THE

PRINCETON REVIEW.

By Whom, all things; for Whom, all things.

FIFTY-EIGHTH YEAR.

JANUARY—JUNE.

NEW YORK.
1882.

JANUARY.

MARCH.

MAY.

JULY.

SEPTEMBER.

NOVEMBER.

FUTURE PAPER MONEY OF THIS COUNTRY.

THE people of this country want a sound paper currency, in a supply as ample as consists with its soundness and instant convertibility into coin for its face. If there were no stronger reason for this, the habit of using it has mastered them.

This habit, however, is due to reasons which are intrinsic and weighty. They will insure its general use in the long-run, all demonstrations of doctrinaires to the contrary notwithstanding. It is far safer and more convenient than coin, even if it be gold, which is some sixteen times more convenient than silver, except for fractional currency. If lost or destroyed, there is no absolute destruction of property. A piece of paper has been lost; the coin constituting the real value represented by it remains. The title to it has indeed gone from the loser of the bank or Treasury note, but it remains in the hands of the bank or government, whose paper note, now lost, promised to pay it on demand. There is no destruction of value, but only a transfer of its ownership. Moreover, the loss from wear and tear and replacement of paper money is infinitesimal. That from the necessary abrasion as well as the clipping, punching, and sweating of coin in constant use would be very onerous, as all history, especially the state of English coin before the establishment of the Bank of England, and of the old Mexican coins not long ago current in this country, abundantly proves. Nay, aside of all wear and other loss, the simple cost of the necessary coin to take the place of its present paper substitutes would be enormous; likewise the cost of handling and guarding it. The quantity required for the purpose would be immense; the cost of exchange, and by consequence of the articles exchanged, would thus be much enhanced. Prices would rise enormously even

measured by a metallic currency, and, in the face of a common impression to the contrary, vastly beyond the standard reached under the use of our present convertible paper substitutes for coin. The coin now used is little more than infinitesimal in proportion to the paper substitutes for it employed in exchange. It is simply enough to serve as a measure of value, and bears somewhat the proportion to the notes, checks, and bills of exchange actually discharging the function of money in trade, which the standard weights and measures of commerce bear to the articles whose quantity they are used to ascertain. The paper presented by Controller Knox at the recent Bankers' Convention at Niagara Falls shows that the responses of 1966 out of 2106 national banks to inquiries made by him proved, that "the relative proportion of gold coin received was 0.65, of silver coin 0.16, of paper currency 4.06, and of checks and drafts 95.13;" while at the banks in New York City the proportions were: gold coin 0.27, silver 0.01, paper currency 1.02, checks, drafts, etc., 98.70 per cent. At Sir John Lubbock's bank in London it was ascertained that the proportion of the different items received in payment for a certain period was: checks and bills 96.8 per cent, Bank of England notes 2.2, country-bank notes 0.4, coin 0.6. Mr. Knox also testifies: "The people throughout the country everywhere ask for paper, and the banks find difficulty in supplying the demand, and a like difficulty in inducing their dealers to accept coin in payment. The Clearing-House vault in New York is full to overflowing."

This too demonstrates that the coin ordinarily used in commerce is barely enough to serve as the yard-stick to determine the value represented by the paper instruments convertible into it which are actually employed. It further confirms the view of such writers on economics as J. S. Mill, that bank notes or paper money, *so long as convertible*, perform a very subordinate part in inflating that bubble of baseless credit which is the prolific cause of financial convulsions and panics. The loans of banks against which checks can be drawn, having all the power not only of paper but of metallic money between those who respectively draw and accept them, are twenty times the amount of the paper money, indeed all money, used in the liquidation of debts and the exchange of commodities. To this source, far

more than any unhealthy expansion of mere currency kept redeemable for its face, is to be attributed the inflation which portends and causes commercial panics. Whether a bank issue its credit in the form of circulating notes, or deposits to the credit of its borrowers, against bills discounted, to be drawn against by check, matters not. Depositors as well as bill-holders can demand specie. The real question is, whether it has loaned its credit to those having means, present or prospective, to pay these bills at maturity. If so, all is well. If otherwise, on any large scale, disaster will come to the bank or banks thus issuing baseless credits, and to the whole mercantile community, and others involved with them. This is the true secret of commercial panics: baseless credit given on a large scale to prop unproductive enterprises or extravagant living which consumes without producing. It may, as the last great commercial panic did, begin with the fall of great banking houses that have loaned their means imprudently, and in their own downfall have shaken the banks that have sustained them by loans. The notion that a plentiful supply of bank notes, constituting less than a twentieth of the actual medium of exchange, so long as they are kept convertible into coin, can cause any considerable and permanently dangerous inflation of prices and consequent speculation is groundless. The moment prices are raised abnormally in this way, importations will come in from foreign countries to reap these high prices. Foreigners will require these bank notes to be converted into coin, and the requisite contraction will quickly come about, especially in these days of telegraphs and steamships. An inconvertible currency is another thing, and operates on the reverse principle.

Most standard political economists and bullionists from Adam Smith down have maintained that, if an inconvertible paper currency made legal tender could be kept down to the amount of coin that would circulate in its place, were there no paper money, it would have precisely the same value. It is seldom that a fallacy so gross has shown such vitality. The idea that bits of paper without intrinsic value, and inconvertible into coin, because armed by despotic authority with the power to wipe out debts, can have the same value or fulfil the same functions as coin or its representative—coin salable in the mar-

kets of the world for its face value when it goes out of use as money—is preposterous. Such government notes have precisely the same value as stay-law certificates, which they are in fact. All other money functions or purchasing power in them are simply derivative from this. Their value is in the main regulated by the prospect of their redemption as respects the fact, degree, and time of it. This was shown abundantly during and after our last war, in which their gold price fluctuated from 38 to 100 cents on the dollar, and often several per cent in a day, according as the fluctuating phases of the war affected the prospect of their redemption. Would this have been possible in respect to gold and silver or their representatives?

It is a notable fact that the panicky element, always an unavoidable, tho in one sense needless, secondary aggravation of commercial crises, which leads to the locking up of money in hoards beyond the reach of solvent borrowers, through fear that its possessors may not be able to command it when they want it, is usually quieted by some device which brings into use some temporary substitute for the regular currency, and not subject to its legal limitations. This stops the panic by providing for the supply of the needs of solvent borrowers irrespective of the lawful money kept in inaccessible hoards for the time being. Then the lawful money itself comes out of its concealment, seeking good borrowers and profitable investment. This afterward, so far from continuing scarce, often becomes a drug. Panics have been repeatedly arrested or prevented in London by an order in council removing for a time the limitation upon the issues of the Bank of England imposed by its last charter. As soon as the merchants found the money could be had, they did not want it. By a temporary suspension of specie payments in this country in 1857 the needed inferior currency was supplied, which dissolved the panic and restored coin payments in six months. In 1873 the "lawful money" sequestered by the panic was not specie-paying; consequently certain "bank certificates" were devised to take their place temporarily. These dissolved the panic, and "lawful money" soon returned to its normal channels of circulation.

In discussing the paper money of the future it may be assumed: 1. That no better was ever devised than that of our

present national banks secured by national stocks; 2. That it is the national will steadily to reduce and speedily extinguish the public debt, so that the very basis and possibility of such a currency will steadily be passing away; 3. The question What is the best circulating medium to supply the vacuum? is more concrete than abstract; not merely what is ideally the best, if the people could be persuaded to adopt it, but what is the best that, with their predilections, traditions, and prejudices, they can probably be induced to adopt.

The practical alternatives are national Treasury legal-tender notes; national-bank notes secured as best they may be by other means than United States stocks; the system of State-bank circulation; the currency provided by some great overshadowing national bank and its branches, concurrently with the circulating notes of State banks, which prevailed through most of the first half-century of our national history.

Some say, indeed, the State is under no obligation to protect the people against issues of worthless money, and that the principle of *caveat emptor* applies here as well as elsewhere. Bank bills, however, circulate as money only in virtue of being issued by public institutions founded and authorized by government. It is the duty of government to make the best practicable provision that what thus is made current as money by its own virtual *imprimatur*, be good for its face, whether paper or coin, and to suppress all counterfeit, unsound, and fraudulent issues. These operate as a fraud upon innocent holders. They destroy the very standards of value and instruments of honorable trade. If the State abdicates this function, there will be no end of schemes and institutions for creating property, or rather filching it from the people, by issuing engraved paper dollars worth less than the paper on which they are inscribed, in exchange for it. Conscience and the Bible alike pronounce "a false balance an abomination to the Lord." Spurious money is the worst form of this sort of imposture.

It will be convenient to treat of the different kinds of paper money which may take the place of the national-bank notes now secured by the deposit of government stocks in the national Treasury, in the event of these being retired by the payment of the national debt or otherwise, in an order the reverse

of that in which they respectively succeeded each other in the past.

1. The only paper currency left us, without further legislation, on the extinction of national-bank notes, would be the legal-tender notes of the national Treasury, in which the former are now legally redeemable. These could be multiplied indefinitely for the simple cost of engraving by the national Treasury. If adequate provision both could and would be made to insure their redemption in gold or equivalent silver, in every emergency short of revolution, they would form the best conceivable currency. It would be the equal of coin without discount in every corner of our country, and in foreign countries even, to an extent not easily foreseen. The profit, whatever it might be, would belong to the people. This, however, is of small moment when balanced against its soundness and redeemability at whatever cost, in order both to preserve the national faith inviolate, and prevent the moral and commercial plague of inconvertible legal-tender paper money among a people. Still, to the full extent to which government keeps in circulation its own notes without interest, in excess of the amount of coin necessary to be kept on hand for their redemption, and the other expenses of maintaining it, it gains a gratuitous loan from the people. The real net profit of this, after all expenses, at the present low rates of interest on government loans is not large. It includes, however, in addition, the slight gain arising from the loss or destruction of these notes in any hands but its own.

Two questions arise at this point: (1) Whether it could, and (2) Whether it would if it could, keep them redeemable in all emergencies short of some social or political upheaval equivalent to revolution, and in the amount required for the public welfare, neither more nor less?

That it can do this is beyond all doubt. Even on the severest estimate, that its coin reserve must be fully equal to its paper promises to pay on demand, and that it must have a gold eagle in its vaults for every paper eagle on the wing, it is superabundantly able to do it. The paper currency of the country, adding the government legal tender to the national-bank notes, amounts in round numbers to $700,000,000. Government could easily command this by the issue of 3- to 4-per-cent bonds to

procure whatever coin or bullion is necessary, in addition to its ordinary specie reserve, to make up this sum. For this it would be reimbursed by an equal value of its convertible notes in paying its obligations and debts of whatever kind. But the government can provide for the redemption of its notes on far better terms. Gold coin of two fifths the amount of the bills issued would be ample in all normal, and most abnormal, conditions to secure their redemption on presentation.[1] The gold would rarely be wanted for the paper, except to settle adverse foreign balances, as long as the bill-holder is sure he can have it if he wishes it. And the people of the country, *if it is their will to have a specie-paying currency*, never will fear that the notes of their government will be dishonored.

But if in any monetary convulsion panic should arise, even with respect to government redeeming its notes, the emergency can be met at once by issuing short-term bonds for the gold at such rate of interest as will certainly command it, and draw it from the hoards which will readily yield it up for such golden securities. This is the normal and effectual way, as all history shows, of commanding the means to meet extraordinary emergencies. The mere fact of its being known that it could and would be resorted to in case of necessity would rarely fail to prevent such necessity. Except for meeting foreign adverse balances, the known fact that in any event the government could and would provide for their redemption, would prevent their being presented for redemption. This was well illustrated by the effect of the 4½-per-cent loan which Secretary Sherman was authorized to make, and did make, in aid of the resumption of specie payments. It not only accelerated and insured this at the time fixed by law, but virtually effected it considerably in advance of that time, and in a way vastly more propitious to the public interest than any attempt to compass the same end

[1] U. S. Treasurer Gilfillan in his recent report pronounces a specie reserve of 40 per cent, or two fifths the amount of all immediate liabilities of the Treasury, ample to protect them. At present it holds this proportion of specie reserve to its legal-tender notes, and the full amount of the face of its gold and silver certificates in coin of each kind respectively, thus making the proportion of entire coin reserve to immediate liabilities over 51 per cent—about $64,000,000, or, exclusive of fractional coin, $38,000,000 in excess of an ample coin reserve to protect all immediate obligations.

by contracting the currency—a process far more stringent and disturbing than that of raising it towards par by accumulating coin for its redemption. There can be no doubt, then, of the ability of the national government to provide a sound paper currency, good always and everywhere for its face in gold, and everywhere preferred to it, with rare exceptions, with equal profit to itself and advantage to the people. But if it undertakes this function, *will* it take the necessary means to make and keep it always sound and convertible?

It must be confessed that here is where this scheme labors. Once it is recognized as the function of government to create money by engraving paper and making it legal tender whether convertible or not, and there is no end of the temptations on every hand to repudiate the obligation to redeem it, nay, to issue it, in such quantities as to necessitate its being irredeemable, in furtherance of all sorts of jobs by which all sections seek to drain the public treasury for their own benefit, or for the behoof of political parties and the cormorants who fatten upon them. No doubt a sound and conservative sentiment will be strong enough to oppose and possibly defeat such a breach of national faith, and debasement of the very measures of value and standards of honesty. But it is by no means certain to prevail. Of that we have had painfully convincing evidence in the long and severe contest for the resumption of specie payments, which more than once only escaped failure by the narrowest, and by the aid of the most adroit parliamentary tactics or hair-breadth technicalities—thus proving too clearly that the heart of the people, or enough of them to sway great parties, was joined to these paper idols and would not let them alone. These irredeemable-paper-money factions are even now courting and courted by political parties. When these are pretty evenly balanced, they become the make-weights to give the preponderance to that with which they can make the best terms. They are possessed with the delusion that value can be indefinitely created by the fiat of the government making paper stamped with the word "dollar" equal to 24½ grains of gold stamped likewise; and that so it has only to make the decree, and it will thus make itself rich, the people prosperous, and wealth abundant, by engraved pieces of paper.

The recent action of the government with regard to silver dollars shows a less gross, but none the less real, form of the same delusion, still dominant in Congress and the national government. As we now write, the silver dollar of 412½ grains is worth in the markets of the world .8701 of the gold dollar of the United States. Yet it is made a legal tender for debt of every kind by congressional enactment for an amount precisely equal to the gold dollar. Congress, which herein is presumed to express the will of the nation, not only ordains this equality of debt-paying power between the gold dollar and the silver dollar to-day worth less than ⅞ of it, but further requires the continued coinage of at least some twenty-five millions of these depreciated dollars annually, altho by no device can it keep the greater part of them in circulation, on account of their bulk so inconvenient, and on account of their depreciation so unacceptable to the people. Their circulation would be far less if there were any adequate supply of one and two dollar bills. This simply proves that the delusion of "fiat money," i.e., of creating intrinsic value by simply legislating it into being, dominates the mind of the nation to the extent of inducing a persistent attempt to add one eighth to the intrinsic value of silver, by mere arbitrary legislative decree. The principle is precisely the same, altho less grossly applied, as if the government should order that a clipped dollar, the present half-dollar, or a pound of lead, or a piece of engraved irredeemable paper should be legal tender for equal sums with the present silver dollar. The only palliating circumstance is the fact, that the existing silver dollar has the same weight of silver as when in a past generation it was equal or superior in bullion market value to the gold dollar. They were then both made of equal legal-tender value, because they were deemed to have the same intrinsic market value. When thus precisely equivalent in value, gold will practically supersede the silver dollars in actual use, on account of superior convenience. The fact that afterwards the market value of silver so advanced as to make the standard silver dollar worth more than the gold dollar drove it into entire disuse, and so effectually demonetized it, on the principle that the cheaper of two currencies of equal debt-paying power will always drive out the dearer, *all other things being equal.* Silver

having been thus in fact demonetized except for fractions of a dollar, the further coinage of it was in 1873 prohibited by Congress. It was thus, to all intents and purposes, abandoned in fact, and in the public apprehension, as a national coin, except for small change. This was the state of things when our national loans were negotiated. In terms payable in coin, the only coin meant and understood by all parties was the only coin then made and issued by the government, small change excepted, i.e. gold. This was expressed and implied in all the phraseology then in use respecting the obligations of the government payable in coin. No thought of restoring the old silver dollar in coinage and use was entertained until the Bonanza silver-mines of the Rocky Mountains and the extensive demonetization of silver in Europe cheapened it in the markets of the world, making a silver dollar of the former weight and fineness worth from $\frac{7}{8}$ to $\frac{9}{10}$ of the gold dollar. Then arose a loud clamor for the restoration and profuse coinage of the "dollar of the fathers," made equal in fiat or legal debt-paying power to the gold dollar, worth from 10 to 15 cents above it in the markets of the world. The profuse coinage of it was then begun, and is now going on, by command of Congress making it likewise a legal tender for all debts due to and from the government, and all other persons and parties.

Now this would have been unobjectionable, not in some minor points, but in graver and more essential aspects, economical and ethical, which awakened intense opposition, had this remonetization of silver been guarded by two provisions which were purposely and even defiantly omitted. 1. That at the start the silver in the silver dollar should be so increased as to make it equal in value to the gold dollar. 2. That its legal-tender quality should not apply to debts contracted during the period in which it had been demonetized by law, or of gold monometallism, but solely to debts contracted when the silver was concurrently with the gold the recognized legal-tender dollar of the country. With these provisions the re-introduction of the silver dollar would have violated no equity. All parties making contracts to pay or receive money, or its equivalent paper representative, would have done it knowing what they

were about, and the chance of the payer, and the risk of the payee, that if either metal should depreciate, the cheaper would be used to discharge the debt. It would be the only fair bimetallism. It is not in the nature of things, or according to experience, that the relative values of gold and silver should remain unchanged, whether as affected by the cost of producing them, or the alternations in demand and supply for useful and ornamental purposes other than money.

But as it is impossible permanently to legislate value into any human product beyond the cost of its reproduction, so no such factitious value can be long injected into silver by any government or syndicate of governments. The recent conference of diplomatic representatives of the great powers to fix the relative values of gold and silver, broke up without seriously making the attempt; and well they might, for all such attempts are vain unless they can prevent all discoveries of Bonanza mines of either metal to lessen the cost of its production, or can increase the demand for it by arbitrary annulment of the laws of human nature which determine its wants and their intensity. The apparent exception in the case of the present concurrent circulation of gold and silver dollars, the latter worth in the markets of the world less than seven eighths of the other, is no real exception. It is due wholly to government monopoly of the coinage of silver dollars. If free coinage of silver, or coinage at a seignorage barely sufficient to pay its cost, were allowed, as in the case of gold, the process would be a very short one to the virtual demonetization of gold. All who had debts of any magnitude to pay would buy silver bullion at present prices and demand its coinage at the national mints, thus saving one eighth of the amount of the debt. The principal accumulations of gold coin, whether in Treasury or bank vaults, or private hoards, would with great rapidity find their way to the melting-pot, or to the steamship for transportation to pay for foreign imports, when $871 gold would pay as much as $1000 silver: just as, during the era of irredeemable legal-tender paper, gold, being at a premium, was used to discharge foreign debts, and the greenbacks or their representatives for all domestic money.

The same principle has been illustrated in reference to fractional currency throughout our whole history, which want of space alone prevents us from showing.

And to this complexion it must come at last with respect to our present silver dollar, if its coinage is persisted in even as a government monopoly. The silver dollars, so far as the government is able to keep them afloat, keeping faith with its bond-holders by paying them gold according to the meaning of its contract with them, and at the same time to avoid obstructing commerce by so bulky a medium of exchange, are taken without hesitation (1) because they are legal tender, and (2) because creditors will take them from their debtors so long as they know that others will take them from themselves in satisfaction of debts. On the other hand, they do not yet supersede gold, because, owing to the government monopoly of legal-tender silver dollars, they cannot be obtained by the people on better terms than gold dollars. But if government coinage of them goes on without check or stint, this equality of the two coins, and their continuance as such in use side by side, will cease. In due time the accumulation will be such that government must pay them out profusely in discharge of its obligations. Its gold will either be drawn from it in preference by creditors and note-holders, or kept from them and withheld from circulation. If drawn out it will go, in one form and by one channel or another, where it will do something more than pay debts which are equally well paid by a coin of seven eighths its value. In either case silver, the cheaper, will banish gold, and convertible paper dollars will be only convertible into our present silver dollars. This is only a question of time, if the present policy is persisted in. This is what the promoters of the policy mean, so far as they understand themselves; and at this point they know what they are about quite as well as they can be told. The whole clamor for the present silver dollar being put on an equality with gold worth 12½ per cent more, is for the purpose of keeping the real legal-tender dollar as much below gold, as much vitiated, as was the paper legal tender for some years before the resumption of specie payments. For this reason we greatly fear that the doctrine of "fiat money" would more or less dominate the policy of the government, if it were entrusted

with the delicate function of supplying the paper money of the country; and all the more so, as this would open an easy way to supply means for the innumerable claimants and jobbers who are always trying to enrich themselves and their constituents from the national Treasury. The present silver-dollar policy is a constant menace to a sound currency.

We are somewhat encouraged, as we see that Mr. Burchard, Director of the U. S. Mint, hitherto an earnest advocate of continued coinage of the standard silver dollar, advises its discontinuance, on the ground that, so far from promoting the union among the nations to fix a ratio of valuation between silver and gold by which 15½ grains of the former shall be equal to one of the latter, it rather retards that consummation. We warmly second his proposal, if we cannot second his reasons for it. For we do not believe it in the power of the legislation of one or many nations to establish a fixed ratio of value between silver and gold, any more than between iron and lead, wheat and maize. Their relative value must in the long-run be determined by their intrinsic value, and this in turn by the cost of production interworking with the law of supply and demand. Such value cannot long, in any normal state of things, exceed the cost of its reproduction. On the other hand, it will cease to be reproduced at existing prices unless they afford a profit. Since, therefore, silver continues to be largely produced at present market rates, and, even so, makes fortunes for many of its producers, it is idle to claim that it has, or by legislation can permanently be made to have, more than its market value. The rate, too, at which gold bullion sells, exceptional disturbing influences aside, fairly represents the cost of producing it as compared with silver. If it did not, if at present market rates mining gold were decidedly more profitable than mining silver, gold-mining would increase until the equilibration of the relative cost and price of the two metals would be effected.

Let it be noted, however, that, whatever tendency exists in the national government to vitiate its own paper currency by making its own Treasury notes legal tender, whether redeemable or irredeemable, and however this may be a reason for resorting to other methods of supplying the needed paper currency of the country, the evil and the danger cannot be wholly

avoided so long as the national government issues its own legal-tender notes as a substantive part of the national currency. For, while it does this, these notes are the supreme standard, above which no issues of banks or other institutions can rise. As they are obliged to receive legal-tender notes in satisfaction of debts due them, so they can be required to pay nothing higher in discharge of the debts they owe. Consequently, whatever the deterioration of the government issues, no others can rise above them. Until, therefore, Congress can be induced to remove the temptation to vitiate this currency by utterly abolishing it, or the legal-tender element in future issues of it, nothing is gained by resorting to other methods of filling the vacuum caused by the gradual extinction of the currency supplied by our present national banks. Like the present and past notes of these banks, however iron-clad their security, it can only secure their being as good as the national legal-tender notes which make a complete redemption of them.

2. Supposing the present security of national-bank bills to be no longer available, let us next consider the alternative of their continued issue protected by the best securities that remain available. What are these? First in order are State stocks. These cannot form the basis of a national currency when nearly one half the State debts are in default as to their interest, or under repudiation as to principal and interest. The same is true of a very large proportion of all municipal debts, county, town, and city. Under a system of State-bank circulation there are doubtless a few States in which, not only their own debts, but those of all subordinate municipalities within them are to all intents good. But in a national system it would be impossible to discriminate by any sure criterion sound from unsound securities; or, if this were possible, to do it in such a way as not to exclude from participation in the privileges of such a banking system so large a part of the country as to insure the defeat of such legislation in Congress.

3. Another plan of considerable merit for continuing the issue of bills by the national banks is, to limit the amount of them to half the capital of the bank issuing them, and make them a first lien on all its assets. No doubt this would be ample security for ordinary cases. But the failure of banks finally to

redeem their notes and pay their other debts is not an ordinary, but an extraordinary, case under any tolerable system of banking. We need a system which will make the notes worth their face in gold in all contingencies. What would such a system amount to in the case of the late Mechanics' National Bank of Newark, New Jersey? Here the losses of the bank from the thefts of its cashier and his confederates, artfully concealed, but stupidly undiscovered, were nearly five times the capital, three times the combined capital and surplus of the institution, and twice the amount of the capital, surplus, and the assessment upon the stockholders equal to the capital. As it is, whoever else loses, the bill-holders are secure, and the notes as good as those of the New York Bank of Commerce. Still, with any tolerable inspection by examiners appointed for fitness, rather than party service, it could hardly happen that a bank could be kept from going into liquidation before its means were too far exhausted to pay its circulating notes, if guarded on all sides as proposed in this plan of Mr. Coe, submitted to the recent bankers' convention. Nevertheless, this plan falls below the present system of securing notes by government stocks in one very important respect. Government bonds can instantly be turned into cash for the redemption of the notes of an insolvent bank, as soon as they are presented. No doubt exists anywhere, or for any time, as to the equivalency of a national-bank note to its face in coin. No one to whom it is offered stops to inquire whether it is issued by a solvent or insolvent bank, no matter where located. The bills of the Pacific National Bank of Boston just reported to have failed are received as readily as those of the New York Metropolitan Bank.

This could not be so in respect of bills secured merely by the ordinary assets of a bank, consisting of the notes of its borrowers or other investments usually made by banks, even tho a prior lien upon them. For first, and at best, it must take time to realize upon these assets through the usual legal processes incident to insolvent persons and institutions. This of itself would render the notes unbankable, and subject them to more or less discount for this reason. And secondly, in nearly all cases of bank-suspension (commercial panics aside) the insolvency of a bank is presumptive evidence, not only of a

temporary but an absolute inability to meet its obligations to a greater or less, certainly to some undefined, extent. At a distance from them, often in their immediate neighborhood, such bills would cease to circulate. Bankers and money-dealers in the vicinage would have means of approximately estimating their value, and would soon fix a market price for them if they were worth anything. Their value would be inversely as their distance from the place of issue. Take for illustration the two lately suspended banks to which we have referred. Without the security of their circulating notes by national stocks, who would trust them beyond their immediate neighborhood, even if there, especially the bills of the Newark Mechanics' Bank?

This points to another evil of such a currency, the same in kind as, but far less in degree than, that which prevailed under the old system of State-bank currency before the civil war and the national banking system which grew out of it. The soundness and solvency of each bank being known only among the people in its immediate neighborhood, the tendency of all its circulating notes would be to centre there, and to possess only a local credit. If they find their way to distant parts of the country, they would, as a whole, be quite sure to be sped back to the region where the credit of the bank issuing them could be known, and their soundness at once tested. The impairment to any extent of the full national credit of any kind of paper money in a like degree impairs its usefulness. It so far forth loses its character as currency and becomes classified, like a large portion of the former State-bank issues, as "uncurrent money," because in so many places at a discount, or unbankable at its face value, especially in the great monetary centres. The evils of this will further appear as we discuss the ante-war State-bank notes which preceded those of the national government and the national banks.

4. This system had furnished the paper money of the country, including almost its entire circulating medium, for about a quarter of a century preceding the outbreak of the war; and concurrently with a great National Bank of the United States and its branches, chartered by the general government, during nearly our entire previous national history. We will consider these as they operated while alone, and then as they operated

while under the concurrent but predominating influence of a great overshadowing United States Bank. Of course, it is only in their relations to paper money, as banks of issue, that we have any present call or space to look into them.

The States early began to assume the prerogative of chartering banks, not only of discount and deposit, but of issue, thus, in addition to other benefits, giving them the inducement arising from the profits, to furnish the people with the convenience, of paper money. It has been a question whether, under the provisions of the U. S. Constitution giving Congress the power "to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin," and forbidding any State "to coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts," the States have the power of indirectly emitting such bills of credit, through the institutions they charter and authorize to emit them, for the purpose of being used as money, and performing every ordinary function that the coining of money would perform. We think this would be an open question now among jurists, had it not been decided affirmatively by the U. S. Supreme Court; and that it would bear reconsideration quite as well, if not somewhat better, than the first decision of that court denying the constitutionality of the irredeemable U. S. legal-tender notes. It is a curious commentary on this, however, that the general government in establishing the national-bank-note circulation extinguished the power to issue circulating notes which the Supreme Court had affirmed to be lodged in the States by the Constitution, by imposing a 10-per-cent tax upon it—a sufficient evidence that it would be dangerous to allow the States to tax government debentures of whatever kind; that even if the States have power to authorize banks to issue paper money *ad libitum*, when the national government has the will, it can find a way to stop it. A question might arise here too as to the legitimacy of imposing taxes for such purposes.

However this may be, we have no doubt of the expediency of preventing issues of money, paper or metallic, by the States, or by their agents and institutions, and of putting upon whatever is allowed to pass with the *imprimatur* of public authority, as money, the stamp of national authority. If the prohibition

were now removed, State banks of issue would be multiplied indefinitely, and their unsecured circulating notes would deluge the land. During the period of this kind of currency it was issued under two systems as to the constitution of the banks themselves, with still further diversities of administration in different States, to insure the convertibility of their issues. The two great systems were banks, each with its own special charter, and free banks, i.e. banks established under a general law authorizing their formation by all who would comply with its provisions. The prevailing system was that of special charter. The free system was an episode in a few States, but it was still in operation in the State of New York when the war broke out. It undoubtedly suggested the analogous system of free national banks having their circulating notes protected by adequate public securities lodged with the fiscal department of the State. It followed the failure of the safety-fund system in the State of New York. This required all the banks of the State to contribute a small percentage of their capital annually, to be held by the State as an insurance fund for the redemption of notes of broken banks. It proved inadequate to bear the strain put upon it by the bank failures which multiplied through the commercial panic extending from 1837 to 1842. The State of New York then adopted the system of making every new bank and every old bank, on the expiration of its charter, at once free and the insurer of its own bills, by requiring the deposit of an amount sufficient for the purpose in approved mortgages and public stocks, national, State, or municipal. This tempted single men, and coteries of men, all over the State, who held mortgages, or the kind of public stocks required, to organize free banks and issue circulating notes nearly equal to the face of the securities deposited, thus duplicating their interest. The result was the speedy failure of many, and crippling of most of them. The security for the bill-holders proved imperfect or worthless. Mortgages, if good, required a tedious process to turn them into cash. Often the real estate which secured them shrunk in value far below the face of the mortgage, and had to be accepted instead of cash by the mortgagee, or by the State as trustee for the bill-holder. Many stocks of States since solvent then were in default for interest. This class of securities

proved inadequate. Altogether the system was a failure, while it taught one great lesson; viz., that nothing is a proper security for bank circulation but that sort of public stocks which, in any and all circumstances, have an immediate salable value above the face of the notes protected by them. The New York free-banking system was at length reformed so as to rule out all but the highest grade of securities, such as United States or New York State stocks or their equivalents, as the basis of their bank circulation. At the time of the adoption of the national-bank system nearly all the New York State banks had got upon this footing. The free-banking system which was copied from New York in the adjacent States of New Jersey and Connecticut had only a transient trial, and disappeared prior to the war.

In the country at large, for a quarter of a century before the national-bank system was established, the circulating medium was issued by banks, either under general laws, or each specially chartered by its own State, and with various privileges and restrictions affecting the amount and safety of their issues. But the exceptions were few in which banks were not practically allowed to issue all that they could keep afloat while redeeming it on presentation. As a whole, banks were soundest, and the baseless inflation least, in the older sections of the country and in the strongest commercial centres. What in slang phrase was known as "wild-cat banking" was, as it always will be, most rampant in pioneer States. The results of the system were:

1. That failures of banks were much more frequent than now, owing to the fact that the attempt was so largely made to create capital by issuing engraved notes representing no capital, and having no substantial basis of issue or redemption.

2. Hence so many of these bank notes became of no, or of uncertain value, that, except at their places of issue, all were at greater or less discount proportioned, other things being equal, to their distance from the place of issue and redemption. At their best estate, they suffered a discount equal to the cost of sending them to the counter of the bank issuing them.

3. The loss of merchants whose business required them to receive remittances in bills of distant banks was very large. Publishers of periodicals often lost from two to five per cent in

turning their remittances into bankable funds. Great banking houses grew wealthy in the business of buying uncurrent money at a discount.

4. It was impossible to travel any distance without taking coin with all its inconvenience and exposure.

5. The liability to commercial panics was augmented so far as it was consequent on reckless or injudicious banking, and fabrication of paper money. Runs on banks always began with panic-stricken bill-holders in the vicinity—a thing impossible under our present system of perfectly secured bank notes.

No doubt similar evils would follow the free re-introduction of State-bank bills as the paper currency of the country, mitigated indeed on one side by the postal money-order system and the great development of railroads and telegraphs through the country, but proportionally aggravated by the immense increase of its area, as these affect the facility of circulating bank notes and returning them to bank counters for redemption.

6. Prior to the era we have been considering, of a paper currency issued by State banks in different States, their operation and influence were much ameliorated by the concurrent agency and influence of a great overshadowing United States Bank. Of these there were two, one succeeding the other after its dissolution by the expiration of its charter. The first was planned by Alexander Hamilton, Washington's Secretary of the Treasury, and, largely through his influence, chartered by Congress in 1791 for twenty years, with a capital of $10,000,000. It was located in Philadelphia, with branches in Boston, New York, Baltimore, Washington, Norfolk, Va., Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans. It was established, despite strenuous opposition on alleged constitutional and other grounds. But it was found absolutely necessary as a fiscal agent of the government, a regulator of paper currency issued by State banks, an instrument for carrying on the exchanges of the country, and, in general, for evolving order out of the financial chaos induced by the expenditures of the Revolutionary war, and the enormous issues of irredeemable paper money spawned forth by the States individually, and as confederated, to carry it on. It was of incalculable benefit to the people. Altho its influence was great and beneficial upon the currency, exchanges, and business of the country, yet the opposi-

tion to it was great, not only on account of the natural antagonism of many to great corporations and moneyed powers, but also to its supposed inconsistency with certain political and constitutional theories largely cherished by parties, and for reasons, we have no room here to discuss. Its charter was not renewed. But the war of 1812 immediately following its extinction brought financial disturbances and exigencies which made the necessity of some national fiscal institution for the transaction of government business, conducting exchanges, furnishing a national currency, and giving steadiness and trustworthiness to the issues of State banks, more urgent than ever. Accordingly, in the face of strenuous opposition, a second United States Bank was chartered in 1816 for twenty years, with a capital of $35,000,000, having its central location in Philadelphia, and branches in other chief commercial centres. It was started in the midst of prevailing financial chaos, and a generally depreciated currency of broken State banks, which had been greatly multiplied to fill several times over the vacuum created by the extinction of the original Bank of the United States. After earnest and persistent struggles it brought order out of this confusion, became the great medium of inter-State exchanges, and the source and promoter of a sound and stable national and State currency.

These Banks of the United States operated beneficially in various ways, which we shall not here undertake further to recount. Their place has, in our altered state of things, been sufficiently well filled by the national banks in respect to inter-State exchanges, and also with respect to a national paper currency. We shall now simply refer to their influence in providing a sound national currency, and promoting soundness in the circulation of State banks in the absence of secured circulating notes such as the national banks now furnish, thus showing what they might do again, if this currency should pass away with the rapid discharge of the national debt.

First. These United States banks furnished a paper currency really current through the nation. It was known to be backed by what was then an immense capital, and to possess all the prestige of national authority, indorsement, and use. Hence it was received everywhere without discount as readily as gold and silver coin. It could be used in travelling in every corner of the

land. Through their branches and the State banks to which their notes were constantly paid, they could almost everywhere be had in exchange for bills of the solvent State banks. When payments by bank drafts, checks, and bills of exchange were less known and available for multitudes than now, it was common to send notes of the Bank of the United States in letters from one extreme of the country to another. A common method of remittance from the South to students in college, as we recollect, was to cut a $100 bill of this bank in two, and send half in one letter and half in another, to guard against thefts in the Post-Office and mail robberies.

Secondly. This U. S. Bank was felt in arresting extravagant and hazardous issues of circulating notes by State banks. For such over-issues were sure to find their way in large quantities into a bank of the magnitude of this institution, and they were forthwith returned to the counters whence they were issued for redemption. We have no doubt that such a bank, with sufficient capital and branches, might be so organized as to supply a sound and adequate national paper currency, and to check the excessive formation and issues of State banks—to be, indeed, another Bank of England here. But we do not believe that the temper of the country will permit its re-establishment. Altho re-chartered by Congress, it was vetoed by President Jackson, and encountered from him a bitter and unrelenting hostility, which succeeded in crushing it. This led to the profuse chartering of new State banks. Many of them prospered by Jackson's transfer to them from the Bank of the United States of the government deposits. This was among the causes (not, in our opinion, as has so generally been held, the chief cause), of the great commercial panic and suspension of specie payments from 1837 to 1842. Speculating in land instead of cultivating it was a far more potent cause, as may readily be seen if we call to mind that in 1836 breadstuffs were imported to this country from Europe, while multitudes of *parvenus* were building palaces and sporting their horses and equipage on the basis of paper fortunes reared on farms converted, by map at least, into town and city lots. A great financier said that the trouble was, that "one half of the people were making carriages and the other half riding in them;" and it was only the

caricature of exaggeration. The result was that the Bank of the United States, failing of re-charter by Congress, obtained a charter from the State of Pennsylvania, by paying a bonus of nearly six millions. Thus swept from its proper national foundations, it was plunged into the mire of corruption in the very first step of its new abnormal career. Out of its normal sphere it fell into the hands of speculators and kiters, and so fell to ignominious ruin. It is needless here to rehearse the steps by which the political revolution of 1840, having for an object the restoration of the United States Bank, failed of it through the untimely death of President Harrison, and the succession to his place of a Virginia abstractionist, who vetoed the bill re-chartering it. After so many mortal blows it died past resuscitation, and has left an odor from its expiring struggles which, added to the prevailing unpopularity of colossal moneyed corporations, will probably prevent its reorganization, whatever its capacity for usefulness. The insufficiency of State banks, without some such regulator, to provide the currency we need, cannot be questioned. It is almost equally certain that no such regulator can be established, even if intrinsically desirable. If there be a system of State or national banks, it should be under a general law, and not by special charters. The bonus for the charter of the United States Bank by the State of Pennsylvania is only an instance, of unparalleled enormity indeed, of this sort of corruption in granting special bank charters more than forty years ago. If so then, what would it be now?

The outcome of the foregoing discussion with respect to the paper money of the future is:

1. That the people will, and of right ought to, have such money, in some form immediately convertible into specie, as their chief circulating medium.

2. That the present national-bank notes, secured by government stocks, are incomparably the best actual or possible, unless notes of the government itself, based on such coin reserves and other provisions as shall secure their redeemability in every contingency less than some great national revolution or convulsion. The great question is whether the disposition of the nation is equal to its power, to provide such a currency.

3. The gradual extinction of the national debt is likely to

work the gradual extinction of our present national-bank notes.

4. The continuance of the national-bank issues, secured by a limitation of them to from half to two thirds of their capital, and by a first lien upon their assets, is somewhat inferior to the present national-bank currency, but immeasurably superior to any system of bank-note issue controlled by the caprice of State legislatures.

5. Such a State-bank currency is proved intolerable both in theory and practice.

6. State-bank notes concurrent with the issues of a great national bank and branches everywhere at par, and at once checking and regulating, while exchangeable with the former, is a vast improvement on a simple unmitigated State-bank-note currency. But the traditions and instincts of the people afford little prospect of a return to such an institution.

7. An ultimate national Treasury-note currency has the highest intrinsic basis of soundness and redeemability, if the people incline to use their resources for this purpose aright. But the temptations are strong, and in some contingencies might prove irresistible, to issue it upon the principle of "fiat money," in quantities practically irredeemable.

8. On the other hand, while any, even the best form of bank issues, except those secured by government stocks, have less intrinsic resources for securing redeemability in all circumstances than Treasury notes, yet so far as they are affected by the temper of the people, this will tend to hold them up to specie payments, because it is in the highest degree exacting towards moneyed corporations. But, in reference to the government, it is more favorably disposed towards free issues and a depreciated standard of currency, because it is liable to conceive that money is thus made plentiful and cheap, and that the people, instead of the banks, reap the profits of it.

Should the issue of the national-bank notes, or the profits of that issue, in any way cease, the taxes on these institutions ought proportionally to cease or abate. Indeed the present rate of taxation upon bank capital is in many instances simply extortionate. Between State and national taxation many banks annually pay 5 per cent or more of their capital in taxes. This is simply

burdening the cost of exchanges, which means ultimately the cost of all articles of exchange to the consumer. It is vain to say that the banks can and do stand it. The more they are oppressively burdened, the less they will be multiplied and the more they will be decreased. The facilities for exchange they furnish, and the benefits of competition among them, will proportionally decline. The capital of the banks in New York City was reduced by many millions in order to offset the taxation of their surplus, insisted on by assessors and sanctioned by the courts. So the State lost both the taxes and the advantages of a large banking and loan capital too. Many places are now deprived of the advantages of banking facilities on account of the taxation which crushes them out. Multitudes are educated by demagogues and other blind guides to look at national banks very much as a mad bull looks at a red flag. This infuriated spirit begets the most wild and frantic assaults upon them. They feel in the same way about those other great instruments of exchange, the railways. They might as well vent their spite at steamships and other vehicles of transportation and exchange, and bring back the glories of the "Age of Homespun," or of simple barbarism. Let abuses be reformed. But reformation is not destruction.

LYMAN H. ATWATER.

THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS TRAINING OF CHILDREN.

THE policy which the German states have long pursued with more or less constancy was first forcibly indicated by Luther, who declared that he who did not send his child to school must be regarded as an enemy of the state. A strong and almost universal public sentiment, backed by compulsory laws with cumulative penalties, and rigidly enforced, now gives the greatest practical efficacy to the principle that all citizens must send their children to school as well as, and for the same reasons, that they must pay taxes or fight in time of war; viz., *pro bono publico*. In his famous addresses to the German nation Fichte urged, near the beginning of the century, that if Germany was ever to rise from the low estate to which she had then fallen, it must be by becoming, as Nature and Providence seemed to him to have decreed her, pre-eminently and exclusively an educational state. It was her peculiar mission, he believed, to develop educational institutions, which should surpass and give pattern to those of all the rest of the world, and to allow the German instinct for unity to be moulded into the form of real nationality by these. Something like this has become the method of imperialism there. Perhaps it is hardly too much to say that educational laws, methods, and establishments are the very best products of civilization in Germany. The lessons of history, past and contemporary, are brought to bear by scholars and specialists of European fame upon every new measure proposed in diet or reichstag; and the ministry of education is, to say the least, second to no department in the German cabinet. The general result is that, while no modern state has had greater obstacles to overcome, such as provincialism, the worst of military-strategic situations, poverty, an aggravated and ever-recurring religious question, etc., the German

state to-day is very strong not only in material, but also in the ideal elements of national strength. More than any other government she has known how to adopt the best features of both the Roman and the Greek states, and in several of its more unobjectionable aspects she has even actualized the Platonic Republic, in which the chief care of the law-giver was the education of the young. Her methods and aims in this direction are now, especially since the Franco-Prussian war, slowly gaining force in the school legislation of most countries of continental Europe, as well as in our own.

But if popular education is now assumed as a condition of existence for monarchies, it is obviously far more essential to the stability and permanence of a republic, governed by nearer the average intelligence, and where schools have most to do in determining the level of that average, and with practically no educational qualification for citizenship. If, in view of this, any one will take the trouble to look over the statistics of illiteracy in our own country, or to examine, if only cursorily, the present educational condition of the Southern States and its obvious and undisputed effects upon the tone of public life, or to read up some representative chapter of the recent history of our educational legislation and to observe how much of it is distorted and perverted by jobbery or partisan interests, compromises, etc., and how much more of it is the work of the ambition of incompetent third-rate legislators, he will perhaps begin to realize more plainly than ever before in how real and literal a sense the life of our republic is a struggle for existence against ignorance and the evils which troop in its train, and to see how it is that the question whether a republican form of government can be permanent is at bottom a question of education. There is ample evidence that the founders of our institutions realized more clearly than we do that "a republic demands for its continued existence a higher standard of both knowledge and virtue among the people than any other form of government," that school laws are the most fundamental department of legislation in a republic, and that the peculiar political problems liable to a republic can be finally solved not by the legislation of majorities, but gradually and by no other means than by education. Indeed, our patriotism is not so much love of past his-

tory or confidence in present institutions as it is belief that human nature is at bottom good, and trust in the beneficent, regulative power of knowledge.

The notion of freedom as quite commonly interpreted is strictly anti-pedagogic. John Stuart Mill is wrong. The *laissez faire, laissez aller* principle is suicidal in a republic, impressive as is the casuistry with which it is so often defended. There must be despotism here if need be. There will always be many who will have to be forced to go to school, coaxed, hired, threatened, flogged, trepanned almost to learn when they are there, and constantly watched and withheld from every evasion or way of escape. Some can respond to no motives but love, praise, and reward, and would be spoiled by coercion, while others, in whom these main-springs of action do not exist and cannot be developed, respond readily and naturally only to a rod of the liberal dimensions prescribed by German school laws. Moral freedom is attained only in so far as the highest motives are spontaneously and autonomously acted upon, and as lower selfish motives are disregarded. This real freedom is the end of education, and if it be assumed at the beginning education is impossible.

There are now abundant indications that we are again beginning to realize that the three R's, or indeed intellectual training alone, is not all that is meant by education, as is so often implied by current educational rhetoric. When we speak of loving knowledge for its own sake we mean for the sake of its effect on our characters as distinguished from all material advantages which may result from it. Strictly speaking, love of knowledge for its own sake is a psychological impossibility. It cannot exist without affecting conduct and character, and its value is measured by the way and the degree in which it does so. That knowledge can have any intrinsic value in and of itself alone is, indeed, the superstition of rationalism and *éclaircissement*, and is no less misleading than is the merely commercial view of it. Like light, knowledge, it is well said, is good to see by rather than to see. Without exerting or ripening into ethical potency, knowledge is not power but weakness, and is nearly as likely to arm the bad as the good elements of the soul and of society. German educators at least have little respect

for the Platonic scruple whether virtue can be taught, and so call their department pedagogy (which even Hegel defined as pre-eminently the art of making men moral), despite the unpleasant associations which the word calls up, because the term includes moral discipline in addition to mere didactics. They assume that "life without knowledge is better than knowledge which does not affect life," and that "all which frees the mind is disastrous if it does not at the same time give self-control and make us better." In a republic, then, in a peculiar sense, I conclude, moral, at the very least, as much as intellectual training is the obligation which the schools owe to the state and even to society.

To realize how great and peculiar is the need of moral training in this country we need simply to reflect that nowhere are children emancipated from the control of parents at so early an age, that nowhere is individual liberty respected, or self-control and spontaneity addressed so precociously. The American child, too, comes into incessant contact with children of all social grades and nationalities, and is more liable to the contagion of vice. It should also not be forgotten that frauds in business and politics make public life, in which scarcely any great event has of late been accomplished without scandal, a school of immorality for the young. Private character is subjected to unusual strains in many ways, including all those peculiar to a period of transition in matters of faith, and the administration of justice, in which republics so easily and fatally fail, is already in many portions of our land, to say the least, exceedingly imperfect. It is not pleasant to dwell upon pictures like these, nor is it pessimistic; but it is simply unpatriotic to refuse to recognize tendencies which strike competent foreign students of our institutions so forcibly and against which the influences of education should be mainly directed.

In most European systems moral is intimately bound up with religious training; the moral code is derived from Scriptures, much as it is by very many teachers of religion in our own country. Here, too, moral training has in the past been left mainly to the church, the strong line of partition between which and the state is perhaps the most original and cherished solution of the religious question in history.

Salutary and important as this principle has proved, it hardly need be said that it must not be too rigorously insisted upon. If each sharp-scented sectary in this land of sects had been allowed to go through all the school-books and sift out all that seemed objectionable to him; if the Jew were permitted to eliminate all that was distasteful to him in the history of primitive Christianity, and the Catholic to weed out the story of the Reformation and evolutionary text-books, and if Quakers, atheists, Methodists, and all the rest could challenge what their respective consciences found offensive, what sort of a curriculum would be left in history, literature, or the arts? Yet altho the separation between school and church can never be absolute, because the human soul cannot be cleft in two, the method has such practical advantages, and is so congenial an expression of the instinct of religious toleration, that it is quite commonly assumed that the state has no right whatever to inquire into the efficiency of the ethico-religious methods of training adopted by the church, still less to interfere with them, whatever their character or however great the public need.

The difficulty of coming into close quarters with our theme is vastly augmented by the fact that the literature upon the subject is so voluminous that most of it represents the views of single individuals, denominations, or confessions, and that no serious or competent attempt has been made, at least in the English language, to give comprehensive, practical, organic form to the insights that must be sought from so many widely differing sources. Some one has conjectured that if all the volumes now in existence which are expressly devoted to moral and religious training were piled together, a structure as large as the tower of Babel might be reared of them alone, and adds that if they could all speak, a confusion of tongues surpassing the "Babel-babble" would be heard. Not only Catholics, Jews, and sceptics but all Protestant sects have contributed to this confusion, until many have drawn hence additional reason for complacency in things as they are, and until, altho we are just beginning to seek a course in practical mechanics for public schools so generic that no special industry shall be favored above another, and of utility for all children like the three R's, the very possibility of such a course in religion and morals as shall be

impartial to all the sects, but helpful to each of them, is doubted or even denied. Scarcely a decade ago most of us would have perhorresced the idea that there could be a seven years' course of Bible study adopted in common by most of the Protestant sects. But it is plain that the consensus respecting right and wrong conduct is still wider. Much moral truth is taught in common by Jews, Catholics, and Protestants by unpedagogic methods, which would be greatly improved if the same common matter were to be admitted by the consent of all into the public schools. The deeper and broader the religious life, or consciousness, experience, insight, the larger does this common element become. Indeed, the existence and need of common elements which no one can doubt, which must be held by all, always and everywhere, which men must believe as men, has been postulated often enough by Protestant thinkers, and underlies the very idea of Catholicity and, in fine, of religion itself. The very idea of Bible is consensus. It assumes the same needs, instincts, possibilities, talents, and predispositions in all for receiving the deliverances of the highest of all muses, the Holy Spirit.

So far as the psycho-pedagogic or practical character is concerned, and rigorously *excluding every other aspect of it*, religion is most fundamentally characterized as the popular culture of the highest ideal as opposed to material utility, which dominates so many of our intellectual interests, by reconformity of life to it. It may be formulated as unity with nature, as the readjustment of conduct to conscience, as restored harmony with self, reunion with God, newly awakened love for Jesus, fresh insight into his mind as new impulse to do his will. The common element is obvious. There has been a loss of the primitive relation or attitude to the highest or ideal norm, and man struggles back, not without pain and great effort, to restore the lost relationship. In a word, there must be atonement with implication of previous estrangement. When this process is conceived as intellectual, faith or intuition are said to close in with certain doctrines considered as normative and central; as emotional the heart is reconciled and loves a divine person, and as volitional God's will is done. How man came to deviate from the ideal, the cause and extent of the alienation; how the ideal is to be conceived, whether subjectively as conscience or a higher in-

stinct always pointing toward the undiscovered pole of human destiny, or objectively as an offended deity who must be placated by religious observances, or as the incarnate *logos;* how the reconciliation takes place, whether the divine ideal inclines to us or we to it first, most, or on what occasion and motive, and in the face of what difficulties and with what kind of mediation, if any; and possibly even whether the whole process be literally real and actual, and accomplished in one time and place for all times and places, or an expression for the whole course of individual life and human history; or, finally, as a sort of formulation which some universal sentiment, like, e.g., that of absolute dependence, gives itself naturally in all ripely developed lives, or indeed all these at once, the results here and hereafter,—these questions, important as they have become, must be subordinated as different explanations of the one great law under which morality itself as well as religion is included. The difference between the lowest, most undeveloped, or natural religion and its highest form of revealed Christianity is so vast, and so justly emphasized by the church because it is so essentially pedagogic and practical, or because it makes what the individual is too limited to more than vaguely anticipate, so articulate, apprehensible, and available as a stimulus and guide to right conduct. It is not mere subjectivism, as Palmer charges in his "Evangelischen Pädagogik," to say that there must be a natural instinct in man coinciding more or less exactly with all that revelation gives, because but for this the latter would be unapprehensible and worthless. Indeed, it is because this fundamental native instinct, often described as longing, craving, homesickness for the good and true, is undeveloped that religion is so often conceived as the irruption of a foreign principle, a graft from a new stock. It is a psychological impossibility to teach anything as purely authoritative. If religion can be taught or revealed, it must already be preformed in us by nature, tho it may be but dimly. The teacher, then, must ever regard and inculcate religion as in a sense a growth or development, and in such a way that this natural predisposition be neither neglected, repressed, nor distorted. The pupil should, and in fact naturally does, repeat the course of the development of the race, and education is simply the expediting and shortening of this course.

This latter is mainly accomplished in religious training by avoiding the countless and tedious deviations, superstitions, and errors which make up so large a part of the history of religion. In a word, religion is the most generic kind of culture as opposed to all systems or departments which are one-sided. All education culminates in it because it is the chief among human interests, and because it gives inner unity to the mind, heart, and will.[1]

It only remains to be said that this common element of union, alienation from and reunion with God, is first and most profound both logically and psychologically. The points of difference between sects, and perhaps to some extent between the ethnic religions, have their justification in natural differences of race, temperament, culture, and associative connections of thought and feeling generally which are not developed in childhood. All differences of this sort should have a very subordinate place or none at all in the religious training of the young. For a child to know more about matters that are peculiar to the sects, or even to Protestantism as opposed to Catholicism, than about the practical notions of religion itself would be as absurd pedagogically as for a medical student to learn the fine points of difference between the nativistic and empirical theories of physiological optics before the fundamental structure of the eye was understood. We are now ready to inquire how this common element should be taught.

II. To be really effective and lasting, moral and religious training must begin in the cradle. It was a profound remark of Fröbel, who, altho he could study only borrowed babies because he had none of his own, has really seen further into the infant soul than Darwin, Taine, Preyer, Kussmaul, or Romanes in their baby-studies, that *the unconsciousness of a child is rest in God.*

[1] Cf., on this paragraph, Diesterweg, "Wegweiser zur Bildung für Deutsche Lehrer." 5te Auflage, 1875. Bd. II. s. 3, *et seq.*

Th. Waitz, "Allgemeine Pädagogik." 2te Auflage, 1875. Bd. II. s. 279–95.

Fr. Dittes, "Schule der Pädagogik." 1875. S. 432–53.

Ostermann, "Pädagogische Psychologie" (on Lotze's basis). 1880. S. 60, *et seq.*

Ziller, "Allgemeine Pädagogik." 1876. S. 153, *et seq.*

Schrader, "Erziehungs- u. Unterrichts-lehre," p. 306, *et seq.*—*et al.*

This need not be understood in any pantheistic sense. From this rest in God the childish soul should not be abruptly or prematurely aroused. A generic germinal-physical sensation before the special senses develop their functions, a vacuous envisagement of pure being, a feeling of transcendent happiness or even angelic communion, gradually lapsing into the particular experiences of life, have all been conjectured, and may, for aught we can *prove* to the contrary, all exist in the infant soul, down and back into which scientific observation has scarcely more than just begun its explorations. Even the primeval stages of psychic growth, or objectivization, are rarely so all-sided, so purely unsolicited, spontaneous, and unprecocious, as not to be in a sense a fall from Fröbel's unconsciousness or rest in God. The sense of touch, the mother of all the other senses, is the only one which the child brings into the world already experienced; but by the pats, caresses, hugs, etc., so instinctive with young mothers, varied feelings and sentiments are communicated to the child long before it recognizes its own body as distinct from things about it. The mother's face and voice are the first conscious objects as the infant soul unfolds, and she soon comes to stand in the very place of God to her child. All the religion of which the child is capable during this by no means brief stage of its development consists of those sentiments—gratitude, trust, dependence, love, etc.—now felt only for her which are later directed toward God. The less these are now cultivated toward the mother, who is now their only fitting if not their only possible object, the more feebly they will later be felt toward God. This, too, adds greatly to the sacredness and the responsibilities of motherhood. I believe with Fröbel that thus fundamental religious sentiments can be cultivated in the earliest months of infancy, altho I cannot see all the efficacy his followers claim for the means to this culture developed in his "mother and cosseting songs." It is of course impossible not to seem, perhaps even not to be, sentimental upon this theme, for the infant soul has no other content than sentiments, and because upon these rests the whole superstructure of religion in child or adult. The mother's emotions, and physical and mental states, indeed, are imparted and reproduced in the infant so immediately, unconsciously, and through so many

avenues, that it is no wonder that women are more disposed than men to believe in occult and perhaps supernatural influences or *rapports* connecting the souls of distinct individuals. Whether the mother is habitually under the influence of calm and tranquil emotions, or her temper is fluctuating or violent, or her movements are habitually energetic or soft and caressing, or she be regular or irregular in her ministrations to the infant in her arms, all these characteristics and habits are registered in the primeval language of touch upon the nervous system of the child as surely as the planchette responds to the influences of unconscious cerebration. At no period of life is it truer in a broader sense that she does most for her child who does most for herself. All that affects her affects it. From this point of view poise and calmness, the absence of all intense stimuli and of sensations or transitions which are abrupt or sudden, and an atmosphere of quieting influences, like everything which retards by broadening, is in the general line of religious culture. Fröbel well compared the soul of an infant to a seed planted in a garden. It was not pressed or moved by the breezes which rustled the leaves overhead. The sunlight did not fall upon it, and even dew and evening coolness scarcely reached it; but yet there was not a breath of air, nor a ray of sunshine, nor a drop of moisture to which it was unresponsive, and which did not stir all its germinant forces. The child is a plant, must live out of doors in proper season, and there must be no forcing. Religion, then, at this important stage, at least, is naturalism pure and simple and nothing more, and religious training is the supreme part of standing out of nature's way. So implicit is the unity of soul and body at this formative age that care of the body is the most effective ethico-religious culture.

This is not the place to enter into details respecting the psychic growth of children, but it should be specified that, however successfully it may be delayed, the time must come when the child will know its own limbs, then its own body as a whole as distinct from other objects, and when its narrow circle of remembered and associated impressions rounds off into a rudimentary personality. Fichte thought this stage epochal, and celebrated it by a banquet when his child first used the pro-

noun I. Fröbel thought this independence could be cultivated earlier by the little game of bo-peep on the mother's lap, by holding the child erect at arm's length from its mother, etc. As the infant thus learns to distinguish between what it does to or for itself and what others do for it, it becomes capable of commanding and obeying, of helping itself, and of feeling the natural consequences of its own acts. Its cerebral centres are rapidly taking shape and acquiring firmness of texture, and it should be most carefully thrown on its own resources so far as they are fully developed, *but no farther*. Before the child can speak the mother is called upon to distinguish between the sounds which spring from helplessness and dependence, and real needs which should be cultivated on the principle of broadening by retarding, and those which spring from the moods and whims of an embryonic personality which may be dwarfed or perverted if allowed to functionate too early, as surely as its legs may become bandied by trying to walk prematurely. It is because as babies grow few and rare, and as mothers tend to become more fond than wise, that this tender but important cradle-battle so often goes against the latter, and children are spoiled, mothers enslaved, and instead of pleasures which are few, mild, and uniform, special, unusual, and intense enjoyments which bring reactions are permitted, and artificial systems of rewards and punishments are resorted to, while the mother gradually loses her influence over the child before the dawn of that adolescent age in which maternal influences and home-ties should be at their strongest and best. The great lesson of this protracted stage of development is the limitation of the absolute selfishness of infant nature, and the recognition of and entire subordination to the rights of others upon whom it must be made to feel its almost absolute dependence. No sharp or rude constraints should interfere with the expansion of its sympathies and affections to others, and no indulgences should obviate the lesson of quiet submission to the authority and even convenience of adult wisdom above its own. The child has few rights other than the satisfaction of its physical needs, for it can perform few duties.

Next to be considered are the sentiments which unfold under the influence of that fresh and naïve curiosity which

attends the first impressions of natural objects from which both religion and science spring as from one common root. The awe and sublimity of a thunder-storm, the sights and sounds of a spring morning, objects which lead the child's thoughts to what is remote in time and space, old trees, ruins, the rocks, and, above all, the heavenly bodies,—the utilization of these lessons is the most important task of the religious teacher during the *kindergarten* stage of childhood. Still more than the undevout astronomer, the undevout child under such influences is abnormal. In these directions the mind of the child is as open and plastic as that of the ancient prophet to the promptings of the inspiring Spirit. The child can recognize no essential difference between nature and the supernatural, and the products of mythopœic fancy which have been spun about natural objects, and which have lain so long and so warm about the hearts of generations and races of men, are now the best of all nutriments for the soul. To teach scientific rudiments only about nature, on the shallow principle that nothing should be taught which must be unlearned, or to encourage the child to assume the critical attitude of mind, is dwarfing the heart and prematurely forcing the head. To indulge in goody talks, or to moralize about God or heaven, is here impertinent and stultifying. The one course paralyzes the healthiest and strongest sentiments, the other cultivates sentimentality and the affectation of impossible insights, or else makes these subjects uninteresting or positively distasteful later, when the mind is ripe for them. It has been said that country life is religion for children at this stage. However this may be, it is clear that natural religion is rooted in such experiences, and precedes revealed religion in the order of growth and education, whatever its logical order in systems of thought may be. A little later habits of truthfulness are best cultivated by the use of the senses in exact observation. To see a simple phenomenon in nature and report it fully and correctly is no easy matter, but the habit of trying to do so teaches what truthfulness is, and leaves the impress of truth upon the whole life and character. I do not hesitate to say, therefore, that elements of science should be taught to children for the moral effects of its influences. At the same time all truth is not sensuous, and this training alone tends to make the

mind pragmatic, dry, and insensitive or unresponsive to that other kind of truth the value of which is not measured by its certainty so much as by its effect upon us. Renan has remarked in substance that all higher truth consists in *nuances*, which play over that realm of conscience and the humanities where open questions will always excite hope and fear. We must learn to interpret the heart and our native instincts as truthfully as we do external nature, for our happiness in life depends quite as largely upon bringing our beliefs into harmony with the deeper feelings of our nature as it does upon the ability to adapt ourselves to our physical environment. Thus not only all religious beliefs and moral acts will strengthen if they truly express the character instead of cultivating affectation and insincerity in opinion, word, and deed, as with mistaken pedagogic methods they so commonly do. This latter can be avoided only by leaving all to naturalism and spontaneity at first, and feeding the soul only according to its appetites and stage of growth. No religious truth must be taught as fundamental—especially as fundamental to morality—which can be seriously doubted or even misunderstood. Yet it must be expected that convictions will be transformed and worked over and over again, and only late, if at all, will an equilibrium between the heart and the truth it clings to as finally satisfying be attained. Hence most positive instruction in Christian truth should be delayed at the very least to the first school year. Many things must come of course incidentally. These should be taught only when demanded and in the briefest possible way, and with the feeling impressed upon the child that these are most serious things, but too high for it yet. This will stimulate curiosity for them later. Up to this age, at the very least, the child should not be *encouraged* in church-going or public piety of any sort. If permitted at all it should be only as a reward, but is dangerous lest sacred things become familiar and conventionalized before they are felt or understood.

So long as the child's parents supply the place of Providence to it, and before its wishes and desires expand beyond the domestic circle, it is only a pretty affectation to cultivate a sense of very *great* intimacy with the Heavenly Father. To feel its inmost thought watched by a divine eye will only tend to foster

self-consciousness, or a morbid and precocious conscientiousness, or at best the forms of conventional morality, while its conceptions of God's nature will be inadequate even to the verge of idolatry, and perhaps forever dwarfed by childish associations. The child's real communion with God is in fact far too immediate and inward to be more than faintly typified by any forms of conscious worship which it can share. It is the being of a precociously and wrongly apprehended God which soon comes to need proofs of his existence; and perhaps, as Lotze says, men were mistaken when they thought they had done well in raising God from that region where he is clung to by the whole soul with all its spontaneous energy, and conferring on him the honor of exactly demonstrating his existence. There is a sense, altho it seems more indefinite and general than Lessing thought, in which the stages of a child's mental growth repeat the experience of the race. The idea of God is not flashed in upon the infant mind complete and vivid at first by any native intuitions. It can be realized in a natural way only after the necessity of a cause is felt to be general, or when the demand for a unity and centre of things in the wide and varied world arises. The child's conception of God should not be personal or too familiar *at first*, but he should appear distant and vague, inspiring awe and reverence far more than love; in a word, as the God of nature rather than as devoted to serviceable ministrations to the child's individual wants. The latter should be taught to be "a faithful servant rather than a favorite of God." The inestimable pedagogic value of the God-idea consists in that it widens the child's glimpse of the whole, and gives the first presentiment of the universality of laws, such as are observed in their experiences and others, so that all things seem comprehended under one stable system or government. The slow realization that God's laws are not like those of parents and teachers, evadable, suspendable, and their infraction perhaps pardoned, but changeless, pitiless, and their penalties sure as the laws of nature, is a most important factor of moral training, more Jewish perhaps than Christian, more scientific it may be said than evangelical, but a factor too noble to be obscured or suppressed, or prematurely superseded as it often practically is by the notion of God as a fond and too indulgent Heavenly Parent, like the father or mother swayed

by foolish childish petitions and always ready and longing to forgive. First the law, the schoolmaster, then the Gospel; first nature, then grace, is the order of growth. That child is unfortunate which has never seen its mother or its father pray, but it does not follow that it should be encouraged to frequent child-prayer-meetings.

The pains or pleasures which follow many acts are immediate, while the results that follow others are so remote or so serious that the child must utilize the experience of others. Artificial rewards and punishments must be cunningly devised so as to simulate and typify as closely as possible the real natural penalty, and they must be administered uniformly and impartially like laws of nature. As command are just, and as they are gradually perceived to spring from superior wisdom, respect arises, which Kant called the bottom motive of duty, and defined as the immediate determination of the will by law, thwarting self-love. Here the child reverences what is not understood as authority, and to the childish "why?" which always implies imperfect respect for the authority, however displeasing its behest, the teacher or parent should always reply, "You cannot understand why yet," unless quite sure that a convincing and controlling insight can be given, such as shall make all future exercise of authority in this particular unnecessary. From this standpoint the great importance of the character and native dignity of the teacher is best seen. Daily contact with some teachers is itself all-sided ethical education for the child without a spoken precept. Here, too, the real advantage of male over female teachers, especially for boys, is seen in their superior physical strength, which often, if highly estimated, gives real dignity and commands real respect, and especially in the unquestionably greater uniformity of their moods and their discipline.

During the first four or five years of school life the point of prime importance in ethico-religious training is the education of conscience. This latter is the most complex and perhaps the most educable of all our so-called "faculties." A system of carefully arranged talks, with copious illustrations from history and literature, about such topics as fair play, slang, cronies, dress, teasing, getting mad, prompting in class, white lies, affectation,

cleanliness, order, honor, taste, self-respect, treatment of animals, reading, vacation, pursuits, etc., can be brought quite within the range of boy-and-girl interests by a sympathetic and tactful teacher, and be made immediately and obviously practical. All this is nothing more nor less than conscience-building. The old superstition that children have innate faculties of such a finished sort that they flash up and grasp the principle of things by a rapid sort of first "intellection," an error that made all departments of education so trivial, assumptive and dogmatic for centuries before Comenius, Basedow and Pestalozzi, has been banished everywhere save from moral and religious training, where it still persists in full force. The senses develop first, and all the higher intuitions called by the collective name of conscience gradually and later in life. They first take the form of sentiments without much insight, and are hence liable to be unconscious affectation, and are caught insensibly from the environment with the aid of inherited predisposition, and only made more definite by such talks as the above. But parents are prone to forget that healthful and correct sentiments concerning matters of conduct are at first very feeble, and that the sense of obligation needs the long and careful guardianship of external authority. Just as a young medical student with a rudimentary notion of physiology and hygiene is sometimes disposed to undertake a more or less complete reform of his diet, regimen, etc., to make it "scientific" in a way that an older and a more learned physician would shrink from, so the half-insights of boys into matters of moral regimen are far too apt, in the American temperament, to expend, in precocious emancipation and crude attempts at practical realization, the force which is needed to bring their insights to maturity. Authority should be relaxed gradually, explicitly, and provisionally over one definite department of conduct at a time. To distinguish right and wrong in their own nature is the highest and most complex of intellectual processes. Most men and all children are guided only by associations of greater or less subtlety. Perhaps the whole round of human duties might be best taught by gathering illustrations of selfishness and tracing it in its countless disguises and ramifications through every stage of life. Selfishness is opposed to a sense of the infinite

and is inversely as real religion, and the study of it is not, like systematic ethics, apt to be confused and made unpractical by conflicting theories.

The Bible, the great instrument in the education of conscience, is far less juvenile than it is now the fashion to suppose. At the very least it expresses the result of the ripest human experience, the noblest traditions of humanity. Old Testament history, even more than most very ancient history, is distilled to an almost purely ethical content. For centuries Scripture was withheld from the masses for the same reason that Plato refused at first to put his thoughts into writing, because it would be sure to be misunderstood by very many and lead to that worst of errors and fanaticism caused by half-truths. Children should not approach it too lightly. It might seem that doctrinal catechisms were the most unpedagogic methods of approach, but a more baleful one has been developed in the ardor of those Sunday-school teachers who require devotion in their closet as the chief means of preparation, and go tingling with the self-consciousness which is the bane of American childhood to inoculate their classes with their own neurological states. Belief is actually made a duty; and as if that, as too often taught, were not enough to stultify conscience, it is made the supreme duty and a condition of salvation even for children.

The Old Testament, rather than the New, is the Bible for childhood. A good, protracted course of the law must pedagogically prepare the way for the apprehension of the Gospel. Even for the Old Testament, a propædeutic selection of the choicest moral tales from Catholic legends, classic and Hindoo mythology, ancient myths and fables, German märchen, and perhaps from the Bibles of other religions, etc., should serve as a sort of introduction. What a Sunday-school library might be gradually developed from such sources, in place of the trashy and even pathological matter so commonly in use! Then the study of the Old Testament should begin with selected tales, told, as in the German schools, impressively, in the teacher's language, but objectively, and without exegetical or hortatory comment. The appeal is directly to the understanding only at first, but the moral lesson is brought clearly and surely within the child's reach, but not personally applied after the manner common with

us. In that country only clergymen who have passed a special examination for that purpose are allowed to teach the Bible to children. This is done in the schools in a way so impressive that the knowledge of the Bible possessed by the average German child of the age of confirmation is infinitely better than that acquired by the best children under our uniform lesson system. The causes of unbelief in that country are not found in what precedes that age, but may be due in part to the fact that Bible study generally ceases then for life. The Old Testament is from beginning to end one long and impressive argument in favor of the practical wisdom of righteousness as a condition of personal welfare and national stability—a lesson not untimely now, and in our land. This lesson must be thoroughly and protractedly taught before the sublime altruistic stand-point of the New Testament can be apprehended. Up to this point the essential training of Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant children now differs only in method and detail, and it seems by no means impossible that a portion of this common element may be some time mutually agreed upon, and even taught in public schools by common consent and with the real advantage of superior methods to all.

Probably the most important changes for the educator to study are those which take place between the ages of twelve and sixteen, when the young adolescent receives from nature a new capital of energy and altruistic feeling. It is a veritable second birth, and success in life depends upon the care and wisdom with which this energy is husbanded. These changes constitute a natural predisposition to a change of heart, and may perhaps be called, in Kantian phrase, its *schema*. Even from the psychophysic stand-point it is a correct instinct which has slowly led so large a section of the Christian church to centre its entire cultus upon regeneration. In this I of course only assert the neurophysical side, which is everywhere present, tho everywhere subordinate to the spiritual side. As everywhere, too, the physical is regulative rather than constitutive. It is therefore not surprising that statistics show—so far as I have yet been able to collect them—that far more conversions, *pro rata*, take place during the adolescent period, which, according to the best authorities, does not normally end before the age

of twenty four or five, than during any other period of equal length.

Before this age the child lives in the present, is normally selfish, deficient in sympathy, but frank and confidential, obedient upon authority, and without affection save the supreme affection of childhood, viz., assuming the words, manners, habits, etc., of those older than itself. But now stature suddenly increases, and the power of physical endurance diminishes for a time; larynx, nose, chin change, and normal and morbid ancestral traits and features appear. Far greater, more protracted, tho unseen, are the changes which take place in the nervous system, to which it seems as if for a few years the energies of growth were chiefly directed. Hence this period is so critical and changes in character so rapid. No matter how confidential the relations with the parent may have been, an important domain of the soul now becomes independent. Confidences are shared with those of equal age and withheld from parents, especially by boys, to an extent probably little suspected by most parents. Education must be addressed to freedom, which recognizes only self-made law, and spontaneity of opinion and conduct is manifested, often in extravagant and grotesque forms. There is now a longing for that kind of close sympathy and friendship which makes cronies and intimates; there is a craving for strong emotions which gives pleasure in exaggerations; and there are nameless longings for what is far, remote, strange, which emphasizes the self-estrangement which Hegel so well describes, and which marks the normal rise of the presentment of something higher than self. Instincts of rivalry and competition now first naturally arise in boys, and girls grow more conscientious, and begin to feel their music, painting, etc., and to realize the bearing of these upon their future adult life. There is often a strong instinct of devotion and self-sacrifice toward some, perhaps almost any, object or in almost any cause which circumstances may present. It is never so hard to tell the truth plainly and objectively and without any subjective twist. The life of the mere individual ceases and that of person, of the race, begins. Many relations of things which hitherto seemed independent are seen. It is a period of realization, and hence often of introspection. It is the golden age of life, in

which enthusiasm, sympathy, generosity, and curiosity are at their strongest and best, and when growth is so rapid that, e.g., each college class is conscious of a vast interval of development which separates it from the class below; but it is also a period subject to Wertherian crises, such as Hume, Richter, J. S. Mill, and others passed through, and all depends on the direction given to these new forces.

The dangers of this period are great and manifest. The chief of these, far greater even than the dangers of intemperance, is that the sexual elements of soul and body will be developed prematurely and disproportionately. Probably the greatest and most experienced living teacher of physiology has expressed the opinion that at least nine tenths of the thoughts, feelings, imaginations of the *average* male adolescent centre for a few early years of this period about this factor of his nature. Quite apart, therefore, from its intrinsic value, education should serve the purpose of preoccupation, and should divert attention from an element of our nature the premature or excessive development of which dwarfs every part of soul and body. Intellectual interests, athleticism, social and æsthetic tastes, should be cultivated. There should be some change in external life. Previous routine and drill-work must be broken through and new occupations resorted to, that the mind may not be left idle while the hands are mechanically employed. Attractive home-life, friendship well chosen and on a high plane, and regular habits, should of course be cultivated. Now, too, tho the intellect is not frequently judged insane, so that pubescent insanity is comparatively rare, the feelings, which are yet more fundamental to mental sanity, are most often perverted, and lack of emotional steadiness, violent and dangerous impulses, unreasonable conduct, lack of enthusiasm and sympathy, are very commonly caused by abnormities here. Neurotic disturbances, such as hysteria, chorea, and, in the opinion of some, sick-headache, are peculiarly liable to appear and become seated during this period. In short, the previous selfhood is broken up like the regulation copy handwriting of early school years, and a new individual is in process of crystallization. All is solvent, plastic, peculiarly susceptible to external influences.

Between love and religion God and nature have wrought a

strong and indissoluble bond. Even Plato, in the symposium, teaches this very impressively. Change of heart before pubescent years is the most disastrous of all precocities and forcings. The age signalized by the ancient Greeks as that at which the study of what was comprehensively called music should begin, the age at which Roman guardianship ended, as explained by Sir Henry Maine, at which boys are confirmed in the modern Greek, Catholic, and Lutheran churches, and at which the child Jesus entered the temple, is as early as any child ought to go about his heavenly Father's business. "It did not seem to me modest for my daughter to hear," said a cultivated and devout German mother, explaining why she had sent her twelve-year-old daughter from the room while I was describing revival scenes I had witnessed in this country. If children are instructed in the language of these sentiments too early, the all-sided deepening and broadening of soul and of conscience which should come with adolescent years will be incomplete. Revival sermons to young children are analogous to exhorting them to imagine themselves married people and inculcating the duties of that relation. It is because this precept is violated in the intemperate haste for immediate results that we may so often hear childish sentiments and puerile expressions so strangely mingled in the religious experience of otherwise apparently mature adults, which remind one of a male voice constantly modulating from manly tones into boyish falsetto. Some one has said of very early risers that they were apt to be conceited all the forenoon, and stupid and uninteresting all the afternoon and evening. So, too, precocious infant Christians are apt to be conceited and full of pious affectations all the forenoon of life, and thereafter commonplace enough in their religious life. One is reminded of Aristotle's theory of Katharsis, according to which the soul was purged of strong or bad passions by listening to vivid representations of them on the stage. So, by the forcing method we deprecate, the soul is given just enough religious stimulus to act as inoculation against deeper and more serious interest later. At this age the prescription of a series of strong feelings is very apt to cause attention to concentrate on physical states in a way which may culminate in the increased activity of the passional nature, or may induce that sort of self-flirtation which is ex-

pressed in morbid love of autobiographic confessional outpourings, or may issue in the supreme selfishness of incipient and often unsuspected hysteria. God, Scripture, etc., cannot seem supreme unless taught most vigorously near the end rather than near the beginning of the educational course. Reference to these should be after we have thought and investigated and applied our faculties to their uttermost, rather than before. Those who are led to Christ normally by obeying conscience are not apt to endanger the foundation of their moral character if they should later chance to doubt the doctrine of verbal inspiration or some of the miracles, or even get confused about the Trinity, because their religious nature is not built on the sand. The art of leading young men through college without unsettling any of the religious notions of childhood is anti-pedagogic and unworthy philosophy, and is to leave men puerile in the highest department of their nature.

At the age we have indicated, when the young man instinctively takes the control of himself into his own hands, previous ethico-religious training should be brought to a focus and given a personal application, which, to be most effective, should be according to the creed of the parent. It is a serious and solemn epoch, and ought to be fittingly signalized. Morality now needs religion, which cannot have affected life much before. Now duties should be recognized as divine commands, for the strongest motives, natural and supernatural, are needed for the regulation of the new impulses, passions, desires, half-insights, ambitions, etc., which come to the American temperament so suddenly before the methods of self-regulation can become established and operative. Now a deep personal sense of purity and impurity are first possible, and indeed inevitable, and this natural moral tension is a great opportunity to the religious teacher. A serious sense of God within, and of responsibilities which transcend this life as they do the adolescent's power of comprehension; a feeling for duties deepened by a realization and experience of their conflict such as some have thought to be the origin of religion itself in the soul,—these, too, are elements of the "theology of the heart" revealed at this age to every serious youth, but to the judicious emphasis and utilization of which the teacher should lend his consummate skill.

Finally, there is danger lest this change, as prescribed and formulated by the church, be too sudden and violent, and the capital of moral force which should last a lifetime be consumed in a brief, convulsive effort, like the sudden running down of a watch if its spring be broken. Piety is naturally the slowest because the most comprehensive kind of growth. Quetelet says that the measure of the state of civilization in a nation is the way in which it achieves its revolutions. As it becomes truly civilized revolutions cease to be sudden and violent, and become gradually transitory and without abrupt change. The same is true of that individual crisis which psycho-physiology describes as adolescence, and of which theology formulates a higher spiritual potency as conversion. The adolescent period lasts ten years or more, during all of which development of every sort is very rapid and constant, and it is, as already remarked, intemperate haste for immediate results, of reaping without sowing, which has made so many regard change of heart as an instantaneous conquest rather than as a growth, and persistently to forget that there is something of importance before and after it in healthful Christian experience.

G. Stanley Hall.

THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY.

ALL people interested in the state of opinion know that there met at Concord, in the middle of July last, a company of very high-souled men and women who held high converse with one another, and with high theories, till the middle of August. I was politely asked to join them, albeit they knew I was not one of them. With great delicacy of feeling they proposed to me a theme in which it was supposed I would be specially interested, the Scottish philosophy, in which I was reared and to which I adhere, not, however, in all its doctrines, but simply in its method, which discovers truths prior in their nature to the induction which discovers them, and which indeed could not discover them unless they were already there in the mind. I regarded it at the time, and still regard it, as a misfortune to me that, owing to an old standing obligation to go elsewhere, I was not able to accept their invitation.

Those who met were drawn together by a common faith and sentiment not easily defined (the school is not much inclined to lay restraints on itself by definition), yet noticeable by all. They constitute a school quite as much so as the ancient Pythagoreans, the Platonists, and Neoplatonists, with whom they have certain interesting affinities. They believe in mind as infinitely higher than matter,—some of them believe in matter simply as a veil thrown over mind. They are sure that in mind there is vastly more than sense, than sight or touch or hearing. Some of them would burst the bounds of space and time, which do so hem us in, and go out into the eternal, the infinite, the absolute. They are seeking to mount to a sphere far above the mundane, and if they do not rise to the sky, which is apt to become ever more remote as we ascend, they at least, as in a balloon, reach

the clouds, whence, as the traveller in the Alps, they gain grand views of the heavens above them and lovely views of the green vales below them.

They are all aspiring after an excellence which they do not find in the busy pursuits and attractive fashions of the world; nor even in its literature and its science, in its newspapers and its novels, which seem to them to have too much of the clay of the earth sticking to them, and to be all too much held down by terrestrial gravity. They are longing and seeking for something higher and better for themselves and for the community. All of them are utterly opposed to materialism under every form. A number are driven to Concord under the influence of a recoiling wave opposed to the whole secular spirit of the age. They feel that even physical science, as the mere co-ordination of material and ever-changing objects, cannot satisfy the cravings of the soul. Most of them adopt the Christian religion on the same ground as many of the Platonists did in the second century, as in consonance with their lofty philosophic ideas. Others rather turn away from it as the Neoplatonists in Alexandria did, because (as shown so graphically in Kingsley's "Hypatia") it is too definite in its precepts and statements of fact and doctrine. Some of them, in accepting it, adapt it to their tastes and make it a cloud lowered from heaven to earth, and embracing in it Buddhism and all religions with their acknowledged errors because containing so much truth. A few of them are disposed to believe in spiritual media and rope-tying—just as their prototypes among the Alexandrian Neoplatonists did in magic and necromancy, as bringing heaven into close connection with earth.

Most appropriately the association met at Concord. The place, with its three thousand dwellers, is in the level country as it swells towards the mountain country to which it looks up. It is a characteristic New England village, only it has been associated with more men and women of real genius than any like place in America: with Hawthorne and his weird fancies; with Margaret Fuller[1] and her enthusiastic and fascinating talks;

[1] Julia Ward Howe tells us "Margaret Fuller once said that she accepted the universe, and Carlyle laughed heartily on hearing it, and said, 'I think she'd better.'"

with Thoreau and his wild-bird wood-notes; with Ripley and his high Coleridgean criticisms. Alcott and Emerson, thank God, are still spared to gather their pebbles from the plains and to scatter them ungrudgingly. These two may be regarded as the true fathers and founders of the school, and their children are proud of them. They were not able to take a very prominent part at the meetings, but they looked in upon them (Alcott occasionally spoke with his old glow), and were welcomed with profound respect and warm affection, as well they might be. From this place Mr. Alcott years ago stretched out his arms to embrace Buddha and all Asia in his wide religious creed. It is understood that latterly he has lost all partiality for bald Unitarianism, and has returned to the faith of the Episcopal Church. Here Emerson has strung his lovely pearls often on slender strings and woven them into a rich necklace. The meeting was honored with the presence of Mr. Stedman, who composed the poem "Corda Concordia" (a considerably labored composition), than whom we have not a finer critic of high poetry in this country. Mr. Sanborn, besides reading some literary papers, was the instrument of bringing together the men and women of kindred tastes from various States of the Union. The association has had a most important accession to it by the removal of Dr. Harris from St. Louis to Concord. If I mistake not, he will henceforth be the leader of the sect. It is expected that he will be the philosopher of the school, and give it organization and system; and if so, it will become more philosophical and less poetical, and possibly thereby less attractive in the eyes of some who love to wander in the wayless and to gaze on gilded clouds.

It might be curious, and very instructive withal, to have laid bare to us the past experience in thought and belief and feeling of those who met together and spoke and listened. But we have no means of ascertaining this, no right to pry into it. Some of the older men, we know, were loosened from the old faith and trained in another faith by Channing, who had such influence in Boston an age ago. Most appropriately an evening was devoted to talk of his merits, and the conference was led by Mr. Hazard. The school of Channing (in this respect, but in no other, like the school of Hegel) has divided into three

streams. There is the Middle division, faithfully keeping to the position of Channing himself. They are a small body of men and women now venerable from age, dreadfully alarmed about the wild course which some of their sons are pursuing, and hesitating whether they should not go over with them to Dr. Brooks's church to save them from utter scepticism. It is clear that the young generation will not stay where Channing stayed, because they see that while he professed to follow the Scriptures, he yet preached doctrines palpably inconsistent with them. The party of the Left are more numerous and active. They see that Unitarianism cannot be drawn from the Scriptures, of which they have let go their hold, and are descending into the barest negations of all belief, and running a risk of sliding into agnosticism and even materialism; the ministers among them seeking to interest and keep up their congregations by preaching on the topics of the times and not on those of eternity. Dr. Frothingham, late of New York, was much troubled with them, and has given us a graphic description of them and of his disgust with them; and has ended with retiring from the active ministry, as not knowing what to believe. The Channingites of the Right are of a higher class. Channing himself was a man of high moral tone, but in no special sense a philosopher; and this class of his followers feel their need of a deeper foundation to rest on, and came in considerable force to Concord in search of it. They feel that they need something more soul-satisfying than Unitarianism, and yet are not disposed to go back to the old orthodoxy. Some of them are striving hard to believe that they have found stable rest in Plato, in Kant, or in Hegel.

It is interesting to find it stated that at the meetings there was a larger number of females—all well educated—than of men. It is also a significant fact that a considerable number of national teachers did thus spend their weeks of vacation, seeking profit as well as pleasure. It is clear that there are in the country inquiring minds seeking for something higher than the business and fashions of the world can give them, than even the science of the day can furnish, or its newspaper literature or its state school lessons. I am not sure that these wishes and hopes were fully gratified; whether the food dispensed has been found

to be as solid and nourishing in the mastication and digestion as in the feeding upon it. Some, I know, felt that the philosophy taught was too impersonal, and not sufficiently practical to meet the wants of men, women, and children in a world of struggle and temptation, of suffering and of sin.

The meeting at Concord last summer is worthy of being carefully noted by thinking minds. It is true that the country as a whole paid little attention to it. The public press, so far as they observed it, did so with a leer, as if not quite sure whether they should admire it or amuse themselves with it. But then it is true that the world has never noticed at the time the occurrences which have afterwards produced such mighty results; the seed lying in the ground is not observed till it springs up simultaneously in the whole field. It may be doubted whether, when the history of 1881 comes to be written by some future Bancroft, the meeting at Concord will have even a passing notice. The historian will dilate on the assassination of Garfield and the madness feigned and real of Guiteau, on the sulks of Conkling, and will settle it for us whether Grant is even now counselling with the President. But he will have little to tell us of the progress made by the grand question of civil reform—the only measure fitted to save us from the tricks of miserable politicians—and still less of the signs of the deeper thoughts of the country as not just accomplished but indicated at the Concord meeting. That meeting, particularly the success so far of the meeting, has its significance. It was a protest against a clamant evil, the wide-spread tendency towards materialism. It expressed a want to be met and relieved, and a strong desire on the part of a body of sincere people to elevate the faiths of the country. Questions were put that must be answered, and these ultimately more momentous than those discussed in the newspapers and in Congress.

I am of opinion that the influence of the meeting has, upon the whole, been for good. The papers read were of a high order both in thought and expression. The inclination of everything was upwards—sometimes, indeed, only the flight of a kite which will have to come down again when the wind which bore it up has subsided. There was a confessed or implied belief in, and constant appeal to, the highest ideas which the

mind of man can entertain. A high ideal of some kind was before every one. I am prepared to maintain and to prove that every one of the ideas and beliefs to which they were appealing has a place in the mind of man, and has in itself an elevating tendency. Such are the ideas of the true, the good, the beautiful, of the infinite, the lovely, and the perfect. It is good to hold up these before the eyes of the men of the world, of the worshippers of wealth, of the votaries of fashion, and the exclusive cultivators of natural science. They are all realities in the mind, quite as much as the monkey, the cat, the newt, and the lamprey, which our naturalists are studying so carefully, are realities without the mind. The speakers at Concord did not err in seeking to draw attention to these mental realities. But the naturalists who have lately written papers on the animals named have not assumed beforehand what they are, but have inquired diligently into their nature, their structure, their growth and habits, and by the careful observation of facts, carried on for months or years, and by searching experiments verifying the hypotheses or theories previously formed. The great defect of the members of the Concord school is that they assume, adopt, and apply the ideas without any previous scrutiny of them after the maieutic manner of Socrates, or observational induction of them after the method of Bacon.

In reading these papers I often wished that Socrates had appeared among them. Boston, of which Concord is an annex, has often been called, not just *the* modern Athens (Edinburgh is vain enough to claim that title), but *a* modern Athens. It has a distant resemblance to that ancient city. It has had orators and talkers, poets and poetasters, historians and story-tellers, journalists and critics, literary societies and cliques. But strange as it may sound, it has never had a Socrates—greatest man in the greatest nation of heathen antiquity—one whose function was to search every kind of wisdom, real or pretended. Had there been such a one in Boston, he would certainly have been attracted to Concord last summer. We can picture him appearing there after having travelled the distance on foot, —certainly I would have travelled a thousand miles on foot to witness the scene. I see him with my mind's eye at this moment, "with that Silenic physiognomy, with that grotesque

manner, with that indomitable resolution, with that captivating voice, with that homely humor, with that solemn earnestness, with that siege of questions." "Oh," says Dean Stanley, "for one hour of Socrates! Oh for one hour of that voice which should by its searching cross-examination make men see what they knew and what they did not know; what they meant and what they only thought they meant; what they believed in truth and what they only believed in name; wherein they agreed and wherein they differed!"

Had he appeared, he would certainly have been welcomed by all, even by the few in secret dread of his cross-questioning. In suasive conversational tone he would have begun simply and innocently by stating that for himself he knew nothing, but learning that so many wise men had met he had come seeking instruction. He might then have taken up the subject discussed by the paper just read, and said how much he had been gratified with it. Having thus gained favorable ears, he would now put questions so easy that they would at once be answered. As I am not that Socrates, I am not able to give his questionings. The subject might be the pre-existence of the soul and the idea in it, as discussed in the Platonic papers by Dr. Jones, or the Hegelian reality, opposed to the Kantian formality, as propounded by Prof. Harris. His avowed object would be by the use of example and logical division to lead them to define what they evidently understood so thoroughly and were talking of so glibly. "It is not that. What then is it? I am not to be satisfied with a statement about the thing; I must know what the τὸ ὄν, the very thing, is." In order to find this he would now approach the subject from a different point, and put another set of questions which would be answered as readily as the previous ones. Not till he had proceeded a certain length in this his skilled dialectical process would he bring out his terrible elenchos or principle of contradiction got from Zeno, and crush as in a vise the double set of answers, showing that they contradicted each other—this amid the visible mortification of some and the gratified tittering of others. Having thus fulfilled one of the ends of his life in exposing the show of pretended wisdom, we can conceive him setting off to Boston to wait the opening of Harvard College, there to have the opportunity to play the

fire of his dialectics on students and even professors, and question them as to the consistency of their philosophy and the worth of their boasted science. Quite as likely when half way he would have stopped and stood still for hours, being arrested by his daimonion, and then returned to Concord to have another gymnastic contest, ending in the dissipation of error, if not in the establishment of truth.

If Socrates was the wisest man in old Athens—so declared by the oracle—Bacon may be regarded as about the wisest guide in modern times. I cannot find that the philosophers of Concord are following the method, or that they have drunk into the spirit, of the father of induction. They feel the slow method of observation to be tedious and irksome to their ardent nature. They seize and cling to what recommends itself at once to their higher nature, intellectual and moral, and would mount to the supreme truth at once. They are unwilling to start with what Bacon insists we should begin with in all research, "the necessary rejections and exclusions," with what Whewell recommends as "The Decomposition of Facts;" that is, to fix on the precise thing to be examined, and put the irrelevant matter out of the way. The whole school are apt to mix up things which should be carefully separated, and to affirm of the whole what is true only of a part. They are especially averse to the slow and laborious method recommended by Bacon of collecting facts external and internal (for there are internal facts as well as external), of collating and co-ordinating them, and thus rising, not *per saltum* but *gradatim*, from particulars to lower laws or axioms (as Bacon calls them), thence to middle, and only then to the highest of all, and to causes and forms.

I hold that the grand ideas which they fondle and cherish and hold forth to the view of the world are all genuine; that they are all in the mind of man, and are ever coming forth into actual exercise in our inward experience. The business of the true philosopher should be to examine them carefully, to determine their exact nature and objective validity. They are entitled to use them only so far as they have done so. But by assuming them at once, and applying them without induction and without analysis or criticism, they mingle error with the truth, and often make the truth bear up the error. They are ever

forming rapid generalizations upon loose resemblances, which cannot be carried out legitimately; and in applying them they are ever falling into serious mistakes. Hence the common objection taken to them that they are mystical, which may be described as seeing everything in a mist. By gazing intently upon certain truths they have cast a halo around them, created by the eye that looks to them. Those who are religiously inclined among them claim to discover truth by divination, and often mistake their own fancies for the inspiration of heaven.

I regret much that I have not been able to obtain a full report of the proceedings of the Concord meeting. I applied to the Boston *Traveller*, which gave an account of the proceedings from day to day, but there were gaps in the numbers sent me, and I cannot give and do not pretend to give an epitome of the papers read.[1] I must satisfy myself with bringing out the characteristics of the school.

I may begin with Dr. Jones. He is a genuine and representative member of the school. I have taken a fancy for him: he has so much personality, he is so unlike his age, so unlike his country. He is a native of Virginia, but is now settled in Illinois. Here he established some twenty years ago the "Plato Club of Jacksonville." It opened with him and two or three ladies to whom he read a dialogue of Plato. "It has had," says a writer in *The Platonist*, "vicissitudes of interruption and resurrection. Meeting originally at various residences, it at length found a permanent home in the parlors of Mrs. J. O. King, who has been a member from the first. A few years ago the meetings were transferred to the rooms of the sister of Mrs. King, Mrs. Eliza Wolcott, who is also one of the original members. Of this society Dr. Jones is the permanent lecturer. It meets every Saturday at 10 A.M. The reader reads Plato ordinarily in the Bohn translation, the Greek original being at hand,

[1] When this article was nearly completed (Dec. 10) I received *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* for July, the publication of which has been evidently delayed. It contains articles read at Concord from Aug. 2 to 5, viz.: The Kant Centennial, by Prof. Mears; Kant and Hegel, by Dr. Harris; Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Categories, by Prof. Morris; The Results of the Kantian Philosophy, by Julia Ward Howe; also a brief Report of Discussions at Concord, by Mr. Sanborn.

and he commonly comments upon it at length." The writings of the great masters of literature and the sacred books of the world are frequently adduced in corroboration and explanation of statements made. In this way are frequently used the Bible, Homer, the Greek tragedians, the Hindu dramas and sacred texts, Shakespeare, Dante, and Goethe. Some of us are grateful that we have one Bible; but this club has a number of Bibles,—from some of which it might be as difficult to get light as to extract sunbeams from cucumbers. It believes in the Bible of the Hebrew and Greek Testaments,—always as interpreted in accordance with Plato; but it also believes in others. "All Bibles," says Mr. Block in an article in *The Platonist*, "are myths—narratives so constructed as to reveal to the fit interpreter the Absolute Truth." If this means all truth or truth without error, I fear the fit interpreter has not yet appeared. The club has been honored by a number of eminent visitors, such as A. Bronson Alcott, Harris, Emerson, Snider. Should I ever be in the region, I hope they will allow me the privilege of attending one of their meetings. Their creed seems to be: "There is one God, and Plato is his prophet"—a higher prophet I acknowledge than Mohammed, or even than Hegel, whom the Germans so admired an age ago; but, alas! they are now inclined to tear down their idol. As Plato was a prophet, we can conceive him to have had a glimpse of this Jacksonville club rising up in Illinois twenty-one hundred years after, and I am sure the thought brought a gratified smile upon his face and helped to bear him under those doubts and snarls that sate on the countenance of his critical pupil Aristotle as he listened to his master.

Dr. Jones delivered two courses of lectures at Concord: one on "Law in Relation to Modern Civilization," the second on "Platonism." He revels in the grand ideas of Plato. He quotes numerous passages which set forth the grandeur of the soul, its pre-existence and its immortality. Applying his lofty views to the present day, he shows what is the downward tendency of "the cognition of a physics without a metaphysics; a natural without a supernatural; a material without a spiritual; a real without an ideal world; a lower world without an upper world, and consequently a natural order without an intelligible

order; natural law without mind, natural forces without will forces, and in fine a Cosmos without a Logos."

I regard it as quite in order to refer to the *Platonist*, a periodical published monthly at St. Louis and edited by Thomas M. Johnson, who seems to be a scholarly man. It is devoted chiefly to "the dissemination of the Platonic philosophy in all its phases." So far as I have seen it, it gazes most fondly on one phase; this, I may add, the highest. Plato was a many-sided man. In particular he had both a negative and a positive side, a searching, doubting side and a doctrinal, dogmatic side. He does seek to establish truth, but like his master Socrates he is quite as frequently employed in exposing pretension. In many of his dialogues he seems to be satisfied with sifting the theories advanced in his time as to truth, beauty, virtue, and kindred topics, is at no pains to specify what is the truth, and leaves us in doubt whether it can be found. This side of Plato was accepted by the academic schools—older, middle, and new—and in the end ran itself out in the barest scepticism, which discussed everything but settled nothing. But Plato had another and more attractive side. He rose up as on eagles', nay, rather on angels' wings towards the contemplation of the eternal Idea in its relations to God, the soul, and the world. This side culminated in the Neoplatonism of Alexandria, which represented the highest state of the soul as consisting in ecstasy; that is, the soul gazing forever on the One, the True, the Good—which became in the end a blank enough and profitless exercise. This is the side commonly presented to us in the *Platonist*. The periodical gives us the treatises of Porphyry, Iamblichus, Plotinus, and Proclus in the version of Thomas Taylor, of whom it has always been doubted whether he understood the works he translated.

Dr. Mulford is held in high esteem in the association and beyond it. He is the author of "The Nation: the Foundations of Civil Order and Political Life in the United States." He there rests the state on God as the foundation, and binds the superstructure by morality. He has another work, "The Republic of God," which has reached a fourth edition. In it he discusses high philosophico-theological themes in a lofty tone of thought and language. He has a higher estimate than I

have of Hegel and his artificial forms, and of Maurice, whose mists, which so impressed many an age ago, are now melting away. He does treat of sin at considerable length, but his view of it and of its essential evil is not sufficiently deep. "Sin," he says, "is unreal" (p. 140); "it is the contradiction of life; but in the consciousness of its contradiction [Hegelian] there is the evidence of a deeper unity in which it may be overcome, and of the ground of its obliteration. There may be a root of righteousness of life that is deeper than the root of evil." Sin seems to me to be as real a thing as moral good, and I do not care about putting good and evil into a unity. Proceeding in this line, Bailey in "Festus" calls "good God's right hand, and evil his left." In the paper read at Concord he criticised the various schools of political life, such as the physical, the utilitarian, the social, the formal or abstract. He maintains that the state implies continuity, authority of law, religion, and morality.

The Rev. Dr. Bartol spoke of the "Transcendent Faculty in Man." He has glowing passages. He says man is an animal; "but he is an angel too: feels the wings folded up on him, is aware of his ability to slough off his physical organism as a serpent does his skin in the wood, conscious that he can dispense with many a tendency and proclivity characteristic and conspicuous in his present life and history, yet not lose his identity, but be the same in essence when he shall soar as now he grovels or gropes." I doubt much whether he sees the right way in which man may soar. "His constitution, as it is at any given time, is all he has to go by. It and not the new translation, the Bible revised or unrevised, is that real word of God which is not a book but, as the sacred volume itself avers, a hammer and a fire and runs very swiftly. Can a book run or be a hammer or fire? The word of God came to Isaiah or to Micah: did it not to Garrison and Lincoln and John Brown? As says the Greek sage, 'all flows,' and our nature blends in the flux of things. We have ecstasies, exaltations above our ordinary state to appreciate Paul's trances, or the transfiguration of Jesus with Peter and James and John, or George Washington's elevation once above himself, as the historian relates, on the battle-field."

The Rev. Dr. Kedney (author of a work on Æsthetics) deliv-

ered an able lecture on the "Groundwork of Ethics." He reviewed the improved Benthamism as presented by John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, and Herbert Spencer, and gave an exposition of the ethics of Kant.

Professor Harris seems to me to be at this present time the greatest man in the school, and the most likely to rule its future destinies.[1] I look upon him with profound respect. It may be doubted whether there is or was an abler superintendent of schools in America than he was when he held that office in Missouri. I do hope that he will continue to further the cause of education by lecturing to our teachers and in colleges on what is called Pedagogic in the German universities, or in some other way that may occur to his fertile mind. But his great work, as it appears to me, is *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, of which he is the learned editor, and which he has carried on with infinite courage and perseverance for a great many years in spite of indifference on the part of the public, and I suspect under a heavy pecuniary burden. In that journal he has had discussed, always from a certain standpoint but invariably in an elevated tone, the deepest problems of human—I believe he would say divine—thought, and tried to make clear to the American public the profundities of Hegel. Once in St. Louis I had the privilege of listening to one of his papers or lectures delivered in a parlor to a dozen high-class ladies, who looked as if they understood him, and who certainly appreciated him highly. He made the generalizations of Hegel as clear and satisfactory as they could possibly be made—generalizations very far-ranging, but, I may add, with which I could not concur. He delivered at Concord two courses, five lectures in each: one on "Philosophical Distinctions," and the other an exposition of Hegel's philosophy. I do hope these last lectures will be published in his journal or in a separate form, so as to enable Americans to determine whether Hegel's strongly compacted system is a castle on the earth or a castle in the air; it is visibly a castle with battlements, with bastions and towers of an imposing and formidable character. In the course on "Philosophical Distinc-

[1] If so, it will have less of Plato and more of Hegel: less of gold-leaf and more of iron; less of rich pasture and more of fences; less of flower and fruit and more of stalks and branches.

tions" he has stages of cognition arranged *à la* Hegel in a triune or triplet form. The first stage is sense-perception, in which there is no thinking. This gives us mechanism. My criticism is that there is intelligence in sense-perception, and that there cannot be mechanism without thinking. The second stage is reflection, which classifies and arranges. I remark that this is a peculiar use of the word reflection, the function of which is usually supposed to be the bending back of the mind and the looking on what is in the mind or has been in it. Arranging and classifying has been commonly ascribed to the comparative powers of the mind. This second stage brings us to chemism, which, as it appears to me, cannot fall under reflection. The third stage is ætiology or teleology, which carries up to another triad—the miracle, art, and religion. These three things may have some affinity as all coming from the higher nature of man, but their bond of union is very loose. It appears to me that an ingenuity much inferior to that of Hegel or Prof. Harris could draw out of the worlds of mind and matter an indefinite number of such trinities, made in a vague way to embrace all things under them, but the distinctions having no deep or actual foundation either in mind or matter.

I am sorry that I have not the means of sketching certain other papers. As I am dealing with philosophy I pass over the literary papers, some of which were brilliant. I have studiously omitted those of the professors who came from their academic halls to discuss metaphysical subjects, as President Porter (who had read for him the paper which appeared in the last number of this REVIEW), Professors Morris, Mears, and Watson. They appeared personally or by their papers chiefly to ventilate Kant in this his centenary year. I may refer to them in a later part of this article, when I treat of the great German metaphysician.

It could be shown by a large induction of historical facts that every prevalent opinion, nay, every practical measure following, is apt to fall back on a philosophy to sustain and defend it when attacked. Hitherto the Concord school has leaned mainly on the ideas of Plato, so grand but at the same time so vague and unbounded. The feeling now is that they must have something more definite and logical. At this present time while there are countless metaphysicians of ability in Amer-

ica, there is, unhappily or happily, no influential philosopher or philosophic school commanding the thought of our young men and calling forth their devotion. The consequence is that those who are not content with the commonplaces of America are resorting to the imposing systems of Germany, most of them to Kant and Neo-Kantism—which is the form in which Kant is now presented, and a few of them to Hegel.

In the last century Locke was by far the most influential philosopher in America. He was the leader in the great movement which set aside the old abstract philosophy drawn out of the brain in favor of the new method founded on facts and experience, and so he was hailed by a people who rebelled against kings and established a republic. Locke easily derived all our ideas from sensation and reflection. Happily this philosophy was never accepted entirely in America. Men seeking to defend truth and morality were always calling in, consciously or unconsciously, and appealing to something deeper than a gathered experience which can never be necessary or universal. The Scottish principle of common-sense satisfied many for a time, but is now forsaken, as supposed to be a mere appeal *ad populum* and not sufficiently profound. American youths, after finishing a rather commonplace course of mental philosophy in their colleges at home, now betake themselves to Deutschland, with high expectations of being able to reach the bottom of things. A writer in a foolish paper lately published, apparently on the principle "Answer a fool according to his folly lest he be wise in his own conceit," thus describes them ("Conflicts of the Age," p. 72): "I have observed of those youths who, after finishing their course in the college down there, set off for a year or two to Germany, that they come back with a most formidable nomenclature as ponderous as the armor of Goliath of Gath. How I rejoice to find a boy rising up to lay them prostrate with a more primitive weapon! For they have become unbearably haughty, and would slay all who cannot pronounce their shibboleth at the fords of speculation. They are introduced at the German universities to a set of distinctions which seem very deep,—the distinction between form and matter, subject and object, *a priori* and *a posteriori*, phenomenon and noumenon,—by which they are led into a labyrinth with no clue to bring them

out. In all these distinctions, and in the nomenclature expressing them, there are subtle errors lurking which lead through idealism to scepticism." These youths, not willing to lose the wares they have gained with such labor and at such expense, bring them home with them, and use them without being able to sift them or cast out the adulterations, and they dispose of them to half-admiring, half-doubting pupils.

Kant has reached, as it appears to me, his highest altitude in this his centenary year,—few philosophers have lived so long. In Germany the works upon him, volumes, articles, pamphlets published this year, are uncountable, all acknowledging defects in Kant as understood an age or two ago, but expounding, or more frequently hinting at, a Neo-Kantism which is to avoid the obvious errors of the old. I have at this moment on the table before me four goodly volumes on Kant written in the English tongue within the last few years: There is the elaborate volume on "Kant," written by Professor Edward Caird, of Glasgow, who examines Kant on the principles of Hegel, and reaches a more ideal realism, which no doubt is self-contradictory,—but then all truth is the combination of contradictories. There is a smaller volume "On the Philosophy of Kant," by Robert Adamson, of Owens College, Manchester, who discusses the problems started by Kant, acknowledging that Kant's "system has manifested inner want of consistency and evident incompleteness;" but so far as I can see, not putting in its room anything satisfactory. He says: "It can hardly be too strongly impressed on the student of philosophy that the ordinary mode of starting in constructive metaphysic with the Cartesian certainty of one's own existence is misleading, and likely to entail the gravest error." I have not been able to find what he proposes to start with. There is the work of Professor Watson, of Queen's University, Kingston, Canada, "Kant and his English Critics," in which he acutely criticises Balfour, Stirling, Lewes, and others who are charged with not properly interpreting Kant. He meets these men by showing that Kant when properly understood is not responsible for their opinions. In my opinion, they may be more successfully met by showing that Kant is himself wrong in those points in which they father their errors on him. Professor Watson is constantly hinting that he

could improve Kant on certain points. Of course I have no opinion as to these improvements till they are drawn out. I have also before me "Text-Book to Kant:" Translation, Reproduction, Commentary, Index, with Biographical Sketch, by James Hutchison Stirling; 550 pages. Written in his usual Carlylish style, often exaggerated to crankiness, he has some admirable expositions and valuable criticisms of Kant's Critique. Once more, I see an advertisement of a translation of the Critique by Max Müller.

I believe that we have now reached the watershed, and that henceforth the stream will descend. Every one of these authors so far finds fault with Kant. From this date he will be criticised more and more severely. More fundamental objections will be taken to him than is done by these his admirers. All philosophers now see that such ideas, or rather convictions, as identity, infinity, and moral good cannot be derived, as Locke maintained, from sensation or the reflection of sensation in the mind. So, with the ghost of agnosticism grinning at us in the darkness, we shall now have to inquire whether, on Kant's theory that the mind begins with phenomena in the sense of appearances (*Erscheinungen*), it can ever rise to realities.

I have as great an admiration of Kant, of the man and of his philosophy, as those I have been criticising have. Vast good has resulted from his calling in mental principles which guarantee higher truth than the senses and save us from scepticism. I like much his partiality for the old logic, and I approve of some of his improvements of it, as, for instance, in introducing Immediate Inferences. For what is valuable in his categories he is very much indebted to that old logic. He has done invaluable service to morals, and I may add religion, in upholding the practical reason with its categorical imperative. The study of his philosophy calls forth and braces the highest energies of the mind, and makes us feel that truth and virtue have an immovable foundation.

But, on the other hand, he has fallen into errors which, legitimately or illegitimately, have been used to support and justify very pernicious ends. I do not allow that Kant met the scepticism, or rather the agnosticism, of Hume in a wise or satisfactory manner. Hume made the mind to start with, and in the

end to be in possession of, only impressions and ideas. His opponents should meet him here and drive back the ravager at the entrance. But Kant took down his outer wall and allowed the Trojan horse to enter with an armed force which he could not cast out, and which kindled a conflagration which left nothing but ashes and mounds behind.

I take deeper objection to Kant's philosophy than was done by President Porter or Professor Morris at the Concord meeting. First, I object entirely to his phenomenal theory of knowledge, to what is called phenomenology. Professor Mears says in his paper of "the materials presented to us by the inner and outer sense:" "These materials are not objects, and their presence does not constitute them experience until they have passed through the pre-existing moulds of the mind and taken their shape. They are not in space or in time of themselves; they are neither one, nor many, nor all; they are neither like nor unlike [is one rose not like another?]; they are neither substance nor qualities, neither cause nor effect; they have in fact no being except as the mind by its own insight recognizes or affirms it of them." The professor is forever lauding Kant for undermining sensationalism; but he did so by making mind as well as matter unknown, and thereby, without meaning it, landing us logically in agnosticism, in the darkness of which Huxley builds up materialism. I could show that agnosticism claiming to be logically derived from Kant is lowering thought in this the last quarter of the nineteenth century quite as much as sensationalism professing to come logically from Locke did in the corresponding quarter of the eighteenth century. As Americans began then to search Locke, so they must now commence to search Kant,—always after studying him and taking what is good from him. Dr. Stirling thus expounds: "In short, both outer object and inner subject, being perceived only through sense, are, by necessary consequence, perceived not as they are in themselves, or not as they just *are*, but merely as they *appear*. Whether we look to space or time, it is only our own states we know in either,"—and I may add, our own states merely as appearances. I hold that the mind begins with things and not with phenomena, with things appearing and not mere appearances. Even a tree seen in the water with its head down

is a real thing: it is the reflection of light from the water. But it will be asked me contemptuously, "Can it be possible that you hold the vulgar doctrine that you perceive the very thing?" They will condescend to remind me that to the eye the sky seems a concave, whereas it is an expanse; that color seems to be in the rose, whereas science tells us that it is a vibration at a certain rate in an ether; that we seem naturally to see things at a distance, whereas we perceive only things touching our eyes. Having condescended thus, they will then turn away from me as not worthy of being further reasoned with. Now I am quite disposed to meet them if they will meet me in argument. By the help of a few acknowledged distinctions I am able to hold by the trustworthiness of the senses. The senses may be charged with giving us more than realities, may seem to be giving us the distance of objects, whereas experiments wrought on persons born blind show that originally man has no such endowment. The difficulty is removed by drawing the distinction between our original and acquired perceptions, and showing that our original perceptions, which by the eye is simply a colored surface, do not deceive but show us the very thing. If those who disagree with me refuse contemptuously to argue with me, I can take it patiently, being sure that some other will be raised up to do what I have not been able to do. Of this I am certain, that the phenomenal theory of knowledge cannot stand much longer; if we do not begin with knowledge in the senses, inner and outer, we can never get it by a further process. Bacon in a well-known passage speaks of men being first inclined to believe in God, afterwards having doubts as they see difficulties, but in the end reaching a well-grounded faith. There is apt to be a like process in the theory of the senses. Men are led primarily to believe their senses, then they discover that the senses seem at times to deceive, but at last they are brought to acknowledge that the deceptions are apparent, not real.

Secondly, Kant has given a very erroneous account of those principles of the mind which he calls in to beat back Hume's scepticism. He represents them as forms imposing themselves on phenomena, whereas they are not moulds superimposing qualities, but perceptions of things with their qualities. They do not impose space and time upon objects, but perceive

objects as in space and time. The very favorite phrases of Kant, *a priori* and *a posteriori*, may cover error. There is not an *a priori* form to impose on things; there is merely the *a priori* capacity to discover things and what is involved in them.

Thirdly, Kant pursued a wrong method throughout—the Critical. I admit that what he calls *a priori* principles are to be sifted before they are accepted. But they are to be sifted simply by inquiring what they are and what they reveal. This does not make a limited experience the foundation of truth. Any one who will give his attention can understand that there may be truths prior to induction and above induction, but the nature of which we can discover only by induction.

But what are we to make of Hegel? I believe I had better let that question be answered by Prof. Harris. Some of my readers, however, may be interested to learn what pains I have taken to be able to find an answer for myself. A quarter of a century ago I resolved to spend five months of the vacation allowed me in Queen's College, Belfast, in mastering the system of the mighty man who for a time reigned as king of thought in Germany. I got a good edition of his works and set myself earnestly to the task of understanding the profound thinker. To assist me I read at the same time Vol. IV. of Willm's "Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande," which expounds the system with all the French *clarté*. I was soon made to realize that I was travelling with a giant who walked with seven-leagued boots, and that I had great difficulty in keeping up with him; but this arose simply from his strength and my weakness, and not from any defect of his. So I persevered. I felt at times as if I got glimpses of his meaning, and then I seemed to lose them. I was sure that this stream must be very deep, and I was bent on sounding it. But then it was pressed upon me that it might look so very deep because it is so drumly. Still I held on with all the obstinacy of a Scotchman for weary months in the sweet summer days. After months of study I thought it right to take a survey and an estimate of what I had gained. As I drew in the net I felt that I had an immense, seemingly an immeasurable length of knotted cordage, but the living fish were very few. At length, feeling my brain oppressed, I broke off and betook myself to the Grampian Mountains,

where I found the observation of the forms of nature, especially of the mountain plants, to be far more pleasant, and I thought profitable, than the study of the artificial forms of Hegel's dialectic. In the end I came to the conclusion that I had gone far enough into the labyrinth, and that as life is so brief and uncertain, and as I had so much other study to carry on and work to do, it might be as well to stop.

Since that I have once or twice ventured to criticise Hegel, but was told very emphatically by those who appeared to understand him that I did not understand him, and I was not quite sure whether they might not be right. I have watched with deep interest the history of the system, and conversed with several eminent Hegelians both of the right and left for hours at a time, and found no two of them agreeing with each other. I have observed that when any man opposes the system, he is told that he does not understand it. I was amused at, and rather gratified with, the story told that Hegel had said, "Only one man understands me, and he does not understand me." I was not amazed, nor was I sorrowful, to hear that the believers in Hegel were every year becoming fewer and fewer, tho metaphysicians still continued to study him and admire his dialectical skill. I confess, however, that I was taken by surprise when the pessimists, who follow much the same method but reach far different results, described one so famous as a charlatan. Finding that in the histories of philosophy he had a great name in the statement and interpretation of opinions, I betook myself to him at times when I was studying some of the ancient systems, such as that of Aristotle; but I found that he put them all under his own forms—in short, Hegelized them.[1] Of Christianity he always wrote in the way of compliment, but it is when he has made it speak as he speaks.

It is not easy to criticise Hegelianism, for this among other reasons, that it contains so much, all things divine and human,

[1] Many of the German histories of philosophy and those who copy them in England and America fall into a like fault. Thus they represent the Greek philosophers as seeking after the *absolute*, which is a German thought. What the Greeks were seeking after was τὸ ὄν, the reality, the real thing; not the *Ding an sich*, which is an absurdity, as there can be no such thing as a thing in itself; but the thing itself, the very thing.

that few if any finite minds can comprehend it. Those who would chivalrously enter into the lists against him may find that they are fighting with forms and not realities—with windmills, like Don Quixote. His philosophy seems to me to consist of rapid generalizations drawn by the speculative intellect from a few loose but at times true points of resemblance, overlooking specialties and differences. Such are his perpetual trinities, being, essence, notion: under being, quality, quantity, measure; under essence, ground of existence, phenomenon, reality; under notion, subjective notion, object, idea; and these again subdivided into threes, the whole in the end being identified with the Christian Trinity. They remind me of those systems of physical science which were taught in our universities before the days of Newton and induction, complete beyond what any physical philosopher can teach in our day. Not being formed carefully after the nature of things, but by pure thinking, these grand logical laws could not be legitimately carried out, and when they were carried out came into collision with facts in our nature or beyond it. But Hegel with his powerful intellect was determined to carry them out, and in doing so was alarmed by no consequences. When nature goes against reason, he holds that it must give way before reason, the higher. When he found that Newton's discoveries would not fall into his framework, he did not hesitate to set them aside, a circumstance which first led scientists to doubt of his pretensions. He is ever assuming what he should first have proved, and he does not scruple to set aside self-evident truth when it crosses his path. He admits that some of his positions are contradictory of each other, but then he maintains that truth is made up of two sides which are contradictory. It can be shown that these antinomies, and those of Kant as well, are not contradictions in things, but simply one-sided, partial, and perverted accounts of things.

He was not contented to be the *minister*, he was the *magister naturæ*. He ever lauded religion, but it had to submit to be ruled by his laws. It is well known that he did not go regularly to any church, and when his wife, a pious woman, would invite him to go with her, he would reply, "Mein Herz, thinking is also devotion." I apprehend that these two things, first his thinking not founded on facts and not subject to God, and sec-

ondly his ambitious speculative intellect, were the two sides or personalities that met in the third thing his philosophy, the whole constituting a trinity which he devoutly worshipped, and in the light of which is revealed more of the "Secret of Hegel" than even in Dr. Stirling's elaborate work.

It is a curious but not an inexplicable circumstance that while his sun has been going down in Germany, it has been rising in some other countries. In Great Britain and Ireland, and I may add in America, there has been no influential thinker since the decease of Mill and Hamilton,—always excepting Herbert Spencer, to whom many of our higher minds are not willing to submit because of the agnosticism of his "First Principles" and his identifying mind with nerves. Finding nothing at home to satisfy them, a number of youths in these countries have been resorting to Germany. In particular Merton Hall in Oxford has been a nursery of Hegelianism, which has had powerful propagators in Mr. Wallace and the two brothers Caird, the principal and the professor. In America Hegel has had an enlightened admirer in Dr. Harris, and a powerful defence in a group of writers in *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*.

To sum up, I believe in the lofty aims of the school at Concord. I go with them in their courageous opposition to scepticism, agnosticism, and materialism. They are doing good by holding before the age certain elevated ideas to lift up its downward look. But they will require carefully to determine what these ideas are, and what the laws by which they are regulated and limited; what they can do and what they cannot do. Many dissatisfied with the meagre philosophy of England, Scotland, and America at this present time are looking anxiously towards Germany. But I do not believe they will be able to beat back the tide by the embankments erected by Kant and Hegel, which when they give way, as they are evidently doing, will only let in the floods of scepticism with greater force. When the ancient Britons were wishing to drive out the Romans they called in the Anglo-Saxons, who became more formidable masters than those they drove out. So it will be with the Teutonic invasion which many are calling in: it may introduce a deeper error than that which it has been brought in to expel.

JAMES MCCOSH.

THE ARCHITECT AND HIS ART.

"I KNOW not," says Viollet le Duc, "whether poets, musicians, and painters are ever suddenly inspired to write an ode, to compose a sonata, or paint a picture; I am inclined to think not, because no poet, musician, or painter of genius has ever revealed to us any such phenomenon in his experience. The sacred fire does not kindle itself. In order to create a blaze we must heap wood and live coals together, arrange the sticks, and blow the smoldering pile until it breaks into a flame."

We have not to inquire very deeply into the means and methods of art, whether they be those of the painter, the sculptor, or the architect, before reaching this conclusion. We find that every great creation of art is a growth, a development, a result of previously acquired facts grouped and fused under some dominating impulse or idea. The poet browses up and down the present and the past, stores his mind from others' harvests, gleans again the oft-gleaned fields; but when his song flows forth, freighted with the rich spoils of patient industry, it has the spontaneity of an inspiration. While viewing the noble river we forget the springs and rills that comprise its source.

The painter presents an image that seems flashed upon the canvas with the ease and celerity of thought, with the vividness and truth of nature; but behind all this there is the laborious, painstaking, studious inquiry into the appropriateness of every detail, that the harmony and value of the most insignificant part may have due reference to the effect of the whole. Following the methods of the architect we shall reach a like conclusion in his case. When he has an edifice to construct he first collects all the data, the requisites, comprehending use, cost, and location, the nature of the material to be employed—in short, every

prominent practical requirement the character of the edifice demands. These he reduces to order by distinguishing the more prominent wants from those that are merely accessory. Upon this data, thus ordered, he erects his constructive forms, subordinating everything architectural to the utilitarian aspects of the plan; and when he has so arranged, adapted, and simplified these requirements as to fulfil every requisite, then he proceeds to give to them architectural expression.

The art of disposing his materials in a suitable and economical manner to attain a given utilitarian end is properly comprised in the science of engineering; but when above and beyond these utilitarian ends, yet in no particular subverting them, the builder seeks some expression of beauty in his construction, he then becomes an architect.

Architecture has been defined as the art of ornamental construction. A building constructed without reference to ornamental design should not properly be termed architectural. Mechanical construction, even when applied to house-building, when devoid of expression or ornamentation, as a factory, for instance, is not architecture. Such a building, however, may be made architectural by artistic treatment.

The first consideration of the architect, therefore, is to secure a proper arrangement of "the real requirements and determine their relative importance, without occupying himself with any considerations of architecture." He adjusts and readjusts the parts, transposes the various divisions, and finally unites them under some prominent necessity. He sketches the ground-plans with reference to their general areas, and subdivides these according to the requirements of the proposed edifice. He applies himself again and again to this task, "changes from left to right, puts that in front which was behind, and returns a hundred times to the disposition of details in his design."

Have we not seen in the analysis of every art how from small beginnings the idea shapes itself; how it grows by the accretion of new facts, and is pruned by the elimination of those that are unessential? Often there is much groping under faint gleams of light, when suddenly the architect "believes that he has discovered in his programme a principal idea, subordinating every other consideration. New light breaks in upon him; instead of ex-

amining the proposition before him in detail, to arrive at the general combination of the whole he reverses the operation, he discovers that until then he has had but a glimpse of the true requirements of the structure, and finds that its various apartments and dependencies should be submitted to a new general disposition, on a larger scale, affecting all their arrangements and communications." In all this extraordinary combination of geometrical figures—squares, rectangles, parallelograms, circles or their segments, and what not—there has been not the first inkling of architectural ideas. Both the architect and the engineer are thus far subordinated to the geometrician. "If," says Le Duc, "during these studies, the architect thinks about the orders, the works of the Greeks, the Romans, or the Goths, or anything foreign to the interior development of his own conceptions, he is lost, and instinctively sacrifices some practical necessity of his plan to obtain a desirable architectural effect."

But his plan settled upon, "his elevations are a part and expression of them, he sees how he should construct them, and the dominating idea of the plan becomes the principal feature of the elevations."

But while sketching this method of procedure I am not insensible of the fact that there is no arbitrary rule of composition or growth in creations of art. Every artist forms his own habit, his style, and he carries his peculiarities down to the very elements of his art. Conversing once with a prominent architect on this very subject—with reference to first conceptions—he declared that the elementary methods varied with the character of the artist; one may carefully determine the ground-plans, and adapt to them the elevations; while another, as was not infrequently the case, may conceive of the whole as a unit—plans and elevations fused under one general and dominating idea. Indeed, we may draw an inference from Michael Angelo's looking upon Brunelleschi's dome at Florence, and declaring that he would suspend it in the air in his contemplated construction of that of St. Peter's, at Rome: and I have no doubt that that dome was the first as it was the last inspiration of his vast undertaking.

It is absurd, therefore, to prescribe as arbitrary the rules for art, when we find ample evidence of their violation by the greatest masters—when we find Shakespeare violating Aristotle's

fundamental requisites for dramatic composition, as well as the grammarian's most rigid rules of syntax. Nevertheless the merit of a rule is tested through its common observance, rather than by its occasional violation, and the practice of architects commonly conforms to the method of proceeding suggested above: on the whole, experience proves this to be the wisest and most natural way of evolving from given premises structures that adequately fulfil the ends for which they are designed. Having therefore determined the arrangement of his interior plans, the architect then erects upon paper "a sort of skeleton or frame, a combination of masses, in which he proceeds to make the exterior appearance a manifestation of the interior dispositions, to cause the idea of the plan frankly to reappear in the elevation, and to decorate or subordinate the various parts according to its suggestions." Here, then, he enters upon the true province of the architect. Here his judgment, his taste, all the resources of his memory, his invention, and his artistic skill, are in demand. The vice-like tenacity of practical requirements in the elevations yields to other influences—allows of some latitude for pleasing effects. He spaces off the main divisions of the exterior walls by determining the construction of the internal arrangement. He expresses frankly the divisions of stories, and the subdivisions of these in accordance with the requirements of construction. He pierces the walls with openings for light and for entrance-ways; and when he has, by many repeated experiments, brought his conception to a definite end, so that his idea is shaped and defined, and capable of being formally expressed, he then gives to his draughtsmen, to be worked out with more care, the fragmentary and experimental records of his task.

The architect employs various kinds of draughtsmen: to each is given the parts adapted to his skill. They are required to be conversant with isometric and projection drawing, and perspective, besides the application of tints indicating the nature of the various materials employed in construction. The drawings of architects comprise plans, elevations, sectional elevations, and perspective views—which latter profess to give a representation of the appearance of the building when completed. These last, I may add, are designed too often to captivate the unlearned.

The critical generally mistrust them, and prefer the dry anatomical definition manifested in the plans and elevations.

In every formative art, drawing is of fundamental importance. The architect should be able to transfer to the paper, with ease, grace, and facility, that which he conceives in the mind. "Without this power he is unworthy the name of architect." In the process of making drawings the architect repeatedly goes over the careful and finished work of his assistants, making fresh suggestions, modifications, or amendments, with a free hand. Finally the finished drawings are made, adapted to a scale, and from these estimates are formed by the builders, including all the specifications descriptive of the nature and cost of materials, and the labor and time necessary for the completion of the work. What are termed "working-drawings" are likewise made, for actual use upon the ground. The preparation of working-drawings involves a thorough knowledge of projection drawing. They include samples of various parts of the construction, of every important detail respecting the mason-work, the cutting and framing of timbers and trusses, the carving of ornaments—in short, they serve as guides for workmen of all kinds, who, as a general thing, are incapable of executing the simplest task without rule or compass. The thorough architect, therefore, comprehends the mathematician and the engineer. He must be conversant with the branches of mathematics relating to stone-cutting and warped-surfaces, with the nature and strength of materials, with the proportion of weight to its just support, and with all that pertains to the forces that are active in the arch.

All the old architects claimed that a knowledge of anatomy was useful to the architect: Vitruvius, Brunelleschi, and Michael Angelo agree in this. Every fine architecture frankly expresses its anatomy. It aims not to conceal its construction, but to express in the externals some suggestion of that which is within. Thus we find its masses and its general forms determine the character of the parts and the details. Many principles of construction have been directly derived from the anatomy of the human form.

In addition to this, the finished architect must carry the sen-

sibility of the painter and the sculptor into his work. He should understand the use of color, in its harmonies and contrasts; and the values of relief resting in sculptured ornament. In short, his requirements, both with respect to science and art, are of such a character, and so numerous, that one may well exclaim—as did Rasselas, when the necessary qualifications of the poet were enumerated—"Enough, for you have convinced me that no man can be—an architect."

Mr. Ruskin, who has been a close student of architecture, and who has attained in that branch of art a high reputation as a critic, even among professional architects, declares that, in his opinion, "no person who is not a great sculptor, or painter, can be an architect. If he is not a painter or sculptor, he can only be a builder. The three greatest architects hitherto known to the world," he says, "were Phidias, Giotto, and Michael Angelo; with all of whom architecture was only their play, sculpture and painting their work. All great works of architecture in existence," he continues, "are either the work of single painters or sculptors, or of societies of painters and sculptors." A Gothic cathedral he defines as "a piece of the most magnificent associative sculpture." This he says in defence of his proposition that "ornamentation is the principal part of architecture." Professional architects, I may add, take exception to this. They hold that "the true nobility of architecture consists *not* in decoration, but in the disposition of the masses, and that architecture is, in fact, the art of proportion." If the proportions of a building are bad, no amount of decoration will serve to lend to it a pleasing or impressive effect. Undoubtedly, underlying every idea of detail, proportion is fundamental in architecture. If we dissect a temple of the Greeks—the Parthenon, for instance—we find the principal features of the façade may be defined as follows: a triangular form, termed the *pediment*, resting on a horizontal parallelogram, termed the *entablature*, which is supported by eight vertical props, or columns, called the *peristyle*. These three principal features explain the construction—vertical posts, supporting a horizontal beam, on which rests the roof, sloped to shed rain. Following the order in which these were defined and ornamented, we learn that the proportions of length, breadth, and height were then determined. The columns were consid-

cred with reference to their true proportions, and with reference to the intervening spaces. Their vertical lines were found to be so pleasing that these were multiplied by fluting the columns. The entablature was spaced horizontally, and then vertically, by adding the *tryglyphs*. Lastly *metopes*, or carved reliefs, were inserted between the tryglyphs, and the pediment was filled in with sculpture. Thus construction gradually blossomed into architecture.

In the early forms of architecture the *mass* preponderates even to a disproportion of weight to its just support—as in the Egyptian. In the Grecian, *symmetry*, or weight subjugated by science, is felt to be the marked characteristic; while in the Gothic, weight is vanquished by the arch, and we find *space* superseding mass. Underlying these elemental features, the fundamental principle is that of proportion. The history of every art reveals a natural development or growth. The theory of evolution becomes strikingly manifest in their successive changes. The earliest builders could not calculate the proportion requisite between superincumbent weight and its just support; and they erred on the right side, by providing superabundant strength to carry their intended burden. "We observe how, by degrees, every architecture becomes slimmer and lighter as experience has brought these proportions to the test." The Egyptian is heavier than the Greek; and likewise after the Doric comes the Ionic, then the Corinthian, and at last the Composite, each order being lighter in construction than its predecessor. Abundant evidence remains to prove that the heavier construction of remoter periods was not based upon any accurate calculation of ratio between support and weight—the first went beyond the demands of the second. In like manner, at a later period, we pass from the Norman, through the intermediate stages of pointed architecture, to the Flamboyant or Decorated. We find the architects of the sixteenth century "fearlessly altering the old Norman arches into the pointed, and round massive piers into slender clustered columns; thus cutting out masses of sustaining material without apprehension of insecurity." In the same manner the walls undergo a change. The apertures for windows are enlarged until they absorb the greater part of the spaces between the supports sustaining the groined arches, while these supports

are reinforced with buttresses and flying buttresses, and thus the bearing lines are continued through a succession of curves or angles to the very ground, quite without the walls. We find, therefore, in the Gothic, vast spaces enclosed, with very little massive material used in construction. Science thus reinforces art, and by its subtile laws enables the architect thus to subjugate matter.

The three grand divisions in architecture originated in the three methods of covering a space; and these three are pure, says Mr. Ruskin, exactly in proportion to the simplicity and directness with which they express the condition of roofing on which they are founded. The Greek is the architecture of the lintel; the Roman, that of the round arch; and the Gothic, that of the gable.

"The most perfect example of the Greek is the Parthenon. The Roman divides into eastern and western—Byzantine and Lombardic. Of the former, St. Mark's, Venice, is the most perfect example; of the latter, the Duomo at Pisa. The Gothic likewise divides into eastern and western branches—the Arabian and the European: the latter may be termed the pure Gothic. In the Greek, the Western-Roman, and the Western-Gothic, the roof-mark is the gable; in the Eastern-Roman and Eastern-Gothic, it is the dome." These distinctions of Mr. Ruskin are both accurate and simple, and once fixed in the memory they will serve to explain much that is fundamental in the principal distinctions of architecture.

But a slight acquaintance with Grecian architecture will enable us to see that the effect of symmetry and elegance was based upon a perfected system of proportion. The general proportions of the *Tetrastyle*, or four-column porticoes, was based upon the square, the height being equal to the breadth. One third is given to the supports, the same to the intercolumniations, and a like area to the entablature, or load supports. The proportions of the *Hexastyle*, or six-column porticoes of Doric temples, were comprised within a parallelogram of a square and a half. The relative proportions of the entablature, the columns, and the intercolumniations, are the same—each comprising one third of the general space enclosed by the outline of the entire façade. The *Octastyle*, or eight-columned portico, of which the Parthenon

is the most perfect example, comprises the double square, having twice the number of columns that are found in the tetrastyle. The proportions are relatively the same—one third to the supports, and a like area each to the entablature and the intercolumniations. The *Roman Octastyle*, as exemplified in the Pantheon, divides the intercolumniations equally with the solids—that is, with the columns and entablature combined. The Pantheon portico is a double square *without* the pediment, and in this respect the Romans differed from the Greeks.

The vertical and horizontal lines of Greek architecture—the outlines of the columns, and the lines of the architrave—are found, on close investigation, to differ in reality from their appearance. Penrose subjected some of the temples to mathematical measurements, and determined the nature of these variations—or at least proved their existence—without penetrating to their origin or cause, except so far as to infer that they were designed to overcome certain optical illusions, and render an increased effect of elegance. Thus the architrave, which has the appearance of being perfectly horizontal, was found to be slightly arched—perhaps to correct any optical interference of the sloping lines of the pediment. This was common to all their temples, but in the Parthenon the curve was applied to the sides also. The columns, likewise, which appeared to be bounded by straight lines, were found to have a convex profile, very slight indeed (in the Parthenon it is only $\frac{1}{550}$ of the whole height), and this outline was in the form of a very delicate hyperbolic curve. Another peculiarity of the Greeks was that of making the columns of their temples slope inward, very slightly it is true, but with a uniformity that evidently was the result of design—it may be, to increase the impression of strength. All the curved lines used, says Penrose, were either hyperbolas or parabolas. "Whatever process of reasoning was employed in arriving at these extreme niceties, the Greeks evidently attached the highest importance to fulfilling the laws deduced with such accuracy."

Accurate measurements having been recently applied to Lincoln, Salisbury, and other of the English Gothic cathedrals, the results obtained show conclusively the mathematical basis of all true proportion in this architecture as well as in the Grecian. Indeed, we must concede that harmonious proportions, whether

applied to form, sound, or color, have their mathematical ratios underlying their effects, producing harmonious or discordant, agreeable or disagreeable impressions.

The proportions of Gothic architecture have not the fixity of the Grecian system: they differ in German, French, and English cathedrals. The general plan which prevails extensively in Gothic architecture is that of the cross. In the East the ground-plan is that of the Greek cross; in the West it is the Latin cross. The latter, says Gwilt, being divided into squares, gives 3, 5, and 7 as the ruling numbers—the arms and centre equal three squares; the whole number, omitting the centre, equal five; and seven is the sum of the length and width. This, according to descriptive geometry, gives the development of the cube. These numbers have been found to predominate in the proportional measurements of a large number of the best Gothic cathedrals. I will not insist upon the absolute accuracy of any such system of measurement; but through increased attention lately given to searching out these proportions, by measuring the surfaces, solids, and spaces of Gothic architecture, they have been found to prevail extensively. That some like system must have been employed in structures of such vast extent, we cannot doubt. It would have been impossible to preserve symmetry and elegance on a scale so extensive without it. The proportion of height to breadth, which varies considerably in English and continental Gothic, is yet conducive to symmetry and beauty in both instances. Pugin declares that, when he began the study of English Gothic, he conceived the proportions to be very defective, and decidedly inferior to those employed in continental cathedrals. But on closer acquaintance he perceived that the distinctions were such as indicated a distinct development of Gothic architecture, and upon laws peculiar to this development. The greater length of nave is peculiar to English Gothic, while the continental is narrow and higher.

The Roman and Gothic roofs are divided into two parts: the lower, or visible vaulting, and the upper, or roof-mask, which protects the lower from the weather. "Thus we have the arch for the *bearing* line below, and the gable for the *protecting* line above." The Roman has a flattened gable surmounting a round arch; the Gothic, a high-peaked gable surmounting a pointed

arch. These simple features, in their variations respecting the arch and the roof-mask, enable us to distinguish these two architectures clearly. These distinctions are repeated throughout the details, as well as in the general forms. "Romanesque and Gothic buildings are more or less Roman or Gothic in proportion to the number of their respective forms that we find united in them," says Mr. Ruskin. Thus we find the semicircular arch of the Romanesque employed throughout the details and ornaments, as in the façade of the Cathedral of Pisa; and in the early Saxon and Norman architecture of England. In the Gothic, the pointed arch, with its high gable, supplies the forms that everywhere prevail throughout this style. It is by the study of these details, no less than the general forms—the vaultings of the nave and aisles, and their respective roofings—that we arrive at a perception of the distinctions and merits of Gothic architecture.

About the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth century, a change took place in the architecture of Europe. The flat southern roof was superseded by the high-pitched northern covering of ecclesiastical edifices, and its introduction brought with it the use of the pointed arch in place of the round, or semicircular; and this was a necessary consequence, for the roof and vaults, being thus raised, necessitated a change in the combination of general forms. Heavy roofs, with few ribs, and great width of vault carried by massive walls with small openings, are characteristic of Romanesque work. Its successor was exactly the reverse—the subdivision of roofing into a collection of light ribs and groined work; the growth of the engaged or disengaged pillars into the lines of the vaulting; the substitution of clustered columns for massive round pillars; and the large windows, both in the clere-story and the main walls, made so large that the walls often appear to be merely the frames of these, but secured against the lateral thrust of the arches by flying-buttresses that offer resisting points. The transition from the Romanesque, or Norman, to the Gothic was beautifully expressed by the substitution of clustered shafts for plain round pillars. These groups of slender supports spring aloft with great lightness, disappearing in the varied foliage of their numerous capitals, and then again rising beyond the clere-

story they soar aloft and disappear in the groined vaultings of the roof.

"The eye requires, on a slender shaft, a more spreading capital than it does on a massy one, and a bolder mass of capital on a small scale than on a large." But while the eye is thus agreeably impressed with the beauty of the capital, its actual use, or service, is "to gather the bearing forces of the upper masonry and concentrate them upon the shaft."

Endless change without repetition is a characteristic of the best Gothic. The source of its inspiration was found in nature. Variety under general uniformity is one of nature's laws which the Gothic architect emulated. The capitals, the shafts, the traceries, the carvings—all weave a harmony of variety in unity throughout this architecture. The round, the angular, the spiral, and the grooved shafts give a varied and complex assemblage of lines that entice the eye aloft, as religious aspirations do the soul. The Gothic cathedral is a vast aspiration transfixed and petrified, and as such it is one of the grandest embodiments of religious fervor—the bodying forth of a great Christian impulse. Compared with this the small Grecian temple has a finite fixity, a completely compassed, finished, and intellectually rounded end and defined character that is an end in itself—tho one of extreme beauty. Architecture presents a field so vast, so varied, and so suggestive of the greatest triumphs of the human mind, that it is impossible, within the limits assigned me in this article, to give more than a few bald suggestions of its scope and character.

The dome presents a subject of extraordinary interest, and there are few things more fascinating in literature than Vasari's account, in his life of Brunelleschi, of the building of the great double dome of the cathedral at Florence, and of Michael Angelo's erection of that of St. Peter's, at Rome.

The Indian minar, the Turkish minaret, the Italian campanile, the Gothic spire, the Norman tower, the Saxon belfry, are, in themselves, beautiful creations. "To build high has been the aspiration of all great builders in every country where architecture has had any share in the expression of life and power;" and these structures were "raised to be seen from a distance, to cry from, or to swing bells in."

One cannot put too high an estimate upon the power of architecture to impress human sensibility, or inspire profound thought. If any one doubts this power, let him make a pilgrimage to its shrines. There is no mere description that will more than dimly suggest the sensations experienced on first entering those vast temples of worship. It is not the skill of the architect we dwell upon in recalling those lasting impressions that overawed the mind and lifted the thought on wings as we entered their solemn aisles and stood beneath their spacious vaults. But it is the voice of art that speaks so eloquently through dumb but expressive silence—as in the struggle of irruptive and dazzling light pouring through lofty stained windows, and dying away in the solemn depths of shade that fill the vast interior spaces of the cathedral. All these combined effects of light, shadow, color, space, and beautiful forms, that are the delight of the beholder, were once but a thought in the mind of the architect. To his art all other arts are made tributary.

A recent effort of Wagner, the composer, to unite the arts under one great musical supremacy, was, in a sense, but a dim reflection of that grand mediæval idea embodied in the cathedral—for while the thought was then expanded and lifted by the vast and solemn architecture, the eye fell upon the sacred subjects of pictorial art, and saintly forms carved in stone. The ear too was filled with the grand waves of the organ and the solemn cadence of chanted verse. Thus all the senses were made avenues through which the mind and sensibility were blended in one common aspiration of joy. Poetry, painting, sculpture, music, and architecture were thus harmoniously united in one voice—the voice of art.

JOHN F. WEIR.

ANTI-NATIONAL PHASES OF STATE GOVERNMENT.

THE rapid growth of the United States has developed a new want in our system of government. In very general terms it may be defined as the need of securing in some efficient way a closer intercommunication and harmony of action between the separate States in matters of purely State jurisdiction. It is the object of this essay to point out precisely the nature and exigency of the want referred to, and to suggest means of supplying it.

The United States in relation to foreign powers is a *nation* possessing all the attributes of an undivided sovereignty; but in its internal organization and government, and in the relations of the several States to each other, the United States is in only a very qualified sense a *nation;* it is rather a congeries of independent powers. Viewed from within, the States are merged in the federal government, or subordinated to it, in really few particulars, and those particulars not the ones that enter most deeply into the development and life of a people. All foreign relations, including war and commerce, naturalization, bankruptcy, coinage of money, post-offices, patents and copyrights, and the suppression of insurrections and invasions—this is a substantially complete list of the interests committed to the federal government, and as to these the States are welded together into national unity. But in all matters other than those above enumerated each State is an independent sovereignty, practically unhampered by the Union, and holding to the other States, in law and in fact, the relations of a *foreign* government.

These statements are truisms, but many of the consequences they involve are practically under-estimated. The legal separa-

tion and independence of the States from each other is greater, and the constitutional power of the federal government to control or supplement State action is far more limited, than the masses of the people are disposed to believe. But it is a fact that in most of those interests that bear vitally upon the prosperity and well-being of a people, the separate government of each State is absolute and supreme. Each State has its own code of civil law presiding over all the transactions and conduct of daily life, its own criminal jurisprudence, its own mass of judicial decisions interpreting its written and unwritten law. Each State pursues its own methods in all that relates to the security of life and of property within its borders; has its own system of taxation, its own system of education, its own system of public charities. There is no social relation and hardly a phase of individual life in which the power and influence of the State are not vastly greater than those of the federal government.

These various State codes and methods and systems that flow through the very arteries of social and of individual life are widely diverse, and are often in sharp conflict with each other. This discordance and conflict between the laws and institutions of the different States present one of the gravest evils in our government. The wrongs resulting from it are hostile to the interests and growing national spirit of the people, and they are wrongs without a remedy; there is no organized instrumentality for their correction within the four corners of our system of government. For these reasons the evil has appealed to revolutionary methods for its cure, and the fact suggests grounds of apprehension for the future.

The "conflict of laws" has formed the subject of large treatises; and it is only possible within present limits, by the selection of a few instances, to illustrate the pernicious operation of such conflict upon our national prosperity. For this purpose consider, first, the subject of State taxation.

In all the States personal property is made an object of local taxation. There are two legal principles regarding personal property, both equally well established, which may be applied in its taxation. The first is that personal property has no *situs* apart from its owner, but is to be regarded as located at the

place where the owner is domiciled. The other principle is that each State has supreme jurisdiction over all persons and over all property actually within its boundaries. A resident of New Jersey owning personal property in Massachusetts is personally subject to the jurisdiction of New Jersey and taxable there; and, under the legal fiction that all personal property, wherever located in fact, is legally situated at the place of the owner's domicile, New Jersey may assert the right to levy taxes on account of the property in Massachusetts. On the other hand, Massachusetts, invoking the second principle above stated, claims supreme jurisdiction over the same property on the ground that it is actually within the State, and imposes a tax upon it. And thus the owner is compelled, under strictly legal principles, to pay taxes for the same property in both States. Suppose, further, that the property is subject to a mortgage held by a resident of Ohio: he, too, may be taxed in Ohio upon the value of his security—that is, on the value of his interest in the property; and so the same property may be the object of taxation in three or more separate States. Yet every State will declare that it is wrong in principle to subject any property to double taxation, and that it is a grievous hardship upon an owner of property, paying a tax on it in one State, to endure the exaction of a second tax in another State. But neither State, while asserting the true principle, can yield the tax-payer any relief. The courts of New Jersey must declare: You are a citizen of this State and subject to its laws; under the system of taxation established and enforced in New Jersey, you have been legally taxed, while the hardship of paying a second tax in another State, of which you justly complain, is attributable to the peculiar laws of Massachusetts, for which we are in no wise accountable. The courts of Massachusetts are equally clear in their logic: We cannot remit this tax without reversing the policy and system which the State of Massachusetts has adopted of taxing all personal property located within the limits of its jurisdiction. The opposite State policies not only inflict on the individual a hardship for which there is no redress, but they put a direct check upon the employment of a common capital in different States and upon the extension of industrial and business enterprises from one State into others; they are

repressive in their operation, inducing the confinement of each interest within the limits of a single State jurisdiction, and so hampering that free expansion of trade which is essential to its healthy growth.

The same obstructive influence of conflicting State laws manifests itself in numberless directions, and their tendency is always blighting on the material prosperity of the people. Negotiable paper is the circulating medium of trade, and is indispensable in its operations very much as free air is needful for the processes of respiration. The laws that govern the validity and negotiability of commercial paper ought to be not only uniform but absolutely identical throughout a country whose business interests are closely interwoven from the Atlantic to the Pacific. And yet the utmost diversity prevails among the different States even upon such elementary questions as—What constitutes a negotiable note? Who is a *bona-fide* holder for value? What is a valuable consideration? Some of the States have usury laws, others have none; the consequences of usury are widely diverse, in some States forfeiting the entire debt, in others only the interest, in others involving some different penalty, and in others making usury a criminal misdemeanor. A note may be perfectly good in one State and utterly worthless in another, while its possession in a third State may subject the owner to actual imprisonment. And so it is that negotiable paper, which ought to circulate with the widest freedom and security, has become a most precarious and dangerous article; and State laws, instead of fostering inter-State commerce, have by their contrariety hampered and discouraged it.

It is perhaps misleading, however, to particularize negotiable paper, for the same absence of uniformity resulting in the same pernicious consequences is found in almost every other species of contract. The force or validity of a contract may be subjected to the test of one of four separate systems of law: first, the law of the State where the contract was made (*lex loci contractus*); second, the law of the State where the contract was to be performed (law of the place of performance); third, the law of the State where the specific property affected by the contract may happen to be situated (*lex loci reisitæ*); fourth, the law of the

State where the action is brought (*lex fori*); and in some classes of actions the law of a fifth State may be controlling the State where the parties are domiciled (*lex domicilii*). In many cases the four or five systems of State law thus to be selected from may be in direct conflict with each other, and it is often a matter of extreme doubt and difficulty to determine which system is properly applicable to the decision of a given case. And even if the States agree in the settlement of that preliminary question, it still follows that the same kind of contract made in separate States is valid and enforceable in one State, only partially valid in a second, and wholly illegal in a third. It is a conclusive presumption of law that every person contracting in any State is familiar with its laws, and the contract is construed as if the parties had incorporated in it, *pro hac vice*, the laws of that State. And yet the laws and legal remedies of the separate States are so dissimilar that a prudent lawyer would decline to give an opinion, without making special examination, upon a simple question relating to the laws of another State than his own. This dissimilarity is not confined to the law of contracts: it extends to wills, intestacy, the law of corporations and partnerships, domestic relations, and through the whole circle of State legislation.

Apply this chaotic jurisprudence to the numerous cases that that will present themselves to every practical mind. Railroad corporations, whose lines traverse a dozen States, making contracts for transportation in each of them, dealing with enormous properties in each of them, incurring liabilities for loss or negligence in each of them, and yet subject to a dozen different and conflicting systems of law, regulating their rights, their duties, and their liabilities; insurance companies and telegraph companies, having agencies and transacting business in every State in the Union; every manufacturing interest and every commercial interest having business relations, more or less extended, in different States, and yet encountering diverse laws as they pass each State boundary; that these enterprises can yet thrive in the face of such adverse and fluctuating circumstances is a marvellous proof of the ingenuity of man and of the vital energy of trade in overcoming obstacles.

There is an equal diversity in the forms of procedure enforced

and in the remedies yielded by the courts of the different States. In a word, the States are legally *foreign* powers with reference to each other, and their systems of law and of administration, so far as they clash or even fail to harmonize, are formidable obstacles to *national* growth and unity. To foster industry and trade you must give certainty and consistency to the civil laws that govern them; and if their extension to another State requires a new adjustment or a reorganization to secure the same legal rights, or subjects them to new conditions under a different State policy, their natural development is repressed by a check that is always pernicious and may sometimes prove insurmountable. The material and moral interests that knit the country together are regardless of State lines, except as they are unduly diverted or severed by incompatible State laws and policies.

The moral interests of the country suffer as well as its material prosperity. The proper treatment of marriage and divorce is fundamental to the morality and even the civilization of a people; and here, at least, it would seem that substantial uniformity might be expected among the States forming a single nation. But in fact the divergence between State laws and adjudications on this vital subject, and the injurious consequences flowing from that divergence, present a spectacle that is revolting to moral sentiment. The possible complications of domestic life in its most sacred relations that may actually arise under the conflict of States tax the ingenuity of the imagination. A citizen of the United States may be legally incapacitated to contract a marriage in one State which the laws of another State sanction; he may be a married man legally in one State and at the same time an unmarried man in another State; he may actually have one lawful wife in one State and another lawful wife in another State. But the real facts of a case recently adjudicated in the New York Court of Appeals will give a keener sense of the conflict of laws than any abstract statement or hypothetical example can do.

In 1871 Frank M. Baker married Sallie West in Ohio; he subsequently abandoned her and established his domicile in New York. The wife, who remained domiciled in Ohio, then brought her suit in the courts of Ohio to obtain a divorce; judgment of

absolute divorce was rendered in her favor in 1874, and in the following year she married one C. H. Murray. After the entry of the judgment of divorce Baker also contracted a second marriage, marrying one Eunice Nelson within the State of New York. He was then indicted in New York for bigamy; he pleaded in defence that the divorce in Ohio having terminated his first marriage, left him free to marry Eunice Nelson. It was conceded that the judgment in Ohio was regularly obtained in accordance with the laws of that State, and that it was unquestionably valid in Ohio; but, on the ground that the defendant was domiciled and actually resident in New York, and did not appear by attorney in the divorce suit, the Court of Appeals held that the divorce was not binding on Baker or on the courts of New York; the divorce was held valid as to the wife, Sallie West, but a nullity as to the husband, Frank M. Baker; by virtue of it the wife became divorced from her husband, but the husband did not become divorced from his wife; Frank M. Baker continued to be the husband of Sallie West when he married Eunice Nelson, and hence he was guilty of bigamy, and was sentenced to the State Prison for five years, and there he probably is to-day. The anomalies involved in this decision are very striking. If Sallie West, now Mrs. Murray, should move with her husband, Mr. C. H. Murray, to New York, she would have two husbands here—no, the subject demands the utmost exactness of language—she would have only one husband, but two husbands would have her as their lawful wife. Mr. Baker has never been deprived of her, altho Mr. Baker is to her no relation, for she was divorced but he was not. Sallie, having been legally divorced, had a right to marry Mr. Murray, was legally married to him in Ohio, and the validity of Mr. Murray's claim to her must be recognized even by the courts of New York. Regard the matter now from Mr. Baker's standpoint: Suppose that he had married Eunice Nelson in Rhode Island instead of New York, and had gone to Ohio upon his wedding tour; the courts of Rhode Island accept the Ohio divorce as valid, and Eunice and her husband consequently set out on their journey a legally married couple; in crossing the State of New York Eunice ceases to hold any lawful relation to her husband, whose New York wife is Sallie West; and, on reaching

Ohio, Mr. Baker ceases to be a married man at all, for, as the decree of divorce prohibited him from marrying again, Ohio will not recognize the validity of the subsequent marriage in Rhode Island.[1]

It is proper to observe, that the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in the case cited does not mark any new departure, but seems to be sustained by the weight of authority both in the State and the federal courts. This case is a forcible illustration of the inextricable and hopeless confusion that has resulted from the adoption of distinct policies by the separate States; and that, too, in a matter where in the reason of things there is not the slightest cause for divergence from absolute uniformity. It is difficult to estimate the demoralizing effects upon the people of such subversion, under the forms of law, of relations that ought to be held sacred. Add to this the utterly insoluble questions about rights of property and legitimacy of offspring growing out of such indeterminate family relations, and the conflict of laws becomes an evil that is insufferable—an evil that in some way and by some means *must* be cured, not only in the interest of decent morality, but in the interest of civilization itself.

The illustrations given of the conflict between State policies have touched but a few of the salient points of the subject; it would be easy to trace this conflict further into all the departments of State legislation and State administration, and to detect the injurious and anti-national tendencies of it in many phases of the life and development of the people. But my present object has been accomplished in pointing out the existence and the nature of the evil; that it is an evil, and that the country needs relief from it, none will be disposed to deny.

It was intimated at the outset that the evil complained of had been developed by the growth of the United States. This is true, not so much in the sense that the divergence of State policies has been increasing, but in the sense that the changed conditions of our national growth are making that divergence to be felt more painfully, and its effects to be more and more in-

[1] I am not aware that this last point has ever been expressly passed upon in Ohio, but, as it *has* been so adjudicated in some other States, it answers the purpose of a fair illustration.

jurious with every step of our progress. At the foundation of the government the people of the several States were really separated in policy and interests; the States had just emerged from the condition of colonies, and were but partially amalgamated. The colonies had led each a separate existence, somewhat aloof from one another and holding toward each other an attitude of jealousy and suspicion. New York and Connecticut had been traditionally at open feud; the existence of Rhode Island had been a kind of standing protest against what was there deemed the illiberal policy and bigotry of Massachusetts; New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland had had little in common in their origin or in their colonial history, and the Southern colonies were at variance with the Northern in their political governments and in the prevailing sentiments of their people. Facilities for intercourse between the colonies were meagre, and instances of social commingling or of business connection between their inhabitants were of comparatively rare occurrence. The common desire for independence from the British crown, and the sympathies and mutual interests developed by their union in the Revolutionary struggle, constituted the bond that drew the colonies together into national unity. When independence was finally achieved the new States retained much of the colonial exclusiveness, and shrank from anything more than a very qualified merger of themselves in a national government. The articles of confederation served rather to foster the jealousy of the States than to knit them together in closer union. And when the Constitution was framed, consolidating the States more firmly, and depriving them of some of the elements of sovereignty, it was not received with universal enthusiasm; it was only after years of reluctance and under the pressure of obvious policy that the Constitution was finally accepted by all the States.

These sharp lines of demarcation between the States have by the progress of time become nearly obliterated in the interests and temper of the people, while *legally* they remain as at first. It admits of no doubt whatever that the population of the United States is vastly more homogeneous and more truly *national* in spirit than it was in its beginnings. This is probably true even of the Southern States, for the past few years give

hopeful signs that the wounds of the civil war are healing, and that the South is slowly growing into the nation. The causes that are strengthening the bonds between the people are as obvious as the fact itself. The civil war strongly intensified the sentiment of nationality; it brought into intimate contact and comradeship large bodies of men from every section; it cemented the people into firm unity by common sympathies, hopes, and sufferings; and its issue was the distinct triumph of the principle of union over the principle of State segregation. The assassination of Lincoln, and, even more, the assassination of Garfield, have fused the people into a brotherhood in the deep feeling of a common grief. The material interests of the nation are all co-operating in every direction toward the same result. Railroads and telegraphs and the newspaper press are daily drawing the people into closer and closer contact; the development of our resources, the extension of business and industrial enterprises, the great moral and social movements of the time —all these agencies are *national* in their scope and tendency. State lines do not hem in the circle of influences that regulate any employment of capital however local, or any industry however humble; all trade, all labor, all individual activity of whatever kind, are parts of one national life, measured by one common pulse that beats alike through the length and breadth of our land.

The conflict of State laws is directly opposed to all these nationalizing tendencies; it is essentially anti-national in its nature and far-reaching in its pernicious working. Interests of labor and of capital that are identical throughout the land are locally hampered or distorted in their development by incompatible systems of State laws and of judicial remedies; lines of progress that are naturally independent of State divisions are intersected by State boundaries, and are apt to be cut off or deflected by an adverse State policy. This contrariety of State systems has no justification in reason or necessity: and a sense of incongruity in dissecting a homogeneous nation into thirty-eight territorial divisions and subjecting these divisions to separate and distinct governments with inharmonious and conflicting laws that yet have *supreme* local jurisdiction over what concerns most deeply the life and character of the whole nation —a sense of incongruity and of unwisdom in this disintegrating

policy has given rise to that tendency, so strongly manifested of late years, toward centralization of power in the federal government. The want of harmony between the States, in dealing with interests of common and really national concern, has seemed to many a proof that the States, acting apart, are not competent to govern those interests, and that there ought to be a central power which should secure to the people a common, or at least a self-consistent, government. And so it is that in the conflict of State laws the minds of the people turn for a remedy to the federal government.

It is certain that the federal government is absolutely powerless to grant any relief, or to exert any influence which shall tend to draw the States toward uniformity or harmony. The limits of its jurisdiction are rigidly and jealously marked by the Constitution, the tenth amendment of which explicitly enacts that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people." The provisions of the Constitution which aim to secure harmony of State action are strikingly vague as well as few and simple. "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State;" "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States;" a fugitive from justice from one State found in another State shall be delivered up on requisition to the State having jurisdiction of the crime; the United States shall protect each State from invasion; and, finally, the federal courts shall have jurisdiction over controversies between two or more States or between citizens of different States, and over claims made by one State against citizens of another State; *not*, be it marked, over claims made by the citizens of one State against another State. A State cannot be sued except by another State; and as the conflict of State laws acts injuriously upon the citizens of the States, and not upon the States themselves in their corporate character, the suffering parties cannot bring their defendant into court. But in no event can Congress or the federal judiciary intervene between the States in any, the slightest way, without subverting the whole system and theory of the Union. The States, in all

matters not delegated to the United States, are as absolute and supreme as the United States is in its sphere; and the United States has no more right to restrain the freedom of State action, touching matters of State jurisdiction, than a State has to override the legislation of Congress upon a topic of federal jurisdiction. Two limits only the Constitution sets upon the discord and wranglings of the States: (1) they shall not proceed to open war, actual invasion; (2) the Supreme Court is vested with power to decide "controversies" between the States, but this has been held to be limited to controversies of a *judicial* nature, not touching the political sovereignty of each State.[1] The fact remains that the federal power cannot be invoked to reconcile the conflicting policies of the States upon matters not expressly delegated by the Constitution to the United States.

It is not difficult to discern the causes that have led the States apart on divergent lines of legislation and policy. The variance cannot be laid to the charge of the State judiciaries. The judges of the State courts, who as a class have been men of broad views and often able jurists, have been keenly sensible of the evils attendant upon a conflict of judicial decisions; they have laboriously collated the decisions of other States in kindred cases and have habitually aimed to reconcile and harmonize them, and so far as possible to follow them. But the differences complained of are inherent in the laws themselves, in the statutes enacted by the separate State legislatures; and it is upon these bodies, the legislatures of the several States, that rests the burden of accountability for the diverse and conflicting systems. The evil is largely the natural outcome of that worst fact in our political history—that politics have become a trade, and not a science. The highest intelligence and the most sterling moral forces in the community have kept aloof from politics, and have delivered over the control of caucuses and political parties, and hence the practical administration of government, to those elements of society that are not rightfully

[1] I do not overlook the restrictions imposed by the Constitution upon State laws, that they shall not impair the obligation of contracts, etc., for these restrictions are founded upon natural right, and would practically be enforced without the Constitution.

the dominant ones. It is the natural result that State legislatures fail to represent the best intelligence or moral purity of their constituencies, and are apt to be manipulated by ambitious leaders who are skilled in intrigue but are wholly unfitted to deal with broad questions of statesmanship.

There are other causes lying deeper than the personal characteristics of those who enact the laws. There are no adequate means by which legislators, however honest or able, can acquaint themselves with precisely what the real needs of legislation demand from them; in acting upon a proposed law they are often ignorant what legislative action the other States have already adopted upon the same subject, what practical difficulties such legislation in other States has encountered, in what directions kindred laws have clashed in different States, suggesting dangers to be avoided and differences to be harmonized; nor can they acquire this information, so essential to guide their action, without studious and laborious research, for which, by their habits and abilities, they are utterly unqualified. There is no official bureau of political information, no official organ of communication between the States, through which the legislature of one State can readily place itself *en rapport* with the other States, gain authentic knowledge, by their experience, of a common want, and cooperate with them in carrying out a defined policy with intelligence and efficiency. So the State sovereignties plod on apart, each in the path of its own narrow policy, legislating only for the supposed interests of its own commonwealth, heedless of harmony with its sister States, and practically ignoring the inter-State conflict of jurisprudence. But meantime a consolidated *nation* has sprung up and has outgrown the States; the constriction of State lines and of local laws and policies is galling to its energy and its growth; and there has arisen among the people a yearning (often undefined, but yet clearly perceptible) to be governed by a national law and a firmly centralized government.

It is exactly here, in my judgment, that lie the weakness, and the danger in the system of government devised by our fathers. While it left each State *supreme* in all matters not delegated to the federal government, it provided no agency to keep the States upon parallel lines of policy, instituted no official organ of po-

litical communication between the States, established no instrumentality to harmonize State laws or to reconcile conflict between them upon matters within State jurisdiction, but of *national* concern. The civil war itself was a culminating outbreak through this very flaw; the causes that were visibly leading to it were beyond the reach of the government, which was powerless to act until they had ripened into actual "insurrection." And the same absence of organized channels for the peaceful diffusion of a national spirit and a national polity, the same lack of official agencies to disseminate the influence of dominant public sentiment and the comprehension of common public interest, which made the war inevitable, have been sensibly felt since the war in keeping the North and South apart and in retarding the progress of reunion.

The proposed remedy, of centralizing power in the federal government, subverts the sovereignty of the States, and is clearly unconstitutional and revolutionary. The only conservative remedy possible must rest in the voluntary action of the States themselves; and it remains to inquire what new measures are best adapted to bring the States together where they have diverged, and to maintain among them a homogeneous policy.

This inquiry, so far as it relates to the single topic of marriage and divorce, has recently elicited considerable discussion. The action of Congress has been invoked, and in other quarters a constitutional amendment has been suggested as means of securing a uniform system of laws relating to marriage. President Woolsey, in a late publication, has demonstrated the revolutionary character of efforts to obtain relief by any form of *federal* intervention; the subject of marriage and divorce is one of those that under our form of government are committed to *State* action and control, and it cannot be transferred to the sphere of federal jurisdiction without doing violence to the organic system on which the union of the States is based. One mode of remedy only is possible: the States themselves must by their joint action construct, and must severally adopt, a uniform code of marriage law. The redaction of such a code may be accomplished by a national convention to be composed of representatives from all the States, selected with reference to

their special adaptation to the task; they must be men of large juridical experience and of liberal spirit, competent to apprehend the precise points of conflict, and to act with a broad comprehension of national conditions and national wants.

The work of such a convention should extend over a far wider field than the single subject of marriage and divorce; that is one only of the multiform instances of the conflict of laws. The whole body of the statute law of the States needs to be fused and moulded into a harmonious system. A really small part of the legislation of a State is purely local and special in its nature, and with that a national convention has of course no concern; but those general laws that affect the business and the industry, the material and the moral interests of the people as a nation, in regard to which the circumstances of no State require a distinctive or isolated policy, should be framed by the united wisdom of the nation, and should be, as nearly as possible, identical throughout all the States. Such a *national code* of laws, digested by a joint convention, and then adopted and enacted by each State, is the only effective substitute for federal centralization, and the only available solution of the present conflict of States.

In the *judicial* enforcement of a national code, differences of interpretation would unavoidably be developed in the independent courts of the separate States. To harmonize and authoritatively settle these differences, power must be vested in the Supreme Court of the United States to exercise an appellate jurisdiction; such power, if not already involved in the constitutional right to decide "controversies between the States," is not inconsistent with the spirit of those provisions of the Constitution that define the functions of the federal judiciary, and a constitutional amendment expressly conferring the required jurisdiction would be wholly germane to the present system.

The enactment of a uniform system of State law, however, while yielding temporary relief, would fail to establish any sufficient guaranty for the future. No code can be made perfect or remain stationary. Experience and the changed conditions of progress would develop the constant need of amendment and of extension; and the States, being supreme and acting separately, would inevitably diverge as they have done in the past,

until the urgency of the conflict of laws again demanded the resort to a national convention.

To avert this prospective conflict, the convention or council of States must be made a permanent body, holding annual sessions, and constituting an organ of official and diplomatic communication between the States. The functions of the council must be deliberative and advisory, without any power of coercion, but having only the moral force that would attach to the collective wisdom of leading minds from all the States. It is a remarkable fact that while each of the governments of Europe finds it advisable to maintain diplomatic representatives at the seats of the other governments, in order to keep itself informed of their movements and to secure a certain harmony of action, the States of the Union, tho legally almost as foreign to each other as the states of Europe and tho infinitely more affected by the measures and the policy of each other, yet have no established agency by which to exert any influence on such measures and policy or even to gain authentic information of them, and they have no official means of communication with each other. This want the council would effectively supply; its members would be in close and constant relations with the legislatures and judiciaries of the several States: defects in the practical working of the national code, proposed new measures of general legislation, new wants developed by the growing interests of the nation, would be reported to the national council from every district throughout the length and breadth of the continent.

With these national and inter-State topics the council would have permanently to deal; and while its action would be limited to recommendations which would not be legally binding on the States until voluntarily adopted by them, the recommendations would necessarily be invested with a great weight of authority. The authority would attach not only to the august and national character of the council, but it may be reasonably hoped would be inherent in the recommendations themselves; for the council would occupy a vantage-ground, above any possible State legislature, in discussing a question of general polity. It would have at its command boundless resources of facts gathered from every corner of every State, it would be raised above local

prejudices, and all its deliberations would tend to broaden its views toward a national horizon. In recommending any public measure or in stamping with its disapproval any discordant State action, the council would at least send forth to the country a forcible presentation of facts and of argument, directing public attention to the issue and enlightening the people as to its bearings in a manner that would ultimately secure its adjustment.

A single instance will illustrate the utility of such a body. Nearly every session of a State legislature is marked by the creation of one or more legislative commissions appointed to investigate and report upon important subjects of statute regulation—taxation, railroads, prisons, public charities. All the topics thus referred to a commission have bearings broader than the limits of the State, and most of them involve interests that can only be effectively protected by community and concert of action between the States. The proposed council would be eminently suited to conduct such investigations as a joint commission for all the States; while, having resources wholly unattainable by any local body, it would enjoy the unique advantage (to which no State commission can ever aspire) of addressing itself authoritatively and officially to all the States alike. It is difficult to conceive any other way in which the States can be practically brought into uniformity and co-operation upon matters in which they all have really identical interests.

The practicability of the scheme itself here suggested turns upon the possibility of inducing the States to unite in its adoption. That is a matter of popular political education and discussion. The tendency toward federal centralization rests on a substantial basis, and seeks to remedy a substantial evil; those who regard the tendency as a dangerous one, believing that centralization imports the eventual breaking up of the republic by its own weight into wholly separate and independent fragments, must meet the tendency by the substitution of a new and better remedy—they must neutralize the tendency by removing the grounds on which its rests. It is possible that two or more States may unite in the establishment of a joint convention for the codification of the general laws of those States or of the laws relating to a single topic. The advantageous results of

even such a limited convention, it is believed, would be so visible and striking as to induce the extension of its scope and the participation of other States, until the movement once inaugurated might grow into an established and universal system.

The great difficulty at present is found in the general lack of information regarding the laws and institutions of the several States, and in the prevailing ignorance touching the extent and details of the conflict between them. Outside the limits of the legal profession men know of this conflict only in a most vague way, except as they are conscious of having themselves suffered from some few instances of it. But a national council of the kind suggested would be an efficient agency of political education for the people, teaching them what grave wrongs are inflicted in the name of law, how their commerce is impeded and their industry checked and their trade depressed or unduly stimulated by inharmonious State laws—teaching them that, while they are a nation in their temper and their interests, they are legally a nation only outside their own country, but at home are subject to the government of States foreign and in many ways hostile to each other.

The full comprehension by the people of the incongruities of our present methods of government by States will be surely followed by an imperative demand for redress, and by the enforcement of *some* remedy; whether the remedy adopted shall proceed from the voluntary action of the States yielding to the national demand, or be found in the simpler tho revolutionary processes of federal centralization, is a question the future only can determine. But on the solution of that question turns the continuance or the downfall of the constitutional system of government inherited from the founders of the republic.

EUGENE SMITH.

THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE THEOLOGICAL CURRICULUM.

IT is natural that one should look with an eye of favoritism upon his own department of study, and, in answer to the inquiry as to what topics are of most importance in current religious thought, that he should contrive to get his own subject pretty high up on the list. For this reason it is generally safe to deduct something from the strong statements which are so frequently made by enthusiastic specialists respecting the burning questions in theological controversy. And yet when we take into account the immense literature that is being produced in reference to the philosophy of religion, as well as the organization of societies in the interest of the Christian evidences and the endowment of chairs of apologetics in our theological seminaries, it can hardly be doubted that the border-land of science, philosophy, and religion is, and is likely to be for many a day to come, the arena of great and growing intellectual interest and activity. It is not a sign of the highest religious condition for the church to be expending so much of her energy in the work of defending her supernatural claims, and for inquiries from within her communion to be made on every hand respecting the value of her credentials. It is nevertheless a fact that the present is an apologetic age, and that the apologetic method and spirit are visibly affecting all forms of the church's life. And while it would certainly be better if truth were not challenged, it can hardly be denied that being challenged it ought to be defended; and it ought not to be necessary at this late day to vindicate the wisdom of the church

in giving apologetics a prominent place in theological discipline. The question should rather be whether under the provisions of this department all the work that is necessary for the vindication of Christianity can be done. For the area of apologetic is far wider than many suppose; and it may well be asked whether it is reasonable to suppose that the exceptional qualifications that are needed for dealing with the difficulties raised in Old Testament and New Testament historical criticism, to say nothing of those which come from the side of physical science and speculative philosophy, are to be looked for in any one mind. The question arises then whether it will not be necessary to carry the principle of division of labor a step farther by entrusting the historical and the speculative sides of apologetic to different hands. And if this were contemplated, as sooner or later perhaps it will be, it should then be considered whether this end could not be best effected by establishing a department which should proceed by a method slightly different from that which is commonly recognized as belonging to apologetic proper. And inasmuch as there is a proper place for philosophy in theology, and, moreover, the attacks upon the Christian religion are to a large extent on the outgrowth of philosophical principles, it may be fairly asked whether fidelity to truth does not demand that, as a protection against the evil consequences in all branches of theology of a false philosophy, we should give a recognized place to philosophy in the theological curriculum. It is a matter of minor importance how such a chair should be designated. It may be called the chair of the relations of science, philosophy, and religion; or simply the chair of religious philosophy. In either case it would be easy to anticipate what class of subjects would properly pertain to it; and it would be apparent at once that, while making use of materials that are common to dogmatics, ethics, and apologetics, the professor in this department would proceed under an organizing principle different from those which determine the departments that have just been named.

To some it would seem that, as the apologete is the professed *advocate* of Christianity, the occupant of a chair like the one of which I am speaking might very properly act in the ca-

pacity of a *judge*. Accordingly he might be expected to enter upon his duties with no foregone conclusions, and to divest himself of all dogmatic bias in order that he might act with scrupulous fairness toward the contending parties in a protracted litigation. But this view of the matter results from a misconception of the relations of dogmatic faith to free inquiry, and a forgetfulness of the relations which nearly all theological seminaries sustain to definite confessional theology. It cannot be said that the condition of fair investigation is antecedent and universal scepticism. A man should be ready to see evidence that contradicts his own opinions. But it is not necessary that he should begin investigation without opinions. The scientific man even is not asked to be such a thorough-going Cartesian in his method as to give up every belief as the condition of prosecuting with fairness a new subject of investigation; and the theologian should have as much liberty in this respect as the man of science. If, therefore, he may enter upon his work in possession of distinct and definite opinions, there is no reason why he should not enter upon it believing in a complete system of theology; in other words, there is no reason why his avowal of belief in a distinct type of confessional theology should hinder his quest of truth or prevent him from recognizing evidence whenever he sees it. The fact, therefore, that our theological seminaries are founded, as a rule, in the interests of the doctrine and polity of the communions which they respectively represent, and therefore that professors in those seminaries enter upon their work with foregone conclusions, is the occasion of no real difficulty. For a man should have made up his mind as to the place of Christianity in the world before taking the position of a teacher in a school of divinity, and he can honestly hold his place in an ecclesiastical organization only so long as he is in sympathy with the ends for which the organization exists. Assuming then that the professor of the department to which reference is made comes to his work under the assumptions of a confessional theology, the work before him is one of great amplitude. It will not be necessary for him to construe the title of his chair in the terms of a minimism of theology, and it would be quite correct to say that the whole area of dog-

matic, so far as it impinges upon philosophy and science, is legitimately within his domain.

And this dogmatic attitude, as has been already said, is not incompatible with the exhibition of a philosophic spirit. The incumbent of this as of every chair should be expected to deal fairly with adversaries; to look difficulties in the face; to make honest concessions when they are needed; to argue without *animus;* and to see both sides of all questions. No good can come through calling hard names. It is argument that tells, not indignation. These are not days of otiose acquiescence in the doctrines of the church. This must be recognized. We cannot compel belief nor punish doubt. We cannot shut up our libraries nor suppress investigation. It is useless to veto thought or write an *Index expurgatorius.* Fairness, patience, a judicial temper, trust in God and reverence for his Word—these are the qualities that should be conspicuous in the teacher of to-day. And when all is done, it is not to his discredit to confess that his case is stronger than the best defence of it can be, and that the true "grammar of assent" is learned by the child of God in the school of Christ and under the teaching of the Holy Ghost.

This is said, however, without any sympathy with some current opinions respecting the argumentative *status* of Christianity. Indeed, one of the important functions of a professorship like the one under discussion would be to show the defensible character of the Christian religion. For it is of little avail for the dogmatician to present the arguments in support of his beliefs, or for the apologete to marshal the Christian evidences, if by the decision of an antecedent question the system of revealed religion is taken out of the range of argument altogether. The defences of Christianity are valuable, but a defence of the defences is needed too. It is a questionable service which is rendered the cause of truth when one form of evidence is magnified at the expense of another, and I have no confidence in the philosophy that first throws the intellect into bankruptcy and then pensions us on an allowance of faith. If God exists, I wish to know the reasons for believing in his existence; and when I am told that I must be satisfied to believe without

reasons, I simply repudiate the suggestion. If Christianity is a divinely revealed religion, there should be evidence that will accredit it; and when I am told that it cannot be proved true, but that it accredits itself to the religious consciousness, all I have to say is that I have a poor opinion both of the piety and the logic that shuts me up to any such conclusion. We know how Sir William Hamilton undertook to aid faith by destroying knowledge; and we know too how he was met—by no one with more power of logic and more clearness of thought than by Dr. Charles Hodge, whose famous chapter on the knowledge of God stands as a magnificent parenthesis in the progress of his theistic argument. The division of thought that followed the publication of the doctrine of the conditioned is full of instruction, and should serve as a warning. Mansel thought he saw in it the basis of a new defence of Christianity; and Spencer pressed it into the service of agnosticism. The general opinion is that while Mansel's was the better cause, Spencer's was the better served. So true indeed is the remark of Hume's most able critic, that "when the most pious philosophical purpose expresses itself in a doctrine resting on an inadequate philosophical principle, it is the principle and not the purpose that will regulate the permanent effect of the doctrine" (Green: Introduction to Hume, p. 133). We are likely to have another illustration of this truth in the discussions that are now before the church.

It is no new thing to be told that we cannot favor the canonicity and inspiration of the Scriptures, and that historical testimony cannot take us beyond probability. Roman Catholic theologians have urged before to-day, and for the sake of shutting us up to the infallibility of the church, what Protestant theologians are urging at this moment, and for the sake of shutting us up to the infallibility of a personal judgment which they call the witness of the Spirit. The method employed has the merit of appearing to honor the Spirit, and on this account will commend itself to many minds. On this account, too, Dodwell's "Christianity not Founded on Argument" was at first regarded with favor. But it turned out that Dodwell's book was written in the interest of scepticism, and the *subjectivism* that

is current, tho not chargeable with any sinister intent, will, unless I greatly err, prove itself a most disastrous concession to the enemy. To fall back upon faith in the thick of a great conflict is to confess defeat. To declare that truths which are not intuitions are at the same time incapable of defence save by subjective tests is practically to retire from controversy and leave the questions of debate to be settled by the quiet operation of the Spirit of God. Some would call this wise. To invoke any argument seems to such men like leaning on an arm of flesh; and the attempt to show that what we believe is believed for reasons that can be mediated to the understanding of thinking men is considered by them as an unholy alliance between philosophy and theology. It seems to be forgotten by such men that while the witness of the Spirit is the ground of indefectible certitude to the individual, it is hard, if it is not impossible, to make our personal certitude the basis of argument with others. It is forgotten that the strongest reasons for our own convictions are not always those of which we can make the most use when dealing with other minds; and therefore, so far from there being any incompatibility between objective evidence and subjective impressions originated by the Spirit, the one is the proper complement of the other. But it is difficult apparently for some to realize that fair debate between believers and unbelievers must proceed upon the basis of common intellectual conditions and common objective evidence. To support a position by a subjectivity peculiar to one party in the discussion, and especially by a subjectivity that begs the whole question in dispute, or to urge a historic bias as an argumentative make-weight, is simply to argue unfairly. In a certain sense Protestantism is individualism. It affirms the right of every man to read and think for himself, and therefore it affirms his right to very considerate treatment in debate. For himself and *in foro conscientiæ* the individual Christian may decide and does decide, in addition to external evidence, by the witness of the Spirit; but when he appears in debate and aims at convincing another mind, he must make use of the canons of certitude that other men employ. He may believe that the Holy Ghost has borne witness to truth in the historic

life of the church; but with the unbeliever this argument will be of little avail: and with the believer even it must be used carefully, or else under the guise of a corporate Christian consciousness we may bring back into the bosom of Protestantism the doctrine of corporate infallibility, which was discarded at the Reformation.

Nothing, however, is here intended that would disparage the doctrine that the Holy Spirit bears witness to the Truth. God undoubtedly will take care of his church. The Bible certainly carries on its face the marks of its intrinsic majesty and divinity. The Holy Ghost is the great Apologete. The increasing army of Christian men is the great bulwark of the church against the encroachments of infidelity. But it is true nevertheless that Christianity can be defended, and ought to be defended, by argument; and instead of sympathizing with the cavalier treatment of the older apologists, which is so common, I believe that Principal Cairns gave utterance to golden words when he said that "Christianity is not promoted by changing either its type of doctrine or its style of evidence" (Unbelief in the Eighteenth Century, p. 279). Argument is not unavailing. It was useful in the deistic battle of last century; it is needed in the theistic battle of this. The church is not wasting her resources when she equips her seminaries; when she endows her professorships of divinity and her lectureships in apologetics.

There is a power even in her commanding attitude which sometimes even her enemies will admit. "You cannot talk of ignoring St. Paul's Cathedral," says Mr. Bradlaugh; "it is too high." Let the church so present the claims of the Gospel as to extort concessions like this and make men say, We cannot ignore the Gospel. We cannot ignore its arguments. We cannot ignore the cathedral of Christian doctrine. It is too high. Its solid walls, its stately towers, its storied windows, its shining pinnacles arrest attention and command the admiration of the world. This, however, imposes upon us great responsibilities. We must defend, but we must have a theory of defence. We must argue, but we must have an organon. We cannot postulate ultimates and put an easy end to controversy. We must

be prepared to follow when the discussion leads, as lead it assuredly will, to fundamental questions in the philosophy of belief.

Of course there is a sense in which it is wrong to approach the Bible with foregone conclusions. It is not a treasury whence men may cull appropriate mottoes for the garniture of their own excogitations; nor have they any right first to think out a doctrine and then, as the manner of some has been, prove that the Word of God agrees with it. The old method of rationalistic dogmatism is of course to be rejected. Yet there is, nevertheless, a place in theology for human thought. There is a philosophy of defence. There is also a philosophy of organization. The results of study are to be classified, and as there is no inspired system of classification the principles that are employed in other inquiries must be turned to account. Moreover, tho each doctrine of our faith is supported by its own array of proof-texts, and may be separately proved by induction, it is equally true that while the laws of thought remain as they are it will be impossible to avoid the deductive process which, when one proposition is given, leads through the mediation of a second to its inferential relations to a third doctrinal statement. And as it is impossible to receive contradictory statements as true, so it is impossible to avoid the attempt to organize by deductive logic the separate doctrinal inductions. In other words, if we think, we must think in accordance with the laws of thinking, whatever the subject of our thinking may be. We may organize the teachings of the Bible after a genetic method and under the category of time; or we may regard the doctrines as co-existing members of a great doctrinal system. And for the sake of distinguishing these methods, we may call the one Biblical, and the other systematic, theology; but the latter is as Biblical as the former, and the former is not less philosophical than the latter. In both cases logic gives the form and Scripture furnishes the matter. And when it is borne in mind that tho logic may change relations it cannot invent facts, it will appear that a Christocentric method in dogmatic, excellent as that method is, can of itself make no change in our dogmatic system. No doctrine can be added; none can be obliterated; no

change in the statement of doctrine can take place as the result of transposing the several dogmatic units and changing their relations in space. So far as doctrine is unaffected by order, changing the order is a harmless thing; and so far as doctrine conditions order, the doctrine must he abandoned or modified before the order can be changed.

This seems so clear that I cannot avoid the impression that behind the purely logical question respecting the order of precedence in which doctrines should be presented there is an organizing principle which determines it; and that organizing principle may involve a very serious modification not of the dogmatic method, but of the matter of dogmatic as well. Both Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians have been moving away, as Räbiger shows (Theologik, s. 157), from the positions occupied in the Reformation period. In both communions there has been a strong tendency to find authority for speaking in the present tense instead of appealing to tradition or the letter of Scripture. Rome has found her organizing principle in the perpetual miracle of papal infallibility, while the tendency in Protestantism is to find it in the infallibility of the religious consciousness. And whether this corporate and subjective infallibility be formulated in the terms of freedom or dependence, whether it be through the speculative intellect or the religious consciousness that the attempt is made to centre theology in the historic life instead of in the record of that life, the effect is just the same: dogmatic theology ceases to be a fixed body of truth to be ascertained by exegesis.

It becomes a historic life finding its highest expression in the Incarnate Logos, but manifesting itself in the Christian consciousness of the church, the interpretation of which is the chief function of dogmatic, as a branch of theological discipline. It is only by some such interpretation as this that I can understand the distinctions which speak of orthodoxy and orthodoxism, the schemes of dogmatic reconstruction, and the frequent assertion that every age must have its own theology.

An author's place in the great family of dogmaticians must sometimes be understood before we can set a proper value upon his words. For there is a great difference between the dogmatic

of ecclesiastical tradition, the dogmatic of papal infallibility, the dogmatic of the religious feeling, the dogmatic of the speculative intellect, and the dogmatic of Biblical exegesis. And as foregone conclusions will shape the place of doctrines in a dogmatic system, so also will they determine the place of dogmatic itself in the system of theological discipline. And in view of the rapid multiplication of theological essays, it is of great practical importance that theological students should have a scientific knowledge of theological encyclopædia, by which is meant not merely an ingenious distribution of the departments of theological study, but a scientific exhibition of the principles that have controlled, as well as those which should control, theological method. For men are giving us their conclusions without their premises. They are giving expression to taking words regarding Christian dogma which those who are filled with the enthusiasm of new thoughts are trying to harmonize with the old theology. They will find that they cannot add the new cloth to the old garment. They will find that statements which impressed them at first so favorably, and carried on their face such professions of devotion to Jesus, require a far more sweeping reconstruction of their theology than they dreamed of. It is very important at this moment that the doctrinal affinities of some of these new things that are brought to our ears should be made plain. For if, as Prof. Ferrier has so brilliantly shown, "the only light of any truth is its contrasting error," it is also true that in order that error should be recognized as such it must be seen in its relations to the system of which it forms a part. There is a clear and fundamental distinction between the dogmatic and the apologetic attitude. It is a mistake to say that the Christian religion as a supernatural and revealed system is incapable of defence save on the basis of an inspired and infallible Bible, true and important as the doctrine of inspiration is. But it is a far greater mistake to carry the method of apologetic into dogmatic theology and say: "Because this is all that is needed for the defence of a supernatural theology, this, therefore, is all that is of value in belief." This is to make the *minimum* of apologetic, the *maximum* of dogmatic. And this is the evil tendency of the hour.

There is close affinity between the speculative thought and the religious life of a people. The influence of a dominant philosophy shows itself in theology. Aristotelianism, Cartesianism, Kantianism, Hegelianism, and now positivism, have been in succession the philosophic forces in theology. In this land the influence of speculation on dogma has been conspicuous. To write the history of the theology of New England is to write the history of its philosophy. Its philosophic interest was developed out of theological exigencies; its theological discussions have flowed in the channels of philosophical speculation. And with the memory of the evils that have followed the intrusion of philosophy into theology before their minds, it is not strange that men are suspicious of philosophy. No wonder, when they remember that speculation has destroyed the historic meaning of every Scripture fact; that confessional dogmas have been made the categories under which a pantheistic philosophy has been rubricized; no wonder, when they think of the dreary homilies on the decrees and disinterested benevolence, that the demand is heard for a Biblical theology. By all means let the demand be met. Let us have Biblical theology in the technical sense of the term; and let our dogmatic theology continue to be a theology of exegesis and not a theology of tradition and speculation. The fact, however, still remains that philosophy and theology have uniformly sustained very close relations to each other; and the history of these relations will teach some important lessons. It will show that the philosophy of the college insensibly affects the theology of the seminary; that to shape the philosophy of a people is to shape its jurisprudence, its ethics, its theology, the ministrations of the pulpit, the teaching of the Sabbath-school, and even the fireside instruction of the home. It will show that between these great departments there is an intimacy that ecclesiastical authority can neither interrupt nor control. The pope may relegate us to Aquinas, and Father Harper may write even more interestingly still concerning the philosophy of the school, but whether Aquinas or Spinoza will be the master-metaphysician of the next generation is something that lies beyond ecclesiastical control. It will show us, too, that while *a priori* speculation has done injury

to truth, there is nevertheless a place, if not for it, at least for metaphysic in theology. In order to exhibit the proper relations of theology and philosophy, one must perform a double duty. Speaking in behalf of theology, there is a long history of invasion to be recited, conquered territory to be reclaimed, and the right of theology to the unmolested enjoyment of her God-given domain to be insisted on and defended. Speaking, on the other hand, in behalf of philosophy, it will be his duty to show the real service that she may render Christian truth, and, guarding against the impression that her former faults are to be punished with perpetual banishment or penal servitude, to say in the words of the reformed theologian Mursinna: *Philosophia non est ancilla sed potius soror theologiæ.*

The word philosophy is used, however, in a somewhat broader sense than that of *a priori* speculation, and, in antithesis to theology, to mean the method that reaches truth through inference and argument, as opposed to that which receives it by direct divine revelations. In a broad sense, then, we say that Christian theology is a matter of revelation and not of philosophy. And yet our system of theology begins with a theistic conception of the universe. There are a few who would say with Watson that we owe our knowledge of God to the Bible, and who would therefore depreciate the theistic proofs; for there are some men who always imagine that it is a mark of special respect for the Bible to teach that we can have no knowledge of God without it.

But men honor the Bible most when they believe what it says; and therefore believe that the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork. There are few who would wish to see the teleological and the moral arguments for God's existence taken out of the books of systematic theology. Yet these arguments are not Biblical. They are as truly philosophical as are the arguments that support any scientific hypothesis. Here, then, we have a reasoned theism—a theory of the universe which, however it originated, is at least defended by the application of the laws of thought to the facts of the external world. We have an inferential as opposed to an informational knowledge of God; and to this extent we have a philosophical factor in our theological system.

There is, then, an empirical and philosophical element in theology, at least in so far as theology makes use of argument in support of the belief in God; for just so far as theology finds an argument for the existence of God in the facts of nature does it give an interpretation to the facts of nature.

Reasoned theism has a subjective and an objective side—a side that relates it to philosophy and one that relates it to science. This would naturally be the place, therefore, to speak of the relations of science, philosophy, and religion. And if I sympathized with many who are so fond of referring to what they call the "conflict" of science and religion, I should at this point indicate that the work of a professor in the department referred to in this article would consist very largely in the attempt to establish amicable relations between the three great powers that have been named. But it must have already appeared that the work pertaining to a chair of religious philosophy has a far wider scope than that of drafting treaties of peace between personalized abstractions; and it ought not to be a very difficult thing to understand the reasons for those differences of opinion on religio-scientific subjects which have given rise to what has come to be known as "conflict-literature." Having two accounts of the same phenomena, one empirical and the other revealed, it is easy to see that through misunderstanding of Scripture or premature generalization in science there may be an apparent discrepancy between them. It will be pretty generally agreed, I think, that in so far as science deals with facts in the phenomenal world false theories must be left to the slow dialectic of time, or be dealt with by men who have a right to speak with the authority of specialists in the several departments of scientific investigation. And it is just as clearly recognized that between the facts of science and the metaphysical inferences that are based upon them the difference is very wide.

The student of science who is aware of the unreached heights and the unfathomed depths of his special department may well resent the patronizing tone of omniscience with which the theologian sometimes speaks of the facts of nature. But the modest student of nature is also well aware that when he goes into the arena of metaphysic he is occupying a position where his

knowledge of phenomena gives him no exceptional advantage. It is not too much to say that the great questions of debate between science and religion transcend the sphere of the empirical, and that the great differences of opinions on religious questions are those which lie at the roots of our intellectual life. A sound metaphysic is therefore the presupposition and postulate of theology as it is the presupposition and postulate of science itself. We are debtors alike to science and philosophy, and we can as little afford to spare one as the other from our theological curriculum.

The word Philosophy is used in this article with a great deal of latitude, it must be confessed, yet with a latitude justified by very good usage. It is used as the synonym of logic. It is used to signify a method so that the exhibition of a system according to its organizing principle would be the philosophy of the system. It is used to indicate *a priori* or speculative reasoning, and is applied specially to systems of thought that follow the deductive rather than the inductive method. It is employed as the antithesis of revelation, and refers to any mode of reaching truth aside from the interpretation of Scripture.

It is sometimes the same as psychology, tho in the stricter application of the word it is metaphysic; that is, as Shadworth Hodgson says, it is, "the ultimate subjective analysis of motions which to science are themselves ultimate" ("Philosophy of Reflection," vol. i. p. 45). In all these senses of the word philosophy, rightly or wrongly, has had and has to-day a place in theology.

And there is yet another sense in which the word Philosophy is used. For as it describes the primary, so it expresses the final stage of knowledge. It is the name which men give to their work when they undertake to articulate the facts of the phenomenal world under some all-comprehensive generalization. And so we have the philosophy of Hegel and the philosophy of Comte. Nor have we a right to complain because such ambitious attempts are made; for some generalization there undoubtedly is that will express the totality of truth; or in other words, there is some explanation of the universe;—tho we make bold to say that any philosophy is incomplete which does not

recognize that the Almighty has left his footprints in this world of things, and that the Lord of Glory has taken his place in the sequences and successions of human history. Call this final statement what we please, science, philosophy, theology, it must proceed under a theistic conception of the universe; it must be shaped under the category of purpose; it must have a place for the Incarnation; and it must take cognizance of the future of the individual in the life to come as well as of the future of the race in the "life that now is."

But the fact that the word Philosophy is used with such breadth and diversity of meaning may suggest the difficulty of defining its place in a theological curriculum. And a difficulty there may undoubtedly be in determining the precise scope of such a department, whether it be known as that of religious philosophy, or philosophical apologetics, or the relations of science, philosophy, and religion. There are, however, some topics that call for special discussion, and that belong more properly to the department of which we are speaking than to any other. To the incumbent of a chair such as the one under consideration it would fall to exhibit, at least in outline, the historic relations of philosophy, science, and theology; not in the form of a history of doctrine, nor yet in the form of a history of free thought; not with the minuteness of Zöckler in his history of the relations between theology and natural science, nor yet after the fragmentary manner in which this work has been so often attempted. It should embrace the age of the Apologists and the influence of scholasticism. It should show the formative principles of the era of the confessions; the effect of the Cartesian philosophy; the anti-confessional drift, which has been brought about by the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy; and lastly, tho not of least importance, it should deal with the special contributions to the history of opinion which have been made in our own land.

But in addition to this historico-critical work there is an important constructive work to be done. And under this head the philosophy of belief will occupy a very conspicuous place. At the bottom of all belief or disbelief there lies a theory of knowledge and belief. A philosophy of sensation will lead to

atheism, but only because it will lead to universal unbelief. The physicist has the same interest as the theologian in the conservation of the *a priori* elements of knowledge. For a sensational philosophy that will leave us an objective firmament as the field of astronomical explorations, and an objective earth as the arena of biological study, and objective other selfs whose lucubrations I can read in the bimonthlies and the quarterly reviews, but which undertakes, because it is a philosophy of sensation, to eliminate God from the category of Being, is a philosophy of unmitigated absurdity. It is with such a philosophy that we have to deal. It tells us that our beliefs in cause, substance, and moral obligation are generalized experiences, and it is none the less objectionable because through the doctrine of evolution it seeks to mediate between the intuitional and the associational theories of knowledge by telling us that the same idea may be both an intuition and an inference—an intuition for the individual and an inference for the race. A great work has already been done in defence of our primary beliefs, and Dr. McCosh has especially placed all the advocates of intuitional philosophy under lasting obligation for his elucidation of this subject. But we have not yet seen the end of controversy, and it looks now as tho the discussions of the next generation were to be as important as any that have preceded it. For the free, finite, perdurable, personal self is the very citadel of truth. We must defend the *a priori* elements of knowledge. We must defend them not as relatively but as absolutely true. We cannot hold an egoistic idealism. We cannot take some point of vantage and, watching the phenomenal world march past in grand review, exclaim: "This after all is only the phenomenal aspect of what I call myself." We cannot hold a philosophy which to be consistent should go on to say that the silent stars die out whenever I go to sleep; and when dissolution comes, to me comes then the funeral of universal Being. And if instead of making the individual self we make the universal self the basis of our philosophy, we shall still find that we have made evangelical Christianity impossible. And when I am told that along a purposive route and through the stages of historic growth rising on itself in the ascent of life the universal self has

struggled for expression, until in thinking, praying man it comes to recognize itself; when the individual self, the self of analysis, reaches out unto and realizes the universal self, the self of synthesis,—it does not save me from the disastrous consequences of such a faith to be reminded, as I am reminded by Mr. Wallace, that this philosophy is a theology throughout. It makes no difference how my personality is obliterated, whether by pantheism or materialism, the effect is just the same. And when it comes to the question whether Christian life shall be strangled by the python of Hegelianism or the python of positive philosophy there is but little to choose.

A valid defence of Christianity must be a defence of knowledge as knowledge. It is bad enough to offer us an unauthorized faith, but it is worse to give us our choice, as Mr. Balfour does, between two inevitable doubts. No service is rendered either science or religion by an attempt to show that there is no valid reason for either, but that we are free to hold to them through what he calls the "practical need of both." This, however, is a large subject, and its development would involve not only the discussion of fundamental truth, but also the processes of proof; the laws of evidence; the province of analogy; the influence of authority; the ethics of belief; the distinction between probability and certitude, and the place of both in religion. In short, it would be the logic of theology. Next in logical order would come the discussion of theism; and we need not say how much interest centres here. The constructive side of the theistic discussion has lost none of its importance in recent years; for while mere illustrations of design in nature cannot be said to meet the exigencies of current debate, the discussion of the teleological principle is becoming more and more important. And when we find men admitting the teleological principle, but denying the theistic conclusion to which it logically leads, it is impossible to avoid the feeling that their anti-theistic utterances are after all important concessions to the theistic position. But anti-theistic literature abounds in these concessions, and when we read of Matthew Arnold's "Stream of Tendency," Spencer's "Unknowable," Schopenhauer's "World as Will," and Hartmann's elaborate defence of finality as the product of uncon-

scious intelligence, we may well ask if the theists with their belief in one personal God are not in possession of the only hypothesis that can save the language of these writers from the charge of meaningless and idiotic raving.

And it is easy to see how large an area of polemic the theistic discussion involves; for not only are objections to be answered, but rival theories of the universe are to be examined. There is the system of pantheism, which organizes the phenomenal world under the conception of God and denies the separate personality and freedom of finite minds. There is the system that does not get outside of the phenomenal self, and so finds its creed shrivelling into a barren agnosticism. And there is, finally, a system that undertakes to articulate the phenomenal universe in the terms of matter, and ends in giving us not only a mechanical world without, but a mechanical mind within. It ends in automatism. It ends in explaining the music of Beethoven, the painting of Raphael, the sculpture of Thorwaldsen, and the cathedral monument of Sir Christopher Wren as the purposeless play of blind material atoms. And when it does this it commits suicide. When mind is reduced to automatism, schism is introduced into our conscious life. You cannot, as Professor Herbert has so ably shown, take intentionality out of matter without taking it out of mind. The materialist cannot help purposing; he cannot help believing that his actions are the realization of purpose; and yet purpose is a word for which his theory of the universe has no use and which it cannot explain. "Consistent materialism," says Mr. Green, "should be speechless." And Mr. Green is right. Consistent materialism is egoism. The self is the solitary tenant of a lone universe. It has no logical right to call any other self its companion, for of that other self it has no knowledge. The soul is a caged bird. It is the function of a true theory of Knowing and Being to open the doors of that gilded cage, and when this is done, with little help from us, but under the irresistible tendency of an instinct born in heaven, this poor, pining, imprisoned thing will fly away to God.

Nor must we overlook the fact that the atheism of to-day is possessed of great industry and intellectual activity. Remem-

ber that this world has been ruled by theistic conceptions. Its literature has been written, its governments maintained, its social institutions established, under the dominating influence of this conception. If atheism is to succeed it has a great revolution to accomplish. And there are sad indications that the men who, like Professor Clifford, believe that the "great companion is dead" already see the natural consequences of their creed. They must reconstruct history and explain the Bible according to the principles of naturalism. They must have a system of criminal jurisprudence to match their automatism. They must take obligation out of ethics and say with Bentham that the word *ought* ought not to be in the dictionary. Life with them is the life that now is, and it is a question whether it be worth living. The poor man will make the best of this world, and as matters cannot be much worse he will take the chances of socialism, nihilism, and regicide. The man of learned leisure will look out of despairing eyes upon a world that gives no pleasure and a future that has no hope. Pessimism will be his philosophy, consentaneous suicide his gospel of peace for a suffering world, a "calculus of hedonics," to use Mr. Sully's phrase, that shall assure him of a slight surplus of pleasure over pain, the one mitigating circumstance in the discomfort with which he looks upon the problem of life.

Theism on its philosophical side is a theory of the universe, but on the side of our religious nature it is belief in a Being whose personality is set over against our personality—a Being upon whom we are dependent and to whom we are responsible. It contains materials, therefore, that belong also to the department of the philosophy of religion; and yet the philosophy of religion is a subject that especially at the present day deserves separate treatment at least to the extent of what Pfleiderer calls the psychology of religion. This is a question which the evolutionists should not monopolize; for if religion is the fruit of fear or superstition, or be a form of homage to dead ancestors, the religious feeling cannot be an ultimate fact in our nature, and cannot be appealed to in support of doctrine. We are interested as Christians in showing that these interpretations of religion are wrong. And conceding even that the

religious consciousness is an ultimate fact in our nature, or that it is the inspiration of the Almighty that fills us with the thoughts of the Infinite or with the feelings that find outlet in prayer, the question still arises whether this divine influence ever transcends the sphere of naturalism; whether, that is to say, there has ever been such an interruption of the uniformity of nature that we can point to certain exceptional facts and say: "These are special, supernatural, miraculous exhibitions of the divine presence." The gravest questions are involved in this inquiry. If with Kuenen and Tiele we answer No, we must conclude that our Christian religion has reached its purest form through successive stages not of progress merely, nor of development merely, for this is true, but of a naturalistic development—a development which compels us to reconstruct history so as to show that the religious life revealed in the Bible has in all its phases and in all its periods been conditioned and determined by its antecedents and environments. If the essence of religion is the religious feeling, how can we ever get out of this circle of subjectivity, or say anything else of Christianity than that it is one of the forms in which a universal religious consciousness has been exhibited? And believing that Christianity is exclusive and is entitled to paramount authority, we must either say with Mulford that Christianity is not a religion, or else we must say that knowledge as well as feeling enters into its essence. Supernaturalism—I mean Revelation—is the condition of an exclusive Christianity, and it is an important element in the conservation of theism. I am far from saying that without a revelation there can be no religion of any sort, and I am far from saying that without a revelation there can be no knowledge of God. But when men give up revelation they will find it easier to give up theism. This is not reasoning in a circle, and at all events men need to be reminded that tho reasoning in a circle may not be good, reasoning in straight lines is intolerably bad. Arguments act and react on each other, and it is the congruity of all arguments that constitutes the best and final argument. Pure theism is not the solution of the world's problem. The man who has given up Christianity is on the road to atheism. The man who is dissatisfied with

the Christian religion is likely to find himself without any religion at all; and the logical outcome of no religion is no morality. For this reason, were there no other, the discussion of fundamental ethics should have a place in theological studies. This, as we have been recently reminded, is just now the "whereabouts of philosophical activity" (*Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, April, 1881). The question in ethics is the possibility of ethics. The question of the hour is not whether God is the logical correlative of our consciousness of moral obligation; nor whether happiness or holiness is the chief end of man; nor whether conscience is intuitional or developed out of a "strong sense of avoidance." It is not expressed in the utilitarianism of Mill, nor in the altruism of Spencer. It does not reveal itself in the paradoxes of Sidgwick, nor in the transcendentalism of Bradley. It is the question whether there can be any guarantee for the purity of home or the stability of the social organism under a philosophy whieh makes man an automaton. Mr. Frederic Harrison indicates his appreciation of the religious problem when he speaks of "the mighty assize of religions which this generation and the next are to try out" (*Nineteenth Century*, August, 1881). He is right in supposing that the time has come for the trial of the issue. We have had enough of demurrers and continuances; enough of answers and replications; enough of rejoinders and surrejoinders. The time has come when men must face the question of the possibility of morals. They must decide between a metaphysic that leads to an absolute vacuum in knowledge; absolute irresponsibility in morals, absolute mechanism in life; and a metaphysic that will secure the separateness, the sovereignty, the morality, the immortality of the soul. With the soul assured, the way to God is plain. If God is, a revelation of God may be. With the possibility of revelation conceded, the proof is sufficient. And with a proved revelation before us, it is easy to understand that in God we live and move and have our being; that the path of history has been the unfolding of his purpose; that the order of nature is the movement of his mind; that the work of the philosopher is to rethink his thought; that Christianity is the solution of all problems; that the blood of Christ removes the

blot of sin; that the church is the flower of humanity; that the Incarnation of the Logos is God's great achievement; that Jesus is the brightness of his Father's glory and the express image of his person; that in him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, and that by him all things consist.

FRANCIS L. PATTON.