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PRINCIPLES OF

NATURAL THEOLOGY

BY GEORGE HAYWARD JOYCE, S.J.

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PRINCIPLES

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INTRODUCTION

It is, perhaps, the most notable feature of the
Scholastic system that it covers the whole ground
of philosophical investigation, and provides a
closely-knit and consistent body of doctrine, deal-
ing with each of the great problems which con-
front human reason. It applies its principles to
the consideration of God, of the world, and of
man ; and offers us as the result of the enquiry
treatises on Natural Theology, on Cosmology, and
on Rational Psychology, not as so many indepen-
dent sciences, but as integral parts of a single syn-
thesis. Nor does it stop here. In Logic it deals
with the problem of knowledge and with the laws
of thought: in Ethics with human conduct: alone
among philosophies it furnishes a satisfactory
theory of extended and discrete quantity as the
basis of Mathematics. Every department of human
thought is gathered up into one vast scheme, the
conclusions of each part bearing out the results
of all the others. The minds — and they were many
—which laboured at the work, aimed at and

VI NATURAL THEOLOGY

achieved a synthesis universal in its range. These
men were not content to leave one region of be-
ing, and that the most important, unexplored.
They held that, if only the right path were chosen,
the peaks might be scaled. It was left for a later
generation at once less sure of foot and duller of
vision to aver first that the heights were unattain-
able, and finally that they were a mere mirage to
which nothing real corresponded.

It follows from what we have said that in the
Scholastic philosophy Natural Theology is no un-
essential adjunct, no mere afterthought, but a
substantive and vital part of the system, without
which it would be radically incomplete. It claims
to establish from assured first principles the exist-
ence of a Supreme Being, distinct from the finite
and mutable things of experience. It maintains,
further, that though the limitations of the human
intellect render all our knowledge of Him inade-
quate, we are not wholly ignorant of His nature.
There are certain attributes which can be affirmed
of Him with certainty, though they are His in a
manner more perfect than any which we can
imagine. Above all, He is intelligent and free,
and therefore possessed of personality. In Him
it finds the source and origin of all finite beings,
and the final cause in view of which such beings
exist.

INTRODUCTION vil

The attitude of much recent philosophy in re-
gard of the subject of which wc are speaking,
shews us the very antithesis of this. The contrast
could hardly be more absolute. The question, it
is true, receives ample discussion, as the succes-
sive volumes of Gifford lectures bear witness.
Moreover, of the thinkers whose philosophical
views derive from Kant and Hegel, many, at least,
maintain the existence of God. Yet it does not
seem too much to say that in no case is a Natural
Theology an essential part of their system. In-
deed, we feel, as we read, that the system would
be more harmonious, more self-consistent, if a
personal God were ruled out. The fact is that the
conviction of God's existence is, as we shall shew,
almost ineradicable from the human mind. Specu-
lative reasons may seem to make against it tainen
usque recur ret. Hence room is made for it even
at the cost of inconsistency. Sometimes too
ethical considerations are operative, as they were
with Kant himself: it is felt that there can be no
basis of moral obligation unless the existence of a
personal God be admitted. Yet the treatise is of
the nature of an excrescence to the metaphysics
of 'the system. .A.nd the positive conclusions are
of so meagre a character that they cannot be said
to form a Natural Theology : they are mere salvage
from the wreck. We are told that God is not a

vill NATURAL THEOLOGY

Creator: that He is not omnipotent: not infinite:
not really distinct from the world or from the
human soul, and consequently not simple : and that
the proofs for His existence are not valid. We are
hardly surprised when we are told that He is not
personal and not moral : or when a pluralist writer
assures us that we ourselves are just as self-existent
as is God : that He is merely primus inter pares.

We have spoken of Natural Theology as form-
ing an integral part of any complete philosophy.
It is, in fact, the most important section of all —
the key-stone of the arch. Apart from it philo-
sophy has failed of its object. " Philosophy," says
Aristotle, " is the scieAce which treats of primary
causes and principles." ^ This is its distinctive
characteristic, by which it differs from the special
sciences. They are concerned with the different
particular types of reality, viewed under their vari-
ous aspects. The object of philosophy is nothing
less than the universe as a whole. Its goal is the
ultimate ground of the manifold of experience —
the primary principles which constitute its explana-
tion. It follows that unless Natural Theology be
a pure delusion, it is the supreme treatise — that for
which all others should serve as a preparation.
For it claims to find in God that ultimate explana-
tion of which it is in search. It shews that He

' Melap/t.j I., c. i.

INTRODUCTION IX

is the first efficient cause, the source and origin
of all that is not Himself; that He is the exemplar
cause, of whose perfection all finite perfections —
all types and forms of being, from the highest to
the lowest — are the reflection: that He, too, is the
final cause of all, since the same necessity which
demands that all things should come from* Him,
requires no less that He should be the end for
whom they exist. Here then, and here alone, is
the object which philosophy sets before it. The
system which has no room for this treatise has
failed of its end.

The vital nature of the issue at stake may be
seen from another point of view besides that to
which we have just adverted. If there be such a
science as Natural Theology, then — viewing man
purely in his natural faculties and apart from
revelation — in that science lies the noblest occupa-
tion of the human mind: and to mislead us on this
subject, to represent the knowledge it confers as
illusory, is to inflict on us an injury of the gravest
kind. When Aristotle enquires in what human
felicity consists, he replies that it must lie in the
exercise of our highest faculty upon the highest
of all subjects — in the exercise of the intelligence
upon eternal verities. i Without entering upon the
question of felicity, which is outside our present

■ Etii. .\'ic., .\. c. vii., 1 1 77 J 13-21; cf. St. Thomas Aq.,
Sum ma Theul., i^, 2a-", q. 3, art. 5.

X NATLIRAL THEOLOGY

scope, it is easy to see that the reason given shews
the knowledge of God to be the highest thing of
which human nature is capable : that it gives us
the true measure of our dignity as men. It fol-
lows that to deny our power to attain to this know-
ledge, to maintain that a science of Natural
Theology is non-existent, is to strike a blow at the
dignity of human nature, and to place mankind
on a lower plane of being.

The method which Scholasticism employs in
dealing with this branch of philosophy is well
known. It is that of demonstration from
axiomatic metaphysical principles. Since the ob-
jective validity of these principles has been denied,
we have devoted a special chapter (chap, ii.) to
this question, and have there shewn that the in-
tellect is not deceived when it unhesitatingly
affirms their universal and necessary validity: that
in so doing it is acting in its proper sphere, and
judging with full competence in regard of its
appropriate object. If this be the case, it is plainly
idle to object, as is sometimes done, that a priori
reasoning based on a universal premiss is uncon-
vincing to the mind, inasmuch as the assumed uni-
versal is liable to be upset by a single contrary
instance. Undoubtedly this would be the case if
we had no capacity of apprehending necessary
truth. But we affirm that within its due sphere

INTRODUCTION xi

the human mind possesses this power. He would
be a bold man who should maintain that the pro-
position, twice two are four, might be invalidated
by an exception. And where the first principles
of metaphysical truth are concerned the intellect
judges with no less certainty than about the primary
verities of mathematics.

Our organon of proof is Aristotelian logic, the
ultimate test of each step being the principle of
contradiction. It is indeed not to be expected
that those who Iiave embraced the Hegelian philo-
sophy should be other than disdainful of such a
system. Thus Principal John Caird, who has
treated our subject from the standpoint of
Hegelianism, wTites: " The unity of the spiritual
world is a thing which lies beyond the standpoint
of formal logic. . . . How can an organ of
thought, which tests all things by the law of con-
tradiction, compass, or in the attempt to compass,
do anything else than misrepresent, the realities of
a world, where analysis is ever revealing contra-
dictions, and whose absolute opposition can only
vanish in the light of a higher synthesis."* The
Scholastic philosophy is fully prepared to take up
the challenge. We maintain that the proofs which
we advance are conclusive : and that our reasoning,
so far from misrepresenting reality, achieves a very

■ hUroducUon to the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 199, 200.

xii NATURAL THEOLOGY

ample measure of knowledge of indubitable
validity regarding the object of our enquiry.
Reality, we affirm, contains no contradictions.
Those which the Hegelian believes himself to have
discovered are mere mare's nests due to his own
inaccurate analysis: they have no basis in fact.

To other writers it appears that the right
method to adopt in the study of Natural Theology
is that of an interpretation of the religious experi-
ence of mankind. This is the view maintained by
Mr. C. J. Webb in his striking volume, God and
Personality. He tells us that, in his judgment,
" Natural Theology is to be regarded, not as a
science consisting of truths reached altogether in-
dependently of a historical religion, but rather as
the result of reflection on a religious experience,
mediated in every case through a historical re-
ligion." i Such a view supposes, of course, that
the intellect cannot arrive at a knowledge of God
by direct systematic proof, but only by reflection
upon the various modes in which the human spirit
has sought to direct itself towards its Divine
source. Here, too, the issue is a clear one. We
contend that the method of direct reasoning is
open to us: and not merely that it lies within our
ix)wer, but that no just exception can be taken to
a very large body of conclusions already reached.

' God and Personalily, p. 32.

INTRODUCTION XIU

Indeed, if our mind is capable of determining
aright the implications of man's religious activities
as brought under observation in the history of re-
ligions, and of gathering in this way certain trust-
worthy conclusions regarding God, it is hard to see
why a valid metaphysic should not reach Him by a
less circuitous route. The science which treats of
primary principles and causes must surely be alble
to tell us something of the source of all being'.
And if it be held that this is beyond the mind's
competence, have we any ground for supposing
that it is to be trusted in the conclusions which it
draws from the religious experience of the race?
Moreover, the method pursued is open to criticism
on another count. It assumes gratuitously that re-
ligions are all natural in their origin. This, how-
ever, must be proved: it cannot be taken for
granted. Is there anything unreasonable in the
hypothesis that other factors have been operative?
that on the one hand God has Himself intervened
to communicate to man truths beyond the scope
of unaided reason: and, on the other, that malefi-
cent influences have been at work, diverting in
many cases the practice of religion to ends wholly
opposed to that which belongs to it by right, and
rendering it a cult, not of God, but of evil? If
this be so, it is impossible to treat the historical
faiths as data for determining Natural Religion.

xiv NATURAL THEOLOGY

In view of the fact that in every religion it is
assumed as beyond all question that the teaching*
is not due to the unaided efforts of the human
spirit, but to communication made ab extra, the
demand for some proof that this is not the case
can hardly be considered extravagant.

From what has been said it will be manifest
that the object of our enquiry is the validity, not
the genesis, of the conclusions regarding God
at which we shall arrive. Statements such as " the
highest proof of any idea is an account of the
process by which it has been reached," i we hold
to be entirely false, and utterly opposed to any
true view of the aim of* speculative thought. There
are, of course, certain provinces of knowledge in
which the genesis of an idea is a question of the
highest moment, inasmuch as in them the validity
of a proposition is dependent on its origin. In the
sphere of dogmatic theology it is essential to shew
that a doctrine which only became explicit at a
comparatively late date was legitimately derived
from one which was at all times explicitly held.
But speculative philosophy does not fall within this
category. Doubtless it is of interest to trace the
elements of a given system to their various sources
—to see in what the Schoolmen were indebted to
Aristotle, in what to the Platonism of Augustine or

■ J. Caird, op. cit., p. 298.

INTRODUCTION XV

of the Pseudo-Areopagite, in what to the moral
teaching of the Stoics. But the interest here is
historical: and the question has little, if any, bear-
ing on the truth of the teaching under consideration.
During the past century the enquiry into origins
has absorbed an immense amount of attention in
regard to many different subjects, as e.g., anthro-
pology, biology, jurisprudence, language, etc., etc.,
and in some it has borne much valuable fruit: the
natural consequence of this being that some minds
came to regard it as the one and only road to all
truth. That it certainly is not. And where the
investigations of speculative philosophy are con-
cerned, it has, we contend, no place. The point
at issue is not how an idea arose, but whether it
corresponds with the reality of things: Is it true?
In the preface to a work on Scholastic philo-
sophy some reference seems necessary to the pre-
judice against which that system has to contend.
It is, indeed, not many years since outside the
Catholic schools it was regarded as undeserving
of serious attention. At our universities the
volumes in which it was contained lay neglected.
And the opinion was commonly entertained that
the middle ages had contributed nothing to the
progress of human thought : that from the days of
the Neoplatonists to the seventeenth century there
was a blank in the history of philosophy. A far

XVI NATURAL THEOLOGY

saner view now prevails. It is recognized that just
as in art, in literature, and in architecture, the thir-
teenth and fourteenth centuries were a period of
rapid advance and of brilliant achievement, so the
same is true in regard to philosophical specula-
tion. Nevertheless, it is still widely held that,
whatever value the system may have had for the
period at which it arose, and whatever the intel-
lectual eminence of those who fashioned it, it
would be absurd to look to it at the present time
for a tenable metaphysic of being. It stands, it
is believed, committed to assumptions once gener-
ally received, but now recognized to be altogether
erroneous. Given these assumptions, it provides
a wonderful synthesis of knowledge. But now that
they are rejected, it can afford no solution to the
great riddles with which philosophy is concerned.
No one, we imagine, will dispute the fact that such
is the estimate taken of it by very many thinkers,
even by those who are far too well informed to be
affected by the old-time prejudices to which we
have referred. Yet, certainly, those who thus think
should find cause for reflection in the fact that on
the continent Scholasticism is not a matter of
merely historical interest, but is likewise a power-
ful factor in contemporary thought. The Neo-
scholastic movement has taken firm root, and is a
living thing. The present writer has spoken of

INTRODUCTION XVll

this elsewhere, and will not here repeat what he
has already said.' Besides, the fact must have been
brought home to many in this country during the
late war. The widest interest was taken in the
fate of the university of Louvain, and in the per-
sonality of its founder, Cardinal Mercier. And
one of the mo3t notable features of that university
is that its philosophical school is a stronghold of
Neo-scholasticism.

There are, however, two objections which are
regarded by many as fatal to the claim of Scholas-
ticism to rank as a living philosophy. Of these
notice may suitably be taken here.

It is not infrequently asserted that Scholastic-
ism is a dualistic system, and that the human mind
has outgrown the stage in which it can accept any
form of dualism. The answer to this is easy. The
term dualism has more than one sense: and it is
here employed sophistically. As ordinarily under-
stood it signifies a system which supposes two first
principles of being, independent the one of the
other. As a rule these are conceived as being a
good and an evil principle, the sources respectively
of spirit and of matter. Taken in this sense, it
is true enough that the human mind has outgrown
the possibility of accepting dualism. Reason is
seen imperatively to demand a single first prin-

' Principles of Logic, pp. i.-xii.

b

xviu NATURAL THEOLOGY

ciple, the origin of all that is. But Scholasticism
is emphatically not dualistic after this fashion. It
teaches the existence of one self-existent Being,
God, the first cause of all that is not Himself. This
is not the sense in which the reproach of dualism is
urged against it. Those who raise the objection
are of the school of Hegel: they affirm the unity
of all being, and reject as philosophically inad-
missible any ultimate distinction between God and
the world. For this reason they style themselves
monists : and it is because Scholasticism is em-
phatic in asserting that God and the created world
are absolutely distinct that they accuse it of dual-
ism. But who has ever shewn that the human mind
has outgrown dualism in this sense of the term?
Doubtless there are difficulties in holding the co-
existence of the finite and the Infinite. But we
contend that these difficulties are capable of solu-
tion, whereas the manifold difficulties involved in
any system of monism, whether spiritual or
material, admit of no satisfactory answer what-
ever. The contention that Scholasticism is to be
rejected because it is dualistic, owes such plausi-
bility as it has, wholly and entirely to the ambiguity
of Ihe term. Indeed, it is open to Scholastics to
turn the argument back on their opponents — retor-
qiiere argumentum . There is, it is admitted, a
sense in which a system of dualism is impossible.

INTRODUCTION xix

Reason will not tolerate the supposition of more
than one self-existent Being. It seeks for one first
principle of things, not for many. Yet the more
recent deselopment of Hegelianism has landed us
in precisely this impasse, and offers us a philo-
sophy of Pluralism I

Still more frequently, perhaps, do we hear the
objection that the philosophy of the Scholastic
doctors is vitiated by their utterly erroneous
notions regarding physical science. They ac-
cepted, it is contended, the geocentric hypothesis
as indisputable : they never doubted that the sun
goes round the earth. And the rest of their ideas
about nature were on the same plane. Do they
not appeal to principles such as that heavy things
tend downwards and light things upwards, and the
like? Where the outlook is so radically faulty,
the resulting philosophical system cannot, we are
told, be other than futile. It is, of course, not
to be disputed that in many respects their scientific
knowledge was extremely imperfect. The last two
centuries have been a time fruitful in physical dis-
covery in many directions — perhaps the most fruit-
ful period in this respect which the history of man
has known. It is not altogether unnatural that the
possession of this new knowledge should generate
some disdain towards those who lived and died
long before this era of discovery dawned, and who

XX NATURAL THEOLOGY

were contenl with a measure of physical knowledge
which to us appears so totally inadequate. Yet it
would be a grave mistake to argue from their
ignorance of the special sciences that their meta-
physics must necessarily be at fault. It is pos-
sible surely for man to reason aright regarding
first principles without a training in the sciences.
He may grasp the true significance of notions such
as unity, truth, reality, substance, efficient and
final causality, etc., etc., without any knowledge
of the mysteries of electricity. We do not hear the
masters of Greek thought belittled for their imper-
fect acquaintance with^ physical science. In their
case men seem to understand that the treatment of
moral and metaphysical subjects is largely inde-
pendent of physical knowledge. This, surely,
holds good equally of the Schoolmen. Moreover,
in justice to these latter it should be observed that
ihey were quite aware that the Ptolemaic system of
astronomy was an hypothesis and not an estab-
lished certainty. They knew better than to con-
clude that because it served well as an explanation
of the facts, it must needs be true. And here
some of our own contemporaries might learn a
useful lesson from them. How often have we not
been asked to accept unquestioningly as an estab-
lished truth in philosophy, or it may be in physical
science, or in anthropology, or in history, some

INTRODICTION XXI

hyix)thesis which, though it affords an ingenious
explanation of a certain number of the facts, is
as yet far from being proven.

We have made it our constant aim to express
the Scholastic reasoning in a form which shall be
intelligible to anyone who cares to follow the argu-
ment. The Schoolmen themselves, when establish-
ing a conclusion, frequently appeal for i)roof to
a formula embodying a principle of Aristotelian
metaphysics. To those familiar with the signifi-
cance of the formula, and with its application in
the Aristotelian philosophy no more was needed:
the proof was adequate. But to those who read it
without the same mental background little or
nothing is conveyed. This constitutes a real diffi-
culty at first to the student who wishes to acquaint
himself with the system : and doubtless is in some
degree responsible for the frequency with which
even scholars of reputation fall into the strangest
errors regarding Scholasticism. We are in
consequence not without hope that this work may
be of interest even to some who differ, perhaps
widely, from us. In view of the historical import-
ance of the Scholastic philosophy and of its grow-
ing influence to-day, there may be not a few who,
while disinclined to study it as encumbered by its
native technicalities, will be glad to see its Natural
Theology in an English dress. If such there are,
b*

XXU NATIRAL THEOLOGY

we venture to direct their attention more especi-
ally to the metaphysical proofs offered for the
existence of God. It is so often confidently
asserted that Kant shewed once and for all the
total inadequacy of the traditional arguments, that
it is a matter of no small moment to observe that
his criticism fails altogether to touch those argu-
ments as they are proposed, e.g., by St. Thomas
Aquinas. The first essential in criticism is to know
what your adversary maintains.

Yet the chief end of our work is practical.
There is, we are convinced, urgent need at the
present moment for a reasoned defence of the prin-
ciples of theism. The prevalent philosophies are
all either pantheistic or materialist in tendency,
leaving no room for belief in a personal God.
Moreover, the controversy is not debated only
among the learned. Unbelief has become mili-
tant. Rationalism carries on an active propaganda
of its own, attacking the very foundations of all
belief in God, and seeking to persuade all,
educated and uneducated alike, that there is no
life but this, and that the only worthy object of
effort is material well-being. Since the challenge
is made on grounds of reason, it is on grounds of
reason that it must be met. Meanwhile the need
is acute. Many a young man finds himself brought
face to face with some specious objection urged

INTRODUCTION xxiii

against the first principles of religion : and though
he instinctively feels that the reasoning is falla-
cious, he is unable to see where the fallacy lies.
To him the difficulty is new, and therefore discon-
certing. He wonders whether a satisfactory
answer can be found. In these cases — and they
are numerous — a reasoned grasp of the main truths
of Natural Theology would afford an adequate
protection against a very grave danger. Hence it
is incumbent on the defenders of religion to do
what in th^m lies to make this part of philosophy
more widely known. The system of thought
elaborated by the great Scholastic thinkers is, we
are convinced, grounded on such solid arguments,
its various parts are so consistent with each other,
and the whole so concordant with reality, that it
provides us with all that we need to defend our-
selves against the more or less plausible objections
which are met with to-day. But so long as a know-
ledge of it is confined to academical circles, its
effects can be but small. That it should be ren-
dered accessible to many is the main purpose with
which this book has been written.

Among recent works written from the Scholastic
standpoint 1 desire to express my obligations to
Dieu, Son Existence et Sa Nature by R.
Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., and to the treatise — for
it far exceeds the usual limits of an article^

xxiv NATl'RAL THEOLOGY

Creation, by H. Pinard, S.J., contained in the
third volume of Vacant and Mangenot's Diction-
naire de Theologie.

My grateful thanks are due to the Rev. L. W.
Geddes and the Rev. M. C. D'Arcy for much valu-
able help. On many points I have sought coun-
sel from one or other of these friends, and always
to my advantage. I am also very greatly indebted
to the Rev. J. Brodrick for his kind assistance in
the correction of the proofs.

G. H.J.

St. Beuno's College,
St. Asaph.

Nov. 15, 1922.

CONTENTS.

PJRT I.

THE EXISTENCE UF CUD.

CHAPTER I.

THE SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE OK NATURAL

THEOLOGY.

§1. The scope ol Natural Theology. §2. Natural
Theology one of the Sciences. §3. Importance of Natural
Theology. §4. Relation of Natural Theology and Super-
natural Theology. PP- ' — '7

CHAPTER II.

THE DEMONSTRABILITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE.

§ r. The Possibility of a Demonstration Denied: Sensa-
tionalist St:uulpoint. § 2. Concepts of Substance and Cause
in the Light of Experience. § 3. Philosophical Vindication
of these Concepts. §4. Philosophical Vindication of Kirst
Principles. § 5. Kant's Teaching. § 6. Neohegelianisin.

pp. 18—55

CHAPTER III.

PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE (i. Metaphysical

Arguments^.

§1. The Cosmological Argument. §2. The .Argument
from Contingency. § 3. The Argument from Motion. § 4.
The Henological Argument. PP- 56 — "5

XXVi NATURAL THEOLOGY

CHAPTER IV.

PROOFS OF god's EXISTENCE (ii. Physical

Argiwie?tts).

§ I. The Teleological Argument. § 2. The Argument from
Life. pp. 116 — 152

CHAPTER V.
PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE (ill. Aloral Arguments').

§ I. Argument from Conscience. § 2. Argument from the
Desire of Happiness. § 3. Argument from Universal Con-
sent, pp. 153—198

CHAPTER VI.
THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

§ I. St. Anselm's Argument. § 2. Descartes' Use of the
Argument. §3. Modern Restatements. pp. 199 — 215

t

CHAPTER VII.

rant's CRITICISM AND HIS ALTERNATIVE
ARGUMENT.

§1. Kant's Criticism and its Fruits. §2. His Criticism
of the Cosmological Argument. § 3. His Criticism of the
Teleological .Argument. § 4. His Alternative Proof from the
Practical Reason. pp.216 — 233

TART II.
NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

CHAPTER VIII.

AGNOSTIC DIFFICULTIES AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
THEIR SOLUTION.

§ I. Agnostic Difficulties. § 2. The Analogical Know-
ledge of God. § 3. Solution of the Difficulties. § 4. Modern-
ism and Agnosticism. pp. 236 — 275

CONTENTS xxvii

CHAPTER IX.
THE DIVINE ESSENCE.

§1. Import of the Enquiry. §2. Essence and Existence
in God. § 3. The Analogy of Being. § 4. The Metaphysical
Essence of God. pp. 276 — 297

CHAPTER X.

ATTRIBUTES RELATING TO THE DIVINE NATURE.

§ I. Di\ision and Deduction of the Divine Attributes.
§2. Unity and .Simplicity. §3. Truth and Goodness. §4.
Infinity and Immutability. § 5. Eternity. § 6. Immensity.

pp. 298—332

CHAPTER XI.
(Attributes relating to the DiiHne Operations. I.)

THE DIVINE INTELLECT.

§ I. The Divine Intellect. § 2. Its Primary and Secon-
dary Objects. § 3. The Divine Foreknowledge. § 4. Phy-
sical Premotion and Scienlia Media. PP- 333 — y?^

CHAPTER XII.
(^Attributes relating to the Dir^'ne Operations, il.)

GOD'S WILL: AND HIS BEATITUDE.

§1. The Divine Will. §2. Its Primary and Secondary
Objects. § 3. The Freedom of God's Will. § 4. Apparent
Frustrations of God's Will. S 5- The Mural Attributes of
God — Justice, Mercy. § 6. The Divine Beatitude.

PP- 372—4"

CHAPTER XIII.
{Attributes relating to the Divine Operations, iii.)

THE DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE.

§1. The .Xttribute of Power. §2. Scope of the Divine
Omnipotence. S 3. The Divine Omnipotence Denied — ' A
Finite God.' §4. Miracles. pp. 412 — 438

XXVni NATURAL THEOLOGY

TART III.

GOD IN HIS RELATION TO THE WORLD.

CHAPTER XIV.

CREATION.

§ I. The Idea of Creation. § 2. Proof of Creation. § 3.
Creation and the Iniimitabilily of God. § 4. God's Freedom in
Creation. § 5. Exemplar Causality of God. § 6. The Pur-
pose of Creation. pp. 439 — 478

CHAPTER XV.
RIVAL THEORIES CONSIDERED («. Pa/Uheism,

a. Naturalism).

§ I. Pantheism and Cijeationism. § 2. Hegelian Panthe-
ism. §3. English Idealist .Systems: — (a) Absolute Ideal-
ism, (2) Mitigated Idealism. § 4. Naturalism, pp. 479 — 523

CHAPTER XVI. ;

CONSERVATION AND CONCURRENCE.

§ I. Direct and Indirect Conservation. § 2. Necessity
of Direct Conservation. § 3. Divine Concurrence. § 4. Theory
of Simultaneous Concurrence. § 5. Concurrence and Free-
will. § 6. Concurrence and Moral Evil. pp. 524 — 556

CHAPTER XVII.
PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.

§1. Pro\-idence, Physical and Moral. §2. Prayer and
Providence. § 3. Optimistic Theories. § 4. The Problem of
Physical Evil. § 5, The Problem of Moral Evil. pp. 557 — 606

PART I.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

CHAPTER I.

THE SCOPE AND IMPORTAN'CE OF NATURAL
THEOLOGY.

§1. The Scope of Natural Theology. §2. Natural Tlieology
as one of the Sciences. §3. The Importance of Natural
Theology. § 4. Relation of Natural and Supernatural
Theology.

I . The scope of Natural Theoloiiy. Natural
Theology is that branch of philosophy which in-
vestigates what human reason unaided by revela-
tion can tell us concerning God. The end at which
it aims is to demonstrate the existence of God, to
establisli the principal divine attributes, to vindi-
cate God"s relation to the world as that of the
Creator to the creature, and, finally, to throw what
light it can on the action of divine providence in
regard of man and on the problem of evil. In
the discussion of these questions the Natural Theo-
logian bases his conclusions purely and solely on
the data afforded by natural reason. He claims
that these are sufficient for his purpose : that in
this manner the mind may rise from the contem-
plation of the visible universe to a knowledge of
the First Cause from whom it proceeds: from the
B

2 NATURAL THEOLOGY

experience of finite beings to a knowledge of the
Infinite Being, whose perfections are faintly
shadowed forth by the things of the created world.
Another name given to this science is Theodicy.
The term seems to have been coined by Leibniz,'
and its literal meaning is ' the justification of God.'
As used by him it implied his own special stand-
point, which was that of an exaggerated optim-
ism. He conceived it to be the function of Theo-
dicy to shew that, notwithstanding all the physical
and moral evils of the world, we have no valid
reason for thinking that the existing order of provi-
dence is not the best that even divine omnipotence
could have devised. With later writers, however,
the word no longer has this significance, but is
simply synonymous with Natural Theology. In
this sense it is appropriate enougli. For Natural
Theology has as its professed object to vindicate
our belief in God, and to deal with the manifold
objections, which from a wide variety of stand-
points have been urged either against His exist-
ence or against His infinite perfections.

The philosophical systems which assert the
existence of God fall into three classes, deism,
pantheism and theism. Deism teaches that God
created the world, but that having created it, He
leaves it to the guidance of those laws which He
established at its creation, abstaining from further
interference. He acts thus, it holds, both in regard
to the physical and moral order. There is no such
thing as a personal providence: nor does prayer
a\ail to obtain His special assistance. The ex-
' Essais de Theodicee stir la bontc de Diett, etc. (1710).

SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE 3

ternality, not to say the remoteness, of God in rela-
tion to the world is fundamental in this system.
Pantheism goes to the other extreme. It denies
that there is any distinction between God and the
universe. Nothing exists, it contends, except God.
The universe is, in fact, simply the Divine Being
evolving itself in various forms. Theism holds a
middle position between these. Like deism, it
maintains the doctrine of creation, affirming that
finite things are fundamentally distinct from their
Infinite Maker. But it rejects the teaching which
makes God remote from the world. It asserts, on
the contrary, that God is, and must be, ever present
to every created thing, sustaining it in existence
and conferring upon it whatever activity it pos-
sesses: that " in Him we live and move and are ":
and, further, that He exercises a special and de-
tailed providence over the whole course of things,
interfering as He sees fit, and guiding all things
to their respective ends. The Natural Theology
which we defend in this volume — the Natural
Theology of Scholasticism — is through and through
thcistic. We contend that the conclusions of theism
may be demonstratively established, and that it will
appear that no other system is capable of a rational
defence.

2. Natural Theology as one of the Sciences.
Natural Theology is rightly termed a science. A
science is an organized body of truth regarding
some special object of thought. In these days, it
is true, we sometimes find the term employed to
denote the physical sciences alone. This is an alto-
gether misleading use of the word. The character-

4 NATURAL THEOLOGY

istics of scientific knowledge as distinguished from
the mere experience of particulars are generality,
organization and certainty. These characteristics
are most fully realized when the system of know-
ledge consists of principles of admitted certainty
and of conclusions derived from these by a rigor-
ous process of deductive proof. Such, for instance,
is mathematics. The method and object of
Natural Theology are very different from those of
mathematics; but it is science for the same reason.
Both disciplines offer us a body of securely estab-
lished truths regarding a specific object, reached
by deduction from general principles, and organ-
ized into a systematic whole.

In claiming for Natural Theology the charac-
ter of science, we musf not be understood to main-
tain that it solves all difficulties concerning God
and His providence over man. ETifficulties remain,
even when the human mind has done its utmost,
as indeed they remain in the physical sciences.
This does not destroy a science's value. Does any
one propose to dismiss the whole science of light,
because we know nothing certain regarding the
medium of propagation which we term the ether,
or the science of electricity, because we are wholly
in the dark as to what electricity is? We have far
more reason to anticipate obscurity in our knowledge
of God than we have to look for it in the physical
sciences. The human intellect finds its connatural
object in that material world which the senses re-
veal to it. Only by a laborious process of reason-
ing does it attain to any knowledge of what is
immaterial. Hence it stands to reason that its

SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE 5

knowledge of the Infinite Being must be frag-
mentary and imperfect. Yet where the supreme
object of human thought is concerned, even such
imperfect knowledge as is within our reach is of
far higlicr worth than the most perfect acquaint-
ance with any aspect of the created order, and its
attainment affords an end more deserving of effort
than the discovery of any physical law. More-
over, though the idea of God thus gained is frag-
mentary, it is at least vastly more adequate than
the conceptions of Him which arise in the mind
apart from scientific reflection. These latter spon-
taneous notions of Ciod are invariably deeply tinged
with aiuhropomorphism. Only througli philo-
sophical analysis do we learn to attribute to God
perfections made known to us in creatures, and yet
to abstract from tlicm in this reference the mani-
fold limitations which adhere to them as realized
in the finite order.

Natural Theology, it is to be noted, is not an
independent science in its own right, but a por-
tion of the science of metaphysics. For it to rank
as a complete science distinct from others we
should have to possess a direct insight into the
Divine Nature itself, and be able to derive our
conclusions from tiie principles proper to that
nature as such, just as, e.g., we derive our
conclusions in plane geometry from the principles
proper to spatial extension. This, of course, we
cannot do: the Infinite Nature is utterly beyond our
ken: in tliis sense there is no science of God. The
point is a \cry important one, for here wc have
the ultimate reason for the incomplete and frag-

6 NATURAL THEOLOGY

mentary character of Natural Theology. Our
knowledge of God consists of a series of conclu-
sions concerning Him, viewed simply as the First
Cause of Being. Being is the object of metaphy-
sics: and the body of truths which relate to the
Supreme Being form a section of that science. The
older writers, indeed, do not distinguish between
the two, but regarded Natural Theology as an
integral portion of metaphysics, and termed meta-
jjhysics Theology as being the science which treats
of God.'

3. I iiiporlaiice of Xalural Theology. The
problems here brouglit under discussion are the
most important wliich can be presented to the
human mind. We are not concerned with barren
academic disputes, but with vital issues which force
themselves upon the mind of every rational being,
and call imperiously for an answer. If it be de-
monstrably certain that there is a God, infinite in
all perfections, the Creator of all things and exer-
cising a direct and immediate supervision over
every action of His creatures, it follows that His
will must be the rule of oiu" life: that our primary
duty is the obser\ance of His laws: and that only
in so far as we employ our freedom to this end,
can we hope to obtain tlic beatitude which is tlie
goal of our endeavour. If, on the other iiand,
tliere is, as so many declare, no sufficient ground
for affirming the existence of God or of divine
providence, we are bound by no such obligation :
and human beatitude is not to be sought in the
attainment of the Supreme Truth and Supreme
■ Cf. .\ristotle, Mclaph. \'l., c. i., 1026328.

SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE 7

Goodness, figments devoid of objective reality, but
in such a measure of temporal felicity as may be
williin our reach. It is manifest that a man's whole
attitude in regard to life and its activities depends
on which of these alternatives he adopts. Nor does
the choice between theism and materialism affect
his individual life alone: its consequences are not
less profound in the social and political order. To
see this it is only necessary to realize how different
are the conceptions of human progress which men
will entertain in the two cases. For progress con-
sists in advance towards a worthy end: and no end
is worthy of man's pursuit which diverts him from
the ultimate goal of his being, and wliich cannot
be brought into relation to that last end. Wiiere
no other end of human effort is recognized than
tem|)oral well-being, [Mogress will be held to con-
sist in such things as tlie advance of the arts and
sciences, the development of material resources,
and the increase of national wealth. But if
throughout society there is a firm con\iction that
man"s true end lies in the attainment of God, then,
thougli men will not cease to set a higli value on
temporal well-being, they will recognize that it
may be bought at too dear a rate, and that if ob-
tained by the sacrifice of a higher good, national
prosperity may be detrimental, not beneficial, to
those who secure it.

The controversy with deism and pantheism is
not less decisive as regards our outlook on existence
than that witli materialism. The philosophy of
deism is wholly incompatible with personal re-
ligion. According to this system, as we have seen.

8 NATURAL THL"OLOGY

God is entirely remote fruni His creatures. He
does not inter\ene in their lives, but leaves the
world to the working of natural law. The per-
sonal relation between God and the human soul,
which is the very presupposition of religion, has
no existence. Of pantheism a good deal will be
said in the course of tlic volume. It will be suffi-
cient here to say that the pantheist, if faithful to his
principles, can neither admit personality in God
nor free will in man. Further, he must deny any
ultimate distinction between moral good and moral
evil. To him both are moments in the one all-
inclusive substance, which is God.

We must not, howe\er, be here understood to
imply that the detailed proofs of Natural Theology
are requisite to convince men of the existence of
God. On the contrary, we maintain that the evi-
dence for that truth is so plain to see and so cogent,
that no rational being can long remain in inculp-
able ignorance regarding it. The mind of man in-
stinctively asks whence came this visible universe
which surrounds him, and of which he forms a
part : and the answer which forces itself upon him
is that it was formed by the will of a Supreme
Being, a personal agent as he himself is. More-
over, within him the voice of conscience enforces
the authority of the moral law, approving all
obedience and sternly condemning any disobedi-
ence to its commands. And this sense of obligation
conveys to him the assurance that that law is the
expression of the will of a Supreme Lawgiver, to
whom he is responsible. In these ways — and
others might be mentioned — reason spontaneously

SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE 9

and without any laborious research aftirins the
existence of God.

Natural Theology gives us the scientific elabora-
tion of these arguments. It shows that, simple as
they are, they are philosophically valid: that no
lurking fallacy renders them worthless: that they
are, if properly estimated, irrefutable. Further,
since difficulties and objections arc apt to suggest
themselves to thoughtful minds, it deals with these,
and shews that satisfactory answers can be given
to them: that none can be adduced which is such
as to shake the certainty of the cnjiclusion. Again,
it goes further, and provides oUter proofs. There
arc many ways of establishing God's existence:
some of them simple, such as those which we have
instanced, others of a nn)re recondite character and
demanding a trained intellect to appreciate their
value.

Yet the idea of God which springs spontaneously
to the mind is, as we have already noted, very im-
perfect. It sets before us a Supreme Being, en-
dowed with intellect and will, to wliom man owes
the debt of obedience and of worshii). But further
than this it hardly goes. On the attributes of that
Being it throws little light. God's infinite perfec-
tions, His omnipotence. His office of Creator
of the world. His justice, His mercy — these
are not matters of immediate recognition. For
any assurance about them, recourse must be had
to the refiective reason if we prescind for the
moment from the question of a supernatural revela-
tion. Man needs a true pliilosophy of God — in
other words, a sound Natural Theology. And

lO NATLKAL THEOLOGY

unless he is thus armed, he will go widely astray,
and fall into errors fraught with the most fatal
consequences.

4. Relation of Natural and Supernatural
Theology. The question naturally suggests itself:
What are the relations between Natural Theology
and Re\ elation? How do they differ? How comes
it that the one or the other is not superfluous?

It should be observed, first, that, though both
treat of God, they are radically distinct as branches
of knowledge. Natural Theology, as we have
seen, treats of God solely in so far as He is known
by the natural reason. The principles from which
it derives its conclusions are the intuitions of the
mind and the facts of experience. Moreover, the
scope of those conclusions is very limited. They
relate to God purely and solely in so far as He is
the First Cause of Being. A science of God as
known in His own essential nature is utterly be-
yond the range of the unaided intellect. By it
alone we know no more of God than we can gather
from the philosophy of being. Dogmatic Theo-
logy has a very different character. It is based,
not on natural knowledge, but on what God has
taught us regarding Himself in the Christian
revelation. Unlike Natural Theology, it is de-
rived from a direct and immediate intuition of the
Divine nature as such: for its ultimate source is
God's knowledge of His own essence. Its data,
so far as we are concerned, are truths regarding
that nature made known to us by God the Son and
His chosen apostles, and contained in Scripture or
ecclesiastical tradition. Differing thus in the

SCOPE AND IiMPORTANCE 1 1

sources whence they draw the premisses of their
arguments, the two sciences differ likewise very
largely in regard of the matter of which they treat.
Thus it belongs to Dogmatic Theology to deal with
many subjects which are altogether beyond the
scope of Natural Theology, such as, e.g., the mys-
teries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. It does
not, indeed, profess so to explain these doctrines as
to make them in all respects comprehensible: for
the mysteries of the Godhead are of necessity be-
yond the reach of man's intelligence. But it
analyses their precise meaning, establishes their
mutual relations, and demonstrates that they do not
conflict with the assured conclusions of reason.
Thus it would be a grave error to confuse the
two sciences. They view God under different
aspects: and even when they teach the same truth,
e.g., the unity of God, they reach it by totally
different paths.

Both of these branches of knowledge are neces-
sary to us. Neither would suffice for man's needs
without the other. Were the arduous path of reason
our sole means of learning about God, our pro-
vision for the practical conduct of life would be
indeed inadequate. A knowledge of the funda-
mental truths of religion is requisite to all, to the
unlettered toiler as well as to the philosopher, to
the boy and girl no less than to the man of mature
years. All alike need to know that God is one
and is supreme: that He is hampered in His action
neither by blind fate nor by an opponent principle
of evil: that whatever befalls us, happens by His
permission: that, if wc arc but faithful, He will

12 NATURAL THEOLOGY

turn all things to our good: that He will reward
the good and punish the evil. Moreover, they need
to know these things as certainties beyond
all possibility of question. Conclusions, still
matter of speculative doubt, will not serve their
turn : for what is dubious lacks force to de-
termine man's action in situations of real difficulty.
And they need to have this knowledge, not as the
result of long and anxious reasoning, but forthwith.
Reason, we allow, can establish these truths. But
we are now considering men in the concrete, and
not tlic ideal specimen of the homo ralioiiaUs. And
how few there arc who have either the ability or
the leisure to engage in these discussions. The
great majority of men are early forced to a life
of labour which precludes them from speculation.
Nothing can be more opposed to common sense
tiian the idea so generally entertained that on moral
and religious questions every man is bound to test
all his beliefs by the cold light of reason, and
admit none save those which reason shews to be
valid.' Men require some shorter, easier way of

' Cf. Lord Balfour, /'oiiiidd/ions of Belief, pt. iii., ch. ii.,
p. 195. " The current tlicory . . . appears to be something
of this kind. Everyone has a ' right ' to adopt any opinions
h<- pleases. It is his ' duty ' before exercising this ' right
critically to sift the reasons by which such opinions may be
supported, and so to adjust the degree of his convictions
tliat they shall accurately correspond with the evidence
adduced in their favour, .\uthority, therefore, has no place
among the legitimate causes of belief. If it appears amongst
them, it is as an intruder, to be jealously hunted down and
mercilessly expelled Reason, and reason only, can be safely
permitted to iviould the convictions of mankind. . . . Senti-
ments like these are among the commonplaces of political
and social philosopliy. Vet looked at scientifically, they seem
to me to be, not merely erroneous, but absurd. Suppose

SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE 13

atlainiiig truth than speculative enquiry— some way
which is within the reach of all. This requirement
a well-authenticated revelation can alone su])ply.
Indeed, the learned can no more spare the assur-
ance which revelation gives than can the un-
learned. Though reason is capable of proving
these truths, yet it is most liable to err: and the
science of metaphysics is notoriously full of pit-
falls for the unwary. The history of human
thought bears witness how even the acutest minds
have fallen into the gravest errors on these sub-
jects. Here, then, revelation affords a sure safe-
guard. It warns the mind from error in many of
the matters discussed in Natural Theology, and
points out in which direction truth is to be
sought.

Nor can it be alleged, on the other hand, that if
a revelation be given. Natural Theology must lose
its value and become unnecessary. Belief in Chris-
tianity demands as its basis a rational certitude
of God's existence. The man who is persuaded
that the human mind is incompetent even to

for .1 moment a rotnmimity, of whioli each member should
deliberately set himself to the task of throwing off as far
as possible all prejudices due to education: where each would
consider it his duty critically to examine the grounds whereon
rest every positive enactment and every moral precept which
he has been accustomed to obey . . . and to weigh out with
scrupulous precision the exact degree of assent which in each
particular case the results of this process might seem to
justify. To say that such a communitv. if it acted upon
the opinions thus arrived at, would stand but a poor chance
in the struggle for existence, is to say far too little. It could
never even begin to be; and if by a miracle it was created,
it would without doubt immediately resolve itself into its
component elements-"

14 NATURAL THEOLOGY

determine whether there l^e a God or not, will
inevitably turn a deaf ear to those who claim to
be His accredited messengers. Only those who
are already assured that there is a God, capable,
if He should see fit, of manifesting His will to
men, are in a position to attend to the proofs of
revelation. In her work of preaching the Gospel
the Church has to deal with many who either doubt
God's existence, or in some way identify Him with
the universe which He has made. For such
as these only proofs drawn from natural reason
can be of service. Moreover, materialism and
pantheism are permanent factors in human thought,
and in every age they are found in open conflict
with the Church as the great bulwark, not merely
of revealed religion, but of theism. The Church
cannot defeat their disastrous propaganda unless
she is able to meet them on their own ground, and
establish by Irrefragable arguments the existence
and principal attributes of a personal God.

In yet another way also Natural Theology lends
support to revelation. God's revealed word is not
confined to the mysteries of the Faith, Ijut deals
also with matters which fall within the scope of
rational investigation. It is plain that truth can-
not contradict truth: that a revelation, if it be
really such, cannot be at issue with any incontro-
vertible conclusion of the speculative reason. And
it is no small confirmation of the Christian re-
ligion tliat, where its teaching admits of being
tested by our natural powers, it can invariably be
shewn that no discrepancy exists: that the doc-
trines of the Faith are in full agreement with what

SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE I 5

may he learned about God from the data whicli
natural knowledge supplies.

Wc have enlarged somewhat on the difference
between Natural and Revealed Theology and on
their reciprocal relations, because during the jiast
half-century a new theory on this subject has ob-
tained currency, according to which all distinction
between the two is denied. The author chiefly
responsible for the prevalence of this view was
Schleiermacher (1768— 1834), a rationalizing
theologian, whose works have exercised a far-
reaching influence. His doctrine of (]od was a
pantheism, founded on the system of Spinoza. Vet
he followed Kant in holding the speculative reason
to be incompetent to afl^ord us any positive know-
ledge about Him. Moreover, his rationalism
could find no place for the idea of revelation in
the sense of an objective divine message. Start-
ing with these presuppositions he sought a new
basis for theology in religious experience. It
should, he held, be the intellectual expression of
our inward experience, and hence develop as that
experience develops. It follows that no doctrinal
formula is to be regarded as having permanent
value, inasmuch as it must in time be superseded by
one of fuller meaning. The significance of many
dogmas is purely symbolical: they are not to be
understood literally. Thus the Christian doctrines
of the final judgment and the corporeal resurrec-
tion are to be accepted as symbols, not as realities.
Here we have the origin of the view to which we
have already adverted,' according to which Natural
■ Infrod., p. xii.

1 6 NATURAL THEOLOGY

Theology is simply the speculative system involved
in some particular phase of religious experience.
Schieiermacher, however, contended that the modes
in which the religious experience finds expression
may justly claim to be at one and the same time
Natural and Revealed Theology. It is natural as
being the work of reason. It is revelation because
our experience is God's manifestation of Himself.
Indeed, since he found room in his system for a
certain number of the doctrinal formulas of Chris-
tianity, he was actually regarded as a defender of
revealed religion. He has unfortunately been fol-
lowed by many subsequent writers in the entirely
new sense thus given to the familiar terms, Natural
Theology and Revelation.' Some of these, as, e.g.,
the Modernists (chap. viii. §4) start from philo-
sophical premisses not unlike his own. The stand-
point of others (as of Mr. Webbl is different. But
in all cases the identification of the two sciences
implies that the idea of revelation as a direct com-
munication of truth from God to man has been
abandoned, and that reason is no longer regarded

' The foUowinp; passage from Mr. C. J. Webb's Goff and
Personality may be cited in illu.stration: " I should hold that
a definite type of religious experience, expressed in an his-
torical religion, is presupposed in every system of Natural
Theology: while the ullim.ite goal of all human speculation,
which can be so named, must be a system which presupposes
all the religious experience of mankind: an experience to
which indeed those who regard Religion as genuine experi-
ence, and not as mere illusion throughout, cannot surely
deny the name of Revelation " 'p. 33 "i. It is manifest how
far removed is the sense here given to the terms from that
which in the history of human thought has ever been regarded
as their proper meaning.

SCOPE AND IlVrPORTANCE I 7

as able to afford certain, even if restricted, know-
ledge concerning Him. We hope in the following
pages to make good the power of tlie liunian mind
to possess a true Natural Tlieology -a body of con-
clusions regarding God derived by logical demon-
strations from principles of indisputable truth. The
possibility of revelation, truly so called, lies out-
side the scope of our work, but is adequately vindi-
cated in many treatises on Apologetics.

CHAPTER II.

THE DEMONSTRABILITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE.

§1. The Possibility of a Demonstration Denied: Sensationalist
Standpoint. §2. The Concepts of .Substance and Cause
in the Light of Experience. §3. Philosophical Vindi-
cation of these Concepts. §4. Philosophical X'indication
of First Principles. §5. Kantian Teaching. §6. Neo-
hegelianism

I. The possihili/y of a dejnonstrafion denied:
sensatiotialist standpoint. Before we proceed to
develop the proofs of God's existence it will be
well to establish the validity of the reasoning to
be employed in them. Our principal arguments
— those whicli belong strictly to the science of
metaphysics — rest on certain fundamental con-
ce[]tions of the intellect, such as substance and
efficient cause, etc., and on certain first principles
immediately connected with these, such as the prin-
ciple of causality, that W liatever comes into //einsj
?niist Iiave a cause. W'e thus establish the exist-
ence of a necessary substance, the cause of the con-
tingent substances which experience makes known
to us. The value of this reasoning is at the present
day widely denied. The neo-hegelian, the fol-
lower of Kant, the sensationalist, though their
respective standpoints are so widely divergent, are
at one in declaring that the conceptions and prin-
ciples in question are destitute of objective validity.
Until this preliminary question is settled it is hardly

DEMONSTRABILITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 1 9

worth while to propose our arguments. Unless we
can shew that the notion of substance — and by this
term we understand something which is no mere
transient qualification of ' the real,' but which pos-
sesses independent subsistence as an integral unit
in nature — is no chimera of the imagination, it is
idle to argue that the world is due to the activity
of a Supreme Substance. Unless we can vindicate
the worth of the concept of efficient cause — that
which by its action makes a thing what it is — it is
useless to commence a proof of a First Cause, or
a Prime Mover. The purpose of this chapter is to
establish the worth of our fundamental conceptions
and of the axiomatic principles which we shall em-
ploy. In doing so we shall take note of the oppos-
ing theories, and shall endeavour to make good
that they are irreconcilable alike with facts of
experience and with reason. We shall deal first
with the sensationalist position, reserving our dis-
cussion of other schools till the end of the chapter.
In connection with the former, we shall touch on
the philosophy of M.Bergson: since, though his
system is in many respects original, his attitude
on the point under consideration is identical with
that of the sensationalists.

The sensationalist philosophy admits no other
knowledge than that obtained by the experience of
the senses. We know, its adherents contend, par-
ticulars and particulars only. We have no means
of obtaining certainty in our universal judgments
except by experience of each several individual em-
braced in the class of which we are speaking. In
every general proposition, which includes in its

20 NATURAL THEOLOGY

scope Others besides those which have actually
fallen under observation, there is involved of
necessity a leap in the dark. And even of par-
ticulars all that we can know are the perceptions
of sense. The so-called 'substance' — something
which persists identically the same, though its
qualities, the direct object of sense-perception, are
subject to change, and which, amid all their multi-
plicity, is somehow or other but one — is, they say,
a creature of our imagination. Similarly as re-
gards our own minds. We know nothing, they
contend, of the mind save transient states of con-
sciousness. The term ' substance,' as applied to it,
is totally devoid of meaning. Mill sums up his
teaching on this subject as follows: " .-Xs body is
the insentient cause to which we are naturally
prompted to refer a certain portion of our feelings,
so mind may be described as the sentient subject
(in the Scholastic sense of the term) of all feel-
ings: that which has or feels them. But of the
nature of either lx)dy or mind, further than the
feelings which the former excites and which the
latter experiences, we do not, according to the best
existing doctrine, know anything at all" {Logic,
Bk. I., ch. iii., § 8'^. As regards the notion of
cause, the doctrine of this school follows the same
lines. A cause, we are informed, is that which
experience shews to be the regular antecedent of
anything. There is no philosophical basis for the
view which would see in a cause tfiot which snakes
a thing to be what it is. Our senses merely per-
ceive one thing precede and another follow. "We
cannot see one thing impart being to another. We

DEMONSTRABIUTY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 2 1

have, then, no right to introduce such a conception,
and to say that the existence of the consequent is
determined by the antecedent. The passage in
which Hume propounds this conclusion is well
known, and deserves to be cited here. He says:

" After one instance or experiment, wliere we have
observed a particular event to follow upon another,
we are not entitled to form a general rule, or foretell
what will happen in like cases : it being justly esteemed
an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course
of nature from one single experiment, however ac-
curate or certain. But where one particular species
of events has always in all instances been conjoined
with another, we make no longer any scruple of fore-
telling one upon the appearance of the other, and of
employing that reasoning, which can alone assure us of
any matter of fact or existence. We then call the
one object cause, the other effect. . . . But there is
nothing in a number of instances different from every
single instance, which is supposed to be exactly simi-
lar: except only that after a repetition of similar in-
stances the mind is carried by Iiabit, upon the appear-
ance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and
to believe that it will exist. This connection, there-
fore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transi-
tion from one object to its usual attendant, is the
sentiment or impression from which we form the idea
of power or necessary connection. Nothing further
is in the case. . . . The first time a man saw the
communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock
of two billiard-balls, he could not pronounce that the
one event was connected, but only that it was conjoined
with the other. After he has observed several in-
stances of this nature, he then pronounces it to be
connected. What alteration has happened to give rise

22 NATLRAL THEOLOGY

to this new idea of connection? Nothing but that he
now peels these events to be connected in his imagina-
tion, and can readily foretell the existence of one from
the appearance of the other." {^Inquiry concerning l/ie
Human Understanding. Section vii., p. 2).

Such in outline is the teaching of the sensation-
alist school on causality. Substantially, it has
not altered since the days of Hume. Spencer, it
is true, modifies it in one respect. He attributes
our conviction that the same cause will produce
the same effect, not merely to the experience of
the individual, but to that of the race. The ex-
perience of past generations, he holds, has gradu-
ally stamped itself upon the brain, so as to establish
'forms of thought.' »Hence from the dawn of
reason we are led to anticipate that the law of uni-
formity will pre\ail in nature, and that the same
antecedent will be followed by the same conse-
quent. As regards the point which concerns us
at present this modification of sensationalist doc-
trine is immaterial.

It is manifest that if things really are as this
philosophy represents them, the arguments for the
existence of God as the First Cause of all things
are utterly worthless. The principle of causality
lacks all necessity: we have no right to affirm that
whatever comes into being must have a cause. As
far as our limited experience goes, every event has
been preceded by an antecedent with which we con-
nect it. But we are not justified in asserting that
this must of necessity be so, except in so far as all
sensible experience takes place in time, and time
involves succession. We have no ground, as Mill

DEMaNSTKABUJTY Of OOD^ ESTfTESCE ^J

ftaoUy o«i^ for aippoang thu tboe is an aato-
logkal connectioa b e f e en amttcedcnt and coose-
quent.* Indeed, eren if she oniveisalitj of die
principle of cauealicy be adminedL it wookl not
cany us to a First Can^. but to an infinite series
of temporal antecedents. MiU is afasofaitdT tnae
to scieationalxst ptinriples wbcn he says: "TIk
cause of erery diangge is a prior «±ange: and soch
it cannot but be; lor if thwe were no ne» ante-
cedent, there would not be a ne» ooo^qDcnt. If
the state of facts vhicfa brings the pbeuumenan
into existence had existed always or for an inde-
finite doration, the efieci wonki always haie existed
or been prodoced an indefinite time ago. It is
thus a necessary part of the fiact of c ai f ia tinn. with-
in the sphere of oar experience, that the cai^es as
well as the effects had a begiDoing in tinae, and
were thenselres caused. "~- The very notion of God,
i5 we conceive Him, is. on die principles of this
school uaerly irrational. For how el« can we coo-
ceirc of God than as the Sapreme Substance, in-
finite in all perfectioas and existuog from all
etemitx? But sensationalian dc<iates thoit si^
stance is a meaningless word: that all we can know
or ever hope to know either of bodies or of minds
are jcatea — ever-dttnging staEes. To assert, there-
fore, that the existence of finite substances enables
us to conclude to an Infinite Substance is amply to
juggle with words. Xo sigiiificancc whatever can
be attached to either of the two terms in Ae tbe->r-.
under considaation.

* rJkr«9 £ss>tjs mm JIMSijmw. p- 144-

24 NATURAL THEOLOGY

We Stated above that, great as is the difference
between the philosophy of M. Bergson and sensa-
tionalism, his attitude to the proofs of God's
existence is practically the same. According to
him, change, becoming, movement, is all there is.
The uni\'erse does not consist in changing things :
it is itself change, life. It is not a living thing;
it is the actual process of life. We ourselves seem
to be permanent beings endowed with life; but
it is not so in reality. We are partial manifesta-
tions of the universal How. And if it be asked what
are the substances, to whose existence our external
experience seems to testify, the reply must be that
they are, so to speak, ' sections ' taken in the flux
by the intellect for practical ends. Life demands
action, and action is im^wssible unless we stabilize
our \iew of the flow by thus cutting across it and
treating what in fact is moving — or to speak more
accurately, motion — as though it were fixed and
abiding. 1 So, too, the separation of cause and
effect is wholly the work of the mind. The stream
of life is one and indivisible. Cause and effect are
partial views, which the limitations of our intel-
lect compel us to take as the condition of our
activity.^

■ " Glioses et t'tats ne sont que des viies prises par notre
esprit sur le devcnir. II n'y a pas de choses, il n'y a que des
actions. . . . Que des choses nouvelles puissent s'ajouter aux
choses qui existent, cela est absurde sans aucune doutc, puis-
que la chose resulte d'une solidification opcree par notre
entendemcnt,^ et qu'il nV a jamais autres choses que I'en-
tendemcnt a constituees y {L' Evolution Crealricc, p. 270, 7th
cd , 191 1 ).

= " Originellemcnt nous ne pensons que pour agir. . . .
Or pour agir, nous commengons par nous proposer un but:
nous faisons un plan, puis nous passons au detail du niecan-

DEMONSTRABILITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 2$

It is manifest that the proof of the existence
of God fares no better in this system than in the
sensationalist philosophy. The objective validity
of the concept of substance and of the principle
of causality is rejected: both are declared to be
creations of the mind. In consequence, every
argument which relies on them is worthless.

2. T/ie concefits of substance and cause in the
light of experience. The work of a philosophy
lies in its ability to account for facts. It claims
to give us the explanation of facts: to tell us what
in their ultimate analysis the data of experience
involve. If then a system fails to give us such
an explanation, if the solution which it provides
is wholly inconsistent with our experience, that
system has no claim on our acceptance. It may
be ingenious: it may suggest novel objections
against current theories ; but it has failed to make
good. Properly speaking, it has no right to be
termed a philosophy. Sensationalism certainly is
open to this reproach. It is in flagrant contra-
diction with facts. Nothing is more evident than
that we possess a direct and immediate knowledge,
not merely of thoughts, \olitions and emotions, but
of a subject which thinks, wills and feels. We are
not first conscious of a thought, from which by a
subsequent inferential process we conclude to the
existence of a thinking subject : we are not con-

isme qui le rcalisera. Cctte dcrnierc operation n'est possible,
que si nous savons sur quoi nous pouvons compter. II faut
que nous ayons e.xtrait de la nature des similitudes ijui nous
perniettent d'anticiper sur I'avenir. II faut done que nous
ayons fait application consciement ou inconscicment de la
loi de causalite " {ibid., p. 47).

2 6 Natural theologv

scious of the bare thought at all, but of ourselves
as i /linking. In other words, our consciousness of
the thuiking, willing subject is direct, not indirect,
unmediate not mediate. Do we not, each of us,
spontaneously speak of my thoughts, tny desires, my
feelings? Every time we so speak we bear witness
thai we are conscious of ourselves as substances,
and of our thoughts as accidental determinations
of the subject self.

Sensationalism refuses to admit this conscious-
ness of a subject, and declares that we know nothing
save a succession of states. In other words, it
denies that we are aware of an ego to which these
states appertain, and to which they must be re-
ferred.' In this, it is plain, it is altogether in
conflict with one of the most certain facts of ex-
perience. We may note further that since con-
sciousness shews us that thought is essentially the
action of a thinking subject, it follows that thought
without a mind is a sheer contradiction in terms.
There cannot be action without an agent. Action
is a determination of the thing that acts : and we

' M. Bergson is of the same mind. After maintaining
that the experience wliich constitutes our psychological life
does not really consist of distinct states, but is a continuous
flow, he proceeds: "Mais commc notre attention les a dis-
tingues et scparcs artificiellcment, elle est obligee de les
rcunir ensuite par un lien artificiel. Ellc imagine ainsi un
moi amorphe indifferent immuable, sur lequel defileraient
ou s'enfileraient les etats psychologiques qu'elle a eriges en
cntitcs indcpendentes. . . . Force lui est de supposer alors
un fil non moins solide, qui retiendrait les perles ensemble.
. . . Quant a la vie psychologique telle quelle se deroule sous
les syniboles qui la recouvrent, on s'aperc^oit sans peine que
le temps en est I'ttolTe meme " (op. cil. pp. 3, 4).

DEMONSTRABILITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 2/

cannot have a determination apart from the sub-
ject which it determines.

Again, the power of memory enables us to say
/ llwughl. When we so speak, we recognize that,
while the thought is transitory, the subject remains
one and identical. I, who am now looking back
on past events, am the self-same person who then
thought and willed in such and such a way. Each
time we exercise the power of memory we dis-
tinguish the enduring substance from its transient
determinations: we have knowledge of the former
as well as of the latter. Indeed, the very existence
of this faculty affords a conclusive proof that the
mind persists through time as the same reality. If
our mental life consists simply of passing states,
existing of themselves without any permanent and
substantial ego, how does it come about that they
do not utterly perish as one by one they make way
for the next in the long series? How can one state
reach back into the flow and recall another which
has long ceased to be? Recollection is not merely
inexplicable, but impossible, unless we admit the
identity of the subject who remembers with the
subject whose states he is recalling.

Nor is the appeal to experience conclusive only
as regards the concept of substance. It is no less
decisive as to the validity of the notion of cause.
I am aware beyond the possibility of doubt that I
can produce thought. I can direct this activity
into a particular channel, and produce thoughts
about such matters as I wish. In other words,
the mind has direct experience of causation:
it is conscious that it gives being to the thought.

2 8 NATURAL THEOLOGY

and makes it to be what it is. Here the attempt to
explain away causality as mere succession breaks
down hopelessly. Not merely am I conscious of
causation properly so called, but this causation is
not exercised by the antecedent mental state at all.
What no longer exists cannot exert causality. It
is the mind which is the cause alike of the previous
and of the subsequent state. And the action of
the mind is not previous to, but simultaneous with
the thought which it produces.

When these facts are duly weighed, it be-
comes evident that a philosophy which maintains
that we have no experience either of substance or
of causation, that these are mere terms to which
nothing objective corresponds, stands self-con-
demned.

It may, perhaps, be said that our appeal has been
to internal experience alone; and that we have
no right to apply concepts derived from internal
experience to the external order. It will, however,
appear that the data of our experience regarding
the external order are no less incompatible with
sensationalism than are the facts of our mental
life.

The sensationalist appeals to his chosen illus-
tration of the two billiard balls. What we see
here, he says, is succession, and succession alone :
the impact of one ball is folloived by the motion
of the other. .And he claims that, so far as ex-
perience is concerned, our knowledge is limited to
this: that the notion of causation is a gratuitous
addition of our own. " All events," says Hume,
■' seem entirely loose and separate. One event fol-

DEMONSTR ABILITY OF GOO'S EXISTENCE 2 9

lows another, but wc can never observe any tie
between them. The.y. seem conjoined Init never
connected " (I.e.). We may readily admit that the
example selected lends some colour to the state-
ment. But is this single example really adequate?
WJien I watch a potter mould the yielding clay with
his hand, do I not sec the clay actually receive i/s
delermination from his fingers? Here, surely,
there is much more than succession. Indeed, suc-
cession docs not enter into the case: for no interval
of time separates the pressure of the finger from
the shape newly taken by the clay. No one, we
believe, will maintain tliat when we affirm that we
see the hand communicate its shape to the clay,
we are introducing a new notion in no way gathered
from experience. I could not, if I would, leave
this notion out. True, I do not see with my eyes
the abstract idea of causation, for the simple
reason that the eye does not see abstract ideas,
but concrete facts. But it is clear that the connec-
tion between cause and effect is no product of the
imagination, but is immediately apprehended as
given in experience. In other words, the sensa-
tionalist contention that our experience can never
shew us anything but two events conjoined by a
temporal sequence, is altogether at variance with
the facts: and this alone is sufficient to shew the
falsity of the theory.

Once again, is it really the case that external
experience is limited to sensible qualities and has
nothing to tell us as to substance? What is, in
point of fact, the object of experience? Do we
perceive mere colour or that which is coloured?

30 NATURAL THEOLOGY

mere hardness or that which is hard? color or
coloratiim, durities or (fun/ml It will hardly be
denied that whiteness and hardness and sweetness
are mental abstractions, and that the real datum
of experience is the concrete object, the hard, white,
sweet thing. If so, experience gives us something
more than sensible qualities: it gives us the thing
or substance. Of course, the external sense does
not apprehend the substance as such. We shall
deal later in this chapter with the manner in which
we know it. Here we are only concerned to point
out that the sensationalist analysis of experience is
inadequate: that when we perceive an external
object, we apprehend something beyond its mere
sensible qualities: andithat this element, of which
these philosophers take no account, is precisely
what we signify when we employ the term
substance.

3. Philosophical viiii/icalioii of these concepts.
There is, then, no shadow of ambiguity in the
answer elicited by our appeal to experience. It
testifies decisively that substance and cause arc
realities not figments. Under the circumstances it
might, perhaps, seem that no more need be said on
the matter. Yet in view of the fact that both sen-
sationalism and Kantianism deny the worth of these
concepts on grounds of abstract reason, it appears
desirable to examine the point somewhat more
closely. In the present section we shall shew that
the principles of a sound philosophy compel us to
admit that these concepts are valid representations
of reality.

We have seen that the sensationalists limit our

DEMONSTRABILITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 3 I

knowledge purely and entirely to the perceptions
of sense. They overlook the fact that sense and
intellect are distinct faculties, and that it belongs
to the intellect to apprehend certain features of
reality which lie beyond the scope of sense. Each
cognitive faculty reveals to us a special aspect of
reality, the aspect apprehended by one being
diverse from that apprehended by another.
Colour is the object of sight. The eye knows
things in so far as they arc coloured. Sound is the
olijcct of the sense of hearing: odour is the object
of tlie sense of smell. The intellect, too, has its
proi:)er object. In knowing anything it apprehends
it in so far as it is a heiiit; or //liiit;. Its object
is being and those notions which stand in immedi-
ate connection with hriiii^. such as, e.g., unity,
multi|)licity, cflicicnt causality, finality, etc., etc.
just as sight shews us of what colour a thing is,
so the intellect shews us 7(>/ial it /.f- its essential
nature. It distinguishes, as sense cannot do, be-
tween things which are such as to subsist upon their
own account ('sul)stanccs |, and those which like
light or colour arc mere determinations of sub-
stance (accidents). It apprehends the constitutive
principle whirli makes its object the kind of thing
it is, the principle which is the root whence its pro-
perties proceed. Take the case of a mathematical
figure, e.g., a circle. The eye perceives a par-
ticular circle of a certain size and colour. The in-
tellect shews us something over and above this.
It apiirehends what a circle is— its qjiiddilaa. as the
Scholastics said- and expresses this in the defini-
tion with which Euclid has made us familiar. That

32 NATURAL THEOLOGY

formula is not concerned with size or colour : it is
concerned with the constitutive principle of the
circle, it shews us its essential nature. Again, take
our knowledge of some concrete object designed
for some special purpose, e.g., a clock. The differ-
ence between the apprehension of sense and of in-
tellect is immeasurable. Sense perceives the face
of the clock, and the hands progressing round it
at different rates of speed. But the eye as such
knows nothing, and can know nothing as to the
purpose of the clock, the purpose which is the de-
termining principle of its every detail. For that
we depend on the intellect. It is through the in-
tellect we know that the clock is so constructed
that the progress of the hands stands in a definite
relation to the period of time which we term a day,
and that the motion being uniform, we can by the
help of the clock determine the precise point of
the day's time, at which an event takes place. Sense
cannot apprehend this relation to the sun's diurnal
course. Yet this is the constitutive principle of
the clock as such. The mechanism of clocks may
vary : one may ho dri\en by weights, another by
a spring. It is the relation to time which makes
the thing a clock.

How absolutely different is the abstract idea —
the work of the intellect— from the picture which
we form in the imagination ! The one shews us
the sensible appearances and these alone : the other
shews us what the thing in. Yet according to the
sensationalist philosophy the abstract idea of a
thing is nothing but an individual image coupled
with a general name. On this subject Mill is
explicit:

DEMONSTRABILITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 33

"The Concept is either a mere mental representation
of an object differing from those copied directly from
sense only in having certain of its parts artificially
made intense and prominent : or it is a jasciculus of
representations of imagination, held together by the
tie of an association artificially produced. When the
mental phenomenon has assumed this . . . charac-
ter, it comes to be termed a Concept, or more vaguely
and familiarly, an Idea."'

It is little wonder that a philosophy vitiated at
its very source by an error so profound should lead
us in the issue to scepticism. For it will hardly be
denied that such is the inevitable conclusion of a
theory which regards the notions of substance and
cause as mere figments.

The idea is frequently distinguished from the
image on the score that the foniier is universal,
the latter particular. This is true. The intel-
lectual concept does not rest in the particular: it
seizes the type. The definition of a circle is
applicable to every circle that ever existed. But
the difference to which wc have adverted is yet
more fundamental, viz., that the image exhibits the
object in its sensible determinations, while the in-

' Exam. 0/ Hamilton (2ncl edit.), p. 394. Cf. also p. 321.
" General concepts, therefore, we have, properly speaking,
none; 'we have only comple.x ideas of objects in the concrete;
but we are able to attend exclusively to certain parts of tlie
concrete idea." M. Bergson is in full agreement: " Quand
les images successives ne different pas trop les unes dcs;
autres, nous les considdrons toutes comme I'accroisement ou
la diminution d'une seule image moyenne, ou comme la de-
formation dc cette image dans des sens difTerents. Et c'est
k cette moyenne que nous pcnsons quand nous parlons de
{'essence d'une chose " {op. cit. p. 327).

34 NATURAL THEOLOGY

tellect views it as a being or thing, and shews us
what it is under that aspect.

The point with which we are dealing is of such
vital importance for the vindication of our primary
notions, and in consequence for the proofs of God's
existence, that it will not be superfluous to offer
yet another argument for the same conclusion.

Of the three operations of the understanding,
conception, judgment and reasoning, the first
place is rightly assigned to judgment. Judgment
is the term of the mind's activity. Both concep-
tion and reasoning are of value to us, because
through them the mind arrives at judgment. Now
judgment deals with beings and with nothing
else. The sign of a judgment is the verb ' to be '
functioning as the copula between subject and
predicate. The subject is the thing with whose
being we are concerned. The predicate expresses
some particular determination of being belonging
to the subject. 1 It may inform us regarding its sub-
stantial being, as when I say : 'Caesar is a man' ; or
about some accidental mode, as in the proposition :
' Ca;sar is in Rome ' ; or it may be a mere negation
conceived by the mind as though it were a mode
of being, as when we say of some one : ' He is a

■ It is doubtless the fact that certain modern logicians.
(".?., Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet reject the tra-
ditional an.aJysis of the judgment, and so explain its import
as to deprive the copula of all significance. To anyone,
however, who is not committed to their particular philoso-
phical presuppositions, the mere fact that man, whatever
be the language he employs, is forced to use the verb to bf
to enunciate his judgrment, affords a sufficient refutation of
their theory. On the the analysis of the proposition see the
present writer's Principles of Logic C3rd edition), c. iii., § 2 :
c. ix., § 4- ■

DEMONSTRABILITV OF GOD'S EXISTEN'CE 35

nonentity.' But whatever be the nature of the
judginent, it is of necessity concerned with the be-
ing of the subject. It is a standing proof that,
over and above sense, we possess a faculty of
another order: and that it belongs to this faculty
to know, not merely those modes of being with
which sense is concerned, but also that substantial
being, of which they are but the accidental deter-
minations. The tale of the philosopher who de-
clared that on the day when a pig could say, ' I am
a pig,' he would hold himself bound to take off
his hat to it, is familiar to all. There was reason
in what he said. To arrive at this knowledge of
its own nature, the pig would need something far
beyond that sense-perception with which the brute-
creation is endowed. It would need an intellect
enabling it to know the being of things, to dis-
tinguish substantial being from its accidental de-
terminations, and to refer these various modes of
being to itself as their conscious subject. Such an
agent would be an auinial rationale like ourselves,
and might justly claim to be treated with a similar
regard.

Our conclusion, that just as vision perceives
the colour of things, so does the faculty of intellect
apprehend their being, may, however, appear open
to a serious difficulty. It is true that we apprehend
the essence of a mathematical figure, and can give
a definition from which its properties can be de-
duced. But this is not the case as regards the
things of nature. It would seem that where they
are concerned the scope of intellect is very limited.
It can discern between substances and accidents.

36 NATLRAL THEOLOGY

and as regards substances it can grasp the dis-
tinction between the living and the inanimate, be-
tween those which are endowed with sense-per-
ception and those which lack this endowment,
between the rational and the irrational : and it can
deduce the properties consequent on these broad
divisions. But here apparently its powers stop
short. If we wish to define any specific class which
falls under one of these heads, e.g., a lion, the only
way is to enumerate the most characteristic deter-
minations which sense-perception exhibits, and to
define it as a sentient substance (an animal) char-
acterized by these attributes. We certainly do not
apprehend the specific essence of these things, as
we do in the case of , mathematical figures.

The limitation here noted must be admitted.
The fact is that only those aspects of being are
fully intelligible which can be entirely abstracted
from matter. Such, e.g., are substance, accident,
cause, life, unity, etc., etc. The more any nature
is involved in material conditions and incapable of
such abstraction, the less of intelligibility does it
possess.^ In this lies the reason why our knowledge
as to the concrete things of nature is so restricted.
The essence of these things — the constitutive prin-

■ We are here, it must be observed, speaking of intelligi-
bility in the absrtract, not in relation to human faculties. .\
nature such as ours, which acquires its knowledge by sensi-
ble perception and by discursive reasoning from the data
thus obtained, arrives with more facility at some measure of
knowledge, however inadequate, regarding sensible things,
than regarding the abstract notions of cause and substance.
But viewed in themselves sensible things do not admit of
knowledge in the same degree as do those realities into which
sense-conditions do not enter. On the lack of intelligibility in
matter, see below, c. x.. §3.

DEMONSTRABILITY OF GOd'S EXISTENCE 37

ciple on which their properties depend — is so bound
up with matter that the intellect cannot know it.
We must be content with a knowledge of the sen-
sible qualities: and the only abstraction possible
in their regard is that by which from the qualities
as found in the individual, we form a general con-
cept applicable to all the class. In mathematics
a higher degree of abstraction takes place : for in
that science we are no longer concerned with sen-
sible qualities, but only with quantity, discrete or
continuous, as the case may be. But, as we have
already said, a still fuller measure of intelligibility
belongs to those aspects of being which admit of
entire abstraction from all material conditions
whatsoever.

We embarked on this discussion with a view
to establish the validity of the notions of substance
and cause. And the bearing of our conclusions
upon this question will easily appear. By a ' sub-
stance ' is signified that which exists as an inde-
pendent thing, and not as a mere determination — ■
that which is in the full sense of the word. For
the independent entity is termed a being in a sense
to which its accidental determinations liave no
claim. Although they, too, are said to ^e, yet be-
ing is predicted of them, not with the same signifi-
cation which it bears in regard to substance, but
analogously. A man, a horse, a tree, are sub-
stances: so too are iron, gold, water. It should
be observed that by ' substance ' we do not denote
the mere material substratum which may be at one
time the earth, then become vegetable tissue, then
be transmuted into human flesh, and afterwards re-

38 NATURAL THEOLOGY

turn once more to its original form.^ A ' substance '
is a complete nature. It is substance because it
exists in its own right, and not as a determination
of another entity}

This notion of substance is a primary appre-
hension of the intellect. No inference is required
to arrive at it. Our sensitive faculties perceive
the sensible qualities of the objects presented to
them — their colour, shape, etc. — and gather them
together in their relation to one another. The data
thus obtained are seen to fall into separate groups,
acting as independent units. Wherever this is the
case, the intellect conceives the object as a sub-
stance. What acts as a single unit, is one,
notwithstanding the vdriety of its attributes. It is
a thing: its attributes are mere determinations of
that which properly speaking is.

Of course, in saying that the intellect immedi-
ately knows the object as a substance, we do not

' We call attention to this point, since even such an able
writer as Lord Balfour so entirely misunderstands the .Aris-
totelian doctrine of substance, as to interpret it of the material
substratum, which passes from one entity to another. Sec
Tlu'ism and Humanism, p. 231. Lord Haldane offers us an
error of another kind, but no less fundamental. The concep-
tion of substance, he says, " has meaning in relation only to
accidents or properties. To define God as substance would
therefore be to define Him as something; relative" {PiUlnvay to
Reality, I., p. 28). The definition which asserts that a sub-
stance exists in its own right and not as a mere determination,
is so framed that the idea of a necessary relation to accidents
is not included in it.

- Aristotle alleges this as the reason why substance con-
stitutes the primary object of metaphysics. The science ot
being finds its proper object in that which is in the full
sense of the term. .'Occidents only have being in so far
as thev are determinations of what truly is. Mftap/i., IV^,
c. ii. S. Thomas .Aq. in Metatli., IV'., lect. I (cf. also Metapli.
XII., c. i). ' .

DEMONSTRABILITV OF GOD'S EXISTENXE 39

mean that from the first it has a clear-cut abstract
notion of substance, such as we have given. It
first apprehends the object confusedly as a thing
with these or those attributes. Only later by rc-
ficction does it come to an explicit recognition of
the distinction between the attributes, which are
many, and the subject to which they belong, which
is one. But we contend that even in the earliest
confused apprehension, the notion of substance is
implicitly present. All that is needed is the re-
fiective operation of the mind u[)on its own concept,
and its true character will make itself known.

That this concept of substance is utterly differ-
ent from any datum of sense is abundantly clear.
The substantial nature is whole and entire in each
part of the object. It does not increase or diminish
with the object's size. Every particle of an
oak-tree has the substantial nature of oak. A small
piece of the wood is just as truly oak as is tlic
whole trunk. The tree may increase in bulk: or
on the other hand, the branches may be lop[)cd
off. In either case the substantial nature remains
what it was. Moreover, as was said above, the
substance is one, though the attributes are many.
And, further, the substance remains permanently
the same even though the attributes display numer-
ous changes. A reality with characteristics such
as these lies outside the scope of sense perception.
The intellect, and the intellect alone, has power
to make it known to us.

Substance and attribute are by no means the
only notions which are directly apprehended by the
mind from the objects of sense without the need

40 NATURAL THEOLOGY

of any kind of inference. To this same class of
apprehensions belong, e.g., unity, multiplicity,
causality, finality, truth, goodness. All of these
stand in immediate relation to being. Thus unity
is being as undivided: multiplicity is a plurality
of undivided things: a cause is that which gives
being to a thing: finality is the purpose of a being:
truth is the conformity between thought and that
which is : goodness is the relation which being, as an
object of desire, bears to the will. Of these we are
here concerned only with the notion of cause. Just
as it belongs, not to the eye, but to the intellect
to know anything as a substance, so the intellect
is needed to apprehend an object as //lai which
conjers being, a cause» It is this which explains
the error of the sensationalists. Holding that
there is no other knowledge save that of sense-
perception, and seeing clearly that the notion of
causality is not a thing which the eye can see, they
maintained that it is a mere word devoid of any
corresponding idea. Yet nothing can be more
evident than that not merely have we the idea, but
that the mind can no more avoid it than the eye
can avoid seeing and recognizing the colours of
the objects of vision. Granted appropriate objects,
the mind instantly, and apart from all inference,
knows the one as cause and the other as effect.
The sensationalist difficulty disappears as soon as
the spheres of sense and intellect are distinguished :
the faculty whose proper object is being must
be capable of apprehending in the data afforded
by sense that which is the source and that which
is the recipient of being.

DEMONSTRABILITY OF GODS EXISTENCE 4 1

Doubtless we sometimes err, and judge that to be
the cause of a thing which in fact is not so related
to it. Bui this is a case in which our error bears
witness to the validity of the concepts in question.
It is because we are so familiar with real causes
and effects that we occasionally allow ourselves to
be misled, and conclude that some event which fol-
lows immediately on another must needs be related
to it as its effect.

It may perhaps seem that we have given an
undue amount of attention to the defence of these
concepts. Yet a somewhat full discussion, we are
convinced, was absolutely necessary. The prin-
cipal objections now urged against the proofs for
God's existence are based, as we have already said,
on the contention that substance and cause are
meaningless terms to which no objective reality
corresponds. Until this fundamental fallacy
should have Ijeen refuted, the whole value of the
proofs must have remained in question.

4. Philosophical vindication of first principles.
Now that we have shewn that the primary con-
cepts of the intellect arc valid, no great difficully
will be presented by the defence of first principles.
These arise immediately from a comparison of two
such concepts, the mind pronouncing judicially in
their regard whether the one necessarily excludes
the other, or, on the other hand, necessarily involves
it. It will be sufficient here to deal with two prin-
ciples only, viz., the principle of contradiction, the
most fundamental of all judgments of the under-
standing, and the principle of causality, the basis
of our proofs of God's existence. Those against

42 NATURAL THEOLOGY

whom we are contending deny the worth of both.

(a) The principle of contradiction tells us that
' the same thing cannot both be and not be, at the
same time and in the same respect.' We reach this
judgment by a simple comparison of the concepts of
being and not-being. Being, as we have seen, is
the first of all concepts. The mind knows all its
objects under this aspect — as things which are. The
task which lies before it, often a most laborious
one, is to determine exactly what they are. But
the notion of ' being ' — ^of thai which is — is plain
from the very dawn of intelligence. We cannot
explain it by any that is simpler: for its simplicity
is ultimate. This notion is followed by that of its
opposite, ' not-being.', The mind recognizes the in-
compatibility of the two, and judges that, ' it is
impossible for the same thing both to be and at
the same time not to be ' : or, as it may be stated in
a slightly different form: ' It is impossible for the
same attribute both to belong and not to belong
to the same thing at the same time.'

The absolutely necessary character of the judg-
ment is manifest from the direct opposition be-
tween being and not-being. It is for tliis reason
that tlie mind does not merely assert its contra-
dictory to be untrue, but finds itself impelled to
state the proposition in a modal form and to de-
clare that it is i//ipossible that it should be true.

It is plain that if this principle were dubious, all
search after truth would be futile: for no statement
of any kind could be made which might not be
simultaneously both true and false. Indeed, it might
have seemed impossible to call it in question. Yet,

DEMONSTRABILITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 43

in the philosophical confusion of the present day,
this has been done. The pragmatists, who regard
reality as plastic, and hold that we ourselves estab-
lish the objective order by stamping upon it those
principles which we find most convenient to the
conduct of life, will not lower their flag even to
the principle of contradiction. Mr. Schiller has the
courage to maintain that this is not, as we fondly
imagine, a self-evident truth, but a postulate which
we impose on reality, because it is useful. Indeed,
to him, as to Heraclitus of old, it can never be true
to say of anything that it is. All things are in flux :
all is becomini^. " In strict fact," lie says, " nothing
ever is: everything becomes and turns our most
conscientious predications into falsehoods" (^a-/ow.r
as Postulates, §34). He fails to see that though
the material world is subject to unceasing muta-
tion, so that the object of sense-perception is alter-
ing even while we perceive it, yet the intellect can
give us knowledge of that which is. Not merely
does it apprehend the substance, which remains
permanent notwithstanding the changes in its sen-
sible attributes, but from perishable individuals it
abstracts the notion of the type. Indeed, it is only
through this power of abstracting the stable type
that science is possible to us. For the object of
science is to be found, not in the singular as such,
but in singulars just so far as the type is realized
in them.

M. Bergson, similarly failing to recognize the
essential difference between the object of sense and
the object of the intellect, also conceives reality
as an ever-flowing stream, whose constant changes

44 NATURAL THEOLOGY

afford us no ground for the apprehension of any
stable truth. He, too, rejects the notion of being,
and contends that there is no reality save becom-
ing. In this system also, where of nothing can it
be said either that it is or that it is not, there is no
room for the principle of contradiction. ^

(A) We now pass to the consideration of
another principle for which self-evidence is
claimed, the principle of causality.

It was stated above that the notion of cause,
in the sense of that which makes a thing to be what
it is, is one of those which are so intimately related
to that of being, that reason apprehends them as
soon as it begins to operate at all. But the mind
soon realizes that thefe is more than one sense in
which we can say of a thing that it makes something
else to be. It distinguishes four kinds of cause,
two of them extrinsic to the effect, viz., the efficient
and the final: and two intrinsic, viz., the material

■ In Mclaph; IV'., c. iii., Aristotle points out that the princi-
ple of contradiction is the first of metaphysical principles, and
that it is the most certain of all truths, inasmuch as it is
impossible for any man to hold that the same thing can
both be and at the same time not be- He is not unaware that
some have questioned its validity, but remarks on this sub-
ject that ' what a man says he does not necessarily believe
\ovK fOTt yap apayKmov a tis Xf'yfi, Tavra Kal vrroXafi^dpftv).
In ch. iv. he rejects the claim for a direct demonstration;
■■ Some indeed demand that even this shall be demonstrated,
but this they do through want of education: for not to know
of what things one may demand demonstration, and of what
one may not, argues simply want of education. For it is im-
possible that there should be demonstration of absolutely
everything: there would be an infinite regress, so that there
would still be no demonstration " {Oxford Universily Trans-
lalioii). It admits, he adds, of ' negative demonstration,"
i.e., by a reductio ad absurdum. Cf. also St. Thomas Aq. ir,
Mela ph. IV., lect. 6.

DEMONSTRABILITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 45

and the formal. Thus, to use a familiar illustra-
tion, when a potter shapes a vessel, say a bowl,
the efficient cause is the workman himself: the final
cause is the purpose for which the vessel is made,
in this case to hold food : the material cause is the
clay out of which it is formed : the formal cause,
the shape given to the matter by the agent. Each
of these four principles of the thing's being is
rightly said to be a cause of the thing. Of each it
may be truly affirmed that it makes the thing to be
what it is. But the senses in which the term is
applied are not identical: the four kinds of causa-
tion are distinct each from the others. The prin-
ciple of causality with which we are here concerned
has reference not to all of these, but only to
efficient causation.

The principle is stated in various ways. Of
these we may notice two: 'Whatever begins to be
must have a cause ' : and 'All contingent being must
have a cause.' The first of these is a more popular,
the second a more accurate and philosophical ex-
pression of the truth in question. The term ' con-
tingent being ' signifies that which is capable of
non-existence. It stands in direct opposition to
'necessary being,' a term only applicable to God.
The principle as affirmed in regard of contingent
being is wider in its application than in the first
of the two forms given. For it is a point in dispute
among philosophers whether God, had He so
willed, might not have created things from all
eternity, in such wise that the universe should have
known no beginning, but that the years should
stretch back in an infinite series. It is plain that,

46 NATURAL THEOLOGY

if this supposition be entertained, there would exist
created being which never began to be, inasmuch
as ex hypothesi the universe is eternal. Neverthe-
less, what has been created even ab aeterno is cap-
able of non-existence: it is contingent being.

When we assert that a projwsition is self-
evident, we signify that its truth appears from the
mere comparison of the concepts which constitute
the subject and the predicate :■ that there is no need
to have recourse to experience to discover whether
or not the predicate will be found in the objects
denoted by the subject : but that the simple con-
sideration of the two concepts suffices to shew us
that the presence of the one invol\-es the presence
(or absence, as the case may be) of the other.
Thus, we saw just now that the principle of con-
tradiction was self-evident, because the concepts
of being and not-being are mutually exclusive, so
that in no case is it possible that what is known
to be should in the same respect not he. In the
same way the principle of causality is self-evident,
because when we consider the notion of ' contingent
being ' and that of ' a thing which owes existence
to an efficient cause,' the mind recognizes a neces-
sary agreement between them, and sees beyond all
possibility of doubt that what is contingent must
be a thing owing existence to an efficient cause.
It is manifest that what is capable of not-being is
not self-existent. What is self-existent is neces-
sary : to exist is part of its nature. We might as well
try to suppose a triangle having only two sides as
a self-existent being which should not exist. It
is also clear that wliatever exists must either re-

DEMONSTRABILITV OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 47

ceive its existence from itself or from some other
being. There is no tertiuin quid {wssiblc : it can-
not have received existence from nothing. There-
fore, as contingent being does not receive existence
from itself — otiiervvise it would be, not contingent,
but self-existent, and therefore necessary, being
— it must receive existence from some other being.
But to receive existence from another being is
to ha\e an efficient cause. The principle,
therefore, is self-evident. It cannot be proved
by an appeal to some higher principle from
which it is derived, for the simple reason that
it is itself in the full sense of the word a
first principle : its truth is involved in the very
terms of which it is composed. The only proof
of which it is susceptible, is that which is proper
to first principles, viz., a reJuctio ad absurdum, in
which it is shewn tliat a denial of this truth involves
a denial of the ])rinciple of contradiction, inasmuch
as we cannot suppose a thing to be contingent and
yet uncaused without maintaining that it can, at
one and the same time, both be, and not be,
contingent.

5. Kant's teacliiiiii. Kant assures us that by the
very nature of the case it is imixjssible that we
should know realities unmodified by the mind —
things as they are in themselves, noumena. This
lie regards as in need of no proof, since he starts
from the assumption that the immediate objects of
experience must be internal to the mind. For that
reason, he contends, our knowledge is, of neces-
sity, confined to phenomena—mental representa-
tions. These, as presented to our knowledge, have

48 NATURAL THEOLOGY

been refashioned according to the laws of our
mentality. The raw material of experience con-
sists of disconnected sensations; but by our cog-
nitive faculties these are transformed into a world
which is apparently external to us. It seems to us
that we know things as existing in space and time.
But in point of fact space and time are our own
contribution. They are the ' form ' of our sensi-
bility: and they do not belong to things in them-
selves, which are out of all relation to such
purely subjective conditions. As sensibility has
its forms, so too has the understanding. Kant
enumerates twelve. These are, so to speak, the
moulds through which sensation passes on enter-
ing the mind, and by«means of which the world of
experience is rendered intelligible. Substance and
causality are of their number. We conceive things
as substances, and we conceive them as due to
causes. But these notions of the understanding,
like space and time as regards sensibility, are in
no way derived from the noumena. They are
merely schemata according to which the mind
organizes its objects.

The principle of causality Kant declares to be
a synthetical a priori judgment. His division of
analytical and synthetical judgments differed from
that in use among the Aristotelian logicians. Accord-
ing to him, analytical judgments are those alone in
which the predicate can be found in the concept
of the subject, as when, e.g., we assert that a tri-
angle is a plane figure. In synthetical judgments,
on the other hand, the predicate adds something
to the subject-notion, and is not contained within

DEMONSTRABII.ITV OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 49

it.' He further distinguished between judgments
a posteriori and a priori. By a posteriori judg-
ments he signified those which are gathered from
experience; by a priori judgments those which are
wholly independent of experience, and must be
attributed to the operation of the mind. All analy-"^
tical judgments are a priori, since, although the
subject-notion may be drawn from experience, no
experience is needed to arrive at the connection
between subject and predicate. But he maintained
that many synthetical judgments too belong to this
class. Wherever a judgment possesses the notes
of universality and necessity, there, he contended,
we have an a priori judgment. Such a judgment
cannot be due to experience: it must, in conse-
quence, be attributable to the subjective laws of
our own mind and be a priori. To this class he
assigned first and foremost all mathematical judg-
ments, save those in which the predicate is actually
part of the definition of the subject. No experi-
ence, he maintains, can ever afford us justification
for asserting that all triangles without exception
must necessarily have their interior angles equal to
two right angles : for experience can only inform
us regarding those individuals which we have

■ The .Aristotelian logicians counted as analytical proposi-
tions not only those in whicli the predicate forms part of the
subject-notion, but those in which it is connected with it by-
necessary relations. Thus a proposition such as, ' every tri-
angle has its interior angles equal to two right angles,' is by
them termed analytical. Kant's division labours under the
grave disadvantage that it reckons together as members of
one class mathematical judgments such as the above and em-
pirical judgments such as ' Socrates is runniiig.' Philoso-
phically it is not merely valueless but misleading.

50 NATURAL THEOLOGY

actually seen. The element of necessity must be
derived from our own minds. The explanation of
such propositions is that the intellect in forming
its judgment applies to it the subjective categories
of ' universality ' and ' necessity,' and judges that
' every triangle must have its interior angle equival-
ent to two right angles ' ; but we have absolutely
no guarantee that this is the case as regards things
in themselves. It must be reckoned to Kant's credit
that he recognized that a vast number of our judg-
ments are characterized by necessity and iniiver-
sality: and that these features call for philosophical
explanation. Empiricism can offer no rational
account of them. Kant, at least, makes the effort
to do so. But the Miswer which he gives to the
problem has little to recommend it.

The whole of this theory rests upon the conten-
tion that a judgment must either be derived
immediately from sensible experience or be wholly
due to the internal constitution of the mind: that
no other alternative is possible. This he assumes:
he offers no proof. Yet, as a matter of fact, the
Aristotelian philosophy provides an explanation of
our knowledge which satisfactorily accounts for the
universality and necessity of these propositions,
quite apart from the alleged subjective categories.
According to that system, as we have already ex-
plained, when the sense perceives the individual
concrete triangle, the intellect apprehends its essen-
tial nature. It understands what the triangle is,
and what are the relations which attach necessarily
to a three-sided plane figure. Moreover, the
apprehensions of the intellect are not confined in

DEMONSTRABILITV OF COn'S FXTSTENCE 5 I

their scope to the particular individual: they relate
to the universal type. The mind, in forming its
concepts, abstracts the general notion from the
singular instance : it knows the triangle as suck.
Hence it is able to enunciate propositions, which
are true of each and every triangle : for in every
individual the general type is realized.

■ It is, moreover, to be noted that Kant's theory
is altogether inconsistent with the facts of experi-
ence. It is manifest that when we affirm a judg-
ment to be necessarily and universally true, we
do not do so in obedience to a spontaneous action
of the understanding for which no reason can be
assigned in the real order, but that we so judge
because our intelligence recognizes the objective
ground of the connection between subject and pre-
dicate. We understand mhy this predicate must
of necessity accompany this subject. We see that
objectively considered the one involves the other:
and that the connection between the two follows
from the very nature of the things in question. To
attribute the clement of necessity to a subjective
' form ' of the mind, and not to the objective nature
of things, is contrary to the most direct testimony
of consciousness. It is not to explain facts, but
to set facts aside in favour of a theory. In regard
to the workings of our mind the testimony of con-
sciousness must be final. .'\nd on this point its
verdict is unambiguous. It is simply untrue to
say that the mind constrains us, we cannot say why,
to affirm this proposition under the category of
necessity, that other under the category of possi-
bility, and a third under the category of existence.

52 NATIRAL THEOLOGY

In each instance we know perfectly well why the
judgment assumes its particular character: and we
know that the reason is found, not in any law of
our mentality, but in the objective data of know-
ledge. Yet according to the Kantian theory our
predications are blind: and no cause can be
assigned why we should apply one category rather
than another in any given case — ^why we should,
e.g., judge one phenomenon to be substance and
another a cause. The whole process must be
attributed to a subjective law, about the working of
which we cannot even hazard a conjecture. Again,
Kant's whole theory is based upon the supposi-
tion that noumena — things in themselves— are the
cause of those sensations which by means of the
categories we organize into phenomena. We can-
not know these noumena ; but we are bound to
postulate their existence. Otherwise, the raw
material of our knowledge remains unaccounted
for. Here, as has often been pointed out, we have
a flagrant contradiction. On the one hand, causality
is declared to be a mental ' form ' — a scheme under
which we view the objects of knowledge, but re-
garding whose validity in the noumenal world we
have no means of judging. On the other, noumena
are held to exercise a veritable causality by pro-
ducing sensations antecedently to the mental opera-
tion which organizes these sensations into pheno-
mena. Similarly, it is assumed that the categories
themselves are true causes : for they are held to
shape the transient sensation into what seem to be
stable objects other than ourselves. They could
not do this if causality were not to Kant's mind

DEMONSTRABILITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 53

something far more than a mere form under which
certain phenomena are presented to the mind.
■*" Nor is it more easy to get rid of the notion of
substance than of that of cause. For how, it may
be asiced, does Kant conceive the subject of know-
ledge, the mind in which the categories inhere?
Is it a reality or not? Manifestly he regards it as
a really existing thing. It is, in his theory, some-
thing over and above the categories themselves:
it is that to which they belong. It is not, like
them, a determination of an already existing sub-
ject ; but it exists in its own right, as an inde-
pendent entity. But what is this except to con-
ceive it as a substance? In view of these facts we
are justified in maintaining that there is nothing in
Kant's theory to shake our conviction as to the
validity of our primary notions and the truth of
those fundamental first principles which form the
very basis of our knowledge.

6. Neo-hegelianism. The neo-hegelian doc-
trines which in one form or another have in recent
years enjoyed so wide a vogue in England, will
claim a somewhat full consideration in a later
chapter (chap. xv.). Hence we shall confine our
remarks on them here within the very briefest
compass, reserving our criticism till it can be given
in the light of a fuller exposition. There are, it
is true, many varieties of opinion within the school
to which we refer, so that it is difficult to make
general statements without seeming unjust to some
individual or other. But it may fairly be said that
in this system there is no room for the notion of
substance. What appear to us to be substances

54 NATURAL THEOLOGY

have no right to be so considered. They are not
subsistent units, nor independent sources of
activity. This is true even in regard to ourselves. *
Whatever may be the testimony of consciousness,
we are ' adjectival to reality,' not substantival
entities. Nor is the one reality to which we are
thus subordinated a substance : it has no being out-
side the ever-evolving modes in which it manifests
itself. The notion of cause fares no better. To
the neo-hegelian there are not two orders, an
objective order of reality and a representative
order of thought. There is but one, and that is
intellectual. It follows that there can be no ques-
tion of real dependence of effect from cause, in
the sense that the action of cause makes the effect
what it is. In the intellectual order there is no
such thing as efficient causation: we are concerned,
not with cause and effect, but with premisses and
conclusion. In this system these totally different
relations are identified. We are told that the
effect does not depend on the cause any more than
the cause upon the effect: they are simply the
terms of a relation. Mr. Bosanquet expressly
assures us that apart from temporal succession,
which is " the natural differentia of causation," he

■ Thus Prof. Bosanquet, arguing on behalf of his conten-
tion that the ultimate subject of all predication is Reality — 'the
one true individual " — says: " It is to me quite astonishing that
an appeal in favour of independent substances should be
made on the ground of our experience of ourselves. What
all great masters of life have felt this to reveal has been a
seeking on the part of the self for its owti reality, which carries
it into something beyond." (Logic, 2nd edit., II., p. 255).
This is to give us metaphor in place of argument. The self
does not seek for its ovvn reality [esse extra causas), but for its
qualitative perfection — a very different thing.

DEMONSTRABILITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 5 5

" cannot see how the relation of conditioning differs
from that of being conditioned." i It is needless
to say that there is no room here for a principle of
causality or for an argument to a first cause.

We have here only said just sufficient to shew
in bare outline how this philosophy deals with those
fundamental notions and principles with which we
are concerned. But it will, we think, be felt that
a system which leads to conclusions so much
at variance with reality cannot be other than
fallacious.

• Op. cil., II., pp. 262, 264. Similarly, Lord Haldane
an adherent' of the same school of thouglit, informs us in
his Gifford lectures that God " cannot stand to the world
in the relation of Cause. For He must be independent of
Space and Time, and wc can attach no meaning to a Cause
excepting as operative within Space and Time " (/'ii//iway
Jo Reality, I., p. 20). Later he enunciates the principle of
causality as: "The principle that every change must be due
to some event anterior to it in time and separate from it
in space" {ibid- p. 214). As we have seen, the notion of
cause has absolutely no connection with the notion of time
or of space.

CHAPTER III.

PROOFS OF COD'S EXISTENCE (i. Metaphysical
proofs ) .

§ I. The Cosmological Argument {God as the First Cause).
§ 2. The Argument from Contingency (God as Neces-
sary Being). § 3. The Argument from Motion (God
as the Prime Mover). §4. The Henological Argu-
ment (God as the One and the Pcr/ccl).

We treat in this chapter of the proofs of God's
existence derived frofn efficient causation, from
contingent being, from motion, and from the multi-
plicity and limitation of finite things. Among the
many arguments by which our conclusion may be
established these ha\e an indisputable right to
priority. They are in the strictest sense metaphy-
sical demonstrations. They rest directly on
primary principles of reason, so that it is impossible
to reject them without at the same time calling in
question the validity of human reason itself. Fur-
thermore, in them our appeal is not to the witness
afforded by physical law, nor to the nature of man
as a moral agent, but simply to the nature of finite
being as such. .Any finite substance whatever is
capable of furnishing the data for the reasoning.
Natural Theology, viewed as a science, is, as we saw
in chap. i.,§ 2, a part of metaphysics. It follows
that the demonstrations on which it rests must be
metaphysical. The physical and moral proofs to

PROOFS OF god's EXISTENCE (l.) 57

be considered in the two following chapters are
subsidiary in character. Those with which we are
here concerned form the essential basis of the whole
treatise.

It must not, however, be imagined that the phy-
sical and moral arguments, because subordinate to
the metaphysical, are therefore devoid of imixjrt-
ance. Natural Theology cannot afford to overlook
them. It is manifest that, where the same con-
clusion can be reached by very different paths, some
minds will be more inlluenced by one argument,
others by another. And it is often the case that
reasoning which can be variously illustrated from
the field of experience is more efficacious to con-
vince the understanding than such as is immedi-
ately based on first principles.

I. The costnological arguinetU. In this iirst
proof we shew that it is necessary to admit the
existence of a first cause of all finite things, and
thai this cause is intelligent and personal. We are
here, be it noted, concerned with efficient causation,
an efficient cause being that whose action makes
the thing what it is. The [wint is of importance
as the term ' first cause ' may be cm]iloyed in
another sense. When, e.g., the materialist says
that no other first cause of the universe need be
[)()stulated save ether,' he is in fact asserting that
a niatcrial cause is sufficient, and that we may dis-
pense with efficient causes altogether.

■ " We regard cihcr as the fundamental cause or agency
in nature, and arc not compelled to look for anything beyond
it. As far as the arguments for a first cause goes, the first
cause may be m;Ucrial " (7V/e Existence 0/ Cod, by J.
McCabc, p. 41).

58 NATURAL THEOLOGY

We must, further, by way of preliminary, call
attention to another distinction, this time among
efficient causes themselves, viz., that between a
cause in fieri and a cause in esse. A cause in fieri
is the