






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1917





THE
PRINCIPLES
AND
CONNEXION
OF
NATURAL and REVEALED
RELIGION
Distinctly Considered.

By ARTHUR ASHLEY SYKES, D.D.

Est quidem vera LEX, recta Ratio, Naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando à fraude deterreat; quæ tamen neque probos frustra jubet aut vetat; nec improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic LEGI nec obrogari fas est; neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet; neque abrogari tota potest: nec vero aut per Senatum aut per Populum solvi hac LEGE possumus. *Cicero apud Lactant. l. vi. c. 8.*

Οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν, ἢ αὐτὸν Θεὸν, ἅπερ ἐδίδαξε διὰ τῶν Προφητῶν, καὶ τῶν Σωτῆρῶν ἐγκατεσπαρκέναι ταῖς ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς· ἢ ἀναπολόγητον εἶναι τῇ θεῖᾳ κρίσει πᾶς ἀνθρώπων ἢ, ἔχων τὸ βέλημα τῆ νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ καρδίᾳ. *Orig. c. Cels. l. 1. p. 6.*

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T H E
P R E F A C E.

THE Design of the following Papers is, so to treat of Religion, both Natural and Revealed, as to deduce it from its first Principles, and to shew that they are Both strictly *Rational*, and worthy of every Serious Man's Attention. The Complaint is very common, that All Religion grows daily into Disrepute: It is certainly contemned by Many; it is perverted grievously by Others; and it is too much neglected by All. Whether all this Mischief has not arose from Mens not understanding the Nature of Religion in general; and from the Religion of Jesus Christ's being set in a different Light from what it ought to be set in; may deserve the Consideration of such as wish well to *Virtue*, and to the Cause of *Christ*. To me it appears, that if the Religion of *Nature* were settled, as it may be, upon a firm Basis; and the Religion of *Christ* were taught as it is in *Jesus*; and its

Evidence were set before Men in its due Light; the Objections against them would easily be answered, and it would be very hard, if possible, to resist their Influence.

Under this Persuasion I proposed to myself to establish such Principles, from which the strongest Objections against both Natural and Revealed Religion (*that I had ever seen*) might be either *obviated*, or fully *answered*: and what is satisfactory to me, may, I hope, be *useful* at least, to some others. The Men who raise the most plausible Objections against Christianity, raise them, as far as I have observed, chiefly from the *irrational* Grounds upon which it is defended, or the *irrational* Doctrines it is said to teach. My Design therefore was so to represent *Religion*, both Natural and Revealed, as they are *in themselves*; and in such a manner as may shew what Ground there is for a *Rational Faith*; and by that means to guard against, or to answer the Objections, which to some appear very formidable.

With this View I have considered Man in the following Treatise as *obliged* to follow a certain *Rule*, or *Law* of Action, from which if he swerves, he cannot but be accountable to the Great Governor of the Universe: That
as

as it is a matter of *Duty* to observe it, *Religion* comes in in aid to enforce the Obligation : And *Revelation* still adds more and more *Motives* to encourage and excite Men to what they are *obliged* to do as *rational Agents*.

This being the General Plan, it became necessary to enquire, What the *Rule* or *Law of Action* to all Mankind is ? Whether they could find it out of *themselves* ? Or, whether they were obliged to go to *Revelation* for it ? And how far in *fact* Men did proceed in these Researches, before the Days of *Christ* ?

In treating of *Revelation*, I thought it necessary, not only to mention the Advantages of it in *General*, but that it would be right to descend to *Particulars*, and to name the Doctrines that were revealed, and to point out the particular Design and Benefit of them. It would be worth while to enter into this Affair much more minutely still : and were any one to do it, he would have an Opportunity of shewing many Parts of the Christian Dispensation, which are little considered, or thought of, as they ought to be.

P R E F A C E.

As every Man has a Right to demand *extraordinary Evidence* for any *extraordinary Fact*, and particularly for such an *extraordinary Fact* as *Revelation* is, such is here produced: And if the *Fact* be fully proved, that there has been a *Revelation* made; and the Ends and Uses of it for the Promotion of *Virtue*, and the Good of Mankind, are shewn; and its proper Connexion with Natural Religion is ascertain'd; the Reader will see such Evidence for it, as will satisfy him that it cannot proceed from Imposture, but that it stands upon a Basis as immovable as Reason it self.

I know not whether my discussing so *largely* the Objection that has of late been urged against the *Mosaic* Institution, taken from *Human Sacrifices* (supposed to have been appointed by it) may not want some Apology. But as I have found the Difficulty make an Impression upon many serious Persons, who could not tell how to remove it; I thought it worth while to contribute what Help my little Abilities could, towards the taking away an Objection, which our Infidels seem to triumph in.

And now if any one should ask, why I would trouble my self, or others, about some
Points

Points which may seem not so immediately necessary to what I proposed : Such as, the Inquiry what *Moral* Notions the *Heathen* World had before the Days of Christ— And, whether they had them mediately, or immediately, from *Revelation*— I need give no other Answer than this— That if the Reader is not curious in such things, he may pass them over : That, for my own part, I was searching after Truth, and was not solicitous where it led me, since I was resolved to pursue and embrace it, and this was the Result of my Enquiry : That just so far as Evidence would go, I was determined to assent, and no further : That if any is curious in this sort of Knowledge, and should be of a different Sentiment from me, he may enjoy it in Peace and Charity : That if they be deem'd mere *Philological* Questions, surely every Man may abound in his own Sense in *such* Points. But then I must add for my self, that I conceive those Enquiries very proper : and particularly, I think it more to the Glory of God, the dread Lord, the great and *wise* Governor of all things, to give to Men, as he has done, Abilities to discover and *find out* the Rule of Action ; and what is *right* for them to do ; and what will lead them to *Happiness* ; and to enable them to do this *of themselves*— This, I say, seems to

me more to the Glory of God, than to say that Men *could* not arrive at such Knowledge, but must traverse the World to come at it.

This will give the Reader some sort of Knowledge of what he is to expect. I must observe one thing further, and that is, that I am conscious of some Inaccuracies in Expression which I find too late to redress. I must therefore desire him to correct, *pag. 22. l. 5:* a Fault of mine, and not of the Printer's, and instead of, *justly suffer Punishment*, read, *justly suffer Censure, or Blame, or Condemnation; and in an inferior, Punishment*. And in *p. 32. l. 5.* instead of, *the Man that*, read *whosoever*; for I intended to observe, that not only *Men*, but all *Superior Beings*, even *God* himself was *obliged* strictly to observe the *One* great Law of Action, which extends to *all Intelligent Agents*. The want of which Consideration, *viz.* That there is but *one* and the *same* Law of Action to *all* Intelligent Beings, *universally*, has been the thing that has misled too many who have treated on the Foundations of Morality.

Perhaps it may be deem'd an Omission, that I have not treated particularly on the *Immortality of the Soul*, and a *Future State*
of

of Rewards and Punishments. But, in Truth, though these are Points of the utmost Importance, and would have been very proper to have been considered, and fall within my Design, and do indeed complete the Argument for *Religion*; yet as I could add nothing very material to what that excellent Writer Mr. *Wollaston* has said upon those Subjects; I choose to refer the Reader to him, rather than transcribe his Works, or attempt to write on a Subject that has been already exhausted by so able an Hand.

THE CON-

T H E

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E R R A T A.

PAGE 46. line 3. for, *to another*, read, *to one another*.
 p. 47. l. 27. f. *of* r. *or*. p. 56. l. 23. f. *he* r. *it*.
 p. 178. l. 31. f. *ad* r. *ab*. *ibid*. l. 32. f. *tristitia* r. *tristitiam*.
 p. 183. l. 27. f. *nor* r. *or*. p. 188. l. 7. f. *cenfer*. r. *confer*.
 p. 211. l. 24. *dele been*. p. 300. l. 9. f. *was* r. *are*.
 p. 378. l. 29. f. *ἀπαλίξοις* r. *ἀπαλίξαις*. p. 399. l. 12. f. *few*
 r. *saw*. p. 412. l. 4. after *Good* put a Comma. p. 458.
 l. 6. f. *ever*. r. *never*. p. 480. l. 12. f. *many of their*
prime r. *the most and best of their*.

T H E

I N T R O D U C T I O N .

THE ordinary conduct of some men in treating all Religion as a matter of *Policy*, to influence the common people, and to keep them in order; and their constant speaking of all Revelation as *Imposition*, or *Enthusiasm*, is a sufficient indication, that either the Principles and Foundations of each are not understood, or not considered as they ought to be. Were any to declaim against the Wildness and Extravagance of some Religionists; or were they to be severe on the Unreasonableness, or Unintelligibleness, of Notions and Doctrines, insisted on by some as of great Importance, and even as necessary to Salvation, they might have opportunities of doing it with Justice and Truth. But to treat all Religion as a mere *political* contrivance, adapted only to regulate and manage *Society*; and to reject Revelation, because some gross Abuses or Misinterpretations have been introduced by men in power and authority, and have been supported by zealots in all communions,—
 This, I say, argues a great Ignorance of the
 B first

INTRODUCTION.

first Principles of Reason, or a weak Judgment, or a great neglect of Consideration. Let a man refute any Notion that appears to him to be false; let him declare against all Absurdities; let him reject all Errors: But as it would be very unreasonable to renounce Truth itself, because it has had some Falsehoods intermingled with it; as it would be ridiculous to reject all Geometry, because there are those who boast of their having demonstrated what cannot possibly be done; so must it be absurd to reject all Religion, because it has been grossly perverted by weak or wicked or ignorant men. It is true, that some have interwove a worldly power and interest into it: They have erected a Kingdom of *This World* under the cover of setting up one that is not of this World. Let this art be detected; let the Iniquity of such a proceeding be displayed; and let all Temporal Views under the Guise of Religion be treated as Hypocrisy and Dissimulation ought to be: But let not Truth be sacrificed, nor Religion (which is capable of strict Evidence) be given up as a Victim to the Absurdities of any Sect or Party of men whatever.

Before any man should pronounce against Religion in general, or the Religion of Christ in particular, He ought to consider the Foundations on which Each of them is built, and the near Relation which the one of these has

to

to the other. He that destroys *Natural Religion*, necessarily must subvert the *Christian Religion*, which stands upon That as its Foundation: As on the contrary, He that establishes and confirms the Principles of *Natural Religion*, must strengthen the Foundation of *Christianity*. Now if they Both contribute to one end; and Both are beneficial to Mankind in their Private as well as Social Capacities; if they Both tend to promote good Morals; and to make men act in every station and circumstance of life, justly, and honestly, and according to the strictest rules of Honour and Virtue; and if they Both are capable of the strictest Proof, they cannot but deserve the attention of every serious thinking person.

It is certain, that without the Principles of *Natural Religion*, you cannot argue with any *consistency* about the Origin of Things, their Order, regular Motions, Ends, Cause: and with them, there is a *perfect Harmony* in the whole. The greater Discoveries and Improvements we make in the true Principles of Philosophy, the more we are enabled to establish and confirm those Principles. Now as *Christianity* is built upon that Foundation, we shall see that it has the same End in view, but offers more Motives and more Reasons to obtain that End than *Natural Religion* does, or can; and consequently, is so far more ex-

cellent, and ought to be embraced by those who profess a regard to the Religion of Nature.

As my design is to shew that both Natural and Revealed Religion are capable of the *strictest Evidence*, I shall begin with enquiring, *First*, Whether there be any *Rule of Action* to Man, and what That is? *Secondly*, Whether Man be a *Free Agent*, or not? And *Lastly*, Whether there be any Maker and *Governor of the World*? For if there be no certain fixed *Rule of Action*, there can be either no Religion at all, or else it must be something very precarious and uncertain. And *2dly*; If Man be not a Free Agent, He cannot be *accountable* for not observing the *Rule of his Actions*. And lastly, If there be no such Being as God, there can be no such thing as *Religion*; the Idea of Religion supposing the Idea of God.

When this Foundation is laid, we may then proceed to consider what *Religion* is; and the Evidence for, and Uses of, *Revelation*; and such other Subjects as fall within my present Design.


T H E
C O N N E X I O N

O F

Natural and Revealed RELIGION.

C H A P. I.

*Whether there be any certain Rule of Action
to Man, and What That is ?*

IT is very observable, that all Nations CHAP.
and all Languages have Words by which I.
they express *Good* and *Evil*, *Right* and 
Wrong, *Virtuous* and *Vicious* Actions.
They must therefore all have some Test or
other, whereby they distinguish Actions, and
range them, as under their proper Classes :
For they never *indifferently* use the Terms
Good and *Bad*, nor do they ever call the
same Action in the same Circumstances *Right*
and *Wrong*. The Point then is, to see if we
can discover what this Test is, to which all
Actions are, or may be referred, and by
which they must be tried, in order to know
under what Class they ought to be ranged, as
Good, *Bad*, or *Indifferent*.

Actions may be reduced to several general
Heads or Classes ; either according to the
B 3 Species

CHAP. Species of the *Agents*, as, *Divine*, *Spiritual*,

I. *Human* : Or else they may be considered according to their *Natures*, as *Moral*, or *Physical*, or whatever Men employ themselves about in their respective Callings, whatever they are. By a *Moral* Action, I mean all such as an Intelligent Agent voluntarily does, the Consequences of which are imputable to him for Good or Evil, for Praise or Censure, for Approbation or Condemnation. By a *Physical* Action, I mean all such Effects as are any way produced by the natural Constitution of things, whether properly and strictly to be called Actions, or not. The other Kind needs no particular Explication. Now these, I say, are all deemed and called *Good*, so far only as they agree to some certain Rule or Measure by which they are estimated. And not only Actions have this Denomination given them, but *Agents* likewise, if what they do comes up to the Test by which they are tried. We ourselves, and every thing which we are capable of doing, is reducible to a certain Standard ; and to make us, or our Actions come under the Denomination of *Good*, or *Bad*, we, and they must agree to a certain proper Measure or Rule. The *Agent* is measured by *Intention* or *Design*, joined to his *Action* : An *Action* is always tried by its Conformity to its proper Standard, without any further View. Thus when any thing is executed with a certain

2

degree

degree of Exactness in its kind, we call the CHAP. work *Good*, and he that designed it, and was I. able to finish his work exactly, a *Good Workman*: If he varies from this Exactness, in making any instrument, or in building, or in any operation whatever, according to the degree in which he swerves from it, he is but an *Indifferent*, or a *Bad Workman*; and the Work too is but *Indifferent*, or *Bad*. Suppose a man intended to make, and did make, a *Circle*, or a *Square*;—if he made the one so exact, that all the circumference was equally distant from the center, it would be called a *Good Circle*: or if in the other, all the lines were of equal length, and all met at right angles, it would be called a *Good Square*: Suppose he were to build a wall, if he raised it perpendicular, and made it strong, and of an height that answered its end, it would be a *Good wall*; and the maker or builder would be in his way a *Good workman*.

Whence now is it that the word *Good*, in all these and such like cases, is applied universally both to the *Agent*, and to the *Effect* produced by him? Is it not, because the Action done agrees to a certain Test which men have in their minds; and by which they measure both the *Agent* and the *Action*?

It is just the same in all *Moral Actions* and *Agents*. There are certain Relations which

CHAP. all men stand in one to another which require a certain Conduct, and which if exactly observed, the person is called a *Good Man*. If a parent intends and acts a tender, kind, part by his child, and takes care of his education, and provision, &c. he is a *Good Parent*. A *Good Subject*, is one that observes the laws of his country, and conforms his Actions to them. And thus it is in every Relation of Life; King, Subject, Master, Servant, Husband, Wife, Neighbour, &c. if the person designs to act, and does act, according to the Relation he is in, he is ever deemed *Good*. So that to be *Morally Good*, a man must design and act according to the circumstances he is in; his true circumstances; his true relations: And to know what These are, every thing which may determine them is to be considered as in fact they are. For *Things* are what they are independent of us; and so are their several Relations: It is *our* business to take notice of them, and to act as they are. And indeed, the consideration of the Nature of Things, their Properties, Habitudes, and Effects, is so necessary, that without it we cannot be what may be called *Good*; and whenever we act according to the real Relations of Things, we cannot be deemed *Bad*.

It would be impossible for any one ever to err, or to do wrong, were he to take in the
whole

whole of the circumstances of things. But men are apt to consider *some* circumstances only, and to overlook others: Now this is not to act according to the Nature or Relations of things, but to act upon a view of a *Part* of the case; and to act upon a *Part* as if it were *the whole*, must necessarily make a man act *wrong*. 'Tis just as if a man were to describe a *Circle*, three parts of which he made true, and the other quarter was a Curve of another order: It could not be a Circle, nor answer the properties of that Figure; and should any one act as if such a Figure were a Circle, he must be guilty of great Errors in the Execution of his Designs.

The proper word by which all the real Relations and Habitudes of things to one another is expressed, is *Truth*, or, *the Truth of things*; and in this it is, that *Truth* is the *Rule of Action* to all men: and he that does any thing agreeable to *Truth* is called *good*.

Whenever I speak of an Agent acting agreeably to Truth, and having a Right to the character or Denomination of *good*, I always would be understood of a person *intending* or *designing* to execute what he does: and not of one who through ignorance, chance, or hazard, produces any good effect. For suppose him to accomplish his work, as *Nealces* is said in *Pliny l. 35. c. 10.* to have done the Foam upon his Horse's Mouth and Bit,

or

CHAP. of *Protogenes* upon the Dog's Mouth that he

I. painted, by a chance throw of his Spunge ;
 however *good* the Picture was, as agreeing exactly to the standard by which it was to be tried, yet the Painters were in this case not *good*, but *lucky* : Their want of *Intention* in the Action, makes them not come up to the Test by which they must be tried, in order to have the appellation of *Good* given them. So that by an *Agent's acting*, I always mean and comprehend under these terms, whatever is necessary to right action in them, *viz.* Intention and Design. The Test of *Goodness* in any Action whatever, moral or physical, is its agreement with the true Relation of things in the case put : and just so much as men do not design or deviate from *Truth*, *i. e.* from the true Relation of things, so much there is of *Badness* in them. Now these Relations, whatever they are, must be carefully examined, and *all* of them considered, or else we follow not *Truth*, the *Truth of the case*, but *some* part, or *some* circumstances only.

It may be said, That this is a Rule of little use to Mankind : We can't arrive at *Truth* in infinite Cases ; and Probability is the great Foundation of Human Action.

Allowing this, it is no Objection to the Rule that I lay down. For what is Probability, but the agreement of *many* circumstances, upon the view of which we venture to
 act,

act, though there may be some other cir-
 cumstances which we cannot know whether
 they will happen or not, which may obstruct
 our designs. To act upon such a principle,
 is acting upon some hazard, because it is act-
 ing upon circumstances which may, or may
 not, happen. But then this is no reason why
 men should not make *Truth* the Rule of their
 actions; but it is a motive to search and en-
 quire and take notice: Because just so much
 as one man can discover more of the true Na-
 ture, Qualities, Properties, Relations of things
 than another, so much less hazard does he
 venture than another, in what he undertakes.
 And in course could we know *all* the Pro-
 perties and Relations of things, and were we
 to act agreeable to them, *i. e.* to the Truth
 of the case, we could not but act right, be-
 cause then we should act as God himself
 acts.

This indeed is not to be expected from such
 a creature as Man, short-sighted, weak, igno-
 rant, exposed to infinite mistakes as he is.
 But yet small as our knowledge is with re-
 spect to him whom the Heaven of Heavens
 cannot contain, yet it is much greater than
 at first sight is imagined. Man, the lowest
 of the rational Creation, hath not only been
 able to trace out the motions of the Planets,
 and to discover their orbits, and to compute
 with the utmost exactness their Conjunctions,
 Oppo-

CHAP.
I.
~~~~~

CHAP. Oppositions, &c. but can give demonstrations  
 I. of what would be the effects in very many  
 possible cases, where no Existence shews us  
 the fact. We can tell, *e. g.* what would have  
 been the consequence, supposing that we had  
 two Moons to go round the Earth; or if we  
 had been placed nearer to, or further from  
 the Sun; or if the Axis of the Earth had been  
 in any other Position. And if by Industry  
 and Labour we can arrive at such Knowledge,  
 much more can we perceive the common or-  
 dinary relations of things, with which we  
 have daily acquaintance, and a constant ex-  
 perience of their effects.

All demonstration consists, not in the con-  
 sideration of things as *actually existing*, but  
 in the perception of their relations to one  
 another, whether they exist or not. And he  
 that can perceive such Relations can demon-  
 strate every Proposition in Mathematicks, as  
 well as if Lines, and Squares, and Circles, and  
 Curves of all sorts did exist. Suppose a man  
 were to act upon this Knowledge, and con-  
 form to what he perceives to be *True*, his ac-  
 tion would be deemed *Right*: Suppose it to  
 be a *Moral* action, conform'd to the *Truth*  
 of the Relation which he stands in to other  
 people, it would be a *Good* action: Suppose  
 again, that the action was not agreeable to  
 the true Relation he was in, as *e. g.* if a man  
 knowingly were to violate the engagements  
 he was under to any person, it would be an

*Evil*



*Evil* action. So that a conformity to *Truth*, CHAP. I.  
 the *Truth of the Case*, or its disagreement with that Rule, is the thing which constitutes an Action or Agent, good or bad.

The ordinary Relations in life we are so well acquainted with, that scarce any body is so great an Ideot as not to know them:— Who is ignorant of this Truth; That no one can have a right to another man's Property? Some cases are so complicated, and so many circumstances are to be taken in, in order to know the *Truth*, the *Truth of the Case*, that it may be very difficult to determine one's self which way to act. But generally speaking, the *Truth* is plain, and there is wanting only common care and attention to direct men: and they are so conscious of this, that they can *condemn* themselves, how much soever they may strive to conceal their actions from others. This shews that they know THE Truth, and measure their actions by That, and are not ignorant of the relations of things; but only strive to cover and conceal from others what they are conscious is done amiss.

Apply this Rule to any or every Virtue, and it will appear an equal, strait, unvaried Rule, that can never fail. What is it makes a man *just*, or *charitable*, or *temperate*? It is his conforming his actions to *Justice*, *Charity*, and *Temperance*. All that is required to *Justice*

CHAP. is, to give to every man his due. *Charity* is

I. the same as universal Benevolence ; and *Temperance* is the government of appetites. Now nothing can come under these denominations that in the least varies from the Rule : For if in ninety nine acts a man gives to others their due, and does it not in the hundredth, he is in that *unjust* : So if he be benevolent to others *very often*, and yet shews ill-will in particular instances, he is not in those cases *charitable* : If he governs his appetites only on particular occasions, and gives them a loose in others, in all such excesses he is *intemperate*. We often indeed denominate a man, not from particular acts but from habits; and if in general he conforms to acts of *Virtue*, we treat him as virtuous: Not that he strictly is so, but we have no words by which we can distinguish such little deviations from exactness. What bears a tolerable nearness to a Line, or to a Circle, we give in loose and common speech the names of a Line and Circle to. But when we speak with philosophical strictness, no man is *just* or *temperate*, further than his actions are conform to strict Justice or Temperance, *i. e.* to the Truth of the Case.

Truth then is the Rule of Action to all intelligent Beings, not only in *moral* cases, but universally in all : nor is it necessary to look out for different Rules for different sorts of

ACTION, one for moral, another for mathe-  
 matical, a third for physical ones, since this  
 one is the proper, just, and adequate measure  
 of all. For what is a virtuous ACTION, but  
 the observing and following the *true* Relati-  
 ons of Persons and Things in the given case?  
 Just as the making a good Clock or Watch is  
 observing the true Properties of the materials  
 made use of, and working them up exactly,  
 or truly. And there is this advantage in con-  
 sidering and measuring ACTIONS by this Rule,  
 that no case can be put, either in relation to  
 the ACTIONS of God, or Man, or any Beings  
 superior to Man, but they may be measured  
 by it. Other rules indeed have been propo-  
 sed: But either they are deficient when they  
 come to be applied to the ACTIONS of *God*; or  
 else they are the same with that which is  
 here laid down, though expressed in different  
 words; or they are no Rules by which in  
 our present circumstances we can try our Ac-  
 tions.

Happiness, *e. g.* is proposed by some as a  
 Rule by which we may try all our ACTIONS:  
 and “no ACTION is good or bad, virtuous or  
 “vicious, but as it naturally and necessarily  
 “produces Happiness or Misery *upon the*  
 “*whole* of things.”

When this is made the Rule of ACTION, it  
 is rightly supposed to be Happiness *upon the*  
*whole* of things. For present Happiness may  
 be

CHAP. be attended with excessive Misery in its con-

I. sequences; and present Evil may be attended  
 with future Good; so that the Surplus only  
 of Good or Evil is to be considered as real  
 in these cases; and by that alone the Action  
 is to be estimated. Where indeed there is no  
 mixture, but pure Happiness is produced, that  
 is good for us: But then I say, that That a-  
 rises from the acting according to the true  
 Relations of things which always must and  
 will produce Happiness. But the question  
 may be put, what is Happiness *upon the whole*  
 of things? Or, whence does it spring? Or  
 what is Happiness itself? This will admit of  
 so many disputes, and Men's Tastes are so  
 different, and we must wait so long for it,  
 that we can't make it a *present* useful Rule.  
 For we do not know what is Happiness, and  
 what not, till the Persons who enjoy it can  
 make their *own* estimates: and as every man  
 must estimate for himself, it will be found  
 not easy to frame any one certain Rule of  
 Action obliging *all* men to govern themselves  
 by. For *Happiness*, or which is the same  
 thing, *Pleasure*, being different to each par-  
 ticular, every man will pursue his particular  
 pleasure; and in course there must be as many  
 Rules of right Action as there are sorts of  
 Pleasure to mankind. But if men, by *Hap-  
 piness upon the whole*, mean, not the particu-  
 lar Pleasures of any one man, but what is  
 suited

suitcd to fuch a creature as *Man* is, this CHAP. will be giving us a *Rule* which will, or may, I. be ufelefs, till we know exactly what we are, and what our happinefs confifts in; which have been the fubjects, and are likely to be fo, of constant difpute whilft we are on this fide the grave.

But whatfoever Happinefs *upon the whole* may be, or even perfect Happinefs pure and unmixed, yet it is not properly the *Rule* of Action, but the *End*; and therefore in ftrictnefs every ftep is to be directed by *Truth* until we arrive at Happinefs. If it be granted me that Truth alone leads to Happinefs, and the End is the proper meafure of the Means, then it is of no great moment which of the two is made the Rule, fince then in reality they coincide, and are in effect the fame.

Others make the *Will of God* the foundation of all Morality, and tell us, that his Command alone makes it rational, fitting, or fafe to practice virtue. It is *He* that binds us; it is *He* that obliges us to it, by connecting our true and certain Happinefs with it.

The Will of God when known is certainly a very good Rule of Action: But to fay that his Command alone makes it rational to practice Virtue, is to leave Men at large, whether they will practice it or not, where his Command is not known. And which

CHAP. way is the Will or Command of God to be  
I. known, where there is no Revelation of it?

Is it to be gathered from the comparison of Ideas, and from the relations of Things? If so, what is the *Will of God* but other words for *Truth*? Nay suppose a positive Revelation given; Is not this to be interpreted by the Nature of Things? Imagine it to be said—Love your Enemies--Resist not Evil--Give to every Man that asketh--Lend, hoping for nothing again, &c. Must not such Expressions be limited, or interpreted by the Nature of Things, or the true Circumstances of the Case? They certainly must, unless Reason be discarded: And if that be once gone, we shall have no test to distinguish the Will of God from the illusions of the Devil, or the Impostures of Men.

But indeed the Will of God does not make the Relations of Things, but only *makes them known*. God does not *make Truth*, but conforms his Will, and requires that we should conform ours, to Truth. He does not *make* by his Will twice Two equal to Four; but his Will is, that all intelligent Agents universally should act agreeably to that Ratio, and not as if twice Two were equal to two hundred.

God might indeed have made the World in a very different manner; and he might, had he pleased, have given us better faculties,  
or

or he might have given us different ones CHAP. I.  
 from what he has. And in this sense it may be said to be owing to the *Will* of God, that the Relations of *existent* Things are what they are: But when this is said, no more is meant than that Things exist *in fact* as they do. But whether the present World had been created or not, it did not depend on the Will of God, that the Ratio, or relation of the Three Angles of a rectilinear Triangle to two right ones should be that of Equality. An intelligent mind could have perceived this Truth, whether ever there had existed *in fact* such a Triangle or not: Nor could a State of Things have been created, where it could be true, that the three Angles of such a Triangle should be equal to four right ones.

The *Will* of God itself is governed and directed by *Truth*; *i. e.* by the true Habitudes and Relations of Things; and this is a sufficient reason why it may be securely relied on. But take away this, and what evidence is there that That which is true and right to day may not be false and wrong to-morrow? Nay suppose even a Promise, that all Things shall continue as they are for any term of years, what Security is there, that he may not break this very Promise? To say that he *will* not, is gratis said upon this Supposition; nor is it possible to prove it, because the very arguments by which it is

CHAP. proved, may possibly be changed, and become false and inconclusive.

I. Again; What is called the *Will* in any Agent, is nothing but the Power he has to begin or forbear Action; to begin to consider or to forbear consideration: But it has nothing to do with Truth or Falshood (which belong to another Power, *viz.* intellect) except it be to act according to the Perception of the Nature of Things, or contrary to them. The *Will* of God therefore cannot be the *Rule* of his Actions, but his *Understanding* must: Nor can it be the Rule of *our* Actions, but as it is governed by *Truth* however made known unto us; and consequently Truth is in reality our only Rule.

Truth then is the one only direct Rule of Action to all intelligent Beings; to God, to Angels, to Men. It is an universal Rule, and serves for not only all sorts of voluntary understanding Beings, but measures all sorts of Things that are to be done. It is a clear Rule by which we may know whether what we do, be right or wrong, good or bad, in all circumstances; and it is a sure director to Happiness, which is the great End we should all strive to attain.

Having considered *Truth* thus far as the *Rule* of Action; it may be deemed an omission perhaps not to carry this Search somewhat



what further ; and not to treat it likewise as a *Law*. Every *Law* is a *Rule* of Action ; but then it implies something more than a bare *Direction* ; viz. an *obligatory* Quality ; a *Rule* has only a *directive* force ; whereas a *Law* has a *directive* and an *obligatory* Power too. The *obligatory* Quality of a *Law* is usually taken to be the *Pleasure* or *Pain* annexed to obedience or disobedience : But this is not properly the *Obligation*, but a motive to comply with *Obligation* ; which by a common Metonymy has at length acquired the Name, and is usually treated as *Obligation* itself.

Let us therefore enquire, what *Obligation* is, and whether Truth *obliges* Men or not ?

In order to this I must observe,

1. That when any Truth is proposed to the mind of Man, it is not by That *compelled* to Action, nor is it put under any *Necessity*, but it is still at liberty to act or not. So that Men may act *contrary* to *Truth*, if they determine so to do. Just so it is with *Obligation* ; this implies no external Force, no Compulsion, no Necessity ; but Men may act (and we find they *do* act) *contrary* to *Obligation*, as much as they do to *Truth*. *Obligation* therefore is not any *physical* or *natural* Power inherent in Men, but must be a *Moral Quality* induced.

2. When Truth appears to the Mind, a rational Agent becomes so affected as to pass

CHAP. a Judgment: and the Judgment it always  
 I. passes is, that if Actions are contrary to, or  
 inconsistent with, what appears to be *true*,  
 it is *worthy* of, or it *deserves*, or it may just-  
 ly suffer punishment. When the mind is in  
 such state, or is thus affected, the Person is  
 in a state of *Obligation*, *i. e.* he has such a  
 disposition of Mind as makes him acknow-  
 ledge himself justly accountable for his con-  
 duct. If Truth therefore can produce such  
 an effect, it has in strict propriety the moral  
 Quality of Obligation; and is truly said to  
*oblige*.

Man so is framed as to have the Powers of  
*Thinking*, and *Judging*, and *Willing*, *i. e.*  
 he can perceive and determine, and act. He  
 is a creature of that sort, that he can deter-  
 mine himself to *act* or not to act, just as he  
 thinks fit. He is not like those Beings that  
 are determined by Gravitation, or Impulse,  
 to one particular way which they cannot for-  
 sake, or change, or alter, unless they are put  
 into some other direction by some external  
 force: But he has, (as will be proved hereaf-  
 ter) a Power of Action or Liberty, by means  
 of which he can in many cases act, or not, as  
 he determines within himself. When Truth  
 is laid before such a Being in a clear manner,  
 he cannot help perceiving it, and by that  
 means his Understanding is informed, though  
 his Will continues still free, and the Man is  
 capable

capable of acting either according, or con-  
 trary, to the Light of his Mind. Consider  
 now,

CHAP.  
 I.  


3. That the Faculties which we have were given us in order to use them, or to apply them to the purposes for which they were given. The Eyes were made to enable us to see, the Ears to hear, the Understanding to make us perceive Truth, and Liberty was added, that we might be capable of Action, agreeable to the purposes of all our Faculties. Suppose a Man by obstinately shutting his Eyes were to fall and receive damage; instead of pity it would be said--He *ought* to have kept his Eyes open, and then he had not been exposed to so much Evil: That is--He did not make use of the means that were in his power, and were put in his power on purpose to preserve him, as he *might* have done; and therefore he may justly suffer this evil. So again: Suppose a Man to know this Truth--It is reasonable to worship God--The End of his having the faculty of Understanding is not complied with, if he does not pay him worship: And in course, should he at any time, or in any manner suffer for such neglect, he would feel in himself that he suffered justly, since he did not conform to his Understanding. Suppose that a Man knew, that a Wall built perpendicular would stand as long as he desired it, *e. g.* 60 years: and yet he care-

CHAP. I. lesly or perversly would build it *hanging*, and it should fall in 60 days, and he should be forced to rebuild it--He would be conscous of his ill deserts, and conscous of just suffering, because he refused to make use of his Understanding, or would not apply it to the Ends for which it was given him.

Hence arises an easy account of *Obligation*, and what sort of *Bond*, or *Tie*, it is upon the Minds of Men. *Natural Obligation*, or as some call it *Obligation of Equity*, is nothing but the Perception of Truth, and the affection of the Mind upon such Perception. Truth has the directive force according to which the Action is to be done: and it moreover puts the Mind into such a state, that if Action is not done according to its direction; the Man is conscous of ill desert, or of being worthy of suffering for it. This renders him *obliged* to act otherwise; not *compelled*, not *necessitated*, not deprived of his *natural Liberty*, not so much as lessened in his privileges, but tied to act as being what he is, an understanding as well as free Being.

The way of the *Roman Lawyers*, and from them of Others, has been, to consider *Obligation*, not in the person obliged, but as an act of a Superior, by which some part of Liberty in the Subject is taken away, by declaring what Actions are, or are not to be, done. But this is not going to the root of the

the Question : And though it be sufficient in CHAP. order to explain the Nature of Human Laws, I. which go no farther than external Acts ; yet it has had this bad Effect, that it has led People to imagine That to be the Ground and Reason of Obligation, which is no more than an Effect or Enforcement of Obligation. Thus *e. g.* Human Laws are the Commands of a Superior which oblige a Man to conform his Actions to them by the Rewards or Penalties annexed unto them. Now the Penalties annexed are not the things which put Men under Obligation to comply ; but they are Enforcements, or additional Motives, to Obligation<sup>a</sup>. For is not a Man obliged to abstain from Injustice and every Act of Violence, even where there is no fear or danger of Punishment ? Supposing a certain Security from all Penalties by means of *Darkness*, or of *desert Places*, &c. would not a Man be still *obliged* not to rob or plunder any one whom he had in his Power, though he might make his Fortune by such an Act of Villany ? Or would it not be a Crime to rob under such an Opportunity, or Circumstance, as much as to do it before Witnesses ? This shews that Obligation arises

<sup>a</sup> Quod si pœna, si metus supplicii, non ipsa turpitudine deterret ab injuriosa facinorosaque vita, nemo est injustus : at incauti potius habendi sunt improbi : tum autem qui non ipso honesto movemur, ut boni viri simus, sed utilitate aliqua atque fructu, callidi simus, non boni. Nam quid faciet is homo in tenebris, qui nihil timet nisi testem & judicem ? Quid in deserto, quo loco nactus quem multo auro spoliare possit imbecillum atque solum ? *Cic. de Leg. 1.*

from

CHAP. from Consciousness of Truth, and derives its

I. Power and Force from the Effect of Truth upon the Mind : That it is, and cannot but be permanent at all Times, and in all Places : That it allows no more a liberty to do ill in private than in public ; and consequently that all Penalties are no more than the Enforcements of Obligation.

I have now shewn that Truth is not only the *Rule*, but the *Law*, of Action ; and that we are under strict *Obligation* to follow it. Does it not follow then from hence, that all deviation from Truth in all cases, in not Moral as well as Moral Actions, is *Sinful* ? Will not Sin, and the Consequence of Sin abound ? Will not every Mistake, Inaccuracy in Work of all sorts, be looked upon as so many Violations of a Law, and consequently become penal in the sight of God, who requires the Observation of this Law from all intelligent Creatures ?

I may I think answer very justly, That such is the real Constitution of things, that no Man can ever deviate from Truth in any Case, but some ill Consequence arises ; sometimes indeed so small as not to be regarded, but oftentimes so fatal as to prove ruinous to the Agent. Whoever shall call this a *Punishment*, will speak inaccurately, because it is only a natural Consequence of things ; and Punishment is always something inflicted more than what arises immediately from the Action itself.

itself. However, it is certainly true, that  
 whosoever makes any piece of work Exact  
 and True, it answers all the Ends and De-  
 signs of the Agent much better, and it lasts  
 longer, than if he does it in an inaccurate  
 careless manner. So that the great Law of  
 Truth is not without its Sanction even in ca-  
 ses not of a Moral nature. The matter is much  
 the same in cases of *Moral Action*; where  
 Truth carries with it an inward Pleasure,  
 Quiet and Peace of Mind, a Satisfaction of  
 doing what is agreeable to the Mind of God,  
 a Recommendation and Approbation of all  
 Mankind. But then when any one is guilty  
 of a breach of Morality, or, which is the same  
 thing, of any act of injustice, or intemperance,  
 or impiety, he not only forfeits all other men's  
 Kindness and Good-will; and is considered as  
 an Enemy to good order in Society; and be-  
 comes Offensive to God; but he is moreover  
 liable to what Punishment the Governor of  
 the Universe may think fit to inflict, because  
 he had it in his Power to act otherwise, and  
 would not exert his Power as he could. So  
 that every deviation from Truth has an Evil  
 of one sort or other attending it, as every ex-  
 act Observation of it has a certain Good. But  
 then the Evil of *Moral Actions*, or the Good  
 that is consequent upon them, being different  
 from the Good or Evil of Actions which are  
 not of a Moral nature; it accordingly receives  
 a different

CHAP.  
I.  
~~~~~

CHAP. a different name: The Deviation in One case
 I, is *Sin*, and *Guilt* is contracted; in the Other
 there is no *Sin* nor *Guilt*, but there is greater
 or less Folly. And as sometimes there is an In-
 ability in us to order things even according to
 our Skill, and sometimes things are above our
 Skill to manage; in these cases there are *In-*
conveniences consequent, though not *imputable*
 to us, because we had not Power to do what
 Truth required; but there is no Sin, no
 Guilt, nor proper Punishment consequent,
 or threatened, to such Actions.

C H A P. II.

Containing several Consequences which naturally arise from Truth's being the Rule and Law of Action.

FROM making Truth the Rule and Law of Action, several Consequences of great Importance naturally arise. As

CHAP.
II.



First, It is the Duty of all men to direct and govern their natural Abilities by the certain Rule of Truth, or agreeably to the real (not imaginary) circumstances of things. Every man must apply *rightly* his Powers in order to be a Good man; and the Rightness of the Application consists in a conformity of Action to *Truth*. Not to *one* or *more* particular Circumstances taken independent of others, but to the *whole*, or to what makes up the *Truth of the Case* in which the man stands. *Particular* Circumstances, how true soever, do not make up THE Truth, but *all* of them put together. A man that has been guilty of some gross crime, may tell his Judge a great many Truths; yet by concealing Others, he does not tell THE Truth, but only a part of it. Now it is acting according

CHAP. ing to THE Truth, the Truth of the Case,
 II. which constitutes a man a Good man.

It may be said, That upon this Notion, No man is good; that universally Man is a very absurd and irrational Being: that he has strong Passions and Appetites at that time of Life when Reason begins to dawn: that he is full of Prejudices planted in him by an early Education: that when he comes out of the hands of his Tutors and Guardians, he sees little but Vice and Folly: that when he goes into the world, he is presently immersed in the concerns of Life: that he is to provide against hunger, and to procure the necessaries of Life: that in course he can have but small Abilities and few Opportunities of cultivating his Mind; and that without much cultivation he can make but little progress in Knowledge.

Be it so: All that will follow is, That there is much difficulty in finding out Truth, and in following it exactly. But then, whatever difficulties an intelligent Being, made as we are, has to struggle with, he has no other Rule of Action but Truth; and the Government of himself in every step of Life ought to be by That. It is in Morals as it is in mechanical Operations: Though the Square, and the Rule, and the Compass, is exactly true, and the same in all hands, to the youngest Beginner and the oldest Artist, yet the

the same Exactness of Practical Conformity CHAP. II.
 is not to be expected, but proper Allowances
 are to be made for the Abilities and Oppor-
 tunities, and Improvements in the Work-
 man. So is it in Moral Practices: Proper
 Abatements must be made for Ignorance, and
 Error, and want of opportunities of Know-
 ing, and for every Circumstance which
 makes a difference in persons. No man can
 be tied up to Impossibilities: Where therefore
 such Circumstances arise, as may justly be
 pleaded in Excuse for such an imperfect
 Creature as Man is, before one who really
 knows what is true and what is false, there
 no doubt Allowances must and will be made,
 and an imperfect Service and Obedience will
 be accepted. But still there is no other Rule
 but Truth, the Truth of the Case, for Man
 to follow, and *we are sure that the judgment
 of God is according to Truth.*

Secondly, The Law of Nature must be of
 constant and perpetual Obligation. Man,
 considered as a reasonable Creature, must
 constantly observe it: nor can any Circum-
 stances possibly arise, which can dispense
 with his obedience to it. It is founded
 in the Nature of things, or in the Relations
 which intelligent Beings stand in to one ano-
 ther; and therefore must be obligatory as
 long as such Beings exist. They seem not to
 me to understand the Extent and Difficulty
 of

CHAP. of observing this Law, who treat *Morality*
 II. as a mean and low Attainment. It is the
 great Business of Men, and of all intelligent
 Beings, to observe it: It comprehends the
 Whole of Duty: And the Man that pre-
 sumptuously violates it, forfeits all pretension
 to Reason, and Goodness.

When this Law is practised from a Sense
 of the Being of God, it becomes then the
Religion of Nature, and comprehends the
 Duty of Man to God, to his Neighbour, to
 Himself: And for what the Extent of this
 is, and what care it requires to practise it,
 and how much every man is obliged to fol-
 low it, I must refer the reader to Mr. *Wol-*
laston's incomparable Book, where this Sub-
 ject is compleatly and accurately handled.

Thirdly, The Circumstances of things be-
 ing very various, and their Relations to one
 another, to us in many cases unknown, it
 follows, that we ought to lay up in our
 Minds as many *particular True Propositions*
 as we can, that These being duly considered
 may help to direct us to Right Action. For
 it is certain, that he that has made the most
 Observation, and has the most treasured up
 particular Truths, will be best able to judge
 what is most likely to be THE Truth, and
 in course what is fittest to be done. That
 which is clear upon comparing many True
 Propositions together, may be very precarious
 and

and uncertain upon a narrower View of CHAP. things. He that should know that Lead is II. heavy, fusible, and malleable, but does not know that it is *soft*, may be induced to apply it to many Uses for which it is unfit, and to which He that knows its *Softness* will never apply it. To bring therefore as many Properties of any thing together, as we can by experience or instruction learn, and to consider them, and their Connexion, is to pursue the best means of arriving at Certainty. Just so it is, when we would act right in any other case. If we frame to ourselves a rule of Action from a single Proposition, where more than one are required to shew the full state of the Case; or if we do it from a very narrow View of things, we may be guilty of great Mistakes and Errors.

'Tis certain in fact that the Good and Evil of this Life is promiscuously dispensed; and Good men suffer Evil things, and Evil men receive Good things. Take this Fact by itself, and turn it over ever so often, and it is impossible to know whether the Conclusion be, either that there is no just Governor of the Universe, or, That there is to be a future State of Recompence. But suppose a Man convinced of the Truth of this Proposition, That God exists, a Good and Just and Wise Being; and that then he comes to consider the unequal Dispensation of things, the

CHAP. Consequence will then be certain, that the
 II. present cannot be the whole of our Existence,
 but there must be a State when all these Inequalities will be made up.

So again; If one argues from any one particular Attribute of the Deity, Goodness, or Mercy, or Justice, without the Consideration of any other, it is very possible to form wrong Systems. The Reason is, that we do not take in the *Truth of the Case*, or all and every Circumstance that ought to be considered. It is right therefore to treasure up in our Minds as many true Propositions as we can, in order to help us to right Action: And the greater our Knowledge is, the less Hazard is there of Mistake or wrong Behaviour.

This too holds equally true concerning any Doctrines of Revelation. He that will understand any point whatever, must keep in his mind the Principles of *Reason*, which are so many *true Propositions*, and must never forego them, lest Contradictions and Absurdities should be imposed under the Pretence and Cover of Revelation.

Fourthly, Whoever they be, that under any Pretence whatever attempt to lessen the Force, or Sense of the Obligation of the Principles of Honesty; or that would weaken the Obligation of Morality; by making it bend to Politicks, or would influence Men to act contrary to Truth and Right; or that imagine nothing
 to

to be true but what Superiors command; or CHAP. that do not pay a sacred Regard to Truth; or II. think that Men ought to pay a greater Regard to any thing than Truth; they are the greatest Enemies to Virtue and Honour that can be, and ought to be detested by every serious Person. They are taking away the Foundations of all mutual Trust and Confidence: They are destroying all Credit: They are raising a Jealousy and Suspicion of even their own Conduct: And bring themselves at-length to an Inability of doing a morally *Good* Action, because all Intention of Right is lost and gone.

Fifthly, Truth being the Rule of Action, the Wisdom of God has so ordered Matters that we never deviate from Truth, the Truth of the Case, but we find an Inconvenience proportionable to the Deviation from it. This has led some to imagine, that all *Obligation* arises solely from the Good or Evil which is annexed to, or consequent upon, the Performance, or Non-performance of an Action; and that no one is *obliged* to follow Truth, because it is *reasonable*, but because of the *Convenience* or *Inconvenience* attending his Obedience.

It is true that God has so contrived and made things, that Happiness or Misery shall follow the Performance or Non-performance of certain Actions: But Happiness or Misery

CHAP. do not *make* the Rule of Action, but *suppose*

II. it: They are the *Motives* or *Reasons* why we should carefully attend to *Truth*: And because *we* might be negligent, or might even wilfully transgress our duties, Therefore God has annexed these as Sanctions to what is the Rule of Action. The Law of any Superior is the Rule which the Subject is to follow: And the *Penalty* is not THE Law itself, but the *Sanction* of the Law. And as the Sanctions of a Law are not THE Law, so are they not designed to *create*, but to *enforce* the Obligation. Pleasure or Pain annexed to a Law do suppose, that a Person will observe his Duty, rather than forfeit, or not enjoy, the one, or bear the other: But if he be so resolute, and determined as to submit to the Pain, or to despise the Pleasure—is his Duty alter'd, or is he less Criminal? No, The Reason of the thing; its being agreeable to *Truth* makes it constantly fit to be done, and induces that Moral Quality call'd *Obligation*: And the Happiness or Misery annexed to the Law, *i. e.* the good or evil Consequences attending it, are *Enforcements*, or *Motives*, constantly to adhere to what is *true*.

Sixthly, However difficult it may be in certain Cases to discover *Truth*, or to comprehend the true Circumstances and Relations of things, yet it must be observed that *Moral Truths* are generally easily intelligible: The

People of ordinary Capacities can converse CHAP. together; they can make use of affirmative and II. negative Propositions; they can do this long together, and upon various Subjects; and if they fall into any Mistake, they are capable of being easily set right in all such Cases, and they presently see and own their Error. All this can't be done without perceiving very much Truth. And indeed the Minds of Men are so framed, that Truth is as obvious to them, when the Terms made use of to express it are clear, as Colours are to their Eyes, or Sounds to their Ears. But then as Art may mix many Ingredients of diverse Sorts, and compound a Colour that cannot be expressed by Words, or perhaps distinguished by the Eye from another that very nearly approaches it, so a Case may be so perplexed by interweaving of many Circumstances, that no one can be able to understand or determine what is the Truth. Whenever this happens, a Man must be liable to blame for acting at all; because the Truth of the Case is so involved, and so many Circumstances are not seen, that he ought not to act as having no Rule to direct him.

Seventhly, The great Objection against making Truth the Rule or Law of Action, may now receive an easy Solution. 'Tis urged, that if Truth be the Rule of Action, and

CHAP. every Action be good that agrees to *Truth*
 II. then Every Action will be Good. “ For
 “ there being as many Truths concerning
 “ Vice as Virtue, this will make the Obliga-
 “ tion to pursue the one, as great as the
 “ Obligation to pursue the other. e. g. *Rob-*
 “ *bery disturbs Society, discourages Industry.*
 “ These are Truths concerning Vice. Ought
 “ we to act according to them?” If the fol-
 lowing of Truth be the thing that makes an
 Action Virtuous or Good, Our Obligations
 will be as many and as strong for following
Vice, since in this Case Actions will agree to
 Truth in one Case, as much as in the other.

The Answer is, *First*, Suppose that oppo-
 site or contrary Truths may be formed about
 any thing, e. g. *Injustice destroys Society —*
Justice preserves Society. This is nothing
 but the same Truth maintained under diffe-
 rent Expressions. E. g. Injustice is the same
 with, *Not Justice* or *-- Justice*; and to *de-*
stroy is equal to *not preserve*. Now two Ne-
 gatives being equal to an Affirmative, or de-
 stroying each other, 'tis plain that *--Injustice*
destroys, is equal to *--Justice Preserves* Society;
 so that opposite Truths may be in reality no-
 thing else but the same Truth differently ex-
 pressed. Bishop Cumberland has very justly
 observed, *Scilicet fuga Mortis & Egestatis*
est amor Vitæ ac Divitiarum; uti qui per duo
Negativa dicit se nolle vita carere (id est eam
habere)

habere) tantundem dicit, ac si affirmaret velle CHAP. II.
se vita frui. De Leg. Nat. Prolegom. § xiv.

The flying from Death and Poverty is the Love of Life and Riches: As he that by two Negatives says he will not want Life, says the same, as if he had affirmed that he would have Life.

Should it be insisted on, That opposite Truths are quite different in themselves, and are not a difference in Expression only; That *Injustice* is not the same with *Not Justice*, but something positive in itself,—Then I say, *Secondly*, That the Truth of a single Proposition is not, or may not be, THE Truth, the *whole* Truth, the Truth of the Case, but only a *part* of the Truth. Suppose a Felon were to be tried for any act of Felony of which he is really guilty; he may in his own Defence own many Truths or true Propositions, but yet not own THE Truth, which, unless it can be come at by Witnesses, or Circumstances, may continue unknown. So in the present Case, it is a true Proposition that *Injustice is destructive of Society*; but then to act upon such a Proposition does not make the Action *Good*, because many other Truths must be violated by him that will destroy Society, and consequently he does not act upon *The Truth of the Case*.

Here therefore is a strange Paralogism offered by means of the Word *Truth*. This

CHAP. Term signifies a *True Proposition*; and it
 II. likewise signifies (as it always does in the present Subject) *The Truth of the Case*; all the Circumstances of the Thing; all the Relations that are concerned. A *true Proposition*, sometimes signifies the *Whole Truth*, or *the Truth of the Case*; and then to act upon such a True Proposition, is following THE Truth. But when a True Proposition does not contain or express the *whole Truth* of a Case, he that acts upon such a Truth may be guilty of enormous Wickedness: Whereas he that acts upon THE Truth of the Case never can be guilty of any Evil. Indeed no Instance can be put, where a Man shall act upon THE Truth, and be guilty of any Vice; because THE Truth cannot lie on both Sides of any Practice whatever. There may indeed be some True Propositions made on Both Sides of a Case; But some Truth is not *the whole Truth*: And consequently it is nothing to the purpose, to make objections which are founded only upon an Equivoque in the Word, *Truth*.

It may be said perhaps that he that acts an unjust, wicked, or villainous Part, acts Truly such a Part; and the *Truth of the Case is*, that it is a villainous Part. But then, This villainous Part cannot be acted, without breaking through the real Relations of things, or that Truth of Circumstances, or Habitudes
 which

which ought to have been observed, and con- CHAP.
 sequently the Offender must be guilty of Sin, II.
 because he does not follow THE Truth: For
 THE Truth can never be on the Side of
 Wickedness in any possible Case, unless both
 Sides of a Contradiction may be true.

Eighthly, The different Manners of expressing themselves has led some to imagine a difference between Writers, who have treated on the Foundations of Morality, who yet really mean one and the same thing. Some call it *Truth*; Others, the Nature of things; Others use the Terms, *Fitness*, *Agreement*, or *Relations* of things to one another. These Terms when explained, all stand for very nearly the same Ideas; and if People were not disputatious, any one of them might be used to express the Rule of Action. *Truth*, is a General Word that comprehends all the Relations of Things to one another. The *Nature of Things*, is their Essence, or what makes them what they are; and in course it comprehends their Properties and Qualities, and Respects to one another. When the Term, *Relations* of things is used, their Essences are not considered, but merely their Habitudes to one another. By *Fitness*, and *Unfitness*, *Agreement*, or *Disagreement*, is supposed such an actual Application of things to one another, from whence we are enabled to perceive their Tendency, or not Tendency

CHAP. to that for which we say they are fit, or their


II. Agreeableness or Disagreeableness to such or
 ~~~~~ such Purposes. By *Reason of things*, we mean their Proportions, or Ratio's. And if we understand these Terms when we treat of Quantity, as in *Figures, Lines, &c.* what should hinder us from understanding Reason, Fitness, Agreement in Moral Science, which we understand so clearly in all Mathematicks?

*Ninthly*, Moral Rectitude, or Moral Pravity do not arise from any natural Good or Evil annexed to the Rule, but from the Agreement to, or Disagreement from, the Rule itself to which the Action is refer'd: And this the Term, *Rectitude*, implies.

It matters little to enquire in this Place, how far a superior intelligent Being may consider the Dispositions in free, imperfect Creatures, to follow or to swerve from Right, and consequently how fit it is to annex Pleasure or Pain, *i. e.* Rewards or Punishments to the Dispositions in Men, who pay Obedience or Disobedience to his Laws. The Point here is what is *THE Law*? And this is, as I have observed, not the *Sanction* of the Law: For if it were, then the Terms would be indetical, and you might use indifferently *Law*, and *Sanction of a Law*, *i. e.* the whole, or the Part, indiscriminately. But take \* the *Truth* of things,

or

\* Quid est autem, non dicam in homine, sed in omni cœlo atque terra RATIONE divinius?—Est igitur, quoniam nihil

or the *Reason* of things, to be the Law, and CHAP. suppose the Action referred to it to agree or II. disagree with it; and then the *Rectitude* or  *Obliquity* of the Action will instantly be seen.

It is true in fact, that God has annexed *Pleasure* or *Pain* to Moral Actions, by positive Law, as he has natural Conveniences or Inconveniences to *natural* Actions. If this be what makes Obligation, it would be absurd to say that God is under *Obligation*; since he cannot have any Happiness added to what he enjoys, or any Misery inflicted on him. But let it be considered, that God has a Rule or Law of Action, as certain as Man, or any other intelligent Being has: That he conforms his Actions to that Rule or Law constantly; that his being free does not give him any Power or Liberty to recede from that Rule or Law; that his Perception of Truth or the true Relations of things to one another, does in Strictness *oblige* him to act agreeably to them; that He would not be *Good*, or *Just*, if he treated Goodness and Wickedness, Virtue and Vice as the same thing, or if he did not conform his Actions to the Reason of things—Let this I say be consider'd, and it will again be evident, that Happiness or Misery, Plea-

nihil est RATIONE melius, eaque & in homine & in deo, prima homini cum Deo rationis societas: Inter quos autem RATIO, inter eosdem resta Ratio communis est. Quæ cum sit LEX, LEGE quoque consociati homines cum diis putandi sumus. Cicero De Leg. l. 1.

sure

CHAP. sure or Pain, is not the Rule or Law of his  
 II. Actions, but *Truth*; and <sup>b</sup> that which *obliges*  
 Him, *obliges* Us, and all intelligent Beings; and this shews us in what the *Rectitude* of Actions consists.

This cannot be expressed in too many different manners, because it is a Matter of the greatest Importance. Men may frame to themselves a different Rule or Law of Action, and it may possibly lead them right, as it coincides with this, which is the way of God himself. They may insist upon the *Moral Sense*, or upon the *Divine Will*, or they may join to these the *Reason of things*, and found Morality on them *all* conjoin'd. But the *Moral Sense* is either the same with the Perception and Judgment pass'd on Moral Ideas, and then it is only a different Expression for the Power by which we perceive and judge of *all* Ideas, as well Moral as others; or else it is a Word without any Meaning. The *Divine Will*, if by that be meant Revelation, it is nothing to the present Purpose: If by it be meant what is discoverable by our Reason rightly applied, it is the same as *Truth*: If by it be meant, that God *made* all Things as they *are*; and that therefore their particular Relations did not, or could not have subsisted

<sup>b</sup> Inter quos porro est communio LEGIS, inter eos communio Juris est. *ibid.*

Jam vero VIRTUS eadem in homine ac Deo est. *ibid.*



unless he had made things as he *has* — This CHAP.  
 is true, but nothing to the Purpose. *Titius* II.

and *Sempronius* being both born of one Father and Mother, could not have stood in the Relation of *Brothers* to each other, had they not been actually born of the same Parents. But supposing this World had not been made, yet the Relation of two that should be born of the same Father and Mother, would have been what we now call *Brothers*; just as a Square would have been equal to two Triangles on the same Basis, supposing that no Square or Triangle had ever in fact been made. The Ideas of Things depend not on the Things themselves, but the Things are made from the Ideas as the Archetypes, and their Proportions, Habitues, Ratio's are eternal. The Square of the Hypotenuse in a Rectangle Triangle is equal to the Squares of the two other Sides, whether there be or be not any Rectangle Triangle made or existing. An Unoriginated Being must have a Property that an Originated Being has not, whether there be any originated Beings or not. It depends indeed upon the *Will* of God, whether particular Relations shall *in fact* exist, but the Relations are the same whether the things exist or not. These do not commence upon a Supposition of God's having *created* things; nor are they the Consequences of the Existence of things. Thus in *Moral* Relations:  
 Before

CHAP. Before that a System of Rational Creatures


II. was made, or put into a Social State, the Ratio or Relation of them to another, the Fitness of Justice, Equity, Temperance, Prudence, Fortitude to their Happiness, were what they are now. It was True from all Eternity, that whether social Creatures should be ever made or not, Virtue would promote the Happiness of such *possible* Beings; Injustice, Cruelty, Unmercifulness, and every Vice would hurt them. The actual Exercise of Justice and Goodness to one another, would commence indeed when such Creatures should be made; but the Relation of Justice to the Good of Society, its Fitness to that End was Eternal. So in case of certain Duties which arise from the particular Frame of a Man's Body, e. g. *Temperance, Chastity*, — These would have been exactly the same; their Proportions, their Fitness, to the Happiness of such a possible Being, would have been the same as now they are in fact: And you might have reasoned from such Relation, or Proportion, in the same Manner as now we do, when such material Bodies as ours are in fact made.

*Tenthly*, as Truth is the Rule of Action, all known Violation of it in *Physical* Cases is Folly, because we cannot alter the Relations of things: But in *Morals* it must be Sin; and must expose the Man that does it, to  
such

such Punishment as his Superior and Judge CHAP. shall think fit to impose. Hence there can- II. not be too sacred a Regard paid to *Truth*: It ought to be our first and our last Care to inculcate its Obligation; and it must be our Duty to observe it with the utmost Strictness and Severity.

*Lastly*, Hence the common Cases which are put, in relation to the deception of *Children, Idiots, Madmen, Ruffians*, may receive an easy Solution. For let the true Circumstances in any of these Cases be stated, and the Action I say ought to be according to them. It is my Duty, *e. g.* to preserve my Child's Life, which cannot be done without the giving him a certain Dose of *Hiera picra*, which he refuses to take because of its *bitter* Quality. To deceive him into the Potion, the Cup is smear'd with Honey, and by this Art the Child is induced to drink what is so necessary for his Preservation. 'Tis *right* I say to do it; and I should not follow *The Truth*, the Truth of the Case of the Child, if I did it not. So to take away privately a Sword from a Madman, or the deceiving him by an Untruth of Falshood, to prevent his hurting himself or others, is acting according to the Truth of the Case: And should any one by enumerating the Circumstances, or Relations of Things, make it appear that the Truth of the Case is not on this side of the

I                      Question,

CHAP. Question, He would prove that a Man is  
 II. obliged *not* to act in this Manner by the  
 *Child* or *Madman*, but not that the Rule of  
 Action is not THE Truth: All that would  
 follow is, that I have been *mistaken* in hastily  
 determining on the Side of the Case which I  
 have done; and not that I followed a wrong  
 Measure in making THE Truth the Rule of  
 Action.

When a Case of Conscience is proposed to  
 any Person, the principal Point is to state the  
 Facts justly and truly, without the Conceal-  
 ment of any Circumstances which may tend  
 to make an Alteration in the Case. One  
 single Circumstance may alter *the Truth* of  
 the whole, and make the Answer negative  
 or affirmative. To judge therefore of *the*  
*Truth*, or what is the Rule of Action in any  
 given Case whatever, all the Circumstances  
 must be weighed, and the Judgment must  
 be directed by them, and he that knowingly  
 acts contrary to the Truth is always guilty of  
 a Fault, which is greater or less according to  
 the Nature of the Case. Now there is no  
 Rule of Judgment but THE Truth; and in  
 Consequence no Rule of Action but THE  
 Truth; and as all Truth is consistent, hence  
 is a certain Rule to be framed, whereby one  
 may determine into what Class any and every  
 Action is to be ranged, whether it be Good,  
 Bad, or Indifferent.

The

The Reason why I have thus at large in-  
 CHAP. II.  
 fisted upon the Rule and Law of Action, is  
 to shew that Men are not at Liberty to act  
 as they please, or to do what comes into their  
 Heads or Hearts; but they are to govern  
 themselves by some Rule which I have proved  
 to be the *Truth of Things*: They are *obliged*  
 to act in a certain Manner; and nothing can  
 dispense with them for acting otherwise than  
 as the Truth requires. This reasoning holds  
 good, *whatever* Religion is supposed to be,  
 or whether there be any such thing as Reli-  
 gion, either natural or revealed. Men must  
 act as Men, *i. e.* as intelligent, reasonable,  
 Creatures; and since they can perceive the  
 Truth of things, and this is shewn to be the  
 one, only, Law of Action, they are *obliged*  
 to follow That, uniformly, and constantly;  
 and if they forsake that, they must be guilty  
 of Misbehaviour.

## C H A P. III.

## Of L I B E R T Y.

CH AP. III. **T**HE Question, Whether Man be a *Free* Agent or not, is of the utmost Consequence in an Enquiry whether Mankind is under any *Obligation* to be *religious*. For if they have no Freedom, but are impelled by *Fate* or *Necessity*; if they are absolutely determined by something either external, or internal, which they cannot controul, they can't be *accountable* for what they do; nor can there be any Rule of *Action* to them, more than there is to *Stones*; They are, and ought to be considered as, mere *passive* Beings, nor answerable for their Behaviour. For as they cannot but go on in that Track in which they are *pushed along*, so they cannot make themselves *Better* or *Worse* than they are: They are Instruments in the Hands of some other Being, or Beings; and are accordingly to be used.

To prove that this is the Case of Man, it is argu'd, that " Every Effect must proceed  
 " from some Cause: Now as every Motion  
 " in

“ in us arises from the Determination of the CHAR.  
 “ Mind, that Determination must arise from III.  
 “ some Cause which must be *sufficient* to ~ ~ ~  
 “ produce it. If this Cause be *not sufficient*,  
 “ it will not in fact produce it; and if it be  
 “ *sufficient*, the Effect will certainly succeed,  
 “ Every thing therefore is produced *necessa-*  
 “ *rily*, as arising from a certain Cause, not-  
 “ withstanding that Cause may not be per-  
 “ ceived by us. There is consequently no  
 “ such thing as *Liberty*; for whatever has a  
 “ Beginning must have a Cause, and every  
 “ Cause is a necessary Cause. If any thing  
 “ can have a Beginning which has no Cause,  
 “ then nothing can produce something: And  
 “ if nothing can produce something, then  
 “ the World might have had a Beginning  
 “ without a Cause, which is an Absurdity  
 “ in itself.”

To clear up a Point, which has been very much embarrassed by the Subtlety of Disputants, I would observe,

*First*, That the Notion of *Liberty*, or *free Agency*, or which is the same thing, a *Self-moving Power*, does not imply any Contradiction in itself. There is no Absurdity or Impossibility in the Notion, that a Being may have a Power of beginning, or stopping Action; or of moving, or not moving, according to the Determination of his own Mind. This I say does not imply any Contradiction,

CHAP. or Absurdity in itself; though it may be very  
 III. hard to explain *how* Motion is begun. Just  
 as we can conceive it possible to *Think*, or to  
 begin *Thinking*; and yet it may be very hard  
 to explain *How* we Think, or *How* the Mind  
 exerts itself in reflection, and comparing Ideas  
 together.

*Secondly*, As the Notion of Liberty implies  
 no Contradiction, so it is capable of strict  
 Evidence, that *God* has in fact a Power of  
*Action*. For were *God* a *necessary* Being,  
 it is impossible that He should ever have made  
 a *Variety* of Beings, at the same time: And  
 much less could he have made any *finite* Be-  
 ings, as all the Works of his Hands (that we  
 have any Knowledge of) manifestly shew  
 themselves to be. Supposing him to be a *ne-*  
*cessary* Being, then whatever it was that  
 obliged him to exert his Power, must oblige  
 him to exert *all* that he had. Now his  
 Power being infinite, the Effects of it must  
 be infinite; and consequently every Creature  
 the utmost Effect of *infinite Power*. For  
 where any Being is urged by *Necessity*, there  
 is no encreasing or diminishing its Effect,  
 since the *whole* power that it has must be  
 exerted. *E. g.* When a Stone falls, its  
 whole Power is exerted, nor can it alter its  
 force, nor vary its direction any way; but  
 which way soever it is impelled, that way it  
 must go, and with its *whole* Force. When



Fire burns, its *whole* Force is exerted, nor can it restrain itself from exerting *all* the Power it has. Just in the same Manner were God as *necessary* a Being as a Stone, or Fire, He must likewise exert his *whole* Power in doing whatever he did: And as a Stone in falling cannot alter its Course, so neither could God alter what he was about, but must exert his *whole* Power without Variation. He could not therefore have made such a *finite* Creature as Man is, since his Power being *infinite*, he could not but exert the *whole* of it in producing such a Being: And the full Effect of infinite Power must have been infinite.

In like manner it follows, that He could not have made *Two* of any Sort of Beings to begin to exist at the same Time; not Two Stars; not Two Plants, or Animals; or indeed any Variety of things: For the *whole* Power of God, his infinite Power, being exerted upon each Particular, and it being impossible to *alter*, or *vary* it, (just as we see it impossible for a Stone in falling to vary from the one Line or Direction it has receiv'd) He could no more produce a *Variety* of Beings at the *same Time*, than a Stone can move in different Lines at the same Time.

Since then there are not only *finite* Beings, but a great *Variety* of them; and they did begin to exist at the same time; it follows that

CHAP. God is a *free* Being, or has a Power of acting, or not, according to the Determination of his own Mind: He has a Power of Beginning Action in himself, when, and how he pleases; just as He thinks fit and right.

*Thirdly*, As *Liberty* is a *possible* Power, and *God* in fact has it, so has he vested *Man* with it. We are so made that we can gain *Habits* or lose them; we can alter by Custom our very Frames and Constitutions, and make ourselves very different at one Time from what we are at another. Now *Habits* cannot be acquired or lost in things that are *necessarily* moved. Throw a Stone up ever so often, millions of millions of times if you please, it will ascend exactly with the same Velocity that is impress'd; and will descend with exactly the same Velocity that it did the very first Time. Light Bodies cannot be made to alter their specific Qualities, nor can you by any Repetition of Tryals or Acts superinduce a contrary Habit; or make them descend in the same Medium in which they were wont to ascend. But it is not so with Men: They can acquire Habits, and can improve them; or they can lessen or totally destroy them; and consequently they have Powers of their *own* which are alterable by Custom, which no *necessary* Beings have, or can have.

These Powers appear in all *Moral* Actions, and in all such Instances where Men propose  
to

to themselves a certain *End*, and then pursue CHAP. it by such Means as they judge proper to obtain it. III. *Design*, and *Choice* are inconsistent with *Necessity*: And *final Causes* imply a Power of Action.

But then it is urged that every Effect must have “ a *sufficient Cause*: and every Cause is “ a *necessary Cause*.” No doubt every Effect must have a Cause sufficient to produce it, or else it never could be produced. But to say that every Cause is a *necessary Cause*, is playing upon the Word *necessary*. The Agent who designs any Effect, must use so much Power as is sufficient for, or necessary to accomplish his End: And thus a sufficient Cause and a necessary Cause are Equal to one another. But still the Agent may be free to use his Power, or not, in producing an Effect; He may exercise just so much Power as is requisite; and thus the Cause may be consider'd as necessary in respect of the Effect, and yet in respect of the Agent it may be *free*.

Every Man is, or may be, free to counteract, or obey, the Dictates of Reason; and yet the *Instrumental Cause* of Action is necessary to produce an Effect. *E. g.* A Man may consent or refuse to write; but yet his Hand, or his Pen, is a necessary Instrument if he does write. When the Cause is applied, the Effect necessarily follows; but the Agent is not under

CHAP. under any Necessity to apply the Cause, *i. e.*  
 III. to write.


~~~~~ If the Argument be, that every Effect arises from a Cause, and that Cause from another, in which Respect it is but an Effect, and so on *in infinitum* — At most this can go back no farther than to God, who is, and cannot but be, endued with Freedom ; and consequently this infinite Series is bounded there. But it is with Man true in fact, that he can in many Cases determine within himself, antecedent to his setting about any Work, whether He will exert his utmost or not : He can consider, and previously determine where he will stop in any Work ; and how far it is fit and right for him to proceed. Now this is not the Case in any one Instance of Things that are impelled by Necessity. They always and universally exert *all* their Force ; they cannot determine before-hand when or where in their Course they will *stop*, but they proceed, and cannot but proceed, as long as a Superior Power directs, or until he puts an End to, their Progress. Necessity is paramount to all Consideration, and consequently not under its Direction. Suppose a Stone to be falling, it cannot but fall with *all its Weight* ; and its Descent will ever be as the Squares of the Times, nor will it be able to retard its Motion, or to go faster. Suppose a Stone were en-

dued with the active Power of thinking, CHAP. III.
 yet this would not alter any one Power or Property which is *necessary*; nor could it change its Direction in falling, more than we ourselves can when we fall, or are thrown, down a Precipice. A Ballance will always preponderate on that Side in which the greater Weight is put; and were it to have *Thought*, yet that would not prevent, or hinder, the Effect of the heavier Scale. Suppose Fire to be endued with the same Property, it would still burn whatever was combustible: It would emit Light and Heat in the same Manner, and in the same Quantity, which it does at present; nor indeed would any one Quality be altered by its *thinking*. A *self-moving* Power therefore is different from *thinking*: And He that has the Power of beginning Motion in himself, can exert it, or make use of it in a greater or lesser Quantity; he can accelerate or retard his Motions, as he thinks it either fit or proper, unless when he is put under necessity. For all such things as are under the Direction of *Necessity* can in no Case, in no Circumstances whatever, change, or alter, their Directions, but must move just as they are impelled.

To enquire particularly whether there be such a thing as *Liberty* is necessary in a Discourse of Religion, because it is not conceivable

CHAP. able that there should be any *Rule of Action*

III. to Beings who are not *Agents*. There may indeed be some certain *Direction* to *necessary* Beings: All Bodies may gravitate according to a certain Law: There may be certain Effects produced, according to the Qualities which such or such a Body may have. A *Load-stone* may attract in one way, and all *electrical* Bodies in another: But then as none of these are *Agents*, or have a certain Rule which they can either follow or not; it is evident that they gravitate, attract, repel in a *necessary* Manner: And this so certainly, that when e. g. a Glass Tube has attracted a Piece of Leaf-Gold, or Down-Feather, no Art can make it touch the Tube a second Time, unless it has first touched some other Body. But this being not the Case of *Moral Agents*, the Question is *1st*. Whether they have any *Rule of Action*? Then, *what* That Rule is? And lastly, whether they are actuated by strict *Necessity*, as some Parts of the Creation are? Were Men merely passive, then they would be impelled to observe the Law of Truth, as uniformly, as Stones are to gravitate according to the Squares of their Times: Or as the Sun and Moon are, to move in their Orbs with such a certain Velocity. For all Beings that we know that are under *Necessity*, follow the Law which they are under uniformly

formly and without Variation. Now if CHAP. Truth be the Rule of Intelligent Beings, and III. Intelligent Beings are *necessary* Beings, they  can no more swerve from *Truth*, than Heavy Beings can from the Laws of Gravitation. But since in fact we find them *deviating* from their *Rule* of Action, we cannot but conclude them to be *Free* Beings; and if *free*, they are accountable for Misconduct.

The End of Punishment, and the Good obtained by it, is another Argument to prove that Man is deem'd by all to be *free*. No one ever *punishes* a Stone for the Mischief it does, or imagines it reasonable to beat, or whip, or break it to Pieces, for falling on a Man, and dashing out his Brains: No nor do we punish a Man that by his Fall should accidentally kill another. The Difference betwixt *Action* or *Passion* is so universally kept up by Mankind, that proper *Punishment* is never inflicted, where it appears that there was no proper *Action*. And indeed all Languages have been formed upon this Principle, that Men are properly Agents; and pursuant to the common Ideas that all have, Men are excited and encouraged to some sort of Actions, and they are dissuaded from others; Reasons and Arguments are suggested; Rewards and Punishments are dispensed; and a constant Difference is put between *necessary* Beings and *free* Agents.

If

CHAP. If Men therefore are *Free*, and have a
III. Power of Action, and have a certain Rule
which it is their Duty and their Happiness to
follow, we must next consider whether there
be such a Being as we term *God*, in order to
have the exact Principles upon which Reli-
gion is, and must be built.

C H A P. IV.

Of G O D.

THERE can very little be added to what CHAP. Dr. *S. Clarke*, and Mr. *Wollaſton*, have ſaid IV. to prove the Exiſtence and Attributes of God. I ſhall therefore refer my Reader to Dr. *Clarke's* Diſcourſe on the Being and Attributes of God; and to Mr. *Wollaſton's* Delineation of the Religion of Nature. For my purpoſe however I muſt obſerve,


1. No Effect can poſſibly exiſt without ſome Cauſe.

2. The Exiſtence of all Beings which are derived from others, muſt be dependent as to their Cauſe; howſoever independent they may poſſibly be after they are brought into Being. Each paſt Generation of Men, *e. g.* was dependent upon the former; as every future Generation will be upon that which preceeds it: But yet, when brought into Being, they may continue independent of their Predeceſſors.

3. No Number of Beings, of which each particular is derived, can ever be underived.

Theſe Principles being laid down, we may argue from them, That

There

CHAP. There must be some *first* Cause of all
 IV. things, which must be underived from any
 other. For supposing no *first* Cause, either
 all things that are, were produced from no-
 thing, without Cause, or else there has been
 an eternal Succession of things in the same, or
 such like manner, as there has been for some
 Thousands of Years last past. If you say that
 all things were produced without Cause from
 nothing — this is directly asserting Effects
 without any Cause; Productions without any
 Powers to produce; which is a Contradiction.
 If an eternal Succession be maintained,
 then this Absurdity follows, that there will be
 a Succession of Beings, each Particular of
 which is derived from another, and yet the
 whole will be underived; every Generation
 will be dependent upon, and derived from
 the former, and yet the whole Series will be
 independent and underived. Now what is
 it that can make the *whole* underived, when
 every *Part* is derived, more than the whole
 of any Generation can be infallible, when
 every particular Man is fallible? Numbers in
 separate dependent Beings do not alter the
 Nature of their Dependency; nor make them
 in that respect different from what they are.
 For as One dependent Being is dependent,
 so are Two; and so are Two Hundred; and
 so are Two Millions, &c. and it only follows
 that in greater Numbers there are *more* dependent

dent Beings, but no approach is made to *In-* CHAP.
dependency. And so it is in respect of Deri- IV.
 vation: One derived Being, continues to be
 a derived Being, and so do ten Millions; nor
 is their Nature altered by their Numbers, or
 their Quality, but they continue *all* as much
 derived as every *one* is.

There must therefore be some first Cause
 from which all dependent Beings must derive
 their Original; and up to which in a certain
 Progress we may ascend; and this Being is
 what is called *God*.

Now as it demonstrably follows, that there
 is, and cannot but be, a *first Cause* of all,
 underived himself, so we may be certain of
 many of his Properties, and of his Attributes.
 He cannot but have *Power*, since he made
 all things; and He must have *Wisdom*, since
 his Creatures are endued with *Intelligence*:
 And he must be a free Being, or endued with
Liberty, since he has made not only *finite*
 Beings, but great Varieties of them. He
 must be *omnipresent*, since he cannot but be;
 for as every thing which cannot but exist,
 such as Duration, and Space, are every where,
 and cannot be conceived (no not mentally) to
 be absent from any Place, so likewise what-
 ever else cannot but exist, must in the same
 manner exist every where, and at all times.
 It is the peculiar Property of necessarily ex-
 istent Beings to be at all times, *i. e.* Eternal;
 in

CHAP. in all Places, *i. e.* infinite or immense; and
 IV. in all Places at the same Instant. Thus, it is
 ~~~~~ the same instant of Time with *us*, and in *Sa-*  
*turn*, and in the remotest fix'd Star: and  
 Space is equally present at the same time to all  
 Beings.

A *wise* Being, that has *Liberty*, and has shewn his *Liberty* and *Wisdom* in the making of the World, cannot deviate from Rectitude of Action, except he want Power, or has a deprav'd Will. The first he cannot want, because he that *made* all things, must have Power at least superior to all things: Nor can he have the Second, unless he were ignorant, or were swayed by some wrong Affection; neither of which can possibly belong to him. He must therefore always *act rightly*: And a powerful, omnipresent, wise Being, always doing what is right himself, cannot but observe the Actions of intelligent free Creatures, and must approve or disapprove their Conduct.

But as Men have strangely annexed different Ideas to the Word, GOD, it may be proper to remove some false Notions which have lately been revived concerning Him.

The *Epicurean* System has been so often solidly confuted, and is so unphilosophical and full of apparent Absurdity, that it seems entirely given up. The *Pantheistic* Scheme is that which *Vanini*, and *Spinoza* profess'd, and which Mr. *Toland*, about the Year

1720, publickly defended. As this seems CHAP. IV.  
 to be the fashionable System, espoused by such as are atheistically disposed, and yet would screen themselves under the Cover of a Term which implies the Reverse of Infidelity, I shall here consider the Principles upon which their Scheme is built.

“<sup>a</sup> They are generally called PANTHE-  
 “ISTS, says Mr. Toland, on account of a pe-  
 “culiar Opinion of theirs concerning God,  
 “and the Universe, which is diametrically  
 “opposite to the *Epicureans*; and to those  
 “that imagine the World was framed from  
 “a *Chaos*; and to the *Vision-mongers*: since

<sup>a</sup> PANTHEISTÆ ut plurimum vocantur propter Sententiam de DEO et UNIVERSO sibi propriam, EPICURÆIS VERO, CHAOLOGIS, et ONEIROPOLIS, e diametro oppositam; cum nullam confusionem primævam, cum nullam fortunam, nedum casum ullum Mundi opificem, admittant PANTHEISTÆ: Sed de rerum causa et origine cum LINO, vetustimo — itantur dicentes,

Ex Toto quidem sunt omnia, et ex omnibus est totum.

Hujus versiculi, quem semper habent in ore fusior est explicatio; quam nos — hic breviter trademus. UNIVERSUM itaque (cujus exigua portio est mundus hic aspectabilis) affirmant esse infinitum, tam extensione quam virtute; continuatione vero totius, et partium contiguitate, unum: immobile secundum totum, cum extra eum nullus sit locus aut spatium: Mobile autem secundum partes, sive per intervalla numero infinita: Incorruptibile simul et necessarium utroque modo, existentia scilicet æternum et duratione: Intelligens etiam eminenti quadam ratione, nec nisi levi similitudine eodem nomine cum nostra intelligendi facultate appellanda: cujus denique sunt partes integrantes semper eadem, ut partes constituentes in motu. *Pantheisticon. p. 5—7.*

F

“ they

CHAP. “ they admit no original or primæval Confu-  
 IV. “ sion, no Fortune, or Accident to be the  
 “ Maker of the World ; but of the Cause  
 “ and Origin of things they say with old  
 “ *Linus*,

Ἐκ παντὸς δὲ τὰ πάντα, καὶ ἐκ πάντων πάν  
 ἔστιν.

“ Of the Universe are all things, and of  
 all things the Universe.

“ This Line requires a larger Explication,  
 “ which take in the following Words.”

“ The Universe (of which this World  
 “ that we see is but a small Part) is infinite,  
 “ as well in Extent as Efficacy ; but in respect  
 “ of the Continuity of the whole, and Con-  
 “ tiguity of the Parts it is One : Unmoveable  
 “ in respect of the whole, since there is nei-  
 “ ther Place nor Space beyond it ; but move-  
 “ able as to all its Parts, through infinite  
 “ particular Spaces : Incorruptible and ne-  
 “ cessary both ways, *viz.* in Existence and  
 “ Duration : Intelligent also in an Eminent  
 “ manner, not to be called intelligent but  
 “ by a light Similitude to our Faculty of Un-  
 “ derstanding : Its integrant Parts are always  
 “ the same, as constituent Parts always in  
 “ Motion.”

In this Account of the *Universe* <sup>b</sup> “ in per-CHAP.  
 “ petual Change, and in which nothing pe- IV.  
 “ rishes,” wherein “ the Death of one thing  
 “ is the Birth of another,” and from whence  
 there is “ a beautiful Variety and Vicissitude,”  
 “ and in which all things necessarily operate  
 “ for the Preservation of the whole, and are  
 “ perpetually revolving as it were in a Circle;”  
 the Pantheists pretend to explain how “ all  
 “ things are made of One, and all things are  
 “ resolv’d again into the same.” Now “ this  
 “ Force and Energy of the whole, the creat-  
 “ ing and governing Power of all things al-  
 “ ways tending to the best End, is *God*;  
 “ whom you may call the *Mind* if you please  
 “ and *Soul* of the *Universe*.” Hence the  
 Pantheists have their Denomination; but  
 then they argue, that “ this Force is not to  
 “ be separated from the *Universe* itself, other-  
 “ wise than by the mere Imagination of the  
 “ Mind.” *p.* 8.

In another part of the same Book, the  
 Deity of the Pantheists is thus described.  
 Their Chairman is supposed to say,

<sup>b</sup> Nihil quippe in toto perit, sed interitus unius est ortus al-  
 terius, ac vice versa; omniaque perpetua formarum mutatione  
 ac pulcherrima quadam rerum varietate et vicissitudine, ad bo-  
 ni Totius communionem et conservationem necessario ope-  
 rantur, et quasi per orbem sempiternæ revolvuntur. *ibid.* *p.* 8.

Vis denique et Energia Totius, creatrix omnium et mode-  
 atrix, *Deus* est; quem *Mentem* dicas, si placet, et *animam*  
 UNIVERSI. *ibid.* unde appellantur PANTHEISTÆ. *ibid.* cum  
 vis hæc, secundum eos, non, nisi sola ratione, ab ipsomet  
 UNIVERSO separetur. *ibid.*

CHAP.  
IV.

° In the World All things are One,  
And One is all in all.



*Answer.*

Which All in all is GOD,  
Eternal and Immense,  
Neither begotten, nor will ever  
cease.

*Chairman.* In him we live, and move, and  
have our Being;

*Answer.* From him every thing had its  
Beginning,  
And will return to him again,

° *Modimperator.*

In Mundo omnia sunt unum,  
Unumque est omne in omnibus.

*Resp.*

Quod omne in omnibus DEUS est;  
ÆTERNUS ac immensus,  
Neque genitus, neque interiturus.

*Mod.*

In eo vivimus, movemur, et existimus.

*Resp.*

Ab eo natum est unum quidque,  
In eumque denuo revoluturum;  
Omnium ipse principium et finis.

*Mod.*

Carmen accinamus  
De natura UNIVERSI.

*Mod. & Resp.*


Quicquid est Hoc, omnia animat,  
Format, alit, auget, creat:  
Sepelit, recipitque in se omnia:  
Omniumque idem est Pater;  
Indidemque omnia, quæ oriuntur,  
De integro, atque eodem occidunt. *ibid.* p. 54, 55.

PACUV.  
apud Cic.  
de Divi-  
nat. l. 1.

He



He being the Beginning and End CHAP.  
of all things. IV.

*Chairman.* Let us sing an Hymn concerning   
the Nature of the Universe.

*All.* Whatever THIS is, it animates  
Forms, nourishes, encreases, makes  
All things;  
It buries, and retakes into itself All  
things;  
The *Same* is the *Father* of All  
things;  
And into the same All things  
which arise  
Anew return, and die in it.

This is the Notion of the Deity which the *Pantbeists* admit. A Deity! eternal, immense, uncaused, from whom all things derive their Being, and who can never cease: But then it is a Deity, that is *no Agent*; that cannot have any *Ends* or *Designs*; that cannot have *Benignity* or *Benevolence*; that has no *Goodness*, as *Goodness* is a Moral Disposition; that cannot *choose*, but must submit to the infinite Varieties and Motions which cannot but happen. So that in reality, this is in *Words* only to say that there is a *Deity*, but in fact it is destroying his Existence. Those who really mean such a Being as God, do not, cannot say, that the *Universe* is *God*, or that the *Power* of the Universe is *God*, any

CHAP. more than they can say either that the Ship is  
 III. the Pilot; or that the Power or Energy of the  
 Ship is the Pilot. <sup>d</sup> “*What a Pilot is to a Ship,*

“*or a Charioteer to a Chariot, or the Coryphæus*

“*to a Choir, or the Law to a State, or a Ge-*

“*neral to an Army, that is God to the Uni-*

“*verse. Only with this Difference, that to*

“*These it is troublesome and painful to ex-*

“*ecute their respective Offices: To Him it is*

“*absolutely easy, as having no bodily Weakness*

“*to hinder him from executing his Part. He*

“*himself unmoveable, moves and conducts all*

“*things where and how he wills.”* Is it not

at first Sight absurd to say that the Ship is the

Pilot? Is he not distinct from it, notwith-

standing he steers it? So is the Great, the

Wise, the Good God, not *the Universe*, but

the *Governor* of the Universe; a Being really

distinct and separate from the World, and

what he directs, or controuls, according to

his *Will*.

There can be no Deity where there is no

proper Spiritual *Dominion* or *Rule*. Now one

part of the Universe, as the Sun, or Moon,

or Stars, have no *Dominion* or *Government* at

<sup>d</sup> Ὅπερ ἐν νηὶ κυβερνήτης, ἐν ἄρματι ἤ, ἡνίοχος, ἐν χορῶν δὲ κορυφαίος, ἐν πόλει δὲ νομῶς, ἐν στρατοπέδῳ δὲ ἡγεμὼν, τῆτο θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ. Πληρὸν καθ' ὅσον, τοῖς μὲν καταμνηρὸν τὸ ἄρχειν, πολυκλή-  
 τόντε ἢ πελυμένον, τῶ δὲ ἄλυτον ἀπονέντε πάσης κεχαρισμένον  
 σωματοκίης ἀθηνείας. Ἐν ἀκινήτῳ ἢ ἰδρυμένῳ, πάντα κινεῖ ἢ  
 ἐπιτάττει, ὅπερ βυλάται ἢ ὄπας. — Aristot. de Mundo, cap. 6.


all over any other part, more than that other part has over them: Nor if you join the whole Universe together, has that any *Dominion* over its several parts. The Universe therefore cannot be God; but that Being that governs the Universe alone can be entitled to that Appellation. I do not speak of *Influences*, such as that of Light or Gravitation in the Sun or Planets towards each other; But of such *Rule* and *Government* in Superiors over others, as renders the Inferiors liable to proper account for voluntary Disobedience to the Law of their Action. In the Universe (as far as we are able to trace it) there is a reciprocal Action and Reaction in all Bodies: If the Sun or Moon gravitates towards the Earth, or attracts it, the Earth does the same towards that. But this is not *Rule*, or *Dominion*, over another; since in this Case both Sun and Earth, *e. g.* are equally Superiors, and equally Inferiors, *i. e.* are neither. But God is properly a *Governor*, Superior to all, uncontroled by any, or all: Every part of the Universe proceeds in the Direction and Order that he *wills*; and cannot but proceed in it: And if the intelligent parts of the Universe do not obey the Laws which he requires, they become the proper Objects of his Displeasure.

Again: Supposing the Universe to be God, then whatever is or can be affirmed of any

CHAP. Part of the Universe, may be affirmed of  
 IV. Part of God: For the Universe has *Parts*,  
 “ and as to all its parts it is moveable and  
 “ contiguous;” and the *Parts* joined together must make up *the whole*. Now if God, as the *Universe* does, consists of *Parts*, he must consist of some parts *necessarily existent* and *unchangeable*, such as Space; and of other parts *not necessarily existent*, but perpetually changing their Form, and perishing in order to produce others. Now *Parts* perpetually changing and perishing are not *necessarily existent*, but may be conceived to be entirely absent, or not to have been, as well as such as are produced from the perishing Bodies may be conceived never to be, since they receive a Beginning. The Idea therefore of God upon this Supposition, is the Idea of a Being compounded of some *Parts* unchangeable, and others perpetually changing: Immoveable, and yet every Part of him which makes up the whole, is moveable: Every *Part* of him, except what constitutes Space, may be conceived *not necessary*, and yet the whole is *necessary*. Can any Idea be more self-contradictory than this?

“ *The Universe*,” says Mr. Toland, “ (of  
 “ *which this World that we see is but a small*  
 “ *Part*) *is infinite, as well in Extent, as Ef-*  
 “ *ficacy; in Continuity of the whole, and the*  
 “ *Contiguity of its Parts, 'tis One.*”

He

He means, that the Universe is made up CHAP.  
 “ of *Infinite Worlds*,” and that all these make IV.  
*One whole*. Here he takes for granted that   
 there are actually “ *Infinite Worlds*,” the  
*Aliquot Parts* or *Constituents* of the Universe,  
 which is infinite in Extent and Power. But  
 this itself is absurd ; since no *Number* of *finite*  
*Parts*, how great soever, can ever constitute  
*Infinity*. Every *Number* is finite ; and every  
 Addition is the Addition of something finite :  
 And the Addition of *Finities* to *Finities*, can  
 never make any thing *Infinite*. The Uni-  
 verse then consisting of ever so many *Worlds*  
 cannot be *infinite* : And what is *finite* cannot  
 be *infinite* in *Power*, or *Efficacy*.

And so in his *Second Property* of the Uni-  
 verse : “ It is immoveable in the whole, since  
 “ *without* it there is neither *Place* nor *Space* ;  
 “ but it is moveable as to all its *Parts*, thro’  
 “ infinite little *Spaces*.” The *Philosophy* of  
 the *Pantheists* is designed to account for the  
 Universe, or infinite *Worlds*, without any  
 Cause distinct from itself. Ask, Whence pro-  
 ceeded all those infinite *Worlds* which make  
 up the Universe ? The Answer is — They  
 all proceeded from *The whole*. What is this  
*whole*, or whence did That proceed ? Why,  
 That proceeded from *all the Parts*. The  
 whole indeed consists, or is made up of all  
 its constituent *Parts* ; but the great Enquiry  
 is concerning the *Original Cause* of this *whole*,  
 and

CHAP. and of all its *Parts* too; of which nothing is  
IV. yet said.

~~~~~ The next Step is exactly in the same absurd manner — This whole is “*moveable* as “to all its *Parts*.” How? through infinite “numberless little Spaces or Intervals.” Now, *First*, what is the *Cause* of this *Motion*? Matter at Rest will always continue in Rest: How then comes the Universe to be *moveable*, or actually in Motion in *all its Parts*? There must be some *Cause* of *Motion*, some original *Mover*, or else the *Parts* of the Universe would be as immoveable as the Universe itself.

Secondly, All the *Parts* of the Universe are moveable, and are in fact in Motion, through “numberless little Spaces or Intervals.” But what Spaces are there to move in, since there is a “Continuity of the whole, and a Contiguity of all the *Parts*,” and “*no Vacuum at all* is allowed for Bodies to move in? But supposing no Difficulty in this Point, whereas it has been demonstrably proved that there is a Vacuum, the Attempt to shew how Motion is begun and continued is remarkable. It is “^f by *mutual* and *mechanical* Consent and Dis-

* Quoniam vacuum nullum est intervallum. p. 9.

^f Mutuo nempe et mechanico consensu dissensuque partium natura sua mobilium, mutuâque concurrentium et impellentium corporum determinatione, quorum est sine ullo vacuo in sua elementa divisio. Neque ulla est determinationum intermissio, quoniam vacuum nullum est intervallum, nec ullum repagulum ultimum. p. 9.

“ sent of Parts that are in their *own Nature* CHAP.
 “ moveable, and by a mutual Determination IV.
 “ of concurring and impelling Bodies, that
 “ may be divided or resolved into their Ele-
 “ ments without any *Vacuum*. Neither is
 “ there any Intermission of these Determina-
 “ tions, because there is *no Vacuum*, nor any last
 “ Stoppage.” Do the Parts of Matter that are
 moveable, *mutually* consent or dissent about
 their Motion? Does every moveable Part of
 Matter *think*, so as to *assent* to or *dissent* from
 any Determination of concurring or impelling
 Bodies. We see and know that Matter gravi-
 tates, and gravitates according to a certain Rule,
 or Law. It is well known that Gravitation is
 always in proportion to the *Quantity of Mat-*
ter in any body; and it is as certain, that all
mechanical Causes act in proportion to the *Su-*
perfacies of the Body. How now can any
 Particle of Matter (even supposing it to think)
 give a *Mechanical* Consent to move by a Law
 which is not *mechanical*? Were all Motion
 in proportion to the *Superfacies* of Bodies, pos-
 sibly a *Mechanical* Solution of it might be ad-
 mitted. But to make any Matter *mutually*
and mechanically consent or dissent to move
not mechanically, is much more absurd than
 any thing in the Epicurean System, that has
 been so often, and so justly refuted.

But perhaps by “*Mechanical* Consent and
 “*Dissent*,” no more is meant than that it is
 not

CHAP. not known how it is done; as when we say,
 IV. such or such Actions are done *mechanically*,
i. e. without Design, or Intention. And then
 mechanical Consent and Dissent, is Consent
 and Dissent *without Design*, or Intention.
 Why does he call ^s *Epicurus's* "fortuitous
 "Concourse of Atoms, and their Declina-
 "tion," a *Figment*, since *Epicurus* could
 justify his Scheme, by the Word *Mechanical*,
 with the same Justice and Truth as Mr. *To-*
land can? It is an Expression without Mean-
 ing; or a meer Word put for a real Cause;
 which is shameful in a Philosopher.

Matter is here supposed to be "in its own
 "Nature moveable, mutually and mecha-
 "nically to assent to or dissent from Motion,
 "or a certain Determination of Motion;" to
 move through "numberless Intervals with-
 "out any Vacuum." If Matter be in "its
 "own Nature moveable," yet still if it be at
rest it requires a *Mover* to put it into Motion.
 It cannot move itself, unless there be a *Mo-*
tive Power in itself, whereby it can move or
 not move at its Pleasure. Now if it has this
 motive Faculty, it cannot exert it through
 those *numberless Intervals*, unless it forces
 other Matter out of them, which must force
 other and other still *in infinitum*: And then
 every minute finite Particle must be able to

^s *Epicuri figmenta — cum concursu suo atomorum fortuito,
 et declinatione earundem non extrinsecus determinata — ablegamus. p. 10.*

remove infinite Bodies, and to cause an infinite Determination of Motion, since "there is no last Stoppage:" And thus finite Power is made equal to Infinite in all Motions, and "infinite Action" is admitted, where the least Motion is made. He goes on,

This Universe is "*incorruptible*, and *necessary* both ways, *viz.* it is eternal in Existence, and will continue for ever." It is true that Reason cannot say whether Matter began 6000 Years ago, or whether it has existed many thousand Years more. Neither can it discover, whether it shall continue for ever, since there is no Absurdity in saying, that it may be such a possible Effect of an eternal Cause, who will if he pleases continue it. But to those who deny that there is *any* original Cause of the Universe, independent of it, and separate from it, one may argue that this Material World, and all those imaginary infinite ones which make up the Universe, cannot have been eternal in Existence.

It implies no Contradiction to *suppose* the Earth, the Sun, or any Planet to be away, and the Space which now they fill to be left empty: And what is supposable, without any Contradiction, to be true of any one of the Worlds of the Universe, is likewise supposable of any, or of all the rest. Now if

^b Quare non absurdum ducimus, actionem statuere infinitam. p. 10.

CHAP. you can suppose one World away, That World
IV. cannot exist by any Necessity in its Nature.

It is not like *Space*, or *Duration*, which cannot even mentally be supposed not to exist. And if one World may be removed without Contradiction, so may all the rest; and in course none of them can be necessary in Existence, or Duration.

I take for granted here what our best and most accurate Philosophers have proved, that there is a Vacuum; at least it implies no Absurdity, no Contradiction to suppose one. And if this may be supposed, I argue that whatever exists by a Necessity in its Nature, or whatever cannot but exist, cannot be supposed not to exist. Try the Truth of this by applying it to such things as cannot but exist. Suppose *Immensity*, or *Space*, not to exist; yet still the Idea obtrudes itself upon the Mind, and we find the thing existing, even whilst we would imagine it not to be. *Duration* has the same Effect upon us; we cannot conceive *Duration* not to be; it is of that Nature, that if in Words we would suppose it not to be, yet we find it *is*. Now it is not so in any *World*, or particular System of the Universe. As we can conceive a Vacuum, we may conceive That to be as large as our solar System, and none of the Planets to be in it. And what we can conceive to be, is
certainly

certainly *possible*; and consequently what may *possibly* not be, cannot exist *necessarily*. CHAP. IV.

The Parts of this Universe are allowed by Mr. Toland to be continually changing, and to undergo infinite Vicissitudes; and the perishing of one part is the Origin of another. Now the Parts which we see to be gone, may be *supposed* without a Contradiction not to have been: And the things produced may likewise be imagined never to have been. The Coals that are burnt to Ashes, and are not, may as easily be supposed never to have been, as not to be; and the Ashes which are now produced, may be imagined never to have been, as well as once not to be. The Coals indeed are *necessary* to produce the Ashes, as the Cause must be prior to the Effect; but neither the One nor the Other were necessarily existent, because we can conceive Both of them never to have been. What therefore might *possibly* not be, cannot be *necessary* in Existence, because a *Possibility* of *Non Existence*, is a direct Contradiction to *Necessity* of Existence.

Lastly, He tells us that this "Universe is intelligent." What is *intelligent*? Rocks? Earth? Water? Matter? Are the Worlds, those infinite Worlds which make up the Universe, are *they themselves* intelligent? Or does he mean, that there is Intelligence in them? Is our Earth intelligent, or is it not the *Men* that

CHAP. that live on our Earth, that are so? But be it

IV. as he pleases; How came *Intelligence* into the
 Universe? The Enquiry is, From whence
 came Motion, and Intelligence, into those
 infinite Worlds that are here supposed? Mat-
 ter itself cannot be without some Cause: But
 suppose it to exist, it cannot *move* without a
Mover. Suppose it *moving*: Yet it may
 move to all Eternity, without producing
Thought, or *Life*. To account for this Diffi-
 culty, our Author supposes “ⁱ an Ethereal Fire
 “ surrounding all things, and therefore su-
 “ pream; pervading all things, and therefore
 “ most intimate to them; an Ether I say (the
 “ wonderful Fabric of the Brain being suited
 “ exactly to it, and external Objects acting
 “ upon it by the Nerves of the Senses, and
 “ exciting various Images) performs all the
 “ Machinery of Perception, Imagination, Re-
 “ membrance, enlarging or contracting Ideas.”

Now *First*, Supposing there is such an
Ethereal Fire, whence came That? Is that
 an Original Self-existent Cause of things, Or
 is it derived from some other Superior Being?
 But in the next place how does it appear that

ⁱ Ignis æthereus omnia circumdans ideoque supremus, omnia permeans ideoque et intimus — ÆTHER inquam, (Cerebri miranda fabrica ad id idonea, et exterioribus objectis per sensuum nervos illic agentibus, variasque phantasias excitantibus) omnem perceptionis, imaginationis, reminiscentiæ, amplificandarum idearum et imminuendarum, machinamentum rite perficit. *ibid.* p. 12.

there is such an Ether at all that does produce CHAP. such Effects? It may I think be allowed, that IV. there is ^k a very subtle Spirit that pervades gross Bodies, and that has very “ particular “ and uncommon Effects, as appears in *Magnetic* and *Electrical* Bodies; that by it “ Light is emitted, reflected, refracted, inflected, and Bodies are warmed, and all “ Sensation is raised:” But this Spirit does not *make Intelligence*; but acts upon Beings that are *intelligent*. This *Æther* does not make any *Matter intelligent*, but it excites *Sensation* in Beings that are *sensible*: It is not God; but it was made itself by God. So that granting this Principle, it will not answer to the Idea of *God*, nor make the *Pantheistic* Scheme a *rational* one, nor account for any of the Phenomena of Nature without taking in that Notion, to avoid which *Pantheism* was invented.

Hitherto we have not been able to account for the Origin of things from the Jargon, that *All things proceed from All*. The Power, or Virtue, or Efficacy, or Energy, of this *whole*, is no real existent *Being*, or *intelligent*

^k Adjicere jam liceret non nulla de Spiritu quodam subtilissimo corpora crassa pervadente, & in iisdem latente; cujus vi & actionibus particulæ corporum ad minimas distantias se mutuo attrahunt — & corpora Electrica agunt ad distantias majores — & Lux emittitur, reflectitur, refringitur, inflectitur, & corpora calefacit; & sensatio omnis excitatur, &c. *Newton. Princip. ad finem.*

CHAP. *Agent*, more than the *Power* of any *Part*.
 IV. is. And therefore when the Term, *God*,
 is thus applied, it can be only to impose on
 the *Unthinking*. “Every thing,” it is said,
 “had its beginning from *God*, and will re-
 “turn to him again;” “he retakes every
 “thing into himself.” The old *Notion* main-
 tained by *Pythagoras*, and others, was, that
 there was *One great Soul* pervading all things,
 and that human *Souls* were *Segments*, or
Avulsions, or *Parts* of that, some how or
 other separated and divided from it. The
 same Scheme was patronized by the *Hereticks*
 of old, who conceived the *Son* to be a *Part* of
 the *Father*, some how or other begot into
 Being. *Tully* has well confuted *Pythagoras*
 by saying, “¹ Did not he see that *God* must
 “be pulled and torn to pieces by this *Separa-*
 “*tion of our Souls from him? Did not he see*
 “*that when we were miserable, part of God*
 “*must be miserable? How can we be igno-*
 “*rant, whilst God and our Souls are the*
 “*same? How can the one know all things,*
 “*whilst the other is so very ignorant of itself,*

¹ Pythagoras qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum & commeansem ex quo animi nostri carperentur, non vidit distractione humanorum animorum discerpi & dilacerari Deum? & cum miseri animi essent quod plerisque contingeret, tum Dei partem esse miseram quod fieri non potest. Cur autem quicquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset Deus? Quomodo porro deus iste, si nihil esset Animus, aut infixus, aut infusus esset in Mundo? Cic. De Nat. Deor. / 1.

“ and

“ and all about it?” Absurd as this Scheme was, the *Pantheistic* seems to be more so. The Soul according to them is nothing but a mere Power of the Man, which when it ceases, cannot be said to *return to God*, more than the Power of a worn out Wheel, or Clock can. The Man ceases to have the Power he once had; just as a Loadstone thrown into the Fire loses its attractive Qualities. But how is it *resolved into God*, or how does *God retake* it into himself, or how does it become a *Part of God*, more than it was *before*? God cannot retake into himself what he never parted with, and which was as much God before the *Retaking* as after. Indeed *God* is upon this Scheme a mere empty Name; and consequently the Expression, to be *resolved into God*, means no more than to be resolved into nothing but what it was already.

Be it then fixed that God is a real Agent, infinite, eternal, powerful, good, wise, the *Governor* of the Universe. Not a Part of it, nor the Whole of it, but a living Director and Moderator of the whole: Not the Soul of the Universe, connected with, or united to it; but as different from it as the Pilot is from the Ship, or the *Governor* is from the State which is under his Rule. Were God the *Soul of the Universe*, united to it as our Souls are to us, he must be *affected* by it, as

CHAP. our Souls are by our Bodies. He would be a

IV. Part of the Universe, not the *Governor* of it:
 He would not be the *Cause* or *Author* of it, more than our Souls are the *Causes* of our Bodies; his absolute universal Dominion over all, unaffected by any thing, makes him, what he is, the God and Father of all; of whom no Conception can be equal, no Expression sufficiently great. To him be all Glory and Praise for ever.

Thus have I considered the Foundations upon which all Religion is built: And so far as any of these are denied, or any Principle is maintained that consequentially subverts any of these, so far is all Religion, Natural as well as Revealed, more or less affected. If there be no Rule of Action, no Man can be answerable for not observing any: If there be a Rule of Action, and Man is a *necessary* Being; he must go on as he is impelled, whether it be agreeably to the Rule, or not; and He that determines our Motions, or impels us, is accountable for whatever is done, and not We who only proceed as we are driven. *Lastly*, If there be no Governor of the Universe, there can be no Religion: Whereas admitting such a Being, and that we have a Rule or Law of Action, and that we have a Power to follow it, Religion becomes a Duty, and every thing appears to be consistent.

C H A P.

C H A P. V.

Of Religion, and what That is.

IT has already been observed, that there CHAP.
V.
is a certain Law of Action to all reasonable Beings, which they are under strict Obligation to follow; and that That Law is *Truth*. Hence it follows that Piety, Justice, Charity, Temperance, Sobriety, in short every Moral Virtue is to be rigidly observed; and every Deviation from Virtue is to be constantly avoided; because every Moral Virtue is agreeable to the *Truth of the Case*, and every Vice is a Deviation from it. Happiness is the great *Motive* to Virtue; because it is impossible for intelligent Beings not to desire to be happy: And the steady uniform pursuit of *Truth* is the only proper Means to That; The Great Creator and Disposer of all things having so contrived us, and all about us, that by our following That, we cannot but arrive at Happiness.

These Principles cannot be too deeply impressed upon Mens Minds, because it hence appears, how *Virtue* and *Interest* are conjoin'd; that it is not only *right* in itself to practice Morality, but that *we* cannot recede from

CHAP. such a Behaviour without a forfeiture of Hap-
 V. piness; nor can any intelligent Being whatever
 ~~~~~ recede from it without *Self-Condernnation*,  
 and a Consciousness of *Blame*.

What now is *Religion*, or what has That to do, or what is its Use, since all intelligent Beings are obliged to follow *Virtue*, and to govern themselves by the Rules of Truth?

I have shewn that there is in fact such a Being as GOD, one that is properly a *Governor* of the Universe. Now we not only stand in a certain Relation to our Neighbours; but likewise to HIM. We are Creatures dependent upon him, and accountable to him, and capable of feeling the Effects of his Displeasure, should we be guilty of acting contrary to his Will. Take therefore the Notion of GOD into Consideration, as we must do if *Truth* be the Law of Action, and then we have a new Set of Arguments, more Encouragements, and stronger Motives to do what is right, than we can possibly have without such a Principle. They therefore who contemn *Religion*, or treat it with Slight, or who impute it to *Craft*, or *Fear*, or *Policy*, or to any such like Causes either in *Governors*, or *Governed*, do not understand what the Meaning or Use of it is.

Whenever any Man attempts to reason about the Origin of things; the Contrivance of the System of the World; the exact Pro-  
 portions

portions in which the Heavenly Bodies are placed in respect of each other; and understands (what is demonstrable) that they are kept in their Orbs not by any Mechanical Causes — It is impossible for him to account for these, and a thousand other Phænomena, without a GOD, or a Being, who made, disposed, and keeps in order, all things. Let Him take in this Principle, and there is a *Consistency* in the whole chain of Reasoning. Let him apply this Principle to any Action that is *right*, and connect it with That; and he will see a great Motive to the Performance of it.


CHAP.  
V.  
~~~~~

We stand obliged to perform every act of Virtue, because it is agreeable to *Truth*, i. e. to the true Circumstances and Relations of things; and its End is Happiness. Now if God is to be *pleased* by such a Conduct, and He will *reward* it, This cannot but be a strong *additional* Engagement to the Practice of Virtue.


All Actions receive their Names, and their Natures, from the Principles from whence they proceed, and with which they stand connected. A Man, *e. g.* that owes another 100*l.* and pays him merely from this Principle, that he is apprehensive that his Creditor will throw him into Jail, may be a *morally wicked* Man, though in the Eye of Human Laws he is esteemed a *Just* Man, and no

CHAP. doubt would be externally, or politically, *just*.
 V. Suppose again, that the same Debtor should
 pay his Debt upon these Principles — That
 it is right that every Man should have his
own; That himself has no *Property* in the
 Hundred Pound, though he has the *Posses-*
sion and the *Profits* of it; that the Hundred
 Pound is really and truly the Creditors, and
 the Right to it has never been alienated; —
 If the Debt, I say, be paid upon these Prin-
 ciples, the Man would be a *morally just* Man.
 Again; Imagine the Principle still altered,
 and to all the *moral* Considerations before-
 mentioned, the Debtor adds that of *God*, the
 Governor of all, whose Favour or Displeasure
 will be as Men act up to the Rule of Action,
 or swerve from it; and that upon this Prin-
 ciple he pays the Debt aforesaid; — Here I
 say he is *religiously just*, or he acts upon the
 Principle of *Religion*. Religion therefore is
 founded upon the Supposition of the *Existence*
 of *God*; and every act done upon that Prin-
 ciple is a *religious* Act: If Acts are done *ha-*
bitually upon that Principle, *Religion* may be
 defined a Habit; but it is always a Reason
 taken from the Consideration of *God* for do-
 in what is right; and when it is added to any
 Reason drawn from the Consideration of the
 Nature of things, it must be more likely to
 keep Men to right Action, than they would
 be without it.

Let

Let therefore any one love *Virtue* for *Vir-* CHAP.
tue's sake; or let him love it for its *usefulness* V.
 either to ourselves or others, *Religion* never 
 contradicts all this Sort of Arguments, but
 allows them their full Strength: And if it were
 possible for Arguments deduced from the
 Beauty, Excellency, or Use of *Virtue*, to
 have ten times more Strength in them than
 they really have, yet still this can be no Ob-
 jection to the Use of *Religion*. Nor is there
 a more pitiful Instance of Weakness and Ig-
 norance, than to make *Religion* to be useful
 only to those, who either are “not able to
 “see the Connexion between *Virtue* and
 “Happiness, or seeing will not regard it: Or
 “to represent it as a thing useful to Preachers
 “and Governors.” This I say is a most un-
 just and ignorant Representation of *Religion*;
 since the Powers of it are equally strong
 to the wisest and ablest Man, and to any
 one else: The more Knowledge and Judg-
 ment any Man has, the more able will he be
 to comprehend the Demonstrations of the Ex-
 istence of a God; and to see the Force of those
 Arguments which are urged to prove that
 there is a Governor of the Universe; and the
 clearer will he see that the Universe could
 not have been without such a Being. And
 if there be a Governor of the Universe, — To
 act as under his Inspection, with a View to
 his

CHAP. his Favour or Displeasure, cannot but be of
 V. great Influence to make a Man do right.

 *Religion* supposes the Existence of God; and supposes that he takes notice of the Actions of all rational Beings. Unless therefore any Arguments could be produced, which can destroy or confute the Reasons for the Existence of such a Being, *Religion* cannot but subsist, and appear in full Strength: Not indeed *against*, or inconsistent with, the Rule of Action; not *against* Virtue, or *against* any thing which can be proved to be true or just, but as *adding Strength* to every thing which can be said for Virtue, and by enforcing it by the Consideration of the Existence of God, and its being acceptable to him. Take any moral Virtue, *Prudence, Justice, Temperance, Fortitude*, and urge it with all the Strength which Reason can supply; press home the Fitness, the Honestum, the Reasonableness of it, and let it have its full Force: Yet still an additional Set of Arguments may be urged in its Behalf, from its being agreeable to the Nature of *God*; from its being *his* Will; from its being of that kind as to procure *his* Favour if we comply with it, or *his* Displeasure if we act contrary to it. Were these Arguments deduced from a wrong Principle, or from any precarious and uncertain Notion, then indeed they, and what supports them, ought to be rejected, as having no sufficient

cient Foundation: But if the first Principle CHAP. be established; if it be true that there is a God, V. a just, good, true Being, that superintends and governs all things, — Then it is impossible, but that Truth and Justice and Goodness must be acceptable to him; and so must every Virtue which can be proved to be agreeable to the Truth of things, or, which is the same in effect, to his Nature, and Will. And if so, *Religion* supplies us with fresh Motives to do whatever is right.

Let us now imagine that there is a Variety of Motives to Virtue: That some Men are influenced by the *Rectitude* of the thing itself: And that others may not be affected by such Arguments. Now if any are influenced to do what is right in itself, from the Consideration of the *Being of God*, and of his Attributes, These are to be considered as so much clear Gain to Virtue. The former are, and cannot but be, confirmed, and established, by these *additional* Arguments: The Latter owe all their Virtue to them. So that the greatest Friends and Admirers of Virtue must acknowledge in general the *Benefit of Religion*, because it makes many virtuous, who otherwise would not be so; and it does it by just and true Arguments, deduced from a demonstrative Principle, which must affect all People.

There

CHAP. V. There are indeed those who would represent *Religion* as a mere Argument from
 ~~~~~ “Hopes and Fears to *cast the Ballance* on  
 “the Side of Virtue.” But this is certainly a great Mistake. For the Ballance in respect of Truth is entirely already, and always will be, on the the Side of Virtue: Or in other Terms, The Obligation to Virtue may be proved beyond all Dispute from the *Nature of Things*. But if it be meant, that Religion is nothing but an Argument designed to operate on Mens *Passions*, in order to make them *Virtuous*, This is, I say, a gross Mistake. For Religion supplies us with a new Fund of Arguments, not derived from “Hopes and “Fears,” but from the Existence of *God* and his *Government* of the World. When indeed *his Favour*, or *Displeasure*, is urged, then our *Hopes* and *Fears* come into Consideration. But *Hopes* and *Fears* are not the Foundations of *Religion*. For were a Creature supposed to be void of these *Passions*, yet the more perfect we suppose him, the more exactly would he conform to right Reason; and the more fully he saw Evidence for the Existence of a God, the more would he in consequence be obliged to be religious. *Hopes* and *Fears* do not make the Rule of Action, but suppose it, and suppose a Governor who steadily adheres to it; and therefore are but of a secondary Consideration,



tion, and purely consequential to the Notion of a God. CHAP. V.


When therefore the Question is — What is *Religion*? And whether there be any such Principle? The Answer is — Religion consists in the Belief or Practice of any thing that is right, from the Consideration of God; and of what is consequent to that, his Favour or Displeasure, according to the Goodness or Badness of our Actions. The Foundations of the Principle are, the Arguments for the Existence of God: And the Advantage of the Principle is, that the Rule of Action is now doubly secured, by its own Reasonableness, and by this demonstratively sure Addition.

There have been those who have attempted to prove, that “God cannot require any *Religion* of Men.” And to make out this Position they reason thus. “*Religion*, as distinguished from *Morality*, is natural, or revealed; and is defined, *Man’s Duty to God*. Which Duty so distinguished can consist in nothing but the Practice of *Ceremonies*, and Belief of *Speculations*. And accordingly all Religions are properly diversified from one another by nothing but different *Ceremonies* and *Creeds*.” Now, 1. It is here asserted, “That God cannot require any *Religion* of Men.” Now if the Idea of Religion be, The Belief, or Practice of any thing that is right from the Consideration of God,

CHAP. God, and his Favour; then the Position here is,

V. That God cannot require the Belief or Practice of any thing, from the Consideration of his Pleasure or Displeasure. What reason can possibly be assign'd why the Governor of the Universe may not require a Man to live soberly, (which is right in itself) or else become the Object of his Displeasure? All the Confusion arises from not having a just Notion of the Word, *Religion*, and its Obligation. For it follows,

2. That Religion is, "Man's Duty to God. Now *Religion* should not be stiled, *Man's Duty to God*; But his doing his Duty in his Station, whatever that is, from the Principle of believing that there is a God, and that his acting so is agreeable to his Will. Nor ought Religion to be so distinguished from *Morality*, as if it had no Relation or Concern with it; since it comprehends all *Morality*, and is a great Motive or Principle to lead Men to the Practice of it. Much worse is it to make Religion, even as separated from *Morality*, consist in nothing but "the Practice of Ceremonies, and Belief of Speculations." For Prayer, and Praise; the Acknowledgment of our Dependence on God; Gratitude to him for Benefits received, and hopes of others to come, founded on a firm Belief that God is, and is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him, are more than what  
can

can be contained under the Notions of *Cere-*CHAP.  
*mony*, or, *Speculation*: And will not come V.  
 under the Objector's Notion of *Morality*. 

When it is said,

3. That "*Religions* are diversified from  
 " one another by nothing but different Ce-  
 " remonies and Creeds," this shews how the  
 Word, *Religion*, and its plural, *Religions*, have  
 been abused. It is a means of great Confu-  
 sion to treat every different Sect as of a *different*  
*Religion*; since difference of Sentiments upon  
 certain Points, makes often no more than a  
 difference of Sect or Party *in the same* Reli-  
 gion. An *Arminian*, *e. g.* is not of a diffe-  
 rent *Religion* from a *Contra-Remonstrant*;  
 nor is a *Church of England* Man from a *Pres-*  
*byterian*, or a *Baptist*. All these are of the  
 same *Religion*, provided they have the same  
 Rule of Faith, however Men may divide and  
 subdivide themselves into Factions or Sects:  
 just as all are under the same Government,  
 or General Laws, in *England*, though there  
 are many Corporations, or Parties, into  
 which they are sub-divided. Sects indeed *in*  
 the *same* Religion are diversified by nothing  
 but Ceremonies and *Creeds*: But *Religions*  
 are diversified by having *different* Rules of  
 Faith; not by having different *Creeds* in the  
 same Rule. This shews you how the *Chri-*  
*stian* Religion differs from the *Mahometan*,  
 and from the *Jewish*, and from all *Paga-*  
*nism*: It has the New Testament as its Rule,

CHAP. different from the *Old Testament*, and from  
 V. the *Alcoran*, and from the Books of *Zoro-*  
 ~~~~~ *aster*, and *Confucius*, &c. Hence it will be  
 easy to answer the Arguments brought to
 prove, that “God can require no *Religion* of
 any Man.” It is urged, *e. g.* That

I. “God is an infinitely perfect Being,
 “ wise, powerful, and happy. He there-
 “ fore cannot want the Service of Men for
 “ his own sake, that is, cannot be served
 “ by them, since they can neither add to his
 “ Knowledge or Power, nor *please*, or *dis-*
 “ *please* him, or in the least move him by
 “ any Actions they can do.” — If therefore
 “ God requires any thing of Men, it must be
 “ for *Mens* sake, and not for his *own* sake, and
 “ consequently it must consist in doing what
 “ is beneficial to *themselves*. But one Man’s
 “ Belief of *Speculations*, or Practice of *Cere-*
 “ *monies*, can be of no Use or Consequence
 “ to *another*.” — Wherefore since God can
 “ require nothing of Man as a *Duty*, but
 “ such Actions as are beneficial to *Society*;
 “ and since nothing is beneficial to *Society*
 “ but *Morality*, it follows that he can require
 “ nothing of us but *Morality*.”

It is true that we can do God *no Service*
 that he stands in need of; nor can we add
 to his Knowledge or Power; but how does it
 follow that we can neither “please nor dis-
 “please” him? If we can act contrary to *Mora-*

lity, i. e. to Truth in the Case put, and God is CHAP. allowed to require of us not to act contrary V. to Truth, we may certainly *displease* him; as we may *please* him likewise, if we act agreeably to his Will.


2. Allowing that what God requires of "Men must consist in doing what is *beneficial to themselves*:" I say that Men may do what is *beneficial to themselves* many ways, e. g. by influencing one another to the Practice of Virtue; by setting themselves as Examples of Virtue; by laying before one another Precepts and Rules of Virtue; and by offering Motives to do all Sorts of good Offices to one another. Now supposing that the *Belief of certain Speculations* may tend to produce this Effect, it might then be consistent with Goodness in God to lay such speculative *Motives* before Men; and there is no Absurdity in believing such Speculations, when it is known that they come from God.

3. Supposing that the *Christian Religion* does contain certain *Speculations*; it is apparent that one Man's *Belief* of them, may be of some Use and Consequence to others, if those Speculations contain proper Motives to Virtue, which could not otherwise be had. In Truth, Religion consists in the doing whatever is right, from a Principle of Belief that there is a God. Now the Belief of God requires a suitable Behaviour towards

H God;

CHAP. *God*; and if He vouchsafes to reveal to Men
 V. any Truths which they by their own natural
 Powers could not discover, it requires assent
 to such Truths, and a suitable Practice or
 Behaviour. This is not in God a “*wanting*
 “*a Service of Men for his own Sake*;” But
 it is a means to make them act virtuously,
 and a Motive to do so, which they could not
 otherwise have had.

It is urged further, “If *Morality* be our
 “*Duty*, it is impossible God should require
 “any thing else of Men, without subverting
 “*Morality*.” If a Proof of this Assertion be
 required, it is answered — “Man being a
 “very finite and limited Being, and un-
 “able through his natural Defects to perform
 “*all the Duties of Morality*, can have no
 “*Duty* enjoined him distinct from *Morality*,
 “but what must, so far as he endeavours to
 “perform it, take him off from endeavour-
 “ing to subdue his Passions, and forming
 “his Mind to the Practice of Virtue. But
 supposing Religion comes properly in aid to
Morality; it can never be thought, that ad-
 ditional Motives offered to engage Men to
 act up to *Morality*, is to *subvert Morality*,
 or to make them less Virtuous; unless it
 can be imagined, that the Consideration of
 Motives to *Morality*, is taking a Man off
 from *Morality*? It is surprising therefore to
 hear it said — That to require any thing of

Men but *Morality* is to make Men *vitious*: CHAP.
Since things may be suggested, and in fact V.
have been by Revelation, which tend to. 
make Men act uprightly, and which are
strong Motives to Virtue. I conclude therefore
that Religion is good and useful; it is a Principle
of right Action, which all Men at all Times
may understand: It tends to make Men
better in every Station and Circumstance of
Life, as it supplies them with an additional
Set of Arguments to live virtuously, and to
do what is Honest. And if any Speculation
is proposed, it is only as it may answer this
good End: And consequently God may re-
quire it, if he thinks fit. But this will ap-
pear better when we consider the Use of Re-
velation.

C H A P. VI.

Of Revelation in general.

CHAP. VI. **I**F natural Religion consists in doing what is our Duty, from a sense of the Being of God, it is easy hence to see how Religion differs from Superstition. The one extends no farther than to what is *right*; the other always applies the true principle to things that are not our Duties. The advantage then of Religion consists in this, that it supplies us with more arguments to do what is right, than we can possibly have without it. Supposing therefore that a method could be found out that would still supply a rational Agent with more arguments, and with more motives for right practice, than what the mere Light of Nature can or will supply; it must be own'd, that in such case and under such circumstances, a Man would receive great benefit from such Assistances. In this I conceive the great Use and Advantage of *Revelation* consists: not in discovering any new *moral* Duties, except as it shews new Relations; not in making a more perfect Rule of Action; not in telling us any thing which the Rule of Action to Men as reasonable Creatures was defective in; but in supplying

plying free Agents with new Arguments, and new Motives, to do that which is known to be their Duties.



The Rule of Action to rational Agents is *Truth*: and the notion of a God, or Governor of the Universe, is a very strong Argument to practise it. He that by searching into the Nature of things can discover the Existence of an invisible superintending Power, has acquired an additional reason for right Action, which the Atheist has not. And as Virtue is the more likely to be secured, the more Reasons a rational free Agent has for following it; hence it follows, that he that is convinced of the Existence of a Deity, is more likely to practise Virtue, than any other person can be without such Arguments. If a Revelation were to supply us still with more and different Arguments to practise what is right, it could not but be of singular advantage to Mankind. If it should ascertain such points as we could only conceive to be *possible*, or barely *probable*; if it should offer to us such Motives as may engage us to our Duties; if it should discover to us any new Doctrines which tend to improve the Cause of Virtue; in all these instances, its Benefits must be allowed to be great to the World. And here,

1. Supposing that the great Governor of the Universe were to afford Mankind such a

CHAP. VI. sort of Argument for his Existence and Providence, that should increase in its Evidence

the further it went from its Origin: That as those who had immediate Inspiration might by some means or other be assured of the Revelation received; so all future ages might, if they would attend, have an extraordinary assurance of the Providence of God: Such a Revelation would be a standing Evidence of the Deity; and would be such an Argument of his Providence as no Reason could resist; and would be a very great Motive to Virtue.

2. Supposing that the Governor of the Universe should discover to Mankind certain Facts, what he at present did do, and what in the Course of his Providence he would do; how he would treat all men; what distinctions he would finally make betwixt the Good and the Wicked; by means of *whom* he would make these distinctions; and should add several circumstances of this *final Proceeding*: — These would be all so many powerful Arguments for Virtue; and if it could be proved that these Arguments came from God, they would be the strongest Motives to Duty that could be urged.

3. Supposing that what natural Reason dictates about a future State should by any means be made a matter of Sense; and in consequence, what a few speculative thoughtful Men with much Study have acquired, should

should be made so plain, that those of the CHAP. meanest Capacities may understand, and be VI. assured of it: This likewise would be of the utmost consequence to Virtue, and must gain it many Followers.

4. Supposing that there were a Revelation of any, or of all these points, and any *Institutions* were made to keep up in the Minds of Men a constant *Remembrance* of them—It is hardly possible to conceive a more effectual Encouragement and Support to Duty, than this likewise amounts to.

Whether there has been in fact any such Revelation as this, shall be considered in its place. But here I would only say, that such a Revelation is *possible*, and, *were* it made, it would be useful. Now, why cannot the Great Creator of all things communicate such Notions to Mankind? If we can convey to one another the Sentiments of our own Minds, and can excite Ideas, or suggest Thoughts to a Man who had never before entertain'd such a Thought, and can make him see the Truth of what we say; certainly any superior Being that can have access to our Minds, may do it as effectually as we can. Imagine that the Human Mind is present to the Sensorium, or place where it resides, and there perceives every, or any Object which passes before the Eye, or Ear: a superior Being by causing any Object to pass

H 4

will

CHAP. will make the Mind perceive it, just as it
 VI. does in its ordinary manner. If the Soul
 ~~~~~ can compound or abstract Ideas, or can understand such Ideas when presented to it, in ordinary Life; by the same means it may be made to comprehend such Ideas, when they are presented to it by any other Being.

We do not understand how the Mind perceives Ideas, but are only assured by Experience of the certain Fact. Whatever is the manner by which this is done by all Souls, we may conceive that God, or intermediate Spirits commissioned by him, may do the same. For there is no Incapacity in us to receive Notions; nor is there any want of Power to give them in that supreme Being, who is the Author of all the Powers and Capacities that the Soul has. If therefore there be any Arguments urged against *Revelation*, they ought not to be founded on the Impossibility of the Thing, but upon the *Improbability* of the *Fact*, as the case at present stands in relation to the *Jewish* or *Christian* Revelation.

Thus *e. g.* it is suggested, That if any Revelation at all be given to Mankind, it must be what All are equally concerned in, and consequently it *must* consist in an equal Discovery to All: That God does not act with *equal* Goodness to *all* his Creatures, if he confers extraordinary Favours on *some*, whilst

whilst he totally neglects *others*: That he is *infinitely good* himself, and therefore no Reason can be assigned why he should act with so much as a seeming Partiality: And such it certainly would be, were he to offer great Advantages to some of his Creatures, and to deny them to others. CHAP. VI.

As this Objection is pointed against all and every particular *Revelation*, it should first be considered in its Influence upon Natural Religion; and if it holds equally strong against *That* and against *Revelation*, it ought not to be made any Objection at all to Revealed more than it is to Natural Religion; unless it can be shewn that the Foundation of all Religion is false.

In order to remove this Difficulty, I would observe, That the infinite Goodness of God does not oblige him in the natural World to make all parts of it equally fertile; nor does every Land flow with Milk and Honey. There are many barren and unfruitful Soils; many spacious Countries, that bring forth little, unless by hard Labour and wearisome Toil, whilst others bring forth with little or no trouble. Why did not this infinite *goodness* so dispose the Earth, that all parts of it should be equally fertile? Or is it to be deem'd a seeming Partiality, that *Palesine*, or *Egypt*, should be fruitful, and *Libya* desert? Now as it is in the *natural* World, so

CHAP. so it is likewise in the *animal*. Have all  
 VI. Men equal Health, equal freedom from  
 ~~~~~ Pain and Sicknefs, equal Vigor, equal Length  
 of Life? And yet fuch Goodnefs as is here
 contended for, could with eafe have pre-
 vented, or can with eafe remove, Pains and
 Diforders; and make the moft afflicted equal
 with the moft healthy Conftitution. Let us
 ftill proceed to the *moral* World. Different
 Men have different Parts and Abilities: Some
 labour under an Ignorance that is incurable,
 and fcarce ever attain to the Principles of
 even *natural* Religion. If Travellers do not
 deceive us, fome whole Nations have no no-
 tion of a Deity; and when we look into
 the Customs and Manners of the *Lapland-
 ers*, the *Samojards*, the *Hottentots*, or the
 wild *Indians*, one cannot but pity their Ig-
 norance and Barbarity. Now the Objection
 will here recur againft the ordinary Provi-
 dence of God, equally ftong as it does againft
Revelation, and in the very fame Terms, *viz.*
 That God does not act with equal *Goodnefs*
 to all his Creatures if he makes a Diftinction
 between them; or if he confers extraordi-
 nary Favours on fome, and does not do it to
 others. Indeed, That fhould not be made
 an Objection againft Revelation, which will
 hold equally ftong againft a plain matter of
 fact in the *Natural*, and the *Animal*, and the
Moral World.

But

But is not God chargeable with *Unrighteousness*, or Inequality of proceeding, if he does not equally give to all, *proper Motives* to do their Duties? Why had not they who lived from *Adam's* days to *Moses* a Revelation from God, which should contain all the Advantages which the *Jewish* Revelation contains? And why have not they who live all over the Universe the same Encouragements with those who enjoy the Light of the Gospel? I answer,

1. Suppose that a man was not able to account for this Difficulty; yet still before we give up the point, we ought at least to weigh it against the Evidence that is produced for an actual Revelation. When Arguments that are clear are produced for a *Fact*, and an Objection is raised against it, Both are to be well weigh'd, and Judgment is to be given according to that which is clear and fully proved, notwithstanding some Difficulty in the case. *E. g.* It is demonstrably clear that there is such a Being as God; and it is fact that there is a difference in the Parts and Abilities of several Men. Now as no Man ought to give up the Argument for the Existence of God, because he cannot account for the difference amongst Men, or reconcile it to the Goodness of God to make such a Creature as Man is: so in the other case, suppose the Argument for the actual Grant, and Use

CHAP. Use of Revelation to be strong and clear;
 VI. this must not be given up because one cannot account for the want of *Universality*; but like many other Truths this likewise must strictly be maintained, notwithstanding a seeming or real Difficulty, which our shallow Capacities cannot comprehend. But,

2. The Discoveries which Mankind is able to make of moral Knowledge, by the mere dint of natural Parts, is very great, if they are willing to apply themselves to thinking: nor is there any one Principle, or one Practice of *Morality*, which may not be known by natural Reason, without Revelation. By *Reason* we may come at a certainty of the Existence of God, and of his Providence; his Goodness, Justice, Mercy, Truth: By *That* we may trace out our Duties to him; and we may discover a future State of Rewards and Punishments: By *That* we may come at the Knowledge of such Truths as relate to our Neighbours, and the corresponding Duties to them; What we are to do in social Life; How we are to behave towards Governors, and what Obedience is to be paid in a *civil* State; Wherein our true Happiness consists, and what it is that must lead to it; And what we ought to do in our private Relations. — These and such like points may be traced out by natural Reason; nor do I know of any one point of Duty towards

towards God or Man, but what Reason will CHAP. suggest, and supply us with proper Motives to VI. do it. The Apostle has observed, that *The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead.* Rom. i. 20. And chap. ii. he says that the *Gentiles, which have not the Law, do by Nature the things contained in the Law: these having not the Law, are a Law unto themselves; which shew the work of the Law written in their hearts; their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing, or else excusing one another.* Rom. ii. 14, 15.

Now, if Reason be able to discover all our Duties towards God or Man, then no Imputation can be laid on God, as if he had not done *his* part: especially since whatever fault arises from Negligence, or whatever Stupidity or Callousness Men bring upon their own Minds, it arises entirely from themselves. There can be no surer way of knowing what Reason can discover, and what not, than by examining what Proficiency was actually made in moral Knowledge, by those who lived where Revelation was unknown. Nor do the false Notions which they likewise maintained, make any Objection against the Light of Reason, more than the false Principles which those who have the

2

benefit

CHAP. benefit of the Gospel maintain, make in reality any Objection against the Light of the
 VI. Gospel. Men, as Men, are very subject to Error: and if the falling into a Pit through Carelessness be no Objection against the Advantage of Light or Sunshine, so neither is an Error against Reason [or Revelation] any Argument of a Defect in it. The Man is careless, and not Reason defective. Therefore,

3. As the Powers of Reason are sufficient in themselves to discover all and every Duty, and likewise to discover proper and sufficient Motives to do them, Revelation may add many more; and if it does so, it must be deem'd by them that have it, a singular Advantage. But then those that have it not, have no right to complain: and to say that there is Injustice in God in distributing extraordinary Favours to some, which he does not bestow on others, is to say that God is obliged to make all his Creatures, at least all those of the same species, *equal* in all respects; all Lands equally fertile; all Animals equally swift, or strong, or healthy; all Men equally wise.

4. It is not impossible but that there may be very different States and Degrees of Happiness, and very different Places in the future State, suited to the Capacities and Abilities of such, as behave here more or less
 according

according to the Rule of Action. Those CHAP. who have no Light ; or Those who through VI. a faulty Education, through strong and early Prejudices which they never overcome, fall into great Mistakes, and Errors—These, I say, need not be miserable ; nor yet be placed in that Station where the most wise and virtuous shall be placed. They must live for ever, and they may go on from Glory to Glory, till at length they may become perfectly happy. If this should be the State of things, then there is no Necessity that all should *here* enjoy the same Privileges at the same *Time* ; nor the same State of Happiness at the same *Time*. Nay how can it be made to appear that a *proportional* Light here may not be the most fit to answer the Ends of Providence at present? And if the Happiness of a moral Agent is proportional to its Progress in Virtue, to ask why it has not *all* possible Motives given it, is to ask why it is not any thing it may wish to be.

The *Usefulness* of Revelation therefore to them that have it, is no more a Reason why it should be bestowed upon *every* Man, than the Usefulness of any of the Comforts of this Life is a Reason why *every* Man should be blessed with them. It may be, in the Dispensations of God's Providence as *useful*, for some not to have Revelation, as for others to have it : And its Usefulness to those who
have

CHAP. VI. have it, is to be considered as all other Benefits are, as Trials, as Talents, as Opportunities, which they ought to improve: And not as a Means without which a Man cannot obtain any Favour of God.

All that I would hence conclude is only this, That Revelation is *possible*: and supposing one given, and that it tends to promote Virtue, it is *useful* to those that have it: And if Men will not seriously apply themselves to understand what is revealed, and do not make a Progress suitable to their Advantages, they shew themselves unworthy of the Favour given to them.

C H A P. VII.


How Revelation may be distinguished from Reason.

THE Possibility of a Revelation has been shewn in the preceding Chapter; CHAP. and the general Objection to it considered: VII. And were the Writings in which this Revelation is contained merely a Collection of Revealed Truths separate and independent of all other Matters whatever; were there no historical, no social, no moral Maxims, or Facts, or other things mentioned, but what were known to come immediately from God, all that would be wanting, would be, Evidence extraordinary for the Satisfaction of honest Minds, that such a Book did in fact come from God. But when a Book contains in it many Facts, and many Truths, which are discoverable by the ordinary Use of our natural Faculties; and these lie intermingled with Matters which are properly the Subjects of Revelation, it becomes a Question, Whether all that is contained in such a Book is to be admitted as Revelation? Or if not, How must we distinguish One from the Other? Some Facts *might* be written by faithful Eye-witnesses; Maxims of Reason, I. Moral

CHAP. Moral Truths, or Observations and Prudential Motives, *may* be urged by Wise and Good Men: And if in one complex Volume we meet with very many such things, how are we to distinguish Matters of Reason from those of Revelation, or how are we to know which Facts are wrote from human Testimony, and which are wrote by the immediate Inspiration of God? The Difficulty does not arise about the *Truth* or *Certainty* of the Scriptures in any Part, but is entirely about the *Inspiration*: And this ought to be carefully considered before we proceed. In order to this, Let it be observed,

1. Whenever a Person that has had a *Revelation* from God speaks such Truths as are discoverable by our natural Faculties, there is no Necessity instantly to infer, that such Truths are the Effect of *Revelation*. Not that such Truths *may* not be revealed; but, unless a clear Evidence can be produced that they are *in fact* revealed, there is no reason why we should assent to them, as *revealed*. Thus when such excellent Rules occur as are contained in the *Proverbs of Solomon*, and in very many other Places, it will be hard for us to prove that these Truths are the Effect of immediate ^a *Revelation*. They are certainly

^a Vox Spiritus Sancti ambigua est: Nam aut significat —
 afflatum Divinum — aut significat pium motum, sive facultatem

certainly all discoverable by our own Abilities: CHAP. VII.
 And as we cannot prove that they were *re-*
vealed, or the Effect of immediate Inspiration, 
 so were we to suppose them inspired, the
 real Use of such Inspiration would be, to ex-
 cite by *Authority* to the Practice of what
 Men are already obliged to do by *Reason*. In
 the same manner when we are commanded
 to love our Enemies; or when we meet with
 the Doctrines of *Mortification* and *Self-denial*:
 These are Points of Natural Reason; and it
 will be hard to prove them the Effects of In-
 spiration. For though these Points are some-
 times urged as *Improvements of Morality*, as
 something that has a more superlative Degree
 of Perfection than what natural Reason could
 dictate; yet when these Words come to be ex-
 plained, and the Doctrines contained in them
 ascertained, and the necessary Limitations fix-
 ed, we shall find no other Rule of Action con-
 tained in them, than what is really deducible
 from natural Reason, though they become a
 Law to Christians by the Authority of him
 that enjoined them.

It is just the same in a great many other
 Instances, where general or universal Proposi-
 tions are to be understood with great Limi-
 tations. *I say unto you, that ye resist not*
Evil — Swear not at all — Give to him that

tatem impellentem ad loquendum salutaria vivendi præcepta,
 vel res politicas & civiles, quomodo vocem Spiritus sancti
 interpretatur *Maimonides* — *Grotius, Not. pro Pace. p. 672.*

CHAP. *asketh thee, and from him that would borrow*
 VII. *of thee, turn not thou away.* These Propo-

ositions are, and ought to be considered, and interpreted with proper Limitations, and are to be understood with rational Allowances, just as we interpret such Sayings in all moral Books whatever.

These Propositions then being deducible from natural Reason, it will be impossible for us to prove that they are the Effect of immediate Inspiration, unless the Person inspired had given some Evidence of his having received such Truths immediately from God.

I would not be mistaken, as if I argued that God could not reveal any particular *moral* Truth unto any Person; nor is it my meaning to suppose that God *never does*, nor never *has* inspired such Truths into the Minds of Men. There is certainly no Absurdity in imagining that God may excite in Mens Minds any Ideas; and if he may excite *any*, he may excite one as well as another. He may inspire certain Persons with things they did not know before: He *may* suggest to their Minds things which they had forgot: He *may* so direct and order it, that they may compare Ideas, and argue and reason from them. But still the Point is, Whether *in fact* he *has* done so? And whether in the Writings of the same Person, who is admitted to have had *Revelations*, every Propo-

tion


tion ought to be allowed to be inspired: Or CHAP. VII.
 if a Distinction is to be made in the same Work, what is the Boundary of each? what must be imputed to *Reason*, and what to *Revelation*?

The Person only to whom a *Revelation* is made, feels or knows that he is inspired. And if we admit any one upon his *own Word* to have an Intercourse with Heaven, we shall be liable to so many Cheats and Impostures, that no wonder if every prudent Man demands some Proof, some sort of Credential of a divine Mission. If therefore any one should teach a Doctrine of common Morality. *e. g.* That *Men should do as they would be done by*, and should declare that he received this Doctrine from God; not the *thing taught*, but the *Revelation* ought to be proved. For it may reasonably be asked, why should God discover, by means extraordinary, what is commonly known, and what he has already given us sufficient Powers ourselves to discover? God does not act in such manner in any other Instances that we know of; and therefore the Probability will always be against such an Assertion: And consequently there ought to be some sort of Evidence, in such Cases, of the divine Mission and Authority.

There is certainly a great Difference to be put betwixt a Matter of common *Reason*,

CHAP. and one of *Revelation*. In all Cases of Re-
 VII. velation, Authority is the Foundation of Af-
 sent: Nor is Reason at all a Judge of the
 Truth of the Proposition revealed; nor is it
 able to find out any Medium by which it can
 prove it to be true; but it depends upon,
 and rests satisfied with the *Authority* of the
 Revealer, and only sees no Inconsistency, no
 Contradiction, nothing clashing with what is
 perceived to be true. But in Matters of *Reason*,
 we can find out proper Means to *prove*
 a Proposition to be true. That *God will judge*
the World by Jesus Christ, is not capable of
 being otherwise *proved*, than by producing
 the Authority of *Revelation*: Whereas in
 any Point of *Morality*, our natural Faculties
 are able to *prove* the Proposition to be true
 or false. Supposing then a Book which plain-
 ly contains *Revelations*, and likewise *Moral*
 and *Historical Truths*; an honest Man may
 demand a *Proof*, that *Moral Truths*, and
Historical Facts, are the immediate Effect
 of Inspiration.

It was *Grotius's* Opinion, “ which he was
 “ fully persuaded of, that the *Prophets* spoke
 “ and wrote what they were commanded to
 “ speak and write by the Inspiration of God;
 “ and the same is true of the *Apocalypse*,
 “ and other *Predictions* of the Apostles:
 “ That whatever *Christ* spake, he likewise
 “ spoke from God: But he did not think the
 “ same

“ same of the *Historical* Writings and *moral* CHAP.
 “ Sayings of the *Hebrews*. It is sufficient VII.
 “ that they are wrote with a pious Intention, 
 “ with great Faithfulness, and concerning
 “ Matters of Importance. Those Books
 “ which the Synagogue judged to be such,
 “ they are Canonical to the Jews; those
 “ which the Church of Christ thinks to be
 “ such, those are Canonical to Christians.
 “ *Esdra*s and *Luke* were not Prophets, but
 “ serious and prudent Men, who neither
 “ would deceive, nor suffer themselves to be
 “ deceived. Did ever *Luke* say — *The Word*
 “ *of the Lord came unto Luke*, and, the
 “ Lord said unto him, Write; as the Prophets
 “ are wont to say? Nothing like it. What
 “ then? *For as much as many have taken*
 “ *in hand to set forth in order a Declaration*
 “ *of those things which are most surely believ'd*
 “ *among us*. He says that his Inducement to
 “ write was not the *Command* of any one,
 “ but the *Example* of others. *Even as they*
 “ *delivered them to us, who from the Begin-*
 “ *ning were Eye-witnesses, and Ministers of*
 “ *the Word, (viz. Mary the Mother of*
 “ *our Lord, his other Kinsmen, the Apo-*
 “ *stles, the seventy Disciples, the Saints,*
 “ *and such as were raised from the Dead by*
 “ *Jesus, many Witnesses of his Resurrection.)*
 “ *It seemed good to me also, having had per-*
 “ *fect Understanding of all things from the*
 “ very

CHAP. "very first to write unto thee in order, most
 VII. "excellent Theophilus. How did he get
 "this perfect Understanding? From the
 "Witnesses themselves, not from Revelation.
 "To write, not things inspired, but dili-
 "gently and in order. The Prophets there-
 "fore were influenced quite in a different
 "Manner from what St. *Luke* was, whose
 "Design being so good, may nevertheless be
 "ascribed to the Holy Ghost. This is the
 "Truth itself, and not Blasphemy." I must
 transcribe *Grotius's* own Words in his *Rive-
 tiani Apologetici Discussio*, into the Margin.^b

^a Afflatu Dei locutos quæ locuti sunt, scripsisse quæ scribere jussi sunt, Prophetas, toto animo agnoscit *Grotius*: Idem judicat de Apocalypsi, & Apostolorum prædictionibus. Christi dicta omnia quin Dei sint dicta, dubitari nefas. De Scriptis Historicis & moralibus Hebræorum sententiis, aliud putat. Satis est quod pio animo scripta sint, & optima fide, & de rebus summis. Quos Libros tales judicavit Synagoga, ii sunt Canonici Hebræis. Quos tales Ecclesia Christiana, ii sunt Canonici Christianis. Neque *Esdra*s neque *Lucas* Prophetæ fuere, sed viri graves, prudentes, qui nec fallere vellent, nec falli se sinerent. Dixitne *Lucas*? Factum est ad *Lucam verbum Domini*: & dixit ei Dominus, Scribe; ut solent Prophetæ. Nihil tale. Quid ergo? Quoniam quidem multi conati sunt ordinare narrationem, quæ de nobis completæ sunt rerum. Dicit, se non præcepto, sed aliorum exemplo adductum ut scriberet. Sicut tradiderunt nobis qui ab initio ipsi viderunt, & ministri fuere sermonis: Nempe *Maria*, mater Domini, cognati ejus alii, Apostoli, Discipuli septuaginta, sancti & resuscitati ab *Jesu*, testes resurrectionis complures. Visum est mihi, affecuto omnia à principio, diligenter ex ordine tibi scribere, optime *Theophile*. Quomodo affecuto? Ex ipsis testibus, non ex Revelatione. Scribere non dictata, sed diligenter, ex ordine. Longe ergo aliter acti Prophetæ, aliter *Lucas*: Cujus tamen tam pium consilium Spiritui Sancto potest acribi. Hæc ipsa veritas est, non blasphemia. *Grot. Oper. p. 725.*

It

It is plain that *Grotius* was of Opinion, CHAP. VII.
 that nothing but the *Prophecy of Scripture* was intended by the Terms *divinely inspired*, when it is said, *all Scripture is given by Inspiration of God*, 2 Tim. iii. 19. His Words are, "Which are those Writings that are eminently sacred, or divinely inspired, *Grotius* had shewn from the Second Epistle of Peter, viz. the Word of Prophecy, or the Prophetick part of Scripture as it lies in Books. For Peter attributes the same to Prophecy, that Paul does to the Scripture of which he is speaking; saying, that it comes from Men inspired with the Holy Ghost, which Title in the Old Testament is peculiar to the Prophets." But it may be doubted whether *Grotius* has delivered himself exactly; because were the *Historical*, and merely *Moral* Parts of the Scriptures, granted to him not to come under the Notion of being *inspired by God*, as the *Prophetic* Part does; yet still there remains another Part of Scripture, which is neither *Historical*, nor *Moral*, nor *Prophetick*, and which yet must necessarily be inspired, I mean cer-

^c Quæ autem sunt literæ eximiè sacræ, sive divinitus inspiratæ exposuerat *Grotius* ex Secunda Petri; nempe sermo Propheticus, sive Prophetia Scripturæ, idque libris consignata. Petrus enim Prophetiæ idem tribuit, quod scripturæ isti, de qua agit, tribuit Paulus, ab hominibus venire sancto spiritu inspiratis; qui titulus in veteri testamento proprius est Prophetarum." *ibid.*

CHAP. tain *Doctrines*, and Commands, or Injunctions,
 VII. which Reason could not trace out, but which
 when revealed appear to be perfectly agreeable
 to Reason. Of this Class there are several,
 which I shall particularly consider hereafter.
 But,

2. Suppose a person should prove by any means, that in the Promulgation of certain Truths he has Authority from above; yet as it is possible that he may not be *always* under the Influence of divine Inspirations, so it is not impossible but that he may *sometimes* speak *from himself*, and be then liable to impose upon others. And if this be *possible*, common Prudence will require a careful Examination of all Pretences to Revelation; and will try to find out some Test, by which it may discover Truth from Falshood. The present Possession of any particular extraordinary Favour does not imply a Perpetuity of it: Present Health, Strength, Riches, Power, Knowledge, Memory, is no Evidence that we shall always enjoy them; nor does the present Veracity and Sincerity of Heart necessarily infer, that we shall never be guilty of Falshood or Deceit.

As therefore it is possible, that a Man that once has been inspired may not always be so; so we meet with plain Instances which shew that Persons once inspired are not perpetually inspired, but have been guilty of
 noto-

notorious Untruths. In 1 Kings c. xiii. we CHAP. VII.
 have a remarkable History of a man of God
who came by the word of the Lord unto Bethel, and cried against the altar in the word of the Lord, and prophesied of a child that was to be born unto the house of David; and confirmed what he said by an evident Sign: and when Jeroboam's Hand was so dried up, that when he extended it, he could not pull it in again to him, at the Prayer of this Prophet a second Miracle was done, the King's hand was restored again, and became as it was before. When he was sent on the Message to Bethel, he was charged by the word of the Lord saying, Eat no bread, nor drink water, nor turn again by the same way by which thou camest. However, an old Prophet that lived at Bethel, hearing what had happened that day, followed after the Man of God; and when he had overtaken him, he told him, I am a prophet as thou art, and an Angel spake unto me by the word of the Lord, saying, Bring him back with thee into thine house, that he may eat bread and drink water. But he LIED unto him. When he had thus seduced the Man of God, a real Inspiration came upon him, and he spake by the word of the Lord, and foretold the sudden End of him that had disobeyed the mouth of the Lord; and accordingly

CHAP. dingly the Man of God was killed by a
VII. Lion.

~~~~~ In this History the *Man of God* was *inspired*, and had an actual *Revelation* given him; and it does not appear that afterwards he said any thing inconsistent with the Truth. But then the *old Prophet*, who brought him back to *Bethel*, plainly told him a direct *Falshood*; and spoke *from himself*, at the same time that he *pretended* to speak from the Lord. Here then is an Instance of one that was inspired *before* he told this *Lie*, and likewise *after* it; and consequently a manifest Proof of the Possibility of a Man's not being always under the Influence of the Spirit, notwithstanding that he sometimes has been, or may be.

Bishop *Fleetwood* very well states this case in his Essay upon Miracles.—“ This is the  
“ plain Meaning of the thing, that if a Pro-  
“ phet, whom God had some time since ho-  
“ noured with an Inspiration or two, should  
“ afterwards, upon the Credit of his former  
“ Inspiration, persuade to Idolatry, the Peo-  
“ ple should not remember what he *had*  
“ *been*, but consider what he *now was*, and  
“ put him to death, because it is impossible  
“ he should have been inspired of God to  
“ such a purpose as this. And if we should  
“ suppose (with some) this Sign or Wonder  
“ [*viz.* of the Diviner] to have been the  
“ work-



“ working a Miracle, yet this is the Solu-CHAP.  
 “ tion of the matter, *That no Man, though* VII.  
 “ *he had formerly wrought Miracles, should*  
 “ *upon the Credit of them be believed when*  
 “ *he talked absurdly, or be followed when he*  
 “ *persuaded to any thing plainly wicked:*  
 “ *which was the case of Judas, and perhaps*  
 “ *some others, who had sometimes wrought*  
 “ *Miracles by Christ's Commission, and yet*  
 “ *did after renounce him and apostatise from*  
 “ *the Faith. Their having been used by God*  
 “ *as his Instruments and Messengers did not*  
 “ *authorise them for ever after to be accounted*  
 “ *such, nor was to give them Credit in every*  
 “ *thing they said or did.” P. 110—112.*

You have another remarkable Instance in the case of *Saul*, who once was under the Influence of the Spirit of God, and prophesied in such a manner as to give occasion for that Proverb, *Is Saul also among the Prophets?* And yet *Saul* not only said false things after this, but *did* them too, in such a manner as to make him be rejected by God.

But put the case of a Prophet, that has been inspired, but afterwards talks not *absurdly*, or plainly *wickedly*, but only of *himself*; there must, I say, be some Evidence produced, that what is said is from *God*, and not from *himself*, if Men would not impose on themselves. Spiritual Pride is very frequently

CHAP. frequently seen to rise in such as have been  
 VII. *Confessors* for Righteousness sake; and it may  
 ~~~~~ arise in such as have been honoured with In-  
 spiration. For,

3. The Infirmities of human Nature are not always taken away from a Man, when extraordinary Favours are conferred upon him by God. *David*, that Royal Prophet, was remarkably guilty of some very notorious crimes: and was far from acting always as if every thing he said, or did, was inspired in him by God. Nor did those to whom a Revelation was made in *after days*, constantly, and perpetually, in every thing they wrote, and in every Sentence they spoke, act under the Direction of the Spirit. There are some things in the *Epistles* which are spoken without *any commandment from the Lord*, in which the Apostles *gave their judgment*, 1 Cor. vii. 25. and when they openly avow that they did so, we have no Authority to assert or maintain, that in such particular Instances, they did it by Inspiration, or by an express Commandment from God. The Diffension betwixt *Paul* and *Barnabas*; the Dispute betwixt *Peter* and *Paul* on account of *Peter's* Diffimulation, are certain Marks of Infirmities somewhere, still continuing with him who had been once favoured by God. And as human Infirmities are not removed by extraordinary Graces,

we must apply some Test by which we may judge of, and distinguish, the one from the other. CHAP. VII.

Be it therefore fix'd, that no Proposition ought to be admitted as matter of Revelation, without a proper Evidence of its coming from God. A matter of mere Reason may indeed come from God, as well as any other Truth; but if a person pretends to teach any plain moral Point from such Authority, he must prove his Mission; that is, he must prove that whatever he says that he brings from God, is actually derived from him. His having been *once* inspired is no Evidence that he *always* will be under the Influence of the Spirit: But as he may speak his *own* Sentiments, like other Men, at certain times, nothing must be admitted as revealed without Proof.

Suppose now that a person should give sufficient Evidence that he has *some* matters revealed unto him, and yet he does not *prove*, nor pretend to prove, that *every* thing he says, is so discover'd; — What part will a prudent person take? *1st*, He will not instantly conceive such matters to be *inspired* as natural Reason dictates; because it is not usual, nor is it necessary, that God should interpose in cases which he has in his ordinary Providence sufficiently provided for. And, *2dly*, Whatever things a Man by the ordinary Faculties

CHAP. culties of his Mind is not able to discover,
 VII. he will naturally conceive to be the Points
 revealed to such a person. The Narrations
 therefore of Facts which a Man himself sees;
 or such as he may have learn'd from the
 Testimonies of others; and all such Truths
 as may be discovered by the natural Opera-
 tions of his own Mind, will not be instant-
 ly admitted as the Result, or Effect, of the
 Spirit of God working upon, and revealing
 such Points to, any one; unless a particular
 or special Proof be brought, that thus it was
in fact. And wherever no such Evidence is
 given, there in general it cannot be impro-
 per to distinguish betwixt what is discovera-
 ble by the use of our Faculties, and what is
 not so; and the one may safely be imputed
 to Inspiration, whilst the other is attributed
 to its proper Parent.

But let us suppose a Person claiming to be
 inspired; and giving a Doctrine which it is
 pretended comes from God. Every Man
 has a Right to Evidence, that the Doctrine
 comes from that Original; and the Doctrine
 must rest upon the Proof. But be the Proof
 ever so surprising, yet the Doctrine itself
 must have certain Qualifications, which must
 antecedently be considered. As,

1st, It must not *contradict* those Princi-
 ples of Truth which our Reason perceives.
 For as our Reason is to be convinced that a

Reve-

Revelation comes from God, if any thing should contradict our Reason, we could not but judge it *irrational*, and therefore impossible to come from him. 2dly, If we were not to *understand* whatever is revealed, we could neither say it was *rational* or *irrational*, *credible* or *incredible*: and consequently we could not be concerned at all in such Revelations. Whatever we have no Ideas of, is nothing to us: and therefore a Revelation always *supposes* in the person to whom it is made, either *proper Ideas*, or it must *make* them. In the *latter* case, whatever knowledge the person inspired might have, he could not communicate it to others; because they could never understand what was communicated to them, more than an *Englishman* could understand what a *Chinese* talk'd about, when he described any thing that was *peculiar* to *China* in his native Tongue. In the *former* case, the Person having the Idea could communicate whatever was revealed, to any one else that had the same common Idea; and both of them could *understand* what was revealed. If any one indeed would endeavour to carry his thoughts farther than what was revealed, he might easily be lost in the dark and intricate Mazes of an unknown Wood. But then this is not understanding what is revealed, but striving for something that is not revealed.

CHAP. 4. Suppose a Doctrine to be revealed, the
 VII. several Parts of which lie dispersed in several
 places of a Book, and some of these Parts
 seem repugnant to others. Their coming
 from God is a sufficient Indication, that they
 are all reconcilable to one another. If there-
 fore in one way they are consistent with
 common sense, and are intelligible; in ano-
 ther way they are incomprehensible and un-
 intelligible; it is most probable that the in-
 telligible Scheme is the Meaning of the Re-
 velation. It will always be conceived by a
 rational intelligent Agent, that if God vouch-
 safes to reveal any thing to him, he will speak
 what is suited to his Capacities, and for his
 Use, and be intelligible by him. The only
 way then is, where a Doctrine lies dispersed,
 to collect together the several Passages rela-
 ting to such Doctrine, and to frame an in-
 telligible consistent Scheme out of them all.
 And should it so happen, that more than
 one philosophical intelligible Notion may be
 framed of any Point revealed, any such in-
 telligible ones ought to be preferred to the
 absolutely unintelligible ones: and the judg-
 ment will be to chuse out of such as are in-
 telligible, which is *The Truth*.

It is certain that in many Instances our
 Notions are very imperfect; and there are,
 or may be, many Facts of which we can by
 dint of our natural Powers discover no Traces
 that

that either they have been, or will be; and there are many things in the World of which we have no notion at all. Wherever we have no Ideas, or very imperfect ones, and are not able to discover more by our natural Faculties; we must allow that such things are *above* our Reason. If any Revelation were to supply this Defect, and to help our Infirmities, or to discover any Facts which otherwise we could never learn;—These cases would not be properly *above* our Reason, but when they were discovered, they would be as *intelligible*, as any other of which we could form the clearest notions. The Principles indeed, upon which we assented to them, would be different: but as to our *understanding* them, they would be the same. It is a Fact which we could not discover by any of our Faculties, that *God will judge the World by Jesus Christ: that the second Death hath no power on him that hath part in the first Resurrection: that the Christ was born of a Virgin, &c.* Though these are *above* or beyond our Powers to *discover*, yet now they are revealed, and so far as they are revealed, we can as perfectly understand each Proposition, as we can any other Truths whatever. If we proceed farther, and examine *How* this or that is to be; *how* we are to *rise* again; *how* the Man Christ will judge us, &c.—these things we do not *understand*;


CHAP. and the reason is, they are *not revealed*. It

VII. is a very different thing to perceive any thing to be *false*; and not to have any Ideas, or such imperfect ones, that we cannot judge whether a thing be true or false. Wherever therefore Revelation is made, if we are not to *understand* what is revealed, such Revelation is the same to all intents as no Revelation at all; and we are in the same State of Darknes and Ignorance we were in before the Revelation was made. These Observations being premised concerning Revelation,

Let us next enquire whether there ever was a Revelation made, and what may come properly under that Denomination.

C H A P. VIII.

*Whether there has in fact been any such thing
as Revelation.*

IN Enquiries into the common Histories CHAP.
of past Facts, it is usual to rest upon the VIII.
Evidence of Persons who are capable of 
knowing the Truth, and are of such Inte-
grity as not to be willing to impose on others:
Nor is there ever more required, than to prove
the Relator of a Fact to be one who was
not imposed on himself, and that he had so
strong an Attachment to Truth that he would
not dare to speak what was false. But in
order to know whether GOD hath at any
time, or in any extraordinary manner, spo-
ken to Men, it seems necessary to go some-
what farther; and not to rest extraordinary
and preternatural Facts upon ordinary and
common Evidence.

Supposing therefore *First*, That in Books
pretending to contain in them *Revelations*,
one were to meet with a great many Facts
foretold; and those such as do not lie within
the compass of human Knowledge, or Con-
jecture; and that there is sufficient Proof
that the Books were wrote long before the
Facts happened; and we find in History such

CHAP. Facts to be afterwards accomplished or done ;
 VIII. — in these Circumstances one cannot but
 conclude that what is *foretold* must be re-
vealed.

Again: If one can have *Historical Evidence* that certain Facts, above the natural Powers of Man, were performed by the same Persons who *foretold* things to come ; This must be a very strong additional Circumstance, to induce one to believe that such Men had *Revelations* from God.

Thirdly: When one considers the Nature of common Evidence for past Facts, in many Instances it must be allowed to decrease according to the Distance of time from the Facts: But in the particular case of a Series of *Prophecies*, the Evidence constantly *increases*, as Events happen. Prophecies therefore and Events corresponding are a growing Evidence ; and if any Book contains a Series of Prophecies, the Persons who live at a distance from the time when the Revelation was made, must have very great and strong Evidence of its Truth. Those indeed before whom Miracles were immediately work'd, had very strong Evidence of the Revelation: But then such as see the Events foretold, *accomplished*, have likewise so great, that They cannot but acknowledge that in fact there has been such a thing as Revelation ;

tion; and they must see extraordinary Evi-CHAP.
dence even in ordinary Occurrences foretold. VIII.

Lastly: Supposing that the same Persons who are endued with a Spirit of Prophecy, should declare to Mankind certain Propositions, agreeable to Reason, which notwithstanding Reason could not possibly have found out; the Evidence for these must rest upon the Proof which can be given, that the Person was inspired.

As the Accomplishment of Prophecies is to us, at this distance, the *great Evidence* of Revelation, (I would not by this exclude, or be thought to exclude, other Proofs which may be derived from other Authority,) it will be necessary to compare some of those which the Scriptures contain with their Events, that from them the Reader may judge of this Argument. And here I shall only take notice of a few remarkable Instances; and leave the Reader to observe others, as incontestable as those which I shall mention.

But before I argue from Prophecy, it is fit to observe, that by *Prophecy* is here meant, such a Declaration of future Events as may be *understood* by Persons, when the Events shall happen: and that it is not any *natural Phenomenon* that returns regularly, and can be known beforehand by such Men who are skill'd in *natural Knowledge*; nor may it be the effect of human *Conjecture*. This Ac-

CHAP. count of Prophecy is that which I reason
 VIII. upon; because it is very certain that Prop-
 ~~~~~~hecy taken in this sense, and fulfilled, will  
 be allowed to be above the Power of Man; and will, if Facts can be ascertained, produce Assent in all reasonable Beings.

Another previous Remark should be made, which is, that whereas *all* Prophecies recorded in Scripture, which relate to Times *very near the Events*, are conceived by some to be sure Marks of the Books being wrote *after the Events*; and in course that the Prophecy was not a Prophecy, but a true History wrote in a prophetic manner, by one that lived to see what happened, and afterwards wrote his Book.—This Objection is of that sort as to make it necessary to take no notice of many Predictions in the Prophets, but only of such as cannot fall under suspicion of that kind. And if several such Prophecies can be found, we may be secure that there has been strictly and properly a *Revelation*.


To begin with what Isaiah says *ch. vii. 8.* that within *Threescore and five Years* shall *Ephraim be broken, that it be not a People*. This was spoken when *Pekah* the Son of *Re-maliab* went up towards *Jerusalem* to war against it. Now *Jotham* began to reign in the second Year of *Pekah. 2 Kings xv. 32.* and he reigned sixteen Years, *v. 33.* and *Abaz* immediately

mediately succeeded him in the *seventeenth* CHAP. Year of *Pekah*, *ch. xvi. 1.* Compute from his VIII. second Year, the Year when this Prophecy was spoken, *Threescore and five* Years, and you come to the very Year in which *Eſer-baddon* entirely subverted the Kingdom of *Israel*, and planted a Colony of Strangers in *Samaria*. This could not be the Effect of human Conjecture, to fix the *Time* when *Ephraim* should be *broken*; and it is so intelligible that no one can mistake its Meaning; nor is it a Knowledge that could be arrived at by any natural Acquirements, like the Knowledge of Eclipses, or perhaps Earthquakes, and other Phænomena of Nature; nor did *Iſaiab* live to see the Times when this Prophecy was accomplished. *Samaria* indeed was taken by *Salmaneſer* in the ninth Year of *Hofhea*, about thirteen Years after this Prophecy; but then there were left in the Land many of the Children of *Israel*; and there they dwelt. But from the Time of the Prophecy to *Eſerbaddon's* coming to *Samaria*, and transplanting the Remains of the Captivity, and placing Men from *Babylon*, and *Cuthab*, and *Ara*, and *Hamath*, and *Se-pharvaim*, instead of the Children of *Israel*, was exactly *Threescore and five* Years; and then it was strictly true, that *Ephraim* was *broken* as to be *no more a People*.

The

CHAP. The next I shall mention shall be That of  
 VIII. *Babylon*, a City so contrived, and so fortified,  
 as if it were to endure to all Eternity: And yet it is so totally destroyed, just as the Prophets foretold, that the Place where it once stood is scarce, if at all, known. It was called *Great Babylon*. *Dan. iv. 30.* The *Glory of Kingdoms*; the *Beauty of the Chaldees Excellency*. *Ez. xiii. 19.* the *Golden City*. *xiv. 4.* the *Lady of Kingdoms*. *xlvi. 5.* The *Hammer of the whole Earth*. *Jer. L. 23.* Its Largeness, Beauty, Strength; its Number of Inhabitants, its Walls, Towers, Gates; the Manner of its Buildings, its Bridges, Palaces, Temples, I shall not describe: But I shall set down what the Prophets have said, and shew the exact Completions. For the Predictions concerning *Babylon* being several, and some of them even *at this Time* confirming the Truth of the Prophecy; and in several Periods there having happened such Events as were specified by the Prophets; One cannot but infer, that such things could not have been foretold, without a particular *Revelation*. I shall therefore here insert what *Jeremiah* has said concerning *Babylon*, as well as what *Isaiab* said many Years before, because I would comprise in one View what was foretold concerning that famous City.

*Jeremiah* lived in the Days of *Josiah*, and prophesied in the thirteenth Year of his  
 Reign;

Reign ; he prophesied also in the Days of *Je-CHAP.*  
*boiakim* — unto the End of the eleventh VIII.  
 Year of *Zedekiah* the Son of *Josiah*, *i. e.*   
 from the Year of the J. P. 4086 to 4126  
 about forty Years. It was at the Beginning  
 of *Jeremiah's* prophesying, that *Nabopollasur*  
 rebelled against the King of *Assyria*, and made  
 himself King of *Babylon*, and after a Reign  
 of twenty Years was succeeded by his Son  
*Nebuchadnezzar* ; and during this Time too,  
 the Captivity of *Judah*, and of *Jeconiab* hap-  
 pened. Let us now see what *Jeremiah* said  
 about *Babylon*, which was not taken till  
 A. J. P. 4175, *i. e.* forty-nine Years after *Je-*  
*remiah* had ceased to prophecy.

Ch. L. v. 1. *The Word that the Lord spake  
 against Babylon, and against the  
 Land of the Chaldeans by Jeremiah  
 the Prophet.*

- 2 *Declare ye among the Nations,  
 and publish—say Babylon is taken,  
 Bel is confounded, Merodach is  
 broken in pieces, her Idols are  
 confounded, her Images are broken  
 in pieces.*
- 3 *For out of the North there cometh  
 up a Nation against her, which  
 shall make her Land desolate, and  
 none shall dwell therein, they shall  
 remove, they shall depart both  
 Man and Beast.* 9 I

CHAP. Ch. L. v. 9 *I will raise and cause to come up against Babylon an Assembly of great Nations from the North Country, and — from thence she shall be taken,*

VIII.



10 *and Chaldea shall be a Spoil—*

13 *—it shall not be inhabited, but it shall be wholly desolate, every one that goeth by Babylon shall be astonished, and hiss at all her Plagues.*

23 *How is the Hammer of the whole Earth cut asunder and broken? How is Babylon become a Desolation among the Nations.*

24 *I have laid a Snare for thee, and thou art also taken, O Babylon, and thou wast not aware:*

38 *A Draught is upon her Waters, and they shall be dried up:*

39 *it shall no more be inhabited for ever: Neither shall it be dwelt in from Generation to Generation.*

40 *As God overthrew Sodom — shall no Man abide there, neither shall any Son of Man dwell therein.*

41 *Behold a People shall come from the North, a great Nation, and many Kings shall be raised up from the Coasts of the Earth.*

42 *They*



Ch. L. v. 42. *They shall hold the Bow and the Lance —* CHAP. VIII.

Ch. LI. 8 *Babylon is suddenly fallen.*

11 *The Lord hath raised up the Spirit of the Kings of the Medes.*

26 — *Thou shalt be desolate for ever.*

27 *Call together against her the Kingdoms of Ararat, Minni, and Ashchenaz—*

28 *Prepare against her the Nations with the Kings of the Medes.*

31 *One Post shall run to meet another — to shew the King of Babylon that his City is taken at one End.*

36 *I will dry up her Sea, and make her Springs dry.*

39 *In their Heat I will make their Feasts, and I will make them drunken, that they may rejoice and sleep a perpetual Sleep, and not wake —*

41 *How is the Praise of the whole Earth surpris'd? How is Babylon become an Astonishment among all Nations?*

57 *And I will make drunk her Princes, and her wise Men, her Captains and her Rulers, and her mighty Men; and they shall sleep a perpetual Sleep and not wake.—*

The

CHAP. VIII. The Things here foretold against *Babylon*, are, That from the *North* a Nation should come against it; and, in particular, it should be the King of the *Medes*, the Kings of *Ararat*, *Minni*, and *Ashchenaz*: That they should take it when it was *not aware*: That it should be done by *drying up her Sea*, and making her *Springs dry*: That it should be so little apprehensive of its being taken, that *one Post should run to meet another*, to shew the King of *Babylon* that his City was taken at one End: and this should be done in the Midst of *Feasts*, when her *Princes*, and *Rulers*, and *mighty Men* were *drunken*, and *asleep*. All this was foretold about Fifty-seven Years before it happened. I do not take notice here of the Declaration, that it should be desolate *for ever*, and continue so, *no Man shall abide there*, or *dwell therein*, because I shall shew how that was accomplished, when I shall cite the Prophecies of *Esaiah* on this Topick.

1. Then, the King of the *Medes* was to come against *Babylon*: And so he did, and *Cyrus* was his General who having subdued the *Lesser Asia*, and made every thing subject to him quite to the *Euphrates*, at length he resolved to besiege *Babylon*. He

2. Had with him the *Armenians*, the Kingdoms of *Minni*; *Ashchenaz*, i. e. *Bitynians* and *Phrygians*, which *Zenophon* tell us made

up

up Part of Cyrus's Army; And those about CHAP.  
the Gordyæan Mountains which is Ararat. VIII.

3. Cyrus had besieged Babylon two Years, and the Citizens were <sup>a</sup> so secure of the Impossibility of his being able to take it, that they went on in their careless way, in great Revels and Feastings. vide Dan. v. Belshazzer made a great Feast to a thousand of his Lords, and drank Wine before the Thousand. v. 1. In that Night was Belshazzer the King of the Chaldeans slain. v. 30. Herodotus observes, <sup>b</sup> that, “by reason of the vast Greatness of the City, when those who dwelt at the Extremity were taken, those who lived in the Middle of the City did not know that they were taken; but it happening to be a Festival, they were dancing, and in great Jollity, till they came to know what was done.”

4. Babylon was to be surprized, and taken when she was not aware, and caught as in a Snare. Herodotus tells us that so it was. “Had the Babylonians, says he, heard or  
“ ima-

<sup>a</sup> Ἐθαῦτα ἔτοι μὲν λόγον ἔιχον τῆς πολιερκίης ἑδύνα. Herod. l. 1. c. 190.

<sup>b</sup> Ὑπὸ δὲ μεγάλῃ τῆς πόλιος, — τῶν περὶ τὰ ἔξωτα τῆς πόλιος ἑλακώτων, τῆς τὸ μῆσον οἰκίωσις τῶν Βαβυλωνίων, ἢ μινθάνειν ἑλακώτας, ἀλλὰ (τυχεῖν γὰρ σφι ἔῴσαν ἔρτην) χερσεῖν τε τῆτον τὸν χρόνον, ἔ ἐν ἑυπαθείῃσι εἶναι, ἐς ὃ δὴ ἔ τὸ κάρτα ἐπιυλοῖο. Ibid. c. 191.

<sup>c</sup> Ἐι μὲν νῦν προεπύθελο, ἢ ἔμαθον οἱ Βαβυλώνιοι τὸ ἐκ τῆς Κύης ποιούμενον, ἔδ' ἂν περιῶδητες τῆς Πέρσης ἐσελθεῖν ἐς τὴν πόλιν, δι-  
ἑφθίκα

CHAP. “ imagined what *Cyrus* was doing, they  
 VIII. “ would never have carelessly despised the At-  
 tempt of the *Persians* to enter their City,  
 “ but would have totally destroyed them.  
 “ For having shut up all the Gates towards  
 “ the River, and then getting upon the Walls  
 “ that were upon the Banks of the River,  
 “ they had taken them all as it were in a  
 “ Net, or Den. But the *Persians* came un-  
 “ expectedly upon them.”

*Xenophon* has given us the same Account of the Siege and taking of *Babylon*; that it was done, “<sup>d</sup> at a Time when there was a great Feast in *Babylon*, at which the *Babylonians* drank all Night and lived in Jollity.” “<sup>e</sup> We go against them, says *Cyrus*, when many of them are asleep, many are drunk.” “ And the King was slain, in this Attack, and the City taken.”

5. This was to be done, by *drying up her Sea*, and *making her Springs dry*. It is well known that *Cyrus* took *Babylon*, by turning the

ἐφθειραν κείρισα. Κατακλήσαιτες γὰρ ἂν πάσας τὰς ἐς τὸν ποταμὸν πυλίδας ἐχούσας, Ἐ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀίμασιδας ἀναβάντες τὰς περὶ τῆς χεῖρας τῆ πόλεως ἐπιλαμμένας, ἔλαβον ἂν σφίρας ὡς ἐν κύρτη· νῦν δὲ ἐξ ἀπροσδοκίτης σφίρας παρέστησαν οἱ Πέρσαι. Ibid.

<sup>d</sup> Ἐερτην τοιαύτην ἐν Βαβυλῶνι - ἐν ἣ πάντες Βαβυλωνίαι ὄλην τὴν νύκτα πινέσι καὶ κοιμάζουσιν. *Xenoph. Cyrop. l. 7.*

<sup>e</sup> Νῦν ἐπ' αὐτὰς ἰαμεν ἐν ᾧ πολλοὶ μὲν αὐτῶν καθεύδουσιν πολλοὶ δ' αὐτῶν μεθεοσι. Ibid.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, καὶ ἦσαν οἱ τὰς ἀγρὰς ἔχουτες ἐαλωκυῖαν τε τὴν πόλιν καὶ βασιλῆα τεθνήκατο. Ibid.

the Course of the River *Euphrates*. “<sup>a</sup> That CHAP. VIII.  
 “ River run through the Midst of the City, VIII.  
 “ and was constantly so deep as to be unfor-  
 “ dable. It was deeper than the Height of  
 “ any two Men standing upon each other,  
 “ and was above two Stadia [ or a Quarter  
 “ of a Mile ] broad.” By means of a fa-  
 mous Receptacle, and great and deep Ditches  
 and Canals, *Cyrus* so drained this River and  
 turned its Course, that his Men “<sup>b</sup> entered  
 it not above Thigh deep at most, and by  
 that means took the City.

Which way should a Man so remarkably foretel such Circumstances, concerning the taking a City deem'd impregnable by all? But we shall find other Circumstances foretold, which could not proceed from any uncertain Conjecture of Human Mind; but must be derived from a Superior Being, who alone can foresee and declare what shall be the Event of things.

*Isaiab* prophesied in the Days of *Uzziab*, *Jotham*, *Abaz*, and *Hezekiab* Kings of *Judab*. But what he particularly spoke about

<sup>a</sup> Ὁ δὲ ποταμὸς ἕρῃ, ἔσθ' ἀμείνων τῆ πόλει, ρεῖ, πλάτους ἔχων πλείων ἢ ἐπὶ δύο στάδια; καὶ μὴ δὲ, ἔφη ὁ Γοερῖας, καὶ βάθῃ γε ὡς ἂν δύο ἄνδρες ὁ ἕτερος ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἐσηκῶς τῷ ὕδατι ὑπερέχουσιν. Xenop. *ibid*.

<sup>b</sup> Ἐς μείσον μῆρὸν μάλιστα κη. Herod. l. i. c. 191.

CHAP. *Babylon*, and its Destruction was in the Year VIII. that *Abaz* died, *i. e.* in the Year of the Julian Period 3987. about 100 Years before *Jeremiab* began to prophecy, and 188 Years before the taking of *Babylon* by *Cyrus*. In the 13<sup>th</sup>. and 14<sup>th</sup>. Chapters he has these remarkable Particulars.

*Ver. 17.* Behold I will stir up the *Medes* against them,


19 And *Babylon* the Glory of Kingdoms, the Beauty of the *Chaldees* Excellency shall be, as when God overthrew *Sodom* and *Gomorrha*.

20 *It shall never be inhabited, neither shall it be dwelt in from Generation to Generation; neither shall the<sup>c</sup> Arabian pitch his Tent there, neither shall the Shepherds make their Fold there.*

21 *But wild Beasts of the Deserts shall lie there, and their Houses shall be full of doleful Creatures, and the Owls [ or Ostriches ] shall dwell there, and Satyrs shall dance there.*

xiv. 16. *They that see thee shall narrowly look upon thee.*

<sup>c</sup> *Chaldæa* alias vocatur *Nabathæa*: Ejusmodi enim Nominibus ab eis vocatur *Irâck* seu territorium *Babylonicum*. At, dictum est *š-wâd*, quia *Schenitæ Arabes* ibi passim degunt in Tentoriis *Nigris*, ex quibus eorum oppida appaent nigra: Eodem modo quo reliqui Arabes habitabant in קקק קקק tentoriis *Nigredinis*. Hyde Reli. Vet. Perf. p. 43.

22 I will rise up against them, saith CHAP.  
 the Lord of Hosts, and cut off from Baby- VIII.  
 lon the Name and Remnant, and Son and   
 Nephew.

23 I will make it a Possession for the Bit-  
 tern, and Pools of Water: And I will sweep  
 it with the Besom of Destruction.

Here the Prophet mentions the *Medes* com-  
 ing against it; and he adds the Design of  
 God *totally* to destroy it; and, as it were, to  
 sweep it away for ever. *Jeremiah* afterwards  
 repeats the same thing, that it should be *whol-*  
*ly desolate*; that the wild Beasts of the Deserts,  
 with the wild Beasts of the Islands shall dwell  
 there; it shall no more be inhabited for ever,  
 neither shall it be dwelt in from Generation  
 to Generation. As God overthrew Sodom —  
 Shall no Man abide there, neither shall any  
 Son of Man dwell therein.

*Babylon* was the Place that *Cyrus* made the  
 Metropolis of his Empire. His Successors  
 continued to reside there: And when *Alex-*  
*ander* returned from *India* he resolved to make  
 it the Seat of his Empire. Its Situation, the  
 Goodness of the Country, the Fertility of the  
 Plains, the River it was built on, all con-  
 spired to make it fit for such a Scheme. But  
 the Neglect to stop the Canals and Cuts that  
 had been made, and particularly the Flux of

CHAP. Water into the *Pallacopas*,<sup>c</sup> had so affected  
 VIII. the Stream of the *Euphrates*, that it was al-  
 most lost by reason of the great Pools and  
 Lakes it fill'd. *Alexander* therefore resolved  
 to make good the Banks of the River, and  
 to turn all the Water into its old Channel;  
 and by this means to recover a vast Tract  
 that was drown'd; and to make the Ri-  
 ver a Fence to the City itself, as it was when  
*Cyrus* took it. But his Death put an End  
 to this Project, and none of his Successors at-  
 tempted it. The Consequence is, just what  
 the Prophets foretold: All the Country is  
 turned into *Pools of Water*, and is and has been  
 in that Condition for many Hundred Years,  
 so that scarce is it known where *Babylon* stood.  
 The Mud and stagnating Water have so de-  
 stroyed the City and Country, that neither  
*can the Arabian pitch his Tent, nor the Shep-  
 herd make his Fold there.* Could it be con-  
 ceived, that all that Country should be de-  
 stroyed in the Manner it now lies? Or could  
 any Man have *foretold*, what was owing to  
 an accidental Contrivance of *Cyrus* in order  
 to take that City? Or was it conceivable,  
 that a Breach made in the Banks of a River,  
 which once proved so fatal to the City, should  
 not be repaired when it became the Metro-  
 polis of the Empire? Or that when it was

<sup>c</sup> v. Arrianus De Exped. Alexand. l. vii.



attempted to be repaired by *Alexander*, yet still it should never be finished? CHAP. VIII.

The total Ruin of *Babylon*, was certainly owing to several natural Causes. The *Perfians* were the first that began it, by neglecting to repair the Banks of the River: Time would necessarily destroy those Parts that were not kept up in continual Repair: The Neglect of the *Macedonians* helped its Ruin forwards: And afterwards the Building of *Seleucia* and *Ctesiphon* so near it, and the peopling of those new Cities from *Babylon*, was a plain Cause of its Destruction. All but its Walls were gone in *Pausanias's* Time: And *St. Jerom* tells us that in his Time it was turned into a Place to keep *Beasts* in, to hunt. *Borchart* in his *Phaleg*. l. 4. c. 15. has collected several remarkable Passages to this Purpose, whom the Reader may consult.

But this is not the only remarkable thing in this Prophecy. *Isaiab* here says—*Behold I will stir up the Medes against them.* In the Times of this Prophecy of *Isaiab* there was no Kingdom of the *Medes*; but they were the Subjects of the Kings of *Assyria*, and about nineteen Years after this they revolted from *Sennacherib*, and made *Dejoces* their King. The King of *Assyria*, *Tiglath-Pilezer*, or *Arbaces*, whose Seat of Empire was at *Nineveh*, when he came against *Judea*, and *Damascus*, he carried great Numbers of Peo-

CHAP. VIII. ple of each Kingdom back with him, and planted them in *Halath*, and *Habor*, by the River *Gozan*, and in the City of the *Medes*. 2 *Kin.* xvii. 6. Now had not the *Medes* been subject to the King of *Assyria*, he would never have planted his Captives in *their* Cities. Nor did they revolt from *Assyria* till after the Death of *Abaz*; and when they did revolt, they did not immediately set up a King. At length when *Dejoces* came to be King of *Media*, *Isaiab* could not then conjecture that the *Medes* should conquer *Assyria*. So that when *Isaiab* said the *Medes* should be stirred up against *Babylon*, and that it should be overthrown as *Sodom*,—This could not arise from any thing but the Spirit of God. The Prophecy was given many Years before that *Media* revolted from *Assyria*; and it must be many Years before the *Medes* could get settled, and in a Capacity to trouble their Neighbours; and more still to conquer those against whom they had revolted. *Isaiab's* Knowledge therefore of the *Medes* being to be the Conquerors of *Babylon* could arise from him alone, who directs and governs all things, and makes every Instrument subservient to his Will.

This Argument from Prophecy is certainly a very strict and conclusive Evidence of the Truth of *Revelation*; nor can it be subverted, unless it be shewn, either that the Books were

*posterior*

*posterior* to the Times in which they are said CHAP. to be wrote; or that the Original Books have VIII. been *interpolated* and corrupted, and the Explications of Passages inserted where originally they were not. But it should not be taken *for granted*, that the Books are not of the Antiquity they pretend to; Nor should it be concluded from the Prophecies themselves, that they were wrote after the Events, unless some other Evidence could be produced to confirm such Suspicion; or it could be proved that God *cannot* foretel Events, or cannot inspire Men with what is future. There are no other Books of equal *Antiquity* with those of the Prophets; and therefore collateral Evidence of *Isaiab's* and *Jeremiab's*, &c. Age cannot be produced. The internal Characters therefore of their respective Ages must be depended on, unless there were any Circumstances in History, or Critique, that could shew them false. Their containing *Prophecies* is no such Mark of false Dates; because it will appear that some of their Predictions extend to Times, when most certain Evidence may be produced of the prior Existence of the Prophetical Books. *e. g.*

It is said by *Isaiab* and *Jeremiab* too, that *Babylon* shall be made *Pools of Water*; never be inhabited; no Man shall dwell there: It shall be destroyed as *Sodom*, i. e. *wholly desolate*: All this did not happen till long af-

CHAP. ter the Time when we have Evidence that  
 VIII. *Iſaiab's* Prophecies exiſted. We then can be  
 ſecure of the reality of the Prophecy in *Theſe*  
 points; and that alone will ſecure the *Reve-*  
*lation.* But in truth, as I ſaid, there is no  
 ground to ſuſpect the Genuinenefs of the Pro-  
 phets Writings, or the general Time in which  
 they are ſaid to live.

For why is *Iſaiab*, why is *Jeremiah*, or  
 the reſt of the Prophets, ſuppoſed to live la-  
 ter, than the Times fixed by their internal  
 Chronological Marks? The Dates in their  
 Books are ſuch, as are not queſtioned by any  
 various Reading: The Circumſtances of their  
 Books are exactly ſuited to their reſpec-  
 tive Times; and the Hiſtories are conſiſtent:  
 Nor are there any critical Marks of Forgery,  
 or Interpolation in *them*; or any thing that  
 intimates that they were later than they pre-  
 tend to be.

The only Pretence for Suspicion is, their  
 being *Prophets*, or their containing Events  
 which happened *after* their Times. Now if  
 it be apparent, that ſeveral of the Events did  
 in fact happen *after* the Times when we can  
 be aſſured by collateral Evidence that the  
 Books did exiſt, there can be no reaſoning  
 againſt *ſuch* Facts. And when once it appears  
 that there are *ſuch* Predictions, Others that  
 were nearer the Prophets Times, will, in  
 reaſon, be judged to be true Prophecies, and  
 not Events deſcribed after they had happened,  
 and

and only *pretended* to be foretold: And in CHAP. consequence the Prophets must retain their VIII. Credit and Authority, which they have among both Jews and Christians. I shall proceed therefore to consider several Prophecies as they occur, and give the Event to which they relate: And if I mention Two or Three that were very near the Prophets Times, such I mean as he himself might see the Event; I shall do it only to throw some Historical Light upon the Passages, and not to insist on them as Evidences against those I have in view.

One of the Instances I mean, is that which I am about to mention from *Isai. xv, xvi.* The Prophet has given us an Account of the Destruction of *Babylon* by the *Medes*, 188 Years before its first being taken by *Cyrus*, or thereabouts. Immediately follows *ch. xv, xvi.* an Account of the Misery which *Moab* was to undergo: And he concludes his Account with saying, *But now the Lord hath spoken, saying, within three Years, as the Years of an Hireling, and the Glory of Moab shall be condemned, with all that great Multitude, and the Remnant shall be very small and feeble.* The capital Cities of *Moab* were to be laid waste, and all the Country was to be harassed. Let us now examine into the History.

*Abaz* King of *Judab* had been attacked by *Rezin* King of *Damascus*, and *Pekab* King of *Israel*; and in his distress he did by  
great

CHAP. great Presents, and Promise of Obedience,  
 VIII. induce *Tiglath-Pilezer* to come up to his  
 Assistance; and he went up to *Damascus*,  
 and took it, and slew *Rezin*, 2 *Kin.* xvi. 9.  
 About this Time the *Edomites* and *Philistines*  
 had attacked *Judea*, and taken many Places;  
 and *Ahaz* was in Hopes to have recovered  
 these by the Assistance of his Ally the King  
 of *Assyria*. But in this he was deceived:  
*Tiglath-Pilezer* returned into *Assyria*, and car-  
 ried with him many *Israelites*, as well as *Sy-  
 rians*; and transplanted them into *Halab*, and  
*Habor*, and *Hara*, and on the River *Gozan*,  
 and in the City of the *Medes*. *Salmanezar*  
 succeeded *Tiglath-Pilezer*, four Years before  
*Ahaz's* Death, and came up against *Hosheah*  
 King of *Israel*, and made him tributary to  
 him. 2 *Kin.* xvii. 3. But *Hosheah* revolting  
 and joining with *So*, King of *Egypt*, this  
 brought *Salmanezar* again against *Samaria*,  
 who besieged it three Years, and took it in  
 the sixth of *Hezekiah*, which was the ninth of  
*Hosheah*, 2 *Kin.* xviii. 9—10. The Siege of  
*Samaria* was begun then in the third of *He-  
 zekiah*: Now *Isaiab's* Prophecy against *Mo-  
 ab* being the Year that *Ahaz*, *Hezekiah's*  
 Father died, it is plain that within three Years  
 was this Prophecy against *Moab* exactly ac-  
 complished. For *Salmanezar* not coming to  
*Samaria*, till three Years after *Ahaz's* Death,  
 he had just that Interval of three Years to en-  
 large

large his Territories to the East of *Judea*, CHAP. VIII. and to secure himself against all Attacks from that Quarter, whilst he should be at the Siege of *Samaria*. During this Time was *Moab* ravaged; as the Prophet has described it.

A Second Instance of the same Sort is in the next Chapter, *Esa.* xvii. The Prophet there speaks of *Damascus*, as already in Ruins, as it was in *Tiglath-Pilezer's* Time; and the Cities of *Aroer* as forsaken, i. e. all those Places which lay East of *Damascus*, and that had belonged to *Syria*: He then adds, that the Fortrefs of *Ephraim*, i. e. *Samaria*, shall cease; as it did six Years after this Prophecy was given. He goes on to foretel that the *Glory of Jacob*, i. e. *Jerusalem*, shall be made thin, and the Fatness of his Flesh shall wax lean. The *Jetes* shall begin to be distressed, and made very thin, by *Sennacherib's* Invasion of them; and that *Sennacherib* shall lose his Army in the Attempt. *Wo to the Multitude of many People, which make a Noise like the Noise of the Seas, and to the rushing of Nations, that make a Rushing like the Rushing of mighty Waters. The Nations shall rush like the Rushing of many Waters, but God shall rebuke them, and they shall flee afar off, and shall be chased as the Chaff of the Mountains before the Wind — And behold at Evening-tide Trouble, and before the Morning he is not.* v. 12, 13, 14. The Flight of  
Senna-

CHAP. *Sennacherib*, and the Destruction of his Army in *One Night*, by a *Blast*, is here particularly foretold, v. *Esa.* xxxvii. 36. 2 *Kin.* xix. 25. *Eighteen Years* before it happened.

The three next Chapters contain a Prophecy of the Disturbances of *Egypt*, some of which did not happen till a *dozen*, or *fourteen*, Years after *Hezekiab's* Death; others indeed sooner in consequence of *Sennacherib's* invading it; and others still after the Restoration of the Monarchy to *Egypt*, when there had been *fifteen* Years civil Wars, and *Psammeticus* had seized the whole; and some relate to what passed after the Siege of *Azotus*, many Years after the Prophecy. The Prophecy was given at the beginning of *Sennacherib's* Reign, when *Tartan*, his General, took *Azotus*, or some time before it: v. c. xx. 1. This therefore was in the A. P. J. 4001; and in this Prophecy mention is made of the *Triple Alliance* betwixt *Egypt*, *Assyria*, and *Judæa*. Now this was not made till after *Psammeticus* King of *Egypt* had taken *Azotus*, which held out against a Siege of *Twenty-nine* Years. Suppose the League then made as soon as *Azotus* was taken, then this Prophecy was *Eighty-six* Years before the Event. But if to this we add the Time that was spent after that Siege, before the Treaty was made;



made; this will extend the Prophecy so CHAP. much the longer. It begins at *ch. xviii.* thus. VIII.

*Woe to the land shadowing with Wings, which is beyond the rivers of Ethiopia.* The true Translation is, *Woe to the land of edged Timbrels, which is beyond the rivers of Arabia Chusea.* What is here rendered *Timbrel*, is the *Sistrum*, a peculiar instrument of the Priests of *Ijis*, nothing like the *Cymbal*, or any Species of it: And that *Chus* signifies *Arabia*, see *Bochart's Phal.* l. 4. c. 2. But it is not my design to comment on the Words by which *Egypt* is here described. God says *c. xix. 2. 3,* *I will set the Egyptians against the Egyptians; and they shall fight every one against his Brother, and every one against his neighbour, city against city, and kingdom against kingdom: And the spirit of Egypt shall fail in the midst thereof; and I will destroy the council thereof — And the Egyptians will I give over into the hand of a cruel Lord, and a fierce King shall rule over them—*

Could there be a clearer description of the time, in which there was two years Anarchy; and then twelve Persons seized the Kingdom of *Egypt*, and divided it among themselves; afterwards *Psammeticus*, by the Help of the *Greeks* which landed in *Egypt*, drove out the eleven Kings, and remained sole King of *Egypt*? He was no sooner settled, but he engaged in a long War against the *Assyrians*,  
and

CHAP. and spent no less than twenty-nine Years, as  
 VIII. I said, in the Siege of *Azotus*, and during this  
 Blockade, he invaded, and continued many  
 Years in *Palestine*. And then it was, *that*  
*the land of Judah was a terror to Egypt,*  
*v. 17,* it stopped the Progress of *Psammeticus*.  
*Psammeticus* reigned no less than fifty-four  
 Years, and after the Siege of *Azotus* he  
 reigned in peace; and therefore then was  
 made the *Triple Alliance* between *Egypt,*  
*Assyria,* and *Judah,* by which the *Jews* had  
 free possession of their Religion in five Cities  
 of *Egypt,* and Commerce went on easily  
 betwixt *Assyria* and *Egypt,* as you have it,  
*ch. xix. 18, &c.*

I pass over the next two Chapters, that I  
 may speak of the Burden of *Tyre,* mention-  
 ed *Isa. xxiii.* This was all accomplished in  
 the Days of *Nebuchadnezzar,* and conse-  
 quently the Prophecy was an hundred and  
 twenty-five Years before the Event at least.  
 For supposing this spoken in the Year that  
*Hezekiah* died, from that to the taking *Tyre*  
 was no less than an hundred and twenty-  
 five Years. It foretels the Destruction of  
*Tyre, ch. xxiii.* and that it *should be forgot-*  
*ten seventy Years, according to the days of one*  
*king; after the end of seventy Years shall Tyre*  
*sing as an harlot. And it shall come to pass*  
*after the end of seventy Years, that the Lord*  
*shall visit Tyre, and she shall turn to her hire,*  
 and

and shall commit fornication with all the kingdoms of the world upon the face of the earth. CHAP. VIII.  
 And her merchandize and her hire shall be holiness to the Lord, it shall not be treasured nor laid up; for her merchandize shall be for them that dwell before the Lord, to eat sufficiently, and for durable cloathing, v. 15—18.

Two things are here very remarkable: That after Tyre was taken, it should lie in a desolate state for seventy Years: and then that she should return to her Merchandize, and trade far and near, and all should be as secure and safe as if under the immediate protection of God, and sacred to him; and that there should be no need of hiding and covering it, but they should have a strong Covering from God. What was *Holiness unto the Lord*, or holy to him, was not to be touched or wasted; or if any one presumed to meddle with such things *evil came upon them*. v. Jer. ii. 3. Hence the Prophet declares that the Merchandize of Tyre should be so secured, that if any one presumed to hurt them, God would send *evil upon them*; as certainly as he did upon those who dared to take to themselves what was consecrated to him. There should be no Occasion or Necessity for laying up in Store; because to the Inhabitants their Trade and Goods should be as before, or [in the Presence of] the Lord, that they might eat to Fulness, and have a lasting Covering.

Now

CHAP. Now Tyre was never taken by *Salmanezar*, nor indeed by any body before *Nebuchadnezzar*, and then it lay desolate seventy Years; and then was restored by *Darius Hystaspes* in the nineteenth Year of his Reign, who allowed them to have a King of their own, and accordingly they had so to the Time of Alexander. See this in *Dr. Prideaux, Part I. Book IV.* They continued from this time in a very flourishing Condition till they bore that remarkable Siege, which all the Writers of *Alexander's* History give so full an Account of, *i. e.* they flourished an hundred and seventy Years.

The Acts of Tyre were to be quite unmentioned for Seventy Years together, just as if they were the Days of one ignominious King that did nothing memorable: And so they were; of no Note, of no Consequence, or Moment in the World, that we hear of; nor do we know of more than the bare Names of six or seven of their *Suffetes* or Judges, from *Nebuchadnezzar's* Days to those of *Cyrus*. In *Cambyſes's* Reign, when he would have invaded the *Carthaginians*, he made use of a *Phœnician* Navy; and they refusing to wage War with the *Carthaginians*, whom they looked upon as their Descendants, that Design was laid aside. *Vid. Herod. l. 3. c. 17—19.* If by the *Phœnicians* we are to understand the *Tyrians*, it is plain they had submitted to  
the

the *Persians*, and were then their Subjects, CHAP. VIII.  
*ibid.* But then at the End of that Time, at which *Tyre* was to recover, she did, in fact, begin to rejoice; and to entice all Traders to her, just as if she had been an Harlot, and had enticed Men to her Embraces: And her Traffick and Gain were as if no one was to touch them; nor do they seem to have stood in fear of any of their neighbouring Kings or States, till *Alexander* at length subdued them. There were in *Tyre* two Temples of *Hercules*, one of them very rich; which shews how *Tyre* committed Fornication with the Kingdoms of the World. *Vid. Herod. l. ii. c. 44.*

In the following Chapters is a long Description of the Destruction of *Jerusalem*, and of all *Judea* under *Nebuchadnezzar*, which I shall pass over: But I must not omit what is said of *Cyrus* cc. xlv, xlv, 1, 2. *Thus saith the Lord to his Anointed, to Cyrus, whose right Hand I have bolden, to subdue Nations before him; and I will loose the Loins of Kings to open before him the two-leav'd Gates — I will break in Pieces the Gates of Brass — I will give thee the Treasures of Darkness, and hidden Riches, of Secret Places:*

This was nigh two Hundred Years before the Times of *Cyrus*: And it is remarkable, that *Cyrus* first subdued *Cressus*, and the *Ionians*, and many Nations, before he attempted *Babylon*, whose Gates were Brass, χαλ-

CHAP. κόπουλον, as *Abydenus* calls it in *Eusebius*, *Præ-*  
 VIII. *par. Evang.* l. 9. c. 49, where he found  
 immense Riches. *Pliny* says, *Cyrus devicta*  
*Asia pondo 34 Millia invenerat præter vasa-*  
*aurea, aurumque factum, & in eo folia ac pla-*  
*tanum, vitemque. Qua victoria argenti 500*  
*Millia talentorum reportavit, & craterem Se-*  
*miramidis, cujus pondus 15 talenta colligebat.*  
 l. 33. c. 3.

To suggest here any Interpolation, is *ist.*  
 gratis said, since there is no various reading,  
 that has ever been observed, or taken Notice  
 of. 2. The whole Passage is exactly wrote in  
 the Style of *Isaiab.* And, lastly, An Interpo-  
 lation is only suggested *because* it is clear *Pro-*  
*phesy*: As if it were impossible for God really  
 to *foretel*, or discover a Futurity. To this

I shall add that remarkable Prophecy con-  
 cerning the Messiah, above seven Hundred  
 Years before the Times of Christ, contained  
 in *cb. lii, liii.* to which our Saviour so exactly  
 agreed. The Description of his Person and  
 Circumstances is so well known, that I shall  
 only take notice of one Inaccuracy in the  
 Translations which has confounded our In-  
 terpreters, as well as it has destroyed the  
 Sense of the Prophet: It is *v. 9.* *And he*  
*made his grave with the wicked, and with*  
*the rich in his death, because he had done no*  
*violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth.*  
 This is a strange reason for making *bis grave*  
*with*

with the wicked, because *he did no violence* : CHAP. VIII.  
 and of our Saviour it was not true, that he made his grave with the wicked, and was with the *rich* in his *death*. On the contrary, he made his *grave* with the *rich*, and was with the *wicked* in his *death*. Interpret the Prophet rightly, and his Words are literally, *He will repay the wicked his death, and the rich his grave*. Great and powerful, as *Pilate* and the Chief Priests and *Pharisees* were, and though they put him to death, yet he would be able to *avenge* it upon them, and would do it, because *he did no violence*, &c.

The Call of the Gentiles, and the present State of the Jews, and their future conversion and return, are very emphatically described; but as this part of *Ishaiab* contains Prophecy in many points not yet fulfilled, it is not to my purpose to mention such particulars.

I proceed next to the Prophecies of *Jeremiah*, who prophesied from the Year of the J. P. 4086, to 4126, that is about forty Years. I have already mentioned his Prophecy about the Destruction of *Babylon*, near *threescore* Years before it happened. He begins his Prophecy in the thirteenth Year of *Josiah's* Reign, that is about twenty-two Years before *Jerusalem* was taken by *Nebuchadnezzar*; and all along he threatens great Mischiefs from the *North* against all the Inhabitants of the Land of *Judea*, *ch. i. 13,*

CHAP. 14, 15. iv. 6. vi. 1—22. and against *Jeru-*  
 VIII. *salem* in particular, iv. 10—14. c. vi. And  
 still he premises, c. v. 18. iv. 27. not to  
*make a full end*, or that they shall not be quite  
 destroyed, as other Nations were, who were  
 carried into Captivity. In the Particulars that  
 I shall cite, I shall confine myself to such  
 Prophecies as cannot be pretended to be wrote  
*after* the Facts, that I may obviate the Pre-  
 tense, that His was a “ Theological or Poeti-  
 “ cal Method of conveying Religion to Man-  
 “ kind.” Nor can it be said, that since  
*Jeremiah* lived to see the things fulfilled  
 which he prophesied about *Nebuchadnezzar’s*  
 coming against *Judah* and *Jerusalem*, he  
 might *pretend* to write Prophecies, that the  
*Jews* should be a *conquered* Nation by the  
*Assyrian*, and carried Captives from their own  
 Land. Admitting this, yet it was not in his  
 Power to guess that they should continue a  
*separate, distinct* People, and never be swal-  
 lowed up, or absorbed, or not confounded,  
 as all other conquered Nations were by their  
 Conquerors.

It is granted, and it cannot be denied, that  
 in the prophetic Books there are “ several  
 “ Prophecies contained, that are very parti-  
 “ cular as to Times, Persons and Places about  
 “ Matters done before, and a small time af-  
 “ the Captivity.” But then it is suggested,  
 “ that there is not a Passage in all these pro-  
 “ phetical



“ phetical Books that has any reference to, CHAP.  
 “ or concerns any distant State of the *Jews*, VIII.  
 “ after the Times these Prophecies may just-  
 “ ly be supposed to have been written.”

I have mentioned the Prophecy about the Destruction of *Babylon*, which was to be as *Sodom* and *Gomorrah*, destroyed for ever. Has it not lain destroyed long enough to shew the completion of the Prophecy? And is its place to be found? Again, the *Jews* were to be made Captives by the *Assyrians*: But yet *their End was not to be*: And whether the Prophecies of the Prophets extend to no distant times of that People from the times of the Prophets, will be further seen as we proceed.

In the xxiiiid chapter is foretold a *Restoration* of the *Jews* from the *Assyrian* Captivity, and this in such a manner, that they shall no more say, *The Lord liveth which brought up the Children of Israel out of the land of Egypt; But the Lord liveth which brought up, and which led the seed of Israel out of the North Country—and they shall dwell in their own land*, v. 7, 8. Again, c. xxiv. After that, *Nebuchadnezzar* had carried away captive *Jeconia*, the Son of *Jeboiakim*—tis said, *I will set mine Eyes upon them for good, and I will bring them again to this land, and I will build them, and not pull them down; I will plant them, and not pluck them up.*

CHAP. will give them an heart to know me, that I  
 VIII. am the Lord, and they shall be my People, and  
 I will be their God. The Prophecy is, that  
*Judab* shall be made captive to the King of  
*Babylon*; but then there should certainly be  
 a *Restoration* of the *Jews* to their own Land;  
 and *Jerusalem* should be rebuilt, and they  
 should have a heart to know God.

*Jeremiah* knew the Proclivity of the People of *Judea* to all sorts of Idolatry; nor could they be kept by the frequent Messages, or Denunciations of the Prophets, from falling into the worship of strange Gods. But here is a Prediction, not only of a return to their own Country, but of their continuance in the Worship of the *One God*, They were to have a Heart to know that *I am the Lord, and they shall be my People, and I will be their God: for they shall return unto me with their whole heart, v. 7.* Had any Captivity produced this Effect before the Prophet's Days? Or how could he conjecture that this Captivity would have a different Effect from all that preceded? *Nebuchadnezzar* and the *Babylonians* were all *Idolaters*, and had a multitude of Gods and Images amongst them: Could *Jeremiah* guess that the *Israelites* would return from thence untainted by the false worship of their Conquerors; and for the future be cured of that Evil, which they

they could not be kept ever free from in their own Land? CHAP. VIII.

But in *c. xxv.* there is something more particular: There is a Prediction, that the *Jews* should be Captives to the *Chaldeans* just *seventy* Years; [*vid. c. xxix. 10.*] and then, that the King of *Babylon* was to be punished, and the Land of the *Chaldeans* was to be made *perpetual desolations*. The fourth Year of *Jeboiakim* was the first Year of *Nebuchadnezzar*, King of *Babylon*: Count from thence to the *first* Year of *Cyrus*, and it is exactly *seventy years*; and then were the *Jews* restored, and the *Chaldeans* became *Subjects* to the *Persians*, and never made any more a figure in History. *Nebuchadnezzar's* Kingdom was to last to *Him*, his *Son*, and his *Sons's Son*, *ch. xxvii.* and then *many Nations* were to serve themselves of *him*; and then were the *Vessels of the Lord's House* to be restored to *Jerusalem* again, *v. 22.* even those which were carried up to *Babylon*. *Cyrus's* Decree to restore these things is mentioned very particularly, *Exra vi. 5.* as made in the *first* Year of his Reign; and this Record was found in the House where the Records were kept in *Darius's* time. *Ibid. v. 1.* *Jeremiab* died long enough before *Cyrus's* Days, and no Mark, or critical Circumstance is found, either in his Language, or any how else, to give ground for Suspicion that his

CHAP.

VIII.



Book was wrote after the Captivity was over ; or that he lived to see the Events, and wrote after they happened, so as to represent himself prophesying what he saw come to pass. Could *Jeremiab* conjecture that there should be a *seventy* Years Captivity, neither more nor less ? Could he say, that the *Jews* should return, and not unite with the *Chaldeans*, or not be *absorb'd*, as the *Ten Tribes* were ? Could he say, that there should be a *Restoration* to the *Jews*, whilst the other Nations which *Nebuchadnezzar* conquered, should be quite swallowed up ? How could he guess that the *Chaldeans themselves* were to be made *perpetual Desolations* ? He says, *c. xxv. 12.* *It shall come to pass, when seventy Years are accomplished, that I will punish the King of Babylon, and That Nation for their Iniquity, and the Land of the Chaldeans, and will make it perpetual Desolations.* It was then conquered by *Cyrus* ; and the *Chaldeans*, as a *Nation*, were destroyed, and they swallowed up by the *Medes* and *Persians*, and absorb'd in them. The *Jews* never were at that time, no, nor at any time since, ever thus absorb'd by their Conquerors as all other Nations have been, and even the *Ten Tribes* themselves have been, to whom a promise of return was never made. Was this written after the Event ?

The Prophet is so full of the *return* of the CHAP. *Jews*, that he repeats it very often, *cb. xxx, VIII.* *xxx, xxxi, xxxiii.* almost as often as he mentions the certain Destruction of *Jerusalem*. Now say, that *Jeremiah* outliv'd the taking *Jerusalem*, and that he might *pretend* to *prophesy* of That, after he saw the Event; yet the other Points could not be so described: He did not live to see the Event of *Babylon* itself; nor the *return* of the *Jews*, which happen'd after *Cyrus* had taken *Babylon*; nor the destruction of the *Chaldeans*: and consequently these are Events not near the times of the Prophet himself.

One thing is remarkable in *Jeremiah*, *c. xxxiii.* That after the return of the *Jews*, God promises that he will perform that good Thing which he had promised to the House of *Israel*, and to the House of *Judah*. *In those days, and at that time, will I cause the Branch of Righteousness to grow up unto David, and he shall execute Judgment and Righteousness in the land. In those days, c. xxxi.* a New Covenant was to be made with the House of *Israel* and House of *Judah*, not according to the Covenant that I made with their Fathers in the day that I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of *Egypt*. We find a New Covenant offered them by *Christ*, which consisted in the Terms mentioned by the Prophet; *vid. Heb. viii.* and which

CHAP. which could not be a matter of human Con-  
 VIII. jecture, nor made upon any probable guess  
 whatever.

However, a Difficulty may be started in relation to *Jeremiab's* Prophecy, that here he foretels a Covenant to be made with the *House of Israel*, as well as with the *House of Judab*. Does not this imply the *Return* of the *House of Israel* to their Land, as well and as much as it does the *Return* of the *House of Judab*? And yet it is well known that the *Ten Tribes* are lost, and *never did return* to their Land; and in consequence the Prophet prophesied *falsly*.

But the Answer is plain; Many out of the *Ten Tribes* returned with the *House of Judab*, and became incorporated with them, as much as the Tribe of *Benjamin* was; e. g. those of *Bethel* and *Ai*, and *Senaab*, were of the Tribe of *Ephraim*; the Children of *Nebo* belonged to the Tribe of *Reuben*. So that the plain Fact was, Some of all the Tribes returned with their Brethren of *Judab* and *Benjamin*; and became one civil State with them. And therefore the Prophet speaking of the *New Covenant* which was to be made with *all* the *Jews* that would accept it, by means of the descendant from *David*; mentions the *House of Israel*, as well as that of *David*; thereby intending that the *Covenant* was not peculiar to the *House of Judab*, or  
 to

to the *Two Tribes* that had continued firm to *David*, but to *all* that would engage in it, be they of what Tribe soever they were. CHAP. VIII.

We must not imagine, that the Covenant here spoken of, was something promised to the *Jews* only in their own Land, in their political Capacity; for then no doubt the House of *Ephraim*, or *Israel*, must have returned and have been re-established, as they were before the Captivity, in a direct Polity or Form of Government, in order to be admitted to it. But it having nothing to do with them in their national Capacity, the House of *Israel*, *i. e.* all of the Ten Tribes, wherever dispersed, were capable of all the Advantages of it. And accordingly it was laid before *them*, wherever they were, as well as before the House of *Judab*; which ought not to have been, had the Prophet not mentioned *Israel* at all. Because many of them were to return, and to be incorporated with the House of *Judab*, and were to come under the one Name of *Jews* for the future, the Prophet justly spoke of the House of *Israel* as well as of *Judab* in his Prophecy of this Covenant. *Hosea* represents this, by the Children of *Judab* and *Israel's* appointing themselves one head; c. i. 11.

Proceed we next to *Ezekiel*, who began to prophesy in the fifth Year of the Captivity, being transported to *Babylon* under *Jehoiakin*.

CHAP. *hoiakin*. In the xith chapter he prophesied  
 VIII. of the *Return* of the People from their Cap-  
 tivity, and declared, that God would *gather*  
 them from the people, and assemble them out of  
 the Countries, where they had been scattered,  
 and they were to have the land of *Israel*. And  
 they shall come thither, and they shall take a-  
 way all the detestable things thereof, and all  
 the abominations thereof from thence. And  
 so indeed they did; for after their return  
 from the *Babylonish* Captivity, and their be-  
 ing planted in the Land of *Israel*, they never  
 were guilty of *Idolatry*; nor had they their  
*detestable things* and *abominations*, which  
 their preceding History is so full of. Other  
 Captivities in former times did not cure this  
 Evil; the *Babylonish* effectually took it away,  
 just as *Ezekiel* here described it. 'Tis need-  
 less to observe, that, by *detestable things*, and  
*abominations*, (*תועבת* and *שקוצ*) are meant  
*Idols*: it is the common manner of Ex-  
 pression for such things. *Vid.* ch. vii. 20.  
 xvi. 36. xxxvii. 23.

The Method I propose hinders me from  
 taking notice of many things that are said  
 concerning *Tyre*, and its Destruction by  
*Nebuchadnezzar* King of *Babylon*; yet one  
 cannot but observe the Condition which it  
 lies in at this day. Not only the *Tyre* which  
 stood on the Land, but the *New Tyre* built  
 on the Island, which *Alexander* took, are



strictly what the Prophet said, *like the top of a Rock, a place to spread nets on*, CHAP. VIII. ch. xxvi.

14. Of the former it was said, *Thou shalt be built no more, for I the Lord have spoken it. ibid.* And *Thou shalt never be seen again*, v. 21, and accordingly it never has been rebuilt: And as to the *New Tyre*, it is in such a Condition that “there is not so much as one entire House left. Its present Inhabitants are only a few poor Wretches, harbouring themselves in the Vaults, and subsisting chiefly upon fishing, who seem to be preserved in this Place by Divine Providence as a visible Argument, how God has fulfilled his Word concerning *Tyre*; viz. That it should be as the Top of a Rock, a Place for Fishers to dry their Nets on.” *Vid. Maundrel’s Travels, p. 49.*

Then follow certain Predictions concerning *Egypt*, which, as they relate to *Nebuchadnezzar’s* Destruction of it, no more must be observ’d by me in them than what was impossible for the Prophet to conjecture. It was foretold then, that *Egypt* should be desolate forty Years: *At the end of forty Years will I gather the Egyptians from the people whither they were scattered—Egypt then was to be a base kingdom, it shall be the basest of the kingdoms, neither shall it exalt it self any more above the nations — it shall be no more the confidence of the house of Israel; ch. xxix.*

CHAP. 12, 14, 15, 16. It is said, *c. xxx. 13.* upon VIII. *Nebuchadnezzar's Invasion* of it, *There shall be no more a Prince of the land of Egypt.* Pharaoh Hophra was King of Egypt, or as Herodotus calls him, *Apries*, whom the King of Babylon invaded; and *Amasis* was by him confirm'd in the Kingdom. And from this Time Egypt has been a *low* or *base kingdom*, reduced to a calamitous State, from which it recovered a good deal in *Amasis's* Reign; but just at the end of that and beginning of the next Reign it was conquered by the *Persians*, and has ever since been governed by *Foreigners*; subjected first by the *Persians*; then by the *Macedonians*; then the *Romans*, *Saracens*, *Mamalukes*, and lastly by the *Turks*, which possess it at this Day.

In *c. xxxvi, xxxvii*, we meet with express Prophecy of the *return* of the *Jews* to their own Land, and under the Types of *dry bones* their being replaced in their own Country. And then there is a particular Account that they shall *not* be divided into *Two Kingdoms* as they were before their Captivity; *They shall be no more Two Nations, neither shall they defile themselves any more with Idols*—All which the Event shews to be literally accomplished.

'Tis added, *v. 24, 25.* *David my servant shall be king over them, and they shall all have one shepherd; they shall also walk in my judg-*

judgments, and observe my statutes and do CHAP.  
 them. And they shall dwell in the land that VIII.  
 I have given unto Jacob my servant, wherein  
 your fathers have dwelt, and they shall dwell  
 therein, even they and their children, and their  
 childrens children for ever, and my servant  
 David shall be their Prince for ever.

I will add to this what *Jeremiah* says,  
 c. xxiii. 5, 6. *Behold the days come, saith the  
 Lord, that I will raise unto David a righ-  
 teous Branch, and a King shall reign and  
 prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice  
 in the earth. In his days Judah shall be saved,  
 and Israel shall dwell safely, and this is his  
 name whereby he shall be called.* Again,  
*Jer. xxx. 9. But they shall serve the Lord  
 their God, and David their King whom I will  
 raise up unto them.* *Ezek.* has it, c. xxxiv. 24.  
*I will set up one Shepherd over them, and he  
 shall feed them, even my servant David, he  
 shall feed them, and he shall be their shepberd,  
 and I the Lord will be their God, and my ser-  
 vant David a Prince among them.* Not till  
 all shall be accomplished which is said in the  
 same Prophecies, can these and such-like be  
 urged against the Persons I have now in view.  
 Some Part is accomplished : Others Parts are  
 unfulfilled ; and most continue till the return  
 of the *Jews*. But Christians can see a Foun-  
 dation laid ; the Person intended by *David*  
 come ; and consistently can explain these Pro-  
 phecies ;

CHAP. phacies ; tho' I am to insist on them no fur-  
 VIII. ther than what is clearly foretold, and could  
 ~~~~~ not be wrote after the Event. To know fu-  
 ture Events, and to be able to *foretel* them, is
 not, cannot be the Effect of Study, or peculiar
 Temperature of Body ; it cannot be taught in
 Schools, since it depends upon an infinity of
 free contingent Actions, which He alone who
 governs all things can direct or foresee. If
 therefore Events have been *foreseen* and *fore-*
told, at such distance of time, as excludes the
 Knowledge of human Minds, and the Powers
 of their Conjectures, it must be owing to
 divine Influence, and to that alone.

The *Rabbinical* Notions of Prophets seem
 not at all consistent with Truth ; nor can any
 thing be more extravagant than to fancy that
 the *Schools of the Prophets* were places, where
 Persons “ devoted themselves to the study
 “ and attainment of *Prophecy*.” It has been
 imagined by some, that the Study and Em-
 ployment “ of the *Sons* of the Prophets,
i. e. of their *Disciples*, was, to be “ instructed
 “ in the whole *Mystery of Prophecy* ; *i. e.*
 “ not as it signifies the bare foretelling of fu-
 “ ture Events, but in the largest and fullest
 “ Signification of the Word, as it implies the
 “ *uttering* or speaking something by a *divine*
 “ *Impulse or Inspiration*, *whatever time it*
 “ *may respect*, *whither past, present, or to*
 “ *come*.” This is making Prophecy “ a
 “ Science,

“ *Science*, and that Men were *train’d up* to
 “ it by *Management* and *Art*.” And that
 “ by their preceding Preparation, Exercise,
 “ and Discipline, Men were render’d more
 “ *susceptible* of the *Divine Impulse*, by know-
 “ ing, as it were, how to cherish and en-
 “ courage it ; and, in short, by their *concur-*
 “ *rence*, to *assist the Revelation*.” Strange
 Notions ! and what could be expected from
 none but Infidels.

This treating Prophecy as a *Science*, at-
 tainable by *Study*, *Management*, and *Art*, and
 taught in the Schools of the Prophets, is not
 by any means agreeable to Fact. When we
 hear of the Schools of the Prophets in the
 Days of *Samuel*, we do not find that they
 were to teach Men to be Prophets ; nor was
 it *Study* that made or could make Men *Pro-*
phets, but the mere Will and Design of God,
 who called Men, and inspired them as he
 saw fit. He had no regard in this to any
 Temperament of Body ; no, nor always even
 to Virtue and Purity of Heart, or Goodness
 of Manners or Morals : No regard was paid
 to Age, Study, Profession ; but as He in his
 Wisdom thought proper, at Seasons when He
 thought best, he called Men to this Office,
 and inspired them with his Will. What Ca-
 pacity, or Dispositions in Mens Minds is
 there, whereby they can know future Con-
 tingencies ? Will all the *Study* or Applica-

CHAP. tion imaginable lead Men into any Know-
VIII. ledge of what is particularly to happen many

~ Ages hence! The *Rabbins* indeed tell us, that *Prophecy* ^a is an Influence from God upon the rational Faculty first, afterwards upon the Faculty of Imagination. They say, “ that ^b no Perfection of speculative “ Sciences, no Goodness of Morals, though “ they are ever so great in any Man, can “ bring him to *Prophecy*, unless he has the “ utmost Perfection of Imagination conjoin- “ ed, from the very instant of his Birth.” Vid. *Maimon. More Nevoc.* l. 2. c. 36. They tell us too, that “ ^c *Prophecy* does not dwell “ where there is great *Grief*, or *Anxiety*, and “ *Concern.*” *Ibid.* But all this is mere Prejudice; since in fact we find inspired Persons, whose *Imagination* is not so perfect, and who have been not so perfect as they should have been. It depends not on the Man, nor on his Faculties, to be acquainted with *Futurity*; but on the *Divine Inspiration*: And if the

^a Veritas & Quidditas Prophetiæ nihil aliud est quam influentia à Deo Opt-Maximo, mediante intellectu agente, super facultatem rationalem primo, deinde super facultatem imaginatricem influens. *Maim. More Nevoch* l. 2. c. xxxvi.

^b Neque etiam ad eam per Scientiarum Theoreticarum perfectionem, aut qualitatum sive morum bonitatem & præstantiam, licet illa in summo gradu alicui infint, perveniri potest, nisi simul conjuncta sit summa facultatis Imaginatricis, inde ad ipsa hora nativitatis, perfectio. *Ibid.*


^c Prophetia non habitat neque inter Tristitia neque inter Pigrinitiam. *Ibid.* p. 295.

Divine Influence be sufficient in itself, and CHAP. the Man be nothing; if neither Goodness VIII. of Morals, nor Goodness of Temperament, nor Study, be essential to such Knowledge; but Divine Inspiration does the whole, it only tends to embarrass, not to explain the Question, to introduce into it such idle Conjectures or Fancies. Would not the Rules of the *Art of Prophecy* have been some how or other continued, if Study could have found out this Knowledge, which all Men are so fond of? Would it have been lost, whilst all are so desirous of knowing what is in the Books of Fate?


It is not necessary here to explain what is meant by the *Schools of the Prophets*; nor to treat of *Inspiration* as made to the several Prophets. It is enough to observe, that the Divine Wisdom made use of such Instruments as best were suited to obtain his Purposes: And it is enough for us to know the *Facts*, though the Reasons may be, to us, in the utmost Obscurity; and to talk of “our Concurrence to assist the Revelation”, and “Man’s being train’d up to it by Management and Art”, is to represent it in a light, that never will be of service to Revelation. But, to return from this Digression to the Point in hand.

The Prophet *Daniel prospered in the Reign of Darius, and in the Reign of Cyrus the Persian,*

CHAP. sian, *Dan. vi. 28. i. e.* between five and six
VIII. hundred Years before Christ. In interpreting

 *Nebuchadnezzar's Dream*, he foretold the Succession of the *Persian, Grecian, and Roman Empires*, and the very remarkable Division of the last into *Ten Kingdoms*; and that *in the days of these kings shall the God of Heaven set up a kingdom which shall never be destroyed; and the kingdom shall not be left to other people; but it shall break in pieces, and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand forever. Forasmuch as thou sawest, that the Stone was cut out of the Mountain without Hands, and that it brake in pieces the iron, the brass, the clay, the silver, the gold, the great God hath made known to the King what shall come to pass hereafter, Dan. ii. 39—45.*

What in the second Chapter is represented under the Notion of an *Image* whose Head was Gold, whose Breast and Arms were Silver, his Belly and Thighs Brass, and his Legs Iron, and his Feet part Iron and part Clay; [*i. e.* the Kingdom over which *Nebuchadnezzar* ruled, was the Gold; the *second* Kingdom, which immediately succeeded, was represented by *Silver*; the third by *Brass*; and the fourth Kingdom was to be strong as *Iron*:] These four Kingdoms are represented again, *c. vii.* under the Image of *four great Beasts*: The first was a *Lion* that had *Eagles Wings*; the second was like a *Bear* that had three
Ribs

Ribs in the Mouth of it ; the third was like CHAP.
 a *Leopard* that had upon its Back four Wings VIII.
 of a Fowl, and the Beast had four Heads ; 
 The fourth Beast was dreadful and terrible,
 and exceeding strong, and it had great Iron
 Teeth, and it had *ten Horns* ; and there came
 up among the ten Horns another little Horn,
 before whom there were three of the first horns
 plucked up by the roots : And behold in this
 horn were eyes like the eyes of man, and a
 mouth speaking great things. In this Prophecy
 are several Particulars of the former explain-
 ed, which sufficiently clear up the Prophet's
 Meaning.

The Lion with Eagles Wings, is the King-
 dom of *Babylon and Media*. The Bear that
 had three Ribbs, is the Kingdom of *Persia*,
 which overcame the *Babylonians* ; and the
 three Ribbs in its Mouth are *Sardes, Egypt*
 and *Babylon*. The third Kingdom was that
 of *Greece*, which had *four* Heads or King-
 doms, and soon made its Progress in the
 World : And it is well known how the
Grecian Empire was divided into *four* Mo-
 narchies. The fourth Beast was the *Roman*,
 which stamped the residue with his Feet :
 and as the *ten Toes* of the *Image* implied ten
 Kingdoms, into which the Feet of that were
 divided, so in the present Representation here
 were *ten Horns*, which are *ten Kingdoms*.
 Then is added what was to happen amongst

CHAP. these *ten Kingdoms*, which is not mentioned
 VIII. in the former Prophecy, *viz.* that another
 shall arise after them, and he shall be diverse
 from the first, and destroy *three Kingdoms*;
 and that this Horn *should have Eyes and a*
Mouth, i. e. He shall speak words against the
Most High, and shall wear out the Saints of
the Most High, and think to change times and
laws, and they shall be given into his hand
until a time, times, and the dividing of time.
 And that then *the kingdom and dominion*
shall be given to the people of the Saints of the
Most High, whose kingdom is an everlasting
kingdom, and all dominions shall serve and
obey him.

Now if the *Roman Empire* was in fact divided into *ten kingdoms*, and *one* arose that destroyed *three Kingdoms*; and prospered, and destroyed wonderfully the true People of God, and it assumed to itself a Power to give Laws to all Christian People, and to persecute them, and they are given into his Hands for a certain time, — one cannot but assent to this Truth, that there has been a Revelation made to Man. For how could *Daniel* write of Facts thirteen or fourteen hundred Years at least before they happened? Or if we were, contrary to all evidence, to suppose the Author of the Book of *Daniel* to have lived as late as *Antiochus's* time, that will make so small an Alteration

as to these Affairs, as not to deserve a Dispute. CHAP. VIII.
 For what signifies it, as to this Affair, whether *Daniel* foretold a variety of future Facts, nine hundred, or thirteen hundred, Years before they happened ?

Those who are willing to evade the Force of this Prophecy, dispute whether the *fourth* Beast in *Daniel's* Prophecy be the Kingdom of the *Seleucidæ* and *Lagidæ*, or whether it represents the *Roman* Empire: And in consequence of this, whether *the* little Horn, before whom there were three of the first Horns plucked up by the roots, Dan. vii. 8.—I say, whether this is designed to represent *Antiochus Epiphanes*, or what has happened long since in the *Christian* Church. Those who plead for the former Notion, do it upon the Authority of *Grotius* and *Junius* principally; who pretend to assign the *ten Kings* which correspond to the *ten Horns* of the fourth Beast; and likewise three *Kings*, which answer to the *three Horns* which *Antiochus Epiphanes* destroyed.

But, the Misfortune is, that in this Solution no regard is had, either to the *Analogy* of Language, which is to be strictly observed in this kind of Interpretations; nor to any Conformity of Circumstances. And if the Words cannot be made to agree with those times; and *do* exactly agree to after-times, no one can doubt to which they ought to be refer'd,

CHAP. All agree, that the Vision of the *four Beasts*,
 VIII, Dan. vii. correspond to the Vision of *Nebu-
 chadnezar's Image*, Dan. ii. *The third Beast*
 was like a Leopard, which had upon the back
 of it four Wings of a Fowl: the Beast had
 also four Heads, and dominion was given it.
 No body doubts but this relates to *Alexander*
 and his Successors. The Prophet goes on;
*After this I saw in the night-visions, and be-
 hold, a fourth Beast, dreadful and terrible,*
and strong exceedingly, and it had great Iron
Teeth: it devoured and brake in pieces and
stamped the residue with the feet of it, and it
*was diverse from all the Beasts that were be-
 fore it, and it had ten Horns. I considered*
the Horns, and behold there came up among
them another little Horn, before whom were
three of the first Horns plucked up by the
roots: and behold in this Horn were eyes like
the eyes of man, and a mouth speaking great
things.

In this Prophetic Language, a *Horn* al-
 ways signifies a *King with his Kingdom*; not
 a *King* separate from, and independent of, his
Kingdom. Thus, Dan. viii. 3. *Behold there*
stood by the river a Ram which had two Horns.
 In the Explication of this, v. 20. 'tis said,
The Ram which thou sawest having two Horns
are the Kings of Media and Persia. These
two Kingdoms were united under *one King* in
Cyrus; and so continued till *Darius*, whom
Alexander

Alexander conquered. The He-goat is the CHAP. Kingdom of Grecia, and the great Horn that VIII. is between his eyes is the first King. Not Alexander alone, but Alexander at the Head of the Greek Empire. For we find that the He Goat smote the Ram, and brake his two Horns, v. 7. not two Kings, for there was but one King of Persia and Media, whom Alexander smote, but two Kingdoms under the Government of one Darius Codomanus.

Now the fourth Beast is described as having ten Horns, and among them came up another little Horn, before whom there were three of the first Horns plucked up. Grotius and Junius have very absurdly applied this to ten Kings of the Seleucidæ and Lagidæ; as if Horns signified Kings, independent of their Kingdoms, which is their first Mistake: and then, when they attempt to account for Antiochus Epiphanes's destroying three Kings, they take one of them, viz. Demetrius, who never was a King at all, to be a Horn. Besides, it is impossible that the fourth Beast should be the Kingdoms of Egypt and Asia, since these were two of the four Horns into which the Kingdom of Greece was split.


Take then the fourth Beast, as it in Truth stands, for the Roman Empire, which subdued the third, as the third had subdued the second, and the second had the first, and every thing comes out clear. This Kingdom or
Empire

CHAP. Empire was broken into *ten Kingdoms*, with
 VIII. their Kings : Some time after a little King
 with his Kingdom was erected, which did in
 fact subdue three Kingdoms, and has all the
 Properties ascribed to it by the Prophet.

The Prophet says *ten Horns* were in the
 Head of this *fourth Beast*, c. vii 20. and ano-
 ther *Horn* came up, and before this, *three*
 fell. He explains this in the following man-
 ner, v. 24. *The ten Horns out of this king-
 dom are ten Kings [i. e. with their Kingdoms]
 that shall arise ; and another shall arise after
 them, and he shall be diverse from the first, and
 he shall subdue or humble three Kings, [with
 their Kingdoms.]*

The *Roman Empire* was split into *ten
 Kingdoms* about the time when *Rome* was
 taken by the *Goths*. And the *little Horn*
 that was to arise *after them*, but *among them*,
 was to be a Prince or Power that was to hum-
 ble or subdue *three Kingdoms*. This King is
 likewise described as *diverse from the first* or
former, as *speaking great words against the
 Most High*, and, *wearing out the saints*, v. 24,
 25. as having *eyes like the eyes of man*, and
a mouth speaking great things. Now


The *Pope*, in his temporal Power, did
 arise *after the ten* : He likewise in order to
 secure or get what is called *St. Peter's Patri-
 mony*, did acquire to himself just *three King-
 doms* ; and by having such a temporal Power

as he got, he is properly a *Horn*, as the others CHAP.
 are : and by his Being an *Ecclesiastic* armed VIII.
 with such *Temporalities*, and having such *spi-* 
ritual Dominion as he has, he is justly de-
 scribed by having *eyes*, and a *mouth speaking*
great things. The *three Horns* plucked up
 by the Pope are, the Exarchate of *Ravenna*,
 the Kingdom of the *Lombards*, and the State
 of *Rome*, which had been an independent
 State several Years before the Pope acquired
 the temporal Dominion of it. The Seat of
 the western Empire had been fixed at *Ra-*
venna many Years ; and *Rome* was a State
 belonging to that : But *A. D.* 726, *Rome* re-
 belled against the *Greek Emperor*, and ob-
 tained a State of Independency in the follow-
 ing Year, 727. And thus did *Rome* and its
 Dutchy, containing about eight and twenty
 Cities and Towns and Villages in *Tuscany*
 and *Campania*, become a Horn. The Ex-
 archate of *Ravenna* was now become two
 Horns ; and the Pope in the compass of a
 few Years getting the temporal Dominion of
Ravenna itself, of the *Lombards*, and of
Rome, (which was, as I observed, an inde-
 pendent State,) he thus subdued *three Horns*
 before him. Whilst indeed *Charlemain* was
 Master of *Italy*, the Popes acknowledged
 some sort of Dependency ; they dared do
 nothing without acquainting him : But after-
 wards under *Lewis the Debonaire*, and his
 Sons,

CHAP. VIII. Sons, they never were quiet, till they had broke loose from that little Dependency that was left; and in a little less than an hundred Years, *viz.* A. D. 876, *Charles the Bald* received the Imperial Crown at the Pope's Hand; from which time the Popes have pretended to confer the Empire as they pleased. And accordingly they transferred the Empire from *France* to *Germany* in the times of *Otho*, A. D. 968: and about an hundred Years after they excommunicated the Emperor himself, and treated him as a Subject of the Pope's.

The only Difficulty arises, from a Supposition that the *little Horn* was to pluck up by the Roots, *three of the first Horns*, *i. e.* three of the *ten Horns*; whereas it subdued only the *Lombards*, and what belonged to *Ravenna*, *i. e.* but *two* of the *ten*; though it did really pluck up by the Roots *three* temporal Dominions, or independent States, *viz.* *Ravenna*, the Kingdom of the *Lombards*, and the State of *Rome*.

The Seventy interpret this Place, that this little Horn should root up, not *three of the first Horns*, but *τρία κέρατα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ*, *three Horns that were before him*. And the *Arabic* render it, that *three Horns were plucked up*, from his Sight, *from before him*, *à conspectu*, *à facie ejus*. And this is the true and *litteral* Translation of the Prophecy:

prophecy : *Three*, not as the *Vulgate* has it, *de* CHAP.
cornubus primis, or as *we*, of the first *Horns*, VIII.
 meaning of the *ten* ; but three of the *Horns* 
 that existed or were before him. The Em-
 pire of *Rome* was at first to split into *ten*
Kingdoms ; and so it did : Then was to come
 up among them, a *little Horn*, which was to
 destroy *three Horns*, that were got into Be-
 ing. And thus did the Papal Power subdue
 just *three States*, and no more : For as for
 its exercise of *Spiritual Power*, that does not
 constitute it a *Horn* ; or if it did, it might as
 well be said to have plucked up all the *ten*
Kingdoms, into which the *Roman Empire*
 was divided, as *three* of them ; since its
Spiritual Jurisdiction was exercised over them
 all *ten*, as well as over the *three*, which the
 Prophecy mentions. He had *eyes like the*
eyes of a man, looking about, and laying
 hold of all Opportunities to advance himself
 and his Interests ; and he had a *mouth speak-*
ing great things, excommunicating Princes ;
 absolving their Subjects from Obedience ; set-
 ting himself up so as to be above being judg-
 ed by Man ; making his Decrees binding up-
 on all the Christian World ; and acting in a
 most absolute and arbitrary manner.

It was an idle Objection made to the Au-
 thority of *Daniel's Books* by *Porphyry*, that
 they were wrote after *Antiochus Epiphanes's*
Days : It was grounded on a false Suppo-
 sition

CHAP. tion that *Antiochus* was the *eleventh* Horn
 VIII. here described. A mere Invention ! founded
 on a manifest Mistake of *Daniel's* Meaning,
 and a want of due Attention to what he said.
 The Prophet lived (at least nothing appears
 to the contrary) as early as *Cyrus's* Days ; and
 then this Prophecy was about 1300 Years,
 or 1400, before the Event referr'd to. But
 supposing *Daniel* to have lived some time
 after *Antiochus's* Days, it will be about nine
 hundred Years before the Completion. How-
 ever, I need not enter into a more minute
 Discussion of this Point, since *Antiochus* did
 not pluck up *three Kings with their King-
 doms*, but only killed *two Kings*, and a third
 Person who was not a King. But supposing
 him a King ; — Kings, as I said, are not
Horns, considered independent of their Ter-
 ritories. But I have said enough to establish
 the Point I have in view.

There are in the Book of *Daniel* alone so
 many remarkable Prophecies, concerning the
 State of the *Jews*, and of the Overthrow of
 the *Persians* by the *Greeks*, the Wars and
 Alliances betwixt the Kings of *Egypt* and
Syria, and the Conquests of the *Romans*,
 that it would take up a Volume alone to
 treat distinctly on them. Perhaps I may be
 thought to have dwelt too long already on
 this Subject : But so many more Instances
 might be produced from *Daniel*, directly in
 point,

point, clear Instances of distant Events fore-CHAP. told, and which came to pass long after the VIII. Book of *Daniel* can be proved to have exist- ed, that I refer them to the Reader's own Ob- servation : or if he desires a particular Com- ment on them, to Sir *Isaac Newton's* Obser- vations on *Daniel's* Prophecies. I proceed.

I may mention the Prophecies of *Jonah*, *Nabum*, and *Zephaniab*, concerning *Niniveb*, notwithstanding the Age of *Nabum*, and of the *Book of Jonah*, are not so absolutely fix- ed as not to admit of some Dispute. *Zephaniab* lived in the Days of *Josiah*, during whose Reign the famous *Niniveb* was de- stroyed. His Prophecy therefore is too near the Event to answer the Design of my pre- sent Enquiry : but since there remained no Footsteps of it so long ago as *Lucian's* Days, no Remains of that very great City that was so much bigger in Circuit than *Babylon* itself, and this was agreeable to what *Nabum* said of it, c. iii. 17, 18, 19, it deserves a place here. *Nabum* lived, as *Josephus* tells us, in the Days of *Jotham*, Ant. l. ix. c. 11. Reckon from the last Year of *Jotham* to the Destruction of *Niniveb*, it will amount to one hundred and thirty-one Years before the Event : *Josephus* himself reckons it above one hundred and fifteen Years between the Prophecy and the Event. *Nabum's* Words are, *Thy crowned are as the Locusts, and thy captives*

CHAP. captives as the great Grasshoppers, which camp
 VIII. in the hedges in the cold day : but when the
 sun ariseth they flee away, and their place is
 not known where they are [have been]. Thy
 shepherds slumber, O King of Assyria, thy
 nobles shall dwell in the dust ; thy people is
 scattered upon the mountains, and no man ga-
 thereth them. There is no healing of thy
 bruise, thy wound is grievous : all that bear
 the fruit of thee, shall clap their hands over
 thee ; for upon whom hath not thy wickedness
 passed continually, c. iii. 17—19. He had
 said, c. i, that the Lord with an overrunning
 flood would make an utter end of the place
 thereof, v. 8. that he would make its grave,
 and utterly cut it off, v. 14, 15. In chap. the
 second, He asks, where is the dwelling of the
 Lions, and feeding place of the young Lions,
 v. 11. meaning the City of Niniveh itself ?
 And then adds, I will cut off thy prey from
 the earth, and the voice of thy messengers
 shall no more be heard, v. 13.

As the Prophecy implies the total De-
 struction of that City, so *Lucian* has observ'd
 that no Foot-steps of it remain, nor can you
 tell where it stood. Ἡ Νῖνῶς μὲν ἀπόλωλεν ἤδη,
 καὶ ἔδεν ἔχνη ἔτι λοιπὸν αὐτῆς, ἔδ' ἂν εἶπης
 ὅπου ποτ' ἦν. *LUC. Ἐπισκοπεῖντες.* It is so to-
 tally made an utter end of, that we know
 scarce any thing about its Situation : if any
 thing is known, it lay on the east side of the
Tigris.

Tigris; and what since has been built has been on the *West*. It was sixty Miles in Circuit; and in course fit to contain such a Number of Souls as *Jonah* mentions: *It was an exceeding great city of three days journey*, Jon. iii. 3. *i. e.* so many Days Journey in Circuit, at the rate of twenty Miles a day: And its Destruction has been just as the Prophets said, that its place is not known. But see *Bochart. Phaleg.* l. 4. c. 20.

I now pass from the *Old* to the *New Testament*. It is foretold by our Saviour, *Luke* xxi. 24. that *Jerusalem should be trodden down of the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled*. And *St. Paul* foretels, that *Blindness in part is happened unto Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in*, Rom. xi. 25. Thus far this Prophecy may be quoted, because it declares a *Dispersion*; and a certain continuance in *being*, till the time of the *Gentiles* is fulfilled.

Now the *Jews* have something very odd and remarkable in them, that they have always continued *in being, separate and distinct* from all Nations with whom they have lived intermixed; and, notwithstanding all the Attempts of powerful Princes, violent Persecutions, Banishments, Imprisonments, Massacres, Stripping and Reduction to Poverty; their being universally hated, and universally ill treated at some times; and at other times

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their


CHAP. their enjoyment of Privileges, Ease, and
 VIII. Affluence; yet nothing tempts them to
 ~~~~~ desert their Religion, or makes them mix  
 with any other Nation in which they dwell. *Moses* foretold, that if the *Jews* would not  
*bearken unto the voice of the Lord, to ob-*  
*serve to do all his commandments and his sta-*  
*tutes—then they should be removed into all*  
 the Kingdoms of the Earth, *Deut. xxviii.*  
 25. Again, *Levit. xxvi.* that if they would  
*not bearken to God—but break his covenant—*  
*he would make their cities waste—and bring*  
*their land into desolation—and scatter them*  
 among the Heathen: *Yet for all that, when*  
*they be in the land of their enemies, I will*  
*not cast them away, neither will I abhor*  
*them to destroy them utterly, and to break*  
*my covenant with them, (for I am the Lord*  
*their God,) but I will, for their sakes, re-*  
 member the Covenant of their Ancestors,  
*v. 14, 31, 33, 44, 45.* From the Days  
 of *Moses* these People have been in many  
 Captivities, and still returned again, as it was  
 foretold; but never were swallowed up and  
 lost among their Conquerors, as all other Na-  
 tions and People have been. The several  
 Events are here so many standing Evidences  
 for Prophecy; real Prophecy, not forg'd after  
 Events, but written long before there was  
 any Mark or Trace of such Events being  
 likely to happen.

It may be worth observing, that it seems CHAP. as strange and surprizing, that the *Jews* VIII. should preserve with so much Fidelity and Care the Books which shew their Sins, and paint out so lively their Reproach and Ignominy; and which *foretel* the unhappy Circumstances in which they are, and which should continue so long. But 'tis more surprizing that the State of things should be such in *all* Christian Nations, that the Jews *may* with ease return, when the *times of the Gentiles shall be fulfilled*. Very numerous as they are, yet they are without Dominion, or Property any where; I mean such as may detain them in any Country: and they are prevented by almost all Nations from purchasing Lands of Inheritance.

Again; St. Paul in 1 *Tim.* iv. 1—3. says, *Now the spirit speaketh expressly that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits, and doctrines of Dæmons, speaking lies in hypocrisy, having their consciences seered with a hot iron, forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats, which God hath created to be received with thanksgiving of them which believe and know the truth.* Is not here a clear Prophecy of what was to happen amongst them which believe, and know the Truth? It is here foretold of Christians, that they should fall into a de-

CHAP. testable, idolatrous Practice, in worshipping  
 VIII. *Dæmons*; they were to *forbid to marry*; and  
 they were to command an Abstinence from  
 certain Meats. These Practices were not in  
 being in the Christian World till long, very  
 long after *St. Paul* had foretold them. The  
 Worship of *departed Souls*, the Invocation of  
 Saints, Idol Mediators, i. e. *Dæmons*, did not  
 begin till at least three hundred Years after this  
 Epistle to *Timothy* was wrote. The Prohibi-  
 tions to *marry*, and Abstinence from Meats,  
 began to creep in towards the end of the *second*  
 Century, and were then condemned: before  
 the end of the *third* Century the Principles  
 of the *Encratites* gained ground very con-  
 siderably: But in the *fourth* Century, when  
*Monkery* came to be in high esteem, the  
 Things which the Apostle so expressly forbad,  
 were *established*, and have continued ever  
 since. Could *St. Paul* hit by Conjecture, or  
 any Guess, that *this* should be the Apostacy  
 of the *latter times*? Could Human Prudence  
 conjecture, that Christianity should be cor-  
 rupted in *this particular manner*? Or could  
 his saying, that Christians should *depart from*  
*the faith* in *this particular* Way, be any  
 Cause or Occasion that they should do, what  
 was so severely *condemn'd*? Had he not *con-*  
*demn'd* these Practices, it might be said, that  
 his Prophecies were the Occasions of them:  
 But, as he speaks so precisely against them,




and condemns them who came into those CHAP. Practices, as departing from the Faith; the VIII. Prophecy was not the *Reason* of Mens Actions in order to make it accomplished, but was a real Prediction of future Events, out of the reach of human Conjecture. 

So again; There are many Particulars foretold concerning an *Antichristian* Power or Dominion which was to consist in Tyranny, and Persecution, and Idolatry: This was to be a State that was to last many hundred Years: It was to be begun and carried on by *lying wonders*; by an extraordinary pretence to abstinence; and *with all power and signs*: It was to be promoted by one that *sitteth in the temple of God*; that *exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped*: It was to be a State wherein Men were to *give heed to seducing spirits, and doctrines of Dæmons*; *forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats*: The woman was to *sit upon a scarlet-coloured beast, full of names of blasphemy—arrayed in purple, and decked with gold and precious stones, having a golden cup in her hand full of abominations and filthiness of her fornication. She was drunken with the blood of the Saints, and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus.* — *The ten kings were to have one mind, and to give their power and strength unto the beast,* Rev. xvii. 3, 4, 6, 10, 13. Again, Rev. xiii. we have the Description of a ty-

CHAP. rannical State or Power, which had a mouth  
 VIII. speaking great things and blasphemies; and  
 power was given him to continue forty and  
 two months. And he opened his mouth in blas-  
 phemy against God, to blaspheme his name and  
 his tabernacle, and them that dwell in heaven.  
 And it was given him to make war with the  
 saints, and to overcome them, and power was  
 given him over all kindreds, and nations, and  
 tongues. There was to be likewise another  
 State which exerciseth all the power of the  
 former—which doeth great wonders—and  
 deceiveth them that dwell on the earth by the  
 means of the miracles which he hath power to  
 do—and he hath power to give life to the  
 image of the beast—and to cause all, both  
 great and small, rich and poor, bond and free,  
 to receive a mark in their foreheads, and that  
 no man might buy or sell, save he that hath the  
 mark.


Here then is the Description of a Polity,  
 which was to be remarkable for *Idolatry* and  
*Persecution*. These were to be its visible Cha-  
 racters; and the Christian World cannot but  
 observe the exact Completion of so remark-  
 able Prophecies. The Worship of *Saints*,  
 the Invocation of *Souls departed*, the Repre-  
 sentations of God under *Pictures and Images*;  
 and in short, whatever it was that the Chil-  
 dren of *Israel* were condemned for so severely

ly

ly under the Name of *Idolatry*, That hath CHAP.  
 a great Power which names the Name of VIII.  
 Christ revived. This Scene of Wickedness;   
 These Doctrines of *Dæmons*, have been carried  
 on by *lying Signs and Wonders*: And pre-  
 tended *abstinence* and *fasting*, and a sanctified  
*continence* which forbids all use of *Marriage*,  
 have been the great means of pouring out  
 the Cup of Abominations among the Kings  
 of the Earth.

Now they that live at this distance of  
 time from the Apostle's Days, are as certain  
 judges of the truth of the Events, as they are  
 of the Sense of the Prophecies. They see the  
 Christian Church not only covered with the  
 Clouds of Ignorance, and Superstition; but  
 what is particularly remarkable, covered with  
 those *very* Clouds of *Idolatry* and *Persecution*,  
 which St. *John* and St. *Paul* so remarkably  
 described. They can see how this was ac-  
 complished; and can trace out the several  
 Steps by which they were brought about.  
 And as Prophecy and Event, (I speak of  
 such Prophecy as is not grounded on, or is  
 the result of human Conjecture,) As Pro-  
 phecy I say, and Event exactly correspond-  
 ing, shew some extraordinary Interposition  
 of Providence; hence I conclude, that where  
 there are such Prophecies, and we see the  
 completion of them, we must acknowledge  
 a Revelation.

CHAP. In the preceding Collections, there are  
 VIII. many Events which happened long after the  
 Death of the Person who prophesied of  
 them ; some *seventy*, some an *hundred*, some  
*two hundred* Years, some longer much, after  
 the Times of the *first* Prophets I cited. If  
 some of these should be thought capable of  
 being set aside, because we have none but in-  
 ternal chronological Characters of the Times  
 when *Isaiab*, or *Jeremiah*, or *Ezekiel* lived,  
 yet several of those I have mentioned cannot  
 be affected even by that Suspicion: And those  
 are the Prophecies which I desire may be  
 considered impartially. When we descend to  
*Daniel*, we begin to have collateral History ;  
 and he foretels things so many hundred Years  
 before Events ; and we have such certain  
 Proofs of the Existence of the Prophecy,  
 before the Events happened, by means of  
 the *Translations* of the Prophets into other  
 Languages, that it is impossible here to be  
 mistaken : And to recur to the Imagination  
 that such Prophecies were wrote after the  
 Events, is entirely groundless. The Force  
 of the *New Testament* Prophecies is still more  
 impossible to be weakened by such sort of  
 Reasoning. And when we have such a Series  
 of Predictions as is contained in the several  
 Books before cited ; and we see so *many* Events  
 corresponding to so *many* Prophecies that are  
 beyond

beyond all exception wrote *before* the Events CHAP.  
happened ; we may reasonably conclude that VIII.  
*all* those Cases which *appear* to be foretold,   
though they were of things which were to  
happen very soon after the Prophecies were  
given, were real *true Prophecies* ; and that  
the Persons who delivered them, had *Them* by  
immediate Revelation, as well as they had  
*Those* which related to more distant Times.

## C H A P. IX.

*Containing the other Evidences that a Revelation has in fact been given.*

CHAP. IX. **T**HE preceding Chapter having run into a greater length than ordinary from the Nature of the Subject contained in it, I shall now make good the other Considerations mentioned in the beginning of that, which will confirm the Fact that a Revelation has been given.

I observed therefore, that

If we have historical Evidence of certain Facts above the natural Powers of Man, performed by the same Persons who *foretold* Things to come — This must be a very strong additional Circumstance to induce one to believe that such Men had Revelations from God. My meaning is, supposing that the same Persons are reported to *work Miracles* and to *prophecy* too, and we see the Prophecy fulfilled by exact Event ; This Circumstance will make it more probable, that the Miracles said to be done were really done, than if we had not such additional Evidence. I do not enquire whether Miracles do, or do not, prove a Doctrine to  
come

come from God ; but when we perceive Events CHAP. exactly to correspond to Prophecies, and the IX. Persons who foretold those Events are reported by Eye-witnesses, or by faithful and judicious Historians, to have worked *Miracles*, one cannot help connecting this Evidence, and assenting to the reality of a *Revelation* given. The Conduct of such Men is plainly extraordinary : The Event seen shews the Man to have been inspired ; and the *Miracle* becomes credible, because the Man that did it, had, in other known Instances, some Intercourse with Beings superior to Man.

*Moses* received his Law from God ; and he likewise foretold several Things which afterwards came to pass. The Things which he foretold being not of that Nature as to lie within the Compass of his Conjecture, and actually coming to pass, were Evidences that he had *Revelations* made to him : But as some of these were very near, and others were remote ; and some parts of what he had from God were of that kind as to require immediate and constant Obedience to be paid ; hence it was necessary that *Moses* should be armed with a Power of *Miracles*, in order to induce the People to receive what he delivered to them. Now the Events which he foretold actually coming to pass, are a strong Evidence to us, that the *Miracles* which he is said to have performed are true. The *Prophecies*

CHAP. *accomplished*, are to us the strongest Proofs

IX. that God was with him : For since we are  
 sure that he was assisted by some Agent far  
 superior to Man ; by one who could see into  
 futurity, and discover what should happen  
 many hundred years beforehand ; we hence  
 can more easily believe that the *Miracles* he  
 did were true.

In like manner, when one examines into  
 the History of the *New Testament*, and one  
 finds a Series of Miracles performed by  
 Christ, and by the Apostles ; and one meets  
 with very particular *Prophecies* ; and long af-  
 terwards, such a Scene of *Events* appears in  
 the World as plainly corresponds to the  
*Predictions* ; one much more easily assents to  
 the History of the *Miracles* themselves, than  
 one should be apt to do, had the *Miracles*  
 only been related without any Prophecy. So  
 much Fiction has obtained in the World, partly  
 through Superstition and Folly, and partly  
 through pious Frauds, that it is very hard to  
 produce evidence for *real* Miracles, which  
 will not be baffled and confounded by coun-  
 ter Evidence that may be produced for *ficti-*  
*tious* ones. The Miracles done by St. *Antony*,  
*Hilarion*, *Martin*, and others of old ; and the  
 later ones of *Ignatius* told by his great Admi-  
 rers ; and those of *Abbé Paris* ; and Ten Thou-  
 sand others at Home as well as Abroad, are  
 gravely and seriously related, and with such  
 Circum-



Circumstances, that it will be very hard to CHAP. distinguish betwixt the Evidence for Miracles IX. really and truly done, and those pretended to be done by these sanctified Cheats. However, let it be hard as you please to distinguish, when nothing further is considered than the bare *Miracle*; yet when we take in the Circumstance of *Prophecy*, This alone will easily distinguish the cases. St. *Paul*, e. g. works an extraordinary *Miracle*, by healing a Cripple at *Lystra*, or by striking a Man blind with a Word, or by casting out a Devil: *Antony*, or *Ignatius*, or the Ashes of any holy Saint, do the same thing. The credibility of the Facts then depends upon the Abilities, and Honesty of the Relators. Now supposing the Relators equal in these Respects, yet still there will be this Difference in the Cases, that the *Events* which we see in the World establish the Credit of the *Apostle*, and prove that he had some Intercourse with Heaven; they prove that he was actually *inspired*; and therefore it is not at all *incredible* that he should be enabled to do such Things as the Historian relates of him. Whereas in the other Cases, we have no Evidence *concurring*, to make us believe that the Person was *assisted* by God; we see no great, or good, ends served by the *Miracles* reported to be done: nor are we concerned whether they did the extraordinary things

CHAP. things that are related or not, since nothing  
IX. depends upon them. We have indeed the

Words of their respective Historians for them :  
but as no extraordinary Evidence is produced  
for these extraordinary Acts, which may tend  
to establish the Credibility of them, we are  
no more concerned in them, than in any  
other extraordinary Accidents which are rela-  
ted by any Historian whatever.

I would not be misunderstood here, as if  
I really imagined, that the Credibility of the  
Facts reported by those Men of *brazen Fore-  
heads*, stood upon an equal Foot with the  
Facts related by the *sacred Writers*. But only  
*supposing*, not allowing them to be equal,  
yet there still remains a sufficient Ground,  
why one should believe the one, at the same  
time that one might justly reject the other.  
For when you can be secure by any other  
Means, that a Person is inspired, his *extraor-  
dinary Works* commence easily credible :  
The whole conspires and forms a consistency ;  
and each is a Security of the other. But  
where there is only an account of *extraor-  
dinary Facts* related, without any *extraordi-  
nary Proof* of their being true, the Credibi-  
lity of them is lessened even by the *extraor-  
dinariness* of the Facts ; and a Man that does  
not see them, may honestly doubt, or suspend  
his Assent, till he finds such Facts some how  
or other fully confirmed.

Again

Again. It is certain that Evidence for CHAP. past Facts, in many Instances, must be al- IX. lowed to decrease according to the Distance of Times from the Things done: And consequently were a Revelation given, the handing of which down to Posterity depended upon *oral* Tradition, its Evidence might so far be decreased, as not to have any, or but a small Degree of Credibility. He that *sees* a Fact done has stronger Evidence of its Truth than any Person can have to whom he relates it. And he that hears the Narration of a Fact from an Eye-witness, is of much more credible Authority than he that has it at a third or fourth Hand. When any thing has gone through many Hands, it receives so many Additions, Diminutions, or Alterations, that it becomes in every Gradation of less Authority, and at last is little heeded; because it is scarce possible to separate the Truth from the Falshoods usually or possibly blended with it. But in the Case of *Prophecies*, it is very remarkable, that the Evidence must *increase* in proportion to the distances of Times from those in which the Predictions were made. Every Event is the Completion of a Prophecy, and a Confirmation of its original Truth: And therefore must give those who are *wise*, in the Scripture Language, a demonstrative Evidence of a Revelation once made. Now as  
the

CHAP. the more Events are completed in a Series,  
 IX. or the more of a *Prophecy* is fulfilled ; so  
 every particular Circumstance completed may  
 be considered as a distinct *Prediction* fulfilled ;  
 and consequently, the Assurance of the Truth  
 of the Revelation is so much the stronger,  
 the more of them are completed.

Where Books are wrote by the Persons to  
 whom a Revelation is made, there the Pro-  
 bability does not decrease in the same Pro-  
 portion as in cases of *oral* Traditions : For  
 Books subsisting many hundred Years, the  
 Probability grounded on them, is the same  
 as if the Writer himself existed all that time,  
 and retained an exact Memory of the Facts,  
 without any alteration whatsoever, for so  
 many Years as the Books exist. They in-  
 deed are liable to the Errors of Transcribers ;  
 but by the same means that we can tell what  
 is the true reading of any Passage in *Virgil*,  
 or *Cæsar*, or *Cicero*, we can tell what is the  
 true Reading of any other Book. But whether  
 we can or no, in some very particular Cases,  
 it makes no great difference as to the Point in  
 hand. *Prophecies* may contain, and in Scrip-  
 ture do contain the foretelling of many fu-  
 ture Events : The accomplishment of these  
 Events is the Evidence to *us* of the Truth of  
 the *Revelation* itself : And as these are fulfilled,  
 they help us to a right understanding of some  
 Passages which are in themselves very dark.

The

The better to explain myself on a Point CHAP. of this Importance, let us consider the Case IX. of the Messiah. It was foretold, *that the scepter should not depart from Judah, nor a law-giver from between his feet, till Shiloh come, and unto him shall the gathering of the people be, Gen. xlix. 10.* That after *Assyria* had smitten *Israel*, and held them in captivity, *Assyria* itself was to be destroyed: And then a rod was to come out of the stem of *Jesse*, and a branch was to grow out of his roots, and the spirit of the Lord was to rest upon him— This root of *Jesse* was to stand for an ensign of the people, to it shall the Gentiles seek, *Eesai. xi. 1—10.* Afterwards 'tis said of this servant of the Lord— He is despised and rejected of men— he was wounded for our transgressions— he was oppressed and he was afflicted, yet he open'd not his mouth, he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter— he was taken from prison, and from judgment— he was cut off from the land of the living, he was to repay his grave upon the wicked, and upon the rich his death, because he had done no violence— he was to see his seed and to prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord was to prosper in his hand— he was to divide a portion with the great, because he poured out his soul unto death, *ch. liii.*

In these Instances, 'tis foretold, That *Judah* should continue a Tribe, and preserve

CHAP. his Dominion, and legislative Power, 'till

IX. *Shiloh came*: That one from the Family of *Jesse* should rise, and the *spirit of the Lord* was to rest upon him: he was to be *despised*, *cut off from the land of the living*; and yet was to *live and see his seed*. When *Jesus* of *Nazareth* arose, it was before the Tribe of *Judah* was dissolved: He was of the Family of *Jesse*; and was remarkable for having the *spirit of the Lord* upon him: he was *despised* and *rejected*, and put to death publicly: As he rose again from the Dead, we can tell how he *avenged his grave upon the wicked*, and *his death upon the rich*; how he *sees his seed*; and *prolongs his days*; and the *pleasure of the Lord* does prosper in his hands. When afterwards the Gospel came to be preached to the *Gentiles*, and they came in to him, and accepted him for their Lord, here was another Prophecy fulfilled: and since the *New Testament* has been published, several other Prophecies have had their due Accomplishment. Now

Here are a *Series* of Prophecies, gradually fulfilled. One cannot but see that the *spirit of the Lord* was upon *Jesus*—Four Years after his Baptism, he was *cut off*; and during his Ministry he was *despised* and *rejected*: then by his Resurrection he was made capable of *seeing his Disciples* encreasing daily in Number. Seven Years after his Death the

*Gentiles*

Gentiles came in unto him : then in process of time arose among his Followers some who departed from the faith, in the particular manner foretold, giving heed to doctrines of Demons, through the hypocrisy of Liars, forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats— 1 Tim. iv. 1—3. And we see in the Christian World a wicked and tyrannical Power, whose coming was after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and lying wonders; who opposeth and exalteth himself above every one that is called God, or is the Object of Worship, so as to place himself as God in the temple of God, and shewing himself as God.

When each of these Facts come out exactly as foretold, one cannot but see a hand of Providence, directing all things, and inspiring each Person to whom he gave these Predictions : and every Step in the Accomplishment, is a fresh Argument for the Existence and Power of one who governs and orders this World. If any Fact has been foretold a thousand, or perhaps two thousand Years before it happens, and every thing is so preserved and directed, that one may trace out the Means how it came to pass ; or when in shorter Periods, one can see that Events are brought about, and yet no Man could foresee such Events ; the consequence is, that every Instance accomplish-

CHAP. ed, shewed the Revelation of the Prophecy,  
 IX. and an Inspiration in the Prophet: it is a  
 standing Evidence of the Great Governor  
 of the Universe; and the more remote any  
 Person lives from the giving the Prophecy,  
 and the more Instances are fulfilled, the Evi-  
 dence for such a Being as God is, must *en-*  
*crease*, whilst all other Evidences from past  
 Facts must necessarily decrease.


This will shew us the Weakness of all  
 those Attempts which make the Evidence  
 for Christianity to be continually *decreasing*  
 from the Time when our Saviour was upon  
 Earth, till he shall come again. For if Evi-  
 dence for a Fact were to *decrease*, e. g. if  
 Credibility, or Faith, were to diminish in a  
 given *Ratio*, so that one could discover when  
 it would be in an *evanescent* State, or as no-  
 thing, and that *Then* our Saviour would come  
 again (because 'tis said, that when he does  
 come he shall find *no faith upon earth*;) I say,  
 were the Evidence from *Miracles* thus to *de-*  
*crease*, yet still the Evidence from *Prophecy*  
 would *encrease* continually, because we have  
 a Series of *Prophecies* that extend to the End  
 of the World; and consequently all Attempts  
 to find out when Christ shall come by means  
 of such proportional *decrease of faith*, must  
 be absurd and ridiculous in themselves; and  
 how much soever they may shew an Exact-  
 ness in Calculation, or a Skill in Computa-  
 tions,



tions, yet they must be of disservice to Christianity, as representing all its Evidence in a continual *decrease*, whereas its Evidence is in reality in a continual *increase*.

*Lastly*, Supposing now that the Persons who are endued with a Spirit of Prophecy, and are assisted so as to do certain Facts which are above the natural Powers of man, should declare and publish to the World certain Propositions, *agreeable to Reason*, but such as no *Reason* could possibly have discovered, the Evidence for these Truths must rest upon the Proof that can be given, that such Persons had an immediate Intercourse with some superior Being; and the credibility of them is proportionable to the Evidence we have that they were revealed.


*E. g.* That God intended to erect a Kingdom in this World, that all People, Nations, and Languages should serve his Son: That Jesus Christ has *all power in heaven and in earth*: that *all judgment is committed to him*: that a time shall come when *he shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father, when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power*: That when *all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him, that God may be all in all*: That we must *all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body accord-*

CHAP. *ing to that he hath done, whether it be good or*  
 IX. *bad : that there is to be a first as well as a*  
 *second Resurrection ; the former of good Men,*  
*who shall live and reign with Christ a thou-*  
*sand years ; and the rest of the dead shall not*  
*live again till the thousand years are finished :*  
*That God so loved the world as to send his Son*  
*into the world to be a propitiation for our sins ;*  
*that when the Son went away, the Comforter*  
*was sent to convince the world of sin, of righ-*  
*teousness, and of judgment : That God pre-*  
*destinated, i. e. designed long before the coming*  
*of Christ into the world, to call the Gentiles*  
*into his kingdom : —These and all such Doc-*  
*trines are properly Doctrines of Revelation,*  
*No Reason could possibly discover God's Go-*  
*vernment of this Kingdom by his Son ; nor*  
*who, nor what that Son was ; nor what are*  
*the Privileges of that Kingdom. Whatever*  
*therefore is believed of this Sort, must be de-*  
*riued from some supernatural Communica-*  
*tions, either immediately or mediately derived*  
*to us ; nor could we without such extraor-*  
*dinary Assistance, have ever discovered any*  
*such Points. And thus it is when St. Paul*  
*acquaints us with the State of our Bodies at,*  
*and after the Resurrection ; the Changes we*  
*are to undergo ; when and where we are to*  
*meet the Lord ; and what is laid up for such*  
*as love God, and love his Appearance.*

Now

Now so it is, that these Doctrines are all derived unto us from Persons who had the Gifts of *Prophecy*, and the Gifts of *Miracles*: from which we cannot but infer that they had, at least at certain times, *supernatural Assurances*: and when they declare that their preaching these things had the Testimony of God, and was not with *the enticing words of mans wisdom, but in demonstration of the spirit*; the only Question is, How far one ought to give one's Assent to the Notions that are thus derived? Those who were Eye-witnesses of the Miracles performed, saw the Attestation of some superior Being to the Truths declared: and we that live at this distance, and see many things *accomplished* which they *foretold*, cannot but see the same Attestation. Now if we can conceive no possible Reason, why that Being which has told the Truth in *Prophecies*, should deceive us in any other *Doctrines* which are revealed; if we cannot conceive, that God should interpose to deceive us, we cannot but assent to the Doctrines which come thus attested: For why should any Being tell us some Truths, in order to deceive us in others?

There has been then in fact a *Revelation* made, to which we cannot reasonably deny our Assent, and as the Books which contain *prophetical* Accounts of things, contain like-

CHAP. wife many other Propositions which are not  
 IX. inconsistent with Reason, and which are as-  
serted to come from the same Being, from  
 whom Prophecies and Miracles did come,  
 we cannot deny our Assent to these, more  
 than we can to those Truths which Event  
 has confirmed.

There are in the Sacred Writings many  
 Prophecies which relate to distant Events  
 from the Times of the Prophets, which I  
 have taken no notice of. The famous Pro-  
 phesy concerning *Shiloh* was fulfilled in our  
 Saviour; and so was that of *Moses* concern-  
 ing the Prophet that was to be *like Him*,  
 Deut. xiii. The particular Instances of the  
*Curses* denounced against the Children of  
*Israel*, by *Moses*; *Daniel's seventy Weeks*;  
*Haggai's* Prophecy of the Desire of all Na-  
 tions coming, during the standing of the se-  
 cond Temple: These are all in point, full  
 Evidences of God's having spoken *at sundry*  
*times, and in divers manners, in time past*  
*unto the fathers by the prophets.* Many more  
 might be added to those which I have taken  
 notice of; but I choose to refer them to the  
 Reader's own Observation; who will easily  
 see, by this method of considering it, as strong  
 Evidence for Revelation, and as full Convic-  
 tion of Mind, as he can have for *Morality*  
 itself; which I think is nothing short of De-  
 monstration.

## C H A P. X.

*How we are to judge of the Sense of  
Revelation.*

AS the Scriptures are generally read, and studied by the Learned of all Nations, and so many *Commentaries* have been wrote upon them, it may seem strange that a right good *critical, grammatical* Comment has never yet been finished. Whether it be that formerly they wanted the Helps which we at present have, such as *Polyglotts, Lexicons, Concordances, &c.* Or whether it has been judged more necessary to guard against Errors, and prevailing false Notions; or whether it has been conceived that such a Commentary would prove dangerous to its Compiler, because he might be obliged to explain Texts into quite different Senses from what they are frequently cited for; or whether through wrong Education and Custom, Men neglect the *Grammatical* Sense as *insipid, and jejune*, and unworthy their Pains; — Whatever is the Reason, it is certain that a true *critical* Commentary upon the *Old Testament* is not yet to be met with. Too often we meet with little else but Theological

CHAP. logical Opinions, Allegories, or the Con-  
 X. ceits of heated Imaginations, vended for the  
 Meaning of the Word of God: Systems of  
 Divinity, long studied and dangerous to be  
 opposed, are made the Standards by which  
 the Scriptures are tried; and thus the Words  
 and Inventions of Men are made the Tests  
 of the Truths of God. This Evil is not  
 likely to be cured, till Men can bring them-  
 selves to read the Scriptures, free from Pre-  
 judices, and pre-conceived Hypotheses; and  
 will endeavour to discover the meaning of  
 them in the same manner, and with the  
 same impartiality, as they do the meaning  
 of *Cicero*, or *Plato*, or any Classic Writer.

It is pretended indeed, that there is a manifest  
 difference to be made betwixt the Words of  
 God, and all other Writings whatever. That  
 in enquiring into the meaning of all human  
 Compositions, no one endeavours to look be-  
 yond the apparent first meaning of the Au-  
 thor; but in the sacred Books there are *seve-  
 ral Senses* to the same Passage: That conse-  
 quently the meaning of many Passages in  
 Scripture is not, what perhaps the Prophet,  
 or the Apostle himself, might imagine in his  
 private Judgment. For though the Words  
 were such as seemed to *him* to relate to near  
 Events; yet the Spirit of God might have  
 a further View, *viz.* to foreseen remote  
 Events; and therefore such Terms might

be directed to be used, as would equally CHAP. X.  
 serve and comprehend *both Cases*; and con-  
 sequently God may have *several Sense*s, and  
*several Meanings* justly applied to his Words.  
 Now,

Supposing that the Opinion or Judgment of the Prophet or Apostle is not to be considered in matters of *Prophecy*, more than the Judgment of a mere *Amanuensis* is; supposing it to be true that if one Man indites, and another writes what he is commanded to write, The Point is not what the Opinion of the *Writer*, i. e. of him who held the Pen in his Hand, was; but what the *Original*, the *Author*, the *Inditer* intended to express; yet it must be granted, that if God had any Views to some remoter Events, at the same Time that the Words which were used were equally applicable to, and designed to express *nearer* Events; those *remoter* Events, as well as the *nearer*, were in the intention of God: And if both the near and the remote Events were equally intended by God in any Proposition, then the literal Sense of them is not the one, nor the other, singly and apart, but *Both* together must be the full meaning of such passages.

'Tis urged, that there are particular Circumstances, which make the Rules laid down for the Interpretation of all other Writings  
 less

CHAP. less applicable to the Writings of the *Old* and  
 X. *New Testament*. The Spirit of God being  
 the Author of the sacred Books, the Persons  
 whose Names they bear, were only *Instruments* used by him to make known his Will to the World. In Cases then where the Prophets were mere Instruments, if they spoke of Persons or Things which carried any Resemblance, *e. g.* to what the *Messiah* was to do or suffer, or to that future happy State of Glory which is to be at the end of all things; They then made use of Words which were equally, and sometimes more applicable to our Saviour, or to That State, than to the Persons, or Things, immediately in view, and which resembled them. They kept these *two Points* always in their Minds; and they were always uppermost in their Thoughts; and therefore the Expressions used, had always a view to *two distinct* things. If you enquire—How we are to know these Passages which thus relate to *two* several *Persons* or *Things* at the same time? — The Answer is—That the Spirit of God comprehending all things and seeing all things, telling us expressly, that such or such things were *fulfilled* in *Christ*, which in the *Old Testament* plainly belong to somebody else, the Meaning must be this—That which was *faintly*, and in a *low degree* said of *Solomon* or *David*, or *Josiah*, or any one else, was  
 literally,



literally, and in a more *sublime* manner, true of *Jesus*; it was *filled up* in him. And this is as intelligible, as if *Virgil* or *Tully* should have told us in some of their later Writings, what they intended in certain Passages of their former Writings. God, the one Author of all, who at different times spoke to the Men of old, was the same who in latter times spoke to the Evangelists, and Apostles, and who best could tell his own Intentions.

By this Scheme a plausible Foundation is laid for *double* Senses of many Passages of Scripture. There are Divines who carry Matters so far, as to argue for a *Mystery* in every Word, especially in some Books of both the *New* and *Old Testament*. They conceive a certain <sup>a</sup> *Fœcundity* (that is the Word they express themselves by) in Scripture: That the Divine Spirit had a *variety of Senses* in its view; and that as every thing was foreseen, *all* these possible Senses were likewise foreseen and intended; and consequently the more Senses are discovered by studious Men, the more we know of the Divine Mind: That every *Historical* Narration is really *prophetical*, and is to be understood *mystically*, or *allegorically*; and he that pretends to understand them in their

<sup>a</sup> Quasi sermonis Ambiguitas sit scripture fœcunditas, aut quasi fœcunditatem non magis etiam pariat imperitia. *Erasmus in Epist. ad Rem. c. 8. p. 383.*

CHAP. one *litteral* Sense, mistakes the Divine In-  
 X. tention: Every Miracle likewise recorded  
 either in the *Old* or *New Testament* is a de-  
 signed *Prophecy*, or *Type*, of future things,  
 and ought to be understood, or interpreted  
 in a *mystical* manner. But,

If any Text in the Sacred Writing be *am-  
 biguous*, either through our being unacquaint-  
 ed with the Terms made use of, or by reason  
 of the Construction or placing of the Words,  
 this will not prove that the Author originally  
 intended *more* Senses than *one*: Or if the  
 same Words are applied in different Senses in  
 different Places, yet it will not follow that  
 a Proposition contains two or more Senses  
 in the Design or Intention of the Writer.  
 Words are the Signs of our Thoughts, and  
 therefore stand for the Ideas in the Mind of  
 him that uses them. If then Words are  
 made use of to signify two or more things  
 at the same time, their Significancy is really  
 lost, and 'tis impossible to understand the  
 real certain Intention of him that uses them.  
 Were God therefore to discover any thing  
 to Mankind by any written Revelation, and  
 were he to make use of such Terms as  
 stand for Ideas in Mens Minds, He must  
 speak to them so as to be understood by  
 them. They must have in their Minds the  
 Ideas which God intended to excite in them,  
 or else it would be in vain to attempt to  
 make

make Discoveries of his Will ; and the CHAP. Terms made use of must be such as were X. wont to raise such certain Ideas, or else there could be no written Revelation. The true Sense therefore of any Passage of Scripture can be but *one* ; or if it be said to contain more Senses than one, if such multiplicity be not revealed, the Revelation becomes useless, because unintelligible.

In all those Cases where Men designedly use *ambiguous* Expressions, with a view of misleading their Hearers, or frame a Proposition so as that it may be construed to different Senses, yet still the Sense of each Proposition is but *one*. Either it is to be pronounced differently, or to be stopp'd differently, or the Construction is to be different, or the Words are to be taken in figurative Senses, or else 'tis impossible to make two Senses out of any Proposition. In those Oracles of Old— *If Cræsus make War upon the Persians, he shall destroy a great Empire,* or that ambiguous one in *Latin*,

*Aic te, Æacida, Romanos vincere posse.*

Neither of these have more than one Sense : For in the former Instance, though a great Empire may be referr'd to either the *Persian* or the *Lydian* ; and from the general Words you can't tell which is meant, yet still those Words contain but one *general* Idea, applicable

CHAP. cable indeed to every potent Kingdom, and  
 X. therefore not particular to either the *Persian*,  
 ~~~~~ *Lydian*, or any other Kingdom. If indeed  
 these general Words— *A great Empire*,—
 relate to only One of the Two Kingdoms,
Lydia or *Persia*, then the most that can be
 said is, That it is an *ambiguous* Proposition,
 which says indeed, that One of those Great
 Empires shall be *destroyed*, but does not say
which: And then the Event alone can de-
 termine which of the *Two* was intended,
 supposing there was Intention and Foresight
 in the Oracle. As to the other, the Propo-
 sition, *Romanos posse vincere te* is quite diffe-
 rent from *te posse vincere Romanos*: and both
 Propositions are determinate and clear; and
 therefore to make *two Senses* out of this
 Oracle, two different Propositions must be
 made; and the whole Difficulty proceeds
 from want of knowing the Construction of
 the Words in the Design of the Author.

All Languages contain general Terms,
 which stand for Signs of general Ideas, and
 which therefore may be applied indifferently
 to many particular Ideas. The *general* Word,
Dust, is applicable to all sorts of Substances
 reduced small and fine: It may therefore be
 applied to any *particular* so reduced; and
 accordingly we say, *Gold Dust*, as well as
 the *Dust of the Earth*: and thus may any
 other *general Terms* be used, not at all in
 different

different Senses, but always in the same uni-
 form meaning as Signs of general Ideas. X.
 When therefore *Virgil* tells us how easily Bees
 may be parted in the midst of a Battle, by
 throwing *Dust* amongst them, in those re-
 markable Lines,

*Hi motus animorum, atque hæc certamina tanta
 Pulveris exigui jactu composta quiescunt.*

The Words are determinate and clear, and have but one Meaning, where every *general* Term expresses the *general* Idea, and that alone. Suppose now that any Man, having Occasion to speak of Intermitting Fevers, and the Ruffle of a Man's Spirits, and the easy Cure of the Disorder by pulverized Bark, should make use of the very Words of *Virgil* to express his Mind—These Verses would not by that acquire a *double* Sense, but only the *general* Words would be applied to a different *particular* Case. The Word *Dust*, is not *ambiguous*; nor does it signify *two* things, when applied to Earth, and to any thing else that is small and fine; but 'tis a *general* Term equally applicable to every Substance reduced to such a State. These then are not Instances of *double* Senses, but of an uniform Meaning of a *general* Expression, or of an Ambiguity arising from the Construction of Words in a particular Language.

CHAP. But it is said, that " God who compre-
 X. " hends in one View every thing that is
 " past, present, and future, may so contrive
 " it that by the same Proposition he may
 " convey to Mens minds very distinct Facts."
 The obvious Answer to this is,


That if God is disposed to reveal to Man-
 kind any Truths, or to have them as stand-
 ing Memorials of his Existence, or Good-
 ness; he must convey them in such a Man-
 ner, that they may be understood, and may
 answer his Ends. If he speaks to Men, he
 must condescend to their Infirmities and
 Capacities, or else he does not speak to them,
 but uses unintelligible sounds. Now if he
 were to contrive a Proposition in such a
 Manner, or so to express himself, that the
 same Proposition should relate to *several*
 Events; the Consequence would be, that
 as often as Events happened which agreed to
 any Proposition, so often would the Revela-
 tion be accomplished. But this would only
 serve to increase the Confusion of Mens
 Minds, and never to clear up any *Prophecy*.
 No Man could say what was intended by
 the Spirit of God: And if *many* Events were
 intended, it would be the same Thing as if
no Event was intended at all. Prophecy is
 not given, unless that Men, when they see
 an Event fulfilled, may thence infer some-
 thing certain about the intention of God.

Now


Now a Prophecy, if it has several Comple- CHAP.
tions, must either be expressed in such gene- X.
ral Terms as to make it useleſs ; or elſe, if it
relates to many Events, no Man can ſay that
it is accompliſhed till all the Events to which
it refers are accompliſhed ; or that it had a
View to one thing more than another. So
that it is not probable that God ſhould ſo
expres his mind, as to have many Senſes to
any propoſition.

Nor is it any ground for ſuch a Suppoſition,
that the Prophets being full of the Ideas of
the *Meffiah*, and his glorious Kingdom,
made uſe of Images taken from thence, to
expres the Points upon which they had
occaſion to ſpeak. For *whenceſoever* they
took their Ideas, yet when they ſpoke of
preſent Facts, it was *preſent Facts* only that
were to be underſtood. Common Language,
and the Figures of it, and the manner of
Expresſion ; the Metaphors, the Hyperboles,
and all the uſual Forms of Speech, are to be
conſidered : And if the Occaſions of the
Expresſion are taken from a *future State*, yet
ſtill the Propoſition is to be interpreted of that
one Thing to which it is particularly applied.
When the Prophet *Daniel*, or St. *John* ſpeaks
of any State or Kingdom under the Image
of a *Beaſt*, or *Stone* ; the Terms *Beaſt*, or
Stone, have not *double* meanings ; but re-
preſent one particular thing : Nor doth it

CHAP. follow from the Prophets taking his Expression from any *remote* thing, that therefore

X.  two or more Senses were intended by the Spirit of God, more than that Two or more Senses were intended by *Homer* or *Virgil*, where their Commentators have found out a variety of Meanings. The most that will follow is, that the Place is either ambiguous, or it is hard to be understood; or the particular Ideas of the Writer may be very difficult to enumerate: But it does not at all follow, that several different Things were intended by the same Prophecy.

It may be still said, That God has *declared* that he had *several* Senses in view under the same Words. The Spirit of God in the Apostles, was the self-same Spirit that spoke by the Prophets: And when the Words of the Prophets manifestly refer to *One* thing, and the Spirit of God in the Apostles declare that it does refer to *another*, We cannot but conclude that *Two* several Things were intended by the same Words; by the former perhaps something less perfectly; by the latter something more completely: And consequently in the latter Case the Words were *fulfilled*, or as it were *filled up*. Thus when *Hoseak*, c. xi. 1. speaks of the Children of *Israel's* coming out of *Egypt*, and uses the Words — *I called my Son of Egypt*; St. *Matthew* uses the same Words

concerning *Jesus*, and says, that *Jesus* con- CHAP.
 tinued in *Egypt till the Death of Herod that* X.
it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the
Lord by the Prophet, saying, Out of Egypt
have I called my son. Matt. ii. 15. 

But this is only a Method, that some learned Men have thought on, in order to account for the manner of Quotation made use of by the *New Testament* Writers. They first suppose, that every Citation that is said to be fulfilled, *πληρωθέναι*, is a *Prophecy*: And then the Event to which it is applied, is conceived to be the *fulfilling* of the *Prophecy*. But this I apprehend not to be the truth of the Case: Since it is certain that our Saviour, and the Apostles, applied the Term, to *fulfil*, where there was only a Similitude of Circumstances: And they cited the Words of the *Old Testament*, and made use of that Term, upon the Application of them, where they did not design to express the *Accomplishment* of a *Prophecy*. You have an Instance very clear in *Matt. xiii. 14, 15.* where our Saviour gives the Reason why he spoke to the People in Parables: *Because,* says he, *they seeing see not; and hearing they bear not, neither do they understand. And in them is fulfilled the Prophecy of Esaias, which saith, by hearing ye shall hear, and shall not understand, and seeing ye shall see, and shall not perceive. For this Peoples*

CHAP. *Heart is waxed gross, and their Ears are*
 X. *dull of hearing, and their Eyes they have*
 ~~~~~ *closed: Lest at any time they should see with*  
*their Eyes, and hear with their Ears, and*  
*and should understand with their Hearts, and*  
*should be converted, and I should heal them.*  
 Our Saviour applies these Words to the *Jews*  
 in *Judea*; and *St. Paul*, many Years after-  
 wards, applies the very same Prophecy to the  
*Jews at Rome*. This shews, that though  
 the Term, *fulfil*, when applied to an *Event*  
*foretold*, does signify the Accomplishment of  
 a *real Prophecy*; yet it was used in Cases  
 where there was no Accomplishment of a  
*Prediction*, but only a *Similitude of Circum-*  
*stances*; and consequently, the Application  
 of the Words of a Prophet to a certain par-  
 ticular Event, by which they are said to be  
*fulfilled*, does not certainly imply either a  
*double Sense* of Prophecy; or that such a  
*particular Event* was foretold: But the real  
 meaning of the Word must be determin'd  
 by other Circumstances; such as, whether  
 the Prophet is speaking of a future Event  
 or not, or, in short by those Means by which  
 one knows whether the Words are prophetic  
 or not.

In the present Instance of Citation from  
*Hoseah*, *Out of Egypt have I called my son*;  
 — It is visible that the Prophet is not speak-  
 ing of any *future Event*: It is as clear that

He is speaking of an Event past many hundred Years before *Hoseab* lived. The Term therefore, *fulfilled*, cannot imply a Prophecy of our Saviours going into *Egypt*, or coming from thence: But only that the Words of the Prophet suited the present Case as exactly, as if he had had the particular Case of our Saviour in view. Compare *Job*. xiii. 18. *James* ii. 23.

But the true way is to examine some of the Instances produced of Passages of Scripture which are said to contain Two or more Senses.

*John* xi. 47—53. The Pharisees and Chief Priests met together in Council to consider what was necessary to be done with our Saviour. *If we let him alone all Men will believe on him, and the Romans shall come and take away both our Place and Nation.* Upon this one of them named *Caiaphas*, being High Priest that same Year, said unto them, *Ye know nothing at all, nor consider that it is expedient for us that one Man should die for the People, and that the whole Nation perish not.* The remark that is made upon this in the Gospel is — *This spake he not of himself: But being High Priest that Year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation; and not for that nation only, but that also he should gather together in one the Children of God, that were scattered abroad.* Now

CHAP. Nothing can make it appear probable,  
 X. that *Caiaphas* really meant any more than  
 this, that *Jesus* ought to be put to death ;  
 that it was better, and more prudent to de-  
 stroy *one Man*, were he e're so innocent,  
 than that Seditions should be raised, and the  
*Romans* provoked, who would not fail to  
 send their legions into *Judea*, and would  
 destroy their State, if the *Jews* would not  
 prevent, or put a stop to, the rising Disorders.  
 This was I say, probably, the only single  
 Sense of *Caiaphas*. But then *Caiaphas* spake  
*not of himself, but prophesied* in those Words,  
*that Jesus should die for that nation.* And  
 herein the *double Sense*, 'tis imagined, ap-  
 pears : *Caiaphas* spoke of a political worldly  
 Conduct to save the *Jewish* State from pre-  
 sent ruin ; But the *Spirit of God* which in-  
 spired him, intended such a Death of *Jesus*,  
 whereby he should gather all the World in-  
 to one Communion, and one Worship. Is  
*Caiaphas* then among the Prophets ? Or  
 was the High Priest, as *High Priest*, wont  
 to be indued with a Spirit of Prophecy ? Or  
 do those Words — *It is expedient that one  
 Man should die for the People* — contain a  
 Prediction, that *Jesus should die for that  
 nation* ? None of these Points can be proved.  
 No more therefore was intended in these  
 Words than this, that *Caiaphas* spoke very  
 agreeable to the will of God, when he spoke  
 of

of the expediency of the death of *Jesus*: CHAP. X.  
 Or, it was not without a particular Providence that he should speak as he did, when 'tis plain that he did not understand nor think of the Design of God, in delivering the *Messiah* up to Death. The Passages which may explain this are such as these, *Matth. x. 19, 20. When they shall deliver you up, take no thought, how or what ye shall speak— For it is not ye that speak, but the spirit of your Father that speaketh in you;* vid. *Mark xiii. 11. i. e. The Holy Ghost shall teach you in the same hour what ye ought to say,* *Luke xii. 11. He that receiveth you, receiveth me; and he that receiveth me, receiveth him that sent me,* *Mark x. 40. John xiii. 20. And Genesis xlv. 8. Joseph says to his Brethen, So now it was not ye that sent me hither, but God. In like manner Caiaphas meant one single determinate thing by his Speech; and he spoke of putting an innocent Man to death. God in his Providence always design'd that the innocent *Jesus* should be put to death; and therefore when *Caiaphas* advised it concerning *Jesus* so long before his Time was come, he spoke as if he had had the Spirit of Prophecy upon him; and considering the Event, and Intention of God, as if he had seen the whole Schemes of the Divine Providence.*

A second

CHAP. A second Passage is 2 *Sam.* vii. 13. *I will be his Father, and he shall be my Son.* These Words were literally intended by God of Solomon: David understood them of Solomon, 1 *Chron.* xxii. 9, 10. *The word of the Lord came unto me, saying— Thou shalt not build an house unto my name— A son shall be born unto thee— his name shall be Solomon— He shall build an house for my name, and he shall be my Son, and I will be his Father.* Again, in a solemn Assembly of the Princes of *Israel*, and all the Men of Consequence and Note of the Kingdom, David assures them, that *the Lord had chosen Solomon to build his house; for I have chosen him to be my Son, and I will be his Father,* 1 *Chron.* xxviii. 6. David not only thought that these Words were appropriated to Solomon, but Solomon himself thought so, as appears from the 1 *Kings* v. 5. *I purpose to build an house unto the name of the Lord my God, as the Lord spake unto David my father, saying, Thy Son, whom I will set upon the throne in thy room, he shall build an house unto my name.* There is nothing in the Context that intimates that any one else is spoken of: and therefore the only Reason why it is conceiv'd that the *Messiah* is meant in these Words is, because the Author of the Epistle to the *Hebrews* has cited these Words as spoken of the *Son of God*, eminently so called,

ed, or, *The Christ*. For unto which of the CHAP.  
*Angels said he at any time, Thou art my* X.  
 Son, this day have I begotten thee? *And*  
*again, I will be to him a Father, and he*  
*shall be to me a Son?* *Heb. i. 5.* Hence  
 therefore a *double* Sense of Prophecies is in-  
 ferr'd, since the same Words intend *two* dif-  
 ferent *Persons*, who lived at a *thousand* Years  
 distance from each other.

It is said indeed, but how will it be proved  
 that the Words in the Book of *Chronicles* re-  
 late to *two different Persons*? When we read  
 a Proposition, and see that it belongs to a par-  
 ticular Person, from the Context, from the  
 Design of the Speaker, and from all the Marks  
 that can appropriate it; which way can a Man  
 be convinced against the common Use of all  
 Language; against all Rules of understand-  
 ing any Truth? You will say the Apostle  
 was *inspired*, and he knew the Mind of God.  
 But let it be considered, that this Man, of  
 whom it was said, *I will be to him a Father,*  
 or his Father, *and he shall be to me a Son,* or  
 my Son, was one who might *commit Iniqui-*  
*ty,* and be *chastened* for it with the Rods  
 of Men; notwithstanding the permission of  
 which, the *mercy of God was not to depart*  
*away from him, as it did from Saul:* every  
 Circumstance in *Nathan's* Message to *David*  
 shews that *Solomon* was intended; and *Solo-*  
*mon* in fact did build the House here named.

CHAP. If it be asked, to whom does the relative  
 X. Word, *His*, in the Place in question, refers  
 to, I will be *his* Father ; the Answer will  
 always be, to *Him*, whose Kingdom was to  
 be established ; *Him*, who was to *build a*  
*house*, which *David* could not ; i. e. *Solomon*.  
 Where then there is no Ambiguity of Con-  
 struction, no Hardness in the Expression,  
 but all is clear and easy, and intelligible, no-  
 thing must make one give up such a Propo-  
 sition, unless one can be content to give up  
 all Language, and never to understand any  
 thing that is said.

Which way then must one account for  
 the Apostle's Citation, and his use of these  
 Words, as if God had spoken them concern-  
 ing his Son *Jesus* ? Not I think by asserting  
*two* Senses to the same Words, or by ima-  
 gining that the Prophecy related both to  
*Solomon* and *Jesus* in the same individual  
 Terms. This was a Prophecy made to  
*David*, in which it was assured him, *ver. 16.*  
*Thine house and thy kingdom shall be stablished*  
*for ever before thee, thy throne shall be estab-*  
*lished for ever.* In consequence of this Pro-  
 mise, *the mercy of God was not to depart away*  
*from David (as it did from Saul, whom God*  
*put away before David)* on account of any  
 Iniquities which He, or His, might be guilty  
 of : Now this Mercy was accomplished in  
*The Christ* who descended from *David*, and  
 who



who was to reign over the house of Jacob for ever, and of whose kingdom there was no end, Luke i. 33. CHAP. X.

'Tis plain that this *whole* Prophecy does not relate to *Solomon*, nor is it to be confined to *his* Times ; but it was to take in the succeeding Times quite down to *the End* ; during which, God was to appoint a place for his people, and to plant them, that they might dwell in a place of their own, and move no more, neither shall the children of wickedness afflict them any more, 2 Sam. vii. 10. This Part of the Prophecy was not to be fulfilled in *Solomon's* Days, but in somebody's else. The Apostle therefore having mention'd the *Authority* and *Dominion* of the Son of God, quotes this Prophecy made to *David* concerning his *Descendants*, and the great and lasting Authority that was established in his *Family*. Christ the Son of God has an Authority or Name greater than Angels ; for God never promised any *Dominion* to them as he did to, and has accomplished in, his Son Jesus ; — *I will be his Father, and he shall be my Son — Thine house and thy kingdom will I stablish for ever, &c.* The Prophecy which is quoted plainly shews that a *great Dominion* was design'd all along for the *Son of God*, which was not design'd for any *Angels* ; and this was the only Point to be proved. Now the citing no more of it,

I than

CHAP. than those Words—*I will be his Father, and*  
 X. *he shall be my Son*—was a sufficient Reference  
 ~~~~~ence, and was only design'd as a Reference to  
 the Prophecy, which proved that an *Inheritance*, a *Power*, a real *Dominion* was all a-
 long design'd to be given to the *Son*, the ap-
 pointed Heir of all things; which being now
 given to *Jesus*, shews how this Prophecy was
 fulfilled. This I think to be more easy, than
 to account for it as some do, by making this
 a different Prophecy from that which occurs,
 1 *Chron.* xxii. 10. But this I perfectly sub-
 mit to the Reader's Judgment.

In a Third Instance—*Surely he hath born
 our griefs and carried our sorrows*, *Eesai.* liii. 4.
 St. Peter in the Use of these Words has ap-
 plied them to the Death of Christ upon the
 Cross,—*who his own self bare our sins in his
 own body on the tree*, 1 *Pet.* ii. 24. St. *Mat-
 thew* tells us, c. viii. 16, 17, *He healed all
 that were sick, that it might be fulfilled which
 was spoken by Esaias the Prophet, saying, Him-
 self took our infirmities and bare our sick-
 nesses.* In both places the Words of general
 Signification are applied to particular differ-
 ent Instances: Not that *Esaias's* Words are
 Words of double meaning, more than the
 general Terms of all Languages; but they
 are to be understood in their usual purport
 and extent, as the Words of every other
 Writer are.

Some-

Sometimes it happens that in a Prophecy CHAP.
 Words are so connected, or are used in such X.
 a figurative manner, that we may not be able to conceive what is the Meaning, until the Event shall, in part or in whole, clear it up. In many of the Prophecies in the *Revelations*, it was impossible to say positively what was the precise Meaning of them, till the Event shewed the Designs of Providence. But then as that One Event was foretold, that One Event shewed the One single literal Sense intended in the Prophecy, and has cleared up, what would otherwise have led Men into Mistakes and Misapprehensions about them.

There is then but one, literal, real Sense of any Prophecy; and that contains the whole that God design'd to reveal. Disputes may sometimes arise amongst learned Men, what was the intended Particular of some Part of a Prophecy; but there was but one Sense of every Part, as well as of the Whole. And if we imagine more than one intended, we may affirm a Prophecy to be so often fulfilled as there are Circumstances which tally with the Words of any Proposition contained in it; *i. e.* we could never tell when it was fulfilled at all, which is making all this sort of Revelations entirely useless, and superfluous.

C H A P. XI.

Of the Advantages of Revelation.

CHAP. XI. **I**T has been shewn that there is such a thing as *Revelation*; and likewise that Truth is the Rule and Measure of Action. The natural Question then arises— What is the *Use* of *Revelation*? 'Tis certain that God does nothing in vain; nor does he do more than is necessary to the Ends he has in view. If Reason therefore be the Rule or Law of Action, and that will shew Mankind all that is necessary to lead them to Happiness, of what Advantage is Revelation? The true Solution of this will be of singular Service to all that are Friends to Christianity.

When Reason is declared to be a sufficient Rule, the Consequence is not as some have imagined, that Men may lay aside and neglect the Gospel Revelation; but it is to assert, that God has given to Men sufficient Powers to enable them to find out their Duties to God, to their Neighbours, and to themselves: That no one Principle of Duty is such, as is not discoverable by Men unassisted by Revelation: That if they follow its Dictates in a regular Practice, they cannot but have hopes

hopes of, and certainly will meet with the divine Favour : That they can inform themselves how to appease the Anger of God after they have transgressed their Duties. This is what is meant by the Sufficiency of human Reason ; and to confute this Notion, some Point of Morality, some Duty should be named, which is not written in the Tables of Mens Hearts ; or is not discoverable by Reason.

It is not to the purpose to name the particular Mistakes or Paralogisms of *Tully*, or of any other ancient Moralist : nor can I think, that in order to enhance the Benefits of Revelation, one ought to decry *Reason*, or declaim upon its *Weakness* ; much less can I think it of any Service to make use of such idle Distinctions as 'tis *remotely* sufficient, but not *proximately* : Nor do I apprehend it of much consequence to consider Mankind in its lowest State, such as the *Hottentots* are, or the wild *Americans*, and such Sorts of our Species. The utmost Care should be taken, not to produce such Arguments against the *Sufficiency* of *Reason*, as will destroy the *Sufficiency* of *Revelation* itself : For we find in fact, that Revelation is not *proximately* sufficient more than Reason ; and admitt all the Uses or Benefits of Revelation, if we look into the Christian World, we shall find Idolatry and Superstition in all its Forms,

CHAP. little inferior to what it was in the Heathen
 XI. World: Vices and Immoralities as shame-
 lessly practis'd in *Rome Christian* as it was in
Rome Heathen; nay, 'tis certain that Idolatry is infinitely more practis'd in the *Christian* World, than it is in the *Mahometan*; and Wickedness abounds in *Europe* much more than it does in *China*. I cannot forbear adding; *it must needs be that offences come, but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh*, Matth. xviii. 7.

When the Advantages of Revelation are to be specified, I cannot conceive that it should be maintained as necessary to *fix a Rule of Morality*: For what one Principle of Morality is there which the Heathen Moralists had not asserted or maintained? Before ever any Revelation is offered to Mankind, they are *supposed* to be so well acquainted with *moral* Truths, as from them to judge of the Truth of the Revelation it self; and from them to fix and determine the Extent and Meaning, or the proper Limitations of such *moral* Propositions as are contain'd in any Revelation. And had we not some Standard by which we could examine, and try what is offered to us under the pretence, or the reality, of Revelation, I do not apprehend which way we could discover Impositions from Realities; or charge a Doctrine with Absurdities; or limit any general
 Expres-

Expressions, or determine the Meaning of CHAP. moral Propositions, which are never expres- XI. sed, or very rarely in the Books of the *New Testament* in a strict philosophical manner. When the Gospel, e. g. enjoins us to *love our enemies*; to *give to every man that asketh thee*; *not to ask one's goods from him that taketh them away*; *not to turn away from him that would borrow of thee*; *not to resist evil*, &c. — These and such-like Passages are all to be understood with proper Limitations; nor do any Men of Sense pretend that the Injunction to *love our enemies*, implies a Command to do to and for them, exactly all the same things, as the Command to love our Parents, or our Friends, does, or would. The Rule of Morality therefore is something founded in the relations of things; and is not fixed by Revelation, but is exactly what it is independent of Revelation: 'Tis the Test of Revelation, or the Standard by which it is to be tried, and consequently must be supposed as previous unto it.

Nor can Revelation be necessary to *ascertain Religion*. For Religion consisting in nothing but doing our Duties from a Sense of the Being of God, Revelation is not necessary to this End, unless it be said that we cannot know that there is a God, and what our Duties are, without it. *Reason* will teach us, that there is a *God*; and that we

CHAP. are to thank him for what we have, and to
 XI. to pray to him for what we want ; that we
 are to be just and charitable to our Neigh-
 bours ; that we are to be temperate and so-
 ber in ourselves. *Revelation* does not *ascertain*
 these Duties, nor make them any other
 than they are without it : It does not *ascertain*
 the Existence of God, but supposes it ; it
 supposes likewise Duties already known ; nor is
 Religion more *uncertain* in any respect with-
 out Revelation, than it is with it ; and con-
 sequently it does not stand in need of Revela-
 tion to *ascertain* it.

What then is the true Use, or wherein
 consists the Advantage of Revelation ? The
 Answer is, It contains *Motives* and *Rea-*
sons for the practise of what is right ; more
 and different from, what natural Reason
 without this help can suggest. Reason will
 discover the different relations of things, and
 the Obligations which Men are under as
 reasonable Agents to do what Reason sug-
 gests. When it takes into its view the Idea
 of God, and applies that to the subject of
moral Duties, and makes his Pleasure, or
 Displeasure the *Motive* to Action or Forbear-
 ance, there *Religion* begins. When any one
 makes use of the *Motives* suggested by *Re-*
velation, there *Revelation* takes place. If
 therefore *Revelation* suggests to any one *more*
Knowledge, and *more Motives* for the practice
 of

of Virtue, than otherwise a Man can have; CHAP.
 in this case it becomes of singular Use and XI.
 Service to Mankind.

To trace out this from its first Source :
 Man is a reasonable Creature, capable of
 thinking and judging; he has a sagacious
 Mind, which from past and present things
 can oftentimes discover future ones; he can
 see and judge of the Causes of things, and
 their Effects and Consequences; nor is he
 tied down to the Consideration of what is
 near, but he can discover very remote and
 distant things, and by this means can com-
 prehend very much of the whole State of
 Life; and he can see what is useful or mis-
 chievous to himself or to his Neighbours.
 This makes it necessary that such a Creature
 should have his Obligations to act rationally
 very *strong* upon him: The *more Arguments*
 therefore or *Reasons* that he has for Action,
 and the *better* they are suited to his Capacity,
 the more will he be kept to the practice of
 what is right, and the more strongly and
 more effectually will they work upon him.
 If by the Strength of his natural Capacities,
 he can discover a *first Cause* and *Governor* of
 the Universe— This will be an additional
 Reason for his Doing, what without this,
 Reason would suggest to be right and fit for
 him to do. When again *more Reasons* are
 given to such a Being, 'tis so much the more

CHAP. VIII. probable he will be kept to the practice of his Duty. The Advantage therefore of Revelation must be great, if either it supplies Mankind with *more Arguments* and *Reasons* for Action or avoidance of Action than they have without it; or if it sets those Arguments and Reasons which they have from Reason in a *plainer* and *clearer light*, than otherwise they could have, in order to engage them to do their Duties. We are not to imagine that Revelation is given merely for Revelation sake, either to shew the World that God knows, or fore-knows more than we Mortals do; but it is with a view to us, and our good, to make Men really *better* than otherwise they would be. And for this Reason it is, were there not many more, that all who profess the Christian Religion should have constant Recourse to the *New Testament* for what the Will of God is; and not to the Additions of Men, who by making a mighty stir about many Points, and by entering into *metaphysical Niceties*, instead of making Christianity a *Doctrine of Use* and *Benefit* to the World, they have made it a *Theological Science*; and the principal and essential Articles of it, such as are of no *Use* or *Benefit* to the World, because unintelligible by the ablest Men.

For the clearer understanding of the real Use of Revelation, it will be worth while to

to enter into a Specification of Particulars as CHAP. they lie in the *New Testament*. The Light XI. of Reason could not possibly discover that there was to be such a Kingdom erected, as that which in Scripture is stiled, *the kingdom of Heaven, of God, of Christ, of the Son of Man*. All therefore that can be known in relation to *That State*; *who* are to be its *Subjects*; *when*, and *where*, and *what* it is to be; what are its *Laws*; what are its *Privileges*; what are the *Penalties* of the Breach of its *Laws*, or what its *Rewards*; when, and where, and by whom These are to be distributed; whether there shall be no End absolutely of Christ's Kingdom, or whether a time will come when Christ shall *deliver up his Kingdom to the Father*— All this is only knowable from *Revelation*. Now supposing that there is a *Revelation* of these things, and of many more which concern this Kingdom; if from thence we can see, that all this is an Argument for *patient continuance in well-doing*, to make Men look to and for a future State of Good and Evil, according to the Good or Evil done here; then the Consequence must be a strong Argument for Virtue, and a strong Motive to it, more than the Light of Nature can give; and therefore to a rational Being it must be of great Use and Service.

CHAP. XI. Where there are any Particulars of this Scene of Providence *foretold*, it is not merely that Men should see and admire the Wisdom and Fore-knowledge of God, but that they may have certain and infallible Arguments that there is a wise Governor of the Universe, who gives to all that observe, sure and certain Signs of his Government; and which therefore must turn the Eyes of Men to Him, and be a constant *Memento* of Him.

The Doctrine of the *Trinity*, when considered as it lies in the *New Testament*, is not any absolute mysterious Notion, but only a Doctrine holding forth that which the baptismal Creed likewise contains, an Acknowledgment of the One God and Father of all, who made and governs all things; who has sent his Son into the World to erect a Kingdom of Righteousness; and who has confirm'd the Truth of what his Son did and said here, by sending a *Third* Person, called *the Holy Spirit*, to enable the Apostles to work Signs and Wonders, and to teach the World that Doctrine which might bring them to Salvation.

So again, in an Instance where Reason can discover a great deal; I mean, that there will be a future State, and this proportion'd to Mens Actions here. This, no doubt, is a great Motive to Virtue, and accordingly 'tis capable

capable of the strictest Demonstration, when CHAP. XI.
 once any one is convinced that the Supream Being is wise, and just, and good. But as many Ideas are to be compared together; and many Observations from Fact and Experience in the World, are all to be brought together in order to trace out this important Truth; the Christian Revelation has produced an Argument from *Eye-sight* for it, *viz.* the *Resurrection* of *Jesus* from the Dead: an Argument which all Men are equally Judges of, the Ignorant as well as the Learned, the Illiterate and Men of low Capacities, equally with those of refined Thought. Here then is a strong Motive to *Virtue* produced, and in such a manner, as naturally will influence all: and which proves a future State in such a manner as every rational Agent may comprehend. It has added to this many Circumstances about our spiritual Resurrection Bodies; about a *future Judgment*; our *Judge*; *Rewards*; *Punishments*; the first and second Resurrection; the State and Place that good Men are to be in with Christ, and with God Himself. He that is acquainted with and fully convinced of these Truths, cannot but be careful not to fail in the pursuit of right Action.

In this manner may every Instance of Revelation be tried. Every Doctrine which is discovered to us, whether it be in general
 com-

CHAP. comprehended under the Term Faith, *i. e.* an

XI. Assent of the Mind to any Truth on the Authority of the Revealer : or it be a particular Notion ; still it is always either a *Reason* for, or a *Motive* to, or a *Memento* of, our Duty. Virtue is the *End* always ; and though sometimes this End may not be at first sight seen, yet if we trace the Chain but one or two Links, we can never fail of coming at this. Thus, *e. g.* the two positive Institutions of Christianity, *Baptism*, and the *Lord's Supper*— They were instituted as *Means to Virtue*, and the properest *Memento's* of our Duty that can be thought of : The one to put us in mind of a *death unto sin* ; the other of the *death of Christ for us*, and *brotherly love* to one another : The one to initiate us into a Society of Men who walk by Faith, and not by Sight ; who believe and trust in God, as a *Rewarder* of them that seek Him : the other to put them in mind of their constant Obligations to observe the Laws of Him, who purchased them to God by his Blood.

Whatever then tends to confirm Mankind in their natural Notions of the Being of a God, or a future State ; whatever will make them more fix'd in those great Principles, than otherwise they would be, This is all so much clear Advantage to Mankind : it tends to make them more useful to Society ; more serviceable to one another ; better Parents ;
better

better Masters ; better Subjects ; better Ser-
 vants, and better Friends, than they could
 be without such Notions. And if this be
 the obvious Consequence, it will not admit
 of one Moment's Debate to assign the true
 Advantage of Revelation, and what its Use
 is. Suppose Natural Reason *sufficient*, if pur-
 sued ; yet what is difficult to prove in the way
 of Reason, may be made much *easier* by the
 help of Revelation. The *natural* Man can
 discover his Duty ; the *spiritual* Man, *i. e.*
 He that is well versed in Revelation, has all
 the Advantages which the *natural* Man has,
 and the *Addition* of all that he can learn
 from Revelation. The one can carry his
 Searches no farther than to make some *general*
 Observations on Providence ; the other has
 many *Particulars* of that Providence disco-
 vered to him. The Man that has Revela-
 tion, has *more Arguments, more Motives*, to
 do his Duty, than he that wants it : and
 surely the more a Man knows, the more
 likely he is to do right. A Moral Agent,
 that has before him a certain Rule, by which
 he is to act, is more likely to observe it, if
 he has an exact Skill, and a full Conviction
 upon him what will be the Consequence of
 his Neglect, and this confirmed to him by a
 great Variety of Arguments and concurring
 Circumstances, than he is who is not so ful-
 ly

CHAP. ly convinced, and has not such irrefragable
 XI. Arguments laid before him.

~ The Doctrines of Revelation may be confined to either *Prophecies*, or to *Truths* taught Men, which their natural Reason could not discover. If Matters of *Morality* be taken in under the general Term, the Uses of them to Men in every Station are very obvious: But the other Notions of it are here principally to be considered. *Prophecy* is a standing Evidence of the Being, and Providence of God: and every Event foretold is a Confirmation of that great Principle upon which all Religion depends. Now this Principle is the great Support of all *Morality* in the World: its Influence is very strong upon all Persons: and if the Principle be made self-evident, that which makes it so must be proportionably *useful*. Men of ordinary Abilities may not be so well qualified to argue back from Effects to Causes; nor are they competent Judges of the Wisdom and Contrivance of things; and particularly of the ordinary Motions of the Heavens, which shew the most consummate Wisdom. But when they hear or see *Events foretold*, they cannot but perceive an *overruling Providence*, which directs all things to promote his Great Ends: and when once they are thus convinced, their *Motive* to *right Action* is encreased. All *Prophecy*

therefore is useful ; useful to prove, useful to support, the first Principle of Morality. CHAP. XI.


Every Doctrine taught in the same Way, has likewise its good Uses, in *discovering* what Reason cannot, or in *confirming* what Reason does, teach. *E.g.* When Reason traces out a providential Disposition of things, Revelation discovers many particular Branches, or Scenes, or Particulars of it ; *viz.* That *all Power in Heaven and Earth is given to the Son of Man ; that God will judge the World by his Son : That we must all appear at the Judgment Seat of Christ : That Jesus Christ is Lord of all.* These and many other *Doctrinal* Points contain Particulars of the Providential Scheme ; and are all adapted to make Men *better*, or to lead a Life of *Holiness* and *Virtue*. Sometimes the Doctrines of Revelation are such as confirm and tend to strengthen those Notions which Reason does teach. Whenever this is done, it is by *adding* such Circumstances to important Doctrines, as may make us more careful of observing the great Rule of Action. The Circumstances of a future Judgment ; of the Appearance of our Judge ; of the Resurrection ; of the Joys prepared for Good Men ; that they are made *Heirs of God, and Joint Heirs of Jesus Christ ; of the Punishments of Bad ones ; of the Gift of God, which is eternal Life ; — These are all*

CHAP. all strong Motives to *Goodness*, and have a
 XI. direct Tendency to make Men *Virtuous*.

And indeed amidst all the Controversies, and Difference of Interpretations, by which the *Bible* has been racked and tortured, yet this great Point has always been secured, that *Goodness* is made the *End* of all Points of *Revelation*. Whenever the abstrusest and most metaphysical Subjects have been treated on, or are ever preached on in any or all Churches, the Divines of all Denominations constantly endeavour to shew the *Use* of their *Doctrinal* Notions, and have and do point out their Tendency to produce *good Practice* in Mens Lives. A certain Sign, that how much soever they differ in their Interpretations of Doctrines, they all agree in their *Use*, which is to promote *Virtue*; and in course, they all agree in fact in this great and universal Design of Revelation.

There may, I think, from what I have said, be this General Scholium drawn.

The Christian that has a true Sense of the Existence of the One God and Father of all, and acts towards Him as the Governor of all things in Heaven and Earth; that behaves himself as in God's Presence; that guards as much as he can against all known Sin, and whenever he falls short of his Duty, immediately returns to it; that is just in giving to every one his Due, and shews this Disposition by a strict Observation
 of

of Promises, Fairness in Dealings, Assistance CHAP.
to the poor and distressed ; that is temperate XI.
and chaste, and governs his Appetites ; that 
does not dare to do Ill, whatever Security he
may have that he shall not be detected or
discovered : That loves his Brethren in
Christ, and endeavours to promote Peace
and Unity, and Concord ; and does not cen-
sure or condemn them for any thing but
Immoralities, or what leads to Immorality ;
That lives in Expectation of another Life, and
of a future Judgment by Christ, and acts as
one accountable to the Great Searcher of
Hearts— Such a Man is truly Religious ;
and let him be abused under what Name Men
will ; let him do, or not do, any indifferent
Act ; by whatever Name, Sect, or Party, he
be named, if he honestly strives to know and
do his Master's Will, he will be receiv'd by his
Lord, and will be rewarded with Eternal Life.

On the contrary, he that has no Fear of
the Great God ; that does not live as in his
Presence ; that is wilfully guilty of any Im-
morality, and does not repent of it, by re-
turning to his Duty ; that is uncharitable in
censuring and condemning his Brethren ;
that dares do what he thinks to be wrong,—
In what Shape soever these Acts may appear,
such as lying, cheating, injuring, swearing
falsly or wantonly, Breach of Promise, judg-
ing, censuring, hating, persecuting his Bre-
thren,

CHAP. thren, — That does not endeavour to know
 XI. and do his Master's Will; such a Man is not,
 cannot be deemed, *Religious*, though he
 reads the Scriptures, observes all the Appoint-
 ments of the Church, frequents Prayers,
 Sermons, Sacrament, keeps fast, or does any
 external Service whatever; nor will he be
 accepted by Christ at the last Day.


C H A P. XII.

Containing Objections against Revelation, and the Answers to them.

IT has been shewn already, that the great CHAP.
 End and Use of Revelation is to make XII.
 Men *Virtuous*; and whatever is founded upon *Truth*, and is suited for the service of *Virtue*, is in itself fit and proper to be universally received among Men. The Religion of *Christ* in particular consists of Motives which all tend to one point, *viz.* to make Men *Better* in their several relations than otherwise they would be: Its great design is to turn Mens Thoughts from *This World*; and to teach them so to live as becomes *Creatures, who seek those things which are above, where Christ sitteth on the right hand of God.* Every Doctrine has a view to this great End; and contains either a *direct motive* to *Virtue*, or a manifestation of the *Providential Disposition* of things; which is indeed a more remote, but at the same time an indisputable Argument for the same Cause. Supposing therefore, what may easily be proved, that the Religion of *Christ* tends to promote good *Morals*, and that this is the great End of all its *Doctrines, Laws, Threats,*
S
Promises,

CHAP. Promises, Declarations, and Exhortations, it
 XII. must be owned to be in its own nature right-
 ly fitted to be an *Universal Religion*: and as
 our Saviour commanded it to be taught to
All Nations, it may justly claim to be *universally*
 received among Mankind, when they
 have it offered to them.

But notwithstanding this, it is objected:
First, “ That whatever was revealed, if it
 “ was designed for *Universal Use*, must be
 “ consigned to *Writing*. *Books* must be
 “ made; and *Arguments* must be used to
 “ convince all such as are not *Eye-witnesses*
 “ of the Evidence produced for the Revela-
 “ tion. Now supposing it wrote in Books,
 “ —Men have no Principle in them where-
 “ by to know that they are obliged to learn
 “ to *read* at all; much less can a Man of
 “ any other Country know that he is obliged
 “ to learn to read *Greek*, or *Hebrew*, or *Chaldee*,
 “ or any foreign Language in which the Re-
 “ velation shall happen to be penn’d. But
 “ suppose we farther, That the Revelation
 “ is *wrote*; all to whom it is proposed must
 “ be convinced by *Arguments* of the Reaso-
 “ nableness and Necessity of receiving it.
 “ If therefore the Revelation contain any
 “ *Law* of God, it ought like all *Laws* to
 “ carry its Authority with it, and *Argu-*
 “ *ments* should not be urged to *prove* its
 “ Authority. For no *Law* is of any Conse-
 “ quence

“ quence or Effect, if the Subject is to *dis-* CHAP.
 “ *pute*, and be *convinced* by *Arguments* of XII.
 “ the Authority of the Legislator. There 
 “ is therefore a double defect in proposing to
 “ the World a written Revelation : *First*, it
 “ is a thing to be *proved* ; whereas the bulk
 “ of the World is not capable of *judging* of
 “ the force of those Arguments by which
 “ it must be *proved*, in order to make them
 “ submit to it : And *Secondly*, if it contains
 “ any *Law* of God, it ought to carry as
 “ plain and visible marks of *His* Authority,
 “ as Human Laws do of the Authority of
 “ their Legislator. God therefore should
 “ have implanted in Mens Minds some in-
 “ nate Principle, by which they might have
 “ known his Laws, and have submitted to
 “ them, as they do to the Laws of the State
 “ in which they live, in which there is al-
 “ ways care taken of a sufficient Promul-
 “ gation.

“ But still there is a farther Difficulty, or
 “ rather Absurdity in supposing a Revelation
 “ *written*, or contained in Books ; and that
 “ is, that in process of time the written
 “ Books must become of *dubious* Authority.
 “ They must become full of *various* *Read-*
 “ *ings* ; one word will be substituted for
 “ another ; and at length the Text itself
 “ must be rendered *precarious* and *uncertain*.
 “ We see how it has been in fact in the New


CHAP. " Testament, where *Thirty Thousand* diffe-
 XII. " rent Lections, are already taken notice of;
 " and how many more would there be,
 " were more MSS. collated? We hear a
 " great deal, among both Antient and Mo-
 " dern Christians, of *different Copies, Cor-*
 " *rptions* of the Scripture, *Interpolations,*
 " and such like Injuries of Time, and
 " wicked Men, which have rendered the
 " Text of the New Testament uncertain:
 " And thus it must happen to all Revelation
 " that is contained in *Books* or *Writings.*"

In This Objection it is observed, That
 " Any Revelation made to a particular
 " Person, and which is designed to be for
 " *universal* and *perpetual* Use must be *wrote*
 " in *Books.* But no Man is obliged to learn
 " to *read,* and much less is he obliged to
 " learn any *foreign Language* in which a
 " Revelation may be penn'd. Therefore
 " God could not design that a Revelation
 " made to any particular Person, should be
 " for the Use of *all* Men; it being impossi-
 " ble that all Men should ever be obliged to
 " learn to *read.*"

It is true, that all Men are not obliged to learn to *read,* or to learn any *foreign Languages:* But Men may be capable of acquiring any Truths, which are useful to them, without being able to *read,* or to understand the *Language* in which an important

tant Discovery was first made. Men may easily drink of a River, without drinking at the Fountain Head. They may be *taught* the Doctrine that is so advantageous to them, without being able to *read* the Original that contains it. And by this means, ignorant People may come to the Knowledge of the Truth; and useful Doctrines may be inculcated, illustrated, and confirmed; and honest Men may come to know what honest Men would be desirous of knowing: And this I take to be the Case even of *Morality* itself.

The Knowledge of *Good Morals* in order to Happiness is not *born* in every, or any Man: but his business is to enquire, and observe, and to pursue in practice what he can learn to be right. We have no antecedent *innate* Principle in us, whereby we know that we are obliged to be *Just* or *Honest*: And however certain and clear to some, even to Demonstration, it may be, that *Justice* and *Honesty* ought to be observed; yet the Reason of those practical Principles may be demanded, and must be given to such as require it. Men certainly, *in general*, come at the Knowledge of *Morality*, just as they do at the Knowledge of other things, by being *taught*; and when they perceive the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas they acquire, they become convinced of the Truth of Moral Principles and of their Obligations.

CHAP. Now as the bulk of Mankind practice these
 XII. Principles, the Truth of which they cannot
 *prove*, so they may any other that they come
 to perceive in fact to be useful to them in or-
 der to direct them to Happiness.

But the cases, it will be said, differ. *Morality* is all discoverable by the Light of our *own Minds*, if we steadily and carefully apply our selves to find it. We have Powers sufficient for this purpose given us by God ; and we are guilty of *criminal Carelessness*, or *Negligence*, if we do not apply them as we ought. Whereas we have no Powers that can discover any matter of *Revelation*.

True. But supposing Revelation contains what is seen to be *useful*, when it is proposed ; will there not be a criminal Carelessness if Men should then refuse to embrace it? But

In Truth, the Objection is founded upon a Supposition, that a Doctrine useful to all must be designed to be *universally* received. Whereas, it may without prejudice be granted, that Revelation was not ever designed to be in such sense *universal*, as to be known to every particular Man in the World, at all Times, or even at the same time: Nor is this any Objection to either the Usefulness of Revelation, or to the Goodness and Justice of God in giving it. Imagine it to be designed only to spread far
 and

and wide ; and that it was to be embraced CHAP. XII.
 by such only as had Opportunity of know- ing it ; and had open honest Hearts, and were willing to accept the Truth in Uprightness ; imagine that God *designed* his favours only to such as were willing to lay hold, and accept them, as foreknowing that such as were not disposed to eternal Life would not accept them : What ill consequence would hence arise ? The Fact would then be, That God designed that Revelation should be at some times only of *General*, but not strictly of *Universal* Use : That God designed to aid and assist *Some*, but not *All* : That He granted extraordinary favour to *some* that had *no strict Right* ; and that he refused such favour to Others who likewise had *no Right*. In this case no One is injured ; though Some have favour shewn. It is the duty of these to improve the Talents they receive : And as for others, they have no right to complain, since Talents not given will not be required to be improved. And should they complain, the Answer is obvious, *Is thine Eye Evil, because I am Good ?*


Revelation then may not be designed for *universal* Use, at all times ; but only for *general* Use, at the Times, and in the Places, where the Privilege is granted. And in those *Places* and *Times*, the Knowledge of it may be acquired without learning to *read*, much less the learning of *strange Languages*. They

CHAP. who never heard of it, may not have any
 XII. *Hardship* or *Injustice* done them ; since Re-
 velation is not necessary either to the Forma-
 tion of Good Morals, or to the ascertaining
 of true Religion, or to lead Men to a State
 of Happiness ; but is properly the committing
 to those who have it greater Motives,
 more Talents, greater Opportunities of Im-
 provement in Virtue and Goodness than is
 to be had without it. Nor can this be re-
 presented as Partiality or Injustice in God the
 great Disposer of all things, more than the
 giving greater natural ordinary Abilities to
 one Man, than are given to another, is liable
 to the same Objection.

'Tis added, " That Men must be con-
 " vinced of the Reasonableness and Truth
 " of Revelation by *Arguments*. Now the
 " Bulk of Mankind is not capable of *judg-*
 " *ing* of the force of the *Arguments* by
 " which it must be proved. And if it con-
 " tains any *Law* of God, it ought to carry
 " as plain and visible Marks of His Autho-
 " rity, as human Laws do of the Authority
 " of their Legislators."

The Nature of propagating a Revelation,
 or spreading it in the World, cannot be by
 any other means in human Power than by
Arguments, in order to convince Men of its
 Truth, Use, and Fitness : and Arguments
 are proper means to induce Men to believe.

But

But then every Man that receives a Truth CHAP. which he perceives to be useful and service- XII. able to him, may not be obliged to be able to  account for every step in its progress from its first Author. 'Tis very frequent for Men to be well satisfied in a right Conclusion, who yet could not be able to make out every step from the Premises. And if a Revelation be capable of being satisfactorily proved to such as can examine and judge; and others who cannot examine, acquiesce in the Judgment of those who can; and at the same time they who hear it, can perceive the *Usefulness* of the thing revealed,—This is as much as can be expected or desired; and it is agreeable to human Conduct in other Cases. The *Mathematician* sees and knows the Reason why such Instruments are made in such a manner, and can demonstrate the Truth of such or such Proportions: whilst the *Mechanic*, who knows not the Demonstration, yet can by his *Rule* and *Compass* do his work as exactly as the best *Mathematician* could do it. He takes for granted, what may indeed be proved but what he himself is incapable of proving; and yet his Work is true and just and worthy of its Author. So in a matter of Revelation, a Man may not be able to judge of the Evidence for a Truth revealed; but yet when it is opened to him, and explained in its Consequences, it may influence

CHAP. ence him to right Action, and be a good
 XII. Principle, though he may not be able to
 answer all questions about its Evidence,
 which may be beyond his Capacity. Nor
 must this be deemed *implicit* following of
 others, whilst you have an avowed Right to
 search and inform yourself, and to make the
 best of the Revelation laid before you.

When it is said, “ That if a Revelation
 “ contains any *Law* of God, it should be,
 “ some how or other, as visible that it pro-
 “ ceeds from God, and should as plainly
 “ carry the Stamp of his Authority, as hu-
 “ man Laws do of the Authority of their
 “ respective Legislators.” — This is true.
 Every Law supposes a Legislator, that is,
 One who has Authority to make and impose
Laws : and when the Legislator is admitted,
 the Laws carry an Authority with them.
 Whatever is a *Law of God*, supposes him to
 be the *Legislator* ; and there needs no other
 sort of Reasoning to prove his Authority,
 than there must be to prove the Authority of
 any other Lawgiver. Should a Man deny
 the Existence of God, and thereupon reject
 His Laws, he must be dealt with as any other
 Subject must that denies the Authority of
 his Sovereign : For the Laws of no Legisla-
 tor carry their own Authority over such a
dispute, whether there be any Legislator or
 not ; or who that Legislator is. If by Laws
carrying

carrying their Authority with them, be meant, CHAP. XII.
 that the Legislator has a Right to punish such
 as question his Authority—This is as true in
 the Case of God as it is of any other Legis-
 lator: for he can punish as much as any
 other Legislator. If therefore a Man ques-
 tions, whether a Law comes from God, and
 denies his Authority, he must take the Con-
 sequence; since the Laws of God certainly
 carry the Authority of God, *i. e.* of an uni-
 versal Sovereign with them; who though he
 be invisible, yet is allpowerful, and can pu-
 nish when and where he sees fit.

Of less Consequence still is the Objection
 from the *various Readings* which in process
 of time must happen to the *Books* in which
 Revelation is *wrote*. This Difficulty is start-
 ed from what has happened to the *New*
Testament; and from thence a general Ob-
 jection has been made against all and every
Revelation that is contained in *Books*. "*Vari-*
 "*ous Lections* must arise; and from them the
 "*Text* itself must become *precarious and*
 "*uncertain*: Wicked Men will *interpolate*,
 "*and corrupt* it; and in short it will be of
 "*such dubious Authority*, that no Man will be
 "*able to say what is enjoined, and what not.*"

This Difficulty being founded upon what
 has happened to the *New Testament*, to an-
 swer satisfactorily to the Ground of the Ob-
 jection is to reply to the Objection itself.

That

CHAP. XII. That there are a great many Various Readings in the Sacred Books is certain: and that there have been Corruptions wilfully made, may, I believe, be proved; but that any one Place of Consequence has been altered, so as not now to be known what the true Reading was and is; or so as to render any *Doctrine* or *Duty* precarious; or that any *Promise*, *Threat*, or *Institution* of Christianity is any way affected by any Corruption, or any Various Reading— This ought to be proved by naming the Point that is concerned. I will suppose, that in some Manuscripts there may be, or is, a Various Reading of a Word of Consequence in some Text: Nay, I will admit, (what is not true) that all Manuscripts are of *equal* Weight, Authority, and Goodness: Yet the most that can be infer'd from these Concessions is, That the Doctrine held forth in such particular corrupted Text is *uncertain*; and were the same Doctrine no where else taught, then it might be said to be *precarious*: But if the same Doctrine should be taught clearly in other Passages, then the Doctrine itself is not affected by such Various Reading.

I know the Fright that some good and learned Men have been under, from the large Collections of Various Readings made by the Editors of the *Polyglott* Bible; and since


since That, by Dr. Mill in the *New Testa-* CHAP.
ment. Dr. Owen made grievous Complaints XII.
 in the former Case; to which Bishop Walton wrote a very curious Piece, entitled, *The Considerator considered; in which the Certainty, Integrity, and Divine Authority of the Original Texts is defended against the Consequences of Atheists, Papists, Antiscipiturists, &c. inferr'd from the Various Readings, by the Author of the Considerations.* Dr. Whitby appears to have been under the same Panick, that formerly Dr. Owen was under; when in his *Examen Variantium Læctionum*, J. Millii, he says, “* *I am heartily grieved to find in Mill’s Prolegomena such things as either may seem to subvert our Rule of Faith, or give at least to others too specious a Pretence to doubt of it; or lastly, give Strength and Support to the Reasons of Papists and others against this Rule. For the very Quantity of Various Readings will make the Minds of some doubtful, and will raise no small Suspicions*

* “ Doleo, & molestè fero tam multa me in Millii Prolegomenis invenisse, quæ hujus Fidei normam vel plane læbescere videantur, vel saltem aliis anam nimis speciosam præbeant de ea dubitandi; aut demum Pontificiorum, aliorumque contra hanc regulam ratiunculis, robur adjiciant & firmamentum. Etenim ipsa variantium læctionum immensa moles multorum animos suspensos reddet, iisque suspiciones haud parvas injiciet, parum quid certi ex libris in omni commate, imo in omni fere commatis parte, variantibus, expectari posse.”

CHAP. “ *that very little Certainty can be expected*
 XII. “ *from Books which have Various Readings*
 ~~~~~ “ *in every Verse, nay almost in every Part of*  
 “ *every Verse.*”

One would think so heavy a Charge should be supported by weighty Reasons : But take these *Various Readings*, and make the worst of them, you cannot name any Doctrine, Notion, Principle or Practice, that is affected by them, or made uncertain. It will indeed be true, that a Doctrine or Command would be uncertain, if it did not occur any where except in the Text that has a *Various Reading*, and that of such a Sort as made it uncertain what the Doctrine, or Command, was. But then if the Doctrine, Command, or Institution occurs plainly and clearly in *other* Places, where there are no *Various Readings*, it will be firmly established from thence ; and thus the true Reading may be restored to a controverted Place.

Let us instance in a Text or two as remarkable as any : 1 *Tim.* iii. 16. *Great is the Mystery of Godliness, God was manifest in the Flesh.* The *Clermont Copy* reads ‘O instead of Θεός, i. e. *Which*, instead of *God* : and the *Vulgate, Syriac, Æthiopic, and Armenian*, plainly read it the same Way : Which is the True Reading, is not the present Business to enquire ; though it may be observ’d, that the Word Θεός, is not cited as  
 in

in the Text by any *Greek* Writer before the CHAP. Fifth Century. The Two Places produced XII. by Dr. *Mill* for that Reading are, one from  a spurious Piece attributed to *Athanasius*; and the other from *Justin Martyr*, which proves directly the contrary to what it is produced for. Now supposing here a Various Reading—All that can follow is, that one cannot prove *Jesus* to be called  $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ , or *God*, from *this Text*. But then suppose that He is called  $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$  in some other Passage, e. g. *John* i. 1. the Doctrine is incontestible, and true, that *Jesus Christ* is  $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ .

So again, *1 John* v. 7. *There are Three that bear record in Heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one, ἐν, unum.* This Text is not to be found in any *Greek Manuscript* which has not been corrected (and known to be so) from the *Vulgate*; or which was not wrote since Printing came into Use: Nor is it read in any *Greek* Writer. In truth, it grew up in *Africa*; and from thence it spread among the *Latins*; and is now crept into the *Modern Versions* of the *New Testament*, without any Authority to support it. However, were it thrown out of the *New Testament*, as never having been originally in it, Does the Doctrine of the *Trinity* suffer any thing by it? I do not recollect that in all the Controversy upon that Subject, Dr. *Water-*  
I
land

CHAP. *land* has ever urged this Text : 'Tis certain  
 XII. the Antient Fathers never did. And yet  
 the *Scripture-Doctrine* of the *Trinity* stands  
 unshaken ; founded upon Passages where  
 there is no Question about Various Readings :  
 And the most that can be said is, that no  
 Man has a Right to use this particular Pas-  
 sage in order to establish a Doctrine which  
 may otherwise be proved beyond all Dispute  
 from incontestèd Places of the *New Testa-  
 ment*.

Granting then that there have been Inaccu-  
 racies of Scribes, that they have been guilty  
 of Inadvertencies and Mistakes ; nay, grant-  
 ing that there are *designed* and *wilful Falsi-  
 fications* of Scripture, in order to confirm,  
 or to support, any Error, (though not one can  
 be produced, except such where the true  
 Reading can even still be shewn : ) Yet as  
 the Various Readings in *Livy*, or *Tully*, do  
 not make the History of the one, or the  
*Philosophy* of the other *precarious and uncer-  
 tain*, so neither do they the Text of the  
*New Testament* in any of its Doctrines or  
 Institutions.

But after all, Are there not many Means  
 by which Men of tolerable Abilities can dis-  
 cover the true Original Words, and distin-  
 guish them from the Faults of Corruptors or  
 Transcribers ? Is there not antecedent and  
 consequent Sense ? Is there not the Analo-  
 gy


gy of Places? Are there not *Old Versions*; CHAP. XII.  
 Antient Testimonies; Commentaries, Expo-  
 sitions of Terms? Are there not all those  
 Methods of Criticism, by which we are able  
 to find out the true Reading of other An-  
 tient Writers? Are all Copies equally Good?  
 Or can we not distinguish between Copies  
 that are carelessly transcribed, and such as  
 carry the Marks of Diligence and Accuracy?  
 In common *Printed Books*, is it not easy to  
 see a great difference in *Editions*, as to Care,  
 and Correctness? And does a *bad Edition*  
 make the Author's Text precarious and un-  
 certain, which may so easily be corrected  
 and set right?

This Objection then was the mere Effect  
 of *Fear* in them that first moved it; and it  
 was taken from them, and made an Objection  
 against the *Possibility* of *Revelation* itself,  
 without considering that it was a mere Ap-  
 peal to weak Mens Passions, and not to  
 their Reason.

A *Second* Objection against all *Revelation*  
 is taken from the *Time* in which it is said  
 to be made. "It is impossible that any  
 " *Revelation* which is design'd by God for  
 " Universal Use, should have been given but  
 " *seventeen hundred* Years ago. How comes  
 " it, that it is even now unknown in so  
 " very many Parts of the World? Were it  
 " so highly useful to Mankind, or intended

CHAP. " to be so, a much more proper *Time* might  
 XII. " have been thought on, than when it is  
 w " pretended to be given. Suppose that it  
 " had been made to *Adam*, in the Begin-  
 " ning of the World ; it might then have  
 " been useful to all his Posterity, who  
 " might have been instructed in it : Or if  
 " a standing Evidence were necessary, God  
 " would have continued such Evidence of  
 " the Truth of his Revelation to all suc-  
 " ceeding Generations." Now,

I. This Objection *supposes* it necessary, that if God design'd to grant a *Revelation* of useful Truths to Mankind, He should have begun with communicating this to *Adam* ; and then that He should have *continued*, some how or other, the Evidence of such Revelation to all succeeding Generations. Suppose that *Miracles* were the Proof of the Revelations coming originally from God ; then a *continued Series* of Miracles should have been done in all future Ages. This must have been done too, not only in *every Age*, but, for the same Reason, in *every Place* : for the Evidence must have been continued, and granted to *every Unbeliever* ; since no other Sort of Evidence is supposed to be satisfactory. All this, I say, *supposes* that no Revelation of useful Truths could be made, unless God designed that *every Man* should at *all times* have the Advantage

vantage of them. Had God indeed *designed* CHAP.  
 this, He would not have given but *seventeen* XII.  
*hundred Years* ago, what was absolutely neces-   
 sary *four thousand Years* before. But,


2. Perhaps we may be able to see an Un-  
 fitness of *Time*, even in the Supposition of a  
*standing Revelation's* being given to *Adam*.  
 For if we may conjecture from what actu-  
 ally did happen in the first Ages of the  
 World, such Revelation must have depended  
 on *Oral Tradition*, and in course it must have  
 been liable to all the Interruptions, Addi-  
 tions, Alterations, and Corruptions, that That  
 Method of Conveyance is justly chargeable  
 with. We see how early that important  
 Doctrine *The Unity of God*, the Unity of  
 the Great Governor of the Universe, was  
 confounded all over the World, except in  
 one Family; and even in That it was scarce-  
 ly preserv'd, notwithstanding the Evidence of  
 that Doctrine was so miraculously proved to  
 the *Jews*. When we reason about things  
 which we can know little of; and of which  
 we can conjecture but with great Hazard and  
 Uncertainty, we ought to be very cautious,  
 and proceed with great Circumspection. Are  
 we competent Judges of *what Time* is the  
 best and most proper for God to grant his  
 Dispensations in? But if we will presume to  
 conjecture, we may with Reverence guess,  
 that That would be the most proper Time

CHAP. when the greatest Communication betwixt  
 XII. Men was open ; when Commerce was  
 spread ; when some One Language was  
 grown almost universal ; and when *Morality*  
 was understood and taught. For though  
 Natural Religion might be at that time  
 much corrupted, and *Idolatry* and *Polythe-*  
*ism* and *Superstition* might prevail very  
 much, yet These Evils might at such a  
 time best be corrected by the help of *Reve-*  
*lation* ; and *Revelation* might be most likely  
 to be received, when good Morals were  
 studied, and the Causes of this Corrup-  
 tion could be displayed. Imagine any one  
 Nation to be known open Avowers of the  
 Unity of God, and very many of its People,  
 through any Reason, very much dispersed over  
 the World : Suppose too that the Learned  
 Men of other Nations had taught the Necess-  
 ity of *good Moral* Behaviour to Society, to  
 private Happiness, to please the Gods, and  
 thus the Way to have been paved for *true Reli-*  
*gion*, in the midst of all their Corruptions :  
 And then suppose a Revelation given to feve-  
 ral Men, and they to travel the World in  
 order to propagate it— *This* should seem the  
*Time*, and *These* the *Circumstances* which  
 should concur, to make it reasonable to *give*  
 a Revelation, and to have it best received. But,

3. Supposing Revelation to be *useful* to  
*All*, at *all Times*, in *all Ages*, yet how can

it



it be proved that God is obliged to grant to CHAP.  
*All*, what is allowed to be *advantageous* for XII.  
 them to know? He has granted to them   
 all Powers sufficient for their Happiness, and  
 'tis their Duty to use them rightly: but if  
 He vouchsafes to reveal Himself to any *One*,  
 or to *More*, This is *Grace* and *Favour* in  
 Him; but the Person on whom the Favour  
 is conferr'd has no Claim of *Right* to it.  
 God is no more *obliged* to grant additional  
*extraordinary* Motives to Good Actions to  
*Every Man*, than he is to give additional  
*extraordinary* Blessings to *Every Man* that  
 is sober and industrious. Sufficient is the  
 ordinary Good in the One Case, and the  
 ordinary Means to Happiness in the Other:  
 And whilst no Accusation can lie against  
 Providence, or the Goodness of God, Those  
 who enjoy the *extraordinary* Favour ought  
 to be abundantly thankful, whilst others  
 have no Right to complain. Look into the  
 World, and see if *all* Knowledge that is  
*useful* be any where, at any time, granted  
 to All. Does *every* Man enjoy the Benefit  
 of that Skill, Judgment, Exactness, which  
 some do? Have the Inhabitants of *Nova*  
*Zembla*, or the *Samojards*, or the *Hottentots*,  
 the Knowledge that the *Englifo* or *French*  
 have? Or have *All* that live in *England*, or  
*France*, the useful Knowledge, that *Sir Isaac*  
*Newton*, or *Mr. Locke*, or *Dr. Clarke* had?

CHAP. It might be useful to *all* to have such Knowledge : but the Usefulness to us is not a Reason why God should be obliged to grant us such a Favour.

4. When the Objection is made against Revelation it self, because it is not given to *All* from the Times of the First Man, from whom all are descended ; — This Objection is founded upon a Supposition of the *Necessity* of Revelation to the *future Happiness* of Mankind. A Supposition ! that is impossible to be proved. For if Mankind are to be judged according to the Light they have, and according to the Opportunities which are in their *own* Powers, and not according to a Knowledge, or a Law, which they have not ; and such as do their Best, according to the Circumstances they are in, are not to be *miserable* ; (which were they to be, it would be indeed hard to reconcile this to Goodness or Justice) if this, I say, be the Case— Then there is no Necessity, that Revelation should be given to *all Men*, nor at all *Times*. The Benefit or Advantage of Revelation consists in its giving to Men *extraordinary* Light and Knowledge, in order to make them regulate their Conduct so much the better. At *what Time*, or to *what Men*, it may best suit the Ends of Providence to grant this Favour, may be to us inscrutable : Or perhaps when we see the Favour granted, it may appear

appear to us the very fittest Time of any. But CHAP. whether We are proper Judges, or not, the XII. Donor of a pure Favour has a Right to take his own Time; and the Receiver has no Right to be Chooser of what depends merely on *Grace*. Admit that the Light of Revelation is such as *suits* all Mankind; that it tends to make Men *Good*, and leads them to Happiness: Yet as it is not *necessary* in order to teach them *Morality*, or to fix the Rule of *Morality*, nor necessary to *ascertain Religion*, nor necessary to their *Happiness*, They are not injured who have it not; and Those that have it, should make themselves the better, or expect a severer Condemnation.

A *Third* Objection against *all Revelation* is urged thus: That “ every Revelation that  
 “ is made, or pretended to be made, is always  
 “ in some particular *obscure Place*. *Jesus*  
 “ of *Nazareth* did his Miracles in *Galilee*;  
 “ and 'tis observable, that They all that  
 “ are inspired receive the Gift, and choose  
 “ to confirm what they say by Miracles,  
 “ done in little obscure Villages, where  
 “ Country People are easily imposed on.  
 “ Why were not the Miracles of *Jesus*, e. g.  
 “ done in Places, where the Extraordinari-  
 “ ness of the Work was most likely to be  
 “ well sifted and searched to the Bottom,  
 “ and thus be most clearly spread over the  
 “ Universe?” Now

CHAP. I. Whatever is done, must necessarily be  
 XII. done in some particular *Place* : And a Fact  
 done, cannot cease to be done, wherever it  
 is supposed to have happen'd. If the Facts  
 therefore were *done*, the certain Consequen-  
 ces of such Facts are as indisputable, as the  
*Faëts* themselves. Whether therefore they  
 were done in *Judea* or *Italy*, at *Jerusalem*  
 or *Rome*, whatever follows from such *Faëts*  
 is exactly the same. I must add, That

2. *Jerusalem* was the Capital of a very  
 considerable Nation, which the *Romans* them-  
 selves with all their Strength, with very much  
 Difficulty, could scarce subdue : And the  
*Jewish* Nation were not, in the Times of  
*Jesus*, either an *obscure* or an *ignorant*  
 People. The *Jews* were not confined to  
*Judea*, but were dispersed all over *Asia*,  
*Egypt*, *Libya*, *Greece*, and *Rome* it self :  
 So that what was done in the Land of *Jewry*  
 in our Saviour's Days, was not done in an  
 obscure Corner of the World ; or among an  
 obscure and ignorant People, who kept no  
 Correspondence with the several Parts of the  
 known World ; but on the contrary, it be-  
 came as *notorious*, as if it had been done in  
 any other Part of the *Roman* Empire.

The Truth is, where a Fact is really  
 done, the Persons that see it done, if Persons  
 of Ability, are sufficient Evidence ; and all  
 others must depend on the Testimony of  
 those

those who saw what was done. Had Mira-  
cles been done in *any* Place, and at *any* Time,  
yet Those who live in *distant* Places, and  
*different* Times, must depend on the Testi-  
mony of others for the Truth of such Facts:  
and the usual Topicks from the Honesty,  
Ability, Integrity of Witnesses must have  
their Force, just as they have at present;  
or else nothing must be assented to, but what  
we *see* ourselves.

But let the Miracles of Jesus be done in  
obscure Villages, as some of them were,  
yet this can make no possible Objection a-  
gainst the Revelation made by him, or by  
his Apostles: For not only *Miracles* were  
done by him and them, but they had like-  
wise the Spirit of *Prophecy*. And those *Pre-  
dictions* being Matters of *growing Evidence*,  
and being confirm'd by *Events*,— this is suf-  
ficient Proof that those inspired Persons had  
extraordinary Assistances; and if they are re-  
ported to have work'd Miracles by able and  
faithful Witnesses, such as cannot be except-  
ed against, one cannot justly refuse Assent to  
such confirmed Evidences.


Allowing therefore (what cannot be proved  
to be true) that the *Miracles* in behalf of  
Christianity were *all* done in *obscure* Places,  
yet if the *Prophecies* of Christ and of the  
Apostles, come out as they foretold, suf-  
ficient and satisfactory Evidence of the Reve-

CHAP. *lation* appears; and the Objection taken  
 XII. from the *Places* where *Miracles* were per-  
 form'd, is absolutely nothing to the Purpose.

A *fourth* Objection is taken from the *Matter* of the Revelation, and the *Manner* in which it is wrote. The Scriptures are wrote in such a *manner*, that Theologers are driven to the Necessity of employing as many false and different Methods of *Interpretation*; as Art and Study can invent. Sometimes the Scriptures are to be understood *literally*, sometimes *figuratively*: Some, but very few, contend, that they are to be interpreted *Rationally*: Some plead that they must be construed *Spiritually*; others *Typically*; and others still more *Mystically*. But besides this, which shews how unintelligible they are, 'tis plain in fact, that *Christians* themselves have been endlessly divided in Opinions about every *Precept*, *Mode*, or thing pretended to be derived from thence.

“ And setting aside the *Manner* in which  
 “ we are taught to understand them, the  
 “ *Matter* is unworthy of God. Some things  
 “ in them tend to make Men *Immoral* and  
 “ *Wicked*: Some things are *injurious to So-*  
 “ *ciety*, as tending to make *Industrious* Peo-  
 “ ple *poor*; and other things imply an im-  
 “ moral Character in God himself; such are  
 “ *eternal* Punishments inflicted for *tempo-*  
 “ *rary* Crimes.”

As

As to the first part of this Objection; The CHAP. Fact is owned, that Divines have contended XII. for the several Methods here mentioned:  But sure it is but Justice to presume, that what proceeds from the Fountain of all Truth, should be understood in a rational Manner. Why should we not understand the Scriptures as we do *Livy* or *Cicero*, or any other *Historical* or *Moral* Writer whatever? Why are not the *Figurative* Parts, the *Allegorical*, the *Parabohical*, so to be interpreted, as the like sorts of Speech are in common Books? And if no one ever mistook the distinction betwixt the *Letter* and the *Spirit* of a Law, when *Cicero* makes that distinction; surely it is as easy to understand the same Expression in *St. Paul*. If a manner of Expression in the sacred Books is *hard* or *ambiguous*, through our Ignorance of Language or Construction; this is not more than what is common in profane Writers, whose manner of Expression frequently puzzles their Readers, and leads them into different Sentiments upon them. In short, Books of Revelation are to be understood as other Books are: And the Absurdities of *Enthusiasts*, *weak*, *injudicious*, *mad*, Men, (which are thoroughly despised and laughed at in all other instances) should not be set up as Standards of sound Judgment in this one point, when Revelation is concerned.

It

CHAP.

XII.

It is urged, that “Christians are endlessly divided about every *Precept, Mode, and Institution* derived from Revelation.”

They are so : And the Reason is, not that there is greater Obscurity in the sacred Writers, than there is in other Books, but that Men of different Parts, Capacities, Skill in Languages, Interests, Parties, Sects, read and comment on them. They bring *to them* Notions which they had imbibed, or which have been imposed on them ; and instead of searching the Scriptures in order to find out what is declared *in* them, they only hunt for Evidence, in order to justify their *Prejudices*. It is well known that *Moral* Books are wrote in a different manner from *Philosophical* ones : and words are never to be understood in that Strictness in the *one*, as in the *other* Case. Figurative Expressions are always capable of a certain degree of Latitude, which may lead inaccurate People into gross Mistakes, by extending them further than the Writer did design. But yet, it is not easy to mistake the great End of Revelation ; and there has been very little if any difference among Christians, whether Goodness of Life be not universally required : The general Motives to Goodness, such as the *Resurrection from the dead ; a future Judgment ; that all must appear at Christ's Judgment*



ment Seat; a Faith in God, and in Christ, CHAP. XII.  
 —These are not the Subjects of Debate amongst the Professors of the Gospel: Or if Questions have arose, they have been about the *Modes*, which inquisitive Men have over-curiously pried into, *without*, and *beyond Revelation*, rather than upon the Matters which have been revealed.

But then I must observe that this Objection is no more justly raised against *Revelation*, than it is against *Natural Religion*. For has not every Principle of *Morality* been as much the Subject of Debate and Difference, as the *Precepts*, or *Doctrines* of Revelation have? Has not the *Existence of God*; the *Liberty of Man*; the Nature of *Good* and *Evil*; what is *Happiness*; what it is that *thinks* in us; whether the *Soul* be *immaterial* or *not*, *immortal* or *not*; the Nature of *Justice*, *Moral Honesty*, in short every point of *Morality* or *Natural Religion* been controverted? Is the Inference from thence, that there is or can be no such thing as *Natural Religion*? Is there no such thing as *Truth*, because the Question has been put, *What is Truth*? Is there no such thing as *Right Reason*, because Men have maintained infinite Absurdities and Contradictions about every thing? Have not some that pretend to be *Mathematicians* disputed about the first Principles of *Geometry*? Has not a

CHAP. late Writer, who was never doubted to be  
 XII. in himself a friend to Religion, disputed  
 whether *Matter exists* or not? Whether the  
 Principles of *Fluxions* are not incomprehensible? Whether Mathematicians have not their *Mysteries*; and what is more, their *Repugnancies* and *Contradictions*? Whether unintelligible Sounds, influencing Men to *Goodness*, be not to be supported and defended? In short, what is there that such *minute Philosophers* have not held, to the Subversion of *Human Knowledge*, and Destruction of all Science? Will it therefore be allowed, that nothing exists but God? or that there is no right Reason, no Morality, no Truth in the World? And yet one may as well conclude, from the infinite variety of controversies that are and have been, that there is nothing *True* in the *Natural* or *Moral* World, as from the great Controversies among Christians, that there is no such thing as *Revelation*; or that the Scriptures are insufficient to convey to Men of common Sense, Motives to Virtue, because every Precept, Mode, or Thing derived from them, has been the Subject of Debate.

But the very Matter of Revelation is pretended to be unworthy of God. “Some things in it tend to make Men wicked and immoral.”

Here

Here the appeal must lie to the Scriptures CHAP. XII. themselves, and not to any groundless Interpretations of them. The only instances that are produced are, that its Principles justify “ *Persecution* for Religion; and all “ Christians put that in practice with more or “ less degrees of Barbarity according to the “ power they have.” But whatever Men that call themselves Christians may do, that can no more affect the *Truth of Christianity*, or the good Principles of the Gospel, than the Vices and Follies of such Christians can the Goodness of the Rules, or the Exactness of the Example, laid down by our Saviour. Where in the Gospel is *Persecution for Religion* commanded, or so much as countenanced? Has it not provided sufficient remedy for differences in Religion, by enjoining *Charity*, and mutual *Forbearance*? Or where has it enjoined any other Method for the Cure of Divisions, among the followers of Christ?

I am not concerned for the Practices of nominal Christians, which are not founded upon any Command, or any Authority, of the Gospel. What if some imagine the words, *compel them to come in*, to relate to the use of *Fire and Sword*, and all sorts of Violence, in order to restrain difference of Sects and Parties among Christians, or to bring into the terms of the Gospel all such as are *without*?

CHAP. Has it not been shewn, even to Demonstration, that the word, *compel*, has no relation to *Persecution* of any sort, and that it means no more than *importunate pressing*, and asking? But if the force of the Objection consists in this, that the *Civil Magistrate* everywhere laies claim to a Power of Rule and Dominion over the *Consciences* of his Subjects; and that He can make Laws for them in Matters of Religion; that He by virtue of his Office can *establish* what he thinks fit, and *punish* such as shall oppose his Sentiments—If this I say be the design of this Objection against Christianity, it must first be proved, that by any *Precept*, or *Law*, of the Gospel, the Magistrate is vested with such an Authority. If this consequence follows from the Magistrate's exercising such a Power, it must first be proved that he is vested with such a Power by some *Precept*, *Rule*, *Command*, or *Concession* of Jesus Christ, or else *Christianity* is unconcerned in the Affair.

It has been indeed pretended that *Christianity* is destructive of Courage; that it inspires Men with a pusillanimous Patience; that it teaches Men to make no resistance to Evil; and that it obliges them not to oppose the Invasions, or Attacks, of Enemies: And some there be who tamely submit to all sorts of Injuries, rather than arm against, and resist


ſiſt an Oppreſſor. There is indeed ſome appearance for ſuch a Charge as this : But the beſt and ableſt Writers among Chriſtians have ſhewn at large that ſuch a Notion is groundleſs : and the general *Practice* amongſt Chriſtians ſhews the general Interpretation of all ſuch Paſſages. But to charge Chriſtianity with making Men wicked and immoral, is treating Light as the Cauſe of Darkneſs ; or making Good the Cauſe of Evil.

A like Suggestion is urged, and with the ſame Injuſtice, That the Principles of Chriſtianity are “ *injurious to Society.*” The Reason given is, not that it contradicts the Magiſtrates juſt Authority, or the Peoples Civil Rights, but becauſe it obliges “ to ſet apart a great portion of *Time* in *Sundays* and *Holidays* ; “ and maintains a great number of Priests ; “ and orders the building of a great number “ of *Edifices* or *Churches* ; and thereby tends “ to make *industrious* People *poor.*”

The Proportion of Time which Chriſtianity requires to be ſet apart is, each *ſeventh* day, in remembrance of that One God who made the Heavens and the Earth and all the Hoſt of them. It is for a Sign of a *perpetual Covenant betwixt God* and his People *throughout their Generations, that they may know the Lord.* God, the Great God, the Maker and Governor of all things, intending to ſe-

CHAP. cure his People from falling into the *Idola-*  
 XII. *tries* of the Nations round about them, in-  
 stituted at first the *Sabbath* as a Mark, or  
 Sign, by which the Worshippers of him  
 might be distinguished from all other Peo-  
 ple whatever. He was the Creator of the  
 World : The People therefore which laboured  
 six Days, and kept a Sabbath on the seventh,  
 in Memory of Him *who in six days created  
 the heavens and earth, and rested on the  
 seventh*, did by that recognize and acknow-  
 ledge the One God to be the only Object of  
 their Worship. The Observation of the  
 Sabbath was a *Sign* or *Token*, by which the  
 Worshippers of that Great Being who made  
 all things declared, that he was by them  
 esteemed the *only God*, and that all other  
 Gods were looked upon by them as *Idols*.

From hence it is, that a Reason may be  
 assigned, why a *Seventh* day was appointed,  
 and not a *Sixth*, or an *Eighth*, or a *Tenth*,  
 or any other portion of Time. It is plainly  
 from hence, that it is an Acknowledgment  
 of *Him* to be *our God*, who in *six days cre-  
 ated the heavens and the earth, and rested on  
 the seventh day*. The *Jews* observed their  
*Sabbath* on the *seventh*, or *last day* of the  
 Week ; *Christians* have as constantly kept  
 their Sabbath on the *first* : Each of them an-  
 nexing a Memorial of the greatest *Delive-  
 rance* each had met with, to the day on  
 which

which they constantly professed themselves CHAP.  
 the Worshippers of *Him*, who made and XII.  
 governs all things. 

Now it is not a little Influence that a careful Observation of this day has upon the minds of all. A good Example is set; Religion is promoted; a Sense of God is publicly encouraged; a future State is taught; the Accountableness of all Men for their Actions is pressed; Virtue and good Morals are enforced with all the Demonstrations of Truth and Light. Can there be a likelier way to improve mankind in *good Morals*, than to employ *one day in seven* in teaching them what tends to the *Good of Society*, and to the Promotion of *Temperance and Sobriety, Justice and Charity, the Love of God and right Behaviour* in every Station and Circumstance?

Yes; but so much *loss of Time* tends to make *industrious People poor*. They are obliged to pay their *Teachers*, and to build and to repair *Churches*, where they meet for *Instruction*.

Admitting so much Expence of Time and Money, the question as it relates to *Society* is, Whether it be most beneficial to it to have public Teachers of good Morals at the Expence supposed, or to have none? Does not a greater *Benefit* arise to *Society* by keeping up a *Sense of God*, and a Notion of all Mens

CHAP. being accountable for all their Actions, than  
 XII. would arise supposing such an Expence saved?

W To determine this, every thing being admitted equal, every *one* that is taught Virtue, or kept from Vice by having good Instruction, and a Sense of the great God laid before him, must be allowed so much gain to the Public: and so many *lives* as are saved, or so much *liberty* as is preserved, in consequence of the avoidance of capital, or other Offences, are to be ballanced against the Expences here mentioned. The Benefit of teaching good Morals is so great to Society, that no wonder it always met with Encouragement from all that know the Connexion between Ethics and true Politics: nor can the latter be administered, where the Groundwork is not laid in the former. If therefore industrious People are at some Expence, (not such as may keep them *poor*, as the Objection supposes) but if they are at some Expence to acquire a Knowledge of Duty, and of right Action, and of the particular Motives to it, the *Society* has the Benefit, as well as the *private Person* who contributes to so good a purpose: and therefore such Expence may justly be encouraged.

Another part of this Objection consists in charging Revelation with representing the Character of God as *immoral*: It represents him as unjust and tyrannical towards his

Crea-



Creatures ; it makes him unmerciful and void of Goodness in inflicting *eternal Punishments* for *temporary Crimes*. CHAP. XII.


This I think is one of the most manifest Instances of strong Prejudice against Revelation that can be produced. For Revelation being all founded upon *Reason*, it follows, that eternal Punishments for temporary Crimes cannot be *revealed*, if eternal Punishments are *unreasonable*. Supposing therefore that Punishments are in *Revelation* called ἀίδιοι, or αἰώνιοι, *eternal* ; if that Revelation can be proved by any just Arguments to be *true*, it follows, that such words must not, cannot, have an *unreasonable* Sense put upon them. In point of Reasoning therefore, you cannot argue that Revelation is impossible, because it speaks of Punishments *eternal*, unless you can prove that *eternal* Punishments are spoken of : and that is impossible, unless it can be proved that the Word necessarily does and must signify a proper *Eternity*. For if it be *possible*, that that Word *may* not signify so, then it is very unjust to argue against Revelation, from what is allowed to be *unreasonable*, at the same time that a *reasonable* Sense may be put upon it.

The exact Signification of an Adjective is always defined from the Substantive to which it is joined. When the term *Good* is joined to *House*, *Horse*, *Sieve*, *Roof*, *Paper*, *Ink*,

CHAP. it conveys a quite different Idea to the Mind :

XII. So when the Word, *Eternal*, or *Everlasting*, is joined to the Substantive *Hills*, or *Mountains*, or to the Word, *God*, it implies a very different Idea. In the like manner when that Term is annexed to *Punishment*, it must receive its Idea from thence : and if *everlasting Punishment* implies, as the Objection supposes, something *unreasonable*, and contradictory to the Idea which we have of God ; then it will follow, that we *ought not* to understand the *New Testament* in *such a Sense* ; but it will not follow that what our Saviour said is false. For it is highly unreasonable to put an absurd Sense upon a Passage, when it is capable of a good one, merely to destroy the Credit of a Book.

Without therefore entering into the question of *eternal Punishments*, or determining what is the meaning of that Expression, it is impossible to draw an Argument from thence against Revelation, unless it can be proved that the Expression implies *Injustice* in God. Now the constant Declarations of Scripture being that God will *judge* the World in *Righteousness*, and it being *a priori* certain, that the *Judge of all the earth* will do *right*, it is absurd to bring an Objection from the *Punishments* which are called *eternal*, and then to construe that word as signifying

nifying \* *perpetual*, and as acute at the End CHAP.  
of Millions of Ages as they were the first day. XII.  
For either this definition of *Eternal*, as ap-   
plied to *Punishments*, is *consistent* with *Righ-*  
*teousness*, and then it implies no Contradic-  
tion to suppose God to inflict them: or if  
they be *inconsistent* with *Justice*, then the de-  
finition itself is wrong; and consequently it  
is no Objection to the Revelation of the  
Gospel.

All the Difficulties that have arose, and have  
given Men ill Impressions concerning the Mat-  
ter contained in Revelation, have taken their  
rise from hence, that Men find out some other  
Rule of interpretation of Scripture than *Rea-*  
*son*. Hence hath arose a supposed Necessity  
of believing things incomprehensible to hu-  
man Understanding; Absurdities, and even  
Contradictions, which it not being safe to op-  
pose, Men have artfully contended, that *Rea-*  
*son* is always to submit to Faith; that  
Reason is no Judge of any thing Revealed;  
that it has nothing to do but to obey.  
When under this cover, they have artfully  
attacked received Notions; or have shewn  
a common Opinion to be full of Absurdity  
or Contradiction, *i. e.* when they have fully  
confuted it, and yet dared not openly deny  
it, then the duty of submission of car-  
nal Reason to Faith is flily pretended, and

\* *Mr. Bayle's Diſt. Art. Pauliciens.*

CHAP. the matter goes off with decency. No Man  
 XII. ever succeeded in this method better than  
 ~~~~~ Monf. Bayle ; and no Man ever did fo much  
 harm to Revelation, as he has done. But thus
 it must be whilst Local Truths are deemed
 sacred and incontestable ; and Liberty is not
 allowed to the Opposers of Revelation to
 speak their Minds without being injured in
 their Liberties or Fortunes. But to return to
 my Subject,

Lastly, It is urged, “ That if Judaifm
 “ and Christianity taught better Morals than
 “ other Institutions in Religion, one would
 “ think those Morals should make a Diffe-
 “ rence between *Jews* and *Christians*, and
 “ the Followers of all other Institutions in
 “ Religion, to the Advantage of *Jews* and
 “ *Christians* ; and that they should outgo
 “ all others in Practice as well as in Specula-
 “ tion, and the Knowledge of what is right.
 “ For Knowledge of their Duty can never
 “ make Men worse than Ignorance and
 “ Mistake of their Duty, but on the con-
 “ trary must necessarily make Men better.
 “ But if *Jews and Christians* will be so ab-
 “ surd as to say, that Men lead the worse
 “ lives for the Knowledge of their Duties,
 “ and grow in proportion *worse* according to
 “ their proportion of *Knowledge*, and that
 “ way account for the excessive Wickedness
 “ of *Jews and Christians*, they will from
 “ the


“ the very value they set on the Jewish and
 “ Christian Morals make *Moses* and *Jesus*
 “ introduce the most immoral Institutions
 “ that ever were. For can there be a more
 “ immoral Institution than one, that in its
 “ own nature tends to make Men worse than
 “ any other ; and that succeeds in the room
 “ of other Institutions, which in their own
 “ nature tend not to make men so bad ?”

It is owned that the Accounts which Travellers have given of the Wickedness of some that are called *Christians*, and of the particular Outrages committed by them, have been beyond all bounds enormous ; a Reproach to them which cannot be either too severely censured, or punished. It is granted that Christians of former Ages were very careless of Moral Doctrine : And that nothing equal to the Ethics of *Tully*, or *Aristotle*, was wrote for the first sixteen Centuries of Christianity. But what is this to the Morality, or Religion, of *Christ*, which is what it is, whether the Disciples of *Jesus* make That the Rule of Action or not ? Whatever is the Cause of the ill lives of Christians, it is not their *Religion*, but something which is *not Christianity* substituted in its place. If Men will place Christianity in *Speculative Opinions*, or in *Ecclesiastical Discipline* ; the Minds of Men will easily be turned from *Righteousness* and *Justice*, and *Charity* and *Sobriety*,

CHAP. *Sobriety*, and in short from *Virtue*, to what
 XII. they place their *Hopes* and *Expectations* in.

But let the *Christian Rules*, as laid down by our *Saviour* be considered; let it be shewn to what all his *Promises* are made; and against what all his *Threats* are denounced; what he exhorts to; what is the *Rule of the Judgment* which he will pass at the last day; and it will appear to be *good Actions*, or real *Goodness of Life*, in which all is to center.

To make out any *Immorality* in the *Christian Institution* recourse is always had to particular *Passages of the New Testament*, which have first a *wrong Sense* given to them, and then an *Immoral*, or a senseless *Consequence*, is drawn. Thus it is urged from such *Passages* as these, *Blessed are the poor—Wo unto you that are rich; Give unto every man that asketh; sell what thou hast, and give alms; forsake all that he hath; take no thought for the morrow, &c.* It is urged, I say, that *Poverty* and bringing *Goods in common* are preached and recommended in the *Gospel*. So *Jesus* commanded his *Apostles* not to have *two Coats*—not to exercise *Dominion*—*Women are not to adorn themselves with broidered hair, or gold or costly array; All men are to have alike honour; not to receive honour one of another.* *Christians* are commanded not to *resist evil; to pull out a right eye*—These are interpreted *literally*,
 I and

and then made to contain Absurdities. So CHAP.
 again ; *I am not come to send peace upon earth* XII.
but a sword—here the Cause is confounded 
 with the Occasion. So the Doctrine of *Re-*
pentance is made a standing Encouragement
 to Men to pursue their vicious Inclinations ;
 and *Self-denial, taking up the Cross, Fasting,*
Mortification, are deemed inconsistent with
 Mens Pursuits of Riches, and Prolongation
 of their Lives. The unlawfulness of *Di-*
vorce, and *Monogamy* too are deemed part of
 the Immoralities of the Gospel. In general,
 The Commands or Prohibitions of Christ are
 represented in an absurd manner ; what is
 spoken figuratively is taken literally ; what
 is capable of a good Sense is perverted from
 the Author's Meaning into a ridiculous one ;
 occasional Advice to particular Persons in par-
 ticular Circumstances is changed into an uni-
 versal Direction to all in all cases ; and then
 truly these Principles thus misrepresented are
 deemed the Principles of Christianity itself.

True Morality cannot possibly be too
 strictly taught ; nor can Knowledge in itself
 be prejudicial to Goodness. But it must be
 owned, that too much of something else has
 been propagated under the name and cover
 of Christianity ; and if Christians, *i. e.* such
 as call themselves by the name of Christ are
 worse Men than all others, it must be owing,
 not to Christianity, which is true, and right,
 and

CHAP. and good, but to what is substituted in the
 XII. place of Christianity, and has the ill luck to
 be called by that name. Christianity consists in the Doctrines and Motives it gives to perform Virtue ; let Virtue be its Basis ; let every Notion of Christianity in the *New Testament* be interpreted just as you would interpret any moral Book whatever, the sense of which you was desirous to understand ; use the same means to understand the Gospel, as you would to be master of *Tully's Offices*, or *Aristotle's Ethics* ; and I am persuaded Christian Morals and Christian Politics would appear demonstratively clear and true, however wicked in their Lives, and absurd in their Politics, some who call themselves Christians may in fact be.

I have reserved for a particular Discussion an Objection which has been of late much insisted on by some Writers, and which is pretended to be founded on an express Command of a plain *immoral* Practice, which is, That the Law of *Moses* enjoined *Human Sacrifices*, and commanded such a *Massacre* of *Whole Nations*, as is contradictory to all our Ideas of the Moral Attributes of God.

C H A P. XIII.

Containing an Answer to the Objections made against the Law of Moses, taken from HUMAN SACRIFICES supposed to have been appointed in it: And from the Command to destroy utterly the Seven Nations.

IT is granted on all hands that nothing CHAP.
XIII.
that is *immoral, unjust, or unworthy* of God, can proceed from Him. If therefore any Revelation contains in it any absurd or immoral Precepts, or Duties, or Commands, it carries its own Condemnation with itself, and all reasonable Creatures are bound to reject it. Now this is said to be the Case of the *Mosaic* Institution: it not only enjoins *Human Sacrifices*, but has likewise commanded such *Barbarity, such Inhumanity* towards others, as cannot possibly be owing to so *good and merciful* a Being as God is. Can he require the *Extirpation* of WHOLE NATIONS at once? Can he order that any set of Men should be so brutal and barbarous as to murder whole Cities, Men and Women and even sucking Children? Could he bid any company of Men to go any where, and *not to save alive any thing that breatheth, but*
i
utterly

CHAP. *utterly to destroy all?* To command *Human*
 XIII. *Sacrifices* implies a cruel, malicious, Disposi-
 tion : but to order the Sacrifice of *Seven*
 whole Nations at one, implies so monstrous a
 degree of Cruelty, as is inconsistent with,
 nay a flat contradiction to, all our Ideas of
 God. Should therefore any Revelation pre-
 tend to come from God with such mon-
 strous Tenets in it, it requires no considera-
 tion ; it ought at once to be rejected.

As this is levelled at the *Mosaic Institution*,
 the consequence is clear : For if the Law of
Moses did enjoin *Human Sacrifices*, and did
 require such a barbarous Extirpation of *whole*
Nations, it will certainly be impossible to
 prove its coming from God.

They who maintain that the *Law of*
Moses approves, and *countenances*, or prescribes
Human Sacrifices, argue thus. “ That the
 “ Levitical Law distinguishes between ordi-
 “ nary Vows, and those Vows where any
 “ thing is devoted unto the Lord ; and this
 “ they pretend is plain from *Lev. xxvii*,
 “ where after many surprizing things about
 “ common Vows, by which the things
 “ themselves, or Money in lieu of them
 “ were to be given to the Priests, at v. 28.
 “ it comes to things devoted, and says, *Not-*
 “ *withstanding no devoted thing that a man*
 “ *shall devote* unto the Lord, *of all that he*
 “ *batb both of man and beasts and of the*
 “ *field*

“ *field of his possession shall be sold or redeemed*—CHAP.
 “ *ed : every devoted thing is most holy unto* XIII.
 “ *the Lord ; and what is meant by being*
 “ *most holy unto the Lord, is explained in*
 “ *the next Verse— None devoted which*
 “ *shall be devoted of Man, shall be redeemed,*
 “ *but shall surely be put to death. They*
 “ *say that it was before declared, that what-*
 “ *ever was the Lord’s, as the First-born of*
 “ *Man and Beast, was to be slain, if God*
 “ *did not order its Redemption. The First-*
 “ *born of Man was to be redeemed ; and*
 “ *that of an Ass, if not redeemed by a Lamb,*
 “ *was to have its Neck broke ; and the*
 “ *Captives taken in War, which fell to the*
 “ *Lord’s Share (there being no Order for*
 “ *redeeming) were, as it is owned by all,*
 “ *to be slain ; Exod. xxx. 12, 13. xxxiv.*
 “ *19, 20.” Vid. Christianity as old as the*
 “ *Creation, p. 94—97.*

I shall therefore at large consider the Pas-
 sage which is supposed to contain the Foun-
 dation of this Notion : *Notwithstanding no*
devoted thing that a man shall devote unto
the Lord, of all that he hath, both of man
and beast, and of the field of his possession shall
be sold or redeemed : Every devoted thing
is most holy unto the Lord. None devoted,
which shall be devoted of men shall be re-
deemed, but shall surely be put to death,
Lev. xxvii. 28, 29.

CHAP. In order to a full and clear understanding
 XIII. of this, the Laws about *Vows*, and about
 ~~~~~ *devoting* things unto the Lord, and about  
*redeeming* things that were *vowed*, must all  
 be considered.

This Chapter of *Leviticus* contains the Conditions, or Prices, upon which if a Man *vowed* any thing to God, he might *redeem* it, or have it again to his own Use : Or in case he *did not*, or *would not redeem* it, it tells us then what was to be done with it. There were some things which by the Law were fixed and determined to be *the Lord's*, antecedent to any *Vow*, or *Promise*, or *devoting* of it ; and therefore for any Man to *vow*, or *sanctify*, or by any Act to *give* or *grant*, such things was needless : They were the Lord's *already*. Other things no Man could have any Right to *vow* : For what He had not Power or Authority to put in execution could not be in his Power to *sanctify*. Of the *former* kind were the *Firstlings of Beasts*, and all the *Tithes* of the Land : These it was absurd for any Man to *sanctify*, or *vow*, because they were *already*, antecedent to all *Vow*, *holy unto the Lord*. Of the *latter* kind, *i. e.* what a Man could not *vow* if he would, were <sup>a</sup> *all such Persons or*

<sup>a</sup> Nemo devovet quod suum non est. *Mishnah*. Vol. V. p. 212. § 5.

Things over which a Man had no Power, e. g. CHAP. XIII.  
 the King; the Magistrates; all independent Persons; all Things to which a Man had no Right, or in which he had no Property: For it is plainly absurd to *vow*, or *devote to God*, what he had nothing to do with.


These then being out of the question, we have in this Chapter Cases of *singular Vows* put, and the Manner of their *Estimation* by the Priest: For the Priest was to make the Estimation, not arbitrarily, but according to the Sums specified in the Law, which he could neither encrease, nor diminish, at his own pleasure. Persons might be *sanctified* or *vowed* to the Lord; and they might be *redeemed* at the Sums fix'd: A Male from *twenty* Years old to *sixty*, was to be valued at *fifty shekels of silver*, and a Female of those Ages at *thirty shekels*. The Male from five Years old to twenty was to be at twenty Shekels; the Female at Ten: From a Month old to five Years, the Male was to be valued at Five, the Female at three Shekels: But if the Parties were above sixty Years of Age, the Valuation was lessen'd, the Male was to be at fifteen, the Female at ten Shekels only.

Whatever was thus *vowed* unto the Lord was capable of being *redeemed* at the Prices set, and of being returned to the Proprietors, or original Owners. But then a Case is put, *ver. 8. But if he be poorer than thy estimation,*

CHAP. *tion, then he shall present himself before the*  
 XIII. *priest, and the priest shall value him : accord-*  
 ~~~~~ *ing to his ability that vowed, shall the priest*  
value him. What we translate, according to
his ability, is in the Original, according as
his hand can find that vowed. Suppose a
Man had vowed, or sanctified his Servant to
the Lord, and had a mind to redeem him ;
but the Master was either become poor, or
however unable to pay the legal Price of Re-
demption. You will say, perhaps, that then
he could not be redeemed. No ; here is
another Rule given of Estimation ; and that
is, what a Man can earn, or do ; or what a
Man hath, and the Estimation is to be made
according to That. The Mishna, and the
Commentators on it Bartenora and Maimo-
*nides are clear enough on this Point. “ * The*
 “ *Law, says Bartenora, concerning him*
 “ *whose hand can find, is this, that a poor*
 “ *Man ought to be estimated according to*
 “ *that which his hand can find : and in this*
 “ *we are to follow his Ability or Substance*

* Lex de illo *cujus manus affecuta fuerit, hæc est, Quod*
Pauper æstimari debeat secundum id quod illius manus asse-
quatur, & hac in parte sequimur facultatem illius qui vovit,
& non Voti. Tunc considerandi sunt in voto, si Juvenis
æstimaverit secundum pretium Senis, solvet pretium Senis,
quandoquidem non consideramus annos illius qui vovit :
Doctores autem Mishnicus eum qui æstimaverit vocat eum qui
voverit, quia Legis Phraseologia utitur, Lev. xxvii. 8. Secun-
dum id quod affecuta fuerit manus illius qui voverit, æstimabit
Sacerdos. Bartenora in Mishn. Vol. V. p. 199.

“ who

“ who makes the Vow, and not of the CHAP.
 “ thing vowed. Then we are to consider XIII.
 “ the *Persons* concern'd in the Vow : If a 
 “ young Man should vow according to the
 “ Price of an old Man, he shall pay no
 “ more than the Price of an old Man, see-
 “ ing we do not consider the Years of him
 “ that vowed, but the Vow itself.” *Mai-*
monides makes much the same Remark :
 “ a What a Man's hand can find, obtains
 “ in him who makes the Vow, as the Law
 “ says, *Lev. xxvii. 8* ; where he who hath
 “ made the Estimation is called he who
 “ vows.” The Reason of this Way of speak-
 ing is, because he who makes the Vow, does
 in reality set the Price according to which
 the Priest shall estimate, because the Man's
 Ability or Earnings is the Rule by which the
 Price is set ; though in Rigour and Exact-
 ness the Priest sets the Estimation. But all
 that I would observe is, That *Persons* vow-
 ed to the Lord might be *redeemed*, either by
 Estimations fixed in the Law, or in Cases
 of Inability to pay them, at lower Prices
 still.

From *Persons* the Law goes on to the
 Case of *Beasts*. *If a Beast were vowed, i. e.*

^a *Affectio manus obtinet in eo qui vovet, quemadmodum
 lex dicit, Lev. xxvii. 8. Secundum id quod affectuta fuerit
 manus illius qui voverit : Ubi is qui æstimavit, vocatur is qui
 vovit. Maimonides, ibid.*

CHAP. XIII. a Beast fit for the Altar, *it was not to be changed at all, neither a good one for a bad one, nor a bad one for a good one*: nay, if the Owner did change it, the Consequence was, *both were to be holy*, ver. 10. But if he vowed any *unclean Beast of which they do not offer sacrifice unto the Lord*, e. g. an Horse, an Ass, a Dog, &c. then he was to bring the Beast to the Priest, and the Priest was to value it, *whether it were good or bad*: And then if the Man would at all redeem it, or have his Animal again, he was to add a *fifth part to the Estimation*, and so to redeem it, v. 11—13.

Suppose a Man were to *sanctify his House to be holy unto the Lord*, the Priest was to estimate it; and if he that vowed it would redeem it, he was to add a *fifth Part of the Money of his Estimation*, and then it was to be his own again. And so it was in the Case of *Fields*, of which many Cases may be put; as, whether it was Land of *Inheritance*, or *Purchase*? How many Years distance was the Jubilee, &c.—They might all be redeemed at the Estimation set upon them by the Priest.

The next thing to be settled is, What is the Meaning of being *holy to the Lord*, or *Holiness to the Lord*, or, *being the Lord's*. Now these Expressions imply no more than this, that Persons, unclean Beasts, Houses, Fields,


Fields, given by Vow to God, either were CHAP. designed for the Use of the Priests and their XIII. Families: or that if they were redeemed, the Money was to be applied to the Repairs of the Temple, or to purchase the usual Sacrifices. ^a *Maimonides* has observed that by the Phrase, *Holiness to the Lord*, is meant all those things which are given “for the Repairs of the Temple: and he adds, that they were instantly to be paid, and not made use of in Trade, or otherwise, for fear of Losses”

So again, 'Tis said expressly, *Lev. xxvii. 28. Every devoted thing is most holy to the Lord.* Compare with this what is said, *Numb. xviii.* where an Account is given of what the Priests were to have. *At ver. 14. Every thing devoted in Israel shall be thine. Every thing that openeth the Matrice in all flesh, which they bring unto the Lord, whether it be of Men or Beast, shall be thine. Nevertheless the first-born of Man shalt thou surely redeem, and the firstling of unclean Beasts shalt thou redeem. But the firstling of a Cow, or the firstling of a Sheep, or the*

^a Porro dicit, *Sanctitas pro Domino*: ubi intelligit omne id quod Sanctitas est Domino, quæ simpliciter sunt omnia ista quæ in refectionem Tempû consecrata sunt, quorum jus postulat ut statim solvantur, & à nemine relineantur in commodum ipsius, quia commodum sive lucrum hocce incertum est & dubium. *Maimon. in Mishn* ibid. p. 207.

CHAP. *firstling of a Goat thou shalt not redeem ;*
 XIII. *they are holy. Thou shalt sprinkle their blood*
 upon the Altar— *And the flesh of them shall*
be thine— All the Heave-offerings of the holy
things — have I given thee, and thy Sons,
and thy Daughters with thee by a statute for
ever, &c. v. 14—19. Hence 'tis plain, that
That which was given to the Lord, and
which God had given to the Priests for their
Use and Service, was called Holy to the Lord.
Now the First-born of Man, and Unclean
Beasts, that were surely to be redeemed, were
Holy : and the Money paid for the Redemp-
tion of a Field is expressly called, a holy thing
unto the Lord, Lev. xxvii. 23. So that this
Expression does not imply that a Person or
Thing that was devoted to the Lord, and
thereby become Holy to him, was to be put
to death, but only that it was to be the
Lord's.

The next thing to be considered is, whether Devoting a *Man* to God will imply that the *Man* must be put to Death. The Text in *Leviticus* is, *Notwithstanding, no devoted thing that a man shall devote unto the Lord, of all that he hath, both of Man and Beast, and of the Field of his Possession, shall be sold or redeemed, every devoted thing is most holy to the Lord.* Men and Beasts, and Houses, and Fields, might be *sanctified*, and yet be redeemed. But here the Case of
Devoting

Devoting such things to the Lord is added ; CHAP.
and 'tis declared that things *devoted* shall not XIII.
be redeem'd. 

The *Jewish* Masters tell us, that a Man could not devote the *Whole* of what he had, because the Law supposes the *Whole* not to be devoted by its saying, v. 28. OF *man and beast, and field.* The *Mishna* observes, “^a That a Man may devote a Part of his Flock and Cattle, Men-servants and Maid-servants, that were *Cananeans*, and of the Field of his Possession : But if he were to devote the *Whole* of these, the Devoting would not be obligatory.” So says *R. Eliezar*, and the Practice is agreed to be with him, and not with *R. Eleazar* the Son of *Azariah*, who thought it absurd that a Man should devote at all, if he could not devote the Whole. These are Niceties, which it is not worth while to insist on : But it is of some Moment to take Notice of the Distinction made between a *Cananean*, and an *Hebrew* Servant : “^b *If a Jew were to*

^a Devovere potest homo à grege suo, & jumento, servis, servabusque Cananæis, agroque possessionis : Hæc vero omnia si devoverit, non sunt devota. Ita R. Eliezer. Dixit R. Eleazar fil. Azarie, Si homo nequeat Deo devovere omnia sua bona, quanto magis tenetur parcere bonis ipsius. *Mishn. Vol. V. p. 212.*

^b Si quis Filium, Filiam, Servum Servamque Hebræos devoverit, atque agrum Possessionis, non devota censentur, quia nemo devovet quod suum non est. *Mishn. ibid.*

CHAP. “devote *his* Son, or Daughter, Man or
 XIII. “Maid-servant, *that were* Hebrews, the de-
 voting would be void, because no one can
 “devote what is not his own.” This shews
 us what *devoting* signifies, viz. *An absolute*
giving to God for ever. In a *Cananean* Ser-
 vant the Master had a Property for ever ;
Ye shall take them as an Inheritance for your
Children after you to inherit them for a Pos-
session, they shall be your bondmen for ever.
Lev. xxv. 44, 45, 46. But it was not so in
 the case of a *Hebrew* Bondman, He was to
serve six years only, and in the seventh he shall
go out free for nothing, *Exod. xxi. 2.* A *He-*
brew Servant therefore could not be given for
 ever, because his Master had no such Pro-
 perty in him. And as to a *Son* or *Daughter*,
 since the Parent has no *Property* in them,
 the devoting must be void in itself, unless the
 Child consents : which if he did the devoting
 was valid ; as appears from the instances of
 Children so devoted by their Parents.

2. The Man that sanctified a Person, or
 Beast, House, or Field to the Lord, might re-
 deem it. But the Law puts a case expressly,
Lev. xxvii. 20. of a Man that has sanctified
 or vowed his *Field*, and WILL not redeem
 it. *If a man will not redeem the field, or if*
he have sold the field to another man, it shall
not be redeemed any more ; but the field when
it goeth out in the Jubilee shall be holy unto
 the

the Lord; as a Field devoted, *the possession thereof shall be the Priests*. When it was not to be redeemed *any more*, but the possession was to be the Priests, then it was a Field devoted. So that a Field given *in perpetuity*, and a Field devoted, is the same thing.

Hence it appears, that if a Man so gave a thing as to design that it should never return to his own Use, or to his Family; or if he would not redeem it, then this sort of Donation was called, *Hberem*, devoted to the Lord.

And now we may, I think, with ease apprehend the meaning of the verse, which has occasioned all the Difficulty—*Every thing which is devoted OF men shall not be redeemed, but shall surely die: i. e.* every Person which is given *in perpetuity* shall not be redeemed, but dying shall die in that devoted State. Not that he shall be *sacrificed*, or be *put to death*, in an extraordinary, uncommon, unnatural manner, but he shall not be redeemed, he shall die in a devoted State.

It will be said, that our Version has it, *He shall surely be put to death*: which implies the taking away the Life of the Person in an unnatural way: and it being opposed to his being redeemed, by the particle, *But*, this shews that it is rightly understood of *taking away the life* of the devoted Person.

But

CHAP. But 1. There is no word in the Original XIII. to answer to the particle, *But*. And, 2. Suppose there were, yet the original Words do not necessarily signify any thing more, than the persons *dying a natural death*. Thus when God said to *Adam*, Gen. ii. 17. *In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die*, מוֹת הַמָּוֶת it is not, *thou shalt be put to death*, but *thou shalt die*. For *Adam* not only continued in Being many hundred years after this Sentence was passed, but died a *natural death*. So again, when the Numbers of *Israel* were taken in the plains of *Moab*, Numb. xxvi. 65. it is said, *Among these there was not a man of them whom Moses and Aaron numbered, when they numbered the children of Israel in the wilderness of Sinai, for the Lord had said of them they shall die in the wilderness*: מוֹת יָמֵהוּ not be put to death, but die their natural deaths. So again, when *Benbadad* was sick, he sent *Hazael* to *Elisha* to enquire whether he should recover of his disease. 2 King. viii. And the Prophet's Answer was—*The Lord hath shewed me that he shall surely die*, מוֹת יָמֵהוּ. So in *Ezekiel* iii. 18. *When I say unto the wicked, thou shalt surely die* מוֹת תָּמִית and *thou givest him not warning, nor speakest to warn the wicked from his wicked way to save his life, the same wicked man shall die in his iniquity, but his blood will I require at thine hand*. And much

to the same effect, c. xxxiii. 8. xviii. 13. CHAP. XIII.
 In these and other places the words do not imply a *putting to death*, nor indeed so much as any particular emphasis; but agreeably to the form or custom of the Language, the *Hebrews* joined together Substantives to the Verbs, just as the *Greeks* very frequently did, who yet meant nothing extraordinary by such forms of Expression. So *Aristophanes*

Μέμψιν δικάϊαν μέμφομαι ταύτην.

Plutus. l. 10.

Again,

Λῆρον ληγῆϊς. v. 517. *ibid.*

And so in *Homer*,

Οἶδ' ἀγορὰς ἀγόρευον ἐπὶ Πριάμοιο θυρήσι.

Il. β. v. 788.

To shew how Persons were devoted, or given to the Lord in *perpetuity*, we have an instance directly and fully to the purpose in the case of *Samuel*. His Mother VOWED A Vow and said, O Lord of Hosts, if thou wilt indeed look on the affliction of thine handmaid, and remember me, and not forget thine handmaid, but wilt give unto thine handmaid a manchild, then will I give him unto the Lord all the days of his life, 1 Sam. i. 11. When
 the

CHAP. the child was weaned, she brought him that
 XIII. he might appear before the Lord, and there
 abide for ever. And she told *Eli*, that she
 had returned him whom she had obtained by pe-
 tition of the Lord to him as long as he liveth,
 v. 28. *Samuel* by being thus devoted to the
 Lord was not slain, or put to death: for we
 find in the following History that he came to
 judge *Israël*, and died an old Man. His
 Mother vowed him to the Lord for ever, or
 gave him for his life; and *Samuel* gave his
 Consent, and ratified his Mother's Donation:
 which shews both how a Person was de-
 voted; and at the same time that the devoted
 Person was not sacrificed, or made a Victim,
 to God.

One may naturally expect that when a
 Law of any Nation is charged with any in-
 famous Imputation, either Reasons should
 be assigned, or Instances produced, upon
 which the Charge is founded. *Capellus*, who
 espoused that side of the Question, that the
 devoted Person was to be put to death, fancies,
 that God appointed, or rather allowed these
 Devotings, *Hberem*, just as he did the Law
 about *Divorce*. He did not approve *Di-
 vorce*; but yet if any Man was of such an
 obstinate Temper that he would not live
 longer with his Wife, God, the political
 Judge of *Isaaël*, permitted him to be di-
 vorced. Just so God did not approve, that
 any

any one should *devote* an human Person to CHAP. him; but if any one were so *rash* as to do XIII. so, God would have the devoted Man put to death. Not that he *liked human Victims*, but for other reasons which God has not, nor indeed is he obliged to give, but which we may guess at.

This being all a matter of mere Suspicion, or Imagination, with an express Confession that *no reason* is given in the Law, this cannot possibly amount to any proof or evidence in the Case.

In the next place he imagines, that
 “ God ^a designed to intimate, that he gave
 “ a power of life and death to Parents over
 “ their Children, and to Masters over their
 “ Slaves: not that they were arbitrarily, or
 “ when they would, to exercise this Power,
 “ but only by the means of *devoting them*
 “ *to the Lord*; and upon such occasion the
 “ Assistance and Concurrence of the Priest
 “ was necessary.”

This is all *supposing* the thing which ought to be *proved*. By the Law, no Parents had a power of Life and Death over their Chil-

^a Ac primo videtur Deus sic tacite voluisse innuere, se potestatem vitæ et necis concedere parentibus in liberos, & heris in servos; non quidem ab ipsismet pro arbitrio exercendi, quum liberet—Sed quam hac duntaxat ratione exercerent, sacra nempe capitis illorum devotione, ad cujus executionem intervenire oportebat sacerdotum operam & ministerium. *Capellus de Voto Jephthæ.*

CHAP. dren; nor had Masters any such over their
 XIII. Slaves: And what they had no power to ex-
 ~~~~~ercise, they could not by the concurrence of  
 the Priests exercise. The Rule of the *Mishnah*, and of common Sense, is, "*that no one*  
*can devote what is none of his own.*" Now if the Lives of Children, or Slaves,  
 were not their Parents, or Masters, *own*, i. e. what they could absolutely dispose of, the  
 consequence is, that they could not devote them so as to take them away.

That the *Greeks* and *Romans* exercised such an Authority over their Children and Slaves is allowed. But the *Jews* never pretended to such a power; Their Law gave them no such Authority; nor do we hear of any such practice, unless we *suppose* the point that ought to be *proved*. The Case of *Hebrew* Servants is stated, and provided for, *Exod. xxi. If thou buy an Hebrew Servant, six years he shall serve, and in the seventh he shall go out free, for nothing. If he came in by himself, he shall go out by himself; if he were married, his wife shall go out with him. If his master have given him a wife, and she have born him sons and daughters, the wife and her children shall be her masters, and he shall go out by himself. And if the servant shall say, I love my master, my wife and children, I will not go free, then his master shall bring him unto the judges, he shall also bring him*


him to the door-post, and his master shall bore CHAP.  
 his ear through with an awl, and he shall XIII.  
 serve him for ever. The Law for Women Ser-  
 vants immediately follows; but nothing that  
 implies a power of Life and Death. Com-  
 pare this Law with what occurs, *Levit. xxv.*  
 39—55. where *no rigour* is allowed to be  
*used* towards Servants: much less had they  
 a power of Life and Death.

*Capellus* owns they had it not except in  
 this particular Case, where Parents or Mas-  
 ters could take away the Lives of Children  
 or Servants “only by the means of devoting  
 “them to the Lord.” Do the words of the  
 Law imply this? Do they necessarily signify  
 this? No. The words of the Law speak  
 no such power; and no one can prove that  
 such a command does come from God, when  
 his words are naturally capable of a different  
 Sense; and the whole Law relating to Chil-  
 dren and Slaves is quite of a different Stamp.  
 How does it appear that the present Case is  
 an Exception to the whole Law besides? Is  
 it from the Words? No. I have shewn they  
*may at least* be interpreted consistent with the  
 rest. Is it from Practice? That I deny:  
 and affirm, that not one single Instance is, or  
 can be produced, of *Human Sacrifices* a-  
 mong the *Jews*. But of this I shall speak  
 more particularly, when I have examined the

CHAP. *Second Reason produced by Capellus for*  
 XIII. his Notion, which is, \* “ That God designed  
 “ by this to deter Men from a wicked Cus-  
 “ tom, by which angry Men are wont to  
 “ devote with Imprecations those to whom  
 “ they wish ill. Since God therefore re-  
 “ solved that he should die, who was devoted  
 “ by any one who had *such a man in his*  
 “ *power*, he seems by this means tacitly to  
 “ *deter* Parents and Masters from rash Curses  
 “ and Imprecations upon their Children and  
 “ Servants,—at the same time admonishing  
 “ Children and Servants not to give the least  
 “ occasion to their Parents or Masters to im-  
 “ precate or curse them; since God some-  
 “ times, as appears by the Event, as it  
 “ were *approved* and *ratified* them.”

But how does this appear, that God by having Men put to death, designed to deter Men from devoting Men to death? He resolved, it seems, to *deter* Men from doing a wrong or wicked Act, by ratifying their

\* Deus sic forte voluit homines à pravo & quasi ingenito vitio & more deterrere, quo solent ira perciti diris & imprecationibus devovere eos quibus male volunt—Quum itaque Deus voluit eum morte affici, qui ab eo in cujus est potestate אנתומה anathemate devotus est, videtur voluisse tacite hac sanctione abstergere parentes & heros à temerariis in liberos & servos diris atque imprecationibus, quibus non raro solent commotiores in eos invehi; simul etiam ut eadem sanctione monerentur liberi & servi, ne vel minimam darent parentibus & heris in se excandescendi, atque diris & imprecationibus adversus se utendi occasionem.— *Ibid.*

wrong and wicked Acts. Strange Reverse CHAP.  
of what one would reasonable imagine! that XIII.  
the wise and just Being should seem to ap-   
prove openly what he inwardly abhorred! As  
if the Cruelty, the Immanity of such a Law  
were altered, whenever it takes place, by  
saying that God designed to *deter* Masters or  
Parents from rash Curses and Imprecations.  
The Law would be still, wherever, or when-  
ever, it was executed, a cruel barbarous Law :  
Nor is the allowance of its being executed  
but seldom, (or ever so rarely, provided it be  
allowed at all ) any abatement of the *Immo-*  
*rality*. How much better had the Law been,  
if such rash and wicked Masters or Parents  
had themselves been the Objects of severe  
Punishments, rather than their innocent Chil-  
dren, or Servants? And is it not more likely,  
that a good and just God would have prohib-  
ited in general, or with a particular penalty,  
all such rash Imprecations ; or that he would  
have punished the *Authors*, rather than the  
*Objects*, of such unguarded displeasure?

But in Truth we have no Grounds from  
the Law of *Moses* to suppose any such design  
in God, as is here imagined. And though  
we sometimes see very sad Examples of Chil-  
dren, who have suffered *as if* God had been  
only the mere Executioner of a hasty Parent's,  
or Master's, curses ; yet when there is no  
Law, no Sanction of a Law, promising,  
Y obliging,

CHAP. obliging, or any ways affirming such a procedure, it is very idle to argue from an imaginary Fact to a Law which must be founded on principles of Right and Wrong.

But besides. Put any such Sense upon the Law as implies that the person devoted was to be *put to death*; and let it be that God designed to *deter* Men from rash Curses and Imprecations; or that he designed to give Men in certain cases a power over others of Life and Death: The Wickedness and Baseness of too many Men is such, that they would abuse this power of taking away the Life of the most innocent creature; and this without any legal Form. How easily might wicked Parents, Masters, Princes, take away the Lives of their Children, Servants, Subjects, without any Crime, nay without legal Trial or Condemnation? Might not every Superior have by this means a Power of being rid of any one that he wanted to be rid of, with ease, under the Veil of Piety and profound Holiness? The plain consequence of such a Sense would naturally lead any unprejudiced Person to such a limitation of any words in a Law, as the Reason of the Case required.

There is nothing then *in the Law itself* which leads us to think, that there was such a thing as *putting* the devoted Person to *death*. Nor is any sufficient *Reason* given, why we should

should take the words in *Leviticus* in any such Sense. It is necessary in the

CHAP.  
XIII.

Laſt place to conſider the Inſtances, or Examples, produced of *Human Sacrifices* amongſt the *Jews*. And here

*Fiſt*, It is ſaid, That the Tribute unto the Lord of the Men of War that went out to the battle; “ The *Captives* taken in War “ which fell to the Lord’s Share ( there being “ no order for redeeming ) were, as it is “ owned by all, to be ſlain.” This inference is drawn from what is ſaid, *Numb. xxxi. 27, 28. The prey both of man and beaſt was to be divided into two parts, betwixt them that went out to battle, and the congregation: and they were to levy a tribute unto the Lord of the men of war which went out to the battle, one ſoul of five hundred, both of the Perſons, and of the Beeves, and of the Aſſes, and of the Sheep: and this was to be given unto the Prieſt for an Heave-offering of the Lord. The Congregation too were to part with a certain proportion of their ſhare, viz. One in Fifty, which was to be given to the Levites.*

Here it is remarkable, that but One of Five hundred was given to the Prieſts, and One in Fifty was given to the Levites. But in neither caſe was there any Victims made of *Men*, more than there was of *Aſſes*, which yet were a part of this Tribute to the Lord. *v. 39,*

CHAP. 45, 28. Do they infer a *human Sacrifice*, because the *Men*, which made part of this *Tribute*, were a *Heave-offering* to the Lord?

And may it not be as well inferred, and for the same Reason, that *Asses* were to be sacrificed in like manner? The Truth is, The *Heave-offering* was given to the Priests for their Use, and for their Families Service. *This is a covenant of Salt*, i. e. a lasting covenant for ever before the Lord unto thee, and to thy seed with thee, Numb. xviii. 19. The Heave-offering, or *Teruma*, was not burnt, or consumed upon the Altar, but after certain Rites of Consecration, were for the sole Use of the Priests and their Families, or for the Use of the Temple, or the necessary Implements thereof. This sort of Heave-offerings then, which was the Lord's Share of the *Captives*, was a Tribute, or Donation, which was for the Use of the *Priests* and *Levites*; and so far were they from being slain, that they were to the Tribe of *Levi*, what the rest of the *Captives* were to the other *Tribes*.

A *Second Instance*, is that famous one of *Jephtha's Daughter*, which no more countenances the Notion of Human Victims, than the Instance of the *Captives in war* did. The words of the Historian are, *Jephtha vowed a Vow unto the Lord, and said, If thou shalt without fail deliver the children of Ammon into mine hands, then it shall be that whatsoever*

ever



ever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me, when I return in peace from the children of Ammon, shall surely be the Lord's, and I will offer it up for a burnt-offering, *Judg. xi. 31.* Jephtha subdued Ammon; and when he came to his own house, behold his daughter came out to meet him with timbrels and dances, and she was his only child.—And it came to pass when he saw her that he rent his clothes, and said, alas! my Daughter! thou hast brought me very low, and thou art one of them that trouble me, for I have opened my mouth unto the Lord, and I cannot go back. And she said, if thou hast opened thy mouth unto the Lord, do to me according to that which has proceeded out of thy mouth. And she said unto her father, Let this thing be done for me; let me alone two months, that I may go up and down upon the mountains and bewail my Virginity, I and my fellows. This was all consented to, and done; and then she returned unto her father, and he did with her according to his Vow which he had vowed.

The difficulty arises wholly from *Jephtha's* saying, *Whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me, shall be the Lord's, and I will offer it up for a burnt-offering.* But suppose a Dog had met him, or an Ass, could he have offered them up to the Lord for a Burnt-offering? Can any thing be more

CHAP. expressly forbid, than to sacrifice *unclean*  
 XIII. *Animals*? Suppose a *Hog*, or any other prohibited Animal had happened to have met him, *could* He, or *must* He, have made it a *burnt-offering* to the Lord? He could not have done it: and therefore his Promise or Vow must mean, that if it was a thing that *could be offered* for a burnt-offering, he would offer it; if not, whatever it was, *it should be the Lord's*. And were the particle which we translate, *And*, in those words—*Shall surely be the Lord's, AND I will offer it up for a burnt-offering*, were that particle I say translated, as it is in our Margins, and as it signifies many times, *OR*, all the Difficulty would instantly be removed.

*Jephtha* was sorry that his *Daughter* should be the first thing that met him, because in consequence of the Intention of his *Vow*, He was to give her to *the Lord*. The Law was clear, *When thou shalt vow a Vow unto the Lord thy God, thou shalt not be slack to pay it, for the Lord thy God will surely require it of thee, and it would be sin in thee. But if thou shalt forbear to vow, it shall be no sin in thee. That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt keep and perform, even a free-will offering according as thou hast vowed unto the Lord thy God, which thou hast promised with thy mouth, Deut. xxiii. 21, 22, 23. And again, If a man vow a Vow*  
*unto*

unto the Lord, or swear an Oath to bind his CHAP. soul with a bond, he shall not break his word, XIII. he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth, Num. xxx. 2. *Jephtha's Daughter*, in consequence of the Intention of his Vow, was designed to be *the Lord's*; and was given to him in perpetuity as a devoted thing. And she consented to this Vow; not to be slain; not to be a burnt-offering, which could not be done; but to be a Servant of the Tabernacle, or an Attendant of the Priests; and to die in that State.

Interpret this Vow of *Jephtha* in the other way, and Then whatever met *Jephtha* at his coming home was to be offered for a burnt-offering; and the Fact might have been, that He must have offered a Dog, or an Ass, or a Camel upon the Altar of God. Now these things being absolutely prohibited, it might have been impossible for him to have performed his Vow. If it is said that he might have redeemed them—So say I, he might have redeemed his Daughter by the same Rule: And if he was obliged to sacrifice his Daughter, he might by the same Law have been obliged to sacrifice a Dog. In truth, he could not be obliged to sacrifice the one, more than the other: but as he vowed his Vow with an Intention that the first thing that met him should either be *the Lord's irredeemably*, or else be offered as a burnt-offering,

CHAP. ring, he performed his Vow, and gave his  
XIII. Daughter in perpetuity to be the Lord's.

~ Nor could he have consistently attempted to redeem her, because she *consenting* to be consecrated to the Lord *for ever*, could not be removed out of that State without a Violation of the Vow, or *breaking his word* in that whereby he had bound his Soul with a Bond.

A *Third Instance*, which I have met with as a clear Case of Human Sacrifices offered to God, is that of *Agag*, whom *Samuel* the Priest sacrificed in *Gilgal*. The Story is, That when *Saul* was sent against the *Amalekites*, contrary to the Directions which he had received to destroy them all, he spared *Agag* their King : and being made sensible that he had transgressed the Commandment of God, *Samuel* ordered *Agag* to be brought forth to him ; and *Samuel bewed Agag in pieces before the Lord in Gilgal*. 1 Sam. xv.

33.

To shew how little this is to the purpose for which it is produced, we must explain what we render *bewed in pieces* ; and what is designed by the phrase—*before the Lord in Gilgal*.

The first of these is a word, *Jeshasseph*, which occurs but in this one place, and therefore its meaning must be determined from the Circumstances of the Passage. The *Chaldee* renders it by a word which signifies to  
*cleave,*

cleave, to tear in pieces, to cut off. And CHAP. this Sense agrees with the place exactly. XIII. Samuel says to him, *As thy sword hath made women childless, so shall thy mother be childless*: and immediately he cleft him with a Sword, or cut him off. But what I would principally observe is, that this Term is not a *Sacrificial Term*, since it is not once used throughout the Law of *Moses*, where so many Orders and Commands are given about *Sacrifices*. From this word therefore there can be no pretence to assert that this was a *human Sacrifice*; since so far as appears, or can be made to appear, this word implies no such thing.

Nor does the other Expression, *before the Lord in Gilgal*, carry the Idea of *Sacrifice*, or of *Victim*, with it: But only, that *Samuel* cleaved *Agag* in pieces, with firmness of Resolution, as in the *Presence of God*, and with a Design to please him. If it should be said, That at that time there was an *Altar* of the Lord erected at *Gilgal*, and that there they offered *Sacrifices* to God, 1 *Sam.* xi. 15. as they likewise did in other places; —all that will follow is, That *Agag* was cleft down with a Sword in *Gilgal* by *Samuel*, and therefore is said to be hewed in pieces *before the Lord*; by which is meant, that it was done in a *place where* the Altar of God was set up: but not at all *upon the Altar*;

or

CHAP. or that his Blood, or Limbs, were any ways  
XIII. offered upon That.

Thus have I considered at large this great Objection against the Law of *Moses*, founded on an imaginary Notion that *Human Victims* were enjoined; and I have shewn that *Persons* were not to be sacrificed by becoming *Holy unto the Lord*. I shall in

The *Second* place consider the case of the *Seven Nations*, and of certain *Cities* which the *Israelites* took; because hence likewise an Objection has been raised against the Law of *Moses*: As if those Nations could not possibly be commanded to be destroyed consistent with the Goodness and Justice of God.

The words of the Law from whence this Objection has been raised are these.

*Deut. xx. 16, 17. Of the cities of these people which the Lord thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth: But thou shalt utterly destroy them, the Hittites, and the Amorites, the Canaanites, and the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee.*

*Deut. vii. 1—5. When the Lord shall deliver them, [viz. the seven Nations] before thee thou shalt smite them, and utterly destroy them; thou shalt make no Covenant with them, nor shew Mercy unto them, neither shalt thou make Marriages with them. Thy*  
I daughter

daughter shalt thou not give unto his son, nor CHAP.  
his daughter shalt thou take unto thy son.— XIII.  
But thus shall ye deal with them, ye shall  
destroy their Altars, and break down their  
Images, and cut down their Groves, and  
burn their graven Images with fire.

*Numb. xxxiii. 51—53. Ye shall drive out  
all the inhabitants of the land before you, and  
destroy all their pictures, and destroy all their  
molten images, and quite pluck down all their  
high places: And ye shall dispossess the In-  
habitants of the land, and dwell therein.*

This was the Command in the Law, and  
the Practice consequent upon it was— When  
the *Israelites* attacked *Arad* the *Canaanite*,  
Israel vowed a vow unto the Lord, and said,  
*If thou wilt indeed deliver this people into my  
hand, then I will utterly destroy their Cities.  
And the Lord hearkened to the voice of Israel,  
and delivered up the Canaanites, and they ut-  
terly destroyed them and their cities: None  
was left alive, Numb. xxi. 2, 3, 35. And it  
was much the same in the case of Jericho.  
The City shall be accursed, even it, and all  
that are in it to the Lord— And you in any  
wise keep yourselves from the accursed thing,  
lest you make yourselves accursed, when ye take  
of the accursed thing, and make the Camp of  
Israel a Curse, and trouble it. But all the  
Silver and Gold, and Vessels of Brass and Iron  
are Holiness unto the Lord; they shall come  
into*

CHAP. *into the treasury of the Lord*; Josh. vi. 17—

XIII. 24. And then follows the Story of *Achan*,  
 ~~~~~ ch. vii. and the exemplary Punishment taken  
 of him for appropriating to himself what was
 devoted to the Lord.

To set these Matters in their true Light,
 I shall consider first the Case of the Destruction
 of the Seven Nations; and then the
 Nature of the *Hberem*, which does not al-
 ways imply *Destruction*.

I. 'Tis granted that the *Seven Nations*
 were to be destroyed; and their Polity, and
 Form of Government, and all Power were
 to be quite put an End to. But this does
 not imply, as the Objection supposes, a *total*
destruction, or *putting to death* of every Man,
 Woman, and Child among them. The *Na-*
tions were to be destroyed *as Nations*, that is,
 their Polity and Government was to be de-
 stroyed; but there was not any such Massacre
 as is imagined. And to prove this, it is plain
 that neither *Joshua*, nor any of the *Judges*,
 numerous as they were, nor *Samuel*, nor
David, nor *Solomon*, nor others after him,
 ever understood these Words of the Law in
 such a Sense as to imagine, that they were
 obliged to cut off every Soul of these Na-
 tions, whenever they became subject unto
 them. These People, or at least several
 of the *Amorites*, *Hittites*, *Perizzites*, *Hi-*
vites, and *Jebuzites*, continued quite unto
 Solomon's

Solomon's Days, as appears from 1 Kings ix. CHAP. 20, 21, and long after. For the Historian XIII. observes, *All the people that were left of the Amorites, Hittites, Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites, which were not of the children of Israel, Their children that were left after them in the land, whom the children of Israel also were not able utterly to destroy, upon those did Solomon levy a tribute of Bond Service, unto this Day.* If Solomon therefore when he had the People of these Nations subject to him, levied only a *Tribute of Bond Service* upon them, he could not apprehend himself obliged by the Law of Moses to *Mas-* *sacre* them, or put them to death. Suppose that the Children of Israel were not able to destroy these People before the Days of Solomon; yet when this King had them in Subjection, he might have done it, instead of making them either *Tributaries* of Money, or of *Service* to him: and upon supposition that he was antecedently obliged by the Law of Moses to put them to death, I do not see how he could have changed the Command of *Death* into a mere *Tribute* of Service, or Money, or both.

2. The Case of *Uriah* the *Hittite*, 2 Sam. xi, xii. is well known. *David's* Crime in causing him to be *slain* was severely censured, condemned, and punished, by God himself. Notwithstanding *Uriah* was of those Nations devoted

CHAP. devoted to Destruction, yet still *David* had
 XIII. no right to *murder* him; nor did the Law
 ~~~~~ that commanded *not to spare any one that*  
*breatheth* of the Seven Nations, justify, or  
 excuse the Contrivance to take him away.

3. One Part of the Law here given sup-  
 poses very manifestly, that All universally were  
 not to be destroyed. For it is said, *Thou*  
*shalt not make marriages with them; thy*  
*daughter thou shalt not give to his son, nor*  
*his daughter shalt thou take to thy son, Deut.*  
 vii. 3. Could there possibly be occasion for  
 this Injunction, if it be supposed that no-  
 thing that *breatheth was to be saved alive,*  
 but all were *utterly to be destroyed?* Must  
 not their *Sons and Daughters* have been slain?  
 Or what End could it serve, to forbid all  
*Intermarriages* with a People that is sup-  
 posed not at all to *be?* I argue,

4. If the *known Reason* and *End* of the  
 Law could be obtain'd without this absolute  
 Destruction of these People, then it might  
 fairly be concluded that such Deletion was  
 not absolutely required, unless it were im-  
 possible to attain such End otherwise. A  
 certain *End* is proposed and declared; and  
 this *End* may be obtain'd by different or va-  
 rious Means. You cannot therefore argue,  
 that these People were to be *destroyed* in  
 order to such a given End; because consist-  
 ent with their *not being destroyed,* that *End*  
 may


may be secured. This *End* indeed could not be obtained without the Destruction of them, as a *Polity*, or as *Nations*; but might very well be secured consistent with their *Lives*.

The Reason given for their Destruction was— *They will turn away thy son from following me, that they may serve other Gods*, Deut. vii. 4. If then these Nations were to forsake their Idolatry, and become Converts unto the Religion of the *Jews*, they would be then, what God required them to be, *Penitents*, and proper Objects of *Forgiveness*, and not of *Punishments*. And it is a Rule laid down in Scripture, and founded in Equity— *At what instant I shall speak concerning a nation and concerning a kingdom to pluck up and to pull down, and to destroy it, if that nation against whom I have pronounced turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them*, Jer. xviii. 7, 8.

But these People not repenting, but continuing the Objects of Displeasure, the Command was *utterly to destroy their cities*, Deut. xx. 16, 17. and *to smite those nations, and to destroy their altars, and break down their images, and cut down their groves, and burn their graven images with fire*, Deut. vii. 2. Whilst they continued *Bodies Politique*, with Power and Influence, they might by Inter-marriages,

CHAP. marriages, or Leagues, keep up Idolatry :  
 XIII. And even when the *Nations*, as such, were  
 destroyed, their Altars, Images, Groves, and  
 Pictures, might tempt Men to false Wor-  
 ship ; and therefore it was not proper to  
 spare even such things. But when the Na-  
 tions were subdued, the surviving Captives  
 (made such by Right of War) might reject  
 the Worship of False Gods ; and the Occa-  
 sions of seducing the *Jews* might be re-  
 moved ; and these very People might be  
 brought to the Acknowledgment of the One  
 God ; and thus they might be preserved alive,  
 and the Reason of the Severity be observ'd,  
 without such Cruelty and Barbarity as is sup-  
 posed. And that this was in fact the Case  
 I argue,

5. From the Instances of *Persons* all along  
 preserved from this great Destruction. *Ra-  
 hab*, and her *Father*, and her *Mother*, and  
 her *Brethren*, and *all her Kindred*, were  
 preserved alive : Not only she herself, who  
 might indeed have pleaded personal Merit  
 against the Letter of the Law, but all her  
 Kindred and Family were saved from De-  
 struction. Now if the Law were to be in-  
 terpreted, as implying an unlimited Com-  
 mand in no Case, and in no Circumstances,  
 to *save alive any thing that breatheth* of these  
 Seven Nations ; neither could the Spies have  
 promised to *deal kindly and truly with her*,

nor could *Joshua*, without a manifest Breach CHAP.  
of the Law, have performed the Promise XIII.  
which they had made, *Josh.* ii. 14. vi. 22. 

So again ; We find it particularly remarked  
in *Joshua*, c. xvi. 10. *That the children of*  
*Israel drove not out the Canaanites that dwell*  
*in Gezer : but the Canaanites dwell among*  
*the Ephraimites unto this day, and serve un-*  
*der Tribute.* So likewise it is remarked,  
*Judges* i. 25. concerning the City of *Bethel*,  
when the House of *Joseph* took it, they let  
*a Man and his Family* that shewed them the  
Way into the City, *go free.* Again, v. 28.  
*It came to pass when Israel was strong, that*  
*they put the Canaanites to Tribute, and did*  
*not utterly drive them out.* And 'tis ob-  
served, that neither did *Ephraim* drive out  
the *Canaanites* in *Gezer*, nor *Asker* drive  
them out in many Places ; and as to *Zebulun*  
and *Naphtali*, and the House of *Joseph*,  
*They made the Canaanites and the Amorites,*  
become *Tributaries to them*, v. 27—35. Since  
therefore neither *David* with all his Power,  
nor *Solomon* did destroy these People ; since  
they subsisted in that Country from the Days  
of *Moses* upward of *four hundred and four-*  
*score years* ; and since they were so far subdued  
as to become *Tributaries*, of *Service*, as well  
as of *Money* ; and since they might therefore  
have been absolutely destroyed, because con-  
quered, and yet were kept alive—hence I

CHAP. argue that these People were not to be abso-  
 XIII. lutely and entirely cut off, Men, Women,  
 ~~~~~ and Children, without any Mercy or Com-  
 passion; but only that they were to be de-
 stroyed *as Nations*; and that if they submit-
 ted, and became subject to the *Jews*, and
 relinquished their Idolatry, they were not to
 be deprived of Life. For did none of the
Jews in all this Time understand the Com-
 mand? Did none of their Generals, or suc-
 cessful Warriors, understand, that their Business
 was absolutely to *destroy* all these People?
 Had they no Opportunity? Had they no
 Power? no, not when they made them
 Tributaries? was *Joshua*, was *Samuel*, was
David such a Stranger to the Law?

But what then is the Meaning of those
 Words— *Thou shalt save alive nothing that
 breatheth, but thou shalt utterly destroy
 them?*

The Answer is: The *Seven Nations* were
 the peculiar People whose Land the *Jews*
 were to take Possession of; and in whose
 Place They were to dwell. They were to
 be outed quite, to make Way for these New
 Inhabitants: in course therefore they, as
 Nations, were to be destroyed, and all
 Power was to be taken from them; and
 they were so far to be conquered, and re-
 duced, as not to have it in their Power to
 teach the *Israelites to do after all their abomi-
 nations*

nations which they had done to their Gods, so CHAP. as to make them *sin against the Lord*. No XIII. Alliance was to be made with them ; no Treaties of Peace were to be concerted ; no Peace was to be proclaim'd unto them : but they were to be subdued and smitten without Mercy, that the *Israelites* might have the Inheritance, which had been all along promised to them. With other Nations or Cities, Peace and Alliances might be made, but not with these. If a War arose betwixt the *Jews*, and any other State or City which was not of the Seven Nations, and such City stood a Siege, They were first to proclaim Peace unto it ; and if the City were willing to become *Tributary* to them, it was to be accepted : if it stood the Siege, and would not accept the Terms proposed, and it afterwards was taken, then its *Males* were to be slain, but not the *Women* and *Children*, *Deut. xx. 10—15*. But of the Cities of these People, which the Lord thy God doth give thee for an Inheritance, thou shalt save nothing alive that breatheth, v. 16. With the Seven Nations the Case was not to be the same as with those People that were remote from them : But if a City stood the Siege, and put the Issue upon their Courage and Fortitude, then *all* were to be destroyed ; not only *Males*, but *Females* and *Children*. But then, if they did submit themselves,

CHAP. the Law does not enjoin that Males and
 XIII. Females, and every thing that breatheth
 shall be destroyed; but they might have
 their Lives, and the *Nation* only, as such,
 was to be destroyed. This Difference was
 to be made betwixt the *Seven Nations* and
 all *other Cities*: in case of Refusal to sur-
 render, *all* were to be destroyed, *Men, Wo-*
men and Children, every thing that breatheth,
 among the *Seven Nations*: Among Others,
 in like case of Refusal, only the *Males* were
 to suffer: But at all Adventures, Those Na-
 tions were to have all Power and Dominion
 taken from them, and they were to be sub-
 verted: And thus will the Law and the sub-
 sequent History be reconciled.

The *Hivites* were certainly one of the
 Seven Nations with whom no League ought
 to have been made; yet by their Art *Joshuab*
made peace with them, and made a league,
 upon the Condition which they themselves
 offered; *We are your servants,* Josh. ix. 11,
 15. In the Event of things, *There was not*
a City that made peace with the children of
Israel, save the Hivites—For it was of the
Lord to harden their hearts, that they should
come against Israel in battle, that he might
destroy them utterly, and that they might
have NO FAVOUR, but that he might de-
stroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses,
Josh. xi. 19, 20. The Conclusion seems
 from

from hence very natural, that as they chose CHAP. XIII.
 to oppose themselves, and try their Success XIII.
 in Battle, and would not surrender, nor ac- ~
 cept any Offers of Submission, they were
cut off. But then, had they submitted, and
 surrendred themselves up, they might have
 had FAVOUR, though they were not to
 have been received as *Allies* or Friends,
 whereby they might have had a Power to
 make *Israel sin against God*—*For if thou*
serve their Gods, it will surely be a snare to
thee: Vid. *Exod.* xxiii. 32, 33. *Deut.* vii. 4.

It may be said, and *Le Clerc* has urged
 it, that * “ The Words of the Law are
 “ very express, *Deut.* xx. 15, 16. where the
 “ Seven Nations are excepted, so as not to
 “ be reckoned among those who were to
 “ have their Lives, if they surrendred them-
 “ selves up. Besides, there is a great dif-
 “ ference between a Law which commands
 “ a People utterly to be destroyed, lest it
 “ should entice those who spared them to

* Verum diserta sunt Legis Verba infra cap. xx. 15, 16. ubi excipiuntur Septem Populi, ne inter eos habeantur quibus Vita offerebatur, si se dederint. Præterea magnum est discrimen inter Legem quæ jubet populum ad interfectionem deleri, ne ad Idololatriam parentes pelliceat, qualis de septem Chananæorum populis lata est; & Legem, quæ juberet eum populum occisione occidi, nisi vestigalis fiat, & religionem dominorum amplectatur. Si posterius voluisset Moses, ubi mentionem facit Legis de delendis Chananæis, clare hanc suam mentem expressisset: res enim digna erat, de qua etiam atque etiam moneantur Hebræi. *Clericus in Deut.* vii. 2.

CHAP. “ Idolatry (which is the Case of the Seven
 XIII. “ Nations) and a Law which commands a
 ~~~~~ “ People to be utterly destroyed, unless it  
 “ became tributary, and embraced the Re-  
 “ ligion of their Superiors. Had *Moses* in-  
 “ tended this latter Case, he would certainly  
 “ have expressed his Mind clearer in those  
 “ Places where he mentions the Command  
 “ to destroy the *Canaanites*; and it was a  
 “ Case that deserves the utmost Clearness;  
 “ and the *Jews* ought to have had it incul-  
 “ cated over and over.”

But it is in fact in this, as it is in many other Cases; Writers express themselves in their own Manner; and the intelligent Reader is forced to be at the Pains of searching, and comparing many Passages, if he will have an exact Knowledge of almost any Point. Practice will often determine the Meaning of an obscure Law: And in the present Case, we have Instances for *five hundred* Years together, of what the *Jews* did to these very Nations: which is a Comment sufficient to shew us, how they understood their Law.

But, says Mr. *Le Clerc*, “<sup>a</sup> What signifies it to make many Words? This was

<sup>a</sup> Quid opus est verbis? Hæc erat vis Voti quod Hebræi vocant *Hberem*, ut hostes, qui eo nomine devoti fuerant, necessario occiderentur. *Vid.* Lev. xxvii. 29. Chananæorum autem Septem familie sunt ita devotæ. *Cleric.* in *Deut.* vii. 2.

“ the Nature and Obligation of the Vow CHAP.  
 “ which the *Hebrews* call *Hberem*, that XIII.  
 “ Enemies devoted in that Form were all  
 “ to be *slain*. Vid. *Levit.* xxvii. 29. And  
 “ the Seven Nations of *Canaan* were so de-  
 “ voted.”

It appears sufficiently that the Law in *Leviticus* here refer'd to, does not relate to putting to death any devoted Person ; nor is there any Instance of any Person devoted to the Lord who ever was in virtue of being devoted, put to death ; and consequently this excellent Commentator was mistaken in this Point.

It has been shewn that the Charge of instituting *Human Sacrifices*, or of the *Jews* practising any such Custom, is not to be imputed to the Law of *Moses* : Nor is that Cruelty and Barbarity with which God is accused in ordering the *Seven Nations* to be massacred, or destroyed utterly, to be found in the Law. But I must proceed a little further, that I may remove the Foundation of this sort of Difficulties, which all arise from not having an exact Notion of the Meaning of the Word, *Hberem*, and to what that Word is applied in the *Old Testament*. I will produce all the Places where that Word is used, and shew its different Senses as I proceed ; which if the Reader imagines to be superfluous, he may pass it by,

CHAP. *Exod. xxii. 20. He that sacrificeth to any*  
 XIII. *God, save unto the Lord only, he shall be ut-*  
 ~~~~~  
terly destroyed: יחרם; i. e. He shall cer-
tainly be put to death without favour, or
mercy. No mercy was to be shewn him,
but he was to be stoned. Thine eye shall not
pity him, neither shalt thou spare, neither
shalt thou conceal him, Deut. xvii. 2—5.
 xiii. 8.

Lev. xxvii. 21. The field when it goeth out
in Jubilee shall be holy unto the Lord, as a
Field devoted; the possession shall be the
Priests. It could never be redeemed by the
Proprietor, but was to continue the Possession
of the Priests for ever. Here devoted, sig-
nifies, absolutely given in perpetuity to the
 Lord.

Ver. 28, 29. These have been above at
 large considered, and 'tis shewn that Persons
 as well as Things were likewise given *in per-*
petuity, i. e. irredeemably.

Numb. xviii. 14. Every thing devoted in
 Israel shall be thine; *i. e. Lands, Houses,*
 Beasts, or Men, shall be the *Priests* for
 ever.

xxi. 3, 4. *If thou wilt indeed deliver this*
people into mine hand, then will
I utterly destroy their cities.

And the Lord hearkened to the
voice of Israel, and delivered up
 the

the Canaanites and they utterly CHAP.
destroyed them and their cities. XIII.

It may be right to observe, that this last verse is not to be understood of what came to pass in *Moses's* days, since it was *Joshua* afterwards, and not *Moses*, that destroyed the King of *Arad*, Josh. xii. 14. For the Sense of the word, Vid. *Exod.* xxii. 20.

Deut. ii. 34 *We took all his cities [Sihon's] at that time and utterly destroyed the men and the women, and the little ones of every city, we left none to remain. Vid. Exod. xxii. 20.*

iii. 6, 7 *We utterly destroyed them [Og's Cities] as we did unto Sihon King of Heshbon, utterly destroying the men, women and children of every city. But all the cattle, and the spoil of the cities we took for a prey unto ourselves. Vid. Exod. xxii. 20.*

vii. 2 *When the Lord thy God shall deliver them before thee, thou shalt smite them, and utterly destroy them; thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor shew mercy unto them. Vid. Exod. xxii. 20.*

Deut,

CHAP. Deut. vii. 26 *The graven images of their gods shall ye burn with fire.—Neither shalt thou bring an abomination into thine house, lest thou be*

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HHEREM, a cursed thing like it; but thou shalt utterly detest it, and thou shalt utterly abhor it, for it is HHEREM, a cursed thing.

All *Idols*, and all that belonged to them, were to be *burnt*, and nought of the *Hherem* was to be kept, *lest thou be, Hherem, like it.* In the *Arabic* tongue, *Hbaram* signifies to *forbid, to be unlawful*; and the Substantive from it, *a thing prohibited.* This, I guess to be the original meaning of the Word: And then because an *Idol* was what was *forbidden*, what was *not to be kept*, what was *unlawful*, or *forbidden*, an *Idol*, I say, was called, *Hherem.* Because likewise what was *unlawful*, and *not to be kept*, and could *not be used*, was to be *destroyed*; Hence the *Hebrew* Signification of the Word *Hbaram*, to *destroy*: Vid. Mr. *Le Clerc's* Notes upon *Deut. vii. 26.* This Text therefore is thus to be understood—*The graven Images of their gods shall ye burn with fire.—Neither shalt thou bring an abomination into thine house lest thou be, Hherem, a thing to be destroyed like that; but thou shalt utterly abhor it, for it is*
abso-

absolutely forbidden, and therefore to be de-
stroyed.

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Deut. xiii. 15 *Thou shalt surely smite the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword, destroying it utterly, and all that is therein, and the cattle thereof with the edge of the sword.*

16, 17 *And thou shalt gather all the spoil of it into the midst of the street thereof, and shalt burn with fire the city and all the spoil thereof — And there shall cleave nought of the Hherem, the cursed thing, to thine hand. Vid. ch. vii. 26.*

xx. 16, 17 *But of the cities of these people which the Lord thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth, but thou shalt utterly destroy them.*

In the Books of the Law then the word *Hherem* signifies 1. a thing absolutely prohibited, such as an *Idol*, or the *Gold* of an *Idol*. 2. A thing given to the Lord in *perpetuity*, and therefore prohibited from common Use: And so the *Arabic* word likewise signifies, a *sacred thing prohibited* from common Use. 3. *Destruction without Favour*

OR

CHAP. of *Mercy*; as in the Cases of *Idolaters*, or
 XIII. war. We shall find other Significations of
 this Word as we descend lower.

Joshua ii. 10 *Sehon and Og whom ye utterly destroyed. Vid. Exod. xxii. 20.*

vi. 18 *The city [Jericho] shall be, Hherem, accursed, even it and all that are therein to the Lord: only Rahab the harlot shall live, she and all that are with her in the house—*

17 *And you in any wise keep your selves from the [Hherem] accursed thing, lest ye make yourselves accursed, when ye take of the accursed thing, and make the camp of Israel a Curse—*

21 *And they utterly destroyed all that was in the city both man and woman, young and old, and ox and sheep and ass, with the edge of the sword. Vid. Exod. xxii. 20.*

vii. 1 *But the children of Israel committed a trespass in the accursed thing: for Achan—took of the accursed thing.*

11, 12 *Israel hath sinned, and they have also transgressed my covenant which I commanded them, for they*

they have even taken of the ac-
 cursed thing, and have also stoln
 and dissembled — Therefore the
 children of Israel could not stand
 before their enemies — because
 they were accursed, Hherem,
 neither will I be with you any
 more, except ye destroy the, Hhe-
 rem, accursed from among you.

Josh. vii. 13 Up, sanctify the people, and say,
 sanctify yourselves against to-
 morrow, for thus saith the Lord
 God of Israel, there is an ac-
 accursed thing, Hherem, among
 you; thou canst not stand before
 thine enemies until ye take away
 the accursed thing, from among
 you.

15 It shall be that he that is taken
 with the, Hherem, accursed thing,
 shall be burnt with fire, he and
 all that he hath.

viii. 26. Joshua drew not his hand back—
 until he had utterly destroyed
 all the inhabitants of Ai.

x. 1 When Adonizedeck—had heard
 how Joshua had taken Ai, and
 utterly destroyed it.

28 And the King thereof he utterly
 destroyed.



- And all the souls that were therein be utterly destroyed that day.*
- 37 *He left none remaining, but destroyed it utterly, and all the souls that were therein.*
- 40 *He utterly destroyed all that breatheth as the Lord, &c.*
- xi. 11 *Utterly destroying them.*
- 12 *He utterly destroyed them.*
- 20 *For it was of the Lord to harden their hearts that they should come against Israel in battle, that he might utterly destroy them, and that they might, N. B. have no favour; but that he might destroy them as the Lord commanded Moses.*
- 21 *Joshua destroyed them utterly and their cities.*

In all the passages of *Joshua* where the word, *Hberem*, occurs, it signifies, *total Destruction without favour*, except in those which relate to *Jericho*. But *Jericho* is called a *Hberem*, and yet was not *totally* to be destroyed: For *all the silver and gold and vessels of brass and iron were to come into the treasury of the Lord*, ch. vi. 19, 24. and every thing *else* was to be destroyed: and accordingly *all that was in the city, both man and woman, young and old, ox, and sheep, and*
ass

as was utterly destroyed. But Achan stole of CHAP. what was consecrated to the Treasury of the XIII. Lord, and *dissembled and hid two hundred shekels of silver, and a wedge of gold of fifty shekels, and hid them in his tent.* Hence it appears that when Jericho, and all that are therein were said to be, *Hberem, to the Lord*—The word does not signify a *total Destruction* of every thing in the City; for certain things were to be saved, and *exempted from common Use*, whilst all the rest were to be destroyed. *Hberem* therefore here signifies, an Exemption of the whole City from common Use by destroying one part utterly, and giving the other to the Treasury of the Lord. In all the other places it signifies a *total Destruction without favour.*

In *Judges* xxi. 11. *1 Sam.* xv. 3, 8, 9, 15, 18, 20, 21. *1 Kings* ix. 21. xx. 42. *2 Kings* xix. 11. *1 Chron.* iv. 41. *2 Chron.* xx. 23. xxxii. 14. the word, *Hbaram*, is used for a mere *total Destruction*; and no *devoting to God* is so much as intimated: nay it is impossible any such Notion should be, because in some places *Heathens* and *Heathen Kings*, and their Father's Actions in *destroying Nations* are spoken of. And as to *1 Chron.* ii. 7. the Story of *Achan* is alluded to, for which see the Observations made upon the Use of this Word in *Joshua*.

CHAP. Ezra x. 8 *A proclamation was made that whosoever would not come within three days—all his substance should be forfeited, and himself separated from the congregation of those that had been carried away.*

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Here we have a new Sense of the Word, *Hbaram*, and it implies a *Seisure* or *Forfeiture* to the public Treasury; or if it were to the *Temple*, then it signifies a *forcible* taking from any one his Substance, and giving it in Perpetuity to the Lord; whereas in *Moses's* time it signified a *voluntary* Consecration or Devoting only. I find that generally it is understood to be a *Seisure* for sacred Uses: and so the Apocryphal *Esdras* and *Josephus* understood it, *Esd.* ix. 3. *Jos. Arch.* l. 11. 5. But this Sense of the Word is only to be found in this place in the Old Testament.

Eccles. vii. 26. *And I find more bitter than death a woman whose heart is snares and nets, Hberanim.*

Here, as in several other places which will occur by and by, this Word is used very figuratively for something that *entangles*, or is *destructive* to Fish, and thence is applied to Men and Women in the same manner.

In

In *Iſaiab*, The Term is used in other Senses still. CHAP.
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Isa. xi. 15. *The Lord shall utterly destroy the tongue of the Egyptian ſea— he ſhall ſmite it in the ſeven ſtreams, and make men go over dry-ſhod.*

xxxiv. 2 *For the indignation of the Lord is upon all nations, and his fury upon all their armies, he hath utterly deſtroyed them, he hath delivered them to ſlaughter.*

5 *For my ſword ſhall be bathed in heaven; behold it ſhall come down upon Idumea, and upon the people of my curſe, Hhermi, to Judgment.*

In theſe places it is applied as an Act of God himſelf to *deſtroy Things* as well as *Perſons*, and therefore there can be no *devoting to God* implied.

xxxvii. 11 *Behold thou haſt heard what the Kings of Aſſyria have done to all lands by deſtroying them utterly.*

xliii. 28 *Therefore I have profaned the princes of the ſanctuary, and have given Jacob to the curſe, Ie Hherem, and Iſrael to reproaches.*

CHAP. In this place, *Hherem*, doth not seem to signify a *total Destruction*, but *abuse, contempt, contumely*, consistent with their being *not destroyed*.

Jer. xxv. 9 *Behold I will take all the families of the North, and Nebuchadnezzar the King of Babylon my servant, and I will bring them against this land, and against the inhabitants thereof, and will utterly destroy them, and make them an astonishment, and an hissing, and perpetual desolation.*

i. 21 *Waste and utterly destroy after them.*

26 *Destroy her utterly, let nothing of her be left.*

li. 3 *Destroy ye utterly all her host.*

Ezek. xxvi. 5 *It shall be a place for spreading of nets in the midst of the sea,*
Vid. *Eccles. vii. 6.*


14 *A place to spread nets on.* Ibid.

xxxii. 3 *They shall bring thee up in my net.* Ibid.

xliv. 29 *Every devoted thing, Hherem, in Israel, shall be theirs.* Vid. *Num. xviii. 14.*

xlvi. 10 *A place to spread forth their nets.* Vid. *Eccles. vii. 6.*

Dan.

- Dan. xi. 44 *Therefore he shall go forth with* CHAP. *great fury to destroy, and utter-* XIII. *ly to make away many.* 
- Mich. iv. 13 *And I will consecrate their gain unto the Lord, and their substance unto the Lord of the whole earth, i. e. give unto the Lord.*
- vii. 2 *They hunt every man his brother with a net. Vid. Eccles. vii. 6.*
- Habak. i. 15 *They catch them in their net.*
 16 *They sacrifice unto their net.*
 17 *Shall they empty their net.*
- Zech. xiv. 11 *There shall be no more utter destruction, but Jerusalem shall be safely inhabited.*
- Malac. iv. 6 *I will smite the earth with a curse, i. e. with utter destruction.*

From this Induction of Particulars we may observe how this word has been used in different Significations. It signified 1. as the *Arabic* now has it, to *prohibit*, to *declare unlawful*. 2. Hence it comes to signify an *Idol*; That and all that belong to it being *absolutely forbid*. 3. Because what was unlawful was not to be kept, or used, it came to signify in general to *destroy*, and 4. to *destroy without Favour or Mercy*. Because that was declared unlawful to be used, which was *given to the Lord*, and what was *given in*

CHAP. *Perpetuity* could not be redeemed; hence, 5.

XIII. what was *devoted to the Lord* in this manner, had the Name of *Hberem*. And hence, 6. what was *appointed to Destruction by God*. Afterwards, 7. whatever was *forfeited or ad-dicted* to the *sacred Treasury* by way of Punishment was called *Hberem*. 8. From the general Signification to *destroy*, Instruments of Destruction to Fish and Beasts, viz. *Nets* were called by the Name of *Hberem*. 9. Because People that *merited Destruction* were justly liable to *Reproach* and *Contumely*, tho' they were *not destroyed*, they are called *Hberem*. Lastly, it is by late Writers very commonly used for a Person loaded with Imprecations or Curses: But not once is it so used in the Old Testament, as far as I have observed it.

And now to return from this, I hope, not useles Digression. What foundation is there to imagine that persons given to the Lord, or devoted, were ever slain, or made Sacrifices of? What one place intimates such a Custom in the Sacred Writings? And what an Abuse must that be, to maintain a Notion, which has not the least Foundation in Word, or Thing, in any Passage of the Scriptures, in order to depretiate a Book which contains the strongest and best Motives to *Virtue* and *Truth*, that ever were laid before Mankind?

C H A P. XIV.

Containing an Enquiry into what Moral Principles the Heathen World had, before our Saviour's Times.

IT has been shewn above that *Truth* is the Rule and Law of Action to reasonable Agents: And it follows, that if any reasonable Creature makes that the measure of his Actions, he must be acceptable to the Governor of the Universe. No doubt is made concerning such as have the Benefit of *Revelation*: They can know and understand their Duties. But Revelation has extended to but a small part of Mankind: and there was a time, when only *One Nation* could boast of having the *Oracles of God committed to them*. What was the case *at that time* of all the rest of Mankind? Were they able to discover their Duties? What Light had they to find them out? Or were they uncapable of knowing their Duties, for want of sufficient Light to direct them?

This being an Enquiry into a *matter of Fact*, it will be necessary to consider what the *Heathens* knew concerning *God* and his *Attributes*; what they maintained concerning *Social Relations*, and the *Duties* thence

CHAP. arising; what they held concerning a *Future*
 XIV. *State*, and the *Punishments* and the *Rewards*

of That: And if it appears that They had right and just Notions concerning their *Duties*, and had right Principles sufficient to lead them into right Action, it will follow, that the Light of Reason is not that *uncertain, weak, insufficient, inconsistent* thing, that is by some pretended: nor ought it to be treated as something *carnal*, and *dim*: And we shall be able likewise to determine a Point canvassed by some, Whether “ the Duties of “ *Morality* were carried by our Saviour to “ much higher Degrees of Purity and Perfection,” than they were in fact by the Heathen, by the mere dint of Natural Reason.

But previously it must be observed, that the *Way* by which any Relations are made known, does not *make*, or is not the *Cause* of, the Relations themselves: They are what they are, independent of the *Manner* by which we become acquainted with them. But in order to *Duty*, i. e. to a correspondence of Behaviour suitable to the Relation which one Being stands in to another, it is previously necessary that the Relation should be *known*. Revelation therefore, by discovering or making known *Relations*, will make corresponding *Duties* arise; which *Duties* likewise may be told us by Revelation, or they may be left

to what the Light of Reason will teach to be proper or fit to be done in the given Case. Revelation too may give much Light to certain Points, which unassisted Reason may not be able to *prove* so clearly and strongly as not to be resisted; and consequently it may be of *eminent Use* to Mankind in this respect. But this is not the Subject of the present Enquiry; which is merely into a *matter of fact*, what Notions the *Heathen* had concerning God, and Man; and the Duties arising from thence; and what Principles they had which might have led them into right Action. And from hence it will be easy to see, whether Revelation design'd to carry Morality to greater degrees of Purity and Perfection than Reason could; and whether the *Heathens* were utterly ignorant of any Instance of *Moral Duty*, that has since been discovered by the Help of the Gospel.

The great Principle of all Morality, which can never be too closely adhered to, and which ought never to be receded from, is this;--That *Truth* is the great Law of Action: Every Rational Agent is *obliged* by it; God himself, the Great Lord of All, the Great Governor, Director, and Controuler of the whole World, never did, never will, never can depart from it: It is equally a Law to Him and to all his Reasonable Creatures. The Love of Truth is the great Principle of all Virtue,

CHAP. and all good Morals ; nor does any one thing
 XIV. argue a Meanness of Spirit, a little, pitiful,
 abject Mind so much, as not to be able
 or willing to follow Truth. The *Persians* of old were so sensible of this, that they “ taught their Children nothing”, says *Herodotus*, “ from the fifth till their twentieth Year of Age, ^a but these three Things, to Ride, to Shoot, and to *Speak Truth*.” He adds soon after, that “ ^b it was thought by them the *basest* and *most scandalous* thing, “ to *lye* : Next to That, to be in debt, upon many other Accounts, but principally “ that it is necessary that he that is in debt, “ should tell Lies.” *Xenophon* gives an Account of the *Persian* Institution of Children, not indeed in the same Words, but what will amount to the same ; *viz.* “ ^c That Children there go to School to learn *Justice*, “ as the *Grecian* Boys did to learn *Letters* : “ and that they brought Accusations against

^a Παιδεύουσι δὲ τὰς παῖδας, ἀπὸ πενταέτης ἄρξάμφοι. μέχρι εἰκοσαέτης, τρία μῦθα, ἵππευσθαι, καὶ τοξοῦναι, καὶ ἀληθίζεσθαι. *Hero.* l. 1. c. 136.

^b Αἰσχρὸν δὲ αὐτοῖσι τὸ ψεύδεσθαι νομίζουσι. δεύτερον δὲ, τὸ ὀφείλειν χρηστῶ. πολλῶν ἰσθ' ἢ ἄλλων εἰνεκα, μάλιστα δὲ ἀναγκαῖον φασὶ εἶναι τὸ ὀφείλοντα ἢ τι ψεῦδος λέγειν. *ibid.* c. 138.

^c Οἱ μὲν δὲ παῖδες εἰς τὰ διδασκαλεῖα φοιτῶντες, μάχονται μανθάνοντες δικαιοσύνην, καὶ λέγουσι ὅτι ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἔρχονται, ὡσπερ παρ' ἡμῶν οἱ τὰ γράμματα μαθησόμενοι.—Γίνεται ἤδη καὶ παισὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὡσπερ ἀδελφῶν, ἐγκλήματα καὶ κλοπῆς καὶ ἀρπαγῆς, καὶ βίας, καὶ ἀπάτης. καὶ κακολογίας, καὶ ἄλλων ὧν εἶκος. Οἷς δ' ἂν ἤματι τέττον τι ἀδικούντας, τιμωρῶνται. Κολάζουσι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀδικῶς ἐγκαλέντας εὐρισκῶσι. *Xenop. Cyrop.* l. 1. p. 3.

“ one

“ one another for Acts of Theft, Robbery, CHAP.
 “ Force, Deceit, Evil-speaking, &c. And XIV.
 “ if any of them were found guilty of In-
 “ justice, they were punished. They punish-
 “ ed too, such as were found to be unjust
 “ Accusers.” There is in *Truth* or *Veracity*,
 something so noble, so natural, and so power-
 ful, that whosoever will form his Conduct
 upon this Principle, must acquire the most
 amiable Character : And perhaps *Epaninon-*
das is not more to be admired in any Part of
 his Life, than this, That he was “^d so rigid
 “ an Admirer of *Truth*, that he never al-
 “ lowed himself in Raillery or Jest, to
 “ tell a Lye.” Nay, so strict an Observer
 of *Truth* was *Cyrus*, that when he was go-
 ing to try the King of *Armenia* for his Life,
 he began with charging the King to “^e speak
 “ *Truth* ; for”, says he, “ I would have you
 “ to know, that to tell a Lye is the greatest
 “ Obstacle to Pardon that can be.” But I
 must add, that *Plato* in many places speaks of
Truth as the *Law of Action* : “^f *Truth* is the
 “ Guide to all Good, both in the Gods and

^d Adeo veritatis diligens, ut ne joco quidem mentiretur.
Cornel. Nep. Epaninondas.

^e Τὸ γὰρ ψευδοῦν φαίνας εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι καὶ τῷ συζητήματι τινὲς
 συγχάνειν ἐμποδῶν μάλιστα ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται. *Xenop. Cyrop.*
 l. 3. p. 51.

^f Ἀλήθεια πάντων μὲν ἀγαθῶν θεοῖς ἡγεῖται, πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώ-
 ποις ἡς, ὁ γεννηθεὶς μέλλων μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων. ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς
 μέτοχος εἶναι, ἵνα αἷς πλείστον χρόνον ἀληθῆς ᾖ ἀθεοῖσι. *Plato de*
Leg. l. v.

“ *Men* :

CHAP. “ *Men* : and he that would be *Happy* should
 XIV. “ endeavour to partake of it as soon as possible, that he may pass his Life longest in
 “ *Truth*” ; *i. e.* that he may live the longest in a State of Happiness.

Natural Reason then discovered this great Principle, which was to serve all Men in the Conduct of Life, as a sure Rule, or Measure, or Law of their Actions. The next Enquiry must be how those who had only the Light of Nature pursued *Truth* ; and what they discovered about the *Governor of the Universe*. And here 'tis plain, that

The Heathens had a Knowledge, or firm Persuasion, that there existed *One, underived, eternal, supreme, intelligent Being, Creator and Governor of the Universe ; Good, Placable, the Punisher of Vice, the Rewarder of Virtue ;* to whom they thought it their Duty to *pay Worship, to pray to Him, to praise Him ;* and this Being they called GOD. This being the Foundation of *Natural Religion*, if *Reason* not only *can* prove this, but *did in fact* discover this ; one may easily conceive that the immediate and direct *Consequences* of such a Principle were discoverable likewise by Reason. The Crime and Folly of the Old Heathens therefore did not consist in their not having *sufficient Light* to direct them right, but in their superstitious Fancies and groundless Opinions which they
super-

superadded to what was manifest, and in their holding the truth in unrighteousness. The invisible things of God, (says St. Paul, Rom. i.) from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead. But that which made them without excuse was, because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things— and changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever. v. 20—25.

But notwithstanding this gross Corruption, the Light of Reason shewed them the Existence of a Great Being, whom the Greeks stiled, *The God; The Creator; God over all; The Cause of all; The Everlasting that had no beginning; The First.* The Latins give him as great Titles, and speak of him as “^h One that has all Perfections; Able to do all things, Immortal, Supreme,” &c. Nor

ε Ὁ Θεός ὁ δημιουργός ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεός πάντων αἰτίων τὸ ὄν αἰεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχων ὁ πρῶτος Θεός. Plato passim.

^h Omnes in se perfectiones habet Cic. de Orato. Princeps Deus. Cic. Som. Scip. Nihil est quod Deus efficere non possit. De Nat. Deor. l. 3.

indeed

CHAP. indeed is there any one of his Attributes,
 XIV. which was of use to good Morals, that the
 ∞∞∞ Heathen world was a Stranger to. Let us
 consider them in the Order above-mention'd.

I. They were well acquainted with that great Foundation of Morality, the *Unity of God*: This not only the *Philosophers* taught, but the *Poets* too; and in the midst of their fictitious Deities, acknowledged this *One* to be supreme. There need no Instances to be produced after what *Dr. Cudworth* has said upon this Subject, having proved at large that *Zeno*, *Empedocles*, *Timæus Locrus*, *Onatus*, *Euclides*, *Socrates*, *Plato*, and many more, asserted One Supreme Being. *Phocylides* says, “ⁱ *There is One God, Wise and*
 “ *Powerful.*” *Orpheus* says, “^k *There is One*
 “ *Unoriginated Being: All things come from*
 “ *One Being.*” That famous Passage cited by so many of the first Christian Writers from *Sophocles*, is worthy of Notice “^l *There*
 “ *is in Truth One, One only God, who*
 “ *made the Heaven, and the wide Earth,*
 “ *and the Sea, and the Winds,*” &c. This was a Notion so thoroughly received, that
 “ notwithstanding the difference of Opinions

ⁱ Εἰς θεός ἐστι σοφός, δυνατός θ' ἅμα. *Phocylides.*

^k Εἰς θ' ἐστ' αὐτογενής· ἐνός ἔργον πάντα τίττυται. *Orpheus.*

^l Εἰς ταῖς ἀληθειαισιν, εἰς ἐστὶν θεός,
 Ὃς ἔφρασεν τ' ἔτσόξαι καὶ γαίαν μακρὰν,
 Παντὶς τε χέροντον οἴσθημα, καὶ ἀνέμων βίαν.

Sophocles apud Justin. Martyr.

“ betwixt *Grecians* and *Persians*, and *Scythi-* CHAP.
 “ *ans*, and *Hyperboreans*, even so great that XIV.
 “ neither Good nor Evil, Base nor Honour-
 “ able, was what they did in fact agree in” ;
 “ yet you may see, says *Maximus Tyrius* ^m,
 “ one Consent all over the World in this
 “ Truth, That *One God is the King and*
 “ *Fathèr of all* ; and that there are many
 “ Gods, the Sons of that Supreme God,
 “ governing with Him.” They allowed
 these *Many Gods*, these *Sons of God*, to be
 ministerial Agents, inferior and subordinate :
 But their Principle was to resolve all into *One*
Supreme, and but *One*.

Their Crime therefore was, in acknow-
 ledging a Power and Dominion in these *Sons*
of God over them ; and in paying them a
 Worship, as if they had had a Dominion over
 them. Just as the *Papists* among Christians
 acknowledge a Dominion in *Saints* and *An-*
gels over them ; and accordingly pray to
 them, and worship them, contrary to Scrip-
 ture, at the same time that they profess a
 Belief that there is but *One God*.

2. This *One Supreme God* was conceived
 by them to be *underived*, *self-existent*, and
eternal. *Orpheus* in the Passage before cited,

^m Ἐτα ἰδίαις ἀν ἐν πάσῃ γῆ ὁμόφωνον νόμον κὲ λόγον, ὅτι θεὸς εἷς πάντων βασιλεὺς κὲ πατὴρ, ἔ θεοὶ πολλοὶ, πρὸ πατέρος, σωάρχοντες θεῶν. Max. Tyr. D. ff. 1.

called

CHAP. called Him ⁿ *Self-existent*. Euripides, *αὐτο-*
 XIV. *φύσις*, i. e. *derived from none other* : and Plato
 uses the same Term. *Timæus Locrus* is cited
 by *Clemens Alexandrinus* to shew that the
 Greeks professed *One Principle* : “ ° *There is*
 “ *One Principle underived ; for if it had*
 “ *had Derivation, it would not have been*
 “ *the first, but That from which the Begin-*
 “ *ning was.*” Plato calls God *Ἄυτοθεός*.
 And *Orpheus* ^p invokes the Greatest of all
 Gods by the Titles of “ *Eternal, Immortal.*”
Timæus says in his Tract, *De Anima Mundi*,
 “ ^q *That nothing but Mind can see the Eter-*
 “ *nal God :*” Nor were the oldest Philoso-
 phers unacquainted with these Notions ; for
 holding a Principle that was the Cause of all
 things, they were naturally led to think that
 he could not be made, or caused, by any
 thing. The

3. Next Attribute which was thoroughly
 well known by the Heathen World was,
 that God was *Wise*, or *Intelligent* ; and that
 nothing was done here but what He was
 perfectly acquainted with. They reasoned

ⁿ *Ἄυτογενής.*

^o *Μία ἀρχὴ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀγέννητος· εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο σὺν ἀνῆν ἔσ-
 ται ἀρχὴ, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐγένετο.* *Timæ. Locr. apud Cle-*
men. Alex. Stro. v. p. 718. *Ἄγέννητος.* *Thales apud Laet-*
tium.

^p *Ἄφθιτον, ἀθάνατον, ῥητὸν μόνον ἀθάνατοις.*

Ἔλθε μέγιστε θεῶν πάντων κρατερῆ σὺν ἀνάγκῃ

Φρικτός, ἀτήτητος, μέγας, ἀφθίτος. ———. *Orpheus.*

^q *Θεὸν δὲ, τὸ μὲν αἰώνιον νοῦς ἦν μόνον.* *Timæus Locrus.*

from the Wisdom and Sagacity of Men, that there must be some *Mind* more able, more divine, than that which we had; and that Reason and Thought, and Perception could not possibly arise from mere Matter and Motion. *Anaxagoras* imputed to the *Force and Reason of an infinite Mind, the Manner and Form of all things*. And indeed unless there were an Intelligent Being, the Maker and Disposer of things, there could be no such thing as Order, or Regularity, and Contrivance. *Aristotle* therefore observes *That Mind was the Cause of the World, and of all Order*: And *Ocellus Lucanus* says *That mutual Harmony keeps together the World; and that God is the Cause of this Harmony*. It matters little how the Old Philosophers applied their Principles, or whether they reasoned right from them, or not: Our Enquiry is not *how* they reasoned, but *what Principles* were discoverable, and actually were discovered by them. *Balbus in Cicero* says “ *This constant Regularity of the Stars,*

^r Anaxagoras primus omnium rerum descriptionem & Modum, mentis infinitæ vi ac ratione designari & confici voluit. *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* l. 1.

^e Νῦν εἶναι καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ τῇ τάξεως πάσης αἰτίας. *Arist. Μεταφ.* l. 1. c. 3.

^f Τὸν δὲ κόσμον συνίχει ἁρμονία· ταύτας δ' αἰτίας ὁ θεός.

^u Hanc igitur in stellis constantiam, hanc tantam tam variis cursibus in omni æternitate convenientiam temporum non possum intelligere sine Mente, ratione, concilio. *Cic. Nat. Deor.* l. 2.

CHAP. " *this Agreement of Seasons from all Eternity,*
 XIV. " *amidst such various Motions, is unintelli-*
 ~~~~~ " *gible, without the Admission of Mind, Rea-*  
 " *son, Intelligence."*

But they did not confine the *Intelligence* of God to wise *Contrivance* in *making* the *World* at first, but they understood the *Nature* of his *Omniscience*. *Xenophon* tells us, <sup>x</sup> that *Socrates* " thought that the *Gods* took " care of *Men* in a different manner from " what the *Vulgar* imagined. For *They* " imagined that the *Gods* knew *some things*, " but did not know *other things*. *Socrates* " thought the *Gods* knew *all things*, *all that* " *was said*, *all that was done*, and *even such* " *things as were* secretly consulted about ; " *that they were* present every where." And indeed the *Argument* is very *conclusive*, that *if we grant that* <sup>y</sup> *God is an Intelligent Being*, *we must grant that He must direct and govern all things*, as *Cicero* well argues. But this more properly belongs to the

4. Next Head, *viz.* That they looked upon God as the *Maker and Governor of the*

<sup>x</sup> Και ἡ ἐπιμελείᾳ θεὸς ἀνθρώπων, ἔχ' ὃν τρόπον οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν. Οὗτοι μὲν ἡδ' οἰοῦνται τὰς θεὰς τὰ μὲν εἰδέναι, τὰ δὲ ὅσα εἰδέναι. Σακράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν ἠγείτο θεὸς εἰδέναι, τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγή βουλευόμενα, πανταχῶ δὲ παρῆναι. Xenop. l. 1. Memorab. Παντάπασι εἰκάσιν οἱ θεοὶ πολλὴν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελείαν ποιῆσαι. *ibid.* l. 4.

<sup>y</sup> Etenim si concedimus intelligentes esse Deos, concedimus etiam providentes, & rerum quidem maximarum. *Cicero de Nat. Deo.* l. 2.

Universe, and all things in it. The invisible CHAP.  
 things of God are certainly to be seen from XIV.  
 the things that are made; nor is it possible ~  
 to resist the Consequence of that known  
 Principle, that *Nothing can come from No-*  
*thing.* Sophocles therefore is justly cited for  
 saying, <sup>a</sup> *There is in Truth One, One only*  
*God, who made the Heavens, and wide*  
*Earth, and Sea, and Winds.* Socrates speaks  
 of Him, as “<sup>a</sup> constituting and holding  
 “ together the whole World, in whom are  
 “ contain’d all good and beautiful things,  
 “ and who shews himself to those who will  
 “ use him, constant, and never-failing; who  
 “ administers all things without any Error;  
 “ quicker than Thought, He is seen as do-  
 “ ing the greatest things, and yet as govern-  
 “ ing and directing them he is invisible.”  
<sup>b</sup> Every thing that is produced, must neces-  
 sarily proceed from some Cause, for ’tis im-  
 possible for any thing to have “ Existence  
 “ without a Cause.” *Plato* hence proceeds

<sup>a</sup> Εἷς ταῖς ἀληθείαισιν, εἷς ἐστὶν θεός,  
 Ὅς ἑρᾶνον τ’ ἐπέδρε καὶ γαῖαν μακρᾶν  
 Ποντὰ τε χάρποτον οὐρα καὶ ἀνέμων βίαν.

Sophocli. apud Just. Mart.

<sup>a</sup> Ὁ τὸ ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα κα-  
 λὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ. Ἐπεὶ χρωμένοις ἀτμίῃ τε καὶ ὑγρῇ ἔσθλητα  
 παρέχων, τῶν δὲ νοσημάτων ἀναμαρτητῶς ὑπερετέοντα, ἕτε-  
 ροίσι μὲν πράττων ὁραταί, τοῦ δὲ οἰκοδομῶν ἀορατὸν ἡμῖν ἐστίν.  
 Xenop. Mirab. l. 4.

<sup>b</sup> Πᾶν δὲ αὖτὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ αἰτίας τινός ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται.  
 Παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίας γένεσθαι αἰετῶν. Plato Timæus p. 28.

CHAP. to explain <sup>c</sup> for “ what Reason he that  
 XIV. “ made and order’d this World did it.” And  
 elsewhere he says, <sup>d</sup> that “ We and all other  
 “ Animals, and Fire, and Water, from  
 “ whence things are, and things like to  
 “ these, we know they are all *derived from*  
 “ God, and made by Him.” How he made  
 the World, and what was the manner of it,  
 or whether the World be an Animal, or a  
 Second God, or whether it be a *Part* or  
*Portion* of God—these are Points, which  
 were disputed, as they are even *now* : And  
 there cannot be a better general Rule laid  
 down, or which is of more Service in this  
 and many other Enquiries “ <sup>e</sup> such as God  
 “ is, so should He be treated and spoke of,  
 “ and such things only attributed to him as  
 “ are suitable to his Nature.”

It was not imagined that as soon as God  
 had created this World that instantly he left  
 it to its own course, and took no further  
 Care or Concern about it. They did not  
 imagine him supine and negligent, or so im-  
 mersed in Pleasure, as to take no notice of  
 his offspring. The *Poets* as well as *Philoso-  
 phers* speak of him as a *Director* and *Gover-*

<sup>c</sup> Δι’ ἢν αἰτίαν γένησιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε ὁ ξυμίας ξυμέτησεν. *ibid.*

<sup>d</sup> Ἡμεῖς μὲν πρ καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα, καὶ ἐξ ἂν τὰ πεφυκότα ἐστὶ πῦρ ἔ  
 ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τέτων ἀδελφά, θεῶ γεννήματι πάντα ἰσμίη αὐτὰ ἀπειρ-  
 γασμένα ἕκαστα. *Plat Sophist.* p 266.

<sup>e</sup> Οἷον τυγχάνει ὁ θεός ἂν, ὡς ἂν πρ ἀπδοτέον. *Plato Repub.*  
 l. 3.

nor of the Universe: Nor could there be a greater instance of Impiety than to imagine that God existed, but yet despised, or neglected human Actions. *Horace* speaks of him as a "f Parent who directs all the Actions of Men and Gods, who governs the Sea, the Earth, the whole World, than whom nothing is greater, no nor like, nor can come near him." In another place he describes God by his Providence, who "g governs the Earth, the Sea, Cities, the Dead, the Gods, and all Mankind by a just Dominion and Power." *Cicero* argues the point at large in his second Book of the Nature of the Gods; and so does *Plato*, who says, "There can be but two Causes why things should be neglected by God. h Either that he thinks it signifies nothing to the whole, if small matters are neglected; or else if it signifies any thing, he neglects them through

f Quid prius d'eam solitis Parentis  
Iudibus, qui res hominum ac Deorum  
Qui mare & terras, variisque mundum  
Temperat hois?

Unde nil majus generatur ipso

Nec viget quicquam simili, aut secundum.

*Hor. t. l. 1. Od. 12;*

g Qui terram inertem, qui mare temperat

Ventosum, & urbes, regnoque tuas,

Divosque, mortalesque turmas,

Imperio regit unus aquo. *Ibid. l. 3. Od. 4.*

h H, Ἀσφίρον ἔστι αἱ ἀφ' ὧν εἶναι τὸ ὄλον. ἀνεπαρένοτον ἢ σφι-  
χρῶν ἢ ῥαθυμίας τῆς φύσεως, εἰ ἀσφίρεται, ὁ αἰ ἀμελεῖται. *Plato de*  
*Leg. l. x. p. 901.*

CHAP. "Laziness or Pleasure." The first of  
 XIV. these Causes he refutes by observing, " <sup>i</sup> that  
 ~~~~~ " the Gods see and hear and know all things,  
 " and have power to do whatever can be
 " done, and then they are good Beings." From hence he infers it impossible for the Gods to be indolent, or so taken up with Pleasure, as to become neglectful of the World. And indeed whilst a divine Presence was maintained to be ^k every where, whilst he was supposed to be in all places, they could not think him careless, or that he did not preside as Governor of the Universe.

5. They were not unacquainted with the Goodness of the Divine Being, nor did they look upon him as implacable, upon Men's Repentance. And indeed a Being of infinite Power and Wisdom without Goodness, would be the Object of Dread and Horror, not of Love and Esteem. But it is Goodness that makes him amiable, and from this it is that all our Hopes are derived: Nor was the Argument inconclusive from Goodness to

ⁱ Πρῶτον μὲν θεὸς ἀμφότεροι φατὲ γινώσκειν, καὶ ὁρᾶν, ἔ ἀκούειν πάντα, λαθεῖν δ' αὐτὸς ἔδεν δυνατόν εἶναι ἢ ὅπως εἰσὶν αἱ αἰθέσεις τε καὶ ἐπισήμαι. — Δύνασ' πάντα ὅπως αὐτὸς δύναμις ἐστὶ θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀθανάτοις. — Καὶ μὲν ἀγαθὸς τε ἔ ἀρίστος. — Ἄρ' ἔ ῥαθυμία μὲν καὶ τρυφῇ ἀδύνατος αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖν πράττειν ὅτιον τοπαράπαν, ὅντας γε οἷος ὁμολογεῖται. *ibid.*

^k Μῆσαι δ' εἰς Δίος πάσαι μὲν ἀγυαί.

Πάσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραὶ μεση δὲ θάλασσα,

καὶ λιμένες· πάντα δ' εἰς Δίος κεχρήμεθα πάντες. *Atatus.*

Mercy

Mercy, and from Mercy to Placability. *Tul-CHAP.*
ly justly observed that *Jupiter* was rightly XIV.
 called by their Forefathers *Optimus Maxi-*
mus, ¹ *the Best, the Greatest, and indeed*
Best, i. e. most bountiful, is put before Great-
est, because it is more great and certainly
more agreeable to be good to All, than to have
great Possessions. *Plato* calls him frequently
The Good, and Good : and so does ^m *Timæus*
Locrus : and so does *Xenophon*, and indeed
 all the Antients : so that it is needless to cite
 Authorities in so clear a Case.

6. But it is doubted by some whether by
 the Light of Reason it could be known that
 God is *placable*, and could be induced by
Repentance to forgive the Sinner. It may
 not perhaps be enough to say with *Plato*, that
ⁿ *Justice and Wisdom are eminently esteemed*
by the Gods ; and that the Wise and Just are
such only as know what they ought to do and
say both to Gods and Men. How much foe-
 ver they may be esteemed by the Gods, yet
 if Men act an unjust, or an unwise, part, as

¹ A majoribus autem nostris Optimus Maximus, & quidem
 antè Optimus id est beneficentissimus quam maximus, quia
 majus est certeque gratius prodesse omnibus quam opes magnas
 habere. *Cic. Nat. Deor. l. 2.*

^m Τ' αγαθόν. αγαθός. De Rep. l. 2. Αγαθός ὡν ὁ θεός. Τι-
 μαίους Λοκρ.

ⁿ Κινδυνεύει γὰρ καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νῦν ἔχουσι
 δικαιοσύνην καὶ φρόνησιν ἀλαφρόντως τετιμημένων. Φρόνιμοι δὲ εἰ δί-
 καιοὶ σὺν ἄλλοι τινές εἰσι ἢ τ' εἰδότες ἂν δεῖ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πρὸς
 θεὸν καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους. *Plato Alcib. 2.*

CHAP. they always do when they are guilty of Sin,
 XIV. it does not follow that God will not strictly
 punish every Instance of Offence. But that
 they are placable, παραιτητοί, is allowed in
Plato de leg. l. x. 901. And *Phurnutus* says,
 ° *They call Jupiter placid, as being reconcilable to such as repent of their Iniquities; for he is not irreconcilable to them: for this reason there are Altars erected to Jupiter the supplicable.*

6. But however placable the Gods were deemed, yet they were looked upon as *Avengers of Evil, and Rewarders of Good Actions.* No Crimes voluntarily committed, no Injustice, was ever thought to escape the divine Knowledge; or if any one was powerful or artful enough to evade the Laws of Man, yet still he was accountable to ° *God, who sees and knows whatever it is that we do.* The Gods were conceived not only to know the outward Act, but likewise what passed within the Heart. *Thales* was asked by one ° *Whether an actually injurious Man could possibly live concealed from the Gods?*

° Προσαγορεύουσι δὲ τὴν μείλιχον τὴν Δία, εὐμείλιχτον ἔντα τοῖς ἐξ ἀδικίας μεταπειθέμενοις. Ὁ δὲ ὅτι ἀδιακείτως ἔχει πρὸς αὐτὸς. Ἀλλ' ἔτι το ὅτι τὴν ἰστίαν διὸς εἰσι βρωμοί. *Phurnutus De Nat. Deor. c. 11.*

° Est profecto Deus qui quæ nos gerimus auditque & videt. *Plaut. Capt. Act. 2. Sc. 2.*

° Εἰ λήθοι θεὸς ἀνθρώπος ἀδικῶν; ἀλλ' ἔδδ' ἀγνωρόμην, ἔφη. *Thales apud Laetium.*

His Answer was, No, nor if he has only CHAP. wicked Intentions. If Men acted a wicked XIV. part in Life, present Punishment was expected; at least that the Gods interposed, and immediately became ^r Enemies to such: But if they escaped, yet a future State and future Punishments were firmly believed. There is a beautiful Passage preserved from *Philemon* which well expresses this Sentiment.

“ ^r Think you, says he, O *Niceratus*, that
 “ those who lived a Life of Pleasure, and
 “ now are gone, shall escape the Notice of
 “ God, as if they were out of his Sight?
 “ There is an Eye of Justice which sees all
 “ Things. There are in Hades two several
 “ Paths, the one of the Just, the other of
 “ the Unjust. For if the Just and Wicked
 “ were to enjoy the same, and the Earth

^r Ἐπιορκήσας πολεμίους τὰς θεὰς ἐκτίσαστο. Xenop. de Agefilao Rege, p. 516.

^s Οἷε σὺ τὰς θανάτους, ᾧ Νικήρατε
 Τρυφῆς ἀπάσης μεταλαβόντας ἐν βίῳ
 Περύγεναι τὸ θεῖον ὡς λεληθότας;
 Ἔστι δίκης Ὀφθαλμὸς ὃς τὰ πάνθ' ὀρᾷ·
 Καὶ γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὴν δύο τρίτες νομίζουσι
 Μίαν δίκαιαν κατέραν ἀσεσῶν ὁδόν.
 Εἰ γὰρ δίκαιον κ' ἀσεσῆς ἔξυσιν ἐν,
 Ἦ γὰρ ὅτε καλύψει τὰς δύο τῶ πάντι χρόνῳ
 Ἄρπαζ' ἀπελθῶν, κλέπτι, ὀπίσπερει, κυκα'
 Μισθὸν πλανηθῆς· ἔστι καὶ ἀδὲ κρίσις,
 Ἦπερ ποίησει θεός, ὁ πάντων διασπότης,
 Οὐ τ' ὄνομα φοσερὸν, εἰδ' ἂν ὀνομάσαιμι' ἐγὼ.
 Ὅς τοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσι πρὸς μῆκρον βίον
 Διδῶσι.

Philemon. apud Grotii

Excerpt. p. 775. Clemens Alexand.

B b 4

“ were

CHAP. " were always to cover both, go Rob, Plun-
 XIV. " der, Steal, confound all things. But don't
 " be deceived, there is a Judgment after this
 " Life which God the Lord of all, whose
 " Name is dreadful, which I dare not
 " name, and who continues Life to Sinners
 " —will certainly execute." 'Tis no mat-
 ter whether this be a Passage of *Diphilus* or
 of *Philemon*; it answers my purpose equally.
 The Advice which follows from the same
 Author to such as imagined there was no
 God is very remarkable. *'There is, there is*
a God, and if any Man does evil, he will cer-
tainly at length suffer Punishment for it.
 There is a beautiful Passage of *Menander*,
 which I must transcribe. *"If any one by of-*
fering of Sacrifice—thinks to make God pro-
pitious he is mistaken. For a Man ought to
be good, not a Debaucher of Women, not an
Adulterer, or Thief, or Murderer, to get
Money. You ought not to covet a Pin's Point,

ἰ Ὅραθ' ὅσοι δοκῶτε σὺν εἶναι θεόν.
 Ἔσιν ᾧ, ἔσιν. εἰ δὲ τις πράττει κακῶς—
 χρόνῳ ᾧ ἔστ' ἴσθι δώσει δίκην.

apud Clem. Alex. St. v. p. 722.

ἰ Εἰ τις θυσίαν προσφέρειν—
 εὖνεν νομίζει τ' θεὸν καθιστάσαι,
 Πλανᾷτ' ἐκείνῳ ἢ φρένας κύφας ἔχει.
 Δεῖ γὰρ τ' ἄνδρα χρησίμων πεφικέναι,
 Μὴ παρῆνας φθείροντα, ἢ μοιχάρῃον,
 Κλέπλοντα, ἢ σφάτλοντα, χρημάτων χάριν·
 Μὴδ' ἐβελόνης ἔταμνον ἐπιθυμῆς, Πάμφιλε
 Ὅ γὰρ θεὸς βλέπει σε πλησίον περὶν.

Menand. apud Grotii Excerpt. 757, 759.

Q Pam-

O Pamphilus, for God is near you and sees CHAP. you. And indeed it was among the Hea- XIV. thens a general Rule—^x *That whatsoever was guilty of Vice, the Gods would certainly punish him.*

But as the Gentiles by the Light of Nature did discover this Property of God, that he hated all sorts of Wickedness, and was determined to punish such as were guilty, so they carried their Searches further, and from the Nature of the Divine Being, the several Dispensations of Providence, the Ill which good Men here met with, and other such-like Topicks, they were acquainted with a State of Rewards for such as had acted *virtuously*: Nay they concluded that this was as certain as the very Existence of God himself. They argued that we are not to think there were any ^y *such Beings as Gods, if good and upright Men did not obtain good things.* That ^z *this was the Judgment of the Gods, that a good Soul that strengthened itself in Goodness went into a better place.* And every one is acquainted with what is said on the Rewards of Good Men in the *Elysian Fields*.

^x ——— Καὶ ἦδ' ὅσις ἀν βροτῶν
Κακὸς πεφύκη. Ζημιῶσιν οἱ θεοί. Eurip. Ion.

^y Εἰ δ' εἰσὶ θεοί, δίκαιον ἂν ἀνὴρ σύ γε
Ἐοθλῶν κυρήσεις. Eurip.

^z Ψυχὴ—ὅποταν μὲν ἀρετῇ θεῖα προσημίχασα γίγνηται— μετακομιθεῖσα εἰς ἀμείνω τινὰ τόπον ἕτερον. Plato de Leg. l. x. p. 904 &c.

CHAP. 7. Such Sentiments concerning the Gods
 XIV. must necessarily lead Men to pay them a proper
 Worship, in *Prayer*, and *Praise*, and *Thankfulness*, and *Submission* to their Will. And this Effect was produced, and these Duties were acknowledged to be due. *Aristodemus*, in *Xenophon's* first Book of *Memorables*, says to *Socrates*, “^a That he thought the
 “ *Divine Being* too grand to stand in need of
 “ his paying him any worship. *Socrates* re-
 “ plied, *If notwithstanding his Greatness he*
 “ *vouchsafes to take care of you, so much the*
 “ *more ought he to be worshipped by you.*” How excellently has *Plato* treated of *Prayer* in his *Alcibiades*? How many good Principles of this Duty are there taught? And how many false ones are justly condemned? *Socrates* approves of this Form as a wise and good one, to pray to God to “^b give us
 “ good things whether we ask for them or
 “ not; and as for what may be prejudicial to
 “ us, not to give them, even if we should
 “ ask for them.” We find *Cyrus* ever mindful of the *Good* which he had received from

^a Δαιμόνιον — μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἡγήσασθαι, ἢ ὡς τῆ ἐμῆς θεραπείας προσδεῖσθαι. ἔκταν, ἔφη, ὅσα μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἀξιοῖ σε θεραπεύειν, τοσαύτα μᾶλλον τιμῆσειν αὐτό. Xenop. Memor. l. 1.

^b Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐδούλω καὶ εὐχομένους ἔ ἀνεύκτοις
 Ἄμμι δίδος, τὰ δὲ δεινά καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλλάξεις.

Plat. Alcib. 2.

or as it is in the Anthologia, τὰ δὲ λυγρὰ καὶ εὐχομένων ἀπερύ-
 κω.

God, and with a grateful Mind *thanking* CHAP. Him for Mercies he had received. *° In the* XIV. *first place, says he, I praise the Gods as much* as I am able, and believe that you do all the same, for we have received Victory and Safety. For these we ought to return Thanks to the Gods.

In these points, those who followed the mere light of Nature seem to be very clear; and they made use of those Faculties which God had given them to very great and good Purposes. But it will be said, that they did not carry their Thoughts with a Consistency throughout. Some of them had Notions of the manner of God's Providence, which was very wrong, or very faultily expressed. It was not enough with them to say, *° That God gave good things to them that obeyed him,* as *Xerxes* in *Herodotus* says, but they spoke of him, as an *Envious Being*, delighted in disturbing and in confounding things: and especially whatever was greater than ordinary. Thus *Solon* told *Cræsus*, that it was his opinion that *° God was envious,*

° Πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς ἐγὼ τε ἐπαινῶ, ὅσων δύναιμαι, καὶ ἡμῶς πάντας αἰμαὶ νίκης τε ἢ τετυχαῖον καὶ σατυρίας. Τῶτων μὲν ἐν χρήν ἡμεῖς χάρισμα ἂν ἂν ἔχωμεν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπτελεῖν. Xenop Cyrop.

l. 1. p. 70.

° Θεὸς ἔτινος ἄγει, καὶ αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν ποτὶ ἐπέτρεψε συμφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρμενον. Herod. l. 7. c. 8.

° Τὸ θεῶν πᾶν ἐν φθοιραντε καὶ ταραχῶδες. Herod. l. 1. c. 32, 81.

CHAP. and loved to confound things: And the Hi-
 XIV. storian has interspersed the same Notion in
 several other parts of his History. He makes
Amasis write a Letter to *Polycrates*; and in
 it he says, that ^f *He knew how envious the*
Deity was. *Artabanus* tells *Xerxes*, ^g *You*
see how God strikes with Thunder the greatest
Animals, nor suffers them to appear as such,
at the same time that he hurts not a Hair of
small ones. *You see how his Darts strike Pa-*
laces and great Trees: For God takes a Plea-
sure in breaking to pieces the most lofty things.
 There is something of the same Nature in a
 Speech of *Jason's* in *Xenophon*, ^h *God, as it*
seems has a pleasure in making little folks,
great, and great ones, little. But perhaps

The Expressions used by both these Histo-
 rians, may be accounted for, if some candor
 be admitted, and a possible construction be
 allowed. God cannot be in himself, and in
 his own Nature, *envious* of human Happi-
 ness; nor is it possible that he can *rejoice*, or
 take any *pleasure* merely to gratify his hu-
 mour in turning things topsy-turvey. When

^f Τὸ θεῖον ἐπισαρμένον ὡς ἔστι φθονέρον. *ibid.* lib. 3. c. 40.

^g Ὅρας ὡς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα ζῶα κεραυνῶ ὁ θεός, ἐδὲ εἰς φαντά-
 ζεσθ, τὰ δὲ μικρὰ, ἐδὲ μὲν κνίσει. Ὅρας δὲ ὡς ἐς οἰκήματα τὰ
 μέγιστα ἀεὶ καὶ δένδρεα τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἐπιτυγχάνει βέλεα. Φιλεῖ γὰρ ὁ
 θεός τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα κολεῖν. *id.* l. 7. c. 10. § 5.

^h Καὶ ὁ θεός δὴ, ὡς εἶπε, πολλὰκις χαιρεῖ τὸς μὲν μικρὰς με-
 γάλους ποιῶν, τὸς δὲ μεγάλους μικρὰς. *Xenoph. Hist. Græ.* l. 6.
 p. 468.

therefore

therefore *Herodotus* or *Xenophon* used Expr^{es-} CHAP. sions that imply such *ill dispositions*, it should XIV. be considered that they might mean no more than mere *Events* which came surprising and unexpected: and that they were such as we ill judging Mortals imagine unfit to be accomplished. It was a Fact that could not be denied, that great Men may and do frequently act contrary to Reason and Truth; and that God, who is not to be influenced by any thing but Truth, and Right, punishes *Great* as well as *Little* People. The word *Envious* therefore is and must be construed with these Principles; and then it can signify no more, than that God turns things about, and in his Providence brings things to pass strangely, in humbling the Great, and in raising those of mean Degree, *as if* he were *envious*, and had a pleasure in turning things topsy-turvey. Had the Historian meant a Disposition properly and strictly directed and influenced by *Jealousy of another's Happiness*, as *Plutarch* says of *Herodotus*, *He had added Blasphemy to Malice*. But if he designed no more than to declare *Events of things*, and the strange Revolutions that often happened in the World, (such Revolutions as *Envy* oft produces amongst Mankind) then that hard Word is to be taken in a figurative manner; or as when we impute to God what cannot but *improperly* be attributed to him.

We

CHAP. We find the very same Expression made
 XIV. use of by *Livy*, l. v. When the City *Veii*
 was taken by *Camillus*, and in it was found
 a greater Booty than he expected, the Dicta-
 tor is said to have lifted up his Eyes to
 Heaven, and to have prayed, “ that if his
 “ Fortune and that of the Roman People
 “ should seem to any of the Gods, or Men,
 “ *too great*, ut eam invidiam lenire quam
 “ minimo suo privato incommodo publico-
 “ que Romani populi liceret: *that That*
 “ *Envy might be mitigated by as little*
 “ *private Inconvenience to himself, and as*
 “ *little public Inconvenience to the Roman*
 “ *People, as was possible.*” *Valerius Max-*
imus has the same Term upon the same
 Occasion, though he gives a different Turn
 to the Dictator’s Prayer: *Si cui Deorum*
nimia felicitas populi Romani videretur,
ejus invidia, suo aliquo incommodo satiaretur,
 l. i. c. v. Though the Term, *invidia*, be
 here made use of, yet no more is meant than
 that if Providence judged the Happiness and
 Success of the *Romans too great*, and thought
 fit to put a stop to it, or even to bring Evil
 upon the *Romans*, let this Evil fall upon *Ca-*
millus, and not upon his People. All that is
 meant by, *Envy*, is explained by, *if the Hap-*
piness seemed too great, and some Evil was
thought necessary to counterballance it. This
 Conduct is very consistent with Truth and
 Right

Right in God ; whereas if it be made to signify an uneasy Disposition arising from another's Happiness, it cannot be applied to God.

However I do not design to vindicate all the Notions of the Heathens in which they spoke concerning the Dispensations of Providence. I am only enquiring what Light they had, and what use in fact they made of it, in order to shew the true Use of Revelation. That they were wonderfully embarrassed by means of *established Gods*, and established Rites and Ceremonies, is certainly true : That their Mysteries were of that kind as to set them right in many parts of their Theology, is very clear : That it was very difficult to get Admission to those who could, or would, set them right, is as true : That their best and wisest Men travelled from *Greece* into *Egypt* to get at the Knowledge of the *Unity of God*, and such like important Truths, is very plain. But as Men had no Authority to teach the Truth, and took not right Methods of propagating it when they had discovered it, and concealed what they knew instead of divulging it ; it is not to be wondered that so much Error prevailed, and must for ever have prevailed, had not a Method been found out to *propagate* Truth against all the Powers, and Authority, and Influence, of the Men of this World.

But

CHAP. But let us proceed in our Enquiries. It
 XIV. has been shewn what general Principles concerning *Truth*, and the Nature and Attributes of *God*, were discovered by the Light of Nature. Let us consider next what was known and said of the *Immortality of the Soul*. For it is certain that the Notion of God as a Governor of all things; and the Notion of our Souls as immortal, and accountable for whatever we do; are the Two grand Principles of all Religion. Now if the Light of Nature, or Reason, be sufficient to discover Both these, and we find in *fact* that the Heathen World had these Notions, and were fully persuaded of them; the Consequence is, that Revelation is not absolutely necessary to *establish Religion*, but that its true use is That which I have assigned above. It may be granted in some sense, that the *Greeks* derived their Notions of their *Gods*, and of the State of departed Souls, from the *Egyptians*, as the *Latins* had them from the *Greeks*: But when Nations that were neither *Greeks* nor *Egyptians*, nor conversant with any of them, believed the *Immortality of the Soul* equally with them, this could not arise from any Communication from them; and it plainly might arise from the Light of Reason rightly used. But let us see how the Fact stood.

It is observed by *Laertius*, that “ⁱ Some CHAP. XIV, said that Thales was the first that said that Souls were Immortal.” Others have attributed this to *Pythagoras*, as *St. Jerom*^k has done: Others again, to *Pherecydes Syrus*. But whichsoever of these it was, no more can be meant, than that one or other of these is the *oldest extant*, and in this sense, the *First*, that said so. It was a Doctrine well known in the World, long before any of these Men lived. *Herodotus* tells us, “^l That the Egyptians are the First that said that the Soul of Man is Immortal; that the Body perishing it enters into some other Animal always ready for it: and when it had passed through all the Animals of the Earth, Sea, and Air, it again entered into the Body of Man. That this Circumvolution was made in three thousand Years: and that this Notion was what several Greeks had asserted; some formerly, others more lately, as if it

ⁱ Ἐπιοὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν πρῶτον εἰπεῖν φασὶν ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχάς. *Laert. Thales.*


^k Audi quid apud Græcos Pythagoras primus invenierit. Immortales esse animas; & de aliis corporibus transire in alia. *Hieron Apolog. adv. Ruffinum*, p 82.

^l Πρῶτος δὲ καὶ τούτῳ τὸν λόγον Αἰγυπτίῳ εἰσὶ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος ἐστὶ, τὸ σῶμα δὲ καθύπευθε εἰς ἄλλο ζῷον αἰεὶ γινώσκον ἐσθύεται· ἐπειὴ δὲ περιέλθῃ πάντα τὰ χερσαῖα καὶ τὰ θαλάσσια καὶ τὰ πτερά, αὐτὴ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σώμα γινώσκον ἐισδύει. Τὴν ἀπειρίστησιν δὲ αὐτῆ γίνεσθαι ἐν τριχίλισι ἔτεσι. Τότε τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ οἱ Ἕλληνας ἔχρησαντο, εἰ μὴν πρότερον, εἰ δὲ ὕστερον, ὡς ἰδίῳ αὐτῶν ἔστι τὸ ἐγὼ εἰδὼς τὰ ἀνόματα καὶ γράψαι. *Herodot. l. 2. c. 133.*

CHAP. “ were their own Invention ; and that he well
 XIV. “ knew their Names, though he would not
 ~~~~~ “ mention them.” He plainly has *Pythagoras*, and his School in view, who taught such a Transmigration as is here described ; and which he learnt in *Egypt*. *Virgil*, with some little Variation, has intimated the <sup>m</sup> same Notion ; as *St. Jerom* has observed in the place before cited. To account for this, That either these Philosophers, or the *Egyptians*, first taught the Immortality of the Soul, it must not be imagined, that either *before*, or *after*, the days of those Philosophers, the Soul was conceived totally to cease to exist : (the contrary to which will be presently shewn ; ) but the *general* Notion was, that the Soul existed in some separate place, ἐν ἄδῃ, in its proper receptacle. The *Egyptians*, as *Herodotus* says, and from them *Pythagoras*, taught a continual *Transmigration* of Souls from one Body into another, and thus a proper *Immortality*. But this was not the *general* Notion of the World ; for they conceived the Soul to be, and to exist in another manner. So that it is a gross Mistake to maintain the *Egyptians*, or *Pythagoras*, or *Thales*,

<sup>m</sup> Has omnes ubi mille rotam volvere per annos  
 Lethæam ad fluvium deus evocat, agmine magno  
 Scilicet immemores supera ut convexa revisant  
 Rursus & incipient in corpora velle reverti.

*Virgil. Æn.* 1. 6.

or *Pherecydes* to be the *first Inventors* of the CHAP.  
Soul's Immortality, in the Sense of continu- XIV.  
ing in Existence after Death. They were   
indeed only the *First* who explained the  
*Immortality* of the Soul in a particular man-  
ner, and asserted a *Transmigration*, in Op-  
position to, what *Cicero* well calls it, “<sup>n</sup> the  
“ *Life of the Dead under Ground.*”

But it will be worth while to examine this  
matter more particularly, because it has been  
much mistaken and abused by Mr. *Toland*,  
in his *Letters to Serena*, p. 28, 29. “*Phere-*  
“ *cydes* of the Island *Syrus*, as we are  
“ informed by *Cicero*, and others, was the  
“ *First* among the *Greek Philosophers* that  
“ committed the Immortality of human  
“ Souls to writing: For though *Thales* is  
“ said to have been of the same Opinion,  
“ yet he published nothing; and *Maximus*  
“ *Tyrius* affirms with *Cicero*, that *Pythago-*  
“ *ras* the *Samian*, the Disciple of *Pherecy-*  
“ *des* was the first among the *Greeks* who  
“ durst openly maintain that the *Body* only  
“ died, but that the *Soul* was Immortal, nei-  
“ ther subject to *Age*, nor *Corruption*, and  
“ that it existed before it came hither.” From  
this he immediately infers—“ You see it was  
“ so great an Innovation, that he was

<sup>n</sup> Sub terra censabant reliquam vitam agi mortuorum. Cic.  
*Tusc. Quæst.* 1.

CHAP. “reckoned a *bold Man*, who had courage  
XIV. “enough to vent it.”

Here are many gross Mistakes in this short account of this matter.

1. “*Pherecydes*,” says he, “of the Island *Syrus*, as we are informed by *Cicero*, was the *first* among the *Greek Philosophers* that committed the Immortality of human Souls to writing.” But where does *Cicero* inform us of this, or any such thing? *Cicero* only says, “° I make no doubt but that *Others* in so many preceeding Ages *disputed* about Souls; but *Pherecydes Syrus* is the *first* or *oldest* that is extant, who said the Souls of Men were *Immortal*.” Not the *first* who committed this Notion to writing; but the *oldest* Writer that was extant, who maintained such a peculiar Doctrine as he did of the Immortality of the Soul.

2. FOR, thus Mr. *Toland* goes on, “tho’ *Thales* is said to have been of the same Opinion, yet he published nothing.” Was *Thales* then older than *Pherecydes*? Or what is meant by proving *Pherecydes* to be the *first* that committed this Notion to writing, FOR, or because, *Thales* published nothing?

3. “*Maximus Tyrius*,” he says, affirms,

° Credo equidem etiam alios tot sæculis disputasse de animis: sed quod litteris existat, *Pherecydes Syrus* primum dixit animos hominum esse sempiternos. *Cic. Tusc. Quest. 1.*

“with



“ with Cicero, † that *Pythagoras the Samian*, CHAP.  
 “ the Disciple of *Phercydes*, was the first XIV.  
 “ among the *Greeks* who *durst* openly main-  
 “ tain, that the Body only died.” So then  
 we have two Firsts. *Phercydes* was *First*  
 just now among the *Greek Philosophers* :  
 Now *Pythagoras* is the *First*, who was the  
 Disciple of *Phercydes* : And *Cicero* is quoted,  
 for *Both* these being *First*.

4. But what is it that *Pythagoras* says,  
 according to *Maximus Tyrius* ? Why, “ He  
 “ was the first among the *Greeks* who *durst*  
 “ openly maintain” — (not a word of *openly*  
*maintaining* is in his Author) “ *openly main-*  
 “ *tain, that the Body only died*” ; but that  
 the Soul was, ἀθανής, did not die, was not  
*subject to Age nor Corrupton*. But where  
 was the *Boldness* of this ? — The World  
 very well knew before the Times of *Pher-*  
*cydes*, or *Pythagoras* either, that human Souls  
 did not die. The *Boldness* of *Pythagoras*  
 therefore did not consist in saying this ; but  
 either in the Expression by which he taught  
 the Soul to be ἀθανής, *immortal* ; or in the  
*Reason* he gave for his Notion. They went  
 out of one Body into another, and not as

† Πυθαγόρας ὁ Σάμιος πρῶτος ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν,  
 ὅτι αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν σῶμα τεθνήσκειται, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀναπλάσσει οὐχίσταται  
 ἀθανής καὶ ἀγήρωσ, καὶ ἥ εἶναι αὐτὴν πρὶν ἢ κεν δεῦρο. Ἐπιστάσαν δὲ  
 αὐτῷ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα λέγουσι, καὶ ὅτι ἤδη πρότερον γένοιτο ἐν γῆ  
 ἐν ἄλλο σώματι. Εὐφορόσ δὲ εἶναι ὁ Τρῆς τότε &c. Maximus  
 Tyrius Diss. 28.

CHAP. Homer, &c. had taught, that they went *uis*  
 XIV. *Idou*; or as *Tully* has expressed this, *sub terra*  
*consēbant reliquam vitam agi mortuorum*:  
 They thought that the Dead pass'd the rest  
 of Life under Ground. *Tusc. Quæf. 1.*

But setting aside Mr. *Toland*, let us consider what *Cicero* has said “<sup>1</sup> *Pherocydes*  
 “ *Syrus* first taught, *i. e.* is the oldest we  
 “ have extant, who taught the Souls of Men  
 “ to be *sempiternos, immortal.* This Opinion  
 “ *Pythagoras* greatly established; and his  
 “ Followers spread it, but then they gave  
 “ no Reason for their Notion, except what  
 “ was contain'd in Numbers, and Mystical  
 “ Descriptions. But then *Plato* came; and  
 “ not only thought as *Pythagoras* did about  
 “ the *Eternity* of Souls, but he brought good  
 “ *Proof* of it.” This is *Tully's* Account.  
 But did not Others, long before *Pherocydes*,  
 or *Pythagoras*, maintain the *Immortality* of  
 the Soul, *i. e.* that it did not dye with the  
 Body? Yes; *Tully* himself acknowledges it  
 as <sup>2</sup> *taught by all Mankind.* The Business  
 therefore is to settle the Meaning of the

<sup>1</sup> Credo equidem etiam alios tot sæculis disputasse de Animis: sed quod litteris extet, Pherocydes Syrus primum dixit Animos hominum esse Sempiternos.— Hanc Opinionem Discipulus ejus Pythagoras maxime confirmavit— Rationem illi sententiæ suæ non fere reddebant, nisi quid erat Numeris aut Descriptionibus explicandum. Platonem ferunt— primum de Animorum æternitate non solum sensitse idem, quod Pythagoras, sed rationem etiam attulisse. *Cic. Tusc. Quæf. 1.*

<sup>2</sup> *Permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium.*  
*ibid.*

Terms used on this Occasion by *Herodotus*, CHAP. and *Pherecydes*, or *Thales*, or *Pythagoras*, XIV. who used the same Expression; and which *Tully* translates *Animos Sempiternos*. This *Immortality*, or *Sempiternity*, is called likewise *Æternity*, which therefore all signify the same thing.

That Souls did, *permanere*, remain in existence, was uncontested; but notwithstanding that, 'tis affirmed that *Pherecydes* or *Pythagoras*, was the oldest extant who taught their *Immortality*, *Æternity*, or *Sempiternity*. There must therefore be some difference betwixt their *remaining*, and their *Immortality*, in *Pythagoras's* Sense. The Writers who lived long before *Pythagoras* declared that Human Souls went to *Hades*, and there they lived in their Places; and continued their *Existence* and *Activity*. Thus the Soul of *Patroclus* in *Homer* was *alive*, and appeared to *Achilles*, and told him what he ought to do. *Hom. Iliad.* ψ', v. 71—106. And when *Patroclus* died *his Soul flew out of his Limbs and went to Hades*.

*Plutarch*\*, or whoever is the Author of

\* Τὸ μὲν δὴ τῶν δογμάτων, Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος ἡμιμαρτυροῦνται ἐστίν, τὸ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον, ἢ καὶ πέρα τῶν λόγων προτίθησιν ὁ Πλάτων. Τίς ἐν τούτοις πρῶτον ἀνεφάνησεν; Ὁμηρὸς, εἰπων ἄλλα, τε καὶ ταῦτα

Ψυχὴ δ' ἐκ ρεθέων πιαμένη αἰδὸς δε βεβήκει. II. π. 856.  
εἰς τὸν αἰεθῆ καὶ ἀόρατον, εἴτε, ἀέρα θεῖν τις, εἴτε ὑπόγειον τόπον.—  
Ἐν δὲ τῇ Ὀδυσσεύῃ δι' ὅλης Νεκυίας, τί ἄλλο, ἢ τὰς ψυχὰς δείκνυσσι μετὰ θάνατον διαμενέσας, καὶ φεγγαμίνας, &c. Plutarch. Περὶ τῆς Ὁμηρῆς Ποιήσεως. c. 15.

CHAP. the Discourse on *Homer's* Poetry, observes,  
 XIV. that from *this Place* the *Pythagoreans* and  
 ~~~~~ *Plato* had their Notions of the *ὑπέρ τὰ ἄστυ*,  
 the Flight of the Soul. “ The *excellenteſt*
 “ of their Notions was, that the Soul was
 “ *immortal* : *Plato* has added *Wings* to it.
 “ Who therefore was it that *firſt* talk'd in
 “ this manner ? *Homer*, among other things,
 “ ſaying, that *his Soul flew out of the Limbs*
 “ *to Hades*, to an *obſcure and inviſible Place*,
 “ whether you place it in the *Air*, or under
 “ the *Earth*.— In the *Odyſſee*, through the
 “ whole *Necunia*, what elſe does he ſhew but
 “ *Souls remaining after Death*, and ſpeaking
 “ as ſoon as they had drank of the *Blood* ?
 “ For he knew this, that *Blood* was the
 “ *Food of the Spirit* ; and *Spirit* was either
 “ the *Soul*, or the *Vehicle of the Soul*.”
 He proceeds to ſhew how *Homer* kept up
 the *Diſtinction* betwixt *Soul* and *Body* ; and
 then that he was well acquainted with what
 after was deemed a *Pythagorick* Notion,
 that *Souls* paſſed from one *Body* to another.


The Notion that prevailed among the
Egyptians, and from them was taken by
Pythagoras, and the following *Philoſophers*,
 was, that the *Soul* was *uncapable of Death*,
καὶ γὰρ. For it exiſted before it came here.
 They in their *Metaphyſicks* imagined it to
 be a *Part or Portion of God* himſelf, a *Section*
 of *God's Subſtance*, which always had, and
 always

always must exist : and this was the Philo-
 sophic Notion from the Times of *Pythagoras*,
 among the *Greeks*. And, if I mistake not,
 this Notion had a mighty Influence in the
 second, third and fourth Centuries of Christi-
 anity, in the Article of the Son's Generation.

They reasoned that all things arose from
 One, and would be resolved into One again :
 And the famous *Chryssippus*, the subtlest of
 the *Stoicks*, was for reducing the Stories of
Orpheus, *Museus*, *Hesiod*, and *Homer*, to his
 Notions of the Gods ; a thing ridiculous and
 impossible : and the Christians, I think, pur-
 sued the same sort of Topick, when they
 talked as they did, Platonically about the
Logos. But my Business is to account for
 the *Pythagorean* Notion of the Soul, which
 he made a Part of the τὸ ἐν. *Cicero* observes,
 that he imagined a Soul, which pervaded
 the Whole, from which our Souls were tak-
 en as a Part or Section ; and which he well
 refuted by shewing the Absurdity of God's
 being torn in pieces, and being miserable, and
 being ignorant. *Pythagoras qui censuit ani-*
mum esse per naturam omnem intentum &
commeantem, ex quo animi nostri carperentur,
non vidit distractione humanorum animorum
discerpi & dilacerari Deum ; & cum miseri
animi essent, quod plerisque contingeret, tum
dei partem esse miseram, quod fieri non posset.

Cur

CHAP. *Cur autem quicquam ignoraret animus homi-*
 XIV. *nis si esset Deus?*

 *Pythagoras* therefore, from the *Egyptians*, imagined the Soul to be a *Part* or *Segment* of God; and therefore to be ἀθάνατος, *immortal*: And the *Boldness* charged upon him was, that he should treat our Souls as *Parts* of God, and apply to them a Term peculiar to the Gods. It was a strange Notion, indeed, when one considers, that Human Souls do much *Evil* here; that they are *ignorant*; that they are *miserable*; which cannot surely be said of God. How are they to be detrudd into Swine, or any Animal by way of *Punishment*? is a Part of God, capable of being *punished*? and capable of deserving this by *Misdemeanors*? or how must one Part of God punish another Part of Him?

But let *Philosophers* reason about these Matters in their own Ways: It is not of much Consequence in the present Enquiry. All that lies upon me to shew, is, that the common Notions of the World differ'd from the Philosophick Metaphysick Scheme. The Heathens believ'd the future Existence of Human Souls, and they believed a State of Punishments proportionable to the Guilt they had here contracted. *Homer* speaks of *Tityus*, tormented by Vultures, because he had used Force to *Latona*. And *Tantalus*,

χαλεπ'


χαλεπ' ἀλγέ' ἔχοντα, suffering great Torments; and *Sisyphus* too, for the Crimes which they had committed. *Virgil* has specified the Good and Evil which the Souls of Men suffered or enjoy'd in another State; nor need we to produce Authority for such a Notion among the *Greeks* or *Romans*. The *Getæ* believ'd the same, as we learn from *Herodotus*, l. 4. c. 93—95. † They do not think that they die, but that they go to *Xamolxis*, where they enjoy all sorts of good things. The *Gauls* believed the same thing ‡. The *Druids* taught, that Souls did not die, but pass'd from one to another, says *Cæsar*. These common Principles were so deeply impressed, and so fully believed by all, that when Death is spoken of as making its approach to any considerable Man, something or other is usually said by Writers, which shews a persuasion of a future State; and Good or Evil is the Expectation for what they have done or suffered. When *Xenophon* was giving an Account of *Cyrus's* Death, in that justly admired Speech of his to his Sons,

† Οὔτε ἀποθνήσκειν ἐωῦτόυς νομίζουσι, ἰέναι τε τοῦ ἀπολλύμενου παρὰ ζαμὸλξιν. *Herod.* l. 4. c. 93. *Xamolxis* taught them, that neither Himself, nor his Guests, nor those that should be born of them for ever, should die; ἀλλ' ἕξουσι ἐς χῶρον τῶτον, ἵνα αὐτὸν περιόντες ἕξουσι τὰ πάντα ἀγαθὰ. *Ibid.* c. 95.

‡ Non interire animas, sed ab aliis post mortem transire ad alios. *Cæs. Com.* l. 6. c. 14.

CHAP. he says, “^x You ought not to imagine, that
 XIV. “ when I shall cease to lead the human Life,
 “ I shall be nothing. You do not now see my
 “ Soul, but you find that I have one, by the
 “ things that are done— As for myself, I
 “ I could never persuade myself, that the Soul
 “ lives whilst ’tis in the Body, and that as
 “ soon as ’tis freed from it, it dies. For I
 “ see, that as long as the Soul continues in
 “ these mortal Bodies, it makes them live :
 “ nor can I be persuaded that the Soul can
 “ become insensible as soon as it is separated
 “ from a Body that is insensible. But on
 “ the contrary, as soon as it becomes pure and
 “ unmixed, then ’tis most likely to become most
 “ sensible. When a Man is dissolved, every
 “ thing appears to go to its own kind, except
 “ the Soul, which is not seen, neither when
 “ ’tis present, nor when it goes away.” Cicero
 has transferr’d this Passage into his *Cato Major*,
 as he has done likewise several excellent Pas-
 sages from *Plato*.

^x Οὐ γὰρ οὐλοῦ τῆς τῆς γε σαφῶς δοκεῖτε εἶδέναι, ὡς ἔδεν ἔσομαι ἐγὼ, ἔτι ἐπειδὴν τῆ ἀνθρωπίνῃ βίῃ τελευτήσω. Οὐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τοι τὴν γ’ ἐμὴν ψυχὴν εἰδῶτε, ἀλλ’ ὡς διεπρωτίετο τέτοις αὐτὴν ὡς ἔσαν κετεφορώτε. — Οὗτοι ἐγώ γε, ὦ παῖδες, εἰδὲ τέτο πάποτε ἐπειδὴν, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ἕως μὲν ἂν ἐν θνητῷ σώματι ἦ, ζῆ ὅταν δὲ τέτρα ἀπαλλ-
 λαγῇ, τεθῆκεν. Ὁρῶ γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώματα ὅσον ἂν ἐν
 αὐτοῖς χρόνον ἢ ἡ ψυχῇ, ζῶντα παρέχεται. Ὁυδὲ γε ὅπως ἄφρον
 ἔσαι ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴν τῆ ἄφρον[⊙] σώματ[⊙] δίχα γίνηται, εἰδὲ τῆ-
 το πάτισμαί. Ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἀκρατ[⊙] καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ νῦς ἐκκριθῇ, τότε
 καὶ φρονιμάτερον εἶδος αὐτὸν εἶναι. Διαλυομένου δὲ ἀνθρώπου, ὅλος
 ἐστὶν ἕκαστα ἀπὸντα πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον πλὴν τῆ ψυχῆς, αὐτὴ δὲ μόνη
 ἔτε κρεῖσσι ἔτε ἀτίσσω ὁρᾶται. Xenop. Cyrop. l. 8.

Sallust observes, “^y That Mankind is CHAP.
 “ compounded of Body and Soul ; and that XIV.
 “ all things follow the Nature of one or 
 “ the other. Whatever therefore belongs to
 “ the Body, such as a beautiful Face, great
 “ Riches, great Strength, These soon decay
 “ and come to an End ; but the Actions of
 “ the Mind, *like the Soul itself*, are *immor-*
 “ *tal*. The good things of the Body have
 “ a Beginning, and will have an End, but
 “ the Soul is *unperishable, æternal*, that
 “ which governs Mankind, active, controul-
 “ ing all things, itself uncontrouled.” It
 at all times, who did not believe the Immor-
 tality of the Soul ; there were some who
 imagined “^z *Death to be a Freedom from*
 “ *Pain and Misery ; that it put an End to*
 “ *all the Evils to which Mankind is exposed ;*
 “ *and that after that, there was no Place*
 “ *nor Ground to expect either Good or Evil.*”

^y Nam uti genus hominum compositum ex corpore & ani-
 ma est, ita res cunctæ — corporis alia, alia Animi naturam
 sequuntur. Igitur præclara facies, magnæ divitiæ, ad hoc vis
 Corporis & alia hujuscemodi omnia brevi dilabuntur ; at in-
 genii egregia facinora, sicuti anima, immortalia sunt. Po-
 stremo, Corpori, & fortunæ bonorum uti initium sic finis est —
 Animus incorruptus, æternus, rector humani generis agit, at-
 que habet cuncta, neque ipse habetur. *Sall. de bello Jug.*

^z Mortem ærumnarum requiem, non cruciatum, esse :
 eam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere ; ultra neque curæ
 neque gaudii locum esse. *Cæsar apud Sall. Bell. Catil.*

They

CHAP. They thought the things to be “^a false,
 XIV. “*which were commonly believed, that Evil*
 “*Men had a different Part allowed them*
 “*from the Good in the other World, and*
 “*lived in horrible, dreadful, nasty Places.*”
 But whatever such Men might say, it altered not the Religious Persuasions of the World; and one such Man as *Plato*, who philosophed rigidly, and was wont to think, and to deduce things in an argumentative manner, is of infinitely more Weight, than a luxurious debauched Man of Wit and Humour.

How far *Plato* maintained the Immortality of the Soul is well known: He produced so many and so weighty Reasons for it, “^b that, as *Cicero* says, one cannot but conclude that he was willing to persuade others, and that he was fully convinced himself of that important Truth. Nor indeed “^c is there any Reason why the
 “ Eternity

^a Falsa existimans ea quæ de Inferis memorantur, diverso itinere malos à bonis loca tetra, inculta, fœda, atque formidolosa habere. *Cato, ibid.*

^b Tot rationes attulit, ut velle cæteris, sibi certe persuasisse videatur. *Cic. Tusc. 1.*

^c Neque aliud est quicquam cur incredibilis his animorum videatur æternitas, nisi quod nequeunt, qualis sit animus vacans corpore intelligere, & cogitatione comprehendere. Quasi vero intelligant qualis sit in ipso corpore— Mihi quidem naturam animi intuenti, multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio, multoque obscurior, qualis animus in corpore sit, tanquam alienæ domui, quam qualis, cum exierit, & in liberum cœlum, quali

“ Eternity of the Soul is incredible, unless it CHAP.
 “ be that we cannot understand, or imagine XIV.
 “ what sort of a thing a Soul is, that has no
 “ Body. As if we understood what it is when
 “ it is in our Bodies. Nay, as if it were
 “ not harder and more difficult to apprehend
 “ it as confined to a Body like a Cage or
 “ Prison, than what it is when it is at Liber-
 “ ty, and goes to its proper Place, as it were
 “ to its own Home. For if we cannot un-
 “ derstand what any thing is which we never
 “ saw, certainly we cannot conceive God him-
 “ self, more than we can what a Soul free
 “ from all Body is.” This is Tully’s Way of
 Reasoning upon Plato’s Notions.

It is not of any moment to enter further into what Philosophers have said, when they attempt to account for the Soul’s *Eternity*. Common Sense taught them, that real proper Punishments were inflicted upon Men for Sins. Who can read *Plato’s Gorgias* (which is not ranked among the *Exoterics* by a late Writer, in which alone the “ Doctrine of a
 “ future State of Rewards and Punishments,” he thinks, “ are detail’d out ;) who can read That, and conceive that *Plato* did not really believe a State of future Punishments and

quasi in domum suam venerit. Si enim quod nunquam vidi-
 mus, id quale sit intelligere non possumus, certè & deum ip-
 sum, & divinum animum corpore liberatum, cogitatione
 completi non possumus. *Ibid.*

Rewards ?

CHAP. Rewards? When he had profess'd at large;
 XIV. how wicked Men are punished, and how
 good Men are rewarded in a future State, he declares, “^dThat to be his *full Persuasion*; “ and from thence it was that he endeavour'd “ to appear before his Judge, having a most “ pure Soul.” And if they imagined Men to be *punished for Sin*, and *rewarded for Virtue*, even supposing this was talked of in a way that might be proved fabulous, yet the Doctrine it self was unshaken. Suppose the Fables of *Acheron* and *Styx*, and *Cocytus*, and *Elysian Fields*, may be all demonstrated to be false, yet it does not follow that the thing convey'd under these Words were believed to be all false. It does not follow that Souls were believed to die, or to be incapable of receiving Punishments or Rewards: but only that this manner of representing them is false. When 'tis said, that the Antients, when they argued about a *future State*, were lost, and could never give Satisfaction to themselves about it— This may be true, and yet it makes no Objection against the State itself being discovered, and well known, and firmly believed, among them. Philosophers then disputed about the Soul, and its Immortality, as Christians have disputed about other

^d Ὑπὸ τούτων ἔ' λόγον πίπεισιν, ἢ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποθανῆμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑμεῖσ' αὐτοὶ ἔχετε τὴν ψυχὴν. Plato Gorgias, p. 526.

Points since. Some of them maintained the Soul to return to a Body after a certain number of Years :

CHAP.
XIV.
~

*Has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos
— in corpora velle reverti. Vir. Ænæ. 6.*

Pythagoras thought them *instantly* to go out of one Body into another : *Chryſippus* ſaid, that we, after our deaths, in certain revolving Periods of Time, ſhall be reſtored to the Form we have now. *Vid. Lactantius, l. 7. c. 23.* Others accounted for the Immortality of the Soul, by ſaying, it was a *Part*, *μέγεθρον*, or *ἀποσμάτιον*, of God himſelf : But theſe were Diſputes, as I ſaid, like thoſe of Chriſtians about ſome of their Doctrines : All agree in the Thing, or Doctrine, though they differ in their Explication of it.

It has been maintained indeed by ſome, that all that the Old Philoſophers held was a Natural *Metemphycoſis*, or a Transition from one Body to another, without any *moral Deſignation* whatever. But ſurely this Concluſion is too haſty : For when it was ſaid, that the Souls of *ill* Men deſcended into *Aſſes* or *Swine*, they did not ſuppoſe the Souls of *good* Men ſo to deſcend. The Souls of *evil* Men, *e. g.* of “ *Murderers*, went into the “ *Bodies of Beaſts*, *Thoſe of laſcivious Men* into

D d

“ the

CHAP. “ *the Bodies of Swine or Goats, ποτι κόλασιν,*
 XIV. “ *for Punishment*”, says *Timæus Læcrus.*

Was this done *for Punishment*, and yet was no Regard paid to the *Morals* of wicked Men? They really conceiv'd Punishments and Rewards of evil or good Actions in Men: and some imagined a *Punishment* by the means of *Transmigration*; others imagined a *Punishment* inflicted in *Hades*; others by immediate Acts of Providence; and all supposed Rewards or Punishments, notwithstanding they might treat as Fables the Stories of *Styx*, and *Cocytus*, and *Acheron*. However, what I contend for is, that the Heathen held a *Moral State of Rewards and Punishments*, according to Good or Evil done here; since though some join'd the pure and unpolluted Souls immediately to God, yet they held that the *Wicked* were to undergo many *Transmigrations*, as *Punishments*: Others, who were not in those Notions, asserted a different Sort of *Punishment*, or *Reward*, according to the different Behaviour of Mankind.

When *Socrates* in *Æschines* had recited what he had heard *Gobrias* say about the future Rewards and Punishments of Men in the other Life, he concludes, that “ being forced by dint of Reason, this only do I know for certain, that every Soul is immortal.”

“ mortal.” And *Axiocbus* declares, upon CHAP.
 having heard what *Socrates* had said, “ that XIV.
 “ he was so far from fearing to die, that he
 “ despised Life, as being to be translated into
 “ a better House.” But enough upon this
 Second great Fundamental of Natural Re-
 ligion. I proceed next to consider, whether
 the Christian Revelation has discovered any
New Doctrine of Morality, which Reason
 does not dictate.

Meric Casaubon, in his Preface to *Anto-*
ninus's Meditations, observes, “ that it is the
 “ Opinion of many, that Matters of Faith
 “ and the Sacraments only excepted, there
 “ is nothing in the whole Gospel which is
 “ not *Juris Naturalis*, and most agreeable
 “ to *Human Reason*. For my Part, says
 “ he, as I would not take upon me to
 “ maintain their Opinion precisely true in
 “ all Points and Circumstances, so I must
 “ needs say, if we esteem that *Natural*,
 “ which *Natural Men* of best Account by
 “ the mere Strength of *Human Reason*, have
 “ taught and taken upon them to maintain as
 “ just and reasonable, I know not any *Evan-*
 “ *gelical Precept*, or *Duty*, belonging to a
 “ Christian's Practice, (*even the hardest*, and
 “ those that seem to ordinary Men most con-
 “ trary to Flesh and Blood not excepted)
 “ but upon due Search and Examination will

CHAP. “prove of that Nature.” And certainly it
 XIV. is so, if that be deemed *Juris Naturalis*,
 which *Grotius* owns to be so; *viz.* quod
 honestius esse dicitur ipsa Ratio; what Reason
 itself dictates to be more fit and right in itself,
 either to abstain from, or to do. *Grot. Ju.*
Bell. ac Pac. l. 1. c. 11. § 6. And it is in
 this Sense that throughout this Enquiry the
 Word *Reason* is certainly to be used. What-
 ever That dictates to be *true*, is the Rule of
 Action: nor can any Proposition of Revela-
 tion be admitted, which to an Enquirer ap-
 pears to be *unreasonable*.

By those who maintain, that Christianity
 has made the Law of Nature *more perfect*
 than Reason of itself could discover, there are
 several Christian Tenets produced in order to
 prove their Point. Some are of the *prohibi-*
tory Kind, others of the *active* Sort. We are
prohibited the keeping *Concubines*, obtaining
Divorce, and the *Marriage* of more Wives
 than One. Of the other Kind are the In-
 junctions, *Resist not evil, but whosoever shall*
smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the
other. Love your enemies; bless them that
curse you; do good to them that hate you, and
pray for them that despitefully use you, and
persecute you; Matt. v. 39—42—44. We
 ought to *lay down our lives for the brethren,*
1 John iii. 16. Ye ought to wash one another's
feet,

fect, Joh. xiii. 14. *If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee. For it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into Hell,* Matt. v. 29, 30. *Whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the Judgment; and whosoever shall say unto his brother Racha, shall be in danger of the Council; but whosoever shall say Thou fool, shall be in danger of Hell fire;* Matt. v. 22. So likewise in relation to our selves, we are to *deny ourselves, to mortify our members which are upon Earth; to love Christ more than Father and Mother.* These I think are the *harsh*est, and bid the fairest of any in the Gospel to be *unnatural*, and indeed are urged as such. Let us remove this Objection, before we proceed further.

It is but fair, that those who suppose these to be *Objections against Christianity*, should not insist on any, or all these, in any *unreasonable* Sense, if they are capable by fair *Methods* of having a *reasonable* Sense put on them. These Rules or Directions, 'tis maintain'd, come from *God*: They therefore ought to be allowed to have a *reasonable* Sense put on them, as they come from a *Reasonable Being*, the very Fountain of all *Reason*, if they are capable of any such Sense.

CHAP. Here therefore the Rules of *Critique* are to
 XIV. be consulted ; and these Books are to be treat-
 ed as you would the Books of any other
 Moral Writer, whose Sense you are desirous
 to discover. You have one general Method
 of Interpretation that must be allowed ; and
 that is, that the Books of the *New Testament*
 being *Moral*, and not *Philosophical*, the Di-
 rections are all to be construed as *Moral Pro-*
positions are. Now it will appear that those
 Precepts being interpreted *Philosophically*,
 which are in their Natures, and in the Design
 of the Speaker, *Moral*, is the alone Founda-
 tion of their being deem'd absurd ; *e. g.*

When it is said, *Love your Enemies ; Re-*
sist not Evil, &c. It is absurd to interpret the
 Words so as if the *same thing* were enjoin'd,
 in the same *Degree*, and in the same *Manner*,
 to *Enemies* and *Friends* ; to *Enemies* and *Pa-*
rents, or *Children*. The Idea therefore of
Love and *Enemies* are to be stated ; and then
 it will appear that no Absurdity is contain'd
 in the Proposition. And so it is in every
 other Instance ; and thus the *New Testament*
 will stand as free from Objections as all other
 Moral Books whatever.

It may be replied, That if our Saviour
 had designed to make such Laws, as, *Love*
your Enemies, Resist not Evil, &c. to have
 been the Laws of his Kingdom— How
 could

could he have expressed them otherwise? CHAP. XIV.
 Had he designed to have absolutely prohibit-
 ed *all Swearing*; could he have done it in
 fuller Terms, or more express, than by say-
 ing— *Swear not at all*? How then must it
 appear, that He did not *design* in this and
 all like Instances, that his Words should be
 taken philosophically and strictly? How can
 we know that He did not intend to abridge
 the Law of Nature, and prohibit certain
 Things which That allows, since his Words
 are capable of such Sense? The Law of
 Nature commands us to *Love our Friends*,
 and plainly enough teaches us to *annoy* our
Enemies: How does it appear that Christ
 did not *intend*, that we should carry our
Love to *Enemies*, and by that prohibit *all*
War, all Hurt and Damage unto any one
 whatever? Why may not He abridge Mens
 Natural Liberties just as the Laws of Political
 Societies always do, commanding Men
 to do, or restraining them from, what they
 may have a Right to by the Law of Na-
 ture. The Answer is,

1. That Jesus Christ never particularly or
 directly intimated any Design to vary from
 the Law of Nature: Nay, by his preaching
 up the Doctrine of *Repentance*, he called
 Men back to *That* Law, as what they had
 violated by *Sin*. Every Deviation from *That*,

CHAP. was looked upon by Him, as what Men
 XIV. ought to *repent* of, and consequently That
 was the *general* Rule and Measure of Action
 to his Disciples.

2. Had he intended that his Commands or Prohibitions should have been understood in such Sense, as absolutely to have prohibited all *Resistance*; or had he design'd to have commanded that Men should *love their Enemies* in the same *manner* and *degree*, as *Friends*; the Words which were to express this, would not have been such general ones as he made use of, and which common Sense would interpret in another manner; but he would have explain'd himself in such manner as would have prevented all Mistakes about his Meaning. Whereas now we are left to our own Reason and Judgment, about the Extent and Meaning of his Precepts; and it would be wrong not to interpret them by that Law to which he recalled us, when he preached up *Repentance*.

3. If a Passage of *Revelation* be interpreted with *Limitations*, and then it appears to be reasonable; but if taken literally and in its full extent, it appears to be absurd, or unreasonable; and if all the other Parts of the same Revelation appear to be rational, and wise; it is *more probable* at least that such Passage ought to be soberly interpreted, than
 2 that

that the Principles of Reason ought to be CHAP. receded from. But if there appears Evidence, XIV. that such Passage comes from God, and no Intimation is any where given, that what is fit and right in itself should ever be receded from, then it follows that we must interpret such Passage according to Reason, since it comes from Him who gave us Reason, by which alone we can judge.

4. That Christ did not intend that those Expressions of his should be taken in such Sense, as that the Love of *Enemies* and *Friends* was to be strictly the same, is clear, because he *allows* in many cases the direct contrary to what such Injunctions may contain; nay, he himself *practised*, and *declared* his Design to practise, the contrary to them. *E. g.* 'tis enjoin'd that we are to *Love our Enemies*: Take these Words as they are taken by them who form an Objection from hence against *all War*, or *all Annoyance*, or *Hurt of Enemies*, or that think all are *equally* to be loved—this, I say, is contrary to Christ's own avowed Design; who severely *punished* the *Jews*, and has threatened to *punish* his Enemies at the Day of Judgment: *Vid.* Matt. xxii. 7. Luke xix. 12, 14, 27. But then,

5. Take the Expressions of the Gospel in a reasonable Sense and Latitude only, and it will appear that our Saviour did not design to *extend* and *exalt* the moral Principles to a degree

CHAP. a degree *unknown to natural Reason*; nor did
 XIV. he design to *enlarge* the common Principles
 of Benevolence and Charity; but only to
 fix them in such a manner as Truth and
 Justice do require. And therefore I cannot
 but observe, that when *Laëtantius* was treat-
 ing of the great good Effects, that the Chri-
 stian Religion produced upon Mens Minds,
 which the Philosophers Precepts did not,
 he says “*What then? Did they [the Philo-
 sophers] command nothing like it? Yes,
 very many things; and they frequently
 come to the Truth.*” And then he accounts
 for the difference of Effects, not from their
not coming at, or knowing the Truth, but
from their want of having it laid before them
in a due manner, and by a proper Authority.

6. Some of these Precepts which are pre-
 tended to be *exalted* in a degree unknown
 to natural Reason, are expressly commanded
 to be after the Example of God, *who maketh*
his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and
sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust,
 Matt. v. 45. Now, as God will *punish* his
 Enemies, and would not act as a just or
 moral Governor of the Universe, were he to

* Quid ergo? Nihilne illi simile præcipiunt? Immo per-
 multa: & ad verum frequenter accedunt. Sed nihil ponderis
 habent illa præcepta, quia sunt humana.— *Laët. lib. 3. c. 26,*
27. Auctoritate— divina carent. Nemo igitur credit, quia
tam se hominem putat esse qui audit, quam ille qui præcipit.
Ibid.

treat good and bad Men *equally*; so may CHAP. Men, in virtue of this very Principle, act: XIV. so that they who extend these Precepts beyond the *reasonable Sense* of the general Words, are guilty of misunderstanding the exprefs Direction of the Gospel.

And now let us fix the Meaning of each Rule of the Gospel, and then see if Reason did not discover to the Heathen World every one of those Duties, which some imagine to be the Peculiar of Christianity: And let it be remembred, that Revelation does not *create* Relations, but only *shows* them; and in consequence Duties arise not from the manner in which they are discovered to us, but the moral Obligation commences, when the Relation is made to appear.

The first Point which is prohibited by Christianity is *Fornication*: Now 'tis said, that the Law of Nature does not absolutely determine this to be *unlawful*, and consequently the Command of Christ is a real Improvement upon the Law of Nature. By the Law of Nature, is here always meant; ^f *whatever is the Dictate of Right*

^f Jus naturale est dictatum rectæ rationis, indicans actui alicui, ex ejus convenientia aut disconvenientia cum ipsa natura rationali, inesse moralem turpitudinem, aut necessitatem moralem; ac consequenter ab auctore naturæ Deo talem actum aut vetari, aut præcipi. *Grot. de Ju. B. ac P. l. 1. c. 1. § 10.*

CHAP. Reason *indicating, from its Agreement or*
 XIV. *Disagreement with the Reason of Things, that*
 ~~~~~ *such an Act as has a moral Turpitude or*  
 Good; *ought to be done or abstained from,*  
*and consequently that it is commanded or pro-*  
*hibited by God.* Whatever therefore is forbid  
 by Christianity, if it be forbid as *dishonest* and  
*unfit by Heathen Nations*, this will shew that  
 Reason dictated to them the *wrongfulness* of  
 such things. Nor is it any Answer that  
 some Nations *allowed*, what others condem-  
 ned; since the Point is, to shew that by the  
 Light of unassisted Nature, Truth might be  
 discovered, and was so in fact.

*E. g.* Doth Christianity forbid all *For-*  
*nication* as sinful? The Heathen World  
 condemn'd it as *Scandalous* and *Infamous*;  
 and if any Nation allowed such Practices,  
 it was not that they *approved* them, but  
 from *Political* Considerations permitted,  
 what they, by public Marks of *Disgrace*,  
 shew'd their Dislike of. They might not,  
 perhaps, think fit to punish such Crimes;  
 but yet they look'd upon all that were guilty,  
 as having done something *base* and *dishonour-*  
*able*. There was " § a *Probrum* in such  
 " Women, a Shame, a *Turpitude* in their  
 " Way of Life," which was as severely

§ Probrum intelligitur etiam in his Mulieribus esse quæ  
 turpiter viverent, volgoque quæstum facerent, etiam si non  
 palam. *Digest.* l. 23. *Tit.* 2. c. 41.

condemn'd



condemn'd as Words could exprefs. Nor CHAP. was this confined to Acts, but all Evil was XIV. deemed to arife from the Heart, and <sup>h</sup> *Evil Thoughts* were deemed the Sources of Sin.

In like manner as *Concubinage* and *Polygamy* are deem'd prohibited by the Gofpel, were they prohibited by many of the beft and wifeft of the Heathen. The *Romans* had each but one Wife. And *Andromache* in *Euripides* fays “<sup>i</sup> 'Tis not right for one  
“ Man to poffefs two Wives; but if they  
“ would live well, they fhould love but one.”  
And again “<sup>k</sup> I cannot approve of two  
“ Wives, the Plague of Families, and con-  
“ ftant Occafions of Quarrels.”

But let us confider thefe particular Precepts which are fuppofed to *exalt* the Law of Nature fo much: *1ft*, *Refift not Evil*; *Matt. v. 39*. Thefe Words cannot be taken in their utmoft extent, as if we were obliged *never* to refift, or oppofe, or contra-

<sup>h</sup> Nam Scelus intra fe tacitum qui cogitat ullum  
Facti crimen habet. *Juvenal.*

<sup>i</sup> ————— ἄδ' ἔρ' καλὸν  
Δυσὶν γυναικοῖν ἀνδρ' ἐν' ἡνίας ἔχσειν,  
Ἄλλ' εἰς μίαν βλέποντες εὐναίαν Κυπριν,  
Στέργῃσιν, ὅσας μὴ κακῶς οἰκίῃν θέλει. *Eur. Andro.*

<sup>k</sup> Οὐδ' ἔ ποτ' ἂν δίδυμα  
Λέκτρ' ἐπαινέσω βροτῶν  
Οὐδ' ἀμφιμάτορας κόρας  
Ἔριν μὲν οἰκῶν  
Δυσμενεῖς τε λυτᾶς.  
Τὴν μίαν μοὶ στεργέτω πόσις γάμοις  
Ἀκαιάνητον εὐναν ἀνδρῶν. *ibid.*

CHAP. dict, an injurious Person ; but they must be  
 XIV. confined to the Subject of *Revenge*, or the  
 Law of *Retaliation*, to which they are op-  
 posed : And how many Passages among the  
*Heathens* may be produced, condemning *Re-*  
*venge* in as strong Terms as can be ? *Grotius*  
 has produced several from *Plato*, *Menander*,  
 and the Schools of *Pythagoras*, and other  
 later Writers, to shew what they thought  
 was fit to be done to such as were Enemies,  
 or injurious to others. “<sup>1</sup> *Plato*,” says he,  
 says in his *Crito*, “*That you must not return*  
 “*an Injury to him that has done you one.*”  
 And again, “*You ought not to return an*  
 “*Injury, nor do Hurt to any Man, what-*  
 “*ever you may suffer from them : Which*  
 “*Maximus Tyrius*, a Follower of *Plato*,  
 “*at large explains in a Discourse entitled,*  
 “*Whether you may return an Injury to one*  
 “*that has acted unjustly by you.* *Hierocles*  
 “*says, to return an Injury, is to come into the*  
 “*same ill Habit with those who first did In-*

<sup>1</sup> Quod Plato propius cæteris perspexit, ejus enim est in  
*Critone*, εὐδὲ ἀδικήματα δεῖ ἀνταδικεῖν. Quod late explicat de-  
 monstratis incommodis quæ ultionem sequi solent, sectator  
 dogmatum Platonis Maximus Tyrius diatribâ cui titulum fe-  
 cit, Εἰ τ' ἀδικήσαντα ἀνταδικητέον. Sed & Hierocles, dixit, τῶ  
 ἀνταδικεῖν ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἴσῳ τοῖς ἀδικῶσι καχεψίαν ἔρχεσθαι. Lace-  
 dæmonii precibus addere solebant τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι δύνεσθαι. Dig-  
 num memoria et Menandri illud,

Οὐτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι εἰς ἀνὴρα, ὃν Γοργίας,  
 Ὅστις ἀδικεῖσθαι πλείς ἐπίσταται βροτῶν.

Grotius in Locum.

“*justice.*”

“ justice. The Lacedæmonians were wont CHAP.  
 “ to add to their Prayers, that they might be XIV.  
 “ able to suffer Injuries. Menander’s Saying  
 “ is worth keeping in our Minds ; O Gorgias,  
 “ He is the best Man, who best knows how  
 “ to bear Injuries.” He then proceeds to  
 mention some Sayings of Pythagoras, of  
 Metellus Numidicus, of Seneca, of Muso-  
 ninus, &c.— To what Grotius has said, let  
 me add from Plato’s Crito, “ <sup>m</sup> To do an In-  
 “ jury to him that has done you an Injury, is  
 “ altogether evil and base.” In his first Rep.  
 he says, “ <sup>n</sup> If any one should say, that it is  
 “ just to give to any one his due, but Inju-  
 “ ries are due to Enemies, good things to  
 “ Friends, he is not to be thought a wise  
 “ Man that talks thus. For ’tis plain, that  
 “ ’tis by no means just to injure any body. If  
 “ any one therefore shall say that Simonides,  
 “ or Bias, or Pittacus, or any other of the

<sup>m</sup> Ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικῶντι καὶ κακὸν ἔσται αἴχρον τυγχάνειν οὐ παντὶ τρό-  
 πῳ φαμέν &c. Plat. Crit.

<sup>n</sup> Εἰ ἄρα ὀφειλόμην ἐκάστῳ ἀποδοῦναι φησὶ τις δίκαιον εἶναι τῷ-  
 το δεῖ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ, τοῖς μὲν ἰσχυροῖς βλάπην ὀφείλειαι παρὰ τῶ δι-  
 καιῶ ἀνδρῶς, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ἀφελείαν· σὺν ἂν σοφὸς ὁ τῆτο εἰπάτω, ἔ-  
 γὼ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον ἔδαμῶ γὰρ δίκαιον εἶναι ἡμῖν ἐφάνη οὐ βλάπειν.  
 Συγχωρῶ, ἢ οὐκ ἔστι. Μαχόμεθα ἄρα, ἢ οὐκ ἔγω— εἰ τις αὐτὸ φη-  
 ῖ ἢ Σιμωνίδην, ἢ Βίαντα, ἢ Πίττακον εἰρηκέναι, ἢ τιν’ ἄλλον τῶ σοφῶν  
 τε καὶ μακαριῶν ἀνδρῶν.— Ἀλλ’ οἶδα, ἢ οὐκ ἔγω ἔμοι δοκεῖ εἶναι  
 τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι τῶς μὲν φίλος ἀφελείν, τῶς δὲ ἰσ-  
 χυροῖς βλάπειν· τί τῶ; ἔφη. Οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περικλέους εἶναι, ἢ Περ-  
 δίκου, ἢ Ξέρξου, ἢ Ἰσμενίου τῶ Θηβαίου, ἢ τινὸς ἄλλου μέγα οἰομένου  
 δυνατῶ πλοῦσι ἀνδρῶν. Plat. 1 Rep. p. 335, 336.

“ wife

CHAP. “ wise and happy, or blessed Men, said so,  
 XIV. “ I shall contradict him. This Notion that  
 “ ’tis just to do Injuries to your Enemies, is,  
 “ I think, the Thought of *Periander*, or  
 “ *Perdiccas*, or *Xerxes*, or *Ismenias the The-*  
 “ *ban*, or some Rich Man, who thinks he  
 “ can do great things.” *Plato* thought it a  
 Maxim of *Politicks* merely, and not of *Mor-*  
*als*, to treat an *Enemy ill*, or return him  
 Evil for Evil. And the famous *Atticus* was  
 so remarkable for being beloved by all, that  
 his Historian tells us by what means he ob-  
 tain’d this Happiness: “ ° He had no En-  
 “ mities, because he never did any Injury  
 “ to any one; and if he receiv’d any In-  
 “ jury, he chose to forget it, rather than  
 “ revenge it.”

But the Passage which is usually cited as  
 advancing Christian Morality above the Reli-  
 gion of Nature is, that of *Matt. v. 44—48*.  
*Love your enemies, bless them that curse you,*  
*do good to them that hate you, and pray for*  
*them that despightfully use you and persecute*  
*you.— For if ye love them which love you,*  
*what reward have you? what do ye more*  
*than others? Be ye therefore perfect, even as*  
*your Father which is in Heaven is perfect.*

° *Nullas inimicitias gessit, quod neque lædebat quenquam; neque si quam Injuriam acceperat, non malebat oblivisci, quam ulcisci. Cornel. Nep. Atticus.*

The Meaning and Extent of this Passage is, CHAP. not that Christians should treat *Enemies*, or XIV. *wicked* and detestable Persons that shew no Dispositions to Amendment, as if they were *Friends*, or *Virtuous*, or *Religious*: This would be to do a real Disservice to Virtue and Religion, and to those that pursue it, to put no difference betwixt such, and those of the vilest Characters. So when we are commanded to *bleſs them that curſe us*; it cannot be to wish them Power, and Riches, and Opportunities to enable them to do us more Mischief. And again, when we are to *do good to them that hate us, and pray for them that perſecute us* and injure us, it cannot be that we ought to *ſtrengthen* them in their Power to injure us more. This would be not only *Folly*, but cannot be an Improvement in any Virtue, or Rectitude of Morals. Put this Passage then into proper Words that expreſs its full Meaning, and it will amount to no more than this, “ Shew to ſuch  
 “ Men as are your *Enemies* a right Diſpoſi-  
 “ tion of Mind: if any Misfortunes or Ca-  
 “ lamities happen to them, expreſs a due  
 “ Concern, and wiſh them ſuch Good as  
 “ may be conſiſtent with their real Happi-  
 “ neſs.” This may be expreſs'd ſeveral  
 Ways, in *Words*, in *Actions* to them, and  
 in private Prayers for them. “ Give them  
 “ *good Words* for their *bad ones*, and expreſs  
 E e “ your

CHAP. “ your good *Wishes* to those who *wish ill* to  
 XIV. “ you : Nay, do more ; *do good to them who*  
 “ *hate you* : if they want your Assistance in  
 “ any Case, be ready to do it in order to  
 “ bring them to a right Mind : Nay, *pray*  
 “ that God would forgive them, and give  
 “ them what is good for them, and not  
 “ that they may perish, or come to untimely  
 “ Ends.” Is there any thing in this that is  
 not reasonable, and honourable, and worthy  
 a Creature that can think ? *Xenophon* makes  
*Socrates* say to *Chærecrates* <sup>P</sup>, who did not  
 know how to stoop to reconcile *Chærephon*,  
 “ *who always was injurious in Word and*  
 “ *Deed, rather than any Advantage to him,*  
 “ *and therefore the Object of Hatred— Stay*  
 “ *not, says he, but endeavour to soften the*  
 “ *Man, and he will soon become subservient*

<sup>P</sup> Ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐμὲ μισεῖν αὐτὸν, ὅτι—πανταχῶς καὶ ἔργῳ ἔ λογῶ  
 ζημία μᾶλλον ἢ ἀφέλεια ἐστίν. Upon this he says, How is it  
 possible that I should not know how to use my Brother,  
 knowing how to speak well of him that speaks well of me,  
 and to do good to him who does good to me ? To cure this  
 humour *Socrates* enters into a large Discourse, and at length  
 says, ὦ γὰρθε, μὴ ἔνοι, ἀλλ’ ἐγκρατεῖ τ’ ἀνδρα καταπραΰναι, καὶ  
 πανταχῶς σοι ὑπακούσεται.—Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ποιητὰ ἀνθρώπια σοὶ ἀν  
 ἄλλως μᾶλλον ἔλοις, ἢ εἰ διδοίης τι. Τῶς δὲ κακῶς καὶ ἀγαθῶς ἀν  
 θρώπων προσφιλιῶς χρῶμεθα μάλιστα ἂν καταπραΰσαιο. Καὶ ὁ Χαιρε  
 κράτης εἶπεν· εἰάν ἐν ἐμοὶ ταῦτα παιδῶν ἐκείνῳ μὴδὲν βελτίον  
 γίνεταί; Τί γὰρ ἄλλο, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἢ κινδυνεύεις ἐπιδειξάσαι σὺ  
 μὲν χρηστὸς τε καὶ φιλαδέλφους εἶναι, ἐκεῖνῳ δὲ φανῶς τε καὶ σοὶ ἀξ  
 ἰῶ εὐεργεσίας; ἀλλ’ ἔδεν οἶμαι τῶτων ἐσοῦν. Νεμίζω γὰρ αὐτὸν,  
 ἐπειδὴν αἰδοῦμαι σε προσκαλεσθῆναι ἑαυτὸν εἰς τ’ ἀγῶνας τῶτων, πάντων  
 φιλονηκίσειν, ὅπως ἀπειθήνηται σε λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ, εὖ ποιῶν. Xe  
 noph Memor. l. 2. p. 588, 589.

“ to you. *Wicked Men* you cannot better se- CHAP.  
 “ cure, *than* by giving some thing; but XIV.  
 “ *Men of Honour and Goodness* you cannot  
 “ gain better *than* by using them well.” But  
*Chærecrates* said, “ *What* if he should not  
 “ grow better for my using him thus? *What*  
 “ then, says *Socrates*, try you to shew yourself  
 “ good, and to have a brotherly Affection  
 “ for him; he will shew himself to be wicked  
 “ and unworthy of your good *Actions* to him.  
 “ But I don’t suppose that either of these will  
 “ be the Case; for I think, when he finds  
 “ that you challenge him to this Combat, he  
 “ will earnestly endeavour to exceed you in  
 “ good *Words* and good *Actions*.” It was an  
 old Rule, “<sup>9</sup> That a mortal Man should not  
 “ retain immortal Anger.” And there is no  
 better Way of shewing that we do not keep  
 it up, than by shewing our Disposition to  
 Friendship, by being ready to do all good-  
 natur’d Offices to such as have injured us.  
*Aristotle*, as well as *Plato*, agrees to this,  
 that it is worse to do an Injury than to re-  
 ceive it; *Ethic.* l. i. And *Socrates* says di-  
 rectly, “<sup>r</sup> If it were necessary for me either  
 to do or to suffer an Injury, I would choose to  
 be injured.

<sup>9</sup> Ἀθάνατον ἔργον μὴ φύλαττε, Σηητὸς ἄν. Grotius Excerpt.  
 p. 925.

<sup>r</sup> Εἰ δ’ ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἐλεῖμεν ἢ μᾶλλον  
 ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν. Plato Gorgias. p. 469, 476, &c.

CHAP. But let us consider the thing: *To love our*  
 XIV. *Enemies, and do good to them that hate us,*  
 signifies not to treat all alike, good and bad, innocent and criminal; but to shew such a Mind to such as have done us an Injury, that if they can amend and behave right for the future, all past Wrongs are to be forgot. Less than this the Words will not admit, and more is not required; since what is required in this Case is to follow the Example of God, who is indeed merciful and ready to forgive, but yet has declared that he will punish obstinate and wicked Offenders. Now we find this laid down as a Law by *Plato*<sup>s</sup>, that “ every Man should be as merciful as possible.” That “ ‘tis right to have Mercy and Compassion to him that is curable; that you should curb your Anger, and not carry things in a womanish manner, obstinately, to extremity: But if a Person be wicked and obstinate, intemperate and incurable, then indeed is Anger to be permitted towards such. For this Reason we say, that a good Man ought always to be ready to forgive as well as to be angry.” Now if Men are

<sup>s</sup> Χρη πάντα άνδρα είναι πρῶον ὡς ὅτι μάλισα. Plato de Leg. l. v.

<sup>t</sup> Ἐλεεινὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν ἰάσιμα ἔχοντα ἐγγαρῆ, καὶ ἀνεύγοντα τὸ θυμὸν πραινέειν, καὶ μὴ ἀπροχολῶντα γυναικείως πικραινόμενον ἀφαιτελεῖν. Τῷ δὲ ἀκράτους καὶ ἀπαραμυθῆτος πλημμελεῖ καὶ κακῶ ἐφίεναι δεῖ τὴν ὀργήν. Διὸ δὴ θυμοειδῆ πρῆπειν καὶ πρῶον φασμέν ἑκάστοτε εἶναι δεῖν τὸ ἀγαθόν. *ibid.*

forgiven



forgiven what is past, they stand *recti*, and CHAP. in course are to be treated not longer as Ene- XIV. mies, or injurious, but as if they had not of-  
 fended. *Aristotle* therefore defines the *πρᾶος*, the Man that keeps the Mean betwixt Angri-  
 ness, and Insensibility of Injuries, to be one  
 “ “ *who is not carried away by Passion; but*  
 “ *as Reason directs, in such manner, to such*  
 “ *Persons, and for such Time as is right.*”  
 A truly good Man that finds the Cause of Dislike removed, will then be ready to do such good-natur'd Acts, as he was ready to do before the Offence commenced, and consequently to do Good to such as hath been *Enemies*.

This Temper was not only taught, but likewise practised by the Heathens; and they not only did *forgive* their *Enemies*, and do Good to them that hated them and despitefully used them; but this was the Character for which *Cicero* payed the highest Compliments to *Julius Cæsar*, commending him<sup>x</sup>,  
 “ that he *could overcome all Resentment, re-*  
 “ *strain his Anger, and not only raise up an*  
 “ *Adversary, remarkable for Descent, Abili-*

<sup>u</sup> Βέλεται ὁ πρᾶος — μὴ ἀγροῦς ὑπὸ τῆ πάθης, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀνὸ λό-  
 γου τάξει, καὶ ἔτι, ἔ ἐπὶ τούτοις, καὶ ἐπὶ τοσούτοι χρόνοι, χαλεπαί-  
 νειν. *Arist. Mor. l. 4.*

<sup>x</sup> Verum animum vincere, iracundiam cohibere, victoriam temperare, adversarium nobilitate ingenio virtute præstantem, non modo extollere jacentem, sed etiam amplificare ejus pristinam dignitatem. *Cic. pro Marcello.*

CHAP. “tics, and Virtue, who was now down, but  
 XIV. “enlarge his former Dignity.” How did  
 Augustus afterwards act by Cinna, who had  
 entered into a Conspiracy against him? “*⁊ I*  
 “give you, says he, a second time your Life:  
 “before I gave it you when you was a pub-  
 “lic Enemy; now I give it you when you  
 “are engaged in a Conspiracy against me.  
 “Let Friendship begin between us from this  
 “Day. Let the Contest between us two be,  
 “whether I have given you your Life, or  
 “you have receiv’d it, and stand in my debt for  
 “it, with greater Trust and Confidence.” And  
 after this he made him *Consul*, complaining  
 that he had not Courage to stand a Candi-  
 date for it; and was afterwards a very hearty  
 Friend, and very faithful. This Conduct was  
 what the Heathens recommended as *honestum*,  
 right and fit in it self; they thought it  
*proper*, and becoming the Person that  
 perform’d it; it was agreeable to Truth,  
 or the Reasons of Things, and the Relations  
 that Moral Agents stood in to one another;  
 and the Mind as naturally and necessarily  
 assented to such Actions, as the Eyes did to

⁊ Vitam tibi inquit, Cinna, iterum do; prius hosti, nunc  
 Insidatori ac Parricidæ. Ex hodierno die inter nos amicitia  
 incipiat. Contendamus utrum ego meliore fide vitam tibi  
 dederim, an tu debeas? Post hæc detulit ultro Consulatum,  
 Quæstus, quod non auderet petere. Amicissimum, fidelissi-  
 mumque habuit. *Senec. de Clemen. l. 1 c. 9.* Vid. *Plutarc.*  
*de capienda ex inimicis utilitate.*

any beautiful Objects, or the Ears to any CHAP.  
Harmony. XIV.

3. Pass we now to the Third Text mentioned, *viz.* 1 John iii. 16. *Hereby perceive we the love of God, because He [i. e. Christ] laid down his life for us, and we ought to lay down our Lives for the Brethren.* The Sense is, That we should be ready to testify our Love for our Brethren, not only by engaging in any Hazards, but even in parting with Life it self to save them from eternal Death. No doubt 'tis a high Instance of Love that is recommended; but 'tis by no means peculiar to the Gospel to have Men part with their Lives to save others, even from Temporal Evils. The Readiness to sacrifice Lives for Friends, and for one's Country, are well known; and if they could teach such a Notion as *bonest* and *right* for such Ends, it naturally must have led them to have taught the same Doctrine for more noble Ends.

4. Our Saviour, as a Mark of *Humility*, bids his Disciples *Wash one another's feet*, John xiii. 14. *i. e.* "Do the readiest Offices to serve one another, and even the *lowest*." Now this will always be done where there is such Love and Charity as our Saviour desired his Disciples to have one for the other. He desired them to love one another; and they that do so always with good to one

CHAP. another, because they love. They that love  
 XIV. one another merely for Profit, or Interest,  
 or Pleasure, have not that Affection that  
 Christ will'd to his Disciples, but such a one  
 as was easily dissolved; for if Men are no  
 longer useful or give Pleasure, that for which  
 they were loved is at an end, and in course  
 the Friendship must cease. But “<sup>z</sup> perfect  
 “ Friendship is that of good Men, who are  
 “ alike in Virtue”, and Friends will always  
 wish all good Things to one another, and  
 be ready to do them <sup>a</sup> *for their Sakes*.

5. Nor is the next Passage of any great  
 Difficulty; *If thy right Eye offend thee, pluck  
 it out, and cast it from thee. For it is  
 profitable for thee that one of thy members  
 perish, and not that thy whole body should be  
 cast into Hell; Matt. v. 29, 30.* The Di-  
 rection here given was plainly occasioned by  
 what was said in the preceding Verse, that  
*whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after  
 her, hath committed adultery already with her  
 in his heart.* And the Sense is, that all  
 Causes of Sin are to be parted with, rather  
 than to incur the Anger of God: The dear-  
 est and most valuable Things must not be  
 the Causes of eternal Ruin. *Grotius* has

<sup>z</sup> Τελεία δὲ εἰσὶν ἢ τῶ ἀγαθῶν φιλία, καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίαν.  
 Arist. l. 8.

<sup>a</sup> Φίλοι τῷ φίλῳ βέλτεται τ' ἀγαθὰ, ἐκείνους ἕνεκα. *ibid.*

produced several similar Expressions and Rules. From *Ovid*, he says, CHAP.  
XIV.

*Dura aliquis præcepta vocet mea : dura fatemur  
Esse, sed ut valeas multa dolenda ferēs.  
Ut corpus redimas ferrum patieris & ignes,  
Arida nec sitiens ora lavabis aqua.*

He should have added what immediately follows ; and then he had produced a similar Instance, quite ;

*Ut valeas animo quicquam tolerare negabis ?  
At pretium pars hæc corpore majus habet.*

6. There is a sixth Passage which relates to our Neighbour, and contains a Restriction upon Anger. *Whosoever is angry with his Brother without a cause shall be in danger of the Judgment, and whosoever shall say unto his Brother Racha, shall be in danger of the Council, but whosoever shall say thou Fool, shall be in danger of Hell-fire ;* Matt. v. 22. There can be no question but this Place is to be understood of *unreasonable* and *immoderate* Anger, join'd with *Abuse* and *Contempt* : For we are certainly *allow'd* to be *angry* and to *sin not*. But hard Words, which carry us to injurious Reflections, are what all the old Moralists forbid ; and so is all Angeriness, ὀργιλότης, and such a Temper as pushes on to Abuse. Interpreters have here with one consent so cited the *Greek*

2 Word

CHAP. Word, Μωρὲ, that it may seem absurd to  
 XIV. call it in question : yet it cannot but seem  
 an odd Expression, when a *Syriac* Word  
 had just before been named : and there  
 seems to be very little difference between  
 calling a Man *Raka*, *empty Fellow*, and  
 μωρὲ, *Foolish*. There is not that Scale in the  
 Crime as there is in the Punishment, and  
 consequently, one may justly suspect that  
 here has been some Mistake. I must add  
 further, that *Raka* is more than *empty* ; and  
 Dr. *Lightfoot* has produced several Instances,  
 where *Raca* signifies the most Sovereign  
 Contempt, like *Scoundrel*, *Rascal*. Now  
 does the Word Μωρὲ in *Greek* any where sig-  
 nify so much, I will not say more, or worse  
 than *Raka* ? He might well therefore ask,  
 “ Quidnam quæso gravius in vocabulo μωρὲ  
 “ quam in vocabulo Ραχὰ.” *What is there*  
*worse in the Word Μωρὲ, thou Fool, than in*  
*the Word Raca ?* If one might be allowed to  
 conjecture in such a Case as this, I should  
 be inclined to think, that Μωρὲ is not a  
*Greek* Word, but is the same Language  
 with *Raca* ; and should not either be inter-  
 preted at all, any more than *Raka*, or at  
 least should not be interpreted from the  
*Greek* Word Μωρὲ, *Thou Fool*, but from  
 what *Morè* signifies in *Hebrew*. I should  
 guess *Morè* to be the same Word which is  
 used *Deut. xxi. 18.* *If a Man has a stub-*  
 born

born **ומורה** and rebellious Son, which will not obey the Voice of his Father, &c. So again, **CHAP. XIV.**  
 v. 20. **Psal. lxxviii. 8.** *A stubborn and rebellious Generation, a generation that set not their heart aright, and whose spirit was not stedfast with God.* So likewise in *Jeremiah, v. 23.* *This people hath a rebellious and revolting, moreh, heart, they are revolted and gone.* Again, *Numbers xx. 10.* in the same Sense, *Hear now ye Rebels, Morim.* If this then be the Meaning of the Word *Moreh*, the Sense is plain, *Whosoever shall be angry with his Brother, shall give an account to God for it, and shall suffer for it: Whosoever shall treat his Brother with Contempt, and use him as a Scoundrel, he shall be treated hereafter with a Punishment proportionable not to what the Council of Three inflicts, but to what the greater Council inflicts: But whosoever shall still use his Brother worse, and call him *Morè, Rebel, Apostate,* [for embracing my Doctrine, or for any such-like Occasion] shall be in danger of Hell-fire. This I offer as Conjecture at a Place, which Interpreters have not sufficiently considered, and have too much been distress'd about; and return from this Digression.*

*Aristotle* tells us, that “ \* *Angry People carry their Passion to Persons they ought*

\* Οἱ μὲν ἐν ὀργῇ τοὶ παχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται, καὶ οἷς ἔδει, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἔδει, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. *Arist. Eth. l. 4.*

“ not,

CHAP. “not, and for things which they ought not,  
XIV. “and more than they ought.” And as the

W Gospel allows Men to be angry, Reason must teach (for the Gospel has not determined the Point) how far a Man may go in Anger, and when it is that he transgresses his Bounds, and becomes faulty. The Moralist had observ'd, that 'tis <sup>b</sup> very hard to say, what are the exact Limits of Anger, so as to be commendable or blameable. He proposes a middle Way that is praise-worthy, i. e. when we are angry with Persons which we ought to be angry with, and for things which we ought, and as we ought; and that all Excesses and Defects of this are blameable.

As to abusive Expressions, Aristotle tells us, that <sup>c</sup> Law-makers forbid some sorts of abusive Expressions, nor does any one allow such Terms as imply Reproach. He had probably Plato in his view, for Plato is very severe in condemning those who are guilty of giving reproachful abusive Names to any Persons. He makes it a Law, <sup>d</sup> That if any one, either beginning himself, or in defence

<sup>b</sup> Ὅ δὴ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίῳων ψεκτός, ἔραδλον τῶ λόγῳ ἀποδέναι—ἀλλὰ γε τοῖστον δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν μῆσι ἐξίς ἐπαινετὴ, καθ' ἡν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζομεθα, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, καὶ ὡς δεῖ—αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλαττώσεις ψεκταὶ. *ibid.*

<sup>c</sup> Οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἕνα λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν. *ibid.*

<sup>d</sup> Ἐὰν δὲ τις λοιδορίας ἄρχων ἢ ἀμυνόμενος ὅστις μὴ ἀπέχεται τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ὁ προστυγχάνων πρεσβύτερος ἢ τῶ νόμου ἀμυνέτω, πληγαῖς ἐξείργων τὰς θυμῶν ἑτέρῳ κακῶν φιλοφρονεμένους. Plato de Leg. l. xi. p. 935.



of himself, does not abstain from such sort of CHAP. reproachful Speeches, let any elder Man that XIV. happens to pass by, restrain by Blows those tumultuous Indulgers of a wicked Anger. The Heathens look'd upon abusive, opprobrious Names, as of evil Consequence, and inconsistent with good Morals; and therefore they severely condemn'd all such ill Conduct: nor would Plato allow any Poet in Comedy, or any other, either by Word, or Image, either through personal dislike or not, to take from the Reputation of any Person, by representing him on the Stage. How much more must he condemn such as are guilty of scandalous Reproaches and evil Names affixed to any Persons Characters.

From our Duties towards our Neighbours let us turn to our selves; and here the general Directions are, to deny our selves, to mortify our selves, and to love Christ more than Father and Mother. Directions! which have been by some Christians perverted to Purposes to which the Scriptures are quite Strangers. What was all the Pythagorean Discipline, but a teaching his Disciples what they ought to do, in order to enable themselves to be worthy the Doctrine he gave? What is denying our selves, but restraining our Appetites, and governing our Passions, and ma-

\* Ποιητῆ δὲ κωμωδίας—μὴ ἐξέσω μῆτε λόγῳ μῆτε εἰκόνι, μῆτε θυμῷ μῆτε ἄλλῳ θυσίᾳ μηδὲ μῆτε ἴσθησιν ἢ πολιτῶν κωμωδίῳ. *ibid.*

CHAP. king every thing subservient to *Truth* and  
 XIV. *Right*? What is *loving Christ* above all  
 things, but an Obedience to *Truth* as the  
 supreme Rule, which we must never swerve  
 from? So that these Principles are not pecu-  
 liar to Christianity, but such as all the best  
 Philosophers taught, and practis'd too, in or-  
 der to obtain their Ends.

Now from what I have in few Words  
 observ'd, I would draw these Uses:

*First*, Christianity does not make the Law  
 of Reason different from what it was; but  
 has added several Motives, principally taken  
 from *another World*, in order to make Men  
 more careful to observe it. The thing is the  
 same, by all to be observ'd; and is knowable  
 by all; but the Motives and Encouragements  
 are very different. We therefore cannot be  
 too sensible of, nor too thankful for, the  
 Assistances we receive from Christ, to enable  
 and to encourage us to persevere in Good-  
 ness. And

*Secondly*, We Christians should not decline  
 any thing that is truly *honourable* and *wor-  
 thy* of a *rational* Creature, nor should we  
 do any thing that is *mean* or *base*; since, by  
 the Light of Nature, the *Heathen* World  
 thought it *infamous* to be guilty of any Action  
 that had a *moral turpitude* in it.

*Thirdly*, That the great Distinction that  
 has

has been made about the *Esoterick* Doctrines and the *Exoteric*, signify nothing in the present Case ; since if *in fact* the Heathen had the Notions of Morality, founded upon a Belief of God, and the Immortality of human Souls, that is sufficient to the present Purpose.

*Fourthly*, Those then who urge, that “ God has at all times given Mankind sufficient Means of knowing whatever he requires of them ” ; That “ the Religion of Nature consists in observing those things which our Reason demonstrates to be our Duty ” ; That “ the Religion of Nature is an absolutely perfect Religion ”, and many other such Topicks as are urged in that famous Treatise, *Christianity as old as the Creation* ; Those, I say, that urge such Arguments, do not weaken in the least the Doctrines of Christ ; since Christianity, properly so called, consists not in a Denial of these Truths, but in a Variety of Motives offered to Mankind to induce them to practise them more steadily.


*Fifthly*, Notwithstanding the Heathen World did discover and know so much of God, and of a Future State, yet by the addition of very much Absurdity, and Folly ; by the gross Idolatries they had every where established ; by the Abundance of Fables they had mix'd with Truth ; by the apparent Falshoods they had embraced ; and thro' the

CHAP.  
XIV.



CHAP. the great Danger that every good Man run,  
 XIV. who should venture to shew them the pure  
 Truth; there was a Necessity of a Reformation, and of calling Men back to the true Rule of Action. How to remove the Loads of Rubbish which by degrees had been thrown upon the beauteous Fabrick of *Truth*, was more than the wisest Mortal could tell, or dare to undertake: Every Creature was stopp'd, by which Light might enter: and that made even *Socrates* declare, that he thought it best to be *quiet, and expect, till some body should come, and by a divine Teaching, remove the Mist from before Mens Eyes.* Plato *Alcib. 2. & Phædon.*

Nor should we wonder at this State of Mankind, or at the Growth of Error and Falshood among them, if we were but to consider the immense Corruptions that have grown in the Christian World; by what Steps they advanced, and how hard it is at any time to get a manifest Error (even such a one as affects the very Vitals of *Christianity*) removed. How has *Poperly* grown and spread throughout the World? How much has its *Idolatry* infected so very great a Part of *Europe*? Which way can a Reformation from its Errors be accomplished, without an immediate Interposition of Providence? And is it not a great Comfort that there will be such a *Time*? When the World is armed  
 against

against Truth, a private Man may bear his CHAP.  
 Testimony, and have the Satisfaction to de- XIV.  
*liver his Soul* ; but the Consequence is visible,   
 it is often nothing better than *casting Pearls*  
*before Swine* ; they will *trample them under*  
*their feet, and turn again and rent them that*  
*cast them.*

*Sixthly*, It does not signify, whether the  
 Heathens argued consistently about Provi-  
 dence, or brought sufficient Proofs of the  
 Immortality of the Soul : *Very many Chri-*  
*stians* that have undertaken to write on those  
 Topicks, have not succeeded to the Satis-  
 faction of others. And we should not urge  
 such Arguments as may be with ease retorted  
 upon us by our Adversaries.

*Seventhly*, Since the Heathens did *in fact*  
 know all those moral Truths, it follows  
 that either they must discover them by the  
 Force of *Reason* ; or they must come to the  
 Knowledge of them from such as had the  
 Benefit of Revelation in Times of Old ; or  
 they must have them by *Tradition* from An-  
 cestors, who had them from God. The  
 Consideration of the last Methods, which  
 have been, and usually are pressed, by many  
 learned Writers, shall be the Subject of the  
 following Chapter.

## C H A P. XV.

*Shewing that the Gentiles had not their Moral Knowledge from Revelation.*

CHAP.  
XV.

THE great Advantage of Morality and of its true Principles is, that it leads Men directly to their Happiness; nor is it possible for them to attain their End, and be what they are capable of being, but by a steady and uniform pursuit of Truth and Right. To this End is the Advantage of Truth recommended: and to this End does all Revelation directly tend. It has been shewn at large, what Notions the Heathen World had entertain'd concerning the Deity, the Immortality of the Soul, and the Rule of Action, which might bring them to Happiness. The only Question is, How came those Heathens by such Notions? I think, it may be answered very truly, That God gave them Faculties, or Powers, which if they would apply as they ought, they might as easily discover all those important Truths which would lead them to Happiness, as they could the Truths of Geometry, or any other useful Knowledge. That Great Being who propos'd and design'd Men for Happiness,

ness, gave them Powers by which they might discover Truth, and trace out its Obligations, and by pursuing what they could see to be right and fit, might please him, and act as reasonable intelligent Agents ought to act. This is natural; what is agreeable to our Notions of God; and what is consistent with the Faculties which we have: and if at any time extraordinary Motives are given to any Man in an extraordinary Manner, This is not inconsistent with any of our Notions of God; but then it does not follow, that what is given to one must necessarily be given to all.

That there has been a Revelation given to some, has been shewn at large, and great Advantages have they had. In order to defend Revelation against Infidelity, some have told us, “ that the *Gentile World* before Christ “ came, had at sundry times, and in divers “ manners, some Beams of divine Light sent “ them from above, to help the *Dimness* of “ the Light of Nature: ” That “ they were “ never entirely destitute of *supernatural* “ *Notices*, never left to the *mere* Light of “ *Nature*, either for forming a Knowledge “ of God and Religion, or for directing “ their Life and Manners.” When the Enquiry is made— By what Channells of Conveyance these *supernatural Notices* were brought into the Heathen World? The An-

CHAP. swer is— “ That the Pagans have, since our  
 XV. “ Saviour’s times, improved their Theology  
 “ and Morality, more or less, by reading the  
 “ Scriptures : That *before* those Times they  
 “ acquired their Knowledge by reading the  
 “ *Version* of the *Hebrew* Scriptures in *Greek* ;  
 “ or else they got it by conversing with *Jews*  
 “ dispersed into distant Quarters ; or else by  
 “ conversing with *Egyptians, Persians, Phœ-*  
 “ *nicians, Chaldæans, &c.* who had been  
 “ instructed by *Jews* ; or else by *Tradition*  
 “ from *Abraham*, who was the Father of  
 “ the *Assyrians* ; or lastly, by *Tradition* from  
 “ *Noah*, or *Adam*, who received immedi-  
 “ ly from God the Doctrines of the One  
 “ true God, of Providence, of the Immor-  
 “ tality of the Soul, and a future State of Re-  
 “ wards and Punishments ; of the Creation  
 “ of the World, and of the Corruption of  
 “ human Nature.” Besides these Doctrines,  
 “ there have been common Rites and Cus-  
 “ toms derived very probably from the same  
 “ Source, such as the Custom of Sacrifices ;  
 “ of some Regard paid to one Day in Seven,  
 “ and of dedicating a Tithe to God.”

Here are two distinct Schemes proposed to account for the Knowledge which the *Gentile* World had of *God*, and *Providence*, and of the *Immortality of the Soul*, and of a *future State of Rewards and Punishments, &c.* The One, that They had it by *Tradition* from *Abraham*,



ham, or Noab, or Adam, who had it from CHAP. God : The *Other*, that They had it directly, XV. or indirectly, from the *Jews*, or from *their Sacred Writings*. Now if it cannot be shewn, that the Heathen World had their Knowledge of these things by either of these Ways, the true Inference is, that as God has given to Man Abilities to judge, and think, and compare things together, and to observe their mutual Relations, hence did they in fact discover their Notions of God, and of their Souls, and of such moral Practice as would lead them to Happiness. Thinking Men discover'd these important Notions, and they taught them to others ; and These, perceiving their Agrecableness and Truth, receiv'd and propagated what was so natural ; and thus in all Nations have the Notions of God and Providence, and a Future State, and Moral Good and Evil been found out, and spread.

And indeed why should Men have recourse to Schemes which cannot be made out ; to mere Hypotheses which cannot be proved to have any Foundation, and which are impossible to be proved for want of Antient History to inform us : Why, I say, should Men have recourse to mere *Hypotheses*, when all may be fully accounted for by the natural Powers which God has given us ?

*The invisible things of God, even his eternal*

CHAP. *Power and Godhead are clearly seen from the*  
 XV. *creation of the world, being understood by the*  
 ~~~~~ *things that are made : so that they are with-*  
out excuse, who when they knew God, glori-
fied him not as God, neither were thankful,
Rom. i. 20, 21. And that they might learn
their Duty the same Way, the same Apostle
observes, Rom. ii. that the Gentiles which
have not the Law, do by Nature the things
contained in the Law : these not having the
Law, are a Law unto themselves, which
shew the work of the Law written in their
Hearts, their Conscience also bearing witness,
and their Thoughts the mean while accusing,
or else excusing one another.

The *First* of these Hypotheses is, That the Gentile World had all their Notions of the One God, of Providence, of the Immortality of the Soul, of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, from *Tradition* from *Adam*, or *Noah*, who had it from God. Now

It does not appear, that either *Adam*, or *Noah*, received from God any thing concerning the Immortality of the Soul, or a future State of Rewards and Punishments. If any one of these Notions be asserted to be derived from God, it must be easy to produce the Passage, or Passages, which contain such Revelation. But when no such Passage is, or can be produced ; nor any other Place
 I which

which asserts that such Revelation of such CHAP. Notion was made to *either* of them, the XV. true Conclusion is, as it ought to be, that there is *none* such ; and consequently whatever is built upon the Supposition of such Revelation, is mere groundless Imagination.

A second Pretence is, That all those Doctrines or Notions were derived from *Abraham* “ who was the Grand Restorer of “ true Religion.” And hence a probable Account may be given of the Repentance of the *Ninevites*, who were, as *Assyrians*, descended from *Abraham*, Gen. xxv. 3. That *Abraham* believed in one God, is true : but whether *Abraham* believed this from *Revelation*, or whether he derived his Notions, whatever they were, of the *Immortality of the Soul*, and of a *future State*, and all or any Part of his *Moral Knowledge* from that Source, is the Point to be *proved*, not to be *supposed*. Why could not the *Ninevites* *repent* upon being told of the Design of God to destroy them for their Sins, without their having ever heard of such a Man as *Abraham*, or of any Notions he ever taught ? Will not natural Conscience tell them, that they ought to *repent* of Sin ? Will not the Light of Nature teach that God is good and merciful ? Can he be merciful, if he does not shew Mercy to proper Objects ? And is not the Penitent a proper Object of Mercy ?

CHAP. Or is not this a clearer Way of Reasoning,
 XV. than it would be to argue from an *Oral*
 Tradition about these Points? What Evi-
 dence is there that *Abraham* had his No-
 tions *from God*, concerning *Providence* and
 a *future State*? The Scriptures never hint
 at such a Source of his Opinions; and I
 know of no Book besides, that can be de-
 pended on, for *Abraham's* deriving his No-
 tions of the *Immortality of the Soul*, from
 God himself.

The *Other* Scheme, that the Heathen
 World had their *Morality* from the *Jews*,
 or from the *Sacred Writings*, directly or in-
 directly, is much more generally received,
 and is supported by very great Authority.
Josephus, and *Justin Martyr*, and *Tatian*,
 and *Theophilus of Antioch*, and *Clemens of*
Alexandria, *Tertullian*, *Minutius Felix*, *Ori-*
gen, *Eusebius*, and *Theodoret*, and *Cyril*, and
 many more Antients as well as Moderns are
 full in point, that the Pagans *stole* from the
Jews, from *Moses* and the Prophets, their
 Moral Notions. *Pythagoras* and *Plato* are
 frequently charged with this *Theft*; and the
 best part of the *Pagan Ethicks*, and their
 most considerable *Laws*, are all said to be
 derived from the *Jews*. And were this Cause
 to be judged of by mere Assertions, without
 examining the Grounds upon which the
 Charge is built; if one were to determine

the Case upon the *mere Authority* of those CHAP. XV. that aver it, it might pass for true. But if one demands particular Instances, and examines them carefully ; if one requires more than mere Assertions, we shall find nothing but *Suppositions, mere Possibilities*, nothing that will amount to so much as a *Probability*, much less to *satisfactory Evidence*.

As much Authority is cited in proof of this Assertion, I observe, that some say it only *in general* ; others make no Scruple to descend to *Particulars*. And

1. *Aristobulus* is quoted, an *Alexandrian Jew*, as 'tis said, and a *Peripatetic Philosopher*, Preceptor to *Ptolemy Philometor*, about an hundred and sixty Years before Christ. He affirms directly, that both *Pythagoras* and *Plato* had copied many things from *Moses's Law*, transferring the same into their own Philosophy. *Eusebius* and *Clement* quote his First Book to *Philometor*, where he says ; “ *Plato copied after our Law*, “ and is manifestly very curious in observing “ every thing that is said in it.” Now to shew how *Plato* might or did come at the Knowledge of *Moses's Law*, *Aristobulus* adds,

² Κατακόλληκε ὁ Πλάτων τῇ καθ' ἡμῶν νομοθεσίᾳ καὶ φανερὸς ἐστὶ ἀποκρίμασάμην ἕκαστα τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ λεγομένων. Cle.m. Alex. p. 411. Euseb. Præp. Evan. l. 13. c. 12.

“ Before

CHAP. “^b Before *Demetrius’s* Time, and before
 XV. “ *Alexander’s*, or the *Persians* were Masters
 “ of these Parts of the World, all that hap-
 “ pened at the *Hebrews*, our *Citizens*, go-
 “ ing out of *Egypt*; and the Manifestation
 “ of all that happened to, or was done by,
 “ them; and their taking Possession of the
 “ Land [of *Canaan*] and the Promulgation
 “ of the whole Law, was all *translated*.
 “ So that it is plain that the aforesaid Philo-
 “ sopher thence *took many* things, for he
 “ was a truly learned Man; as *Pythagoras*
 “ likewise *transferr’d* many things from
 “ us into his Philosophy.” Let us take for
 granted, that

This was the *Aristobulus* (for it is a cer-
 tain Mistake in *Clemens* to speak of one in
Ptolemy Philadelphus’s Days) who is men-
 tioned, 2 *Macc.* i. 10. “ And that ^c he wrote
 “ several Books to prove that the Peripatetic
 “ Philosophy depended upon the Law of
 “ *Moses*, and the other Prophets:” He

^b Δηρμηνεύεται ἢ πρὸ Δημητρίου τῷ Φαληρέως, δι’ ἑτέρον, πρὸ
 τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ Περσῶν ἐπικρατήσεως, τότε κατὰ τὴν ἐξοργὴν τὴν
 ἐξ Αἰγύπτου τῷ Ἑβραίων, ἡμετέρων δὲ Πολιτῶν, καὶ ἢ τῷ γεγονότων
 ἀπάντων αὐτοῖς ἐπιφανείᾳ, καὶ κράτησις τῷ χαίρας ἔ τῷ ὅλης νομοθεσί-
 ας ἐπιξηγήσις, ὡς εὐδὴλον εἶναι τῷ προειρημένον Φιλόσοφον εἰληφέναι
 πολλα γέγονε ἢ πολυμαθίᾳ, καθὼς καὶ Πυθαγόρας πολλα τῷ παρ’
 ἡμῶν μετενεγκας εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶ δογματικοίαν. *ibid.*

^c Ἀριστοβούλου τῷ κατὰ Πτολεμαῖον γεγονότι τῷ Φιλάδελφον — βι-
 βλία γεγονέναι ἱκανα, αἱ ὧν ἀπεδείκνυσιν τὴν Περιπατητικὴν φιλοσο-
 φίαν, ἐκ τε τῶ κατὰ Μωϋσεία νόμου καὶ τῶ ἄλλων κρτῆσῶν προφητῶν.
Clem. Stro. l. v. p. 705.

was of the Stock of the anointed Priests ; CHAP.
 and he was King Ptolemæus's Master, and XV.
 was living in the hundred and fourscore and eighth Year of the Æra of Seleucus, as appears from the Author of the Book of *Maccabees* : Now,

1. It will appear very strange that the *Aristobulus* that was of the Stock of the Jewish Priests, should make use of a Form of Expression, that is so unnatural to a Jew. When he is speaking of the Jews going out of *Egypt*, he calls them OUR Citizens, or Subjects. Had he called the Jews in a Book dedicated to *Ptolemy*—YOUR Subjects— it had been natural and intelligible. But how a Jew could use such Language is scarce to be understood, since none but a *Greek*, or an *Egyptian*, or one of a different Nation from the Jews, could talk in that manner. But,

2. Let him be a Jew ; what I would observe is, that he does not say that the *Hebrew* Scriptures, or any Extracts from them, had been translated before *Demetrius's*, or *Alexander's*, or *Cyrus's* Days ; but, that “ *Accounts of the Things which had happened to the Jews at their going out of Egypt, had been translated.*” But whether from the *Hebrew*, *Phœnician*, or *Egyptian* Tongues these Narrations were translated, *Aristobulus* does not say. Nor,

3. Do

CHAP. 3. Do his Words intimate that there was
 XV. any old *Greek* Version of the Scriptures before *Alexander's* Days : Nor can that be the Meaning of his Words, since it is immediately added “^d But the whole Translation “ of every thing in the Law was made in “ the Reign of *Philadelphus*, your Ancestor, “ who applied to that End very great Magnificence, *Demetrius Phalereus* taking “ care of every thing necessary for that purpose.” The *Narration* therefore of the whole Law is not the same with *the whole Translation of every thing in the Law* ; since the one is plainly by the Author distinguished from, and opposed to, the other. All therefore that he means is, That there was an Account of the Exit of the Children of *Israel* out of *Egypt* ; and of their taking Possession of the Land of *Canaan*, and of the Manner of their Laws being given them, long before the Translation of the Scriptures made in *Philadelphus's* Days. But what Account this was, or whose it was, we cannot tell : Only this we are sure of, that it was not any *Greek* Version of the *Sacred Writings* that he alludes to, because such Old

^d Ἡ δ' ὅλη ἐρμηνεία τῶν νόμων πάντων, ἐπὶ τῷ προσεγεγραμμένῳ Φιλαδέλφῳ βασιλεῖ, σὺ δὲ προγόνῳ, προσεγεγραμμένον [1. προσεγεγραμμένον.] μείζονα Φιλοτιμίαν Δημητρίῳ τῷ Φαληρέῳ πραγματοποιησάμενος τὰ περὶ τούτων. Euseb. Præp. Evan. l. xiii. c. 12.

Version was unknown to all the Fathers ; CHAP. to *Josephus*, to *Philo*, and to *Aristeas*, who XV. all speak of the LXX, as the *First* Version of all.

4. *Aristobulus* talks of a *Narration*, or *History*, of what had happened to the *Jews*, translated even before the Times that the *Persians* made themselves *Masters* of *Asia*. Now this was done by *Cyrus* ; and this *Narration* or *History* referred to, must therefore have been before some of the *Prophets* lived, and in course before many of the *Sacred Books* were wrote. Was this *Translation* into *Greek*, so early ? For whose *Use* was it made ? Nay, it must have been before *Pythagoras's* Times, since *Pythagoras* “ transferr'd many things into his *Philosophy* “ from it.” Now the *Greeks* were not at that time looked upon as considerable, nor indeed much known, unless it were as mere *Travellers*, or perhaps *Soldiers*. The *History* therefore here spoken of *might not* be *Greek* ; and yet the *Account* of *Aristobulus* is generally taken as alluding to some *Old Greek* Version of the *Bible*. But

Lastly, Be it what it will, the *Words* of *Aristobulus* contain only a *general Assertion* but no *Proof*, no one single *Instance*, that either *Plato* or *Pythagoras* took any one thing out of *Moses*, and transplanted it into their respective *Philosophy*.


A *Second*

CHAP. A *Second* that asserts this Fact in general is
 XV. *Megasthenes*, quoted by *Clemens Alexandri-*
 nus, and by *Eusebius*, as asserting that the
 Greek Philosophers borrowed many of their
 Notions from the *Jews*. But yet all that he
 says amounts to no more than this “^c That
 “ the *Brachmans* among the *Indians*, and
 “ the *Jews* in *Syria*, had said the same
 “ things that the Philosophers in *Greece* had
 “ said.” Which may be very true, and yet
 the one not have *stoln* it from the other;
 any more than *Numa* stole from *Moses* the
 Law which forbad the *Romans* to make an
 Image of God in the Shape of Man or Beast.
 What common Sense dictates is the same in
 all Countries, and in all Times: Nor is it
 easy to be effaced but by the *Politicks* and
 Authority of those who have Ends to serve
 from the Ignorance, or Follies, or Wicked-
 ness, of those who ought to be instructed in
 Truth, and supported in Righteousness.

Josephus descends a little more to *Parti-*
culars, and whilst he was doing what Credit
 and Honour he could to his Country and
 Countrymen, he made no Scruple to say,

^c Φανεράτατα δὲ Μεγαθένης ὁ Συγγραφεὺς, ὁ Σελεύου τῷ Νικά-
 τορι συμπροσβιακῶς ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶ Ἰνδικῶν, ἀπὸ γράφει. Ἄπαντα μὲν
 τοὶ τὰ περὶ φύσεως εἰρημένα παρὰ τοῖς Ἀρχαίοις, λέγεται καὶ παρὰ
 τοῖς ἔξω τῆ Ἑλλάδος φιλοσοφῶσι: τὰ μὲν παρὰ τοῖς Ἰνδοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν
 Βραχμάνων, τὰ δὲ ἐν Συρίᾳ ὑπὸ τῶν καλεσμένων Ἰουδαίων. Euseb.
 Præp. Evan. l. 9. c. 6. Clem. Alex. p. 360.

“ That

“ ‘ ‘ That *Pythagoras* not only knew the CHAP.
 “ Affairs of the *Jews*, but was for the most XV.
 “ part an *Imitator* of them.” *Josephus* had 
 Zeal enough for the Glory of his Nation to
 byass him from That which is the Ornament
 of an Historian, *Not to dare to say any thing*
that was false, and not to be afraid to say any
thing that was true. But so it is ; groundless
 Stories are told by him as true, and very im-
 portant Truths are by him concealed. To
 prove that *Pythagoras* imitated the *Jews*, he
 cites *Hermippus*, one “ conversant in all
 “ History, who tells us in his First Book
 “ concerning *Pythagoras* ^ε, that *Calliphon* be-
 “ ing dead, *Pythagoras* said, that *Calliphon*’s
 “ Soul conversed with him Night and Day ;
 “ and that he bid him not go on in any
 “ Place where his Asss may stumble ; and
 “ to abstain from thirst-making Waters ;
 “ and to avoid all Injury to any one’s Reputa-
 “ tion.” Afterwards he adds these things ;
 “ ^δ *Pythagoras* said and did those things,
 “ imitating the Notions of the *Jews* and

^ε Πυθαγόρας — ε̄ μόνον ἐγνωκώς τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν δὴλ. εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ ζηλωτὴς αὐτῶν ἐκ πλείστων γεγενημέν. Joseph. c. Apion. l. 1.

^δ Hermippus λέγει — ὅτι Πυθαγόρας, ἐνὸς αὐτῶ τῶν συνοσιαστῶν
 τελευτήσαντ. τὸνομα Καλλιφῶντ. τὸ γέν. Κρωτανιάτ. τ.
 τὴν ἐκείνου ψυχὴν ἔλεγεν συνοδιατρίβειν αὐτῷ καὶ νύκτωρ ε̄ μεθ’ ἡμέ-
 ραν καὶ ὅτι παρεκλιύετο μὴ διέρχεσθαι τόπον ἐφ’ ᾧ ἂν ὄν. ὀκλάσῃ.
 καὶ τῶν διψίων ὕδατων ἀπέχεσθαι, ε̄ πάσης ἀπέχειν βλασφημίας.
 ibid.

^δ Ταῦτα δὲ ἔπραττε καὶ ἔλεγεν ε̄ Ἰουδαίων καὶ Θρακῶν δόξας μιμού-
 μεν. καὶ μεταφέρον εἰς ἑαυτὸν. ibid.

“ *Thra-*

CHAP. “ *Thracians*, and transferring them to him-
 XV. “ self.” Upon this *Josephus* remarks, “ It
 ~~~~~ “ was true, that he transferr’d many of the  
 “ *Jewish Customs* into his own Philosophy.”

When particular Instances are thus given of things *stoln*, it is not very difficult to see whether the Charge be just, or not. *Hermippus* tells us a ridiculous Story of *Pythagoras*, and of the Advice that *Calliphons’s* Soul gave him about Three Things: Not to go on in the Way where your Afs may stumble or fall; to abstain from *thirst-making Waters*, and to avoid all *Blasphemy*. Now, which of these *Three* relates to any *Jewish Custom*? Does he allude to the Story of *Balaam* in his Advice, not to go on in the Way in which your Afs may stumble or fall? But how could a general Rule be formed from such a particular Incident? *Pythagoras’s* Symbols were formed upon something *natural*, though obscurely expressed; as in this he forbid Mens proceeding, where they were, as we say, to strive against the Stream; or where there might be great probability of getting hurt. So in the next Case, Men were to abstain from *thirst-making Waters*; i. e. not to do such things as will create you more Trouble and Pains than you had before; just as drinking *salt Water* will make you *more thirsty*. Is there any thing in the *Jewish Law*, from whence these Symbols were derived? Had there  
 there

there been any Maxim among the *Jews*; CHAP. framed any how from the Incident of *Balaam's Ass* falling with him on his Journey; XV. and had *Pythagoras* used the same, or a very similar Expression, there might have been some Pretence for asserting that he alluded to a *Jewish Notion* or Saying. But the *Jews* do not appear to have had any such; and *this* Saying may as well be formed from any other Fall of an *Ass*, as from *Balaam's*.

Perhaps it may be said that the Third Piece of Advice, to *avoid all Blasphemy*, was taken from the *Jews*. But it must be first agreed, what was meant by the Word *Blasphemy*; and how that Word was applied: whether more is meant than *hurting any one's Reputation*, which is the natural Meaning of the Word; or whether it was applied to *God*, or no, by *Pythagoras*? Surely it is a lame Proof of a Notion being taken from the *Jews*, when you know not with any Precision, what the Notion is.

*Josephus* in another Place says, that “<sup>i</sup> *Plato* imitated our [*i. e.* the *Jewish*] Law-giver in requiring that all his Citizens should exactly learn all the Laws; and not mix

<sup>i</sup> Μάλιστα δὲ Πλάτων μίμηται τὸ ἡμέτερον τομολόγιον, κἄν τῷ μηδὲν ἔστω παιδίσμα προτάττειν τοῖς πολίταις, ὡς τὸ παντὰς ἀκριβοῦς τὰς νόμους σκυλιανθάνει. Καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ τῷ μὴ δύναι ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐπιμνησθῆναι τῶν ἐξῆθεν, ἀλλ’ εἶναι καθαρὸν τὸ πολίτισμα τὸ ἡμμερόντων τοῖς νόμοις πράξασθαι. *Joseph. c. Apio l. 2.*

CHAP. “ foreign Laws with their own, but con-  
 XV. “ tinue steady to their own Laws.”

But why could not *Plato*, or indeed a Man of less Abilities than *Plato*, think himself of so useful an Institution? Or what Evidence is there for imagining that he took this Hint from *Moses*? It is *gratis* said, and may as easily be denied, as affirmed, without Proof.

When we descend lower, to *Christian* Writers, we shall find them full of strong Assertions; and a great Variety of Passages are quoted; but yet, I do not remember one that contains a direct Proof of what it is produced for. They were good Men, and meant well, but they were not always accurate Reasoners. I will consider what they affirm.

*Justin Martyr* is very full, and says expressly, that what the Philosophers and Poets have said, either of the *Immortality of the Soul*, or of *Punishments after Death*, or of *Contemplation of heavenly things*, or the like Opinions, they took their Hints from the Prophets. In his *Cohortation to the Greeks* he has instanced in abundance of Particulars, which *Plato* stole from *Moses*, and which he dressed up with all the colourings of Art, in order to make them go down the better. He charges *Orpheus*, and *Homer*, and *Solon*,  
 and

and *Pythagoras*, and *Plato*, with being <sup>k</sup>help-CHAP.  
*ed from Moses's History*. Now all the Evi-XV.  
 dence he produces, that *Orpheus* and *Homer*  
 “ probably” made use of *Moses*, or received  
 any Advantage from him, is, <sup>l</sup> “ that where-  
 “ as at times they speak of more Gods than  
 “ One, at other times they speak of *One Su-*  
 “ *preme God*, learning what they said in  
 “ *Egypt.*” *Pythagoras* likewise speaks <sup>m</sup> of  
*One God*. *Plato*, who is most accused, and  
 out of whose Works many things are cited,  
 as *similar* to what is in the *Prophets*, yet  
 when he is charged with *Theft*, such soft-  
 ning Terms are used, as set aside the Evi-  
 dence. • *He received, as it seems, the Do-*  
*ctrine of the One God from Moses and the*  
*rest of the Prophets, learning it in Egypt.*

But let us see the Instances produced.  
 • *Plato* “ having heard in *Egypt*, that God  
 “ said to *Moses*, *I am that I am*, and being  
 “ much pleased with what was said concern-  
 “ ing the One God, he in his *Timæus* lays  
 “ it down as if it were his own Sentiment,

<sup>k</sup> Ἐκ τῆς Μωσείας ἱστορίας ἀφελθέντες. Justin. Coh. ad Græcos.

<sup>l</sup> Ibid. p. 17, 22. <sup>m</sup> Ibid. p. 18.

<sup>n</sup> Πλάτανον διηγεσάμενον μὲν ὡς ἑοικε. τὴν περὶ ἐνὸς καὶ  
 μόνου θεοῦ, Μωσείας καὶ ἄλλων προφητῶν διδασκαλίαν, ἣν ἐν Αἴγυπτῷ  
 γενόμενον ἔγνω. ib. p. 18.

• Ἐγὼ εἶμι ὁ ὢν, καὶ σφόδρα ἀρεσθεῖς τοῖς περὶ ἐνὸς θεοῦ εἰρημέ-  
 ροις. ibid. p. 20.

CHAP. and says, “ P According to my Opinion, we  
 XV. “ must first enquire what it is that exists  
 ~~~~~ “ always, but was not produced ; and what  
 “ it was that was produced, but does not
 “ exist always.” Upon this *Justin* asks the
 Question, “ Whether it was not one and
 “ the same thing in effect, when *Moses* said,
 “ *He that is*, spake, and when *Plato* says,
 “ *That which exists ?*”

Now it is plain that either of these Expressions may be properly applied to the ever-existing God ; and it must be granted that God may be justly called, *He that exists*, or, *That which exists* : But how does it appear from hence that *Plato* had the Passage of *Moses* in his view, since there is not the same Expression : and supposing there had been, *Plato* might have thought of denominating God from his *Existence*, without ever seeing what *Moses* had said. *Plato* philosophis'd, and went as far he was able to the Root of things : he consider'd in a *metaphysical* abstract manner, *Existence*, and compared it with the Ideas of *Production* and *Corruption*. But what Evidence is this, that *Plato* took from *Moses* what he says,

P Τί τὸ ὄν μὲν αἰεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον· καὶ τὶ τὸ γενόμενον μὲν, ὄνδ' ἐδέξατο.—ὃ δοκεῖ ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν εἶναι ;—Ὁ ῥ' Μωϋσῆς ὁ αὖν ἔφη, ὁ δὲ Πλάτων τὸ ὄν. p. 20.

Athenagoras too cites this in his Legation, without applying it to such an idle Purposè as Justin here does. Vid. p. 18.

since *Moses* never made the same sort of metaphysical Enquiries? CHAP.
XV.

Yes, but says *Justin*^a, *Plato* “ manifestly alludes to *Moses*, though he was afraid to name *Moses* for fear of *Socrates*’s Fate: For he uses these Words; For God, as the *old Saying* is, is the Beginning and End, and Middle of all things. Here *Plato* plainly and clearly calls the Law of *Moses*, the *Old Saying*, being afraid to name *Moses*’s Name for fear of the draught of Hemlock.”

But the Reason why he says, that this is taken from *Moses*, is very strange, since *Moses* has no such Expression: and all the Reason he assigns for applying this to *Moses* is, because *Moses*’s Law, was in fact *Old*. And then truly for this good Reason, every Saying that is called by *Plato*, or by any other, *Old*, must clearly be in, and taken from *Moses*.

The next Charge is, that *Plato* [and *Homer* too] took from the *Prophets* the Doctrine of the *Resurrection*. The Foundation of this is, that *Plato* tells the Story of one, “ who being slain in Battle, and lying unburied twelve Days, just as they were going to put him on the Funeral Pile he revived,

^a Ὁ μὲν ὄν θεός, ὡς περ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος τῆς καὶ μισοῦ τῶν πάντων ἔχων. Ἐπιπέτα οὖν Πλάτων σαφῶς ἐφανερώς τὸ παλαιὸν λόγον Μωσείας ἀνομιάζει νόμον. τῶ μὲν ἀνόματι Μωσείας φῶσιν τῶ κατὰ μὲν μνηστῆρ δειδίως. *ibid.* p. 24.

Διὰ τὸ τῶ λόγος παλαιότητος τὸ Μωσεία σημειοῦται σαφῶς. *ibid.*

CHAP. “ and told the Spectators, that he had seen
 XV. “ People punished in the other World ; and
 “ particularly, as to the Tyrant *Aridæus*, he
 “ saw him bound *Hands* and *Feet*, and
 “ *Head*, and thrown upon the Ground,
 “ and stript of his *Skin*, and torn with
 “ Thorns, &c.”

That this must relate to the Doctrine of the *Resurrection* it is argued, that if *Aridæus* and the rest, left that Body that had a *Head and Hands, and Feet, and Skin*, upon Earth, “ how could they undergo this Punishment in Hell? For none of them will say that the Soul has a *Head, and Hands, and Feet, and Skin.*” So likewise “ *Homer* mentions *Titius* stretched over Nine Acres ; and Vulturs eating his *Liver* : Now the *Liver* shews manifestly not the Soul, but the *Body* :” And *Homer* was in *Egypt*, and learnt many things there, which are mention’d by *Justin*, to shew that the Poet transferr’d many things out of the *Sacred History* of the *Prophets* into his Poem.

I must just mention some of these, that the Reader may judge of this *clear Theft* from *Moses*. *Moses* said, *In the Beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth* ; then the *Sun* and *Moon*, and *Stars*. Now “ *Homer* “ learning this in *Egypt*, and being

‡ Ibid. p. 26.

§ Ibid.

¶ Ibid. p. 27.

“ delighted

“ delighted with the Things wrote about CHAP.
 “ the *Creation*, when he was to describe. XV.
 “ the making *Achilles's* Shield, he tells
 “ you, that *Vulcan* made upon it the *Earth*;
 “ and the *Heaven*, and the *Sea*, and the
 “ *Sun*, and the *Full-moon*, and all the *Stars*
 “ which are in *Heaven*.” Again ; “ The
 Poet describes *Alcinous's* Gardens as ever
 flourishing, and full of Fruits. This shews
 that he knew of the Garden of *Eden* from
Moses.

Again ; * If any one will consider the ma-
 king the *Tower of Babel*, by which the
 Men of those Times thought they might
 ascend into Heaven, he will find a perfect
 Imitation of this made by the Poet under
 the Persons of *Otus* and *Ephialtes*, who, as
 the Poet says, threatned the Gods with War ;
 and in order to that were desirous to put
Ossa on *Olympus*, and *Pelion* upon *Ossa*,
 that they might climb up into Heaven. So
 again ; Because the Poet very finely has de-
 scribed † *Jupiter* throwing *Ate* out of Hea-
 ven ; *Homer*, it seems, must instantly have
 the Hint from *Esaiab*. As if nothing could
 be invented by a fine Imagination ; or no
 fine Representation could be made of what
 was the daily Object of the Senses ; no com-
 mon Incident could be magnified ; nor could

Ibid.

* Ibid. p. 28.

† Ibid.

CHAP. any Man think in the same general manner
 XV. with another, though his Words and Descriptions are quite different.

But, to return to *Plato*: God having said to *Moses*^z, Exod. xxv. 9. “According to all
 “ that I shew thee, after the pattern of the
 “ Tabernacle, and the pattern of all the In-
 “ struments thereof, even so shall ye make it :
 “ and again ; thou shalt make it after the
 “ pattern, shewed thee in the Mount. *Plato*
 “ meeting with these Passages— he thought
 “ that some *Idea*, or Pattern of Things exist-
 “ ed antecedent to and separate from what
 “ could be comprehended by the Sense.”
 As these are Instances where there is some
 sort of *Similitude*, from whence the Good
 Father imagined *Plato* and *Homer* had their
 Notions ; he next produces Places, where
Plato says direct contradictory things to what
 are in the Scripture ; and yet he took these
 too from thence.

“^a Whence did he take occasion to say,
 “ that God was in a fiery Substance ? Was
 “ it not from the Third Book of *Kings* ?
 “ There it is written, *The Lord was not in*
 “ *the Wind ; and after the Wind an Earth-*
 “ *quake, but the Lord was not in the Earth-*
 “ *quake ; and after the Earthquake a Fire,*
 “ *but the Lord was not in the Fire.*”— Now
Plato not attending to the express Words

^z Ibid. p. 29.

^a p. 30.

with necessary Care, said, God was *in a fiery* CHAP.
Substance; whereas the Scripture says, He XV.
 was *not* in the Fire.

To mention one Instance more: “^b What
 “ the Holy *Prophets* call the *Holy Ghost*—
 “ *Plato* calls *Virtue*— In like manner as the
 “ Holy *Prophets* divide one and the same
 “ Spirit into Seven *Spirits*; He likewise
 “ calling it one and the same *Virtue*, divides
 “ it into four *Virtues*.” Here then is an
 Instance, where neither *Name*, nor *Di-*
vision, has any manner of Relation; and yet
 this too was clearly taken from the Scriptures.
 So that if he speaks *contrary* to the Scrip-
 tures, or *nothing like* the Scriptures; if there
 is *no* manner of Connexion; or if there *is*;
 still all is taken from thence; and either by
Analogy, or by *Perversion*, or by *not under-*
standing them, or by some means or other,
 He must have it all from them alone.

The Principle from whence this strange
 Conclusion is drawn, is this, that ^c ’tis “ im-
 “ possible even to come at the Knowledge
 “ of such great and divine things as true Re-
 “ ligion contains, unless we learn them of
 “ such as before knew them”: *i. e.* it is im-
 possible to know our Duties to God, or to
 discover our mutual Relations to one ano-

^b p. 31.

^c Ἀδύνατον τὰς μὴ πρότερον παρὰ τῶν εἰδόντων μεμαθηκότας τὰ
 ἔτιω μετὰ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν πνεύματα γινώσκειν. p. 4, 5.

ther,

CHAP. ther, unless God himself, or some body else,
 XV. tells us. It was not, I suppose, considered,
 ~~~~~ that unknown, or undiscoverable Duties cannot possibly be Duties to any body; and consequently those to whom these things were ever discovered could be under no Obligation to do them. Their Ignorance is no Fault; and consequently they cannot be punished for what is no Crime.

But how does it appear that *Plato* and *Homer* had such or such particular Pieces of Knowledge, as have been mentioned, either from *Moses*, or from the *Jews*? *Egypt* was indeed famous in early Times for Knowledge; and the *Greeks*, and Others, were wont to travel thither to acquire Learning: But that *Plato* or *Homer* must be acquainted with the *Jewish* Writings, because they came into *Egypt*, is still to be prov'd. There was in *Plato's* Time no Version of the *Hebrew* Writings into any other Language: and as to *Homer's* Days, it may be questioned, if there were any *Jews* at all in *Egypt*.

It was certainly a wrong Step taken by *Justin*, and by others that came after him, to descend to *Particulars* in their Charge. Had they rested in *Generals*, it might have not been easy to have detected the Fraud; but when they descend to *particular Facts*, one is surpris'd at the Wildness of their Reasonings. *Justin* repeats it in his Second Apology,

gy, That “<sup>e</sup> All things which relate to the CIIAP.  
 “ *Immortality of the Soul, or Punishments af-* XV.  
 “ *ter Death, or Speculations about heavenly*  
 “ *Things, or such-like Opinions, whatever of*  
 “ this sort both their Philosophers and Poets  
 “ have said, they have taken occasion from  
 “ the Prophets to say them.” The Proof of  
 this, such as it is, we have seen before in his  
*Advice to the Greeks.* In this *Apology* he  
 asserts, that *Plato* had his Notions of the  
*Formation of the World, from Moses*; and  
 that he made use of *Moses’s* Account of the  
*brazen Serpent*, “<sup>f</sup> though he did not un-  
 “ derstand indeed that the Pole upon which  
 “ the Serpent was erected was a *Type of the*  
 “ *Cross*”: However, he imagined something  
 “ to be meant by the Letter X, but not well  
 “ knowing what, he said that the Power  
 “ which was next to the Supreme God, *κεχι-*  
 “ *άσθαι ἐν τῷ παντί*”, was divided across like  
 “ the Letter X in the Universe. He mentions  
 likewise “ a *Third Principle*: For having

<sup>e</sup> Καὶ πάντα ὅσα περὶ ἀθανασίας ψυχῆς, ἢ τιμοριῶν ἢ μετὰ θάνατον, ἢ θρασύας ἑρηνικῶν, ἢ ἄλλων ὁμοίων δογμάτων, καὶ φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ποιητῶν ἔφασαν, παρὰ τῶν προφητῶν τὰς ἀφορμὰς λαβόντες—ἐξηγήσαντο. *Apolo.* 2<sup>da</sup>. p. 82.

<sup>f</sup> Μη ἀκριβῶς ἐπιπέμψῃς, μηδὲ νοήσας τύπον εἶναι σταυροῦ, ἀλλὰ χρίσασμα νοήσας, τὴν μὲν τὴν πρῶτον θεὸν δύναμιν κεχιῶσθαι ἐν τῷ παντί εἶπε. Καὶ τὸ εἶπεν αὐτὸν τρίτον, ἐπειδὴν ὡς προσηγορῶν, ἐπὶ τῶν ὕδατων ἀέθρα ὑπὸ Μωσέως εἰρημίνον ἐπιφέρει τὸ τῷ Θεῷ πνεύμα. Δεύτεραν μὲν ἢ χάριν τῷ πατρὶ Θεῷ λόγῳ, ὃν κεχιῶσθαι ἐν τῷ παντί ἔφη, δίδωσι. τὴν δὲ τρίτην, τῷ λαβόντι ἐπιφέρει τῷ ὕδατι πνεύματι εἶπεν, τὰ δὲ τρίτα περὶ τῆς τρίτον. *Apol.* 2. p. 93.

“ read

CHAP. “ read that the Spirit of the Lord was said  
 XV. “ by *Moses* to be carried upon the Waters —  
 ~~~~~ “ He gives the second Place to the Word of  
 “ God, who he said was divided *across* like
 “ an X in the Universe ; but he gives the
 “ third Place to the Spirit which was carried
 “ upon the Waters, saying, τὰδε τρίτα περὶ
 “ τὸν τρίτον i. e. *but the third concerning*
 “ *the third.*” Thus far *Justin* ; and these
 were the principal things which *Plato* is said
 to *steal* from *Moses* and the *Prophets*.

As to *Tatian*, he has been content to rest
 in *Generals*, saying only, that the *Greeks*
 “ ^g had endeavoured to corrupt or adulterate
 “ whatever they had learnt from *Moses*, and
 “ such as philosophis’d like him.”

But then *Theophilus* goes further, and en-
 ters into *Particulars* again. Having men-
 tioned *Everlasting Punishments*, he says,
 “ ^h These *Punishments* being *foretold* by
 “ the *Prophets*, the *Poets* and *Philosophers*
 “ that came after, *stole* the *Notion* from the
 “ *Holy Scriptures*, that their own *Notions*
 “ might be more worthy of *Credit*.” This
Fancy, of the *Poets stealing* from the *Law*
 and the *Prophets*, he repeats in his *Second*

^g Τα ὅσα περὶ τῷ κατὰ Μωσέα, καὶ τῷ ὁμοίως αὐτῷ φιλοσοφούντων ἔργων, παραχαράττειν ἐπειρέθησαν. Tat. c. 61. p. 135.

^h Ὡς τιμωριῶν προειρημένων ὑπο τῷ προφητῶν, μεταγενεστοί γεγάμηται αἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι ἔκλεψαν ἐκ τῶν ἁγίων γραφῶν. Theop. ad Ant. l. 1. p. 79.

Book, and applies it to ⁱ the *Conflagration of the World*. But his only Ground for this appears to be, that these “Men lived after *Moses*, and wrote things agreeable to what *the Prophets* had said.” *Theophilus* was a Man that was well versed in *Pagan Books* and *Pagan History*: But when a general Charge of *Theft* is founded upon no Evidence; and when so many fine Passages are produced by him from *Æschylus* and *Pindar*, and *Euripides*, and *Archilochus*, agreeable to the first Principles of common Sense, why should these be all imputed to *Theft* from *Moses* and the *Prophets*, rather than to what a common Genius that had any Notion of a God would utter? “¹ What if *Malachy*, and *Esaïas*, and the *Sibyl*, and the other Prophets, have spoke about the *Conflagration of the World*; and that likewise the Poets and the Philosophers have had the same Notion, and have wrote clearly about *Justice*, and *Judgment*, and *Punishment*, and likewise of *Providence*”—must the one have stolen it from the other?

ⁱ Περὶ ἐκπυράσεως κόσμου—ἀκόλῳθᾳ ἐξήϊπον τοῖς προφήταις, καί-
περ μεταγενέστεροι γενόμενοι, καὶ κλέψαντες ταῦτα ἐκ νόμου ἔ τῶν
προφητῶν. I. 2. p. 115.

¹ Περὶ μὲν ἐκπυράσεως Μαλαχίας—καὶ Ἰσαίας—ταῖν Σιβύλλα,
καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ προφῆται· Ἄλλα μὲν καὶ οἱ ποιῆται ἔ φιλοσοφοί, καὶ δι-
δηλώκασιν περὶ δικαιοσύνης, καὶ κρίσεως, ἔ κολάσεως, ἔτι μὲν καὶ περὶ
προνοίας. Theoph. I. 2. cit. finem.

But


CHAP. But as the principal Persons that contend
 XV. for all that is valuable being derived from
 the *Jews*, are *Clemens of Alexandria*, and
Eusebius, and *Theodoret*; and these have pro-
 duced so many Particulars of this *Theft*, it
 will be worth while to see if they have pro-
 duced better Evidence.

Clemens of Alexandria repeats the Charge
 which *Justin Martyr* had made, “ that
 “ *Orpheus* and *Homer*, and *Pythagoras*, and
 “ *Plato*, had *stoln* from *Moses*, their *Ethicks*
 “ and *Laws*, and whatever was valuable.”

That *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, and *Solon*, and
 all the rest whom he names, travell'd into
Egypt, in order to learn the Wisdom of the
Egyptians, is allowed. That all the Wisdom
 which there they learnt was owing to the
 Sacred Books of the *Jews*, is the Point in
 debate. As *Pythagoras* and *Plato* are the
 Principal who are charged with *Theft*, I
 will begin with them. “ *Pythagoras* is said
 “ to have conversed with the *Egyptian Pro-*
 “ *phets*, by whom he was *circumcised*, that by

ⁿ Πυθαγόρας [εἴρηται συμβεβληκέναι] αὐτοῖς τέτοις [τοῖς Αἰ-
 γυπτίων προφήταις] δι' ἧς καὶ ἐπειτέτμητο, ἵνα δὴ καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄδύτα
 κατελθὼν τὴν μουσικὴν παρ' Αἰγυπτίων ἐκμάθοι φιλοσοφίαν. Καλ-
 δαίαν τε καὶ Μάγων τοῖς ἀρίστοις συνεγένετο. Clem. Stro. p 354-5.
 Ἰσoriέται δὲ Πυθαγόρας μὲν Σάγγηδι τῷ Αἰγυπτίῳ ἀρχιπροφήτῃ
 μαθητεῦσαι, ibid. 356. Ἀλέξανδρῳ ὃν τῷ περὶ Πυθαγορικῶν
 συμβόλων, Ναζαράτω τῷ Ἀσσυρίῳ μαθητεῦσαι Ἵ Πυθαγόραν. Ἰε-
 ζεκίηλ τέτον ἠγῶνται τινες — ἀκηκοέναι τε πρὸς Γαλατῶν καὶ Βραχ-
 μάων. 358.

“ that

“ that means he might have access to their CHAP.
 “ *Temples*, and learn the mystical Philosophy XV.
 “ of the *Egyptians*. He likewise conversed 
 “ with the Principal of the *Chaldeans* and of
 “ the *Magi*.” He is said to have been “ the
 “ Disciple of *Sonchedi*, the Archprophet of
 “ the *Egyptians*.” “ *Alexander* in his Book
 “ of the *Pythagoric Symbols*, says, that he was
 “ Scholar to *Nazaratus* the *Assyrian*, whom
 “ some take to be *Ezekiel*, and to have
 “ conversed with the *Galls* and *Brachmans*.”
 Let us join to this Account of *Clemens* what-
 ever may tend to make this Argument the
 stronger ; because it will save the Trouble of
 distinctly considering what *Origen*, or others
 have said. *Origen* cites *Hermippus* (the
 same Person whom *Josephus* has quoted
 against *Apion*) “ *Hermippus*, says he, ° is
 “ reported in his First Book concerning
 “ Lawgivers, to have said, that *Pythagoras*
 “ brought his Philosophy from the *Jews* to
 “ the *Greeks*.” This makes something for
 those who are content to rest in *Generals* ;
 and it is fit that what *Porphyry* has said should
 be added, that he not “ P only travelled
 “ amongst the *Arabians* and *Egyptians*, but

° Λέγεται κ̄ Ἑρμιππον ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ νομοθετῶν ἰστορικῆσαι,
 Πυθαγόραν τὴν ἑαυτῆ φιλοσοφίαν ἀπὸ Ἰσθμίου εἰς Ἑλλάδας ἀγαγεῖν.
 Orig. c. Cell. p. 13.

P Ἐκ τῆ περι ταῦτα τὰ ἔθη πλάνης ὁ Πυθαγόρας τὸ πλεῖστον τῆ
 σοφίας εὐεπορευσατο. Porphyrius Vit. Pythag.

CHAP. “ also went to the *Hebrews* and *Chaldæans*,
 XV. “ in order to acquire Learning ” : and then

adds, “ From his wandering amongst these
 “ Nations he acquired the most of his Wis-
 “ dom.” He adds, that ⁹ in “ *Babylon* he
 “ conversed with other *Chaldæans*, and also
 “ went to *Zabratus*, by whom he was puri-
 “ fied from the Filths of his former Life.”
Jamblicus tells us of his Stay at *Sidon*^r,
 “ where he discoursed with the Prophets, the
 “ Successors of *Mochus* the Naturalist, and
 “ with others also, and with the *Phœnician*
 “ Priests.”

From these Circumstances it is contended
 that *Nazaratus*, *Zaratus*, *Zabratus*, or what-
 ever his Name was that purified him in *Af-*
syria, was *Ezekiel*, or some of the *Jews* :
 Then that the Successors of *Mochus*, with
 whom he conversed at *Sidon*, were the Suc-
 cessors of *Moschus* or *Moses* : And lastly, it is
 hence inferr'd, that he had the principal, or
 at least some of his Notions from the *Jews*.
 Every one of these Assertions will require
 stronger Proof than I have seen produced.

Pythagoras applied himself to *Thales* for
 Knowledge. *Thales*, after he had taught

⁹ Ἐν τε Βαβυλῶνι τοῖς τ' ἄλλοις Καλδαίοις συνεγένετο καὶ πρὸς τὸ
 Ζάβρατον ἀφίκετο, παρ' ἧ καὶ ἐκαθάρθη τὰ τῶν προτέρων βίβλυματα.
 ibid.

^r Ἐνταῦθα συνεκλήθη τοῖς τε Μάχων τῶν φυσιολόγων προφῆταις
 ἀπηγόνοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἃ Φοινικικοῖς ἱεροφάνταις.

him what he could, excusing himself on account of his Age and Infirmary, advised him to go into *Egypt*, and converse with the Priests of *Memphis*, and particularly those of *Jupiter*. *Pythagoras* upon this undertook a Journey into *Egypt*, and spent twenty-two Years amongst their Priests. *Thales* had all the Wisdom he knew from *Egypt*, and he look'd upon the *Egyptians* as the only Persons able to instruct so fine a Genius. But then, nothing but that insatiable Thirst after Knowledge could have enabled *Pythagoras* to go through the Fatigue and Plague which the *Egyptians* put him to. He got recommendatory Letters from *Polycrates* to *Amasis* King of *Egypt*: and *Amasis* wrote to the Priests in his Favour. Upon this he applied to the *Heliopolitans*; they sent him to the Priests at *Memphis*; these likewise sent him to the *Diospolitans*. And when at length they dared not disobey the King any longer, they took care to make his Studies as painful and irksome as it was possible. It was here he was " *circumcised*, in order to get access to their mystical Philosophy." *Pythagoras*

* Μόνις ἔνθ' δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἑ Αἰγυπτίαν προφήταις συμπεριληκταί, διδάσκαλ' δὲ αὐτῆ ἑδεις ἀναγράφεται, ὡσπερ ἔδει φερικὸς τῷ Συρίῳ, ὃ Πυθαγόρας ἐμαθήτ' ὄσεν. Clem. Stro l. i. p. 352.

† Πολυκράτης αὐτὸν Ἀμασίδι στείρησι δι' ἐπιστολῶν, καὶ ἐξέμαθε τὴν φωνὴν αὐτῶν. Laer vit. Pythag.

‡ Δι' ἧς καὶ περιτέμνεται, ἵνα ὅθι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα καταλθὼν τὴν μυστικὴν πρὸς Αἰγυπτίαν ἐκμάθοι φιλοσοφίαν. Clemens, p. 354-5.

CHAP. was * *young* “ when he began to travel, not
 XV. “ above eighteen Years old : ” then he went
 ~~~~~ into *Phœnicia* ; how long he staid is un-  
 certain : thence to *Egypt* ; and as he spent  
 twenty-two Years amongst their Priests, this  
 will make him above Forty when he *left E-*  
*gypt*. He went from *Egypt* to *Babylon*, and  
 there he became the Disciple of *Zaratus*  
 the *Assyrian* : and here he spent, says *Jam-*  
*blicus*, twelve Years ; *p.* 37. and thence he  
 went through *Samos* and other Places ; and  
 so he came into *Italy*, about sixty Years of  
 Age. Whoever then this *Zaratus* was (per-  
 haps the famous *Zoroaster*) he must be at  
*Babylon* some time betwixt the sixty-fourth  
 and sixty-seventh Olympiad. *Ezekiel*, whom  
 some fancy to have been *Zaratus*, was a  
 Priest in the fifth Year of *Jekoiachin*’s Cap-  
 tivity ; and he prophesied to the twenty-  
 fifth Year of the Captivity ; *i. e.* to the  
 fifty-first or fifty-second Olympiad. *Pytha-*  
*goras* died Ol. 70. 3. *i. e.* about seventy Years  
 after this. Now admitting *Pythagoras* to  
 have met *Ezekiel* at *Babylon* when he was  
 between fifty and sixty Years of Age, *Py-*  
*thagoras* must have lived to be near an hun-  
 dred and thirty Years Old, which never was  
 pretended by any Writer whatever. *Pytha-*

\* Νέος ὡν ἐπεδήμισατο. Laert. Περὶ ὀκτωκαιδέκατου μάλιστα  
 ἔτη γεγονώς. Lamb.

goras therefore could not meet him at *Baby-CHAP.*  
*lon*, though he might other *Jews*, since he XV.  
 did not reach *Babylon* till several Years after  
*Ezekiel* was dead.

However, let it be supposed that *Zaratus* was *Ezekiel*, yet what one thing did *Pythagoras* learn from him? The things for which *Pythagoras* was famous were, his Skill in *Arithmetic*, *Geometry*, *Astronomy*, the mystical Doctrine of Symbols, the Generation of the World by *one God*, and such-like things. But then every one of these were *Egyptian* Notions, and to be learnt in that School as well as at *Babylon*. Unless therefore some Particulars could be produced, which proved that *Pythagoras* had his Hint from the *Jews*, it is absurd to charge him with *stealing* his Doctrines from them. Nay, if one takes the *Jews* as settled in *Egypt* a little before *Pythagoras's* Time, 'tis certain he could learn from them no one single good Notion; no, not that first Principle of Ethicks, the *Unity of God*. For “ the *Jews* which went into  
 “ *Egypt*; *Jer.* xliv 1. having settled in  
 “ *Migdol*, and *Takpanes*, and *Noph*, and in  
 “ the Country of *Pathros*, at *Daphne* near *Pel-*  
 “ *usium*, and in the Country of *Thebais*, gave  
 “ themselves there wholly up to *Idolatry*,  
 “ worshipping the *Queen of Heaven*, and  
 “ other *false Deities* of the Land, and burn-  
 “ ing Incense to them, without having any

CHAP. “ more regard to the *Lord their God.*  
 XV. “ Whereupon the Prophet *Jeremiah* cried  
 ~~~~~ “ aloud against this Impiety, among whom  
 “ he lived, that is, those who had settled in
 “ the Land of *Pathros*. But all his Exhor-
 “ tations were of no other Effect than to
 “ draw from them a Declaration, that they
 “ would worship the Lord *no more*, but
 “ would go on in their *Idolatry*.” *Prideaux*
Connexion, Part I. Book II. at the Beginning.
 The only thing then that was likely to come
 from the *Jews*, at that Time, was not at all
 likely to be learnt from them in *Egypt*, and
 it was as fully taught by the *Egyptians* as by
 the *Jews* in *Palestine*. If the *Egyptians*
 joined a Polytheism to their Notion of the
One God, so likewise did the *Jews* as much
 at that Time.

But the best is, they, who tell us that *Pythagoras* stole his Notions from the *Jews*,
 have likewise descended to *Particulars*; not
 indeed in this so prudent perhaps, as some of
 their blind Admirers, who, if *they* had had
 the Direction, would have persuaded them
 to content themselves *with Generals*. The
 Hypothesis indeed would then have been less
 liable to particular Objections: but as they
 have in fact descended to *Particulars*, this
 shews the *Reasons* of the Hypothesis, and
 demonstratively proves the Absurdity of the
 Notion. Had the Fathers been contented

with what was true, they might with ease have repelled the Attacks of the *Greeks*, by shewing them what was certain, that *Moses* lived long before any of their Philosophers; that the best good things which any of them have said about *God*, the *Creation of the World*, the *Soul of Man*, *future Rewards and Punishments*, are said by *Moses* and the *Prophets*, and were said before any of their *Philosophers* pretended to advance such Notions; that therefore what they said were, as *Theophilus* speaks, ἀκόλυθα τοῖς προφήταις, agreeable to what the *Prophets* said: But when they go on, and say, that the *Greeks* ἐκλεψαν, stole from the Scripture, or that *Numa* was ὠφεληθεὶς, helpt out by *Moses*. *Clem.* p. 359. this is to be proved, and not merely asserted.

In order then to examine the Grounds upon which *Clemens* lays this Load upon *Pythagoras*, we must examine the *Particulars* he produces as stoln. In the Fifth Book of his *Stromata*, c. 5. p. 660, &c. He mentions these: “ The *Pythagoric* Symbols de-
 “ pend, though very occultly, upon the
 “ Philosophy of the Barbarians. The *Sa-
 “ mian* Philosopher advises, not to have a
 “ Swallow in your House, that is, a talka-
 “ tive, prating Whisperer, one that can keep
 “ nothing that is communicated to him.
 “ For says the Scripture, *The Turtle and*


CHAP. “ *the Swallow observe the time of their*
 XV. “ *coming : and no one ought to dwell with*
 ~~~~~ “ *Trifles.*—’Tis more probable, that by this  
 Symbol *Pythagoras* meant— That you should  
 not admit such a Scholar to your Instruction  
 as would not constantly attend. The Swal-  
 low comes but once a Year, and stays but a  
 little Time with us.— Again, *Pythagoras*  
 says, “ The Pot being taken off the Fire,  
 “ you must not leave the Mark of it on the  
 “ Ashes, but rake them strait. And again,  
 “ when you rise out of your Bed, you must  
 “ make smooth the Bed-cloths. By which  
 “ he intimated that you ought not only to  
 “ blot out the Mark, but even not to leave  
 “ the least Trace of *Anger*. *Let not the*  
 “ *sun set upon your wrath*, saith the Scrip-  
 “ ture : and he that said, *thou shalt not co-*  
 “ *vet*, took away all *memory of Injuries*. —  
 “ In like manner he advises to *make smooth*  
 “ *the Bed*, by which he meant, that we  
 “ ought not to remember any Dream, nor  
 “ to regard Sleep in the Day-time, no, nor  
 “ any Pleasure had in the Night-time. Per-  
 “ haps he intimated, that we ought by the  
 “ Light of Truth to destroy all dark Imagi-  
 “ nations. Now *David* says, *Be ye angry,*  
 “ *and sin not*— Again, It was one of *Py-*  
 “ *thagoras’s* Sayings, *You must not sail upon*  
 “ *the dry Ground*. By which he shews, that  
 “ *Imposts*, and such sort of Duties, ought  
 “ to

“ to be rejected— For this Reason, says the CHAP.  
 “ Word, that *Publicans* shall hardly be sa- XV.  
 “ ved. Again, *Pythagoras* commands, not  
 “ to wear Rings, nor to engrave on them  
 “ the Images of the Gods. Just as *Moses*  
 “ many Ages before commanded in the  
 “ Law to make no Statue or Image *graven*  
 “ or cast, or sculptured— And in general  
 “ *Pythagoras* and his Followers, and *Plato*,  
 “ more than the rest of the Philosophers,  
 “ were *conversant* with the Legislator *Moses*,  
 “ as you may see from their peculiar Do-  
 “ctrines.” — And then, having spoken a-  
 bout the Nature of *Thieving*, he proceeds :  
 “ *Pythagoras* made an Epitome of those  
 “ things which *Moses* said concerning Righ-  
 “teousness, saying, — You must not go be-  
 “ yond the Balance ; *i. e.* you must not trans-  
 “ gress equality in distributing Justice— for  
 “ this reason, says our Lord, take my *Yoke*,  
 “ *Ζυγον*, upon you, for 'tis light and easy :  
 “ and when his Disciples contended about  
 “ a *Primacy*, he enjoin'd *Simplicity* with  
 “ *Equality*, saying, they should be like  
 “ *Children*.”

There is another Place where *Pythagoras* is charged with taking from the Law, all that *Kindness* which he insisted on towards *Brutes*. His Words are, “ *Give*, says he,


† Χάριται τῇ μητρὶ τὸ ἔκγονον, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς πρῶτας ἡμέρας.  
 Clem. Stro. p. 477.

CHAP. “to the Dam its Offspring, even in the seven  
XV. “first Days.” The Passages produced by

 *Clemens* out of the Law, as similar to, and from whence *Pythagoras* took his Notion, are these, *Thou shalt not seeth a Lamb in its Mother's Milk—Thou shalt not muzzle the Ox that treadeth out the Corn—and the Labourer is worthy of his Hire—and thou shalt not plough with an Ox and an Ass.*

I think there needs no more than to repeat these Instances to shew that *Pythagoras* did not steal his Dogmata from the Scriptures. Surely he that lived at least five hundred Years before Christ was born, did not steal from the *New Testament* any of his Sentiments ; and yet *Clemens* cites the *New Testament* as well as the *Old*, to make good his Charge. What do all these Passages amount to, except that *Jeremiah* used the Word *Swallow*, and so did *Pythagoras*. Whatever *Pythagoras* meant by *making smooth the Bed*, and *not leaving the Mark of the Pot on the Ashes* ; Neither *Moses*, nor *St. Paul*, have any Expression like it : and if the Moral be what *Clemens* says it was, that you are to *forgive Injuries*, *Egyptians*, or any thinking People, might know such a Truth as well as a *Jew* could. What if *Pythagoras* was against all *Imposts* ? Does the *New Testament*, from whence it seems he took the  
Hint,

Hint, forbid them; or does it not rather CHAP.  
*command Duty to whom Duty is due.* XV.

*Pythagoras* was in his Sentiments so very  different from the *Jews*, and continued so always, that there is no probability of his having conceived any great Respect or Value for them or their Lawgiver. *Pythagoras* <sup>z</sup> so lived, as to “ abstain from all *animal Food*, “ as some say, and thought Altars polluted “ by Blood.” *Laertius* in his Life says, that he had “ a peculiar Value for the Altar of “ *Apollo Genitor* at *Delos* <sup>a</sup>, because nothing “ was placed upon it, but *Wheat, and Bar-* “ *ley, and Cakes*, without *Fire*, and *no* “ *Victim.*” Or suppose that he allowed all other *animal Food*, and only <sup>b</sup> abstained from the *Ram* and the *Ox*, as *Laertius* tells us; yet all this is far enough from the *Jewish* Customs, who used *bloody* Sacrifices daily, and eat of multitudes of *Animals*, and particularly those which *Pythagoras* thought right to abstain from. Had he abstained from *Meats* or *Drinks* peculiarly forbidden by the Law, it might have been urged as a possibility, or a probability, for what he is

<sup>z</sup> Αὐτὸς ἕτως ἔζησεν, ἀπεχόμενος τῶ ἀπὸ τῶ ζώων τροφῆς, καὶ τὰς ἀταμιμάκτους βρωμὰς προσκινῶν. Iamb.

<sup>a</sup> Πρὸς ὃν — Πυθαγόραν προσελθεῖν φασὶ φόνω καὶ θανάτῳ μὴ μιανέντα. Clem. Stro. 7. p. 848.

Διὰ τὰ πυρὸς καὶ κριθῆς ἔ τὰ πόπανα μόνα τιθεῖσθαι ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, ἄντι πυρὸς, ἱερέιον δὲ μηδέν. Laertius.

<sup>b</sup> Μερὸν ἀτίχεαθαι ἀροτῆρῳ βοῶς καὶ κριεῖ. Laertius.

charged

CHAP. charged with : but even then it must have  
 XV. been proved that such his Abstinence was  
 owing, not to *Egyptian, Babylonian, or Phœ-*  
*nician* Customs ; nor to what he might learn  
 in *Asia*, but purely to the *Jews*. But as he  
 differed from the *Mosaic* Prescriptions so  
 entirely, it is ridiculous to charge him with  
*stealing* his Notions from the *Jews*.

There is indeed one Topic which may  
 seem at first sight to have been borrowed  
 from the *Jews*, and that is the Notion of  
 the *One God*. The Words cited from *Py-*  
*thagoras*, and his Notion is extreme fine ;  
 “ *God is one* ; and he is not, as some ima-  
 gine, in an extramundane Space, but  
 within it, whole in the whole Circle, an  
 Inspector of the whole Creation, the Tem-  
 perament of the Whole, ever existing, the  
 Author of all Powers and things, a shining  
 Light in Heaven, the Father of all, the  
 Soul and Life of the whole World, the  
 Motion of all things.” *Justin Martyr*  
 has quoted the same Words with some little  
 Variation, and so has *Cyril* against *Julian*.  
 Whether *Pythagoras* had this from the Scrip-  
 tures directly, or indirectly, is the Point.

“ Ο μὲν θεὸς εἷς· χεῖρ δὲ ἔχ’ ὡς τινες ὑπονοῶσιν ἐκτὸς τῆς  
 ἀβυσσοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἀίθρῳ ὅλῳ, ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κύκλῳ ἐπιτίποκ-  
 πασας γενέσει, κρᾶσις τῶ ὅλων· αἰεὶ ἂν, καὶ ἐργάτης τῶ αὐτῆ δύνα-  
 μιαν καὶ ἐργῶν ἀπάντων, ἐν ἐρανῶ φωσῆρ, καὶ πάντων πατήρ, νῆρ καὶ  
 ψυχῶσις τῶ ὅλῳ κύκλῳ, πάντων κίνησις. Clem. Cohor. p. 62.

It is certain that the *Egyptians* in their AR-CHAIC. Theology did teach *one* only Supreme XV. Mind, the Maker and the Governor of all; as fully appears from *Plutarch* in his Book *de Iside & Osiride*; from *Horus Apollo*, in his Hieroglyphicks; and from many others cited at large by Dr. *Cudworth*. The grand Secret of the *Pythagorean* Philosophy was likewise this, that there is *One* God, the Supreme Governor of all. As this was a Part of the Secret Theology of the *Egyptians*, which they imparted only to their Kings and Priests, and *Pythagoras* was at so much Pains as to be *circumcised*, and had the King's Letters to the Priests, in order to his getting acquainted with their Theology, how natural is it for him to have this Notion from *Them*, rather than from the *Jews*?

From *Pythagoras* let us pass to *Plato*, who is said to have “learned *Geometry* from “the *Egyptians*, *Astronomy* from the *Babylonians*, such Charms as tended to procure Health from the *Thracians*, but all his *Laws* that were just and true, and his Notions about God, from the *Hebrews*.” Now it must be remembered that *Plato* lived an hundred Years before the *Jewish* Books

ἡ Γεωμετρίαν παρ' Αἰγυπτίων μαθητάνεις· ἀστρονομίαν παρὰ Βαβυλωνίων· ἐπιπέδους τὰς ὑγιεῖς παρὰ Θρακῶν λαμβάνεις—νομῶς δὲ τὰς ἑσσοὶ ἀληθεῖς καὶ δόξαν τῆν τῷ θεῷ, παρ' αὐτῶν ἀφελήσας τῶν Ἑβραίων. Clem. p. 60.

were

CHAP. were translated into *Greek*, and therefore it is  
 XV. very probable that he knew nothing of them.

However, since he stands charged with *Theft* so strongly, it will be proper to examine into the particular Evidences.

“<sup>e</sup> *Plato* declared his Dislike of a *Luxurious* Way of Life, as eating *twice a day*; “ never spending a Night alone” — why truly, *Plato* had heard of *David*, who dealt among the People — as well to the Women as Men, to every one a Cake of Bread, and a good Piece of Flesh, and a Flaggon of Wine; 2 *Sam.* vi. 19. So we translate it: the *Greek* Words, I think, hardly convey the same Ideas; nor is it worth the while to enquire into their Meaning exactly; since let them signify ever so mean and indifferent a dole, it is impossible to say, that from this Place *Plato* stole his Opinion. For *Plato* is maintaining that “<sup>f</sup> No Man under Heaven that “ lives a *luxurious* Life from his Youth, can “ ever become an able wise Man, whatever “ natural Parts he may have.” What relation has this to a *Largefs* that *David* gave to the People? Or could not *Plato* argue

<sup>e</sup> Πλάτων τὸ ἔναυσμα τῆ Ἑβραϊκῆς φιλοσοφίας ζωπυρῶν — φησὶν — ἑδομάως ἤρεσε δις τῆ ἡμέρας ἐμπικλάμων ζῆν, καὶ μηδέποτε μόνον κοιμῶμενον νύκτωρ — εἰ γὰρ ἄπυσθῆ ἦν ὁ Πλάτων τῆ Δαβιδ ὅς — διεμερίζεν — ἐκάστω κολλυρίδα ἄρτῶ, καὶ ἐχαρίτιν εἰ λάγανον ἀπὸ πηγῶν. Clemens Pædag. I. 2. c. 1. p. 176.

<sup>f</sup> Ἐκ γὰρ τούτων ἔστ’ ἂν φρόνιμῶν εἰδείς πότ’ ἂν γενέσθῃ τῆ ἰσὺς τῆ ἕργων ἀνθρώπων δύναται, ἐκ νέε ἐπιτηδεύαν ταῦτα. *ibid.*

from



from a known common Fact, without steal-  
 ing his Thought from a Passage of Scripture,  
 that says not what *Plato* said? CHAP. XV.

A second Instance produced is in his Second Book, c. 10. where *Plato* is supposed to take from *Moses* what he says about *Sodomomy*, which I will not transcribe; or if I did, there would not appear any manner of Ground to suppose that he had his Notion from *Moses*.

The next Case is more remarkable. “ The Law, says he, given by *Moses* rejects a spotted Garment, as impure ”: He means the Law which relates to the *Leprosy* that was in a Garment, where if the Plague be greenish or reddish in the Garment— it is declared to be the Plague of *Leprosy*, Lev. xiii. 49. He then goes on, “ that which is all white from the Crown of his Head to the Sole of his Feet, is clean. Now to pass from the Body to the Soul, laying aside all Variety and Deceit, let us love the simple unvaried Colour of Truth.” *Clemens*, if he liked it, might urge this Allegory as far as he pleased, and might play with the Simile as long as he would; but then he instantly adds, & *Plato*, “ in this an *Imitator*

Ἔν τῷ τῶν ἄρα ζηλωτῆς Μωσέως ὁ Πλάτων, ὕφην ἐκεῖνον διπιδίχεται, ἢ μὴ πλέον ἔργον πρόσσει γυναικὸς σώφρονος. χράματα δὲ λευκά, πρέποντα ἂν εἴη τεμνότητι καὶ ἄλλοις λέγει. Καὶ εἰ ὕφῃ δε βάρμματα μὴ προσφέρειν· ἀλλ’ ἢ πρὸς τὰ πολέμια κοσμημένα.  
 Clem. Pædag. l. 3. p. 286.

CHAP. “ of *Moses*, allows that sort of woven Gar-  
 XV. “ ments, to which no more Work is ap-  
 “ plied than becomes *modest Women*; and  
 “ *white Colours* are agreeable to *Modesty*.  
 “ And elsewhere he says, In a woven Gar-  
 “ ment you ought not to use *Dies*, except  
 “ for the *Ornaments of War*.” *Plato* is  
 said to have thought *White* to be a *modest*  
*Colour*. He therefore imitated *Moses*, or  
 had him particularly in his view, in a Place  
 where *Moses* declares, that if the *Plague be*  
*greenish or reddish in the garment, in the*  
*warp or in the woof, it is unclean*. One  
 would admire what it was that could make  
*Clemens* urge this as an Imitation of *Moses*,  
 supposing *Plato* had wrote even what he is  
 made to say. But a Man will more wonder,  
 when he considers *Plato*’s own Words, and  
 the Subject he was writing about. The  
 learned Editor of *Clemens*, his present Grace  
 of *Canterbury*, has produced them in his  
 Notes upon this Place. “ <sup>h</sup> *Plato*, speaking  
 “ of *Donations* which were to be consecra-  
 “ ted to the *Gods*, says thus, *The Garment*

<sup>h</sup> Ut huic Loco sensus constet adducenda sunt Platonis verba è lib. 12 de Legibus p. 992. ubi de donariis quæ diis consecranda sunt hæc ait, Ἴφην δὲ μὴ πλέον ἔργον γυναικὸς μίᾳς ἐμμνην. Χράματα δὲ λούκα πρέποντ’ ἂν θεοῖς εἴη καὶ ἄλλοις ἔν τῷ ὕφῃ· βάρμματα δὲ μὴ προσχέρειν ἄλλ’ ἢ πρὸς τὰ πολέμου κοσμήματα. In quibus *Clemens* σῶφρον<sup>o</sup> pro ἐμμνην, et σεμνότητι pro θεοῖς posuit, ut suo instituto accommodaret. *Potter in loc.*

“ ought

“ ought not to have more Work bestowed CHAP.  
 “ upon it than one Woman can do in a XV.  
 “ Month. As to Colours, White is fuitable  
 “ for the Gods in other things, and in what  
 “ is wove. You ought not to bring Dies of  
 “ other Colours, unless for Ornaments of  
 “ War.” In this Quotation, *Clemens* has  
 “ put *σώφρονος* for *ἔμμηνον*, and *σεμνότητι* for  
 “ *θεοῖς*, that he might accommodate this to  
 “ his Purpose.” Is this to *imitate*, or *copy*  
 from, *Moses*? or could not *Plato* have his  
 Notion of what was proper to be *consecrated*  
 to the Gods, without ever hearing of what  
*Moses* had said about a *Leprous Garment*? or,  
 in short, what relation has the one to the  
 other?

But to pass from his *Pædagogus* to his  
*Stromata*, wherein he attempts to shew, and  
 certainly does prove, that the *Greek Philosophy*  
 was principally derived from what they  
 called the *Barbarian*. This is the Place  
 where we are to expect the strongest Evi-  
 dence; and where our Author attempts by  
 variety of Instances to prove how much all  
 the eminent *Grecians*, Poets as well as Phi-  
 losophers, were assisted by, or obliged to the  
*Hebrews*. The Instances, it is plain, will not  
 hold good: but then it is said, the *Greeks*  
*depraved* and *corrupted*, they *dissembled*, and  
*disguised* the Doctrines they receiv'd. *Plato*,  
 who

CHAP. who <sup>1</sup> learnt his *Philosophy* from the He-  
 XV. “*brews*”, nor no one else, can so totally  
 disguise it, but that it will or may be per-  
 ceived; the *Spark* will plainly enough shew  
 that he had his Knowledge from the He-  
*brews*, if thence he took it; nor will any  
 Disguise be thick enough to cover him, if he  
 be really guilty. He confesses, it seems, “that  
 “he had a very good Opinion of the Bar-  
 “*barians*”, i. e. such as were *not Greeks*,  
 and owns that “he himself, and *Pythagoras*  
 “too, learnt many of their prime Notions  
 “from them.” The only Question is, *who*  
 these *Barbarians* were? were they the *E-*  
*gyptians, Chaldæans, Persians, Babylonians,*  
*Thracians?* or were they *Jews?* *Plato* owns  
 himself, that he was a Disciple of *Sechnou-*  
*phis* the <sup>k</sup> *Heliopolitan*, and it is well known  
 that when *Clemens* is reckoning up the sever-  
 al Inventions of the *Barbarians*, the *Jews*  
 have no share amongst them: and at last he  
 gives us it, as the Opinion of some, <sup>1</sup> that  
 “the *Greek Philosophy* came from the  
 “*Devil.*” However, let the *Greek Philo-*  
*sophy* be ascribed to whom you will, we

<sup>1</sup> Ὁ ἐξ Ἑβραίων φιλόσοφος. Stro. 1, 1. p. 231. Τὸ ἕνασμα  
 τῆς Ἑβραϊκῆς φιλοσοφίας ζωπυρῶν. Pæd. l. 2. c. 1.

<sup>k</sup> Δῆλον ὡς σεμνῶν αἰεὶ τὰς βαρβάρους εὐρίσκειται μεμνημένῳ  
 αὐτῷ τε καὶ Πυθαγόρῃ τὰ πλεῖστα ἐ γενναϊότατα ἢ δόγματων ἐκ  
 βαρβάρους μαθόντας. p. 356.

<sup>1</sup> Ἡ δὲ Ἑλληνικὴ φιλοσοφία—ὡς ἄλλοι βέβηλοι ἐκ τοῦ Διαβόλου  
 τὴν κίνησιν ἔχει. p. 366.

must enquire into the Particulars said to be taken from the *Jets*; for it will be agreed, that *Plato* learnt from *Foreigners* the grand Principles of his Philosophy.

It is not necessary to take notice of some general things, which, as he says in his Second Book of *Strom.* " are delivered to the *Greeks* from *Moses the Great*": where any one may see a Play upon Words sufficient to astonish him. But when he says that the *Whole* " of the *Grecian Ethics* had its Origin from *Moses*, viz. all that they say of *Fortitude*, and *Temperance*, and *Prudence*, and *Justice*, and *Perseverance*, and *Patience*, and *Modesty*, and *Continence*, and above all these, *Piety*", this, I think, ought to be proved. For why cannot a Man of *Plato's*, or *Aristotle's*, Parts, consider the Relations of Men to one another; and shew the Weakness, the Folly, the Iniquity of Vice; or the Excellency and Usefulness and Fitness of Virtue, either in private Life, or to the Public? But as every thing is to be derived from *Moses*, *Plato* is supposed not capable of saying or imagining

<sup>m</sup> Παρὰ Μωσίου τῆ μεγάλῃ ἐπὶ τὰς Ἑλλήνας ἀφιδόξῃ δόγματα. *Strom.* 2. p. 439.

<sup>n</sup> Ἄρισταί αἱ παρὰ τῷ Μωσῷ ἀναγεγραμμένα, ἀρχὴν Ἑλλήσι πάντος τῆ ἠθικῆ τῶτε παραχρόμαι ἀνδρείαν λεγῶ καὶ σωφροσύνην, καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καρτερίαν τε ἐν ὑπομοχῆν, καὶ τὴν σεμνότητά, καὶ ἐγκράτειαν, τὴν τε ἐπὶ τῆτοις εὐσεβείαν. *ibid.* p. 469.

CHAP. any thing himself, no, not so much ° as his  
 XV. *Region of Ideas*, but presently 'tis taken from  
 ~~~~~ *Moses*.

1. *Plato* in his *Timæus* says^P “ that he
 “ would not then speak concerning the
 “ Principle or Principles of the Universe,
 “ and what he thought of them, for no
 “ other Reason but because it was difficult
 “ in the present Method he was in, to ex-
 “ plain what seem'd to him most likely.”
 Now, says *Clemens*, “ those Prophetic
 “ Words— *The Earth was invisible, and*
 “ *without Form, gave them the handle to*
 “ *talk of material Substance.*” Could not
Plato think of, or talk of *material Sub-*
stance, without knowing that *Moses* had
 ever used such an Expression as here is
 cited? 'Tis plain that *Plato* would not here
 declare, what he conceived to be *most proba-*
ble: which argues that he had thought upon
 the Subject, and like a Philosopher, had en-
 quired into the Origin of things. But that
 he had his Hint from *Moses*, or supposing
 that he had seen *Moses*, that That was the

° Ὅτι χάρις ἰδεῖν ὁ Πλάτων κέκληκεν, παρὰ Μωσίου λαβῶν τόπον
 εἶναι αὐτὸν ὡς τὸ πάντων καὶ τὸ ὅλων ὠσεκτικόν. *ibid.* p. 690.

P Τὴν περὶ πάντων εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε ἀρχάς εἴτε πῆ δοκεῖ τέτων
 περὶ τὸ νῦν ἐρητέον, δι' ἄλλο μὲν εἶδεν, αἷμα δὲ τὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι κα-
 τὰ τὸ παρόντα τρόπον ἢ διεξόδοις δηλῶσαι τὰ δοκῶντα.—Ἡ λέξις, ἢ
 προφητικὴ ἐκείνη, ἢ δὲ γῆ ἢ ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκευάστος, ἀφορ-
 μῶς αὐτοῖς ὑλικῆς ἐστὶς παρέχεται. *Clem. Stro.* 5. p. 790.

Foundation of his Notion, wants Evidence. CII AF.
Plato justly enquired “⁹ Whether sensible XV.
 “ and tangible Matter had or had not a Be-
 “ ginning”: and at length he determin’d,
 that it had a *Beginning*, and in course a
Maker. But does not this follow from strict
 Ratiocination, without the Authority or De-
 termination of any one? Unless therefore
 from some other Topic it appears, it does
 not from this Instance appear, that *Plato*
 ever saw *Moses’s* Books, or had ever heard
 of them.

2. The next is, “^r that *Punishments after*
 “ *Death*, and particularly Punishment by
 “ *Fire*, All the Poets universally, and par-
 “ ticularly the *Greek* Philosophy, have stoln
 “ from the *Barbarian* Philosophy.”

Plato is the first of these Plagiaries that
 is cited, who in these very Words says—
 “^s There fierce Men, seemingly on fire, stand-
 “ ing by, and bearing the Roaring, privately

⁹ Πότερον ἦν, ἀρχὴν ἔχων γενέσεως ἰδεομένη, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς
 τινος ἀρχαίτη, ὁρατός τε ἢ ἂν ἀπίος ἔσιν· ἀπίος τε ἂν σάμα
 ἔχει p. 701.

^r Τὰς μὲν θάνατον καλᾶσεις, καὶ τὴν ἄπυρὸς τιμωρίαν διὰ τῆς
 βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας, ἢτε Ποιητικῆ πάσα Μῦθος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ Ἑλλη-
 νικὴ φιλοσοφία ὑφείλετο. p. 700.

^s Αὐταῖς φησὶ ταῖς λέξεσιν. Ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἄνδρες ἄγριοι διάπυροι
 ἰδεῖν, παρεῶντες, καὶ καταμανθάνοντες τὸ φθέγμα, τῆς μὲν ἰδία πα-
 ραλαβόντες ἦγον, τὸ δὲ Ἀριδαῖον καὶ τῆς ἄλλης συμποδίσαντες χεῖρας
 τε καὶ πόδας καὶ κεφαλὴν καταλαβόντες καὶ ἐκδύσαντες, εἰλον παρα-
 τὴν οὖν ἐκτὸς ἐπ’ ἀσπαλάθων κνάπιοντες. Clem. p. 700. Stro. 5.

CHAP. “ *seizing*, carried away these. But taking
 XV. “ and skinning, and binding *Aridæus* and
 “ others, *Hands* and *Feet*, and *Head*, they
 “ dragg’d them out of the Way, tearing
 “ them with the Thorns of *Aspalathus*.”

Plato has used these Words indeed ; but which of the *Prophets* have ever spoke a Word like this ? Why yes : “ ‘ These *fiery*
 “ Men are *Angels*, who *seizing* the Wicked,
 “ punish them : as the *Pfalmist* says—*Who*
 “ maketh his *Angels* *Spirits*, and his *Mini-*
 “ *sters* a flaming Fire.” But how does it appear, that *Plato’s fiery Men*, were the same as the *Spirits* in the *Pfalmist* ? God is able to make a *fiery Flame* either execute his Wrath, or do whatever he intends : but because a real *Fire* may be subservient to his Will, therefore, “ *fierce Men* who looked as
 “ if they were all *on fire*”, and “ a real
 “ *Fire*”, means the same thing. The Father had his Notion of the Office of *Angels* at the last Day, discovered first in the *New Testament*, in his Head ; and then was willing to lay hold on a Passage in the *Old* one, to make good the Accufation he had made. Just as in the next Sentence almost ; *Plato*

‘ Οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες οἱ ἀλαμπυροὶ ἀγγέλους αὐτῷ βέλονται δηλῶν, ἃ παραλαβόντες τὰς ἀδικίας κολάζουσιν. Ὁ ποιῶν, φησι, τὰς ἀγγέλους αὐτῷ πνεύματα, καὶ τὰς λειτουργίας αὐτῷ πῦρ φλέγον. *ibid.*

makes

CHAP. XV.
 makes no scruple to write “ of the Angels
 “ of Little Ones seeing God ; *i. e.* shewing
 “ the Care and Inspection of Angels guard-
 “ ing us, according to the Scripture.” That
Plato indeed intimates such a thing is cer-
 tain : But did *Plato* write prophetically ?
 Did he *steal* prophetically ; *i. e.* out of Books
 that should be wrote three or four hundred
 Years after he was dead ? *Clemens* makes no
 scruple of citing Passages out of the *New*
Testament ; as if, because the Spirit which
 inspired the Apostles was the same with that
 which inspired the Prophets, therefore *Plato*
 might *steal* his Notions from the *New Testa-*
ment, which was *not* written, as well as from
 the *Old*, which was written.

3. “ x That the World was made, the
 “ Philosophers, taking the Notion from
 “ *Moses*, held. *Plato*, in particular, puts
 “ the Question very expressly, Whether the
 “ World existed, having no Beginning of
 “ its Existence, or whether it was made,
 “ beginning from some Principle, since ’tis
 “ tangible, and has a Body.” And again,

“ Τῶν μικρῶν κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν καὶ ἐλαχίστων τῶν ἀγγέλων τῶν
 ὄραντας τὸ θεῖον πρὸς ὃν καὶ τὴν εἰς κτίσιν δι’ ἀγγέλων τῶν ἐπιθεσάτων ἰκνύ-
 σαν ἐπισκοπὴν ἐμφάνειαν, οὐκ ὀκνεῖ γράφειν. p. 701.

x Γενητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον οὐκ Μωϋσέως παραλαβόντες, ἰδογμά-
 τισαν οἱ φιλόσοφοι. Καὶ ὅγε Πλάτων ἀντικρὺς εἶρηκε, Πότερον ἔν
 ἀρχῇ ἔχων γενέσεως ἑδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τινὸς ἀρξάμενον
 ὁρατὸς τε γὰρ ὧν ἀττός ἐστίν, ἀπίος τε ὧν καὶ σῶμα ἔχει. Αὐτὸς
 τε. ὅπου ἂν εἴτῃ, τὸν μὲν ἔν ποιητὴν καὶ ταῖρα τῶνδ’ ἐπὶ πάντος ἐρεῖν
 τε ἔργον. *ibid.*


CHAP. when he says, “ ’Tis difficult to find the
 XV. “ Maker and Father of this Universe.” But
 be it ever so difficult, *Plato* concludes, that
 the World was *made*, not from the Authority of *Moses*, nor from the Principle from whence *Moses* had it, but from *Reason*.
 “ ’Tis *visible*, says he, and *tangible* : Now
 “ all things of *this kind* are the Objects of
 “ *Sense* ; but the Objects of *Sense* are per-
 “ ceiv’d by *Sensation*, therefore ’tis plain
 “ they are, and are *made*.”

4. Wherever *Clemens* could pick up any thing in *Plato* that had any sort of Similitude to any thing in the *Bible*, he presently imagines that the Philosopher had That in his Eye. When therefore *Plato* mentions a Soul governing every thing that is moved, even Heaven itself, and asks “ * Do you think
 “ that there is one or more of these govern-
 “ ing Souls” ? and answers, that there are more than one, *viz.* “ One Beneficent, ano-
 “ ther that is able to act contrary to him :”

¹ Ὁρατὸς γὰρ ἀπτόξ τέ εἰν καὶ σῶμα ἔχων, πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἰσθητὰ. Τὰ δὲ αἰσθητὰ, διόξ περιλήπτα μετὰ αἰσθήσεως, γιγνόμενα καὶ γενητὰ ἐφάνη. Pla. in Τιμητο. p. 1047.

² Τὸν ὑπὸ τῆς βυρσῶος φιλοσοφίας ἐκτελλόμενον Διάλογον ἃ τῶν δαιμόνων ἔρχοντα, κακοεργὸν εἶναι ψυχὴν, ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῶν Νόμων ὁ Πλάτων λέγει ταῖς δε ταῖς λέξεσιν. Ψυχὴν διοικῶσαν τοῖς πάντῃ κινούμενοις μῶν ἐ καὶ τὸν ἔρανον ἀνάγκη διακεῖν φάναι — μιάν ἢ πλείους ; πλείους — δυοῖν πε ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργατίδ³, κα τῆς τάναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάσασθαι. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῷ Φαιδρῳ ταῦτα γράφει. Εἰ μὲν δὴ κα ἄλλα κακά, Ἄλλὰ τις δαίμων ἐμίξε τοῖς πλείοις ἐν τῷ παραυλίκα ἰδόνῃ. Clem. Strom. l. 5. p. 701.

And

And again in his *Phædrus*, “ There are CHAP.
 “ other Evils, and some *Dæmon* has mixed XV.
 “ present Pleasure with most of them” — 
 All this truly relates to the *Devil*, the *Prince*
of Devils : But might he not have learnt
 this from the *Persians*, or *Babylonians*, as
 well as from the *Jews*? So again ;

5. In the Tenth Book of his *Laws*, *Plato*
 plainly shews us the *Apostolical* Saying ; *We*
wrestle not against Flesh and Blood, but a-
gainst Principalities and Powers, against
Spiritual Wickedness of those in Heaven. For
 he says, “ ^a Since we have agreed that there
 “ is a Heaven full of many good things,
 “ and likewise of the contraries, though
 “ there be not more of these : we say there
 “ must be an everlasting Contest, and there
 “ is occasion for a very great Guard.” Now
 if one of these Sayings must be taken from
 the other (which is not at all necessary) it
 will be thought the most probable, that
 since *Plato* lived before *St. Paul* four hun-
 dred Years, he did not take it from *St. Paul* ;
 but *St. Paul* took it from *Plato*, who lived
 so long before him.

^a Ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῶν Νόμων, ἄντικρυς τὸ Ἀποστολικὸν δόγμα ἐκείνο· Οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ἡ Πάλη πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς, πρὸς τὰς ἐξουσίας, πρὸς τὰ πνευματικὰ τῶν ἐν οὐρανοῖς· ὡς καὶ πᾶσι γράφειν. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συνεχάρησαμεν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἶναι μὲν ἕρπυλον, πολλῶν μισθῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, πλείονας δὲ τῶν μισθῶν, μάχη δὲ φαίνεται ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῆς τοιαύτης, καὶ φυλακῆς ταυμάσιας διομένης. *Clem. Strom. v. p. 702.*

CHAP. The Notion of the Platonick *Trinity* is
 XV. not pretended to be derived from *particular*
 Passages of the *Old Testament*; but Passages
 in *Platō* are supposed to be similar to the
 Notions of the Christian *Trinity*. And so
 in another Instance, that of the *Sabbath-day*,
 or *Seventh-day*, viz. in the *Week*. *Clemens*
 here has pick'd out of *Plato*, *Hesiod*, *Homer*,
Callimachus, and *Solon's Elegies*, some things
 about ^d the *Seventh-day*, or things remark-
 able on the *Seventh-day*. But first he should
 have proved, (what requires Proof,) that the
Greeks in those Times observed the periodical
 Return of every *seventh Day*, or kept one
 Day in seven as a *sacred Day*. One at first
 sight may imagine that *Hesiod's* saying *the*
seventh Day was holy; and *Homer's* saying
 so often that the *seventh Day was Holy*, im-
 plied that every *seventh Day* was observed,
 and that the Heathens had a periodical re-
 turn of Weeks, and kept some one Day of
 every Week holy. But,

1. *Hesiod* is not speaking of the Division of
 Time by *Weeks*, but by *Months*; and he tells
 us which are *fortunate Days*, and which are

^d Καὶ ἑβδομὸν ἱερὸν ἡμέρας. Hesiod.

Ἄστυρ ὅτι

Ἐβδομάτη δ' ἄρτι καταλήγει ἱερὸν ἡμέρας

Καὶ

Ἐβδομη ἢ ἱερή.

Καὶ πάλιν

Ἐβδομη ἡμέρας ἔλω ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ ἅπαντα Clem. p 713.

unlucky

unlucky Days in the Month. The first, the fourth, the seventh Day, does not mean the first, the fourth, and the seventh Day of the Week, but of the Month; and accordingly he goes on in the next Line to say what the eighth and ninth are fit for; and then the eleventh and twelfth, &c. Every one of Hesiod's Commentators, Moschopoulos, Proclus, Tzetzes, all observe the Reason why the seventh Day of the Month is Holy, because they observe that it was Apollo's Birth-day, and was consecrated to him.

2. With much less Exactness is Homer cited, as speaking of the seventh Day, or Day of the Week, whereon all things were at the Creation finished. The Verse as it stands quoted, would lead one to imagine that Homer had some Knowledge of the Creation in seven Days. But had Homer any such Notion? Or is there such a Verse in Homer? There is indeed a Verse in the *Odyssée*, Τέτρατον ἡμαρ ἔην καὶ τῷ τετέλεστο ἅπαντα, when Ulysses had finished all things, and was ready to part with Calypso. *Odyss.* é. But as to the other Line, it is not in either the *Iliad* or *Odyssée*, or any other of Homer's Poems, now extant: Or if it were, unless

* Ὁγδοκάτη τ' ἐνάτη τε δὴν γε μὲν ἡμαρτα μῆνος &c.
Ἐνδεκάτη τε δωδεκάτη τ' ἄμφω γε μὲν ἰοδλαὶ &c.

Hesiod. *ibid.*

CHAP. it could be shewn that *Homer* counted Time X V. by *Weeks*, it would prove nothing to the Purpose. And then as to the two other Citations, they plainly are not *Homer's*; nor is there any such Line as 'Εβδομάτη δ' ἠπειτα κατήλυθεν ἱερὸν ἡμᾶς· or that other 'Εβδομή ἦν ἱερή· no, nor the fourth 'Εβδομάτη δ' ἡοὶ λίπομεν ῥόον ἐξ 'Αχέρουτῳ· Or if they were, they must be proved to relate to the *Sabbath*; for it is well known not to have been the Custom of the *Greeks* to count Time by Periods of seven Days.

'Tis time to pass from *Clemens*, without taking any notice of further Citations. Others who came after him were still for improving the Hint, upon as little Grounds as he did. Such were *Tertullian* and *Minutius Felix*. But *Origen* freely owns it to be “^f far from clear”, whether *Plato* had his Notions from the *Jews* or not. “It is not at all clear and certain, says he, whether by accident *Plato* said these things, or whether, as some imagine, during his Travels in *Egypt*, happening upon some that philosophis'd the *Jewish* Affairs, he learnt some things of them.” He speaks in the same manner in other Places, not ven-

^f 'Ου πάνυ δε δῆλον, πότερον κατὰ συντυχίαν ἐπιπέπλωκε τέτοις ὁ Πλάτων, ἢ (ὡς οἰοῦνται τινες) ἐν τῇ εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἀποδημία συντυχῶν καὶ τοῖς τὰ Ἰουδαίων φιλοσοφῆσι, καὶ μιᾶν τινὰ παρ' αὐτῶν &c. Orig. con. Cels. p. 190.

turing to affirm what he saw some had affirmed, but contenting himself with *not condemning* what had been so hastily asserted. CHAP. XV.

“ I won't deny, says he, that those Sayings which *Phædrus* spoke, *Plato* learnt from some *Jews*, or as some write even that he having read the Prophets, he published those things ; *viz.* As to that Supercelestial Place, none of our Poets has celebrated it as it ought to be, nor ever will, &c. And even where he ventures to go a little further, it is not to assert a *known Fact*, but only to propose it as his Conjecture that *Plato* took a certain Notion of his from the Prophets. “ We guess, says he, that *Plato* took his Notion from the Prophets.” Did not *Origen* know, that *Justin Martyr*, and others, had openly charged *Plato* with taking the principal of his Notions from the *Jews*? This he knew ; but had he been satisfied with the Evidence, he could not have used all along so remarkable a Caution as he does. When he had occasion to mention the famous *Hermippus's* Testimony, does he do it as *Josephus* did? No: But only

Ἐγὼ δὲ σὺν ἀπειγνύσκω τὰς ἀπὸ τῆ φαιδρη λέξεις ἀπὸ τινῶν Ἑβραίων μεμαθηκότα τῷ Πλάτωνα, ὡς δὲ τινες ἀνέγραψαν, ἔτι καὶ τοῖς προφητικοῖς ἐντυχόντα λόγοις ἐκτεθειῶσ, ἐν οἷς ἔλεγε &c. p. 288.

ἢ Ἄφ' ὧν σχημαζόμεθα καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνα εἰληφέναι. p. 351.

CHAP. speaks it, as reported by others. “ⁱ *Hermip-
XV.* “*pus is said to have related it in his History,*
 “ that *Pythagoras* transferr’d from the *Jews*
 “ his *Philosophy to the Greeks.*” Why this
 Guard? How comes he to use such a Cau-
 tion? He always mentions this Opinion with
 great Reserve— “ ’tis not certain,— I don’t
 “ deny— as some think, write, suppose— I
 “ conjecture.” Could he always talk thus if
 he were satisfied that the Notion was true,
 and the Fact well proved? He asserts indeed
 “ that ^k whatever the *Greeks* said well was
 “ discovered to them by God”: but that
 they had it from *Moses* and the *Prophets*, is
 at best a Conjecture which he would not
 positively assert, however inclinable he was
 not to oppose what others had weakly main-
 tain’d before him.

But though *Origen* seem’d to guard so
 warily, and would not in Terms contradict
 a vulgar Error, *Lactantius* made no scruple
 of doing it. “^l I am, says he, *wont to won-*

ⁱ Λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἑρμιππον—ἰσορηκέναι, Πυθαγόραν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ
 φιλοσοφίαν ἀπὸ Ἰσραηλίων εἰς Ἑλλήνας ἀγαγεῖν. p. 13.

^k Ὁ Θεὸς ᾗδ’ αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, καὶ ὅσα καλῶς λέλεκται, ἐφάνηρωσε.
 p. 276.

Verum autem non nisi ejus scire est qui sit doctus à Deo.
 Neque enim potest aliter repudiare quæ falsa sunt, eligere, ac
 probare quæ vera. *Laſt.* l. 7. c. 7.

^l Unde equidem soleo mirari, quod cum Pythagoras &
 postea Plato, amore indagandæ veritatis accensi ad Ægyptios
 & Magos & Persas usque penetrassent, ut earum gentium ritus
 & sacra cognoscerent, (suspiciabantur autem sapientiam in re-
 ligione versari) ad Judæos tantum non accesserint, penes quos
 tunc solus erat; & quo facilius ire potuissent. *Laſt.* l. 4. c. 2.

“ der,

“ *der*, why *Pythagoras*, and afterwards *Plato*, CHAP.
 “ who out of an earnest Desire of searching XV.
 “ out Truth, travelled to the *Egyptians*, and
 “ went as far as to the *Magi* and *Persians*,
 “ yet they never came anear the *Jews*, a-
 “ mong whom alone true Religion then was,
 “ and whither they could have gone easier
 “ than where they did.” In another Place,
 he says, that “^m they never had any Notion
 “ of Scripture, for what ever was in the
 “ Prophets was kept close in the Temple of
 “ God.” Was *Lactantius* a Stranger to the
 Notions of *Clemens* and *Justin*? I suppose,
 Not; but he knew that the Opinion, that
 the Philosophers took all their Notions from
 the *Jews*, was a mere groundless Assertion.
 Their Sacred Books indeed clearly and con-
 stantly maintained that great fundamental
 Principle of Morality, the *Unity* of God;
 and excellent Morals might have been learn'd
 from thence: But *Egypt* taught this Prin-
 ciple as well as *Judæa*; and so did the *Ma-
 gians*; and such Genius's as *Pythagoras* and
Plato would easily deduce from Reason the
 Obligations of Duties, and social Relations,
 and a future State of Rewards and Punish-
 ments.

^m Nullas litteras veritatis attigerant; sed quæ prophetarum
 vaticinio tradita, in sacratio Dei continebantur. *Lact.* l. 2.
 c. 10.

Enough

CHAP. Enough has been said already to shew with
 XV. what little grounds those who lived within
 the first three hundred Years charged the
Greeks with taking all their Morals, &c. from the Scriptures. Yet as there were very learned Men, who espoused this Notion afterwards, I mean *Eusebius* and *Theodoret*; it might seem an Omission to pass by them entirely. They have wrote whole Books to prove the *Plagiarism* of the Philosophers, and perhaps they may be thought to have hit upon things which *Clemens*, &c. have missed.

Eusebius undertook to prove, and has very truly proved, that the *Greeks* derived all their Knowledge from Foreigners: that the best and oldest of their Philosophers were far inferior in Age to *Moses*; nay, that *Pythagoras* himself had his Philosophy from *Barbarians*. This is proved beyond all possible Contradiction by Authorities unquestionable: The only Point is, whether *Pythagoras*, or *Plato*, or any of the *Egyptians*, *Persians*, *Phœnicians*, &c. derived their Knowledge from the *Jews*. That *Pythagoras* and *Plato* said like things to what the *Hebrews* said; or that there is some *Similitude*, may be ac-

ο Πρὸς τὰ Ἑβραίων λόγια συμφωνίαν. Euf. Præp. Evan. l. xi. c. 1.
 Ὅμοίως τοῖς Ἑβραίων λόγοις. Euf. Præp. Evan. l. xi. c. 35.

knowledged : But 'tis not enough to prove CHAP.
 a bare *Similitude*, but it must be such a one XV.
 as may shew that they *stole* their Doctrines
 from the Bible. *Eusebius*, speaking of *Plato's*
 Notions of intelligible and incorporeal things,
 says, that “^p he followed *Moses* and the
 “ Prophets ; whether he learnt his Notions
 “ from any Report, since he lived amongst
 “ the *Egyptians* at that Time when the
 “ *Hebrews* were the second time deprived
 “ of their Land by the *Persians* ; or whe-
 “ ther he discovered of his own self the true
 “ Nature of things ; or whether God vouch-
 “ safed him this Knowledge by any other
 “ Means. For God, saith the Apostle,
 “ *Rom. i. 20. hath made himself manifest to*
 “ *them. For the invisible things of him are*
 “ *seen from the Creation of the World, being*
 “ *understood by the things which are made,*
 “ *even his eternal Power and Godhead, so*
 “ *that they are without excuse.*” He allows
 that *Plato* might come at the Knowledge
 of these Points by several Ways ; one where-
 of is, by his own natural Genius ; and if
Eusebius had been willing to have considered
 things fairly, he might as well not have

P Τῷ πανσόφῳ Μωσεί, καὶ τοῖς Ἑβραίων Φροφήταις Πλάτων ὁ
 θαυμάσιος ἐπηκολυθηκώς—εἴτ' ἐξ ἀκοῆς εἰς αὐτοὺς ἠκέρως μαθὼν,—
 εἴτε καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ τῆ ἴσ' πραγμάτων ἐπίσταλὸν φύσει· εἴτε ὁπωσθε
 ὑπὸ θεῶ καταξιοθεὶς τ' γνώσεως. Ὁ θεὸς γὰρ φησὶν αὐτοῖς ἐφατέ-
 ρως &c. *ibid.* c. 8.

supposed

CHAP. supposed that even the *Egyptians* had learnt
 XV. their Notions from any Tradition at all, but
 by Search had found out these things of
 themselves.

The famous Citation from *Numenius* ⁹ —
 “ What is *Plato*, but *Moses* speaking pure
 “ *Greek* ” ? — will not prove that *Plato* took
 his Sentiment about the Existence of God
 from *Moses* ; but only shews that *Plato*’s
 Sentiment was very like to *Moses*’s. *Plato*
 might easily speak of God as *one*, as *always*
existing, and having *no Beginning* ; and pro-
 ceeding in his Reasoning from these and
 such-like Ideas, might say many things
 which agree to the true Nature of God.
 But why must this be derived from *Moses* ?
 Or why not from the *Egyptians*, or from his
 own Discoveries ? For where there are com-
 mon Ideas to all Men, why may not diffe-
 rent Men speak the same things ?

It is not so indeed, where Men have not
 Ideas ; as in Instances which Reason cannot
 discover, and which therefore must come
 from *Revelation*. Such, *e. g.* is the Notion
 of the *Trinity* ; where, if *Plato* had any
 such Sentiment, it must be confess’d that
 he must have that some how or other from

⁹ Νεμῆνιος δὲ ὁ Πυθαγόρειος, φιλόσοφος, ἀντικρυς γράφει, Τὸ
 ᾧ ἐστὶ Πλάτων, ἢ Μωσῆς ἀπεικάζων. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 1.
 c. 22.

Revelation. Eusebius therefore has taken CHAP. some Pains to prove that *Plato's Second Cause* XV. was the same with the Christian's *Second Person in the Trinity*; nay, that he likewise had spoken of the *whole Trinity*. But then the Places produced from *Plato* have no relation to the Doctrine of the *Trinity*; and the *Old Testament* it self has so little of the *Trinity*, Word or Thing, that That must be proved, not merely asserted, to contain the Foundation of *Plato's Scheme*; or else all that is said is beside the Question. Eusebius puts the Question thus “^r Whence, except “ from the Writings of the *Jews*, could it “ come into *Plato's Mind* to think of *another God* superior to him that was the “ *Cause of all things* that are made, and to “ call him the *Father* of Him who *governs* “ all? Whence was it that he gave the “ Name of *Lord* to the *Father* of him who “ *made all things*.”— I likewise ask, where in the *Old Testament* is there any mention of the *Father of him who made all things*? It is not enough to explain the *Old Testament* by the *Theology* of the *New*; or to form to our selves Notions from the latter, and then to

^r Πόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἐπῆλθεν αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶντων ὃ γενητῶν αἰτίαι κρείττονα ἄλλον θεόν, ἢ ὃς καὶ Πατέρα τῶ πανηγεμόντι προσεπέειν; πόθεν δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ τῶ Κυρίου ἐπὶ τῶ Πατρὸς τῶ Δημιουργοῦ τάξαι ὄνομα. Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. 11. c. 16.

CHAP. explain the former from clearer Revelations
 XV. made in the latter : But we are to take the
 ~~~~~ *Old Testament* independent of the *New*, as it  
 stood in *Plato's* Times, and then see what  
 Grounds there is in That for his *Three sub-*  
*stantial Principles.*

It is but a lame Proof that *Plato* ever saw  
 the Scriptures, because truly he does not dif-  
 fer from *Moses* about several things. The  
 Point is ; Does he so agree, that it can be  
 shewn that he had his Notions from thence ?  
*Plato* reasons about the *Immortality of the*  
*Soul*, and produces Arguments for it ; and  
 if he talks agreeable to *Hebrew Notions*, it  
 does not therefore follow, that he *stole* his No-  
 tions from them. What signifies it to produce  
 such sort of general Similitudes as these—  
*Plato* says, “ that the Sun and Moon and  
 “ five other Planets, as they are called, were  
 “ made by the λόγῳ [Word or Reason]  
 “ Design of God to distinguish Times and  
 “ Seasons ” “ Observe, says *Eusebius*, that


Ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς ἀθανασίας ἐδὲν Μωσέως ὁ Πλάτων διέσηκε  
 τῇ δόξῃ. *ibid.* c. 27.

Ἑβραίοις κατὰ πάντα φίλον. c. 28.

Ὡς σὺν ἐπιπέσει τῷ Ἀφροδίτης. c. 29.

Ἐπιτίθει δὲ, εἰ μὴ τὸ, Ἐξ ἑνὸς λόγου καὶ Ἀφροδίτης θεῶν εἰρημέ-  
 νον τῷ Πλάτωνι, ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη τῷ παρ' Ἑβραίοις φάσκοντι, τῷ λό-  
 γῳ Κυρίου οἱ ἄρανοι ἐσφραδίσθησαν, καὶ τῷ πνεύματι τῶν σώματων αὐτῶν  
 πᾶσα ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν. Ἀλλὰ καὶ Μωσέως εἰπόντος, καὶ ἔθετο αὐτὰς  
 ἐν σφραδίσματι. Ὁμοίᾳ κέχρηται καὶ ὁ Πλάτων φανῆ τῇ, ἔθηκεν, εἰ-  
 πῶν. c. 30.

“ *Plato*

“ *Plato* says, by the *Word and Design of* CHAP.  
 “ *God*—just like that of the *Pſalmiſt*, *the* XV.  
 “ *Heavens were made by the Word of the*   
 “ *Lord, and all the hoſt of them by the ſpirit*  
 “ *of his mouth. Moſes* likewise and *Plato*,  
 “ use the ſame *Word* almost ; *Moſes* ſays  
 “ *ἔθετο*, and *Plato* *ἔθηκεν*, *be placed*, and *be*  
 “ *both placed.*” There needs no Reflection  
 upon ſuch Inſtances as theſe ; for if they  
 prove any thing, they prove, that *Moſes* wrote  
*Greek*, (for in *Plato’s* Days the Scriptures  
 were not tranſlated into *Greek*) or that every  
 one that uſes a common Word, muſt ſteal  
 from the Scriptures.

I know not whence it happens, that *Eufe-  
 bius*, juſt as *Clemens* and *Juſtin Martyr* be-  
 fore him had done, parallels *Plato* with Paſ-  
 ſages taken out of the *New Teſtament* : Juſt  
 as if the *New Teſtament* had been wrote in  
*Plato’s* Days. When *Plato* mentions *Æacus*  
 and *Minos*, and *Rhadamanthus*, as Judges  
 in the other World, preſently <sup>u</sup> the *Epistles*  
 to the *Romans* and *Corinthians* are produced  
 as holding forth to us a *future Judgment*.  
 If *Plato* cautions <sup>x</sup> that his Doctrines ſhould  
 not be divulged amongſt ignorant Men, the  
 Words of our Saviour are produced—*Give*  
*not that which is holy to dogs, neither caſt*

<sup>u</sup> Vid. *Euseb.* lib. 12. c. 6.

<sup>x</sup> Εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὲντοι μή ποτε ἐπιπέσῃ ταῦτα εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπειθεύ-  
 τας. *ibid.* l. 12. c. 7.

CHAP. *pearls before swine.* Eusebius was too good a  
XV. Chronologer to confound such distant Times.

But in truth, if he design'd only to shew <sup>y</sup> a  
*perfect Concord* betwixt *Plato's* Doctrines,  
and those of the *Jews*, under which he  
comprehends our Saviour and his Apostles,  
then this was a just Way of Reasoning. But  
this will not prove the other Point, that  
*Plato* either saw, or read, or heard, of any  
sacred Books amongst the *Jews*; much less  
will it prove that he *stole* his Notions from  
them.

It is much the same about the *Laws*  
which *Plato* has appointed. There may be  
a Similitude betwixt some of his *Laws*, and  
some of *Moses's*; but then they are such as  
all Commonwealths naturally would fall into  
for their own Security. When *Moses* deter-  
mined, that he that killed the Thief who  
attempted to break open an House in the  
*Night-time*, should be deem'd not guilty of  
*Murder*; and *Plato* did the same—Com-  
mon Sense shews the Reasonableness of such  
a Law, and not that the latter took the  
Hint from the former.

One need not, I think, descend any lower,  
I mean, to take any notice of what *Theodo-*

<sup>y</sup> Τῆς Πλάτωνος πρὸς τὰ Ἑβραίων λόγια σιωδίας, ὡς ἐν ἁρμο-  
σίᾳ συμφάνει λόγος. Lib. 12. c. 1.



ret has said on this Subject. He often repeats it, that *Pythagoras* and *Plato* stole their Notions from the *Jews*. He observes that the <sup>z</sup> *Phenicians* were near Neighbours to the *Hebrews*, and from them learnt, if they knew any thing at all of the Truth. The *Egyptians* too had the chief of their true Notions from the *Hebrews* who lived long in *Egypt*. The *Chaldeans* likewise captivated the *Jews*, and carried them to *Babylon*, and there “<sup>a</sup> being convinced by the miraculous Facts of the fiery Furnace, and the Lions Den”, they thought the *Jews* worthy Teachers of the Truth. And lastly, *Cyrus* conquering the *Lydians*, taught them what he had learnt from *Daniel*. By these means he conceives the Truth to be spread about the World, and that whosoever happened to converse with any of these Nations, derived, or might derive the Truth in this manner from the *Jews*.

When one examines into the *Particulars*, one gains no manner of Light from any thing produced by *Theodoret*, more than one did from those that went before him in these Imaginations ; e. g. “ *Plato* meeting

<sup>z</sup> Πρόσχωροι ή άγχιτέρμονες. Καί παρά τέτων ήμαθον, είτε ήμαθον, τον άλθθειαν. p. 10.

<sup>a</sup> Έκ τών αυτόθι γεγενημένων θαυμάτων περι τε την κάμινον ή τής λιοντας. ibid.

CHAP. “ with the *Hebrews in Egypt*, carefully ob-  
 XV. “ serv’d the *Prophetic Writings*, and learnt  
 ~~~~~ “ from thence that *River of Fire*, which  
 “ the Divine *Daniel* saw.” ^b *Plato* indeed
 has a large Account of the Punishments of
 wicked Men in a Future State ; and in that
 he talks of a *River* which he calls *Puri-
 phlegeton*, and gives an Account of its Ef-
 fects. And *Daniel* mentions a *fiery Stream*
 upon a quite different Occasion, not as
 punishing wicked Men, nor any thing like
 it ; but only as *coming forth from God* :
 nor does he assign any manner of Use of it,
 as *Plato* does. So again, he says, that
Plato took from *Esaiab* that Notion, *their
 Worm shall not die, neither shall their Fire
 be quenched*. But when one looks into
Plato, and finds nothing like it, the Reply
 is, that he “ ^c took his Hint from thence,
 “ but mixed it up with so much Fable of
 “ the *Greeks*, as to make it seem entirely
 “ his own.” *Theodoret* should have proved
 first that he took his Notions from the *Jews*,
 by some sort of Evidence, before he gives
 us such an improbable Story as he does.

^b Ἐντυχὼν ἡ δὲ Ἐσραίου ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τῶν προφητικῶν πάντως λόγι-
 ων ἐπήκασε, καὶ τὸ τῆς πυρὸς ἕμιθε ποταμὸν, ὃν ὁ Θεσπέσιος εθεάσα-
 το Δανιὴλ. p. 156.

^c Ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος τὰ μὲν ἐκείθεν λαβὼν, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τῶν Ἑλληνι-
 κῶν ἀναμίξας μύθων, τὴν περὶ τούτων ἐποίησεν λόγος. p. 156.

There is indeed one *general Argument* CHAP. used by *Clemens Alexandrinus* to prove that XV. the *Grecian Philosophers* stole their Notions from the Scriptures; and it is this, *viz.* that our Saviour himself called the *Greeks, Thieves*. If you ask for the Place, it is clear, *John x. 8. All that ever came before me are Thieves and Robbers*. See the Argument urged, *Strom. i. p. 366, 367, & lib. V. p. 733*. But I think it deserves only to be mentioned, that its Weakness may be perceiv'd.

I have now, I think, sufficiently examined this Hypothesis, which has been often insisted on as a Means to put some Stop to Infidelity, and to enhance the Advantages of Revelation. When one sees a Scheme of such Reasoning laid before a Set of Men, who openly call for *Evidence* for Revelation, what Effect can one expect to flow from hence, but a Confirmation of them in their *Infidelity*. Instances should be produced, at least, of some Truths derived to the Heathen World by Means of such *supernatural* Notices as are pretended. It is not enough to say, that *Justin*, or *Eusebius*, or an hundred more, have said so. The *Reasons* upon which they say so are to be produced; and if it be affirm'd ever so often, with an *αὐτοῖς ἔφα*, the *Fathers* have told

CHAP. *us so*, yet that will not avail against all Probability.

There is one Thing more that I would remark : The Notion that the Fathers had, that the *Heathen stole* their Notions from *Moses* and the *Prophets*, was one great Means of *corrupting* the true Christian Religion. They first imagined that the Heathen Philosophers and Poets borrowed Notions from the Scriptures : and then truly they put off the Heathen Notions of those Philosophers and Poets as true Christian Principles. Thus was *Platonism* introduced as early as *Justin Martyr's* Days, and the *Logos* of *Plato* and *Orpheus* was represented as the true *Logos* of *St. John*. And hence may a good Account be given of the Corruption of Opinions, and a Change of Language and Notions that began to get Ground in the *Second* Century ; and has been attended with wonderful, but very natural Consequences, in Christianity, which it is not my Intention here to consider.

T H E
C O N C L U S I O N.

I HAVE endeavoured in the preceding Pages to lay down such Principles, as are, I think, of great Service to both *Natural* and *Revealed Religion* : and if I have been mistaken in any *Particular*, yet I am sure I am right in the *Sum total*, which is *Virtue* and *Goodness of Life*. It was necessary to determine what the Rule of Action to *Man* was : and it appears to be *One, fixt, unalterable* Rule, the same to all Intelligent Beings, even to God himself. This therefore must be followed, with all its Consequences ; and *Religion*, and *Revelation*, conspire to engage Men to follow it, steadily and uniformly.

The Truth of *Natural Religion* is not much controverted : but *Revelation* has met with many Adversaries : The great Point therefore was to *prove*, that there had been a *Revelation* given to Mankind ; and to shew That in such a Light, as either would obviate, or answer such Objections as might be brought against it : I do not mean, such only as are *public*, but others likewise *which*

CONCLUSION.

I have met with, which I thought it fit and right to consider, and which indeed principally led me to treat of these Points.

I was very desirous to establish well my First Principles: And as I think *Morality* and the *Being of God*, capable of strict Demonstration, *Natural Religion* must be so too. And if *Prophecy* and *Event* corresponding, may not be called by that Name, yet the Evidence thence arising is so strong and clear, that it cannot come under a Denomination lower than That of *Certainty*. *Many Prophecies*, and *many Events*, exactly tallying to each other, carry such strong Evidence with them, that the Mind can no more refuse its Assent, than to the clearest Truth that can be laid before it. If therefore the Principles I have laid down are rightly apprehended, it will be easy to go on, and to prove the *Truth* of the *Christian Religion*, even with the greatest Strictness. The Prophecies of the *Old Testament* exactly agree to *Jesus of Nazareth*; and he worked Miracles to prove himself to be *The Christ*: The *Prophecies* of the *New Testament* are Evidences of a *Revelation* given to *Him*, and to his *Apostles*; and we see those very Prophecies, some *perfectly accomplished*, others in *part* accomplished; enough amply to satisfy any curious Person. I know no stronger Evidence

Evidence than this affords : May it be fully and impartially considered ! And then, as to any little Errors, Inaccuracies, Defects, Oversights, which I may have been guilty of in treating so delicate a Subject as this is, the candid Reader will forgive them in One whose whole and sole Aim is Truth, and Virtue, and Honesty, and the real Service of that Religion, and That only, which *Jesus Christ* came into the World to teach Mankind.

F I N I S.

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