thought—of the universal system. Indeed, the psychical factors interpenetrate and shape the physical, so that even material development can only be expressed in terms of exact thought and righteous law. Yet Mr. Spencer, even after formally and repeatedly repudiating a materialistic explanation of the universe, never proposes any other than a materialistic formula in his attempted explanation. Matter and motion, the redistribution of these, chemical elements, physical laws, equilibration and polarity, are all strictly materialistic. He therefore makes no provision for the far greater and more important of the dual factors. Such materialistic monism can never furnish the starting-point for a philosophy that shall afford adequate explanation for a universe in which mind, personality, will, conscience, moral impulse, and religious aspiration are the chief and most important things to be accounted for.

By his own showing, by the very statement of his formula of evolution, it is obvious that Mr. Spencer is not entitled to one iota of mental energy in the construction of his philosophical scheme. He is bound to account for everything by material force. But as the mental energy alone can give the parts of his great system definite form and coherence, he must of necessity presuppose or assume it everywhere to keep that system from hopeless collapse. One of his most enthusiastic admirers has well expressed his method employed throughout his entire construction :*

"He steals some Mind, and he maintains, underneath the surface of his reasoning, an illicit channel of communication, by which he can, all unperceived, take feloniously as much more Mind as his necessities may demand. . . . . He is like one weaving a thread of varied strands, who, by sleight of hand, has obtained one

* *Spencer's Structural Principle Examined*, by Rev. W. D. Ground, p. 85.

strand to which he has no just right ; and then, having it, keeps working onward, ever taking more, and so produces his thread with the one strand which everybody knows has no right to be there. So Mr. Spencer, being engaged in developing solar rays, has seized this thread of Mind ; he then skillfully contrives to wind solar rays and Mind together, until at length he reaches molluscs, and he still continues the process until, at length, out of the first patch of star dust, we have evolved the powers of a Shakespeare ! His logical sin is, therefore, one of the most dangerous and most unpardonable kind ; for it is one which is ever secretly repeated, and ever on a larger scale ; he has embezzled some Mind, and he goes on purloining, until he has done his best to construct a universe without an Intelligent Creator."

Perhaps it may not be amiss to suggest that the philosopher has devised "the Unknowable" as a storehouse, not only for warehousing difficult problems, but also from which furtively to draw the needed supplies of mental energy. But however that may be, his system fails to meet the first test, that of totality; and thereby fails to conform to the third, that of matching the reality.

2. Mr. Spencer, by adopting a false method, fails to reach any *true principles* in his investigation of the universal system of things.

In the two papers printed in the January and April numbers of this REVIEW, and already referred to, Mr. Spencer's so-called "Principles of the Unknowable" and "Principles of the Knowable" were shown not to be philosophical principles at all. His criterion of philosophical truth, the "universal postulate," by which all truth is to be tested, namely, "the inconceivableness of its negation," was shown to ignore the positive and direct nature of all our most valuable knowledge—intuitions of sense, consciousness, and reason – and to reduce the basis of our knowledge to a mere *impotence*. In the regions of both the Unknowable and the Knowable he reaches, not principles, nor even truths in any sense, but pure abstractions with no basis in reality, and fit only for constructing a speculative system that has nothing in it to match reality. His ambitious scheme for constructing a genuine system of universal philosophy that should explain all existences was therefore foredoomed to failure. The attempt to build a granite cathedral out of "wood, hay and stubble," could not prove more futile or disastrous. Mr. Spencer's methods are utterly worthless, affording him no substantial material with which to erect a lasting structure. Genuine philosophical principles, the essential and ultimate facts and truths of existence, are to be reached, tested and verified only by the method of inductive verification already briefly outlined in this article.

3. A third fatal defect in the philosophy of transformism is the failure of its author to adhere to his *organizing principle, Evolution*, as defined by himself at the outset, and indeed the failure of that so-called principle itself.

After vowing not to use the term "Evolution" in the common sense of "development," Mr. Spencer prevailingly ignores what he claims to be the true sense and uses the false one. The occasional allusions to Evolution in the new sense—the sense required by his philosophy*—merely serves to cover up the fact of the false procedure. A careful examination cannot fail to bring out this fact. Evolution deals almost uniformly with "aggregates," masses, concrete forms, and is used to express recognizable development by the operation of natural laws. It becomes a gradual "accumulation of insensible differentiations," according to natural law.

This is illustrated in *First Principles*, in the chapters exhibiting the "Law of Evolution." Starting with nebulous matter, the *development* of the sidereal and solar systems is traced. *Development* is traced in organic life, in man, in society, in language and art. Mr. Spencer traces the fact of *development*—a fact admitted before he began to exert any influence upon English thought—along these manifold lines in the onmoving of the universe, and would have us believe that this is tantamount to *evolution*. But he has failed to show that these changes are the results of antecedent conditions and traceable to matter and motion, the ultimate factors recognized by his philosophy. There is therefore no "Evolution" about it. The same is true of the treatment of Biology. The philosopher dwells upon the idea of gradual or progressive change, of increase of differences, of the agency of natural laws. A few sentences will show the drift:

"Each organism exhibits, within a short space of time, a series of changes which, when supposed to occupy a period indefinitely great, and to go in various ways instead of one way, give us a tolerably clear conception of organic evolution in general."†

"Our imaginations must indeed be feeble if we fail to realize in thought the evolution of the most complex organism out of the simplest. If a single cell, under appropriate conditions, becomes a man in the space of a few years, there can be surely no difficulty in understanding how, under appropriate conditions, a cell may in the course of untold millions of years give origin to the human race."

All this is "*development*" pure and simple, except as he shuffles in for an instant, by the way, his philosophical meaning of "evolution" in order to reach his Munchausen-like conclusion. The procedure is the same in Ethics. In his *Data of Ethics*, starting out with the definition of "life," he advances to consciousness of pleasure and pain; to purposive adaptations to the environment for self-preservation in nutrition and reproduction; to *egoism* with the conscious recognition of "better not" as a motive in conduct, and, on the basis of this, to *altruism;* and

* *First Principles*, p. 285. † *Principles of Biology*, Vol. i, p. 349.

somehow to the transformation of "better not" into "ought not." Whatever element of truth there may be in all this attempted historical view, the view itself is simply that of *development*. Now no one denies the facts of development, or the progressive unfolding of man's ethical nature and views. What is wanted of a philosopher—and what Mr. Spencer proposes at the outset—is that he should *explain* them. What is wanted of Mr. Spencer is that he should explain them in terms of his own formula of "Evolution," as he has proposed to do, *i. e.*, in terms of "matter and motion." There is not a whisper of such an explanation. As a critic has said, "the history of human developments is a matter of natural history and no more." There is no explanation about it.

In fact, Mr. Spencer uses "development" throughout his whole system to play the part of the ass in the lion's skin. While the "development" process furnishes the body presented under cover, the real "Evolution" which is the one thing proposed by the philosopher is present only in the form and outside show.

The most thorough-going of Mr. Spencer's critics has clearly set forth the effect and the character of this method of presenting the so-called evolution:

"The effect of this mode of presenting Evolution or the unification of knowledge is heightened by the seemingly systematic manner of its exposition. Development is shown to be universally characterized by progress in three forms—namely, from a simple, indefinite, incoherent state to a complex, definite and coherent state; and the wonderful scope which the universe affords, both in time and space, for historically exhibiting these traits, overwhelms the mind with a sense of the universality of evolution, *in spite of the fact that all the time the very point of the question is missed in the absence of any explanation.* We recognize the gradual development, but where is the deductive connection? Where is the promised system of corollaries from original factors which shall account for the historical development?"*

The banner under which "our great philosopher" started out to carry on his campaign for the conquest of the universe had inscribed upon it "Evolution," in his primary sense of the "integration of matter and the concomitant dissipation of motion;" the banner under which he carries on the campaign and seems to win the complete victory is inscribed with Evolution in its secondary and harmless sense of "development"—the sense repudiated by Mr. Spencer to begin with. By deft changes of the one for the other, in connection with the magnitude of the task of presenting an unfolding universe, he confuses and mystifies his followers and —himself: while he utterly fails in his philosophical enterprise, and furnishes scarcely the mockery of an explanation. The results

* Guthrie, *On Mr. Spencer's Data of Ethics*, pp. 8, 9.

of examining his general method of procedure emphasize the failure of Mr. Spencer to organize his material by Evolution, and also the failure of Evolution itself as the structural principle for universal philosophy.

It is not too much to say, that, as a result of this procedure, Mr. Spencer's main defect, as judged by his own statement of his aim in Philosophy. becomes thus his chief excellence. Throwing out his philosophy as a worthless attempt at the explanation of the universe by Evolution, his scientific scheme is left as an imperfect sketch—exceedingly imperfect, indeed, because so unscientific—of the broadest and most comprehensive statement of the process of the development of the universe that has been essayed. It has an attempted range and sweep surpassing all former efforts at such exposition. It is this that makes his works suggestive and inspiring even to thinkers who scout his Evolution Philosophy; but the Evolution spoils the scientific exposition, introducing error at all points in the progress of the unfolding, and making it a misleading influence with all crude and loose thinkers. Humboldt's *Cosmos* was intended to "convey, not only a graphic description, but an imaginative conception, of the *physical world*—which should support generalization by details, and dignify details by generalization;" Mr. Spencer attempts incidentally to do a like work for the *phenomenal universe*, making use of all the "new science," and adding innumerable generalizations imaginative and otherwise of his own, and recognizing what the moderns have learned since Humboldt concerning the development of the world according to one great plan. It must therefore be admitted that while he has so often confused *à priori* and *à posteriori* reasonings, and mistaken conjectures and mere generalizations for genuine scientific inductions and ultimate principles, he has frequently suggested new lines of thought for other and more careful investigators to carry out; and that, while he has failed in his philosophy, and fallen short of truth or gone beyond it in his scientific scheme, he has at least sketched a vast outline in fragments for more patient and accurate thinkers of the future to connect and correct and fill out. Nevertheless, this failure of Evolution as an organic idea, added to the philosopher's failure to take in the sphere of all existences in its totality, and to his failure to reach any genuine principles in that sphere as a basis for a philosophical system, completes the discrediting of his universal philosophy as a scientific construction matching and explaining the universe of reality. The system does not stand the tests proposed in the program of its author, much less the general tests that should be applied to all such constructions.

III. The task remains of indicating *the failure of the new philosophy in its attempted solution of the successive specific problems that it sets for itself.* In the space at command it is barely possible to illustrate the entire procedure by presenting some instances of it as specimens, on the principle *ex uno disce omnes.*

According to the original prospectus, issued in March, 1860, Mr. Spencer proposed to give to the world, in periodical parts, a system of philosophy embracing "First Principles," "The Principles of Biology," "The Principles of Psychology," "The Principles of Sociology," and "The Principles of Morality." The Preface to the American edition of *First Principles* briefly outlined the system. The scheme developed in "First Principles" was "designed by the author to serve for guidance and verification in the construction of the succeeding and larger portion of his philosophic plan," and aimed to present "so much of the general principles of Physics as is essential to the development of his method." In the second work of the series—the *Principles of Biology*—Mr. Spencer proposed to enter upon "the subject of Organic Nature," and to furnish "a systematic statement of the facts and laws which constitute the Science of Life." In the *Principles of Psychology* Mr. Spencer was to "pass from the consideration of Life to the study of Mind. This subject will be regarded in the light of the great truths of Biology previously established; the connection of life and mind will be traced; the evolution of the intellectual faculties in their due succession, and, in correspondence with the conditions of the environment, will be unfolded, and the whole subject of mind will be treated, not by the narrow metaphysical methods, but in its broadest aspect, as a phase of nature's order which can only be comprehended in the light of her universal plan." In the fourth work of the series—*The Principles of Sociology*, or Social Science—the author was to take up the science of human relations. "The growth of society, the conditions of intellectual and moral progress, the development of its various activities and organizations, will be here described, and a statement made of those principles which are essential to the successful regulation of social affairs." Lastly, in Part Fifth —*The Principles of Morality*—the promise of the program was, that "the truths furnished by Biology, Psychology, and Sociology will be brought to bear, to determine correct rules of human action, the principles of private and public justice, and to form a true theory of right living." Such was the sublime undertaking outlined by Mr. Spencer forty years ago. Not less sublime has been the spectacle of the moral heroism of the man, for almost half a century—in spite of sickness and poverty, through evil report and

through good report—in his self-appointed, unremitting, heavy task of carrying forward that work to its recent completion. Whatever may be the thought of the results, such an example is of priceless worth to the present generation of philosophical thinkers as an incitement to large enterprises.

The chief problems that meet the philosopher by the way readily suggest themselves: How to get the original start from the Homogeneous; How to get from Matter and Motion to Life; How to get from non-sensitive and unconscious Life to Sensitive and Conscious Life or Mind: How to evolve Society, Religion and Morality out of what has gone before. Look now upon some of the proposed solutions.

1. The basal problem is, *How to get the original start from the Homogeneous.*

As already seen, the promise of the New Philosophy is to evolve everything from the Homogeneous by the redistribution of Matter and Motion. Mr. Spencer is bound to do this by his own statement of the problem and by his formula of Evolution.

It becomes evident speedily that the philosopher cannot take a single step forward from the "homogeneous" without positing "force" or "forces," of which no clear and consistent account is given. He must assume at the outset what is later asserted on the basis of a bare *suspicion*, that there was originally but one form of matter, and that, "by the different grouping of units, and by the combination of the unlike groups, each with its own kind and each with other kinds, it is *supposed* that there have been produced the kinds of matter we call elementary."* On the foundation of this *suspicion* and this *supposition*, the scheme prepares the way backward to the "homogeneous," and forward, by the aid of the sixty and more chemical elements thus brought in, to the "aggregation" of matter necessary for further progress in its task. As matter of fact Mr. Spencer does not start with the "homogeneous," and does not explain his evolution of the "heterogeneous" by the simple "redistribution of matter and motion." Consider now, somewhat in detail, his philosophic procedure, in handling this fundamental problem.

Confessedly the proper point of beginning in Evolution is the point reached by ultimate Dissolution. The goal of Dissolution is the "homogeneous." Can this be reached in thought? Perhaps thought with the aid of imagination can reach out toward it. All bodies must be resolved into their molecules; all these into their chemical elements; all these into their constituent atoms, or ultimate units—until there shall remain in *matter* no differences of

* *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. i, p. 155.

shape or size, and in *motion* no differences of rate or mode. The process must be carried beyond this even, until the distinctions of *matter* and *ether* disappear, and absolute homogeneity is reached. Matter and ether are *different*, and "every difference or change implies previous history," and philosophy, by our philosopher's own terms, must pass beyond these, if it is "not to remain self-convicted of inadequacy." Nor can the process of dissolution reach the "homogeneous," so far as one can see, until this incoherent, indefinite, imperceptible matter is equally diffused throughout immensity. Here, then, is the end, the condition, toward which dissolution tends—every ultimate particle precisely like every other, each with simple rotary motion, or with "pressure and tension" everywhere "coëxistent and coëqual"—a condition which Mr. Spencer characterizes as "Omnipresent Death." At this point—at this universal deadlock of the universe—Evolution is to begin its work.

How is it to unfold out of the "homogeneous" the "heterogeneous" as we find it in the manifold forms of inorganic matter? That is the problem.

Mr. Spencer starts his evolution by the assumption that "homogeneity" is a condition of "unstable equilibrium," and hence "some rearrangement must result:"

"The phrase unstable equilibrium is one used in mechanics to express a balance of forces of such kind that the interference of any further force, however minute, will destroy the arrangement previously subsisting; and bring about a totally different arrangement. . . . . The state of homogeneity cannot be maintained" (*F. P.*, pp. 401, 402).

"On setting out, the proposition which comes first in logical order, is, that some rearrangement must result" (*F. P.*, p. 401).

But what is to disturb the equilibrium, that is perfectly balanced, and therefore must remain stable, until so disturbed? Some "further force," says Mr. Spencer. But what is that "further force?" The finger of the Almighty? Or what? What room is there for loose "forces" flying about in the "homogeneous?"

Just here we find the philosopher's start toward heterogeneity: "the interference of any other force, however minute." Here is the deft assumption at the basis of all. One has aptly described Evolution as a "lump with a *start* in it."

Mr. Spencer has his own characteristic method of rendering plausible—or rather of covering up—the assumption of such a "start." His arguments are drawn from instances of the most *concrete and heterogeneous kind*. We cite two by way of illustration:

"Were it possible to bring a mass of water into a perfect state of homogeneity,

. . . . yet the radiation of heat from neighboring bodies . . . . would inevitably produce heterogeneity" (*F. P.*, p. 402).

"The instability thus variously illustrated is obviously consequent on the fact, that the several parts of any homogeneous aggregation are necessarily exposed to different forces—forces that differ either in kind or amount; and being exposed to different forces they are of necessity differently modified."

Now what is the relevancy of all this? The philosopher is discussing what would take place in the "homogeneous," which, according to hypothesis, has no "outside" and "inside," no "neighboring bodies," and is not exposed to "different forces." *Ex hypothesi* there can be no "external influence" to destroy the equilibrium. Mr. Spencer's philosophical method is as eccentric as the hat-band of the celebrated Richard, which "went half-way round and tucked under." Instead of setting out from the "homogeneous," he really starts with a limited universe, or scattered groups of matter, made up of all the chemical elements in gaseous condition, with gravitation and his whole list of "forces" in active operation. All this he deftly assumes, in addition to the "further force"—the original "start!"

After the start has been made, an ingenious device for getting the most out of the movement is found in the "multiplication of effects," another corollary "from the persistence of force." He says:

"In proportion as the area over which anything extends becomes heterogeneous, the results are in a yet higher degree multiplied in number and kind" (*F. P.*, p. 455).

His conclusion is as follows:

"Thus the conclusion that the part-cause of Evolution is the multiplication of effects; and that this increases in geometrical progression as the heterogeneity becomes greater; are not only to be established inductively, but are deducible from the deepest of all truths" (p. 458).

What, then, becomes of the "persistence of force:" what of its unchangeable sum-total in the universe? Here, looked at from the point of view of matter and motion, there is more *effect* than *cause!* But manifestly, the multiplication is in *number*, not in *quantity*. Each effect becomes at last *infinitesimal* So that this wonderful principle, so far as true, can add nothing to the sum-total.

Take an illustration at the summit of his great argument:

"The only further fact demanding notice, is, that we here see more clearly than ever, that in proportion as the area, over which any influence extends, becomes heterogeneous, the results are in a yet higher degree multiplied in number and kind While among the primitive tribes to whom it was first known, caoutchouc caused but few changes, among ourselves the changes have been so many and varied that the history of them occupies a volume. Upon the small, homogeneous community inhabiting one of the Hebrides, the electric telegraph would produce, were it used, scarcely any results; but in England the results it produces are multitudinous."*

* *First Principles*, p. 455.

The plausibleness of Mr. Spencer's statement arises from a fallacy involved in the whole procedure. Instead of starting with the "homogeneous," or with matter not far removed from that, he takes an illustration in which the main—almost the only—force involved is that of the *human spirit* as a free causal agency in the intellectual and social world. "Matter and motion" have as little as possible to do with it: simply for the reason that with them there is no "multiplication of effects" in any sense that will be useful as a "part-cause of Evolution." All the "multiplication of effects" in the instance given is due to *the causal energy of mind.*

Wherein, then, consists the "part-cause" of Evolution, that promised to be so useful in enlarging the universe? It belongs to the same category with the "further force" that gave the "homogeneous" its "start." By its assumption Evolution becomes a lump which has in it not only a *start*, but also a *fungus* with indefinite capacity for growth. Manifestly there will not be found along this line of procedure any adequate solution of that first and basal problem, How to get from the Homogeneous to the Heterogeneous.

2. The second problem is. *How to get from Matter and Motion to Life.* How does the philosopher attempt to solve it?

In the advance from Matter to Mind there are three capital movements: that from Matter and Motion to Life; that from Life to Sensation: and that from Sensation to full Psychical Action. This suggests three specific problems under the general. By the hypothesis, out of matter and motion, working along the lines of force, come by Evolution, life, sensation, mind. Attention must here be confined to the first of these specific problems, How to bring Organization and Life out of Matter and Motion, under the organizing principle of Evolution.

There is barely need to call attention at this point to Mr. Spencer's fundamental assumption that Matter and Motion constitute the knowable universe, his assumption without proof of his famous so-called axiom of the Persistence of Force, and his conclusion from these assumptions that there is but one manifestation of Force and that the mechanical. After what was presented in the former discussions, it will be taken for granted that they will be received by discriminating thinkers at their full worth—or worthlessness. Mr. Spencer's mode of arriving at them has been seen to be characteristic.

Into his scientific juggler's hat he has put all this without the slightest warrant from fact and contrary to the principles of his own hypothesis. Not one of these, tested by self-evidence,

necessity and catholicity, has the slightest title to the name of philosophical principle. That is, his system has no philosophical basis. But granting him all these by way of involution to start with, it is certain that the outcome of evolution can be no greater than the involution. If anything more is brought forth, it must be either because something more was surreptitiously put in at the outset, or because something is introduced in the process of development itself. As De Pressensé has so well said, "Evolution cannot give more than it possesses. The total of an addition cannot be more than the sum of the figures comprising it."*

The so-called *elements* with which Mr. Spencer starts out are matter, force, motion and evolution—*matter* as the ultimate element; *force* as the ultimate cause; *motion* as the primary resultant of the two, matter and force; *evolution* as the ultimate principle governing. Scientifically he has bound himself to introduce no new elements in the course of his system-building. If he does so, it can only be at the expense of his honesty or of his logic.

How does Mr. Spencer proceed to transform matter and motion, or mechanical force, into life and organization?

There are three ways, as one of the critics has observed, in which his attempt to bridge over "the process of Evolution from the inorganic to the organic may be regarded."†

> "*First*, as an endeavor to represent in words an actual and observed process of nature; or, *secondly*, it may be an attempt to represent and realize in thought what might be an actual, but is an unobserved process of nature; or, *lastly*, it may only be an evolution of words, representing a supposed process of nature."

If it must be regarded in the first way, it may be valuable science; if in the second, it is questionable speculation; if in the third, it is mere logomachy.

Some brief citations from Mr. Spencer's statement of the transforming process will show to which form his attempt belongs, whether to that of exact science, or to that of scientific speculation, or to that of word-juggling.

Obviously it is not easy to quote satisfactorily from so immense a mass of material, in which so much is irrelevant. Says Mr. Spencer:

> "Organic matters are produced in the laboratory by what we may literally call *artificial evolution*. Chemists find themselves unable to form these complex combinations directly by successive modifications of simpler combinations. In some binary compound, one element of which is present in several equivalents, a change is made by substituting for one of these equivalents an equivalent of some other element, so producing a ternary compound. Then another equivalent is replaced, and so on. . . . . And in this manner highly complex substances are eventually

* Edmond de Pressensé, *A Study of Origins*, p. 47.

† Guthrie, *Mr. Spencer's Formula of Evolution*, p. 57.

built up. Another characteristic of this method is no less significant. Two compounds are employed to generate, by their action upon one another, a compound of still greater complexity; different heterogeneous molecules of one stage become parents of a molecule a stage higher in heterogeneity."*

In this passage, Mr. Spencer has assumed that "organic molecules" are simply "highly complex molecules." He begins with calling certain molecules "complex," proceeds with showing how they "generate" and "become parents" of still more complex, and ends with calling the latter "organic." He has added together certain shapes, sizes and relations of motion, and what can he produce by these but a system of such shapes, sizes and motions? We know that $2 + 2 = 4$, and $4 + 4 = 8$; but the latter, though more complex, is of the same construction as the former. Whence then the "organic" molecule? The skilled juggler in shaking out the molecular contents of his hat has let the half-way principle of "*organization*" drop, perhaps unconsciously, out of his intellectual sleeve.

A little further on we find these "*organic* molecules" increasing wonderfully in complexity and variety, and Mr. Spencer informs us that

"In the early world, as in the modern laboratory, inferior types of organic substances, by their mutual action under fit conditions, evolved the superior types of organic substances, ending in *organizable protoplasm*."

And so, out of the sleeve, after the "organic molecules," have come "organic substances," all becoming "parents of organizable protoplasm!" Is it out of place to inquire who has told the philosopher the secrets of "the early world?" Is he the "wisdom" that was present in the beginning of the creation?

Mr. Spencer next proceeds to the "shaping" of "organizable protoplasm," and thus introduces a "plastic" element, by which, and in connection with which, same shaping force, "colloid and crystalloid masses," are formed. These are, of course, simply "more complex masses of molecules;" but with Mr. Spencer they prepare the way for another drop from the sleeve, which results in

"The production of the still more composite, still more sensitive, still more variously changeable portions of organic matter, which . . . . displayed actions verging little by little into those called *vital* actions, which protein itself exhibits in a certain degree, and which the lowest known living things exhibit only in a greater degree."

Complexity has become "sensitive" and "*vital*," and the chasm between the atom and the "living being" has been bridged—*verbally*, at least.

The keen critic already referred to has arranged all the steps in

* *Principles of Biology*, Vol. i.

order, and called the whole "The Stair of Life, by which we mount verbally from the inorganic to the highest forms of life." Among the steps are: Matter in motion; simple molecules; compound molecules; complex molecules; highly complex molecules; organic molecules; superior types of molecules; generation and parentage of molecules; higher types of organic molecules; sensitive molecules; still more composite, sensitive and changeable molecules; molecules with phenomena verging little by little into those called vital actions; lowest known living things and aggregates of them; the nascent life developed in these becoming more pronounced. He has well remarked that the *evolution* "*appears to be out of words only.* It is a kind of ladder of semi-synonyms. The stair by which we mount from the inorganic to the highest forms of life is made up of words that bracket together biological and chemical (*i. e.*, mechanical) processes. It is a scheme founded on the frailties of language. Complex is overlapped by organic, organic is overlapped by sensitive, sensitive is overlapped by vital, and so we get life; class or degree is overlapped by type, complex combination is called generation, greater complexity and greater sensitiveness, and generation is the generation of higher types. Then there is adaptation to environment and corresponding change of structure, and through generation again we get heredity, and the establishment of highly organized living beings and organized experience."*

What is to be said of such a solution of this second problem in the light of the simple principles of logic? The process, scientifically considered, is so-called induction without facts, assumption without warrant, and assertion without limit; philosophically considered, it is philosophy without principles. Every page devoted to the subject illustrates the incapacity of the philosopher for logical thinking, as well as his disregard of scientific fact and principle. He ignores the real, known and sufficient cause of the phenomena of life, for his hypothetical, inadequate cause, molecular motion. He is perpetually confounding antecedent, concomitant and law, with cause. He surreptitiously puts in, by sheer force of assumption and assertion, the very thing that he promises to develop out of matter and motion. He ignores the decision of Chemical Science, so well expressed by that great authority, Professor Virchow, of Berlin, when, in his reply to Ernst Haeckel, at the Munich meeting of the German "Association of Physicians and Naturalists," he said that it would to him [in view of his materialistic tendencies] be "some satisfaction to be able to say that the group of atoms known as Carbon & Co. . . . . the firm of

* Guthrie, *Mr. Spencer's Formula of Evolution*, pp. 58, 59.

Carbon & Co., once upon a time separated itself from ordinary carbon, and under special conditions produced the first plastidule, and that it still continues to do the same thing. But in the face of this we have to state that all real scientific knowledge has proceeded in the opposite direction.''*

So Mr. Spencer makes organization the originator of life, in utter disregard of the demonstration of the greatest living authority in Biology (acknowledged such by his enemies), Lionel Beale, that "life is always the producer and never the result of organization."

The inevitable conclusion is that Mr. Spencer has utterly failed to solve the first of the lesser problems on which his greater problems depend. He has produced, not exact science, nor scientific speculation, nor philosophy in any proper sense; but *word-juggling*. How infinitely short he has come of the mystery of Life! Life is not mere conformity to environment; that is only the outer condition of Life. There are inner conditions vastly more important than that; but even these are not Life. It is not adequately conceived "when we think of it as the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." Life is that mysterious something that uses chemical and mechanical forces, and yet it is not they and is not of them. It takes *dead matter* and transmutes it into *formed matter;* combines it into cells with a living unity; shapes it into organisms made up of many cells, no one of which exists for more than the briefest time, and yet all of which work together to maintain the being in all its parts; and weaves the whole into rose or peach or eagle or man with a deft wisdom reaching up toward omniscience. Molecules, complex molecules, still more complex molecules—these as philosophical explanations of the marvels of life are the very Dundrearyism of Philosophy!

The strenuous and destructive criticisms of Mivart, Weismann and others have forced even Mr. Spencer himself to confess, in the latest edition of his *Biology*, the utter inadequacy of his so-called philosophy.† He says:

"Though *The Origin of Species* proved to me that the transmission of acquired characters cannot be the sole factor in organic evolution, as I had assumed in *Social Statics* and in *The Principles of Biology*, published in pre-Darwinian days, yet I have never wavered in the belief that it is *a* factor and an all-important factor."

At an earlier stage of his work, in discussing "The Dynamic Element of Life," he is compelled to confess that "Life displays

* *Popular Science Monthly*, Supplement, Feb., 1878, p. 302.

† *Principles of Biology*, Vol. i, edition of 1898, "Inadequacy of Natural Selection," p. 690.

itself in ways that conform to the definition; but *it also displays itself in many other ways.*"* After quoting and criticising his own definitions of Life—in its more common form: "the definite correspondence of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences;" and in its more abstract form: "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"—he acknowledges that both "changes" and "relations" compel the assumption of something more than his formula to account for the phenomena of Life:

"Thus the critical testing of the definition brings us, in another way, to the conclusion reached above, that that which gives the substance to our idea of Life is *a certain unspecified principle of activity.* The dynamic element of Life is its essential element."

What is that but a frank confession of the inadequacy of his philosophy to explain that which he set out to explain, and whose explanation is the only *raison d'être* of the two portly volumes on *The Principles of Biology?* And what is it but an acknowledgment, after all the interminable verbal thimblerigging, of a *vital principle*, or *vital force*, as the essential dynamic element before any start can be made along the lines of vital phenomena?

3. There is space left merely to touch upon some of the remaining problems of universal Evolution. The procedure is everywhere the same.

Take the problem of the origin of man. Man came from *protoplasm.* "The properties of protoplasm result from the disposition of its molecules;" there is no substantial difference between the protoplasm of the amœba, the oyster, the ape, and the man; the original functions in all these cases are simply reproduction, motion, and nutrition; all forms of vegetable and animal life have been gradually evolved from the earliest and simplest organisms; man in his totality is derived from the interaction of organism and environment through countless ages past—what is all this but endless assumption and assertion? The evolutionary schemes of zoölogy and anthropology shatter themselves utterly against the facts of no spontaneous generation, of no transmutation of species, and of the historical distinctness of man and his abysmal separation from the lower animals by his godlike reason.

Equally simple is the ascent from organism to mind. Since by this theory all knowledge must come by the senses, it must have its origin in "matter in motion." Beginning with a blow from matter, there follow, in direct causal relation, "impression," "vibration," "neural tremor," "sensation." It is only neces-

* *Principles of Biology*, pp. 113, 114.

sary further to confound "sensation" with "consciousness," to set "sensations" to "aggregating" and "segregating" themselves, and to complete his sleight-of-hand performance with "faint aggregates" and "vivid aggregates," to bring out all the mental powers—from those of the cheese-mite up to those of the Arch-Ghost in Mr. Spencer's new Pantheon. And so without effort Dubois Reymond's "impassable chasms" are bridged over one by one.

And how is Conscience to be evolved out of the lower elements? It is the same procedure with variations. Mr. Spencer recognizes the fact that Ethics deals with purposed conduct. Such conduct can be understood only as a part of conduct in general; and this only as a part of action in general; and this again, according to the Philosophy of Evolution, only as a part of the cosmical process. He insists upon "the consideration of moral phenomena as phenomena of Evolution:"

> "If the entire universe has been evolved . . . . if one and all conform to the law of evolution; then the necessary implication is that those phenomena of conduct in these highest creatures with which morality is concerned, also conform."

He acknowledges himself bound to show the ultimate necessity of the occurrence of the distinctions of right and wrong in conduct, in the very nature of the universe. But what does he do? While he insists upon the problem of Ethics as a deductive one, he turns from it, after a few blinding generalities, and substitutes for it the treatment of the *historical development* of morality in the world.* He thereby blinks the real issue at the outset, and introduces a scheme that proposes to trace the historical development of Ethics out of the animal instincts of nutrition and reproduction, to transform brute selfishness into human self-sacrifice, to beget altruism of egoism, and to bring the sublime imperative "ought not" out of "better not." In all these problems the formula of Evolution is ignored, and not even the first step taken toward the cosmical solution promised.

The climax is capped when, ignoring even the show of Evolution, in Mr. Spencer's sense, this philosophy summons up the "ghosts" of our ancestors from the vasty deep and fashions a ghost-hierarchy to explain the greatest fact of history, Religion! The summit of the structure thus becomes, as Mr. Frederic Harrison phrases it, "the ghost of Religion," and humanity reaches the height of its development and aspirations, not in mere "cosmic emotion," but in the inspiring prayer, "O Great Ghost, hear us!"

When Evolution has thus brought the universe to the summit

* *Data of Ethics*, p. 61.

of the ages, there must begin the reverse process of Dissolution. By the same lines the movements of history are to go forward along the grooves of Dissolution until everything is resolved into the "homogeneous" again, and the "deadlock of the universe" is reached. The "lump" being thereby prepared for a new Evolution, all that is needed is to provide a new "start," and a new "fungus" in the same old way, in order to have the universe run the same monotonous round once more, and to let "Our Great Philosopher," "the Apostle of the Understanding," complete his everlasting scheme of scientifico-philosophical Bosh! The "unification of knowledge" has been completed and the new principle of Evolution has explained dynamically the universe of existences! The "Known God" has disappeared as a manufactured article of the metaphysician and a useless incumbrance, and Evolution has more than supplied his place, for has it not capacity to furnish an infinite succession of world-systems?

This is but the natural outcome of a so-called philosophical enterprise whose postulates, axioms, corollaries and formulas of Evolution—*i. e.*, whose essential elements, laws of manifestation, and structural idea—are all stark assumptions. Indeed, so far as principles are concerned, the scheme is hopelessly bankrupt from the start. The raw material of the system is worthless. The one all-pervasive Force—dragged in in spite of the very terms of the original proposal of the philosopher—as the warp and woof of the system, has no existence. Physical and mental causation have not been identified. Even the physical forces have by no means been unified, since chemistry recognizes some seventy simple bodies, and "every atom is subject to the action of at least six powers—gravity, chemic attraction, chemic repulsion, polarity, cohesion, elasticity—which are irreducible to one another." Mr. Spencer's "great sole law of the Persistence of Force is," as Mr. Lilly has said, "nothing else than an illegitimate corollary from the unquestionable fact of the conservation of energy. . . . . The doctrine of the persistence and indestructibility of Force as taught by him is an amalgam of physical dogmatism and metaphysical error."* Any so-called philosophy built on such foundation and of such materials is necessarily and manifestly false.

As a scientific construction it fails to stand a single one of the three accredited philosophical tests. Like the colossal image of Nebuchadnezzar's dream, the feet of which, made of mixed iron and clay, could not stand the smiting of the stone cut out without hands, so this vast speculative structure, with its mixture of worth

* William Samuel Lilly, *The Great Enigma*, p. 129.

and worthlessness, goes to pieces under the stress of sustained criticism.

As has already been made evident, it falls short of the requirements of the test of completeness, or totality of sphere, by so stating its formula as to exclude the supreme factors of the universe, and by failing to grasp and analyze even the partial facts with which it professes to deal. At the same time the real distinction between "science" and "philosophy" is thrown out by Mr. Spencer's definition of those terms: "Science is *partially unified knowledge:* philosophy is *completely unified* knowledge" (*F. P.*, p. 134). There is no room left for philosophy as "the science of principles," *i. e.*, no room for philosophy itself.

It is obvious, too, that the system fails to meet the requirements of the test of structural or organic idea. Evolution does not avail for the accomplishment of the task attempted by means of it; while to avoid the demonstration of failure, "development" is shuffled into the place of "Evolution," and used in its stead in the work of construction. But Mr. Spencer does not—as already shown—organize his universal scheme by this new principle. It is not a system of orderly development, but a system built up by continuous deft substitutions of one abstract term for another of slightly changed meaning—the entire process being carried on and obscured by technical language used in most indefinite or out-of-the-way significations. Such, for example, are "differentiation" and "integration," as used in the Formula of Evolution—ostensibly mathematical and exact terms, but used in senses that would daze even a mathematical genius. Mr. Guthrie has emphasized this in an incidental criticism of the philosopher's cosmical scheme:*

"Mr. Spencer's philosophic conception was indeed imposing, and before its magnificent proportions many have bowed down in sincere respect. But his cosmical scheme when carefully examined proved to be constructed of terms which had no fixed and definite meaning, which were in fact merely symbols of symbolic conceptions, conceptions themselves symbolic because they were not understood—and the moment we began to put them to use as having definite values they landed us forthwith in alternative contradictions. Then to effect cosmical evolution, which is a process of imperceptible objective change, what was necessary, but to adopt a system of imperceptible word-changes, so that the imperceptible word-changes accompanying the imperceptible objective changes should lead us in the end to completed results, and the process of evolution should thus be made comprehensible! In this manner over the spaces of an enormous work have we been skillfully led by a master of language, till we find ourselves in imagination following out mentally the actual processes of the universe. But after all it has only been a process, in our minds, of the skillful substitution of words! . . . ,

"By such terms as Equilibration, including the theory of the moving equilibrium; by such terms as polarity plastic and coercive; and by plausible similarities between modes of process, we are deluded into supposing we understand the

* *On Mr. Spencer's Data of Ethics*, Preface.

constructive progress of nature and are made to feel happy and proud of our knowledge. A great self-satisfaction attends the student, who believes himself rightly to understand the universe. We are pleased with our teacher and are still more pleased with ourselves.

"But the real difficulty appears when the necessity for exposition arises. If one undertakes to explain, if one has to condense and solidify for the purpose of teaching, if one wishes to make others understand and share the knowledge one has attained, then indeed our difficulties commence. What seemed so grand and alluring to look at will not stand the ordinary handling of scientific language and logical statement as between man and man. The illusion vanishes, the system has gone."

That is, there is no evolution in it all except *verbal*. A witty Frenchman once said of the Bedouin, that "he is born with his mouth full of curses." Of Mr. Spencer, as he appears in his philosophy, it might be said, that he was born with his mouth full of great swelling words, but that they are often "words without intellectual equivalents."

Equally far does the New Philosophy come short of meeting the requirement of the third test, that it should match the reality. The whole system swings loose from the basis of universal fact and principle on which it should rest and out of which it should rise; thereby certifying its philosophical worthlessness. It is a vast scheme of speculative physics, constructed by one lacking all qualification for such work.

In the light of common sense and correct logic, of strict reason and sound philosophy, Mr. Spencer's great effort must therefore be pronounced a failure both as a construction and as an explanation. His attempt to remand God to the region of the unknown and the unknowable has not the support of a single principle, but proceeds rather from baseless and unwarranted assumptions, by question-begging, *non-sequitur*, and the abuse or frailties of language, to conclusions that are demonstrably false. Evolution with the Unknowable of the agnostic is no adequate substitute for the living God of the theist. His working principles, drawn from the so-called domain of the Knowable, have been shown not to be principles at all, nor even legitimate inductions, but hasty and faulty generalizations or groundless speculations—all professedly founding their main claim to credence upon a criterion that is utterly false and worthless.

In fine, as the "modern Aristotle," "our great logician," John Stuart Mill—who was so much in vogue a generation ago—has been found and decided to be peculiarly wanting in logical acumen, comprehension and coherence: so the "modern Plato," "our great philosopher," Mr. Spencer, is found to be lacking in philosophic insight and analysis and in scientific constructiveness; so that, according to good judges, the philosophically inclined

were already ceasing to read his work and consigning it to the upper shelf before the recent issue of its final volume.* As Mr. Mill shattered himself to no purpose against the invincible reasons for a First Cause; so Mr. Spencer, in "stretching out his hand against God," and "strengthening himself against the Almighty," has met with the same disastrous fate. In spite of both their attacks—or rather, the more because of them—Theism as the ultimate explanation of all things, the necessary postulate and presupposition of the Cosmos, or universe of order, remains unshaken. God *is*, and any adequate conception of the universe irresistibly certifies to His being.

Christian Philosophy stands fast the more firmly because of speculations of an un-Christian Philosophy. The one humiliating feature of it all is, that so many who profess to be intelligent and thinking men should hasten to accept the "roundabout reasonings" and "remotely inferential conclusions"—acknowledged to be such by Mr. Spencer himself—the hasty generalizations and *non sequiturs*, the "symbolic conceptions" and "pseud-ideas" of the so-called thinker, and for them to give up the truths that have been attested by the Word of God and the voice of the ages, that have made modern Christian civilization with all its glories, and that find perpetual demonstration in the universe and in the human soul itself. It is in this way that the New Philosophy has

* The following extract from an editorial criticism (in *Zion's Herald*, December 30, 1896), of the volume then just issued that completed Mr. Spencer's lifework, is given as one of many indications of the strong drift of philosophical judgment in this direction. From internal evidence the article would seem to have come from the pen of the Professor of Philosophy in Boston University, one of the earliest of the able critics of Mr. Spencer's system. He writes, after acknowledging the philosopher's great task and wonderful heroism:

"When Spencer projected the plan of his great philosophical edifice, his books were read by few. In the middle of his labors there occurred a springtide of scientific interest. Natural science secured a grip on the popular intelligence which it has since retained and strengthened. Spencer's teachings became popular, and his writings met with the same welcome which was accorded to those of Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall, in their chosen departments, and to Max Müller in the department of language and comparative religions. But Spencerian empiricism, making man's life a momentary flicker between two eternities of lifeless and hopeless darkness, is about played out. Faith in it is largely a thing of the past. The most distinguished of those who nodded assent to his theory of the universe—Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall—have passed away. Others, like that gifted and promising scientific genius, the late G. Romanes, left his standard long ago and have found for themselves a nobler philosophical faith. There is to-day scarcely a single man enjoying a first-class reputation as a philosophical thinker, who is willing to be responsible for Spencer's opinions. There are even significant indications in his lately published book that his own faith in the crude and coarse empiricism of his early writings is slowly but surely giving place to something better; and we would not be surprised if the man who was born and bred in one of the best and brightest of Christian homes should become an avowed Christian."

wrought incalculable evil and, reaching down from the higher grade of intellects and leavening the masses, has so widely shaken, if not shattered, their faith in the supernatural.

There are, however, two peculiarly satisfactory considerations regarding the outcome of the philosophy of transformism. The first is, that this latest attempt—in the name of science, and with appeal to all the new learning—to bridge over the breaks in the progress of the history of the unfoldings of the universe, which breaks Dubois Reymond declares to be "impassable chasms"—that this latest attempt has practically demonstrated that these breaks remain still unspanned, so that there is not only the same necessity as of old for the creative fiat, but a necessity emphasized by this new and gigantic effort and failure. The other satisfaction arises from the fact that the exigencies of the task and of the universe force the new philosophy to know and affirm a vast deal about that "Unknowable" that is held in reserve and considered as "manifested" or "inscrutable," "out of relation" or "in relation," as the needs of the unfolding system may require—a vast deal so indefinite and incoherent and contradictory and worthless as immeasurably to exalt by contrast the wisdom of Divine Revelation; and that they force from the agnostic philosopher a renewed confession of faith, in ever-recurring mutterings about the "Inscrutable Power" to which resort must be had in warehousing the too difficult problems that meet him by the way.* Thereby the necessity for God is shown to exist both at the core of the evolving universe and in the heart of the agnostic thinker.

The logical and irresistible conclusion from this survey of the New Philosophy is, that there is no rational and philosophical foundation for the hypothesis of Materialistic Evolution, which denies everything but matter and motion in the movement of the unfolding universe, or for that of Agnostic Evolution, which postulates an unknown and unknowable something as the basis of that movement; and that the hypothesis of so-called Theistic Evolution, which assumes a God back of all working out results

* In his concluding words on religion, in his latest book completed at seventy-six years of age, there is something that sounds strangely like a confession of faith, forced out by the soul's needs. Writing of the philosophical investigator, he says:

"But one truth must grow ever clearer—the truth that there is an Inscrutable Existence, everywhere manifested, to which he can neither find nor conceive either beginning or end. Amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain *the one absolute certainty* that he is ever in the presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed."

Vain assuredly is the attempt of man, with the instincts of religion deep down in his soul, to ignore or deny or hide himself from the Living God! It reminds one of the cry of the Psalmist: "Whither shall I flee from thy presence?"

along the unalterable line of natural law and by physical forces exclusively, has not yet entered upon even the first stage of the process of scientific proof. Everything points toward, and more and more emphasizes, the supremacy of the moral and spiritual over the material in the universe, of the free over the necessary, and tends unswervingly toward the establishment of the Theory of Development, the theory of the orderly unfolding of the system of the universe, according to divine plan, and with various and free divine interpositions in the history of rational beings, especially of mankind, with a view to advancing the interests of morality and religion in the establishment of the universal Kingdom of God. The living, personal God—the Father, Son and Holy Ghost—having his clearest manifestation in the ever-living, all-gracious, ineffable covenant Jehovah of the Old Testament, and in the Redeemer Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God, in the New Testament, is thus seen to be the only key and centre of unity to the universe and to human history and destiny; while it becomes apparent that outside of the Christian Philosophy there is not even a whisper of any adequate explanation of the actual system of reality that comprehends all existences and all events. Philosophy, cut loose from all the quasi-scientific verbiage, has its ultimate principle summed up and fixed in a single monosyllable—God.

New York. Daniel Seelye Gregory.

III.

THE TEXT OF THE MINOR PROPHETS.*

THE title, Minor Prophets, as every intelligent reader of Scripture is no doubt aware, indicates size, not value, but the general ignorance of the contents of the twelve books might warrant any interpretation. Lack of aids in study can no longer be pleaded, for a bewildering number of works, dealing with all or part of the subject, have appeared within recent years. Two new commentaries on the whole twelve and the third edition of another prove the present interest in this part of Scripture.

These more recent works must suffice for reference in this paper.

Prof. Wellhausen's last edition bore the more modest title, *The Minor Prophets Translated with Notes;* the new edition appears as *The Minor Prophets Translated and Expounded.* Yet the book is apparently little altered and not at all expanded, and the former title would still set forth more accurately its plan and scope. The translation is terse, the notes compact, no superfluous word is spent even on a Preface, yet, within this narrow compass, the author raises abundant material for discussion and has no peer either in useful or in useless suggestion.

Prof. Nowack is editor of a series known as the *Handkommentar zum Alten Testament,* and for it he has written this exposition of the Minor Prophets. The style is clear and simple and the arrangement admirable. Introductions are divided into sections, with titles indicating the subjects discussed, and translations occupy the upper part of the page, and notes the lower. This departure from the ancient German method of packing large pages with an equal democracy of type and sprinkling translation up and down the exposition, is a great relief, at least to English-speaking readers. By the admirably simple and effective device of print-

* *Die Kleinen Propheten*, übersetzt und erklärt von D. W. Nowack, o. Prof. d. Theol. i. Strassburg i. Els. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.

The Book of the Twelve Prophets, Commonly Called the Minor, by George Adam Smith, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Glasgow. London: Hodder & Stoughton; New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. Vol. i, 1896, Vol. ii, 1898.

Die Kleinen Propheten, übersetzt und erklärt von J. Wellhausen. Dritte Ausgabe, Berlin, 1898.

ing passages of doubted authenticity in italics and marking corrections of texts by asterisks, the author's conclusions are made still more conspicuously clear.

Prof. Smith's work is already known to all English-speaking readers of religious literature. Nothing he has written lacks color and movement. Here the mass of detail is enormous, yet it is never suffered to become wearisome, and in rapid, vivid sketches four centuries of history pass before the reader. By confidence in his own opinion, the author inspires confidence; and he knows how to set forth his conclusions as cheering to the heart as well as convincing to the reason. This finality, so satisfying to the general reader, may be less agreeable to the student, who, however, must always remember the popular aim of the book and acknowledge that it is no small success to depict those dim and distant centuries not in the pale reflections of the modern investigator, but in the glowing utterances of the men who lived and moved amid the events.

The most careless reader of any of the three writers must be impressed by the liberal alteration of the text. To the thoughtful reader it speedily becomes the matter of primary and paramount importance. The text of most of the books is regarded by all three as largely interpolated and very corrupt. Smith, the most conservative, says there is scarce a book without interpolations. The text of Hosea is "dilapidated, in parts beyond the possibility of repair;" the text of Zephaniah is "very damaged;" parts of Nahum are "badly mauled and clamant for reconstruction of some kind;" in the poetic parts of Habakkuk "some words are manifestly wrong and the rhythm must have suffered beyond restoration." Wellhausen dismisses passages with a wave of the hand, and alters them with a confidence only omniscience could justify. Half the pages of Nowack's translation of Hosea have passages printed in italics as interpolations, and the other half are covered with a galaxy of stars to indicate corrections. The fate of Amos is only happy by comparison. Obadiah, already the smallest of the prophets, is diminished by half. Micah fares no better. Nahum commences with a whole chapter of somebody else's writing. So little is left of Habakkuk that the book would more justly have been called by his name had he written what is not his. Of his three chapters, Zephaniah loses a large part of the second and all the third.

This conclusion, that the text has been largely altered and interpolated, Smith regards, not only as undeniable, but as altogether consoling and edifying. "The general fact," he says, "must be admitted that hardly one book has escaped later additions—addi-

tions of an entirely justifiable nature, which supplement the point of view of a single prophet with the richer experience or the riper hopes of a later day, and thus afford to ourselves a more catholic presentment of the doctrines of prophecy and of the divine purposes for mankind."* This would be very consoling but for those other phrases, "badly mauled," "very damaged," "clamant for reconstruction."

To understand what is supposed to have happened, it is necessary to recall the point of view of the more advanced criticism. The book of the law discovered in the temple in the reign of Josiah was not even our present Deuteronomy, but only the Deuteronomic Code. At the time of its discovery, it was probably no very ancient document, and had had no previous influence on the religion of the nation. The rest of the legislation, especially what is known as the Priestly Code, was elaborated, mainly out of tradition, during the Exile. Its practical operation dates from 445 B.C., when Ezra and Nehemiah imposed it by solemn covenant upon the people. During all that period and centuries later, these matters of comparatively modern institution were diligently read back into the history and literature of the past. Literary property being an idea unknown, and the idea of a writing being of divine inspiration, or even a sacred monument of the past, not having yet arisen, the transcriber freely altered to meet the needs and convictions of his own generation. From the earliest times, passages were modified to suit the issue of events, to celebrate recent deliverances, to point new morals, to refresh the patriotism of ardent Jews. During the Exile prophecies of restoration were enlarged or added in the spirit and style of the Second Isaiah, while at a later period dull literalism and rigid sacerdotalism exercised their corrupting influence.

This view represents the present state of advanced professorial opinion. For an unprofessional inquirer to differ from it, may savor of presumption. But specialist opinion and the ultimate verdict of mankind have never, on any subject, been in such perfect agreement that the humblest student need fear to have the courage of his opinions. On historical conclusions based chiefly upon suppositions, on arguments deriving their validity chiefly from our ignorance, on literary canons which, being universally applied, would dismember all literature, difference of opinion may be entertained with modesty.

In three ways this conclusion admits of being examined: in respect, *first*, of the General Grounds on which it rests; *second*, of the General Results to which it leads, and *third*, of the Particular

* Vol. i, p. ix.

Difficulties it is designed to remove. And as it may tend to clearness, these three will be treated in order.

The *General Grounds* on which this conclusion of the excessive corruption of the text rests, are not set forth in a systematic manner by any of the writers, yet no study is more in need of an ordered statement of postulates. Errors in editing writings, a large part of which may have appeared as fugitive pamphlets, require no further explanation than the limits of human knowledge; but that affords no explanation of changes which could only have been perpetrated by preternatural carelessness and willfulness. Some further justification both in history and human nature may reasonably be required.

As a beginning, therefore, we ask, whether anything in the history of Israel indicates this excessive freedom in handling the literary monuments of the nation?

Only in slight and apparently accidental matters does our present text differ from that used by the translators of the Septuagint. "Occasionally," says Smith, "it enables us to correct the text; but by the time it was made, the text must already have contained the same corruptions which we encounter." This fact being otherwise expressed, means that as far back as we have any test to apply, no large manipulation of the text took place. As transcribers are not a class whose habits are likely to alter in a day, this proof of their care carries us much farther back than at first sight might appear.

In the age succeeding the Exile we find Zechariah, to quote Smith again, appealing "to the older prophets with as much solemnity as they did to Moses himself."* Could such reverence permit either careless or willful alteration? Moreover, the very name, "Former Prophets," used more than once by Zechariah, shows that their writings were regarded as monuments of the past, and not as adaptable material for the edification of the present. Again we may reason backwards. This attitude can have been no mushroom growth. "The habits," says Smith, "which the life in Babylon had perfected, of arranging and codifying the literature of the past, and of employing it in place of altar and ritual in the stated services of God, had canonized Scripture and provoked men to the worship of the very letter."† Have we not here both an inward and an outward guarantee for the faithful reproduction of the text—in the reverence of the transcriber, which would hinder him from making alterations in the text: and in the number of the readers and their familiarity with the writers, which would make it impossible to introduce large alterations had they

* Vol. ii, p. 268. † Vol. ii, p. 269.

been made? Again we reason backwards. Is it not more natural to suppose that the formal reverence of the many grew out of the wise reverence of the few, than out of a state of disregard for the past and license in handling the prophetic writings? From the beginning the prophets claimed special inspiration, and we find them taking care to have their words properly recorded. Is it probable that the persons who took the trouble to reproduce their writings were quite devoid of their spirit or utterly without interest in their time? The simplest explanation of the growth of the conception of an inspired Scripture is to suppose that the claims of the prophets were maintained and ever enlarged by their successors, and the difficulty is greatly increased by supposing an interregnum of indifference.

It is just as difficult to find ground in human nature as in history for this excessive carelessness and wilfulness.

The perversity ascribed to the poor transcribers is too utterly incredible. To their charge all repetitions, all vagueness, all irregularity of measure, all lack of logical sequence is laid. Apparently, the more glaring an error, the more readily they perpetrated it. But they too were men. Prof. Smith complains that we have released the authors from our own laws of life and thought, and have paid the heavy penalty of losing all interest in them. The complaint is just, and no man has done more to remedy the loss by setting the prophets before his own generation as living men battling in a real world. But where is the gain, if the transcribers are to be set free from our own laws of life and thought? And already excessive uncertainty is sapping this revived interest.

On the hypothesis that they were men of like passions with ourselves, is it credible that, in an age which was ever busy with the past, they perpetually adapted the monuments of the past for the edification of the present; that in a time of growing reverence for the prophet, they had no anxiety to retain the exact words of the prophet; that in an age of much writing, they had no respect for literary property?

Though the advanced view of the history were indubitably proved, the literary conclusions by no means follow. The historian who composes by piecing quotations, and who allows many discrepancies to pass rather than alter his authorities, is not a person careless of literary remains, but is already on his way toward an excessive slavery to the letter. Prophetic writings, moreover, are of a different nature from historical compilations. Does the High Church historian alter Hooker or interpolate Taylor because he zealously reads very modern views back into the past? Writings, such as hymns, which have on them no special stamp of

the individuality of the author and no relation to any definite events, have often been altered for purposes of edification. But never were writings better secured by the impress of their authors and an intimate relation to their time than the Old Testament prophecies.

Nor does it appear possible, human nature having its present limitations, for such writings to have been construeted after the fashion supposed. Genius can take up the work of predeeessors and fuse it in the lava of a glowing utteranee, or at least send it forth firmly embedded in the thought, conglomerate and molten rock all of one pieee; but can subsequent meddling make even respectable conglomerate or anything better than a quarry of stones? Had but some enterprising interviewer left us an aeeount of the methods of these ancient manipulators of the seissors, some of us who now stumble on the plain might yet learn to mareh upon the heights. In the way of making mistakes few things are entirely beyond human nature, but this style of eoncoction is not within its reach.

There is one further eonsideration. How often might it be supposed that these writings were eopied? Perhaps once in a century. The text might have attained the corruption aseribed to it, had it been once a year.

Passing now to the *second* point, we consider the *General Results* after critieism has separated additions and alterations from the original. Being compelled by eonditions of time and spaee to take short examples, we ehoose Habakkuk and Zephaniah. There is this further advantage in the ehoiee that the eireumstanees of the former warrant us in expeeting uniformity of tone and mood, and of the latter unity of purpose. Are these things more manifest and are the prophets more credible figures after being passed through the critical cleansing fires than before? That is our *second* question, and surely it affords a fair and reasonable test.

Habakkuk, as the book stands, consists of a prophecy whieh leads on to a dirge, and which is connected with a elosing psalm by the lines:

> "But Jehovah is in His holy temple,
> Silence before Him all the earth."

This first impression of unity is deepened by the prevailing sense of a weary time, in face of whieh faith is sad but stable. "Troubled on every side, yet not distressed; perplexed, but not in despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed." Chap. i. 6, at least as translated, is the sole interruption to this feeling. The rest of the book speaks of patience under a trial long endured in view of a deliveranee long delayed, but this

verse seems to speak of a calamity only beginning. "Look among the nations and contemplate and wonder mightily, for I am doing a work in your days ye would not believe though it were told you. Lo, I am raising up the Chaldeans." Wellhausen and Nowack omit the whole passage i. 5–11 as an older oracle, apparently inserted not quoted. Prof. Smith, following an interpretation of Budde's, inserts it after ii. 4. But neither method removes the difficulty, for in the passage itself it is clear that the evil is not something which is to be begun, but something which has long been going on. It is already to be seen among the nations, and the whole description of the Chaldeans manifestly rests on things already transacted. The idea required by the connection is not amazement that the evil is to be begun, but amazement at the absence of every evidence that it is to be ended. On the principle of the easier reading, מקים, being a word usual in such a phrase, may have been substituted for some more unusual expression. In support of this supposition the LXX. might be adduced, for it translates, "Behold I am *rousing* up," which gives a very suitable meaning. 'Behold an amazing thing. Much evil as the Chaldeans have already done, God is stirring them up to more.' But even this slight alteration seems scarcely necessary, for the word, as it stands, being read, as every word should be, with a due regard to its connection, lends itself to a similar meaning. Taking *Behold Me* as emphatic, the participle in its proper sense of continuance, and the verb as *to stand fast*, we obtain, "Behold me upholding the Chaldeans," encouraging, not checking, as might be expected, their destructive career, which is nothing else than Isa. xxviii. 21, "that he may do his work, his strange work," adapted to the circumstances of the prophet's time. The imperfects may also indicate repetition, in which case they should be translated as pluperfects, "Ye would not have believed, though it had been told you."

This difficulty being removed, there is no further interruption to the feeling of the book. In the first verse the prophet strikes the keynote of his message. "O Lord, how long shall I cry and thou wilt not hear?" Outward oppression, long continued, is a great evil, and the internal corruption it creates is worse. Yet God sustains the Chaldean in an unbroken course of successful cruelty. This fierce and rapid nation marches through the wide world, robbing, terrifying, regarding no law but might. The rapidity and discipline of his cavalry only enables him the better to devour, oppress and enslave. Neither foe nor fortress can resist his might. Then he is gone like the wind, yea, he passes and is reckless, this his might being his god.

Nevertheless Jehovah is the true God and must have another purpose than the death of His saints and the perpetual triumph of the wicked. "Art not thou from of old, Jehovah, my God, my Holy One, so we shall not die! O Jehovah, thou hast appointed him for judgment and, O Rock, thou hast ordained him for correction."* One would suppose that, if a single verse in the whole book were guaranteed by the passion of it, this must be secure; but all three writers reject everything but the first clause, "Art not thou from of old, Jehovah, my Holy God," which, thus isolated, sinks to commonplace. Whence this unanimity? "Because it anticipates the solution!" Nowack has also the hardihood to assert that it interrupts the connection, as if it were not the business of such an interjection to interrupt the connection. The man who raises such objections to this cry of the heart, should turn his attention from poetry to jurisprudence.

God must have such a solution in store, God whose eyes are too pure to look upon iniquity and whose heart is too tender to contemplate trouble. And yet He appears to contemplate spoilers and to be deaf when a wicked man swallows up one more righteous than he. Not very logical, it may be, but magnificent! Men are fishes, the Chaldean a fisher with only one object of adoration, his net, which he is allowed to empty out at will that he may slay without sparing.

Yet the faith of the prophet triumphs. He will stand on watch for God's message, for God's own interpretation of His chastening. And a vision does come, one for all to read. God's ways are long, very long, but they are all straight. The vision is ever for an appointed time, and pants for the end and will not fail. Though it long delay, wait for it, for come it will, and unretarded. And on what can God's vision rest, if not on justice? The spirit of the oppressor is proud and perverse, but the righteous is protected by his faithfulness. This swaggering hero is under a greater delusion than wine, for cruelty, not suffering, is weakness. Wherefore the oppressed, not the oppressor, shall yet sing over the fallen.

The song which follows is in five stanzas of more uniformity of structure than is usual in Hebrew poetry. The first four begin with *Woe;* the last, for a reason not difficult to suggest, ends with *Woe*. Oppression is debt, weakness, blindness, shame, and, resting on the worship of the work of man's own hands, is as futile as its idol. The last stanza is not parallel in structure because it is not parallel in idea, but states what is at the root of all these ills, and only then denounces the final woe, a device which marks the instinct of the true poet, but to which all our critics so strongly object

* Hab. i. 12.

that they transpose the lines. Smith inclines to add what he calls the striking refrain, "For men's blood and earth's waste, Cities and their inhabitants," to all the stanzas; Wellhausen and Nowack consider it unsuitable even to the two verses in which it is at present found. All three reject the stanza vers. 12–14 as patchwork out of Micah iii. 10, Jer. li. 58 and Isa. xi. 9. The quotation from Isaiah alone is certain. The resemblance to Micah is in an expression so common as to require no conscious imitation, while the passage in Jeremiah, occurring, as it does, loosely at the end of a sentence, has every appearance of being itself a quotation. Wellhausen admits that, like the rest of the ode, it is directed against the heathen world-power. The conglomerate, if it be conglomerate, is molten into unity with itself and with the rest of the ode. This result, judging by ordinary standards of probability, is as likely to be due to the poet himself as to another person whose motive for making such an interpolation is by no means evident.

The psalm in chap. iii is regarded by all three writers as a late hymn. The title and musical marks are thought to suggest the service of the Second Temple, especially as no other part of the prophets is so treated; definite historical situation is supposed to be wanting; the style and temper is said to be different; the way in which the prophet speaks not for himself, but for Israel, is thought to be unlike a prophet of the age of Habakkuk; the language, though not late, is thought to have affinities with psalms of a late date; the phrase *Thine Anointed* for the people and not for the king must be after the days of the monarchy; and the psalmist is said to draw his comfort from other thoughts than the prophet and to set Israel as righteous in more definite opposition to the oppressor as wicked.

The question rather involves the editing than the preservation of the text, yet the general impression made by the book is so much affected by the presence or absence of this psalm, that we must at least glance at the arguments.

The singularity of the position of this psalm amid the prophetic writings, instead of being an argument against its authenticity, might with more reason be used in its favor; for few things are done carelessly which are not sanctioned by custom. Had it been the fashion to decorate the prophetic writings with lyrics, there might have been ground for doubt. The arrangement of it for public singing proves nothing amid a people who had probably no superabundance of hymn books. Nor is the historical situation so very obscure. On the contrary, it is, for a lyric, singularly definite. Hope struggles here also against long-continued oppres-

sion. Jehovah is besought to revive His work amid the years, an expression most readily explained as the long weary years on which the early part of the prophecy has dwelt. Amid the tumult, God is asked to remember to pity, and Israel waits for the day of distress to go over the people who oppress her. "For the fig tree buds not, and there is no productiveness in the vine, the fruit of the olive has disappointed, and the fields have produced no fruit, cut off are the flocks from the fold, and no herds are in the stalls. Yet I will exult in Jehovah, I will rejoice in the God of my deliverance. Jehovah, the Lord, is my strength. He will make my feet as hinds' feet, and on my heights make me to walk."* The calamity here described is assumed to be famine. But perpetual raids are as disastrous to crops and herds as either drought or blight. Here, as elsewhere in the psalm, and in agreement with all the rest of the prophecy, the evil is oppression and not famine, for hinds' feet and the maintenance of heights, all important before a human foe, would be futile in face of famine.† The situation seems, therefore, to be exactly the same as in the rest of the book. The difference in style is no more marked than would be apparent in any writer who practiced a different species of literature. All acknowledge that the style is old, and the only way of escape is to maintain that it is archaic. The temper is different only when the doubts of the earlier portion are exaggerated and its faith diminished. We see the same attitude of waiting in trouble, but not in despair. The objection that the psalmist personifies Israel is met by Nowack's just contention that the chief characteristic of this book, the new element it adds to prophecy, is the opposition between Israel as righteous and her oppressor as wicked, just this very identification of the prophet with his people.‡ Naturally it is more complete in a lyric than it could be in a prophecy, but the agreement in a matter so characteristic of the prophet is a strong evidence of genuineness. The title *Thine Anointed* may very well mean the king.§ The clauses may be parallel, not synonymous, and may quite well mean, "Save the people and their ruler." The truth seems rather to be that, as far as a lyric can agree with a prophecy, it deals with the same situation, speaks with the same language, utters the same weary but expectant faith, and looks for the same long-delayed deliverance.

Here we have two prophets. One is the prophet expurgated, the prophet as skeptic, the beginning of speculation in Israel; the other is the prophet who, like other prophets, found speculation

* Hab. iii, p. 17–19.

† Similar expressions are used certainly of war in 2 Sam. xxii. 34.

‡ P. 251. § iii. 13.

abundantly begun and skepticism abundantly rife and who spoke to his age, not because he doubted, but because he believed—the prophet unexpurgated. Which is the more credible figure? The man who discovers the beginning of speculation has certainly arrived very near the sources. Habakkuk, on the contrary, rather suggests the influence of the greatest of all speculative writings, the Book of Job. It suggests this in the striking use of the word עמל,* in the tone which the prophet combats, and finally in the appearance of Jehovah Himself at the close to solve all doubts. But this is a large question, and for the present purpose not urgent. All that need be said is, that the prophet, as he stands, is a true prophet with a message for his time, a noble and credible figure; while an arbitrary criticism alters the picture and leaves no prophet, no living voice crying in the wilderness, but a mere echo of the doubts of a feeble and downcast age.

Our second example belongs to a slightly earlier period. The genealogy of Zephaniah, in a title which is generally accepted as genuine, is traced back through four generations to Hezekiah. As the genealogy of no other prophet goes back beyond two generations, this more remote ancestor must have been specially conspicuous. The supposition that he was no less a person than the king is confirmed by the dates which just admit of such a succession. This royal descent gives special meaning to the prophet's denunciation of the king's household, and to his ideal of a pastoral simplicity; for the prophet ever found his duty in what lay nearest him and his ideal in what was farthest away.

He begins by anticipating a day of doom, to destroy the idolators who have corrupted and the idolators who have forsaken the worship of Jehovah. Amid the multitude of sacrificing, God has a sacrifice for which the guests are already invited and sanctified. Fat peace still continues, foreign fashions material and spiritual, trafficking, secret vice and dull, practical atheism. Material interests fill the whole horizon. "But the wealth of the nation is for spoil, and their houses for desolation; they are building houses they shall not inhabit and they are planting vineyards the wine of which they shall not drink." The day draws very near when even the man of war shall have no resource but woman's tears, a day when nature frowns and war shouts, when blood is cheap as dust and flesh as dirt, when the wealth for which every virtue is sold avails nothing, a day of destruction for all the inhabitants of the land. Nothing less can come because nothing less will move their obduracy. Let this nation unabashed collect its thoughts, and bend before the storm, for there is ever protec-

* i. 13.

tion to all who, in obedience and humility, wait on God. "Ere the appointed time arrive and ye have passed away (LXX.) like chaff, ere the fierce anger of Jehovah has yet come upon you, ere the day of Jehovah's wrath has yet come upon you, seek Jehovah, all ye meek of the earth who have done his decree, seek righteousness, seek meekness, if that ye may be hidden in the day of Jehovah's anger."

Piety alone is essential to the nation. The royal household, the merchants and money lenders, the comfortable and wealthy, are all to share the fate of the gorgeous worship. By the meek remnant who escape, the nation shall be restored in piety, but not in state. This conception of the nation of the meek rests on Isaiah xi, or Isaiah xi rests on it, which affords equal confirmation. It is a state in which God will judge the poor with righteousness and defend the meek with equity, where, in its pastoral simplicity and security, the wolf lies down with the lamb. As in Isaiah, so in Zephaniah, Jehovah will set Himself to recover the remnant of His people and the same nations are mentioned here as in Isaiah, with the very remarkable omission of Edom-Philistia, Moab, Ammon, Egypt, Assyria, and in the same order.* And in both writers the motive for this destruction of the surrounding nations is the same. A life of pastoral simplicity requires a large land unharried by neighbors. In Zephaniah the seacoast is to be a site for shepherds' cisterns and sheepfolds, where in the deserted cities the remnant of Judah will make their flocks lie down at eve; and though Moab and Ammon are to be as Sodom and Gomorrah, God's people shall possess their wastes. The heathen gods, having no worshipers, shall be famished, and in these border lands a pious, if sparse, people shall each man from his place worship Jehovah. That these scattered homesteads may be at peace, the ancient enemies, Egypt and Assyria, must also be destroyed. The Ethiopians who then ruled in Egypt, not being immediately dangerous, are passed over with a simple prediction of their slaughter; but on the destruction of Nineveh the prophet dwells with a passion and detail which proves how much he had suffered with the misery of his native land.

Yet his patriotism could not blind his eyes. No lighter fate, no happier destiny can await Jerusalem. She is a rebellious, polluted, oppressing city, deaf to warning, self-confident, impious, her princes roaring lions, her judges evening wolves, her prophets lustful and liars, her priests profaners of the holy things and abusers of the law. Though every morning God brings justice to light and does not allow Himself to fail, the sinner learns no shame. Peo-

*Cf. Zeph. ii. 4–15 and Isa. xi. 14–16.

ples have been rooted out and cities left without inhabitants. No warning could have been ampler. "I said, surely she will fear me. She will accept punishment and not be cut off because of her iniquity, even all that I have punished her for. But they have only been active to corrupt all their doings." What resource remains either for God's justice or His mercy, but to assemble her enemies that the land may be consumed by the fire of His zeal?

The fire is hot but purifying. "Then will I give the people a pure lip that all of them may call on the name of the Lord to serve him with one accord." From distant lands suppliants come bringing gifts. But even the spiritual supremacy of the nation will not cause vainglory, for God shall have removed by His judgments the haughty and have left only a people humble and poor who trust in the name of Jehovah, a people who do the right and speak the truth and live their simple lives, feeding their flocks by day and making them lie down at night, none terrifying. God's presence will be the only and sufficient protection. The pious remnant also in captivity He will bring back. That seems to be the meaning of "those who have sorrowed at being away from thy assembly." At that time God will do all the petition of His people, helping them in weakness, gathering their captives, giving glory for shame, and turning their captivity before their eyes.

Here we have all the characteristics of the prophetic writings. The people live in thoughtless ease, undisturbed by the clouds on the horizon, while the prophet, instructed by a heart sensitive to the sins of the time and a conscience awake to the justice of God, reads ominously the signs. No calamity is specified, but the disturbed state of the north, with Medes and Babylonians closing on Assyria, and with inroads of savage Scythian hordes, afforded ample reason for fear. He regards the calamity as imminent, yet he is never lost in the outward event, but ever contemplates its design. It is to manifest God's righteousness and purify the national religion. His teaching rests on the earlier prophets, on Amos' denunciation of the peer and the palace, on Hosea's expectation that the nation can only be regenerated by the destruction of its elaborate civilization, and, above all, on Isaiah's picture of the land after the razor of Assyria has shaved it, when a man shall nourish a young cow and two sheep and live on the abundance of milk and butter. But to Zephaniah the nation is of less consequence than to the earlier prophets, and the piety of the individual more. We reach an interesting stage in the progress from Isaiah, who, regarding the nation as still essential to the nation's religion, predicted its security, to Jeremiah, who, finding that the spiritual ideal had far outgrown the national, proclaimed the over-

throw of the nation. In Zephaniah the nation is still to continue, but its civilization and government are to end. A certain sobriety has fallen upon an age which had waited long for the realization of past hopes, so that even the closing picture of the ransomed state seems rather a relic of the past revived again than a living hope of an original time.

Zephaniah treads in the steps of the earlier prophets, conspicuously of Isaiah. Nowack does not express himself too strongly when he says that "Zephaniah moves throughout in the track of Isaiah."* Parallel lines of thought, he says, can be traced point by point—the Assyrians from the northeast in Isaiah, the Scythians in Zephaniah. God as Judge resolves to make an end of evil in both, and the pride which resists God and trusts temporal things is the chief sin in both.

In the book, as it stands, the agreement can be followed much farther. Both prophets condemn the luxury of their time, and Zephaniah's ideal of pastoral simplicity rests on Isaiah. Zephaniah, as Isaiah, bases his expectation of calamity upon God's justice and the need for cleansing the nation, and he, too, does not stop at the affliction, but looks to the blessed ends God designs it to serve. We have already seen how the oracle on the nations seems to be an expansion of a passage in Isaiah, and the epilogue absorbs as much of Isaiah's glorious ideal as a man who lived more in hard facts in a duller age could accomplish. This deep impress of Isaiah's style and thought is natural in a descendant of Hezekiah and a man who moved in the same circle as the greatest of the prophets.

But would a slavish imitation of mere externals be equally natural? For criticism does not merely modify the figure of the prophet. It leaves an entirely different person with an entirely different message. The resemblance to Isaiah is now only in phrase and incident. The idea of a world-judgment which sprang, in Isaiah, directly from his conception of the character of God's sovereignty, in Zephaniah, is but an incident, having no place in his circle of thought, no deeper divine motive, no further gracious purpose. That is Nowack's view of the book, and Smith's is not different. "There is no great hope," he says; "hardly any tenderness and never a glimpse of beauty. . . . . Nor does Zephaniah foretell the restoration of nature in the end of the days. There is no prospect of a redeemed and fruitful land, but only of a group of battered and hardly saved characters; a few meek and righteous are hidden from the fire and creep forth when it is over. . . . . His book is the first tinging of prophecy with apocalypse: that

* P. 279.

is the moment which it supplies in the history of Israel's religion." *

"The verses which seem to contradict this assertion," Nowack continues, "ii. 11, iii. 8–10, which speak of an annihilation of the heathen gods and a worship of Jehovah by all peoples, belong as little to Zephaniah as ii. 8–10, in which the justification of the judgment on Moab and Ammon is that they have contemned the people of Jehovah."† Wellhausen and Smith, with some slight differences in detail, take up the same position.

It combines two marvels, either of them great, and both together overwhelming. First, a man of power and originality misses all the inwardness of his master's teaching; and, second, a strangely harmonious series of interpolators supply his failure. Truth is said to be stranger than fiction, and certainly no writer of fiction would attain any appearance of verisimilitude with a plot dependent upon such happy dovetailing of fortuitous events.

We ask with interest for the explanation. Zephaniah, Nowack says, reached his idea of a world-judgment from without, Isaiah from within; and Smith means the same thing when he declares that Zephaniah stands too near the judgment. Zephaniah is supposed to be writing face to face with the Scythian hordes, to be proclaiming a day of the Lord because he sees the instrument and not because, like the earlier prophets, he feels that God has a suit with His people. The young king might reform, but what interest could the prophet have in his work when the elements were loose! "Why," says Smith, "does Zephaniah never talk of the love of God, of the Divine Patience, of the Grace that has spared and will spare wicked hearts, if only it can touch them to repentance? Why has he no call to repent, no appeal to the wicked to turn from his evil ways? We have already seen part of the answer. Zephaniah stands too near the judgment, and the last things." ‡

In accordance with this view, the explanation of the calamity in i. 3, as designed to remove the stumbling-blocks with the sinners, is ascribed to a later Jew, a person who, "in season and out of season," obtruded this idea. Prof. Smith regards this criticism as too drastic, which is one of many instances where his literary instinct is too strong for his logic, for, if the section is to be read as simply a description of a calamity the prophet sees approaching, this clause must be omitted and a great deal more. The prophet is supposed to have perceived the Scythians on the horizon, to have looked for them by the coast route from which they would turn aside to Judah and then overrun the coast lands and assault Egypt. This being done, he expected them to retrace their steps

* Vol. ii, p. 49. † P. 280. ‡ Smith, Vol. ii, p. 71.

and overthrow Assyria. Wellhausen and Nowack reject the passages in ii. 7, "And the coast lands shall be for the remnant of the house of Judah . . . . for Jehovah their God shall visit them and turn their captivity." This is consistent. The land now falls to the Bedaween and the passage becomes simply a description of the passing of the Scythians. But to cut out the very passage which seems to afford the motive for the prophecy is, to say the least of it, drastic criticism; and again Smith's literary instinct compels him, in the face of his own reasoning, to accept it. The oracles on Moab and Ammon are rejected by all three writers, chiefly because these countries did not lie in the track of the Scythians. Chap. iii. 9, 10, which predicts that the peoples shall receive a pure lip, worship Jehovah, and come from distant lands for His service, is said to be contrary to the "simple and austere gospel of Zephaniah."* That such a hope should be wanting in so close a student of Isaiah does not seem to stir any amazement. The closing verses from iii. 14 onwards are, as usual, ascribed to the Exile. "To a folk poor and humble," says Smith, "in the new state and temper of their life came a new song from God nearly a hundred years after Zephaniah."† That is very nicely expressed, and is kinder than Wellhausen and Nowack's estimate of it as compounded mainly out of imitations and generalities.

We ask where all this is discovered about the Scythians. Among other causes of danger they may have been dimly on the prophet's horizon, but that their immediate approach governed his predictions is a view absolutely without support. On the contrary, we find the time singularly free from panic, and even the king's household, who might be expected to have as recent political information as any prophet, live undisturbed, careless, foppish, lawless lives.

Whether we omit the clause i. 3 about the removal of the stumbling-blocks with the sinners makes no difference in a chapter which deals in detail with their removal. Prof. Smith asks us to "note the absence of all mention of the Divine Mercy as the cause of deliverance."‡ But what if the prophet declares that the Divine Mercy can do no more? To charge all the calamity upon obdurate deafness to every form of instruction is surely to place God's Mercy very high. Those who escape, moreover, are the *meek*, and who are they if not those who trust in the Divine Mercy? Wellhausen questions the word *meek*, as he thinks it has here a spiritual significance which was of later growth. But arbitrariness can go no further than to doubt a characteristic word, in a characteristic place, a word eminently derived from the writer's

* Smith, Vol. ii, p. 70. † Vol. ii, p. 73. ‡ Vol. ii, p. 59.

character and experience and still further guaranteed by being found in Isa. xi. 4, either as original or copy.

The ode in ii. 4–15 is supposed to be in the elegiac measure, but much broken. This defect is ascribed to the interference and incapacity of the transcribers. But surely a peculiar measure ought to afford protection to the text, as the deafest interpolator must have had some sense of it and some regard for it. A copyist or interpolator is not the sort of person who would take liberties with a definite and regular metre. As no one seems to know anything very convincing about Hebrew metres, the argument may be received with calmness. But if it is so, the lines in question require but a very slight correction to be the best metre in the ode :

> "And the sea-coast shall be sites of shepherds' cisterns
> And sheepfolds ;
> And the coast shall be for the Remnant of the House of Israel,
> On it shall they pasture ;
> In the houses of Askalon shall they lie down at eve,
> When Jehovah shall visit them ;
> And their God shall turn their captivity." *

The second ode on Moab and Ammon has no appearance of being written in the long and short lines known as the elegiac measure, but in equal long lines. That is not very remarkable, particularly as the third on Nineveh seems to be in equal short lines.

The reproaches on Moab and Ammon are said to be appropriate only to the time of the destruction of Jerusalem. This date is thought to be confirmed by such phrases as "the remnant of my people," "the rest of my nation." But Moab and Ammon are denounced as early as Amos, and Edom, the nation ever denounced at the later date, is here all the more conspicuously omitted that it is mentioned in Isa. xi. The "remnant of my people," and the "rest of my nation," might at any time after the invasion of Sennacherib have been applied in a literal sense to Judah, but is best understood, as in Isaiah, as the spiritual remnant, the gold after the purging of the dross. Was there ever any hope that the poor remnant left after the destruction of the nation by the Babylonians would possess Moab and Ammon? Was not their own land far too wide? Prof. Smith admits the weakness of this argument, and believes he finds a stronger in the opposition which he thinks exists between ver. 11, which predicts the conversion of the nations, and ver. 12, which makes them the prey of Jehovah's sword. But the difficulty is created by interpreting ver. 11 apart from its connection; for it is not the heathen, but the Jews, who

* Zeph. ii. 6 and 7. Read שבי for ושב.

are to possess the lands between the desert and the coast after the worshipers of the heathen gods have perished out of it, and it is they who are to worship Jehovah. Against the heathen Jehovah is terrible. By consuming the worshipers, he famishes the gods of the land till those countries are left to the worshipers of the true God.

The epilogue opens a large subject for discussion. Those promises of restoration which conclude Amos, Hosea and Micah as well as Zephaniah are all in dispute. Such additions are different from patching of the text, and may easily be explained without presupposing any intention to add to the author. Yet the canons by which they are ascribed to the age of the Second Isaiah would prove with greater certainty that all the lyrics in the English language belong to this century. In the minds of all the early prophets, with the doubtful exception of Amos, the idea of a purified and restored nation was ever uppermost. While engaged in their usual work of denouncing the sins of their contemporaries, they had no cause to dwell on it. But, like other public teachers, they must have been governed by a double impulse, one to utter forcibly the side of truth most demanded by the occasion, and the other to balance it by the whole truth as demanded by its own importance. Hosea, we know, arrived at this conviction of a restoration by a long and bitter domestic experience, and Isaiah taught it with a vast splendor. From the fall of Samaria, Israel was only a remnant, and, after the invasion of Sennacherib, hundreds of thousands of Jews were in Exile. The whole work of Josiah, moreover, shows how mightily the idea of a restored nation was working in the popular mind. The rise of the literature of the Exile is far easier to explain, if we suppose that the former Prophets ended as they do now, than if we suppose that the exiles themselves, with no nation in Palestine to claim them or receive them, first created the hope. One such epilogue might be explained, the multiplication of them is incredible. They are vital and different. Such poetry is not made to order, even when one idea rules in the minds of men. The particular instance before us, the epilogue in Zephaniah, has exactly that self-restraint and contact with reality which is so eminently characteristic of the writer, and the idea that the spiritual eminence of the nation will not lead to pride after the severe purgation through which it has passed fits no one so well as the prophet, who taught that "the meek shall escape, even a people humble and poor."

In all this detail, it is not doubtful that the unexpurgated prophet is a far more credible figure than the relic which escapes the critical shears.

We pass to the *third* aspect of the matter, the *Particular Difficulties* which might justify this view of an excessive corruption of the text. When the text is examined in detail, are we driven to this estimate of its state to explain its difficulties? Are they so utterly intractable and so multitudinous as to make it evident that there must have been a period either of excessively careless or excessively arbitrary reproduction?

To find fault with examples of one's own selection would be easy. Wellhausen's emendation of Zeph. iii. 14, accepted also by Smith and Nowack, is an example sufficiently interesting. The prophet is describing the desolation of Nineveh. Flocks lie down where nations jostled and strange and doleful creatures inhabit her ruins. Then comes the passage to which objection is taken. "A voice sings in the window, desolation on the doorstep, for the cedar work is stripped." A voice that never entered by the door sings, a voice of winged creature or ghostly visitant, for the cedar work which filled door and window are stripped, both openings left eyeless sockets. That is poetry. Wellhausen corrects to: "The owl sings in the window, the raven on the doorstep." That is how a child might arrange its Noah's ark.

But no human work being without flaw, random selection of failures would lead to no convincing result. We shall therefore limit attention to Hosea, the text of which Prof. Smith regards as "one of the most dilapidated in the Old Testament, in parts beyond the possibility of repair,"* while Prof. Nowack gives the most practical proof that he holds the same opinion, by making some fourscore emendations. The task of still further selecting amid such affluence is lightened by the easy and secure guidance of Nowack's asterisks. At chap. xi we come, after passing many constellations of these stars, to the Pleiads or the Milky Way.

"I called him to be my son,"† in ver. 1, is changed to, "I call his sons." The usual prophetic relation of Israel to Jehovah is said to be *syouse*, not *son*. But surely that prescribes very narrow limits to the prophetic imagination, and does not appear to give due weight to such parallels as Ex. iv. 22, where Israel is called, "My son, my firstborn." The correction, moreover, seems to leave a clumsy confusion in the sentence, the nation being spoken of first as *Israel's sons* and then as *Israel*. For the corrections in the next verse, "I called them. . . . . They went from me," for "they called . . . . they went from them,"‡ there is more justification. Yet the vague third person plural, apparently for the prophets, is used in ver. 7, and the corruption of both texts is

* Vol. i, p. 220.

† לבני for לבניו.

‡ כִּקְרָאִי and מִפָּנַי הֵם for קראו and מפניהם.

less probable. The second correction, however, does seem necessary. But it involves only the right division of a word. God's representatives called: forthwith Israel went from God instead of toward Him. The change in ver. 3 from, "I took them *by their arms*," to "*on my arm*,"* only destroys the figure—for a child who is being taught to walk, is held up by his own arms, not carried on the arm of another. The preposition *over* may have been selected to indicate the height of the person who holds, though it is used in Gen. xxvii. 40 simply as *by*, "to live by the sword." The changes in ver. 4 are each slight, but, taken all together, very improbable. Nowack reads: "With human bands I drew them, *with cords of love*, and I was toward them as one who lifts up the yoke from their cheeks and I bowed me to him and gave him to eat."† No wonder he doubts the authenticity of the clause, *with cords of love*, the anti-climax is so amazing. The verse is capable of being translated without correction or anti-climax: "With human bands I drew them, with cords of love, yet I was to them as those who put a yoke on their jaws, though I fed them gently." God has treated Israel with a father's love, yet Israel does not credit Him with so much as a driver's care. That the previous clause is similar in construction, being also a contrast, not a sequence, is another argument in its favor, and Isa. i. 3, "The ox knoweth his owner and the ass his master's crib," gives additional support. In ver. 5, the absence of the negative is no special gain. The thought goes back to the beginning. Israel has been called out of Egypt to be God's son, but having been more obdurate than the cattle, shall he not return to his former state, not in the actual Egypt this time, but in the worse bondage of Assyria? That the prophet ever imagined a second captivity in the actual Egypt, no incident in the history of his time suggests. The only justification for altering, "by their counsels," in ver. 6, to "in their fortresses,"‡ is a preference for uniformity of construction of a kind that never existed except in the dullest writings. Evil counsels, springing from hard thoughts of God, very fittingly follow in the connection. The meaning of the word translated *staves* or *members* is doubtful. But what language is without rare and doubtful words? And changes are not usually made toward the difficult and unfamiliar, but toward the simpler and better known. To the word translated *anger*, in ver. 9, objection is raised with even less reason, for, tradition, an easy derivation from the verb to be hot, and a parallel in Jer. xv. 8, afford unusually good support for a rare Hebrew word. "Hopelessly corrupt" is the verdict

* אקחם על זרועתי.

† כמרים על מיעל לחיהם ואבט אליו אוכיל לו

‡ בכפציהם.

passed on ver. 7. A parallel to the most difficult clause is found in vii. 16. One passage supports the other, making it very improbable that the difficulty of interpretation arises from corruption of the text. And even the difficulty of interpretation is very much exaggerated, the ordinary interpretation, that the prophets call up but fail to lift up, being neither alien to the connection nor hard to obtain from the original. Out of the whole passage from the last clause of ver. 8 to the end of the chapter this alone escapes: "For I am God and not man, in thy midst holy and not a man." The original, whether corrupt or not, can at least march; this remnant can scarce limp.

From this example it will be seen that corrections are made with a liberal hand, but the canons which justify them are nowhere laid down by any of the writers. Four tests, however, may be distinguished, which may be arranged as follows: (1) The Greek Version, (2) Simplicity of Meaning, (3) Sequence of Ideas, (4) Style, Tone and Temper of the Prophet and his Age.

The Septuagint is a witness of the highest value, but there is reason to wish that some of the criticism which might be spared from the Hebrew text were devoted to the Greek. No effort is made to obtain the original text and abide by it, but every form of the text is brought under contribution. Unless there is some probability that the various readings have been obtained by revisions of the translation, the method is most uncritical. They seem, on the contrary, to be chiefly mere lapses in transcription toward the easier and more familiar. But this is also the practical outcome of the modern treatment of the text, for emendations are in almost every case toward constructions of sanctioned simplicity and commonplace. Even where the Greek text is not doubtful, marked differences between the translation and the original do not always prove a difference of text. The idiosyncrasies of each translator would repay more careful study, but in them all an accurate tradition is bounded by an amazing ignorance, and pious diligence is too often displayed in mere dexterity of blundering. Who that knows how readily the current phrase is substituted for the unfamiliar can be sure that the translator of Hos. iii. 2 had *barley and wine* before him? The reading so largely accepted of chap. vii. 6, "like an oven have they *kindled* their hearts," for *drawn near*, is probably only an example of the familiar habit of taking a short cut through difficulty. The reading is easy in itself, being familiar and indefinite, and it is suggested both by its previous use and by its connection with oven. The text, on the other hand, though unusual in the connection, is peculiarly graphic, describing in one word the evil effects when hearts, already aflame with

lust, are brought together in plots as coals are collected in an oven. Many differences of reading rest on nothing better than this comfortable habit of shunning difficulties. Other differences arise from direct and absolute blundering. In chap. vi. 3, the Greek is quoted in support of Giesebrecht's amendment, "as soon as we seek him, we shall find him." The correction, in any case, only succeeds in reducing a graphic and beautiful figure to a repetition and a commonplace. That God's goodness will be speedy, has already been said; that it will also be certain, the text adds. As sure as the sun will rise, God will appear to bless. "Let us follow on to know the Lord. Like the morning His coming forth is certain." In no case is there any reason for altering this fitting expression of a nation's sentiment in exalted mood, but the support of the LXX. does not appear to rest on anything but a blunder. מצאו was derived from מצא, being regarded as an infinitive with suffix, translated *His finding* and paraphrased *We shall find Him.* From none of our critics do these considerations seem to receive their due weight.

After such cross-examination, the LXX. still bears witness to errors in the consonantal text of the original, but then only to such slips as the lengthening of yods and the shortening of vavs, confusions between *nun* and *resh*, occasional substitutions of the familiar for the unusual. Moreover, it shows plainly that the letters have not always been rightly divided into words, nor the words into clauses. This correctness imbedded in error, rightly considered, bears strong testimony to the careful transmission of the original.

This test is closely connected with the next, *Simplicity of Meaning*, for the aid of the LXX. is seldom invoked except to remove a difficulty. But the ancient interpreter, unfortunately, had almost exactly the same perplexities as the modern, and conjectural emendation is then the only resource. As can be seen from the example given above, there is small hesitation in using it: yet no question is more perplexing than to know what manner of difficulty springs from corruption of the text, unless it be to decide what measure of success in removing it proves that the original has been restored. Did no difficulties of interpretation exist in an ancient author, especially one like Hosea, whose style is terse and rapid, and who follows the swift-changing emotions of a troubled time, the internal politics of which are not presented to us by any other writing, it would be very remarkable. That his meaning should at times only loom in dim, large outline through his words, like a landscape through mist, is sufficiently accounted for by our ignorance, without the need for presupposing extensive corruption of the text. The tendency of a transcriber's corrections must ever be

toward smoothing away difficulties. Being utterly puzzled, he might blunder, but even that could only be within narrow limits; for only ignorance unconscious of itself is venturesome.

There are two passages of peculiar difficulty in Hosea, one which has already been touched on, chap. vii. 3–7, and one still more perplexing, chap. xii.

The first passage Prof. Smith aptly describes as "an obscure passage upon obscure events." In particular, the details of the figure are doubtful. Yet the general impression of a wicked people ready for mischief, a drunken court, a conspirator biding his opportunity, men brought together in plots as coals in an oven gathering heat till they are ready to burn up their rulers, is amazingly vivid. A passage so strong and vivid can hardly be seriously corrupt, and the proposed emendations only increase the darkness by removing the most conspicuous features of the picture. The clause about the baker waiting patiently beside his kindled oven till his dough is leavened is omitted; "they draw near their hearts" is altered to "they kindle," and "their baker" is read as "their anger." The last correction requires no change of consonants, but it can hardly be right, for lust, not anger, is given as the root of insurrection, and "their baker" for the conspirator who bides his opportunity and then uses their lust is agreeable to the figure. They kindle their hearts, would only be a repetition, for the prophet ascribes all the calamity to the fact that their hearts are already aflame with lust. Devastation follows when these wicked hearts are brought together in plots like kindled coals in an oven. Perhaps there should be a different division of clauses. "For they bring together their hearts as an oven, while they lie in wait all night their baker sleeps, in the morning it is burning like a flaming fire." Lustful hearts brought together in plots, like coals in an oven, need no further impulse to wickedness. The clause about the baker waiting is not a superfluity, but the leading thought. As the prophet has already charged the sins of the priesthood upon the lusts of the people, he now ascribes to the same fruitful source the assassination of the kings. Among a people aflame with their lusts, a conspirator needs but to bide his opportunity to accomplish any mischief.

The second passage (chap. xii) presents far greater difficulty, but to cut out every apparent divergence from what is conceived to be the main line of thought (the second clause of ver. 1, vers. 4–7 and vers. 13, 14; Eng. version, xi. 12, xii. 3–6, vers. 12, 13), is only to leave us with the question why interruptions so violent were ever inserted. The LXX. indicates errors of the usual type. In ver. 1 (Eng., xi. 12), for example, we have "Ephraim surrounds

me with falsehood and with impiety the House of Judah and Israel. Now God knows them and a holy people they shall be called." Here we have a different division of a clause, a different division of a word, and the confusion of two similar letters, the usual type of error into which a transcriber falls when he is not guided by the sense. But that, without any conceivable motive, he should make incursions of his own into the regions of history and metaphor in order to import further difficulty into a passage already sufficiently perplexing, is a supposition which severely taxes our credulity.

None of our commentators derives much assistance from the LXX. yet it seems to offer some explanation of the introduction of the history of Jacob into the prophecy. The frequent repetition of *with* in the original is very unlike the style of Hosea and the LXX. removes this difficulty. Israel might slip in, House of Israel being a current phrase. A similar difficulty is found in Micah i. 5, and in 2 Chron. xxx. 1 there is also a curious combination of Israel and Judah. The prophecy then links itself to the last chapter. God will punish but restore His people. "Ephraim has surrounded me with lies and the House of Judah with deceit; still God knows them and a holy people they shall be called." The deceit and violence which hinder this consummation were found even in the ancestor of the nation who used violence from the womb, but did not prevail till he was vanquished (LXX.), when in tears and supplications he found God and knew Him as the all-prevailing Jehovah. "So, thou, return to thy God, guard mercy and justice and hope on thy God continually." But instead of this faith, Ephraim, in the spirit of the huckster, looks for all his security to wealth, regardless of the sin which is its canker (LXX.). In earlier days, Israel was no wealthy military power. A prophet led, not a general; and knowledge, not gold, was their wealth. Only when they left the simple desert life did they fall. "Lo, in Gilead idolatry, surely it was disaster. In Gilgal, they sacrificed oxen, yea, their altars were as heaps in the furrows of the field. As when Jacob fled to the field of Syria, and served for a wife and by a wife was kept (LXX.), so by a prophet God brought up Israel from Egypt and by a prophet were they kept." Weak instruments both for the preservation of the nation, but strong because they were God's. Ephraim's methods, on the contrary, are a conspicuous failure. The God whom they served in their simple state in the desert they forgot in their pride, as soon as they had entered a wealthier land. Hence their political disasters, hence the calamity either of having kings or wanting them. And if any of their evil deeds are still hidden, they are not in the

grave, but in the womb of time. Painful the birth may be, but when the time arrives there will be no delay. Nor will kindly death intervene to remove this troublesome offspring. Samaria and all the wealth in which they have trusted will be destroyed and still more fearful calamities prevail. Yet penitence shall be followed by a better protection than idolatrous sacrifices, however wealthy, or horses, however numerous; and the end of idolatry shall be the end of tribulation.

Though far from being the only possible interpretation, this outline may suffice to show that a meaning can be traced through the whole, and that, beyond such unconscious slips as are easily made in the transmission of a difficult passage, the simple and sufficient explanation of the difficulties is our ignorance.

But this passage has been dwelt on at such length, chiefly because it shows that, however many be the insertions, they are anything but glosses in the ordinary sense of the word. Synonyms are not attached to difficult words, nor explanatory clauses to difficult constructions, nor notes to obscure historical references. The passage stands in all its native difficulty and the modern commentator omits not because the clauses are expansions of the sense, but because they add to the perplexity. A better proof that the text was never recklessly interpolated could not be found.

The second test readily passes over to the third. A meaning is simpler, mainly as it improves the *Connection of Ideas*.

But here we are met by another grave difficulty. What is reasonable sequence? People conscious of something less than absolute logical connection in their own utterance cannot be sure how far the prophets may have allowed themselves a similar freedom.

Who, for example, can be convinced that the sixteenth verse of chap. ix once stood between the eleventh and twelfth? The unanimity with which Wellhausen is followed in making this arrangement stirs admiration, but not belief. Men's ideas of sequence vary so much that many will not see that the order of ideas is at all improved, finding great difficulty in believing that the prophet would think it necessary to pray for a miscarrying womb and dry breasts for a people whose root was already withered. The climax also seems to suffer. What could be more impressive, as the last touch to a picture of deepening disaster, than "Blasted is Ephraim, withered the root of them, fruit they produce not, yea, even when they beget children, I slay the darlings of the womb, yea, though they bring up sons, I bereave them." And if there is repetition, where is it more in place than to emphasize such a climax? The LXX. suggests a translation

which gives even a closer connection to the passage as it stands. By taking the two clauses of ver. 11 together, we get: "Ephraim, like a bird, their glory has taken itself away from birth, from motherhood, from conception." The prophet does not say that the nation is sterile, but that it is so corrupt and awaits so stern a destiny, as to remove all cause for joy when a man is born into the world. Then he proceeds: better a nation doomed by sterility than by slaughter.

But, supposing that the transposition, instead of interfering with the sequence of ideas, had greatly improved it, whether is it easier to imagine some imperfection in the writer or to attribute to the transcribers either the perverseness which could transfer consciously, or the flagrant carelessness which could transfer unconsciously, a passage so far away from its original and fitting connection?

The sequence demanded is of a kind which does not exist in literature, barely in academic lectures. In all true literature, something more subtle than logic leads on from one thought to another. Growing intensity is often a surer guide than mere connection of ideas. Smith ever vibrates between the more liberal standard of his own literary instinct and the most unliterary critical measuring rule; the others treat Hosea as if he had concocted his lectures under the rigid discipline of a written outline. Nowack protests against such an idea, but nothing else could justify many of his conclusions. We have seen how he rejects the second clause in chap. xi. 4, "with cords of love," the intensification of the feeling not being accepted as a proof of genuineness. Still more amazing is his rejection of "my heart turns in me, my compassions all glow," in xi. 8. With such simple, passionate eloquence, it rises out of the previous clause, so beautifully tender is its conception of God, so entirely does it befit a prophet living amid the ruin of his nation, and so utterly impossible is this cry of the heart for a writer calmly copying in Babylon, that most people would as soon doubt its genuineness as they would the genuineness of a mother's lament over her first-born. But the note of intensity, of sincerity, is esteemed of no importance and all is rested on a wooden rigidity of dead logic by which nothing that could be called literature was ever yet created.

Where clauses do give meanings foreign to the connection, the errors seem to have arisen in the usual way, by confusion of similar letters, by errors in dividing words and clauses, or by substitution of the familiar for the less known. At least there do not appear to be any corrections at all convincing which go beyond these limits.

An interesting example of a clause requiring some correction is

found in chap. iv. 4. Beck's emendation: "My people are like their chemarim," requires but little alteration. It is accepted by Smith, and formerly satisfied Wellhausen. But this combination of the contemptuous with the ordinary name of priest, the contemptuous first, the ordinary immediately following, is very improbable, rendered more so by the repetition of the same idea, "like people, like priest," in ver. 9. Nowack, and now Wellhausen, read: "For my people are like thee, O priest." This is better, but is a more violent change of the text, and has the same objection that it repeats the idea in ver. 9. The simplest change, involving only one vowel point and the period, gives the meaning most agreeable to the context. Hosea, after the long discipline of his domestic sorrow, has been made to recognize the difference between his own work and the work of his predecessor, Amos. To strive or cry is useless. The suit is no longer in man's hand, but in God's. Let not a man strive, thy people are as my litigants.* That is the strife in which priest and prophet and people shall be overthrown.

Compare with any of these simple corrections, such fruits of bold antiquarian hypothesis as the importation of *Beersheba* into iv. 15, *Judah defiles herself with quedeshim* in xii. 1 (Eng., xi. 12), and *I will be his Anat and his Aschera* in xiv. 8. To Wellhausen the credit of such enterprise is due, and though Smith and Nowack hesitate at all but the first, in this last edition his own confidence is still unshaken.

This test of sequence is intimately connected with the next and last, the *Style, Tone and Temper of the Prophet and His Age.* Many passages are rejected as obnoxious to this test.

The ascription of prophecies of restoration to the age of the Exile has already been discussed, but the whole question of interpolation is intimately connected with this narrower issue. That this hope was a prime motive in Hosea's prophetic activity, could have no more convincing evidence than the tale of his domestic misery, the discipline whereby he learned it. With such certain proof that the hope of restoration was the ruling impulse of his ministry, how can it be good criticism to remove such passages as chap. xi. 9–11, simply because there is a violent figure and the mention of returning to blot out Ephraim? Who uses bolder figures than Hosea? Or is boldness the mark of an interpolator? From the first invasion of Tiglath-pileser, captives were in Assyria and refugees in Egypt. Even the heart of Isaiah, the prophet of another nation, went out after them. The phrase to which objection is taken rather indicates that, though there had been calamity,

* רִיבִי.

Ephraim had not been blotted out. This impression is confirmed by the form taken by the promise of restoration. The people are to be brought back to dwell in their houses, surely more natural to a prophet living amid the empty houses than to a writer in another land long years after they were in ruins.

But the early date of Hosea affords another test. If the Exile were so fruitful in interpolations, the century between must have left some mark. Four passages are regarded as the work of a Jew in whom patriotism was a stronger passion than respect for the prophetic text. These are i. 7, iv. 15, vi. 11 and xii. 1 (Eng. ver., xi. 12). Why he should stultify his labors by allowing such passages as v. 5, 13, vi. 4, x. 1, xii. 3 (Eng., 2), to escape, nay even insert them, is not manifest, unless his patriotism was of the nature of the Irishman's who regarded the absence of Irish names from a bank failure as another injustice to Ireland. As the work of Hosea, on the other hand, these passages represent a natural and interesting change in his prophetic attitude, as he saw the moral conditions of Judah becoming assimilated to those of Ephraim.

Chap. i. 7 alone awakes reasonable doubt. Any pious Jew might readily make a side note on the great deliverance of Judah, and such side notes easily slip into the text. Yet were there no such event as the destruction of Sennacherib's host, the passage would read as a very general assertion that the deliverance was to be divine, not human, and the expectation of a different destiny for Judah might easily arise from its different moral and physical conditions. Hosea might the more earnestly cherish this conviction, as he had not at that time attained to the hope of a restoration of the good elements of the whole nation.

In chap. iv. 15 the prophet seems to see the corruption of Ephraim overflowing into Judah, and warns the Jews against coming to the degrading sanctuaries of Ephraim. This verse has a singularly hard fate. for it is held to be both superfluous and defective. The passage which makes it refer to Judah is omitted and Beersheba is added as a third place name, so as to read, "Take not the oath at the Well-of-the-Oath." No play on the other names suggests that a name with a paronomasia is wanting. A well-known name protected by a play on it drops out, and those not so protected remain. The clause as it stands is manifestly intended to prohibit intercourse with Ephraim, and Beersheba was in Judah. Had Beersheba, therefore, actually appeared, it would have been regarded as a repetition of Amos v. 5. No phrase was ever written which could not be plastic in the hands of such criticism. The phrase which is thought to require expansion, *nor swear*

by the life of Jehovah, is used more than once to describe the corrupt Jehovah worship. That is apparently what it means in Amos viii. 14: "By the life of thy God, O Dan." Were emendations less abundant, one might suggest for the second clause, "By the life of Jehovah, Beersheba," the present text having arisen from the confusion of two yods, aided a little by reverence for the sacred name. In Zeph. i. 4, 5, the sin of swearing by Jehovah is still more manifestly a description of the corrupt Jehovah worship. Two false worships are denounced, a foreign cult, apparently the Assyrian adoration of the Hosts of Heaven, and idolatrous Jehovah worship. Two kinds of priests, the *Chomer* and the *Cohen*, have two classes of adherents, the former, those who have altogether forsaken the worship of Jehovah, and the latter, those who have corrupted it and who are described as swearing by Jehovah, swearing by their king, Jehovah's least spiritual title. All this Nowack abolishes by a few drastic corrections and reads: "I will destroy out of this place the Baal and the name of the priests and those who pray on the roofs to the hosts of heaven and who worship Jehovah and swear by Milcom." What singular company for the prophet's own deity, and what a tame and colorless remnant. What a contrast to the rapid, piled-up clauses with which the prophet emphasizes his hatred of the degraded religion! How could the name of *priest* be abolished? How could the worship of Jehovah have been denounced without a word to say what was wrong in it? And whence comes Milcom? No hint of Ammonite influence on Judah at this time exists.

Passages entirely alike may only be copies; but passages like Hosea iv. 15 and Zeph. i. 4, 5, which agree, with marked individual differences, afford each other the strongest support. When we still further find that in marked, and, in the connection, necessary, contrast to Amos v. 5, Beersheba is omitted in Hosea iv. 15, it is hardly possible to find a better guarantee of authenticity. If still further argument is necessary, the warning to Judah against taking part in the services of sanctuaries long in ruins seems superfluous, and a pious Jew could surely have found something more flattering to say of his nation than to place it in such bad company and to hint that it needed to be warned against such bad habits.

The difficulty in Hos. vi. 11 can be removed by reading the second half of the verse as the beginning of the next prophecy. The prophecy in chap. vi closes with "Also, O Judah, a harvest is appointed for thee!"—a similar harvest to Ephraim, ruin and woe. Then the next prophecy begins: "When I would turn their captivity, when I would heal Israel, then is the iniquity of Ephraim

manifest." *To turn the captivity* may be used as in Job xlii. 10, for removing calamity and restoring to blessing, and Zeph. iii. 20. would also seem to require this larger meaning.

Nowack alone omits the second clause of chap. xii. 1 (Eng., xi. 12) as an interpolation. The others regard it as corrupted out of something less complimentary to Judah. But wilful insertion or conscious emendation is disproved by the denunciation of Judah which immediately follows.

That an occasional marginal note may have been inserted, or that in a literature largely of the nature of pamphlets there were mistakes in editing, is probable: that, in some cases, remaining parchments were used for transmitting writings which were then taken to belong to the preceding author, is probable. But none of these errors affords any approach to an explanation of the alterations the text is supposed to have undergone.

The vice of specialism has always been an excessive love for the lancet and the cautery, in forgetfulness of the general constitution of human nature. To show how these methods would work, if extended to other fields of literature, we select for dissection a passage from Milton, choosing the conclusion of Samson Agonistes, because it has most resemblance to the prophetic epilogues:

> "All is best, though we oft doubt
> What the unsearchable dispose
> Of Highest Wisdom brings about,
> And ever best found in the close.
> Oft He seems to hide His face,
> But unexpectedly returns,
> And to His faithful champion hath in place
> Bore witness gloriously; whence Gaza mourns,
> And all that band them to resist
> His uncontrollable intent:
> His servants He with new acquist
> Of true experience from this great event,
> With peace and consolation hath dismiss'd,
> And calm of mind, all passion spent."

Manifestly this passage is inappropriate to the closing years of Milton, to which tradition ascribes it. By that time all hope of the ascendency of his party and the establishment of a righteous nation was in ruins. It must have been written on the eve of the Revolution which is spoken of as "this great event." This impression that the passage is not genuine is confirmed by the irregularity of the metre, which is "broken and intruded upon," and by the presence of such ungrammatical expressions as *dispose* and *intent* used as substantives and *hath bore* as a perfect. The fourth line, "And ever best found in the close," is a mere repetition of the

idea in the three previous lines, that the Highest Wisdom brings about the best. "Whether this unbearable repetition is to be ascribed to the author is a matter of taste." On the contrary, "all is best found in repose," is a new and fitting idea, following naturally the consciousness of God's supervision. Lines eight and nine are corrupt perhaps beyond all possibility of restoration. We have the vague phrase, *hath in place*, no definite place being specified, the impossible grammar *hath bore*, the rhyming of *mourns* and *burns*, and such impossibly unequal lines as *But unexpectedly returns* and *Bore witness gloriously; whence Gaza mourns.* "As in season and out of season," the Puritans referred to the martyrs, we might slightly transpose, and read:

> "But unexpectedly returns
> To witness gloriously in Gaza place
> Even where His faithful champion burns."

Gaza Place suggests by the play on the English word the shamefulness of the spectacle. Gaza was also the chief town of the Philistines. This suggests that it was the work of the opposite party, the word being used in a metaphorical sense as late as Matthew Arnold. In accordance with this idea, the next line must be read as setting forth the class to whom this witness is given and we must read:

> "To all that band them to assist
> His uncontrollable intent."

Here we have a most curious and interesting example of the strange combination of predestination and fighting which was so characteristic of the Puritan. The absolute certainty of God's decrees does not abolish the necessity of combining to contend for their fulfillment. The rest is a vision of this consummation, apparently the Revolution, and the author stands so near to it that he can speak of it as already realized.

As all literature has been produced by the same activities of mind and heart, why should canons of criticism be applicable only in one narrow field? We know the language of Milton better than the language of Hosea. Why should not the same methods give the same results when applied with a like rigor?

ALNWICK, NORTHUMBERLAND, ENGLAND. JOHN OMAN.

IV.

"IT SAYS:" "SCRIPTURE SAYS:" "GOD SAYS."

IT would be difficult to invent methods of showing profound reverence for the text of Scripture as the very Word of God, which will not be found to be characteristic of the writers of the New Testament in dealing with the Old. Among the rich variety of the indications of their estimate of the written words of the Old Testament as direct utterances of Jehovah, there are in particular two classes of passages, each of which, when taken separately, throws into the clearest light their habitual appeal to the Old Testament text as to God Himself speaking, while, together, they make an irresistible impression of the absolute identification by their writers of the Scriptures in their hands with the living voice of God. In one of these classes of passages the Scriptures are spoken of as if they were God; in the other, God is spoken of as if He were the Scriptures: in the two together, God and the Scriptures are brought into such conjunction as to show that in point of directness of authority no distinction was made between them.

Examples of the first class of passages are such as these: Gal. iii. 8, "The Scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached before the gospel unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all the nations be blessed" (Gen. xii. 1–3); Rom. ix. 17, "The Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up" (Ex. ix. 16). It was not, however, the Scripture (which did not exist at the time) that, foreseeing God's purposes of grace in the future, spoke these precious words to Abraham, but God Himself in His own person: it was not the not yet existent Scripture that made this announcement to Pharaoh, but God Himself through the mouth of His prophet Moses. These acts could be attributed to "Scripture" only as the result of such a habitual identification, in the mind of the writer, of the text of Scripture with God as speaking, that it became natural to use the term "Scripture says," when what was really intended was "God, as recorded in Scripture, said."

Examples of the other class of passages are such as these: Matt. xix. 5, "And he answered and said, Have ye not read that he which made them from the beginning made them male and female, and

said, For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and the twain shall become one flesh?" (Gen. ii. 24); Heb. iii. 7, "Wherefore, even as the Holy Ghost saith, To-day if ye shall hear his voice," etc. (Ps. xcv. 7): Acts iv. 24, 25, "Thou art God, who by the mouth of thy servant David hast said, Why do the heathen rage and the people imagine vain things" (Ps. ii. 1); Acts xiii. 34, "He that raised him up from the dead, now no more to return to corruption, ... hath spoken in this wise, I will give you the holy and sure blessings of David" (Isa. lv. 3); "because he saith also in another [Psalm], Thou wilt not give thy holy one to see corruption" (Ps. xvi. 10); Heb. i. 6, "And when he again bringeth in the first born into the world, he saith, And let all the angels of God worship him" (Deut. xxxii. 43): "and of the angels he saith, Who maketh his angels winds, and his ministers a flame of fire" (Ps. civ. 4); "but of the Son, *he saith*, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever," etc., (Ps. xlv. 7) and, "Thou, Lord, in the beginning," etc. (Ps. cii. 26). It is not God, however, in whose mouth these sayings are placed in the text of the Old Testament: they are the words of others, recorded in the text of Scripture as spoken to or of God. They could be attributed to God only through such habitual identification, in the minds of the writers, of the text of Scripture with the utterances of God that it had become natural to use the term "God says" when what was really intended was "Scripture, the Word of God, says."

The two sets of passages, together, thus show an absolute identification, in the minds of these writers, of "Scripture" with the speaking God.

In the same line with these passages are commonly ranged certain others, in which Scripture seems to be adduced with a subjectless λέγει or φησί, the authoritative subject—whether the divinely given Word or God Himself—being taken for granted. Among these have been counted such passages, for example, as the following: Rom. ix. 15, "For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion" (Ex. xxxiii. 19): Rom. xv. 10, "And again he saith, Rejoice, ye Gentiles, with his people" (Deut. xxxii. 43); and again, "Praise the Lord, all ye Gentiles; and let all the people praise him" (Ps. cvii. 1); Gal. iii. 16, "He saith not, And to seeds, as of many; but as of one, And to thy seed (Gen. xiii. 15), which is Christ;" Eph. iv. 8, "Wherefore he saith, When he ascended on high, he led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men" (Ps. lxviii. 18); Eph. v. 14, "Wherefore he saith, Awake thou that sleepest and arise from the dead and

Christ shall shine upon thee" (Isa. lx. 1); 1 Cor. vi. 16, "For the twain, saith he, shall become one flesh" (Gen. ii. 24); 1 Cor. xv. 27, "But when he saith, All things are put in subjection" (Ps. viii. 7); 2 Cor. vi. 2, "For he saith, At an acceptable time, I hearkened unto thee, and in a day of salvation did I succor thee" (Isa. xlix. 8); Heb. viii. 5, "For see, saith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern that was showed thee in the mount" (Ex. xxv. 40); James iv. 6, "Wherefore he saith, God resisteth the proud but giveth grace to the humble" (Prov. iii. 34).

There is room for difference of opinion, of course, whether all these passages are cases in point. And there has certainly always existed some difference of opinion among commentators as to the proper *subauditum* in such instances as are allowed. The state of the case would seem to be fairly indicated by Alexander Buttmann, when he says:

"The predicates λέγει or φησίν are often found in the New Testament in quotations, ὁ θεός or even merely ἡ γραφή being always to be supplied as subject; as 1 Cor. vi. 16, 2 Cor. vi. 2, Gal. iii. 16, Eph. iv. 8, v. 14, Heb. viii. 5, iv. 3 (εἴρηκεν). These subjects are also expressed, as in Gal. iv. 30, 1 Tim. v. 18, or to be supplied from the preceding context, as in Heb. i. 5 *sq.*"*

Of the alternatives thus offered, Jelf apparently prefers the one:

"In the New Testament we must supply προφήτης, ἡ γραφή, πνεῦμα, etc., before φησί, λέγει, μαρτυρεῖ."†

Winer and Blass take the other:

"The formulas of citation—λέγει, 2 Cor. vi. 2, Gal. iii. 16, Eph. iv. 8 al.; φησί, 1 Cor. vi. 16, Heb. viii. 5; εἴρηκε, Heb. iv. 4 (compare the Rabbinical אמר); μαρτυρεῖ, Heb. vii. 17 (εἶπε, 1 Cor. xv. 27)—are probably in no instance impersonal in the minds of the New Testament writers. The subject (ὁ θεός) is usually contained in the context, either directly or indirectly; in 1 Cor. vi. 16 and Matt. xix. 5, φησί, there is an apostolic ellipsis (of ὁ θεός); in Heb. vii. 17, the best authorities have μαρτυρεῖται."‡

"In the formulas of citation such as λέγει, 2 Cor. vi. 2, Gal. iii. 16, etc.; φησίν, 1 Cor. vi. 16, Heb. viii. 5; εἴρηκε, Heb. iv. 4—ὁ θεός is to be understood ('*He* says'); in 2 Cor. x. 10, φησίν (א DE, etc. [?], 'one says'), appears to be a wrong reading for φασίν (B), unless perhaps a τις has dropped out (but cp. *Clem. Hom.*, xi, 9 *ad init.*)."§

The commentators commonly range themselves with Winer and Blass. Thus, on Rom. ix. 15, Sanday and Headlam comment: "λέγει without a nominative for θεὸς λέγει is a common idiom in quotations," referring to Rom. xv. 10 as a parallel case. On Gal. iii.

* *A Grammar of the New Testament Greek*, Thayer's translation, p. 134.

† Sec. 373, 2, 3.

‡ Winer, Sec. 58, 9, γ; p. 656 of Moulton's translation.

§ Blass' *Grammar of N. T. Greek*; English translation by H. St. J. Thackeray, M.A., p. 75.

16, Meyer says: "*sc.* θεός, which is derived from the historical reference of the previous ἐρρέθησαν, so well known to the reader;" and Alford: "viz., He who gave the promises—God;" and Sieffert: "οὐ λέγει *sc.* θεός which flows out of the historical relation (known to the reader) of the preceding ἐρρέθησαν (cf. Eph. iv. 8, v. 14)." On Eph. iv. 8, Meyer's comment runs: "*Who* says it (comp. v. 14) is obvious of itself, namely, *God*, whose word the Scripture is. See on 1 Cor. vi. 16; Gal. iii. 16; the supplying ἡ γραφή or τὸ πνεῦμα must have been suggested by the context (Rom. xv. 10). The manner of citation with the simple λέγει, obviously meant of God, has as its necessary presupposition, in the mind of the writer and readers, the Theopneustia of the Old Testament." Haupt, similarly: "The introduction of a citation with the simple λέγει, with which, of course, 'God' is to be supplied as subject, not 'the Scripture,' is found in Paul again v. 14, 2 Cor. vi. 2, Rom. xv. 10; similarly φησί, 1 Cor. vi. 16 (εἶπεν with the addition ὁ θεός, 2 Cor. vi. 16)." A similar comment is given by Ellicott, who adds at Eph. v. 14: "scil. ὁ θεός, according to the usual form of St. Paul's quotations; see notes on chap. iv. 8 and on Gal. iii. 16:" though on 1 Cor. vi. 16 he speaks with less decision: "It may be doubted what nominative is to be supplied to this practically impersonal verb, whether ἡ γραφή (comp. John vii. 38, Rom. iv. 3, ix. 17, *al.*) or ὁ θεός (comp. Matt. xix. 5, 2 Cor. vi. 2, where this nominative is distinctly suggested by the context): the latter is perhaps the more natural: comp. Winer, *Gr.*, § 58, 9, and notes on Eph. iv. 8." On 1 Cor. vi. 16, Edwards comments: "*sc.* ὁ θεός, as in Rom. ix. 15. Cf. Matt. xix. 4, 5, where ὁ ποίησας supplies a nom. to εἶπεν. Similarly in Philo and Barnabas φησί introduces citations from Scripture." On 2 Cor. vi. 2, Waite says: "A statement of God Himself is adduced;" and De Wette: "*sc.* θεός, who Himself speaks." On Heb. viii. 5, Bleek comments: "That there is to be understood as the subject of φησί, not, as Böhme thinks, ἡ γραφή, but ὁ θεός, can least of all be doubtful here, where actual words of God are adduced;" and Weiss: "This statement is now established (γάρ) by appeal to Ex. xxv. 40, which passage is characterized only by the interpolated φησίν (cf. Acts xxv. 22) as a divine oracle. . . . . The subject of φησίν is, of course, God, neither ὁ χρηματισμός (Lün.) nor ἡ γραφή (Bhm.)." On James iv. 6, Mayor comments: "The subject understood is probably God, as above, i. 12, ἐπηγγείλατο, and Eph. iv. 8, v. 14, where the same phrase occurs; others take it as ἡ γραφή. Cf. above, v. 5."*

Most of these passages have, on the other hand, been explained

* So also Wandel: "James then cites the passage Prov. iii. 24, in which we must simply supply 'God' to λέγει."

by some commentators on the supposition that it is ἡ γραφή that is to be supplied, as has sufficiently appeared indeed from the controversial remarks in the notes quoted above. This circumstance may be taken as precluding the necessity of adducing examples here.* Suffice it to say that those so filling in the *subauditum* are entirely at one with the commentators already quoted in looking upon the citations as treated by the New Testament writers as of divine authority, it being, in their apprehension, all one in this regard whether the *subauditum* is conceived as ἡ γραφή or as ὁ θεός.

In the meantime, however, there has occasionally showed itself a tendency to treat these subjectless verbs more or less as true impersonals. Thus we read in Delitzsch's note on Heb. viii. 5: "For '*see*,' *saith He*, *i. e.*, ὁ θεός, or taking φησί impersonally (that is, without a definite subject), '*it is said*' (*i. e.*, in Scripture), (Bernhardy, *Synt.*, 419)." So Kern on James iv. 6 comments: "λέγει here *impersonaliter*, instead of the foregoing λέγει ἡ γραφή;" and accordingly Beyschlag, in his recent commentary says: "to λέγει, ἡ γραφή is to be supplied, or it is to be taken with Kern impersonally." Similarly Godet on 1 Cor. vi. 16 says: "The subject of the verb φησίν, *says he*, may be either Adam or Moses, or Scripture, or God Himself, or finally, as is shown by Heinrici, the verb may be a simple formula of quotation like our '*It is said*.' This form is frequently found in Philo."† Some such usage as is here supposed may seem actually to occur in the common text of Wisdom xv. 12‡ and 2 Cor. x. 10.§ But in both

* As a single example, take, *e. g.*, Oltramare, on Eph. iv. 8: "Διὸ λέγει, scil. ἡ γραφή: In accord with the extreme frequency with which the New Testament is cited, Paul often cites by saying simply λέγει (v. 14, Rom. xv. 10, 2 Cor. vi. 2, Gal. iii. 16; cf. Rom. iv. 3, ix. 17, 1 Tim. v. 18), or φησι (1 Cor. vi. 16; cf. Heb. viii. 15), or εἶπε (1 Cor. xv. 27). He understands the subject, which is understood of itself, γραφη or θεός (see Winer, *Gr.*, p. 486)."

† Earlier still De Wette explained the phrase in a somewhat similar way. His note on Eph. iv. 8 runs: "Old Testament support. διὸ λέγει] *therefore* (because Christ gives the gifts and according to the presupposition that all that concerns Christ is predicted in the Old Testament) *it is said*, [heisst es] (cf. Gal. iii. 16, 1 Cor. vi. 16—a formula of citation (also v. 14) like Jas. iv. 6, Acts xiii. 35, Heb. x. 5, not elsewhere found in the apostle (cf., however, 2 Cor. vi. 17) . . . . ." And again on Eph. v. 14 we read: "διὸ λέγει] *therefore it is said* [heisst es] (in the Scriptures). Cf. iv. 8." He supposes that, in the latter passage, Paul confuses a customary application of Scripture with the very words of Scripture.

‡ Grimm's note on the passage runs: "Instead of the rec. reading, φησίν, Alex. Ephr., 187, 248, 296, Compl. have φασίν. Nevertheless the author may here return to the singular, referring to the potter before depicted (see the following verses). Or φησί may stand impersonally, in the sense of 'heisst es,' 'sagt man,' Win., p. 462, 6th ed.; Müller, *Philo's Buch von d. Weltschöpfung*, p. 44." Cf. further, below, p. 497.

§ φησίν is placed by Tischendorf, Tregelles and Westcott and Hort in their texts:

passages the true reading is probably φασίν; in neither instance is it clear that, if φησίν be read, it has no subject implied in the context; if φησίν be read and taken as equivalent to φασίν it still is not purely indefinite; and in any case the instances are not parallel, inasmuch as in neither of these passages is it Scripture, or indeed any document, that is adduced.

The fact that a few very able commentators have taken this unlikely line of exposition would call for nothing more than this incidental remark, were not our attention attracted somewhat violently to it by the dogmatic tone and extremity of contention of a recent commentator who has adopted this opinion. We refer to Dr. T. K. Abbott's comment on Eph. iv. 8, in his contribution to *The International Critical Commentary*. It runs to a considerable length, but as on this very account it opens out somewhat more fully than usual this rather unwonted view of the construction, we shall venture to quote it *in extenso*. Dr. Abbott says:

"Διὸ λέγει. 'Wherefore it saith' = 'it is said.' If any substantive is to be supplied, it is ἡ γραφή; but the verb may well be taken impersonally, just as in colloquial English one may often hear: 'it says' or the like. Many expositors supply, however, ὁ θεός. Meyer even says, 'Who says it is obvious of itself, namely, God, whose word the Scripture is.'* Similarly Alford† and Ellicott.‡ If it

---

while φασίν is read by Lachmann and placed in their margins by Tregelles and Westcott and Hort. The former is read by ℵDEFGKLP, etc., by the cursives, and by the Vulgate and Coptic versions, while the latter is the reading of B, Old Latin and Syriac. Heinrici pertinently remarks (in his own *Commentary*, 1887): "The reading φασίν, which Lachmann accepts, is just as strongly witnessed by B, the Itala and Peschitto as φησίν (ℵ DFG Vulg. Copt.) and it almost looks as if φησίν were a correction occasioned by the succeeding ὁ τοιοῦτος (against Meyer)." Alford, who continues to read φησίν equally pertinently on that hypothesis, remarks: "φησίν, taken by Winer (Ed. 6, § 58, 96), DeWette and Meyer as impersonal, 'heisst es,' '*men say*;' but why should not the τις of ver. 7, and ὁ τοιοῦτος of ver. 11, be the subject?" See further below, p. 497.

*[See above, p. 475.]

†["*He* (viz., God, whose word the Scriptures are. See reff. [*i. e.*, Rom. xii. 3, 2 Cor. x. 13, iv. 13, 16 = Paul only], and notes: not merely 'it,' es heisst, as De Wette, *al.*: nor ἡ γραφή: had it been the subject it must have been expressed, as in Rom. iv. 3, ix. 17, *al.*) *says* (viz., Ps. lxviii. 18, see below: not in some Christian hymn, as Flatt and Storr—which would not agree with λέγει, nor with the treatment of the citation, which is plainly regarded as carrying the weight of Scripture.")]

‡["'*He saith*,' *sc.* ὁ θεός, not ἡ γραφή. This latter nominative is several times inserted by St. Paul (Rom. iv. 3, x. 17, x. 11, Gal. iv. 30, 1 Tim. v. 18), but is not therefore to be regularly supplied whenever there is an ellipsis (Bos, *Ellips.*, p. 54) without reference to the nature of the passages. The surest and in fact only guide is the context; when that affords no certain hint, we fall back upon the natural subject, ὁ θεός, whose words the Scriptures are; see notes on Gal. iii. 16." See further above, p. 475. At Gal. iii. 16, Ellicott had said: "'*He saith not*;' not ἡ γραφή (Bos, *Ellips.*, p. 54), as in Rom. xv. 10—where the subst. is supplied from γέγραπται, ver. 9—or τὸ πνεῦμα (Rück., Winer, *Gr.* § 39, 1), which appears arbitrary, but the natural subject ὁ θεός, as in Eph. iv. 8, v. 14, and

were St. Paul's habit to introduce quotations from the Old Testament, by whomsoever spoken in the original text, with the formula *ὁ θεὸς λέγει*, then this supplement here might be defended. But it is not. In quoting he sometimes says *λέγει*, frequently *ἡ γραφὴ λέγει*, at other times *Δαβὶδ λέγει*, *Ἡσαΐας λέγει*. There is not a single instance in which *ὁ θεός* is either expressed or implied as the subject, except where in the original context God is the speaker, as in Rom. ix. 15. Even when that is the case he does not hesitate to use a different subject, as in Rom. x. 19, 20: 'Moses saith,' 'Isaiah is very bold, and saith;' Rom. ix. 17, 'The Scripture saith to Pharaoh.'

"This being the case, we are certainly not justified in forcing upon the apostle here and in chap. v. 14 a form of expression consistent only with the extreme view of verbal inspiration. When Meyer (followed by Alford and Ellicott) says that *ἡ γραφή* must not be supplied unless it is given by the context, the reply is obvious, namely, that, as above stated, *ἡ γραφὴ λέγει* does, in fact, often occur, and therefore the apostle might have used it here, whereas *ὁ θεὸς λέγει* does not occur (except in cases unlike this), and we have reason to believe could not be used by St. Paul here. It is some additional confirmation of this that both here and in chap. v. 14 (if that is a biblical quotation) he does not hesitate to make important alterations. This is the view taken by Braune, Macpherson, Moule; the latter, however, adding that for St. Paul 'the word of the Scripture and the word of its Author are convertible terms.'

"It is objected that although *φησί* is used impersonally, *λέγει* is not. The present passage and chap. v. 14* are enough to prove the usage for St. Paul, and there are other passages in his Epistles where this sense is at least applicable; cf. Rom. xv. 10, where *λέγει* is parallel to *γέγραπται* in ver. 9; Gal. iii. 16, where it corresponds to *ἐρρήθησαν*. But, in fact, the impersonal use of *φησί* in Greek authors is quite different, namely = *φασί*, 'they say' (so 1 Cor. x. 10). Classical authors had no opportunity of using *λέγει* as it is used here, as they did not possess any collection of writings which could be referred to as *ἡ γραφή*, or by any like word. They could say: *ὁ νόμος λέγει* and *τὸ λεγόμενον*."

It is not, it will be observed, the fact that Dr. Abbott decides against the *subauditum*, *ὁ θεός*, in these passages, which calls for remark. As he himself points out, many others have been before him in this. It is the extremity of his opinion that first of all attracts attention. For it is to be noticed that, though he sometimes speaks as if he understood an implied *ἡ γραφή*, or some like term, as the subject of *λέγει*, that is not his real contention. What he proposes is to take the verb wholly indefinitely—as equivalent to "it is said," as if the source of the quotation were unimpor-

(*φησί*) 1 Cor. vi. 16, Heb. viii. 5. So apparently Syr., which here inserts *illi* after *λέγει*." The passage referred to in Bos (London ed. of 1825, pp. 57, 58) is as follows: "In the New Testament, where the Scripture of the Old Testament is cited, *φησί* or *λέγει* often occurs with *ἡ γραφή* understood—a word which actually stands in other passages: 1 Cor. vi. 16, Eph. v. 14, Gal. iii. 16, Heb. v. 14. The same thing occurs in the Greek fathers. Marcus Eremita, in his earlier aphorisms, No. 106, *οὐδείς, φησί, στρατευόμενος ἐμπλέκεται ταῖς τοῦ βίου πραγματείαις*, 'No one, says (the Scripture, 2 Tim. ii. 4) going a-soldiering is entangled in the affairs of this life.' So, No. 134: *φησί γάρ, ὁ ὑψῶν ἑαυτὸν ταπεινωθήσεται*, 'For, says (Scripture), he that exalteth himself shall be brought low.' There may be also understood *pro re nata εὐαγγελιστής, προφήτης, ἀπόστολος*: but the other is more general and suits excellently. SCHOETTG."]

* [The text actually has "ver. 14." but we venture to correct the obvious slip.]

tant and its authority insignificant. This interpretation of his proposal is placed beyond doubt by his remarks on chap. v. 14. There we read:

"Διὸ λέγει. 'Wherefore it is said.' It is generally held that this formula introduces a quotation from canonical Scripture. . . . . The difficulties disappear when we recognize that λέγει need not be taken to mean ὁ Θεὸς λέγει—an assertion which has been shown in iv. 8 to be untenable. It means, 'it says,' or 'it is said,' and the quotation may probably be from some liturgical formula or hymn—a supposition with which its rhythmical character agrees very well. . . . . Theodoret mentions this opinion. . . . . Stier adopts a similar view, but endeavors to save the supposed limitation of the use of λέγει by saying that in the Church the Spirit speaks. As there are in the Church prophets and prophetic speakers and poets, so there are liturgical expressions and hymns which are holy words. Comparing *vv.* 18, 19, Col. iii. 16, it may be said that the apostle is here giving us an example of this self-admonition by new spiritual songs."

So extreme an opinion, as we have already hinted, naturally finds, however, little support in the commentators, even in those quoted to buttress it,—of course, in its fundamental point. Braune says: "We must naturally supply ἡ γραφή, the Scripture, with λέγει, 'saith,' (James iv. 6, Rom. xv. 10, Gal. iii. 16, 1 Cor. vi. 16: φησίν), and not ὁ θεός (Meyer, Schenkel*), or ὁ λέγων (Bleck: the writer):" to which Dr. M. T. Riddle, his translator, however, adds: "The fact that Paul frequently supplies ἡ γραφή (Rom. iv. 3, ix. 17, x. 11, Gal. iv. 30, 1 Tim. v. 18) is against Braune's view; for in some of these passages there is a reason for its insertion (see *Romans*, p. 314), and as the Scriptures are God's Word (Meyer), the natural aim and obvious subject is ὁ θεός. So Alford, Ellicott and most." Moule's comment runs: "*Wherefore* he *saith*] Or *it*, *i. e.*, the Scripture, *saith*. St. Paul's usage in quotation leaves the subject of the verb undetermined here and in similar cases (see, *e. g.*, chap. v. 14†). For him the word of the Scripture and the word of its author are convertible terms." Macpherson alone, of those appealed to by Dr. Abbott, supports, in a somewhat carelessly written note, the indefinite interpretation put forward by Dr. Abbott,—being misled apparently by remarks of Lightfoot's and Westcott's. His comment runs:

"A very simple quotation formula is here employed, the single word λέγει. It is also similarly used (‡chap. v. 14; 2 Cor. vi. 2; Gal. iii. 16; Rom. xv. 10).‡ This word is frequently employed in the fuller formula, *The Scripture saith*, λέγει ἡ

* ["With λέγει God is to be supplied as subject. From this way of adducing it, it is already clear that the cited words cannot be taken from a Christian hymn in use in the Church at Ephesus (Storr, Flatt), but must belong to the sacred, God-given Scripture." Accordingly at v. 14 he says: "In accordance with the formula (λέγει, chap. iv. 8) usual in adducing Scripture, it can scarcely be doubtful that the apostle intended to cite an Old Testament passage."]

† The comment there is simply: "he *saith*] or possibly *it* (the Scripture) *saith*."

‡ [The parenthetical marks should doubtless be removed.]

γραφή (Rom. iv. 3, x. 11, xi. 2; Jas. ii. 23, etc.); or the name of the writer of the particular scripture, Esaias, David, the Holy Spirit, the law (Rom. xv. 12; Acts xiii. 35; Heb. iii. 7; 1 Cor. xiii. 34, etc.).* Of λέγει, φησί, εἴρηκε, and similar words thus used, Winer (*Grammar*, p. 656, 1882) says that probably in no instance are they impersonal in the minds of the New Testament writers, but that the subject, ὁ θεός, is somewhere in the context, and is to be supplied.† On the contrary, Lightfoot, in his note on Gal. iii. 16, remarks that λέγει, like the Attic φησί, seems to be used impersonally, the nominative being lost sight of. In our passage we have no nominative in the context which we can supply, and it seems better to render the phrase impersonally, *It is said*. The same word is used very frequently in the Epistle to the Hebrews, but always with God or Christ understood from the immediate context. Westcott very correctly remarks (p. 457) that the use of the formula in Eph. iv. 8, v. 14, seems to be of a different kind."‡

Outside of these commentators quoted by himself, however, Prof. Abbott's extreme view has (as has, indeed, already incidently appeared) the powerful support of Lightfoot and Heinrici. The former expresses his opinion not only in his note on Gal. iii. 16, to which Macpherson refers, but more fully and argumentatively in his note on 1 Cor. vi. 16 printed in his posthumous *Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul*. In the former of these places he says:

"οὐ λέγει seems to be used impersonally, like the Attic φησί in quoting legal documents, the nominative being lost sight of. If so, we need not inquire whether ὁ θεός or ἡ γραφή is to be understood. Comp. λέγει, Rom. xv. 10, Eph. iv. 8, v. 14; and φησίν, 1 Cor. v. 16, 2 Cor. x. 10 (v. l.)."

In the latter, speaking more at large "as to the authority assigned to the passage" quoted by St. Paul, he says:

"What are we to understand by φησίν? Is ὁ θεός to be supplied or ἡ γραφή? To this question it is safest to reply that we cannot decide. The fact is that, like λέγει, φησίν when introducing a quotation seems to be used impersonally. This usage is common in Biblical Greek (λέγει, Rom. xv. 10, Gal. iii. 16, Eph iv. 8, v. 14; φησίν, Heb. viii. 5, 2 Cor. x. 10, v. l.), more common in classical Greek. Alford, after Meyer, objects to rendering φησίν impersonally here, as contrary to St. Paul's usage. But the only other occurrence of the phrase in St. Paul is 2 Cor. x. 10, where he is not introducing Scripture, but the objections of human critics and of more than one critic. If then φησίν be read there at all, it must be impersonal. The apostle's analogous use of λέγει points to the same conclusion. In Eph. v. 14 it introduces a quotation which is certainly not in Scripture, and apparently belonged to an early Christian hymn. We gather therefore that St. Paul's usage

* [This sentence seems formally incomplete; probably "is frequently employed" is to be supplied from the preceding clause.]

† [This scarcely gives a complete view of Winer's remark: he says that "the subject (ὁ θεός) is *usually* contained in the context, either directly *or indirectly*," and proceeds to adduce cases of ellipsis.]

‡ [What Westcott apparently says is not that "the two passages in the Epistle to the Ephesians (iv. 8, v. 14, διὸ λέγει) appear to be different in kind" from the usage of Hebrews, but from the cases in the rest of the New Testament, where God is the subject of λέγει indeed, but "the reference is to words directly spoken by God." He possibly means, "different in kind" from the usage both of Hebrews and of the rest of the New Testament: but he does not seem to say this directly. See post, p. 489.]

does not suggest any restriction here to ὁ θεός or ἡ γραφή. But we cannot doubt from the context that the quotation is meant to be authoritative."

In his own commentary on 1 Corinthians (1880), Heinrici writes as follows:

"To φησί, just as to λέγει (2 Cor. vi. 2, Gal. iii. 16) nothing at all is to be supplied, but like *inquit* it stands, sometimes as the introduction to an objection (2 Cor. x. 10, where Holsten refers to Bentley on Horat., *Serm.*, i, 4, 78), sometimes as a general formula of citation. It is especially often used in the latter sense by Philo, in the quotation of Scripture passages, and by Arrian-Epictetus, who supplies many most interesting parallels to the Pauline forms of speech. Schweighäuser, in his Index, under φησί, remarks of it: nec enim semper in proferenda objectione locum habet illa formula, verum etiam in citando exemplo ad id quod agitur pertinente. J. G. Müller (*Philo the Jew's Book on the Creation*, Berlin, 1841, p. 44) says that φησί, after the example of Plato (?), became gradually among the Hellenistic Jews the standing formula of citation."

In his edition of Meyer's Commentary on 1 Corinthians (eighth edition, 1896), this note reappears in this form:

"φησίν). Who? According to the usual view, God, whose words the sayings of the Scripture are, even when they, like Gen. ii. 24 through Adam, are spoken through another. Winer 7 § 58, 9, 486: Buttmann, 117. But the impersonal sense '*es heisst*,' '*inquit*,' lies nearer the Pauline usage; he coincides in this with Arrian-Epictetus and Philo, with whom φησί sometimes introduces an objection, sometimes is the customary formula of citation. Cf. 2 Cor. x. 10, vi. 2, 1 Cor. xv. 27, Eph. iv. 8; Winer, as above; Müller, in Philo, *De op. mund.*, 44; Heinrici, i, 181. In accordance with this, are the other supplements of subject—ἡ γραφή or τὸ πνεῦμα (Rückert)—to be estimated."

Even in the extremity of his contention, therefore, Dr. Abbott, it seems, is not without support—on the philological side, at least—in previous commentators of the highest rank.

He himself does not seem, however, quite clear in his own mind: and his confusion of both considerations and commentators which make for the fundamentally diverse positions that there is to be supplied with λέγει some such subject as ἡ γραφή, and that there is nothing at all to be supplied but the word is to be taken with entire indefiniteness, is indicatory of the main thing that calls for remark in Dr. Abbott's note. For, why should this confusion take place? It is quite evident that in interpreting the phrase the fundamental distinction lies between the view which supposes that a subject to λέγει is so implied as to be suggested either by the context or by the mind of the reader from the nature of the case, and that which takes λέγει as a case of true impersonal usage, of entirely indefinite subject. It is a minor difference among the advocates of the first of these views, which separates them into two parties—those which would supply as subject ὁ θεός, say, and those which would supply ἡ γραφή, say. That one of these subdivisions of the first class of views should be violently torn from its true comradeship and confused with the second view,

betrays a preoccupation on Dr. Abbott's part, when dealing with this passage, with considerations not of purely exegetical origin. He is for the moment less concerned with ascertaining the meaning of the apostle than with refuting a special interpretation of his words: and therefore everything which stands opposed in any measure to the obnoxious interpretation appears to him to be "on his side." Put somewhat brusquely, this is as much as to say that Dr. Abbott is in this note dominated by dogmatic prejudice.

There do not lack other indications of this fact. The most obtrusive of them is naturally the language—scarcely to be called perfectly calm—with which the second paragraph of the note opens: "We are certainly not justified in forcing upon the apostle here and in chap. v. 14 a form of expression consistent only with the extreme view of verbal inspiration." Certainly not. But because we chance not to like "the extreme view of verbal inspiration," are we justified in forbidding the apostle to use a form of expression consistent only with it, and forcing upon him some other form of expression which we may consider consistent with a view of inspiration which we like better? Would it not be better to permit the apostle to choose his own form of expression and confine ourselves, as expositors, to ascertaining from his form of expression what view of inspiration lay in his mind, rather than seek to force his hand into consistency with our preconceived ideas? The whole structure of the note evinces, however, that it was not written in this purely expository spirit. Thus only can be explained a certain exaggerated dogmatism in its language, as if doubt were to be silenced by decision of manner if not by decisiveness of evidence. So also probably is to be explained a certain narrowness in the appeal to usage—that rock on which much factitious exegesis splits. Only, it is intimated, in case "it were St. Paul's habit to introduce quotations from the Old Testament, by whomsoever spoken in the original text, with the formula ὁ θεὸς λέγει," "could this supplement here be defended." One asks in astonishment whether St. Paul really could make known his estimate of Scripture as the very voice of God which might naturally be quoted with the formula "God says," and so render the occurrence of that formula occasionally in his writings no matter of surprise, only by a habitual use of this exact formula in quoting Scripture. And one notes without surprise that the narrowness of Dr. Abbott's rule for the adduction of usage supplies no bar to his practice when he is arguing "on the other side." At the opening of the very next paragraph we read, "It is objected that although φησί is used impersonally, λέγει is not:" and to this the answer is returned, "The present passage and chap. v. 14 are

sufficient to prove the usage for St. Paul;" with the supplement, "And there are other passages in his epistles where this sense is at least applicable;" and further, "But in fact, the impersonal use of φησί in Greek authors is quite different." One fancies Dr. Abbott must have had a grim controversial smile upon his features when he wrote that last clause, which pleads that the meaning assigned to λέγει here is absolutely unexampled in Greek literature, not only for λέγει but even for φησί, as a reason for accepting it for λέγει here! But apart from this remarkable instance of skill in marshaling adverse facts—a skill not unexampled elsewhere in the course of this note, as any one who will take the trouble to examine the proof-texts adduced in it will quickly learn—might not the advocates of the supplement, ὁ θεός, say equally that "the present passage and chap. v. 14 are sufficient to prove the usage for St. Paul, and there are other passages in his epistles where this sense is at least applicable." And might they not support this statement with better proof-texts than those adduced by Dr. Abbott, or indeed with the same with better right; as well as with a more applicable supplementary remark than the one with which he really subverts his whole reasoning—such as this, for example, that elsewhere, in the New Testament, as for instance in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the usage contended for undoubtedly occurs, and a satisfactory basis is laid for it in the whole attitude of the entire body of New Testament writers, inclusive of Paul, toward the Old Testament? Certainly, reasoning so one-sided and dominated by preconceived opinions so blinding is thoroughly inconclusive. The note is, indeed, an eminent example of that form of argumentation which, to invert a phrase of Omar Khayyam's, "goes out at the same door at which it came in:" and even though its contention should prove sound, can itself add nothing to the grounds on which we embrace it. At best it may serve as the starting-point of a fresh investigation into the proper interpretation of the phrase with which it deals.

For such a fresh investigation we should need to give our attention particularly to two questions. The first would inquire into the light thrown by Paul's method of introducing quotations from the Old Testament, upon his estimate of the text of the Old Testament,—with a view to determining whether it need cause surprise to find him adducing it with such a formula as "God says." Subsidiary to this it might be inquired whether it is accurate to say that "there is not a single instance in which ὁ θεός is either expressed or implied as the subject, except where in the original context God is the speaker," and further, if Paul's usage elsewhere can be accurately so described, whether that fact will warrant us

in denying such an instance to exist in Eph. iv. 8. The second question would inquire into the general usage of the subjectless λέγει or φησί in and out of the New Testament, with a view to discovering what light may be thrown by it upon the interpretation of the passages in question. It might be incidentally asked in this connection whether it is a complete account to give of φησί in profane Greek to say, that the "impersonal use of φησί in Greek authors is quite different from that of the New Testament, inasmuch as with them φησί = φασί, 'they say.'"

It is really somewhat discouraging at this late date to find it treated as still an open question, how Paul esteemed the written words of the Old Testament. And it brings us, as the French say, something akin to stupefaction, when Dr. Abbott goes further and uses language concerning Paul's attitude toward the Old Testament text which implies that Paul habitually distinguished, in point of authority, between those passages "where in the original context God is the speaker" and the rest of the volume, so that "we have reason to believe" that the formula ὁ θεὸς λέγει "could not be used by Paul" in introducing Scriptural language not recorded as spoken by God in the original context. He even suggests, indeed, that Paul shows an underlying doubt as to the Divine source of even the words attributed to God in the Old Testament text—"not hesitating to use a different subject" when quoting them, "as in Rom. x. 19, 20, 'Moses saith,' 'Isaiah is very bold and saith;' Rom. ix. 17, 'The Scripture saith to Pharaoh'"—and deals with the text of other portions with a freedom which exhibits his little respect for them—"not hesitating to make important alterations" in them. It would seem to require a dogmatic prejudice of the very first order to blind one to a fact so obvious as that with Paul "Scripture," as such, is conceived everywhere as the authoritative declaration of the truth and will of God—of which fact, indeed, no better evidence can be needed than the very texts quoted by Dr. Abbott in a contrary sense.

For, when Paul, in Rom. ix. 15, supports his abhorrent rejection of the supposition that there may be unrighteousness with God, with the divine declaration taken from Ex. xxxiii. 19, introduced with the formula, "For he"—that is, as Dr. Abbott recognizes, God—"saith to Moses," and then immediately, in Rom. ix. 17, supports the teaching of this declaration with the further word of God taken from Ex. ix. 16, introduced with the formula, "For the Scripture saith unto Pharaoh"—the one thing which is thrown into a relief above all others is that, with Paul, "God saith" and "Scripture saith" are synonymous terms, so synonymous in his habitual

thought that he could not only range the two together in consecutive clauses, but use the second in a manner in which, taken literally, it is meaningless and can convey an appropriate sense only when translated back into its equivalent of "God saith." The present tense in both formulas, moreover, advises us that, despite the fact that in both instances they are words spoken by God which are cited, it is rather as part of that Scripture which to Paul's thinking is the ever-present and ever-speaking word of God that they are adduced. It is not as words which God once spoke (εἶπεν, LXX.) to Moses that the former passage is here adduced, but as living words still speaking to us—it is not as words Moses was once commanded to speak to Pharaoh that the second is here adduced, but as words recorded in the ever-living Scripture for our admonition upon whom the ends of the world have come. They are thus not assigned to Scripture in order to lower their authority: but rather as a mark of their abiding authority. And similarly when in that catena of quotations in Rom. x. 16–21, we read at ver. 19, "first Moses saith," and then at ver. 20, "and Isaiah is very bold and saith," both adducing words of God—the implication is not that Paul looks upon them as something less than the words of God and so cites them by the names of these human authors; but that it is all one to him to say, "God says," and "Moses says," or "Isaiah says:" and therefore in this catena of quotations—in which are included four, not two, quotations—all the citations are treated as alike authoritative, though some are in the original context words of God and others (ver. 16) words of the prophet—and though some are adduced by the name of the prophet and some without assignment to any definitely named human source. The same implication, again, underlies the fact that in the catena of quotations on Rom. xv. 9 *sq.*, the first is introduced by καθὼς γέγραπται, the next two by καὶ πάλιν λέγει and καὶ πάλιν, and the last by καὶ πάλιν Ἡσαΐας λέγει—the first being from Ps. lxxviii. 50, the second from Deut. xxxii. 43, the third from Ps. cxvii. 1, and only the last from Isaiah—Isa. xi. 10: clearly it is all one to the mind of Paul how Scripture is adduced—it is the fact that it is *Scripture* that is important. So also it is no more true that in Gal. iii. 16, the λέγει "corresponds to ἐρρήθησαν" of the immediately preceding context, than that it stands in line with the "and the Scripture foreseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by faith, preached the Gospel beforehand unto Abraham" of iii. 8—a thing which the Scripture as such certainly did not do; and with the "for it is written" of iii. 10 and iii. 13, and the unheralded quotations of the Scriptures as unquestioned authority of iii. 11 and iii. 12; and with the general appeal in iii. 22 to the

teaching of Scripture as a whole as the sole testimony needed: the effect of the whole being to evince in the clearest manner that to Paul the whole text of Scripture, inclusive of Gen. xii. 3, Deut. xxvii. 26, Hab. ii. 4, Lev. xviii. 5, and Gen. xxii. 18, was as such the living word of the living God profitable to all ages alike for divine instruction.

We need not go, indeed, beyond the first sentence of this Epistle to the Romans from which all but one of Dr. Abbott's citations are drawn, to learn Paul's conception of Scripture as the crystallized voice of God. There he declares himself to have been "separated unto the gospel of God which he promised afore by his prophets in the Holy Scriptures" (Rom. i. 2). Dr. George T. Purves, in a singularly well-considered and impressive paper on "St. Paul and Inspiration," printed in THE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW for January, 1893,* justly draws out the meaning of this compressed statement thus:

"Not only did Moses and the prophets speak from God, but the sacred Scriptures themselves were in some way composed under divine control. He not only affirms with Peter that 'moved by the Holy Ghost, *men* spake from God,' but that '*the Scriptures themselves* are inspired by God.' Paul plainly recognizes the human authorship of the books, and quotes Moses and David and Isaiah as speaking therein. But not only *through them*, but *in these books* of theirs did God also speak. Many readers notice the first part of Paul's statement, but not the second. God spake 'through the prophets *in the Holy Scriptures*.'"

This emphasis on the *written* Scriptures as themselves the product of a divine activity, making them as such the divine voice to us, is characteristic of the whole treatment of Scripture by Paul (1 Cor. x. 11, Rom. xv. 4, iv. 23, 1 Cor. ix. 10, iv. 6): and it is thoroughly accordant with the point of view so exhibited, that he explicitly declares, not of the writers of Scripture, but of the sacred writings themselves, that they are theopneustic—breathed out, or breathed into by God (2 Tim. iii. 16). For he applies this epithet not to "every prophet," but to "every *Scripture*"—that is, says Dr. Purves, to "the whole collection to which he had just referred as the 'sacred writings,' and all their parts:" these *writings* are theopneustic. "By their inspiration, he evidently meant," continues Dr. Purves justly, "that, as writings, they were so composed under God's particular direction that both in substance and in form they were the special utterances of His mind and will."

It could be nothing more than an accident if Paul, under the dominance of such a conception of Scripture, has nowhere happened to adduce from it a passage, taken out of a context in which God is not expressly made in the Old Testament narrative itself

* Vol. iv, p. 13.

the speaker, with the formula, ὁ θεὸς λέγει, expressed or implied. If no instance of such an adduction occurs, it is worth while to note that fact, to be sure, as one of the curious accidents of literary usage; but as there is no reason to doubt that such a formula would be entirely natural on the lips of Paul, so there is no propriety in calling it impossible in Paul, or even in erecting a distinction between him and other New Testament writers on the ground that they do and he does not quote Scripture by such a formula. As a matter of fact, the distinction suggested, between passages in Scripture "where in the original context God is the speaker" and passages where He is not the speaker—as if the one could be cited with a "God says," and the other not,—is foreign to Paul's conception and usage, as has abundantly appeared already: so that whatever passages of the former kind occur—"as in Rom. ix. 15," says Dr. Abbott—are really passages in which Scripture is quoted with a "God says." It cannot be held to be certain, moreover, that passages do not occur in which the "God says" introduces words not ascribed to God in the original context—so long, at least, as it is not obvious that "God" is not the *subauditum* in passages like Acts xiii. 35, Rom. xv. 10, Gal. iii. 16. It is no doubt, however, also worth observing that it is equally matter of fact, that it is rather to the Epistle to the Hebrews than to those that bear the name of Raul that we shall need to go to find a body of explicit instances of the usage in question. This is, as we have said, an interesting fact of literary usage, but it is not to be pressed into an indication of a divergent point of view toward "Scripture" between the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Epistles that bear Paul's name.

Even Dr. Westcott seems, to be sure, so to press it. In the interesting dissertation *On the Use of the Old Testament in the Epistle*, which he has appended to his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews*, he sets out in some detail the facts that bear on the mode in which that epistle cites the Old Testament:

"The quotations," he tells us, "are without exception made anonymously. There is no mention anywhere of the name of the writer (iv. 7 is no exception to the rule). God is presented as the speaker through the person of the prophet, except in the one place where He is directly addressed (ii. 6). . . . . In two places the words are attributed to Christ. . . . . In two other places the Holy Spirit specially is named as the speaker. . . . . But it is worthy of notice that in each of these two cases the words are also quoted as the words of God (iv. 7, viii. 8). This assignment of the written word to God, as the Inspirer of the message, is most remarkable when the words spoken by the prophet in his own person are treated as divine words—as words spoken by Moses: i. 6 (Deut. xxxii. 43); iv. 4, comp. *vv.* 5, 7, 8 (Gen. ii. 2); x. 30 (Deut. xxxii. 36); and by Isaiah: ii. 13 (Isa. viii. 171.), comp. also xiii. 5 (Deut. xxxi. 6). Generally it must be observed that no difference is made between the word spoken and the word written. For us and

for all ages the record is the voice of God. The record is the voice of God, and as a necessary consequence the record is itself living. . . . . The constant use of the present tense in quotations emphasizes this truth: ii. 11, iii. 7, xii. 5. Comp. xii. 26."*

Every careful student will recognize this at once as a very clear and very true statement of the attitude of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews toward the Old Testament. But we cannot help thinking that Dr. Westcott overshoots the mark when he throws it into strong contrast with the attitude of the rest of the New Testament writers to the Old Testament. When he says, for example: "There is nothing really parallel to this general mode of quotation in the other books of the New Testament"—meaning apparently to suggest, as the subsequent context indicates, that the author of this Epistle exhibits an identification in his mind of the written text of the Scriptures with the voice of God which is foreign to the other writers of the New Testament—he would seem to have attached far too great significance to what is, after all, so far as it is real, nothing more than one of those surface differences of individual usage which are always observable among writers who share the same fundamental view-point, or even in different treatises from the same hand. Entirely at one in looking upon the Scriptures as nothing less than τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ (Rom. iii. 2, Heb. v. 12†)—in all their parts and phrases the utterance of God—the epistles that bear the name of Paul and this epistle yet chance to differ in the prevalent mode in which these "oracles" are adduced: the one in its formulas of citation emphasizing the sole fact that they are "oracles" it is quoting, the others, that these "oracles" lie before them in *written* form. Let the fact of this difference of course be noted: but let it not be overstrained and, as if it were the sole relevant fact in the field of view, made to bear the whole weight of a theory of the relations of the two in their attitude toward Scripture.

Impossible as such a procedure should be in any case, it becomes doubly so when we note the extremely narrow and insecure basis for the conclusion drawn, which is offered by the differences in usage adduced between Hebrews and the rest of the New Testament—which means for us primarily the epistles that bear the name of Paul. Says Dr. Westcott in immediate sequence to what we have quoted from him:

"There is nothing really parallel to this general mode of quotation in the other books of the New Testament. Where the word λέγει occurs elsewhere, it is for the most part combined either with the name of the prophet or with 'Scripture:'

Op. cit., pp. 474, 475.

† Westcott, *in loc.*, "it seems more natural to refer it to the collected writings of the Old Testament."

e. g., Rom. x. 16, Ἡσαΐας λέγει; x. 19, Μωυσῆς λέγει; xi. 9, Δαυεὶδ λέγει; iv. 3, ἡ γραφὴ λέγει; ix. 17, λέγει ἡ γραφή, etc. Where God is the subject, as is rarely the case, the reference is to words directly spoken by God: 2 Cor. vi. 2, λέγει γὰρ (ὁ θεός); Rom. ix. 15, τῷ Μωυσεῖ λέγει; ix. 25, ἐν τῷ Ὡσηὲ λέγει. Comp. Rom. xv. 9–11 (γέγραπται . . . . λέγει . . . . Ἡσαΐας λέγει). The two passages in the Epistle to the Ephesians (iv. 8, v. 14, διὸ λέγει) appear to be different in kind."

The last remark is apparently intended to exclude Eph. iv. 8 and v. 16 from consideration.* The immediately preceding one seems intended to suggest that the subject to be supplied to λέγει in Rom. xv. 10, which carries with it also Rom. xv. 11, is ἡ γραφή; if we rather supply with Sanday-Headlam θεός, this citation would afford an instance to the contrary. Other cases similar to this, *e. g.*, Acts xiii. 35† and (with the parallel φησι) 1 Cor. vi. 16,‡ are simply passed by in silence. If such cases were considered, perhaps the induction would be different.

It is possible, on the other hand, that the usage of the Epistle to the Hebrews also is conceived by Dr. Westcott a shade too narrowly. It scarcely seems sufficient to say of ii. 6, for example, that this passage is not an exception to the more general usage of the Epistle inasmuch as it is "the one place where God is directly addressed"—and is therefore not ascribed to Him, but to "some one somewhere." According to Dr. Westcott's own exposition,§ we have in i. 10 also words addressed *to* God and yet cited as spoken *by* God, and in a number of passages words spoken *of* God nevertheless cited as spoken *by* Him; and, in a word, the fundamental principle of the mode

* What is meant may possibly be that these two passages in Ephesians are analogous neither to the usage of Hebrews nor to that of the rest of the New Testament, but stand out by themselves. In that case Dr. Westcott probably means to take them as instances of the indefinite use of λέγει. Cf. above, p. 480.

† Cf. Meyer's note: "λέγει], the subject is necessarily that of εἴρηκεν, ver. 34, and so, neither David (Bengel, Heinrichs and others), nor the Scriptures (Herrmann), but *God*, although Ps. xvi. 10 contains David's words addressed to God. But David is considered as the interpreter of God, who has put the prayer into his mouth. Comp. on Matt. xix. 5."

‡ Cf. Meyer's note: "φησίν], who it is that says it, is self-evident, namely, *God*, the utterances of Scripture being His words, even when they may be spoken through another, as Gen. ii. 24 was through Adam. Comp. on Matt. xix. 5. Similarly Gal. iii. 16, Eph. iv. 8, Heb. viii. 5, 1 Cor. xv. 27. Ἡ γραφή, which is usually supplied here, would need to be suggested by the context, as in Rom. xv. 10. Rückert arbitrarily prefers τὸ πνεῦμα." "To take it *impersonally*, '*it is said*' as in 2 Cor. x. 10, according to the well-known usage in the classics, would be without warrant from any other instance of Paul's quotations from *Scripture*. Comp. Winer, *Gr.*, p. 486 [English translation, 650]; Buttmann, *Neut. Gr.*, p. 117 [English translation, 134]."

§ For he supposes the words quoted in i. 10 to be addressed not to Christ, but to God: "God through His Spirit so speaks in the Psalmist that words not directly addressed to Christ find their fulfillment in Him."

of quotation used by this Epistle is that the words of Scripture as such are the living words of God and are cited as such indifferently—whether in the original context spoken by Him or by another of Him, to Him, or apart from Him. In any event, therefore, the citation in the present passage by the formula "some one hath somewhere borne witness" is an exception to the general usage of the Epistle, and evidences that the author of it, though conceiving Scripture as such as a body of divine oracles, did not really lose sight of the fact that these oracles were delivered through men, and might therefore be cited on occasion as the deliverances of these men. In other words, here is a mode of citation of the order affirmed to be characteristic of the letters bearing the name of Paul. It is at least not beyond the limits of possibility that another such instance occurs in iv. 7: "saying in David." No doubt, "in David," may be taken here, as Dr. Westcott takes it, as meaning "in the person of David," *i. e.*, through his prophetic utterances: but it seems, on the whole, much more natural to take it as parallel to ἐν τῇ βίβλῳ Μωυσέως (Mark xii. 26), ἐν τῷ Ὡσηέ (Rom. ix. 25), and as meaning "in the book of David*—exhibiting the consciousness of the author that he is quoting not merely "God," but God in the *written Scripture*—written by the hand of men. This is the more worth insisting on that it is really not absolutely certain that the subject of the λέγων here is immediately "God" at all. There is no subject expressed either for it or the ὁρίζει on which it depends; and when we go back in the context for an express subject it eludes us, and we shall not find it until we arrive at the "even as the Holy Ghost saith" of iii. 7. From that point on, we have a series of quotations, introduced, quite in the manner of Philo, with formulæ which puzzle us as to their reference—whether to God, who is the general subject of the whole context, or to Scripture, conceived as the voice of God (*e. g.*, iii. 15. ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι—by whom? God? or "the Scripture" already quoted? iv. 4, εἴρηκεν—who? God? or Scripture? iv. 5, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ πάλιν). Something of the same kind meets us in the eighth chapter, where quite in the manner of Philo, we begin at ver. 5: "Even as Moses was oracularly warned when about to make the tabernacle, for 'see,' φησίν, etc.," and proceed at ver. 8. with a subjectless λέγει, to close with ver. 13 with an equally subjectless ἐν τῷ λέγειν. It certainly is not obvious that the subject to be supplied to these three verbs is "God" rather than "oracular Scripture."

One can but feel that with a due regard to these two classes of neg-

*So (according to Lünemann), Dindorf, Schulz, Böhme, Bleek, Ebrard, Alford, Woerner: add Lowrie, Riggenbach.

lected facts, a somewhat broader comparison of the usage of the Epistle to the Hebrews and that of those letters that bear the name of Paul would not leave an impression of such sharp and indubitable divergence in point of view as Dr. Westcott's statement is apt to suggest. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, the verb λέγω is used to introduce citations, (1) with *expressed* subject: ii. 6, "But someone somewhere hath borne witness, saying . . .;" iii. 7, "Even as the Holy Ghost saith . . . .;" vi. 14, "God . . . . sware by himself, saying . . . .:" (2) with subject to be *supplied from the preceding context:* i. 6, "And when he (God) again bringeth in the firstborn into the world, he saith . . . .;" i. 7, "And of the angels he (God) saith . . . .;" ii. 12, "He (Christ) is not ashamed to call them brethren, saying . . . .;" v. 6, "As he (God) saith also in another place. . . .:" (3) with subject to be *supplied from the general knowledge of the reader:* x. 5, "Wherefore when he (Christ) cometh into the world, he saith . . . .;" x. 8, "Saying (Christ) above . . . .;" xii. 26, "But now hath he (God) promised, saying . . . .:" (4) *without obvious subject:* iii. 15, "While it is said, To day, etc." (by whom? God? or the Scripture quoted, iii. 7 *sq.*?); iv. 7, "He [or it?] again defineth a certain time, saying in David . . . .;" viii. 8, "For finding fault with them, he [or it?] saith . . . ." (cf. viii. 13, "in that he [or it?] saith . . . "). On the other hand, in the epistles that bear the name of Paul we may distinguish some four cases of the adduction of Scripture by the formula λέγει. (1) Sometimes, quoting Scripture *as a divine whole*, the formula runs ἡ γραφὴ λέγει or λέγει ἡ γραφή: Rom. iv. 3, ix. 17 (λέγει ἡ γραφὴ τῷ Φαραώ), xi. 2 (ἡ γραφὴ ἐν Ἠλείᾳ), Gal. iv. 30, 1 Tim. v. 18. (2) Sometimes it is adduced *by the name of the author:* Δαυεὶδ λέγει, Rom. iv. 6, xi. 9; Ἡσαΐας λέγει, Rom. x. 16, 20, xv. 12. (3) Sometimes it is quoted *by its contents:* ὁ νόμος λέγει, Rom. iii. 19, vii. 7, 1 Cor. ix. 8, 10, xiv. 34; the righteousness that is of faith λέγει, Rom. x. 6 (cf. ver. 10); ὁ χρηματισμὸς λέγει, Rom. xi. 4. (4) Sometimes it is adduced by the verb λέγει *without expressed subject.* (A) In some of these cases *the subject is plainly indicated* in the preceding context: Rom. ix. 25 = "God," from ver. 22; x. 10 = "the righteousness of faith," (?) from ver. 6; x. 21 = "Isaiah," from ver. 20. (B) In others it is less clearly indicated and is *not altogether obvious:* [Acts xiii. 35 = "God," from εἴρηκεν?]; Rom. ix. 15 = "God," from ver. 14?; Rom. xv. 10 = "Scripture," from γέγραπται?; 2 Cor. vi. 2 = "God," from preceding context?; Gal. iii. 16 = "God," from the promises?; Eph. iv. 8 and v. 12. It should be added that parallel to the use of the subjectless φησί in Heb. viii. 5 we have the similar use of it in 1 Cor. vi. 16.

When we glance over these two lists of phenomena we shall certainly recognize a difference between them: but the difference is not suggestive of such an extreme distinction as Dr. Westcott appears to indicate. The fact is that for its proper estimation we must rise to a higher view-point and look upon the two lists in the light of a much larger fact. For we cannot safely study this difference of usage as an isolated phenomenon: and we shall get the key to its interpretation into our hands only when we correlate it with a more general view of the estimate of Scripture and mode of adducing Scripture prevalent at the time and in the circles which are represented by these epistles. Dr. Westcott already points the way to this wider outlook, when at the end of his discussion he adds these words:

"The method of citation on which we have dwelt is peculiar to the Epistle [to the Hebrews] among the writings of the New Testament; but it is interesting to notice that there is in the Epistle of Clement a partial correspondence with it. Clement generally quotes the LXX. anonymously. He attributes the prophetic words to God (15, 21, 46), to Christ (16, 22), to the Holy Word (13, 56), to the Holy Spirit (13, 16). But he also, though rarely, refers to the writers (26, Job; 52, David), and to Books (57, Proverbs, 'the all virtuous Wisdom'), and not unfrequently uses the familiar form γέγραπται (14, 39, etc.). The quotations in the Epistle of Barnabas are also commonly anonymous, but Barnabas mentions several names of the sacred writers, and gives passages from the Law, the Prophets and the Psalms with the formula, 'the Prophet saith' (vi. 8; 2; 4, 6)."

And, he should have added, Barnabas also repeatedly adduces what he held to be the Word of God with the formulas γέγραπται (iv. 3, 14, v. 2, xi. 1, xiv. 6, xv. 1, xvi. 6) and λέγει ἡ γραφή (iv. 7, 11, v. 4, vi. 12, xiii. 2, xv. 5): and indeed passes from the one mode of citation to the other without the least jar, as, for example, in chap. v: "For *it is written* concerning him, some things indeed with respect to Israel, and some with respect to us. For *it saith* this (Isa. liii. 5, 7). . . . . And the *Scripture saith* (Prov. i. 17). . . . And *still also this* (Jer. i. 25). . . . . For *God saith* (Zech. xiii. 6). . . . .' For the *prophesier saith* (Ps. xxii. 21, etc.). . . . . And again *it saith* (Isa. l. 6)." Though adverting thus to these facts, however, Dr. Westcott quite misses their significance. What they mean is shortly this: that the two modes of citing Scripture thought to distinguish Hebrews and the letters that bear the name of Paul, do not imply well-marked distinctive modes of conceiving Scripture; but coexist readily within the limits of one brief letter, like the letter of Clement or that of Barnabas. No wonder, when laid side by side, we found the usages of the two to present no sharply marked division line, but to crumble into one another along the edges. And when we look beyond Clement and Barnabas and take a general glance over the literature of the time, it is easily

seen that we are looking in the two cases only at two fragmments of one fact, and are seeing in each only one of the everywhere current methods of citing Scripture as the very Word of God. It seems inconceivable that one could rise from reading, say, twenty pages of Philo, for example, without being fully convinced of this.

Philo's fundamental conception of Scripture is that it is a book of oracles; each passage of it is a χρησμός or λόγιον, and the whole is therefore οἱ χρησμοί or τὰ λόγια: he currently quotes it, accordingly, as "the living voice" of God, and whole treatises of his may be read without meeting with a single citation introduced by γέγραπται or with the Scriptures once called ἡ γραφή. Nevertheless, when occasion serves, he adduces Scripture readily enough as ἡ γραφή, and cites it with γέγραπται, and calls it τὰ γράμματα. We have no more reason for assuming that such modes of citing Scripture would have been foreign to the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (whose mode of citing Scripture is markedly Philonic) than we have for assuming that the author of the tract *de Mutatione Nominum*, in which they do not occur, but where Scripture is almost exclusively οἱ χρησμοί, or the author of the tracts *de Somniis*, where again they do not occur, but where Scripture is almost exclusively ὁ ἱερὸς (or ὁ θεῖος) λόγος (i. 14, 22, 33, 35, 37, 39, 42, ii. 4, 9. 37, etc.: i. 33, ii. 37)—which designations are rare again in *de Mutatione Nominum* (ὁ θ. λ., 20; ὁ ἱ. λ., 38)—held a different conception of Scripture from the author of the tract *de Legatione ad Caium* (§ 29) or the tract *de Abrahamo* (§ 1), in which the Scriptures are spoken of as τὰ γράμματα or αἱ γραφαί. There is no reason, in a word, why, if the Epistle to the Hebrews had contained even a single other verse, it might not have presented the "exotic," ἡ γραφή or γέγραπται. Because Philo or the author of this Epistle was especially accustomed to look on Scripture as a body of *oracles* and to cite it accordingly, is no reason why he should forget that it is a body of *written* oracles and be incapable on occasion of citing it from that point of view. Similarly because Paul ordinarily cites Scripture as *written* is no reason why he should not be firmly convinced that what is written in it is *oracles*, or should not occasionally cite it from that point of view. In a word, the two modes of citing Scripture brought into contrast by Bishop Westcott are not two mutually exclusive ways of citing Scripture, but two mutually complementary methods. The use of the one by any writer does not argue that the other is foreign to him; if we have enough written material from his hand, we are sure rather to find in him traces of the other usage also. This is the meaning of the presence in the Epistle to the Hebrews of suggestive instances of an approach to the citation of Scripture as a document: and of the presence in the Epistles bearing the name of Paul of

instances of modes of citation which hint of his conception of Scripture as an oracular book. Where and when the sense of the oracular character of the source of the quotation is predominatingly in mind it tends to be quoted with the simple φησί or λέγει, with the implication that it is God that says it: this is most richly exhibited in Philo, and, within the limits of the New Testament, most prevailingly in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Where and when, on the other hand, the consciousness that it is from a written source that the authoritative words are drawn is predominant in the mind, it tends to be quoted with the simple γέγραπται or the more formal ἡ γραφὴ λέγει: this is the mode in which it is most commonly cited in the Epistles that bear the name of Paul. Both modes of citation rest on the common consciousness of the Divine authority of the matter cited, and have no tendency to exclude one another: they appear side by side in the same writer, and must be held to predominate variously in different writers only according to their prevailing habits of speaking of Scripture, and at different times in the same writer according as the circumstances under which he was writing threw the emphasis in his mind temporarily upon the Scriptures as written *oracles* or as *written* oracles.

From this point of view we may estimate Dr. Westcott's remark: "Nor can it be maintained that the difference of usage is to be explained by the difference of readers, as being [in Hebrews] Jews, for in the Gospels γέγραπται is the common formula (nine times in St. Matthew)." This remark, like his whole treatment of the subject, seems conceived in a spirit which is too hard and narrow, too drily statistical. No one, doubtless, would contend that the difference of readers directly produced the difference of usage, as if the Scriptures *must* be quoted to Jews as "oracles of God," and to Gentiles as "written documents." But it is far from obvious that the difference of readers may not, after all, have had very much to do with the prevalence of the one mode of citation in the Epistle to the Hebrews and of the other in the Epistles that bear the name of Paul. The Jews were certainly accustomed to the current citation of the Scriptures as the living voice of God in oracular deliverances—as the usage of Philo sufficiently indicates: and it may be that this was subtly felt the most impressive method of adducing the words of the Holy Book when addressing Jews. On the other hand, the heathen were accustomed to authoritative documents, cited currently, with an implication of their authority, by the formula γέγραπται:* and it may well be

*Cf. Deissmann, *Bibelstudien*, 109; *Neue Bibelstudien*, 77: and also for the implications, Kuyper, *Encyclopædia of Sacred Theology*, pp. 433–435 and 444–445.

that this subtly suggested itself as the most telling way of adducing Scripture as authoritative law to the Gentiles. We need not ride such a notion too hard: but it at least seems far from inconceivable that the self-same writer, addressing, on the one hand, a body of devout Jews, and, on the other, a body of law-loving Romans, might find himself using almost unconsciously modes of adducing Scripture suggestive, in the one case, of loving awe in its presence and, in the other, of its binding authority over the conscience. Be this as it may, however, it is quite clear that the fact that Paul ordinarily adduces Scripture with "the forms (καθὼς) γέγραπται (sixteen times in the Epistle to the Romans), ἡ γραφὴ λέγει, and the like, which never occur in the Epistle to the Hebrews," implies no far-reaching difference of conception on his part from that exhibited by that Epistle, as to the fundamental character of the Scriptures as an oracular book—which, on the contrary, is just what he calls them (Rom. iii. 2)—and certainly raises no presumption against his occasionally quoting them as an oracular book with the formula so characteristic of the Epistle to the Hebrews, ὁ θεὸς λέγει, or its equivalents. And the fact that "Paul not unfrequently quotes the words of God as 'Scripture' simply (*e. g.*, Rom. ix. 17)" so far from raising a presumption that he would not quote "Scripture" as "words of God," actually demonstrates the contrary, as it only in another way indicates the identification on his part of the written word with the voice of the speaking God.

If we approach the study of such texts as Eph. iv. 8, v. 14, therefore, from the point of view of the Pauline conception of Scripture, there is no reason why they should not be understood as adducing Scripture with a high "God says." To say that "we have reason to believe" that such a formula "could not be used by Paul," is as wide of the mark as could well be. To say that it is a formula more in accordance with the point of view of the Epistle to the Hebrews, is to confound mere occasional differences in usage with fundamental differences in conception. To Paul, too, the Scriptures are a book of oracles, and though he cites them ordinarily as *written* oracles there is no reason why he should not occasionally cite them merely as *oracles*. And in any case, whether we take the *subauditum* in such passages as "God," or "Scripture," or prefer to render simply by "it," from Paul's point of view the meaning is all one: in any case, Scripture is to him the authoritative dictum of God and what it says is adduced as the authoritative word that ends all strife.

In seeking to estimate the likelihoods as to the meaning of such

a locution as the διὸ λέγει of Eph. iv. 8, v. 14, we should not lose from sight, on the other hand, the fact that the Greek language was not partial to true "impersonals," that is, absolutely indefinite uses of its verbs. Says Jelf:

"Of impersonal verbs (in English, verbs with the indefinite *it*) the Greek language has but few."*

Says Kühner:

"Impersonal verbs, by which we understand a verb agreeing with the indefinite pronoun *it*, are not known to the Greek language: for expressions like δεῖ, χρή . . . . λέγεται, etc. . . . . the Greek always conceived as personal, in that the infinitive or subjoined sentence was considered the subject of these verbs."†

No doubt, the subject often suffers ellipsis—especially when it may be counted upon readily to suggest itself, either out of the predicate itself, or out of the context, or out of the knowledge of the reader: and no doubt this implied subject is sometimes the indefinite τις. But it remains true that as yet there has turned up no single instance in all Greek literature of λέγει in the purely indefinite sense of "some one says," equivalent to "it is said" in the meaning of general rumor, or of a common proverb, or a current saying; and though there have been pointed out instances of something like this in the case of the kindred word φησί, it still remains somewhat doubtful precisely how they are to be interpreted. The forms commonly used to express this idea are either the expressed τις, or the third person plural, as λέγουσι, φασί, ὀνομάζουσιν, or the third person singular passive, as λέγεται, or the second person singular optative or indicative of the historical tenses, as φαίης ἄν, = *dicas*, or the like.‡

We find it, indeed, occasionally asserted that φησί is used sometimes or frequently as a pure impersonal, in the sense of "it is said." The passage from Bernhardy, to be sure, to which reference has been made in support of this assertion, by more than one of the commentators adduced above, has its primary interest not in this point, but in the different one of the use of the singular φησί for the plural—like the Latin *inquit*, and the English "says" in that vulgar colloquial locution in which it is made to do duty not only in the form "he says," but also in such forms as "I says" and "you says," and even "they says" and "we says." What Bernhardy remarks is:§

"*The rhetorical employment of the singular* for the plural rests on the Greek peculiarity (K. 3, 5; 6, 13c.) of clearly conceiving and representing the multitude

* § 373, 1. obs., 1. † *Ausführ. Gram.*, ii, 30 (§ 352).

‡ Jelf, § 373, 7: Kühner, *l. c.* Jannaris (*A Historical Greek Grammar*, 1161 *sq.*), treats the omitted subject no otherwise than Kühner.

§ *Syntax*. 419.

by means of the individual. A ready instance of this is supplied by the formula φησί, like the Latin *inquit* an expression for all persons and numbers for designating an indefinite speaker (den beliebigen Redner)—'heisst es'; and by the more classic εἰπέ μοι in appeal to the multitude in Attic life (as *Pac.*, 385, εἰπέ μοι τί πάσχετ' ἄνδρες; coll. *Eccl.*, 741), Plat. (clearly in a turn like εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι), Demosth., *Phil.* i, p. 45; *Chers.*, p. 108; Timocr., p. 718."*

The usage of φησί here more particularly adverted to—for all numbers and persons—seems a not uncommon one. Instances may possibly be found in the *Discourses of Epictetus*, i, 29, 34 (Schenkl, p. 95). "Even athletes are dissatisfied with slight young men: 'He cannot lift me,' φησί," where φησί might perhaps be rendered by our vernacular, "says they," referring to "the athletes." Again, iv. 9, 15 (Schenkl, p. 383): "But learn from what the trainers of boys do. The boy has fallen: 'Rise' φησί, 'wrestle again, till you become strong!'" where we may possibly have another 'says they,' viz., the trainers. Possibly again ii. 16, 20 (Schenkl, p. 133), "But consider, if you refer everything to a small coin, not even he who loses his nose is in your opinion damaged. 'Yes,' φησί, 'for he is mutilated in his body,'" where possibly φησί is "says you," referring to the collocutor, addressed in the preceding context in the second person—though, no doubt, another explanation is here possible. Indeed, in no one of the instances cited is it impossible to conceive a singular subject derived from the contextual plural as specially in mind. If φησι were genuine in Wisdom xv. 12,† 2 Cor. x. 10,‡ these might well supply other instances—the "says they" in each case continuing the contextual or implicated plural. But in none of these instances, it is to be observed, would the subject be conceived as in the strict sense "indefinite." It is a perfectly definite subject that is present to the mind of the writer, given either in the immediate context or in the thorough understanding that exists between the writer and reader. There is in them nothing whatever of the vagueness that attaches to the French "on dit," or the German "man sagt," or the English "it is said." The Greeks had

* These references are added in a note: "Von φησί in späten manche nach Bentley, wie Dav. ad Cic. Tus. i, 39; Wytt. ad Plut., T. vi, p. 791. Von εἰπέ μοι, Heind. ad Euthyd., 29."

† Cf. Grimm's note, given above, p. 476.

‡ Meyer, *in loc.*, continues to read φησί. He says, "*It is said*, impersonal, as often with the Greeks. See Bernhardy, p. 419. The reading φασίν (Lachmann, following B. Vulg.), is a rash correction. Comp. Fritzsche, ad *Thesmoph.*, p. 189; Buttmann, *Neut. Gram.*, p. 119 [English translation, 136]." So in essence most commentators, including Flatt, Storr, Krause, DeWette, Kling, Waite. Rückert more warily comments: "φησίν is here properly recognized as a formula of adduction, without reference to the number of those speaking. See Winer (304)." Cf. above, p. 477.

other locutions for expressing this idea, and if it was ever expressed by the simple φησί, only the slightest traces of it remain in their extant literature.

In the seventh edition of the Greek Lexicon of Liddell & Scott,* nevertheless, this usage is expressly assigned to φησί. We read:

"φασί parenthetically, *they say, it is said*, Il. 5, 638, Od. 6, 42 and Att.; but in prose also φησί, like French *on dit*, Dem. 650, 13, Plut. 2, 112 C., etc. (so Lat. *inquit, ait*, Gronov, Liv. 34, 3, Bent. Hor. 1 Sat. 4, 79;—especially in urging an objection or counter-argument, v. Interpp. Pers. Sat. 1, 40);—so also ἔφη, c. acc. et inf., Xen. An. i, 66."

It is far from obvious, however, that the passages here adduced will justify precisely the usage which they are cited to illustrate. In the passage from Demosthenes—ἔστω, φησί, ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἡ αὐτὴ τιμωρία, etc.—it seems to be quite clear, as the previous sentence suggests and the editors recognize,† that the subject of the φησί is ἕκαστος τῶν γεγραφότων, and is far from a purely indefinite τις. The passage from Plutarch (*Consolatio ad Apollonium*, xxi) is more specious. It runs: ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἤλπιζον, φησὶ, ταῦτα πείσεσθαι, οὐδὲ προσεδόκων; and is translated in the Latin version, "At, inquiunt, præter spem mihi hic casus et expectationem evenit;" and in Holland's old English version, "But haply you will say, I never thought that this would have befallen unto me, neither did I so much as doubt any such thing." A glance at the context, however, is enough to show that there is no purely indefinite φησί here, though it may be that we have here another instance of its usage without regard to number and person. In any case, the subject is the quite definitely conceived interlocutor of the passage. That the ἔφη adduced at the end of the note as in some degree of the same sort is not an indefinite ἔφη, but has the Clearchus of the immediately preceding context as its subject, is too obvious for remark. Clearchus was present by the request of Cyrus at the trial of Orontes, and when he came out he reported to his friends the manner in which the trial was conducted: "He said (ἔφη) that Cyrus began to speak as follows." It is not by such instances as these that the occurrence of a purely indefinite φησί can be established.‡

The subjectless φησί, to be sure, does occur very thickly scattered over the face of Greek literature, introducing or emphasizing quotations, or adducing objections, or the like: but the "it" that is to be supplied to it is, ordinarily at least, a quite definite

* P. 1665a (Oxford, 1883). † Whiston, Reiske, Weber.

‡ We are indebted to Prof. S. S. Orris, of Princeton University, for suggestions in preparing this paragraph. He permits us to add that, in his opinion, "φησ is never equivalent to the general, indefinite *they say* or *it is said*."

one with its own definite reference perfectly clear. A characteristic instance, often referred to, is that in Demosth., *Leptin*, § 56 :* *καὶ γάρ τοι μόνῳ τῶν πάντων αὐτῷ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ στήλῃ γέγραπται. ἐπειδὴ Κόνων, φησίν, ἠλευθέρωσε τοὺς Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους.—Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα. . . . .*" Here F. A. Wolf comments: "Absolute ibi interjectum est *φησίν*, aut, si mavis, subaudi *ὁ γράψας*;" and Schaefer adds: "Subaudi *ἡ στήλη*." † It does not appear why we should not render simply "it says:" but this "it" is so far from an "'indefinite' it" that it has its clear reference to the inscription just mentioned. Perhaps even more instructive is a passage in the third Philippic‡ of Demosthenes, which runs as follows:

"That such is our present state, you yourselves are witnesses, and need not any testimony from me. That our state in former times was quite opposite to this, I shall now convince you, not by any arguments of mine, but by a decree of your ancestors (*γράμματα τῶν προγόνων*), which they inscribed upon a brazen column (*στήλην*) erected in the citadel. . . . . What, then, says the decree (*τί οὖν λέγει τὰ γράμματα*)? 'Let Arithmius,' it says (*φησίν*), 'of Zelia, the son of Pythonax, be accounted infamous and an enemy to the Athenians and their allies, both he and all his race.' . . . . The sentence imported somewhat more, for, in the laws importing capital cases, it is enacted (*γέγραπται*) that 'when the legal punishment of a man's crime cannot be inflicted he may be put to death,' and it was accounted meritorious to kill him. 'Let not the infamous man,' saith the law, 'be permitted to live' (*καὶ ἄτιμος, φησί, τεθνάτω*), intimating that he is free from guilt who executes this sentence (*τοῦτο δὴ λέγει, καθαρὸν τὸν τούτων τινὰ ἀποκτείναντα εἶναι*)."

In both cases it is doubtless enough to render *φησί*, "it says," its function being in each case to call pointed attention to the words quoted: but the "it" is by no means "indefinite" in the sense that its reference was not very definitely conceived. On the second instance of its occurrence Wolf comments: "*s. ὁ φονικὸς νόμος*," § while Schaefer says: ‖

"Pleonastice positum cum *γέγραπται* praecesserit. Verumtamen h. l. sensum paulo magis juvat quam ubi post *εἶπον, εἶπε*, continuo sequitur *ἔφην, ἔφη*. Ad *φησί* subaudi *ὁ νομοθέτης*."

These instances will supply us with typical examples of the "absolute" *φησί*; and, in this sense, "subjectless *φησί*" is of very common occurrence indeed in Greek literature.

But really "subjectless *φησί*," *i.e.*, *φησί* without any implied subject in context or common knowledge, which therefore we must take quite indefinitely, is very rare indeed, if not non-existent. Perhaps one of the most likely instances of such a usage is offered us by a passage in Plutarch's *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, 34.¶ Holland's old version of it runs thus: **

* Reiske, p. 477; Dindorf, ii, 23.
† Reiske and Schaefer, vi, 162.
‡ iii, §§ 41, 42 (p. 122); *Oratores Attici*, v, 214.
§ Reiske-Schaefer, v, 579.
‖ *Op. cit.*, p. 581.
¶ P. 119 F (Wyttenbach, I, ii, 470).
** P. 530 (20–30).

"And verily in regard of him who is now in a blessed estate, it has not been naturall for him to remaine in this life longer than the terme prefixed and limited unto him; but after he had honestly performed the course of his time, it was needfull and requisit for him to take the way for to returne unto his destinie that called for him to come unto her."

From this we may at least learn that *φησίν* here presented some difficulty, as Holland passes it by unrendered. The common Latin version restores it, reading the last clause thus: "Sed ita postulabit natura ut hoc expleto *fatale* quod aiunt *iter* conficeret, revocante eum jam ad se natura;" the Greek running thus: "*ἀλλ' εὐτάκτως τοῦτων ἐκπλήσαντα πρὸς τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἐπανάγειν πορείαν, καλούσης αὐτῆς, φησίν, ὁδὴ πρὸς ἑαυτήν.*" The theory of the Latin version obviously is that *φησίν* here is to be taken indefinitely, that is as an index hand pointing to a current designation of death as an entering upon the "fated journey"—*ἡ εἱμαρμένη πορεία*. This is explained to us by Wyttenbach's note:*

"*φησίν*] non debebat offendere viros doctos. Est *ut ait poeta ille unde hoc scriptum est.* Videt hoc et Reiskius. Correxi versionem. De Tragici dicto in Animadversibus dicetur."

Accordingly, in the Animadversions,† he addresses himself first to showing that the expression here signalized was a current poetical saying—appealing to Plato,‡ Julian, Philo; and then adds:

"Cæterum *φησίν* ita elliptice usitatum est: v. c. Plutarcho, p. 135 B., § 817 D., Dion. Chrys., p. 493 D., 532 A., 562 B. Notavit et Uptonus ad Epict. in Indice. In annotationibus ad Lambertum Bosium de Ellipsibus unus Schoettgenius, idque ex uno Paulo Apostolo hunc ususum annotavit, p. 74. Et. Latine ita dicitur *inquit*, quod monuerunt J. F. Gronovius et A. Drakenborch. ad Livium xxxiv. 3, J. A. Ernestus in Clav. Cic. voce *Inquit.*"

It does not seem, however, that Wyttenbach would have us read the *φησί* here quite indefinitely, as adducing for example a current saying: judging from his own paraphrase this might appear to him as a certain exaggeration of its implication. Its office would seem rather to be to call attention to the words, to which it is adjoined, as quoted, and thus, in the good understanding implied to exist between the writer and his readers, to point definitely to

* I, ii, 470. † VI. ii, 791.

‡ Phaedo, 401 B. (115): "in these arrayed, [the soul] is ready to go on her journey to the world below, when her time comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other men, will depart at some time or other. Me already, as the tragic poet would say, the voice of fate calls (*ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἄν ἀνὴρ τραγικὸς, ἡ εἱμαρμένη*)." The other passages adduced witness only to the currency of the phrase *ἡ εἱμαρμένη πορεία*. But the language of both Plutarch and Plato would seem to imply that the "calling" is certainly a part of the quotation.

§ *Præcepta Sanit. Tuend.*, 135 B., *οὐ κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν, ἔφη, γνώμην*. Wytt.: "*ἔφη* notat alterius dictum ut alibi *φησί*, de quo diximus, p. 119 F."

its source: so that it might be a proper note to it to say, "subaudi ὁ τραγικός, vel ὁ ποιητής"—and this might be done with a considerable emphasis on the ὁ; nay, the actual name of the poet, well known to both writer and reader, though now lost to us, might equally well be the subauditum, and such, indeed, may be the implication of the subauditum suggested by Wyttenbach: *ut ait poeta ille unde hoc scriptum est.* Surely, an instance like this is far from a clear case of the absolutely indefinite or even generally undefining use of φησί.

Among the references with which Wyttenbach supports his note, the most promising sends us to Epictetus, whose *Discourses* abound in the most varied use of φησί, and offer us at the same time one of our most valuable sources of knowledge of the Greek in common use near the times of the apostles.* We meet with many instances here which it has been customary to explain as cases of φησί in a wholly indefinite reference. But the matter is somewhat complicated by the facts that we are not reading here Epictetus' *Discourses* pure and simple, but Arrian's report of them; and that Arrian may exercise his undoubted right to slip in a φησί of his own whenever he specially wishes to keep his readers' attention fixed upon the fact that they are his master's words he is setting down, or perhaps even merely out of the abiding sense, on his own part, that he is reporting Epictetus and not writing out of his own mind. When such a φησί occurs at the beginning of a section it gives no trouble: every reader recognizes it at once as Arrian's. But when it occurs unexpectedly in the midst of a vivacious discussion, the reader who is not carrying with him the sense of Arrian's personality, standing behind the Epictetus he is attending to, is very apt to be stumbled by it, and to resort to some explanation of it on the theory that it is Epictetus' own and is to find its interpretation in the context. An attempt has been made by Schenkl in the index to his edition of Epictetus† to distinguish between the instances in which φησί occurs "inter Epicteti verba ab Arriano servata," and those in which it occurs "inter Arriani verba." It will be found that most of the instances where it has been thought markedly indefinite in its reference are classed by him in the second group and are thus made very definite indeed—the standing *subauditum* being "Epictetus." Opinions will, no doubt, differ as to the proper classification of a number of these: and in any case many instances remain which cannot naturally be so explained—occurring as they

*Cf. Heinrici as above, p. 481; and Blass, *Gram. of New Testament Greek*, English translation, p. 2.

†*Epicteti Dissertationes*, etc. (Lipsiæ, 1894). Index, pp. 701, 702.

do in the midst of vividly conceived dramatic passages. In this very vividness of dramatic action, however, is doubtless to be found the explanation of these instances. So far are the verbs here from being impersonal, that the speakers in these little dialogues stood out before Epictetus' mind's eye as actual persons; and it is therefore that he so freely refers to them with his vivid φησί.

The following are some of the most striking examples of his usage of the word. "But now we admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, namely progress or improvement. Such a person, φησίν, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making great progress" (i, 4, 9).* Here Schenkl suggests that the φησίν is Arrian's, and this would seem to be a good suggestion, as it illuminates the passage in more ways than one. If not, the *subauditum* would seem to be the collocutor of the paragraph: a "some one," no doubt, but rather *the* "some one" most prominent in the mind of writer and reader in this discussion. "But a man may say, Whence shall I get bread to eat, when I have nothing (καὶ πόθεν φάγω, φησί, μηδὲν ἔχων;)?" (i, 9, 8). Here again the φησί seems best explained as Arrian's (Schenkl): if not, the *subauditum* is again the collocutor prominent through the context, and only, in that sense, indefinite. "Who made these things and devised them? 'No one,' you say (φησίν). O amazing shamelessness and stupidity" (i, 16, 8). The reference is to the collocutor. "They are thieves and robbers you may say (κλέπται, φησίν, εἰσι . . . .)" (i, 18, 3). Either Arrian's (Schenkl), or with the collocutor as the *subauditum*. "How can you conquer the opinion of another man? By applying terror to it, he replies (φησίν), I will conquer it" (i, 29, 12). Subaudi the collocutor. "For why, a man says (φησί), do I not know the beautiful and the ugly?" (ii, 11, ?). Either Arrian's (Schenkl), or subaudi the collocutor. "How, he replies (φησίν), am I not good?" (ii, 13, 17). Either Arrian's (Schenkl), or subaudi the collocutor. So also similarly in ii, 22, 4; iii, 2, 5; iii, 5, 1, etc. Cf. also ii, 23, 16: iii, 3, 12; 9, 15; 20, 12; 29, 19. Similarly, in the Fragments we have this: "They are amusing fellows, said he (ἔφη = Epictetus), who are proud of the things which are not in our power. A man says, I (ἐγώ, φησί) am better than you, for I possess much land and you are wasting with hunger. Another says (ἄλλος λέγει). . . . ." (*Frag.*, xvii [Schw., 16]). Here the φησί is brought in as the initial member of a series and in contrast with ἄλλος λέγει: it would seem to be Epictetus' own, there-

* We purposely use Long's translation, which, in all these instances, proceeds on the theory that the φησί is Epictetus' own.

fore, and to mean "says one." as distinguished from another; and thus it appears to be the most likely instance of the "indefinite φησί" in the whole mass. But even it seems an essentially different locution from the really indefinite "it is said," "on dit," "man sagt."

A glance over the whole usage of φησί in Arrian-Epictetus leaves on the mind a keen sense of the lively way in which the word must have been interjected into Greek conversation, but does not greatly alter the impression of its essential implication which we derive from the general use of the word. Take a single instance of its current use in the *Discourses*, in its relation to kindred words:

"So also Diogenes somewhere says (ποθ λέγει) that there exists but one means of obtaining freedom—to die contentedly, and he writes (γράφει) to the king of the Persians, 'You cannot enslave the city of the Athenians, any more,' says he (φησίν), 'than fishes.' 'How? Can I not catch them?' 'If you catch them,' says he (φησίν), 'they will immediately leave you and be gone, just like fishes: for whatever one of them you catch dies, and if these men die when they are caught, what good will your preparations do you?'" (IV, i, 30).

The lively effect given by such unexpected interpositions of φησίν is lost in our decorous translation of the New Testament examples: but it exists in them too. Thus: "But she, being urged on by her mother, 'Give me,' says she, 'here upon a charger, the head of John the Baptist'" (Matt. xiv. 8); "But he, 'Master, speak,' says he" (Luke vii. 40); "But Peter to them, 'Repent,' says he, 'and be baptized each one of you'" (Acts ii. 38); "'Let those among you,' says he, 'that are able, go down with me'" (Acts xxv. 5); "'To-morrow,' says he, 'thou shalt hear him'" (Acts xxv. 22); "But Paul, 'I am not mad,' says he, 'most noble Festus'" (Acts xxvi. 28).* The main function of φησί then would appear to be to keep the consciousness of the speaker reported clearly before the mind of the reader. It is therefore often used to mark the transition from indirect to direct quotation†: and it lent itself readily, therefore, to mark the adduction both of objections and of literary citations.

* The matter of this interposition is investigated for Plato by Stallbaum, p. 472 D, 580 D.—where he seems to have collected all the instances of interposed φαμέν in Plato. Cf. also Bornemann and Sauppe on Xenophon's *Memorab*, iii, 5, 13, and the indices of Schenkl on Arrian-Epictetus and Thieme-Sturz on Xenophon (sub. voc. φάναι).

† On Acts xxv. 5, Blass has this note: "5 fit transitus ex or. obliqua in rectam, ut I. 4 al; hinc φησίν interpositum ut I. 4 B.," *i. e.*, in the *Western* text of I, 4, which reads: "'Which ye heard,' says he, 'from my mouth.'" The interposition of a "he says," or some similar phrase, to keep the consciousness of the hearer or reader bright on the fact that the words before him are *quoted* words is, of course, a general linguistic and not a specifically Greek usage. It is found in all languages. A Hebrew instance, for example, may be found in 1 Kgs. ii, 4.

But, one would imagine, it did not very readily lend itself to vague and indefinite references.

If we desire to find cases of "subjectless *λέγει*" in any way similar to those of *φησί*, we must apparently turn our back on profane Greek altogether.* We have fortunately in Philo, however, an author, the circumstances of whose writing made literary quotation as frequent with him as oral is in the lively pages of Epictetus' *Discourses*. And in Philo's treatises *λέγει* takes its place by the side of its more common kinsman *φησί*, and is used in much the same way, though naturally somewhat less frequently. In harmony with his fundamental view-point—which looked on the Scriptures as a body of oracular sayings—Philo adduces Scripture commonly with verbs of "saying"—*φησί*, *λέγεται*, *λέγει*, *εἶπεν* (*γέγραπται* falling into the background). Passages so adduced are often woven into the fabric of his discussion of the contents of Scripture; and where the words adduced are words of a speaker in the Biblical narrative, the subject of the *φησί* or *λέγει* which introduces them naturally is often this speaker—whether God or some other person. Equally often, however, the subject given immediately or indirectly in the context is something outside of the narrative that is dealt with: in this case it is sometimes Moses, or "the prophet," or "the lawgiver"—at other times, "the Holy Word," or "the sacred Word," or "the Oracle," or "the Oracles" (*ὁ θεῖος λόγος, ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος, ὁ χρησμός, τὸ λόγιον, οἱ χρησμοί, τὰ λόγια*)—at other times still it is "God," under various designations. Often, however, the verb—*φησί* or *λέγει*—stands not only without expressed subject, but equally without indicated subject. The rendering of these cases has given students of Philo some trouble, arising out of the apparent confusion, when the subject is expressed, of the reference of the verb,—now to a speaker in the text of Scripture and now to the author of the particular Scripture, to God as the author of all Scripture, or to Scripture itself conceived as a living Word. This apparent confusion is due solely to Philo's fundamental conception of Scripture as an oracular book, which leads him to deal with its text as itself the Word of God: he has himself fully explained the matter,† and we should be able to steer clear of serious difficulties with his explanation in our hands.

Nevertheless, a somewhat mechanical mode of dealing with his citations has produced, on more than one occasion, certain odd results. Prof. Ryle says:‡

*Schenkl catalogues in the *Discourses* of Epictetus two cases of interposited *λέγει*, quite in the style of *φησί*—iii, 19, 1 and Fragment, xxi, 10—but in both cases the subject is expressed.

† In *de vita Mosis*, iii, 23.

‡ *Philo and Holy Scripture*, p. xlv.

"The commonest forms of quotation employed by Philo are φησί, εἶπεν, λέγει, λέγεται, γέγραπται γὰρ. Whether the subject of φησί be Moses or Scripture personified cannot in many cases be determined."

In no case is the subject strictly indeterminate, however, and the failure to determine it aright may introduce confusion. Thus, for example, in *de Confus. Ling.*, § 26 (Mangey, i, 424), Philo mentions the Book of Judges, and cites it with the subjectless φησί. Prof. Ryle comments thus:*

"He does not mention any opinion as to authorship, and introduces his quotation with his usual formula φησίν. We are hardly justified in assuming that Philo intended Moses as the subject of φησίν, and regarded him as the author of Judges (so Dr. Pick, *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1884). Moses is doubtless often spoken of by Philo as if he were the personification of the Inspired Word; but we cannot safely extend this idea beyond the range of the Pentateuch. All that we can say is that φησίν, used in this quotation from Judges, refers either to the unknown writer of this book or to the personification of Holy Scripture."

Or else, we may add, to God, the real author, in Philo's conception, of every word of Scripture. Prof. Ryle, however, has not caught precisely Dr. Pick's meaning: Dr. Pick does not commit himself to the extravagant view that wherever subjectless φησί occurs in Philo the *subauditum* "Moses" is implied: he only says, in direct words, that here—in this special passage—"Moses is introduced as speaking." It would seem obvious that he had a text before him which read "Moses says," and not simply "says," at this place. This text was doubtless nothing other than Yonge's English translation, which reads Moses here, as often elsewhere with as little warrant: "'For,' says Moses, 'Gideon swore, etc.'"† The incident illustrates the evil of mechanically supplying a supplement to these subjectless verbs—which cannot indeed be understood except on the basis of Philo's primary principle, that it is all one to say "Moses says," "the Scripture says," or "God says." The simple fact here is that Philo quotes Judges, as he does the rest of Scripture, with the subjectless "says," and with the same implication, viz., that Judges is to him a part of the Word of God.

As has been already hinted, by all means the commonest verb used by Philo thus,—without expressed or obviously indicated subject,—to introduce a Scripture passage, is φησί. Perhaps, however, the one instance to which we have incidentally adverted will suffice to illustrate the usage—other instances of which may be seen on nearly every page of Philo's treatises. It is of more interest for us to note that λέγει seems also to be used in the same subjectless way—examples of which may be seen, for instance, in the following places, *Legg. Alleg.*, i, 15; ii, 4; iii, 8; *Quod*

* *Op. cit.*, p. xxv. † Vol. ii, p. 27.

Det Pot. Insid., 48; *de Posterit. Caini*, 9; 22; 52; *de Gigant.*, 11; 12; *de Confus. Ling.*, 32; *de Migrat. Abrah.*, 11; *Fragment. ex Joh. Monast.* (ii. 668). In *Legg. Allegor.*, i. 15, for instance, we have a string of quotations without obvious subject, introduced, the first by the subjectless φησίν, the next by the equally subjectless ἐπιφέρει πάλιν, and the third (from Exod. xx. 23) by λέγει δὲ καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις. In *Legg. Allegor.*, ii. 4, we have Gen. ii. 19 introduced by λέγει γαρ without any obvious subject. Yonge translates this too by "For Moses says:" but to obtain warrant for this we should have to go back two pages and a half (of Richter's text), quite to the beginning of the treatise, where we find an apostrophe to the "prophet." In *de Posterit. Caini*, 22, λέγει ἐπὶ μὲν Ἀβραὰμ οὕτως (Gen. xi. 29), though Yonge supplies "Moses" again, that would seem to be demonstrably absurd, as the passage proceeds to place "Moses," in parallelism with Abraham, in the *object*. Similarly the passages adduced from *de Gigant.*, 11 and 12 (Num. xiv. 44 and Deut. xxxiv. 6) are *about* Moses, and it would scarcely do to fill out the ellipsis of subject with his name. Examples need not, however, be multiplied.

It would seem quite clear that both the subjectless φησί frequently, and the subjectless λέγει less often, occur in Philo after a fashion quite similar to the instances adduced from the New Testament. And it would seem to be equally clear that the lack of a subject in their case is not indicative of indefiniteness, but rather of definiteness in their reference. Philo does not adduce passages of Scripture with the bare φησί or λέγει because he knows or cares very little whence they come or with what authority; but because he and his readers alike both know so well the source whence they are derived, and yield so unquestionably to its authority, that it is unnecessary to pause to indicate either. The use of the bare φησί or λέγει in citations from Scripture is in his case, obviously, the outgrowth and the culminating sign of his absolute confidence in Scripture as the living voice of God, fully recognized as such both by himself and his readers. In the same sense in which to the dying Sir Walter Scott there was but one "Book," to him and his readers there was but one authoritative divine Word, and all that was necessary in adducing it was to indicate the fact of adduction. The φησί or λέγει serves thus primarily the function of "quotation marks" in modern usage: but under such circumstances and with such implications that bare quotation marks carry with them the assurance that the words adduced are divine words.

It would seem to be very easy, in these circumstances, to give ourselves more uneasiness than is at all necessary as to the precise *subauditum* which we are to assume with these verbs. It may serve

very well to render them simply, "It says," with the implication that Philo is using the *codex* of Scripture as the living voice of God speaking to him and his readers. The case, in a word, would seem to be very similar to that of the common New Testament formula of quotation γέγραπται—meaning not that what is adduced is somewhere written, but that it is the authoritative law that is being adduced. Just so, "It says," in such a case would mean not that somebody or something says what is adduced, but that the Word of God says it. As the one usage is the natural outgrowth of the conception of the Scriptures as a written authoritative law, the other is the equally natural outgrowth of the conception of Scripture as the living voice of God. How very natural a development this usage is, may be illustrated by the fact that something very similar to it may be met with in colloquial English. In the same circles where we may hear God spoken of as simply "He," as if it were dangerous to name His name too freely, we may also occasionally hear the Bible quoted with a simple "It says," or even with an elision of the "it," as "'Tsays:" and yet the "it," though treated thus cavalierly, is in reality a very emphatic "It" indeed—the phrase being the product of awe in the presence of "the Book," and importing that there is but one "It" that could be thought of in the case. Somewhat similarly, in the case of Philo, the Scriptures are cited with the bare φησί, λέγει, because, in his mind and in the circles which he addressed, there stood out so far above all other voices this one Voice of God embodied in His Scriptures, that none other would be thought of in the case. The phrase is the outgrowth of reverence for the Word and of unquestioning submission to it: and the fundamental fact is that no special subject is expressed simply because none was needed and it would be all one whether we understood as subject, Moses, the prophet and lawgiver—the holy or sacred Word or the oracle—or finally, God Himself. In any case, and with any *subauditum*, the real subject conceived as speaking is GOD.*

If now, in the light of the facts we have thus brought to our recollection, we turn back to the New Testament passages in

* The reverent use of an indefinite may be illustrated from the mode of citation adopted in Heb. ii. 6—"one hath somewhere testified"—a mode of citation not uncommon in Philo [as, for example, *de Temul.* (ed. Mang., i, 365), εἶπε γάρ πού τις (*i. e.*, Abraham, Gen. xx. 12), and other examples in Bleek, II, i, 239]. Delitzsch correctly explains: "The citation is thus introduced with a special solemnity, the author naming neither the place whence he takes it nor the original speaker, but making use (as Philo frequently) of the vague term πού τις, so that the important testimony itself becomes only the more conspicuous, like a grand pictured figure in the plainest, narrowest frame."

which the Old Testament is cited with a simple φησί or λέγει, it may not be impossible for us to perceive their real character and meaning. There would seem to be absolutely no warrant in Greek usage for taking λέγει, and but very little, if any, for taking φησί really indefinitely: and even if there were, it would be inconceivable that the New Testament writers, from their high conception of "Scripture," should have adduced Scripture with a simple "it is said"—somewhere, by some one—without implication of reverence toward the quoted words or recognition of the authority inherent in them. It is rather in the usage of Philo that we find the true analogue of these examples. Like Philo, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews looks upon Scripture as an oracular book, and all that it says, God says to him: and accordingly, like Philo, he adduces its words with a simple "it says," with the full implication that this "it says" is a "God says" also. Whenever the same locution occurs elsewhere in the New Testament, it bears naturally the same implication. There is no reason why we should recognize the Philonic φησί in Heb. viii. 5, and deny it in 1 Cor. vi. 16: or why we should recognize the Philonic λέγει in Heb. viii. 8 and deny it in Acts xiii. 35, Rom. ix. 15, xv. 10, 2 Cor. vi. 2, Gal. iii. 16, or in Eph. iv. 8, v. 12. Only in case it were very clear that Paul did not share the high conception of Scripture as the living voice of God which underlies this usage in Philo and the Epistle to the Hebrews, could we hesitate to understand this phrase in him as we understand it in them. But we have seen that such is not the case: and his use in adducing Scripture of the subjectless φησί and λέγει quite in their manner is, rightly viewed, only another indication, among many, that his conception of Scripture was fundamentally the same with theirs, and it cannot be explained away on the assumption that it was fundamentally different.

It does not indeed follow that on every occasion when a Scripture passage is introduced by a φησί or a λέγει it is to be explained as an instance of this subjectless usage—even though a subject for it is given or plainly implied in the immediate context. That is not possible even in Philo, where the introductory formula often finds its appropriate subject expressed in the preceding context. But it does follow that we need not and ought not resort to unnatural expedients to find a subject for such a φησί or λέγει in the context, or that acquiescing, whenever that seems more natural, in its subjectlessness, we should seek to explain away its high implications.* Men may differ as to the num-

* The matter is approached in a sensible and helpful way by Viteau, in his *Étude sur le Grec du N. T.: sujet, complement et attribute* (1896), p. 61.

ber of clear instances of such a usage, that may be counted in the New Testament. But most will doubtless agree that some may be counted: and will doubtless place among them Eph. iv. 8 and v. 12. Some will contend, no doubt, that in the latter of these texts, the passage adduced is not derived from the Old Testament at all. That, however, is "another story," on which we cannot enter now, but on which we must be content to differ. We pause only to say that we reckon among the reasons why we should think the citation here is derived from the Old Testament, just its adduction by διὸ λέγει—which would seem to advise us that Paul intended to quote the oracular Word.

There may be room for difference of opinion again as to the precise *subauditum* which it will be most natural to assume with these subjectless verbs: whether ὁ θεός or ἡ γραφή. In our view it makes no real difference in their implication: for, in our view, the very essence of the case is, that, under the force of their conception of the Scriptures as an oracular book, it was all one to the New Testament writers whether they said "God says" or "Scripture says." This is made very clear, as their real standpoint, by their double identification of Scripture with God and God with Scripture, to which we adverted at the beginning of this paper, and by which Paul, for example, could say alike "the *Scripture* saith to Pharaoh" (Rom. ix. 17) and "*God* . . . . saith, Thou wilt not give thy Holy One to see corruption"

He is treating of the subject to be mentally supplied, *i. e.*, of the case where the reader may be fairly counted upon to supply the subject, and he remarks (*inter alia*): "76 (9). There is a kind of mental subject peculiar to the New Testament. When events of the Old Testament are spoken of, these events are supposed to be known to the reader or the hearer, who is invited to supply the subject of the verb mentally. . . . . 77 (10). There is still another kind of mental subject peculiar to the New Testament and kindred to the preceding. In the citations made by the New Testament the subject is often lacking, as well for the verb which announces the citation as for the verb in the citation itself. The reader is supposed to recognize the passage and is invited to supply the subject. (*a*) For the verbs which announce the citation there occur as subjects: ὁ θεός, Acts ii. 17; ὁ προφήτης, Acts vii. 48; Δαυεὶδ, Rom. iv. 6; Μωϋσῆς, Rom. x. 19; Ἡσαίας, Rom. xv. 12; ἡ γραφή, Gal. iv. 30. When the verb has no subject, the reader is to supply it mentally: Acts xiii. 34, 35, εἴρηκεν and λέγει, the subject is ὁ θεός, according to the LXX., Ez. lv. 3, and Ps. xv. 10; Rom. xv. 10, πάλιν λέγει (ὁ Μωϋσῆς), according to Deut. xxxii. 43; Eph. iv. 8, λέγει (ὁ θεός or Δαυεὶδ), according to Ps. lxxvii. 19; Eph. v. 14, διὸ λέγει, those who regard the passage as imitated or partially cited from the Old Testament give Ἡσαίας as the subject of λέγει, according to Isa. lx. 1, 2, but if we regard this passage as containing some κῶλα of an early hymn (in imitation of Isaiah) we must supply as the subject τις, 'it is said,' 'it is sung' (96a); Heb. viii. 5, φησίν (ὁ θεός), according to Ex. xxv. 40." We do not accord, of course, with the remark on Eph. v. 14; and we miss in Viteau's remarks the expected reference to the deeper fact in the case.

(Acts xiii. 34). We may well be content in the New Testament as in Philo to translate the phrase wherever it occurs, "It says" —with the implication that *this* "It says" is the same as "Scripture says," and that this "Scripture says" is the same as "God says." It is this implication that is really the fundamental fact in the case.

PRINCETON. BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

V.

MORALITY: INTUITIVE AND IMPERATIVE.

THEORY in morals is closely bound up with practice. Men are often better than their opinions, and yet the heart is apt to follow the head. Given a defective system intellectually, and the consequences will soon appear in conduct. President Patton, a little time since, was reported to have said that he hoped Princeton would always stand for a "comparative morality;" and no wonder that men began at once to ask what kind of morality this might be; of what new school in ethics this was the vernacular and what would be its fruits. Happily this anxiety was soon dispelled by the discovery that the report was in error; that what the distinguished Princeton divine spoke of was not "comparative" but "imperative" morality. But anxiety was properly awakened. Not the best name in the land should give currency to an utterance unless it has the ring of the true metal. Our safety lies in the fact that the average mind is disposed to stand by the old defenses; to keep company only with tried acquaintances, and to require of the swaggering stranger to give account of himself before it will extend him a welcome. The matter is one in which the average mind is bound to be interested. A sound ethics lies at the basis of all that makes life worth living, and eternal vigilance is the price of this as of every similar good.

Current scholarly discussions, in which the genetic method of treatment is made so prominent, are not calculated to reassure us. Their tendency is disintegrating and destructive. Time was when the categorical imperative of Kant was supposed to be the final word in the controversy, but in our day we see this set aside for a doctrine which robs the inward law of its authority and sets the soul adrift on the shifting currents of human opinion. The moral sentiment is a growth: it is evolved little by little out of the mental and emotive equipment of the brute creation. The point at which the idea of right, the sense of obligation, the principle of rectitude, slips in, cannot be accurately ascertained, but somewhere along the course of his history man discovers that he has it, and that is enough. Such is the view which hopes soon to become the prevailing one.

For this reason the reassertion of the Kantian position becomes important, and all efforts in this direction are to be welcomed. Conscience must not become a convenient label for mental operations which deal only with the expedient, the desirable. If there is no such thing as moral obligation, say so; let us know the fact with which we have to deal just as it is; but do not retain the word after you have sacrificed the thing. We have had enough of the wolf in sheep's clothing. Apparently ethical thinkers are waking up to this truth, though it can hardly be said that the reaction against existing tendencies which is sure to come in the end has already set in.

But there is danger, too, on the other side, that the reaction may go too far: that the definition of conscience as a mere abstract perception and law of right, which leaves the settlement of the question, What is right? to other processes and authorities, may result in mischief akin, if not equal to the utter denial of essential righteousness. It is discouraging to be told that while the inward monitor demands of us unmistakably that the right be done under all circumstances, it furnishes us no sure indication of what the right consists in. Who will tolerate a government which continually insists upon obedience to the laws, and yet never publishes them? A poor guideboard that would be which bore the legend, "Take the right path at your peril," but out of several put no mark upon any one to show that it should be chosen. So one feels in regard to a conscience which makes the right imperative, but tells nothing as to where the right is to be found. Consider the following which we cull from a recent article entitled "The Actual John Brown:"

"There is no question of his sincerity; but conscience is merely the motive power of moral action. It does not discriminate and determine what is right and what is wrong. That is the function of the judgment. In the judiciary of the soul the judgment issues its verdicts and conscience is the marshal who executes. If the judgment is clear and strong, but conscience supine, or bribed by passion, or overawed by fear, then the man will cry in the agony of his struggling nature: "The good that I would I do not. O wretched man that I am." If the conscience is vigorous and vehement for righteousness, but the judgment weak or partial, or uninstructed, then the man may go right or he may go wrong, only he will go all lengths: and if he takes the wrong way which seems to him right he is a fanatic, without scruple, fear or favor—the more dangerous in proportion to the storm and stress of his moral sense."

Here we have the whole thing in a nutshell; and it does not take long to draw the inferences. When the error is in the judgment alone, how shall its victim be held to a strict account? May not any man innocently fall into error of this sort? It may be said that we are morally bound to be careful in the formation of our judgments, but upon the theory in question, how can this be

known except by a previous judgment? Suppose it is held that experience must decide—the accumulated wisdom of the race—this raises the question at once, What gives this accumulated wisdom authority? We may have great respect for it, and, as matter of fact, be swayed and governed by it, but may it not after all be mistaken?

And now if, to free us from embarrassment, resort be had to Scripture, and everything is made to hinge upon divine commandments, difficulties of another class rear their heads. Can Scripture itself be authoritative except through conscience? And how, from this point of view, with those who have not the Scriptures? who are shut up to such conclusions as their education and experience may furnish—often a very faulty education and a very limited experience? Have these any moral guide, and are they in the strict sense morally responsible? If they live up to the light they have—in this sense conscientious idolaters, conscientious adherents of a moral code that permits dishonesties, impurities, falsehoods—is not that sufficient? If these things are judged to be right, shall we go "behind the returns" to obtain a different verdict? Why not absolve the man if only he can say, I verily thought that I ought to do many things contrary to Jesus of Nazareth?

It is an old error, of course. No matter what a man believes, if only he is sincere. But it stalks abroad to-day as unblushingly as if it had not been met and routed a hundred times. Can we then afford to put a foundation under it by our theory of conscience? to advocate such a view that errorists of this sort will have us at their mercy? We must follow facts, it is true; but does not a theory of this nature show that we have not reached the bottom facts? that our analysis of conscience is not exhaustive? Grant the original moral intuition, but leave the situation without relief when we reach the region of a darkened or perverted conscience, and evidently the problem has not been vigorously thought through. And it is to be feared that many even eminent names in ethics lie under this condemnation.

And the alarming part of it is, the practical misjudgments which grow out of this wrong theory. There, for instance, are the heathen; they are in moral darkness. And now will a righteous God demand of them conformity to the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount, or even to the standard that is lived up to in Christian lands, so much more enlightened than their own? There is the street gamin: the level of the curbstone ethics is apt to be a low one. And how shall this moral waif be judged? By the words and example of Jesus, or by his own rough-and-ready code, in which abusive language and doubled fists and blows are important

factors? Error on these points is proverbially obstinate. Useless to urge Scripture against it or to show how it destroys itself. The oracle has spoken. Bed-rock has been reached. The heathen must be given clean papers if they follow the light they have, even though living in idolatries and in shocking inhumanities: and the consequent indifference in the Church as to the world's evangelization, the undermining of the doctrine of justification by faith alone, and the apologizing for those in Christian lands whose surroundings are unfavorable and whose light is dim, must be accepted. All of which is intensified by the prevailing talk about "heredity" and "environment"—words with which the unscrupulous do not hesitate to juggle in discussing these questions. Practically, conscience is what parentage and surroundings make it. When the light is abundant, conscience says one thing; when the light is dim, it says another thing. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind. The main point is to act conscientiously; to think you are doing right. What the idea of right is filled up with, is a secondary matter. So men talk. High time one would think, for closer discriminations and for a more even holding of the balance between conflicting extremes of opinion. And to this we hope to contribute in what follows:

I. The general position of the intuitive moralist is unassailable. Conscience gives the distinction between right and wrong—ultimate, not to be resolved into anything simpler. And the idea of right carries with it the obligation to obedience. Inseparable also from this idea of right and this sense of obligation is the approval of right, the condemnation of wrong—the approval of self or others as having done right, the condemnation of them as having done wrong—and the conviction that the one should be rewarded and the other punished.

When one assumes this position he has found the true starting-point, to say no more. He has taken his bearings correctly, and in so far is fortified against subsequent error. The axioms of mathematics are not a more solid basis from which to proceed in reasoning than is the intuition of right and the corresponding conviction of duty. The axioms stand by the impossibility of their opposites, and so do "right" and "ought" as principles of conduct. This is what we understand by the "imperative morality" for which Dr. Patton is so deeply concerned; and a sad day will it be for Princeton or for any other educational institution in this or other lands, when it leaves this serene and unquenchable light to follow the *Will-o'-the-wisps* with which certain modern thinkers are seeking to entice from the true path. Morality, intuitive and therefore imperative, not only has all the great historic names in

its favor—Plato, Cudworth, Kant, Coleridge, among philosophers, to say nothing of the long array of representative Christian theologians; it not only has been triumphantly defended in recent times, first against the sensational school of Locke, and then against such nineteenth-century giants as Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer; it is in all ages the natural, spontaneous, unforced verdict of the human soul. Leave man to himself and this is the doctrine which he proclaims and rests in; first concretely, then as the result of reflection and investigation. The opposite view is evolved painfully and defended by great effort; and when all is said and done, thought settles back upon the right as ultimate, lodged as a first principle in the soul. Consciousness delivers this testimony, and it cannot be gainsaid. To this, as to other first principles, language, with its constant iteration of "right" and "ought," or their equivalents, adds its testimony; and the truth is woven into the entire fabric of human history. The actions of men do not conform in all cases, or generally, to the inward imperative, it is true; and when the soul has gone astray it may spin sophistries in its own defense; but the verdict of mankind does not admit them; wrong-doing is held to account in the end, and virtue is its own reward.

Our best recognized authorities confirm this. Says Dr. H. B. Smith (*Theol.*, 181):

"The existence of conscience thus testifying to a moral law implies an essential distinction between right and wrong; an immutable morality. It acts in view of right, which is a simple idea, no more to be resolved than the idea of duty. From this judgment we cannot get rid. We can no more help pronouncing this action to be right or wrong than we can help judging this or that proportion to be true or false. We not only say pleasant or painful, but we are also compelled to say right or wrong."

Again (*ibid.*, p. 183):

"This perception (and feeling) of right and wrong is immediately attended by a feeling of obligation to do the right and refuse the wrong. We are obligated morally to do only what is morally right. No force can morally bind us which is not resolvable into right. This feeling of obligation is definite and peculiar. It is expressed by the word 'ought.' It enforces a simple and imperative obligation. In calling it the 'categorical imperative,' Kant frees morals from the happiness scheme. Right and ought are inseparable. We need no intervening terms. . . . . This 'ought' is native to the soul: it comes up before we have any conception or idea of the highest good. Children feel its force against all that seems to be pleasant or desirable."

Similarly, Dr. McCosh (*Intuitions*, p. 256):

"I have been urging that moral good is not a creation of the mind when contemplating actions or affections, but that it has an actual existence. But let us understand what is the precise nature of the reality. In order to express the reality some are in the habit of saying that morality has an objective and not a mere subjective existence. But this language is not fitted to bring out the full

truth, and may leave an erroneous impression, as if moral excellence had an existence as a separate object, like a stone, or a mountain. It has an existence, but merely as a quality of free acts of intelligent beings."

These are admirable statements, in which the one author supports and confirms the other. They are disputed only by the utilitarian school, or by the school now coming to the front as a substitute for the utilitarian—as, in fact, furnishing a new basis for its contention—the evolutionary. The lowest foundation in ethics is the distinction between right and wrong, radical, necessary and eternal. Man does not impose this distinction upon objects, but perceives it in them. Virtue and vice are qualities inherent in certain actions; impossible to be argued away.

The weakness of utilitarianism as an ethical system is found just here. It is ethical in name only. It relaxes the hold of the moral principle upon us by its attempted analysis of it. Expediency can never yield oughtness. If we are determined to measure all things by their tendency to promote happiness, we sacrifice principle to policy. Men may now have their *mistakes* pointed out to them, you may deplore their folly, and teach them to do the same, but you cannot denounce their *guilt*. Even their folly depends upon the point of view—the relative value of actual present, compared with probable future and more enduring good. Dr. Mark Hopkins, whose controversy with Dr. McCosh twenty-five years ago created quite a stir in ethical circles, while "deriving the whole moral value of right from obligation," does not derive obligation itself from anything more primitive. He insists, with the school to which he belongs, that the sense of oughtness is called into action only in connection with what is felt as the highest good; but oughtness or rightness is primitive and immutable.

II. The moral intuition not only distinguishes between right and wrong, drawing after it the obligation to do the one and to avoid the other, when either comes to be recognized; it also shows us in what, essentially, right and wrong consist. This follows from the fact that right and wrong are perceived as qualities inhering in certain actions. Conscience may be perverted, or the judgment as related to moral questions may go astray in some particulars, but not as to the main facts. What conscience perceives and declares is not simply that the right is to be done, but that certain things are to be done as right. It begins with the concrete and ends in the abstract.

In other words, the idea of right has a correspondent in the actions of moral agents, and the moral intuition enables us to perceive what that correspondent is, viz., the love of God with all

our heart, and the love of our neighbor as ourself. The idea of right is not simply a form, to receive its content from other sources. To fill up this form, as we are not dependent on utility, so neither are we dependent on education or revelation. The foundation of morals is not given in positive commandments. In the law inscribed upon the heart certain obligatory things are manifest, as the apostle says: "These, having not the (written) law, are a law unto themselves: which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another."

Heathen moralists perceive the same thing, as is apparent from the oft-quoted passage in Cicero: "This law (of conscience) does not speak one language at Athens and another at Rome, but is the same to all nations and ages, deriving its authority from the common sovereign of the universe, and carrying home its sanctions to every heart."

Says Dr. Archibald Alexander (*Moral Science*, p. 31), answering the objection that among men of different countries and entirely different education there is no agreement in their judgments respecting the morality or the immorality of the same actions:

"It has never been pretended as being a matter of fact that between men of different countries there is a *total* difference in the opinions entertained respecting what is right and what is wrong. A few cases only of difference are alleged, in which this discrepancy is observed, but in regard to those actions which are reckoned good or evil there is a general agreement. No nation or tribe or class of mankind has ever held that it is a virtuous or proper thing to do injury to men. . . . . It has never been held that ingratitude—though everywhere common in practice—is a commendable thing; or that deceit and fraud are as praiseworthy as honesty and fair-dealing."

To the same effect is the testimony of Dr. McCosh (*Intuitions*, 252, 253):

"The mind is led by its very constitution to perceive that there is an indelible distinction between good and evil, just as there is an indelible distinction between truth and falsehood. It finds that every substance has potency; that the species implies the individual; but it also declares that to give every one his due is good, and must be good, and that it is wrong in children to neglect their parents, and in God's creatures to forget their Creator. . . . . When I am led to believe that there is a good God who made me and upholds me, the mind declares that it is and must be good to love and obey that being, and that there is an obligation lying on me to do so. This is expressed by such phrases as δέον, *duty*, *right*, *ought*, *obligation*, the convictions embodied in which cannot be accounted for on any utilitarian hypothesis. It is shown that a particular action readily within our power will tend to promote the happiness of an individual, or of society; the mind's apprehension of this is one thing, and the conviction that we ought to do it is an entirely different thing, and the two should never be confounded."

These statements seem to touch almost the heart of the subject,

but Prof. D. S. Gregory (*Christian Ethics*, p. 85) presents the thought even more systematically:

"The three great relations in which the agent is to fulfill his mission of duty are his relations to God, to himself and to his fellow-men. Certain fundamental and germinal moral judgments respecting these relations have been admitted in all ages, and have been brought out with great clearness under the Christian system of morality.

'In his relation to God, the enlightened moral consciousness reveals the judgment that the agent, as a religious being, is bound to render supreme devotion to God.

"In his relation to himself, the enlightened moral consciousness reveals the judgment that the agent, as an individual, responsible person, is bound to preserve his being, develop his powers to the utmost, and direct them to the accomplishment of the true mission of man.

"In his relation to his fellow-man the enlightened moral consciousness reveals the judgment that the agent, as a social being, is bound to love his fellow-man as himself. These judgments furnish the basis of all human duties, and are therefore the foundation of practical ethics."

Again (*ibid.*, 86):

"Man is so made that he intuitively perceives these principles and recognizes in them his rule of conduct. Why does a man judge that course of conduct to be right and obligatory which preserves, develops and perfects his being? Why that which advances the highest interests of his neighbor? Why that which honors God? He is so made that he cannot help judging thus It is his normal condition. . . . . It is obvious that these moral principles will be clear to the agent in proportion to his moral enlightenment. . . . . There are vestiges of these principles found in all men who are at all developed morally. The principles are recognized as existing and obligatory the world over—even when men make the most perverse applications of them in their practice. In proportion as the agent reaches a more complete moral development, these principles are always more clearly and fully recognized."

From these authorities Dr. Henry B. Smith may seem to differ slightly. His statement is (*Theol.*, pp. 187, 188):

"Men agree that what is right should be done; but when we come to specific points, differences commence. This is so evident that those who advocate the universal correctness of conscience say, that in these cases it is the intellect that is wrong and not the conscience; the data are wrong and not the conscience. But this does not help the matter. The decision is a wrong one, and it is the decision of conscience. If it is not, what is a decision of conscience, and what is the sphere of conscience? This attempt to evade the difficulty rests on the assumption that conscience is an ideal dictator of right and wrong, something apart from and above the man. Whereas we have maintained that it is neither a faculty pronouncing dictatorially on all actions, nor a faculty giving all men right principles of action, but that it is simply the mind judging and feeling in view of right and wrong: it includes all the operations of the mind in view of what has moral quality, except the desires, choices and determinations of the will. . . . . Conscience in its primitive function assures us that right is ultimate and is essentially different from wrong. This is its most distinct, unmistakable and well-nigh universal utterance, but it does not tell us what the right is, in all its particulars and relations. Conscience, in short, is not in itself alone automatic, a self-law above all law. This is the ethical, against the theological position; it is the rationalistic against the supernaturalistic. Here is the turning-point in many discussions: in

discussions, *e. g.*, as to the Scripture going against conscience. The general abstract statement as to the binding nature of the distinction between right and wrong, is mixed up with the question as to what is right and wrong in particular cases. . . . . We do not believe that conscience says directly in regard to any external relation that it is necessarily right or wrong. The assertion must come back to the internal state. Yet we remark: Conscience when enlightened and educated is right, and as is said above, it is generally right in respect to general principles, though not as generally as to details and modes of carrying out principles."

This is not as clear as it might be, we must confess. The distinctions between principles and actions, between internal state and external relations, between general rules and particular cases is raised, but it is not carried through uniformly. We may admit error as to the specific application of principles if only the principles themselves are conceded, nor need they always be discerned with absolute clearness, but to say that "conscience is not a faculty giving to all men right principles of action," and again, that as to "general principles" it is only "generally right," is weak and unguarded. What is the class of principles in regard to which it may be in error, and how may they be distinguished? And are there any concerning which it is always right? We maintain that there are, viz., those mentioned above, love to God and to our neighbor; and they are given in the same process by which the distinction between right and wrong is perceived.

The views of Dr. Smith must be judged on their merits. We may say incidentally, however, that we think it will be hard to convict him of all that his somewhat incautious language seems to imply. He is known to be an Edwardean in morals, and so can hardly maintain that our primitive and ultimate idea of right is altogether abstract, but must hold that it has some content. With him, the correspondent to this idea in conduct is love to Being; and although the analysis of the term "right" may not yield this idea of love, the one never arises in consciousness without the appearance of the other as its correlate.

So much, then, for these authorities, to which others might be added. Our design in quoting from them so freely has been to show a wide consensus in the opinion that the law of right, as implanted in the conscience, does not leave the soul in helpless uncertainty as to the substance of duty. No man is utterly refused an answer to the question, "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?"

Of course it may be allowed, and must be, that the judgment errs frequently when it applies itself to the solution of moral questions, as well as when it applies itself to the solution of those of a different character. Its employment in the moral sphere does not confer upon it infallibility. It is important also to mark off the

domain in which these errors are possible. But it is no relief to say that they are errors of the cognitive faculty only, and not of the conscience; that conscience can never go wrong; and that in regard to the thousands of matters concerning which man may be morally at fault, conscience has never uttered any dictum whatever, nor was ever designed to: it has confined itself rigorously to saying that the right, when ascertained by legitimate processes, must always be done, and the wrong, under similar circumstances, must always be avoided.

It is a convenient theory in monarchical countries that the king can do no wrong, and when fatal policies are adopted, that all the blame is to be imputed to the ministry. This is frequently said when men know to the contrary, and when the royal hand can be plainly seen directing ill-advised measures. The king reigns, he does not govern: he simply gives authority to acts of which others are the originators and promoters. But although this agrees very nearly with that view of the functions of the moral faculty which we now have under consideration, it cannot give it currency. If conscience is only a figurehead, like the Merovingian kings of France, the *rois fainéants* kept shut up in a convent for the most part and only brought out on State occasions to set their seal to what others were doing, then the sooner this faculty is dispensed with the better. The judgment, capable of deciding what is right, is the real master; is conscience, in fact, and, like the mayors of the palace in the period of French history referred to, will soon reign *de jure* as well as *de facto*. On the other hand, if conscience mixes in the government, really has its say as to what is to be done, then it must share the responsibility. The polite fiction as to its immaculateness must be dismissed, even as the Scriptures do dismiss it, not hesitating to speak of a conscience "evil," "defiled," "seared with a hot iron."

And to come back to the disputed thought, what do we gain by it? As matter of fact, man falls into frequent errors in regard to duty, and upon any theory finds conscience lending them its support. Define conscience then according to the most rigorous scheme possible, as concerned only with the perception of right, and the obligation to follow it when once ascertained, and although theoretically you have saved it, by this process, you have not done so practically: that is, you have not saved the man. He is in as great a dilemma as ever—misled on matters of the gravest import; and whether you ascribe the harm to the moral faculty, or to the cognitive faculty, equally he is a victim. You "change the place but keep the pain." And the natural consequence is that the sense of blameworthiness is

deadened, if not entirely removed; for is mere intellectual error so deadly a sin? The whole tendency of this view is to relieve the soul of felt responsibility, and to lead it to take its moral mistakes lightly. And at the root of the whole affair lies a treason to the intellectual as well as to the moral nature. For how can the judgment decide what is right without bringing over into the process that very intuition of right which, by supposition, must be so rigidly excluded from it? Start from the standpoint of conscience, and lay the blame of erroneous conceptions of duty over upon the cognitive faculties alone, and you find a cognitive element, the intuition of right, in the most central and essential exercise of the moral nature. You cannot confine the definition of conscience within the bounds of a single mental operation. Start from the standpoint of the judgment, and assume that the mistakes made are altogether there, and the judgment borrows something from conscience in the process of reaching its conclusions. This, doubtless, is what leads Dr. Henry B. Smith to say:

"The wrong decision is there, and it is a decision of conscience; if not, what is a decision of conscience and what is the sphere of conscience?"

There are difficulties, of course, in the choice of the other alternative, *i. e.*, the grouping under conscience of all that enters into the moral regulation of conduct (conscience is the mind thinking and feeling about right and wrong); but they are less embarrassing. We face the facts now, at any rate: and the source of the confusion is seen to be in the will, which, by daring to act contrary to the moral imperative, has put the whole ethical machinery out of joint, and has arrayed the soul in antagonism to itself.

Nor do we fare better in our appeal to revelation to extricate us from our trouble. This seems to be the factor in whose behalf the theory of an unerring conscience is so stoutly defended, and so persistently urged upon our attention. The design is to magnify the word of God. Man's state, we are told, would be a desperate one, if left only to the conclusions of his unaided judgment. Imposing as is that accumulation of moral maxims gathered painfully by experience and with frequent retracing of steps, which has come to be the common possession of the race; great as is the respect commanded by it as we see it strengthening itself with each generation, nevertheless simply as the product of human effort at collecting and sifting, a lurking uncertainty attends it always; and our confidence is totally impaired when we find it differing as the surroundings and education of peoples differ, and what in one locality is held on to with utmost tenacity rejected with abhorrence in another. The conclusion then is natural, that the certain knowledge of duty must be furnished by

positive commandment, and that thus alone is there put into our hands the clue by which the labyrinth can be threaded. This appears in the Scriptures themselves in the fact that before man's apostasy he depended on revelation to make duty plain: much more, then, must this be the case after his sad fall, and the consequent darkening of his understanding. All the trouble in the matter arises from man's pride in his capacities, and his unwillingness to repair for counsel to that Word which was given for a lamp unto his feet and a light unto his path.

Thus far the objector. But without in the least disparaging the Scriptures for their proper use, and especially for repairing the evil that sin has occasioned, we maintain that to depend on them for our entire knowledge of duty is suicidal. It proves nothing that man was placed under positive commandment in Eden, and previous to the apostasy. That may have been the case without overlooking the moral constraint which he was already under by creation. It constituted a specific obligation, but did not interfere with the more general one to which conscience already responded. Indeed it is impossible to see how the positive command could get any grip upon the spirit except through the general principle that God is to be loved and served: and if we admit this, then conscience does not stop with the simple dictum of conformity to righteousness, but in one most important particular clothes the idea with flesh and blood. Unless conscience first furnishes it, how can there be that recognition of the moral claims of God which constitutes His positive command a rule of duty? Something must be seen as obligatory to begin with, else, whether with revelation or without it, no step in advance can be taken, and man will be left, as a moral being, not "following his marching orders," but simply "marking time." That God is to be loved with all the heart is the precept that conscience begins with, and side by side with this, that love is the fulfilling of the law to our neighbor. On this basis build as many specific precepts as the Scriptures will furnish: but do not destroy the foundations, for "if the foundations be destroyed, what shall the righteous do?"

Then go back to the positive commands in Eden. Were these the sum-total of the law under which man was placed at first, or were they only representative of its character? If the former, the outfit was a meagre one, even for the opening experiences of life: if the latter, where are the additional commands, of which these are only type and symbol? Certainly we have no long list of them, even when we have searched the record through and through. It is customary to maintain that the stock of moral judgments, referred to above, with which we find the race com-

monly endowed, are the remains of a primitive revelation, and that this is what gives them their validity; but this is conjecture, not proof. Nor does the inspired statement that "because they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind," point more unerringly to a mass of primitive revelations than to light in the conscience, subsequently obscured by sin. Certain it is at the present day that the heathen cannot trace their moral judgments back to a primitive revelation; and therefore upon this theory they must be left in total ignorance as to what duty consists in. Conscience, being only an executive and not a legislative faculty, cannot correct any existing error, but only goads the soul to the practice of it. And for ourselves, with the Bible in our hands, if the moral judgments are so untrustworthy, how can the Bible help us since we are actually dependent on the judgment, to interpret it for use?

What remains, then, but that we fall back upon the original position, that in the intuition of right we receive also in the most fundamental sense the knowledge of what is right—that God is to be loved and served, and that the advantage of our fellow-man is to be sought? This is as much a part of the primitive dictum as that right, as such, is obligatory. In specific applications of the principle, errors may and do occur; but the principle is always present by which to correct them. The main problem is to distinguish, not between the idea of right and its applications, but between the original and universal application of it, and those that are subsequent and acquired. It is in the latter only that error is possible.

Having thus arrived at the nature of conscience, and having determined its functions—how far it is to be regarded as an infallible rule of duty—we are prepared for certain inferences, both theoretical and practical, of a highly important character.

1. Conscience in its inmost essence and nature is not a growth; is not the outcome of infinitesimal changes in man's intellectual and emotive powers, upward from the brutal state, resulting at last in the moral element in man as we find it to-day. This conception is ruled out by the character of the moral intuition and imperative. The absolute knowledge of moral distinctions and the immutable sense of moral obligations of which we are conscious could never be arrived at in this way. Suppose we accept evolution as the method by which God brings to pass His designs in the organic sphere, and even recognize its presence to a certain extent in the sphere of spiritual life, still when we come to account for conscience, we are bound to admit a special divine interposition when first the moral element asserts itself. From a mere aggrega-

tion of non-moral factors we can get only the non-moral. The categorical imperative, on such a basis, is out of the question. Right and ought are uncaused effects. They have, in fact, no validity. Morals are customs only; ways in which people have found it convenient to act.

But consciousness does give the categorical imperative. Right and Ought stand out from the background of experience in unmistakable positiveness, and Bible religion is built upon them from the first. "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" is a question which dates back almost to the beginnings of human history; and the conception thus furnished us is one which man has not struggled up into by slow and painful gradations, but belongs to the very endowments which make him man. Discover the moral element in the brute if you can—many are trying to make this discovery to-day—and success will only place the divine creative act in this particular a little further back. It will establish thorough kinship between the human and the animal races, though not between the human and the vegetable. It is not for us to say how the lower orders of being *must be* constituted. We must accept the facts when ascertained. But one thing is certain: you cannot have the brute what we now conceive him to be and out of his nature derive man's ethical endowments. The attempt to develop these from the sympathetic feelings in the animal is a failure. The evolution halts at the crucial point—the passing over of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous. We may reach in this way a rude form of Altruism, in distinction from the self-regarding spirit, but we cannot show why either regard for self or regard for others is obligatory. All is instinctive: the very principle of righteousness—oughtness, duty—is wanting.

Henry Drummond, in his *Ascent of Man*, takes a position the exact opposite of this. With him, apparently, the homogeneous does pass over into the heterogeneous. The moral element in man strikes its roots into physical processes. It emerges along the line of those slow unfoldings by which from rudest beginnings the physical structure reaches its maturity and perfection. He maintains indeed that "there are two struggles for life in every living thing—the struggle for life, and the struggle for the life of others:" that "the web of life is woven on a double set of threads, the second thread distinct in color from the first, and giving a totally different pattern to the finished fabric;" that "the struggle for the life of others is the physiological name for the greatest word of ethics—Otherism, Altruism, Love:" and that "from Selfism to Otherism is the supreme transition in history:" but even while supporting this contention he takes us back, and is

compelled to, to the time when any moral difference between these two is indiscernible and impossible. Thus we read (*Ascent of Man*, pp. 221 *sq.*):

"The two main activities of all living things are Nutrition and Reproduction. The discharge of these functions in plants and largely in animals, sums up the work of life. The object of Nutrition is to secure the life of the individual; the object of Reproduction is to secure the life of the species. These two objects are thus wholly different. . . . . Both of course at the outset are *wholly selfish*: both are parts of the struggle for life. Yet see already in this *non-ethical* region, a parting of the ways. Selfishness and unselfishness are two supreme words in the moral life. The first, even in physical nature, is accompanied by the second. In the very fact that one of the two mainsprings of life is Other-regarding there lies a prophecy, a suggestion of the days of Altruism. . . . . It is not said that the function of Reproduction, say in a fern or an oak, is an unselfish act, yet in a sense, even though begotten of self, it is an Other-regarding act. In the physical world, to speak of the struggle for food as selfish, or to call the struggle for species unselfish, is alike incongruous. But if the morality of nature is impugned on the ground of the universal struggle for life, it is at least as relevant to refute the charge by putting moral content into the universal struggle for species. No true moral content can be put into either, yet the one marks the beginning of Egoism, and the other of Altruism. . . . . That an Other-regarding principle should sooner or later appear on the world's stage was a necessity, if the world was ever to become a moral world. And as everything in the moral world has what may be called a physical basis to begin with, it is not surprising to find in the mere physiological process of production a physical forecast of the higher relations, or, more accurately, to find the higher relations manifesting themselves at first through physical relations. The struggle for the life of Others formed an indispensable stepping-stone to the development of the Other-regarding virtues."

This is a significant passage, but in many places its confusion of thought is extreme. For instance, the opposite doctrine does not maintain that "the morality of nature is impugned on the ground of the universal struggle for life." What is claimed is, the entire absence of the moral element in this struggle. Consequently the effort on this basis to foist a moral element into the universal struggle for species is left without a leg to stand on. And this is only a single illustration of the inconsistencies which must arise whenever an actual effort is made to derive the moral from the non-moral.*

Prof. Harris, of Andover, contends that the idea of right may be analyzed into other and simpler elements: that "right is determined by and correlative to the good;" that "obligation is the requirement we make of ourselves to realize the good," and that "moral law or the Right is the moral Ideal or the Good recognized as obligatory and authoritative;" not one of which positions should be allowed to pass current without strict examination.

* These paragraphs on Prof. Drummond were written and sent in for publication before his lamented death. They are not intended to traverse in the least the general estimate of him as a wonderfully gifted mind, and a robust and splendid Christian character. In this estimate the writer heartily concurs.

But this author is very emphatic in holding that the moral element in human nature cannot be derived from the elements of the non-moral being preceding it. He says (*Moral Evolution*, p. 100):

"The assumption is made that a simian ancestor recognized the intrinsic superiority of sympathetic over self-regarding feelings. Now undoubtedly the creature which does this is a moral being. He is thereby differentiated from all non-moral beings. He has that perception not as a non-moral but as a moral being. When such comparisons and estimates are made, the simple fact is that man has appeared. A being which does not make such comparisons is an animal. A being who does make them is a man. If there ever was a being which, in the earlier part of its existence, did not form such judgments, and in the latter part of its existence did make them, that being became a man. The instant the first comparison was made, and the relative value of feelings was judged, the transformation was so radical that, even if there was physical continuity, a new kind of being appeared. . . . . Inquiry concerning the origin of the sense of obligation is simply inquiry concerning the origin of man. Duty was not merely an advantage, a utility, which man adopted after he had been man for a longer or shorter time. Without it man would not be man. It is his nature."

This is refreshing and instructive after the half lights, the insensible shadings of things into each other in the midst of which we have been groping our way under Prof. Drummond's leadership. Its qualities are clear-cut and positive. "It stands four-square to all the winds that blow."

True, an able critic of the author says that his evolution is a misnomer. It is no more than "progress" or "advancement." "Nothing could be further from Darwin's idea. It absolutely destroys the whole fabric of the 'Origin of Species.'" But be this as it may, the main position of Prof. Harris at this point is one for which we contend; adding of course that it is God who imparts the new perception and sense (if this is the process to which the facts testify) by which the animal becomes the human. Here, if not before, is where He interposes and says: "Let us make man in our image after our likeness." The physical continuity between man and the lower animals may be left to the evidence. Here unmistakably we have creation. "Man has appeared," to employ Prof. Harris' phrase, because God designed and willed him to appear. Differentiated in this radical way from the brutes, he stands forth a new order of being, the crown and completion of creative work in the world. And it is the distinctly moral element in him which establishes the fact. Nor do we understand that Christian evolution, so-called, ever goes farther than this. It certainly never goes farther with safety. A thorough-going Darwinianism is one thing: that modified doctrine of development by which certain Biblical thinkers have sought to adapt the assumed facts in the natural world to the great truths of revelation is something quite different.

2. While conceding freely a moral development of the race according to the principles already laid down; that is, development in the application of fundamental rules of conduct to particular instances—a process which has not yet reached its conclusion, and may not, for long periods—we contend that the law of love to God and man lies at the beginning of the process and not at its conclusion. It must be so if this law constitutes fundamental morality; if in the primary dictum of conscience not only is the right required of us, but certain things as right. Man without revelation does not state this law to himself in the perfect form in which it issues from the lips of the Divine Saviour; his perception of it may be dim and inadequate: but it is there, in his heart, the foundation course in practical obedience; the material principle of ethics, corresponding to the formal principle, and the sense of obligation; righteousness visible and palpable, that can walk the earth and engage in the ordinary work of life.

Some may be troubled by the fact that in the opinion of eminent thinkers the possession of a moral nature does not in itself necessitate a belief in God: this belief is the result of several lines of proof combined. Dr. McCosh, for instance, takes this view, though he adds at once, "wherever we do by combined intuition and the obvious facts of experience reach God, the God who gave us all our endowments, and therefore our moral constitution, the mind traces up the obligation under which it lies to Him." It must be remembered, however, that formal proof is one thing, and the spontaneous resting of the soul in truth and fact is another. And here it may be remarked that the intelligence which is sufficient to distinguish between right and wrong will not fail of those other intuitions, and of that correct interpretation of experience from which a belief in the Divine existence naturally proceeds; so that, save for certain exceptional cases where the mind has been greatly sophisticated, a belief in right and a belief in God always go together. Dr. Shedd is not disposed to wait for these slow processes. "Who," he says, "can feel himself amenable to a moral law without at the same time thinking of its Author? The law and the lawgiver are inseparable: the one is the mirror and the index of the other. If the eye open dimly upon the commandment it opens dimly upon the sovereign; if it perceives eternal right with clear and celestial vision, then it looks directly into the face of God." And the testimony of inspiration is: "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness. Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them. For the invisible things of

him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse."

A prevalent idea seems to be that man in his lowest state has crude notions of right, but with reference only to certain specific duties which he owes to those nearest him—the members of his own family circle or clan—the residents of his neighborhood. Gradually the circle of duties enlarges; the moral impulse is felt as to a greater number of particulars. Then there is a widening of the number embraced in the obligation. Somewhere along the process the idea of God is introduced—the God of idolatry first, afterward a monotheistic deity—and first one, then another duty is recognized toward him; until finally we get the full principle and the law appears to us in the terms of supreme love to our Maker and equal love to our fellow-man. This is reversing the process. It is standing the pyramid upon its apex. Down at the foundation the whole law is recognized in its germ and essence. But this fundamental knowledge of duty does not hinder in the least an unfolding in the way of application. To successive generations there come successive widenings of the horizon; what is allowed in one age is disallowed in the next. The movement is from the crude to the refined; from the simple to the complex. This would have been the course of things in one sense, even if man had not fallen. It is unnecessary to postulate in Eden an acquaintance with duties which circumstances had not as yet presented to the human agent; though of course, as unfallen, man would have recognized and performed these duties at once, as they arose. To man as fallen they arose often without being recognized; hence the long struggle upward. There is room here, too, for God to add positive commandments when it pleases Him; the fruit of a tree that must not be eaten in Eden; a portion of time to be kept holy; and under Israel the whole ceremonial system. Back of all, however, lies the reverence, obedience, affection, due to God as such. So in regard to our fellow-man. The principle is to do him good and not evil. But there is only a gradual attainment of the particulars in which this principle is perfectly fulfilled. Love worketh no ill to his neighbor, therefore love is the fulfilling of the law; but just what is the demand of love in conduct has not as yet been wrought out with absolute precision, though there can be no question with reference to most things. Practical morality as to many social, economic and public questions is still an unsolved problem. We are waiting for the light.

3. We reach thus the true distinction between morality and righteousness; or better, between morality and religion.

By some morality is defined as what is due from man to his fellow, religion as what is due from man to God. But this separates too sharply between the two, and in recognizing many persons as moral but not religious must regard them as truly keeping the law in one table while transgressing or neglecting it in the other. Another opinion is that morality consists in fulfilling our obligations to our fellows out of regard for them: religion in fulfilling these obligations, together with all higher ones, out of regard for God. But even this puts into morality of the irreligious sort more than can be found there. Did one ever have true regard for his fellow except as it was rooted in regard for his Creator?

The correct definition is, as appears from our discussion, that religion—which is equivalent to essential righteousness, though not as yet by necessity perfect righteousness—is obedience to the moral law in its great underlying principle of love to God and love to man, while morality, as distinguished from it, is simply conformity to an accepted and prevailing standard. The idea of right is there, and the prevailing rule of right as man understands it, is complied with, but this is all. *Mores*, customs, set the standard. The soul responds to these, but does not go behind them to find the rule of duty. Conscience is urging it all the time to conformity with essential righteousness, and the soul is not and cannot be at rest. "All these have I kept from my youth: what lack I yet?" But it has become enmeshed in its surroundings and fails to rise above them. Its virtues are civil virtues only; and while they may be excellent, many of them, so far as they go, they lack the spirit, the true inward principle of righteousness after all. This is why morality must not only be pronounced insufficient for righteousness in God's sight, but may even be denounced and condemned for its intrinsic character; why, too, such a sentiment as that of John Stuart Mill, "If from this position of integrity and morality we are to be sent to hell, to hell we will go," is enough to make one shudder. The morality practiced in Christian lands may differ very widely from heathen morality as to details, but is on the same level with it as to ultimate character. In Christian lands we have the Decalogue and the Sermon on the Mount, and in heathen lands these are wanting; but by respect for these high standards simply because they are the prevailing ones in Christendom, one does not attain to true obedience to them. Even manward his righteousness is still fatally defective. The virtues of the second table all proceed from the same root. No one was ever genuinely truthful without being also genuinely honest. Sincere respect for human life never yet went hand in hand with the sacrifice of female virtue. If I love one neighbor as I ought,

I will not hate another. And so the virtues of the two tables have a common origin. The talk so commonly indulged in about squaring obligations with our fellow-man, leaving him no unsatisfied claims against us, while God is neglected and defrauded, is simply self-deception. Many exemplify it, but it shows how entirely their moral theory is vitiated.

On the other hand, the heathen, in contrast with ourselves, are not to be condemned as immoral, simply because their standard differs from our own, but only when they fall below what may be expected in view of such light as they have. Their standard may be a high one. Cicero in his *De Officiis* leaves no standing-room for practices which many a man of Christian education will attempt to justify. Usually there lingers among men enough of the primitive law of righteousness to warn them against the lower forms of evil. But if the standard not of practice but of recognized duty has seriously deteriorated, and still to this altered standard the man is faithful, then the moralist of Christian lands cannot sit in judgment on him. God can, of course; and so can all those who are in accord with fundamental righteousness, but no others. Surely from this point of view one should not resent the teaching that he hangs his hopes on his morality only to be betrayed. It is the work of the sculptor, exquisite it may be as the marbles of the Parthenon, but lacking the breath of life.

4. The heathen are in no absolute dependence on revelation for knowledge of duty, however it may be as to knowledge of the way of salvation. As has been seen, it is impossible to show that the moral code they are now possessed of, be it higher or lower, proceeds from a primitive revelation, and equally it is needless to do so. The two tables of the law were not first bestowed upon man in the Decalogue. That legislation only retouched the handwriting on the heart where it was growing dim; where sin was obliterating it. The "law and the prophets," to employ the phrase of Christ, were in the consciences of men from the first. They are in the consciences of the heathen to-day. Debased as may be the maxims to which the heathen man outwardly acknowledges allegiance, behind and beneath them lies the mandate which is his supreme rule of duty, and by which he knows he will be tried in the end. It is a fictitious sympathy therefore which accuses God of dealing so hardly with him. Will he be condemned for his idolatries and inhumanities when he knows no better? He does know better: we may boldly affirm it; and the key to the situation is there. Classic religion left the gods free to practice dishonesties and impurities, but it did not grant an equal freedom to man: and by that fact it testified to a better God than

those whom it seated upon Olympus, and to a higher morality than the worship of those gods fostered.

This is what Tertullian claims when he says: "The God of the Jews is the one whom the souls of men call their God. We worship one God, the one whom ye all naturally know, at whose lightnings and thunders ye tremble, in whose benefits ye rejoice." Tertullian did not allow that the Homeric gods, the gods of imagination and poetry, are the ones whom the *souls* of men call their God. And in this he but reproduced the doctrine of Paul, who holds men everywhere inexcusable because of their universal knowledge of God, and who derives this knowledge from man's constitution, combined with the testimony of creation and providence. He says that "when they knew God they glorified him not as God," but here instead of referring to a knowledge derived from a primitive revelation, he takes great pains to build it up from a natural basis, and to draw his inferences from it for the men of his own generation as well as for those of a remote past.

5. If ever the Church shall advance to the position now advocated by some even of her conservative theologians, that the heathen may be saved in some instances without the knowledge of the historic Christ, it will be upon the basis which our contention in this article furnishes. This position as defined by its advocates is, that if there are those among the unevangelized whose relation to God is a saving one, it is by reason of the redemptive work of Christ, and through the renewing energy of the Holy Ghost. They have not conscious faith in Christ, of course, but they have the "habit of faith," such as the Spirit may impart to infants; they are thus united to Christ, and pardoned through his blood and justified by his merits; the evidence of it being their consciousness of sin, their longing to be delivered from it, and their trust only in the grace of God, and not at all in themselves. This is a very different thing, of course, from the idea of their being saved on lower grounds than those of a perfect righteousness —because, for example, of their own good works in living up to the light they have and therefore needing no atonement in order to pardon. Nor does it conflict with the provision of the Confession of Faith: "Much less can men not professing the Christian religion be saved in any other way, whatsoever, be they never so diligent to frame their lives according to the light of nature and the law of that religion they do profess; and to assert and maintain that they may is very pernicious and to be detested."

If there are cases of the kind supposed—and trustworthy missionaries claim possibly to have encountered them in rare instances —it can only be because having through conscience a true knowl-

edge of fundamental duty, and of their failure to perform it—convicted thus of sin—the Spirit has led them to true contrition, and has wrought within them that self-renouncing trust issuing in true obedience, which is the Gospel condition of salvation. God no more works without means than in producing any other saving results. The possibility of such cases has this to recommend it, that it puts the evangelized and the unevangelized on the common footing of having salvation placed within their reach, with nothing standing in the way but their cherished sin, while it is to the preached Gospel that we must look as the divinely ordained means through which alone the salvation of any can be confidently reckoned upon. We do not argue the question, however, but simply call attention to the relation to it of that view of conscience which leaves no soul in ignorance of fundamental duty. It is not in the worship of false gods that souls are supposed to be united to Christ, but in the worship of the true; it is not in the exercise of selfishness and pride, but in the exercise of that love which worketh no ill to his neighbor, and therefore is the fulfilling of the law.

Milford, Pa. Thomas Nichols.

VI.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL NOTES.

CRITICS AND APOLOGISTS.

In the *Expository Times* for February, 1896, p. 227, an editorial notice of Dr. W. H. Green's treatise on *The Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch* began in these words: "'There is now but one Old Testament scholar who rejects the results of criticism.' So said a higher critic recently; and he named the scholar—Prof. Green, of Princeton. The statement was too severe on some other men, but not too complimentary to Prof. Green. For he is a scholar; they who resent his attitude most hotly admit it most readily."

Exactly three years have elapsed since the above statement appeared. What is now the "advanced thought" of the higher critics in respect to Prof. Green, as reported in the *Expository Times* for February, 1899? They have discovered in the interval that he is not a scholar. Criticism that is up to date is now able to treat him with contempt. Thus they who venture still to believe in the historic truth of the Old Testament are left poor indeed. Their only scholar has been discredited! We should be sorry to think that the accomplished editor of the theological magazine in which Dr. Green has been held up to derision has changed the opinion which he formerly expressed regarding the learning of that honored Christian apologist. Possibly owing to the pressure of work now devolving upon him the obnoxious paragraphs escaped his observation.

The Rev. J. A. Selbie has charge of the department entitled, "Among the Periodicals," in the *Expository Times*. In the issue referred to he reproduces with unmistakable approbation some criticisms which Dr. Carl Steuernagel wrote in the *Theologische Rundschau* of last December in condemnation of apologetic treatises recently translated into German. Mr. Selbie will be naturally considered a high authority on Biblical literature from his editorial position, and from the fact that he is the chief assistant of Dr. Hastings in the preparation of the new *Dictionary of the Bible* now in course of publication by Messrs. Clark, of Edinburgh. Dr. Steuernagel is privat-dozent of Theology in Halle, and is author of a Commentary on Deuteronomy which appeared last year in the Nowack series of manuals. Grave and damaging accusations made by such men, it seems to us, ought not to be left unnoticed, especially in view of the tone of assurance with which they are brought forward, which is fitted to impose on the inconsiderate and ignorant.

Against Dr. Green in particular, and recent apologists in general, Dr. Steuernagel, as reported in the *Expository Times*, brings these three serious charges: "That their work is frequently of a very superficial character, that they set up a man of straw for their attacks, and that even their Biblical knowledge often leaves much to be desired." From reading Dr. Steuernagel's original article we can testify that he is not misrepresented. We must now confine our attention to an examination of the truth of these charges as preferred against Dr. Green, who is the chief mark of our critics. The second of these charges we take up first, as it is evidently considered the most crushing, and its statement in the English translation is followed by a note of exclamation: "Green sets up a man of straw to represent the position of critics when he alleges that the latter, whenever the name *Jahweh* occurs in an 'Elohistic' passage, assume that a redactor has either introduced a sentence from a parallel narrative or altered the original *Elohim* into *Jahweh*. Green actually makes this allegation in connection with passages subsequent to Ex. iii, although every critic knows that E tells us in Ex. iii. 13ff. of the revelation of the new divine name *Jahweh* to Moses, and that from this point onwards the latter name even preponderates in E!"

It is in review of Dr. Green's *Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch* that this accusation is made. The offense charged, if proved to have been actually committed, must be pronounced utterly inexcusable, and would of itself be sufficient to destroy Dr. Green's reputation as a scholar. But what must be said of his accusers if they have borne false witness against him? His is not the only reputation at stake.

Has Dr. Green "set up a man of straw [a *Zerrbild* as the original has it] to represent the position of critics?" We will let the most distinguished of the higher critics represent, in their own words, their position in regard to the mooted point. They should know what they have been in the habit of teaching. Dr. August Dillmann, professor of Theology in Berlin, who died in 1894, gives the testimony of an expert in his treatise *Ueber die Composition des Hexateuch*, appended to the second edition of his Commentary on Numbers, Deuteronomy and Joshua. On p. 617, in treating of the Elohistic document, whose existence he and the other divisive critics postulate, Dillmann thus writes: "Das wichtigste Kennzeichen dieser Schrift ist die Benennung Gottes mit Elohim (auch nach der Einsetzung des Jahvenamens Ex. iii), welche E mit andern alten Geschichtsschreibern (in Jud. u. Sam., vgl. Knobel, 561) gemeinsam hat; sie ist bei ihm durchgängig, u. יהוה in seinen Stücken erst durch die späteren Bearbeiter hereingebracht."

In this quotation Dillmann distinctly asserts that the most important criterion of the E document is its naming of the Deity by *Elohim*, and that God is so named in it both *before* and *after* Ex. iii; that this use of *Elohim* in E is *thoroughgoing*, or universal; and that when the name Jehovah is found in passages belonging to E, its introduction is to be ascribed to later hands. If Dillmann was competent to give a correct

account of his own doctrine, Dr. Green must be acquitted of the charge of setting up a man of straw, *ein Zerrbild*, to represent the position of the higher critics.

Prof. Julius Wellhausen is another witness who may be allowed to give testimony on this question. In his treatise, *Die Composition des Hexateuchs und der historischen Bücher des alten Testaments*, p. 72, speaking of Ex. iii. 10–15, which he claims for the Elohistic document, he remarks: "Wirklich erscheint hier überall im Munde des Erzählers אלהים v. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, während von nun ab dies Kriterium für längere Zeit aufhört, freilich wie es scheint, mehr durch Schuld des Bearbeiters, als nach der Absicht des Elohisten selber, der nach wie vor für gewöhnlich den allgemeinen Namen gebraucht zu haben scheint."

In this quotation Wellhausen clearly makes the use of the name *Elohim* a criterion of the E document, and ascribes the omission of this name in Elohistic passages after Ex. iii to the fault of the redactor, and not to the original author, whom Wellhausen holds to have, both before and after Ex. iii, commonly employed the general name of God or *Elohim*. To produce further evidence at our command on this head would be a work of supererogation.

Dr. Green does not pretend to be infallible, but reviewers should be very careful of rashly accusing him of disgraceful blundering, lest haply they fling a boomerang which may recoil to their own hurt. Dr. Green knows as well as any living man the tricks of the redactor whom the critics are obliged to assume for the purpose of upholding the modern documentary hypothesis of the composition of the Pentateuch. He could truly say of him what Paul says of Satan: "We are not ignorant of his devices." He is not likely to be caught napping while describing his varied and whimsical operations. He has studied the work assigned to R thoroughly, and has given the best description of it that we have anywhere seen. It seems very superstitious on the part of the critics to profess to believe in such a being in this enlightened age. But they feel that they cannot get along without him, and so to them R is a name to conjure with. Here is Dr. Green's account of that strange character whose symbol is R: "The most capricious and inconsistent conduct is attributed to R, such as is an impeachment of both his honesty and good sense. He is held responsible, in fact, for everything that is at variance with the requirements of the hypothesis. And on the supposition that such a person really existed and did the work ascribed to him, it is quite impossible to form any intelligent notion of his methods or his aims. We are told that in some places he carefully preserves minute fragments of his sources, though they are a superfluous repetition of what has already been more fully stated in the language of other documents; and yet elsewhere he freely omits large and essential portions of them. In some places he preserves unchanged what is represented to be plainly antagonistic, while in other places he is careful to smooth away discrepancies and to give a different turn to variant passages by transpositions or

by insertions of his own. He sometimes keeps his documents quite distinct in language and form, at other times he effaces their peculiarities or blends them inextricably together. All these offices must be assumed in order to carry the hypothesis safely through; but whether such a bundle of contradictions was ever incarnate in any actually existing person, the only proof of his existence being that these contradictory things are alleged about him, every one must judge for himself" (*Hebraica*, Vol. vii, p. 35f.). This is no caricature of R. Those familiar with Pentateuchal criticism will without difficulty recognize the accuracy of the portraiture in every feature.

In the quotation made from the *Expository Times* it is affirmed that "every critic knows that E tells us in Ex. iii. 13ff. of the revelation of the new divine name *Jahweh* to Moses" This is what no critic *knows*. But the destructive critics *profess* to know it. Herein they greatly err.

To obviate misapprehension it is proper to observe that Dr. Green does not assert that the critics always assume that the presence of the name Elohim in what they call a J section is owing to the interference of R. On the contrary, he says expressly in his *Higher Criticism*, p. 91, that "Elohim is repeatedly found along with Jehovah in passages attributed to J where the critics explain that the author of this document used both names as the occasion demanded." He appropriately asks, "If J could use both of these names, and in so doing was governed by their inherent signification and by the appropriateness of each to the connection in which they are severally employed, why might not P and E do the same? Or why, in fact, is there any need for J, P or E, or for any other than the one author to whom a uniform tradition attributes all that it has been proposed to parcel among these unknown and undiscoverable personages?"

We now turn to the first of the charges made by Steuernagel. It is thus stated: "It is surely a very superficial explanation of the interchange of the divine names to say with Green that *Jahweh* is employed when God is thought of as the God of salvation and of gracious condescension, whereas the name Elohim is chosen when he appears as the Creator or Judge of the world. Why, then," asks Steuernagel, "is the God who enters into covenant with Noah (Gen. ix) and with Abraham (Gen. xvii) called *Elohim?* Why is the God who executes judgment on Sodom and Gomorrah called *Jahweh?* Why is it that in perfectly parallel narratives we find at one time *Jahweh* and at another time *Elohim?* (compare Gen. xii. 10–20 with xx. 1–17)."

We agree with Steuernagel that if Dr. Green had given such an inadequate account of the divine names as he attributes to him, it would furnish a very superficial and unsatisfactory explanation of their interchange. But what if Steuernagel is here guilty of the offense which he charges on Dr. Green, which we have already weighed and found wanting? What if he sets up a man of straw instead of the real Dr. Green? This is what he has done. He does not fairly represent the position of

the man whom he antagonizes. Dr. Green, in his discussion so courageously and triumphantly carried on in *Hebraica* with Prof. W. R. Harper, could not have proceeded far in the attempt to show the appropriate and discriminating use in Genesis of *Jehovah* and *Elohim* respectively without seeing the futility of his contention if he had only followed the simple rule attributed to him as sufficient for explaining everywhere the preferential employment of one or other of the two divine names *Jehovah* and *Elohim*. We have not been able to discover that Dr. Green has stated in any of his writings that *Jehovah* cannot be properly used when God is thought of as Judge of the world. He knew that *Jehovah-Elohim* pronounced sentence on the old serpent and on our first parents, and that *Jehovah* judged Cain; and he often refers to acts of judgment on the world performed by Jehovah. In the book which Dr. Steuernagel reviews, Dr. Green carefully distinguishes the two divine names as follows :*

"Elohim is the general name for God, and is applied both to the true God and to pagan deities. Jehovah is not a common but a proper noun. It belongs to the true God alone, and is His characteristic name, by which He is distinguished from all others, and by which He made Himself known to Israel, His chosen people. Accordingly Jehovah denotes specifically what God is in and to Israel; Elohim what He is to other nations as well. That universal agency which is exercised in the world at large, and which is directed upon Israel and Gentiles alike, is by Elohim, the God of creation and providence. That special manifestation of Himself which is made to His own people is by Jehovah, the God of revelation and of redemption. The sacred writer uses one name or the other, according as he contemplates God under one or the other point of view. Where others than those of the chosen race are the speakers, as Abimelech (Gen. xxi. 22, 23) or Pharaoh (xli. 38, 39), it is natural that they should say Elohim, unless they specifically refer to the God of the patriarchs (xxvi. 28) or of Israel (Ex. v. 2), when they will say Jehovah. In transactions between Abraham or his descendants and those of another race God may be spoken of under aspects common to them both, and the name Elohim be employed; or he may be regarded under aspects specifically Israelitish, and the name Jehovah be used. Again, as Elohim is the generic name for God as distingnished from

* In the *Homiletic Review* (published by Funk & Wagnalls Company, London and New York) for August, 1898, pp. 166ff., and for September, pp. 257ff., Dr. Green has two valuable papers on "Elohim and Jehovah in the Pentateuch." He first examines the use of these divine names in other books of the Old Testament, and then considers their use in the books of Moses. These papers are the latest and, we think, the most careful and complete connected discussion of the subject that has proceeded from Dr. Green's pen. They deserve the study of those who would master this important question. At the close of his investigation he makes the claim, which is not too strong: The divine names occurring in the Pentateuch have now been considered in detail, and I think it may fairly be said that it has been shown that their employment is regulated by the same principles which prevail in the rest of the Old Testament."

beings of a different grade, it is the term proper to be used when God and man, the divine and the human, are contrasted, as Gen. xxx. 2; xxxii. 28; xlv. 5, 7, 8; l. 19, 20" (*Higher Criticism*, pp. 102, 103).

Dr. Green further observes that "while in certain cases one of the divine names is manifestly appropriate to the exclusion of the other, there are others in which either name might properly be used, and it is at the discretion of the writer which he will employ. When an event is capable of being viewed under a double aspect, either as belonging to the general scheme of God's universal providence, or as embraced within the administration of His plan of grace, either Elohim or Jehovah would be in place, and it depends on the writer's conception at the time which he will employ. It is not necessary, therefore, in Genesis, any more than in other books of the Bible, to be able to show that there was a necessity for using that divine name which is actually employed. It is sufficient to show, as can invariably be done, that the writer might properly use the name which he has actually chosen" (*Higher Criticism*, p. 106).

It is not difficult now to answer the question of Steuernagel: "Why is the God who enters into covenant with Noah (Gen. ix) and with Abraham (Gen. xvii) called Elohim?" The covenant described in Gen. ix was made, not with the chosen seed, but with Noah and his seed, and all living creatures, with all flesh upon the earth (Gen. ix. 9, 10, 15, 17). Its universal character is made very prominent. Therefore, the general name of God, *Elohim*, is most appropriate. When God is set forth as distinguishing the chosen seed from the rest of mankind, then Jehovah is more fittingly used. See ver. 26 of the same chapter, where we read, "Blessed be Jehovah, God of Shem." It is surely not by accident that in the next verse the blessing of Japheth is attributed to Elohim.

But why is it Elohim who enters into covenant with Abraham (Gen. xvii)? We answer that the first verse of Gen. xvii tells us that it was Jehovah who did this; and we refuse to listen to the critics who say in the interest of their theory that this verse is an interpolation by R, or that R has at least substituted Jehovah for Elohim. It is Jehovah, then, who enters here into covenant with Abraham, or rather, renews and enlarges the covenant mentioned in Gen. xv. 18. But why is Elohim used throughout the remainder of the chapter? Because there is a peculiar significance in speaking here of God in His character as the Omnipotent Creator. El Shaddai, God Almighty, is what Jehovah calls Himself in the first verse. There was special cause to dwell on God's power. The chapter begins with mentioning the great age of Abraham. The patriarch himself is introduced as asking, "Shall a child be born unto him that is an hundred years old? And shall Sarah, that is ninety years old, bear?" (ver. 17). He was even led to suggest that the numerous posterity promised to him might be granted in the line of Ishmael. A son by his wife did not seem within the bounds of possi-

bility. But he is told definitely that Sarah should bear him a son in the next year, and that she should be a mother of nations. If, to strengthen Abraham's faith, Jehovah in the beginning of the chapter thought it proper to call Himself El Shaddai, thus emphasizing His divine power, it is in admirable keeping for the sacred narrator to use subsequently throughout the theophany the familiar name of Elohim, which is a nearer equivalent of El Shaddai than Jehovah is, and is more suggestive that power belongeth unto God than this latter name.

It is further asked, "Why is the God who executes judgment on Sodom and Gomorrah called *Jahweh?*" The God of Abraham, Jehovah, was conspicuously revealed in the destruction of Sodom. We may answer the question in Dr. Green's own words: "It is Jehovah in chap. xviii who in condescending grace concludes the covenant transaction with Abraham by becoming his guest, and in the familiarity of friendship admits him to His counsel respecting Sodom, and accepts his intercession on its behalf; and who still further (xix. 1–28) executes the purpose which He had disclosed to Abraham, of *purging his own land* of gross offenders (cf. xiii. 13, xv. 16, xviii. 20, 21)" (*Unity of Genesis*, p. 152). What he says in the same place on the use of Elohim in xix. 29 answers well a difficulty raised by critics.

We have another question to answer: "Why is it that in perfectly parallel narratives we find at one time *Jahweh* and at another time *Elohim* (compare Gen. xii. 10–20 with xx. 1–17)?"

There is a remarkable resemblance between the two narratives. We add that there is a likeness between them which our divisive critics would obliterate. In the earlier the name Jehovah alone is used, and it occurs but once; it is the only name of God occurring in Gen. xii. 10–20. "Jehovah plagued Pharaoh and his house with great plagues because of Sarai Abram's wife" (ver. 17). In the similar narrative in Gen. xx, the name Jehovah occurs once, and that too in describing the judgment inflicted by the LORD on Abimelech, for a like offense: "For Jehovah had fast closed up all the wombs of the house of Abimelech, because of Sarah, Abraham's wife" (xx. 18). The correspondence is striking. But the *à priorism* of such critics as Kuenen, Wellhausen and Dillmann will not tolerate in an Elohistic chapter this verse in which the name *Jehovah* is found, and they accordingly ascribe it to the interference of R. But it coheres closely with the preceding sentence, which is, in fact, unintelligible without it.

We might be content with this answer to the last question. But we may draw from Hengstenberg a most satisfactory explanation of the use of Elohim throughout the rest of Gen. xx, which relates graphically the affair between Abraham and Abimelech on account of Sarah. For Abimelech God is Elohim; of Jehovah he knew nothing. Only as Elohim could God appear to him. Abraham uses in conversation with Abimelech Elohim, while he accommodates himself to his standpoint. Therefore he prays also to Elohim; for his intercession is uttered in the

ears of the king. How the use of Elohim is called forth by the contents of the chapter appears very clearly from ver. 11, where Abraham says, "Because I thought, Surely the fear of Elohim is not in this place." Abraham confesses that he was herein deceived There was in Gerar the fear of Elohim. But the fear of *Jehovah* did not exist there. Under no circumstances could Jehovah be used in ver. 11 (*Authentie des Pentateuches*, i, pp. 351, 352).

Dr. Green is censured further for maintaining that "Scripture is an organism whose parts are inspired by God and consequently combine in a harmonious whole." This is the view which the Lord Jesus Christ and His apostles held of Holy Scripture. It is the view to which those who call Christ Master are committed, and it can be vindicated against all impugners. But it is a great error to charge Dr. Green with "refusing to view the harmony of Scripture as the result of a process of development under divine guidance." We find him, in the Preface to his book which is reviewed, saying that the Pentateuch "contains the germs from which all that follows was developed." And one of his arguments to prove that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch "is furnished by the elementary character of the teachings of the Pentateuch as compared with later Scriptures in which the same truths are more fully expanded. The development of doctrine in respect to the future state, providential retribution, the spiritual character of true worship, angels and the Messiah, shows very plainly that the Pentateuch belongs to an earlier period than the book of Job, the Psalms and the Prophets" (p. 45).

As illustrative of the *à priori* reasoning of our critics we may instance the following statement: "Green denies, of course, that the critics believe in divine revelation at all." Such a denial, Dr. Green would make in regard to such critics as Kuenen, Reuss and Wellhausen. They were avowed antisupernaturalists. But Dr. Green never denied of such critics as Delitzsch, König, Strack, or even of Dr. C. A. Briggs, that they believed in divine revelation at all. In THE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW for October, 1893, p. 553, he could thus write: "Beyond question Dr. Briggs is honestly aiming to defend the revealed Word of God and evangelical religion against the hostile attacks of a destructive and revolutionary criticism. Convinced that the critics have established much that is at variance with what has been currently believed hitherto respecting the origin and structure of the books of the Bible, he is persuaded that the only honest and safe course is frankly to accept these conclusions, and adjust the belief of the Church accordingly. He confidently maintains that nothing which is essential to the Christian faith will be lost by so doing, while, if this is not done, the Bible will be put in apparent opposition to the sure results of modern scholarship, to the serious disadvantage of the Christian faith, a disadvantage to which it cannot be rightfully subjected. This is an intelligible position." But Dr. Green proceeds to show that this position is

untenable, and that "the divorce which the professor proposes to effect is impracticable. The books of the Bible are the charter of the Christian faith. If the former are unsound, the latter cannot be maintained."

The development hypothesis to which Dr. Green is unalterably opposed is, "That the Pentateuchal codes are not, as represented in the Pentateuch itself and elsewhere in Scripture, component and mutually related parts of one complete system of legislation, but constitute so many distinct and successive systems of legislation, the next in order being in each case further developed than that which preceded it; and that the differences between the codes are such that they cannot all have belonged to any one period, least of all to the Mosaic, as represented in the Scripture account, but long periods of time must have elapsed to give occasion for their introduction." This hypothesis, which makes the whole record of the Bible on this subject a colossal forgery, he cannot accept, and he has given good and sufficient reasons for not accepting it. These reasons deserve serious and candid consideration.

Dr. Steuernagel is not well informed of Dr. Green's position, neither is he, as we have proved, as conversant as he might be expected to be with the views of the critical school to which he professes to belong. We have looked into his Commentary on Deuteronomy. He impresses us as a man very desirous of saying something novel and startling. He assails the unity of Deuteronomy. He thinks that he has discovered in the book two authors who are distinguished by him from one another by respectively applying "thou" and "you" to the people of Israel. These different authors he proposes to indicate by Sg = singular and Pl = plural. From the varying use, too, of the second and third persons he would infer a difference of source. Prof. E. König, of Rostock, has had the patience in three papers published in the *Expository Times* to examine minutely the arguments of this nature which Dr. Steuernagel has adduced in support of his divisive hypothesis. We venture to think that few intelligent persons who will take the trouble to read these papers will fail to be convinced that Dr. König has successfully met this attempt to divide Deuteronomy among Deuteronomistic documents Sg and Pl, in addition to J, E, P and Redactors. Sure we are that the new criteria could be easily applied to impugn the unity of other books of the Bible and of extracanonical writings, and even of unquestionable productions of nineteenth-century authors

We may be permitted to subjoin a single specimen of the liberty Dr. Steuernagel allows himself in Scriptural exegesis. He has these brief notes on Deut. xviii. 15: "The LORD thy God will raise up unto thee a prophet from the midst of thee, of thy brethren, like unto me; unto him ye shall hearken." *Like unto me.* "כמני is remarkable, as Moses elsewhere in the Law does not speak thus of his own person, and it may therefore well be regarded as a sign that this passage has proceeded from a Redactor." אליו תשמעון *Unto him ye shall hearken.* "An addition on account of the plural number, especially as without it the connec-

tion of ver. 16 is improved." Such arbitrary criticism aims at the destruction of the Christian argument from Messianic prophecy in the Old Testament. It may be called critical exegesis, but it is really no better than the working of reckless caprice. It seems to Steuernagel a small matter to erase from the Bible the brief words, "Like unto me," "Unto him ye shall hearken," to say of them lightly that they are additions by an unknown reviser to a document which Moses never wrote, but which originated long centuries after his death. But precious in the sight of the LORD is that Word which he has once spoken, though it may be rejected by professed interpreters of the Bible. This Word of the LORD "is settled in heaven" (Ps. cxix. 89). And it is not forgotten by Him. Was not this apparent when the disciples who were with Jesus on the Mount of Transfiguration with Moses and Elijah heard a voice from heaven, saying, "Hear him?" Even unbelieving commentators cannot avoid admitting that this voice from heaven "Him hear!" (the "Him" has the emphasis) points significantly back to the command in Deut. xviii. 15, "Unto him ye shall hearken." Christ, too, had assuredly in His mind the words, "a prophet like unto me," when He said to the Jews: "If ye believed Moses, ye would believe me; for he wrote of me" (John v. 46). And Peter preached to the Jews after Christ's resurrection that in the person of Jesus the prophet, like unto Moses, had been raised up, unto whom they should hearken. Men who intelligently believe Christ and His apostles cannot avoid believing that the Law was given by Moses, and that it was divinely revealed to him. He who said to the scribes who evaded that Law, who explained away its obvious meaning, "Ye have made void the Word of God because of your tradition" (Matt. xv. 6), would he be less severe now in condemning those who have no more reverence for that Law than for some old profane documents that have been preserved to our time? May we not think of the Lord Jesus as now saying to a perverse and unbelieving generation of destructive critics of the Scriptures: Woe unto you, critics, ye have made void the Word of God by your criticisms, and by them ye are seeking to destroy other men's faith in that Word?

PITTSBURG, PA. DUNLOP MOORE.

VII.

REVIEWS OF

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

I.—APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

Essay on the Bases of the Mystic Knowledge. By E. Récéjac, Doctor of Letters. Translated by Sara Carr Upton. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. 8vo, pp. xi, 287.

This book will have a warm welcome from those who desire some sound, clear and able statement of the distinguishing idea of enlightened modern Mysticism. We may overlook the paradox when we see the publishers' announcement of it as "a scientific exposition of Mysticism." The paradox is in the fact that Mysticism is in essential antithesis to science; accordingly, to formulate scientifically the principles of Mysticism would be, *ipso facto*, to destroy them. However, the book is exceptionally clear in its thought, vigorous in its style, and often brilliant in its striking insight and expression.

The philosophical basis of the argument is partly Hegelian, partly Kantian. It reminds one of Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* in its search for the Absolute, and of Spencer's *First Principles* in its giving up of that search. It is, for the most part, a study in epistemology, and is worth noticing, among the many such, only because it proposes its unique answer to the problem. It posits the inability of the human knowing faculty to compass the Absolute. "The work of knowing—the effort to synthetize the world and the ego—is forever recommencing" (p. 2). Of course, then, that effort can never advance to a successful accomplishment. Metaphysics is infirm, inadequate; the Reason in man cannot define the illusions that infest the penumbra of its legitimate sphere. Bradley's cynical remark might have been quoted: "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct."*

This assumed inability of knowledge leaves the door wide open for the mystic. By science, we *know;* by reason, we *think;* by Mysticism, we *comprehend*. Rejecting Kant's comparison of Mysticism to "some vast ocean, the empire of illusion," the author boldly declares that "either Mysticism contains a negation of thought worse than Scepticism or it is the most perfect activity of the mind" (p. 1).

We have not seen the untranslated edition of this book, but as the title is given in the English there is an inconsistency on the title-page, for, again

* *Appearance and Reality*, p. xiv.

and again, the author rejects the idea of knowledge in favor of what he calls *experience*. The mystic is one who seeks the Absolute in ways other than dialectical. The modern consciousness has an intense feeling of freedom; this freedom is, at bottom, nothing else than disinterestedness, and, being such, it is essentially homogeneous with the Absolute. This disinterestedness is an alienation of the self, "a voluntary abdication of the *me*." In this way does the mystic overtake the Unknowable--it is still the *Unknowable*, to be sure, but it is experienced. Thus Mysticism lends itself to the postulates of Agnosticism, "but it refuses to maintain an attitude of religious respect to the Unknowable merely as Unknowable." Indeed, the mystic soul does not experience the Absolute immediately, but only by means of symbols. The mystic walks not by faith or by sight, but by symbols. Augustine could reach the very limits of intellection, but his purely metaphysical genius was ill adapted to the use of symbols and so we hear him exclaim: "I got as far as the thinking force, which is myself. . . . . I had a flashing gleam of you, O my God, and then immediately sinking backwards I said, 'Who can go further? Shall I seek visions? Many have tried them and have found only illusions.'"

The perception of the transcendental is the first step in the mystic experience. Ribot is quoted with sanction: "Clear consciousness is but a small part of total consciousness." We need the *abandon* of the mystic, "the faculty of valor;" we need the naïve consciousness of the savage in some degree; we need to understand better Pascal's meaning when he says, "The heart feels first principles;" we need the recognition of what the author calls the "excessivity" of truth; we must remember that the foundations of things rebel against rigid formulæ, and that the way to be sure not to know the greatest truths is to be very eager or to try very hard to know them.

These symbols are the sole instruments of the mystic consciousness. Here we are led to the verge of the Swedenborgian doctrine of knowledge. All mental activity is by means of symbols. Science lives by symbols; "we employ anthropomorphic substitutes" for the purely mathematical or scientific terms which ought to be used. *A fortiori*, the use of symbols in philosophy is indispensable. The εἴδωλα of Democritus is closely akin to the symbolism of religion. Symbols give to consciousness both stable equilibrium and its quota of representations. They give vivacity, fixity, consistency to religious thought. When St. Bonaventure borrowed a symbol from mathematics and applied it to the Eternal, he gave vividness to our conception of the Divine: *Deus est sphaera intelligibilis, cujus centrum est ubique et circumferentia nusquam*. Symbols, however, do not represent so much as suggest. Scripture is largely the analytical translation of symbols. If Isaiah had been cogitating dialectically, we should have had a page of philosophy on the nature of holiness instead of the vision in the sixth chapter of his prophecies. The Trinity is a mystic notion, a psychological symbol, for the human mind could not have conceived it dialectically. Bossuet is here quoted: "A created Trinity which God effects in our souls represents to us the Increate Trinity."

This theory of knowledge is very far-reaching. It is one thing to say that all objective knowledge is analogical, and quite another that all knowledge is symbolical. Spencer says we cannot know the *Ding an sich*. Récéjac agrees with this, only he says we can experience not the Ding, but symbols of it; or, more accurately, he says we experience the Ding *by means of* the symbols. But what of the relation between the symbols and the *Ding an sich?* The generous cloak of the mystic covers this gap and he rests content. The author argues strenuously for the exclusive subjectivity of all

mystic phenomena, and particularly all such as may seem to have an objective or external character in the theophanies and visions of Biblical narrative.

He concedes the necessity of a triple guard in Mysticism, namely, in substance: (1) There can be no self-transcendence except morally, *i. e.*, on the side of Freedom; (2) there can be no direct intuition of the Absolute; (3) nothing which contradicts natural knowledge or experience, reduced to the concepts of Reason, must have expression mystically. In these points the author seems not only inconsistent with himself, but also with the essential idea of Mysticism, which we have always understood to be an unquestioning deference to its own oracles and utterances as paramount and supreme.

The Absolute we seek is not far off, but is near at hand. Indeed, there is Pantheism between the lines on many of the pages. The inspired and the inspiring Reason are not in simple contact, but they are "an actual identity." It is nothing "but our formal identity with God which prevents us from determining Him to ourselves scientifically" (p. 280). Von Hartmann is referred to as complaining that "Theism starts from the dogmatic *à priori* that God and man are two conscious personalities of different essence;" and though our author fain would demur, he fails to tell us just what he is to do, and, indeed, he conveniently dismisses the whole subject in a footnote by saying, "Our subject does not take us so far."

We have now indicated the drift of the book. We are interested in it on account of its theological implications. The theme is not Christian, but Universal Mysticism. Even so, it has its bearings upon Christian thought and life. A very prevalent and popular tendency in Christendom just now could have no quarrel with the postulates of the mystical Frenchman. Herrmann, as quoted by Mr. Mackintosh in the *American Journal of Theology*,* is not far from Récéjac when he says, "For religion the real is not that which can be explained, but that which can be experienced."

The mystic's notion of God is that of the philosophized Absolute. He is the infinite and intelligible "surplus," and the man who by direct knowledge seeks this surplus outside of himself seeks that which "*is not.*"† There is no apparition of the Absolute except in the human personality; it is person "raised to the n^{th} power." The Absolute is the Supreme Unity which implies substantially all first principles, the complete synthesis of all egos and all non-egos.

The author has a mystical interpretation and valuation of Christ. He was "constantly and personally actuated by the Absolute." Christ is the apparition of the Word of God in the human conscience, only (to use Bossuet's expression) "more real and true than all the others." Our personality is all we have of the divine. "Should the light of history reveal to us some Personality animated with more Reason and Will than appeared in Jesus, the theological thesis, with all its consequences, would be compelled logically to transfer itself to such an One" (p. 118).

The author's reference to St. Augustine, already mentioned, would appear to be a concession that Mysticism extends its franchises only to those of a certain "temperament." Inspiration is to Faith what an intense state of consciousness is to a weak one. The ethical conception of love as the alienation of the ego, "the abdication of the me," is certainly a very unguarded statement of altruism, for the sinking of the ego is a condition precedent of the Nirvana of an obliterated individuality, the slow suicide of self-annihilation. Indeed, in his discussion of "The Mystic City" the author tells us that "back of the symbols where the mystic feels God (but have we not been told that "back of the symbols" we cannot go?) he also feels his soul

* January, 1899, p. 31. † Italics his.

identified in union with God, and thence he obtains knowledge of his immortality, without recourse to any other considerations" (p. 267). The soul is an integral part of the Absolute, and so, if the Absolute is deathless, the soul is. This is eternity, not immortality. The mystic asks no questions about the future; having alienated the ego, he has no further thought of resuming it with the persistent desire of the "will-to-live."

We doubt the gain of which the mystic boasts. Religious dogma on one side and cause-bound, empirical consciousness on the other have driven the author to find a more excellent way. We doubt his having found it. The excellencies of his thought are confined almost wholly to its inconsistencies. The Mysticism of history has not owned the safeguards which this book respects.

Indeed, is not the very effort to analyze and formulate Mysticism an inconsistency? It transcends science; it overrides philosophy; its value, as well as its "valor," is in its spontaneity, but analysis kills spontaneity. It is a strange feature of Mysticism that while it consists largely of introspection, too much introspection or of a certain kind may destroy it utterly. It must be rather consciousness than self-consciousness, for there is a truth in Bradley's remark: "To observe a feeling is, to some extent, to alter it." The mystic's habitation must be in the unexplored margin between clear consciousness and the periphery of that other part of Ribot's "total" consciousness which, accordingly, is *not clear*—the "penumbra" of consciousness. To explore, to map out, to illuminate that penumbra is, of course, to destroy it.

And so we have to say of this book that it is a strong presentation of a weak case, a clear statement of the mystic's position; but just in proportion as the statement is clear the Mysticism loses its essential characteristic, just in proportion as the daylight shines in the twilight disappears.

San Francisco. HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

Ideas from Nature. Talks with Students. By William Elder, A.M., Sc.D., Professor of Chemistry, Colby University. 12mo, pp. 202. (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society [1898].) Five calm, well-informed, thoughtful *causeries* on Design, Objections to Design, Energy, Natural Law and Miracle, and Nature a Manifestation of Law. In style and contents alike these "talks" are peculiarly attractive: there is no exaggeration either on the one side of scientific claim or on the other side of religious dogma, but an unusual precision and balance is preserved throughout. "It is indeed true of religion and science as is often said," Prof. Elder says with fine discrimination of their relations, "that each has its own province and methods, and we must not try to apply methods where they are not applicable. They are separate lines of mental activity, but they are not parallels whose only requirement of each other is that they be kept forever apart. They are ordinates springing from a common origin in the divine. All truth is one and harmonious; whatever is found to be true in one department must supplement truth in every other department. God has not called us to confusion in the intellectual sphere of our being any more than in the emotional" (p. 133). Prof. Elder's doctrine of physical causation is, to our thinking, insufficient, and will ultimate in denying any real causality outside of Will and so in identifying all the energy in the universe with the Will of God: "that continuity of cause and effect which science declares to be the rule of nature," he says, "is simply the continuity of divine activity." It is important, on the contrary, that we allow the reality of created energy as well as of created stuff. His doctrine of miracles is defective in an opposite way, as he conceives them as wrought by God by means of energy resident in the

created universe—by means of the *potentia ordinata* in a word—and so reduces them to the category of "Providential acts," in the strict theological sense of that term. Accordingly when speaking of the origin of the universe, he supposes that an intelligent observer of the process "could trace changes, more manifold truly, but not *in kind* [italics ours], different from those we see when we study the evolution of a bird from an egg" (p. 175). From a sentence like this we see that the cloven hoof of evolutionary philosophy is not wholly eradicated from the thought of even such graceful and gracious Christian scientists as Prof. Elder. The quarrel of the Christian with evolutionism turns on the precise point that, not content with providing a *schema* for the method of creation, evolution substitutes itself for the fact of creation. Men of the quality of Prof. Elder cannot indeed follow the crudity of thought characteristic of men like Haeckel and assume a process without a beginning, and they therefore postulate a primal creation: but after that primal act of creation it is apt to be all process with them—divinely led, if the Christian or even speculatively theistic conception is operative with them, but not in kind different in any step from what we see about us in the providential government of the world. One would like to know the basis of this point of view. Did God *create* the primal stuff by means of precedently present forces? Why then must He *mould* the stuff, thus created by immediate act, only by mediate activities? Through what mediate forces could, for example, the immortal soul be produced? Or, to come to the supreme point, the God-Man? The Christian man need not hesitate to allow that to an external observer the origin and development of the universe might seem to proceed without break of continuity: but he is bound to insist that there has been operative in it not merely the Divinely led forces inherent in it from the beginning, but here and there the Divine energy itself acting immediately and producing something which was not even potentially included in its precedent conditions, and which is therefore new, not merely in the sense that the undirected forces of the universe could never have brought it into being, but in the sense that it was beyond their power to produce even under the infinitely wise and powerful guidance of God and required for its production a truly creative act. This directly supernatural activity must needs be confessed for the production of the created stuff in the first instance; it must needs be confessed also in the subsequent moulding of that stuff into the forms we see about us, whenever a new stage of development is attained; and it must needs be confessed also in the production of what we call with the highest right a miracle. Prof. Elder does not seem to confess it; though otherwise his exposition of the whole doctrine of miracle is singularly well balanced and satisfactory.

II.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE BOOK OF THE TWELVE PROPHETS. By GEORGE ADAM SMITH, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Glasgow. Vol. II. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1898. 8vo, pp. xii, 541. (The Expositor's Bible Series.)

A full year has passed since the appearance of this closing volume of the Expositor's Bible Series. Perhaps no one of the many other contributors to this library of forty-nine volumes could have brought the series so well to a sustained close as Prof. George Adam Smith. Born to instruct, by making books he has rapidly become one of the most popular teachers of his generation.

Not a few have already reviewed the volume before us, and, so far as we have seen, in the most complimentary manner. We, too, wish to express our indebtedness to the author for his very suggestive and masterly production. In many respects this two-volume work on the Twelve (so-called) Minor Prophets is an extraordinary one. Prof. Smith has a genius for popular exposition, and we praise him without qualification for such a rare gift.

At the same time, we confess that we are not altogether pleased with his *critical* genius. As we pointed out in a brief critique of his first volume, in this same REVIEW, too often he allows himself to be misled by the rash vagaries of others. It is to be regretted that Prof. Smith denies the genuineness of so many sections of the prophecies contained in these twelve books. For example, it is a pity that he should still insist, in his Preface to this volume (p. ix), that Amos ix. 8–15 is not authentic. For, in consequence of this, he finds himself forced, on the same grounds, to reject the closing verses of Zephaniah's prophecies (iii. 14–20), which he claims are, like Amos ix. 8–15, either exilic or early postexilic (cf. ii, pp. 44, 45). Thus, by what, in our judgment, is a false canon of criticism, he mars the symmetry, and therefore the beauty, of both Amos and Zephaniah.

Likewise, in his criticism of Zech. ix–xiv, which is popularly assigned by modern expositors to a Greek date, he agrees with Stade (*Z. A. W.*, 1881–2) that these oracles were written between 300 and 280 B.C. But in doing so he really minimizes (p. 459) the similarities in thought, diction, etc., between chaps. ix–xiv and i–viii, and, on the other hand, exaggerates, though unconsciously, no doubt, the differences. He finds, for example, that the historical circumstances reflected in the two parts of the book are quite unlike (p. 459); that in chaps. i–viii the whole earth is described (cf. i. 11) as at peace, whereas in chaps. ix–xiv all is changed (pp. 459, 460). But, in arguing thus, he forgets his perplexity, expressed on p. 284, over the angels' report that "the whole earth lies quiet," when at that very time (519 B.C.) the great revolts against Darius were in active progress. The natural conclusion to be drawn from such a circumstance, to our mind, would rather be that chaps. ix–xiv describe, even more accurately than chaps. i–viii, the *true* historical situation of Zechariah's period, and that, therefore, they need not be assigned to another age, nor sundered from the Prophet's own writings. And again, when he says (p. 449), "The peace and the love of peace, in which Zechariah wrote, has disappeared," excepting in the passage ix. 10–12 which, in a footnote on the same page, he apparently discards as "strangely out of place in the rest of ix–xiv," yet, as a matter of fact, reclaims on p. 468.

Or, take the case of Joel: On p. 379 he argues that Joel must have lived after the exile, as "no other Hebrew document from before the exile speaks of Greece," and that the *arrangement* of the Prophets counts for nothing, as "the exilic Obadiah and the postexilic Jonah" both stand before Micah;—which is rhetoric rather than logic or argument.

But, again, one's attention is arrested by our author's disposition of the Book of Jonah, when compared with his treatment of Hosea i–iii. Not many decades ago the prevailing opinion was that of these two prophecies the Book of Jonah is historical, while Hosea i–iii is an allegory or parable. Now, on the contrary, Hosea i–iii is considered by many to be historical, whereas the Book of Jonah is parabolic. Prof. Smith shares this modern view. But it is not his disposition of these prophecies which really strikes the reader, but the *reasons* which he assigns for so interpreting them.

For example, on p. 493 he remarks: "The Book of Jonah is cast throughout in the form of narrative," and on p. 498 he further remarks, "It offers to us all the marks of the parable or allegory." Turning, however, to

Vol. i (p. 236), we find this statement concerning Hosea i–iii: "The style betrays narrative rather than parable." In other words, in Vol. i Hosea i–iii is *narrative rather than parable;* whereas in Vol. ii Jonah is both *narrative and parable.* What our author means is surely not very clear. Going on with his interpretation of the Book of Jonah, he tells us (p. 496) that the story is based on the historical Jonah of Gathhepher, who flourished in the reign of Jeroboam II, and then proceeds to explain his history as though a parable. This is very attractive and to many minds satisfactory enough, but we are inclined to ask before we accept of it: Do the parables contained in the Bible ever have historical personages as their basis? Is it even consistent with the nature and definition of a parable that it should contain things difficult to be believed (*e. g.*, the miracle of the fish)? In parables are not the thought and fact one, requiring little or no effort to perceive and believe? Does not Jonah's story resemble those of Elijah and Elisha so closely that if these were intended by their authors to be historical, so was the Book of Jonah by its author? If a parable and written by a postexilic author, as is alleged, why attached to the name of Jonah? (Prof. Smith confesses on p. 605 that herein lies a difficulty.) Is it not possible that some unknown Prophet of the eighth century may have recorded Jonah's mission and intended it as history? On this hypothesis the book would be history with a purpose quite as much as though dating from postexilic times, and with this advantage, that the author would be relieved of all historical anachronisms. Moreover, it should be observed that other allegories or parables in the Old Testament usually have their accompanying explanations or applications, whereas Jonah has none (cf. Isa. v. 1–7; 2 Sam. xii. 1–7, xiv. 1f.; 1 Kgs. xx. 39-41, etc.).

The general plan of Prof. Smith's work is good. The greatest care has been taken to paint the historical background of the Prophets. Introductory chapters on the Seventh Century and on the Persian and Greek Periods are given in their appropriate places to contribute to this end. He treats the prophets chronologically, as does Wellhausen, and reaches conclusions concerning their individual dates which closely resemble those of the celebrated German. Prof. Smith's dates are as follows: Amos, ca. 755 B.C.; Hosea, 743–734; Micah, 720f. (a unit and from the reign of Hezekiah); Zephaniah, ca. 625; Nahum, either 625 or 608; Habakkuk, 608–605; Obadiah, early exilic (or shortly after 586); Haggai, 520; Zechariah i-viii, 520–518; Malachi, before 445; Joel, 410–404; Zech. ix-xiv, 300–280, and Jonah, ca. 300 B.C.

Comparatively few typographical errors occur, but the following need correction: 605, not 506 (p. 118); 12, not 11 (p. 124, last line); ver. 2, not ver. 26 (p. 151); Obd. vii, not ix (p. 166); vi. 8, not vi. 9 (p. 255); Neh., not Neb. (p. 335), and Introd.[5] 301, or Introd.[6] 322, not Introd.[6] 301 (p. 498, n. 2). As a whole, the work is of great value, and is sure to prove a most helpful companion to the study of the Twelve Prophets.

Chicago. GEORGE L. ROBINSON.

KRITISCH-EXEGETISCHER KOMMENTAR ÜBER DAS NEUE TESTAMENT BEGRÜNDET VON H. A. W. MEYER. DER BRIEF DES JACOBUS, von der 4. Auflage an bearbeitet von Dr. WILLIBALD BEYSCHLAG, ord. Prof. an d. Univ. Halle. Sechste verbesserte Auflage. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1898. Pp. 238.

We cannot too heartily thank Prof. Beyschlag for this new edition of the *Commentary on the Epistle of James* in the Meyer series. It is very opportune, since this Epistle, always a problem in New Testament criticism,

has recently been treated in two opposite ways, both of which proceed on thoroughly false views of the rise of early Christian literature. On the one hand, certain critics, represented especially by Spitta, have sought to show that it was a purely Jewish document with a few Christian interpolations. On the other hand, another class of critics, represented best by Harnack, have sought to relegate it to a late period, and conceive it as a Gentile document representative of the Christian legalism into which Christianity is said to have soon degenerated after the influence of Paul had ceased. Obviously these two views are mutually destructive. Prof. Beyschlag, in his brief but cogent introduction, shows that they are both wrong. He attributes the Epistle to James, the Lord's brother. He shows that its readers were the Jewish Christians of the dispersion, especially those in Syria. He forcibly proves that no other class of readers can the writer have had in view: that the allusions to their situation are definite and clear; and that the Epistle must be dated before the beginning of Paul's missionary work, or at any rate before it had made much progress. As against Spitta, he admirably defends the Christian character of the Epistle. He shows that while the writer was indeed well versed in the Old Testament and in the Jewish Wisdom-literature, he and his readers were Christians; that they had been baptized, trusted in Jesus as the exalted Messiah, belonged to Christian conventicles, and that the Epistle is saturated with the teaching of Jesus. As against Harnack, he shows that the Epistle was written to a definite circle of Jewish Christians who were so situated as no Jewish Christians can be conceived to have been in the second century, and that his so-called legalism is not that, *e. g.*, of Barnabas, but is only the spiritual interpretation of the law, such as is given by Christ Himself, from the standpoint of Judaism. Beyschlag also finds in James no reference to the Pauline doctrine of faith and aptly shows that, if such were intended, the author would certainly have gone much further than he did. The false faith against which he warns is the characteristic Jewish confidence in their orthodoxy, which naturally appeared among the Christians also—all the more because of their conviction that Jesus was the true Messiah—and in which they were tempted to repose without bringing forth its spirit in appropriate works. As against Jülicher, also, Beyschlag defends the intelligibility and naturalness of the order of thought in the Epistle.

But the best part of his argument is that which shows that among the Jewish Christians such religious temptations and difficulties as the Epistle reflects were possible within ten to twenty years after Pentecost. The contrary opinion has recently been put forth. It is said that such worldliness and loss of enthusiasm could not then have existed among Christians. But Beyschlag aptly points to the faults of the Corinthians five years after their church had been established. Moreover, the delay of the Parousia, the oppression by their rich fellow-countrymen, the influence of their commercial habits and civil contentions would tend to create just such discouragement and temptations as the writer warns against. On the other hand, the religious ideas of James centre around the spiritual interpretation of the law, under the influence of the new life begotten through the word of Jesus: and this is just what we might expect of a converted and devout Jew in the earliest period. The motive for specific theological development was as yet wanting; hence the lack of it in this Epistle.

The Commentary itself is brief. The author amusingly complains of the demand in our days for "vest-pocket Commentaries." His work, however, is sufficiently thorough, and shows long reflection on the details of the Epistle. We regret to note that in iv. 5, he accepts the Textus Receptus κατῴκησεν, instead of κατῴκισεν, as read by Tisch and Westcott-Hort, and

so, we think, misses another proof of the Christian character of the Epistle. In ii. 1, he makes τῆς δόξης a genitive of quality after the whole clause τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, so that it describes the Lord Jesus Christ as the exalted Messiah. He thus rejects the tempting construction, which J. B. Mayor is disposed to favor, of regarding it as in apposition with the preceding clause—a construction which is a very easy one, and suggests a thought quite natural for a Jewish Christian.

Princeton. GEORGE T. PURVES.

Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, as Edited and Enlarged by E. Kautzsch, Professor of Theology in the University of Halle. Translated from the Twenty-fifth German Edition by the late Rev. G. W. Collins, M.A.; the translation revised and adjusted to the Twenty-sixth Edition by A. E. Cowley, M.A. 8vo, pp. xvi, 598. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press; New York: Henry Frowde, 1898.) Books are not so much made in Germany as they grow: and as they grow they are apt to change very much in character. This is preëminently true of the Hebrew grammar which still bears the name of William Gesenius. It first appeared in 1813, a small octavo of about two hundred pages, designed to introduce beginners to the study of Hebrew. From the first the book was successful, as it well deserved to be, and ran rapidly through fourteen editions during the lifetime of the author. After Gesenius' death six more editions appeared at intervals from 1845 to 1872, cared for by Dr. E. Rödiger; succeeded by (thus far) five more from 1878 to 1896, under the editorial hand of Prof. Kautzsch. From the first the method of Gesenius (for the nature of which see König, *Lehrgeb.*, i, § 2) exercised great influence among English-speaking scholars. Prof. Stuart's Hebrew Grammar, for example, was substantially a reproduction of Gesenius, and Nordheimer's well-known grammar followed the same system in its essential features. The eleventh edition of Gesenius' (Halle, 1834) was translated in 1839 by Dr. T. J. Conant, and Rödiger's seventeenth edition by the same scholar in 1846, while Rödiger's twentieth edition was put into an English form by Dr. B. Davies in 1869, and reissued, revised on the basis of Kautzsch, by Dr. E. C. Mitchell in 1880. Now we have this new translation from the twenty-fifth and -sixth editions of Kautzsch from the hands of two English scholars. Meanwhile, as the German Gesenius has grown to be something very different from the Gesenius of 1813, so our new English Gesenius is something very different from the Conant-Gesenius of 1839. The point of view has very considerably changed, and what was one-sided in Gesenius' grammatical method has been largely corrected. The attitude of the grammarian to the sources for the language has very greatly altered, and the whole historical growth of the language is approached from a totally new standpoint. Above all, however, the purpose of the book has been gradually modified, and additions have been made to its text of such a kind and to such an extent that it has been transformed from a *Hebräisches Elementarbuch* into something very like an *Ausführliches grammatisch-kritisches Lehrgebäude der hebräischen Sprache*, and has a better right to stand now as the successor of Gesenius' work of that name, which appeared in 1817, than of the primary *Grammatik* of 1813. It is certainly no longer a book for beginners. It is now rather an admirably compressed comprehensive handbook of the language for advanced students, crowded with observations and discussions on all sorts of interesting or puzzling points, and provided with a rich conspectus of and index to the current literature of investigation; and, we must add, made fully "modern" in every sense of that word. It is not necessary here, however, to describe in any detail so well-known a book as the Kautzsch-Gesenius. What is novel with respect

to the present volume concerns only its English form. The name of the Clarendon Press guarantees, of course, something very like perfection in the manufacture of the volume: and nothing indeed better in this line could be desired than this handsome book, with its clear open type, excellent paper and admirable presswork. The translator's work too has been done with exceptional skill and combined fidelity and freedom. Very wisely, little has been attempted beyond the translation—or rather the transfusion—of the German text into simple and clear English. A number of references to English books and supplementary remarks have been added, ordinarily enclosed within square brackets; but the work remains Kautzsch's and preserves both the section numbers and marginal alphabet by which references may be readily identified. Except for the critical standpoint occupied—which unfortunately affects even a grammar, though, as we may be happy to acknowledge, chiefly in the somewhat subsidiary sphere of the history of forms and usages—the book is very much a model of what such a book ought to be; and for English students, at all events, is in its English form much preferable to the original German. The Clarendon Press has such a fine regard for the eyes and æsthetic feelings of students!—*Vetus Testamentum in Novo.* Die alttestamentlichen Parallelen des Neuen Testaments im Wortlaut der Urtexte und der Septuaginta zusammengestellt von W. Dittmar, Pfarrer in Walldorf (Hessen). 1. Hälfte: Evangelien und Apostelgeschichte. 8vo, pp. vii, 176. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1899; New York: Lemcke und Buechner.) The literature that has been devoted to the study of the use the New Testament makes of the Old has become very large. The first formal treatise on the subject seems to have been Francis Junius' *Sacrorum Parallelorum Libri Tres*, published in the first decade of the seventeenth century. The latest lies before us. Between the two is ranged a long series—each of which has some contribution of its own to make to the understanding of the matter. The most recent treatises in German and English precedent to Pastor Dittmar's—Dr. Franklin Johnson's *The Quotations of the New Testament from the Old* (1896) and Dr. August Clemen's *Der Gebrauch des Alten Testamentes in der neutestamentlichen Schriften* (1895)—are elaborate discussions, the one of the manner and propriety of the quotations and the other of the nature of the use made of the Old Testament by the New Testament writers. The present book stands in strong contrast with these, in that it contains nothing but the text of the quotations along with the Old Testament texts with which they are compared—to which is adjoined no single word of comment. It essays purely to lay before the reader the sifted materials for studying the quotations in their actual form. It takes its place thus rather with the works which collect the quotations than with those which discuss them. Of these there already exist a considerable number—the latest of which is Dr. C. H. Toy's *Quotations in the New Testament* (1884), which has much the same end in view as the present volume. Dr. Toy's work differs from the present volume, however, in that it does not content itself with merely exhibiting the quotations alongside of the Old Testament texts, but adds a critical discussion to each. Here we have nothing at all but the bare text. It must not be hastily inferred, however, that Pastor Dittmar's volume is therefore the less valuable one and has no special contribution of its own to make to our better understanding of these quotations. Quite the contrary is the case: and we would not willingly spare his additions to what we find elsewhere. In the first place, though he prints nothing but the bare texts, he gives us in every case critical texts. The New Testament text is taken from Nestle's edition of 1898, with an eye open to any significant variations in the several transmissions. The LXX. ext is taken from Swete's edition, and the significant variations from it are

also noted. In the next place the most extreme care is taken in comparing the New Testament with the Old Textament texts, and by a series of printer's devices the reader's attention is called without labor on his own part to the following cases: the agreements of the New Testament text with both the Massoretic Hebrew and Septuagint Greek; its unlikenesses with both; its agreements with the Massoretic against the Septuagint; with the Septuagint against the Massoretic; with various readings of the Septuagint; with various readings of the Septuagint when they accord with the Massoretic; with a parallel passage to the passage actually quoted. In the third place the collection of passages is much more comprehensive than that found in any of its predecessors, as it essays to include not merely the formal citations from the Old Testament, but also all the silent allusions to and adoptions of Old Testament language found in the pages of the New Testament. Thus, for example, in Matt. i, Toy adduces but a single quotation; Dittmar records nine. By a series of signs he seeks to distinguish this larger material into three classes: citations in the narrowest sense of the word; quotations in a broader sense; and mere occasional adoption of words. Thus he prevents the reader from being overwhelmed by what might otherwise seem a real embarrassment of riches. By these three peculiarities, Pastor Dittmar's book easily wins a justification for itself in the face of all that has been done in this field before, and places in the hands of the modern student another instrument of precision which he will not be able to do without in his study of the subject. We observe that this "first half" is issued as a sort of experiment and the work will be completed only in case that its sale is encouraging. It is to be hoped that the response will be such as to secure its completion.——*Primeval Revelation.* Studies in Genesis i-viii. By J. Cynddylan Jones, D.D. The "Davies Lecture" for 1896. 12mo, pp. xiii, 366. (London: Hodder & Soughton, 1897; New York: The American Tract Society.) The "Davies Lecture" is an annual lecture delivered before the General Assembly of the Welsh Calvinistic Methodists, on a foundation established by Mr. Thomas Davies, of Bootle, near Liverpool, in memory of his sainted father. The second lecture, that of 1895, was delivered by the distinguished educator and scholar, Dr. T. C. Edwards, Principal of the Theological College at Bala, and under the title of *The God-Man* was duly published, according to the provisions of the Trust. It was a lecture distinguished by the author's well-known thoughtfulness and learning—and especially by its thoroughly "modern" tone and spirit. A notice of it may be found in this REVIEW for April, 1896 (Vol. vii, p. 367). Mr. Jones' lecture of 1896—its immediate successor—differs very markedly from Dr. Edwards'. It is the work of a man of wide culture rather than of exact erudition, and its tone and spirit take hold of the tested thinking of the past rather than reach out eagerly—too eagerly—after the novelties of the present, which may, after all, prove to be the wonder rather than the seed of the future. Mr. Jones' general theme was "Mosaic Theology," but in this volume he has given us only the first section of his contemplated subject, namely, that on "Primeval Revelation" as distinguished from "Patriarchal Revelation" and "Sinaitic Revelation"—sections which are yet to come. The lectures are written vigorously and are opulently illustrated and present in a most attractive way the substance of the teaching of the first eight chapters of the book of Genesis. The tone of the book is markedly reverent: the narrative is treated soberly and with sound judgment, and in a spirit of trust both in the truthfulness and in the pregnancy of its message—in a word, frankly as a portion of the Word of God, profitable for the instruction of the man of God even of our century. The teaching drawn from it is shortly the evangelical Gospel: and this is pressed on the attention of the

reader with zeal and with winning candor. Of course, a few things are said with which we will not all quite agree: an occasional slip is made in fact, or inference, or doctrine. But these are minor matters: the book is a thoroughly good book and will refresh the mind and heart of every sympathetic reader. Its significance is indeed far deeper than merely that it is a restatement of fundamental old truths, held far too lightly by the men of this generation. Its real significance lies in this: that it is in its very form and methods and all its contents a protest against the merely atomistic, pedantic, philologico-critical study of these old documents now so fashionable, in favor of a vital, sympathetic, religious study of them. "Under the stress of the evolution theory," we read in the Preface, "theologians of repute are endeavoring to get, not as much, but as little, meaning as they possibly can out of the early narratives of the Bible. . . . . Has the principle of Old Testament interpretation, as illustrated in the Epistles to the Romans, and Galatians, and especially in the Epistle to the Hebrews, been invalidated? Development implies a beginning as well as an end, germs as well as fruit. . . . . Is it a healthy tendeucy of the modern theological mind to be thus continually endeavoring to reduce the Christian faith to a minimum, to be always asking not how much, but how little, we may believe?" These are searching questions. And it is the prime merit of Dr. Jones' Davies Lecture that he essays to advance us in this better path to which Christian feet ever return when they are led by the Spirit of Christ rather than the spirit of the times.——*Colossian Studies.* Lessons in Faith and Holiness from St. Paul's Epistles to the Colossians and Philemon. By H. C. G. Moule, D.D., Principal of Ridley Hall, and formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 12mo, pp. xi, 318. (London: Hodder & Stoughton; New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1898.) We have only recently (see this REVIEW for January last, p. 159) had occasion to welcome the delightful *Philippian Studies* with which Principal Moule—now, happily for Cambridge and the advancement of a sound and reverent New Testament scholarship in that ancient seat of learning, Norrisian Professor of Divinity at Cambridge—supplemented in the interests of practical religion his more scholastic commentary on that epistle, published in the "Cambridge Bible for Schools." In the present volume he does the same for his Commentary on Colossians and Philemon in the same series. No more serviceable gift could be given to devout students of the Word than these richly suggestive volumes. Founded on the most minute scholastic study of the text of the epistles, brooded over in a mind thoroughly furnished with every good point of view and accustomed to devotional meditation, touched with a poetic strain of feeling, they give us the very essence of the Word. Prof. Moule's sole purpose, after ascertaining the exact sense of the written words, he tells us, "has been to bring out for the reader's notice some of those inexhaustible messages for the soul which the study of the God-given utterances of the apostle has carried home to" himself. What he has given us comes from a heart well instructed in the mysteries of the Word and goes directly to the heart.——*Die biblische Geschichte des Neuen Testaments.* Kurze Auslegung der Evangelien und Apostelgeschichte, von G. Stöckhardt, Professor am Concordia-Seminar zu St. Louis, Mo. 8vo, pp. xvi, 408. (St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Publishing House, 1898.) To his *Biblical History of the Old Testament*, Prof. Stöckhardt now adds this *Biblical History of the New Testament*, thus completing the comprehensive survey he proposed to himself of the whole historical material comprised in the Scriptures. He adverts in the Preface to the essential difference in the form of the material provided by the New Testament, and the corresponding difference in the method adopted in reproducing the Biblical record. The Old Testament history is

more simply, broadly, diffusively written—as befitted the stage of development of those for whose guidance it was primarily set down: the history of the New Testament is written in a more concise and pregnant form, befitting the needs of those who lived and read in the fullness of the times. Accordingly a chief task in the reproducing of the Old Testament history was to bring together and exhibit the salient points in the narrative, while the development of the rich contents of the compressed text becomes the historian's main concern in the case of the New Testament. This gives the present volume more of the character of an exegetical and after that of a harmonizing exercise than was true of its companion: and, indeed, the book has much the appearance of a concise, historical commentary on the Harmony of the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. The work is done with care, with appreciation of the problems raised, with fine readableness, and in a spirit of clear and decided confidence in the detailed trustworthiness of the Biblical narrative.

III.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

ANECDOTA OXONIENSIA. THE DIALOGUES OF ATHANASIUS AND ZACCHÆUS AND OF TIMOTHY AND AQUILA. Edited, with Prolegomena and Facsimiles, by FRED. C. CONYBEARE, M.A., formerly Fellow of University College, Oxford. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press; New York: Henry Frowde, 1898. 4to, pp. lix, 104.

Among the neglected sources for the early history of Christianity which our own age is recovering and utilizing, not the lowest place may be assigned to the monuments of the Christian polemic against Judaism. This anti-Judaic polemic seems to have had the form of dialogue impressed upon it by the example of its earliest instances. Justin's *Dialogue with Trypho* has been preserved to our own day and has stood as the type of such compositions through nearly two millenniums. But an even deeper influence would seem to have been exerted on the popular mind by a dialogue which may have been even earlier than Justin's, the lost *Dialogue of Papiscus and Jason*. And not the least interest of scholars in their investigation of the extant examples of literature of this type turns on their hope of recovering some knowledge of the contents of this older work. This was the motive, for example, of Harnack's study of the *Altercatio Simonis;* and the search after hints of such an underlying document gives form to Mr. Conybeare's prolegomena to the two interesting texts which he has now for the first time given to print. The two dialogues themselves which are here printed are not of very early date. The former seems to belong to the early fourth century, and the latter is considerably later. But Mr. Conybeare thinks that they both rest on a much older common document, on which Tertullian also, to name no later writers, was dependent, and perhaps even Irenæus and Justin. It is very natural that he should wish to see in this lost original the old *Dialogue of Papiscus and Jason*. We cannot profess to look upon Mr. Conybeare as a very safe guide in critical inquiries of this kind. His criticism strikes us as commonly not only extremely subjective, but overacute and, indeed, unbalanced; and in this very discussion he appears to us to overshoot the mark in more than one important item, notably in his treatment of certain citations from the Gospel narrative found in the *Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila*, behind which we see no reason for surmising, as he does, something other than the canonical sources. But he expends a wealth of learning on his expositions, and we do not see why his general conclusion may not be tentatively assumed—which is all, indeed, that he recommends to us.

The text of the *Dialogue of Athanasius and Zacchæus* is taken from a Vienna MS. of not later than the twelfth century, collated with the old Armenian version, which was made about the opening of the eighth century. That of the *Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila* is taken from a Vatican codex of the twelfth century. The former is printed in large, bold type, well leaded, and is accompanied by a copious body of illustrative notes. The latter, "because of its extreme prolixity which deterred Angelo Mai from printing it," is "relegated to the obscurity of an Appendix," where it appears in small but clear type, and accompanied with few notes beyond the indication of parallels with the accompanying dialogue. Despite this, however, it presents more points of interest in its contents than its fellow, and it is from its text that Mr. Conybeare takes the starting-point for his discussions.

Probably the most interesting passage in either dialogue is the enumeration of the books of the Canon at the opening of the *Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila*. This presents some peculiarities, and even though coming from a late date deserves remark, while if it should chance to represent an early document excerpted by the writer it is eminently worthy of study. The passage runs as follows:

"And it came to pass on the morrow, as they were sitting in the place called the Dromus" [*i.e.*, as Mr. Conybeare explains, p. liv, the "public promenade at Alexandria, a place where rhetorical displays took place"], "and a great audience was collected, that the Jew began by saying, 'From what sort of books do you mean to make your argument, sirrah?' Timothy the Christian said, 'You do not reject any book of the Law and the Prophets?' The Jew said, 'May God Almighty forbid that I should despise any part of the inspired Scriptures (τι τῶν θεοπνεύστων γραφῶν) . . . . .' The Jew said, 'What kind of books are they from which you mean to make the discussion with me?' The Christian said, 'Since there are also certain other books, that are apocryphal, I will enumerate them to you: for they are those that are in the Testament of God, which also the Hebrew translators translated, alike Aquila and Symmachus and Theodotion; two others also, however, were found hidden in jars: one in Jericho and the other in Nicopolis, the same is Emmaus. But who translated them we do not know: for they were found in the days of the desolation that happened to the Jews under Vespasian. These, then, are the inspired books (αἱ θεόπνευστοι βίβλοι), both with the Christians and with the Hebrews:—the first book is Genesis, second Exodus, third Leviticus, fourth Numbers: these are those that were dictated (ὑπαγορευθεῖσαι) by the mouth of God and written by the hand of Moses: the fifth book is Deuteronomy, which was not dictated (ὑπαγορευθέντα) by the mouth of God, wherefore neither was it placed in the Arôna, that is in the Ark of the Covenant. This is the Mosaic Pentateuch. The second book is sixthly that of Numbers; seventhly the Judges along with Ruth: the eighth book is the Paraleipomena, first and second: the ninth book is the Kings, first and second. The tenth book is the third and fourth of the Kings: eleventh, Job: twelfth, the Psalter of David: thirteenth, the Proverbs of Solomon. Fourteenth, Ecclesiastes, together with the Songs. Fifteenth, the Twelve Prophets, Isaiah, Jeremiah: and again Ezekiel: then Daniel and again Esdras twentieth: and the twenty-first book is Judith: the twenty-second, Esther, for the seventy-two translators have transmitted to us in the Apocrypha Tobit, and the Wisdom of Solomon and the Wisdom of the Son of Sirach. These twenty-two books are the inspired and canonical ones (αἱ θεόπνευστοι καὶ ἐνδιάθετοι): there being really twenty-six, but counted as twenty-two, because [three] of them are double: and according to the letters of the Hebrew alphabet. All the rest, however, are of the Apocrypha.' The Jew said, 'And of what sort are those handed down to you which you call the New Covenant?' The Christian said, 'What is the need of these?' The Jew said, 'That just as you think to convict me from the Collection (διαθέτου), I, too, may convict you from your Covenant.' The Christian said, 'The first book is the Gospel, then the Acts of the holy Apostles: and again their Epistles, and the fourteen Epistles of Paul: these are what we have: and all the rest are Apocrypha: and if you mean to adduce anything out of the Apocrypha, you will yourself have to do the listening'" (p. 66).

Mr. Conybeare calls attention to the resemblances between this list and the Catalogue of Epiphanius: he might have compared it also with the Catalogue of Cyril of Jerusalem—with which, especially in the New Testament portion, it shows striking affinities. It bears a distinct flavor, indeed, of the Palestinian tradition and that of an earlier date than any that can be assigned to the *Dialogue* in which it occurs: it so far, therefore, supports Mr. Conybeare's conjecture that this *Dialogue* rests on preëxistent material.

What is meant by the denial of divine "dictation" to the book of Deuter-

onomy and the consequent exclusion of it from the Ark is not at first sight apparent—unless, indeed, it rests merely on the observation that this book consists professedly of "words of Moses" rather than of direct words of God, and so looks back to some such distinction as that which Philo (*De Vita Mosis*, iii, 23) draws between the oracles given "in the person of God" (ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ), those put in the form of dialogue, and those delivered ἐκ προσώπου Μωϋσεώς—all three being, nevertheless, alike χρησμοί, because written ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς βίβλοις. It is clear that the Christian collocutor here classes Deuteronomy in the θεόπνευστοι βίβλοι, though representing it as not "dictated by the mouth of God," and therefore not deposited in the Ark. One would like to know whether there are other traces in early Christian or Jewish literature of this discrimination among the inspired books between those actually dictated and others only inspired.

We cannot lay great stress on the occurrence of this point of view here, for we are made quickly aware of the popular rather than, so to say, authoritative character of these dialogues, on the most cursory reading of them. It will be remembered that it is so that Origen, with generous appreciation and yet unmistakable meaning, speaks of their prototype, the *Dialogue of Papiscus and Jason* (*Contra Celsum*, iv, 52): it was τὸ εὐτελέστερον among Christian explanations of the prophets of the Old Covenant, better adapted for the reading of the unlearned than for serious students. It is easy to ascribe too great significance to the oddities of such popular treatises: our own age would scarcely like to be judged by its examples of purely popular religious thought. But to one who knows how to distinguish between the significance of popular religious notions and the trend of theological thinking, there lies a rich field of investigation in these documents of the people, which ought to be much more fully worked than has heretofore been done. There is a danger, however, that in attempting to fit these lucubrations of the lower strata into the course of theological thinking going on contemporaneously in the more authoritative strata of the Christian community, we shall only produce confusion worse confounded. Mr. Conybeare does not escape this danger, and his readers must allow for his errors here.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

Neglected Factors in the Study of the Progress of Christianity. By the Rev. James Orr, D.D., Professor of Church History in the United Presbyterian Theological College, Edinburgh. 12mo, pp. 235. (London: Hodder & Stoughton; New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1899.) These delightfully written lectures, which are worthily set out in a daintily printed volume, were originally prepared for the Mansfield Summer School, Oxford, 1894, and subsequently delivered at Auburn Theological Seminary as the course of Morgan Lectures for 1897. The main impulse which inspires them seems to be a natural desire to set over against the one-sided investigation of the influence of heathenism on the Christianity planted in its midst, which has dominated the study of early Church history of late, an effective reminder of the more important influence of Christianity upon the heathenism into the midst of which it was cast, which constitutes the fundamental fact in the history of the early Church. As a matter of fact, it was Christianity that conquered heathenism, and not *vice versa*, though in their zeal to trace the remainders of heathenism taken up into the conquering Christian system and preserved in it like flies in amber, many modern writers seem to lose here all sense of proportion and discrimination of values. It is possible, certainly, that they too are emphasizing a somewhat neglected factor in the early history of Christianity, and that we needed to be reminded that even Nicene Christianity (no less than modern Christianity) is not a pure tran-

script of apostolic Christianity, but necessarily has in it an infusion of heathen thought: and we who, with wider cast glance, look on from a somewhat higher level surely ought not to begrudge to the modern investigator (who seems often to be able to entertain but one idea at a time), as he discovered a few years ago that the New Testament was written by Jews and preserves traces of Jewish modes of thought within its structure, so now also to discover that the earliest stages of Christian thought were wrought out by Greeks and preserve traces of Greek thought in their structure. We may fairly hope that after awhile, when all the elements have been thus one by one in turn exploited, the pendulum will settle down to the sober, comprehensive view of the Christian origins which the docile may even now learn from accredited teachers. Meanwhile, while the blinding enthusiasm for the influence of heathen thought on the formation of early Christianity is reigning, it comes with the value of a delicious piece of quiet sarcasm for Dr. Orr to remind the students of early Church history that the real problem after all concerns the influence of Christianity on the heathen world, and to point out in his admirable fashion how this greater problem has of late been minimized and pushed aside and neglected. "There has been much investigation" of late, he tells us, "into the modes and results of the influx of Pagan ideas and associations into Christianity, but there has not been the same carefulness in inquiring whether the flow was all on one side, whether, as is antecedently probable, there was not a current *outward* corresponding to the current *inward*—to borrow a term from science, an exosmose corresponding to the endosmose—and what the strength of this outward current might be" (p. 19). The neglect of the real problem of early Church history thus charged on recent historical investigation, Dr. Orr proceeds to exhibit by showing in turn that Christianity had a much larger early influence in the Roman empire than is ordinarily recognized, as well *laterally*, *vertically* and *intensively*. These three terms provide the subjects of the three lectures. The first of them investigates the rapidity of the diffusion of Christianity through the empire, and shows that the greatness of its victory has been ordinarily very much underestimated, and that whenever the veil is in any degree lifted for us, whether by monumental or by literary evidence, we see a rapid and widespread conquest of the world going on, such as will force us to increase very materially the ordinary estimates of the number of Christians in the empire at every salient date. The second lecture investigates the character and condition of those apparently more especially reached by the Christian propaganda, with the effect of correcting the common view that it made its first conquests chiefly amid the lowest classes—the scum of the cities—and establishing the fact that while Christianity appealed to men of all classes with power, it was chiefly among those whom we should know to-day as the solid middle class that it made its largest gains. In the third lecture is investigated the effect which Christianity had on the thought and life and usages of the society which most resisted its conquest—on the section of society which in the face of its pressure remained heathen—with the effect of showing that it permeated the whole fabric of heathen thought and life and transformed it to a new soundness and vitality. The whole presents a most engaging picture of the effects of Christianity on the heathen society on which it impinged, and gives the reader a more succinct and convincing view of the working of the new leaven in its leavening of the world than he will easily find elsewhere.——*Calvin's Prädestinationslehre.* Ein Beitrag zur Würdigung der Eigenart seiner Theologie und Religiosität. Von Lic. Dr. Max Scheibe, Privatdozent an der Universität Halle. 8vo, pp. 126. (Halle a. S.: Max Niemeyer, 1897.) This is a careful and informing study of the whole body of Calvin's teaching as to predestination, with a view to

determining not what that doctrine is—a matter on which there is no room for serious divergence of opinion—but what were the determining motives that led Calvin to the adoption of this doctrine and what place it occupies in his theological system and in his general religious conception. After a short introduction, in which the existing variety of opinion on these points is noted, the book is divided into two parts. In the first of these an exposition is given of Calvin's several deliverances on the subject in chronological order. This is minutely and carefully done: and lays before the reader in abstract the whole material for forming a judgment. In the second part the problems whose solution it is the object of the book to advance are directly attacked. Scheibe seeks to trace a growth in Calvin's conception of predestination from the incidental hints of the first edition of the *Institutes* (1536), in which it appears only in a soteriological relation, to the full-blown doctrine as it appears, for example, in the last edition of the *Institutes* cared for by Calvin (1559), where it has attained a cosmological significance. In this we cannot account Scheibe to have been successful. The allusions to the doctrine in the first edition of the *Institutes* are no doubt only incidental, and are meagre enough: but they contain the core of the doctrine as subsequently more fully taught by Calvin, and the very meagreness of the allusions is the sufficient account of the incompleteness of the statement: and we must not overlook the fact that the Genevan Catechism of the very next year contains in essence the whole doctrine. Neither do we think that Scheibe is successful in tracing Calvin's first impulse to lay stress on the glory of God as the end of all his activities to the specific influence of Jaques Lefévre d'Estaples; or in tracing forms of statement or conception made use of by him to the specific influence of Martin Bucer. These conceptions were part of the common property of the Reformation movement, and go back directly to Augustine, and behind him to Paul. On the other hand, however, we look upon the main contention of the volume—Scheibe's attempt to find a middle ground between the extreme opinions represented by Schweizer (who would make Calvin's doctrine of predestination the central and formative doctrine of his system) and by Ritschl (who would look upon it as an alien excrescence on his system)—as eminently successful. His exhibition of Calvin's doctrine of predestination as an element in his system secondary in origin to his doctrine of salvation by faith in Christ, but essential to the integrity of his systematic construction, and especially precious to him just because it guarded his doctrine of salvation by free grace alone, seems to us to be quite unassailable. So also does his exhibition of the religious roots of Calvin's doctrine of predestination, and his rejection of the idea that it was the outgrowth of a merely speculative or even merely exegetical process. The truth seems to be that to Calvin, as to Augustine, the primary importance of this doctrine was distinctly soteriological, and Calvin's earnest proclamation of it even in its cosmological reference was primarily due to the clearness of his perception that this doctrine of God alone comported with a doctrine of salvation by free grace alone. The merit of Scheibe's treatment is that he perceives this general fact, and that in bringing it out he marshals the details with great fullness and makes even the *nuances* of Calvin's teaching clear to us.——*Addresses at the Celebration of the Two Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the Westminster Assembly by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A.* Edited by the Rev. Wm. Henry Roberts, D.D., LL.D. 12mo, pp. 342. (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1898.)——McCormick Theological Seminary. *The Celebration of the Two Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the Adoption of the Westminster Standards*, and the Inauguration of the Rev. J. Ross Stevenson, D.D., as Professor of Ecclesiastical History. 12mo, pp.

82. (Chicago: Published by the Board of Directors [1898].)——*The Significance of the Westminster Standards as a Creed.* An Address delivered before the Presbytery of New York, November 8, 1897, on the Occasion of the Celebration of the Two Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the Completion of the Westminster Standards. By Benjamin B. Warfield, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton. 12mo, pp. 36. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898.)——*Addresses delivered before the Synod of California at Oakland, October 22, 1897, in Commemoration of the Two Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the Westminster Standards.* 8vo, pp. 32. (San Francisco: Printed by Order of the Synod [1897].)——*The Westminster Standards and the Present Age.* An Address delivered by Thomas McDougall before the Cincinnati Presbytery, March 3, 1898, and before the New Albany Presbytery, April 14, 1898. 8vo, pp. 21. (Cincinnati, 1898.) The honor of inaugurating a fitting celebration of the fifth jubilee of the Westminster Standards must be conceded to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. At its session at Charlotte, N. C., in May, 1897, it consecrated a considerable amount of time to this grateful object, and in due time published the addresses delivered on that occasion in a handsome volume, which was duly noticed in this REVIEW for January, 1898 (Vol. ix, p. 178). Meanwhile, the movement thus so auspiciously begun propagated itself throughout the Presbyterian world. The celebration at the closing exercises of the Theological Seminary at Princeton, in May, 1897, at which addresses were delivered by the Rev. Drs. Wallace Radcliffe, James D. Moffat and D. S. Gregory, antedated by a few days the proceedings at Charlotte. During the ensuing autumn and winter the several Presbyteries held celebrations all over the country, at which notable addresses were made and the hearts of Presbyterians were lifted up in gratitude to God for His gracious dealings with them in entrusting to them the preservation and propagation of so much of His truth. Besides the instances mentioned in the titles given above, there lie before us as we write a large number of elegantly printed programs issued for guidance on such occasions. Among these may be specially noted the beautifully illustrated program prepared by Dr. Henry C. McCook for the celebration in the Tabernacle Presbyterian Church, at Philadelphia, January 16–19, 1898, at which the old Psalms were sung to the old "tones" and the principal addresses were delivered by the Rev. Drs. John DeWitt and John S. MacIntosh; that prepared for the celebration by the Presbytery of Brooklyn, December 16, 1897, where the address was given by Dr. Francis L. Patton, and there was sung a hymn written for the occasion by the Rev. Dr. John Fox; that prepared for the celebration by the Presbytery of New Brunswick, held in Trenton, on February 16, 1898, at which addresses were delivered by the Rev. Drs. Francis L. Patton, John DeWitt, George T. Purves and Wm. Henry Roberts; and that prepared for the celebration by the Presbytery of Lehigh, at Lafayette College, July 4, 1898, where the addresses were delivered by President E. D. Warfield, LL.D., and the Rev. Dr. Wm. Henry Roberts. All this widespread commemoration suitably culminated in the celebration at the General Assembly, during its sessions at Winona Lake, on Thursday, May 26, 1898, the appropriate memorial of which is the first volume, whose title is given above. The Assembly gave the whole day to this expression of their appreciation of the benefits conferred on them by the labors of the Westminster divines; and the volume contains, along with a historical introductory note and two sermons appropriate to the occasion by the Moderator (Dr. Sheldon Jackson) and Stated Clerk (Dr. Wm. Henry Roberts) respectively, no less than twelve addresses. It was a great day for the lovers of the truth of God so richly expressed in these noble Standards. The speakers were selected from the

working pastors and ruling elders of every section of the Church. The subjects of the addresses were mainly of a historico-practical character, and their form and contents united to give them an immediate popular effect. If any criticism arises in the mind of the reader of them, as they lie on the printed page divorced from the voice and gesture which gave them wings to the hearer, it is that a slightly apologetical tone is perhaps too prominent in them. This is true even of the singularly thoughtful and attractively put address of President James D. Moffat on "The Fundamental Doctrines of the Westminster Confession and Catechisms." The query may occur to the reader, indeed, whether in his assumption of a defensive rather than a positively self-congratulatory point of view, Dr. Moffat may not, in one instance, have been misled into the use of language—no doubt unwittingly—which may seem to surrender the very principle of electing grace which he is engaged in so winningly defending. When he raises the question as to the explanation of "how it comes about that some are willing and others are unwilling," he appears to throw the emphasis rather on the human than the divine will—at least, he is engaged at the moment in contemplating the relation of the human will to the result—whereas to Paul it was enough to refer all "to the good pleasure of His will" (Eph. i. 5). Therefore, the "Christian and philosophical agnosticism" which he recommends to us scarcely strikes on the mind with the same religious significance as our Lord's, "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight" (Matt. iv. 26). Whatever unpleasant impression may be made by this, however, will be quickly dispelled when the page is turned and the thoughtful and wise remarks on the love of God are encountered, culminating in this notable sentence: "The value of the simple proclamation that God loves us lies in the fact that it is God, whose powers are perfect and whose character is attractive, who is declared to love" (p. 124). It was a fine idea of the authorities of the McCormick Theological Seminary to combine the inauguration of Prof. Stevenson to the chair of Ecclesiastical History with the celebration of the Westminster anniversary. To this end Prof. Stevenson took as the subject of his inaugural address, "The Westminster Standards as Tested by History," and additional addresses were delivered by President Moffat and Dr. G. T. Purves—the former on "Some Neglected Aspects of the Westminster Standards," and the latter on "The Value of the Westminster Standards to the Preacher." In his address Dr. Moffat retains his defensive attitude toward the Standards and returns to the unsatisfactory equation of elect and non elect = willing and not willing, almost as if the ground of the former distribution could be found in the latter fact, instead of (as the Scriptures constantly teach and our Standards strongly assert) *vice versa*. But despite this flaw, the three addresses make a ringing impression on the reader, and justify him in hoping good things of the Westminster theology so long as it is taught by men of such quality. Dr. Warfield's address before the Presbytery of New York essays to point out how it happened that the essence of evangelical religion got so clearly and purely stated in the Westminster Standards, and what account must be given of their combined scientific precision and religious vitality. The addresses before the Synod of California, besides the introductory words of Dr. W. B. Noble, include the following: "Place, Personnel and Proceedings of the Westminster Assembly," by Rev. Henry B. Gage; "The Doctrinal Contents of the Confession," by the Rev. Prof. Henry Collin Minton, D.D.; "The Influence of the Westminster Standards in Promoting Government by the People," by the Rev. John Hemphill, D.D.; and "The Influence of the Doctrinal System on Modern Civilization," by the Rev. Prof. Wm. Alexander, D.D. These are all sterling addresses worthy of a more permanent form than this

slight pamphlet gives them, and it is a delight to note that they give forth no uncertain sound. Nor does the address of one of the Church's most honored and most faithful elders, Mr. Thomas McDougall, delivered at their request before more than one of the Presbyteries of the Church, with which our list of titles closes. It promises well for the future of the Presbyterian Church that it was able so easily, at every point in its widely extended borders, to put forth its testimony to the truth it has received and by which it lives, with the vital earnestness and intelligent appreciation which these sample addresses exhibit. Addresses like them—equal to them in grasp on the truths expounded and devotion to the principles of our Confessional teaching—were delivered in every part of the Church. The impulse they must have given to sound thinking and enthusiastic propaganda of the precious truth entrusted to us must have been very great. It is a pity that more of them have not been given at least the prolonged life and influence of a pamphlet publication. It is another pity that a considerable number of them have not been collected and put into permanent book-form. Is it too late even now to express the hope that our Board of Publication may collect, say, a couple of volumes of them, of the same size as that which contains the addresses delivered before the Assembly? The three volumes together would not be more than a fitting memorial of a great occasion, and of the splendid manner in which it was celebrated.——*Montevideo—Maybank.* Some Memoirs of a Southern Christian Household in the Olden Time; or, The Family Life of the Rev. Charles Colcock Jones, D.D., of Liberty County, Ga. By his Son-in-law, R. Q. Mallard, D.D., Author of *Plantation Life before Emancipation*, etc. 12mo, pp. 87. (Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication [1898].) Those who have read Dr. Mallard's delightful sketches of *Plantation Life before Emancipation* will turn to this later volume with expectations which will scarcely be fulfilled. There is now and then apparent in it the same reminiscent charm and loving touch in describing the "olden time;" but the narrative element of the volume shrinks to unexpectedly narrow proportions, or, to apply the author's own simile, the "sermon" sinks pretty nearly wholly into "application." Dr. Mallard is so intent on holding up the beautiful example of Dr. Jones' Christian home for our instruction and imitation that he hardly draws the outlines of the example and wholly neglects to fill in the picture. This is the more regrettable as the life of this great Christian philanthropist is one we should have both enjoyed reading and profited by, and as Dr. Mallard is in every way qualified to write it in an attractive and satisfying way.

IV.—SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

What the Bible Teaches. A Thorough and Comprehensive Study of all the Bible has to Say Concerning the Great Doctrines of which It Treats. By R. A. Torrey, Superintendent of the Bible Institute, Chicago. Author of *How to Bring Men to Christ*, *How to Study the Bible*, etc. Chicago, New York and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company [1898]. 8vo, pp. 539.

It would be a very precious book that gave us "a thorough and comprehensive study of all the Bible has to say concerning the great doctrines of which it treats." Needless to say, Mr. Torrey's useful volume hardly fulfills to the letter this great promise of the title-page—which forms therefore something of a stumbling block at the threshold of his serviceable but somewhat

desultory collection of Bible-readings on doctrinal topics. At the opening of his Preface, he explains more circumspectly that "it is not supposed for a moment that this book exhausts all the Bible has to say on the topics treated, much less that it takes up and exhausts every topic dealt with in the Bible." Of course, it does not. There are many of the great doctrines of the Bible which are not treated at all here—such as all those that cluster around the fact of the election of grace and all those that belong under the locus of the Church and the means of grace. And the treatment accorded to the doctrines selected for study moves far too much on the surface to have plumbed the depths of any one of them.

But though the Preface sets the title-page right on this point, it raises a difficulty of its own in the emphatic claim it puts in for the method of the work as being in an especial sense "inductive." The chief gain that has been made by doctrinal study of late years is its acquisition of a more inductive method. That is the significance of the birth of the new discipline of "Biblical Theology." Whereas there has been a tendency hitherto to formulate doctrine on the basis of a general impression derived from a cursory survey of the Scriptural material or on the basis of the specific study of a few outstanding texts isolated from their contexts, and then to seek support for it in more or less detached passages; it is becoming more usual now to rise from the thorough understanding of the teaching of complete sections of Scripture to larger and larger groups until an insight into the doctrinal whole is attained—in the unity of its historical development and the harmony of its varied expression. Mr. Torrey's method is altogether alien to this truly inductive process. He begins with isolated passages, collected under a purely formal *schema* already present explicitly or implicitly in his mind: and this is not made induction merely by arranging the texts first and the propositions which they support second, on the printed page. We have not the remotest intention of suggesting that Mr. Torrey is not striving to give the pure teaching of the Bible in these propositions; neither do we doubt that he succeeds in giving the pure teaching of the Bible in the large majority of them. We are merely animadverting on the claim put in that the method pursued in this volume has some distinguishing right to the name of "inductive." That it certainly has not.

The fact is that Mr. Torrey's method is undistinguishable from the ordinary method of the exercise known as "Bible-readings." What he has given us is just a series of sublimated "Bible-readings" on doctrinal topics. Any appreciative estimate of the book must proceed on the clear recognition of this fact. If we are to regard it as a contribution to dogmatics, we must needs look upon it as moving over the surface of its subject—as incomplete, insufficient and occasionally erroneous. If, on the other hand, we may accept it for what it is—a series of thoughtful Bible-readings on selected doctrinal subjects, including especially the topics of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit—we may gladly recognize it as an admirable example of an admirable method of teaching, from which we may all learn much. Of course the limitations of its method characterize it: and of course the limitations inherent in the author's equipment and doctrinal views condition it. Even in his Bible-readings, naturally, Mr. Torrey still teaches his Arminianizing theory of redemption, and his Keswick doctrine of the Baptism of the Spirit, as well as his burning, evangelical blood-theology. As is also, perhaps, natural in Bible-readings, his exposition runs much on the surface of things and is rather external and at points even shallow. We read occasionally thoroughly misleading things: as, for example, when we are told that all of God's gifts are at the disposal of all who wish them, for there is no respect of persons with Him (p. 379), or that "numbers belong primarily to the physical world," so

that the category of number can be only with difficulty applied to spiritual being (p. 20).

In such deep things as the Trinity, the Person of Christ, the idea of Eternity, Predestination and Freedom—Mr. Torrey's plumbet does not reach the bottom. But though he does not know how to discrimiuate between the extraordinary and ordinary gifts of the Holy Spirit and so leads his readers into very muddy water indeed, as to spiritual gifts and guidance. he does know the fundamental thing about the Holy Spirit—that He is a Person—and how to present this truth in a form so striking, so true and so enheartening (p. 225), that we should like to see his three paragraphs on it bound as a frontlet between the eyes of every Christian teacher. And though he does not know all the secrets of the divine dealing with man, as they are revealed in the Word, he does know that most fundamental secret of all—that the Holy God hates sin and punishes it because it is sin—and how to set forth God's holy hatred of sin in language as moving to the conscience as it is faithful to the Word of God (p. 39). And the best thing about the book is that it is this element of evangelical religion, laying hold of the very core of the Gospel, that constitutes its main contents. As we read, we see there are many things that Mr. Torrey has yet to learn concerning the great doctrines that the Bible teaches, but we see also gladly that there are many things taught by the Bible that he has learned and knows how to teach the Christian world, and we gladly put ourselves in these at his feet.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

Joh. Guelielmi Baieri Compendium Theologiæ Positivæ, adjectis notis amplioribus, quibus doctrina orthodoxa ad παιδείαν academicam explicatur, atque ex scriptura s. eique innixis rationibus theologicis confirmatur, denuo edendum curavit Carol. Ferd. Guil. Walther, SS. Theologiæ Doctor et Professor. Editio auctior et emendatior. *Indices* fecit Theo. Buenger. 8vo, 132. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1899.) The edition of Baier's *Compendium* prepared by Dr. Walther and used (as we believe) as a text-book in the theological classes at the Concordia Seminary, is completed by this comprehensive body of *Indices*, which place every part of the contents of the book fully at the control of the student. The "index rerum, nominum, auctorum" is drawn up with great care and occupies no less than one hundred and five closely printed pages. To it is adjoined the "index locorum Scripturæ." At the end there are three entries of less important matter, viz.: (1) "Axiomata et Dicta Præstantissima nonnulla" (113-129), a collection of theological aphorisms laid down or explained in the compendium: such as "Wisdom is first and religion second, because we first know God aud afterwards worship Him;" "We would rather confess a cautious ignorance than profess a false knowledge;" "There are many things contained ἐν γραφῇ which are not contained ἐν γράμματι;" and the like; (2) certain *dicta* concerning terminology; and (3) certain *Baieriana* of which Dr. Walther did not approve—such especially as concerned predestination and its relation to faith and regeneration. The little volume will be iudispensable to possessors of the edition of Baier to which it is an adjunct.——*Affusion the Only Scriptural Baptism.* By Rev. J. W. Tyler, M.A. 16mo, pp. 39. (Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication [1898].) A well-written and strong presentation of a somewhat overdrawn position. It is not unnatural (though somewhat unfortunate) that extreme claims beget extreme claims in reply. The blame belongs on the shoulders of the original parties to the dispute.

V.—PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

Apostolic and Modern Missions. By Rev. Chalmers Martin, A.M., Sometime Missionary in Siam, Elliott F. Shepard Instructor in the Old Testament Department, Princeton Theological Seminary. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1898.

Missions and Politics in Asia. By Robert E. Speer, Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1898.

These twin volumes—the latest printed products of the "Students' Lectureship" in connection with Princeton Theological Seminary—constitute together a valuable contribution to the study of the missionary problem. They furnish at the same time a significant indication of the continued vitality of the venerable Alma Mater, by the efforts of whose sons the Lectureship was established in recent years. Whatever may be said of the Princeton theology, adhesion to it has always been found compatible with a wide outlook upon life; and, while presenting an unflattering picture of the world's great need, it has inspired a deeply practical interest in the welfare of the human race. Princeton theology in action has its own contribution to make to the advancement of Christ's kingdom not in America only, but beyond it: and the very fact of the establishment of this Lectureship by the students is a notable evidence of the breadth of their evangelical sympathies, and of their desire to inform themselves as to how and where they may best serve their own generation according to the will of God.

1. Prof. Martin's book is the outcome of his lectureship in 1894. It runs the parallel between "Apostolic and Modern Missions," in respect of their Principles (chaps. i and ii), Problem (chaps. iii and iv), Methods (chaps. v and vi), and Results (chaps. vii and viii).

In the opening chapter, the scripture norm of missions is found in the Great Commission enunciated in the close of the synoptic Gospels and in the example of the apostles as presented to us in the Acts and the Epistles. The aim of apostolic missions (as in the case of Paul, for example) is held by the author to have been, not merely the widest possible proclamation of the Gospel, and not merely the conversion of the greatest possible number of individual souls, but the establishment in as many and as important centres as possible of self-governing, self-supporting and self-extending churches. Their motives were obedience to the command of Christ, zeal for His honor and for the triumph of His kingdom, and compassion for a world perishing in sin. And in the second chapter it is shown that—while no doubt false scents have sometimes been followed—the aim and the motives of modern missions do substantially reproduce those of apostolic days. A mere rapid evangelization of the world is not the object in view, but its Christianization; so that many of the most eminent missionaries in the history of the Church, especially from the time of Carey downwards, have been content to show little in the way of immediate results if only they might lay the foundation of large achievement in days to come. As to the motives of modern missions there is no difficulty in showing that, in spite of misunderstanding and misrepresentation these have been as in the early days obedience to the Master, love to Christ and love to men—the main source of missions being "not, strictly speaking, in any motive at all, but in a motor, in Christ Himself."

In chap. iii the Problem of missions is set forth, and is seen to be practically the same in ancient and in modern times. There were of old external obstacles to success. There were physical difficulties to be overcome by foot

travel, or by cautious creeping from headland to headland on the sea. There were moral and spiritual difficulties, such as were presented by the pervasive influence of false faiths already in possession throughout the Roman world. There was a great array of persons interested in maintaining heathen faith and worship, of whom typical instances are seen in the book of Acts. There was the empire itself with its persecuting animus and power, and with Judaism anxious to utilize it against the sect of the Nazarene. And above all there was the corruption of the time, imposing on righteousness and holiness a battle against wickedness and sin. Within the Church, again, there were serious obstacles arising from the character and conceptions of the early Christians, and in particular from their Jewish prepossessions. Yet the time was ready—through Roman roads and law and commerce, through the prevalence of Greek culture, and through the spread of the synagogue system by the exiled Jews—for the world-wide diffusion of the Gospel. The Church herself, too, was being prepared for her high calling, especially through the instrumentality of the great Apostle of the Gentiles—who was so manifestly under divine training and protection and control in the prosecution of his mighty work. To all this the modern parallel is offered in chap. iv. It might indeed at first sight appear that—with a vastly larger *orbis terrarum* than the ancients knew—with the world power not concentred, but divided among many nations—and with the influence of modern culture and civilization on the side not of heathenism, but of Christianity—all the conditions are now changed. But it is demonstrated that the problem of the Christian Church a century ago presented a real and deep analogy to its problem in apostolic times. Though greater in numbers and in power, the Church needed then a spiritual discipline to arouse it to missionary zeal not unlike that depicted in the pages of the Acts of the Apostles. Some of the outward obstacles had been done away, but others remained. Present day heathenism, like ancient, has its strong prepossessions. The minds of its votaries are not like *tabulæ rasæ*, but have been deeply influenced in thought, feeling, belief, character by false religions. Heredity and inveterate custom, along with a constantly suggestive environment, have done their work. Heathenism, too. has many interested defenders still, in the region not of philosophy or of religion only, but of trade : and government policy unhappily has been too often anti-missionary. Then within the Church there was a great backwardness to engage in missionary effort that had to be overcome. Even men like Luther and Calvin in Reformation days had little practical concern about the need of the great heathen world. This, no doubt, was partly explained by the engrossing strain put upon their energies at home, and partly by the circumstance that the Reformation countries came into little direct contact with heathen lands ; which then, so far as they were colonized or appropriated, were chiefly in touch with Spain and Portugal. But certain strange eschatological views unquestionably hemmed in the evangelical horizon of the Reformers: and while the world had to be economically prepared by Providence for the spread of the Gospel, through the hegemony of the seas passing into Protestant hands and with it the commerce of the world and contact at every point with heathenism, the Church also had to be enlarged in her outlook and quickened in her zeal, to put forth her claim upon the whole world for Christ.

Under the Methods of the missionary enterprise the author in chap. v justly includes not merely modes of operation in the field, but the whole mode of administration adopted and practiced by the Church at home. In describing the *modus operandi* in apostolic times, he brings into prominence various salient features of the plan of campaign disclosed in the book of Acts There is the *geographical distribution* of the apostolic missions. It was a

campaign outlined and directed by Christ. Beginning at Jerusalem, it was ordered to include all Judea and Samaria, and then to extend to the uttermost parts of the earth. And in obeying these marching orders, the holy war was carried on from divinely indicated centres—Jerusalem, Antioch, Corinth, Ephesus, Rome. Then there are the *agencies* employed in the days of the apostles. First among these comes *preaching*. The early propagators of Christianity were eager to preach everywhere, to make known by the living voice the glad tidings of the Gospel—in colloquial often as well as more formal address, according to the character of the audience. But they were careful to *instruct* as well as to preach: and to *organize* as well. They took pains to supervise their sphere of influence by personal visitation or by the help of assistants with whom they kept themselves in close spiritual touch. What a number of young lieutenants Paul had, for example. We see him in the book of Acts, even when in a Roman dungeon, like a general giving orders to his aides, or like the head of a great commercial house issuing instructions to his subordinates in every important city. To what a noble use the *pen* also was put in those early days! The truth is that to missions we are indebted for the New Testament itself; for by far the greater part of it was written in response to the missionary exigencies of the growing Church. Yet another apostolic agency has to be mentioned—the power of *miracles*. Specially interesting in this connection are the gift of healing and the gift of tongues: and it is very certain that these were exercised for a practical purpose—to gain a ready and a universal acceptance of the Gospel. Healing for the body predisposed men to listen to the offer of healing for the soul. And many of those who might have understood Greek quite well were more likely to welcome a message when they heard it, "each man in his own tongue, wherein he was born." And even so, as it is shown in chap. 6, the guiding hand in modern missions no less than in apostolic has been the hand of God. The *geographical plan* has not been of man's devising. If human wisdom and predilection had been left to choose, the choice might have been very different. But Providence has often interposed in the most decisive and unmistakable way to give direction to the plan of campaign for winning the world for Christ. Not in its allurements only, but in its debarments, too, it has shown the proper path. Judson wished to labor in India; but the East India Company refused him permission and he was drifted to Burmah, where he did his great life work—"Burmah, the one country of the East of which," as he afterwards confessed, "he had a horror." Livingstone, too, was bent on going to China; but the London Missionary Society, after considering the propriety of sending him to the West Indies, despatched him to Africa: and who that knows anything whatever about the Dark Continent does not recognize that David Livingstone had a divine commission there? As regards methods and agencies, these in modern times have been varied—evangelistic, educational, literary, medical, industrial. This has been found necessary in the light of circumstances, and the apostles themselves were tolerant of variety. But still, as in the early days, the preaching of the Gospel is the great agency for the Christianization of the world. It does not need the production of stone and lime chapels to evidence the truth of this; for in order to preaching the only real essentials are a preacher and an audience, and these may be anywhere, "in native chapels, in heathen temples, in the homes of the common people, on the verandah of the missionary's house, in the ward of the mission hospital, in the market place, at the boat-landing, by the camp-fire in the jungle, in the hovel of the outcast, in the palace of a king." With readiness to adapt the message, and with modern means of locomotion at its service, what a power preaching may be made. Supervision is not forgotten either now, with the plurality of churches

springing up in heathen parts and an ever expanding work. The importance of settling native pastors is being generally recognized, as it was even in Carey's time; with a European or American missionary of judgment and experience over them—call him what you will, secretary, synodical missionary, pastor-at-large, or missionary bishop—invested with the power of supervision. Personal visitation is still continued, while these natives, kept in touch with the missionaries who train and send them, have their own character and experience deepened in becoming intermediaries of Gospel influence to the heathen around them. The pen also has its own part still to do in connection with missionary labor, through Scripture translation and the production and diffusion of Gospel tracts. Missionaries have learned "that the printed page, while it cannot take the place of the living preacher, may be a John the Baptist to prepare his way, a Timothy or a Titus to remain behind and repeat his message." And have there not been miracles, too, of grace in the modern mission field, toward which the patient acquisition of the languages of heathendom and the compassionate application of the art of healing have been made directly accessory? Men of every nation now "hear and read the wonderful works of God in their own tongue wherein they were born;" and medical missions have done much at least in "dispelling prejudice and opening the way for Him who can say to the sick of the palsy not merely 'Take up thy bed and walk,' but 'Man, thy sins be forgiven thee.'" In addition to all these methods, there is another which, considering the extent to which modern missionary labor is carried on among barbarous peoples, is more needful in connection with it than with the missionary work of apostolic days. This is the educational method, which the author well defends (along with Alexander Duff) as having the evangelistic element at the heart of it, as it seeks to train and equip a great variety of needful functionaries—"school teachers, elders, Bible-readers, evangelists, pastors, leaders of religious thought and life, the Luthers, Calvins, Wesleys of heathen lands."

The two closing chapters deal with missionary Results: and here again a parallel is drawn between apostolic and modern times, to show that the old cry which, though uttered by an insensate mob, had so much of truth in it, might be echoed in a true sense still—"these that have turned the world (οἰκουμένη) upside down are come hither also." The first apostolic result of missions was a wide diffusion of the knowledge of the Gospel, through which Christianity found at least a lodgment from Spain to Babylon, and from Alexandria to Rome. As regards the quality of converts gained, these in outward condition (with exceptions such as Manaen, Erastus, Sergius Paulus, Pudens and Claudia) were mostly of the lower and middle classes of society. The impression we gain of their inward character from the Acts and some of Paul's epistles is in many respects a pleasing one. The simple faith, and unity, and mutual love, and joyousness, and teachableness displayed in some of the early church communities, the aggressive zeal, too, and spiritual power which manifested themselves among them, were cheering evidences that the Lord Himself was working with the disciples and through them. Not that there were not dark shadings sometimes to the picture—as at rich, gay, corrupt Corinth, "the Paris of the Roman world," where errors in doctrine and immoralities in life crept in very early and distressingly among the adherents of Christianity. But on the whole new and potent forces had begun to stir beneficently in heathen society ere the apostles themselves passed away; and new views, feelings and practices were already introduced which were destined to be more fruitful with the advancing years. Among these may be named, a new estimate put on the dignity of woman; a new view of the sacredness of marriage; a new tenderness for children; a new

care for the slave; a new sense of the nobility of labor—all of which were certainly making in the direction of "turning the world upside down." If now we seek to bring in a modern comparison, it may be objected that modern missions have had a far longer time than the apostles had to secure results, and that a quantitative comparison would be in that respect unfair. But the unity of the Roman Empire and the smalluess of the then known world have to be borne in mind, together with the fact that (with no disrespect to earlier efforts) present day missionary results have practically all been realized since the time of Carey—that is, within a hundred years. Besides, a quantitative comparison is not the really important thing, but the main question rather is, as to similarity in the kind of results achieved. As regards the extent of missionary work in modern times, it may be said to have obtained a foothold in every land excepting Thibet; and even over its forbidding ramparts the Moravian missionaries during the past ten years have been able to throw the Thibetan New Testament. The diffusion of Gospel truth may be safely said to be at least as great proportionately as in the days of the primitive church. Results, in the shape of converts and churches, have come in more slowly, it must be admitted, than they did then, as is seen in the experience of such devoted men as Carey, Judson, Morrison and Marsden. But this from the human side may be at least partly accounted for by various hindering circumstances which have compelled the patient breaking down of heathen suspicions as well as the bestowal of long weary years to the study of strange tongues. And in the issue persevering hope and labor have been wonderfully justified. "To say in a word what can be put in the form of statistics there were in all heathendom, when the century of missions began, less than 200 missionaries and 50,000 converts; when it closed, there were 6000 missionaries, 30,000 native evangelists, one-sixth of whom were ordained, 5700 churches, and 750,000 living church members, forming the nucleus of a Christian community of not less than 3,000,000." If we come to consider the quality of modern results, it is found that these, as in the primitive church communities at Corinth and Ephesus and elsewhere, are not quite pure and unmixed. Yet their general character, of steadfastness, love, purity and devotion, is such as to fill the hearts of God's missionary servants with holy joy; for in them lies the proof now and for us, that Christ is with His people.

Thus the grand conclusion reached by Prof. Martin, that modern missions are a fair counterpart of the missions of which the New Testament gives account. "It is good," as he says, "to be assured that the modern missionary enterprise is no longer an experiment, that 100 years of organized effort have proved its permanence, laid bare its principles, and tested and approved its methods. But it is more to know that it is a child of that which was conceived on Olivet, which was brought to birth at Pentecost, and which reached maturity in the work of Peter and Paul and John; that it is heir to every encouragement upon which the early Church could lean; and that its prospects are in sober truth 'as bright as the promises of God.'"

Such is a general outline of the argument pursued by Prof. Martin in this informative and interesting volume. Not more than a few additional words are called for by way of appreciation of the author's work. It manifests a large acquaintance with the literature of missions, as well as a penetrating grasp of Scripture principles and examples bearing on the subject. The book is very intelligently paragraphed; and every now and then the argument is skillfully gathered up, in a way suggestive to an old Princeton alumnus of the manner of the elder Hodge. There are few typographical errors, and only a very occasional lapse in respect of fact—as when the

inventor of the steam engine instead of being called, like Livingstone, that "great Scotchman" is designated "James Watt, the Englishman," in a way calculated to offend Caledonian susceptibilities.

2. Mr. Speer's volume on "Missions and Politics in Asia" is an appropriate sequel to the other. It embodies the five lectures delivered by him at Princeton in 1898, and gives, along with the fruits of reading and meditation on the missionary problem the results of his personal observation during an extended tour in Asia in the two preceding years. What is furnished is not so much a detailed account of missions in the lands visited, as a description of the conditions under which missionary enterprise is called to operate in the Asiatic countries and an indication of the hopes and ambitions that may be associated with it.

A leading thought all through is, that Christ is the Lord of men, and that the forces, religious and otherwise, which go to shape present-day history are working toward His kingdom and glory as their ultimate goal. It is shown that the East, no longer unchangeable, is in a very interesting condition at the present time, which the author regards as in reality a constructive, a creative era in the history of the Orient. "What we are watching are not so much death gasps as birth throes—the pangs of a mighty labor in the old mother Asia. And I believe that what she has borne is naught in comparison with what she is to bear."

The first lecture deals with Persia and Islam. After tracing the fruits of the Arab conquest, in the destruction of Zoroastrianism and of independence, it gives an interesting if somewhat intricate account of the Persian type of Mohammedanism—which is of the Shiah as opposed to the Sunnee division of Islam. The general situation, which is complicated by the fact that while the Persians are Shiahs their ruling dynasty (being unconnected with the line of Ali) is non-Imamic, is summed up thus: "Persia is the stronghold of the Shiah sect whose doctrines possess its people with a strange fanaticism. Yet the Mohammedan religion is a distinct ecclesiastical organization, having no political power, and hedged in and curtailed as an influence by the present dynasty, which, while holding the Shiah faith and asserting it as the State religion, still is and can but be in the place of a usurper of the rights of Ali's line. Religiously, Persia is isolated from Turkey, which is Sunnite; and, politically, there is no commerce. For Islam can have but one head: and Muzaffr-i-din is as far from recognizing Abdul Hamid as that head, as the Sultan is from bowing to the Shah."

A deplorable picture is given of the present social and religious condition of Persia. The practice of "takia," or religious compromise, and the legality of "mutah," or temporary marriage, with the prevalence of yet darker customs, are shown to have utterly sapped the foundations of social morality; and the political condemnation of Islam is affirmed to have been nowhere more clearly written than in the social rottenness of Persia. And what is the hope for the country's future? Russian eagles and British boats are hovering near. The interposition of either of these powers might reanimate the nation to some extent. The advent of either of them means order; the advent of one of them means progress with quicker steps. But the true hope for Persia is in a living Christianity—which, since 1835, has been diligently but prudently working among the non-Moslem population, and to whose approaches the Mohammedans themselves are believed to be more open in Persia than anywhere else, and more open now than at any former time. One of the most experienced and successful native workers among the Moslems is quoted as having expressed the belief that "thousands of Mohammedans would accept Christianity if there were religious liberty."

In the second lecture we have an account of the present play of political

and religious forces in the three peninsulas of Arabia, India and Indo-China, for which a European counterpart is suggested in Spain, Italy and Greece. Speaking of Asiatic Turkey, the author is emphatic in his condemnation of the Turkish government, as evil and that continually, and as especially corrupt and unjust in those remote sections of the globe where the Turk has his own way undisturbed. Though there are one or two points of feeble light, as at Bagdad and Mardin, like twinkling stars in a darkened sky, the religious dawn seems far distant still in southeastern Turkey; while in Arabia the chief suggestions of hope, along with the object lessons in peace, order, liberty and justice supplied by British rule at Aden, are the quiet work of the Arabian mission on the east and the progress of the Scotch mission initiated by Ion Keith Falconer in the south.

Passing to India, we find a widely different situation, with "Mohammedanism under a Christian empress, moving forward, educated, liberated and with no power to crush save by insurrection." In the Indian peninsula, the author discerns, along with some occasion for anxiety, much ground for hope as to future social and religious developments. In his review of the past connection of Britain with India, he largely follows Prof. Seeley, and is, on the whole, fair in his estimate of British influence, if somewhat cynical as to British motives and certain British methods. To establish order, law, education, trade everywhere in the peninsula, as Britain has done, and out of the complexity of little kingdoms and diverse tribes called "India," to form a new nation with a growing sense of unity is, as he freely admits, no mean service to civilization. But it has brought with it elements of danger, against which, he justly maintains, the one true safeguard is, the Christianization of the people. Even from the point of view of British interests in India, the work of Christian missions, as leading statesmen have themselves recognized, is of the first importance; and those directly responsible for the government of India have in notable instances been mostly ready to acknowledge that missions, so far from having failed, have been "constructing the firmest foundations on which British influence in India can rest, and are reaching down to those classes for whose mental and moral improvement the government has been able to do the least."

As regards Indo-China, the emasculating and degrading influence of centuries of Buddhism is vividly portrayed; and the main hope for Siam is found, not in its coming partition between the Indian empire and what the author somewhat hastily describes as "the curious colonial system of France —curious, because it is so difficult to understand why God allows such a poor travesty upon his earth"—but in the clean, wholesome, vitalizing work of the Gospel. And of that work and service, officials themselves being witness, the beneficient fruits are already beginning to appear.

The third lecture is devoted to China, and is, in some respects, the most luminous and interesting of the series. First, the characteristics of the Chinese people are described; and then the question of origin and the question of destiny are taken up—how in the operations of Providence a people so mighty, so curious and so impressive has been produced, and for what unseen, divine purpose; geographical isolation (between the sea, the desert and the mountains of Thibet) and peculiarity of language have had their powerful effect; but it is the prevailing conception of education, so singularly conservative in such a quickwitted people, that has been the great formative force in Chinese character. The system of competitive examinations, under which a man of ability may raise himself to the highest office in the State has been in vogue for thousands of years: and no doubt that has served to keep alive a certain degree of democratic liberty. But what has all along been the subject matter of examination? The classics of Con-

fucius, which were compiled six centuries before Christ and are still regarded as containing the sum total of available wisdom! This being so, who can wonder that Chinese civilization has become sluggish and unprogressive, and that the governing literati are especially stereotyped in their ideas of administration and in their foolishly contemptuous estimate of the poor barbarian nations outside the Celestial empire?

As regards the future, there is manifestly no hope for China in Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, or any of her own religions. Nor is there hope for her in her political and civil institutions, which are utterly rotten and effete. What may be effected in a secular sense for China through the present scramble for trade or territory among the European nations remains to be seen. But "determinations of territorial boundaries, and assignments of political authority are minor and insignificant in comparison with the forces which run down to the roots of personal life. And of these forces time will show that none is running deeper or spreading more widely than Christianity."

No doubt the Gospel has had its special hindrances in China. Besides the difficulty of presenting the Christian message to the Chinese mind so as to win for it a ready and unbiased reception, the progress of Christianity has been sadly hampered through political entanglements which have made it difficult for the missionary work to appear as the propaganda of a kingdom that is not of this world. "From the beginning of foreign intercourse, the trader and the missionary have been classed together. The same rights have been claimed for each; the claim was enforced by war in the case of the trader, and the consequent treaties have included the missionary." But when all has been said, the spiritual work of the missionary is "the most penetrating and permeating of the forces leading China on to the new day. . . . . Out of it a new church is rising of a new sort. It will have its own heresies and trials; but it will have elements of power which have belonged to none of God's other peoples."

In the fourth lecture, we pass to a consideration of the conditions of modern life in Japan, which means a transition "from an atmosphere laden with the oppressive odors of decay to one charged with the ozone of exuberant vitality." After a brief but comprehensive recital of the story of the recent opening up of Japan to the current of western civilization and some discriminating comments on the pregnant differences between Chinese and Japanese character and education, the author shows that new Japan is largely a product of Christian influences. Its open-minded, receptive people have come for one thing under the pressure of western civilization in the matter of trade, with "its allied enginery of diplomacy, bribery, friendliness and intimidation." They have felt a not less potent influence in the sentiment of progress, which has been strong upon the people, with a desire for recognition and equal intercourse among the nations. And this has brought a consequent readiness to welcome the Christianity which had apparently done so much for the western peoples. Yet it has to be confessed that the chief note of the present Zeitgeist in Japan is industrialism, with the dollar as its chosen deity: to which must be added a national conceit which finds expression in a militarism that outbids in enthusiasm even that of Russia or of Germany. And the great danger to Japan's development in the present emergency is the lack of a solid morality and of its root in a pure and reasonable religion. It is disappointing to find even a statesman like Marquis Ito, asking: "What is any religion, Buddhism or Christianity, but superstition, and, therefore, a possible source of weakness to a nation." Such words are indicative of the materialistic reaction which has set in of recent years with renewed force in Japan. But in vain will

this interesting nation grasp, for selfish ends, at Christian civilization, apart from the Christianity which has really given it life. The story of Japan's fervid welcome to Christianity a few decades ago, and its hardly less speedy access of indifference to religion, is a sadly significant one. "Twenty years ago, the churches were thronged; the missionaries were overrun and some of them almost adored; the schools were crowded and thousands were pressing into the church." But this enthusiasm did not last. Oriental pride and western rationalism together brought about a reaction; and the sorrowful picture is now seen of a people "grasping at the fruits of civilization and ignoring its unseen but indispensable roots." The service to be done for Japan by a real Christianity is obvious. Her people, with all their superficiality and fickleness, do with all sincerity desire what is best. And, pertinently asks Mr. Speer, "who dare doubt that they will find it at last, with all their national hopes and boastings—nailed to a cross?"

The fifth and closing lecture deals with what till lately was almost a *terra incognita*, namely Korea. It is to that far off, secluded peninsula, inhabited by its Hermit nation, that the solution of the onward moving Eastern question has at length been shifted in most recent days. Our author, who traces the history of Korea back to the time of King David, describes very lucidly the modern developments of the political situation, from the invasion of the peninsula by Japan in 1876 to the present time. The jealous watchfulness of one another on the part of China and Japan—the internal conflicts between the liberal or Japanese party and the conservative or Chinese party in Korea itself—the bold stroke made by the Mikado in 1894, and the temporary success attending it, and the subsequent intervention of Russia, are all brought under eloquent review. And the conclusion come to from a scrutiny of the political field and forces is, that "the prize is in Russia's keeping and at Russia's disposing; that is the sovereign political force that will control Korea's destiny, whatever temporary conciliations may be given to Great Britain or Japan." But a different force from that of Russia is making itself felt in the peninsula, and is destined to do so increasingly with the revolving years—the power, namely, of Christianity and of Christian education. For the present, it may be remarked that Russia stands at least for order, protection and law; and though religiously retrogressive as things now are, the Russian State (and the Greek Church too) has at work within it internal forces which will accomplish mighty changes in the not distant future. Russia and religion may yet go hand in hand, contributing together their own share to "the reconstructive processes which are building on toward the kingdom of God."

Such is, in brief, an outline of the contents of this suggestive volume. The instructive conclusion reached by Mr. Speer from the whole of his comprehensive survey is, that while politics are not intentionally a missionary force, and while Christian missions have not directly aimed at political or sociological results, these two forces, under divine superintendence, have helped one another. At the same time the emphatic judgment with respect to missionary *method* is, that missions are not to be regarded (as among the Mohammedans and the Romanists) as mass movements, but as a work distinctively of individual regeneration. The opposite view and line of policy has sometimes seemed to promise gain; but it means in the end inevitable loss. "The Good Shepherd knoweth His sheep, one by one, by name; and the kingdom of God is to rest on *individuals* redeemed, and not on the quicksand of multitudes superficially changed." As regards the missionary *motive*, it is justifiably claimed that, with the command of Christ and the need of men in view, there is much inspiration to earnest prayer and brave and persevering effort to be derived from a survey of the world as it

actually is at the present time. On the one hand, fear may operate—in presence of the peril of allowing East and West to come together on the basis of common material advantage or political relationship without a corresponding sympathy in spiritual ideas. On the other hand, however, hope—as we see rising, no doubt more conspicuously in some heathen lands than in others, "the walls and battlements of the kingdom of God, which it is His purpose to establish on the earth."

Mr. Speer is to be congratulated on having produced such a timely as well as informing book. It was to be expected of him from his position and experience as Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions that he would take a wide and intelligent view of his subject. But he has brought special personal qualifications to the discharge of his present task. He has not yielded to the official temptation of being too statistical, and his lectures bear no trace of the affectation of superior knowledge. They abound in information clearly conveyed, and in judgments frankly expressed. But the facts are stated without prosiness and the opinions without pedantry. Historical knowledge and descriptive power combine to light up the author's argument, and reasons are adduced for the inferences drawn. The colors are by no means uniformly bright, but neither is the view taken of the heathen world pessimistic and despairing. Veracity and sanity mark the book in its every page, and it is animated throughout by a courageous and cheerful faith in the power and the love of God.

Edinburgh. CHARLES A. SALMOND.

Predestination. God's Working Plan of His Universe. By Rev. A. W. Pitzer, D.D. Small 12mo, pp. 14. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1898.) An eloquent little sermon, counseling the hearer to believe God, though he cannot always fully comprehend all He says, and in particular to cling to the blessed doctrine of predestination, though its harmony with freedom may be more or less hidden from us. The subtitle accurately explains what predestination is, and forms the thesis which is developed with rich illustration in the discourse. The keynote of the presentation may be found in the words, "It is, too, a doctrine unspeakably precious to all God's dear children—amid the storms and darkness of their earthly pilgrimage—to know that every trial, every burden, every bereavement, every sorrow has been foreseen and foreappointed by a wisdom that cannot err and by a love that cannot change." Here in very deed is the great dilemma—either we are wholly in God's hands or else we are, to some extent at least, the prey of chance or the caprice of man or the malice of Satan. The Christian heart will not long stay in deciding that dilemma when it faces it practically: but even in the Christian heart sometimes "knowledge puffeth up."——*The Gospel in Gold; or, The Grace of Giving.* By Rev. James J. Chisholm, D.D. 18mo, pp. 60. (Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication [1898].) Dr. Chisholm here gives us a singularly sane and moving exposition of the Christian's relations to wealth and the duty and privilege of giving. We do not like the suggestion that the Old Testament tithing law may in its essence be of validity in the New Testament Church. It is fair to add that Dr. Chisholm does not say it is. But we have misread a portion of his notable tractate if he does not intend his reader to take away with him the feeling and conviction—if not the proposition—that that law, though not formally in force, does yet fairly express the duty, the minimum duty, of each Christian man. There is a principle underlying it, of course, which is valid for all time—for the will of God for Israel was not in its very foundations an arbitrary thing; but it is as easy to return to "weak and beggarly elements" in this sphere as in that of "days and months and

seasons and years," and we could have wished a little more careful guarding at this point. But this is a small matter in Dr. Chisholm's beautiful tract. What could express the essence of the whole matter better than these fine words, which sum up the teaching of the whole?

"Therefore, as a part of the glad tidings which the birth of God's Son, the gift of the Father's love, brought into the world, we preach this Gospel in gold: that giving is both a mode of worship and a means of grace; that the measure of our giving must honor the glorious Gospel, must vindicate the Saviour's claim of superiority over his great rival for the human heart—mammon—and must prove the power of his grace to overcome that 'love of money which is the root of all evil.'"

We could wish the tract in the hands of every Christian man.——*The Mormons.* By Rev. E. O. Guerrant, D.D. 16mo, pp. 12. (Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication [1899].) An effective, brief exposure of the iniquity of Mormonism, which hangs like a vampire on the outskirts of our civilization and fails in no energy to propagate itself in our midst. It is said that the system supports no fewer than 2300 missionaries!

VI.—GENERAL LITERATURE.

THE GREAT POETS AND THEIR THEOLOGY. By AUGUSTUS HOPKINS STRONG, D.D., L.L.D., President of the Rochester Theological Seminary; Author of *Systematic Theology* and *Philosophy and Religion*. Philadelphia: Baptist Publication Society, 1897. 8vo, pp. xvii, 537.

The great poets whose theology Dr. Strong seeks to set forth are Homer, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Goethe, Wordsworth, Browning and Tennyson. He does not maintain that the poets are "conscious theologians." In their vocation as seers, however, they have glimpses of truth in theology, as well as in philosophy and physics. From their higher point of view, indeed, they sometimes descry truths which are yet below the horizon of other thinkers. Poetical expressions of these truths are all the more valuable because they are clothed in the language of feeling and appeal to our sense of beauty. "The great poets, taken together, give united and harmonious testimony to the fundamental conceptions of natural religion, if not to those of the specifically Christian scheme. This testimony is cumulative, and it follows the law of evolution, by advancing from vague to clear. Even poets like Goethe, who proclaim another gospel, witness, in spite of themselves, to the truth as it is in Jesus."

He does not find in Homer "a characteristically religious poet." "Homer never heard of the word 'theology,' nor did he ever write the Iliad or the Odyssey with the conscious aim of setting forth theological ideas." . . . . "Yet Homer had his theology, notwithstanding, for every poet puts together in more or less complete form the facts which he has apprehended about Deity, and the relations of Deity to the Universe." The first thing that strikes the thoughtful reader of the Homeric poems, Dr. Strong maintains, "is their undertone of monotheism." . . . . "Though there are many gods in the Iliad and Odyssey, yet they constitute a hierarchy in which Zeus is supreme." Sin he makes "a self-chosen unlikeness to God in character and conduct." As God is the sum of all natural tendencies and forces, both good and evil, sin at its worst "can only be the short-sighted following of evil impulses, the origin of which can, in the last analysis, be ascribed to God himself." And this, says Dr. Strong, "is actually the prevailing conception of sin in the Iliad and Odyssey," showing that the poet had some faint ideas of substitution and atonement. Dr. Strong interprets Homer in the light of the

revealed word and finds that the Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the word shone dimly in his darkness. In short, Homer confirms and illustrates both the teaching of John in the first chapter of his Gospel and Paul in the first and second of Romans.

As Homer was the poet of his time, so was Virgil the poet of the Roman Empire. Neither his earlier nor his later work can be interpreted, except in the light of contemporaneous Roman history. Dr. Strong makes Virgil "the precursor of modern poetry and civilization—the most complete literary representative of the Latin race, and the best read poet of all time." His age was one of criticism and unbelief. But Virgil sought to bring back the primitive faith and belief in the higher powers. He sought "to inspire in a generation that was self-seeking and partisan some sense of the greatness of the State, of the duty of patriotism, of the dignity of labor, of the value of peace; in short, he would make Rome secure by investing public virtue with religious sanctions" (pp. 71–2).

Virgil anticipated, and to a certain extent predicted, a reign of peace under a child to come forth from a virgin. The coming child, he says, in one of his epilogues—the Fourth—"shall overthrow the age of iron and shall found a golden race; he shall take on himself a divine nature; he shall see heroes mingling familiarly with the gods; he shall himself be one of them. Under his mild government men shall recover their ancestral virtues; the timid flocks shall no longer fear the lion; serpents shall perish and poisonous herbs disappear. From the very cradle of the babe shall spring living flowers; the earth everywhere shall be alike fruitful. The soil shall not need the harrow, nor the vine the pruning-fork; the plowman shall release the ox from the yoke. Best of all, the Fates declare that this age of peace shall endure forever." One can hardly resist the inference that the above passage is a paraphrase of the eleventh chapter of Isaiah. "Constantine," says Dr. Strong, "recited a part of this Eclogue to the assembled fathers at the Council of Nice." He did it "with the view of showing that heathenism had predicted its own downfall; that the deliverer it looked forward to was nothing less than divine" (p. 95.).

In treating Dante, Dr. Strong comes on to more familiar ground. He makes the poet "master of all the learning of his time." This learning he uses to set forth the theology of the Roman Church of the Middle Ages. Dante had both clear convictions and the courage of his convictions. He rebukes in terribly severe terms the vices of the Church, denounces the pride and venality of many a pope. Distinguishing between the office of God's spiritual vicegerent and the base practises of some who sit in St. Peter's chair, "he puts some of them, heels upward, in hell." Dante aims to set forth man as a subject of God, free to obey or disobey, and bound to answer to his own conscience and to Him who made him." "The Divine comedy," Dr. Strong holds to be "an attempt to put all theology and all philosophy into practical form, that man may have before his eyes an interpretation of the universe of things, a concrete representation of eternal truth, a justification of the ways of God to men." "It is," continues Dr. Strong, "the loftiest conception ever framed by any earthly poet, and the execution is worthy of the theme." The Divine Comedy was the first Christian poem, and it seems to Dr. Strong also "to be the greatest." Dante is highly practical. He "represents nearness to God and service to God's creatures as contemporaneous."

Dr. Strong's treatment of Shakespeare—"the myriad-minded," and the greatest name in our literature—seems to us discriminating, clear and just. He is "a great elemental force in the world's thought." He answers to Aristotle's definition of poetry as "an expression of the universal." "Sin begins in the abuse of free will, but by that abuse man makes himself a

slave." Thus sin may come to be "a fixed state of obstinate self-assertion, and that defies both God and man." "I challenge any man," says Dr. Strong, "to find unbelief in the *dramatis personæ* of Shakespeare's plays, except in cases where it is the manifest effect or excuse of sin, reproved by the context, or changed by fearful acknowledgement of the truth by the results of transgression." Though faulty in his life, "after earnest searching I can unhesitatingly avow the belief that the great dramatist was both pure in his moral teaching and singularly sound in his faith." Shakespeare's theological opinions peer out especially in his sonnets. His dramas are more framed to please the audiences for whom they were written.

Milton stands in stature like Saul, "from his shoulders upward higher than any of the people." "Milton's sublimity," says Dr. Strong, "is a new majesty combined with a new harmony." It includes "intense personality," "austere purity," and "religious faith more important and dominant than all the rest." "John Milton was a profound believer. He believed in a personal God and in man's responsibility to Him." "He was a man of clear and deep thought, multifarious and exact learning, and unqualified integrity." "By birth and education he was a Puritan;" "an unwavering believer in the infallibility and sufficiency of the Bible as God's revelation of truth to man." "He could neither be a hypocrite nor a slave." "Of all the great poets Milton was the one and only systematic theologian." Summing up the qualities of the man and his works, Dr. Strong says, "Moral energy, hatred of unrighteousness, unconquering devotion to truth, resistless determination to put down oppression, uplifting of the soul to God,—all these, apart from Scripture, have never been put into more soul-moving forms of expression than they have been by John Milton." "His generous verse has glorified the time in which he lived and the doctrine for which he contended. His poetry is the real product of that stalwart age of faith and freedom."

Dr. Strong takes the theology of Milton from his *Christian Doctrine*. Taken from this work it is opposed in fundamental doctrines to the theology of the Reformed churches and to his other well-known works, composed and published continuously for a period of more than thirty years, and especially to *Of True Religion*, *Heresy*, *Schism and Toleration*, the work published by Milton in 1673, the year before his death. "In his early life," says Dr. Strong, "he—Milton—had planned a treatise on Christian truth; in his last years he composed it." Indefinite as this statement is in respect to time, it differs directly from Milton himself, who, in the dedication of the treatise, gives the time and reasons of its beginning, and, inferentially, at least, of its completion. It differs also from the precise and positive statement of Edward Philips, Milton's nephew and pupil, who, in his *Life of Milton*, testifies that on certain recurring days, the Sabbath, in his pupilage, he wrote, at his uncle's dictation, parts, if not the whole, of this very work. Philips so identifies the work he wrote that it cannot be mistaken. Moreover, the work when found was in Philips' handwriting. Dr. Strong maintains that the *Christian Doctrine* was left by its author to be published after his death. "Curiously enough," he says, "it was never printed during his lifetime; the very existence of it was forgotten. . . . . After a disappearance lasting nearly a century and a half this work, the key to Milton's poetry, came to light. . . . . It has never yet gained wide recognition in the theological world. . . . . It is so original and so able a discussion of fundamental truth, that it merits careful attention." Dr. Strong gives cursorily the contents of *Christian Doctrine*, following Masson largely, quoting both his words and comments. Then, as if seeing the discrepancy with the theological character he had given him as a "Puritan of the Puritans,"

"the poet of the Protestant Reformation," and "the product of that stalwart age of faith and freedom," he pertinently asks, "Can we still subscribe to this dictum when we find him in his doctrinal treatise declaring himself to be an Arminian, an Arian, a Monist, a Traducian, a Soul-sleeper, a Premillinarian, and, last of all, a Baptist?" To show that we can, he gives a new definition to Protestantism. It seems to us anomalous that Dr. Strong does not see that the position in which he places Milton by making *Christian Doctrine* his last work, and intended to be posthumous, destroys the integrity he attaches to him, and ought to lead him to scan more carefully the evidence on which this assumption rests, and, instead of following Aubrey, as Masson and many other biographers have done, to follow Milton himself in his dedication of *Christian Doctrine*, and Philips in his *Life of Milton*, and the harmony of Milton's writings, aside from the anomalous *Christian Doctrine*. This repetition and following of the discredited Aubrey by so many biographers and writers upon Milton merits what Masson says of Addison, viz., "The statement that it was the criticisms of Addison that first awoke the English nation to a sense of Milton's greatness ought to have been exploded long ago, and owes its continued vitality only to that inherent sheepishness in human nature which will persist in repeating anything whatever that has once been strongly said" (Masson's *Life and Times of Milton*, Vol. vi, p. 787).

I have so far exceeded my limits in this review that I am able to speak only cursorily of the other great poets. Dr. Strong presents Goethe justly as "the poet of pantheism." "He believed only in a God who was identical with nature, who consecrated the lower impulses of man as well as the higher, who could be approached without confession or repentance of sin. His writings affected only an æsthetic, never an ethical, reformation." "It was a pagan culture which he set himself to attain. He was the 'great heathen' of modern times, and he was not ashamed to be known as such. . . . . Goethe had in his heart turned away from the true God, the personal God, the God of holiness, the God who imposes moral law, the God who offers pardon through Christ—and he had put in His place a God of his own wishes and imagination, a God to whom evil and good are both alike, because both alike proceed from him, a God who is best served not by self-restraint and self-sacrifice, but by the unhindered development of all our inborn instincts and powers." "Goethe's history shows that he loved darkness rather than light because his deeds were evil."

Wordsworth is treated as "the poet of nature." He was "primarily a seeker after truth." To him, "truth was reality; the inner life of things." "The world of nature and of man expressed not only thought but feeling, and this thought and feeling was the thought and feeling of a Being greater than the world, because he was the Maker and the Life of the world." We have only commendation for Dr. Strong's treatment of Wordsworth.

Browning is more difficult of treatment. This, Dr. Strong judges, arises from his artistic defects. Yet he would not have these defects "blind any of his readers to the broad humanity of the poet and his ideal pictures of the deep thoughts of man's heart." "No poet of this century is more widely learned; no poet has more carefully pondered the great problems of existence; no poet has uttered more important truth." Yet our author says, "with every inclination to put the best interpretation upon his work, I am obliged to confess that Browning came dangerously near to the pantheistic explanation of sin" (p. 434).

Few poets, none that we know save Milton, gave so early promise of greatness as did Tennyson. "At five years of age, in his father's garden,

when caught and swept along by a gale, he exclaimed, 'I hear a voice that's speaking in the wind.'" Our first and deepest impression of any poem was from "In Memoriam." Dr. Strong finds that belief in God and in a divine order in the universe are fundamental to Tennyson's system of thought. "A more omnipresent theistic spirit it would be difficult to find in the works of any poet." For this reason "he regrets all the more that in Tennyson's utterances about God he has so largely fallen in with methods of expression derived from the agnostic school of modern thinkers." See the summing up of his theology (p. 519-20). This is clearly evangelical.

Though we dissent from the treatment of Milton, we have been highly instructed with *The Theology of the Great Poets*, and commend it as worthy of the place its author holds as a theologian and man of letters.

Williston, Vt. A. D. BARBER.

The Poetry of Tennyson. A Book of Essays in Vital Criticism. By Henry Van Dyke. With an Etching by G. Mercier. 16mo, pp. xxiii, 296. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897.)——*Little Rivers.* A Book of Essays in Profitable Idleness. By Henry Van Dyke. With an Etching by G. Mercier. 16mo, pp. 278 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897.)——*The Builders and Other Poems.* By Henry Van Dyke. 8vo, pp. 87. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897.) These three dainty volumes very fairly represent the purely belletristic product of one of the most literarily inclined of our Presbyterian pastors. The most serious of them—the study of *The Poetry of Tennyson*, which is now further described as a "book of essays in vital criticism"—first appeared about a decade ago, when it had the advantage of being first in the field, at least in America, among the inevitable attempts "to estimate the meaning and worth of the most popular and influential poet of the nineteenth century." Not that it needed that advantage in order to make its way among lovers of Tennyson or lovers of the criticism of life. It is fresh and inspiring, instructive while far from pedagogic, and proves as welcome to-day as on its first appearance. The first edition was genially described to our readers by the late Rev. Dr. James O. Murray in our issue for January, 1890 (Vol. i, p. 174), and the second edition was welcomed in our issue for January, 1892 (Vol. iii, p. 206). We extend an equally hearty welcome to this pretty "Cameo edition," and wish the book a long life in its mission of pointing out not so much the beauties as the nobilities of Tennyson. This new edition is enriched by a new chapter on "In Memoriam." In *Little Rivers* we think Dr. Van Dyke has touched the high-water mark of his literary product so far. Here we have simply a delicious series of sentimental idylls in the style of the last century, shot through with a flavor which is native only to this. The spirits of Isaac Walton and the Country Parson not so much struggle together here, as harmoniously flow together for the delight of the reader, who finds every hour given to these pages a piece of exceedingly profitable idleness. This booklet too richly deserves its republication in the dainty "Cameo series." The little volume of *Poems*, unlike its fellows, appears now for the first time, and in grace of form and serious outlook on life alike merits a place by their side. Dr. Van Dyke is not a poet by profession, but, as perhaps he himself would say, "by divarsion," and it would be unfair to judge his verses as other than occasional. The most serious poem of the volume is naturally that which gives it its title—the Academic Ode recited at the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the founding of Princeton College. Those who were present on that occasion will recall the fine impression it made upon the ear and will be glad to see it here in print, making as fine an impression on the eye. The other verses are more fugitive, and, as a whole, scarcely rise

to the level of the Ode. Some are the product of Dr. Van Dyke's love of the fields and their company of feathered songsters: some come from the atmosphere of his study lamp: the best are probably the brief expressions of fragments of his outlook on life and its trials and hopes and problems. One of these is a poetic rendering of the Italian motto, *In la sua voluntade é nostra pace:* and, if it is not to be taken in a Pantheistic sense, breathes a Calvinism, the accents of which we are glad to catch even thus occasionally on Dr. Van Dyke's lips, in the hope that it represents a deeper feeling of his heart than some of his more formally theological utterances:—

> "O mighty river! strong, eternal Will,
> Wherein the streams of human good and ill
> Are onward swept, conflicting, to the sea,
> The world is safe because it floats in Thee."

Probably, after all, the hearts of even the best of us find no real rest except in essential Calvinism; or, as Augustine puts it—"our hearts are restless till they find their rest in Thee."——*Authors and Their Public in Ancient Times.* A Sketch of Literary Conditions and of the Relations with the Public of Literary Producers, from the Earliest Times to the Fall of the Roman Empire. By George Haven Putnam, M.A., Author of *The Question of Copyright*, etc. Second edition revised. 12mo, pp. xvii, 309. (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1894.) [Third edition revised, 1897.] ——*Books and Their Makers During the Middle Ages.* A Study of the Conditions of the Production and Distribution of Literature from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the Close of the Seventeenth Century. By George Haven Putnam, A.M., etc. Two volumes. 8vo, pp. xxvii, 459 + x, 538. (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1896 and 1897.) These three volumes, taken together, supply a comprehensive history of the work and trade of the publisher, from the earliest time to the opening of the eighteenth century. As befits a history of publishing by a publisher, the books are sumptuously produced. The first volume was originally designed to form a preliminary chapter to the more direct history of the origin and development of property in literature—which is, after all said, the fundamental theme of Mr. Putnam's studies: he was well advised, however, to give it ultimately this independent publication. The greater work records the results of the author's researches into the history of the manifolding and distribution of books in what may by way of contrast be called modern times, that is from the fall of Rome to the beginnings of the conditions which obtain at present. The two works together afford, thus, a tolerably complete survey of the methods of the production and distribution of literature down to the rise of the copyright. The conception of property in literature was slow in growing. It was long, indeed, before anything like a system in the production and distribution of books arose. In classical Greece nothing of the kind existed; its beginnings appeared first in Alexandria; and only in Augustan Rome did on the one hand an organized body of publishers and on the other some consequent compensation to authors appear. With the downfall of the Roman empire all this of course came to an end. The maintenance of any literary productivity became then dependent on the *scriptoria* of the monasteries, followed by the universities, until, after the invention of printing, a new factor of the highest importance enters the field in the great printer-publishers. Mr. Putnam's chief treatise thus naturally divides itself into the history of the manufacture of books in manuscript and that of the earlier printed books. To these he has added, as an extensive third part, and the culmination of his work, a comprehensive history of the beginnings of property in literature (Vol. ii, pp. 343–509). The first part, on "Books in Manuscript" (Vol. i, pp. 3–317), is divided into four

chapters, treating in turn of "the making of books in the monasteries," "some libraries of the manuscript period," "the making of books in the early universities," and "the book trade in the manuscript period." The second part, on "The Earlier Printed Books" (Vol. i, pp. 317–459, and Vol. ii, pp. 339), contains twelve chapters, on "the Renaissance as the forerunner of the printing press," "the invention of printing and the work of the first printers of Holland and Germany," "the printer-publishers of Italy," "the early printer-publishers of France," "the later Etiènnes and Casaubon," "William Caxton and the introduction of printing into England," "the Kobergers of Nuremberg," "Froben of Basle," "Erasmus and his books," "Luther as an author," "the house of Plantin" and "the Elzevirs." The third part, on "The Beginnings of Property in Literature," comprises chapters on "privileges and censorship in Italy, 1498 to 1798," "privileges and regulations in Germany, 1450 to 1698," "regulations for the control and the censorship of the printing-press in France, 1500 to 1700," "the beginnings of literary property in England, 1474 to 1709," and "the development of the conception of literary property." A survey of these topics will suffice to indicate the comprehensive character of the work. There is nothing else quite like it in English and the book is as pleasant to read as it is full of instruction.——*Essays Literary and Philosophical.* By James Lindsay, B.D., B.Sc., F.R.S.E., F.G.S., etc. 12mo, pp. xiii, 166. (Edinburgh and London, 1896.) The style in which these "Essays" are written has somewhat of the flavor of a spoken address, and we are not therefore surprised to learn that they were first delivered as lectures. Mr. Liudsay's attraction to the literature of which he treats was evidently rather that of the thinker than that of the artist. His four subjects—"The Mind of Dante," "The Philosophy of Faust," "The Philosophy of Tennyson," "Emerson as a Thinker"—may indeed be "respectively connected with epic, dramatic and lyric poetry" and the literature of the New World: but we may be sure they were chosen by the author on account of the philosophic wealth which lay under the poetry rather than because they are representatives of differing forms of poetry. His real subject is the philosophy of the representative poets—the poet of mediævalism, of modern pantheism, of English liberalism, and of New England transcendentalism. With him the dictum of Edmund Schérer applies also to poetic composition of every kind: "If there is no philosophy there is no meaning; and if there is no meaning, what have we to do with it?" It is the "mind that was in Dante as a Christian poet and philosopher"—who knows what sin is and responsibility and freedom: the dream of the evolution of the eternal substance eternally active which dominated the thought of Goethe: the God-sense of Tennyson: and the pantheism of Emerson whose "God is rather ill-defined—to put it mildly"—that interest him. And in these things he interests the reader, bringiug to bear on the exposition, as is usual with him, a vast mass of material drawn from a wide and rather miscellaneous reading.——*The Spiritual Sense of Dante's Divina Commedia.* By W. T. Harris. 12mo, pp. xxi, 193. (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1896.) This philosophical study of a great poet's thought took its place on the shelves of wise men some ten years ago. It has its limitations: limitations not only on the side of poetic temperament with all that that implies in an interpreter of a poet, but also on the side of knowledge of the history of theological thought with all that that implies in an interpreter of Dante—who is very much Thomas Aquinas done into verse. Dr. Harris approaches Dante with some violence as one who would wrest a meaning out of him congruous to his own thought, rather than as one who would simply reflect Dante's own meaning. But the book remains a stimulating and instructive one, which every student of Dante will find his

profit in reading.——The University Series. *Shakspere and His Predecessors.* By Frederick S. Boas, M.A., Formerly Exhibitioner of Balliol College, Oxford. 12mo, pp. viii, 555. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896.) A comprehensive and thoroughly instructive discussion of all of Shakespeare's writings in their approximate chronological order—a work which has been left until now insufficiently done in any English text-book. Special attention has been paid to the relation of the several pieces to their sources, to their technique and to their points of contact with the literature of the time, as well as with the earlier, including the mediæval, periods. It is this last feature which has suggested the title given the book, although only five chapters (about 88 pages) is given to the formal treatment of Shakespeare's predecessors. The remaining eleven chapters are a thoroughly well-informed and competent discussion of all the chief characteristics of Shakespeare's writings themselves, and, along with them, of his own development and his literary methods and art. It is a capital book and is well adapted for use as a text-book in advanced literary classes.——*Chapters from a Life.* By Elizabeth Stuart Phelps. Illustrated. 12mo, pp. 278. (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1897.) The times seem to have come when every man is his own Boswell—and almost every woman, too. Few men or women are so well fitted to be their own Boswells, however, as Mrs. Ward. She has given us a charming series of sketches of her childhood's home at Andover and her upbringing there and of the incidents, work, accomplishments and acquaintances of her literary life. There is much in the book that is frankly autobiographical and much that is suggestive: and the whole is enlivened by anecdote and shrewd characterization of others, not to speak of the lively movement of Mrs. Ward's style—so lively that it sometimes is almost flippant. The illustrations are largely portraits, and a goodly gallery they make. ——*The Last Years of St. Andrews.* September, 1890, to September, 1895. By the Author of *Twenty-five Years of St. Andrews*, *The Recollections of a Country Parson*, etc. 8vo, pp. xii, 397. (London, New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1896.) It is impossible not to delight in Dr. Boyd's writings. His life, as the tone of sadness which characterizes this his latest volume keeps the reader aware, is running toward its end, until now, as he tells us, more of his friends are in heaven than on earth; but the peculiar vein of mingled shrewdness of comment and humor which has given distinction to his writings has by no means run out. At every page the reader is kept ejaculating, What daring familiarity! What extremity of personality! What shrewdness of observation! What tenderness of feeling! What justness of comment! What delicious rancour! Every page has its surprise and its lesson, and the interest is kept quick until the end. As already hinted, however, an unwonted sadness colors this volume. It is the record of the closing years of a happy life at St. Andrews, and these closing years are quite different from what was hoped of them when, in bringing his delightful *Twenty-five Years of St. Andrews* to an end, Dr. Boyd promised that, if he were allowed to complete thirty years of that charge, he would continue the chronicle. "I knew enough," he says now, "a year since, to be able to say it would be a simple but pathetic story; but I never dreamed how sorrowful a story it was to be." It is, nevertheless, a most tenderly and attractively told story of five quiet years of a Scottish parson's waning life: and, of course, the very cream of anecdotage is here. Nor has it proved, after all, that these five years are the last years of St. Andrew's: and if occasional papers in the magazines portend anything, we may hope after a while to have "yet more last years of St. Andrews," which will be as sure of a welcome as this pleasant volume. This notice was written thus far before the end came in the dreadful accident at Bornemouth.

We let it stand as it was written. No more reminiscences of St. Andrews are to come to us, and it only remains for us all to lay our wreath of *immortelles* on the grave of the "Country Parson" who brought us so much quiet enjoyment in the years that are gone.——*Thomas and Matthew Arnold, and Their Influence on English Education.* By Sir Joshua Fitch, M.A., LL.D., formerly Her Majesty's Inspector of Training Colleges. 12mo, pp. ix, 277. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897.) This latest issue in the series on "The Great Educators," publishing under the editorship of Prof. Nicholas Murray Butler, ranks both in inherent interest of subject and in skill of treatment among the best of its fellows. It does not attempt, of course, to tell the story of the two Arnolds from the general point of view, and thus to come into competition with the biographies of the father by Dean Stanley and Miss Worboise, and into direct collision with the expressed wishes of the son; but only to give some account of the honorable position which both occupy in the history of public education in England and in the grateful memory of her teachers. The place of each in the history of and public education in England, though different in kind and impinging on the development of public education in very different ways, may be said to have been almost equally great: and though they approached and prosecuted their work in different spirits, and looked at it from differing points of view, each is certainly worthy of grateful remembrance on the part of all who value a sound education. Sir Joshua Fitch writes not only from a sympathetic standpoint as regards both his subjects, but out of the intimate knowledge of Matthew Arnold, on that side of his personality, which comes from personal association with him in his educational work.——*Darwin and After Darwin.* An Exposition of the Darwinian Theory, and a Discussion of Post-Darwinian Questions. By the late George John Romanes, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., Honorary Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. III. Post-Darwinian Questions: Isolation and Physiological Selection. 8vo, pp. viii, 181. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1897.) In the first volume of this comprehensive treatise Mr. Romanes expounded "The Darwinian Theory." In the two concluding volumes "post-Darwinian questions" are taken up. The former of these two (noticed in this REVIEW, vii, 383) was given to a discussion of the main question which has arisen in evolutionary circles "after Darwin"—that of what characters may be considered hereditary, whether only congenital or also acquired characters. In this volume we have a discussion of a principle to which Mr. Romanes had come to give a very high place—in some senses, the highest place—among those concerned in the process of organic evolution, the principle of "Isolation." He says that "in the principle of Isolation we have a principle so fundamental and so universal that even the great principle of Natural Selection lies less deep and pervades a region of smaller extent," and that thus it really provides, with the two basal principles of Heredity and Variation, the third pillar of the "tripod on which is reared the whole superstructure of organic evolution." Isolation is here used in the broad sense of the prevention of intercourse between a separated section of a species and the rest of its kind, without regard to the cause of this prevention—whether geographical barriers or any other interference with interbreeding. What is called on the title-page "Physiological Selection" takes its place, therefore, only as a specific form of Isolation—the form that arises from infertility between the members of any two groups of organisms occupying the same territory. It seems that only Mr. John T. Gulick among Mr. Romanes' fellow-workers attached the same importance to the principle of Isolation: and Mr. Gulick is therefore appropriately honored in this volume both by a full recognition of his work and by his portrait appearing as its frontispiece. As in all of Mr. Romanes'

works, both the exposition and the argnment is lucid and thoroughly good reading. Nor, after his presentation of the case, can we doubt the importance to the theory of Darwinian evolution of "the principle of Isolation." Whether, however, it has actnally played such a part as is here ascribed to it, and whether specifically infertility is at all explained in the remarks directed toward acconnting for its "rise," may fairly be doubted.——*Relics of Primeval Life.* Beginuing of Life in the Dawn of Geological Time. By Sir J. William Dawson, LL.D., F.R.S., etc. With 65 Illustrations. 12mo, pp. xiv, 336. (New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1897.) The contents of this latest volume from Sir J. William Dawson's pen, we are told, are "the substance of a course of lectures on pre-Cambrian fossils, delivered in the Lowell Institute, Boston, in November, 1895," and, further, that they traverse somewhat the same ground, though, of course, with much added light, which was occupied by the anthor in an earlier volume, now out of print, *The Dawn of Life*, published in 1875. The book proves to be a very carefully drawn-up, thongh popularly expressed, discussion of the whole question of pre-Cambrian life. Of course, the central place is occupied by the primitive relics which Dr. Dawson has made so well-known nnder the name of Eozoon: and all that is known of Eozoon up to date—with all that has been said, pro and con, concerning its animal origin—is here bronght under review. The volume thus gives a complete exhibition of all that is known of the earliest and most primitive forms of animated existence—the dawn of life properly so called; for Dr. Dawson frankly allows that scientific investigation has not made the first step toward explaining the *origin* of life. All that from the standpoint of science we can affirm is that these are relics of living beings: how the living beings of which they are the relics came into existence—whether by spontaneous generation or by direct creation—science in itself is incompetent to say. It will not do, then, he thinks, to dogmatize on snch matters in the name of science: nor to make vast demands on credulity and time in order to exclnde the most natural and direct explanation of the rise of life and the differentiation of forms—creative force. "Seriously," he says very jnstly, "the necessity for indefinitely protracted time does not arise from the facts, but from the attempt to explain the facts without any adequate canse, and to appeal to an infinite series of chance interactions apart from a designed plan" (p. 323). Like all of Dr. Dawson's books, the present is a model of clear exposition, prudence in inference, and reverent handling of the great issues implicated.——*Ancient India: Its Language and Religions.* By Prof. H. Oldenberg. 8vo, pp. 40. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1896.) Three articles on "The Study of Sanscrit," "The Religion of the Veda," and "Buddhism," written out of ample knowledge by a master hand, and translated excellently. They were first published in the *Deutsche Rundschau* and afterwards translated for *The Open Court.* Prof. Oldenberg shows that those who seek a conuection between Buddhism and Christianity err in not allowing sufficiently for the parallel appearance of similar phenomena independently in widely sundered regions.——*Nirvana.* A Story of Buddhist Philosophy. By Paul Carus. Illnstrated and printed by T. Hasegawa, Tokyo, Japan. 12mo, pp. 46. (Chicago: The Open Court Pnblishing Co.).——*Karma.* A Story of Early Buddhism. By Paul Carus. Illnstrated and printed by T. Hasagawa, Tokyo, Japan. 12mo, pp. 21. (Chicago: The Open Conrt Pnblishing Co.) The latter of these exqnisite booklets has already been in its former editions mentioned in this REVIEW: the former is a fit companion to it. Nothing could exceed the daintiness of the softly colored illnstrations, and the booklets form a novelty in their whole artistic character of the introduction of which into onr Western life

Dr. Carus may be proud, [illegible]-press is agreeable: but it is the book itself which is a delight.——*Homilies of Science.* By Dr. Paul Carus. Second Edition. 12mo, pp. x, 317. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1897.) It is only necessary to chronicle this new issue, in the cheaper form of "The Religion of Science Library," of the "Homilies of Science" which Dr. Carus first printed as editorials in the, at that time, weekly journal, *The Open Court*, and subsequently gathered into an attractive volume. They are devoted, of course, to the exposition and defense of that sentiment of which Dr. Carus would make a religion—a religion without a personal God, a substantial soul, or an individual immortality. It is pathetic to read in the Preface of how, brought up in a pious household and destined to a life as a Christian missionary, he "grew unbelieving and an enemy to Christianity," yet in the depths of his soul "remained thoroughly religious." He thinks he is no longer an "enemy to Christianity" because he now elects to call by the name of "the New Christianity" whatever he chances to consider truth: and as the notion of Christianity thus varies with the variations of our opinions, we can never come into conflict with it. How easy it all is, and how satisfactory! Let all dogmas go, and identify the new Christianity with "truth," *i. e.*, what we at any time happen for the moment to consider "truth:" and we at least have the name! "Convey" the wise call it.——*Hypnotism, Mesmerism, and the New Witchcraft.* By Ernest Hart, formerly Surgeon to the West London Hospital, and Ophthalmic Surgeon to St. Mary's Hospital, London. A New Edition, Enlarged, with Chapters on "The Eternal Gullible," and Notes on the Hypnotism of Trilby. With 24 Illustrations. 12mo, pp. ix, 212. (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1896.) The papers which Dr. Hart has brought together here have as their end to protect the public from the snares laid for it in the pretensions of modern purveyors of the marvelous. Besides the papers, new to this edition, mentioned in the title, the book consists of four papers bearing the captions of "Hypnotism and Humbug," "Hypnotism, Animal Magnetism, and Hysteria," "Mesmerism and the New Witchcraft," and "Gropings after the Supernatural." The author writes as an instructed physician who has made himself familiar with kindred phenomena, as well as a shrewd investigator who has made himself familiar with these marvels: and he wields a very direct and forceful pen. The exposures he makes can scarcely be gainsaid. ——*Three Lectures on the Science of Language*, delivered at the Oxford University Extension Meeting, with a Supplement, "My Predecessors," by F. Max Müller. Second Edition. 8vo, pp. 112. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1895.) The first edition of this booklet was published in 1890: and we need now only note its reappearance in a second, identical edition. Nowhere else can an insight into Prof. Max Müller's doctrine of language be so readily and pleasantly obtained.——*Easy Lessons in Vocal Culture and Vocal Expression.* Designed for the Use of Classes in Grammar and High Schools, Academies and Normal Schools. By S. S. Hamill, A.M., Chicago, Author of *Science of Elocution*, etc. 12mo, pp. 198. (New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Curts & Jennings, 1898.) A clear and well-arranged series of lessons on elocution, accompanied with illustrative extracts, full directions and diagrams, and apparently leaving little to be desired for a plain and useful course of study in vocal expression.——*Inebriety: Its Sources, Prevention and Cure.* By Charles Follen Palmer. 12mo, pp. 109. (New York, Chicago and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1896.) A somewhat *à priori* treatise on inebriety, conceived rather as a nervous disease than as an immoral state. The author speaks indiscriminately of "neurotic diseases, such as a simple nervous temperament, neuralgia, chorea, hysteria, hypochondriasis, inebriety, criminality and insanity:" and deprecates the treatment of drunkenness primarily as

fault rather than as disease. He makes haste to prevent misunderstanding, wishes it remembered that he does "not regard all drunkards as subjects of diseased inebriety:" he even admits incidentally that the "majority of drinkers are not diseased." And yet he writes steadily from the point of view that drunkenness is disease and should be treated as such: "the moral view," he says, "has had full sway; the moral responsibility of the drunkard has been the topic of a century; institutions have been founded on the 'moral basis,' and society and law, and, worse than all, the family of the inebriate, have treated him not as a sick man, but as a moral delinquent." How else should they treat him? This antithesis is the keynote of the book: and surely it is a false antithesis, and, worse than all, the author stands on the wrong side of the dilemma. Vice may produce disease and it may be the outcome of disease—and that is true of other vices than drunkenness: but the vice and the disease are separable entities: and the author should not have confused them.——*Moral Law and Civil Law Parts of the Same Thing.* By Eli F. Ritter. 12mo, pp. 212. (New York: Hunt & Eaton; Cincinnati: Cranston & Curtz, 1896.) Under this non-committal title is hidden a lawyer's plea against the licensure of saloons for the sale of intoxicating drinks. The argument depends on the links: that public necessity justifies restrictive or prohibitory legislation; that the saloon is a public nuisance and a menace to public morals: and that the licensure of an immorality is a legal absurdity and *ipso facto* void. The exact form in which the author applies his principles to the case in hand may be noted from the following extract: "My application of the principle to the case in hand is that, as the saloon business does not limit nor lessen, but encourages and augments the evils which arise from the sale of liquors: as the history of one hundred years thoroughly establishes that the saloon business, with its places of resort, is the worst and most dangerous system for the sale of liquors that could possibly be provided: as the saloon business is not necessarily connected with the sale of liquors, as the sale of intoxicating liquors might be provided for, for all necessary purposes, without connection with the saloon business, or any place of resort, for the convenience and purpose of drinking the same: therefore the Legislature does not have the power to license the saloon, the dangerous and evil resort." We should not like to commit ourselves to Mr. Ritter's argumentation: but we are heartily at one with him in thinking the saloon an evil that should be abolished.—— *Culture and Reform.* By Anna Robertson Brown, Ph.D., Author of *What is Worth While?* etc. 12mo, pp. 32. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1896.) Dr. Brown certainly puts her finger on the right spot when she declares that all true "reform" must consist in putting our wills in harmony with the divine will and runs back to the one-root principle of "Seek ye first the kingdom of God:" must therefore be "based on fundamental righteousness: and would best start out from the Church, the one large social body which is distinctly divinely organized and sanctioned as an agent to preserve righteousness in the world." So, she has little doubt of the success of "reforms." "But have you not forgotten something?" she asks. "Have you not forgotten the physical environment which hampers us, and the imperfection of our every power? Man cannot carry out this dream." "No," she replies, "I have not forgotten. *It is in God's world that we live. He puts us in it. . . . . The end is with Him.*" This is wholesome teaching.——*The Reader's Shakespeare.* His Dramatic Works Condensed, Connected and Emphasized, for School, College, Parlor and Platform. By David Charles Bell. Vol. iii, 12mo, pp. 521, buckram, $1.50. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1897.) The preceding volume of this series was noticed in this REVIEW for January, 1897 (Vol. viii, p. 172): the present volume contains the Comedies and brings the work to a conclusion. Prof. Bell has

sought to present Shakespeare—not in "selection," but in "condensation"—in a form best adapted to be read aloud: and to accompany the text with such notes and diacritical marks as will enable the reader to present it intelligibly. Shakespeare is very much a mirror of life: and we may prefer to see him like life, clearly, and see him whole. But after all, for public or family reading, as Prof. Bell says, "there is much that *must* be omitted—a great deal that *may* be omitted," and (let us be thankful) a good deal that *cannot* be omitted. The task the editor set before himself he has carefully and well performed: and the book may be confidently recommended for the uses for which it is designed.——*The Best of Browning.* By Rev. James Mudge, D.D. With an Introduction by Rev. William V. Kelley, D.D. 12mo, pp. 252. (New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Curts & Jennings, 1898.) The title of this useful little book is scarcely likely to convey an accurate idea of its character. It may be best described as an introduction to the study of Browning, and as such it will prove a very efficient guide to young people who would fain obtain some insight into the greatness of this poet. It opens with a series of three chapters (covering sixty-nine pages) on "Browning's Life," "How to Read Browning," and "The Benefits of Browning Study" respectively. These are followed by three brief anthologies of extracts entitled respectively, "Brief Felicities and Fancies," "Moral and Religious Thoughts" and "Gems of Description" (pp. 70–110). Then follows a selection of "Complete Poems," accompanied by notes. The selection is excellently made, but perhaps too prevailingly—to justify the unqualified title—from the poems of spiritual and religious character. ——*Ulysses S. Grant.* Conversations and Unpublished Letters. By M. J. Cramer, D.D., LL.D, Ex-United States Minister to Denmark and to Switzerland. 16mo, pp. 207. (New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Curts & Jennings, 1897.) The Rev. Dr. Cramer is brother-in-law to Gen. Grant and in this volume supplements the accredited histories of his career with certain details of his family life and some account of his character as seen at close quarters in the intimacy of the household.——*Three Old Maids in Hawaii.* By Ellen Blackmar Maxwell. 12mo, pp. 394. (New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Curts & Jennings, 1896.) A former book of the author's—*The Bishop's Conversion*—exhibiting something of the conditions of missionary life in India, was noticed favorably in this REVIEW, Vol. v, p. 559. The present volume weaves into a rather bright story of "love and such" a picture of present-day Hawaii, which will be interesting, specially now under our new national relations to those heavenly islands. ——*Gathering Clouds.* A Tale of the Days of St. Chrysostom. By Frederic W. Farrar, D.D., Dean of Canterbury, Author of *Darkness and Dawn*, etc. 8vo, pp. xiii, 593. (New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1895.) To the picture of how on the rising of the Sun of Righteousness the blackness of the heathen darkness was scattered which Dean Farrar gave us in his *Darkness and Dawn; or, Scenes in the Days of Nero* (see this REVIEW, iii, 207), he now adds this equally carefully drawn (and equally flamboyantly written) picture of how, after too short a while, the world reinvaded and partly even triumphed over the nominal Church. Those who are familiar with Dean Farrar's later writings will understand how a sketch of the age of Chrysostom can be made by him an opportunity to pillory and even vituperate his pet aversions. The high-Churchman comes in for many a lurid description: the so-called "'religious' newspaper" receives its accustomed characterization. The whole process of the ascertainment and formulation of Christian truth has the supremest scorn and contempt poured over it. "Christ came not to elaborate recondite shibboleths, but to create holy characters" (p. 81): "Christ came not to affirm a creed, but to create a character" (p. 172): "I seem to care little about the hard, unintelligible words of which every tongue

prates; but if I do not understand the doctrine, I try to do the will" (p. 281): "Opinions differ, and will differ; it is not by our opinions that Christ will judge us, but by our fruits" (p. 343):—such is the misleading manner in which the author continually proclaims the Gospel of indifferentism—an indifferentism which would reck nothing of the difference between those even who confess and deny that Jesus Christ is God manifest in the flesh. Abating these faults of temper and of standpoint, however, and always abating the overladen style and pedantic multitude of rare and sesquipedalian words—the book is a distinctly successful picture of the decadence of the Church at the end of the fourth century, and will convey to the reader as true and vastly more vivid a conception of the streams that entered into its life than any professed histories of the time.——*A Wind Flower.* A Novel. By Caroline Atwater Mason, Author of *The Quiet King*, *A Minister of the World*, etc. 18mo, pp. vii, 282. (Philadelphia: A. J. Rowland [1899]). In this strongly written story Mrs. Mason would commend evangelical Christianity by a picture of earnest Anglicanism and equally earnest Quakerism brought into sharp contrast—and both most sympathetically drawn — gradually passing by virtue of their very earnestness and high religious quality into the middle ground of evangelical religion. The story attains a very high level at the very beginning and moves on that high plane through most of its course, though it hardly sustains it to the very end. We fear it must be admitted that both the Anglican and the Quaker are slightly vulgarized as well as evangelicalized at the end: and that Mrs. Mason's conception of evangelical religion is both a little defective and somewhat overslaughed by the modern humanitarianism. The book closes thus a little disappointingly. But this will but little affect the reader's enjoyment of an admirably wrought-out story of both truth and power.——*Dwellers in Gotham.* A Romance of New York. By Annan Dale. 12mo, pp. vi, 392. (New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Curts & Jennings, 1898.) The motive of the author seems to be to picture the contrast between high and low life in New York, in order to bring into clear relief the grasping cupidity and hollowness of the one and the dire need and essential worthiness of the other. The artistic *motif* through which this is to be accomplished is the tracing of the fortunes of two college friends, entering New York in the same social circle indeed, but at opposite poles. The book is innocent of anything like a plot, and consists of a succession of scenes intended to picture the contrasting lives of rich and poor. While not without a certain vigor, the style is hopelessly vulgar: and while not without some insight into life, the lines are drawn with so heavy a hand that no picture presented possesses any semblance of reality. When we say the book is well meaning, we have probably said all that it is just to say.——*The Story of Marthy.* By S. O'H. Dickson. 12mo, pp. 269. (Richmond, Va.: The Presbyterian Committee of Publication [1898].) "Marthy" is a bright and inquisitive "mountain" girl, for whose education "Miss Greyson" engages the interest of a "circle of summer workers" —gathered from the pleasure seekers visiting the mountains in the heated season. It is a well-written narrative that holds the interest and will doubtless sway the consciences of its readers. The illustrations cannot be highly commended.——*Ward Hill, the Senior.* By Everett T. Tomlinson, Author of *Ward Hill at Weston*, etc. 12mo, pp. 360. (Philadelphia: A. L. Rowland, 1898.) An exceptionally well-told and elevating story of school life. Ward Hill had fallen into bad and idle ways in his previous year at "Weston," and had left in disgrace: he returns as a senior determined "to turn over a new leaf" and rehabilitate himself in the eyes of both faculty and students. How he did so, this book tells. It is a story of a manly boy making a man of himself, and is sure to appeal to the consciences of its young readers.

For use in Library only

For use in Library only

Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library
1 1012 01025 9119