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I.

## PHILLIPS BROOKS AS A THEOLOGIAN.

EVERY great preacher is of necessity a theologian. The converse of this proposition is of course not true; for exclusive devotion to the formal systematization of truth may hinder freedom and power of speech, so that the power of the pulpit may have no direct proportion to the thoroughness of the preacher's conceptions of truth. A few great ideas ardently believed may be uttered by some master of assemblies with such burning earnestness and illumined with imagery so splendid, that they become at once motive powers to all who have ears to hear; while a far more perfect mastery of divine truth may fail of the expression worthy of its greater depth and scope. Nevertheless, it is what a man believes concerning God and the things of God that chiefly gives him power to preach: and still further is it true that the highest attainments in the pulpit are possible to him only who has not merely attained the rudiments of the Gospel, but who has sounded its depths; who has not only gathered the fragments, but can rightly divide the whole Word of Life. The greatest preachers have ever been great theologians. It is therefore with peculiar interest that we open the six volumes of sermons of the late Bishop Phillips Brooks, his Bohlen Lectures on *The Influence of Jesus*, Yale Lectures on *Preaching*, *Two Lectures on Tolerance*, a volume of *Addresses*, and last, *Essays and Addresses*, 1894, besides some less considerable publications, and find the guiding axiom of his ministry clearly affirmed. In his *Lectures on Preaching* (p. 129) he says: "No preaching ever had any strong power that was not the preaching of doctrine." And again (*Sermons*, Fourth Series, p. 49): "The decrying of dogma in

the interest of conduct is natural, but very superficial. Let us not join in it." Still more satisfactorily in the Preface which he wrote to a little volume of *Selections from the Writings of Frederick Denison Maurice* (compiled by M. G. D.): "The days in which we live are a good deal given to contempt of theology. In this great teacher of our day there was a noble rebuke and protest against that feeble and enfeebling scorn. He was altogether a theologian." And in the volume of *Essays and Addresses*, published since his death ("The Teachableness of Religion," delivered in 1892): "And it is not possible, I think, to maintain the distinction which is often drawn between teaching religion and teaching theology. If you teach religion, you must teach theology. . . . . The preacher in his pulpit and the professor in his chair are both doing the same work" (p. 209).

These wholesome and emphatic affirmations make it pertinent to ask as to his own theology, What body of doctrines gave form and character to his own speech and preaching? Such an inquiry gains in interest from the commanding eminence of Bishop Brooks among the pulpit masters of the day. Few men dying so early in life leave so wide and splendid a reputation in all the Churches of the saints, as well as in his own. He was a burning and a shining light, and we may well lament that its cheerful radiance is quenched forever, save as it still shines in these attractive volumes. Since his death he has become even more a popular ideal, suffering a little of that amiable idealization, the often accompaniment of greatness, which his soberer admirers must deprecate, as he surely would have done. In a time when "the individual withers," it is delightful to see in his life the power of a great man to subdue the hearts of men, women and children to his kindly rule, writing himself upon the minds of thousands, so that his thoughts have become a potent stimulant and fashioner of the thought of his day. Those who think with him in theology naturally magnify his power—even above measure. Canon Farrar does not consider that he has his equal in the English Church today. Dr. Lyman Abbott (in the *Outlook*) declares him "the greatest preacher in America during the last decade." One of his fellow-bishops (Bishop Clark of Rhode Island), at a memorial meeting held in Brooklyn, N. Y., February 22, 1894 (reported in the *Brooklyn Eagle*, February 23), in still more extravagant terms exalts not only the man and the preacher, but his theology, declaring that he would "as soon think of fathoming the bottom line of the ocean as giving the bottom line of his theology." We venture to think that such a canonization would not be wholly acceptable to its revered subject; for whatever else he was or was not, Phillips Brooks was a

great man because of his great manliness. It is a word much used, and not always without a touch of cant, sometimes with a covert fling at vital godliness, but his manliness was genuine.

Towering above all his fellows like Saul in physical stature, they came to recognize also his greatness of mental and moral stature. His noble candor and sincerity of faith, his large generosity of spirit, and a certain genial and glowing freshness of speech pervaded his style with a delicate flavor of his own charming personality, making even the printed page a delight to those who have never heard his voice nor known the magic spell of his living presence. Such personal traits and gifts joined with an eloquence that rarely illustrates Cicero's definition of true eloquence as of the nature of virtue, may indeed blind us to the value of the inquiry as to his doctrines. A noble life and a gift of speech should not hinder the inquest into the degree in which the preacher taught the truth, for this after all must be the final test of all preaching. Did Phillips Brooks owe his power to the keenness of his vision of truth and to the breadth and thoroughness of his comprehension of its loftier and its lowlier ranges? Or are we to attribute it rather to the tenacity of his grasp of a few leading ideas, "thoughts that breathe and words that burn," when his voice uttered them and his life gave them force and beauty? In striving thus to see Phillips Brooks the theologian in Phillips Brooks the preacher, we must remember how difficult it is not to do some injustice to the preacher in drawing a body of doctrines mainly from a series of popular sermons and fugitive addresses. It will be possible only to exhibit the metes and bounds of his thinking, and indicate the type of his theology and his general position in the circle of Protestant Churches in which he is *clarum et venerabile nomen.*

It is well known that he was born under Unitarian influences and trained under Dr. Vinton, an Episcopal minister who held to the type of doctrine deemed orthodox in the Episcopal Church thirty years ago; and that he pursued his studies in the Divinity School at Alexandria, Va. His general doctrinal position may be gathered from a sermon delivered by his brother, the Rev. Arthur Brooks, D.D., in New York, just after the death of Bishop Brooks. "The Broad Church movement meant to him a closer relation between God and man," and although he saw various dangers in it, "he never feared as to its ultimate results." That epoch-making book, *Essays and Reviews*, appeared in England the year after he entered upon his first parish, and his estimate of the new movement which it represented marks the difference between him and such men as Dr. Vinton. This is the gist of his brother's statement, and it fixes his general attitude, no doubt, not only in ecclesiology, but in theology.

Broad-Churchism, however, is rather a vague term and covers a multitude of notions. As its advocates describe it, it is a tendency rather than a fixed position in religious thought, a transition, a passing note in the music of "divine philosophy." Its definitions are often colored with the agnostic temper of the age, and its science gravitates towards nescience. The glow of light on the pages of Dean Stanley, for instance, is as beautiful as the phosphorescent glow on the waters of a summer sea, and as difficult to hold or analyze. The essential indefinability of all truth seems the cardinal principle of many writers of this school, and some of the vagueness and ambiguity of statement inevitably following therefrom obscures the pages of Bishop Brooks, rendering the question of his theological point of view more difficult of answer. But the simple, wholesome, outright character of the man constantly corrects this, which we must esteem a vicious infirmity of the party with which he was in general in sympathy. He loved clear thinking and plain speaking too well to be willing "to palter with us in a double sense." The force and skill of some of his most effective sermons are due to the unshrinking boldness of his thought and the precision of his definitions.

Approaching now the question of his theology, we may ask the question which it is well to apply to all preachers and all thinkers of all schools, Christ's own question concerning Himself, What think ye of Christ? It is wonderfully true of Bishop Brooks that his whole preaching was a prolonged and glowing tribute of praise, and honor, and glory to our Lord Jesus Christ. It is said that he once answered, being asked what sermon he would preach, "I only have one sermon." He might have adopted in his own way the exclamation of Count Zinzendorf, "I have but one passion; it is He." His whole thinking continually revolves about His Person, in reverent delight over His humanity and His divinity, glorying in His life and death, and appealing to all men to believe and obey Him. While we must rejoice in this and in the saving power that therefore followed his ministry, the moment we press further into his doctrine concerning our Lord's Person, the more surprising, and, to our view, the more deplorable, is his evident departure from the theology of the Episcopal Church, as from the view of the immense majority of Christians in all ages. His doctrine of the Person of Christ—ever the key to any man's whole idea of the Gospel—colors, and, as we think, greatly lowers his ideas both of the man Christ Jesus, of God Himself, of humanity, redeemed and unredeemed, altering with it the work of Christ for our salvation.

His view of Christ is expressed with great clearness in a sermon with the significant title of, "The Eternal Humanity," on the text,

"I am Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the End," etc. Let us take his own words: "Christ says, 'I am Eternal.' Now that must mean not merely that He has existed and shall exist forever, but, also, that in the forevers of the past and the future He is eternally Christ; that the special nature in which He relates Himself to us as a Saviour never had a beginning and never shall have an end. Now what is that special nature—Christ! The word includes to our thought such a divinity as involves the human element. Christ is the divinely human and the humanly divine. It is the Deity with a peculiar human sympathy, showing by a genuine brothhood the experience of man. That is to say, there are two words: God and man. One describes pure deity, the other pure humanity. Christ is a word not identical with either, but including both. . . . . Keep this in mind and then see what it will mean when we are told that this Christ nature, this divine human has existed forever. Are we not in the habit of talking as if the redemption which called for an anointed Redeemer were a late thought in the universal history? Untold ages after the dateless time when God began to be, His Almighty word was spoken, and a new world and with a new race to live on it shaped itself out of the void. In that new world a new experiment of moral life brought a catastrophe unknown before, to meet whose terrible demands the great Creator Himself came and took the nature of this last creature living in His last creation. God was made man and Christ the God-man was made manifest before the worlds. Here we make man, you see, a late thing in the history of the universe; and how is it possible that Christ who is God with the element of human sympathy should be eternal?" On the contrary, he continues, "already before man trod the garden in the high glory of his new godlikeness, the pattern of the thing he was to be existed in the nature of Him who was to make Him. Before the clay was fashioned and the breath was given, this humanity existed in the divinity; already there was a union of the divine and the human; and thus already there was the Eternal Christ." (*Sermons*, sixth series, pp. 311, 312). The explicitness of this language, repeated again and again, forbids us to construe it to connote the old idea that God had in His mind from all eternity a concept of the genus man, among the other "archetypal" ideas which were subsequently realized in creation. Bishop Brooks uses the word, speaking of "archetypal humanity;" but to him it clearly means more than that humanity had an ideal existence in the mind of God before his real existence in the flesh. "What if the type and this life I now live were part and parcel of the everlasting Godhead? What if it be the peculiar glory of one of the persons of that Godhead that he has worn forever, bound

with His perfect deity, the perfect archetype and pattern of this humanity of mine?" (p. 313). "What if He had borne forever the human element in His divinity, anointed Christ from all eternity? What if there had been forever a Saviourhood in the Deity, an everlasting readiness which made it certain that if such a catastrophe as Eden ever came, such a remedy as Calvary must follow? Does not this deepen all our thoughts of salvation? Does it not teach us what is meant by 'the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world?'"

These extracts well illustrate Bishop Brooks' aversion to the mode of writing which distinguishes many writers of the Broad Church school. The doctrine may be thought difficult to believe, and even self-contradictory: but it is not further confused by the irritating ambiguity of statement, such, for instance, as makes the attempt to follow Dean Stanley like chasing the rainbow; nor is it tortuous with the complicated paradoxes of Maurice. It is a very definite and tangible Christology, and furnishes a key to his whole thinking. The sermon in which it occurs was preached in 1864, but has been published since his death. The doctrine which it so clearly expresses evidently dominated his whole ministry, for it appears many times, though in less definite statement, and furnishes a clue to many expressions otherwise ambiguous. In a little volume of *Addresses* (mostly Lenten addresses), he declares that the essence of the Christian faith is "not the inspiration of the Bible, not the election of certain souls or the perdition of other souls, not the length of man's punishment, not the doctrine of the Trinity, but simply this: The testimony of the divine in man to the divine in man that lifts up the man and says: 'For me to be brutal is unmanly; to be divine is to be my own true self'" (p. 63). And again (pp. 81, 82): "Man in the fulfillment of his nature by Jesus Christ, is man," and that "humanity means purity, truthfulness, earnestness and faithfulness to that God of which humanity is a part; that God which manifested that humanity was a part of it, when the incarnation showed how close the divine and human belonged together."

The far-reaching consequences of such a view of the Person of Christ are at once apparent. Bishop Brooks preaches the Deity of Christ; it is not necessary to cite specific passages, for it is woven into the warp and woof of all his preaching. But what is "Deity" in his view? Christ is God, but God in Him is not pure God nor ever has been, but God *plus* an uncreated humanity. What is an uncreated humanity? Humanity has no more distinguishing mark than that it is creaturely; God alone is the uncreated and absolute. But this impassable gulf between the Creator and His creature is here destroyed, and at once the counterfeit face of pantheism

appears. Bishop Brooks may not have seen this or may have seen with unseeing eye, but it crops out in many confused expressions, such as those quoted above. "The personal force in Christianity is the nature of Jesus full of humanity, full of divinity,"—thus he begins his Bohlen Lectures on *The Influence of Jesus*, and this is the note of the whole book, which contains many striking passages, but is as a whole confusing and unsatisfying. If humanity has from eternity existed in divinity, the idea is inevitable that the divine life is intrinsically incomplete until creation and even redemption shall have taken place, and all the pantheistic affirmations are latent and some of them are expressed in Bishop Brooks' writings. "For the New Testament is always just on the brink of pantheism," he tells us (*Essays and Addresses*, p. 158, "The New Theism"), "and is only saved from it by its belief in the intense personality of Jesus, and its overwhelming injunction of responsibility." If the New Testament is indeed "just on the brink of pantheism," the New Theism will quickly enough plunge over the brink under the spur of this novel exegesis and new-old philosophy.

It seems plain that, in trying to find some middle ground between the Unitarianism in which he was born and the orthodoxy of the Episcopal Church, he really lost hold of the best elements of both. Orthodox Trinitarians and consistent Unitarians of the old type are at one in affirming the Transcendence of God and His incapability of confusion with His creatures. This Bishop Brooks denies in his attempt at a Mediating Theology. It is well to realize what it involves, both as to God and man. The old theologians were wont to say that God existed "simpliciter." This must be changed if Bishop Brooks is right. "The second Person of the Trinity has worn archetypal humanity," as His "peculiar glory," "forever bound up with His perfect Deity." In sad sincerity then must we say, God is no longer God. As to man we must also think differently. When the first Adam was created, all of humanity was not in him, for the eternal humanity was left in God, unless indeed the creation itself was an act of humiliation to God by which the second Person of the Godhead parted with His "peculiar glory." Rejecting this alternative, manhood until Christ came was hardly manhood at all, but only a pale reflection of the divine original. Then when Christ was born in the "little town of Bethlehem," which Bishop Brooks has apostrophized in such melodious numbers, He can hardly be said to have become man, for He was that already, but only to have added to His eternal humanity a mysterious connection with the sinful part of His own nature, and so He may be said to have come to redeem Himself. If the orthodox Christology and Soteriology ever seem difficult of belief

such a chaos of absurdities as this will make them easy by contrast. The effects of it on our notions of man's actual condition as a sinner, and the nature of the redeeming work of Christ, are equally grave. Humanity being thus in root and essence divine, it is hard to see how man can fall without involving God in the calamity. Bishop Brooks does not deny the fall in terms, but many of his statements are confused, and some of them seem to carry the logical consequence of his Christology into expression.

In his sermon on the "Natural and the Spiritual" (*Sermons*, sixth series, p. 242), "Howbeit that was not first," etc., he says: "The Bible teaches and our deeper observation, that the material has within itself the power of spiritual life." "The whole secret of the physical has not been read until its power of becoming spiritual by the service of the spirit has been discerned." "This is what Baptism means. It is the declaration that this new-born life which seems only a new-born animal has in it, bound up with it, a divine nature. Baptism is the claiming of that nature. It is the assertion of the regeneration, the deeper and higher birth, the birth from heaven, which is coincident with the birth from earth, and which is to use the physical basis as its servant and its power of development." Read many other passages and you might suppose that Bishop Brooks believed in the common doctrine of regeneration, but evidently he was far from it. To the same purport is the whole tenor of a sermon (*Sermons*, Fourth Series) on "The Church of the Living God." "The Christian Church is the body of redeemed humanity. It is man in his deepest interests, his spiritual possibilities. It is the under life, the sacred, the profounder life of man, his regeneration. Every human being in very virtue of his birth is a potential member of the Christian Church. His baptism claims and asserts his membership in that Church which is simply humanity as belonging to God, the divine conception of humanity." In the first sermon of the same volume, "The Light of the World," he declares, "that in so far as man is not God's he is not truly man," and "that whatever he does in his true human nature undistorted, unperverted, is divinely done." "Shall we leave it to doubting lips to tell about the 'tendency which makes for righteousness?' Shall we not tell of it—we who believe in Christ who made in His very being the declaration of the nativeness of righteousness to man, who bade all men see in Him how the Son of Man is the Son of God in the foundation and intention of His life?" (p. 78). Again (p. 14), "Once think it possible that God should fill a humanity with Himself, once see humanity capable of being filled with God, and can you conceive of His not doing it? Must there not be an Incarnation? Once think it possible that

Christ can, and are you not sure that Christ must give Himself for our redemption?" Seen in the light of this truth (p. 15), "the Christian Church is nothing in the world but . . . . the primary crystallization of humanity." "It is no favored elect body caught from the ruin, given a salvation in which the rest can have no part. All men are its potential members." The missionary in a heathen land sees in all he finds there the raw material and the suggested potency of that divine life which he knows that it is the rightful condition of the Sons of God to live. "It is the true philosophy of history that man is the child of God, forever drawn to His Father, beaten back by base waves of passion, sure to come to Him in the end."

These extracts, which could be further reinforced, are enough to show that the sermon on the "Eternal Humanity" was not a passing speculation. Such a thing would indeed be entirely foreign to the nature of the man. His Christology, his Anthropology and his Soteriology are inextricably bound together. The divinity of Christ means to him the divinity of humanity, and consequently the impossibility of there being any such fall of man as would destroy what he calls "the nativeness of righteousness to man." Sin on this view is indeed an interference with the perfect fulfillment of the "original divinity" of man, but one which God must remove by what might be called a species of natural law governing his action. The nature of the saving process is of course greatly altered on this theory. Redemption is "the perfection of humanity on its own human lines." Eternal life "is the deepening of the present life, and not merely its substitution by another life some day" (*Essays and Addresses*, p. 117). "Starting with the intrinsic capacity of man to receive the life of God, all spiritual growth consists in the more and more complete reception of that life" (p. 25). "The process of Redemption" is "the regeneration of man into his true self by the faithful use and treatment of the world, in the obedience and love of God" (p. 27).

Christ's relation to the saving process is about this, so far as we can see: as the fulfillment and completion of the incomplete life of the first Adam and his seed, He awakens the dormant sense of native goodness, calling man to a consciousness of his inherent divinity which sin hinders him from realizing, and at the same time carries out the original design of creation—if design that can be called which is rather the inevitable movement of the one life which has ever existed *ex necessitate* in the Eternal Son. "The second Adam follows the first Adam, Christ comes after and completes the humanity which had been in the world before His incarnation" (*Sermons*, sixth series, p. 255). It would be interesting to know

what, on this theory, becomes of the doctrine of universal human brotherhood, which the genial Bishop preached so eloquently. Adam, Noah, Abraham and all the ancients, the sweet singer of Israel and the evangelical prophet, alike, were not really men of like passions with us completely created in the image of God, completely fallen into sin, and now completely redeemed into the image of the only Begotten; they were incomplete copies of the original humanity, not only by reason of sin, but by the primal charter of creation, and in the deepest constitution of their nature. The deep sense of human brotherhood which throbs through the Old Testament and binds its heroes to those of later time is inexplicable on this theory.

In the Introduction to the little volume of *Addresses* published since his death, the Rev. Julius H. Ward refers to a MS. sermon, from which some extracts are quoted in an article by Mr. Ward on Bishop Brooks in the Andover *Review* for May, 1892, and which Bishop Brooks had told him was the expression in a nutshell of his intellectual and religious position (Introduction, p. 7). It contrasts the former and the more recent views of "all the truths and doctrines of Christianity" by saying that we are growing to consider them as "essential and not arbitrary." "The difference is clear. All the ordinary activities of the world, such as the processes of nature, are regarded as essential; they result from the nature of things; but the processes of religion are often conceived of as purely arbitrary, the result of a will of God, upon principles of which we can know nothing. The good tendency which I recognize and rejoice in, is to get rid of this, to look upon religious doctrines and spiritual processes as essential and not arbitrary. This or that happens to the soul of man because it must, because it is as inevitable for it as it is for fire to burn or frost to freeze. Its causes have been preparing and the result must come. It is essential. It is in the very essence of things." He then applies this principle to punishment, to forgiveness and to conversion. "The poor sinner suffering in eternity—I may see in his suffering the necessary consequence of his sin which not even God could have hindered so long as the sin was there. Or take another truth, the truth of God's forgiveness of the soul that comes to Him. There are certainly here the two ideas. The old belief in election made it arbitrary. God called and welcomed and forgave whom He pleased. The doctrine of fitness makes it essential. God will forgive and welcome all that He can—whoever is capable of it shall have it." "Similarly conversion becomes more beautiful the more we see how natural it is, how there are no new fantastic processes, but the most primary and noblest powers of our human nature are working

at their healthiest and best. To be a new man in Christ Jesus is to be fully and thoroughly a man." In like manner the Atonement shows "how natural are the divinest things. The Incarnation and the Atonement were not unnatural and monstrous, but the completion of the most familiar processes, the fulfillment of the most familiar principles of life, and it is a growth in our religion when we more and more fully perceive this same truth now."

Bishop Brooks here yields to the easy temptation of all controversialists, and exaggerates and distorts the doctrine he would set aside. Orthodox Christians do not teach that Incarnation and Atonement were unnatural and monstrous, nor that God's punishments or His favors are arbitrary in the sense that they are unjust or unkind or capricious. The divine action in punishment or in forgiveness is doubtless regulated and limited both by God's own specific promises and threatenings; and these are due to the sum-total of all His perfections. Those essential moral qualities which make God what He is shine in all His dealings with His creatures. "He cannot deny Himself." But surely this is no new doctrine; and we take Bishop Brooks to be under the influence of that powerful current in modern thought which at first subtly and then openly confuses natural with moral law, and exalting man as though he were divine soon comes to reduce deity itself to the rank and standing of one of His creatures, subject like them to His own laws both physical and moral—if indeed there be any real difference between the natural and the spiritual. So he continues: "All this change from the arbitrary to the essential in religion has its connection with the other habits of our age, with its love of physical science and its study of nature and her laws. But we must not on this account mistrust it; . . . . it chooses to look at God not as a fitful omnipotence choosing each hour's colors by each hour's whims, but as essential law in whom all things move by moral necessities which He cannot change unless He changes Himself and is no longer God." The historic faith of the Church has never attributed a fitful omnipotence to God; but although Bishop Brooks speaks of "*moral* necessities," he does not clearly maintain their distinction from physical necessities. This is not an advance in our views of God, but simply retrogressive to the barren pantheistic fatalism which ever and anon the Church must resist, steadfast in the faith. "The New Theism," in *Essays and Addresses*, pp. 153–155, confirms this. He quotes, with approval, F. E. Abbott's "Scientific Theism," the gist of which is this: The universe *per se* is an infinite self-consciousness. "If all forms of monism are necessarily pantheism, then scientific theism is necessarily pantheism." This is the New Theism whose dawn Bishop Brooks hails. He denies that it is pantheism; but

applauds Abbott's "rejection of the personality, in whose hands the universe is pictured as lying by the ordinary religious thought of men." The ordinary religious thought of men will call this the first stage of pantheism, however its advocates may shrink from the name.

Confusing thus the essential nature of moral law, it is not surprising that man's responsibility under that law should be obscured also; and that there is apparent a defective character in Bishop Brooks' view of man, both as a creature and a sinner. He has little to say of God as Law-giver and Judge and man as creature subject to a definite divine government and living under a broken law whose penalties he is liable to. It may be unjust to say that this never appears. Phrases occur that seem to imply it. But the old phrases like old bottles are ready to burst with the new contents. Here is a characteristic example (quoted in the Phillips Brooks *Year Book*, 1893): "When Jesus died it was as if He lifted up His voice and said, Sin is old but I am older than sin, punishment is necessary but mercy, the forgiveness of the penitent, is a necessity far back behind that, deeper in the eternal divinity." In what sense are we to understand this? In the light of what we read elsewhere it would seem to rest upon the same basis, viz., that the forgiveness of sins is a "necessity," more even than the infliction of the penalties of a broken law. The moral law by its intrinsic and necessary character binds God to send His Son to die for sinners; that is, it is not law at all except as the laws of nature may be called law.

It signifies much as to his conceptions of the way of salvation that in the whole six volumes of sermons there is not a single one on justification by faith, if indeed the phrase occurs. When it does occur (*Essays and Addresses*, p. 383), in an essay on Luther, he declares: "not by a bargain as when you buy goods across the counter, but by an openness and willingness which realizes the oneness of your life with God's as when the bay opens its bosom to the inflow of the sea, so does your soul receive the grace of God. However he may have stated it in the old familiar forms of bargain, this was Luther's real doctrine of justification by faith," which denotes "the essential belonging of the human life to the divine." "Faith is not an act but a being." What Luther would say of this *bouleversement* of his doctrine, his wondering followers may be left to conjecture. Bishop Brooks has several sermons on Faith, in which its dignity and greatness are eloquently expounded, but its justifying office not at all, nor its glory as the special gift of God.

Such an omission can hardly be without design in a preacher so propense to theologizing, and the following extracts seem to confirm the argument from his silence. "There are two answers to the

question, What shall become of the wickedness I have done? One is, God will forgive your sin, He will remit its penalties. In view of this or that persuasion, every penalty of sin is lifted off and you are free. The other is, You cannot be wholly free from sin until you cease from sin. *No taking away of penalties can free you.* No, God will give you a new heart if you will be obedient to Him." "No doubt both answers have their truth, but the second answer promises a more divine and perfect mercy than the first." "You must not think of Christ's redemption as a great scheme to save men from the punishment of sin. That is too negative; that is too low. It is the great opening of the celestial possibilities of man. Expect to escape, know that you can escape from the consequences of having been wicked, only by being good." So far as this is capable of being reduced to any consistent doctrine, it seems to mean that the penalties of sin are lifted gradually and in proportion as man, by being good, ceases from sin. Then indeed is salvation come by the law, and Saul the Pharisee is a better theologian than Paul the herald of free grace, abounding to the chief of sinners.

With such a view of deliverance from sin it cannot surprise us to find that the Bishop's ideas of the nature of sin are not wholly after Paul. The first sermon of the last volume is on the Pauline phrase —the crux of interpreters—"The Mystery of Iniquity." It is pretextual rather than contextual, and has the merit certainly of not diminishing the mystery of the matter. "What do we mean," he asks (p. 5), "by original sin? Not surely that each being comes into the world guilty, already bearing the burden of responsible sin. If that were so, every infant dying before the age of conscious action must go to everlasting punishment, which horrible doctrine I think nobody holds to-day. Original sin means some sort of tendency or possibility of sinfulness. I take it to express nothing more than something vague and indefinite—it does not say what—something in man which makes it certain that as he grows up into manhood he shall grow up in transgression, and that, you see, is the same mystery of iniquity, in other words." "To express nothing more than something vague and indefinite"—there could hardly be a more exact and felicitous exposé of Latitudinarian theology, but it is not often that Bishop Brooks lapses so lamentably into its intellectual feebleness and self-contradictions. He is a strong Samson in fetters, losing his native intellectual virility by accepting in part a false philosophy. One can almost see and feel the uneasy dissatisfaction of a mind so loving clearness and strength with so impotent a conclusion of a great matter. But it signifies much that it occurs exactly in the place where the awful

facts of Scripture and the facts of human life no less contradict most plainly any gospel based on the native goodness of human nature.

The Pauline antitheses of sin as guilt *vs.* righteousness by faith, and of law as the minister of condemnation *vs.* grace as undeserved favor, not a necessity but free, are to his preaching as though they were not; much less (as appears above) does he recognize any election of grace. "As an elect body, the Church is but the type of complete humanity—elect, not that it may be saved out of the world, but that the world may be saved by its witness and specimen of what the whole world is in its idea. It is the sons of the Father who have learned their sonship through the Son crying to all the family of God and bearing witness that to be a son of man is to be a child of the Almighty." The new birth is "a birth from God, restoring in you the first idea of your existence that you are His child." "You are born at once out of the highest heights of God into the deepest depths of yourself." Under such a scheme there is, of course, no room and no real necessity for any legal justification of the individual; nor can the adoption of sons bear any intelligible sense. Why should God adopt those who are already His sons? He only needs to awaken in them the lost or latent sense of sonship. Original sin being "nothing more than something vague and indefinite," atoning blood, alas! becomes like it. Justification and adoption having lost their true meaning, sanctification, the supernatural cleansing of the inmost chambers of the polluted spirit by the blood of the covenant, becomes likewise vague and indefinite, and is only the development and fulfillment of the original goodness native in all men by the aid of the Incarnation, of a Person who, having eternally had our humanity in Him, found it necessary to redeem mankind so as to carry out the original design or inherent nature, not only of a created, but of an uncreated humanity. Certainly sin does not in this light appear so exceedingly sinful, while grace has changed its very nature, and—must we not confess?—has lost its chiefest charm.

We cannot now pause to point out Bishop Brooks' well-known views as to questions of Church government and the Sacraments. They are not substantially different from those long ago taken by the "Low Church" party in the Episcopal Churches; but they have, of course, a "Broad Church" basis, rather than an "Evangelical" one, if we may use these convenient terms so much disliked by many Churchmen. The aim of the present essay is to indicate the type of Bishop Brooks' theology by looking at the weightier matters of his gospel. Two important questions not hitherto noticed he touches rarely and in a manner quite hesitant, viz., Inspiration and Everlasting Punishment. This reticence, however,

is likely to have been a matter of skill in preaching rather than any real clinging to old-fashioned orthodoxy. "How many men in the ministry," he asks (*Essays and Addresses*, p. 66), "to-day believe in the doctrine of verbal inspiration which our fathers held, and how many of us have frankly told the people that we do not believe it, and so lifted off their Bible's page the heavy cloud of difficulties and inconsistencies which that doctrine laid there? How many of us hold that the everlasting punishment of the wicked is a clear and certain truth of revelation? But how many of us who do not hold it," etc., after which we are surprised to hear him add that he is not speaking now of whether these ideas are true or not. What he says must mean that he is one of those "who do not hold it." The Church of Christ does not know the absolute truth about it (*Sermons Preached in English Churches*, p. 129), "but must be content with the assurance .... that it must be a terrible thing, and one whose consequences do not die speedily or easily for any soul to grieve his heart." Gamaliel (Sermon xii, p. 257) went back from the Sanhedrim "meaning to teach with all his might that Christianity was wrong." Nevertheless, in spite of this definite and intelligent rejection of Christ, "he must somewhere, sometime, if not here then beyond, have come to the truth and to Christ himself."

As to Inspiration (*Lectures on Preaching*, p. 161), he refers to "the cynical author of Ecclesiastes" in a way that leaves no room for doubt that he shares the popular idea of a partial inspiration, rather than that he disputes the canonicity of the book in question. The passage seems to mean that certain books (such as Ecclesiastes or the Song of Solomon) are not equally the word of God with the Epistle to the Romans or the Gospel of John, for instance; that there is a Bible within the Bible. The old idea of Inspiration has passed away, so he seems to say, and we have "a new and better relation to the Bible." What this is can hardly be doubtful when (*Essays and Addresses*), after glowing and unqualified eulogy of Dean Stanley, especially commending his behavior to Bishop Colenso, he exclaims (p. 355), "How many eyes fastened upon his pages have seen gradually issuing through the thin substance of the half-mythical Moses or David in whom they once tried to believe, a real Moses or David," etc. Bishop Brooks continually cites Scripture in the customary way, as though its *dicta* were of authority; but evidence multiplies that the appeal to Scripture, unlike the appeal to Cæsar, does not carry with it any obligation to obey the finding of the court.

Such a survey of Phillips Brooks the theologian through the medium of his published works is of interest not only as the study

of a rarely gifted preacher, but because it reveals in many ways the theological tendencies of the age, and the degree in which, for better or worse, they are affecting the spiritual life of the Church.* The genesis of his beliefs it is not hard to discover. His brother, in the sermon quoted above, no doubt correctly described it. Incidental allusions scattered throughout his writings, and especially the Preface to the *Selections from the Writings of Frederick Denison Maurice*, betray how powerfully, in common with multitudes of others, the course and manner of his thinking was shaped by "the English Schleiermacher," as he has been sometimes called. A good title for his collected works would be, "The Gospel according to Schleiermacher, translated into English by F. D. Maurice, with some assistance from S. T. Coleridge and others, and now freely adapted to American use by Bishop Phillips Brooks." Not, indeed, that the "New Theology," currently so called in America, has any valid claim to its title; the fundamental postulate of Bishop Brooks as to the person of Christ is at least as old as Apollinaris. "The mind of Christ," he (Apollinaris) said in effect, "is at once divine and human; the Logos is at once the express image of God and the prototype of humanity. This appears to be what he meant when he said that the humanity of Christ was eternal—a part of his system which was much misunderstood by his opponents. . . . ." "There is no reason to suppose that Apollinaris meant to teach that our Lord's flesh was eternal. . . . . His idea was that Christ was the celestial man; celestial because divine; man not merely as God incarnate, but because the divine Spirit is at the same time

* Since this article was begun a very interesting sketch of *The Theology of Phillips Brooks*, has appeared, by the Rev. Leighton Parks, D.D. (Damrell & Upham, 1894), drawn not merely from his published works, but "as the result of many a long talk as we sat late into the night by his fireside or mine" (Preface, p. 4). It confirms, from this vantage ground of a sympathetic confidant in cordial agreement with Bishop Brooks' theology, the account of it outlined in the present essay. "Is Jesus Christ an anomaly who has burst into the prison-house of time to satisfy eternal wrath by infinite suffering? Not so. Because we are sons God sent His Son, manifesting God's humanity." This was Bishop Brooks' doctrine as interpreted thus by his friend (p. 7). "In one of the last talks I had with him he said with much solemnity . . . . 'Our divinity interprets His (Christ's), the perfection of God in man reveals ours'" (p. 21). "How do we know that He is not the great exception" (p. 20)? "Brooks gave the answer" that "did not lead to the immorality of the Calvinistic atonement. . . . . Jesus was not born to be a victim to appease the divine wrath. . . . . He is the Eternal Son of God, the revelation that there ever was a sinless humanity in the bosom of the Father, in whose image men are made. He is not God plus man or man raised to God. He is the Son of God—divine or human according as we see Him. His divinity is like the brilliance of the jewel, an integral part of his perfect human life." Dr. Parks is manifestly correct when he adds: "Whether this theology is true or false is the question on which our Church must sooner or later express its opinion" (p. 39).

essentially human" (Prof. A. B. Bruce, *The Humiliation of Christ*, first edition, p. 55). So likewise Dorner, in his *Person of Christ* (Division i, Vol. ii, p. 372): "The πνεῦμα in Christ" (as conceived by Apollinaris) "was a human πνεῦμα, although divine. Nay, more," he says also, "the divine πνεῦμα or the Logos, which in Christ was human πνεῦμα, was eternal, and existed before the Incarnation. The Logos must therefore have existed as man also, prior to the Incarnation, and his deity was in itself man from the beginning."

The theological conceptions now so plausibly announced as new have been advanced in various guises with similar confidence many times since Apollinaris' day. The sober judgment of the Church has rejected them when their true nature and final consequences have been perceived. At first glance, however, they present many points of attraction, and borrowing as they now do the diction of orthodoxy and decking out philosophical subtleties in Scriptural drapery, their essential nature and incorrigible tendencies considered as a formal statement of doctrine may be completely hidden. "The prevalent Christology among a numerous and distinguished class of modern theologians, though not professedly pantheistic, is nevertheless founded upon the essential oneness of God and man. This class includes the school of Schleiermacher in all its modifications, not only in Germany but in England and America." So wrote Dr. Charles Hodge more than twenty years ago (*Systematic Theology*, Vol. ii, p. 440). What an illuminating commentary on this pregnant declaration these two decades of religious thought have furnished! Schleiermacher's Christology and Anthropology, as described by Dr. Hodge, exhibit all the essential features of the style of thinking which is now vaunted in America and Britain as the last and highest wisdom. Christ, according to him, is the Urbild or Ideal man, in whom the idea of humanity is fully realized. He is divine because man is the *modus existendi* of God on the earth. In ordinary men, even in Adam, God so to speak, was and is imperfectly developed. "Christ is supernatural as to His beginning" (quoted by Dr. Hodge from Schleiermacher), "but He becomes natural, a simple, or pure human person. The same is true of the Holy Spirit and of the Christian Church." The natural and the supernatural being thus merged into one, the whole nature of Christianity is changed therewith, and its whole development and all its processes are at once natural and supernatural—that is, the difference between the two is merely verbal. Lest this should be thought a biased view, let Prof. Pfleiderer describe this system, from quite the opposite standpoint (*The Development of Theology*, pp. 53, 54): "The fundamental idea of Christianity he considered to be, that the corruption of the world, consisting in alienation from God, is put an end to, and

a mediation is effected between the finite and God by individual points scattered over the whole, in which both the divine and the human are united. What was truly divine in Him (Christ), was the clearness of His idea of the necessity of a mediation between everything finite and God; or of the necessity for redemption for man imprisoned in the finite." Then, quoting Schleiermacher's own words, "His (Christ's) consciousness of the directness of His knowledge of God, and of His existence in God, and of His power of arousing it in others, was at the same time His consciousnes of His mediatorial office and of His deity." "But never," adds Schleiermacher, "did Jesus claim to be the only mediator, . . . . and so neither does the Bible forbid any other book to be, or to become a Bible, too. Christianity will last forever, in so far that there will never be a time when no more mediators are needed, but nevertheless it repudiates the claim to be the sole sovereign form of religion. . . . . A prophetic mind could even now indicate the point which may be the centre of communion with God for future generations." Upon such a foundation as this there is of course no room found for the Protestant doctrines of Justification by Faith, Christ's atoning sacrifice as a satisfaction to divine justice, nor for Regeneration as a special and supernatural act of God, followed by the continuous work of Sanctification by the Eternal Spirit.

The school of Schleiermacher is a large and influential one, exhibiting many and various variations from the original type, but recognizable in them all as bearing the impress of his master mind. One of the chief difficulties in understanding it lies in the inveterate propensity of many of its advocates for seizing the old orthodox phrases and using them in a new sense without any sufficient advertisement of the change—a process of theological counterfeiting being stealthily carried on, by which well-known terms and expressions with a definite historical sense, the current coin of the realm of thought, are debased by foreign alloy and still made to pass as genuine. The creeds are thus "filled with new meanings" (so they put it), that is, made to mean what they do not mean. It is partly this that makes Maurice so hard to understand, in spite of the lucid clearness of his style. When a man is bent on reading mystical semi-pantheism into the Athanasian Creed, the clearest style cannot save him from confusion worse confounded. But the confusion is due to other causes, also. "Mr. Maurice again," Matthew Arnold says, "that pure and devout soul, of whom, however, the truth must at last be told, that in theology he passed his life beating the bush, with deep emotion, but never starting the hare" (*Literature and Dogma*, p. 312). The aptness of this witticism will be relished by any one who has labored to fathom the mind of this remarkable

man, and found it like following the will-o'-the-wisp over the marsh. Nevertheless it cannot be gainsaid that he has exerted a potent influence in English thought, and the "Preface" to the little compend from his writings referred to above from the pen of Bishop Brooks leaves little room for doubt that he being dead yet spoke from the eloquent pulpit of Trinity Church. "Mystic and moralist never came to more harmonious and perfect meeting than in Maurice. The result of their meeting was a great spiritual master, whom the world has already felt and whom it is yet to feel much more before his power is exhausted" (Preface to *Selections*). To exhibit the theology of Maurice in his own words is impossible here. One of his recent eulogists, well able from long intimacy to speak with authority (the Rev. H. R. Haweis in the *Contemporary Review*, June, 1894), epitomizes his theology thus:

"1. That in some true and really sympathetic and effectual sense God is the Father of *all* men; that there never was a time when we were not His children; that baptism is the proclamation, not the creation, of that divine fact—it is the sacramental symbol which we adopt in claiming what belongs to us, and to every child born of a woman.

"2. That Jesus Christ was the coming forth of something that had always existed in God, it was the coming forth of the human side of God—God manifest in the flesh. We could, therefore, understand Him in Jesus, and in Jesus alone, a special use having been made of the earthborn form of human nature to manifest or display to man God's humanity. Our salvation lay in becoming partakers more and more of His nature; our righteousness was therefore *real* (and not forensic), because imparted; *ideal* in so far only as it was aspirational, and to that extent imputed. Man's heaven lay in getting rid of sin, not the punishment of sin; and being transformed by the renewing of his mind: that could only be done by the descent of divine human nature into depraved human nature, the disease of man being thus verily and indeed cured by the health of God. That was the meaning of being a new creature in Christ, born again, putting on Christ, being washed, sanctified, redeemed."

A single quotation from Maurice's *Life and Letters* (Vol. i, p. 156) illustrates his position: "The truth is, that every man is in Christ:" the only difference between believers and unbelievers being that some men own the fact and act on it, while others wickedly refuse. "The real state of every man" is to be "joined to Christ"—the opposite "is no state at all." It is seldom that so great a man reduces his own theory to such gross absurdity in the very statement; it enables us to see why one of his commentators in an English review long ago declared Maurice incapable from first to last of accepting words as an exact measure of thoughts, and another that he was incapable of accepting thoughts as an exact measure of either things or persons. If he was "the English Schleiermacher" (Pfleiderer would say rather the English Dorner), Bishop Brooks may not unfairly be called an American Maurice, clearing away the fog that hangs about the outlines of Maurice's inchoate system, and

leavening his own communion and a considerable section of the whole family of Protestant Churches with this new-old doctrine.

There are two great hemispheres in salvation, corresponding to the two great needs of fallen man: deliverance from the guilt of sin, the curse of the law; and deliverance from death by the gift of life through Jesus Christ. Phillips Brooks proclaimed as one who saw with open vision the glory and wonder and everlasting beauty of the latter of these, and his words are often a thrilling revelation of its reality and blessedness. Under his potent touch old things become new, and the familiar phrases that denote the Light and the Life of God in men glow and blaze with majestic beauty. "In Him was life" he ever seems to say, and his very style catches a marvelous vitality from the theme. There is an abounding joyousness in his preaching, a childlike trustful happiness at the thought of Christ as though life was a perpetual Christmas, and he ever heard the shepherds saying, "Let us go even now to Bethlehem;" so that his sermons ring with the refrain of his own song—

> "Yet in thy dark streets shineth
> The Everlasting Light."

Replete with original and virile force, and constructed often with consummate literary skill, and perfumed with the choice aroma of a lovable character, they are an exhilarating tonic to an age wearied with its own questionings and sick of the vanity of riches. Many an agnostic mind came through his guidance to the knowledge of God as the real and Immanent Life and Light of the world; and as a sympathetic interpreter of the hidden phases of the spiritual life, uncovering the thoughts of many hearts and with delicate insight interpreting spiritual things to the spiritual, when shall we look upon his like again? Nevertheless it cannot be said that he discerned the crowning glory and mystery of eternal life as the free gift of sovereign grace, bestowed in a new creation upon a race dead in sins, for to him spiritual life was but a deepening of the natural life. Of the other hemisphere of salvation, that vast continent of grace across which is written Justification, he seems as ignorant as Europe was of America before Columbus. Faith, the bridge or *nexus* that connects the one with the other, he sees only from one side. As the conscious beginning of what Christ does in us, he sees and preaches it like a veritable prophet; but alas that the prophet should never go on to its office as the act of appropriation laying hold upon the saving benefit of Christ's work for us upon the cross. The Person of Christ he adores as God manifest in the flesh, but he cannot reach the height of Paul's soaring pæan, "that God may be all in all;" for to Bishop Brooks Christ manifested equally an eternal humanity that, as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall

be, at once humanity and divinity. Thus the doctrine of Christ's divinity is weakened into the deification of man.

In many high places of thought this reconstruction of the Gospel is now enthroned as the highest expression of the religious consciousness. From within the camp of the covenanted host in the very language of the word which it sets aside, and in grosser forms from the camp of the enemy, these same cries are echoing. "The distinction between the divine and the human is the anti-Christ of theology"—this is the "message," which one modern "prophet" bids us hear under dreadful penalties. "God is human and man is divine. The humanity and divinity of the Son of God were essentially the same."* And again: "Fellowship with the sufferings of Christ is the common atonement which all who believe in Him may make for human sin. The atonement is ours as well as Christ's." A much more notable writer † strikes the same keynote, declaring that Paul attributes to Jesus "a kind of separation from humanity, and a kind of identification with God, which is practically a return to the old Jewish opposition of God and man. . . . . In this way he seems to deny the union between the human and the divine, which was the essential lesson of the life of Jesus." "The theological doctrine of the two natures in Christ . . . . has never found an echo in the voice of immediate religious experience. . . . . Christ is divine *just because* he is the most human of men . . . . the Son of man who reveals what is in humanity, *just because* he is the purest revelation of God in man." It would be easy to append a catena of similar quotations gathered almost at random from current theological literature—all variations upon the one theme, the essential identity of God and man. Phillips Brooks' latest eulogist ‡ phrases it boldly: "The soul of man is consubstantial with God." Lovely and pleasant in their lives the apostles of this other Gospel may be; but all the more because they are, and because this prince of preachers charmed his generation with his magnetic eloquence and uttered much vital truth, the Church of God must not fail to expose the glittering delusions so strangely fused therewith. One of their own poets also § has foretold what must come to pass if we should be blind to the attempt to compromise truth and falsehood—

> "If e'er when faith had fallen asleep
> I heard a voice 'Believe no more,'
> And heard an ever-breaking shore
> That tumbled in the Godless deep."

BROOKLYN, NEW YORK. JOHN FOX.

* *The New Redemption*, by Prof. George D. Herron, pp. 48, 133.

† *The Evolution of Religion*, by Prof. Edward Caird, Vol. ii, pp. 213, 214, 232, 233.

‡ *The Theology of Phillips Brooks*, by Rev. L. Parks, D.D., p. 21.

§ *In Memoriam*, cxxiii.

## II.

# THE ORIGIN AND COMPOSITION OF GENESIS.

## THE UNITY AND CONTINUITY OF GENESIS.

THE unity of a literary work may be shown in a variety of ways. The most natural signs of unity are oneness of plan and the mutual dependence of constituent parts. Over against a theory of compilation from various sources homogeneity of style and vocabulary also, if they exist, may properly be urged as subsidiary arguments. A general external unity in Genesis is now nowhere denied. Neither is it denied that its author, or final compiler, had for a definite purpose to prepare a work introductory to the history of Israel or the theocracy. A deeper question, however, must be kept in view: Is the actual, demonstrable unity of Genesis only of such a sort as to allow the theory of its origin now so widely current, or does it, *per se*, exclude it?

According to Tuch,* the aim of Genesis, in its relation to the other books of the Pentateuch, is to show how, under the special care of God, His chosen people, from the beginning, were separated from other peoples, through the moral elevation of the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; how they were fitted for theocratic relations; and how to these same patriarchs was revealed the fundamental law of such relationship and was given the promise of possessing Canaan. Similarly Ewald:† "The goal which the author of Genesis set before him is sufficiently clear from his work. He employs himself with the fortunes in Canaan of the three ancestors of Israel. His plan is to trace the history of the people of God from its origin to the period of its transplanting to Egypt."

These conceptions of the immediate purpose of Genesis we may adopt, in their general features, and proceed to inquire how the author carried them out in detail. First, what is the object of the matter preliminary to the history of Abraham in Genesis? Evidently it has more than one object. As it respects the patriarch personally, it is first to show his genealogical descent. Genesis presents

* *Com. über die Genesis*, xvii.

† *Die Composition der Genesis*, p. 267.

no more marked feature than its interest in the genealogies of its principal characters. Accordingly, it was not enough to say that Abraham was the son of Terah. He had Noah also for an ancestor. And who was Noah? Once in the period of the Flood, it was impossible not to go further back. What was the occasion of the dreadful visitation? Whence the evils that were then adjudged? Whence these divergent moral currents? Whence was man himself and the earth on which he exists?

But there were weightier reasons why our author began with the beginning of things. There had been definite historic stages before the days of Abraham; the Flood had marked the close of one, the confusion of tongues at Babel another. To give the remarkable call of the patriarch its proper perspective and setting, it was needful to display also great events. A new start, so to speak, was to be made with him. To have failed to indicate this fact would have been to fail in what is one evident aim of the book. Then too, in Abraham there was the principle of selection illustrated. Terah had other sons; Abraham was the one chosen, separated from his kindred by special call to receive the revelations of God and become an exceptional agent of His will. It was an important point with the writer to show that this principle had not taken its rise with Abraham. It had also been manifest in the choice of Shem from among the sons of Noah, in the rescue of Noah himself out of the midst of a drowning world, and even still further back in the contrasted lines of Cain and Seth. Whence the necessity of such selection? Evil was in conflict with the good. Whence came the evil? From God? No; the world and man as made by God were "very good."

So it was not alone, or chiefly, because of his interest in tracing genealogies that the author of Genesis was led to begin his work with the creation. One of his main purposes plainly stamped on every part of the book, genealogies not excepted, was to show that Israel, in a peculiar sense, was a chosen people. Its history is represented not indeed as something apart from the world's history, but as, under God's control, the best fruit of it and destined finally to be the world's richest blessing. Let us notice more particularly how this law of selection governs throughout the work and so serves as a peculiar sign of its unity.

Cain, as already suggested, was driven forth (iv. 14) in order to leave in freedom those who would call on Jehovah's name (iv. 26). With the failure of this plan through subsequent intermarriage of the races, Noah was chosen for a new trial. When a like moral deterioration showed itself in his descendants, culminating once more in the dominance of the evil, a third start was made with

Abraham; but under the same law of separation and restriction. Terah sets out with his family for the land of Canaan; Abraham and Lot alone really enter it. Soon Lot is set aside, and with as manifest a purpose as previously Cain, Ham and Japheth had been. So among the descendants of the patriarch, there is no point which there is a more special effort on the part of the historian to make clear than that it is not Hagar's son or Keturah's children who are to represent the chosen line of promise, but Isaac, the son of Sarah; it is not Esau but Jacob. The rejection of one is scarcely less marked than the choice of the other.

It is worth noting how this fact appears in what one might regard as the most unchangeable features of the book, its genealogical lists. They are constructed in a way to lead us to suppose that it was a special object of the writer to display it. We are given, for instance, a list of Cain's descendants as well as of those of Seth. The difference is that, in the case of Cain, there the matter drops; while in that of his brother the genealogy is made the connecting link conducting to the history. Of the sons of Noah, the genealogy of each is given; Shem's alone is represented in the following narrative. And there is a curious circumstance which here enhances the contrast. The order of the sons' names as they usually occur is Shem, Ham, Japheth; but the order of the genealogy is Japheth, Ham, Shem, —evidently in order to make the transition to the succeeding narrative more easy and natural.

In the same way in Terah's family (xix. 37, 38), Lot's descendants are named only to pass out of the immediate history, while it goes on with Abraham. Of Abraham's seed, the descendants of Ishmael (xxv. 12–15) and of Keturah (xxv. 2–4) are given; the story concerns itself only with Isaac. So, in each case, the subordinate branches of the family are first disposed of, the slag, as it were, separated from the ore, in order then to go on with what was the main concern of the writer. Of Nahor's seed there is a list of eight names recorded of whom nothing more is said excepting of Rebecca. Of Isaac's seed, the descendants of Esau are named, to disappear from Genesis; while the story of Jacob and his sons occupies the remainder of the book. This peculiarity of the work vanishes at this point simply for the reason that with Jacob the line of promise is complete for the time. Of the same purport is the way in which the family relations of the chosen people are jealously guarded from corruption or confusion. It had been intermarriages, a free intermingling on common ground, that had been the fatal step in the two earlier epochs of the race. Now there was to be exclusion. This is quite sufficient to explain what otherwise might have been puzzling in the narrative; why, three times, incidents are

given in the lives of Abraham and Isaac in connection with the royal courts in Egypt and Gerar which are very similar in their general character, and could not be regarded as creditable to the patriarchs (xii. 10–20, xx. 1–18, xxvi. 6–11). It was in order not to leave any ground for suspicion, on occasions when such suspicion might easily have arisen, that the promised seed was not in the line of promise. With special emphasis it was impressed on Abraham's mind, in the presence of misgivings, that Sarah should be the mother of the promised seed. The peremptoriness of race separation could hardly have been given a sign clearer than in the rite of circumcision. Ishmael, "the wild ass among men," might ally himself in marriage with the people of his mother; Esau take to him wives of the daughters of Canaan, though to the grief of his parents; but with Isaac and Jacob it was not to be tolerated. "Abraham said unto his servant . . . . I will make thee swear by the Lord, the God of heaven and the God of earth, that thou shalt not take a wife for my son of the daughters of the Canaanites among whom I dwell" (xxiv. 3). It is a most significant fact to which attention cannot be too strongly directed, as showing the importance of this matter in the view of the author of Genesis, that the story of the procuring a wife for Isaac is given an extraordinary prominence. It is the longest chapter in Genesis. It occupies two and one-half of its fifty-eight pages. Even greater prominence is given to the same matter in Jacob's history. "Isaac called Jacob and blessed him, and charged him, and said unto him, Thou shalt not take a wife of the daughters of Canaan" (xxviii. 1). In Genesis the spirit of exclusion as it respected other nations becomes so strong as even to appear almost like repugnance, as shown in the case of Hamor the son of Shechem and the daughter of Jacob (chaps. xxxiv and xxxv).

Could there well be stronger evidence than these examples afford that the author of Genesis deliberately set out so to use the sources at his command as to show what is said in Deuteronomy (vii. 6), that God had chosen Israel "to be a peculiar people unto himself, above all peoples that are upon the face of the earth?" Plainly, too, he made the freest use of his sources for the end he had in view. He was not their slave, but their master. Far beyond the impression made upon us of mere material of various sorts to be conserved or regarded, is the decided pragmatism of the writer. Genesis has no more marked literary characteristic than the purpose which rules in it.

We have shown this as it respects the divine choice of a people; it is no less manifest as it respects the choice of a land. Here the beginning is made with Abraham. If we except the evident foreshadowing of the destiny of Canaan already in chaps. ix. 20–26 and

x. 15–19, the end, which is the Conquest, lies outside the bounds of Genesis. If one purpose bind the first two-thirds of the book together in an unmistakable unity, the other does it for the last two-thirds. Abraham is commanded of God to go into a country which He will show him (xii. 1). He proceeds to Canaan, fulfilling God's purpose as truly thereby as he would have done had it not been the original intention of Terah to emigrate thither. We are not left in ignorance of the true state of things. "The Canaanite," it is said, "was then in the land." But this declaration is immediately followed by another that "God appeared unto Abram and said, Unto thy seed"—note the exact nature of the first promise—"will I give this land" (xii. 4–7). From this time the subject is never long out of sight. In the following chapter it is repeated, after the patriarch's separation from Lot, with added breadth and intensity (xiii. 14, 15). Two chapters later the bounds are named—"from the river of Egypt unto the Euphrates"—and the gift is ratified by a covenant (xv. 18). Two chapters later still it is said, in connection with the rite of circumcision: "And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land of thy sojournings, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession." The promise is never simply repeated in the old terms. Again to Isaac, when tempted through famine to leave the country, it is said (xxvi. 3–5): "Sojourn in this land, and I will be with thee, and will bless thee; for unto thee and unto thy seed I will give all these lands, and I will establish the oath which I sware unto Abraham thy father." This becomes afterwards the favorite form of reference to the promise. It is an interesting circumstance that while both Abraham and Jacob temporarily left the land of Canaan, Isaac was not permitted to do so. Once more the promise is repeated to Jacob in terms recalling earlier utterances (xxviii. 13–15), on the occasion of his fleeing from the wrath of Esau unto Mesopotamia, and again on his return (xxxv. 12):* "And the land which I gave unto Abraham and Isaac, to thee I will give it, and to thy seed after thee will I give the land." So likewise on the patriarch's going down to Egypt. He seems to hesitate to make the change without the divine permission, which he secures at Beersheba (xlvi. 4): "I will go down with thee into Egypt; and I will also surely bring thee up again." As was natural to expect, Jacob did not forget this pledge. When death was drawing near he made Joseph, who alone had the power to bring it about, swear by a peculiarly solemn form of oath, found elsewhere only in the history of Abraham, that

* The importance which is attached to this first appearance of Jehovah to Jacob is seen in the fact that it is referred to on the occasion of each subsequent one (xxxi. 13, xxxv. 1, 7, xlviii. 3, 15, 16).

he should not be buried in Egypt (xlvii. 29, 30): "When I sleep with my fathers, thou shalt carry me out of Egypt, and bury me in their burying place. And he said, I will do as thou hast said. And he said, Swear unto me: and he sware unto him." The same assurance he afterwards required from the remaining sons (xlix. 29–32). And Genesis is brought to an appropriate close with a circumstantial record of the burial of Jacob in Machpelah by his sons, including Joseph, together with a record of the dying words of Joseph (l. 24, 25): "I die; but God will surely visit you, and bring you up out of this land unto the land which he sware unto Abraham, to Isaac and to Jacob. And Joseph took an oath of the children of Israel, saying, God will surely visit you, and ye shall carry up my bones from hence." This they also did as we are told in Joshua (xxiv. 32), burying them in Shechem, "in the parcel of ground which Jacob bought of the sons of Hamor, the father of Shechem."

Not only is the matter of the future possession of the land of Canaan by Israel thus conspicuously and indelibly stamped on every principal feature of the story, there is an evident purpose also to show that it would be no usurpation on Israel's part to have and to hold it. It was, first and foremost, a warranty from God (xii. 7). Its present inhabitants were there by sufferance alone. Through the grossest forms of sin they had forfeited any supposable rights arising from preoccupancy. The detailed description of Sodom and its inhabitants (chaps. xviii, xix) is no mere episode. "Now the men of Sodom were wicked and sinners against the Lord exceedingly" (xiii. 13). The sole reason given why Abraham and his seed were not put in immediate possession of the country was that the iniquity of the Amorites was not yet full (xv. 13–16).

Pains are taken to show that, although the patriarchs on certain occasions had temporarily vacated the land, it was with the express intention of returning thither (xii. 10, xxvi. 1, xxviii. 10, xlvi. 1, etc.). They never renounced, so to speak, their right of domicile. It was, accordingly, no misnomer to apply to Canaan the title in the later parts of Genesis, "land of the fathers" (xxviii. 41). Critics have objected to the phrase, "the land of the Hebrews," in the mouth of Joseph as an anachronism (xl. 15). If, however, "the land of the Perizzite" and "the land of the Hivite" were in place, "the land of the Hebrews" was quite as much so. A tendency is clearly observable to bring into view the part the patriarchs took in the affairs of the land. Abraham, on winning against large odds an important victory over its oppressors—though he had interposed particularly on Lot's account—is publicly blessed by the priest-king of Salem. With the political leaders, however, he asserts his independence, refusing an offered reward lest it should be said that

they had made Abraham rich (chap. xiv). Abimelech proffers him the freedom of the land (xx. 15), as did later his successor with Isaac (xxvi. 26–31), and desires an alliance with him.

On what other literary ground is it, moreover, that an entire chapter is devoted to an account of the purchase by Abraham of a burying place? The most minute details of the transaction are thought worthy of record, including the witnesses and the purchasing price to a shekel. On every subsequent reference to the affair—three times altogether in the book—the fact that it was a purchase from Ephron the Hittite and that the adjoining field was included in the sale are noted (xxv. 9, 10, xlix. 29–32, l. 13). So it is stated that Jacob bought a piece of ground in Shechem when he returned from Paddan-aram, paying for it one hundred *kesitahs*, a coin named only here in the Bible. This purchase he looked upon as giving him proprietary rights, and we find him later, apparently, bestowing it upon Joseph as a legacy (xlviii. 22).

Nor is this all. In the choice of the people we saw how, throughout the narrative, the principle of separation and elimination dominated. It is equally true, and along the same lines, as it respects the land. It is a feature that concerns not alone the native population, but also the descendants of the patriarchs outside one clear line of demarcation. It is not enough for the writer to describe how by Lot's voluntary choice of the plain of the Jordan, Abraham was left free range in Canaan. It must be noted later that, through their incestuous origin, his descendants made impossible every claim to the possession of the land along with Abraham's seed (xix. 30–38). An effective farewell is taken of them in the words, "The same is the father of the Moabites," "the same is the father of the children of Ammon unto this day." Of Ishmael it is predicted before his birth that his home will be apart from his brethren (xvi. 12). Of his descendants we are carefully informed that they dwelt from Havilah unto Shur that is before Egypt (xxv. 18). So the second possibility of a disputed claim was shut out. In the case of Keturah's children, the object of the narrative could not be plainer were it directly stated (xxv. 6): "But unto the sons of the concubines which Abraham had, Abraham gave gifts; and he sent them away from Isaac his son, while he yet lived, eastward, unto the east country." So far, then, an unclouded title belonged to Abraham and by him was transmitted unimpaired to his son.

How was it with Jacob? Here matters are more involved. Esau is the first-born. In a moment of physical distress he sells his birthright. Still he looks and works for the coveted blessing. In this he is shrewdly outwitted by Jacob and Rebecca. Yet the undoubted

physical power is on the side of "My lord Esau." Will he not secure by force what he had failed to get through natural channels? The interest of the story, through several chapters, centres in this contest. All the more marked, therefore, is the issue. Esau had been flitting, apparently undetermined, back and forth from Canaan to Mount Seir. On Jacob's return to Canaan, after the joint burial of their father, to our great surprise he takes voluntary and final leave of the promised land. "And Esau took his wives and his sons, and his daughters, and all the souls of his house, and his cattle and all his beasts, and all his possessions, which he had gathered in the land of Canaan and went into a land away from his brother Jacob" (xxxvi. 6). The event itself and the imperative reason behind it could not well have been more conspicuously displayed.

In chap. xxxix the historian had been particular to note a mere incidental peril to the patriarch's rights from another quarter. Laban and his friends had been wounded in their feelings, and believed themselves wronged in their property interests by the fugitive Jacob. Might not this become the occasion of future trouble? Laban's formal pledge is made to settle it (xxxix. 52): "This heap be a witness, and the pillar be witness that I will not pass over this heap to thee, and that thou shalt not pass over this heap and this pillar unto me, for harm." Thus Jacob is left in undisturbed possession of his ancestral rights in Canaan and the aim of the writer, as far as it concerns this second principal point, reaches its culmination. If one clear purpose, like a silken cord, runs through the pages of Genesis that God would separate unto Himself a people of His choice, another runs parallel to it in every part, that for His people, at the appointed time, He would have ready a land that should be all their own.

There is a third principal thought displayed on the pages of Genesis which should not be overlooked; it is that the patriarchs, not without trials to their faith or discipline, entered into their promised possessions. This is particularly true of Abraham and Jacob; it is less true of Isaac, of whom we have little information.* No sooner is the promise of a numerous seed made to Abraham than the proving of his faith begins. He is seventy-five years of age. Sarah is barren. His riches increase apace, but not his family. Meantime the promise is renewed; once on his entering Canaan, again after his separation from Lot: "Unto thy seed will I

* Though he, too, had sufficient occasion for the exercise of faith and hope, for Rebecca was barren. During twenty years they waited for the promised seed and when it came it was in a way to cause the gravest apprehensions (xxv. 22, 23). Isaac's death, his burial by Jacob and Esau, recorded along with a list of Jacob's sons (xxxv. 23–29), opens the notable tendency of the historian to keep strictly to his theme.

give this land" (xii. 7). "And I will make thy seed as the dust of the earth: so that if a man can number the dust of the earth, then shall thy seed also be numbered" (xiii. 16). Still the expected blessing came not. After he had been in the land a period of years, we hear him uttering his thought in prayer after this manner: "O Lord Jehovah, what wilt thou give me, seeing I go childless, and he that shall be possessor of mine house is Dammesek Eliezer." "Behold to me thou hast given no seed" (xv. 2, 3). Now the promise takes a more definite form: "This man shall not be thine heir; but he that shall come forth out of thine own bowels shall be thine heir" (xv. 4). Abraham believes, but asks for a sign. It is given him with a fourth renewal of the promise (xv. 18). Time goes on until ten years have passed since the patriarch's arrival in Canaan. His faith begins again to waver. An heir born of his own flesh had been assured to him, but should it be by Sarah? Abetted by her, he takes Hagar as wife, and in his eighty-sixth year she bears him Ishmael. Hagar is vouchsafed a communication from the heavens; they are now seemingly shut to Abraham (xvi. 7). Thirteen years longer he waits. The dates are supplied, no doubt, with deliberate intention. Then Jehovah appears again, and for the fifth time communicates with His waiting servant. Hagar's child was not the promised seed. Within a year Sarah should bear a son; his name should be called Isaac. Through him she should become the "mother of nations." This was Jehovah's covenant. As a token of reciprocation, Abraham must adopt the rite of circumcision for his offspring (chap. xvii).

Hopes long deferred now seem on the eve of realization; but Sarah's faith is in need of quickening; hence a special theophany is granted on her account, but with a definite reference to the last: "At the set time I will return unto thee . . . . and Sarah shall have a son" (xviii. 14). Meantime the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah takes place, with Lot's rescue, and, what is more to the point, Abraham's journey to Gerar and his trial with Abimelech. It is not without a purpose, as we have seen, that the writer gives this incident; it is with a special purpose that he introduces it at just this point. At last the event predicted twenty-five years before occurs, by the very course of the history plainly constructed on the plan of a graduated series of events. The attention had been continually and ever more closely riveted upon it. "And Sarah conceived and bare Abraham a son in his old age, at the set time of which God had spoken to him" (xxi. 2).

But the climax has not yet been reached. It lay in the divine command to Abraham to take this son of his, this only son whom he loved, and offer him up as a burnt offering. When in unques-

tioning obedience he carried out, as far as with him was possible, the injunction, the utterances of Jehovah to him reach their culminating point (xxii. 16). The revelation is in a form so wonderful that afterwards there is no more favorite designation of Canaan, as we have intimated, than as "the land which the Lord sware unto Abraham" (xxvi. 3, l. 24). "By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord, because thou hast done this thing, and hast not withheld thy son, thine only son: that in blessing I will bless thee, and in multiplying I will multiply thy seed as the stars of heaven and as the sand which is upon the seashore."

There had been at the beginning the promise of a numerous posterity; then that it should be from his own body; then that it should be through Sarah; then the name of the child and the date of his birth are given; and at last, after years of happy possession, the supreme trial whose issue assured to the patriarch the absolute certainty of all that had been previously spoken. Or, tracing the progression of thought along another line, we first find Jehovah speaking with Abraham (xii. 1); then appearing to him (xii. 7); then ratifying a covenant with him through a visible sign (xv. 17, 18); then appointing, on his part, a token of the mutual covenant (xvii. 9); then sharing with him as a guest a covenant meal, an act elsewhere unexampled in the Bible (xviii. 8); and, finally, swearing by Himself an oath of eternal faithfulness to all that He had promised, and accounting him, as Isaiah notes, His friend (cf. Isa. xli. 8). Thus the story of Abraham, in this particular, bespeaks from beginning to end a unity of purpose that is unmistakable.

Jacob's trials naturally had an individual stamp, but they are run in the same general mold. To no small extent they were the result of his own lack of faith and honesty, but they were real. His protracted banishment from his father's house; his peculiarly irksome service with Laban; his long continued and well-grounded fear of Esau; the peril into which he was brought by his lawless sons at Shechem; the temporary absence of Judah and his low life with Hira, the Adullamite; above all the deception practiced upon him who had grievously deceived his own father, by his sons in turn, in the matter of Joseph—these facts absorb the material of the book in this part of it and form a closely jointed narrative.

Like those of Abraham and Jacob, Joseph's history begins with revelations from heaven in which his future is foreshadowed; and like them he makes his way through trials to his providential destiny. The material, though in itself tolerably complete, is of one pattern with what goes before and looks towards the same end; to show how God was preparing a people for Himself. In fact, it is the life of Jacob which furnishes the key to that of Joseph. There it

has its beginning, that gives point to the transitions, and in the exaltation of Joseph it comes to its best fruitage and receives its highest reward. One is apt to overlook that this very turn is given to the narrative of Joseph by its title. It begins with the words, "These are the generations of Jacob" (xxxvii. 2); just as Jacob's history is placed under the rubric: "These are the generations of Isaac" (xxv. 19).

After Joseph is once fairly established in Egypt, the one thing of importance before the writer's mind seems to be to get Jacob and his family there. When they are there and have been presented to Pharaoh and had got them possessions therein and were "multiplied exceedingly," the next thing in order is the decease of Jacob. This stage of history was now complete; the family was ready to give place to the nation. As Noah, Abraham and Isaac had done, Jacob bestows his blessing upon his sons before his death. It is surprising how much of the history of the patriarch and his children reappears in this blessing, taken in connection with the family register placed a little earlier (chap. xlvi). We recall again his experiences in Haran, including the birth of his children severally; the death of Judah's sons; Dinah's misfortune at Shechem, with the lamentable part taken in it, to their cost, by Simeon and Levi; Reuben's shameless act with Bilhah, by which he lost his birthright; and especially the place which, in the later time, Judah had won in the father's heart. Nothing is needed but a bare rehearsal of the facts recorded to show how inseparably they are woven together like warp and woof in the fabric of the story.

There is one thing more giving a peculiar cast to Genesis which should not be wholly omitted: I mean its predictive element. Delitzsch speaks of three concentric circles of revelation: (1) the seed of the woman, who is the conqueror of evil in mankind; (2) the seed of the patriarchs, who is the blessing of the nations; (3) the seed of David, who is the salvation and glory of Israel. Their order is exactly reversed in the fulfillment. It is a significant fact that two of these great circles lie within the bounds of Genesis. Of course our present interest in the matter is not so directly theological and religious as literary. How far do these predictions make a feature of the book inclusive of its several constituent parts?

It has been customary and seems reasonable to connect the promise of the coming seed (iii. 15) with Eve's words (iv. 1): "I have gotten a man with (the help of) the Lord;" and with Lamech—the tenth from Adam, the number of completion—who exclaimed on the birth of Noah (v. 29): "The same shall comfort us . . . . because of the ground which Jehovah hath cursed." Clearly, moreover,

in the mind of the historian, who has arranged his matter with this in view, it was Shem among whose descendants the promised good should come to bloom. Canaan should be his servant; Japheth dwell in his tents (ix. 26, 27). Again, Abraham is Terah's son, the tenth, in turn, in the goodly line of Shem, and in him all the families of the earth should be blessed. With Abraham the promise entered its second stage of development. It is no longer the seed of the woman, but that of the patriarchs which is the goal of hope. How this special hope centres again in Isaac, then in Jacob, and what pains are taken to show beyond all cavil that there had been no divergence in the line of blessing, we have seen. In similar terms the promise is repeated to each of them. To the former it is said: "I will establish the oath which I sware unto Abraham thy father . . . . and in thy seed shall the nations of the earth be blessed" (xxvi. 3, 4). To the latter: "I am the Lord, the God of Abraham, thy father" (again, "thy father" to Jacob), "and the God of Isaac . . . . in thee and in thy seed shall all the families of the earth be blessed" (xxviii. 13, 14; cf. xxviii. 3, 4).

From Jacob the blessing would naturally have descended to Reuben the first born. Isaac was Abraham's only son by Sarah. Esau had voluntarily relinquished his birthright in favor of Jacob, and God had accepted and ratified the transfer. On which of Jacob's sons would it fall? Reuben had forfeited his claim by incest (xlix. 3); Simeon and Levi more by their cruelty to the Shechemites (xlix. 5–7). Hence the blessing is divided; the material rights of primogeniture go to the favorite Joseph (xlix. 22–26); the primacy to Judah, the fourth son (xlix. 8–12). To him his father's sons should bow down. "The sceptre shall not depart from Judah," is the language of the announcement, "nor the ruler's staff from between his feet until Shiloh come and unto him shall the obedience of the peoples be." Whichever of the disputed renderings of the more essential clause be adopted—"until Shiloh come;" "until he come to Shiloh;" "until that [that is, the kingdom] come which is his"—it is impossible to vacate the passage of the great hope. It has been growing in intensity, while gradually narrowing in compass and range throughout our book. It is not necessary for us to insist here that this hope is Messianic, or looks at all beyond the Jewish people. It can and must be claimed that it is a marked peculiarity of Genesis, and transfuses it like a beam of light from first to last.

We now advance to a new stage of the inquiry. We have shown, in four particulars, that the author of Genesis had a distinct plan before him. These four objects of his are not of equal prominence, but they are in perfect harmony with one another and are

blended together in an obvious unity. If he had other objects in view, they were clearly subsidiary to these, and made to contribute to their unfolding. The conclusion is inevitable and is, in fact, so far undisputed. Genesis exhibits, superficially at least, a remarkable oneness in conception and design. In its general features it bears the marks of the same constructive mind. Each part is fitted to its place in the general plan and duly contributes to its development. What is the bearing of this fact on the current theory? Genesis, in its present form, must have been the work of one master mind. Can anything be known respecting the sources he had at his command? It can be shown, we think, with reasonable certainty, that the documents known as J, E and P, as such did not form the basis of his work. The facts hitherto set forth in this paper, although selected at random for their own sake and with no such secondary end immediately in view, have strongly suggested this inference already. The theory now in vogue is plainly incompatible with such a unity of plan, so carried out. With the presupposed redactor or compiler, it was less a question of clearly putting an object before his readers, or of teaching them some moral lesson, than of conserving and displaying his material. For the quasi-canonical matter he felt a tender, even a sacred interest. We are told that his frequent faults of judgment were generally due to a pardonable bias of feeling towards his sources. The evident purpose of the author of Genesis, on the other hand, shown in the four particulars named, demonstrates exactly the contrary feeling. He worked as a master. He made his material strictly subserve the ends he had in view. The matter selected, what it should be, whether genealogical or historical, whether little or much, whether drawn out in extreme detail or put in the form of bare statement, was selected, shaped and manipulated as it was, because the author had set before him a definite literary and moral goal which he never lost sight of. It was not because he had three documents to combine into a pleasing verisimilitude. We may safely challenge the judgment of every candid investigator whether *prima facie* this is not the case. If it be so, it is a fact which goes very far towards settling the question before us; it proves that Genesis is not a compilation from three continuous sources of the nature of J, E and P.

We have already considered how extremely improbable it is that three such works, so alike in material and chronological order, existed at the periods named. The difficulties of such an hypothesis are greatly enhanced by what has been said in the present paper. Each must also have been penetrated by the same purpose. We now see, as we have not before, what must have been, severally, their aim,

content, spirit and peculiar construction. Like Paley's mysterious watch, whose separate parts, when brought together, fitted each so nicely, they must have been proportioned and adapted to one another at the start, or their compiler was a greater wonder-worker than Moses in Egypt. We have the supposed documents delimited for us in Genesis and can easily test how they are severally related to this group of objects, together forming the manifest purpose of its author. Take first the principle of separation and exclusion through which the choice of a people was effected. Is it a feature of each of this trio of alleged early writers? To a certain extent it is. We have pointed out how the genealogies are employed; and have shown that in their relative position, and even in their inner construction, they give evidence of having been used to help the author in this aim (with iv. 16–19 cf. v. 3–30; and chaps. x, xi). This is P's testimony; but only in part. It singles out, like the others, Noah and Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and marries the last two among their kindred. It is the document of the covenants and of circumcision. It marks, with approval, the growing estrangement from the Canaanites, little observable in the time of Abraham (xxvi. 35; chap. xxxiv); and allows to the Israelites a possession by themselves in the land of Egypt (xlvii. 11).

With reference to J and E it is less necessary to illustrate this point, since it would be generally admitted. Seth's substitution, Shem's exaltation, Abraham's call, most of the great promises of a numerous offspring, the three stories of special trial at royal courts; Jacob's purification at Bethlehem; the enucleation of the family alike in Canaan and in Egypt—these are here; and to crown all, Jacob's blessing upon his sons with his prophetic glance directed into the distant future as well as the nearer past.*

Look, next, at the author's purpose respecting the land of Canaan. J records the call to Abraham to migrate; P equally shows whither; J has the first promise of the land as an inheritance (xii. 7); P soon after repeats, and emphasizes it by a covenant (xvii. 9); J gives information that centuries must pass before the promise is fulfilled (xv. 16); P tells how Abraham, in pledge of unabated confidence, bought for himself and family a burying place at Machpelah (chap. xxiii); J and E repeat (xxvi. 3, xli. 4) the promise of the land to Isaac and Jacob; the same is true of P (xvii. 8, xxxv. 11). And in the successive eliminations of possible counter-claimants each document, either by historical record or by pertinent state-

* Let it be noted here once for all that, in this survey of the contents of the several documents, no distinction is made between what is known as J and $J^1$; nor any attention given to mere excerpts of a document assigned by critics to the redactor in the obvious interests of the theory advocated.

ment, shares: in the dismission of Lot, of Ishmael, of Keturah's children, and of Esau. Again, consider the common trials of the patriarchs. Is P colored by this fact? It is not ignorant of the clog that Lot proved to be to Abraham; it notes Sarah's barrenness and implies that of Rebecca (xxv. 21); speaks of the "grief of mind" that Esau's wives were to his parents; records Jacob's protracted absence in Paddan-aram; the perilous complications at Shechem on his return, and the dying of the patriarch in Egypt with his face turned towards Canaan. With respect to J and E, it is less necessary to enlarge. They divide between them the record of the long continued discipline of Abraham; of Jacob's experience at Haran; his grave differences with Laban and Esau; and of his sufferings from the injustice done to Joseph and the share he had in Egypt.

So, finally, as it regards the predictive matter of our book, the same result is reached. J has received from some the name of the "prophetical writer," to so large an extent is matter of this sort referred to it. It is not wanting in E, which predicts that Abraham's seed shall be as the stars; and, later, that in them shall be blessed all the nations of the earth (xv. 5; cf. xxii. 16, 17). Isaac's prophetic blessing upon Jacob is assigned by our analysts, partly to J, partly to E; so the narrative of the divine appearance to Jacob on the way to Haran, with its accompanying promise (xxviii. 10–22; cf. xxxv. 1). And it is E which records the vision accorded to Jacob on his way to Egypt and the promise that his bones shall finally rest in the land of his fathers (xlvi. 4, 5).

How is it with P—to a large extent a mass of dry statistics, names and dates? Did the spirit of prophecy touch it also? It is P which, looking forth to the end of time, declares that there shall no more be a flood to destroy the earth (ix. 11); corresponding to J's words, in view of the same event just passed: "While the earth remaineth, seed time and harvest and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease" (viii. 22). We have already seen with what consummate skill the author of Genesis divided P's genealogy of Shem in the midst (chaps. x, xi) in order to take it up later on, and so to concentrate attention on Shem's famous scion, the son of Terah.

Notwithstanding the disconnected and fragmentary nature of P's matter elsewhere, there is no mistaking its drift. Abraham goes to Canaan, grows there to be rich and powerful, becomes a party to the covenant by which substantially the same things are assured to him as by J and E (xxvii. 7, 8): "And I will establish my covenant between me and thee and thy seed after thee throughout their generations for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee

and to thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land of thy sojournings, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God." When Abraham is laid to rest in the significant Machpelah, it is P which remembers to record how God blessed his son Isaac, as in P it is noted that he had promised to do (xxv. 11).

It is P which puts into Isaac's mouth these words of benediction for Jacob: "God Almighty bless thee . . . . that thou mayest be a company of peoples" (xxviii. 3); and into God's mouth an express prediction of like content: "A nation and a company of nations shall be of thee, and kings shall come out of thy loins . . . . and the land which I gave unto Abraham and Isaac, to thee will I give it and to thy seed after thee will I give the land" (xxxv. 10–12). To this promise, found in P, Jacob, likewise in P, points back, in a conference with Joseph in Egypt, assigning to Joseph's two sons a portion in this land which was to be an "everlasting possession." Hence, P is not so wanting in this element of prediction as might be thought. It has enough of it to leave no just room for doubt that the same master hand, controlled by the same general purpose, shaped it and fitted it to its place.

It might be asked: Is not this reasoning a two-edged sword? Does it not tend to support, rather than to overthrow the theory that there are combined in Genesis three originally separate works, having similar contents? We answer, No, far from it, in the form presented. Such a theory might have plausibility in certain contingencies and to a certain limited degree. Followed out to a logical conclusion in the present case, it is a boomerang which comes back to confound its projectors. The argument from similarity of contents here proves too much to serve the theory. If it have the value of proof at all, it proves that J, E and P are inseparable parts of one work. Where was there ever a narrative of any length which could not be separated into parts, each more or less continuous in itself, and, in the nature of the case, bearing a striking resemblance to one another? That is in no sense extraordinary. The proof that the divisions are constituent parts of one and the same work and belong together is in the fact that when found together, or when put together, they form an organic whole; a whole that is obviously penetrated and dominated by certain ideas, which may appear and should indeed appear, to some degree, in the parts themselves, but unorganized, without a nice inner connection, without growth and without climax. That is the exact state of the case here. We have no mechanical junction of disconnected stories. We have a continuous evolution from primary ideas.

None of the supposed sources presents in their fullness and strength

the four ruling principles named. None of them fails to represent, in some form and degree, every one of them. J is prophetical, but so are E and P in a degree, and, what is more to the point, along the same lines and looking to the same objects. P offers powerful evidence here and there that its author was intent on showing how Israel became a people and inherited a land; but it is in scraps, unrelated segments. The circle is complete when to them are added the statements of J and E. On the other hand, it might be made out from J or E, and far better from both together, that it had pleased God to train His servants in patience and heroic trust. But the lesson would be below the standard clearly aimed at by the author of Genesis without the matter supplied by P. Simple walls are not meaningless; they have not the significance of walls converging to the arch. That is what these supposed sources do for one another. It is admitted that they are composed of the same material, that it is shaped to a like pattern; but some fail to see that apart, they are each loosely, if at all, connected and are feeble in suggestion. Together they come to their own, are alive with meaning throughout, and make up the palpable unity of Genesis.

Take, for example, the trial of Abraham respecting the promised seed. There is no more marked feature of the book, and each of the alleged sources contributes its part. Take J alone and you get the idea, but without some important side lights upon it touching Eliezer and Abraham's doubts (xv. 1–3). Without P the promise on which Abraham's hopes, as well as his own matchless faith are based, fail of their culminating point, and the related series of events lacks their proper perspective. Again, without P and J, E would be unintelligible; having a tolerable beginning, but without middle or end. We find Isaac, as we do Ishmael, in it, and the patriarch's trial at Jehovah-jireh. That is all. The last is an important contribution as such to the scheme of Genesis. Isolated in E, it is incomprehensible—would cause, in fact, the gravest perplexity.

This illustrates sufficiently well the point we have in view. To separate Genesis into three parts by the lines of cleavage laid down in the current analysis would be to rob the book of its admitted meaning. To admit such meaning, though only in part, and suppose it the product of little more than an external adjustment of originally dissevered independent works, mediated by how deft soever a hand, is to predicate an ethical and a literary impossibility,—if the hand were unskilled and clumsy, a gross absurdity. As Prof. Driver * says of the "traditional view," the price at which such a theory must be maintained is too high.

* *Introd.*, p. x.

The argument for the unity of Genesis derived from the quality of the Hebrew employed has been already given on both its negative and positive sides in the previous chapter. It is generally admitted that Genesis represents, to a considerable extent, the oldest form of the language. But it is said that in P, mingled with signs of antiquity, are elements characteristic of its latest form. This we beg leave to question on the ground of facts elsewhere presented; and we call for proof. What has been hitherto adduced as proof is plainly inadequate, finding a complete parallel, to say no more, in J and E. The conclusion, accordingly, to which we are necessarily driven by the data in hand is this: If from the general criteria of language and style it is impossible to say that Genesis did not originate in the time of the early kings (1000–800 B.C.), on the same ground it is impossible to deny that it might have arisen in the time of Moses.

One other ground for the unity and continuity of Genesis remains to be considered. It is the references of its several parts to one another. They are far more numerous than is generally supposed, and their bearing is unmistakable. The problem is complicated somewhat by differences of opinion among critics as to the relative order of the sources and the time of their union. For convenience we shall have in mind the hypothesis of the great majority who hold that J and E after circulating independently were first united; then, long after—not less than three centuries—were supplemented and completed from P. As might be expected, the redactor or compiler has here an important role. At each step his part is to be carefully scrutinized lest he exceed his prerogative or transgress the rules of logic, since, in the end, whoever else he may be, he is the responsible agent of the theory which created him.

There are found in Genesis, as we now have it, four classes of cross references: of P to P; of P to J or E; of J or E to P; and of J and E to one another. For present purposes the references of P to J or E, or *vice versâ*, will be sufficient. Actual references or a dependence of this sort are obviously out of harmony with the theory, in fact disprove it. If the matter of P refers to or presupposes that of J or E, it must have been written with reference to it. The same is true of J or E in relation to P. The only alternative is to suppose, that in these particulars the original form of all sources was virtually alike; that is to say, if the cases are numerous, instead of there being three distinct sources at the basis of Genesis, there was one Genesis from which the alleged sources were derived. Another possibility should not be overlooked. The way may be prepared in one part of Genesis for what appears later, without prejudice to the theory that the former may be an original

source on which the latter has freely built, that is, some form of a supplementary theory which is not yet altogether antiquated.

First, are there indications of the dependence of J or E on P? Throughout chaps. ii and iii (J) the word Elohim has generally been put in a way almost singular in the Bible, alongside of Jehovah, in obvious reference to chap. i (P). It is usually ascribed to the redactor. Was he then so theologically inclined? It must be conceded that he took a great deal of pains to emend his (three-hundred-year old) source, since he was obliged to insert the word not less than a score of times.* Again, "heaven and earth," as a conception, in v. 29, is a remarkable interjection of a scrap of matter from J in the midst of P. It refers to the birth of Noah, which is the subject of the context. There are but two alternatives: either the matter is from J, and here depends on P's statement which immediately precedes, or it is P's matter, and refers back to J (iii. 17). Either supposition is out of harmony with the theory.

In vi. 7, vii. 23, it is admitted by all, that there is found in J a characteristic expression consisting of a dozen words in the English, of P (i. 26): "Let us make man in our image, and let him have dominion." By a clear evasion of strict logical consequences, however, it is charged to the redactor. A credible reason for these two lapses of the redactor, who was so careful in chaps. ii and iii to use words by line and plummet, has never been given. In vii. 1 (J), Noah is told to come into "the ark," though all that is previously said about "*the ark*" is said in P (vi. 13–16). In the same verse Jehovah is represented as saying to the patriarch: "Thee have I seen righteous before me in this generation," in obvious dependence on vi. 9 (P), as the peculiar coloring of the language shows and as is admitted by Dillmann.† In vii. 3, 9, the language again, it is universally conceded, shows that J is in the livery of P. But it is claimed, *redactor fecit.* A possible reason why critics might claim it, we have; any good reason why the redactor should do it, we have not.

In vii. 12 (J), the statement that the rain was upon the earth forty days is directly dependent on the verse just before, vii. 11 (P), which speaks of the opening of the windows of heaven; and in viii. $2^b$ (J), there is a like dependence on viii. $2^a$ (P). The declaration in viii. 20 (J), that Noah built an altar, presupposes his disembarkation recorded only by P in a previous section (viii. 4). In ix. 22 (J), there is a clear anticipation of a fact stated in x. 6 (P). It is

* In ii. 18, "living creature" (cf. i. 21, etc.), claimed by critics as an expression peculiar to P, might fairly be cited as referring to i. 21, etc. (P).

† *Die Composition des Hexateuchs,* p. 656.

laid to the charge of the redactor, but in palpable avoidance of the logic of facts (cf. ix. 18, 19). In x. 15 (J), a genealogical statement is made that can be understood only by referring back to P (x. 6). It is held to be another of the redactor's adjustments. Would he have cut up J, the older family register, to piece out P's, and make a mess of both? He was more economical in chaps. iv and v, where, wittingly or not, he is supposed to have preserved one and the same register in two forms. In x. 24 the redactor is made to supplement P's register by a verse of his own. In doing so he has employed one of the most characteristic expressions of J ("begat" in the Hebrew). Working in the age and spirit of P, he should have been more shrewd. If, on the other hand, it was intended as an introductory link to J's list which follows, it is equally clumsy in showing a dependence in other respects on P.

Again, in xi. 1–9 (J), the account of the confusion of tongues is absolutely necessary to explain x. 5, 20, 31, 32 (P), which implies that the nations already had different tongues. Chap. xii. 4 (J), which speaks of Lot's going to Canaan with Abraham, is mystifying without xi. 27, 31 (P), which informs us who Lot is. In xii. 6 it is remarked that Abraham passed through the land. We only know what land it is from the preceding verse, contributed by P. In xviii. 10, 14 (J), Jehovah assures Abraham that he will surely fulfill his promise when the season comes round "at the set time." The time had just been marked in chap. xvii. 17 (P), as Sarah's ninetieth year (cf. xii. 4, xxi. 5). In xxi. 2 it is said that Sarah "bare Abraham a son in his old age," an obvious reference to P's statements concerning the patriarch's age, for they occur nowhere else in J. In xxi. 13 (E), we read: "And also of the son of the bondwoman will I make a nation, because he is thy seed." Its form suggests at once xvii. 20, where the promise concerning Ishmael has fuller expression (P). In xxiv. 6, 7 (J), the death of Sarah is directly implied. It had been previously recorded in xxiii. 1, 2 (P), and there alone. To say that the redactor inserted the reference in J is simply a sign of stress of weather, and does not change the matter an atom. In xxv. 18 we have another instance of the piecing of P with a scrap from J, and the scrap would be meaningless anywhere else. What such a fact means, a moment's reflection will suggest. A statement made in xxix. 30 (E), is logically dependent on what is said in the preceding verse (P), and the idea would be intolerable without it (cf., also, xxix. 23, 24). We claim further that what is said of Esau's movements in connection with Seir (xxxii. 3, xxxiii. 16, J), is only intelligible when taken together with what P supplies in various passages (xxxv.

29, xxxvi. 6–8; cf. xliv. 30, 31).* Chap. xxxiv. shows throughout the mutual dependence of J and P.

The connection is as close in some cases as subject and predicate (vers. 1, 2); or the corresponding parts of a compound sentence (ver. 3). A matter proposed in P, in one case, is carried out in J (with 14–17 cf. 19). In ver. 25 we read: "And it came to pass on the third day, when they were sore, that (so far P) two of (J) the sons of Jacob (P), Simeon and Levi, Dinah's brethren (J), took each man his sword, and came upon the city unawares, and slew all the males" (P). We are asked to believe that a redactor working in the days of P used his scissors thus mercilessly on his sources, and for what purpose here? To supplement J in the interests of P? No; but to correct P and make it harmonize with J—a proceeding in polar contrast with his assumed attitude in general. And he did this when, if he had left P's representation unmodified, he would have had a more natural and easily accepted statement: namely, that all the brethren were concerned in the affair, instead of two only.

What now do these examples show? They show, as far as they go, and their scope is not inconsiderable, that J and E presuppose P, on which they so clearly depend. To ascribe the phenomena presented to the simple manipulation of the sources is manifestly out of the question. To say that the matter was originally alike in these particulars, or that the redactor has changed it to make it conform where it was unlike, are pure conjectures to which the advocates of the theory are not entitled, especially to any such extent. They have not, moreover, the merit of plausibility. In fact, they are suicidal. We have one original Genesis, and these three are extracts, not sources.

Changing now the point of view, let us note any instances where P refers to or presupposes J or E. As in the last case, an exhaustive induction is not attempted. In v. 1 we read: "The book of the generations of Adam." It is reasonable to suppose that this proper name, gradually introduced from chap. iii. 17 (cf. iv. 25), comes through J, where we find already a sense for the importance of names (cf. ii. 19, 23). In the following verse we read: "Male and female created he them and blessed them, and called their name Adam." This appears to refer to the work of creation as recorded in J (ii. 7), and to be a play upon the word Adam, that is, in its root-meaning, earth, the material from which they are there said to have been made ("dust from the ground"). The fact that Adam and his descendants are spoken of as dying (v. 5), looks back to ii. 17 (J), where death is threatened as the consequence of disobedience.

* If there were a discrepancy—which there is not—it is in P when compared with itself.

The expression in v. 24, "Enoch walked with God," like a similar one at vi. 9, referring to Noah, implies the corruption of the earth described only in J. In vi. 11, the statement that the earth was corrupt, like the last passages, but more peremptorily, requires the account of the introduction of sin contained in J. Chap. i had concluded with the words: "And God saw everything that he had made, and behold it was very good."

In vi. 12 we are told that all "flesh" had corrupted his way upon the earth. The peculiar designation of the fallen race as "flesh," is derived from vi. 3 (J). In vii. 6 (P), the immediate announcement of the flood in J (vers. 1–5) is plainly presupposed. In vii. 17 (P), the flood is said to have been "forty days" on the earth, looking back to vii. 12 (J). It is laid to the redactor; but at the expense either of his good sense or his honesty. In ix. 3 (P), where flesh is allowed to man as food, there is doubtless a reference to the previous restriction to a vegetable diet, and most likely, from the phrasing of J's form of it (iii. 18; cf. ii. 16, J; i. 29, P). In ix. 5 (P), "and surely your blood will I require," etc., seems to allude to the account of Abel's murder (J), especially to the words: "The blood of thy brother crieth unto me from the ground." In xi. 31 (P), Sarah is spoken of as Abraham's wife. The fact of the marriage is noted two verses before in J. In xii. 4 Abraham's age is given when he started from Haran. The fact and the occasion of his going to Haran are found only in J, just before (xii. 1–4). In xiii. 6, the circumstance is mentioned that the substance of Abraham and Lot is too great to permit them to dwell together. How it comes to be so is described in J in the preceding context (xii. 16, xiii. 1–5). The same relation of the documents is true as it regards their recorded separation (xiii. 11, 12; cf. xiii. 7–11).

In xvi. 3, "Hagar *the* Egyptian" is introduced into the narrative of P. How Abraham came to have an Egyptian maid is told only and told very consistently in J (xii. 16, xvi. 1). In xvii. 7, God speaks of establishing His covenant with Abraham. That He had made one appears only from J and E, in previous chapters. In xix. 29 the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah is alluded to as having taken place. The fact is described by J at length in the preceding context. In this same brief allusion to the event by P, Lot is said to have been delivered on Abraham's account, evidently implying Abraham's intercession recorded in J (xviii. 23–32). In xxxii. 2 (P), Abraham is noticeably spoken of as having *come* to mourn for Sarah. We are informed in E that he was in Beersheba at the time (xxii. 19), while Sarah had died at Hebron.

In xxv. 20 (P), the reference to Isaac's marriage looks back to the record of it in xxiv. 67 (J); that to Rebecca's relatives, including

Bethuel, "the Syrian of Paddan-aram," to J in xxii. 23, xxiv. 29. In xxv. 8 (P), Abraham is said to have died in a "good old age," an expression taken from the promise that he should do so, recorded in xv. 15, which is properly matter of J, although to avoid a collision assigned by critics to the redactor. In xxv. 11 (P), it is said that Isaac dwelt at Beer-lahai-roi, a statement based on a previous one (of P) that he had come up from there to meet and marry Rebecca (xxiv. 62; cf. xvi. 14). In xxviii. 1, Isaac's charge to Jacob is founded on the foregoing narrative of J and E; so xxviii. 2 on xxiv. 9, xxviii. 7 on xxvii. 42, although for no apparent reason except to avoid danger to the theory in the last case the redactor has been supposed to have made an insertion of two words in P's text. A part of ver. 18, chap. xxxi (P), is afloat, like a piece of cordage in the sea, unless it be connected with the narrative of J and E found immediately before. That it floats in a certain common direction does not prove it any the less a fragment. Who is the Dinah of whom the story is told by both P and J in chap. xxxiv? We are informed only in J (xxx. 21). How do we know that Hamor is the father of Shechem (xxxiv. 4, P)? E tells us a few verses earlier (xxxiii. 19). Critics think he ought not to have done so, but the "ought" has force from their point of view only. In xxxv. 9, God is said to have appeared unto Jacob "again" when he came from Paddan-aram. It can only relate to his first appearance to him when he went thither, recorded in E (xxviii. 11, 12). Critics would refer the one word *again* to the redactor. It is quite too small a buffer to stand the concussion of intervening history. In xxxv. 10 (P), where the change of Jacob's name from Jacob to Israel is recorded for the second time, the first account of it (xxxii. 25, J) is in view where alone its *raison d'être* appears. In xxxv. 26 (P), Zilpah is referred to as Leah's handmaid. It looks back to xxx. 9 (J) where the fact is stated in its original and fuller form. In xli. 46 (P), Joseph is introduced as having stood before Pharaoh. The circumstance is described in the context (J and E) just preceding. Without this connection, it is another piece of floating wreckage. In xlvi. 6, 7, xlvii. 5, 6, 7–11, there are like scraps from P relating to Joseph's going down to Egypt, which are similarly incomplete when considered apart. At this point, moreover, a long list of Jacob's descendants is given as a *résumé* of scattered information elsewhere. By a fundamental principle of the analysis it should be assigned to P. It is introduced by matter which is so assigned. It has some of P's alleged characteristic expressions (xlvi. 15). But it refers back to events peculiar to J and E (ver. 12, etc.). The criticism, accordingly, is between two fires. As is usual in such cases, it gives way in favor of the redactor to the extent of about twenty verses.

In xlvii. 27 (P) the expression "land of Goshen" is found, said to be at home only in J, P's being "land of Egypt," or "land of Rameses." To parry the blow to the theory and save an alleged duplicate, the redactor is supposed to have inserted the two misleading words, the very thing he was there not to do (cf. xlvii. 11). If critics can give as forcible and necessary a reason for his doing it as they themselves have for holding that he did it, the hypothesis might be regarded as credible. In xlviii. 7, in P's context, and with his phraseology, Rachel's death is incidentally noted. A circumstantial description of the event appeared in JE long before (xxxv. 16–22). Here again resort is taken to the redactor, but against the judgment of some of the ablest of the critics themselves. It was not unnatural for Jacob in speaking with Joseph respecting his sons that he should refer to the decease of Joseph's own mother. A large part of chap. xlix is devoted to Jacob's final blessing upon his sons (vers. 1–27). To it in detail ver. 28 (P) makes clear reference in these words: "And this it is that their father spoke unto them and blessed them, every one according to his blessing, he blessed them." It is a fitting conclusion to this long list of instances in which P takes account of the matter of its supposed companion documents.

Again we ask, What is to be done with these facts? Some of them might be disputed. We do not claim absolute certainty in every case; only in the majority of cases. Whatever may be said of some of the instances cited cannot affect the validity of the rest. The argument is not like a chain whose strength is equal only to that of its weakest link. The point to be considered is: Are not these instances of cross reference just what might have been expected were Genesis as a literary work essentially a unit? Are they not fully as numerous in this case as they would be in that? And are they not of the same general character? It is to be remembered that the references of P to P and of J to E and *vice versâ* have not been considered, nor many others not so directly bearing on the theory before us. They would add immensely to the list. On the other hand, were Genesis constructed as claimed by the advocates of the current analysis, would not, must not, the fundamental differences cropping out be far greater, and these cross references much fewer and of a different character? So it seems to us. We would, as a matter of course, expect indications very marked and very clear of a literary make-up so pronounced.

We are pointed, it is true, to the evidence of language and of duplicate accounts. These we have considered elsewhere* and do not find sufficiently strong to overcome the acknowledged and

* See article in THE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW for April, 1895.

demonstrable unity of the book. Were there no other testimony that the repetitions pointed out in Genesis are not marks of diverse documentary sources, the fact that many of the same sort remain in each of the supposed documents, after the analysis has been reduced to its lowest terms, would be fully adequate to disprove the theory at this its strongest point (cf. v. 32, vi. 10, x. 1, vi. 11, 12, vii. 14–16, 18–20 triplicate, ix. 9–11, 12–17, xii. 5, xvii. 8, 10). These are a few examples, taken somewhat at random, from the one document P, the one most scrupulously separated from the others. It is apparent that they are not signs of different documents, but mere reiterations for the purpose of emphasis or of clearness.

The methods adopted to weaken the force of the argument for the unity of Genesis from the many mutual references of the alleged sources have already been glanced at. Sometimes it is claimed that they are due to the mere juxtaposition or the skillful adjustment of somewhat similar original material. For this supposition the references are clearly too numerous and the dependence too direct, since the date of their origin respectively cannot be forgotten. More often the dependence is charged to alterations introduced by the redactor in his material. This might be admitted oftener in the score or so of cases alleged, if a really probable reason were given for the most of such changes from the point of view of a redactor. The necessity for them from the critic's point of view is perspicuous enough. It is needless to say that every such introduction of the redactor, as a mere puppet of the theory, is itself a strong, if indirect argument against the theory. At best it must be regarded as irregular, an exception to what is claimed. Beyond a certain narrow limit exceptions of this sort become an unbearable burden upon a theory, and that limit is here left far behind. A bare survey of the editorial matter of the Genesis of the analysis, on whatever side considered, can only awaken the gravest suspicion towards the theory it is brought to support.

It is to be remembered, too, that this evidence from cross references among the alleged documents in Genesis does not stand by itself. It comes to confirm a view still generally accepted and hitherto universally held. It comes to the support of other reasons for the unity of Genesis which would be quite conclusive were they offered in favor of another book. The four great lines of thought which we have discovered running through it are thus shown anew not to be factitious but real, organically connected not only among themselves, but with a multitude of other subordinate lines which contribute to their development. That there are, to some extent, original fragmentary documentary sources at the basis of the pres-

ent Genesis we are convinced, and shall attempt hereafter to show. It will be found to be in no consistent sense out of harmony with the positions already taken. That this original material lies there, however, still like massive blocks of sandstone alternating with granite and gneiss; that these blocks yet appear in the common structure, only covered here and there with bits of stucco and an occasional interchange of the material to make a verisimilitude, a semblance of uniformity—is more than disproved by the facts presented. Genesis represents not so much compilation as strenuous elimination and selection. It is characterized, not by bare uniformity, or a unity that is outward and in a few points. It has the unity of the landscape. The earth, the tree, the cloud are there, but each existing for the other, and by a subtile inner concord working together under the guidance of one controlling mind for common ends.

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## III.

# THE AUTHENTICITY AND GENUINENESS OF DANIEL.

AMONG the books of the Old Testament, that of Daniel stands in the forefront as a witness for Jesus Christ. Through all the centuries it has borne powerful testimony for the divine origin and claim of Christianity. It contains the supernatural element in a high degree. Its miracles and prophecies are of the most pronounced description and demand the direct agency of God for their production. These marked features of the book have incurred for it the displeasure of rationalistic critics, who have massed all the resources of the critical method for the purpose of destroying its authenticity and historical credibility, while evangelical scholars have been no less earnest in their defense. The history of the contest is an interesting one.

For more than two thousand years the Church of God has held that the Book of Daniel was written at Babylon during the exile and had Daniel for its author; and that its historic statements are true and its miracles and prophecies genuine. The first to dispute this position was Porphyry, a heathen philosopher of the New Platonic School, in the latter part of the third century of our era. He maintained that the book was a forgery, its miracles impossible, and its prophecies history written after the event. He frankly admitted that history had verified some of the prophecies of Daniel, "and then adroitly turned his admission into a weapon of attack, arguing that a record so exact could be made only after the events: Daniel played the part of an historian in the mask of a prophet." The matter rested for many centuries until the attack was resumed by the Dutch Jew Spinoza, the French infidel Voltaire, the German rationalist Berthhold, and the English deist Anthony Collins, the actual precursors of the destructive critics of to-day, who reproduce the same arguments. In their view, the book does not come from Daniel and his times, but from the Maccabean age, when the Jews were persecuted by Antiochus Epiphanes. They hold that the predictive elements of the book, so far as there is any truth in them at all, are history in the form of prediction written after the

events had occurred, and that the narratives, including the miracles, are simply fictitious stories invented for a pious purpose.

Even the most evangelical of these critics do not differ substantially from this position. Cheyne states that, "if there be an element of historical tradition in the narratives of Daniel, we have not at present the means of detecting it;" considers "the details to be full of improbabilities and contradictions;" and says "that the work, in the form in which it is written, has its date in the Maccabean period, and that, as in the case of Deuteronomy [according to the critics] in earlier times and the apocalyptic writings which preceded and followed the rise of Christianity, the author, in the service of truth, assumed a name which would, more than his own, command the respect of his countrymen." "Such a writer," thought the late Dr. Weir, "however much we may disapprove his procedure, yet, regarding him in the light of his age, we cannot so unhesitatingly condemn. It was not unnatural that the cessation of the voices of the old prophets should have been followed by what may be described as echoes waked up from time to time, and chiefly at critical periods of the national history, in the breast of sympathizing and enthusiastic disciples. From this point of view we may perhaps say that the book of Daniel is in part an attempted echo of Jeremiah."* This certainly is startling. Daniel merely an echo waked in the breast of an enthusiastic patriot from reading Jeremiah! Dr. Driver grants, indeed, that such a man as Daniel must have existed, and that the book which bears his name "rests upon a *traditional basis;*" but he looks upon the narrative parts as products of the imagination, in which the author may have drawn on written traditions dealing with the history of Babylon. "And the elements in the book of Daniel which, upon the critical view of it," he says, "are predictive in appearance but not in reality, are just part of the *symbolic imagery* adopted by the writer for the purpose of developing one of the main objects which he had in view, viz.: the theocratic significance of history."† Only this substance of truth is reliable in the book of Daniel. These citations may suffice clearly to set before us the conclusions which the destructive critics have reached in reference to the book of Daniel.

## I.

The arguments, which are urged by these critics in favor of their view of the book as unhistoric and ungenuine, are not conclusive.

1. The fact that in the Hebrew Canon the book of Daniel is not placed among the Prophets, but occupies the ninth place, between

* Dr. Cheyne, in *Encyclopædia Brittanica*, Article "Daniel."

† *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, p. 482.

Esther and Ezra, in the last division, called Hagiographa, is cited in proof of its late origin. It is argued that if it had been in existence at the time when the writings of the prophets were put in the Canon, it would have been assigned a place among them.

But surely this does not follow. For Moses, the greatest of all the prophets of Israel, and Samuel and David, who were also prophets of God, were not classed in the Canon with the Prophets. The fact is clear that the divisions of the Hebrew Canon were not made chiefly on the basis of subject matter, but on the ground of literary, linguistic, and perhaps political peculiarities. Moreover, the order of the books in the original Hebrew Canon is at present not known. In Jerome's time the Hagiographa began with Job and ended with Esther, while now they begin with Psalms and end with Chronicles. Origen, who informs us that he gives the order of the books of the Old Testament according to the Hebrews, joins Ruth to Judges, and places Daniel between Jeremiah and Ezekiel, a very significant place certainly. Josephus divides the Hebrew Canon into the five books of Moses, thirteen Prophets, and four books of Psalms and Morals, from which it is plain that he ranked Daniel with the Prophets. The Septuagint also places Daniel in the Prophetical section. It is not impossible, therefore, that in the first arrangement of the Hebrew Canon Daniel was placed among the Prophets.

2. The book of Ecclesiastes was written before 200 B.C. The author, who calls himself the son of Sirach, gives a long list of Hebrew heroes, including Ezekiel, Nehemiah, and the Minor Prophets, but omits Daniel; and for this reason the book is supposed not to have been in the Canon at that time. But the argument *e silentio*, never very conclusive, is particularly unreliable in this case; for the son of Sirach also makes no mention of Gideon, Samson, Jehoshaphat, nor even of Ezra. The omission of Daniel's name, like that of Ezra, may have been a mere slip of memory, and furnishes no clue as to the time when his book was written.

3. It is argued further that the book of Daniel presents linguistic features which make it impossible that it could have been written at Babylon during the exile.

(*a*) It is asserted that it contains a number of proper names which could not have been used at Babylon. No reliance can, however, be placed on this assertion. It is impossible for us to predicate with certainty the exact form which proper names ought to have had at Babylon during the exile. Then also it is proverbial that copyists and transcribers have often made wretched work in mutilating the form of proper names; Lenormant has shown

that the Babylonian character of these names can be readily demonstrated.*

(*b*) The composition of the book in two languages is a fact urged against its genuineness. It may be difficult, if not impossible, for us to surmise why the author wrote the book in the two languages of Aramaic and Hebrew—chap. ii. 4 to chap. vii inclusive in the former, and chap. i to chap. ii. 3 and chap. viii to chap. xii in the latter. Good reasons may be assigned, but it is not important for us to consider them here. Eichhorn at first endeavored to demonstrate from this fact a double authorship for the book; but the two sections of it are so vitally interlaced that all critics now agree that they both came from one and the same author. The same mingling of the two dialects is found in the book of Ezra. And when in addition to this we consider the fact that, as Dr. Pusey has so ably shown, the Aramaic of Daniel is quite an ancient specimen of the Eastern dialect of that language, which came in time to be used among the Jews quite generally, of an age somewhat earlier rather than contemporaneous with the Aramaic of Ezra, which was that of the Persian period; and the further fact that the Aramaic section is pervaded by Hebraisms, and the Hebrew part by Aramaisms, making it similar to the Hebrew of Ezekiel, who, during the exile, prophesied by the river Chebar—then it becomes quite clear that these linguistic peculiarities, instead of militating against it, give strong support to the Danielic authorship of the book at Babylon. This is still further confirmed by the fact that the Aramaic of Daniel approximates closely to that of the Babylonian inscriptions.

(*c*) The fact that a few Persian words are scattered through the text, not a dozen in all, does not militate against this position. Daniel lived some time into the Persian period, and, previous to that time, there had been intercourse for many years between Babylon and the Persians. It is therefore not at all strange, but rather to be expected, that a high officer of state would embody some Persian words in his writings of that period. Lenormant has well said: "All these Persian expressions show clearly that the book of Daniel, in its original, was written in the time of the Achamenides, and not in that of the Silucides—*i. e.*, at the time when in Babylon the Persian were supplanting the old Assyrian titles and before the Grecian conquest had introduced other Greek designations.†

(*d*) More stress has been laid by the critics on the presence of Greek words in the text, as proof that the book of Daniel was not written until sometime in or after the Greek period. But all the

* *Magazine of Christian Literature*, September, 1891, p. 327.

† *Ibid.*, p. 332.

Greek words found in Daniel are confined to the names of the musical instruments given in chap. iii. 5. Only four of these are at present considered of any value in the argument. They are פְּסַנְתֵּרִין, *ψαλτήριον*; סוּמְפֹנְיָה, *συμφωνία*; קִיתָרוֹס, *κίθαρις*; סַבְּכָא, *σαμβύκη*. Recent researches have made it about certain that the last two of these words are of Oriental origin. Only the first two remain then, and their presence in the book can be fully explained on other grounds. The symphonia, it is said, was a great favorite with Antiochus Epiphanes; but this surely does not prove that it may not have been a great favorite with Nebuchadnezzar as well. The cuneiform inscriptions show that, while previous to the eighth century B.C. they had but few musical instruments, and the role of the musician was entirely subordinate at the court of Babylon, there was a wonderful revival in the art of music and a great increase in the number of musical instruments after that period. Lenormant says that "under the Sargonides musicians are constantly represented on the bas-reliefs and are repeatedly mentioned in the inscriptions. They had knowledge, moreover, of at least ten different musical instruments, some of which are evidently of foreign origin, as, *e. g.*, the Syrian kinnor, the double pipe from Asia Minor, and the seven-stringed zither, which was doubtless a Grecian invention.*

History informs us that a brother of the Greek poet, Alcæus, during the reign of Nebuchadnezzar or one of his immediate successors, made himself renowned to the utmost limits of the earth by giving help to the Babylonians. It is now known that the Greeks had at an early day spread themselves extensively among foreign nations. They were an enterprising, energetic people; and, although they considered themselves superior to all others, yet history records the fact that they were fond of intercourse with strangers and traveled in foreign parts. Petrie, in his *Ten Years Digging in Egypt*, gives an account of the discovery of undoubted Greek words in that country on tablets of the seventh century B.C., and gives reasons for thinking that Greeks were in Egypt centuries before that time.† Rawlinson has shown that as early as 650 B.C., Psamatik I, king of Egypt, hired a large body of Greek troops to assist him in his wars. These became a permanent part of the Egyptian army, and were considered its best soldiers. While these Greek troops were in the Egyptian army, Nebuchadnezzar made war on three different occasions against the king of Egypt, twice with Neco, and once with Apries, his son, and on the first and last of these occasions obtained complete victories, overran the

* *Magazine of Christian Literature*, September, 1891, p. 330.

† *Ten Years Digging in Egypt*, pp. 37–69, 152.

whole of Egypt with his army, and took back with him to Babylon great stores of booty and a large number of prisoners.* Inscriptions also show that for more than a century previous to the exile, Babylon, the "City of Merchants" and of warriors, had extensive mercantile, political and military intercourse with the Greeks. The Assyrian monarchs Sargon, Sennacherib and Esarhaddon made a number of successful military expeditions to the West and Northwest, against Samaria, Egypt, Tyre, Sidon, Armenia, and in Lydia and Cilicia. Sargon took Ionian prisoners, and the Island of Cyprus became tributary to both Sargon and Esarhaddon.† Later on Cyrus also made an expedition to the Northwest in Asia Minor, and both he and the Assyrian kings before him must have come into contact with the Greek colonies which had settled there. It is known that articles of luxury were part of the tribute paid to Assyrian kings.‡ In view of these facts the presence of the names of a few Greek musical instruments in a document written at Babylon during the exile can excite no surprise. It is rather to be expected; and Dr. Pusey calls attention to the fact that among the musical instruments inscribed on the monuments of Sennacherib is found the *pesanterin* of Daniel.§

The 137th Psalm reveals a Babylonian custom. It shows that musical instruments were brought to Babylon with prisoners of war, who were compelled to entertain their victors by playing and singing. With weeping eyes the captive Jews sitting by the rivers of Babylon exclaimed: "We hanged our harps on the willows in the midst thereof. For there they that carried us away captive required of us a song." Greek prisoners may also have brought their musical instruments, which would become known by Greek names, and be used for the entertainment of their captors.

4. The use of some of the references which the author of Daniel makes to himself and to his religiously moral habits, as proofs of the late origin of the book, is scarcely worthy of serious consideration. The honorable references to Daniel are not different from similar expressions which Paul makes of himself, the propriety of which no one questions; and to say that Daniel's custom of observing daily three seasons of prayer, his frequent fasts and strict abstinence from profane food and drink, demand a period long after the exile, ignores the fact that, according to Scripture statements, all these practices were observed generations before the Babylonian cap-

* *History of Ancient Egypt*, Vol. ii, pp. 473–516.

† Schrader's *Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament*, Vol. i, pp. 63, 279–288; Vol. ii, pp. 21–23, 39–43, 85–99.

‡ Pusey's *Daniel*, p. 96.

§ *Ditto*, pp. 96, 97.

tivity;* and further assumes that the child of God, in the growth of his religious life and experience, is subject to an iron law of development instead of being led by the quickening word and the free Spirit of the living God.

5. The critics also assert that the author of Daniel has fallen into several errors of statement which he would not have made had he written at Babylon during the exile.

The use of the term "Chaldeans," *Kasdim*, has been cited as proof of the late origin of Daniel. Dr. Driver affirms that the Chaldeans, as a caste of wise men, did not exist until some time after the Babylonian empire, and that therefore the use of the term in the book, in that sense, proves that it originated long after the exile.† Prof. Sayce, however, contends that the term is used in the book of Daniel in the sense of fortune-tellers, and that, since that word was not employed in that sense until in the Greek period, we must conclude that the book was not written until after that period.‡ The opinions of these two investigators scarcely support each other. On close inspection it will be seen that Daniel makes careful discrimination in referring to the *literati* of Babylon. He uses the term Kasdim to designate a class of wise men similar to the learned priests of Egypt. Lenormant rightly insists that the exact description of the literary classes of Babylon which we have in Daniel can be accounted for only on the supposition that the book was written in that city at the time of the exile by one perfectly acquainted with the facts; and shows that there existed then a Chaldean priest-caste at Babylon, founded by Nabopolasser, the father of Nebuchadnezzar, to which the reigning dynasty belonged, Nebuchadnezzar himself being a seer and a prophet; and that this caste had for its sacred science a special language, the Akkadian, rightly termed the tongue of the Chaldeans, in which Daniel was particularly instructed, while the common court language at Babylon was the Chaldee or Aramaic.§ Daniel's reference, therefore, to the Chaldeans as a class of wise men appears to be strictly accurate.

The statement that Darius set one hundred and twenty princes or satraps over the kingdom is adduced as another error, since Xenophon makes mention only of nine,‖ and Herodotus gives no more than twenty.¶ But were these secular historians infallible? The fact that they differ so widely from each other might rather

*2 Sam. xviii. 33; 1 Kgs. xvii. 20, viii. 38, 44, 48; Ps. v. 8, xxviii. 2, lv. 17, cxxi. 1; Judg. xx. 26; 1 Sam. vii. 6; 2 Sam. i. 12, xii. 22.

† *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, p. 468.

‡ *The Higher Criticism and the Monuments*, p. 535.

§ *Magazine of Christian Literature*, September, 1891, p. 330.

‖ *Cyrop.*, vii. 4, 2; viii, 6.

¶ *Herodotus*, iii, 89.

lead to the inference either that they both erred or that they referred to a different kind of satraps. The latter alternative can be easily maintained. Cuneiform inscriptions have made it evident that the number and extent of satraps in the Persian empire varied at different times. It is therefore entirely unnecessary to compare the satraps of Xenophon and Herodotus with those of Daniel. On the supposition that Xenophon gives us true history on this matter in the *Cyropedia*, we may infer that by the nine satraps he meant the presidents who were placed over the satraps mentioned by Daniel. These were, at first three in number, but they may have been, no doubt were, increased with the enlargement of the kingdom. This indeed appears probable from Xenophon's own statements in the same chapters of the *Cyropedia*, to the effect that after the conquest of Babylon the conquered countries were divided into provinces, over which presidents were appointed. Herodotus, owing to his nearness in time to that reign, gives the twenty satraps into which Darius Hystaspes divided the kingdom; but the presumption is that these twenty satraps represent, not the one hundred and twenty of Daniel, but the three Babylonian presidents, of whom a larger number was needed for the government of the entire Medo-Persian empire. There is evidence to support the belief that the term "satrap" was given to officers of different rank and extent of jurisdiction, precisely as in the case of the term "judge" with us. The smaller may therefore have been included in the larger division. That the extent of the dominion of the satraps of Daniel was small may be inferred from the list of officers given in chap. vi. 7, where satraps stand in the third place, being ranked by both presidents and governors. They appear to have held the rank of prefect, and we have no reason to suppose that they exercised authority over any very extensive territory. Rawlinson calls attention to the fact that some of the earlier satraps were in reality governors of petty districts only,* and since their functions were judicial, as well as military and executive, it is very probable that there were smaller within larger circuits. Xenophon, in his *Hellenica*, speaks of a satrap Mania who was dependent on another satrap Pharnabazus.† Daniel's account of the satraps is therefore in harmony with other credible history.

The immense and awkward size of the image of gold which Nebuchadnezzar had erected in the plain of Dura, about ninety feet high by nine broad, is pointed out as another error in the book of Daniel. But if we suppose the image to have been not simply one huge statue, but a bust on a pedestal, as is probable, and the whole not solid gold, but some material overlaid with gold, all difficulties

* *Bible Commentary on Daniel*, p. 315. † *Hellenica*, iii, 1, 8.

vanish. The proportions of such a shaft would not be more absurd than those of the obelisks of Egypt. According to the cuneiform inscriptions, Eastern monarchs were in the habit of spending fabulous sums of money in erecting colossal statues in honor of themselves. Petrie, in his researches in Egypt, has discovered a statue of Rameses II, at Zoan, of immense size.* This huge statue was sculptured out of hard red granite, is in the form of an erect figure, and has about the same dimensions as the image described by Daniel.† In the year 572 B.C., and again in 568, Nebuchadnezzar overran Egypt with his army and must on both occasions have passed by Zoan. It may be that the colossus of Rameses was in ruins at the time of Nebuchadnezzar's invasion, but if he did not see it either erect or in ruins, he may easily have heard of it, and have determined to erect one as large or larger to his own memory at Babylon. This discovery at Zoan completely overthrows the objection of the critics at this point.

In chap. i. 1 it is stated that "in the third year of the reign of Jehoiakim, king of Judah, came Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, unto Jerusalem and besieged it." But according to Jer. xxv. 1, 9, xxxvi. 9, xlvi. 2, it would appear that Jerusalem was not taken until the fourth or fifth year of the reign of Jehoiakim. Then also, according to statements in the first chapter of the book, Daniel and his three friends had been taken captive and been subjected to a three years' course of training before they were brought into the king's presence. But in chap. ii. 1 it is stated that Daniel came before Nebuchadnezzar to interpret his dream in the second year of his reign, while in chap. i. 1 Nebuchadnezzar was already called king when he went to besiege Jerusalem. There seems, therefore, to be no room for the three years' training. Apparently there are here two historical errors. But the statement of chap. i. 1 probably refers to the time when Nebuchadnezzar set out from Babylon on his expedition against Jerusalem. The Hebrew word בּוֹא is better translated by *went* or *set out* than by "came," as in Jonah i. 3, "to go," בּוֹא "with them to Tarshish."

It is now also known that Nabopolassar was still king when the expedition against Jerusalem was undertaken. His son Nebuchadnezzar was his general and representative, and when, therefore, he was called king in chap. i. 1 it was only in a proleptical sense, just as one might now write that President Grant conducted the siege of Fort Donaldson, although as a matter of fact he did not become

* *Ten Years Digging in Egypt*, pp. 31, 32; *The Expositor*, third series, Vol. i, p. 217.

† Prof. Henry Alexander White estimates the height of it to have been one hundred and twenty feet (*The Origin of the Pentateuch*, p. 189).

President until some five years subsequent to that event. Nebuchadnezzar became king a year or more after the siege of Jerusalem. This fact makes the record harmonious and shows that there was ample time for the three years' training of Daniel.

The book of Daniel gives account of the reigns of two kings at Babylon who are not mentioned by extra-Biblical historians, and from this circumstance it is argued that the author of Daniel erred in his historical statements as he would not have done had he been at Babylon at the time. But why not conclude that these other historians blundered, especially since Daniel can be shown to be far more correct in his narration of history than they? Davidson makes this objection to conservative writers, that they "always proceed on the assumption of Daniel's unquestionable correctness." But why should they not make this assumption? The correctness of Daniel has not only never been successfully impeached, but has been confirmed by nearly all credible history and the discoveries made from cuneiform inscriptions, which bear on the subject. Christians have a right to affirm the correctness of the historical statements of the Bible until they are shown not to be correct.

Daniel says that Belshazzar was king of Babylon, that he was present in that city at a feast when Cyrus took the city, and was then slain. However, Berorus and Abydenus, both Babylonian historians, and Herodotus, the Greek historian, relate that Nabonidus was the last king of Babylon previous to the Persian conquest, and that instead of being at Babylon when the city was captured he had fled to the fortress of Borsippa, where Cyrus took him, and whence he banished him to Caramensa. A few years ago it was said in reference to this: "No hypothesis can reconcile this account with the other." Recent discoveries, however, have solved the problem completely.

On the annalistic tablet of Cyrus, which was discovered by Mr. Pinches in 1880, Nabonidus makes mention of "Belshazzar (Bel-sarra-utsar) my first-born."* A mutilated cuneiform inscription, which was discovered amid the ruins of Babylon and which was translated in 1882 by Mr. Pinches, proved that Nabonidus had associated his first-born son, Belshazzar, with himself as king on the throne.† On the annalistic tablet it is narrated that immediately before the fall of Babylon, Belshazzar was with the court and part of the army north of the city, while Nabonidus himself was south

* *The Cuneiform Inscriptions and the O. T.*, Vol. ii, p. 131; *The Higher Criticism and the Monuments*, p. 449 and fol.; *New Light on the Bible and Holy Land*, p. 302.

† *New Light on the Bible and Holy Land*, p. 306; *Cuneiform Inscriptions and the O. T.*, by Schrader, Vol. ii, p. 130.

of Babylon, leading in person that part of the army which confronted the advancing host of Cyrus. It is reasonable to suppose that on the defeat and flight of Nabonidus and the retreat of his army towards Babylon, Belshazzar would advance into the city and try to join his forces with those of his father for a united stand against the invader. He seems to have taken refuge with his court in one of the great palaces of Babylon, where resistance was made against the conqueror for some days after the rest of the city had been taken, but the refugees in the palace were soon compelled to surrender. It was undoubtedly in that struggle that Belshazzar lost his life. He is not mentioned afterward, no doubt for the reason that, as Daniel says, "on that night was Belshazzar the king of the Chaldeans slain." He was king because he had been raised to that dignity by his father, and he was the only king left, as Nabonidus was either a prisoner or a fugitive. The accuracy of Daniel's statement is thus fully corroborated. And thus we learn also why the reward offered by the king for interpreting the mysterious handwriting on the wall was the place of "third ruler in the kingdom." Why the third? Pharaoh made Joseph the second; Nebuchadnezzar made Daniel second for interpreting the dream; Ahasuerus gave Mordecai the second place. The place next to the king was that of the highest honor. But since there were then two kings, the second place could not be given; it was occupied. The third place was the highest at the king's disposal; and he conferred that honor on Daniel.

To explain Daniel's statement that Belshazzar was Nebuchadnezzar's son or kinsman, it is only necessary to make the very probable supposition that Nabonidus, his father, had married a daughter of Nebuchadnezzar, which would bring Belshazzar into near enough kinship to be called his son. The book of Daniel itself suggests this supposition. For when Belshazzar was trembling with fear over the handwriting on the wall, the queen came to give him advice. This queen, since she is discriminated from the wives of Belshazzar,* and the mother of Nabonidus had died some months before this time, could have been none other than the wife of Nabonidus and mother of Belshazzar, the one person whose testimony on the point at issue should be accepted as conclusive. The lords of Babylon must have been perfectly familiar with all the facts in the case, and in their presence she said that Nebuchadnezzar was the father of Belshazzar.† This she would, under the circumstances, not have said if it were not strictly true. It is admitted that Nabonidus was not connected with the family of Nebuchadnezzar, and she herself must therefore have been the connecting link. And as

* Dan. v. 2. † Dan. v. 11.

the daughter of Nebuchadnezzar and mother of Belshazzar, her noble bearing and the circumstantial minuteness of her statement are entirely natural. Moreover, according to Daniel's book, the kingdom of Nebuchadnezzar was to be followed immediately by the Medo-Persian empire, and, since Nabonidus was not of Nebuchadnezzar's family, if his wife also did not belong to it, then there was an entirely new dynasty between that of Nebuchadnezzar and the kingdom of the Medes and Persians, and the author of Daniel is thus shown to be inconsistent with himself. But the conduct and speech of the queen-mother remind us that, in Daniel's view, on that memorable night the dynasty of Nebuchadnezzar had not yet terminated and that she was of his lineage. It is not improbable that this very fact of being the son-in-law of Nebuchadnezzar may, on the one hand, have emboldened Nabonidus violently to seize the throne for himself, and, on the other, led the people quietly to acquiesce in the outrage. Was he not thus entitled to the throne as well as Neriglisser, who had successfully conspired against his brother-in-law, Evilmerodach, the son of Nebuchadnezzar? The Behistun inscription also shows that Nabonidus had a son by the name of Nebuchadnezzar.

In regard to Darius the Mede, Daniel makes the positive affirmation that he became king at Babylon after the death of Belshazzar, that he was the son of Ahasuerus and reigned with full kingly authority. Since Daniel was also acquainted with the reign of Cyrus, which he makes subsequent to that of Darius, it is impossible that he should have meant Darius Hystaspes. Darius the Mede has not been identified thus far, either in general history or by the monuments, but these do not contradict Daniel's record, and much which they contain is better understood on the basis of that record, as we shall see.

Extra-Biblical historians make Astyages, the son of Cyaxeres, the last Median king, and Cyrus his immediate successor on the Medo-Persian throne, mentioning no king intermediate between the two. Nothing, however, in their statements contradicts the idea of such an intermediate reign, and everything they say may be readily harmonized with it.

Nickolas of Damascus says that Cyrus conquered Astyages and made an end of Media as an independent power; and affirms that Astyages had no son, but a daughter whom he gave in marriage, with the whole of Media as dowry, to a Mede named Spitamas. Their sons, Spitakes and Megabernes, after the death of Spitamas, were made satraps of Cyrus. Ctesias assents to the first part of this statement of Nickolas, but credits Astyages with having a son, who, however, may have been only a natural son.

On a clay-cylinder discovered at Abu-Habba, Nabonidus says that Cyrus destroyed the army of Astyages and took him as a prisoner to his own country. The annalistic tablet of Cyrus relates that in the sixth year of Nabonidus (549 B.C.) an engagement took place between the army of Cyrus and that of Astyages, that the troops of Astyages revolted against their king and delivered him as a prisoner to Cyrus, who thereupon went to his capital, Egbatana, and took the conquered treasures to his own land of Anzan.* The same tablet narrates that in the month of Tammuz (June), in the seventeenth year of the reign of Nabonidus (538 B.C.), the army of Cyrus joined battle with that of Babylon, and gained a victory over it at Rutium some distance south of Babylon. The soldiers of Accad then revolted and some of them were slain. Nabonidus fled to a place of hiding. On the fourteenth of the same month the Persians took peaceable possession of Sippora; and on the sixteenth Gobryas (Ugbaru), the regent of Gutium and general of the army of Cyrus, entered the city of Babylon without fighting. Some of the Babylonians, however, took refuge in the palace E-Saggil—probably Belshazzar and his court—where for a time they resisted, but were soon subdued by the invader. About three months later Cyrus himself came to the city and appointed Gobryas of Gutium regent over Babylon.†

On the Cyrus cylinder it is stated that the god Marduk "called Cyrus, king of Elam, to have dominion.‡ He subjected the men of Kurdistan and all the barbarians (the dark races) under his feet." Of Cyrus it says that he "entered in peace into Babylon," and joyfully took up his "abode in the royal palace." His "far-extending armies spread themselves peacefully through the city of Babylon." "All the kings who dwell in all the regions from the upper sea to the lower sea [probably from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf], the kings of Syria, and the inhabitants of tents, all of them brought rich tribute and kissed my feet within the city of Babylon."

These references contain the principal evidence which is cited in proof of the position that there was no intervening reign at Babylon between Belshazzar and Cyrus. But we submit in all candor that this proof is not conclusive. On the contrary, the statement of Ctesias and that of the annals of Nabonidus may indirectly furnish proof in favor of such a reign. For if Cyrus, after the fall of Astyages, went

* *The Higher Criticism and the Monuments*, p. 449; *Beweis des Glaubens*, February, 1889, p. 59; *The Expositor*, third series, Vol. i, p. 220; *New Light on the Bible and Holy Land*, p. 308.

† See all of the last-named references on their appropriate pages.

‡ *New Light on the Bible and Holy Land*, p. 305; *The Higher Criticism and the Monuments*, pp. 504–507; *Expositor*, third series, Vol. i, pp. 224, 225.

to his own land of Anzan, taking Astyages with him as prisoner, he must have left some one on the throne of Media to rule the country. Since Cyrus was in great favor with the Median people and their army, this ruler was undoubtedly a prince of the royal house of Media, who afterward, having joined forces with Cyrus for the conquest of Babylon, was made viceroy over Babylon under the name of Darius the Mede. This view finds support in the account of Xenophon, to which we will presently refer.

However, we must here insist that the mere silence of historians, who in many particulars can be shown to be incorrect, cannot be given sufficient weight to disprove the positive affirmations of Daniel. Nor can such weight be given the cuneiform inscriptions which bear on the case. The annalistic tablet, to which reference has been made, is extremely obscure. Several years of narrative are wholly wanting, and of that which remains we have often only single words on a line, so that the interpretation of these inscriptions becomes largely a matter of conjecture. No one can say what this tablet would reveal if we had it in its complete form. In a less degree the same is true also of the Cyrus cylinder. It is fragmentary and obscure. It is also pertinent to ask here, Who wrote these inscriptions? Were they trustworthy scribes? From the character of their work it must be evident that they had no special qualification for telling the truth. These Babylonian inscriptions were evidently written by priests who were strongly swayed by prejudice in favor of the Babylonian worship. The religious character assigned to Cyrus in them is contrary to that given him by the Persian inscriptions, and therefore, in all probability, not true. Inscriptions of this kind cannot be used to disprove the positive statements of an author like Daniel, whose writings bear the stamp of candor and truthfulness, even if they flatly contradict them, as they do not. The truthfulness of these inscriptions must be tested by the Bible and not that of the Bible by them.

The principal difficulty seems to be to fix upon the name of one in the royal line of Media who can properly be assigned a place as king at Babylon between Belshazzar and Cyrus. But the fact that the name of a king cannot be clearly determined is no proof that he did not exist. Whatever the name may have been there is evidence enough to warrant the belief that a Mede did reign at Babylon as the immediate successor of Belshazzar.

Xenophon, in the *Cyropedia*, makes mention of such a king, and calls him Cyaxeres II.* His account may be briefly stated thus: Cyaxeres II succeeded his father, Astyages, on the Median throne. Being the brother of Mundane, the wife of Cambyses, he requested

* *Cyrop.*, I, v, 2, ii, 1; VIII, viii, 19.

his brother-in-law to help him in his warfare against the Assyrians or Babylonians. Cambyses sent his son Cyrus with an army, who conquered the Babylonians, and also the Lydians, who had joined forces with the Babylonians. Cyaxeres II having no son, gave his daughter to Cyrus for wife, and the whole of Media for a dowry. Cambyses and his wife gave their consent to this arrangement. On the death of Cambyses, Cyrus became king of Persia, and on that of Cyaxeres II also of Media and Babylon. According to Xenophon, also, Cyaxeres II was king both of Media and of Babylon, of Media undoubtedly after the fall of Astyages, and of Babylon after the conquest of that city by Cyrus, thus confirming the conjecture which we made above on the basis of the annals of Nabonidus. True, we cannot accord any great degree of historical credibility to the *Cyropedia*, but Xenophon possessed the historical spirit in a high degree; and there is no compelling reason for supposing that his account of this matter is a pure invention. We need not wonder that some of the persons whom he names are not presented in their true relations to other known persons and events, and that some matters of detail should appear somewhat askew. That was to be expected. But there is nothing which warrants the belief that he did not give us correct history on the main point at issue, viz., the reign of a Median king at Babylon immediately after Belshazzar. It is conceded that Babylon was taken by the Persians 538 B.C., and that Cyrus died 529. In assigning him, therefore, a reign of nine years at Babylon, it is evident that both the clay tablets and Herodotus date the commencement of that reign from the time of his capturing the city. Xenophon, however, gives him a reign of seven years only at Babylon,* and it should be noticed that in this matter he is consistent with himself. He allows some time for the reign of his Cyaxeres II. In stating that Cyrus was of noble birth,† and that the capture of Babylon occurred at night,‡ Xenophon makes it manifest that he had a more minutely accurate acquaintance with the family of Cyrus and with Babylonian affairs than Herodotus; and it may be that while the statement of Herodotus in respect to the length of the reign of Cyrus at Babylon is not to be questioned, that of Xenophon may rest on the knowledge of a fact which had eluded the search of Herodotus. If this be true, as we believe it is, then it may be possible to reconcile the two statements on the basis of that fact.

Seemingly the Bible supports Xenophon in this matter. It makes the year after the capture of Babylon "*the first year of Darius the*

* *Cyrop.*, VIII, vii, 1.

† Pusey's *Daniel.*

‡ *Cyrop.*, XII, v, §§ 15-33 ; Rawlinson's *Ancient Monarchies*, Vol. iii, p. 517.

*Mede.*" * Presumably, therefore, when it speaks of "the first year of Cyrus," † it means some other year. In making this statement, "So this Daniel prospered in the reign of Darius, and in the reign of Cyrus the Persian," ‡ the Bible clearly distinguishes between the reigns of these two kings. It is possible, however, that, as in the case of Nabonidus and Belshazzar, it may have regarded their reigns as synchronous. But Ezra makes the year of the return of the Jews to Jerusalem "the first year of Cyrus," § which must have been some considerable time after the taking of Babylon. For it is known that Cyrus was in Babylon during the latter part of 538 B.C.‖ After that time he made an extensive campaign, in which he attacked and conquered a number of kings, cities and countries, the last of which was Syria. It is not known how early he started on this campaign; but supposing that he did set out before the close of 538, that he met very little resistance anywhere, and that his movements were therefore quite rapid, yet military operations require time, and it is scarcely possible that he could have returned from that expedition to Babylon before sometime in 536. The decree for the return of the Jews could not have been issued before the conquest of Syria. Indeed, it is clear from Ezra iii. 7 that at the time of the issuing of the decree, Syria was under the power of Cyrus. To allow the best part of two years for all these events is a moderate estimate. It took Ezra and his company four months to travel from Babylon to Jerusalem, and Cyrus consumed six months simply to march with his army from Sardis to Cunaxa in the neighborhood of Babylon. If we may judge of the rapidity with which large bodies of people moved in those times from these examples, then surely we cannot assign less than two years to the campaign of Cyrus to which we have referred. While, therefore, the Bible does not commit itself to the definite period of seven years for the reign of Cyrus at Babylon, it leans decidedly towards this view of Xenophon. And we should not overlook here the fact that since Syria is mentioned on the Cyrus cylinder, the inscription on it must have been written subsequent to the conquest of Syria, and therefore all that it says concerning the sovereignty of Cyrus at Babylon and of his receiving tribute and having his feet kissed there by the kings of all countries is to be referred rather to 536, or later, than to 538 B.C.

Incidentally it is also worth noticing here that the statement of Xenophon, in reference to his Cyaxeres II, that he had given the whole of Media with his daughter to Cyrus for dowry with

* C. ix. 1 and xi. 1.

† C. i. 21.

‡ C. vi. 28.

§ Ezra i. 1.

‖ *Beweis des Glaubens*, March, 1889, p. 95; *Higher Criticism and the Monuments*, pp. 504–507.

the remark that he had no male heir by true wedlock, points to an age in Cyaxeres in which he had abandoned the hope of obtaining an heir, and so corresponds with the statement of Daniel that Darius was sixty-two years old at the commencement of his reign at Babylon.

Some cuneiform inscriptions ascribe to Cyrus the title, "King of Babylon and king of countries," for nine years. But Lenormant says that, on some of the contract tablets of Babylon, Cyrus is called "King of countries from 538 to 536," and only after 536, "King of countries and king of Babylon."* If this should be true, it would indicate that for two years some one either reigned instead of Cyrus or jointly with him.

Abydenus, the Babylonian historian, who undoubtedly had access to the records which had been kept by the priests of Babylon, puts this prophecy in the mouth of Nebuchadnezzar concerning Cyrus: "The *Persian mule* shall come, being in league with your own gods, and shall bring you into bondage; *the Mede*, the pride of the Assyrians, shall be his helper."† The statement, "*being in league with your own gods*," accords exactly with the inscriptions of the annalistic tablet. This fact raises a strong presumption in favor of the credibility of the entire prophecy. The whole of it comes from the same source. Another fragment of Abydenus makes mention of a Median who took part in the conquest of Babylon and "was renowned even to the borders of Syria."‡ The Armenian Chronicle of Eusebius is not always to be implicitly trusted. But the following remark, which it bases on the authority of Abydenus, cannot for that reason be regarded as entirely spurious. In giving an account of the capture of Nabonidus by Cyrus, and of his translation to Carmensa, it significantly adds: "Darius, the king, drove him out of the same region."§ This testimony of Abydenus voices the belief which must have been current at a very early time in Babylon, where, if anywhere, the truth in the case must have been known, and cannot, therefore, be dismissed as unworthy of credence merely for the reason that it is not clearly confirmed by other secular history, nor by the cuneiform inscriptions which have thus far been unearthed and deciphered. It is corroborated by the far better authority of the Bible. On the supposition that Darius the Mede is identical with Cyaxeres II of Xenophon, the record of the Armenian Chronicle confirms Xenophon's view that Darius was also king of Media after the fall of Astyages.

* *Magazine of Christian Literature*, September, 1891, p. 328; *Beweis des Glaubens*, March, 1889, p. 94.

† Zöckler's "Daniel," in *Lange's Com.*, p. 31.

‡ *Magazine of Christian Literature*, September, 1891, p. 328.

§ i, p. 61, referred to in *Beweis des Glaubens*, February, 1889, p 49.

Æschylus, the poet, in his *Persæ*, represents that Cyrus followed on the throne as *the third* from that Mede who first led the army,* and whose son helped in the conquest of Babylon. This would give us the following order: Astyages, Darius (or the Cyaxeres II of Xenophon) and Cyrus.

Josephus credits the accounts of both Daniel and Xenophon.† He says that the son of Astyages, the Darius of Daniel, was known to the Greeks by another name, manifestly referring to the Cyaxeres of the Greek historian.

The inscription on the obscure and fragmentary annalistic tablet, to which reference has already been made, not only harmonizes readily with the idea of a Median reign at Babylon immediately after the fall of Belshazzar, but will be best understood on such a supposition. It states that Cyrus came to Babylon three months after its capture, and invested Ugbaru of Gutium with the authority of government. It is probable that Gutium was either identical with Media, or was the name given to a larger district of country of which Media was a part. The tablet thus seems to bear distinct testimony to the reign of a Mede at Babylon after its conquest by Cyrus.

The Babylonian Chronicle also makes it clear that Ugbaru, or Gobryas, exercised regal power in Babylon, appointing governors under him about as Daniel affirms.‡ He was regent with all the powers of king. The only authority, in fact, which was exercised by rulers of those early times was absolute authority. Nebuchadnezzar appointed Zedekiah king at Jerusalem instead of his nephew, who was deposed, but Zedekiah, although only an appointee, ruled with absolute regal power at Jerusalem. The same was true of Gobryas. The regent was an absolute king in the sphere of his jurisdiction. Belshazzar was called king as well as Nabonidus, although in reality he was only vice-king. Cambyses, also, was called "king of Babylon," on a clay tablet, No. 906 of the British Museum, at the same time that Cyrus, his father, was called "King of countries, and king of Babylon." On clay tablet No. 877, it is written "Eleventh year of Cambyses, king of Babylon;" yet he did not reign full eight years in his own name after the death of Cyrus.§ He was therefore for more than three years called king of Babylon, when in reality he was only vice-king, as Gobryas had been before him. They were called king, because they exercised kingly authority. Daniel, therefore, only followed the prevailing custom in calling Darius the Mede king of Babylon, even supposing that he

* *Τρίτος δ'ἀπ' ἀυτοῦ Κῦρος, Persæ,* 762–766. † *Antiquities,* X, xi, 4.

‡ Smith's Revised *Bible Dictionary,* Article "Darius, the Mede."

§ *Beweis des Glaubens,* March, 1889.

was only an appointee of Cyrus. On the basis of these facts it is easily possible to effect a complete reconciliation between Herodotus and some of the inscriptions on the one hand, and Xenophon and the Bible on the other. The statements on either side are partial only. Both together give us more nearly the whole truth. We can readily see that, in view of the shortness of the reign of Darius, and of the overshadowing eminence of Cyrus, the great conqueror and supreme king, Herodotus and other historians, taking a general view of the situation largely from the outside, should make mention of Cyrus only, while Daniel, who came more directly into contact with the reign of Darius at Babylon, would naturally speak of him only. The difficulty here is not insuperable. Daniel and Xenophon give us a particular incident of Babylonian affairs, which other writers noticed either but indistinctly or not at all. This is no unusual thing in historical writers.

Attention has already been called to the fact that Cyrus was absent from Babylon after its capture by him, on an extended expedition of conquest, which, on a moderate calculation, consumed about two years. Some one must have reigned in his place during that time with full kingly authority and power, and reigned probably over the entire empire, as seems to have been the case with Darius the Mede. Cyrus was engaged with other matters. The annalist calls this regent Ugbaru. Daniel says, "Darius the Mede was made king." It is now known that the name Darius is simply an appellative, meaning "holder," which would be given tothe governor of a country on his coming into power, just as under similar circumstances the Germans would give to such a person the somewhat similar name of *Stadthalter*. He may have received the name for the reason that he held the government for the time being for Cyrus. The language of Daniel favors this idea. For in chap. v. 31 he says: "Darius the Median *took* the kingdom," and in chap. ix. 1, "Darius, the son of Ahasuerus, of the seed of the Medes, *was made king* over the realm of the Chaldeans." This would seem to imply that he "*took the kingdom*," and "*was made king*" by request or permission.

The fact that the annalist and Daniel differ in the name which they give to this regent can be no bar to the view here contended for. Names are often misleading. The important thing here is not the name, but the fact of a Median reign at Babylon immediately after the dynasty of Nebuchadnezzar. The difference in name may be due simply to the slip of a scribe. Schrader informs us that the name Darius was written in fifteen different ways at Babylon.* Mistakes in transcription might thus all the more easily be made. It

* *Cuneiform Inscriptions and the O. T.*, Vol. ii, p. 63.

may also be that Ugbaru was there only temporarily, and that he was replaced by another prince of Media. Still another supposition is possible. When Nebuchadnezzar replaced Jehoiachim by his uncle Mattaniah on the throne of Judah, he gave to the latter the new name of Zedekiah. After the same custom Cyrus may have given this prince, whom he "made king" in Babylon, the new name of Darius, and he may thus have borne both the names of Ugbaru and Darius. This may also account for the fact that a Median prince bore the Persian name Darius. The meaning and nationality of the name would thus both remind him that he reigned by the authority of Cyrus.

The Greek name Cyaxeres is an expansion of that of Xerxes, and is identical with the Median Ahasuerus. This identity has been confirmed by the cuneiform discoveries of Chapollion and Grotefend.* They also are mere appellatives like Pharaoh, Cæsar or Emperor, given to the *actual* ruler of a country. Cyrus at one time signed himself *Cyaxeres*. Astyages must have inherited the title from his father Cyaxeres I, and it could be lawfully assumed by any descendant of that monarch who might come to the throne of Media, and Xenophon's account may therefore be substantially correct.

It is thus clear that the account given by Daniel of this matter not only fits admirably into credible history, but makes that history luminous and consistent. Daniel says that Darius, the Mede, was made king at Babylon; and we have seen that many statements of history, tradition and the monuments are best explained and understood on the supposition that a Mede reigned before Cyrus, or contemporaneously with him.

There are considerations which favor the supposition that Cyrus would have pursued a policy of that kind. The Medes and Babylonians had been on terms of intimate friendship. Their forces had joined in the conquest of the Assyrians; Nebuchadnezzar had married the sister of Astyages, and if Cyrus was himself connected with the royal family of Media by marriage, he might all the more readily be induced to make such an arrangement, particularly if it suited his convenience. It was also in thorough accord with his known conciliatory spirit. For some reason or other Cyrus seems to have been especially favorable to the Medes. For, after having conquered Crœsus, he placed the Medes Mazares and Harpagus successively at the head of the army in Asia Minor.† And on the supposition that he desired to do everything to win the loyalty of the

* *Bible Com. on Daniel*, p. 310; *Cuneiform Inscriptions and the O. T.*, by Schrader, Vol. ii, p. 63.

† *Beweis des Glaubens*, March, 1889, p. 96.

Medes, he could scarcely have hit on a better line of policy than to elevate one of their popular princes to a seat on the throne with himself.

The conclusion thus reached obtains strong confirmation from the Bible itself. Both Isaiah and Jeremiah, in foretelling the overthrow of Babylon, connect the Medes with the Persians in accomplishing that event.* Isaiah uses these remarkable words in xxi. 2: "*Go up, O Elam: besiege, O Media.*" Since Cyrus was a Persian, it was long a puzzle to scholars why the prophet should name the country of Elam, but recent discoveries have shown that Cyrus was indeed king of Elam; and since therefore Isaiah was absolutely correct in the first half of the above prophecy, he was presumably as correct in joining Media with Elam. Some of the critics maintain that the twenty-first chapter of Isaiah was written at Babylon during the exile. We do not accept that view; but on that hypothesis, since the author of Isaiah was unquestionably a man of the highest capacity and integrity, his statement, as that of an eyewitness, should be received as proving that both Media and Persia took part in the conquest of Babylon. Such testimony in any event is vastly more trustworthy than conjectural interpretations of fragmentary Babylonian tablets and cylinders. Then, also, if we pursue the fair method of interpreting the book of Daniel in consistency with itself, we must give due weight to its claim that the Medes shared not only in the capture of Babylon, but also in the government which succeeded the fall of Belshazzar. That Darius the Mede was intrusted with the reins of government is by no means all that it says on the subject.† It represents that the kingdom was taken from Belshazzar and divided, not by being given to two kings, but to a kingdom composed of two nations. The kingdom which succeeded that of Nebuchadnezzar was a composite one, made up of the Medes and Persians, in which, while Persia had the preëminence, Media retained a good share of its autonomy and regal dignity, as in the case of some of the members of the German empire of to-day. The kingdom established at Babylon was ruled by "the laws of the Medes and Persians," in which expression the Medes are placed first as the older nation, and perhaps also with a desire to conciliate them. So deeply did this idea of the double character of the kingdom become rooted in the minds of the people that, as late as the days of Esther, the laws and customs of the Medes and Persians were still regarded as unalterable.‡ The same truth is still more forcibly set forth in the symbolism of the book. In the image of Nebuchadnezzar's dream (chap. ii), the kingdom which

* Isa. xiii. 17, xxi. 2; Jer. li. 11–28.

† Dan. v. 28, vi. 8, 12, 15, viii. 20.

‡ Esther i. 3, 14, 48, x. 2.

was to succeed his was a composite one, represented by the breast and arms of the image. In Daniel's vision of the four beasts, given in chap. iv, the same kingdom appears under the figure of a lop-sided bear, vividly representing the preponderance of Cyrus in the double dynasty. In the vision of the ram (chap. viii), we have still clearer representations of the same truth. The ram had two high horns, "but one was higher than the other, and the higher came up last." The book itself tells us (R. V., chap. viii. 20), "The ram which thou sawest that has the two horns, they are the kings of Media and Persia." It was the double dynasty which supplanted that of Nebuchadnezzar. One ram and two horns, one kingdom with two kings, in which, however, the older king was inferior to the younger, who was represented by the highest horn. This agrees precisely with the conclusion which we reached above. Darius reigned under Cyrus and was thus inferior to him in royal power and dignity. But it should be clearly noticed that all these figurative representations are wholly inconsistent with the idea of a single compact dynasty, either Median or Persian, succeeding that of Nebuchadnezzar at Babylon.

6. Some critics contend also that the theology of Daniel points to a late date for the origin of his book. They pretend to be able to determine how much of divine things it was possible for any one to know at any particular period of the world's history. They maintain that the doctrine of the Messiah, of angels, of the resurrection, and of a judgment on the world, are taught with more distinctness and in a more developed form than was possible in that period of Old Testament times which covers the exile. Daniel could not have been so far advanced in theological learning as the author of the book appears to have been. They regard the doctrines of the resurrection and of angels as derived from the Persians, and therefore as not understood and held in the times of the exile. The inner consciousness of the critics tells them that the theology of the book of Daniel suggests the "general atmosphere" of the second century B.C. But on the supposition that the book of Daniel is truly inspired and contains a revelation from God, all these objections vanish at once. We hold that Daniel received his theology, not from the Parsees, but from the Lord Himself, by the way of revelation and inspiration; and there is absolutely nothing to show that God could not have made known to Daniel at the time of the exile everything which we find in his book.

7. However, the real objections of the critics against the book of Daniel rest upon the supernatural character of its miracles and predictive prophecy. It is claimed that the miracles are so extraordi-

nary as to be fabulous and out of harmony with the type of miracles described in other parts of the Old Testament, objections being made especially to the preservation of the three Hebrews in the flames of the fiery furnace, the appearance of the mysterious hand-writing upon the wall and the deliverance of Daniel from the den of lions. The prophecies, it is claimed, are too minutely particular in their predictions of history, unlike other prophecies of Scripture, and are therefore irrational and must have been written after the events predicted. Taking counsel from merely subjective impressions, they affirm that the miracles and predictive prophecy are simply the form, the stage dress, which were invented by the writer for the purpose of conveying the substantial truths of the book in a more striking and impressive manner. But it will be noticed that on this theory the entire distinctively supernatural element disappears from the book altogether. There is nothing supernatural about it, since it is the mere invention of the author. The form of the book, according to this critical theory, is fraudulent and therefore not credible.

This is not the place to enter upon a discussion of the questions of the credibility of miracles and predictive prophecy; but it is proper to observe that the miracles of Daniel, though striking, are not essentially different from miracles recorded in other parts of the Old Testament, especially those of the critical periods of the history of the chosen nation, as when Israel was in slavery in Egypt, during the exodus, and in the times of Elijah and Elisha. The prophecies also accord with Daniel's position at Babylon and with that of the chosen nation, and, further, with their purpose respecting the great world-powers and the final triumph of the Messiah's kingdom. In their apocalyptic character they are closely related to the prophecies of Ezekiel and Zechariah, and in their minutely predictive element they bear a resemblance to prophecies of the older Scriptures, especially to many in Isaiah. The truth is that the miracles and prophecies of Daniel can be regarded as out of harmony with the character of miracles and prophecy as revealed in the older Scriptures only by first ruling out of them a large part of the miracles and predictions which are contained therein on the ground that they too are fabulous and impossible.

But even if it were not possible to show the miracles and prophecies of Daniel to be similar in character with those found in other parts of the Old Testament, we could not concede the validity of the argument of the critics. The Lord has never bound Himself to supply the supernatural element in certain stereotyped forms and only at stated periods in the history of His kingdom on earth. He has ever displayed His grace and power to meet the necessities of

His people, and on the ground of need the miracles and prophecies of the book of Daniel can be amply justified. The pitiable and crushed condition of the chosen nation at the time of the exile furnishes abundant reasons both for the miracles and prophecies. God was leading His people through severe discipline for their gross sins, and they needed unusual support and encouragement to sustain them in the process. These circumstances called for a special display of His divine power and love to keep alive the faith and hope of His people, to inspire them with courage to endure necessary trials, and to keep them from being utterly crushed by the world-powers to whom He had, for the time being, subjected them.

Christians do not urge the supernatural element as a reason for the genuineness of Scripture; but believing, as they do, that God is omnipotent, omniscient and infinite, they believe also in the possibility of the supernatural, and insist that if a book of Scripture can be shown on good evidence to be authentic, the striking presence of the supernatural in it is not to be urged against its genuineness and credibility on the presupposition that the supernatural in such a form is impossible.

## II.

Having thus shown that the objections raised by the critics against the historic character of the book of Daniel are not relevant, we proceed to consider the positive evidence in favor of its authenticity and genuineness. This is of a nature so strongly cumulative that it invests the traditional belief with the highest degree of probability.

It should be said at the outset that our contention is not that Daniel may not have employed a secretary or amanuensis; nor that copyists may not have introduced errors and corrupted the form of proper names; nor, further, that editors may not have introduced into the text glosses and explanatory notes, although there is no evidence that this has been done to any great extent; nor need it be denied that the book is fragmentary and for that reason imperfect in form. But the contention is that the book of Daniel, substantially as we have it now, was written at Babylon during the exile; that Daniel, the prophet, was its author; and that, as far as it goes, it gives a truthful presentation of things as they actually occurred or were to take place.

1. The book itself claims Daniel as the medium through whom its contents were given, and Babylon as the place of its origin. No fair critic will deny that the author professes to impart matters which either he himself had witnessed or which had been divinely revealed to him at Babylon.

In the first or narrative portion of the book, the author is indeed referred to in the third person; but that literary feature is satisfactorily explained on the basis of the well-known fact that the historians of old were in the habit of narrating historical events, not in the first, but in the third person. Xenophon wrote history almost exclusively in that way. In this respect Daniel followed the literary custom of ancient times. No one questions the fact that the entire document is from the same author; and since in the last half of it, which contains the prophetic visions, Daniel speaks of himself in the first person, his authorship must cover the entire book. We have, for instance, expressions of this kind: "Daniel—wrote the dream," "and told the sum of the matters;" "I Daniel was grieved in my spirit;" "As for me, Daniel, my cogitations troubled me;" "A vision appeared—even unto me, Daniel;" "When I, even I, Daniel had seen the vision;" "I, Daniel, understood by the books the number of the years;" "I, Daniel, was mourning three full weeks;" "But thou, O Daniel, shut up the words;" "Then I, Daniel, looked, and behold, there stood other two." Furthermore, in addition to these instances, in which the author speaks of himself in the first person, and gives us his name, he is personally so intimately and vitally related to the events which he narrates, and there are throughout the book so many personal allusions to him, made in a way so entirely casual and natural, that the conviction forces itself on the mind that the author could have been none other than this Daniel, who lived and moved at Babylon in the midst of the scenes which he so vividly describes. And the literary form and features of the book, as well as the customs and manners revealed therein, lead resistlessly to the same conclusion. This book is, therefore, by its own claim and on the face of it authentic and genuine.

But the critics, according to the rationalistic method of interpreting Scripture, declare that all this is not real but only delusive appearance; and that if one will look beneath the surface, results altogether different will be reached. Instead of being an authentic and genuine record, they affirm that, according to the results of a thorough and scientific scholarship, the book is a work of the imagination, produced from three to four hundred years after the exile by a patriotic Jew in Palestine on the basis of an exilic Babylonian tradition. Said a professor of an American Theological Seminary, in a lecture delivered in England a few years since: "Daniel is a tale with a moral to it." And it must be conceded that if the document was not written until the Greek or Selucid times, it can at best be only a work of fiction, into which, however, a few historical facts may have been woven. Some of the more

evangelical of the critics, who would still regard Daniel as an inspired book, adopt this view on the plea that God can reveal His truth through the medium of fiction as well as in any other way. But to this theory, especially as applicable to the book of Daniel, there are two objections, which are fatal to it.

(1) It is out of harmony with the claim which the Holy Scripture makes for itself. It represents itself to be the record of the revelations which God has made of Himself in the course of centuries, affirms Him to be the God of absolute truth,* and claims that the men who wrote this record were especially inspired for their work by the "Spirit of truth," so that it is a revelation from the God of truth in respect both to its contents and form. "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God,"† and is thus "the Scripture of truth." This general conception of the Bible, therefore, that it is a record of revelations from God, occurring as actual historical events, and made under the superintendence of the Spirit of truth, would seem to preclude the idea of its being a work of fiction which deals in imaginary facts and narratives.

But it is urged that the Bible contains riddles, stories, proverbs, allegories, parables, symbols, and the like, and that, since the imagination enters more or less into the construction of these, it is fair to assume that nothing in the nature of divine revelation and inspiration precludes the idea of an entire book of the Bible being a work of fiction. This, however, is not sound reasoning. For some of these matters are in the Bible for no other reason than that they were actually said and done. Like the sayings of Satan, they are an integral part of a truthful record. Beyond that, the Bible is not responsible for them. This is true of Jotham's story and Samson's riddle.‡ The *proverbs* are generally wise maxims which no one questions; *symbols* are emblematic representations of things or properties which are real or actual; *parables*, if not recounting actual events, rest on events which are real in life and nature; and the *allegory* is simply a figurative application of real facts. In none of these things is there anything contrary to truth. They are figurative presentations of truth, used by the Spirit of truth to set forth the truth in a way more clear and forcible, and they have always been considered as perfectly consistent with the strictest theory of revelation and inspiration. They furnish no analogy from which to argue for the presence of a book of fiction in the Bible. If there is such a book in Scripture, that fact must be demonstrated on other

* Deut. xxxii. 4; Num. xxiii. 19; Ps. xxxi. 5; Isa. xxv. 1; Jer. x. 10; Rom. iii. 4; 2 Cor. i. 18; Titus i. 2.

† 2 Tim. iii. 16; 1 Cor. ii. 12, 13; 2 Pet. i. 21; Acts i. 16; Heb. i. 1.

‡ Judg. ix. 7–15, xiv. 14.

lines of argument. Parables, symbols, and the like, may have in them an element of the imagination, but they are pillars of the truth, and for that reason bear decidedly against the contention that the book of Daniel is a fiction. For if that be its character, it is from first to last false in fact.

But the Scripture employs one term respecting itself which precludes absolutely the idea that Daniel is a work of fiction. It is the term "*Testimony*." The Scriptures are God's testimony to man concerning His will given in a testamentary or covenant form.* This term is used with such frequency that it manifestly applies to the whole Scripture from beginning to end. It is worthy of notice that all persons of the Trinity join in this testimony.† The Scriptures are the "testimony of God," "the testimony of Christ," and the witness of the Spirit who is truth. They are the deposition of the triune God. As the word and testimony of God, the Scriptures are declared to be "very pure," infallibly true, and absolutely sure and faithful, so that they may be implicitly believed and trusted.‡ They are the faithful sayings of God, disbelief in which incurs the sin of impeaching the veracity of God.§ None of these could apply to Daniel's writings if they were fictitious. Evidently to Christ and the apostles the Scripture had the weight of the testimony of God. They appealed to them always, and to brief sentences of them, as absolutely true and of final divine authority. It is not too much to say that Christ held all the statements of Scripture binding on the faith and conscience of men.‖ This character, therefore, of being the word and testimony of God, which the Scriptures give to themselves and which is endorsed by Christ Himself, makes it impossible to regard the book of Daniel as a work of fiction, for in such a character it would not only be false, but fraudulent as well, written with intent to deceive.

(2) But, secondly, if for the sake of the argument we should concede the claim of the critics that the book of Daniel is a work of the imagination, it would then have to meet the requirement of a work of that kind. But such requirement the book does not meet. It is pervaded by no persistent plot to which the different parts of the book are made tributary. There are certain correspondences and agreements between the first and second parts, but no plot. We

* Deut. vi. 17 ; 1 Kgs. ii. 3; 2 Chron. xxxiv. 31; Ps. xxv. 10, xcix. 7, cxix. 24, 31, 88, 111, 129, 152; Isa. viii. 20; Acts xiv. 3; 2 Thess. i. 10; Heb. iii. 5.

† 1 Cor. ii. 1, i. 6; 1 John v. 6; John xv. 26, xvi. 13; 1 Cor. ii. 13.

‡ 2 Sam. vii. 28; Ps. xii. 6, xciii. 5, cxix. 138, 140, 160; Prov. xxx. 5; Rom. xv. 4; Titus i. 9; Heb. x. 23; 2 Pet. i. 19; Rev. xxi. 5, xxii. 6.

§ 1 John v. 10; Luke xxiv. 25; John iii. 33, v. 38; Heb. iii. 12.

‖ John v. 39, x. 34, 35; Matt. xv. 3, 4, xix. 4, 5, xxii. 29; Mark vii. 7–13; Luke iv. 14–26.

look in vain for the plan and symmetry of a work of art. Then also it presents no characters consistent with the view that the book is a work of fiction. Nebuchadnezzar is prominent in the first four chapters and disappears entirely with the fifth. It is impossible that he should have been suggested by Antiochus Epiphanes. The two characters have scarcely anything in common. Equally fruitless is the attempt to make it appear that Daniel is a story modeled after the life of Joseph. The relation of Joseph to his brethren and his position at the court of Egypt do not correspond in the vital points with Daniel's relation to the Jews and his position at the court of Babylon. Then, again, the book does not reflect the theological, religious, moral and political sentiment of the Maccabean period, as certainly it would have done had it been composed then as a work of fiction for patriotic and religious purposes. It is also inconceivable that the author, if his aim was to write a novel for the purpose of creating a patriotic, religious sentiment and enthusiasm, should have adopted the strange method of using two languages not only, but those languages as used centuries before his time. Did any one ever write a work of fiction half in one language and half in another, and in a very antiquated form of both of them? Writers of successful fiction are far wiser than that. They aim to write in a manner which shall lead the people to read their productions, and, therefore, in speech and sentiment seek to come as near to the customs of the people as possible.

The literary form of the book, therefore, furnishes insuperable objections against its being called a work of fiction. It neither claims nor possesses such a character. It proclaims its own genuineness and throughout assumes to have been written at Babylon by Daniel and conveys the impression that what it records was actually seen, said, and done. So strongly is this claim enforced that the ripest scholars and the entire Church of God have for more than two thousand years believed it to be true. And, if it be not true, the work passes into a domain of imposture. To represent it as a "pious fraud," perpetrated by a good man for patriotic and religious purposes, does not relieve the matter. Good men do not manifest, and they never have manifested, their piety in the conscious perpetration of fraud. They keep their consciences void of offense in the service of God. Even Dr. Cheyne, in quoting Dr. Weir with approval, concedes that in this age of moral light we must "disapprove the procedure of such a writer." But what must be morally disapproved now, should always have been so disapproved. The true way out of this dilemma is not to accept Dr. Cheyne's theory. The simple straightforward style of the author, his transparent honesty, and his proved historical accuracy in so many particulars, put the stamp of genuineness on the entire book.

2. The historical accuracy with which many characters, incidents and usages are described, is so great and minute that it points to an author who had personal knowledge of the matters of which he writes. Says Lenormant: "In the book of Daniel, all the characters are drawn with as minute a fidelity to historical accuracy as those of the court of Xerxes in the book of Esther."*

The many titles of political and judicial officers given in the third chapter are so entirely Babylonian that we must assign that part of the book at least to the times of the exile. Had it been written in the Maccabean age it would surely have contained the Greek word στρατηγός, which was so prominent in Greek official life.

All references to the royal palace and to the plain of Dura reveal an entirely correct conception of Babylonian topography. This accuracy as now confirmed by extra-Biblical history and especially by the cuneiform inscriptions, is seen, on close inspection, to be minute and varied in reference to such matters as the importance attached to dreams; the training of youths selected from hostages to stand before the king; the description of the Babylonian court, and the dress of courtiers; the use of musical instruments; the death penalty inflicted on blasphemers; punishment by burning alive; the different classes of wise men; the presence of women at feasts; the sacredness of the number seven; Babylonian theological ideas, such as the unity of the Divine Essence and the Supreme God, represented in brilliant regal state by the human figure in its entirety as the Ancient of days; the religious character of Nebuchadnezzar; the lion's den; Nebuchadnezzar's image, and Babylonian manners.

Two things deserve special mention here since they put marked emphasis on the minute accuracy with which the author describes matters which are exclusively Babylonian. One is the images of the beasts with their horns, which the prophet introduces to describe the world-kingdoms, the winged lion, the bear, the leopard, the ram and the goat. The meaning of these was not understood until it was revealed by Babylonian monuments and Assyro-Chaldean sculpture. Explorers have searched in vain for such images in Palestine. These symbols are confined to Assyria and Babylon. The other is the entire correctness of Daniel's account of the reign and assassination of Belshazzar. Of all historians, Daniel alone has given us correct history on this matter, just as he only has given the correct account of the peaceful surrender of Babylon to Cyrus. These things show clearly that the author wrote under Babylonian influence, and that he was intimately acquainted with the myths and history of Babylon, and thus point unmistakably to Daniel

* *Magazine of Christian Literature*, September, 1891, p. 329.

as the one man best qualified to write the book which bears his name.

Furthermore, the record of these historical events, to whose minute accuracy I have referred, and that also concerning Darius the Mede, are narrated in a way so natural and apparently so truthful so entirely incidental, candid and artless, without further attempt at explanation, that the conviction becomes irresistible that the author, as a living witness and personal participant in the events, wrote of them to his own contemporaries, who were acquainted with them as well as he himself was.

The language, also, as already shown, both of the Hebrew and Aramaic sections, points unmistakably to the Babylon of the exile as the place and time of the composition of the document. It fits in there exactly. The meagre presence of the Persian, and the still less quantity of the Greek element contained in it, furnish added testimony to the same effect. The author knows next to nothing of Greek customs, manners and speech, and he would certainly have been intimately acquainted with all these had he written in the Greek or subsequent periods in Palestine. The entire coloring of the book, its scenes and characters, belong to exilic Babylon; it moves among the people and in the atmosphere and uses the dialect of that place and time. A Palestinian Jew, however jealous for the truth of God, could never have written this book centuries afterward in the times of the Maccabees, for, with the scant and unreliable information at his disposal, such historic accuracy would have been simply impossible for him. That accuracy points to one who lived at or near the times when the events occurred.

So strong is this chain of evidence derived from the confirmed accuracy in respect to so many matters of minute detail, that Lenormant, who held the view of the modern critical school, was compelled by it to abandon it for the traditional views. He says: "The reasons which now impel me to change my former view and to adopt the declaration of the Talmud, as to the date and composition of Daniel, are solely of a scientific nature, and are based upon a study of the cuneiform texts." He asks, "Is it just to deny the authenticity of a book merely because it recounts miracles?" "I demand of the rationalistic exegetes only that they do not use two standards of weight and measure, but judge the book of Daniel, and indeed every other Biblical writing, irrespective of the marvels related, by the same standards they use in judging the tablet of the Egyptian monarch. It is but little to ask, but that little we are surely justified in demanding from every critic, who rightly claims this title, and who does not throw himself blindly into the service of preconceived philosophical theories."*

* *Magazine of Christian Literature*, September, 1891, pp. 325, 340.

3. The postexilic books of the Bible do not in so many words notice the book of Daniel. But this fact does not prove its non-existence at the time when they were written. Their writers as prophets of God wrote independently for the needs of their own times under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. And evidence is not wanting that Daniel's writings were not unknown to them.

The book of Nehemiah contains two prayers, in chaps. i and ix, in which the language of Daniel's prayer, given in the ninth chapter, is quoted almost exactly. The correspondence is so close that rationalistic critics admit that one must have been quoted from the other. They assert that Daniel copied from Nehemiah, and then assume the lateness of the origin of this book. But the character of the prayers of the two books shows conclusively that the author of Nehemiah drew on Daniel. The prayer of the Levites in the ninth of Nehemiah contains very little petition. It is a long recital of facts concerning the dealings of God with His people, and their ungrateful conduct towards Him, in the exact language of Scripture. It cites the words of Moses in the Pentateuch, and it cites Daniel as it does Moses. While the prayer of Daniel consists of a series of fervent confessions and petitions, expressed in an original and rhetorical style, with more of an attempt to interpret Scripture than to cite it. This is good evidence not only that the author of Nehemiah quoted from Daniel, but also that, at the time when he wrote that book, Daniel was already regarded as a canonical document invested with divine authority.

Ezekiel speaks of Daniel as a man of great wisdom, faith and righteousness, and puts him in the same rank with Job and Noah. While this does not prove that Ezekiel was in possession of Daniel's writings, since he may have become acquainted with him through other channels, it does prove that he knew Daniel to be not only a veritable historical character, but a grand hero of the faith and a prophet of God, precisely as he is represented in the book which bears his name; and the presumption is that he became acquainted with the life and character of Daniel from the documents of his book, which no doubt were circulated at the river Chebar where Ezekiel resided.

Zechariah also in his vision of the four horses (i. 18) and in that of the four chariots (vi. 1) was affected by Daniel's vision concerning the four world-powers. Even the critics concede that the parallelisms can be very naturally and satisfactorily accounted for on that supposition. Other correspondences might easily be traced between Zechariah and Daniel, but these suffice.

It is therefore probable that Nehemiah, Ezekiel and Zechariah were acquainted with the writings of Daniel, their fellow-prophet,

and thus sustain to that extent the claim of those writings that they originated at Babylon during the exile.

4. The admission of the book of Daniel into the Canon of Holy Scripture is evidence of its historical credibility. From the earliest times the Jews have invested this book with divine authority, and for that reason incorporated it with the Scriptures. The Jews exercised extraordinary care in this matter. To them were committed the oracles of God; and whatever remissness may be laid to their charge in other matters, they were scrupulously faithful in receiving and transmitting as Holy Scripture only such documents as were certified to them as oracles of God.

Certain critics would have us believe that the admission of any document into the Canon of Old Testament Scripture rested simply and only on the decision of certain Jewish authorities who formed that Canon. But the right of a book to be in the Canon of Scripture rests on a foundation much stronger than that. It is known that the test for the recognition of a book of the New Testament as canonical was apostolic authority. The Church fell back upon that Canon as a standard of defense against the numerous attacks which it had to encounter. In its recognition of a document as canonical we have its testimony that it was known to be stamped with the authority of the apostles. Appeal to it would otherwise not have served its ends. The Old Testament Canon was formed in a way precisely similar. Josephus, in a citation which is given below, clearly indicates that among the Jews the term Scripture was given only to documents which were certified to them as having come from the hands of God's prophets. This idea is fully developed in the New Testament. The fundamental conception is that Scripture is something which God has given by the hands of His holy prophets.* On this conception the Old Testament grew up. The divine influence which inspired any book certified it also to the age in which it was produced as God's word by the mouth of a prophet. As such it was received and transmitted by the Church, and those who recognized it as canonical in that act simply certified to the historical fact that it had always been regarded by their nation as a prophetic book or an oracle of God.

These considerations make it inherently improbable that, if the book of Daniel is nothing more than the invention of an unknown author of the Maccabean times, it should have been immediately admitted into the Canon of Scripture. In such admission the Jews would have been understood to declare that this book was properly certified to them as the production of a prophet of God. It was

* Heb. i. 1; Rom. iii. 2; Acts i. 16, iv. 25; 1 Pet. i. 11, 12; 2 Pet. i. 21.

impossible for them to be deceived in the matter, and there is no conceivable reason why they should have joined the author in a deliberate attempt to palm off an imposture on their own nation and the world, as the Word of God. So improbable is this conjecture that it may safely be declared to be impossible.

And further, in view of the test on which books were admitted to the Canon of Scripture, the fact that the book of Daniel has, from the earliest times, been associated with his authorship, constitutes evidence in favor of its genuineness and authenticity. One age certified it to another with conscientious care. There never has been a body of men better qualified in every way to certify to that historical fact than those learned and devout Jews who have transmitted to us the Canon of the Old Testament Scriptures.

The universal belief among the Jews at, and long before, the coming of Christ that there had been no prophet among them for four hundred years previous to the Christian era, makes this argument all the more conclusive. Josephus refers to this belief as a conceded fact. It is corroborated by the statement in Maccabees that they put the stones of the profaned altar in "a convenient place until a prophet should come to show what should be done with them." * Would the Jewish authorities give any book a place among the oracles of God which was produced during a time in which, as they firmly believed, no prophet had spoken? It is incredible.

This is not the place to consider the question of the time at which the Old Testament Canon was closed. But all the evidence in favor of its early completion supports also the point for which we are here contending; and the vast preponderance of historical evidence still favors the opinion that the Canon was completed not later than 400 B.C.

5. The testimony of Josephus in support of the same conclusion is clear and decisive. Not only did he constantly assume the book of Daniel to be both authentic and genuine, calling him "one of the greatest of the prophets," but he has made two statements which reveal his opinion on the question in the clearest manner.

(1) The first is the account which he gives of the completion of the Old Testament Canon. He says: "From the death of Moses to the reign of Artaxerxes, who succeeded Xerxes as king of the Persians, the prophets after Moses wrote down events in thirteen books, the remaining four containing hymns to God and advice to men concerning conduct. From Artaxerxes to our time each event has been recorded, but these writings have not been thought worthy of like credit with those, because there was not the clear

* 1 Macc. iv. 45, 46, ix. 25, xiv. 41.

succession of the prophets." * The importance of this statement cannot be overestimated. It shows that it was the unchallenged opinion of the Jews in the days of Josephus that the books of the Old Testament were all in the Canon before the death of Nehemiah, and that they were put there for the reason that they were certified writings of the prophets. It further shows that Josephus was not only acquainted with the books which had been produced from the days of Nehemiah to his own times, but knew that they had not been given a place in the Scripture because they were known not to be prophetic documents. There can be no question that Josephus voiced the general opinion of the Jews of his and preceding times. The Talmud puts Daniel in the Canon at that early date.† The Baba-Bathra states that the great Synagogue which was convoked by Nehemiah, among other books, edited "Ezekiel, the twelve prophets, Daniel and Esther." This tradition, owing to its great antiquity and universality, becomes invested with a high degree of trustworthiness.

(2) Secondly, Josephus relates that the prophecies of Daniel were shown to Alexander the Great about 330 B.C. by the high priest Jaddua, and says that the Greek monarch was greatly pleased and encouraged by the prophecy concerning the overthrow of the Persian monarchy, which seemed so clearly to refer to himself. Some critics endeavor to discredit this statement of Josephus by trying to make it appear that he contradicts Nehemiah, who, in chap. xii. 22, seems to imply that Jaddua was already high priest in his lifetime. It is argued that Nehemiah and Jaddua lived too far from each other in time to admit of the possibility of the latter being high priest during the life of the former. But without considering the possibility that the name of Jaddua may have crept into the text as a gloss by a later hand, it may be shown to have been easily possible for Jaddua to have reached the office of high priest before the death of Nehemiah, on the reasonable supposition that both he and Nehemiah may have lived to be between seventy-five and eighty years of age.

But that aside, it can be shown that the account of Josephus, instead of contradicting that of Nehemiah, rather explains and dovetails into it. Josephus relates that Manasseh, a brother of Jaddua, had married a young woman of the family of Sanballet, the Horonite, that for some time he exercised the office of high priest conjointly with his brother Jaddua, and that he was forced by the Jewish authorities to relinquish the office owing to his refusal to abandon his heathen wife. Nehemiah says (xiii. 28) that he banished a son-in-law of Sanballet, who was one of the sons of Joiada,

* *Apion* i. 8. † *Bible Commentary on Daniel*, p. 215.

the high priest, which can only mean either that he expelled him from the office of high priest or interdicted his entrance upon it. Since Nehemiah uses the terms son and grandson interchangeably, as is shown in the case of Johanan, whom, in xii. 22, 23, he calls both the son and grandson of Eliashib, it may be taken for granted that the person whom he banished was the son of Johanan and grandson of Joiada, and therefore on this point his account and that of Josephus are in substantial accord. It is also evident from what Josephus says, that Manasseh was extremely reluctant to demit his right to the office of high priest. He did everything in his power to cling to it. Afterward, through the influence of his wife's family, a temple was built for him in Samaria, of which he was made the high priest. This further shows how much his heart was set on his official position.

Under these circumstances it cannot be considered at all strange that Nehemiah, with his intense zeal for the purity of God's worship, should resort to all honorable means in his power to make the accession of Manesseh to the high priesthood impossible. And what more effective measure could he adopt than to enroll the name of Jaddua in the succession of high priests, since such enrolling of his name would be tantamount to the official exclusion or deposition of Manasseh. It is clear that Nehemiah was still alive at the time that Manasseh married the daughter of Sanballet. That makes it probable that Jaddua was then already born, and if born, his name could certainly be enrolled. And since Nehemiah had expelled Manasseh, it is altogether probable that he would designate the one who should follow Johanan in the succession, even if that successor was then only a boy. The fact that he had the power to expel the one shows that he had also power to appoint the other; and he was not the man to leave so important an office in either doubt or danger, when he possessed the power to prevent it. That he did enter the name of Jaddua in the registry during his minority may certainly be inferred from his own account of the matter in xii. 22, 23. This passage makes it evident that, while the list included the name of Jaddua, the *registration* was only until the days of Johanan, his father. What is that but to say that Jaddua was enrolled previous to his being high priest, sometime during his father's term of office?

The statements, therefore, of Josephus concerning Jaddua are at so many points in touch with those of Nehemiah, that they help to confirm the credibility of the entire account of the episode with Alexander. The extraordinary consideration and favor which this Greek king showed the Jews, make it manifest that he felt indebted to them for something, and the showing of the prophecy to

him by Jaddua, as Josephus affirms, furnishes a perfectly natural explanation for the manifestation of that kindness. But if the account given by Josephus is true, then the prophecy must have been old enough to make its fulfillment an extraordinary event, and the authenticity and genuineness of the book of Daniel are thus strongly supported by it.

6. The evidence derived from the Apocryphal and similar books support the same truth.

The first book of Maccabees contains many references to Daniel. It will suffice to mention two. In chap. i. 54, the writer evidently looks upon Daniel's statement concerning the abomination of desolation as a description of events which were connected with Antiochus Epiphanes. In chap. ii. 59, 60, he represents the dying Mattathias, about 165 to 160 B.C., as exhorting his sons to be faithful in their resistance to the idolater. Having cited the examples of Abraham, Joseph, Caleb, David and Elias, he points to the deliverance of Daniel's three companions from the fiery furnace, and of Daniel himself from the lion's den, for the purpose of inspiring them with patriotic courage and zeal. The historical credibility of 1 Maccabees is beyond dispute. The suggestion of some critics that the writer of it spun these heroes of the faith out of his own free and fertile imagination is simply preposterous. The very fact that he cites Daniel along with Abraham, David and other Bible worthies is conclusive proof that he obtained them all from the Scripture. It may be conceded that 1 Maccabees was not written until sometime in the last half of the second century B.C., but manifestly the author of it lived so near to the times of Antiochus Epiphanes as to enable him to be perfectly familiar with the belief of the Jews in that period, and therefore his reference to the book of Daniel furnishes convincing proof, not only of its existence at that time, but that it was then a recognized book in the Canon of Scripture, and so must have been written many years earlier. Even if we concede that 1 Maccabees may not have been written until the very close of the second century B.C., since it quotes Daniel in Greek, it is impossible that this book should have been received into the Canon and found its way to Alexandria for translation into Greek, if it was not written until 170 to 165 B.C., as the critics affirm.

The book of Baruch imitates Daniel so extensively that some scholars have ventured the suggestion that both books came from the same pen. Reference to the Nebuchadnezzar and Belshazzar, comformity to thought and language, and the modeling of the prayers contained in the first three chapters of Baruch after that which is recorded in the ninth chapter of Daniel, show that the author of

Baruch was intimately acquainted with the book of Daniel. There is a practical consensus of scholarship to the fact that the book of Baruch was written sometime during the Persian period. Ewald, himself a critic of repute among his fellows, contends that it must be assigned to that period both on theological and linguistic grounds.* He insists, however, that the book of Daniel was the later production, and that its author quoted from Baruch; but the reasons which he assigns for that view are not cogent. We have already shown that so far as the argument from language is concerned, the book of Daniel belongs to the very beginning of the Persian period. Its literary form and historical contents entirely agree with that. But aside from that, the book of Baruch has no originality whatever. Its material is clearly borrowed from other Biblical books. For this reason many scholars have called it a mere "cento" of Jeremiah and other prophets. On the other hand, the book of Daniel is original throughout. Its author is never a mere copyist, and this is by itself evidence sufficient to show that Baruch borrowed from Daniel, and not *vice versâ*. Schrader concedes this.† The book of Daniel therefore must have existed prior to the middle of the fourth century B.C., and this fact fairly puts its authenticity beyond question.

A writer in *The Thinker* gives good reasons for believing that the older part of the book of Enoch certainly, and the earlier portions of the Sibylline Oracles probably, were written before the end of the third century B.C.‡ Both books contain important references to Daniel. The book of Enoch has a clear reference to the last judgment spoken of by Daniel, and also contains the expression, "Son of Man." From this it would seem that previous to 200 B.C., the book of Daniel held its established place in Holy Scripture. The earlier portion of the Sibylline Oracles also contains unmistakable imitations of Daniel, such for instance as the account of the terrible beast with the ten horns, among which sprang up another little horn which spake great words. The latest possible date which can be assigned to this Sibyl is about 150 B.C. But the Sibyl imitated the Greek copy of Daniel; and, even if we accept this latest date for its origin, how could it possibly have imitated Daniel in Greek so soon after his book was written in Aramaic and Hebrew? The problem becomes still more difficult if we insist on the probable date of the origin of the Sibyl in the latter part of the third century B.C. But this is not all. This part of the Sibylline Oracles was written by an Alexandrian Jew in Egypt, while in the opinion of the critics, Daniel was written by a Jew in

* *History of Israel*, Vol. v, p. 208.

† *Cuneiform Inscriptions and the O. T.*, Vol. ii, p. 133.

‡ *The Thinker*, June, 1893, pp. 492-496.

Palestine; but history testifies to the fact that for the last two centuries B.C., the Alexandrian Jews knew little of the affairs of their brethren in Palestine, and that the Palestinian Jews were as ignorant of the affairs of the Jews in Egypt. Therefore it is altogether improbable that a book which may have been produced in Palestine in Aramaic and Hebrew should at once find its way into the Canon, and then to Alexandria for translation into Greek. The prevalent critical theory is here shown to be at war with the clearest historical facts. A fatal fallacy underlies it. The evidence derived from the Sibyl is conclusive on the point that the book of Daniel was regarded as a part of prophetic Scripture, some distance back in the third century B.C.

These books of the Apocryphal period furnish still another line of argument on this question. If we accept as true the statement of Josephus that no books were added to the Old Testament Canon subsequent to the reign of Artaxerxes, for the reason that no prophetic writings had been certified to the Jews since that time, we have in that fact a satisfactory explanation why some of the Apocryphal and similar books were not included in the Canon of Scripture. Many of them—like Baruch, Tobit, Ecclesiasticus, 1 Maccabees and the older part of Enoch—are books of deep spirituality, an elevated moral tone, devoted patriotism and pure diction. The critics are fond of putting Daniel on the same level with some of them. One cannot help asking why were they not given a place in the Scripture? The sufficient answer is, that they had never been certified to the Jews as the Word of God by the hand of His prophets. They were the product of a time in which, according to a belief which was universal among the Jews, God did not visit His people in the ministry of a prophet, and they could not admit to the Canon of Scripture any writings which they did not know to be oracles from God.

7. The Septuagint also bears witness to the same general conclusion which we have thus far reached. This translation of the Scriptures was begun about 285 B.C. Preparations for it may have been made before that time by Ptolemy Lagus, but the work was executed by Ptolemy Philadelphus, whose reign commenced from 286 to 284 and ended 247 B.C. It is inherently probable that the translators had the complete Canon of the Old Testament at the beginning of their work, and that the entire work was completed during the reign of Philadelphus. Not only did Ptolemy desire a translation of all the sacred books of the Jews, but such a translation had become a religious necessity to the Alexandrian Jews, since many of them were not able to use the Hebrew language. We have no evidence that any books of the Scripture were sent from

Palestine to Alexandria other than those which were sent at the beginning of the Septuagint translation; and since, as has been indicated above, there was from the year 200 B.C. to the times of Christ virtually no intercourse between the Palestinian and Alexandrian Jews, it is not likely that such books were sent during that time for addition to the Greek copy, even if others were added to the Canon in Palestine. Some writers, indeed, credit Ptolemy Lagus with the Septuagint translation, but no writers assign any part of the work to a time later than Ptolemy Philadelphus.

If we may look for a correct opinion on this subject anywhere, it ought certainly to be at Alexandria, and from thence there has been transmitted an unbroken and entirely trustworthy tradition to the effect that the entire Septuagint was completed during the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus. Aristobulus, writing to Ptolemy Philometer, about 150 B.C., after having stated that the Pentateuch had been translated into Greek before the Persian period, says: "But the whole translation of all things pertaining to the law was in the time of him called King Philadelphus, thy ancestor." He uses the term "law" evidently in the wider sense of the entire revealed will of God in which it is so often employed in both the Old and New Testaments. That this continued to be the accepted opinion at Alexandria for many centuries is manifest from the statement of so careful a Christian writer as Clement of Alexandria in the latter part of the second century A.D. He says: "They say the Scriptures, both the law and the prophetical, were interpreted from the dialect of the Hebrews into the Greek tongue in the time of King Ptolemy Lagus, or, as some say, of the one called Philadelphus." But whether or not the entire Septuagint was completed before the death of Ptolemy Philadelphus, it is tolerably certain that the book of Daniel must have been translated by that time.

Attention has already been called to the fact that the author of the Sibyl quoted Daniel in the Greek before the close of the third century B.C., and that makes it probable that his book was in the original series which was sent from Palestine to Alexandria to be translated into Greek 285 B.C. But the Septuagint translation of Daniel is so permeated with textual corruptions, and contains so many interpolations, transpositions and glosses, that, as Dr. Pusey has so ably shown on critical grounds, a long interval must have elapsed between the production of the original of Daniel and its translation into Greek.* Translators would not attempt in that way to corrupt the text of a recent production. An examination of the Septuagint, therefore, leads us to the conclusion that the

* Pusey on *Daniel*, pp. 328–330.

original of Daniel must have existed at a date so early that its authenticity may be safely inferred.

8. The testimony of the New Testament, which to the Christian is of greater value than any other, is in full accord with the entire mass of evidence to which attention has been called. It treats the book of Daniel as genuine, and accords to it historical credibility. The book of Revelation is to a great extent a reflex of it. St. John had certainly been powerfully impressed by the prophecies of Daniel. The title "Son of Man," which was used several times by Christ concerning Himself, and which was ascribed to Him by the dying Stephen, was evidently taken from the pages of Daniel.* The deliverances from the fiery furnace and the lion's den are referred to as actual historical occurrences.† Paul's declaration that the saints shall judge the world, and his description of Anti-Christ seem to repeat almost literally what Daniel had prophesied.‡ When Christ spoke of His sitting on the right hand of power, and of coming again in the clouds of heaven, He referred unmistakably to the prophecies of Daniel. But our Lord makes one reference to Daniel so direct and literal that it alone settles the question of the genuineness of the book. Speaking on the Mount of Olives to His disciples concerning the overthrow of Jerusalem, He gave them this direction for securing their safety: "When ye therefore shall see the abomination of desolation, *spoken of by Daniel the prophet*, stand in the holy place (whoso readeth let him understand), then let them which be in Judea flee into the mountains." § It should be observed that Christ refers to Daniel here not as either a romancer or a forger, but as one of the great historic prophets of God, who was inspired to utter this prophecy and whose writings are therefore stamped with divine authority. Not only does our Lord credit Daniel with this prophecy, and endorse it as truthful, but He makes it His own and affirms on His own responsibility and authority that it will be fulfilled. If, therefore, Daniel was no prophet, neither is Christ. Here we see the destructive consequences which necessarily follow from a denial of the genuineness and authenticity of Daniel. It invalidates the testimony of Jesus Christ, whom God commends to us as the True and Faithful Witness. And Sir Isaac Newton did not state the case one whit too strongly when he said, "Whosoever rejects the prophecies of Daniel does as much as if he undermined the Christian religion, which, so to speak, is founded on Daniel's prophecies of Christ." ‖

* Matt. xix. 28, xxiv. 30, xxvi. 64; Acts vii. 56.

† Heb. xi. 33, 34.

‡ 1 Cor. vi. 2; 2 Thess. ii. 3-10.

§ Matt. xxiv. 15, 16.

‖ *Observations on the Prophecies of Daniel*, i, p. 10.

That the critics comprehend the seriousness of their position is plain from the efforts they make to explain the matter. Bleek essays to solve the difficulty by suggesting that Christ did not treat the Scripture in a critical way. But this does not relieve the matter; for, whether or not He was critical in His method of using the Scripture, the question is, Did Christ, in interpreting or citing Scripture, speak truth or error? He claimed to be the world's one true Prophet, amply qualified to understand, explain and fulfill the Word of God, and He fully identified Himself with Daniel in this one specific prophecy, affirming that it would come to pass precisely as Daniel had predicted, and therefore He and Daniel must stand or fall together as prophets of God. If on this occasion our Lord, in citing the Scripture, spoke falsely (whether through ignorance or for other reasons matters not), then our confidence, not only in the Bible, but in the testimony and authority of Christ as well, is successfully undermined.

But there is so far no occasion whatever for Christians to abandon their faith either in Daniel or Christ. We have shown that the critics have not yet made good their assertions in reference to this book, and that an unbroken line of cumulative evidence, derived partly from the book itself and partly from a large and varied series of undoubted historic facts, firmly establish the entire historical credibility of Daniel's book. It will continue in the future as in the past to bear witness for the truth of God and the claims of the Lord Jesus Christ.

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## IV.

# THE FUNCTION OF THE REASON IN CHRISTIANITY.

WHAT do we mean by the reason? Sometimes it stands for that faculty of the mind by which we reason or draw inferences. Its exercise is reasoning, and it itself is known as the understanding. Again, reason denotes the mental power which sees necessary truth at once, without an intermediate process of reasoning. As thus contrasted with the understanding, it is called intuition. Once more, by certain English writers reason is used in a general sense for that aggregate of mental and moral qualities by which man is distinguished from the brutes. Very often it is a comprehensive term for intelligence, or for the cognitive powers of man. Thus in the words of Charles Hodge, it is the "cognitive faculty, that which perceives, compares, judges, and infers." This is the sense in which it will be used in this paper, except when its employment otherwise is distinctly noted. The question, then, which is before us is, Has our faculty of perceiving, comparing, judging, and inferring any function in ascertaining and verifying religious truth? and if so, What is its function? and, more particularly, What is its function in these respects as related to the religious feeling, the conscience, the Church, and the Scriptures?

I. The reason has a function in religion. Within its own sphere it may be a source and ground and measure of religious truth.

That this is so appears, first of all, in the untenableness of the positions from which the contrary is argued. These are, in the main, three:

1. That of the Agnostic. He holds that knowledge is impossible in the sphere of religion. His creed is that "it is the glory of God to conceal a thing." He worships "an unknown God," so long as he worships. He appears in every age. You meet him to-day, perhaps, more frequently than ever. He appeals specially to Sir William Hamilton, to Mansel, to Herbert Spencer, thinkers who have had few equals in our time and few superiors in any other. Nor may it be denied that he stands for an important truth and because of it. In a most real sense God must ever be "the Great Unknown." "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou

find out the Almighty unto perfection?" The error of the Agnostic is not the affirmation that God can never be known fully; it is the assertion that He cannot be known at all. This denial, so far as it claims to be philosophical, is based, and may be exposed, on one or on all of three grounds.

It proceeds, first, on a false theory of the nature of knowledge. This is, that to know anything we must know it in its essence and be able to define it itself. Hence, as the finite cannot know the essence of the infinite God, and as He is, because infinite, that is without limits, indefinable, we cannot know Him. Would not this reasoning, however, bear equally against our most common knowledge? We discern no limits to the ocean. Yet does that keep us from knowing so much of it as comes within our vision? We do not know even a blade of grass absolutely or in its essence. The little child will ask with reference to it questions that the profoundest scientist cannot answer. Do we, then, know nothing concerning the blade of grass? Is it impossible that knowledge should be partial and yet true so far as it goes? If so, only God can know anything; for only God can know everything. Thus the Agnostic's theory of knowledge must land him in universal skepticism. If he is consistent, he cannot but say with Arcesilaus, "We can know nothing, not even this itself, that we know nothing."

Again, the denial that God can be known at all proceeds on a false theory of the condition of knowledge. This condition, it is held, is the identity of the subject knowing with the object known. As Mansel puts it, *Quantum sumus scimus* and *Simile simili cognoscitur*. Hence, as we are not a part of God, as we do not hold to pantheism, we cannot know God, we must hold to nescience. This theory, however, is manifestly false. Knowledge does require a capacity, a kinship. We could not know God if we were not spiritual and so akin to Him. But knowledge does not depend on identity of nature. If it did, all knowledge, except self-knowledge, would be impossible. To know that space is boundless, we should have to be boundless; for we can know only so far as we are. To know the non-ego, the ego would have to be the non-ego; for like is known only to like.

Once more, the denial that we are considering proceeds on a false definition of God as the infinite or the absolute. By the infinite is meant the all; and by the absolute the unrelated. In either aspect, consequently, God cannot be known. As the infinite or the all, He cannot be known: for to know is to distinguish the object known from others; and so if God could be known, He would not be the all or the infinite. To try to know Him, therefore, is like the attempt to take hold of something which must go to pieces if you

take hold of it. In like manner, God cannot be known as the absolute: for we can know only what is related to us just as we can see only what is presented to our eye; and so if God could be known, He would not be the unrelated or the absolute. To endeavor to know Him, consequently, would be like the effort to see what must lie beyond the range of vision.

This reasoning, however, though flawless in itself, fails because it is based on false premises. There is no such infinite, there is no such absolute.

There need not be. The absolute does not necessarily mean the unrelated. It may mean that which stands in no such relation to anything outside of itself as to depend on it or be constrained by it. An absolute sovereign is not one who sustains no relations to his subjects; he is one who sustains only such relations as he himself pleases. The infinite need not mean the all because it signifies unlimited. We may have an infinite line, an infinite surface, an infinite solid. Space may be infinite without being duration, and duration may be infinite without being space. Hence, a spirit may be infinite and yet be distinct from physical forms of existence and even from finite spirits. All that is necessary to his being infinite is that no limit can be assigned to him as a spirit. That is, when anything is said to be infinite all that need be meant is, not that it is not limited in the sense of being distinguished from other things, but that no limit is possible to it as so distinguished. Hence, when we say that God is infinite, it does not necessarily imply that He is the sum of all things, and so unknowable; it may as well mean that He is a spirit or person to whose being and attributes *as such a spirit or person* no limit is possible. Though he embraces nothing but himself, that self is boundless.

Again, not only need there not be any such infinite or absolute as the philosophical Agnostic supposes; there cannot be. The phenomenal or relative universe demands the absolute as its ground; and because it is its ground, the absolute must have come into relation to it. So, also, the infinite cannot be the all. The two are and must be radically distinct. The infinite is a term of quality; the all is a term of quantity. The infinite is the not-finite; the all is the sum of the finite. Hence, the one cannot be the other. They are mutually exclusive as goodness and space.

And all this is confirmed by consciousness. Its clearest and strongest testimony, a testimony that must be accepted if we are to be justified in thinking, is to our personality. That is, consciousness insists that the infinite does not embrace us, and so that it is not the all; and thus it exposes the untenableness of the last ground on which the Agnostic would take his stand.

2. There is the position of the Mystic. To him God is not incognizable as to the Agnostic, but is cognizable only by an organ other than reason. We believe in God, though we cannot prove His existence. We feel and realize spiritual truth, though in terms and propositions we cannot express it. In a word, religion resides, not in the reason or cognitive powers, not even in the will or active powers, but in the sensibility. Such was the principle with which Schleiermacher overcame the rationalism of Germany. Such, with modifications, was the teaching of Theodore Parker and the New England Transcendentalists. Such, too, is the root of the tendency now so widely apparent to exalt the Christian consciousness as the discoverer and the test of truth, and to decry the importance of everything like systematic or reasoned theology.

While admitting that those who have thus emphasized the importance of feeling in religion have in doing so done good service to it, we are bound to deny that religion is wholly, or even chiefly, a matter of feeling.

In the first place, feeling is impossible without the exercise of reason. Feeling presupposes intelligence. As Bowen says, "It is a state of mind consequent on the reception of some idea." Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence on God implies some knowledge of Him. How could we feel dependence on that of which we knew nothing? Could a child feel thus towards his father if he did not first become aware of his father and of the relation between them? Were this not so, religious feeling could not be discriminated as such. Within the sphere of feeling proper we are conscious only of pleasure or pain. Here the rapture of the sensualist and the devout elevation of the saint are on a level. Of the nature of its object feeling itself gives not the least intimation. As it is its object that arouses it, so it is its object that determines its character; and an object cannot be such unless it be known. "All feeling must be able to justify itself to some idea." Hence, the Mystic in making religion begin with feeling shows only that he does not know what feeling is.

Nor is the position of the Mystic true even so far as this, that there is no place in religion for the logical faculty, the understanding. Because some of the truths of religion are intuitive, it does not follow that all are. The idea of God is innate; the Bible makes no attempt to prove His existence; many claim that the arguments of theology fail to prove it. Still, it will not result that all the truths involved in our relations to Him are also intuitive. Personality is a fact of consciousness; we cannot demonstrate it. The relations of the world about us to our personality, however, are not, in the main, facts of consciousness. These have to be ascertained

by observation and reasoning. Thus because religion is partly a matter of intuition it does not follow that it is wholly so. Analogy would seem to suggest that even in it there might be a place for reasoning.

This may be shown to be so even in the case of those religious ideas which are clearly innate. Take the idea of God. We believe in Him because we were constituted to do so. Admit, if you please, that in the last analysis we are conscious of Him. Still, we are all aware that there are arguments for the existence of God, and that the profoundest thinkers have been and are yet elaborating them. Thus the fact shows that we can reason concerning even that which is intuitive in religion. It has been done; it is being done. Moreover, the result proves that it is well that it should be done. These arguments are useful as replies to skeptics. They are yet more useful in developing our innate idea of God. If they do not make it more certain that there is a God, they do make it much clearer what God is. There is thus both a place for reasoning in religion, and it is well that reasoning should be in its place. It will be. We are so made that we cannot help endeavoring to systematize and reconcile the facts which we admit to be true. The question is not whether there shall be theology, but what shall be the system of the theology. Schleiermacher may claim to begin with feeling, but his development is by logic. Even extreme Mysticism is itself the refutation of its pretension. Its feeling depends on reason, and it reasons while it feels.

3. There is the position of the Indifferentist and Exclusionist. It is with the understanding only, and not with reason as denoting the cognitive powers in general, that he has his quarrel. He argues from the sacredness of Christianity as a divine revelation. "It were presumption, it were impiety," he holds, "to reason with reference to a 'Thus saith the Lord.' We ought simply to listen and obey. Admit that what He says is above reason, or even that it is contrary to reason; it is enough that God has spoken." I have called such objectors Indifferentists, since indifference is commonly the root of their objection. Numerous in all our churches, they do not prize spiritual things sufficiently to care to reason with reference to them; more especially as it is hard work to reason closely, and particularly in the sphere of religion because of the grandeur and spirituality of its truths.

There are those, however, who make the same plea, but with a different motive. We may call them Exclusionists. They are profound thinkers, as G. H. Lewes; and some of them are also sincerely religious men, as Michael Faraday. They would regard reason and revelation as independent and even as mutually exclusive

authorities. Hence, the latter may be true, though above the former or even though contrary to it; and so there can be no place for reasoning in religion. This is beyond its sphere.

This view, we must admit, contains much more than a grain of truth. When God has spoken we cannot listen too reverently. It is true, but in another sense it is far from true, that the Bible should be treated just as other books. The question, however, is, Could it be honored, if its teachings were considered contrary to reason or even above reason? No. Take the case of "contrary to reason." A revelation that was such we could not respect. We may believe a royal proclamation simply because it is a royal proclamation. We will not do so, however, until we have discerned on it the king's seal, or until reason has been otherwise satisfied that it is a royal proclamation. In like manner, though reason be not called on to try the contents of a supernatural revelation, it must decide as to the evidence that it is from God. Indeed, as there must be some test of this, so, until the revelation has been proved to be supernatural, reason is the only test available. This, however, implies that the contents of the revelation are rational as truly as is its evidence. Otherwise, we should have reason proving the unreasonable, and so stultifying itself. In a word, a revelation justifying to reason, as it must do before in any event it may be received, a right to teach what is contrary to reason, is an impossible conception.

It is the same in the case of "above reason." In one sense, of course, this phrase suggests an important truth. There is much in religion, as in nature, that we cannot comprehend. There are doctrines of the Bible of which it is specially true that we can know them only "in part." They are too large for us. Though we can see into them, we are not able, and we never shall be able, to reason through them. "The riches of Christ" are, indeed, "unsearchable." This, however, is not what is always meant by the phrase, "above reason." Since Liebnitz it has been used by many apologists to suggest that while nothing can be accepted as revealed which contradicts reason, yet revelation may communicate to us what in its nature, and not merely in its extent, transcends reason. The difficulty is not that the truth is too large for reason to comprehend; it is that it is of a sort different from what reason can apprehend. That the ocean is above human vision because it is too broad to be taken in by the eye, illustrates the true sense of "above reason." That oxygen gas is above human vision because it is too ethereal to be its object, illustrates the meaning of "above reason" in the theory that we are criticising. Now this view is open to the same objection that we noted in the case of "contrary to reason." In-

deed, what is "above reason" in the sense that we are considering is "contrary to reason." We would not speak even of the vast stretches of the ocean that we do not see as invisible. Its nature is such that it can come into relation to the eye, though its extent is such that most of it lies beyond our vision. We would, however, speak of oxygen gas as invisible. Its nature is such that it cannot come into relation to the eye; it is not simply beyond vision, it is contrary to vision. In like manner, there are truths so far-reaching, so manifold in their connections, that they will always be beyond the comprehension of our reason; but if there were truths whose nature was such that they could not come into relation to reason at any point, they would not merely be beyond it, they would be contrary to it. Between them and it, as between sight and the invisible, there would be and could be only contradiction. Nor may we urge that, as what is contrary to sight may still be found true by some other test—for chemistry can detect the invisible oxygen; so what is "contrary to reason" might yet be shown to be true by higher revelation. The analogy does not hold. In physical nature there are many tests of truth, and so what cannot come into relation to one of them may do so to another: but in spiritual nature there is only one test, there is but one reason, we can conceive of no other; and thus what cannot come into relation to it so that reason can begin to construe it must be to us utterly unknown, indeed a nonentity. Even a special revelation could not be believed, because it could not be accepted, if there were no side of it that reason could recognize as rational. Faith, as we shall see hereafter, is and must be rational. Indeed, it is reason. It is reason acting on the most rational of all grounds, divine testimony. Its object, consequently, the subject of that testimony, cannot differ in kind from the object of reason proper. Therefore, to say that the Bible can be "above reason" in the sense that its truths belong to a sphere which reason cannot enter, is as absurd as to say that it can be true though "contrary to reason." Both suppositions are identical, and so the former as impossible as the latter. Nor does all this imply the Dogmatism of Wolf, that the doctrines of the Bible should be accepted only so far as they have been demonstrated. It is rather the position of that master apologist, Henry B. Smith, that every doctrine has its philosophical aspect and, therefore, that that only is true faith which reason introduces and which even the understanding can and ought to follow, though it may sometimes have to do so at an infinite distance.

Such, then, are the three grounds on which it is denied that reason has a function in religion; that of the Agnostic, that of the Mystic, and that of the Indifferentist and Exclusionist; positions the

manifested untenableness of which seems to show that reason has a function in religion. When the adversary cannot make his point, it is a strong presumption that the case is gained.

We will turn now to the positive considerations which prove this to be so.

Observe, therefore, that Christianity is very stimulating intellectually. The influence of the Bible is not confined to rendering men "wise unto salvation." Beyond all other books it has made thinkers. It cannot fail to do so. The intellect is enlarged chiefly in proportion to the truths on which it is exercised, and where can we find truths which for sublimity and profundity can be compared with those of the Scriptures, "the deep things of God"? Now may it be supposed that Christianity has no place for the reason which she, more than all else, has thus developed? As well might we think that a father would give his children their best training with reference to judging for themselves, if he did not mean them to do so.

Again, Christianity demands and, since it is true, deserves the active service of the reason. We are required to present even our bodies "living sacrifices" to God. In view of what He is and what we are, it is but just that we should. Hence, the system of truth in which God has personally revealed His highest glory is slighted, if respect even of the lowest sort is wanting to it. Therefore, though the assent of the reason to the truths of Christianity is not so exalted as faith's consent to them, still, it is an assent which is indispensable, because it is an assent which is due. He who is satisfied merely to believe Christianity to be from God, who does not try also to understand why and how this is, dishonors the God on whom he professes to believe. Anselm has well said: "*Negligentia mihi videtur, si postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intelligere.*"

That this must be so appears from the nature of faith. It is complex. It is the consent of the will to the assent of the reason. It begins with reason in the general sense of cognition; for it must have an object, and the object to be such must be known. It develops itself with the help of reason in the sense of the logical faculty; for it consents to what rests on testimony which it understands that it is rational for it to receive. Its further growth depends much on the effort of the understanding to comprehend its mysteries. Is not such the child's faith, which our Lord has presented as our ideal? The little one cannot comprehend what his father says, but he believes it, because he knows that his father is worthy of all confidence; for this very reason he keeps asking the why and the wherefore; he understands that his father could not

teach him that on which it would be vain for him to think: and as by reasoning he advances in the comprehension of what he had received simply on his father's testimony, his belief in him, and consequently his love for him, grow in strength because in intelligence. Hence, Henry B. Smith has fitly written: "He who thinks highly feels deeply. From long meditation on the wonder of the divine revelation, the mind returns with added glow to the simplicity of faith." And, therefore, a wholly unreasoning faith is not merely a weak faith, or a wrong kind of faith; it is not faith.

Beyond all this, reason itself is a divine revelation. Human knowledge is not aboriginal and self-subsistent, but derived. It issues originally from a higher source than the finite intelligence. "Man is able to perceive intuitively, only because the Supreme Reason illumines him." "The Λόγος," says St. John, "is the light of men; and coming into the world enlightens every man." Nor is it otherwise with discursive thought. Reasoning is controlled by laws which God has established and which reveal to us His intellectual nature. "Our thoughts are not God's thoughts;" yet when we really think, it is in accord with the regulative principles of His thought. Logic binds our thinking because God is essentially logical. Besides this, in natural religion, quite as much as in revealed, God is the object of thought. Therefore, He is the author of natural religion, and so it is a revelation from Him as well as of Him, not only because, as we have just seen, human reason has the ground of its authority in the Supreme Reason, but also because the object generally is the cause of the subjective impression, on account of the connection between subject and object. Thus our consciousness of God is not produced by us, but by God who impresses us. Nor is this all. "God is not simply the object of knowledge, He is also an agent who operates on the human mind so that it shall have this knowledge of Himself." "In the phrase of St. Paul, God 'reveals' and 'manifests' His being and attributes within the human spirit." There is, therefore, no difference between natural and revealed religion as to the source. Both are equally from God. The difference is as to the record. That of the latter constitutes the Scriptures; that of the former is written on the expanse of nature and on the tables of the heart.

Now the question arises, Does the later of these revelations supplant the earlier? Should the voice of reason be disregarded because the voice of prophecy has been heard? Such is not God's method. He changes the use of things; He never supersedes them. A revelation still existing though it had served its purpose, would be an anomaly in the universe. He who knows the end from the beginning has no garret in which to store what He needs no longer;

for He created and has permitted no such things. That the revelation in reason continues, and specially that, as we have seen, the revelation in the Scriptures tends only to develop it, would seem to prove that, as ever and more than ever, reason has a function in religion. All this is strengthened by God's method in the written revelation itself. It has been progressive. It consists of successive revelations. The Gospel has followed the Law and has fulfilled it, but it has not superseded it; it has only changed its use. This is true even of the ceremonial requirements. If their function was to point sinners to "the Lamb of God," now that once for all He has been offered up, their function is to be "the patterns," and in so far forth the interpreters, of the heavenly sacrifice. And precisely so, if God has given in His Word and in His Son a revelation of Himself which goes far beyond that in nature, the analogy even of the supernatural revelation in the Scriptures would indicate, not that reason was no longer to be heeded, rather that in its more elementary but as divine teachings we should seek light on the mysteries of grace.

All this is confirmed by experience. Schiller wrote: "The history of the world is the judgment of the world." He would seem to have meant much what our Lord did when He said: "By their fruits ye shall know them." It is so in this case. The history of Christianity proves that reason has a function in religion.

It does so negatively. Whenever reason has not been recognized in religion, the issue has been evil. If, under such circumstances, faith has not always degenerated into gross superstition, it has at least lost its power to sustain itself. No spiritual movement has promised more than did Pietism. So vigorous was it at first that, as Hurst has said, "Rationalism in Germany, without Pietism as its forerunner, would have been fatal for centuries." Yet Pietism lacked "a homogeneous race of teachers." Its founder, Spener, had blended reason and faith harmoniously. His successors cast off the former and blindly followed the latter. Hence, Pietism fell. The good which it had done continued; it itself disappeared.

On the other hand, there is the positive historical argument. Whenever reason has been, as we claim, rightly honored in religion, good has resulted. The Roman empire could scarcely have become a Christian State without the apologies of Justin, of Origen, and of Tertullian. To the age of faith which succeeded the time of Augustine no single man contributed so much as did this great Bishop of Hippo, and his grand work was that magnificent effort of reason, "The City of God." If the divorce of religion and culture was one of the causes of the Deism of the last century, the defense of Christianity by Butler and Paley and their associates had more

to do with the revival of faith with which the century closed, and their defense was altogether on grounds of reason. If but lately the school of Tübingen threatened to banish the supernatural from history and even from the Gospels, the overthrow of its influence has been followed by new spiritual life in Germany, and this overthrow has been effected by German scholarship. This historical connection between reason and faith becomes most significant when we consider the work of the Church or missions. Their greatest advance has been associated with those periods in which reason was duly employed in religion. As a distinguished professor of Church History has well said: "The age which may be called by eminence the age of the Apologists was also the greatest missionary age of the ancient Church;" and "the great apologetic work in England during the last century was accompanied, certainly immediately followed, by the great missionary movement, which from that day to this has been gathering strength, and is at this time the most characteristic work of the Church." In a word, we have but to turn to history to read the confirmation of Bacon's remark: "A little philosophy leads a man to atheism, but a good deal to religion."

Were all that has been said, however, insufficient, the sure testimony of the Word of God would still be for us enough. The Bible establishes the right of reason in religion. Max Müller is correct when he asserts that Christianity is the most philosophical of all religions. The apostles, our Lord Himself, appealed to reason as well as insisted on faith; and they insisted on faith because they appealed to reason. Life eternal, we are taught, consists in the knowledge of the only true God and of Jesus Christ whom He has sent. If specific statements are required, we have St. Peter's charge "to sanctify in our hearts Christ as Lord: being ready always to give answer to every man that asketh you a reason concerning the hope that is in you, yet with meekness and fear;" a charge, too, which the general aim of the epistle in which it occurs shows to be addressed, not to ministers only or specially, but to every Christian.

II. I have given so much time to proving that reason has a function in religion because at the present day and in the Church this is what needs to be established. Our tendency is not towards the sin and folly of exalting reason unduly in religion; it is rather towards the folly and sin of acting as if God, who is the Supreme Reason, could be irrational. Moreover, in demonstrating, as we believe that we have demonstrated, that reason has a function in religion, we have stated the principles which will enable us now easily to answer our second question, viz.: What is the function of the reason in Christianity? A source and ground and measure of what is to be

believed concerning God, and as to the duty which He requires of us, to what extent and with what limitations is it so?

Limitations there must be.

This is rendered probable by the fact that the greatest thinkers have so supposed. It was the peculiarly wise teacher of the Hebrews who said, "No man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end." "The Greek sage by emphasis declared that, if he excelled others, it was only in this—that he knew that he knew nothing. It was the avowed object of the sagacious Locke to teach man the length of his tether. Reid labored to restrain the pride of philosophy." It was Kant's design to show how little the speculative reason can accomplish. Sir William Hamilton sought to prove within what narrow limits the thought of man is confined. The metaphysician *par excellence* of Oxford has endeavored to undermine the rational theology of both Britain and Germany. Herbert Spencer, whose transcendent ability even his opponents must admit, holds that man's highest knowledge of God is that He is unknown and unknowable. These are but specimens. Surely such a consensus of opinion raises a strong presumption. When those who have been most conscious of limitations to the reason are those who have striven most to emancipate it, it would seem that these limitations must be real.

This also is confirmed by history. Whenever men have "leaned to their own understanding" in religion, spiritual death and moral corruption have been the result. But two examples out of many may be adduced.

Gnosticism was an early attempt to blend the philosophy of the East, or of Greece, with the doctrines of the Gospel. It would bring the New Testament into harmony with the speculations of the philosophers. It numbered many noble disciples, and it has given us some noble teaching. It was the Gnostic Basilides who said: "I will assert anything, sooner than I will allow a complaint or a slur to be cast on Providence." Yet Gnosticism is responsible for some of the most dangerous errors of the present day; and though the term Gnostic was originally glorious, it became infamous because of the idle opinions and dissolute lives of the persons who bore it. They gave reason free course, and it ruined them as well as stultified itself.

The other example that may be noted is modern Rationalism. Behold it in Germany. Wolf, with whom it began, was Christian in fact as well as by name. It was with a holy purpose that he devoted himself to the study of mathematics; as he himself said, he would "reduce theology to incontrovertible certainty." He meant no harm when he assumed as his cardinal principle that doc-

trine was true, or fit to be taught, only so far as it could be mathematically demonstrated. Nor did the evil of his teaching appear at once in his successors. Even Semler, the author of the famous Accommodation Theory which has done so much to impair the trustworthiness of Biblical Criticism—even Semler was pure in his private life, and little has been written that is more touching and edifying than is his own account of the death of his daughter. But he was all this in spite of Rationalism. To see its true, because mature, fruit, we must look for it in such men as Bahrdt; teachers who took up the Bible with sacrilegious purpose and made it the plaything of a vicious heart; men who, in some cases, surrendered themselves to the corruptions of the gambling-room, the beer-cellar and the house of prostitution; persons who, though professors of theology, were the slaves of passion even more than of doubt. Behold Rationalism in England as exemplified in the Deists. Here, too, it began well, so far as sincerity and nobility of aim were concerned. Lord Herbert wrote to prove that Christianity as a revelation was not needed; but on bended knee he asked of God a sign whether he should publish his book, and he believed that he received one. To appreciate, however, the awful moral as well as spiritual results of the "religion of nature," we have only to remember that Hume taught that self-denial was mischievous; that Bolingbroke said that morality was but selfishness; and that even Herbert asserted that "lust was to be blamed no more than hunger." Behold Rationalism in France as illustrated by the Encyclopedists. Many of them were amiable men; some of them, at least at first, were estimable men. There were acts of Voltaire as the apostle of toleration which make us exclaim, *O si sic omnia!* Helvetius dismissed God from the world; but he was benevolent to the poor. More quickly and terribly than elsewhere, however, did the true fruit of their teaching appear. During the four hundred and twenty days of the Reign of Terror "*la sainte guillotine*" destroyed four thousand victims. Doubtless, Voltaire and his associates would have disclaimed these atrocities; but what did their principles do to hinder them? These things were done in the name of Reason, and Voltaire and his associates made reason supreme.

Why the results of Rationalism should be so awful, a study of the reason reveals. Its own testimony concerning itself is that Rationalism is irrational. This is so because of three facts:

1. The human reason has been vitiated by human depravity. Sin has darkened the intellect as well as corrupted the heart. "There is not that clear perception of truth which characterizes the angelic intuition, and which was possessed by the unfallen Adam." No one has thought seriously and has not felt that his thinking

faculty is unnaturally weak, and scarcely anything is more significant than the dependence of clearness of intellect on purity of life. Again, sin "gives a bias to the will against the truth." Men do not like to retain even that knowledge of God which they have by nature. The history of religion in general is the proof of this. Once more, "sin weakens the power of intuition itself." Vice, and, though to a lesser degree, sin not so gross, must debilitate the spiritual and rational faculty by strengthening the sensuous nature. Finally, "as part of the punishment of sin, God withdraws for a time His common grace, so that there is little or no intuitive perception of moral truth." He "gives over to a reprobate mind" those who "change His truth into a lie." If all this does not apply to those who have been born again "new creatures" in Christ, it still remains true even of them at their best, that they "see through a glass darkly."

2. Even, however, if the reason of man had not been vitiated by sin, its function would still be limited; for it itself, like its subject, is finite. As compared with the infinitude of God, ideal man would "be less than nothing and vanity." How presumptuous, then, even for him, it would be to hope to comprehend God, or to "lean to his own understanding" in the legitimate, because necessary, effort to do so. The eye that gazes on the ocean may be perfect, but it would be folly for it to trust itself for what lies beyond the little circle of the horizon.

3. Were human reason both unimpaired and infinite, it still would not be fitted to solve the deepest problems of religion, or to answer the most pressing questions of human life. For, after all, the one inquiry which will not be suppressed is not, What is God? or, What is man? but it is, "How can man be just with God?" The consciousness of guilt is universal; all religions testify to it. But further than the consciousness of guilt, reason, unaided, cannot go. She knows that God will "by no means clear the guilty;" she knows also that He will never punish the guilty beyond their deserts; she knows, in short, that God will be absolutely just. This is involved in His nature as God. Because He is God, we are able to argue that He will always be just; He would not be God, could He be otherwise. It is not so, however, with reference to His grace. He must act justly; He need not show grace. Whether He will or not, depends on His will as well as on His nature. The question, then, is not as to what He must do; it is as to what He has decided to do. This, of course, can be known only as He shall inform us. Socrates, therefore—as he could reason merely from God's nature—was right when he remarked in substance that we could not be sure whether God would pardon sin. Tschoop, the Mohican chief, was

correct when, having come to the Moravians to ask for a missionary for his people, he said: "Do not send us a man to tell us that there is a God—we all know that; or that we are sinners—we all know that; but send one to tell us about salvation." On the most important and pressing of all subjects, consequently—viz., redemption—reason can teach us simply the supreme need of it. As to the certainty of it, or as to the method of it, it of itself can say nothing. This is not because the truths of salvation are above reason, in the sense of unrelated to it; it is because they depend on what is beyond reason's ken until specially revealed by God—on what is, not necessary with Him, but optional with Him.

Two results of these limitations require to be noted:

On the one hand, if religion is to spring—as it must do to be true—from the reconciliation of God to man and of man to God, reason cannot be the sole measure and ground and source of all religious knowledge and conviction. As has been seen, the most important knowledge lies, in the nature of the case, beyond it. Hence, there must be the light of special revelation as well as that of reason, and the supreme failure of English Deism is only one of many proofs of this. Nor, though not the source, can reason be the measure and ground of all religious truth; so that, though special revelation is admitted, it is accepted as such merely because reason endorses it. This is practically, as before, to make reason the only source of knowledge in religion, at least for the learned; and that this less extreme form of Deism is no better than the other, is evinced by the fact that it failed as signally. Nor, once more, though neither the source nor the ground, can reason be even the measure of all religious truth; so that, according to the Dogmatism of Wolf, what has been revealed is to be accepted only in so far as it has been demonstrated. That which is too vast to be seen by us we may not expect to be able to measure. Are we to believe in the love of Christ merely so far as we can now explain it? Is not the essence of its preciousness that, though we can know it in part and are bidden to grow in the knowledge of it, it will always "pass our knowledge?" As might have been supposed, such dogmatism has invariably developed into lifeless rationalism. He who will admit nothing which transcends himself cannot grow in likeness to Christ.

On the other hand, then, if reason is to exercise its legitimate function as a source or ground or even measure of truth, there must be some rule by which it itself shall be controlled. Where do we find this rule?

In the feelings? Should the reason, as so many are now holding, be subordinated to the Christian consciousness? Though we believe in election, should we deny reprobation if our feelings rebel

against it? No. Our feelings have been corrupted by sin quite as much as our reason has been vitiated. They share in its finiteness. There is not a limitation which it has and from which they are exempt. At best, therefore, they could be only a guide coördinate with reason. They might not presume to direct it. But this is not all. In their nature the feelings show that they themselves ought to be controlled by reason. As has been seen, they depend on it. Even their character can be determined only by it. It is absurd, therefore, to let the feelings decide for us what is rational, to judge that a doctrine is not true simply because we do not like it. This is as if we were to say that whatever is agreeable to the body is safe. Then a man who is freezing should go to sleep because he feels drowsy. The fact is that before we can trust our feelings in any sphere we must know whether truth or error has aroused them, and they can determine this in religion no more than the freezing man's drowsy feeling can decide for him that it is a feeling which should be heeded. That we do not like a doctrine may be the very reason why we ought to try to hold it. The heathen "did not like to retain God in their knowledge." Nor may it be urged that this does not apply to Christian consciousness. Though to a less extent, it does; and it is bound to, until Christian consciousness has been perfectly sanctified. Nor will the relation of feeling to reason be essentially different even then. Feeling will be perfect, because it will be perfectly rational. When God glorifies a man He restores, He does not pervert, those relations between his powers, which relations are so divine that even now in his ruin they may be seen to be normal. Were historical proof of this position needed, we should have only to study the significant connection between mysticism and fanaticism.

Since, then, the feelings may not be reason's rule, may the conscience? May our sense of right be the measure of the rational? May we adopt the view so common that he who means to do right will be right? Again, No. Not less than reason or feeling has the conscience been corrupted by sin. As in the case of both of them, therefore, its judgments may not be received without question. Indeed, the most atrocious crimes have been committed for conscience's sake. The Hindu mother cast her child to the crocodiles because she felt this to be her duty. Paul tells us that he "verily thought with himself that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth." With such facts, it is hard to see how any one could, as James Martineau has done, make conscience the seat of authority in religion. Undoubtedly, in all it gives the unique sense of right and consequent obligation; but, undoubtedly, too, in all it needs to be corrected as to the particulars of right and obligation.

Were this not so, however, conscience might not be elevated as the standard for the reason. Though conscience has a cognitive element, its sphere of cognition is much narrower than that of the reason. The function of the reason is to tell us what is. The function of the conscience is to emphasize among the things that are, merely those which also ought to be. Thus, for example, while conscience only affirms that we ought to obey God, to reason is submitted the broader proposition that God is sovereign. It would seem, therefore, that reason should guide conscience rather than that conscience should determine reason; that, in the light of the consequences of the fact that God is sovereign, our duty to Him should be developed, rather than that our sense of right should decide as to the truth of His sovereignty. Nor is historical proof wanting, either, for the correctness of this position. No man ever exalted, and probably no man could have exalted, morality as did Kant. Yet, in reducing religion to it, he destroyed religion. He allowed public worship, but only for the recitation of moral hymns or the hearing of moral discourses. He permitted private prayer, but only as meditation. In summing up all religious truth in the moral law, he denied those saving truths in connection with which comes the divine power by which alone the law can be kept. Hence, as might be supposed, nothing is taught more plainly by history than this—that the religion of conscience only, or mere morality, ceases at last to be even morality.

Since, then, neither the feelings nor the conscience can afford the guide that reason needs, shall we find it in the Church? Because she is under the constant leadership of the Holy Ghost, may it not be that reason should submit to her dogmas as to what is and must be rational? Is not the Romish position of the infallibility of the Church, or of the Pope, the true one? Again, No. It is difficult to see why the Holy Spirit should secure perfect holiness or infallibility in the Church any more than in the individuals who compose the Church; and that He does not, is evident from the painful facts that the history of the Church is a record of sin, and that the creeds of the Church have, on many and even important points, often been perplexingly conflicting. Were this difficulty, however, less serious than it is, there would still be a fatal one. Reason lies nearer to us than any other authority, and so no other evidence can be sufficient to overturn its testimony. If you see a tree in front of you, the only thing that can make you really believe even that it may be an illusion, is that other men, with eyes as good as yours, cannot see it. Galileo could have been convinced that the earth did not move round the sun only by astronomers who could prove, by his own mathematics, that he was incorrect. The authority of

the Church, because evidence other than that of reason, would weigh with him not at all in such a matter. She might, by her terrors, force him to declare on his knees his detestation of his own doctrine; but she could not prevent him from saying, at least in an undertone, as he rose, "It does move, for all that!" The only theory, therefore, on which the Church could be claimed as the absolute standard for the reason, would be the Hegelian one—that the divine immanence in the Church made her actually and in all respects the divine reason developing itself on earth. Of course, we cannot now discuss Hegelianism; nor would formal refutation of it seem necessary when we remember that it is admitted to involve such beliefs as that "the real at any time is the rational for that time," and that, consequently, "might makes right." Here, as elsewhere, moreover, the judgment of history is decisive. Whenever the Church, whether holding this philosophy or not, has been exalted above the individual reason—not merely as a divinely appointed teacher, which she is in proportion to her Scripturalness, but as an absolute authority—reason, instead of being corrected and developed, has been perverted and dwarfed. The course of Roman Catholicism teaches no plainer or more awful lesson. Even the Church must be judged by reason.

Since, then, neither the feelings, nor the conscience, nor the Church can afford the standard that reason must have, if it is to discharge its function in religion, where shall we find it? Shall it not be in the Scriptures? Yes; for they fulfill the two required conditions. In their original form they were throughout, even as to details of every kind, absolutely errorless; and they were this because they are the inspired Word of Him who is the Supreme Reason. The original form Providence has preserved or restored in all respects, save a comparatively few of the merest unessentials in expression. Thus the Scriptures afford an adequate standard, and a standard of the same kind with reason itself. They are, consequently, what reason itself, in its very nature, demands for its true development; and, hence, nothing can be so rational as for reason to accept the Scriptures, and proceed reverently and humbly, but confidently, in them, even more than in nature, to think God's thoughts after Him.

III. We are, therefore, prepared for our third question, which can now be dismissed with a few concise statements; viz., the inquiry, What is the function of the reason in relation to the Bible, or Inspired Word of God?

On the one hand, because of what we have seen to be true as to the dignity of the reason, and the importance of its function in religion, we may affirm as follows:

1. For all that logically precedes the Scriptures, as the being and personality of God, the need of a written revelation, etc., we must go back to philosophy, to reason pure and simple. Even the Romanists admit this. Of the four propositions of the Holy See (December 12, 1855) concerning Traditionalism and Rationalism, the third is: "The use of reason precedes faith, and leads men to it with the aid of revelation and grace." This is evidently true. Though reason is not infallible, yet antecedently to revelation, it is, as we have seen, the only instrument of investigation, the only test. Hence, Henry B. Smith has well said: "If we cannot construct the foundations and the outworks of the Christian system on impregnable grounds; if we cannot show the possibility of miracles, and of a revelation; if we cannot prove—absolutely prove—the existence of a wise, intelligent, personal, and providential Ruler of all things: then we are merged in infidelity, or given over to an unfounded faith. If we cannot settle these points on the field of open discussion, we cannot settle them at all." Nor may it be said that reason's results cannot be certain, inasmuch as, since she cannot discover the truths of revelation, she could not prove the necessity of them. There could scarcely be a worse fallacy. A man may be too sick or too ignorant to find the remedy that he needs, and yet not be too sick or too ignorant to make known what he needs.

2. Reason should judge of the evidence that the Scriptures are the Word of God, and so to be received on His authority. Faith in them as such is irrational and impossible without evidence; for faith involves assent, and assent is conviction produced by evidence. Yet here, for the best results, reason must be to such a degree under the influence of the revelation as to be favorable towards its evidence. Otherwise, to what is strongest it will be blind. One need not be a Christian to be intellectually convinced of the divine origin of Christianity, but one must be illuminated by the supreme reason of the Spirit of Christ, if he is to feel Him to be "God manifest in the flesh." Nor is this strange. Careful investigation may prove to you that a certain statue is a Phidian marble, but only the artist's spirit can cause you to feel that it must be.

3. Reason should decide as to the actual content of the Scriptures —what it is that their words convey in a fair historico-grammatical interpretation. Exegesis is a rational work. The guidance of the Holy Spirit is indispensable in it, but this is that the reason of the exegete may be preserved from error. The right of private judgment of the Bible, one of the foundation-stones of Protestantism, is based on this function of the reason.

4. Reason should distinguish among the interpretations of the Scriptures between what is above reason in the true sense of beyond

it, and what is above reason in the wrong sense of out of relation to it, or contrary to it. That is, as a revelation must evince rationally its right to be believed; so, as has been seen, it itself can contain nothing irrational or impossible. In deciding what is thus, however, the reason must act rationally and not capriciously. Its judgments must be guided by principles which commend themselves to the common consciousness of men, such as—that that is impossible which involves a contradiction; that it is impossible that God should do or command what is morally wrong; that it is impossible that revelation should deny any well-authenticated truth, whether of intuition, experience or science; that it is impossible for what reason cannot try to comprehend to be true. All this must be so; for God, who is the Supreme Reason, cannot but be rational and hence self-consistent.

5. Within the system of truth drawn out of the Scriptures, reason—that is, the understanding—must shape the definitions and develop the creed, so as to ward off error and bring out the truth with reference to the particular wants and philosophical attainments of each age. This, as has been said, is a necessity of the mind. Only when we can cease trying to be scientific, can we, without inconsistency, decry systematic theology and creeds. The Socinian and Arminian position, therefore, that we should content ourselves with the mere statements of Scripture and not go on and develop the legitimate inferences from them, is not only false; it is also impossible, as is evinced by the notorious fact that Socinians and Arminians, as well as Calvinists, have their systematic theology. Indeed, on but one condition is the course which they advocate possible, and that is, that there has been a loss of interest in "the deep things of God." Hence, the clamor even among us for a short creed to state only the truths indispensable to salvation, is far from reassuring. It would seem to indicate less zeal for the truth as such and to forebode less efficiency in the service of Him who is "the truth." A great Scotch theologian has said: "No mere simplification of a belief has ever conquered, unless the half has burned more brightly than the whole." Nor may it be replied that the fallen understanding is not competent to grapple with spiritual realities. The same might be said with reference to the manifold mysteries of nature. All that the reply amounts to is, that in the use of the understanding, as of every other power, we should constantly seek the aid of the Holy Spirit; and the question may well be raised in rejoinder, whether God would have addressed the Scriptures to human reason, and commanded us to "search" them, and promised by His Spirit to guide us, had He not intended that even the understanding should make the effort? It is the searching faculty.

On the other hand, because of the limitations of the reason, we may affirm:

1. Reason may not presume by itself to fathom or reconcile even those of the deep truths of Scripture which it can discern unaided. The fact is that it has not been able to. As Prof. Christlieb has written: "Neither in ancient nor in modern times has it been possible to find in the whole earth a nation which, without the revelation recorded in Scripture and by its own powers of thought, has arrived at definite belief in one living personal God!" And this sweeping statement is emphasized by Plato's well-known complaint, "How hard is it to discover the Father of the universe!" There is a theology of nature and of reason, but even when most developed its incompleteness and uncertainty demand the full and clear revelation in the Written Word.

2. In particular, reason alone has nothing to say as to either the fact or the method of human salvation. It is even her function, that she may not deceive men, to declare that on this supreme question she of herself knows nothing. When, therefore, God has revealed His grace in the Gospel of His Son, she has but two things to do—to point men to it, and to show them its wondrous harmony with the scheme of nature. The highest function of Philosophy or of Science is to bring men to the cross as to that for which she has ever been seeking but which she could never by herself have found; and then with them take her place, an expectant reverent learner, before "the wisdom as well as the power of God," and thus herself be made "wise unto salvation."

PRINCETON. W. BRENTON GREENE, JR.

# V.

# REVIEWS OF

# RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

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## I.—THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

ENCYCLOPÆDIE DER HEILIGE GODGELEERDHEID. Door Dr. ABRAHAM KUYPER, Amsterdam, 1894. 3 vols, 8vo, pp. 486, 634, 585.

These three goodly volumes constitute unquestionably one of the most important contributions made in recent years to the scientific study of theology. The writer, Dr. Abraham Kuyper, Professor of Theology in the Free University of Amsterdam, needs no introduction to the readers of this REVIEW. His article on "Calvinism and Confessional Revision" is still gratefully remembered as one of the ablest papers that ever appeared in its pages. Dr. Kuyper is a man who has distinguished himself in many departments. He is a born leader of men. His activity as the recognized successor of the great Dutch statesman, Groen Van Prinsterer, and the head of the Anti-revolutionary party in the Netherlands, has given him a position in Dutch civil and political history. By means of his labors in the organization and direction of the *Doleantie* movement he has left an indelible impression on Dutch ecclesiastical history. His wide, profound and accurate scholarship, the scientific grasp and dialectical acumen with which he handles every theme which he touches, the charm of his style, the spiritual insight and intensity of conviction with which he expounds the fundamental principles of Reformed theology in their purest conceptions, on the basis of an orthodoxy which, while uncompromising in its character, still clearly maintains the historical consciousness of its origin and historical development—such factors as these have combined to give him his present commanding position in theological thought. The work now under consideration may be fitly regarded as the ripest achievement of all the years of study which Dr. Kuyper has given to this field. Three things must be considered for the proper exhibition of its merits and of its claims upon the scientific student of theology. The first is the theological and scientific point of view of the writer, the starting point which determines the nature and scope of the entire work. The second is the scope of the work itself, the object which the writer proposed to himself. The third is the manner in which the author's plan has been executed and his purpose attained.

In regard to the first point we cannot do better than quote, with some

freedom, a few lines from the Preface, where the author himself delineates for us his scientific and theological position:

"This Encyclopædia takes its stand on the fundamental principles of the Reformed theology, to which the writer adheres with the full strength of his convictions. The point of departure, therefore, of this Encyclopædia is what Calvin calls the *semen religionis* or the *sensus divinitatis in ipsis medullis et visceribus hominis infixus*. By virtue of the fact of Palingenesis which, like the fact of sin, affects the character of our *consciousness* as well as other elements of our being, the character of this *sensus divinitatis* as found in the regenerate necessarily differs from its character as found in the unregenerate. Hence the scientific labors of these two classes must also be characterized by different tendencies. This difference of starting point accounts for the differences between this and similar works in regard to the course pursued.

"The author himself was brought up under the leadership of Scholten and Kuenen, in a totally different sphere of theological thought. Afterwards he was no less strongly attracted and charmed by the *Vermittelungstheologie*. But neither his heart nor his head found rest until his eyes were opened to perceive the depth, the seriousness and the beauty of the Reformed Confession, which has come down to us from those days so rich in spiritual power when Calvinism was still a *world power* not only in the theological, but also in the social and political field.

"This very experience, however, made him sensible of the urgent necessity of rousing the Reformed theology out of the sleep in which it had been enthralled ever since the middle of the eighteenth century, and of bringing it into touch with that form of human consciousness which has been developed in the latter part of this nineteenth century. In the case of those, accordingly, who, like the author, find the expression of the deepest convictions of their hearts in the principles of the Reformed theology, this encyclopædia may serve to enable them to resume their scientific labors in the sacred domain of theological science with the feeling of renewed confidence. For others it can have, at most, an historical and psychological interest."

In treating of the task or scope of Theological Encyclopædia, Dr. Kuyper starts with a careful and elaborate investigation of the original etymological significance of the word *encyclopædia*, and also of the various senses which have historically been given it. His conclusion is that encyclopædia is that philosophical science which, applying itself to the whole domain of scientific knowledge in so far as men have taken possession of it, sets forth and explains the organic structure of this science, in itself, taken as a whole, and in its various subdivisions. As such, it is a purely formal science. It has nothing whatever to do with the contents of science, save where these contents may serve to throw light on the formal structure. Realistic encyclopædia is no encyclopædia. Science is as to its form an organism, an organic structure. In this organism there are various organs. Each organ has its own functions. To describe these functions in a purely formal manner, to set forth the nature of these organs or *membra*, to describe their bounds, to show how they are related to each other and to the organic whole of which they are parts, that is the province of encyclopædia. Such is the definition of the province of encyclopædia in general. Theological encyclopædia is simply the application and specialization of this definition to the narrower province of theology considered as forming a part, a subdivision of science in general. Theological encyclopædia, accordingly, is defined as the investigation of the organic structure of theology in itself, and as forming an integral part of the organism of science. Its object, however, is distinctly stated to be not only to understand and describe the nature of theology, but also to exercise a critical judgment as to its history, and further to promote its healthy development. In other words, it must not only answer the question, What is theology? It must also give a critical estimate of the results of previous studies in the field of theology, and point out the path in which that study ought to advance in the future. This definition of the scope of theological encyclopædia is notable especially for its rigid adherence to the formal aspects of the science which it treats, and its absolute exclusion of all discussion of the contents of its various subdivisions, save in so far as a knowledge of these contents is necessary for the formal treatment of the organic structure. Hence a clear line of demarcation is

drawn between such theological encyclopædia as is here set forth, and treatises on theological "propædentic," hodegetics, methodology, bibliographical lists, and other similar works, intended to serve as handbooks for beginners, or helps for students. The beginner, especially if he be not well versed in the history of philosophy, psychology, and other kindred sciences, will not find much to comfort him in these pages.

In the execution of his plan the author gives us first an extremely full and elaborate history of the discipline of theological encyclopædia. This history occupies by far the greater part of the first volume. Nowhere in all literature is there such a complete history of theological encyclopædia from the point of view of the orthodox Reformed theology. Everything that has ever been written for the development of the conception of theology as a science, in its entirety, and in its various subdivisions, is here, as it were, tabulated and properly appraised. The whole is divided into three periods. The first period begins with Origen and ends with Nicolas de Clémanges (d. *circa* 1430). The second period begins with Roger Bacon, and ends with Karl Friedrich Bahrdt (1785). This period covers the Reformation and post-Reformation periods. The third period treats of the development of theological encyclopædia under the influence of modern philosophy. Its indirect influence in this domain is traced in the writings of Kant, Herder, Lessing and others. The first writer who wrote a theological encyclopædia under the direct influence of modern philosophy was Schleiermacher; the last who is mentioned is M. Reischle, the editor of the twelfth edition of Hagenbach. This review of the literature, depicting the growth and development of the conception of theology as a science, is both full and eminently fair and discriminating. That it is highly instructive is so manifest that it scarcely needs mentioning.

The treatment of theological encyclopædia proper begins with the second volume. The object of this volume is to set forth first the nature of science in general, and next to assign to theology its proper place in the organism of science. This involves the discussion of the definition of theology. If theology be defined, as some propose to define it, as the "science of *religion*," whether this means religious experience as it exists in the consciousness of the individual, or what the Germans call technically *Religionswissenschaft*, there is no distinct place for theology in the organism of science. This ground is entirely occupied by anthropology, psychology and ethnology. When, however, we properly define theology as "the science of *God*," or, more strictly speaking, as the science of the revealed knowledge of God, then its appropriate place becomes clear at once. Each general division of the organism of science is founded on an inherent distinction. The distinction between man's physical and psychical natures gives us the groups of medical and philological (or philosophical) sciences respectively. The relation of man, the individual, to other individuals about him gives us the judicial group of sciences. The distinction between man and the world about him gives us the great group of *natural sciences* as they are generally called. The last distinction, finally, is the distinction between God and the world, of which man forms a part. It will not do, however, to define theology simply as the science which has God for its object. It is not permissible to coördinate God and the creatures which are the objects of the other sciences. The object which this science proposes to itself is rather *that knowledge of God which God Himself has imparted to us*. Dr. Kuyper, in this connection, revives the distinction which the old theologians used to make between the *archetypical* and the *ectypical* knowledge of God. *Theologia archetypa* is the perfect knowledge which God has of Himself. *Theologia ectypa* is that knowledge of God which lies within the reach of our faculties. Theology,

therefore, as we know and study it, is intimately connected with and dependent upon revelation. This thought is further developed in four propositions: 1. God reveals Himself for His own sake, and not for the sake of man; "for His own glory," as the Westminster theologians would say. 2. This revelation of God must be made to a creature capable of receiving this revelation and transforming it into subjective knowledge of God. 3. To do this man must be qualified by his nature, relations and process of development to apprehend that which has been revealed, and transmute it into subjective knowledge of God. This last is the work of man's logical faculties. We must give that which has been revealed a place in our thoughts. We must *reconstruct* it for our thoughts by analysis, synthesis, systematization, and restatement in forms which appeal to our consciousness. 4. The revelation of God to the sinner is the same as the revelation of God to unfallen man, with these two exceptions: the evil effects of sin in the sinner must be neutralized, and the knowledge which God reveals must be extended so as to include the knowledge of God's attitude towards the sinner. The definition of theology previously given is now somewhat amplified and stated as follows: The science of theology is that logical action of the general subject of regenerate humanity, which, by the aid of the Holy Spirit, takes up the revealed knowledge of God into its consciousness, and reflects it out of its consciousness. Taking his stand on this as the true definition of theology, Dr. Kuyper has a sharp criticism to offer on those deformations and adulterations of theology which, having severed all connection with its original form, have substituted therefor a different science entirely, a subdivision of psychology and of historical ethnology, which proposes as its object not the knowledge of God, but the knowledge of religion as a phenomenon in the life of humanity.

By far the greater portion of the remainder of this second volume (pp. 291–511) is taken up with the discussion of the doctrine of the Holy Scriptures as the Word of God, and the *principium theologiæ*. This is probably the part of his work where the author will meet with the most serious criticism from the formal point of view. In his Preface he himself recognizes that he has laid himself open to criticism by this lengthy discussion of a subject which, as to its nature and the manner of its treatment, belongs, not to Encyclopedia, but to a work on Dogmatics. He seeks to excuse himself on the ground that his Dogmatics has not been published, and that this lengthy treatise was necessary here in order that his position might not be misunderstood. It would have been better had this chapter been published as a separate book. Then a brief *résumé* of his positions might have been given here, and the reader might have been referred to the book for a fuller elucidation of the author's position. In this way the scheme of this encyclopædia would not have been disjointed by the intrusion of this extraneous matter. This discussion of the doctrine of the Word of God, including the whole field of inspiration, is nevertheless extremely valuable in itself.

After having shown the full bearing and significance of the statement that the Holy Scriptures are the *principium theologiæ* (to be carefully distinguished from the *fons theologiæ*) and the way in which this *principium theologiæ* determines the nature of the theology which proceeds from it, the next problem is the proper division of the organism of theology into its component parts. The usual nomenclature, which speaks of exegetical, historical, systematical and practical or technical theology, is rejected, because it is based exclusively on the activity of the subject or mind of the student. The proper way is to analyze the object studied and make this analysis furnish the basis of division. Since the Holy Scriptures are the *principium* of theology, the first place must be given to those studies which are directly concerned

with these Scriptures as such. The second group of studies traces the influence of these Scriptures in the life of the Church. The scope of the third group of studies is to reflect and reproduce the contents of Scripture in our consciousness. The fourth group treats of the way in which the influence of the Word of God is to be perpetuated in the manner prescribed by its own ordinances. These four subordinate groups are termed *Bibliological*, *Ecclesiological*, *Dogmatological* and *Diaconiological* sciences respectively. The last-named term is somewhat strange. Its warrant is found in the use of the Greek word διακονία to indicate *ministry*, *official service*, in such passages as 1 Tim. i. 12, 1 Cor. xii. 5, Eph. iv. 12.

The third or concluding volume is occupied with the analysis and discussion of these four great divisions of the one organism of theology. Out of the vast mass of material calling for commendation and comment a few points only can be culled. The use of the term *Canonics* to designate that which is usually termed *Isagogics* or *Introduction* will hardly meet general approval. The term Canonics has been preëmpted for a special subdivision, while the term *Introduction* is too firmly established to be easily displaced and the objections urged against it do not appear to be well founded. In treating of the different subdivisions of the exegetical group of sciences (Textual Criticism, Sacred Philology, Hermeneutics, Exegesis Proper, Metaphrase), it is at least open to question whether Sacred Philology ought not to precede Textual Criticism, both logically and chronologically. The most noteworthy feature of the treatment of the first or Bibliological group is the inclusion of what is ordinarily termed Biblical Theology, under the title of *Historia Revelationis*. Dr. Kuyper very properly objects both to the term Biblical Theology (or Biblical Dogmatics), and to that which is usually designated by that term. The Holy Scriptures do not contain any dogmata; only the material out of which the Church under the guidance of the Holy Spirit is to construct dogmata. In the true conception of *Historia Revelationis*, of what Biblical Theology ought to mean, we find that science which sets forth the true organic nature of revelation as an historical process, in its entirety, and in its various subdivisions. In regard to the second or Ecclesiological group, the most notable feature is the wide expanse of territory which it covers. It goes far beyond the traditional limits of Historical Theology. From the point of view of Dr. Kuyper's conception of the nature of this group as the exhibition of the effects of the Word of God, the *principium theologiæ*, in the life of the Church, this wide inclusion can be justified, at least to a certain extent. It will be difficult for him, however, to maintain a permanent place in theological science, strictly speaking, for such departments as Christian Character Study, Christian Piety, the Christian Family, Society and State, or Christian Literature, Science and Art. Dr. Kuyper's mind is eminently dogmatic, and hence we naturally expect a particularly full, strong and satisfactory treatment of the Dogmatological group of Theological Sciences. In this expectation we are not disappointed. Questionable is only the assignment of a special province under this head to Patristics, even in the amplified sense in which Dr. Kuyper uses it. Apologetics is reckoned as a member of the Antithetical departments, along with Polemics and Elenctics. In the treatment of the fourth or Diaconiological group, which includes all that is usually comprehended under the head of Practical Theology, we are struck especially by the full development of the work of the elders, deacons and laymen who hold no official position, as well as of ministers of the Word.

Dr. Kuyper's main object, in our interpretation of this book, is threefold: 1. To show what theology really is: not *Religionswissenchaft*, the science of religion, but the science of the revealed knowledge of God. 2. To vindicate

for theology its rigid scientific character and supreme importance. Even if it be not just to call it the *scientia scientiarum*, it may properly be called the Queen of Sciences. And 3. To show that theology is not an agglomerate of separate and unrelated studies, but a compact, well-knit, thoroughly constructed, entirely homogeneous organism, in which part is related to part, and all the parts stand related to the whole; which starts from its own germ, and follows its own law of organic development. In this threefold purpose, he has, in the humble judgment of the present writer, admirably succeeded.

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## II.—APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. Being a Study of the Doctrine of Jesus as Developed from Judaism and Converted into Dogma. By WILLIAM MACKINTOSH, M.A., D.D. Glasgow: James Macklehose & Sons; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894. 8vo, pp. xv, 607.

Some fifteen years ago, the religious world was startled by the appearance of a volume bearing the simple title of *Scotch Sermons, 1880.* It was a collection of twenty-three sermons by thirteen "clergymen of the Church of Scotland," and was designed to acquaint the public with "a style of teaching" which the editor thought was "increasingly prevalent among the clergy of the Scottish Church," and which made it its object so to present "the essential ideas of Christianity" as to show that they are "in harmony with the results of critical and scientific research." A good object, surely. The trouble with these sermons, however, was that they did not seek to consider the results of recent "critical and scientific research" in the light of the revealed truth of God, and to exhibit the harmony of all truth, whether derived from revelation or from nature; but, taking their point of view from current theorizing, pared down "the essential ideas of Christianity" to fit the assumed "results of the most recent critical and scientific research." The volume was appropriately estimated by Dr. A. A. Hodge in the issue of *The Presbyterian Review* for January, 1881 (Vol. ii, p. 212, *sq.*). "The collection as a whole," he said, "is utterly valueless, except as 'specimens of a style of teaching' which is said to 'increasingly prevail amongst the clergy of the Scottish Church.' Neither the learning nor the logic of these sermons avails to throw light upon any other subject of human interest under the sun. And neither the hearing nor the reading of such discourses could ever avail to promote any other valuable practical quality than that of patience. Some of these sermons do not contain any statements absolutely opposed to the essential truths of Christianity, but not one sets forth any doctrine or duty which can be in any special sense classed as Christian."

One of the writers represented in the volume was the Rev. William Mackintosh, D.D., of Buchanan, who contributed two sermons on the text, "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap" (Gal. vi. 7). With reference to these sermons, but more especially the latter of them, Dr. Hodge remarks: "Rev. William Mackintosh, D.D., Buchanan, discourses concerning the renovating power of Christianity. He asks:

"What is the Gospel good for? What title has it to that designation? What service does it render? (p. 162).

This he answers thus:

"The problem of human life—the task appointed to us—is our deliverance from the sway of

our lower nature, our surrender to the control of our higher nature. The powers by which we are enabled to accomplish this task are three. *First.* Our own higher nature itself. *Secondly.* The beneficent constitution of things in general, their tendency in favor of what is good. *Thirdly.* These two factors are brought into full operation by the revelation to our consciousness of that which was implicitly contained in them, of the Divine good-will or paternal relation towards us, given us by Christ (pp. 171-173).

That is, all that Christ does for us is to assure us of God's good-will. With this encouragement we save ourselves, by the use of natural powers acting under natural conditions." Dr. Mackintosh's sermons, in a word, fairly illustrated the hint of the editor of the volume, that the sermons included in it belong to a class which are seeking to bring "the essential ideas of Christianity" into "harmony with the results of critical and scientific research." He himself describes his aim in them in such words as these: "Our endeavor has been to show what modifications of the popular construction of Christianity are needed to bring it into harmony with the laws of mental physiology" (p. 172). "The light which science sheds upon human destiny" is the light in which he would walk. And "science" with him is above all the investigation of physical nature: it is from this sphere that he would borrow his governing idea. "In these later times," he tells us with extreme *naïveté*, "science *in its researches into the material world*, has lighted everywhere upon the traces of an all-pervading continuity" (p. 145); and this being true, we may now "confidently postulate" "the existence in the moral and spiritual worlds of an analogous principle." Wherefore, that a step may be taken towards the reconciliation of faith and science he devotes these sermons to showing that "the principle of continuity obtains in the moral sphere no less than in the material and rules the succession of religious as of other phenomena" (p. 145; cf. p. 134).

The former of the two sermons is occupied with an attempt to demonstrate this "law of moral continuity." "The law of the spiritual harvest," we are told, "is that evil is the natural," nay, the inevitable, "product of evil; that nothing either good or evil ever perishes of itself, but must in some way influence, or enter as an element into, the future" (p. 146). This is an article of natural religion, and "underlies Christianity as much as does the existence and unity of God, or any other article of natural religion" (p. 134). "It cannot be shaken or removed by any subsequent revelation;" it is rather one of the tests of the truth of systems (p. 134). If we speak of God's judgment on sin, we must still think merely of this direct and infallible action of moral continuity, "without the intervention of any supplementary or epicyclical contrivance" (p. 139): for "the judgment of God is only another name for the natural and inevitable consequence of our lives" (p. 143). Divine judgment is therefore continuous and progressive, and all supernatural action is out of place in it: no divine fiat can interfere with moral development here or hereafter. "Such interference on the day of judgment is as inadmissible, because as inconsistent with human liberty and with an inviolable order, as at any other crisis in the history of man" (p. 140). No, it is impossible to remove sin by a sovereign or forensic fiat: "the chain of moral sequence is carried on in unbroken sequence" (p. 144)—we are under the operation of a universal law which acts, like all law, uniformly.

Under such circumstances we may well ask, What service, then, can the Gospel render? The second sermon essays to offer a reply. "The Gospel," we are told, "does not profess to exempt us from the law of moral continuity" (p. 146), although it does show us the way from evil to good (p. 147). Certainly it does not offer us a supernatural change. But even physiology knows something of reversal of process; and there is a latent spiritual force within us to which the Gospel may appeal. The dominance of sin indeed never becomes absolute and undisputed; so that the better principle has within itself

the potency of a reactive force. Doubtless after evil habit has become confirmed, the better principle may seldom or never be led so to act by the mere sense of duty or moral obligation: it needs some new hope or new affection to arouse it. But under the stimulus of "the revelation to our mind of the paternal character of God and of the gracious relation in which He stands to us," it is capable of very energetic reaction (pp. 153, 163, 165, 168). Thus a complete revolution is produced in our feelings and relations towards Him, and our religious life is elevated to a higher level (p. 153). "The problem of human life" then, "—the task appointed to us—is our deliverance from the sway of our lower nature, our surrender to the control of our higher nature. The powers by which we are enabled to accomplish this task are three: *First.* Our own higher nature itself, which is never wholly effaced, and which reacts against the evil, and makes us receptive of all the higher influences that may be brought to bear upon us from without. *Secondly.* The complex of all those higher influences—the beneficent constitution of things in general, their tendency in favor of what is good, which operates upon us more or less, even when we are unconscious of it. . . . . *Thirdly.* These two factors for the accomplishment of the Divine purpose are consummated, or brought into full operation, by the revelation to our consciousness of that which was implicitly contained in them, but of which we had otherwise remained unconscious; by that revelation we mean of the Divine good-will, or paternal relation towards us, by which Christ has reinforced our better nature, enabling us to be intelligent fellow-workers with God in our conflict with evil, and giving a higher aim to our life. . . . . It is through our reason, through our conviction that God wills the triumph of our better nature, that we are animated to a triumphant forth-putting of its latent energies" (pp. 153–156).

So viewed, it is apparent that "the Gospel can only be regarded as a revelation or discovery to man of a method of salvation which had always been possible in the nature of things" (p. 157); and doubtless many have used it apart from what we call the Gospel (pp. 156, 157, 159). The Gospel is not some new power which comes to our salvation; it is only an instrumentality to stir us up to save ourselves: "it will be distinctly apparent that the Gospel can be a means of supplanting evil by good only by discovering and evolving powers which had always existed. . . . . The Gospel deserves its name simply because it teaches and persuades us to cease from evil and to do well; to change the seed which we sow, and thus to obtain a better harvest" (p. 158). We call ourselves Christians, not because we fancy Christ has saved us by some sort of "expiation," but simply because we have obtained our knowledge of God as Father, which calls out our latent reaction against sin, "in some historical connection with the impulse given by Christianity" (p. 156). All that Christ did for us, "in the strict and literal sense, was to reveal to us the infinite placability of the divine nature" (p. 158; cf. pp. 161, 162–3, 170). His teaching amounts to no more than "that nothing stands in the way of those who desire to break off their sins by righteousness except the outward and inward opposition which has been arrayed by the law of recompense against their better endeavors" (p. 167); and His work amounts only to this teaching. We may reverence his memory "as Mediator between God and man;" but only in the sense that "He it was who, from the depths of His own experience, imparted to men the knowledge of God as our Father in heaven; whose property it is to forgive the trespasses of His children, and to incline their feet into the path of righteousness" (p. 170). "How humanity rose at length in Christ to this thought of God's absolute goodness" would be inexplicable to us, were it not that we have reason to believe that God has impressed on creation itself evidences of "His design to secure the triumph of what is good and to deliver us from evil" (p. 165).

But humanity in Christ having obtained this knowledge of the divine paternity, it is able in its power to react against sin and sow its seed unto righteousness. And so the very law of moral continuity will operate to bring it to moral perfection.

It is evident that Dr. A. A. Hodge was thoroughly justified in finding nothing either novel or distinctively Christian in this teaching. It is just the purest form of Socinian thought. The Unitarian layman, Mr. George William Curtis, gives perfectly clear expression to the same conceptions in that confession of his faith which leads his biographer to say that to him "conscience" (not Christ) "was the divinely appointed Saviour of the world:" "I believe in God who is love; that all men are brothers; and that the only essential duty of every man is to be *honest*, by which I understand the absolute following of the conscience when duly enlightened."* Dr. Mackintosh could not express his own doctrine better: even down to the emphasis on honesty, it is quite the same. "Only he who feels that a necessity is laid upon him of bearing his own burden, and helping others to bear theirs," says Dr. Mackintosh, "may hope to grow into that noblest work of God, the simply honest man, the genuine disciple of Christ" (p. 172). To be simply honest is to be Christ's genuine disciple: not to depend on Him for "escaping responsibility for our vices." In this case, of course, any pagan may be a "genuine disciple of Christ." How entirely apart from all that is distinctively Christian Dr. Mackintosh's whole scheme of doctrine is, indeed, may be illustrated for us by a remark of Mr. Edmund Gosse, in his interesting "portrait" of Walter Pater. "When I had known him first," he says, "he was a pagan without any guide but that of the personal conscience; years brought gradually with them a greater and greater longing for the supporting solace of a creed."† Dr. Mackintosh is dominated on the contrary by a desire "to reduce the dimensions of dogma," to strip off everything from his creed but the one article of "moral continuity" (p. 168). Walter Pater, in other words, was moving upwards from his paganism to Christianity: Dr. Mackintosh had moved down from the heights of Christian truth to a merely pagan position. This is fairly illustrated again by an incident recorded by Dr. Denney, in his recent *Studies in Theology*.‡ He tells us of a Hindu society, which was formed for much the same object which Dr. Mackintosh doubtless thinks he has secured in his sermons—"to appropriate all that is good in Christianity, without burdening itself with the rest." "Among other things which it appropriated, with the omission of only two words, was the answer given in the Westminster Shorter Catechism to the question, What is repentance unto life? Here is the answer. 'Repentance unto life is a saving grace, whereby a sinner, out of a true sense of his sin, and apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ, doth with grief and hatred of his sin turn from it unto God, with full purpose of, and endeavor after, new obedience.' The words the Hindus left out were *in Christ;* instead of 'apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ,' they read simply, 'apprehension of the mercy of God.' . . . . They were acute enough to see," continues Dr. Denney, "that in the words they left out the whole *Christianity* of the definition lay. . . . . I entirely agree with their insight. If the mercy of God is separable from Christ, independent of Christ, accessible apart from Christ, . . . . there is no need and no possibility of a Christian religion at all." In a word, salvation by repentance and amendment is not Christianity—just because Christianity is specifically salvation by Christ. The essence as well as the glory of Christianity is that it provides for sinful man *a Saviour*.

We have dwelt thus fully on Dr. Mackintosh's contributions to the volume

* *George William Curtis*, by Edward Cary, pp. 7, 334, 339.

† *The Contemporary Review*, December, 1894.

‡ pp. 130, 131.

of *Scotch Sermons* because the treatise at present before us stands in such express relation to the earlier sermons that a clear apprehension of their teaching will greatly conduce to an understanding of this treatise. It is not merely that the present work occupies the same standpoint with the sermons and proclaims the same meagre teaching, although now as "the religion of Jesus" rather than as the doctrine of Paul. It is that it is in effect a serious attempt to supply a rational basis for the teaching of the sermons. The sermons taught that the essence of Christianity is, Every man his own saviour. But they left the truth of this teaching dependent on Dr. Mackintosh's assertion. He said, This is Christianity; this is God's method of dealing with the soul; this is what Paul and Jesus teach us. But it was obviously not what Christians believed to be Christianity; what the creeds of the Churches set forth as God's method of dealing with the soul; what the founders of Christianity proclaimed as its substance; what the records of the New Testament represent as the teaching of either Paul or Jesus. In what alembic and by the aid of what reagents Dr. Mackintosh had been able to reduce Christianity to this "essence" remained hidden from his readers. On further reflection, he himself perceived that he had run beyond his warrant (p. 149): Paul, at least, taught a "heterosoteric" doctrine—to use E. von Hartmann's term. Otherwise, however, his original conception remained unchanged; and remained hanging in the air. After fourteen years, he gives the world at last an attempt to supply a foundation for his teaching. This is the real function of the present volume. It sets forth the conception of the origin and development of Christianity, which alone will harmonize with his teaching as to the nature of Christianity. He had taught that Christianity provided only for a natural salvation. Conformably to this he now argues that it is merely a natural religion, and, being a natural religion, can have had no other than a natural origin. The task which the author has set before himself in this volume is, thus, none other than to account for the rise of Christianity as a purely natural religion. There is no lack of frankness or of thoroughness in the manner in which this task is approached and prosecuted. "The attempt made in this volume," he says, is "to trace the origin of Christianity to the common religious instinct working under the influence of natural forces and amid historical conditions" (p. v). More specifically it attempts "to show that Christianity took its rise in a great spiritual and religious movement among the Jewish people, or in a great transformation of Jewish ideas effected by Jesus and spreading from Him to His disciples; and to find in that movement and in certain favoring circumstances and historical conditions, without looking beyond to any supernatural or transcendental causes, an explanation of the whole relative phenomena" (p. 4). Dr. Mackintosh means by the phrase, "the whole relative phenomena," all that it is capable of expressing. At no point and through no channel does he allow that anything above nature has entered into the formation of Christianity. Not in the person of Jesus Himself, and not in aught that preceded or followed Him. Jesus was no doubt the founder of Christianity; but His rising to whatever height of thought He attained, is entirely explicable from "the reaction of His mind upon the inherited and environing conditions, social and spiritual, present in Judea in His day" (p. vii). All that had gone before was merely a natural spiritual and religious development, providing these inherited and environing conditions. All that came after was merely the progressive mythical and dogmatic corruption of the teaching of Jesus, through the working upon it of the imaginative and ratiocinative faculties of His followers.

Now of course Dr. Mackintosh does not suppose that the records of Christianity represent it as the merely natural religion which he conceives it to be.

He freely admits that the account of the origin and nature of Christianity given in these records, if treated as trustworthy, would entirely justify the common conception of Christianity as supernatural both in origin and method. He even declares that if Christianity be the merely natural religion which he supposes, "its genesis must have differed widely, nay, enormously, from that which can possibly be gathered from a literal or textual exegesis and an unskeptical study of the New Testament" (p. 586). He declares it therefore to be evident that "something more than a sound exegesis and hermeneutic will be needed to extract from" "the primitive records," "the proximate facts regarding the origin and development of the Christian system," if that origin and development are to be conceived as purely natural. "We have only to make the attempt," he adds, "to find that we cannot effect the removal of the supernatural element, as if it were a mere appendage or external fixture, so as to leave the residuum standing as it was. That element is, so to speak, chemically combined with the history, and can be discharged only by a process which involves a change or dissolution of the entire fabric, or, if this be thought to be an exaggerated representation, let us say rather that it is an element woven like a strand into the texture of the history, so as to be removable only by a general disturbance and dislocation of the evangelical record" (p. 45).

But if the case be such, surely it is incumbent on us to inquire, on the one hand, whence arises the justification for the attempt to remove so pervading and determining an element out of the primitive records, and, on the other, after the fabric has been dissolved, whence can be derived the clue for the recombination of the elements, into a new and now purely natural history of the origin and development of Christianity. Our author seeks his justification in the postulate of the impossibility of the supernatural. On the assumption of the impossibility of the supernatural, the supernaturalistic account of the origin of Christianity given in its primitive records cannot be true, and necessity is laid upon us to attempt to conceive its origin as a natural development. The clue for the reconstruction of the history on the other hand, is sought at the hands of modern criticism: "the history, be it observed, being such as is arrived at by submitting the canonical records to the ordeal and sifting of modern criticism" (p. vi). By the aid of these two assumptions—the assumption of the impossibility of the supernatural and the assumption of the validity of all the conclusions of the extremest type of modern criticism—Dr. Mackintosh supposes that he can reconstruct the history of the origin of Christianity so as to exhibit it as a purely natural religion. It would be too gross a circle to suppose that thus Christianity is directly proved to be a natural religion. What is apparently in Dr. Mackintosh's mind, is that the success of his reconstruction of the origin and development of Christianity under these assumptions will react to give him increased confidence in the assumptions themselves. He seems to point to the consistency, the naturalness, the likelihood of his construction of the history as an evidence of its truth, and thus as an evidence that Christianity is not a supernatural religion. Why this should need evidencing if the supernatural is really impossible, is not, however, easy to see.

It must be admitted, to be sure, that Dr. Mackintosh does not make clear to us why we must assume the supernatural to be impossible. We are told that "the critical necessity of getting rid of the supernatural element" is so "imperative," that it justifies any conjectural reconstruction of the history which accomplishes it (p. 262). But when we inquire what this imperative necessity rests upon we never get much beyond the simple dictum that it is "in accordance with the demands of modern science." In the brief passage which is given to the formal treatment of the subject, this declaration is

somewhat expanded (pp. 19, *sq.*). We are told that "science has brought into view certain considerations which strongly imply the impossibility of any infraction of the immanent laws of existence;" that it has found in every department of existence which it has investigated, "that all occurrences, phenomena and sequences bear invariable witness to the control of law and to the sway of order—that what is called divine action never operates irrespective of such order, or otherwise than naturally—*i. e.*, through or in accordance with such order:" and that therefore, "modern thought holds, in the form of a scientific conviction, what was matter of surmise or divination to a few of the leading minds in ages long past, viz., that the universe is governed by immutable laws inherent in the very nature and constitution of things—by laws that are 'never reversed, never suspended and never supplemented in the interest of any special object whatever'" (pp. 23, 24). The stringency of the steps in this reasoning does not lie, however, on the surface. How we can infer from any study of the ordinary course of things, however protracted, prolonged or complete, that an extraordinary event never occurs, and much more that it can never occur, it is not easy to see. An extraordinary event is by definition outside the ordinary course: and whether it occurs or not is not a matter of inference from the ordinary course, however completely investigated and understood, but a matter of observation; while, whether it can occur or not, is certainly not a matter of inference from its observed non-occurrence, but must rest on some principle deeper than experience can supply. The fact is that the impossibility of the supernatural can be affirmed only on *à priori* grounds, and no theist is entitled to affirm it. We may hold it to be improbable to the verge of the unprovable, but its possibility is inherent in the very conception of God as the personal author and governor of the universal frame. And if it is possible, then its actual occurrence is simply a question of experience and a proper subject for testimony. So soon, however, as it is once admitted that the actual occurrence of the supernatural is a proper subject of testimony it will be hard to contend that such wealth and variety of testimony as is available for the occurrence of supernatural events in the origin of Christianity can be mistaken. This, Dr. Mackintosh himself understands. "When a critic like Kuenen," he remarks, "professes to believe or not to dispute the possibility of miracle in the abstract, and to be willing to leave that as an open and unsettled question, but at the same time shows himself very exacting as to the evidence for the miraculous element in Christianity as a whole, or for the miraculous works recorded of Jesus in particular, and declares that the evidences for these do not satisfy his canons of credibility, the likelihood is that unconsciously to himself, there is an *arrière pensée* in his mind equivalent to the denial of the possibility of miracles; at least, that is the impression that the rigor of his criticism will make on the minds of others" (p. 23). An instinct for safety, therefore, leads him to deny the possibility of miracles. "Indeed," he exclaims, "it is easy to see that to grant the possibility of miracle in the abstract is to surrender the whole position to the orthodox theologian. To say the very least, it is to place the supernatural character of Christianity among the things which cannot be disproved" (p. 22). But however inconvenient this fact may be for those who are determined to deny the reality of the supernatural in Christianity, it hardly supplies a philosophical basis for asserting the impossibility of miracles. Miracles remain a matter of observation and testimony. And if anything can be proved by testimony, the supernatural origin and nature of Christianity must be held to be proved.

It is possible, of course, to demur that this testimony evaporates in the caldron of modern criticism: and we must remember that our author, along

with the impossibility of miracles, assumes the truth of the conclusions announced by this criticism. To him the Biblical accounts are not history but philosophy—the crude philosophy of men who could not but share in the errors and superstitions of their age. The true course of the history can be obtained only by seeking the kernel of fact concealed within this philosophizing envelope. "The religious movement as it went on from age to age created for itself a miraculous history, just because it knew not how otherwise to place itself as record." But "underlying the miraculous records of the Old and New Testaments there is the secret history of the great, non-miraculous religious movement which was of secular duration and ran through many stadia." "The historical records do not so much show the phases of the religious evolution, as rather the religious standing of the writers who compiled them as a vehicle for the utterance and propagation of their own religious ideas." It is the task of "what is called the 'higher criticism,'" to eliminate these crude conceptions of the Biblical writers, and "trace and follow out the underlying history" (p. 6), the result being, of course, the substitution of a non-miraculous for a miraculous account of the origin of Christianity. That Dr. Mackintosh's auti-supernaturalism cannot get along without this critical reconstruction of the Biblical histories, is obvious enough, and is clearly recognized by himself: "The volume which is here placed before the public could not possibly have been written uutil the new criticism had so far done its work, and may be regarded as an outcome of that great movement" (p. v). It is only on the assumption of the full conclusions of the extremest form of this criticism that his work can claim consideration at all. To plead this critical reconstruction, however, as a support to his anti-supernaturalism, would involve a peculiarly gross form of the *argumentum in circulo.* The very principle of this criticism in the form in which alone its results would be available for such a purpose, is the denial of the supernatural; and results which depend on the rejection of the supernatural can scarcely be made a support for its rejection. Nor is an appeal to these critical results calculated to add strength to his case. They are themselves matters of pure assumption. Dr. Mackintosh simply adopts them and nowhere seriously attempts to justify them. No one else has succeeded in justifying them. Not only are they wholly without historical evidence; they possess no historical probability, they supply no natural historical sequence, and they cannot be made to coalesce with known historical facts or to fit into the known historical framework. A scheme which requires the assumption of their truth, stands condemned as impossible by its association with a congeries of such impossibilities. It is perhaps worth while to observe further, that even if these critical conclusions were admitted in their full extent as assumed, they would still fail to rid Dr. Mackintosh of the most stringent testimony to the supernatural. This is true even of that form of the supernatural which consists in miraculous occurrences in the origin of Christianity. The confessedly genuine epistles of Paul, by themselves, bear a testimony which cannot be gainsaid to the occurrence of supernatural events at the fouudations of Christianity, culminating in that greatest of all supernatural events, the resurrection of Jesus. It is true equally of that form of the supernatural which consists in the manifested glory of the divine founder of Christianity. No critical reconstruction of Christiau literature has yet availed—none which does not destroy not merely its texture but the very threads of which it is woven can avail—to eliminate from it its ineradicable testimouy to the supernatural impression of that unique figure, or to the supernatural impulse that streams from it. It is the testimony not merely of one of His disciples, but of every line of Christian record and of every event of Christian history: "We beheld His glory, a glory as of an only begotten of the Father, full of grace and

truth." Still less will the whole body of assumed critical results avail to rid Dr. Mackintosh of that form of the supernatural which is equally an offense to him—a supernatural salvation, wrought out by Jesus and offered by Him through His followers to the world. When the most violent forms of critical reconstruction have done their worst, the results still embalm for us a Jesus who is and who claims to be a Redeemer and a Saviour, who does not proclaim an "autosoteric" but a "heterosoteric" salvation. Dr. Mackintosh, indeed, is constrained to admit as much. The critical residuum brought to his hands, requires still further criticism that he may obtain from it an unmiraculous Jesus who requires men to save themselves and does not undertake to save them. The Jesus and the Christianity which Dr. Mackintosh offers us, therefore, is not the product of even the most radical criticism, but simply the creation of his own mind. What he believes to be sober, Jesus may be allowed to teach: but beyond the line of his own judgment as to sobriety of doctrine, no record can convince him that Jesus taught. "So long as we credit Jesus with sobriety of judgment, our guiding principle of criticism, viz., the rejection of the supernatural element, forbids us to regard these sayings as genuinely His" (p. 64). Here is Dr. Mackintosh's principle of criticism. It may not seem unlikely that if we are to make our Jesus on the pattern of our own souls, we may have to content ourselves with an unmiraculous Jesus. But if we are to have the Jesus of historical testimony, in any degree, we cannot escape acknowledging a supernatural Jesus—who Himself came from heaven and brings a message from heaven of redemption in His blood.

May not, then, the results of Dr. Mackintosh's reconstruction of the origin and development of Christianity serve as their own sufficient testimony? It is on this possibility that Dr. Mackintosh apparently places his dependence. He seems to say, Look at this picture of how Christianity was prepared for, how it was originated, how it was developed, how it was corrupted; and see if its naturalness, coherency, consistency do not justify the presuppositions on which the picture is founded. The plausibility of the suggestion arises from the happy use which is made of hypothesis in all forms of scientific investigation: the positing of a supposition, the deducing of the results which would follow on the assumption of its truth, the comparison of these results with observed fact, the establishment of the truth of the original supposition by the conformity of the results with known fact and the discovery through their suggestion of further facts not hitherto observed. The fallaciousness of such an appeal to this method as is at present proposed, however, is too glaring to require to be shown. Here the proposed assumptions are not suggested by the observed phenomena, but are dragged in from without and lack all inherent probability; the results they yield by deduction confessedly differ enormously from the facts as witnessed by testimony; their assumption does not put us in the road to the discovery of independent evidence of their truth, but sets us in opposition to the whole body of evidence. The sole appeal is made to the inner consistency of the results; and this obviously, so far as it exists, is an artificial product and the inevitable effect of the process by which they are obtained. Such an appeal, indeed, involves the grossest confusion between the verisimilitude of fiction and the verity of fact. If valid in a case like the present, it would be valid to demonstrate the objective reality of the whole *mise en scène* and action of every successful fiction: the "wizard of the north" would become a "creator" in the strictest sense, and his product would no longer be romances but actualities; and the objective reality of the world of *Flat-Land* would require to be affirmed. Self-consistency and "naturalness" may be carried to the point of that "inevitableness" which is the mark of the action of the best fiction, and they argue only the genius

of the author: actuality is not reached on this road. After all, history is not an *à priori* but an *à posteriori* science, and the test of reality in its sphere is nothing else than conformity to fact as experienced and witnessed. Even then, did Dr. Mackintosh's reconstruction of the history of the origin and development of Christianity possess the qualities of self-consistency, naturalness, "inevitableness" to the highest conceivable degree, it would remain a mere idle sketch of what might have been on certain contingencies; it might fairly be contemplated by him with sadness as what he could well wish might have occurred—the poet tells us that "the saddest words of tongue or pen" are these, "It might have been;" but it could gain thence no claim whatever to be considered as what was.

What, then, are we to say of the claims of his reconstruction to be the actual history of the rise and development of Christianity, when we are obliged to deny to it, as we are, even this inner consistency and naturalness? It is only when stated generally and in the vague that it has the least verisimilitude. It sounds quite attractive to speak of Christianity as taking its rise "in a great spiritual and religious movement among the Jewish people," so that "Judaism and Christianity denote the successive stages of one long evolution of religious thought and seutiment:" to represeut the phase of this development which is specifically called Christianity, to have "been founded, proximately, in the great religious experience which befell Jesus in its purest form and to have been reflected in His life and teaching;" and to explain "that that experience was transmitted and propagated to the minds of His disciples, not, however, in its pure and original form, but through the medium of the impression made by the personality of Jesus on their emotional nature; and that that impression, acting on their imaginative and ratiocinative faculties, was what gave to Christianity the mythical and dogmatic construction which is presented to us in the New Testament and in the creeds of the Churches" (p. 4). But so soon as an attempt is made to fill in these vague outlines with a detailed history of the progress of this great religious movement—as it passed from heathenism into Judaism; through the various stages of the religion of Israel into Christianity; from the religion of Jesus to the doctrine of Paul and the mythology of John: all appearance of verisimilitude passes away and we are asked to leap all sorts of historical chasms and to assume repeatedly the most impossible sequences, in order that not a natural but a contra-natural evolution may be substituted for a supernatural history. The author enters, of course, into the labors of his predecessors and founds his attempted reconstruction of the history of this secular development on the assumed results of the critical schools of Wellhausen and Reuss, of Weizsäcker aud Pfleiderer. All the historical impossibilities for which these schools are responsible in their efforts to eliminate the supernatural from the history of the Christian religion lie then, from the beginning, at his door. But these are not enough. From their results he merely takes his starting point, and proceeds to cleanse the history of the last remnants of the evil leaven of supernaturalism and with it of the last traces of verisimilitude. Everything now hangs in the air: the most stupendous eveuts, turniug the whole course of the world's history, spring causelessly into existeuce; historical Christianity itself becomes a mighty beneficent force released out of a fermentation of delusion, error and fraud.

We are dealing here with a mass of details which it is impossible to transfer to our pages in justification of our remarks, much more to examine with any fullness. We are reduced to the adduction of an illustration or two. Consider, for example, then, the lame and impotent explanation which is offered of the undeniable identity of the Christ of prophecy with the Christ of history. "In this fulfillment we do not see the evidence of a prophetic

foreknowledge of events which took place five or six hundred years after the prophets lived; for that would manifestly be a supernatural prevision. But yet, the correspondence between the prophetic embodiment of the ideal, and the general features of the life of Jesus as reported by the synoptists, is so close, that no sane person can regard it as purely accidental. We, therefore, explain the fulfillment to ourselves as due fundamentally to the evolution of that religious idea of which Israel and the early Church were the organs" (p. 329). In other words, the correspondence between the prophets and synoptists is due to the simple fact that they shared the same ideal, and therefore expressed their ideal alike: the actual Jesus had nothing to do with either picture. "'The prophets impersonated their ideal, while the Church idealized the person,' thus between them completing the circle of thought." That we may escape the admission of the supernatural here, therefore, we are asked to conceive the whole fundamental portrait of Jesus, even as given by the synoptists, as myth.

Consider again the explanation that is offered of the conversion of Paul. "Our explanation, then, of the Apostle's conversion is, that it was occasioned by the moral and spiritual ideas introduced into his mind by contact and intercourse, though of a hostile kind, with the little band of men whom he persecuted. . . . . When speaking of the doctrine of Jesus, we pointed out that it was His discovery of the evangelic view of the religious relation which satisfied Him that He Himself, as the discoverer of that relation, was the promised Messiah. And our position now is that St. Paul, conscious of having derived this view, however mediately and indirectly, from Jesus, was satisfied that His claim to be the Messiah was well founded. The moment of Paul's conversion was just the moment at which, after much inward debate and misgiving, the evangelic view as taught by Jesus took absolute possession of his mind. As by a flash of inward light, he recognized the immense import of that new relation which formed the base of that teaching. The doctrine was so novel, so revolutionary in the religious sphere, of such startling range and gravity, and of such beneficent consequence to himself that he readily believed all that the disciples alleged of the resurrection of Him who had revealed it. . . . . In the moment of crisis, when the new ideas gained the upper hand, it would appear to him as if Jesus had wrestled and prevailed, and cast him to the ground. The light, the fall and the voice were but the form into which his sense of mental illumination and of subjugation by one who was stronger than he had thrown itself. And when he afterwards reflected on that wonderful experience, it would seem to him as if the struggle which had gone on within him had been brought to an issue by an act of self-manifestation on the part of Jesus, by an act of condescension to him personally, if not on his account yet to him as a chosen instrument to transmit 'the benefit' to others" (p. 372). In this subjective experience of Paul's, Dr. Mackintosh bids us find the sole "sight" of the "risen Jesus" on which the deathless conviction of His resurrection which animated the primitive disciples could be founded.

We say the "sole 'sight' of 'the risen Jesus,'" although we read in this paragraph itself of Paul's accepting the doctrine of the resurrection at the hands of those who were disciples before him. For, when we turn to the earlier passage where the origin of the belief in the resurrection on the part of the earlier disciples is treated, we learn that their language as to a "resurrection" is represented as purely figurative, and that they are supposed to have made no pretension of having seen even an apparition; but that now Paul is thought to have erroneously imputed his own experience to them. In such a passage as 1 Cor. v. 1, *sq.*, then, the Apostle simply misrepresents the matter when he attributes "Christophanies" essentially like his own to others. The query, of course, inevitably arises, How, granting that Paul may have so mis-

conceived the facts at first, is it conceivable that he should not soon have been set right? Dr. Mackintosh thinks it enough to reply that it is not at all likely that Paul and Peter ever found out their difference (p. 364). "It is by no means likely that the conference of the two men would turn upon the nature of their experiences. St. Paul's mind would be prepossessed with the idea that the experience of Peter and his companions had been the same with his own, and he would feel no curiosity upon the subject, nor think of scrutinizing the details. On the other hand, Peter had by this time, we presume, accepted the sensuous representation of that experience in place of the real explanation; or for the sake of convenience he had adopted the figurative mode of describing it, and would naturally suppose that St. Paul, in any allusion which he might make to a vision, might only be referring to a similar experience and employing that figurative style of expression which seemed to come naturally to all who spoke of that crisis of the spiritual life" (p. 365). The desperation of this hypothesis of mutual misunderstanding and of no intercourse between Paul and his fellow-disciples on the foundations of his faith —especially in face of the explicit historical statements of his epistles—is evident on its face, and is illustrated by the looseness of its hold on Dr. Mackintosh's own mind. Shortly afterwards it suits his purpose, in a new turn of the argument, to assume the exact contrary: and the existence of this previous passage, or its essential place in the central argument of the book, does not prevent him from writing: "But as by the time that the Apostle wrote his great Epistles, he had conversed with the earlier Apostles, and no doubt with many of the first disciples, there is, to say the least, a huge unlikelihood that he could have remained ignorant of the leading events of the life of Jesus. It is hardly conceivable that he should not have taken care to inform himself as to the earthly life and teaching of one whom he adored as the Lord from heaven. His omission to do so would argue a state of mind so incurious and indifferent as to be unnatural and incomprehensible" (p. 377). And yet, though he professes to be informed as to Christ's resurrection appearances, we are to believe that he was not so informed, and never felt the need of becoming so!

We are at the centre of Dr. Mackintosh's argument, we say, when we envisage his account of the rise of the belief in the resurrection of Jesus, and it may repay us to consider what he expects us to believe with reference to it. That no such resurrection ever took place is of course given at once, in his fundamental postulate of the impossibility of the supernatural. That not even a subjective vision occurred in the case of any but Paul, we have already incidentally seen to be his contention. How then does he account for the rise of that belief in the resurrection of the Master which was the dominating force in Christianity from the very beginning? The answer is to be found in observing that he subtly transmutes the problem into the essentially different one of how the disciples regained their belief in Jesus' Messiahship after the deadly blow inflicted by His death. Then he operates with platitudes like these: "the human mind is endowed with marvelous elasticity" and "does not willingly surrender itself to despair," so that a reaction is sure to supervene shortly after any deep depression. This inherent tendency of the mind was reinforced by the impression made on His disciples by Jesus, "which was too deep to be effaced by a single blow." And this was further reinforced by the great impression made by the nobility of His death, so that it is truer to say that the cross glorified Christ than that He glorified the cross. "The spiritual sense of the disciples had been so far trained and educated by their intercourse and association with Jesus, as to discern the hidden 'glory' of the cross, *i. e.*, of the death of Jesus upon it. No act of His life 'became Him,' or exalted Him so much in their eyes, or so revealed His true greatness as His death. It was not the Christ who in the first instance trans-

figured the cross, but the cross which transfigured the Christ. . . . . The mode and spirit in which Jesus laid down His life was what above all else transfigured Him in the eyes of His disciples and confirmed His claim to be the Messiah and the Christ" (p. 278). The reaction from their sensuous hopes which was consequent on Christ's death clarified their vision, and led them on to look for a spiritual kingdom, in which Jesus, though dead, might still reign: "When Jesus died, it was to the disciples inconceivable that a life of such divine beauty should have lapsed. . . . . All that had been visible of Him, all that was mortal of Him, had been consigned to the tomb; but this undeniable fact could not prevent the rising conviction that the spirit within Him had escaped, and soared into a new life in a higher and happier sphere. *The sudden birth of this conviction in the minds of the disciples, we hold to have been the true theophany, the apotheosis of Jesus*" (p. 268). The disciples, then, did not suppose that Jesus had in any physical sense "risen again;" this was but a figurative mode of expressing their own resurrection to new hope: "What, then, actually took place on a day or days immediately subsequent to the crucifixion was not that Jesus rose again from the dead, but that the disciples, commencing with Peter, emerged suddenly, as in a moment, from the more than sepulchral gloom into which they had been plunged by the death of Jesus and in which it seemed as if the light of faith had been forever extinguished" (p. 287). Thus the resurrection of Jesus is transmuted into simply the rise of a new hope in the minds of the disciples, unattended by any event in any way extraordinary. The subsequent discussion is occupied with an attempt to show how this hope propagated itself, and how it was, through a figurative use of language, altered into a belief in a physical resurrection

It must not be overlooked what an important part the nobility of Christ's death on the cross plays in this construction. It was the cross that transfigured Christ to His first disciples. It was the cross which glorified Him to them. It was by the mode and spirit in which He laid down His life that His claim to be the Messiah was confirmed to them (p. 278). It is probably a vice inseparable from the mode of argumentation adopted in this volume that elsewhere, when the needs of the argument require it, precisely the contrary is asserted with reference to the effect of Christ's crucifixion upon His followers. "The crucifixion," we read (p. 376), "was in fact a sort of puzzle to the disciples, which, however, did not shake their faith in Him as the Messiah, and in the truth of His doctrine, and the reality of His resurrection." It was "an offense" which they could only hope would be removed by a glorious second coming. It is difficult to see how the cross could have been both one of the chief causes of the continued faith of Christ's first followers in His Messiahship and a difficulty to their faith in Him as the Messiah; both an offense and Christ's chief glory. But it is not very difficult to see how it happens that it is alternately represented as each in turn by our author. By the one representation he seeks to help himself over the difficulty of explaining, as a mere subjective fact, the rise of belief in Christ's resurrection in the hearts of His dejected followers, left forlorn by their Master's death. By the other representation, he seeks to help himself over the difficulty of explaining, as a Pauline invention, the rise of faith in Christ as a Redeemer, who died that we might live. For the former purpose he enlarges on the grandeur of Christ's death on the cross and its potent effect in enheartening His followers. For the latter purpose he enlarges on the offense of the cross to the first disciples, that the emphasis placed on it in Paul's theology may be made to appear singular. In spite, then, of the declaration on the one page that it was the cross which "above all else" "confirmed Jesus' claim to be the Messiah" to His first followers, he does not hesitate to say on another that they "maintained their faith in the Messiahship of Jesus *in spite* of His

ignominious death," while "He became the Messiah for Paul *in consequence* of it" (p. 450, 451). So slight a hold on reality has Dr. Macintosh's whole construction.

Could anything indeed possibly be more "unreal" than this whole explanation of the rise of faith in Christ's resurrection? The chasm that yawns between despair and enthusiasm is to be bridged over. Our author proposes to bridge it by postulating—nothing. Nothing occurred, he says: the disciples simply recovered their tone. They preached the the resurrection: their followers believed in it. They themselves did not: they were merely using figurative language. By this figurative language they meant to express only their own recovery of hope. If we ask what occurred to mediate their recovery of hope and to lead them so to express it, he replies simply, nothing occurred. Nothing occurred! Nothing occurred at the root of the greatest revolution in the human heart and in the history of mankind the world has ever seen. No sun arose between that black Friday and that glorious Sunday to account for the new splendor which illuminated the world. Nothing occurred to create the Christian Easter and the Christian Sabbath. Nothing occurred to deflect the whole course of human life, to ring out the old and ring in the new, to implant in man new hopes, new ideals, new life. There is nothing in *Alice in Wonderland*, half so incredible, half so contrary to the "order of nature." As certain as it is that new life and hope came to the disciples' hearts on that Sunday morning, as certain as it is that through this new life and hope Christianity sprang into existence, as certain as it is that Christianity still persists in the world, so certain is it that *something occurred* in Jerusalem on that Sunday morning, of so stupendous a nature as to bear in its bosom the promise and potency of all these stupendous results.

Not only, however, is Dr. Mackintosh's construction thus incapable of being carried through on any simple and consistent view of the history; it is incapable of being carried through without the imputation of dishonest intention and deed to the chief actors in the development of the Christian religion. This imputation is again already involved, of course, in Dr. Mackintosh's adoption of the conclusions of the most radical forms of modern criticism as the foundation of his structure: for those conclusions include no little imputation of fraud to the writers of the Biblical books. But Dr. Mackintosh is compelled to go yet further in the same pathway. Not only is it found by him impossible to exonerate the procedure of the fourth evangelist in the forum of the modern conscience (pp. 532, 543), but Jesus Himself must stand convicted in the same court, guilty of one of the worst faults of religious innovators—the employment of familiar language to hide the novelty of a new proclamation (p. 160). The accusation is softened as far as possible: such conduct is represented as perhaps a virtue—certainly as but "the following of an instinct common to all religious reformers." But it remains an accusation of the use of a deception from which the truly honest man will shrink. A naturalistic origin for Christianity, it seems, cannot be obtained, save at the cost of something more important than even historical verity: it involves also the ruin of the moral character of its founders and builders. This surely cannot be held to be a recommendation of the construction, derived from the character of the results obtained by it.

But if Dr. Mackintosh's assumptions have nothing in themselves to recommend them, and are not confirmed by the results obtained on the supposition of their truth, where shall we go to find support for his construction of Christian history? He himself points out that his attempt to provide Christianity with a naturalistic account of its origin may have an alternative issue. "Either it may discredit the supernaturalistic theory of Chris-

tianity; or it may go far, in the way of a *reductio ad absurdum*, to demonstrate the untenableness of the anti-supernatural theory." The marked ability and unwonted thoroughness with which he has prosecuted his task—shrinking from no extremity of conclusion legitimately involved in his premises—offer certainly an unusual opportunity for a fair comparison between the two theories. No one possessed of any historical insight ought to hesitate an instant in deciding between them. The naturalistic construction is renewedly exhibited here as historically incredible: things do not happen so, cannot happen so in a world where the law of adequate causes rules. The intrusion of supernatural causes into the affairs of men may be difficult to believe: the multiplication of contra-natural effects in a chain of ever-increasing complexity is impossible to believe. Dr. Mackintosh's volume thus acts, "in the way of a *reductio ad absurdum*, to demonstrate the untenableness of the anti-supernatural theory." The reader must conclude that Christianity cannot be explained as a natural religion: the "common religious instinct, working under the influence of natural forces," is inadequate to its production. But Dr. Mackintosh not only assumes, as we have seen, but solidly argues, that the supernatural origin and the supernatural nature of Christianity stand or fall together. The anti-supernaturalistic assumption must operate all through or nowhere. If it is admitted in the matter of the origin of Christianity, it must involve, as is shown in a very lucid Appendix, an anti-supernaturalistic construction also of the person of Jesus, of the nature of His work, and of the method of salvation. The converse is, of course, equally true. It would be difficult to refute the representation which Dr. Mackintosh makes of the implication of the Divinity of Christ in the conception of His work as expiatory (pp. 415, 416). His real starting point, for this volume, it will be remembered, did not lie in a conviction of the naturalistic origin of Christianity, but in a conviction of the naturalistic character of the saving process (p. 212, 149, *note*). The real object of the book is to support this conviction. That he may believe that "salvation" under Christianity is "autosoteric," he seeks to show that Christianity is itself a human product. The failure to show the latter will necessarily react on the possibility of believing the former. A supernatural Christianity is as unconformable with an "autosoteric" salvation, as a natural Christianity is with a "heterosoteric" salvation. The attempts to seek a middle ground, Dr. Mackintosh's trenchant logic grinds to powder: and here is likely to be found the chief service that his book will render. He who ponders the argument as he has wrought it out with such boldness and care, is likely to rise from its perusal with the conviction that the whole leaven of Socinian thought on the mode of salvation has gone to its judgment with Dr. Mackintosh's attempt to construct an anti-supernaturalistic Christianity. If we begin, for example, with the soteriological conceptions of McLeod Campbell, or let us rather say specifically of Dr. John Young—for it is from something like these, it would seem, that Dr. Mackintosh took his starting point—we must logically proceed to something like Dr. Mackintosh's conceptions of the origin and history of Christianity. Conversely, if the most elaborate attempts to conceive Christianity as in origin a purely natural religion go up in smoke, the fires which consume them must inevitably eat their way back to the correlated conceptions of the method of salvation.

The failure of Dr. Mackintosh's effort to construe Christianity as a natural religion, however, will react on his attempt to explain Christian salvation as "autosoteric" in other and more direct ways also, as well as by this logical correlation. For it must be evident that the failure of the attempt to explain away the supernatural in the origin of Christianity, will discredit beforehand the use of the same methods which are relied on for that result, to explain away

the expiatory nature of Christ's saving work. The contrast which Dr. Mackintosh seeks to erect, in dealing with this matter, between "the religion of Jesus" and "the doctrine of Paul," is a purely artificial one, with no ground in fact. All of Christ's followers understood Him to teach that He came into the world to save the world by the outpouring of His blood: all the records of His teaching represent Him as offering Himself as a ransom for sin: the sacramental ordinances which He instituted for His Church embody the sacrificial and cleansing nature of His work in vivid object lessons. This witness cannot be eliminated. If we are to credit any historical testimony, it is quite certain that Jesus represented Himself as rendering the Father placable to sinful man by His own expiatory work, and not as merely discovering the Father's inherent "infinite placability." And if we are to credit Jesus in this, Dr. Mackintosh himself being judge, He must needs be more than man, and Christianity, as instituted by Him, is a supernatural religion, not merely as originating in supernatural acts, but also as supported by supernatural sanctions, and as operating in supernatural modes and with supernatural powers. The failure to explain away the supernatural in the origin of Christianity not only, however, discredits the process of explaining away this testimony, it also removes the motive to refuse credit to the testimony of Jesus to His redemptive work in what Dr. Mackintosh calls "the dogmatic or supernatural sense." It does indeed even more, as we have seen: it leaves this as the only conception of the nature of His work which will harmonize with the origin of Christianity, now shown to be supernatural, and therefore predisposes us to credit it. Supernatural pomp and display accompanying the advent of Jesus might have been unnecessary, unsuitable, incredible, if all that He came to do was to teach anew what men by feeling after had often before discovered without His teaching, and would often again discover without His teaching. But if He came truly as a redeemer of a lost race, to reverse the course of history and restore to men the favor of God, then it was fitting that He should bring heaven to earth with Him. So Dr. Mackintosh perceives; and we do not see that the argument can be resisted by which he exhibits it. He rightly therefore acts on the assumption that if salvation is "autosoteric," Christianity must be a natural religion, and must have its origin like other natural religions only in the religious instincts of men. And if we act rightly it must be on the parallel assumption that since Christianity, as is renewedly exhibited in this volume, cannot be construed as a merely natural religion in origin, neither can the salvation it offers men be construed as "autosoteric." Dr. Mackintosh has bravely thought himself through and correlated the parts of his system: the result is that in the collapse of a part the whole system is involved.

*Princeton.* BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

*An Inquiry into the Truth of Dogmatic Christianity.* Comprising a Discussion with a Bishop of the Roman Catholic Church. By William Dearing Harden. Pp. viii, 268. (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1893.) This title is a misnomer. Instead of a critical inquiry by an impartial scholar, we have the special plea of a lawyer who would make out a case against Christianity. His arguments, moreover, are founded on ignorance and developed by perversion. The crescent, not the cross, has been the agent of civilization; and that, too, though the Arabs derived their science from the Greeks and their introduction to Greek authors from the Christians. "Faith is a blind reliance on the views and assertions of others, and the utter suppression of reason." That "damnation is more successful than the counter-scheme of salvation" is the teaching of the Church. "Faith paralyzes, doubt invigorates;" and that, too, though history tells of scarcely one

man of action who was not also a man of faith. "The recent revision of the New Testament shows clearly in many instances the inexactness of the recognized accounts of Christ," though in reality scarcely anything has tended more to establish their integrity and accuracy. "The portions of the Gospels which teach the deity of Christ are late interpolations," though no reason is or could be given for this amazing assumption other than that the argument requires it. These are but a few specimens of the kind of pleading by which this book is characterized. As might be expected, its conclusions would often be harmful did they not rest on reasoning manifestly unsound. "Sin is ignorance, evil is instruction, study the remedy, and knowledge the reward." "Men are not free." "When criminals are punished, it is not because they are guilty; it is because they are dangerous." These are but samples. And yet there are some good things in this book. We agree with Mr. Harden that if the Bible should be proved untrustworthy as to its facts, it could not be relied on as to its doctrines. We think, too, that if the discussion with the bishop does nothing else, it shows clearly that it is from the Scriptural standpoint of Calvin, and not from that of the Semi-pelagianism of the Romish Church that Christianity can be most easily and most triumphantly vindicated; and we give Mr. Harden credit for not a little shrewdness in choosing for the object of his attack this mongrel and emasculated form of Christianity.——*Inspired Anticipations of Some Conclusions of Modern Science and Philosophy.* The Inaugural Address of Samuel Spahr Laws, A.M., M.D., LL.D., D.D., as "Perkins Professor of Natural Science in Connection with Revelation and Christian Apologetics," in the Presbyterian Theological Seminary, at Columbia, S. C. Delivered May 10, 1894. Pp. 32. "To bring out the truth of the Bible is a true way to defend the Bible." We could scarcely have a better illustration of this than Dr. Laws' address, in which he maintains the thesis that "the leading valid conclusions of modern science and philosophy have been anticipated by the writers of the sacred Scriptures." We congratulate Columbia Seminary on her new professor. He will do much to enlarge her already great usefulness, and to extend her already wide reputation.——*Essays and Addresses.* An Attempt to Treat some Religious Questions in a Scientific Spirit. By the Ven. James M. Wilson, M.A., late Headmaster of Clifton College, Vicar of Rochdale, Archdeacon of Manchester. Pp. 262. (London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.) The religious questions referred to are such as "Morality in Public Schools and its Relation to Religion," "The Theory of Inspiration, or, Why Men do not Believe the Bible," "Miracles," "Evolution," "Fundamental Church Principles," etc. These are discussed with such a wealth of information and with such clearness and attractiveness of style that we are not surprised that "a cheap edition" of this volume has been called for. It is in accord, too, with the views of that large number—larger in the Church of England than with us—who think, that Christianity can best be explained by explaining it away; that the true method of converting secularists is by teaching them that "the distinctive doctrines of the Church and many of the sects are utterly unimportant at schools and everywhere"; that "inspiration is only an illumination in all that concerns religious truth"; that the doctrine of verbal inspiration is "utterly unsubstantiated by Scripture and by historical testimony, repudiated by the greatest living theologians, and by the vast majority, if not the whole, of the educated Christian ministers in the world"; that miracles are merely the "product of a spiritual power which resembles in nature the noblest and highest faculties in man"; that, indeed, God and man are essentially one, and that, consequently, the divine sacrifice whereby God would "reconcile the world unto himself" and make it possible for us to become "partakers of the divine nature" may be

entirely ignored. Our limits forbid thorough examination of these papers, and any other would be unworthy of their ability. We must add, however, that Christianity has more to fear from such apologetics than from any or all direct attacks.——*The Teaching of the Vedas.* What Light does it Throw on the Origin and Development of Religion? By Maurice Phillips, London Mission, Madras. Pp. viii, 232. (London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1895.) "This book is intended to answer two questions, viz.: (1) What is the fundamental teaching of the Vedas? and, (2) What light does that teaching throw on the origin and development of religion?" To the former, and probably the more difficult, of these inquiries it gives a very satisfactory reply. Under the four heads, "Theology," "Cosmology," "Anthropology," and "Soteriology," in untechnical language, and with frequent and exactly noted quotations from the Vedas, and specially from the oldest or Rig Veda, it sets forth the characteristic teaching of these scriptures. That "the religion of the undivided Aryans was a monotheism more or less clearly defined"; that the religion of the earlier Vedas themselves was henotheism; that as the idea of God as a person separate from nature was never grasped by this, so it developed into a philosophical pantheism,—these are the more important conclusions from the theology of the Vedas. That creation was the work of an intelligent being; that, with reference to its mode, it was represented, now as out of nothing, now as from preëxisting matter, and later as a phenomenal emanation from Deity,—this is a summary of the Vedic cosmology. That man was distinguished from all other creatures as "the thinker"; that the consciousness of sin, though "a prominent feature in the small number of hymns addressed to Varuna," the oldest of the gods, was, throughout Vedic literature, generally weak and usually wanting; that when sin was recognized it was conceived both as "a fall and as the voluntary transgression of divine laws entailing punishment"; that "immortality was regarded as a species of apotheosis or deification"; that the soul, "throwing off all imperfection," became "clothed in a shining form" or spiritual body glorified and purified by fire; that the pleasures of heaven were sensual rather than spiritual; that the fact and terrors of hell were intimated, but neither clearly nor frequently; that there is no trace of the doctrine of metempsychosis in the Rig Veda; that, in like manner, there is in it no authority for the complicated system of caste, the four social distinctions which subsequently developed into caste being then only four social ranks, which originated in the necessities of social, political and religious life,—these are the principal teachings of the anthropology of the Vedas. That "prayer and praise are the spontaneous expression of the feelings of dependence upon, and moral relationship to God"; that sacrifice is the soul of the Vedas, being older than their hymns, which were composed for its celebration; that human sacrifices, though mentioned in the earliest hymns, could not have been common; that the propitiation of the gods and the happiness of the sacrificer are the chief objects of all Vedic sacrifices; that the sacrificer himself was represented by the animal which he sacrificed; that "by the act of sacrifice *alone* could the gods be satisfied and their favor secured"; that there seem to be striking foreshadowings of the divine sacrifice for "the sin of the world"—such is an epitome of Vedic soteriology. With the conclusions from these teachings we can, in the main, agree. It is certain that the difference between the religion of the Vedas and modern Hinduism is that between light and darkness. It is as certain "that the development of religious thought in India has been uniformly downward, and not upward—deterioration, and not evolution." It is almost as certain that if we could go back far enough in time, "we should find a monotheistic religion, pure and simple." It does not seem to us so clear, however, "that the higher and purer concep-

tions of the Vedic Aryans were the results of a primitive divine revelation." If this means only that "the theory of natural evolution cannot explain all the facts," we give hearty assent. If it means that many of the ideas of the Vedas may be faint reflections of the revelation made to our first parents and from them passed over to their descendants, and that some, as the idea of sacrifice, are undoubtedly due to this revelation, we have no fault to find. If it means, however, as it would seem to, that, while man has by nature a religious tendency or capacity for God, *all* his knowledge of Him has been derived from a primitive miraculous revelation, we must dissent. Such is not the teaching of Romans i. 20. Moreover, could a miraculous revelation be understood, at least without a further miracle, if its subject matter were absolutely out of relation with all knowledge already apprehended? In a word, must we not discern the handiwork of God in nature and feel the claim of His law in conscience, if we are to appreciate a revelation from heaven? To deny natural religion is to undermine supernatural religion.

*Princeton.* WM. BRENTON GREENE, JR.

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## III.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

GENESIS AND SEMITIC TRADITION. By JOHN D. DAVIS, Ph.D., Professor of Semitic Philology and Old Testament History in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, N. J. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: David Nutt, 1894. 8vo, pp. 150. $1.50.

This is a timely book. It undertakes to point out and exemplify the true use of the abundant materials furnished by the cuneiform tablets for the vindication and exposition of the Scriptural accounts of early man. The author's purpose, however, is not primarily apologetic or expository, but critical. It has been well said that no department of science can make real progress without constant and searching criticism, in order that zeal may not outrun knowledge, nor brilliant conjecture do duty as secure fact. The remark is fully applicable to the apologetic use of the results of recent research in the East. That Assyriology has suffered for the lack of rigid critical examination by those who have undertaken to exploit its results for apologetic purposes is notorious. Ten years ago an American scholar published an earnest deprecation of certain abuses of Assyriology for purposes of Old Testament study, such as overhaste in its employment, the refusal to accept its clear facts, and the disposition to ignore the new problems with which it confronts the Biblical scholar. Exegetes and apologists were told that they ought to distrust popular and cursory statements of surprising discoveries, and ought to demand of the special investigators that they give them nothing as assured result which has not been thoroughly tested and sifted. Yet preachers and people have continued to catch at all manner of alleged confirmations of Scripture in the same undiscriminating way. They have eagerly appropriated whatever seemed favorable to their contention and have coolly rejected whatever seemed unfavorable; in one breath accepting the tablets as trustworthy witnesses, and in the next quietly discrediting them or putting their troublesome statements out of sight. Nor have speakers and writers at second hand been the only offenders in this respect. Accomplished archæologists like Prof. Sayce, to say nothing of such writers as Major Conder, have not infrequently shown the same lack of scholarly patience, the same culpable disposition to jump at conclusions when the tablets seemed to say what they wished them to say, and the same reluctance to acknowledge unpalatable facts. In the volume before us, Dr. Davis has

treated a portion of this material in a manner that is free from the faults above described. Confining his attention to the accounts of primitive times, as found in the Book of Genesis and in ethnic tradition, he winnows the material in the most thorough and satisfactory manner. In his Preface, after referring to the doubts once connected with the Babylonian traditions concerning early men as cited by Greek and Jewish writers, and the confirmation of the general trustworthiness of these citations by the discovery and decipherment of the cuneiform tablets, and their demonstration that much, perhaps all, of the doctrine taught in Israel concerning primitive times was an inheritance from Babylonia, he states his purpose as follows:—

"These native records have illuminated and elucidated the early chapters of Genesis. They have established the antiquity of the Hebrew narratives as traditions, with all that this fact involves for interpretation, and they have contributed particulars of greater or less value, which were wanting in the Hebrew record, but which serve to at least cast a side light, and sometimes to make methods and conceptions plain which before were obscure or ambiguous.

"But along with the valuable material which has been obtained from these records of the past, much that is worthless has been dragged into publicity. Mistranslations, due in part to the infancy of the science of Assyriology and in part to undue haste, have been put forward, meaning has been wrested from the narratives which they were never intended to bear, and false conclusions have been drawn; and these errors have gained currency in popular literature, and have been made the basis of argument in works which assume to speak with authority on Biblical matters.

"The purpose of this book is to attempt the removal of the accumulated rubbish and expose the true material; and when the work of separation has been accomplished as thoroughly as possible, to subject the genuine materials to careful investigation. In not a few instances the Hebrew narrative still stands alone, no parallel account having been found in the literature of other nations. When such is the case, the attempt is made to discover the meaning of the record in the manner of ordinary exegesis, with all the aid afforded by early Hebrew understanding of the tradition. It is regretted that on several topics negative results only can be obtained; but patience with negative results and the quiet tarrying by the argument for and against are better than haste."

There are fourteen chapters, treating of the following subjects: "The Creation of the Universe," "The Sabbath," "The Creation of Man," "The Help Meet for Man," "The Site of the Garden of Eden," "The Temptation of Man," "The Serpent of the Temptation," "The Cherubim," "Cain and Abel," "Cainites and Sethites," "The Sons of God," "The Deluge," "The Mighty Hunter," and "The Tower of Babel." Some of these are notoriously difficult subjects. Prof. Davis handles them all in a scholarly manner, and with a conspicuous fairness which soon wins the confidence of the reader. But, while the book is written by a scholar and not a mere popularizer, it is free from undue technicality, and is readable throughout. The first chapter taxes the attention more perhaps than any other, and is one of the most valuable in the book. It is not only a conclusive discussion of the historical relationship between the cuneiform and the Biblical accounts of the Creation; but it is also a most suggestive discussion of some related questions of great interest, such as the partial subordination of chronology to some other principle of arrangement in the Scriptural account of the works of Creation (which, if proved, would side-track effectually a once fierce controversy), and the meaning of the much-discussed "days" of the Hebrew tradition. Attention is called to the omission of the definite article from the enumera-

tion of the periods, a method suitable for exhibiting a relation which the writer would not narrowly define. Add to this "the Semitic tradition which has been preserved in the Babylonian version that the successive stages in the development of the ordered universe occupied long periods of untold duration, and the presumption becomes strong that the Hebrew writer likewise conceived of the creation period, not as seven times twenty-four hours, but as vastly, indefinitely long."

The chapter on "The Help Meet for Man" is a fascinating one. In view of the fact that it is in accord with old Babylonian tradition, as well as with Biblical history, for divine revelation to be made by symbolic dreams, and in view of the implications of the narrative concerning the creation of the woman from the rib of the man, the question is raised as to whether this was a real event or a vision, the author inclining to the former view. "If this was a vision, it was the method employed by God to reveal to man those truths regarding woman upon which the moral relations rest. In a symbolic manner man is taught that woman is one blood with him, that she equally with him is the handiwork of God, that she was created for the man, was committed unto him by God, and has her place by inherent right at man's side as help and companion. "It may be that like Paul, who knew not whether he was in the body or out of the body, the seer of this vision was ignorant whether the event was subjective or objective. He transmitted it just as it occurred, without note or comment, as a revelation of God which inculcated truth if even in a symbolic manner."

Mr. Boscawen's confident declarations concerning a Babylonian parallel to the Hebrew narrative of the "Temptation," are shown to be wide of the mark, and doubts are thrown even upon the supposed representation of the "Fall" on the so-called Adam and Eve cylinder.

In the paper on "Cain and Abel," the author speaks of the difference in character between the two men, but there is no reference to the difference in character between the two offerings. The fact that Abel's was a bloody sacrifice seems to us an essential point.

The author's caution is well illustrated by his statements concerning the apparent parallel between the list of ten Chaldean kings who reigned before the flood and the Sethite genealogy recorded in the fifth chapter of Genesis, both of which are restricted to antediluvians, contain the names of ten persons, and terminate with the hero of the flood. "What is the relation of these lists to each other? It is difficult to say. The wiser course is to suspend judgment for the present and allow the question to remain open. The facts are capable of two interpretations: either the two catalogues are fundamentally different, having been constructed for different purposes, yet as they deal with prominent persons belonging to the same historic age and to the same country, cross each other at various points, and culminate in the same individual; or else—and this is the more probable theory—when the accretions and transformations of centuries are removed, the two catalogues will be found to represent the same tradition."

In his chapter on "The Deluge," the author makes a neat point against the divisive critics, showing *from the cuneiform account* that difference of style is not an infallible evidence of diversity of document. Concerning another point of interest in connection with the record of the Flood, he says: "No testimony for or against a universal deluge is contained in the tradition, either in its Babylonian or Hebrew transmission, unless it be involved in the announced purpose of God to destroy man whom he had created from the face of the ground, both man and beast and creeping thing and fowl of the air. Even this announcement is not testimony to a universal deluge, unless animals were distributed over all parts of the globe.

Moreover, the language which is used to announce the divine purpose must not be interpreted as meaning more than the sense which it conveyed to the people to whom it was addressed. It must be interpreted also in the light of the probable meaning which Noah attached to the command to him to take every sort of animals with him into the ark, and especially to the command to take all food that is eaten; for he certainly did not attempt to penetrate distant unexplored regions of the earth in order to discover unknown animals and secure for them their own peculiar and indispensable food. Finally, the language must be interpreted without violence to the requirements of passages like Joel iii. 1; John xii. 32; Dan. vi. 25."

These are but meagre indications of a few of the subjects dealt with in this valuable volume, and of the admirable combination of conservatism and liberality in the treatment of them. One thing we may suggest which would add somewhat to the convenience of the work: in the translations given from the tablets the lines should be numbered, in order to ease and exactness of reference. We venture to recommend also the introduction of an Index. There seem to be no misprints whatever, and there are thirteen excellent illustrations, reproducing Babylonian tablets bearing on the subject matter. The book is a credit to American scholarship, and we commend it heartily to all students of the early chapters of Genesis, especially to any who may have been disturbed by recent discussions as to the trustworthiness of those ancient Scriptures.

*Hampden Sidney, Va.* W. W. MOORE.

THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE HOLY LAND. Especially in Relation to the History of Israel and the Early Church. By GEORGE ADAM SMITH, D.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Glasgow. London: Hodder & Stoughton; New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1894. 8vo, pp. xxv, 692.

The work of the Palestine Exploration Fund has given us a vast mass of valuable information relating to the geography and history of the Holy Land. Most of this has been made accessible by the excellent reports, maps, and other publications of that society. It remained, however, for some one to present, in adequate literary form, the important gains of these and other labors of recent years, together with all previous knowledge on the subject. Dr. George Adam Smith has undertaken this task, and the volume before us is the result. It was by no means an easy task. The field is large. The demand for accuracy is exacting. Robinson, Stanley and others had set a high standard. We expected a great book—nothing less could seem worthy of the occasion. Dr. Smith brought to the work an almost ideal equipment —broad and thorough scholarship, special devotion to Old Testament history and criticism, experience of travel in the land itself, and, to crown all, a remarkably clear and attractive English style. If we open the book with high anticipations, on the whole our best expectations are realized; though in some particulars we are disappointed, and in some we are perplexed.

The chief function of such a book is to help us to a more perfect understanding of the history, scenes and incidents of which lie in this land. This history can boast of no more interesting or important events than those in which Abraham or Jacob are the chief actors. We naturally turn to the scenes of their sojourn in the land. To our surprise their names do not occur in the Index. We look for Moreh and Mamre and Machpelah; not one of them is found. We find Beersheba, but on turning it up we are again disappointed, finding only a trifling discussion of the origin of the name.

We look for Israel, and are perplexed to find the most inconsistent views as to the origin and early history of that nation. On the one hand (pp. 85 to 88), the author leads us to understand that he does not regard the Biblical account of the sojourn in Egypt as at all reliable. He seems to hold that "Israel was purely a desert tribe, who by the inspiration of Jehovah are stirred up to leave their desert home and settle as agriculturists in Palestine." On the other hand, we have frequent incidental references to the patriarchs which imply their historic reality and the sojourn in Egypt (*vid.* pp. 283 and 585).

Now a geography of Palestine may very well be written without reference to the patriarchs. But it should not be called "historical." A history of Israel may proceed consistently on the supposition that the patriarchs are mythical; or it may proceed on the basis of the narrative in the Old Testament; but it cannot do both at the same time. This double-minded attitude is unscientific as well as inartistic and perplexing. The difficulty seems to us to be in the author's attempt—an attempt avowed in the Preface—to write on "the principles of critical methods." This rather vague proposition seems to mean that the "criticism which consists of the distinction and appreciation of the various documents of which the books of Scripture are composed" is to determine what and how much of Scripture is to be regarded as reliable history. We do not enter upon the question of how much these attempts of criticism have "contributed to the elucidation and arrangement of geographical details in the history of Israel," but it certainly seems premature to attempt to rewrite the geography of Palestine on the faith of conclusions that are themselves so far from settled, and whose validity is by no means determined by any real consensus of scholarship. The contribution made towards the solution of difficulties by these critical methods is absurdly small; and even these are rarely ventured in the text proper, while the discussions in the notes are necessarily too brief to be satisfactory or even suggestive.

As illustrative of this, take the note on Beersheba (p. 285): "Gen. xxi. 22–31[a] obviously implies the meaning to be the well of seven. But 31[b]–32 more strongly says that it means the well of the oath. It almost seems as if two accounts were here mingled, and though there is no linguistic proof of this, all the passage from 22 to 32 belonging to E, one is inclined to extend J back from 33, 34 to 31[b]." Surely it is unwise to provoke the gainsayer to ask how strong an "inclination," in the absence of linguistic evidence, should be to justify extending J to any given length in any direction. Surely we can afford to assume the substantial accuracy of the Pentateuch for a few years longer at any rate, as a working hypothesis. Even if the patriarchs be mythical, they occupy prominent places in literature, and should have at least the respect we show to Hamlet or Ulysses.

One more disappointment lies in Prof. Smith's treatment of the history of the Crusades. This is certainly less important than the Biblical history. Still it is a matter of history, and of the most picturesque history the world has ever seen; and historical geography should not slight it. We would not assert that Dr. Smith has not worked up this part of his subject adequately, but certainly all that he gives us might be gathered very easily.

Turning now from these criticisms of principles and of subordinate matters to the work as a whole, there remains for us the pleasant task of highest commendation. The plan of the book is good, the treatment is thorough, the style is admirable, the maps and Index are excellent—though the maps are on wretched paper. Three general divisions set the matter before us under the heads: 1. The Land as a Whole; 2. Western Palestine; 3. Eastern Palestine. In the first section the chapters on "The Form of the Land and its

Historic Consequences" and "The Scenery of the Land, with its Reflection in the Poetry of the Old Testament," seem to us peculiarly fine. In the second division the earlier chapters seem more carefully done than the later. The chapter on "The Shephelah" is especially helpful. The third section, on Eastern Palestine, is probably the most valuable part of the book, as a contribution to the literature of the subject; not that it is any better wrought out than the rest, but because it treats of a newer field.

The homiletic instinct of the author reveals itself pleasantly on almost every page. He is never too much occupied with heights and distances to note a spiritual analogy or an ethical suggestion. In some cases these suggestions are elaborated into quite a little homily. For example (p. 220ff.), we have from the text. "There the child Samson grew up," a delightful prose poem on the hero of the tribe of Dan. "It is as fair a nursery for boyhood as you will find in all the land. . . . . We see with one sweep of the eye all the course in which this uncurbed strength, at first tumbling and sporting with laughter like one of its native brooks, like them ran also to the flats and the mud, and, being darkened and befouled, was used by men to turn their mills."

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THE JOHANNINE THEOLOGY. A Study of the Doctrinal Contents of the Gospel and Epistles of the Apostle John. By GEORGE B. STEVENS, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in Yale University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894. Pp. xii, 387.

Students of theology were prepared to give a cordial welcome to this volume from the pen of Prof. Stevens, because his work on *Pauline Theology*, reviewed in these pages by Prof. Purves (January, 1894, p. 141), had shown him well qualified for the task, and because, as he states in the Preface, "no treatise which purports to furnish a critical and systematic presentation of the theology of John has hitherto been composed in English." The book is well printed and bound, uniform in style with the *Pauline Theology*, and is provided with a bibliography of recent literature, useful though brief, an Index of texts and one of subjects.

The discussion is confined, as the title indicates, to the Gospel and the epistles. We should be glad to have a treatise on the doctrine of the Apocalypse from Prof. Stevens, if he will seek a safer basis for his exposition than the assumption that "the beast of the Johannine Apocalypse is a symbol for the Roman Empire, or for the Emperor hero personally" (p. 147). The same method is pursued as in the *Pauline Theology*. The teaching of the apostle is distributed under the heads of dogmatic theology in fifteen chapters, each preceded by a brief list of books bearing upon the theme. In view of the fact that "no type of New Testament teaching has more of individuality than the Johannine" (p. 2), it is a serious defect that this book is almost entirely devoid of reference to the life, character and experience of John. The personal element appears to be studiously ignored. Though his life was less eventful than Paul's, surely his peculiar relation to Jesus and to Mary the mother of Jesus deserves remark. It was through his intimate knowledge of Jesus that he attained that knowledge of God which made him preëminently the theologian. Not through philosophic reflection, but on the bosom of Jesus he learned that God is love. A sketch of his life and character should precede the examination of his writings. In this respect the volume on *Pauline Theology* has pursued the better course.

With these general remarks we may proceed to review the work somewhat in detail.

*Chapter i. The Peculiarities of John's Theology.*—Attention is called to the predominance of the Pauline type of thought in the great dogmatic systems. Prof. Stevens himself has indicated the reason—"we can hardly speak of a Johannine system at all" (p. 371)—yet it is true that theology would be greatly enriched if larger space were accorded to the beloved disciple. Though it contains much that is excellent, the chapter as a whole is one of the least satisfactory in the book. The discussion is not adequate to the theme.

*Chapter ii. The Relation of John's Theology to the Old Testament.*—The theme is well treated. "Jesus grounds His work and teaching distinctly upon an Old Testament basis." He assumed both the unity and the inspiration of the Old Testament, while He often differed widely from His contemporaries in His understanding and application of its doctrine; for example, in His view of the Sabbath. "That which is most striking and important in the attitude of Jesus towards the Old Testament, as represented in the fourth Gospel, is the confidence with which He asserts—as against the Messianic ideas of His time—the correspondence of His person and the work to the prophetic ideal."

*Chapter iii. The Idea of God in the Writings of John.*—Prof. Stevens groups the teaching of John concerning God about the words, "*God is spirit*" and "*God is love.*" "*God is spirit*" represents the divine nature on the metaphysical side, while His ethical or transitive attributes are summed up in the phrase, "God is love." "Love, the impulse to bless and to impart His own goodness, makes Him what he is." The thought of self-revelation and self-impartation is conveyed also by the words, "God is *light.*" "Love is not a mere temper or inclination which it is optional with God to exercise or not to exercise towards the beings whom He has made. It is absolutely essential and constituent in God's being." This is held "to exclude the position of some theologians, that God may at will suspend the operation of His love." Many Calvinists will repudiate the unqualified statement, for which Calvinistic theology is made responsible, that "there is a conflict in the Divine Being between love and justice" (p. 284). The distinction between the love of benevolence and the love of complacency, which Prof. Stevens accepts, is evidence that the favor of God is not indiscriminately bestowed, but is largely conditioned in its exercise by the character of men.

The objects of God's love are shown to be three—His Son, the world, believers. The question is discussed whether John represents all men as children of God, or believers only; and the conclusion is reached that "God *is* the Father of men, but men *become* sons of God. . . . . God can be called the Father of men because He always remains *actually* in His relations to men what He is *ideally;* whereas men must *become* sons of God, because they are not *actually* what they are ideally." The solution is ingenious, but it is beside the mark. Prof. Stevens has created a difficulty which John does not present. Nowhere in the writings of John is God termed the Father of all men. The word always denotes His relation to the divine Son, or to believers who have become sons of God through Him. The problem is not to reconcile apparent discrepancies in John, which disappear upon examination; but to harmonize the teaching of John with other portions of the New Testament, where the universal Fatherhood of God is clearly taught. This was the common ground on which Paul met the men of Athens, and it lies at the basis of the appeal which the Gospel makes to all mankind. In origin, capacity and ideal destiny they are children of God. According to Scripture there is a sonship by nature and a higher sonship by grace; and John characteristically

recognizes only the higher form, the ethical and spiritual relation. In this sense men become sons of God only through the new birth.*

*Chapter iv. The Doctrine of the Logos.*—As this subject has recently been treated at length in this REVIEW (July, 1894), we need only indicate briefly the views of Prof. Stevens. The word *Logos* was a term of current philosophic speech. "The conception represented by the *Word of God* in Hebrew thought relates more to the divine activity; that represented by *Wisdom* relates more to the divine attributes." He is probably in error when he supposes that Philo's "descriptions of the Logos can denote nothing less than a real person, an hypostasis distinct from God." Philo found the elements of his teaching, it is observed, in the Old Testament, while the form in which they were cast was shaped by Gnostic speculation. It is probable that John had some direct knowledge of Philo's system. "In John we have what is not found in Philo—a clear and consistent personification" (the word is ill-chosen) "of the Logos." The thought of incarnation is foreign to Philo's system, and in general the differences between Philo and John are much more fundamental than the resemblances. It should be added that the Logos of Philo is neither Messiah nor Redeemer.

*Chapter v. The Union of the Son with the Father.*—It is clearly shown that the relation of the Son to the Father is not ethical merely, but essential and eternal.

*Chapter vi. The Doctrine of Sin.*—The dualism implied in the contrast between light and darkness is not physical, grounded in the nature of man as consisting of matter and spirit; nor metaphysical, inherent in the essence of the universe; but ethical, the result of free volition. The doctrine of the fall of Satan is found in the New Testament, according to Prof. Stevens, only in 2 Peter and Jude, which he unhappily terms deutero-canonical; and they depend upon the Apocryphal book of Enoch. But from whatever source the inspired writers have drawn the doctrine, they have set to it the seal of their authority. Nor can 1 Tim. iii. 6, "not a novice, lest being puffed up he fall into the condemnation of the devil," be summarily set aside with the remark that "in any case no reference to the fall of Satan can be found in it." The interpretation thus rejected is the most obvious and natural sense of the passage, and is held by many of the ablest expositors in ancient and modern times—Chrysostom, Calvin, Bengel, Wiesinger, Alford, Ellicott. The chapter closes with an interesting discussion of *Antichrist* and the *sin unto death.*

*Chapter vii. The Word of Salvation.*—Jesus is termed by John the Baptist "the Lamb of God" not as the antitype of the paschal lamb, but as the sacrificial victim of Isa. liii: "The death of Christ was sacrificial in its significance and saving in its effect."

*Chapter viii. The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit.*—The personality of the Spirit is demonstrated by three considerations: (1) "The Spirit is expressly distinguished from Christ; (2) He is described by personal designations; and (3) to Him is ascribed a series of personal activities." His mission is treated under three heads: "(1) The relation of the Spirit to the historical work of Christ; (2) the work of the Spirit in believers; and (3) His work in the unbelieving world."

*Chapter ix. The Appropriation of Salvation.*—The opinion of Wendt, who excludes from faith the idea of union with Christ, and indeed would banish it altogether from Christianity, is acutely criticised. It is highly incongruous indeed that a disciple of the school of Ritschl, which depreciates or denies the

*The whole subject is admirably treated in a paper published in this REVIEW, July, 1893, by Charles A. Salmond, entitled, "Homiletical Aspects of the Fatherhood of God."

mystical elements in the Christian faith, should undertake to expound the teaching of John; for these are the very elements by which his doctrine is distinguished.* "Faith is neither a subjective play of feeling, nor a speculative conviction or assent; it is a personal relation."

*Chapter x. The Origin and Nature of the Spiritual Life.*—The tests of the new birth are righteousness, love and faith. The words of Christ, "born of water and the spirit, are referred to the repentance baptism of John, and to the spiritual cleansing which Christ Himself effects."

*Chapter xi. The Doctrine of Love.*—Two points are discussed: "(1) The term which is used to express the idea of love, and (2) the subject and object of the love that is predicted." The distinction commonly drawn between ἀγαπᾶν and φιλεῖν is maintained. The main characteristics of love are found to be these: (1) It is a personal relation; (2) it is a social virtue; (3) it is the guarantee of righteous living; (4) it is "the giving impulse in God, the motive of his self-communication;" (5) it is the motive of sacrifice and service; (6) it involves faithful devotion to its object.

*Chapter xii. The Doctrine of Prayer.*—Four topics are treated: "(1) The words by which prayer is described; (2) the references which are made to the prayers of Christ; (3) indications respecting the nature and spirit of prayer on the part of the disciples, and (4) assurances in regard to the answering of prayer." Under (1) the distinction drawn by Trench between αἰτεῖν and ἐρωτᾶν is rightly rejected; and it is held that αἰτεῖν is the more specific and more urgent word; . . . . ἐρωτᾶν is more general, and is the higher and finer word. . . . . The latter verb is, therefore, more naturally used of the prayers of Jesus, while the former is applied to the asking of gifts and favors from God by others." In following out this distinction, Prof. Stevens is at variance with himself; for on p. 295 he remarks, following Trench, that ἐρωτᾶν "is in no single instance used in the New Testament to express the prayer of man to God;" while on p. 297, in commenting on 1 John v. 16, he observes that "both verbs," αἰτεῖν and ἐρωτᾶν, "are used of prayer to God." Under (4) wise words are spoken upon the conditions and limitations of prayer. The idea is excluded "that human desires can give the law to the divine order, and that the human will can become determining for the divine." The closing paragraphs of the chapter are admirable.

*Chapter xiii. The Doctrine of Eternal Life.*—Eternal life in the writings of John "is usually described as a present possession of believers," while yet it "looks forward to the 'last day' for its completion." *Eternal* "emphasizes the source and nature of the life which it describes, rather than its continuance." "Such a life is, of course, by its very nature, imperishable." The doctrine of conditional immortality is rejected.

*Chapter xiv. The Johannine Eschatology.*—Three themes are treated—the second advent, the resurrection and the judgment, events which will occur in this order in close connection. The literal second coming of Christ is taught. Upon p. 331 Prof. Stevens unhappily remarks, "The effort will be to interpret what our author has written; the task of determining by conjecture the precise words and meaning of Jesus Himself, in the utterance, sixty years or more before they were written dowu, of those discourses which John had reported, I shall not attempt." If we cannot regard the fourth Gospel as a trustworthy record of the life and teaching of Christ, its distinctive value and authority are gone. John is not an inspired teacher if he is not a faithful witness. It is not the opinion of John that concerns us, but the Word of Jesus. And Prof. Stevens has himself observed that "we can establish the substantial agreement in underlying ideas between John's version of

*On Ritschl's theology, see the article in this REVIEW for January, 1892, by Prof. C. M. Mead, D.D.

the teaching of Jesus and that of the Synoptists" (p. ix). The resurrection of the last day is represented as physical and universal, with "no hint of a separation in time between the resurrection of life and the resurrection of judgment." Paul, it is affirmed, does not teach the resurrection of all men, but of believers alone; but this can be maintained only by impeaching the trustworthiness of the report of Paul's speech in Acts xxiv. 15 (*Pauline Theology*, p. 357, note). In spite of the errors to which attention has been called, this is one of the most satisfactory chapters in the book. The calm and sober judgment with which these themes are treated—themes so readily and so often abused—and the soundness of the main conclusions reached, are worthy of high commendation.

The subject of *Chapter xv* is "*The Theology of Paul and of John Compared.*" Prof. Stevens has not escaped the besetting sin of writers upon theological themes—and not of them alone—that of giving an undue proportion of space and labor to the refutation of erroneous opinions, often more than to the positive exhibition of the truth. This volume is by no means an extreme example of the kind, for the judgment of the author is too sound to permit him to run to excess; but he should have been more upon his guard against the danger of allowing the voices of commentators and critics to drown the voice of John. Though the book has its errors and defects, it has merits of a high order. The style is lucid, the exegesis careful and sober, the learning ample; and it is pleasant to find one so familiar with the vagaries of German criticism who has been so little affected by them. The attitude of Prof. Stevens is that of a devout believer. To his treatment of these high themes he has brought not only intellectual skill, but spiritual fervor, and it is always true that the heart makes the theologian. We cordially commend this volume to all students of theology, especially of the theology of John.

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*The Comprehensive Concordance to the Holy Scriptures.* By Rev. J. B. R. Walker. Based on the Authorized Version. With an Introduction by M. C. Hazard, Ph.D. 8vo, pp. 980. Price, cloth, $2.50; half leather, $3. (Boston and Chicago: Congregational Sunday School and Publishing Society, 1894.) We have kept this new Concordance on our table for some three months and have tested it in practical use, with the result of finding it to be all that its publishers claim for it. It keeps itself strictly to the one function of being a handy text-finder. It attempts no rivalry with the great quartos of Young and Strong in richness of contents. But it supplies a real need in placing at the elbow of every busy worker a text-finder of moderate size, sufficient comprehensiveness (it is said to contain 50,000 more references than Cruden), high accuracy and eminent useableness.——*Histoire de la Vulgate pendant les prêmiers siécles du moyen age*, par Samuel Berger. Mémoire couronné par l'Institut. 8vo, pp. xxiv, 443. (Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie, 1893.) In adding this monumental work to the long series of treatises with which he has enriched the history of the Latin Bible, M. Samuel Berger has only once again earned the gratitude of all lovers of the Biblical texts. The general limits of the subject as here treated were determined, no doubt, by the terms of the subject proposed by the Academy of Inscriptions; but, as M. Berger explains in an illuminating Preface, they are also inherent in the nature of the case. History must be written not as one would like to write it, but as it can be written: and the origin of the Vulgate is precisely the period of its history of which we know least; so that it is necessary to begin our historical studies of the Latin Bible with the detailed treatment of a period of which we have some hope of recovering a true picture. The present work is a model of historical research and presentation. It covers the

history of the Vulgate from the beginning of the time of the Merovingians to the end of the Carolingian period, and follows its fortunes from one extremity to the other of the Latin world. There is brought together and placed in the broad light of adequate knowledge, everything that will enable the reader to understand the whole course of the development from the first incursions of the Vulgate texts from Spain and Ireland into a land which still clung, in large measure, to pre-Hieronymian texts, until the settlement of the Carolingian Vulgate text in the use of the whole Gallic Church. M. Berger's method is chiefly geographical: he busies himself primarily with following the geographical order and seeking to determine the local origin of the several recensions of the Biblical text, and the gradual spread of the influence of each. His material is disposed as follows. He first treats of the introduction of the Vulgate into Gaul, whether from Spain or Ireland; then he treats of the old French texts, in the region from the Pyrenees to the Loire, in the North, and on the Italian border; then comes a discussion of the Bible of Theodulph, followed by one on Alcuin and the Bibles of Tours, and the great Carolingian Schools; the whole is closed with chapters on the Accessories of the Bible text, and with a rich series of Appendices including material for justifying the statements made in the history proper. It would be impossible to give in a brief notice any conception of the wealth of material which M. Berger uses in this work, or of the comprehensiveness of his treatment of it. Let it suffice to say that the volume constitutes the definitive treatise on its subject.——*The Parchments of the Faith.* By Rev. George E. Merrill, Author of *The Story of the Manuscripts*, etc. 12mo, pp. 288. (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1894.) Mr. Merrill has been for some years known to students of the New Testament text as the author of a bright little book called *The Story of the Manuscripts.* The present volume is written in the same clear style; and with the same skillful touch introduces the general reader to the history of the preservation of the Bible through the ages. Somewhat over a third of the space is given to the Old Testament MSS. and versions: the rest to those of the New. The work is very well done; and the book may be confidently recommended as a trustworthy guide to those who would like to learn in a pleasant way how our Bible has come down to us. To be sure, the origin of Daniel is assigned to the middle of the second century before Christ (p. 15); but the tone of the book with reference to the Old Testament is better indicated by such an admirable passage as this: "Jesus . . . . left His followers in possession of their old Bible, doubly sanctified to them by His own use, quotation and authority. Its value was not lessened, but increased, as he had confirmed its truth, fulfilled its predictions of the Messiah, applied its teachings to His own life, and expounded them for His disciples" (p. 28). ——*How the Codex was Found.* A Narrative of Two Visits to Sinai, from Mrs. Lewis' Journals, 1892–1893. By Margaret Dunlop Gibson. 12mo, pp. 141. (Cambridge: Macmillan & Bowes, 1893.)——*A Translation of the Four Gospels from the Syriac of the Sinaitic Palimpsest.* By Agnes Smith Lewis, M.R.A.S., Author of *Glimpses of Greek Life and Scenery*, *A Catalogue of the Syriac MSS. in the Convent of St. Katharine on Mount Sinai*, etc. 12mo, pp. xxxvi, 239. (London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.) The narrative of the discovery of this old MS. of the ancient Syriac version of the New Testament, and of its recovery to the world through the enterprise of two Presbyterian ladies, belongs to the romance of scholarship. These two volumes, prepared by these fortunate ladies themselves, record the facts connected with its discovery, and open to the English-reading public its treasures. The promptness with which the natural curiosity of the public has been met by these excellent volumes deserves all praise, as also does the adequacy of the

material given in them. A word of appreciation and thanks is all, however, that they call for here. Any critical remarks on the value of the Codex and on the problems which it raises or solves must needs be postponed to a notice of the Syriac text itself, which also is already before the public. Meanwhile, those interested in the subject may find admirable papers by Mr. Burkitt in *The Guardian*, Prof. Rendel Harris in *The Contemporary Review*, and above all by Dr. Th. Zahn in the first three numbers of Luthardt's *Theologisches Litteraturblatt* for 1895, as well as a convenient summary of facts by Dr. Farrar in *The Expositor*. It may not be amiss to add that the importance of the new Codex is to be found in the aid it may render in reconstructing the history of the Syriac version: and that the attempt which has been made to drag it into current theological controversies, especially by some young scholars in the columns of *The Academy*, is altogether misjudged. ——*Lectures on the Religion of the Semites.* First Series: The Fundamental Institutions. By the late W. Robertson Smith, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge. New Edition, Revised throughout by the Author. 8vo, pp. xiv, 507. (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1894; New York: Macmillan & Co.) A very careful and full *résumé* of the contents of this volume with a brief but sufficing estimate of its value, by Dr. William Henry Green, was given in this REVIEW (Vol. i, p. 671, *sq.*), on the appearance of the first edition. The reader is referred now to that review. The present edition has been revised throughout, with the painstaking care which Dr. Robertson Smith bestowed upon his publications: and it now appears in a form which, while essentially unaltered in its contents, is yet very thoroughly brought up to date and much improved in details. Its central contention, as to the origin and meaning of sacrificial rites, is in nowise changed by the revision, and, we may add, is imperceptibly strengthened by it. The theological significance of the work rests in this sacrificial theory: and it is in his working out of this theory that Mr. J. G. Frazer, Dr. Smith's friend and co-worker, finds his great contribution to modern thought. If his views should prevail, to be sure, large reconstructions of Christian doctrine might become necessary. But we confidently rest in Dr. Green's verdict, that Dr. Smith's presentation is not fitted to give prevalence to his views. We are sorry to learn that the publication of the two later series of Burnett lectures, continuing the discussion of the *Religion of the Semites*, is no longer to be hoped for. Those who heard them spoke so highly of them that it is a matter of regret that this series of lectures, which made apparently so brilliant an impression, will need to be judged hereafter only by this certainly very inadequate first course.——*Die Litteratur des Alten Testaments nach der Zeitfolge ihrer Entstehung.* Von G. Wildeboer, Theol. Doct. und ord. Professor in Groningen. Unter Mitwirkung des Verfassers aus dem Holländischen übersetzt von Pfarrer Dr. F. Risch in Heuchelheim bei Landau. 8vo, pp. x, 464 (Göttingen: Vandenhœck und Ruprecht, 1895; New York: B. Westermann & Co.) Dr. Wildeboer's treatise on *The Literature of the Old Testament in its Chronological Sequence* has already, in its Dutch original, been reviewed in this REVIEW by Prof. G. Vos (Vol. v, p. 696). For an account of Dr. Wildeboer's method and of his opinions as to the origin of the Old Testament books, and for an estimate of the value and significance of his treatise, we must refer the reader, to Dr. Vos' review. It will suffice here to say that the German translation is an admirable one, and that it has been made, through certain corrections which have been introduced, essentially a revised second edition of the work. The most important of these corrections Dr. Wildeboer refers to in the Preface to the German edition as follows: "Above all, Koster's study of the restoration of Israel in the Persian period has required of me many modifications in my estimate of the Priest

Codex and Chronicles." The reference here is to Koster's *Het herstel van Israël in het Perzische tijdvak*, published early in 1894, in which the whole subject of the Persian period of Jewish history is subjected to a most drastic treatment. Prof. Wildeboer at once greeted Koster's conclusions with a hearty welcome, in the *Theologische Studiën*, 1894, pp. 277, *sq.*, and now naturally incorporates them, with some unimportant modifications, into his treatise. According to these conclusions, the story of a return of a large body of exiles under Zerubbabel is simple fiction, and the second temple was built by Jews who had never been deported. It is interesting to observe so radical a critic as Dr. Wildeboer still pluming himself on being "conservative"—*i. e.*, of course, more conservative than some. But his readers will agree with Prof. Vos in looking upon his position as logically anti-supernaturalistic. When open materialistic atheists like Ernst Haeckel, as in his recently published *brochure* called *Monism*, still talk of their belief in God, the soul, immortality, and pose as the conservators of religion—only, a purified religion, a religion without God, soul or immortality—we can scarcely wonder that theologians like Prof. Wildeboer should still claim to believe in the existence of a revelation after they have ground its sole vehicle to powder. What is needed above everything in these days of confusion is some electric spark to flash through the world of thought and crystallize parties on their lines of real cleavage. Above everything, the world needs to know now on which side men are standing, and we need not doubt that there are many who need to have their real position revealed even to themselves.——*Was lehrt man gegenwärtig auf der Universität Halle-Wittenberg über das Alte Testament?* Ein Beitrag zu den "Ernste Blicken in den Wahn der modernen Kritik des Alten Testamentes." Von Dr. th. Adolf Zahn. 8vo, pp. 34. (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1894.)——*Socialdemokratie und Theologie besonders auf dem Boden des Alten Testamentes.* Von Dr. th. Adolf Zahn. 8vo, pp. 37. (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1895.) [Imported by B. Westermann & Co., 812 Broadway, New York.] These two brochures continue Dr. Zahn's good witness against the rationalistic treatment of the Old Testament which has taken such full possession of the German Universities. The text of the former of them is taken from Kautzsch's translation of the Old Testament, and especially from his abstract of the history of the Old Testament literature which accompanies it. "It is a new phenomenon," says Dr. Zahn, "that a Bible translation should be made wholly to serve theories which have grown up on the basis of empiricism and rationalism and deny miracle and revelation." Even De Wette, Zunz, Weizsäcker, were content to give a simple translation: but Kautzsch must subordinate all to "a tendency." "The German scholar believes," he exclaims, "that, as Delitzsch says, omnipotence dwells in his inkstand, and so champions his pet notions with glowing fanaticism." Isolated from the living church and the life of the people, he becomes a prey to the dreams and spectres of his own chamber and strikes out viciously at all that crosses his path. "German theology learns nothing. Therefore its labor goes for nothing, and of all its investigations nothing remains but the poison-drops which gather into the Bible in the vest pocket of the social democrat. This will also be the result of this new 'Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament' with which Halle-Wittenberg has presented us; it will increase unbelief in the trustworthiness of the Word of which the Lord in His hottest conflict said: It stands written." These closing words of the first pamphlet give the text of the second. Social democracy is here taken as the natural expression of the growing unbelief under which German society is thought to be groaning: and the theological Faculties are represented as being, instead of bulwarks against, rather fomenters of this unbelief—as is seen especially in their destructive criticism of the Old Testament. The pamphlet consists

of a rapid and telling review of the teaching of the several Faculties of Theology as to the trustworthiness of the Old Testament Scriptures, with a view to justifying this contention. It closes with these stirring sentences: "There are at work unnumbered forces for the general ruin of all order and righteousuess: the most dangerous are those which destroy the authority of the Bible. . . . . With faith in God's Word, Germany could be a rock of the truth; instead of this its barren sea casts up mire and dirt. But the chief blame must be borne by the Universities."——*The Higher Criticism.* Au Outline of Modern Bible Study. By Rev. C. W. Rishell, A.M., Ph.D. With an Introduction by Prof. Henry M. Harman, D.D., LL.D. 12mo, pp. 214. (Cincinnati: Cranstou & Curts; New York: Hunt & Eaton, 1893.) The value of this useful sketch of the Higher Criticism is somewhat marred by a lack of clearness. It would have been useful to treat of the method of study called the Higher Criticism from a purely formal point of view, and to outline its aims, methods and principles. It would also have been useful to present a *précis* of the conclusions which the prevalent school of criticism seeks to commend to the scholarly world. But those two undertakings are so diverse that they need to be kept, not indeed apart, but certainly unconfused. The author, however, in his sketch first of the one and then of the other does not appear to us to have kept them from invading each the sphere of the other; and the consequence is that the conclusions of a single school are in danger of being conceived by the unwary reader as the findings of "criticism." What we need is a clear outline of the principles of criticism, with an equally clear recognition of the fact that the prevalent school of critics is only one school, and that its conclusions are only the dogmas of a single aud that an extreme party. That there are critics and critics, the author of course duly notes; and that the so-called "traditionalists" are also critics he also mentions: but the tone and contents of his book are such as to render the uninstructed reader very liable to confuse "criticism" with the work of the disintegrating school of critics. His own position we should judge to be what he would class as "conservative criticism," *i. e.*, conservative disintegrating criticism. The name is of course objectionable when so applied. The so-called "conservative critics" belong to the same party with the so-called "radical critics"—it is only a questiou of degree between them; and both should be included in Dr. Harman's term "skeptical critics," *i. e.*, they are critics who have come to question more or less the generally received conclusions. Dr. Harman's own term—"evangelical critics"—is no more acceptable. It brings in a religio-theological point of view, not germane to the subject. Critics, professing alike to use purely critical methods but reaching opposite conclusions, cau only be discriminated among themselves by the character of their conclusions. It is entirely misleading to attempt to distinguish them on the wholly extraneous ground of whether they are pious, devout, evangelical, or the like, in their religious views. Such an attempt is sure to introduce that dualism in thought which shows itself in the uncertainty of touch characteristic of this otherwise meritorious volume.——*Radical Criticism.* An Exposition and Examination of the Radical Critical Theory Concerning the Literature and Religious System of the Old Testament Scriptures. By Francis R. Beattie, Professor of Systematic Theology and Apologetics in the Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary, and Author of *An Examination of Utilitarianism* and *The Methods of Theism.* With an Introduction by W. W. Moore, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Old Testament Literature in Union Theological Seminary, Virginia. 12mo, pp. 325. (New York, Chicago and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1895.) The faults we have just adverted to in Dr. Rishell's book have been avoided by Dr. Beattie in this singularly calm and

balanced "Exposition and Examination of the Radical Critical Theory." Dr. Beattie never permits his readers to fancy that criticism is the peculiar possession of the "radical" school, or that in surveying the conclusions of that school he is taking stock of the results of a century's critical examination of the Scriptures. The work of this school is fairly estimated and given its proper place in the history of the intellectual movements of our time: its findings are stated in outline, the principles on which and methods by which it proceeds are exhibited, and its value is soberly weighed. We can confidently recommend the book to all who are seeking a clear and simple account of the new school, and a calm estimate of the value of its conclusions. The volume is divided into four parts. In the first of these, Criticism, the Higher Criticism and the Radical Higher Criticism are defined. In the second, a cursory history of the critical movement from Porphyry to our own day is given. In the third, we have a rapid exposition of the Radical Criticism in its presuppositions, methods and main results. In the last, we have a more detailed critical examination of the chief elements which enter into the critical hypotheses. The whole richly deserves the high commendation passed upon the book by Dr. Moore, in the Introduction: it is a "sound, timely, and readable" book.——*The Negative Criticism and the Old Testament.* An All-around Survey of the Negative Criticism from the Orthodox Point of View, with Some Particular Reference to Cheyne's *Founders of Old Testament Criticism.* By Theodore E. Schmauk. 18mo, pp. 232. (Lebanon, Pa.: Aldus Company, 1894.) This is also a thoroughly good book. Mr. Schmauk has as clear a perception of the philosophical presuppositions and logical methods of the negative criticism as he has of the details of its arguments and results. His introductory chapter and the series of subsequent chapters in which he "attempts to delineate," as he says, "the negative critical mental type," are models of keen and illuminating writing: while he conducts the direct argument against the processes and results of the negative critics with candor and success. The accuracy and fullness of his information are conspicuous: but even more conspicuous are his philosophical grasp of principles and his power of clear and telling statement of them. The book is badly printed: its proofs have not been well read: it has been published in a corner, and may not find its way readily into the regular channels of trade. It will be a pity if so good a book—in many respects the best brief general and popular rejoinder to our negative critics which has been published—does not get into general circulation. It may be obtained from "The Aldus Publishing Company," Lebanon, Pa., at a cost of one dollar. ——*That Monster, the Higher Criticism.* By Marvin R. Vincent, D.D. 12mo, pp. 41. (New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. [1894].) So far as Dr. Vincent's object in this vigorously written little pamphlet is to defend against unreasoning prejudice the right and duty of critical examination of the Bible, he will have all lovers of the Bible with him. So far on the other hand, as it is his object to defend the methods and results of the prevalent critical assault on the trustworthiness of the Bible, he will have against him all lovers of the Bible who are sufficiently instructed to discern the signs of the times and sufficiently independent to withstand the fashionable fads of the day. By confusing these two objects in his treatment of the questions which he raises, Dr. Vincent does what he can to continue the unrest and doubt which have not unnaturally taken possession of the minds of Christian men as to Biblical criticism. It is perfectly fatuous to urge that all criticism must be right when wielded by men of devout spirit. It is only too true that the Bible has often suffered more from its professed friends than from its avowed enemies. The question now pressing on the conscience of Christian men is not whether criticism is a right, and not whether some of the

disintegrating critics may not mean right in their criticism; it is whether this disintegrating criticism is itself right. Surely those who think it is not right, have the right to say so, and to decline to permit it to be prosecuted under their sanction. The exercise of this indubitable right on their part is what Dr. Vincent calls "ecclesiastical persecution."——*The Old Testament Under Fire.* By A. J. F. Behrends, D.D. 16mo, pp. 26. (New York: Butler Bible-Work Company [1895].) Dr. Behrends has done what doubtless many other earnest men among us have done and are doing, though they have not yet like him risen up in meeting and told their experience: he has come to feel that he could no longer take his opinions as to the origin and structure of the Old Testament at second-hand from the critical specialists, and has accordingly sought to form an independent judgment as to the results which they are proclaiming. In this pamphlet he tells us what one earnest pastor has found in his study of the Old Testament, with a view to testing the conclusions of the popular critical school. It is well summed up in one rather trenchant sentence: "When historical criticism ceases to make its conclusions the premises of its argument, it will be time enough to take it seriously." Of course Dr. Behrends does not object to the critical examination of the Old Testament: but he thinks that historical criticism ought not to part with common sense when it approaches the Biblical books; and he finds that this is just what the now prevalent school has done.——*Lex Mosaica; or, The Law of Moses and the Higher Criticism.* With an Introduction by the late Right Reverend Lord Arthur Hervey, D.D., Bishop of Bath and Wells. Edited by Richard Valpy French, D.C.L., LL.D., F.S.A. 8vo, pp. xxxvi, 652. (London and New York: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1894.) The purpose of this valuable volume and the excellence of its execution were appreciatively estimated by Dr. William Henry Green, in the April number of this REVIEW (p. 346, *sq.*). It is reverted to here chiefly in order to indicate the authors who have here united in the endeavor to exhibit, by a new investigation of the material, that, upon the current critical theories, "the history is unworkable in *any one* of the centuries between the period of the great law-giver and the completion of the Canon." The work is a sustained effort to show that what is called the "traditional" view of the Old Testament books and dispensation does, and that the new so-called critical view does not, correspond with the historical records. That this may be done thoroughly, the several periods are parceled out to separate scholars, and the results of their investigations are brought together in a single view. The late Bishop of Bath and Wells introduces the body of essays, and Dr. Henry Wace closes the volume with a skillfully drawn summary of the argument and its results. The critical essays themselves are thirteen in number, as follows:—1. "The Archæological Witness to the Literary Activity of the Mosaic Age," by Prof. Sayce; 2. "Moses the Author of the Levitical Code of Laws," by Canon Rawlinson; 3. "The Deuteronomical Code," by Principal Douglas; 4. "The Period of Joshua," by Canon Girdlestone; 5. "The Period of the Judges," by Dr. Valpy French; 6. "The Times of Samuel and Saul," by Mr. Lias; 7. "The Period of David and Solomon," by Dr. F. Watson; 8. "The Northern Kingdom," by Dr. J. Sharpe; 9. "The Southern Kingdom," by Dr. Alexander Stewart; 10. "The Eighth Century," by Dr. Stanley Leathes; 11. "The Seventh Century," by Dr. Robert Sinker; 12. "Ezekiel and the Priestly School," by Mr. Spencer; 13. "The Post-exilic Period," by Dr. R. Watts. In these several essays, "it is believed," as Dr. Wace summarizes, "that the various writers have shown that every period of Jewish history, and each successive contemporary record, bears traces of the truth of the old tradition; and this continuous and unbroken chain of evidence must carry, if it can be established, overwhelm-

ing weight." The importance of the issue which is raised he justly points out as follows:

"It will be acknowledged that the writers of the present volume are not wrong in regarding the issue thus raised as most momentous in its import, not only to our belief in the Old Testament, but to the general truth of Christianity. It has already involved grave questions respecting the limits of our Lord's authority and knowledge, and it must entail not less grave questions respecting the authority and inspiration of the apostles and evangelists. . . . . In proportion to the gravity of the issues actually, or even possibly, involved, will be the responsibility for any hasty application of critical processes, or for any prejudiced conclusions."

We take great pleasure in calling renewed attention to this readable and yet careful testing of the historical possibility of the theories of the disintegrating criticism of the Old Testament. It would be hard to find a single volume from which a more comprehensive view of the issue could be obtained.——*The Origin of the Pentateuch in the Light of the Ancient Monuments.* By Henry Alexander White, M.A., Ph.D., D.D., Professor of History in the Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Va. 8vo, pp. 304. (Richmond, Va.: B. F. Johnson Publishing Co., 1894.) Prof White's historical lectures lie at the base of this volume, and he offers it to the public in the hope that it may be found serviceable "in connection with the study of the English Bible as a text-book of history in our colleges and universities." The treatment is not, as the form of the title might suggest, logical, but rather historical. First the historical data are surveyed in a section called "The Witness of the Monuments," which furnishes the starting point of the investigation. Then the material of the Pentateuch is treated in a series of sections on "The Beginnings of Divine Revelation Contrasted with Heathen Folk Lore," "Divine Revelation Continued in Opposition to Heathen Nature Worship," "Divine Revelation in Conflict with Heathenism," and "The Divine Charter of Deliverance from Heathen Superstition." It will be seen that the scheme of the book very well adapts it to the historic purpose for which it is recommended. Its bearing on the origin of the Pentateuch is, in a sense, incidental; but none the less real for that. It is refreshing in these days to meet with a work conceived in a spirit of such profound faith in the trustworthiness of Scripture.——*The Permanent Value of the Book of Genesis*, as an integral part of the Christian Revelation. Being the Paddock Lectures for 1894. By C. W. E. Body, M.A., D.C.L., Professor of Old Testament Literature and Interpretation in the General Theological Seminary, New York; Sometime Provost of Trinity College, Toronto, and Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. 12mo, pp. xxi, 230. (New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1894.) Prof. Body's "Paddock Lectures" are devoted to an attempt to seek a correct orientation with reference to the proposed critical reconstruction of one book of the Bible. The first lecture is introductory and gives an outline of the critical problem in general; the second gives a critico-historical sketch of the literary analysis of Genesis; the third, fourth and fifth undertake a more detailed testing of the results of the critical hypothesis as applied respectively to the narratives of creation and paradise, of the fall, and of the deluge and the patriarchal period. The whole treatment is sober and open-minded; and the main effort is to approach the questions raised from a point of view less narrow and one-sided than that of the prevalent criticism. The result arrived at is that the permanent value of Genesis as a religious, ethical, theological, and not less as a historical document, is in little danger from the assaults of this criticism. The inconsequence of the methods adopted by it, and the untenableness of the results attained by it, are repeatedly exposed in a very telling way: and the reader is kept ever reminded of the deeper issues that are involved. There are, to be sure, a few matters in which we do not see eye to eye with Prof. Body, as for example his over-

strained reverence for the Fathers, and his apparently overdone abstraction of the literary and historical problems of criticism. But such matters as these do not affect the value of the book, which is a distinctly sound and useful one, and must operate to open the eyes of its readers to the real state of the case and to aid them in recovering their balance after the critical onset.——"By-Paths of Bible Knowledge," xxi. *The Sanitary Code of the Pentateuch.* By the Rev. C. G. K. Gillespie, A.K.C., A.C.P., etc. 12mo, pp. 96. (London: The Religious Tract Society; New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co. [1894].) An interesting if somewhat slight little book. The author's idea is that the sanitary provisions of the Mosaic law, although couched in popular form suitable to the apprehension and common use of their first recipients, have nevertheless a distinctly scientific basis. "It is interesting and helpful to see that the broad outlines of such treatment as the latest investigations have shown to be the most effective, even under conditions so widely different in structure and detail, are clearly indicated in the sacred sanitary code of the Pentateuch." There is possibly a tendency in the treatment of details to seek too constantly a physical rather than a symbolical reason for the several relevant provisions of the law.——*Judas Maccabæus*, and the Jewish War of Independence. By Claude Reignier Conder, D.C.L., LL.D., M.R.A.S., Major R.E. New Edition. 8vo, pp. 218. (London: A. P. Watt & Son, for the Palestine Exploration Fund; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.) The first edition of Major Conder's sketch of the Jewish War of Independence appeared as long ago as 1879. It is now reissued with a new Preface. Its value consists in the military criticism of Judas' strategy and the vivid pictures of his battles.——*From the Exile to the Advent.* By Rev. William Fairweather, M.A., Kirkcaldy. 12mo, pp. 210. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1895; New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.) Like all the parts of the series of which it forms the latest issue, this little treatise is a markedly satisfactory treatment of its theme. The fly in the pot of the apothecary is the mistaking of certain findings of the school of criticism now so popular for historic fact. The period of the exile is glorified on its literary side as having produced the second Isaiah, in which "the high-water mark of Hebrew prophecy is reached," as well as made its contribution towards the production of other books such as the Pentateuch and Joshua; while not only some Psalms, but the book of Daniel (the narratives of which have yet "a historical basis"), are carried down into the Greek period. It seems odd that even writers of "Handbooks for Bible Classes" cannot remember that the proper material for history is facts, not hypotheses: and that even scholarly students appear to find it so difficult to realize that true learning exhibits itself not in a precipitate eagerness to "incorporate" the latest guesses of "untrammeled" criticism into their literary products, but in a calm balance of judgment which cannot be "quickly shaken from its mind."——"The Expositor's Bible." Edited by the Rev. W. Robertson Nicoll, M.A., LL.D., Editor of *The Expositor.* Six recent volumes, crown 8vo, to wit: *The Book of Numbers.* By the Rev. Robert A. Watson, M.A., D.D., Author of *The Gospels of Yesterday, Judges and Ruth*, etc. Pp. xiii, 414. *The Second Book of Kings.* By F. W. Farrar, D.D., F.R.S., Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; Archdeacon of Westminster. Pp. xvi, 496. *The Books of Chronicles.* By W. H. Bennett, M.A., Professor of Old Testament Languages and Literature, Hackney and New Colleges; Sometime Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. Pp. xii, 464. *The Psalms.* By Alexander Maclaren, D.D. Vol. iii: Psalms xc–cl. Pp. viii, 641. *The Book of Ezekiel.* By the Rev. John Skinner, M.A., Professor of Old Testament Exegesis, Presbyterian College, London. Pp. xi, 499. *The Book of Daniel.* By F. W. Farrar,

D.D., F.R.S., Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; Archdeacon of Westminster. Pp. xii, 334. (London: Hodder & Stoughton; New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1894 and 1895.) These six volumes are the latest Old Testament issues in that excellent series, "The Expositor's Bible." They retain the high level of expository skill and breezy freshness which that series early attained. "Can these dry bones live?" need no longer be asked even of the itineraries of Numbers or the genealogies of Chronicles. We cannot admire enough the charming way in which Prof. Bennett, for example, discourses on the significance of lists of names, statistics and family traditions, or Dr. Watson on the laws of the Jews. It seems to us all the more a thousand pities that so admirable a series of popular expositions should have been permitted to be deflected from its proper end of expounding the Christian Scriptures into an effort to correct them. For this is, in plain words, what has happened to the Old Testament portion of the series; it has become largely a propaganda for the destructive theories of recent Biblical criticism. The several authors, to be sure, wish to save the moral character of the Biblical writers whom they are expounding: they are earnest in insisting upon their "sincerity," their "honesty," their "good intentions." But the historical character of the narratives they have given us they wave aside with a somewhat easy smile of incredulity. Dr. Watson desires the reader to note at the outset of his study of the Book of Numbers, that "the effect generally" of that book "is that of a compilation made under difficulties by a scribe or scribes who were scrupulous to preserve everything relating to the great law-giver and the dealings of God with Israel." The basis of the book consists then of "contemporary records of some incidents, and traditions early committed to writing," "venerable records reaching back to the time they profess to describe, and presenting, though with some traditional haze, the important incidents of the desert journey." The "scribe or scribes" sought sincerely to frame the history of the journey from these materials. "But in order to reach historical fact they had to use the same kind of means as we employ; and this qualifying statement, *with all that it involves*, applies to the whole contents of the book we are to consider. Our dependence with regard to the events recorded is on the truthfulness but not on the omniscience of the men, whoever they were, who from traditions, records, scrolls of law and venerable memoranda compiled this Scripture as we have it." The exposition is conducted on this presupposition. The same is of course true of Archdeacon Farrar's *The Second Book of Kings*. In a still greater measure is it true of Prof. Bennett's *The Books of Chronicles*. To him "Chronicles is really an anthology gleaned from ancient historic sources and supplemented by early specimens of Midrash and Hagada:" it was written in uncritical times and its author was easy of belief: above all the author was incapable of reading himself back into the past and always assumed the past to have been precisely like the present; and was, furthermore, prone to incorporate his dreams rather than realities into his historical sketch. In a word, he has given us an exceptionally untrustworthy history: "Chronicles fails more seriously than most history, and on the whole rather more than most commentaries and sermons." Dr. Watson recalcitrates somewhat from the ordinary point of view of this school of writers and seeks to modify the statement which represents that "the inspired condition would seem to be one which produces a generous indifference to pedantic accuracy in matters of fact, and a supreme absorbing concern about the moral and religious significance of facts." But it is on this dictum that Prof. Bennett's exposition frankly acts. Still more frankly Dr. Farrar's treatment of Daniel. Dr. Farrar looks upon the historical portion of this book as only a series of moral and religious *Haggadoth*, and its prophetic portion as only a body of veiled

exhortations: the book "cannot be regarded as literal history or ancient prediction." And he expounds it accordingly. No doubt such a point of view is very different from that which our Lord occupied: but it is suggested that we must be free to follow what we deem the truth at all hazards, even though the Truth Itself stands in the way: and who does not know, by this time, the expedients by which He may be got out of the way? It is a thousaud pities, we say, that "The Expositor's Bible" has fallen into this rut. Its value for even the preseut is greatly injured by it. Its value for the future, for all the portion of it affected by this critical reconstruction, is quite destroyed by it. It cannot be long before men will decliue this new allegory as energetically as they do now the old: and will ask once more for honest and straightforward exposition. It may be convenient, for the present, to attach to each section of the narrative, *Hæc fabula docet:* but this narrative is not in profession, iutent, or effect a moralizing fable, but history: and being history the primary question regardiug it concerns—not the sincerity and honesty of its authors—but the truth and trustworthiness of its representations. And so soon as common sense so far reasserts itself, the mode of dealing with inspiration which characterizes this new allegorical school will cease too. It may be convenient for the present to represent exceptionally untrustworthy history as "inspired," because forsooth inspiration cares for the spiritual lesson conveyed, not for the vehicle in which it is conveyed. But when we finally cleanse our minds from cant and recognize these narratives as history and not "fables," it will be hard to defend the view that inspired history is characteristically exceptionally untrustworthy history.——"The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges." *The Book of Psalms.* With Introduction and Notes. By A. F. Kirkpatrick, D.D., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Regius Professor of Hebrew. Books ii and iii: Psalms xlii-lxxxix. Extra fcap, 8vo, pp. lxxx, 556. (Cambridge: University Press; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.) The first portion of Dr. Kirkpatrick's excellent commentary on the Psalms, including the first book of the Psalter—Psalms i-xli—was appreciatively noticed by the late Dr. C. A. Aiken in the issue of this REVIEW for January, 1892 (Vol. iii, p. 152). The Introduction to the Psalter which accompanied the first part, and is reprinted in this second part, was sufficiently characterized in Dr. Aiken's notice, and to it the reader is now referred. The commentary loses nothing of its precision and helpfulness in its passage through the Psalter. The treatment of the Psalms most frequently alleged to be Maccabean—the xliv, lxxiv, lxxix, together with the lx, lxxx aud lxxxiii—falls in this volume; and as was foreshadowed in the Introduction, Dr. Kirkpatrick fiuds good reasons for assigning them all to an earlier date.——*Dr. Martin Luthers Auslegung des Alten Testaments.* Fortsetzung: Predigten über das erste Buch Mosis und Ausleguugen über die folgenden biblischen Bücher bis zu den Psalmen (excl.). Aufs neue herausgegeben im Auftrag des Ministeriums der deutschen ev.-luth. Synode von Missouri, Ohio und anderen Staaten. 4to, pp. vii, and coll. 1973. (St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Publishing House, 1894.) Though published after a goodly series, this volume is iu the order of enumeration the third in the great St. Louis edition of Luther's *Works* in German. The two first volumes contain Luther's "great expositiou" of Genesis: this contains his further expositions of Genesis and those of passages in Exodus, Numbers, Deuteronomy and 2 Samuel—these completing, as the title informs us, the whole body of Luther's expositions up to the Psalms. The lecture on the Book of Judges which was published by Buchwald in 1884 from a Zwickau MS. is omitted on account of its fragmentary and otherwise dubious condition. The volume has been prepared with the care which its predecessors have taught us to expect from Prof.

Hoppe, and is issued in the same admirable shape.——*The Trial and Death of Jesus Christ.* A Devotional History of Our Lord's Passion. By James Stalker, D.D. 12mo. (London: Hodder & Stoughton; New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1894.) Dr. Stalker is in his element in writing a devotional history, and we have read every word of this, his latest, book with pleasure and we trust with profit. We are grateful to him that he has not written it "in the declamatory and interrogatory style common in devotional works." But we fear that in reacting from the habit of writing devotional books "in Oh's and Ah's," he has occasionally allowed the pendulum to swing almost into baldness. The former portion of the present book at least has impressed us as lacking in that distinction of style which would naturally clothe such a theme. At times we have had the sordidness of our Lord's persecutors and the pitifully harsh circumstances of His earthly sufferings too sharply borne in upon us by Dr. Stalker's uncompromising realism for there to remain much contemporaneous room for emotions of devotion. One of the most helpful features of the book consists in the practical lessons which are continually drawn out with consummate skill and pressed on the reader. With an occasional one of these we may not agree, as, for instance, with the remarks on anodynes on pp. 160, *sq.* Dr. Stalker's idea seems to be that pain is only to be destroyed when an ulterior good is secured thereby, beyond the relief of suffering. Our own point of view is precisely the opposite: that we are justified in enduring escapable pain only when some ulterior good beyond the suffering is to be attained by it. His view seems to us to posit a good in suffering *per se*, which may be innocently lost only in case its loss is necessary to gain a greater good. While we should say there is no good at all in suffering *per se*, and it cannot be innocently endured when it is avoidable, unless for the sake of obtaining a good. But the points where we can find ground of dissent from Dr. Stalker are very few.

*Princeton.* BENJ. B. WARFIELD.

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# IV.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

CÆSARIUS VON ARELATE und die gallische Kirche seiner Zeit. Von CARL FRANKLIN ARNOLD, Doctor der Theologie und Philosophie, a. o. Professor der Ev. Theologie an der Universität Breslau. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung; New York: B. Westermann & Co., 1894. 8vo, pp. xii, 607.

This is one of those thorough pieces of biographical work which so delight and satisfy the reader that it would be hard if the author did not feel requited for his labor. It is the more welcome that Cæsarius and his times have not, despite Neander's interest in them, received heretofore the attention they deserve. The body of the book consists of a detailed narrative of the life of Cæsarius, placed in its setting and thrown out against the background of the political, social and ecclesiastical life of his day (pp. 1–433). This is accompanied by a rich body of footnotes justifying the text, and is followed by what we should call an Appendix, but which appears here as a "Second Part." Into this are gathered certain aids to a thorough study of the work of Cæsarius. The pieces included are: (1) *Initia Cæsariensia*, or an "index of first lines" of all the accessible pieces ascribed to Cæsarius; (2) "Communications from the MSS. of Cæsarius;" (3) A careful edition of Cæsarius' Epistle *de Humilitate;* (4) A critical account of the sources of information for the life and labors of Cæsarius; (5) A careful discussion of Cæsarius' Rule for Nuns; (6) A similar discussion of the

Rule of the Monastery at Lerins. (7) An investigation into the relations of Cæsarius to the Gallic Liturgy; (8) A very full discussion of the Canons of the Second Council of Orange. This Appendix occupies the space from pp. 435 to 573. The rest of the volume is taken up with the full Index and the list of the chief books used. Some idea of the comprehensiveness and thoroughness of the biography proper may be conveyed by an enumeration of the headings of the twelve chapters into which it is divided. These are: "Cæsarius' Youth in the Land of the Burgundians" (pp. 1–41); "Cæsarius at Lerins" (pp. 42–65); "Cæsarius at Arles up to his Election as Bishop" (pp. 66–114); "Cæsarius as Bishop, a Pupil of Pomerius and Disciple of Augustine" (pp. 115–181); "Cæsarius as Metropolitan" (pp. 182–214); "Banishment and Restitution of Cæsarius" (pp. 215–223); "The Council at Agde" (pp. 224–239); "Fortunes and Efforts of Cæsarius during the Great South Gallic War" (pp. 240–258); "Cæsarius in Ravenna and Rome—Closer Connection with the Papacy" (pp. 259–281): "Cæsarius and the Catholic Church" (pp. 282–311); "The Closing of the Semi-Pelagian Controversy by Cæsarius; the Second Council of Orange" (pp. 312–372); "The Last Decennium in the Life of Cæsarius, his care for the Nunnery and his Charity, his Zeal in Preaching and Discipline, his Will and Death" (pp. 372–433).

Within this comprehensive framework is packed not only a flowing narrative of all the details that are known of Cæsarius' varied activities, but also a full discussion of their relations and of their *rationale*. The book thus becomes in effect a history of the Church in southern Gaul during the period of Cæsarius' activity—a period of confusion and transition in every department of life. The age was in fact one of the pivotal points in history. Politically, the old Roman world was passing into the new Germanic world; ecclesiastically, the Roman influence was in the act of hardening into domination; theologically, the old Gallic synergism was giving way to the Augustinian monergism of grace. In all these and other similar movements Cæsarius took a leading part. It may even be said that, above all others, it was due to his skillful guidance that the Church in Gaul passed not only safely but profitably through these troubled times. It requires no pressure therefore, to make an account of his labors the centre about which a history of the Gallic Church of the first half of the sixth century gathers. The two stories are really one, and one could not be written without the other. Cæsarius was truly a "representative man."

> "What was living in thousands, he expressed; what hundreds said, he said most clearly and most vitally: what many wished and strove after, he did and attained; what was dear to the wisest of his day he brought together and turned to account. . . . . There may have been others of his contemporaries more gifted or more masterful. But there was none, in the deeper sense, more fortunate. His personal inclinations and pursuits marvelously fell in with the needs and tasks of his time. Led by a fine tact or instinct (which, however, was rooted not in accident but in piety and humanity) he let what his age could not use alone and threw himself with all his force into what was stringently needed. Therefore every defeat metamorphosed itself for him into ultimate triumph, the importance of which was not lessened by the fact that it sometimes benefited not himself but his cause. Thus his labors were very fruitful for his own time and far beyond it. In the errors of his day he had, no doubt, full share. He did not seek to become a reformer; but he certainly corrected what was perverse, so far as his strength and his insight permitted" (pp. 1, 2).

These were the qualities which made him the greatest leader of his time. It was the defects of these qualities which constituted his weakness. A man of affairs, he always had his eye on the easily practicable rather than on the ideally right. As a doctrinal leader, this habit of thought enabled him to obtain much—it also betrayed him into fatal concessions: it enabled him to approach the truth—it forbade him to attain it. This is plainly evident in his conduct of the semi-Pelagian controversy, which it was given

to him to close in Gaul with a victory for Augustinianism, but, of course, being the man he was, with a victory for only a modified and curtailed Augustinianism. The effect of such a victory was a defeat, inasmuch as it prevented the Church forever afterwards from attaining to a pure Augustinianism.

The chapter on the semi-Pelagian controversy and its conclusion in the Second Council of Orange, is one of the most instructive in Dr. Arnold's book. The tradition of the Gallican Churches was distinctively semi-Pelagian. It was Rome that was the candlestick on which the light of Augustinianism was set for the illumination of the world. During the century that had intervened since Augustine, Gallic thought had progressively departed more and more widely from his teaching. Dr. Arnold enumerates three stages:

"First the synergistic teaching of the Gallic theologians sought support for itself in those writings of Augustine which were composed long before the Pelagian controversy. This was the period of naïve synergism. Out of it grew the so-called Massilian school: its leader was Cassian; it based itself especially on Chrysostom, contended particularly against the African's doctrine of original sin, and worked empirically and exegetically without building up another system over against the Augustinian. The third stage of development of the Gallican synergism may be called the Lerinensian. Its chief representative was Faustus of Rhegium. It reverted especially to Origen, attacked particularly Augustine's doctrine of grace, used a philosophic-dogmatic method, and sought to frame a unitary theological structure" (p. 314).

As a nurseling of Lerins, Cæsarius himself came out of the centre of the semi-Pelagian circle and apparently owed his Augustinianism to the influence of the rhetorician Pomerius, whom he met at Arles. Pomerius was a man of letters rather than a theologian; but he was imbued with the Augustinian theology, although exhibiting it in a less thorough type than that of Prosper to whom his work *On the Contemplative Life* was formerly ascribed.

"In the association of Cæsarius with this African," says Dr. Arnold, "lies the solution of the riddle that a pupil of the Lerinensians, a comrade of crass semi-Pelagians, absorbed with purity and depth the most valuable and abiding element of Augustinianism, *i. e.*, not its theological system but its religious content. The theological importance of Cæsarius lies in the fact that he saved for Gaul and thus for the West, the fruits of the spiritual conflicts of the great African, which were such as had been endured by none other since the Apostle Paul" (p. 84).

How this salvation was accomplished Dr. Arnold describes in another passage conceived in the same spirit:

"Between the opposing conceptions a compromise was concluded—a compromise of such a nature that while one remained victorious, it yet received modifications from its opponent. That one remained victorious which possessed the greater religious life-power, Augustinianism. All positive propositions of the Gallic synergism were repelled. This result is, in the last analysis, to be credited neither to Augustine's greater learning or higher dialectic gifts, nor to the propaganda of the Catholics who were driven out of Africa to Gaul, nor to the favorite ideas of Cæsarius or the purity of his character, nor finally to the Church politics of Rome; but to the religious needs of the human heart. These were better met by Christianity than by heathenism, by Catholicism than by Arianism, by the enthusiasm of asceticism than by the lukewarm worldliness of the old opponents of monarchism; and they found more strength and consolation in the Augustinian fundamental conception of divine grace, than in the paltry mechanism of the synergistic moralism. The importance of Cæsarius of Arles in the history of doctrine lies in this—that he himself experienced the superiority of the African's doctrine of grace in itself; that in his practical activity as teacher, pastor, preacher, bishop, metropolitan and papal vicar, he came forward in its behalf in a manner which must be called as energetic as moderate, as popular as far-seeing; that finally he found, in this way, in union with the Roman chair, the solving word, by which the theological need was met. This took place in the Canons of the Second Synod of Orange, which were drawn up by him" (p. 343).

According to Dr. Arnold, these Canons are constituted of three parts: The first eight Canons are directly polemical against the Gallic synergism, and were drawn up by Cæsarius; the rest of the Canons were sent to Cæsarius by Felix IV, but were subjected to weakening modifications by Cæsarius before being presented to the Council; while the concluding symbol came from Cæsarius' own hand again.

In Cæsarius' dealing with the sections sent from Felix as well as in the sections of his own compositiou, we can trace the anxieties of the man of affairs: he is acting not primarily as theologian zealous for the truth, but rather primarily as ecclesiastic seeking the greatest possible following for the deliverances of the Council.

"The Augustinian doctrine of grace," says Dr. Arnold, speaking of these Canons, "was assimilated to the vulgar Catholicism and monastery-theology by Cæsarius. It thereby gained in intelligibility and lost iu depth and spirituality. If this road of Cæsarius' should be followed further, danger would arise of losing the great acquisitions of the past. With Cæsarius and his immediate pupils, this danger came very little forward; it was only those who came later who faltered in the battle against externalizing and materializing religion" (p. 382).

Let no one lessen the achievement of Cæsarius: it was a great thing to bind Gaul also to the Augustinian doctrine of grace. But on the other hand let us not close our eyes to the serious consequences of the compromising method which he adopted in order more easily to secure this great achievement. The definitions of the Second Council of Orange, with the help of Rome, became the norm of Western orthodoxy. Thus crass Gallic synergism was forever excluded from its bounds. But thus, equally, a pure and complete Augustinianism was placed forever beyond its reach. By Cæsarius' compromises the Canons of Orange were so framed as to limit Church doctrine above as well as below. They settled it finally that the Western Church should no more be purely Augustinian than crassly semi-Pelagian. The result is that Thomism has come to represent the supremest height of doctrine attainable in the Latin communion. The decrees of Trent are the natural sequence of the Canons of Orange.

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GERMAN SOCIETY AT THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES. By E. BELFORT BAX. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894. 8vo, pp. xi, 276.

"The work, of which the present volume is the first installment, aims at giving English readers a general view of the social condition and the popular movements of Germany during the period known as that of the Reformation. . . . . The present volume, which has a more general character than its successors, deals with a period limited, roughly speaking, by the closing years of the fifteenth century on the one side, and by 1525, the year of the great Peasant rising, on the other." Such is the purpose of this little volume as set forth in the Preface. It is at most an introduction to the volumes which are to follow, and even as an introduction it is slight and shallow. Its standpoint is one of hostility to so-called modern individualism, and it dwells with commendation on the "primitive communism" of the Teutonic peoples. As a result of this attitude there is a current of violent denunciation of the feudal conditions then in decay, accompanied by a not less violent criticism of the spirit of the Roman law as fostering private ownership, the growth of national kingship, and the changing status of the various groups forming the proletariat. The author is out of sympathy with government in any of the forms brought under discussion, his point of view being that of a social democrat. He is not less out of sympathy with the Church as an institution, either reformed or unreformed, and he does not rise to any apprehension of the great impulse that lies within the Church as a religious force, having seemingly, like the disciples at Ephesus, never "so much as heard whether there be any Holy Ghost." No one occupying the positiou expressed in the following quotatiou cau possibly weigh the social forces at work in such a period as the Reformation. "The idea of ordinary men, or of the vast majority, holding their religion as anything else than a very pious opinion absolutely unconnected with their daily life, public or private, has already

become almost inconceivable to us." Such a low spiritual conception of life prepares us in some measure for such a passage as the following from his estimate of Luther. "It is, indeed, doubtful if the man who sang the praises of 'wine, women, and song,' would have been deemed a fit representative in Parliament or elsewhere by the British Nonconformist conscience of our day; or would be acceptable in any capacity to the grocer deacon of our provincial towns, who not content with being allowed to sand his sugar and adulterate his tea unrebuked, would socially ostracise every one whose conduct did not square with his conventional shibboleths." The unfitness of one who writes iu such a style to deal fairly and earnestly with a remote and embittered conflict of principles still of deep and living interest is obvious. It shows itself throughout the volume under review in a series of striking pictures of the social side of Germany between 1500 and 1527, each one of which, in so far as it is true, is only a half truth. The truth is set in a false light, and is distorted beyond recognition. As a history of the period this volume is inaccurate, inadequate and insincere.

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BISHOP LIGHTFOOT. Reprinted from the *Quarterly Review*. With a Prefatory Note by BROOKE FOSS WESTCOTT, D.D., D.C.L., Bishop of Durham. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894. 16mo, pp. 139. Price: $1.25.

Joseph Barber Lightfoot was born April 13, 1828, the son of a Liverpool accountant. His primary education was received in the Birmingham Grammar School at the hands of "the great High Master," Dr. Prince Lee. Thence he went up to Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1847. His course at college was distinguished; he became fellow of Trinity in 1852; and tutor in 1857. He was one of the founders and editors of the *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology* in 1854 and contributed freely to its pages. He became Hulsean Professor of Divinity in 1861, and in 1865 published his first book, the commentary on *Galatians*—which he designed to be the initial volume of "a complete edition of St. Paul's Epistles." In 1870 he was appointed to a canonry of St. Paul's; and in 1875 was transferred from the Hulsean to the Lady Margaret Chair at Cambridge. In 1879 he was made Bishop of Durham, and died of overwork on the 21st December, 1889.

Dr. Lightfoot's literary activity was very great. The cream of his published work has been given permanent form in twenty volumes. Of these, three belong to the projected "Edition of St. Paul's Epistles," and comprise commentaries on *Galatians* (1865), *Philippians* (1868) and *Colossians* (1875). A second series comprises his work upon the Apostolical Fathers: *Clement of Rome* (1869), with an Appendix (1877), reissued in final form in two posthumous volumes (1890), and the great *Ignatius* in three volumes (1885), together with the abridged edition of the *Apostolic Fathers*, issued posthumously (1891). Two important volumes may be called occasional, in so far as they were the result of circumstances arising which seemed to call for discussion of special subjects by men fitted to handle them: these were the essay on a *Fresh Revision of the English New Testament* (1871), and the remarkable series of essays on the testimony of the first two centuries to the New Testament, which appeared in the *Contemporary Review* from 1874–1877 and were gathered into a volume in 1889 under the title of *Essays on "Supernatural Religion."* Then we have the series of volumes of his spoken addresses, including his two Episcopal charges (1882 and 1886) and the goodly array of posthumous volumes, *Leaders in the Northern Church* (1890), *Ordination Addresses* (1890), *Cambridge Sermons* (1890), *Sermons*

*Preached in St. Paul's* (1891), *Special Sermons* (1891). Lastly we have two posthumous volumes of essays, one of which contains much new matter not before printed, the *Dissertations on the Apostolic Age* (1892) and the *Biblical Essays* (1893); together with a volume made up of hitherto unpublished *Notes on Epistles of St. Paul* (1895). The mere enumeration of these titles conveys no adequate sense of the rare value of their contents—their value as contributions to knowledge, as models of scholarly work, as impulses to investigation, as bulwarks of truth. They are the "remains" of the greatest patristic scholar and one of the greatest Biblical scholars of his day, who also proved himself a great preacher and a great administrator: and they are worthy memorials of their great author. "All," remarks the anonymous writer of the sketch of his life now before us, with eminent justice, "are marked by the same characteristic features. The matter is everywhere that of the painful investigator, the principle is that of the Christian philosopher, the form is that of the artist in words."

No complete memoir of the great scholar and bishop has as yet appeared. Meanwhile we have two very interesting and valuable sketches of his life and character: the article by his colleague at Cambridge, Dr. Hort, in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, and the present anonymous paper, which is now reissued in book-form with an appreciative Preface by Dr. Westcott, his schoolmate, companion in his Cambridge work and successor in his bishopric. The author writes out of full information and conveys to the reader something of his own enthusiastic appreciation of Lightfoot's character and work, especially of his work at Durham, where he showed from the first unsuspected powers of organization and administration. What may be called the text of the paper is taken from the inscription upon the monument which has been raised to Lightfoot in the Cathedral Church of Durham, and declares that his works do and shall bear witness to him. The author passes his various works in review and permits them to bear their witness to the greatness of their author.

At only one point does he seem to think Lightfoot in need of a word of defense. The Presbyterians have seized upon his essay on "The Christian Ministry" in the commentary on *Philippians*, and have claimed his great name as for them. This seems to the author a serious matter. Some pages in the body of the essay are given to removing such "a misrepresentation;" and an Appendix is added, reprinting a series of extracts from Lightfoot's published writings bearing on the subject, which Lightfoot "felt it to be his duty to collect and print" soon after the close of the Lambeth Conference of 1888. After all the explanations, however, the matter remains where it was. The misapprehension is not on the part of the Presbyterians, but on the part of Dr. Lightfoot's Episcopal friends, and indeed of Dr. Lightfoot himself. The thesis which Dr. Lightfoot made good in his noble essay in question is not a thesis upon which Presbyterians and Episcopalians divide. The investigations which he made into the origin of the Christian ministry did result in presenting the threefold ministry as a matter which could "be traced to Apostolic direction." But Presbyterians, too, believe in and possess a threefold ministry—bishops, presbyters and deacons. The point of dispute between them and Episcopalians is not here. It concerns questions within that common ground—such questions as these: whether the primitive bishop was bishop of a parish or of a diocese; and whether the bishop stood over against the presbyter and deacon conceived of as only two stages of the same lower office, or the deacon rather stood over against the bishop and presbyter, conceived of as two forms of the same high office. Dr. Lightfoot's investigations supported, with a rare wealth of learning and of scholarly force, the ground that is common to Presbyterians and Episcopalians. On the points

of difference his investigations support the Presbyterian conceptions. The primitive bishop which he brings before us is a parochial and not a diocesan officer. The line of division between the primitive officers which he brings before us runs between the bishop-presbyter and the deacon, and not between the bishop and the presbyter-deacon. Presbyterians may thus justly claim his essay as their justification.

*Princeton.* BENJ. B. WARFIELD.

*Urkunden aus dem antimontanistischen Kampfe des Abendlandes.* Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung. Von Lic. Theol. Ernst Rolffs. Pp. 167. *Zur Abercius-Inschrift.* Von Adolf Harnack. Pp. 28. (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'she Buchhandlung, 1895.) The two works contained in this volume constitute No. 4 in Vol. xii of Von Gebhart and Harnack's *Texte und Untersuchungen.* The first of the treatises sums up views of four anti-Montanistic writers. Two of these are anonymous opponents of Tertullian's, appearing respectively in that writer's *de ieiunio* and *de monogamia.* The other two are Origen and Hippolytus. Rolffs has done original work on Tertullian's opponent in the *de ieiunio* and on Origen, but has limited himself quite closely to rehearsing the results reached by predecessors with reference to the other two authors named. It would be unfair, however, even in this part of his work, to ascribe to the author a blind or slavish adoption of the labors even of such men as Bonwetsch, Harnack, Voigt, Nöldechen and Lipsius. Wherever it is a question not of fact, but of inference from well-ascertained facts, we find our author entirely independent of all predecessors. Harnack in his brief part of this number deals with the Abercius inscription. From the bare text of this inscription it is not possible to reach an absolutely certain conclusion as to what it was. Some have made it the epitaph of a pagan of the second century (so Ficker); others have taken it to be a Christian's epitaph (so Schultze and Zahn). Harnack enters the field with his well-known critical acuteness, advocating a third view in which he claims that he reconciles the apparently inconsistent phenomena in the inscription. He ascribes the inscription to a syncretistic source. Abercius, according to this view, was one of those pagans who had been attracted by Christian customs and beliefs and had even adopted some of them. That there were such pagans and even a syncretistic system of pagan-Christian beliefs and practices Harnack proves by the testimony of Philippus Sidetes. But if there were, then the best explanation of the mixture of heathen and Christian elements in this inscription is that it owes its origin to this syncretism.——*A Select Library of Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church.* Second Series. Vol. viii. *The Treatise de Spiritu Sancto, The Nine Homilies of the Hexæmeron and The Letters of St. Basil the Great, Archbishop of Cæsarea.* Translated with Notes. By the Rev. Bloomfield Jackson, M.A., Vicar of St. Bartholomew's, Moore Lane, and Fellow of King's College, London. Pp. lxxvii, 363. (New York: The Christian Literature Co., 1895.) The above title indicates sufficiently the selection made of St. Basil's works for the Nicene and post-Nicene series. It may be commended as a very fair selection. The translation is generally well done, although in special places it is open to the criticism of being too free, and it may be wise for the specialist to refer to the original for greater precision. The prolegomena are abundant and satisfactory on the life and labors of Basil. A chronological and a genealogical table prefixed make it easy to obtain a bird's-eye view of the career of the author and of the relations in which he found himself during the stormy period of the Semi-Arian controversy. The section on editions and translations might have been made fuller. The defect is hardly atoned for by referring in a general way to Fabricius because the non-expert English

(at any rate the American) student would scarcely know where to put his hand on a Fabricius or how to use him when obtained; and as for the expert he would not need the suggestion to consult Fabricius, being already aware of the value of that writer as a source in such investigations. The list of MSS. found in the English institutions (the Bodleian Library and the British Museum) is a valuable feature of the volume. We may also note the diligence and care of the publishers in rendering the volume tasteful and accurate. ——*Luther as a Spiritual Adviser.* By August Nebe, Doctor of Theology, Professor, Pastor. Translated by Charles A. Hay, D.D., and Charles E. Hay, A.M. Pp. viii, 246. (Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society, 1894.) The original of this work first saw the light as a contribution to the quadricentennial celebration of the great Reformer's birthday in 1883. Nebe drew from Luther's *Letters* and *Tabletalk* a large collection of facts bearing on the pastoral side of Luther's character. It was a side that had not been thoroughly studied. How did the Reformer care for the sick? How did he approach the erring, the forlorn, the tempted, the mourning and the dying? These questions suggested themselves to Pastor Nebe not merely as questions of historical interest, but as leading to the study of the thoughts and methods of a man who had been eminently blessed in his efforts to help men in their endeavors after a higher spiritual life. The translators deserve the thanks of the American public for putting this book, even though late, within the reach of the reader of English.——*Christianity as a Factor in Civilization.* By Rev. Samuel Weir, B.D., Ph.D. Pp. 115. (Cincinnati: Cranston & Curts, 1893.) Basing himself on the labors of Uhlhorn, Hallam, Barry, Schaff, Fisher, Brace and Storrs, the author of this essay calls attention to the beneficent effects of the Gospel on the intellectual, moral, social, political and domestic life of man. The subject is not new, nor is the manner of treatment. One feels inclined to regret that the author was not directed to some other topic as a subject for research while pursuing graduate studies.——*The Fast and Thanksgiving Days of New England.* By W. DeLoss Love, Jr., Ph.D. Pp. 607. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1895.) The Fast and Thanksgiving days of New England were, according to Dr. Love (and in this no one will dissent from his judgment), substitutes for the festival days of the reformed Anglican calendar of the days of the Stuarts. This reformed calender again was simply a modification and adaptation to the English Church of the Roman (Catholic) calendar introduced among the English with all other Romish practices during the Middle Ages. In reacting from this essentially Romish calendar, the Puritans passed over to a system of fasts and thanksgivings. An effort was made to preserve some of the festivals in the calendar because of their association with the life of Christ, but it did not meet with immediate success. It is only within these latter years that these "Feasts of Christ" have been recognized as different from the numerous saints' days and other festivals of the calendar and gradually readopted. The author traces this history through the periods of colonial and national life in New England. He builds altogether on the sources and with great care and patience. Occasionally he makes an obscure or misleading representation, as when at the beginning of chap. ii (pp. 28, 29) he leaves the impression that the Presbyterian branch of the Puritan body was distinguished in this manner from the Independents—that the Independents were in favor of preserving the "Feasts of Christ," and the Presbyterians in favor of their rejection along with the rest of the Church calender. This, we think, is not the intention of the author, but the first impression of his language is to this effect and is therefore misleading. In general the strong point of the work is the patient and thorough collection of facts and its weak point a lack of generalization. The volume is equipped with a full list, which the author calls a

calendar, of the dates when fasts and thanksgivings were observed in New England, and another list, which the author calls a bibliography, but which is in reality a catalogue of addresses and sermons preached in New England on fast and thanksgiving occasions.——*A History of the Reformed Church, Dutch; the Reformed Church, German; and the Moravian Church in the United States.* By E. T. Corwin, D.D., Prof. J. H. Dubbs, D.D., and Prof. J. T. Hamilton. Pp. xviii, 525. (American Church History Series, Vol. viii.) (New York: The Christian Literature Co., 1895.) This volume constitutes an apparent anomaly in the American Church History Series. The three denominations represented in it bear the names of European countries. This, however, is only an apparent anomaly, as these European Churches were transplanted into and have had an eventful history on American soil and can rightfully claim a place in the series. Moreover, they have all been to a certain extent transformed and modified under the new conditions which they have had to confront on this continent, and are American at least to that extent. Two queries are suggested by the perusal of these histories: (1) Whether the reasons for the continued separate existence of Churches organized primarily on European national lines can be valid and permanent; and (2) Whether the longer these Churches exist as separate bodies on the basis of these lines of division, it does not become the harder to return to a true and sound basis of Church organization and life. Besides the original ground of existence in the case of each of these denominations, there grows up up a tradition or history which acts as a motive for perpetuating its life. Of the work of each of the three historians in this volume it may be said that they have had high scientific ideals and have measurably succeeded in realizing them.——*A History of the Baptists in the United States.* By A. H. Newman, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Church History, MacMaster University, Toronto. Pp. xiv, 515. (American Church History Series, Vol. ii.) (New York: The Christian Literature Co., 1894.) It appears to be not an easy thing for a Baptist historian, writing a history of Baptists, to avoid turning advocate and propagandist, and attempting to defend or inculcate the distinctive principles of the denomination. This feature is minimized in, though not altogether excluded from, the work before us. The denominational spirit appears at its strongest perhaps in that part of the work which is, so to speak, outside the bounds of strict history and more directly in the region of exposition—in the introductory part of the book. This is the part which treats of the distinctive principles held by Baptists and their relation to other bodies of Christians. The author shows a more judicial frame of mind as he enters into history proper. He abandons for instance the effort so commonly made by Baptist historians to establish a continuity of Baptist teaching from the days of the apostles to the time of Peter de Bruys and Henry of Lausanne. He is satisfied to begin with these, assuming simply that, although the apostolic Church was undoubtedly organized on Baptist principles, the chain was broken sometime during the dark ages. Another topic on which Dr. Newman does not allow his denominationalism to affect his historical judgment is the treatment of Roger Williams by the Massachusetts authorities. He sees, with all his respect for Williams, that the Massachusetts authorities had very good reasons for treating him as they did. Dr. Newman is very highly to be commended for making the line between the Baptists in America and in Europe very distinct. He very properly sums up all that it was necessary to say of the pre-American history of Baptists and puts it in a brief Introduction. This is a point on which some of the other writers in the American Church History series have erred, in blending the European and American histories of their respective denominations and giving an altogether disproportionate amount of attention and space to the former.——*The History*

*of the English Church and People in South Africa.* By A. Theodore Wightman, B.D., D.C.L., late Scholar of S. Mary Magdalene College, etc. Pp. xi, 277. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1895.) Christianity was introduced into South Africa in 1486 by Bartholomew Dias, a Portuguese Roman Catholic. The Dutch came with Protestantism in the year 1652. This was the time of struggle for the Reformed Church in France, and the Huguenots found their way out of the struggle into the regions settled by their brethren from Holland, first in small numbers, and after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, in larger colonies. Thus the Protestant Church of South Africa was of the Reformed type and held the field undisputed until 1795. In that year the Cape of Good Hope being surrendered to the English, a new ecclesiastical body—the Anglican Church—naturally made its appearance in South Africa. This book gives an account of the new epoch thus made. The English Church in South Africa has had two struggles to go through, viz., first the struggle with Erastianism and secondly the struggle with heresy. Around these struggles therefore the author, very properly, groups the material he has collected. Much of this material is, of course, of little interest to the general reader, but some of it, especially that referring to the case of Bishop Colenso, is not only interesting but instructive and it is with pleasure that we commend it to the historical student.——*Reminiscences.* By Thomas M. Clark, D.D., LL.D., Bishop of Rhode Island. Pp. 226. (New York: Thomas Whittaker, 1895.) One does not read very far into this book before realizing that he has before him a book based upon a high ideal. The style is extremely attractive. The eminent Bishop has evidently a faculty and a taste for saying what he has to say in such a way as to arrest the attention and arouse the interest of his readers—a happy faculty certainly. But the period from which the Bishop draws his reminiscences also adds to the interest of the volume. It is a period of great and rapid changes and no one is keener to discern their meaning than Bishop Clark. Presbyterians, especially those familiar with Princeton and its institutions, will be especially interested in the Bishop's account of the Princeton of sixty years ago, including a brief characterization of Dr. L. H. Atwater. Of course the Bishop looks at Princeton theology from around the corner he had turned in going over to Episcopalianism. But that was to be expected and is more than atoned for by the full account of the growth of Episcopalianism which follows.——*Landmarks of Church History.* By Henry Cowan, D.D. Pp. iv, 154. (New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co., 1894.) This is one of the "Guild Text-books" edited by Prof. A. H. Charteris, D.D., and Rev. J. A. McClymont, D.D. If the authors of the bulkiest volumes on General Church History feel called upon to explain that they have had a difficult work to perform, how much greater occasion must one have to point to the difficulty of his task who, like Dr. Cowan, has undertaken to compress Church History into 150 very small pages. The editors of the "Guild Text-books" may be congratulated on having secured such a master of his subject for this work, for only a master could have overcome the difficulty of the situation so well. ——*Life and Letters of Dean Church.* Edited by his Daughter, Mary C. Church. With a Preface by the Dean of Christ Church. Pp. xxiv, 528. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1894.) The publication of the *Life and Letters of Dean Stanley* by Mr. Prothero has aroused a natural interest and eagerness to know more of that great movement within the English Church during the second quarter of the present century which issued in the differentiation of the High and Broad Church parties. Dean Church, the subject of the volume before us, was an admirer of the chief leader of the High Church party in its early days. In fact he was associated with John Henry Newman in the literary work of translating some of the ancient Fathers of the

Church. The collection of his letters and their publication by his daughter with some biographical notes will go far towards satisfying the desire created by the Life of Stanley. The aim of the book, however, is not to show Dean Church in his full relations to the now historic parties, or to locate him in the great "Oxford Movement," but to let him represent himself through his correspondence and that not altogether, nor chiefly as a theologian, but as a man with a sphere of labor to which he immediately gave his attention. Thus, after all, the light thrown by the volume on the course of the history of the Anglican idea is incidental. But even so it is not inconsiderable, and we may congratulate ourselves on having now access to the views of another of the prominent men of that interesting movement.

*Chicago.* A. C. ZENOS.

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## V.—SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

DER VERKEHR DES CHRISTEN MIT GOTT. Im Anschluss an Luther dargestellt von Dr. W. HERRMANN, Professor in Marburg. Zweite gänzlich umgearbeitete Auflage. Stuttgart: Verlag der J. G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1892. 8vo, pp. 282.

In this new edition of his work, Herrmann has dropped out the most of the polemic matter which he put into the first. He has evidently tried to present his views in as attractive a form as possible. He writes in an earnest tone which impresses one with the conviction that the author not only fully believes what he says, but regards it as supremely important that others should believe the same. The style of the book is much more rhetorical than scientific. There is a repetitiousness in it which sometimes becomes almost wearisome. One reads for more than a hundred pages without finding a single numeral or other visible indication of the plan and progress of the thought. The work is divided into four parts: a brief Introduction, (pp. 1-12); Chap. i, "The Christian Religion Contrasted with Mysticism" (pp. 13-43); Chap. ii, "God's Intercourse With Us" (pp. 44-162); Chap. iii, "Our Intercourse With God" (pp. 163-282).

Mysticism is said by Herrmann to consist in one's "seeking and finding the influence of God on the soul simply in an inward experience of the individual, that is, in an excitation of the feelings which is supposed to be an immediate attestation of the fact that one is laid hold of by God, while at the same time nothing external is with clear consciousness seized and held fast" (p. 15). The mystic, he says, "is lifted above all that troubles and constrains other men, because he knows that he has found God. But for the same reason he has got beyond Christ" (p. 21). "We, on the contrary, deem that in finding God Himself we find nothing but Christ" (p. 23). "The old dogma of the deity of Christ is a prophecy of the fact that the Christian at the climax of his inner life in God finds Christ" (p. 25).

But though Herrmann thus emphasizes the fact of something objective as essential to Christianity; yet he says: "We can understand only that to be a revelation of God which brings us to a real intercourse with God. And we can conceive only those to be the thoughts of our own faith which force themselves upon us as truth in our intercourse with God" (p. 29). Personal experience is insisted on as contrasted with the mere appropriation of other people's thoughts. The science of dogmatics tends to foster this latter course. "It sounds so fine, when in our theology we make it our fixed aim to appropriate as much as possible of Scriptural thoughts. But the inevitable consequence of this is that we learn to satisfy ourselves with an external

connection. True fidelity to Scripture is something quite different. We are really in the way of the Apostles when in our own situation we become certain of God and of His grace in the same way that they did in their situation —through the person of Jesus" (p. 195).

Herrmann's central thought is that genuine intercourse with God is effected through the self-manifestation of God in the person of Jesus. "By virtue of His holiness He does not allow men to approach Him by their own exertions. He grants this only in oue way, which He Himself opens" (p. 45). No communication about God can effect the purpose. "God makes Himself known by a *fact on account of which we are able to believe in Him.* . . . . We Christians hold that in the whole universe we know but one fact which can accomplish this—the historical appearance of Jesus handed down to us in the New Testament" (p. 47). A favorite form of expression with Herrmann is that Jesus comes to us as an "undeniable reality," aud that He becomes the best part of the Christian's own reality. Accordingly on the one hand he emphasizes the fact that it is the *historical* Christ through whom we have intercourse with God, while, on the other, he insists that our assurance of faith does not depend on the infallibility of historical testimony. "That on which the believer stakes his whole existeuce he cannot receive simply from other men" (p. 54). An examiuation of historical records can at the best only bring us to a *probability.* "It is self-evident that such a judgment does not present us facts on which religious faith can maintain itself." . . . . "Nothing in the historical appearance of Jesus which can be included in this process of making out what is probably real can be the ground of faith" (p. 55). "If, nevertheless, the person of Jesus is to us Christians so sure that we see in Him the ground of our faith, the revelation of God present to us, this conviction has nothiug to do with a historical judgment." Freedom from the doubt which more or less besets all such judgments we obtain "not as a fruit of our own exertions, but as an effect of the power of Jesus Himself" (p. 57).

We seem here to be confronted with something resembling a contradiction. In oppositiou to the mystic who imagines himself to be able to hold direct intercourse with God, we are told that such intercourse is possible only through the medium of the historical fact of the appearance of Jesus Christ handed down to us in the New Testament. But in opposition to the sceptic who can always raise plausible questions as to the historical accuracy of the New Testament narratives, we are told that our faith rests on no judgment as to historical facts, but on the present working of the power of Jesus. How does Herrmann reconcile these two positions? He goes on to say: "In the Christian Church we are made acquainted not ouly with the external details of the life and historical work of Jesus, but we are brought before Him Himself and receive a picture of His inner life" (p. 57). "At every step a conscientious reader of the Gospels may be forced to doubt whether the things reported really happened so. . . . . But the only thing which comes to us from the Gospels as a reality which overpowers us and excludes every doubt is just the most subtle thing [*das zarteste*], viz., the inner life of Jesus itself" (p. 59). "Nothing else in Christendom is so needful as that Christ should be preached. For to learn to see Him is for a Christian the way of salvation. But we do not help men to this when, resting on New Testament reports and teachings, we relate of Jesus that as the Son of God He was born of a virgin, that He taught this and that, wrought many miracles, even raised the dead, that He Himself rose again from the dead, and now, after His ascent to the Father, reigns omnipotent. . . . . In our time such a method would, as a rule, operate as a serious hindrance to men. For the most of them can no louger in childlike simplicity assent to these things" (p. 63).

Much more of the same sort might be cited; but no clear solution of the difficulty would be found. On the one hand it is strongly insisted that Christ is known only as a historical person, the knowledge of whom is communicated to us by the Christian Church. "The picture of the inner life of Jesus could be preserved only by the men who experienced the liberating effect of this fact. . . . . Only in His Church could a picture of His inner life be preserved" (p. 57). Yet on the same page we are assured that "it is impossible to connect the religious persuasion with a historical judgment." In other words, in one breath it is affirmed that all our knowledge of Christ is a communicated knowledge of a historical person; in the next it is declared that all historical knowledge is knowledge only of *probability*, whereas the ground of religious faith must be something *certain*. The "inner life" of Jesus is spoken of as something perfectly distinct and undeniable; but all the details of the historical records and tradition from which alone the character of that inner life can be gathered may be freely questioned. We know *Jesus* certainly; but we do not know anything *about* Him certainly!

The book presents us a continual series of vibrations between these two positions. There is much that is very truthful and very well said. Herrmann writes like an earnest Christian who is thoroughly impressed with the evil of confounding doctrinal belief with personal religion. He forcibly insists that the Christian religion means the possession of a new life, submission to God, and the acceptance of forgiveness assured to us through Jesus Christ. He labors to show that our salvation does not come from any doctrine about Christ, but directly from God as manifested in Christ. But in setting this forth he is continually hampered by the fatal dualism in which he has involved himself. His favorite and prevalent method is to declare that the man who is susceptible to religious impressions is "overpowered" by the picture of the inner life of Jesus. This vision of Jesus operates as a "liberating" force on him. In particular it brings him the assurance of the forgiveness of his sins. But how? Herrmann says: "According to the Socinian and rationalistic doctrine Christ *proclaimed* the divine forgiveness of sins; according to the orthodox doctrine He *made* it *possible;* in reality He has *accomplished* it in us" (p. 110). By which is meant that we experience forgiveness "because in the historical Christ we in fact see God Himself" (p. 111). The "essence of God" is nothing else than "the inner life of Jesus" (p. 137). "The same man through whom the reality of God becomes apprehensible and certain to us shows Himself kind to the men who have the feeling that they are far from God" (p. 76). "From the kindness of Jesus towards the sinner who through Him is brought to humble himself the sinner derives courage to believe that in the whole procedure the love of God is seeking him" (p. 91). "How God works we learn by experiencing that God through the spiritual power of Jesus makes us feel who He Himself is, what He wills, and what His purpose with us is" (*ibid.*). That is, Christ brings forgiveness not by what He *says*, or by what He *does*, but by what He *is*. "True, Jesus did tell of the love of the Father in heaven which is ready unreservedly to forgive the penitent. But He never made the shameful requirement that any one should believe this on the ground of His assertion, but spoke to men who saw Him and who in the power of His personal life were to perceive the Father in heaven of whom He spoke" (p. 105).

Rejecting the current doctrine of atonement or propitiation—the notion that Jesus in any way by His self-sacrifice secured the forgiveness of sinners—Herrmann nevertheless feels impelled to set forth how it is that Christ can be called a Redeemer. As above observed, he expressly disclaims holding the view that Christ was a mere prophet proclaiming the forgiving grace of God. Jesus, says Herrmann, *was* such a prophet, "but He does

not thus effect our salvation. He is, rather, our Redeemer by virtue of the fact that He Himself compels us to understand the will which is operative in His work to be the mind and will of God, who by the entrance of Jesus into our life comes near to us in order to draw us into intercourse with Him" (p. 142). In great profuseness of expression this conception is expounded; but through it all one is continually puzzled. How does Jesus compel us to recognize His will to be the will of God? If we *beforehand* know what the mind and will of God is, then Jesus makes no *revelation* of it to us; He may be said to exemplify it, but we learn nothing *new* about it. If, however, we do not beforehand know what God's character is, then how do we know that Jesus by His life reveals it? To be sure, He said to Philip, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father;" but He could not have meant to make "the shameful requirement" that Philip "should believe this on the ground of His assertion." Indeed, according to Herrmann, we cannot be *sure* that He ever spoke these words to Philip. What, then, can we make of the above-quoted passage? It can mean no more than this: that Jesus by His ideal perfection of character, makes the impression of being a human impersonation of the divine holiness. That is, Jesus fulfilled the divine law; He was what every one ought to be. But this presupposes that the divine law is already known.

But Herrmann set out to show how Jesus is our *Redeemer*. To be convinced that He outstripped all other men in moral excellence, and even attained absolute sinlessness, may evoke from us admiration and honor for *Him;* but how does that redeem *us*, who thus only learn the more distinctly how far we are from that holiness without which no man can see the Lord? Even if we understand Herrmann to hold (however inconsistently, as above indicated) that Jesus really revealed the forgiving grace of God, this would not justify us in calling Him our Redeemer or Saviour. But the New Testament everywhere so represents Him; it asserts and implies that He did a work whereby *He* secured our redemption; it especially connects the notion of redemption with the sufferings and death of Christ. This is so obvious that Herrmann cannot but give some heed to it. But having rejected all theories of satisfaction and propitiation, what can he make of these representations? He says: "So mighty in Him is the consciousness of His own purity that it stands clearly before His eyes that the impression made by His death will break the spiritual fetters of the men who have found Him and can remember Him" (p. 70). Again: "He expresses on such an occasion as that of the Last Supper the confidence that His person will remove the burden from the heart of every man who should see Him in His dying" (p. 71). Only very rarely, and thus vaguely, does Herrmann connect the the consciousness of forgiveness with the death of Christ. But such utterances only provoke the inquiry: *Why* or *how* does the view of Christ in His death give us such a spiritual deliverance? But the inquiry is not answered. We are only told in the next sentence, "From it [Jesus' death] every one who in his own conscience feels himself addressed by Jesus' demand must receive the impression that Jesus was what He professed to be. In suffering for righteousness' sake He was the prototype of many men." That is, the death of Christ was the final proof of His sincerity and uprightness.

So then after all we find that it is not the death, but the life, of Christ that secures forgiveness; and we are tempted to conclude that Herrmann only means that Christ has come into the world to communicate the assurance that God is essentially a pardoning God. But no; Herrmann emphatically protests that "every one who knows how in earnest to make anything of the work of Jesus will most of all get the impression that the divine forgiveness of sins is not a matter of course, but something in the

highest degree wonderful" (p. 103). Repeated assurances that Christ has made an atonement for us are, we are told, of no use. "The Christian desires a fact which can confront the fact of his own self-condemnation. Nothing can help him but the convincing fact, speaking to him from an undeniable occurrence, that God forgives precisely *him*. To this fact the orthodox theology has not opened the way, but rather has closed it" (p. 106). "Everything is spoiled" when the notion that Christ suffered in our stead "is made the starting point for the understanding of Jesus and the ground of the certainty of the forgiveness of sin" (p. 107). One must first have the experience of forgiveness, we are told; then "when he has in truth found in Jesus the God who forgives him, he will find in the appearance of Christ help against the doubts of an evil conscience. He will then see that Jesus, in bestowing forgiveness, at the same time did everything that was needed in order to maintain the moral order of God" (p. 108). The conceptions that have been usually connected with the atonement "encourage in the sinner the very convenient fancy that the opposition between God and the sinner can be removed by a judicial transaction transparent to the understanding. And then they conceal the truth that this oppposition can be removed only by the fact of forgiveness as an incomprehensible revelation of personal love" (p. 109). And the case is finally summed up in the proposition: "God can accord to us His forgiveness only by Himself turning to us and thus practically taking us into intercourse with Himself" (p. 112).

So then Herrmann's doctrine is that the ordinary Christian doctrine of the forgiveness of sin is not true, and would be useless if it were true. Nothing that the New Testament writers say—nothing which they report Christ as saying—nothing which Christ is reported to have said about God—can be relied on as absolutely true. Nothing of all this can be made the foundation of our faith. We must have a direct view of God manifested in Christ as forgiving us. "When the person of Jesus touches us as a fact of our own reality, then we perceive the Gospel. Not every one can see the personal life of Jesus. We see it only when it pleases God to reveal His Son in us" (p. 66). The image of "the inner life" of Jesus must be presented to us and "overcome" us; it must "compel" the conviction that He represents the grace of God; it must "overpower" us and bring us into fellowship with God and into the consciousness of being forgiven.

The situation, then, according to Herrmann, is this: All striving for an immediate mystical fellowship with God leads to self-delusion; in order to gain assurance of faith we must trust in a historic revelation. But historic records give us at the best only a greater or less degree of *probability*, while yet for religious faith we must have an absolutely *certain* foundation. One would suppose that Herrmann had thus made religious assurance an absolute impossibility. But he resorts to the *tour de force* of positing a "historical" Jesus, about whose historical or outward life, however, we know nothing certainly, but whose "inner life" we know unmistakably, when it pleases God to reveal it to us! Beginning with a denunciation of mysticism, he ends with a mysticism of his own, and then innocently wonders that Christendom in general has not seen things as he sees them.

*Hartford.* C. M. MEAD.

*The Breath of God.* A Sketch, Historical, Critical and Logical of the Doctrine of Inspiration. By the Rev. Frank Hallam, Author of *The Supreme Rite*, *The Devil's Masterpiece*, etc. 8vo, pp. v, 103. (New York: Thomas Whittaker, 1895.) The purpose of this little book is sufficiently set forth in its second title. It is written in a slashing style, which sometimes rises towards the picturesque and sometimes falls towards the flippant. It does not

seem to bring any contributions of value to the problems which it reviews. Indeed, it does not always profess to have sifted its material. The author repudiates the "intention to express his own convictions upon each detail of criticism," and proposes only "to set forth with something of their own spirit and force the convictions of the critics." The need of such an undertaking is not obvious: "the critics" do not strike us as so lacking in power and willingness to set forth their own "convictions," that Charity must needs step in to lend them a heart and voice; nor do their "convictions" appear to us to be of such certitude and value that they must at all hazards be rescued from their dumb lips and given to a perishing world. The sphere of usefulness of such a book cannot be large: the well-informed reader will know the matters set forth as well as the author knows them, while the purely popular reader will rather be disturbed and unsettled than instructed and edified by his jaunty allusions to them. The author's personal attitude seems to be one of sincere reverence for divine truth, combined with an undisciplined readiness to credit everything that has been said derogatory to the vehicles by which it is conveyed to men. We are perhaps not justified, on the basis of this little book alone, in saying that his logical faculty is weak: but we are justified in saying that the problems here brought under review have not been seriously thought through by the writer—that the facts have not been collected with sufficient care, that their meaning has not been investigated with sufficient independence, depth and comprehensiveness, and that really constructive thought has not been expended on them. No doubt, on the other hand, the book fairly represents the state of many bright but hasty—devout but restless—minds in our churches on the great questions concerned with God's Word: and as such it is full of meaning to those who would know the times in which we live.——*Biblical Inspiration and Christ.* By Marvin R. Vincent, D.D. 12mo, pp. 43. (New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co. [1894].) We are almost afraid to complain of the indefiniteness of the conception of inspiration which Dr. Vincent here commends to us, after the warning which he gives us on p. 34: "It is so only in contrast with the artificial and superficial precision of scholastic definitions." Nevertheless, we must confess that we have found Dr. Vincent's exposition of inspiration quite hazy, and we are not conscious that our inability to grasp it clearly is due to the largeness of the conception which he presents. Indeed, when he says in a somewhat rhetorical manner, "As well expect a cyclone to pick its way between the beds of a kitchen-garden, as that this majestic, personal, divine energy, moving with its colossal stride through Scripture, should mince its pace over Matthew's mistake of Jeremiah for Zechariah, or the discrepancy between Stephen and Genesis, or the differences of the four Evangelists in recording the inscription over the cross" (p. 35)—we are tempted to wonder whether we can share his conception of what "largeness," as applied to divine operations, implies. We should never expect "the colossal stride through Scripture" of Him who speaks in the voice of a gentle stillness rather than in the whirlwind or earthquake, and whose movement through the world does not break off the already crushed reed or quench the last spark from the already dying wick, to be so regardless of what Dr. Vincent thinks small matters. We do not see that the antithesis should be between a theory of inspiration which ascribes to God care for only the great things of Scripture, and one which ascribes to Him care for only the little things of Scripture: we prefer to conceive of God in giving His Holy Word to man as having capacity and leisure to care for the great and small things alike; and in so conceiving of Him we are not conscious of being out of harmony with the conception of Scripture itself or out of analogy with the mode of working of the God of the Bible in other spheres of His operation.

There seems, however, to be not only some indefiniteness in Dr. Vincent's conception of inspiration, but also some lack of unity between the conceptions dominant in his mind at different times. In the opening pages of this paper, for example, he appears to have in mind a conception of inspiration as a divine act imparting a special character to the Bible, discoverable from an investigation of the phenomena of the Bible itself. Here inspiration is of the *book*, and imparts a peculiar character to the book, which can be identified by the application of tests; and it is in harmony with this that he speaks, once at least, of *God causing to be recorded* somewhat in this book for our instruction and warning—as if God were causally related to *the record itself*, as it stands. But, in the rest of the paper, inspiration is emphatically denied to the record, and made to inhere in the persons of the agents of revelation alone. The presence of God in the men of God, some of whom wrote Scripture, and in the documents only as, and so far as, they are informed with the personality of these men of God—this is inspiration according to the dominant conception of the paper as a whole: which seems somewhat odd when we remember that in the only place where the word occurs in the Scriptures it is ascribed to the writings and not to the writers. It is therefore, however, that Dr. Vincent cares little for faults in the writings: "over and past all such trifles, we are carried by the sense of God in the men; as we see how they are dominated and swept onward by zeal for God, though their zeal sometimes finds expression in forms from which the Christian sense revolts," etc. (p. 22). From which it seems to follow that wherever zeal for God is manifested there we can find inspiration; from which it would seem to follow, again, that Paul the Pharisee, who certainly had a zeal for God which found expression in a form from which the Christian sense revolts, was equally inspired with Paul the apostle. The possibility of such a conclusion bids us pause and allow that inspiration after all does concern itself with "knowledge," and that therefore some of those things which Dr. Vincent counts trifles may not be "trifles" relatively to it. In one thing we are in entire accord with Dr. Vincent: the matter of inspiration—its reality, its nature, its effect, its extent—cannot be treated as an esoteric matter; no theory can be held true which is not the source of power and inspiration to God's people, which cannot stand to them as a support and stay. Possibly the fact to which he himself adverts, that to the great mass of Christians inspiration is conceived in the strictest way, is not without its meaning here. Nor can the experience in Germany be without meaning—where it is found, after so long a trial, that none of the half-way theories *will work*, as Brieger's interesting lecture on the increasing alienation from the Church, reviewed by Prof. Scott in our number for April, p. 357, shows us. The ages have for us no more emphatic lesson, indeed, than that it is in proportion as the Bible is approached humbly and simply as the voice of God, the testimony of Jesus, that it works with power among men. Dr. Vincent himself says: "If the ear of this age could be opened to the voice of the God-man filled with the Holy Ghost and speaking in Scripture, if its heart could be laid bare to that testimony, the attitude of the apostolic age towards Scripture would be reproduced. Earlier conditions, it is true, are not better because they are earlier; but it is certain that Scripture appealed to the apostolic Church as a whole with a freshness, a vividness, a simplicity, a directness, and a power of conviction which are too much wanting in the modern Church. The reason was that Scripture was searched chiefly in order to hear in it the voice and the testimony of Jesus" (p. 42). Amen, we say: though doubtless in our own sense of the words. The apostolic age saw in the whole Bible the testimony of Jesus: in proportion as this age looks upon it as, in all its parts and elements alike, the voice and the testimony of Jesus, in that proportion will the Bible continue

to be a power and an inspiration in the life of the world.——*Jacob Behmen.* An Appreciation. By Alexander Whyte, Author of *Characters and Characteristics of William Law*, etc. 12mo, pp. 86. (Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1894.) Dr. Whyte's studies in the mystics bore delightful fruit the other day in the essay on William Law which he prefixed to a volume of extracts from his writings: it has ripened again into a fruitage equally delightful in this essay on Jacob Behmen, "the greatest of the mystics." We cannot boast so strong an affinity with mystical thought as Dr. Whyte's; and we are accordingly less full than he of half-adoring admiration for its product. What the mystics have done for the world in deepening apprehension of God and quickening communion with God, we gladly recognize and hope we can appreciate. When their thought of God is only "super-confessional," we may yet account it their "true and genuine distinction, their shining and unshared glory." But when it becomes not only "super-confessional" but also "super-Scriptural"—"almost super-Scriptural" is Dr. Whyte's phrase relatively to Behmen—not only are our wings too closely clipped to follow its flight, but doubts arise in our minds as to its goal. "God-intoxicated" men the mystics were, to be sure: their glory is that it was *God*-intoxication, their shame too often that it was God-*intoxication.* We would fain follow them to God, but we should not wish to fall with them into the abyss.——*Central Truths and Side Issues.* By Robert G. Balfour, Minister of Free New North Church, Edinburgh. 12mo, pp. 238. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895.) This volume consists of six essays, "written at intervals during the course of a long and busy ministry," but "carefully revised and some of them entirely rewritten" for this publication. Three of them relate to subjects which the author rightly esteems central truths of the faith: three of them raise what he would equally rightly—though with full recognition of their importance—call relatively side-issues. The former three treat the great themes of the Incarnation and Atonement: the latter three discuss respectively the meaning of "the doctrine of baptisms and the laying on of hands" in the opening of the sixth chapter of Hebrews, the place and purpose of the Sinai covenant in the history of redemption and the resurrection of the body. Mr. Balfour wields a facile pen and everywhere exhibits scholarly investigation and careful thought, as well as a firm grasp upon the essential doctrines of evangelical religion and a trained power of popular exposition. He is particularly happy in his exegetical studies and in his criticism of the views of others: and thus it happens that we have read with most interest the papers which treat of what he calls side-issues, in which the exegetical element is very large and very fresh; and after them, the second paper on the Atonement which discusses with acuteness and force the theories which have been proposed as substitutes for the evangelical view of substitutive Satisfaction. The two more especially doctrinal papers seem to us somewhat less fresh in matter and less satisfactory in treatment. The latter of them closes with an exceedingly well-conceived passage on the relation of the "limited Atonement" to the preaching of a free Gospel. In the former Mr. Balfour propounds a kenotic doctrine of the incarnation, similar to Martensen's and liable to all the objections which lie against Ebrard's. He seems to have been misled here by accepting without criticism the translation of Phil. ii. 7 which the kenotists have given it: "He emptied himself." It is often said that if we accept our philosophy at the hands of others, we have already given them our theology: perhaps it may be equally said that if we accept our translation of Scripture at the hands of others we have already surrendered to them the government of our theology—a remark which will have its varied application in these days of new Biblical translations

by the Kautzsches and Weizsäckers. Commencing with a kenotic translation, Mr. Balfour remains in the kenotic ranks, chiefly because he fails to do justice to the dualism of Christ's nature. He thinks it necessary to believe as a "mystery" that the Logos was at one and the same time omnipresent and locally confined, omniscient and ignorant, but too bold to say that one nature in Christ could be omniscient while the other remained ignorant. For our part, we agree with the whole Church for a millennium and a half in esteeming the former self-contradictory and the latter divine truth. We should have thought that there has been no time since, say, Athanasius' treatise on *The Incarnation of the Word of God*, when it would be possible for a thoughtful student of theology to say that Christ's confession of ignorance of the day of His second coming "can only mean that *in His incarnate form* He did not possess that knowledge," that "*the Word when He became flesh*" was not omnipresent, and the like. In his fruitful study of Heb. vi. 1, *sq.*, Mr. Balfour seems to us to mark out the true path of interpretation of that puzzling passage, in his assignment of "baptisms and laying on of hands" to Jewish and not Christian customs, and in his taking this clause parenthetically. Is it not best, however, to make this "doctrine" appositional to "foundation," and to take the parenthesis as a description of the ritual discussions which as types lie at the bottom of Christian doctrine indeed, but beyond which the Jewish readers of the Epistle found difficulty in going? The discussion of the Sinai covenant is also comprehensive and suggestive. The matter is difficult, and we do not see our way to going the whole way with Mr. Balfour; but he has certainly illuminated the subject.——*The Gifts of the Holy Spirit to Unbelievers and Believers.* By the Rev. C. R. Vaughan, D.D., of the Synod of Virginia. 8vo, pp. 415. (Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication, 1894.) Like most of the doctrinal treatises which come to us from the Presbyterians of our Southern States, Dr. Vaughan's book on the Holy Spirit is a model of sober and reverent exposition of divine truth. It is divided into two parts, which treat respectively of the work of the Holy Ghost on hearts as yet unregenerate, culminating in the regenerating act itself; and of His gracious work in the souls of God's children. About equal space is given to each of these two intensely important topics, and each is treated in a manner which will interest as well as instruct. Dr. Vaughan had the interests of God's people in mind in writing, and the book is accordingly one which will be read to their profit not only by the teacher of the Gospel, but also by those members of the flock itself who would fain know the spiritual blessings which God has in store for them.——*De Hierarchia Anglicana Dissertatio Apologetica*, Auctoribus Edwardo Denny, A.M., Ecclesiæ de Kempley in Dioec. Glocestren. Vicario perpetuo, et T. A. Lacey, Ecclesiæ de Madingley in Dioec. Eliensi Vicario perpetuo; Præfante R. D. Sarisburiensi episcopo. 8vo, pp. xvi. 265. (Londini: Apud C. J. Clay et Filios, 1895 [New York: Macmillan & Co.].) This thorough treatise on the Anglican episcopal succession has been given a Latin form in order that it may become better known to foreign students, *i. e.*, of course primarily to Romish students, of the subject. The Bishop of Salisbury, in his Preface, commends it to foreign readers as a work already approved in England, and meriting the larger circulation which a Latin dress may give it. In matter it is a careful attempt to clear the episcopal succession of the Church of England from doubt, treating in detail of the consecration of Matthew Parker and of Barlow, of the rite used in Parker's consecration, of the doctrine of intention and its application to the English cases, of the priestly acts, and of the practice of the Church of Rome. One is quite impressed by the evident care of the writers: and from a Presbyterian point of view somewhat oppressed by it. Can the claim of a Church to be a true Church of Christ really depend

on these things?——*Persecution and Tolerance.* Being the Hulsean Lectures preached before the University of Cambridge in 1893–4. By M. Creighton, D.D., Lord Bishop of Peterborough, etc. 12mo, pp. xii, 140. (London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1895.) The main conclusions which Dr. Creighton commends in these lectures are that persecution, or the infliction of punishment for erroneous opinions, was contrary to the express teaching of Christ, was alien to the spirit of Christianity and was always condemned by the Christian conscience: that it was really exercised for political rather than for religious ends, and was only adopted by the Church from the system of the world, when the Church accepted the responsibility of maintaining order in the community; and consequently that it gave way to tolerance not through any progress of intellectual enlightenment or increasing indifference or growth of spirituality, but simply on the discovery by the State that a great diversity of opinions was compatible with the maintenance of social order. The result of Dr. Creighton's study of the subject, then, is not to exonerate Christians or the Church from the sin of persecution; but certainly to relieve Christianity from that stain. He shows that persecution was not rooted in Christianity and was not the result of any Christian impulse; but was rooted in certain social doctrines and grew up under the pressure of assumed social and political necessity. But that the Church made herself the instrument of the State in religious persecution is, he thinks, all the more to her discredit that persecution was alien to her nature, and was protested against by the terms of her commission and by the consciences of her children. Dr. Creighton will not allow the validity of the plea that the Church was misled through intellectual error into persecution. He points out that Christians always knew that it was morally wrong (pp. 93, 97): "Men never thought persecution right; but they valued social order and regarded the ecclesiastical organization as a necessary factor in its maintenance. . . . . Men of piety deprecated persecution, men of intelligence demonstrated its lack of foundation; but it was maintained for the same reason for which it had been admitted, namely, political convenience." And, then, he gives us the profound generalization—one of many similar passages of light and leading which stud the volume: "It is a thought borne home to the mind of any who reflects upon the past, that the sphere of human error in matters of morality is smaller than is generally supposed, and the sphere of sin is greater. We must not be misled by the success of nations, of movements, or of individuals, to condone their misdoings. . . . . Men did wrong, not because they erred through ignorance, but because they took the shortest and most obvious means to secure their immediate objects" (p. 29). Inconsistencies like this are not intellectual but moral defects: they are the result of time-serving, and arise "because men first determine from motives of expediency what they mean to do, and then call in their intellect to supply them with plausible reasons" (p. 101). It is already doubtless obvious that this pregnant little book has its lessons for us of to-day as well as its conclusions as to the past.——*Death and the Resurrection.* An Inquiry into their True Nature. By Calvin S. Gerhard. 12mo, pp. 240. (Philadelphia: Charles G. Fisher, 1895.) The puzzling problems of eschatology are approached by Dr. Gerhard in a devout and reverential spirit, and are treated with a seriousness and care fitted to awaken confidence in him as a guide. Of all theological topics, however, those relating to eschatology rest most exclusively on a simple Scriptural basis, and Dr. Gerhard unfortunately, in common with the whole mediating school of theological thought, approaches them from a point of view the opposite of the simply Scriptural. To him the problem which really presses is how to conform Christian eschatological notions to the assumed implications

of current scientific theories;* and he, accordingly, approaches the Bible as one having a controversy with it. "We will proceed by calling attention to the fact that the truth that man was created mortal *is admitted* in the Scriptures," he says for example—in apparent unconsciousness that the very form of language used betrays his extra-Scriptural point of view. Now, there is no hope of building up a true eschatology from this point of departure. Science, too, is a revelation of God; but the remote implications which are drawn from modern theories of the universe relative to the modes of future existence, cannot be taken as postulates superior to the explicit Word of God, without evaporating the whole eschatological teaching of Scripture. This is what happens in Dr. Gerhard's case also. His fundamental postulate is one with which he fancies modern science provides him—that "man was created with a dying body:" and this he makes the principle of his whole doctrine of the future world. "If man's natural body was not intended to be immortal," he argues, "then it is not likely that the resurrection, as the completion of his existence in the world to come, will include the resuscitation or glorification of the corpse" (p. 14). The purpose of the book is to give some color of likelihood to this inference. In order to this, the author propounds a theory of the nature of the resurrection which transmutes it into a process beginning in this life, continued at death, and completed at the final consummation. The underlying philosophy is monism, and he accordingly gains great assistance from Dr. J. M. Whiton's *Beyond the Shadow*. He supposes mind and body to be only two manifestations of one life: but as they are two necessary modes in which the one life manifests itself, the soul cannot exist without a body. This is not to say that the soul carries a body with it into the next world, in the Swedenborgian sense; much less that it produces a new body for itself in the next life: but that the underlying substantial basis there, as well as here, manifests itself in its essential dualism, and there is only left a ripening for the consummation. The resurrection is already present to each, then, on death, and that as a necessary human characteristic. The resurrection of Christ, it is obvious, creates great difficulties for this scheme. It is declared to have been not a "resuscitation of the corpse" (p. 153); and "not the glorification but the dissolution of His natural body:" "His corpse," we are told, "was resolved into its original elements and *thus* escaped corruption, not by glorification but by *immediate* dissolution" (p. 155). Nor did He wait for the third day in order to rise; like other men He rose at once on death: "He submitted to natural decease and *at the same time* was raised into a glorified form of existence;" "while He was dying, He also *at the same time* surmounted death, and therefore was enabled to live in a more exalted sphere of existence" (p. 154). Nay, He was "resurrected" before He died. As a man, He rose from the dead, for all men rise; but as God-man He "outstripped all other men:" "even during His earthly sojourn He was continually living in a risen state" (p. 161); "living the life of God, He rose at every point above the plane of our sinful life" (p. 162). What Dr. Gerhard does with Scripture to reconcile it with these views, and how, from them, he develops a detailed eschatology, we must refer the reader to his book to learn. That he has not taken Scripture simply at its face value must be already evident: and, since to take Scripture simply at its face value is the principle of our eschatology, it is also evident why we cannot accept Dr. Gerhard's construction.

*Princeton.* BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

*For this widespread tendency (which amounts, of course, to practical Rationalism), see above, p. 507, and our April number, p. 367.

# VI.—PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

OCCASIONAL ADDRESSES AND SERMONS. By the late Rev. SAMUEL J. WILSON, D.D., LL.D., Senior Professor in the Western Theological Seminary at Allegheny, Pa., and some time Pastor of the Sixth Presbyterian Church of Pittsburgh. With a Memoir, by the Rev. WILLIAM H. JEFFERS, D.D., LL.D., Senior Professor in the Western Theological Seminary. Edited by the Rev. MAURICE E. WILSON, D.D., and the Rev. CALVIN DILL WILSON. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1895. 12mo, pp. i–lvi, 1–359.

This is a book longed for by not a few. Rumor recently changed the longing of some into hope, and now that hope has found fruition in a most interesting memorial volume. Almost twelve years have passed since Dr. Wilson fell asleep in "perfect peace" (p. xxxvi). The men who knew him best are now in that segment of life from which retrospect is easy; in which the blessed memories of earlier years grow constantly and rapidly more and more hallowed. For such men the appearance of the book is certainly most opportune. To such, the tribute quoted on pp. li–lvi, prepared by Dr. A. A. Hodge—himself greatly beloved—in 1883 for the *Presbyterian Review* accurately indicates Dr. Wilson's eminent place as a Christian man, as a theological professor, and as a Presbyterian minister. Hundreds of his students who survive him will mourn afresh as they read these words: "His nearly one thousand graduates remained bound to his heart by hoops of steel. He prayed for them, wept with them, gloried over them, following them along all their ways. And they knew him and gloried in him as their leader, and now they weep over the wide world for their prince is dead" (p. lv).

The photogravure frontispiece presents a "*vera effigies*" of that man of God as the students of his later years knew him. And how familiar is the chirography represented in the *facsimile* autograph: "Samuel Jennings Wilson!" Doubtless, the editors, his nephews, have hit upon a most appropriate dedication: "To those who were never absent from the mind and heart of the author, his students and parishioners, in accordance with that which would certainly have been his own wish, this book is dedicated." The Memoir by Dr. W. H. Jeffers is a noteworthy piece of brief, elegant and adequate characterization. Here are some thirty pages of most profitable reading for any minister of the Word. Especially the young man, student for the ministry, or in the earlier years of the public exercise of his calling, with his career, presumably, largely before him, will find here much to be prayerfully thought upon. Here, all too brief as it is, occurs a distinctly valuable contribution to the stores of biographical reading for theological students and ministers.

The main body of the book is occupied by the "Occasional Addresses and Sermons." There are nine addresses and nine sermons. These are arranged apparently upon the plan of putting the best first. At the head of the addresses stands "John Knox," the famous Tercentenary oration, popularly repeated by Dr. Wilson more than one hundred times after the first delivery, November 20, 1872. The initial sermon is that noble pulpit utterance, "The Spirit of Missions," first preached as the Moderator's Sermon, May 20, 1875. Several of the sermons are without chronological note, but each of the addresses is marked with a suggestion of the place, occasion and time of delivery. One interested in the mental and spiritual biography of this remarkable man should read, *e. g.*: 1. "Quit you like Men," 1855; 2. "The History of Preaching," 1858; 3. "Our Country Calls—A War Speech," 1862; 4. "Hope for the Republic," 1863; 5. "Ministerial Consecration," 1868; 6. "John

Knox," 1872; 7. "Caleb and the Anakim," 1874; 8. "The Spirit of Missions," 1875; 9. "Farewell Sermon," 1876; 10. "The Distinctive Principles of Presbyterianism," 1880; 11. "Address to the Graduating Class of 1883."

Dr. Wilson was indescribably intense. His characteristic silences, his volcanic outbursts were alike intense (p. liii). The war speech (p. 147) and the war sermon (p. 247) show how he was attuned to respond to the stroke of the times that tried men's souls. Read how he describes the charge at Lookout Mountain. "At Lookout Mountain our men charged the enemy above the clouds. Through the clouds and above them they swept upward with fiercer impetuosity than the storm sweeps downward. They fought with the clouds beneath their feet. The roar of their musketry was above the home of the thunder" (p. 263). Quite as intense but quite different in quality is the following: "In strength is our safety. If we show the white feather every Jack-daw will begin to peck at us; every second-rate cock on the European dunghill will begin to strut and crow and whet his spurs. Europe must be taught to let us alone" (p. 261). We remember that these words were uttered thirty-two years ago amid the excitements of war, and that words which if spoken by an ordinary man would pass for inflated bombast were taken from Dr. Wilson by his contemporaries as words of truth and soberness.

The sermon, "Quit you like Men," is the sermon of a licentiate, but preached before the Society of Religious Inquiry of Washington College, June 17, 1855. Side by side with it, stands the sermon, "The Spirit of Missions," the Moderator's sermon at the opening session of the Eighty-seventh General Assembly in the First Presbyterian Church, Cleveland, O., May 20, 1875. These two sermons alone would give the careful reader a measure of the man of which this volume is a memorial. And, as such an one reads on throughout the volume, there must be impressed upon him the conviction that utter consecration to Jesus Christ makes the most sectional man cosmopolitan, cosmical, eternal. This Western Pennsylvanian of the Western Pennsylvanians in his spiritual and intellectual life walked with God "from everlasting unto everlasting." "From eternity God chose a people for Himself. The idea of the Church rests upon and springs out of the eternal purpose of Jehovah. In the working out of this eternal purpose the divine thought assumes form and visibility in time" (p. 95). "From out the ruins of the Fall, prophecy uplifts her majestic form; with a glance she scans the vista of the coming ages and proclaims ultimate and complete victory through an incarnate Redeemer" (p. 195). "For ten years the Grecian sentinels kept their watch towers, waiting and watching for the beacon-fires which should announce the fall of Troy. At last the signal came—a flash of light—and from tower to tower the fiery message leaped over land and over sea until from Ida to Argos the announcement of victory had been carried on the wing of the flame. So the watchmen of Zion shall lift up the voice; with the voice together shall they sing; for they shall see eye to eye" when the light of the Gospel shall flash from shore to shore, from island to island, from continent to continent, from pole to pole, and the whole earth shall be filled with His glory. Amen and Amen" (p. 216).

Here, gathered from this volume, is a brief but most charming, edifying and stimulating course of reading for any of our theological students: 1. "Ministerial Consecration;" 2. "The History of Preaching;" 3. "The Distinctive Principles of Presbyterianism;" 4. "John Knox;" 5. "Presbyterianism in the United States;" 6. "Address to the Graduating Class of 1883;" 7. "The Spirit of Missions." The sermon on "Caleb and the Anakim" is a sermon to warm the blood of age, to make the ears of gray-beards tingle. The "Farewell Sermon" wonderfully opens "the treasures of

divine love and grace." None of us who were Dr. Wilson's students from '75 to '78 have forgotten the substance of the Chapel talk on "Higher Life." His voice still rings in our ears as he declares: "I have no faith in any Christian experience which detracts from the spirituality, depth, breadth, length, height, scope, reach and comprehensiveness of the divine law. I believe in that Christian experience which, in proportion as it is developed, sees more and more the infinite purity and holiness of the law, and which just in this proportion discovers defilement, corruption and utter unworthiness in ourselves, and which thus sinks the soul in the dust at the foot of the cross to give all honor and glory to the Lord Jesus Christ" (p. 190). Some modern Barnabas would serve his day as a son of consolation and help, if he should print for gratuitous distribution—at least among ministers of the Presbyterian Church in the the U. S. A.—some six or seven thousand copies of Dr. Wilson's address on the "Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Pastorate of the Rev. Dr. Brownson." Here is indeed a "Tract for the Times" (see pp. 174–177).

This is a memorial volume. In no respect is the memorial more pathetic than in the marks it bears of an intense life overcrowded, of magnificent possibilities suppressed, thwarted, dissipated by pressures and distractions from which the Church could, if she would, largely protect her willing ministers. It is promotive of hope to be able to say that Dr. Wilson in his own career experienced an improvement in the Church's methods of promoting ministerial and professional efficiency. Yet the last overworked and handicapped professor did not die with Dr. Wilson. The appearance of this volume is timely in these restless days. The Church of Jesus Christ will never lose confidence in those of her ministers who hold the faith and are possessed of the spirit of Samuel Jennings Wilson. God keep his memory green!

*Pittsburgh.* HENRY T. MCCLELLAND.

DEMON POSSESSION AND ALLIED THEMES. Being an Inductive Study of Phenomena of Our Own Times. By Rev. JOHN L. NEVIUS, D.D. With an Introduction by Rev. F. F. Ellinwood, D.D. Chicago, New York and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1895. 9 x 6½, pp. x, 482.

This work is by a distinguished missionary of the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America, who labored forty years in China, departing this life in 1893. The Introduction is by the distinguished Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions. It is ably edited by Henry W. Rankin, Esq., who supplies a chapter (xviii) on "The Facts and Literature of the Occult," and also copious Indexes, Bibliographical, Biblical, Pathological, and General. Many years ago Harper Bros., New York, published *China and the Chinese* by the same author, which is still as good a general account of the land and people as may be found. The editor justly says: "Dr. Nevius stood in the first rank of modern missionaries as an evangelist, pastor, educator, organizer, and founder of Christian literature in a pagan tongue." The Introduction says as justly: "His philosophic insight, his judicial fairness of mind, his caution and his conscientious thoroughness [were] admirable qualifications for such a study."

The title itself is enough to attract readers; and also to repel many who ought to read the book. The reputation of the author may assure the latter that a theme which has become repugnant to them, as it was originally to him, is here treated in a fashion that does justice both to their sentiments and also to the subject. If they find that the editor goes too far, they will find caution itself in the Introduction, which, to the question, Does the author establish the fact of demon possession? answers in effect like the

parents of "the man born blind:" "He is of age; ask him; he shall speak for himself." It says: "Each reader of the book must form his own conclusions. The author does not insist upon any particular conclusion" (p. vi). But on p. 332 the author says: "To briefly sum up all: it would seem that every age and country present phenomena which exhibit, in some variety of form, the reality of demon intercourse with men, and of demon possession. . . . . History is full of facts which illustrate the demonology of the Bible, and seem to find in that neglected doctrine their only sufficient explanation." An amplification of this position may be found on pp. 308–311.

The Contents display the following: Chaps. i.–iii: The author's first Experiences of demon possession in China. iv: The Circular Letter to evoke information from all parts of China, particularly the testimony of native witnesses whose reliability could be vouched for. The Letter proposed thirteen enquiries admirably fitted to elicit testimony of facts purely. v.–vii: Reports from native Christian Chinese; supplemented by many others in Appendix i. viii–ix: Demon possession in India, Japan and other lands; including Christian countries: amplified by the editor in Appendix ii. x: Character of the evidence, and facts established by it. xi–xv: Various explanations and theories accounting for the phenomena, with particular exposition of the Biblical theory as the best and most satisfactory explanation. xvi: Historical sketch of Demonism. xvii: Spiritualism. The book is scientific and apologetic, exactly as books that report geographical explorations and archæological excavations in Bible lands. It is a valuable scientific acquisition, when "a find" clears up some occult matter of human life. It is a valuable contribution to Christian apologetics when "the find" corroborates Biblical statements of fact that have been discredited. The apologetic value is the popular interest. The purely scientific value interests a narrow circle.

The facts produced in this book may be classed with those finds in Bible lands that corroborate Scripture. But they concern a very different subject from the usual ones, viz., Demoniacal possession. The Biblical representations on this subject might be thought incapable of similar corroboration. No one has looked for the mummy of one of the possessed persons to turn up, with the unmistakable proofs of the possession described in the Bible. No one has expected to encounter one of the very demons that Jesus cast out. And nothing of the sort has happened. But this book reports what may convince the reader that in China, that land of so many origins, the identical plague of demon possession has existed and still exists, though now disappearing before Christianity, as it did in Palestine. That plague has great prominence, and therefore great importance in the New Testament. It appears there as a familiar thing, which only perplexes present-day believers the more, because to them it is as unfamiliar and incredible as solid water is to an ignorant inhabitant of a tropical island. Under the circumstances, scepticism has much apparent advantage, and spiritualists claim, with a logical force hard to resist, that believers in demon possession are bound to admit the pretensions of spiritualism. All these matters are relieved, and embarrassment is exchanged for satisfaction, by the facts as they are reported and applied in this book. Its readers should be as many as the reflecting persons who have felt the embarrassments and perplexities just referred to.

*Philadelphia.* SAMUEL T. LOWRIE.

*Five Stars in a Little Pool.* By Edith Carrington. With Original Illustrations. This is an unusually good specimen of the wholesome fiction issued by the American Tract Society. It is apparently of British author-

ship, but coutains nothing which is not adapted to all meridians. The illustrations are numerous and spirited, being executed by artists of celebrity. The verses prefixed to each chapter are well selected, and serve a useful office in pointing the reader to the best of our poets—an office which cannot well be begun too soon.——*The Source and Fruit of Sorrow, and Christ the King of the Unseen World.* By Arthur Mitchell, D.D. (*Ibid.*) This little booklet is a pleasing memorial of the accomplished Secretary whose removal in the prime of his vigor was such a sore stroke to the Church he loved and served so well. In the first of the two sermons the reasons and the uses of afflictiou are treated carefully, tenderly and, above all, Scripturally. In the secoud there is a pleasing account of the Saviour's rule over Hades. In it Dr. Mitchell quotes a sentence from John Howe which is worth repeating: "The abode of the apostate and the lost may be no more in proportion, nay, inexpressibly less, than some little rocky island appointed as a place of punishment for criminals, in comparison with a flourishing, vast empire, fully peopled with industrious, rich, sober-minded and happy inhabitants." The sentimeut is not strange, bnt it is well to know that it was cherished by such a distinguished Puritan.——*Master and Men; or, The Sermon on the Mountain Practiced on the Plain.* By William Burnet Wright. (Houghton, Mifflin & Co.) This volume hardly answers to its title. The author simply gives a running commentary on the Beatitudes, adding to each one a concrete case from history, sacred or profane. The skill with which this is done may be seen from the fact that the blessing upou those who huuger and thirst after righteousness is illustrated by the death-scene of Socrates. In his second chapter the author insists upon the point that the Gospels were subsequent in time to the Epistles and are the authorized commentary upon them —an error which has sometimes been broached by stronger men than Mr. Wright. It is indeed quite possible that the synoptic narratives were composed at a later period than Paul's first writiugs, but that such was the case has not beeu proved, nor can it be. The materials are not present to justify an assured conclusion. Besides, the author's coutention opposes not only the general consent of believers in all ages, but the plain facts in the case. The Epistles presuppose the evaugelical narrative. The scheme of redemption could not be fully understood till after its accomplishment in the death, resurrection and ascension of our Lord, as He Himself intimated (John xvi. 12), adding the promise of the Holy Spirit who should guide the disciples into all the truth. The weakest and most unscriptural of all the "fond inventions" of our time is that which puts a bottomless chasm between the Gospels and the Epistles, and underrates the latter as mere human deductions. No fine writing or graceful sentimeut can gloze over the pestiferous error.——*Tony: The Story of a Waif.* By Larsdell Mitchell. (Philadelphia: C. H. Banes.) A slender volume, beautifully printed, and adorned with spirited illustrations. It tells of a newsboy who was injured by an accident, and in the hospital charmed everybody by his whistling and his self-control. The story lacks naturalness and simplicity in the telling, and is hardly worthy of its exquisite dress. It is far inferior to its companion volume.——*Daisy.* By Marshall Saunders. (*Ibid.*) This is an account of a little girl iu a boarding-house, who suddenly takes a faucy to a young man who is beginning to go on the wrong road. By her artless ways she wins him away from evil associations, and by her experience on a sick bed completes the change. The narrative is recouuted in a very simple form, and does its work very effectually, showiug how, in the words of the old prophet, *a little child shall lead them.* ——*Dictionary of Scientific Illustrations and Symbols: Moral Truths Mirrored in Scientific Facts.* By A Barrister of the Honorable Society of the Inuer Temple (W. F. Ketchum). The Preface of this volume speaks of the

superior certainty of scientific facts. It is a curious commentary upon this claim to find (p. 196) a reassertion of the old error that grains of wheat taken from Egyptian tombs, where they had lain for three thousand years, "on being planted in the soil of France grew into waving corn." The author has collected from a wide field the various marvels, indicating in a simple way the source whence they are drawn, and then adding the moral or spiritual truths which they suggest. And there are indexes which make the book easy of reference. The book, as the title-page informs us, is designed for the use of the Senate, the Bar, the Pulpit and the Orator. We doubt its usefulness to these classes. Illustrations to be effective must be drawn from the speaker's experience or observation. When they are cut and dried and labeled, as they are in this volume, they fail in strange hands to do what is expected of them. Nor has the author escaped the danger of inventing analogies where they do not exist, as (p. 127) where the foreknowledge which decides birds to migrate is said to be of the same kind with that which enables a prophet to foresee and describe what is to come—both being endowments of nature—whereas the differentiating quality of a Scripture prophet is that through special divine aid he is enabled to do what is impossible for unassisted nature.——*The Children, the Church and the Communion.* By Charles Cuthbert Hall. (Houghton, Mifflin & Co.) This neat little volume is further described on the title-page, "Two Simple Messages to Children from One who Loves Them and who wants Them to Love the House of God and the Table of Christ." It appears that Dr. Hall is in the habit of holding a Children's Service on Sunday eventide, and these sermons are selected from many delivered on such occasions. They are admirable specimens of this kind of preaching, simple, earnest, not overloaded with incident or anecdote, yet attractive because the preacher has something to say and says it in a loving spirit. The faculty of interesting children is a rare one, but it can be acquired if due pains are taken, and what accomplishment is more worthy of a preacher's anxious toil?——*Missions at Home and Abroad.* Papers and Addresses Presented at the World's Congress of Missions. Compiled by the Rev. E. M. Wherry. (American Tract Society.) The Columbian Exposition did far more than present a view of the world's material progress, and since its close the press has borne abundant witness of the emphasis it put upon the intellectual, moral and religious advancement of the race. A chief feature of the latter was the Congress of Missions. In our last number notice was taken of woman's work in this great cause as summed up in a volume issued by the American Tract Society. Now we have the whole subject as it was treated by experts at the World's Fair. The volume is remarkable for its ability and completeness. After appropriate Introductory Addresses comes a paper by the Rev. A. N. Hitchcock on the "Place and Function of Missionary Societies in the Work of the Church," so sensible and weighty that one wishes that all Christians might read it. Dr. D. J. Burrell, Dr. A. Mackay-Smith and Prof. Graham Taylor speak wisely and earnestly on "City Missions." Equally well do Drs. W. C. Roberts, Wishard and Hillis treat the problems of "Home Evangelization." Then comes a series of papers on "Foreign Missions" by Drs. George Smith, Washburn, Scott, Dennis and others, each taking up an important part of the vast theme. Four interesting papers, one of which gives the facts as to mission work among lepers, are grouped under the title "Beacon Lights from the World's Mission Field." Another series of six essays is headed "Auxiliary Agencies in Missions," such as the Bible and tract societies, medical missions, etc. Two very good papers by laymen handle "Money and Missions," and four others by clergymen treat of "Comity and Coöperation." We have mentioned somewhat in detail the contents of this volume to justify our com-

mendation of it as a most valuable addition to any missionary library. Rarely are so many topics, handled by known experts, embraced in a duodecimo volume of less than five hundred pages; and there are few men so well informed as not to find novel and valuable information in one or other of its component parts. The only fault we have to find with the editor is the lack of an Index.——*The Jew and the German; or, From Paul to Luther.* A Historical Study. By Franke Kelford. (Philadelphia: J. O. Wiuston & Co.) The second title of this volume leads one to expect a parallel drawn between the great apostle and the sturdy Reformer, but none such appears. On the contrary, these names are selected merely as marking the beginning aud the end of "a long reach of time crowded with momentous events and movements." The book is designed to trace the founding and the formative period of Christianity, its development, its corruptions aud its Reformation. We cannot agree with Dr. J. G. Morris that this is well done. The points to be treated are not well selected, nor is the treatment thorough. For instance, chap, xiii. on "The Crusades," speaks of the evil done by this movement, but is silent as to its influence upon the march of European civilization. The book is written in a good spirit and contains much that is both useful and true, but as an historical *précis* it is not what the times demand.——*The Estrangement of Young People from Christianity.* By President J. E. Rankin, D.D., LL.D. From the French of Dr. Eugene Bersier of Paris. (Funk & Wagnalls Co.) Any thing from the pen of the distinguished Bersier, whose sudden death a few years ago saddened so many hearts not only in France, but all over Protestant Christendom, commands attention. This little tractate, which appears to be adequately rendered by Dr. Rankin, treats of an evil existing in many lands. Inquiring into its causes the author says that some turn away from the Saviour because they "want to enjoy life and have a good time." Others have serious doubts and difficulties owing to the self-esteem arising from imperfect knowledge, in regard to whom he quotes Bacon's well-known apothegm.* He specifies in this way: "A man knows a little of astronomy, and so he ridicules the Old Testament for not putting the sun in the centre of our planetary system. He knows a little of geology, and so he smiles as he reads the first chapter of Genesis. He knows a little of anthropology, so he pities the man who believes that creation can have sprung from a single head. He is a little of a critic, and he is amused with the discrepancies of the Gospels. He knows a little of medicine, and so he wonders how one can believe in books which speak of demoniacs and miraculous cures; a little of philosophy, and so he balances the argumeut for and against the existence of God" (pp. 16, 17). M. Bersier handles both classes well, and in the course of his reply to the second, says: "It is needful to bear in mind that the difficulties which a man finds in Christianity are in all systems, and are inherent in our finite state, with this difference, however, that Christianity gives us the most practical solution of them and the one most comfortable to our conscience" (p. 23). This remark has often been made before since Bishop Butler's time, but it needs to be often repeated even to the same generation.——*Qualifications for Ministerial Power.* By Charles Cuthbert Hall, D.D. (Hartford: Hartford Seminary Press.) This volume contains the Carew Lectures for 1895. It is a fresh treatment of an old theme. The author discusses first the power of a qualified ministry, then in order the qualifications, physical and mental, experiential and devotional, social and pastoral, liturgical and homiletical, and finally, theological and ecclesiastical. There is a deal of fine writing and thoughtful suggestion, with some drawbacks. The root of the Greek word for *liturgy* does not mean, as Dr. Hall says (p. 176), "belonging to the people." Nor

* A little philosophy inclineth men's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion.

does intelligent subscription to a creed "impede ministerial power" (p. 220). Nor is the "Renaissance of theology" which he welcomes (p. 226) anything but the revamping of an old error.——*God Spake All These Words.* By James H. Brookes. (St. Louis, Mo.: Sold by Rev. J. W. Allen, D.D.) This little volume is a successful attempt to show in a popular form the supernatural origin and inerrant inspiration of the Scriptures. Dr. Brookes argues from its known character, and then shows how all the way through the Old Testament and the New it is asserted that God spake what is recorded. The book is eminently readable, and conveys a great amount of useful information. The author evidently holds what has been called "the cast-iron theory" of inspiration, but this is infinitely better than any of the putty theories which allow the reader to make of God's Word just what he pleases. We should differ from Dr. Brookes in some of his explanations of difficult places, but the general tone of his volume is so reverent and earnest and sensible that the book is calculated to be extremely useful, and we wish for it a wide circulation.

*New York.* TALBOT W. CHAMBERS.

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# VII.—PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

GENETIC PHILOSOPHY. By DAVID JAYNE HILL. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. pp. 382.

This is a provoking book by reason of its inequality. It attracts a reader by its crisp style, its fine criticisms of the views of others and by its wholesome sentiments on morality and kindred subjects. But we occasionally descry the tails of "the little foxes that spoil the vineyards," as when the author, the learned President of Rochester University, takes shots at current religious dogmas and startles us with the extraordinary discovery that it is from the ancient Greeks, not from the Hebrews, that we have obtained our monotheism. We sometimes get a glimpse of rather large foxes, for a philosophy that claims to be scientific by way of protest against the older or non-scientific philosophy. The task in hand is to develop in the scientific way, matter, life, man himself, body and soul, with all his faculties, as consciousness, feeling, thought, will, art, morality, religion and science itself, without once interrupting the continuity of physico-chemical causation. The author succeeds, at the start, in showing that Herbert Spencer, who attacked the same problem, has rather bungled the work. After warning us against wrong assumptions, he bases his argument on a general assumption of his own, which carries with it the entire case. Observing an order of phenomena in nature, he gives to this an ideal extension in time or space, so as to include every conceivable kind of evolution that ever was or will be set down for explanation. Looking back to the beginning of the world of matter and energy, he declines to explain whence it came, confessing that he cannot do so without violating the law of continuity. So he leaves a great initial note of interrogation, as an unreduced fortress in his rear.

Within the limits of the inorganic world his course is plain sailing, as all schools of thought now accept the physico-chemical theory of the world's development as to inanimate nature. Mendelejeff's law (cited by the author) goes far towards proving some kind of evolutionary origin for chemical elements; and Bütschli's researches into the amœboid structure and movements of a drop of oil (which have escaped the author's notice) show how much that was supposed to be purely vital is explainable on lower

principles. President Hill on coming to consider the origin of animated nature, explains it as coming, without any supernatural interference, from non-living matter, and believes that life itself is only a high kind of physico-chemical energy. His statement that "the hyperphysical entity of life is abandoned by biologists" is misinformation: on this physiological point Dr. J. Burdon Sanderson, the leader of physiology in English-speaking countries, has stated within the last few years that there is a reaction towards vitalism, and ascribes the change to the discovery that the cell is the vital unity, which has transferred to itself the mystery formerly attaching to the whole organism, the cell itself remaining unexplained. And the same writer returns to the subject in a recent letter to *Nature* (Oct. 26, 1893), where he says that he understands *life* to include the physical and chemical activities of parts, *together with their coördination*, "not the processes only, nor their coördination only, but both at the same time;" and he further explains that this coördination is not a form of energy. Our author is not more successful in his logic than he is in the matter of scientific information. He says that the inadequacy of physical and chemical forces to produce vital phenomena is a "gratuitous assumption." The scientific method is to charge false assumptions on those who assert, not on those who question, the adequacy of unknown factors. When he alleges that the energy which at the inorganic level displays itself in physico-chemical phenomena advances to a higher stage in organic forms, he is gratuitously assuming what the elaborate investigations of modern times about spontaneous generation have disproved as strongly as it is possible to prove a negative.

His essay on the genesis of the soul, on psychosis or consciousness as distinguished from neurosis or the activity of the nervous molecules, forms a new departure in the same line. He sharply and justly criticises Herbert Spencer for deriving consciousness from the amœba which Spencer described as devoid of sensation, after having stated that the simplest form of consciousness is sensation. He himself takes the easier way of ascribing intelligence to amœba, whence he can easily trace it, along with all its esthetical, moral and religious derivates, down, or up, to man. But the problem still remains, to explain according to continuity how amœba came to have intelligence. On this we are treated to a *résumé* of ancient dreams about the preëxistence of souls or metempsychosis, and to modern dreams as to every physical phenomenon having a sort of double, or *metakinesis* accompanying *kinesis*, so that to use his lucid language, "When the kinetic manifestations assume the form of the molecular processes of the human brain, the metakinetic manifestations assume the form of human consciousness." Thus the mystery is cleared by finding soul with consciousness disguised in inanimate nature long before amœba existed, in fact from the outset. Our author shrewdly starts at the very beginning with a stock in trade, which provides for every case that may occur till the knell of doom. And when we ask where he got all this rich stock in trade, he replies that he will not try to explain the first origin of the world as he cannot explaiu this part consistently with continuity. It is manifest that he might have provided with equal facility for giving us the genetic philosophy of heaven and hell and the angels. But the name of the book is a misnomer: it is a deutero-genetic philosophy, the genesis itself being unexplained; is in fact a revival of the eighteenth century conception of evolution, like a Chinese puzzle-box in which the posterity to infinity are successively enclosed in the first. We think that there is something good in modern as distinguished from this exploded evolution; but one of the difficulties under which evolution groaus is derived from the sort of arguments and applications ventilated by its advocates.

We have a feeling of genuine respect for the effort to press the mechanical or physico-chemical theory of nature as far as possible; but the lacunæ in our knowledge are too great to give any hope of complete success to such efforts in problems of life, thought and morality. We are, at the same time, pleased with President Hill's application of his principles to theism and immortality. He claims that his view of genetic philosophy "is not atheism; but the divine is to be sought in the constitution of things, not in interferences with them." The order and progress of the world are the secure foundations of religious faith. Nor does science destroy the hope of eternal life; it supplements other arguments; for the transmission of mental and moral qualities from one generation to another by an invisible medium, is as singular as any transference of psychic activity from the present to a future existence.

*Princeton College.* G. MACLOSKIE.

ELEMENTS OF DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. By NOAH K. DAVIS, Ph.D., LL.D. Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Virginia and Author of *The Theory of Thought*, etc. New York: Harper and Bros., 1893. 12mo, pp. 204.

This well-printed text-book is the result of many years of practical work by the able Professor of Logic in the University of Virginia. It is an admirable compend of the logical doctrines of the present century, written clearly and simply and arranged naturally in short chapters, each of which closes with a praxis in which the instruction of the chapter is brought home to the student by means of appropriate exercises. The author says that "logic is not at all an art, but strictly a science;" we think, however, that any one who may thoroughly master all the problems presented in the practical exercises of this book will find that he has made great progress in what may be called the art of logic, *i. e.*, the art of thinking and reasoning correctly. It is true that logic is properly a science; yet since it is a practical science, we cannot find fault with those who have called it an art.

Of the many handbooks in logic which have appeared during the last twelve or fifteen years, we know of no one superior to this of Prof. Davis. It is well conceived; it shows painstaking thoroughness of execution; it should prove very satisfactory both to teachers and to pupils, and to all who may desire to study and understand logic as generally expounded at the present day. For the existing science, though founded on that of Aristotle, has diverged in many important respects from the teachings of this great master, having received modifications of doctrine from the philosophies of Locke and of Kant, and having been given shape by eminent German and English writers. Dr. Davis, though himself an independent thinker, has not seriously altered the doctrines which Sir William Hamilton introduced to English readers, but has confined his suggestions and improvements to minor matters. This circumstance, doubtless, will commend this new text-book to those who are seeking a suitable manual; and perhaps should do so.

Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the ordinary logic of to-day is by no means the final statement of the science, and that many of the commonly taught doctrines are imperfect and erroneous. For the strength and vitality of logic have arisen not so much from its theoretical teachings as from its practical forms and rules, the value of which is largely independent of the explanations with which they may be accompanied. We shall illustrate this view by enumerating some statements in which Prof. Davis may be regarded as the spokesman of logicians generally.

First, the definition, "Logic is the science of the necessary forms of

thought," seems inadequate. We feel inclined to add "so far as thought is the instrument of rational conviction." The thought of which logic speaks is not thought in general, but only thought as employed by reason and as engaged in the pursuit and attainment of truth. Logic might be defined as the science of rational conviction.

Again, we cannot accept the doctrine that "Logic has nothing to do with the things we think about. It treats of thought in disregard of its content. . . . . It is concerned ouly with the form, not at all with the matter of thought" (pp. 4, 12). How can a science which is to guide the mind in its pursuit of the knowledge of truth and fact have nothing to do with the nature and laws of things? Is it not the business of logic to tell us when our thought corresponds with entities or realities, and when it does not? Such a science may not concern itself with the laws of being except so far as they are general and comprehensive, but a satisfactory logic must relate to those laws of existential connection and sequence which are discovered only as presented in the nature and operation of entities.

In the next place we question the teachiug that all the rules of logic are based on three ultimate laws or axioms, viz., those of identity, contradiction and excluded middle, and that "the whole of pure logic is only an articulate development" of these laws and of their applications (p. 8). These principles, as combined, assert that every conception or statement as of fact must be either true or false, and that if it is either it cannot be the other, but must always remain true or false. On the ground of this axiom we reject as impossible and absurd any assertion which directly contradicts known truth, or which itself sets forth the same thing as being at the same time existent and non-existent. And when a statement does not immediately involve any contradiction, we allow that it has at least a possibility of being true. The law of contradiction, therefore, and its fellows form a test of logical consistency. But the scope of logic is not confined to mere possibility and consistency. It chiefly relates to the sequence, necessary or possible or probable, of one thing upon another. This is not at all provided for by the axioms given above. And even inconsistency or absurdity cannot be evidenced by the use of these laws except so far as it arises from an immediate, not from a deduced, contradiction.

Dr. Davis' doctrine of judgment is that of Locke as modified by later logicians. He says (p. 67): "As a product of thought a judgment is the result of comparison. Two notions are compared, and the judgment pronounces that they agree or disagree." This use of the word "comparison" to indicate the act of mental collation is infelicitous; though it is so employed by eminent writers. But why should we follow Locke in saying that we compare notions aud pronounce them to agree or disagree? It is true that the mind uses notions in judgment, but is the judgment not about the things to which the notions correspond? Is any ordinary judgment ever about notions? And do we ever judge that one notion agrees, or disagrees, with another? Prof. Davis appears to be sensible of the difficulty of perceiving this agreement or disagreement of notions; so he gives another definition (p. 87): "A judgment either affirms or denies that one notion is in or under another." This is not so unintelligible, but it is no more satisfactory. For, as already said, we judge with, but not about, notions; and, in the second place, if we should substitute here general objects or classes of objects for the notions, it is not true that judgment always puts one class under another or one kind of thing under another. As a rule men form judgments and assertions without thinking of classes or of genera and species at all. These are secondary and somewhat artificial modes of thought. We vastly prefer the old doctrine of Aristotle that a proposition

is a sentence setting forth the inherence or the non-inherence—*i. e.*, the existence or the non-existence of one thing in another. When we say, "Snow is white—snow is not black," we assert that whiteness, and deny that blackness, exists in snow; when we say, "The fish does not fly, but swim," we assert that the action of flying is non-inherent, while that of swimming is inherent, in the fish.

Inferences are defined by Prof. Davis as "enunciations in which from something laid down and admitted, something distinct from what is laid down follows of necessity." In this he agrees with Aristotle and is correct; but it is difficult to see how one thing entirely distinct from another can be inferred by the axiom of identity, or by any of those three laws claimed to be the foundation of every logical process. For they show only where a certain consistency, not where the connection or sequence of things, may be asserted.

Nor do we find anywhere in these "elements" any explanation of the essential nature of inference. The law of Reason and Consequent or of Antecedent and Consequent—also called the principle of the sufficient or adequate reason—is mentioned only in connection with conditional propositions. In our view no rational account of inference and reasoning is possible if we do not recognize a power of the mind to perceive a connection between the natures of things, such that when the existence of a thing of a given sort is perceived or supposed, the existence of another thing of a different sort may be inferred as actually or as hypothetically necessary or possible or probable. In other words, inference arises because the mind is able to perceive laws of connection and sequence between entities or kinds of entities. These laws of inference are the axioms and postulates of reason.

Finally, let us say that the common doctrine of the syllogism which Prof. Davis expounds admirably is not a true statement of Aristotle's doctrine, and seems to us utterly weak and unsatisfactory. It represents the syllogism as the necessary form of all reasoning, and declares that the process expressed by it is the comparison of two notions with a third so as "to see their agreement or disagreement, and consequently to conjoin or disjoin them" (p. 99). The true explanation and definition of reasoning is simply that it is a continued process of inference which arises when the consequent of one sequence may be taken as the antecedent of another. The principle of it is a development of the principle of antecedent and consequent, and may be termed the law of the *consequent-consequent*, because a third thing as being consequent to a second becomes consequent also to the first and so is a consequent consequent. The Aristotelian syllogism is founded on this principle, and is an inference in which from two general illative propositions a third illative proposition is deduced. The great importance of this syllogism arises from the fact that it is the form in which all reasoning may be stated and in which it may be fully tested. When Dr. Davis says

*Man is responsible;*
*One responsible is free;*
*Therefore, man is free—*

the consequent "responsible" of the first premise is made antecedent in the second premise, whereupon, in the conclusion, the consequent "free" of the second premise is made consequent of "man," the antecedent of the first premise.

In the above remarks we have mentioned a few—a very few—of the points in which we regard the logic of this nineteenth century as defective and erroneous. We have no doubt whatever that a much better logic will find

general acceptance before the twentieth century has finished its first quarter. Meanwhile such text-books as this of Dr. Davis will do good service.

In the present critique it has been our object mainly to contrast views without discussing them, and to give examples of that doctrinal reconstruction which must follow if we adopt the rule, "Back to Aristotle; begin again at the beginning." Should any one desire a fuller statement of the writer's views and of his reasons for them, this can be found in a book entitled *The Modalist*, published by Ginn & Co.

*New York.* EDWARD JOHN HAMILTON.

A STUDY OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES. By JAMES SETH, M.A., Professor of Philosophy in Brown University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1894. 8vo, pp. 460.

It is with no ordinary pleasure that we have read Prof. Seth's *Study of Ethical Principles.* It is not often that we can speak of a book with such unqualified praise—especially in the realm of philosophical writing. It may perhaps be more respectful, as a recent reviewer remarks, to criticise than to praise such a book as this. But we cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of saying a few words of hearty commendation and of congratulation to Prof. Seth on thus propitiously making his *début* as an author by the publication of a work which places him at once among the chief ethical writers of the day. We trust his book will have many readers, as it deserves to have as well on account of its literary form as of its philosophical insight. We know of no better book to recommend to one desiring to put himself *en rapport* with the general trend of ethical thought. Prof. Seth writes from the point of view of a sound metaphysic, his exposition is clear, his criticism keen, and his style excellent. He has risen superior to the apparently predominant feeling that speculative grasp is commensurate with literary barrenness. Having thoughts to utter, he is not too proud to give attention to the manner of their expression. He reads literature as well as philosophy, and makes use of his reading.

Prof. Seth's *Study* falls very naturally into four main divisions, consisting of an introductory section and three parts. In the Introduction he discusses the nature, method and psychological basis of ethics. The definition of a science will depend upon its subject matter, and the latter will determine the method it employs. Accordingly, as we should expect, we find the keynote to Prof. Seth's ethical theory in his definition. "Ethics," he says, "is the effort to convert into rational insight that faith in a Moral Ideal or absolute human Good which is at the root of all moral life." Or again, "It is the business of ethics, then, to scrutinize the various ideals which, in the life of the individual and of the race, are found competing for the mastery." From this it is evident that Prof. Seth is to be classed with those who define character and conduct with reference to an Ideal rather than in terms of Duty, or the Right, or the Good. Not, however, that his view excludes the others. The ancient moralists, making the Good their favorite category, asked: "What is man's chief end?" With modern writers it has been more customary to ask: "What is man's Duty?" Both of these aspects of the question would however be subsumed under the author's conception of the Moral Ideal. As a rational being, man lives and acts with ends in view. The supreme End, as the central and organizing principle of life, is the Highest Good. Or we may say that among the various types of ends which are open to one, among the alternative and conflicting goods, that is the Ideal which is held to be the chief End, the Good. The Good, or the End, or the Ideal, are only different aspects of the same thing. And so of Law or Duty.

Mere authority, human or divine, does not satisfy man. The absoluteness of moral laws depends upon their spirit, not their letter. "They are the several paths towards some absolute Good." "The Law of the several moral laws can be found only in the claim of an absolute Ideal; their authority must find its seat and explanation in the persistent and rightful dominion of some one End over all the other possible or actual ends of human life." Prof. Seth's definition is a very pretty one, and when rightly understood, seems to us above criticism. We would raise only one question in regard to it, viz., whether, merely as a matter of expression, it lays sufficient emphasis upon the idea of obligation. Prof. Seth would of course say that the existence for us of a Moral Ideal carries with it the obligation to realize that Ideal. His own position is expressed in the following sentence: "The End of life is an ideal of character to be reached by the individual, and his attitude to it is one of obligation or duty to realize it." But suppose one says, "I do not choose to realize my Ideal. I have an Ideal, but I recognize no obligation to pursue it." This is a possible and a not uncommon position. It is possible to separate the Ideal from the idea of Duty. The question, in other words, is whether the Ideal is of the nature of a Categorical or of an Hypothetical Imperative. The Hedonist's Ideal, *e. g.*, is pleasure, but the only Imperative he recognizes is a contingent one; he must do so and so if he desires such and such a thing. The pursuit of pleasure demands the exercise of prudence; but is the Hedonist under any obligation to make pleasure his End? Where does the idea of Duty come in? Yet the feeling of obligation, the idea of Oughtness, is fundamental to the moral life and should in some way be included in our definition of ethics. We must either explain it or explain it away. In other words, Prof. Seth's definition must be understood to imply (and that it does imply this he makes abundantly clear in the sequel) that this "rational insight" into which our "faith" is to be converted carries with it not only our reasoned confidence that a certain chosen end constitutes the absolute Good in human life, but also that it is categorically binding upon us, that the ever-present Ideal is also an eternal Ought. It is with great regret that we pass over Prof. Seth's excellent discussion of the method of ethics and its psychological basis. Though by no means a new idea, yet especially commendable at the present time seems to us his distinction between the ideal and the actual in the sphere of conduct and his insistance that ethics is the science which deals not merely with the Is but with the Ought-to-be.

Having in the Introduction marked out the ground to be traversed, the author proceeds in Part i to the main discussion. The nature of the Ideal we are to hold will depend upon the interpretation we put upon human nature. There have always been two main tendencies observable. "On the one hand man has been regarded as either exclusively or fundamentally a sentient being, and upon this psychology there has been built up a hedonistic theory of the Moral Ideal. If man is essentially a sentient being, his Good must be a sentient Good, or Pleasure." "On the other hand it has been held with no less confidence, that man is, either exclusively or essentially, a rational being, and that his Good is therefore not a sentient but a rational Good." Prof. Seth holds that each of these views represents but a half truth. Man is neither wholly a sentient nor wholly a rational being. It is as unreasonable to exclude the one element as the other. Accordingly, after giving two chapters, one on Hedonism and one on Rigorism, or the ethics of Reason, in which he weaves in much acute criticism with lucid exposition, at the same time giving the subject an historical setting and perspective which seems to us altogether admirable, Prof. Seth passes on to unfold his own ethical system, which, following Aristotle, he calls Eudæ-

monism or the Ethics of Personality. "As the watchword of Hedonism may be said to be Self-satisfaction or Self-gratification, and as that of Rigorism is apt to be Self-sacrifice or Self-denial, so the watchword of Eudæmonism may be said to be Self-realization or Self-fulfillment." But the question then is, What *is* the Self? or *which* Self is to be realized? Eudæmonism answers, "The total self rational and sentient." In what then, we ask, does true Selfhood consist? What constitutes Personality in distinction from mere individuality?—a distinction of which Prof. Seth makes much. The answer takes us back to our psychological basis. It is because man is a self-legislating being, because he can "look before and after" and order his life with reference to definite ends, because the law of his life is not of the nature of a Force operating from without as in the physical world, nor of the nature of the Instincts which determine the activities of animals for them, it is in virtue of the fact that as a rational being, endowed with Will, man's activity is self-determined, that he is a "Person." Where force alone rules there can be but might, no right. "But might is not right in human life; it is this distinction that constitutes morality." If man is on the one side a part of nature, he on the other side rises above nature; and it is in the "critical and judicial" view which man is able to take of "the impulsive and sentient life" that consists "that Conscience which distinguishes man from the animal creation, and opens to him the gates of the moral life, which are forever closed to it."

The distinction between Hedonism and Eudæmonism is a legitimate one, and possibly the latter is as good a name as Mr. Seth could have adopted by which to designate the system here unfolded. It might perhaps with equal justice be designated modified Intuitionalism or modified Idealism. That is to say, the idea of obligation might be regarded as intuitive, though the particular virtues be not so regarded. Or, looked at with reference to the End or Ideal, we might hold that obligation is included in the given Ideal. In either case the feeling of obligation would be a part of man's nature, which is Seth's position. And in either case we have still to give a farther explanation of this idea of Oughtness. As Prof. Seth shows in regard to the "moral principles" of the Intuitionists that though they may be to us "necessary and irresistible," yet the farther question remains as to their objective basis and validity, since otherwise it might be shown that they are intuitive only in the sense of being instinctive (pp. 185, 187); so here, this "inner demand" of our nature requires not only to be recognized as a psychological fact, but to be validated by giving it an objective basis. Thus inevitably we are led into the region of metaphysics. Accordingly, in Part iii, the author discusses the Metaphysical Implications of Morality. It is in this regard especially that Prof. Seth's book is superior to Mackenzie's *Manual of Ethics*. These two books, Seth's and Mackenzie's, while not pretending to give as exhaustive a treatment of the subject as some of the larger works, furnish the most pleasantly written and readable presentation of it with which we are acquainted. But Mackenzie seems to us after all to leave the feeling of obligation hanging in midair. If this is not the fault of his system, but comes rather from his endeavor to write an ethic apart from metaphysics, it at least shows the impossible nature of that undertaking. We may perhaps question whether Prof. Seth would not have done better to bring in the metaphysical aspect of his subject earlier in the discussion instead of leaving it till the last, since, as he very forcibly shows, it is so fundamental to the whole. We become impatient to know the *why* as well as the *what* of Moral Obligation, not only the content but the ultimate basis of the moral life. Possibly merely as a matter of arrangement it might have been better to finish with the discussion of the Moral Ideal before taking up

the subject of the Moral Life. There is, however, this great advantage to be noted in the method pursued, viz., that we thus become more and more conscious of the incomplete foundation laid in the psychological discussion, and becoming more and more convinced of the need of a Metaphysics of Ethics we eagerly look forward to what is the real ground-work of the system. Prof. Seth here stands on high theistic ground. He believes in the moral government of the universe, and ultimately rests man's morality upon it. Of the three chapters, all of them admirable, which compose the third and concluding "part" of the book, and which deal with the Kantian trinity of Freedom, God and Immortality, the second chapter, on the Problem of God, is superb. In these chapters Prof. Seth rises to the height of his speculative power, and not only ably criticises the naturalistic and pantheistic theories of the universe in regard to their bearing on morality, but also lays deep the foundations of his own system. It is here especially that his solution of the ethical problem proves its superiority to the solution of the Absolute Idealists. They too would say that the existence of the Ideal carries with it the obligation to realize it. But when asked the question, Why?—when asked, on what this obligation rests—they can have no answer, not only having taken away the ethical postulates of Freedom, God and Immortality, but having likewise robbed us of that separate and perdurable Personality on which these postulates rest. Prof. Seth, on the contrary, converts our "faith" in a Moral Ideal into "rational insight" by showing its "certificate of birth." This certificate witnesses to the divine origin of the Moral Ideal. "The secret of the power of the Moral Ideal is the conviction which it carries with it that it is no mere Ideal, but the expression, more or less perfect, of the supreme Reality; that 'the rule of right, the symmetries of character, the requirements of perfection, are no provincialisms of this planet; they are known among the stars; they reign beyond Orion and the Southern Cross; they are wherever the Universal Spirit is.'" "We are self-legislative; but we reënact the law already enacted by God; we recognize, rather than constitute, the law of our own being. The moral law is the echo within our souls of the voice of the Eternal, 'whose offspring we are.'"

Where fine passages so abound it is not easy to deny one's self the pleasure of quoting at length. But we must now bring this very inadequate notice to a close, though we have entirely omitted to speak of Part ii, which, under the title of "The Moral Life," treats of virtues and duties, both individual and social. We should have liked also to call attention to two or three minor points in regard to which Prof. Seth does not carry our judgment; but these are of comparatively slight importance, a few sand grains in the marble, and on the whole we know of no book on ethics that so nearly expresses our own position. If Scotland is to be congratulated on having produced two such brilliant representatives of modified Hegelianism as the brothers Caird, she is not less to be congratulated on producing in the brothers Seth two such able exponents of a sounder philosophy—one which, while assimilating the best elements of Idealism, yet contends for the distinction between the finite and the Infinite Self, and ultimately bases morality upon the relation existing between them.

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THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS. By BORDEN P. BOWNE, Professor of Philosophy in Boston University. New York: Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square, 1892. 12mo, pp. 309.

In this volume Prof. Bowne first endeavors to settle the long-standing dispute between systems of theoretical ethics by combining what he regards as

the two best systems, and then discusses the relations of ethical theory to religion and to the individual and the social life of man. The systems which he compares, and on which his own views are based, he distinguishes as the "goods ethics" and the "duty ethics," the former being the most approved form of utilitarianism and that according to which all right conduct is explained as various forms of beneficence, and the latter being that intuitional theory in which no attempt is made to reduce right actions to an internal unity of essence beyond what is expressed in the assertion that they are all right and obligatory.

"The goods ethics," says Prof. Bowne (p. 79), "claims that material rightness is determined by relation to well-being and that our duty is to find and follow this material rightness. Formal rightness, or virtue, is simply the will to realize this material rightness so far as we apprehend it. But this claim is entirely compatible with the intuitive perception of the validity of certain formal principles. The goods ethics may even admit the system of intuitive principles and claim only to find their rational ground and to criticise their application."

The position thus assumed by Prof. Bowne is a strong one and is very consistently and ingeniously maintained throughout his treatise. After arguing that the question why we believe a certain course of conduct to be right, as distinguished from the question *how* we come to believe it right, must be determined according to "its tendency known or believed in to promote well-being" (p. 30), he shows that the conception of good as used in morals is an extremely comprehensive one, that "the ideal good is conscious life in the full development of all its normal possibilities" (p. 69), and then notes that this conception is so general and indefinite that no human mind has ever found it sufficient as a practical guide and rule. He rejects that utilitarianism which he calls "the calculating ethics" (p. 81), and declares that in order to discover what things are right and good "we have to fall back on some form of moral insight" (p. 98).

This intuition manifests itself in two ways, the first of these being the use and assertion of the ideas of "duty and obligation," obligation here signifying obligatedness and duty being that to which we are obligated. Prof. Bowne agreeing with the intuitionalists holds that the idea of moral obligation is something absolutely simple; and he teaches that it is a relation which the soul perceives between itself and right ends or actions, or between itself and its capabilities of desiring right ends and of performing right actions. "Moral goodness does not consist in conforming to human laws or opinions, or even to divine law, except as they are believed to conform to righteousness" (p. 100). "Externally we may have commands and prohibitions enforced by rewards and penalties, but the idea of obligation refuses to coalesce with these" (p. 102). According to our conceptions nothing could be truer than these teachings respecting moral obligation.

The second way in which the human mind shows a power of moral intuition appears in the production and use of an ideal of life and character. This ideal has a universal element which does not admit of doubt or change, according to which the good will, that is the will and disposition to do good, is set forth as obligatory and of good desert, and the evil will is condemned as evil and of bad desert. But there is also another element, "highly variable and uncertain in comparison with the former," setting forth "the ideal of human perfection towards which the individual should strive" (p. 112).

The changeableness and weakness of man's conceptions of what he should be and do, and the error and distortion which frequently affect them are ascribed by Dr. Bowne to the imperfect and varied development of human nature. Hence the differences in the moral views of the savage and of the

civilized man, of the heathen and of the Christian. But he maintains that every mind has an ideal, "only partially grasped and gradually evolving, yet the court of appeal concerning what is morally right. "For the authority of this ideal there is no warrant but the soul itself, just as for the truths of the pure intellect there is no warrant but the soul itself."

This teaching concerning the intuition of an ideal is not so satisfactory as that concerning the intuition of our obligation to choose and pursue what is good and right. Beyond doubt different men and different tribes of men form varying and even conflicting ideals of conduct and appeal to them as rules of life; but are these in the strict and proper sense *intuitional?* Do they not lack the marks of original, independent and absolute intuitions? To us they are merely moral conceptions formed by rational beings under the recurring necessities and exigencies of their daily experience. Like other products of reason, they are liable to imperfection and error. They can be called intuitive only in an improper sense and because they do not originate in the speculative exercise of reason but are evolved from the spontaneous and habitual judgments of men in individual cases.

The general impression made on the mind of one who has read Dr. Bowne's book with some care is that the author is an earnest and well-balanced thinker who has a keen sense of the difficulties and requirements of a philosophical question and who shows both ingenuity and judgment in offering solutions. His thought, which is generally, if not always, in the right direction, is a fine illustration of what may be called the eclectic and constructive style of philosophizing. Many prefer this method to any other. We think that more satisfactory results are attainable by that scrutinizing and careful process of analysis and generalization which begins with individual or specific instances and which evolves general principles and laws from these without any—or with very little—assistance from ingenious conjecture. In order to reach absolutely reliable conceptions of the right, of the good, of the relations to one another of these two great ends of rational pursuit, and of the specific nature and proper spheres of the different modes of human duty, there is need of a more searching analysis and of a more methodical generalization than we have found in the pages of Prof. Bowne. As a series of philosophical essays, the chapters of Prof. Bowne's book will be found readable and instructive. The style is clear, forcible, piquant, and, though somewhat more subdued than that of his earlier writings, shows also an increased elegance. One frequently meets with bright, sparkling sentences which might serve for apothegms and which show both the keen moral sense of the author and his knowledge of human nature. In the latter part of the book, also, the practical judgment of Prof. Bowne is admirably employed in discussing questions respecting individual, social and political morality.

*New York.* EDWARD JOHN HAMILTON.

*A History of Philosophy.* With especial Reference to the Formation and Development of its Problems and Conceptions. By Dr. W. Windelband, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Strassburg. Authorized Translation by James H. Tufts, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the University of Chicago. 8vo, pp. xiii, 659. (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893.) Prof. Tufts was led to translate Prof. Windelband's *History of Philosophy*, which appeared in its original form in 1892, by the conviction that its method fitted it in a very high degree to serve as a text-book for those students of the history of thought who desired aid in "singling out the important problems, tracing their development, disentangling their complications and sifting out what is of permanent value." What is peculiar in

Dr. Windelband's method is already adverted to in the title: he has attempted not a history of philosophers but a history of philosophy; what he has essayed is not to discuss the various systems which the several philosophers have developed, in their chronological sequence, but to trace the formation and development of philosophical problems and conceptions. Such a task as this is obviously one of extreme utility and of extreme difficulty. For its successful accomplishment, there would be required a learning which should hold at easy command all the details of the history of thought, a historical sense, critical ability, impartiality of mind of the first order, and a speculative power capable of standing above all the systems and estimating the contributions which each has made to the knowledge of the truth. As to how far Prof. Windelband has succeeded in his great task, opinions will differ, and will differ partly, of course, according as Prof. Windelband's own system commends itself to each; for, naturally, such a history of philosophy becomes more or less a history of its author's own philosophy. But none will fail to allow that Prof. Windelband's learning is equal to the strain he has put upon it or that the book is distinctly a successful one and is full of stimulus and light for the reader. Possibly the chapter on Kant is the most satisfactory single chapter: while those on the philosophic thought of the Fathers and Schoolmen and of the Renascence are unusually full and interesting.——*Ethic*, etc.; translated from the Latin of *Benedict de Spinoza*. By W. Hale White. Translation Revised by Amelia Hutchinson Stirling, M.A. [Edin.] Second Edition, Revised and Corrected, with New Preface. 8vo, pp. cv, 297. (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.) Mr. White's lovingly exact translation of this treatise of Spinoza's appeared first some dozen years ago (1883). What was as nearly perfect before as translations often get to be, has been still more perfected by the pious care which he and Miss Hutchinson Stirling have devoted to it since. The new Preface, which extends to a hundred pages, is really a comprehensive and sympathetic essay on Spinoza's philosophy, although Mr. White declines the task of "connecting Spinoza with metaphysics before and after"—partly because he does not feel sufficiently acquainted with the details of the history of thonght, partly because he does not feel that he knows even Spinoza to perfection, and partly because he thinks Spinoza would himself have preferred "to rest his claim to attention mainly upon his *Ethic* strictly so called." He has made of it, at all events, a most helpful volume.——*An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, and an Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, by David Hume.* Reprinted from the Posthumous Edition of 1777, and Edited, with an Introduction, Comparative Tables of Contents, and an Analytical Index, by L. A. Selby-Bigge, M.A., Fellow and Lecturer of University College. 12mo, pp. xi, 349. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.) Mr. Selby-Bigge's excellent edition of Hume's early *Treatise on Human Nature*, which was published in 1888, is here followed by an equally excellent edition of two of those "pieces" which their author put forth in later life as a substitute for "that juvenile work which the Author never acknowledged," with the expressed desire that henceforth "the following pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles." Scholarly opinion has always been divided as to what should be made of these declarations: some have taken the author at his word and ignored the earlier *Treatise:* others, among whom are to be numbered the late Mr. T. H. Green and Mr. Selby-Bigge himself, practically look upon the *Treatise* alone as being Hume. "To ignore the *Treatise*," says Mr. Selby-Bigge, "is to deprive Hume of his place among the great thinkers of Europe." He would not have the *Treatise* neglected, then; nor would he have these *Enquiries* entirely forgotten.

That they may be the better understood, he has printed here, as Introduction, an extended comparison between the two, which is very well done indeed and will enable the student to read either in the light of the other. The whole book is a model of its kind.——*Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy and especially of His Logic.* By William Wallace, M.A., LL.D., Fellow of Merton College, Oxford, and Whyte Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Second Editiou, Revised and Augmented. 12mo, pp. xix, 477. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.)——*Hegel's Philosophy of Mind.* Translated from *The Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*, with Five Introductory Essays. By William Wallace, M.A., LL.D., etc. 12mo, pp. ix, 202. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.) Prof. Wallace has solved the problem of making Hegel intelligible. It is safe to call his translations simply perfect. The translation to the *Logic* appeared as long ago as 1874, accompanied with Prolegomena which have been enlarged in this second edition to the compass of the goodly volume mentioned above, while the translation itself (1892, 2d ed.) now occupies a separate volume. The translation of the *Philosophy of Mind* now appears for the first time, while the intermediate section of the *Encyclopædia* is in the meanwhile passed over—one ventures to hope only for the meanwhile, despite Prof. Wallace's present declination of the task. The Prolegomena to the *Logic* and the introductory essays to the *Philosophy of Mind* make admirable reading; and if they seem a little touched with that peculiarly Oxford spirit best exemplified by Dr. Jowett (the Prolegomena are dedicated to Dr. Jowett's memory), which seemed to indulge in philosophy only for its "culture value," they certainly do nearly all that is possible in the way of mediating Hegel to coutemporary thought. The two volumes may be recommended as one of the best extant introductious to the study of Hegel.——*The Ethics of Hegel.* Translated Selections from his *Rechtsphilosophie*, with an Iutroduction. By J. MacBride Sterrett, D.D., Professor of Philosophy in the Columbian University, Washington, D. C. Author of *Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion*, etc. 12mo, pp. 12, 216. (Boston: Ginn & Company, 1893.) This little book is the second volume of an "Ethical Series" edited by Prof. Sneath of Yale, and is designed for use in undergraduate instruction and study in colleges. The plan is to give selections from the great modern treatises on ethics, with explanatory and critical notes. Dr. Sterrett's volume seems to fulfill the requirements of the series very well. The Introduction consists of a biographical sketch and an exposition of the relation of Hegel's *Ethics* to previous ethical thought as well as an exposition of Hegel's *Ethics*.——*Aspects of Pessimism.* By R. M. Wenley, M.A., D.Sc., Lecturer in Philosophy in Queen Margaret College, Glasgow, etc. 12mo, pp. x, 337. (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1894.) Dr. Wenley has collected here certain essays previously published, and, largely adding to them, has made a volume with a sufficient unity to justify their publication together. The topics treated are "Jewish Pessimism—in Job and Koheleth;" "Mediæval Pessimism as an Attendant on Mysticism;" "Hamlet;" "The Pessimistic Element in Goethe;" "Berkeley, Kant and Schopenhauer;" and "Pessimism as a System—as seen in Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann." The author's style is not always clear-cut and precise, but his thought is ordinarily accessible and the volume constitutes a welcome desultory discussion of one of the dark shadows of human thought.——*Three Lectures on the Vedânta Philosophy*, delivered at the Royal Iustitution in March, 1894. By F. Max Müller, K.M., Member of the French Institute. 8vo, pp. 173. (London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1894.) These delightful lectures are written with all of Prof.

Müller's easy command of the subject and graceful pleasantness, almost playfulness, of style. Some critics apparently mistake this popular presentation for shallowness or inaccuracy. Nothing could be less the fact. This exposition of the Vedânta philosophy is as exact as it is charming, and is clearest and most careful just where the difficulties become greatest, as, *e. g.*, when a *précis* of Sankara's analysis of subject and object is given (p. 61, *sq.*). We have not been able to feel the sympathy for the Vedânta which Prof. Müller does. Based on metempsychosis and reaching out to absorption into the abyss of Being, it offers nothing which can comfort or strengthen in this world of trial and labor. It sounds very nice when Prof. Müller gives its quintessence as: "Brahman is true, the world is false, man's soul is Brahman and nothing else," and then translates this into, "God is true, the world is fleeting, man's soul is God and nothing else." But we care neither to know Brahman nor to be Brahman, when Brahman turns out to be only a well-nigh attributeless abyss of Being.——*The Elements of Metaphysics.* Being a Guide for Lectures and Private Use. By Dr. Paul Deussen, Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy at the University of Kiel, Germany. Translated from the Second German Edition, with the Personal Collaboration of the Author. By C. M. Duff. With an Appendix . . . . on the *Philosophy of the Vedânta*, etc. 12mo, pp. xxiv, 337. (London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.) Schopenhauer, whom Ruskin in 1853 called "the last most ingenious and most venomous of German philosophers," turned, as is well known, with deep sympathy to the Vedânta philosophy. "In the whole world," Prof. Müller quotes him as saying, "there is no study so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Upanishads. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death." Prof. Deussen is, in this, the true follower of Schopenhauer; it has been said that the Vedânta is to him the gospel and Schopenhauer its prophet and expounder. As he himself expresses his attitude, he finds the reconciliation of all contradictions in "the idealism founded by Kant and wrought out to perfection by his disciple, Schopenhauer." The exceptionally clear and attractive presentation of this philosophy which is given us in this volume in an exceptionally clear and attractive English translation, was first published in 1877, and appeared in its second German edition in 1890. It is in effect a systematic attempt to elucidate the philosophy of Schopenhauer by means of exhaustive oriental learning. The keynote of the message it brings is found in the one word *denial:* it is by denial that we find reality and morality; and it is by denial of the will to live that we discover life. "And so the Vedânta," Prof. Deussen says in the address published in the Appendix, "is the strongest support of pure morality, is the greatest consolation in the sufferings of life and death—Indians keep to it!" That is to say, prefer it to the Christian substitute now offered you. It is one of the phenomena of the day that Indian pantheism is preferred to Christian theism: and this is one of the teachers who advance it.——*Primer of Philosophy.* By Dr. Paul Carus. 12mo, pp. vi, 232. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1893.)——*Our Need of Philosophy.* An Appeal to the American People. By Dr. Paul Carus. An Address delivered on August 24, 1893, before the World's Congress of Philosophy at Chicago, Ill. 12mo, pp. 14. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1893.)——*The Philosophy of the Tool.* By Dr. Paul Carus. A Lecture delivered on Tuesday, July 18, 1893, before the Department of Manual and Art Education of the World's Congress Auxiliary. 12mo, pp. 24. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1893.) Dr. Paul Carus, the editor of the quarterly journal called *The Monist*, and of the weekly journal called *The Open Court*, finds time amid his editorial labors to write and publish quite voluminously on his favorite topics of monistic philosophy and the

resultant monistic religion. His journals are admirably edited and supply probably the best American sources of information as to the trends of thought in the circles which they represent. With them and his books and pamphlets he has gradually acquired in his adopted land quite an enviable influence. The two lectures named above are excellent examples of his best popular manner. The one is an eloquent plea for philosophic thought in America, and for the formation of an American philosophy "as broad as the world and worthy of the lofty humanitarianism of the founders of our country." The other is a development of the idea of the tool and the relations of thought to the use of instruments, running up into the relations of science and philosophy and of both to religion. This last is Dr. Carus' characteristic theme and finds a systematic expression in his *Primer of Philosophy*. Here the spirit of mediation rules: and we have an attempt to set forth, in simple form, the monistic conception of the universe as the solvent of all difficulties and the harmonizer of all contradictions. Dr. Carus' methods are far removed from the bluff self-assertion of writers like Ernst Hæckel: but beneath his smoother periods and soothing remarks there reigns a conception of the universe—of God, the soul, immortality—not essentially different from Hæckel's.——*Compte, Mill, and Spencer: An Outline of Philosophy.* By John Watson, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Queen's College, Kingston, Canada, etc. 12mo, pp. xx, 303. (Glasgow: James Maclehose & Son; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.) Dr. Watson's little book is really an "Outline of Philosophy" in accordance with its second title, and is designed to supply for philosophy as a whole the same kind of general outline that is now accessible in abundance for psychology and ethics. The first half of the title indicates the method of the book: it is critical as well as constructive. "Partly out of respect for their eminence, and partly as a means of orientation, I have examined certain views of Compte, Mill, and Spencer—and also, I may add, of Darwin and Kant—which appear to me inadequate." As is well known, Dr. Watson's philosophical creed is what he calls "Intellectual Idealism," by which he means, he says, "that we are capable of knowing Reality, as it actually is, and that Reality, when so known, is absolutely rational." His affiliation thus is with the late T. C. Green and Edward Caird.——*Basal Concepts in Philosophy.* An Inquiry into Being, Non-Being, and Becoming. By Alexander T. Ormond, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Princeton University. 12mo, pp. viii, 308. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894.) A notice of Dr. Ormond's notable book by Dr. James Iverach, published in *The Critical Review of Theological and Philosophical Literature* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, Vol. iv, 380), so fully expresses just what we should wish to say of it, that we transfer it substantially to our pages.

"The problem of Prof. Ormond's book may be briefly stated thus: How does the creative energy of the Absolute fall short of an absolute result, and only produces the finite and imperfect? . . . . Whether we think that the solution is adequate, or that it is not, certainly all competent readers will agree that in Prof. Ormond we have found a metaphysician of the highest order. He is learned in the history of philosophy; he has made himself acquainted with the great systems of philosophy; and his speculative power and insight are not hampered or hindered by his learning. Sometimes, indeed, our attention is diverted from the main issue, by the keenness of the criticism bestowed on some of the great systems, and by the brilliancy of the sections in which Prof. Ormond sums up the trend and tendency of philosophic thought. We know nothing more brilliant than the few pages in which he touches 'the mountain peaks of speculation, ancient and modern.'"

Every reader of Prof. Ormond's book will set his seal to this cordial praise. We find ourselves in accord also with Dr. Iverach's critical remarks on the main problem:

"How, then, does Prof. Ormond proceed 'to ground rationally the sphere of relativity in the

Absolute?' We have found this to be the hardest part of the book. Prof. Ormond thinks that Hegel made a great step when he restored the Negative as a necessary philosophical datum. His own position consists in a more thorough restoration of the Negative. . . . . It is well to get acquainted with a Negative which can produce such positive results, and can so hamper the Absolute 'that it can produce no other than a relative result.' But what is it when we do meet with it? . . . . This Non-being which is negative on all sides has so much reality that it causes the Absolute to produce only a relative result. As for ourselves, we find the transition from the Non-being and the Negative to the functions which they play in Prof. Ormond's system to be absolutely unthinkable. We can only say so, and let the matter alone."

——*John Stuart Mill.* A Study of His Philosophy. By Charles Douglas, M.A., D.Sc., Lecturer in Moral Philosophy, and Assistant to the Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. 12mo, pp. xv, 274. (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1895.) Dr. Douglas rightly describes his able and interesting little book as aiming rather "to examine some ideas which underlie Mill's work," than "to give a summary of his opinions, or a detailed account of his contributions to the philosophical sciences." Herein lies its value. It traces the roots of Mill's thinking to Kant, Hume, Berkeley, Locke, DesCartes: and it exhibits the efflorescence of his theory of knowledge into the complex of his philosophical doctrines. The book is calculated for a usefulness much beyond the exposition of a single system: it will illustrate in a very pointed way the importance of psychology in the development of philosophical systems and of philosophical thought.——*Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory.* A Treatise of the Phenomena, Laws and Development of Human Mental Life. By George Trumbull Ladd, Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. 8vo, pp. xiii, 676. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894.)——*Primer of Psychology.* By George Trumbull Ladd, etc. 12mo, pp. xv, 224. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894.)——*Philosophy of Mind.* An Essay in the Metaphysics of Psychology. By George Trumbull Ladd, etc. 8vo, pp. xiv, 414. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895.) In these noteworthy volumes Dr. Ladd presumably completes his comprehensive series of text-books on psychological science. The series it will be remembered included, along with the members of it mentioned above, also a fuller and a more elementary treatise on physiological psychology—the *Elements of Physiological Psychology* (1887) and the *Outlines of Physiological Psychology* (1891). Taken together, this is a remarkable series of volumes, probably the most notably complete contribution to the text-book literature of psychology made as yet by any American author. The general philosophical affiliation of Prof. Ladd with the eclecticism of Lotze, and his general psychological affiliation with the school of Wundt, are well known and receive new illustration from the books now before us: but so also does the essential independence of his thinking and his industrious determination to work his own way through the problems of his science. The volumes at present before us include the following treatises: a very comprehensive descriptive and explanatory Psychology, which is designed "to give a clear, accurate and comprehensive picture of the mental life of the individual man, and also to explain this life as it appears in the light of *all* the resources of modern psychological science and with the idea of '*development*' constantly kept in mind;" a brief primer of descriptive psychology, which "aims to narrate some of the more obvious facts and principles known to modern scientific psychology in an orderly but wholly untechnical way;" and an attempt at a speculative treatment of certain metaphysical problems which are "suggested but not usually discussed in the course of a thorough empirical study of mental phenomena"—problems concerning "the real nature and relations to the external world, and especially to the body, of that subject of all the phenomena, which we are accustomed to call the mind." What this "subject of all the phenomena is," in Dr. Ladd's view,

we scarcely learn with perfect explicitness: and we are not quite sure that "the soul" means the same to him in his *Physiological Psychology* and in his *Philosophy of Mind.* But at all events, he has a good deal to say about this "subject of phenomena"—a good deal that is constructive and valuable; and perhaps we ought not to complain even of human agents from whom we get much that is good, if we sometimes get also somewhat that we must account evil. And certainly no one will consult Dr. Ladd's psychological books without profit.——*The Psychology of Attention.* By Th. Ribot, Professor of Comparative and Experimental Psychology in the Collège de France. Authorized Translation (second, revised edition). 12mo, pp. vi, 115. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1894.)——*The Diseases of Personality.* By Th. Ribot, etc. Authorized Translation. 12mo, pp. iii, 157. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1894.)——*The Diseases of the Will.* By Th. Ribot, etc. Authorized Translation from the Eighth French Edition, by Merwin-Marie Snell. 12mo, pp. vi, 134. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1894.)——*The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms.* A Study in Experimental Psychology. By Alfred Binet. Authorized Translation. 12mo, pp. xii, 120. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1894.) Here we have several treatises by the two leading French masters in empirical psychology in an excellent English dress. All the translations issued by the "Open Court Publishing Co." are indeed of admirable quality. Two of the treatises belong, as will be seen, to the department of psychical pathology. All reflect the empiricism which in both hemispheres rules the psychological thought of the day. "It is a psychology," says Dr. James Iverach somewhere, "which builds largely on physiology, which explores the nervous system for physical concomitants for psychological events, which is great in the cross-examination of babies, and of late years has dealt largely with the possible experiences of the primitive man. It is great on the natural history of man, especially in the growing period of babyhood, youth and early manhood. It is always of opinion that a process of becoming explains the result." It is a psychology, it may be added, which has little or no use for a soul: beginning at the periphery it does not know how to get to the centre, and has fallen to doubting (when it does not openly deny it) whether there be any centre of unity for the several strands of "feeling."——*Leib und Seele bei Fechner und Lotze, als Vertretern zweier massgebenden Weltanschauungen.* Von Dr. Theodor Simon, Schlosspfarrer in Gottbus. 8vo, pp. 118. (Göttingen: Vandenhœck und Ruprecht, 1894.) This treatise opens with a few introductory words, outlining the history of its problem up to to-day, and then sets itself to a thorough comparison of the teaching of Lotze and Fechner for the matter in hand. To this, first an exposition of the teaching of each is given; and then they are compared under the rubrics, "Anatomical Physiological Considerations" and "Metaphysical Considerations." The author's sympathies are with Fechner.——*An Introduction to Comparative Psychology.* By C. Lloyd Morgan, Principal of University College, Bristol. With Diagrams. 12mo, pp. xiv, 382. (London: Walter Scott; New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894.) Since the death of Mr. Romanes, no English writer is left us who can speak with more authority on the psychic life of animals than Mr. C. Lloyd Morgan, the accomplished author of *Animal Life and Intelligence.* In the present book he subjects the relation of the psychology of man to that of the higher animals to a very thorough discussion, illuminated by a great body of illustrative examples. His standpoint is that of evolution, inclusive of psychical phenomena. Even so, however, he does not find that the line of evolution is as yet unbrokenly traceable. He does not find the perception of relations or the exercise of the faculty of reason in any animal except man: and enunciates the conclusion that no

other animal has "reached that stage of mental evolution at which they are even incipiently rational." The book is, in this whole line of investigation, an important contribution to science. In its incidental discussion of the theory of consciousness, on the other hand, and the metaphysical foundation, we cannot look upon it as possessing much value.——*The Elements of Ethics.* By James H. Hyslop, Ph.D., Instructor in Ethics, Columbia College, New York. Author of *The Elements of Logic.* 8vo, pp. vii, 470. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895.) This strong book is apparently designed as a text-book, and has taken form and method of presentation from that design. It is nevertheless an especially full and thorough discussion of the elements of ethics. The method is the analytical one, and the analytical process is pushed very far indeed. The strongest chapters are those on the "Freedom of the Will," in which the author stands for the power of alternative choice under the name of *velleity;* on "The Nature and Origin of Conscience," in which he defends a nativistic theory, which recognizes an original power of distinguishing right and wrong, but not of particular acts; and on "The Nature of Morality," where he attempts a synthesis of his own. Dr. Hyslop writes fluently and with confidence in his conclusions; the book makes good reading; and though we cannot look upon it as the last word on the problems it discusses, nor always indeed as headed in the right direction, no one will fail to derive both stimulus and instruction from it.——*Dualism and Monism and Other Essays.* By John Veitch, M.A., Hon. LL.D. (Edin.), Late Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow. With an Introduction by R. M. Wenley, M.A., D.Sc., etc. 12mo, pp. xlii, 221. (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons.) This interesting booklet appears as the second series of the lamented author's *Essays in Philosophy.* It contains three papers. The first of these defends the "philosophy of common-sense" by means of a searching criticism of the Phenomenal Monadism taught by Prof. Dauriac in his *Croyance et Réalité.* The second is a fragment on History and the History of Philosophy, originally designed as the opening chapter of an extended work on the history of Greek Philosophy "with special reference to the theory that the history of philosophy is a record of 'progress by antagonism.'" The third is a previously published paper on the Theism of Wordsworth. Dr. Wenley has prefixed an extremely interesting sketch of Prof. Veitch's position in philosophy—as *ultimus Scotorum:* but the reading of his criticism of phenomenalism leads one to hope that his final words for realism will not fail to bear much fruit.

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## VIII.—GENERAL LITERATURE.

THE LIFE AND WORK OF JOHN RUSKIN. By W. G. COLLINGWOOD, M.A., Editor of *The Poems of John Ruskin.* With Portraits and other Illustrations. In Two Volumes. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1893. 8vo, p. xiv, vi, 565, and Appendices, pp. xxi and xxxi.

The bookmaker's art has exhausted its powers on these two beautiful volumes. Paper, type, page, illustrations, all conspire to put into the reader's hands a book which it is a delight to handle and to read. Mr. Ruskin himself, we are told, has been wont to be "extremely particular" about the material dress in which his writings were presented to the public, and "knows how to calculate the effect on the reader of the look of his work in print." His letters to his publishers discuss the size of the page, and the "delightful

type," and suggest that "a quarter inch off this page would look better;" he was even made ill once by the division of a word at the end of a line! Well, even his fastidiousness would be satisfied by the look of these volumes: perhaps he has lent his advice to the details in this case too, or Mr. Collingwood has imbibed his taste.

Mr. Collingwood, in his long and intimate association with Mr. Ruskin, has enjoyed exceptional opportunities for knowing him—for knowing the life that he has led, the things he has done, the man that he is. The sketch he has given us bears everywhere traces of this intimate knowledge. But that it may not disappoint, it must be judged strictly by what it proposes. Mr. Collingwood warns us beforehand not to expect in it "The Life and Friends of John Ruskin," or his "Life and Times." He adds that it is "intended neither as an apology nor as a criticism," and that it is meant to record only "the story of a noble life and the main issues of a great man's work." Within these limits it is a thoroughly successful book. The reader will desiderate here and there more definite facts: he feels at times that just those details are kept from him which he needs in order to appreciate or even understand Mr. Ruskin's character or action. But he reads the book from beginning to end with unbroken pleasure, and rises from it with a better understanding and a higher appreciation of Mr. Ruskin, the man, and of his aims and of his work than he had before.

What an enthusiastic, perfervid genius he has been—full of contradictions, but only of such contradictions as arise from the generous impulses of an essentially great and genial mind. The picture given of him by the *Oxford University Herald* is a true one—but a one-sided one. "The intensity of his own perceptions always gave him difficulty in receiving any knowledge from others, and it has taken the form of subjectivity or egotism. He is unable to endure authority on any subject, or even to accept testimony. His life has been spoiled by his continual attempts to substitute a Christianity of his own for the Church of England; he has his own political economy; he has systematized an excellent botany of his own, a mineralogy of his own, a geology of his own; he has driven himself frantic by conducting a magazine of his own; he has separated himself from everybody whose mind is not a minute copy of his own." His chivalric enthusiasms—for Turner, for the Pre-Raphaelites, for Kate Greenaway and Francesca Alexander—must be borne in mind to correct and condition such a description. But with such allowances it seems to be just. Mr. Ruskin is one of the great prophets of our day. But his mission has been to compel attention to neglected sides of truth. His usefulness has therefore been as a stimulant rather than as a leader.

One of the lines of movement in this life, which Mr. Collingwood's story enables us to trace, dimly but instructively, is the driftage of Mr. Ruskin's religious thought and life. Beginning with a sound evangelicalism, his religious tendencies have drifted back and forward with his enthusiasms, now towards Roman splendor, now towards skeptical coldness: the shock of some fancied Waldensian bigotry upsets him now (p. 255), and now he is brought measurably back to his moorings by the influence of Miss Alexander and the simple piety of the Protestant "brethren" in Florence under Pastor Rossetti's teaching (p. 521). It is always, however, an "artistic feeling" in religion that sways him: and it is apparently the "sincerity and simplicity" rather than the truth of Mr. Rossetti and his band of "outcast Protestants" which impress him, and aid so powerfully in leading him back from the wildernesses of thought and doubt, if "not to the fold of the Church," yet "to the footstool of the Father."

*Princeton.* BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

*Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan.* By Lafcadio Hearn. In Two Volumes. 8vo, pp. x, 699. (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1894.) Mr. Lafcadio Hearn appears to have been favored with unusual opportunities to observe the unfamiliar Japan of the unsophisticated Japanese people themselves, as distinguished from the Occidentalized classes: and he is certainly endowed with unusual power to commit all that he has seen to a page which, under his magic touch, is not dead, but a living thing. We read his vivid and richly wrought descriptions with uncloyed delight, and we rise from the last page only regretful that the feast is over. Nearly every side of Japanese character, and nearly every sphere of Japanese effort, are brought before us, as the author generously makes us sharers in his acquirements, his experiences and his impressions. Even popular Japanese heathenism has awakened in him a sympathetic thrill. Mr. Hearn is a modern humanist, and like his forerunners of the Renaissance he is very much of a pagan in his religious outlook. Only, as it was the glad gods of Greece which filled their hearts with an old-world delight, with him it is the lighter and kindlier superstitions of a people whom we may in some aspects call the Greeks of Asia. This is what his boasted Agnosticism amounts to. His eyes are holden that he cannot see aright in the sphere of spiritual things, and he therefore allows himself to call Christianity "a faith far more irrational than Buddhism." But though his anger against the God of Truth, whom he professes not to know, blinds him to the things of the other life, and leads him to declare with warm irrationality that "Japan has nothing whatever to gain by conversion to Christianity, either morally or otherwise, but very much to lose"—fortunately for us, he is awake to the beautiful things of this life and knows how to bring them home with him and lay them before us in a bewitching way. The publishers have given his pictures a fittingly attractive frame: two prettier volumes it would be difficult to find.——*My Summer in a Mormon Village.* By Florence A. Merriam. 16mo, pp. 171. (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1894.) Everybody has been delighted by the authoress' little book for children, *Birds Through an Opera Glass*, and will turn to this new booklet, prepared to read its chit-chatty pages with a quiet enjoyment. No one will be disappointed. There is no attempt to analyze Mormonism or to estimate its social results. But the daily experiences of one who spent a summer in a Mormon village on an errand alien to studies in theology or sociology, are jotted down simply and with a very pleasing effect. The human side of village life is vividly realized, and we are made to feel the common humanity which emerges through whatever crust of strange religions and customs. The book will be useful not only to one who would spend an idle hour pleasantly, but also to any one who would realize how a touch of nature keeps all the world kin.——*The Rights and Duties of Citizens of the United States.* A Manual of Citizenship. By Dr. Edward C. Mann. 12mo, pp. vi, 143. (New York, Chicago and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell & Co., 1894.) The idea of this little book and the object it sets before itself are certainly most excellent. Dr. Mann's notion is that "the scholars in our public schools and colleges should be instructed as to the elements that go to make up a good and useful citizen of our country, and the obligations, civil, social and political, due to others from them:" and he has attempted "to present a systematic course of instruction" to that end. The book is full of enthusiasm and earnestness: but does not seem to us very well adapted for a text-book.

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