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I.

THE MOSES OF THE CRITICS.

MOSES had gone up into the thick darkness, fire, and smoke, which covered the summit of Sinai. The people had waited in vain for his return. Days and weeks had passed, a month and more had elapsed, still there were no tidings from him, and no sign of his reappearance. "And when the people saw that Moses delayed to come down from the mount, the people gathered themselves together unto Aaron, and said unto him, Up, make us gods, which shall go before us; for as for this Moses, the man that brought us up out of the land of Egypt, we know not what is become of him" (Ex. xxxii. 1). Their excited minds pictured him as hopelessly and forever gone; he would never be seen, nor heard from again. Thus in the imagination of the critics the Moses of the Bible has disappeared from view. And with loud acclaim they are chanting the praises of the mystic symbols E, J, D, P and R, which they have set up to fill the vacancy created by the removal of Israel's great leader. The advance of critical science has in their opinion entirely changed the aspect of affairs; and the history of that whole period must be reconstructed on a new and different basis. Let us briefly consider what the critics propose to substitute for the Moses that has been taken from us. The theme proposed is the Moses of the critics, or Moses as the critics represent him.

The Moses of the Bible is a clearly defined, conspicuous and commanding personage. Saved from threatened death in his infancy by an interposition of Providence, which secured for him a training at the court of Pharaoh without weaning his heart from his own

people, and then disciplined by his long abode in the desert, he was called of God to deliver Israel from the bondage of Egypt, to organize them as the covenant people of God and lead them on to Canaan, the land long before promised to their fathers. He accordingly established amongst them by divine direction ordinances of worship and laws for the regulation of individual life and public affairs, which are recorded in the books which bear his name. He thus fulfilled his commission as the divinely appointed and divinely guided legislator of Israel and founder of the religion of the Old Testament, being accredited as such by the most stupendous miracles in Egypt, at the Red Sea, at Sinai and throughout the abode in the wilderness.

This law was a schoolmaster to bring men unto Christ. It was a body of elementary symbolic ordinances for the time then present, representing, sealing and applying in visible and palpable forms the pardon of sin and communion with God, which were afterwards more fully unfolded, until at length the types and shadows were succeeded by the substantial realities of the Gospel. It is to Moses and the prophets that our Lord and His apostles make their appeal in confirmation of the divinity of their own commission. "Do not think," said Jesus to the Jews, "that I will accuse you to the Father; there is one that accuseth you, even Moses, in whom ye trust. For had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me; for he wrote of me. But if ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe my words?" The authority of Christ Himself stands or falls with that of Moses, upon which he here rests his own claims.

It is sometimes affirmed that the questions raised by Biblical critics are purely literary, and involve no serious theological consequences. What matters it who wrote Deuteronomy? or who wrote the Pentateuch? Of what account is it to us whether Moses wrote it, or a succession of writers were employed upon it? whether the laws which it contains were all given by Moses, or are in large part the product of a later age? It makes all the difference in the world whether the record respecting Moses and his work is historically true and credibly attested as such or not. The religion of Israel is not a body of abstract speculative truths, which may retain their validity, whether the Mosaic narratives are true or false. It is based on the facts there related, of God's selection of Israel and entering into covenant with them as His people, of His revealing Himself to them through Moses, giving them their institutions and laws, and accompanying these disclosures with the most signal manifestations of His presence and power. If this is a reliable record, and the facts are as there represented, the divine origin and authority of the religion of the Old Testament rests on an impregnable

basis. And the New Testament, which is built on this solid foundation, stands secure.

But on the other hand, if this record is not to be trusted, and the facts are not as they are represented, and the revelations which are alleged to have been made to Moses were not really made to him, and the institutions and laws which he is declared to have received from God were not so received, but were the growth of circumstances through long ages, then the Pentateuch is no longer the word of God, the religion of Israel is not based on an immediate divine revelation, but is a purely human product, however it may have been developed under a certain measure of divine superintendence; and Christ and His apostles have given their solemn attestation to that which proves to be altogether different from what it claims to be and from what they conceived it to be.

We most assuredly have no disposition to decry the science of Biblical criticism. Its province is to investigate the origin and structure of the books of the Bible; to ascertain when, and by whom, and under what circumstances, and for what purpose they were written, and to determine the nature of their contents. These are not only proper subjects of inquiry, but they are very important to a correct understanding and a right appreciation of the Bible as a whole and of its several parts. And we do not object to the higher criticism of the Pentateuch. It is not only entirely legitimate, but extremely serviceable if properly applied. We welcome the most thorough and searching inquiry into the authorship and the historical character of the Pentateuch. Such an inquiry fairly conducted can only result in establishing the truth of the record and the reality of its claims. What we do complain of is the unfriendly prepossessions, the false principles and the perverted methods, which infect much of what passes at present under the name of higher criticism, and have led to the most preposterous and destructive conclusions, until the very term "higher criticism" has become an offense to serious minds and suggestive of pernicious and deadly assaults upon the Christian faith. The purpose of the present article is not the detection of the fallacies in the reasoning of the dominant school of critics, nor the refutation of their positions, but simply the statement of their conclusions respecting the life and work of Moses.

And first, what are the sources of information concerning him, as they conceive them? The accounts contained in the Pentateuch are in their opinion quite misleading. This is not the opinion of unbelieving critics merely, who are avowed antagonists of supernatural religion, but of those as well who claim to be evangelical and orthodox, and yet have accepted advanced critical views. With

one accord they not only deny that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, but they hold that the Pentateuch, as we possess it, does not give a truthful and trustworthy record whether of the events of his life or of the laws and institutions which he ordained. The Pentateuch, it is alleged, is a composite production. It is not the work of any one writer, but is made up from four different documents, which the critics claim that they are able not only to recognize, but to reproduce. They profess to determine in regard to each section, paragraph, and even clause of the Pentateuch, from which of these documents it has been taken. And now by singling out the sections, paragraphs and clauses, which according to their hypothesis had a common origin, and arranging them continuously together, they can reconstitute these primary documents; and thus they find themselves in possession of the historical sources from which the Pentateuch itself was derived. These primary sources, as the critics conceive them, are designated for brevity by the letters J, E, D and P. J is the Jehovist, so called because he characteristically uses the term Jehovah in speaking of the true God. E is the Elohist, who employs the term Elohim, which is the Hebrew for God. D is the Deuteronomist, to whom together with his coadjutors the body of the Book of Deuteronomy is traced. P is the priestly writer, to whom the ritual law is assigned, and such portions of the history as are supposed to be cognate with it.

If the partition of the text of the Pentateuch on alleged grounds of diction and style into four so-called documents were all that was attempted by the critics, the question thus raised would indeed be a purely literary one to be determined by literary evidence, and it would leave the historical truth and divine authority, and even the Mosaic origin, of the Pentateuch unimpaired. The mere division of the Pentateuch into any number of parts, upon any principle whatever, or upon any lines whatever, cannot injure its truthfulness, or affect in any way the character of its contents. A division into so-called documents in itself considered would be as harmless as the current division into five separate books, and these into different chapters and verses. The Pentateuch would still remain in its integrity and in full validity upon any grouping possible of its contents. And Moses might still be its responsible editor, if any number of writers had been employed upon it under his direction, and the whole were issued with his approval and under his sanction.

The critical hypothesis, as it is currently maintained, sets itself in opposition to the truth, and by necessary consequence to the divinity of the Pentateuch, in two particulars:

1. A date is arbitrarily assigned to the documents so remote from the events recorded, as to make their testimony quite unreliable.

2. The documents are arbitrarily represented to be variant and conflicting; one or the other of them must consequently be in error; and it is only by balancing one over against the other that the real truth can be elicited from these discordant witnesses.

J and E are reckoned the oldest and most reliable of these documents. Critics fluctuate in fixing their date between 900 and 750 B.C., that is to say from 100 to 250 years after the building of Solomon's temple, or from 600 to 750 years after the exodus from Egypt. Dr. Briggs tells us* that the Ephraimitic document E was written in the northern kingdom of Samaria; and the Judaic document J was written in the southern kingdom of Judah. These two kingdoms came into existence with the schism of Jeroboam, 500 years after the exodus; and if these documents were written in these kingdoms, they must have been later still. He fixes the date of J and E more definitely by saying that "these documents were not composed before the age of Elijah,"† that is to say about six centuries after the exodus. Deuteronomy is referred to the reign of Josiah, or shortly before it, upwards of 800 years after the exodus. And P is put after the Babylonish exile, more than 1000 years after the exodus. For our knowledge of Moses and the events of his time we are thus alleged to be dependent upon sources removed upwards of five, eight and ten centuries from the events which they record, and which transmit to us the traditions that were circulating at these several dates. It is apparent that the credibility of the Mosaic history is thus seriously undermined. What confidence can be intelligently reposed in accounts which rest on no better basis than oral tradition through five, eight and ten centuries, particularly as the age of Moses was followed by periods of disorder and conflict, and contaminating contact with the former population of Canaan, and foreign oppression, which were peculiarly unfavorable to the accurate and safe transmission of national traditions.

Thus, Kuenen‡ says: "Our faith in Israel's own accounts of her career is at once severely shaken by the discovery that by far the greater number of these accounts did not proceed from contemporaries, but were written very long after the events of which they treat. . . . . The accounts . . . . of the times of Moses . . . . are separated by an interval of many centuries from the facts which they alone communicate to us. . . . . On the most favorable supposition a period of more than five centuries intervenes between the event and the earliest account, while a very large majority of the

* *North American Review* for January, 1894, p. 69.

† *The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, p. 150.

‡ *Religion of Israel*, i, p. 16.

narratives, and just those which are very important for our object, are at least two centuries younger."

It is still further alleged that these documents differ materially in their statements, and give divergent representations of what took place. They must therefore have followed variant traditions, which are in many respects, the critics tell us, irreconcilable with each other. The lack of agreement between the witnesses discredits their testimony yet more. And it raises the question whether they can even be depended upon where they do agree; for in such cases how can it be known whether these are really separate authorities confirming each other, or whether one may not have borrowed directly from the other and simply repeat its unsubstantiated statement? Thus Prof. Kittel, of Breslau, whom Prof. Francis Brown* describes as a "reverent critic," and a "profound believer in the supernatural" says:† "It is evident that neither the agreement of the sources in the principal points, nor the accompanying impression of credibility, can of itself be conclusive as to the historical character of the Mosaic history. For along with the agreement of our accounts there is in other points an undeniable divergence. And we can no longer determine, in how far accounts which agree with an earlier source, are given independently or in dependence upon this earlier source." The critical partition, by isolating passages from their proper connection, interpreting them at variance with their context, and making the part equal to the whole, brings forth discrepancies. And these discrepancies so produced are urged both as justifying the partition and as destroying the credit of narratives which, taken in their completeness, are self-consistent and have every appearance of truthfulness.

It is further claimed that the aim of these documents is not to present a simple record of facts as they actually took place, but that the history has been warped either unconsciously or designedly in order to make it the vehicle of inculcating religious ideas. It follows upon this conception of the case that the teachings of the Pentateuchal history are not lessons drawn from the actual experience of Israel and God's providential dealings with them, but this history is a fictitious embodiment of the religious thought of the people or of their spiritual guides. The doctrine is not deduced from the divinely guided history of Israel, but the record of the history has been moulded into accordance with the accepted doctrine. God did not in reality reveal Himself in the history in the manner there set forth, but Israel's notions of God have been incorporated into the history. This remodeling of the history into

* *Presbyterian Review* for 1889, p. 138.

† *Geschichte der Hebräer*, i, pp. 203, 204.

accordance with current religious thought, or with the most elevated forms of religious thought, and so transforming it into what has been euphemistically styled "idealized history," has been ascribed to a pious intention, but it is a falsification of history nevertheless. It is a substitution of legend for history. The forms of history are preserved, but its real substance and true intent are changed. Under such treatment the supernatural element so conspicuous in the Pentateuchal history, and which is woven into its whole texture, is at once frittered down from objective reality to subjective impression. The miraculous no longer betokens an immediate divine interference; it is the legendary exaggeration of the marvelous. Prophetic utterances are not the offspring of a foreknowledge of future events divinely imparted; the experience of later generations has simply been transferred back to an earlier time, and put into the mouth of one who lived long before the event. Dr. Briggs* does not hesitate to say: "If it were possible to resolve all the miracles of the Old Testament into extraordinary acts of divine Providence, using the forces and forms of nature in accordance with the laws of nature . . . . still, I claim that nothing essential would be lost from the miracles of the Bible." And he adds in the same connection: "Christian men may construct their theories about the miracles of the Bible with entire freedom so long as they do not deny the reality of the events themselves, as recorded in Holy Scripture." This is precisely what the critics do in relation to the plagues of Egypt, the passage of the Red Sea and other miraculous facts; they admit the occurrence of the events, but strip them of all their supernatural features. And Dr. Driver, speaking of the writer of one of the so-called documents of the Pentateuch, says:† "It is probable that in many cases only particular elements of the representation were supplied to him by tradition; his representation, as a whole, seems to be the result of a systematizing process working upon these materials, and perhaps also seeking to give sensible expression to certain ideas or truths. . . . . His aim seems to have been to present an ideal picture of the Mosaic age, constructed indeed upon a genuine traditional basis, but so conceived as to exemplify the principles by which an ideal theocracy should be regulated." And he adds in a note: "It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the representation of P included elements not in the ordinary sense of the term historical." In other words, the writer has given an ideal instead of a strictly historical representation of the Mosaic age. To the elements supplied by tradition he has added others from his own imagination in order to

* *Inaugural Address*, p. 37.

† *Literature of the Old Testament*, p. 120.

embody his religious conceptions, and make his story of that period conform to what he thinks it must or should have been.

Besides all this the Redactor or Redactors, who are supposed to have combined the documents into the Pentateuch, as we now possess it, have greatly increased the perplexity of the subject by their well-meant but mistaken attempts to remove discrepancies or correct imaginary errors. In so doing they have, as the critics affirm, obscured or perverted the real meaning of passages which they have retained, while they have omitted others which were very important for a correct understanding of the matters with which they deal. Thus Dr. Briggs says:* "There are historical mistakes in the Christian Scriptures . . . . errors of historical events and persons, discrepancies and inconsistencies in the historians, which cannot be removed by any proper method of interpretation. . . . . They used with fidelity the best sources of information accessible to them; ancient poems, popular traditions, legends and ballads, regal and family archives, codes of law and ancient narratives. . . . . There is no evidence that the divine Spirit corrected their narratives either when they were lying uncomposed in their minds, or written in manuscripts.

"The higher criticism shows us the process by which the sacred books were produced, that the most of them were composed by unknown authors, that they have passed through the hands of a considerable number of unknown editors who have brought together the older material without removing discrepancies, inconsistencies and errors. In this process of editing, arranging, addition, subtraction, reconstruction and consolidation, extending through many centuries, what evidence have we that these unknown editors were kept free from error in all their work?"

This then is the situation imposed by the critical hypothesis, as held alike by the destructive critics and by those who regard themselves as evangelical critics. The Mosaic history is drawn from sources which date respectively five, eight and ten centuries after the exodus, and which represent the tradition prevalent at those several periods. The testimony of these sources is conflicting and has been colored to correspond with the religious ideas of the writers. They are also in a mutilated condition from the omissions, insertions, transpositions and alterations by the Redactors. Now in all honesty it must be asked, if such be the sources out of which the Mosaic history is constructed, what confidence can be reposed in it?

We now proceed to the history of Moses, as the critics find it in

* "The Truthfulness of Holy Scripture," *The World's Parliament of Religions*, Vol. i, p. 652.

the various documents. Some extreme critics discover discrepancies in the narratives of his infancy and his flight from Egypt; but these are too frivolous to deserve mention. A more serious divergence, upon which all insist,* is that according to J and E the Lord first revealed Himself to Moses at the burning bush in the desert of Sinai, where he was tending the flocks of his father-in-law, the priest of Midian. He was then and there commissioned to be the deliverer of Israel from the bondage of Egypt, and charged to go and make this known to the people; upon his hesitating to do this because of his inability to speak well his brother was associated with him (Ex. iii, iv). P gives (chaps. vi, vii) quite a different version of this transaction. He knows nothing of Moses ever having resided in Midian, or fed flocks at Sinai, or seen a vision of the Lord at the burning bush. He explicitly states that it was in Egypt that God revealed Himself to Moses, commissioned him to deliver Israel, bade him make this known to the people, and on his manifesting reluctance to speak associated his brother Aaron with him.

E and P state that it was upon this occasion that God first made Himself known as Jehovah; but according to J this name Jehovah had been in use from the days of Enosh the son of Seth, and was freely employed by the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, to whom P expressly says it was unknown.

In J Moses expresses the apprehension that the people will not believe his message nor admit his claim that the Lord had appeared to him; and the Lord in consequence gives him several miraculous signs to accredit him to them; his rod turned to a serpent and then reconverted to a rod, his hand made leprous and healed again, and water poured upon the land becoming blood.

E and P represent the matter quite differently. E knows of no miraculous signs exhibited to Moses, which he was to repeat in the presence of the people, but only speaks (iv. 17) of a rod being given to him, which he was to take with him and with which he was to perform miracles. In one of J's signs, it is true, a rod is spoken of, but that rod was the object upon which the miracle was wrought, converting it into a serpent; whereas the rod of which E speaks was the agent in working miracles, it was clothed with miraculous virtue, the supernatural change being effected not in the rod itself, but in other things by lifting the rod or smiting with it, which is a totally different conception of the nature of the rod and of the use to which it was to be put. It would seem indeed from Ex. vii. 15, that the same rod was used in both these ways, since Moses is there told to take the rod which was turned to a serpent in his hand in order to smite the water of the river with it and so

* So Dr. Briggs, *The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, p. 165.

turn it into blood. But the critics tell us that this verse has been interpolated by the Redactor, who has attempted in this unwarranted manner to harmonize these widely separate conceptions of the rod, and so reconcile J and E, when in point of fact they are hopelessly at variance. In E the rod is simply and invariably an instrument with which to work miracles. In J it is never used for this purpose; he only narrates that on one occasion it was itself changed to a serpent.

Indeed the critics make this a criterion, by which to distinguish J from E. If a miracle is wrought by Moses by means of his rod, this determines the narrative to be from E. If it is wrought immediately by Jehovah without the intervention of Moses' rod, then it is by J. Upon this principle they partition the text between these documents; every passage in which the rod of Moses occurs is straightway for that reason assigned to E; every passage in which Jehovah acts independently of Moses' rod is assigned to J. And when the partition is complete, they bid us observe how uniformly E makes mention of the rod of Moses, while J never refers to it at all; whereas this is simply the result of the partition, which they have themselves made.

P agrees with J in speaking of a rod changed to a serpent; but he differs entirely in his statement of the place, and the circumstances, and the design of the miracle. According to J it occurred in the desert of Sinai in connection with the vision at the burning bush, and was a sign there given to Moses, which he was to repeat in the presence of the people to accredit him before them. But P (vii. 9–12) transfers it to the court of Pharaoh, and makes it the first of a series of signs wrought at the demand of the king, who summoned his magicians to exhibit their skill and engage in a contest with Moses. Aaron's rod was metamorphosed into a serpent; the magicians do the same with their rods, but Aaron came off superior, since his rod devoured theirs.

In Ex. iv. 18, Moses asks and obtains leave from his father-in-law, Jethro, to return to Egypt; in ver. 19 Jehovah bids him to return. And this is made a ground for parceling these verses between different documents, since they assign quite different reasons for the act of Moses.

J relates (iv. 20) that Moses took his wife and sons with him in his return to Egypt. E says, on the contrary (xviii. 2–5), that Jethro brought them to Moses after the exodus, when he visited him at Mount Sinai. It is therefore inferred that they must have remained with Jethro, and could not have gone with Moses to Egypt. To be sure xviii. 2 expressly says that Moses had sent her back; but this, we are told, is an interpolation by the Redactor,

who thus endeavors to remove what the critics insist is an evident contradiction.

There is also a disagreement between J and P as to the manner in which the message of Moses was received by the people. J says (iv. 31) that the people believed; but P (vi. 9, 12), that they would not hearken unto him.

It thus appears that the documents are at variance in respect to the circumstances of the divine call of Moses to be the deliverer of Israel. It is affirmed on the one hand that the Lord appeared to him in the desert of Sinai in a burning bush, and there commissioned him; on the other that the commission was given to him in Egypt without any vision or burning bush. It is affirmed on the one hand that the divine name Jehovah was then revealed for the first time; on the other that this name had been known and used from the earliest ages of mankind. It is affirmed by one that three several miraculous signs were given to Moses then and there by which to accredit him before the people; by another that no signs were given him, but a miraculous rod was placed in his hand; and by still another that the sign of a rod changed to a serpent was not given to Moses in the desert, nor by him exhibited to the people, but that it was wrought in the presence of Pharaoh and simulated by his magicians. It is affirmed by one that Moses returned from Midian to Egypt, after having of his own motion sought permission of Jethro; by another that he did so at the bidding of Jehovah. It is affirmed by one that he took his wife and sons along with him into Egypt; by another that he left them behind with Jethro.

In this conflict of testimony what are we to believe? Especially when we remember that the witnesses are from five to ten centuries removed from the events which they narrate. The only thing established would be that it was currently believed at those late periods that Moses had been called of God to deliver Israel from Egyptian bondage; but there were the most divergent representations in regard to the place where this call was given to him and its attendant circumstances.

It should be observed here that all this alleged variance is created by the critics themselves; and none of it exists in the sacred narrative as it lies before every reader of the Mosaic history. The narrative is split up into parts, and each of these parts is reckoned a separate and independent account of the whole matter. And then by the fallacy of making the part equal to the whole, or one part equal to another part which is quite distinct, seeming discrepancies are produced. The Lord appeared to Moses at the burning bush in the desert of Sinai, and summoned him to be the deliverer of his people. But when his interference on their behalf only had the

effect of leading Pharaoh to double their tasks, the Lord spake to him once again in Egypt, pledging Himself to release Israel from bondage. These are not, as the critics allege, discrepant accounts of the same thing; they are separate revelations made on distinct occasions. That signs should be given him to accredit him before the people, and one of these should likewise be wrought afterwards in the presence of the king, and that in addition Moses should be directed to use his rod in the mighty works which he was to perform, that the people gladly believed his message at first, but when the only result appeared to be to aggravate their burdens they subsequently became incredulous, that Moses took his wife with him to Egypt in the first instance, and afterwards thought it more prudent to send her back to her father till Israel should be set free, there is in all this surely no real inconsistency. The narrative bears the appearance of truth and reality in every one of its particulars. It is only the violent treatment, to which it is subjected by the critics, that causes even the semblance of discordance. Their maxim is divide and conquer. The sacred narrative is parceled between separate documents; these documents are made to contradict each other; and so their statements are distrusted.

We have seen how the critics deal with the call of Moses. When he proceeds to the execution of his task, they find additional discrepancies between the documents. P gives a prominence to Aaron, and E to the elders of Israel, which they do not have in the other documents. In JE Moses simply asks Pharaoh to allow the Israelites to go a three-days' journey into the wilderness to sacrifice to Jehovah; in P he demands their unconditional release. The different accounts disagree as to the manner in which the plagues were wrought. According to P they follow upon the stretching forth of Aaron's rod; according to E they were induced by the stretching forth of the rod or hand of Moses; according to J they were produced without human instrumentality by the sole and immediate agency of Jehovah. They differ also as to the number of the plagues and what the plagues were. And R has added to the confusion in at least two instances by reporting as distinct and separate plagues, what Dr. Briggs* and other critics assure us are only variant accounts of one and the same. Dr. Dillmann, one of the most eminent of European Old Testament scholars and critics, and a chief antagonist of Wellhausen, expresses himself on this subject in the following manner:† "As the original core of the matter we may assume that the land and people of Egypt were visited in the time preceding the enfranchisement of Israel by all sorts of

* *The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, p. 78.

† *Die Bücher Exodus und Leviticus*, p. 66.

repulsive natural occurrences, which the Israelites ascribed to the agency of their God, and by which their leaders, Moses and Aaron, sought to prove to the Egyptian court the supremacy of their God over the king and the gods of Egypt. But it must be confessed that in Israelitish tradition these occurrences had long been exaggerated into the miraculous. And when once the whole had been transported into the realm of God's unbounded omnipotence, R could have no scruple in arranging the plagues severally found in his sources into a series of nine successive plagues, and thus sketching in an artistic picture in colors to shine forever the treasures of might which God controls for the help of His people, and the overthrow of those who resist His will; also the slow and long suffering but sure and effective dealing of God with His enemies, and the progress of evil in man until at last he becomes perfectly hardened."

The narrative in Exodus does indeed draw such a picture as Dr. Dillmann describes. Is this simply an ideal picture, which Israelitish fancy has dressed up in order to fill out its conception of the goodness and severity of God, which is based indeed on some undefined natural occurrences, but all its miraculous features are to be discarded as legendary or fictitious? Or is it a true and faithful record of what God actually did by His mighty hand and outstretched arm on behalf of His oppressed people? In the latter case it is a revelation of what God truly is; and it demonstrates that Moses was indeed God's accredited messenger and that Israel was His chosen people, and that the revelations made through Moses and the institutions founded by him were indeed from God. And thus the divinity of the religion of the Old Testament has the unmistakable attestation of God Himself, and rests upon an immovable objective basis. But if this picture is one which Israelitish imagination has drawn, it is a purely subjective conception, and is to be judged as any other fancy picture which men may draw. It has no authority over our faith; and it has no value to us except as representing the belief of a generation remote from the events described, when these had been distorted into forms quite different from the reality.

Wellhausen finds a conflict between the documents in respect to the observance of the passover. In P, which is held to be the latest and least reliable, the passover is said to have been instituted prior to the exodus, the blood of the paschal lamb being sprinkled on the doorposts and lintels of the houses of the Israelites to protect the inmates from the destroying angel on his errand of death throughout the land of Egypt. But J and E contain no such account. On the contrary they speak not of a feast before the

exodus, but of the exodus as prior to the feast and for the sake of the feast. Leave was asked to go three days in the wilderness in order to observe a feast to the Lord. But in the course of time the order was reversed. It came to be supposed that the observance of the feast was with a view to the exodus, instead of the exodus with a view to the feast. The annual sacrifice of first-born cattle gave rise to the story that the first-born children of the Egyptians had been swept off by a plague in order to facilitate the departure of the Israelites, and that the passover was in commemoration of this imaginary event. So easy is it for a critic to pervert and nullify the plain statements of the history by partitioning the documents at his pleasure, and then giving loose reins to his imagination.

According to Dr. Dillmann there are, including the song of Moses in Ex. xv, four distinct and divergent accounts of the passage of the Red Sea, all of which nevertheless agree in the statement that Israel was in great peril from the Egyptian army, which had overtaken them by the sea, but escaped unharmed while the Egyptians were drowned. All of them are tinged with the miraculous, but in different degrees. The simplest story is that of the song, if its poetical description be not understood in a grossly literal sense. It records the destruction of the Egyptian host, but not a dry passage of Israel. The water was driven back by the wind, then the wind changed and the water returned, submerging the host of Pharaoh. There were simply natural causes under divine direction. The miracle consisted in the rescue of the people from extreme danger without any agency of their own. In J, as in the song, a strong east wind divided the sea. But in E it was divided by the lifting of Moses' rod, and in P by the stretching out of Moses' hand, so that the waters stood like perpendicular walls on either side, until by the same instrumentality they were closed again. In E the angel of God and in J the pillar of cloud and fire keep the Egyptians from approaching the children of Israel, retarding their advance and throwing them into confusion, till overcome by terror they flee, but are met by the refluent flood and not one of them escapes. A remarkable providence, in which there was nothing strictly supernatural, is thus gradually overlaid with legendary features by the traditions of later ages. In treating of "the story of the crossing of the Red Sea," Dr. Briggs* calls attention to "the historical nucleus and the varied poetical embellishments," and says that while it is a difficult task for the Sunday-school teacher and scholar to undertake to distinguish between them, it will have the advantage of enabling "the scholar to distin-

* *The North American Review*, for January, 1894, p. 73.

guish between the real and the ideal in Biblical history." The critical partition affords an easy method, as will be seen from this and other examples, of separating a narrative into portions which may be variously dealt with, the critic accepting what he pleases and rejecting the rest.

After the passage of the Red Sea Israel proceeded by successive stages to Mount Sinai, where the law was given. Here Wellhausen startles us by his discovery that Israel never was at Sinai at all, and that no law was ever given there. He tells us* that there is perceptible in JE "a form of tradition according to which Israel after the passage of the Red Sea marched directly to Kadesh without first making an excursion to Sinai." "Israel came at once from the exodus to Kadesh" on the southern border of Canaan; and there Israel remained during the forty years of their abode in the desert. It was at Kadesh, not Sinai, that the law was given; only the legislation there was not an act once for all, but lasted forty years and consisted in the administration of justice at the sanctuary, which Moses began, and the priests and judges continued after him. This conception of Moses' legislation as mainly consisting of judicial decisions rather than of statutory enactments is shared by Dr. Driver,† who says of Ex. xviii, the same passage to which Wellhausen here appeals: "The chapter is one of great historical interest: it exhibits to us a picture of *Moses legislating*. Disputes arise among the people; the contending parties come to Moses to have them settled; he adjudicates between them; and his judgments are termed 'the statutes and decisions (*Toroth*) of God' (ver. 16). It was the historic function of the priests to *give decisions* (*Toroth*) upon cases submitted to them, in matters both of civil right and ceremonial observance; and here Moses himself appears discharging the same function, and so laying the foundation of Hebrew law." This belongs to a notion of the work of Moses, which effaces completely the great body of the laws attributed to him, and merges his function as a legislator in that of a judge deciding causes brought before him for adjudication. While Dr. Driver does not agree with Wellhausen in eliminating Mount Sinai from Israel's history, he is in accord with him in reducing Moses' work of legislation to a minimum. In like manner Dr. Dillmann‡ maintains that Moses wrote nothing; he was a great leader and legislator, who delivered his statutes orally, who reformed the worship and elevated the manners of the people, and purified their religious ideas and their conceptions of God and of His service, and organ-

* *Prolegomena*, p. 363.

† *Literature of the Old Testament*, p. 28.

‡ *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie*, iii, p. 432.

ized them as the people of God, but gave them no written book of laws.

Wellhausen undertakes to account for the prominence given to Sinai in Israelitish tradition, though none of the transactions recorded of it actually took place there. This he does in the following manner: he tells us that "the true and ancient significance of Sinai is quite independent of the giving of the law. It was the seat of the deity, the sacred mountain, doubtless not only for Israel, but generally for all Hebrew and Kainite tribes of the vicinage. The priesthood of Moses was derived from the priesthood there; there Jehovah appeared to him in the bush; thence He sent him to Egypt. Jehovah continued to dwell there in the estimation of the Israelites long after they had settled in Palestine. In the song of Deborah he came from Sinai. In Deut. xxxiii, the Israelites did not go to Jehovah at Sinai, but He came to them from Sinai to Kadesh. It came, however, to be thought more fitting to let the Israelites go to Jehovah. The first form of the tradition was that they appeared at Sinai before Jehovah's face to worship and offer to Him (Ex. iii. 18), and in departing received the ark as a substitute for Jehovah, who continued to dwell on the mountain (Ex. xxxiii). By a still further step Sinai was made the scene of the solemn initiation of the relation between Jehovah and Israel. By a poetic necessity this was converted into a dramatic act upon a lofty stage. What in the older tradition had proceeded in a slow and quiet way, filled up the entire period of Moses, and began just as it continued ever after, was now for solemnity and spectacular effect condensed into a splendid initiative. It then became necessary to characterize the covenant between Jehovah and Israel in some positive way, that is to say for Jehovah to announce the basis and conditions of it to the people, and make known its fundamental laws. And thus the legislative material found entrance into the historical representation."

The basis for this extraordinary representation is found in the so-called parallel narratives, of which the critics make such extensive use. It is claimed that variant accounts of the same transaction have in numerous instances been mistaken by R for distinct events, and recorded as such. Now Wellhausen insists, and other critics agree with him in this, that the narratives which precede the arrival at Sinai are simply duplicates of those which follow the departure from Sinai. There is general critical consent that the appointment of judges to relieve Moses (Ex. xviii) is a duplicate account of the selection of elders to assist him (Num. xi); that the gift of manna and quails in Ex. xvi is identical with that recorded in Num. xi; and that the bringing water from the rock at

Rephidim in the wilderness of Sin (Ex. xvii) is only another version of that recorded as having taken place at Kadesh in the wilderness of Zin (Num. xx), and to this Dr. Briggs* gives his assent. But if these incidents on the way to Sinai are only imaginary reproductions of events which properly belong on the way to Kadesh, then, Wellhausen argues, the visit to Sinai is itself imaginary, and the only thing of which we have proof is that Israel went from the Red Sea to Kadesh. Preposterous as his conclusion is, it is no more so than the premises from which it is drawn. Yet critics, who shrink from the former, thoughtlessly play into his hands by admitting the latter.

Most critics, however, agree that Israel came to Sinai and there received the law. But they profess themselves greatly perplexed in their endeavors to ascertain what took place at Sinai and what law was given there. They complain of the irreconcilable divergence of the documents, of the serious displacements and of the extensive lacunæ, and that R in his attempt to harmonize the documents has put them together in a manner that is altogether misleading, and has so obscured their real sense that it is well-nigh impossible to ascertain the actual course of events. The critics have themselves to thank for all the trouble that they here find; it arises wholly from their partition of the text. The statements of the sacred record are quite plain and self-consistent throughout, and he who follows them has no difficulty in ascertaining either what was done or what laws were enacted. But when the critics undertake to slice this indivisible record into distinct documents, and then make each of these documents stand for a separate and independent account of the whole matter, of course they find it impossible to make these documents agree.

The laws given at Sinai are parceled by them in the following manner: They assign to E the Ten Commandments in Ex. xx, and the judgments embraced in Ex. xxi–xxiii, which are entitled the book of the covenant;† to J (Ex. xxxiv. 10–26) the covenant as renewed after the sin of the golden calf; to P the entire ritual law

* *The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, p. 79.

† Kuenen limits the Sinaitic legislation still more (*Hex.*, p. 258, *sqq.*). He is of the opinion that in the original narrative of JE no laws were given at Sinai but the Ten Commandments; the book of the covenant (Ex. xxi–xxiii) and the words of the covenant (Ex. xxxiv. 10–26) were in that document assigned not to Sinai but to the plains of Moab, and they have been transposed to their present position by R in order to give place to the Deuteronomic law, which "is really a new edition of the book of the covenant, though very greatly amplified and modified." Dr. Briggs also identifies Deuteronomy with the book of the covenant (*Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, p. 157), thus nullifying not the legislation at Sinai, but that in the plains of Moab.

or Priest code, embracing the detailed directions given to Moses during the forty days spent on Mount Sinai (Ex. xxv–xxxi), the construction and erection of the tabernacle (Ex. xxxv–xl), the laws in Leviticus and the first ten chapters of Numbers. Each document has thus a separate portion of the legislation attributed to it. And now, if each of these separate portions taken singly is made to stand for the entire body of the legislation at Sinai, what can there be but discord? And if one is deemed reliable and another not, the discredited portion will be set aside as non-Mosaic. The process is simple, but the fallacy is obvious. This is the way in which the critics uniformly deal with the Mosaic legislation. As according to the current hypothesis E is separated from the events at Sinai by an interval of from five to seven centuries, while P is at ten centuries' remove from them, their hand is given with some hesitation to E, while P is waved aside entirely. Thus the whole ceremonial law, save a few undefined germs, is summarily shoved overboard; and whatever Mosaic statutes can be recovered, must be sought within the limits of E, with which J substantially agrees, though this document is confessed to be here in a very mutilated condition.

Thus Dr. Driver (*Lit. O. T.*, p. 45): "It is reasonable to suppose that the teaching of Moses on these subjects (*i. e.*, civil ordinances and ceremonial observances) is preserved in its least modified form in the Decalogue and the Book of the Covenant." Observe what this implies. We are referred to the few elementary statutes in four chapters of Exodus, preliminary to the formal ratification of the covenant between God and Israel, for our knowledge of Moses' teaching in its least modified form; while all the institutions and statutes which followed the ratification of that covenant, which grew out of it, were based upon it, and unfolded in detail the privileges and the obligations involved in that covenant relation, are swept away as non-Mosaic. And this notwithstanding the fact that these ordinances, which the critics thus summarily remand to a period long posterior to the Mosaic age, are uniformly prefaced: "And the Lord spake to Moses, saying." And the subscription to chap. xxvi of Leviticus declares of the entire antecedent portion of the book: "These are the statutes and judgments and laws which the Lord made between him and the children of Israel in Mount Sinai by the hand of Moses." And the closing supplemental chapter (Lev. xxvii) has a subscription of like import: "These are the commandments which the Lord commanded Moses for the children of Israel in Mount Sinai."

When Dr. Driver remarks (p. 34) that in the book of the covenant "religious institutions are still in a simple undeveloped stage," and (p. 144) that in P they "bear the marks of a more advanced

stage of ceremonial observance," and would have us infer from this that ages of development must have intervened between these two bodies of law, the obvious and sufficient answer is found in the character and design of each respectively. The former consisted of a few simple statutes, to which the people were required to promise obedience as the condition antecedent to the formation of the covenant between God and Israel. The latter gives full and developed expression to the blessings which would accrue to Israel and the duties incumbent upon them as flowing from this covenant relation; and this in the forms of a symbolic ceremonial. The development is not the growth of long periods. It is merely the unfolding of the true conception of the covenant in a series of object lessons before the eyes of the people. Dr. Driver tells us (p. 146) that the later elements in P were still referred to Moses; which is equivalent to saying that what the Scriptures declare expressly was spoken by God to Moses was not spoken to him at all. The laws, which as a whole and in each separate part are affirmed to have been given by the hand of Moses, may upon this theory contain some particulars which emanated from him; but the vast proportion of these laws, and the system into which they are wrought, and the principles of which they are the expression (p. 144), belong to a much later age, and are the gradual growth of post-Mosaic and even post-Solomonic usages.

Dr. Driver and the critics generally do not content themselves with maintaining that the ritual law considered as a whole must be regarded as a post-Mosaic development; they assert the same specifically of particular portions of this law. Thus they are in open variance with the inspired record in respect to the sacred tabernacle.* This is most elaborately described in Ex. xxv, *sqq.*, the specifications being given even down to the most subordinate particulars with the minuteness of an architect, and the process of its construction being detailed with equal minuteness and exactness of repetition (Ex. xxxvi, *sqq.*), the measurements of the whole and of each of the apartments and of each individual item used in the building being accurately stated, and the materials for the frame and the coverings and the veil and the hangings down to the loops and taches and tentpins and cords and the decorations and the articles of furniture. All this elaborate detail is communicated with the view that this structure might be in every part designed of God, and made after the pattern shown to Moses in the mount. But the critics would have us believe that the whole is the mere product of the fancy of a later age, and is simply a proof that P was of a calculating and idealizing turn, and that his imagination disported itself after this dreary

* This is more fully discussed in the last January number of this REVIEW.

and wearisome fashion. And this though it is expressly affirmed of each separate part that it was made in precise accordance with the divine directions; the names of the master workmen who built it are given; the day on which it was erected and dedicated is specified; and not only is Moses' approval of the work particularly spoken of, but the divine approbation was manifested by filling it with the divine glory. And further mention is made of the arrangements for its transportation, as Israel journeyed from place to place, the parties charged with its removal, the number of oxen and of wagons employed in carrying it, and the names of the princes by whom these were presented to the congregation. All this, which is seriously related as historical fact, and in regard to a matter so sacred, is held to be an absolute fiction, the sheer invention of a dreamy writer. We are told in Num. ii, that the tabernacle stood in the centre of the camp, and the disposition of the several tribes about it is particularly specified, the whole forming a hollow square, with three tribes on each of its four sides. This is again declared to be a pure piece of fancy on the part of P, who had a taste for regularity, and thus conceived a sort of geometrical representation of the religious idea, that God had taken up His abode in Israel.

The critics are also in open and avowed collision with the inspired record in respect to the priesthood. They assert* that priestly rights were not limited to the family of Aaron until after the Babylonish exile, but were enjoyed by the Levites generally until that time. And yet we are expressly told (Ex. xxviii, xxix, Lev. viii, ix), that Aaron and his sons were made priests by divine direction, while the Levites generally were appointed to subordinate functions at the sanctuary (Num. iii, iv, xviii); and that this led to the rebellion of Korah and other Levites, who, dissatisfied with the inferior positions assigned to them, aspired to the priesthood (Num. xvi. 8–11). Their awful overthrow is recorded, and the priesthood of Aaron received a fresh divine sanction from his rod that budded, which was thenceforward kept in the sanctuary as a perpetual reminder of the event.

The critics deny that the law restricting sacrifice to a central sanctuary (Deut. xii, Lev. xvii) was in existence before the time of Josiah, notwithstanding the recorded fact that all Israel in the time of Joshua resisted the erection of another altar than that at the sanctuary as an act of rebellion against Jehovah (Josh. xxii. 10, *sqq.*).

The critics declare that the sin-offering and the annual day of atonement are postexilic, though the laws ordaining them are ex-

* Driver, *Literature of the Old Testament*, p. 132.

plicitly said to have been given to Moses at Mount Sinai, and mention is made of the actual offering of the former (Lev. x. 16–19), and of the institution of the latter (Lev. xvi. 1, *sqq.*), at the time that Nadab and Abihu met their death for offering strange fire before the Lord.

Human sacrifices are peremptorily forbidden in laws given by God to Moses (Lev. xviii. 21, xx. 2; Deut. xii. 31, xviii. 10), as abominable to the Most High, as punishable with death, and as one of the iniquities for which the Canaanites were to be punished, and for which the Israelites would be similarly punished, if they were guilty of it. It is the same lesson which Abraham was taught when the angel restrained his hand, and a ram was shown him to be offered in place of Isaac. And yet Dr. Briggs* allows himself to use the following most extraordinary language:

"There is indeed no prohibition of the offering up of children in the earliest codes of the Hexateuch. The prohibition was first made in the Deuteronomic code, and originated somewhat late in the history of Israel. The early Hebrews shared with the Canaanites and other neighboring nations in the practice of offering up their children in the flame to God. From the point of view of sacrifice nothing could be more acceptable than the best beloved son, except the offerer himself. . . . . The offering up of children and of domestic animals and grains was all a preparing discipline. The training was true and faithful for the time. But it was provisional and temporal, to be displaced by that which is complete and eternal. These were the forms in which it was necessary to clothe the divine law of sacrifice in its earlier stages of revelation."

Equally astounding is the language which he uses respecting those figurative expressions in the Mosaic writings and in the Bible generally, in which the attributes of God are set forth in human forms to render them more intelligible. These are sundered by critical partition from the passages in which the spirituality and supreme exaltation of God are most fully set forth, a literalism of interpretation is imposed upon them of which neither the writer nor his readers ever dreamed, and wholly unwarranted conclusions are thence drawn that they indicate low and imperfect apprehensions of the divine nature. This utterly unjustifiable procedure involves the same lack of appreciation of the proper meaning of language, as though one were to contend that the branch springing from the roots of Jesse (Isa. xi. 1) was in the intention of the prophet a literal stick of wood. Dr. Briggs† says:

"It is true that there are at times representations of vindictiveness in God, a jealousy of other gods, a cruel disregard of human suffering and human life, an occasional vacillation and change of purpose, the passion of anger and arbitrary preferences, which betray the inadequacy of ancient Israel to understand their

* *The World's Parliament of Religions*, i, p. 656.
† *Ibid.*, p. 659.

God, and the errancy of their conceptions and representations. But we all know that the true God does not accord with these representations. We may call them anthropomorphisms or anthropopathisms, but whatever we may name them, they are errant representations. They do not, however, mar the grandeur of the true God as we see Him in the Old Testament. The truthfulness of the teaching of the doctrine of God is not destroyed by occasional inaccuracies of the teachers."

It is no merely literary question then which this style of criticism raises. It is not simply whether the Pentateuch was written by one author or another, while its historic truth and its divine authority remain unaffected. The truth and evidence of the entire Mosaic history are at stake. And with this stands or falls the reality of God's revelation to Moses and the divine origin of the Old Testament. And this again is not only vouched for and testified to by our divine Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ and His inspired apostles, but upon this the Lord Jesus bases His own claims. Moses wrote of Him. The predictions uttered and recorded by Moses speak of Christ. The types of which both the Pentateuchal history and the Mosaic institutions are full point to Christ. But if the predictions are not genuine, and the history is untrue, and the institutions were not ordained of God, but are simply the record of priestly usage, what becomes of the witness which they bear to Christ? And must not the religion of the Old Testament sink in our esteem from a religion directly revealed of God to one which is the outgrowth of the Israelitish mind and heart, under an uplifting influence from above, it may be, but still proceeding from man, not from God? It is then based not on positive truth authoritatively communicated from God to man, but on the aspirations and reflections, the yearnings and longings and spiritual struggles of devout and holy men seeking after God, with such divine guidance and inward illumination as good men in every age may enjoy, but that is all. There is no direct revelation, no infallible inspiration, no immediate and positive disclosure of the mind and will of God.

The religion of the Bible is not merely one of abstract doctrines respecting God. It does not consist merely in monotheism, nor in right notions of the being and perfections of God as abstract truths. Nor does it consist merely in devout emotions and aspirations towards the Divine Being. But both its doctrines and its practical piety are based on positive disclosures which God has made of Himself in His dealings with men and His communications to them. It is a historical religion based on palpable outstanding facts, in which God has manifested Himself, and by which He has put Himself in living relation to men. Appeal is throughout made to the mighty deeds and the great wonders wrought by His uplifted hand and His outstretched arm in evidence that it is the almighty God, who has

acted and spoken and revealed Himself, and no mere human imaginings. To discredit these Biblical statements is to discredit the Biblical revelation. And this is what is done throughout the entire Mosaic period, not by Kuenen and Wellhausen and Stade and Cornill merely, who are avowed unbelievers in a supernatural revelation, but by those likewise who claim to be evangelical critics.

It is notorious that the long succession of distinguished scholars, by whom the divisive hypothesis has been elaborated in its application to the Pentateuch, have been unbelievers in an immediate supernatural revelation. And they have not hesitated to avow their want of faith in the reality of prophetic foresight and of miraculous powers. The ready method, by which these have been set aside, is by dexterous feats of criticism. Revelations of truth and duty are brought down to such a period in the history as may fit in with some imagined naturalistic scheme of development. Predictions which have been too accurately fulfilled to be explained away as vague anticipations, shrewd calculations, or lucky guesses, must, as they claim, have been uttered or at least committed to writing after the event. Miracles cannot have been recorded by eye witnesses or contemporaries, but are regarded as legendary exaggerations of events, that are entirely explicable from natural causes. It is therefore assumed that they necessarily imply a sufficient interval between the occurrence and the written narrative to account for the growth of the story. A hypothesis wrought out on the basis of these principles, which are throughout covertly assumed, and the critical phenomena most ingeniously adjusted into conformity with them, can lead to no other result than that with reference to which it was shaped from the beginning. While the discussion seemingly turns on words and phrases and the supposed peculiarities of individual writers, the bent of the whole thing is to rivet the conclusion, which the framers of the hypothesis have tacitly though steadily contemplated, a conclusion irrefragable on their philosophical principles, viz., that the supernatural must be eliminated from the Scriptures. And hence the hypothesis is at this time one of the most potent weapons in the hands of unbelief. Supernatural facts, which stand unshaken in the Mosaic records like granite mountains, impregnable to all other methods of attack, dissolve like wax in the critics' crucible.

Real discoveries are not of course to be discredited because of false principles that are entertained by the discoverers, or wrong motives that may have influenced them. If unbelievers in divine inspiration by their learned investigations can assist us in the elucidation or more correct appreciation of the sacred writings in any respect, we welcome their aid with all our hearts. But all is not

gold that glitters. And there can be no impropriety in subjecting novelties to careful scrutiny, before we adopt conclusions at war with our most cherished convictions and with what we hold to be well-established truths. The apostle's maxim applies here, "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good." The recent acceptance of this hypothesis by men of high standing in evangelical circles does not rob it of the pernicious tendencies inwrought in its whole texture, and will not prevent the full development of these tendencies, if it shall ever gain prevalence among us.

One very momentous consequence of the adoption of this hypothesis is palpable upon its surface. It nullifies at once the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, and substitutes anonymous documents, of late age, in an imperfect state of preservation, which have been woven together and to some extent modified by an anonymous Redactor. It is at once obvious what a vast diminution hence results in the external guarantee of the truth of the record. If Moses himself committed to writing the events in which he bore so conspicuous a part, and the laws and institutions enacted by him, and this product of Moses' own pen has been preserved to us in the Pentateuch, we have a voucher of the very first order of the accuracy of the narrative in every particular, proceeding as it does not only from a contemporary and eye witness cognizant of every detail, but from the leader and legislator whose genius shaped all that he records, and who was more than any other interested in its true and faithful transmission.

It would be a relief if these anonymous sources were themselves the work of contemporaries and participants in the events recorded. If, as Delitzsch assumed when he first suffered himself to be captivated by the hypothesis, Eleazar or Joshua or men of like stamp with them were the authors of the documents, and these were put together in the age immediately succeeding that of Moses, it might seem as though this would afford abundant assurance of the truth of their statements. But who is to assure us that Eleazar or any of his compeers had a hand in these records? If we abandon the Mosaic authorship, which is so explicitly and repeatedly certified by the earliest tradition that we are able to summon, we are out upon the open sea with nothing to direct our course. Nothing can disprove its composition by Moses which does not disprove its origin in the Mosaic age. All thought of its proceeding from the pen of contemporaries must then be abandoned. We go blindly groping along the centuries in quest of authors. The documents may be attributed to Samuel, or to Nathan, or other distinguished men in earlier or in later times. But all is unwarranted conjecture; there is no firm lodgment anywhere. The notion that the authors

of these so-called documents, or the Redactor who compiled the Pentateuch from them, can be identified in the absence of any ancient testimony pointing to another than Moses is utterly groundless.

Even the age to which the documents are to be referred has been vehemently contested, and in the opinion of some is yet unsettled. The Psalms of David are entitled to be heard on this subject. But the critics who discredit the authorship of Moses discredit likewise that of David, and either allow no Psalms whatever to be from his pen, or so few that his voice is silenced entirely. The prophets of the eighth century B.C., Hosea and his contemporaries, supply the first body of evidence, that the critics admit to be unimpeachable. Here then they are obliged to call a halt. The allusions to the contents of the Pentateuch in the oldest books of the prophets are so numerous and explicit that they cannot be disregarded. It must be acknowledged that one or more of the Pentateuchal documents must have been in existence before their time.

It may be said that things are not necessarily as we would like to have them. Desirable as it might be that the history of the Mosaic age should be authenticated by the pen of Moses himself, yet if this has not been done, it cannot be helped, and we must be content with such records as we have. But when we consider the supreme importance of the age of Moses in the religion of Israel, and the fundamental character of the revelations then made, is it supposable that the Lord who brought them out of Egypt by so mighty a hand conducted them through the wilderness, framed their institutions, and gave them such marvelous tokens of His presence and such immediate communications of His will, should have taken no pains to have this faithfully recorded for the instruction and guidance of future generations of His people? The proof should be very clear and cogent before we assent to such a disparaging conclusion.

But if the authors of the several documents were infallibly inspired, and if the Redactor were likewise divinely guarded from error, would we not then have a perfectly trustworthy record, as much so though it were produced in a comparatively late age, as if it had been contemporaneous with the events themselves? This fond fancy is dispelled the moment we come to examine the actual working of the hypothesis, as this has been abundantly illustrated in preceding pages. It is constructed on the assumption not merely of the fallibility but the falsity of the documents, whose accounts are represented to be not merely divergent but contradictory; upon the assumption likewise of the incompetency or bad faith of the Redactor, who either misunderstands his authorities or willfully perverts them, ascribing to them a meaning foreign to their original

and proper intent. The Pentateuch is thus held to be based upon conflicting narratives, written several centuries after the occurrences which they profess to relate, and embodying the diverse traditions which had meanwhile grown up respecting them. These the Redactor has undertaken to harmonize by a rearrangement and by additions of his own, that obscure and alter the original meaning, when in point of fact they were, so the critics affirm, mutually inconsistent. The Pentateuch, therefore, on its face yields a very incorrect representation of what actually took place in the time to which it relates. The only way to reach the real facts is to undo the work of the Redactor, eliminate his misleading additions, and restore as far as possible the documents to the condition in which they were before he meddled with them. This will put us in possession of three discordant traditions, which had arisen in the course of centuries respecting the events in question. The comparison of these traditions will yield a modicum of truth upon the subject, and the rest must be left to conjecture.

And this, be it remembered, is a part of the canon of Scripture, the part in fact which lies at the foundation of the whole; that Scripture, which according to our blessed Lord cannot be broken, and which according to the apostle Paul is given by inspiration of God. Is it surprising that they who accept this hypothesis insist that the current doctrine of Scripture and of divine revelation requires revision?

The extent to which the Mosaic history crumbles away under such treatment, as has been illustrated above, varies with different critics. To Kuenen and Wellhausen it is utterly untrustworthy. Others recoil from such unsparing demolition, and allow more or less to stand unchallenged. But this difference of result is due to the subjective state of the critic himself, not to any clear and intelligible ground in the nature of the case. The whole process is vicious. The claim is preposterous that a consistent and continuous narrative may be rent apart *ad libitum*, and meanings assigned to isolated portions, which the words might admit if viewed independently, but which are impossible in the connection. Yet this lies for the most part at the basis of the divisive criticism, determines generally the line of fracture, and imparts to the whole subject nearly all of its interest and importance in the view of its adherents. Even if the partition hypothesis were well founded and the documents, of which the critics speak so confidently, had a real and separate existence, the Redactor who had them before him in their original completeness was much more competent to judge of their true meaning than modern critics, who by their own confession possess them only in a fragmentary and mutilated condition, and so

blended together that it is extremely difficult and often quite impossible to disentangle them with certainty and accuracy. Under these circumstances to deal with the Pentateuch in its present form in a manner which implies either mistake or misrepresentation on the part of the Redactor is gratuitous and inadmissible unless on the clearest and most unmistakable evidence.

It is nevertheless a fundamental assumption in the literary partition of the Pentateuch, that the Redactor has misunderstood or misrepresented his sources; that narratives, which were but varying accounts of the same thing, were supposed by him to relate to distinct occurrences, and he has treated them as such, wrongly assigning them to different occasions and perhaps different persons; that he has combined his sources in such a way as to give a wrong coloring to their contents, so that they make a false impression and convey a meaning quite different from that which properly belonged to them in their original connection. And the chief value and interest of the critic is thought to be the new light which he brings into the narrative and the altered meaning which he discovers by undoing the work of the Redactor, who is supposed to have cut away much precious material from his documents that is now irrecoverably lost, and to have modified even the mutilated remnant which he has handed down to us. Unless this be so, what is gained by the partition? If everything means just what it did before, what good has been accomplished? If, on the other hand, the meaning has been altered, the question returns, Which is right and which is the better entitled to our confidence, the Redactor who had ample means of knowing what he was doing, or the modern critic who relies upon his conjectures for his facts?

A yet more serious aspect of this literary partition is that there is no limit to it. If the door be opened even on a crack to admit it, all is at the mercy of what there is no means of controlling; and nothing can prevent the door being flung as wide open as the hinges will allow. The appetite for division and subdivision grows by every concession made to quiet it. The analysis of Wellhausen, of Dillmann, of Juelicher, and of Stade shows that we have not yet reached the beginning of the end. Fresh seams are constantly discovered in what critics themselves have previously regarded as indivisible; fresh errors and mistakes are discovered in the narrative that were never suspected before; and the whole becomes the plaything of the critic's fancy. The advocates of literary partition among us at present may stand on comparatively conservative ground* under the influence of their own past training and of cher-

* Dr. Cheyne (*Founders of Old Testament Criticism*, pp. 252, *sqq.*) makes some significant statements respecting the methods adopted by himself and others to

ished principles, which they are unwilling to abandon. But what is to hinder their followers, who are not similarly anchored, from pursuing this partition to its legitimate consequences? It is the first step that costs. And the initial step in this partition is the admission of the untrustworthiness of the sacred record as it now stands, and the necessity of transposition, alteration and reconstruction in order to reach the real truth. After this initial admission has been made, everything further is but a question of degrees. The Scripture is no longer reliable in its present form. The inspiration of its writers has been surrendered. We have lost our infallible guide. And distrust may be carried to any length that the inward disposition of the operator inclines him to indulge it. In yielding the principle everything has been conceded that is involved in it and follows from it. The avalanche cannot be arrested midway in its descent.

The Pentateuch in its unity and integrity is impregnable to hostile assaults. But accept the partition of it which the critics offer, and this will inevitably carry with it the false principles on which it is based, and which are wrought into its entire texture from first to last. From a homogeneous, self-consistent record, the books of Moses are thus converted into mutually conflicting documents of unknown origin, pieced together in a manner to obscure their true original sense by an unknown Redactor. If this is conceded, the truth and inspiration of this portion of Holy Scripture are not worth a rush. The scheme of partition, upon which with unessential modifications critics are now substantially agreed, is what is meant at present by the literary analysis of the Pentateuch. This is what the advocates of that analysis are everywhere understood to accept. This is what is maintained and defended in every volume and treatise written in its interest. This it is which is commended to learners and inquirers on the subject. This is what every voice lifted in its favor must be understood to affirm, unless there is an

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introduce the conclusions of the higher criticism gradually and without giving offense, viz., by putting forward in the first instance those results which "are most easily assimilated by thinking laymen," and "*adapting* Old Testament criticism and exegesis to the prejudices of orthodox students. . . . . As late as ten or twelve years ago this was sorely needed. But now we have got beyond this." He charges Dr. Driver with "excessive caution" in his *Literature of the Old Testament;* with being "free in his criticism up to a certain point, but then he suddenly stops short." His "book is to a certain extent a compromise," in which Biblical criticism is "pared down for apologetic reasons;" and which "assumes that though the traditional theory of the origin and the historic value of the Old Testament books has been overthrown, yet we must in our reconstruction keep as close to the old theory or system as we can." Dr. Cheyne reminds his more timid associates that "the time for even a partly apologetic criticism or exegesis is almost over;" and he calls upon them to exercise a "*fearless* criticism," and boldly avow what they really hold.

open and positive renunciation of the fundamental principles of this divisive criticism, which so directly antagonize the inspired verity of the Pentateuch in the form in which it has been handed down to us.

If these principles are discarded and the different portions of the Pentateuch are suffered to supplement and explain each other and to harmonize together, as the author of it in its present form intended that they should, the discussion of its literary features and the comparison of the diction and style and conception presented in its different portions would be altogether harmless. This could by no possibility lead to any such partition, as critics now claim, who make these literary phenomena merely the starting point for boundless conjectures and vagaries. Refuse to give loose rein to wild and profitless conjectures born of caprice, if not of skepticism and unbelief, and the fullest consideration of the literary phenomena of the Pentateuch will not alter its meaning in any part; and that factitious attraction which now attaches to the novelties of the higher criticism will completely disappear.

In spite of all that has here been exhibited, it has been affirmed* that "the analysis of the Hexateuch into several distinct original documents is a purely literary question in which no article of faith is involved;" and students are referred to "the completed works of Wellhausen, Reuss, Kuenen, and Dillmann" to study it for themselves. It is sufficient to say that if these distinguished scholars understand the nature and effect of their own hypothesis, it is in the view of each one of them inconsistent with the historic truth of the Pentateuch. The wholesale acceptance of the results of German unbelieving criticism in respect both to the Pentateuch and the rest of the Old Testament by professedly evangelical men is as perilous as it is novel.

The question of the hour is, What shall be done with this bag of dynamite, which has been placed on board of the vessel? Its advocates claim that it is an inoffensive carpet bag, and that there is no harm in suffering it to remain where it is. Meanwhile the fuse is slowly burning. And the practical question for all the passengers is, Shall the vessel be abandoned, and each consult as best he may for his own individual safety, or shall the dangerous package be flung overboard? Shall the staunch old doctrine that the Bible is the infallible Word of God be renounced, and the effort be made to save whatever it is possible to rescue from the wreck, or shall the hypothesis of the literary partition of the Pentateuch be sunk in the depths of the sea?

PRINCETON. WILLIAM HENRY GREEN.

* Dr. Briggs in the *Presbyterian Review* for 1887, p. 340.

II.

ON MONTANISM.

THE second century is in many respects one of the most important eras in the history and development of the Christian Church. It was during this period that Christianity, in all the vigor and freshness of youth, was rapidly diffused throughout the Roman empire and beyond its boundaries. Then arose those Christian fathers who by their learning and abilities stood forth as the apologists of Christianity and the defenders of its faith and purity. Then the Canon of Scripture was compacted, and the creed of the Church was tabulated. Then the Roman empire declared itself openly hostile, and Christians as the adherents of an illicit religion were exposed to persecution. Then also arose dangers within the Church which threatened either its destruction or its corruption.

There were in the second century especially three tendencies which, arising from within, attacked the Church on different sides, and which had to be encountered and overcome. Ebionitism, a survival of the Judaistic views of those who opposed Paul, threatened to confine Christianity in the fetters of legalism, to convert it into a Jewish sect, and thus to check its expansion as the religion of the world. Gnosticism, a mingling of the elements of Christianity with those of heathen philosophy, threatened to pervert Christianity from being a practical religion to be a system of theoretical philosophy, confined to the initiated, like Platonism or Aristotelianism. And Montanism, a puritanic and reactionary system, threatened to divorce Christianity from the understanding, and to make it consist in excitement and emotional feelings. Ebionitism, which had received its death-wound by the destruction of Jerusalem, was no longer formidable, and was nearly extinct before the close of the century. Gnosticism, on the other hand, was in its full vigor and was divided into various sects, each having its renowned teacher. Montanism arose during the century and spread over the whole Church. While Ebionitism and Gnosticism cannot point to any single teacher who may be regarded as the founder of their systems, Montanism, on the other hand, was first promulgated by one person, from whom it derives its name. The

principles of Ebionitism are well known and have been fully discussed. Much has been written about Gnosticism, and the student of theology is familiar with the systems of those renowned heresiarchs Basilides, Valentinus and Marcion. But, except in the statements of ecclesiastical historians and in articles in Encyclopædias, Montanism has been seldom discussed in the English language. There are numerous German works on the subject, as those of Schwegler, Bonwetsch and Belck, but the only English work with which we are acquainted is De Soyres' *Montanism*, a work which, although an able and systematic treatment of the subject, is not much known. The nature of Montanism is not much understood, especially as it has been distorted by the aspersions of its opponents; and yet it was a system which exercised nearly as much influence as Gnosticism, which numbered among its converts one of the greatest of the fathers, and which in its principles still lingers in the Christian Church.

The exact date of the rise of Montanism is undetermined. On this point ecclesiastical historians differ; Eusebius assigns one date, and Epiphanius another. Eusebius, quoting from an anonymous author, says: "There is a certain village called Ardabau in that part of Mysia which borders upon Phrygia. There, when Gratus was proconsul of Asia, a recent convert, Montanus by name, through his unquenchable desire for leadership, gave the adversary opportunity against him. He became beside himself, and being suddenly in a sort of frenzy and ecstasy, he raved and began to babble and utter strange things, prophesying in a manner contrary to the constant custom of the Church, handed down by tradition from the beginning." This, however, gives us no information, as we have no means of fixing the date of the proconsulship of Gratus. Elsewhere Eusebius informs us that the martyrs of Lyons and Vienne (A.D. 177) wrote to Eleutherus, bishop of Rome, relative to the views of the Montanists, a sect which had recently arisen in Phrygia. It would, however, require some time for the diffusion of their views to such an extent as to reach Gaul. Epiphanius, on the other hand, gives us two dates, A.D. 126, and the nineteenth year of Antoninus Pius, A.D. 166. We cannot then be far wrong in fixing the rise of Montanism about the middle of the second century.

Montanus was a native of Phrygia. He was born of heathen parents, and there is some reason for supposing that he was a priest of Cybele. On his conversion to Christianity he was filled with enthusiasm, saw visions, fell into ecstasies, and announced himself to be a prophet, the organ of the Paraclete. He was a chiliast and fixed on Pepuza, a city of Phrygia, as the place where Christ was personally to reign with His saints. He attached to himself a num-

ber of converts, and especially two women of high social position, Maximilla and Priscilla, who left their husbands and attached themselves to him as prophetesses. He and his prophetesses are much reviled by their opponents, the worst motives are assigned to their actions, and their deaths are described as shameful and as the punishment of their false pretenses. Thus the anonymous writer quoted by Eusebius says: "By another kind of death (than that of martyrdom) Montanus and Maximilla are said to have died. For the report is that, incited by the spirit of frenzy, they both hung themselves; and that they died, and ended their lives like the traitor Judas." These rumors, for they are given merely as such, may well be rejected as not requiring refutation, being the aspersions of bitter enemies. When we turn to the pages of Tertullian we find a far more creditable account of the characters of Montanus and his prophetesses.

To understand the nature of Montanism and to appreciate its tendency, we must realize the condition of the Church. Christianity had greatly extended itself, and come in contact with the manifold relations of the world. It was essential in order to be a universal religion that it should accommodate itself in some degree to these relations; and there was great danger of its going too far in that direction, of its losing its first love and becoming secularized. Gnosticism also was being rapidly propagated; the principles of a false philosophy were corrupting the Church, and giving rise to many pernicious heresies. Docetism, of which we see traces in the New Testament, had been developed into a system; and the doctrine of æons, as intervening between God and His creatures, was embraced by many. Besides, the Canon of Scripture, though perhaps then framed, was perhaps not yet universally acknowledged; and no system of Christian doctrine had as yet been formulated. It was under these circumstances that Montanism arose. It may be considered as a reactionary movement opposed to the secularism of the Church on the one hand, and to the rationalism of Gnosticism on the other. Hence it was ascetic in its nature, directly opposed to all unnecessary intercourse with the world, inculcating a disregard for worldly honors and enjoining Christians to avoid as much as possible occupying worldly positions or filling the offices of the State. Instead of reason and philosophy, Montanism taught that Christianity consisted in religious impulses and in obedience to the voice of the Spirit speaking in the heart or through the prophets. Harnack supposes that the Montanists are the old believers, and that Montanism was an attempt to reform the Church, to conserve its original essential forms, and to retain its apostolic simplicity and purity. But although there may be some ground for this supposition,

yet Montanism was more than a mere reactionary and conservative movement; it professed to be progressive, to impart new revelations, and to develop the views of Christ and His apostles; it was the age of the Holy Ghost following the age of Christ.

Montanism was a natural product arising from the character of the times. Montanus himself does not appear to have been a striking personality; at least little is said about him. Neander lays stress upon his being a native of Phrygia, the land of religious excitement and fanaticism. But if he had not taught in his system the spirit of the age, his views would have made little impression on the Church and would soon have been forgotten. The increased secularism of the Church and the growth of sacerdotalism must have created a strong reaction. The cautions of our Lord and His apostles against the spirit of the world would come home to men of spiritual feelings, of strict morality, and of an impulsive nature. They would feel themselves drawn from the world and impelled to testify against that spirit of worldliness which was insinuating itself into the Church. Feeling deeply the momentous nature of religion and the unspeakable importance of spiritual realities, they would be apt to fall into the other extreme of asceticism; and as millenarian views then prevailed and it was a general notion that prophecy was not withdrawn from the Church, they would welcome the new prophets with their declamations against worldly licentiousness and arrogance. Besides, converts from heathenism, called out of gross darkness into marvelous light, would naturally be filled with enthusiasm and highly susceptible of religious impressions.

As we find the germs of Gnosticism in the apostolic times, so also do we find the germs of Montanism. It was only a growth and development of tendencies already existing in the apostolic Church. Thus, especially in the fourteenth chapter of 1 Corinthians, there is a description of a state of matters in the Christian assemblies at Corinth which bears a certain resemblance to the practices of the later Montanism. Paul finds it necessary to advert to the mode in which worship was conducted at Corinth, and to correct the abuses which prevailed. It would appear that men and women there spoke with tongues, uttering things that could not be understood and suggesting the idea of madness. People were thrown into a state of frenzy, the understanding was in abeyance and the spirit alone was excited. "If therefore the whole Church be come together into one place and all speak with tongues, and there come in those that are unlearned or unbelievers, will they not say that ye are mad?" And along with this speaking with tongues, these incoherent utterances, there were prophesyings; men and also as it would appear women

stood up in the assemblies for worship, giving out that they were endowed with the spirit of prophecy, and addressing the congregation, as the Spirit gave them utterance, not so much perhaps predicting what was in the future as exhorting and warning the faithful. In all this could be found models for the rhapsodies of the Montanists, their ecstasies, visions and prophesyings.

Montanism, proceeding from Phrygia, a soil suitable to its origin and growth, spread rapidly through Asia Minor. It attracted to it the susceptible and the ascetic. Many who were dissatisfied with the growing worldliness of the Church attached themselves to it. Those who entertained strict views of discipline, who felt the necessity of greater purity within the Church, and were offended with the mildness and laxity of the discipline exercised towards offenders, adopted the severer rules of Montanism. The prophecies enforcing asceticism recommended themselves to their consciences. Montanus provoked opponents, but he also gained adherents, and these in the circles of earnest-minded Christians. Among these the number was not small who, dissatisfied with the state of the Church, strove after a purer and stricter life and an ascetic form of Christianity. The Church of Thyatira, we are informed, became wholly Montanistic. Montanism appears to have numbered among its followers many eminent men who in their day were distinguished leaders of Christian thought. Among the more prominent men in the party may be mentioned Themiso, who wrote a catholic epistle to the Church, in which he defended the tenets of Montanism, and who appears to have succeeded Montanus as the leader of the party; Theodotus, the organizer of the Montanistic churches; and Proclus, who carried on a debate with the Roman presbyter Caius at Rome.

Montanism was soon carried to Rome, the common resort of all opinions and notions. We learn from Eusebius that the martyrs of Vienne and Lyons (A. D. 177) sent a communication to the bishop of Rome, apparently in favor of Montanism, requesting his interference with the churches of Asia with a view to the restoration of peace. "The followers of Montanus, Alcibiades and Theodotus in Phrygia," observes Eusebius, "were now giving wide circulation to their assumption in regard to prophecy, and as dissension arose concerning them, the brethren in Gaul set forth their own prudent and orthodox judgment in the matter, and published several epistles from the witnesses that had been put to death among them. These they sent, while they were still in prison, to the brethren throughout Asia and Phrygia, and also to Eleutherus, the bishop of Rome, negotiating for the peace of the churches." It would appear from the statement of Tertullian that this recommendation was partially successful; and that Eleutherus was at first disposed to acknowl-

edge the Montanists as orthodox members of the Christian Church and to recognize their prophetic gifts. But Praxeas, a confessor, afterwards the author of the Monarchian heresy, came to Rome, and so wrought upon the mind of Eleutherus as to persuade him not only to withdraw his countenance from the Montanists, but to condemn them, and to cast them out of the Church. "After the bishop of Rome," observes Tertullian, "had acknowledged the prophetic gifts of Montanus, Priscilla, and Maximilla, and in consequence of the acknowledgment had bestowed his peace upon the churches of Asia and Phrygia, Praxeas, by importunately urging false accusations against the prophets themselves and their churches, and insisting on the authority of the bishop's predecessors in the see, compelled him to recall the pacific letter which he had issued, as well as to desist from his purpose of acknowledging the said gifts. By this Praxeas did a twofold service for the devil at Rome: he drove out prophecy and brought in heresy; he put to flight the Paraclete and (alluding to his Patripassian views) he crucified the Father."

But the greatest triumph of Montanism was in Northern Africa. In A.D. 203 Tertullian became a convert to Montanism. He was then the greatest among the fathers of the Latin Church, a man of great learning, a consummate orator, full of zeal and passion, and the ablest defender of the faith against Marcion and other Gnostics. An African by birth, being born in Carthage, and of heathen parentage, he was at an early age converted to Christianity. The character of his mind was ascetic, and he was uncompromising in his opposition to worldly practices, and thus his sympathies were with Montanus even before he adopted his views. It does not appear that Tertullian ever withdrew himself or was expelled from the Church. Notwithstanding his adoption of Montanistic errors, he continued to be reverenced as a Christian father, and was regarded by Cyprian as his master. Supported by such an advocate as Tertullian, whose orthodoxy and high-minded character and persuasive eloquence gave a sanction to its tenets, Montanism must have made great progress in Northern Africa. The two distinguished Carthagenian martyrs in the reign of Septimus Severus, Felicitas and Perpetua, were in all probability Montanists, as may be inferred from their visions, asceticism and prophesyings. Augustine informs us that in his time there was a sect called Tertullianists, but this is probably another name for the Montanists, being so called from their distinguished convert and advocate.

The Montanists, at least in Asia Minor and in Rome, were expelled from the Catholic Church. At first it is probable that they held meetings of their own within the church, when the prophets and prophetesses gave forth their predictions to their adher-

ents and sympathizers. But, after their expulsion, they organized themselves into a separate Christian sect with their own bishops and prophets. Their headquarters appears to have been Pepuza in Phrygia, where first Montanus and afterwards Themiso presided over them: hence they received the name of Pepuzans. As they do not appear to have separated themselves from the Church in Northern Africa, and as in other countries we have only the accounts of their enemies, and are deprived of the testimony of Tertullian, there is but scanty mention of these Montanistic churches.

While Montanism had its converts and defenders, it had also its assailants. Eusebius wrote with an evident animus against it, and gives extracts from the writings of its opponents. He quotes from an anonymous writer, from Appollonius, Miltiades, and Serapion. Praxeas, as Tertullian informs us, opposed them in Rome. The presbyter Caius carried on a controversy with the Montanist Proclus, and wrote a book against the sect. But it was not only by writings that Montanism was opposed, but more active measures were taken by Church councils. It would appear that the first ecclesiastical councils mentioned in history were held against Montanism. Special mention is made of the Synod of Iconium (A.D. 176?) when Montanism was condemned. It was, though not without some dissentient voices, pronounced heretical. Those who adhered to it were excommunicated, and those who had been baptized by Montanists, on their return to the Catholic Church were enjoined to be rebaptized. According to the then prevalent view, no baptism was considered to be valid and completed which was performed outside the pale of the Church. The Montanists were willing to remain in the Church and to recognize its bishops, but they were forcibly expelled from it; they were sectarians, not from choice but from compulsion. Thus the prophetess Maximilla is represented as saying, "I am driven away from the sheep-fold like a wolf, but I am no wolf; I am the word, and spirit, and power."

The subsequent history of Montanism is soon told. A Church supported by a fanatical spirit cannot long survive the death of its leaders. The spirit of enthusiasm gradually cools down. The falsification of the prophecies of Montanism by the course of events shook the belief of those who had given their adherence to it. The immediate advent of Christ, which had been so confidently predicted, had not occurred. The number of converts gradually diminished. In the time of Epiphanius, Montanists were in Cappadocia, Galatia, Phrygia, Cilicia, and had even spread into Constantinople. Also Sozomon informs us of several adherents in Phrygia, notwithstanding the imperial edicts against sectaries. In

Phrygia Montanism arose, and in Phrygia, according to our last notices of it, it lingered.

Having given this brief sketch of the history of Montanism, we proceed to consider its tenets. The spirit which pervaded it might be called enthusiastic and even fanatical, but it was deeply religious. Montanism was not like Gnosticism the offspring of the intellect and philosophy; it was the child of devotion. The supernatural prevailed over the materialistic. Men who were aiming after a purer, nobler and stricter life were among its converts. And especially, as we shall see, the doctrine of the agency of the Spirit, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the soul of man, so that man became the organ of the Spirit, constituted its very essence. Different from the Ephesian converts who did not know whether there was a Holy Spirit, Montanism lived in the Spirit. Of course it was a question whether the spirit which actuated Montanism was the Holy Spirit or a spirit which was not of God.

The fundamental idea of Montanism was not so much that it was a return to the spirit and practice of the apostolic age, a restoration of primitive Christianity, as Harnack supposes, but that it was a continuation of revelation; it was progressive in its nature. According to Montanus, inspiration did not cease with the apostles, the role of revelation was not completed, prophecy and the Holy Spirit were still in the Church. And when we consider that the complete Canon of Scripture was perhaps not yet universally acknowledged, and that no formal statement of Christian doctrine had yet been made, it was natural that such an error should occur. There was, according to Montanus, a development in revelation; the age of Christ and His apostles was not the last age, but was to be succeeded by the age of the Spirit; just as in nature there is a development in vegetable and animal growth, as all things have a tendency to improve and progress, so is it in religion. This idea is stated by Tertullian in a passage of such singular beauty and eloquence, that we cannot refrain from quoting it at length: "Nothing is without stages of growth; all things await their season. As the preacher says, There is a time for everything. Look how creation advances little by little to fructification. First comes the grain, and from the grain rises the shoot, and from the shoot struggles out the shrub; thereafter boughs and leaves gather strength, and then what we call a tree expands; then follows the swelling of the bud, and from the bud bursts the flower, and from the flower the fruit opens; and that fruit itself, rude for a while and unshapely, little by little, keeping the straight course of its development, is trained to the mellowness of its flavor. So, too, righteousness—for the God of righteousness and creation is the same—was first in a rudimentary

state, having a natural fear of God; from that stage it advanced through the law and the prophets to infancy; from that stage it passed through the Gospel to the fervor of youth; now, through the Paraclete, it is settled into maturity. He will, after Christ, be the only one to be called and revered as Master, for He speaks not from Himself, but what is commanded by Christ."

Thus then, according to Montanus, revelation is continuous and progressive; the age of the Father is succeeded by the age of the Son, and the age of the Son is succeeded by the age of the Spirit. Jesus Himself before His departure had said to His disciples: "I have many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will guide you into all truth; for He shall not speak of Himself, but whatsoever He shall hear, that shall He speak, and He will show you things to come." This promise, according to the Montanists, was only partially fulfilled by the outpouring of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost; it receives its full fulfillment in the age of the Spirit. This is the highest stage of revelation; the disciples had then advanced from youth to manhood, and were then capable of receiving deeper truths, and of performing the higher duties of Christianity. Montanus and several of his followers professed to be the organs of the Holy Ghost; they were prophets and the Spirit spoke through them; they were the mere instruments of communication, the Spirit was the efficient Agent. Some indeed suppose that Montanus actually claimed to be the Holy Ghost; that the Spirit was incarnate in him, as the Logos was in Jesus. "Montanus," observes Mosheim, "pretended to be the Paraclete or Comforter, whom the divine Saviour at His departure from the earth promised to send to His disciples to lead them into all truth." But such an assertion, we think proceeds from a misunderstanding of the strong statements said to have been made by Montanus, as if he were speaking of himself absolutely, and not merely of himself as the organ of the Holy Ghost. His enemies, with the exception of Cyril of Jerusalem, never accused him of such blasphemy; and certainly there is no trace of it in the writings of Tertullian. Some of the assertions of Montanus which his enemies, two hundred years afterwards, put into his mouth are very bold and startling; as when he is represented as saying: "I am the Lord, the Almighty God who took up my abode in man: I am neither an angel nor a messenger; but I am come as the Lord Himself." But, if Montanus ever made such an assertion, which is extremely doubtful, he only intended emphatically to assert that he was the organ of God, that it was not he who spoke, but the Spirit of God who spoke by him.

Montanus and his two chief disciples, Maximilla and Priscilla,

claimed to be prophets, and they professed to be inspired by the Holy Ghost. They urged their pretensions as prophets upon the Church, and requested that these pretensions should be tested; the words which they uttered were the revelations of the Holy Spirit. But the form which their prophecy assumed was objectionable and the cause of much offense, and gave the advantage to their opponents. They did not speak in a state of calmness and composure, but in an ecstatic state. They fell into trances, visions were imparted to them, and hence their prophecies in the mode of their delivery bore too strong a resemblance to the ravings of the heathen prophetesses. Yet Tertullian does not take offense at this form of prophecy. "We have," he observes, "among us a sister whose lot it has been to be favored with sundry gifts of revelation, which she experiences in the Spirit by ecstatic visions amid the sacred rites of the Lord's day in the church; she converses with angels, and sometimes even with the Lord; she both sees and hears mysterious communications; some men's hearts she understands, and to them who are in need she distributes remedies. Whether it be in the reading of the Scriptures, or in the chanting of Psalms, or in the preaching of sermons, in all these religious services matter and opportunity are afforded her of seeing visions. After the people are dismissed, at the conclusion of the sacred services, she is in the regular habit of reporting to us whatever things she may have seen in vision." Of course it follows from the ecstatic form of prophecy that the judgment is suspended and the will is passive; the man is the mere vehicle of divine communications, and if these are reduced to writing he is only the pen in the hand of the writer; all self-action is taken away. Thus in one of his communications Montanus observes: "Behold the man is as a lyre and I sweep over him as a plectrum. The man sleeps, and I wake. Behold it is the Lord who estranges the souls of men from themselves."

It must be remembered that prophecy as a miraculous gift was considered as present in the Church. In the New Testament there is frequent mention of prophets, such as Agabus, Silas and Judas. In the Church of Corinth the worship was conducted by the prophets. And there were also prophetesses; mention is made of the seven daughters of Philip, the evangelist, who did prophesy. In the Didaché prophets are mentioned, and appear to be a recognized order in the Church. Justin Martyr alludes to prophecy as a well-known gift in the early Church. So that there was nothing necessarily in opposition to the views of the early Church in the claim of Montanus and his followers to be prophets. The question whether the will was active or passive in prophecy does not appear to have been fully discussed. Justin Martyr uses

the same figure of a lyre and a plectrum. "Men," he observes, "have no need of rhetorical art, but to present themselves pure to the energy of the Holy Spirit in order that the divine plectrum itself, descending from heaven and using righteous men as an instrument like a harp or lyre, might reveal to us the knowledge of things heavenly and divine." Athenagoras, in his apology, expresses the same view in describing the inspiration of the prophets of the Old Testament: "The prophets who, lifted in ecstasy above the natural operations of their minds by the impulses of the divine Spirit, uttered the things with which they were inspired, the Spirit making use of them as a flute player breathes into a flute."

Montanus and his followers defended the ecstatic form of prophecy from Scriptural instances. Peter, he observes, was in an ecstasy when the heaven was opened and the miraculous sheet descended to him. Paul was in an ecstasy so that he could not tell whether he was in the body or out of it when he was caught up to the third heavens; and also, when praying in the temple, he fell into an ecstasy, and heard a voice saying unto him, "Make haste and get thee quickly out of Jerusalem." John was in an ecstasy in Patmos, when the revelations of God were imparted to him. So, also, the examples are numerous in the Old Testament of the prophets Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel and Zechariah receiving their communications in an ecstatic form. On the other hand, the Catholic Church repudiated the ecstatic form of prophecy. The spirit of the prophet must be subject to the prophet; for God is not the author of confusion but of peace. Christianity is a reasonable service, and not a matter of trances and visions. Whatever may have been the form of prophecy in the Old Testament, in the New Testament ecstasy was exceptional and the apostles spoke words of soberness as well as of truth. According to the assailants of the Montanists the ecstatic form of their prophecies was a proof of their heathen origin and that they proceeded from the evil one. And in thus condemning these prophecies the Church considered that it was acting according to the injunction of the apostle: "Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God, for many false prophets are gone out into the world."

Although the Montanists professed to be the repositories of new revelations, yet these revelations did not refer to doctrines, but to morals and matters of Christian practice. Their bitterest enemies do not accuse them of heretical views, but acknowledge that they held the faith of the Catholic Church. Thus Epiphanius writes: "The Montanists receive the Holy Scriptures, the Old and New Testaments, and likewise acknowledge the resurrection of the dead. Concerning the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, they believe

even as the Holy Catholic Church does." And Firmilian observes that the new prophets appear to acknowledge the same Father and Son as we. Tertullian was as great a champion of orthodoxy after he fell into Montanistic error as before. Montanism cannot then be called a heresy in the same sense as Gnosticism, but was rather a Christian sect, holding the same views with the Catholic Church, but separating from it on matters of practice rather than of doctrine.

Considering the spiritual and ecstatic nature of Montanism, we are not surprised to find that they were chiliasts, believers in the personal reign of Christ, and in the establishment of the new Jerusalem. On this point they do not differ from the general belief of the Church in the age in which they lived. Chiliasm was then generally avowed: Justin Martyr, Irenæus and Tertullian were chiliasts. Montanus believed in the immediate advent of Christ, and that the world was fast approaching its termination. This idea pervaded all his peculiar views. Marriage was unnecessary because the human race would no longer increase; by self-denial, fasting and penance men loosened themselves from the world, and hardened themselves against that persecution which was to usher in the last days; as there was to be a speedy end of life flight from persecution was out of place; sinners were not to be suffered to remain in the Church, because it must be pure to receive as a bride the bridegroom; the extent of things permissible was to be limited, for the world was passing away and all its pleasures. Thus everything was looked upon with reference to the speedy advent of Christ, and believers were to be like servants holding themselves in readiness for the return of their Lord. Maximilla is represented as saying: "After me there is no more prophecy, but only the end of the world."

The Montanists were stern ascetics. They denounced the amusements of the world. A great controversy arose in Carthage regarding the veiling of virgins, which the Montanists enjoined and in favor of which Tertullian wrote. So, also, crowns and chaplets worn in honor of the emperor, and the laurel crowns of soldiers, were to be renounced; and when a Christian soldier was martyred because he tore off the chaplet from his head with which he was crowned for some heroic action, his conduct was applauded and held forth for imitation. Fasts also were multiplied. Three periods of fasting were enjoined, besides the so-called stationary weekly fasts, that of Wednesday because Judas on that day conspired to betray Christ, and that of Friday because on that day the Lord was crucified. These fasts were not left to the voluntary adoption of individuals, but were imposed by the direction of the Holy Ghost on all believ-

ers. Hence Appollonius charges Montanus with making laws for fasting. As Montanism was a reaction against worldliness, it necessarily assumed an ascetic character. Tertullian asserts that it was this ascetic character which was the cause of the rejection of Montanism by the Church; and it is very probable that it would have a deterring influence. "It is this which raises controversy with the Paraclete; it is on this account that the new prophecies are rejected; not that Montanus and Priscilla and Maximilla preach another God, nor that they disjoin Jesus Christ from God, nor that they overturn any particular rule of faith or hope, but that they plainly teach more frequent fasting than marrying."

The Montanist view of marriage was somewhat peculiar: they both underestimated and overestimated it. They favored celibacy and regarded it as a higher spiritual state; and especially they considered that the clergy should refrain from marriage. But at the same time they recognized that marriage was a divine institution, and regarded the prohibition of it by heretics as opposed to the ordinance of God. They looked upon is as the union of two souls, not merely for time, but for eternity. "When two faithful ones are united," observes Tertullian, "there is a Church and Christ Himself is present." Marriage is a spiritual union in the common life, sanctioned by the Church, and consecrated by Christ: it is not even dissolvable by death, and is destined to endure beyond the grave. Hence they strongly denounced second marriages, and regarded such a connection as adultery. "Heretics," says Tertullian, "do away with marriages: the carnal accumulate them. The former marry not *even* once; the latter, not *only* once. But neither is such continency to be praised, because it is heretical; nor such liberty to be defended, because it is carnal; the former destroys the God of marriages, the latter confounds Him. We admit one marriage, just as we admit one God." The only exception to this rule was when a man or woman was widowed before conversion, as heathen marriages were regarded as unconsecrated by the Lord and therefore dissolvable by death. When it was objected to this view that Paul allowed second marriages (Rom. vii. 3), it was answered that this either refers to those who were married before conversion, or that Paul suffered second marriages on account of the infirmity of the flesh, just as he circumcised Timothy on account of false brethren, or shaved his head on account of a Jewish vow. "If Christ abrogated what Moses commanded concerning divorce, why should not the Paraclete abrogate what Paul permitted concerning second marriages? The new law abrogated divorce; the new prophecy abrogates second marriages."

The Montanists were severe in discipline. They regarded sins

committed after baptism of peculiar aggravation and would hardly admit of the restoration of offenders on repentance. Certain sins, such as relapse into heathenism, licentiousness, and murder, they regarded as unpardonable, rendering those who committed them incapable of restoration to the Church. They did not deny the divine forgiveness; God may forgive them, but the Church cannot; its gates are forever closed against such heinous offenders. The power of the keys was indeed in the Church, and was exercised in the restoration of lesser offenders, but even this power did not belong to the bishops and presbyters, but to the prophets. It was to be exercised with great caution, lest an inducement should be held out to men to commit sins on the supposition that their sins will be forgiven. Hence the Montanists opposed themselves to the lax discipline especially of the Church of Rome, and to the restoration of those who from fear of death had fallen from the faith. "But you say," observes Tertullian, "the Church has the power of forgiving sins. This I acknowledge, and admit more than you—I who hear the Paraclete Himself in the persons of the new prophets saying, The Church has the power to forgive sins; but I will not, lest they commit others withal." "The Church, it is true, will forgive sins; but it is the Church of the Spirit by means of a spiritual man; not the Church which consists of a number of bishops."

The Montanists exhibited a fanatical desire for martyrdom. They considered it wrong to court martyrdom, but it was equally wrong to fly from it in the time of persecution. They were ready at all times to sacrifice their lives for the sake of Christ. The spirit of Montanism is seen in the following declaration: "Let it not be your wish to die on your beds in the pains of childbirth or in debilitating fever; but desire to die as martyrs that He may be glorified who suffered for you." They explained away our Lord's words, "If they persecute you in one city flee ye to another," which evidently counseled flight from persecution, by affirming that they were not a permission to the Church in general, but were limited to those addressed, and were even to them of temporary significance. Hence the Montanists had numerous martyrs and they reckoned this as a proof of the truth of their claims. "When," says the anonymous writer in Eusebius, "they are at a loss, being refuted in all they say, they try to take refuge in their martyrs, alleging that they have many martyrs, and that this is a sure evidence of the so-called prophetic spirit that is in them."

It is evident from what has been said, that the relations of the Montanists to the Church must have been strained, and it is not a matter of wonder that they should have been excommunicated. Whilst they remained in the Church, they must have been unruly

members. They were in decided opposition to sacerdotalism. This was regarded by them as a usurpation of the priesthood common to all believers. The prophets demanded freedom of speech, so that they might make their announcements without hindrance; and these announcements were to be regarded as of divine authority, being made by the Spirit speaking within them. Hence they divided the Church into two classes: those who were inspired with a prophetic spirit, who were termed spiritual, and those who were not inspired, who were termed carnal or psychical. The prophets were exalted above the clergy; bishops and presbyters were regarded as an inferior class. The prophetic office, like the priestly, was not restricted: all were or might be prophets as well as priests to God. It was not confined to men; for in Christ Jesus there was neither male nor female; Priscilla and Maximilla were as prominent as Montanus himself. Epiphanius and St. Augustin inform us that the Montanists had women bishops and women presbyters who executed ministerial functions. This, however, is doubtful, as it is denied by Tertullian, a more competent authority, in his work on the *Veiling of Virgins*, written after he became a Montanist. "It is not permitted," says Tertullian, "a woman to speak in the church, nor to teach, nor to baptize, nor to offer (the Eucharist), nor to claim to herself a lot in any manly function, not to say in any sacerdotal office."

Such were the tenets of the Montanists. There is much in them to praise, but also much to censure. Their zeal, their devotion, their fervor, their readiness to suffer for Christ, the strictness of their morality, their spiritual aims, are all matters for commendation; but their narrowness, their severity, their fanaticism, their factiousness, their spiritual pride, their arrogance, are evils which if they had prevailed would have inflicted a serious injury on Christianity. "Shall we not thank God," observes a recent author, "who saved His Church from this new danger of a spasmodic ecstasy which claimed to overrule the truth that was treasured in the consciences of Christian men; from the danger of a haughty aristocracy that condemned all the Christians as psychical; from the danger of rulers which claimed to pronounce judgments by their personal inspiration, not as the mere administers of the customs of the Church; from the danger of a caste that left no place for the consciences of God's children, and had no pity for weakness, nor declaration of forgiveness for penitence; from a system which, beginning by a claim to special inspiration, led on to petty regulations of external conduct?"

The influence of Montanism on the Church was not wholly evil. It exercised a beneficent effect as a remonstrance against increasing

worldliness, and probably in many quarters created a revival of spiritual religion. It protested against the lax discipline which in many churches was exercised by the bishops. And as the religion of the Paraclete it brought into prominence the work of the Holy Spirit in renewing the heart and life. With these positive effects there were also negative advantages. The Church in opposition to Montanism rejected all ecstasies and raptures claiming to be the inspired utterances of the Spirit, and affirmed that the prophetical office had ceased; it declared that Christianity was the spirit of a sound mind as well as of power and love. The erroneous idea of a continuation of revelation exercised an influence on the Church in the estimation of the Canon. Revelation, it was declared, had ceased with the apostles; the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments were the only authoritative statements of doctrine, and the only authoritative rules for Christian life. And also both Montanism and Gnosticism led to scientific theology: to a declaration of what the Catholic Church believed in contrast to the fancies of the Montanists and the heresies of the Gnostics.

Nor has Montanism ever ceased to operate in the Christian Church. The name may have perished, but its spirit survives. It is a phase of Christianity which must always exist wherever feeling prevails over judgment, in seasons of religious excitement, and where in consequence of the laxity of the age severity of discipline is demanded. We find especially traces of Montanism in Romanism, in the celibacy of the clergy, in the enforcement of penance, in the raptures and ecstasies of the mediæval saints, and in the multiplication of fasts. Hence the defenders of Montanism are chiefly to be found among the Roman Catholic theologians. Cardinal Newman describes Montanism as an anticipation of the mediæval system, and according to Prof. W. Archer Butler, "he censures Tertullian solely, it would seem, for having arrived at perfection too soon, for having ambitiously presumed to be a mediæval saint before his time." So also among the mystic sects, especially those which had for their object the revival of religion and were a reaction against the spirit of the world. Among the Fratres Spirituales, the early Waldenses, the Anabaptist sects at the Reformation, the early Quakers, the Puritans with their strict discipline, the Quietists, the Plymouth brethren, traces of a Montanistic spirit may be discerned. But perhaps the most exact counterpart of the Montanists of the second century is to be found in Edward Irving and his disciples; the speaking with tongues, the ecstasies and raptures into which many fell, the revival of the prophetic office, the utterances of prophetesses, the claim to a continued revelation of the Spirit, the firm belief in the immediate advent and

the millennium, all recall the time when Montanus and the prophetesses Maximilla and Priscilla saw their visions and uttered their predictions. In all those religious demonstrations where feeling and enthusiasm prevail it is our duty to try the spirit whether it is of God, and not to suffer ourselves to be led astray by the excesses of extravagance or the claims of inspiration.

EDINBURGH. PATON J. GLOAG.

III.

SEPARATION OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH FROM THE REFORMED IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.*

MY design is to indicate how slowly the process ran out its course, by which a Lutheran and a Reformed Church arose in Germany in the sixteenth century. This matter is now, under various forms, conceived of in a way that does not correspond to the historical truth. On the one side people picture to themselves a reformation proceeding from Wittenberg, of which Luther, with his courage inspired by faith, was the bold initiator; and on the other side, they think of a reformation originating in the energetic faith and fiery zeal of a Zwingli. These reformations are then thought of as like two circles, which merely touch each other; or, according to others, which really intersect, and have large segments in common, but which yet never cover exactly the same space, or were drawn from one centre. It would be easy to make manifest the erroneousness of this view in the whole course of the century of the Reformation.

It is easy to refute this false opinion of two circles which never coincide, by pointing to the Marburg Conference of 1529, at which the two champions, Luther and Zwingli, to be sure, assailed each other vigorously, but at the close laid down the Marburg Articles, in all particulars of which they declared their agreement, and only in the one matter of the Eucharist postponed the bringing of their views into accord. We need further only to mention the name of a Bucer, who devoted his life to the cause of union, and whom modern investigation would fain make to be a feeble compromiser, forgetful how much it is itself characterized by feebleness and a spirit of compromise and accommodation. Bucer was really sincere in the desire to unite Luther and the Swiss on the question of the Lord's Supper. But he overrated his own powers, and found in Wittenberg a hero growing old, already resting on his laurels, who had such an overpowering influence on Bucer that he could not speak out his mind, and the Wittenberg Concord (1536) was forced

* [Our readers are indebted to the Rev. Dunlop Moore, D.D., of Pittsburgh, Pa., for the translation of Dr. Böhl's paper.—EDITORS.]

upon him. Of Melanchthon, a man quite adapted to the adjustment of differences, it is well known that he felt himself almost more in sympathy with the Swiss than with Luther, under whose jurisdiction he lived in fear and trembling. At the Marburg Conference he uttered only eight words, although uther repeatedly called on him to speak. Lastly, we need only to mention Calvin, who for a long time was held to be a Lutheran; and who after his departure from Geneva was in Switzerland reckoned among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, as he was in fact the friend of Melanchthon and of the zealous anti-Zwinglian Brenz. The latter, as late as 1548, wrote to Calvin in the most friendly terms, and asked to be remembered in his prayers (Stähelin, *John Calvin*, i, 230).

Till far on in the second half of the century of the Reformation there were, properly speaking, only Evangelicals or Protestants; and the names Lutherans, Zwinglians, Calvinists were by all authorities of that time entirely repudiated.* At all diets the princes and free imperial cities assembled, united by the bond of the Augsburg Confession; and the Saxons were willing to allow the Heidelbergers and the Hessians to interpret for themselves the Augsburg Confession according to the altered edition of 1540. The controversy respecting the altered and unaltered (*Variata* and *Invariata*†) Confession did not become a burning one till after the year 1561. It was especially about the year 1580, that it blazed out. Calvin edited Melanchthon's *Loci*.‡ Melanchthon could have wept the eyes out of his head on account of the contention about the Lord's Supper.§ Lutheran theologians chiefly were interested in the appearance of the Heidelberg Catechism, while Calvin read it perhaps only cursorily. The Elector Palatine struggled hard to obtain from the German princes recognition for his Catechism, and he wished to have it regarded as conformable to the *Augustana*. He was not willing to pass for an adherent of Zwingli, whose books he had read even as little as those of Calvin. He wished to be regarded as adhering to the Augsburg Confession rightly understood. And who in the year 1560 understood that

* Zanchius in a letter complains of people applying to themselves such names.

† This distinction, first urged by Flacius in 1562, at the Colloquy with Strigel, speedily attained great importance.

‡ Zanchius too (*Epp.*, ii, p. 203), in 1580, praises Pezel, minister in Herborn, for publishing a selection of Melanchthon's writings of a doctrinal nature. He found fault with many things in them, but, on account of Melanchthon's tolerance on the Eucharistic question, he willingly overlooked other points.

§ Cf. his letter to Hardenberg of Bremen, in which he says that his tears would not bear proportion to his grief even if they were as abundant as the water in the Weser and the Elbe.

Confession exactly as it was understood in the year 1530? In its tenth article, certainly in the German edition at all events, more was conceded to the doctrine of Transubstantiation than ought to have been done.* This article was afterwards amended by Melanchthon.

In no place can we perceive the nature of the communion between the two movements (the Lutheran and the Reformed) so clearly as in Strassburg up to the year 1560. The thought of a definitive separation was not, properly speaking, entertained till after the middle of the sixteenth century. There were, indeed, already heard in Strassburg voices that would have refused Calvin the use of the pulpit when he was passing through that city.† Here and there, too, in Germany, the exiles, who had left neighboring countries where persecution was raging, met with no friendly reception. Alasco had to depart from Denmark, and was not suffered to remain in Hamburg, because Westphal thought it would endanger the fatherland to harbor a Sacramentarian. Later, in the year 1556, he was excluded from Stuttgart by that very Brenz who nine years before had found an asylum in Basel. Nevertheless, in Frankfort those who held the views of the Swiss, by the advice of Dathen, let their children be baptized by the city clergy who held Lutheran opinions; and when Calvin in September, 1556, was called as arbitrator to Frankfort, the wine of honor was poured out to him. Moreover, the states of the empire that were inclined to the Swiss doctrine were not excluded, in the year 1555, in the compact entitled "the Religious Peace;" and there was then in Germany only *one* Protestant Church which in that Peace received on the basis of the Augsburg Confession toleration, or rather equal authorization. Melanchthon, moreover, was still living; and Luther was in the eyes of all a man of God, indeed, but a man of God whom it was allowable to criticise. Calvin and his friends still lived in the hope of being able by a conference to adjust with their opponents the sad controversy respecting the Lord's Supper. The doctrine of predestination was not then matter of dispute.‡

* The *Confutatio* of the Augsburg Confession, therefore, did not altogether disapprove of this tenth article.

† In Frankfort Calvin was in 1556 allowed to preach only in the Church of the Exiles, of the Reformed faith.

‡ Hesshusius wrote to Nic. Gallus of Regensburg on May 24, 1568: "Spangebergius causam rejectionis reproborum in Deum *non* rejicit. Melisandrum mone hac de re, ut intra septa maneat." Hesshusius desired that the predestinarian Melisander might be head of the school for the evangelicals in Regensberg (MS. in the archives at Regensburg). Also Calvin writes in 1560 to Zerkint of Bern, that up to this year no one had taken exception to the doctrine of predestination (v. *Opp. omnia*, Strassburg edition, Vol. xvii, 238). In

Calvin, supported by Melanchthon, conceded as much as he possibly could. Melanchthon himself, greatly shaken and depressed by the conflict of the Epigones raging around him, was longing for rest. He was no longer equal to the demands made on him. By his authority peace was to be brought to hundreds of thousands in France. It was for him to pronounce the deciding word in the old dispute between the Swiss and the Wittenbergers. The contending parties pressed round him in Worms in 1557. The Saxon zealots turned their backs on the Colloquy appointed by the Emperor Ferdinand between the evangelicals and the adherents of the old Roman Catholic faith, after that they had with Flacian warmth set forth their grievances and gained nothing. In vain they called on Melanchthon to assist in condemning the Calvinistic doctrine of the Supper. He refused to do so, and for this Calvin thanked his friend. To this Colloquy at Worms came the aged Farel and Beza from Geneva, together with others, in order, in the name of their French brethren who were in Paris suffering persecution, to invoke the aid of the princes assembled at Worms. They laid before them a confession of their faith, to free the French brethren from all suspicion, especially relative to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. They addressed their brethren who held Lutheran views, and declared to them that they had a lively feeling that they and those assembled at Worms formed one and the same Church of the Son of God. Nor was sympathy, in fact, withheld from them in Worms. Melanchthon, Brenz and the zealot Marbach (whom we shall soon become acquainted with as an adversary of the Reformed doctrine) promised assistance to the French brethren, and induced the princes to intercede for them with the King of France. Beza returned to Switzerland more hopeful than ever. But after this colloquy everything remained unaltered.* Melanchthon returned home by Frankfort, where he declared to the minister Baier: "We agree with the French in all points except respecting the Supper, and this article," he stated, "was not sufficient to justify our repelling those who think differently from us about it." He then went home to Wittenberg to torment himself a couple of years, and then to die without having spoken the deciding word. However much the friends of an accommodation in Geneva and Germany

the year 1543, Melanchthon charged Calvin with the refutation of Pighius, who had expressed himself against the doctrine of grace taught by Luther, Melanchthon and Calvin.

* Zanchius, too, wrote in vain to Melanchthon in Worms (*Epp. Zanch.*, ii. 148), conjuring him to speak a word on the Supper in the interest of peace, and also exert his influence with Brenz to this end. Possibly Melanchthon talked with Marbach, for the latter returned from Worms to Strassburg with a spirit of greater moderation.

clung to him, however much Calvin pressed him, he was afraid, and remained just what he was at Augsburg in the year 1530. Already his enemies had brought it so far that the King of Denmark and the elector Augustus of Saxony reproached him in letters with vacillating.* He, himself, was already an object of suspicion to the zealots, and was hardly able by his authority to prevent a collision; and this collision was not long delayed.

It ensued in Strassburg in 1560 immediately after Melanchthon's death. Here stood a great and powerful party, that boasted in a special manner of the name of Luther and was weary of Melanchthon's yielding spirit, over against the small and gradually diminishing party that sided with the Swiss. The apple of discord was the Supper of Peace. Marbach gave it a Lutheran meaning, and wished to have published in Strassburg a book by Hesshusius on this side. The Italian Hieronymus Zanchius, with some colleagues in the University, advocated the Swiss doctrine of the Supper; and they proposed that the book of Hesshusius should be suppressed. Zanchius, a foreigner, who had come through Switzerland to Germany, and had been laboring in Strassburg eight or nine years, had been at first offensive to the Strassburg ministers, as too liberal a thinker on several points in controversy at that time. Marbach, the leader of the Lutheran party, was, for example, displeased with him because he would not treat the pope as Antichrist, or as one for whom it was not lawful to pray. People blamed Zanchius, also, for engaging in an almost friendly conversation with the Roman Catholic prelate Delfinio on the ecclesiastical questions of the day; they were even horrified by such independent conduct of the gifted Italian. There were then, it may be said, in all countries, many superior minds that were inclined to Calvinism, and that as rivals of the intolerant party that was carried away by Flacius and that prevailed especially in Thuringia, lower Saxony, and the North German Hanseatic cities, threatened to outflank it and to absorb the moderate party led by Melanchthon. Zanchius, in fact, found then so much support in the council of the city that the printing of the book of Hesshusius was interdicted. For this Marbach, who was superintendent in Strassburg, was determined in conjunction with Pappus,† and other colleagues, to have revenge. He accused Zanchius before the Scholarchs on account of certain theses which Zanchius uttered

* Care should have been taken not to make of this vacillating man, in that first generation which followed only the strongest characters, the father of a so-called Melanchthonian or German-Reformed movement. Even at the present day Prof. Karl Müller (*Preuss. Jahrbücher*, 1889, p. 121) follows too closely in the footsteps of Heppe and Ebrard. This is a controversy which would deserve a separate investigation.

† Cf. his *Life* by Horning, pastor in Elsass.

in his prelections. These theses were taken by Marbach from the copies of students, or reports made by them; and they were not even laid before Zanchius till he was accused on this ground. In the accusatory libel presented by Marbach to the rector of the university, the celebrated John Sturm, complaint was made chiefly that Zanchius denied the falling away of the elect, that he taught predestination too much and too frequently, that he spoke of the end of the world and of Antichrist in a manner contrary to Scripture, and finally (now came the chief trouble of Marbach) that he did not think and teach concerning the Sacrament conformably to the Augsburg Confession.

Here on one small spot we behold the violent conflict of minds, and see brethren, who hitherto had at least dwelt together under the roof of *one* Church, fall out, and then in strife separate, never to meet again. This is the high interest for us as students of Church history, which this episode at Strassburg inspires. Zanchius, an Italian and professor of theology, was even on account of his national peculiarity a thorn in the eye of his less versatile German colleagues. And now he, the foreigner, who was suddenly and artfully assailed, had to defend himself in respect to certain tenets which were fathered on him. Manifestly the whole religious movement, with which he was connected, was to be assailed in his person. He stood quite alone, for Bucer was no more, and the rector Sturm was a poor substitute for him. He had, therefore, to defend against the too powerful party headed by Marbach that cause which afterwards became the cause of the Reformed in Germany. There were still in the city many of Bucer's friends, who saw no difference between Bucer's views on the perseverance of the saints and the incriminated doctrine of Zanchius. It had not yet been by any means decided in Strassburg which Confession was to be followed. In the Congress at Schweinfurt in 1532, Strassburg had, indeed, for political reasons, and without renouncing the Tetrapolitan Confession, subscribed Melanchthon's Augsburg Confession, but only, as it seems, the dogmatic part of it. So at least John Sturm represents the case in a letter to Peter Sturm (*Zanchii Epp.*, ii, p. 164), a letter which affords us an insight into the reasons which the party of the Reformed alleged against Marbach. At all events, from this double subscription great confusion ensued, so that in the seventh decade of the sixteenth century the Strassburgers did not well know by which Confession they were bound; whether by that Confession of Augsburg which is called the Tetrapolitan, and which, too, had been presented to the emperor at the diet of Augsburg in 1530, or by the Augsburg Confession which Melanchthon composed. At a

vote on this question the Lutheran party of Marbach was, in the beginning, in the minority, and the *Confessio nostra* was, and remained, rightfully the *Tetrapolitana*, the old Confession of the venerable veterans Bucer, Capito and Hedio. But we will not enter too deeply into details. It is enough to say that recourse was had to the expedient of settling the dispute between Zanchius and Marbach by arbitrators. Of these only two were inclined to "Reformed" doctrine. The others were men of the sharper temperament, though by no means partisans of Flacius. At their head stood Andreæ, and beside him Sulzer of Basel,* who, although belonging to the Reformed Church, was strongly inclined to the Lutheran doctrine of the Supper. His great endeavor was to pacify the contending parties, and he almost forced Zanchius, at the close of the work of arbitration, to give his hand to Marbach. Thus the representatives of the different movements, with their pronounced tendencies, were still together in variegated mixture, within the walls of *one* city and, as it were, under *one* Church roof.

In this dispute it is interesting for us to attend to the contents of the theological judgments which Zanchius personally procured with reference to his theses; and, secondly, to the tenor of the instrument which was drawn up to settle the controversy by the arbitrators, at whose head stood Andreæ of Tübingen and Sulzer of Basel. The zealous Zanchius had not spared himself pains; in truth his reputation and even his position in Strassburg depended on the peaceful termination of the controversy. He questioned in person the different faculties and expert authorities touching the orthodoxy of his theses. Heidelberg, Marburg, Basel, Schaffhausen, Zürich declared in his favor. He visited Tübingen also, and requested Brenz to give his assent to the theses respecting the impossibility of the falling away of the saints, and the doctrine of the Supper. Brenz was on his guard. The somewhat equivocal answer which he returned to Zanchius was interpreted by the latter as assenting to his theses; other Reformed theologians complained only that Brenz, out of regard for his friend Marbach, joined to his assent such modifying clauses.† Brenz wrote to Marbach that he wished the doctrine of predestination to be set forth *a posteriori*, not *a priori*; in such a way, therefore, that our faith might be thereby strengthened, and not weakened. He also warns Marbach against mentioning the name of Zanchius from the pulpit. Respecting the Antichrist he would make no decision, and was more tolerant than Marbach. Brenz's *Commentaries* show‡ that he firmly held the

* Of Sulzer and also of Andreæ, Calvin writes to Zanchius that they had right views on predestination (*Epp. Zanch*, ii, 138).

† Blaurer to Calvin, *Opp. Calvini*, xix, p. 243.

‡ See his Commentary on Acts xix. 9.

doctrine of predestination. Hesshusius taught the same in his book, *De libero Arbitrio*, which was approved by the Strassburg arbitrators,* and by Marbach and the rest.

The instrument† drawn by these arbitrators to establish peace avoided rigorousness in both directions. It inclined rather to the side of Marbach. But it was the wish of the arbitrators to spare Zanchius; and, above all, to avoid the scandal which would necessarily follow the deposition of so famous a teacher as he was. They did not desire to pass a final judgment on the doctrine itself. This Sulzer of Basel expressly declared to Zanchius. They contented themselves in the matter of the Lord's Supper with referring to the Augsburg Confession in the more recent form of the year 1540, and to the Wittenberg Concordia of 1536, and, in other things, with carefully steering by the cliffs, passing over in silence the formula "in, with and under," as well as the question of the partaking by unbelievers of the body and blood of Christ. In the doctrine of predestination they did not touch on, as we should say at the present day, the metaphysics of the question, and made prominent only its practical bearing, and this in the interest of the troubled conscience. They referred to Augustine, Bucer, and Luther's treatise *De Servo Arbitrio*, but warned against needless speculations. Assuredly those received no countenance who, appealing to the later doctrine of Melanchthon on predestination, expressed themselves in their zeal against Zanchius almost as Pelagians would have done (*Epp. Zanchii*, ii, p. 143). On *one* point only did the scale incline decidedly to the side of the opponents of Zanchius. The amissibility of grace was conceded, though only in a very cursory manner. Zanchius durst hardly have signed this formula, rigorously understood. He did so only for the sake of peace, and on the repeated recommendation of Calvin, who gave his advice to Holbrac also in the same conciliatory spirit. Zanchius, as also the French minister Holbrac, belonged up to this time to the company of Strassburg ministers.‡ That a peace purchased in this way should not last long, the adversaries of Zanchius took good care. After half a year he, weary of vainly defending himself,§ left the city. A call from an Italian congregation of Chiavenna came opportunely, and he with-

* *Zanchii Epp.*, ii, p. 138. These arbitrators also conceded indirectly the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints by fully admitting the opinions expressed by Hesshusius in the book *De libero Arbitrio*. Zanchius, too, appealed to that book in support of the perseverance of the saints.

† Under the title "Concensus inter theologos et professores ecclesiæ Argent. de cœna Domini et prædestinatione." Strassburg, 1563.

‡ Cf *Opp. Calvini*, xx, 23, 104.

§ Cf. *l. c.*, pp. 104, 105.

drew from further strife and yielded the field to his foes. In a letter written from Basel he took leave of his former colleagues, still conscious of having maintained only the customary doctrine, in particular that of Bucer.* He went away without any feeling of revenge. In the same year (1563) Holbrac was dismissed from his place, and the French church was dissolved.

The contest between Marbach and Zanchius was only a prelude to the speedy actual separation and division into two churches. In the year 1561 the German princes attempted at Naumburg to make the Augsburg Confession of the year 1530, with the interpretation of 1540, the shibboleth of the entire German evangelical Church; and the attempt would have succeeded had not the restless Duke of Saxony protested, and gradually drawn over to his side the majority of the Protestant States. Even now, however, the proper apple of discord was *only* the doctrine of the Supper. The party of Flacius was of one mind on the question of predestination with those who subsequently were denominated the "Reformed;" and the Flacians employed predestination as a weapon to fight against the Melanchthonians,† who long maintained themselves in the electorate of Saxony. Not till a later time, during the strife about Crypto-Calvinism, did this electorate succeed in detaching itself from the moderate party in the empire. In a word, about the time of the origin of the Formula of Concord between 1570–1580, there were only two different parties; the one consisting of people who would let themselves be reasoned with on the doctrine of the Supper; and the other of such as would hear no reason on the subject. Those who were weary of the vexatious strifes, as Hesse, Anhalt and other States of the empire, joined the party led by the inhabitants of the Palatinate, and, finally, did *not* accept the Formula of Concord. The others shut themselves off, and formed a body that took for its shibboleth the unaltered Confession of Augsburg. It was after the Formula of Concord that the evangelicals clearly separated into two churches; that is, one part went its own ways and abandoned the other, which then, by rejecting the Formula of Concord but retaining the Confession of Augsburg, was gradually consolidated in the empire into churches which for the *first* time testified by a great historical act at Dort that they belonged to the Reformed Church, that meanwhile had arisen outside of Germany.

In yet another way can we follow this gradual origination of

* *Epp.*, ii, p. 150.

† Cf. F. Galle, *Versuch einer Characteristik Melanchthons*, pp. 329–341. Melanchthon's deviation, too, in the doctrine of predestination did not at any time or anywhere attain actual authority before, at the earliest, the close of the sixteenth century.

two churches in Germany owing their existence to the Reformation. Here, too, we see that everything turned upon the dogma of the Lord's Supper, and that absolutely nothing was spoken of the doctrine of predestination, as of a dogma in dispute. This second point of difference was at most forced in here and there, as at Strassburg; otherwise, it belonged to quite later periods of the development of the doctrine of the Church.

We fix here our eye on the Palatinate and its elector, Frederick the Pious, who caused the Heidelberg Catechism* to be composed. With hand and foot he defended himself against the charge that he had anything to do with Zwingli or Calvin. He wanted his Catechism to be tried by God's Word alone; and as for the rest, he would keep to the Augsburg Confession, but as set forth in the *Variata*. He thought that even the princes who swore by the word of Luther could not be satisfied with the *Invariata*, because this taught the doctrine of the papists in regard to the Lord's Supper. But this pious prince was, as immediately appeared, a white raven in his class. In this class the determining factors were quite different from the purely spiritual. The latest historical investigation has made this manifest; besides, his correspondence, edited by Kluckhohn in three volumes, lies before us. It was not the wisdom which is from above that now swayed the German princes in their ecclesiastical politics, but the earthly wisdom. There stood at the side of the princes, theologians† and statesmen who were contentious and jealous of the opposite party, and who had more in their eye the local politics of their masters than the honor of God and the spread of the Gospel. Extremely suspicious must we regard it when we see Janssen, in his *History of Germany in the Age of the Reformation*, place himself more on the side of the Lutheran States led by electoral Saxony, than on that of their opponents. He praises their politics as full of moderation, and loyal to the emperor and the empire, and abuses the party of the Palatinate as revolutionary, ascribing to it an evil spirit of sedition, and charging it with the ruin of the empire, and even the Thirty Years' War. Ah, but Janssen comes by thirty years too late with his fabrication

* On the origin and character of this Catechism Sudhoff in his Biography of Olevianus and Ursinus has said what was necessary. Lately (1890) Prof. Gooszen of Leyden has published the Heidelberg Catechism with explanatory passages drawn from authorities. This in itself valuable work marks, however, a retrogression in representing Bullinger as influencing the dogmatic expression of the Catechism. He did not play the leading part in the circles that produced the Catechism. He stood far behind Calvin. The praise which Zanchius gives him in a letter to Lavater (*Epp.*, ii, 187) is pretty moderate.

† Holbrac writes to Calvin of the *improba et pervicax episcopalis audacia* of the opposite party in Strassburg, which knew how to maintain itself in opposition to the Senate (*Opp. Calvini*, xix, 490).

of history; our original authorities speak too clearly, if not for scandal-seeking men, recklessly devoted to their own party, yet for the reverent investigator, the man *sine ira et studio*. In his correspondence Frederick the Pious comes before us as a shield of the evangelical faith, not only for his home in the narrower sense, but also for Germany, yea, rather for France, the Netherlands, England, Scotland—as a man who always exhorted to peace, and strove after and recommended a definite policy for the German evangelical States of the empire. Besides, he serves as a model as father of a family, as husband and especially as father-in-law, and still serves as an example in the reformation of the national Church, a true genuine bishop of his country. Under his auspices* the Heidelberg Catechism and the *Agenda* of the Palatinate were composed. In Question 80 of the Catechism he added with his own hand the last words which characterize the mass as an accursed idolatry.

And how was he treated? He had to suffer much on account of his Catechism—ay, at the imperial diet at Augsburg in 1566 it was (according to the emperor's design) to cost him his electoral dignity. This time, however, the emperor reckoned without his host. The evangelical princes at last combined, and stood up for Frederick III, led by electoral Saxony which then looked askance at the lately proclaimed Swabian doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body. They did not want the emperor to interfere in the internal affairs of Protestants. But for what silly things brethren then contended with one another! In some inexplicable way it came to pass that we suddenly find ourselves in a whirlpool of open and concealed hostilities of brethren against brethren. Because in Heidelberg the bread was broken in the administration of the Supper, while in Weimar the wafer was reached to the communicant, the electress of the Palatinate, Maria, was not allowed in Weimar to take the place of a sponsor for her grandchild. At the nuptials of a Saxon princess with Frederick's son Casimir in Heidelberg, the ceremony could not be performed by one of the court preachers of the Palatinate. A minister, known as an enemy of Calvinism, had, by the will of the elector of Saxony, to come for this purpose from Bretten to Heidelberg.

Beside other bitter experiences which the elector Frederick had to bear, he had this also to suffer, that some of his own children rose up against him. His daughter, who had a Saxon husband, showed herself quite unfeeling towards her parents. His daughter-

* That Frederick even before the publication of the Catechism knew how to speak the words we find in it, is proved by his wonderfully fine letter to John Frederick the Middle, his son-in-law (*Briefe*, ed. Kluckhohn, i, p. 307 ff.).

in-law, that Saxon princess, could not wait for his death in patience; and even his eldest son and successor, Ludwig, opposed his father's plans of reform in the Upper Palatinate during his life, and afterwards destroyed as much as he could of the creations of his father in the Electorate. The suspicions and bitter words, conveyed to him in the letters of his daughter Dorothea, and of her consort John William, were at least a violation of the commandment, "Honor thy father and thy mother." For a long time they sought even to alienate from him his wife, who was very averse to the introduction of Zwinglianism, "the Zwinglian seed,"* until at last she voluntarily followed him, and became the most faithful coworker with him in the building up of the Church of the Palatinate, standing by his side and comforting him.

History has pronounced sentence on the question on which side were right and justice, and the letters of Frederick the Pius still testify to the sufferings and toils of this most faithful confessor of the German princes of the sixteenth century. In Saxony they soon attempted a high game of politics, and sided with the emperor rather than with the Palatinate, with the inciters to strife among the theologians rather than with the peace-makers. Frederick III was distinguished above all his fellow-princes by the interest which he felt in the world in general. His look stretched far beyond the interests of the Church of his own country. While his opponents in the empire would agree to no accommodation with foreign Christians, especially with those in France, but stiffly insisted on the Augsburg Confession and subscription to it, Frederick had no desire that this Confession should be imposed on them as a constraining fetter. Eight hundred and sixty-two congregations in France had already presented to the king a confession of their own.† And now it only served to create confusion to keep urging the Protestants of France to subscribe in addition the Confession of Augsburg. On the whole, it was pure shortsightedness on the part of the great majority of the German princes that they avoided united action with foreign Protestants. Strengthening the Huguenots, and then union with France against Spain, would have also put a bridle on the emperor at home, and have inclined the scale everywhere in

* *Briefe Friedrichs*, ed. Kluckhohn, i, p. 40.

† This drawing up of a particular Confession of their own, which was to unite the Protestant Churches (May, 1559), is not to be adjudged free from precipitation. Calvin speaks (Vol. xvii, 526) of a "pertinax zelus," which animated some to give forth a Confession of their own; and he solemnly testifies before men and angels that it *displeased* him. At the well-known, hastily convoked Synod of Paris (May, 1559) a form prepared by Calvin, which arrived in the last hour, was adopted. This is the Confessio Gallicana, the mother of the Confessions of foreign Reformed Churches.

favor of the Gospel. But the massacre in Paris on St. Bartholomew's day shattered in a night all ambitious plans.* The Gospel is not advanced by such means; this Frederick the elector Palatine had to learn, as before him Philip of Hesse had done, when he with the Swiss and Venice formed far-reaching plans for overcoming the emperor. But even after this night of terror in Paris, when affairs took an unfavorable turn for the Protestants in France, Frederick did not intermit his efforts to gain the German princes for them, and also for their brethren in the faith in the Netherlands. But he, on whom, humanly speaking, all depended, Augustus of Saxony, felt no inclination to such a policy; later he was even averse to it, and soon followed in the track of the imperial policy for the fatherland,† because Vienna promised him greater advantages than Heidelberg. The cause of this political veering of Augustus we see in the sudden turn which Church politics took. The Crypto-Calvinists must be thoroughly humbled, and the victory of the fanatical party had also been made sure in Dresden. Melanchthon's son-in-law, Peucer,‡ was sent to prison to pine there for twelve years (Anno 1574). The Catholics rejoiced, says Kluckhohn, at the complete turning round of Augustus, and even the Spanish ambassador was happy at a court where a preacher could be heard thundering against the Calvinistic sect and the "nefarious Beza." The dreadful fruits of such a course meet as in the Thirty Years' War, and lastly in the perversion of Augustus the Strong. And yet Saxony had it in her power to play the part of Brandenburg in Germany.

The Elector Palatine Frederick remained consistent in spite of all opposition. He could not refrain, says Kluckhohn (p. 406), from writing to the Elector Augustus, and would not be put off even by the sharp rebuff which he received. Against the harsh denial of any community of faith between the Saxons and the Heidelbergers Frederick maintained mildly and calmly the idea of fraternal unity, while there was agreement on the essential points, and variation only on non-fundamental questions.§ Augustus is said to have hereupon answered, that he held the article concerning the Lord's Supper to be the chief one in the whole body of Christian doctrine.‖ We hear such words with regret, and must agree with Calvin in

* 60,000 men were murdered in Paris and other cities in 1572, because they confessed Christ our only Lord and Saviour. *Briefe Friedrichs III,* Vol. ii, p. 528 note.

† Cf. Kluckhohn, *Friedrich der Fromme,* pp. 403, *sqq.*

‡ Pezel published the *History of Peucer's Sufferings.*

§ *Briefe Friederichs III,* ii, 713.

‖ See Calinich, *Kampf und Untergang des Melanchthonismus in Kursachsen,* p. 139.

writing to Schalling of Regensburg: "It is to be lamented that we, few in number, although we confess in all things the same Gospel, yet let ourselves be disunited by the Lord's Supper, which ought to be the strongest bond of union" (*Epp.*, xvi, p. 429, *sq.*). Melanchthon, as he was about to expire, declared on hearing evil tidings from France, "All my sickness does not pain me so much as the great misery and distress of the holy Christian Church arising from needless separation."* What here, however, interests us most is that the catastrophe in Saxony became a preparation for the final establishment of the Formula of Concord. As we have already observed, the rent had become by it definitive, and it soon enlarged to such an extent, that henceforth there could be said to be two evangelical churches in Germany.

The party holding Reformed views was long confident enough to try yet again to make approaches to the opposite party—a completely hopeless endeavor! Before the Lutherans formally bound themselves together by the Formula Concordiæ, the Reformed assembled once more, and resolved at the Convention of Frankfort in 1577 to formulate a Confession in order to unite by a firm bond the dissevered churches at home and abroad. Zanchius was commissioned to do this work. He was to have regard specially to the Confession of Augsburg.† And in the Harmonia Confessionum of the year 1581, which has been republished by Ebrard, we actually find the Augsburg Confession and Saxon Articles by Melanchthon beside the Second Helvetic Confession. This was the last word that the Reformed spoke in the matter of Confessions during the century of the Reformation. A mosaic formed out of many Confessions was the result. A Formula of Concord such as the Lutheran was not effected; we think that this was not to the injury of the Reformed Church.

However, we must from the standpoint of history protest energetically against the notion, that in the Reformed Church, whose rise we have described, the *Loci* of Melanchthon were to be or even might be permitted to be, the dogmatic text-book as well as the *Institutio Calvini*. He who can still adopt this view, cannot have attentively followed the investigations, especially of Alex. Schweizer and of Scholten in Holland, during the last decades. Pezel of Herborn published, it is true, in 1580 the *Argumenta* drawn from the *Loci* of Melanchthon, but with the consciousness that they needed greatly to be corrected. He wrote at length on this point to the strictly Reformed theologians of Neustadt; and Zanchius sent to him in the name of Ursinus and Tossanus also

* *Melancthon's Leben* by Schmidt, p. 664.

† Zanchius, *Epp.*, ii, p. 192.

critical marginal notes, by which what was most offensive to Reformed Christians was removed from the *Loci* of Melanchthon. From the two documents still extant in the letters of Zanchius* the whole interesting question of a Melanchthonian form of doctrine respecting predestination within the Reformed Church is placed in the right light. Melanchthon's authority was needed as a bulwark against the Lutheran zealots. Melanchthon had been for the Reformed the doorkeeper, who made them sharers in the advantages of the Peace concerning religion. Calvin never forgot this service. However much a Bullinger and other Swiss theologians were annoyed with Melanchthon, yea angry at him, Calvin remained to the last his friend. He even translated his *Loci*, although in doing so he taxed Melanchthon with his deviations.† Into what perplexity a man like Zanchius was thrown by this act of Calvin is shown by a letter of his which has been mentioned already, which he wrote in 1562 to his optimus pater Calvinus.‡ His opponents in Strassburg had begun to appeal to Melanchthon's *Loci* (in the last edition). Zanchius now wished from Calvin—who he, of course, presumed had admonished Melanchthon on account of these manifest aberrations—that he would send him the answers received from Melanchthon, that he (Zanchius) might make use of them. Zanchius was firmly persuaded that Melanchthon could not possibly have taught "so godless" a doctrine respecting predestination and free will as his Strassburg opponents made out from the *Loci*. But Zanchius did not know how to help himself in presence of the inexorable fact, and he called Calvin to his aid. That Calvin could give him no satisfactory answer if he made one at all, is certain. These deviations in doctrine by Melanchthon were dealt with after the example of Japhet and Shem. They were covered over, or made harmless by glosses. Very far then are we from admitting a German Melanchthonian form of doctrine within the bosom of the Reformed Church.

But weightier than this question, with which we are now not closely concerned, is the other question touching the consequences of the rise of a Reformed Church by the side of the Church which appealed to Luther's authority. That a second Church arose by the side of the first was contrary to the will of those who had the greatest share in its formation. Melanchthon and Calvin, who saw farther than the Zürichers, than even Bullinger, resisted the disruption with all their might. It was chiefly the unskillfulness of the followers of Luther that called forth this disruption which needed

* *Epp.*, ii, pp. 202–204.

† See Schweizer, *Centraldogmen*, i, p. 388.

‡ *Epp. Zanchii*, ii, p. 143.

not to have taken place. The talk about "another spirit" which the Swiss possessed, ought to be at length given up. Neither Zwingli nor Calvin thought of propounding to their hearers a *new* doctrine beside that of Luther. They wished from the first to be "a united people of brothers" with the Lutherans. But this was rendered impossible for them through the offenses against Christian love on the part of Luther and his followers. At the attempt to effect concord in Regensburg in 1541 the Strassburgers, among them Bucer and Calvin, had taken part along with the Wittenbergers. In the Augsburg Peace concerning Religion of 1555, the imperial States that inclined to the Swiss were not excluded. In 1557 the German princes, quite after the mind of the theologians present, especially of Melanchthon, interceded for their French brethren in the faith. To procure this intercession of the German princes Frederick repeatedly exerted himself to the utmost. And Christopher of Würtemberg would willingly have gone into it, if the foreigners would only have assented to the Augsburg Confession. In spite, however, of all urging to subscribe this Confession, the French churches who at that time were in France itself still numbered with the Lutherans, adopted a Confession of their own, the Gallicana (1559), after a draught furnished by Calvin. Henceforward at the religious conferences there was put into the hand of their Roman Catholic opponents a weapon, by which they could point to the fact that the Huguenots did not agree with those who followed the Confession recognized in the German Empire. This circumstance was prejudicial to the consolidation of the Huguenots, and later was most hurtful to the Protestants in Belgium. In vain did William of Orange, on his entry into Antwerp and afterwards, attempt to gather the parties around the banner of the Augsburg Confession, and thereby secure for all the evangelicals the benefit of the compact entitled the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555). The ministers sent by the Huguenots from France to the Netherlands thwarted the plans of William of Orange, and stimulated the people to arbitrary proceedings, which were in conflict with the laws of the country. There were, alas, soon three parties on the soil of the Netherlands that so greatly needed unity. In Flanders and on the French borders the Reformed (Calvinists) preponderated; on the German borders the Lutherans (Martinists); lastly the Anabaptists in Holland and Zeeland.* From such division into three parties advantage was drawn only by the enemies of the Gospel who soon were allowed to enjoy a triumph, in that, at the united

*Groen v. Prinsterer, *Archives de la maison d'Orange*, Nassau, ii, 151. Lutherans and Reformed, owing to the pressure of circumstances, did, indeed, unite to form a Synod in Antwerp, presided over by Peter Dathen, in 1566.

Synod of Lutherans and Reformed at Antwerp in 1566, the members of Synod fell out concerning the tenth article of the Augsburg Confession, whose acceptance William of Orange had recommended. We hear of enmity just before the time when the temples were closed and the Prince of Orange left the country.* And even in Antwerp the Calvinists had caused William of Orange before his departure the greatest difficulties, which went so far as to threaten his life.

The miscarriage of the best meant attempts to win the entire Netherlands for the Gospel, the ill success of the Huguenots in France itself, how easily it might have been avoided, and a united people of brothers have been formed, if only a little yielding had been shown to the Reformed in Germany, and account had been taken of the political necessity. Thus, however, the foreign brethren in the faith were reduced to misery and placed in a condition that made them often seek deliverance by desperate steps. Had not even Maximillian II been offended by the contention of brethren? And how could the Duchess of Parma, who was Regent in the Netherlands, fail to take advantage of the like contention? Did not even a Matthias Flacius see himself compelled to take account of the need of the times, and sit at Antwerp in a Synod together with the Walloon Christians (the members of the Reformed Synods of Amsterdam and Antwerp, of Valenciennes and Tournay)?† Dogmatic differences did not then hold him back from sitting together with the Reformed—why then at other times? Why did his party therein so sharply assail the Melanchthonians in Germany that these showed themselves more inclined to the Swiss, a result which was not desired by the Flacians in their excessive zeal for the pure doctrine of Luther?

Everything in the so-called blooming period of the Reformation went on frightfully after the manner of men. But few thought of walking circumspectly and accommodating themselves to the time. The impulse of self-preservation brought the Protestant princes to cling convulsively to the Augsburg Confession, and to evidence this also by repelling their brethren in the faith in other lands, and giving them over to their furious enemies, who were as much the enemies of the German princes. And when anything was done, it was always done late. Deputies of these German princes came to the court of Brussels to make intercession; but even *while they were*

* Groen v. Prinsterer (*l. c.*, iii, p. 52) bears witness to this enmity in April, 1567.

† The members of the Synods of Amsterdam and Antwerp, who were all Reformed, declared themselves ready to subscribe the tenth article of the Confession of Augsburg.

present the executions began, and then Alba followed. But why did they come? In order to save those of the same faith with themselves, Lutherans especially, but also the Reformed. Still more sensitively did this disagreement of those who were called to brotherly concord avenge itself on the field of theology. They theologized in Wittenberg on their own account, and so in Geneva. A mutual understanding was not sought. A coworking was rejected. The Wittenbergers hardly asked for the opinions of the Würtembergers; and Calvin saw himself restricted to a couple of places in Switzerland that often caused him difficulties. Whilst within the Lutheran Church the one party (the Flacians) made the name Osiandrist a term of opprobrium, the other party in Tübingen most highly commended a man of this stamp. Of the danger of Osiandrism the Reformed party had never any proper conviction, and the intellectual activity of Melanchthon in this direction had no value for them. In my work on *Justification by Faith* I have tried to estimate this lack of association in theological efforts.* The consequence was that the leaven of Osiandrism was not sufficiently expelled from the Church, or that this sickness, as a stage in its development, did not run its full course, which would have conduced to the health of the Church. The Formula of Concord drew, indeed, the results arising from the doctrinal disputes peculiar to the Lutheran Church and brought by that Church to an end; but in many respects this was done after the manner of the balancing of accounts at the end of the year. The assets and liabilities of the Church they attempted to register at the end of the century. What was to be believed and what was to be rejected (rejectio errorum) occupied a large space in the Formula Concordiæ, which was not in truth a Confession.

The Reformed had heard only indirectly and at a distance of these doctrinal controversies, which only ignorance can hold to be unimportant. From a letter of Hubert† to Calvin it appears that they almost made themselves merry at the spurning of Menius by the stricter Lutherans. They even fought shy of the Augsburg Confession, because there was such a want of unanimity manifest among its special representatives.‡ And thus important contests were carried on in one corner of Germany, and chiefly in the German language; and the results of these contests were in an extremely

* Especially Cap 2, "Schicksale der Rechtfertigungslehre nach Melanchthons Tode."

† *Opp. Calvini*, xvi, p. 458.

‡ John Sturm writes in the time of the Zanchian controversy with great indignation at the disputes of the partisans of the Augsburg Confession (Antinomians, Majorites, Wittenbergers, Jenaites, Hesshusians, Flacians, Islebians and Prætorians!!) *Zanchii Epp.*, ii, p. 164.

one-sided manner, by means of the Formula of Concord, imposed, as a dogmatic ordinance, on one part of the Church, that, namely, that would be guided by Luther.

The Reformed continued to be regarded in the empire as adherents of the Augsburg Confession, but were more attached to special Confessions than to that of Augsburg It, indeed, afforded them protection in the empire, but was otherwise burdensome enough, inasmuch as their brethren in foreign countries would have nothing to do with the Confessio Augustana, and had had enough to suffer from its representatives. In the course of time, then, the brethren of one family sought to forget as far as possible their connection, and at least acted as if they could live apart, and get on better without mutual assistance. In this way, however, the rich gain of the Reformation was in large measure, on both sides, on the side of the Lutherans as on that of the Reformed, greatly impaired.

VIENNA, AUSTRIA. EDOUARD BÖHL.

IV.

EZEKIEL AND THE PRIESTS' CODE.

THE part supposed to be played by the Book of Ezekiel in establishing the "critical" as opposed to the "traditional" theory of the Pentateuch (or, to speak more correctly, of the "Hexateuch") is well known. By the advocates of that theory, it is believed conclusive evidence can be drawn from the writing of the prophet of Tel-Abib, that the so-called Priests' Code had no existence in his day; and this fact (on the assumption generally made that it has been placed beyond dispute) is commonly adduced as an argument in confirmation of the main thesis, that the Levitical system contained in the three middle books of the Pentateuch originated, at least in written form, in postexilic times. Other arguments, it is true, are advanced in support of this startling proposition; but the immense importance of this, which is claimed to be derivable from Ezekiel, is recognized alike by conservative theologians and revolutionary critics. If on the one hand it can be shown that Ezekiel had no acquaintance with the Priests' Code, then both perceive a presumption will arise in favor of the non-existence of that Code before the exile, as one can hardly imagine that, had it then been in circulation, Ezekiel, who was of priestly extraction and whose father, if not himself, had frequently officiated in the temple at Jerusalem, could have remained entirely ignorant of its contents. Whereas on the other hand, if it shall appear that the Book of Ezekiel implies on the part of its author a knowledge of the ritual law comprised in the Priests' Code, then just as certainly, in the judgment of both, will this circumstance preclude the notion of a late origin for the latter. Accordingly it is proposed to submit this question of the relation of the Priests' Code to Ezekiel to unbiased study, eschewing as far as possible violent language and vicious logic, in the hope of arriving at a well-grounded conviction as to which of the two documents is entitled to claim priority.

It is self-evident that either Ezekiel preceded the Priests' Code, or the Priests' Code preceded Ezekiel. No competent scholar now maintains that the priest-prophet on the Chebar and the author of the Priests' Code were one and the same person. The Grafian hypothesis, that the Law of Holiness, as Lev. xvii–xxvi is fashion-

ably styled, emanated from Ezekiel, has fallen into disrepute. Kuenen and Wellhausen having declined to endorse it, it may be said to be for the present, at least, practically abandoned. With the unanimous consent, therefore, of those authorities who usually settle high matters of criticism for the uninitiated, it may be fearlessly asserted that, whoever wrote or compiled the Priests' Code, it was not Ezekiel.

I. CAN IT THEN BE MAINTAINED THAT EZEKIEL PRECEDED THE PRIESTS' CODE? That it can is the contention of Kuenen, Wellhausen and their adherents, two of whom, Drs. Cornill of Königsberg and Driver of Oxford, have lately published scholarly works on Old Testament Introduction, in which the considerations believed to justify this conclusion are set forth with ability and clearness. These considerations are not different from those with which readers of Kuenen and Wellhausen are familiar; but, inasmuch as in Cornill's *Einleitung in das Alte Testament* and Driver's *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament* they are presented in what these writers doubtless regard as their strongest lights, it will be convenient to take them as set forth in the above-named works. According then to Cornill, whose statement is perhaps the fuller, the arguments relied on to demonstrate the priority of Ezekiel are four: first, the fact that Ezekiel in his temple-vision outlines a Torah of his own instead of appropriating that which already existed, if so it be that in his day the Priests' Code did exist; secondly, the deviations perceptible between Ezekiel's Torah and that of Moses, which deviations, it is argued, would have been impossible had Ezekiel been acquainted with any such written Torah as is traditionally ascribed to Moses; thirdly, the so-called degradation of the Levites, who in preëxilic times, it is maintained, performed priestly functions and enjoyed priestly rights, but who in postexilic times, and in compliance with the Torah of Ezekiel, were reduced to a subordinate position, and appointed to be helpers of the priests, who thereupon blossomed out into a higher order of clergy; and fourthly, the use by the Priests' Code of words and phrases to be found only in postexilic literature, as for instance רָקִיעַ to denote the firmament. It is much to be regretted that the Königsberg professor has not furnished his readers with anything in the shape of proof of these allegations—an omission for which he apologizes in the Preface to his work on the ground that his work was not designed to be polemical, but intended solely to present a collective view of the commonly accepted results of criticism. What, however, he has deliberately neglected to provide can easily be obtained from other sources.

1. The first consideration believed to indicate Ezekiel's priority to

the Priests' Code is *the circumstance that in his temple-vision the prophet has incorporated a sacrificial Torah of his own, instead of simply appropriating that of Moses.* This, assumes Cornill, he would have done had he known of its existence. "Why," asks Kuenen,* from whom the argument is borrowed, "why does not Ezekiel content himself with a simple reference to Mosaic laws," instead of giving instructions "as to the consecration of the altar of burnt offerings, the qualifications required for admittance into the priesthood, the dress and cleanness of the priests, the festivals and sacrifices which belonged to them?" "For in the present Pentateuch," he continues, "all these subjects are in fact regulated and this generally more fully and minutely than in the writings of the prophet of the exile;" and because Ezekiel did not adopt the Mosaic *corpus legum* as it stood, he (Kuenen) feels "we must infer that Ezekiel was not acquainted with the whole of the Mosaic law"—with Deuteronomy and the Book of the Covenant certainly, but with "nothing beyond these collections." Moreover, to this argument Kuenen asserts no one has ever returned a satisfactory reply. But may not the explanation of this neglect be that when properly looked into the so-called argument is found not to need reply?

Without insisting that the "must infer" on which Kuenen takes his stand is a pure begging of the question, since if one "must infer" that Ezekiel had no knowledge of the Priests' Code, then the probability (amounting almost to a certainty) is that the Priests' Code had not then been composed, so that all disputation on the subject ought at once to cease—but without insisting on this, it may be reasonably urged that unless evidence can be produced that Ezekiel had he been aware of the existence of a Mosaic Torah would have been obliged by imperious necessity to incorporate it in his temple-vision—and nothing in the vision suggests this—the finding so confidently proclaimed by Kuenen becomes immediately devoid of force. It is simply turning logic into ridicule to contend that, because Ezekiel did not for his visionary temple appropriate the Mosaic Torah, therefore he did not know of its existence. If, while cognizant of its existence, he abstained from adopting it or any part of it, the reason probably was that he did not want it. Should it be insisted that he ought to have wanted it, inasmuch as it would have served his purpose better than the one he extemporized, the obvious rejoinder is that Ezekiel was more likely to understand what his own purpose was than any nineteenth-century critic, whether Dutch, German or English; and that, if he passed by the Mosaic Torah in whole or in part, and devised another, the presumption is that he deemed the Mosaic Torah to be not entirely or precisely suited to the end he had in view.

* *The Religion of Israel,* Vol. ii, p. 115.

Ezekiel's aim in the temple-vision, it is too readily taken for granted, was to outline a new ritual for the restored theocracy at the close of the exile; but, although supported by a formidable array of exegetes and critics, this explanation of the purpose of Ezekiel's Torah cannot be regarded as made out, and indeed rests on no more solid foundation than the exigencies of the theory it is called in to buttress. The present writer has elsewhere * shown that no conclusive evidence can be adduced for asserting, as Graf, Kuenen, Wellhausen and their followers do, that Ezekiel designed to prepare beforehand either an architectural plan for the second temple or a ritualistic programme for the reëstablishment therein of the true Jahve worship, but that his real object, so far as that can be gathered from a study of the vision, was, by means of well-known symbols, to set forth views of divine truth for the consolation of his fellow-exiles. Hence it does not appear that any unavoidable necessity was at hand to constrain Ezekiel to adopt the Torah of the Priests' Code either in whole or in part, even if he knew of its existence, or any reason why, if his purpose could be served without it, he should not have ignored it altogether. In other departments of knowledge an answer like this would suffice to dispose of an objection similar to that now being considered; one fails to see why more should be demanded in the sphere of Biblical criticism.

2. *The deviations of Ezekiel's Torah from that of the Priests' Code* form the second ground on which priority is claimed for the former. Special emphasis is laid on this by Cornill, † who, after stating that the requirements of Ezekiel's Torah come short of those of the Priests' Code, continues: "Why does Ezekiel in the matter of worship require so much less than Num. xxviii and xxix? Where has the high priest, for the Priests' Code the centre of the theocracy, disappeared to in Ezekiel? Where is the great day of the atonement of Lev. xvi? How shall one represent to himself the ordinances concerning the priest and Levite lands of Ezekiel, when placed alongside of the forty-eight Levite cities in Numbers? Even here can impartial consideration recognize in the Priests' Code only a development of Ezekiel's ideas." To a similar purport writes Wellhausen,‡ noting deviations of Ezekiel's code from that of Moses and inferring the precedence of the former. But in reply to this position a number of considerations present themselves.

(1) On the assumption that Ezekiel did not intend to compile a new constitution for restored Israel, but, as above explained, to

* *Pulpit Commentary on Ezekiel,* Vol. ii, note at the end of chap. xlviii.

† *Einleitung,* pp. 64, 65.

‡ *Geschichte Israels,* p. 108.

furnish his fellow-exiles with a picture, in words and phrases they could understand, of an ideal worship, there was nothing to prevent him from appropriating as much or as little of the earlier Torah as he perceived to be helpful to his purpose, and passing by the rest; and this, one might be pardoned for thinking, ought to terminate all controversy on the matter.

(2) Nevertheless, granting that Ezekiel did intend to propound a new sacrificial rubric, it will be difficult to explain why, if he was guided by the same Spirit that directed Moses, he should not have been at liberty, in dealing with the lawgiver's Torah, to take or leave of it precisely as that Spirit led him. Those who believe the Pentateuchal code in its last analysis to have been the work of the Holy Ghost, by whom the prophets of the Old Dispensation were moved; and that Ezekiel's instructor (chap. xliii. 6, 7) was no mere rhetorical puppet, but a veritable personage (either a divinely commissioned "man," or Jehovah Himself); will be slow to admit that the later seer could not have modified, omitted, or, if need were, canceled the legislation of the former. Wellhausen* frankly recognizes that Ezekiel was under no obligation to reproduce exactly the statutes of Lev. xxiii and Num. xxviii and xxix, though he considers the prophet had as little right to make a multitude of completely purposeless variations. The latter part of this averment has already been deprived of a considerable part of its force by what has been said concerning Ezekiel's aim in publishing the Torah of his temple-vision, and might easily be further weakened by showing that at least in many instances, and those the principal, plausible reasons can be proposed for its deviations from that of Moses;† meanwhile, it is enough to note that Wellhausen concedes the impossibility of tying up Ezekiel, as Kuenen and Cornill suggest, to every item in the Priests' Code, even on the supposition that its earlier existence must be admitted. Driver also grants that no decisive argument can be based on Ezekiel's deviations, because "as a prophet Ezekiel's attitude towards the sacrificial system may have been a free one."

(3) Then, it must always be open to argue that if Ezekiel was not at liberty to deviate from the Priests' Code (supposing it to have been the earlier) by leaving out the high priest, the feast of Pentecost and the great day of atonement, for a like reason the author of the Priests' Code (assuming it to have been the later) should not have felt himself at liberty to deviate from Ezekiel's Torah by appending to it a high priest, a feast of Pentecost and a great day of atonement, of all which it was ignorant; and all the more should

* *Geschichte Israels*, p. 108.

† See second part of this essay, third division.

he have abstained from doing so, that he must have been familiar with the Deuteronomic admonition against tampering with the divine commandment, whether by adding to or taking from it (Deut. iv. 2, xii. 32). As, however, he does deviate from Ezekiel, why, it may be asked, should not the same logic as is resorted to to prove that Ezekiel knew nothing of the Priests' Code, be now employed to show that when this latter was written, Ezekiel's Torah was unknown, and therefore could not have been in existence? But if the Priests' Code was not composed till after the exile, the Book of Ezekiel, it is certain, *was then in circulation*, and must have been known to the author of the Priests' Code, who, nevertheless, did not hesitate to depart from its prescriptions; which reveals the fallacy of reasoning from Ezekiel's deviations from the Priests' Code to the non-existence of the Priests' Code itself: whereas if Ezekiel's book had not been published when the Priests' Code was written, and the compiler of this code was not aware of the existence of any such prophetic work as Ezekiel's, ought not the case to be held as established, that the Priests' Code belonged to preëxilic, and therefore most likely to Mosaic times? Nor does it weaken the force of this contention to plead with Cornill and Driver that the Priests' Code, when placed alongside of Ezekiel's Torah, presents the appearance of being a development of antecedent ideas. In so saying they merely echo the voice of Wellhausen, who considers the priority of Ezekiel to be guaranteed by its closer affinity to the Priests' Code than to Deuteronomy.* But in cool reasoning what is this if not another instance of *petitio principii?* No one denies that Ezekiel stands nearer to Leviticus and Numbers than to Deuteronomy—a fact the bearing of which on the problem in hand will be immediately exhibited. What is called for just at this point in the discussion is a convincing demonstration of how this patent and universally acknowledged fact should involve the conclusion that Ezekiel had no acquaintance with the Priests' Code, but that the Priests' Code appropriated thoughts and words, ideas and phrases, rites and ceremonies from Ezekiel and developed them to suit the circumstances of postexilic times. The most that Driver can permit himself to say is, that Ezekiel's regulations "while more complex than those of Deuteronomy are frequently simpler than those of the Priests' Code, so that the inference that the system of the Priests' Code is a development of that of Ezekiel, as Ezekiel is of that of Deuteronomy, *naturally suggests itself*." † But why, it may again be asked, should it have been less natural for Ezekiel to simplify the Priests' Code than for the Priests' Code to develop Ezekiel? What is there in or about this mystic

* See in this next paragraph.

† The italics are the writer's.

word "develop" imperatively to demand that the movement which it represents shall always proceed in the direction of multiplying dead rites rather than in that of diminishing them? According to Wellhausen, the Jahve worship, which before the exile was naïve and spontaneous, after it became a thing of machinery and State regulation. Surely, however, that was a reverse sort of development to what Paul had in contemplation when he wrote: "First that which is natural and afterwards that which is spiritual." Evolution or development in the sphere of religion, it appears to the present writer, usually advances from bondage to freedom; and if "evolution" or "development" must be the key to solve the problem of priority as between Ezekiel and the Priests' Code, unquestionably precedence should be given to the latter.

(4) To the foregoing may be added one more argument, not entirely destitute of weight, which rises freely out of what has just been stated with reference to the closer affinity of Ezekiel with the Priests' Code than with Deuteronomy. It is not customary for present-day critics to emphasize Ezekiel's divergences from Deuteronomy; but inasmuch as these are greater than his divergences from the Priests' Code, one is pardonably curious to learn why the critical method has not equally, and in point of fact much more, concluded that the fifth book of Moses had no existence in the days of the prophet of Tel-Abib. Had it done so, it would of course have been "hoist with its own petard:" the fallacy of its reasoning would have been exposed, and the whole superstructure of hypothesis resting on that reasoning would have been laid in ruins. But if the argument will not apply to Deuteronomy, much less will it hold true of the Priests' Code, that, because of its divergences from Ezekiel, or of Ezekiel's divergences from it, it cannot have been known or even composed before the exile.

3. The third argument relied on to demolish all opposition to the late date of the Priests' Code, is *the so-called degradation of the Levites* (Ezek. xliv. 6–18), which shows, it is alleged, that the distinction between "priest" and "Levite" dominating the Priests' Code was unknown until Ezekiel created it—the Deuteronomic Code having been totally ignorant of Levites who were not priests, and in fact having employed as its standing designation for those who ministered at the altar the compound term, "the priests, the Levites." Well, it ought frankly to be conceded that if the premises set forth in this argument are correct—first, that the distinction between priest and Levite was unknown before the exile; secondly, that all Levites were priests and were recognized as such in Deuteronomy and other preëxilic books; thirdly, that Ezekiel intended to originate a specifically new order of clergy by ordaining

that henceforth only Zadokite priests should officiate in the second temple, while those non-Zadokite priests who under the monarchy had served at heathen altars should be degraded to the rank of temple servants; and fourthly, that the Priests' Code carries back this distinction into primitive Mosaic times, and makes it the foundation of a hierarchical system—assuming, let it be repeated, that all these propositions are unassailably correct, no room whatever can remain for suspicion that Cornill is not warranted in writing, "Then can the Priests' Code only be dependent on and therefore later than Ezekiel." That is to say, if the thesis requiring to be proved be first taken for granted, that the Priests' Code was composed after Ezekiel, then the conclusion cannot be gainsaid that the Priests' Code may have been dependent on, and must have been later than, Ezekiel; in other words, if the Priests' Code followed Ezekiel, then must Ezekiel have preceded the Priests' Code. The logic is without doubt admirable; if only it were not traveling in a circle. And this vicious habit is one of the worst characteristics of the modern school of Old Testament critics. But can the four above-named propositions be accepted as incontrovertibly true? If they cannot, the argument so confidently based upon them must ignominiously fall to the ground.

(1) That the distinction between priests and Levites was unknown before the exile is a familiar commonplace with the Wellhausen school of critics; yet it cannot be denied that the exiles who returned to Palestine with Zerubbabel were acquainted with both orders of officers (Ezra ii. 36, 40, 70). If therefore, as Smend* affirms, the distinction was first mooted by Ezekiel in the twenty-fifth year of the captivity, or B.C. 575, and Zerubbabel arrived from Babylon in the first year of Cyrus, or B.C. 530, the distinction must have passed into general recognition and indeed acquired all the binding force of a long-established custom within the space of fifty years; and that, too, amongst a people widely scattered throughout the Babylonian empire and so situated that it was impossible to put the distinction in force. The modern critical spirit may feel itself equal to the task of believing that actually that was what occurred; it is doubtful if any other spirit without a theory to support would be able to meet so extensive a demand on the historic imagination. †

* *Der Prophet Ezechiel*, p. 313.

† Driver (pp. 146, 147) manifestly hesitates about asserting that the distinction in question was unknown in preëxilic times. Not only does he admit that "the right of exercising priestly offices," which he *thinks* (the italics are ours) "must have been enjoyed by every member of the tribe of Levi," was "evidently not incompatible with the *preëminence* of a particular family (that of Aaron; cf. Deut. x. 6);" but he confesses it "difficult not to think that among the families

(2) As for the alleged non-acquaintance of preëxilic books with the distinction set up in both Ezekiel and the Priests' Code between priests and Levites, that also is asserted with greater vehemence than the evidence will warrant. For—

In the first place, the distinction in question is not strange to Deuteronomy. The classical proof-text, it is agreed, for the identity of priests and Levites in preëxilic times is Deut. xviii. 1, where it stands written: "The priests, the Levites, *even* all the tribe of Levi shall have no portion or inheritance with Israel." From this it is the custom to infer that in preëxilic times every Levite was a priest. A little reflection, however, will make it evident that this conclusion is somewhat hastily arrived at. The above clause, it is obvious, may be interpreted in several ways. Either the three terms, "the priests," "the Levites" and "the whole tribe of Levi," may be regarded as standing successively in apposition—in which case they will be synonymous; or, "the priests" and "the Levites" may be taken as denoting the component sections of "the whole tribe of Levi;" or, "the priests the Levites" may be looked upon as one component term, equivalent to "the priests who are also Levites," or "the Levites who are priests," *i. e.*, the priestly, as distinguished from the non-priestly Levites—"all the tribe of Levi" being added to suggest that the exclusion from land inheritance was designed to apply not to the priestly section of the tribe only, but to the non-priestly as well. To the first of these alternative expositions the objection is that the juxtaposition of three synonymous terms is, to say the least of it, not a usual construction in Hebrew or any other language; against the second may be urged that the absence of the connective particle between "priests" and "Levites" almost necessarily forbids it; the third is favored by the frequent occurrence in Deuteronomy of the phrase, "the priests, the Levites," where only priestly functionaries can be thought of (see chaps. xvii. 9, 18, xxiv. 8, xxvii. 9). Yet the employment of this phrase to denote "priests proper" need not exclude the possibility of the Deuteronomist having known of other Levites who were not priests; and the circumstance that in chap. xviii. 1, he adds "*even* all the tribe of Levi" renders it nearly certain that he did know of such non-priestly Levites when he penned the verse in question. A glance

permanently connected with the temple, which belonged or were reputed to belong to the priestly tribe, there must have been some whose members failed to maintain the right which they technically possessed and were obliged to be content with a menial position; so that this exclusion of the priests of the high places from the priesthood probably only emphasized a distinction which already *de facto* existed and is recognized explicitly in B.C. 536 (Neh. vii. 39, 43, etc.)." In other words, Driver feels that the non-acquaintance of preëxilic times with the distinction between priests and Levites cannot be maintained.

at the other passages in which the phrase "the priests the Levites" occurs, will show that the additional clause "all the tribe of Levi" is not required and would rather be out of place, since the persons intended are manifestly those known to Ezekiel and the Priests' Code as "priests;" whereas, in chap. xviii. 1, the omission of this clause would distinctly lead to a misconception by suggesting that only the priestly section of the tribe was to be debarred from having a portion or inheritance with Israel. Moreover, the correctness of this explanation is confirmed by the manifest allusion to the two classes "priestly" and "non-priestly Levites," not only in the context of Deut. xviii. 1, viz., in verses 3 and 6, but also in a later passage, chap. xxvii. 9–14, where "the priests the Levites" whom Moses marks out to speak the blessings and the curses upon Israel after reaching Canaan are discriminated from the tribe of Levi, which takes its place along with Simeon and Judah, Issachar, Joseph and Benjamin upon Mount Gerizim, while the remaining tribes stand upon Mount Ebal. And still further, as Hengstenberg has pointed out, in various parts of Deuteronomy, as chaps. xii. 12, 18, 19, xiv. 27, 29, xvi. 11, 14, xxvi. 11, 12, 13, the Levites are grouped along with widows, orphans and strangers in such a way as to convey the impression that the writer did not regard them as identical with Levitical priests or priestly Levites; and certainly in none of the above instances does he call them "the priests the Levites." Wherefore, it follows that from Deuteronomy it cannot be inferred that every Levite was a priest.

In the second place, the distinction between priests and Levites is not unknown to other books besides Deuteronomy.

(*a*) In Josh. xxi. 4 a sharp line of demarcation is drawn between "the children of Aaron the priest, which were of (מִן, out of) the Levites," and "the Levites" generally; and if it be replied that Josh. xxi belongs to the postexilic Priests' Code, then one inquires in return how the preëxilic or Deuteronomic phrase, "the priests the Levites," should be found in Josh. iii. 3? Perceiving the dilemma which this inconvenient fact springs upon him, the modern critic responds by excising the whole section (Josh. i–xii, with sundry exceptions about which Cornill and Driver are not agreed) from the Priests' Code and assigning it either with Cornill to J and E, a hypothetical Jehovistic and Elohistic writing, or with Driver to two imaginary documents marked by him respectively as *a* and *b*; and in particular by handing over Josh. iii. 3 to a Deuteronomic redactor who, when combining J and E or *a* and *b* with P, inserted this characteristic expression. As, however, no real ground can be detected why Josh. iii. 3 should be placed to the credit of a supposititious redactor except to account for the presence of a Deuteronomic

phrase in a composition (JE) which, according to the critical hypothesis, was written before Deuteronomy; and as no solid argument can be advanced in support of the postexilic origin of Josh. xxi, and indeed no argument at all except that it does not identify but distinguish "the priests" and the "Levites;" it can hardly be surprising that persons of ordinary capacity should hesitate before accepting the "scientific" results to which these so-called arguments conduct, as "demonstrated truths."

(β) In Judges xvii, the glory of Micah's priest, though used by Wellhausen as a prop to support his thesis, that every Levite was a priest, rather countenances an opposite conclusion. Nothing could have been more natural than that in an unsettled period like that of the Judges a wandering Levite in search of a home and an occupation should be glad of employment at the hands of a well-to-do though idolatrous farmer like Micah; and, if he himself was not pronouncedly religious—by no means a violent hypothesis—nothing was more likely than that he should not shrink from taking on himself priestly functions, and all the more readily because of his belonging to the priestly tribe. That this was the circumstance which prompted Micah to hire the young man as keeper of his house of gods, the narrative expressly states. Micah perceived that his private sanctuary would acquire an importance it could not otherwise possess, if only he could obtain for it the services of a regular priest; and, as this was probably regarded by him as out of the question, the next best thing to do, it seemed to him, was to engage a Levite to act in this capacity. Nor is it without significance that, before the Levite could exercise his priestly functions, Micah insisted on his undergoing a form of consecration. The phrase "to fill the hand" is never used, in the Priests' Code or anywhere else, of the consecration of a Levite, but always only of the consecration of a priest (see Ex. xxviii. 41, xxix. 9, 29, 33, xxxii. 29; Lev. viii. 33, xvi. 32, xxi. 10; Num. iii. 3); nor does it ever signify to induct into office one already possessed of the right to perform official functions, but always denotes the investiture of one with functions not previously exercised or belonging to him;* from which it follows that, if Micah considered his wandering Levite to be in need of a ceremonial consecration, the probability at least is that he did not regard that Levite as one already clothed with priestly prerogatives and powers.

(γ) In 1 Kings viii. 4, "the priests and the Levites" (the particle being in the text) are reported to have brought up into the temple the ark of the Lord and the tent of meeting and all the holy vessels that were in the tent. If the LXX. omit these words, Jerome in the

* See Keil, on Leviticus vii. 37.

fifth and the Targum in the fourth century preserve them as they stand, with the connective particle. This, however, as any one can see, is a small matter, since it is easy to silence this witness by simply declaring with Cornill that "in 1 Kings viii. 1–11, individual traces can be detected of a post-Deuteronomic revision dependent on the Priests' Code." Wellhausen * does not venture farther than to observe that "1 Kings *may* rest on the Priests' Code;" while Driver, † though thinking the LXX. text *may* have been the original one, does not place the compiler of the Books of Kings so late as the close of the exile, but finds him in "a man like-minded with Jeremiah and almost certainly a contemporary who lived and wrote under the same influences." If, therefore, this opinion be correct, ‡ the testimony of this verse must be held as going straight for the acquaintance of preëxilic times with the distinction between priests and Levites.

(*δ*) In Isa. lxvi. 21, also, where Jehovah promises in the days of Israel's restoration to take of the heathen "for priests and for Levites," the distinction recurs—the expression "for priests, for Levites," being different from the Deuteronomic phrase, "the priests the Levites," and, therefore, not admitting of being rendered as equivalent to "Levitical priests" or "priestly Levites," but demanding as its true interpretation "for priests and for Levites." Here, again, however, it is granted that the value of this as an argument can quickly be reduced to zero by simply pronouncing Isa. lxvi of postexilic date; but, inasmuch as the Deutero-Isaianic authorship of chaps. xl–xlvi, though advocated by distinguished names, cannot be regarded as universally admitted or unchallengeably proved, it is only fair to receive its testimony at least provisionally in favor of the proposition that the distinction between priests and Levites was not unknown in preëxilic times.

(3) From the preceding statements it will follow that Ezekiel could not have intended to introduce a new and previously unheard-of distinction between "the priests" and "the Levites," whom he mentions in his Torah. With reference to the much quoted passage (chap. xliv. 6–16) in which the degradation of the Levites occurs, it is apparent that the Levites who went astray by ministering at heathen altars were in the first instance apostate priests, who had proved unfaithful to the charge of Jehovah. That these were followed by many "Levites" proper, who probably hoped through officiating at idol shrines to attain to the dignity of priests, is by no means unlikely. But in any case all who did prove unfaithful were

* *Geschichte Israels*, p. 147. † *Introduction*, p. 189.

‡ Compare Bleek (*Introduction to the Old Testament*, ii), who finds the Redactor of Kings in Baruch, Jeremiah's secretary.

"Levites," and in being henceforth restricted to menial services connected with the temple they were subjected to a real degradation—the "priest Levites" through being deprived of the honorable functions they had previously possessed, and the "Levites" proper through being thrust down from dignities they had sinfully assumed. All this, moreover, one can see might easily have been designed to realize itself under the new era, without Ezekiel having contemplated the introduction of a novelty in legislation; while the argument, it is evident, acquires additional force, if Ezekiel's temple-vision was not at all a programme for the Church of the restoration, but a symbol for the Church of God in all times.

(4) It scarcely needs to be added that the foregoing considerations are fatal to the idea that the Priests' Code "carries back into Mosaic times" the distinction between priests and Levites and makes this the foundation of its whole hierarchical system. That this distinction does lie at the base of the Levitical system no one denies or doubts; what is both denied and doubted is that this distinction required to be carried back, since all the evidence hitherto examined points in an opposite direction.

4. A fourth argument adduced to prove the later date of the Priests' Code is *the occurrence in it of words belonging to the exilic or postexilic era.* If this signifies that between the middle books of the Pentateuch and Ezekiel a close affinity in respect of language prevails, no competent scholar will contest so undeniable a proposition; but, if the sense be that words find a place in the Priests' Code which could have been derived from no other source than Ezekiel, then of necessity, if this allegation be correct, the Priests' Code must be later than Ezekiel. Driver, it is noticeable, does not lay large stress on this contention, but Cornill, after Wellhausen, does. Yet the solitary illustration furnished by him is that of *rakiya'*, firmament (Gen. i. 6, 7, 8, 14, 15, 17, 29), which he affirms could only have been learned from Ezek. i. 22, 23, 25, 26, x. 1. Outside the Priests' Code, Ps. xix, cl, and Dan. xii, the term in the sense of "firmament" or "heaven" is to be met with exclusively in Ezekiel; wherefore, is Cornill's reasoning, the Priests' Code, the Psalter and Daniel must all have borrowed it from that prophet. As usual the German critic omits to explain why Ezekiel could not have borrowed it from the Priests' Code or the Psalter; nor does it seem easy to perceive how he could have rendered any reason except one, that on this hypothesis the Priests' Code and the Psalter must have preceded Ezekiel, a concession which would have been fatal to the theory he wished to uphold; he simply argues that as the Second Isaiah (xlii. 5, xliv. 24), and the author of Psalm cxxxvi. 6, employed the verb *raka'* to denote the stretching out of the earth,

the ordinary sense of *rakiya'* in exilic times must have been "an expanse of earth," a "*pavimentum*," or "floor," and that the new sense of "firmament" or "aërial expanse" must have originated with Ezekiel, and therefore could only have been acquired by others from him.

Persons who are neither "experts" nor "critics" may be excused if they find it trying to preserve their gravity at what must appear to them little better than learned trifling. One cannot help expressing surprise that the Königsberg professor did not investigate how it came to pass that Ezekiel departed from what he knew to be the current import of *rakiya'* and devised for the term another signification of which no one had heard before. Had he done so he might have remembered that without calling in the aid of the Priests' Code Ezekiel could have picked up this way of using *rakiya'* from Ps. xix, unless indeed that delightful ode must be relegated to a postexilic or exilic date. This latter is the period to which it is assigned by Cornill and Driver; but unfortunately the judgment of these scholars is in large measure discredited by the circumstance that one can perceive at a glance how on *à priori* grounds, by the very exigencies of their theory, they are compelled to deny to this poetical composition a preëxilic origin, whilst over against their verdict can be placed that of Ewald and others who with better insight ascribe at least the earlier portion of it to David. And in any case, if the Psalm must be credited to the era of the exile, what does this prove but that the use of *rakiya'* to denote the firmament did not originate with Ezekiel, but was already in his day current, and had most likely been derived from an earlier source, as for instance from the opening chapter of Genesis? But the truth is that inferences as to the relative age of Hebrew documents,—inferences drawn, like this of Cornill, from the presence in or absence from them of certain words and phrases—are always precarious and sometimes of no value whatever, it being generally difficult, as Bredenkamp* observes, because of the scanty literature preserved to us, to affirm concerning two documents in which the same words and phrases occur, which is the primary and which the secondary.

The conclusion then to which the foregoing examination has conducted is that so far as the evidence submitted goes, it cannot be sustained that Ezekiel preceded the Priests' Code. Accordingly it remains to inquire—

II. Whether grounds exist for believing that the Priests' Code preceded Ezekiel,—grounds, it is meant, independent of and additional to those furnished by the preceding investigation,

* *Gesetz und Propheten.*

which, if it has shown that Ezekiel did not precede the Priests' Code, has also by implication proved that the Priests' Code must have preceded Ezekiel. Well—

1. It is universally conceded that *between Ezekiel and the Law of Holiness* (Lev. xvii, xxvi), *which forms a considerable part of the Priests' Code, the points of contact, in respect of thought and expression, are both numerous and striking.* A list of parallel passages, similar thoughts and identical words and phrases may readily be prepared by any ordinary reader with the help of a concordance, while the student will find a list constructed for him in Smend's Commentary on Ezekiel or in Driver's *Introduction.* As the notion of Ezekiel's authorship of this so-called Law of Holiness has been abandoned,* the sole question calling for solution is, which of the two writers was dependent on the other. Cornill† accords precedence to Ezekiel on the grounds, (1) that a writer of the originality and extensiveness of Ezekiel would hardly have framed his style on the model of one single chapter (Lev. xxvi), to which the resemblance is chiefly confined; (2) that Ezekiel had he known of this section of the Priests' Code would not have devised a Torah of his own; (3) that the distinction which the Law of Holiness makes between the priests generally and the high priest shows its place to be between Ezekiel and the Priests' Code; and (4) that chap. xxvi implies the standpoint of a long existing exile. But the first of these grounds is an exaggeration, little likely to be endorsed by an unprejudiced reader of the two compositions. The second has been set aside in dealing with the previous problem of the alleged priority of Ezekiel. The third is destitute of weight unless the theory be granted it is called in to prove. The fourth is true only if the writer of Lev. xxvi. 34–45 could on no account utter a prediction. Students of the passage, to whom the supernatural is not synonymous with the incredible or the impossible, hold that exactly this is what the author has done; but higher critics, who have no room or toleration for anything that transcends the natural, can explain the correspondence between his words and the actual course of Israel's subsequent history in no other way than by affirming that the words must first have been written down towards the end of the exile. Driver so far modifies this view as, while conceding that prediction proper is out of the question, to allow that the words may have been and probably were composed before the exile, but at a time so near (say in the days of Jeremiah) that a great prophetic soul with a clear eye for the signs of the times could readily have discerned what was coming. For the purpose of the present inquiry, it is not needful to determine whether

* See above, p. 434.

† *Einleitung*, p. 78.

Driver's position, which is that of Klostermann, is better founded than that of Cornill, who follows Wellhausen and Smend; it suffices to call attention to the circumstance that Cornill's reasoning is disclaimed by Driver, who regards the priority of Lev. xxvi, and with that of the Law of Holiness (and with that, why should one not add, of the Priests' Code?), as the more probable.

2. It is agreed by critics generally that *in the Priests' Code* (*and even in the other portions of the Pentateuch*) *fragments, longer or shorter, occur, which belong to the same class of writing as the Law of Holiness*, and ought accordingly like it to be ascribed to the author or compiler of Lev. xxvi. Amongst such fragments may be reckoned on the authority of Cornill and Driver, who in this copy Delitzsch, Dillmann, Horst and Kuenen, Lev. xi. 43, 45, if not also Lev. xi. 1–23, 41–47; Num. xv. 37–41; Ex. xxxi. 13, 14. Cornill, after Wurster, would add Lev. xiii. 1–46, xiv. 1–8; Num. v. 11–31, vi. 2–8, and throw in on his own account Lev. xv and Lev. xii with Num. xix. But as all these sections when put together go a long way towards making up a complete Leviticus with no inconsiderable portion of Numbers, if all emanated from the same hand and that hand according to Driver belonged to a contemporary of Jeremiah, the inference will thereby be strengthened, that the Priests' Code in its entirety was composed before Ezekiel, and, if before Ezekiel, then most likely in Mosaic times and by the hand of the Hebrew law-giver himself.

3. *It is easier to explain the deviations of Ezekiel's Torah from that of the Priests' Code* on the assumption that this was the earlier, *than to account for the divergences of the Priests' Code from Ezekiel* on the supposition that the latter enjoyed the precedence. To make good this assertion by a detailed exposition would demand a larger space than can be obtained in the present article; but a choice may be made of the more important divergences between the two documents already noted,—as for instance of the four selected by Cornill, viz., the discrepancy between the offerings demanded in the Mosaic Code (Num. xxviii and xxix) and those prescribed by Ezekiel (xlv. 13, xlvi. 15), the absence of a high priest from the Ezekielian Torah, the abolition in the same of the great day of atonement, and the impossibility of harmonizing Ezekiel's priest and Levite lands with the forty-eight Levite cities of the Book of Numbers.

The first of these should not occasion stumbling on the traditional hypothesis of the precedence of the Priests' Code. It is simply needful to recall what has been previously stated, that Ezekiel was under no obligation to reproduce the Mosaic Torah, *verbatim et literatim*, if his aim in composing the temple-vision did not require

him to do so; and this it could hardly have done if his object was to institute a new ritual for the second temple (had the ritual prescribed by him been in all respects identical with that of Moses it would not have been new), and much less if it was to outline an ideal worship for his countrymen, in words and phrases they could understand; and that this was really the prophet's aim will not fail to strike him who observes that Ezekiel's modifications of the Mosaic Torah were directed principally towards the simplification of its prescriptions, so as to render them more suitable as symbols. But now let the assumption be made that Ezekiel's Torah was the first sample of a written code of sacrificial laws, and that it was prepared expressly for the convenience of the postexilian Church, on what principle can it be explained that the author of the Priests' Code should have felt himself at liberty to disturb the symmetry of Ezekiel's Code, and to introduce changes which rather tended to make it less easy to observe? Only, so far as one can see, could this have been done on the principle that Ezekiel's Torah had not been divinely revealed to him, but was purely a fabric of his own construction. This, however, was most assuredly not Ezekiel's understanding of the origin of his Torah; and if the claim preferred for it by him be allowed, that it was directly communicated to him by Jehovah, it will also require to be conceded that the author of the Priests' Code was less likely to deviate from Ezekiel than Ezekiel was to deviate from the author of the Priests' Code.

The second instance, the absence of a high priest from Ezekiel's Torah, is in the same way susceptible of explanation on the supposition that Moses' Torah preceded. The ideal future to which the prophet on the Chebar looked forward was one in which Israel's vocation to be a kingdom of priests would be much more nearly realized than it had ever before been, and in which no more necessity should exist for the services of a *pontifex maximus* like the ancient Hebrew high priest. Accordingly, in the most natural manner possible, Ezekiel permits him to disappear in the golden age of the Restoration. But how, it must again be asked, if Ezekiel, in draughting a Torah for the postexilian temple, made no mention of a high priest—how should any later writer, working in Ezekiel's spirit, as he is commonly credited with having done, have so glaringly contradicted his master as to introduce a functionary of whom that master never dreamt?

In a similar fashion, the omission from Ezekiel's Torah of a great day of atonement is intelligible on the hypothesis that he was depicting an ideal state of prosperity for the new Israel, in which it should serve Jehovah on the basis of a previously completed atonement and consciously enjoyed reconciliation. In that

golden era of the future to which his temple-vision referred, there would be no need, as in preëxilic times there had been under the Torah of Moses, of a great day of atonement to foreshadow a propitiation yet to come; but merely of such oblations as would symbolize the people's personal appropriation of the atonement already made, and cheerful surrender to the rule of Jehovah and His servant David, their prince. On the other hand, if the author of the Priests' Code constructed his Torah after Ezekiel had written his, it will always remain a mystery why he should have imposed upon the people the burden of an additional ceremony which Ezekiel had declared to be not required.

And, finally, if it is not a hard problem to discover why Ezekiel should have been silent about the Levitical cities of the Priests' Code, and should instead of these have assigned his priests and Levites tracts of land in the near vicinity of his ideal city—if all this becomes luminous and significant, when once it is remembered that Ezekiel's temple-vision was not a politico-ecclesiastical programme, but a spiritual and religious symbol, it must continue to baffle the best exegesis to explain why, if the temple vision was not a symbol but a programme, not an ideal picture but a prosaic manifesto, as the higher critics allege, not only was no attempt made to carry it out, but the author of the Priests' Code actually substituted for the land-tracts eight and forty cities? If it be answered, that the author of the Priests' Code acted as he did in modifying Ezekiel's Torah because it was found in practice to be unworkable, what is this but an admission that Ezekiel's temple-vision as a whole was only intended for a symbol of spiritual and religious truths, and that in consequence the modern theory which sees in Ezekiel's Torah the first efforts at a written Torah and therefore the forerunner of the Priests' Code, rests on a mistake, and, in the words of Vaihinger, is little better than a "learned delusion?"

4. A last consideration which points to the earlier existence of the Priests' Code, is *Ezekiel's manifest acquaintance with its phraseology and institutions.* It is hardly necessary to specify instances, as the statement is not denied by either Cornill or Driver, only the inference deduced from it is by both contested. Cornill, after Kuenen, Wellhausen and Smend, contends that neither the preexilic practice, nor the preëxilic literature knew anything of the Priests' Code, and that any similarity between the two documents in question is sufficiently accounted for by regarding the Priests' Code as a development of Ezekiel; Driver, on the other hand, feels constrained to admit that "whether Ezekiel presupposes the *completed* Priests' Code, it is difficult not to conclude that he presupposes *parts* of it," that "the Priests' Code embodies some elements with

which the earlier literature is in harmony, and which indeed it presupposes," that "the legislation of the Priests' Code was not 'manufactured' by the priests during the exile," but was "based upon *preëxisting temple usage*," and that in short it is only "probable that the completed Priests' Code is the work of the age subsequent to Ezekiel."

Without replying to Cornill that the alleged silence of the preëxilic literature about the language and institutions of the Priests' Code cannot be made out otherwise than by first excising from these earlier documents, wherever possible, as postexilic additions every allusion to the Mosaic ritual, and where this cannot be done by doubtfully referring such allusions to the Jehovistic history or the Deuteronomic code; it may suffice, in drawing this article to a close, to advert to the significant fact that Driver clearly perceives that this contention of the advanced critics will not do, and that an honest examination of the preëxilic literature does discover in it traces of the style and institutions of the Priests' Code, though he attempts to break the force of this concession by adding that this does not prove the existence in preëxilic times of the *completed* Priests' Code. It is noticeable that he does not say "written" Priests' Code. May it therefore be inferred from this that he admits not only that "the chief ceremonial institutions of Israel" were "*in their origin* of great antiquity," but that they were handed down in written form, though not, perhaps, "*in the shape in which they are formulated in the Priests' Code?*" It cannot surely be maintained that their existence in written form before the exile was impossible; while it much more accords with reason to believe that they owed their transmission to their having been set down in writing, rather than to unwritten usage. But if "the chief ceremonial institutions of the Priests' Code" existed in written form before the exile, as Driver seems to allow, one may be pardoned for inquiring whether this is not a virtual abandonment of the critical hypothesis, a tacit acknowledgment of the impossibility of upholding the postexilic origin of the Priests' Code, a practical admission of the Priests' Code's precedence of Ezekiel. Unwilling to be thus pushed into a tight place, the Oxford professor harks back upon the distinction between the institutions of the Priests' Code and the literary document in which these are recorded, saying that, while the former *certainly* descended from preëxilic antiquity, the latter *probably* originated in postexilic times. To many investigators this will wear the aspect of a subterfuge, resorted to in order to escape the conclusion towards which his concessions unmistakably marshal the way, viz., that if the institutions of the Priests' Code flourished

in preëxilic times, the probability, amounting almost to a certainty, is that the literary document in which these institutions have been preserved was also composed in preëxilic, and if in preëxilic, most likely in Mosaic times.

The result then arrived at is briefly this, that not only is there no sufficient ground for holding Ezekiel to have preceded the Priests' Code, but on the contrary there is good cause for believing that the Priests' Code preceded Ezekiel. If this does not establish the traditional doctrine of the Mosaic authorship of the three middle books of the Pentateuch, it at least renders wholly untenable the modern theory of their postexilic origin.

KILMARNOCK, SCOTLAND. THOMAS WHITELAW.

V.

THE PROLOGUE OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

THE opening words of the several Gospels are characteristic. Matthew, the Hebrew, begins with the genealogy of Christ, His descent from Abraham, father of the chosen people. Mark, writing especially for the Romans, enters at once upon the story of the public ministry and mighty works of Christ, and the narrative, with its oft-repeated "*straightway*," moves on with the swift and stately march of the imperial legions. Luke, the Gentile, introduces his Gospel with a formal preface, after the manner of the Greek historians, and traces the ancestry of Christ not to Abraham, father of Israel, but to Adam, father of the race, and beyond Adam to God. John, addressing the universal Church, matured in knowledge and in faith, takes a loftier flight, and discloses the Eternal Son in the bosom of the Father. The eagle flies in the face of heaven, and looks undazzled on the sun.

It has been urged that the Fourth Gospel lacks progress. The story moves in a circle with frequent repetition and monotony. The end is apparent from the beginning, and the catastrophe is delayed with difficulty. There is a measure of truth in the charge. John is not about to publish a romance, of which the interest depends upon intricate plot and startling conclusion; but the story of a life familiar to his readers, of which several accounts have already been given to the world. The opening verses (1–18) form the argument of the book, and sketch in broad outline the history which is then related in detail. It is true in general that the contents of the prologue are drawn from the discourses of Christ recorded in the Gospel. The most notable exception is that the doctrine of creation through the Son is not found in the words of Christ (yet see v. 19), as the doctrines of the atonement and of the Holy Spirit are not found in the prologue.*

*It further appears that of words characteristic of John the greater part may be found in the prologue, as the following list will show:

λόγος in this sense peculiar to John.											
ζωή	John	66	times		(Gospel	36)		elsewhere in N. T.			70.
φῶς	"	32	"		("	23)		"	"		40.
μαρτυρέω	"	48	"		("	33)		"	"		31.
μαρτυρία	"	30	"		("	14)		"	"		7.

Many analyses of the prologue have been made. None is adequate, all are suggestive. The question that must determine the division is, at what point does the incarnation enter? Various answers are returned, but we must rest in the conclusion that in the prologue, as in the narrative, the history of the Incarnate Word begins with John the Baptist (ver. 6). For the purpose of the present study we have then this analysis.

General Theme, the Word.

I. The Word eternal and divine (vers. 1, 2).

II. The Word creative and illuminating (vers. 3–5). The Word is here presented in his relation to nature, which culminates in man. He is the creator of the world, the light of men.

III. The Word incarnate and redemptive (vers. 6–18). This is the main theme, and occupies the largest space.

(*a*) The preparation for the coming of the Word (vers. 6–8). In John the Baptist the Old Testament, as it were, bears witness that the Redeemer foretold from the beginning is now come.

(*b*) The coming and reception of the Word (vers. 9–13). He was unknown by the world, rejected by the Jews, received by some.

(*c*) The nature of His coming (vers. 14–18). He came in the flesh and dwelt among men, in contrast to the partial and transient theophanies of the Old Testament.

Thus the Word is presented in relation to God, as the Eternal Son; to nature, as Creator; and to man, in general, as Light, in particular as Redeemer. The term, Word (*Λόγος*), in this personal sense is peculiar to John. He employs it also in his First Epistle (i. 1), where Christ is called the Word of Life; and in Rev. xix. 13, where He is called the Word of God. He is the Word of God and the Life of man. It is worthy of note, in answer to those who ascribe the discourses of the Lord to the evangelist, that the term does not occur elsewhere throughout the Gospel. If we seek the origin of this title, we must distinguish between the term and the thought that it conveys. The *term* was in current use in the speculations of the time, familiar alike to Gentiles and to Jews. John,

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πιστεύω....John 109 times.....(Gospel 99).....elsewhere in N. T. 134.
(*πίστις* nowhere in G.—in Ep. 1, in Rev. 4.)
ἀληθής and kindred words, John 93 times (Gospel 73).. " " 90.
(*ἀληθινός* in John 23, remainder of N. T. 5.)
κόσμος... in John 105 times.....(Gospel 78)..... " " 80
σκηνόω only in John.
γινώσκω..in John 86 times..... (" 56)..... " " 136.
δόξα..... " 36 " ..... (" 19)..... " " 131.

The comparative meagreness of the vocabulary of John is shown in this Review for October, 1891, p. 657.

in the spirit of Paul at Athens, proclaiming the Unknown God, unveils the truth that lay enshrined in the word. Behold this λόγος, of which you speak, incarnate in Jesus Christ. The *thought* expressed by the term has its roots in the Old Testament, the common source whence John and Philo drew. Philo developed the thought philosophically, under the guidance of Plato; John historically, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. That the λόγος of Philo has striking points of analogy with the Λόγος of John is manifest. But the points of difference are no less striking. The teaching of Philo is vague, confused and uncertain, while John walks with assured step amid these high mysteries. Generically, the λόγος of Philo differs from that of John, because it signifies not the Word, but the Reason of God. Specifically, it differs in three main particulars. 1. It is impersonal. After all that has been written upon this vexed and difficult question, this remains the more probable opinion. 2. It is not incarnate. With Philo's doctrine of the inherent evil of matter, it was impossible that the Divine Reason should become flesh. The λόγος of Philo emphasizes the separation of God from the world; the Λόγος of John reveals God immanent in the world from the beginning, now manifest in the flesh. 3. It is not the Messiah. The truths of sin and salvation had little place in Philo's system, and the Messianic hope, if not lost, had grown dim. Creation, therefore, but not redemption, is ascribed by Philo to the Word; while redemption through the Word is the central thought of the Fourth Gospel (xx. 31).

Three distinct lines of preparation in the Old Testament converge upon the doctrine of the Word.

(*a*) The word of God is represented as the instrument of His power, the revelation of His will. To it are ascribed, as here to the personal Word: Eternity—"Forever, O Lord, thy word is settled in heaven" (Ps. cxix. 89; comp. Is. xl. 8); Creation—"By the word of the Lord were the Heavens made" (Ps. xxxiii. 6; Gen. i); Illumination —"Thy word is a lamp unto my feet" (Ps. cxix. 105, 130); Redemption—"He sendeth his word, and healeth them" (Ps. cvii. 20; comp. Ps. xvii. 4, cxix. 9, 11; Is. lv. 11). The Word of Jehovah came to the prophets, and was seen by them (Is. ii. 1; Micah i. 1). It is profoundly true alike of the physical and the spiritual nature of man, that he does not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God (Matt. iv. 4). In Christ God hath magnified His Word above all His name (Ps. cxxxviii. 2). The doctrine of the word was further developed by the Rabbis, and in the Targums the Memra, or Word of Jehovah, is a frequent paraphrase for the divine name.

(*b*) Wisdom, especially as personified in Proverbs, chaps. viii and ix

(comp. Job xxviii). To it are ascribed as here to the Word: Eternity—"The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old: I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was" (Prov. viii. 22, 23); Creation—"The Lord by wisdom founded the earth" (Prov. iii. 19; comp. Ps. cxxxvi. 5; Jer. x. 12, li. 15: in Prov. viii. 30, wisdom is termed a master workman); Illumination—"Counsel is mine and sound knowledge" (Prov. viii. 14); Loving intimacy with God—"I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him" (Prov. viii. 30; comp. Prov. xxx. 4: "What is his son's name?"); Redemption—"She is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her" (Prov. iii. 18): "Whoso findeth me findeth life" (Prov. viii. 35. 36); Dwelling with men—"Rejoicing in his habitable earth; and my delight was with the sons of men" (Prov. viii. 31). In the apocryphal books of Wisdom (chaps. vii–xi) and Ecclesiasticus (chap. xxiv) wisdom is further personified (see also the Book of Enoch xc. 38). In Luke xi. 49, according to the most probable interpretation, Christ calls Himself *the wisdom of God* (not so in Luke vii. 35).

(*c*) The mysterious Being called the Angel of Jehovah, of the Covenant, of the Presence, who appears at intervals from Genesis to Malachi, and is at once identified with Jehovah and distinguished from Him (Gen. xvi. 7, 13, xlviii. 15, 16; Ex. iii. 2, 4, 6; Is. lxiii. 9; Mal. iii. 1). Whether that angel was the Second Person of the Trinity, or a creature acting in the name and by the authority of God, in either case is prefigured the incarnation of the Word.

The general truth underlying all these representations is that God reveals Himself mediately, and that the medium of all revelation in nature and in grace is the Word. The word of man is the partial and inadequate expression of the inner life; the Word of God is the complete and perfect revelation of the divine nature (Col. ii. 9).

Thus the prologue of the Fourth Gospel, which of all parts of the New Testament at first glance may appear most alien in form and spirit from the Old Scripture, is seen to strike its roots deep down into the history, the law, the prophecy of the earlier dispensation, and the Word of John is one with the Jehovah of Moses. The creative and prophetic Word reaches its full and final expression in the Word incarnate.

Such is the Word. By the analysis proposed we have:

I. The Word eternal and divine (vers. 1, 2). Of the Word it is here affirmed:

(*a*) That He is eternal. This indeed is not directly asserted, but is clearly implied. *In the beginning*, when compared with ver. 3, plainly signifies *before the creation*. The eternity of God is simi-

larly expressed in Ps. xc. 2 (comp. Col. i. 15; Ephes. i. 4; Heb. i. 2). The Word was not only *in* the beginning, He *is* the beginning (Rev. iii. 14, xxi. 6, xxii. 13; comp. Augustine's interpretation of viii. 25). He is the First Cause and the Final Cause of the creation (Col. i. 16). With the words *in the beginning* Moses introduces the story of creation, John the story of redemption. The purpose of redemption was formed in that eternity in which God dwelt alone. "He chose us in him before the foundation of the world" (Ephes. i. 4; comp. Ephes. iii. 11; Rev. xiii. 8, xvii. 8; Matt. xxv. 34). The Gospel records the unfolding of that eternal purpose in time. "Christ . . . . who was foreknown indeed before the foundation of the world, but was manifested at the end of the times for your sake" (1 Pet. i. 20; 2 Tim. i. 9). Christ declared His preëxistence in explicit terms. "Before Abraham was, I am" (viii. 58). "The glory which I had with thee before the world was" (xvii. 5, 24) (vi. 62).

(*b*) With God. The phrase πρὸς τὸν θεόν denotes not a passive, but an active relation, not mere abiding with, but the direction of the nature towards, intercourse, communion. The combination of the preposition of motion with ἦν indicates that this tendency towards God is the permanent state of the Word. The thought is expressed in ver. 18 by the phrase *in the bosom of the Father*. Compare πρὸς τὸν πατέρα in 1 John i. 2. The names given to the Second Person of the Trinity—Word, Son—are drawn from His relation to the First Person. In his teaching upon this point the apostle simply repeats the words of his Master (xvii. 5, 24).

(*c*) Was God. The personality of the Word is declared. The full and absolute Deity of the Word, conspicuous throughout the Gospel, is expressly affirmed. θεός stands emphatically first, not ὁ θεός, which would confound the Word with the Father. The unity of nature and the distinction of Persons in the Godhead are disclosed. He who was with God was God. To be adequate the Word must be divine. The only perfect mirror of God is God. He is the effulgence of the Father's glory, and the very image of His substance (Heb. i. 3). "Accordingly, as though uttering Himself, the Father begat the Word equal to Himself in all things; for He would not have uttered Himself wholly and perfectly, if there were in His Word anything more or less than in Himself" (Augustine de Trin , xv, 14) While the doctrine of the Trinity transcends reason, it is not contrary to reason. Remote analogy has been found by Augustine. and others in the constitution of man—as in the union of memory, understanding and will in the one person. As life assumes higher forms, it is governed by a double law—a growing unity of organism, an increasing diversity of parts. The more highly developed

the creature, the greater are the differences that prevail between its members. The unity becomes more perfect, the parts become more distinct. Creation in this regard reflects the nature of God. In Him for distinction of parts is found distinction of Persons, and these Persons are One God. The word *Person* is liable to mislead by suggesting the idea of limitation, but we have no better with which to express the thought. "Yet when the question is asked, What three? human language labors altogether under great poverty of speech. The answer, however, is given, three 'persons,' not that it might be (completely) spoken, but that it might not be left (wholly) unspoken" (Aug. de Trin., v, 9). Moreover, it is written that God is love. Love implies an object. The infinite and eternal love of God implies an object infinite and eternal. In the Godhead subject and object are found together, and in the mutual love of Father, Son and Spirit, God is in Himself sufficient and complete. "Ubi amor, ibi trinitas." John had learned of Christ. "The Father is greater than I," he said (xiv. 28); yet again, "I and the Father are one "(x. 30), and "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father" (xiv. 9), while he suffers Thomas to adore Him as Lord and God (xx. 28; comp. v. 17, 18). Equality of nature is entirely consistent with that personal subordination which is involved in the very terms *Word* and *Son*.

Ver. 2 furnishes at once an emphatic recapitulation of ver. 1, and the transition to ver. 3, from the nature to the activity of the Word.

II. The Word creative and illuminating (vers. 3–5).

The punctuation of vers. 3 and 4 is in doubt. The fathers generally, Westcott and Hort, and the margin of the Revised Version place a period after οὐδὲ ἕν; so that we read, "Without him was not anything made. That which hath been made was life in him." The Word is thus represented as not only the creator but the preserver of the universe, "upholding all things by the word of his power" (Heb. i. 3). The combination of the perfect γέγονεν, however, with ἦν is so singular that some early authorities substitute for ἦν ἔστιν. Moreover, by this pointing the whole sentence is rendered harsh and obscure. On internal grounds, therefore, the usual punctuation with the period after γέγονεν is preferred. The truth is stated after John's manner positively and negatively, and with emphatic fulness of phrase. The complete statement of the Scripture doctrine of creation is that God made the world through the Son (Heb. i. 2). All things are of God through Christ (1 Cor. viii. 6). "Between the speaking of God and the making of the creature," said Augustine, "what was there by which it was made but the Word?"

"In him was life." The imperfect ἦν bears back the thought to the time of the creation. When the world was made He was and ever continues to be the source and spring of life, all life, of every kind. "With thee is the fountain of life: in thy light shall we see light" (Ps. xxxvi. 9)—words in which the Psalmist anticipates the profoundest teaching of the apostle (comp. v. 26). "In him we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts xvii. 28). Man is the crown of the creation, made in the image of God, and in him life appears not as bare existence but as light, the light of reason and conscience by which he is distinguished from the lower creatures. And in addition to this inward light to man is granted the light of revelation.

With ver. 5 sin enters. The natural and normal relation of the Word to the world, realized for a short season in the beginning, is expressed in the statement that the life was the light of men. But that relation has been interrupted. No account is given of the origin of evil. It is simply assumed, according to Scripture usage, as an existing condition. "The light shineth in the *darkness*." That word characterizes the state into which man has fallen through sin. God is light (1 John i. 5); darkness is alienation from God. This darkness is not solely or chiefly intellectual, but moral and spiritual. "Every one that doeth ill hateth the light, and cometh not to the light, lest his works should be reproved" (iii. 19–21). The darkness is not ignorance, but willful choice of evil. Ignorance is not the cause, but the consequence of sin. In this darkened world the light still shines, but the darkness did not apprehend it. The present tense affirms what is always and necessarily true, for the Word is by nature light; the aorist states the historical fact that from the time when sin entered the world the light has not been apprehended. The word κατέλαβεν may signify *overcame* (comp. xii. 35), and then the victory of the light is indicated. But the meaning, *apprehended*, is to be preferred, and the phrase sets forth in figure what is afterward plainly expressed in vers. 10 and 11. The darkness might have become light ("Ye were once darkness, but are now light in the Lord"—Ephes. v. 8), as the light may become darkness (Luke xi. 35). There were those, indeed, from the beginning who apprehended the light—Abraham, who saw His day and was glad (viii. 56); Moses, who wrote of Him (v. 46); Isaiah, who saw His glory (xii. 41): as when He was manifested in the flesh there were some who received Him, though by the world in general He was rejected.

Now men are by nature not in the light, but in the darkness—"children of wrath" (Ephes. ii. 3)—and death is their portion. Here are the elements, contradictory, hostile, mutually exclusive,

yet existing side by side, the light and the darkness, of which the conflict shall be described.

From the creation of the universe and the fall of man, thus briefly but vividly portrayed, the evangelist proceeds to his main theme, the story of redemption. The Word became flesh to restore to men the light and the life forfeited by sin.

Compare with this section the words of Christ in v. 20, vi. 48, viii. 12, xi. 25, xiv. 6, xvii. 2.

III. The Word incarnate and redemptive (6–18). As the central thought of the Gospel this is treated at length.

(*a*) The preparation for the coming of the Word. The history begins with John, to whom the title of *the Baptist*, frequently employed by the other evangelists, is never given in the Fourth Gospel. The apostle nowhere names himself, and the only John whose name appears is the Baptist. It is one of many incidental evidences of the genuineness of this Gospel that the writer saw no occasion to distinguish the Baptist from himself. John was not the light, as some may have fancied (i. 20; Luke iii. 15; Acts xix. 1–7), but the lamp (v. 35). Christ was the Word, John was only a voice (i. 23). Augustine has drawn out the distinction with great force and eloquence. "A word," he observes, "is something even without a voice, for a word in the heart is as truly a word as after it is outspoken; while a voice is nothing, a mere unmeaning sound, an empty cry, unless it be also the vehicle of a word. But when they are thus united, the voice in a manner goes before the word, for the sound strikes the ear before the sense is conveyed to the mind; yet while it thus *goes* before it in this act of communication, it *is not* really before it, but the contrary. Thus, when we speak, the word in our hearts must precede the voice on our lips, which voice is yet the vehicle by which the word in us is transferred to, and becomes also a word in, another; but this being accomplished, or rather in the very accomplishment of this, the voice has passed away, exists no more; but the word which is planted now in the other's heart, no less than in our own, abides." All this Augustine transfers to the Lord and to his forerunner. "John is nothing without Jesus: Jesus just what before He was without John; however to men the knowledge of Him may have come through John. John the first in time, and yet He who *came* after, most truly having *been* before, him. John, so soon as he had accomplished his mission, passing away, having no continual significance for the Church of God; but Jesus, of whom he had told, and to whom he witnessed, abiding forever" (Trench, *Synon. N. T.*, § 89).

In this Gospel our Lord appeals in vindication of His claims to seven witnesses: (1) John the Baptist, the messenger foretold by

Malachi (v. 33–35); (2) His own works (v. 36, x. 25); (3) His Father (v. 37, viii. 18); (4) The Scripture (v. 39); (5) Himself (viii. 18); (6) The Holy Spirit (xv. 26); (7) His disciples (xvii. 27; comp. 1 J. iv. 14). In the prologue only (1) and (7) appear. John came to bear witness of the light, and the purpose of his witness was that all men might believe on the light. By believing men become sons of light (xii. 36). His message, though immediately addressed to the Jews, appealed to them not as children of Abraham (Luke iii. 8), but as sinful men, enjoined upon them duties common to the race, and proclaimed the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the *world* (i. 29). In the last of the prophets the breadth of view characteristic of the prophetic order appears conspicuous, and the purpose of John the Baptist was one with the purpose of the Gospel. "These are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye may have life in his name" (xx. 31). Such is the witness of John, a man strange, solitary, unique, the living link that binds the New Testament to the Old, greater than the greatest of the Old, less than the least of the New (Matt. xi. 9, 11).

(*b*) The coming and reception of the Word. John was not the light, but there *was* the true light. The word rendered *true* (ἀληθινός) is frequent in the writings of John, and is opposed not so much to the false as to the partial and imperfect. It signifies that which fills out the meaning of its name, which *is* absolutely and perfectly what the name denotes. The true light is contrasted with the "broken lights," of earlier revelation, which culminated in the witness of the Baptist. Of this light it is declared that it lighteth every man. Through reason and conscience God, who is light, shines into every soul that He has made. Justin Martyr rightly ascribed all the truth that appears in the speculations of heathen philosophers to the spermatic or disseminated word (Apol. ii. chap. 13). The germs of truth have been implanted in every heart. The truth of Plato, though mingled with error, flows from the same fountain as the truth of Paul. The light is one, the truth is one, and both light and truth find their unity in God.

It is further declared that this light was coming into the world, for the clause ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον must belong not to ἄνθρωπον, as in our common version, but to τὸ φῶς. The personal advent of the Word, the Light, is described. Even while John was bearing witness of the light, the light was coming into the world in the person of Jesus, now about to enter upon His public ministry, and thereby reveal Himself to men as the Son of God. The light that had illumined the world from the beginning, darkened and obscured hitherto, was about to burst forth in full splendor (for the phrase

come into the world as applied to Christ, comp. iii. 19, ix. 39, xii. 46, xvi. 28, xviii. 37).

In vers. 10–13 the reception of the Word by three different classes is described. Henceforth the light is personal. Not the neuter, but the masculine pronoun is employed.

(1.) The world (ver. 10). The relation of the world to God throughout the whole history of mankind since the fall is represented in this single sentence. He was always in the world, the world was His, for He made it, yet the world knew Him not. It failed to apprehend the revelation of God in nature and in providence ("the world through its wisdom knew not God"—1 Cor. 1 : 21), and now fails to apprehend the clearer revelation of Him in the Word incarnate. God has always been in the world, the world has never known God. And this attitude of the world towards God continues even when the Word has come in the flesh. The revelation of God and the ignorance of the world here side by side reach their height.

The term *world* (κόσμος) has two ethical senses in John: (1) It is the scene and sphere of the natural life, the life apart from God. It is thus the environment of the flesh (σάρξ). This world the believer is forbidden to love (1 John ii. 15), for it is ruled by Satan (xvi. 11). (2) The world is humanity alienated from God. As the word *house* may denote the building, or the inhabitants of the building, so the term *world* may have this double sense. Out of fallen mankind God has chosen some to life, and they are not of the world, as Christ is not of the world (xv. 19, xvii. 16). Thus the race is divided between the world and the Church.

It is true of mankind in general that they do not know God, in whatever form He may be revealed, whether He speak in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, or at the end of these days in His Son (Heb. i. 1). "They refused to have God in their knowledge" (Rom. i. 28; compare the words of our Lord to the Pharisees, "If ye were blind, ye would have no sin; but now ye say, We see; your sin remaineth"—ix. 41). The world knew not God the Son, nor God the Father (xvii. 25), nor God the Holy Spirit (xiv. 17). Throughout the writings of John the greatest stress is laid upon knowing God. Our Lord said, "This is life eternal, that they should know thee the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ" (xvii. 3). The conditions of this knowledge are made plain in the First Epistle. They are obedience ("Hereby know we that we know him, if we keep his commandments"—ii. 3), righteousness ("Whosoever sinneth hath not seen him, neither knoweth him"—iii. 6) and love ("Every one that loveth is begotten of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love"—iv. 7, 8).

(2.) The Jews. He came unto His own possession, His heritage, His home (τὰ ἴδια, xix. 27), and His own people received Him not, like the wicked husbandmen of the parable (Matt. xxi. 33–44). The word of the prophet was fulfilled, "He was despised, and rejected of men" (Isa. liii. 3). The covenant relation of Jehovah to Israel is ascribed to Christ. "Thou art an holy people unto the Lord thy God: the Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be a peculiar people unto himself" (Deut. vii. 6). That the Jews were the people of God, and therefore His own people, Christ plainly taught. The temple was His Father's house, and He cleansed it by virtue of His authority as the Son of God. "Salvation is from the Jews" (iv. 22). Of Him the Scriptures testify (v. 39); of Him Moses wrote (v. 46); His glory Isaiah saw (xii. 41); Abraham rejoiced to see His day, and he saw it, and was glad (viii. 56). "All things that are mine are thine, and thine are mine" (xvii. 10). In the Fourth Gospel as in the earlier Gospels He is represented as the Messiah (iv. 25, 26), and His mission was primarily to the Jews. Only after they had rejected and crucified Him was the Gospel preached to the Gentiles. Israel should have been separate from the world, prepared by centuries of divine training to know and obey the Christ. But while the world did not know Him, Israel did not receive Him, and theirs was the greater sin (xix. 11). Years of hatred and persecution and the cruel death upon the cross are summed up in this mild and sorrowful expression, *did not receive Him.* They did not *receive* Him as their Messiah, but they *took* (xix. 17) Him as a malefactor (παρέλαβον in both cases). The world which He had made and the Jews with whom He had established His covenant, conspired to crucify Him. They did not know Him because they had lost the knowledge of God. "It is my Father that glorifieth me; of whom ye say that he is your God; and ye have not known him" (viii. 54). So generally did the chosen people reject their Messiah that John habitually employs the term *the Jews* to designate the party opposed to Christ—a sense which it rarely conveys in the other Gospels. When John wrote, towards the close of the century, the national rejection was complete, and the first stroke of judgment had fallen in the destruction of Jerusalem.

(3.) The world as a whole did not know Him, the Jews as a people did not receive Him, but there were some both of the world and of the Jews who knew Him and received Him as the Son of God, the Saviour of men. The result of not knowing Him, of rejecting Him, is passed over in silence, but the result of receiving Him is described. The meaning of *received Him* is made plain by the following clause, *believe on His name.* The present participle (πιστεύουσιν)

denotes not the initial act but the permanent condition of faith. The name (ὄνομα from root of γιγνώσκω) is that by which one is known. To believe on His name is to believe on Him as He is revealed. The phrase *to believe on*, used once only in the earlier Gospels (Matt. xviii. 6), is of frequent occurrence in John, and signifies *resting on* and *entering into personal union with*. Salvation proceeds from *believing on* Christ, not simply from *believing* Him. Singular exceptions are found in v. 24, "He that heareth my word, and believeth him that sent me, hath eternal life," and 1 John iii. 23, "And this is his commandment, that we should believe the name of his Son Jesus Christ, and love one another." So the Greek reads. The phrase, *believe the name*, occurs there only in the New Testament.

To those who thus receive Him He gives power—both the right and the ability—to become children of God. He does not *make* them the children of God. That is the work of the Holy Spirit, whom also Christ gives (xv. 26, xvi. 7). The Father elects, the Son redeems, the Spirit regenerates. Christ has purchased for men the right to become children of God—the new birth by which they actually become children of God is wrought by the Spirit. The nature of the new birth is shown. The subjects of it are born not of blood, the material elements of which the body is composed, as the plural αἱμάτων suggests; nor of the will of the flesh, mere sensual passion; nor of the will of man, as in the desire for posterity. From these is the natural birth, and "that which is born of the flesh is flesh" (iii. 6; comp. 1 Pet. i. 23). "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God" (1 Cor. xv. 50). The new birth is supernatural and spiritual. "Except a man be born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God. . . . . Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. . . . . That which is born of Spirit is spirit" (iii. 3–6). To *receive* is the part of man; to *beget* is the part of the Spirit.

In the Old Testament God is commonly represented not as the Father of individuals but of the chosen nation. "Israel is my son, my firstborn" (Ex. iv. 22). The title "children of God" is applied to the covenant people (Deut. xiv. 1). Individuals shared the right and privilege of sonship through their relation to the theocratic commonwealth. In the New Testament all is changed. Henceforth, the relation of God to men is not national but personal. He chooses not a single race, but individuals out of every nation, and of all tribes and peoples and tongues (Rev. vii. 9). Not those born of Abraham, but those born of the Spirit are the sons of God (Gal. iii. 7). Christ's own are now His disciples (xiii. 1). Men become children of God through the gift of Christ by the power of

the Holy Spirit. Christ is Son of God by nature, men become sons of God by grace. The Lord plainly distinguishes His relation to God from that of His disciples. "I ascend unto my Father and your Father, and my God and your God" (xx. 17).

It is interesting to observe that John uses the term υἱὸς θεοῦ of Christ alone; men are τέκνα. The single exception is found in a passage quoted from the Septuagint in Rev. xxi. 7. Paul uses both terms in speaking of men. Τέκνον presents the relation of men to God rather on the side of birth and growth; υἱός on the side of dignity and privilege. It is more important to note that with Paul men become sons of God by adoption, with John by regeneration. Paul approaches the doctrine of John indeed when he affirms, "If any man is in Christ, he is a new creature" (2 Cor. v. 17); "Neither is circumcision anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature" (Gal. vi. 15; comp. Rom. xii. 2; Ephes. iv. 24; Col. iii. 9, 10, where the *old man* is contrasted with the *new*). In Titus iii. 5 the teaching is explicit—"According to his mercy he saved us, through the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost." But the main thought with Paul is that of adoption. "Ye received the spirit of adoption" (Rom. viii. 15). In the fulness of the time "God sent forth his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, that he might redeem them which were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons" (Gal. iv. 4). *Adopted of God* is the thought of Paul, *born of God* is the thought of John. "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is begotten of God" (1. v. 1, 4, 18, iii. 9). Nowhere does John speak of the adoption of believers, nor, indeed, does the thought, so prominent in the letters of Paul, appear elsewhere in the Epistles of the New Testament. It is a mode of representation peculiarly Pauline. James writes, "Of his own will he brought us forth by the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first fruits of his creatures" (i. 18). Peter speaks of believers as "having been begotten again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, through the word of God, which liveth and abideth" (1. i. 23). John seized upon the inner, vital relation which the believer sustains to God; Paul brings to light rather the outward and formal aspect of the truth.

(*c*) The nature of His coming, the mode of His manifestation, is described in the phrase, *the Word became flesh*. In four words John states the fact of the incarnation, which is related in detail by Matthew and Luke. In this closing section all is historical, the witness of disciples, John the Baptist, Moses, the law; and the Word henceforth appears only in the person of the man Christ Jesus.

The term *flesh* (σάρξ) is of comparatively rare occurrence in the

writings of John, but is often used by Paul, from whom indeed the psychology of the New Testament must be mainly drawn. As man is distinguished from the lower animals by an intellectual and moral nature, so is he distinguished from the higher intelligences by a material body. Hence flesh is often equivalent to man or mankind (xvii. 2; Matt. xxiv. 22; Gal. ii. 16; 1 Pet. i. 24). In the ethical sense *flesh* signifies human nature apart from God, as πνεῦμα (*spirit*) signifies the divine principle of life by which that nature is renewed, and hence that nature as renewed (iii. 6; Rom. vii. 6, viii. 9, 10, 13, 16). The flesh is not, as some have thought, originally and inherently corrupt. It is not sin, but the seat of sin (Rom. vii. 17, 18). Sin is not a primal element in human nature, but a disease that has fastened upon it. The *flesh* is actually and universally, but not originally or of necessity, sinful; therefore it was possible that Christ could come in the likeness of sinful flesh (Rom. viii. 3), and yet Himself be without sin (2 Cor. v. 21).

The Word, by nature pure Spirit (iv. 24), became flesh, a clear and abiding revelation in contrast to the partial and transient disclosures of the divine nature that went before. He assumed not merely a human body, but human nature. John speaks of his body (σώμα, ii. 21, xix. 38), soul (ψυχή, x. 15, xii. 27), and spirit (πνεῦμα, xi. 33, xiii. 21, xix. 30). No emphasis is laid by the choice of this word upon the thought of weakness, and susceptibility to suffering, though of course that is involved in the term, as in every other by which human nature is denoted. The Word assumed a true body and a reasonable soul. He did not cease to be what He was before, but added the human nature to the divine. The union of the animal and the spiritual in man affords a faint illustration of the union of God and man in Christ, the blending of two natures in one person. The light that lightens every man became man. "When therefore he had said, 'born of God,' lest we should, as it were, be filled with amazement and trembling at such grace, at grace so great as to exceed belief, that men are born of God, he says, 'And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us.' Why then dost thou marvel that men are born of God? Consider God Himself born of men" (Augustine). Man does not cease to be man by becoming the Son of God; the Word does not cease to be God by becoming the Son of man. That title, so often upon the lips of Christ, and upon His alone, during His life on earth, expresses at once the reality and the breadth of His humanity. By birth a Jew, in spirit He was simply man (comp. x. 16, xi. 52).

By the incarnation of the Word two ends were accomplished. (*a*) The revelation of God. Though His works had declared His glory, and His Word had revealed His will (Ps. xix), God was

not known by the world, nor even by His own chosen people. In the person of Christ He came forth visibly in human form, the highest creature form in which God may appear to the eyes of men. Because man was made in the image of God, God may assume the likeness of man. In Christ the revelation of God is perfect and complete. "In Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily" (Col. ii. 9). "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father" (xiv. 9). (*b*) The redemption of man. Whether the Eternal Son would have become incarnate if sin had not entered the world is a question much debated, to which Scripture returns no answer. The incarnation is uniformly associated with the work of redemption. The Word became flesh that He might offer Himself a sacrifice for the sins of men. "Behold, the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world!" (i. 29; comp. iii. 16). "The bread which I will give is my flesh, for the life of the world" (vi. 51). "To this end was the Son of God manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil" (1. iii. 8). "The Father hath sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world" (1. iv. 14). "Having abolished in his flesh the emnity" (Ephes. ii. 15; Col. i. 22; Heb. ii. 14). He has dedicated for us a new and living way through the veil, that is to say, His flesh (Heb. x. 20). His human nature, through which His atoning work was accomplished, He still retains, and continues to be God and man in two distinct natures and one person forever. Thus He is qualified alike by divine appointment and human sympathy, to be the merciful and faithful High Priest of His people (Heb. ii. 18, iv. 15). In heaven He appears as the Lamb that was slain (Rev. v. 6, 12).

The Word who in the beginning was truly and absolutely God became true man, with all that belongs to manhood as it came from the hand of God. In opposition to the docetism of his time, which denied the reality of our Lord's human nature, John laid great emphasis on the truth that Christ came in the flesh. His true humanity is an essential element in His redeeming work. "Hereby know ye the Spirit of God: every spirit which confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God; and every spirit which confesseth not Jesus is not of God: and this is the spirit of the antichrist, whereof ye have heard that it cometh; and now it is in the world already" (1 John iv. 2). "For many deceivers are gone forth into the world, even they that confess not that Jesus Christ cometh in the flesh. This is the deceiver and the antichrist" (2. 7; comp. 1 John v. 6). Thus made flesh the Word dwelt among us, the eye-witnesses of His life on earth. The word rendered *dwelt* (σκηνόω) is found only in the writings of John, and signifies literally *tabernacled*. The thought of *transient* sojourn which was originally suggested by the

word finds no place in the usage of John. He employs it elsewhere only in the Apocalypse, where it describes the abode of God with His people and the dwelling of the redeemed in heaven (Rev. vii. 15, xii. 12, xiii. 6, xxi. 3, the only passages in which the word occurs). He is Emmanuel, God with us. The visible presence of God among His people, prefigured in the tabernacle and the temple of the old covenant, is realized in Him. We beheld His glory—primarily, we the apostles—then "those that believe on his name" of ver. 12, now all believers in the mirror of the written Word (2 Cor. iii. 18)—"We all, with unveiled face beholding as in a mirror the glory of the Lord"—margin of Revised Version (comp. 2 Cor. iv. 6). We *beheld*, saw with fixed and attentive regard (see 1 John i. 1, where *saw* and *beheld* are used together). The sight of God, which was once thought ominous of death (Ex. xxxiii. 20; Judges xiii. 22), is now a vision of life and peace.

The main teaching of the four Gospels respectively may be summed up in the words, Law, Power, Grace, Glory. It is not the glory of the transfiguration mount to which John refers, though that was the most signal display of divine splendor that Christ permitted His disciples to behold; but the glory that shone throughout His life. John alone of the evangelists does not relate the story of the transfiguration. The transfigured Christ appears on every page. The glory of God is the outshining of the divine perfections, the manifestation of the divine excellence. Under the old covenant it was represented by the Shekinah, the light that symbolized the presence of God with Israel. Moses craved a clearer revelation, and prayed, "Shew me thy glory" (Ex. xxxiii. 18). Isaiah saw the glory of God in His temple (chap. vi), and that glory was the glory of the Eternal Word (xii. 41). Since God is light, indeed, every disclosure of God is a revelation of glory. The glory which formerly appeared only to chosen individuals at rare intervals all the people of God may now behold (Matt. xiii. 17).

It is not strictly true, as Weiss asserts, that "the sending of the only begotten Son is never by John, as with Paul, put in the point of view of a humiliation" (*Bib. Theol. New Testament*, § 145 [c]). The thought of humiliation is clearly suggested, if not expressly declared. The glory which He had with the Father before the world was (xvii. 5) He laid aside for a time (vii. 39—"Jesus was not yet glorified"—xii. 16, xvii. 5), to be resumed after His death and ascension (xvii. 1, 5). The glory of the Eternal Son is distinguished from the glory of the Son of man, which He imparts to His disciples (xvii. 22). Here too "the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another" (1 Cor. xv. 40). Yet it is true that John does not sharply distinguish between the humiliation and

the exaltation of Christ. With Paul the incarnation is the veiling of the glory of God ("Though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor"—2 Cor. viii. 9; "Who, being in the form of God, counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being found in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the cross"—Phil. ii. 6–8). With John it is rather the manifestation of that glory. In the first (ii. 11) and last (xi. 4, 40) of His miracles His glory appeared, and no less in the whole course of His life. The death of Christ was to Paul the lowest depth of His humiliation; with John it was the first step in His exaltation (xii. 23). The glory that Isaiah saw (xii. 41) was the glory of the suffering Messiah as well as the glory of Jehovah upon His throne (the quotations in xii. 38–41 are from Isa. liii. and vi). The Messiah and Jehovah are one. The beloved disciple who saw not only the transient gleam of divine splendor upon the holy mount, but the poverty and obscurity of his Master, of whom Isaiah said, "He hath no form nor comeliness; and when we see him, there is no beauty that we should desire him" (liii. 2)—His anguish in the garden, the cruel mocking and scourging, the painful and shameful death upon the cross (xix. 26)—exclaims, We beheld His *glory*. Paul and John present different aspects of the same truth. God was manifested in the flesh. The glory of God, else "dark with excess of light," was so far veiled by the flesh that men might clearly behold Him who is invisible (1 Tim. i. 17, vi. 16).

The glory of the Word is the glory of an only begotten Son, partaker of the Father's nature, sole heir of the Father's wealth (Heb. i. 2). The term, *only begotten*, John learned from his Master, who employed it to set forth the transcendent nature of God's love to men. "He gave his only begotten Son" (iii. 16). The same thought is conveyed by the term in 1 John iv. 9. Christ is thus distinguished from the children of ver. 12, who become children and heirs of God through Him (Rom. viii. 16, 17). In relation to God He is the Only Begotten; in relation to nature (Col. i. 15) and to His people (Rom. viii. 29) He is the first born. The only begotten Son is coeternal with the Father. "Do you ask of me whether the Son were born? I answer, 'born.' For He would not be a Son if not born. So when I say the Son always was, I say, in fact, was always born. And who understands 'was always born?' Give me an eternal fire, and I will give thee an eternal brightness" (Augustine). He is full of grace and truth, qualities in which His glory essentially consists.

Another and clearer beholding is reserved for the believer. "Father, that which thou hast given me, I will that where I am

they also may be with me; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me" (xvii. 24). "We know that if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him; for we shall see him even as he is" (1 John iii. 2; Rev. xxii. 4). While we dare not speak with assurance of mysteries so high, yet it appears inconceivable that God in His essential nature, as the Infinite Spirit, should be seen of men. In heaven as on earth Christ shall be to us the Word, the revelation of God. John was permitted to behold the heavenly glory, to see Him who had been nailed to the cross exalted upon the eternal throne, and throughout the Apocalypse the power, the majesty, the grace of God are exhibited in the person of the glorified Redeemer.

The statement that the Word was made flesh stands in marked contrast to the first verse. The Word *was* in the beginning, *became* in time; was with God, dwelt among men; was God, became flesh.

In ver. 15, the witness of one of those who had beheld His glory is given. John the Baptist holds a prominent place in the prologue and throughout the opening chapter of the Gospel, not merely in answer to those who would unduly exalt him, but much more because in him, as in Moses and Elijah on the mount of transfiguration, the old dispensation rendered homage to Christ. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that it was he by whom the evangelist was led to the Saviour, and the Fourth Gospel is colored by the personal experience of the author in far greater measure than the other Gospels. The enigmatic form of the Baptist's witness was adapted to awaken interest and fix attention. Some interpret his words with reference to time only, others with reference to rank only; but the best interpretation includes both ideas. He who came after me in time—entering later upon his ministry—is preferred before me in honor, because from eternity he was before me. "I indeed, baptize you with water unto repentance; but he that cometh after me is mightier than I, whose shoes I am not worthy to bear; he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire" (Matt. iii. 11). It is not strange, indeed, as is urged against this interpretation, that he who comes after should hold higher rank, as the king is preceded by the herald. But Christ's priority in rank is unique, because it is based upon His priority in time, while yet He appeared later upon the scene. In respect to His human nature later than John, He takes precedence by virtue of His divine nature.

In the verses that follow, it is not the Baptist, but the evangelist, that speaks, as "we all" may suggest. The Word has been described as full of grace and truth. Those qualities belong to Him in virtue of His divinity, to which John bears witness, and his testimony is confirmed by the experience of all believers. The ὅτι (because), with which this verse is introduced, according to the true

text, gives the reason for the assurance of the truth of ver. 14, as confirmed by the witness of John the Baptist. The testimony of eye-witnesses—"we beheld"—and of John is followed by testimony drawn from the experience of all believers. "Fulness" (πλήρωμα) is "a recognized technical term in theology, denoting the totality of the Divine powers and attributes" (Lightft. on Col. i. 19: see the complete and admirable account of the word in the detached note upon the passage). "In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily" (Col. ii. 9). "For it was the good pleasure of the Father that in him should all the fulness dwell" (Col. i. 19). He is full of grace and truth. Of that divine and inexhaustible fulness we all, all believers, receive; and grace for grace, grace succeeding grace, an ever-fresh and full supply, sufficient for every need. All the blessings are comprehended that issue from the love of God.

The word *grace** leads on to the contrast between the old covenant and the new.

The seventeenth verse might serve as the motto of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Moses was a servant, Christ is the Son (Heb. iii. 5, 6). God gave the law by Moses, but by His own Son sent grace and truth to earth. The law may be given by men or angels; grace and truth are inseparable from the person of the Word. This is the last and highest stage of revelation. In nature the everlasting power and divinity of God are seen (Rom. i. 20); in His law His holy will is declared; in Christ His grace and truth are made known. The law *was given*, a single act; grace and truth *came*, in continuous unfolding. The Word is presented as the man Christ Jesus—the Saviour of men, the Anointed of God. In Him is established that new covenant which Jeremiah foretold (xxxi. 31).

John has little to say of the law. The word νόμος does not occur in his writings outside the Gospel, and there he refers to it only as a historical fact. This was due in part to that natural temperament which inclined him to dwell rather upon essential principles than upon the temporary forms in which they might appear; and in part to circumstances. When this Gospel was written, after the destruction of Jerusalem and the wide extension of Christianity, the Church confronted new errors, new conditions, new problems. Questions regarding the Mosaic law, so prominent in the days of Paul, had lost their importance, for the providence of God had returned a decisive answer. The conflict between Christianity and Judaism had given place to the larger conflict between Christianity and the world.

*In the Fourth Gospel χάρις (grace) is found only in the prologue. Elsewhere in the writings of John it occurs only in salutations (2 John 3; Rev. i. 4, xxii. 21, the only instances of its use).

Here the law of the old dispensation is sharply contrasted with the grace and truth of the new. *Grace*, in the distinctive New Testament sense, especially frequent in Paul, signifies the undeserved love of God to men. To the thought of love on the part of God is added the thought of ill-desert on the part of man. Grace is the favor of God towards men as *guilty;* mercy (ἔλεος) is the favor of God towards men as *miserable*. It is characteristic of John that he prefers the general term *love* (ἀγάπη) to the special term *grace* (χάρις). Salvation is all of grace (Rom. iii. 24; Ephes. ii. 5; Titus ii. 11).

With grace truth is joined. "I am the way, and the truth, and the life" (xiv. 6). "To this end have I been born, and to this end am I come into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice" (xviii. 37). The law and grace are opposed in that men are condemned by the law, are saved by grace. "As many as are of the works of the law are under a curse: for it is written, Cursed is every one which continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law, to do them" (Gal. iii. 10). "The law worketh wrath" (Rom. iv. 15). "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law" (Gal. iii. 13). "What the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh," God wrought through His Son (Rom. viii. 3). "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life" (2 Cor. iii. 6; see also 2 Cor. iii. 7–11). The law is opposed to truth not in that it was false, but in that it was partial and transitory. The law was holy, the commandment holy and righteous and good (Rom. vii. 12), because it expressed the will and answered the purpose of God. But that purpose was itself provisional and transient. "The law made nothing perfect" (Heb. vii. 19). It had "a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things" (x. 1). "It was added because of transgressions, till the seed should come to whom the promise had been made" (Gal. iii. 19). "So that the law hath been our tutor to bring us unto Christ" (Gal. iii. 24). Therefore the law is done away in Christ, because He has fulfilled it. "If ye are led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law" (Gal. v. 18). "Ye are not under law, but under grace" (Rom. vi. 14). "I came not to destroy, but to fulfill" (Matt. v. 17). "Christ is the end of the law unto righteousness to every one that believeth" (Rom. x. 4). He fulfilled the ceremonial law as the antitype which all the ordinances of that law prefigured; He fulfilled the moral law by His perfect obedience. The law fulfilled objectively by Christ is fulfilled subjectively by love ("Love therefore is the fulfilment of the law"—(Rom. xiii. 10; Gal. v. 14), in other words, by Christ *for* the believer, then by Christ *in* the believer. "If we love one another, God abideth in us,

and his love is perfected in us" (1 John iv. 12) (xiv. 20–23, xvii. 26). To the believer the moral law remains the rule of conduct, but is no more the condition of salvation.

Grace and truth were not unknown to the saints of the former dispensation. To Moses the Lord revealed Himself "a God full of compassion and gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy and truth" (Ex. xxxiv. 6). The Psalmist cried, "But thou, O Lord, art a God full of compassion and gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy and truth" (Ps. lxxxvi. 15, lxxxix. 14, cxxxviii. 2). And indeed it was Christ Himself, in whom grace and truth appear, of whom Moses wrote, to whom the Old Scriptures bear witness (v. 39, 46). But in comparison with the abundant revelation of the Gospel, the knowledge of these divine attributes was wanting under the old covenant; as the Spirit had been in the world from the beginning, yet it is said, "The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified" (vii. 39). Christ is greater than the greatest (Abraham, Moses, David, Solomon), holier than the holiest (the law, the Sabbath, the temple), of the Old Testament.

The revelation of God is given only through the Son. "No man hath seen God at any time." The theophanies of the Old Testament were only partial and temporary disclosures of the divine grace and power. To Moses God said, "Thou canst not see my face, for man shall not see me and live" (Ex. xxxiii. 20). God Himself, the Infinite Spirit, is forever invisible to mortal eyes. "No man hath beheld God at any time." (1 John iv. 12). He dwelleth "in light unapproachable, whom no man hath seen, nor can see" (1 Tim. vi. 16, i. 17). After citing several passages from the Scripture in which men are said to have seen God, Chrysostom asks, "How then saith John, No man hath seen God at any time? It is to declare that all these were instances of (His) condescension, not the vision of the essence itself unveiled. For had they seen the very nature, they would not have beheld it under different forms, since that is simple, without form, or parts, or bounding lines. It sits not, nor stands, nor walks: these things belong all to bodies. But how he is, he only knoweth." Christ reveals God because He and He alone has seen Him. "Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is from God, he hath seen the Father" (vi. 46, iii. 11–13). God is seen in Christ (xiv. 9), in so far that His true nature is brought to light. It is not through the works or words of Christ alone, but through His whole personality that God is manifested. He is "the image of the invisible God" (Col. i. 15; 2 Cor. iv. 4). "No one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any one know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him," (Matt. xi. 27).

For υἱός (18) we prefer, on preponderant if not conclusive evidence, to read θεός. The terms already severally applied to Christ, *God* and *Only Begotten*, are here united, and the full truth is disclosed. He is only begotten God. He is able to reveal the Father, because He sustains towards Him relations of the closest intimacy and affection. *God* and the *Word* of ver. 1 become the Father and the Son. The phrase εἰς τὸν κόλπον occurs here only in John. The beloved disciple is said to have reclined in Jesus' bosom (ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ), (xiii. 23). The Son is in the bosom of the Father not only now as exalted, but eternally. That is His home. In majesty He is enthroned upon the right hand of God (Luke xxii. 69; Heb. viii. 1; Acts vii. 55); in love He rests in the bosom of the Father. Thus the prologue returns to the starting point. It began with "the Word with God," it closes with the Son in the embrace of the Father.

While the main purpose of the Fourth Gospel was not controversial or polemic, it is noteworthy how many errors are refuted, even in the few verses that form the prologue; not merely popular Jewish fancies, such as that which rendered undue honor to John the Baptist, or regarded descent from Abraham as sufficient qualification for the kingdom of heaven; but those profounder and more harmful, errors which reappear from age to age in the world, and even in the Church. (*a*) How thoroughly the doctrine of the person of Christ is guarded against the aberrations of Arianism, Socianism, Sabellianism, Apollinarianism and Docetism. His unity with the Father, and His distinct personality, His absolute Deity and true humanity, are affirmed side by side. No more clear, careful and exact definitions can be found in all literature than those which are given here. (*b*) Various forms of Gnostic and philosophic error, some of them rife in the days of John, some of them prevalent to-day, are condemned. Such are the doctrines of Dualism and the Demiurge, the eternity and inherent evil of matter. Such are Deism and Pantheism, subtle forms of untruth or half truth, which have exercised and fascinated the minds of men from the beginning. The nature of God, Trinity in unity; His relation to the world which He has made, and to man as fallen and as redeemed, under the old covenant and the new, all are set forth with matchless clearness and power. It is not too much to say that he who has mastered the teaching of these verses has found a key that will open to him not only this Gospel, but the essential truth of all Scripture. The fundamental truths of creation, providence and redemption, all have here a place. Such range and variety of truth in so narrow compass is found nowhere besides—the sweep of the unfolding of the divine purpose from its origin in eternity to its fulfilment in the incarnation of the Word, the nature and extent

of the divine revelation in all the various forms in which it has been granted to man, culminating in the grace and truth of Jesus Christ—all this compressed in fewer words than elsewhere in Scripture are employed to relate a single miracle.

Matthew, Mark and Luke may be termed the Gospels of the Kingdom; this is the Gospel of the King. In all of them, indeed, Jesus Christ is the central figure, the Son of God, the only Saviour. But in this Gospel peculiar emphasis is laid upon His Person.* The miracles related are chosen mainly to introduce His discourses, and the central theme of His discourses is not, as in the earlier Gospels the kingdom of heaven, but Himself. The parables which those Gospels record are designed chiefly to set forth the nature of the kingdom; in this Gospel, which contains no parable, His profoundest teachings turn upon His own person. He says not, *The kingdom of heaven is like*, but *I am*. The *I am* of Jehovah, that returns upon itself and denies what it seemed about to reveal, *I am that I am*, is unfolded in the doctrine of Christ concerning Himself.

It is ever true of the Lord Jesus that those who know Him best love Him most profoundly, and render Him most exalted honor. Mark was the friend of Peter, Luke of Paul; John was preëminently the friend of Jesus. It is he, the disciple whom Jesus loved, admitted to closer intimacy with Him than was ever man beside, who sees in every act and attribute of His life the manifestation of divine glory. Not content to affirm that He was eternally with God, twice in this brief prologue John calls Him God, and ascribes to Him titles and attributes which may rightly be ascribed, and in Scripture are ascribed, to God alone. He is the Word, the Revealer of God; the Maker of the universe, the Source of all life, the Light of men, the Redeemer of His own, the Jehovah of the old covenant, Very God of Very God. The voice of John is in accord with the voice of all Scripture, in the Old Testament and in the New, which places the crown of Deity upon the head of Him to whom men moved by the Holy Spirit bear witness that He is Immanuel (Isa. vii. 14); Wonderful, Counsellor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace (Isa. ix. 6); Ruler in Israel, whose goings forth are from of old, from everlasting (Micah v. 2); the Lord, whom ye seek (Mal. iii. 1); Prince of life (Acts iii. 15); Lord of glory (1 Cor. ii. 8); our Great God and Saviour Jesus

* This appears in the vocabulary of the several Gospels. Matthew records 155 instances of our Lord's use of the personal pronouns in relation to Himself; Mark 74; Luke 113; and John 499. In John He makes use of the reflexive pronoun 16 times, nowhere in the other Gospels. On the other hand the phrase *Son of man* is found in Matthew 31 times, in Mark 14, in Luke 25, and only 12 in John. See article, "Vocabulary of New Testament," in this REVIEW for October, 1891, p. 657.

Christ (Tit. ii. 13); over all, God, blessed forever (Rom. ix. 5). To this witness of earth replies the heavenly chorus, the angels and the living creatures and the elders—representatives of the animate creation and of redeemed humanity—saying with a great voice, Worthy is the Lamb that hath been slain, to receive the power, and riches, and wisdom, and might, and honor, and glory and blessing. And the whole vast universe responds—every created thing which is in the heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and on the sea, and all things that are in them, Unto Him that sitteth on the throne, and unto the Lamb, be the blessing, and the honor, and the glory, and the dominion, for ever and ever (Rev. v. 11–13). Amen and Amen.

PEEKSKILL, N. Y. J. RITCHIE SMITH.

VI.

THE KANTIAN THEISM.

KANT'S great constructive work in Epistemology was the analysis of experience to show those principles which are necessary in order to render it possible. He shows that the activity of mind is necessary to knowledge, and that the connected experience which constitutes knowledge only exists in relation to self-consciousness through the categories. But if we discover self-consciousness with its activity and categories and then arbitrarily presuppose that they are individual and human, differing essentially from that which is universal, then that which was to give us reality and objectivity shuts us off from it. Kant did this. After having shown that objects cannot exist out of relation to a mind, he presupposes that knowledge is a mechanical process, the putting together of separate factors. Hence, under the necessity of choosing which of his factors is the real one, he says that reality is that which affects our senses, so that the next step is to say that self-consciousness, as known, is merely a phenomenon of the internal sense, and the synthetic activity of self-consciousness only a logical notion. Then, of course, the breach between knowledge and reality can never be closed; all the work ofmind is individual and subjective; the impression of sense, which Kant has shown cannot exist alone, is the only source of content for the categories; so that the real world lies as a sphere of dead "things in themselves" which are unrelated to mind, the unknown mysterious causes of sensation, while supersensible reality is still farther removed from the sphere of the knowable.

Accepting, however, the spirit of Kant's teaching, we will be led logically to reject his doctrine of the limits of knowledge. If self-consciousness is a spiritual activity, how can it be unreal? And if things exist only in relation to a mind, what ground have we left for the assumption of a reality unrelated to mind and supposed to lie in a sphere external to thought? That which we know is the real, and the spirit of Kant's own teaching should prevent us from postulating any other reality.

Let us apply this to the problem of Theism. According to Kant's false presuppositions, God must be entirely separate from the

world and the human spirit, standing in external and mechanical relations to each. Of course, if men accept this view, everywhere must there be altars "to the Unknown God"—yes, and to the unknowable God. If God is to be knowable, He must be immanent in man and nature, a self-revealing Spirit. It was this truth that Hegelians and the Neo-Kantians grasped. But they took Kant's self-consciousness considered as a logical notion and raised it to universality, thus making the Absolute, which we call God, merely an immanent thought-process in nature, which only reaches complete self-consciousness in man, and which never transcends this finite world and human spirit. The results of this are obvious. If the supernatural be reduced to the spiritual; if all idea of a God who is transcendent as well as immanent be lost; what Bible doctrine does not lose all its meaning? The supernatural basis of Christianity is shaken and Christ Himself becomes merely the person in whom a spiritual power reaches its highest form, and who, instead of being the sacrifice for sin, is merely the apostle of evolution by self-sacrifice, who gave power to His teaching by a martyr's death.

It is clear then that God must be both immanent and transcendent if we are at the same time to know Him and believe His revealed Word to us. But only a self-conscious personal Spirit can be both immanent and transcendent. It is important, therefore, to hold fast to the grounds of Theism, which have been too often given up since the Kantian criticism. We will endeavor to follow the grounds of Theistic belief and Kant's noted criticism.

The question, then, is whether the Absolute of Philosophy is God.

The question now comes up as to whether there is any *a priori* reason for believing that this is so. Reason gives an affirmative answer. Her supreme category is Unity. A complete and absolute Unity must be attained. Now there are the spheres of nature and of freedom. But nature is independent of our finite wills. If therefore all we can say is that Absolute Being exists, the dualism between nature and freedom cannot be done away with. The only possible unity is one where the ends of freedom are realized in nature, and this can be only if nature is controlled by a Unitary Being which is active for ends, directing nature for the realization of these ends of freedom. Mechanism is not chance but law, and the idea of law includes in it that of an end. Thus mechanism leads by necessity to Teleology, and the only unity is a teleological one where self-conscious intelligence and will is subjecting Mechanism to its own ends. The supreme unity is found when Mechanism and Teleology harmonize in the nature of a Being who is the source of both moral and natural law. Reason is satisfied only where the

heart is satisfied, in the belief and knowledge that above all is one personal, self-conscious Spirit, the Absolute God who has predetermined all things for the realization of His own glory and the well-being of humanity. Kant recognizes this *a priori* necessity. He argues * that the Absolute must be conceived as one and individual because it is the primal source of all things; and in another place,† he tells us that the highest unity is a teleological one so that Intelligence must be predicated of the Absolute. In fact the connecting link of Kant's whole system is Teleology. He sets forth Nature and her categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason;* and after leaving noumena beyond the reach of knowledge so that we cannot even say that they exist, he shows us that they exist and opens up the world of freedom in the *Critique of Practical Reason;* but he connects the two spheres in his *Critique of Judgment* by means of the Teleological judgment which reflects on nature as though she were subject to a Supreme Intelligence and realizing the ends of freedom. But with Kant an *a priori* necessity is only a subjective one. To say that anything is *a priori* with him is equivalent to saying that it is subjective only, and he seeks to show that all arguments *a posteriori* with reference to this question are fallacious. He grants what has been given *a priori*, but only as a subjective necessity, and then shows the dialectical procedure of Reason in the Theistic argument.

But it is clear from the introductory remarks on knowledge that this identification of *a prioriness* and subjectivity is groundless. The fact that a truth is *a priori* necessary by no means proves that it has no objectivity, nor does it even leave us powerless to claim for it objectivity. The fact that it is *a priori* is strong evidence of its objective truth. And it is also true, as has been shown, that Kant's separation between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* in knowledge is false. They are two aspects of truth which is a unity. Therefore the *a posteriori* must not conflict with the *a priori*, and if we find that it does we may be sure that one or the other is not genuine. If it be true, then, that *a priori* we must say that the Absolute is self-conscious and personal Intelligence, then it is of the very greatest importance that this be justified *a posteriori*, that is, in experience; for if this be not possible we may well question our supposed *a priori* necessity. Now the *a posteriori* justification of our belief in the existence of the Absolute and of our determination of it as personal self-conscious Intelligence, is the Theistic argument. The arguments of which this is composed are *a posteriori* with the exception of one aspect of the Ontological argument. The question

* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, "Transcendental Dialectic," Bk. ii, chap. iii, § 2.

† *Critique of Pure Reason*, Appendix to the "Transcendental Dialectic."

before us, then, is as to whether or not the Kantian criticism has overthrown the historic Theistic arguments.

There is one point, however, which should be carefully noted before estimating the weight of Kant's criticism. It is that the idea of God which he uses as the object of these arguments is very different from the God of Theism when rightly understood; and also very different from the God which we might infer from what Kant himself has admitted as an *a priori* though subjective necessity. The God of Theism is a self-conscious and personal Spirit and this realizes both the ideas of immanence and transcendence. Now as we are seeking the *a posteriori* justification of that which we have determined *a priori*, of course this same idea of God which has been reached *a priori* should be the subject of the Theistic argument. Moreover since Kant has admitted the *a priori* necessity of determining the Absolute as intelligent and personal, such a God could be immanent as well as transcendent, and such a Being should have been made the subject of his criticism. But such is not the case. The God which is the subject of his remarks on the Theistic arguments is the God of eighteenth-century Deism, and of course they avail against this. His theory of knowledge was marred by its mechanistic character, and so the objects of knowledge come to have a mechanism about them and exist apart from consciousness. God stands apart and in a purely external and mechanical relation to the world and man. The idea of God which he gives * has three elements. First the sum total of the possibility of all experience. Second the conception of an *ens realissimum*. And in the third place the attributes which we get by what he calls "hypostatizing" the idea; that is, he argues that from it all things derive their reality and so it is regarded as primal. A primal Being must be one and simple. Then we regard it as the ground of all things, and cogitate the whole sum of our experience as an individual whole, giving the idea of individuality, and so reach the idea of God. Now nothing could be more mechanical than this. God is not the sum total of all existence regarded as a whole and individual. He is not a sort of mine or fund of reality from which we draw. He is not a sum total of all reality as though reality were, as a house, made of different mechanically constructed parts. God is a spirit existing in spiritual relations to His finite creatures. It was just such a mechanical and pantheistic definition as this which lead Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel into so many difficulties. Dr. Runze † speaks to the point on this mechanical

* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, "Transc. Dialect," chap. iii, § 2.

† Runze, *Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis*, p. 81.

conception. He says that the mechanical conception of a sum total which limits God to a mere aggregate, is not interchangeable with the idea of the Highest Being. "Much rather," he says, "does the highest reality lie at the foundation of the possibility of all things as a cause and not as a sum total."

We must carefully bear in mind that it is God, a living Spirit who exists in spiritual relations to us, whom we are seeking; and not a God who is afar off, and in merely mechanical relations to us or else out of all relation.

The Theistic arguments, Kant's treatment of which we are now to examine, are four in number. There is the Ontological argument which tells us *a priori* that if the Absolute or Necessary Being exist we must predicate infinity of all its attributes, and identify it with the All Perfect Being; and *a posteriori* this argument expresses the truth that God through this perfect idea has spoken in and to the consciousness of humanity, so that His existence may be inferred as the cause of this idea. Next there is the Cosmological argument which proceeds from the contingent to the necessary, and thus from this we infer the existence of a necessary Being which the Ontological argument on its *a priori* side tells us is the Most Perfect, the Infinite Being. Then there is the Teleological argument, which argues from the adaptations of means to ends in nature to design, and thence infers that Intelligence is to be predicated of the Absolute. Lastly we have the Moral argument, which from our moral nature and the supreme categories of Morality infers the moral nature of the Absolute.

The most notable and important fact with reference to these arguments is their vital connection with and mutual assistance of each other, while at the same time each preserves its own identity in the performance of its special function. They are parts of one whole, which cannot stand hostile criticism if separately required to perform the whole task. Thus the Cosmological argument gives us the existence of the Necessary Being, but nothing more. The Teleological and Moral arguments give us attributes of this Being, while we leave experience and say *a priori* that these attributes are infinite and so identify the Absolute with God. Therefore these arguments can neither be separated nor identified. They have been most happily likened to a bundle of twigs, which when bound together the strongest arm cannot break, but when separated may be broken by the weakest. They are the *a posteriori* ground of that firm conviction that the Absolute of Philosophy is the God of the Bible, and together with the *a priori* ground of this same belief they change it into a reflective knowledge by which man's reason bids his heart take courage as it faces the assaults of skepticism.

Kant first criticises the Ontological argument.* He discusses it in its *a priori* form. Anselm† is the author of this, so we must look to him for a statement of it. He gives it thus: "And we believe that Thou art a Being than whom a greater cannot be conceived. . . . . And certainly that than which a greater cannot be conceived cannot be in the intellect alone. For if it be in the mind only there can be thought a Being existing in reality also, which is greater. If therefore that than which a greater cannot be conceived is in the mind only, it follows that that, than which a greater cannot be conceived is that, a greater than which can be conceived: but certainly this cannot be. There exists, therefore, beyond a doubt a Being than whom there can be no greater, both in thought and in reality." Anselm's reasoning is simply that if we could conceive the non-existence of that than which a greater cannot be conceived, then a greater could be conceived, which is a contradiction. But, of course, this is after all merely a necessity of conception founded on the impossibility of conceiving the opposite. It asserts a contradiction in the removal of existence as a predicate, asserting that it is contained necessarily in the concept. Now Kant's first criticism is that the arguments which have been drawn to show the correspondence between thought and things have been taken from judgments, not from things. This criticism attacks the argument as though Anselm's position were that what exists *in intellectu* exists also *in re*. But this is not his argument, as Dr. Patton‡ shows. His argument is, as has been stated, that existence is necessarily in the concept of the Perfect Being. Kant realized this, and proceeded to criticise the argument in this form by showing the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments, and that being is not a real predicate. He argues as follows: If there is a contradiction involved in the denial of this predicate, it must be contained in the concept; and must therefore be a merely logical predicate and so say nothing as to reality: therefore though the annihilation of this predicate involves a contradiction, both subject and predicate may be together suppressed without contradiction. But if the judgment is to express existence, that is if being is a real predicate, it must add something to the concept and so its removal will not involve a contradiction. Moreover existence is not a real predicate or there never could be a correspondence between the concept and object, the object always being greater.

Now in order to estimate the force of this we will state three positions which may be held with reference to the Ontological argument.

*Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, "Transcendental Dialectic," chap. iii, § 4.

† Anselm, *Proslogion*, Caput ii.

‡ Patton, *Syllabus of Lectures on Theism.*

1. There are those like Anselm who hold that it is an *a priori* demonstration of existence.

2. There is the view of Leibnitz,* who believes that Anselm's argument needs to show first that the idea of a Most Perfect Being is possible, that then the conclusion follows, and that this is done when it is shown that there are no contradictions involved in this Idea conceived as existing.

3. There is the position which we have indicated, that the *a priori* side of the argument is not designed to prove existence, but to show that the Necessary Being of the Cosmological argument is the Infinite and Perfect Being of our idea. And *a posteriori* this argument is to express God's witness to humanity of His existence, through this perfect idea.

Now the first of these positions Kant has successfully overthrown. His arguments against any *a priori* demonstration of God's existence merely from the idea are unanswerable. There are *a priori* reasons, but from the mere concept a demonstrative proof in the Anselmian way is not possible. He has also been successful against the position of Leibnitz; for if the possibility of the idea is to be shown by the mere absence of all contradiction, Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments will rise against us, and the Leibnitzian view will not differ from the Anselmian. But against the third position Kant's arguments can have no force. He has made two errors in his criticism. He has taken the *a priori* side of this argument, which is only designed to identify a certain idea with the Necessary Being of the Cosmological argument, and has required that existence be shown *a priori*. But that which is the far greater mistake is the fact that he has neglected the *a posteriori* side of the argument altogether. DesCartes is the author of this aspect of the Ontological argument. He gives the Anselmian proof, but also argues that the idea of God is Perfect and Infinite, and that therefore God must be its cause. He says,† "And, in truth, it is not to be wondered at that God, at my creation, implanted this idea in me, that it might serve, as it were, for the mark of the workman impressed on his work; and it is not also necessary that the work should be something different from the work itself; but considering only that God is my Creator, it is highly probable that He in some way fashioned me after His own image and likeness, and that I perceive this likeness, in which is contained the idea of God, by the same faculty by which I apprehend myself; in other words, when I make myself the object of

* Leibnitz, *Thoughts on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas.*

† DesCartes, *Discourse on Method and the Meditations,* Meditat. 3, also *The Principles of Philosophy,* Part i, § 18.

reflection, I not only find that I am an incomplete, imperfect and dependent being, and one who unceasingly aspires after something better and greater than he is; but, at the same time, I am assured likewise that He upon whom I am dependent possesses in Himself all the goods after which I aspire, and that not merely indefinitely and potentially, but infinitely and actually, and that He is thus God." Kant has done away with an *a priori* demonstration of the far-away God of the eighteenth-century Deism. But he has left untouched the Ontological argument as the grand expression of the truth of Mysticism, the truth that God is near, and that the consciousness of humanity is a God-breathed consciousness with a God-given idea. Negatively, He speaks to our spirits in the feeling of weakness and dependence which grows into the reflective knowledge of our finitude. In the dissatisfaction with the world and ourselves we see that we are not of earthly origin, that there is in us that which comes from a source above Nature, and that we can have been produced by no natural process. And all this would not be possible if God had not inspired our consciousness with the positive idea of Himself as the Father of our spirits. In ourselves we feel His presence, and then know it; in the world we see an Ideal that is not of the world. God as a self-conscious and personal Spirit can be thus near to us. The strongest and most spiritual minds in all ages have felt His presence, and have testified to the truth of Mysticism. God is truly present to the consciousness of humanity both in its idea of Him and in its aspirations after Him. He has spoken to men, and Rationalism can never dissuade them from belief in this truth.

Kant next criticises the Cosmological argument. This is the argument from the contingent to the necessary. Aristotle is its author. He argues* for the existence of a First Mover, thus regarding the world under the category of motion, as contingent. Kant gives the argument so as to include the finite ego under the category of contingency. He gives the argument as follows:† "If something exists, an absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now I, at least, exist. Therefore there exists an absolutely necessary being." The argument, he says, proceeds thus. "A necessary being can be determined only in one way, that is by only one of all the opposed predicates; therefore, it is completely determined by its concept, and there is only one concept which can completely determine a thing *a priori*, that is the concept of an *ens realissimum;* therefore, as this is the only concept by and in which we can cogi-

* Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. ii, chap. vii.

† Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, "Transcendental Dialectic," chap. iii, § 5, *sq.*

tate a necessary being, therefore a supreme being necessarily exists."

Now, in order to meet the Kantian criticism of the Cosmological argument, we must have a clear idea of its function and relation to the Ontological argument; that is, to the *a priori* side of that argument, which it is to be remembered Kant always means, and which for convenience we will refer to as the Ontological argument in discussing Kant's criticism of the Cosmological. The Cosmological argument gives us the existence of a necessary Being, but cannot determine the nature of that Being. The Ontological argument *a priori* shows us that if such a Being exists its nature must be of a certain character; but it cannot give *a priori* demonstration of the existence of this Being. Now Kant makes an error similar to that which he made in criticising the Ontological argument. He criticised that argument as though it were designed to demonstrate *a priori* the existence of a Being corresponding to its concept. Now we see that he states the Cosmological argument as though it were meant to perform not only its own work, but that also of the Ontological argument in the determination of the nature of the necessary Being. That which he terms the first part of the argument shows that an absolutely necessary Being exists. Now, instead of seeing that this is all that is required of this argument, he proceeds to add the Ontological argument as a second step in the Cosmological; and then states as his first point of criticism, that experience, that is the Cosmological argument, merely aids Reason to make the first step to the existence of the necessary Being; and that we must turn away from experience to the conception of an *ens realissimum* to determine the properties of this Being, so that the Cosmological argument becomes the Ontological. Now it is perfectly true that the Cosmological argument is insufficient by itself; but Kant should have realized that the inference to the existence of a necessary Being is all that this argument can be legitimately required to do. Moreover, when, after adding the Ontological argument in its *a priori* aspect as a second step in the Cosmological, he says that reason believes that we may infer the existence of a necessary Being from the concept of an *ens realissimum*, he seems to have forgotten that he has admitted on the very same page that "experience is held to aid reason" in showing the existence of a necessary Being, and that he himself added this second part "to determine the properties" and not to demonstrate the existence of this Being. We see, then, that Kant's first criticism of this argument consists in putting the Ontological and Cosmological arguments together and criticising each because it cannot perform separately their joint task. He tries also to bring out this same

criticism by logic. He says that the *nervus probandi* of the Cosmological argument is the proposition that every absolutely necessary being is an *ens realissimum;* and if this be true, since all *entia realissima* are alike, it follows that this proposition may be converted simply, and we have the proposition that every *ens realissimum* is a necessary being; and this proposition being determined *a priori* by concepts, we have the Ontological argument. In short, he says that in the identification of the *ens realissimum* with the necessary Being, we assume that we can infer the latter from the former. But this is not true. It is difficult to see why the Cosmological argument, in turning to the Ontological to determine the nature of the Necessary Being as Infinite in its attributes, after having shown its existence, must proceed on the assumption that the Ontological argument must show *a priori* the fact of existence.

Kant also makes the following objections to the Cosmological argument:* First, that the transcendental principle of causality is only valid in the sensuous world, because the purely intelligible or intellectual conception would never produce a synthetic, that is, an objective proposition. The answer to this objection is the rejection of his doctrine of the limit of knowledge. Thought is synthetic of itself, and it is not the object of sense which makes it so. And it is obviously false reasoning to argue that, because in scientific cognition the content of the category is given in the sphere of experience, therefore, this is the only kind of causality admissible. Of course, if we define causality as invariable sequence and then say that this includes all causality, we rule out the Cosmological argument by definition. But his doctrine of causality as merely invariable sequence is inadequate for science; how much more so, then, must it be for metaphysics, and how unfair its application in this sphere. We cannot use a purely mechanical and physical category when we have reached the sphere of spirit. The contingent involves the necessary, but a caused cause is still contingent. Our idea of causation is not fully satisfied with a cause that is itself caused, as is the case with every cause in the relative sphere; and the mind must find its type of causation in the causality of will determined by motive and character, but free from physical necessity. If this be not admitted, the alternative is physical necessity, and this leads to, or rather involves, materialism. The categories of science may be used with no materialistic implications at all; they have their legitimate sphere. It is only when the metaphysician tries to use them that materialism ensues. Thus Mr. Spencer, in trying to explain the universe by relative and material forces, *ex*

*Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, "Transcendental Dialectic," chap. iii, §5, p. 374.

hypothesi shuts himself off from any valid inference to the Absolute, and his postulate of the Unknowable has nothing on which to rest. If it is manifested in the material and relative force which explains the universe, the implication is materialistic as to the nature of ultimate reality; or if this Unknowable is entirely apart from the relative force which explains things, then why postulate it? This is merely to show the danger of making physical categories do metaphysical work. However, in making the inference of the Cosmological argument, we go beyond the sphere of natural causation in the very idea of the argument, which expresses the necessity of the existence of Absolute Being.

Kant's last objection to this argument is that the impossibility of an infinite series of causes is assumed, and that this is a principle which cannot be justified. This is simply a statement, in a slightly different form, of the principle of which we have just been speaking, or, more accurately, may be inferred from this principle,—that everything contingent must have a cause. The highest category of causation is not satisfied with anything but a non-contingent and uncaused cause. The stage of scientific cognition is not denied when we assert this; but that which we recognize as real in one stage of reflection, is seen at a later stage to be not the ultimate reality; and while we admit the reality of the one we may reflect upon it as only a partial view of reality and go on to higher categories. If, then, we are to admit the validity of our highest spiritual categories,—and we must if any knowledge at all is to be possible,—we must admit that an infinite series is impossible. Kant goes on in this same chapter to explain the dialectical illusion substantially as follows. On the supposition that something exists we cannot avoid the inference that something necessary exists. But let us form any conception whatever of a thing, nothing prevents me from cogitating its non-existence. We may thus be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary basis, while at the same time we cannot cogitate any individual thing as absolutely necessary; and the conclusion is that neither necessity nor contingency are properties of things, but merely subjective principles. In other words, we may be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary basis, and yet because we cannot find this among any of these contingent things, we conclude that these principles are only subjective, or else we break down in contradiction. Obviously, the conclusion does not follow. If we try to find the Absolute as one of the series of contingent things, we find that we can cogitate none of these as necessary. But it is just for these very contingent things that we are seeking a basis that shall not be one of them. If we try to cogitate the Absolute

Spirit after the analogy of the world-series we can reach no result; but when it is shown that it is a false supposition that all objectivity for knowledge is given by sense, then we need not conclude that principles which transcend the sensuous sphere are merely subjective. We are groping for Being where everything is Becoming; and trying to find a changeless resting place where decay is a principle as well as beginning to be. If we search in the right place, we shall find that Absolute Being is not far from every one of us. Only we should be careful to let the brightest, truest light within us show us where to look.

The Teleological argument next meets the Kantian criticism. This argument, which Kant calls the Physico-Teleological, from the adaptations which are observable in Nature infers design, and thence attributes Intelligence to the Absolute Being. This argument Kant says deserves to be mentioned with respect. He says,* "The world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle of order, variety, beauty, and conformity to ends, that whether we pursue our observations with the infinity of space in one direction, or into its illimitable divisions in the other, whether we regard the world in its greatest or its least manifestations, even after we have attained to the highest summit of knowledge which our weak minds can reach, we find that language, in the presence of wonders so inconceivable, has lost its force, and number its power to reckon, nay, even thought fails to conceive adequately, and our conception of the whole dissolves into an astonishment without the power of expression, all the more eloquent that it is dumb." Kant's criticisms of the Teleological argument in the *Critique of Pure Reason* are two in number, and arise as before from the fact that he requires this argument to do the work of three. He says, in the chapter from which we have just quoted, "We cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances to a demonstrative certainty and to a reception on its own merits, apart from favor or support from other arguments." Now we do not make this claim for it. We neither claim for it "demonstrative certainty," nor that it can be considered apart from other arguments. Let us see exactly what can be expected from it in its organic connection with the other arguments.

The Cosmological argument shows us that a Necessary Being must exist, and now by the Teleological argument we infer that it must be possessed of Intelligence wonderfully great, which the Ontological argument on its *a priori* side shows to be infinite. The Teleological argument, then, is to show that the cause of the world is an Intelligent Cause, and this is all that can be legitimately required of it. In order to indicate how it does this we cannot do better than quote

* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, "Transcendental Dialectic," chap. iii, § 6.

from this same chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason:* "The chief momenta in the physico-teleological argument are as follows: First, we observe in the world manifest signs of an arrangement full of purpose, executed with great wisdom, and existing in a whole of a content indescribably various, and of an extent without limits. Second, this arrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things existing in the world, it belongs to them merely as a contingent attribute; in other words, the nature of different things could not of itself, whatever means were employed, harmoniously tend towards certain purposes, were they not chosen and directed for those purposes by a rational and disposing principle in accordance with certain fundamental ideas. Third, there exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause, or several, which is not merely a blind, all-powerful nature, producing the beings and events which fill the world in unconscious fecundity, but a free and intelligent cause of the world. Fourth, the unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of a reciprocal relation existing between the parts of the world, as portions of an artistic edifice, an inference which all our observation favors, and all principles of analogy support."

In this chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant makes two criticisms of this argument. The first he expresses thus—"According to the physicoteleological argument the connection and harmony existing in the world evidence the contingency of the form merely, but not of the matter, that is, of the substance of the world. . . . . This proof can at the most therefore demonstrate the existence of an architect of the world whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of the material with which he works, but not of a creator of the world, to whom all things are subject." Now in the first place this objection involves asking too much of this argument: all that is sought from this argument is to show that the Absolute Being, of whose existence as the cause of all relativity we are assured on other grounds, is possessed of intelligence. This would be a sufficient answer to Kant's criticism, but we may go even farther. Dr. Flint* says that this objection can be urged, only if order were not of the very essence of matter itself, and not merely something superimposed in the arrangement of it. "Science," he says, "shows that the order in the heavens and in the most complicated organisms is not more wonderful than the order in the ultimate atoms themselves. The balance of evidence is that order penetrates as deep as matter itself."

Kant's second criticism is that from the order in the world we can infer only a cause proportionate thereto. We can conclude therefore from this argument, only that the Intelligence and Power of the

* Flint, *Theism*, Lect. vi.

world-cause is very great; but not that the Intelligence is infinite and the Power absolute; and they must be so determined, as such a predicate as "very great" gives no determinate conception of this Being, nor does it inform us what it may be. Empirical considerations failing to give this determination to the concept, we accomplish this by falling back upon the Cosmological argument, which is the Ontological in disguise. "After elevating ourselves to admiration" of the power and wisdom of the world's author, and finding that we can advance no farther by this method, we proceed to infer the contingency of the world from the order in it and then argue from its contingency to the existence of a Necessary Being, and thence to the concept of the *ens realissimum*. This objection obviously arises from the demand that the Teleological shall alone do the work of all three arguments, and it only gives an illustration of their unity and organic connection. When Intelligence has been predicated of the Absolute, this argument has performed its function. When once this is done all materialistic explanations of ultimate reality become impossible, and we are then obliged *a priori* to say that this Intelligence is infinite. Thus it refers directly to the *a priori* argument and not indirectly through the Cosmological as Kant says. It does not, then, depend on this argument, much less is it identical with it. It needs only the Ontological argument on its *a priori* side for its completion, while the Cosmological argument needs both the other two.

Kant's criticism, then, amounts to showing the connection of these arguments, since his objections may be all classed under two heads: First, those criticisms which do not rest on the separation of the arguments, but which we have seen only to avail against the mechanically conceived God of Deism, but not against a God who is a Spirit at once immanent and transcendent; and secondly, those criticisms which rest on the separation of the arguments, and the requirement of one to do the work of all; and these we have shown to be unfair. We may learn from this that every road, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori*, will lead us to some aspect of Absolute Being. In God are all things, and every line of reasoning must culminate in Him; while no one way can lead us to the whole truth, which is so vast that the human mind can never hope to comprehend it. The inspired writer was only expressing the sense in which we must all be Agnostics, when he said: "Canst thou by searching find out God?" And yet it is because "He is not far from every one of us" that we apprehend Him in everything.

We have yet, however, to consider Kant's most subtle criticism of the Teleological argument. This is given in the *Critique of Judgment* where it is discussed much more elaborately than in the *Critique of*

Pure Reason. This criticism is that finality is merely a subjective principle of reflective judgment.

In order to make clear his somewhat confused discussion it will be necessary to state a little more precisely the steps in the Teleological argument. Lotze* has hit the nerve of the design argument, though his criticism of it does not seem just. He says that the argument is involved in a piece of circular reasoning, because it rests on the assertion of the improbability of certain results happening if they were not designed; but that this improbability holds only if we presuppose design, for then things which resulted without being designed would seem exceptions to the general rule; but if we do not presuppose design, then all this improbability vanishes; for the argument, says Lotze, rests on the belief that "what is without purpose, perverse and irrational, has a better title itself to existence, or is more likely, as such, to be real, than what is not so." This is not true. The design argument makes no presuppositions as to what is or is not likely to exist in such and such a case; nor does it presuppose design; but without any preconceived ideas at all, upon observation of the wonderful adaptations in nature, it argues that it is highly improbable that this could have happened if it had not been designed. Of course this is not demonstration, and it is open to critics to deny this improbability on which the argument rests; though we do not believe that they can show adequate grounds for this denial. However the nerve of the argument is this improbability just mentioned; and the argument is primarily, as has been remarked, "to design" and not "from it."

Three distinct steps may be traced in the argument. First, observation shows order, harmony, adaptation, and law in Nature. This rests on observation, and is not denied by those who will not admit finality. But, in the second place, is this order and adaptation finality? Are there ends in Nature? Can this order be explained by mechanical causes alone? The order and system is too vast and complex to have been produced by chance, but will not mechanical law and efficient causation explain it? Now we see phenomena where the results seem to have required such an extraordinary and complex combination of circumstances and mechanical causes, and where there is such an agreement of the present with the future, as Janet† puts it, that we are compelled to believe that this wonderful combination could not have been brought about if the idea of the end did not exist in the cause and determine the means. Now we have a direct knowledge only of the nature of our own acts, but here we find a direction of means to ends. But the actions of other

* Lotze, *Philosophy of Religion*, chap. i, §§ 10, 11.

† Janet, *Final Causes*, Bk. i, chap. i.

men resemble our own in every particular, and it seems as if they were directed to ends. Then the acts of animals while differing from those of men in that we do not ascribe any intentionality to them, which is not the question here as should be carefully noted, yet resemble them in being apparently directed to ends. Next, the relation between organ and function, organism and environment, is a witness of adaptation. In view of all this we conclude that finality is a law of nature. But, in the third place, does finality involve intentionality? Can we infer intentional finality and hence a conscious and intelligent cause of it? Here we argue that intentional finality is the only rational view. For since it is nature which forces us to admit finality, it cannot be merely subjective. We have left, then, as a cause of finality, either Nature itself or conscious intelligence. We know by our own consciousness that intelligence is a sufficient cause for it, and we know that it is characteristic of our intelligence to act for ends; but of unconscious finality we know nothing; so we conclude that it is more logical to infer conscious intelligence than that of which we know nothing, not even its possibility. Either the First Cause is absolutely unknowable or else this much anthropomorphism is necessary. It is the fact that we are created in God's image that enables us to know him. So that anthropomorphism is the assertion that His nature is in us to an imperfect degree, and not an imputation of our nature to Him; and it is difficult to see why Zoomorphism should be preferred to this. We are now concerned, however, not with the Philosophy of the Unconscious, but with Kant's doctrine of subjective finality; but because of the difficult nature of his discussion of this, we have outlined these steps in the argument in order that we may use them as guides in our examination of the Kantian doctrine, to which we now proceed.

As to the first step in the argument, the order and adaptation observable in nature, this he recognizes and presupposes in the *Critique of Judgment*, directing his whole discussion to the last two steps as stated. He asks whether this adaptation is "purposive," and whether we can infer an Intelligent Cause of the world. But he mingles these two points in the discussion, sometimes considering both at once and sometimes going from one to the other, so that we will endeavor, for the sake of clearness, to separate these points, and to present a brief statement of his views on each of these points, as given by him in the *Critique of Judgment*.

But before examining his theory of finality, we must see what the assumption of order and harmony involves. Dr. Flint* takes the position that it is merely a kind of finality; but Janet† and

*Flint, *Theism*, Lect. ii. †Janet, *Final Causes*, Bk. i, chap. v.

Diman* make order the basis of a separate argument for intelligence, so that even though we cannot infer finality from order, we may use the latter in our Theistic argument. Kant takes this order for granted, and then says that mechanical causes explain it, except in some cases where mechanism breaks down and where we must conceive an Intelligent Cause. Janet has made this mistake also, and Dr. Patton† has criticised him for it. The relation of intelligent causation to mechanism is not that the former comes in when the latter breaks down. There is a deeper relation than this. We ask, even where things are explained by mechanical causes, what is the cause of these causes? The Cosmos is a vast system of mathematical relations and dynamic sequences apart from any question of finality. Now we cannot propose mechanical law as the explanation, because it is precisely this law which we are seeking to account for, so that this would be begging the question. Law itself is the thing to be explained, and our alternatives are chance and intelligence, so that if we abandon the former we are driven to the latter. There is no other alternative, since we have seen it to be a *petitio principii* to hypostatize law, making a metaphysical entity out of it for its own explanation. And no more can we hypostatize chance. So that it seems that intelligence is the only possible conclusion. The world, considered as a Cosmos, is nearly as wonderful as when considered under the category of finality. It seems, then, that Kant's admission of the reign of law makes the concession which the Theist wishes, even though finality could not be proved. The argument from finality, however, is a still stronger evidence of intelligent causation, so that it is of the greatest importance to the Theist in giving the *a posteriori* side of Theism. We proceed, therefore, to a critical examination of the Kantian doctrine of finality.

In considering the question which has been given as the second step of the argument, whether we can infer finality from order and adaptation observed, Kant seeks to show that finality is merely a subjective principle of the reflective judgment. Its origin he explains substantially as follows:‡ The Understanding legislates *a priori* for knowledge of Nature as an object of sense. The Reason legislates *a priori* for the causality of freedom in the supersensible sphere. But the supersensible must be able to determine the sensible in regard to the causality of freedom, because the effects must take place in the sensible world, and although the possibility of this cannot be comprehended, it must be presupposed. The

*Diman, *The Theistic Argument*, chap. iv.

†Patton, *Syllabus of Lectures on Theism*.

‡Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, translation by Bernard, Introduction and Division 2.

effect in accordance with the concept of freedom is the final cause which ought to result in the natural world, hence the conditions of its resulting are presupposed in Nature. The Teleological judgment does this, and thus bridges the gap between the phenomenal and noumenal spheres. Therefore, it is a necessary judgment. But what is its nature? Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained in the universal. Now, if this universal be a necessary concept which renders experience possible, as do the categories of the Understanding, then the judgment is called a determinant one. But if we have only a particular empirical law, and try to find the concept for it, then the judgment which makes the subsumption is called a reflective judgment. Such a judgment cannot borrow its principle from experience, for it is seeking a necessary principle; nor can it get it from the Understanding, for then it would be a determinant judgment; therefore the faculty of judgment must itself supply this principle *a priori*. The principle is this. For reflection on Nature, if this is to be possible, the same *a priori* certainty must be conceived to be in the particular laws of nature as in the universal ones. They must be considered as if they proceeded from an Understanding, though not our own, so as to render possible a system of experience embracing the whole of nature; in short, nature must be conceived as purposive. Here are Kant's own words:* "As universal laws of nature have their ground in our understanding which prescribes them to nature, although only according to the universal concept of it as nature; so particular empirical laws, in respect of what is in them left undetermined by these universal laws, must be considered in accordance with such a unity as they would have if an Understanding, though not our Understanding, had furnished them to our cognitive faculties so as to make possible a system of experience according to particular laws of nature. Not as if in this way, such an Understanding must be assumed as actual, for it is only our reflective judgment to which this Idea serves as a principle, for reflecting, not for determining; but this faculty thus gives a law only to itself and not to nature." This concept, then, is only necessary for our understanding; and whether or not it is true objectively we cannot say, because it arises from the peculiarity of our understanding. It is the peculiarity of the human Understanding, says Kant, that it is discursive, that it proceeds from universals to particulars. But as these are undetermined by the universal concept, in order that they may be subsumed under it Reason demands that they be conceived as purposive. But Kant goes on to say that we must recognize the possibility of an Understanding which is intuitive and not discursive.

* Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, translated by Bernard, Introduction, ‡ 4.

Such an Understanding would intuite the whole and its parts in one act, so that there would be no necessity for any distinction between final and efficient causes, but the whole could contain the possibility of the parts, and itself be merely the result of them as causes; but in accordance with the peculiarity of our Understanding the whole must be considered the result of the parts, and it is impossible that it should contain the ground of the possibility of the parts, so that the idea of the whole must contain the possibility of the form and adjustment of the parts, and this idea of the whole is a purpose. So Kant concludes that finality is merely a concept necessary for our minds. This constitutes the nerve of his objection to the Teleological argument; for when we come to consider the two criticisms which he makes on the third step of the argument, that of the inference to an Intelligent Cause of finality, we will find that this same doctrine of subjective finality is repeated, and that it is the only one of the two criticisms which could have any weight. So that this second point being established, the Theist would have gained his point as far as Kant is concerned. Of course, in a treatise on Theism the doctrines of Hegel, Schopenhauer, and von Hartmann would also have to be considered.

Kant's doctrine of finality is open to the following objections:

In the first place the deduction of the principle of finality in nature from a necessity of connecting nature and freedom is a mistake. This is taking finality in its *a priori* and spiritual significance as referring to ultimate moral ends, and trying to introduce, or rather force, it into the sphere of observation and natural phenomena. This highest category of Reason has its proper place as we have seen, but not in the *a posteriori* argument from final causes. The concept of finality in nature, that is the finality inferred from the adaptations of means to ends in nature, cannot be deduced *a priori* from the concepts of morality. Any attempt to derive one of these teleological concepts from the other must lead to confusion, and it has led Kant into an unfair criticism of the *a posteriori* argument in question, because, having deduced the principle *a priori*, the argument would have to presuppose a knowledge of ultimate ends in the spiritual sphere. But this argument does not presuppose any knowledge of these, and is grounded entirely on observation, inference, and probability; so that Kant's criticism of it because of our ignorance of ultimate ends is groundless and arises from the confusion pointed out. In the second place, his doctrine of the subjective origin of finality is open to criticism. We have seen how he sought a more specific origin of this principle than the one just mentioned. The principle is a rational tendency due to the peculiar nature of our understanding, which is

discursive and not being able to intuite the whole and its parts must use this principle in the subsumption of particulars under universals. Now, of course, if the principle of finality in nature were *a priori* in the same sense as is that of causality, that of conditioning experience, then it would be objective; but this we concede to Kant is not the case. But we deny his statement that experience cannot prove it, and believe that he is wrong in making it merely a rational tendency. If by experience he mean direct observation, then this does not give the principle; but it is an inference from this with all the weight of probability upon probability until it almost reaches necessity and certainty. Finality is forced upon us by our observation of nature. It is a demand of Reason upon occasion of experience and therefore objective. Says Dr. Patton,* "If we were under the necessity of seeing finality in everything, then subjective finality would be the best guarantee of objective finality. It would be an *a priori* truth. But there is no such subjective necessity. And since we see finality in some things and not in others there must be some objective ground for this distinction." Trendelenburg also shows a contradiction at this point of Kant's argument. Here is his view, as summarized by Janet:† "If finality were a necessary form of our knowledge, as space and time are necessary forms of our sense intuition, all things would appear to us in the relation of means to ends. But no, according to Kant, the help of finality is called in when the explanation by efficient causes no longer suffices; it is the object itself which forces the mind to quit the road it was following. It is then the object which determines when we must apply the purely subjective principle of finality." The demand for this principle is occasioned by observation of nature. It is true, as Kant says, that our minds being constituted as they are we must conceive nature thus. But this is not a sufficient guarantee of its subjectivity. The assertion that it is, is merely his assertion of the relativity of knowledge, which postulates without grounds the existence of a reality which is not the object of consciousness. Knowledge implies a knowing mind, it is the mind's grasp of objective truth. We cannot say then, that because it requires a mind to know, knowledge is subjective. The knot of the question is whether or not there is any connection between our minds and their principles of knowledge, and Universal Reason which is the ground of all things. If we deny this connection, absolute skepticism must be the result. This objection of Kant to finality on the ground of its subjectivity finds its strongest answer in a criticism of his theory of knowledge. We conclude,

* Patton, *Syllabus of Lectures on Theism.*

† Janet, *Final Causes.*

then, that finality is an objective fact which demands our acceptation and calls for explanation.

With reference to the third step of the Teleological argument as stated, Kant's criticism is twofold.

The first one is this: * After criticising the doctrines of Epicurus, Spinoza, and of Hylozoism, he says of Theism that, while it is the best of all systems because it ascribes the purposes of nature to Intelligence, it nevertheless does not establish its claims, because it rests its inference on the basis of finality, which has been shown to be only a subjective principle. The second criticism, given in the section entitled "Physico-Theology," is this: † However far Physico-Theology be pushed, it can never disclose the ultimate purpose of creation, because it does not extend its inquiries beyond experience. It is based on inquiries into the purpose for which nature exists, and on this the concept of a Supreme Intelligence rests. Our ignorance of this ultimate purpose prevents us from inferring an Intelligent Cause of finality.

The first objection, that finality is merely a subjective principle, has been already dealt with; and we have seen that finality is a real truth to be explained, and, as Kant says, granting this, Theism seems a more reasonable theory than those of Epicurus and Spinoza and, we may add, than that of Hegel.

The second criticism was that the argument presupposed a knowledge of the ultimate end for which nature was created; and that our ignorance of this vitiates the argument, since from the knowledge of contingent ends in nature we cannot infer an Infinite Intelligence. With reference to this, it may be said that this *a posteriori* argument does not seek to infer Infinite Intelligence, but only to show that the First Cause is possessed of intelligence. It therefore does not presuppose any knowledge of ultimate ends; but from the wonderful adaptation of means to ends in nature, the mind concludes that the cause of all this must have been an intelligent cause. When this is done this argument has performed its special function. This last criticism is irrelevant, because it requires the argument to prove too much.

As long as men continue to seek adequate reasons for the phenomena about them this argument will continue to have weight, in spite of the subtle criticisms of philosophers. Men never can be made to believe that this vast and wonderful cosmos resulted from chance or that mechanical law is self-explanatory. Neither will they believe that it resulted from the evolution of an immanent principle which reaches self-consciousness only in man, and so can-

* Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Bernard's translation, § 73.

† Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, § 85.

not be "external to anything;" no more will they believe that their firm conviction is a mere vagary resulting from the peculiarity of their mind. The belief will always exist that Conscious Intelligence is at the beginning of things as well as that it is their ground, immanent in nature and man, yet external to both. The supernatural can never be reduced merely to the spiritual.

The conclusion from all this would seem to be that the position reached *a priori* is confirmed by *a posteriori* considerations. That we get a true view of reality, no matter which of the two standpoints we take. That they thus agree is strong evidence of the truth of each.

To leave the consideration of any aspect of Kantism without including the results of the *Metaphysics of Ethics* and the *Critique of the Practical Reason* would be unjust and would give no adequate conception of his system. In an age when the commands of duty had been reduced to maxims of prudence or of inclination, he raised his voice more powerfully than any other to show the sacredness of duty; for in spite of the Utilitarian way in which his categorical imperative voices itself, this is given as a test rather than a ground of Rightness, the ground being found in man's noumenal nature, which connects him through freedom to Reason Universal. The autonomy of the will is the basis of his Ethics, and is open to severe criticism; but he certainly did uphold duty as against a calculating morality. And furthermore he showed the necessity of a Metaphysical basis for Ethics. We will have to consider, then, very briefly, his Ethical teaching, and here of course only so far as it bears directly on Theism.

The relation of Theism and Ethics he conceived, we believe, inadequately. The true relation between them, or the moral argument for Theism is, briefly, this. The three fundamental categories of Ethics are Moral obligation, the Right, and the Good. Our consciousness tells us that we are under an unconditional obligation to conform our conduct to a certain standard of Rightness and to realize a certain end or *summum bonum*. This is all that our moral consciousness tells us, but there must be some ultimate metaphysical explanation of these categories. Beginning with the fact of moral obligation, we see that to give this any empirical deduction would result in reducing it to a hypothetical imperative; and to make the will absolutely and unconditionally legislative for itself must result either in a philosophy of caprice which would explain away the categorical imperative, or else in the Ethical Pantheism of Fichte. The only adequate explanation of the categorical imperative, therefore, is one which distinctly separates the Absolute and Relative wills; regarding moral obligation as the Will of God binding His

creatures to Right, which must consequently be explained as His nature, and to realize the good, which must embrace human well-being or perfection and happiness, and God's glory. That the Absolute must be possessed of moral attributes is thus the testimony of moral phenomena. Let us now examine Kant's doctrine of the relation of Theism and Ethics. He lays down what he believes to be the two great foundations of Ethics in his *Metaphysics of Ethics*. He tells us* that from experience we can never tell of an action whether it is objectively right only, or whether it is also subjectively right, that is, done merely out of respect for the moral law; but that we conclude that whether or not there are actions of this latter kind cannot be the question, and that Reason itself, independent of all experience, tells us what ought to take place, and that this imperative is categorical. This imperative, being a fact of consciousness, must have some explanation which will render it possible. He lays down the principle of the autonomy of the will as the ground and explanation of the moral law. The will must legislate for itself by an *a priori* maxim, because all heteronomous theories are inadequate, empirical principles being unable to give a categorical imperative, and the rational principle of perfection being too indefinite, while the theological view of connecting the moral law with God would necessitate an "intuition of the Divine Perfection" which we cannot have. So he concludes that the moral law in our consciousness is the "*ratio cognoscendi*" of freedom, while freedom is the "*ratio essendi*" of the moral law. This being the case, we expect some superficial conception of the connection of God and Morality. It is found in the consideration of the *summum bonum*. This is the material category of Ethics, and Kant shows† that it must include happiness as well as virtue,—"worthiness to be happy." It is here that the existence of God can be shown. Kant gives this in substance as follows:‡ Man ought not to seek happiness, but he ought to realize it. But happiness is the harmony of all physical nature with one's end. Now the acting, rational being is not the cause of nature, and there is no necessary connection between virtue and happiness. Therefore the supposition of a supreme Moral Cause of nature, a Holy Will, is necessary in order to connect necessarily the two elements of the *summum bonum*. We must therefore predicate moral attributes of God. Thus the moral law leads through the conception of the *summum bonum* to religion. The moral laws are recognized as Divine commands, not in the sense that they are right because God wills them, but because He is holy, and His will is in accordance with them.

* Kant, *Metaphysics of Ethics*, Abbot's translation, Preface, § 2.

† Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Bk. ii, chap. ii.

‡ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Abbot's translation, Bk. ii, chap. ii, § 5

Now in the first place, God stands in such a doctrine in too external and superficial a relation to Ethics. He is brought in merely in order to get over a difficulty in harmonizing the elements of the *summum bonum*. The categories of Moral obligation and Rightness can be explained without Him. This leaves us with a theory of freedom which is caprice, and instead of explaining moral obligation explains it away. On the contrary we know that the imperative speaks to us with all the constraint of an Absolute Will commanding our own, and cannot be explained as our noumenal self determining our phenomenal self. God, with Kant, becomes the moral governor because He has a holy will which perfectly obeys this principle of Rightness which is external to and above Him. All this difficulty arises because Kant thinks that if we explained the moral law by God's will it would make it arbitrary. He does not seem to see another alternative, that God's will and nature cannot be in opposition. God must will these laws because they are the expression of His nature. It is the fact of the determinism of the divine will which makes a necessity of the Christian Mystery in the Incarnation and Atonement. Surely as far as arbitrariness is concerned nothing could be more so than Kant's theory. It is just because God is the *ratio essendi* of all the ethical categories that we ascribe to Him a moral nature. The objection that we can have no "intuition of the divine perfection" could be urged only if God were entirely different from us and out of all relation to us. But it has been seen that the Self-revealing Spirit which a true Metaphysics gives us, can be like us because we have been formed in His image. It is this truth that makes all knowledge possible, and Agnosticism must be the result of denying it. In order to know nature, we must determine our series of states of consciousness in time in relation to a relating and unifying self-consciousness which cannot be part of the series; and this in turn must be a true copy of that self-consciousness which makes nature possible. If then our noumenal self carry with it a moral ideal so must God also be conceived as possessed of moral attributes.

But even passing any defects in Kant's theory, we may ask, Upon what does it all rest? What is his ground for asserting that the Practical Reason opens up the noumenal sphere? Kant says* that it is not opened to knowledge. Freedom, God and Immortality are not matters of knowledge but only deducible from the Moral law, which is the one point where the noumenal world enters our consciousness. But we may well ask what special right it has to this unique position. Examination of consciousness will show us that the necessity accompanying our theoretical principles is just as strong

*Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Preface.

and true, just as universal. It would seem, then, that we must admit the validity of our theoretical principles in the noumenal sphere, or else become agnostic in Ethics also. Kant's position is not logical. He is not logically constructive. Yet through all, this was his aim, this was the spirit of his whole system.

The ruling categories of eighteenth-century thought were those of individualism, mechanism, and sensationalism. These had such a hold on the human mind that it seemed as if Philosophy was to be forever impossible. Knowledge must be explained mechanically and sensationally, or its possibility denied. Morality must be reduced to physical necessity, or at best to a calculus of prudence. Religion was an empty name. Kant lived and thought just at this time. He gives noble expression to the power and worth of the human spirit. He illumines everything with the light of self-consciousness. He brings out the *a priori* elements in knowledge. He places morality above prudence. He causes the great movement of German Idealism. In short he makes possible the whole intellectual life of the nineteenth century. He rises, an intellectual giant, tearing himself from the fetters of the preceding thought; and though he is held back half chained, as it were, by the very bonds whose power he fought so nobly to break, and did break, yet the first step was the hardest to take, and he must be classed with the world's great thinkers whose influence has been positive and constructive. He will always be, as Dr. Stirling says, "der ehrliche Kant."

PRINCETON. C. WISTAR HODGE, JR.

VII.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

THE ONE LAWGIVER.

One of the most distinctly marked features of the Church of the present day is the weakened hold which men have of the doctrine of future retribution. This is shown not by the alteration of creeds and confessions, but by the publication of books and pamphlets, by the utterances of prominent men in different communions and by the action of various local ecclesiastical bodies. In these it is declared with more or less emphasis that sin is not eternal, and that one day all men without exception will be brought home to happiness and to God. But if this be true then there is no such thing as retribution. All the penal sanctions of the law are changed into corrections, their real ultimate end being not the satisfaction of justice but the reformation of the transgressor. Sympathy with the wrongdoer takes the place of sympathy with eternal rectitude. This arises from a feeble sense of the evil of sin. Men shrink from the unsparing denunciations of Scripture, and are disposed to palliate and excuse moral delinquencies as if they were infirmities, accidents due to the weakness of man's nature, greatly to be regretted indeed and avoided, yet not by any means demanding a penalty strictly endless. If we trace farther back the source of these views, we find it in the inadequate apprehensions men have of the Divine Law. They do not keep in mind its holy spiritual, searching, inflexible character. They do not recognize its absolute and unchangeable authority. They merge all the perfections of God into His one aspect as a Father, and so overlook His majesty as a Moral Governor. Forgetting, too, that even a father must rule and that a family without discipline is on the sure road to ruin, they so explain the divine paternity as to make it mere good nature. The Father of all cannot finally reject any, and His grace is as universal as mankind. Making happiness rather than holiness the last end of His procedures, they resolve the law into an educational institution instead of an original and unbending standard of duty. They see no force in the fine lines of Wordsworth:

> Stern daughter of the will of God!
> O Duty! if that name thou love,
> Who art a light to guide, a rod
> To check the erring, and reprove.

In direct opposition to all such loose and indefinite opinions stands

the positive assertion of the Apostle James (iv. 12), "There is one Lawgiver." This pregnant statement is introduced in a way characteristic of a large portion of the New Testament, where the discussion or the decision of a single point of moral duty is made to turn on principles of world-wide comprehension. The apostle was rebuking the censorious habits of his brethren. He says that their sitting in judgment upon others was a reversal of the natural and appropriate order of things. As subjects of the law, obedience was their one simple duty. But instead of confining themselves to this, they thought and talked about the disobedience of others; they examined the scope and meaning of the law and applied it to their fellows. In so doing they usurped the function of the author and applier of the law, and thus violated a fundamental principle. For, he says (we render the passage according to the order of the original and the text of the latest critics), *One is the Lawgiver and Judge, who is able to save and to destroy.* One Being and one only is the Author and the Administrator of the law, and He alone has the power to make that administration effective and final.

Of course the apostle did not mean to deny that there is any other legislation that is legitimate and authoritative. Such there is and always has been. But it is of the earth, and earthly. It is confined to particular times and places. It is limited to external conduct. It is always subject to change, whether its origin has been in conquest, in usage or in the free choice of those who constitute the lawgivers. The world's history furnishes many illustrious examples of jurisprudence from the days of Solon to the Code Napoleon. But the best of these are only partial and tentative. Their authors to the extent of their ability applied the principles of universal reason to the mutual relations of men, but there they stopped. They could not enter the interior domain of the soul, nor even outside of that domain could they speak with original authority. At an infinite remove beyond the greatest of these, or all of them together, stands the One Lawgiver who speaks for all worlds and for all time, who lays His hand upon the whole nature of man, and whose decisions are irreversible. He is the original fountain of law and government, and the best human institutions are such simply because they rest upon His ordinance and carry out His purposes.

That God is a Lawgiver arises from the fact that He is Creator. Even in the lower sphere of physical forces, it would be inconsistent with His perfections to allow the existence of a permanent chaos. We should expect, what science shows to have been the fact so far as its observation extends, that the irregular action which undoubtedly once existed was intended only to precede and introduce an orderly succession of phenomena, *i. e.*, that chaos would end in cosmos. Hence there is a propriety in the expression "the laws of nature," since it denotes regular sequences of events as the result of a supreme will. The heavens and the earth declare the glory of God, because

they are under law to Him, and that fact is the foundation not only of all knowledge and all progress, but even of existence itself. Were there no uniformity in natural sequences, science would become guesswork and life a riddle.*

But if God imposes law upon unorganized matter, much more must He upon rational beings. Man, we are told, was made in the image of God, a free, self-conscious agent, endowed with reason, conscience and will, and therefore raised immeasurably above all other orders of being on earth. As the immediate offspring of God he partakes of His spiritual nature, and therefore is capable of knowing Him and having communion with Him. But he is also capable of turning away from Him and pursuing wrong courses. This would be true were a man a purely spiritual being, but much more must it be true when we consider that he is of a composite nature, having a true body as well as a reasonable soul. And this body has appetites which are exposed to perverse influences even more than the passions of the mind. Man, therefore, must have a rule of action. His own moral constitution requires it as well as his relation to his Maker upon whom he is dependent and to whom he is subject. The wise and holy God cannot be indifferent to the character of His intelligent creatures either in respect to their dispositions or their conduct. He must have a will upon the subject, and that will must necessarily take the shape of law. It is indeed conceivable that He might have so constituted men that they would always be disposed to do right, an infallible propensity of nature guiding them at every step, so that there never could be a possibility of their going wrong either from inclination or from mistake. In such a case there would be no need of a formal law. Reason would be as unerring as instinct. A constitution so essentially and inalienably conformed to the Divine Will would be its own law. But, so far as we know, the Almighty never did constitute any of His creatures after this manner. Even the angels, who excel in strength, were made under a possibility of falling, and many of them actually did fall.

Such being the case, man with all his high endowments being fallible and peccable, there must needs be given to him a fixed rule of conduct. The existence of law, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity. It springs out of the very nature of things. Man would not be man and God would not be God were there not a standard of truth

* "If natural laws were not inexorable, if they were changeful, erratic and uncertain in their action, life would be intolerable and this world a frightful chaos. No plans could then be made; no undertakings could be securely developed; the material and moral progress of the race comes to an end; society dissolves in physical anarchy for which it is not responsible; the sciences explode in ruins; the arts topple from their sinking foundations; the individual cowers before the cruel caprice of his Creator. The one beautiful remnant of the original creation which survives, towering like a sublime Greek peristyle above the heaping ruins of man's sinful life, is the inexorable, the unchangeable character of natural laws."—*Charles Cuthbert Hall, D.D.*

and duty. Conscience would have no basis for its action were its possessor not amenable to a moral governor who had expressed His will in an authoritative shape. Mere suggestion or advice will not answer. There must be something absolute and peremptory, something that comes as the irrevocable declaration of God's own judgment of good and evil, something established over mankind, like the sun in the firmament, the same from the world's first day to the last. It says, *Thou shalt*, or *Thou shalt not*, and it means to be obeyed. It has, therefore, sanctions, as it, indeed, must have; otherwise it would not be law at all, but a mere expression of opinion. And these sanctions must be enforced. For if not, then they might just as well not exist. A *brutum fulmen* is of no more account than the coruscations of a summer's evening sky called "heat lightning." Hence the apostle says, "One is the Lawgiver and Judge," the giving of a law implying the subsequent holding of a judgment to see whether the law has been complied with. And this judgment is not theoretical but practical, for He who holds it is "able to save and to destroy." He has the power to give actual effect to His adjudications. And this power He will certainly exercise, else why should its possession be asserted?

God, then, is a Lawgiver in the just and full sense of that term. Nor can the edge of this statement be turned by the declaration that He is also a father, and has whatever feelings and views are implied in that tender and endearing relation. There is no necessary inconsistency in the two terms. It is essential to a father's position that he have authority, since the weakness, the ignorance, the dependence of his children require that they should be under direction, and that direction whatever name it may take is really law, *i. e.*, the expression of the will of a superior, attended with appropriate sanctions. How can a family exist, how can any of its ends be secured, without law? Can there be a more vivid, earthly representation of the pit than a household where there is no restraint, no order, no control, but all the evil tendencies and malignant passions of our fallen nature run riot? It is insisted, therefore, that the Fatherhood of God so far from being in derogation of His authority as Lawgiver is rather in confirmation of it.

When Hooker, in the famous passage which closes the first book of the Ecclesiastical Polity, said of law, that "her seat is in the bosom of God," he declared a necessary and ultimate truth. Here is the primal fount of all obligation. Other rulers and legislators derive their legitimacy from circumstances, and are, therefore, subject to constant modifications, owing to the inevitable change of these circumstances by force or fraud or human mutability. But God is Lawgiver in consequence of the perfections of His own nature, and therefore holds this office for all creatures and through all time. He is the supreme authority for the universe, so that there is no exaggerated emphasis in the assertion, *One is the Lawgiver and Judge*. All others

are limited, and derived, and imperfect, and temporary: He is underived and unlimited and infallible and eternal. Creatures can no more escape from His law than they can from His presence. Like Himself it pervades all space and all time. Let men go where they will, to the uttermost parts of the sea or to the utmost bounds of the everlasting hills, to the heights of heaven above or to the depths of sheol beneath, still, still, everywhere they are beset behind and before by the unalterable declaration of God's judgment concerning good and evil. It encompasses them like an atmosphere. It is as universal and unalterable as the chain of sequences in the physical world. Nay, more so. For one day the heaven shall pass away with a great noise and the elements shall be dissolved with fervent heat; the whole natural order of the world shall cease; but never the moral order of the creation. It inheres in the very nature of God and the necessary relations of rational and responsible creatures, and, therefore, is everlasting and unchangeable, taking in all worlds and all states of being. Yes, the grass withereth and the flower fadeth; one generation goeth and another cometh; the pillar'd firmament is rottenness; but the Word of the Lord stands through the unwasting ages,—

ONE IS THE LAWGIVER AND JUDGE.

NEW YORK. TALBOT W. CHAMBERS.

VIII.

REVIEWS OF

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

I.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE REVISERS' GREEK TEXT. A Critical Examination of Certain Readings, Textual and Marginal, in the Original Greek of the New Testament adopted by the late Anglo-American Revisers. By the Rev. S. W. WHITNEY, A.M. Boston: Silver, Burdett & Co., 1892. 2 vols., 12mo, pp. 361, 350. $5.00.

Most of those who followed the progress of the late revision of the translation of the New Testament will recall the incessant and violent attacks by Dean Burgon upon the text which was the basis of their work. Many scholars have been surprised to learn that we have in the United States a follower of the Dean, who has occupied much of his time for eleven years in gathering material for an onslaught upon the "Revisers' Greek Text." Mr. Whitney cannot be charged with being precipitate in the presentation of whatever conclusions he has reached. On the other hand, if his work be found faulty, he may not plead that he did not realize how serious was his undertaking. We had been reverently congratulating ourselves that the Revised Version was an improvement upon the Authorized not only in respect of faithfulness to the original, but also in that the text which it translated was much nearer that of the autographs than was the *Textus Receptus*, the basis of the Authorized Version. Out of this state of mind we are now startled by being assured that probably "the Revisers' Greek text is less trustworthy than the best editions of the commonly accepted text." The seven hundred pages of the two volumes before us are devoted to the task of proving this unpleasant proposition. Not only is this the case, but the author tells us in the Preface (p. 4), that he has not done his worst,—that "at almost every turn . . . . spurious readings appear in the Revisers' Greek, which need to be corrected. . . . ." Truly, the case must be bad indeed when volumes larger than the New Testament itself only begin the task of showing the deficiencies of our supposed best text.

We must be careful to note here that the Revisers issued *no official Greek text*. Two texts which have a semi-official character were issued from the University Presses of Oxford and Cambridge, one edited by the brilliant, though erratic, Dr. Scrivener, and the other by E. Palmer. Westcott and Hort's text, now the companion of many clergymen and the text-book of

most theological students, must not be mistaken for that which the Revisers followed, although it is practically the same, and Mr. Whitney's animus is as violent against the one as against the other. Consequently the object of our author's animadversions is necessarily at times inferential.

The fundamental thesis of the author is that the oldest manuscripts, upon which the Revisers most leaned, are radically corrupt; that, inferentially, the cursive rather than the uncial manuscripts are the fittest and most reliable witnesses for the true text. He assumes the existence, as early as the sixth and following centuries, of a well-developed and scholarly textual criticism which produced the text as found mainly in the cursives. How a scholarly textual criticism should thus have produced texts so discordant as those which the cursives show as compared with the substantial agreement (notwithstanding our author's denial of this agreement, Vol. i, p. 48, *et saepe*), of, say, the texts of Tischendorf, Lachmann and Westcott and Hort, he does not explain. Let our author's own words (Vol. i, p. 21) show his position: "The older manuscripts, while more likely *on account of their antiquity*" (italics are ours) "to present many early corruptions, ... are also on account of their age likely to present, *now and then*" (italics still ours) "a genuine reading, which may not be found in the great majority, *if in any*" (our italics again), "of the more recent ones." But the most curious defect of Mr. Whitney's entire work is that never once does he give a hint of the method he would employ to detect these genuine readings in the old manuscripts he so distrusts. Let us hear our author further: "In fact, it by no means follows that a New Testament manuscript of the fourth century, for example, presents a more correct text than one of the fifth or even of the tenth century. It may even be said that the probabilities are that the later manuscript, as a whole, is quite as likely to present the genuine text as the older, if not more so" (Vol. i, p. 20). Surely, in view of all that we know of copyists' errors alone, the position of Mr. Whitney is curious. So another statement of his sounds peculiar: "The only place that can stand in need of the textual critic's notice or touch, is where obvious error of some kind exists in the text, and where rival readings are presented, concerning which he needs to pass judgment, and decide, if possible, what the true reading may be" (Vol. i, p. 46). It has always seemed to us that what our author demands has always, or very nearly always, been provided by the Revisers. But what he evidently means (though his words do not necessarily carry that meaning) is, that where a *Textus Receptus* reading gives good sense it should be let alone. Yet, how many are the readings which give good sense and yet are clearly not correct. Along this line one thing more in the Introduction calls for remark. It is the implication (see *e. g.*, p. 47) that the Revisers have made "nonsense of the text." Such treatment of the Revisers' work is decidedly disingenuous; it is unworthy such a painstaking and undoubtedly honest critic as Mr. Whitney is.

So much for the assumptions upon which the work is based. If such manuscripts as ℵ, B, L and 33, and the Itala, Syriac and Egyptian versions are to be regarded as suspicious *because of their antiquity*, assuredly a reconstruction of the science of textual criticism is to-day the crying need of New Testament study. That such a position is untenable goes without saying. It is important to note this basis of the criticism, for the value or lack of value of the work depends upon the correctness of the estimate of the worth of these early manuscripts and versions.

The canvass of Mr. Whitney's examination of the text of the Revisers proves that he has a wide acquaintance with the readings of New Testament manuscripts. Indeed, we question whether any scholar in America, now that Dr. Ezra Abbott is dead, excels him in this regard, unless it be Dr. Isaac H.

Hall. Perusal of even a few pages of his critique shows that he has spared neither time nor patience in the investigations pursued. But we are also brought face to face with the fact that he counts, rather than weighs, his authorities. Setting aside altogether his bias in favor of the late manuscripts as against ℵ and B, his methods evince a disregard of the genealogical grouping of manuscripts. A manuscript is to him simply one manuscript. His flings at the terminology "Alexandrian," "Syrian," "Western," are open. Nevertheless, whatever fault be found with those terms, there is no room to question the facts for which they stand.

Following out his work on his own lines, he has been compelled to modify in some particulars the thesis which he set out to prove, viz., that the *Textus Receptus* is a better text than the Revisers'. In some cases he has admitted that the reading of the common text is inadmissible. In numerous instances he has proved his case—that the Revisers' readings are questionable; but they made no claim to having reached final conclusions in all cases. So far as he has called attention anew to those instances, Mr. Whitney has done real service to the students of the Word, and future revisers will have to reckon with him. But in many instances we think he has wasted his energies. It seems unfortunate, for example, that about one-third of the readings with which he finds fault are in the margin. If so much was wrong with the body of the text, why waste time and space on marginal matter? One instance of this sort will illustrate our point. In Matt. v. 25, margin, the Revisers have: "Some ancient authorities omit *deliver thee*." On this Mr. Whitney remarks (Vol. i, p. 66): "The omission is attested *only*" (italics ours) "by the Sinaitic and Vatican manuscripts, four cursives (one of these second hand), one copy of the Old Latin, the Ethiopic and Armenian versions. Chrysostom and the two Latin Fathers, Arnobius and Hilary. It was hardly worth while to notice the circumstance in such a way; and the only apparent reason for so doing is the fact that Lachmann, Tischendorf and Westcott and Hort omit the words." Scholars are wont to think that when Lachmann, Tischendorf and Westcott and Hort agree, the text is pretty nearly the best we can reach. But outside of this we submit that our author's judgment can not be too implicitly followed if such an array of authorities as that given above is considered to carry no weight. The statement "some ancient authorities" is surely moderate enough to satisfy a fair-minded scholar.

We are sometimes carried into the realm of probability for support for the author's opinion; for instance he says (Vol. i, p. 67): "to which (other testimony) we should probably be able to add A and C *if their testimony were not lost*." Of course it is open to the other side to demand the basis for such a statement, or even to claim that A and C would favor their reading "if their testimony were not lost."

Perhaps enough has been said to indicate the value the work appears to possess. It is to be regretted that the author has so great bias against the Revisers' text. That a body of scholars so erudite, so painstaking, so fair, and so conservative could have made so pitiable a failure as Mr. Whitney would have us believe can hardly be credited. We wish we could commend the work in proportion to the labor the author has bestowed upon it. We fear, however, that the undertone of prejudice which unfortunately runs through both volumes, and the mistaken estimate of the value of certain manuscripts upon which Mr. Whitney has built his criticism, will deprive even the just strictures of the Revisers' text of the weight to which a more dispassionate presentation would have entitled them.

Brooklyn. GEORGE W. GILMORE.

DAS BUCH JESAIA. Uebersetzt und erklärt von D. BERNH. DUHM, o. Prof. d. Theol. in Basel. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1892.

This is a volume in Nowack's *Handkommentar zum Alten Testament*. It contains twenty-two large pages of introductory matter, and 458 pages of commentary. The type is clear, and the mechanical work reasonably well done. The poetical parts of the text are printed in lines, and different kinds of type are used to indicate the supposed composite character of the text. The literary work is carefully done throughout, and the translation and comment indicate fine literary insight. Especially there is a clearness and ripeness of statement that is in favorable contrast with a great deal of work that is done on the Old Testament.

With these words of praise, this notice must now confine itself to certain general considerations touching the point of view of the book, and the opinions it advocates. Using the term school in a very broad sense, the book has the virtues and the vices of the school to which it belongs. Scholars like Prof. Duhm find the Church in possession of certain traditional views as to the origin and character of the books of the Bible. On general principles, it must be that some of these traditions are true; but others never had any ground save poor conjecture; and still others have come to be wrongly understood, and so have lost whatever truth they may originally have had. Scholarly men find the churches disposed to adhere undiscriminatingly to views to which they are accustomed, the untenable as well as the tenable, rather than take the trouble to restudy the matter. They sometimes find the defenders of the old views ready to accuse rather than to argue, ready to prop up their opinions by harmonistic hypotheses rather than examine and repair the foundations, ready to enlarge a thimbleful of evidence into a hogshead of orthodox conclusions. So far as the efforts of Prof. Duhm and others like him are directed to the breaking up of this state of things, they are commendable. To the extent to which they have engaged in the patient, careful study of matters not heretofore sufficiently noticed, their work is praiseworthy. As a matter of fact, they are making real and rich contributions to our knowledge of the Scriptures. And though orthodoxy counts them as foes, it may receive from them a richer boon than from any of its friends, in its being driven in self-defense to a study more patient and fruitful than theirs.

But when these men resort to the same mistaken methods which they disapprove in their opponents, especially when they make everything depend on the acceptance of schemes which have no ground whatever excepting harmonistic hypotheses, when they reason by maximizing the evidence for one side and minimizing that for the other, then they show that they are human and fallible like other men.

Prof. Duhm starts with the assumption that the writings attributed to Isaiah were open to change until the book became canonical, and that this occurred a good while after the making of the Septuagint translation, when the so-called Earlier and Later Prophets came to be classed together as a division of the Scriptures. He affirms that the first clear mention of the book in its present form is in Luke iv. 17. So he concludes that if, in the year 100 B.C., any one happened to find a writing that was correctly or incorrectly attributed to Isaiah, we know of no reason for thinking that he would have hesitated to rewrite it, adding or omitting at his pleasure. If we do not accept this assumption, if we regard it as very improbable that, up to a century before Christ, the writings of Isaiah existed in forms in which they were open to extensive changes, Prof. Duhm will fail to carry us with him in many of the views he advocates.

But what ground is there for assuming that there was no recognized prophetic canon prior to our present classification of the Earlier and Later Prophets? What ground is there for assuming that any Scriptural book became recognized as sacred only by the process of being classed with others in an official canon? Prof. Duhm has good company in these assumptions; but they are not merely baseless; they are contrary to probability and to evidence. The idea that any writing attributed to a great prophet was open to extensive changes by others, after it had once been put on record, is an idea whose validity should be proved, and not taken for granted. It is not to be accepted without proof.

Prof. Duhm says that Isa. xliv. 28 is cited in 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22 *sq.*, as from Jeremiah; and he infers from this that Isa. xl–lxvi cannot then have belonged to a book of Isaiah. But it is not clear that the author of Chronicles represents Cyrus as alluding to the words in Isaiah. He certainly does not cite the passage, or represent Cyrus as citing it, as if it were from Jeremiah. And if he did, it would be strange reasoning to infer that there was then no book of Isaiah with the last twenty-seven chapters in it.

Instances like these are very abundant. The conclusions which Prof. Duhm seeks to establish by them are of great importance. He regards our Book of Isaiah as a collection of productions of different authors of different dates. But many weaknesses need to be eliminated from his argument before it will justify our acceptance of his views in the points where they conflict with what seems to be the plain meaning of passages in Isaiah, or in the New Testament, or even in the Apocrypha or Josephus.

Auburn. WILLIS J. BEECHER.

THE LIFE OF JESUS CRITICALLY EXAMINED. By Dr. DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS. Translated from the Fourth German Edition by GEORGE ELIOT. Second Edition, in one volume. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1892. 8vo, pp. xxxviii, 784.

The republication of "George Eliot's" translation of Strauss' *Leben Jesu* places that book once more in the hands of students of the history of destructive criticism, and is, in that point of view, a thing to be welcomed. There can be no safety obtained by evangelical Christianity through ignorance of the work of those who have sapped and mined at its foundations.

On the other hand, it is a sign of the times, and one of numerous present-day indications of the marshaling of forces for a still more decisive battle over the supernatural character of the foundation documents of the Christian religion. In this point of view, the instructive Introductory Essay from the pen of Prof. Pfleiderer, which has been prefixed to this edition, is very significant. In it the Berlin professor and recent Edinburgh Gifford lecturer points out the epoch-making character of Strauss' work; regrets such "concessions to supernaturalistic dogma" as are made by even such writers as Keim; and commends to all, such destructive criticism as Strauss', in order to clear their eyes from the glare of "the imaginary lights of mythological tradition," and prepare them to see what truth exists "in the twilight of the Biblical origins of our religion." The reception accorded by "liberal critics" to this republication of Strauss, in what we had hoped were these more instructed days, tells the same story. Mr. J. Frederick Smith, writing in *The New World*, for example, greets it with acclamations. "After all," he cries, "the book was not slain; or if it was slain, it has come to life again, and 'the last error is worse than the first' . . . . The critic Strauss still lives!"

No mistake could be greater than the prevalent popular impression that the critical battle has been fought, as regards the New Testament, once for

all; and that now we have to face such destructive theories as were once applied to the New Testament, only in the sphere of Old Testament criticism. There is as great a body of destructive critical literature published annually upon New Testament as upon Old Testament books; and it is quite as radical in its results. The only difference between the two spheres is that evangelical men have "oriented" themselves with reference to New Testament criticism of this type; and the Church has become aware that it is not for her, and has left it to one side, not concerning herself further with it. The greater popular interest in destructive Old Testament criticism is due solely to the fact that, as yet, the Christian world in general has not turned its back upon it, as a matter outside its concern and merely the plaything of unbelieving puzzle-lovers. The vigorous destructive New Testament criticism is looked upon now by the Church only with the same kind of interest as that with which she regards such polemic writings against Christianity as a Buddhist or a Mohammedan may put forth—as, say, *The Spirit of Islam* of Syed Ameer Ali. When the essentially antisupernaturalistic character of the postulates of the current Old Testament criticism is as fully realized by the Church, it too will go upon the shelf.

The only danger in this attitude is that after awhile, when the course of the debate is forgotten and Christian men are no longer prepared to meet the assaults afresh, new inroads of destructive methods of criticism may be made before the Church once more awakes and finds her bearings. And the remedy for this is to keep in knowledge the details of the controversies of the past as well as of those of the present. We must have our Neanders, and Ebrards, and Lechlers, and Lightfoots always with us, that the Strausses and Baurs may be recognized as interesting curiosities of bygone days, and the Pfleiderers, and Stecks, and Völters as untimely births of the present.

Princeton. BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Schrifte des Institutum Judaicum in Berlin, No. 10: JESUS CHRISTUS IM THALMUD. Von Studienlehrer HEINRICH LAIBLE. Mit einem Anhange, "Die thalmudischen Texte," mitgeteilt von Lic. Dr. GUSTAF DOLMAN. Berlin: H. Reuther, 1891. 8vo, pp. vi, 96 and 20. Price, 2 marks.

The purpose of this carefully written and thoughtful brochure is to answer the question, What says the Talmud about Jesus? on the basis of the unexpurgated editions of the Talmud and the fresh materials recently brought to light mainly by the textual researches of Rabbinowicz. It was undertaken at the instance of Prof. Dr. Hermann L. Strack and completed with his coöperation, appearing first in the well-known *Nathanael*, *Zeitschrift für die Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche an Israel*, Vol. vi, 1890, pp. 1-39 and 73-127. "The importance of the theme, however," says Dr. Strack in his introductory note, "called for its separate publication; for this, Herr Lic. Dr. Gustaf Dolman has added an accurate edition of the unexpurgated original text of the passages in question after the oldest prints and the work of Rabbinowicz." He has also appended several notes to the text of Laible, so that the work bears the *imprimatur* of Strack and Dolman, and can thus be considered an authoritative, trustworthy and true presentation of all that the Talmud has to say in regard to the person, work and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth.

The main facts, according to the Talmud, in regard to Jesus are succinctly as follows: The putative father of Jesus was Paphos ben Jehuda, a carpenter by profession, but jealous and suspicious in his character; so much so that he denied Mary her marriage due and locked her up when going to work.

Mary, a female hairdresser, or, later, a small vegetable huckstress, was led by her husband's marital unfaithfulness into adultery, and was summarily divorced, becoming the butt of the lewd, ribald jokes of the time. Wandering, outcast and abandoned in the slums of the city, she gave birth to the bastard Jesus, begotten when she was menstruant (see Lev. xv. 24, xx. 10, 18) by Pandera, a cursed Roman soldier. Such is the immaculate conception. In hell, Mary is punished by suspension by her breasts because she fasted one day and counted it two. Insolence, insubordination and inattention characterized all Jesus' dealings with His teacher, R. Joshua ben Perachja; while immorality displayed itself in His dealings with men and women, towards which latter He cast many amorous glances, so that His life was shortened to thirty-three years, in accordance with the statement, "Thirty-three years old was Balaam, the lame, when the robber, Pilate, put him to death." Jesus' lameness was due to a fall occurring during the exercise of His magic arts. That Jesus was a fool follows from His assertion of the filial Godhood in opposition to the Monotheism of the Torah, while His idolatry appears from His public offering of incense in the open streets. Nay, more—"He has wrought magic, deceived and seduced ISRAEL" to apostasy from God and Judaism. Thus He is the Balaam κατ' ἐξοχήν, the perfected antitype of the Old Testament heresiarch. His antagonism to Pharisaic Mosaism appears in the designation, זָקֵן מַמְרֵי; yet *'Aboda Zara* 166, 17a, reveals the penetrating character of a remorseless logic untrammeled by dogmatism and unconfused by the intricacies of abstruse problems. "Never man spoke as this man." When Jesus was exiled to Egypt with R. Joshua ben Perachja, ample opportunity was afforded Him and eagerly used for becoming thoroughly skilled in the magical wisdom of Egypt, which was nine times as subtle as that of all the remaining world together. This wisdom was zealously guarded from exportation by its native devotees, who searched every outgoing traveler for magical books or formulæ. But Jesus succeeded in eluding detection by means of gashes cut in His flesh, wherein the magical treasures were deposited, and came safely home with His wizard knowledge, by means of which He deceived and seduced the people *à la mode* Simon Magus. The wonderful character of His works was due to the extraordinary potency of His magic. After His death, miracles were wrought in His name and by His name. From the record of His trial in *Sanhedrim* 67a, four things appear: (1) Jesus was betrayed by a disciple; (2) He was sentenced on the evidence of two witnesses; (3) He was betrayed and tried in the night; and (4) the Jews were directly responsible for His ignominious death. Forty days' interval elapsed between His trial and crucifixion, during which daily proclamation was made for further and favorable evidence. Cause of delay: He "stood near the government," that is, Pilate was "willing to release him." "He was hanged on the preparation day of the Passover," at Lydda. With three kings—Jeroboam, Ahab and Manasseh—and with three of His disciples—Peter, James and John—Jesus has no part in the future world. He who had sinned and made the people to sin could never repent. Jewish hate follows Him to hell and feasts its eyes on the Son of Man as He seethes in a cauldron of boiling pitch, while the hog-pen, or Vale of Hinnom, pours filth down in never-ending streams upon Him from the compartments of hell above. The heathen emperor, Titus, chose his own punishment; Balaam stands in a current of flowing suds; Jesus writhes in boiling pitch. "See," says *Gittim*, 57a, "what a difference between the apostate of Israel and the heathen prophets."

The brochure of Laible can confidently be recommended as the latest, freshest, best work on its theme; as, indeed, the only accessible and trustworthy discussion of its problem in all its ramifications.

Duffields, W. Va. R. B. WOODWORTH.

HORÆ EVANGELICÆ; OR, THE INTERNAL EVIDENCE OF THE GOSPEL HISTORY. By the Rev. T. R. BIRKS, M.A., late Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy, Cambridge. London: George Bell & Sons; New York: Macmillan & Company, 1892.

This book was published after the author's death by his son, the Rev. H. A. Birks. It is practically a reprint of an earlier work which appeared in 1851. The editor, however, has thoroughly revised it, making additions here and there, especially at points where his father modified his opinions. The general position of the author in regard to the Gospels is as follows: 1. That the order of the evangelists is the same as in our present Bibles. 2. That each writer wrote with a knowledge of and "reference to those that had preceded him." 3. That from "a careful examination of the chronology of the Acts, approximate dates may be assigned to the several authors." The authenticity of the Gospels, as we now have them, is held to; also the early date of the Synoptics, somewhere between 30 and 60 A.D. The work is divided into three books.

Book I. The author considers the mutual relations of the Gospels by discussing the various theories of their origin. He rejects the theories of common documents and of oral tradition, and concludes by favoring that of mutual succession. He then considers Matthew and Mark by themselves, and from internal comparison decides that Matthew is the earlier account—the variations in Mark being due to an attempt to restore the true order of chronology. Luke is then compared with the other two in great detail—the author attempting to show how in each parallelism Luke's is the later and derived account. Thus he concludes that the order of writing was Matthew, Mark and Luke. The ease with which he discards the theories of original documents and of oral tradition is a little surprising. In refutation he devotes scarcely more than a sentence to each of them. He discards the former because "two Gospels merely compiled from a common document would record the same event in almost the very same words:" the latter, because "if the Gospels were formed independently from loose traditions, a close verbal resemblance could rarely exist between them." Neither of these being true of our Gospels the theories are rejected. His method, too, of finding his original Gospel by comparing in detail the parallel passages of Matthew and Mark cannot give certainty, as a difference of opinion is possible in nearly every case cited. At most he but shows the plausibility of his view.

Book II. The date, authorship and chronology of the Book of Acts is very carefully ascertained. He concludes that Luke wrote the Acts in A.D. 63, in Antioch, being ignorant of Paul's then recent release. Having previously determined the historical order of the Gospels to be Matthew, Mark and Luke, and concluding from Acts i. 1, that Luke's Gospel was written before the Acts, he proceeds to date the Gospels in the reverse order. An interval must have elapsed between the Acts and Luke. From the widespread circulation of Luke implied in 1 Tim. v. 18, added to 2 Cor. viii. 18, which he refers to Luke, he concludes that the date could not be later than A.D. 57; but he thinks that the book was probably written by Luke at Antioch about A.D. 51, before he joined Paul at Troas.

He fixes upon Mark as the author of the second Gospel, writing under the influence of Peter. The external testimony, naming Rome as the place and dating at or near Peter's death, is rejected; but from the Latinisms and the explanations of Jewish customs, our author concludes that the Gospel was designed for the use of the Roman soldiers, who were early numbered among the Christian converts, and was written in Palestine between the years 46 and 50.

The date assigned to Matthew is A.D. 42, about the time of the conversion of Cornelius. The argument bears more on the Jewish origin and Jewish readers, than on the date. This latter, however, is shown to be early, and from the previous hypothesis necessarily a few years before Mark. Next follows a discussion of the original language of Matthew. Our author rejects the external evidence of a Hebrew original, and concludes not only that Matthew wrote in Greek, but argues more or less at length that Greek was the language of Galilee and that many of our Lord's discourses must have been originally spoken in that language. He accounts for the statement of Papias (*Eus.*, iii, 39) on the ground of ignorance; Papias taking it for granted that Hebrew was necessarily the language of the Jews. Throughout this whole discussion of authorship and dates it will be seen that the author's chief reliance is upon internal evidence. The external testimony is rejected when it conflicts with the internal, as he regards the internal the stronger and more trustworthy of the two.

Book III. In this book the author studies the characteristic design of each of the four narratives. Matthew, under the symbol of a lion, represents Christ as the mighty King—the lion of the tribe of Judah. He stands forth as the stern lawgiver uttering woes upon the disobedient. Mark, under the figure of an ox, reveals the patience of Christ—His unwearied, powerful energy. It goes into the details of His work and pictures the ceaseless activity of His daily life. Luke, under the figure of a man, represents the humanity of Christ. This side of His character is dwelt upon, showing Him as full of human sympathy and mingling freely with all classes of men. John, under the figure of an eagle, soars aloft and depicts the exalted divinity of our Lord, revealing the eternal and intimate relation between Christ and the Father.

The book closes with a full and admirable discussion of the internal evidence for the authenticity of John's Gospel.

Tunkhannock, Pa. S. C. HODGE.

THE WITNESS OF THE EPISTLES. A Study in Modern Criticism. By the Rev. R. J. KNOWLING, M.A., Vice-Principal of King's College, London. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1892. Pp. xii, 451.

This volume is a timely and valuable addition to the literature in English of New Testament criticism and apologetics. It is a book for students and is rightly given the sub-title of a study in modern criticism, for it is the outcome of a wide and careful reading of modern New Testament criticism. Sometimes the pages appear rather overladen with references and quotations, and the style is not always attractive; yet the author is not only at home in the literature of his subject but is also evidently its master. The book will be of special value to many who have not access to German critical literature. In fact more than half of it is occupied with a review of critical opinions concerning the genuineness and evidential significance of Paul's Epistles. The author begins by showing the acknowledged importance of these epistles, even if their number be limited to those accepted by the most advanced critics, as witnesses to the historical life and teachings of Christ. He then gives a lengthy "historical retrospect" of the admissions concerning this witness made by leading New Testament scholars. This retrospect furnishes many valuable examples of the fact that critical investigation does confirm, even apart from the testimony of the Gospels, the truth of the chief events of Gospel history. The weight of critical opinion is seen strongly to oppose the older Tübingen view that Paul knew little and cared less for the facts of Christ's life. On the contrary his doctrinal teaching plainly rested

on the knowledge of the historical Jesus which the whole Church possessed and disseminated and to which numerous references may be found in his epistles, though these were, of course, not written to give such information but simply assumed it. Mr. Knowling describes at some length Resch's view that Paul used the supposed collection of discourses written by Matthew, and P. Ewald's still more recent contention that Paul even shows acquaintance with the materials of the Johannean tradition. The position taken by these writers evinces a marked tendency to reaffirm the trustworthiness of the evangelical record.

All this, however, goes on the supposition that at least five or six of Paul's epistles are genuine. But the last decade has seen the rise of a small but valiant school of New Testament criticism which seeks utterly to overthrow all the foundations on which previous criticism rested. Loman, Steck, Völter, Van Manen, reviving the much ridiculed position of Bruno Bauer, now argue that the four great Epistles, whose genuineness was the corner-stone of Tübingen criticism, are forgeries of the second century. Hence Mr. Knowling gives a very full description and criticism of these "recent attacks upon the 'Hauptbriefe,'" which will prove of especial interest to many of his readers. The strange somersault, performed by this wing of rationalistic critics, is a peculiarly edifying spectacle to conservative scholars, who may expect to gain substantial results from the discussion. The new school may be described as the Nemesis of rationalistic New Testament criticism; for, while attackiug the older critical theories, it is in spirit identical with them. It shows the same culpable neglect of the external evidences for the New Testament books and willingness to reject, at the behest of a theory, the approved results of investigation in post-apostolic literature (as *e. g.*, the epistles of Ignatius). We find in it the same hypercritical analysis of documents and keenness to discover contradictions in an author where rational exegesis finds none, that other writers have used upon the later Pauline Epistles. The analytical fever certainly reaches its height in Völter's dissection of Romans and Galatians. We meet in this school also a strange willingness to build an incredible hypothesis, as when Pierson and Naber actually fabricated an unknown Bishop Paul as the author of the Epistles, or when Loman supposes a deliberate idealizing of the apostle by the leaders of Gentile Christianity in the second century, as the cause of the forging of the writings which go by his name! The replies made to these most "advanced" critics are excellently summarized by Mr. Knowling. A few points of permanent gain may be also noted as likely to accrue from the discussion. Such is the disposition of the new school to impute more trustworthiness to the Acts of the Apostles in order to disparage the Epistles—a singular reversal of the earlier view, and one that would seem to leave no historical ground whatever for denying at all the entire trustworthiness of the Acts. Such, too, is Steck's argument that the writer of the Epistles used our Gospels—an argument which at least brings out the agreement between the two. And such is the exegetical proof which these critics offer of the high Christology of the Epistles. The account of these attacks therefore is of considerable value even to those who oppose the methods by which such destructive criticism proceeds.

The second part of Mr. Knowling's book consists of a constructive presentation of the witness of the Epistles to the apostolicity of the Gospel narrative. This part, too, is written with constant reference to the results of modern critical exegesis. The result is not only to show that the Pauline Epistles presuppose just such a history as is given by the four Gospels, but also to reveal in them many more allusions to the acts and teachings of Christ than appear at first sight. Paul's witness to the chief events, such as

the Incarnation itself, and the betrayal, the crucifixion, burial and resurrection of Jesus, is unquestionable and the evidence is cogently presented. An important point also is the discussion (pp. 244, etc.) of the argument from Gal. iv. 4 for Paul's belief in Christ's miraculous conception and the events of His infancy. Mr. Knowling succeeds in showing that the most natural explanation of the apostle's language is to assume his belief in these facts; and, if so, we have renewed assurance that those events formed part of the original apostolic announcement. Still more fruitful is the chapter on Paul's witness to our Lord's life and teaching. The chapter is crowded with references and a careful reader will receive an overwhelming sense of the impression which the reported acts and words of Jesus had made on the apostle and on all the early Church. Neither Paul's early hostility to the Church nor his position after his conversion nor his missionary work nor his apostolic letters, in short neither his life nor his theology, are explicable save on the assumption of the truth of the account given in our Gospels and Paul's acquaintance with less or more of it.

Mr. Knowling does not discuss the vexed question whether Paul possessed the evangelic narrative in oral or in written form, though he frequently alludes to the subject. His argument acquires greater force by appearing independent of that discussion. While different students will differ as to the inferences to be drawn from this or that phrase in the Epistles, the argument as a whole seems irrefutable and the more so when so clearly the verdict of critical inquiry. It provides an admirable climax to the historical proof from early Christian literature, of the apostolicity and consequent trustworthiness of our four Gospels.

Princeton. GEORGE T. PURVES.

Clews to Holy Writ. A Scheme for Studying the Whole Bible in its Historical Order During Three Years. By Mary L. G. Petrie, B.A. 8vo, pp. xii, 338. (New York: American Tract Society.) This is one of the text-books for students in the "College by Post," an English correspondence school which has grown to large dimensions from a very modest beginning in 1881. While other than Biblical subjects are studied in this organization, Bible study is made a *sine qua non* for gratuitous instruction in other branches, and there is an ever-increasing number who join the Scripture classes alone. In 1887, the author of this book devised a scheme of chronological study of the whole Bible, which should cover three years, and this volume is the fifth edition. The general plan on which it proceeds is to divide the 1189 chapters of the Bible into nine portions, which are to be read through in nine terms of four months each, this being a little more than one chapter a day. The *Clews to Holy Writ* is not a commentary, but a series of suggestive helps to the closer study of each passage. These helps are given under the following heads: "I. General Summary of the History of a Period," "II. Books to be Read," "III. Periods and Dates," "IV. Geography," "V. Heroes," "VI. The Coming Messiah in Type and Prophecy," "VII. God's Revelation of Himself to Man," "VIII. Man's Relation to God in Worship," "IX. Thirty-two Questions." Though quite unassuming and not essaying to deal with the weightier matters of Biblical criticism, the book will be a welcome aid to those who wish to make a devout study of Scripture without going into critical niceties of interpretation.——*Outline Studies in the Books of the Old Testament.* By W. G. Moorehead, D.D. 8vo, pp. 363. (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co.) This is simply what its title implies, a brief summary of the contents and teachings of the Old Testament intended for beginners in Bible study. Like the preceding book it deals briefly or not at all with the theories of current criticism.

Certain prerequisites for successful Bible study are emphasized, viz., a perception of its unity, its central theme, its redemptive function, the progress of doctrine therein and its supreme authority. The names by which God is revealed are deemed of highest importance, and a chapter is given to Typology. In Ecclesiastes a strained emphasis is put upon the phrase "under the sun," which may be best understood by observing that in the analysis (p. 196) the final admonition is to "live *above the sun* and all will be well." The author accepts the allegorical theory for Canticles, and he revels in the apocalyptic elements of Daniel, to whom he devotes much more space than to any other prophet except Isaiah.——*Anti-Higher Criticism; or, Testimony to the Infallibility of the Bible.* Edited by Rev. L. W. Munhall, M.A. 8vo, pp. 354. (New York: Hunt & Eaton.) The title of this book is objectionable, as it serves to perpetuate a slur which has been cast upon a perfectly legitimate method of investigation; and since there is considerable Higher Criticism of the right sort in this book it is somewhat misleading. Mr. Munhall here gives us a series of addresses, which were delivered in Educational Hall, Asbury Park, during August, 1893. The occasion of their delivery was a Bible conference, which has been conducted at the seaside by Mr. Munhall for the past six years, their object being "the promotion of prayerful, critical, exegetical study of the Holy Scriptures." The speakers were selected from among our leading professors and pastors, and the subjects cover both the Old Testament and the New. In the Old Testament are treated the Pentateuch, Job, Psalms, Isaiah, Daniel, and Esther. In the New Testament, the Gospels, Acts xv, Thessalonians, and 1 John. Dr. Brookes treats, in conclusion, of the testimony of the Bible to its own integrity. Dr. Howard Osgood in the first paper discusses "Learned Doubt and the Living Word," showing how the Word of God has triumphed even while the most bitter assaults have been made upon it, and not by charging upon the enemy's positions, but by outflanking them. In one of his two addresses Dr. Green gives an historical outline of the attacks upon the unity of the Pentateuch, and a defense of it, illustrating the absurdity of modern analytical methods by applying them to the Parables of the Prodigal Son and of the Good Samaritan. In the second, he defends the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch. Prof. Moorehead dates the Book of Job very early, and leans towards the Mosaic authorship of it. Dr. Chambers gives us an interesting introduction to the Book of Psalms, defending in his second paper the early origin of the Psalter, and the religious character of the Imprecatory Psalms. Dr. Brookes vigorously defends the unity of Isaiah against the assaults of what Prof. Driver has well styled Hypercriticism; we cannot, however, but regard as fanciful and forced his argument on p. 184, based upon the inversion of the chronological order of chaps. 36, 37 and 38, 39. He asserts that this inversion is to bring the reader face to face with Babylon, and that the way is thus prepared for the prophecies of the second half, which, in his opinion, are thus shown to be an integral part of the book. Rev. G. S. Bishop, D.D., writes on the Book of Daniel. We need to note certain errors in this article: on p. 209 Umgheir should be Mugheir; at the bottom of the same page the Saviour's words in Matt. xxi. 44 are taken as an allusion to the Stone in Nebuchadnezzar's dream—they would seem more naturally to be a reminiscence of Isa. viii. 14, 15; on p. 212 the author evidently confuses the Chaldee or Aramaic with the native language of Babylon. There is not space to comment upon all the material which this book contains; but portions of it will be found quite valuable to those who are seeking a clue to the labyrinth of Old Testament speculation.——*Is Moses Scientific?* By Rev. P. E. Kipp. 8vo, pp. 239. (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co.) It is the aim of the author of this book to show that positive science and the

first chapter of Genesis are at one. He is unwilling to seek a *reconciliation* between Genesis and Science, as that, to his mind, implies conflict. He seeks to show that Moses is rigidly scientific in every statement he makes. Not that he gives a full scientific classification, but that what he wrote contained the germ which should later develop into a tree of knowledge. Neither does he claim that Moses understood the full content of the words he used. The chapter (Gen. i) contains expansive ideas which "require all the science of to-day to unfold." With portions of these statements most of us, doubtless, are in accord, but the thoroughness with which the author carries out the identity of scientific results with Gen. i will amaze rather than convince many. For instance, he takes the Hebrew word raqia' (p. 78), and tracing it back to an onomatopoetic root with the meaning "buzz," "crackle," asserts that this word was chosen to describe the *expanse*, on account of the terrific thundering and the titanic crash of the elements which must have accompanied the work of the second day. In the chapter on the "Antiquity of Man" the query will arise why, if he allows a certain systematization of the genealogies of Genesis (p. 232), he should insist upon the literal science of Gen. i. But on the whole, the book is an interesting résumé of the recent attempts at harmonizing Genesis and Science.——*Moses and the Pentateuch.* A Popular Statement of the Theories of the So-called Higher Criticism, together with Some of the Reasons for not Accepting Them. By Rev. Howard Agnew Johnston, Ph.D. 18mo, pp. 120. (Cincinnati: *Herald and Presbyter.*) This attractively bound little volume contains in permanent form a series of articles which originally appeared in *The Herald and Presbyter.* The form is compendious and concise and gives one a bird's-eye view of the development of recent theories, the arguments for and against Mosaic authorship, recent discoveries and their bearing upon the Old Testament, and in chaps. vii–xii the internal evidence of the different books to their authorship. In chap. xiii we hear a word regarding errors and discrepancies, and in chap. xiv the burning question of the relation of Christ to criticism is clearly stated and ably expounded. The author has made a slip on p. 90 in stating that there is but one form for the masculine and feminine of the personal pronoun of the third person in the Pentateuch; since both הוּא and הִיא are frequently used. In our opinion too much weight is given to statements that have been made by Prof. Sayce; for he lacks in exactness, and often makes extravagant claims, while on the subject of Biblical criticism his trumpet gives an uncertain sound. Dr. Johnston's book in general is an arraignment of those who imperil, by their critical theories, the inspiration and authority of the Holy Scriptures.——*Versuch einer Reconstellation des Deboraliedes.* Von C. Niebuhr. 8vo, pp. 48. (Berlin: 1894.) This short essay gives us a new and startling view of the fifth chapter of Judges. Revolutionary seems almost too tame a word by which to describe it. The principle, with which the author starts out, seems safe and reasonable enough; it has always appeared to us that there were sundry dislocations and transpositions of the original order in the present literary form of the Song of Deborah, for there are indications of a refrain which recurred at more regular intervals than now, throughout the entire poem. The action, too, seems to return upon itself. But in the work in question, in addition to criticism upon the literary structure, we are treated to one surprise after another. Deborah is the name of a town, Barak is its chieftain, Sisera is not a general in Jabin's host but a king of Egypt; the poem is thus not merely reconstructed, but taken up bodily and set down with its face to the south instead of to the north. Sisera, king of Egypt, belongs, not to the nineteenth or twentieth dynasty, but to the eighteenth; he is identified with that family of which Khu-en-Aten was the great representative.

Ver. 8 refers to the new and pestilent solar heresy, which that king introduced. The uprising of the tribes was consequent upon the death of Khu-en-Aten and the turmoil that followed under his weaker successors. With the help of conjectural additions and emendations the rehabilitated poem reads very well and gives an interesting glimpse into imaginatively reconstructed Hebrew history.——*Job: Jehovah's Champion.* By W. G. Ballantine, D.D. Brochure, pp. 40. (Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co.) This little book from the facile pen of President Ballantine sets forth the literary beauties of the Book of Job, its thought, connection and lessons. Like Prof. Genung, in his *Epic of the Inner Life*, the author recognizes that it is the sneer of Satan, which Job is set, all unconsciously, to refute, and that for this he is Jehovah's champion; but at the same time he does not overlook the fact that Job in his invectives went grievously astray, that he needed to learn a lesson of complete trust and to relinquish absolutely and forever the imperious demand for the reason of his sufferings.——*The Psalms.* By Alexander Maclaren, D.D. Vol. ii, Psalms xxxix–lxxxix. 8vo, pp. 503. (New York: Armstrong & Son, 1893.) This volume forms part of the sixth series of the "Expositor's Bible." Vol. i, appearing in the fifth series, has already been noticed in this REVIEW. The Psalms are treated in the author's well-known and luminous style. A new translation is given of each, in which there are often marked differences from either the Authorized Version, or the Revised Version. While the text is not overburdened with references to previous writers, the author shows himself fully abreast of the scholarship of the present day. He rejects the extreme views of Cheyne, showing conclusively the impossibility of applying the fervid utterances of Psalms xlv and lxxii to a Ptolemy, and the absurdity of imagining that a Jewish Psalmist should take "up the singing robes of a court poet." The fullness and suggestiveness of his discussion of Ps. xlix is admirable. He brings out in a very striking way the contrast between the Shepherd who leads through the Valley of the Shadow of Death and Death who is the shepherd of the ungodly; and he is not afraid to see the light of the Resurrection morning shining through this Psalm. His book throughout is an example of exposition founded upon careful exegesis, and all warmed by a sympathetic appreciation of the Psalmist's inmost feelings. It were well to remember one of his utterances when confronted by prosaic and literalizing criticisms upon the style and expressions of the Psalter: "It is possible to tame lyric outbursts into accuracy at the cost of energy. Psalmists are not bound to be correct in style. Rivers wind; canals are straight." ——*How to Read the Prophets.* Part iv: Ezekiel. By the Rev. Buchanan Blake, B.D. 12mo, pp. 238. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1894.) Readers of this REVIEW are doubtless familiar with the general scope of the other volumes in this interesting series, the plan of which is substantially followed in the one before us. It may be briefly summarized as follows: Division i: "The Text of Scripture." Division ii: "The Prophecies in Their Historical Succession." Division iii: "The Religious Conceptions of Ezekiel and a Chronological Table." The author has in some respects an easier task than with the earlier prophets, for Ezekiel preserves a nearly perfect chronological order. The style of the author is not always perfectly felicitous; for instance, the translation "Child of Man" is no improvement on the one ordinarily given, and "Nebuchadnezzar on the war-path" (p. 65) is not a happily chosen heading. On the other hand, the elimination of some of the objectionable expressions of the plain-spoken prophet makes certain chapters more readable in modern ears. The indication of words and passages not found in the LXX. by means of italics and brackets renders this book a valuable aid to the student of the Greek version. The author's critical posi-

tion is indicated in his Introduction and still more clearly in the last chapter of Division ii. He considers Ezekiel to have mapped out the new ritual and to have planned the new temple in the silent years of the exile, when he was one of that group of priests who shaped the religion of Israel and gave it a permanent and final character. But the significant admission is made (p. 213) that "the style of the Code (of Leviticus) is quite distinct from that of Ezekiel." And the temple he so carefully elaborated on paper was never built as he devised, nor even erected upon the site he chose. Do not these failures of realizatiou speak for the ideal character of the last sectiou of Ezekiel's prophecies? And is not its particularity sufficiently accounted for by the clearly marked peculiarity of his style which leads him to depict so conscientiously every detail in his graphic pictures, whether they be the glory of Jehovah, the wondrous Tyrian ship, or the shame of Judah and Samaria? It seems to us that in the last divisiou the author has underestimated the prophet's clearness of insight and his perception of the need of his people. But the presentation of the prophecies in their historical succession will prove very useful for those to whom the prophet has been but a shadowy form.——*Die Zukunftserwartung des Jesaia.* Von H. Hackmann, Lic. theol., etc. 8vo, pp. iv, 174. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1893.) The author in this brochure having dismissed Isa. xl-lxvi from his consideration, examines chaps. i-xxxix, dividing this half into six parts, which are the following: i (ii)-xii, xiii-xxiii, xxiv-xxvii, xxviii-xxxiii, xxxiv and xxxv, xxxvi-xxxix. Of these, three are rejected as non-Isaianic, viz., xxiv-xxvii, xxxiv, xxxv and xxxvi-xxxix, since to his mind they bear evident marks of later authorship. His examination of the future outlook of the prophet therefore confines itself to ii-xii, xiii-xxiii, and xxviii-xxxiii. These chapters are again carefully sifted and the conclusion reached that while there are many Isaianic fragments, no one of these three sections was put into its present form by Isaiah himself. That prophet was no writer of books, but a strong personality of the ancient period, whose oral teachings came down to succeeding generations like Delphic utterances; and, combined with the more elaborated writings of his adherents and successors, were by degrees gathered together and incorporated first into three smaller groups and finally into one body of (so-called) Isaianic writings. Having thus cleared the way for his discussion, the writer proceeds to examine the passages he considers genuine for their prophetic material. He considers the first actual prophecy of Isaiah to consist of the passages ix. 7-20, x. 4, v. 25b-30. A strophe, which originally stood before x. 4, has been lost; and v. 25b-30 rent from its connection, still has clinging to it the refrain which characterizes this early prophecy. The passage xvii. 1-11 follows next and is directed against Damascus and Ephraim. It plainly belongs to the earlier period, since it contemplates Syria as still independent. Chap. vii is the next prophecy in order of time, and his exposition of the thought of this chapter is interesting. He regards it as directed against the Northern kingdom and confederacy, solely. Judgment upon Judah is not before the prophet's eye at all. The promised sign is for the encouragement of Ahaz, the presence of Shear Jashub to symbolize the fact that, in spite of the approaching crisis in Ephraim, Judah shall be saved. Ver. 17, which introduces the thought of judgment upon Judah, is rejected as a later gloss. The following is his interpretation of the Immanuel prophecy, in which he closely follows Duhm: "The political situation will shortly be such, that in view of the great deliverance a mother will name her child 'God with us.'" Chap. vi is carefully examined and the conclusion reached that the vision and the commission of the prophet have reference simply to the Northern kingdom. The revelation to Isaiah is of the total destruction of the ten tribes. Ver. 13a

declares that even if there be a remnant it shall be consumed; 13b, which introduces a more merciful conception, is rejected as the gloss of a later compiler who, as in other cases, adapted the prophecies of Isaiah to the circumstances of Judah. It is considered probable that Shear Jashub was born and named about the time of the occurrences in chap. vi, and that his name symbolizes not that a remnant out of Judah should be preserved, but that in the total destruction of the Northern kingdom Judah itself should remain as a remnant. The idea of a righteous remnant in Judah was a later development in the prophet's mind. The few prophecies which fall in the next period, covering perhaps 733–722, still refer to the kingdom of Israel; here belongs chap. xxviii. 1–4; Tiglath Pileser III, Salmanæsar IV and Sargon were the great historical characters. It has been quite a popular theory to attribute several passages beside chap. xx to the time of Sargon. This the author vigorously combats; he is unable to see, either in the history or in the situation presupposed by the prophecies, any allusions that suit the time of Sargon. The chapters under consideration here, that are genuinely Isaianic, belong to the reign of Sennacherib when the prophet's activity was at its height. Not only the section 28–32 but also x. 5–34, xviii. 1–6 and xxii. 1–14 should be put in this period. Isaiah, as we know, was violently opposed to the Egyptian alliance, and predicted destruction at the hand of Assyria if it were entered into. His advice was rejected and Sennacherib came, but a sudden change in his plans carried him from before the apparently doomed city. Chap. xxii depicts the prophet's view of the whole situation; his sense that judgment is still certain, in spite of this temporary deliverance, and his disgust and indignation that at a time when the hand of Jahveh was so manifest, the people should feast and indulge in senseless mirth instead of sitting in sackcloth before their God. He seemed to see as never before the utterly unstable and careless condition of the people. The prophet was not so shortsighted as to think he was mistaken in his message, but he found that he must reconstruct his view of the time when God would finally punish Judah. In this combination of the prophetical material it will be observed that all the historical explanations of chaps. xxxvi and xxxvii are discarded as of later origin. The future outlook of the prophet in the view of the author is confined in the main to his immediate generation. Isaiah is remarkably clear-eyed. He sees the impending fate of Israel and Judah; he also grasps the idea of a saved remnant, but that is the limit of his horizon; of a more distant or even of a Messianic future our author considers him to have no vision. The last pages of the book deal with those remarkable passages which are the crown of the prophet and without which our conception of Isaiah is irrepressibly poor; these are ii. 2–4, ix. 1–6 and xi. 1–9. They are very happily described as pictures of the future, independent of historical relations. But they are not Isaianic! They look too far ahead. The book which has been so carefully rearranged and reconstructed, from which everything at variance with the author's view has been eliminated, has no place for such telescopic visions. They are relegated to the postexilic period and left hanging in the air, like a mirage, for some compiler of the age of Zechariah or Ezra to incorporate into a body of prophetic writings. In spite of its bias the book has its excellencies. It is an independent examination of the material from which the author often arrives at quite different conclusions from those of the radical school with which are his affiliations. His attempt to arrange the prophecies chronologically is painstaking and conscientious and the results often very valuable; often, also, as in the case of chap. xxii, he has entered very sympathetically into the spirit of the prophet's conception.

McCormick Theological Seminary. A. S. CARRIER.

II.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

A Literary History of Early Christianity. Including the Fathers and Chief Heretical Writers of the Anti-Nicene Period. For the Use of Students and General Readers. By Charles Thomas Crutwell. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1893. 1 vol. in 2.

This work stands to the history of early Christian literature, for which scholars have been looking (and which, perhaps, they will find in Harnack's work, already published but not at this writing at hand), as Crutwell's *History of Roman Literature* does to Teuffel's. It is a book for the general reader, not the scholar. If the "students" for whom it is intended are the average divinity students, as the author's definition of "student" in his *Roman Literature* would seem to indicate, it is rather well suited to its proposed aim, but the word "students" might as well have been left out. If, however, the scholarly divinity students are meant, the book is not well suited to its purpose, as it has in general no specific references to sources whether primary or secondary, and no bibliographical apparatus.

As a matter of fact the author does not seem quite willing to accept the general reader as his only audience, and makes sundry not very successful efforts to "ride two horses at once," as when he adds the "authorities for the text of Clement" (pp. 36, 37), and makes vague references to Lightfoot, Salmon, Robinson, v. Gebhardt, Harnack, etc.

On the other hand, the author expressly disclaims any pretensions to learning or to having any resource "where the learned disagree" (p. 419). Indeed the whole work is a constant disavowal of technical scholarship and a revealing of the fact that the author is not a specialist. It is obviously a book by a general reader for the general reader.

To apply to a work of this sort the same tests which are applied to a professedly critical work is idle. In the main it does represent the latest or nearly the latest investigation. It would be easy to point out technical errors of omission or commission of which a recognized specialist in patristic literature (say "Mr. R. Harris, now of Philadelphia," as Cambridge's Reader in Palæography is called on p. 289) would never be guilty. Certainly no one of the distinguished authorities whom he quotes from time to time could possibly have authorized him to say of the writings of Hippolytus (p. 412) that "the only one now preserved, though unfortunately not entire, is the *Philosophumena* or *Treatise Against All Heretics*." Errors like this are especially to be regretted in a work intended for the uncritical; but it would be misleading to lay great stress on them. The work is founded on excellent secondary sources, makes a free use of primary sources for literary purposes, is up to date enough to include the Gospel and Revelation of Peter, and follows a good method in the use of select translations—although this use is not very proportionate or ample.

Its general method is that of Nirschl, Schaff, Donaldson (?) and all the patrologists, minus, of course, all critical apparatus. After a short general introduction each writer is taken up in detail and a brief account given of his life, his writings and his theology, the whole matter being looked at in a rather more animated fashion and expressed in a rather more literary form than in the more scholarly works which cover the same ground, while at the same time quite outclassing in information and judgment the "popular" accounts of the same subject. The real excellence of the work consists in that it puts a subject, about which every well-educated person should know something, in a form which is perhaps as near being interesting as the subject admits of.

Princeton. Ernest C. Richardson.

THE CHURCH IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE BEFORE A.D. 170. By W. M. RAMSAY, M.A., Professor of Humanity in the University of Aberdeen. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, [1893].

This book consists of two parts. Part i is entitled, "St. Paul in Asia Minor," and is a study of the travels of the great apostle. Part ii is the lectures upon the Church in the Roman Empire from 64 to 170, which Prof. Ramsay delivered at Mansfield College, Oxford, during May and June, 1892. The person who should pass this book over with the remark that the subject is trite would make a great mistake, for Prof. Ramsay has written an extraordinary book. His qualifications for the task he set himself are uncommon. He has been over the ground literally. He works from those primary sources, the localities themselves. He has passed years in archæological researches in Asia Minor. This enables him to make a number of remarks which would not occur to one who knew the places merely from books. He is well read in the contemporary literature; and accepts the books of the New Testament as authorities for history and estimates their credit on the same principles as that of other historical documents. But another qualification should be mentioned: he has been emancipated from skeptical German "authorities." He was once their slave. He says, "For years, with much interest and zeal, but with little knowledge, I followed the critics and accepted their results. In recent years, as I came to understand Roman history better, I have realized that, in the case of almost all the books of the New Testament, it is as gross an outrage on criticism to hold them for second-century forgeries as it would be to class the works of Horace and Virgil as forgeries of the time of Nero" (p. viii).

Before passing on to speak at some length on the contents of the volume, attention must be called to the map of Asia Minor, with the political divisions from A.D. 40 to 63 marked upon it, which is inserted in the back cover. It is remarkably clear and should lie open before the reader as he uses the book. Here also is the place to call attention to what are the chief faults of the book. First, its rather fragmentary character, as it is made up more of a number of notes and observations than of long digested matter. As the Preface and the slip of Corrigenda show, the author before publishing had not made up his mind upon some important points. But this is, on the whole, a good fault, as proving how open-minded the author is and how ready to retract any opinion which can be shown to be erroneous. A more serious fault, and one which can easily be corrected, is that it takes too much for granted on the part of the reader. Prof. Ramsay forgets that we are not all as well acquainted with the Roman writers as he is himself. It is noticeable that while he refers at great length to Pliny's letters to Trajan, and also to the writings of Tacitus, and mentions the best edition of the former, he does not give the passages themselves. It may be remarked that the reader can find an English translation of both Pliny and Tacitus in Bohn's series.

But it seems almost ungracious to say a single word of adverse criticism of a book which is so interesting, inspiring and instructive; and therefore I proceed to bring out some of its important statements. Prof. Ramsay holds that in the Book of the Acts the writer has incorporated what he calls the "Travel-Document," which was an account of Paul's journeys written by Paul or by one of Paul's companions. It is the object of this book to examine the journeys in Asia Minor recounted in this "Travel-Document," and to show how minutely accurate the account is. Prof. Ramsay some years ago had a very low opinion of the Book of the Acts; but his study of the ground has convinced him that he was wrong. While acknowledging, as we all must do, great indebtedness to Bishop Lightfoot, he takes issue with him

upon one important point, the discussion of which occupies several pages of this book, and in fact may be said to affect more or less the whole of it—namely, the meaning of the word "Galatians." Bishop Lightfoot understands it as denoting the Celtic people of the district popularly and generally known as Galatia, whereas Prof. Ramsay understands Galatians as meaning inhabitants of Roman Galatia—that is, the inhabitants of the vast Province of Galatia, as it was called by the Romans, which embraced parts of Phrygia, Lycaonia and Pisidia. Having settled in his own mind this important point, Prof. Ramsay passes on to discuss the localities of the first journey, and, as before remarked, he does not do this as a mere book student, but as one who has been upon the ground, and the result is that he gives an extraordinary amount of freshness to his narration. He takes issue with Conybeare and Howson upon many points, *e. g.*, upon the time of year in which Paul landed at Perga; he declines to commit himself to any season. But his most striking difference is in regard to the route which the apostle took in fleeing from Antioch. In settling this point he brings in a reference to the legend of Paul and Thekla and he discusses this legend in a most luminous way in chap. xvi. The way in which he traces the route of the apostle by the use of incidental references in the legend, is a triumph of constructive criticism. Another point of interest is the use he makes of the *Codex Bezæ*, which, as is well known, differs in a very remarkable way from the received text. He discusses this *Codex* at length in his eighth chapter, and comes to the conclusion that the author of the *Codex* must have been a person of consequence in the second century who had the audacity to alter first-century forms and facts to suit those of later time (p. 163).

Prof. Ramsay has some curious remarks to make about the mysterious sickness of the Apostle Paul, and the equally mysterious unwillingness on the part of the apostle to take John Mark with him when starting out on his second journey. Paul's illness, he contends, was nothing more or less than a bad attack of malarial fever (p. 63). He quotes Lightfoot's remark in exposition of Galatians iv. 13-15, "A return of his old malady, 'the thorn in the flesh, the messenger of Satan sent to buffet him,' some sharp and violent attack it would appear, which humiliated him and prostrated his physical strength." And then Prof. Ramsay remarks: "I appeal to all who have experience, whether this is not a singularly apt description of that fever, which has such an annoying and tormenting habit of catching one by the heel just at the most inconvenient moment, in the midst of some great effort and on the eve of some serious crisis, when all one's energies are specially needed."

In regard to the defection of John Mark, Prof. Ramsay says: "John Mark was willing to come into Pamphylia with them, but not willing to go on into the country north of Taurus, and therefore he evidently considered that the latter proposal was a departure from the original scheme. Cyprus and Pamphylia were countries of similar situation to Cilicia and Syria, and in the closest possible relations with them, whereas it was a serious and novel step to go into the country north of Taurus." He then says: "This relieves John Mark from a serious charge, which is not quite in keeping with his boldness in originally starting on this first of missionary journeys" (pp. 61, 62).

Prof. Ramsay devotes an entire chapter (chap. vii) to Paul at Ephesus. He holds to the literal accuracy of the account in Acts. In reply to one objection commonly made, that it is strange that no shrines of the goddess Diana are found in museums, he says that these shrines were mostly made of terra cotta and were bought for putting up in the temple and were not carried home; and, besides, at intervals there was a clearing up in the tem-

ple, when the terra-cotta ones would be shattered and those made out of silver would be melted down.

The second part of Prof. Ramsay's book has naturally more unity than the first part. It discusses the causes which led to the rapid spread of Christianity in the Roman Empire and those causes which hindered it. He shows that the struggle between Christianity and Rome was a struggle to the death; that Christianity was set over against the religion of the State—that article manufactured by the Roman emperors to maintain their authority.

He devotes much space to Pliny's report and Trajan's Rescript, and gives the results upon p. 223. He shows that actions against Christians had become habitual before the accession of Trajan and that a form of procedure had grown up. He then discusses the action of Nero towards Christians, and concludes that "between 68 and 96 the attitude of the State towards the Christians was more clearly defined, and that the process was changed, so that proof of definite crimes committed by the Christian was no longer required, but acknowledgment of the Name alone sufficed for condemnation. Nero treats a great many Christians as criminals, and punishes them for their crimes. Pliny and Trajan treat them as outlaws and brigands, and punish them without reference to crimes" (p. 245). Chap. xii discusses the Flavian policy towards the Church. This brings in the persecution under Domitian. "The Christians were a politically dangerous body; and, if that be so, the danger must have lain especially in the fact that they were an organized and united body. It is therefore inaccurate to speak of the Flavian action as directed against the Christians. That phrase might be used about Nero, but the Flavian action was, if we can trust our inferences from the authorities, directed against the Church as as organized unity" (pp. 274, 275).

As Prof. Ramsay dates 1 Peter about 80 A.D., he of course dissents from the idea that Peter perished in the Neronian persecution. On the other hand, he inclines to believe that Peter actually was for many years in Rome, and that it was from that city that he wrote his epistle.

He also holds to a late date for the Revelation, and says, "As a Christian document, the Apocalypse is an historical impossibility about A.D. 70" (p. 301). He puts it after A.D. 90.

In regard to the use of the word "World" by the Apostle John, he holds that it did not have any theological meaning, but meant the Roman Empire, so that when John said, "Marvel not, brethren, that the World hateth you," he referred to the hatred of the State towards the Church and not to the opposition which the Christian meets with to-day from the temptations of unspiritual surroundings (p. 304).

Prof. Ramsay dates 2 Peter between 100 and 120, and therefore excludes it from the Canon.

Since this volume came into our hands, it has passed into a second edition, and we trust that it will have a still wider circulation, as it so richly merits, for it is one of the freshest contributions to Biblical study for many a day. The author may not now be orthodox upon all points; but a man who has such an open mind and who is such a sincere seeker after truth will surely find it, and come ultimately to believe that the accuracy of the New Testament, in all its parts, is no more to be questioned than the accuracy of the God who wrote it.

New York. SAMUEL MACAULEY JACKSON.

A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. Second Series. Translated into English, with Prolegomena and Explanatory Notes, under the editorial supervision of Philip Schaff, D.D.,

LL.D., and Henry Wace, D.D. Vol. vii: *S. Cyril of Jerusalem, S. Gregory Nazianzen.* Pp. lx, 498. (New York: The Christian Literature Co., 1894.) The volume contains the Catechetical Lectures of Cyril of Jerusalem, edited by Edward Hamilton Gifford, D.D., formerly Archdeacon of London and Canon of St. Paul's. The original part of Dr. Gifford's work is to be found in the Introduction, treating of the life and writings of Cyril, especially the Catechetical Lectures and their doctrinal content. It will be sufficient to say of this Introduction that it is in keeping in the scope and quality of its scholarship with the best that has been done by other editors of the "Select Library." The translation is a revision of Dean Church's original translation (for to Dean Church Dr. J. H. Newman gave the credit of it, when it first appeared in the *Library of the Fathers of the Catholic Church*). The changes introduced by the present editor are unessential. It is to be regretted that the edition could not have been made a complete one so far as Cyril's works are concerned by the incorporation of the "Letter to Constantius" and "Homily on the Paralytic," since both of these writings (the only ones omitted from this edition), are brief and it would have been comparatively easy to append them to this part of the volume. The second part of the volume is taken up with Select Orations and Letters of Gregory Nazianzen, edited by Charles Gordon Browne, M.A., Rector of Lympstone, Devon, and James Edward Swallow, M.A., Chaplain of the House of Mercy, Horbury. With more material at their disposal these editors have made a much briefer Introduction than the editor of Cyril. This in itself would be no evidence of insufficiency, but an examination of the work reveals that too much has been sacrificed to brevity. The third division of the Prolegomena for instance is entirely unsatisfactory. Its special subject, the Literature of S. Gregory, is an especially rich one; and the treatment of it here is scarcely better than total omission. Students of Gregory Nazianzen will continue to depend on other helps for their guidance at least on this point. The selection of Orations and Letters is reasonably representative, though it might have been made more complete.——*Stoics and Saints.* Lectures on the later Heathen Moralists, and on some Aspects of the Life of the Mediæval Church. By the Late James Baldwin Brown, B.A., Minister of Brixton Independent Church, author of *The Higher Life, First Principles of Ecclesiastical Truth*, etc. Pp. viii, 296. (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893.) Morals, Pagan and Christian, historically considered, is the unifying string that runs through these lectures, which otherwise, like beads, would fall apart, each being independent of the others. Morals, however, are connected with and traced to their roots—Philosophy among the heathen and Religion among Christians. Thus the volume presents a consecutive study in Mr. Baldwin Brown's incisive and scholarly style of the practical effects of Epicureanism and Stoicism before the appearance of Christianity, and of the monastic system within Christian times. Much of what may appear incompleteness of presentation is accounted for by the editors on the ground that these lectures were never finished for publication, but are put before the public as left by their lamented author.——*Der Dialog im Dienste der Apologetik.* Von D. O. Zöckler, ord. Prof. der Theologie in Griefswald. Pp. 70. (Gütersloh: Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann, 1894.) The adoption and use of the dialogue as a literary form by the Church in ancient, mediæval and modern times, in its conflicts, both internal and external, furnishes Dr. Zöckler with a subject for a monograph full of interest and instructiveness. He treats the subject historically, tracing a development from the earliest and simplest uses to the most recent and complex. He has evidently gone beyond what the facts in the case warrant in making the symposium as a literary form a development of the dialogue. The symposium is a group of

essays on the same subject by authors who differ in their views of it. It lacks one of the essential features of the dialogue, viz., the freedom and apparent spontaneity of conversation.——*History of the Christian Church in the Middle Ages.* By the late Dr. Wilhelm Möller, Professor Ordinarius of Church History in the University of Kiel. Translated from the German by Andrew Rutherford, B.D. Pp. xii, 561. (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893.) The original German of this work has been mentioned in the PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW, Vol. iii, p. 758. This translation renders the German faithfully, but for that very reason makes a poor English book. To those who may not be accustomed to the long and involved sentences of that language and the frequent interruptions of these sentences by the author for the purpose of referring to sources, the volume will prove a difficult one to use.——*Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte.* Von Dr. Wilhelm Möller, ord. Professor der Kirchengeschichte in Kiel. Dritter Band. Reformation und Gegenreformation, unter Benutzung des Nachlasses von Dr. W. Möller, bearbeitet von Dr. Gustav Kawerau, ord. Professor der Theologie in Kiel. Pp. xvi, 440. (Freiburg i. B. und Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr, 1894). Although appearing as a part of the Church History of the late Dr. Möller, this volume is altogether the work of Möller's colleague at Kiel, Dr. G. Kawerau. It is Möller's only as it adopts the general plan of Möller's two volumes and continues what Möller left unfinished. Kawerau himself has had abundant and special preparation for just this part of the work planned by his late colleague, in and through his labors on the Weimar edition of Luther's works. He does not evince much originality either in the disposition of the material or in the view of the meaning of the movements with which he is dealing. But he has given us an excellent compendious history of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. The range of the literature to which he refers is rather more limited than that of Möller's previous volumes. In this respect it seems adapted preëminently to the needs of German students. It is to be hoped, if a translation into English is undertaken, that this defect may be remedied by the addition of references to English works.——*The Baptists in History.* With an Introduction on the Parliament of Religions. By George C. Lorimer, Minister at the Temple, author of *The Galilean; Studies in Social Life; Isms, Old and New*, etc. Pp. 117. (Boston: Silver, Burdett & Co., 1893.) In this little book we have two essays very different in their nature and merits. The first treats in a calm and thoughtful way of the late Parliament of Religions. Contrasted with the extravagant representations made regarding that body, both commendatory and condemnatory, this account of Dr. Lorimer's is refreshing. The second and main part of the book, however, fails to be what it was intended on account of too great an eagerness to vindicate the peculiarities of the Baptists, even in those particulars in which history has pronounced against them and led their descendants of to-day to set them aside. It is a panegyric and a plea rather than a historical investigation.——*Henry of Navarre and the Huguenots in France.* By P. F. Willert, M.A. Pp. 478. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1893.) This volume appears in the "Heroes of the Nations" series and makes a most interesting and faithful representation of the French Reformation during the last years of the sixteenth century. The author's use of unfamiliar names to designate familiar persons is often confusing. It is to be doubted whether anything is gained by reverting to the antiquated habit of translating names into English, such as Louis into Lewis, Jeanne into Jane, etc., or of putting the familiar "Politiques" into the English "Politicians," or of using the almost unknown Rosny in speaking of Sully, proper and true as the former name may be.——*The Pilgrim in Old England.* A Review of the History,

Present Condition and Outlook of the Independent (Congregational) Churches in England. By Amory H. Bradford, author of *Spirit and Life; Old Wine in New Bottles*, etc. Pp. xviii, 344. (New York: Fords, Howard & Hulbert, 1893.) The name "pilgrim" is given here by a sort of license to those who did not go on pilgrimage, but shared in the sentiments and beliefs of those that did. A more strictly descriptive title for the book would have been "The Present Condition of Congregationalism in England." The author does indeed undertake to treat of the history of the Independent movement in England; but either the specific object in view in the preparation of the work or some other cause stands in the way of his rendering a permanent or valuable historical contribution to his subject. In this regard the volume is disappointing. It gives us nothing either new or conceived of from the point of view of relations newly discovered by the author. But though the book be of little value as history it is quite full of fresh presentations of the English Congregationalism of to-day. Yet even here a strong suspicion arises in the mind of the reader as to whether Dr. Bradford is not overstating the departure of English Congregationalism from its old ground of Calvinism. Probably the wish to have it so has affected his view of the case. It is certain he does not support his assertions on this point by a sufficient array of facts. His generalizations are rather the result of impressions received from a more or less careful study of certain local centres than the result of a thorough induction of all the facts in the case.——*A History of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States.* By Henry Eyster Jacobs, Norton Professor of Systematic Theology in the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia. [The American Church History Series, Vol. iv.] Pp. xvi, 539. (New York: The Christian Literature Company, 1893.) If this volume has set the pace for its successors in the series projected by the American Society of Church History, we may expect a successful issue to the project. Prof. Jacobs has certainly treated his subject in a genuinely scholarly manner. Beginning with the question, "What is Lutheranism?" in his Introduction, he traces Lutheranism from its sources in Europe to its first planting on this side of the ocean in the seventeenth century, the organization of the denomination under Muhlenberg, and its subsequent experiences to the present day. He makes no effort to conceal his natural zeal and admiration for the peculiarities of the denomination with which he has been identified, but does not allow this zeal to lead him into partisanship as a historian. His periodology, however, is somewhat too elaborate and confusing. It is hardly useful to divide the history of 250 years into six periods, especially as the characteristics of some are so little different from those that precede or follow. The overlapping of periods II and III is noticeable and cannot but perplex the inexperienced. It would have been much better to combine periods III and IV under the natural title of "Deterioration and Revival."——*A History of the Methodist Church, South, the United Presbyterian Church, the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, and the Presbyterian Church, South, in the United States.* By Prof. Gross Alexander, D.D., James B. Scouller, D.D., Prof. R. V. Foster, D.D., and Prof. T. C. Johnson, D.D. [American Church History Series, Vol. xi.] Pp. xii, 487. (New York: The Christian Literature Co., 1894.) The four Churches put together in this volume form a natural group, in the first place, on the ground of their being of the class of smaller ecclesiastical bodies; and, secondly and chiefly, because they are products exclusively of American history. With the exception of the United Presbyterian Church, they have had nothing in the Old World to which they correspond. And even the United Presbyterian Church, though having its roots in Scotland, has as an organization nothing but the name in common with the United Presbyterian

Church in Scotland. Two of these four bodies, moreover, owe their separate existence to the evolutions of the political history of this country, and could not possibly have had any reason for existence anywhere else. The American Society of Church History may well take special interest in this volume of the series it has undertaken to put forth. In the composition of the histories there is, as was naturally to be expected, a tendency to exaggerate the local and transient features of the ecclesiastical life of these denominations. With the founders of these Churches it was a matter of conscience and duty that they should take the course they did; and the impartial historian can do nothing but bow with deference to these conscientious convictions; but, as he notes the changes which have come and the gradual disappearance of the reasons for separate existence, he is prompted to hope that the very writing of their history may tend to remove them out of the atmosphere of local and provincial feeling and lead to their reunion with the larger and more historic bodies with which they are naturally affiliated.——*The Religious Forces of the United States Enumerated, Classified, and Described on the Basis of the Government Census of 1890.* With an Introduction on the Condition and Character of American Christianity. By H. K. Carroll, LL.D., in charge of the Division of Churches, Eleventh Census. [American Church History Series, Vol. i.] Pp. lxii, 449. (New York: The Christian Literature Co., 1893.) Naturally this volume belongs to the close rather than to the beginning of the Series of which it constitutes a part. There are obvious reasons, however, why it should be put at the beginning, and these seem to have governed the editors. The contents of the volume are the result of the investigation made by Dr. Carroll in his official capacity as Departmental Census Supervisor. His method of procedure, as set forth in the Introduction, is thoroughly scientific; and, although the range of the investigation undertaken by the Census Bureau was narrower than might have been desired, yet, as the most adequate possible under the circumstances, it is to be welcomed as a sufficient basis for a broader study later on. This same method of procedure is calculated to secure the most accurate and trustworthy results; we could not suggest any that is better suited to do this. And yet to illustrate the difficulty of getting at the truth in such matters, it might be mentioned that under the single item of the "Greek Orthodox Church" (p. 81) instead of one Church organization in Louisiana there should have been enumerated also two in New York and possibly one in Illinois (Chicago), though perhaps this last may have not been fully perfected until after the census of 1890 was taken.——*Henry Ward Beecher: The Shakespeare of the Pulpit.* By John Henry Barrows, author of *The Gospels are True Histories*, and *I Believe in God.* [American Reformers Series, edited by Carlos Martyn.] Pp. xvi, 541. (New York: Funk and Wagualls, 1893.) This biography of Beecher is characterized, first of all, by its outward compactness. It gives in a smaller compass more of the facts of a most eventful career than any other thus far given to the public. Besides, its style is clear and attractive. This might have been expected in a work by Dr. Barrows. Thirdly, the point of view is sympathetic and enables the author to interpret his subject for us the more correctly. Perhaps a somewhat intimate acquaintance between biographer and subject contributes to produce this sympathy. At any rate the charm of it is perceptible to the reader. Moreover, Dr. Barrows has striven to go deeper than mere appearances and to explain somewhat the life and character of Beecher on philosophical principles. One of the most suggestive chapters in the whole work is that which traces the elements of Beecher's character to his ancestry.——*Memorial of Rev. J. H. Worcester, Jr., D.D.* Containing a Brief Biography and Selected Sermons. Pp. 343. (Published by the Sixth Presbyterian Church of Chicago, Ill., 1893.) The

biography of Dr. Worcester contained in this memorial volume was compiled by Mr. Alexander Forbes, very well known as a hard-working business man and elder in the Sixth Presbyterian Church of Chicago. It is evidently compiled with great care and discrimination. Besides the biography, the volume also contains the memorial addresses of President Buckham at the funeral of Dr. Worcester in Burlington, Vt., and of Dr. McPherson at the Union Theological Seminary, New York, and a few selected sermons by Dr. Worcester.

McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago. A. C. Zenos.

III.—SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

The Place of Christ in Modern Theology. By A. M. Fairbairn, M.A., D.D., Principal of Mansfield College; Gifford Lecturer in the University of Aberdeen; late Morse Lecturer in Union Seminary, New York; and Lyman Beecher Lecturer in Yale University. London: Hodder & Stoughton; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1893. 8vo, pp. xxiii, 556.

The watchword of this large volume of five hundred and fifty-six pages is the war-cry of the "higher critics" and their theological allies. The Churches have throughout their histories so modified the teaching of Christ by attempts to harmonize it with their respective environments, that both He and His teaching have been set at naught through creeds and doctrinal traditions. They tell us that the remedy for all this is the recovery of "the historical Christ;" and they are the men to recover the Christ of history and restore His doctrine to the Churches of Christendom. Such is the modest claim advanced in this book on behalf of the "higher criticism." At least through its learned labors the "higher criticism," we are informed, has placed the Christian theologian in a position never before occupied, where "he can now stand face to face with the historical Christ, and conceive God as He conceived Him. What God signified to Jesus Christ He ought to signify to all Christian Churches; and here all can find a point from which to study themselves and their systems." What God signified to Christ we are to find in Christ's consciousness. "The standpoint of the interpreter is, as it were, the consciousness of Jesus Christ, and this consciousness where it is clearest and most defined, in the belief as to God's Fatherhood and His own Sonship" (Preface, viii). How the interpreter is to take his stand at this standpoint, if we are to believe these theological critics, is certainly a mystery. In his *Kingdom of God*, Prof. Bruce, of the Free Church College of Glasgow, says that it is doubtful whether this standpoint can be discovered. He tells his readers (p. 359) that "It may be doubted, indeed, whether a real knowledge of the historical Christ be now possible." It is true, Prof. Bruce, in the second edition, expresses his surprise (p. 357) that some have understood him to be expressing his own view in this sentence; but the whole drift and tendency of his book have their only possible expression in that most skeptical sentence. Indeed, the position of Biblical *errancy* now taken by those "higher critics" who are in search of the historical Christ, will warrant no other conclusion; for who can trust the accounts of the historical Christ given in the Gospel histories, if the writers, as Dr. Bruce alleges, as in the case of Luke, were chargeable with "*modifications, omissions and additions?*" (p. 14). Such is a specimen of the way in which the "higher critics" have helped the theologian to stand face to face with the historical Christ!

But the task our author has set himself is not simply the recovery of the historical Christ; it embraces also the discovery of Christ's consciousness. Here is certainly a grave difficulty—a difficulty which would seem absolutely insuperable to the "higher critics." The consciousness of Christ is, of course, shut up in His own bosom, and is inaccessible save as He may see fit to make it known. The only communications He has made regarding its contents, however, are those placed on record by the apostles and evangelists in the New Testament. If we are ever to gain access to the august chamber of that sacred consciousness, it must be by means of the revelation made through their writings. Here again, as in the case of the recovery of Christ Himself, these critics are self-debarred all entrance; for they have built up a critical system whose cornerstone is the errancy of Scripture. On their own principles, therefore, they can have no guarantee that the contents of Christ's consciousness have been accurately reported by the New Testament writers. This is a fatal objection to the theory under discussion; for, on the avowed principles of the theorists themselves, there is no guarantee that the standard whereby the theologies of Christendom are to be remodeled and reduced to unity, possesses the indispensable attribute of infallibility. If, as they affirm, these writings, through which alone knowledge of Christ's consciousness is attainable, are errant, and, therefore, untrustworthy, it is manifest that no confidence can be placed in any canon of reconstruction or test of doctrine deduced from their contents. If the theology of Christendom is to be reconstructed so as to be in accordance with the consciousness of Christ, and if the medium through which alone His consciousness is to be discovered, be unreliable because of "*modifications, omissions and additions*," the resultant theology must be as unreliable as the standard to which its doctrines have been conformed. In a word, our author's projected doctrinal reformation, if carried into effect, must end, not in the unity and harmony of the creeds of Christendom, but in the subversion of all faith in any theological system based upon the testimony of prophets, apostles or evangelists. Universal theological skepticism is the only logical, legitimate goal of a theory of theological reconstruction based upon the critical principles of the "higher critics."

As our author, despite the views of inspiration inculcated by the "higher critics," has sufficient confidence in the Gospel by John to base upon its teachings certain elements of his own theological theory, we are justified in placing in it a like confidence where it arrays before us the fundamental elements of the economy of redemption as unfolded from the consciousness of the historical Christ. It is true he regards the Gospel as given by John as largely the outcome of the evangelist's own speculation regarding the person and life of Christ. "John's, while the most speculative," is regarded by our author as "the most personal Christology in the New Testament" (p. 345). Of course, the implication is that the speculative element has something to do in moulding the Christology of the other New Testament writers. However, the author has no hesitation in accepting anything in these alleged speculations which seems to harmonize with his own Christology.

Following the example thus set, let us accept the lead and guidance of John to the consciousness of the historical Christ. Surely the beloved disciple who leaned on His bosom at the Last Supper and was admitted to the inner circle of His fellowship, must be a safer guide than the "higher critics" who rise up, after the lapse of nineteen centuries, to gainsay his testimony. The question raised is a very simple one, and one for the answering of which the evangelist has furnished us with abundant material. The question is this: What is the testimony of John regarding the contents of Christ's con-

sciousness—that standard by which the theologies of the Churches of Christendom are to be reconstructed and reduced to harmony? Had Christ treasured up in His consciousness a definite soteriological system, and is that system to be found among the Churches of Christendom? Let Christ Himself, as reported by the evangelist, give answer.

In the first place, we find revealed in our Lord's discourses, not the vague benevolence of a universal Fatherhood, cherished alike towards all men, as men; but a definite, discriminating, sovereign love, manifesting itself in the selection of the subjects of His saving grace out of the mass of a guilty, fallen humanity, and in committing them to Christ who becomes responsible for their salvation. Those thus given Him He calls His sheep. Besides those sheep which are of the Jewish fold, He tells us that He has other sheep which are not of this fold, and that He *must* bring them also, so that there shall be one flock and one Shepherd. It will be observed that He claims these other ungathered sheep as His before He gathers them. They are His *federally*, as the Father's gift in the covenant of redemption. "Thine they were and thou gavest them me and they have kept thy Word."

In the second place, these discourses teach that the Saviour's knowledge of those given Him is as definite as the Father's knowledge. His knowledge of them is such that He calls them by name and leads them forth, as a good shepherd knows and calls his flock to follow him. He says, "I know my sheep, and am known of mine."

In the third place, His call is an effectual call. His sheep hear His voice and follow Him and a stranger will they not follow, for they know not the voice of strangers. Speaking of this call, He likens it, in its efficiency, to the call in response to which those that are in the graves shall come forth at the last day.

In the fourth place, He lays down His life for the sheep, acting as their substitute. This substitutionary surrender of His life for them He is authorized to make. He has received a commandment from His Father to make it. It is because of this commandment that He says, "I have power (*exousia*, authority), to lay it down and power (*exousia*, authority) to take it again." Here we have a definite atonement effected by the good Shepherd, by the Father's appointment, with a view to the salvation of the sheep committed to Him of the Father. He lays down His life *in the room* of His sheep alone, ransoming them and no others.

In the fifth place, it is not in virtue of any inherent *ability* that the sheep hear His voice and follow Him. "No man can come unto Me except the Father which hath sent Me draw him." This is certainly an avowal of the doctrine of human *inability* in regard to spiritual things.

In the sixth place, so far are the sheep from possessing any spiritual ability, in their unregenerate state, that even when drawn of the Father to the Shepherd and received by Him, they do not possess any spiritual strength to abide in His fold. Hence provision is made for their *perseverance* through the joint action of the Father and the Shepherd. "I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any one pluck them out of My hand. My Father, which gave them Me, is greater than all; and no one is able to pluck them out of My Father's hand." Here we have the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints stated, and a reason assigned for it. Their perseverance is simply the perseverance of the Father and the Shepherd in the prosecution of their one eternal purpose to save.

In the seventh place, the spiritual *inability* affirmed in these discourses is absolute, for the subjects of it are regarded as spiritually dead. This is manifest from the fact that the Shepherd's work includes the *impartation* to them of eternal life. "I *give* unto them eternal life." This is a very differ-

ent thing from *offering* eternal life. He *gives* them eternal life, and He was commissioned and empowered to *give it*. He reminds the Father of this commission. "Even as Thou hast given Him power (*exousia*, authority) over all flesh, that He should give eternal life to as many as Thou hast given Him."

In the eighth place, the Shepherd's commission embraces the resurrection of the bodies of those given Him of the Father. He tells the Jews that He came down from heaven, not to do His own will, but the will of Him that sent Him, and this is the will, He informs them, of Him that sent Him, that of all that He hath given Him He should lose *nothing*, but should raise it (*auto*) up at the last day. His commission, therefore, will not be carried fully into execution until, with *the entire company* committed to Him, He ascends in triumph over the last enemy, to give in His account before the Father, when He will be able to say, as He points to that great host which no man can number, "Behold, I and the children which Thou hast given Me; they are all present, not one missing."

Here, then, we have arrayed before us, by the beloved disciple, the leading soteriological contents of the consciousness of "the historical Christ." It is certainly not too much to claim that the system disclosed bears a very striking resemblance to at least one of the creeds of Christendom. The points embraced in it are: 1. The sovereign election by the Father of the subjects of salvation. 2. The gift of those thus chosen to the Son, who becomes responsible for their salvation. 3. The Son's definite knowledge of all committed to His trust. He knows them individually and calls them by name. 4. His call is effectual, His sheep hear His voice and respond to it by following Him. This call is, by Himself, likened to the call wherewith He shall wake the dead at the last day, a call whose summons those who are called shall certainly obey. 5. For those given Him of the Father He lays down His life. He dies in their stead by the authority of the Father. To them, and to them alone, His death has *redemptive* reference, expiating their guilt and reconciling them to God. 6. The utter inability of His sheep in regard to spiritual things is another item in this instructive inventory. Not one of them can come unto Him except as he is drawn to Him of the Father. 7. In conformity with this latter representation, His sheep are described as destitute of spiritual life, and His commission embraces, as one of its essential elements, the impartation to them of a life that is spiritual and eternal. For the due execution of this part of His commission, the Father has given Him power (*exousia*) over all flesh, the only limitation being, that this power shall be exercised in the impartation of eternal life only to those given Him of the Father. 8. The perseverance of those gifted with the life thus imparted is assured beyond all peradventure. They are held in His own hand and in the Father's hand, and no one is able to wrest, or wrench, them out of that omnipotent grasp. 9. His commission embraces the resurrection of the bodies of all whom the Father has committed to Him.

Here, then, is an outline of our Lord's soteriology as it lay enshrined in His own consciousness, and it is manifest that there is one, at least, of the creeds of Christendom that needs no readjustment to be conformed to it. John Calvin never sketched a creed more thoroughly Calvinistic than that presented in the foregoing outline. There is not a fundamental principle of the economy of redemption which it does not embrace, and they are simply the constituent elements of the Calvinistic theology. If, then, as our author proposes, the theologies of Christendom are to be rectified and reconstructed according to the consciousness of the historical Christ, here is the standard to which they are to be comformed, and here is the centre of theological

and ecclesiastical unification. If Christ's consciousness is to rule in the reconstruction, the Churches of Christendom must become Calvinistic.

Our author, however, does not stand by his fundamental pure and simple. Christ's consciousness as revealed by Himself does not suit his theological system, and, therefore, it must be modified. Instead of the foregoing broad, comprehensive inventory of its contents, he reduces it to two factors, God's Fatherhood and His own Sonship. "God was His Father, He was God's Son. What God was to Him He desired Him to be to all men; what He was to God all men ought to be. . . . . Men are God's sons; filial love is their primary duty, fraternal love their common and equal obligation" (p. 48). In a word, the great aim of the book is to inculcate the doctrine of the universal Fatherhood of God, and the universal sonship of men. The question of course naturally arises, If all men *are* the sons of God and God the Father of all men, how is it that even our author represents Christ as desiring to have this mutual relation of Fatherhood and sonship inaugurated? In support of this theory of the universal Fatherhood of God and the correlative universal sonship of men, the chief arguments, so far as Scripture is concerned, are a few passages from the Sermon on the Mount. Christ, we are told, as He stood in the midst of men, taught them to address God as their Father in common with Himself. A reference to that Sermon aud the position occupied by Christ while He delivered it, will prove that when He spake of God's Fatherhood, He was addressing His own disciples; and that at this particular stage of His discourse He was instructing them and not the promiscuous multitudes that came up after Him and them. The language He applied to them would be out of place if addressed to the encompassing throng. He tells them that they are the light of the world, the salt of the earth, a city set on a hill that cannot be hid. He tells them that they shall be persecuted for His sake, as the prophets of the olden time were. Were the multitudes outside the circle of His disciples—the light of the world, the salt of the earth, the successors of the Old Testament prophets? Towards the close of His address He does take cognizance of others than His disciples, and while the language He employs is perfectly in place while addressed to the multitudes, it would have been altogether unsuitable if addressed to His disciples. They are admonished to enter in at the straight gate, warned to beware of false prophets, to be careful not to build their hopes of heaven upon a false foundation.

In fact, the chief argument in support of God's universal Fatherhood is a speculation based upon the inner relations of the Godhead, the sum and substance of which is, that as there is in the Godhead the relations of Fatherhood and Sonship, God is under obligation, if He create moral agents at all, to produce a society which shall be the counterpart and reflex of those inner paternal and filial relations. The society created must be not simply a society of moral agents, but a family, a society of sons of which He is the Father, and to whom He sustains relations akin to those He sustains to His only-begotten and well-beloved Son. In the passage (pp. 440–446) in which this speculation occurs, the word *must* is used several times, and the word *cannot* is added to give it additional force. Entering without a ray of revelation to light his path where even the seraphim might well veil their vision and fear to tread, our author has no hesitation in laying down the lines on which the Creator *must* work. He *must* act so and so, and *cannot* act otherwise. Of course there is no argument in this speculation. It is from beginning to end a piece of mere speculative dogmatism. There is nothing in it of which faith can take hold. In opposition to all this, if we are to indulge in speculation on such a subject, it might be just as well contended that God might create moral agents in His own image, after His own likeness, in knowledge,

righteousness and holiness, giving them dominion over the creatures as lords of this lower world, without raising them to the high rank and dignity of sonship. This could scarcely be called a speculation, as it seems to be in accord with the history of man's creation. In that history there is abundant evidence of man's standing as earth's lord, but there is very little said about his occupying the position of a son. It is not through man's creation that the inner personal relations of the Godhead have been revealed. These august relations are unfolded in man's redemption, and nowhere else.

This doctrine of the universal Fatherhood of God and the correlative sonship of man is the standard by which, according to this book, the theologies of the Churches are to be adjudged and reformed. There is not room to point out the extent to which this doctrine has dominated the author's theology. The present writer has done this in a series of articles in the Belfast *Witness* for September and October, 1893. Suffice it now to say that with Dr. Fairbairn, the leading outcome of the Fatherhood is, that there is no *penalty* inflicted under the divine, paternal government which is simply *penal*. Even "*the very penalties*" are never merely retributive or vindicatory, but always corrective and redemptive. This principle he extends to the divine administration in the future state. God, as a Father, can never abandon the sinner. Throughout the *œons* of eternity, the *penalties* inflicted will have for their object the reformation and redemption of the subjects of them. These are the men who talk so grandly and loudly of the Fatherly benevolence of God! Would it not be more benevolent to convert men *here*, under the benign influence of the means of grace, than to postpone their conversion until they are imprisoned in outer darkness, where their worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched? The only answer that can be attempted to this question is, that there is, in the will of man, an obstacle which even omnipotence itself cannot overcome without, as our author puts it, destroying the freedom of man and the will itself. Those who take this ground simply prove that they are neither philosophers nor theologians. They confound the faculty of the will with the moral state of the will. The very object of regeneration is the disenthrallment of the will. Prior to this mighty change the will is the bondslave of sin. The man's cognitive and conative powers, as well as his feelings, are all in bondage. As Christ told Nicodemus, the sinner can neither *see* nor *enter* the kingdom of God until he is born from above. So much for the insight of our so-called modern theology into the state in which the Gospel finds the sinner, and the agency of the Holy Ghost in applying the redemption purchased by Christ.

As a specimen of the way in which our author has treated some of the great theologians of former days take the following: "Calvin," he says, "was as pure, though not as conscious and consistent a Pantheist as Spinoza. . . . . Calvin may be said to have anticipated Spinoza in his notion of God as *causa immanens*" (pp. 164, 165). The chief proof on which he founds this charge is given by him in a footnote as follows: "*Fateor quidem pie hoc posse dici, modo a pio animo proficiscatur, naturam esse Deum*" (Calvin, *Instit. Christ. Relig.*, lib. i, cap. v, § 5). The reader will be surprised to learn that what Dr. Fairbairn has here given as a complete sentence, ending with a full stop, is only the first clause of a sentence, ending in Calvin's *Institutes* with a semicolon, and followed by a long clause in which Calvin repudiates Pantheism. The clause omitted by Dr. Fairbairn is as follows: "*sed quia dura est et impropria loquutio, quum potius Natura sit ordo a Deo præscriptus, in rebus tanti ponderis, et quibus debetur singularis religio, involvere confuse Deum cum inferiore operum suorum Sursu, noxium est.*" The clause first quoted as a complete sentence by our author is, in English, "This may be piously said, provided it proceed from a pious mind, that na-

ture is God." In the clause our author omits, Calvin, it will be seen, adds; "but as this is a harsh and an improper way of speaking, since nature is rather the order prescribed by God, in matters of such great importance and in which a peculiar reverence is due, it is baneful (*noxium est*) to confound God with the inferior course of His own works." There is no need of comment on this treatment of a man who stands out as *facile princeps* of the theologians of Christendom. While doing ample justice to Calvin's ability, character and influence, Dr. Fairbairn has dealt with him in this matter as the "higher critics" have dealt with the Word of God. Reference is now made to this charge against the greatest of all Reformers in order to put the reader upon his guard, that he may not accept, without reference and verification, the author's animadversions upon the theologies and theologians of centuries long gone by.

Belfast. ROBERT WATTS.

THE SON. By the Rev. T. MOZLEY, M.A., Formerly Fellow of Oriel, Author of *The Word; Reminiscences;* and *Letters from Rome.* London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1891. Pp. vi, 345.

This is an interesting book on a subject of vital importance. It may be read with profit, though most readers will likely enter protest against many of the views advanced. The author is not to be confounded with Canon Mozley, who has given us the well-known treatise on *Miracles.* He is perhaps best known as the writer of two volumes—*Letters from Rome*—in which is given an exceedingly readable account of the Ecumenical Council of 1870, at Rome. He was reared in the Anglican Church, and took a deep interest in the Tractarian movement. It would seem that our author is far from satisfied with the doctrinal position of the Anglican Church, particularly in regard to the trinitarianism of its creed. At the same time he does not make it clear whether Romanism or Nonconformity is really to be preferred. More than once the book leaves the impression that the writer has passed through a rationalistic stage of mental activity, from which he has emerged with antagonism to all creeds.

The book consists of fifty-four short, pithy chapters, which treat of a great variety of themes. It is written in a very pleasant style, but the logical arrangement seems defective. The letter-press and make-up of the volume are excellent and leave nothing to be desired.

The treatise itself opens with a brief description of the great moral and social revolution marked by the advent of Jesus Christ, and then the question is raised, "Who and what is Jesus Christ? How came He to stop and turn the current of the history of the race? Who is the Son?" (p. 10).

In the opening chapters the basis of the discussion is laid in the nature of man rather than in the Scriptures, and this feature is equally true of the whole treatise. Our author (p. 50) finds that "the two titles of our Saviour —Son of God and Son of Man—may be inscribed on the whole nature and condition of man; and, in that sense, on every human being." "In the qualified plural sense we are all sons of God and sons of man." And on p. 58 he adds that "We must also see in the Sonship of the Saviour our own restored sonship, and in our sonship the true and supreme Sonship of Him who has brought us back to the presence of the Father." Here one cannot fail to note that no real distinction is made between the eternal Sonship of the second Person of the Trinity and that of the finite creature, nor again between the natural sonship of mere creaturehood, and the true spiritual Sonship which is the product of grace.

Then follows a discussion of "various theories of existence." Theism is

taken as so far true, and yet our author emphasizes the fact that "mere theism is insufficient" for the purpose it is supposed to serve. We freely admit that mere theism is not all we need for our religious wants, but at the same time we maintain that, as a philosophic theory, theism gives us the true doctrine of the universe and at the same time affords the rational ground upon which revelation and redemption rest.

Then in chap. xvii our author points out that pagan faiths gave no place to the idea of Sonship, and in chap. xviii he seeks to show that the Church of England has a very inadequate idea of it. In chap. xix our author's opposition to orthodox trinitarianism appears in an exposition of the parable of the Prodigal Son, in which this language occurs, "When they (certain writers) insult human intelligence, even heaven itself, with a monstrous conception of a triple deity in which Father and Son are no more than one." This sounds the keynote of subsequent discussion.

In chaps. xxii–xxvi we have some curious discussions on Personality, on Identical Personality, on Personalities and Abstractions, on Competing Personalities, and on Various Personalities. All through these chapters there is a gentle movement forward in the attack which is about to be made on orthodox trinitarianism, by assaulting the doctrine of the Son of God which is therein set forth. In like manner, and with the same evident object in view, chaps. xxvii–xxxi deal with such topics as these: Multiple Existence, Various Existence, Relative Existence, Spiritual Existence and Preëxistence.

In the chapter on Preëxistence there is much to provoke comment. Our author quietly assumes that Scripture is silent upon the subject. Then he says, "It is impossible to dispute it, the reasonable soul of man cannot accept the idea of an instantaneous creation of everything out of nothing" (p. 192). This being the case he concludes that "human souls may have had an existence in some previous state" (p. 197). Such a view he thinks best meets "the moral difficulty of finding men born morally bad" (p. 197). We freely admit the moral difficulty, but find no relief in our author's theory, for he only shifts the difficulty a step back. The old federal theology, with Adam as the head and representative of his seed and imputation the fact, is a far better solution of the moral difficulty than that which our author gives. But the main aim of this chapter seems to be to lay the basis for asserting the preëxistence of the Son without at the same time affirming His absolute eternity.

Then in the remaining chapters of the book our author's views come gradually out. Several chapters discuss the term "Person" in various aspects. Here in different ways assault is made upon the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity. He says (p. 216), "In absolute oneness distinct personality must disappear." Reading these chapters one can almost fancy that the ghost of Arius or Socinus had come forth and written a book. All through, familiar theological distinctions such as that between "person" and "essence" are entirely overlooked.

In chap. xliv we at length find our author's views of "the Trinity" and of "the Son" stated. It is virtually a refined *modal* Trinity. Each person is a mode, a relation, or an office of the one Almighty God (pp. 284, 285). So far as Jesus Christ is concerned our author objects to the phrase "God the Son," and asserts that He is only the "Son of God," while men and angels are sons of God also. How far the Sonship of Christ, of angels, and of men agree is not explained. On p. 342 we are told that "it is a great truth that Christ is an operation and a manifestation of the Almighty, but it is only half the truth;" still we look in vain for the other half of a truth which is all important.

Such being the doctrine of "the Son," we are ready to be told that no real redemptive scheme appears in the book. Its closing utterances are quoted in proof of this, "He through whom we are born again, in whom we hope to be perfected, and with whom we desire to be like-minded, is the Son, and as a Son does His duty to the Heavenly Father, and shows us how to do ours. To that Heavenly Father He is the way, the truth, and the life, not less the Beginning because also the End."

Louisville, Ky. FRANCIS R. BEATTIE.

THE SOTERIOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By WILLIAM PORCHER DU BOSE, M.A., S.T.D., etc. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1892. 12mo, pp. 391.

The writer of this interesting treatise on the grandest of all themes is the Professor of Exegesis in the University of the South (Episcopal), and his discussion is manifestly an outgrowth of his studies in this special department. The key to the volume appears in his analysis, at the outset, of the term *Salvation*, as implying in some sense the realizing of all natural and moral good, but specially the realization of all spiritual good in God and in union of soul with Him. "Our one good is God, righteousness and life, which are three," yet in a deeper, more comprehensive sense, as he teaches, are one. Having justified this conception by an exposition of the terms employed in the New Testament to set forth this salvation—reconciliation, redemption, resurrection—he carries the definition on with him throughout his discussion.

Christ as the Saviour is portrayed in a series of chapters on his several spheres and offices as the Mediator, our reconciliation and redemption, resurrection and propitiation. This is followed by another series of chapters on the incarnation, the divine and human nature, and the sinlessness of Christ, with special discussion of His human nature and freedom from all earthly corruption. His work and example, priesthood and sacrifice, are discussed in several chapters, and the volume ends with a brief presentation of the Church and the Sacraments in their relations to our salvation.

One cannot refrain from challenging the positions of the author on several important points. The first of these relates to the Scriptures as an inspired and authoritative record. Inspiration, with the peculiar certification which such demonstrated inspiration brings, seems to us indispensable to any intelligent confidence in the New Testament as containing "a single, consistent, complete and true soteriology, or doctrine of human salvation." If this doctrine has not come to us from God, bringing supernatural evidence to its truthfulness, how can we accept it as a fundamental and central constituent in our religious belief?

It is a question whether the author has not brought before us a conception of salvation which emphasizes too much, relatively, the subjective elements, and ignores too much, relatively, the objective elements in that gracious process. Unquestionably the opposite tendency has been too strong in Protestant, and especially in our Calvinistic theology, and it ought not to be at all an unwelcome phenomenon, that so many thoughtful minds are beginning to realize more fully the *Christus in nobis* which ever stands in Scripture over against the *Christus pro nobis* of whom the Pauline letters say so much. Salvation is a restoration to holiness, to love, to obedience, to life inward and spiritual and eternal, as well as a deliverance from guilt and condemnation under law. But on the other side is it not a serious mistake to exalt the former aspect of our salvation, at the expense of the latter, or through any ignoring of that objective justification without which, as a condition, there can be no real spiritual life in man?

In respect to the human nature of our Lord and His freedom from all taint of sin, we incline to think that the author has speculated too freely, and has gone farther than the inspired Word warrants. We would also challenge in a friendly way his prelatic view of the Church and especially of the Sacraments, as factors in the great work of human salvation. Baptism is not justificatiou, neither is the Holy Communion sanctification, *per se;* they are but signs and emblems of the great spiritual experiences which these two terms express. But the volume is full of striking thoughts, of suggestive exposition, of admirable doctrine, as well as keen and subtle speculation, and will be read with interest by all who once master its peculiar method and its rather perplexing style.

Lane Seminary, Cincinnati. E. D. MORRIS.

THE WILL IN ITS THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS. By JOHN L. GIRARDEAU, Professor of Systematic Theology in Columbia Theological Seminary, South Carolina. Columbia, S. C.: W. J. Duffie. 12mo, pp. 497.

This book is a republication of a series of articles written for *The Southern Presbyterian Review*, with the addition of six or seven chapters upon the same general subject. It is an earnest and commendable effort to elucidate those ethical and theological questions which pertain to man's free and respousible ageucy and to divine foreordaining sovereignty. The peculiarity of the treatise is that it advocates, in a limited and modified form, the doctrine of the self-determining power of the human will. Without some such power, according to Prof. Girardeau, sin, guilt and righteous condemnation would be impossible; without it, therefore, there can be no satisfactory ethics, no satisfactory theodicy.

The professor's position may also be understood from his strong opposition to that theory of the essential nature of voluntary activity which is called Determiuism or Necessitarianism, and from his maintaining that man as morally responsible has the power of contrary choice. Moreover, in all this he claims to be a follower of John Calvin.

He does not, indeed, assert that man in his fallen condition has any self-determining power by which he may enter on a life of faith and godliness, but holds with Calvin that mankind are spiritually dead and unable, without the grace of God, to have any experience of piety. But he teaches that unregenerate man has self-determining power in regard to things external and civil, in matters of merely moral culture, and in regard to certain acts (as Bible-reading, church-going, and so ou) which tend towards religion. "The unregenerate man is therefore responsible for neglecting to do these things, and will be unable to justify himself when charged with failure to perform these duties before the final bar of judgment" (p. 405).

Then besides this direct condemnation for one's own shortcomings, man is "responsible for the sin of Adam, his federal head and representative. The iuability to do spiritual acts, which now characterizes him in his unregenerate condition, is penal, and cannot excuse him for not performing those acts" (p. 406). Moreover, as each of us is directly responsible for his own actions so far as they are subject to the self-determining power of his will, so we are all federally responsible for the sin of Adam because the alternative of doing or not doing that sin fell within his alternative power of coutrary choice.

In support of the claim that the foregoing positions are those of Calvin Dr. Girardeau quotes largely from the great Reformer. For example, Calvin says, "We assert that the human race, having lost the liberty (*libertate*) which it had received at creation, fell into miserable bondage. In this con-

dition of bondage, we deny that man is endued with the free (*libera*) power of choosing as well good as evil, so that he can apply himself to whichever alternative he pleases (*ad utrumque libet*)." And again, "Adam, therefore, might have stood if he chose, since it was only by his own will that he fell; but it was because his will was pliable in either direction (*in utramque partem flexibilis*), and he had not received constancy to persevere, that he so easily fell. Still he had a free choice (*libera electio*) of good and evil, and not only so, but in the mind and will there was the highest rectitude and all the organic parts were duly framed to obedience, until man corrupted his good properties and destroyed himself." "These passages," says the professor, "clearly proved that Calvin affirmed for man in innocence the power of contrary choice—the liberty of inclining to either of opposing alternatives. He plainly declares that, although Adam freely elected to sin, he might have elected to stand. If this be Determinism, white is black, or we are dazed: and, if we are out of harmony with Calvin in holding that Adam had the power of contrary choice, we have not been able to follow a guide in a broad road at noonday. The truth is, we derived our doctrine from him, in great measure, and have faithfully stuck to him until this hour" (p. 151).

With respect to the effect of regeneration on the human will, Prof. Girardeau holds the Calvinistic doctrine that converting grace gives to man a prevailing tendency towards holy ends and activities while yet the old nature or disposition constantly contends with the new and gains many temporary triumphs. Moreover in connection with this doctrine the professor teaches that regeneration in great measure restores that self-determining power—or power of contrary choice—which was lost in Adam, so that the believer becomes able to do or not to do many spiritual duties. "We do not here speak," he says, "of the use of the Means of Grace, but of gracious spiritual acts which spring from and express the life of holiness, such as acts of faith, love, hope, zeal, etc. . . . . The ground here taken is that God sometimes leaves believers to the free, undetermined elections of their renewed wills—elections to which they are competent in consequence of the possession of sufficient grace, but which may be counterworked by the elections of their unrenewed wills" (p. 455). Prof. Girardeau decidedly distinguishes the sufficient grace just mentioned, and which gives to the Christian a self-determining power in regard to spiritual duties, from that which Arminians claim for every unregenerate hearer of the Gospel, and which gives the sinner a self-determining power in respect to his own conversion; and it must be allowed that the two things are quite distinguishable, though they seem also to be analogous with one another.

Finally with regard to the will in man's glorified estate, Dr. Girardeau teaches that it becomes absolutely confirmed in holiness. The self-determining power towards sin or holiness is displaced by "the complete destruction of the mutability of the will—the immutability of the will in holiness will characterize all of man's voluntary agency."

Such, in brief summary, are the views which Dr. Girardeau advocates with great earnestness and with much variety of argument. We shall not attempt any discussion of them; this would call for a lengthened article. We cannot conclude, however, without expressing the opinion that Prof. Girardeau is right in claiming that his positions are entirely consistent with the Calvinistic system. Some may question whether his conception of the power of contrary choice, or the self-determining power of the will, be not different from that philosophical doctrine which has generally been indicated by the use of these phrases; and may think that his words call our attention to a phase of truth which might possibly be clothed in preferable language. But his thought seems to lead powerfully in a right direction.

The ethical reasonings of the treatise, also, have peculiarities about which queries might naturally arise. Such peculiarities are to be expected in the yet undeveloped state of ethical science and of the philosophy of the will.

But we, for one, welcome this book as an evidence of that independent thought which the times demand even from those who may be the most conservatively inclined. For if the lovers of the Bible and its doctrines are to make headway against the errorists of our day, they can hope to do so only by means of thorough, fearless and honest thinking.

New York. EDWARD JOHN HAMILTON.

Lincoln University, Chester County, Pa., Theological Department. *Inauguration of Rev. Robert Laird Stewart, A.M.*, as Professor of Pastoral Theology, Evidences of Christianity and Biblical Archæology, and of *Rev. J. Aspinwall Hodge, D.D.*, as Professor of Instruction in the English Version of the Bible, Tuesday, January 23, 1894. 8vo, pp. 48. (Philadelphia: Allen, Lane & Scott, 1894.) This is a very enheartening pamphlet, with its notices of advance in the provisions for theological instruction at Lincoln, the stirring charges to the new professors, and their admirable inaugural addresses. Both new professors, as was befitting, magnified their respective offices. Prof. Stewart spoke upon "The Place and Value of Pastoral Theology in the Curriculum of Theological Study," and spoke most instructively and helpfully, taking the broadest and highest view of the scope and function of his department. Dr. Hodge took as his theme "The Extent and Unity of Bible Study." His tracing of the *representative principle* through Church doctrine, polity and worship as a unifying principle is not only intensely interesting, but a real contribution to thought. We ought not to neglect to mention Dr. Purves' clear and forceful outline of the doctrine of the authority of Scripture, in his charge to Dr. Hodge. We conceive great hopes of Lincoln's future when we listen to its new professors talking of their several branches of instruction.——*Some Current Notions Concerning Dogmatic Theology.* Inaugural Address of Charles Marsh Mead, Ph.D., D.D., Riley Professor of Christian Theology, February 14, 1894. 8vo, pp. 21. (Hartford, Conn.: Hartford Seminary Press, 1894.) Would that Prof. Mead's wise words could be engraved on the hearts of all our Christian teachers. In form, his address is a justification of the Chair of Dogmatic Theology in our seminaries; in essence it is a strong defense of dogmatic, which is as much as to say supernatural, Christianity. He posits the four objections that dogmatic theology is unpractical, not feasible, inconsistent with the constant evolution of truth, and implicative of historical and metaphysical elements unnecessary to Christianity. He shows in turn that the attempt to divorce religion from all questions of science, philosophy and history is equivalent to a total abandonment of the supernatural and a descent to the lowest plane of naturalism and rationalism; that all things cannot be surrendered to an evolutionary process of becoming, but some things *are*, and must be treated as fixed—for example, there can be no evolution of the multiplication table and as little of the fundamental facts and doctrines of the Christian revelation; that it is not only feasible but necessary to state Christian truth systematically; and that the practical effect of truth will depend on its clear apprehension and formulation, unless indeed we really believe that the less one knows about the Gospel the better he can exemplify and teach it. His unanswerable remarks on the necessity of a creed for any Church union, and the disintegrating character of all agitation for Church union on no formulated basis of belief; and his admirable remarks on the undermining effect of the present rage for "societies," exemplify the practical nature of Dr. Mead's thought.——*Darwinism.* A Lecture delivered before the Young Men's

Christian Association. By the Rev. Prof. Marais, D.D. 4to, pp. 15. (Cape Town: Dennis Edwards & Co., 1894.) A reasonable orientation of Christian thought over against Darwinism, expounding the theory, and counseling caution in commitment with reference to it. Prof. Marais holds that the problem which Darwin attacked is by no means as yet solved. We have read the lecture with the more pleasure, that it brings us a waft of Reformed thinking from the ends of the world, as does also the next book to be mentioned.——*Malebranche en zijne Bestrijders.* Een zedekundige studie. Door Pieter Joseph Cruse. 8vo, pp. xvi, 315. (Utrecht: A. H. Ten Bokkel Huinink, 1891.) This careful study of Malebranche also comes to us from the bosom of our Reformed brethren in South Africa. Dr. Cruse, who presented it as his doctorate thesis at Utrecht, was born in Cape Colony and received his preliminary training at Stellenbosch, to one of the professors at which, Prof. Marais, he dedicates this publication. After an Introduction in which he treats of Malebranche's life and works, the philosophers of his time and the sources of his system, he subjects the system itself to examination under the three heads of "Metaphysics," "Theology" and "Ethics." He recognizes the difficulty of understanding precisely what Malebranche understood in his metaphysics by the "étendue intelligible," and what he meant to teach as to its relation to God. His conclusion on this point is summed up thus: "God is the universal reason, the 'monde intelligible,' thus also the 'étendue intelligible,' says Malebranche. God is the eternal, thinking, extended essence, says Spinoza. The difference between the two lies only in the 'étendue intelligible,' which Malebranche identifies with God, and which he distinguishes from material extension. But this difference falls away, in as much as Malebranche makes things the *modi* of God. With Cousin, we think we must say that Malebranche along with Spinoza was the greatest pupil of Descartes, and may be called, in a literal sense, the Christian Spinoza." When we add to this conception, Malebranche's theory of "occasional causes," we may well say with Dr. Cruse that his metaphysical principles required a theory of determinism from him. Yet his doctrine of human freedom and grace has been and may be charged with Pelagianism. Hence Dr. Cruse emphasizes the fact that though his ethical views cannot be understood apart from his metaphysics, they are not wholly in harmony with his metaphysical principles. The treatise bears marks of careful work and seems a very instructive treatment of its subject.——*What is Inspiration?* By the Rev. E. Winter, D.D. 8vo, pp. 41. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: A. Van Dort [1894].) This pamphlet has as its object to protest against Dr. John DeWitt's book bearing the same title, which was noticed in this REVIEW for January last (p. 169). Its appearance breaks a "conspiracy of silence." "As no voice was raised against the position taken by the esteemed Dr. De Witt, these pages are offered," is the author's own account of its origin. "The writer's motive," it is added, "was to utter an humble though earnest plea for the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures." As such we welcome the pamphlet most heartily, as a faithful venture in a good cause. Two important points are pressed in it with force. One, that the attempt to confine inspiration to the "thoughts" and not the "words," always proceeds on grounds which attack the thoughts themselves. The other, that progress in revelation of truth or duty does not imply error to be corrected, but only advance in a right line. The author's remark: "A more developed revelation as found in the New Testament Scriptures, does not imply a correspondingly higher grade of inspiration," will also repay consideration.——*Addresses at the Inauguration of Professors of the Presbyterian Theological Seminary at Omaha, Neb., September 5, 1893.* 8vo, pp. 34. (Omaha: Lew. W. Baker, 1893.) On this occasion the professors inaugurated at this vigorous young seminary

were those for the two Biblical departments, Old and New Testaments, and the addresses of both were largely devoted to the doctrine of inspiration. The Rev. Matthew B. Lowrie, D.D., who was inducted into the Chair of New Testament Literature and Exegesis, took for his theme, "The Bible as the Word of God;" and the Rev. Charles G. Sterling, Ph.D., who was inducted into the Chair of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis, spoke on "The Study of the Old Testament." The two addresses are an honor to the young institution, and give the Church the assurance that the truth of God will be taught in it by men thoroughly prepared to expound the Word and resist all attacks upon it. Dr. Lowrie's address is largely devoted to outlining a sound apologetical position; Dr. Sterling's develops the reasons for and methods of studying the Old Testament. Under the former of these heads Dr. Sterling lays the chief stress upon Christ's testimony to the Jewish Scriptures as establishing their unique character as the Word of God. "To get rid of Christ's testimony to the Old Testament Scriptures" he strikingly remarks, "is to tear to shreds the Gospel history. . . . . It is to deny the existence of the real Jesus of history . . . . The Old Testament Scriptures as the authoritative and perfect Word of God must stand or fall in intelligent human faith with Jesus of Nazareth." "Let the timid or doubting Christian," he urges, "who is alarmed or unsettled by the current criticism and slander of this Divine Book, dare to stand with the God-man Jesus against all men of weaker spiritual strength and lesser wisdom." This is indeed the essence of the whole controversy on inspiration as at present pressed: is it safe to accept and trust Jesus' views of Scripture, its divinity, its authority, its truth? The line that divides into two camps men who reply yes and no to this question, ought certainly to be the line which separates Christians from the world.——*Public Services at the Installation of the Rev. J. Preston Searle, D.D.*, as Professor of Didactic and Polemic Theology in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in America, at New Brunswick, N. J. 8vo, pp. 49. (New York: Board of Publication of the Reformed Church, 1893.) As Dr. Cornelius Brett, the President of the General Synod, in his sermon (p. 10), reminded him, Prof. Searle has the distinction of having been inducted into the oldest professorship in the oldest theological seminary in the New World, to succeed such men as Livingston, Milledoler, Van Vranken, Berg, Van Zandt and Mabon, a true apostolic succession, which Dr. Brett knows how to trace back to Christ. Dr. P. D. Van Cleef's excellent practical charge opened out the duties of the office. The new professor, in the beginning of his address, modestly disclaimed any special present fitting for the great task before him; but promised diligence in its prosecution, hearty loyalty to the Reformed Standards (p. 38), and above all to keep his eye fixed on Christ, the great Revealer. Because it is to Christ alone that he looks, he feels that he cannot occupy a rationalistic standpoint in his attitude towards divine truth, or seek guidance from the spirit of the age or even from the spirit of the Church of any age. The whole address is admirable. We are not sure that we fully apprehend the remark that a true theology, because it must be Christ-spoken, "may not be philosophically complete" (p. 46). Paul, though he would not preach in enticing words of man's wisdom, nevertheless spoke wisdom—the wisdom of God. It surely is not a question of principle, but of fact, which experience is to decide, whether the theology which is Christ-spoken "may not be philosophically complete"—which we take to mean, may not constitute a logically complete system of truth. Christianity must not permit itself to be dominated by philosophy, nor can she permit philosophy to supply the moulds into which her precious treasures are to be poured. But she may be, and will be, found to provide a Christ-spoken theology which is philosophically complete.——*The Evolution of Love.* By Emory Miller,

D.D., LL.D. 12mo, pp. 346. (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1892.) The speculative ability of this small volume is of a high order. The author attempts to present Christianity as a reasoned system, almost as the necessary implication of our knowledge of self. He thus transmutes it into a philosophy; and his desire is, of course, to make it appear as the one true philosophy. Like Descartes, with his *Cogito ergo sum*, he begins at the bottom—finding the fundamental fact in the fact of a perceiving agent, man's "perception of himself as perceiving." From this he proceeds upwards to God, by the pathway of "implications of Being;" and then develops the nature of God as *actus purus* and that *actus* love. The sorites, sententiously stated, is: "reality is action, action is life, perfect action is love." Taking hence a new start, he next develops the "implications of love," in a doctrine of creation, sin, atonement, future state. The step upwards from Being to God, depends on the position that existence implies self-existence and dependence, independence—somewhere; so that in the perception of ourselves as existing and dependent, a self-existent, independent not-ourselves is implicated. Less solid is the passage from the conception of God as *actus purus* to the conception of Him as Love. The fundamental thought is that "perfect action, conscious and volitional, is the highest generalization, the ultimate unit, the unconditioned nature of infinite being." This is identified with self-love as "that kind of action which in a perfect being actualizes a perfect or ideal self." Then we are told that the only difference between self-love and love in general is a subjective one, and we may as well drop the word "self." Having thus obtained love for God, nothing remains but to develop the implications as to creation, sin, atonement, the future, of such a conception of God. Of course creation is conceived optimistically: "the purpose of creation is the realization of a perfect universe;" "love's creative action must project the highest ideal of conditioned being—a perfect universe." But as God creates free agents, the realization of perfection depends as truly on their wills as on His; all that He can do is to establish the most favorable conditions for their securing perfection. Sin, which is fundamentally selfishness, having introduced evil, love can only so modify the conditions as to render reharmonizing and perfection still attainable. The atoning fact is found in "the subjective strain" which is experienced by a love which endures incalculable abuse; in the "consciousness of solicitude" which God has "as the Eternal Son, the relative consciousness in Deity," "in his objective efforts to order a perfect universe, conditioned as his effort is by the freedom of the persons who compose the universe." Thus "'love's devotion to the perfect,' agonizing because conditioned by evil, is an atonement for sin, a ransom for sinners, the atoning fact." The eschatology of such a scheme would naturally be Universalism. But evolutionistic conceptions, careful rather of the type than of the single life, enter in to condition the result; and Dr. Miller compromises upon Annihilationism. He refuses the name, indeed, and prefers to call it "the self-sinking of personality," conceiving it as the gradual extinction of the self-consciousness of a sinner in a period proportioned to the definite determination in each of the selfish purposes (pp. 263 and 343). We do not see why the influence of the evolutionary conception need be stopped at the fate of the wicked; rather would we suppose that from this point of view, too, Dr. Salmon's remark will hold, that "in no system which disposes of the wicked by annihilation will it be long possible to maintain faith in the immortality of the good" (*The Eternity of Future Punishment*, p. 7). It is on the whole a very pleasing scheme with which Dr. Miller presents us, wrought out in an unusually sustained dialectic. It doubtless comes as near to the facts as one could hope to come in an *a priori* construction, based on the deification of love.

Many passages occur in the volume which are brilliantly thought and finely expressed. For ourselves, however, we prefer "the concrete, popular way" of expressing religious facts, which the Bible uses. We do not think Christianity gains anything by being transmuted into a philosophy and having its divine facts pared down, or explained away, in order that they may fit better into a philosophical scheme of human devising. We go with Harnack so far as this: that "the universal and supernatural character of the Christian religion imposes upon its adherents the duty of finding a statement of it which will not be impaired by our wavering knowledge of nature and history." Not that we can do without philosophy, but that she must recognize herself as second not the first—the servant who obeys, not the mistress who commands.

——*The Gospel of a Risen Saviour.* By the Rev. R. McCheyne Edgar, A.M., author of *The Philosophy of the Cross*, etc. 8vo, pp. xv, 376. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1892.) There is an immense amount of well-digested material packed into this comprehensive volume. Dr. (for he now deservedly bears the title of "Doctor") Edgar's reading must be prodigious; while he marshals his material with a skill equal to his learning. The plan of the volume is first to lay firmly the fact of a "Risen Saviour," both as a historical reality and as a perpetual power in the experience of His people; and then to develop the "Gospel" revealed in Him. Both parts of the book are admirably executed —the former most thoroughly and satisfactorily, but the latter with sufficient fullness to serve the purpose in view. The evidence, from all sources, for the resurrection of Christ is developed in the first part, of two hundred and fifty pages, with a fullness and a cogency which leave little to be desired. In the sections on the Biblical evidence we have a very clear summary of the primary evidence, with incidental defense of it against objectors. In those on "Christ Risen in the History of the Church" and "The Risen Christ among the Doctors" we have an interesting survey of Christological discussion in the Church. In the part on the Gospel involved in the Risen Saviour, we have a lucid account of fundamental Christian doctrine from a fresh point of view. The impression left by the whole quite justifies Dr. Edgar's view that the key of the Christian position, at large, may be found in the single and supreme historical fact of the resurrection of the Master from the dead. There is little that need be said in the way of criticism. Perhaps some of the remarks on eschatological problems (such as those with reference to the meaning of a "spiritual" body and of Christ's descent unto Hades) scarcely reach the high level of the rest of the book. But the volume is as remarkable for its judiciousness as for its richness of material. Let us quote only a few "words for the times" anent mysticism. "As for the Mystics of the Middle Ages, they were too busy analyzing the incarnation of God within themselves, through the reception of the Holy Ghost, to give themselves earnestly to the more important problem of the incarnation of God in Christ Jesus. Thrown in upon themselves, their introspection produced no result in the advancement of the knowledge of Christ. . . . . There was thus a practical obscuration of the Risen Saviour. . . . . It is also to be noticed that a mystical school arose in the wake of the Reformation, which demonstrated that the attention of men was again shifting from the Person of the Saviour to the operation of the Holy Ghost. We see it in such a book as Johann Arndt's *Six Books of True Christianity* when he passes from Scripture and Christ, to conscience and the inner light, as coequal guides of men. . . . . Of course I do not mean to affirm that the work of the Spirit within men should not receive careful examination; but when it absorbs attention to the neglect of Christ; when men are thrown in for the revelation which is really embodied in a Risen Saviour, ... it is

time that the tendency should be corrected." We cannot refrain from directing attention also to the strong and faithful words on the "historic episcopate" and the cause of Church union, on p. 343 *sq.* But perhaps we would best direct attention to the whole volume, which is full of good things.——*Evidence of Salvation; or, the Direct Witness of the Spirit.* By the Rev. Everett S. Stackpole, D.D. 18mo, pp. viii, 115. (New York: T. Y. Crowell & Co. [1894].) The author's zeal is in behalf of the Protestant doctrine of assurance, based upon the testimony of the Holy Ghost. He fears that Christians are learning to do without assurance, and are thus tending to live upon a lowered plane of spiritual attainment; or else are seeking the grounds of certitude in misleading experiences or external reasonings. Either, he perceives, would strike a blow at the roots of Christianity, and practically or logically tend to undermine its supernaturalism. He would draw back men's thoughts to the sealing of the Holy Ghost, and base their assurance upon His supernatural testimony in their hearts. This is a thankworthy undertaking; and it is prosecuted with fervor, knowledge and skill. On one or two points of fundamental importance to the doctrine, however, the author, from his Wesleyan standpoint, is confused and misleading. (1) He does not distinguish clearly and firmly between the witness of the Holy Ghost and the interpretation of that witness by its recipient. His conception vibrates accordingly between salvation and the assurance of salvation as the direct product of that witness. At one time he says: "When we base our salvation upon anything else than this divine testimony in the soul, we have sunk down to the plane of heathen philosophies" (p. 46); and we agree with him heartily, and in this sense accord fully with the statement that "in the days of the apostles no one was considered converted if he were destitute of the direct witness of the Spirit" (p. 61). It is not this that "high Calvinists" doubt: they begin to doubt only when this is transmuted into the proposition that assurance is so of the essence of faith, that faith does not exist where assurance is not present. They draw a distinction between the *certitudo entis* and the *certitudo mentis*—which ought not to be a difficult thing to do. "An unconscious reception of the Spirit is a delusion and a snare" (p. 71), Dr. Stackpole indeed proclaims, with no apparent consciousness of the inevitable "Distinguo" which must be sounding in his ears. No very subtle distinction is drawn when it is suggested that one may be conscious (as every converted man is and must be) of the change that has taken place within him by and through the gift of the Spirit, without being directly conscious that it is the Holy Ghost that has wrought this change. Of this, indeed, no man is directly conscious, seeing that the Holy Spirit works beneath consciousness. Calvinists consentiently witness that it is only by the almighty testimony of the Holy Ghost borne in the heart, that men are persuaded and enabled to believe savingly in Christ: this is only another way of stating their doctrine of "effectual calling," "efficacious grace," or "physical regeneration." But they do not see their way open to affirm that, therefore, no one is saved who has not attained to full assurance that he is saved. Nor is their unwillingness to affirm this founded, as Dr. Stackpole suggests, on a fear on their part lest "if all the elect should receive full assurance, there would be a clear division of the sheep from the goats in this life, and it might lead to practical antinomianism" (p. 61). They heartily wish that all the Lord's people had full assurance. Their unwillingness to affirm it is founded solely upon their perception of the illogical character of the inference. And they are confirmed in their unwilliugness to make the step asked of them, by the further perception that those who do make it cannot carry it through. Such sentences as the following show that Dr. Stackpole cannot himself abide by it:

'It would be a mistake to suppose that all Christians at their conversion receive an equally clear and satisfying assurance of divine acceptance' (p. 77). 'A really converted person may have erroneous notions about the witness of the Spirit, and so get into despondency. He is not condemned but uncertain' (p. 51). 'He already had all that is essential to the witness of the Spirit, but did not know how to interpret his changed state of heart' (p. 86). 'We do not mean to affirm that the divine testimony is always equally clear. It may be obscured by reason of physical infirmities, temptations, weakness of faith, or ignorance of Gospel promises' (p. 63). 'Some trust tremblingly, waveringly, examining themselves more than looking unto Jesus' (p. 84).

His own personal experience, indeed, as recorded on p. 85 furnishes a clear instance of true conversion without knowledge of it, of salvation existent and persistent without assurance. (2) He misconceives the manner in which the witness of the Spirit is delivered. He represents it as a special revelation, arguing that God will delay neither to forgive a penitent sinner nor "to notify him of the fact" (p. 87). "The general principles of salvation may be found in the written Word," he argues, "but my salvation or yours is nowhere revealed in the Bible. The Word gives no testimony whatever with reference to that event. If I ever learn that for a certainty, it must be by a special revelation to me. The canon of revelation is not completed for me till God has expressly signified to my soul that I am His child" (p. 34). The mode of this revelation is not asserted, however, to be propositional: it comes by way of "spiritual intuition." "So one knows immediately and without reasoning when he feels condemnation for sin, and he knows equally well when that condemnation is removed. Its removal is due to an inwrought conviction that his sins are forgiven. He cannot explain that conviction, neither can he rid himself of it except by voluntary transgression of known moral law" (p. 63). In one word, then, the testimony of the Spirit is conceived of as taking the form of a blind conviction of forgiveness of sins and salvation. How the sinner is to know that this blind conviction is not a delusion, we are not told: we are only told that while one may fancy he has it, when he has it not, yet no one who has it is ever mistaken in it. We miss adequate grounds for this discrimination. We do not see how a blind conviction can testify to anything; we do not see how it can validate itself as a "revelation;" we do not see how God can so deal with rational creatures. By as much as it is reasonable to suppose that God will deal with rational creatures as rational creatures, by so much is it unreasonable to suppose that He will work a conviction of salvation in the minds of His children without cognizable ground. We fall back, therefore, with great confidence upon the common distinction between the "efficient cause" of our assurance and the "formal ground" of our assurance. Assurance is wrought in us by the Holy Ghost, who thus bears His testimony to our salvation; but it is grounded on sufficient reason validated to the intellect. Were it not so assurance would not even be rational: and if not rational, it would hardly assure, but would inevitably suggest hysteria.——*Our Christian Passover.* A Guide for Young People in the Serious Study of the Lord's Supper. By the Rev. Charles A. Salmond, M.A., South Morningside, Edinburgh. 32mo, pp. 94. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894.) In this little treatise Mr. Salmond skillfully adapts his teaching not only to the capacities but to the hearts of the young people he has in view: but still manages to communicate a true theology of the Sacrament. It is an admirable booklet, which we would fain see in the hands of all our pastors and all our young people.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

IV.—PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

THE LORD'S PRAYER IN THE EARLY CHURCH. By FREDERIC HENRY CHASE, B.D., Principal of the Clergy Training School, Cambridge. Cambridge: The University Press, 1891. 8vo, pp. xii, 179. (*Texts and Studies: Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Literature.* Edited by J. Armitage Robinson, B.D., Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge. Vol. i, No. 3.)

THE LORD'S SUPPER AND THE PASSOVER RITUAL. Being a Translation of the Substance of PROF. BICKELL'S Work, termed "Messe und Pascha." By WILLIAM F. SKENE, D.C.L. With an Introduction by the Translator, on the Connection of the Early Christian Church with the Jewish Church. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891. 12mo, pp. xii, 219.

These two books are welcome indications of a return to the one method of studying the origin of the usages of the Christian Church which promises to be fruitful of solid results. Neither book prosecutes this method in an entirely satisfactory manner: both are somewhat crotchety, and the results obtained are proportionately marred. But it is something to see liturgical scholars turn their eyes in the right direction.

The fundamental postulate of both books is the obviously true, but of late years much neglected one, that the natural (as distinguished from the supernatural) *origines* of Christian order, government and worship, are to be looked for in the Jewish Synagogue. Mr. Chase begins with a very interesting sketch of the position of the Synagogue in the Jewish Church at the period of the advent of Christianity, and of the relations of the infant Church to the Synagogue system. "To the Synagogue system," he says, "speaking from a human point of view, the Church owes it that she outlived the days of her immaturity and weakness. Here was an organization ready to hand, which she could use and gradually mould after her own higher type of life. . . . . A purely secular historian would not be far wrong were he to trace both the survival and the spread of the Church, at least during the first half century of her life, to her close alliance with the Synagogue." Accordingly he teaches, rightly enough, that the first Churches were essentially Synagogues; and that "the Church, in the earliest days of the faith, as far as concerned her discipline and her worship, may be described as an association of Synagogues, gradually multiplying as she gained new territory for her Master." Dr. Skene begins further back and gives a sketch of the origin of Synagogue worship after the captivity, attributing—in a very instructive remark—the marked change in the stability of the Jews in their faith after the exile to it: "The result of the establishment of the Synagogue worship, which brought the teaching of the Law home to every town and village in the land, was that, while under the temple worship, which was confined to Jerusalem, the Jews were constantly relapsing into idolatry, which led, at last, to their captivity; after their return to their own land they adhered stedfastly to the worship of the one true God" (p. 5). The greater portion of his Introduction is given to tracing the relation of Jesus' arrangements for founding His Church to Synagogue precedents: this is overdone and cannot be followed as a whole. But the general conception that "the Christian Church was to come in the place of the Synagogue" is thoroughly justified, and is traced out in details which are always interesting if not always certain. He teaches that the Christian ministry was originally an exact copy of the seven elders of the Synagogue: three rulers and judges, three

parnasim (two to collect alms and one to distribute them), and an apostle or angel of the congregation, called the *Scheliach tsibbur*, whose duty it was to conduct the Synagogue worship and to represent the congregation (pp. 31, 35). These were at a later date differentiated into elders, deacons and bishop: the "seven" of Acts vii being the original undifferentiated local "ministry" as distinguished from the "missionaries" or apostles. The main object of the book is, however, to trace the early Christian worship back to germs in Jewish rituals.

It is in this general aspect that we find the greatest value of these two books. Their special business is, the one to study the Lord's Prayer in its original form, meaning and relation to early worship; and the other to show that the Liturgy of the Lord's Supper goes back to and takes hold on the Jewish Passover Ritual. The greater portion of Mr. Chase's book is given to investigating the meaning of the petition, "Deliver us from the evil one," which, with Dr. Lightfoot and the Revisers, he understands as masculine, with a direct naming of Satan. The rest of the book takes up each petition in turn and seeks to bring together all that can be learned of its meaning, original form and transmission. Prof. Bickell's work, which Dr. Skene has translated (and we are bound to say translated very ill), has as its special task to demonstrate the apostolic origin of the Church liturgy for the Lord's Supper. His argument is that a better proof of this than Probst's attempt to find allusions to it in the apostolic writings (an attempt which Bickell admits has failed) arises out of the broad fact that the Christian liturgy (in at least the *Anaphora*) rests on the Jewish Passover Ritual. He supposes that this could not be, unless it were not only apostolic but represented the remembrance by the apostles of the first Eucharist celebrated by Christ Himself after the Passover meal. The inconsequence of this contention need not shut our eyes to the value of the main point, that the earliest Christian liturgy known (that contained in the *Apostolical Constitutions*) shows affinity with the Jewish service—partly (in the ante-communion), with the Sabbath morning prayer, and partly (in the Anaphora) with the Passover Ritual. It is an indication of the bad editing of the book that the translator does not add any notes adjusting Bickell's argument to the new conditions arising from the discovery of the *Didaché*, which was not known when Bickell wrote. The prayers connected with the Lord's Supper in the *Didaché* are distinctly more Jewish than those of the Clementine liturgy: and doubtless represent an earlier stage of the adaptation of the Jewish ritual to Christian use. But they will not fall in with Bickell's special line of remark.

Princeton. BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

THE WORLD OF FAITH AND THE EVERYDAY WORLD AS DISPLAYED IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF ABRAHAM. By OTTO FUNCKE, Pastor of the Friedens-Kirche, Bremen. Translated from the Sixth German Edition by SOPHIA TAYLOR. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street, 1891.

These sermons are, in reality, a series of articles published in the *Bremen Kirchenblatt*, based upon sermons preached in 1884 and 1885, in the Friedens Kirche, Bremen, on the life of Abraham. The lessons of Abraham's life are here developed and applied, for the benefit, especially, of the "tempted, whether by intellectual doubt or grievous divine dispensations." The author "completed and worked up each sermon in the free manner in which it now appears."

An English reader who expects to find in these discourses many of the characteristics often attributed to German sermons will be agreeably disappointed. When Prof. Phelps published his *Theory of Preaching*, in 1881, he

could say nothing better of the German preachers than that "they have sacrificed strong thought, argument and doctrinal preaching to the more emotive forms of religious discourse. They have indulged excessively in hortatory preaching." It is encouraging to notice, now, that Otto Funcke, in this volume, does no such thing. He preaches "doctrine practically and precept doctrinally." He evidently preaches to men as well as to women and children. There is but little that is overfanciful in these sermons. Certainly, there are no fantastic conceits, in which so many German preachers seem to take delight. His illustrations illustrate; they are none too many, and they are generally novel, bright and interesting. A picture is painted, in miniature, of some event in Abraham's life, or some vivid, appropriate incident is placed in the introduction, so as to give an added interest to the whole subsequent discussion, shedding a kind of imaginative, picturesque glow over the whole. The titles are mostly appropriate and truthful as well as attractive. They do not promise more than the sermons perform—except, perhaps, such a one as this: "Dost Thou Believe in the Victory of the Sun?" by which he means only, Hast thou faith in the ultimate triumph of the kingdom of God? Such titles may excite curiosity, but the effect is a disappointment which is irritating. In one of our cities a large audience gathered, expecting to hear an historical lecture on "The Thirty Years' War," which, to their vexation, proved to be an egotistic narrative of the author's contention against the liquor traffic in England for thirty years!

The style of these sermons is remarkably "vivid, idiomatic and crisp." I could find but one sentence resembling what was considered once the typical German prose sentence—the subject of the proposition at the top of the page and the verb at the bottom, with all sorts of qualifying clauses and subordinate thoughts crammed into the middle. Are we indebted to the translator for this improvement in sentential structure? We think rather that the preacher wrote these sermons, originally, with his audience in his eye, and rewrote them to be read by the readers of the *Kirchenblatt*. He did not develop his theme merely for the sake of its development or for his own gratification. He did not "sermonize" nor preach like a functionary in the performance of a prescribed duty. But, with Christlike altruism, he preached to and for others, subordinating thoughts of self in his efforts to make the influence of the Gospel a reality in the lives of men. This self-sacrifice in writing often prevents involution in style, promoting, if it does not assure, vividness, directness and force.

In his Preface our author tells us that he has endeavored to translate the Biblical Shemitic narrative of Abraham's life "into Japhetic language." It is always unfortunate so to modernize the Scriptures in translation as to destroy their oriental peculiarities. A retranslation of the Bible into the language of common life degrades it. The New Testament was translated, in 1858, into a "thoroughly modern style," but fortunately the attempt did not receive the approval of scholars or of the public. And it is still a question whether working up the Biblical narratives into modern story books is as wise as it is pecuniarily profitable to authors and publishers just now. But no reader of these sermons will lose sight of the oriental setting of the Shemitic narrative of Abraham's life. Abraham is still here the ancient Hebrew, the father of the faithful. Yet he is here a man among men, "a man of like passions with us." "The objectionable sections" in his life, as well as his praiseworthy deeds and traits, are fully treated. And so his example is for our comfort and encouragement as well as for our spiritual growth.

These discourses will give indirectly to the English reader an interesting knowledge of German home life, especially in its religious aspects—its cares,

griefs, joys, hopes, trials and temptations. It is a simpler life than ours. It is, perhaps, more real and genuine, and often much less ambitious and pretentious; how like and yet how unlike our own. Into this life the living patriarch is made to enter. The preacher, evidently, has no thought that the patriarch would not be received with honor in German homes. As his life and character are here developed, neither preacher nor hearer nor reader seem to assume that Abraham was in such "a low stage of moral advancement that we would not receive such a man into our families."

We know of no better example of the practical use of Scriptural biography in the pulpit than these German sermons. It was very appropriate that such discourses, with "eternal and perfect peace as their object," should be preached in "the *Friedens* Kirche" and enlarged for circulation and adapted to be read by the people engaged in the struggling life of the great commercial city of Bremen.

And yet, let the reader compare these sermons with those of the Rev. Dr. D. R. Breed, of Chicago, on *Abraham: The Typical Life of Faith*, lately published, and candor will compel him to acknowledge that in depth and breadth of thought, in power of argument, in the development of spiritual truth, and in the vigor and urgency of application, the American preacher is the superior.

Glens Falls, N. Y. ANSON J. UPSON.

From B. Westermann & Co. there come to us two small books representing the more serious side of German literature. One is *Unsere persönliche Stellung zum geistlichen Beruf.* Den theologischen Commilitonen. Von Th. Häring, Dr. u. Prof. der Theologie. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht.) A vigorous address to those who contemplate the clerical office, passing in rapid review the various forms of error which nowadays threaten the truth. It was occasioned by the fact that a pastor had reason to call into service a candidate who once, when administering the Sacrament to a sick man, had this question asked, "Sir, do you believe what you have just said to me?" Instead of answering, the young man fled!——The other is, *Das apostolische Glaubensbekenntniss in Predigten.* Von F. Horn. (*Ibid.*) A very satisfactory exposition of the articles of the Apostles' Creed, maintaining and enforcing them from the Holy Scriptures with much directness and point. Evidently the parochial clergy of Germany have not accepted the modern attacks on the *Symbolum Apostolicum.*——*Speculum Sacerdotum; or, The Divine Model of the Priestly Life.* By the Rev. W. C. E. Newbolt, M.A. (Longmans, Green & Co.) A series of addresses on 2 Cor. vi. 4–10, the first eight of which were delivered at a "Retreat" in Litchfield. They are designed to use the interesting and vivid statement of Paul's course as the basis for an exhibition of the graces required in the Anglican clergy. They are well written, and judicious from the author's point of view. He gives ministers the name of *priests*, which is never given them in the New Testament. He urges the duty of fasting periodically, but forgets that a stated fast is nowhere enjoined in the New Testament, and only once in the Old. But he is very spiritually minded, and the book is adapted to be useful.——*The Gospel of St. Luke.* By Alexander Maclaren, D.D. (A. C. Armstrong & Son.) This title is misleading, as it seems to imply that the whole of the third Gospel is treated, whereas it is only such portions as were selected for the International Sabbath-school Lessons a year or two since. The book is not exegetical or expository, but a homiletic treatment of the contents of the passages under review. It is of course good, for if the author has published anything vapid or superficial we have never seen it. He has a peculiar facility for seizing the strong points of a theme, arranging

them in a logical yet natural way, and presenting them with vivacity and interest. He is thoroughly evangelical, and makes precious truth attractive by his way of setting it forth.——*The Hebrew Twins.* A Vindication of God's Ways with Jacob and Esau. By the late Samuel Cox, D.D. Prefatory Memoir by his Wife. Portrait. (Thomas Whittaker.) Mrs. Cox occupies the first forty pages with an interesting and instructive account of her husband. The rest of the volume consists of a series of discourses on the portion of Genesis which recounts the history of Isaac's sons. Dr. Cox was somewhat of a free lance in theology, and some of his writings are quite open to exception. But in the present volume he appears to great advantage as a defender of the truth. In reply to the suggestion of some learned men that the stories of Genesis are mythical and have a parallel in the traditions of other ancient nations, he asks (p. 41), "Why does not some scholar produce them, or some poet weave them into a tale as moving and wonderful as that of Genesis?" He makes a judicious study of Jacob's character, not glossing over his serious defects, and not misreading the tenor of God's dealings with him. The book is healthful and stimulating.——*The Christ.* By James H. Brookes. (Fleming H. Revell Co.) This volume is an interesting and skillful summary of the teachings of Scripture respecting the nature, office, work, names, words and history of the blessed Lord. It is not often one meets with a book so refreshing and inspiring. Dr. Brookes seems to have the entire contents of the Bible at his fingers' ends, and is able to cite any portion of it with accuracy and point. This fact makes his writings peculiarly dear to the pious heart. They take in so much of the spirit and the letter of the living oracles. Truth does not become more truthful by being uttered in inspired words, but it certainly does gain in attractiveness and in power. Each of the twenty-one chapters is closed with verses which express the main theme in melodious numbers. The final chapter deals with a point as to which all evangelical believers are not yet at one, Christ's second coming; but apart from this the entire volume may be warmly recommended as excellent matter for devotional reading.——*Every-day Religion; or, the Common-sense Teaching of the Bible.* By Hannah Whitall Smith. (*Ibid.*) Common-sense is by no means a common endowment of men, and hence there is a flavor of assumption in the title of Mrs. Smith's volume. Yet the title is abundantly justified by the contents. The author selects passages from the Old Testament or the New, and comments upon them in a lucid, practical, suggestive way that can hardly fail to be of service to any reader. There is no attempt at exposition, much less at any strangeness of interpretation, but simply the putting forth with great directness the plain sense of the Word. And the book will serve a useful purpose as suggesting the method in which ordinary Christians may best read the Scriptures for devotional and practical ends. It is a sort of object lesson in the art.——*Key-Words of the Inner Life.* Studies in the Epistle to the Ephesians. By F. B. Meyer, B.A. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Meyer is well known for various writings of an edifying nature. In this little volume he maintains his reputation, yet perhaps urges unduly the point that certain words, which keep recurring like a note or chord repeatedly struck in a musical composition, are a key to the meaning, and also to the Inner Life. This is true to a certain extent, as in the phrases "in Him," "in the heavenly places," etc., but not so far as the author pushes it. Still the little volume contains much that is useful without being commonplace, for Mr. Meyer is a thinker, and occasionally shows peculiar powers of expression.——*Popular Selections from Hymns, New and Old.* Revised. By D. B. Towner, T. T. Eaton and G. H. Simmons. (*Ibid.*) The design of this booklet is better than its execution. Less than half of the hundred hymns it contains are those sanctioned by

long use by Christians of every name, and the rest are choral melodies of very varied merit, some being a mere pious jingle. What is needed for watering places or occasions when persons of various denominations are accidentally or temporarily thrown together, is a collection of a hundred hymns which can be furnished very cheaply. The test of any hymn for such a collection would be the fact that it had entered into the service-book of at least three different ecclesiastical bodies.——*Bunyan Characters.* Lectures delivered in St. George's Free Church, Edinburgh. By Alexander Whyte, D.D. (Presbyterian Board of Publication.) Dr. Whyte has essayed a task from which any one might shrink, to expand and illustrate and apply the wondrous galaxy of characters which Bunyan has outlined in his matchless allegories; but he has succeeded and has made an interesting and profitable book, one that readers will enjoy in proportion as they are familiar with the *Pilgrim's Progress* and the *Holy War*. The author is acquainted with the circumstances of the period, and often gives an illuminating touch to a person, a scene or an event. He is, besides, a man of wide reading and of patient thought, and his pages are at once pleasing and instructive. He has the native grace of Bunyan with the addition of true academic culture, and so has made a distinct and valuable addition to our religious literature.——*Washington the Man.* A Sermon Delivered before the Sons of the Revolution in the State of New York, February, 1894. By the Rev. Edward B. Coe, D.D., LL.D. (Printed for the Society.) Perhaps there is no one theme so hackneyed in the view of the American people as the character of their first President. His praises have been said and sung so long and so generally that every one feels that he has nothing more to learn about him. Yet the author of this discourse held a large audience, composed mainly of adult men, in rapt attention from beginning to end, and whoever reads the printed words will be at no loss to discern the reason. It was because the speaker chose to consider not Washington the soldier, nor Washington the statesman, but Washington the Man, and he drew the outlines of that majestic personality with a skill and taste equal to the theme. He did not make him out a demigod or a legendary hero, but a man broad of mind and large of heart, and so fitted to perform the great work set before him. Such a lucid and luminous portraiture was well suited to the time (the Sunday before February 22) and to the Society which aims to cherish and reproduce the virtues of their Revolutionary ancestors.——*Assyrian Echoes of the Word.* By the Rev. Thomas Laurie, D.D. With Illustrations. (American Tract Society.) This is an attempt to popularize the discoveries of archæology. The author is not himself an explorer nor does he profess to be an adept in interpretation, but having lived for years at Mosul and become familiar with the region where the relics of ancient civilization are stored, he has sought to "gather up the fragments" and put in order the numerous corroborations of Scripture that have been brought to light. These are arranged under the alphabet for convenience of consultation. We would not be willing to answer for all the identifications made, but the volume abounds in interesting and suggestive matter, and must be very useful to the ordinary reader. The illustrations are well chosen and instructive.——*Rachel's Farm.* By Annette L. Noble. (*Ibid.*) This is one of the series of wholesome fictions issued by the Tract Society. As its name indicates, it exhibits the claims of country life over against the attractions of the city. The story is simple but engaging, and the moral is not obtruded, yet we suppose that few young women could read it without receiving many useful suggestions.

New York. TALBOT W. CHAMBERS.

V.—RECENT MISSIONARY LITERATURE.

THE HOLY SPIRIT IN MISSIONS. Six Lectures by A. J. GORDON, D.D. New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co. [1893]. 12mo, pp. 241.

THY KINGDOM COME. The *Missionary Review* of November, 1893. An Article by the Editor-in-Chief.

The volume named above and the article by Dr. Pierson are, in substance, almost identical. In the January number of the *Review* (1894) the editor says, while the views expressed in the November number "bind no one . . . . but are purely those of the editor-in-chief and, he may add, of his beloved colleague, Rev. A. J. Gordon, there is no hesitation in affirming that these are substantially the views of the majority of workers on the foreign field." These allegations give great importance to the views thus expressed, on account of their "irreconcilable" difference from those which Dr. Pierson calls "the common views of the kingdom," and which he complacently says may be "largely traditional and historical, rather than Scriptural and spiritual." Further, he says, he "holds these views not as tentative nor theoretical, but as final, and unassailable on Scriptural grounds," and properly insists that his article must be met and answered on a Biblical basis. This is just what should be done; for if the common view is un-Scriptural it must be given up, and at once; and if the new view thus widely given to the Christian public is not Scriptural, it must and will be assailed on purely Scriptural grounds. A book notice does not afford space or opportunity for examining these views, or, as they seem to us, that theory; but doubtless they will be considered at length in some other way. All we can now do is to indicate their leading features and the assumptions which underlie the theory.

The theory is novel and startling, and "the bearing of this study," to quote Dr. Pierson's words, "of the kingdom and the ages on Missions is not only important, it is fundamental, vital;" and, we add, should these views gain general acceptance, will overturn to the foundations the views and practices which for the last century have obtained in all the Reformed churches in their effort to "make disciples of all nations." In Dr. Gordon's book the first chapter, entitled "The Holy Ghost's Programme of Missions," contains the gist of the theory; the rest of the book is a logical deduction from the principles there laid down. Dr. Gordon bases his views on a strange and certainly novel exposition of the teachings of the apostles, James, Peter and Paul, as we find them recorded in Acts xv. 14, 18, Rom. xi. 5, 7, Acts xi. When properly interpreted these passages clearly sustain no such theory.

The four chief features of the new theory may be specified as: 1. There are four ages; "one came to an end at the first advent of Christ; another terminates at His second coming and His assumption of the kingdom; a third ends at the close of the millennium and surrender of His kingdom to His Father."

2. This "present evil age," as Dr. Pierson characterizes Dr. Gordon's second age, in which we live, is a "parenthesis" in the history of Israel, "the awful gap of Israel's national rejection," and belongs to the "times of the Gentiles." When their "fullness has come in" there will be a "resumption of the ancient nation." This is the age of the Church, during which the kingdom is individual, not collective nor visible.

3. The work entrusted to the Church during this age is to witness and suffer, while, as Christians, they preach the Gospel. In this way God is call-

ing out "the elect" by His Spirit. The Church's work is not to convert the world or Christianize the nations. Here may be noted such statements as the following: There was no *Ecclesia* until (Acts x. 11) "on the day of Pentecost the Church was let down from heaven" to take into it unclean Gentiles of every kind. When "the number of elect Gentiles has been accomplished then the Church will be taken up again into heaven, even at the appearing of the Lord in glory." The Holy Spirit, as "Christ's substitute," now administers the kingdom. "We are not justified by Scripture in expecting, during this age, the real triumphs of Christ's kingdom." Our duty is not to bring the world to Christ, but Christ to the world. There is, during this age, no visible kingdom. The Church and the visible kingdom do not, cannot coëxist. Christ had a kingdom before the Church was formed at Pentecost, which was interrupted by the ascension and will be resumed after the Church has been caught up into heaven and the nation of Israel has been restored under the personal reign of King Jesus. "The visible Church is not the kingdom of God."

4. "The coming age," or "last days," will be ushered in by the return of the Lord at the head of an army, viz., "the Bride," who "with him now becomes a warrior." This is "an age of conquest." There "are to be both at the beginning and end wars of conquest and judgments more or less destructive." This will be "the age of the kingdom," an age whose policy is not like that of the present age persuasive, but coercive. "The sword belongs to the kingdom." The Lord will take in person "command of his army and with it march forth to the final conquest of the nations," smiting them with the sharp sword and ruling them with a rod of iron. The subjects of the kingdom will be men in the flesh, and the kingdom will be "of this world," for "Christ shall then mount the throne of this world."

As the result of this theory, Mission work, until the second advent, should be restricted to preaching the Gospel, thus witnessing for Christ, seeking the conversion of individuals and their separation from the nations. But there should be no trying to affect nations as such, *i. e.*, as "political organizations," or collectively. They are to be conquered, not converted. By way of contrast to the above it is to be noted that hitherto the churches have conducted their missionary operations in the firm belief: (1) That there is a visible Church now on earth, organized; and that among its other functions is that of sending out missionaries. (2) This Church is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ; "in the world, but not of it;" spiritual in its nature, agencies and instrumentalities, not carnal; established by the gospel of truth, righteousness and love. Of this kingdom Jesus is *now* King and will continue to reign till the end. (3) The Christian *Ecclesia* is a continuation of the Old Testament Ecclesia, which included all Old Testament saints. The visible Church of the Mosaic economy consisted of the natural seed of Jacob, for a time organized as a nation, but intended to continue only "until the seed should come." Jesus is the real King of the real Israel of God, whose kingdom includes, without distinction, believing Jews and Gentiles alike, and shall have no end. (4) The work entrusted to the Church is "to disciple all the nations." This can be done, not by force, but only through the regenerate people of God, who, like leaven, permeate and transform the nations of which they are part; gradually, but mightily and permanently elevating, civilizing, purifying all nations, so that they willingly become subject to the revealed will of God in secular and social affairs and enthrone Jesus Christ as King and Ruler of the princes of the earth. Thus is God's kingdom now coming in power.

The contrast between the two views is clear enough. They are incompatible, mutually destructive; if the one is right the other must be wrong. The controversy has begun; great is the truth and it will prevail.

The fallacious assumptions underlying the theory of Drs. Gordon and Pierson are: (1) "Those who regard the present age as final are logically shut up to a hopeless pessimism; for (2) they can show no evidence that the circle of election is broadening out into that of universal redemption; (3) the increase of the heathen is numerically seventy times greater than that of the converts during the century of Missions;" therefore (4) Missions as conducted in the past, from apostolic times till now, are an un-Scriptural mistake and have been a failure; (5) the world's conversion can be effected only by the personal presence of Christ, reigning by force over men in the flesh. All these assumptions have no foundation in Scripture; they are wholly deductions from reason and sense, and utterly devoid of faith in God's promises made to His Son and to His Church.

Dundas, Ont. JOHN LAING.

FIFTY YEARS IN AMOY; OR, A HISTORY OF THE AMOY MISSION. By P. W. PITCHER. New York: Reformed Church Board of Publication.

The author of this volume is, as he has been for several years, a missionary at Amoy. He has given a faithful account of one of the most successful Chinese missions, one founded by David Abeel and carried on by men of like spirit. Mr. Pitcher first describes the locality (with a map); then tells how the work began in 1842 under the American Board; gives the succession of missionaries; relates their methods and agencies, the peculiar constitution of the Churches (a blending of the English Presbyterians and the American Reformed Dutchmen), the nine congregations, self-supporting, under American supervision, their wondrous benevolence, the work medical and educational that is maintained. One chapter is given to two notable political events, the Tai-peng Rebellion (1850–1864), and the Anti-Missionary Movement in South China (1871). The volume concludes with some missionary statistics of China, and is furnished with an Index. The Amoy mission is remarkable for the eminent men employed in it (Abeel, Pohlman, Doty, Talmage, Burns, Swanson, *et al.*); for its example of two missions, one American, the other British, combining to build up a native independent Church with its own creed, polity and discipline; and for the amazing degree of the divine blessing it has enjoyed, there being in it more self-supporting churches (18) than in all the rest of China. It is well, therefore, to have in compact form and from trustworthy sources a narrative of its origin and progress and methods and characteristics. This Mr. Pitcher has given us in his volume, which is ornamented with a number of cuts of persons, places and things, and is no inconsiderable addition to the missionary literature of the time.

New York. TALBOT W. CHAMBERS.

Students' Lectures on Missions, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1893. *Foreign Missions after a Century.* By Rev. James S. Dennis, D.D. 8vo, pp. 368. (New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1893.) The Students' Lectures on Missions at Princeton could not possibly have been more worthily inaugurated than by Dr. Dennis' masterly survey of the field, as given in this volume. A second edition, already called for, indicates that the public have estimated the book at its true value. The topics of the several lectures are: "The Present-Day Message of Foreign Missions to the Church," "The Present-Day Meaning of the Macedonian Vision," "The Present-Day Conflicts of the Foreign Field," "The Present-Day Problems of Theory and Method in Missions," "The Present-Day Controversies of Christianity with

Opposing Religions," "The Present-Day Summary of Success." We know no single book from which may be obtained at once so comprehensive, so accurate, and so illuminating a general survey of present-day mission problems, methods and successes.——*An American Missionary in Japan.* By Rev. M. L. Gordon, M.D. 16mo, pp. xiv, 276. (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1892.) A delightful as well as instructive account of the nature of mission work in Japan, and a survey of its progress and results. When we remember that Protestant mission work began in Japan in 1859, and the first church (of eleven members) was organized in 1872, the 334 churches and 33,000 Christians contributing $72,000 in 1891, for "Christian and philanthropic purposes," are no mean showing. There are specially interesting chapters on the beginnings of a Christian literature for Japan, and on "Comparative Religion as a Matter of Experience," in the latter of which stress is justly laid on the sense of sin which is awakened by Christianity alone of the religions that have reached Japan. The accounts of the recent reaction against foreign influence are most instructive. Doubtless the young Church as well as the young nation must learn by experience; but what a pity they cannot utilize others' experience!——*Korea from Its Capital.* With a Chapter on Missions. By the Rev. George W. Gilmore, A.M. 12mo, pp. 328. (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, [1892].) The accomplished author has succeeded in putting into this volume an exceedingly satisfactory account of Korea. The successive chapters treat of "The Country," "The Government," "The Capital," "The Language," "The People," "Domestic Life," "Attire and Adornment," "Woman and Her Work," "Amenities and Solemnities," "Religion," "Resources," "Progress towards Civilization," "Foreign Relations," "Foreign Life in Korea," "Missionary Work." The style is straightforward and interesting; and the volume is illustrated with some twenty-five beautifully executed plates from photographs.——*Life and Letters of Samuel Norvell Lapsley*, Missionary to the Congo Valley, West Africa. 8vo, pp. 242. (Richmond, Va.: Whittet & Shepperson, 1893.) This volume is made up of Mr. Lapsley's letters and diary, written on the field, which give a most vivid picture of the pioneer work in establishing an African mission, and at the same time create in the reader a deep interest in this young man of God who was permitted to give but two short years of labor to his chosen vocation before he was taken higher. The blood of Samuel Rutherford flowed in his veins, and the spirit of Samuel Rutherford seems to have descended upon him. A brief Memoir is prefixed, and the volume is excellently illustrated from photographs.——*The Story of the Life of Mackay of Uganda.* Told for Boys. By his Sister. 8vo, pp. vii, 338. (New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1892.) This is not the stirring missionary biography, *Alexander Mackay of Uganda*, done over again for more youthful readers, but is an entirely new selection of incidents from Mackay's life, told in the same attractive style. It ought to have a wide circulation.——*The Story of John G. Paton*, told for young folks; or, Thirty years among South Sea Cannibals. By the Rev. James Paton, B.A. With Forty-five Full-page Illustrations. 8vo, pp. 397. (New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1892.) A most successful recasting of the *Autobiography of John G. Paton*, for the sake of a new and younger audience. It retains the power of the larger book.——*The Bishop's Conversion.* By Ellen B. Maxwell. With an Introduction by James M. Thoburn, Missionary Bishop for India and Malaysia. 12mo, pp. 384. (New York: Hunt & Eaton, 1892.) A very well-written story designed to remove the mistaken grounds on which much injurious criticism of missionaries and their methods is indulged in. The Bishop also had his ideas of where missionaries were wrong: but he was converted. Those who wish to know how, and who wish to learn at the same

time something of the trials and methods of life in India, may do so most pleasantly by reading this interesting and instructive volume, and along with it may be profitably read the following volume, which is mentioned here in order that students of Mission-life may not miss it.——*The Simple Adventures of a Memsahib.* By Sara Jeannette Duncan, Author of *A Social Departure*, *An American Girl in London*, etc. With Illustrations by F. H. Townsend. 12mo, pp. iv, 311. (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1893.) A wonderfully vivid, if a bit flippant, account of life among the commercial class in Calcutta. Every page sparkles with brightness and hits; and if we have no elegance of style, we have a vigor which goes a long way to reconcile us to the lack. The student of missionary biography will do well to read this racy description of secular Calcutta life, as a kind of exercise in what the Germans call *Zeitgeschichte*. He will find in it much that is frivolous and un- if not even ir-religious, but he will find much that is instructive.——*James Gilmour of Mongolia.* His Diaries, Letters and Reports. Edited and arranged by Richard Lovett, M.A. Author of *Norwegian Pictures*, etc. With Three Portraits, Two Maps and Four Illustrations. Second Edition. 8vo, pp. 336. (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1893.) The kind of man James Gilmour was and the kind of work he was doing for Christ and his fellow-man, we already knew from his own absorbingly interesting book, *Among the Mongols*, published in 1882. In presenting this summary of his life-work to the public, his biographer represents him not unjustly as "one of the greatest missionaries of the nineteenth century," and that although success as measured by numerous converts was denied him. His greatness consisted in "setting before this generation a noble example of absolute devotion to duty and of self-sacrifice that shrunk from no cost in the service of the Mongols and the Chinese, of steady perseverance in a hard pathway, even when the eagerly longed-for tokens of progress were not vouchsafed." "James Gilmour's bow abode in strength because he had cultivated his mind, because he had disciplined his spirit by prayer, by constant study of Scripture, by close walking with God, and because, when he gave himself to the service of Mongolia, he kept back nothing." Surely a man of whom this can be said was great with the greatest kind of greatness; he has fulfilled the angelic promise concerning John the Baptist and has been "great in the sight of God." May Mr. Lovett's book make his example fruitful, that it may be said of him in his war against evil things, as of Samson, that those whom he slays at his death may be more than they which he slew in his life.——*Presbyterian Missions.* By Ashbel Green, D.D., LL.D. With Supplemental Notes by John C. Lowrie. 8vo, pp. xiii, 249. (New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. [1893].) Dr. Ashbel Green's well-known historical sketch of Presbyterian Missions was drawn up by request of the Foreign Board in 1838. It has been long out of print, though no book has arisen which supplies its place. Our venerable father in God and veteran missionary-secretary, Dr. John C. Lowrie, than whom no one living is better prepared to write the history of Presbyterian Missions, has republished Dr. Green's book as the first volume of an extended history of Presbyterian Missions which he is projecting. In reprinting it he has greatly enriched it with supplemental notes. Every lover of missions will pray God that Dr. Lowrie's life and strength may be continued him for the completion of his labor of love.——*The Invincible Gospel.* By George F. Pentecost, D.D. 16mo, pp. 52. (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1893.)——*The Mission of Christianity to Other Religions.* By the Rev. James S. Dennis, D.D. 16mo, pp. 29. (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1893.) Two faithful words, for Christ and His Gospel, spoken at the late "Parliament of Religions."