



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

hilos.

PROCEEDINGS
OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

NEW SERIES.—VOL. III.

*Containing the Papers read before the Society during the
Twenty-Fourth Session, 1902-1903.*

PUBLISHED BY
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE,
14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON, W.C.,
AND 7, BROAD STREET, OXFORD.

1903.
Price Ten Shillings and Sixpence nett.

106263
11/10

HARRISON AND SONS,
PRINTERS IN ORDINARY TO HIS MAJESTY,
ST. MARTIN'S LANE, W.C.

B


11

A72

NS.V.3

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
I.—MR. BRADLEY'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT. BY G. F. STOUT	1
II.—"APPEARANCE AND REALITY": A REPLY TO MR. CARR. BY A. J. FINBERG	29
DISCUSSION—Criticism by H. W. Carr	42
III.—TIME, NECESSITY, LAW, FREEDOM, FINAL CAUSE, DESIGN IN NATURE. BY SHADWORTH H. HODGSON ...	47
IV.—EXPERIENCE AND EMPIRICISM. BY G. E. MOORE ...	80
V.—THE LOGIC OF PRAGMATISM. BY HENRY STURT ...	96
VI.—A RE-STATEMENT OF SOME FEATURES IN KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTALISM. BY G. DAWES HICKS ...	123
VII.—THE RELATION OF LOGIC TO PSYCHOLOGY, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE VIEWS OF DR. BOSANQUET. BY W. R. BOYCE GIBSON	166
DISCUSSION—Criticism by Bernard Bosanquet	183
VIII.—THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUB-CONSCIOUS. BY R. LATTA	187
<hr style="width: 20%; margin: auto;"/>	
ABSTRACT OF MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION	209
REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE	211
FINANCIAL STATEMENT....	213
RULES	214
LIST OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FOR THE TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION, 1903-1904	217



PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY,
1902-1903.

I.—MR. BRADLEY'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT.

By G. F. STOUT.

Introductory.—It would, I presume, be generally admitted, that all predication has for ultimate subject something concrete. But it seems a gigantic paradox to maintain that there is only one thing which is concrete in the sense required. Now it is just this paradox which forms the most essential feature of Mr. Bradley's theory of judgment, and it is just this paradox which constitutes the indispensable basis and presupposition of his whole philosophy.

In examining his views I shall refer especially to the first, and in a less degree to the second, chapter of the *Logic*. Both these chapters contain assertions which he would not now defend. But I shall endeavour to confine my criticism chiefly to those essential points which he does and must abide by.

Definition of Concreteness.—With a view to clearness, I must here attempt to say what I mean, and what, I take it, is ordinarily meant by the term *concrete*. What is concrete is particular. But we cannot affirm that whatever is particular is concrete. The roundness of this or that orange, as it exists in the orange, is particular. But it is not concrete. It is not concrete, for the reason that its particularity is derivative. It is particularised not only for our knowledge, but in fact by its being a partial feature of the particular

orange. If we disregard what is involved in its existence in the particular orange, we immediately think of it an abstract universal which cannot exist without being particularised. On the contrary, the orange is ordinarily regarded as particular in its own right. Doubtless it stands in manifold relations to other particulars, and such relatedness essentially determines its special nature. But such relatedness is not generally supposed to give it particular existence. Both the orange and the table on which it lies are for the plain man particulars in their own right—in other words, they are both concretes. And it is only because they are both concretes that they can stand in that particular relation which we express or imply by saying “that the orange is lying on the table.” The mutual relatedness distinctive of concrete existence presupposes their particularity, and therefore cannot logically constitute it. Concreteness, then, is underived particularity. In order to show that anything is not concrete, it is not sufficient to show that its special nature is determined by relations to other things. It must be shown that it owes its *particularity* to such relations, and that they do not, on the contrary, presuppose its particularity. It must be shown that it is only particularised as an adjective of something else. What Bradley, Spinoza, and Hegel try to show is that everything is ultimately particularised only as an adjective of the absolute. There is for them only one concrete. On the other hand, Aristotle, Leibnitz, and Herbart agree with common sense in holding that there are a plurality of concretes. In this I follow them.

Ideas and Signs.—Mr. Bradley begins with the thesis that there cannot be “judgment proper without ideas,”* and he proceeds to affirm that all ideas are symbols or signs, and must be recognised as such by the person judging. If we enquire what is a symbol or sign, he provides us with a precise answer. A sign or symbol is “any fact that has a meaning, and meaning

* *Logic*, p. 2.

consists of a part of the content (original or acquired),* cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign." As Mr. Bradley now no longer admits the possibility of "floating ideas," we must, in spite of the note to page 4, add that the content of the sign is not only cut loose from its existence, but also "referred away to another real subject." The term "content" stands for the nature of anything as distinguished from its existence.

If we examine this definition closely, we soon see that however well it may apply to the special case of ideas, it is not applicable to other signs. It is not true that whenever we use a sign, the content of the sign is thought of as qualifying the thing signified. When a forget-me-not is regarded by me as a sign of faithfulness in love, I do not mentally qualify faithfulness in love as being blue, or having stamens and a corolla. Yet Mr. Bradley, when he wrote the *Logic*, regarded such cases as coming within the scope of his definition. I submit that they evidently fall outside it. It is clear that so far as the definition holds good at all, it holds good only of signs which owe their significance to their likeness to the thing signified. But even here there is a difficulty. In regarding a handful of wheat as a sample of a sackful, I undoubtedly regard the qualities of the wheat in my hand as also belonging to the wheat in the sack. But I do not, in any intelligible sense, mentally cut loose these qualities from their existence in the sample before me. If I did not recognise the qualities as existing in the sample, it could not represent for me the rest of the wheat. Finally, it is very hard to accept the statement that only the content of signs can be significant, and not also their existence. When an engine-driver sees a danger-signal on the line, the actual existence of the signal at the time has surely a meaning

* I cannot discover what this reservation means. I have consulted Mr. Bradley himself without result. He assures me, however, that it is of no importance.

for him. It indicates a correspondingly existent danger which a merely imagined or supposed signal would not indicate.

If ideas satisfy Mr. Bradley's definition of a sign, it is plain that they form an altogether peculiar species of signs. Indeed, they must differ so much from other signs that it may well be doubted whether we ought to apply the term *sign* to them at all.

Logical and Psychological Idea.—There is, however, no doubt that the definition of a sign does agree most rigorously with Mr. Bradley's own account of ideas. Indeed, we have only to take one more point into account in order to transform it into a complete definition of what constitutes an idea according to Mr. Bradley. We have only to consider the kind of existence which, according to him, belongs to the signs used when we have ideas, or, in other words, make judgments. The sign exists as psychic fact. It exists as an immediate experience of the person judging at the time when he judges. It must be an immediate experience, in the same sense as a toothache or hunger, if and so far as they are actually being felt. The content of the idea is merely a partial content of this psychical fact divorced from its psychical existence. The psychical fact Mr. Bradley calls a psychical idea, in distinction from the logical idea with which he is alone concerned. This terminology seems to me unfortunate and misleading. It implies that meaning can be in no sense a psychical fact. Now, if the term *meaning* stands for what is meant, this may be admitted; but the act or process of meaning this or that is psychical fact, and can be nothing else. Further, this act or process is essential to ideas even from a psychological point of view. A psychical idea, in Mr. Bradley's sense, is, as he himself points out, not an idea of anything. This being so, it cannot be regarded, even by the psychologist, as being an idea at all. To have an idea is to think of something as so and so qualified. Both for logic and psychology the idea is the qualification by which the thing thought of is determined for the thinker. The

difference between the points of view from which the logician and the psychologist respectively regard ideas need not be discussed here.

Essential Points of the Theory.—We are now in a position to state the leading points in Mr. Bradley's theory of judgment:—

(1) According to this theory the entire content of every idea is also a content of immediate experience* at the time of

*Strictly speaking, the qualification, "immediate," is unnecessary, and may very well mislead. There is no difference between my experience, in the strict sense, and my "immediate" experience. When I now think of the felt pain of yesterday's toothache, this pain, though it is now thought of, is not now an experience of mine at all. It was so yesterday. If we choose to say that yesterday's toothache is now a mediate experience of mine, we ought clearly to recognise that we are using the term "experience" in a generically different sense from that which attaches to it in speaking of "immediate" experience. We mean merely that it is something we are thinking of, not something we are feeling. The distinction is as great as that between a "wire," in the sense of a telegraphic despatch, and a wire as it stretches from one telegraph post to another.

If there is necessarily some quasi-cognitive awareness attaching to the mere existence of a feeling, yet this awareness must be distinguished from the content of which we are aware; for the awareness is present both in pleasure and pain, and both in anger and fear, whereas the content varies. We may affirm that the awareness and the content are inseparable abstract aspects of the relatively concrete feeling. But we must none the less distinguish them. And the content, as well as the awareness, is an experience of the person who feels,—his *immediate* experience, if we choose to call it so. In any case, we ought not to call the content an object. For the mode of our awareness of it is radically different from that of our present awareness of yesterday's pain. Yesterday's pain is distinct in existence from our present cognition of it. The present cognition is our experience, not that which we cognise. But that awareness of present pain which is supposed to be involved in the bare fact that it is felt, is not distinct in existence from the feeling. It is merely an abstract aspect of it, like its intensity.

Further, I would point out that what is my experience does not cease to be so because I cognise it, and it does not cease to be *immediate* because I cognise it. I may be actually feeling angry, and at the same time judging that I feel angry. Similarly, I may judge, and at the same time judge that I am judging—*e.g.*, when I purposely give an example of the process of judgment. Feeling and judging no more cease to be immediately experienced merely because they are also cognised, than the moon ceases to be the moon simply because someone thinks of it.

judging. If it were not so, it could not be used to determine for thought the subject concerning which we judge. Thus, whenever we think of or apprehend anything as having a certain qualification, the characters which we ascribe to it are wholly contained within our own psychical state at the moment. From this point of view "no idea," as Mr. Bradley himself says, "can be anything but just what it means." The partial content of psychical existence which is used as an ideal symbol must be simply identical with what it signifies. Regarded in this light, the actual existent psychical state which is supposed to serve as a sign may appropriately be called an "image." For it contains a duplicate of its own meaning, as an image in a mirror is a duplicate of the object it reflects. Hence we find Mr. Bradley freely using the terms image and imagery without special explanation. "The imagery," he says, "is a sign, and the meaning is but one part of the whole which is divorced from the rest and from its existence."

(2) A second point of Mr. Bradley's theory is that the partial content of our immediate experience which is used as an idea, is *eo ipso* "cut loose," "alienated," "divorced," or "prescinded" from its existence as a feature of our psychical state. In judgment it is indeed treated as the qualification of a concrete existence. But this concrete existence is always and necessarily something other than the immediate experience from which it is extracted. In becoming a logical idea, it becomes a "wandering adjective." Setting aside the cloud of metaphor which is apt to envelop Mr. Bradley's meaning in brilliant obscurity, what does this really involve? In plain language, it affirms that the partial features of immediate experience which are used as ideas on judgment, are never themselves apprehended as being features of the psychical fact in its immediacy. Here there is a marked contrast between Mr. Bradley's "ideas" and other signs. When in other cases I use one thing as the sign of another, I have already an idea of the thing which fulfils for me the function of a sign.

It is already the subject of judgments with determinate predicates. Otherwise I could not possibly use it as a symbol of anything else. But of necessity this cannot hold good of the psychical fact which constitutes the existence of the sign used in judgment. We cannot suppose that we have already an idea of this without a vicious circle. We should have to say that an idea is the qualification of something else by an idea of psychical fact. Mr. Bradley certainly cannot be charged with any such absurdity. For him the very essence of predication is the divorce of a partial content of psychical fact from its psychical existence, and its reference to some other existence. There is no place anywhere in the process for an idea of the psychical fact in its immediacy.

A third and most vital point of Mr. Bradley's doctrine emerges when we press the question: What are the ultimate subjects to which predicates are attached in judgment—wherein do the wandering adjectives find a home? The answer is already logically implied in the very conception of an ultimate subject taken in conjunction with Mr. Bradley's doctrine of ideas. An ultimate subject must be a concrete existence, containing as part of its concrete nature those features which are ascribed to it in judgment, so far as the judgment is true. From this definition, taken in connexion with the general theory of judgment, there follows of necessity a most important and startling consequence. There can be for us only one ultimate subject of predication—the absolute whole of being. For an ultimate subject is only determinable in thought through its ideal predicates: and these by their definition are all abstract universals—contents cut loose from their existence. However complex they may become, they must still remain complex generalities. But if an ultimate subject is to be determined for our thought as one concrete individual among others, it can only be so by these abstractly universal qualifications, and this is for ever impossible. Thus the only concrete being which can exist for us is the one concrete which is presupposed in

all predication—which is needed to individualise the abstract generality of all possible predicates. Apart from the process of judgment this ultimate subject is absolutely indeterminate. It is a mere *that* without a *what*. It is just Hegel's category of pure being indistinguishable from pure non-being. And this distinctionless unity can never become pluralised for us. We can never say: "Lo, here is an ultimate subject," or, "Lo, it is there." It is everywhere or nowhere.

Hence follows Mr. Bradley's ultimate test of truth. If a predicate is not fitted to be a predicate of the absolute as such, it is so far false. For it must be a predicate of some concrete being. But the only concrete being is the absolute.

Criticism.—Turning, now, to criticism. I propose to join issue on each of the three points which I have indicated as vital in Mr. Bradley's theory :—

(1) First, Mr. Bradley affirms that whenever we apprehend or think of anything as having a certain qualification, that qualification is always in its entirety present as a content of his own psychical existence at the time. Now, under a reservation to be discussed later, I am prepared to maintain not merely the contradictory but the contrary of this proposition. I am prepared to maintain that, so far as the subject of judgment is other than our own immediate experience, it is always determined for thought by a qualification which is not a content of our own immediate experience. For present purposes, however, it is enough to show that this is sometimes the case.

The instances which appear, at first sight, most aptly to illustrate Mr. Bradley's doctrines are those in which the vehicle of thought is mental imagery in the strict sense—*i.e.*, revivals of sensible qualities and relations. Let us consider especially visual imagery. So far as our thought merely refers to the visible appearance of a thing not actually seen, the only content of immediate experience which can be detached from its existence and used as a predicate is the content of a mental

picture. On the other hand, what we normally think of is the thing as it actually has been seen, or will be seen, or may be seen with the bodily eye. The subject of judgment is, therefore, ideally determined by characters which do not belong to the psychical image. Our meaning somehow includes those distinctive characters of actual sensation which are absent from our immediate experience at the time. If we were thinking of the thing, not as actually seen, but as we had mentally pictured it on some previous occasion, the visual image might be virtually the same. But our specific meaning would be essentially different.

I admit, of course, that when we use a visual image in judgment, part of our meaning is also a content of the image. But where the reference is to actual sensation, we could not mean this, unless we meant more than this. I could not ascribe to a horse as actually seen features belonging to a mere mental picture unless I thought of the horse as actually seen and not merely imaged.

Coming to details, we find this view corroborated at every point. I mentally picture the face of a friend. Not being a very good visualiser I get no distinct view of the face as a whole, but only a series of fluctuating and fragmentary glimpses, now of this part and now of that. Yet what I mean throughout—what I have an idea of—is the visible appearance of the face as a whole, as I might see it with the bodily eye. The partial glimpses are apprehended by me as being partial,—as being fragments of a certain specific visual whole. The fragmentary contents of the fluctuating image do indeed qualify the whole face. But they can only do so on condition that I think of the whole as such—and the whole as such is not imaged.

We reach the same result if we consider the inaccuracy rather than the fragmentariness of images. I am thinking, let us say, of a perfectly straight line. I may use, for the purpose, either an image or a percept of a line which as

imaged or perceived deviates sensibly from straightness. I succeed in meaning what I do mean by regarding the line thought of as being without all such deviations from straightness as belong to the merely imaged line. It may be said that this relation of otherness falls within the content of immediate experience. But even if I admit this, I must still insist that what is ideally represented is not merely the specific relation of otherness, but that which is required to satisfy this relation. As so qualified it necessarily falls outside the content of immediate experience. It is essentially determined for thought as *not* being qualified by the immediately experienced content.

There are some few persons who have virtually no visual imagery at all. But they are not for that reason incapable of ideally representing things as seen when they do not actually see them. Undoubtedly in doing so they use certain contents of immediate experience, and in particular revivals of kinæsthetic sensations connected with the movements of the eyes. But what they have an idea of is visual experience as such. It is not something which is merely invested with qualifications drawn from the content of motor and tactual imagery. It is determined for thought as other than the contents of such immediate experiences, and as standing in certain specific relations to them.

Turning from the thought which uses mental imagery to judgments directly connected with actual perception, we find that here also meaning is not always, and perhaps is never, merely coincident with any content of existent psychical fact. I apprehend a billiard ball lying before my eyes as being blue. In doing so I qualify it by a partial content of a visual sensation which I am experiencing at the moment. But the predicate *blue*, as a quality of the billiard ball, is very far from being merely this or any other content of my immediate experience. It includes a special relatedness to other characters of the object which is no mere content of my psychical state at the time. To develop this point at length would carry us too far.

But it seems sufficient to point out that the sensible quality, as I affirm it, involves what Mill would call a permanent possibility of sensation. How can a possibility, as such, be part of the content of immediate experience? The immediate experience is actual or nothing. Again, let us take the case of extension as a predicate of bodies. Mr. Bradley has written an article to show that psychological states are extended. From his point of view it is absolutely necessary that they should be so. He himself recognises the necessity as an immediate consequence of the proposition that, so far as regards their content, ideas must be what they mean. The position of those persons who accept the general doctrine, and get boggled at the application of it, seems to me ridiculously inconsistent. Further, as regards the question of fact, I am in a great measure in agreement with Mr. Bradley. Visual and tactual sensations are psychological facts—immediate experiences. And certainly visual and tactual sensations have an extensive character. I also agree that, apart from this, we could never become aware of external objects as extended. But I am compelled to deny that the extension of physical things, as we apprehend it, is ever quite the same in nature as this, or any other, content of immediate experience. When I apprehend the extension of a physical thing I usually apprehend it as having a determinate size and figure. Now it is also true that my visual or tactual sensations and images have magnitude and figure. But their magnitude and figure is different not only in existence but in content from those of the physical thing as apprehended by me. I see a pen close to me, and a lamp-post in the distance. I judge the lamp-post to be bigger than the pen. But the visual sensations which I use in apprehending the size of the pen are far more extensive than those which I use in apprehending the size of the lamp-post. In general our judgment of physical magnitude remains fixed within wide limits independently of very great fluctuation in the extent of the corresponding visual sensations. Nor is the case

essentially altered if we turn to tactual experience. The extensiveness of tactual sensation varies in amount with the locality of the skin stimulated. The same holds good of kinæsthetic sensation. The quantity of joint, tendon, and muscle sensation will differ according as we explore an object merely by a movement of the fingers, or by a movement of the whole hand on the wrist-joint, or, again, of the arm up to the elbow, or by varying combinations of such movements.

Berkeley has pointed out that visual extension and tactual extension are so far disparate in character that we cannot judge a given quantum of the one to be equal to, or greater, or less than a given quantum of the other. But there are not for us two correspondingly distinct magnitudes of the same physical thing. The spatial extension of a material body is thought as single, and it is not thought of as being either distinctively visible or distinctively tangible. It is determined for us as that which is required to satisfy certain relations. But there is no adjective merely drawn from the content of our immediate experience which can fulfil this condition.

I have yet to refer to another group of cases, which seem even harder to reconcile with Mr. Bradley's theory. There are instances in which the specific nature of an object of thought as such does not seem to correspond even partially to any assignable content of our psychical state at the moment. The leading example is the use of words in silent thought or in actual speech. Many of us habitually think without using any sensory images or percepts except the verbal. For instance, in composing this address I myself have scarcely used any other. Now it is, of course, sheer nonsense to say that the specific nature of what we think of when we thus think in words is constituted by partial features of the content of the words themselves considered as auditory-motor or visual-motor complexes. I have elsewhere maintained that, besides the verbal images or percepts, there are connected with these other peculiar modifications of our psychical state which cannot properly be called

images. Each word has a distinctive meaning, because, owing to its preformed associations and its context, it modifies immediate experience in a distinctive way which does not seem capable of further analysis. But I do not see how it can possibly be maintained that what we think of is even partially determined for our thought as being in nature identical with these peculiar contents of immediate experience. On the contrary, we must regard the word and its psychic "fringe" or "halo" as constituting together the sign of something specifically distinct from them, not only in existence, but in nature. What we think of is determined for thought as that which is related in a certain way to such signs. And the relation just is that of sign to something signified. What we think of is thought of as that for which the word with its psychic fringe or halo stands. The subject is one which I have often discussed before, but always with a tormenting sense of confusion and inadequacy. I feel that my present statement rids my own mind of an intolerable burden. It would be easy to go on from now till doomsday multiplying illustrations of my general position. Probably my overwhelming sense of the importance of the point has already led me to try your patience unduly. I shall therefore conclude with a general challenge to my opponents to produce a negative instance. I challenge them to produce a judgment in which there is reference to existence beyond immediate experience, where the whole content of thought is merely coincident with some content of immediate experience.

I would also urge that the opposite view leads to consequences which cannot be reconciled with admitted facts. Reference to existence beyond immediate experience could not occur in the form in which it actually does occur if the entire content of judgment were always merely coincident with some content of immediate experience. Human beings who have not learned or do not accept the philosophy of Hegel or Mr. Bradley suppose that there are an indefinite number of

distinct things concrete and individual in the sense required to constitute them ultimate subjects of predication. When the man in the street affirms that a certain cow has a crumpled horn, he would not admit that he is affirming, however indirectly, that the absolute has a crumpled horn, or that his statement must be partially false because as it stands it cannot hold good of the absolute. On the other hand, when he affirms that it belongs to the general nature of cows to chew the cud, he would most readily admit that he is *eo ipso* affirming that this or that individual cow chews the cud. Now, I am not here concerned with the question whether the plain man is right or wrong in supposing that there are an indefinite plurality of ultimate subjects of predication. What I now desire to point out is, that even if he be under an illusion, the illusion itself is inexplicable on the lines of Mr. Bradley's theory. For Mr. Bradley the subject of judgment is initially an absolutely indeterminate *that* without any *what*,—pure entity without quiddity. It becomes qualified only through the predicates which are attached to it. But these predicates are all of them partial contents of immediate experience alienated from their existence. As such they are all abstract. Indeed, this is the compelling motive of their application as predicates of something else. If they were not apprehended as being, through their abstractness incapable of standing alone, they would not be regarded as adjectives of another substantive. As the process of predication advances, the predicates used become more and more complex. But from the nature of the case they still remain complex abstractions. They are still merely contents of immediate experience cut loose from their existence. And it still remains true, according to the theory that the reason of their being referred to something else as adjectives is that, owing to their recognised abstractness, they cannot stand by themselves. Now, how can this progressive determination of the initially indeterminate subject by characters that are always abstract, ever come to produce even the appearance of

a plurality of concretes as ultimate subjects of predication? Mr. Bradley seems to me to have proved too much. If his theory of predication were true, it would need only to be stated in order to be universally accepted. Nobody would suppose that any proposition could be ultimately true or false of anything but the absolute.

(2) We now turn to the second point of Mr. Bradley's theory of judgment. We find him constantly and strenuously asserting and re-asserting that in all judgment the content of our immediate experience which is used as a predicate is cut loose from its existence as a feature of our psychical life. It is not at all apprehended as being a feature of our psychical state, but only as a qualification of something else. I find this doctrine extremely hard to understand. If we follow it out rigorously, it seems to commit logical suicide. The whole doctrine of ideas is founded on a recognised contrast between the content of an idea as predicate of an object and the same content as a feature of immediate experience. Now I fail to see, if the doctrine itself be accepted, how Mr. Bradley or anybody else could ever become aware of this contrast. I fail to see how there could be any sort of cognition of immediate experience at all, or of anything as a feature of it, or of the fact that it has features. Immediate experience, it must be noted, is in no sense a knowledge of itself. It does not characterise itself either as being mere feeling or as being this or that sort of feeling. Judgment is the essential form of knowledge. Without it there is nothing that can be called discernment, distinction, recognition, or awareness of connexion and relation. If, then, it is essential to judgment that the contents of immediate experience are cut loose, divorced, alienated, from their existence as contents of immediate experience,—if judgment merely consists in ascribing these "wandering adjectives" to something else,—it does not seem possible that we should ever become able to predicate anything concerning immediate experience, either truly or falsely.

It does not seem possible that we could ever even have an idea of it as being immediate. Yet we find Mr. Bradley constantly making judgments about immediate experience as unhesitatingly as if it were a coal scuttle or an equilateral triangle. In the *Logic* he says of the idea, considered as psychological fact, that it exists "with particular qualities and relations. It has its speciality as an event in my mind. It is a hard individual, so unique that it not merely differs from all others but from itself at subsequent moments." Again, in chapter IX of *Appearance and Reality*, we find the following statements:—"At any time all that we suffer, do, and are, forms one psychological totality. It is experienced all together as a co-existing mass, not perceived as parted and joined by relations even of co-existence. It contains all relations and distinctions, and every ideal object that at the moment exists in the soul. It contains them, not specially as such, and with exclusive stress on their content as predicated, but directly as they are, and as they qualify the psychological 'that.' And, again, any part of this co-existence to which we attend can be viewed integrally as one feeling." Any part of this co-existence to which we attend! What does this mean? Does it imply that we can distinguish the part within the psychological whole, so as to apprehend it as being within this whole? If so, then there is certainly a judgment having for its subject existent psychological fact. But how is it possible to reconcile this with Mr. Bradley's own definition of judgment as excluding all reference to psychological fact as its subject,—as consisting merely in using some partial content of psychological fact as a qualification of an existence which is not psychological. If we abide by this definition there is no possibility of having a cognisance of psychological fact at all. What Mr. Bradley says about psychological immediacy may be all true and instructive. But on his own theory he could not possibly know anything about it, or even suppose that he knew anything about it.

I can see no way out of this *impasse*, unless we discard the assumption that judgment cannot qualify psychical fact in its immediacy. And this leads us to inquire on what ground the assumption is made. Mr. Bradley supplies two answers to this question. For the first I may refer to the following passage in *Appearance and Reality*:—"The idea is not the same as fact, for in its existence and meaning are necessarily divorced. And the subject, again, is neither the mere 'what' of the predicate, nor is it any other mere 'what.' Nor even if it is proposed to take up a whole with both its aspects, and to predicate the ideal character of its own proper subject, will that proposal assist us. For, if the subject is the same as the predicate, why trouble oneself to judge? But if it is not the same, then what is it, and how is it different?"* To this I reply that, so far as judgment refers to psychical fact in its immediacy, the predicate is distinguished from the subject as part from whole. The subject is the inclusive unity of immediate experience which contains the partial feature predicated of it. Mr. Bradley's other answer simply consists in strenuous reiteration of the thesis that in all judgment something is qualified which is not psychical fact in its immediacy. With this thesis I myself am in emphatic agreement. But I fail to find any cogency in the inference which Mr. Bradley draws from it. It is one thing to say that my judgment always qualifies something other than my own immediate experience. It is quite another to say that it does not qualify my immediate experience at all. The position for which I contend is that any complete judgment does both coincidentally. When Mr. Bradley says, that in judging we "cut loose," "alienate," "divorce," "prescind," or "separate" psychical content from psychical existence, I would point out that these words are the merest metaphors. They are merely metaphorical expressions for what we more appropriately call "discerning," or

* Ch. xv, p. 168, of *Appearance and Reality*.

“distinguishing.” But what we discern or distinguish never does or can lose connexion for our thought with that from which or within which it is discerned or distinguished. Would not Mr. Bradley himself tell us that to distinguish is to unite? He must therefore be driven to maintain that his metaphors are more than mere metaphors. He must maintain that “divorce” is more than discernment, and that it excludes the possibility of discernment. But such a contention seems irreconcilable with omnipresent fact. Doubtless in all judgment I somehow use partial contents of my immediate psychical existence in determining the nature of some other existence. But, in being so used, are they ever so isolated from their context or complement in immediate experience that in place of this context or complement there is for our thought mere blankness or nothingness? The question, I take it, answers itself.

In judging a piece of paper to be white, the visual sensations which I use are only a fragment of a mass of visual experience not so used. But the continuity of this fragment with the whole does not fall utterly outside the range of my thought at the time. The fragment is not “cut loose” from its context as it might be if I became afflicted with partial cortical blindness. The point is to me so plain that I shall not argue it further until I know what opponents may find to urge against it.

I must, however, add some words by way of explanation. In the first place, the total psychical fact is not apprehended in the same way as its partial feature. It is only so far apprehended as is necessarily implied in the discernment of parts within it. It is not itself discerned as a partial feature of a more comprehensive whole. We are not aware of it as circumscribed or bounded off. If we choose to confine the term object to what is demarcated in this way, then it cannot be said to be presented as an object. In the second place, the psychical reference in judgment, though it is invariably present, may be very subordinate and inconspicuous. It may

be implicit, not explicit. In other words, though the psychical reference is necessarily included in the total judgment, yet our interest and attention in judging may be primarily and predominantly centred in something which falls outside the range of our immediate experience. Not only may this be so, but in fact it most frequently is so. Probably in the earlier stages of mental development it is always so. In the third place, we must avoid identifying psychical reference with what we call self-consciousness. The consciousness of self is a complex product of mental development, and even in its simplest phases it always includes a reference beyond immediate experience. All that we are justified in affirming is that the primary psychical reference implicit in all judgment is the ultimate point of departure of the growth of self-consciousness, and that it always continues to be its essential basis and pre-supposition.

(3) We now come to the third, and perhaps the most interesting, point in Bradley's theory of judgment. If this theory is accepted, it is for ever impossible for us to determine in thought any individual, as such, except one—the absolute whole of being. This alone is concrete in the sense required to constitute it an ultimate subject of predication. This alone is a substantive; whatever else we may distinguish in thought is merely its adjective.

So far as this contention is based upon the general doctrine of judgment we have already virtually disposed of it. In the first place, we have pointed out that in all judgment we are aware of psychical fact in its immediacy. Hence in all judgment we are aware of an individual existence which is not the universe. Mr. Bradley himself calls it a "hard individual." The only question that remains is whether we can determine in thought other individual existences as such. This would be, of course, impossible if our only means of determining what we think of consisted in qualifying it by contents of immediate experience cut loose from their existence. But we have tried

to show that the object of thought is also determined by its *relatedness* to the content of immediate experience. It is apprehended as that which is required to satisfy a certain relation. Now, since we are aware of psychic fact in its immediacy, there can be no reason why an object should not be determined for thought by its relatedness to psychic fact in its immediacy. When this is so the object must be apprehended as individual, in the same sense as immediate experience is individual.

This is my general position abstractly formulated. The actual situations in which the individual is apprehended as such are just those described by Mr. Bradley himself as involving, in a peculiar sense, direct contact with reality. When a man grasps a solid object in his hands, when he stamps on the ground, when he is wrestling for his life with an adversary, or when he is awaiting the fateful yes or no from the lips of his beloved, he is determining in thoughts individuals distinct from others and from the all inclusive universe. In this respect those experiences are of primary importance in which motor activity finds itself variously conditioned in the attainment of its ends. And in spite of the scorn with which it is treated by Mr. Bradley and others, I must maintain that what is known as the experience of resisted effort has, from this point of view, an especial significance.

Having once attained the thought of individual existences in this direct way, it becomes possible to determine others in thought by their connexion with these. Other individuals are determined for thought as being in individualised relations to individuals already recognised as such. In general, if we set aside the primary awareness of psychic fact in its immediacy all individual existence is determined as such by its connexion with other individual existence.

Objections Considered.—And, now that I have reached this point, I see advancing against me an overwhelming flood of

hostile arguments. There are many which I can anticipate, and doubtless there are also many which I do not anticipate. I proceed to deal very briefly with some which I foresee as likely.

In the first place it may be urged that what I call an individual has no real claim to this title. Being admittedly only part of the universe, it must be related to other parts, and without such relatedness it would not be what it is. This objection would, indeed, be fatal if I began by admitting that the individual, as such, must be self-existent in the same sense as the absolute whole of being is self-existent. But to presuppose this is merely to beg the question at issue. An individual has all the self-existence I require if it is capable of being an ultimate subject of predication. It must be self-existent as compared with the partial features and aspects of its own nature, and it must not be a partial feature or aspect of the nature of anything else. Its independence is merely that of a substantive in relation to its adjectives. It by no means follows that it cannot be related to other individuals, and have its nature determined by them and the relations in which they stand to it. Nor does it follow that it cannot have individual parts which, as Hobbes would say, are parts of *it*, and not parts of its nature, and are therefore not capable of being predicated of it. A pillar supports a roof. If there were no roof the pillar could not support it; if there were no pillar the roof could not be supported by it. But the roof is not therefore an adjective or partial feature of the nature of the pillar, or *vice versá*. You cannot in virtue of their relation say that the pillar is a roof, or that the roof is a pillar. Neither is the relatedness of either an adjective of the other. The pillar supports in relation to the roof, and the roof is supported in relation to the pillar. But the roof does not support, and the pillar is not supported—if we regard them only in their connexion with each other. Finally, the relation into which pillar and roof both enter is not an adjective of either of them. It falls outside the

nature and existence of both. It falls within the whole of which both are parts. It is a predicate of this whole that it contains the relation as one of its partial features. Just as an individual may be related to others without compromising its distinctive independence, so it may comprehend within its unity parts which are themselves individual. Of course these parts cannot be its adjectives. They are parts of its existence, not of its nature. But, in fact, no one supposes otherwise. No one says that a tree is a leaf, or that a dog is its tail. What we can predicate is the relatedness of the whole to the individual part, in accordance with the special form of unity characteristic of the whole. We can say that the tree has a leaf growing on the extremity of its topmost branch, or that the dog is wagging its tail. Nor do I find any relevant difficulty in being compelled to assume that some individuals contain individual parts which no assignable number can finally exhaust. If, whatever number of parts is taken, the subdivision can still be made exhaustive, and does not make any difference to the unity and continuity of the whole quantum, and if all the exhaustive subdivisions are quantitatively equivalent to each other, there seems to me no possibility of exhibiting at any point anything which can be properly called a contradiction or absurdity.

Another group of objections may be based on the principle that what is transient cannot be concrete. And this seems to destroy at once the individuality of present psychical fact in its immediacy. Now I admit that if the term transient be taken in a certain sense, what is transient is abstract. The complete fact of change has two aspects: (1) an enduring sameness of content, which taken by itself is abstract; (2) a continuous alternation of differences in the way of particular determinations of this abiding content. These differences considered by themselves as what passes or is transient in the process, are also undoubtedly abstract. But in any actual change these two aspects of duration and transition are unified in a peculiar way. I do not mean that we can conceptually construct an

idea of change merely by putting together in thought these abstract features. On the contrary, the experience of change is required to show us how they can be united. It is only within the completed whole of change that we distinguish them. And this whole it is that I take to be concrete. Further, every temporal subdivision of concrete change is itself concrete.

This suggests another difficulty. A real individual cannot, as such, be in continuous connection with what is unreal. But present psychic fact is essentially a transition from the past which is no longer real to the future which is not yet real. I reply that in affirming anything to be no longer or not yet real, we do not deny that it is real at all. What we refer to is simply the time of its occurrence, not to its reality or unreality, its concreteness or abstractness, when it does occur. When we say that a future or past event is not real now, we simply mean that it is not taking place at the time when we are making the judgment. But so far as the judgment is true, it takes place at some other time related in a certain manner to the present.

Again, it will perhaps be said that psychic fact in its immediacy is so fleeting that we cannot have time to apprehend it before it is gone. My answer consists in a reference to the mode in which I suppose the psychic fact to be apprehended. We become aware of it only so far as we discern a partial feature within it. But this partial feature waits long enough to be discerned.

I must next defend myself against the sort of criticism which Mr. Bradley brings to bear on the analytic judgment of sense. For evidently what I call "psychic reference" is a pure case of this kind of judgment. "It is," says Mr. Bradley, "a very common and most ruinous superstition to suppose that analysis 'is no alteration.'" Now, if "analysis" is taken to mean an actual or ideal separation or taking to pieces, I have no quarrel with this statement. But if what is meant is the discernment of a partial feature within a whole as being within this whole, then I must confess that I

am very superstitious indeed. Still I admit that Mr. Bradley's contention would have some force as against me, if I maintained that the discernment of a feature of immediate experience makes no difference to the experience as it existed before the distinction was made. But this I do not hold, and I do not think that any defender of the analytic judgment of perception need hold it. The immediate experience referred to is the immediate experience when discernment of the partial feature is already present. Having disposed of this point, we come to the central principle of Mr. Bradley's argument, which is most clearly stated on page 97 of the *Logic*. "The sensible phenomenon," he says, "is what it is, and is all that it is; and anything less than itself must surely be something else." The question is, "When I take in my judgment one fragment of the whole, have I got a right to predicate this of the real, and to assert 'It, *as it is*, is a fact of sense?'"* Of course, if Mr. Bradley means predication of the absolute when he speaks of predication of the real, it is useless to argue the point further at this stage. But if he means predication of the sensible phenomenon a partial feature of it, it is difficult to see how he can find any cogency to his own argument.

If I say "this sound is shrill," I do not take a partial feature of the sound, and then merely identify the sound as a whole with this partial feature. If I say "this animal is a quadruped," I do not assert that its whole being consists in having four legs. If I wanted to say such things I should express myself differently. I should say "this sound is shrillness," or "this animal is quadrupedality." Whenever we judge at all, we not only predicate a partial feature, but we predicate it as partial. What we assert is its connectedness within the whole nature of the subject, in accordance with the characteristic form of unity distinctive of that subject. Mr. Bradley's criticism, it seems to me, is justified only in the

* Cf. *Logic*, pp. 93-102.

case of a class of judgments which nobody makes, because everybody sees at once that they are false. Everybody sees that it must be false to say that an orange is rotundity, or that a fox is sagacity. If all analytic judgments of sense involved a like absurdity, there would be no need for Mr. Bradley, or anybody else, to exhibit this fact by an intricate argument.*

Finally, I ought, perhaps, to say something of the direct argument by which Mr. Bradley apparently seeks to show that all ideas are merely abstract universals. This argument consists in a challenge to examine the content of any idea whatever. It is maintained that on examination we shall always find that

* Yet we have not altogether disposed of Mr. Bradley's case. He has yet another string to his bow. In the analytic judgment, besides the special feature discerned, there is always an unexplored remainder. According to Bradley, the unexplored remainder must so condition the nature of the special feature that this cannot be what it is apprehended as being. The principle of this argument, so far as I can understand it, is by no means self-evident. The principle seems to be that there cannot be in any sense or in any degree what we call a datum or a premise. The nature of the relatively unknown cannot be determined for us by the nature of what is already known. On the contrary, what we regard ourselves as knowing is wholly and utterly at the mercy of the relatively unknown. And the relatively unknown is entirely merciless. So long as we are at all ignorant, all our judgments must be false. I submit that this principle involves absolute scepticism and absolute empiricism,—in the worst sense of the word *empiricism*. It is equivalent to denying the logical possibility of anything which can in any sense be called inference, or transition from the known to the unknown. I submit, also, that it has no real justification. All that we are justified in asserting is that, so far as a judgment involves presumptions as to the nature of what is relatively unknown which are not merely elicited from the data on which we proceed, the judgment may be falsified by acquisition of new data. But so far as a judgment is merely analytic, so far as it consists in discerning partial feature within the whole of reality, it involves no such assumption. The real basis of Mr. Bradley's argument is his view of the nature of the one ultimate subject of all judgment. This must exclude all plurality, all relative independence, all relatedness of its partial features. Indeed, it cannot, in any ordinary sense, have partial features. Virtually it is not only a unity, but a perfectly simple unity. Hence all appearance of partial features within it must be mere appearance, and not truth. All discrimination is falsification.

the idea turns out to be in its intrinsic nature applicable to a possible plurality of instances. There is nothing in its intrinsic nature which confines it to a singular and unique subject. “‘That bough is broken,’ but so are many others, and we do not say which. ‘This road leads to London’ may be said just as well of a hundred other roads.” From such considerations Mr. Bradley seems to infer that the only unique and singular subject which we can determine in thought is the absolute whole of being. Now I insist, as strongly as Mr. Bradley, that whenever we have an idea we think of a general qualification,—of a qualification capable of existing in a plurality of instances. But I would point out that this mere generality never is, or can be, the entire content of our meaning. We cannot think of general characters without *co ipso* thinking of them as exemplified in instances which are ultimately particular. In recognising that “this is a road” may be truly affirmed of a hundred roads, I must also think of the hundred roads, and recognise that in the long run these are, and must be, particular roads, and not mere generalities. To think of the abstract universal is of necessity to think of the particular also. Generality would not be generality at all if it were mere generality.

The only question which remains concerns the possibility of singling out any one particular instance as such. The typical ways in which we attempt to do so are by using such words as “this” or “that,” or by pointing. Mr. Bradley insists that such signs cannot fulfil the function assigned them, because they have a generalised meaning. We can *point* to many things, and “this” or “that” are the most generally applicable of all words. This is, of course, true. But it by no means follows, because such signs have a general significance, or more accurately a general element of significance, that they do not also have a particularised significance. We must distinguish general meaning and occasional meaning. The general meaning is that which is common to more than one possible application

of a sign. The occasional meaning is determined by the context and circumstances under which it is actually being used on this or that occasion. So far as the determining circumstances are themselves particular, they are capable of particularising the meaning of the signs. Mr. Bradley's argument reminds me of a boyish joke. A boy calls out to another, "Where are you?" The answer is, "Here!" Which is met by "No, you are not here; you are there!" The meaning of the words "here" and "there" of course varies with the actual position of the speaker when he uses them. Hence the school-boy dialectic. Of course, if the question be pressed how the circumstances under which a sign is used are themselves particularised, I must fall back on the psychical reference to judgment,—on the concrete individuality of the psychical life of each of us.

Appearance and Reality.—In conclusion, I would invite your attention to an aspect of Mr. Bradley's philosophy which does not perhaps come strictly within the scope of this paper. Whatever is not fitted to be a predicate of the absolute he condemns as being *pro tanto* mere appearance. Now, this whole position seems inevitably to presuppose that the absolute does really appear. It seems futile and meaningless to explain this and that as being mere appearances if you regard the fact of appearance itself as being a mere appearance. Appearance must, therefore, be a predicate true of the absolute. But what does appearance in this sense ultimately mean? It can, I think, only consist in the fact that there are a plurality of finite centres of experience. Unless we presuppose this fundamental fact the whole conception of "mere appearance" loses all significance. There would be no one to whom anything could "merely appear." The fact itself is admitted by Mr. Bradley to be beyond the reach of explanation. "That experience should take place in finite centres, and should wear the form of finite 'thisness,' is in the end inexplicable." But he sees in this no serious objection to his

general theory. For "to be inexplicable and to be incompatible are not the same thing." The plurality "exists in, and therefore must qualify, the whole. . . . Certainly in detail we do not know how the separation is overcome, and we cannot point to the product which is gained, in each case, by that resolution. But our ignorance here is no ground for rational opposition. Our principle assures us that the absolute is superior to partition, and in some way is perfected by it."*

Now, this seems to me very like an unconscious evasion of the real difficulty. It is proposed to treat the existence of finite centres of experience as mere appearance. But mere appearance, I presume, is always due to our partial apprehension of the one reality, and this again to our finitude. Thus it is a vicious circle to explain partial apprehension or finitude of experience as being itself mere appearance. There can be mere appearance only on condition that something appears, and this ultimately can only be the absolute. Unless the absolute really has appearances Mr. Bradley's whole position becomes untenable. But the fact that it appears at all is the same thing as the occurrence of experience in finite centres. When, therefore, we say that experience takes place in finite centres we state what is absolutely true.

It is further to be noted that if appearance, as such, is a true predicate of the absolute, what is true of appearance, as such, must also be true of the absolute. Thus, if there are degrees of appearance, there are degrees in which the absolute really does appear. In fact, Mr. Bradley calls them "degrees of reality." It would seem to follow that the conception of "degree" is fitted to be a predicate of the absolute. But would it not be just as easy to dispose of its claims as of those of other concepts examined by Mr. Bradley? The doctrine of degrees of reality involves the reality of Degrees. But the assumption of the reality of Degrees, honorary or otherwise, looks like an Academical prejudice.

* *Appearance and Reality*, p. 226.

II.—“ APPEARANCE AND REALITY ” : A REPLY TO MR. CARR.

By A. J. FINBERG.

THIS paper is in no sense an attempt to defend Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. There must be some show of an attack before a defence is required, and I cannot bring myself to see that Mr. Carr's paper was an attack. But others so regarded it, and apparently Mr. Carr. So it is clear that some of us have misunderstood Mr. Bradley. And if I have misunderstood, I am anxious to learn where.

I have observed that, in discussing Mr. Bradley's books, there is only one thing which is regarded as irrelevant—that is, Mr. Bradley's own published account of what he means. I desire to-night to limit the area of discussion to Mr. Bradley's arguments only so far as they are concerned with Mr. Carr's criticisms. Of course, I alone am responsible for the construction I put upon Mr. Bradley's words. And I may as well confess that I am dependent for that meaning upon what is printed in Mr. Bradley's books. I mention this apparently superfluous point, because we have been assured that Mr. Bradley is given to eating in private the words he uses in public. So if Mr. Carr assures me that Mr. Bradley has informed him in private that he attaches “no importance” to some of the arguments employed in *Appearance and Reality*, I must ask to be allowed to regard such confidences as irrelevant. But I do not think Mr. Carr is at all likely to adopt such methods.

The main question Mr. Bradley sets himself to answer in his book is, as I understand it: How, without contradicting ourselves, can we think of Reality? We cannot, with Locke, regard the unknown qualities of the “real essence” as the only

reality, and dismiss all our experience of the world as fantastic ; or consider that "primary qualities" give us what "really exists." Again, Hume's classification of some experiences as real and others as "fictions of the mind" is equally impossible. In the chapters criticised by Mr. Carr, Mr. Bradley asks, Can we discover the real existence of Space, Time, Motion, Causation, &c., in our ideas of these phenomena? In his own words, "Do these ideas belong to Appearance or to Reality?" The answer is that they belong to appearance, and as such they have only a relative reality—they are not a "pure negation," as Mr. Carr puts it. What appears must be interpreted by, or brought into relation with, the universe of thought; only thus can we reach the fuller reality of the individual object and of the totality of individual objects. Only a one-sided aspect of reality is ever directly given. What is given must be qualified by thought before even the approximate reality can be thought of with any approach to consistency. Our knowledge, then, never is reality, but it qualifies reality; it may be described as adjectival.

Such a theory does not allow us to reject any appearance as illusory. If what appeared to sense were illusion, how could we find truth? We cannot reject any experience. But each individual experience presents only a partial aspect of reality; taken by itself it proves self-contradictory. But "to deny its existence, or to divorce it from reality, is out of the question. For it has a positive character, which is indubitable fact, and however much this fact may be pronounced appearance, it can have no place in which to live except reality. And reality set on one side, and apart from all appearance, would assuredly be nothing." (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 132.)

Mr. Carr writes, "It is this positive conception of appearance that I desire to criticise." "That contradictions should be true of Reality is surely absurd, but in what sense can we imagine them to be true of appearance? *How can the contradictory appear?*"

To which the answer is obvious, "the contradictory" cannot appear, because there is no such thing in the real world. It is only the reality that can appear. If Mr. Bradley states or assumes that the contradictory appears, his whole argument breaks down. But I have not been able to find any such passage.

Mr. Carr continues, "Contradictory appearance is as unthinkable as contradictory reality"—(which depends on the precise meaning attached to the word "unthinkable;" if it is taken as meaning "not experience-able," I cannot agree). "It is not that there appears to be a contradiction: that would be a mere way of saying that there is error in our conception." But that is exactly the argument. Mr. Bradley does not suggest that fact is anything other than fact. The errors in our ideas are errors that belong to our way of thinking. Mr. Bradley thinks that the aim of metaphysic is to bring our ideas of reality into harmony with our experience, not to reject experience and satisfy ourselves with unmeaning words. Consequently I think Mr. Carr is misrepresenting Mr. Bradley's doctrine when he says "It is that contradiction—in the present example, absolute contradiction—is the positive content of the appearance and exists in the appearance." The example referred to is that "Motion implies that what is moved is in two places in one time." Motion here is an idea of the mind, an ideal conception, consequently not a "thing" that can ever appear to us; the self-contradiction in that idea is therefore not an absolute contradiction but a relative one, relative to our limited powers and experience.

Mr. Carr continues: "Can appearance be ultimately self-contradictory? A possible reply may be, that it is not appearance that appears but reality, and that the inconsistent content is the result of the divorce of appearance from reality. Such a reply would meet the difficulty if we had positive knowledge of reality, or actual experience of it as reconciling contradictions." Mr. Carr's "possible reply" is, of course, the proper reply. To

his objections the replies are, (1) that we have positive knowledge of reality through our experience. It is the reality that acts upon us, therefore we have this positive knowledge—it can hardly be called negative. And (2) when it is realised that contradictions only qualify our perceptions of reality, it is easy to observe that every action we perform effects a practical reconciliation (if I may be allowed so to express it) of our illogical perceptions. Our idea of motion is illogical, but we can walk across the room in safety, and—sometimes—hit a bird when we try. We could never perform these feats if reality were not in rough practical agreement with our ideas of it, nor if it were, as Mr. Carr supposes, an “unknown x .”

I quite agree with the next sentence. (Our conceptions) “cannot be a full or a true analysis of appearance: what appears is not, and cannot be thought to be, inconsistent with itself.” What appears is the reality, and Mr. Bradley does not regard it as “inconsistent with itself.”

“Mr. Bradley holds that all the conceptions by which we endeavour to understand the world are inconsistent with themselves.” If Mr. Bradley holds any such view I have not been able to find it expressed in his book. For how can a conception be inconsistent with itself? The “content is self-contradictory,” but surely that is not the same thing. A conception is not one of its contents or all of them, any more than a thing is one of its qualities or all of them. If Mr. Carr is thinking of the first paragraph of Mr. Bradley’s Chapter I, I do not think it can bear his interpretation. I will quote it:—“The fact of illusion and error is in various ways forced early upon the mind; and the ideas, by which we try to understand the universe, may be considered as attempts to set right our failure. In this division of my work I shall criticise some of these, and shall endeavour to show that they have not reached their object. I shall point out that the world, as so understood, contradicts itself; and is therefore appearance, and not reality.” And at the end of the last chapter of this First Book are these words:—“The

whole result of this Book may be summed up in a few words. Everything, so far, which we have seen, has turned out to be appearance. It is that which, taken as it stands, proves inconsistent with itself, and for this reason cannot be true of the real.” The saying that ideas “have not reached their object” seems to me to mean that they have not accurately distinguished between reality and fiction: “the world, as so understood, contradicts itself,” means that unless these ideas are taken as “ideal,” we shall be forced to regard the reality as self-contradictory. Some of the contents of these ideas are self-contradictory, therefore they must be classed with what seems, and not with real-existence. And an idea classed as appearance can hardly be classed as real. Mr. Bradley’s arguments aim at proving that, so far as our ideas are of appearances, they are obviously incomplete. And before these ideas can be applied to reality they must be modified or transcended by the help of other ideas.

If we follow Mr. Carr in the exposition of his rival theory, I think we shall be able to realise clearly the chief points at issue.

Mr. Carr holds “the reality in the absolute sense of our conceptions of space and time.” “Reality is consistent . . . the consistent is timeless, for everything conceived *sub specie temporis* is inconsistent and exhibits contradiction . . . the real will only be found, if found at all, *sub specie æternitatis*.” All this is a differently-worded statement of Mr. Bradley’s argument (I shall produce additional demonstration later), and which Mr. Carr has been seeking to disprove. He continues:—“Can anything that is ordinarily conceived *sub specie temporis* be also conceived *sub specie æternitatis*? Only by abstracting from content all meaning and leaving bare being.” This is the vital point of the whole business. We shall have to return to it, but I will complete the quotation first:—“Are there any objects that are conceived by us *sub specie æternitatis*, and that can only be so conceived? It seems to me that time and space

are such objects. Time cannot be conceived as in time. Duration and succession have no meaning as applied to time itself." (Yet we are to suppose "Time itself" to "exist," and yet have no duration.) "Time is therefore eternal; and if eternal, real; and if real, not inconsistent or self-contradictory." But even if Mr. Carr's logic were impeccable, such a conception of Time *sub specie aeternitatis* is still only a conception. Grant that it is as closely correspondent with the reality as any conception can be; that it is Thought purged and transformed to its highest splendour; yet it still remains Thought—ideal, unreal. We can hardly fancy that the reality alters in itself with our conceptions of it. It is, therefore, advisable to keep the two things separate, and not confound our thought with the thing as real existence. So the nature of Time itself cannot be supposed to be affected by Mr. Carr's arguments; it is only that our minds have been enlarged. Instead of having one conception of time we have two. So we can talk of time and not mean Time, and we can confuse ourselves and those who listen to us. And Mr. Carr does not show that our conceptions are inconsistent with the real reality merely by comparing one conception with another, and showing that these differ. For Mr. Bradley's argument does not compel us to believe that people's ideas of things do not differ.

Mr. Carr's mistake evidently springs from the idea that his conception is not a conception, but is real. So we must consider whether a conception manipulated in the manner described can bring us face to face with Ultimate Reality? Can we know the infinite by the simple process suggested? And what an easy process it is! What a pleasant amusement for winter evenings! You take a conception, dismiss all content except "bare being," and there is the noumenon behind phenomena. But why, it may be asked, retain one quality of phenomena and transfer that, and that alone, to real existence? Why should this one quality be taken and the rest condemned? Because, I suppose I may be told, the other qualities are

evidently relative, and cannot, therefore, be true of the real without modification; and, besides, they contradict each other. But if “being” can be perceived, it must have reference to some other to whom it must seem. Our idea of “being” cannot form part of any real subject or existent, as such, for whether we affirm that A is, or A is not, the subject remains the same in either case. The meaning of the statement itself demands that neither more nor less shall be present in the actual world than just the A thought of by me (*cf.* Sigwart’s *Logic*, English translation, p. 72 *seq.*). “Being” expresses the relation of a subject of thought to my faculty of knowledge. And that is why as a quality it does not conflict with what is directly given to sense. “Being,” as the term is used in *Metaphysic* and *Logic*, is never directly given, but is deduced. It is simply the most general characteristic of every perception.

Mr. Carr’s attitude seems to me peculiar. Everything that really matters—for instance, the feelings of pleasure and pain—he is quite prepared to throw overboard. They are secondary qualities, and but seem. But the bare deduced “isness” of these illusory qualities is sacred. The “isness” of appearance is real, but the contents of perception are unreal. No defence of this procedure is given; and I must confess I am unable to imagine any.

But Mr. Bradley’s position is clearly defined. Nothing can be thought of until it has attained sentient perception. Sentient perception or experience has reality as an adjective of the real, but the “isness” predicated by experience belongs to the appearance and not to the real existence qualified by the experience. That the presence of the adjective may be taken as an indication of the existence of something is doubtless true. There is real existence certainly, but it just as certainly is not its appearance. In the present case Time and Space are the appearances, and as such they qualify real existence, but are unreal as Time and Space—*i.e.*, as revealed through sensuous

perception. We cannot suppose that every appearance is real in its own nature and as appearance. So Mr. Bradley's position is that Time and Space, in so far as they are ideas of what has been experienced, are appearances, and in so far as they are names applied to what has not been perceived by sense, they have no meaning. In other words: So far as there is any sense in these conceptions they cannot be absolutely real. And to this Mr. Carr replies in effect: If we take these conceptions as, literally, nonsense, they are absolutely real.

It is evident that when Mr. Carr criticises Mr. Bradley's treatment of Time, Space, &c., he is using words in a different sense. Mr. Carr's conception of "bare isness," which he calls Time "in itself," has no connexion whatever with the meaning of Mr. Bradley's Time. Mr. Carr writes: "Duration and Succession have no meaning as applied to time itself; they apply only to that which is in time. Before and after are not conceivable, have no meaning as applied to time itself; they fall within time." Of continuity and discreteness Mr. Carr writes: "To me these attributes appear quite unmeaning as applied to pure space; they are applicable only to the content of space. No break of any kind is imaginable in space. Nothing can divide it in the sense of coming between one part and another." "Infinite divisibility and infinite extensibility . . . are perfectly consistent" as applied to pure space. "It is only where content is involved that contradiction can enter." "All divisions fall within space—are in it, not of it. There are no parts of space . . . the parts do not combine to form the whole, nor is the whole composed of the parts." Space is not a relation, but is it a substance? "I find it impossible to apply such terms as 'solid,' 'repulsive,' 'simple,' or even 'without' and 'within,' to pure space, they seem to me to have meaning only for that which occupies it."

But Mr. Carr objects to the statement that space empty of all content is an unreal abstraction. Mr. Bradley's words are "Empty space—space without some quality (visual and

muscular), which in itself is more than spatial—is an unreal abstraction. It cannot be said to exist, for the reason that it cannot by itself have any meaning. When a man realises what he has got in it, he finds that always he has a quality which is more than extension. But if so, how this quality is to stand to the extension is an insoluble problem. It is a case of ‘inherence,’ which we saw was in principle unintelligible.” To which Mr. Carr replies, “Perceived space . . . must have some quality. But space, as we conceive it, . . . has no visual or muscular quality. But that is no ground for rejecting it as an unreal abstraction. I can annihilate in thought everything that occupies space, but by no power of thought can I annihilate space itself. Figure, colour, solidity, or any spatial quality abstracted from space is nothing, is unrepresentable to the imagination, but space itself is entirely different to its contents.” These extracts make it clear that Mr. Carr’s conception of space is something that has no connection with space as perceived. He admits that his conception of the unperceived has no meaning, but he does not admit that that is a reason for calling it an unreal abstraction. It rather serves to guarantee its reality, for it does not contradict any of our experience. It is evident, I think, that Mr. Carr’s distinction between conception and perception requires examination. As Mr. Carr uses them they seem to agree very much with the slipshod use of such terms in the popular psychology of the moment. But it is evident that what Mr. Carr says of his unmeaning conceptions does not touch Mr. Bradley’s arguments which show that all conceptions which are not unmeaning belong to space as perceived.

(With reference to Mr. Carr’s statement that “the question of the perception of space has been specially excluded by Mr. Bradley from the argument,” I can only ask in astonishment for the production of the passage.)

Of Pure Time Mr. Carr tells us that it is not discrete, “it is one and unchangeable.” “It is independent of events” in

time, it is "not a relation of its parts." "Before" and "after" do not qualify it. It is infinite.

Of these conceptions of time and space, Mr. Carr adds, they "may be impossible to represent to the imagination or to realise in thought, but they are not self-contradictory, nor meaningless, nor inconceivable."

I must confess that a conception "impossible to represent to the imagination or to realise in thought" seems to me to be inconceivable and meaningless; though I am glad I can agree with Mr. Carr in thinking that what is meaningless is not self-contradictory. But I fail to see how, whatever view we take of this, it affects Mr. Bradley's main position.

There can be no doubt, I think, then, that when Mr. Carr speaks of Time and Space he does not mean what Mr. Bradley means by the same words. And the difference is seen to depend largely upon the sense in which the words perception and conception are used. So, instead of Mr. Carr's arguments affecting the position they are immediately criticising, they are seen to raise this other question: How far must conception depend upon perception? From the definition I have already given of Mr. Bradley's position it is evident that he regards conception as more closely related to perception than Mr. Carr does. And on this clear issue I do not think Mr. Carr's position can be maintained. He regards perception as the necessary preliminary to conception. But when perception has once existed it can then be totally dismissed as of no importance. The only thing that matters is the knowledge that it shall once have existed, and apparently that is all that is required to constitute a conception. I suppose Mr. Carr would confine perception to sentience, conception to the interpretation and extension by thought of what is given to sense. But the relation in which a conception must stand to sentience is not the same for Mr. Bradley as for Mr. Carr. Mr. Carr's conception is therefore not the exact equivalent for the terms Mr. Bradley prefers, Thought or Idea. I mention this as

much of the misunderstanding which seems to prevail with regard to Mr. Bradley's writings seems to depend largely upon a confusion of terminology. As this author's books owe their prominence and great value to the evident necessity for correcting the imperfections of current popular philosophy, it is obvious that such an object can only be attained by the employment, and perhaps invention, of a more accurate terminology. And until it is clearly understood that Mr. Bradley does not habitually use certain words in the loose and inconsistent sense in which, for instance, Mr. Herbert Spencer and Dr. Stout prefer to use them, the value of his contributions to modern thought are likely to be overlooked. Indeed, if this difference in phraseology is to be ignored, I do not see how he can escape being regarded as the writer of nonsense prose unfit for the nursery, in which light he has afforded so much amusement to members of the Aristotelian Society.

Connected with this point I confess I find it difficult to account for Mr. Carr's failure to draw attention to the one point in which Mr. Bradley is in hearty agreement with him; I allude to the evident necessity for transcending in thought what is immediately perceived. In the two or three chapters at the beginning of *Appearance and Reality*, Mr. Bradley argues that as a necessary part of the contents of sentient perception (which is evidently much more than bare sensation) turns out to be inconsistent, therefore Thought is urged on to reconcile them in a higher synthesis. Mr. Carr denies that there is any disparity, but says it disappears if we accept his higher conceptions. He simply offers us a rival metaphysical doctrine, which doctrine has no reason for existing if Mr. Bradley's contentions are not valid; if Mr. Carr's objections could be maintained—viz., that contradictory appearance is as absurd, as inconceivable, and as unthinkable as contradictory reality—his own doctrine of the “ Infinite ” is unnecessary, for there is nothing to explain. On the other hand, Mr. Bradley

considers that there is something that requires explanation, and, like Mr. Carr, he is prepared to turn to Thought for this. The inconsistency of time "directs us beyond itself. It points to something higher in which it is included and transcended" (p. 207). "Time is not real as such, and it proclaims its unreality by its inconsistent attempt to be an adjective of the timeless. It is an appearance which belongs to a higher character, in which its special quality is merged. Its own temporal nature does not there cease wholly to exist, but is thoroughly transmuted" (p. 209). And of space, its "essential nature . . . is entirely inconsistent. It attempts throughout to reach something which transcends its powers. It made an effort to find and to maintain a solid self-existence, but that effort led it away into the infinite process. . . . And its evident inability to rest within itself points to the solution of its discords. Space seeks to lose itself in a higher perception . . . and against the possibility of space being in this way absorbed in a non-spatial consummation, I know of nothing to set" (p. 222).

There seems to be a superficial resemblance between Mr. Carr's "conceptions" and Mr. Bradley's "higher perceptions." But there are important differences also, and I venture to think they are in Mr. Bradley's favour. To begin with, a higher perception that has meaning seems preferable to a conception that has none. The higher perception answers the purpose for which it exists, by reconciling in an intellectual synthesis the jarring and partial experiences of life. Mr. Carr's conception does not help us with our phenomena. If his ultimate realities have no connexion with our world of experience they cannot reconcile conflicting aspects of experience. If they are connected "we have, in effect, every unsolved problem which vexed us before; and we have, besides, this whole confusion now predicated" of the reality, which is "no longer, therefore, something by itself. But this perplexed attribution was precisely that which the doctrine intended to

avoid." If these "pure" realities have no connexion with our appearances how can they explain them? For, as Mr. Carr carefully points out, pure time and pure space have nothing in common with what seems time and space to us. Mr. Carr's ultimate realities are simply our old friends, "Things in themselves."

Instead of removing any of our difficulties Mr. Carr seems only to increase them; for, in addition to all our other troubles, he would set us wondering how in infinity there is room for two infinities—infinite time and infinite space.

But the serious point at issue is whether our ideal consummation is to include implicitly our world of finite or limited experience, or whether it is to stand apart from our existence, in the abstract "mere being" of some part of this existence. To me, I confess, Mr. Carr's unreal abstractions seem meaningless and devoid of any value. I certainly cannot consider that they annihilate or override my world of experience. For instance, the pleasures and pains which form part of sentient existence seem to me of much more importance than their abstract "isness." As Mr. Bradley says: "The appearances after all being what we experience, must be what matters for us. They are surely the one thing which, from the nature of the case, can possess human value. Surely, the moment we understand what we mean by our words, the Thing in itself becomes utterly worthless and devoid of all interest. And we discover a state of mind which would be ridiculous to a degree if it had not unfortunately a serious side. It is contended that contradictions in phenomena are something quite in order, so long as the Thing in itself is not touched. That is to say, that everything which we know and can experience does not matter, however distracted its case, and that this purely irrelevant ghost is the ark of salvation to be preserved at all costs. But how it can be anything to us whether something outside our knowledge contradicts itself or not is simply unintelligible. What is too visible in our own readiness to

sacrifice everything which possesses any possible claim on us, and what is to be inferred is our confusion, and our domination by a theory which lives only in the world of misunderstanding."

That Mr. Carr's criticisms betray an elaborate and profound misconception of Mr. Bradley's arguments I think I have produced evidence to show. Much of it seems due to Mr. Carr's failure to distinguish between ideas and what they stand for, between predicate and subject, between appearance and reality. On the other hand, what makes Mr. Bradley's book so valuable is its masterly and exhaustive demonstration of the urgent necessity for distinguishing between Thought and what must be regarded as an other to Thought. "Thought's relational content can never be the same as the subject, either as that subject appears or as it really is. The reality that is presented is taken up by thought in a form not adequate to its nature" (p. 179). It is futile to talk about regarding things *sub specie aeternitatis*. And the confusion between subject and predicate leads Mr. Carr to mistake the sense in which Mr. Bradley uses the word "contents," and to apply it to the subject instead of to the predicate. It is this failure to distinguish between thought and fact which has led to the production of Mr. Carr's irrelevant abstractions, and which has induced him to regard them as explaining what he endeavours to show needs no explanation.

In the discussion on Mr. Finberg's paper, Mr. CARR made the following remarks :—

Mr. Finberg has done me great honour in devoting a paper to a reply to my criticism of some of Mr. Bradley's arguments in my paper read last session. There are a few instances of mistake as to my meaning which I will notice, and then attempt to reply to some of the criticisms.

1. Mr. Finberg represents me as saying that the ideas of space, time, motion, causation, &c., are in Mr. Bradley's view

a "pure negation." His words are "they are not a 'pure negation' as Mr. Carr puts it." The only passage I can find in which I have used the phrase is that at the beginning of my paper in which I attempt to justify my title, "Mr. Bradley's Theory of Appearance," against a supposed objector who might hold that Appearance is a pure negation (*A. S. Proc.*, 1901-2, p. 215). It is not my own view nor my idea of Mr. Bradley's view.

2. On p. 32 Mr. Finberg quotes a sentence which he says he quite agrees with. Unfortunately the subject of the sentence which he supplies in parenthesis is not the subject of my sentence. It is not "our conceptions," but "the inconsistencies Mr. Bradley finds in our ordinary conceptions" that I have said cannot be a full or a true analysis of experience.

3. The passage Mr. Finberg calls on me to produce (p. 37) he will find in *Appearance and Reality*, p. 35. I must acknowledge that I ought to have specified more distinctly that the question excluded is that of the psychological origin of the perception of space. I did not imagine anyone would fail to understand that intention.

4. Mr. Finberg has called attention to my use of the word "conception." The word is my own choice, but I claim to have used it consistently and I do not think it has caused my critic to misunderstand my meaning. I confess however that if I were re-writing the paper I should be careful to use Mr. Bradley's own word "idea," and if at the time of writing my paper I had had in mind the first chapter of Mr. Bradley's *Logic* in which he carefully defines his use of the word I should most certainly have felt bound to do so. But though I have used a different word I do not think anyone will charge me with meaning a different thing. By our "conceptions" of space, time, motion, causation, &c., I intend only what Mr. Bradley calls our ideas or thoughts of them.

My paper dealt entirely with what I may describe as Mr. Bradley's "inconsistency" argument, and its special

application to the ideas of space, time, motion, change, causation, and activity. I have endeavoured to show that thorough inconsistency is incompatible not only with what Mr. Bradley defines as reality, viz., the self-subsistent, but also with the appearance of such reality. In order to show this I have examined the particular nature of the contradictoriness exhibited by these ideas and have found it to consist in the necessary attribution of infinity to the ideas of space and time. I have argued that infinity rightly conceived is not a source of contradictions in these ideas but is the reconciler of contradictions.

I will now deal with Mr. Finberg's criticisms.

1. I am charged with having misrepresented Mr. Bradley's theory of Appearance, in having said that according to it the contradictory appears. Mr. Finberg reminds me that only the reality can appear; that appearance is appearance of reality. With this view I entirely agree. Appearance belongs to reality; if there be no reality there can be no appearance. But I am examining the "inconsistency" argument, which is that the appearance is appearance and not reality because it is self-contradictory and inconsistent. Consistency is the test by which appearance is distinguished from reality. Reality so far as it is distinguished from its appearance is nothing more than the not-inconsistent which is constituted by the inconsistency of the appearance. The appearance is the whole experience, and that is inconsistent with itself, contradictory through and through. If the appearance exhibits contradiction, the contradictory appears. It is no assumption. It is nothing to the point to say that the contradiction in the appearance is due to the one-sided or partial aspect of the reality. Mr. Finberg quotes my sentence, "It is not that there appears to be a contradiction: that would be a mere way of saying that there is error in our conception." He replies, "But that is exactly the argument." To which I reply, surely not; such a contention would simply reduce

the argument to absurdity. The contradiction in the idea is an actual contradiction. Take the example discussed in my paper, “Motion implies that what is moved is in two places in one time.” If what is intended is that there merely appears to be a contradiction, it should have been written, “Motion seems to imply, but does not really imply, that what is moved is in two places in one time.” The point of Mr. Bradley’s argument is that motion is an absolute contradiction so far as the appearance is concerned.

2. Mr. Finberg objects to my contention that reality with Mr. Bradley is an unknown *x*. He declares “that we have positive knowledge of reality through our experience.” “It is the reality that acts upon us, therefore we have this positive knowledge—it can hardly be called negative.” All that I say is that it is not positive knowledge of reality as such, any more than it is direct experience of reality as such. Reality is postulated to justify appearance from which it is distinguished.

3. I am criticised as setting up a rival theory. This rival theory is not my theory, nor have I any theory so far as the present argument is concerned. What I have called in my paper “a simple positive argument, which seems to me to establish the reality in the absolute sense of our conceptions of space and time,” is an argument which, though not stated in the terms Mr. Bradley makes use of, was yet, I thought, based on premises that he would grant. I now know that this is not so. Mr. Bradley, in some remarks on my paper that were read in the discussion, said on this point that I appear to assume that the timeless is consistent. I admit that the positive argument in my paper does make this assumption, and if it is not admitted by Mr. Bradley, then of course as against him my argument fails. Mr. Finberg’s criticism is based on an entire misconception of my meaning. He represents me as saying that “bare being” is one of the contents of a conception or idea that might maintain the reality of that conception when all other content is gone. At least, this

seems to me the meaning of his long disquisition on my conception of "isness." I never intended any such nonsense as he ascribes to me. The distinction I intended was simply Mr. Bradley's distinction between content and existence, not a distinction between one of the contents and the rest, and I do not suppose content and existence to be separable because distinguishable. My argument was to show that existence *sub specie aeternitatis* is existence without content or meaning and therefore unthinkable. The reason I used these terms which are not Mr. Bradley's in criticising Mr. Bradley is that the inconsistencies and contradictions in our ideas which are exposed by his dialectic appear to depend largely, if not entirely, on a distinction between an in-time and a timeless existence.

III.—TIME, NECESSITY, LAW, FREEDOM, FINAL CAUSE, DESIGN IN NATURE.

By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON.

IT is the property of Dialectic to raise problems, it is the property of Analysis to solve them ;—just the reverse of the ordinary conception of philosophy, according to which it is Metaphysic which propounds, Dialectic which solves, philosophical questions. Of the terms composing the title of the present paper, Time is that which will be found to contain the key to the puzzles, of which the other terms are names. But it is Time as discovered and laid bare by subjective, that is, metaphysical analysis, Time conceived, not as a single empirical and yet purely formal entity, but as an inseparable co-element in every, even the least, empirical experience, incapable by itself of empirical, that is, separable existence, and yet real in the sense of contributing, as an inseparable co-element, to make all empirical experience what it is.

Nothing can be more futile as a philosophical method than that kind of Dialectic which consists in taking our ideas, concepts, or categories, as *data*, defining them severally by what we suppose to be their essential nature, and then seeking to bring them into some systematic construction, free from mutual contradiction. It is a delusion to suppose that, because all philosophy is thinking, and the very process of thinking turns everything it thinks of into general ideas or concepts, therefore it can think of nothing which is not already a general idea or concept. It is a delusion closely parallel to that which leads us to imagine that, because mathematic begins and proceeds by numbering and making units, therefore units and numbers exist as entities in nature before we begin to count ; a delusion to

which probably is in a great measure owing that famous puzzle of the One and the Many, which has exercised the ingenuity of golden academic youth in all ages, beginning with that of the first Academy. For the mathematical priority of 1 to 2, of 2 to 3, and so on, in the operation of counting, becomes as it were a bridge, by which we fallaciously transfer the distinction between the One and the Many to the order of real genesis in Nature, and so endeavour to conceive the One as the originator, or fertile womb, of the Many, instead of regarding both alike as products of thought applied to perception. A few words bearing on these points will be found later on, when I come to speak of Laws of Nature.

Thought, on the contrary, far from assuming its own result, general concepts, as its own pre-supposition, both can and does *de facto* distinguish, in the moment of thinking, the object thought of from its own present dealing with that object; that is, it deals with it irrespective of the change which its present operation is working in it, that operation being not at that moment objectively before it. Unless this were so, we could never think of anything as simply present or as an individual, apart from its membership of a class, or from its particular as opposed to its individual character. True, we classify it even in calling it simply present or individual; but this classifying results from our present thinking of it, and does not belong to the object thought of prior to our thinking of it.

Now this being so, thought both can and, in philosophy, ought to distinguish, not only between its object thought of and its own present dealing with that object, but also, within that object, between a part or parts which are its own presupposition, whether as condition or as material, and its own law or constitution as a thinking process. A thinking process with self-created or self-creating concepts, ideas, or categories, is not an ultimate *datum* of experience, but a fictitious entity, obtained by disregarding the analysis of the really experienced thinking process, which is something highly complex, and partly if not

chiefly dependent, for its nature and properties, upon simpler states and processes of consciousness.

This method of philosophising, this kind of Dialectic, is therefore bad for several reasons, the chief of which may perhaps be stated as follows :—

First. Because it has tacitly or openly to assume an energy or agency, either in abstract thought itself, or in its concepts, ideas, or categories, or in some transcendental Ego or Subject, as thinking agent.

Second. Because it takes the ideas, or whatever things are named by single words, as themselves single, without adverting to the fact, that names which are descriptive describe things by what they are predominantly, not by what they are solely or exclusively ; thereby setting up quite fictitious entities as ultimate realities.

Third. Because it assumes that the form of consciousness given in thought is ultimate, without enquiring whether thought itself is not conditioned upon the nature of the object-matter with and upon which it is said to operate.

All these assumptions are wholly unwarranted as initial assumptions in philosophy. They denaturalise it, inasmuch as they make it arbitrary, dependent on the ideas, concepts, or categories, which may happen to commend themselves as ultimate to particular thinkers, and on the definitions which they may choose to give, as expressing their essential nature.

But now to come somewhat closer to the special questions of this paper. There are two well-known ways of approaching phenomena with the purpose of increasing knowledge, the scientific and the philosophical, which together exhaust and cover the entire field. Of these the scientific assumes, to begin with, the existence of some generally admitted real objects of common-sense ideas, designated usually by single words, which fall under the two comprehensive classes of—Matter, with its energies, on one side ; Mind, with its energies, on the other, the

object-matter respectively of physical and psychological science. Each endeavours to arrive at a knowledge of the nature of its objects, which are assumed to be realities, by watching them in operation, and ascertaining the laws of their processes, interactions, history, and evolution. And this being so, it is clear that no branch of science ever gets beyond the range of common-sense ideas, since it is restricted by its own initial assumptions—namely, by its ideas (or no-ideas) of those assumed realities—Matter, with its energies, on the one side, Mind, with its energies, on the other, which it has taken as its basis and starting point.

The other or philosophical way of approaching phenomena is very different. It makes no assumptions to begin with, but, in approaching phenomena from the subjective side, begins by analysing the knowledge which we have of them—that is to say, consciousness or experience itself, apart from any assumption that it is *we* who have the consciousness, or that either *we* or *matter* are the objects known in or by the consciousness. Experience *per se* is the thing analysed. How experience is possible, is a question to be answered, if at all, by means of analysing experience itself. In fact, the two first and most important questions of philosophy are those concerning the reality of those two objects which science assumes to begin with, on the warrant of common-sense, Matter and Mind with their several energies. What we mean by *reality*, what we mean by *being*, what we mean by *energy*, and so on, through an indefinitely long list of current words and phrases, are among the first questions which philosophy proposes to itself, and, for answers to which, it goes, not to hypothesis, but to analysis of experience. Not to mention that even hypotheses must be drawn ultimately from experience, since the imagination of them must have been suggested by it.

Moreover, no limits of any kind are assumed, to begin with, by the philosophical line of thought; it does not assume that experience is limited in any way whatever. Neither does it

assume that it is unlimited. The idea of a limit, boundary, or limitation, like every other idea, is itself drawn from and discovered in phenomena. The field of science and scientific hypotheses is therefore contained within, and its conceptions are valid only within, the field of philosophy. No hypothesis concerning the origin, the genesis, the reason, the possibility, of the field of philosophy—that is, of experience—is possible. Science itself limits its own field by assuming particular objects—Matter with its energies, and Mind with its energies—as its given basis. Whatever pretension the criticist, or neo-criticist, or absolutist, or any other so-called philosophical school may make, to give an account of the origin, genesis, reason, or possibility of experience as an *analysandum*, you will find in the end that they are accounting for it only on the assumption of the existence of some particular individual Mind, or some particular Energy of such a mind—say, for instance, of Thought—an assumption which presupposes the existence of that which they are professing to account for.

In short, there is no *datum* beyond experience as an *analysandum*; being a *datum means* being within it or co-extensive with it. When from this experience we have got the ideas of end and beginning, of limitation, of difference and similarity, of knowing and not knowing, and so on, then indeed we can and do distinguish between a part of the field of experience which is positively known or knowable, and another part which is not positively known or knowable, and again between a part which is positively known to exist, and another part which is positively known not to exist. But all these and such like distinctions of experience lie within the field of experience as an *analysandum*; and this is why we have some sort of grip even of what is non-existent, unreal, purely imaginary, or pure nothing, or, in other words, how it is, that these and similar words have a meaning for us.

Moreover, we have in subjective analysis, or analysis of experience simply, a test of completeness, which is wanting in

merely scientific procedure; I mean the circumstance of our arriving at elements in it, which taken by themselves are simple, and yet cannot stand or be experienced alone, but require some equally simple co-element in order to enter into experience at all. This circumstance, which gives a limit and completeness to the metaphysical principle which I have named *the distinction of inseparables*, supplies a new justification for holding all philosophy to be *metaphysical*, as going beyond the concrete or empirical, while at the same time it never carries us beyond the region of experience, nor admits of a recourse to so-called noumenal entities beyond phenomena. All such entities would, in fact, be empirical, though purely imaginary.

The scientific line of thought is thus for ever precluded from successfully expanding into a philosophy, in either of its main branches, physical or psychical. It places itself, by its initial assumption, at the point of view of the Existent, as if the meaning of this term was known *a priori*, instead of at the point of view of Experience, or Knowledge of existence. But of the two terms, Existence and Experience, it is only Experience which neither calls for nor admits of explanation. It and its meaning are one. It is the evidence but not the creator of the Existent.

But perhaps you will say, is it not itself an existent, and that in its whole extent, so that it is itself the only existent of which it gives evidence, and is evidence and existence in one? That it is so is the contention of what is known as philosophic Idealism. But to answer the question so raised, that is, whether experience, or consciousness as a knowing, does or does not contain evidence of the existence of something other than consciousness itself, we must go to the analysis of experience, or consciousness, and nowhere else. It is as necessary to do so in the solution of this the Idealistic contention, as it is in answer to the contention of physicists or psychologists, when they attempt to base philosophy upon the assumption

either of Matter or of Mind. And it is so for the same reason, namely, that it is only in consciousness or experience that the meaning of either of the terms, Being or Existence, is to be found, and that to begin a philosophy with the dogma, that these terms have no other meaning but experience or consciousness, is to claim an *a priori* knowledge of the meaning of those terms, which is an unwarranted assumption. Idealism must stand or fall by the results of subjective analysis.

What, then, does subjective analysis tell us in respect of those terms which form the purpose of the present paper? I will begin with the first of them—time, and bring it into connection with the three next—necessity, law, and freedom. Its elucidatory power depends entirely on that feature in it which is revealed by subjective analysis, its being an element only, but also an inseparable and indispensable element, in all experience. Taken in this way it is a continuum which is the pre-requisite of, and also overlaps, as it were, every division or limitation; no beginning or end of it can be presented or represented in consciousness; all divisions fall within it, for these are derived from differences in its co-element of feeling or qualitative content; so that wherever, or in whatever empirically real object of experience or of thought, we may take either a beginning or an end of existence to lie, we are compelled to recognise that we have taken, and can take, no absolute beginning or end, but only one which has reference to our present state of knowledge, and not only so, but that also no absolute beginning or end is ever possibly representable in thought.

Time, moreover, as such a continuous and inseparable element, cannot be treated as if it were itself an empirical or complete object; it cannot be said to *flow equably*, or to *flow* at all; it is the condition, for empirical objects, both of their changing or moving, and also of their remaining unchanged or stationary. Nevertheless it is not itself fixed, nor are its parts simultaneous. It is a continuum, but a peculiar one, a

continuum of time; it is duration, abstract duration; but, though abstract, not general in the logical sense, not a logical but a perceptual universal—that is to say, it is not the object of a concept covering a number of particulars, as *colour* covers *red*, *yellow*, *blue*, and so on, but a single though abstract continuous thing, having or capable of having parts or portions distinguished in it; an abstract continuum, in no part or portion of which, however minute, or however simple its content, is the end simultaneous with the beginning. *A fortiori* the same thing is true of longer portions, however great their length.

On these accounts we have to think of the universe as infinite, in the sense of existing in time, and having no absolute beginning or end; at the same time it must be thought of as a single thing, owing to the same feature of time-continuity; and this feature, it will be remarked, is a condition to which thought itself is subjected, not one which it can conceive absent or abolished, but one which is inherent in every possible content or object, in or upon which it operates. Thought itself moves only by drawing ideal lines of momentary arrest in a time-process. Time is common to every mode of consciousness, thought included. When we think of time, or of the universe, as infinite, we entertain indeed definite thoughts of them, but we do not reverse their infinity as objects thought of; nor do we make them into objects of logically general terms or concepts; we treat them as individuals, just as when we say *this* individual man, *this* particular tree—that is to say, having, by thought, classified them, we return them again, by thought, to the perceptual order, and our thought of them then simply represents the perceptually given facts which enforce and are essential to that attribution of infinity.

Now, it will be noticed that our thinking is here subjected to a necessity, we cannot get rid of those features of continuity and infinity which attach to all contents of consciousness or experience, independently of the operations of thought upon or with them. But what is meant here by necessity? There

are two main kinds of necessity: one the necessity of constraint or compulsion, the other that of thought, or logical necessity. To which of these two kinds does the necessity here spoken of belong? In some sort it may be said to belong to both, logical because it appears in the texture of concrete thought, compulsory because imposed on, and irreversible by, thought. But it becomes a logical necessity only when and because it is imposed on thought by its pre-logical conditions; its source lies in those conditions, not in the thinking process itself. Its recognition is not, like that of the principles of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, involved in and essential to the thinking process as a process, as when we say Black is Black, and isn't not-Black. It is an universal feature in the perceptually given content or object of thought, but this universality need not be consciously made use of, in order that the thinking process should be carried on, though the disregarding it is inevitably attended with error in the constructions which that process leads to. It is an universality, but not a strictly logical necessity, an universality of fact, not a logical necessity of thought. There is no logical necessity that there should be an universe, a reality, an existence; there is no logical necessity that, being, they should be infinite. These things are facts simply, but universal, practically inevitable, always found when we find anything. We cannot put a logical necessity at the beginning of Being, or of Existence. And this universality of simple fact and time-continuity, a perceptually given comprehensiveness, is plainly a very different thing from what is known as logical universality, the universality expressed by logical universals or general terms.

But even strictly logical necessity, the necessity expressed by the laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, and by Aristotle's *Dictum de omni*, is an instance of the great metaphysical law of the distinction of inseparables. It cannot be hypostasised as a self-existent necessity. The

thinking process is a process of consciousness, consisting of changes in the process-content of consciousness, according to those logical laws just spoken of, and it is in obedience to, or rather fulfilment of, those logical laws that its necessity, known as logical necessity, consists. But as an existent process it depends upon, and is inseparable from, an energy, or group of energies, which some conceive as belonging to and exerted by a physical agent, the brain, and others as belonging to and exerted by an immaterial or spiritual agent, the Mind or the Ego; and in this, its existential character, no logical necessity attaches to it. In this character, namely, as an existential process, it has either no necessity at all, or whatever necessity it has is also of an existential character, falling under the head of the necessity of constraint or compulsion. And it makes no difference to the validity of this metaphysical distinction, whether we conceive the existential process, upon which the process of thought as a process of consciousness immediately depends, as the process or activity of a physical or of an immaterial agent. It is as an existent process simply, that it is exempt from logical necessity. Logical necessity is a necessity entirely within consciousness as a knowing, a thought about facts whereby we seek to give a reason for their existence, not itself a fact as distinguished from the thought of it, but a thought which only as such is a fact. The necessity of constraint or compulsion, on the other hand, may lie beyond immediate consciousness as a knowing, because appertaining to facts in their existential character, in which it and they may be knowable only as objects of inference.

We see, then, from what has now been said, that if we take pure thought—that is, the thinking process *per se*—as our primary datum, the awareness of logical necessity precedes and dominates the awareness of universality as a fact, because thought, of which it is the law, belongs to the subjective aspect of things, and the subjective aspect, being a knowing, is the condition of our knowing fact, that is, being or existence of

every kind, which is the objective aspect of things, inclusive of all its features, universality being one of them. We can then readily imagine, though erroneously, that universality of fact, the perceptually given kind of universality, is a particular case of logical necessity, or conditioned upon it as the more fundamental and comprehensive fact of the two. The truth, as we can now see, is, that logical necessity is in no other way the *prius* or foundation of universality of fact, than as it is involved in the knowing or thought of such universality, that is, in just the same way, and the same sense, as it is involved in the thought of any other feature in facts, say, for instance, their contingency, transitoriness, particularity, or complexity. In short, logical necessity belongs wholly to the subjective aspect or knowing of things. If, however, you objectify it as being itself a fact, you *ipso facto* subsume it under the conception of universality, which from this the objective or existential point of view is the more comprehensive conception of the two, and are compelled to seek for the explanation of the uniformity of its laws, in just the same way as for that of any other equally complex psychological function. This, however, compels a recourse, in all instances, to the pre-logical or perceptual data of experience, which are the presupposition and material of thought.

There is, therefore, no possibility of placing logical necessity at the source of things, unless it be by ascribing real agency or efficiency to thought, simply as a special part of the subjective aspect or knowing of things, that is to say, by imagining it to be being and knowing at once, and in one and the same respect, self-existent, and creative of its own content. The other kind of necessity, necessity in the sense of constraint and compulsion (including, of course, attractive as well as repulsive forces), belongs clearly to the objective or existential aspect of things, as its contrary, freedom, also does; and all cases of it must plainly lie within, not beyond, the universe of things, which, as we have seen, is inevitably, as a fact, conceived

as infinite in time, owing to time being continuous and an inseparable element in all experience. The conception *universe* precludes the possibility of intelligibly putting the question concerning it, whether its existence is free or compelled.

And here I approach that part of the subject of this paper which will to many, perhaps, be the most interesting. Is there such a thing as freedom or free action in the really existing universe? And if there is, then is the psychological function of will or volition capable of it? Is free-will a fact? Of course, it is not my intention to argue this old question at any length, but only to make some few remarks which may serve to put the point of view from which to regard it in its true light. We all know what is meant by compulsion or constraint. Every particle of matter, organic and inorganic, must be conceived as possessing and capable of exerting some degree of energy. When the energies exerted by one group or groups of material particles repress or deflect those exerted by another group or groups of such particles, the action of the latter group or groups is said to be compelled or constrained by the action of the former. The requisite conditions, in the environment, for both actions are, of course, presupposed. When, the same presupposition being made, the energies exerted by any group or groups are not so compelled or constrained by the energies of another group or groups, but are left to exert themselves in obedience to the internal constitution of the group or groups they belong to, then the action of those groups is said to be free. I think it will be generally admitted that there are many actions—namely, those universally classed as volitional or voluntary—which must come under this conception of freedom, and that they must do so, whether we take them as energies exerted by single immaterial agents, or by groups of material particles of brain substance. I take freedom, therefore, in this ordinary and empirical sense of the term, as an established fact; and I think that free-will, in this sense of the term, is the fact which chiefly contributes to give us both

what is called the sense of freedom, and also what is called the sense of responsibility, when the Subject's attention is drawn to the nature of his own experience in exercising volition.

It is the question as to the truth of this sense of freedom, and the truth of this sense of responsibility—that is, as to the reality of freedom in free-will—which gives this latter question its extreme interest and importance in Ethic and Theology. The difficulty in solving it lies in the elusive character of the agent, at least in the present state of our psychological knowledge. We cannot, so to speak, lay hold of the Ego or immaterial agent *per se*; neither can we (at any rate at present) lay hold of and circumscribe that group or groups of cerebral particles, or define those modes of cerebral action, which (in physiological psychology) are from time to time the agents or the activities underlying volitional action. That is to say, we cannot observe the real agent at work, distinguish him from other agents or extraneous energies, and ascertain, either by inspection or introspection or inference, that his action is self-determined or determined from within. In default of this we have had recourse, as usual, to Dialectic, and to attempted definitions of freedom. Some have asserted its reality, by supposing it to consist in the self-determination of the universe. Others have denied its reality, by opposing it to determination by uniform law, or laws of nature. These I think are the main heads under which speculations concerning it fall.

As to the first of these I have already argued, that neither freedom nor necessity is a conception applicable to the universe in its totality, both of them being precluded by the conception of the universe in its totality as infinite, and the conception of infinity overriding that of a closed or completed totality. But a few words must be said on the second conception, that which opposes freedom, not to superior compelling energy, but to uniform law, which it is maintained admits of no breach,

unless we are prepared to admit the influx of Chaos, which again is itself a term for a wholly unintelligible and unthinkable idea. And at any rate it is perfectly true, that the uniformity of law in all regions of the universe, beyond as well as within the range of our positive knowledge, is an axiom, or postulate, or ideal, with which no rational being can afford to dispense. At the same time it must be recognised, that it is an uniformity which supposes unremitting change, as the material subject to it. Nothing whatever, not even the smallest time-content, ever occurs twice exactly as it occurs once; but, along with its time-movement, some change in its quiddity also must be conceived as taking place, were it only in virtue of its change of relation to its environment. Uniformity, in fact, presupposes change, just as Identity presupposes difference. But this does not derogate from the validity of either, as axioms of rational thought and knowledge. I am not, therefore, about to deny the universality of uniform law, but simply to maintain that universal uniformity, not being the contrary of freedom or free activity, is in no way incompatible with the reality of freedom.

Law implies uniformity, and uniformity law; where there is one, there also is the other. And they are present in phenomena simply as observed, verified, inferred, or anticipated features; no energy, force, activity, or agency, is included in the simple fact of law natural. But to oppose it to free-activity is *ipso facto* to attribute activity or agency to it, that is, to hypostasise it as an agency of a particular, that is, an uniform kind. This goes, so to speak, beyond the record, and is an empiricist fallacy. It is not as if law natural was like civil law, which is a rule laid down beforehand to govern certain actions, and enforced by the civil power of the law-giver behind it. Laws of Nature are made by, and exhibited in, the actions which they are figuratively said to govern. They are inseparable features of those actions, which are figuratively said to obey them. The actions produce the laws

in producing themselves—that is, in their own course of proceeding. The opposite or empiricist fallacy arises from first distinguishing abstract law from abstract content, then forgetting that so distinguished they are abstractions made for convenience of thinking, and then hypostatising them in imagination as separable entities, capable the one of governing, the other of being governed. To make entities of such abstractions is empiricism. The energies of real agents work uniformly. To try to conceive them working otherwise is to try to conceive Chaos. That is the simple fact. But it is no justification for characterising that working, that action, as unfree.

This conception of the true relation of laws of nature to the operations which exhibit them flows immediately from the conception of Time as an inseparable element of all phenomena, of all experience, which has been set forth above. At whatever point we may, for the purpose of any inquiry, take as the origin, either of any phenomenon or set of phenomena, or of the knowable universe as a whole, we cannot but conceive it as existing, continuing, and proceeding in time, or (same thing) as involving time in itself and its proceeding. To conceive the existence of a law prior to such an origin, or not itself exhibiting the fact of existing, continuing, and proceeding in time, is impossible. How there come to be uniformities in natural operations is a misleading question; somewhat like the question, how there come to be differences and similarities in sensation. We find the uniformities there as a fact,—that is all we can say; and without them no other question about facts would be even intelligible.

Nothing is more astonishing in modern times, and in what calls itself philosophy, than that gross empiricism now signalised, which consists in hypostatising laws of nature, or the uniformity of the course of nature, as if they were efficient agencies, over and above the physical (or spiritual) agencies on which they are said to be imposed. It is a fallacy which has its

close parallel in that hypostasising of general terms or conceptions, which is known as mediæval or Scholastic Realism. What, let us ask, is a Law of Nature? It is a general term applied to processes, or energies, or actions, and grouping similar processes together, as other kinds of general terms group similar qualities, or attributes, or substances, together. And such general terms have just as little efficacy in producing the processes which they describe, and so in governing the Course of Nature, as those other general terms have in producing the qualities, attributes, or substances, which they serve to group. Similar agents in similar circumstances will act in similar ways, and produce similar results, at whatever times you may take them; but the agencies to which this similarity of operation is due belong to the agents, not to imaginary laws imposed upon the agents from without.

It will help us, perhaps, to apply here the scholastic distinction between Universals *ante rem*, *in re*, and *post rem*, a distinction which is quite as applicable to the mathematical, or as they may be called perceptual, universals, numbers, and figures, as to logical universals or general terms. It is only universals *post rem* that are positively known to us. We think of them, indeed, as actually existing *in re*, and in the case of the mathematical universals, perceive and imagine them as so existing; but then, in both cases, they *ipso facto* lose their character as logical universals or general conceptions; we do not know them *in re* as universals, and at the same time as distinguishable elements, in the *res* to which they belong. In the mathematical case, it is always an individual number or figure which we perceive or imagine. Now, Laws of Nature are universals which have their real existence as universals *in re*. Universals *ante rem* are fictitious entities made by surreptitiously assigning to universals *post rem* a separable existence, prior to and contributing to condition the nature of the *res*, from which the knowledge of them, as universals *post rem*, is derived.

It will be observed that the conception of freedom or free activity, including free-will, is one of those common-sense conceptions or ideas which are the *explicanda* or real problems of philosophy. It will also, I think, be evident, that the result of applying subjective analysis to the conception of free activity will be to establish the reality of a class of free actions, in this the ordinary sense of the term, as contradistinguished from constrained or compelled actions; which, in the case of free-will, is a sufficient basis for relying on the truth of what we call the *sense* of freedom, and the *sense* of our own responsibility for our free actions. At the same time, the same analysis removes both freedom on the one hand, and necessity, compulsion, and constraint on the other, from the class of ultimate characteristics, or unanalysable properties of activity, mutually exclusive, to the possession of one or the other of which every action is supposed to owe its essential nature of being either free or bond. On such a dialectical basis as the last sentence depicts, one may go on arguing for ever, either for or against the reality of free activity; and the case of volition will always offer what, on such a basis, will always seem an irresistible argument for its reality, in the *sense* of freedom which accompanies it. A supposed immediate sense of freedom will always seem to be at least an equipoise to any argument against its reality, drawn on a dialectical basis, either from the conception of logical necessity, or from that of an uniformly operating power, conceptions which must logically lead to the division of the universe between the two wholly unintelligible entities, pure activity on the one hand, and pure passivity on the other. But then the *sense* of freedom in volition is no more a proof of the reality of freedom, taken as an unanalysable ultimate, than the Reidian *sense* of the reality of Matter is a proof of the reality of Matter, against the disproof of it offered by Berkeleyan Idealism. It is subjective or, as I prefer to call it, metaphysical analysis, which alone seems to me to put these questions in their true light, while at the same time it

supports the truth of the conceptions of freedom, free-will, and responsibility, taken as common-sense objects thought of, and not as ultimate factors which enter as such, and, as it were, in their own right, into the constitution of the universe.

Free-will may perhaps be best conceived as the power of giving or withholding decisive weight to or from any one among conflicting motives, as compared with one another by reflective perception; or more briefly expressed, as the power of obeying or disobeying the dictates of conscience. We are here concerned with real agencies, though we have only the terms of their attendant consciousness, wherewith to lay hold of them in thought. In obeying these dictates the will is good, in disobeying them bad; bad, because it is then in discord with the agent's own knowledge. But in either case it is *free*, so long as the power remains of doing either the one or the other. And it must be noted that, without reflective comparison of motives, that is, without conscience, there is no will, nothing which can be called conscious choice, nothing but blind (though possibly conscious) action. Accordingly, the cerebral action which is attended by conscience must be conceived as additional to, and incorporated with, that action which is attended by consciousness simply, so that its exercise becomes a constant factor or motive agency in volitions, a factor having as its function to perceive and compare other motives with each other, and thereby, figuratively speaking, to hold the balance equably between them.

Now, it is in the distinction between these two inseparables—I mean the two functions of perceiving and deciding—that the freedom of volitions consists. For suppose that, figuratively speaking, a man is enslaved to a bad, or enslaved to a good, kind of motives, that is, to a bad or a good engrained habit and temper of mind, he may still retain, and in normal cases does retain, the power of dwelling upon the function of perceiving, and of thereby giving weight to its dictates, as itself a motive power, before finally deciding, in any particular

act of choice, in favour of the motive (whether it be good or bad) which has the force of engrained habit behind it. What conscience then tells him is to deliberate before he chooses; and he can decide to deliberate or not to deliberate, before he decides between the other motives then in conflict. In such cases as are now supposed, deliberation is the exercise and realisation of his freedom of choice. If in such cases he decides not to deliberate, he gives away, for the present act, his freedom of choice; but he gives away only what he already has, and by his natural constitution cannot but have, namely, his freedom, and does so only by an exercise of that very freedom, the exercise of which for the time he renounces. The act of refusing to deliberate is itself an act of choice, an act determined by the self-conscious agent, and recognised by him as his own.

Thus what the agent does in the cerebral process of volition is to remould the material offered by the other cerebral processes, and then re-issue it in the shape of acts of choice, each stamped, as it were, like a coinage, with his own image and superscription. It is this remoulding and re-issuing, not the whole act, including what I have called the offered material, which is in a special and distinctive sense the agent's own act, in every volition; a sense special and distinctive, because the act expresses what the agent *is*, not what he has or knows, and is an act the consequences of which, so far as they affect himself, be they good or bad, he knows and feels to be deserved and just. But as every act of remoulding and re-issuing thus contributes its quota to modify, in one direction or another, the agent's nature and the material offered to subsequent reactions, it is plain, not only that their cumulative effect must be very great, but that the consequences exclusively due to them must very soon exceed the power of the most searching self-examination to discriminate.

Yet it is as impossible to conceive a self-conscious agent devoid of this remoulding and re-issuing power, as it is to

conceive any, even the least, particle of matter devoid of physical motion or tendency to motion—that is, of what is called force or energy. And it is just this remoulding and re-issuing power that is meant, or ought to be meant, when we speak of free-will—that is, of free action in volition. With those dogmatists who refuse to attach any other meaning to freedom but one which includes the idea of a creation of acts *ex nihilo*, acts which are therefore not subject to the law of uniformity, it is of course useless to argue in support of a rationally intelligible freedom in volition—freedom in the same sense which it bears when applied to the relations between man and man, and between individuals and the community.

It only now remains for me to speak of the two last topics named in the title of this paper—Final Cause, and Design in Nature. And first of Final Cause. My way is smoothed by what I have already said. You probably anticipate my next remark: it is, that Final Cause, like Freedom, is the object thought of by a common-sense conception or idea, which can be profitably dealt with only by subjective analysis—that is to say, in respect of which it is for the subjective analysis of our conception of it, and not for dialectic, to decide whether or not the supposed object of that conception can be admitted, as an ultimate, indecomposable, and essential factor, into the constitution of the universe. The mere statement of the question seems to invite us at once to have recourse to Dialectic. It all depends, we seem to say to ourselves, on what we mean by Final Cause; and then we fly to some definition or other which seems to us most likely to harmonise with our prepossessions, whatever they may be.

But let us for once try the other, the analytical, method. Final Causation, as we positively know it in ordinary experience, is a very complex affair. It is found only in conscious agents. It is the only kind of causation into which, as ordinarily conceived, consciousness enters as an essential ingredient. It requires an anticipation in a present idea of some end to be

attained in the near or remote future, and this anticipatory idea in some way contains the motor power, or becomes the motive, of the action it is said to cause, by acting upon the conscious agent who both entertains the idea, and performs the action in consequence of it. Thus the conscious agent contains in himself both the cause of his action and the action said to be caused by it. That is to say, he is or contains both the efficient and the final cause of the action, in what is known as final causation; and both of these are really efficient—the motive in acting on the conscious agent, and the conscious agent in responding by an act of his own. Final Causation is thus a special and complex mode or kind of efficient causation, the mode in which anticipatory consciousness appears to come in as efficient agency, the anticipated end being also the motive of the action, its *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως*.

In no other of the four kinds or heads of causation signalised by Aristotle is this necessarily the case; neither the formal, nor the material, nor the efficient cause (which is *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως* simply), but the final cause only, appears to require, as an essential feature, that consciousness should be involved in it; according to the well-known dictum, *Causa finalis movet, non secundum suum esse, sed secundum suum esse cognitum*; or, in other words, that it is not the end, but our idea of the end, which determines our voluntary action. Volition in its lowest terms is presupposed by final causation, and *a fortiori* by action from design. All volition is selective or preferential, but the alternative courses need not be more than *felt* as different, and compared as *felt* with one another; no idea or conception of an end to be attained by adopting either of them is of necessity involved. When the idea of an end to be attained becomes the motive of voluntary action, and to the extent that it does so, that action becomes designed or purposive, as governed by an anticipation of its effect, and the part apparently played in it by consciousness becomes still more conspicuous.

Consider for a moment how important is the difference thus established, and what important consequences would follow, if final causation could be admitted as a single, ultimate, and unanalysable mode of causation, and in that character explanatory, within its own sphere, of phenomena generally. I say within its own sphere, because, so far as we have gone at present, it stands in conjunction with the three other heads of causation—the formal, the material, and the efficient; but it would soon be found to encroach upon and include first the efficient, and then even the formal and the material, as subordinate modes of itself, owing to its really concretion and complex character being assumed as single, ultimate, and indecomposable. It is not, however, to these consequences that I wish now to call attention. The essential difference (from which these consequences would follow) consists in this, that while causes belonging to the three other heads answer respectively the questions What? and How comes? a final cause alone answers, or professes to answer, and to answer at one stroke, the question Why? as well as the question How comes? It professes to give the reason or rationality of an action, as well as its *de facto* or efficient causation, thus making ideas into efficient causes. It professes to satisfy the demands of what is called the Practical Reason, as well as of what is called the Speculative Reason, or, in other words, the demands of thought directed to ascertain the Good and the Preferable in all its kinds, as well as of thought directed to ascertain the True in point of fact only. It is to Kant that we owe the full establishment of the fundamental distinction between the Practical and the Speculative Reason, though with him it is still entangled in the meshes of his peculiar ontological theory.

Now, as already said, there is no doubt whatever that, as a concrete empirical phenomenon, an object of common-sense ideas, and described by common-sense terms, final causation, or conscious action for purposes or from motives, is a fact of everyday experience, familiar to every one, every day and all

day long. The question is, how in philosophy we are to deal with this empirical fact. It is here that opinions and methods diverge. The crucial point is, where in the concrete phenomenon are we to place, to what constituent of it are we to attribute, the efficient causation, the agency concerned in it? There are, I think, but three main directions in which an answer has been and is still being sought, which it must suffice here to enumerate and very briefly characterise:—

1. The first, handed down from immemorial antiquity, takes the concrete phenomenon, of acting from motives in the human conscious being, simply as it stands, and assumes, by hypothesis, an immaterial agent or agency, called a Soul, Mind, or Ego, to account for it, as the seat at once of consciousness and of conscious action. But it must be noted, that those who hold this hypothesis have no knowledge whatever of their supposed immaterial agent or agency, other than or beyond what is contained in their actual experience of the concrete phenomenon to be accounted for. It cannot be said to contribute anything whatever towards its explanation, but is simply a statement that the phenomenon is self-explanatory. And the same is true of particular faculties of the supposed immaterial agent, each in its own department, such as the Will, the Intellect, the Imagination.

2. The second direction, which is that taken by strict Idealists, noticing the total absence of knowledge of any immaterial agent or agency *per se*, attributes the agency to the states or process-contents of consciousness itself. That is, they assign to consciousness alone, apart from any other agent, either material or immaterial, the task of producing the appearance, or rather of throwing itself into the form, of what, in common-sense thinking, we know as the real world of mind and matter, of persons and things, and of the laws of nature by which, in common-sense thought, that world seems to be governed. But I think it must be said, that no success has hitherto attended any attempt to show how this

transformation is possible, or by what laws of pure unsupported consciousness it can even be imagined to take place.

3. The third direction is that adopted by those (to whom, but with some important particularities of my own, I count myself to belong), who have recourse to physiological psychology for an explanation, taking the existence of a real world of organic and inorganic material existents, with their laws, as already proved. On this basis, and starting from what, on this basis, is a familiar and constantly observed fact, that sensations occur only in consequence of the stimulation of some part of the neuro-cerebral system by physical agencies, whether internal or external to the body, and taking account of the highly complex structure of the brain, and the connection of its parts with one another, and with nerves subserving outgoing action, it is (they hold) obvious and reasonable to suppose, that the whole course of redintegration or association of states or process-contents of consciousness, down to their minutest changes, and including those which constitute what are called volitions, or acts of conscious choice, is similarly dependent—that is to say, that its phenomena, one and all, occur only in consequence of some stimulation or change of stimulation in some part or parts of the cerebral organism. Even the well-known “*click* of resolve” in volitions, as Professor William James calls it, is probably dependent upon some corresponding “*click*,” or sudden change, having taken place in the underlying cerebral process; so that the causal efficacy, which is apparently due to an idea or desire acting upon the Ego, or upon other of his ideas or desires, is in reality due, not to that idea or desire, as a state or process-content of consciousness, but to the cerebral process underlying it, in conjunction and interaction with other cerebral processes.

The whole mechanism or machinery (so to call it), or organised operation of the efficient agency, concerned in the consciousness of conscious beings, is thus attributed by this hypothesis to the working of the living cerebral and neuro-cerebral

system, and is supposed to go on below the threshold of consciousness—that is to say, to support no consciousness of itself as a physical or physiological action; or again, in other words, to be a physical activity in living neural tissue, supporting a consciousness in which no consciousness of itself as such an activity is included: a circumstance which is entirely in accordance with the fact, that in no case, not even in that of conscious and reflective choice, have we any immediate knowledge of the precise *How* of the process. What is called Self-consciousness, or the supposed immediate perception of the Ego by itself, lies within the consciousness which is conditioned upon the cerebral process, and therefore the Ego, its supposed Subject-Object, must be held to do so too. There is no immediate knowledge of the Ego's agency. When, in ordinary language, we say that *we feel, we think, we remember, we choose, we determine, we act*, and so on; when we say that our actions originate in, and are guided by, moral or mental ideas and motives; we are speaking solely from the experience which is immediately present in consciousness, though erroneously including in the experience the real agency supporting it, which is not immediately present in the consciousness. It is our very unconsciousness of the real agency which enables us to make this mistake—that is, to imagine that we have an immediate knowledge of the agent and his action. And here I may say that I cordially welcome Mr. Wildon Carr's agreement with me on the cardinal point (to use the words which he uses), that "activity or agency is an object of knowledge not found in the nature of knowledge itself by analysis," notwithstanding that his argument rests, as he says, "entirely on a dialectical difficulty in the conception." For how, I would ask, can the correctness or incorrectness of any conception be ascertained otherwise than by analysis of it, in the last resort? See Mr. Carr's paper, "The Theory of Subjective Activity," in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. I, New Series, 1900-1901, pp. 198-199.

This third hypothesis must, I think, be admitted to supply definite grounds for coping with the complexities of the phenomenon known as final causation, or the purposive activity of conscious beings, which is the form in which that phenomenon appears in ordinary experience; and farther, that it contrasts most favourably in this respect with the two other modes of approaching the problem which that phenomenon presents. Apart, however, from the great difficulties which lie in the way of its satisfactory application, difficulties which arise from the imperfection of our physiological knowledge of brain organisation and operation, and from the impossibility of any immediate self-observation of the concomitance or sequence in detail between brain changes and changes in consciousness—apart, I say, from these great difficulties in working out this hypothesis, there is always to be reckoned against it the primary difficulty which lies at the root of all physiological psychology, of which it is a branch. I mean the difficulty which we feel in dispensing with the necessity for discovering some special *nexus*—*i.e.*, some force or energy defined and governed by a law of its own, between phenomena so disparate in kind as Matter and Consciousness, before adopting the hypothesis that either of them is dependent on the other, in any real sense of *dependence*. We are not easily satisfied with the simple fact of time and space relations between them, relations of mere co-existence and sequence according to some law or laws of those relations; although in no case of real dependence, of whatever kind it may be, is anything more really known to us, than these relations and their law.

Mr. Benecke, for instance, in his highly interesting paper, "On the Aspect Theory of the Relation of Mind to Body" (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. I, New Series, 1900-1901, pp. 24-25), in arguing against my view of the case, writes:—"However it be put, the relation of the psychic to the physical series appears to me on this view to involve an action without reaction, or an effect in excess of the cause, and

how can we harmonise this with the rest of our knowledge?" And to the word *cause* in this sentence he appends a footnote:—"By the Principle of the Conservation of Energy the material effects equal the material cause. The psychological effect would, therefore, according to this view, have to be regarded either as an additional uncompensated effect of the same cause, or as being really produced without a cause." By "the rest of our knowledge," Mr. Benecke seems, then, to mean the laws governing physical phenomena, the action and reaction of matter on matter, at the head of which stands the law of the Conservation of Energy. It is true that physical energies are subject to this law; but then no such law as this can be assumed, or even expected, to hold good between two such disparates, or, as Mr. Benecke calls them (p. 26), "incommensurables," as material energies and modes of consciousness. To do so would be, in thought, to materialise consciousness, by conceiving it subject to a law which is strictly applicable to matter only, a result which, I think, Mr. Benecke's own theory, the Aspect Theory, as he calls it, would fail to avoid.

I also think that Mr. Benecke, in his argument against what he supposes to be my view, too much, and indeed wholly, disregards the particular conception of Real Condition, as a substitute for that of Efficient Cause, which is set forth in that work of mine to which he explicitly refers, *The Metaphysic of Experience*, and which I have again set forth in a paper, entitled "The Conceptions of Cause and Real Condition," read before the *Congrès International de Philosophie*, at Paris, in August, 1900, a paper which will also be found in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. I, New Series, having been read before this Society at the meeting next following that at which Mr. Benecke's paper was read. To that paper of mine, and to the definition there given (p. 54) of a Real Condition, as "something on the existence or continuance of which, in given circumstances, something else comes into or continues in existence, and without which it

would not do so;”—as also to two other papers of mine following up the same line of thought, one “On the Substance-Attribute Conception in Philosophy,” the other on “The Conscious Being,” and both contained in the same volume of our *Proceedings* as the former, the present brief reference must here suffice. In psychology as well as in philosophy, since both alike deal with consciousness in relation to matter, a larger, less restricted, conception of what used to be called Efficient Causation seems to be required, than one drawn from the consideration, and adapted to the explanation, of physical phenomena alone.

I hope I may be pardoned for this somewhat lengthy digression, in elucidation of the third direction taken by some in endeavouring to account for the familiar phenomenon of conscious action for a purpose, or Final Causation. But now to return. The result of the foregoing analysis of that phenomenon, and of the enquiry into the three main directions taken by different schools of thought in explanation of it, is plainly this: that Final Causation cannot be regarded as an ultimate, indecomposable, and essential factor in the constitution of the universe, or as contributing anything, in that character, to our speculative knowledge of it. In that character its explanatory power is gone, so soon as it is shown to stand itself in need of explanation. And its explanation must be sought elsewhere than in a mere repetition of the *explicandum* on a larger scale. The positively known region of the universe, it is true, exhibits everywhere marks of what is called Design, Purpose, Adaptation of parts to parts, and of means to ends,—characters similar to those exhibited in the works of positively known conscious agents; but these conscious agents are themselves parts of the universe, and the nature of their purposive and conscious actions must be explained, if at all, from that of other parts of the universe, and cannot be erected into an explanation of the universe itself in its totality. In other words, it is no speculative

explanation of the universe to attribute the marks of design, which are everywhere found in this world of ours, which is the material corner of it, to an almighty Designer and Creator of it.

It would, or at least it might, be otherwise, if Final Causation were known to us as an ultimate, indecomposable, and essential factor or element in the constitution of our positive knowledge of the universe, as, for instance, are time and spatial extension, which are the formal elements of empirical experience; the ultimate qualities of feeling (sensation and emotion), which are its material elements; and those few ultimate kinds of difference and sameness found in empirical objects—namely, change, motion, and figure—which are the foundation of arithmetic and geometry; empirical objects being objects which consist in the union of a formal and a material element. Factors or elements of these three kinds—the formal, the material, and the mathematical—must at any rate enter into any speculative conception which we form of the universe, being positively known to us as essential constituents of every conception which we can frame of concrete or empirical objects. But, as I have tried to show, it is not so with what I may call pure final causality. This is neither representable in thought as a single though abstract element in the actions of conscious beings, nor is it a necessary ingredient, disclosed by analysis, in the composition of those actions. The cerebral processes underlying anticipation and judgment are sufficient to account for the activity underlying acts of choice or volitions; but then these cerebral processes are themselves highly complex *explicanda*.

At the same time this analysis fully justifies us in regarding the conscious purposive actions of conscious beings as a distinctly marked class of actions, taken, of course, as they are taken in ordinary thought, and including the sense of freedom and responsibility which in many cases attaches to them. Actions belonging to this latter group—namely, free or

self-determined acts of conscious choice—are, in fact, the highest and noblest part of our nature as human beings; they constitute our Personality; they are the core of our moral Character; and they include Hope of a better future, as one of the essential characteristics of our being.

In this last characteristic, Hope, lies their special value and significance, as connecting us with the positively unknown region or regions of the universe, of which we know nothing positively, save only their existence, and of which even these actions tell us nothing speculatively. They are actions belonging to what is called the Practical, as distinguished from the Speculative, Reason. But hope, being practical, is not limited by positive knowledge; it extends as far as thought can reach even in its highest abstractions, and farther than the grasp of any concrete fancy or imagination. Its range is infinite and eternal, as is the universe itself. To trust it, when the actions in which is embodied are in fact guided and approved by Conscience, is to have faith in God.

But it will be said, Do we not, and must we not, think of God Himself as a Person, and is not this to think of Him as a finite part and product of the universe, just like ourselves? How, then, can hope and faith in the infinite and eternal be hope and faith in God? Taking the latter question first, the answer is, that this would be impossible, if we had a positive and speculative knowledge of God as a person, a knowledge such as we have of ourselves as persons. But this is not the case; we have no such knowledge of God as this. And here the first question, as that on which the latter is founded, must receive its answer, which is as follows:—The thought of Personality which at its best, that is, when including such actions only as are prompted by the highest and noblest emotions, and are guided by the sense of moral rightness, is the highest and best reality that is known to us,—this thought we take as our true though inadequate representation and expression for the thought of what is the highest and best and mightiest reality in the

infinite and eternal universe. This is our anthropomorphic way of giving definiteness to our hope and faith in the eternal and infinite Power, which sustains, pervades, and governs the universe. Words like *faith*, *trust*, *confidence*, imply the reality of a power, on which the feelings expressed by them depend, in which they are reposed, towards which they are felt. They imply more than hope in this respect, though hope is their necessary foundation.

We are therefore impelled to take this way of thinking by our emotional and moral, quite as much as (to say the least) by our intellectual nature. Our highest and best emotions are not only felt towards Persons, but are those, among the personal emotions, which are only satisfied by a return of the same emotion, or one belonging to the same specific kind, on the part of the object of it, and neither demand nor are capable of any other satisfaction; whereas the malevolent personal emotions—such, for instance, as hatred and anger—are satisfied only by the suffering or humiliation of their object. Emotions of the former kind imply and promote harmony without discord, those of the latter discord without harmony. It is only towards a beneficent personal power that we can feel gratitude, only in a beneficent personal power that we can repose trust. And in so feeling and thinking we are obeying a common and imperative need of human nature, felt as much by those who attempt its philosophical analysis, as by those who adopt the common-sense conception of the divine personality as the object of an immediate intuition, or innate idea, of an absolute reality, just as they take all other realities of common-sense thought as absolute. Analysing, or attempting to analyse, the way really taken is not to abolish the need for taking it, any more than analysing the way in which we infer the reality of the material world is to abolish the truth of that inference—that is, the reality of Matter, which common-sense also takes as an absolute datum. Religion is rooted in the nature of man, and not in the results of philosophical analysis or speculation.

Hence the universality of the appeal which it makes to learned and unlearned alike. Moreover, analysts must think and speak in common-sense ideas and language, in religious as in all other practical matters, taking their consciousness and its real conditioning together, without distinguishing between them; since terms of consciousness are the only means we have of designating the particular processes of real conditioning, corresponding to them each to each, there being no possibility of discriminating those particular processes of real conditioning taken alone. In religious thinking every one must think in common-sense (not analytical) ideas and conceptions.

In saying this I am not overlooking the difference between these two realities, Matter and that which we represent by our conception of the divine personality, which are similar only in point of the absolute character attributed to both by common-sense thought. They differ profoundly, in that the former, Matter, is an object of positive knowledge, the latter of faith, where positive knowledge is impossible. That is to say, although the fact of the real existence of the divine nature, as our object thought of, is represented in our thought of it, which is its subjective aspect, yet we have no positive knowledge of that nature as a real existent, as we have of the nature of Matter as a real existent, which latter knowledge takes the form of the various positive physical and physiological sciences. Human knowledge (as distinguished from faith) of the divine nature and its real existence—that is to say, *Theology*—is therefore restricted to take the form of a psychological and philosophical knowledge of our own conception or idea of them.

Thus the very conception by which we represent the reality of the divine nature includes the thought, that its real object thought of transcends all possible human knowledge. And this conception is therefore confessedly inadequate, though it is also true, or a true conception, in the sense that the personality, which is its definite content, is included as essentially belonging to, taken up into, and involved in, as

well as transcended by, the reality which it is an endeavour to conceive. We can think, and, what is more, we cannot help thinking, of regions of reality beyond the grasp of our positive anthropomorphic thought. But even to these regions hope and faith extend; they extend beyond the reach of positive speculative thought; they extend to what we can only describe, either by negatives, such as infinite, unconditioned, or by self-repetitions, such as eternal; it is upon hope and faith that all religions worthy of the name are founded.

To these Christianity adds Charity, or Love in its highest sense, as its own distinctive characteristic, and as an essential element in its foundation. It is in his love to God that the human being's sense of his union with God resides; but it is love conceived as originating in the Almighty towards all men, and demanding love, worship, and obedience from every man in return. That God is Love, is the Revelation of Jesus Christ. And accordingly, so far as he speculates at all upon the history and course of Nature, the Christian's positive belief must be, that the power or energy which, in man, underlies and maintains the moral Law of Love is continuous and identical with the one (and only one) almighty and everlasting power or energy, which underlies and maintains the infinite and eternal universe, and into subjection to which all things, seen and unseen, will finally be brought.

IV.—EXPERIENCE AND EMPIRICISM.

By G. E. MOORE.

ALMOST all philosophers now-a-days are agreed in speaking respectfully of "Experience." Before Kant's time philosophers were divided into Empiricists, on the one hand, and, on the other, those who held that so many and such important conclusions could be derived from "innate truths" alone, that they despised the aid of "Experience." Now-a-days "innate truths" are wholly out of fashion; and though "pure thought" may still be thought to do a great deal, its function is generally limited to the "interpretation of experience." This change is due to Kant, and its full significance is, I think, rarely recognised. The statement that Kant made "experience" the *sole premiss* of all our knowledge will probably sound strange to many; and it may seem even stranger to hear that those who reject his conclusion that our knowledge is *limited* to "possible experience," do not for the most part differ from him in making experience their sole premiss. Yet I think it is easy to see that Kant did do this. Kant tries to defend the truth of "synthetic *a priori* propositions" by showing that they are "conditions for the possibility of experience." This he can only do by showing that they are implied in actual experience. But to show that A is implied by B will not prove that A is true, unless it is assumed that B is true. That Geometry has a claim to validity, which Spinoza's "geometrically demonstrated" Ethics has not got, rests for Kant on the fact that the former is and the latter is not implied in "experience." Spinoza's system may quite well contain nothing but "conditions for the possibility" of something other than actual experience; but the difference in validity between it and geometry would still remain for Kant. It is, therefore, only

the fact that actual experience is true which gives Kant a reason for asserting the validity of "transcendental" and denying that of "transcendent" knowledge. Experience is true, and geometry is implied in it; therefore, geometry is true. Such is Kant's reasoning. To have rested the claim of geometry on its bare self-evidence would not have satisfied him; for the "transcendent" metaphysics, which he declares to be "unscientific," might make exactly the same claim. He thinks he has *proved* the validity of geometry, and *disproved* the possibility of transcendent metaphysics; and for this proof "Experience" is his *sole premiss*.*

Now subsequent non-empirical philosophers differ from Kant, for the most part, only in maintaining that more is implied in "experience" than he could find to be so. They do not claim, any more than he did, to have other and independent premisses for their conclusions, such as the pre-Kantian dogmatists assumed. But this fact suggests two questions, which the following paper attempts to answer:—I. How much do philosophers assume when they assume "Experience" as their sole premiss? II. In what essential respect do Kant and non-empirical post-Kantians differ from such philosophers as Hume and Mill, who are deservedly called "empirical?"

In answer to the first question, I shall endeavour to show that, in assuming "Experience" as a premiss, philosophers assume the truth of a vast number of propositions, which, as a matter of fact, they subsequently conclude to be false.

In answer to the second, I shall endeavour to show that empiricists are distinguished, not by any theory of the *source* of knowledge, but by the fact that they constantly imply that all known truths are of *the same kind* as experiences, although, in fact, they assume the knowledge of truths which are not of this kind.

* The proposition "geometry is implied in experience" is not a premiss of the conclusion "geometry is true," in the piece of reasoning given above. (See Lewis Carroll, in *Mind*, N.S. 14, p. 278.)

I.—*Expérience*, in its common philosophical significance, seems to denote a sum of actual experiences. Thus “my experience” or “your experience” means the sum of my or your experiences; and “experience” without such qualification commonly stands for the sum of human experiences. “Experience” does, however, also denote that common character, in virtue of which actual experiences are classed together; and it is obvious that only this common character is susceptible of definition, since the number and variety of actual experiences is too great to be exhausted. “Experience,” then, denotes a kind of cognition; and, like “cognition” and “knowledge” themselves, the word stands for a double fact: (*a*) a mental state, and (*b*) that of which this mental state is cognizant. Thus “an expérience,” like “an observation,” may stand either for the observing of something or for that which is observed.

The kind of mental state denoted by cognition or consciousness is itself of too simple a nature to admit of definition: it is something which can be easily recognised as one and the same, existing in all instances of cognition, and differing from the various objects of which it is the cognition. It will not be disputed, however, that cognitions are *also* distinguished from all other kinds of mental existents, if any such there be, by the fact that they always do stand in a unique kind of relation to something else—something, namely, of which they are cognitions; and the kinds of cognition are commonly distinguished by the kinds of object of which they are cognitions. That they also differ in themselves would appear to be proved by the fact that one cognition may be the cause of another cognition, although the object of the first is the cause of something entirely different from the object of the second—*e.g.*, in the case of association by similarity. But that there is nevertheless no objection to distinguishing the kinds of cognition by the kinds of their objects would appear to be proved by the fact that in all cases where we know the effects

of a cognition they seem to be connected by a uniform law with the nature of the object of that cognition. It would seem, then, that though cognitions are distinguished from one another by intrinsic differences, these differences always correspond to some difference in the nature of their object. In dividing them, then, according to the nature of the objects, we shall be dividing them truly; and no other course seems open to us, since no one has yet succeeded in pointing out wherein the intrinsic difference of one cognition from another lies.

(1) The first great division between objects of consciousness is between those which are true and those which are false; and "experience" is generally and properly confined to the class of cognitions of what is true: a "false experience" would be commonly allowed to be a contradiction in terms. The word "cognition" itself is sometimes confined, as its etymology suggests, to awareness or consciousness of what is *true*, in which case it is equivalent to "knowledge." But a "false cognition" would not be so generally recognised as a contradiction in terms, as "a false experience" or "false knowledge"; and since the word is grammatically more convenient than "awareness" or "consciousness," I have used it above, and shall use it below, as equivalent to these terms. "An experience," then, is a true cognition; and it must be noted that there is no evidence that a true cognition has any intrinsic difference from a false one, since none of the properties of objects with which the psychological laws of sequence appear to be connected is universally a mark of truth. Thus a true cognition may as readily cause a false one by the laws of association, or a false cognition a true one, as either may produce one of its own kind in this respect. Any cognition of which the object is "that a thing is true" does indeed differ intrinsically from any cognition of which the object is "that a thing is false;" but the cognitions of the things themselves do not so differ. In truth, then, we have a mark of all the

objects of experience to which, so far as is known, no intrinsic property in the states of mind cognizant of them corresponds, although every true proposition differs from any false one.

But (2) not all true cognitions are experiences. The objects of experience all fall within the class of true propositions about existing things; and existence is a mark to which we have reason to suppose that something in the state of mind corresponds—*i.e.*, states of mind cognizant of existential truths differ intrinsically from those which are cognizant of any other class of truths, although they do not differ intrinsically from those which are cognizant of false existential propositions.

But (3) the very same existential truths which we experience may at another time be known to us by memory, or at the very time when we experience them another mind may have attained to a knowledge of them by inference or mere imagination. What is it which distinguishes our experience of them from that knowing of them to which we give these names? The distinction for which we are to look is that which, in Hume's language, divides "impressions" from "ideas." He held that this distinction consisted merely in the superior "liveliness" of the impressions; and it seems to be true that, at most times when we are experiencing, some part of what we experience is cognized with a "liveliness" superior to that, which belongs to most of our memories or imaginations; so that by far the greater number of our "lively" cognitions are experiences. But (*a*) it must be remembered that at each moment of normal experience we have experience of a vast variety of objects: and it would seem certain that, whatever this "liveliness" may be, only a comparatively small number out of this variety—namely, those which are near the centre of attention, are cognized with more liveliness than most imaginations; yet all are certainly experienced. And (*b*) there seems no reason to doubt that some true imaginations may, like hallucinations, possess as high a degree of liveliness as any experience. There does not, therefore, seem to be any intrinsic

property either in an experience or in its object which will serve to distinguish it from all imaginations. We are driven to the conclusion that an experience is in itself quite indistinguishable from a true imagination, memory, or inference, and, if it is to be precisely distinguished from these, can only be so by the circumstances under which it occurs. But language certainly demands such a distinction; it would be generally felt that the term "experience" should denote something which cannot, even in a single case, be identical with that which is denoted by mere imagination: and hence we must say that exactly the same cognition, when occurring under certain circumstances, is properly called an experience, and, when occurring under different circumstances, a mere imagination.

When once it is thus recognised that an experience is to be defined not merely by any intrinsic properties of itself or its object, but also by its circumstances, it becomes easy to distinguish it from *memory* and *inference*. The only difference which seems to differentiate these from it in all cases is one of this extrinsic kind—namely, (*a*) in the case of memory, that it has among its causes a previous cognition of the same object, whereas any object can be *experienced* only once; and (*b*) in the case of inference, that it has among its causes a mental process of a peculiar kind, which is never among the causes of an experience. Moreover, this method of defining experience has been very frequently adopted; an experience has been generally held to be distinguished from other cognitions by its origin or accompaniments.

There still, however, remains the case of certain true imaginations. What kind of circumstances will always distinguish these from experiences?

1. It has been proposed to define experience as "immediate" knowledge. This is a negative definition, referring to the absence of mental causes. But there are certainly some imaginations of which we do not know the mental causes. We

cannot, therefore, assign any definite class of mental causes which is invariably found among the causes of an imagination and invariably wanting among the causes of an experience; and to say, what is probably true—namely, that imaginations always have some kind of mental cause, which experiences are without, is merely to say that they *can* be defined by their mental causes: it does not itself constitute that definition. It may, perhaps, be said that among the causes of every imagination is some previous experience; but, even if this be true, it requires an independent definition of experience before it can itself be taken as a definition of imagination. Nor, finally, are we entitled to assert that experiences have no mental causes, because we know of none. Accordingly in any sense in which we are entitled to assert that experiences are immediate, except that which makes immediacy deny causation by previous experiences, we have an equal right to call some imaginations immediate.

2. It is, perhaps, true that all experiences are accompanied by cognitions of objects closely related to their own—that their objects are always members of a simultaneously cognized continuum. But it is certain that some imaginations, if only their objects be true, may be thus related to both experiences and imaginations occurring simultaneously.

3. It would seem, then, that the only method of distinguishing an experience from an imagination is by means of antecedents or accompaniments other than mental. Let us take the case in which the same object is simultaneously experienced by one man and imagined by another. The total antecedents and accompaniments of both cognitions are the same. If, then, they are distinguished by their antecedents, this must mean, not that they have different antecedents, but that the one has to some of their common antecedents a relation which the other has not got. Nor can this relation be identified with invariable antecedence, since in this case the imagination and the experience have the relation in

question to different antecedents, and consequently neither set of antecedents can be said to precede invariably the cognition which is in one case an experience and in the other an imagination. We must, then, understand the statement that an identical imagination and experience are distinguished by the circumstances under which they occur, as meaning that the one has the same relation to some of its circumstances which the other has to others, and that this is a relation which neither has to all; and this relation would seem to be sufficiently defined by the fact that from the circumstances in question you could infer the future existence of the cognition, although from the existence of the cognition you could not infer which set of circumstances had preceded it. If we call this relation "causal," then we may say that an experience is always distinguished from a true imagination by the nature of its physical causes; and there does, in fact, seem to be a class of causes, capable of exact definition, some member of which class is always among the causes of an experience, but never among those of an imagination. Each different experience has, indeed, a different cause; but the class to which all such causes must belong may be defined in the following way:—

Every event, and consequently every experience, has this causal relation to some set of circumstances at every preceding moment, the set becoming larger and larger as you recede in time from the event in question. Among these sets (which may each be called *one* of the causes of any given experience in a different sense from which each member of any one of them may be called *one* of its causes) there will always be one of which the thing or event, the existence of which is the object of the experience, is a member. Among the causes of an imagination, on the other hand, the thing or event, whose existence is its object, will never be thus included. It follows from this that among the *accompaniments* of an experience there will always also be some having to it the special relation that its existence could be inferred from theirs, and that these accompaniments

will be different for an experience from what they would be for an imagination ; but *this* difference is not capable of a definition which shall be at the same time general and exact, since the condition which renders such a definition possible in the case of antecedents—namely, the identity between part of the object of an experience and part of one of its causes, does not hold for its accompaniments. It must be noticed that in cases where the object of the experience is the existence of something mental—*i.e.*, in the case of what have been called “experiences of the inner sense,” the causes by which it is characterised as an experience will thus *ex hypothesi* include something mental. But it may be useful to observe that in this one case an alternative definition is abstractly possible, if, as seems probable, every kind of mental occurrence both invariably accompanies and is invariably accompanied by one peculiar kind of physical event—namely, that any cognition of a mental occurrence, among the causes of which is included the physical event having such relation to that occurrence, is an experience.

(4) Having thus defined the difference between experience and all other ways of cognizing the same objects, it remains to say something more with regard to the kinds of object which can be properly said to be experienced. It has been laid down above that all such objects must be true, and must be existential propositions. (i) From the first of these conditions it follows that every object of experience must be complex. That this is so is implied by all philosophers who hold, as all do, that inferences can be drawn from the subject-matter of experience ; but it may be thought to conflict with the very common theory that *sensations* or *sense-impressions* are experiences. “Sensations” are frequently spoken of as if they or their objects might be simple ; they are regarded as being or supplying the elements of knowledge. This difficulty, however, seems to be merely due to the fact that “sensation” is commonly used to denote two quite different forms of cognition, which are not in

general clearly distinguished from one another. The proper and usual meaning of "sensation" is that in which it denotes a cognition of *the existence of* a simple quality; a sense in which "sensations" are experiences. But it is commonly thought that this is identical with the cognition of a simple quality, a form of cognition, which is undoubtedly possible, but which is by no means so important.

(ii) It may seem strange to some that the object of an experience should be called a proposition. But such object may undoubtedly be "the existence of such and such a thing," and it seems impossible to distinguish the cognition of this from the cognition "that such and such a thing exists." The object of experience, moreover, is undoubtedly true, and allows valid inferences to be drawn from it, both of which properties seem to be characteristic of propositions.

(iii) What types of proposition can be properly included under the description "propositions about existing things," and hence, as objects of experience, is a more difficult question. In ordinary life we do undoubtedly include, among the objects which we say we experience, successions and coexistences; and the usage of philosophers seems to be generally in agreement with this use of the term. We might thus be said, for instance, to experience the motion of a coloured point. Now, it would seem that this proposition would be properly interpreted in the form: "Such and such existing things, having this and that spatial position at this and that time, are divided from one another by such and such a spatial distance and such and such a temporal distance." But this is not strictly an existential proposition, nor can its meaning ever be exhausted by any number of such; it does not assert the existence of anything: it asserts that two or more existing things have certain relations. At most it is capable of analysis into "the position in space, occupied now by this, has such and such a spatial distance from the position occupied then by that," and "the position in time occupied by this here has such and such a temporal

distance from the position occupied by that there." But to allow that such propositions may be objects of experience involves a twofold modification of our definition. (a) We must extend the definition of "existential proposition" to include the assertion of a relation between existents of which the existence may be the object of experience. It is by such an inclusion of relations between existents that *perception* is distinguished from "sensation"; and perceptions are generally held to be experiences. (b) We must also allow that the existence of a position in space or time may be an object of experience. Yet it would be paradoxical to assert that positions in space or time could be among the causes of anything. We must, therefore, extend the definition of experience by adding that the existence of a thing which is not itself among the causes of an experience, yet if it be included in the proposition from which the effect may be inferred, may be an object of experience. This extension of our definition will certainly allow the existence of positions in space and time to be included among objects of experience. For every causal inference is from the fact that a thing exists *at a particular time and place* to the fact that something else will exist at a particular time and place. Though, therefore, we do in ordinary language restrict the term cause to the thing which so exists, yet the necessary connection involved in the term does not hold between its existence and that of its effect, but between their existence at their respective positions in time and space. The same extension of our definition will, however, also allow us to include among experiences cognitions that such and such a quality exists, apart from any specification of time and place. We have it, then, that an empirical proposition must either (a) assert truly the existence of one or more members of one of the following classes of entity—classes none of which is identical with any other or with the sum of any others: namely, (α) this here now, (β) this now, (γ) this here, (δ) this, (ϵ) this place now, (ζ) this place, (η) this time; or else (b)

must assert a relation between some members, not of these classes, but of the new classes formed in each case by all the existing members of each of them; or, finally, (c) must assert something collectively of some members of the classes last defined. Classes (b) and (c) may perhaps be more clearly defined in the following way—namely, that those only among relational and collective propositions can be objects of experience, or empirical, in which the terms related or grouped presuppose propositions of class (a).

(5) In the above manner (3) must an experience be defined if it is to be distinguished from every case of true imagination. It is to be noted, however, that the use of the word is commonly extended to include cases of imagination which resemble experiences in a respect which can only be defined by means of the above definition. For instance, when we see that a table is wooden, this would commonly be called a case of experience, although some part of the properties which we mean by "wooden" are certainly not among the objects of any cognition caused by the action of the table upon our eyes. In such a case our knowledge of the existence of these properties which have a certain spatial relation to those which *are* among the objects of sight, and are experienced, must be allowed to be a mere imagination, since it has not its objects among its causes; but we call it an experience, because its object is simultaneous with the object of an experience which is simultaneous with it. When, therefore, an imagination resembles a simultaneous experience by having the same temporal relation to its object, we commonly rank it as an experience of class (a); and cognitions, into which it enters in the same way as true experiences of class (a) enter into cognitions of classes (b) and (c), may also be called experiences.

II.—Having thus given a precise meaning to "experience," we may now inquire in what sense, if any, *empiricism* can be defined as implying that "experience is the origin of all our knowledge."

It is plain, in the first place, it cannot mean that experience is its own origin; and, therefore, that by "all our knowledge" we must understand all that is not itself experience.

But with regard to that part of our knowledge which is not itself experience: (i) it is certain that not every empiricist need deny, or imply the denial of, the fact that the brain co-operates with experience in determining what inferences, imaginations, and memories we shall have, just as it co-operates with the object in determining what experiences we shall have. It is not, then, essential to empiricism to hold that experience is the sole *cause* of all knowledge other than itself. And (ii) if our definition merely means that experience is *one* among the causes of all such knowledge, then this is not denied, but constantly implied, by many philosophers who are not empiricists: *e.g.*, when it is allowed that experience is necessary as an *occasion* for the knowledge of a necessary truth.

It remains, then, to inquire in what sense, if any, this definition will hold, supposing that by "origin" be meant "premise," and by "experience" and "knowledge" not our mental states, but the truths of which they are cognizant. Understood in this sense, the definition must mean that experience is the *sole premiss* of any truths we know which are not themselves experienced. But this doctrine, as was said above, fails to distinguish empiricists from Kant and from post-Kantian non-empirical philosophers; since they too imply that we have no title to assert the truth of any proposition which is not implied in experience.

It appears, then, that no implication with regard to the position of experiences as causes or as premises of all our knowledge will suffice to define empiricism. Yet empiricism does undoubtedly imply the assignation of some kind of pre-eminence to experience in respect of truth. There seems to remain but one way in which this can be done—namely, by implying that all the truths we know are of the same *kind* as

the objects of experience. From this principle it would follow that, in a sense, actual experience was the sole *test* of all our knowledge; since it would be true that we could know nothing but what *could* be experienced, and that consequently any piece of knowledge might be disproved by a possible observation or experiment. On the contrary, it is characteristic of non-empirical philosophers to hold that we have some pieces of knowledge which no possible experience could disprove, although almost all suffice to prove them. It would remain true, no doubt, that the empiricist must imply that we have pieces of knowledge which never are tested by actual experience, and which cannot (humanly speaking) be so—*e.g.*, that the moon is spherical. But this very fact helps to explain why the doctrine that “experience is the origin of all our knowledge” has been commonly supposed to define empiricism. For that doctrine by its very terms admits that we do know more than we actually experience, and yet, at the same time, exhibits a wish to maintain that experience is more certain, more truly knowledge, than anything else we know. This inconsistency may very naturally be suggested by the fact that what is of the same kind as an object of experience is just what *can* (in one sense) be experienced, although, as a matter of fact, it never can (in another sense) be experienced.

There seems, then, sufficient reason for taking this implication “That we can know nothing but what could be experienced, *i.e.*, what is of the same kind as what we do experience,” to define empiricism; and this, if our definition of experience has been correct, is exactly equivalent to the definition—that empiricism is distinguished by the frequent implication that all known truths are truths about what exists at one or more moments of time. And the correctness of the definition is further confirmed by the fact that the most general and obvious characteristics of empirical systems seem naturally to follow from this presupposition. Thus (1) empiricists are

always characterised by their treatment of so-called necessary truths, of which an extreme instance are the truths of arithmetic. These truths are not existential truths, and hence we find that empiricists tend either (*a*) to admit their truth, but to interpret them as analytic or insignificant; or (*b*) to interpret them as universal, and deny that we can know them. By the former device they are enabled to hold that such truths are mere parts of what we experience, not something different, which can indeed be inferred from experience, but cannot be disproved by it. On the other hand, the device of interpreting all such truths as universal is due to an attempt to assimilate them to existential truths of the form "all these things have this character," and thus to make them *possible* objects of knowledge. And the denial that we can know them is due to the fact that these are a limiting case in which it is impossible not to recognise the incompatibility of possible knowledge in the one sense with that in the other. It seems obviously absurd to maintain that we can observe every instance of a given class; whereas it is not obvious that the same absurdity, if it be an absurdity, is involved in maintaining that we can observe *some* instances, which we do not observe. The empiricist fails to see the difference between the assertions "all these things have this character" and "so many things of *this class* have this character." When he says, "all things of this class, *within the limits of observation*, are of this character," he can still think that he is making an empirical proposition, a proposition in extension, because he seems to himself to be making an assertion not about a whole class, but about a part of a class. His assertion, then, that we can know only *general* and *probable*, not *universal* and *necessary* propositions, seems to be due to the fact that he applies to all truths the test of conformity to the type of objects of experience, and admits as certainly true those only which seem to him, because he confuses this test with the test of actual experience, to have such conformity. (2) A second characteristic of empiricists, which

seems also to follow naturally from this presupposition, is the tendency to regard all inference as either analytic or causal. The view that it is analytic harmonises with their presupposition in the same way as the view that necessary truths are analytic, and the characteristic of causal inference is that it is inference from the existence of one thing to the existence of another.

V.—THE LOGIC OF PRAGMATISM.*

By HENRY STURT.

Object of the Paper.—It will be a revelation to some who read this paper that Pragmatism has any logic to offer. In certain quarters the advocates of pragmatist doctrine have been denounced as "Apostles of Unreason," and Professor Latta hints pretty strongly that they nourish hostile designs, not merely upon the theory of knowledge, but upon the very existence of knowledge itself. To the distorted vision of the intellectualist the pragmatist is a sentimental half-mystic, who hates systematic thinking, and bases his caricature of a philosophy on a monstrous antithesis between cool reason and an emotional something called "our practical needs."

With this spirit abroad it is time to carry the war into the enemy's country. The intellectualist assumes that he has logic to himself at any rate; though he might perhaps be got to confess that he has not been entirely successful in other provinces—ethics, for example. It is time to shake this false security. The object of my paper is to show that the logician must take due account of the active side of life if he would interpret knowledge aright; and this main contention involves the subordinate one that the intellectualist, who has consistently ignored activity, interprets knowledge wrong.

The Standpoint of Logic.—Intellectualism has been a trouble in philosophy from the beginning. One obvious cause of it is the sedentary contemplativeness of the philosophic profession.

* "Pragmatism" is used hereinafter as denoting an interpretation of experience which takes due account of activity. It does not imply that all experience is will, or all metaphysic faith. "Logic" is theory of knowledge.

But this influence, powerful though it has been, is mainly interesting to the student of the pathology of thought. For the present purpose it is more relevant to note the causes which lie genuinely within the region of theory. Putting it shortly, we may say that the mistake of intellectualism lies in the standpoint of its logic. It assumes that abstract knowledge is the typical form of knowledge, whereas the truer view is that active knowledge is typical. These terms require explanation; and that which follows will help to define the standpoint of pragmatist logic.

It is fundamental to the standpoint of the present paper that the best and most typical kind of knowing is that which is bound up with doing. As illustrating this we may cite a use of the term "understanding," which is very significant. A man is often said to "understand" some active pursuit—cricket, for example—when he can do it well and intelligently. In the same way a successful and intelligent general, like Napoleon, might be said to understand war in a higher sense than the ablest arm-chair strategist. The distinction I am making is one form of the distinction between "knowledge of acquaintance" and "knowledge-about" laid down by John Grote and made current by Professor James.

Contrasted with active knowledge is the passive knowledge of the looker-on—that of the arm-chair strategist, for example. The distinction, I admit, is but a relative one. For passive knowledge is primarily acquired for the sake of action; as youthful education is preparatory for the activities of later life, or as listening to a question is preparatory to answering it. My opponents, however, will be the last to dispute the distinction. They emphasize only too strongly the intellectual detachment of the listener and looker-on. Now the fault of philosophy all through has been to think more of the looker-on than of the doer. But the present-day intellectualism goes yet further in taking as its ideal one kind of passive knowledge. What that kind is a further distinction will show us.

Passive knowledge is divisible into concrete and abstract. In concrete knowledge we study the object in its concrete individual totality. The best example of this is the study of human character, which does not admit of the simplifying process of abstraction to a very large extent, because each human character is individual, and operates mainly according to laws of its own. There are a good many abstract rules about human action which are true and valuable, but they form a small bulk as compared with our concrete knowledge of men.

Abstract knowledge is the opposite of concrete in that its proper objects are things which do not possess personal individuality and spontaneity. Abstraction is an artificial simplification of concrete objects entered upon for the sake of understanding them more easily. Its possibility depends on the existence of uniformities in things. The stricter the uniformities, and the more they admit of being reduced to a manageable number of formulæ, the more suited the objects are to abstraction.

The main features of abstraction may be studied in the familiar example of mechanics, the abstract science of matter and motion. In it abstraction is made from various facts of concrete experience according to the special department investigated. In the kinetics of a point we abstract from the fact that all material particles have size. In the kinetics of a rigid figure we abstract at certain stages from the fact that all materials have flexibility, and so on. The ideally rigid form of the science is that it should start with certain fundamental laws; that with them, as from a stock-in-trade, the student should begin operations; and that if fresh material is needed it should not be introduced surreptitiously, but embodied explicitly in postulates and definitions.

Mechanics is a good example of an abstract science, because there is no question from whence its stock-in-trade is drawn. It comes, of course, from concrete experience. Its forces, movements, levers and the rest are real things which have had

certain features abstracted from them. Mechanics is a good example, too, because the reference to reality and utility is plain all through. The mechanic makes his abstract calculations to ascertain the working power of a machine. The calculation is entered upon for utilitarian reasons, and it is found to be a useful help in practice. And this is so because the concrete facts abstracted from at the beginning can be allowed for in the result without seriously impairing the practical value of the calculation.

But the species of abstract science which is constantly being quoted by intellectualists as most nearly realising their own ideal is geometry. It is so far detached from reality as to give some colour to the argument that its fundamental propositions are independent of experience altogether, though I suppose that the claim of apriority for geometry is not held now in the same way that it used to be; its concepts are clear-cut and systematic in a high degree; its content is not affected by lapse of time or change of place; and the majority of the people who learn it have no thought of making use of it. The history of the influence of mathematics upon philosophy has not yet been written; but, when it is, I think it will be seen that geometry has had a vast, and in many ways a bad, influence on the theory of knowledge.

I hope this explanation will have thrown sufficient light on my statement that the intellectualist takes abstract knowledge, not active knowledge, as the type and ideal. The intellectualist, ignoring change, conation, and spontaneity, would like to see the universe reduced to the form of a book of Euclid. If we want to know what it all comes to, we cannot do better than study the following extracts from an able article by Professor Muirhead, entitled "The Goal of Knowledge" *:—

"We may," says Professor Muirhead, "describe the end of knowledge as a concept or mode of apprehending the world in which, as in the

* *Mind*, N.S., No. 24, pp. 476, 477.

developed organism, the processes of differentiation and integration have been brought to completion in a fully articulated system of coherent judgments."

And, he continues:—

"Knowledge may be said to aim, in the first place, at its own expansion. It seeks to embrace reality in all its parts or details. It aims in the second place at explanation. It seeks to understand the relation of the parts to one another and to the whole to which they belong. Its ideal may thus be schematised as a whole of clear and distinct parts related to one another in such a way that the mind can pass from any one along the lines of judgment and inference to any other, with the result that the whole is seen to be reflected into every part, and every part to contain the whole. Whether the world can ever thus be reduced to complete transparency is a question with which we need not trouble ourselves at present; it is sufficient to note not only that all science proceeds upon the assumption that it can, but that those sciences which are most advanced, and which as 'deductive' are commonly taken as the types of completeness and certainty, really do to a certain extent exhibit these characteristics. Thus geometry aims in the first place at exhausting, and in the second place at proving the interconnection of the properties of the figures with which it deals, and it would not be difficult to throw the knowledge we derive from it as to any particular figure, *e.g.*, the triangle, into a form which would exhibit the properties of the figure as such, and of each of the separate species of it (if it has species) as necessary deductions from its own nature, and as thus inherently related to one another through their common relation to the whole whose properties they are."

Professor Muirhead is, of course, not alone in his admiration for the geometrical form of knowledge. Geometry is constantly quoted by intellectualist logicians as the type of science. It is, as we see, regarded by them as consisting of a systematic arrangement of fixed abstract concepts linked together by connections of the utmost stringency. Nor is it the matter only which is regarded as giving it superiority to ordinary concrete knowledge. It is superior also in the motives with which it inspires the student. The ideal geometrician, so the intellectualist would suggest, is one who pursues his study entirely from intellectual curiosity, as indifferent to the utilitarian aspects of his science as Aristotle's God absorbed to all eternity in the contemplation of his own perfection.

It is not part of my design to prove in detail the wrongness of the intellectualist view of knowledge. If it were, I should have to demonstrate that abstract knowledge, though in its appeal to mere intellectual curiosity and to the love of intellectual gymnastic it has a certain interest separate from action, is yet dependent on action at every turn. It will be enough in this place to mention two or three points which would form part of such a demonstration. In the first place, the impulse to the abstract sciences has arisen out of practical needs—a fact to which, in the case of geometry, the mere verbal derivation testifies. Then the selection of their characteristic material has been throughout dictated by practice. In the case of geometry, demarcated circles, triangles, and squares are rarely seen in nature, unless we search for them scientifically; in the crafts they are most common and indispensable. Out of all the innumerable figures that might be drawn, we should not have selected the usual geometrical figures for investigation if utility had not suggested them to us. Thirdly, the dignity of science depends on its connection with reality, which may be at any time, even if it is not at a given time, practically important to man. Apart from an implied reference to the real, the study of geometry must sink to the level of a game like chess, which in its abstractness, the clearness and systematic character of its concepts, its timelessness, its plan of starting with a stock-in-trade of formulæ, and its appeal to the taste for gratuitous intellectual exercise, fulfils perfectly the outward form of an abstract science according to the intellectualist ideal. But lastly and most important of all, an attack on intellectualism would have to show that it cannot explain the fundamental conceptions and elementary functions of knowledge. I need not enlarge upon this argument now, because it is contained by implication in the remainder of my paper, which will attempt to prove that these conceptions and functions are only interpretable by taking due account of the active side of life.

Fundamental Conceptions of Logic.

System.—It will be convenient to start with a conception which is generally spoken of as fundamental, though we shall see later that it is dependent on another which really lies behind it. The intellectualist logicians of the present day, making a vast improvement on the old logic, lay great stress on the conception of system. They would not object to the doctrine that judgment is systematic in its very simplest forms, or that inference is process from what is given in judgment to what is not given on the strength of a systematic arrangement uniting them. My difference with intellectualists is thus not concerned with the importance of system, but with their view of its meaning and origin.

On the pragmatist view the system of human purpose is the typical system. How system is to be interpreted by purpose may be illustrated best by a humble, commonplace example: "I am going to make a table." The making of the table involves a long train of thoughts and actions which are organised by their subordination to the making. Such a system of thoughts and actions is the type of all systems. Its importance and frequency are often overlooked, because cultivated people are seldom engaged in definite tasks of manufacture. But all of us, if we stop to think of it, are incessantly engaged in doing things which necessitate our looking forward and forming plans, however trivial. And wherever we have a plan there is a system, with details arranged in harmonious subordination to an end.

The explanation of system as purposive in its origin, which our culture and artificiality may make us hesitate to accept in reference to ourselves, is greatly reinforced if we appeal to anthropology. Primitive man must exert himself strenuously to keep alive. He has no love for the gratuitous exercise of intellect in serious and strenuous tasks, however fond he may be of playful thought and action in times of leisure. His

intelligence works mainly in the immediate service of practical needs. The origin of the conception of system cannot therefore be looked for anywhere but in the process of carrying out the most practical purposes. Long before man had found the need of abstract science the conception of system had perforce become familiar to him. And if we had not learnt what system means by the carrying out of our own purposes, no abstract system could have meaning for us.

Interest.—I began with system because it is a conception which is thoroughly familiar, but interest is really prior to it. This will be evident if we consider that system is something we make, or at any rate select, and that to induce us to do this we must have a motive interest which will be the organising principle of the system. The part which interest plays is most apparent in the case of things we make, such things as form the majority of the objects of our concern. Take the case of electric lighting. Glass, copper, tar, brass, china-clay, india-rubber, hemp, carbon-filaments, and a hundred other heterogeneous materials raked together from the ends of the earth are welded into a system under the pressure of the interest they subserve. Directly one of these materials becomes obsolete it ceases to interest the engineer and drops out of that system of his knowledge. Where the objects of knowledge are entirely natural, my contention will be verified by a little consideration. In such cases we select our system, even though we do not make it. The flower in the crannied wall, taken just as it is, has an enormously various content. It absorbs and exhales various gases, exerts mechanical force upon the wall, has various botanical affinities, has such and such cellular tissue, nourishes certain insects, and so on almost indefinitely. But no one, even the most accomplished botanist, interests himself in a wall-flower in this all-round way. The botanist, the chemist, the entomologist, the builder, not to mention the poet and painter, may all concern themselves with it; but they each select a different side, and organise their knowledge for their

own purposes. . Even geometrical systems could not exist without this selective action.

Truth.—I take truth next, because I think it is entirely subordinate to the conception which precedes. Apart from interest there is neither truth nor error. As truth is a somewhat ambiguous term—it may mean true statements or true-ness as a quality of statements—I had better begin by defining it. By truth I mean the correspondence of a statement or thought with reality; and by saying that the conception of truth is subordinate to the conception of interest I mean that it is futile to inquire how far a statement corresponds with reality till we know what the interest was which caused the statement to be made. Apart from an interest which is its motive, a statement is neither true nor false, but unmeaning; or to use the words of Dr. G. F. Stout:—"A person cannot be right or wrong without reference to some interest or purpose."* And, furthermore, when we do know what the interest is, the degree of truth ascribed to a statement does not depend merely on its correspondence with reality; it depends also on the degree to which it satisfies the interest.

Before I try to prove these two points it may be well to say a few words on the general nature of truth. It is the usual mistake of the intellectualist to speak as though knowledge in general aimed at a comprehensive and thorough correspondence with reality. Dominated, as usual, by his preference for abstract science, and ignoring, as usual, the fact of change, he regards the reality which is the archetype of knowledge as eternal and immutable, and truth as no less possessed of these qualities. This is a doctrine which has taken strong hold of popular imagination, so that Cudworth's phrase of "eternal and immutable truth" has come to be invested with something of the sanctity of a religious formula. And yet it only needs a moment's thought to see that the phrase is inappropriate,

* "Error," in *Personal Idealism*, p. 10.

and that the thorough and comprehensive correspondence is an absurd imagination. For but a small part of the archetypal world itself can be called eternal and immutable, and the part grows ever smaller with the growth of science. The "unchanging hills" are to the geologist mere creatures of a year. The starry heavens, the old type of fixity, are to the astronomer's eye as mutable and restless as the sea. In a truer sense than Heracleitus meant all things flow and nothing abides. Realities of the utmost importance to human life are constantly coming into existence and vanishing in decay. This world of change no sane thinker would ever attempt to compass. The organized structure of human thought can never bear more than an infinitesimal relation to it. Such slender portion of knowledge as each of us can win must always be conditioned by our needs. Reality is like a mighty unknown river rushing past, and truth a cupful which a wanderer snatches from it to quench his thirst. Nor of the truth we get can we keep more than a little. The greater part of our learning must in self-preservation be forgotten.

Considered from the pragmatist standpoint, true knowledge in general has a different air from the eternal, comprehensive, and wholly disinterested structure which is such a favourite with the moralising rhetorician. Let us turn now to special truth. From the general nature of knowledge it is plain that any particular statement cannot be judged by us to be true or false according as it is fitted to take its place in a completely true system of knowledge. No such completely true system exists, or can exist, in human minds, because only a small fraction of reality lies within our interest and ken. And, furthermore, a particular statement is not judged as true or false according as it corresponds with that fraction of reality in which mankind is actually interested. A particular statement is judged true or false according as it corresponds with reality relatively to the particular line of interest which called forth the statement. If the statement appeals to no current line of interest its truth or falsity is not considered at all. It is simply neglected as

unmeaning. Of this let me give an illustration. Suppose that to a roomful of people engaged in ordinary tea-table conversation there entered a man who shouted out "Two and two make four." Now, if there is a judgment unconditionally true in the eyes of intellectualist logicians, it is just this. But what would the roomful of people think? Certainly they would not say, "How false!" still less "How true!" They would say (or think) "What a lunatic!" They would refuse to consider this arithmetical statement in the light of a contribution to knowledge, because it has no possible appropriateness at that time and place. People recognise, in fact, that judgments are not made without substantial reason. The pressure of the need which evokes the judgment might almost be described as an interrogation. And where there has been no question, there can be no answer.

Now we come to the second point to be proved of special truth, that the truth which we ascribe to a statement does not depend solely on its correspondence with reality, but has reference also to the degree in which it satisfies the interest which evoked it. Suppose someone asks what is the colour of the wild wall-flower, and suppose the answer be given, "It is yellow." Now this is certainly not a false answer, as the answer, "It is brown," would be. But our view of the degree of truth it has will vary according to our interpretation of the questioner's purpose. If the questioner be a little child who does not want, and could not understand, a closer definition of the colour, then we should pronounce the answer true without reservation. But if the questioner is a painter of botanical illustrations, then the answer will strike us as being very partially true. No possible answer could be absolutely true, because the colour is not susceptible of exact verbal definition. But this vague answer is nearly useless to the questioner, and this uselessness influences us when we pronounce it "very partially true." If the answer were adequate to the painter's needs we should pronounce it "quite true."

The relation of truth to interest is one of the burning questions of contemporary logic, and I have tried to express myself about it with all the clearness at my command. But, in spite of all efforts to avoid misunderstanding, I fear I shall have imputed to me an extreme form of pragmatism which makes truth depend on interest, in the sense that any statement becomes true which is sufficiently interesting and useful to us. This view I do not hold. But I do hold that truth is subordinate to interest, and that no theory of knowledge is sound which inverts the subordination or divorces them.

It is the same line of reasoning applied in a different direction which leads one to be discontented with the scholastic formal logic. One is inclined to think that it has no grip of reality at all, and is only good for sharpening the wits of the learner. I am glad to agree with Mr. Bosanquet in his denunciation of what he calls "the futility of the skeleton judgment,"* and heartily accept the reason he gives, *i.e.*, that the skeleton judgment "S is P" or "S is not P" gives us no clue to the purpose of the judger. At the same time, I do not quite see how this reason is consistent with the general intellectualist tone of his doctrine, in which human purpose is usually ignored. This, however, by the way. The objection made to "S is P" holds good no less of the stock-judgment of the old logic: "All men are mortal." We cannot tell whether it is meaningless or relevant, true or false, adequate or inadequate, categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive, or mere nonsense, till we have such a context as shows us why it was made.

Self-Consistency.—In view of what has gone before, a very few words will suffice for self-consistency. This conception plays an immense part in recent logic and metaphysic, but, as a rule, its nature is left entirely obscure. We get no light by being told that anything is self-consistent which is internally

* *Knowledge and Reality*, p. 219.

harmonious and not self-discrepant. It can only be harmonious by conforming to a harmonizing principle. When that which is harmonious is a self-conscious being, the principle must be looked for in its dominant purpose; when it is below the self-conscious level, the principle lies primarily in the purposive consciousness of him who deals with it. Apart from purpose, self-consistency has no meaning, and this should be remembered in criticising a philosophy like Mr. Bradley's, in which self-consistency is made the supreme metaphysical principle. Mr. Bradley's philosophy has no room in it for purpose; and so his principle of self-consistency wavers between a tautology and a mystery.

The Elementary Functions of Knowledge.

System, Interest, Truth, and Self-consistency are conceptions which have application to every form and function of knowledge alike. We have now to consider separately the elementary functions,—Concept, Judgment, and Inference,—and estimate what change in accepted views the pragmatist standpoint will involve.

Concept.—The old view of the concept or universal, as got by merely missing out individual differences, makes the most complete and unfortunate severance between knowledge and action. Far better is the view advocated by Mr. Bosanquet, which regards the universal as a sort of formula constituting the essential nature of the particulars which come under it. A good instance, from his point of view, is the general equation or formula which enables a geometer to determine any particular point on a parabolic curve. This is very well as far as it goes; but here we have once more the “hard” abstract concept of geometry which is secondary to the concept of ordinary experience. In ordinary experience we are dealing with material which is infinitely more plastic than the material of geometry; and therefore ordinary concepts vary within a much greater range.

When we reflect that concepts are thoughts in individual minds, it follows that a man's concepts of common objects must vary with his idiosyncrasy. Concepts vary in different people, and in the same people at different times. A stick is differently conceived by the schoolboy, the soldier, and the lean and slipped pantaloon respectively.

But let us discount these purely individual variations and recognise that ordinary concepts must be standardised—that for purposes of intercommunication there must be a common concept of a walking-stick, for example. And let us ask: What determines the elements which are admitted into the concept? The answer at once discloses the importance of purpose in the constitution of concepts. The dominating factor in the formation of the standard concept of walking-stick is the purpose for which it is used.

This principle explains well enough the way we form our concepts of things of human use having no independent life of their own. But does it explain the way we form concepts of creatures which have independent life? "Not by itself," we must answer. But it does so when we give to our principle its natural extension. Take for example the concept of the dog. A crude and primitive intellect will form a concept which is entirely utilitarian. A higher intellect will think of the dog more from the dog's own point of view. Most prominent in his concept will be those qualities which subserve the dog's own life, not those which subserve the life of man. So also it is with everything that has individual being. And, though it may seem far-fetched to say so, I think that a refined and subtle extension of the same desire to see things from their own point of view accounts for that romantic interest in inorganic nature which is the life-principle of scientific work even when its form is driest.

Judgment.—In judgment we come to what is admittedly the main function of knowledge. Like the concept, it is penetrated by purpose. To bring this out more clearly I

will contrast it with an opposing view, which we find in Mr. Bosanquet's *Essentials of Logic*. There he says that judgment always has three properties: "It is (α) necessary, (β) universal, and (γ) constructive" (p. 23), and later on he defines judgment as "the reference of a significant idea to a subject in reality, by means of an identity of content between them" (p. 79). One of these propositions—that which affirms the constructiveness of judgment—I heartily agree to. The others I regard as influenced by a tendency, not always consciously realised, to take abstract science as the type of knowledge.

In the first place, judgment is not necessary. It does not "express what we are obliged to think." The phrases, "I am unable to resist the conclusion," "I am forced to believe," "I am driven to think," "I have no alternative but to suppose," quoted by Mr. Bosanquet as typically frequent in the formation of knowledge, are, I should say, not appropriate even to abstract theoretical discussion, but rather to cases of controversy in which the emotions are engaged. What Mr. Bosanquet really has in view is abstract intellectual cogency; and this is not characteristic of typical knowledge, but is chiefly felt in the abstract sciences where the thinker's initiative is at a minimum, because he surrenders himself to study a clearly defined stationary system. The typical judgment is systematic, but it is not necessary, because it is the expression of free volition. It will be more convenient to speak further of necessity and cogency after inference.

Nor does it seem true that every judgment is universal. "There are," says Mr. Bosanquet, "different senses of 'universal' as of 'necessary.' We are now speaking only in the widest sense, in which universality is a property of all judgment whatever. . . . I not only feel that my judgment is inevitable for me, but I never think of doubting that, given the same materials, it is obligatory for every other intelligent being." Now, this again is only true, if at all, of abstract science. Out of precisely similar data men will construct an infinite diversity

of judgments because they have different interests—interests which they have largely created by their own efforts. The intellectualist logician could only exclude the possibility of diversity by making universality a tautology—that is, by saying if two men's interests are the same and their data the same their judgments will be the same.

Thirdly, it does not seem right to say that "judgment is the reference of a significant idea to reality." Such a definition is only appropriate when we have definite and well-understood concepts, cases of which we note when they occur. In other words, the definition is only appropriate to the judgment in which recognition preponderates, and does not fit the more typical form which is mainly constructive. Mr. Bosanquet's position in this matter derives its plausibility mainly from the examples he chooses—"This is a table," "This is blue," "This is a flower," "That light is the rising sun," "That sound is the surf on a sandy shore." Now these, from my point of view, are not typical judgments. They are, without exception, intelligible only as recognitions made incidentally to the execution of some purpose or pursuit of some interest. For example, we might suppose "This is a table" to represent the half-conscious recognition of a civilised man who wants to do something for which a table is needed (say, to write a letter), and, looking round, finds what he wants. But it is in the constructive form of judgment which expresses the active purpose for the sake of which recognitions are made that we must seek for the typical judgment. If we take as our example, not "This is a table," but "I shall write a letter," we shall see that judgment is not "the reference of a significant idea to a subject in reality, by means of an identity of content between them."

On a pragmatist theory thought and action are not to be separated for a moment. The typical judgment is an integral part of an action. There is no action, rising above blind impulse, in which judgment at least (to say nothing of inference) is not

involved. Let us take an example. Walking home along the street and experiencing a half-conscious sense of fatigue, I suddenly and without premeditation decide to hail a cab, which at that moment turns the corner. Such an action, however swiftly made, must involve judgment. It is a judgment of the form "I shall take a cab" that I regard as typical.

The justification for taking the active or purposive judgment as typical is not its frequency—though surely it occurs immensely oftener than any other fully-conscious form—but the fact that it is the key to all intelligent experience. Without it the more passive sort of judgments would be meaningless and impossible. We can imagine a man who was always acting, and never sat down to think for thinking's sake. But the man who always thought and never acted is inconceivable. How could he possibly understand the things he thought about?

Subsidiary to every active judgment there are always recognitions more or less out of the focus of consciousness. In taking a cab I must recognise it as a public conveyance, must recognise the kerbstone as needing a step down, and so on. Such recognitions shade off by imperceptible degrees into the half-conscious or sub-conscious. In every action a man must have some sort of consciousness that he is himself, has a body, and so on. We can hardly draw a distinct line at the point where cognitive judgment ends and sub-conscious awareness begins.

Inference.—Without staying to develop this view of judgment it will be most convenient to go on straight to inference, into which judgment shades off imperceptibly on the other side. The distinction between judgment and inference corresponds to the distinction between an action decided on, done and ended with the means which are ready to hand, as opposed to an action which requires the agent to cast about for means; or, it may be, leads him on to think of other actions not contemplated when the first was undertaken. Let us suppose

that a man, sitting at home on Sunday, resolves to hire a cab for the station. There may be some difficulty about getting one on that day. His resolution then leads him to think of the best means of summoning the vehicle. "If I want that cab I had better go to Smith's stables; he does not object to Sunday work." This is the most typical form of a concrete inference from a general principle to details falling under it. In another form the inference may be not to means, but to consequences leading on to further action. "If I drive to the station I shall pass Jones's lodgings, and may as well leave this note for him." Such trains of thought, when contrasted with the case of the man who hails the passing cab suddenly, illustrate well the distinction between inference and judgment.

Now that we have got the essential character of judgment and inference clear in typical cases, let us see how it is traceable in the more passive sort of intellectual operations. Suppose we are watching a wasp kill a house-fly, clip off its wings and legs, and ultimately fly away with it. The wasp's behaviour will remain mysterious till we seize the general idea that it is somehow connected with the feeding of young. The "general idea" of the wasp's behaviour is of the same kind as the "general idea" of a purpose of our own, and it is through our ability to form purposes that such "general ideas" are intelligible to us. The same is true of "general ideas," which I will hereafter call plans, relating to inorganic things. The thought which makes a piece of rock intelligible or a geometrical problem soluble, might be described as the apprehension of an impersonal plan.

In regard to the apprehension of any particular plan the question may always be raised whether it is a judgment or an inference. The answer will be that it depends on the apprehender. What is a judgment to the trained entomologist or geologist or mathematician may be a laborious inference to the inexpert. Inference no doubt enters somewhere into most apprehensions. But the point at which it comes in is the

point at which direct apprehension fails, and a movement forward is required to something beyond what was grasped immediately.

Cogency.—One of the most interesting points in a theory of knowledge is the doctrine of cogency, because it bears on the freedom of the will. The cogency of an inference is to be explained primarily by the relation of means to end. A concrete active inference is cogent when the matter inferred is essential to the carrying out of a plan resolved upon. If a man wants to drive to the Great Western station from Queen's College in 10 minutes he *must* go by way of Park End Street; by no other route can he get there in the time. In the abstract sciences a permanent cogency is possible wherever the subject-matter is such that it forms a very stringently interrelated system. The degree of cogency one can get in science depends in every case upon the quality of the material. In geometry and astronomy a comparatively few abstractions will make it perfect, so that it deserves the name of necessity; in political economy it is immensely less stringent. In any case, no piece of reasoning owes any of its validity to the logical form in which it is expressed. The efficacy of the syllogism to constrain assent is a sheer delusion.

All this bears on the free-will controversy in a way that can only just be indicated here. The whole question depends on what sort of a system human action is. Is it a fixed system? Or is it a system which, so to speak, makes itself as it goes along, and is, therefore, not fully predictable because it is always bringing into being something new. But with this controversy I am not directly concerned. All I want to point out is that determinism can get no help at all by appealing to Logic. An impression seems to exist that if human action were allowed to be spontaneous Logic would instantly be burst to pieces, and, like Humpty Dumpty, could never be put together again. This is a mere bogey. Logic is the handmaid of fact, not its mistress. If human action is

spontaneous, logic cannot alter it, but must conform thereto. But, of course, it is impossible that logic should not conform. So far from that, if a pragmatist view of logic is true, it is only human spontaneity that makes the operations of knowledge intelligible.

The question of cogency has been much obscured by two confusions—one characteristic of “hard” or mechanical determinism, the other of “soft” determinism. In the first, intellectual cogency is confused with physical compulsion. On this confusion I need not spend much time, as most of my hearers must long ago have seen through it. I only want to point out that physical compulsion, so far from being analogous to perfect knowledge, is really antithetic to it. Its true analogues are, in the sensitive sphere, such physical pains and pleasures as we can neither understand nor expel; and, in the intellectual sphere, that sort of intellectual compulsion which we experience when from ignorance or stupidity we cannot understand a situation, and move helplessly along a line of action which we do not approve. The second confusion is that of “soft” determinism. In this the active cogency which we make when we enter upon a line of action by a volitional resolve is confused with the passive cogency to which we surrender ourselves when we study an object of abstract science. I may add the caution that I do not mean to draw an absolute distinction between the two kinds of cogency, for, in a sense, we co-operate in making the passive cogency also.

Deduction and Induction.—As inference in general is to be interpreted by reference to action, so must its two forms—deduction and induction. In deduction a man has in his mind his general purpose or plan and then proceeds to arrange details with a view to carrying it out. Conversely, with induction a situation is presented which calls for a plan to cope with it; the completion of the plan is the completion of the induction. This simple antithesis is true in the main, but the facts demand

a good deal of qualification of it. This will be seen if we raise the old debate whether deduction is prior to induction, or the reverse. As the matter is somewhat subtle, let us set it forth by way of *pro* and *con*. At first it looks as though deduction were prior, because in every action you must have a plan, however vague, before the means to its action can be inferred. But then, on the other side, the argument meets us that before we need a plan there must be a situation calling for it; and so it looks as though induction must come before deduction. To this comes the rejoinder that plans and purposes never spring up without antecedents of their own kind. Every new purpose is formed on the analogy of previous purposes, may, in fact, usually be regarded as a continuation of them. So the balance seems to incline back again to deduction. But then the reflection occurs that the inferential process by which one purpose is developed out of another is not exactly deduction. Take as a good illustration the growth of a political institution or the development of a line of foreign policy. In such cases we can trace continuity all through, and yet the later development is not all potentially existent in the earlier stages. The continuous principle is progressively modified to suit ever fresh circumstances. And in view of the current Hegelian doctrine of immanent development, it is necessary to insist that the stimulation of the new circumstances is no less essential to development than the abidingness of the continuous principle. Thus we finally conclude that priority lies neither with deduction nor with induction, but with a form of rational process that combines the two. This I should like to call Rational Development, because it is exemplified best by the normal process of a human life. A man exemplifies it when he lives on rationally consistent principles, partly moulding them to his environment, partly moulding his environment to them.

Implicit and Explicit.—A few words on the meaning of “implicit” and “explicit” are made opportune by the frequency

with which these terms are used in current logic. Professor Muirhead's phrases about a system such "that the whole is seen to be reflected into every part, and every part to contain the whole" might be paralleled to any extent from logical writings of the same tendency. A pragmatist logic must argue that such a view of implicitness is quite impossible and far-fetched in regard to most systematic contents, and is only superficially plausible in cases like geometry. We get at the truth by going back as usual to action, and viewing system in its primary meaning of plan made by a purposive agent. Now a plan is not forced upon an intelligent agent by any one of its own details. It is the agent who selects the details to subserve the plan. And thus, plainly, before the plan is formed it is absurd to say that it all lies implicit in something that afterwards comes to be a detail of it. But when the plan is made, and the planner has got familiar with the details as forming part of it, each detail becomes invested with such a meaning that it becomes capable of suggesting the whole plan to him. This is not a Hegelian miracle, but only an example of the commonest sort of mental synthesis. The same line of thought explains our secondary apprehension of the plans of others from a few details or even from one. The empty cartridge-case in the heather on the 13th August tells the whole tale—but only to a man who knows about grouse-shooting. The matter is not really different in regard to geometry. The given two sides and contained angle stand to a geometer for the whole triangle—but to the geometer only. He has learnt to construct triangles for himself. It is only in so far as he is capable of *constructing* the figure that a part can stand for the whole of it to him.

Supposal.—It will readily be imagined that a pragmatist view of supposal must be widely different from that of intellectualism. I use the term supposal in preference to hypothesis because it has a more natural association with action. "Supposal," says Professor Bosanquet, "is more a psychological

than a logical attitude.”* “I contend,” he remarks in another place,† “that supposal is rather the intrusion of a non-logical feature into cognition than a logical attitude.” The standpoint of pragmatism, on the other hand, leads to the view that supposal is essential to cognition just because it is essential to action. For the purpose of proving this it will be convenient to distinguish two kinds of supposal, the active and the passive.

Let us take active supposal first, meaning by that term the supposal which is essential to action. That supposal is essential to action follows from the simple consideration that every action implies a plan in the agent’s mind. Action, indeed, may be viewed as a sort of experiment upon reality, and just as in the case of scientific experiment there must always be a scheme behind it. Now this plan or scheme is essentially a kind of supposal. The scheme is not a loosely-held notion floating before the mind; it must be regarded as something feasible and needing to be done. We must keep before us the thought, “Suppose it done, what then?” in order to arrange for the continuous conduct of the experiment. Every purposive plan may be regarded as a supposal or hypothesis which the issue either verifies or refutes.

We come now to passive supposal—that is, to scientific hypothesis in the ordinary sense—and consider how it is essential to knowledge. The foregoing quotations from *Knowledge and Reality* on supposal imply the view that it is a sort of ladder to knowledge, which the individual learner uses because he cannot do without it, but is glad to kick away as soon as he reaches truth. The argument for such a view is strongest in the abstract sciences, especially in their elementary parts. The earlier propositions of Euclid, which we all know so well, have the air of a fixed impersonal structure of truth,

* *Knowledge and Reality*, p. 37.

† *Ibid.*, p. 44.

and it seems unreal to insist that the attitude of supposal is necessary to their existence as knowledge. "Is not the forty-seventh proposition," the reader may ask, "independent of the mental diathesis of the individual learner?"

The whole notion of an impersonal structure of knowledge is a delusion, or, shall we say, a pictorial way of thinking useful for certain purposes, but not to be taken as scientifically exact. There is no knowledge within human ken which is not a process in human minds. But let us consider the various ways of knowing the forty-seventh proposition, in order that we may see how supposal enters into them. First and foremost, we must think of the discoverer. Undoubtedly Pythagoras must have used supposal. Something must have suggested to his mind that the two squares were equal to the one; and he must have provisionally assumed the equality in order to make the experimental investigations which led to the establishment of the proof. Next take the learner, one who is really a learner, and does not merely commit to memory the words of the demonstration. To such a learner the enunciation is a sort of challenge to supposal. The statement that the squares are equal is an invitation to try and see whether they are not equal. So far as the demonstration has real interest for him, it is an answer setting at rest an interrogation which the enunciation has provoked: "I wonder whether the squares are equal. Let me see if the book can prove it." The best teaching methods go further in not letting the learner hang upon the book, but in prompting him to discover for himself. Next take the jaded schoolmaster, teaching the proposition to his third form for the hundredth time. With him, as he gets more jaded, the spirit of questioning, of trial, of supposal, of experiment, of discovery, dies out. But simultaneously, I contend, his knowledge dies out too. The proposition may burn deeper and deeper into his memory, but he does not get to know it better. On the contrary, he gets to know it worse. Its epistemonomic content atrophies and shrinks.

He thinks less and less about what it means, till at last there is danger that his mental exercise upon it may become as mechanical as a Buddhist praying-wheel. The best proof that a jaded teacher is ceasing to have knowledge is his inefficiency in imparting it. Finally, we come to the accomplished geometer, who may be said to know the proposition, though he is not thinking about it. This, I should say, is not knowledge in the full sense, but potential knowledge. The geometer has the psychical and physiological dispositions which enable him to know when occasion comes. But it is inexact language to say he knows the proposition when his mind is a blank or otherwise engaged. The same distinction of potential and actual, which must not be abolished because it has sometimes been abused, enables us to say in what sense there is a permanent structure of geometrical knowledge. There is no actual structure. But in the volume of Euclid there is material which will help a normal civilised mind to have knowledge.

So far my polemic against the attempt to exclude supposal from knowledge presupposes a standpoint different from that of my opponents; it presupposes a dynamic as opposed to a static view of knowledge. But let us for the sake of argument take up the static point of view; let us assume that knowledge is passive rather than active. Even from this standpoint I think it can be shown that supposal is essential to knowledge. For, consider what is meant by saying that a fact is so and so. Surely it means that *if* we made the proper experiment we should find the fact as described. Suppose a geologist to recount to us the qualities of olivine. "Olivine is a basic silicate of magnesia with some iron, crystallizing in the trimetric system; it has no cleavage and a glassy lustre, so that it looks at first like quartz, but is distinguished by its beautiful olive-green colour." What meaning can we attach to this, but one into which supposal enters? *If* the rock be analysed, it will yield such and such elements; *if* melted and allowed to cool, it will form certain definitely-shaped crystals;

if examined superficially, it will be mistaken for quartz, and so on. Without supposing ourselves engaged with the rock, the description means nothing. The same is true of historical knowledge, for testing which actual experiment is impossible. When you say that Waterloo was fought on June 18th, 1815, you imply that if we had been there then we should have seen the battle.

Goal of Knowledge.—We are now, at the conclusion of the paper, in a position to contrast the conception of the goal of knowledge, as it may appear to a pragmatist, with that outlined in the sentences of Professor Muirhead quoted near the beginning. The first thought which Professor Muirhead's description of the goal of knowledge provokes is a prayer that it may never be realised. Oh, the dreariness of a world in which everything is known through and through by everybody all at once! How insufferable the prospect of a universe which might "be schematised as a whole of clear and distinct parts related to one another in such a way that the mind can pass from any one along the lines of judgment and inference to any other!" How paralysing the thought that nothing new can come from the future!

The view of the world which underlies this present paper is that not only will there be always new things coming into existence, but that the new things will be always the more interesting and numerous the higher the development of human life. To man's knowledge of the laws of the inorganic world, and to his power of predicting its future, we can set no definite bounds. In the organic world below the human level man may some day move with much more confidence than now. But in the sphere of human life, vastly the more important half of knowledge, we can neither hope nor desire the power of full prediction. And the reason is not that human life is irrationally uncertain, but that it is a process of new and fresh creation. Action may be as systematic as a good and intelligent life can make it, but its concrete content will

be none the more predictable. The richer personality becomes, the more power it has of bringing forth new things from its treasure. Every advance in our power over nature gives fresh opportunities to personality. It is because they are oppressed by nature, so to speak, that the life of savages is so dull and uniform. If the civilisation of the future widens, as we hope it will, action will be ever more free and interesting, and the knowledge which is not separable from action will be ever further removed from the dreary ideal of intellectualism.

VI.—A RE-STATEMENT OF SOME FEATURES IN
KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTALISM.

By G. DAWES HICKS.

1. IT is not the object of the present paper to offer another contribution to the voluminous literature of Kantian exegesis. I am not setting out, either, upon the vain endeavour to extract from the Kantian writings one coherent body of philosophic doctrine. That would hardly be a profitable employment, and would involve a manifest act of violence in regard to some elements at least of the matter to be dealt with. Whichever line of interpretation such an expositor might elect to follow, he would be bound to be entangled in the meshes of a polemical dispute not only with other expositors but also in a greater or less degree with Kant himself, and to have forced upon him the task of explaining away discrepancies irreconcilable with his scheme. I desire rather to fix attention upon that trend of reflection in Kant which adverse criticism has been all too prone to lose sight of, and to emphasise the features that seem to me to retain, and likely to continue to retain, their significance and value in the treatment of ultimate philosophical questions. But I am not concerned to argue that my selection of material is either that upon which Kant himself laid the foremost stress or that which most faithfully reproduces the characteristic marks of his teaching. I think, indeed, a good case could be presented for both these contentions, although I expressly disclaim any attempt at doing so now. To my mind, Kant was for the first time making his way into a new region of speculation, and "if we had seen these roads before they were made," we should not be surprised at his frequent deviations from the straight path. I propose, then, to discuss those aspects of Kant's thought, which connect themselves especially

with some current problems of philosophical debate, and to indicate briefly the ultimate conception of experience to which they appear to lead, a conception, let me premise, not by any means to be identified with the Absolute Idealism of Hegel. If, however, it should be maintained that in what follows I have deserted Kantian territory and forfeited the claim to discipleship, I am content to submit to disfranchisement, and to defend the positions I occupy on their own merits, without presuming to shelter myself under the shade of a great authority.

2. I can, perhaps, best approach the course of consideration I have in view by distinguishing it negatively from all that side of Kant's teaching which seems to me to lead to an *impasse*, before which we find ourselves at a stand. There is, undoubtedly, a vein of reflection apparent throughout the Kantian writings that deservedly lends itself to the kind of criticism adopted, for example, by Hegel, in his earlier period. To Hegel it seemed evident that according to Kant the whole content of philosophy terminated in a knowledge of mere subjectivity and not of real being; that its logical outcome was a species of subjective idealism, which attributed both the form and the matter of knowledge to the individual mind or knowing subject, the form to its thought, the matter to its sensation or reaction on stimulation. Now, so conceived, Hegel is perfectly warranted in describing Kant's idealism as little else than the "*Erweiterung des Lockeanismus*," and in pointing out that it involves just the crude dualism of individual minds and things which the Critical Philosophy had gone forth to slay.*

It would not be difficult, from this point of view, to institute a close parallel between both the procedure and the results of Kant and Locke. Hegel himself refers† to the

* Hegel's *Werke*, i, pp. 20, 27, and 31.

† *Ibid.*, p. 20.

almost identical terms used by the thinkers in question in formulating the problem with which they propose to deal. The parallel, however, becomes more striking when we compare the way in which, in each case, the attempt is made to construct a theory of knowledge upon a psychological account of its genesis. To separate the shares contributed by Sense and Understanding, whether the contributions be viewed as due to the operation of these so-called powers, or in whatsoever other manner they may be accounted for, is inevitably to imply that what is thus contributed is a product, a real occurrence or fact, and that the resulting combination is in some way a compound in which these two detached products come together. And the implication is in truth explicitly acknowledged no less by Kant than by Locke. When the former declares, in the Introduction to the 2nd edition of the *Critique*, that "the faculty of knowledge is called into activity by objects which affect our senses, and which either produce ideas by themselves, or rouse the activity of our understanding to *compare, connect, or separate* them, and thus to work up the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which we call experience,"* he is practically repeating, in so many words, what Locke had said before him, namely, that the materials of sense being given and passively received, "all that man can do is either to *unite* them together or to *set them by one another*, or wholly *separate* them."†

The correspondence might be maintained with a greater or less degree of fidelity throughout the subsequent stages of treatment. Locke's simple ideas of sense contain doubtless a good deal more than Kant's manifold of sensuous intuition, but, after all, the *amount* that is ascribed to sense does not affect the principle that is involved, and moreover Kant, in certain passages, is constantly to be found speaking of the

* Kant's *Werke*, iii, p. 33 (Hartenstein).

† *Essay*, Book II, chap. xii.

sensuously given as *Erscheinungen*, or even as *Gegenstände*,* where the analogy with Locke is almost complete. In regard also to the factor supplied by understanding, although Locke's account of what he calls "the operations of our own minds within" is highly perplexing and obscure, it cannot escape notice that the part they play in experience is not without its resemblance to the functions often assigned by Kant to the Categories.

Pursuing, then, the course of reflection to which this method of procedure inevitably gives rise, Kant is repeatedly tending to the conclusion reached by Locke, viz., that the element of reality in knowledge is that furnished from without. By Locke whatsoever was, as he says, "added to" or "super-induced upon" the given ideas of sense or reflection was designated "ideal," "inventions and creations of the understanding," and allowed no validity in determining the content of the real. It is impossible to exaggerate the disastrous consequences to which this violent separation leads. The very theory which thus severed the real element from the subjective or ideal contribution of the mind is the theory which ultimately

* Elsewhere I have tried to show that three distinct conceptions of phenomenon (*Erscheinung*) are to be discerned in the Kantian writings:— (1) In the "Dissertation," and more or less in the *Trans. Ästhetik* of the *K. d. r. V.*, a phenomenon is an object (*Gegenstand*) of sense, which arises through affection of the *status representationis* of the individual subject by the *objecti alicujus presentia*. In such affection the soul is passive, and it is expressly maintained that the apprehension of phenomena precedes the logical use of the understanding. (2) The *Vorstellung*, as a psychical state, and the content presented thereby, being confused, a phenomenon is regarded as that which *becomes* an object when it is determined by the Categories. The Categories are then spoken of as being applied (*angewandt*) to the phenomenon, and this expression is characteristic of the entire view, which is that of the subjective idealism considered above. (3) The properly transcendental meaning of phenomenon, first appearing in the later sections of the *Trans. Analytik*, is that of a fully constituted object of experience, in which the Categories are already *immanent*, and which is expressly distinguished from the subjective states in and through which it is apprehended.

has to admit that in all the "given," so far as it is matter of knowledge at all, there is relation, notwithstanding the fact that relation is the "workmanship of the mind," and that the very secret inner core of real being is for us an idea, in regard to the content of which we can determine nothing, and which, in accordance with the premisses already laid down, ought to be dismissed as adventitious and unreal,—the idea, that is, of substance. Kant's speculation, in so far as it proceeds with the help of similar abstractions, is attended, in the end, with a similar fate. It culminates, namely, in a metaphysical dualism of the subject-in-itself and the object-in-itself, as two reciprocally related entities, outside the sphere of knowledge, which somehow, by their mutual interaction, give rise to a *tertium quid*, the quasi-existent world of experience. But in respect to these two real entities, Kant finds himself exactly in the position of Locke with respect to his hypothetical substances—they are "uncertain suppositions of we know not what."

Kant himself, of course, supplies abundant grounds for rejecting these conclusions to which in his unguarded moments he is so frequently tending. To extend the notion of reciprocity, the highest category within the realm of knowledge, and which, because it is the highest, necessarily involves all the rest, to an imaginary real background, which existed before knowledge was, and through the mutual interaction of the parts of which knowledge comes to be, is clearly to undermine the whole fabric, which the critical analysis of experience had so laboriously reared. We must regard this category in one way or the other. Either it expresses a relation for consciousness, in which case we must not view consciousness itself as springing out of it, or it expresses a relation not for consciousness, in which case we can form absolutely no conception of it, nor of all the other categories on which it depends. The error lying at the root of the confusion is easily traceable. Kant had discovered that in knowledge generally there was involved the altogether unique antithesis of the subject knowing and the

object known, and lapsing into the mode of speech we are accustomed to in dealing with the phenomena of nature, he is tempted to convert the antithesis in question into a duality of existence and to interpret it after the fashion he had adopted in regard to the quite subordinate distinction of the two classes of objects, those of outer and inner sense. There is ample evidence that he accepted the hypothesis of a causal relationship between so-called external things and the inner processes of the empirical subject, both things and empirical subject being parts, of course, of the world of experience. In his posthumous works, he speaks repeatedly of the individual subject being affected by matter. Perceptions (*Wahrnehmungen*), he says, are "empirical presentations (*Vorstellungen*) produced by the influence of the moving forces of matter upon the subject." "The moving forces of matter are in reference to the subject *causes* of perceptions." Now, matter is "that which moves in space,"* space is a form of perception, and what moves in it are "empirical (*i.e.*, perceptual) data." So fully aware is Kant of all this, that he actually uses the peculiar phrase "*Erscheinungen von Erscheinungen*," or "*Erscheinungen zweiter Ordnung*," or again "*indirecte Erscheinungen*," to denote the products that ensue through the interaction of two phenomenal objects, two "*Erscheinungen erster Ordnung*." Affections of Mind, then, if they occur at all, are, like affections of body, processes *within* the known world of experience,† and

* Kant's *Werke*, iv, p. 369 (Hartenstein).

† Vaihinger is of opinion that, in the 2nd edition of the *Critique*, Kant assumed a two-fold affection of the mind, on the one hand through things in themselves and on the other hand through outer phenomena. But the subject affected in the two cases was not the same. Things in themselves affected the *transcendental* subject, and thereby arose the entire world of experience, of which the empirical ego was a part. Outer phenomena, on the contrary, affected the *empirical* subject, and thereby arose sensations and presentations, as states of the individual consciousness (see Essay, "Zu Kant's Widerlegung d. Idealismus," in the *Strassburger Abhandlungen*, 1884, pp. 87-164). This view, however, seems to me difficult to reconcile with the fact that just in those passages where Kant most clearly

to treat them as in some way antecedents of experience is obviously to commit the very sin with which Kant charges the "coarse dualism," that mistakes "representations of thinking subjects" for "things existing by themselves."

3. In laying stress now upon the *transcendental* line of reflection, I desire to emphasise those features of the Critical Philosophy that stand out in marked contrast to all that tendency in Kantian speculation we have just been considering. The expression "transcendental," Hegel remarks, "has an ugly look about it, and suggests a monster in the background," but in default of any other term it conveniently denotes a distinct mode of approaching the philosophical problem which we owe to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant's meaning of transcendental, Hegel thinks, may best be gathered from the way in which he distinguishes it from transcendent. In contradistinction to what may be supposed to lie beyond the categories of the understanding, the unity of Self-consciousness, which Kant calls transcendental, is the unity which attaches to objects in virtue of the fact that they are objects of knowledge. Can a knowledge of objects, then, itself be regarded as an object? The very essence of Locke's method, as indeed of empiricism generally, consisted in proceeding throughout upon the assumption that this possibility was so self-evident as to need no prior justification. Conscious experience was viewed from without, exactly as perceived things are viewed, by an external observer, and every factor that could not be presented as an immediate object of experience was rejected as illusory. The implication was that an inspection of the process of

distinguishes his theory from subjective idealism, and insists upon regarding the totality of phenomena as an objective world, independent of the individual subject, expressions that seem to point to a mechanical influence of things in themselves are for the most part wanting. Moreover, it is to be remembered that the notion of Noumena, no less than that of phenomena, undergoes a series of transformations in the course of Kant's development. These considerations may justify hesitation in resorting to so violent an expedient as Vaihinger proposes.

knowing might be made *by* the knowing process, that careful observation would disclose the elements of which it was composed, and the manner of their arrangement, that, by "turning the mental eye inwards," we should see what was going on. The essence of the transcendental method lies in its rejection of that assumption, and in its determination to examine knowledge from the inner side as a mode of apprehension, rather than as itself an object known. It is explicitly defined by Kant as the investigation "which is occupied not with objects, but with our mode of knowing objects." In other words, the question, how it is possible that anything can be presented as an object at all, is altogether misconceived when the attempt is made to answer it by decomposing the said object into simpler elements which are themselves likewise taken to be objects. Once recognise that the fundamental problem in knowledge is to account for the fact of objectivity, and it is evidently a case of *ὑστερον πρότερον* to refer us to constituents of knowledge which themselves rest upon the very objectivity for which we need to account. The search then, for the *conditions* which render knowledge possible is undertaken from the conviction that we are without justification when we convert the conception of knowledge itself into a conception of an object known. The conditions of knowledge may, indeed, be inferred from an analysis of known facts, for we may expect that what is known will yield us some clue to the conditions upon which its knowability depends, but the analysis will not enable us to exhibit those conditions as parts of known material. If, for instance (assuming for a moment the result of Kant's investigation), we find that Sense, Understanding, and Unity of Apperception are involved in a knowledge of objects, then are we *ipso facto* debarred from treating sensations, notions, and self-consciousness as though they were themselves objective parts of the objective world.

It is but another way of saying the same thing, to assert with Kant that a transcendental method seeks for "the ground

of *a priori* determinations in respect to objects of experience." Kant, it is true, falls into the error of drawing a sharp distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements, and, regarding the first as universal and necessary, and the second as particular and contingent, of speaking often as though the latter were indeed already experienced objects. The distinction is, however, really foreign to the principle upon which his method is based. According to Kant's own showing, the *a posteriori* elements are as necessarily and universally involved in the texture of *our* experience as the *a priori*, and so even from that point of view the severance cannot be defended. But, in the reference here concerned, the term *a priori* ought to bear, and generally for Kant does bear, a significance of a different kind. It should denote that which is *logically prior* to knowledge and the objects of knowledge. Now, in this respect, elements of sense and elements of thought stand upon a precisely similar footing. If synthesis, relation, conjunction, be a characteristic feature of cognition, a mode in which conscious recognition or awareness is possible, it cannot come before us as itself one of the facts cognised, nor have any resemblance to those external links of connection discoverable by observation among the parts of nature. And equally certain is it, that if sensation be also a requisite factor in experience, it cannot as such come before us as itself a separate part of what we are capable of experiencing. The conditions of experience, therefore, whether they be sensations or notions or what not, are bound, by the very necessity of the case, to be abstractions; we may be able to distinguish them as various *aspects* of the way in which experience is possible, but we are *ex hypothesi* precluded from treating them as separate entities in the real world.

It follows from what has been said that "the procedure of a transcendental philosophy which would be consistent with itself must be immanent throughout."* As such, it attempts to

* Pringle-Pattison, *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 17.

determine what is necessary in order that knowledge should be by what may be called an *inner* analysis of the nature of knowledge, by disentangling the several features woven into its structure, but resolutely refusing to detach these from the context in which it finds them and to conceive of them as in any way *brought together* by some extraneous influence. And since knowledge for us is mainly knowledge of objects, it may formulate its problem as an inquiry into the significance of objectivity and the relations involved therein. But it does not assume a distinction between subject and object as its primary datum. On the contrary, it insists that that distinction, as falling within the realm of knowledge, is part of its problem, and not forthwith to be accepted as an ultimate and irreducible fact.

3. The result of Kant's analysis is a familiar story, and I do not propose to follow the steps by which it was reached. Objectivity, Kant finds, is possible because there are involved in the contents of Consciousness those universal and necessary principles, which give to presentations that centre of reference, that fixed nucleus or position, by means of which the said presentations exhibit a systematic order and connectedness in the field of experience. "We find," he says, "that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it something of necessity: the object, namely, is viewed as that which hinders our experiences from coming to us at hap-hazard, or capriciously, and binds them down beforehand to a certain determined course; for all our experiences, which are taken to refer to any one object must, in reference to it, harmonise with each other,—*i.e.*, they must have that unity which the conception of an object implies."* In other words, the object, in the most general sense of the word, is that which steadies, or gives stability to, the wandering manifold of possible intuition. Such steadiness or stability would be impossible unless the means

* Kant's *Werke*, iii, 570 (Hartenstein).

were provided, by which the floating data of sense could be discriminated, and connected in regular and ordered manner, unless, that is to say, certain definite principles of combination were involved, in accordance with which the said data could be arrested and referred to their distinct place or setting in the context of experience. The reference of presentations to an object means that under similar circumstances similar presentations can always be had, and this implies rule, order, systematic arrangement of the elements of sense.

In the "Transcendental Deduction" are furnished the grounds which to Kant's mind justified the conclusion above summarised. I touch now briefly upon the gist of it in order to exhibit the argument if I can in a somewhat different light from that in which it ordinarily appears. The two forms in which the Deduction is presented are thus admirably characterised by Professor Adamson in the Lectures recently published. In the one, says Professor Adamson, Kant "is endeavouring to give an analysis of the act of 'being aware'—an analysis which is conducted, so to speak, from within, and in which abstraction must be made from all references to the various ways in which experience comes about for us." In the other, "he has to occupy the relatively external position and has to introduce the consideration of the way in which our experience is given."*

(a) The first method is that pursued mainly in the second edition of the *Critique*. It begins with the Consciousness of Self-identity and seeks to determine the conditions of its possibility. That self-consciousness *is* identical Kant claims as a merely analytical proposition. It means no more than that what *I* am conscious of is in *my* consciousness, that the content of which I am aware is so constituted as to be *capable* of being accompanied by the "Ich denke." In other words, unity of consciousness cannot, through any diversity of presentations, be split up into as many coloured and different

* Adamson, *Development of Modern Philosophy*, i, 185.

bits of consciousness as there are presentations, for in that case not only experience but self-consciousness would be impossible. But this unity as such is a bare identity devoid of all content, and in order that it should be aware of its own unity and identity it must be in such relation to a plurality and multiplicity as to furnish the ground of their synthesis. The analytic unity, that is to say, presupposes a synthetic unity of the parts of a manifold. Now this latter is by no means contingent or variable; it is precisely that type of unity which corresponds to the conception of an object. I have, for example, a series of presentations of a certain red colour, a_1, a_2, a_3 , which in time are separate one from another. If I assert it is the same red, of which through those presentations I am aware, I cannot mean that a_1, a_2, a_3 , as states of consciousness, are the same, for, as a matter of fact, they are different. I can only mean that the contents of the presentations are related to, or indicate something, A, which remains one and the same whether I am aware of it or not. The object, that is to say, is no other than the necessary and universal way in which the contents of presentations are combined, and the consciousness of the unified and identical object is the correlate of the consciousness of self-identity, which apart from the former would be inconceivable. (b) The second method of proof is that pursued mainly in the first edition of the *Critique*. It begins with the consciousness of objects and inquires what is involved in that. If, then, we contemplate knowledge *ab extra*, and endeavour to describe the whole act of perceiving, the becoming aware of an object, we can lay out the process, so Kant thinks, under three heads. Firstly, sensuous states as taking place in time happen successively. As occurring in a particular moment, each psychical event must be a separate, distinct element, an "absolute unit," otherwise it would not be a state or event at all. But every apprehended object contains within it a multiplicity of sensuous contents. In order, therefore, that the multiplicity of sensuous contents should be

apprehended as a unity, it is essential that the contents of the several sensuous states in their temporal sequence should be distinguished from one another and then combined unit with unit. But this elementary synthesis obviously involves, secondly, the reproduction of that which has been presented in the successive psychical states, for the latter are in perpetual flux, and the synthesis of Apprehension could not come about if the sensuous contents vanished likewise. Imagination is the name given by Kant to the capacity of retaining a sensuous content in an apprehended object, after the sensuous state in and through which it originally appeared has ceased to be. By means of imagination, the reproduced contents lose the character of successiveness and are placed in a relation of contemporaneousness one with another. Finally, reproduction would not avail for the knowledge of an object, unless the reproduced contents were *recognised* as such. Unity of Consciousness is the name given here by Kant to the capacity of recognising that the reproduced contents are not something new, but identical with those originally presented, parts, that is to say, of one and the same experience. Such recognition implies that the contents in question lose the character of particularity, and become in the object universal characteristics. In other words, the Categories, the modes in which the sensuous contents are combined according to rule, and thus lose their particular character, are, at the same time, the modes in which unity of consciousness realises itself in the objective world.

Such, in meagre outline, I take to be the substance of Kant's celebrated "Deduction." I proceed to notice some of its more general implications. In the first place, it is clear that in this determination of objectivity no appeal has been made to any supposed causes of presentations. The multiplicity of sense is indeed still regarded as "given," but objectivity, in diametrical opposition to the empirically given elements, is traced to those characteristics of the complex

content which are universal and necessary and therefore in essence thought relations. Kant's meaning can, I think, best be expressed in some such terms as these. The way in which the universal principles involved in an act of knowledge come to recognition, as contrasted with the existence of particular subjective states, is identical in character with an act of *projection* or of *externalisation* (what the Germans call *Entäußerung* or *Gegenüberstellen*), in consequence of which the object *stands over against* the individual subject as something distinct from himself and his inner life. Or, to put the same point in another way, the characteristic feature of the object, its standing over against the apprehending subject, means that its elements are arranged in a regular, definite, determined manner, according to a fixed order or prescribed rule, that the individual subject, in his apprehension of such object, is *compelled, constrained, forced*, to conform to the principles inherent in consciousness as such. The laws of the game are not laid down by him; he has no option in regard to the terms on which it is to be played. And so, in contrast with his *changing* states, the object appears in a condition of *permanence*, the correlate, so to speak, of the permanent unity of Apperception, which forms the basis of his empirical consciousness.

It follows, in the second place, that the transcendental unity of Consciousness cannot be regarded *merely* as the underlying principle of unity in the experience of the individual. That which constrains and that which is constrained cannot be one and the same. Kant distinguishes the former as "Bewusstsein überhaupt," "ursprüngliches unwandelbares Bewusstsein," "stehendes und bleibendes Ich," "Correlatum aller unserer Vorstellungen," &c.—metaphors which are intended to indicate partly its non-individual and partly its purely formal nature. It is ground, therefore, of the objective world generally, and whilst constantly individualising itself in each concrete centre of consciousness, yet stands over against the latter in the

aspect of what Windelband describes as an "überindividuelle Function." "The synthetical proposition that all different empirical consciousnesses are connected in one Self-consciousness is," declares Kant, "the very first principle of our thinking."* And it is worthy of notice that, in his view, the source of the moral law and of the objectivity of the phenomenal world is one and the same. In both cases there is laid upon us an obligation, in the one that of the categorical imperative, in the other that of conformity to the rules of intellectual apprehension.† Is, now, this conception open to the charge of hypostatizing an abstraction? One may readily admit that Kant's mode of presenting it often is. He speaks frequently as though the "Pure Ego," apart from the concrete world of experience in which it is involved, could exert agency and convert a chaotic manifold into an intelligible cosmos. But a consistent Transcendentalism is by no means tied down to the implications of that terminology. Transcendentalism is not a theory of creation, nor an attempt to exhibit the mode in which a Self either has set to work, or by necessity would set to work, to frame a universe.‡ If we speak of activity at all, it is as correct to say that objects make consciousness as that consciousness makes objects, but neither expression is accurate. Whatever account we may have to give of agency, it is certainly to be ascribed to concrete realities and not to the warp and woof of which they are woven. At the same time, there is no disputing the fact that a certain amount of

* Kant's *Werke*, iii, 578, Anm. (Hartenstein).

† As though developing this thought, Professor Rickert, in his able monograph, *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntniss*, 1892, contends that the logical necessity in judgment, which guarantees objective knowledge, is a necessity "des Sollens" and not "des Seins."

‡ Instead of converting the transcendental unity into the idea of God, I sometimes wonder why those thinkers who contrive to theologise Kant's conception do not rather find its analogue in the doctrine of the Logos, which in its two-fold form (*ὁ ἐνδιάθετος* and *ὁ προφορικός*) is a much closer parallel.

apparent hypostatizing is unavoidable, if we are to deal with abstractions at all. Granted that the organisation of experience does involve a number of ultimate generalities, what way have we of representing them to ourselves, save by the use of imagery, which if taken literally at once confers upon them a quasi-substantive mode of existence?

4. The full significance of the transcendental theory cannot, however, be adequately gauged until the relationship of individual finite minds to the ultimate unity involved in knowledge be determined with some degree of precision. The general principle upon which the Kantian analysis had proceeded may be expressed in the form, that whatsoever we are disposed to admit as constituting part of the world of experience must be construed in terms of consciousness. Unfortunately, in spite of his own explicit statements referred to above, and of numerous others to like effect, Kant is repeatedly tending to interpret this dictum as though it implied that the Consciousness in question were identical with the concrete personal existence of the finite subject. He is repeatedly reverting, that is to say, to the Lockean standpoint, according to which facts of experience are to be regarded as *Vorstellungen* in the sense of mental states or psychical events in the development of a particular individual. Futile is the attempt to work the two theories together. No position can well be more hopeless before the problem of knowledge than that of the thinker who insists (1) that our experience consists only of mental processes, modifications of the mind, and (2) that the very essence of an act of knowledge consists in a reference to that which is other than and independent of the finite thinking mind. For transcendentalism there is no avoiding the conclusion that the individuality of the finite subject is just as certainly a part of the world of experience as any material thing and that the modes of its growth, instead of determining the nature and relations of the world of experience, must themselves be determined thereby. It is only in so far as Kant

recognises this that his investigation is really fruitful. When he lays it down as the principle upon which the critical method is founded that all so-called facts of experience must be interpreted in terms consistent with the Unity of Consciousness and when at the same time he includes among the facts of experience the empirical existence of the finite subject, he is drawing, with whatsoever imperfection of phraseology, the distinction between presentations as transitory states of mind and the content to which those presentations refer and which relative to them is transcendent and objective. Nor is it to claim a knowledge superior to what the finite subject can attain, to take up such a position in regard to Consciousness. To defend the position no more is required than recognition of the fact that the finite subject may become aware of his empirical and determined existence as part of the sum total of his experience. That such a distinction should be possible for him, that he should thus, in the very act of knowing, transcend the limits of his own finitude, is surely a characteristic of knowledge which we cannot overlook, and which remains inexplicable so long as we confine attention to the transient succession of mental states making up the subjective existence of the individual mind. As Hegel maintained later, the consciousness of limitation is only possible in so far as consciousness itself is in some way over and beyond that limit.*

There is much, unquestionably, in Kant's formulation of the distinction here emphasised to awaken distrust. Ready, as one may be, to admit the truth of his main contention, that the individual mental life is not to be identified with the fundamental unity of consciousness, it is impossible to accept as well founded the violent severance between them which he appears to institute. As the logical condition of experience, the latter cannot be thought of as a pure unity devoid of difference; as an object of experience, capable of contemplating itself as such,

* See, e.g., Hegel's *Werke*, vi, 121.

the former must be a mode in which the ultimate unity of consciousness realises its own being. Just as little as the categories can be "applied" to objects of perception, but must be already constituent elements *in* them for them to be objects at all, so the transcendental consciousness must be essentially involved in the consciousness of the empirical subject, both in the process by which it comes to know objects and to know itself as one of them. And the whole doctrine of an "inner sense," through which apprehension of subjective states is supposed in some way to be acquired, may well be relinquished to the unsparing criticism it has recently met with.* But when all this has been said, it still remains true that Kant's treatment of the problem initiates a new movement in philosophical thought. Kant namely, expressly, and definitely repudiates a doctrine which from the time of the Cartesians downwards had been accepted as a self-evident maxim in speculation. The processes of the individual consciousness, the mental states of the individual self, Descartes had contended, are known directly face to face, and are necessarily such as they appear to the mind to be. So far as immediacy or certainty of knowledge is concerned, we are confined to the inner events of our own mental history and to them alone. Self knowledge is the primary basis of certitude, and from it only can we advance to the knowledge of anything else. We first become assured of our own existence and then we infer, as ground or cause of our inner experiences, the existence of outer things. Apprehension, therefore, of so-called external objects must be of secondary and inferior validity; it must partake of the problematical character attaching to inference generally. Against this view Kant brought reasoning to bear, the aim of which was to show that with respect to immediacy or self-evidencing certainty, the individual mind as existing in time and external objects as existing in space stand on precisely the

* In Adamson's *Development of Modern Philosophy*, vol. i, p. 240 *sqq.*

same level, and are, so far as apprehension is concerned, strictly correlatives. Nay, in the second edition of the *Critique* he was prepared to go farther, and to maintain that the balance of advantage in this connection falls to the side of external perception. For subjective states are admittedly in a condition of perpetual flux, and to become aware of them there must be furnished a permanent in time, in relation to which their temporal existence can be determined. But the only permanent in time known to us is extended matter in space. External perception is, therefore, more direct and more immediate than internal perception.

Kant's account of the cognition of subjective states has difficulties of its own, but they do not affect the soundness of his argument in reference to the assumed priority of subjective states in knowledge. A whole host of self-made puzzles has sprung up from this unwarranted assumption. It has dominated the School of English Empiricism from Locke to Mill, and is at the root of the sceptical distrust of knowledge in which empiricism has usually resulted. "Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings," declares Locke, "hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them."* "Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible," exclaims Hume; "let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can we conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass."† Even a thinker so little inclined to Empiricism as Lotze is compelled to yield to the sceptical argument whatever strength it may derive from the admission that "the changing whole of our ideas (*Vorstellungen*) is the sole material given us to work

* *Essay*, iv, 1, 1.

† *Treatise*, 1, ii, vi, p. 371 (Green).

upon," and that knowledge *must* be subjective in the sense of being an act or process of the finite mind itself. "All we know of the external world," he asserts, "depends upon its ideas within us; it is to that extent perfectly indifferent whether with Idealism we deny the existence of that world and regard our ideas of it as alone reality, or whether we maintain with Realism the being of things outside us which act upon us. On the latter hypothesis as little as the former do the things themselves pass into our knowledge; they only awaken in us ideas, which are not things. It is, then, the multiplicity of ideas within us, no matter where they have come from, which forms the sole material *directly* given us, from which alone our knowledge can start."* In recent times the same standpoint has been occupied by Professor Volkelt, whose elaborate work, *Erfahrung und Denken*, is a sustained attempt to construct a theory of knowledge upon the Cartesian basis. Volkelt starts with what to him seems an incontestable proposition, that "all the acts claiming to constitute objective knowledge are inseparably united to the individual consciousness of the knower, that primarily and immediately they happen nowhere else save in the consciousness of the individual, and that they are perfectly incapable of extending beyond the consciousness of the individual and of grasping or entering into the field of the real that lies outside." The slightest inspection, he thinks, is sufficient to convince us that we possess "an absolutely self-evident knowledge of our own conscious states," and the certainty does not rest upon an inference drawn from a number of experiences, but upon the immediate information the mental processes give of themselves. On the other hand, the objective reference in knowledge is an outcome of judgment and inference; but judgment and inference are themselves subjective processes and can furnish no more than a subjective guarantee for the reality

* *Logik*, ii, section 306.

of the trans-subjective. "All objective knowledge, so far as its claim to certainty is concerned, has a somewhat *mystical* character," for it implies either "ein Hinausgreifen über das Bewusstsein" or some other "contact with the trans-subjective" equally enigmatical.*

The critical objection urged by Kant to the assumption made in all these instances seems to me conclusive. We are *not* entitled to take for granted that the mere occurrence of a mental state is in itself sufficient to constitute apprehension of that mental state as a fact occurring. The implication is that the mental state is and must be known as *mine*, recognised, that is to say, as a fact in my inner life. But the reference to the subjective, in this sense, is just as certainly an act of judgment, and implies just as surely the conditions of knowledge generally, as the reference to the trans-subjective in external perception. Neither psychologically nor logically can it be made out that recognition of the subjective character of inner experience precedes recognition of the objective character of outer experience. *Psychologically*, the inner life does not begin as a self-conscious life. It gradually comes to self-consciousness, and the stages by which the consciousness of self is reached proceed on a parallel line with the stages by which the consciousness of objects is reached. The conception of what is subjective comes into being only in correlation with the conception of what is objective, and every characteristic by which the former step by step attains to definiteness and distinctness can be matched by a corresponding characteristic by which the latter likewise attains to definiteness and distinctness. *Logically*, it is as little possible with respect to the facts of the inner life as with respect to the facts of the objective world, that there should be apprehension of them without the antithesis between the act of knowing and that which is known implied in knowledge generally. We can,

* *Erfahrung und Denken*, pp. 4, 54, 137.

indeed, obtain from Lotze himself the precise argument that is fatal to the view expressed in the passage of his above quoted. It is, he insists, a popular prejudice to suppose that in order to *know* a thing it is necessary to *be* that thing. So far from that being necessary, the reverse is true,—knowledge never can *be* the thing it knows, but only a complex of ideas *about* the thing. If, in order to know some metal in itself, a man could contrive to *be* that metal, the knowledge of which in the way of ideas does not satisfy him—“well, he would *be* the metal no doubt, but he would be farther off than ever from apprehending himself as the metal which he had become.” Conceive of him as intelligent metal, and still he would apprehend himself only as he appeared to himself through the medium of ideas, not as he would be apart from such representation.* Why, then, should an intelligent mind have meted out to it in this respect a condition of knowledge different from that of an intelligent metal ?

5. I am prepared to press the argument here adopted to its legitimate outcome, and to maintain that subjective states *as such* never are facts of which we are directly aware. And in so doing, I believe one is consistently following out the implications of the transcendental theory of knowledge. Let me proceed by the help of current terminology. Mr. Bradley’s distinction between ideas as occurrences, events, or processes of mind and the contents or meanings of which in and through such ideas we are conscious, is an accurate and adequate way of expressing what is virtually involved in the Kantian distinction between the empirical ego and the fundamental Unity of Consciousness. But when the existence and the content are characterised respectively as the “that” and the “what” *of* the idea, a relapse is made to the old Cartesian view from which Kant’s criticism should rescue us. Mr. Bradley assumes that originally ideas are simply given or presented, and as

* *Logik*, iii, 1, section 308.

such are "felt" or "experienced," but not discriminated or known. Originally, the "what" is presented in unity with the "that," and so long as such unity is preserved, the psychical state is for knowledge no idea at all. Knowledge proper does not begin until the psychical idea has become, through the discriminating activity of thought, a sign or symbol of an existence other than itself. A sign or symbol is "any fact that has a meaning, and meaning consists of a part of the content, cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign."* In other words, we start with a psychical state, possessed of a definite nature or character or sum of qualities, of which in some way we have immediate experience *before* the act of judging, and this nature or character or sum of qualities *is* the content with which we are concerned in the operation that constitutes knowledge. The meaning is a part of the nature of the mental state as an existent sundered from its original context and attached to another existent outside and beyond the first. On this point Mr. Bradley is quite explicit. The psychical state is a mental image or complex of mental imagery, and "contains," as Dr. Stout says, "a duplicate of its own meaning, as an image in a mirror is a duplicate of the object it reflects."† Or still more emphatically Mr. Bradley insists, in words often quoted, that "the idea of the extended has extension, the idea of the heavy has weight, the idea of the odorous has smell, and the idea of pleasure, beyond all controversy, I should have thought, exists, and is so far pleasant."‡ I will not appeal to

* Dr. Stout has already subjected this doctrine to a very able and searching examination. With most of his criticisms I concur, but here I wish to press an objection, more radical than any he urges, for the purpose of bringing into view the conclusion for which I am making

† For example, prior to my forming the judgment, "the whale is a mammal," a "mammal-image" must exist as a psychical state within my head, and from that image the predicate of the judgment must be abstracted. See *Logic*, pp. 7 and 8.

‡ *Mind*, N.S., iv, 21.

ordinary language as evidence against this assertion, although the notion of a triangular, or of a heavy, or a scented psychical state certainly does seem very like a *reductio ad absurdum*. The important point, however, is that in all these instances we are really already dealing with objective predicates, and that they do not become less objective by being transported into the mind as qualities of its subjective states. In that case, the subjective states have ceased to be ways in which we are aware and have become objects of our awareness; we have simply pushed the problem of judgment a stage further back. For we must regard the qualities in question in one of two ways. Either they must be facts of experience, and then they presuppose the experiencing in and through and for which they are facts; or they are not facts of experience, and then not only are they useless for the purpose of predication, but we have evidently no ground for distinguishing them as qualities contained in psychical states at all. On the former supposition, which alone need be considered, we should be landed with the difficulty of an infinite regress. Because, in order to be aware of the content of an idea, part of which I am to cut off and attribute to another reality, I should need first of all a prior idea, part of whose content I had already cut off and ascribed to the idea in question, before I could become aware of the latter, and so on *ad infinitum*. In other words, the process of knowledge could never begin. And even were we to suppose that in some inexplicable way we could become immediately aware, without an act of judgment, of the nature of psychical states, we should have left on our hands the hopeless problem of explaining how those psychical states, apprehended as images, could ever come to be regarded as existent parts of our mental life. If their nature consists in being duplicates of the objects they reflect, how comes it that we not only distinguish them from such objects but confer upon them an altogether unique kind of existence designated by the term subjective?

I can see no way out of these and other similar difficulties, save by entire rejection of the view that the content of which we are aware in apprehension is in any sense to be identified with the nature or structure of the psychological state in and through which the awareness in question comes about. I should dispute, in other words, that from any point of view an idea, as a mental occurrence, ever can *be* what it *means*, that the "sign" ever can be identical with *what it signifies*. It would be truer to say that the mental state *makes* the content than that it *is* the content, although even this expression would not be strictly accurate. There is, I should say, an absolute dissimilarity of character between the symbol and the symbolised, which altogether precludes us from conceiving of the former as an image or a copy of the latter. The mental state, as an existent, is an act or process of apprehending, arising under particular conditions and calling for explanation by reference to the circumstances under which it has arisen. The content, that which is apprehended through the mental state, is not itself an existent which can in any way operate so as to impress its character upon another existent, but a definitely distinguishable fact in the complex whole we call knowledge. And I can discover no reason for supposing that in visual and tactual sensations we have any exception to the distinction here emphasised. Why should the *act* of apprehending blue be itself blue, any more than the *act* of apprehending a triangle be itself made up of lines and angles? Or why should the act of apprehending hardness have itself the quality of hardness, any more than the act of hearing a friend's voice have itself the quality of that voice? As Reid excellently puts it, "pressing my hand with force against the table, I feel the table to be hard," but, "the hardness is in the table, and there is nothing resembling it in the mind."* The conditions necessary for knowledge are just as much involved in the

* *Reid's Works*, i, 30.

apprehension of a simple sense quality, as in the apprehension of any other qualities, and no purpose can be served by the attempt to constitute the former into an unique and altogether peculiar kind of knowing or experiencing.

It seems to me, then, that the apprehended content never is the content or nature of the mental state by which it is apprehended. The mental state, as an event or occurrence, never has its own mode of existence before it as a fact of which it is conscious. Our only way of forming any conception of its mode of existence is by converting it into a content by means of and for another mental state, to which content, as such, no predicate of existence can be attached. It follows, then, that in knowing we never know our mental states, as mental states, any more than in seeing we see the organ of sight. Mental states are not facts of which we are aware, but ways or modes in and through which we become aware. Let me explain by means of an example. Assume for a moment the materialistic hypothesis that consciousness is an outcome of physical agencies, the result of certain molecular changes in the substance of the brain and nervous system. These, then, are the states or events or occurrences in and through which awareness comes about. One thing, however, is certain. We are never conscious either of cerebral particles or of neural processes in the presented content, which on this theory we are aware of in and through their instrumentality. The cerebral state, in other words, does not throw forward its own nature into the content which it produces. We are left totally ignorant of that nature, so far at least as the content is concerned; whilst the former consists of movements in the nerve cells, the latter consists (say) of the sense qualities and other factors combined in the object called a book. But now suppose that instead of a material, I substitute a psychological, process, and regard this as the agency in and through which awareness of a content comes about. Then, my contention is, we are just as little directly aware of the nature of *this* process as we were of the process in the previous

case. It forms neither the whole nor any part of the content apprehended. As a process, we may call it, if we will, a complex of psychical mechanism, in contrast to the physical mechanism presupposed by the materialistic theory. If, therefore, we retain the term sign or symbol for the mental state, we must be prepared to admit that it is a sign or symbol that fulfils its function without furnishing any idea of its own nature. We should thus be returning in large measure to the sense in which the term was used by Reid, who maintained that, apart from reflective effort, the sign "is never attended to, but passes through the mind instantaneously and serves only to introduce that quality in bodies which by a law of our constitution it suggests."* Further, we must be prepared to relinquish the dogma that "the psychologist deals with psychical events merely as such." Psychical events, apart from the content or meaning which they suggest, could not form the data of any science. We have no means of describing or distinguishing them save by the marks that come before us in the various experiences which they mediate.

6. I have, however, in the preceding section left Kant himself far behind, and I have now to show how the conclusion just reached connects itself with what I take to be a consistent carrying out of the transcendental principle. Kant certainly had not arrived at the result that mental states as such were incapable of being directly experienced. In the argument above referred to, he does indeed explicitly reject the view that experience of them is prior to our knowledge of external objects, but he still seems to hold that as objects of what he calls inner sense some apprehension of their nature may be obtained simultaneously with apprehension of objects in space. The very phrase "object of inner sense" is, however, sufficient to indicate the confusion involved. As objects they are not acts of apprehending, but contents apprehended; and it is only

* *Reid's Works*, p. 120.

because Kant here throws the act of knowledge entirely upon the transcendental self that such a view of them is possible. They become, in fact, sensuous contents, not yet referred to objects in space. But whosoever rejects the violent severance that Kant institutes between the transcendental and empirical self, and conceives of the former as essentially implicated in the latter, must relinquish also the view of psychical states as objects. Then they are no longer objects of which we are aware, but acts of awareness, and of them, in that case, is true what Kant asserted of the fundamental Unity of Consciousness, that we "cannot know that as an object which we must presuppose in order to know any object." Then it is truer to say that the conscious subject is his mental states than that he *has* them; it is in and through them that the transcendental principles involved in knowledge are actualised in the life of the individual. When this correction is made, we have left on our hands, instead of objective mental states, the perfectly legitimate conception of apprehended contents not yet referred to objects. And the question arises whether Kant was justified in ascribing to thought not indeed the function of "objectifying the subjective," but of conferring upon the contents mentioned the objective reference. In the work already alluded to, Professor Adamson has brought acute criticism to bear upon this feature of Kant's doctrine, and maintains that it cannot be accepted without important reservations. "There is," he says, "no such simplicity about the notion of object as to render it at all probable that its introduction is the expression of a single unique function of mind." "No one," he urges, "can suppose that the first, the simplest form in which the antithesis arises in consciousness between the subjective contents of mind and an object is that developed systematised representation which appears in Kant's analysis as the correlate and expression of understanding."* These objections seem

* Adamson, *ibid.*, p. 253 *sqq.*

to me well founded, and I am prepared to admit also the further contention that psychologically the reference to an outer world is not a primary fact in consciousness. There comes first in order of time the apprehension of contents which are referred neither to the subject nor to the object, and it is amongst these that the marks must be sought which lead to the later distinction being made. I make no doubt that the discrimination is effected through gradual recognition of the difference between an actually perceived content and a reproduction of that content in imagination, the former coming to be referred to an external reality and the latter to the inner life.* But when so much has been granted, the real import of Kant's doctrine has been in no wise invalidated. It is perfectly true that he himself endangers it by his apparent admission that, in respect to the sensuous contents of so-called inner sense, some kind of apprehension is possible without the notions of understanding, but the admission is altogether out of keeping with the whole drift of his transcendental theory, and we are justified in discrediting it on that account.

In what way, then, should we now have to bring out the truth contained in the principle that the reference to the object is the work of thought? In some such way, I imagine, as the following. We cannot get behind the fact of awareness of a content for the purpose of explaining how it supervenes upon that which is not awareness; in Dr. Shadworth Hodgson's words, "we are wholly incapable of conceiving any quality of consciousness *quâ* quality as caused in any way whatever."† But we *can* point to certain features in the process of becoming aware which are essential to its nature as such. The simplest, crudest, most rudimentary fact of consciousness, of which we

* I have dealt with this question in my paper on "The Belief in External Realities," *Proceedings*, N.S., vol. i, p. 200.

† *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society*, N.S., vol. i, p. 53. Cf. *Metaphysic of Experience*, vol. i, p. 416 *sqq.*

can form any idea, would be the recognition of a content possessing, in however vague and chaotic a fashion, some distinguishable character. There would be involved in it, therefore, the elementary function of discriminating, comparing, and assimilating, without which not even the most obscure awareness of anything is conceivable, and which afterwards, in the course of mental evolution, becomes the highly complex form of activity it is usual to call thinking. As Professor Adamson observes, the general character of facts of consciousness remains the same from first to last, however complicated or developed the later processes may be. "There is nothing in the most advanced, the most developed stage, which is not generically the same as that which enters into the simplest." * Let us concentrate attention for a moment on the latter. Were we to proceed on the lines of the atomistic psychology, which Kant adopted from the empiricists, we should be compelled to say that isolated presentations or contents being given, some new activity of mind ensues when such contents are distinguished the one from the other, and we should thus, at the outset, come across a distinct and unique faculty of relating, similar to what Kant appears to have assumed thinking or understanding to be. For if, on having simultaneously the contents A and B, consciousness is always, however dimly, aware of C, the fact namely of their likeness or difference, and without which it would not be aware of them as distinct contents at all, then obviously there must be some special process through which the production of C comes about. If, however, we are thorough-going in our rejection of atomistic psychology, we ought at once to admit that we do not begin with isolated contents, and *then* discover that they resemble or do not resemble one another. What we begin with is rather a confused, chaotic, undifferentiated whole, in which there is little distinction of parts, but in which

* Adamson, *ibid.*, ii, p. 193.

the first vague recognition of distinction indicates the rise of consciousness, the awareness, that is to say, of a content. To put it briefly, isolation, separateness, particularity, are not originally given; it is precisely *the* problem of psychology to explain how, in the growth of mind, they come about. The process of recognising differences, of discriminating, and, by discriminating, of relating, is not, therefore, extraneous to the contents supposed to be operated on by it; it *is* the very process in and through which the contents come to be presented at all, and there is no having such contents apart from this fundamental process of apprehension itself. The sensation of a certain blue colour, for example, is not, indeed, a mere relation; but the blue colour is only apprehended as a content of experience, if there be contained in the mental life sufficient means of singling it out in some measure from the rest of the visual field. No sense content whatsoever, not even the dimmest and most obscure, can be apprehended, save through the complex activity, which includes at once stimulation *and* discrimination. In the course of development, these two sides of one and the same process come to be distinguished; the discrimination comes to be regarded as more peculiarly an inner function, whilst the elements dependent on stimulation are regarded as relatively external or outer in character. The advance to what is more specifically called thinking results from the establishment of this distinction, and from the increasing facilities afforded in the evolution of mind for effecting a more thorough bi-partition in conscious experience of the complex activity in question. Thought and the products of thought, in all their subsequent varieties, do but represent a higher stage in mental development of the fundamental capacity of discriminating and comparing involved in the most rudimentary stages. The rise into clearness and definiteness of ideas of relation, the severance of such relations from the related objects, which is the work pre-eminently attributable to thought, is but an explicit

unfolding of what is implicitly implied in the recognition of contents, together with their resemblances and differences, at all. So much for the activity in its earlier form; let us now look at it in a relatively advanced stage of development. Analysis of it then yields certain well-marked features. In the first place, in thinking, as opposed to what is usually called perceiving, there is a characteristic inwardness or reflectiveness; we appear to be in a less immediate, a less direct, relation with that to which our thinking refers than is the case in perceiving. Thinking manifests itself as an essentially inner activity; it presupposes, in other words, that there has been acquired such amount and kind of experience as renders the consciousness of itself on the part of the apprehending subject possible. Kant, therefore, is perfectly justified psychologically in connecting thought with self-consciousness. He errs only in treating the former as a derivative of the latter. As a matter of fact, consciousness of self and recognition in indefinite fashion of relations among the parts of presentative experience probably come about together; they are mutually involved in one and the same set of mental conditions. In the second place, it is characteristic of thinking that it gives rise to products partaking of the nature of generality; a thought is a general notion. Generalisation may be described roughly as the selection of a mark or feature, or of a combination of marks or features, and the liberation of the same from those accompanying elements with which it was originally presented. Such selection can only be effected if the means are already present of retaining and comparing directly given contents, and so of freeing them from the accidental concomitants in conjunction with which they originally appear. It depends for its exercise both upon the supply of materials and upon the discrimination and recognition of relations amongst the materials offered in sense perception and imagination. Every relation recognised as such is by its very nature general in character; it is *ipso facto* withdrawn (to a

certain extent at least, and the extent rapidly increases) from those limitations attaching to it on the occasions of its initial presentation. Kant, then, again, is psychologically correct in laying stress upon thought, as the function of "bringing the synthesis involved in knowing to notions." Notions *are* psychologically the ways in which a thinking subject gradually becomes aware of unity and relatedness in the manifold of its experience, and, correlatively, of its own unity and identity in apprehending the said manifold. Kant's mistake lay in speaking as though immediate sensuous data at once called forth the categories, as ultimate and primitive constituents of mind. In the third place, wherever we find thinking we find also a reference to the real objective order of fact as contrasted with the merely contingent sequence or coexistence of sense presentations and images. In the judgment, for example, "this stone is hard," there is, no doubt, a conjunction of perceptive and representative elements forming the content "a hard stone," but the conjunction is further accompanied by the conception of a real objective connection, quite peculiar in kind, indicated by the form of the judgment, which at once separates what is conjoined in the given content, and, at the same time, connects the separated elements in a manner wholly unlike that of their conjunction in immediate experience. Now, we may translate the phrase, objective validity, by the equivalent terms, universality and necessity, and assert it to be characteristic of thinking that its contents are conceived as universally and necessarily connected. They are taken to be independent of the particular act of thinking, to be the common property of every thinking mind, to be related, therefore, in some way, to intelligence as such. Once more, then, psychological analysis confirms Kant's contention that universal and necessary notions are products of thought, and that objectivity is no other than the necessary and universal way in which the manifold of experience is combined. It would question only the justification of regarding the objective reference as a

primordial characteristic of consciousness, and not rather as the outcome, with thinking, of a complicated process of psychical development.

Accordingly, if we extend our point of view, and take account of the earlier forms of mental existence, so far from being forced to abandon the transcendental theory, we are enabled to free it from many contradictions left standing in Kant's treatment. Thinking, we then see, is, in its more evolved form, essentially a composite act, depending for its various forms upon the peculiarities of the matter on which it is exercised. Undoubtedly it is instrumental, in mature intelligence, in referring each content of sense and imagination to the objective order that determines the position of such content in the whole system of experience, and in developed thinking we invariably find this reference to the objective order of fact as contrasted with the merely subjective play of the thinker's perceptions and ideas. Undoubtedly, it is through the operations of thought that we arrive at the clear and definite discernment of individual objects, with which we are prone to take for granted we start. We begin with what in strictness can be described as neither individual nor general. By breaking up the composite and indeterminate mass of experience originally presented, we gradually arrive at a recognition on the one hand of generalities and on the other hand of individual objects. Every fresh discrimination affords the basis of a judgment, the subject of which is the particular object and the predicate the universal notion, and, through the synthesis thus effected (for subject and predicate are not more separated than united in the judgment), we form an idea of a particular object which possesses qualities or stands in relation. Every such judgment is, in Kantian phraseology, at once analytical and synthetical—analytical, because it breaks up or sunders what in presentative experience is given in conjunction; synthetical, because it unites these separated elements and by so doing at once enriches the subject and

specialises the generality which forms the predicate. The *notion* of an individual object, in contradistinction to the transient perception of it, contains only those features which we regard as permanent, essential features, and which, in mature experience, we seem, though erroneously, to apprehend directly. There could, however, never have come about this grade of consciousness, with which Kant was really dealing in his "Deduction of the Categories" otherwise than as a result of development from the elementary function of discriminating and comparing, and in the elementary function there were implicitly contained those features of unity and synthesis which are the necessary conditions of conscious experience throughout. Rightly, then, did Kant maintain that the initial fact in conscious experience is not mere passive receptivity. Rather is it in nature already akin to an act of judgment, in which there is at least involved as a constituent what we, looking back upon it, may not unfitly describe as the affirmation, "something is." But such primitive act of intelligence would contain no explicit reference of the content either to the object or to the subject. It would contain only implicitly and unrecognised the essential elements that later would enable the said reference to be made. Recognition, therefore, of objective relation, when at length in the course of evolution it is reached, is no new, superadded kind of apprehension. It is the natural development from the establishment in consciousness of the distinction between the discriminating activity and the content discriminated, a distinction which in its crudest forms appears before the advent of what in psychology it is usual to call thinking, which, even then, has, as its correlative, the first dim emergence of self-consciousness on the part of the subject, and which becomes more intricate, more complex, with every step in the gradual advance to clearness and definiteness of self-knowledge.

In the light of what has been said, one stock objection, urged from many sides, to the Kantian theory falls to the

ground. If Kant's assumption of a manifold of sense data, as isolated and disconnected units, be admittedly a pure fiction, does not the whole of his argumentation, it is asked, suffer hopeless and inevitable collapse? We have seen how far this is from being the case. But a further reply is permissible. Kant's reasoning was directed against a purely empirical theory of knowledge, and in that connection retains its validity. For surely the question then remains — would not sense impressions necessarily be the unrelated particulars Kant depicts, *if* they were, as the empiricist assumes, nothing else than sense impressions? As a mere impression, occurring at a particular moment in time, the event in question could not be anything else than separate and distinct; for that is involved in the very idea of impression. It is only because consciousness never is wholly sensuous, only because it involves from the very beginning both unity of reference and capacity of discriminating and comparing, neither of which constituents can be ascribed to sense, that nexus and connection amongst sensuous contents are never absent. If it be urged that sensuous impressions would at least be connected as members of a temporal series, it is a fair rejoinder to insist with Lotze that there is the greatest difference imaginable between the succession of two representations and the *awareness* of such succession. In the latter sense alone can sequence be spoken of as a relation, and it, equally with the awareness of difference in the successive presentations, is certainly not a given sensuous fact, but implies a mental act in character and essence allied with what we call thinking or judging. Of course, if you put into sensation at the outset all the relations you want to get out of it in the end, it is no wonder if out of it all relations come. Only in that case you have radically changed the idea of sensation, and endowed it with the promise and potency of all rational experience. A thorough-going empiricist, such as Hume, had at least too clear a conception of the character of his data to admit the introduction

into them of features to which, as such, they could show no claim.

7. I seek, in conclusion, briefly to indicate the ultimate conception of the world of experience to which these considerations seem to me to point. I have insisted upon the distinction between a psychical state as an event or occurrence of the inner life, and the content of which in and through the psychical state we are aware. But now I wish to emphasise the view that the distinction is a distinction of thought and not of entities, a distinction of aspect and not of separate modes of existing. It warrants in no way the inference too hastily based upon it, that there are two existing facts involved, on the one hand the mental state, on the other hand the content or presented object. "It is," as Dr. Adamson puts it, "a totally false abstraction, based on the analogy of our conception of external things, to give to the contents of these modes of apprehension a fictitious independence, and to identify the act of apprehension which makes them with a kind of inner vision directed upon them."* We, in our abstracting thought, distinguish hearing from the sound heard, seeing from the object seen, and so on, and the distinction is, as we have seen, of first-rate significance and importance. But, at the same time, it is equally important to remember that there is no audible sound apart from hearing, or visible object apart from seeing; the content is not except as apprehended, the apprehension is not except as the apprehension of a content. To apply to contents or apprehended objects the predicate of existence at all seems to me wholly to mistake their significance, and to be probably *the* instance of hypostatizing an abstraction that has wrought most mischief in philosophical speculation. The mental state exists—it occurs, and by its occurrence the subject is aware; the content, on the other hand, conceived of in abstraction from the mental state, is neither an existent nor an occurrence, but a portion of the wider whole to

* Adamson, *ibid.*, ii, p. 57.

which we give the name of knowledge. The first is a phase of the ceaseless process of mutability characteristic of existence generally; of the second, it may doubtless be said that it possesses perpetuity and unchangeableness, that nothing can alter it, for the simple reason that it is not an existing fact to be operated on or affected in any way whatsoever.

The problem here touched comes prominently forward in attempting to determine the exact significance attaching to the important Kantian conception of "appearance" or "phenomenon." The use of the term by Kant is by no means free from ambiguity, but if we take the passages more strictly consonant with the transcendental point of view, there is little difficulty in extracting a precise and definite account of its meaning. By "phenomenon," in all these cases, is denoted a determinate content of sense perception, which, as apprehended, is placed in relation to other contents of sense perception, the relation in question being expressible through a general law or notion. But no sooner is this definition obtained than it becomes evident, what, indeed, on transcendental principles ought never to be doubtful, that phenomenality, so conceived, cannot be regarded as given in and with the sensuous stimuli. At the most, the constituent of the content for which sensation could be responsible would only be in part the *quale*, or concrete filling, of that which is determined as phenomenal. Yet in defiance of his own principle that it is the act of thought or understanding which gives to presentations that centre of reference by which there comes about the awareness of a content at all, Kant is constantly falling back upon the dependent, constrained, given character of sense-affection to explain the fundamental characteristic of knowledge, the antithesis between the act of knowing and that which is known. Phenomena, he insists, are no more than presentations, modifications of mind, and have, therefore, only a mental existence. Now, the root of this contradiction is just the confusion between psychical state and content, from which

Kant, although he has done so much to save others, never wholly succeeded in saving himself. So long as the content known is assumed to be identical with the psychical state in and through which it is known, so long even as it is assumed to be identical with the nature, or a part of the nature, of that psychical state, there is scarcely a possibility of avoiding the ascription to such contents of a quasi-independent mode of existence no less baffling than the uncertain kind of being assigned by Plato to the world of sense particulars. It is, for instance, clearly not Kant's view that phenomena and the realm of things-in-themselves together form two parts of one world of existence, the term existence being applied in the same sense to each.* As constituting a *tertium quid* between the knowing mind and the sphere of the ultimately real, the realm of phenomena is, at least, "transcendentally ideal"—that is to say, its assumed mode of existence is *toto genere* distinct from the mode of existence characteristic of the two realities between which it intervenes. Kant, then, if pressed, would have been compelled to admit the inconsistency a criticism of this sort brings to light. And such inconsistency can only be removed, (1) by distinguishing between the psychical state and the phenomenon, of which, in and through the psychical state, we are aware, and (2) by recognising that

* Mr. Bradley is especially emphatic over his solution of the problem under consideration. To deny that appearances exist is, he says, "sheer nonsense" (*Appearance and Reality*, 1st ed., p. 132). Yet nothing can be clearer than that he too finds it utterly impossible to apply the term, existence, in the same sense to the Absolute (see, *e.g.*, p. 317, note). It is also part of his doctrine that "an idea, if we use idea of the meaning," "cannot as such exist" (*Logic*, p. 8), and that "appearance is content not at one with its existence, a 'what' loosened from its 'that'" (*A. and R.*, p. 187), and, therefore, one would suppose, ideal, and not existent. It is evident, I think, that the existence Mr. Bradley ascribes to phenomena follows as a consequence of his theory of judgment already discussed, and that it confirms what is said above. For if an idea, as meaning, is part of the character or nature of an existent psychical state, it is difficult to see how such idea can lose its existence even though it be "cut off" from the whole to which it originally belonged.

the phenomenon does not as such exist, but is an orderly and connected way in which conscious minds, in and through their existent psychical states, have experience.

Relinquishing, now, the conception of the thing-in-itself as an excrescence on the Kantian system, we find ourselves left with the conception of a multiplicity of minds, forming parts of an existing universe, together with the experience, of which, in and through their existing states, such minds are conscious. Considered in abstraction from the experience to which it gives rise, the existing universe resolves itself, so far as I can see, into a system of mechanism—psychical mechanism it well may be, but mechanism nevertheless which *quod* mechanism is reality reduced to its lowest and least significant terms. As such, it does not directly report itself in knowledge, for the very purpose of the mechanism is to reveal a meaning other than itself, a system of truth which is not a mere pictorial reduplication of the means in and through which it comes to be. The contents or apprehended objects of knowledge have indeed a reality of their own, but it is a reality not to be identified with existence in the sense in which we apply that word to the mechanical agency which occasions them. It need not, however, in any way belittle or impoverish our conception of the world of experience to deny to it that kind of reality which we ascribe to mechanism, whether regarded as physical or psychical. For the reality that does attach to it is of a higher and worthier order. It is the reality of *meaning*, of *validity*, of *value*. Just as the reality of Raphael's Sistine Madonna is not to be gauged by the mineral and other ingredients which compose the colours on its canvas, the ochre and chrome and bitumen and the rest, but rather by the thoughts and ideas and feelings which these are the means of awakening in the mind of the beholder, so the reality of consciousness is not to be gauged by the processes and events which serve to awaken the contents of which it is aware. "It is," says Herbart, "an old error to conceive of knowledge

as a copy of that which exists,"* and he rightly points to Kant as the thinker who entirely broke away from that ancient prejudice. The Copernican change was, indeed, much more radical than even its author himself imagined. It amounted, in short, to the subordination of the sphere of existence, in rank and degree of reality, to the sphere of knowledge, which, so far from being a faint, more or less imperfect image of the former, had a nature of its own to manifest and laws of its own to obey. Why, indeed, should we suppose that the sole office of intelligence is to serve as a sort of mirror or photographic plate, upon which the outlines of the machinery that generates it are being continually thrown afresh *in sæcula sæculorum*?† Adapting the language of Lotze, one might ask why, instead of setting up mechanism as the goal to which all our efforts of knowledge should be directed, we should not rather look upon the splendour of light and sound, and of sentient experience generally, not to mention the higher achievements of the theoretical and practical reason, as the end which all the dispositions of mechanism, whose obscurity we deplore, are designed to realise. "What pleases us in the drama that we see developed before us on the stage is the poetical idea and its inherent beauty; no one would expect to enhance this enjoyment, or discern a profounder truth, if he could indulge in an examination of the machinery that effects the changes of scenery and illumination; no one, while taking in the meaning of the spoken words, desires a distinct knowledge of the physical processes by which the organism of the actors produces the resonant vibrations of their voices, or initiates the motion of their expressive gestures. The course of the universe is such a drama; its essential truth is the

* Herbart's *Werke* (Hartenstein), iii, 1, p. 3.

† As a matter of fact, the analogy would not hold, for the mirror and photographic plate subserve a far more useful purpose than that of displaying the details of their own structure.

meaning set forth so as to be intelligible to the mind; but the other, which we would often so fain know, and in which, deceived by prejudice, we first of all seek the true being of things, is nothing else than the framework on which rests the alone momentous actuality of the fair appearance. . . . We should not gain, but lose, if we had to sacrifice the radiant splendour of colour and light, the power and sweetness of tones, the fragrance of odours, in order to be consoled with receiving, in exchange for this vanished world of beauty, the most accurate acquaintance with vibrations moving with more or less velocity in this and that direction.”*

From the point of view I have here been taking, we obtain a significance for the phrase “transcendental” more extended and distinctive than meets us in the usage of Kant. In contrast to a psychological investigation which endeavours to trace the successive mental states in and through which knowledge makes its appearance in the individual mind, a transcendental inquiry would concern itself with knowledge as transcending the particular mechanism giving rise to it, and with the necessary laws and conditions upon which knowledge in its own realm depends, and to which it conforms. The fundamental antithesis for philosophy would be, not that between appearance and reality, but that between conscious experience and the mechanism in and through which conscious experience realises itself. Experience consists of a system of contents or meanings, common to individual minds on account of the ultimate Unity of Consciousness, which is the logical ground and basis of knowledge. What we call existence, on the other hand, is the mechanism which provides the agency, the occurrence, that gives rise to the apprehension of specific contents at specific moments of an individual mind’s development. It seems to me anything but contradictory to speak of such mechanism as psychical in

* Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Eng. trans., i, p. 352.

nature, in the case both of individual minds and of so-called physical events, for I make little doubt that could we, as external observers, inspect the processes of the former and translate them into objects of knowledge, they too would present themselves to us as physical. We have no means of viewing the mechanism of what we call material nature from the inside, any more than we have of viewing the mechanism of individual minds from the outside. When we present to ourselves a mental state as an object, just that which is specifically characteristic of it, viz., its doublesidedness as related both to the subject knowing and to the content known, eludes observation, and it really comes before us in the aspect of a material thing. It is, then, far from a capricious play of fancy to venture the supposition that the inner being of physical events similarly evades us.

To determine in what way existence and experience are ultimately connected would be, on the theory I have been trying to sketch, the culminating problem of Metaphysics. An ultimate dualism between them we already see is precluded. Existence must in so far at least conform to the nature of experience as to furnish the framework in and through which a developing system of knowledge and morality is possible. That, however, is one thing; it is quite another to maintain either that knowledge or experience is an existing entity or that existence consists in being experienced or known. Even Berkeley is forced to the admission that a mind, as an existent, cannot be presented as an object of experience; ideas, he says, "cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts." Some "notion" of mental operations he thinks we may obtain, apparently by way of reasoning or inference, yet their existence consists "not in being perceived, but in perceiving." Berkeley, probably, scarcely realised the greatness of the issue he had thus raised, but at this point of his thinking he came very near to formulating the precise problem which the philosophy of Kant has bequeathed to us.

VII.—THE RELATION OF LOGIC TO PSYCHOLOGY
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE VIEWS OF
DR. BOSANQUET.

By W. R. BOYCE GIBSON.

MY original intention in taking Dr. Bosanquet's "Logic" as subject was to make a general review of the whole work, partly critical, though mainly and essentially appreciative. In the course of this rash endeavour to do justice in a short paper to a treatment of Logic so peculiarly rich and suggestive, I found myself falling back upon three fundamental problems,—the problem of logical development, the problem of the logical universal, and the relation of Logic to Psychology. Of these three problems only the third is treated of, or rather touched on, in this paper. The selection to which I have been thus driven by the spirit of Specialisation is unfortunate to this extent, that it emphasises more especially my critical attitude towards Dr. Bosanquet's work, whereas a treatment of the logical universal would have brought out my deep indebtedness to it. Through the firm grip of the category of systematic identity which it shows, Dr. Bosanquet's "Logic," with its superb theory of Inference, undoubtedly takes the student much beyond the point reached by Dr. Sigwart, the guiding idea of whose work—the ideal of logical necessity—just lacks this systematic character.

With respect to Dr. Bosanquet's conception of logical development, I may perhaps be permitted just to venture an opinion. I have failed to see that the development is, in any intelligible sense, *objective*. It is not a time-evolution, an impossible suggestion, though continuously urged upon the reader by the author's language; nor is it a piece of transcendental dialectic, at least not in Hegel's sense, if we are

to trust Professor Pringle-Pattison's interpretation,* for the evolution of the forms of judgment is not presented as an evolution *towards*, but as an evolution *of* and *within* the concrete universal. Dr. Bosanquet's evolutionary method seems to me to be in fact only a metaphorical way of recording, in the terms of a time-evolution, the systematic placing of a variety of thought-forms, according to the degree and manner in which they express a certain logical ideal, the ideal of systematic identity.

I am not quite sure whether Dr. Bosanquet would accept this suggestion as to his real meaning,† but the interpretation in no way minimises the importance of the conception as applied in the "Logic." It is no small achievement to have taken over into logical method the notion of continuity, and to have applied it powerfully and consistently and with endless fertility of resource. Dr. Bosanquet has now familiarised us—to our great profit—with a type of analysis which by dint of scrutinising its object for traces of forward-looking tendencies and divergencies enables the object, so to speak, to appoint its own natural successor in the logical series. Our last word here also is one of indebtedness and gratitude.

I pass on now to the main subject of to-night's paper: the relation of Logic to Psychology.

The question of Abstraction raises many important problems as to its meaning and legitimate use, but perhaps the most pressing of these bears on the question of the extent to which it is lawful to apply it in shaping the subject-matter for the different sciences of mind. Let me illustrate by a reference to the Science of Psychology as conceived by Professor James.

* Cf. *Hegelianism and Personality*, Lecture III.

† Cf. Dr. Bosanquet's Preface to the *Logic*. "I think, however, that systematic form is essential to clear exposition and to really effective criticism, and I have not supposed that my work will be considered as a system in any other sense than that thus implied."

The epistemological difficulties into which Professor James is led in his treatment of Psychology seem to me to have their sole origin in an illegitimate use of Abstraction, the purport of which is essentially embodied in the frank confession that the psychologist's attitude towards cognition must be a thoroughgoing dualism. Professor James seems to think that the only definite consequence that flows from the adoption of this position is that mind knowing and thing known must be treated as *irreducible*. In an obvious and useful sense this is no doubt true, and is certainly not the really damaging consequence of the original admission, to wit that it entirely cancels one of the elements in the very act of positing it, an abstraction which cuts off any possibility of connection between Psychology and Theory of Knowledge. If "mind knowing" is not to be a "thing known," it is obviously unknowable, and in the light of this transparent truism it is a foregone conclusion that consistent reflection will lead the author of this distinction to the explicit confession that the knower is unknowable and can be grasped only as a postulate. But this is not a *further* result; it is explicit in the very terms of the dualistic presupposition. As Professor James aptly puts it, Psychology so understood is no longer a Science of Consciousness but a Science of Sciousness—the "con" being naturally *de trop* where only *one* element is left to consider.

Now this abstraction certainly leads to one real advantage, to the possibility, the necessity indeed, of treating its product by the established methods of Natural Science. Just in so far as this is possible in dealing with facts of mind, Professor James's treatment is no doubt conspicuously successful, and I am further persuaded that Professor James pursues a right instinct, after reducing Consciousness to an adjectival condition, in attaching it to the body. The goal towards which the dualistic starting-point leads seems to me to be undoubtedly a physiological psychology. But it is not a physiological psychology that can have any bearing on the problem of

Knowledge, and it is just when we want to know what Psychology can tell us about Knowledge that we realise the insufficiency of this abstract, empirical treatment of the subject.

The epistemological difficulty, on the impracticable basis adopted by Professor James, is sharply felt so soon as we realise that in order that the state of Consciousness may not be divorced from all content, it must be allowed its object. We are thus left with an object conscious of an object. The great chapter on the Stream of Thought is burdened throughout by this defect. The Stream of Thought, as Professor James treats it, is not a stream of objects cognised but a stream of cognitions. It is the knower surreptitiously introduced, only to be treated in violation of its nature, as the thing known.

We get into similar difficulties if we start from the subjective side of experience. Struck by the intimate "feltness" of the experiencing process itself we may be led on to insist that our so-called subjective states of feeling, knowing and willing cannot by their very nature be conceived as objects. When we *think* of the self as knower, making it our object, the self thus thought of is not the real self that experiences, but only the object of a thinking experience of the subject. My *knowledge* of an experience of mine can never be a substitute for that experience itself. So runs many a modern attempt to do justice to the rights of the subject, leaving us with the disquieting conclusion that we can *experience* subjectively what we are absolutely precluded from ever knowing at all. May we not, however, justly relieve ourselves of this paradox by concluding that this subjective view commits an error of abstraction, the counterpart of that committed by the merely objective Psychology? For is it not an attempt to investigate the knower as self-existent apart from his knowledge, the thing known being cancelled out of existence throughout the discussion?

The moral of these attempts at establishing Psychology on a one-sided basis seems simply to be this, that an abstract

Psychology cannot furnish a starting-ground for a Science of Knowledge. If Psychology is to be of any direct service to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge, it must be set on a concreter footing. Its subject-matter must be concrete individual experience. How such a science can be adequately developed remains a problem, but there seems no evading it. In a Psychology like that of Professor Stout's, where the problem of mental activity is treated in closest conjunction with the control exercised over it by its object, we have the most satisfactory approach to such a science with which I am familiar.

Before proceeding to connect this discussion with Dr. Bosanquet's treatment of Logic in relation to Psychology, I would like to emphasise the main consequence that seems to me to follow from the adoption of this experience-basis in Psychology. It gives to Psychology a participation in the same subject-matter as belongs by right to Logic and Metaphysic, and indeed to any Science that calls itself a Science of Mind. All have the same content and differ only in point of view, *i.e.*, in ideal and method. I say "point of view," because this is the customary device for allowing difference of treatment over the same matter, and I cannot see clearly why the device should not be respected. It must, of course, be respected if we are to keep up these traditional distinctions between the various mental sciences, but it has sometimes struck home to me that the interests of mental science would be really better consulted if philosophers cared less about the limits between the mental sciences and their several encroachments one upon the other, and rested their division of labour on difference of *problem*. Helmholtz, writing on the eye, does not hesitate to make the differences between Mathematics, Physics, Physiology, and Psychology subservient to the effective treatment of his problem, and I cannot see why philosophers should be less anxious to bring Psychology, Logic, Ethic, and Metaphysic into sympathetic co-operation with each other. The project

is a strictly feasible one once a community of basis is reached in some accepted view of experience which does justice both to the unity and the difference of the subject and the object, and I am sure it would be much more stimulating to the student of mental science to be set to work up *problems in toto* instead of in section as the present custom of studying the Sciences apart obliges them to do. But whether we differentiate the mental sciences according to problem or point of view, their solidarity is guaranteed once the common basis is conceded. In particular Psychology is no longer separated off by its lack of *objective reference* from the normative and objective Mental Sciences, Logic, Theory of Knowledge, and Metaphysic. The objective reference is as essential to the concretely based Psychology as it is to the philosophies of mind. In Professor Stout's Psychology, for instance, "meaning" is the psychological equivalent for objective reference. It is the object that acquires meaning for the subject. James's distinction, again, between the subjective structural aspect of feeling and the objective functional aspect of cognition, "the two aspects in which all mental facts without exception can be taken," really comes to the same thing. "Every feeling," we read, "is at the same time a bit of Knowledge," and this bit of Knowledge is just the objective reference of the feeling.

It seems to me a fundamentally unfortunate fact that the distinction between image and objective reference insisted on by Mr. Bradley in the first chapter of the *Principles of Logic* should have been practically adopted by Dr. Bosanquet as running parallel with the distinction between Psychology and Logic.

Psychology, we read, "treats of the course of ideas and feelings."* The psychical life, as psychology studies it, is made up of a stream of psychical occurrences, of momentary psychical

* *The Essentials of Logic*, p. 4.

states, "a stream of ideas and feelings taking place in our several heads."* "It is quite true," we read, "that the actual presentations of this room, which each of us has in his head at this moment, are all different from each other, and different from any which we have had before, and shall ever have again. They are perishing existences, wholly mental, and each of them when past is irrecoverably gone. That is the property of a presentation within the course of consciousness. It is a particular, 'perishing existence.' Psychology deals then with the mere course of consciousness, the mere stream of presentation, it deals with the psychical state *quâ* event and not *quâ* meaning. Where meaning comes in, objective reference, ideal construction, we have passed out of Psychology into Logic." †

This, as I take it, is—or was—Dr. Bosanquet's view of Psychology. It is so Heraclitean in its spirit that the Platonic query naturally suggests itself—Can there be any science at all of these particular, perishing existences? It has been clearly recognised by the Avenarian school, by Avenarius himself, Petzoldt, Mach, and others, ‡ that this psychological Atomism can become a science only by first postulating a rigid psychophysical parallelism and then making the laws of the nervous system the dominating principle of Psychology. This is, of course, a *reductio ad absurdum* of the Psychology that rests upon the particular, perishing existence. And Dr. Bosanquet at least is quite aware of this. Atomism, he tells us, cannot take us any further than A is A—that is, cannot take us a step beyond our starting-point in any direction.§

But Dr. Bosanquet characterises the point of view of Psychology as artificial. || He admits, indeed insists on the fact that psychical occurrence and objective reference are distinguishable

* *The Essentials of Logic*, p. 17.

† *Ibid.*, p. 21.

‡ So Dr. Bosanquet himself refers to the psychological consciousness as "the consciousness attached to our body." *Essentials*, p. 17; *cf.* also *The Psychology of the Moral Self*, ch. x.

§ *The Psychology of the Moral Self*, p. 21.

|| *Essentials*, p. 11.

by abstraction only.* In considering an idea as a psychological occurrence we simply abstract from its meaning. He confesses that it is impossible to point to a referenceless psychological image as forming "any recognisable part of our mental furniture, for every such part which can be described and indicated by a general name is something more than a psychological image."† If there were such a thing as pure feeling or pure sensation, that would be the pure psychological state as a concrete part of mind.

This view of the matter suggests to me the following reflections:—(1) Psychology so conceived is purely sensationalistic. Its subject-matter is strictly limited to feelings and sensations, or, in the case of perceptions and ideas, to the abstract sensory element in such perception or idea. Of the two aspects which James ascribes to every psychological state, one only comes under the ken of this Psychology, namely, the feeling-aspect. The cognition-aspect must be taken up *in toto* by Logic. To say that Logic or the Theory of Knowledge does *not* deal with the genesis of psychological states is simply to make a separate science of Mental Development dealing with the acquisition of meaning and skill. For how can an atomistic, sensationalistic Psychology deal with the problem of a continuous development? Moreover (2) it hardly seems consistent to refer to this stringless time-series of pure feelings and abstract sensory elements as a stream of occurrences at all. How can an abstract sensory element be called an occurrence?

A third reflection suggests itself of a more deep-reaching character. To what extent does this recognition that psychological occurrence and objective reference are not existentially independent affect the epistemological problem?

We have seen that the conception of the course of individual consciousness—more correctly the course of the consciousness of the nervous system—of which the elements are perishing psychological occurrences, leads strictly to an

* *Logic*, p. 5.

† *The Essentials of Logic*, p. 74.

atomistic, sensationalistic view of the science that treats of it, and logically to its subordination to Experimental Physiology. I do not think that there is any other issue to the situation if accepted with all its logical implications. It is customary, however, in the case of those who define Psychology in this way, to introduce surreptitiously the element of "meaning" or "reference" into their subsequent treatment of the subject—an intrusion which quite alters the whole position. Thus we find Dr. Bosanquet insisting that if a Philosophy is built up out of this mere Psychology it will take the form of Subjective Idealism, the essence of Subjective Idealism lying in the ascription to the world of Knowledge of properties which are only true of the stream of presentation.* It is true that the objective reference in the case of Subjective Idealism stops short of the recognition of a world of objects which still persist and interact when the personal consciousness is withdrawn and cannot therefore be identified with that objective reference which in Dr. Bosanquet's view is the *raison d'être* of Logic; but a reference beyond the mere unmeaning feeling is essential for the existence of any philosophical view of the universe, so that Subjective Idealism is at bottom as illegitimate an issue of the psychological position as accepted by Dr. Bosanquet as is the Objective Idealism which he favours.

I am far from objecting to these surreptitious enlargements of the original boundaries of Psychology. Had Dr. Bosanquet accepted the "stream of presentation" as an adequate representation of mind as it concretely is *quâ real* event, then the epistemological question would be wholly insoluble. Knowledge would not only be an illusion, but it would be impossible to explain how it could be an illusion. On the view of Psychology which Dr. Bosanquet takes there is, as he himself admits, no getting beyond A is A, and therefore no possibility of Knowledge, so that if the "is" of the mental life were

* *Essentials of Logic*, p. 20.

exhaustively considered in this Psychology, the familiar question "How can the Consciousness which consists in a stream of particular perishing existences be also the Consciousness which apprehends an objective world of Reality, in the form of Knowledge?" could only be answered by insisting that the suggested transition from atomic feelings to systematic knowledge was in the nature of things impossible, or at least logically inexplicable.

The fact is that an irresistible dialectic compels Dr. Bosanquet to give up the abstract conception of Psychology with which he starts. The process of illicit abstraction is analogous to what happens when we stretch a tough elastic string. So long as we consciously hold the ends apart, then, though the tension may be irksome, we at least maintain our original intention; but once we let one end of the string slip away from us, there ensues a more or less speedy return to the normal position. So it is with Dr. Bosanquet's "artificial" view of Psychology. The "is" of the mental life is by that artifice torn asunder into a mere subjective feeling element and an objective meaning and value element, and the former relegated to Psychology as the whole content of the stream of presentation. But by the time the epistemological question is fairly broached, we find that the "is" of the mental life has reverted to its natural constitution. We find that the whole world, for each of us, *is* our course of Consciousness, in so far as this is regarded as a system of objects which we are obliged to think.* In a word, the "objective" *is in* the individual Consciousness, though it is identified with something beyond the individual Consciousness.† But if the objective *is in* the individual's thought, then the Science which professes to deal with the course of Consciousness should surely include this objective element within its scope, and Dr. Bosanquet's comment that the objective world may be introduced into Psychology,

* *Essentials of Logic*, p. 14.

† *Ibid.*, p. 11.

but only *as* a thought, seems to me to be just an unfortunate relapse into that abstract Psychology from which the unconscious dialectic of his own reflection was in process of saving him.

The problem of the relation of Logic to Psychology appears to me to be intimately bound up with the shape we give to the important epistemological problem concerning the regulative factor in Knowledge.

So long as Logic is severed from its psychological basis the essentially logical conceptions of "purpose" and "ideal" are practically ignored. The logical crux is made to turn on the opposition between content and form with regard to this regulative function, avoiding thereby the deeper opposition between the regulative functions of *content* and of *purpose*.

Now it is quite possible to be in perfect sympathy with the arguments in favour of the rights of content against those of mere form (*e.g.*, the *a priori* category), and yet feel that injustice is done to the claims of purpose. The Voluntarist standing on psychological ground may be as true an Anti-Formalist as the Intellectualist who is indifferent to his psychological basis.

But the opposition between content and form seems to me to be less fundamental than the opposition between the determinative function of content and of ideal. Are we determined in our thinking by interest, purpose, ideal, or by the reality we think? Is logical thinking in particular guided by a logical Ideal, or is it the *content* of conception, judgment, and reasoning which guides the reflective processes?

I am strongly of opinion that of the two types of Modern Idealism, the Objective and the Voluntaristic, it is the Voluntaristic which does most justice to the parts played in Knowledge by content and ideal respectively. I am not quite sure what the Objective Idealist does with the Ideal, but I am quite sure of the important part attributed to the "content" by the Voluntarist. I fancy that the tendency with Objective

Idealism is to include the Ideal or standard of Thought within Reality itself, and that this tendency shows itself in the assumption that the *Ideal* really exists *in realised form* prior to its realisation. The Ideal, so the argument seems to me to run, is certainly not *subjective* in origin: it must be objective, and therefore coalesces with the objective content which thought refers to as Reality.

Of course, once the term "Ideal" ceases to be used at all and we have to choose between "content" and "idea severed from its ideal," the theory that it is the content which determines thought and not any subjective form which goes as it were to meet the content from without, initially alien and external to it, would meet with the Voluntarist's reluctant approval, reluctant, because he would still be sighing after his vanished Ideal. But is there any reason for dwarfing the importance of the regulative idea in Philosophy with which the term Ideal is so honourably connected? Does its use by the Voluntarist, for instance, lead to any injustice to the content of thought and its power over thought? Far from this being the case, I repeat that to me it is only from the Voluntaristic standpoint that full justice seems done to the rights both of Ideal and of content. The individual's thinking is presented to us from this standpoint as regulated, inspired, guided by its internal purpose, or Ideal, and on the other hand *controlled*, objectively controlled by the content. The regulative idea is thus preserved intact without loss of the conception of control by the object. I doubt, for instance, whether anyone has done more than Professor Stout has done in pressing home the truth that abstract thought does not imply freedom from the control of the object with which the thought is concerned. By way of illustration, I take the following, which reproduces the gist of a lecture of Professor Stout's I once had the privilege of attending. "Ideal construction—*i.e.*, that form of mentally constructing reality which proceeds by trains of ideas—is not a merely subjective process, a process solely under its own

control, save just at that point where it touches on this world of sense-experience. It is essentially and throughout an ideal experiment, the characteristic of an experiment being that the object experimented on both controls and is controlled by the experimenter. The experimenter can control the conditions under which the experiment shall take place, but the issue of the experiment is completely determined by the nature of the object experimented on. No amount of control over the conditions can keep dry gunpowder from exploding when a lighted match is applied to it. So in the ideal experiments in which ideal construction consists. The experimenter here exercises over his object, the world, the great controlling force of *abstraction*; the object, on the other hand, is continually controlling the thinker by the mere fact that it is what it is and not what the thinker would like it to be. Abstraction therefore does not take the thinker even temporarily beyond the reach of the object he has to explain. It is a process determined throughout by the requirements of the object and not by mere subjective convenience. We do not pass away from objects in making or in following up abstractions, but only from certain aspects of those objects which happen to be irrelevant to the inquiry." Such an account of the control exercised over thought by its content certainly yields no less to the object than the striking pages on the same subject by Professor Henry Jones, a representative of Objective Idealism, in his criticism of the Philosophy of Lotze [pp. 348-354], wherein he urges that "the reality which we are said to 'encounter in perception' is *carried over into* conception in all effective or genuine thought, and guides that process."

I proceed to illustrate the distinction between the Intellectualist, metaphysically grounded Logic and the Voluntaristic, psychologically grounded Logic by a brief discussion of Dr. Bosanquet's view of the ultimate subject of the Judgment.

The general reference to Reality as the ultimate subject, in so far as it simply implies insistence on the *objective* and

systematic character of the reference, can provoke no possible objection, but when we find it insisted on again and again that the Reality referred to is "Reality as a whole," we are filled with perplexity, none the less keen that the expression seems to occasion no misgivings whatsoever to the author himself. The only definite apology for the expression that I have come across occurs in a footnote on p. 78 of the larger *Logic*. To the statement that "the ultimate subject of the perceptive judgment is the real world as a whole," the footnote supplies the following commentary: "Analysis and cross-examination readily verify this as a fact. After admitting any judgment to be true, you cannot deny its modifying effect on any portion whatever of your real world, *i.e.*, it has been admitted of the real world as a whole." It is hard to believe that Dr. Bosanquet intends this as any elucidation. If, as he has himself so ingeniously pointed out, it is illegitimate to argue from "We do not know it to be impossible" to "It is possible," it is surely still more precarious to infer "Not only is it possible but we admit it as true."

I cannot resist the conclusion that the question as to the ultimate nature of the judgment is quite insoluble apart from any reference to the purpose of the judge, for apart from such reference, how is the logical requirement of *relevance* to be guaranteed?

We surely gain a much firmer basis for determining the meaning of the term "ultimate" when we start from the psychological analysis of judgment, as given, *e.g.*, by Professor Stout.

After defining the subject of the judgment as the previous qualification of the general topic or universe of discourse to which the new qualification supplied by the predicate is attached, we read that the *ultimate* subject is always the universe of discourse.*

* *Analytic Psychology*, II, p. 214.

Now this universe of discourse may no doubt exist in the speaker's mind in very indeterminate form, as an apperceiving system or total disposition of the vaguest kind, the office of the judgment being precisely through the predication to make the topic one degree more explicit.

The ultimate subject, from the logician's point of view, can of course be nothing so indeterminate as this. I should define it as the psychological subject so reconstructed as to be systematically relevant to the further determination conveyed by the predicate. It is the psychological subject stripped of its accidentals, and rendered determinate in such a way as best to answer the purpose of the speaker; or, in other words, the apperceptive system or universe of discourse logically transformed in the sense of being completely adapted to the apperceived notion conveyed by the predicate, hence released from such significance as is accidental to the purport of the predication, and the relevant residue so organised as to bring out the purport of the predication as transparently as possible.

The logical unity of the judgment seems to me to be bound up with this voluntaristic ideal of *relevancy*. In so far as I include irrelevancies in the subject of my statement, I run counter to the meaning and purport it is the function of the judgment to render more explicit. Take, for instance, the judgment "This house is my home." If I attempt to bring in Alaska into the logical scheme of my subject, I can only do so by entirely falsifying my meaning, "This house which in some dim, unstateable way is bound up with the fortunes of Alaska, is favoured by the same sun and moon, rolls incessantly along with it about the common terrestrial axis, &c., is my home. The unity of the judgment, so far as it implies harmony between subject and predication, is broken by the incongruous introduction into the judgment of an element out of touch with the speaker's purpose. A home so depersonalised would no longer be a home.

On this view of a logical elaboration based on relevancy to purpose, the logical subject is essentially *determinate*. It is an organised whole all the parts of which are, as it were, *polarised* by the meaning of the predicate so as to converge in one direction towards one common mark, and are not only convergently organised but explicitly formulated.

This determinateness of the logical subject comes out with peculiar sharpness in the case of judgments that embody scientific observations. Here the logical ideal is to define what one is observing as accurately as possible.

E.g., "This grass is green." What is "this grass"? What kind of grass? What shade of grass? The ultimate *logical* subject here, ultimate from the point of view of the scientific purpose, is a mental reconstruction of what is given to sense of such a kind that all the *vagueness* of the sense-perception is eliminated. It is the "this" rendered as determinate as its own nature will allow. Far from being "Reality as a whole," it is the logically refined residuum of the given sense-perception. And to make it more than this is to stultify the purpose. We would propose then, as typical of the voluntaristic point of view, to define the ultimate logical subject as the subject elaborated into complete relevance with the further determination conveyed by the predicate.

* * * * *

I would like in conclusion to venture some remarks of a general, almost personal, kind. The critical tone of this paper may have left the impression that its writer holds the rift among Idealists to be more serious than it really is. I consider, on the contrary, that the times were never more hopeful. We have seen, in the notion of systematic coherency, a principle applied with singular success in many branches of inquiry—especially when allied with the development idea—and the standing problem of the One in the Many has ceased in the light of it to perplex us so much. The interpretative power of the idea of Organic Unity has surely gone a long way

towards encouraging us to believe that Philosophy has both found and verified a category worthy of her pretensions.

But are there not problems looming ahead, indeed close upon us to-day, for whose solution we need a category still more deep-reaching and convincing than that of the organic unity of Self-Consciousness *as at present understood*, a category that will reconcile the conflicting claims of Monists and Pluralists, Gnostics and Pragmatists, Absolute and Personal Idealists, the World and the Individual? Even Professor Royce's great attempt appears to me to fall short of the present requirements of Philosophy in this respect. I cannot but think that the present tendency of the two wings of Idealism to emphasise each its own point of view to the temporary obscuration of the other is the surest means for bringing into clear light the conflicting facts for whose reconciliation this concreter category is wanted. We seem to be approaching that deeper insight into the meaning of Self-Consciousness—Social Self-Consciousness, Divine Self-Consciousness—by the fruitful method of analysing and emphasising more penetratingly its main conflicting aspects, and thereby laying the foundations for the concreter synthesis of to-morrow. In the meantime I cannot but think that much would be gained if the Pluralists or Voluntarists, among whom for progressive purposes I would provisionally class myself—keeping, I hope, an open, reflective eye on the larger issues—could but frankly recognise that the pluralistic postulate cannot be insisted on as ultimate, and that the function of the Pluralism of to-day is just to prepare for a more fruitful Monism *of the right kind* which shall do adequate logical justice to the moral claim of Personality to be free, and creative, within limits, both of its own destiny and the destiny of the world it inherits.

In the discussion on Professor Boyce Gibson's paper, the following remarks by Professor BERNARD BOSANQUET were read :—

I should like just to thank Dr. Boyce Gibson for his kindly references to my *Logic*, and to add suggestions on two or three of the points which he has touched. I welcome the closing explanation of the true position of the Pluralist.

1. Is the development of the Logical system a Time-evolution? I think the problem of a time-evolution is apt to be inconsiderately pressed both against Hegel and against lesser writers. Primarily, I suppose one meant, connection is connection, and a connected whole would, if nothing hindered it, be real as a system, not in time. But as, for some reason which we cannot explain, nothing complete can exist all at once in our experience, the connections must assert themselves in a different way, viz., as laws of development in time. In a complete existence, every term would possess the complement which it cries out for. In time, it appears by itself, and its complement appears afterwards. Of course, there are all sorts of breaks and retrogressions; I speak only of the principle of a succession so far as uninterfered with. And as to this, it seems to me that a whole is a whole, in the same way, ultimately, whether it appears in temporal phases or not. I don't think this affects the principle of its wholeness. Time is only an imperfection, by which the whole is prevented from appearing all at once. Any fragment of it, which is allowed free play in a partially uninterrupted arena, will at once begin completing itself according to the law of the whole. Thus the development is in time because the whole is out of time.

2. Atomic Psychology.—It is very hard to make a distinction between Logic and Psychology, except by including much else, along with Logic, in Psychology. If one allows this to be done, then one gets a Science which is really Metaphysic at one end, and, say, measurement of reaction-time at the other. This seems to me disorderly from a methodological

point of view; and I have noticed, I think, elsewhere as well as in H. Spencer, what seem to me amateurish accounts of inference, &c., inserted on half a page of a psychological treatise. (I am not, of course, referring to Professor Stout, whose work is always thorough and of the highest scientific quality.)

If this is to be avoided, must not the line be drawn where "truth" begins to be a predicate of mental processes or products?

I draw attention to pp. 175-6. This states the crux, I think. It seems easy to say, "Take in the course of Consciousness without abstraction"; but if you do, can you stop short of estimating the argument, say, for the existence of God? I tried to meet this difficulty by the suggestion which Dr. Boyce Gibson deprecates. I thought perhaps one might say, "I won't consider what is meant by the 'truth' of a cognitive state, or what sort of thing is implied in alleging that any mental state can express reality; but I will point out the peculiarities, *quod* mental, of all mental processes or products, including those which, rightly or wrongly, we believe to express reality," "and," one might add, "will show by what psychical stimuli and occasions the mind is compelled to produce these states mysteriously called 'cognitive.'"

I thought Mr. Stout's inquiries into "meaning" would come fairly under some such heading as I have sketched, though I do think it very hard to keep them apart from Logic.

Well, then, having this crux in view, I wanted to knock out of the reflection upon mental phenomena all that concerns their truth or expression of reality, which, I thought, cannot be considered apart from a theory of reality. The remainder, I thought, would be the sphere of Psychology. But I did not think that this restriction would make it atomic. A stream is surely continuous; and, though ever changing, and deprived of the reference to a real world, the mental content is continuous in itself, is it not, and this continuity is analysable? You can

show the laws of its sequences without showing how it expresses reality. Without considering what makes a judgment true, you can show what causes it to be attended to, to lose attention, and to be replaced by some other mental object. Nor do I see why it should be sensational. The continuity involves surely the *de facto* operation of universals, without taking into account their value as expressive of reality. I don't doubt that the theory of conation and mental systems must lead up to the frontier of logic, but is there any harm in that kind of relation between two sciences? When you have brought the mind up to a certain grade of organisation, its processes cease to be, even by abstraction, intelligible, without a theory of the sort of reality at the cognition or production of which they aim; and then you must pass on to Logic and Metaphysic.

If Psychology takes in the function of expressing Reality, it must cease to be a natural science; and its best exponents will not put up with this, I think.

3. About "purpose" there is a suggestion I should like to make. It is being suggested on all sides that "purpose" helps to define and regulate cognition; that cognition is rather organic to purpose than self-determining. What does purpose here mean? If it is to sustain the claim which it makes to special definiteness—to being something anticipated in detail before carried out—it must be such a purpose as we identify with a change in the external world, a house to be built, a journey to be taken, &c. But I suggest the point whether these can ever partake of the character of true or ultimate purpose. An ultimate purpose is always, is it not, the production of a harmony or removal of a contradiction, in our experience? To this, every change in the external world, such as those above-mentioned, is a means; and its apparent definiteness arises from the distinctness in space and time of the means to be employed. But such a change is never a primary and ultimate purpose; never wholly assumes the real character of an "end." This character, on the contrary, belongs

ipso facto to every cognitive conation pure and simple ; *it* aims, at once and directly, at removing a contradiction or establishing a harmony in our experience. But if it is to be regulated by or made instrumental to an external change, as in calculation made for a "practical" object, it appears indeed to gain in definiteness of purpose, but is really distorted from its native ultimateness, and turned into a means to a means. Whereas if aimed at satisfying an intellectual need, it aims directly at a part of or element in the ultimate end—harmony in experience. But in this case no "practical" purpose *can* regulate or define it, because the condition of its service is to go wherever the λόγος takes it. The previous intellectual need, defined by previous intellectual efforts, is a *general* definition of the conation, but its specific definition must come from itself and from its success, and can come in no other way. A "practical" aim could only, here, be a distortion and interruption. For a "practical" aim is always directed to a means ; only a cognition (or *moral* effort, *e.g.*, at purity of heart), is directed to something which, however partial and narrow, partakes at least of the character of an ultimate end. It is worth noting what an array of "practical" arrangements and institutions are really *in the service of cognition* (libraries, geographical expeditions, universities, so far as aiming at research, and, indeed, at guiding and promoting the organisations of life as a spiritual whole of experience), as evidence of the truth of the view that "practical" purposes as defined by external change are at least not the only ones which can act as ends predominating over a great apparatus of means. The *defining* power, which is attributed to purpose, I believe to rest largely on a fallacious inference from considering external changes as the type of practical aims ; whereas in reality these are never true ends, and the character of a true end belongs much more, really, to pure cognition.

VIII.—THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUB-CONSCIOUS.

By R. LATTA.

FEW things are more remarkable in the philosophical (and especially the psychological) thinking of our day than the attention which is being given to the sub-conscious. The philosophical atmosphere is full of it; and in spite of its elusiveness, no one ventures to doubt its existence. This very elusiveness of the sub-conscious makes it a handy solvent of the most difficult problems. It is always at our call, and yet no one knows exactly what it is. So great is our passion for solutions, so strong our dislike to an inconclusive discussion, that we are usually ready, after a time, to welcome the introduction of the sub-conscious as likely to bring the weary strife of dialectic to a soothing, comfortable end. Not so long ago this useful function was performed by the "appeal to consciousness"; but the intuitional philosophy has come to appear somewhat old-fashioned, and we prefer nowadays an "appeal to the sub-conscious." Thus when the psychological inquirer is ready to despair about the problem of the relation of body to mind, he finds the "threshold of consciousness" a veritable "door of hope." And in the same way, philosophers like Professor James and semi-philosophical writers like Maeterlinck, perplexed by the wider problem of mechanism and teleology, of the cosmic and the moral orders, alike take refuge in the sub-conscious. "What, after all," they say, "is the good of all this intellectual worry, this arguing 'about it and about,' 'ever learning and never coming to a knowledge of the truth' ? We make too much of our intellect, our clear consciousness. It is as if we should claim to know the whole size of an iceberg, when we have measured only the fragment of it that rises above the sea. Clear consciousness is to sub-consciousness

as the dry land is to the sea and all that lies beneath it ; it is like the crests of a few great wrinkles on the solid sphere of earth. Intellect, then, must be humble and take the second place which is its due. Its difficulties arise from its impertinence, its over-ambitious dream that it can solve all riddles. But there are instincts within us, vague and indefinable, yet infinitely strong. Let us put our trust in these, for they are real ; we cannot get over them. And let us leave intellect to play with the facts which these instincts give us."

It may be profitable, then, to inquire into the nature and history of this vague but eminently useful conception. And as the history may throw some light on the nature of the sub-conscious, let us begin with the history. Von Hartmann, in his *Philosophy of the Unconscious* (Eng. trans., vol. i, p. 19) attributes to Leibniz "the glory of having been the first to affirm the existence of ideas of which we are not conscious, and to recognise their vast importance." But while it is true that Leibniz was the first philosopher who consciously spoke about the unconscious or the sub-conscious, we may, I think, push our inquiry further back in time and consider not merely the conscious recognition of the sub-conscious, but its actual (however unconscious) use. If we do so, we shall begin with Plato. And we are confirmed in thus beginning by the fact that those (including Von Hartmann) who lay most stress upon the sub-conscious regard it as the source of the materials or the content of consciousness, that to which consciousness gives form, and out of which it makes its world. Thus, Von Hartmann sees "in the whole history of philosophy nothing else than the conversion of a mystically-begotten content from the form of the image or the unproved assertion into that of the rational system, for which certainly often a new mystical production of single parts is required, which a later age finds already contained in the ancient writings" (Eng. trans., vol. i, p. 368). And "the essence of the mystical" is "the filling of consciousness with a content (feeling, thought, desire) through

involuntary emergence of the same from the unconscious" (p. 363). This is true, of course, not merely regarding philosophy and mysticism, but regarding all knowledge and its content. The quotations I have made are simply a special and interesting example of Von Hartmann's general principle. Consciousness must have a content, a *datum*, something given. Whence is it to come, if not from the sub-conscious? Now this is simply a modern way of putting the ancient problem about the known and the unknown, which was raised by the sophists, and of which Plato attempted a solution in his theory of *ἀνάμνησις*. As it is put in the *Meno* (80E):—"A man cannot inquire either about that which he knows or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to inquire; and if he does not know, he cannot inquire; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to inquire." That is to say, knowledge must always mean "getting to know something." If that something is always within knowledge it is always known, and the process of knowledge becomes meaningless. If, on the other hand, the thing to be known is outside of knowledge, knowledge can never reach it, and thus, once more, the process of knowledge is meaningless. Plato endeavours to solve the problem by what is practically a reference to the sub-conscious. He extends the meaning of knowledge so as to make it include, not merely actual conscious knowledge, but also the knowledge we possess without being aware of it. If we take into account this latent knowledge, there is no need that we should go outside of knowledge to find its content. The soul knows all things from the first, and in order to make her knowledge complete and conscious, she has merely to recollect, to bring forth what is already hidden in her own being. "The soul, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that there are, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue and about

everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, there is no difficulty in her eliciting, or as men say learning, all out of a single recollection, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all inquiry and all learning is but recollection" (*Meno*, 81). And again, speaking of the uneducated slave, from whom, by judicious questioning, Socrates has elicited mathematical truths, he says:—"If there have been always true thoughts in him [the slave], both at the time when he was and was not a man, which only needed to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must always have possessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man" (86). With this, again, may be compared the well-known passage in the *Theætetus*, in which a distinction is drawn between *possessing* knowledge (as when we possess birds in an aviary) and *having* it, in the sense of *using* it (as when we hold a bird in the hand). To possess knowledge is evidently to have it sub-consciously; to use it is to have it actually, in clear consciousness.

It is easily seen that, as Plato puts it, this is no solution of the problem of knowledge. It simply puts the question a stage further back and gives us no explanation of the way in which the soul, in its pre-human existence, acquires the content of its knowledge. And it is, of course, not Plato's final answer to the question. But for our present purpose (the consideration of the meaning and function of the sub-conscious) it is remarkably suggestive. If we leave out of account the reference to pre-existence, what remains is the assertion that sub-consciously (however the fact may be explained) we are from the first in possession of a knowledge of all things, and our most developed knowledge is simply an unfolding of this primary possession. "All nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, and therefore, when we have remembered one thing, there is nothing to prevent us from finding out all others." Knowledge, in short, is not an accumulation of independent facts, a passing from the known to the unknown or a miraculous

transformation of things which are quite unknown into things which are completely known ; but a single system, so perfectly compacted that in knowing any part of it we in some degree know the whole. Knowledge, in short, may be partial ; but it is never knowledge of mere parts. However imperfect and obscure it may be, it is from the first a knowledge of the whole. It is as impossible for new content to enter into it from without, as it is for new energy to break into the system of nature. The sub-conscious in Plato accordingly is not, as it has tended to become in the hands of some recent writers, a region of abstract possibilities, in which anything may happen and from which sudden and destructive incursions may at any time be made into consciousness. The sub-conscious is rather used by Plato as a means of maintaining the essential unity of knowledge, while at the same time accounting for its growth and for the various degrees which may be recognised in it.

I do not think it can be said that in any other Greek writer we have so direct a use of the sub-conscious as in Plato, and I therefore pass to modern philosophy, in which the conception is first definitely recognised. It would be paradoxical to regard Descartes as laying stress upon the sub-conscious, for nothing is more characteristic of him than his rationalism, his emphasising of clear and distinct consciousness. And yet Descartes's method of doubt implies that fundamental truth is latent in the mind and requires nothing but a satisfactory method to uncover it. This is confirmed, I think, by the fact of Descartes's unfinished dialogue, the *Recherche de la Vérité par les Lumières naturelles*, in which, after the manner of Plato's *Meno*, he endeavours to show that the main principles of his philosophy may, by judicious questioning, be extracted from the mind of an unsophisticated plain man. The ground of this method is the systematic unity of knowledge, which, of course, is just an aspect of the principle, laid down by Descartes and developed by Spinoza (and, in his own way, by Leibniz), that thought must be its own witness, its own test, that it is not to be

justified by any external authority, but only by its consistency with itself.

Leibniz was, as is well known, the first great philosopher to draw direct attention to the sub-conscious element in mental life. His doctrine on this matter is deeply imbedded in his system as a whole, and it would be impossible to do full justice to it without showing its dependence on the main principles of his philosophy. I must content myself with noting a few significant points.

(1) In the first place, in the introduction to the *Nouveaux Essais*, he directly connects his theory with the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence which, he says, "though a myth, contains, in part at least, nothing incompatible with bare reason." For Leibniz makes use of the sub-conscious to explain the existence of innate ideas in our minds, not as fully developed cognitions, nor yet as mere abstract possibilities, but as definite, germinal potentialities or "virtualities," as imperfectly perceived ideas with a tendency to become perfectly perceived. "If the soul were like empty tablets, truths would be in us as the figure of Hercules is in a block of marble, when the block of marble is indifferently capable of receiving this figure or any other. But if there were in the stone veins which should mark out the figure of Hercules rather than other figures, the stone would be more determined towards this figure, and Hercules would somehow be, as it were, innate in it, although labour would be needed to uncover the veins and to clear them by polishing, and thus removing what prevents them from being fully seen. It is thus that ideas and truths are innate in us, as natural inclinations, dispositions, habits, or powers, and not as activities, although these powers are always accompanied by some activities, often imperceptible, which correspond to them." Evidently the sub-conscious is here again used as a means of justifying the systematic unity of our conscious life. We receive nothing from outside ourselves; our whole knowledge is developed from within. There is in

our knowledge no external combination of content and form. What is given is given from within, given in the sub-conscious, which is absolutely continuous with the conscious.

(2) Thus, in the second place, Leibniz directly connects his account of the sub-conscious with the general principle which he calls the law of continuity. Thus, he says:—"Unconscious perceptions are of as great use in pneumatics (the philosophy of mind) as imperceptible corpuscles are in physics; and it is as unreasonable to reject the one as the other on the ground that they are beyond the reach of our senses. Nothing takes place all at once, and it is one of my great maxims, one among the most completely verified of maxims, that *nature never makes leaps*, which I called the *law of continuity* when I spoke of it in the first *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*; and the use of this law in Physics is very considerable: it is to the effect that we always pass from small to great, and *vice versâ*, through that which is intermediate in degrees as in parts, and that a motion never immediately arises from rest nor is immediately reduced to rest, but comes or goes through a smaller motion, just as we never completely traverse any line or length without having traversed a smaller line, although hitherto those who have laid down the laws of motion have not observed this law, and have thought that a body can in a moment receive a motion contrary to that which it had immediately before. And all this leads us to think that *noticeable perceptions* also come by degrees from those which are too small to be noticed. To think otherwise is to know little of the illimitable fulness of things, which always and everywhere contains an actual infinity." (Introduction to *New Essays*.)

Now this law of continuity manifestly means that the objects to which it applies constitute a single self-sufficient system, the elements in which are so closely interconnected that no change can take place in any one of them without in some degree, however infinitely slight, affecting all the others. As applied in physics, it is the basis of the mechanical view of

nature: it is the presupposition of the calculus. This is well brought out by Mr. Merz, in his book on Leibniz. He says (p. 173):—"The use and application of this mechanical mode of dealing with phenomena depends upon the tacit supposition that the things of this world are connected in such a manner that, if at any point a certain change takes place, according to distance in time and space, this change is accompanied or followed by changes in everything else. These other changes may be exceedingly small, they may be practically imperceptible, but the mechanical view cannot be upheld without postulating that the consequences of every event or phenomenon spread through all time and space, so far as these are filled with existing things. It is true that this may not have been sufficiently obvious in the beginning of exact research, and this for a very simple reason. Exact science began by studying phenomena in the same way as mathematicians study figures; it studied them experimentally—viz., in the abstract and isolated, *i.e.*, torn out of the connections in which they stand in time and space. The application to real things and phenomena consisted, then, in making in the abstract result the necessary corrections, and in approaching nature by an infinite number of approximations. Nobody was more fitted than Leibniz to appreciate at once the true nature of the exact method, and to see that scientifically every phenomenon is made up of an infinite number of infinitely small elements, and likewise that every action, considered as a beginning, produces around it a reaction which is divided into an infinite number of parts. Mathematically speaking, every phenomenon is an integral, and can be split up both in its antecedent causes and following effects into a compound of an infinite number of infinitely small occurrences. In Leibniz's mind this truth took the form of the law of continuity."

A hint which Leibniz gives in the passage I quoted from him enables us to conceive the same idea in a slightly different way. He takes as an illustration the fact that "a motion

never immediately arises from rest nor is immediately reduced to rest, but comes or goes through a smaller motion, just as we never completely traverse any line without having traversed a smaller line." Now, this means that the distinctions between motion and rest and between a point and a line are not absolute but relative distinctions. There is no absolute rest, no absolute motion, no absolute point, no absolute line. Rest is simply infinitely small motion, the point is simply an infinitely small line. If rest is the limit of motion, the point is the limit of the line. When, therefore, we speak of rest without reference to motion, of points without reference to lines, we are treating them abstractly, as isolated phenomena, and we are ignoring the abstraction we have made. Really, from the point of view of a satisfactory physics or mathematics, they are members of a system, in the closest interrelation with one another, and, so long as we ignore this, we cannot penetrate to their real nature. In mathematics, for instance, we may get certain information about rectilinear figures, treated by themselves, or about curves treated by themselves; but we cannot make all the progress we might until we realise that there is perfect continuity between the rectilinear figure and the curve, that the distinction between them has as its foundation a real systematic unity. Leibniz, as we have seen, extends this general principle to the relation between the conscious and the sub-conscious or the unconscious. The difference between them he regards as one of degree. The sub-conscious is simply a low degree of the conscious; unconsciousness is infinitely small consciousness. Accordingly, the significance of the sub-conscious for Leibniz is that it is the limit of the conscious. Sub-consciousness derives all its meaning from consciousness, and cannot be regarded as constituting an independent realm or system.

(3) In the third place, however, it has to be noted that Leibniz, arriving at his conception from the side of mathematics and physics, does not do full justice to what is implied

in his theory. The progress of mathematics and physics is possible only on the presupposition that the objects of each of these sciences form an independent and continuous system. But the objects of mathematics and physics are comparatively abstract. Each of these sciences considers the world from a limited point of view, takes into account only certain of the simplest elements in the concrete phenomena. And the more abstract any science is, the more possible is it to express the interrelations of its phenomena in a quantitative form. Thus the infinitesimal calculus is a most valuable instrument for the solution of problems in physics, just because physics is concerned only with a few of the innumerable characteristics which concrete phenomena present. Physics regards every phenomenon simply as a phenomenon of motion in space, leaving out of account all that is involved in life, consciousness, and so on. The progress of investigation has inevitably compelled the physicist to recognise that, if his science is to have a sure foundation, its objects must be regarded as forming a self-complete, independent system, a system the continuity of which is perfect. There must be no gulf between motion and rest, between apparent motion and apparent absence of motion. And the infinitesimal calculus is the practical expression of this in scientific method. But, while the infinitesimal calculus is the method by which the conception of system solves the fundamental problems of physics, it is rash to assume that the application of the idea of a self-complete, continuous system to the problems of life or of consciousness must take a similar quantitative form. Rest may be infinitely small motion (which, of course, is quite different from entire absence of motion); but it does not follow that sub-consciousness can be rightly described as infinitely little consciousness. Leibniz, however, as one of the discoverers of the infinitesimal calculus, was naturally inclined to extend its application analogically to other scientific spheres than that of physics, and accordingly he describes sub-conscious perceptions as

petites perceptions. One may note, in passing (though it does not affect the present argument), that the self-contradictions in Leibniz's *Monadology*, as a whole, are in great part due to this analogical transference of mathematical categories to the spheres of life and consciousness. In the particular case we are considering, the contradiction appears in the fact that Leibniz's own account of perception makes the phrase "*petites perceptions*" a meaningless one. For the difference between perceptions is rather one of quality than of quantity. It is a difference not in size but in distinctness, clearness, obscurity. There is a partial recognition of this in the criticism of Hartmann, who says:—"If, as Leibniz himself maintains, natural disposition, instinct, the passions—in short, the mightiest influences in human life—take their rise in the sphere of the Unconscious, how are they to be shaped by ideas which are withdrawn from consciousness simply on account of their weakness? Would not the more *powerful* conscious ideas prevail at the decisive moment?" But I should differ from Hartmann when he adds that "for the main objects of Leibniz's consideration, innate ideas and the constant activity of the soul, his assumption of the infinitely little consciousness certainly suffices." An innate idea surely does not differ from a consciously recognised principle merely in the degree of its intensity. However great may be the identity of content between the two, the difference of content is no less remarkable. In short the distinction between the sub-conscious and the conscious is not one which can be adequately described in quantitative terms.

It would be impossible, in such a paper as this, to consider in detail the use of the sub-conscious in modern psychology and metaphysics. And I am not sure that, for our present purpose, we should gain much by such an inquiry. In what follows I shall have to make incidental references to some of the modern theories, and had the limits of this paper permitted, I should have given some critical consideration to

such views as those of Professor James. But it will be most convenient to break away from the history at this point and to examine further the problem of the sub-conscious itself, in the light of suggestions from the theories I have touched upon.

So far as our inquiry has gone, we have seen that the thinkers who employ the notion of the sub-conscious, whether implicitly or explicitly, use it in the most intimate connection with the idea that knowledge, either as a whole or in some particular department, must be regarded as a complete and more or less perfectly organic system, within which there are no isolated, fortuitous, or contingent elements. This appeared very clearly in our consideration of the view of Leibniz, and a little further thinking out of what is suggested in his doctrine will tend, I think, to establish more firmly the position that the real significance of the sub-conscious is just this systematic character of knowledge.

We saw that in the sphere of mathematics and physics the notion of infinitesimals is an application (or, if you like, an indication) of continuous system, both in the scientific knowledge involved and in the objects of that knowledge. And the use of infinitesimals is in this sphere, as we have seen, a satisfactory application or indication of the notion of system, because we are here dealing only with the measurable aspects of phenomena. The use of infinitesimals means that the objects of mathematics and physics are not isolated, or, in other words, that we cannot really *know* the nature of any one of them (or any kind of them) without taking into account its essential relations to others. We cannot, *e.g.*, know rightly what a point is, unless we take into consideration its relation to a line, we cannot know what a line is unless we consider its relation to a surface, and we cannot know what a surface is without reference to a tri-dimensional figure. And the same thing is, of course, true regarding the objects of physics.

Now from the point of view of life, also (the standpoint of biology), the world is a continuous system. But here

infinitesimals are useless or inadequate. The system is not a system of measurable things. Or rather, perhaps, the measurable aspect of the system is secondary and subordinate. So far as measurement is used, it is merely symbolic of aspects or characteristics in the phenomena which are not measurable. The system is a system, not of mathematical figures, nor of motion and rest, but of organic and inorganic, living and non-living. An unsystematic view of biology would be one which should limit the subject-matter of the science to the living or the organic, as distinct from the non-living and inorganic. But you cannot rightly limit the objects of biology to a certain definite class of phenomena, any more than you can so limit the objects of physics. Just as, for physics, every motion has its relation to all other motions, and can be properly understood only when this general idea is kept in view, so every plant or animal organism has its relations to all other things, both organic and inorganic, and can be properly understood only when this fact or principle is recognised. The failure to apply this notion of system in biology seems to me to be the cardinal error in the well-known argument of Huxley in his Romanes lecture. Huxley's error, I think, consists in speaking as if there were a closed sphere, a limited group, of natural objects and natural conditions, opposed to the sphere of human operations and yet subject to more or less arbitrary interferences from the human sphere. It is, of course, not the business of biology to inquire into human ideas and purposes, to inquire into the psychological, social or economic aspects of phenomena, but, on the other hand, the separation from nature (in the biological sense) of all that is due to human interference is a limitation of the science of biology which must inevitably lead to error. Human interferences with plant or animal life are always changes in the conditions of that life, and it does not seem to me to make any substantial difference whether the cause of change in the conditions is human interference or something that seems merely physical. Suppose that in a

tract of open country a large town were established or a group of coalpits or manufactories sending forth chemical fumes, and thus changing the character of the atmosphere. The interference with life, in such a case, would be due to man; but the struggle for existence among the plants of the locality would go on under the new conditions, unless the conditions were such as to end the struggle by killing off all the plants. And I do not see that this essentially differs from what takes place when climate varies, owing to great physical changes.

Accordingly we may, I think, say that the system which biology presupposes cannot rightly be regarded as excluding, in Huxley's words, "those parts of nature in which man plays the part of immediate cause." On the other hand, it is equally impossible to exclude from this system any set of phenomena which we may describe as inorganic or non-living. Biology recognises this in its insistence on environment, to which it can set absolutely no limits. There is no physical phenomenon, no inorganic thing, which may not have its relation to life. We cannot thoroughly understand the living, the organic, until we have made perfectly clear its relation to the inorganic in all its forms. That is, I think, the true significance of the attempts which are made to produce the living from the non-living. It does not really matter whether we believe biogenesis or abiogenesis to be the true theory. The important thing is the full discovery of the reasons for our belief. Our knowledge of life cannot be complete until we have discovered these reasons, that is to say, until we have made clear the whole conditions of life. And looked at from the other side, the side of the inorganic, the same thing is equally true. We cannot know the inorganic properly and fully, until we know its relations to the organic, to life. These relations are a part of its nature. We may, for the purposes of a special science, regard all phenomena practically as inorganic, we may abstractly ignore the element of life, but in so doing, we fail to give a

complete account of the nature of *any* of the phenomena. In making this abstraction, in seeking to know the phenomena of the world only as physics knows them, we are abstracting in a manner analogous to that which appears when we seek to know points apart from lines, motion in antithesis to rest. No thing which we describe as inorganic is known properly until its potentialities in relation to what is organic are recognised. These potentialities are a part of the nature of the objects of our study. Just as there are no phenomena which are isolated from the system of energy, so there are no phenomena which are isolated from the system of life.

When we turn from life to consciousness, we find the notion of system appearing in an exactly analogous way. In the whole range of our experience there is no phenomenon which is not a phenomenon of consciousness, which does not involve, as an element in its nature, some relation to consciousness. This is the very basis of recent psychology, and it has been made so clear to us by the writings of Dr. Ward, Dr. Stout, and others, that I need not dwell upon it. It is equally evident as regards phenomena in their organic and in their inorganic aspect. As regards phenomena in their organic aspect, it is the imperfectly recognised presupposition of physiological psychology, and as regards the inorganic aspect of phenomena, it is the similar presupposition of psychophysics. Thus, the significance of the hypothetical brain physiology, on which some investigators are at present engaged, is that organism, physical life, can only be known properly, concretely, when its relation to consciousness is fully understood. That, I think, is the meaning of the hypothesis of "unconscious cerebration," of the correlation of certain parts of the brain with certain elements in conscious experience, of the hypothesis of circuits and tracts in the brain and, in general, of the correlation of neuroses with psychoses. All this has, as its presupposition, the conviction that the brain and the nervous system generally are not sufficiently

understood until we take into account their definite relation to consciousness. Similarly in a great part of psycho-physics (so far, that is, as it is not merely an adjunct of physiological psychology) we are engaged in studying the definite relations of various forms of energy to conscious processes. And the presupposition of the investigation is that neither the forms of energy nor the conscious processes can be properly understood except in relation to one another. But both in the case of physiological psychology and in that of psycho-physics, the presupposition of system is, I think, imperfectly recognised. In physiological psychology the governing conception is that of a parallelism between nervous and psychical processes, while in psycho-physics (as, *e.g.*, in Fechner's law) the ideal is the establishment of an equation between physical stimuli and phenomena of consciousness. This evidently means that psychical phenomena (phenomena of consciousness) are still regarded as forming a relatively independent group or system in fundamental union and yet in contrast with other independent groups or systems, on the one hand of physiological or biological, and on the other hand of merely physical phenomena. In psycho-physics the presupposed unity between the groups is a unity of quantity, the slightest, most superficial of all unities. And in physiological psychology the unity is completely indefinite. It is at most the unity of two aspects of one and the same thing, and there is no satisfactory attempt to show how the unity expresses itself in these two aspects, how, in short, it is connected with its differences. This, of course, is really a metaphysical problem of the utmost difficulty, and I do not mean to criticise physiological psychology for not attempting its solution. The standpoints of psycho-physics and of physiological psychology are in many respects useful, and their investigations are certainly profitable. What I wish to make clear is merely this, that their methods presuppose the notion of one all-embracing psychical system, but that they recognise this only in an imperfect way.

Now this imperfect recognition of the systematic unity and completeness of the psychical appears negatively in psychophysics and in physiological psychology through their use of the notion of the sub-conscious. In short, this use of the sub-conscious is, in its way, analogous to the use of infinitesimals in physics and mathematics. Just as the conception of the infinitely little indicates, *e.g.*, that the distinction between motion and rest is a relative one, so the conception of the sub-conscious indicates the relativity of the distinction between the conscious and the non-conscious (whether physical or biological). But the conception of infinitesimals, being much more definite and applying to a much simpler system, is much more scientifically profitable than the conception of the sub-conscious. The sub-conscious is entirely vague and indefinite, and in this vagueness lies the peril of its use. But it invariably signifies, however imperfectly, the continuity of the conscious and the non-conscious. This is manifestly the significance of such psycho-psychical phenomena as the lowering of the threshold of consciousness. Stimuli which in certain circumstances are not powerful enough to produce sensation are sufficient in other circumstances to give rise to it. This the psychophysicist would describe (though hardly explain) by the supposition that below the threshold of consciousness the stimulus gives rise to a sub-conscious sensation. And this means simply that there is complete continuity between the conscious and the non-conscious. Similarly in physiological psychology, the significance of what is called "unconscious cerebration" (which, taken strictly, is a phrase implying a meaningless distinction, for all cerebration is unconscious), is that nerve-processes, which at one time are apparently correlated with consciousness, at another time are not, while yet there must on the psychical side be something, however indistinct, to correspond to them, that is to say, something sub-conscious. And here again, as in the case of the lowering of the threshold, the suggestion is evidently due to the idea of the continuity of the conscious

and the non-conscious. Further, it is worthy of note that (as cases like these suggest) the sub-conscious is always a construction on the basis of consciousness. It is dependent on consciousness, and derives all its meaning from consciousness. It is, indeed, always a hypothetical extension of the conscious in one direction or another.

When we pass from the use of the sub-conscious in psychophysics and physiological psychology to its use in connection with such problems as those of memory, association, thought, instinctive judgment and feeling, impulse, &c., its significance as an indication of the systematic unity of our mental life is, if possible, more evident. In the case of memory and association the sub-conscious is used to explain the recall of ideas which appear to have gone completely out of consciousness, or the associative connection of ideas which do not appear to have any immediate relation to one another. In other words, it is used to explain the mental process of transition from one idea to another, in cases in which there is no immediately evident ground for the transition. And the explanation consists in the hypothetical interpolation of an indefinite number of sub-conscious ideas between the two ideas which we find to be mysteriously connected in consciousness. This is exactly analogous to the way in which the principle of continuity is applied, say in mathematics and physics—viz., by the hypothetical interpolation of a series of infinitely small differences between two apparently discrete things. Now the necessity for the supposition of sub-conscious ideas, in the cases of memory and association, arises from the fact that, in our psychology of memory and association, we begin with the empirical assumption of distinct, particular ideas, which we must somehow externally connect. The ideas, the actual connection of which we desire to explain, are regarded in the first instance as discrete or separate, and we endeavour to fill up the gap between them by supposing a series of similar sub-conscious ideas to intervene between the one and the other. This, however, is simply a

negative or imperfect recognition that our first assumption of the discreteness of the ideas, as hard, independent particulars, was a wrong assumption. It is an imperfect recognition of this, and a recognition badly made. For if we are to get over the initial discreteness of the conscious ideas, if we are to establish continuity between them, we must, on this hypothesis, interpose between any two of them an infinity of sub-conscious ideas. Yet that can hardly be intended by those who make use of the notion of the sub-conscious in this connection.

When we speak of the sub-conscious in relation to the problems of memory and association, we really mean (as it appears to me) that our ideas are not properly understood when they are regarded as discrete particulars, externally associated; but that the problems which the actual facts present can only be solved by the recognition that all our ideas are elements in an organic system, a system of universals not divorced from the particulars but penetrating or constituting them — of universals penetrating or constituting the particulars not from without but from within. In other words, what we regard as independent ideas are really elements which we have by abstraction cut out of the tissue of our mental life — not particular facts but ideal constructions like the figures of geometry — and the supposition of the sub-conscious is an imperfect attempt to revoke this abstraction and to approximate to the reality of our consciousness, the system which is its true nature. Borrowing a metaphor from recent psychology, I might put the same thing in this way, that there are no such things as sub-conscious ideas, but the sub-conscious is a name for the infinitely extensive and complex “fringe” of our conscious ideas, the “fringe” which we neglect when we construct the abstract notion of a conscious idea, but which, as indicating the universal element which is the foundation of every conscious idea (the element of its unity with all other ideas in a single system), we must recognise whenever we endeavour to consider consciousness in its concreteness.

I can do no more than touch upon the significance of the sub-conscious in judgment, feeling, and impulse. In these cases the problem is that of the immediacy of the phenomenon. We judge or think in certain instances without being able to assign reasons or grounds for our judgment and yet with an uncontrollable conviction that we are right, we feel (as in a racial antipathy, or in a liking or dislike for people with certain physical characteristics) with a complete immediacy—a certainty which we cannot explain and yet which we cannot overcome—and we are similarly controlled by certain impulses, which are apparently instinctive and yet which are often of a kind peculiar to ourselves as individuals, so that they can hardly be referred to instinct in the ordinary sense. Such phenomena as these are commonly referred to the activity of our sub-conscious self. And the sub-conscious self is often regarded as a mysterious, inexplicable entity, more or less cut off from our conscious self, and capable of making incalculable incursions into the domain of consciousness. But it seems to me a more reasonable way of interpreting these phenomena to regard them as expressions of the systematic unity of our conscious life. Every such phenomenon might, I think, be shown to have a history in the conscious life of the individual. Take, as a single instance, the problem of apparently instinctive racial antipathy. It is, I think, inherited from one generation to another through the infinitely subtle influence of countless remarks, suggestions, gestures, expressive of the convictions of our society, which, from our earliest years, we mentally absorb, as a plant absorbs sunlight, and which, developed by our own observation and reflection, become an essential part of the structure of our experience. Actually to trace out all the grounds of such an antipathy, in the case of any individual, would be an infinitely difficult (nay, an impossible) task—as difficult as to account, say, for some of the minute, yet very real, characteristics which distinguish two particular plants of the same species. It is the complexity

of the grounds or reasons of these apparently instinctive feelings, judgments, and impulses that makes them seem inexplicable. They are so implicated in the system of our conscious life, they have such innumerable relations to the other elements in it, that we find it impossible to single them out in reflection. In cases like these, then, it seems to me that the reference of the phenomena to a sub-conscious self can only mean the reference of them to the system of our mental life, considered as a unity so complex, so organic or hyper-organic, that the difficulty of giving a complete historical account of the phenomena is practically insuperable.

Those who, like Professor James, tend to separate the sub-conscious from the conscious, seem to me to be induced to their hypothesis by a wrong interpretation of what is meant by universals. Their error, as I take it, is similar to that which has led to the use of the sub-conscious in connection with memory and association. Just as, in this case, the problem arises from the assumption of discrete ideas which have somehow to be connected, so, in the case of instinctive judgments, feelings, &c., it has its root in the supposition that universals are fixed, isolated general notions. No structure of such notions (if any such structure be possible) can be adequate to reality. Experience refuses to be forced into it; the individuality, the very life of things escapes it. If, therefore, thought is essentially a kind of mosaic of hard concepts, it becomes necessary to postulate a "something more," an immediate, real particular, which cannot be analysed into concepts grounded upon other concepts. Within consciousness we cannot escape from thought, from universals, and consequently this immediate reality, the unsearchable life of experience, which cannot be caught in a conceptual net, however finely meshed, must be referred to the sub-conscious. This appears to me to solve the difficulty only by giving it a name. It is essentially a "faculty" hypothesis, breaking the unity of experience and opening the way to an uncurbed imagination of abstract

possibilities, which is destructive of all rational explanation. And hence I can only regard it as the *reductio ad absurdum* of the assumption which gives rise to the problem, the assumption that universals are hard, independent concepts. It is as difficult to show that any structure of such concepts can exist as that such a structure can be adequate to reality. If the concepts are connected on any grounds whatever their initial fixity is disproved, and the original assumption falls to the ground. But in truth thought does not consist of concepts nor of judgments. It has no units, out of which it is built up by accretion. It is from the first a complete system, in which the elements of form and matter, however we regard them—as ground and consequent, as predicate and subject, as connotation and denotation, as general and particular, as mediate and immediate—are separable only by abstraction. The universality of thought is its systematic unity in difference, and it belongs as much to the most apparently immediate and instinctive as to the most apparently mediate and rational of our experiences. To develop this fully is impossible within the limits of this paper. But what I have said may suffice to draw attention to an aspect of the subject which (though it is perhaps familiar enough) has not received enough of notice in recent discussions. If, as I have sought to show, the notion of the sub-conscious is a hypothetical construction which derives all its meaning from the conscious, and if its real significance consists in its indication, however negative, of the systematic unity of consciousness, the utility of the notion is destroyed when the sub-conscious is regarded as a mysterious independent region, the relation of which to consciousness is mainly external and, of course, wholly inexplicable in terms of thought.

ABSTRACT OF MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE
TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION.

Meeting, November 3rd, 1902, at 8 p.m. The President in the Chair.—Professor S. Alexander and Professor A. Senier were elected honorary members. The President read the Inaugural Address on “Mr. Bradley’s Theory of Judgment.” Mr. A. F. Shand, V.P., then took the Chair, and a discussion followed in which Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, Mr. Bertrand Russell, Dr. Dawes Hicks, Mr. Carr, and Mr. Finberg took part, and the President replied.

Meeting, December 1st, 1902, at 8 p.m. Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, V.P., in the Chair.—Mr. A. J. Finberg read a paper on “Appearance and Reality.” A discussion followed in which Mr. Benecke, Mr. Boutwood, Mr. Carr, Dr. Goldsbrough, and the Chairman took part, and Mr. Finberg replied.

Meeting, January 5th, 1903, at 8 p.m. Mr. A. F. Shand, V.P., in the Chair.—Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson read a paper on “Time, Necessity, Law, Freedom, Final Cause, Design in Nature.” A discussion followed in which Mr. Massey, Professor Brough, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Kaibel, Mrs. Herzfeld, Mr. Spiller, Dr. Hicks, and the Chairman took part, and Mr. Hodgson replied.

Meeting, February 2nd, 1903, at 8 p.m. Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, V.P., in the Chair.—Mr. G. E. Moore read a paper on “Experience and Empiricism.” Mr. Russell, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Kaibel, Dr. Goldsbrough, Mr. Carr, and the Chairman took part in the discussion, and Mr. Moore replied.

Meeting, March 2nd, 1903, at 8 p.m. Mr. A. F. Shand, V.P., in the Chair.—Mr. G. C. Rankin was elected a member. The following resolution was passed unanimously:—“That the

Society has heard with deep regret of the severe loss it has sustained in the death of Professor D. G. Ritchie, a member of long standing and former President." The Honorary Secretary was instructed to send a message of sympathy to Mrs. Ritchie.

Mr. H. Sturt read a paper on "The Logic of Pragmatism." A discussion followed in which Mr. Hodgson, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Carr, Dr. Hicks, and Dr. Goldsbrough took part, and Mr. Sturt replied.

Meeting, May 4th, 1903, at 8 p.m. Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, V.P., in the Chair.—Dr. G. Dawes Hicks read a paper on "A Re-statement of some Features in Kantian Transcendentalism." In the discussion Mr. Shand, Mr. Carr, Dr. Goldsbrough, and the Chairman took part, and Dr. Hicks replied.

Meeting, May 18th, 1903, at 8 p.m. Mr. A. F. Shand, V.P., in the Chair.—Miss Edith A. Pearson was elected a member. Professor W. R. Boyce Gibson read a paper on "The Relation of Logic to Psychology, with Special Reference to the Views of Dr. Bosanquet." Dr. Bosanquet sent a reply to the criticism of his views which was read by the Honorary Secretary. In the discussion Mr. Hodgson, Dr. Hicks, Mr. Benecke, Dr. Goldsbrough, Mr. Carr, and the Chairman took part, and Professor Boyce Gibson replied.

Meeting, June 8th, 1903, at 8 p.m. Dr. G. Dawes Hicks, V.P., in the Chair.—The Report of the Committee for the session and the Financial Statement of the Treasurer, audited by Mr. Kaibel and Dr. Goldsbrough, were received, and after some discussion adopted. A ballot was held for the election of officers for the ensuing session. Professor G. F. Stout was elected President; Dr. G. D. Hicks, Mr. G. E. Moore, and Mr. A. F. Shand, Vice-Presidents; Mr. A. Boutwood, Treasurer; and Mr. H. W. Carr, Honorary Secretary. Mr. Kaibel and Dr. Goldsbrough were re-appointed Auditors.

Professor R. Latta read a paper on "The Significance of the Sub-conscious." In the discussion Mr. Hodgson, Mr. Shand, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Carr, Dr. Goldsbrough, and the Chairman took part, and Professor Latta replied.

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR THE
TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION.

(*Read at the Meeting on June 8th, 1903.*)

WE have to record a very sad loss to the Society in the death of Professor D. G. Ritchie of St. Andrews. Professor Ritchie joined the Society 18 years ago, and has throughout his membership taken an earnest and active part in its work. He has contributed many valuable papers. He was elected President for the Session 1898-9.

During the Session which concludes to-day there have been eight meetings, and the following papers have been read, all of which have been printed for publication in the *Proceedings* :—

- “Mr. Bradley’s Theory of Judgment,” by Professor G. F. Stout, President.
- “Appearance and Reality, a reply to Mr. Carr,” by A. J. Finberg.
- “Time, Necessity, Law, Freedom, Final Cause, Design in Nature,” by Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson.
- “Experience and Empiricism,” by Mr. G. E. Moore.
- “The Logic of Pragmatism,” by Mr. H. Sturt.
- “A re-Statement of Some Features in Kantian Transcendentalism,” by Dr. G. Dawes Hicks.
- “The Relation of Logic to Psychology, with special reference to the views of Dr. Bosanquet,” by Professor W. R. Boyce Gibson.
- “The Significance of the Sub-Conscious,” by Professor R. Latta.

The membership of the Society shows a decrease. We have lost by death, resignations, and removals seven; two new

members have been elected. The Society now numbers 62 ordinary and 11 corresponding members. The decrease in membership is matter of regret, indicating as it does a failure on the part of the Society to attract students and workers in philosophy in London. On the other hand, the Committee is glad to report that the meetings of the Session have been well attended, and the discussions well maintained.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT FOR THE 24TH SESSION, 1902-1903.

GENERAL ACCOUNT.

RECEIPTS.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	EXPENDITURE.	£	s.	d.
Subscriptions—										
61 Members	64	1	0				Printing "Proceedings," N.S., Vol. II (23rd Session)	61	3	2
Less—9 unpaid.. .. .	9	9	0	54	12	0	Printing cards, notices, &c., and proofs of Papers (7), for 24th Session	6	1	1
Arrears owing last Session	5	5	0				Advertisement in <i>Athenæum</i>	0	15	4
Less—2 unpaid	2	2	0	3	3	0	Gratuities to attendants	1	2	6
							Hon. Secretary's postage	2	0	0
							Hon. Treasurer's postage	0	5	2
Balance from Publication Account				13	12	3				
				£71	7	3				

PUBLICATION ACCOUNT.

PUBLICATION ACCOUNT.	£	s.	d.
Balance brought forward from last Session	121	0	11
Interest on Savings Bank Account, &c... .. .	2	12	5
Messrs. Williams and Norgate (sale of "Proceedings")	11	10	0
	£135	3	4
Balance of General Account			
Balance deposited in the Post Office Savings Bank	13	12	3
	121	11	1
	£135	3	4

This leaves still to be paid for, referring to the 24th Session, the rent of the rooms, the cost of the "Proceedings," Vol. III, and the proofs of Papers, &c.

Examined and found correct—
 (Signed) F. KAIBEL.
 G. F. GOLDSBROUGH.

(Signed) ARTHUR BOUTWOOD,
Hon. Treasurer.

22nd May, 1903.

RULES OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

NAME.

I.—This Society shall be called “THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY,” or, for a short title, “THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.”

OBJECTS.

II.—The object of this Society shall be the systematic study of Philosophy; 1st, as to its historic development; 2nd, as to its methods and problems.

CONSTITUTION.

III.—This Society shall consist of a President, Vice-Presidents, a Treasurer, a Secretary, and Members. The Officers shall constitute an Executive Committee. Every Ex-President shall be a Vice-President.

SUBSCRIPTION.

IV.—The annual subscription shall be one guinea, due at the first meeting in each session.

ADMISSION OF MEMBERS.

V.—Any person desirous of becoming a member of the ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY shall apply to the Secretary or other officer of the Society, who shall lay the application before the Executive Committee, and the Executive Committee, if they think fit, shall nominate the candidate for membership at an ordinary meeting of the Society. At the next ordinary meeting after such nomination a ballot shall be taken, when two-thirds of the votes cast shall be required for election.

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

VI.—Foreigners may be elected as corresponding members of the Society. They shall be nominated by the Executive Committee, and notice having been given at one ordinary meeting, their nomination shall be voted upon at the next meeting, when two-thirds of the votes cast shall be required for their election. Corresponding members shall not be liable to the annual subscription, and shall not vote.

ELECTION OF OFFICERS.

VII.—The President, three Vice-Presidents, Treasurer, and Secretary shall be elected by ballot at the last meeting in each session. Should a vacancy occur at any other time, the Society shall ballot at the earliest meeting to fill such vacancy, notice having been given to all the members.

SESSIONS AND MEETINGS.

VIII.—The ordinary meetings of the Society shall be on the first Monday in every month from November to June, unless otherwise ordered by the Committee. Such a course shall constitute a session. Special meetings may be ordered by resolution of the Society or shall be called by the President whenever requested in writing by four or more members.

BUSINESS OF SESSIONS.

IX.—At the last meeting in each session the Executive Committee shall report and the Treasurer shall make a financial statement, and present his accounts audited by two members appointed by the Society at a previous meeting.

BUSINESS OF MEETINGS.

X.—Except at the first meeting in each session, when the President or a Vice-President shall deliver an address, the study of Philosophy in both departments shall be pursued by means of discussion, so that every member may take an active part in the work of the Society.

PROCEEDINGS.

XI.—The Executive Committee are entrusted with the care of publishing or providing for the publication of a selection of the papers read each session before the Society.

BUSINESS RESOLUTIONS.

XII.—No resolution affecting the general conduct of the Society and not already provided for by Rule XIV shall be put unless notice has been given and the resolution read at the previous meeting, and unless a quorum of five members be present.

VISITORS.

XIII.—Visitors may be introduced to the meetings by members.

AMENDMENTS.

XIV.—Notices to amend these rules shall be in writing and must be signed by two members. Amendments must be announced at an ordinary meeting, and notice having been given to all the members, they shall be voted upon at the next ordinary meeting, when they shall not be carried unless two-thirds of the votes cast are in their favour.

LIST OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FOR THE TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION, 1903-1904.

PRESIDENT.

G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D.

VICE-PRESIDENTS.

SHADWORTH H. HODGSON, M.A., LL.D. (President, 1880 to 1894).

BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D. (President, 1894 to 1898).

G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., PH.D.

G. E. MOORE, M.A.

A. F. SHAND, M.A.

TREASURER.

A. BOUTWOOD.

HONORARY SECRETARY.

H. WILDON CARR, 22, Albemarle Street, W.

HONORARY AND CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

Elected.

1885. Prof. SAMUEL ALEXANDER, M.A., 13, Clifton Avenue, Fallowfield, Manchester (elected hon. member 1902).

1884. ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D., Aberdeen (elected hon. member 1893).

1899. Prof. J. MARK BALDWIN, Princetown, New Jersey.

1889. J. M. CATTELL, M.A., Ph.D., Garrison, New York.

1880. Prof. W. R. DUNSTAN, M.A., F.R.S., 30, Thurloe Square, S.W. (elected hon. member 1900).

1891. M. H. DZIEWICKI, 21, Szpitalna, Cracow, Austria.

1881. Hon. WILLIAM T. HARRIS, LL.D., Washington, United States.

1883. Prof. WILLIAM JAMES, M.D., Cambridge, Mass., United States.

1899. EDMUND MONTGOMERY, LL.D., Liendo Plantation, Hempstead, Texas.

1880. Prof. A. SENIER, M.D., Ph.D., Gurthard, Galway (elected hon. member 1902).

1899. Prof. E. B. TITCHENER, Cornell University, United States.

MEMBERS.


Elected.


1898. Miss DOROTHEA BEALE, Ladies' College, Cheltenham.
 1893. E. C. BENECKE, 174, Denmark Hill, S.E.
 1888. H. W. BLUNT, M.A., 183, Woodstock Road, Oxford.
 1886. Prof. BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D., *Vice-President*, The Heath Cottage, Oxshott.
 1890. A. BOUTWOOD, *Treasurer*, Bledlow, Bucks.
 1889. Prof. J. BROUGH, LL.M., University College, Aberystwyth.
 1895. Mrs. SOPHIE BRYANT, D.Sc., 6, Eldon Road, Hampstead.
 1883. Prof. S. H. BUTCHER, M.A., 27, Palmerston Place, Edinburgh.
 1881. H. W. CARR, *Hon. Sec.*, 25, Cumberland Terrace, Regent's Park.
 1895. STANTON COIT, Ph.D., 30, Hyde Park Gate, S.W.
 1884. P. DAPHNE, LL.B., 9, Roseleigh Avenue, Highbury.
 1896. E. T. DIXON, M.A., 9, Cranmer Road, Cambridge.
 1899. J. A. J. DREWETT, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
 1891. Lady EVANS, Nash Mills, Hemel Hempstead.
 1893. W. H. FAIRBROTHER, M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford.
 1901. A. J. FINBERG, The Retreat, Heronsgate, Rickmansworth.
 1897. Prof. W. R. BOYCE GIBSON, M.A., 9, Briardale Gardens, Platt's Lane, Hampstead.
 1900. G. F. GOLDSBROUGH, M.D., Church Side, Herne Hill, S.E.
 1882. C. J. GRECE, LL.D., Redhill, Surrey.
 1901. Mrs. HERZFELD, 53, Marlborough Mansions, Finchley Road, N.W.
 1890. G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., *Vice-President*, 7, Highbury Grange, N.
 1902. Mrs. HICKS, 7, Highbury Grange, N.
 1892. L. T. HOBHOUSE, M.A.,
 1830. SHADWORTH H. HODGSON, M.A., LL.D., *Vice-President*, 45, Conduit Street, W.
 1896. Mrs. GILLILAND HUSBAND, 69, Belsize Park Gardens, N.W.
 1896. Miss L. M. JACKSON, 29, Manchester Street, W.
 1892. Miss E. E. CONSTANCE JONES, Girton College, Cambridge.
 1899. ROBERT JONES, M.A., M.D., Claybury, Woodford Bridge.
 1896. FREDERICK KAIBEL, 27, Kensington Mansions, Earl's Court, S.W.
 1881. A. F. LAKE, 12, Park Hill, Clapham Park, S.W.
 1898. Prof. ROBERT LATTA, M.A., D.Phil., The College, Glasgow.
 1897. Rev. JAMES LINDSAY, M.A., D.D., Springhill Terrace, Kilmarnock, N.B.
 1899. J. LEWIS MCINTYRE, D.Sc., Rosslynlee, Cults, N.B.
 1896. J. ELLIS McTAGGART, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge.
 1896. Miss E. A. MANNING, 5, Pembridge Crescent, W.
 1883. C. C. MASSEY, 124, Victoria Street, S.W.
 1889. R. E. MICHESON, M.A., 4, Prince Arthur Road, Hampstead, N.W.
 1896. G. E. MOORE, M.A., *Vice-President*, Trinity College, Cambridge.

Elected.

1900. Rev. G. E. NEWSOM, M.A., King's College, London.
 1900. R. G. NISBET, M.A., 17, Dunard Road, Rutherglen, N.B.
1903. Miss E. A. PEARSON, 129, Kennington Road, S.E.
1903. GEORGE CLAUS RANKIN, M.A., The Settlement, Tavistock Place, W.C.
 1889. Rev. HASTINGS RASHDALL, M.A., D.C.L., New College, Oxford.
 1893. GEORGE S. RHODES, Ashby, Otley Road, Harrogate.
 1895. ARTHUR ROBINSON, M.A., 4, Pimlico, Durham.
 1896. Hon. B. A. W. RUSSELL, M.A., 44, Grosvenor Road, S.W.
1897. Mrs. SCHWANN, 4, Princes Gardens, S.W.
 1888. L. A. SELBY-BIGGE, M.A., 7, Wilbraham Place, S.W.
 1892. ALEXANDER F. SHAND, M.A., *Vice-President*, 1, Edwardes Place, Kensington, W.
1901. A. T. SHEARMAN, M.A., Hillsbrough, Tunbridge Wells.
 1900. Prof. W. R. SORLEY, M.A., St. Giles, Chesterton Lane, Cambridge.
 1901. GUSTAV SPILLER, 104, Gore Road, Victoria Park, E.
 1888. G. JOHNSTONE STONEY, M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S., 30, Ledbury Road, Bayswater, W.
1887. Prof. G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D., *President*, St. Andrews, N.B.
 1893. HENRY STURT, M.A., 5, Park Terrace, Oxford.
1900. Prof. C. B. UPTON, M.A., St. George's, Littlemore, near Oxford.
1886. FRAMJEE R. VICAJEE, High Court of Judicature, Bombay.
1902. JOSEPH WALKER, Pelleroft, Thongsbridge, Huddersfield.
 1890. CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
 1896. Prof. R. M. WENLEY, M.A., D.Sc., East Madison Street, Ann Arbor, Mich., U.S.A.
 1900. A. WOLF, M.A., University College, Gower Street, W.C.
-

HARRISON AND SONS,
PRINTERS IN ORDINARY TO HIS MAJESTY,
ST. MARTIN'S LANE, W.C.





B Aristotelian Society for
11 the Systematic Study of
A72 Philosophy, London
ns.v.3 Proceedings

**PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET**

**UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY**

