


PROS AND CONS
IN THE
GREAT WAR

LEONARD A. MAGNUS



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THE GREAT WAR



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PROS AND CONS
IN THE
GREAT WAR
A RECORD OF FOREIGN OPINION
WITH A REGISTER OF FACT

BY

LEONARD A. MAGNUS, LL.B.



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DEDICATED
TO
THE ENEMY

'Thy mouth hath testified against thee.'
—2 *Sam.* i. 16.

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PREFACE

THIS book is a compilation of opinions. The arguments are stated primarily from the foreign point of view, for which the convenient word 'Pro' is used, 'Con' designating the reply.

The true facts of the Great War have not been published: here and there from the multitude of official documents something may be gathered of the vast stock of historic conversations and papers, out of which the future historian will endeavour to reconstruct the dead past.

When he does so, his story will still be untrue, however painstaking, accurate, and conscientious, for he will not be a contemporary, and he cannot avoid importing his later-born personality.

But amid all the flotsam of contemporary thought, unguided or misguided, there lurks a great and essential truth, that of living impression: the very falsities of which reflect the actual living beliefs and aspirations.

The material for this book has been drawn in the main from German and other foreign sources, with occasional reference to official documents; these latter rather as incidents or correctives, in view of their validity as opinion, where opinion tallies with fact.

By seeing ourselves as others portray us, we may both lose and gain in self-respect, and anyhow profit

in self-knowledge ; whilst those who have been allowed to picture us only as our enemies would have it, may also learn something to their advantage in seeing that case presented in its bare crudities.

Possibly, too, in the hour of settlement, this book may be useful to those who might indulge their forgetfulness with the flattering graces of forgiveness.

In assembling in these few pages what is almost an encyclopædia of the mooted problems of the War, curtailment is unavoidable : but those who are curious can amplify any reference.

L. A. M.

PROS AND CONS OF THE WAR

ANTICIPATIONS

Pro: (1) In *Grossdeutschland* (1911) Tannenberg forecasts the course of the coming war (*v. also* PAN-GERMANISM).

(a) Serbia will aspire to become a great power [p. 299]. This will be a signal for a revolt in Austria, in which the Germans of Austria and Germany will march south. Then Russia and France will intervene; England will remain selfishly neutral.

Observe: The war was started by the demands made on Serbia in 1914, and it was intended to do the same in 1913 (*v. § 2* of this heading).

Russia will be compelled to relinquish the Baltic provinces, Lithuania, the Neman, the Dviná and Dnepr districts [p. 301].

Observe: The German invasion has followed these lines.

Germany will not be tempted, like Napoleon, into the morasses of Central Russia.

Observe: She has not attempted to advance beyond the Pripet.

(b) 'Greater Germany cannot be attained, save by a war with Europe. Russia, France and England will oppose the foundation of Greater Germany. Austria, powerless as she is, will not weigh much in the scales. The Germans will not march against Germany. Pan-Germanism must be the principle underlying our enterprise. . . . I know very well that my idea of extending our frontiers will not only conflict with hostile peoples,

but, within our boundaries, there will be men smitten with the notion of legality who will raise an outcry' [*ibid.*, p. 104]. 'Since the South African War, Anglo-German antagonism has been the keynote of European diplomacy' [p. 104]. 'Discouraged by the defeat of Russia in the Far East [as Tannenberg supposes, by Japan], France will seek a new ally, and will find one in her hereditary enemy, England. This new manœuvre will serve her but little, for the issue will be decided on land. England, on land, can lend only feeble assistance to her ally.

'If the English cruisers try to capture our commercial marine, this fact will only pile up France's indebtedness to us. . . .' 'On sea, Great Britain in war does not recognise private property. Let us follow the example set, and exercise the same right on our domain, the land. . . .'

(2) In the Serbian Blue Book, Appendix No. 2, Giolitti's speech to the Chamber, Dec. 5, 1914, is quoted: 'During the Balkan War, on the 9th August, I received from my hon. colleague, Signor di San Giuliano, the following telegram, "Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, hoping to bring into operation the *casus foederis* [v. p. 277] of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. I am endeavouring to arrange with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria; but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action as defensive, and therefore that no *casus foederis* arises"' [v. also Appendix, ITALY v. AUSTRIA.] Germany then refused. [*Observe: that the Kiel Canal was not quite finished.*] 'No doubt military considerations entered into line with this "not yet"' [*J'accuse*, p. 99].

(3) From the French Yellow Book (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) it is clear that in 1913 (the centenary of 1813), feeling was being stimulated in Germany against the 'Slav peril,' to which 'public opinion really seems indifferent,' and against France for daring to counter the New

German Army Law with the Three Years' Service Act. 'By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France.'

A German secret Army Memorandum of April 2, 1913, is also published: 'We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of France. . . .' It details how the outbreak is to be engineered, so as to clear Germany of responsibility for it. Trouble must be stirred up in Russia, Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco. Risings must be provoked. 'But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralized; this would be the case with Belgium or Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the West from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the North we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia. . . . On the South, Switzerland forms an extremely strong bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank' [For this reason (*v. p. 35*) Germany warmly approves Switzerland's stout defence, and blames Belgium]. 'If, on the contrary, their [the Belgians'] defensive organization was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the West, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country [Belgium] on the lines of our interest. . . .'

'An ultimatum, with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law' [*Secret Memorandum of the Germans*, April, 1913, quoted in French Yellow Book].

'If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred years ago. We will then remember that the ancient provinces of

the ancient German Empire, the country of Burgundy, and a large part of Louvain are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her.'

'There is in Germany a preliminary measure to mobilization, which we [the French] have not got . . . a general call to "attention." This warning was given in 1911. Now [April 4, 1913] it has been given about ten days ago' [*ibid.*].

'There are in this country [Germany] forces making for peace, but they are unorganized and have no popular leaders' [*ibid.*].

A warlike policy is stimulated—

- (1) By those who want it because it is 'inevitable.'
- (2) Because of over-population.
- (3) Because it is a humiliation to parley with France.
- (4) Because the governing classes [*v.* PRUSSIA, CONSTITUTION] fear democratization [*cf.* *J'accuse*, p. 95].
- (5) By manufacturers of guns and armour plate.
- (6) By the Universities, which are preaching Pan-Germanism, and wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German.
- (7) By rancour at the outcome of Moroccan policy [*v.* MOROCCO].

(4) [Authority: No. 6 French Yellow Book.] The Emperor William II., in a conversation with King Albert of Belgium, told him that war with France was inevitable, and King Albert protested that France was not bellicose.

Each one of these forecasts has been fulfilled in Germany's actions, and each one ante-dates the outbreak of war.

(5) In March, 1914, Herr R. von Wild, at Berlin, was enquiring of Captain von Papen at Washington what was found by experience to be the best way of blowing up railway lines in anticipation of a European war [Papen Correspondence, Nos. 1 and 5]. Papen was accredited

both to Mexico and the United States [*ibid.*, Nos. 4 and 2], and was plotting to stir up trouble in Mexico, before the outbreak of war.

Nearly all of this, as far as it lay in Germany's power, has been fulfilled.

(6) 'Germany needs new markets. We can only get other folks' goods by war. Our energy in peaceful commerce tends irresistibly to war' [*General-Anzeiger*, 8, vi., 1913].

'Only by our good sword can we get our place in the Sun. War is a part of the Divine order of things. How easily it might come about that Germanism should go under in a cosmopolitanism, if we ever lose sight of the fact that war is necessary for the race, society, and the State' [The Crown Prince, *Deutschland in Waffen*, May, 1913].

(7) The Germans contend that they invaded Belgium out of sudden necessity, which knows no law.

Con: (a) The invasion of Belgium was anticipated in 1911: *v.* the letter of Dr. Kuyper, when von Jagow repudiated any such notion; as a result, the Dutch land frontier was left unfortified, and forts erected at Flushing [Beer, p. 89]; (*v.* HOLLAND).

(b) The new Army Law of 1912 enlarged Germany's Army, creating as a counter-move the Three Years' Service law in France. On this occasion there was a secret session of the Belgian Chamber, when de Brocqueville, privately warned by King Charles of Roumania, announced the coming infraction of Belgian territory.

(c) Tannenberg [*Grossdeutschland*, 1911, p. 139] announces the project of annexing Belgium. His book, fantastic as it seems, corresponds very exactly with subsequent history.

(d) Germany planned the invasion [beforehand] [Eduard Meyer, p. 186].

(e) In the celebrations held at Liège in 1913, the emissary sent by Germany to greet the new King and

Queen of the Belgians was General Emmich, the commander at the siege of Liège in 1914 [*J'accuse*, p. 208].

(f) In the *Leipzigertagblatt*, 1907, Professor Martin, a close friend of the Kaiser, pointed out that Germany must in due time rob France of her northern provinces down to the sea, and that Belgium and Holland ought not to be forgotten [Kiersch, p. 4; cf. Tannenberg, *passim*].

(g) 'The Neutrality of Belgium will not stop us' [Bernhardi, II., p. 434].

(h) 'The plan for the invasion of France had been long ago determined on, to be carried out successfully in the North, across Belgium' [*Deutsche Kriegerzeitung*, Sept. 2, 1914]. Also consult Belgian Grey Book, No. 22, II., 13; French Yellow Book, No. 2.

ATROCITIES

ENGLISH.

Pro : The English commanders have had to prohibit looting [*Who are the Huns?* p. 196].

Con : This bare fact of prohibition is brought forward as an instance of malpractice, to justify German pillage.

BELGIUM.

Pro : There were none; the American correspondents allowed by the Germans to visit the occupied territory saw none.

Con : As a fact, these particular correspondents were arrested and detained as spies [*San Francisco Examiner*, *apud* Rouquette, pp. 39 and 45].

Pro: The Germans deny committing any atrocities [Molenbroek]. Molenbroek and Sidler justify them on the ground that the Belgian population behaved like banditti [*Carnets de route des combattants allemands; German Atrocities; Morgan; Molenbroek, II., pp. 30, 35, and 53*].

These atrocities are mere hearsay evidence [Domela, p. 55; Sidler, p. 22].

The Germans never looted any treasure [*Who are the Huns? p. 176*].

The so-called atrocities are merely restatements of horrors displayed on the French cinemas [Molenbroek, II., p. 31].

Con: Admissions in German diaries. Wholesale pillage is acknowledged [*Carnets de route, pp. 8, 12, 39, 45, 109*].

'First of all, the cellar was looted, then they turned their attention to the house, upsetting boxes, cupboards, even a safe, after vain attempts to break it open' [p. 12].

'Inside the house, our men had behaved like Vandals: everything was upside-down' [p. 22].

'The Vandals could not have done any worse' [p. 45].

'This manner of waging warfare is really barbarous. I am surprised we dare rail at the conduct of the Russians, for we do far worse in France; and on every occasion, on the least pretext, burn and ravage' [v. p. 13].

Gross massacres are admitted in the German diaries [*Carnets, p. 29; Morgan, pp. 90, 101, 103*]; e.g. Morgan, p. 90: 'I have also bayoneted several women. During the fight at "Batonville" I did for seven (7) women and four (4) young girls in five (5) minutes.'

'The village was literally sacked: the blond beast betrayed itself. The Huns and Landsknechts of the Middle Ages could not have done any better' [*Rapports belges II., p. 173*].

'And yet we now are all of us merely licensed murderers' (*Konzessionierte Totschläger*) [*Carnets, p. 81*].

Pro: The French commit atrocities; gouge out the eyes of the wounded, etc., etc. [German White Book].

Con: A German diary says: 'With these orders,

they tell us ghastly tales of the monstrous behaviour of the French : that the wounded on the battlefield have their eyes gouged out, etc., etc. . . . I have an idea that we are treated to these tales merely to prevent lagging in the rear or desertion : our men also think so ' [*Carnets*, pp. 85 and 89].

Observe : These diaries are illustrated with photographs of the originals, and their accuracy has never been contested.

Extracts from the tables in the *Atrocités Belges*, II., pp. 1 and 6.

Provinces	Houses burnt	Pillaged
Brabant	5,821	16,448
Liège	3,555	
Antwerp	3,588	
Namur	5,243	

	Civilians killed	Deported.
Brabant	897	2,110
Dinant	606 ascertained names	
Louvain	114 " "	
Tamines	119 " "	
Andenne	123 " "	

Con : The innocence of the Belgian clergy is admitted by the Austrian priest Aloysius van den Bergh, on behalf of the *Wiener Priester-verein*, supported by Cardinal Piffl, and Cardinal von Hartmann, archbishops of Vienna and Cologne ; by the Abbé Karl Sonnenschein of München-Gladbach [*Kölnische Volksztg.*, Sept. 10, 1914] ; by Lieut.-Col. von Eulwege (as to Andenne) [*Frankfurterztg.*, Jan. 6, 1915].

The German White Book (on Atrocities) pretermits all mention of these facts, which would disprove the averments that the Belgian priests instigated the *francs-tireurs* [*Réponse Belge*, p. 37].

The evidence of the German White Book seeks to prove too much : the German Army is everywhere beyond reproach ; superhumanly kind. ' The attitude

of the German Army has been exemplary,' says Major von Klewitz, who was one of the incendiaries at Louvain [*Réponse Belge*, p. 40].

Kaufmann, a priest at Aix-la-Chapelle, wrote to the *Kölnische Volksztg.* on Sept. 30, 1914, to state that in the thirty-five hospitals at Aix-la-Chapelle he could not find one German who had had his eyes gouged out. He controverts the truth of the stories to this effect published in that paper.

The *Vorwärts* of Berlin [Dec. 6, 1914] could not trace any at Hanover or at Berlin.

The origin of the legend may have been that the wounded on the field always shade their eyes, and that the crows attack the eyes; further that shrapnel wounds and cannonading affect the optic nerve [Belgian Grey Book II., Nos. 107 and 108].

Con : One strongly-marked feature in the atrocities in Belgium and France is the fact that they are conducted by officers, and not incidents of undiscipline; e.g., a Prussian lieutenant at Tongres writes [Baudrillart]: 'Up to the present we have only fired a few villages, for example, Saint Veith. Saint Veith was razed to the ground; now we are going to start with the towns. Louvain is to be the first.'

Con : The German White Book dealing with the horrors in Belgium merely cites about 80 communes: 10 in Brabant, 4 in West Flanders, 1 in East Flanders, 10 in Hainault, 10 in Liège, 21 in Luxemburg, 23 in Namur; and mentions not a word of the devastations in the provinces of Limburg and Antwerp.

The facts are that devastations took place in 107 communes of Liège, 141 in Namur, 51 in Antwerp, 118 in Brabant; in which four provinces there were respectively 3,444, 5,243, 3,553, and 5,833 houses burnt.

The German White Book further omits any mention of Visé, Termonde, Barchon, Melen-la-Bouxhe . . . in all 38 towns and villages, in which there were altogether 3,063 killed [*Réponse Belge*, pp. 27 and 28].

Or, again, at Aerschot (population 8,000) there were

150 massacred, amongst them several women and children ; and 300 deported to Germany.

In the environs of Aerschot, out of a population of 16,219 there were 57 killed and 486 deported—as far as can be ascertained by the Belgian Government [*ibid.*, p. 48].

Other figures might also be cited.

On July 22, 1916, 500 prominent Catholics in Spain published a remonstrance against the atrocities and desecrations in Belgium. The German Government gave the signatories to understand that any of them who had property in Belgium would be mulcted, and their estates visited by the German soldiery.

Con : For further details of German massacres, *v. Atrocités Belges*, II., pp. 32, 53, 55, 61, 63, 67, 71, 73.

LOUVAIN. Con : [*Atrocités Belges*, II., p. 114]. This official document contains direct evidence that the affray was started by an exchange of shots between German troops, and details the deliberate massacres of priests and civilians.

At Louvain the persons massacred have nearly all been identified by the Belgian authorities ; there is not a soldier amongst the victims, nor have the Germans in support of their thesis named one soldier *franc-tireur* [*Réponse Belge*, p. 18]. (Also *v. LOUVAIN.*)

FRANCE.

Pro : There were fewer *francs-tireurs* in France than in Belgium, hence there was less destruction [Hildebrand, p. 4].

Con : [*Les violations des lois de la guerre par l'Allemagne*, I.] The results of part of the French judicial inquiry are tabulated below. These statements are partly sworn testimony of eye-witnesses, without hearsay or secondary evidence ; and the German diaries are every one authenticated by photographic reproductions. The proof is either the evidence of

French witnesses or German diaries, or else the sworn statements of German prisoners. The references refer to the numbers of the several statements.

Except when it is expressly stated that a superior officer (including a sergeant-major) [Feldwebel] directed such operations, the incidents are not imputed to the culpability of the officers: but such merely negative statement does not disprove a probability that officers may have been guilty. Many such cases were merely reported to the hospitals, and the evidence is given by the physician who treated the case.

The evidence cited here only relates to a short period of the war and a limited front.

Moreover, evidence is only obtainable for such parts of France as were recovered after the Battle of the Marne. As to the rest, we have to wait, except in as far as casual diaries reveal what has gone on behind the present German lines, and sometimes relate to Belgium.

EXTRACTS FROM DIARIES

No. 46. 'As a punishment, dire misfortune had to be commended towards the population, often unjustly, and it is true that the blackguards amongst us felt they were entitled to do deeds of shame. This reproach is applicable mostly to the Service Corps, and the rear, where second-class troops are used, who are unsuitable for the front. . . .'

'The stories, mostly invented and largely exaggerations, of children's hands lopped off, and women violated, if true at all, do not of course affect the Army as a whole, but only a few criminals.'

No. 51. 'March by Ottignies to Vays. Place set on fire after our march. Court-martial. People very nice when courteously addressed. Our company shows better form than others. The pioneers are bad, the artillery are brigands.'

No. 58. 'The sky was coloured a ghastly red ov

the village: tongues of flames were flickering and testifying to German heroism. *C'est la guerre.*'

No. 70. (A lieutenant's diary): 'A village on a hill was burning almost glowingly white. From a distance it looked like the burning of Valhalla in the *Götterdämmerung*. A wonderful but terrifying sight.'

No. 74. 'This sort of warfare is barbarous. I wonder how we can gird at the Russians: we in France behave very much worse, and any pretext on any occasion is good enough for plunder and murder. But God is just and looks on: "The mills of God grind slowly, but they grind exceeding small."'

No. 79. 'We are lying down on the lawn of a glass-manufacturer's house; the cellar is just now our regimental H.Q. The village and workmen's homes have been thoroughly plundered. Horrible. There is really some truth in the talk of German barbarians.'

The Massacring or Mutilating of Wounded Men and Prisoners

DIRECT PROOF OF SUPERIOR COMMAND

FRENCH EVIDENCE

- No. 7.* 9 men.
- No. 13. 50 men.
- No. 16. 1 man.

GERMAN EVIDENCE

- No. 18. Gen. Stenger's general order to kill prisoners confirmed by other diaries.
- No. 19. About 75 men killed, including 13 civilians and some women.
- No. 19. About 30.
- No. 20. 'No quarter to Turcos.'
- No. 22. General order to kill all who surrender, unless wounded.
- No. 23. Order to kill any English.
- No. 24. Turcos killed by order.
- No. 26. 2 prisoners shot by order.

[*The numbers refer to documents in '*Les Violations, etc., Vol. I.*']

NO DIRECT PROOF OF SUPERIOR COMMAND

FRENCH EVIDENCE

- No. 8. 30 men.
 No. 9. 1 man.
 No. 10. 50 men.
 No. 11. A 'section.'
 No. 12. 1 man.
 No. 14. 3 men.
 No. 15. 1 man.
 No. 17. 1 man.

GERMAN EVIDENCE

- No. 21. Wounded massacred.
 No. 25. Prisoners always massacred.

Pillaging—Violations—Incendiarism—Assassinations

DIRECT PROOF OF SUPERIOR COMMAND

FRENCH EVIDENCE

- No. 28. A civilian massacred.
 No. 29. Incendiarism on a large scale at Diarupt (Vosges).
 No. 30. Incendiarism at Raon-l'Étape (Vosges).
 No. 31. Massacres and incendiarism at La Ferté-Gaucher (Seine-et-Marne).
 Nos. 81 and 82. Nomeny burnt to the ground without any provocation, by methodical incendiarism, house by house. A general massacre of the inhabitants.

GERMAN EVIDENCE

- Nos. 33 and 34. At Lunéville and Rheims hostages taken and fines of £20,000 imposed for supposed attacks by civilians.
 No. 35. Two women and a child shot by order of a major at Melen (Belgium).
 No. 37. 129 civilians shot near or at Dinant.
 No. 42. Incendiarism and massacre at Tongres, because the bridge had been blown up.
 No. 45. Hargnies set on fire.
 No. 46. A Bavarian deploras the needless incendiarism.
 Nos. 83 and 84. Nomeny burnt to ground by 8th Infantry Regiment, Bavarian, on Aug. 20 and 21.
 No. 59. At Fosse (Belgium) pillage, incendiarism, and loot divided.
 No. 65. A priest and his sister hanged on Franco-Belgian frontier.
 Nos. 66, 69, 70. Pillage and murder: great drunkenness.
 Nos. 72, 73, 75, 76, 77. St. Maurice, Pépinster, Blâmont: massacres and plunder, of women and children as well.

NO DIRECT PROOF OF SUPERIOR COMMAND

FRENCH EVIDENCE

No. 32. Violation and murder of women at Esternay (Marne).

GERMAN EVIDENCE

No. 36. General pillage at Berzée (near Charleroi).

No. 39. Ethe (Belgium) set on fire and sacked.

No. 40. French prisoners forced to run with the horses.

No. 41. Incendiarism and pillage at Betten.

No. 43. Réthel thoroughly plundered.

No. 44. Orchies burnt and plundered.

No. 47. A château at Rumigny plundered.

No. 48. Plunder near Dinant.

No. 49. General massacre at Dinant.

No. 50. Sainte Barbe (Vosges) set on fire.

Nos. 51, 52, 53. General pillage.

Nos. 54, 55, 58. Pillage and massacre in Belgium.

No. 56. Frenchmen burnt alive in their houses.

No. 57. Drunkenness and undiscipline general at Réthel.

The Service Corps is the worst.

No. 60. At Birisceau (?) incendiarism and torture of inhabitants.

No. 61. The massacres at Visé.

Nos. 62 and 63. 300 Belgians shot, and girl killed.

No. 67. Murder of 3 men and a boy at Fumay (Ardennes).

Nos. 68 and 71. 250 murdered at Dinant. Pillage.

No. 76. Parux (Meurthe-et-Moselle) and other villages burnt: 'and then we ate some cherries.'

Nos. 79 and 80. Champenoux, Courey: massacre and pillage.

The evidence as to incendiarism shows that the German troops were regularly equipped with petrol-sprays and explosive tablets, so as to produce a speedy fire. All these cases of incendiarism are supported by two or more independent testimonies, directly bearing on the facts, without any second-hand evidence.

The Use of Weapons Forbidden by Hague Convention

BY ORDER OF OFFICERS

FRENCH EVIDENCE

Nos. 90-97. Sept. 9, 1914. The German Government allege that the English and French used dum-dums and expansive bullets, and must proceed to reprisals.

On the contrary, on Aug. 4 such bullets were captured from the Germans in the Schlucht; so also on the 9th, etc., etc. Samples are shown of the bullets found in the German stores: split solid nose, soft-nose bullets, and also explosive bullets [v. SERBIA (van Tienhoven)].

The French bullet is made of one metal: the German of lead coated with nickel.

GERMAN EVIDENCE

No. 98. General von Lüttwitz, Sept. 15, 1914, forbids the use of *Übungspatronen* (explosive bullets, only intended for use in manœuvres). They have been inserted with the rest by mistake. They are to be withdrawn from use, to avoid impugment from the French.

No. 99. The French orders are to shoot at sight anyone carrying illegal cartridges.

The Germans are to shoot at sight any enemy carrying similar cartridges, and are warned that, if themselves captured with bullets looking like dum-dums or with the nose scratched, they are liable to be shot out of hand.*

* This German order is evidence that the Germans used such bullets and withdrew them under pains and penalties.

Belgian Report on Atrocities [VII., p. 45, English Edition] reports on bullets manufactured so as to be expansive, captured on a Hanoverian *Oberleutnant*.

The Use of Flaming Liquids and Asphyxiating Gas

FRENCH EVIDENCE

No. 100. The French cite this German document captured.

No. 101. The new German gas is chlorine contained in steel cylinders, with a pipe directing it towards the enemy.

Nos. 102 and 103 describe the effects.

GERMAN EVIDENCE

No. 100. A German order was captured giving details of a new device for the use of liquid fire, and directions. The waves of fire had a range of 20 by 20 metres, are mortal, and burn for a time of one to two minutes. The flow can be checked at will. These *Flammenwerfer* will be principally used in street-fighting and storming operations [Original German text, p. 172].

Violations of the Treaty of Geneva

BY ORDER OF OFFICERS

FRENCH EVIDENCE

No. 85. A French doctor at Mercy-le-haut shot at by a German officer.

No. 86. French stretcher-bearers forced to set fire to houses of mayor and doctor at Recquignies.

No. 87. Dressing-station at La Pêcherie (Neufchâtel) deliberately bombarded.

No. 88. French wounded fired at by order of German officers.

No. 89. French consul at Gomery (Belgium) murdered on Aug. 22, 1914, and wounded officers massacred.

All these cases are substantiated with supplementary evidence.

*Bombardments of Open Towns, Sacred Buildings,
Public Buildings, and of Fortresses, without
Previous Notice*

FRENCH EVIDENCE

No. 105. The Germans during their occupation of Rheims did use the tower for purposes of observation: the French did not, and the cathedral was deliberately bombarded and destroyed.

No. 106. There was no French battery less than 1,200 metres distant from the cathedral.

No. 104. The open town of Pont-à-Mousson was bombarded in August, 1914, without notice, with no demand for surrender, and not followed by occupation.

No. 107. The German aviators have bombarded Paris and killed civilians.

(So, too, the Zeppelins over England have achieved nothing but the title of 'baby-killers.')

GERMAN EVIDENCE

General von Disfurth [*Der Tag*] admits that the German troops have no object except to win: they may as well earn their title of barbarians.

'Rheims will soon be bombarded to dust by our 42 c.m. guns' [*Berliner-tagblatt*, Sept. 5, 1914].

Yet in 1871 Bismarck spared Notre Dame.

Disloyal Acts of War

FRENCH EVIDENCE

No. 108. Sept. 13, 1914 (near Nouvions). A section of French troops who surrendered were used as a screen by the German troops whilst in action.

No. 109. A similar act, under orders from a German officer (Sept. 20, 1914, near Nouvion).

No. 110. (Sept. 25 and 26, 1914). French prisoners were compelled to construct trenches in the rear of the fighting line.

Nos. 111 and 112. (Oct. 19, 1914). German troops on one occasion under a German officer were using women and babies as a screen in the open and behind windows.

GERMAN EVIDENCE

No. 113. A Bavarian 1st lieutenant in the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* used civilians as a screen, and publishes the fact.

Cruelty towards the Civil Population

FRENCH EVIDENCE

No. 114. The Germans fired at the fleeing population of Pont-à-Celles, after burning the houses (Aug. 21, 1914).

No. 115. Uhlans set the only three men in the village of Hartennes (Aisne) on fire (Sept. 23, 1914).

Nos. 116 and 117. Convoys of civilians were most barbarously treated, and old men who lagged shot dead.

Nos. 118, 119, 120. At Fresnes (Meuse), Sainte Barbe (Vosges), Chivy (Aisne) in Sept., Oct., and Nov., 1914, civilians, women and men, burned alive in the houses; any men found murdered; civilians robbed, and removed without provocation.

Rapports et Procès-Verbaux d'Enquête de la Commission instituée en vue de constater les actes commis par l'ennemi en violation du droit des gens, vol. I., contains an immense number of pieces of evidence, from eye-witnesses or sufferers, collected in a most rigorous legal manner.

Some of the conclusions may be quoted, though the mass of lurid detail should be read by those who doubt, or by those who want to justify their conviction in German barbarity. 'The deeds discovered by us day by day, constituting, as they do, common law offences, such as are punished in every country with the most severe and degrading penalties, prove an astonishing retrogression in Germany, in the German mind, since 1870.' (And yet re-read Zola's account of the 'Camp de la misère' after Sedan, in *La Débâcle*; and cf. Von Moltke, 1880 [WAR, p. 299]).

The violations of women have been unspeakable; there has been no regard for human liberty; pillage has been systematized to a nicety, and especial attention paid to any and every relic of antiquity or art. The tragedy of Nomeny is comparable with that of Louvain: it was, if anything, more complete, but the town is less famous, and the incident less known.

Plundering has been committed by officers of the highest rank, e.g., at the Château de Bave, which was occupied by someone entitled 'Royal Highness'; or again at the Château de Beaumont, occupied by Major von Ledebur and Graf Waldersee [p. 177]. Incendiarism has been almost invariably preceded by methodical looting. The 2nd and 4th Bavarian infantry regiments seem to have distinguished themselves, but not to have been alone.

These acts have been committed by officers, or under their order or with their connivance. This is the feature characterizing the Germans in this war. In other wars barbarities have occurred, but only because a nation-in-arms necessarily includes all of its criminals: and discipline cannot repress every man in a fighting army.

In this first volume there are 471 unexceptionable affidavits. The German White Book (for which v. p. 9) only deals with one or two districts (and these comparatively unaffected in Belgium); even then does not attempt to deny, only to justify: and the French evidence has been unassailable. An analysis similar to the preceding could easily be drawn up from this volume.

GERMANY.

Con : 'In the wars of 1814-15 the troops of Blücher burned innumerable villages, exterminating the inhabitants; after the battle of Waterloo the Prussians massacred entire battalions of unarmed prisoners; in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, burning, pillaging, and massacres; war fines on towns and Vandal-like destruction occurred on a great scale; during the international occupation of Peking, 1900, the German troops distinguished themselves from all the others by their butchery and plundering' [Lugaro, pp. 94-95].

EAST PRUSSIA.

Pro : The Germans allege savage slaughter and devastation during the Russian occupation of East Prussia [*Who are the Huns?* p. 160].

Con : The German *Chronik der Christlichen Welt*, 1916, No. 6, states as follows [*Observer*, 16, iv., 16]:

' EAST PRUSSIA IN 1915

' THE RUSSIAN INVASION AND ITS EFFECTS

' The first invasion of the Russians in August, 1914, was far more extensive than the second; almost two-thirds of the province were submerged by the ebb and flow of the hostile armies. But the economic and also the ecclesiastical damage was comparatively slight.

The Russians regarded the territory, which they hemmed in on both sides, as a safe possession, an annexed province. From this feeling, but also without doubt from an originally sincere desire for a humane and orderly method of conducting the war, it is to be explained that there were no devastations, lootings, or cruelties affecting the goods and chattels of the civil population, who on their side no doubt showed themselves free from fanaticism. The few isolated exceptions, which naturally could not be avoided among such huddled masses of men, have been afterwards exaggerated beyond measure and represented as general. Also the damage done by the battles was comparatively slight. After their annihilating defeat at Tannenberg the Russian retreat was a mere flight with short rearguard engagements. In the course of it about 1,000 non-combatants were carried off as hostages, especially a number of respectable citizens from Lyck and the neighbourhood, among them the superintendent and two clergymen.

‘A far greater dislocation of social life took place at that time through the flight and the demoralization of the refugees, and also, in part, of those who remained behind without any control. The signs of devastation found in the deserted premises and houses are demonstrably due for the most part to the disorderliness of the inhabitants themselves. There are districts—*e.g.*, the whole district north of Memel—from which no one fled at all in the first invasion and which, in spite of the enemy’s occupation at that time, have remained free from any damage by war.’

The Russian Government appointed an extraordinary Commission of Enquiry. Morgan [*German Atrocities*, p. 104] selects nine examples: of a violation of a sister of mercy; and a violation at Kalysz; three of the murder of wounded soldiers; of the burning alive of sixty-six or sixty-eight wounded men in a shed, and ill-treatment of prisoners of war (who were insulted, pelted, starved, kept in unsanitary conditions); of prisoners mutilated, and so forth.

AUSTRIA

Austria is a composite of many nationalities.

(As to Galicia and Bukovina, *v.* POLAND.)

Dynastic considerations for some considerable time obtained parts of Italy for her. In the War of the Austrian Succession, she lost Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, and her own province of Silesia. In 1779 she acquired Innsbrück and Falkenstein. After 1815 she reacquired Lombardy and Venetia (*v.* ITALY). Hungary was united with her under the Habsburg dynasty in 1687. In 1878 she took over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and annexed them in 1911. The rest of the states constituting Austria have been in her possession for several centuries.

Pro : 'To understand matters, consider, on the one hand, that Austria-Hungary had serious and incontrovertible grievances. The Kaiser would have abused his position of a friendly adviser to a plaintiff with a strong case, if he had utilized his credit as an ally, and the authority he enjoyed, on account of his power to help, to induce the Court at Vienna to renounce, even in part, any of the reparations due, or the necessary guarantees.

'On the other hand, the facts were just the other way: with regard to the pressure which the Entente might have brought to bear on Russia, to persuade her not to take sides for a culprit, not to interpose herself in a matter she was already too deeply involved in, after her encouragements to culpable acts' [Bertourieux, p. 70].

The demand for Austrian officials to act as coadjutors in the investigation (§ 5 of the demands, *v.* p. 241) went beyond the bounds of international law, but was justified in the circumstances [*ibid.*, p. 65].

The refusal to accept § 5 was Serbia's only chance of impunity [*ibid.*, p. 66].

'Sazonov should have intervened much earlier, to

prohibit his protégé, Serbia, from interfering in Austro-Hungarian politics' [*ibid.*, p. 68].

'Possibly later on documents will be discovered . . . to provide impartial historians of this tragic question, viz., the Serbian Government's connivance in the murder of the Arch-Duke . . . ' [*ibid.*, p. 63].

(In other words, the Austrian proof is insufficient.)

Pro : On July 26, 1914, Austria-Hungary officially and solemnly declared at St. Petersburg that she was not aiming at any territorial acquisitions in Serbia ; not wishing to infringe the integrity of Serbia, but merely to assure tranquillity for herself [German White Book, No. 10].

Con :

' SIR G. BUCHANAN, BRITISH AMBASSADOR AT ST. PETERSBURGH, TO SIR EDWARD GREY.—(*Received July 27*)

' *St. Petersburg,*

' *July 27, 1914.*

' (Telegraphic.)

'Austrian Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution, seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government.' [No. 44, *British Blue Book*].

'It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable to Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain' [*ibid.*, No. 139].

Pro : Austria would not admit of any intervention in the Serbian dispute [Roggen, p. 4].

Con : The 'localization' might, if insisted on, provoke Russia to war to guard her own interests.

'Russia declared that she must have a voice in the settlement of this conflict. Thereby the danger of European complications began raising a threatening head' [German White Book, pp. 8 and 18].

Pro : Austria was not aiming at a Balkan hegemony, but was merely pursuing a defensive conservative policy [Roggen, p. 59 ; Royen, p. 48 ; Spahn, p. 25].

Con : Austria was hemmed in by the rise of the Balkan Powers. She was pursuing a conservative policy in 1867, when frustrating Italian unity and nationality.

Pro : Austrian ambition to secure Salonica is a mere fable [Ándrássy, p. 18].

Con : Austria is utterly hemmed in by the Balkan States, and by Italy [Spahn, p. 25].

Pro : Austria and Germany should conclude a Customs Union and be one State indissoluble [Haus-halter].

Pro : Austria yielded to suggestion for consultation on Serbian crisis [British Blue Book, No. 133 ; Labberton, I., pp. 15, 40, 249].

Con : Yes, after Germany had despatched an ultimatum to Russia, demanding demobilization [British Blue Book, Nos. 131, 138, 144 ; Austrian Red Book, I., No. 55 ; *J'accuse*, p. 246].

Con : The despatch [No. 133, British White Book] in which Austria consented to discuss the substance of the Austrian note to Serbia is suppressed in the Austrian and diplomatic papers.

Pro : This is because the matter concerned the private relations between Austria and Germany, and therefore should not be published in German countries [Labberton, II., p. 49].

It may be pointed out that, in all the diplomatic correspondence of the Entente, there is no hesitation in publishing the communication amongst themselves [British, French, Russian, Serbian, Belgian Books, *passim*].

Pro : Austria and Germany are allies since 1880. [Tannenberg, pp. 12, 80, 86 ; *J'accuse*, p. 53].

Con : Yet German writers are willing to cede Trieste and the Trentino to Italy : German diplomats make this concession formally to Italy, and force Austria's hand ; and Tannenberg [*Grossdeutschland*] speaks of breaking Austria up, and annexing the German parts to the German Empire.

Germany is shackled to a corpse in steady dissolution [*J'accuse*, p. 53].

Germany officially offered the Austrian Trentino to Italy (see Appendix, ITALY *v.* AUSTRIA).

Pro : Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance, and not only broke faith by being neutral, but went over to the enemy.

Con : By the Triple Alliance (*v.* p. 278) the alliance between Austria and Italy was only cemented on the ground that for any eventual encroachment of Austria in the Turkish Balkans, Italy was to be correspondingly compensated ; and no measures were to be taken against Turkey in the Balkans, save such as had been previously submitted to and approved by both parties (Art. VII.).

The rise of the Balkan States disturbed the expectations of Austria ; and Italy had in 1913 [*v.* Serbian Blue Book, Appendix] refused to assent to an Austrian campaign against Serbia.

The Austrian note to Serbia was not notified to Italy (perhaps not to Germany) ; it was at once declared by Italy to be aggressive, and to raise claims for compensation, irrespective of Austria's success in arms against Serbia. Austria, under German pressure, had to admit the justice of all of these claims under Art. VII., and offered Italy portions of Albania. Italy adhered formally to the international obligation of maintaining the independent existence of Albania, and insisted on

concessions in the Trentino, and in the direction of Trieste. Germany forced Austria to concede the former, execution to be made on the termination of the war: the latter she refused. Italy went to war to secure for herself what she was entitled to under the letter of the bond by which she had so long been attached to the enemy from whom she released herself, in alliance with Prussia in 1866: since, in Count Nigra's words, 'Austria-Hungary and Italy must be either allies or enemies.

For this reason, Italy was not at war with Germany; the original ground of her alliance with Germany was the co-operation in 1866 against Austria, cemented by resentment against France at the occupation of Tunis in 1882; but this grievance was appeased in 1911, when Italy appropriated Libya, against the desire of both of her partners in the Triple Alliance [*Libro Verde*; Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. II.]. (But *v.* Appendix).

THE BALANCE OF POWER

Pro : England uses the doctrine of the balance of power merely as a lever to her own ends, provided she remains supreme at sea [Révai, p. 61].

In any future settlement there must be an end of the doctrine of the balance of power; and England must have no voice in the council of the nations [Chotzky, p. 25; Révai, p. 113].

The rise of the Balkan States forced Germany to support Austria, who was now hemmed in anew [Spahn, p. 25]. Germany had to increase her army after the Balkan wars [Platzhoff, p. 22; Verriijn-Stuart, p. 33].

Con : An increase—for what purpose?

Pro : The Balkan League was engineered by Russia and England [Révai, pp. 43 and 57; Heutsz, p. 76]; and henceforth England must be deprived of all

opportunities of terrorism in the Balkans [Révai, p. 109; Labberton, I., p. 53].

Con : Berchtold in 1913 kept the peace by not trying to grab territory [Mandere, p. 26].

FOR BALKAN STATES *v.* Appendix, p. 317.

THE 'BARALONG'

[Cd. 8144.]

On Aug. 19, 1915, a German submarine and its crew were sunk by H.M. auxiliary cruiser *Baralong*, which came up from behind the steamer *Nicosian*; and it is stated that as the crew tried to escape they were fired at. The German Government demanded proceedings for murder against the commander of the *Baralong*.

The charge is substantiated fairly well by a number of affidavits.

As a fact it is probable that the execution was done by the crew of the *Nicosian* when the German crew attempted to board her.

In his reply, Sir Edward Grey offered to submit this case to arbitration, together with that of the German submarine which struck the *Arabic* without notice and drowned forty-seven non-combatants; that of the British submarine *Arundel* on the Danish island of Saltholm, on which a German destroyer fired, until a Danish war-vessel intervened; and the case of the *Ruel*, attacked without notice; the crew were fired on whilst trying to escape. All of these had taken place within the same forty-eight hours.

BELGIUM

Pro : (1) The neutrality of Belgium has been impugned on three grounds :

- (1) That it was bad politics to resist Germany.
- (2) That Belgium had pledged herself to the Entente.

(3) That her territory was not inviolable [Waxweiler, p. 7].

It is argued that Belgium was merely anti-German [Bertourieux, pp. 82 and 84].

(But Bertourieux contradicts himself, for the bulk of his arguments are drawn from the Belgian *Dossier*, and he quotes opinions of Belgian diplomats, which, as he states them, are mainly anti-French, e.g., p. 85 for the years 1908 and 1914.)

Von Jagow stated in an interview with the Associated Press [*Lokal-Anzeiger*, Oct. 16, 1915] that Belgium was encouraged by England, and threw herself into war, being under bonds to England [Waxweiler, p. 39].

Con : (1) Belgium's national policy must be careful and constant neutrality [Waxweiler, p. 18].

In the course of her history she has defended herself against possible or apprehended attacks absolutely impartially ; against France in 1836 and 1848 ; in 1867 against Napoleon III. ; in 1875 [p. 27] ; in 1885-90 when suspected of German sympathies ; and in 1887, when suspected of English sympathies [*ibid.*, pp. 20 . . .].

Lord John Russell, Disraeli, and Bismarck all ratified the same view of the inviolability of Belgium [*ibid.*, p. 25].

In 1836 Belgium would not enter into a commercial treaty with France [*ibid.*, p. 20]. Yet in 1890 Belgium concluded a commercial treaty with Germany, terminating in 1917 [p. 90]. She has always been keenly alive to guard her neutrality from any foreign interference.

The same spirit has been shown in the manifesto of the Flemish party in 1915 : ' We will not live in dependence on any foreign power ' [*ibid.*, p. 31].

Belgium, so far from being pledged between 1906 and 1910, directed her War Office to consider the possibility of invasion from all quarters : in 1906 from Germany, 1907 from France, 1908 from France and England, 1907 from Germany, and 1910 from France ; and in 1911 Baron Beyens apprehended the possibility of England and France partitioning the Congo [*ibid.*, pp. 61 and 75].

It is also noteworthy that in 1875 the German military *attaché* at Brussels, Major von Sommerfeld, requested Baron Lambertmont, a Belgian diplomat, to get Namur and Liège fortified, so as to allay the military apprehensions of Germany.

This went much further than the consultations of two soldiers in 1906 and 1913.

Bertourieux bases his whole anti-Entente book on the Belgian reports. This is evidence enough that the Belgian State could not have been attached to any great power, and was merely perpetually anxious to be safeguarded.

Pro : (2) Belgium might have granted a right of passage, like Bulgaria or Greece [Bertourieux, p. 82].

A Belgian, Frère Orban, writes in the *Bruxellois* of Dec. 16, 1915 (this is the paper published under German auspices) : ' There is no diplomatic act obliging Belgium to repulse by arms an attempt to violate her neutrality, if her territorial integrity and independence are not threatened.'

German pamphlets accuse Belgium of concerting measures with England against a German invasion ; of not informing Germany of these measures ; of turning her treaty of guarantee into a scrap of paper [Schülte, *von der Neutralität Belgiens*, pp. 115-117 ; *La neutralité belge*, p. 8 ; *apud* Waxweiler, p. 82].

Con : (2) Belgium refused the right of passage, because of her necessity, which is neutrality.

As to the facts regarding Greece, *v.* GREECE.

Greece was an independent state, on whose behalf Venezelos requested the Allies to occupy Salonica, so that Greece might safely fulfil her treaty obligations with Serbia.

Greece failed to keep her word.

Dr. Richter [*Die Neutralisation von Staaten*, 1913] says [p. 220] that a guarantor-state is entitled to intervene to defend a neutralized state from attack, irrespective of the consent of that state.

In 1913 Sir Edward Grey denied the false rumours of

England's attempting to land troops in Belgium ; and re-affirmed that as long as other powers respected Belgium, England also would [No. 100, Belgian Grey Book, II.].

Pro : (3) ' It is by no means certain that an intention had not been conceived of letting the Belgian neutrality be deliberately violated by England, even if the Germans had respected it' [Bertourieux, p. 84].

Con : (3) This is an utter falsehood [*v.* British White Book, No. 125].

Pro : (4) The Belgian *Dossier*, published by the Germans, is said to prove Belgium's guilt [*Belgische Aktenstücke*, 1905-1914, herausgegeben vom auswärtigen Amt ; Berlin].

Con : (4) As published by the German Government, there are distortions which almost amount to forgeries. '*Conversation*,' which is quite readable in the photographic reproduction [Waxweiler, p. 50] is turned into '*convention*' and translated *Abkommen*, though in the French edition published at Berlin '*conversation*' is reproduced.

The inscription on the envelopes, 'Conventions anglo-belges,' meaning, loosely, 'agreements,' in General Ducarne's handwriting, is rendered as though it were in the singular, and signified a treaty.

In the German edition the marginal note, 'L'entrée des anglais ne se ferait qu'après la violation de notre neutralité par l'Allemagne' is only quoted at the end, and in French, as though it were merely accessory.

The following paragraphs are passed over [for reproduction *v.* Waxweiler, p. 55]: 'The first visit in the middle of January (1906). Mr. Barnardiston acquaints me with the preoccupation of the General Staff of his country, bearing on the general political situation, and the possibilities of wars at the moment. A despatch of troops, about 100,000 men in all, was projected in the event of Belgium being attacked.'

(*v.* MOROCCO.) War was expected that year. So, too,

in 1870, Gladstone officially informed the Belgian Minister that the incident of the Franco-Prussian secret treaty was of the utmost gravity, and involved England further in Belgian affairs.)

The Belgian general in 1906, however, replied that intervention was a political question and must be referred to the Minister for War.

The document goes on to detail how, *after* invasion, the English troops might arrive in time to assist and save Belgium [*ibid.*, p. 59].

It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive designs on the part of other Powers are made by Germany, who, since 1906, has established an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren, thinly-populated tract. These railways were deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon Belgium which was carried out two months ago (Belgian Grey Book, Appendix, No. 3).

'In this collection, edited by the enemy, in which obviously amongst the published documents only those appear from which the hostile cause might be reinforced, there is not one thought, expressed or implied, leading to anything that might impugn Belgian policy' [Waxweiler, p. 68].

Pro : (5) The Belgian Government disregarded the warnings of its agents [Waxweiler, p. 70].

Con : (5) Baron Greindl (on whose pro-German views so much reliance is placed) in 1906 discusses all the possibilities of an invasion of Belgium, starting with Germany, and alludes to the conversations of 1906 without any qualms, and calls them *démarches, ouvertures, propositions*. 'We have shown we will not let ourselves be intimidated.' This despatch is generally not quoted by German pamphleteers [Waxweiler, pp. 71-72].

Pro : (6) -Belgian territory was not inviolable [Wittmaack, *Deutsche Revue*, Feb., 1915 ; Schülte, pp. 66-68 ; F. Norden, *La Belgique neutre et l'Allemagne*, Brussels (Richard, 1915)].

Article VII. of the Treaty of 1839 : ' Belgium shall be an independent and perpetually neutral State ' ; ' inviolable ' is omitted, though it stood in the Convention of 1831.

Con : (6) The Conference of London, 1830, made Belgium independent, but left her with the obligation imposed on the Kingdom of the United Netherlands of 1815, viz., to serve as a buffer against France ; and in this sense it was understood by Talleyrand, who put Belgian neutrality in the same rank as Switzerland, thus implying inviolability.

For this reason, in 1831 the Great Powers forced Holland to evacuate Belgian territory.

By the Treaty of 1815 the fortresses of Ostend, Nieupoort, Ypres, those on the Scheld, Huy, Namur, and Dinant, Charleroi, Mariembourg and Philippeville might be occupied by Great Britain and Prussia, in case of a war with France.

In 1831 a secret clause (published in 1864) was added to the Treaty of 1830, by which France undertook to dismantle her fortresses on the Belgian frontier, and Belgium those on her side, the Great Powers renouncing every right to garrison them.

The word ' *invulnerable* ' was therefore implied in Article VII. ; the whole of the Treaty was guaranteed, including the boundaries of the new kingdom [Waxweiler, pp. 92-115].

Pro : (7) Belgium allowed France to invade Belgium first [Grasshoff, *Belgiens Schuld*, p. 6].

Con : (7) The French Government prohibited any troops passing the Belgian frontier until Aug. 5, 1914, and then only with permission of the Belgians.

The German evidence is that on July 26 two French officers were seen at Brussels ; on the 29th eight French soldiers ; on the 29th an aeroplane which looked French ; and similar vague casual evidence of unnamed persons [For a complete refutation *v.* Belgian Grey Book, II., No. 18] ; [Waxweiler, pp. 117 . . .].

[No. 151, British Blue Book.]

' SIR F. VILLIERS, BRITISH MINISTER AT BRUSSELS, TO
SIR EDWARD GREY.—(RECEIVED AUGUST 3).

' *Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

' (Telegraphic.)

' French Government have offered through their military *attaché* the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been sent to-day :

' " We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take." '

This was *after* the invasion of Luxemburg.

It has not been proved that the French invaded Belgium prior to the declaration of war [*v.* p. 70, and Struycken, p. 65 ; Labberton, II., p. 99]. Labberton also admits that there is no evidence that France intended a flank attack through Belgium.

Pro : (8) Belgium is German territory and should be re-absorbed [Kotzde, p. 6 ; Heinemann-Frohmann, p. 1]. The Flemings are merely a low German offshoot, by chance made independent of the original Holy Roman Empire.

Pro : (9) Antwerp is, in the main, merely a port for German shipping [Tannenberg, p. 121 ; Dernburg *apud* Rouquette, p. 88].

Pro : (10) Belgium was coerced to take our side, when she annexed the Congo ; and thus, by acquiring colonies, forfeited her neutrality [Révai, p. 53].

Con : (10) The act of annexation of the Congo was fully recognised by Germany, and unconditionally. [Beyens, p. 325].

Pro : (11) Any State would have done by Belgium as Germany did, but England is responsible for the

invasion by Germany, as she refused to stand aside [Ándrássy, p. 58].

Pro : (12) Belgium has always been unneutral, because Liège was so strongly fortified [Picard, p. 33 ; *Who are the Huns ?* p. 13] ; because her neutrality was one-sided [Landauer, p. 7 ; Wernle, p. 23], and her sympathies anti-German ; because Belgium was a support to France and England, and not to Germany [Spahn, p. 61] ; because her neutrality was self-infringed [Chamberlain, p. 82] ; because France sent troops into Belgium prior to declaration of war [Chamberlain, p. 82] ; because Belgian neutrality could not exist, the Belgian State having been annulled, like all creations of treaty rights and obligations, by the declaration of war between all the guaranteeing powers [Labberton, II., p. 12 ; 'R.,' p. 21].

Con : (13) In a German Confidential Memorandum [March 19, 1913, French Yellow Book, No. 2] it is stated : ' In the next European war it would also be necessary that the small States should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their fortified places could be rapidly conquered or neutralized ; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland. . . . If we could induce these States to organize their system of fortification, so as to constitute an effective protection for our flank, *we could abandon the proposed invasion.*'

Moreover, Bethmann-Hollweg admitted on Aug. 4, 1914, that he had done a wrong—excused on the pretext that necessity knows no law (*v. LUXEMBURG*).

This admission has been officially denied by him in his speech of December, 1914, and has been refused credibility on the following grounds by various apologists, namely :

(a) Bethmann-Hollweg knew on Aug. 4, 1914, of Belgium's guilt, but apologized so as to leave England a loophole for not declaring war [Révai, p. 53].

(b) Belgium was a mere contractual convenience erected in 1839 between the Great Powers, and automatically ceased to exist when England, the last-

remaining of the Guarantee Powers, took up arms [Labberton, II., p. 12; Molenbroek, II., p. 147].

(c) Belgium had been erected as a buffer between France and Germany, and ceased to exist when they were at war [Molenbroek, II., pp. 12 and 20].

(d) By the Treaty of 1839 the neutrality, but not the territory of Belgium was guaranteed [Molenbroek, II., p. 3; Stael].

(e) Germany was justified because the German-French frontier was impregnable [Dieren, p. 74].

(f) Because Belgium was fortified only against Germany [Dieren, p. 103].

(g) Because Germany offered to respect Belgium, and made a proposal to England which England refused [Molenbroek, II., p. 19].

(h) Because there were French troops in Belgium before the declaration of war [Molenbroek, II., p. 20].

'The Treaty did subsist and had not been consigned to oblivion' [Roggen, p. 134; also Kraaijenhoff].

Namur faced both ways, anyhow.

Molenbroek omits to mention the conclusion of No. 123 British Blue Book. Belgian neutrality was absolute, not conditional on any Power remaining neutral, or on a promise not to hit France too hard. This fact was admitted by Jagow (Foreign Secretary at Berlin) on April 20, 1913, in a speech to the Reichstag: that Belgian neutrality is determined by international convention, which Germany is resolved to respect; and by Below-Soleske (German Minister at Brussels) on Aug. 2, 1914: 'The troops will not cross Belgian territory. Serious events will take place. Your neighbour's roof-tree may blaze, the fire will spare your home' [*J'accuse*, p. 207].

It is absolutely untrue that there were French troops in Belgium; after the invasion Belgium appealed to France and England for aid [British Blue Book, No. 153; Belgian Grey Book, I., No. 140], and the German evidence alleged is unsound and ridiculous [Morgan, *German Atrocities*, p. 20; and *v.* pp. 8 and 19].

Per contra: [Belgian Grey Book, - No. 104; *La*

Belgique et l'Allemagne, p. 20]. Austrian cannon was used against Liège before the Austrian declaration of war [August 28, 1914], and acknowledged by the official German news posted up at Brussels; and *La Belgique et l'Allemagne* reproduces a photograph of the Antwerp German paper of Aug. 2, 1914, notifying German subjects of their liability to serve, and expressly stating that 'Germany, like France, has given Belgium an assurance that her neutrality would be respected.'

Pro : (14) Labberton [II., p. 46] considers Belgian resistance in arms merely quixotic and excessive zeal, and that this excess of virtue justifies Germany.

'The United States are not concerned with the misery of a people that ran their own heads into the noose, and played at being heroes. America need not foot the bill' [*San Francisco Examiner*, Nov. 18, 1914].

Con : (14) As a contrast, when Switzerland [Waxweiler, p. 52] on Aug. 4, 1914, protested her resolve to guard her neutrality by all means within her power, the German Government expressed its satisfaction.

In any event, Germany's intention to invade was absolutely irrespective of any supposed previous conversations of Belgium with France and England [*J'accuse*, p. 161].

Eduard Bernstein, the German socialist, admits [p. 28] that the invasion of Belgium was unjustified, that England felt no hatred towards Germany, and did her utmost to prevent war, even at the last, after hostilities were in progress against Serbia.

Cf. Emile Cammaerts :

Chantons l'orgueil de nos défaites,
Par ce beau soleil d'automne,
Et la joie de rester honnêtes
Quand la lâcheté nous serait si bonne.

Pro : (15) According to the *Kölnische Zeitung*, March 13, 1915, Belgium, being a composite nation, has no nationality; and Walloons and Flemings, though both Catholic, desire separation. Germany is the liberator [De Beer, p. 86].

Con : (15) So, too, East Prussia, *à fortiori*, as the Germans are Protestant and the Poles Catholic [De Beer, p. 86].

THE BOERS

Pro : The Transvaal and Orange Free State should have entered into the German Customs Union in 1895. Then they would not have been involved in English wars. England has politically ruined these two countries. The right moment would have been immediately after the Jameson Raid (1895), and everyone wants to know why this was not carried out. It is certain that steps were taken [Tannenberg, p. 139].

Con : England too was politically surprised by the Boer War, and consequently had not taken any military precautions at all adequate to her aims, or suited to give weight to political demands [Bernhardi, p. 277].

Pro : The British promoted the Boer War of 1899 in order to steal the goldfields, and in a spirit of aggression.

Con : The Boer War would never have arisen but for German intrigue with Kruger [Kiersch, p. 12]. The cause of it was that the Boer Government withheld all rights from the new settlements, and wanted to retain an oligarchy of the original inhabitants.

Pro : The British, in the conduct of the Boer War, starved the Boer women and children in the concentration camps [Dieren, p. 28 ; Mandere, p. 110].

Con : When the Boers were carrying on a guerilla warfare, retiring home as pacific farmers, at intervals, and generally leaving the land uncultivated and ravaged, the British collected and maintained the women and children ; the sanitary condition of the camps, which left much to desire at first, was improved as time went on.

Pro : The British used poisonous shells, lyddite and turpinitite, against the Boers [Dieren, p. 28].

Con : The use of explosive shells which incidentally may give forth noxious gases, is not forbidden by any convention.

The official German history of the Boer War, (*Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften Gr. Gen. Stab.*, p. 61, 1905) states :

'The surrender of the Boers [after Paardeberg] proceeded without incident in a most honourable way. Lord Roberts greeted the valiant Kronje with the significant words, "You have made a gallant defence, sir," and thereupon gave him quarters in his own tent. The men followed their general's good example, and made it their business to feed their half-starved prisoners, every man giving from his own scanty store, and the captives were treated with great consideration. A German officer-prisoner, who had fought on the Boers' side, reports as follows : "The treatment we received at the hands of the English officers and men was all through friendly and humane, and it was not only the officer, but Tommy as well, who showed himself a thorough gentleman." Contrary to the many mis-statements which have obtained currency throughout the world, owing to a misinformed Press, it seems to be the duty of a truthful historian to insist, from a knowledge of the facts at first hand, that the English army, when confronted with organized and disciplined commanders, showed the same chivalry and humanity as was also practised by the Boers. It was only later on, when those bodies of militia of loose composition and slack discipline dissolved, and when the Boers who fought on assumed the character of irregular combatants, that the fighting naturally became more bitter in spirit, as the distinction became fainter between genuine combatants and a hostile population. This fact explains, and justifies, the harshness of the war, on the score of necessity.'

THE BOER REBELLION (1914-15).

Pro : The Germans are disappointed that the Boers did not rise and fight on Germany's side [Schowalter, p. 1] ; it was Germany's fault, as she had not organized

any 'systematic infiltration' into South Africa [*ibid.*, p. 4]; in fact, Germans sent to South Africa became absorbed. The Kaiser's telegram to Kruger was a part of the anti-English policy, but was not followed up. Kruger told Schowalter that he had not received any definite German promise. The grant of self-government to the Transvaal was the outcome of the pressure of Anglo-German rivalry.

Con : These are all admissions of German intrigue prior to the rebellion.

The grant of self-government was the policy of the Liberal Ministry, and there was no thought or apprehension of Germany.

Pro : The resolution in the Union Parliament to support Botha and the United Kingdom was 'unworthy' [*cf.* also Penning, *passim*].

Pro : The Germans allege that Nakab, where the Germans in force invaded Union territory, was really German, and that the British authorities altered the map so as to cast the blame on the German forces [*Who are the Huns?* p. 56; and Penning].

Con : 'Nakab or Nakob is a water-hole about eighteen miles north of the Orange River, on German territory, quite close to the Union Border. A German police-post is established here. On the other side of the border there is a Union police-post. Both posts take their name from the water-hole. The water-hole itself is so near the border that a kopje on Union territory commands it. What had happened was that the Germans had occupied this kopje, apparently to safeguard their access to the water.

'The few maps which mark this position of Nakab at all naturally showed the water-hole which was on German territory.

'On a map published by the Railway Department, Nakab was shown as on the German side of the border. After the arrival of the news of the violation of Union territory, the officials concerned were apparently seized by doubt as to the accuracy of their map in this respect, since they were unaware of the existence of two, really

three, places going by the same name. Accordingly they altered the position, shifting it further east, and just over the border. This was done in the most open manner. This circumstance was, however, eagerly seized on as a proof of how perfidiously the Government was deceiving the public' [*South African Rebellion Report*, p. 15].

In any case, the German pamphlets omit to mention :

(1) The treason of Maritz, who was in command of the North-Western District of the Cape Province.

(2) His arrangements previous to 1913 with the German authorities in South-West Africa.

(3) The efforts, after the outbreak of the rebellion, of Botha, Steijn, and others to allay it without recourse to arms.

(4) The provisional treaty with the Governor of German South-West Africa, the terms of which were that the latter was to render assistance to liberate Cape Colony, and to receive in return Walfish Bay.

(5) The systematic poisoning of the wells by the Germans in the course of the campaign.

In Cd. 8306 the British Government have published the full evidence on the poisoning of the wells.

The wells in German South-West Africa were discovered to be systematically poisoned with arsenic ; and when tested, this was found to be an arsenite of sodium.

Franke (Governor-General) and Seitz (the Imperial Governor of South-West Africa) put forward in their official replies the pretext that the wells were rendered unfit for use ; that cooking-salt was first used, and then 'kopper dip' (or 'cooper's dip') : and that notices were put up at the wells thus treated.

The British forces could not find any such notices.

A photographic reproduction is inserted of the following order to poison the wells :

'Gabib (meaning the patrol at Gabib) has been instructed thoroughly to infect with disease the Ida mine. Approach Swakop and Ida mine with extreme caution and do not water there any more.'

Yet Seitz, on May 22, 1915, flatly denied having used

poison, and considered that notices of the infection were an excuse for the act [*cf.* the German claims that notices to warn intending passengers on the *Lusitania* exculpated the prospective murderers (*v.* p. 137)].

There were other atrocities; near the infected wells dynamite charges had been placed in a mill, so as to be exploded by a revolution of the sails.

It may also be observed, in connection with this campaign, that the prisoners taken by the Germans were abominably treated. The wounded were neglected; the officers starved; the men starved; no clothing provided; the interned civilians also starved.

'Windhuk gaol is the best prison in the Protectorate [officers and political prisoners were there interned]. We have examined it, and are of opinion that it cannot be called a good prison according to modern ideas of penal treatment. It was infested by bugs. . . . The sanitary arrangements were primitive. . . . The chief gaoler was a man, Meyer, who it is hardly denied was very harsh and almost brutal in his manner. . . .'

As to the native soldier-prisoners: 'The treatment to which these natives were entitled, as prisoners of war, is, by analogy, that given by the Germans to corresponding natives in their military employ. Now it is a matter of common knowledge that the German treatment of natives in the Protectorate and their ideas of what constitutes cruelty to natives differ very widely from ideas prevailing in the Union, and the members of the Commission have a good working knowledge of how far these ideas are carried in practice. In these circumstances we did not consider it necessary to lead evidence on the subject, and we make no report on any alleged ill-treatment of these natives' (*v.* CAMEROONS).

THE CAMEROONS

[Cd. 7974, Nov., 1915.]

There were complaints raised in Feb., 1915, as to the treatment of the German prisoners in the Cameroons.

Lieut. Otto Wieneke, one of the Germans captured, complains of impolite behaviour on the part of the English and French authorities at Duala; that the prisoners were compelled, when they departed, to leave their luggage behind; that the natives were given opportunities for plundering; that the journey to Lagos was most uncomfortable; and, in general, the 'treatment of the prisoners was lacking in politeness, consideration, and sympathy. The guard and control carried out by coloured soldiers was scarcely bearable. . . . Your petitioner and other gentlemen were very much surprised when one day they were brusquely rebuked by the black man on guard; they had to take their cigars out of their mouths when they passed the guard.'

The grievances are:

- (1) That private property was insufficiently protected.
- (2) That Brigadier-General Dobell drove them from Duala in an unworthy and tactless manner.
- (3) The inhuman treatment of the prisoners during the transport.

Further, the *Weser-Zeitung* (Feb. 23, 1915) publishes a statement by Wolf and Student, a missionary and a merchant in the Cameroons, that the natives were commissioned to murder Germans.

Parenthetically, it may be observed that we allowed this petition; that it was considered and commented on by the Colonial Office, and referred to the Colonial authorities. When the Germans removed Belgian civilians to Germany, they did not permit reclamations against the conduct of the guard, and sift them at Berlin, publishing full details.

In reply, the report points out that all the allegations are unfounded; that the native plundering was stopped; that the German prisoners were protected from the anger of their former subjects; and that the European Germans had largely themselves to blame for any unsanitary condition on board.

The White Paper also contains medical reports that the transport was capable of accommodating 560 persons,

and that all arrangements for food and sanitation were satisfactory.

Brigadier-General Dobell denies that any price was ever set on the head of any Germans; that Erich Student had only been six months in the Cameroons, and was in charge of native troops, who revolted against him; and that Schlichting (the German said to have been murdered) was killed in fair fight.

Complaints were also made that Frau Märtens, the wife of a German missionary, died through insufficient attendance. The full statement of the nurse who attended her up to her death and the full dietary is reported in the White Paper.

Lastly, the German Evangelical Press published a pamphlet on the Martyrdom of Evangelical Missionaries in the Cameroons, the evidence of English barbarity being supplied by two American missionaries, A. Orthmer and Valentin Wolff. Charlotte Schüler and Pauline Kessler added other gruesome recitals of hewn-off hands, starvation, etc.

Brigadier-General Dobell pointed out in reply :

(1) That Orthmer was really an Austrian, and Wolff had been born in Germany : all the other witnesses were German.

(2) That the prisoners were given the best accommodation available.

(3) That Germans were always in danger of attack from natives, and had often given provocation to them.

(4) Lt.-Col. Cockburn (who was in command) shows that both Orthmer's and Wolff's statements are direct falsehoods.

The Appendix contains a number of letters of thanks and appreciation from the Germans who have no complaint to make.

This slander was spread broadcast on the Continent. Every allegation in it is false.

In Cd. 8306 the British Government have published the results of a rigidly judicial inquiry into the conditions prevailing in the Cameroons.

Without going into details, there are quoted official orders to massacre natives (pp. 9, 29, 41, 47, 60, etc.), mutilate them (pp. 16, 25, 28, 30, 45, etc.), to devastate villages wholesale (pp. 13, 23, 25, etc.); these outrages were witnessed by Englishmen (pp. 5 and 59).

Women and children were the victims, quite as much as unarmed natives.

The native troops employed by the Germans were directed to use poisoned arrows (p. 15).

On Nov. 26, 1914, Ebermaier (the Imperial Governor) sent a protest to Luis Daban y Ruis (Secretary-General for Spanish Guinea), complaining that Brigadier-General Dobell had removed white women and children from the city of Duala in a barbarous way; had not allowed them to take their property with them; and invoked the protection of the articles of the Hague Conference. (Whereas Hauptmann von Crailsheim (p. 65) defends his action in taking medical men as prisoners, on the score that war in the colonies was uncivilized and did not come under the Hague Convention.)

Dobell replied (Dec. 23, 1914):

(1) All women at Duala were given the option of remaining or joining their husbands, who were prisoners.

(2) They decided to leave, and were allowed as much baggage as could be accommodated; the remainder was forwarded as soon as possible.

(3) The European quarter of Duala was overrun by natives, who were soon overawed; and Germans were unmolested.

(4) He referred to the brutalities practised by the Germans.

The object of these brutalities was terrorism, as many natives favoured the English (pp. 31 and 17); they were perpetrated by the army of occupation, from whom the natives took shelter behind the lines of the Allies.

Lieutenant von Engelbrechten (p. 9) issued the following orders :

‘ Several cases of Dualas attacking my soldiers and who openly help the English . . . enforce on me the safety [? protection (original not given);? *Sicherheitsstellung* translated as *Sicherheit*] of my movements, *i.e.*, to treat the Duala natives and their intertrading compatriots as combatants . . . and in special cases, as rebels and as traitors. I have ordered the destruction of all Duala villages. All Dualas met on the roads carrying weapons are to be shot. Prisoners will only be made when they are caught red-handed, and can be legally tried and condemned to death. . . .’

The German-whites supervised these horrors. *E.g.* (p. 34) : ‘ The Germans came to one village and tied up Nbonko and Nta, headmen, and others. The Germans ran away when they heard that the English were coming. . . . Three days after, they came back again. . . . As soon as the soldiers were out [of the train] they began shooting the people. They then burnt the village. . . .’

Many other instances might be quoted.

The German troops fired on the wounded in Red Cross wagons (p. 17); they maltreated and starved the prisoners of war (p. 62), murdered them (p. 66); intercepted the food which the American Mission was sending the captives (p. 63); took medical officers prisoner, and coloured troops, who were taken prisoner, were mutilated and murdered.

The evidence is both French and English : there is no hearsay, and photographs of the wounds are published in the text.

Amongst the most guilty Germans mentioned are Priester, Meinhard, Leopold Kuntz, Crailsheim.

Soft-nosed bullets were used by the German troops (p. 5); as also in East Africa.

It is evident (p. 17) that the Germans had no hold on the natives, save by force; and that the natives, on the withdrawal of the Germans, might well have indulged in some reprisals.

NURSE CAVELL

[For authority see Cd. 8013.]

On Aug. 26, 1915, Sir Edward Grey requested the United States Minister at Brussels to inquire as to the reported arrest of Miss Edith Cavell, head of a training-school for nurses at Brussels.

On Sept. 21 the answer came through that Miss Cavell had been arrested; she had been declared guilty of concealing French, English, and Belgian soldiers of military age. She had an advocate, one Braun, who had himself admitted that the charges were true.

On Oct. 13 the United States Ambassador at Brussels reported that she had been sentenced to death on the 12th and executed at 2 a.m. on Oct. 13.

Apparently she had a fair trial, with a Belgian advocate to defend her.

The efforts of the United States Ambassador were unavailing to obtain a revision.

On Oct. 12 the Political Department of the German Administration advised the American Embassy that no sentence had been pronounced, and no decision might be reached for a day or two, but that the Legation should be fully informed as to developments.

The Embassy made repeated inquiries in the course of the day, the last at 6.20 p.m. (Belgian time).

At 8.30 they learned from an outside source that sentence had been passed in the course of the afternoon (before the last conversation with Mr. Conrad, of the Political Department).

The American and Spanish Ambassadors called on the head of the Political Department at about 10, and saw him with other members of his staff. He 'expressed disbelief in the report that sentence had been passed, and manifested some surprise that we should give credence to any report not emanating from official sources.' They stayed there until about midnight, but were almost refused any hope of clemency.

The American Ambassador appealed for clemency to the Governor General von Bissing.

It was all too late.

Braun, counsel for Nurse Cavell, 'was prevented from pleading before that Court by unforeseen circumstances': he had handed over the case to Mr. Kirschen. 'Lawyers defending prisoners in the German military courts were not allowed to see their clients before the trial, and were not shown any document of the prosecution.'

She was convicted for aiding soldiers to cross the frontier. Before even the petition for pardon could be presented, she was executed, without any notice being given to the Legation.

Pro-German comment is uniform: that she was rightly convicted for an offence. No one mentions that false statements were made, and by means of these the execution was hastened, before any appeal could be launched or petition for pardon presented.

Sir Edward Grey [Cavell Papers, No. 7] is confident that the news of the execution of this noble English-woman will be received with horror and disgust . . . the attitude of the German authorities is, if possible, rendered worse by the discreditable efforts successfully made by the officials of the German Civil Administration at Brussels to conceal the fact that sentence had been passed and would be carried out immediately.

Yet 'the woman was sly and mean' [Dieren; *apud* Maks, p. 7].

CENTRAL EUROPE

The Germans design a great Central European State. The following references may exemplify it.

(1) Tannenberg, 1911 (*v.* INTENTIONS) includes Belgium, Holland, Esthonia, Courland, Russian Poland, and the North-Eastern departments of France, in Europe, as well as Austria and Serbia, and Switzerland.

(2) This seemingly wild aim is confirmed by de Beer [p. 168].

(3) Modern Europe will consist of States, not of nationalities; *e.g.*, Poland and the Trentino can continue Polish and national under foreign dominion [*Dietsche Stammen*, II., p. 120].

Observe: *Dietsche Stammen* is a pro-German paper founded in Holland to protect the 'Germanic' nationality.

(4) There is no longer to be a 'balance of power,' *i.e.*, all the Powers embroiled for the benefit of England, but Europe is to be federated and governed under the hegemony of Germany [Labberton, I., p. 47, on the 'Object of the War for Germany'; also Labberton, I., p. 18; Chotzky, p. 25]. This is called the European Monroe Doctrine: England is to have no voice on the Continent [Révai, p. 81].

(5) The Pro-Flemings accept the scheme on the ground that there will be no annexation, merely a commercial union [Picard, p. 36; Labberton, III., p. 83].

(6) The scheme includes Vienna, since 'the road to Constantinople passes by Vienna' [Royen, p. 59]. The whole of this new Central Empire must speak German [Chotzky, p. 37; Tannenberg, p. 35].

(7) New Germany must include the industrial districts of France, all the Netherlands, Poland, the Baltic provinces and Galicia; the boundary with Russia, if possible to be the Dnepr, and Lake Peipus. The Ukraine is to be saved by Germany from Russia [Heinemann, p. 73, etc.].

New Germany must include all the great waterways, from source to mouth, of the Dnepr, Rhine, Danube, and the Ægean coasts [*Deutschland und Ungarn*].

(8) This scheme of European cultured States includes Sweden; not Russia [Brüggemann, p. 5]; and the Finns and Turks [*Dietsche Stammen*, p. 121], but not the Greeks.

(9) There must be in time 150,000,000 Germans

settled within these frontiers after expelling all the natives; and the mission is German, not European [Kotzde, p. 9, etc.].

The economic scheme is already being advanced. A Balkan Coal Syndicate is now being founded to exploit the Balkan mines and oust English coal [*Echo*, June 15, 1916].

Observe: The aims of the Germans are self-contradictory: they want to unify the 'German race,' and, at the same time, for strategic or economic reasons, occupy Galicia, Holland, etc., etc. [Manen, p. 32].

COLOURED TROOPS

Pro: The Allies are guilty of a gross crime to civilization in using Asiatic, African, and coloured troops against Europeans [Svén Hedin, p. 350; *Who are the Huns?* p. 61; Révai, p. 81; Landauer, p. 78; Wilser, p. 45 (the Allies employ cannibals); Brüggemann, p. 1; Bertourieux, p. 17].

Con: This is not an infraction of the Hague Conventions; and, where Germany has such troops available, e.g., in her colonies (whence she cannot transport them), she uses them in her colonial wars, and has done so in both S.W. and E. Africa.

The Germans in their White Book of the Allies' atrocities have not been able to cite any such outrages against the Turcos and other coloured troops as have been proved against the German troops in the French, Belgian, and English documents.

CONSTANTINOPLE

Pro: (1) Should be Bulgarian [Erni, p. 2].

(2) Should be part of Central European alliance; but Russia would have been granted a passage for her ships without let or hindrance [Heutsz, p. 65].

Con : Russia depends largely on her export of grain, which can only be shipped through the Dardanelles : the measures proposed would throttle her more effectively than the Turks have done up to the present.

DAR-ES-SALAAM

Pro : The English bombarded Dar-es-Salaam, which was an open town, in defiance of the laws of international law [*Who are the Huns?* p. 53 ; Langheld, p. 63].

Con : The Germans have bombarded many open towns, *e.g.*, Scarborough, Lowestoft, Bar-le-Duc, etc., etc. At Dar-es-Salaam we destroyed the German wireless, which was of assistance to their cruisers, at that time still on the high seas. This fact is not even mentioned.

EGYPT

The English administration of Egypt is just and good. There is no response to a Jihâd (holy war). German trade is on the increase in Egypt under British rule [Erich Meyer, *passim* ; Stellwagen, *passim*].

ENGLAND

Pro : (1) England in 1800 raised Europe against Napoleon I. (*v.* KAISER), and, in particular, raised Prussia against the great legislator and consolidator ['R.', p. 10].

Con : (1) 'R.' is a pro-German Dutchman. This condemnation of the rise of Prussia is noticeable.

Pro : (2) England in 1800 waged war in Spain, merely to defend Gibraltar ['R.,' p. 11].

Pro : (3) England in 1800 never helped her allies on land, and merely grabbed colonies ['R.,' p. 13].

Pro : (4) Great Britain's intervention in Belgium ; her advice that the Meuse Valley should be fortified ; the fact that after the battle of Yvoir the Belgian Army repaired to Antwerp, and did not join the French ; the fact that Antwerp was not relieved in force by the English ; and the Belgian Army prematurely withdrawn, all go to show that Belgium, in holding the Yzer, is only acting as England's cat's-paw to guard Calais.

Pro : (5) Great Britain has not contributed any land forces to her allies [Dieren, p. 44] in this war. She wages war at the cost of her allies [Landauer, p. 74 ; Révai, p. 65].

Con : (5) England provided the whole of her regular army (150,000), and has raised 5,000,000 men.

Pro : (6) Great Britain is a country merely actuated by commercial motives [Tannenberg, p. 237].

Pro : (7) It is foretold by Bernhardt [p. 148] and Tannenberg [p. 231] that the British colonies will refuse support to the Motherland.

Con : (7) The English colonial system is admirable ; 'not a mere uniformity, nor centralized' [Landauer, p. 12]. The standard of education is high, though not a part of the civil service [Landauer, p. 20]. Germany has been England's pupil in law and science [Landauer, p. 15].

Pro : (8) The differential tariffs against Germany and in favour of Great Britain in the British colonies were a part of the plot to oust Germany, and England coerced the colonies [Dieren, p. 47 ; Heutsz, p. 71 ; Révai, p. 32].

Con : (8) Preferential rights were granted by the colonies voluntarily, without recognition or recompense. (Also *v.* ENVY.)

Pro : (9) The colonial soldiers are mere mercenaries [‘R.’, p. 51].

Pro : (10) Great Britain is regarded as a nation of hypocrites, and always guided by a tortuous and mendacious policy of self-interest [Labberton, I., p. 29; Chamberlain, p. 20; Révai, p. 13].

Con : (10) Apart from traditions of ‘perfidie Albion,’ the history of this notion may be thus summarized. The basic thought of Modern Germany is materialistic; *i.e.*, they call a spade a spade, and thereby forget it may import something more than that agricultural implement;—something may be reticesced or implied. The French are equally logical and direct, though less materialistic. But all British thought, like the British constitution, has grown up under the code of law and legal phrase; and law evades general definitions. We have no legal ‘liberties’—of the Press, assembly, etc.—only technical injunctions. When, therefore, we proclaim we are a free nation, where is the evidence? The letter of the law often points to the direct contrary. Thus, too, if we went to war to protect Belgium, and that moral duty coincided with our interests to keep the Netherlands out of the grip of a strong Continental power, to the German the existence of that selfish interest, especially when suppressed or understood in an ellipsis, proves the former ground to be mere hypocrisy; especially in view of such current political philosophy as Lasson’s, Bernhardi’s, Treitschke’s, etc. (for which *v.* p. 267). The British State is a human complex which cannot be mathematically formulated; Germany wants an exact machine working in an undeviating direction [*v.* STATE].

Pro : (11) Great Britain is regarded as a world-wide plotter with wonderful ingenuity.

(a) We have poisoned all the neutrals against Germany [Spahn, p. 10].

(b) We contrived the Balkan War of 1912 in order to safeguard our hold on Egypt; and also the Turco-Italian War of 1911 with the same object [Heutsz, p. 76; Révai, p. 43].

(c) We intrigued with Italy, to detach her from the Triple Alliance; forcing Italy to elect between the prospects of the Trentino and Tunis; and forcing her to adhere nominally to her former allies, so as to cut the ground under Germany's feet [Révai, p. 46]; (*v.* ITALY).

Con : (11) (*a*) *v.* PRESS. And has not Germany's action in Belgium had some influence in this direction?

(12) Great Britain is accused of various defects:

Pro : (*a*) She takes war as a mere sport, not in dead earnest [Dieren, p. 43].

Con : (*a*) True, Tommy sings 'Tipperary'; and Michel the Hymn of Hate. Which is the funnier?

Pro : (*b*) She is very backward, and filled with obsolete notions [Eduard Meyer, p. 151; Francken, p. 38].

Con : (*b*) Largely true.

Pro : (13) Great Britain aims at erecting the Kingdom of God upon earth by means of the British Empire [Schröer, p. 65].

Pro : (14) British thought is sluggish and fears facing direct logical consequences, and is content with half-solutions. There is no philosophic outlook, no clearly formulated ideals, no system; only compromise [Schultze, *passim*].

Con : (14) In other words, the German system is a science, artificially defined, and only true in relation to itself, not an elastic natural organism adaptable to circumstances and changing with them.

Pro : (15) England has no idea of Race, merely of Nation or State [Chamberlain, p. 48].

Pro : (16) England would never have joined in a war to regain France Alsace-Lorraine [Greindl, June 12, 1908; and Beyens, April 27, 1914; *apud* Bertourieux, p. 4].

Pro : (17) England will retain Calais and the French coast [Bertourieux, p. 126].

Pro : (18) Edward VII. promoted a vigorous policy of aggression on Germany, in concert with Delcassé [Bertourieux, p. 23; Schröer, *passim*].

Edward VII. intrigued with Japan and Russia, who are the natural foes of European freedom [Bertourieux, p. 49].

Con : (18) The visits of Edward VII. to Berlin in 1909, of the German Emperor and Empress to London in 1911, and other Anglo-German organizations, produced a better feeling [Belgian diplomatic reports ; Bertourieux, pp. 41 and 42].

Pro : (19) The English armaments in 1908 were unnecessary, unless intended for aggression [Bertourieux, p. 51].

Pro : (20) England is governed by an alternating party system, quite different from the unitary State control or *étatisme* on the Continent.

Con : (20) And therefore her policy is much less unitary and centralistic than that of Germany [Eduard Meyer, pp. 1-20].

Pro : (21) England's right policy was to go hand in hand with Germany, to have shared the French and other nations' colonies, and divided the world [Tannenberg, p. 247].

Pro : (22) The Cabinet in England is despotic, and there is no political freedom [Chamberlain, p. 33]. English politics are really congoloid [*ibid.*, p. 22] ; and, unlike the German National Army, our new army is not a popular or national effort [*ibid.*, p. 34] ; (v. STATE and PRUSSIA).

ENVELOPMENT (EINKREISUNG)

Pro : When in 1902 Edward VII. concluded the entente with France, and followed it up with an Anglo-Russian understanding, clamour arose in Germany against the policy of envelopment (*einkreisung*). (For its application to the Moroccan crises, v. MOROCCO.) The policy was regarded as hostile and provocative to Germany [Labberton, I., p. 17 ; Bassermann, p. 80]. The policy was the mistaken prejudice of King Edward VII. [Schröer, p. 34, etc.]. Edward VII. is the anti-German Napoleon [Baumann, p. 14].

Landauer (an Austrian) considers that King Edward VII. was merely pro-French, not anti-German [Landauer, p. 54] ; (*v.* also ENGLAND).

Con : It is never stated that Germany was closely and firmly bound by a treaty of alliance with Austria and Italy ; and, if the Entente's policy were one of encirclement geographically, the policy of the Triple Alliance might be regarded as one of extrusion (*Auskreisung*) [*J'accuse*, p. 58]. On the other hand, the Triple Entente was a loose understanding, which did not pledge Great Britain to co-operation with either France or Russia [*v.* British Blue Book, Nos. 105, 87, etc.] ; regarding France, ' that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other support of their armed forces ' ; regarding Russia, ' in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called upon to intervene. '

As to the relations between Russia and France, the Dual Alliance Treaty has not been published. For the terms of the Triple Alliance Treaty, see Appendix, ITALY - *v.* AUSTRIA, and TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

The measures taken by Germany in the Moroccan crises were such that Italy could not support her allies at Algéiras, nor in 1913 after the Balkan war [Serbian Blue Book, Appendix No. 2 : Giolitti's revelation of the Austrian intentions against Serbia].

Evidently the Triple Entente was not aggressive or conclusive.

Between 1899 and 1913 Great Britain always endeavoured to draw near to Germany [*J'accuse*, p. 61] ; tried to limit naval competition ; and in 1903 Chamberlain had attempted to conclude an Anglo-German Treaty. This endeavour was therefore common to both parties, Conservative and Liberal (*v.* MARINISM).

In 1905 Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman proposed to limit armaments, and started doing so. From 1907 to 1914 Germany steadily refused. Lloyd George, who in July, 1910, spoke against the ' epidemic of waste (in

armaments) which is ruining the world ' was forced by circumstances, not his own making, to become Minister of Munitions in the war.

Sir Edward Grey in 1902, on being approached by Germany to pledge himself to unconditional neutrality in the event of a European war, agreed to this formula. ' The two Powers being naturally desirous of securing peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will not make or join in any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object ' [*J'accuse*, p. 77].

Lastly, in 1912 Germany refused Churchill's offer of a ' naval holiday,' *i.e.*, that both Powers should agree to postpone the building of further ships (*v. also* ENGLAND).

ENVY (Commercial Rivalry)

Pro : British policy before the war was solely dictated by envy of the commercial prosperity of Germany ; and the growth of her fleet (*e.g.*, Williams' *Made in Germany*) [Bassermann, p. 15 ; Spahn, p. 41].

Pro : ' Never, since the time when Germany drew up a definite naval programme, has our policy with regard to naval matters possessed an aggressive anti-English character ' [Bassermann, p. 148].

England is acting from sheer envy of German commerce [O'Reilly, *San Francisco Examiner*, Aug. 25, 1915].

Con : Great Britain has not been greedy at others' expense [Eduard Meyer, p. 128 ; Naumann, p. 136]. She was certainly apprehensive of the growth of German commerce in English and colonial markets ; and many politicians wanted a tariff against her. However, the degree of envy was shown by the obstinate maintenance of free trade ; whereas Germany was fenced in with a high wall of protective tariffs.

Moreover, German aggression in Belgium and Northern France was distinctly dictated by envy. German ambition aimed at the annexation of the Belgian and French coal-fields [Tannenberg, p. 305; Heinemann, pp. 9, 23, 27]; (*cf.* U.S.A., Dernburg's remarks).

Belgium was a very serious competitor with Germany for the world's markets: holding one-fifth of the European trade, vying with Germany in South America, and, in fact, all the world over [Heinemann (quoting Schweighoffer as well), p. 7].

Antwerp was Germany's great port to the East [Heinemann, p. 15]; and the Flemings, who were 'oppressed' by Belgium, covered the Belgian industrial districts, including Maastricht, Liège, Brussels, Antwerp, Ostend and Dunkirk, and the Lille district [*ibid.*, p. 11].

Similar arguments are used in this book to justify annexation of industrial Poland, from Łódź to Warsaw and beyond.

ERRORS ON BOTH SIDES

Germany's Errors are all fundamental, arising from a misunderstanding of other peoples, and a supposition that they will all fall in with her designs and share her point of view. Thus:

(a) She expected Japan to go to war with Russia [Tannenberg, p. 301].

(b) She reckoned on the disloyalty of the British colonies [*ibid.*, p. 244].

(c) She calculated on the disloyalty of Ireland. She merely stirred up a few *intransigents* and armed them [Thurneysen, p. 33].

(d) She never anticipated that Belgium would fight for her independence. Belgium saved Europe.

(e) She never reckoned on England's intervention, and thought, at the last, she could bargain us off with offers of a share in French booty [No. 85, British Blue Book].

(f) She was sure of her agents succeeding in stirring up rebellions in Africa, India, and Egypt; in Algeria, Morocco, etc. (*v.* p. 177).

(g) She never realized how strong France would be.

(h) She never relied upon Italy; but never calculated on the revulsion of moral feeling against Austria and Germany, which was the ultimate and real cause of the Italian people driving Italy to war.

(i) She anticipated [Bernhardi, p. 279, etc.] that France and England would outrage Belgian and Danish neutrality.

All such errors are temperamental, moral, and irremediable.

British Errors have been plentiful, but fall under a different category.

They are blunders, lack of 'intelligent anticipation of events.' We started on the supposition that an expeditionary force of 100,000 would be sufficient, and that 150,000 was generosity; we blundered grossly in Gallipoli and the Dardanelles; we thought we could still do with a voluntary army—and did thus raise between three and four millions; we still retain the old peace Parliamentary Government. They are blunders of confidence—thus we had confidence in Bulgaria and Turkey to the last, and would not let Serbia make a timely attack in anticipation—and of indolence, and of lack of organization: we have had to learn and to unlearn; thus we never reckoned on having to convert or influence the neutral Press, and were unready; in fact, we had no schematized *Realpolitik* which had to be selfishly enforced and skilfully disguised.

FALSE NEWS

Under this head some samples of German intelligence are stated.

Pro : All English news and politics are lies [Schröer, p. 19; Bücher, pp. 3, 43; *Who are the Huns?* p. 205; etc., etc.].

Some alleged samples of false English news are :

(1) We published false news of the relief of Antwerp [Dieren, p. 24].

(2) In the English papers news appeared of the German fleet being beaten (before the battles off Coronel or the Falkland Isles), and that the German Army had been flung back on to the Rhine [Thurneysen, p. 33]; and that we had bombarded Cologne Cathedral [Schröer, p. 55].

Con : The following are samples of facts stated in various papers on German authority, or in books and pamphlets :

(1) On Aug. 2, 1914, in the Antwerp German paper : the statement that Belgium had nothing to fear [*La Belgique et l'Allemagne*, p. 6].

(2) The following sets of facts generally pretermitted or passed over :

(a) All the revelations of German intrigue in the United States, e.g., the Archibald, von der Goltz, and Papen papers (v. U.S.A., p. 292).

(b) The omissions in the Austrian Red Books, Nos. I. and II., of all the diplomatic correspondence between Berlin, Vienna, and Constantinople. The correspondence of the Allies amongst themselves is freely published [v. p. 253]. These omissions cover all the representations Berlin is supposed to have made between July 28 and 30, to mitigate the severity of the Austrian demands on Serbia [cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 43; *J'accuse*, p. 237]; also, in both the German and the Austrian books, No. 133 of the British White Book is omitted, viz., a communication of July 31 from Sazonov, conveying the Austrian promise to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.

(c) Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, on Dec. 24, 1914, stated that Austria at first mobilized merely against Serbia (whereas on Aug. 4 he acknowledged in his speech that she had partially mobilized against Russia); that Germany merely objected to the form of a conference (whereas she refused to enter into any discussion, and never would state in

what form she might consent) ; that England mobilized first by not dispersing the fleet, which happened to be assembled for manœuvres. In his speech (reported *Times*, June 7, 1916) Bethmann-Hollweg says that ' he worked feverishly at the settlement of the differences between Russia and Austria, and that more especially the Kaiser remained in uninterrupted telegraphic communication with the Tsar ' [for the facts, *v. WHO WILLED THE WAR?* p. 309]. At any rate, there is no evidence of such exertions. Austria did agree at the end. Germany refused, or disregarded all the four formulas put forward by Sir Edward Grey.

In the same speech (*v. STARVATION*), he affirms that at the victory off the Skager-rak Germany won the freedom of the seas.

(*d*) In the volume *Ein Bayernband*, a book to glorify the Bavarian army, in mentioning the fight at Haelen no indication is given how the Belgians at this point defeated the Germans [p. 81].

The devastation at Battice is wholly attributed to the inhabitants firing at the soldiers [p. 58]. Yet [p. 30] it is admitted that the affray was started by German troops firing on each other.

In this book there is also lacking any reference to any individual piece of heroism on the part of the Germans.

(*e*) The German Embassy at Constantinople spread false news of a revolution in India, of the Kaiser being a convert to Islam, and so forth (*v. TURKEY*).

(*f*) The German Consulate at Rotterdam published a brochure, ' Vérités historiques d'après des documents historiques français. France et Angleterre, par un neutre.' The trend of the book was to alienate France and England (like Bertourieux). The publication was ascribed to Alphonse Lemerre, who denounces it as a forgery. English publishers' names are similarly used [Maks, p. 31].

Con : The Belgian reply to the German ultimatum was not published in Germany until Aug. 8, 1914 (*cf.* p. 251, as to Serbia's reply), or in any of the official White Books.

In a pamphlet, *Die Wahrheit über den Krieg* (The Truth about the War), it is stated that Belgium replied with a declaration of war; and in the *Urkunden, Depeschen und Berichte der Frankfurter Zeitung* that no reply was sent [Waxweiler, p. 1].

Con : Jan. 4, 1915. Scarborough is said to be a defended place : the German text translates *befestigt* (fortified) [Anton, p. 7].

Pro : England refused to give Germany a pacific assurance in 1912 [Bertourieux, p. 45].

Con : Germany demanded a promise of absolute neutrality in any event. We promised never to support any aggressive policy (*v. p. 55*).

Con : On Aug. 26, 1915, Wolff published a story that a man presented himself at a Dutch consulate in Switzerland, and applied for a Dutch passport, so as to enter Belgium. He was a Belgian; when searched, he was carrying a little book entitled *Our Allies*, dated July, 1914, and containing pictures of French uniforms.

This is a *rechauffé* of a story published in the *Kölnische Zeitung* on Aug. 28, 1914.

The Dutch Consulate published a *démenti* of the story in the *Basler Anzeiger* (Sept. 7, 1915), which is not quoted anywhere in the German papers [Waxweiler, p. 43].

Con : A Flemish paper at Ghent in 1912 published an article with these words :

'Are we quite mad? Might not these (French) aeroplanes one day be called upon to fly over Belgium?'

The facts were that a French-Belgian paper had suggested subscribing to the French national fund for aviation.

The author of a pro-German pamphlet, *Neutralité belge et neutralité suisse* [p. 30] infers that in Belgium one went so far as to participate in French armaments [Waxweiler, p. 46].

Pro : England aided the Hereros in their insurrection against Germany in S.W. Africa [Bertourieux, p. 39].

Pro : Other general items of German allegations :

(a) The British authorities in Egypt supplied the

Turkish forces during the Italo-Turkish war [Erich Meyer, p. 9].

(b) At Brussels the Burgomaster Max ordered the Garde Civique to fire on the Germans.—On the contrary, he disarmed and disbanded them.—[*Schwarzbuch* (official), p. 108].

Observe : If so, they were belligerents, carrying arms openly, and led responsibly.

(c) The whole of the North Sea was first declared a closed area by Great Britain [Brandt, p. 146].—On the contrary, the Germans first carried on a 'submarine warfare' against merchant ships.

(d) British authorities connived at the attempted murder of Casement [*Who are the Huns?* p. 157; Eduard Meyer, p. vii.] and were guilty of drowning General Delarey [Eduard Meyer, p. vii.; also Penning]. Jaurès was assassinated by the French Government [Chamberlain, p. 40].

(e) The British are cruel to their German prisoners (also *v.* p. 41); [Potthoff, p. 41; *Schwarzbuch*, p. 68]. The German officers who complained, according to the official *Schwarzbuch*, are said to be prisoners in Rothness Isle—which cannot be traced in the *Gazetteer*. German civilians are robbed of their civil rights in England.—On the contrary, these are tenderly guarded in the Law Courts.—The English authorities were the first to initiate concentration camps for alien enemies [*Who are the Huns?* pp. 258, 265].—On the contrary, we started interning aliens long after *Ruhleben* was instituted.

(f) All German teachers were dismissed in England, and the language forbidden [Chamberlain, p. 11].

(g) Entire Irish regiments have been massacred by order [Thurneysen, p. 35].

(h) The torture of animals is general in England [Schröer, p. 49].

(i) According to English aspirations, the boundaries of England should be Cologne, and of France Würzburg and Magdeburg [Chotzky, p. 23].

(j) Edward VII. promised Zealand to Belgium

[Baumann, p. 35]. England is aiming at possession of Zeeland [*Dietsche Stemmen*, Jan.-Feb., 1915, p. 336].

(k) In England shots are fired at cinemas at heads of animals, because they are thought to resemble Germans [Soesman, *Oorlogspsychologie*, p. 47].

(l) The English language inhibits clean thinking, being a mere hybrid, or mongrel, and has too many words [Schultze, p. 27].

(m) The original expeditionary force had to be embarked drunk [Eduard Meyer, p. 31].

(n) England invariably suppresses liberty and native language, whereas Germany encourages both [Chamberlain, p. 39; *Dietsche Stemmen*, I., p. 125].

(v. SMALL NATIONALITIES).

Con : Whenever Germany is contemplating some new monstrous method of waging war she begins by attributing its use to her enemies.

In reading English and French war news much that is disadvantageous is concealed: but such official excisions are strictly limited, whereas colossal deductions have to be made from deliberate falsehoods in German news [*Nog wat losse*, pp. 43, 44].

Pro : *The Times* [June 17, 1916] quotes from the *Basler Nachrichten* [June 11, 1916] that the latter published a series of letters which it had received from Swiss sources [*Observe*: the German-Swiss are, as a rule, pro-German]. The writer remarks that, if the war lasts long enough, even the stupid neutrals will acquire all kinds of knowledge in the art of refusing to be deceived by lies. He says that the German reports of the naval battle off the Skaw will play a valuable part in this education, and proceeds to analyze the whole series of the lies of the wicked Wolff [also v. PRESS, p. 186].

Pro : 'It will soon be said, "Er lügt wie telegraphiert"' (He lies like a despatch) [Bismarck, *apud* Beer, p. 30, Feb. 13, 1869].

Pro : Blue Books and official papers should be disregarded, as untrustworthy and misleading: the majority of pamphlets do disregard them [Landauer, p. 53].

Con : The Germans, when they entered Brussels, discovered a series of Belgian diplomatic documents, of which they have made much capital (*v. Belgian Dossier*). They are reproduced without dates or signatures, very much curtailed, in the Official *Aktenstücke zum Kriegs-ausbruch*. The translation in part is falsified ; and the following is the prefatory note : ' The indication of the passage quoted, and the exact date, have been omitted for pertinent reasons ' [*Aktenstücke*, p. 49]. The same reservations and omissions are to be found in the German White Book and in other official publications.

Grasshoff in *Belgiens Schuld* [p. 14] quotes a deposition by one Cochard to prove that the French were the first to invade Belgium. Cochard wholly misstates the marching-orders of his regiment ; and himself mysteriously disappeared after an encounter with the Germans. Cochard formed part of the patrol which was ambushed. The French authorities clearly prove the whole statement to be forgery [*Réponse Belge*, pp. 442-444].

A certain Belgian, Major Girard, has written against the Belgian cause ; he had quitted the Belgian Army before 1891 [Waxweiler, p. 47].

THE FAR EAST

Pro : Japan will want to attack India and be a danger to England [Tannenberg, p. 251]. She will act in the Great War with Germany against Russia [*ibid.*, *passim*]. She will turn England out of China [Eduard Meyer].

Japan must have been bribed by England, if one is to account for her action [Royen, p. 62].

The rise of Japan as a Great Power imperils Australia, and is a menace to the commercial highway of the East [Heutsz, pp. 36-39].

Germany cheated Japan of the fruits of her victory after the Russo-Chinese war, and at the Treaty of Shimoneseki (1895) forced Japan to abandon Port Arthur ; Germany thereupon seized Kiao-chow, as a compensation for the death of two missionaries (1898)

[Schiemann, p. 8], and the new German Navy Law was passed ; England, to counterbalance, occupied Wei-hai-wei, and Russia took Port Arthur. The Russo-Japanese War was the outcome of this [Manen, p. 30].

Con : The Anglo-Japanese alliance (formed in 1902) helped to keep China open to European trade against the Continental ambitions of Germany, France, and Russia [Lintum, p. 4].

Pro : Japan menaces the Dutch colonies. An article by Takekoshi advocating their annexation by Japan is quoted in *Dietsche Stemmen* [March-April, p. 396]. Holland's hope is in Germany's help.

Germany needed a colony on the Chinese coast ; forced Japan in 1895 to abandon Liao-Tung, and in 1898 took Kiao-chow on a 99 years' lease : so that any attack by Japan was a violation of Chinese neutrality, and was robbery [Schrameyer, *passim* ; *Who are the Huns ?* p. 70].

Con : Japan, in conducting her campaign, carefully distinguished between 'neutral' Chinese territory (*i.e.*, outside the German sphere of influence) and the territory leased.

'In Nov., 1897, two Catholic missionaries were murdered. Admiral Diedrichs who [*v.* U.S.A.] interfered with Admiral Dewey at Manila Bay, steamed into Kiao-Chow [*v.* FAR EAST], took Tsing-Tao and announced the occupation of all the islands and dependencies on Nov. 15, demanded an indemnity of 200,000 *taels* and a 99 years' lease of the territory' [Gauss, p. 117].

Pro : German designs on China may be illustrated from *Dietsche Stemmen* (Jan.-Feb., 1916) ; a quotation from Georg Schweitzer : 'In modern China the recognition of the fact that Germany is the least dangerous State to the Chinese Government is steadily spreading at Peking, together with the natural tendency to cultivate the essential educational and economic relations with the West through Germany as intermediary. Germany must build up her economic expansion on her intellectual elasticity.'

England, by her alliance with Japan, and her general policy, has frustrated the wisdom of the Kaiser in trying to deal betimes with the Yellow Peril [Bertourieux, p. 48].

THE FLEMISH MOVEMENT

Pro : Since the occupation of Belgium the Germans have been conducting a vigorous agitation in favour of the Flemings. It has a substantial foundation in the fact that Belgium was a bilingual State, created in 1830 and 1839 (after the revolt from the Protestant Netherlands) out of the Flanders and Walloon districts, and that it was only by slow degrees that Flemish won for itself equality with French. A movement for the autonomy of Flanders, as a specifically Flemish country, was being strongly waged before the war.

Since then (*v. also* PAN-GERMANISM), the theory of the Teutonic brotherhood has been fervently preached by the German and pro-German pamphleteers, both to justify and to consolidate their conquest.

The movement has failed, for it is acknowledged [*Dietsche Stemmen*, March-April, p. 444] that it was premature, at present, to agitate for Home Rule for Flanders.

The Germans have promised to set up a Flemish University at Ghent [*ibid.*, Jan.-Feb., p. 238], but fulfilment has been postponed. Other signs of their interest is that French street-names in Belgium have been removed [*v. Toekomst*, etc.]

'There is a movement at Ghent in favour of a moral union with our sister-nation, the Germans' [*San Francisco Examiner*, Oct. 10, 1915, Overseas News (a German agency)].

The Belgian State has been vigorously denounced [*ibid.*, Jan.-Feb., 1916, p. 217, etc., etc.] as an artificial monstrosity, now happily disposed of.

The soil is claimed as German [Heinemann, p. 23] ; a sample of the proof is that, as regards Northern France, a French manual states : ' Placée au point de contact entre le monde néo-roman et le monde Germanique, la France du nord a une population très mêlée. Le type flamand, proche parent du type Germanique, prédomine dans toute la zone septentrionale. Même, dans tout le nord de la Flandre, la langue flamande est encore parlée par la majeure partie des habitants.'

One Fleming, Frederik van Ouwekerk, writes in German in the *Neue Rundschau*, October, 1915 : ' Flemings can scarcely offer much love as oppressed subjects of the Belgian State, scarcely be joyous sacrifices in the army. Their inclination will always be towards Flanders and Holland, not Belgium.' And again another writer in Flemish says : ' The ultra-flamingant feels the Flemish movement to be an independent national movement, not a municipal Belgian difficulty ' [For similar expressions, cf. Anon., *Vlaanderen en de Belgische Kwestië* ; Labberton, I., p. 27 ; Molenbroek, II., p. 44 ; and Picard, *Vlaanderen na den Oorlog*].

It is a point of some interest that in this Flemish movement, in which the Germans are continually asserting the nationalism of the ' German ' race, the leaders are absolutely mixed ; on the Belgian side there stand Cauwellaert, Vandervelde, etc. ; on the Flemish, Picard, René de Clercq, etc.

It is also noticeable that the *Vlaamsche Stem*, one of the pro-German Flemish papers, has died, despite all careful nutrition.

The aims of this Flemish movement are somewhat confused:

(a) The Dutch would not altogether like to have the kingdom of 1830 re-established : the two portions of the Netherlands have been too long separated.

(b) The Flemings hope they may attain autonomy for Flanders under their own rule, and that they may be as independent of the Dutch as of the Germans.

(c) The Germans [*Who are the Huns?* p. 173] insist on the excellence of their administration in Belgium ;

e.g., they allowed the Dutch to feed the Belgian population; and Domela Nieuwenhuis van Nyegaard, the pro-German protestant pastor at Ghent, is always speaking of how the Belgian population welcome their German cousins, and how much they feel at home with them. [The authority is the files of Dutch and Belgian papers of all colours.]

Con : The Belgian Army is still very actively recruited from Belgians; and for the reply to the methods of administration *v.* ATROCITIES and BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

The Manifesto of the Flemish party stands for equal rights for Flemish and French in an independent Belgium. 'And any who call themselves Flemings and attempt to negotiate with the German Government are as false to the Flemish movement as to the Motherland' [*Telegraaf*, July 21, 1915].

'How far German influences were responsible for fanning *flamingantisme* to excess, it is impossible to say. The leading flamingants were not conscious Germanizers. But German sympathy with the extension of Flemish and diminution of French was natural; and the German Government must have departed from its usual practice, if it did not employ agents to foster such a process. At all events, the later extravagances, if we may use the word, of the *flamingant* agitation appear to have coincided in date with the growth of definite German designs against Belgian independence' [*Ensor, Belgium*, pp. 49-50].

Emile Cammaerts [*Observer*, July 16, 1916], gives a lucid account of the new German propaganda in Belgium, which started in February, 1916. The Flemish University of Ghent is proving almost impracticable against the passive resistance of the Belgians. The Flemings resent all the attention given to them by the Germans.

The nature of the movement is illustrated by Labberton [*de Vlaamsche Beweging*], who says that the genuine *Flamingants* are in revolt against the defunct Belgian State, and should ally themselves to Germany, which

will annex Luxemburg and the right bank of the Meuse as a Walloon State in Central Europe, leaving Flanders free (also as a State in Central Europe) to be forcibly Flemicized, even against the general will of the people. In this wise the Netherlands will cease to be the strategic battlefield of the Latin and Teuton nations.

FRANCE

Pro : (1) France and Germany before the war.

(a) Bismarck in 1866 offered Napoleon III. an extension of territory on the Rhine, so as to induce France to stand neutral. Napoleon III. went to war to make Bismarck keep his promise [Platzhoff, p. 13].

(b) Bismarck in 1870 resumed Alsace for historical and strategical reasons, and foolishly refrained from Belfort : he annexed Lorraine under dictation from the military chiefs [Platzhoff, p. 14].

(c) France profited by the loss of Alsace, for she acquired an African Empire. She should have been further despoiled in 1870 [Révai, p. 139 ; Tannenberg, *passim*].

(d) The French North-African Empire was tacitly ceded to France by Bismarck [Platzhoff, p. 16] ; Tunis was granted at the Congress of Berlin, 1878, as Morocco might have been [Platzhoff, p. 16 ; Révai, p. 45].

(e) Bismarck's great mistake was to underrate the great recuperative powers of France, and to forget that a republic might be strong [Platzhoff, p. 16].

Con : (1) Platzhoff omits to mention the attempt of Bismarck to bring on another Franco-German war in 1875 ; a machination defeated by English threats of intervention. (But *cf.* Platzhoff, p. 15, on the ' preventive war ' contemplated after 1870 by Bismarck.)

Similarly [Italian Green Book] Germany coerced Austria to offer Italy part of the Trentino, the promise to be carried into execution after the conclusion of the war.

Tunis was granted to France in 1880, because Italy had a claim, and, on the strength of this grievance, Bismarck astutely secured the adhesion of Italy to the Triple Alliance. Italy had in return to renounce irredentism, *i.e.*, the claim to the Italian countries still annexed to Austria. Germany therefore gained full value on the exchange [Seignobos, p. 786].

Pro : (2) The Franco-Russian Alliance (*cf.* ENVELOPMENT).

(a) After 1879 Russia steadily gravitated towards France [Platzhoff, p. 19] : this alliance acted as a drag, and ensured European peace [*ibid.*, p. 20]. This alliance was directed against England, not Germany [Révai, p. 46].

Con : The terms of the Alliance are unknown. At any rate, it was cemented after the fall of Bismarck, who always insisted on the necessity of a good Russo-German understanding.

Pro : (b) Germany might have escaped the Triple Entente by being conciliatory to England. She refused [Platzhoff, p. 22].

Con : For evidence *v.* British Blue Book.

Pro : (c) The outbreak of war in 1905 was avoided by Germany's peacefulness [Platzhoff, p. 22].

Con : Was it not rather that Germany dared not face the British Fleet, and Russia was too exhausted after the Japanese War, so that the Entente gave way ?

Pro : (d) The Franco-German agreement as to Africa was regarded by both sides as unsatisfactory [Platzhoff, p. 24 ; *also* Tannenberg ; Spahn, p. 21 ; French Yellow Book, quoting German authorities verbatim, No. 1].

Con : If so, it was a fair compromise : it gave the German colonies in Africa very strong strategic positions [*J'accuse*, p. 74 ; Beyens, p. 231 ; Bernhardi, p. 284]. But it did not satisfy the dictatorial lusts of Germany.

Pro : (e) When Kitchener turned Marchand aside at Fashoda in 1898, France had to elect between her ambitions in Alsace and Egypt ; and French weakness was England's gain [Révai, pp. 43, 163 ; Spahn, p. 19].

Con : It was after a ten years' campaign that Kitchener reached Fashoda ; and French public opinion recognised the justice of our position at Fashoda as against a chance military expedition.

Pro : (3) (a) France is always discontented, and a possible firebrand [Spahn, p. 19] ; is merely aggressive, only desiring conquest [Ándrássy, p. 50] ; is the eternal enemy of Germany [Tannenberg, p. 220].

Con : Jaurès advocated a Franco-German alliance [*J'accuse*, p. 86].

The entente with England rendered any *revanche* impossible [Bertourieux, p. 4].

Pro : (b) French outposts were the first to cross the frontier in the present war [*Who are the Huns?* p. 20 ; Svén Hedin, p. 44].

Con : There were no troops directly on the French frontier [Roggen, p. 89] ; whereas Germany sent hers directly on to the frontier. The French troops were withdrawn ten kilometres within the frontier [British Blue Book, No. 105 ; French Yellow Book, No. 106]. On the contrary, the German troops did cross at one unnamed point [German Chancellor's speech, Aug. 4, 1914] ; in fact, at no less than 19, all of which are fully specified, dated, and named and proved [*Les violations des lois de la guerre par l'Allemagne*, p. 31]. Whereas the allegations that French aviators flew over German territory and dropped bombs are baseless.

In the *Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift*, April, 1915, Dr. Schwalbe says : ' The Nuremberg magistracy writes on the 3rd April of this year : " To the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Bavarian Army Corps. Nothing is known of the fact that either before or after the outbreak of war the railway-line between Nürnberg and Kissingen, and Nürnberg and Anspach, was bombed by enemy aviators. All such reports are proven false." I consider my proper duty to notify this fact, which removes from the French the load of a serious accusation ' [Maks, pp. 29 and 30].

Pro : (c) There must be a reconciliation of France and Germany, for the dream of crushing France is

Utopian ; but France must forgo every notion of a *revanche* [Platzhoff, p. 28 ; Spahn, p. 20]. This alliance should be directed against England [Révai, p. 135 ; Spahn, p. 22]. France must be crushed so that she never dare aspire to counter Germany [Tannenberg, p. 304].

Pro : (4) President Poincaré is too dictatorial in France [Bertourieux, p. 101].

He is a danger at the Elysée [Belgian report, Feb. 21, 1913 ; *ibid.*, pp. 57, 76].

Pro : (5) Delcassé's retirement in Oct., 1915, was a good thing for France [Bertourieux, p. 103]. He was too Jingo and Chauvinistic [Belgian report, March, 1911 ; *apud* Bertourieux, p. 56].

In 1906 his retirement, enforced by Germany, staved off an aggressive policy [Bertourieux, p. 41].

Pro : (6) France is acting as England's dupe, and will, at the most, get nothing but Alsace-Lorraine out of the war [*ibid.*, p. 126].

She should make peace and an alliance with Germany, admit the guiltiness of Serbia, be quit of English aggression [*ibid.*, p. 132].

Pro : (7) France, by subscribing the Pact of London, fettered her economic interests to those of England and rendered neutral pacific intervention more difficult [*ibid.*, pp. 105, 107 ; Francken, p. 19].

ALSACE-LORRAINE

By the Treaty of Frankfort, 1871, the territory bordered on the north from Longwy, proceeding east, and then south-east by Saarlouis, Forbach, Sarguemines, Wissembourg to the Rhine, thence following the Rhine upwards to Bâle and meeting the frontier by Huningue and Belfort, was surrendered to Germany. This region had been French since 1686.

After the annexation in 1871, the *Reichsländer* (as the provinces were called) were under the rule of the Kaiser and Bundesrat (Federal Council), who jointly had the

sole right of initiating legislation ; the country up to Jan. 1, 1874, was under this dictatorship.

In 1873 the general constitution of the Empire came into force : by the regulation of Oct. 29, 1874, the *Landesausschuss* (Provincial Assembly) was created, and its composition determined by the Imperial Statute of July 4, 1879, at 58 members, 34 co-opted by the *Bezirkstage* (district diets) from amongst themselves, four from the Municipal Councils of the four great cities, and 20 by electors, selected by remaining municipalities, each of whom had one vote, to serve for three years. The *Landesausschuss* can, within the limit of its provincial legislative power, initiate new laws and receive petitions. When first instituted in 1874 the *Landesausschuss* was only a deliberative body. Even now, in cases when its consent is required, the Reichstag may act on its behalf : and the use of the French language is prohibited. The sessions are public.

The executive authority in German Alsace-Lorraine is vested in the Emperor ; and by the law of May 2, 1877, laws affecting the Reichsländer (Landesgesetze) can only be promulgated by the Emperor with the concurrence of the Bundesrat, subject to this, that the *Landesausschuss* can legislate in matters not reserved to the Federal States.

The Emperor is represented by the Imperial Governor (Statthalter). Up to 1879 the affairs of Alsace-Lorraine were managed by a section of the Imperial Chancery : by the Law of July 4, 1874, the seat of government was transferred to Alsace-Lorraine, and the Emperor was empowered to appoint a vicegerent with a ministry, resident at Strassburg. This ministry controls all branches of justice, education, and administration.

Alsace-Lorraine has no plenipotentiary representatives in the Bundesrat ; it sends two deputies, selected by Prussia, who, combined, have only one vote. It sends 15 members to the Reichstag.

After the annexation 160,000 elected for French nationality ; 50,000 emigrated to France ; these 210,000 amounted to about ten per cent. of the probable popula-

tion of the provinces when annexed ; the remainder tried to remain, claiming aliens' privileges, especially exemption from military service. This was not allowed.

In 1873 the municipal councils of Strassburg, Metz, and Colmar had to be suspended for insubordination. Out of the 22 *arrondissement* elections of 1873, only 14 were validly elected, and out of the three District Diet elections in 1873, only one (the three districts are Lower Alsace, Upper Alsace, and Lorraine) ; the remainder would not take the oath of fealty.

At the first elections to the Reichstag (1874) ten ultramontanes and five dissidents were chosen, who at once protested against the annexation.

In 1876 the Government secured the five Lower Alsatian seats. Yet even in 1879 'the terrorism of the Francophils was greater than ever.'

In 1881 and 1884 the autonomists were beaten at the polls.

In 1884 the use of the French language was prohibited (by an imperial law). Papers were suppressed, French insurance companies suspended, and when Manteuffel (the first Statthalter) died in 1885 'the work of the amalgamation of Alsace-Lorraine with Germany had retrogressed.'

In 1887 all the fifteen seats were recaptured by protesters ; and in 1887 Hohenlohe (the new Statthalter) instituted a severe *régime* of passports on the frontier to inhibit French agitators—who still seem to have found willing material to work upon.

In 1889 the use of any language except German was prohibited in the Courts of Law. In 1890 three loyalist deputies were elected and the passport *régime* was abandoned.

In 1890 the German official estimate of the population according to origin was 210,000 French and 1,393,000 German.

In 1893 there were elected for the Reichstag seven Clericals, one Liberal autonomist, two Social Democrats, one Conservative *Altdeutscher* and four pro-German Alsace-Lorrainers.

In 1896 more autonomy was granted to the municipalities, and in 1898 a new Press Law was introduced.

In 1900 the German civil code was made applicable to Alsace-Lorraine, and the dictatorship clause in the Constitution abrogated [*Kaiserreden*, p. 109].

The deputies elected in 1898 consisted of ten Alsace-Lorrainers, one adherent of the *Reichspartei*, one member of the *Freisinnige Partei*, one Social Democrat, and two belonging to other groups.

In 1911 a measure of autonomy was introduced, giving the *Reichsländer* some provincial liberty, such as is enjoyed by the Federal States of the Empire.

[These details are drawn from the German Encyclopædias, not from French sources. It will be seen how much liberty there is, and how far the French of these provinces have been conciliated and amalgamated, when there is such recurrent need of repressive measures (*v.* SLESWIG for other general laws as to the use of any language except German). But from the French Encyclopædia it appears that the use of French in all public administration was forbidden in 1884, without regard to the ordinary language of the commune.]

THE PAMPHLETEERS' OPINIONS

There is no affection for France in Alsace-Lorraine, save in a few political hotheads [*Bertourieux*, p. 13].

FRANCS-TIREURS

Pro : The Germans, in defending their conduct in Belgium, complain of the conduct of the civilian population, who fought in an unorganized way against the German soldiers, without being properly organized as an army.

Con : The Belgians fought, after towns had been

effectively occupied, and committed atrocities against the German troops, which necessitated reprisals [Dieren, p. 22; Geerke, p. 218]. This last-named popular history does not controvert the story of the *francs-tireurs* at Dinant, but only remarks that the vengeance was terrific [Kraaijenhoff, p. 37]. In France there were fewer of them [Hildebrand, pp. 2 and 70]. Such reprisals were fully justified [Külpe, p. 19]. (For details *v.* ATROCITIES). As a sample, in *Who are the Huns?* [p. 118] it is stated that the unsuspecting German soldiers were fired at by civilians at Louvain. The general assumption is that no one has the right to take up arms except a professional soldier.

Con : Mgr. Heylen states that German authority can only cite by name three *francs-tireurs* in all of the provinces of Namur and Luxemburg; and that the evidence against these three (who were ecclesiastics) is very dubious [*Réponse Belge*, p. 62].

Con : 'And how in any case could the Germans find fault with the civil population of Belgium for some act of self-defence, when they boast the institution of the Landsturm? Coming into existence in April, 1813, the German Landsturm was a levy in mass of the countrymen; without uniform, they armed themselves as best they could with scythes or pitchforks when guns were wanting, ready to oppose *invaders* with all the means at their disposal. It was an army for *the desperate defence of its own country*' [Lugaro, p. 53].

Con : [Struycken on the German White Book, pp. 7 . . .].

I.—Struycken, a Dutch neutral, analyzes the German official folio, *Die Völkerrechtswidrige Führung des belgischen Volkskrieges*. He says: 'The book is entirely different in character from the reports of the Belgian, French, and English commissions. The latter purport to be indictments of the German Army, and with that in view present in an almost monotonous and unbroken series the declarations of victims and witnesses of German outrages. [Morgan says as to his method (*German Atrocities*, p. 3): 'The reader may remember

that in May [1915] a report as to the crucifixion of two Canadian soldiers obtained wide currency in this country : we failed to discover anyone who had been an actual eye-witness . . . it was felt that such mere hearsay evidence, however strong, was not admissible.’] The German Book, on the other hand, is a defence, not designed primarily to deny the outrages—to some extent they are described therein in all their details—but to justify them in the very words of those actually responsible.

‘In the eyes of the German Government a savage popular war against the German Army broke out in Belgium immediately after the invasion. . . . Civilians of every station in life . . . were taken with weapons in their hands. From houses and gardens, from roofs and cellars . . . civilians fired upon the German troops. The soldiers were exposed to a most despicable ill-treatment . . . all this following on an apparently friendly reception on the part of the inhabitants.

‘In face of this the German Army was not only justified, but obliged to take the severest measures ; the guilty had to be treated . . . as criminals and murderers ; the innocent had to suffer with the guilty : hostages were taken in great numbers, to be killed, if necessary . . . houses had to be burnt down.’

In the German *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege* (which departs from the Hague Convention, *v. p. 97*) we read : ‘The organization of irregulars in military bands and their subjection to a responsible leader are not by themselves sufficient to enable one to grant them the status of belligerents : even more important than these is the necessity of being able to recognise them as such, and of their carrying their arms openly.’ ‘The *unorganized** people’s war was also impermissible in those places which had not been occupied by German troops, and particularly in Dinant and the neighbourhood, as the Belgian Government had sufficient time for an organization of the people’s war as required by International Law.’

* Italics are the editor’s.

Struycken continues : ' One has some reason to be astonished at such scornful remarks addressed to the Belgian Government by a Government which was a co-guarantor of Belgian neutrality, and had repeatedly in recent times, before the invasion, given the assurance that this would be respected ' [v. p. 34]. ' In any case, it reveals a misunderstanding as regards the aims of the Hague Convention. In the first place it by no means follows from Article 2 of the convention that the population taking up arms without fulfilling the conditions contained therein is acting in conflict with the law of nations, and at the Conference at Brussels and at the first Peace Conference it was precisely the Belgian delegates who took the lead in obviating the possibility that any such inference should be drawn from the Convention. Armed resistance not in accordance with the Hague Convention does not enjoy the protection of the law of the nations ; those who take part in it have not the *right* to be regarded as soldiers, but it does not by any means follow that their actions are to be regarded as in conflict with the law.

' In the second place it is not a question whether the Belgian *Government* was in a position to organize the civilian population for warlike purpose—this Government did not desire it. No, the Convention is designed to protect the *population* in places where they have, on their own initiative, taken up arms to repel the enemy ; and therefore the question that must be put is whether the *population* had had sufficient time to give themselves a military organization. If one is to assume that, in the given circumstances, the population in the Belgian frontier villages and Dinant had, in fact, sufficient time for this, one can without hesitation strike out the provisions of Article 2 of the Convention, on the ground that they are never applicable.

' However that may be, whether because they had never been taught anything else, or because the explanation of the Convention now given by the German Government was then before them, the German officers had no hesitation in applying the same methods both to

occupied and unoccupied territories whenever they imagined themselves to be confronted by forcible resistance on the part of the civilian inhabitants. What that meant may be illustrated by the events at Dinant, as given in the German White Book.

'On the 23rd August Dinant was stormed by the German troops. They were under the impression that the part of the town lying on the right-hand side of the Meuse had already been evacuated by the Belgian troops. As they entered they were in fact fired upon from all sides, and, as they thought, out of the houses. In the conviction that the civilian inhabitants were responsible for this, house after house was stormed and cleared of inhabitants. As it appeared impossible to obtain control of the town in this way it was then destroyed by artillery.

'What had now to be the fate of the civilian inhabitants who—in the opinion of the German troops—had offered forcible resistance? On the 23rd August, even according to the judgment of the German Government, the town did not form part of the occupied territory. The population, so the German troops were convinced, had *organized* armed resistance, and had taken up arms on their own initiative to resist the invading troops. That the latter, in this belief, stormed the houses in order to overcome the resistance, is clear. Had they met with armed resistance in the course of this, and repelled it by force, the victims thereof would have had nothing to complain of. But—by hundreds and hundreds, men, women, and children were taken prisoners in the houses, on suspicion of having fired. What was their fate to be? If they fell under the protection of Article 2 of the Convention they should have been treated as combatants, as soldiers, *i.e.*, they should have been made prisoners of war and, in accordance with Article 4 of the Convention, have been treated with humanity. What happened to them? *They were all "niedergemacht" (slaughtered)*. How? One deposition out of many, that of "Stabsarzt" (staff-surgeon) Dr. Petrenz, shows how. He tells us of his experiences on the morning of

the 24th August, the day after the assault: "On the bank of the Meuse between the river and a garden wall directly to the left of the pontoon bridge lay a heap of civilians who had been shot; I do not know how many; I estimate about 30 to 40. I do not know who had shot them. I have heard that the Grenadier Regiment No. 101 carried out an execution there. *Among the people who were shot were some women, but by far the greater number were young lads. Under the heap I discovered a girl of about five years of age, alive and without any injuries.* I took her out and brought her down to the house where the women were. She took chocolate, was quite happy, and was clearly unaware of the seriousness of the situation. I then searched the heap of bodies to see whether any other children were underneath. But we only found *one girl of about ten years of age who had a wound in the lower leg.* I had her wound dressed and brought her at once to the women." "

Struycken goes on to show that when the German White Books speak and complain of the *organized* warfare, 'systematic' firing of the *francs-tireurs* [*Schwartzbuch, passim*], invariably the German losses are stated by the Germans, who were subjected to murderous fire, to have been negligible [*ibid.*, pp. 31...], five men of a company being wounded on such an occasion.

The nature of the evidence, after a rigid legalistic discussion, is thus summed up by Morgan [*German Atrocities*, p. 20]: 'I think it is not too much to say that it bears the stamp of the forger's hand upon it, the same hand that forged the Ems telegram, and garbled the documents captured in Brussels [*v. p. 30*]. It was conceived in iniquity and brought forth in falsehood. It confesses, but it does not avoid.'

In this part of the argument I omit all the collective judicial matter contained in the British and Belgian Reports on the Atrocities. The truth has never been controverted: the German pamphleteers simply deny (*v. ATROCITIES*).

Thus, too [Beer, p. 184]: 'There have been shot dead, as *francs-tireurs*, little boys, young girls, and tottering old men.'

(For further analysis of this German White Book *v. Réponse Belge*.)

II.—The author of *J'accuse* [p. 168] was present at a cinema at Berlin, at which there was a presentation of the heroic Andreas Hofer, the volunteer who fought for the freedom of the Tyrol, and of his execution; immediately followed by another picture of the Belgian *francs-tireurs* being shot in masses by the Germans. Both were intended to incite patriotism. In the presentation of Andreas Hofer 'the French were slain by the enemy ambushed behind houses, trees, and rocks.' Compare the German accusations of the Belgians.

III.—On Aug. 4, 1914, after the declaration of war, M. Berryer, Minister of the Interior, issued a circular to the 2,700 Belgian communes expressly forbidding any irregular warfare in districts 'occupied' or 'unoccupied' and advising peaceable behaviour towards the Germans [*Belgian Atrocities Report*, p. 106]. For further confirmation, consult *German War Proclamations*.

IV.—Mgr. Heylen, Bishop of Namur [*Belgian Atrocities*, French edition, p. 186] affirms solemnly: 'We affirm, together with all the inhabitants of our villages, without exception, with the entire Belgian people, that the story of the Belgian *francs-tireurs* is a legend, an invention, and a calumny.' In this solemn document detailed proof is afforded, as well as lists of murdered priests.

V.—Whatever the provocation may have been in some few villages, a few chance shots, very probably fired by soldiers in disguise, there is no justification for burning down the entire village, and shooting a large number of men, whether guilty or not [*J'accuse*, p. 169].

'The German conduct of the war is severe, but it is not cruel' [Svén Hedin, p. 56].

CAPTAIN FRYATT

' The Foreign Office forwards for publication the following letter addressed by Viscount Grey to the United States Embassy :

' The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the United States Chargé d'Affaires and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Page's Notes of the 29th and 31st ultimo relative to the shooting of Captain Charles Fryatt, Master of the s.s. *Brussels*, on the charge of having attempted, on the 28th March, 1915, to ram a German submarine by which his vessel was attacked.

' Viscount Grey will be grateful if Mr. Laughlin will request the United States Ambassador at Berlin to be good enough to inform the German Government that his Majesty's Government desire to enter the most formal protest against this proceeding, which they can only describe as the judicial murder of a British subject, held prisoner of war by the German Government, under conditions in direct violation of the law of nations and the usages of war.

' From the information already in the possession of his Majesty's Government there can be no doubt that the trial of Captain Fryatt was conducted under circumstances calculated to cast the gravest obloquy on the authorities concerned. Independently of the fact that no time appears to have been afforded for any other effective steps to be taken on behalf of the accused man by the United States Embassy, the German Government themselves appointed an officer to conduct the defence, instead of allowing Mr. Gerard to choose counsel whom he might consider suitable for that purpose; and the unseemly haste with which the trial was instituted and the sentence carried into effect is a sufficient proof that the German authorities were fully conscious of the unwarrantable nature of their action, and anxious to

forestall the legitimate outburst of indignation which must necessarily be evoked in this country. The reason ascribed by the German Government for this precipitancy—namely, that it was impossible to detain longer those witnesses whose evidence was of the greatest importance—the officers and crew of the submarine—cannot but be regarded as unparalleled in circumstances such as those with which the tribunal had to deal.

‘Further, the fact that the grave intelligence of Captain Fryatt’s execution was merely communicated verbally to Mr. Gerard by the German Foreign Office on the 28th July can only be interpreted as showing the reluctance of the German Government to bring their proceedings to his Excellency’s knowledge in official form.

‘In communicating the foregoing to the German Government, Viscount Grey will be much obliged if Mr. Gerard will request the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to furnish him, for the information of his Majesty’s Government, with a copy of the finding of the Court-martial, as well as with a statement of the manner in which the Court was constituted, of the persons of whom it was composed, of the line adopted by the defence, and of the witnesses who were called upon to give evidence, both for the defence and the prosecution.

‘Foreign Office, August 7, 1916’ [*Times*, Aug. 10, 1916].

GERMANY

I.—*Absorption*. The ready absorption of the Germans into other nationalities.

Pro : Before 1913 Germans by six years’ residence abroad lost their nationality, even though they acquired no other, and became ‘sans patrie.’

Con : By the Law of July 22, 1913, no German lost his nationality, either by residence abroad, nor if naturalized abroad, provided he declared to a German

Consul his intention to remain a German, notwithstanding any new oath of allegiance.

Pro : Germans, as a nationality, are easily absorbed into any other. Six millions have emigrated to the United States from 1832 to 1910, and are lost to Germany [Tannenberg, p. 253]. The House of Holstein-Gottorp (the ruling dynasty in Russia) has been completely slavized [*ibid.*, p. 167; Labberton, III., p. 26].

Pro : The Germans in Austria will be completely converted into Czechs, Poles, Magyars, etc., etc., unless forcibly prevented [*ibid.*, pp. 71, 36, 48]. So, too, in Poland [Kotzde, p. 15]; and Greece [*Echo*, Sept. 14, 1916].

Pro : Germans are equally easily assimilated in both Portuguese and Spanish America [Sievers, pp. 89, 94; Vallentin, pp. 6, 8, 63; *also v. SOUTH AMERICA*].

Con : *v. PAN-GERMANISM* as to strength of the race. II.—*Germany aggressed.*

Pro : Germany has been deliberately aggressed by all the nations [Potthoff, p. 23].

Con : *v. WHO WILLED THE WAR ?*

Pro : Germany as such is the Parsifal amongst the nations [Spahn, p. 8] and the hapless victim [J. Müller, p. 47]. Germany is peaceful : if she increased her army after the Balkan wars it was merely in self-defence. When France followed suit it showed hostile intention [Platzhoff, p. 22].

Pro : Germany deserves sympathy, because she has so many foes [Wernle, p. 22]. (Wernle is a Swiss, and says Belgium was to blame, as she was anti-German. Therefore the quality of her neutrality was dubious, and Germany can be justified.)

It was Germany's unrequited love, friendship for England, and kindness towards France that led her into the trap [Chamberlain, p. 1].

Pro : Germany is *peaceful* ; she is not a conqueror-state like Russia, and has kept the peace for forty-four years. Had she been aggressive she might have found earlier opportunities [Révai, p. 133].

Con : German policy has been drifting aimlessly since 1870, and requires strong direction [Spahn, p. 10].

Pro : 'A people that enters into a war not thrust upon it is guilty of an offence to human civilization.' But Germany is too honourable [Verworn, p. 27].

Con : For disproof *v.* ANTICIPATIONS.

Germany must secure for herself Livonia, the Baltic provinces, Galicia, Northern France, Belgium. Her boundaries must be the Pripus, the Dnepr, the North Sea, and the Ægean, etc. [Heinemann, p. 77].

Pro : Germany *is tolerant*: she favours national languages and welcomes foreigners [Chotzky, pp. 41-43].

Con : (*v.* ALSACE, SLESWIG, and POLAND). Only in England would Bernard Shaw and others have been allowed to criticize the war-policy as they did [Kiersch, p. 19].

In Germany there is no religious, political, or other general liberty, and no freedom of the Press [Manen, p. 66].

III.—*Germany is gentle* to all of her prisoners.

Pro : [*Who are the Huns?* pp. 110 and 136; Kotzde, p. 6].

Con : For disproof *v.* PRISONERS OF WAR and ATROCITIES.

Pro : In Vienna, Czech immigration is welcomed, and these foreigners prosper. In the good old days a strong people used to attack, exterminate, and expropriate a feeble people. Germany should recollect that charity begins at home [Tannenberg, p. 99; *v. also* AUSTRIA].

IV.—*Germany encourages liberty.*

Pro : [Chotzky, p. 18].

Con : *v.* MILITARISM and STATE.

V.—*Germany has been too modest.*

Pro : In 1866 she should have taken a slice of Moravia and Bohemia. In 1870 she was surprised by the ease of victory and merely imposed the ridiculous indemnity of £200,000,000. She ought to recolonize all new territory, especially as her population is too dense [Tannenberg, pp. 298, 72, 101].

Con : In the Official Gazette now published at Lodz Germans are stated to claim dominion from the Congo to the Atlantic, from the Indian Ocean to the Great

Central Lakes. The world is to be saved by the German spirit [*J'accuse*, p. 283; cf. INTENTIONS and ANTICIPATIONS; and Spahn, p. 36]. The German language is to be universal [Chotzky, p. 37; Tannenberg, *passim*].

VI.—**Con** : *The German Empire is a conglomerate*, a complex of old feudal states, in which there has been no clean democratic sweep. There is no real unity [Brugmans, p. 32]. Only as late as 1900 was Civil Law standardized all over the German Empire; but Criminal Law was codified at once in 1871 [Manen, p. 4].

VII.—*England was cold* to the formation of German unity.

Pro : [Spahn, p. 37.]

Con : This is not true. Kingsley, Carlyle—not to mention others—welcomed the reunion of Germany, but may have resented the North German Federation being turned into an Empire and spoliating France.

VIII.—*Germany has never stolen* private property in this war.

Pro : [*Who are the Huns?* p. 178; Svén Hedin, p. 195]. But the English and French have looted very largely in France [*ibid.*].

Con : *v.* ATROCITIES for an account of the deprivations of the Germans in Belgium and France.

IX.—**Con** : '*Modern Germany largely combines all the vices of youth: she is too impetuous, with the old bad customs of ancient Prussia superadded.*' The Prussian merchant is only the pendant to the Prussian coronet [Brugmans, p. 34].

X.—*Germany is unpopular.*

Pro : Because the truth is never loved; and the world envies the best [Chotzky, p. 49]. The German is regarded as a bully, or a toady, and is unfree [Brander, p. 74].

Con : It is not true that Germany and Germans are unpopular [Dieren, p. 45].

XI.—*Germany has a moral and a religion* for the world (*v.* PAN-GERMANISM).

Pro : Germany is justified, because her State as an individual has genius, and cannot be judged by common rules; and Germany is the most ethical and

dutiful nation in the world ; her militarism is the token of her spirit of devotion (*v. also* MILITARISM and STATE) ; [Labberton, I., p. 46]. She will repay Belgium by rejuvenating and resuscitating her [*ibid.*, p. 81]. She is free of sentimentality [Labberton, I., p. 56]. Graadt van der Roggen [p. 133] endorses this view.

Christianity is unsuitable to the Germans [Houston-Chamberlain, quoted by Poll, p. 83].

Con : German fidelity is mere blind clanship ; and their patriotism bigotry [*Nog wat losse*, p. 8].

'The Germans who maintain a special god of their own, attach to him a special belief to correspond' [Beer, p. 138].

'There are two great principles in conflict as well : the Entente, who wish to conserve and aim at higher ideals ; the German, innocent of honour or right, and letting the sword arbitrate. They filled the world with bitterness and distrust, and then realized there was not much reliance placed on their good-will' [Kiersch, p. 22].

'The *Deutsche Treue* [German loyalty] which is so much extolled, is made up of servile obedience ; fidelity of vassals, obedience to the master, which does not exclude betrayal, when there is the possibility of passing to the service of a stronger master. Discipline, order, the organization itself from which the Germans drew so much profit, are founded not so much on the consciousness of a collective end, as on the mystic and instinctive respect for authority, which paralyzes all criticism, but quiets the individual, removing from him the weight of every responsibility.

'It is so easy to obey ! With all this, although the habit of obedience is in the blood, although it is strengthened in the family, in the school, and in the life, there are acts of obedience which are not carried out unless the moral stamp of him who obeys is adapted to the order he receives. There are armies—not German—which would not obey certain revolting orders. There are soldiers—not German—who would let themselves be shot rather than kill the wounded, eviscerate women, and mutilate children. There are officers—not German—

who would feel themselves dishonoured by transmitting certain orders. It is easy for the theorists seated at a desk to admit terrorism as a military necessity, but terrorism cannot be put in practice if the troops are not adapted for the inhuman business' [Lugaro, pp. 90-92].

German loyalty is mere obstinacy produced by the idolatry of organization, slackening the eagle's flight of intellect to a snail's pace [Stilgebauer, quoted by Maks, p. 15].

Pro : Professor Wilhelm Ostwald is a distinguished German scientist, maintaining much the same ground, and upbraided by Mandere and Kernthamp (Mandere, *sub tit.* Ostwald).

Con : Ostwald in 1910 published in the *Revue de Paris* : ' Je suis cosmopolite et je demande à la nation française le plus grand geste du nouveau siècle, le libre désarmement ' [Kiersch, p. 21].

' *New York, Aug. 10th, 1916.*

' The State Department has published a series of notes which disclose the utter disregard of interned German officers for their parole.

' After a number of officers and men belonging to two interned German liners had broken their leave the State Department addressed a complaint to the German Government, pointing out that several of them had returned to Germany. In reply, the German Government, with characteristic casuistry, drew a distinction between the 'pledge' given by the escaped officers and their 'word of honour.' The officers, the Berlin Foreign Office stated, did not understand that they were giving their word of honour.

' No reply has been returned to a further communication from the State Department, dwelling on the seriousness of the breach of faith and announcing that no further leave could in consequence be granted to interned officers and men' [*Times*].

GERMANY—COMMERCE

Germany, when she became an Empire, had few natural resources, and therefore had to impose a high tariff for revenue ; thus she isolated herself from the

world-market, and was ill-disposed to regard commerce internationally : rather to identify it with the State and the nation [Brugmans, p. 32].

In the industrial conflict between England and Germany, English Free Trade fostered German industrialism [Landauer, p. 34].

Germany, as an Empire, began on Free Trade, with money pouring in from the French indemnity. Money, thereby, became too cheap ; and Germany in 1880 resorted to Protection, on the instigation of the southern and agrarian interests.

Her banks participate in the commercial enterprises, and rise and fall with them.

German trusts, after the American, are the highest in the world, and all her industries are controlled by gigantic unitary, semi-State syndicates : the army industrialized [Manen, pp. 15-19].

Since 1894 Germany has been involved in constant tariff wars.

The English Free Trade policy spelt greater civilization and fostered German industry, three-quarters of German goods proceeding into Europe. Belgium was a dangerous competitor to her. Half of Germany's exports went to Russia [*ibid.*, pp. 19-30].

GERMANY—EXPANSION

Pro : Germans have no homesteads, merely lodgings. They are not a commercial people, but home-loving ; have not a European mission, but a German mission ; there will be 150 millions of Germans in Central Europe soon, and they must have land for agriculture.

They should expand eastward and clear the ground of the Slavs [Kotzde, pp. 1-9].

They will thus release the Poles from the Russian yoke [*ibid.*, p. 11].

This struggle for space is quite apart from the internal

quarrel of the classes, as argued by the Socialists ; and Germany must expand.

The national wars must be bitter, and end with the expropriation of the conquered inhabitants and massacre of the prisoners ; but there is no German territory left to redeem [Pothoff, pp. 1-24 ; Vietinghoff, *passim*].

There are 87 millions of Germans in Europe, scattered ; these must be redistributed and reallocated so as to form an organic racial unity.

Amongst these Germans are included the Germans of the Baltic provinces, the Dutch, the Flemings, the inhabitants of Northern France, still to be redeemed [Tannenberg, chap. i.].

Con : Germany has no need to expand. The table of emigration is declining ; from 1881 to 1890 the annual average was 134,000 ; from 1891 to 1910, 52,800 ; and in 1912, 18,500. Immigration is on the increase [*J'accuse*, p. 39].

This is confirmed by Beyens [p. 198], who also states that labour is so much in demand that every year 600,000 to 700,000 agriculturists from Poland have to be imported to reap the Prussian harvests.

GERMANY AND A 'PLACE IN THE SUN'

Pro : Germany needs a 'place in the sun.'

Con : The author of *J'accuse* quotes from Bernhardt, showing how prodigious was the increase of German commerce ; her coal exports began to surpass those of England, and in Prussia alone the national wealth augmented annually by £200,000,000. 'There is no connection between the extent of a country, and its colonies and its prosperity' [Bernhardt, p. 317 ; *J'accuse*, p. 35].

Germans lived everywhere abroad, spreading German trade and manners ; she had her colonies everywhere (*v. PRESS, GERMAN*).

German trade was world-wide, her colonies all-sufficient. She has virtually occupied Spanish and Portuguese colonies without incurring the expenses of maintenance (*v. also* SOUTH AMERICA); [Brugmans, p. 27].

Pro : England has prevented Germany gaining colonies [Révai, p. 28]. Germany has had no share in colonial expansion [Verrijn-Stuart, p. 26]; (*v. U.S.A., Dernburg*).

Con : On the contrary, we looked on, after English explorers discovered and mapped Central Africa, whilst Germany annexed large parts.

The independence of Samoa was guaranteed in 1889 at the Congress of Berlin, by the United States, Germany, and Great Britain. But free government led to nothing but civil war, and in 1898 Germany upheld one claimant to the throne against the other pretender, who was supported by Great Britain and the United States. In 1900 England withdrew from Samoa, was compensated elsewhere, and the islands were partitioned between the three Powers.

Tonga became a protectorate of Great Britain, after Germany established a coaling-station in the Archipelago in 1899, and the spheres of interest were partitioned.

Germany needs no colonies [Dieren, p. 90].

In 1883 the Colonial Company for German S.W. Africa was granted a charter. Charters were issued subsequently for German New Guinea, the Marshall Isles, the Carolines (purchased from Spain), and in 1895 for Kiao-chow. Yet Germany has no national settled colony; the gist of the demand is the eternal apprehension that, in the event of war, Germany might be cut off from all supplies of cotton and copper. 'Whereas nothing ought to be imported from foreign countries; the countries whence the raw materials come ought to be appropriated' [Manen, pp. 31 and 32].

There never can be any real German colonies, as German colonists are rapidly absorbed (*cf.* SOUTH AMERICA), *e.g.*, the Templars' Colonies in Palestine fifty years ago [Wiedenfeld, p. 6].

German prosperity is independent of her colonies, in which there are only 27,000 whites ; and her trade with them is nugatory : 5 per cent. of her total trade [*J'accuse*, p. 40].

THE GERMAN FLEET

Pro : The German fleet was first largely increased in 1898, the year of the first Navy Law. It safeguards the Dutch colonies against English aggression [Landauer, p. 38 ; Heutsz, pp. 45 and 56] ; (*v. also* MARINISM).

Con : The German fleet was not merely protective of German commerce, but the object was to attain world-empire [Mandere, pp. 160-162 ; Kiersch, p. 18].

GREECE

Pro : (1) Our political object had been to annex Mitylene, Lemnos, and the Greek islands ['R.', p. 41] ; and our occupation of Greek territory is unjustified, and, as such, considered to justify Germany in Belgium.

Con : (1) It is seldom pointed out by pro-German pamphleteers that Serbia and Greece were bound by treaty to mutual defence, if attacked by a third Power ; that, in view of Bulgaria being supported by the Central Powers, Venezelos (who was then in power) invited us to occupy Salonica, in order that Greece might fulfil her obligation without the risks of instant annihilation ; that the Serbians, when invaded by Bulgaria on the flank, as well as by Austria, were betrayed by Greece ; that the King of Greece assumed an autocracy, dismissed Venezelos, and declined to intervene. [But *cf.* Mandere on Venezelos.]

Belgium, being suborned by the Entente, declined to give Germany a right of passage : Greece formally protested and gave way [Francken, p. 12].

Greece furnishes a precedent to prove that neutrality

need only be passive, and not active ; and does not imply inviolability [Labberton, III., p. 70].

But Greece was independent and not guaranteed nor bound to a perpetual neutrality ; except that by the Treaties of London of 1827 and 1836 Corfu had been fully neutralized, and yet was occupied in January, 1916.

On Jan. 18, 1916, King Constantine to a reporter of the Associated Press protested against the occupation of Corfu, Lemnos, Imbros, Mitylene, Salonica, etc., the destruction of the bridge at Demir Hissar, and so forth [Bertourieux, pp. 85 . . .]

The Kingdom of Greece was constituted by the Great Powers as a constitutional monarchy. King Constantine has illegally dissolved the Greek Parliament, and dismissed the reigning minister, so as to defeat the policy of the alliance with Serbia at the critical moment.

There exists a curious analogy of the time of the Crusades. *Cf. :*

Or non avesti
Tu, Grecia, quelle guerre a te vicine ?
E pur quasi a spettacolo sedesti,
Lento aspettando de' grand' atti 'l fine.
Or se' tu vil serva, è il tuo servaggio,
(Non ti lagnar) giustizia, e non oltraggio.

[Tasso, *Gerusalemme liberata* I, LI.]

Those wars that came
So near to thee, O Greece,—couldst thou sit down
And wait and watch them, as an idle game,
Waiting the end of deeds of great renown ?
So now, poor slave, in thy just slavery,
Complain not, for no wrong is done to thee.

THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS

There were two Peace Conferences at the Hague, in 1899 and 1907. The first sat from May, 1899, for a month. No progress was made in the matter of disarmament, mainly owing to the determined opposition of Germany. The Geneva Convention was extended to

naval warfare, and resolutions passed as to legitimate weapons, expansive and explosive bullets, and so forth: also an international Court of Arbitration was established at the Hague. It was in this year that the Venezuela dispute was voluntarily arbitrated between Great Britain and the States (*v. VENEZUELA*).

The second Conference met on June 15, 1907, and sat until Oct. 16, 1907. Amongst the disparities of opinion one may note:

(a) Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's projects for the limitations of armaments found no favour with France; and Prince Bülow in the Reichstag declined to discuss them.

(b) The American proposal to limit the right of capture at sea was opposed by Great Britain.

(c) The proposed limitation of the right of planting submarine mines was opposed by Germany.

(d) A proposal for obligatory arbitration was opposed by Germany and Roumania, though supported by 31 nations.

(e) The constitution of the great arbitral court could not be satisfactorily determined [*Times Annual Summary*].

Germany subscribed to the resolutions of the two Hague Conferences: yet in 1902 the General Staff published a manual for the guidance of officers [*Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*] (31 of the 'Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften,' herausgegeben vom Grossen Generalstabe Berlin, Mittler). The divergencies of this text from the precepts adopted in 1899 are very marked, and have been illustrated in parallel columns by Struycken [*De Oorlog in België*, pp. 13-30].

At the second Conference in 1907 the other Powers protested against this publication. Baron Marschall von Biberstein (who is the responsible editor of the *Schwarzbuch der Schandthaten unserer Feinde*, for a consideration of which *v. ATROCITIES*) recanted on the German propositions, and proposed the resolution which became Article 3 of Convention IV. of 1907; *viz.*, 'The belligerent who violates the dispositions of this code

shall be held to an indemnity, if it takes place ; and shall be responsible for all the acts committed by the persons forming parts of its armed force.'

Yet there has never been a revised edition of the German manual [*Les violations des lois de la guerre*, I., 1915].

The following are the Articles of the Hague Conferences to which Germany has formally subscribed [*ibid.*, pp. 17, 24, 32, 57, 137, 151, 170, 180, 189, 197]:

(1) 'The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits determined by the annexed act to the Treaties of April 19, 1839, under the guarantee of the Courts of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, shall henceforward form a perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe this same neutrality towards all other States. The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated for by this article. This principle is and remains under the sanction of the collective guarantee of the signatory Powers to the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is a neutral State' [*Treaty of London*, May, 1867].

'Belgium shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. She shall be bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other States.

'The Courts of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia guarantee to H.M. the King of the Belgians the execution of all the preceding articles' [*Treaty of London*, Nov. 15, 1831, Articles 7 and 25].

'The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Belligerents are forbidden to pass troops or convoys of munitions or supplies across the territory of a neutral power' [*Convention V. at the Hague*, Articles 1 and 2].

(2) 'The Contracting Powers acknowledge that hostilities amongst themselves shall not commence, save with a preliminary non-equivocal notice, that shall have either the form of a reasoned declaration of war or that of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war' [Article 1, *Convention III. at the Hague*].

Yet Germany crossed the French frontier at nineteen points prior to a declaration of war (*v. p. 70*).

(3) 'It is forbidden (*c*) to kill or wound an enemy who has laid down his arms, or cannot defend himself, and has submitted at discretion.

'(*d*) To announce that no quarter will be given' (*v. p. 12*); [Article 23, *Hague Convention*].

(4) 'The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to the army but also to the militia and volunteer-corps that satisfy the following conditions :

'(*a*) To have in command a person responsible for his subordinates.

'(*b*) To carry a distinctive sign, recognisable at a distance.

'(*c*) To carry arms openly.

'(*d*) To conform in their operations to the laws and customs of war.

'The population of a non-occupied territory which, at the approach of the enemy, spontaneously takes up arms to fight the invading forces, without having had the time to organize, conformably with the preceding article, shall be considered to be belligerent if it carries arms openly and respects the laws and customs of war' [Articles 1 and 2, *ibid.*].

'Family honour and rights, the lives of individuals, the property and religious convictions and exercise of religious cults shall be respected' [Article 46, *ibid.*].

'Pillage is formally forbidden' [Article 47, *ibid.*]; (*v. FRANCS-TIREURS and ATROCITIES*).

(5) 'Mobile sanitary corps (*i.e.*, those intended to accompany armies in campaign) and the fixed establishments of the medical service shall be respected and protected by belligerents.

'The *personnel* exclusively attached to the removal, transport, treatment of the wounded and the sick, to the administration of the medical corps and establishments, the clergy on the army staff, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances ; if they fall into the enemy's hands they shall not be treated as prisoners of

war' [Articles 6 and 9 of the *Geneva Convention*, renewed July 6, 1906].

Yet hospitals have been fired on, hospital ships sunk, the Red Cross officers attacked, made prisoners, etc., etc. (*v.* ATROCITIES).

(6) 'The Contracting Parties pledge themselves to renounce mutually, as amongst themselves, the use by their troops, on land or sea, of any projectile weighing less than 400 grammes, that shall be either explosive, or charged with detonant or inflammatory matter' [*Declaration of St. Petersburg*, Dec. 11, 1868].

'The Contracting Powers deny themselves the use of bullets that expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope, the envelope of which does not entirely cover the core, or is sliced' [*Hague Convention*, July 29, 1899]; (*v.* ATROCITIES: the Germans use poison-gas, lachrymose shells, expansive and explosive bullets).

(7) 'The Contracting Powers forbid the use of projectiles, the only object of which is to spread asphyxiant or deleterious gases' [*Declarations at the Hague*, July 29, 1899].

'In addition to prohibitions by special conventions, it is expressly forbidden:

'(b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army.

'(c) To use arms, projectiles, or materials likely to cause superfluous injury' [*Hague Regulations*, Article 23].

(8) 'It is forbidden to attack or bombard by any means whatever, towns, villages, habitations, or buildings that are not defended.

'The commander of the assailing troops, before beginning a bombardment, and, excepting in the event of active attacks, must do all within his power to warn the authorities.

'In sieges and bombardments every necessary measure must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings consecrated to purposes of religion, art, science, and charity, historical monuments, hospitals and places

where the wounded and sick are assembled, provided that they are not used at the same time for military purposes.'

(9) 'It is similarly forbidden to a belligerent to force the hostile people to take part in operations of war directed against their country' [Article 23, *Hague Regulations*].

(10) 'The honour and rights of the family, the life of individuals, private property, the religious convictions and exercise of the cults must be respected' [Articles 25, 26, 27, *Hague Regulations*].

Under these ten heads the French Government have summarized the breaches of the German Government of its own pledges, and prove by German confessions, photographs, diaries, and army orders, the unprovoked infraction of these humanitarian rules.

Struycken [*De Oorlog in België*, pp. 16, *seq.*] thus contrasts the Hague Regulations and the *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege* (*v. supra*).

He also cites the French *Les lois de la guerre continentale*, which are in conformity with the Hague Conventions throughout.

INTRODUCTION.

HAGUE REGULATIONS.

In the expectation that a complete code of the law of war will be issued, the High Contracting Parties consider it useful to declare that in the cases not comprehended in the regulations nor edicted by them, the populations and belligerents remain under the protection of the principles of International Law, in so far as these follow from the accepted customs between civilized peoples, the laws of humanity, and the demands of the public conscience.

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In modern war, there prevail not only the traditions of old soldiers, but also the stamp of the tendencies of the present day. But since nineteenth-century thought was very much swayed by humanitarian considerations, which often degenerated into sentimentality and mawkishness, there have been no few attempts to remodel the development of the customs of war, in a sense entirely contradictory of the nature of war and its objective. In the future there will be many such endeavours, especially as these efforts have found moral recognition in some of the clauses of the Geneva

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ART. 2.—The inhabitants of a non-occupied district, who, at the approach of the enemy, of their own motive take up arms to fight the invaders, without having the time to organize, in accordance with Art. 1, are regarded as belligerents, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.

ART. 22.—The belligerents have no indefinite right, in their choice of means, to injure the enemy.

ART. 4.—Prisoners of war must be treated with humanity.

ART. 23c.—It is expressly forbidden to kill or wound an enemy who surrenders or has no means of self-defence.

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Convention, and the Conferences at Brussels and the Hague. . . .

The danger that the officer may in this way arrive at wrong notions of the real nature of war is not excluded. . . . Only by a thorough study of military history will the officer be secured from exaggerated ideas of humanity, from learning that war entails certain cruelties, that the ruthless practice of these is the only genuine humanity.

The organization of irregulars into military bands, with subordination to responsible leaders, is not sufficient to gain them recognition as combatants: what is more important is the recognisability by some exterior mark, and the open carrying of arms. . . . This requirement must be made, when dealing with risings in mass . . . *i.e.*, so-called national or popular war . . . and does not amount to a denial of the natural right of defence of the Motherland; merely to a compulsion, to defend it in an orderly way.

Any device of war without which the object of the war cannot be achieved may be used: but every act of violence and destruction is to be rejected, that does not further that object.

Humanitarian claims, *i.e.*, the sparing of men and property, can only come into play in so far as the nature and object of the war allow.

The following regulations apply to the killing of prisoners: They may be killed (3) as reprisals in case of urgent necessity, whether as reprisals against similar measures, or other excesses of the enemy; (4) in extremities, when no other means

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of safety are at hand, and the existence of the captives is a danger to one's own life.

Reprisals, it may be observed, are combated by many advocates of international law on grounds of humanity. To constitute this a universal principle, is an intelligible mistaking of the object, seriousness, and the laws of war, for the sake of an exaggerated and unjustified humanitarianism. . . .

It is now generally admitted that prisoners can only be killed in the utmost necessity and when the duty of self-preservation and the security of one's own state call for such a measure.

ART. 23.—A belligerent is also forbidden to force enemy subjects to take part in operations of war directed against his own country.

The use of the inhabitants in convoy and other work has also been stigmatized as an unjustified compulsion to take part in 'military operations.'

But no officer should extend this notion too far, for any work to be executed during war-time . . . might be brought into connection with military operations. It is only the military necessity (*Kriegsraison*) that can decide. . . . In the war of 1870-71 the Germans seldom needed compulsion to induce civilians to carry out necessary works. They paid high wages and had a sufficient supply. . . . If labourers are refused (by the local authorities), punishments can be inflicted.

Hence Count Renard, whom the French and pro-French military jurists so censured, acted in accordance with the practice of military law. To enforce labour for the reconstruction of a bridge, he threatened he would shoot some labourers after lesser measures had failed: . . . he did not need to carry his threat into effect.

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ART. 26.—The Commander of the assailing army must, before proceeding to a bombardment, and, excepting in the case of an armed attack, do all he can to warn the authorities.

ART. 30.—A spy, caught in the act, may not be punished without trial and sentence.

ART. 44.—(Not accepted by Germany, Japan, Montenegro, Russia, and Austria.)—A belligerent is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of an occupied district to give information about the army of the other belligerent or his means of defence.

ART. 46.—The honour and lives of families, the life of persons and the rights of private property, religious convictions and public worship, must be respected. . . .

(The French practice forbids the taking of hostages.)

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Previous notice of a bombardment or a storming is unnecessary. Such requirements by some International jurists are quite unmilitary, and must be rejected by soldiers. The besieger has to consider whether there is not an element of surprise and success in not making a declaration. . . . Should there be no time lost, and no object of war compromised, the notice answers to the requirements of humanity.

Seeing how heavy is the penalty of a spy, it is desirable, in so far as the rapid operations of law allow, to have the fact of espionage proved and not left merely to suspicion.

The idea that no inhabitant of an occupied country can be forced to fight against his own country has one exception in general warfare: the compulsion and use of inhabitants as guides in unknown country. However much humane feeling may dislike coercing men to harm their own country, no army fighting in hostile territory can dispense with such services.

A severer measure is to coerce the inhabitants to tell facts about their own army. . . . Most writers in all nations are unanimous in rejecting this right. Yet it cannot always be dispensed with. The necessity (*Kriegsraison*) will often render it obligatory.

Hostages are persons from the hostile army or State, taken to accompany the army, or as prisoners to secure, or as guarantees for the fulfilment of treaties. . . .

The requisition of them has in modern wars become less frequent: and some professors of international law have deduced that the taking

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ART. 49.—If the occupying army beyond and except charges mentioned in Art. 48 (viz. : those of the State which is occupied), raises other contributions in money, these may only be to supply the needs of the army or the administration of the territory.

(*Ausraubungssystem*), represented an advance in the humanizing of warfare.

Since modern international law does not recognise the right to plunder and devastate, and since the maxim that war is directed against States and not against private persons is uncontested, it logically follows that contributions . . . are, according to modern conceptions, invalid.

They are only licit

- (1) In the stead of taxes.
- (2) In the stead of levies in kind.
- (3) As punishments.

(1) is based on the right of raising taxes and using the money, inherent in the occupying power.

(2) In cases when the delivery of specific articles is impossible in one district, and the deficiency must therefore be made up by purchase elsewhere.

(3) As punishments they were frequently used in the war of 1870. If French writers impugn German warfare as excessive in this respect, it must be remarked that the embittered character of that war in its last stage, and the constant participation in it of the ordinary population, made the sternest measures necessary. On the civil population a fine is most efficacious.

of hostages is obsolete in warfare amongst civilized nations.

But the precedents in the Napoleonic wars, in the wars of 1848, 1849, 1859, 1864, and 1866; as well as in the Algerian, Caucasian, and English Colonial wars. . . .

A new application of the right of taking hostages was exercised by the Germans in 1870-71, to secure the safety of the railways, by compelling notables to travel on the engines. . . .

Contributions (*Kriegsschatzungen*) are sums of money raised perforce from communities in occupied territory. They are to be distinguished from compulsory supplies (*Zwangslieferungen*), as they are not intended to satisfy an immediate requirement of the army, and therefore can only very seldom be justified on grounds of the exigencies of war. Contributions arose as so-called ransoms (*Brandschatzungen*), i.e., exemptions from looting and devastation, and thus, as compared with the former system of spoliation

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ART. 50.—No generalized punishment in money or otherwise may be inflicted on the population, on the score of personal acts for which they cannot be regarded as principally responsible.

ART. 52.—Levies in kind and personal services cannot be raised from the communities or inhabitants, except to provide for the needs of the army of occupation. They must be proportioned to the resources of the country, and be such as not to involve the inhabitants in aiding operations against their own country.

Such requisitions and services may only be demanded on the authority of the General in command in the country occupied.

Such requisitions in kind must be paid for in cash, as far as possible: if impossible, they must be certified by receipt, which must be honoured as soon as may be.

But it is the custom, in so doing, to be as gentle as possible, and to give a receipt for the goods compulsorily seized, to be honoured at the conclusion of peace.

In order to avoid excesses, such as may easily take place, whilst requisitioning, it is often recommended that enforced levies shall only be ordered by superior officers, and that the native civil authorities are to be utilized in the collection of them.

But it is indisputable that in war this cannot always be done; it is rather the leader of some little detachment, even one single man, who

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War-rebellion is the taking up of arms by the population against the occupation: war-treachery, the injury and endangering of the hostile power by deceit or the conveyance of news to the national army; whether by legitimate or illegitimate means, *i.e.* espionage.

Against both of these only the most ruthless measures are of avail. (Precedents are cited from the Peninsular War and Napoleonic wars.) 'Both Wellington and Napoleon had recourse to terrorism, as soon as the popular war had started.'

Requisitioning is now a universally admitted right in international law, and dates back to the French Revolution. It is well known that in 1806 Prussian battalions used to lie beside well-filled granaries, and bivouac on potato-fields, and never dared to touch other folks' goods: the French model soon brought them to better ways.

In modern times the protection of private property has received more consideration. As a prohibition of enforced levies has no prospect of acceptance in international law, the obligation has been set up of at least paying for the goods requisitioned. This theory has not yet been satisfied as a point of law, and the right of requisitioning without payment still obtains as before, and will probably in the future be claimed by all belligerents.

may find himself in the inevitable contingency of requisitioning indispensable articles.

If Art. 40 of the Declaration of Brussels exacts that the requisitions in writing should be proportioned to the capacity and resources of the country, in theory everyone will willingly accede to the reasonableness of this demand; in practice, it will scarcely ever be regarded.

In cases of necessity, the needs of the army decide: and it is well to familiarize oneself with the thought that in the rapid and stormy moments of a war, the orderly procedure of peaceful times cannot, with the best of wills, be followed.

Note.—For German contraventions of the Hague Regulations and observance of their War Book, v. ATROCITIES and SVÉN HEDIN.

HATRED

The glut of 'hatred' expressed in Germany is so well known that some opinions on the subject are worth quoting.

Pro: England hates Germany [Tannenberg, p. 230; Chamberlain, p. 8]. (Chamberlain adds that France is too frivolous to hate Germany, and Germany too kindly to hate England.) [Imelmann (who traces the growth of this feeling in modern English literature, and discovers one solitary exception in Richard Whiteing's *Moonshine*, at the conclusion of that book). Eduard Meyer, p. 206, thinks the feeling incurable].

Pro: 'English enmity toward Germany is not of recent date. It is based on jealousy and fear' [Greindl in 1905, 1907, and 1909; *apud* Bertourieux, p. 36].

Con: England was not hostile to Germany until a few days before the outbreak of war [Landauer, p. 43], as is shown by the fact of the many Germans in London, and the few English in Germany. Bernstein [p. 29] writes to the same purport.

Pro: Germany hates England [Wernle, p. 25]. 'Germany has a peculiarly good understanding of foreign nations.' Révai [p. 71] says the English are insular, conceited, idle, loathe competition, are dull

and greedy, hypocritical, sanctimonious, guileful, and selfish, and devoted to vain sports.

So, too, Sombart, whose excesses of hatred are blamed by Schröer [p. 9] and others; and Bücher [p. 8] who hates England 'like sin.'

Con : The Swiss-German writers condemn the notion of hatred [*Blätter für zwischenstaatliche Organisation ; das Neue Europe*, May, 1915, p. 6].

Johann Müller deplores hatred [*Grüne Blätter*]; he adds: 'Out of blood and iron a new German unity shall arise; a "Fatherland" in the deepest sense of the word, Germany, the homeland of the Kingdom of God on Earth.'

Con : Baudrillart [p. 96], states that the Germans bombarded Rheims cathedral for archæological reasons. Göires one hundred years ago declaimed: 'You are to destroy and burn to ashes the Church at Rheims, where Lewis was baptized; where the Empire of the Franks was born—those false brothers of the Germans.'

Anything stirred the nervous Germans into apprehensiveness and fear, e.g., any visit of Edward VII. to Italy, or to Russia, the fact of the Duchess of Luxemburg opening her Court with a speech in French, etc., etc. [Kiersch, p. 18].

The Russian hates the German, because Germany is the neighbouring country which stares him in the face as a comparison, and has a civilization that humbles his barbarian's pride [Baron Beyens in 1910; *apud* Bertourieux, p. 28].

'The Russian people think that Germany has cheated them of the fruits of victory' [*ibid.*].

The extracts in Bertourieux are from the German edition of the Belgian *Dossier*, which has been edited by the Germans [Waxweiler, p. 68].

Con : From the *New York Tribune* :

'Professor Münsterberg, who remains our most eminent exponent of Teutonic *Kultur*, informed his American audience that he foresaw an Anglo-German-American Alliance as one of the logical and necessary consequences of the present deplorable conflict. . . . He believes he is accurately forecasting the future. . . . But Mr. McClure (who has only recently been in Berlin)

finds the British hatred of the German a far more impressive and fearsome thing than the German hatred of Britain, and his belief is that it will prove more lastingly so. . . . As a hater the Briton is totally unlike the German. He is incapable of producing a Hymn of Hate . . . and he is very slow in bestowing his hate upon anyone outside his own immediate vision. Above all, he is so hopelessly inarticulate. . . .

'When the war began, the Briton had only the most confused notion about "Fritz," as he then named his foe. He certainly did not hate Fritz, and, taken in the mass, he was a good deal puzzled about the whole affair. . . . Being at war, he went somewhat blindly and slowly towards the job in hand. . . .

'As for the British soldier, he went to war in a frankly sporting spirit. There is something enduringly pathetic about the fashion in which that slender expeditionary force sailed away to stop the avalanche, the Tommies singing "Tipperary" and promising to be back by Christmas. . . . When the reports of German atrocities . . . were general, the average Englishman held his peace. He did not believe what he heard; he did not easily come to hatred.

'But there came a time when, all through England, the truth had to be accepted. . . . If you should settle on the date of the German gas-attack, the first one at Ypres, you would not be far from the date when the Englishman actually made up his mind about the German; and, about that time, the Englishman, taking him by the million, went to war.

' . . . The British soldier had made up his mind, on full and sufficient evidence, that the German soldier did not fight clean. Some hundreds of thousands of these soldiers, each to his own class and circle, recounted by letter, or while on leave, what he knew about the "Hun," for there was no more talk of "Fritz." . . .

'After Gallipoli, England was filled with praise of the Turks by the troops he had defeated, for the Turk, as contrasted with the 'Hun,' fought clean. . . .

'Amazingly slowly, education in hate went forward in England. It was not a matter of Governmental activity, and it was not fed by professional eloquence . . . it marched straight through the nation, and was at all times traceable to individual decision. . . .

'Probably, never have Englishmen of all classes so completely hated and loathed a foreign nation as do the British now hate and loathe the German . . . for to-day the German is, for the Englishman, the man who abuses women and children on land and murders them on water. . . .

'The Englishman hates him, not as a nation primarily . . . but as an individual. . . . Being such it cannot be settled by a Government or disposed of by a treaty of peace. . . . The most pathetic thing in the world just now is the German, who wants to see the war end, and have everything forgiven and forgotten. . . . At all events, let us hope that the United States will not become the ally of Germany before Great Britain does. . . .' [*New York Tribune*, Aug. 8, 1916].

LISSAUER'S 'HYMN OF HATE'

Was schieert uns Russe und Franzos ?
 Schuss wider Schuss und Stoss um Stoss !
 Wir lieben sie nicht, wir hassen sie nicht,
 Wir schützen Weichsel und Wogesenpass,
 Wir haben nur einen einzigen Hass.
 Wir lieben vereint, wir hassen vereint,
 Wir haben nur einen einzigen Feind,
 Den Ihr alle wiszt, den Ihr alle wiszt :
 Er sitzt geduckt hinter grauer Flut
 Durch die Wasser getrennt—die sind dicker als Blut—
 Voll Neid, voll Wut, voll Tücke, voll List.
 Wir wollen treten in ein Gericht,
 Einen Schwur zu schwören Gesicht in Gesicht,
 Einen Schwur von Erz, den verblast kein Wind,
 Einen Schwur für Kind und Kindeskind.
 Vernehmt das Wort, sagt nach das Wort,
 Er wälze sich durch ganz Deutschland fort :
 Wir wollen nicht lassen von unserem Hass,
 Wir lieben vereint, wir hassen vereint,
 Wir haben alle nur einen Feind : *ENGLAND !*

In der Bordkajüte, im Feiersaal,
 Sassen Schiffsoffiziere beim Mahl.—
 Wie ein Sabelhieb, wie ein Segelschwung,
 Einer riss grussend empor den Trunk,
 Knapp hinknallend wie Ruderschlag,
 Drei Worte sprach er : ' Auf den Tag ! '
 Wem galt das Glas ?
 Sie hatten alle nur einen Hass.
 Wer war gemeint ?
 Sie hatten alle nur einen Feind : *ENGLAND !*

Nimm Du die Völker der Erde in Sold,
 Baue Walle aus Barren von Gold,
 Bedecke die Meerflut mit Bug bei Bug,
 Du rechnetest klug, doch nicht klug genug.
 Was schieert uns Russe und Franzos ?
 Schuss wider Schuss und Stoss um Stoss.
 Wir kämpfen den Kampf mit Bronze und Stahl
 Und schliessen Frieden irgend einmal.
 Dich werden wir hassen mit langem Hass,
 Wir werden nicht lassen von unserem Hass.
 Hass zu Wasser und Hass zu Land,
 Hass des Hauptes und Hass der Hand,
 Hass der Hammer und Hass der Kronen,
 Drosselnder Hass von siebzig Millionen,
 In Liebe vereint, in Hass vereint,
 Sie haben alle nur einen Feind : *ENGLAND !*

Russia and France—they matter not,
 A blow for a blow and a shot for a shot :
 We love them not, we hate them not ;
 At Vistula and Vosges we wait ;
 We have but one and only hate.
 We love as one, we hate as one,
 We have one foe and one alone.

He is known to you all, he is known to you all,
 He crouches behind the dark grey flood,
 Full of envy, of rage, of craft, of gall,
 Cut off by waves that are thicker than blood.
 Come, let us stand at the Judgment Place,
 An oath to swear to, face to face,
 An oath of bronze no wind can shake,
 An oath for our sons and their sons to take.
 Come, hear the word, repeat the word,
 Throughout the Fatherland make it heard.
 We will never forgo our hate,
 We have all but a single hate,
 We love as one, we hate as one,
 We have one foe, and one alone—*ENGLAND !*

In the Captains' Mess, in the banquet-hall,
 The officers feasted, one and all.
 Like the sweep of a sabre, like a sail on the swing,
 One seized his glass, let three words ring,
 Short and sharp, like a rudder's play,
 Spoke three words only : ' To the Day ! '

Whose glass this fate ?
 They had all but a single hate.
 Who was thus known ?
 They had one foe, and one alone—*ENGLAND !*

Take you the folk of the Earth in pay,
 With bars of gold your ramparts lay,
 Bedeck the ocean with bow on bow ;
 Ye reckon well, but not well enough now.
 Russia and France, they matter not,
 A blow for a blow, a shot for a shot.
 We fight the battle with bronze and steel,
 And peace at some time we will seal.
 Yet *you* we will hate with a lasting hate ;
 And from our hatred will never abate.
 Hate by water, and hate by land,
 Hate by head, and hate by hand,
 Hate by hammer, and hate by crown,
 Seventy millions, choking hate down.
 We love as one, we hate as one,
 We have one foe, and one alone—*ENGLAND !*

(From *The Spectator*, Oct. 31, 1914. Reprinted by permission of the Proprietors.)

HELIGOLAND

In 1806 Heligoland, which was then Danish, became of capital importance, after Napoleon had from Berlin decreed a blockade of England. In 1807 England, being at war with Denmark, seized Heligoland, and Lord Russell said: 'With a small expense this island may be made a little Gibraltar . . . it is the key to the rivers Ems, Weser, Jahde, and Eider.'

In 1814 we retained the island, and it was our possession of it in 1870 that enabled the French to blockade the German coast.

From 1884 onwards an agitation arose in Germany to have possession of the island, favoured by Sir John Gorst and some others, and bitterly opposed by other politicians. In 1890, against Bismarck's advice, it was ceded to Germany in return for Zanzibar and concessions in East Africa [*Contemporary Review*, July, 1916].

HOLLAND

I. ANNEXATION BY GERMANY. **Pro**: In 1870 Germany had ample reasons to march against the Dutch, since the King had given her a pretext for war in his intention of selling Luxemburg to Napoleon III. The inclination of King William III. of Holland towards France was well known by all the Powers [Tannenberg, p. 129; cf. Kraaijenhoff, p. 13].

'Holland will soon enough annex herself' [Bismarck]. William the Silent redeemed Holland by seeking help of Germany. Now she should be made a constituent State of the German Empire [*Dietsche Stemmen*, Jan.-Feb., 1916].

'It is obvious that we (Germany) could not profitably

annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland' [German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky (No. 15), British Blue Book].

Con : If these attempted precedents in the 'seventies are true, the fact that they were not realized because of universal opposition to their immorality does not justify them any the more at the present time. Napoleon III. may possibly have had such projects ; England very obviously would not countenance them. William II. tried to accomplish them ; England intervened.

Pro : 'Holland is by its geographical position and its commercial and industrial interests, its nationality and language, an original German province, and, unless Holland be incorporated in the German *Bund*, Germany will be a house whose generator is a foreigner. Holland belongs to Germany just as much as Brittany and Normandy do to France' [List, 1841 ; *apud* Brugmans, p. 25].

'It is Germany's undeniable duty to win back the King of Streams, the inexhaustible source of German wealth,' *viz.*, the Rhine. Possibly a purely governmental bond is not necessary : some economic bond is ; the accession of Holland to the German Customs Union is as necessary to us as our daily bread [Treitschke ; *apud* Brugmans, p. 15].

'Holland ought to join the German Empire as a confederate state with her Royal house, her European territory, and her Southern American colonies, her Malay and Australian colonies.' She is to retain Java for herself, but Dutch is to be disused save as a provincial dialect [Tannenbergh, pp. 139 and 307].

Con : German neutrality is safe, save against Germany [Geerke, p. 108].

Pro : In the programme of the '*All-deutscher Verband*.' 'We are not thinking of making Holland German, because immemorially she has been German. We will bring Holland back into the Empire, back into the Empire's life. We must have the Rhine down to its mouth' [Brugmans, p. 39].

(This latter refers to the strip of Zeeland from Sluis to Merxem, by virtue of which the mouth of the Scheld is controlled by the Dutch. For further stories as to this strip *v.* FALSE NEWS.)

Con : German (*deutsch*) and Germanic are not identical [Brugmans, p. 22].

II. COLONIES. Pro : The Dutch colonies are more than the Dutch can defend, and are in danger from England and Japan. The existence of the German fleet is the safeguard of the Dutch colonies : after it shall have been laid low, England can safely proceed to assail them [Heutsz, pp. 4 and 55].

Con : Before even the Germans built a fleet, we never contemplated such a move.

Pro : These colonies are so vast that Holland cannot even develop them, let alone guard them adequately. It is only German volunteers in the Dutch Army that save the situation [Tannenberg, p. 132].

In the Dutch colonies there is a great grievance at the fact that only one European in five is a Dutchman, and the four-fifths mostly German [*Dietsche Stemmen*, March-April, 1916].

The Dutch apprehend grave danger to their colonies from Japan [*Dietsche Stemmen*, March-April, 1916]. Germany is the safeguard.

Con : Tannenberg [*passim*] anticipated that Japan and Germany would be jointly fighting against Russia. If so, where would Japan's share have come in? Or what about the German-Japanese antagonism?

Pro : Holland and Switzerland act as guards to Germany's flanks in this war. Therefore they are secure from aggression [*Dietsche Stemmen*, Jan.-Feb., 1916].

Con : The same argument did not protect Belgium, though there would never have been a Sedan, save for Belgium.

Pro : In the year 1907 the Dutch were proposing to fortify their German frontier. There was strong opposition from Germany : the Heemskerck ministry fell, and was replaced by Dr. Kuijper's [*v.* Lucien Wolf, *Times*, Aug. 3 and 11, 1907]. In the event, the Dutch

were forced to fortify Flushing and the coastal defences of the Scheld [Roggen, p. 134].

Con : The incident of the abandonment of the one set of fortifications, for which there was need, and the enforcement of the other, is noteworthy, especially in view of the date [*v.* ANTICIPATIONS].

On this occasion, when the Dutch proposed fortifying Flushing, the Belgian Government suggested to Berlin that a renewed declaration of Germany's intentions to respect Belgium would calm opinion in the Netherlands and Belgium.

Bethmann-Hollweg made a declaration to this effect [Belgian Grey Book, No. 12, May 2, 1913].

HUNGARY

In 1848 the Russian Army aided the Austrians in suppressing the Magyar revolt. In 1867, after the defeat at Sadowa, Hungary was raised to the rank of a sister-kingdom with Austria, the Magyars being made supreme in the country, which included Italians at and near Trieste, Serbians in Croatia, and many other alien nationalities. Thus Hungary, like Italy, gained liberty for herself indirectly from the antagonism of Prussia and Austria (*cf.* Appendix, ITALY *v.* AUSTRIA ; and ITALY).

German intentions may be gauged from Tannenberg (1911) [p. 94], who requires in the racial redistribution the cession of the German basin of the Raab to Germany, of Croatia to the southern territories bordering on the Adriatic, of Slavonia to Serbia, and German as the second official language : all German schools to be autonomous or 'peculiar'; and, if the Magyars are in the least hostile, the whole country is to be treated as a Prussian province. The southern boundaries of this Hungary are to be the Drava and the Sava [p. 51].

The Magyars, according to his computation, are only 42 per cent. of the population, the Germans being only 12 per cent., and the Slavs 28·8 per cent.

One of the aims of German policy (*v.* CENTRAL EUROPE) is to establish a Customs Union between Austria-Hungary and Germany. The economic obstacles are the competition of industrial Germany and industrial Austria, and the fear of the Prussian Agrarians of being swamped by the agriculture of Hungary and the central plains [*Deutschland u. Ungarn, passim*].

In the ideal map drawn up in this pamphlet, German-Austrian dominion is absolute over the entirety of the waterways of the Elbe, the Danube, the Oder, the Sava, the Vardar, down to Salonica on the Ægean, and Galats on the Black Sea.

There is no mention at all of the grievances of the subject races in Hungary, and the forcible suppression of all of their languages in favour of the Magyar. It is only the Germans [Tannenberg, pp. 49, 65] who seem willing to comply (*v.* GERMANY: *Absorption*).

INDIA

Pro : India has been brutally coerced by England in this war, according to the declarations of Hindoos at San Francisco [*Who are the Huns ?* p. 59]. In reality the people and princes sympathize with Germany.

Con : Great Britain has been able to release a great part of her English garrison from India: the Indian troops have fought magnificently at Gallipoli, in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and France, while the Indian princes are generous and loyal.

Pro : If England were defeated, she would forfeit the whole of India, Persia, Thibet, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan to Russia [Tannenberg, p. 244]. (Elsewhere in the same book, to Japan.)

INTENTIONS

Under this head a few of the aspirations before and during the war are summarized.

- (1) After the war, England may remain independent,

but her 'Kultur' (one of lies, hypocrisy, etc.) must be absolutely changed [Verworn, p. 53].

(2) London must cease to be the banking-centre of the world; all international currency is to be in marks [Brandt, p. 185].

But London as the banking-centre of the world may act as intermediary and lender in the payment of the war indemnity of France to Germany of £1,750,000,000 [Tannenberg, p. 317].

(3) Dover and Calais are to be held by Germany, who will build the Channel Tunnel [Brüggemann, p. 31]. Or else the French and Belgian coasts [Ándrássy, p. 66].

(4) The *Pax Germanica* is to prevail: from the territories of Germany all non-Germans are to be exterminated: the Roman Empire of the German race is to be established, which will police the seas and govern all the English colonies; e.g., a proportion of one-tenth Germans in Australia will by their superior capacity be the masters [Chamberlain, pp. 82 . . .]. Thus a true community of mankind will be established [*ibid.*, p. 95; also Labberton, I., p. 48].

(5) After the war, France must be tenderly treated in order that she may co-operate with Germany in crushing England. If she will not consent, she must be smitten hip and thigh [Spahn, pp. 22-23; Platzhoff, p. 28; Bertourieux, p. 131].

(6) Europe must be under the hegemony of Germany; England must abandon all her strategic positions, such as Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, the Suez Canal; France will thus be relieved of the incubus of the English Fleet, and Germany will be assured of the supply of raw materials (*cf.* GERMANY—COMMERCE); Italy and the Balkans will no longer be terrorized by England; and England under the new Monroe Doctrine is to have no voice in European affairs [Révai, pp. 87 . . .].

Then Germany can easily quell any idea of a French *revanche*, and of Pan-Slavism [*ibid.*, p. 115].

'Our [the German] imperialists want the exclusive "place in the sun." They know very well—though

they do not say it, and Bernhardt's book proves it—that we have every proper "place in the sun," disputed and disputable by no one' [*J'accuse*, p. 49].

(7) Tannenberg [*Grossdeutschland*, pp. 305 . . .] thus outlines the Articles of Peace :

France cedes the *départements* of les Vosges with Epinal, Moselle-et-Meuse, and Nancy and Lunéville, Verdun and Ardennes. The whole population to be deported. She retains only Algeria of all her colonies (which are to be divided with England). Holland and Belgium are to be incorporated in the German Empire. France is to cede her Russian securities to Germany.

Russia cedes all Livonia, Lithuania, Poland, and any German settlements on the Volga and in southern Russia.

Germany and England partition Turkey, the Portuguese, French, and Spanish colonies.

Germany assumes a protectorate over the Argentine, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay.

Austria is to consist of the Kingdom of Hungary, Roumania, Poland, Serbia, and Bulgaria, in strict alliance with and subordination to Germany, who takes the remainder of the Austrian Empire.

Should England be at war with Germany, she is to forfeit all South Africa, Egypt, the Soudan, East Africa, Central Africa, Barbadoes, Trinidad, etc., etc. Since the conquest of the air she is no longer an island [Tannenberg, pp. 244 . . .].

[*Cf.* British White Book, No. 101 : 'The Chancellor asks us, in effect, to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken, and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory, as distinct from the colonies. . . . He also asks us to bargain away whatever interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We would not entertain that bargain either.']

(8) Tannenberg's demands on Russia, Holland, Belgium, and France are almost identically confirmed in Heinemann [pp. 40 . . .]. All Russian state-land is to be confiscated, as well as any, the owners of which have disappeared [*ibid.*, p. 59]. The Ukraine is to be rescued

from Russian tyranny [pp. 64 and 73]. But to avoid any danger of the Polish trade displacing the German, an interior Customs' barrier is to be erected [Tannenberg, p. 74].

(9) The former inhabitants must all be massacred, expropriated, or deported, after the experience of the failures and difficulties in Sleswig and Alsace-Lorraine [Potthoff, p. 40; Vietinghoff, *passim*; Heinemann, p. 33, who insists on the retention of the coal-fields of Belgium and the Briey-Longwy district, and complains that Germany was too generous in 1870; Tannenberg, *passim*; so, too, Chamberlain, etc.].

(10) Many of these tracts of country have been temporarily occupied by Germany; in fact: 'I told an American journalist that peace negotiations could only reach a settlement, if they were conducted by statesmen of the belligerent Powers on the ground of the real war situation, as shown by every war-map' [The German Chancellor's speech, *Times*, June 7, 1916].

(11) Bohemia is to be permanently and radically Germanized: the existing majority of Czechs over Germans to be deported to Russia, or elsewhere [Tannenberg, p. 81]; (and *cf.* AUSTRIA).

(12) Although Germany is utterly unselfish in Egypt [Erich Meyer, p. 13]; although her trade is on the increase unchecked [*ibid.*, p. 16]; although English rule is so good that there would be no response to a *Jihâd* or Holy War [*ibid.*, p. 26], Germany should [*ibid.*, pp. 28 and 29] create a sphere of influence for herself as she has done in Turkey, to safeguard her power, and make the neutrality of the Suez Canal more certain (also *v.* EGYPT and SUEZ).

Stellwagen, a Dutch writer, agrees that England governs Egypt very well, and that Egypt must belong either to Turkey or England [Stellwagen, p. 36].

(13) According to Dernburg in America, Belgium commands the principal exit for German commerce, and has been conquered regardless of the cost of blood and gold . . . Belgium cannot be restored.

Nevertheless these views might be modified, if all the other German demands, especially that of free maritime exchange, were to be granted, and the commercial relations between Belgium and Germany revised.

Great Britain has always frustrated the efforts of Germany to create a colonial empire ; she thrust France into sole possession of Morocco, and put obstacles in the way of Germany's making Mesopotamia into a gunnery for the world. [These statements are directly false ; *v.* MOROCCO, GERMANY, and TURKEY.]

Dernburg defines the articles of peace as :

(1) Germany will not claim any more European territory, merely gain stronger frontiers.

(2) Belgium belongs geographically to Germany. Antwerp is a German port (*v.* p. 32), and commands the mouth of the German Rhine [*sic*]. Belgium will have to enter into the German Zollverein, but is too alien to be incorporated.

(3) The neutrality of Belgium is to be abolished, as has been shown, and her ports must be permanently protected from French or English aggression.

(4) The North Sea must be made free, since England has closed it. The coasts of the Pas-de-Calais, Holland, Belgium, and France must be neutralized even in time of war.

(5) All cables to be neutralized.

(6) As the Monroe Doctrine prevents Germany from expanding in South America, she must be given Morocco by way of compensation.

(7) All of the German colonies must be restored, and Germany must in addition have others with a temperate climate.

(8) *Carte blanche* to Germany with regard to Turkey.

(9) Other little nations to be free, if they support Germany [Rouquette, pp. 87 . . .].

(14) The German Socialist paper of Zürich, the *Volksrecht*, in July, 1916, outlined a scheme of peace-conditions acceptable to Germany, and bearing the signatures of great industrialists and financiers, deputies, professors and authors, in all about 90.

Belgium is to remain inviolable ; but Germany may take any necessary measures for military and naval defence on Belgian soil ; assumes the responsibility of defending Belgium, and the diplomatic representation of Belgium abroad ; she also guarantees the political independence of Flanders.

The Franco-German frontier is to be revised to the strategic advantage of Germany, who also annexes all the ore and coal-producing districts, which are essential to the free growth of the German Empire.

Russia is to forfeit the Baltic provinces, and the west and south up to the border of the pure Russian population.

England need only consent to the establishment on her shores of stations for the German fleets, aerial and maritime.

The Entente is to concede Germany all the colonies in Africa essential to the position in the world.

Lastly, the Allies are to grant Germany full commercial facilities, and are to be pledged not to enter into any commercial treaties amongst themselves or with the neutrals directed against Germany.

These conditions are only to be considered if the Powers of the Entente themselves approach Germany with a request for peace [*Novoe Vremya*, July 13-26, 1916].

(15) Professor Ernst Häckel [*New York Times Magazine* ; *apud Times*, June 5, 1916], declaring himself to be a pacifist, outlines the proper conditions of peace. These include the retention of Belgium and Antwerp and the Congo ; the expulsion of Great Britain from all of Africa, including Egypt ; and the protectorate over all of Asia Minor.

(16) For the Central European scheme *v.* CENTRAL EUROPE. Labberton [*de Vlaamsche Beweging*, pp. 76 . . .] makes it include two new provinces, Luxemburg (the Duchy and the Belgian province), and Flanders, on the left bank of the Meuse ; thus assuring Central Europe, directed by Germany, full strategic advantages (*v.* FLEMISH MOVEMENT).

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Pro : Treaties become defunct. If Germany two years ago had announced her intention of invading Belgium she would have drawn war on herself. Therefore, in self-defence, she was justified in acting suddenly. In other words, the Treaty of Guarantee was already defunct and our intervention was a mere legal quibble [Labberton, II., p. 34 ; Molenbroek, II., p. 6].

Con : This is an admission of German aggression. The construction of the Treaty of 1839 is utterly fallacious.

Pro : 'Who would believe Bismarck would have spoken to this effect had he anticipated the circumstances of 1914 ?' [Molenbroek, II., p. 6].'

Con : The neutrality of Luxemburg was recognised by Bismarck as an obligation holding 'until Judgment Day' [*ibid.*] ; (v. LUXEMBURG).

MALTREATMENT OF EMBASSIES

Pro : The German Embassy at Petrograd was looted [*Who are the Huns ?* p. 85].

Con : If this be wholly true, the German ambassadors were escorted by France and England with every courtesy : the Germans confiscated the French presidential train at the frontier, and the English and French ambassadors were submitted to every kind of indignity on their journey *via* Denmark.

DUM-DUMS

Pro : The British use dum-dum bullets, contrary to Hague Convention [Landauer, p. 78 ; *Münchener Medizinische Wochenschrift ; Who are the Huns ?* p. 75] ; (v. also ATROCITIES).

Con : By accident some dum-dums may have been used, but as to regular German practices, *v.* p. 15.

Explosive bullets have been used by the Austrians on the Italian front in the Torre Valley [*Times*, May 15, 1916]; (*v.* ATROCITIES—FRANCE).

Incendiary bullets were used in France by the Germans; these set the wounded on fire [Morgan, *German Atrocities*, p. 124].

Expansive bullets have been used against the Serbians by the Austrians [Thienhoven, p. 47].

Pro : It is stated that the Germans were not the first to use poison-gas: probably the reference is to the poisonous gases emitted from lyddite and other shells, first used by the English in the Boer War [*Who are the Huns?* p. 156; Dieren, p. 28].

Con : Poison-gas is used by the Germans (*i.e.*, a heavy gas, pumped out and rolling along the ground (*v.* ATROCITIES—FRANCE, for further details).

IRELAND

Pro : Dealing with Ireland, Eduard Meyer quotes extremist opinions denouncing English misgovernment; when giving a history of the Union in 1800 he does not state the fact that the Catholics were emancipated at that time; and he says Ireland has furnished no recruits [pp. 102 and 204].

Con : The English government of Ireland has not been very fortunate: but it cannot be compared with the Prussian administration of Sleswig, Poland, and Alsace (*cf.* SLESWIG, POLAND, and STATE).

Pro : Rudolf Thurneysen, Professor of Celtic at Bonn, acknowledges the justice and fairness of the Land Purchase Acts; but he tells stories of Irish regiments massacred by order of the English Government; and prophecies that Irish freedom will be conferred by the German Government [pp. 30-33; *cf.* Molenbroek, I., p. 12; Sidler, p. 30].

Con : He does not contrast with the expropriation schemes of the Prussian Government [*v.* pp. 176 . . .]. The Germans artificially substitute alien land-owners for the native ; the English divest their own co-nationals, who were themselves half-Irish.

ITALY

(Consult AUSTRIA *v.* ITALY, in Appendix)

Preliminarily, it may be useful to give a sketch of modern Italian history.

From one point of view, the Austrian, the fight is for the open sea, for the freedom of the seas (of which the Germans now prate so hard, *i.e.*, the liberation of the ocean from its present masters, and the transfer of predominance). Austria's only road to the Mediterranean is through Serbian-Croatian territories into the Adriatic, and Serbian-Macedonian lands into the Ægean. When the Greeks, unanticipatedly, overwhelmed the Turks in the First Balkan War and secured Salonica, leaving the hinterland of that port, the Vardar valley, in the hands of their allies, the Serbs, Austria received a great check, and she was certain sooner or later to attempt to recover the avenue in which she had had a very positive contingent interest.

Austria's tenure of Istria and Dalmatia presents some interesting features. The close of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries witnessed the last frantic efforts of the Germanic powers to retain the mastery over Italy. Venice, owing to her swamps, was almost unassailable, and from about the year 1220 secured to herself Trieste, Pola, Dalmatia, Ragusa, and all the Dalmatian islands, down to Montenegro, which, alone of Serbian territories, retained a measure of independence in its mountain fastnesses.

The southern boundary line alone varied with the

fortunes of war against the Turk : Austria acquired a little tongue of land between Gorizia and Trieste as a part of the kingdom of Hungary, as a continuation of Carniola : however, for nearly six centuries Istria, Dalmatia, and the islands had been Italian territory.

In the great cataclysm of Europe, when a Corsican upstart played and juggled with historic frontiers and age-long institutions with the most complete disregard and ignorance, the Republic of Venice was extinguished.

In 1795 the last remnants of Poland were partitioned. The taste for such violent usurpations of national rights may have been infectious ; in 1798 the same operation was performed on Venetia. In 1795 Austria was allotted Galicia and the territory of Cracow. By the Treaty of Campoformio, 1797, the following changes took place : Venetia was partitioned ; Austria surrendered the Netherlands to France, as well as Upper Italy down to the Oglio. The remainder of Upper Italy became part of the French Kingdom of Italy. Austria received, as compensation, Venetian Istria and Dalmatia, down to the Bocche di Cattaro, and thus for the first time became coterminous with Montenegro. In 1803 the episcopal territories of Trent and Brixen were secularized and formally incorporated with the Tyrol. The Venetian provinces of Bergamo and Brescia were left in the French Empire.

This adjustment was confirmed by the Treaty of Lunéville in 1800 ; but by the Treaty of Presburg, 1805, the South Tyrol was added to the Kingdom of Italy, with the Valley of the Adige, the whole of the Trentino, and all Venetia. The severment of Istria and Dalmatia still remained.

But Napoleon marched to Moscow, and then came Waterloo. The Congress of Vienna, 1815, carefully sifted the chaff and the wheat out of Napoleon's schemes ; and, in so far as it could, preserved the chaff. In Italy the old tyrannies were restored, but not the ancient liberties ; Lucca and Venice disappeared for ever.

From 1815-1859 Austria retained the Milanese, all of Venetia down to the Po, and Istria and Dalmatia. The

old Genoese Republic was given over to the Kingdom of Sardinia.

In 1859, after Magenta and Solferino, Austria had to surrender Lombardy to the Kingdom of Sardinia; and in 1866 Prussia, who had found it convenient to use the new kingdom of Sardinia as an ally against Austria, had to acquiesce in the transfer of Lombardy to Italy, nominally through the mediation of France.

Italy then embarked on a colonial policy, taking Erythraea, but was defeated by the Abyssinians in 1896.

In 1911 Italy declared war on Turkey to safeguard her interests in Tripoli. This was against the wish of the allies; and Germany was suspected, not without reason, of supporting Turkey. Territory in Africa lay outside the scope of the Triple Alliance (*q.v.*, p. 277); and, when Germany in 1906 and 1911 pursued schemes of aggression against France in Morocco, and Austria in 1913 against Serbia (*v.* p. 177), Italy would not follow her allies, and declined again in 1914, as she regarded the war as one of aggression, not of defence.

There are comparatively few references to Italy in German pamphlets; the principal are:

Pro: The Turco-Italian war of 1911 was the Entente's first success [Heutsz, p. 78; Révai, p. 46]. Italy should have sought a field of expansion in Africa [Heutsz, p. 75].

Con: It was not promoted by them, but it was Italy's first independent step.

Con: Salandra, in a speech of June 2, 1915, stated that the Austrian Ambassador at Rome would not pledge himself to what might be the outcome of a war with Serbia. When Serbia practically acquiesced in the Austrian Note, Vienna stood aghast, and was almost frustrated [Kiersch, p. 32]. (N.B.—This is in direct contradiction with the Austrian promises: *v.* Italian Green Book, No. 6; Austrian Red Book, No. 14.)

Pro: Italy in 1907 had an understanding with France and England [Baron Greindl].

She adhered to the Triple Alliance, so as to be sure of being able to turn to the stronger side [Bertourieux, p. 53].

Pro : Italy on July 5, 1914, demanded compensation, under Article VII. of the Triple Alliance, in the event of Austria taking action against Serbia [*Who are the Huns?* p. 393].

Con : There is no diplomatic record of this fact published; but, in any case, if true, it only shows that the Austrian demand was already formulated on July 5. The writer does not mention that Germany ultimately had to support Italy's interpretation of Clause VII. (see Appendix, ITALY *v.* AUSTRIA).

Pro : Tannenbergh [p. 303] in his forecast reckons upon Italy supporting Germany and Austria, and suggests partitioning Austria and surrendering to Italy the Tessino and the Trentino.

Con : Germany did eventually suggest such accession, and forced Austria to give a conditional promise to effect this after the war (see Appendix, ITALY *v.* AUSTRIA).

In 1906 Austro-Italian relations were already almost at the breaking-point [Bassermann, p. 85].

THE KAISER (*v. also* KULTUR)

(1) At Bremen, March 23, 1905, the Kaiser said: 'You must cherish the fixed conviction that God would never have taken such pains for you, and your German homeland, and His people, had He not intended us for a great destiny. We are the salt of the earth. God has summoned us to civilize the world. You are the apostles of human progress' [De Beer, p. 68].

(2) The Kaiser, when on a visit to Munich, inscribed in the visitors' book the following quotation from Juvenal (Sat. VII. 233): *Sic volo, sic iubeo*. He omitted the latter half: *sic pro ratione voluntas*.* The

* Thus I wish, thus I command. Thus, in reason's stead, my will.

Prussian cannon since 1742 are inscribed : *Ultima ratio regis** [De Beer, p. 122].

(3) In a recent speech at a camp occurs : ' People abroad say I want to build a world-empire. No greater nonsense has ever been uttered about me. It is in morals, conscientiousness, industry, that Germany's conquering strength exists, which shall overcome the world ' [*ibid.*, p. 54].

(4) Between 1910 and 1914 the Kaiser's intention became steadily more bellicose, as is indicated by his speeches [*J'accuse*, pp. 97-135]. He hesitated up to the last : his telegrams to the Tsar of July 28 and 29, 1914, are quite friendly in tone [German White Book, Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23], but on the 30th he was completely won over to the extremist views of the war-party, that Russia had no direct interest in the conflict.

(5) In November, 1913, the Emperor, accompanied by General von Moltke, had a conversation with the King of the Belgians. The Emperor's attitude was completely changed ; he regarded a war with France as inevitable, and was no longer the champion of peace. He was overwrought and irritable, perhaps jealous of the Crown Prince's popularity. The object of the interview may have been to overbear the opposition of King Albert, and dispose him to a policy of non-resistance [French Yellow Book, No. 6].

(6) The Kaiser's telegram to Kruger, 1896, on the Jameson raid, caused great perturbation [Schiemann, p. 8 ; *cf.* BOERS]. It was a part of the anti-English policy of Germany [Schowalter, p. 8].

(7) The Kaiser dismissed Bismarck because the latter did not agree with the Kaiser's proposal of a vigorous policy in the Near and the Far East [*v.* TURKEY and FAR EAST ; VÉLA, p. 4].

(8) The Kaiser, on Sept. 4, 1914, sent the following telegram to President Wilson, so as to anticipate the arrival of the Belgian deputation by one day :

* The monarch's last argument.

' I protest solemnly against the manner in which this war is conducted by our enemies, whose methods make it one of the most barbarous in all history. . . . Besides using these atrocious weapons, the Belgian Government has excited the civilian population to take part in the fighting, and has for long organized the resistance. The cruelties in this guerrilla warfare, even at the hands of women and priests, practised on wounded soldiers, doctors and nurses (doctors have been killed and ambulances fired on), were such that our generals were compelled eventually to adopt the severest measures, in order to punish the guilty and terrorize the bloodthirsty populace, by preventing the continuance of these shameful practices. . . . Villages, and even the ancient city of Louvain (except its magnificent *hôtel de ville*) have had to be destroyed, to protect our troops ' [*La Belgique et l'Allemagne*, p. 105].

(Bethmann-Hollweg, on Sept. 2, 1914, also spoke of horrible barbarities of which the Belgians had been guilty.)

From No. 108 of the Belgian Grey Book, II., the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* [Oct. 30, 1914], and *Vorwärts* [Dec. 6, 1914] both deny that at Aix-la-Chapelle, Hanover, and Boston, there was a single instance to be traced of a German thus wounded or with his eyes gouged out.

There was never any evidence, medical or otherwise, of such outrages, which must be dismissed as fabrications [*Réponse Belge*, pp. 35 and 36].

' William has been accused of duplicity and of perfidy. The accusation cannot be said to be undeserved. He has often boasted of being the true advocate of peace, and has not neglected opportunities of advising his people to keep their powder dry and the sword sharp ; while as to his motto, *Oderint dum metuant*,* one does not know whether it is meant more for foreigners or for his own subjects. To the Boers he sent a notorious telegram encouraging them to resistance, while he was

* Let them hate, provided they fear.

proposing to Queen Victoria a plan of his for making war against the rebels. In October of 1910 he expressed personally to the King of the Belgians his desire that the good relations between Belgium and Germany should always become closer; while he could not have been ignorant of the underhand preparations which were being made for the conquest of Belgium. And in 1911, visiting King George, he brought in his suite to England, under false colours, the chief of the Service of Espionage' [Lugaro, p. 34].

Pro : The present war is being promoted by England against the Emperor William II., who is a second Napoleon, an organizer and law-giver and consolidator; and, to defend himself, had to strike the first blow in the enemy's country ['R.', p. 1].

EXTRACTS FROM SPEECHES

Aug. 5, 1889, at Sandown :

'Germany possesses an army which answers to her needs; and if the British nation possesses a fleet sufficient for the needs of England, this in itself will be considered by Europe in general as a weighty factor in the maintenance of peace' [Gauss, p. 49].

Dec. 16, 1897, in his speech to Prince Henry, who was in command of the East Asiatic squadron :

'Our commerce is not new; in old times the Hanseatic League was one of the most powerful enterprises which the world has ever seen . . . but it came to nought, because the one condition was lacking, namely, that of an Emperor's protection. [This may be premature: it lasted several hundred years, and the German Empire has not, as yet, attained its diamond jubilee.—*Editor.*] Now things have changed: the first condition, the German Empire, has been created; the second condition, German commerce, flourishes, and it can only develop if it feels itself safe under the power of the Empire. Imperial power means sea-power, and imperial power and sea-power are so interdependent that the one cannot exist without the other. . . .

' If anyone should wish to insult us in our rights or wish to harm us, then drive in with the mailed fist, and, as God wills, bind about your young brow the laurels which no one in the entire German Empire will begrudge you ' [Gauss, p. 118].

In Oct. 1908, the Kaiser set out on his Eastern tour, *via* Vienna, Venice, Constantinople (where he stayed some time), to Palestine, returning in December of that year.

In reply to an address from the German colony at Constantinople, he said :

' In your address you reminded Me of the policy of my late Grandfather. I may say I found the directions for my policy forecast by Him, and I cannot do better than to follow that course. That policy proved that two great peoples of different origin and faith can be right good friends and avail themselves of each other in peaceful competition.'

On Oct. 29 in Jerusalem he spoke at the foundation of a new German evangelical church in favour of evangelical missions. On Oct. 30 at Bethlehem he said : ' The German Empire and the German name have now attained such respect in the whole Ottoman Empire as they have never had hitherto. It is now our business to show what Christian religion really is, that the exercise of Christian love towards Mohammedans as well is our duty, not through dogma and proselytism, but by example. Everything will hinge on our practice [*v.* KULTUR], our institutions, the life we live in their sight, the manner of our intercourse with them, the evidence that we are at one with them.'

On Nov. 1 he addressed the German Templars at Jerusalem :

' If ever any of you want My protection, I shall be there : happily, the German Empire is in a position to afford its subjects abroad a full reserve of aid ' [*Kaiserreden*, p. 424 . . .].

Stettin, Sept. 23, 1898 :

' The old Pomeranian spirit has again come to life and driven you from the land upon the water. . . . Our

future lies upon the water' [Gauss, p. 126]. (Cf. MARINISM.)

Hamburg, Oct. 18, 1899 :

'It was a solemn act we have just witnessed, when we gave over to its element a new portion of the floating defence of the Fatherland. . . . Sorely do we need a powerful German fleet' [Gauss, p. 150].

Kiel, July 3, 1900 (on launching the *Wittelsbach*) :

'The ocean-waves knock at our people's door, and force them to demand their place in the world as a great nation, drive them, in short, into world-politics.

'Germany's greatness makes it impossible for her to do without the ocean ; but the ocean also proves that even in the distance, and, on its further side, without Germany and the German Empire, no great decision dare henceforth be taken' [Gauss, p. 138].

July 3, 1900, at Wilhelmshaven, when the troops were being embarked to China to suppress the Boxer rebellion :

'You know it well, that you are going to fight a desperate, well-armed, and cruel foe. If you meet him, know that no quarter will be given [*i.e.*, by them, as the context shows], no prisoners will be taken ; carry your arms so that, for a thousand years hence, no Chinaman dare look askance at a German. Maintain your discipline' [*Kaiserreden*, p. 358].

[The exact text of this speech is much disputed. In support of this text, cf. the Kaiser's speech at Wilhelmshaven on July 2, 1900, and on Aug. 2, 1900. On July 2 he said : 'You will meet a foe not less courageous unto death than yourselves. The Chinese, trained by European officers, have learnt how to use European weapons. . . .' The official *Reklam* edition (which may be pruned down), confirms the *Kaiserreden* (*l.c.*) ; and the Wolff despatch of July 27 gives the same sense in words very slightly modified. However, a volunteer who heard the speech had the impression that the Kaiser said, more or less : 'You must with God's help so beat him that no Chinaman for centuries will think of raising a hand against a German . . .' and (in an excited voice) : 'On the oath you have sworn me, I require of you to give no quarter ; prisoners will not be made ; you are to avenge these recent horrors'] [*Kaiserreden-Reklam*, II., pp. 206, 210, 211, 212, 220].

At Hamburg, June 18, 1901 :

'In spite of the fact that we have no such fleet as we should have, we have conquered for ourselves a place in

the sun [*i.e.*, in China]. It will now be my task to see to it that this place in the sun shall remain our undisputed possession' [*Times*].

March 22, 1905, at Bremen :

'We are the salt of the earth; but we must be worthy of being it' [Gauss, p. 233].

March 31, 1905, at Tangiers (*v.* MOROCCO)—

The Emperor, in reply to an address from the Germans settled there :

'I hope that my visit to Tangiers declares this [*viz.*, that Germany has great interests in Morocco] plainly and emphatically, and that it will call forth the conviction that what Germany undertakes in Morocco will be negotiated exclusively with the Sovereign Sultan' [Gauss, p. 240].

June 15, 1908, at Döberitz :

'Well, it certainly looks just as if they were trying to encircle us and bring us to bay; but we can put up with that. The German never fought better than when he had to defend himself on all sides. Let them all come; we are ready' [*Times*].

May 7, 1908, at Vienna—

(The Burgomaster prayed that the Almighty might guard the Kaiser and protect him for the weal of the mighty German Empire, and the true happiness of Austria-Hungary, which had just recently experienced anew the legendary Nibelungen fidelity of the German Empire. [This was after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (*v.* p. 233), when the German Army had been mobilized against Russia, who had to withdraw her protest.]) The Kaiser replied :

'... For the rest I believe I may gather from your address that it was the realization by the city of Vienna of the fact that, at a severe crisis, the Ally stood beside your gracious sovereign in protective armour. This was an obligation both of duty and friendship: as, for the good of the world at large, the alliance has passed as a priceless element into the conviction and life of both peoples.'

[The official *Reklam* text prints 'in schirmender

Wehr'; the original was 'in glänzender Wehr' (in shining armour)] [*Kaiserreden-Reklam*, IV., p. 218].

KULTUR (*v. also* STATE)

SOME DEFINITIONS

'Historians, philosophers, and political writers, and other apologists of German *Kultur*, want to impose on the world a specifically German manner of thought and feeling' [French Yellow Book, No. 5, July, 1913].

'Man's freedom belongs not to himself, and does not characterize his individuality, only his relation to the community.

'This surrender, and conquest of self, is a feature peculiarly German.

'The individual only possesses personal rights for the service of the community.

'German training is a training for the community. Nowhere is this stronger than in the German endeavour to take over the cultural resources of other nations, and to enrich their own' [Fritz, pp. 9 . . .].

The English characteristic is eudæmonism—happy-go-lucky-ness, an empiricism: the German, an elaborated self-control [Sidler, p. 28].

Patriotism is the conception of the human ideal, a proselytising religion to spread a particular civilization, adapted to the world at large, and based upon a pride of race [Schröer, p. 10].

Freedom and law-abidingness, as in England, stand merely for egoism, not for disciplined enthusiasm [Schröer, p. 23]. (Schröer objects to the English reverence for law, because it impedes direct action, and provides an arbitrary standard of conduct, which may be hypocritical.)

In England there is no single philosophical outlook on life [Schultze, p. 11].

'That civilization is the most ethical which is best adapted to reality, *i.e.*, pays close attention to the actual and discards the spiritual. *Kultur* is the potentiality of thought, and therefore Germany is the most honourable of nations (on this basis). The Measure of Potentiality of Culture is fixed by the value attained in directed Experimental Thought. English patriotism is therefore one at all costs: the German species, one of honour (*i.e.*, thought adapted to the end)' [Verworn, p. 10].

Germany is the most ethical nation in the world: has an ethical genius, as a people [Labberton, I., p. 71].

The German *Kultur* is a national product, the worship of the colossal, a kind of teratology, an adoration of force. It leads to great conceit, bad art, and love of the gigantic [Soesman, p. 9].

'*Kultur* is the exercise of all one's powers directed to the purpose of perfect freedom, perfect independence from everything not ourselves.' '*Kultur* is conscientiousness, thoroughness, and high morals, a peculiarly German mark' [Fichte; *apud* de Beer, p. 86].

Had Oscar Wilde been a German, he would have been in favour at the Kaiser's Court (referring to the Eulenberg scandals) [De Beer, p. 58].

Germany has the monopoly of a *Kulturpolizei* (inspectors to guide public thought) [De Beer, p. 58]; and in Germany the *Kulturkampf* raged for some ten years, under Bismarck—a persecution of the Catholics [*v.* RELIGIOUS ASPECT; De Beer, p. 99; Baudrillart, p. 27].

The whole world is to have all the German excellences: except freedom [De Beer, p. 165].

'A people of high culture, out of one little adapted to concentration and warlike efficiency, must justifiably obey barbarians whose policy and military preparedness are superior' [Lasson, 1868; *apud* De Beer, p. 167; so, too, Giesebrecht, quoted by De Beer; and *v.* PAN-GERMANISM].

'Two great principles are in conflict, the *Entente*, willing to conserve, aiming at higher notions; the German, innocent of honour or right, letting the sword arbitrate' [Kiersch, p. 22].

'Germany is the country of command *par excellence*' [Manen, p. 33].

'In any case motives of culture or civilization cannot properly be adduced as causes of the present horrible war' [Sidler, p. 5].

Note.—The translation of *Kultur* as 'Civilization,' when applied to nations, is approximately accurate. Its strict meaning is, rather, cultivation or culture along the lines of original characteristics. Like the English word 'development,' it is used to mean either the process or the consummation.

LOUVAIN

I.—The proceedings of the Germans in Belgium can only be illustrated in this book ; and an analysis of the tales of Dinant, or Aerschot, or Andenne, etc., would serve as well ; or of Nomeny in France.

The story of Louvain is a sufficient example : the historic fame of the city renders the facts more lurid, though not more humanly horrible.

On Aug. 18, 1914, the Germans were on their way to Louvain, and the Burgomaster issued a proclamation, calling upon the inhabitants to remain peaceable, and surrender all their arms. This was done.

On the 19th at 2 p.m. the Germans entered, and immediately made a requisition of £4,000 ; at 2.30 the German troops paraded through the town. All was calm. Aerschot had been sacked and laid waste a day or two before [*Réponse Belge*, p. 291].

On Aug. 20 a contribution of £4,000, commuted to £600 a day, was levied. The Germans were quartered at the Hôtel-de-Ville, regardless of the danger of fire in this precious building [p. 291].

On Aug. 22 a notice was placarded all over Louvain, recording what had been the barbarities of the Belgians in the conduct of the war. This notice had been printed in anticipation in Germany [p. 292].

On Aug. 23 the German criminals incarcerated at Louvain were released [p. 292].

On Aug. 24 a requisition was made of £500. The Germans were still peaceably disposed, for the outrageous conduct of a German colonel at the station was formally reprimanded by the commandant of the town [p. 293].

On Aug. 25 the German troops were billeted on the inhabitants.

On that day the Germans were surprised and defeated by the Belgian Army, which had made a vigorous sally from Antwerp, and riderless horses were seen galloping into Louvain; the Germans were in disorderly retreat, and were fired on by their own patrols in the outskirts of the town.

Massacre and incendiarism followed almost immediately on the 26th.

On the 27th the civilians were ordered to evacuate Louvain, prior to the bombardment of the city. Over 10,000 were expelled and suffered unimagined hardships. A large number were consigned to German prison-camps.

On the 28th these scenes were still being enacted.

On Aug. 29 the Secretary of the United States Embassy motored over; and the Germans disguised a number of German soldiers to act as *francs-tireurs* at various points in the town, so as to convince the neutral diplomats [p. 298].

The proof of this ruse is contained in several depositions.

(1) The rue Marie-Thérèse was evacuated, save by a German picket. It was there the American Secretary was fired on [p. 383].

(2) To prove the guilt of a priest, a soldier fired into the air [p. 383].

(3) The incendiarism was planned, and the parts of the city to be destroyed had been mapped out [p. 384].

(4) No. 105, rue de la Station was one of the few houses spared in that district. In *Anlage No. 45* a German soldier, Rudolph, deposes that from that house

at 3 p.m., Aug. 25, members of the *Garde Civique* forced their way in with arms. If so, the house would have been burnt down, and the inhabitants punished. So, too, a 'lively' fire was directed by Belgians from No. 120, rue de la Station—which has also been spared! —[p. 322]. The preservation of these houses is a proof of the purpose they had served [p. 313].

(5) Fuse-signals were seen rising from the *Place de la Station*, after which the general fusillade began. The Belgian Army had no such fuses [p. 323].

(6) On houses which were to be spared, a notice was nailed: 'This house is to be spared. It is strictly forbidden to enter houses or set them on fire without leave of the superior officers' [p. 299].

The pillaging went on for eight days, from Aug. 27. In the course of September, a judicial inquiry was held by Baron von der Goltz, Governor of Belgium. The German White Book on the Belgian Atrocities reproduces the German testimony; but only one statement from the Belgian witnesses, that of Professor Lemaire [pp. 300 and 92], who swears he never saw any civilians firing on the Germans, and that a number of houses in the rue Léopold were set on fire.

In the result, in Louvain and the immediate neighbourhood, 210 civilians were massacred, many deported, and 2,117 houses destroyed.

On Jan. 17, 1915, some of the victims were exhumed from a square in Louvain, where, according to the *Kölnische Zeitung*, there had been no burials [*De Tijd*, Jan. 23, 1915; *apud Réponse Belge*, p. 385].

One hundred and eighty-six men, 24 women; or—

Under 5 years of age	3
5—9	0
10—15	5
16—18	6
18—49	127
50—59	40
60—69	18
70—79	7
Over 80]	4
	<hr/>
	210 killed.

This list does not include those who died, or were seriously injured by exposure during evacuation, internment, and deportation.

So much for the sequence of events.

II.—The German accusations are :

(1) There was an insurrection at Louvain in connection with the successful sally from Antwerp.

(2) That on July 26, 27, and 28 there was persistent and regular firing in the streets, which was 'murderous,' 'terrible,' 'a ceaseless rain of bullets,' 'sheer rapid fire.'

(3) That the insurrection was planned by the *Garde Civique*.

(4) That the priests were accomplices in the plot.

(5) That Belgian regulars, dressed as civilians, fired treacherously after the occupation of the town [p. 314].

(6) According to Major von Klewitz 'the conduct of the German troops at Louvain was exemplary.' (For this Major von Klewitz, *v. p. 9.*) Whether the sum total of these accusations could have justified the reprisals is a matter of doubt.

Before discussing these points singly, it is as well to contrast some German allegations.

(a) From the German White Book :

'In face of the brutal attacks to which they were subjected, the German troops had to proceed to energetic reprisals. In accordance with the threats, inhabitants who took part in the attack were shot, and the houses from which they had fired were set on fire. It was impossible to prevent the fire spreading to other houses and gutting several streets ; it was thus that the Cathedral was burnt. Our troops, under the officers' direction, with great self-sacrifice prevented a further spread of the conflagration.'

(b) The *Kölnische Volkszeitung* (Sept. 5 and 10, 1914), *Der Fels* (Sept., 1914), the *Berliner Tageblatt* (Oct. 4, 1914) [pp. 310 and 365], point-blank deny the guilt of any of the clergy, the concealment of any arms in the churches ; and General von Linden-Inden (the general in command of the 10th Army Corps) at Hanover says :

'It is untrue that the many Belgian prisoners at Münster fired on our soldiers : two of them only are merely suspected. It is also false that there were found on any of them hewn-off fingers with rings on them.'

The first and second charges (1) and (2) are out of court. All the arms had been surrendered ; the German casualties (for which there is no medical evidence, nor proof when the wounds were inflicted), by their own admission, amounted to five officers (who were not killed), two clerks, 23 men, and 95 horses : one soldier, Schmidt, passed unscathed through five terrific fusillades : according to a German doctor 'by a miracle this violent fusillade has not wounded one soldier' [p. 345] : and there is evidence [p. 369] that one soldier who was killed, and was pointed out as a victim to a murderous attack, had been dead some hours and killed in the battle outside the town.

As to charge (3), *v. supra*. In all their campaigns, both in 1870 and this war, whenever the Germans sack a town some houses are spared : the inscription is generally 'Hier wohnen gute Leute.'

As to (4) (*v. INDEX*), the Germans cannot defend their own thesis. In any case, the perusal of the German evidence points to the fact that every allegation is at second-hand ; and the witnesses do not give the names of their informants. The Belgian evidence is the direct testimony of eye-witnesses.

As to (5), every army on retreat drops some of its laggards, and some uniforms may well have been found [p. 315]. The Belgian evidence, anyhow, is unanimous, that fires broke out at a given signal, after dusk, in all quarters at once. According to Grondijs, a Dutch neutral eye-witness, the fire in the cathedral broke out at the centre turret.

It is significant that even more exaggerated accounts of the Belgian machine-guns, which appeared in the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* [*v. Frankfurterzeitung*, Sept. 5, 1915], are not reproduced in the German official publication [p. 321].

In this abstract most of the Belgian evidence as to

German savagery has been disregarded ; but systematic starvation, degradation, massacre, are all proved up to the hilt [*Réponse Belge au libre blanc allemand*, 1916, pp. 291-391].

THE LUSITANIA (*v. also* SUBMARINES)

On May 7, 1915, the *Lusitania* was sunk by two, if not three, German submarines. The act was deliberate, for German agents had spread warnings in New York before she sailed. The loss of life was appalling.

On Feb. 18, 1915, Germany had declared a 'submarine blockade' of all the coasts of the British Isles : not but what the cases of torpedoing without notice preceded this formal notice. *E.g.*, on Oct. 26, 1914, the *Amiral Ganteaume*, with 2,000 unarmed refugees, had been sunk in the Channel, and on Jan. 30, 1915, two British merchantmen, and on Feb. 1st the *Asturias*, a British hospital ship. On Feb. 21st the American steamer *Evelyn* was mined off Borkum.

On March 1st Asquith proclaimed a general policy of blockade of the German coast, to prevent any trading ; and followed this up with an Order in Council declaring the North Sea a closed area. (Yet responsible German writers often complain of this Order as tyrannical, and declare that it preceded the 'submarine blockade'.)

American indignation was aroused at the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and President Wilson despatched, on May 15, 1915, a Note that may be thus summarized :

May 15, 1915. I.—The German methods of retaliation for loss of commerce are inadmissible, as incompatible with the freedom of the seas, and the Government must be held to strict accountability for all infringements of American rights.

II.—The practical impossibility of employing submarines to destroy commerce, without an infringement of the accepted rules of justice and humanity, is insisted on (*v. U.S.A.*).

III.—The indisputable right of American citizens

. . . with confidence that their lives will not be illegally endangered is firmly maintained.

IV.—A demand for the disavowal of the act by the German Government, and steps to prevent the recurrence of such acts.

V.—Expressions of regret and offers of reparation cannot excuse a practice the natural necessary effect of which is to subject neutral nations . . . to new and immeasurable risks.

VI.—The German Government must not expect the United States to 'omit any word or act' necessary to preserve the rights of American citizens.

On June 1, 1915, Germany at last replied to the following effect :

Germany had been willing from the outset to abandon submarine warfare against merchantmen in response to a return by England to the accepted regulations of war regarding contraband. It was not Germany's, but England's, fault that America's well-meant proposals for commerce failed.

The question of foodstuffs and raw materials was not a question of necessity for Germany, but one of principle. Germany has shown that she cannot be starved out by Great Britain's embargo on foodstuffs. . . . 'We may be a little short. . . . The same is true of raw materials. . . . The analogy of the besieged fortress does not apply to Germany. . . . There is no precedent for the siege of the civilian population in its own land with no possibility of escape' [Interview with Herr von Jagow, *Times*].

The American reply came, with less delay, on June 12th, and may be thus summarized :

In case of the *Falaba*, America does not admit that if a merchantman tries to escape, this disculpates the captor from rescuing the passengers.

It was officially certified that the *Lusitania* had no guns, masked or otherwise, was *not* transporting Canadian soldiers : otherwise she would not have obtained her clearance papers.

On the principle of humanity, to sink a great liner carrying over one thousand passengers was nefarious.

The proclamation of a war-zone from which neutral ships have been warned off does not abbreviate the rights of American citizens travelling in merchant ships of the belligerent nations.

■ The captor is bound to investigate the character of the suspected merchantman.

The Government of the United States called for assurances from Germany in all of these senses.

The German reply was again delayed one month, and still equivocated; completely disregarding the disproof that the *Lusitania* was carrying contraband—a matter on which British evidence might also be cited, in addition to American.

It may be observed that the provision of painting neutral colours on the hulls of neutral vessels has not saved them from attack by German submarines.

The German Note in reply states (July 10th):

‘The Imperial Government has learned with satisfaction that the Government of the United States anxiously desires to see the principles of humanity observed in the present war. . . . With appalling clearness the case of the *Lusitania* shows to what an extent the methods of warfare of our enemies endanger human life.

‘The advice to British merchant vessels to arm themselves and to ram submarines . . . abolished all distinction between merchant and war vessels, and thus neutrals travelling or merchant vessels were in an increased degree exposed to all the dangers of war.

‘If the commander of the submarine which destroyed the *Lusitania* had allowed the crew and passengers to take to the boats before firing a torpedo, this would have meant the destruction of his own boat.

‘In order to avoid endangering American passenger steamers, German submarines will be instructed to allow such passenger vessels to pass unmolested if they bear special distinguishing marks, and if notice is given of their departure a reasonable time in advance, but the Imperial Government hopes that the American Government will guarantee that such vessels carry no contraband.

'In order to supply sufficient means of transport for American citizens across the Atlantic, the German Government proposes to increase the available number of steamers by a reasonable number of neutral steamers, the number of which must be agreed upon beforehand, to sail as passenger ships under the American flag, under the conditions above mentioned for American steamers.'

On July 15th Germany apologized for sinking the *Nebraskan* as an 'unfortunate incident.'

On July 24, 1915, the United States replied to Germany:

'The Note of the Imperial German Government dated July 8th has received the careful consideration of the Government of the United States. It regrets that it is obliged to say that it has found it most unsatisfactory, because it . . . proposes arrangements for the partial suspension of those principles [the accepted principles of the law of humanity] which virtually set them aside.

'The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction that the Imperial German Government recognises without reservation the validity of the principles . . . that the high seas are free; that the character and cargo of a merchantman must first be ascertained, before it can be lawfully seized or destroyed; and that the lives of non-combatants may in no case be put into jeopardy, unless the vessel resists or seeks to escape after it has been summoned to submit to examination. For a belligerent act of retaliation is *per se* an act beyond the law; and defence of the act retaliatory is an admission that it is illegal. The Government of the United States is, however, keenly disappointed to find that the Imperial German Government regards itself to a large degree exempted from the obligation to observe these principles, even where neutral vessels are concerned, by what it believes the policy and practice of the Government of Great Britain to be in regard to neutral commerce. . . . The Government of the United States cannot discuss the policy of the Government of Great Britain, except with that Government itself, and

must regard the conduct of other belligerent Governments as irrelevant to any discussion with the Imperial German Government. . . .

' If a belligerent cannot retaliate against an enemy without injuring the lives of neutrals . . . humanity, as well as justice and due regard for the dignity of neutral Powers, should dictate that the practice be discontinued. . . .

' The Government of the United States is not unmindful of the extraordinary conditions created by this war. . . . It is ready to make every reasonable allowance for these novel and unexpected aspects of war at sea, but it cannot consent to abate any essential or fundamental right of its people because of a mere alteration in circumstances. . . . The events of the past two months have clearly indicated that it is possible and practicable to conduct such submarine operations within the so-called war-zone in substantial accord with the accepted practices of regulated warfare. . . .

' In view of the admission of illegality made by the Imperial Government when it pleaded the right of retaliation . . . the Government of the United States cannot believe that the Imperial Government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the *Lusitania*. . . .

' The Government of the United States, whilst not indifferent to the friendly spirit in which it is made, cannot accept the suggestion that certain vessels be designated by agreement of the Imperial Government, which should be free on the seas now illegally proscribed. The very agreement would by implication subject other vessels to illegal attack, and be a curtailment, and therefore an abandonment of the principles for which this Government contends. . . .

' The Governments of the United States and of Germany . . . are both contending for the freedom of the seas. . . . The Imperial German Government expresses the hope that this object may in some measure be accomplished even before the present war ends. It can.

' In the meantime . . . friendship itself prompts the

United States Government to say that repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly.'

This could only be construed as an ultimatum; but, as America showed no signs of following her protest up with force, Germany still dallied: and it was only at the end of August that there were any signs of compunction—no doubt facilitated by the havoc which had meantime been wrought by the British Navy amongst the submarine raiders.

On Aug. 28th it was reported that Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, promised that full satisfaction should be given for the sinking of the *Arabic*, and had explained that German submarine commanders had been ordered no longer to attack merchantmen without warning.

On Sept. 2nd this was confirmed. Bernstorff sent Lansing (American Secretary for Foreign Affairs) this memorandum:

'MY DEAR SECRETARY,

'In reference to our conversation of to-day, I beg to inform you that my instructions regarding our answer to your last *Lusitania* note contain the following passage: "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without ensuring the safety of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance."

'Although I know you do not wish to discuss the *Lusitania* question until the *Arabic* incident has been definitely and satisfactorily settled, I desire to inform you of the above, because this policy was decided upon before the *Arabic* incident occurred.

'(Signed) BERNSTORFF.'

On Sept. 9th, according to reports from Berlin at Washington, the *Arabic* was stated to have been sunk in self-defence.

In the meantime other negotiations had been pending;

Dumba, the Austrian Ambassador, had been proved guilty of instigating plots to destroy munition works in the country to which he was accredited; on Oct. 6th he was literally compelled to leave America, and was followed on Dec. 4th by Boy-Ed, and von Papen, *attachés* to the German Embassy (*v. p.* 292).

At this point Germany, by provoking new discussions on other outrages, such as the sinking of the *Falaba*, *Arabic*, and other vessels, had diverted the course of negotiation, and when, on Nov. 11, 1915, the *Ancona* (sailing to New York) was sunk by a submarine waving the Austrian flag, American wrath was turned on to Austria. On Dec. 8th a peremptory Note was sent to Vienna, demanding an utter disavowal, the punishment of the captain responsible, an indemnity for the American victims, and assurances against any repetitions of such acts; and a second note on Dec. 22nd.

On Dec. 16th Vienna asked for fuller particulars, and on Dec. 31st apologized in full for 'an incident which, from the humane point of view, is deeply to be regretted.' She promised an indemnity.

In January, 1916, the question of the *Lusitania* was revived. On Jan. 8th the German Embassy published a statement that it was authorized to settle the *Lusitania* controversy in terms satisfactory to the United States Government, and 'is willing to disavow the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and to admit that the torpedoing of the vessel was an illegal act, but committed under extenuating circumstances.' The memorandum admitted that the rules of international law had not been regarded in the North Sea and the Atlantic.

But, to qualify this admission, Germany began reiterating a former claim.

On Feb. 10th the German Government handed in a memorandum addressed to all the neutral Powers, to the effect that merchant vessels, if armed, whether for defence or otherwise, were not entitled to be regarded as peaceful merchantmen, but as belligerents.

The United States would not recognise this new claim (Feb. 17, 1916).

But the effect was again to postpone the question of compensation for the *Lusitania*; as the settlement of the claims due on the *Lusitania* were postponed, pending the controversy as to the arming of merchantmen (Feb. 18th).

On March 9th Germany presented a Note to the United States to the effect that the Allies were illegally preventing neutral trade from reaching Germany, and were intercepting neutral mails; and that Germany, after submarines had, against her will, sunk neutral vessels, had complied with the wishes of the United States with regard to submarines, and did not attack neutrals. Yet England now illegally armed merchantmen, instructed them to attack submarines, and so rendered the use of submarines impossible for the purpose of arresting hostile trade, according to the principles set forth in the Declaration of London.

On Feb. 29, 1916, Count Bernstorff handed in a new memorandum: to the effect that unarmed liners and merchantmen will not be sunk without warning, unless there is proof that they are armed. The memorandum suggests that our merchant ships are instructed to attack submarines, with the object of insinuating that legal armaments for defence are offensive; a doctrine which leaves plenty of latitude for 'mistakes.'

In this connection it is worth while recalling a German regulation of 1914 [*Who are the Huns?* p. 365]:

'The German Prize Court Law of 1909 was given a special appendix on June 22, 1914; that is, before the beginning of the war, in which it was plainly stated that all hostile acts on the part of an armed merchant vessel would be regarded as piracy, and the crews were to be treated as freebooters and pirates, and not as regular troops, "in accordance with the regulations appertaining to extraordinary acts of war."'

Mr. Van der Veer, however, points out that this doctrine is contrary to German teaching on this point [*Times*, Aug. 1, 1916].

'Sir,—It may be useful for neutrals to have a proof, based on German theory, that the captain of the *Brussels* was legally justified in acting as he did against a German submarine.

'The manual on the rules of warfare at sea, *Das Seekriegsrecht*, written by

legal assessor Dr. Hans Wehberg, of Düsseldorf, a recognised German authority on international law, who finished his book three months after the war had begun and published it at the beginning of last year, states (p. 282) :—
 “As already pointed out, the resistance of neutral merchant ships against search is not allowable. Enemy merchantmen may, on the contrary, resist capture by force.”

‘Against the German excuse that Captain Fryatt acted as *franc-tireur*, Dr. Wehberg says on pp. 283 and 284 :—“It is unfounded to say : Because in war on land armed resistance may not be carried out by civilians, therefore that is also the case in war at sea. It could then equally be said : In war on land the private property is unassailable, therefore the same must apply to war at sea. But we have repeatedly stated in this work that that hypothesis is untenable. . . . The doctrine : ‘Armed resistance is only allowed to organized troops,’ is in this general view just as false as the assertion that war is but a legal condition between States, which excludes the peaceful population.”

‘Dr. Wehberg also says (p. 286) :—“The act of resistance has no influence on the fate of the crew of an enemy merchantman.” By what right then did the German authorities shoot Captain Fryatt as a *franc-tireur* ? Only by the arbitrary German doctrine that “might is right.”

‘Surely the whole civilized world must condemn in the strongest possible manner such brutal practices. How much longer will the neutral world allow Germany to continue her illegal and shocking atrocities ? Have neutrals but only regard for their own monetary interest while disregarding the far higher moral issues in this war at stake ?

‘Yours, etc.,

‘JOHN C. VAN DER VEER, London.

‘Editor of the *Amsterdam Telegraaf*.’

In July, 1916, Captain Fryatt of the *Brussels* was executed on this same pretext ; and Germany justifies herself thus (Aug. 1, 1916) ; (none of the evidence has been published) :

‘It is only too intelligible that the English Government attempts to justify Captain Fryatt’s action, for it is itself in a high degree a fellow culprit. Captain Fryatt, acting as he did, acted only on the advice of his Government.

‘The British Government’s statement intentionally misleads. Captain Fryatt did not attempt to forestall an underwater attack without warning by the submarine.

‘The U boat was above water, and signalled to him when above water to stop, according to the international code. Therefore he did not merely attempt to save the lives of his crew, because they were not endangered.

‘Moreover, on March 28, 1915, Captain Fryatt allowed

the submarine which was approaching his ship for examination to draw up close so as to ram her suddenly, his object being to destroy her and so gain the reward offered by the British Government.

'This was not an act of self-defence, but a cunning attack by hired assassins. Captain Fryatt boasted of his action, though happily he failed to attain his object.

'This was brought home to him during the trial by witnesses from the crew of the submarine in question, whose evidence was against him. The British Parliament believed he had succeeded, and praised his conduct, and the British Government rewarded him.

'The German war tribunal sentenced him to death because he had performed an act of war against the German sea forces, although he did not belong to the armed forces of his country. He was not deliberately shot in cold blood without due consideration, but as a *franc-tireur*, after calm consideration and thorough investigation.

'As martial law on land protects the soldiery against assassination by threatening the offender with the penalty of death, so it protects the members of the sea forces against assassination at sea. Germany will continue to use this law of warfare to save her submarine crews from becoming the victims of *francs-tireurs* at sea.—Reuter.'

The controversy between the United States and Germany was aggravated in April, 1916, by the torpedoing of the Channel passenger steamer *Sussex* without notice; and, after much prevarication, Germany had to admit on May 10th that the *Sussex* had been torpedoed by a German submarine; that the guilty commander had been punished, and that Germany would indemnify the States for any damage to Americans injured by the explosion.

Again, the chain of negotiations had been interrupted by the claims arising on the *Sussex*; but America still insisted on the general proposition; and on May 4th Herr von Jagow handed Mr. Gerard at Berlin a reply to the American protest.

This document [*Times*, May 6, 1916] is thus summarized by the *Times* :

'The American Note, which was sent as a result of the attack on the *Sussex*, was practically an ultimatum. It recapitulated the chief German crimes at sea, which were described as "wanton and lacking every justification," recalled Germany's many broken promises, and declared :

If the Imperial Government should not now, without delay, proclaim and make effective renunciation of its present methods of warfare against passengers and cargo ships, the United States can have no other choice than to break off completely diplomatic relations with the German Government.

'In reply to this clear, unequivocal pronouncement Germany has sent a Note in which the following are the chief points :

I. Germany reserves further communication in regard to the *Sussex* until certain points of 'decisive importance' have been ascertained.

II. The American statement that the sinking of the *Sussex* was but one incident in a long series of deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on ships of all nationalities is denied. On the contrary, Germany has instituted a 'far-reaching restraint' on the use of her submarine weapon solely in the interests of neutrals. Submarine commanders have orders to act in accordance with the general principles of International Law, except against enemy ships carrying enemy goods in the war zone. 'Errors,' however, have 'actually occurred.'

III. America is blamed for the greater part of the 'accidents' to American citizens, because she refused to accept Germany's proposals made 'in order to reduce to a minimum for American travellers and goods the inherent dangers of naval warfare.' Germany still stands by her former proposals.

IV. Germany cannot dispense with her submarine warfare, which she has adopted 'in self-defence against the illegal conduct of British warfare, while fighting a bitter struggle for national existence,' but she will make a 'further concession,' in spite of the fact that America has not shown adequate 'fervour' about the millions of German women and children whom Great Britain desires to starve. The 'concession' is that submarine commanders are to act in accordance with the principles of International Law *both within and without* the war zone—*i.e.*, no ship anywhere shall be sunk without warning and without saving the lives of those on board, unless she attempts to escape or offers resistance.

V. In return for this 'concession' Germany expects that America 'will now also consider all impediments removed which may have been in the way of mutual co-operation towards the restoration of the freedom of the seas,' and that America will 'demand and insist that the British Government shall forthwith observe the rules of International Law universally recognised before the war.'

VI. Should America not succeed in getting 'the laws of humanity followed by all belligerent nations' Germany reserves 'complete liberty of decision.'

'It may be recalled that the American reply to the German Note of July 8th last said :

The Government of the United States cannot discuss the policy of the Government of Great Britain in regard to neutral trade except with that Government itself, and must regard the conduct of other belligerent Governments as irrelevant to any discussion with the Imperial German Government of what this Government regards as grave and unjustifiable violations of the rights of American citizens. . . .'

All these questions are still pending: There is no authentic news that any of the claims of any neutral power on Germany, for neutral ships wantonly sunk without notice or warning have been met.

Possibly, German submarines have been more chary of attacking American vessels of late ; possibly they have not had free play.

Whatever grudging admissions Germany may have made in her negotiations with the States as published, the correspondence shows clearly that she has never retracted her original position that any merchantman which resists piratical attack by a submarine, which cannot by its very nature exercise the right of search at sea and in a legitimate way, is a freebooter or *franc-tireur*.

From the *Times* (May 12, 1916) the following official figures are derived, showing to what an extent German submarines have sunk both British and Allies' ships, as well as neutrals, without any warning.

BRITISH SHIPS IN 1915

Jan. 30	..	<i>Tokomaru</i>	March 9	..	<i>Blackwood</i>
Feb. 15	..	<i>Dulwich</i>	March 9	..	<i>Princess Victoria</i>
Feb. 20	..	<i>Cambank</i>	March 11	..	<i>Florazan</i>
Feb. 23	..	<i>Branksome Chine</i>	March 13	..	<i>Invergyle</i>
Feb. 23	..	<i>Oakby</i>	March 18	..	<i>Glenartney</i>
Feb. 24	..	<i>Western Coast</i>	March 21	..	<i>Cairntorr</i>
Feb. 24	..	<i>Rio Parand</i>	March 22	..	<i>Concord</i>
Feb. 24	..	<i>Harpalion</i>	April 1	..	<i>Sevens Sea</i>
March 7	..	<i>Bengrove</i>	April 4	..	<i>City of Bremen</i>

BRITISH SHIPS IN 1915.—(Continued)

April 10 ..	<i>Harpalyce</i>	June 15 ..	<i>Strathnairn</i>
April 15 ..	<i>Ptarmigan</i>	June 28 ..	<i>Dumfriesshire</i>
April 18 ..	<i>Vanilla</i>	July 18 ..	<i>Batoum</i>
May 1 ..	<i>Edale</i>	July 28 ..	<i>Mangara</i>
May 3 ..	<i>Minterns</i>	Aug. 1 ..	<i>Fulgens</i>
May 6 ..	<i>Centurion</i>	Aug. 10 ..	<i>Rosalie</i>
May 7 ..	<i>Lusitania</i>	Aug. 16 ..	<i>Serbino</i>
May 18 ..	<i>Drumcbree</i>	Aug. 19 ..	<i>Arabic</i>
May 19 ..	<i>Dumfries</i>	Sept. 12 ..	<i>Asbmore</i>
June 1 ..	<i>Saidieb</i>	Nov. 19 ..	<i>Hallamsbire</i>
June 4 ..	<i>Imkum</i>	Dec. 20 ..	<i>Huntly</i>
June 6 ..	<i>Stratbcarron</i>	Dec. 20 ..	<i>Belford</i>
June 12 ..	<i>Leuctra</i>	Dec. 28 ..	<i>Huronian</i>

BRITISH SHIPS IN 1916

Feb. 1 ..	<i>Belle of France</i>	April 6 ..	<i>Yonno</i>
March 7 ..	<i>Harmatris</i>	April 6 ..	<i>Vennacher</i>
March 18 ..	<i>Lowlands</i>	April 7 ..	<i>Braunton</i>
March 19 ..	<i>Fort Dalbousie</i>	April 10 ..	<i>Silksworth Hall</i>
March 22 ..	<i>Kelvinbank</i>	April 10 ..	<i>Robert Adamson</i>
March 24 ..	<i>Salybia</i>	April 21 ..	<i>Felisiana</i>
March 27 ..	<i>Manchester Engineer</i>	April 22 ..	<i>Tregantle</i>
April 1 ..	<i>Pertb</i>	May 8 ..	<i>Cymric</i>
April 5 ..	<i>Zent</i>		

NEUTRAL SHIPS TORPEDOED WITHOUT WARNING
BY GERMAN SUBMARINES.

1915

Feb. 19	<i>Belridge</i>	Norwegian
March 13	<i>Hannab</i>	Swedish
April 3	<i>Douro</i>	Portuguese
April 14	<i>Folke</i>	Swedish
April 15	<i>Katwijk</i>	Dutch
April 17	<i>Ellispontos</i>	Greek
May 2	<i>Gulflight</i>	American
May 7	<i>Ellen</i>	Swedish
May 25	<i>Nebraskan</i>	American
May 26	<i>Betty</i>	Danish
June 9	<i>Svein Farl</i>	Norwegian
July 14	<i>Rym</i>	Norwegian
August 18	<i>Magda</i>	Norwegian
August 27	<i>Uranus</i>	Swedish]

NEUTRAL SHIPS TORPEDOED WITHOUT WARNING
BY GERMAN SUBMARINES.

1916

March 9	<i>Silius (s.v.)</i>	Norwegian
March 15	<i>Tubantia</i>	Dutch
March 18	<i>Palembang</i>	Dutch
March 20	<i>Skodsborg</i>	Danish
March 20	<i>Langeli</i>	Norwegian
March 23	<i>Kannik</i>	Norwegian
March 27	<i>Harriet</i>	Danish
March 31	<i>Hollandia</i>	Swedish
April 1	<i>Peter Hamre</i>	Norwegian
April 5	<i>Baus</i>	Norwegian
April 7	<i>Eemdijk</i>	Dutch
April 7	<i>Rijndijk</i>	Dutch
April 8	<i>Santenderino</i>	Spanish
April 9	<i>Sjöllyst</i>	Norwegian
April 30	<i>Vinifreda</i>	Spanish

' In addition to the above, there are several cases in which there is no reasonable doubt that the vessel was sunk by torpedo fired without warning from a submarine, but in the absence of actual proof, due to the lack of survivors or from other causes, these cases are omitted from this list.'

The following are some of the views expressed by pamphleteers :

Pro : Germany has never used women and children as cover for hostile preparations : there were at least 5,000 cases of cartridges on board [Dieren, p. 29; *Blätter für Zwischenstaatliche Organisation, Zürich, May 1915*]. The *Lusitania* was an armed cruiser [*Who are the Huns? p. 367*].

Con : Even supposing the *Lusitania* had been carrying contraband, the proper course was to take her into a German or neutral port and get her condemned by a Prize Court. This was the course followed by the *Moewe* with regard to the *Appam*. To sink vessels at sight, because a belligerent has not command of the sea, is not warfare (*v. SUBMARINES*). Apart from this practice, Germany has used women and children in Belgium as a living shield [*v. p. 17*]. Furthermore

[*v. Times*] the British Admiralty and the United States authorities explicitly deny the allegation that there was any contraband on board. The policy of barbarity illustrated by the *Lusitania* is utterly condemned [Mandere, p. 168].

Moreover, in the case of the *Ophelia*, it was the Germans who made use of the cover of the Geneva flag to carry ammunition [Foreign Office Papers, May 20 and July 5, 1915]; yet, in the course of the parleying with the United States, the German Government wrote: 'The case of the *Lusitania* shows with horrible clearness to what jeopardizing of human lives the manner of war conducted by our adversaries leads,' as though it had not been a German torpedo. (*Cf.* p. 304, where the guilt of causing the war is attributed to England, because she would not acquiesce in the predatory intentions of Germany.) [Morgan, pp. 22 and 23].

Pro : Germany was merely instrumental in sinking the *Lusitania*; she was incited by England. But the greatest responsibility falls upon America [as it was an armed cruiser]. Letter of Protest of German-Americans [Rouquette, p. 128].

LUXEMBURG

Pro : Only the neutrality of Luxemburg was guaranteed; not the independence or territory [Roggen, p. 100].

Con : 'Gentlemen, we stand now on guard perforce: necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, possibly trodden Belgian soil. Gentlemen, this is contrary to international law' [The German Chancellor, Aug. 4, 1914; *v. also* BELGIUM—NEUTRALITY; MIGHT AND RIGHT].

Pro : In 1829 and 1866 Tuillierand and Napoleon III. respectively were negotiating to annex Luxemburg [Kraaijenhoff, p. 13].

It is suggested that Luxemburg might be assigned to Belgium as compensation [*Dietsche Stemmen*, March-April, 1916, p. 506].

Con : 'The neutrality of Luxemburg was recognised by Bismarck "up to judgment day." Who would believe he would have said this, had he known the circumstances of the year 1914?' [Molenbroek, p. 6].

The neutrality of Luxemburg was designed merely against France, but international law never holds under stress of necessity. Had Germany announced her intentions earlier, she would have provoked war sooner [*ibid.*, pp. 7-8].

(Is it not obvious that whatever the origin of law, it stands valid against all changes, until finally abrogated, or fallen into tacit desuetude?)

The invasion of Belgium and Luxemburg was unjustified [Potthoff, p. 42].

In the course of the invasion, the stationmaster at Trois Vierges was seized, communication with Belgium cut off, and the tunnel blown up *before* the ultimatum to Belgium [Gierke, p. 62].

In point of fact, the Great Powers, when they created the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, had assigned Luxemburg a special and complex status. The Belgian provinces were ceded to the King of the Netherlands as an increase of territory, but Luxemburg, as an indemnity for the loss of the German domains of Orange-Nassau, was annexed to Prussia, and made into the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg, descendible in the house of Orange-Nassau in succession male, but forming a part of the German Confederation. The City of Luxemburg was turned into a federal fortress with a Prussian garrison; and the State a state of the German Confederation, only personally attached to the Netherlands. But King William I. of the Netherlands treated Luxemburg as a province of his Kingdom.

The Revolution of 1830 (when Belgium seceded) cut Luxemburg into two; the town, with its Prussian garrison, was the only part which remained loyal to the King.

The rest of the country rose and joined hands with Belgium. Only a portion was left at the settlement to Belgium; the rest, the present Grand-Duchy, was restored to Holland, but in 1843 entered into the German Customs Union. When the Germanic Confederation was dissolved (in 1866) the King is said to have wanted to sell Luxemburg to France, but Prussia objected. Prussia withdrew her garrison, and the Great Powers in 1867 by international convention defined Luxemburg as a sovereign neutral State, guaranteed by the Powers, forbidden to have either an army or fortifications.

In 1890 the male line failed: Wilhelmina became Queen of Holland, and Luxemburg passed to the nearest agnate, the Duke of Nassau [Seignobos, pp. 225-6].

MARINISM

Marinism or navalism is the word used by German and pro-German pamphleteers to characterize English policy as against the militarism of Prussia. The following remarks illustrate the point of view.

Pro : The Germans insist on re-establishing 'the freedom of the seas.'

Con : The Freedom of the Seas as a doctrine was recognised first by the Treaty of Paris, 1856, Great Britain being the last to accept it; the United States (who insisted hardest in 1882 on the neutralization of the Suez Canal) have not yet (1883) formally adhered to the doctrine [Fournier, p. 100].

Pro : 'The talk of German militarism recalls the old parable of the mote and the beam. Is not Britain's supremacy of the sea built up on a military system? Can one imagine a more widespread militarism than that which stretches its recruiting nets over five continents,

which reaches gratefully after the straw held by Republican Portugal, and which advertises in every newspaper and at every street corner "the need for more men"?' [Svén Hedin, p. 356].

Con : 'Rivalry with the fleets of England and France I would regard as an exaggeration, but we must be strong enough to avoid being washed off the seas by second-class Powers, especially by those second-class Powers which we cannot reach by land. Our defensive armaments will be adequate, if we have a certain number of armoured ships, especially for the protection of our merchant vessels in distant seas. For this purpose we must have cruisers, and we need more of these than we possess at present' [Bismarck, 1895; *Times*, Sept. 12, 1908].

The fleet is essential to an island, which depends on its commerce for its life : it is defensive.

The English recruiting only embraced the homeland ; the colonies volunteered.

The army had to be increased at the outbreak of war from about 150,000 to 5,000,000.

Regarding Portugal, *v.* PORTUGAL.

'I consider it expedient that the German people should clearly understand what dangers threaten from England, and how they can be met.

'In view of these dangers and the circumstances that we are not strong enough to entertain any idea of provoking a battle . . . the plan might be formed of anticipating the enemy by a sudden attack. . . . In this way the English fleet might be badly damaged at the outset . . . its superiority lessened. . . .

'The war against English commerce must be boldly and energetically prosecuted, and should start unexpectedly. The prizes which fall into our hands must be remorselessly destroyed. . . . The sharpest measures must be taken against neutral ships laden with contraband. Nevertheless, no very valuable results are to be expected from a war against English trade. . . . Under these circumstances nothing would be left to us but to retire with our war-fleet under the guns of our coast-

fortifications and by the use of mines to protect our own shores. . . . It would be necessary to take further steps to secure the importation from abroad of supplies necessary to us. . . . The simplest and cheapest way would be if we obtain foreign goods through Holland, or perhaps neutral Belgium, and could export some part of our own products through the great Dutch and Flemish ports. New commercial roads could be discovered through Denmark. . . . Such measures would prevent an absolute stagnation of trade.

'Free commerce with Sweden is essential to us, since our industries will depend more and more on the Swedish iron-ore' [Bernhardi (1911), pp. 156 . . .].

Pro : The Declaration of London was never accepted by England, and English navalism is the real danger. England never established a legitimate blockade, and insists on the doctrine of continuous voyage [*Who are the Huns?* p. 273].

Con : *v.* RIGHT OF SEARCH for reply.

Pro : The British fleet would not fight; merely wanted to starve the Central Powers. There must be a maritime balance of power, so that all raw materials may pass freely over the seas [Révai, pp. 96 and 100; Sidler, p. 18]. Russia and France are the real victims of England's marinism, and are blinded by Teutonophobia [Sidler, p. 20].

Con : Naval action was delayed until both fleets met. There have been actions off Coronel and the Falkland Isles and the Skager-rak. (For the exercise of naval power, as illustrated by English and German practice, *v.* SUBMARINES.)

We are supplying ammunition and men and commodities. The victims seem content.

Pro : If Germany wins, and the British fleet is annihilated, Holland will be quite prosperous [Dieren, p. 104].

Con : *v.* SLESWIG and SMALL NATIONALITIES. There was an increasing apprehension of German designs in England from 1902 onwards, due to German naval expansion, in despite of the English propositions for a

reduction in naval armaments, with or without co-operation by Germany. In 1914 the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal at Kiel had been sufficiently deepened to permit of the passage of the largest man-of-war. The Liberal Cabinet in power from 1907 to 1914 offered Germany a permanent ratio of naval power on the basis of 16 to 10.

In 1908 Lloyd George gave the assurance he would joyously shake hands with Germany, if her hand were loyally stretched forth. Bassermann and Bülow refused. McKenna in 1909, Asquith in 1910, Sir Edward Grey in 1911, Lord Haldane in 1912 still tried; Germany steadily refused: the utmost obtained was 'an understanding, not a written agreement' to defer by agreement the execution of naval contracts.

In 1912-13 Churchill proposed a naval holiday; and in 1912 Grey gave Germany the following promise: 'The two Powers being naturally desirous of securing peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.'

Meanwhile (*v.* GERMANY—COMMERCE) the English markets were open free to all German trade. Germany was hedged in with a high tariff-wall. [*J'accuse*, pp. 70-79, 90, 99].

Con : In the report of the battle off Skager-rak the German papers boasted that their ships had fought outside the range of the coastal fortifications [*v. Times*].

Pro : The British wrongfully use neutral flags [*Who are the Huns?* p. 333].

Con : The use of neutral flags has always been a legitimate ruse. Since the war, Germany has insisted on neutral ships being painted in the national colours, and has thus disguised her own; *e.g.*, the *Moewe*, and the 'Norwegian' ship that convoyed Casement.

MIGHT AND RIGHT

Pro : 'The war should not leave the vanquished anything save his eyes with which to weep. Modesty on our part would be sheer folly.'

'Justice and injustice are words void of meaning in the domain of high politics. Expediency and disadvantage are the only governing principles. . . .'
[Tannenbergh, pp. 304 and 180].

Germany was justified by considerations of strategy in declaring war on Belgium for refusing a passage [Molenbroek, II., p. 37 ; Picard, p. 30]. 'France could wait ; we could not.' 'Were we to wait in patience until the Powers, between which we were wedged in, should have chosen their time to declare themselves?' [Bethmann-Hollweg, Aug. 4, 1914].

Con : 'If we look at France first, we are entitled to assume that single-handed she is not a match for us. The French army lacks subordination under a single commander, the united spirit which characterizes the German army, the tenacious strength of the German race, and the *esprit de corps* of the officers. France, too, has not those national reserves available which would allow us almost to double our forces' [Bernhardi (1911), p. 146].

'Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against complete subjugation. A Russian war can hardly ever become a struggle for political existence . . . the inhabitants will hardly show self-devotion in wars, the object of which cannot be clear to them' [*ibid.*, p. 149 ; 1911].

It was well known in 1914 that the French Army was unready, and the Russian Army could not mobilize nearly as quickly as the German. Why therefore could not Germany wait ? Serbia [*v. SERBIA* and No. 46 French Yellow Book] had accepted every demand of Austria, and the *Entente* would have seen them enforced.

Germany could not wait, because the military engine had been started and was under way.

Pro : Sentimental policy is idiocy ; humane dreams are stupidity. The division of the good things should begin at home. Politics is a business. Justice and injustice are notions only applicable to civil life.

The German people is always right, because it is the German people, and has 87 millions [*v. p.* 169]. Our fathers have left us a good deal to clear up [Tannenberg, p. 297].

Con : Germany will conquer by virtue of her essential superiority, by civilization against barbarism, not by rule of force [Chamberlain, p. 90].

Pro : The proceedings of the Congress of Vienna (1815) in recasting Europe, the action of Prussia in annexing Hanover, etc., etc., show that no regard should be paid to any principle of legitimacy [Tannenberg, pp. 105 . . .]. The political behaviour of a State is governed only by its own interests [Bernhardi, p. 274].

Con : *i.e.*, two blacks make one white.

Pro : Germany is justified by necessity in withdrawing her promises, and by the obsolescence of the treaties [Labberton, II., p. 35]. But England's attitude was unjustified and mere legalism [*ibid.*, p. 38]. 'Between States there in only one form of law, the right of the stronger' [Lasson (1868)].

Con : There was no evidence of military necessity [Labberton, II., p. 37].

'The treaty subsisted and had not been consigned to oblivion' [Poll, p. 130].

'Agreements and contracts lose all their meaning, when the moral duty of respecting them is not recognised' [*Kölnische Volkszeitung*, March 13, 1915].

'You should further know that there are two *genera* of fighting, the one by law, the other by force ; the former pertaineth to man, and the latter to the beast : but, inasmuch as the former is oft insufficient, needs must we have recourse to the second' [Machiavelli, chap. xviii. ; Poll, pp. 11, 12, 25].

'The Germans are very addicted to theoretic thought ; whatever they desire in this form is called "Wissenschaftlichkeit." Just as the savage carves himself a

fetish, and then ascribes to it all sorts of divine powers, so the German works out a theory on something or other, and then believes he has really discovered the truth of the matter. Thus their last point of view is that might stands above right. . . . But if soon, as we may expect, Germany has not the power, she also has not the right, and has done a grievous wrong, for which she must be heavily fined ' [*Nog wat losse*, p. 19]; (*v. also WAR and STATE and GERMANY*).

' When the mania of greatness meets with external resistance, the mania of persecution immediately breaks out ; and that is what has already happened. Germany has begun to complain of being envied, thwarted unfairly by all, plotted against and persecuted. It curses the wrong-headed resistance of ungrateful peoples who do not wish to know happiness under German discipline. Belgium persists in not letting herself be finished off. France will yield neither money, territory, colonies, nor liberty. The English cousins, traitors, will not allow to be taken from them quietly all the means of life, and everything that makes life worth living. Italy fancies that she has a personality of her own. Russia, the barbarian, will not let one even strangle little Serbia. It is a downright conspiracy of wilful wickedness.

' The more simple-minded Germans, stuffed full of official fictions, ask themselves with surprise why Germany is so antipathetic to every one.

' The reason is immediately found by the megalomaniac intellectuals ; it is envy of their genius, strength, and prosperity ' [*Lugaro*, pp. 131-2].

MILITARISM

England is said to be at war to crush Prussian 'militarism.' The phrase needs definition (*v. also STATE*). The meaning may be said to be that we must crush the spirit of military assertiveness, which has laid hold of the entirety of Prussian and German thought,

administration, and education, and has usurped supreme control over all the civilian and peaceful pursuits.

Pro : 'The obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof from politics in peace as well as in war only holds good in a limited sense. . . . The War Minister and Head of the General Staff must be kept *au courant* with the fluctuating phases of policy. . . .'

Con : *i.e.*, assuming an aggressive policy.

Pro : 'The general attitude of German diplomacy in the matter of Belgian neutrality can only be explained by its complete abdication in favour of the military' [*J'accuse*, p. 200].

Con : The military caste in Prussia and Germany is above the law ; it is an officers' despotism, which can, in ordinary life, kick civilians off the pavement (*cf.* the *Zabern* incident, p. 314) [Manen, p. 62]. Whereas in England the imperialistic spirit is balanced by democracy [Poll, p. 91].

Pro : German militarism is innate in the German character, and Prussia is the great instructress [Schröer, p. 36].

German militarism merely means a system of national defence [Révai, p. 22 ; Wernle, p. 19 ; 'R.', p. 16]. Militarism and armaments bring about a spirit of hardihood and self-abnegation [Külpe, p. 27].

Con : In Germany the military manage the colonies, diplomacy, royalty, railways, etc., etc., and domineer everything [Poll, p. 96].

MONROE DOCTRINE

(*v. also* U.S.A., SOUTH AMERICA, VENEZUELA)

President Monroe on Dec. 2, 1823, declared that his administration had asserted in negotiations with Russia 'as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved that the American continents by the free and independent position which they have

assumed and maintained are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . . . With the existing colonies and dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and we shall not interfere. But with the governments which have declared their independence and maintained it . . . we could not view any interposition in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States' [*Historians' History*, xxiii., p. 350].

In 1867 Napoleon III. was compelled to withdraw his troops from Mexico [*ibid.*, p. 46].

'In 1901 Germany, to facilitate forcible collection of her claims in Venezuela, and to prevent American interference, officially recognised the Monroe Doctrine' [*ibid.*, p. 601].

The following are some of the views expressed in the present juncture :

Pro : The Monroe Doctrine has been shaken by the unneutrality of the United States.

Con : The Monroe Doctrine originated in the refusal of the U.S.A. to allow the methods of the Holy Alliance to spread to the Americans. Canning, for Great Britain, was very chary of accepting the united policy of repression of the three Emperors (Austria, Russia, and the King of France) [Lintum, p. 12].

Yet Révai speaks of the new Monroe Doctrine to exclude England from any voice on the Continent [Révai, p. 81].

Tannenberg [p. 323] in his forecast claims half of South America as a German protectorate.

The Monroe Doctrine assumed a new form when England acquiesced in America's taking over the Sandwich Islands (1889), Hawaii (1895) : it remained valid, though America had foreign possessions.

At the Venezuelan crisis, 1895 (*v.* VENEZUELA) Cleveland insisted that no other Power than America might settle a South American dispute. Roosevelt had to agree that America should not prevent Germany and England coercing Venezuela to acknowledge her debts ;

and Roosevelt was so 'royally generous that he himself submitted the matter to the Hague Tribunal, and abode by the decision in favour of the Great Powers, without making any protest' [Lintum, p. 40]. (Also *v.* U.S.A.)

MOROCCO

In 1904 by the Franco-British agreement the 'open door' had been guaranteed to the whole of Europe, though France undertook to govern and pacify Morocco. Germany protested vehemently: and the upshot was the Algeciras Conference of 1906. Yet Germany's trade with Morocco at that time averaged £100,000 a year, and 'her course has usually been regarded as unnecessarily belligerent' [Gauss, p. 240].

'In 1905 the internal condition of Russia was deplorable; revolution was rife; the army disorganized after defeat. By the Anglo-French Treaty of 1904 we recognised Morocco as the domain of France, in return for France waiving her claims on Egypt.

'The German attitude became more minatory after Russia had been defeated, and on June 6, 1905, Delcassé was forced to resign the foreign secretaryship in France. Germany insisted on her rights in Morocco; and, after a war had been nearly brought about, the matter was left to be adjudicated by the Powers at the Conference of Algeciras, which was to meet in January, 1906.

'The outcome of this Conference was that all the Powers were to be equally entitled: France was only to have a privileged position in Morocco, in so far as Algeria was coterminous: and, on this last point, Germany, opposed by all the other Powers, had to give way.

'But in 1907 disorder still went on in Morocco. Europeans were massacred; and in July Raisuli kidnapped Kaid Sir Harry Maclean for ransom. In August, Casablanca was occupied by the French troops, and hostilities went on until December, the work being done by the French.

' In 1911 the Moroccan question again became serious. Germany was affected, because the Turco-Italian war of 1911 had ended with the cession of Tripoli to Italy, thus rendering Italy more independent of the Triple Alliance, and assigning one portion of the Ottoman Empire to a non-German Power. However, in Aug., 1911, Russia and Germany signed an agreement with regard to the Bagdad Railway, a fact which was regarded as a weakening of the Triple Entente.

' In May, 1911, French troops entered Fez, and in June the German Government gave France to understand that, in spite of the Franco-German agreement of 1909, Germany would not acquiesce in French political ascendancy without "compensations" in Morocco, or else the Congo. On July 2 Germany despatched the *Panther*, a man-of-war, to Agadir, to remain there until a normal condition of things had been restored in Morocco.

' Great Britain at once notified Germany that she would not stand aside where her own interests were at stake. On July 21 Lloyd George delivered at the Mansion House a clear speech to the same effect. In November France made Germany cessions in the Congo, whilst it was guaranteed anew that all Powers should have equal economic opportunities in Morocco. The Franco-German agreement was a fair compromise—in so far as it left all the parties dissatisfied. The position of Spain and her interests in Mexico were still left undetermined' [From the *Times Annual Summaries*].

VIEWS EXPRESSED

Pro : At the crisis of 1911 over Agadir, Germany displayed immovable patience.

The despatch of an Anglo-French squadron was unjustifiable [Bertourieux, p. 46].

In 1908 Baron Greindl (Belgian Minister at Berlin) writes: ' It must have been foreseen at Paris that this brutality would produce, not only in Morocco, but

throughout the whole Mussulman world, an anti-foreign and anti-French movement, which would provide the pretext for converting a temporary into a permanent occupation.' 'At the moment when the Treaty of Algeciras was being signed, three of the contracting parties, England, France, and Spain, were entering into engagements incongruous with their public promises.' 'France violated the Treaty of Algeciras' [Bertourieux, p. 16].

Con : The report of the Belgian Minister at London (Jan. 14, 1906) is to the effect that Germany's action towards Great Britain in the Boer War, and her opposition at the Conference of Algeciras, render Anglo-German friendship almost impossible [Waxweiler, p. 56].

Pro : Greindl, in March, 1911, speaks of Delcassé, after his fall, boasting of aggressive action against Germany, merely as an instrument of Edward VII. [Bertourieux, p. 33].

'The German Government [in Nov., 1911], promised to recall her man-of-war when order should have been restored in Morocco, and was not aiming at establishing a naval base in Morocco [Bertourieux, p. 47].

War nearly came about [*ibid.*, p. 47; Waxweiler, p. 56].

Germany had great interests in Morocco; yet Italy did not support Germany either in 1906 or 1911 [Eduard Meyer, p. 160]. So that Germany was isolated [Schiemann, p. 11].

Con : The commercial interests of Germany in Morocco were very slight, both in 1906 and 1911.

The policy of the 'open door' had been guaranteed by England and France under the Agreement of 1904, and confirmed by the Conference of Algeciras, in 1906. Yet Germany's trade at the time averaged less than half a million dollars annually and 'her course here has usually been regarded as unnecessarily belligerent' [Gauss, p. 240].

Pro : Germany in accepting a rectification of the Congo frontier, and compromising with France, did very

foolishly. She precipitated Italy's attack upon Tripoli, which undermined the solidity of the Triple Alliance, and weakened public confidence in the strength of the administration [Bernhardi, pp. 285-6].

The failure of the *coup d'Agadir* in 1911, and the inability of Germany to succeed then, was due to English support of France [Chamberlain, p. 62; Landauer, p. 51].

Con : This is the typical German argument; the bystander who guards his neighbour from assault is guilty of an offence to the assailant.

Pro : War might have broken out in 1904 over Morocco: only France flinched [Chamberlain, p. 60].

Germany, in return for ceding her supposed interests in Morocco in 1911, was compensated by France with a cession on the Congo frontier [Dieren, p. 86].

In 1904 England and France exchanged Morocco against Egypt [Verriijn-Stuart, p. 27].

Pro : Morocco was Germany's protégé [Baumann, p. 27].

At the Conference of Algeciras, 1906, Franco-German interests were compromised [Spahn, p. 20].

In 1905 the Kaiser disembarked at Tangiers and made a speech to the Sultan's delegates, directly contravening the policy of France. This act was provocative, and is the cause of any tension (*v.* KAISER, p. 129).

Later on he sent the *Panther* to Agadir with the same object.

Yet in 1905, 1909, and 1911 these differences were amicably settled [*J'accuse*, p. 86].

In the French Yellow Book, No. 2, Enclosure 1, a confidential German memorandum on the strengthening of the German army is set out :

(1) The Conference of Algeciras has removed the last doubts on the solidity of the Triple Entente, and the British promise 100,000 men in the event of a conflict. Some reply must be made to counter the situation.

(2) The French, by violating the Moroccan treaties, brought about the Agadir incident. An attack on

France was more hazardous owing to the improvements in the French Army.

(3) The Balkan wars might have forced Germany to support Austria, who was thereby prejudiced.

(4) All the Germans, even the Socialists, bear us a grudge for depriving them of their share of Morocco [French Yellow Book, I., Ann. I.].

NEUTRALIZATION OF THE COLONIES

Pro : On Aug. 7, 1914, Germany proposed to declare Africa neutral, so that fighting should be confined to Europe. The Allies refused [Dieren, p. 35 ; Bücher, p. 13]. The English troops started war on Lake Nyasa on Aug. 25, 1914 [*Who are the Huns?* p. 53] ; (v. DAR-ES-SALAAM).

Con : On Sept. 25, 1914, the American Consulate at Antwerp preferred a request on behalf of the German Government to have the colonies of all the belligerents in the Congo basin neutralized during the war.

On Oct. 21, 1914, the Belgian Government notified the German Government, through Madrid, that on Aug. 7 the Belgian Government had proposed such a course to the French and the English, in order that the war might not extend to Central Africa. The French and English Governments declined, because as a fact German troops had already attacked British Central and East Africa, as well as the Congo port of Lukuga on Lake Tanganyika. Therefore the request came too late [Belgian Grey Book, II., pp. 47-50].

This apart, the request was tantamount to Germany's asking her enemies not to avail themselves of Germany's inability to defend her outlying colonies, and to leave any harbours, or shelters, or telegraphic installations untouched for possible hostile use (*cf.* RIGHT OF SEARCH).

PACIFICISM (*v. also* WAR)

Pro : Peace is an emollient ; there should be no more Hague Conferences : the forty years' peace has been unrest. Germany has no appetite for peace conferences [Chotzky, pp. 11-17].

Con : Dr. A. H. Fried assures us that there was, in fact, a close connection between the conduct of Germany at the Hague Conferences and the formation and strengthening of the Triple Entente. Dr. Fried writes :

' There was no thought of an attack on Germany, but only of the necessity for defence against Germany. . . Germany's complaints against Delcassé and Lansdowne are unjustified. She has herself brought about the situation from which she is suffering. At the Hague in 1899 she placed in the hands of her enemies the moral weapon of mistrust. By so doing she neglected to seize a great opportunity, and to win for herself the reputation of a power desirous of securing peace by modern methods.

' Germany showed an untimely persistence in her old paths. How greatly the attitude of Germany in the year 1899 was at fault may be gathered from the recently published reminiscences of Andrew D. White. It is clear from White's *Reminiscences* that Count Münster (who obtained the title of Prince for his services at the Hague Conference) aroused, by his attitude as German delegate at the Hague, a feeling of exasperation and mistrust towards Germany in all the other states.

' Germany is still suffering from this mistrust, and Delcassé would not have been possible without Münster ' [*Blätter für Zwischenstaatliche Organisation, Zürich, Nov.-Dec., 1915, apud Fernau, p. 35*].

Pro : Eternal peace is a dream, and produces paltry and craven feelings [Külpe, p. 32].

Con : Bismarck in 1888 said : ' We fear God and nothing else on earth, and that is what makes us love

and honour peace.' The end of this quotation is now generally omitted [Beer, p. 96].

The Baroness Bertha von Suttner is a prominent German pacifist, the authoress of *Die Waffen nieder* (*Lay down your Arms*).

When the Campbell-Bannerman ministry came into power in 1905, it vigorously favoured the peace congresses at the Hague; Sir Edward Grey was one of the spokesmen for the limitation of armaments.

The only opponents were Germany and Austria, who only returned evasive replies and tried to distort the endeavours of all the other nations into ruses to cover aggressive designs [*Tägliche Rundschau*, April 9, 1907]. Liebermann, Bassermann, and Prinz von Bülow all stood aside.

At the second Hague Conference of 1907 Baron von Marschall similarly rendered all the proceedings futile by refusing to assent to any limitation of armaments. Germany would not agree to the limitation of the laying of mines at sea, but she wanted to rescind the right of capture at sea. Great Britain declined to agree to the latter proposition [*J'accuse*, pp. 65-69]. As to naval proposals, *v.* MARINISM.

Since the war of 1812 with the United States (which arose on the right of searching neutral ships) there have been many disputes between Great Britain and America, all settled by goodwill and compromise. The long frontier is entirely undefended.

'In the same month of May, 1871, when the representatives of England and her revolted colony had come to arbitration at Washington, the German Government was dictating its conditions of peace to France. What a contrast! On the one side is the spirit of Bismarck, on the other that of Gladstone. And the result! In all the divergencies that have arisen since 1872 between America and England, the world can remain quiet and believe it will all come out right. But, at the least dispute between France and Germany, the anxious doubt arose: will it all go wrong again?' [Lintum, pp. 33 and 1-16].

PAN-GERMANISM

THE 'GERMAN' RACE

1. The German race is enumerated by Tannenberg at 87 millions :

62	millions in the Empire.
8.9	Dutch and Belgian.
2.5	in Switzerland.
10	in Austria.
2.1	in Hungary.
2	in Russia.
<hr/>	
87.5	

[Tannenberg, pp. 5 and 6].

These scattered parts have to be unified.

2. The German race is thus characterized : Only those should rule who are conscious of their mission [Brüggemann, p. 34].

Germany is the land of genius [Chamberlain, p. 14], is peaceful (whereas England is bellicose) [*ibid.* p. 18], and will conquer all the world over through her inborn superiority [*ibid.*, p. 90].

As the sane and humane combatant, she will conquer [J. Müller, p. 3].

At present she has no home [Kotzde, p. 6] ; (*v.* GERMANY—EXPANSION).

' We are not mere mortals : we are more, because we are Teutons, because we are Germans. Our race with its culture has a higher value than any other in the world ' [Schönere, *apud* Beer, p. 167].

The German race will confer universal health and manliness [Labberton, II., pp. 86 . . .], and will restore Belgium and rejuvenate her by her ethical genius.

' Out of blood and iron a new German unity shall arise, a " Vaterland " in the truest sense—Germany the heart of the Kingdom of God upon earth ' [J. Müller, *Grüne Blätter*].

Germany still has to reclaim the Baltic provinces, to which Russia has no right [Tannenberg, p. 177]; but these must be expropriated of all non-Germans, and the country renamed [*ibid.*, p. 209]: also the regions of the Pripet and the Styr, whence the Gothic nation sprang [*ibid.*, p. 211]: and, as to Scandinavia, being Teutonic, this, too, will form a part of the federation [*ibid.*, p. 125].

The Boers of South Africa, being Germanic, must be brought back into the fold [*ibid.*, p. 277]; also Northern France [Heinemann, p. 23].

The present war is a revolt of lesser breeds against the higher Germanic, and defeat would degrade the German character [Wilser, pp. vi. and vii.], but race must be understood as the entire physical and mental superiority of the light-haired, white-skinned, intellectual peoples. The Germans are pure-blood, and England has been guilty of treachery to *Germanentum*, which in 1870 conquered Celtic and Slav femininity [Wilser, *passim*; Schröer, p. 18; Potthoff, p. 7].

In the new unified German Empire there must be no language except German allowed [Chotzky, p. 37], though the rule will not be one of force [Chamberlain, p. 90]; but for a while interpreters from the vernaculars are to be permitted, subject to a tax for the privilege, according to the property of the petitioners [Tannenberg, pp. 113, 199].

In this new Empire there will be manhood-suffrage for all true-born Germans, and no one can vote unless German is the only language spoken at home and outside, and any non-German name Germanized [Tannenberg, p. 112 . . .].

No education is to be provided to any natives, unless they are Germanized (as above) [*ibid.*, pp. 35, 38]; any recalcitrant families are to be emigrated to America.

The same processes apply to Bohemia, German Poland, etc.; all education (*v.* SLESWIG) is to be through the medium of German [*ibid.*, pp. 5 and 199].

However, so many new industrial regions would prejudice inner Germany, so an interior customs wall

is to be erected [Tannenberg, p. 89; Heinemann, pp. 45-99].

The races who cannot be included are the Russians, Greeks, and Romance; but the Finns and Turks may be [*Dietsche Stammen*, Jan.-Feb., 1915, p. 123]; (*v. CENTRAL EUROPE*).

Con : (1) The proper solution would be a federation of Europe under Germany; not Pan-Germanism [Labberton, I., p. 55]. Labberton is a pro-German writer.

(2) *v. GERMANY—Absorption.* The solubility of Germans is admitted by all the Pan-German pamphleteers. Is this a proof of strong nationality? Thus [Tannenberg, pp. 25, 26, etc.], German Catholics in Poland are rapidly Polonized; and in Bohemia the Germans are fast becoming Czechs, though the Slav nations are repressed.

(3) There is no German territory left to redeem [Potthoff, p. 11].

All attempts to Germanize other races fail [*ibid.*, p. 12].

(4) 'The Germans have done much for civilization; but civilization has not permeated them as yet' [George Bourdon; *apud* Kiersch, p. 5].

(5) The inconsistency whereby Rotterdam should be German, because Dutch is not unlike German; and Galicia German, because it is valuable, should be observed. Yet this is part of the programme of the *Alldeutscher Bund* [Manen, p. 32].

(6) Medieval Germany had to struggle for unity, France for liberty, and England for commercial and social life. Hence when the scholastic doctrine was dropped, each country developed a philosophy of its own, tending respectively to authority, individualism, and utilitarianism.

'If we trace the beginnings of the transition from the divorce of ethics and morals principally in the writings of German thinkers, we do not do so because of anti-German proclivities. It is simply because:

(1) In no other country have so few and so weak counteracting tendencies arisen, or has the main stream been so undiverted.

'(2) In no other country has the influence of the main current on the national soil been so great.

'(3) Because other false propositions besides those obtaining in Germany have abetted the present system of thought in the world, but none of them has directly instigated the momentous events of to-day.

'(4) Because Germany is, in fact, the perfectest ensample of a modern civilized state, consonant with that counsel of wisdom that sets the standard of law outside that of morals.'

Fichte, Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, citizens of a decentralized country, tried to unify God and Man. In so doing, they idolized authority and the State; this doctrine was sublimatized by Hegel, and transferred in its entirety from the State to the individual by Nietzsche.

In Hegel the worship of Might and Man degenerated into the glorification of the State, self-conscious and dictatorial; and Erdmann in 1848 calls Fichte an emanation of the true German mind.

☛ According to Hegel the individual has no rights, only duties to the State. [In England we are slowly learning he has some duties and many rights.]

(Cf. STATE, and the citations from Lasson).

The Germans in their infatuation for Race have claimed—according to Houston-Chamberlain—Julius Cæsar, Dante, Rafaël, Voltaire, etc., nearly every great man, as Germanic, or dolichocephalic. Thus Chamberlain says: 'The Teutons could never have won the world by their virtues alone without their evil qualities, such as avarice, cruelty, treachery, contempt of all rights, save their own right to rule.

'But it must be admitted that, wherever the Teutons have been most cruel, they have laid the foundations for the highest and most moral' [Chamberlain, 1900].

'We Aryans are Teutons, the born rulers of mankind, an enlightening race of demi-gods, such as the Greeks erstwhile' [Ammon, p. 86].

'That we can wage a war such as this is the proof that the great Universal Mind is with us' [*Frankfurter-Zeitung*, Easter, 1915 [Poll, pp. 37-86].

(7) The equation German=Germanic=Aryan is open to doubt.

(8) Pan-Germanism originated in an educational movement, in the desire for unity; also, as a reply to Pan-Slavism (*q.v.*). Its orientation was changed to politics and aggression. Germany historically never combined. Prussia and Brandenburg, the outposts against the Slav world, have conquered Germany. From 1848-70 it was the question, which should absorb which, Prussia or Germany? To this day the conflict goes on, and there are many 'Muss-Preussen' (compulsory Prussians) left. Pan-Germanism in the present form is simply the continuation of the Prussian tradition [Brugmans, pp. 8, 11, 16 . . .].

'The Emperor William I. once said in a pet, when Prince Bismarck was suggesting to him that the Empire might not accept some political move: "Oh, the Empire! The Empire is merely Prussia enlarged!" A brusque, soldierly way of putting it, but quite true' [Treitschke, *Politik*, I., 40]; (*v. also* PRUSSIA).

POLAND

PRELIMINARY

The Polish question can be definitely assigned to its origin, *viz.*, the partitions. These were:

(1) 1772. Prussia took Malborg, Pomerania, Warmia, and part of Great Poland, Ermland, 'West Prussia,' the Netze district, without Dantzic or Thorn, a territory lying between Brandenburg and East Prussia, and thus filling a dangerous gap. Austria took Galicia and Lodomira. Russia took Polotsk, Vitebsk, Mikislav, and Polish Livonia.

'Poland was deprived in all of a third of her area, but the remaining territory was "guaranteed" by the Powers.'

'It must not be supposed that these monstrous usurpations were made without some show of justice. Both Austria and Prussia published elaborate expositions of their claims to the countries invaded.' The first partition was suggested by Frederick II. of Prussia, and only reluctantly acceded to by Austria and Russia.

(2) 'At the Conference of Pillnitz, 1790, the indivisibility of Poland was expressly mentioned.'

At the partition of 1793 Russia received Lithuania, Podolia, Volhynia, the Ukraine, and East Poland.

Prussia received Dantzic, Thorn, and Southern Prussia, Kalysz and Posen, Gnesen.

Austria, who was fighting France, got nothing.

In 1793 Kosciuszko revolted, but was defeated by the Russian general, Suvorov; and a German historian, Reichard, calls the storm of Warsaw 'a peaceful and merciful entry of the clement victor.'

(3) 1795. Russia received the remainder of Lithuania, a great part of Samogitia, part of Kulm (on the right of the Bug), and the rest of Volhynia.

Austria received the greater part of the palatinate of Cracow, the palatinates of Sandomir and Lublin, with a part of the palatinates Polachia and Masovia, on the right bank of the Bug.

Prussia had the portions of the palatinates of Masovia and Polachia on the right bank of the Bug; in Lithuania, part of the palatinate of Troki and Samogitia (which is on the left bank of the Niemen), Warsaw and a district of Little Poland forming part of the palatinate of Cracow.

Thus the banks of the Pilitsa, the Vistula, the Bug, and the Niemen marked out the frontiers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

(4) In 1806 Napoleon entered Posen and Warsaw in triumph, and formed the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, consisting of Posen, Kalysz, Plock, Warsaw, Lomza, and Bromberg, to be united with Saxony. He modernized this realm, introduced the Code Napoléon, abolished serfdom, and so on. This fragment of Poland even became powerful. The Poles fought for the French and

reconquered Galicia and Cracow in the Austrian War of 1809.

In the resulting treaty they were cheated, and were only allowed to retain Radom, Cracow, Siedlce, and Lublin.

(5) By the Treaty of 1815 the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was declared to be Russian and was granted a free constitution, liberal and national, with religious liberty and the official use of Polish.

Galicia and the salt mines of Wieliczka were restored to Austria.

The Grand Duchy of Posen, forming the Western Palatinates bordering on Silesia, was surrendered to Prussia.

The city-district of Cracow was formed into a free and independent republic (of about 19½ geographical square miles). The remainder of Poland was surrendered to Russia as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw under a free constitution.

This free constitution lasted with some friction until 1830; Alexander I., a generous ruler, died in 1825. In 1830 the Poles rose in insurrection against Nicholas I., deposed the Romanov dynasty, were suppressed, and Russian Poland was incorporated with Russia.

(6) The independent republic of Cracow lasted down to 1846, when it was suppressed by Austria.

(7) In 1863 the Poles in Russian Poland again rose against Russia. The insurgents had no chance, and were brutally suppressed [*Historians' History*].

Such is, in outline, the course of this great historical crime. True, Poland was not a unitary State; she included the alien inhabitants of Lithuania, Livonia, and the Little-Russians of the Ukraine. But she was, at least, not less composite than other States; and if her aristocratic constitution made her somewhat oppressive and disorderly she was not alone in this fault.

In the modern government of Poland, as partitioned, three different developments are traceable:

(1) In Russia, after 1863, there was a grim reactionary policy; but the tyranny was sporadic, and there is,

probably, more liberty under the unorganized and uneconomic *régime* of the Russian bureaucracy than in Prussia.

(2) In Austria the provincial scheme of administration has secured to Poland a large measure of autonomy, and German methods of administration, hygiene, and thoroughness have brought Austrian Poland a certain measure of prosperity and contentment.

(3) In Prussia there is nothing but a policy of official tyranny, and attempted Germanization, the rigorous suppression of Polish (*e.g.*, in Russian Poland, street-names are bilingual; in German Poland, German only), organized colonization, and persecution of the Catholic Poles. The policy suggested by Tannenberg (*v.* PAN-GERMANISM) is the practice (*cf.* SLESWIG).

In the schools, in all public life, in the whole of the centralized administration (which comprises very many of the enterprises left in private hands in England) and, as far as possible, in the churches (except that the Poles, being Catholic, obtain the support of the Catholic German *Centrum* party in ecclesiastical matters), Polish is forbidden and its use punished.

(4) At the outbreak of the war, Aug. 14, 1914, the Grand Duke Nicholas issued the following proclamation to the Poles:

'The Russian Army brings you the solemn news of this reconciliation, which obliterates the frontiers dividing the Polish peoples, which it unites conjointly under the sceptre of the Russian Tsar. Under this sceptre Poland will be born again, free in her religion and her language. Russian autonomy only expects from you the same respect for the rights of those nationalities which history has bound to you.'

Since the German occupation it is said that a Polish university has been established at Warsaw (just as a Flemish one has been promised at Ghent). This is in full accord with their policy of ingratiating themselves with subject populations of other powers.

(*Cf.* French Yellow Book, No. 2., II., a secret report of the German War Office of 1913. 'We shall have to

stir up trouble in North Africa and Russia. This is a means of using up our adversaries' resources. We must absolutely establish relations with men of influence in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, by means of properly selected instruments, to prepare the ground in the event of a European war. Of course, in such event, we should acknowledge these secret allies publicly, and assure them, at the conclusion of peace, that they should keep anything gained. These desiderata can be carried out. A few years ago we got into such contact, but unfortunately the results were not sufficiently consolidated. . . . Insurrections fomented in time of war by political agents must be carefully fostered, and have sufficient material [*v.* U.S.A., Papen intrigues; and ANTICIPATIONS]. They should burst forth when the means of communication are destroyed. The Egyptian school in especially suitable, as linking up more and more all the intellectuals of the Mussulman world.)

The subsequent policy of Prussia is to Germanize (*v.* PAN-GERMANISM (Tannenberg's projects); SLESWIG (the course of events); and SMALL NATIONALITIES).

In the history of these annexations it is worth observing that four years before the first partition, in 1768, Frederick II., in return for recognition as King by the Republic of Poland, solemnly by treaty swore not to attain any of the pre-existing treaties with Poland, and offered his power as a guarantee for the maintenance of the rights and liberties of the Republic.

On April 9, 1772, he wrote to his brother Henry: 'The partition of Poland will unite three religions, the Catholic, the Orthodox, and the Protestant; Poland will thus be for us a sort of Holy Communion, of which we shall all partake. If this act does not bring salvation to our souls, it will, at any rate, contribute considerably to our realm.'

Again in 1790, Frederick William II., at the very time when he was planning the second partition, gave a solemn pledge to what was left of Poland, and the same comedy was repeated in 1793 [*v.* *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1916: The Royal House of Hohenzollern].

After 1815 Prussia and Austria annulled all the free constitutions set up by Napoleon, but retained all the principalities annexed or submerged.

In 1870 Bismarck, by falsifying the Ems telegram, brought on war.

The events of 1914 continue the tradition.

The following are some of the pamphleteers' views on Polish matters.

Pro : (1) German Poland is to be excluded for some years from the Customs Union, and products of German farms are to be admitted free into the interior ; those of Polish farms to be heavily taxed. Soon all the Poles will be bankrupt : their banks will cease to exist (*cf.* SLESWIG) ; and, perforce, all the Poles will have to submit to German terms and be Germanized.

In calculating the price on expropriation to Germans, estates are to be valued at the lower rate, *i.e.*, before enhancement in consequence of German improvement. The grants are to be to old soldiers [Tannenberg, pp. 89, 193].

[So, too, Heinemann, p. 48, much to the same effect : he is concerned with the Polish industries at Lodź, which might compete with the German.]

(2) In Eastern Prussia in 1911 there were 1,600,000, of whom .65 per cent. were Germans, .35 per cent. were Poles ; and 802 German villages, against 488 Polish [Tannenberg, pp. 17 and 26].

(3) The population of Austria is 35.7 per cent. German, 60 per cent. Slav. Galicia is perfectly satisfied under present rule. Galicia has 7,800,000 Poles, Ruthenes (or Little-Russians), and Roumanians, 7,800,000 Czechs, Slovenes, and Croatsians, 9,000,000 Germans ; and the total population of Galicia and Bukovina is 26,150,600 [Tannenberg, p. 55].

(4) In German Poland the teachers are still largely Poles. German policy is weak. These Poles should be forced to Germanize their names [Tannenberg; p. 35].

Con : (1) An independent Poland would be a thorn in Germany's side ; Germanization would only make the Poles sullen and hostile. The solution is freedom in a

German federation [Potthoff, p. 13]. (Potthoff is an ultra-German writer.)

(2) For true national life there is no reason that Poland or the Trentino should belong to a national state: language is life [*Dietsche Stemmen*, Jan.-Feb., 1916, p. 120]. (*Observe*: this same pro-German publication is crying out against the intolerable inclusion of the Flemings in a Belgian state.)

(3) The experiments in expropriation and colonization in Poland and Sleswig have failed utterly in face of the organized banking arrangements of the Danes and Poles, in spite of every obstacle [Tannenberg, p. 32; *J'accuse*, p. 18].

(4) The population of occupied Poland has been starved. The following proposal was made by Sir Edward Grey [*Times*, July 28, 1916], and has been refused by Germany:

' Foreign Office,
' July 26, 1916.

' YOUR EXCELLENCY,

' I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's communication of July 8th in which you are good enough to lay before his Majesty's Government an appeal to all belligerent Governments to come to an agreement for the relief of Poland.

' His Majesty's Government desire to settle, once and for all, the whole question of importations of foodstuffs into territory in the occupation of the enemy. They therefore make the following final proposal:

' If the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments will reserve wholly to the civil populations of the territories which their armies have occupied—viz., Belgium, Northern France, Poland, Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania—the entire produce of the soil, all live stock and all stocks of food, fodder, or fertilizers in those territories; if they will admit to those territories neutrals selected by the President of the United States with full powers to control the distribution of food to the whole population, and to transfer, when necessary and possible, from one territory to another surplus stocks existing in the one and lacking in the other; and if the President of the United States will undertake the selection of these neutral agents, his Majesty's Government will on their part give them every assistance in their power and will admit into such territories any imported food supplies necessary to supplement native stocks and to afford to the populations a fair subsistence ration, so long as they are satisfied that their enemies are scrupulously observing their part of the agreement.

' If this offer is refused, or if the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments do not reply before the harvest in the occupied territory begins to be gathered, but continue to refrain from stating officially, for the information of

the Allied Governments, their exact attitude in regard to these questions of relief, his Majesty's Government will hold them responsible, and will exact from them such reparation as can be secured by the Allied arms or enforced by the public opinion of the neutral world, for every civilian life lost through insufficient nourishment in every territory occupied by the armies of the Central Powers.

'It is obvious that if this proposal is to be put into operation successfully no time must be lost. The new harvest will shortly be gathered, and for the plan to be of any advantage to the populations of the occupied territories the fruits of the harvest must be placed in neutral control before they have been appropriated for the use of the subjects of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

'I have, &c., for the Secretary of State,

'WALTER LANGLEY.

'His Excellency the Honourable W. H. Page.

'The question of affording relief for the people of Poland was raised last December by the officials of Polish institutions in the United States, who obtained the support of the American Commission which is distributing relief in Belgium. On January 14 last Mr. Asquith stated that the French and British Governments were considering the question and pointed out that the shortage in the necessaries of life in Poland was due to the systematic confiscation of native stocks by the occupying armies. On February 21 the United States Ambassador communicated definite proposals for the relief of the citizens of Warsaw, Lodz, and other towns, the German Government to undertake that there should be no interference with the imported foodstuffs, and itself to revictual the population in the rest of Poland in their occupation.

'The British Government, having consulted the Russian Government, in a reply published on May 18 accepted the principle of Mr. Page's proposal, but stipulated that the measures of relief should apply equally to the part of Russian Poland in the occupation of Austria-Hungary, and that the German and Austrian Governments should at the same time make arrangements adequately to supply and care for the populations of Serbia, Albania, and Montenegro, under the supervision of neutral subjects or organizations.

'A semi-official telegram from Berlin, dated June 5,

announced that Germany could not agree to the conditions imposed by the British Government. Germany, it was declared, could not contract obligations on behalf of Austria and Bulgaria, nor could she abandon her own condition that the army of occupation in Poland should be maintained by the stocks of food in the country. In view of the deadlock which thus arose, President Wilson on July 21 addressed a personal appeal to the rulers of the European countries concerned, asking them to agree to terms whereby food supplies could reach the Poles.'

PORTUGAL.

In the Middle Ages Portugal was often in alliance with England.

In 1890 there was a dispute with Portugal over a frontier in Africa, and a British squadron blockaded the Tagus.

Portugal was neutral during the Boer War, but allowed the British Consul at Lourenço Marques to search luggage for contraband.

During this war German troops have repeatedly invaded Portuguese Africa; and for this reason Portugal has declared war, as she has not received any satisfaction.

THE PRESS

THE GERMAN PRESS

There existed two German papers in London,* one in Paris, and probably others elsewhere.

Holland is neutral, save for English interference [Jung, p. 82].

* Not suppressed until some months after the outbreak of war.

In Holland several of the great dailies are controlled by Germans, and the *Toekomst* and *Dietsche Stemmen* have been recently founded in their interests.

Outside Europe, the *Deutsche Zeitung* for China; a German paper in Turkey; the *Rundschau* at Bangkok; the *German-American* at Manila. As to South America (*v. this title*). In New York the *Fatherland*, and others.

Germany is publishing, amongst others in Poland, the *Gazeta Wojenna*; in Belgium, the *Antwerpsche Tijdingen*, the *Gazette des Ardennes*, *Le Bruxellois*, and others.

There is too much censorship [German Chancellor, June 7, 1916; Bücher, p. 56; Jung, p. 15].

'I regard it, therefore, as one of the most important duties of a Government like ours, to use the Press freely and wisely for the enlightenment of the people. The views of the Government should find comprehensive expression in the local Press. . . . More important than the teaching and enlightenment by the Press is the propaganda of action. . . . The soul of our nation is not reflected in that part of the Press with its continual dwelling on peace and denunciation of any bold and comprehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness' [Bernhardi, pp. 256-7].

There should be no more official Press [Bücher, p. 61].

An Academic State School of journalists should be established [Bücher, p. 64].

The *Kölnische Volkszeitung* has perhaps the largest number of special correspondents: two at Paris, one at Brussels, three in London, one at Madrid, one at Rome, one at Petrograd, one at Vienna, one at Constantinople, one at Washington, and a few others [Jung, pp. 11 . . .].

Generally foreign news is supplied by the Wolff Agency, as Reuter, Havas, and others do not cover Germany.

Early in 1914, before the Declaration of War, the Germans were endeavouring to organize publicity in

the foreign Press. German societies were to be established or enlarged in the Argentine, Canada, Russia, the States, etc. A meeting was held secretly in February, 1914, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dr. Hamann, the head of the Press Bureau, and representatives of the principal industrial and shipping syndicates were convened. They formed a private company with the 'purpose of furthering the German industrial prestige abroad.' The company was to enter into an agreement with the *Agence Havas* not to publish any news regarding Germany unless supplied by Wolff's Bureau [Havas subsequently refused]. £25,000 a year was to be devoted to advertisement, bringing up the total available to £50,000 or £75,000. The advertisements were to be inserted only in foreign papers that published news concerning Germany 'originating exclusively from the new company,' the information being supplied gratuitously or at a nominal cost, so that these papers should be substantially interested in the scheme. 'The foreign Press is to be watched by the company's agents. . . . Any incorrect reports are to be telegraphed home and corrected by telegrams issued by the company.'

'The countries to be thus guarded were in the first instance the South American States and the Far East; but the system was to be extended to all parts outside Europe.'

'Whether the evil exists or not, the money will be spent on secret service to popularize Germany abroad.'

The rates fixed for such telegrams showed a reduction to a quarter of the commercial rates, and British Africa and India were included in the scheme.

The *Deutsche Export Revue* [June 5, 1914] gives details of this syndicate. It is presided over by a triumvirate consisting of Geheimrat von Borsig, Landrat Rötger, and Herr Schacht, and the Board represents the chiefs of all the large industrial syndicates of Germany. The paper is subsidized by the German Foreign Office to the extent of £12,500 a year [Cd. 7595 (1914); De Beer, *Hohenzollern en Habsburg*, p. iv.].

THE FOREIGN PRESS GENERALLY

(1) The American Press has been bribed by England [Eduard Meyer, p. 131].

(2) Germany needs a *bonne presse* abroad [Bassermann (1906), p. 149].

(3) The neutral Press is hostile to Germany: the Wolff Bureau has no place in the sun; it is all a conspiracy against Germany. A German cable and press agency should be semi-officially established and subsidized [Rotheit, *passim*; *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, May, 1915, p. 214; Jung, pp. 3, 14, 15].

(4) All the foreign (non-German) Press lies: no Germans are believed [Bücher, pp. 33, 19].

(5) The Italian Press is controlled by large financial interests; the Vatican Press is distinct. After Sonnino made the Italian Press free in 1907, the Vatican *Corrispondenza Romana* organized a scheme to colour the Catholic Press generally, which was also extended to the German Catholic Press [Jung, pp. 34-36].

(6) In France the Press is omnipotent and sensational [*ibid.*, p. 50].

(7) Germany is trying to convert the American, the Swiss, and the Scandinavian Press [*ibid.*, pp. 80-83].

(8) The Spanish Press is on the whole favourable to Germany, because the *Correo Espanol* has a private wireless, belonging to the Jesuits [*ibid.*, p. 81].

THE ENGLISH PRESS

Pro : The English Press is all lies [Anton, *passim*; Bücher, p. 58].

English politicians used the Press in order to foment the war [Jung, p. 75].

The Reuter and Havas monopoly of news should be broken [Bücher, p. 61].

The English cable-monopoly must be broken, and the cable companies neutralized. The submarines are to cut the English cables [*ibid.*, pp. 62-63].

Reuter's agency became the official Press in England as early as 1850 [Jung, p. 21]. [This is untrue.]

Reuter's news is all false [Jung, p. 23 ; Anton, *passim*, etc., etc., etc.].

Con : The English Press is free, very accurate and complete. There is no Social-Democratic Press as there is in Germany (*v.* SOCIALISTS).

The Press in England received the honour of being received by the King [Jung, pp. 57, 63, 65].

The *Times*, despite change of ownership, still maintains its rank [*ibid.*, p. 65].

'In contradiction to the Russian Press, which bears the mark of the ruling autocracy, the English Press is absolutely free. English papers are not subventioned by the Government (and no such aid is requisite, in view of their huge income) : they are not inspired, *i.e.*, there is not an English paper that does government business at the sacrifice of its own purposes. There has never been a government or minister that has ever had a paper at their service for any length of time ; when ministers have to address the public, they write letters to a paper, or make speeches for that paper, the colour of whose opinions is nearest to their own' [*ibid.*, p. 63].

THE FRENCH PRESS

Pro : Extravagant stories have appeared in the French Press since the war, and the censorship is too severe [Bertourieux, p. 99].

Con : So, too, elsewhere ; but Bertourieux never speaks of the wild romances that appear in the German Press, and are never contradicted or corrected.

THE U.S.A. PRESS

This German propaganda aims at obtaining a speedy peace through a League of Neutral Nations (at the time of Germany's greatest exhibition of military strength) ;

at suppressing the supply of American arms to the Allies [for which *cf.* p. 292].

X There is a large body of Pro-German Press agents in America, some of them controlled by William Randolph Hearst, *viz.*, three at New York, one at Boston, two at Chicago, two at Atlanta, one each at San Francisco and Los Angeles; and seven monthlies [Rouquette, p. 24]. The Germans influence the Universities and through them the whole of educated opinion [*ibid.*, p. 3]; not to speak of the broad commercial interests [*ibid.*, p. 10].

Of the 80 millions of Americans 16 are of Teuton origin [*ibid.*, p. 1], but emigration to America from Germany has decreased from 200,000 annually in 1890 to 25,000 in 1914 (*cf.* GERMANY—EXPANSION).

German propaganda extends from Maine to California; and the propagandists put German nationalism before American citizenship [*ibid.*, p. 17]; and these Germans constitute a separatist block, not harmonious with general American sentiment [*ibid.*, p. 32].

HOW TO WORK THE NEUTRAL PRESS.

It is no good sending articles to the neutral Press [Bücher, p. 64].

The Berlin authorities supplied articles to be propagated in the United States Press by the Embassy [No. 8, Papen Papers; Archibald Papers, p. 6 (German documents intercepted by the British Admiralty)].

PRISONERS OF WAR

Pro : The French are said to have massacred their prisoners [Dieren, p. 13].

Con : The Germans massacre prisoners and give orders for so doing [*Nineteenth Century*, June, 1915];

[Morgan, G. A., p. 121 and 103]. There is no confirmation of the alleged French commands.

Prisoners are massacred by the Germans. 'Official orders, Aug. 26, 1914, by Commander of 7th Company of Infantry, 112th Regiment, at Thionville. "From to-day onwards no prisoners are to be made. All prisoners are to be slaughtered. Wounded men, whether armed or helpless, are to be slaughtered. Prisoners in larger closed formations are to be shot down. Not a living man is to be left in our rear"' [Morgan, p. 51].

The German prisons are neglected, filthy, and breed fever [Wittenberg report; and Petri, on the conditions at Holzminden].

Prisoners of war in Germany have been uniformly maltreated, insulted, and starved [*Atrocités Belges*, p. 98]: e.g., the tale of a Belgian judge of Dinant incarcerated at Cassel.

The *Russkoye Slovo* (quoted in *Times*, May 19, 1916), gives gruesome details of the tortures inflicted on Russian prisoners in Germany. The *Rech* [Sept. 17-30, 1915] contains a vivid account by a Russian prisoner who escaped from the Island of Als (Sleswig), of the starvation and forced labour to which prisoners are subjected.

Prisoners on leaving Germany are forced to sign testimonials that they have had nothing to complain of in their treatment [Petri].

Bücher [p. 54] supposes that at 'Frith Hill' German officers had to do likewise for publication in the English newspapers.

Pro : By the Hague Conventions no prisoners can be forced to labour for the captor-state, except under conditions (*v. p.* 99).

Hildebrand denies coercion and states that the Belgians were working willingly for high wages [*Belgian Atrocities*, pp. 75 and 81; Hildebrand, pp. 40 . . .].

Con : In Belgium, Belgians are coerced to work on the railways to aid Germany. At Malines the population refused, and was confined to the workshops and

starved. In Russia the same is done, and Russian prisoners are employed on the Western front [*German Atrocities*, p. 127].

Pro : German prisoners of war have been maltreated in India [*Times*, May 11, 1916].

Con : Dr. A. Meyr, one of those repatriated, wrote to the American Consul, enclosing a copy of a letter to the superintendent of the camp at Ahmednagar, to convey 'their thanks for and appreciation of the considerate manner in which he [the superintendent] exercised his authority.'

German prisoners in England are very well looked after [Bücher, p. 54].

Pro : Germans in England attempted to evade internment and registration: classes and ranks were scrambled in the English camps, which were unsatisfactorily crowded; and the medical attendance was insufficient; but conditions were on the whole fair [Jünger (Dec., 1914), *passim*].

Con : This pamphlet was composed in 1914, and contains no serious reproach against the administration of the English, French, or Russian camps.

In Cd. 7862 (June, 1915) the American Ambassador's reports are thus summed up on the comparison of English and German treatment of prisoners: 'During the first eight months of the war, the period here under consideration, Great Britain has in every case shown herself ready and willing to treat German prisoners of war in accordance with the provisions of International Conventions, and the recognised principles of humanity. In Germany it was reported that "the British are almost starved, and such have been their tortures that thirty of them asked to be shot." "The prisoners are stated to be given very little food and to be all herded together without light or warmth, their condition being such that they are apparently being gradually starved to death." These facts have come to the knowledge of the British Government, although there is evidence that certain features of the German internment camps are concealed from visitors.' And so forth.

PRISONERS OF WAR IN ENGLAND

In November, 1914, the United States' Ambassador reported as to the condition of German prisoners in England:

(1) Officers' accommodation was plain and comfortable. They had German soldiers as servants.

(2) Soldiers had adequate quarters, and minor luxuries.

(3) The prisoners did their own cooking, and so had food to their own taste.

(4) Everything was done to provide them with recreation.

(5) Clothing and housing were everywhere satisfactory. There have been no complaints since or before [Cd. 7815].

In April, 1916, the British Government decided on employing some of the prisoners in France, to the number of 1,450, on work not connected with the war.

The German Government thereupon sent 2,000 British to Poland. The United States Ambassador at Berlin promised to survey their condition [Cd. 8260]. Since then the German Government has refused leave to the American authorities to inspect or visit these Polish camps.

It is, however, common knowledge that the Germans from the beginning have been utilizing their prisoners, including British, on trench-digging, even munition-making and public and agricultural work, to a very large extent.

Subsequent reports confirm the excellence of the arrangements in British camps [Cd. 8234 (the documents' dates range from March to July, 1916)].

PRISONERS OF WAR IN GERMANY

In the following particulars the details have been taken (with the exception of two instances) from the reports made by representatives of the United States Embassy. Owing to these representations the lot of the prisoners has been considerably ameliorated. It will be noticed that the conditions generally prevailing are now very different from what they were only a year ago. The visits to the camps have largely been made without giving previous notice. It is gratifying to find that with few exceptions (including the terrible neglect at Wittenberg) the medical men and nurses of Germany have been humane and considerate to the wounded officers and soldiers of the Allies.

In the early days insufficient clothing and overcrowding in unsuitable buildings were a crying scandal. These conditions have now been to a very large extent removed.

The complaints of insufficient food and of the character of the same appear to be justified up to the hilt, and a large number of organizations in the Allied and Neutral Countries [*v. Cd.* 8262, p. 8] are kept continually at work sending in parcels of food to make good in some measure the terrible shortage.

For references to treatment by Germans of prisoners of war in Africa, *v. pp.* 40 . . .

* Signifies camp for officers.

† The numbers of British prisoners are in each case put in parentheses.

PRISONERS OF WAR IN GERMANY

CAMP.	WHEN VISITED.	PRISONERS. †	SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY VISITORS.
AACHEN	Feb., 1916	(41)	Hospitals for wounded. Conditions good.
ALTDAMM	Dec., 1914	6,000	Little to complain of. Insufficient food.
ALTENGRABAU	April, 1916	4,400	Facilities for football, etc. Well treated.
BERLIN (Hospital)	Dec., 1915	(34)	Satisfactory.
•BISCHOFSWERDA	Oct., 1915	(41)	Restriction of privileges. Much dissatisfaction. Food arrangements to be revised.
"	Jan., 1916	(39)	Conditions improved.
•BLANKENBURG	Jan., 1916		Satisfactory.
"	June, 1916		No complaints. Walks in wood on parole.
•BLENHORST	Sept., 1915	96	A Kurhaus in a good-sized park. Officers selected as likely to be benefited by course of the noted mud baths. Conditions excellent.
BRANDENBERG	June, 1916	2,000	These formed the crew of the trawler <i>Horus</i> . Generally satisfactory.
•BURG	Mar., 1915	525	Camp did not impress me favourably.
"	Nov., 1915	550	Strict supervision owing to attempts to escape.
•CELLE	April, 1915	9,000	Conditions satisfactory.
•CASTLE CELLE	Oct., 1915	260	Insufficient food.
•CLAUSTHAL	Sept., 1915	198	Modern hotel. Tennis and racquet courts. Satisfactory.
"	Jan., 1916	175	Satisfactory.
•COTTBUS	March, 1916	3,000	Conditions satisfactory. Theatre. Field for football, etc.
•COLBERG	June, 1916	140	Catering satisfactory. Walks in country permitted. Gymnasium.

SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY VISITOR.

CAMP.	WHEN VISITED.	PRISONERS.†	(Hospitals.) Conditions good. (Detention camp.) Men imprisoned generally for refusal to work in mines, etc., or in munition factories. (Hospitals.) Conditions satisfactory. (Detention Camp.) Nineteen N.C.O.'s and men had been imprisoned here, principally for refusing to work. Generally satisfactory. Health of camp good and 'atmosphere' satisfactory. Comfortable and satisfactory. Satisfactory. Dirty condition. Insufficient food. Improved conditions. Satisfactory. Reading-room. Orchestras. Overcrowded and complaints as to food. Seven in punishment cells for attempting to escape by tunnelling. Many leave the camp each day in working parties. Generally satisfactory. Complaints as to food. No complaints as to treatment. 300 away in working camps. Satisfactory. In addition, 67 British are at work in the neighbourhood. 328, in addition, away at working camps. Facilities for football, etc. Six men under punishment for dilatoriness at rubbish-sorting camp. Camp being transferred. No complaints.
COLOGNE	Feb., 1916	(107)	
"	Feb., 1916		
"	May, 1916	(88)	
"	May, 1916	(67)	
*CRELFELD	April, 1915	(154)	
"	Oct., 1915	(199)	
"	Mar., 1916	(213)	920
*CROSSEN	Aug., 1915	(13)	
*DOBERITZ	Dec., 1914		9,000
"	May, 1915		8,634 (3,657)
"	Jan., 1916		
DORSTEN	Oct., 1915	(20)	
DÜLMEN	Oct., 1915	(700)	
"	Mar., 1916		4,398 (1,051)
DYROTZ	Jan., 1916		2,000 (631)
"	April, 1916	(426)	
ERFURT	May, 1916	(15)	

*FRIEDBERG	July, 1915	300	(14)	Stone barracks. Satisfactory.
"	Dec., 1915			Satisfactory.
"	June, 1916	583	(22)	Comfortable quarters. Food satisfactory. Complaint as to canteen prices. Facilities for tennis, football, etc. Walks under parole.
FRIEDRICHSFELD	Oct., 1915	15,000	(300)	Also 100 British at work camps. Facilities for football and tennis. Satisfactory.
*FÜRSTENBERG	Dec., 1915		(28)	Satisfactory.
GARDELGEN	April, 1915	10,000	(228)	Epidemic of typhus.
GERMERSHEIM	Feb., 1916	3,127	(43)	(Hospitals.) Conditions good.
GIESSEN	July, 1915		(1,700)	One of the best-organized, neatest, and most contented camps visited. 450 Canadians need uniforms.
"	Feb., 1916		(914)	Of these 481 have been detailed for working camps. Previous lack of clothing now remedied. Satisfactory.
*GNADENFREI	Aug., 1915	350	(8)	A modern boys' school. Overcrowded. Tennis court.
"	Jan., 1916	405		Overcrowded. Not sufficient exercise. Only German books allowed.
"	May, 1916	350	(7)	Walks allowed. Gymnasium opened. Several improvements.
GÖRLITZ	Mar., 1916		(66)	Field for football, etc. Some engaged on road work.
GÖTTINGEN	April, 1915	6,000	(1,500)	Commandant limited to expenditure of 60 pfennigs per day per man for food. An American Y.M.C.A. building.
"	Feb., 1916	7,000	(800)	300 of the 800 are detailed to outlying work camps. Satisfactory. Large library.
GUBEN	Aug., 1915		(13)	Satisfactory.
"	Mar., 1916	3,000	(47)	Bad lighting and ventilation to be improved.
GÜSTROW	April, 1915	6,000	(300)	Distributing camp for centres of employment in agriculture or public improvements.
*GÜTERSLOH	Jan., 1916	51,000	(3,000)	Satisfactory. Mostly at branch working camps.
"	Jan., 1916	1,050	(88)	Also 40 British orderlies. Satisfactory.
○ HAKENMOOR	Dec., 1915	600	(60)	Satisfactory.

SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY VISITOR.

CAMP.	WHEN VISITED.	PRISONERS. †	REMARKS.
*HALLE	April, 1915	500 (50)	Insufficient food.
"	Oct., 1915	500 (39)	Conditions had improved.
"	Mar., 1916	468 (36)	Marked improvement.
HAMBURG	July, 1915	(23)	Hospitals for wounded. Treatment good.
"	Mar., 1916	(8)	Ditto.
HAMELN	May, 1916	3,000 (207)	Food supplies from home and Switzerland covered entire needs. Well treated. No serious complaints. Football facilities and tramps over the hills.
HAMMELBURG	Feb., 1916	2,000 (72)	Employed in work on the roads. No room for exercise.
*HANNOVER MÜNDE	July, 1915	600 (3)	Factory building. Many improvements installed. 14 British orderlies here.
"	Feb., 1916	717 (22)	Satisfactory. Tennis court, etc.
"	June, 1915	280 (15)	Modern barracks. Tennis courts. Satisfactory.
"	Feb., 1916	332 (13)	Satisfactory, but somewhat overcrowded.
HERVEST-DORSTEN	Oct., 1915	700 (200)	Working largely at agricultural jobs. Generally satisfactory.
HOLZMINDEN ¹	Sept., 1915		Insufficient food. Verminous conditions. Brutality.
INGOLSTADT	June, 1915	(2)	Sanitary arrangements unsatisfactory.
"	Jan., 1916	4,000 (11)	Satisfactory.
"	Feb., 1916		Officers' quarters depressing. Improvements promised.

¹ There were no British prisoners in this camp. The conditions are described by a Dutchman named Petri, a commercial traveller with German connections, who has published an account of his prison life and experiences, which were mild compared with those of other prisoners. He never tasted the prison food, but subsisted on parcels sent in. On leaving Germany he was asked to sign a certificate as to the good quality of the food; he evaded the question [Petri, *passim*].

KONIGSMOOR						Satisfactory.
•KRONACH	Dec., 1915	250	(4)			General conditions favourable.
LANDAU	Feb., 1916	1,400	(25)			Satisfactory.
LANGENSALZA	May, 1916		(101)			Of these, 3 sergeants, 27 corporals and 30 privates were deprived of privileges because they did not volunteer for work. Food unsatisfactory.
LILLE	July, 1915					Temporary prison. Clean and sanitary.
LIMBURG	July, 1915		(2,300)			Complaints <i>re</i> food. Irish prisoners.
"	Feb., 1916	9,500	(2,045)			Of these (Irish) 864 were detailed for outside working camps. Conditions satisfactory.
•MAGDEBURG	Mar., 1916	472	(8)			Satisfactory.
•MAINZ	June, 1915		(63)			Treatment and food good.
"	June, 1916	530	(117)			Of these 37 were to be transferred to Switzerland. Canteen well stocked. Several tennis courts, etc. Walks allowed under parole.
MANNHEIM	Feb., 1916		(60)			Conditions good. Accommodation for 10,000. Scientifically constructed camp.
MEREBURG	Nov., 1914	10,000				Satisfactory.
"	Dec., 1915	19,839	(340)			Majority away on working parties. Bath had been constructed.
MESCHEDI	Aug., 1915	2,000	(13)			Satisfactory.
MINDEN	April, 1916	11,000	(301)			British are all N.C.O.'s transferred from other camps, but, it was said, not for disciplinary purposes. No musical instruments allowed. Insufficient space for exercise.
MÜNCHENBERG	April, 1916	813	(105)			48 of these were in working camps. Food satisfactory. Insufficient space for exercise. This is not a permanent camp. (Hospital.) Well treated.
MUNICH	Feb., 1916		(10)			Complaints as to food.
MÜNSTER I.	April, 1915		(6,389)			
" II.			(11,093)			
" III.			(4,491)			

SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY VISITOR.

CAMP.	WHEN VISITED.	PRISONERS†	REMARKS
MÜNSTER I.	Mar., 1916	(336)	Overcrowded. Badly lighted. Hospital arrangements satisfactory.
MÜNSTER II.	Mar., 1916	9,000	Generally satisfactory. Badly lighted.
MÜNSTER III.	Mar., 1916	3,500	Generally satisfactory. No complaints.
MÜNSTER (Hospital)	Mar., 1916	(39)	Conditions satisfactory. Food excellent.
NIEDERZWEHREN	Dec., 1915	18,000	180 of the British were quartered in working camps. Satisfactory.
*NEISSE	Aug., 1915	366	Far from satisfactory. Space for exercise very limited.
"	Jan., 1916	800	Satisfactory.
"	May, 1916	831	Improved. Visits to town allowed.
*NEUBRANDENBURG	July, 1915	190	Satisfactory. Certain privileges withdrawn owing to attempts to escape.
NEUHAMMER	Mar., 1916	(9)	160 British detailed to working camps (agricultural).
NEU-STRELITZ	May, 1916	1,059	Auxiliary camp to Güstrow. Food prepared by prisoners. Canteen well stocked. Conditions distinctly favourable.
NÜRNBERG	June, 1915	(48)	Also 9 wounded Englishmen in hospital with good care and treatment.
"	Oct., 1915	(35)	No substantial complaint.
"	Feb., 1916	3,300	Satisfactory.
*OSNABRÜCK	April, 1915	444	Complaints as to quality and quantity of food.
"	Oct., 1915	400	Conditions had improved somewhat.
PARCHIM	May, 1916	2,900	25 away in working camps (farms). Satisfactory.
POLAND		(2000)	2,000 British prisoners were sent to work in Poland as a matter of reprisals. The German Government has declined to allow the U.S.A. Embassy officials to visit these Polish camps.

	2,000	(100)
QUEDLINBURG		
RUHLIBEN (Civilian Camp)	2,000	(100)
"		
"	4,273	
Dec., 1915		
Jan., 1915		
Feb., 1915		
July, 1915		
June, 1916		

No important complaints. 40 away on working parties.
Many cases of destitution.

2,000 in greatest destitution.

It is announced that the prisoners are to be put on half-rations.
From Dr. Taylor's reports they are largely living on parcels from England.

(13th July) The German Government deny that they do not recognise their obligation to supply food to British prisoners of war, and that less food is supplied to the civilians than to the military.

If England, by way of reprisals, reduce rations to prisoners in England, the German Government will withdraw permission for collective and individual parcels.

Overcrowding. No improvement in conditions. (See following extracts.)

'With regard to the question of the exchange of British and German civilian prisoners of war, His Majesty's Government would be unable to agree to the repatriation of all the German civilians interned in this country in exchange for all the British civilians interned in Germany, as this would involve the release of about 26,000 Germans in exchange for about 4,000 British subjects (SIR EDWARD GREY, July 18, 1916; v. Cd. 8296).

'It is intolerable that people of education should be herded six together in a horse's stall, and in some of the lofts the bunks touch one another. The light for reading is bad, and reading is a necessity if these poor prisoners are to be detained during another winter.

'In the hay-lofts above the stables conditions are even worse. For example, in Barrack No. 2 one half-section of the loft is, at the centre, about 10 feet from the floor from the highest point, and the loft slopes downwards, so that at the sides it is only 4½ feet above the floor. The floor of this part of the loft is about 10-20 metres by 12-80 metres. The beds are so close together that they touch. In this confined space sixty-four men live. The light from the little windows is so faint that prisoners' eyes will be seriously injured, if the sight is not permanently lost, and this semi-darkness will undoubtedly cause depression and mental trouble.

'The heating system should be improved and provision made for the drying of clothes by radiators or a drying-room in each barrack. The prisoners are obliged to answer roll calls outside, often in the rain, and have no means of drying their soaked garments.

'Many things, such as soap, usually issued to prisoners, even in gaols, I am informed, have never been given to the prisoners at Ruhleben. Various authorities from time to time have promised that the housing would be bettered. The present conditions should no longer prevail; during another winter they will be impossible' (MR. GERARD to MR. PAGE, June 28, 1916; v. Cd. 8296).

'It would appear that practically no improvement in the housing of the prisoners has been made, that six men are still housed in one horse-box, which, as Mr. Gerard says, is intolerable, and that the light for reading is bad. Unfortunately the conditions in the hay-lofts seem to be even worse than those prevailing in the boxes; one loft is only 4½ feet high at the sides, and sixty-four men are crowded into a space 10-20 metres by 12-80 metres. The loft is in semi-darkness. The effect on the mental and physical state of the prisoners of such conditions is too obvious to need comment. Sir E. Grey had hoped that the construction of six new barracks referred to in Mr. Gerard's despatch enclosed in Mr. Page's note of the 21st May, 1915, had removed cause for serious complaint as regards overcrowding, and he learns with great regret that this is not the case' (SIR EDWARD GREY, July 21, 1916; v. Cd. 8296).

CAMP.	WHEN VISITED.	PRISONERS. †	SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY VISITOR.
SAGAN	Mar., 1916	(34)	All the British in good condition.
SALZWEDEL	April, 1915	8,000 (49)	Fairly satisfactory.
SCHNEIDEMÜHL	Oct., 1915	46,000 (486)	About 40 per cent. of prisoners live outside in working parties. Conditions which were unsatisfactory in the spring had improved. Complaints as to food.
"	June, 1916	2,900 (127)	Kitchens and food satisfactory, but British subsisted on packages from home.
SENNELAGER	Sept., 1915	3,000 (538)	Complaints <i>re</i> food.
"	Mar., 1916	(1069)	Usual complaints as to food not fully justified. 58,000 and 53,000 packets of food received from home in January and February respectively. Facilities for football, etc.; 611 away on working parties.

SOLTAU	April, 1915	30,000	(400)	Conditions satisfactory.
"	Jan., 1916	48,000	(472)	819 British are employed outside the camp. Satisfactory.
SPANDAU	Feb., 1916		(74)	Overcrowded, but generally satisfactory. The men work at neighbouring chemical works.
"	Mar., 1916		(45)	Employed at chemical works. Food 'not bad.'
SPROTTAU	Aug., 1915		(14)	Satisfactory. A centre for working camps.
"	Mar., 1916		(7)	These seven, sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment for refusing to work on Sunday, have appealed and await re-trial.
STENDAL	June, 1915	7,020	(64)	All the British had been wounded and recently discharged from hospitals, where they had been kindly treated.
"	Oct., 1915	5,500	(150)	Insufficient clothing. Complaints as to character of food.
"	Mar., 1916		(326)	Conditions greatly improved.
STUTTGART	Feb., 1916	3,401	(5)	Satisfactory.
TEGEL/	Feb., 1916	280	(76)	Satisfactory. Working camp for factory in suburb of Berlin.
TREUENBRIETZEN	June, 1916	30	(16)	Working camp. Men in good condition. Usual complaints as to food. ¹
*VILLINGEN	June, 1915		(2)	Barracks. Permitted to walk in country.
"	Feb., 1916	359	(5)	Overcrowded. Leaves room for decided improvement.
*WAHMBECK	Aug., 1915	99	(8)	An old-fashioned hotel. Some lack of space for exercise, but will be rectified. Food good.
WAHN	Oct., 1915	5,000	(500)	General health of men seemed good. Orchestra. Satisfactory.
*WEILBERG	Feb., 1916	260	(17)	Satisfactory.
*WERL	Mar., 1916		(6)	Generally satisfactory. Walks under parole.
WESEL	Oct., 1915		(200)	(Hospitals.) Treatment entirely satisfactory.
"	May, 1916		(2)	Detention Camp. Satisfactory.
WÜNSDORF	Mar., 1916		(597)	The British prisoners are Indians. Treatment good, food satisfactory, clothing sufficient. Special cooking arrangements.
"	May, 1916	3,400	(569)	Conditions satisfactory.

CAMP.	WHEN VISITED.	PRISONERS. †	SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY VISITOR.
WITTENBERG ¹	Oct., 1915 Nov., 1915	5,000 (400)	Insufficient clothing. Men regarded as criminals. Spotted typhus epidemic. "More unfavourable than I had been led to expect."
"	Mar., 1916	(700)	Of these 400 are at work at outlying camps. The new commandant, General von Studtowitz, has inaugurated a number of improvements.
ZERBST	June, 1915	12,000 (70)	Conditions satisfactory.
ZOSSEN	April, 1915	15,500 (233)	Complained of the character of the food.

¹ The British Government Committee reported in April, 1916 (Cd. 8224), after the return of the imprisoned officers of the R.A.M.C., as to the conditions of the camp during the typhus epidemic of 1915, when over 1,000 typhus patients (about 150 British) were in the camp. The mattresses were infected and verminous, there was an absence of soap, bandages, and medical supplies and appliances. The camp was in charge of General von Dassel (since removed) and Dr. Aschenbach, who personally refused the supply of medical requisites. Complaints were made of the presence of savage dogs in the camps and frequent floggings by means of a rubber whip.

The following account of an escaped Russian prisoner is taken from the journal *Reck* of Sept. 17-30, 1915 :*

'On the 10th of September, 1914, we were at the station of Olita. On the night of the 15th—16th October our 2nd and 4th Battalions made an attack. . . .

'We were surrounded by Germans and could see them plundering our companions. When they took us prisoners as well, we underwent the same fate. All we had, money, watches, tobacco, vanished into the pockets of the Germans. At 7 p.m. on the 16th of October we were despatched with a convoy of prisoners to the rear, on the evening of the 17th packed into goods waggons, with the doors and windows shut, and after a twenty-four hours' journey taken to Schneidemühl. At one of the stations they gave us some skim-soup. On the 20th at last we got a bit of bread. We were stoned whilst being put on board the train ; and, at lunch-time, at one of the stations, the women kept on threatening us with the gallows.

'At Schneidemühl we slept for the first night in an unfinished barrack, lying one on the other. On the morning of the 19th of October two Russian doctors came along, who warned us to hide any money, watches, crucifixes, as there would be a search made, and such articles might pass into the Germans' hands. At 11 a.m. a German doctor arrived, and began vaccinating us ; he knocked our hands about mercilessly. Whoever at this place had any bandages, gave them to his doctors to bind the wounds, as the Germans afforded the prisoners no bandages or drugs. After vaccinating us, they gave out clothes and clay dishes, and quartered us in earthen huts.

'These earthen huts* owed their existence to the first prisoners, who, to contrive some shelter from the cold and the rain, dug them with sticks and old tins. Life in them was impossible. The straw was never changed, and teemed with visitors. There was no washing accommodation, as near the earth-huts there are no wells, and it is not easy to get outside the wire-fence. Matters were no better regarding the feeding. All of those who were quartered in the earth-huts were the last on the list to get food. Some 2,000—2,500 men were left breadless. Sometimes the same prisoner might not get any bread for three or four days on end. In order to obtain any bread, we had to creep out of our rat-holes at 2 or 3 a.m. and form a long queue, waiting some four to five hours in the rain or frost. Nearly all the unfortunates in German duress endured cold and starvation, and in addition to this fare floggings or blows from the butts of the rifles or from bayonettes or bullets. In the Schneidemühl camp I myself witnessed five German soldiers, in their doctor's presence, flogging an English soldier half-dead ; they laid him on a barrel for daring to stand up for a Russian who had been insulted by a German. After this torture the Englishman, who was more than half-killed, was tied to a stake, and then taken to the hospital, where he died next day.

'At Schneidemühl this same doctor who officiated at the torture of the Englishman hustled away the prisoners who were crowding round the canteen, and wounded one Russian with his sabre. At Schneidemühl a German soldier shot down a Russian who refused to go to work. The food

* Cf. for similar conditions the Spanish prisoner's experiences at Zossen-Bünsdorf [*Daily Telegraph*, Sept., 1916].

was poor and insufficient. The captives became emaciated and fell from exhaustion as they crawled out of their earth-holes.

'About the 25th of October the Germans began driving the Russian prisoners to dig trenches. The trenches were dug on a hill near the station of Uszcz [about six miles away.—Ed.]. The earth-dwellers were the most often despatched on the work, as they were the most easily collected. They were forced at the bayonette-point to dig the trenches, and more than one Russian life fell to the German bullets or bayonettes. At Uszcz Station the valley was artificially flooded, as the Germans were in dread of a Russian invasion.

'Between the 2nd and 4th of November, I, with a party of prisoners, was sent to the Quedlinburg camp, where the arrangements were decidedly better. But here, too, flogging was common, and tying to a stake a favourite form of punishment.

'It is apposite to mention that both at Schneidemühl and Quedlinburg the Germans took away from both Russians and English their boots and, on the field, their greatcoats as well.

'At the Quedlinburg camp the Russian prisoners were quartered together with the Belgians and the French in one big courtyard. But, seeing that we lived on very friendly terms with our allies, the Germans put us apart. Amid all the German bestialities, those fellow-Russians who knew German did us great harm.

'Just before Easter the rations of bread were lessened, half a pound being given instead of one pound. They boiled the soup with dirty potatoes, and instead of meat threw lumps of offal into it. In the evening almost every day a stew of meal or potatoes. The Russian prisoners were kept very hungry. Many could not stand it, and swallowed any filth they could gather in the cesspools. The Germans, knowing how hungry the Russians were, were glad of the sport and diversion of bringing a tub of soup to the gate of the barrack, and distributing the contents at request. The Russians crowded up; when the Germans saw them, they joyously drove them back with sticks, bayonettes, and sabres. They very often struck the Russian prisoners and drew blood; and all for a spoonful of bad soup.

'Towards the end of March the Germans began sending out parties of volunteers to do agricultural work in the fields and the factories, and on the 12th of April sent almost all the Russian captives to the Parchim camp [in Mecklenburg-Schwerin].

'The arrangements at Parchim recalled those at Schneidemühl in many respects, except that there were practically only Russians there. It would have been easy enough to have combined amongst ourselves; but many, seeing that anything can be done with a captive, use the opportunity for their own advantage. At Parchim many Russians are busy with their own little concerns; but unfortunately it is difficult to find out their family names. Thus I discovered at this camp that the interpreters connived with the seniors of the groups in cheating the prisoners in the distribution of bread.

'From the camp at Parchim, Russian prisoners were detailed in small working parties to camps and local farms.

'On the 29th of April 1,200 men were sent to the camp at Bimolen (near Bramstein), where the prisoners worked at uprooting of stumps and breaking up rough ground.

' At this place both the Russians, as well as the German soldiers, struck on the ground of starvation. The pay for the work was at first 3, 5, and 6 pfennigs a day. When thirty N.C.O.'s refused to work and the rest of the N.C.O.'s followed their example, they raised the pay to 30 pfennigs a day. But as a punishment they sent us every day to the kitchen to clean potatoes, threatened us with all sorts of penalties for combining, and so on. Seeing that in this camp a strike might recur among the prisoners, the Germans decided to send out a number of them to field work; and those who did not wish to go they despatched to the camp at Witorfeld, near Neumünster, after a preliminary but ineffectual sorting.

' The reason for their sending prisoners in small batches to do field work is because a great lack of foodstuffs is apprehended in Germany, and that there are next to no husbandmen, all the available men having been called to the colours.

' In July, 1915, I noticed that the posts of station-masters at the stations on the narrow-gauge lines were consigned to women, and only one old man could be spared to act as guard. The absence of the male sex was very observable, not only in the villages, but also in the bigger towns. In Germany the local harvests of grain and potatoes have been very scant, and may not be expended by the owner. Everything has been confiscated from the population, grain, potatoes, turnips, cattle, and pigs. A family may retain only 180 pounds of corn. Anyone who dares to keep any more forfeits all his grain; and the culprit is liable to imprisonment. Prices in Germany are very high. Manual labour is also very expensive. A fifteen-year-old shepherd boy receives £30 and all found for six months' work.

' After being sent to the camp at Witorfeld I was despatched to field-work in Sleswig When we were crossing over the Kiel Canal, all the windows in the train had the blinds drawn.

' The prisoners' life amongst the German peasants was pleasanter than at the camps; but regulations were just as strict. No one might converse with the prisoners, or tell them where they were. The prisoners are lodged somewhere in a room apart or in a barn. The windows, if any, are sealed with an iron grating. The door is locked at night. The prisoner has his food by himself. He is paid 4d. a day for ten hours' work.

' From the 14th of July I was sent to the island of Aar, where I, with eighty-five of my countrymen, had to dig a canal and construct a sea-wall. Life on this island was very severe. The food provided was very poor. For breakfast and supper a thin stew of meal with starch, and for dinner, potato soup. Never any meat; now and then a bit of blood-pudding, or rotten salted fish. In addition to this they gave us, when at work, a bottle of coloured water instead of coffee; of course no sugar. The lodging for the prisoners was a barn, formerly allocated to the pigs. The straw was never changed, only sometimes added to. There were millions of parasites in it. Never a bath. When at work, the sentries struck the hour with their sticks, fists, and the butts of their rifles. For a ten-hour day they paid 20 or 30 pfennigs.

' On the 15th of August, taking advantage of an overcast night, we three prisoners decided on quitting the German island

' When we were in Danish waters the Danes who had discerned us hastened to our help. The Germans abandoned a chase which was now hopeless. . . . '

PRUSSIA (*v. also* GERMANY and STATE)

Prussia is a very modern agglomeration. For the acquisition of the Polish provinces, *v. POLAND*.

Pomerania passed from Poland to Sweden at the Peace of Westphalia (1684), being partitioned at the Oder between Sweden and Brandenburg. At the Peace of Stockholm (1720) most of this Swedish portion up to the River Peene was transferred to Prussia, and in 1815 all the remainder. The country was originally Slav, but in 1309 conquered by the Teutonic Order of Knights; in 1466 reconquered by Kazimir Jagellon of Poland. These medieval facts would be sufficient to a Slav, proceeding on German models to claim the country anew (*cf.* the arguments for SLESWIG, the UKRAINE (p. 256), and ALSACE-LORRAINE).

Sleswig-Holstein was acquired in 1866 and Alsace-Lorraine in 1870, Hanover in 1866, the Rhenish provinces (70·7 per cent. Catholic) in 1815, Silesia in 1742.

In 1866 Prussia conquered Southern Germany, and, owing to her large acquisitions, is the dominating State in the German Empire. The Bundesrat, a Federal Council, has 58 members, of whom 17 are Prussian: some little States are practically unrepresented. The Kaiser is President of the Bundesrat, and Prussian delegates preside over every committee.

The Bundesrat has legislative, judicial, and executive powers, all of them indefinite. In military matters the Kaiser nominates the board, except for one Bavarian delegate. The navy is entirely Prussian.

The Reichstag is still elected on the electoral basis of 1870 and is thoroughly unrepresentative; moreover, it can consent to, or reject, or amend Bills presented by the Bundesrat, and cannot initiate any measures (a power now inherent in the Russian *Duma*). Its powers are strictly defined, and preclude anything not stated in the constitution.

The Ministry is one man, the Imperial Chancellor, who must also be Chancellor for the Kingdom of Prussia.

To relieve the work, deputies are appointed by him for what would be in other countries independent ministries. Neither the *Reichskanzler* nor the *Stellvertreter* (subordinate ministers) are responsible to the Reichstag; they have no seat in it, but come down to address it.

Prussia is governed by a bureaucracy, which virtually extends over the Empire, many departments, *e.g.*, the postal services, railways, insurance, etc., etc., being Imperial.

Every official has a legal right to his post, is subject to interior disciplinary courts, a regular *droit administratif* (a notion unknown to England, paralleled by the clerical privileges or rights of clergy, placing 'clerks' beyond the law, which were suppressed early in English history).

Any official may be removed 'when official requirements demand it,' and thus they are all dependent and subservient. The reason may be that a permanent agreement with the highest authorities is essential.

In Prussia itself the *Herrenhaus* or House of Lords is strictly oligarchic: elections for the Lower Chamber are by open voting, and wealth gives a right to three votes against one. Thus the Prussian Lower Chamber, also elected on a basis of 1870, is absolutely undemocratic. Tannenberg [pp. 201 . . .] recommends this as a model in territories of *Gross-deutschland*.

The *Herrenhaus* consists of an all-powerful caste, and the sons of the nobility are not commoners as in England.

These noble castes are above the law, and constitute a part of the military caste, which is also beyond the ordinary law.

The official Evangelical Church supports all these institutions; and, although the Reformed and the Catholic Churches are acknowledged, no one not a Lutheran has any chance of promotion or advancement. As in the Middle Ages (where, as Heine says, there was no liberty, only liberties) Prussia is a land of privilege, without freedom of Press, persecuting other religions, with no right of assembly.

In the industrial world, under the *Gewerbeordnung* of

1869, no workmen's rights exist; and the organized trusts, under which (*v.* GERMANY—COMMERCE) the commerce is carried on, black-list any recalcitrants, so that the whole country is a prison to any unpopular element.

Every language but German is suppressed and forbidden (*v.* SLESWIG, POLAND, and ALSACE); and Poles, Danes, and the French are regularly expropriated (*v.* pp. 259, 176, 71).

Hence, even thus, the Social-Democrats command one-third of the Reichstag and have a Press of their own.

'The State is perishable and made for man: not *vice versâ*.' But this is the converse of German dogma [Manen, pp. 40 . . .]; [*Die Verfassung des deutschen Reiches: Reklam*].

Kant (1724-1804) has founded modern German thought; he practically synchronizes with the rise of Prussia: he preaches *αὐταρκία*, self-sufficiency, the sacredness of the will of the State—all anti-Christian doctrine [Poll, pp. 43 . . .].

Pro: Prussia is the kernel of Europe, the hope of its resurrection [Labberton, II., p. 70].

Con: The Prussian 'Junkertum' was steadily losing hold of power, and the agrarian interests (which prosper by war, *e.g.*, the free supply of prisoner-labour) was suffering: hence the agrarians and aristocracy desired war [*J'accuse*, pp. 12 and 95].

There is great discontent at the war profits in Germany, and various devices are suggested [Sturtz, *passim*].

The diplomatic service is confined to Prussian aristocrats, who have only themselves to blame for any errors [*J'accuse*, p. 87].

THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF THE WAR

Pro: France is a nation of infidels: she has dissolved religious communities, and is to be punished for her sins [Duijnsted, p. 19].

Con : France has shown in the present war that she is still a sound Catholic country [Baudrillart, p. 38]. Whereas Germany persistently levels churches to the ground, defiles them, and massacres priests [*ibid.*, p. 80 ; Grondijs, *passim*].

PROTESTANTISM

Pro : The Kaiser is the protagonist of the Lutheran Church : when in Jerusalem he championed this cause (*v.* Speech, p. 127).

Con : As the protagonist of the Christian Protestants, he is raising the Moslem world against Christianity [Koffyberg, p. 52].

Pro : German missions in the English colonies and the German colonies occupied by the British have been ruthlessly destroyed.

A few missions in India can do harm. India is still not a Christian country, and the English are doing wrong in anglicizing her ; in fact, nationalism will soon be driving them out of Egypt and India.

The true German field lies in Asia Minor [*Dietsche Stemmen*, Jan.-Feb., p. 326 ; Hauck, *passim*].

Con : This accusation is untrue [*e.g.*, *v.* Cameroons Paper (Cd. 7974, No. 12), completely disproved in No. 15 ; and *v.* CAMEROONS].

Germany has always used missions as political agencies (*e.g.*, the price of two German missionaries at Kiao-chow was a whole colony) ; and German agents cannot be trusted at large. (As to India, *v.* INDIA ; as to Asia Minor, *v.* TURKEY.)

CATHOLICISM

Pro : Germany contains a very large proportion of Catholics, who in politics form a strong party, called the *Centrum*, and for many years had to defend the Catholic Church against Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*.

Con : The Kaiser appears as the leader of Protestantism, and as the apostle of a new German god.

Against Christian doctrines on war (*viz.*, war is only justifiable when provoked and for a just cause of defence), Germany sets up war as an object *per se* (*v.* WAR; PAN-GERMANISM; and p. 85).

The *Kulturkampf*, a specific German invention [*J'accuse*, p. 197] is the outcome and is exemplified by the behaviour of Prussian officers (*v.* ZABERN) [De Beer, p. 99] in Germany, and the savage warfare against churches and priests in Belgium and France (*v.* ATROCITIES); the permeation even of Catholic papers in Germany with anti-Christian philosophy is deplorable [Baudrillart, pp. 17, 27, 31, 32, 38, 72, etc.].

Liberalism preached mere utilitarianism, while Socialism advocated only internationalism. Socialism has become a mere propaganda for the proletariat. Modern materialism is the cause of this war. As a reaction from the irreverence of modern Germany, a supernationalism has arisen.

This war has put an end to international Socialism, and leaves the field open to the true Christian doctrine of love and tolerance.

The position of the Pope is unsafe under international guarantee, but secure under Italy [Duijustree, quoting Troelstra, Verschuur, *passim*; so, too, Aengenent, *passim*; for van Poll, *v.* PAN-GERMANISM].

THE RIGHT OF SEARCH

The right of visitation and search of neutral vessels at sea is essential to the prosecution of naval warfare, and has been admitted by all maritime states and by every international law writer of repute. It furnishes the only means by which a belligerent is able to satisfy himself that a mercantile vessel flying a neutral flag is entitled to fly such flag, and also whether such vessel is carrying contraband goods or engaged in violating a lawful blockade. And while the practice of visitation and

search secures to the belligerent an effective means of putting into operation forces which are often of vital importance for the success of the struggle in which he is engaged, it imposes on the genuine neutral the minimum of interference with his *bonâ fide* trade enterprise. The neutral acting in good faith has it in his power to satisfy the searching vessel on the spot that the trade in which his vessel is engaged is legitimate. Upon this, all further ground for interference by the belligerent ceases, and the neutral is at liberty to continue his voyage.

Where no suspicious circumstances come to light, the visit of the neutral vessel is effected according to the English practice by the sending of an officer on board the neutral to examine the ship's documents, by which the character of the vessel, the nature of the cargo, and its destination, and the ports from and to which the vessel is sailing are shown. Maritime nations are in general agreement as to the documents which merchant vessels must carry for this purpose. These are: 1. The ship's register. 2. The sea-letter issued by the neutral state. 3. The log-book. 4. The charter party, if any, relating to the voyage. 5. The invoices and bills of lading for the cargo. 6. The muster roll of the ship's crew. The requirement to keep on board particulars such as these, which must be kept in the ordinary course of a shipper's business, cannot be looked upon as involving any hardship on the neutral.

But although the doctrine of the right of visitation and search has gained universal acceptance, disputes have from time to time arisen as to certain special cases in which it has been contended that the right should be abandoned or relaxed. Chief among these are the case of a neutral merchantman sailing under a convoy of ships of war supplied by the neutral state, and where the neutral vessel is engaged in carrying mails. The question of the immunity of convoyed merchantmen from search, which was first raised in 1653, has not yet reached the stage at which any general rule of conduct has been found which the chief maritime states of the world would be prepared to accept. The British view,

which is opposed to granting immunity, is still that which was laid down by Lord Stowell in the case of the *Maria* (I. Rob., 340), though an offer to relax it was made in the Naval Conference of 1908-9. It has the merit of an historical consistency unusual in theories of international law, and is certainly the doctrine most in harmony with the developments which have taken place of recent times in systems of naval warfare.

As regards the position of neutral vessels carrying mails, maritime states are in general agreed to accord them a large, if not a complete, measure of non-interference by belligerent cruisers. But in the application of this concession difficulties inevitably arise. A belligerent might be willing to grant complete immunity from visitation and search by his cruisers to a genuine mail-steamer: but he is entitled to be assured that the mail-steamer is what she purports to be; and it is difficult to see how he can obtain any assurance worth acceptance if he forgoes his right of search. A neutral may be engaged in carrying military despatches of the utmost importance or goods undoubtedly contraband in the guise of innocent letters or postal packets. Numerous instances of this have occurred in the course of the present war. Whatever may be the degree of theoretical immunity granted to neutrals carrying mails, a belligerent cannot be expected to look calmly on while his military interests are being seriously injured by a neutral whose special privilege is placed at the service of his enemy. The curtailment of the exercise of any recognised right which would enable a belligerent to impose a speedy peace on the enemy is not in the long run in the interests of the neutral himself.

DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGE

This is the expression of a rule of international law that goods found on board a neutral vessel on the high seas are to be regarded as in direct transit to those whom they are ultimately intended to reach, notwithstanding that their immediate destination may be a neutral port.

And if the ultimate consignee be an enemy, the goods in the neutral vessel are regarded as enemy goods. The rule applies chiefly to cases of contraband goods and to goods intended for a blockaded area. In its modern form it had its origin in the decisions of the prize courts of the United States during the Civil War (the *Circassian*, II. Wallace, 135; the *Bermuda*, III. Wallace, 514; the *Springbok*, V. Wallace, 1.), but the principle upon which it is founded had obtained the approval of courts and jurists long anterior to that date, and is besides consonant with reason. It being admitted that a belligerent is justified in capturing contraband intended for the enemy, and in preventing neutrals from violating a blockade established by him of his enemy's territory, it can matter nothing that the contraband is being conveyed by an indirect route, or that the intention to violate the blockade is obscured by the choice of an unusual method of approach to the blockaded area. The real condition of things is made more difficult to establish, but, once established, it would be contrary to every principle of sound judicial administration if the neutral were to be at liberty to invoke the difficulties of proof which his own wrongdoing had created as a reason for escaping the penalty due to his offence against the rights of the belligerent. While neutral states do not feel called upon to interfere to prevent their subjects trading with a belligerent or attempting to violate a properly established blockade, they cannot complain if the enemy of the belligerent takes any steps reasonably necessary to prevent or detect offences committed by a subject of the neutral against a right secured to belligerents by international law.

PAPER BLOCKADE

The name 'paper blockade' is that given to a blockade not sustained by any actual force, or by a force notoriously inadequate for the purpose of rendering a vessel which tries to enter or leave the blockaded place liable to probable capture. It is difficult to fix with accuracy

the degree of danger of capture which would make a blockade effective. The Declaration of Paris of 1856, to which almost all maritime states have given their adherence, lays down that a blockade is only binding when it is effective, 'that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.'

As a vessel which is engaged in trying to reach a blockaded port becomes liable to seizure and condemnation from the time she sets out on her voyage with a knowledge that the blockade exists, it is a matter of supreme importance both to neutrals and to belligerents to know when a blockade is to be regarded as more than a mere paper blockade, which neutrals are at liberty to disregard.

How difficult this is often found to be in practice will be seen in the case of two of the most extraordinary blockades of modern times. During the American Civil War, the United States Government proclaimed a blockade of the Confederate ports, involving a coastline of more than 3,000 miles. Although the Federal fleet was, in the early stages of the war, at all events, wholly inadequate to control the passage of ships into or out of the ports of this area, the blockade was recognized as effective by foreign Governments. And where, during the continuance of this blockade, a vessel sailed from Bordeaux to Havana with an instruction to her master to sail thence to New Orleans, but in case he found when he reached Havana that New Orleans was blockaded, then to such other place as might be indicated to him at Havana, and the vessel was captured on its way to Havana, it was condemned by the United States Courts for attempting to violate the blockade (the *Circassian*, II. Wallace, 135).

The other instance arose during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8. Turkey proclaimed a blockade of the Russian coasts of the Black Sea from Trebizond to the Danube, and assigned to a squadron of cruisers the task of maintaining it. That the squadron was unequal to the task assigned to it was recognised by Turkey

herself, for the Porte also stationed two cruisers in the Bosphorus with instructions to capture any vessels coming from the blockaded ports. These Bosphorus guard ships captured some neutral (Greek) ships which had sailed from one of the blockaded ports without meeting with the investing squadron, and the Prize Court sitting at Constantinople condemned the vessels for violating the blockade.

From these examples, and having regard to the views expressed by judges and writers in other recent instances, we may take it as the settled rule of international law that if the neutral vessel engaged in trying to run a blockade incurs a serious risk of capture during any stage of his passage to or from the blockaded port, the blockade will be held to be an effective and not a mere 'paper' blockade.

The position from the point of view of international law as generally accepted by maritime nations, but containing such concessions to neutral interests as Great Britain, as the chief naval Power, felt she could make, was embodied in the Declaration of London. As, however, this did not meet with the acceptance of other nations, though the objections were for the most part objections in point of form, the Declaration has been withdrawn, but of course without prejudice to the state of the law already existing. It would, consequently, not be a tenable objection to Great Britain acting in disregard of any concession she was prepared to make under the Declaration, to say that had the Declaration been accepted by foreign Powers she would not be justified in withdrawing her concession. It has to be borne in mind that the Declaration never came into force.

The practice of German propagandists appealing to the Declaration for matters conceded by Great Britain, while they refuse to have regard to other parts which are incompatible with their theories, is inconsistent either with the ordinary rules of construction or with elementary rules of logic. Thus, they maintained that it is unlawful to remove hostile persons from neutral ships [*v.* §47 of the Declaration] during the time when cotton

and oils were being passed by Great Britain, as being on the ' free list ' [Cd. 4554, p. 89].

[*The preceding section is contributed by T. Hynes, LL.B., Barrister-at-Law.*]

The exercise of the right of search at sea by Naval Powers has given rise to a long correspondence between Great Britain and the United States. The United States admit :

' A belligerent nation has been conceded the right of visit and search, and the right of capture and condemnation, if upon examination a neutral vessel is found to be engaged in unneutral service, or to be carrying contraband of war intended for the enemy's Government or armed forces. It has been conceded the right to establish and maintain a blockade of an enemy's ports and coasts, and to capture and condemn any vessel taken in trying to break the blockade. It is even conceded the right to detain and take to its own ports for judicial examination all vessels which it suspects for substantial reasons to be engaged in unneutral or contraband service, and to condemn them, if the suspicion is sustained. But such rights, long clearly defined both in doctrine and practice, have hitherto been held to be the only permissible exceptions to the principle of equality of sovereignty on the high seas as between belligerents and nations not engaged in war.'

The English contention is fairly summarized in No. 8 [Cd. 8233], §§ 3, 7, and 8 :

' 3. I need scarcely dwell on the obligation incumbent upon the Allies to take every step in their power to overcome their common enemy, in view of the shocking violation of the recognised rules and principles of civilized warfare of which he has been guilty during the present struggle. Your Excellency's attention has already been drawn to some of these proceedings in the memorandum which I handed to you on the 19th February. Since that time Lord Bryce's Report, based on evidence carefully sifted by legal experts, describing the atrocities committed in Belgium ; the poisoning of

wells in German South-West Africa ; the use of poisonous gases against the troops in Flanders ; and, finally, the sinking of the *Lusitania*, without any opportunity to passengers and non-combatants to save their lives, have shown how indispensable it is that we should leave unused no justifiable method of defending ourselves.'

'7. It may be noted in this connection that, at the time of the Civil War, the United States found themselves under the necessity of declaring a blockade of some 3,000 miles of coast-line, a military operation for which the number of vessels available was at first very small. It was vital to the cause of the United States in that great struggle that they should be able to cut off the trade of the Southern States. The Confederate armies were dependent on supplies from overseas, and those supplies could not be obtained without exporting the cotton wherewith to pay for them ; to cut off this trade, the United States could only rely upon a blockade. The difficulties confronting the Federal Government were in part due to the fact that neighbouring neutral territory afforded convenient centres from which contraband could be introduced into the territory of their enemies, and from which blockade running could be facilitated. Your Excellency will no doubt remember how, in order to meet this new difficulty, the old principles relating to contraband and blockade were developed, and the doctrine of continuous voyage was applied and enforced, under which goods destined for the enemy territory were intercepted before they reached the neutral ports from which they were to be re-exported.

'8. The difficulties which imposed upon the United States the necessity of reshaping some of the old rules are somewhat akin to those with which the Allies are now faced in dealing with the trade of their enemy. Adjacent to Germany are various neutral countries which afford her convenient opportunities for carrying on her trade with foreign countries. Her own territories are covered by a network of railways and waterways, which enable her commerce to pass as conveniently through ports in such neutral countries as through her

own. A blockade limited to enemy ports would leave open routes by which every kind of German commerce could pass almost as easily as through the ports in her own territory. Rotterdam is indeed the nearest outlet for some of the industrial districts of Germany.'

And—

'It is the practice of the German Government in the waters through which the *Neches* was passing to sink neutral as well as British merchant-vessels, irrespective of the destination of the vessel, of the destination or origin of the cargo, and without proper regard or provision for the safety of passengers or crews, many of whom have lost their lives in consequence. There can be no question that this action is contrary to the recognised and settled rules of international law, as well as to the principles of humanity.

'His Majesty's Government, on the other hand, have adhered to the rules of visit and search, and have observed the obligation to bring into port and submit to a Prize Court any ships or cargoes with regard to which they think they have a good case for detention or for condemnation as contraband.

'His Majesty's Government are not aware, except from the published correspondence between the United States and Germany, to what extent reparation has been claimed from Germany by neutrals for loss of ships, lives, and cargoes, nor how far these acts have been the subject even of protest by the neutral Governments concerned.

'While these acts of the German Government continue, it seems neither reasonable nor just that His Majesty's Government should be pressed to abandon the rights claimed in the British note of the 23rd and to allow goods from Germany to pass freely through waters effectively patrolled by British ships of war.'

The substance of the contention is that Germany, not having the mastery of the seas, still desires the benefit of unchecked trading, and therefore endeavours to obtain immunity for shipments through neutral States, that can only be intended for herself. For a neutral

Power to admit this view would amount to ranging itself on the German side, and annulling the legitimate advantage at sea possessed by the Allies (*cf.* MARINISM).

The United States complain [Cd. 8233, No. 1] of Great Britain virtually promoting new international regulations by Order in Council.

‘But the novel and quite unprecedented features of that blockade, if we are to assume it to be properly so defined, is that it embraces many neutral ports and coasts, bars access to them, and subjects all neutral ships seeking to approach them to the same suspicion that would attach to them were they bound for the ports of the enemies of Great Britain, and to unusual risks and penalties.

‘It is manifest that such limitations, risks, and liabilities placed upon the ships of a neutral Power on the high seas, beyond the right of visit and search and the right to prevent the shipment of contraband already referred to, are a distinct invasion of the sovereign rights of the nations whose ships, trade, or commerce is interfered with.

‘The Government of the United States is, of course, not oblivious to the great changes which have occurred in the conditions and means of naval warfare since the rules hitherto governing legal blockade were formulated. It might be ready to admit that the form of “close” blockade with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports is no longer practicable in the face of an enemy possessing the means and opportunity to make an effective defence by the use of submarines, mines, and aircraft; but it can hardly be maintained that, whatever form of effective blockade may be made use of, it is impossible to conform at least to the spirit and principles of the essence of the rules of war. If the necessities of the case should seem to render it imperative that the cordon of blockading vessels be extended across the approaches to any neighbouring neutral port or country, it would seem clear that it would still be easily practicable to comply with

the well-recognised and reasonable prohibition of international law against the blockading of neutral ports by according free admission and exit to all lawful traffic with neutral ports through the blockading cordon. This traffic would, of course, include all outward-bound traffic from the neutral country and all inward-bound traffic to the neutral country, except contraband in transit to the enemy. Such procedure need not conflict in any respect with the rights of the belligerent maintaining the blockade, since the right would remain with the blockading vessels to visit and search all ships either on entering or leaving the neutral territory which they were in fact, but not of right, investing.'

Sir Edward Grey contends in reply [*ibid.*, p. 12]:

' 5. In the various notes which I have received from your Excellency, the right of a belligerent to establish a blockade of the enemy ports is admitted—a right which has obviously no value save in so far as it gives power to a belligerent to cut off the sea-borne exports and imports of his enemy. The contention which, I understand, the United States Government now puts forward is that, if a belligerent is so circumstanced that his commerce can pass through adjacent neutral ports as easily as through ports in his own territory, his opponent has no right to interfere, and must restrict his measures of blockade in such a manner as to leave such avenues of commerce still open to his adversary. This is a contention which His Majesty's Government feel unable to accept, and which seems to them unsustainable either in point of law or upon principles of international equity. They are unable to admit that a belligerent violates any fundamental principle of international law by applying a blockade in such a way as to cut off the enemy's commerce with foreign countries through neutral ports if the circumstances render such an application of the principles of blockade the only means of making it effective. The Government of the United States, indeed, intimates its readiness to take into account "the great changes which have occurred in the conditions and means of naval warfare since the rules hitherto governing legal

blockade were formulated," and recognises that "the form of close blockade, with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports, is no longer practicable in the face of an enemy possessing the means and opportunity to make an effective defence by the use of submarines, mines, and aircraft."'

Moreover [*Who are the Huns?* p. 365]: 'The German Prize Court Law of 1909 was given an extension on June 22, 1914, before the opening of the war, in which it was plainly stated that all hostile acts on the part of an armed merchant vessel would be regarded as piracy, and the crews were to be treated as freebooters and pirates and not as regular troops in accordance with the regulations appertaining to extraordinary acts of war.'

Was there any protest against this 'novel' or new enactment? Is there in it any provision for judicial procedure?

This is similar to the argument against the *franc-tireur* on land (*v. FRANCS-TIREURS*). Probably the same credibility may be afforded to the judge-executioner's plea of 'man hat geschossen' ('Shots have been fired, resistance was made').

The United States protest [Cd. 8234, No. 1] against the delay involved in searches of modern ships.

The British contention in reply is [*ibid.*, pp. 20 and 21]:

'6. The effect of the size and seaworthiness of merchant vessels upon their search at sea is essentially a technical question, and accordingly His Majesty's Government have thought it well to submit the report of the board of naval experts, quoted by the United States Ambassador in paragraph 7 of this note, to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe for his observations. The unique experience which this officer has gained as the result of more than eighteen months in command of the Grand Fleet renders his opinion of peculiar value. His report is as follows:

"It is undoubtedly the case that the size of modern vessels is one of the factors which renders search at sea far more difficult than in the days of smaller vessels.

So far as I know, it has never been contended that it is necessary to remove every package of a ship's cargo to establish the character and nature of her trade, &c. ; but it must be obvious that the larger the vessel and the greater the amount of cargo, the more difficult does examination at sea become, because more packages must be removed.

“ This difficulty is much enhanced by the practice of concealing contraband in bales of hay and passengers' luggage, casks, &c., and this procedure, which has undoubtedly been carried out, necessitates the actual removal of a good deal of cargo for examination in suspected cases. This removal cannot be carried out at sea except in the very finest weather.

“ Further, in a large ship, the greater bulk of the cargo renders it easier to conceal contraband, especially such valuable metals as nickel, quantities of which can easily be stowed in places other than the holds of a large ship.

“ I entirely dispute the contention, therefore, advanced in the American note, that there is no difference between the search of a ship of 1,000 tons and one of 20,000 tons. I am sure that the fallacy of the statement must be apparent to anyone who has ever carried out such a search at sea.

“ There are other facts, however, which render it necessary to bring vessels into port for search. The most important is the manner in which those in command of German submarines, in entire disregard of international law and of their own prize regulations, attack and sink merchant vessels on the high seas, neutral as well as British, without visiting the ship, and therefore without any examination of the cargo. This procedure renders it unsafe for a neutral vessel which is being examined by officers from a British ship to remain stopped on the high seas, and it is therefore in the interests of the neutrals themselves that the examination should be conducted in port.

“ The German practice of misusing United States

passports in order to procure a safe conduct for military persons and agents of enemy nationality makes it necessary to examine closely all suspect persons, and to do this effectively necessitates bringing the ship into harbour."

' 7. Sir John Jellicoe goes on to say :

' " The difference between the British and the German procedure is that we have acted in the way which causes the least discomfort to neutrals. Instead of sinking neutral ships engaged in trade with the enemy, as the Germans have done in so many cases in direct contravention of Article 113 of their own Naval Prize Regulations, 1909, in which it is laid down that the commander is only justified in destroying a neutral ship which has been captured if—

' (a) " She is liable to condemnation ; and

' (b) " The bringing in might expose the warship to danger or imperil the success of the operations in which she is engaged at the time—

we examine them, giving as little inconvenience as modern naval conditions will allow, sending them into port, only where this becomes necessary.

' " It must be remembered, however, that it is not the Allies alone who send a percentage of neutral vessels into port for examination, for it is common knowledge that German naval vessels, as stated in paragraph 19 of the American note, ' seize and bring into German ports neutral vessels bound for Scandinavian and Danish ports.'

' " As cases in point, the interception by the Germans of the American oil-tankers *Llama* and *Platuria* in August last may be mentioned. Both were bound to America from Sweden, and were taken into Swinemünde for examination."

' 8. The French Ministry of Marine shares the views expressed by Sir J. Jellicoe on the question of search at sea, and has added the following statement :

' " La pratique navale, telle qu'elle existait autrefois

et consistant à visiter les navires en mer, méthode que nous a léguée l'ancienne marine, ne s'adapte plus aux conditions de la navigation actuelle. Les Américains ont pressenti son insuffisance et ont prévu la nécessité de lui en substituer une plus efficace. Dans les Instructions données par le Département de la Marine américaine, du 20 juin, 1898, aux croiseurs des Etats-Unis, on trouve déjà la prescription suivante :

“ ‘ Si ces derniers [les papiers de bord] indiquent de la contrebande de guerre, le navire devra être saisi ; sinon, il sera laissé libre, à moins qu'en raison de puissants motifs de suspicion, une visite plus minutieuse paraisse devoir être exigée. ’ ”

The volume of exports from the United States to the European neutrals bordering on Germany has increased enormously. § 15 of Cd. 8234 puts it at :

1913.....	Dollars	97,480,000
1914.....	„	88,132,000
1915.....	„	234,960,000

These sales into neutral countries were at uncommercial rates [*ibid.*, § 20].

‘ One of those which has been disclosed is a contract with a firm in Germany for the sale of no less than 50,000 bales of cotton linters at a price which was about double that which linters were fetching in any other country than Germany. The whole quantity was to be shipped to neutral ports. Various shipments made under this contract have been held up, and in all cases the goods were shipped with papers and under conditions which concealed the enemy destination altogether. Sweden is not in normal times a large importer of cotton linters, and it certainly would not be reasonable to maintain that, because the ship's papers did not disclose this contract of sale or the enemy destination, shipments of linters under this contract should be regarded as intended to become part of the mass of merchandise for sale in Sweden.’

The British authorities [Cd. 8145] endeavour to meet the difficulty by passing exports to 'representative associations of merchants.'

'23. In the presence of facts such as those indicated above, the United States Government will, it is believed, agree with His Majesty's Government that no belligerent could in modern times submit to be bound by a rule that no goods could be seized unless they were accompanied by papers which established their destination to an enemy country, and that all detentions of ships and goods must uniformly be based on proofs obtained at the time of seizure. To press any such theory, is tantamount to asking that all trade between neutral ports shall be free, and would thus render nugatory the exercise of sea power and destroy the pressure which the command of the sea enables the Allies to impose upon their enemy.'

Further confirmation of this fact may be obtained from a German source [Schmidt (New York, 1914), Table XI.], that the decrease of exports in 1914 to the Central Powers was 340 million dollars, and increase to the European neutrals 294.5 million dollars.

German exports to the United States in 1914-15 were about half of the total of 1913-14: there was no substantial variance in the exports from the European neutrals to the U.S.A.

The following are some of the opinions expressed:

Pro: We blockade neutral ports unjustly; lay mines in the open sea; arrest neutral contraband, without respect to ownership; remove German and Austrian subjects from neutral vessels; and prevent the free use of the seas in accordance with the Declaration of London [*Engeland en de afsluiting, passim*; Révai, p. 110; Brandt, p. 146; Molenbroek, p. 16; Verrijn, p. 48].

Con: *v.* preceding arguments. The writer quotes the English Admiralty denial of German imputations.

We remove contraband at sea, whether chattels or persons. Otherwise no nation predominant at sea would derive any advantage.

Pro : Germany claims the freedom of the sea [Révai, *passim*].

Con : *i.e.*, the power of trading in war-time just as in time of peace.

The complaints of neutrals are directed against the German use of sea-power, not the English [Brandt, p. 150].

There is no freedom over lands or territories occupied by an enemy.

From the *San Francisco Examiner* [pp. 46-56, Rouquette] it is evident that the gravamen of the charges of the pro-German Press is the interference with the export of cotton to the Central Powers. The pretence that the Southern States are thereby prejudiced, does not hold : in the first place, if they are, so are many other interests by war ; in the second, the Allies provide an adequate market.

ROUMANIA

Roumania on Aug. 28, 1916, declared war against Austria, and is also formally at war with the Central Alliance. The negotiations are not yet published, but an inkling of them may be gathered from the *Rech* of Aug. 2-15 : probably they are similar to the Austro-Italian negotiations :

' Last year our enemies had no reason to be disturbed as to Roumania remaining neutral. At the time when the Austro-German armies were threatening our southern provinces the neutrality of Roumania was considered impregnable. The powerful assault by our armies shook its foundations. Now the neutrality of Roumania is like a house that may crumble any instant. It must be anxiously guarded, propped up and strengthened with supports. The neutrality of Roumania is occasioning Germany and Austria very great concern, and they are evidently prepared for the heaviest sacrifices to conserve it. Their last year's experiment with Italy (*v.* ITALY) goes to show which of the partners in the Austro-German

firm is held answerable for military unsuccess. Last year Germany wrenched from Austria a consent to territorial compensations for Italy. Now the unlucky thing is that Roumania is claiming territory belonging to the Kingdom of Hungary, not a portion of the withered body of Austria, but of the healthy organism of Hungary, which stands ready to resist sturdily.'

Apparently the negotiations from the first were based on Article VII. of the Triple Alliance,* to which Roumania adhered, as appears from her Declaration of War.

'The Alliance concluded between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy had, according to the declarations of the Governments themselves, only an essentially conservative and defensive character; its principal object was to guarantee the Allied countries against any attack from outside and to consolidate the state of things accepted by previous treaties.

'It was with the desire to harmonize her policy with these pacific tendencies that Roumania joined this alliance. Devoted to the work of her internal reconstruction, and faithful to her firm resolution to remain, in the region of the Lower Danube, an element of order and of equilibrium, Roumania has not ceased to contribute to the maintenance of peace in the Balkans.

'The last Balkan wars, by destroying the *status quo*, imposed upon her a new line of conduct. Her intervention hastened peace and restored equilibrium. For herself she was satisfied with a rectification of frontier which gave her greater security against an aggression, and which at the same time repaired the injustice committed to her detriment at the Berlin Congress. But, in the pursuit of this end, Roumania was disappointed to observe that she did not meet from the Cabinet of Vienna the attitude which she was entitled to expect.

'When the present war broke out Roumania, like Italy, declined to associate herself with the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary, of which she had received no previous notice from the Cabinet of Vienna. In the spring of 1915 Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary; the Triple Alliance no longer existed.

'The reasons which had determined the adherence of Roumania to this political system disappeared. At the same time, instead of a grouping of States seeking by common effort to work in agreement in order to assure peace and the maintenance of the situations *de facto* and *de jure* created by treaties, Roumania found herself in presence of Powers making war with the very object of transforming from top to bottom the old arrangements which had served as a basis for their Treaty of Alliance. These profound changes were for Roumania an evident proof that the object which she had pursued in adhering to the Triple Alliance could no longer be attained, and that she must direct her views and her efforts towards new paths, the more so as the work undertaken by Austria-Hungary assumed a character threatening the essential interests of Roumania as well as her most legitimate national aspirations.

* This is confirmed by Bethmann-Hollweg's speech of Sept. 28, 1916.

‘In presence of so radical a modification of the situation created between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Roumania, the latter resumed her liberty of action. The neutrality of the Royal Government, imposed upon itself in consequence of a declaration of war made without reference to its will and contrary to its interests, had been adopted, in the first instance, as the result of assurances given at the outset by the Imperial and Royal Government that the Monarchy, in declaring war upon Serbia, had not been inspired by a spirit of conquest and that it was in no way aiming at territorial acquisitions.

‘These assurances have not been realized. To-day we find ourselves confronted by situations *de facto* from which may arise great territorial transformations and political changes of a character constituting a grave menace to the security of the future of Roumania. The work of peace which Roumania, faithful to the spirit of the Triple Alliance, had endeavoured to accomplish has thus been rendered fruitless by those very Powers who were called upon to support and defend it.

‘In adhering in 1883 to the group of the Central Powers, Roumania, far from forgetting the ties of blood uniting the populations of the Kingdom with the Roumanian subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, had seen in the relations of friendship and alliance which were established between the three Great Powers a precious pledge for her internal tranquillity, as well as for the amelioration of the lot of the Roumanians of Austria-Hungary. In fact, Germany and Italy, who had reconstituted their States on the basis of the principle of nationality, could not but recognise the legitimacy of the foundation on which their own existence rested. As for Austria-Hungary, she found in the friendly relations established between herself and the Kingdom of Roumania assurances for her tranquillity, both in her interior and on our common frontiers—for she was well aware to what an extent the discontent of her Roumanian population found an echo amongst us, threatening every moment to trouble the good relations between the two States.

‘The hope which we had based from this point of view upon our adhesion to the Triple Alliance was deceived for a period of more than 30 years. The Roumanians of the Monarchy not only have never seen a reform introduced of a nature to give them the semblance of satisfaction, but they have, on the contrary, been treated as an inferior race and condemned to suffer the oppression of a foreign element which constitutes no more than a minority in the midst of the various nationalities of which the Austro-Hungarian State is composed. All the injustices which our brothers were thus made to suffer maintained between our country and the Monarchy a continual state of animosity, which the Governments of the Kingdom only succeeded in appeasing at the cost of great difficulties and of numerous sacrifices.

‘When the present war broke out it might have been hoped that the Austro-Hungarian Government, at least at the last moment, would end by convincing itself of the urgent necessity of putting an end to this injustice, which endangered not only our relations of friendship but even the normal relations which ought to exist between neighbouring States.

‘Two years of war, during which Roumania has maintained neutrality, have proved that Austria-Hungary, opposed to all internal reform which could ameliorate the life of the peoples which she governs, has shown herself as ready to sacrifice them as she is powerless to defend them against external attack.

' The war in which almost the whole of Europe is taking part raises the gravest problems affecting the national development and the very existence of States. Roumania, moved by the desire to contribute to hasten the end of the conflict, and compelled by the necessity of safeguarding her racial interests, sees herself forced to enter into line by the side of those who are able to assure her the realization of her national unity.

' For these reasons she considers herself from this moment in a state of war with Austria-Hungary ' [*Times*, Aug. 30, 1916].

RUSSIA (*v. also* WHO WILLED THE WAR ?)

Pro : Russia threatens Sweden, which is only guarded by a strong Germany [Svén Hedin, p. 304].

Con : Sweden is especially anxious regarding the Åland Isles, which are unfortified, in accordance with the Treaty : save that fortifications may be put up temporarily to guard them from being seized by Germany.

Russia is allied with England, who would never tolerate an attack on Sweden.

Pro : At the Congress of Berlin, Germany had to elect between Russia and Austria, and chose to support Austria ; and deprived Russia of the fruits of victory in the Russo-Turkish war of 1878 [Spahn, p. 32].

Con : Germany restored Macedonia to the Turks ; and relaid all the foundations of the problem in the Near East.

Pro : The Russian civilization since 1572 has been merely an adaptation of the German [Tannenberg, p. 167].

Con : Peter the Great went to school largely with the Dutch : and French influence has been very strong in Russia. German officialism has also unfortunately been the model for the administration.

Pro : Russia at the peace of Nystädt (1721) acquired the Lettish countries, which had a purely German civilization. She has no right to these countries [*ibid.*, p. 177].

Con : (*v. PRUSSIA*), and how she has conquered countries much more alien. Russia, at any rate, was only striving towards a sea-board.

Pro : A Russian, Prince Svyatopólk Mirski, has published a scheme of the partition of Europe according to Pan-Slavist ideals.

All of Eastern and Western Prussia, farther Pomerania, Posen, and Upper Silesia, are to be Russian territory.

Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia are to form an independent Czech kingdom, with middle and lower Silesia.

Saxony is to be increased with the districts of Merseburg and Erfurt.

Sleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg are to belong to Denmark: Hanover to the Guelfs, and to receive an accretion in Westphalia.

The Rhine provinces, the Palatinate, and Alsace-Lorraine are to be French.

So, too, Holland and Belgium.

Hungary is to be independent.

A new southern kingdom of Illyria is to be formed, consisting of Serbia, Croatia, Slavonia, Carinthia, Carniola, Dalmatia, Southern Styria, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro.

Austria is to be reduced to Upper and Lower Austria, Salzburg, and Upper Styria; Prussia to Brandenburg, Magdeburg, Stralsund, and Stettin.

Thus Austria, Prussia, Hanover, Bavaria, and Saxony will be equalized.

The westerly German districts are to form a new Confederation of the Rhine under France.

All that is required is the consent of the 87 millions of Germans [*ibid.*, p. 142].

Con : This dream has at least some merits.

It proceeds on the principle of nationality and co-ordinates territories accordingly. It repairs the breaches of nationality caused by Prussian and German aggression in the past [*v.* AUSTRIA and PRUSSIA].

In fact, in general outlines, it restores peoples to what they were, before Prussia and the Holy Alliance split them up, and broke up age-long associations.

It is more gentle to Austria than Tannenberg's dream (*v.* PAN-GERMANISM).

Lastly [*v. p.* 169] there are not 87 million Germans.

Pan-Slavism is quite different from Pan-Germanism. It is not a scheme of conquest, but of liberation of the Slav nations to live their own life, free alike from Turk, German, and Magyar. It also has a religious basis, in the community of the orthodox faith, to which very many Slav nations adhere.

Tannenberg [pp. 193, etc.] proposed expropriating and exterminating all the Slavs of Bohemia, Prussian Poland, etc., the Baltic provinces, etc. [so, too, Kotzde, p. 14]. The necessity for this German violence arises from what both Tannenberg and Kotzde admit, that the German is absorbed into any and every population. The Slav elements are tougher and have persisted, ever since the German stream overran Eastern Germany, which in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries was still Slav.

Pro : Russia's expansion is blind and aimless [Chamberlain, p. 45].

Con : *i.e.*, it is national and not an artificial purpose of the State.

THE SCRAP OF PAPER (EIN FETZEN PAPIER)

No. 160

SIR E. GOSCHEN, BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN,
TO SIR EDWARD GREY

London,
August 8, 1914.

SIR,

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant* I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow † at once replied

* See No. 153.

† German Secretary of State.

that he was sorry to say that his answer must be ' No, as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,* and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty

* See No. 159.

to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—'neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless

by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of ' life and death ' for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future ? The Chancellor said : ' But at what price will that compact have been kept ? Has the British Government thought of that ? ' I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late

fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never dispatched.*

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

SERBIA AND AUSTRIA

HISTORY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING 1914

[Authority: *Times* files.]

After the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, there remained a troublous problem. Turkey was compensated with the cession of Novi Bazar (which, from the Austrian point of view, created a useful wedge

* This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

between Serbia and Montenegro); Russia stopped the outbreak of a Turco-Bulgarian war; Serbia alone was uncompensated and was threatened in 1909 (as also in 1913, *v. p. 2*) with invasion by Austria.

'Every effort was made by Sir Edward Grey to bring about a settlement which would have satisfied Count Ährenthal [foreign secretary for Austria] without too deeply wounding the pride of the Serbians and the Russians. These efforts were on the eve of being successful, when towards the end of March Germany intervened, and by what was barely a veiled ultimatum compelled the Russian Government to abandon the Serbian cause and to agree to recognise the annexation without more ado' [*v. p. 312*; and WHO WILLED THE WAR?].

'The humiliation inflicted upon Russia has created a state between her and the two Central European Empires which is likely to remain an important factor in European politics. The recent meeting between the Tsar and the King of Italy at Racconigi, and the exchange of Russian and Italian views on Balkan questions have everywhere been understood as a sign that Italy, whilst still adhering to the Triple Alliance, yet recognises and is on her guard against the danger that may threaten her own interests from an aggressive Austro-German hegemony in Europe.'

On Jan. 16, 1909, the trial began at Ágrám of 53 Serbian-Bosnians for high treason, for plotting to dismember Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia and attach them to a greater Serbia.

Allegations were made against the *Slovenski Yug* (published at Belgrade): it was said that bombs were being manufactured at Belgrade for use against King Nicholas of Montenegro. The informant was an Austrian *agent-provocateur*, Nastich by name [*cf. the tactics in 1914, v. SERBIA and SLESWIG*].

The trial drifted on into May; there was no vestige of solid evidence; amongst the documents cited were statements that certain Croatian deputies at the *Landesrat* for Croatia had plotted with the Serbian

Government, which, in its turn, had invited English aid.

In October, of the 53, 22 were acquitted, and 31 condemned to various sentences of penal servitude.

Towards the end of the year there was a sequel in the form of a libel action brought by the Croatian deputies mentioned above against Friedjung for publishing those allegations, which it was stated were forgeries. At the trial it was proved, against a hectoring judge, that those documents, which had already been accepted as evidence of the existence of the conspiracy in the Ágrám trial, were nothing but forgeries of the clumsiest description (they were thus characterized by the Serbian Minister, who offered to invite representatives of the Powers to Belgrade to prove the utter falsity of these allegations: even the index numbers on these documents were entirely wrong); and one of these forged documents (used at an Austrian state-trial for high treason on behalf of the Crown) purported to be an agreement between Serbia and Great Britain [*cf.* SERBIA and SLESWIG].

In view of the flimsy evidence in 1914 against Serbia, the similarity of the proceedings; in view of the false accusations made against Denmark in 1909, 1911, and 1913 (*v.* p. 257), and in view of the false accusations against Belgium, and the fraudulent misuse of the *Dossier* (*v.* p. 29), is it too much to presume that all the so-called evidence in 1914 of the participation of Serbia in the murder of the Archduke is very possibly evidence of the same character as the official documents and the Friedjung trial?

SERBIA

Pro: The Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. I, is prefaced with a long statement that the Serbian Government countenanced or incited disruptive propaganda in Austrian domains. In 1909 Serbia had to give a promise to maintain good

Con: These Austrian territories consisted of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which single-handed in 1878 almost won their liberty from Turkey, and were declared autonomous by the Treaty of San Stefano, but were then handed over at the Berlin

Pro :

and neighbourly relations. This was not kept, as an 'association formed on Serbian territory under the leadership of high officers, civil servants, teachers and judges' existed to 'stir up revolution in the territories of Austria-Hungary' and 'poisoned the public conscience in such a way that common assassination was regarded as the best weapon in the struggle against the Monarchy. From the atmosphere created by this malicious agitation there sprang up a whole series of murderous attacks on high functionaries . . .' and culminated in the murder of the Arch-Duke Francis Ferdinand 'which had been carefully prepared in Serbia.'

It is evident that 'the small Serbian State would never have ventured to work for the separation from the great neighbourly Monarchy of the territories which were inhabited by Southern Slavs, if she had not been sure of the secret approval and protection of Russia.'

Serbia and Greece punished her by taking part of what had been assigned as her share of the booty at the Conference of London.

The whole history of the Balkans, from the eighteenth century down to 1911, when the Balkan nations asserted themselves, has been the competition of Russia and Austria for influence.

There is no shadow of legal evidence that Serbian intrigue was responsible for the murder of the Archduke: the documents appended to the Austro-Hungarian Red Book [No. I.] only show that the Serbians agitated for reunion with their co-nationals: the trial after the murder of the Archduke was not held in public; and the expressions of the Serbian Press were legitimate opinions, as also the propaganda of the Serbian *Národna Odbrana*, or National Defence Committee.

For instance, as part of the evidence, allegorical pictures are found at the Serbian War Office, representing the Serbian countries still under foreign rule.

How many lost possessions still figure in the escutcheons of Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and other countries? It would be as good evidence.

The murderers were subjects of Austria, not of Serbia.

Con :

Congress in 1880 to be administered by Austria. In 1908 they were annexed to Austria, who ceded the Novi Bazar (so as to divide Serbia and Montenegro) back to Turkey, though Austria had been garrisoning it ever since 1880.

At the same time Eastern Roumelia was artificially separated from Bulgaria, and similarly made autonomous: but the amalgamation of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia (the whole county is Bulgarian) in 1885 was not opposed by Austria or Russia.

This amalgamation produced the Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1885, in which the Serbians were defeated at the Battle of Slivnitsa.

In 1909 there was a severe Moroccan crisis (*v. Morocco*) which led to war; only Italy opposed; Germany was not ready, but cowed Russia with a swift mobilization and a boast of 'shining armour' (*v. Kaiser's Speech*, p. 129). Russia was exhausted by the Japanese war.

The Balkan war of 1911 redeemed the Balkan States from Turkey: but when Bulgaria, at Austrian instigation, treacherously attacked her Balkan allies, and was defeated,

Pro: However, on Aug. 24, 1914, without previous consultation with Italy [*v.* Italian Green Book, No. 7], nor perhaps with Berlin [*v.* Russian Orange Book, Nos. 18 and 19], certainly without reference to Russia [British White Book, No. 3], the Austrians handed the following demands on Serbia with a forty-eight hours' time limit for reply [*ibid.* No. 4]:

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on July 23, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:

'On March 31, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:

'"Serbia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary, and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter."

'The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which has its birth under the

Con: Sir Edward Grey [British Blue Book, No. 5] remarks: 'The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia.

'I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.'

The Austrian Ambassador at Rome read out the documents to the Italian Minister [Austria-Hungary Red Book II., No. 8], who 'when I had finished reading said. "We seem to be at a turning-point in history." I remarked he must concede the purely defensive character of our action; to which he agreed, saying: "Certinement, je n'aurais jamais cru que l'on puisse constater la culpabilité d'officiers et de fonctionnaires Serbes dans le drame de Sarajévo."'

However, within those forty-eight hours, the Serbian Government, under the advice of the Russian, British, and French Ministers, replied as follows. The reply appears in the Austro-Hungarian

Pro:

eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

'Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of March 31, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the Press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction; in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

'This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

'It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Sarajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the *Národna Odbrana*; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

Con:

Red Book I. [No. 34] on the left, with the Austrian remarks on the right:

ENCLOSURE.

Reply of the Royal Servian Government to the Imperial and Royal Government of the 12/25 July, 1914.

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant,* and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national *Skupchina* † and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th* March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their agents, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school-book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several

* Old style.

† The Servian Parliament.

Pro:

'The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

'To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

'In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their *Official Journal* of the 13/26 July the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—*i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal

Serbian Reply (continued).

times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved.

Austrian Remarks.

The Royal Servian Government confine themselves to asserting that since the declarations on March 18, 1909, no attempt has been made by the Servian Government and their agents to change the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thereby they deliberately and arbitrarily shift the ground on which our *démarche* was based, as we did not maintain that they and their agents have taken any official action in this direction.

Our charge, on the contrary, is to the effect that the Servian Government, notwithstanding the obligations undertaken in the above-quoted note, have neglected to suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.

Their obligation, that is to say, was that they should change the whole direction of their policy and adopt a friendly and neighbourly attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not merely that they should refrain from officially attacking the incorporation of Bosnia in the Monarchy.

Pro :

Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of March 31, 1909.

“The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.”

‘This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the *Official Bulletin* of the Army.

‘The Royal Servian Government further undertake :

‘1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity ;

‘2. To dissolve immediately the society styled “*Národna Odbrana*,” to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form ;

‘3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves,

Serbian Reply (continued).

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the Press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

Austrian Remarks.

The proposition of the Royal Servian Government that utterances in the Press and the activities of societies are of a private character and are not subject to official control is absolutely antagonistic to the institutions of modern States, even those which have the most liberal law with regard to Press and associations ; this law has a public character and subjects the Press, as well as associations, to State control. Moreover, Servian institutions themselves contemplate some such control. The complaint against the Servian Government is in fact that they have entirely omitted to control their Press and their associations, of whose activities in a sense hostile to the Monarchy they were well aware.

Pro :

or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ;

' 4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government ;

' 5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy :

' 6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory ; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto ;

' 7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voijsa Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employé, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Sarajevo ;

' 8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier ;

' 9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in

Serbian Reply (continued).

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Sarajevo ; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them.

Austrian Remarks.

This proposition is incorrect ; the Servian Government were accurately informed of the suspicions which were entertained against quite definite persons, and were not only in a position but also bound by their internal laws to initiate spontaneous inquiries. They have done nothing in this direction.

Serbian Reply (continued).

Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Sarajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the *Journal Officiel*, on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration :

Pro :

interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government ; and, finally,

' 10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

' The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

' A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.'

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations :

On March 31, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Austrian Remarks.

Our demand ran :

' The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary . . . '

Serbian Reply (continued).

' The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary—*i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

Austrian Remarks.

The alteration made by the Royal Servian Government in the declaration demanded by us implies that no such propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary exists, or that they are cognizant of no such propaganda. This formula is insincere and disingenuous, as by it the Servian Government reserve for themselves for later use the evasion that they had not by this declaration disavowed the then existing propaganda, and had not admitted that it was hostile to the Monarchy, from which they could further deduce that they had not bound themselves to suppress propaganda similar to that now being carried on.

Pro :

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian Press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary, and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of March 31, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing

Servian Reply (continued).

'The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly pledged by the declaration of March 31, 1909.*'

'The Government, &c. . . .'
(identical with the text as demanded).

Austrian Remarks.

The wording demanded by us ran :

'The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries . . . participated. . . .'

By the adoption of this wording with the addition 'according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government' the Servian Government are pursuing the object that has already been referred to above, namely, that of preserving a free hand for the future.

Servian Reply (continued).

The Royal Government further undertake :

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupchina a provision into the Press law providing for the most severe punishment

* New style.

Pro :

a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Serbia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilized nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the

Serbian Reply (continued).

of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

Austrian Remarks.

We had demanded of them :

1. 'To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.'

We wished therefore to ensure that Serbia should be obliged to see to it that Press attacks of that nature should be discontinued in future; we wished therefore to know that a definite result in this connection was assured.

Instead of this, Serbia offers us the enactment of certain laws which would be calculated to serve as means towards this result, viz. :

(a) A law under which the Press publications in question which are hostile to the Monarchy are to be punished on their merits (*subjectiv*), a matter which is of complete indifference to us, all the more as it is well known that the prosecution of Press offences on their merits (*subjectiv*)

Pro

Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a *dossier* elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

ANNEX.

The criminal inquiry opened by the Court of Sarajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions:

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Sarajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Czubrinović, one Milan Czigonović, and Trifko Grabež, with the assistance of Commander Voja Tankosić.

Austrian Remarks (continued).

is only very rarely possible, and, if any law of the sort is laxly administered, even in the few cases of this nature a conviction would not be obtained; this, therefore, is a proposal which in no way meets our demand, as it does not offer us the slightest guarantee for the result which we wish to obtain.

(b) A law supplementary to Article 22 of the constitution which would permit confiscation—a proposal which is equally unsatisfactory to us, as the existence of such a law in Servia is of no use to us, but only the obligation of the Government to apply it; this, however, is not promised us.

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory—all the more so as they are evasive in that we are not told within what period of time these laws would be enacted, and that in the event of the rejection of the Bills by the Skupchina—apart from the possible resignation of the Government—everything would be as it was before.

Serbian Reply (continued).

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the *Národna Odbrana* and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the *Národna Odbrana* Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

Pro :

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Czabrinović, and Grabež by the man Milan Cziganović and Commander Voja Tankosić at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depot of the Servian army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Cziganović taught Princip, Czabrinović, and Grabež how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabež in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.

5. To enable Princip, Czabrinović, and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organized by Cziganović. By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Shabats (Rade Popović) and Ložnica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbić, of Ložnica, with the assistance of various individuals.

Serbian Reply (continued).

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia everything that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

Austrian Remarks.

The whole of the public life of Servia teems with the propaganda against the Monarchy, of the Národna Odbrana and of societies affiliated to it; it is therefore quite impossible to admit the reservation made by the Servian Government when they say that they know nothing about them.

Quite apart from this, the demand we have made is not entirely complied with, as we further required :

That the means of propaganda possessed by these associations should be confiscated.

That the re-establishment of the dissolved associations under another name and in another form should be prevented.

The Belgrade Cabinet maintains complete silence in both these directions, so that the half-consent which has been given us offers no guarantee that it is contemplated to put a definite end to the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy, especially of the Národna Odbrana, by their dissolution.

Austrian Remarks.

In this case also the Servian Government first ask for proofs that propaganda against the Monarchy is fomented in public educational establishments in Servia, when they must know that the school-books which have been introduced into the Servian schools contain matter of an objectionable nature in this respect, and that a large proportion of the Servian teachers are enrolled in the ranks of the Národna Odbrana and the societies affiliated with it.

Serbian Reply (continued).

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from the military service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and functionaries for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government, that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory; but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

Austrian Remarks (continued).

Moreover, here, too, the Servian Government have not complied with a portion of our demand as fully as we required, inasmuch as in their text they have omitted the addition which we desired, 'both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction'—an addition which quite clearly shows in what directions the propaganda against the Monarchy in the Servian schools is to be looked for.

Inasmuch as the Royal Servian Government attach to their consent to the removal of the officers and functionaries in question from military and civil service the condition that these persons should have been convicted by judicial inquiry, their consent is confined to those cases in which these persons are charged with a crime punishable by law. As we, however, demand the removal of those officers and functionaries who foment propaganda against the Monarchy, a proceeding which is not generally punishable by law in Servia, it appears that our demand under this head also is not complied with.

International law has just as little to do with this question as has criminal procedure. This is purely a matter of State police, which must be settled by way of a separate agreement. Servia's reservation is therefore unintelligible, and would be calculated, owing to the vague general form in which it is couched, to lead to unsurmountable difficulties when the time comes for concluding the prospective agreement.

Serbian Reply (continued).

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th* June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Com-

Austrian Remarks (continued).

Our demand was quite clear and did not admit of misinterpretation. We desired :

(1) The opening of a judicial inquiry (*enquête judiciaire*) against accessories to the plot.

(2) The collaboration of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the investigations relating thereto ('*recherches*' as opposed to '*enquête judiciaire*').

It never occurred to us that representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government should take part in the Servian judicial proceedings; it was intended that they should collaborate only in the preliminary police investigations, directed to the collection and verification of the material for the inquiry.

If the Servian Government misunderstand us on this point they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between '*enquête judiciaire*' and simple '*recherches*' must be familiar to them.

In desiring to be exempted from all control in the proceedings which are to be initiated, which if properly carried through would have results of a very undesirable kind for themselves, and in view of the fact that they have no handle for a plausible refusal of the collaboration of our representatives in the preliminary police investigations (numberless precedents exist for such police intervention), they have adopted a standpoint which is intended to invest their refusal with an appearance of justification and to impress on our demand the stamp of impracticability.

This answer is disingenuous.

The inquiries set on foot by us show that three days after the crime,

* Old style.

Serbian Reply (continued).

mandant Voja Tankosić. As regards Milan Cziganović, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th* June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the inquiry at Sarajevo, for the purposes of the later inquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Shabats-Ložnica line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will themselves take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will

Austrian Remarks (continued).

when it became known that Cziganović was implicated in the plot, he went on leave and travelled to Ribari on a commission from the Prefecture of Police at Belgrade. It is, therefore, in the first place incorrect to say that Cziganović had left the Servian State Service on the 15th/28th June. To this must be added the fact that the Prefect of Police at Belgrade, who had himself contrived the departure of Cziganović and who knew where he was stopping, declared in an interview that no man of the name of Milan Cziganović existed in Belgrade.

The interviews in question must be quite well known to the Royal Servian Government. By requesting the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them all kinds of details about these interviews, and keeping in reserve the holding of a formal inquiry into them, they show that they are not willing to comply seriously with this demand either.

* Old style.

Serbian Reply (continued).

inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

11. If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th/31st March, 1909.

This was considered insufficient, and the Austrian Government declared war on Serbia, July 28 [British White Book, No. 50].

Italy [Austria-Hungary Red Book, No. 22], declared her neutrality, as the Triple Alliance was merely defensive.

The Russian comment can be gauged from No. 10 French Yellow Book, and No. 6 British White Book :

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 6, 1914.

In the course of an interview which he had asked for with the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Sazonof pointed out in a friendly way the disquieting irritation which the attacks of the Austrian Press against Servia are in danger of producing in his country.

Count Czernin having given him to understand that the Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for the instigators of the crime of Sarajevo on Servian territory, M. Sazonof interrupted him: 'No country,' he said, 'has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers threaten Servia? Do not embark on such a course.'

May this warning not be in vain.

PALÉOLOGUE.

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

Germany did not publish the Serbian reply until much later—after July 28, 1914—'as it would have had a calming effect on German readers' [Russian Orange Book, No. 46].

The Austrian Red Book I., dealing with the general European War, only appeared in February, 1915.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna [Belgian Grey Book, II., No. 3], on July 22, 1914, reports the preparation of eight army corps to invade Serbia, and that there was common talk of partitioning Serbia, like Poland. (Contrast the solemn promises of Austria to respect the integrity of Serbia [British White Book, No. 91, etc.], and compare the apprehensions as to Austria's action [British White Book, No. 82].)

The diplomatic discussion went on until Aug. 1 on the 'localization' of the conflict on which Austria and Germany insisted whilst Russia refused. When Austria consented to a discussion of the substance of her demands, Germany declared war on Russia (*v. p.* 309 for full proof; and WHO WILLED THE WAR?).

THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME OF THE PAMPHLETEERS' OPINIONS.

Pro: (1) Russia rendered the settlement of the Serbian question impossible [Landauer, p. 64; Roggen, pp. 60 and 73].

(2) Austria communicated her ultimatum to her allies, Germany and Italy, too late; but the conflict might have been localized. Berlin knew nothing of the terms [Roggen, p. 40; Molenbroek, I., p. 25; Platzhoff, p. 26].

(3) The assassination of the Archduke was plotted in high circles in Russia, not only in high circles in Serbia [Chotzky, p. 33].

Con: (1) *v.* preceding remarks, and *v.* WHO WILLED THE WAR?

(2) The Serbian Blue Book rectifies the errors in the Austrian [Mandere on Marshal Putnik]. Austria was at fault; and the Socialists said so [Bernstein, p. 10; Kiersch, p. 30; Poll, p. 20].

(3) Chotzky gives no evidence. In the *Nineteenth Century* (Feb. 1915) Dr. E. J. Dillon recalls the meeting at Konopisht with the Archduke Francis, and gives strong reasons

Pro:

(4) Austria vigorously suppressed pro-Slav agitation (Ándrássy, p. 15).

(5) Serbia was not a State worthy of the name: her sovereignty was a legal fiction [Labberton, II., p. 97].

(9) The war might have been localized.

If Germany knew of the terms of the ultimatum, she was blood-guilty: if she did not, she was criminally negligent [*ibid.*, p. 129].

Germany declined to extend the term of the ultimatum, and refused to influence Austria [British Blue Book, No. 71].

Con:

for surmising that the murder might have been by German secret agents. The Archduke was in favour of establishing a third Crown, detaching the Slavs from Hungarian rule, and constituting them into a new kingdom.

(5) Austria herself never conquered Bosnia [Dieren, p. 67]. The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina lost Serbia 2,000,000 Serbs [Royen, p. 27].

(6) The Austrian invasion of Serbia was barbarous in the extreme. Dr. van Tienhoven, a Dutch doctor at Valjevo, went through the first two campaigns in which the Austrians were beaten. The Austrians introduced typhus, used expansive bullets, massacred, pillaged, devastated; also used explosive bullets (with a charge that burst on contact), and brought chaos everywhere [Tienhoven, *passim*].

(7) The demands on Serbia were so framed that they must fail and lead to war [Eduard Meyer, p. 180].

(8) The Serbian reply to Austria was not published in Germany until too late to mollify public opinion [Beer, p. 44]. It was published on July 29, three days after Austria declared war [Roggen, p. 91; German White Book Ia].

(9) Yes, if Serbia had been abandoned by the Entente [*S'accuse*, p. 203].

Localization was a mere subterfuge to make war [*ibid.*, p. 126].

The correspondence between Germany and Austria has never been published (*v.* p. 58). Austria refused a prolongation of the time-limit [Russian Orange Book, No. 12]. The German Foreign Secretary doubted if Austria would accede [Russian Orange Book, No. 14; British Blue Book, No. 18]: no reasons were given [*J'accuse*, p. 108].

'The Serbian reply exceeds all our (Russian) expectations in its moderation: and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfaction to Austria. We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria, unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext of war with Serbia' [Russian Orange Book, No. 33].

Serbia was obsequious in her reply: Russia offered to stand aside and leave the matter to Italy, England, Germany, and France. 'If Serbia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the matter in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy' [British Blue Book, Nos. 17, 24, 35, 36, 42, 51, 53; *J'accuse*, pp. 111 . . .; also *v. J'accuse*, p. 123, for the summary of the case against Austria].

Pro: (10) Serbia yielded everything but the essential [Bertourieux, p. 8].

Con: (10) Serbia yielded everything, save one point. She promised to change her Press law, and enslave her Press: only she wished to refer the co-operation of Austrian officials in the inquiry into the murder to the decision of the Hague Tribunal. Austria refused [British Blue Book, Nos. 39 and 50]. 'With a little good-will on the part of Berlin, peace might be kept, and irreparable disaster stayed' [Belgian Grey Book II., No. 20].

Pro: Serbia was born at the Congress of Berlin, 1880 [Verrijn-Stuart, p. 32].

Con: Utterly untrue (*v.* SERBIA and AUSTRIA).

She attained her own liberty and conserved her nationality and literature continuously.

Pro: (July 2, 1914, Baron Beyens):

'The Pašić ministry is winking at the hotbed of anarchy at Belgrade and should not be startled at a requisition for energetic action against the guilty, instead of treating them with blind tolerance' [Bertourieux, p. 62].

The Pan-Serb agitation was fomented by England and Russia. The Obrenovići (King Alexander and Queen Draga) were dethroned by England. 'This policy waited the spontaneous event or the ripening of the divergencies of the Powers, to select the means and persons

who would successfully provoke a decisive incident. In 1909 England interested herself in Austro-Serbian conflicts' [*ibid.*, pp. 37, 57-59].

Austria was patient in the extreme [Baron Greindl in Nov., 1910; Beyens in Nov., 1912; *ibid.*, p. 59].

Pro : The Národna Odbrana was for Serbia and Pan-Serbism what the 'Ligue des Patriotes' had been in France for our Chauvinists, and the *ἔθνικὴ ἑταιρεία* in Greece for Hellenism; only more unscrupulous and violent in its propaganda by deed [Bertourieux, p. 61].

The Russians, of all nations, should not have been complaisant to such a movement.

Con : The Greek and Italian revolutionary societies redeemed their nationalities from a foreign yoke.

As to Russia, v. No. 10, French Yellow Book (p. 250 of this book).

SERFDOM IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA

Serfdom was abolished in Austrian Bohemia and Moravia in 1781, in German Austria in 1782, in Prussia in 1807, in Württemberg in 1817, in Bavaria and Oberlausitz in 1818; in Austria the last traces were abolished in 1848 [Meyer, *Encycl.*].

However, no full peasant-ownership was conferred, and most of the land was credited to the lords of the manors. The ownership was transferred only to 'peasants,' *i.e.*, a man possessing a yoke of draught-animals, and not to all of these [Knapp, *Die Landarbeiter in Knechtschaft und Freiheit*, p. 79]; and these richer peasants, with some exceptions, were allowed free disposal and ownership of a half or two-thirds of their land. The poorer peasants still remained serfs [*ibid.*, p. 80].

In 1850 a further reform was instituted and some of the poorer peasants were accorded free properties without an obligation to render services: but this reform was not far-reaching in its effects, and the great majority

of the poorer and smaller peasants still have to render feudal services and are almost in the position of serfs [*ibid.*, pp. 83-84]. The German emancipation 'split the enserfed peasantry up into two classes, the countrymen free from services, and the countrymen without any land: it released the landlord from his former obligations towards his peasants, and supplied him, so as to work his capital, with the condition of labour which was considered inevitable, *viz.*, a proletariat.'

In a lecture by the same author in January, 1894 [*Die Bauernbefreiung in Österreich und in Preussen*], the peroration runs:

'In the eighteenth century the problem was unquestionably stated in these terms: how can the peasantry be conserved in full numbers, and how can the relation between the lord and the peasant be solved, so as to spare the peasant too heavy a sacrifice? To this problem, Austria, though later in the day, supplied a better solution than Prussia. In Austria the peasant's land has been kept for him, but not in Prussia; in Austria, at the crucial moment, the lord did not contrive to gain control of the legislature, and reverse the current of the legislation, so that the intended benefit fell to the landlord, and not to the peasant. In Austria there have not been so many little owners turned into landless labourers, as in Prussia. In Austria the peasants have not had to give up as much land, nor to pay such high rents as in Prussia.'

Russia emancipated her serfs only in 1861; but it was in generous and full measure; and the obloquy of serfdom, so often cast at Russia, is much more applicable to Prussia. For this we can quote German authority.

Serfdom was abolished in Russia in 1861, and the village communities (*mir*) were accorded ownership of their lands [*Meyer, Encycl.*]. 'In Russia, after the emancipation, there were no distinctions of classes inside the peasant-class, only one class of peasant, and they all became free, all were released from the feudal services' [*Knapp, Die Landarbeiter*, p. 81].

THE SLAV QUESTION

Pro : 'Germans and Slavs cannot live side by side in the same country and enjoy equal rights. Peace is an odious word : peace between Germans and Slavs is like a treaty made of paper laid between fire and water' [Tannenberg, pp. 40 and 41]. The Slavs to the east must be expropriated, so that the Germans may expand and replace them [Kotzde, p. 15].

Con : Germans and Slavs get on very well together, were it not for politics [Chamberlain, p. 46]. The Slavs are quite happy under Austrian rule [Chotzky, p. 34]. The Slav and the German work together very well [*ibid.*, p. 35].

Pro : The Southern Slav agitation is the outcome of English intrigue [Révai, p. 59].

THE UKRAINE

Little-Russia (*v.* POLAND), or the Ukraine, belonged to Poland, up to the partition in 1772. It contains very rich soil and great mineral wealth. The people in the portion taken over by Austria are called Ruthenes ; those in Russia Little-Russians.

Pro : The Ukraine is to be saved from Russia and modern Tatars (*i.e.*, the Japanese) by Germany [Tannenberg, p. 215 ; Heinemann, pp. 64 and 73 ; *Dietsche Stammen*, p. 131, Jan.-Feb., 1916]. It was once the home of the Goths, and therefore part of the German heritage [Tannenberg, p. 211].

SLESWIG (*v. also* SERBIA)

There are very few references to Sleswig in the pamphlets : the occupation has long been a *fait accompli*.

Eduard Meyer [p. 120] in referring to Sleswig passes

over the broken treaties, and refers with satisfaction to Prussian policy; and it is clear that Danish troops were employed in Belgium in the early days [Domela, pp. 33 and 94].

But the history of Sleswig provides some very suggestive parallels with the attack on Serbia.

Allegations of criminal plotting in Serbia against Austria [Austria-Hungary Red Book, No. 19, enclosure].

1. The *Národna Odbrana* was a private society, embracing many Serbian notables, aiming at subversion of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

2. It trained Komitadjis in guerilla warfare for the prospective war against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Serbian Press declaimed against the sacred person of the monarch (the Austrian Emperor) and infringed Austrian penal law at every turn.

It treated assassinations, successful or otherwise, of Austrian governors as heroic deeds.

4. The *Národna Odbrana* works as an 'educational society,' but is also associated with athletic and military clubs.

5. Certain allegorical pictures at the Serbian War Office are a proof of aggression.

The *Národna Odbrana* recruits its members from amongst Bosnians.

Allegations proving the unneighbourly conduct of Denmark [*Le Slesvig du Nord*, p. 149].

A German paper, the *Heimdall*, was founded in 1895 as the organ of Pan-Germanism, and the journal of the *Alldeutscher Verband*. Its motto is, 'From the Skaw to the Adriatic, from Boulogne to the Narva, from Besançon to the Black Sea' [v. CENTRAL EUROPE].

Denmark is treated as a section of Germany, and university professors are set to prove the thesis.

The *Hamburger-Nachrichten* in 1910 speaks of the participation of Danish officials at Irredentist meetings.

The Danish Press is said to maintain an irritating anti-German attitude, and to be subventioned by Russia. Thus the *Zeitfragen* (March 3, 1913) denounced that the new device at Copenhagen was 'Down with the Turks, and then with the Germans.' These were all forgeries.

In 1914 Frobenius, in *Petermann's Mitteilungen*, details Denmark's military projects against Germany with the connivance of a certain Western Power.

A Danish song, speaking of 'light in thought and steel in arms' is perverted by Herr Hahn (member of the Reichstag) into a proof of treason (cf. A.H., 1., App. I.).

6. It is implicated in the murder of the Archduke.

7. Opinions in the Serbian Press—

(1) Abhor the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

(2) Disapprove of King Peter visiting Vienna.

(3) Call Austria a second Turkey.

(4) In dealing with the murder of the Archduke, insist that the anti-Austrian policy of the Serbians is very much to blame.

(5) Wish to boycott Austrian enterprises on the Danube.

8. Serbia relies on Russian help and is merely an agent.

Dr. Hahn's electoral address in 1913: 'Our fellow-countrymen in North Sleswig are involved in a desperate fight for German law and customs. The Danish agitation has always taken the offensive in an incredible fashion and in a violent form. It has a widespread and wonderful organization, richly subsidized. The object of this campaign, to which the Danish elements in North Sleswig has forced the German inhabitants, is to reunite Sleswig and Germany.'

The manifesto declaims against the Danish propaganda: maintains that the Germans are being oppressed.

In 1908 the *Dybbøl Post* (a Danish paper in Sleswig) is accused of saying: 'We hate everything German.'

The statement was untrue: two articles had been put together to produce a forgery.

This was proved, but the authors of the calumny never punished.

The *Heimdall* in 1897, 1901, 1909, 1913, etc., denounced Danish propaganda as dictated by Russia, and alleges a secret treaty to hand over Copenhagen to Russia in the event of war; founds a 'Committee to protect Northern Sleswig' which pours forth propaganda; *Kleindeutschland* (the organ of the *Alldeutscher Verband* in 1909) accuses the Danes of coveting Holstein.

The similarity of these accusations, together with the correspondence of the dates of their ebullience with the European crises, is very striking. They seem to be designed for an attack against Denmark. They have been disproved. At the Ágrám trial in 1909 Count Forgach was convicted of using forged evidence on behalf of the Austrian Government.

It seems probable that the *ex parte* statements in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book may be equally false: Forgach is still at the Foreign Office at Vienna.

There follows a brief analysis of German administration in Sleswig-Holstein. A comparison with Tannenberg's forecast (*v.* PAN-GERMANISM) in the intended Greater Germany shows that Tannenberg was not romancing in his severities: he was following a set model.

From *Le Slesvig du Nord* we extract some of the principal measures of repression (*cf.* PAN-GERMANISM).

In 1907 there was a new language-law prohibiting the use of Danish for public purposes, and by Article VII. up to the year 1927 Danish might be used at public assemblies after formal notification to the police and formal permission.

In 1889 German was introduced as the medium of instruction in the schools.

The treaties between Denmark and Germany created a class of people who were neither Danes nor Germans; not being born on German territory, or being the children of parents who had not opted for German nationality. These people have to serve in the army, but have no civic rights and are forbidden to marry legally, since their children would not be German.

There is a regular system of territorial expropriation. It has been ineffectual and has mainly inflated the value of land. The system of peasant-ownership led to land being repurchased by Danes, so that the administration tried a new system of *Rentengüter*, small leaseholds, tenable only at the mercy of local German officials.

The Danish popular banks countered the movement; they lent money to their own people.

But in 1888 the German administration prohibited further subdivision, and in every case claimed the right of pre-emption, and started new *Kreditverbände* for the sole benefit of Germans.

In 1864 Danish was banished from the schools as a part of the curriculum; and in 1871 this prohibition was extended to the elementary schools. In 1878 German

was introduced, concomitantly with Danish as the medium of instruction; and in 1888 not even religious instruction might be given in Danish, so that children were taught like deaf-mutes [p. 105].

The Lutheran ministers and teachers were all alike state functionaries and had to obey.

In 1891 vain attempts were made to secure six hours a week of Danish teaching.

A Danish Free Church arose and was persecuted, as, by law, the sacrament had to be in German. (Similar regulations have obtained in Poland; only Poland, being Catholic, received protection from the authorities.)

Yet the country is still predominantly Danish; but persecution is constant. There is no justice for Danes: any private assembly can be invaded by the police; any public meeting in Danish—even a lecture by Nansen—is broken up or prohibited.

Yet Germany, having possessed herself of this foreign country and failed to assimilate it in fifty years, has to organize a propaganda to show that she is being attacked by an unneighbourly Press in Denmark; and produces endless books to prove her linguistic and moral title to these countries, which were under the Danish crown for five hundred years. The Plébiscite provided for by the Treaty of Prague, 1864, to decide what should be the government of the country, was never accorded. The war of 1863 was raised on a medieval claim, on behalf of the House of Augustenborg, to whom the Duchies escheated, owing to a technicality in the grant: this house was never instated, and Prussia and Austria, having both appropriated their spoil, quarrelled in 1866, after which Austria forwent her share.

As to Prussian policy, Queen Victoria wrote in 1864 to Lord Granville:

'Prussia should at least be made aware of what she [the Queen] and every honest man in Europe must think of the gross and unblushing violation of every assurance and pledge that she [Prussia] had given, which she [Prussia] had been guilty of' [*Contemporary Review*, July, 1916].

SMALL NATIONALITIES

I.—GERMAN STATEMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT

‘ On a closer examination, it is clear that only a really powerful State corresponds to the idea of a State. Hence the incontrovertible ridiculousness inherent in the existence of a petty State ’ [Treitschke, *Politik*, p. 43].

‘ A sacrifice for a foreign people is not merely immoral, but contravenes the notion of self-preservation, which is a State’s highest ideal ’ [*ibid.*, p. 100].

‘ A so-called petty State is no State at all, but a community at sufferance, which only apes being a State in a ridiculous fashion ’ [Lasson, *Das Culturideal des Krieges*]; (v. also STATE and WAR).

‘ In the next European war it will also be necessary that the small States should be forced to follow us or be subdued ’ [Confidential German Official Memoir, French Yellow Book, No. 2].

All little nations, such as Finland, Poland, the Boers, if they support Germany, shall have the right to follow their own destinies [Dernburg, *apud* Rouquette, p. 89].

II.—THE VIEWS OF THE PAMPHLETEERS

Pro : (1) England cannot conciliate coloured subjects [Schultze, p. 35].

Con : (1) ‘ The native population were firmly convinced that with the departure of the German forces, and the arrival of their deliverers, the English, a period of freedom had set in ; the recent murders and repressions were fresh in their minds, and no doubt it seemed to the German missionaries that “ the sky sang with an indescribable shout of scorn and rejoicing.” Every German in Duala was in dread of reprisals, and openly said so ’ [White Paper on Cameroons, Cd. 1393, p. 43].

(2) No country has ever joined England willingly [Sidler, p. 12].

(3) England crushes small nationalities [Verworn, p. 48]. England's rule over small nations is bloody and ungenerous [Baumann, p. 26].

(4) Her rule over small nations is established by invasion, not the desire of protecting little Powers [Ándrássy, p. 55; *Dietsche Stenmen*, Jan.-Feb., 1916, p. 125; *Révai*, p. 21].

(3) In these islands every local language and dialect is fostered. In Germany, everything non-German is crushed.

(4) Yes, she leaves them alone as long as she can; and is tolerant when she must intervene.

THE SOCIALIST PARTIES

The International Socialists have long been working for international peace and the reduction of armaments. The following are some of the views expressed.

Eduard Bernstein states that on July 29, 1914, an International Socialist Conference was still sitting at Brussels. He has published a translation in full (unlike the official German versions) of the English and French diplomatic documents, and admits :

1. (1) That the invasion of Belgium was utterly unjustified (p. 7).
- (2) That Austria had no right to flout Serbia as she did (p. 10).
- (3) That after August, 1914, Germany has had to swallow lethe in abundant draughts.
- (4) That the German and Austrian Socialists agreed on their points (p. 10) : Germany is the greatest enemy of peace (pp. 48 and 44).
- (5) That Austria and Germany forced on war, whilst England and France tried to prevent it (p. 25).
- (6) That in England there was no hatred of Germany, and war was only reluctantly accepted (pp. 25 and 29).
- (7) He cites the German mobilization of 1913, and the Zabern affair (*q.v.*) as instances of German wrong-doing.

- (8) The German Socialists in the Reichstag had no alternative, save to vote the war-credits, when war was a *fait accompli* (p. 15).
- (9) That the intervention of England was a matter of doubt up to the last : she could not have interposed as the ally of Russia (p. 43) : the invasion of Belgium forced her hand (p. 29) ; and Burns, Trevelyan, and others resigned, but were subsequently convinced that there was no alternative (pp. 37 and 49). The English Socialists were thus solid.
- (10) The democracies of all the neutral countries are on the Allies' side (p. 40).
- (11) The Italian Socialists wanted at once to strike in favour of Belgium (p. 46).
- (12) The Russian Socialist delegates would not at first vote the credits for the war, and left the House (p. 39).
- (13) The French Socialists (p. 25) did not hesitate, as France was on the defensive (*v. PACIFICISM*).

2. Liebknecht still refuses to accept the Prussian point of view, and has been condemned to imprisonment for high treason. Fernan, the Author of *J'accuse*, and many other non-juring Socialists have their doubts.

3. In Germany the Social Democratic Press (*v. PRESS*), acts independently of the rest, and does not accept official dictation. Bücher (p. 53) certifies that the Socialist Press since the war has been quite loyal to Germany.

4. Potthoff writes a pamphlet to voice the opinion of the conforming Socialists. He admits that the fight is between states, not races ; that Belgium and Switzerland are nations ; that there is no German territory left to redeem ; that German attempts to Germanize fail ; for the rest he follows the official arguments, for which look under the appropriate titles in this book (pp. 7-12).

5. International Socialism, which has merely aimed at the material advantage of the working-classes, has failed in its objects : there must be some new spiritual unifying agent (Duijnstree, p. 16).

SOUTH AMERICA

(*v. also* INTENTIONS, and MONROE DOCTRINE)

South America, unlike the rest of the world, has not yet been partitioned among the European Powers.

German trade is immensely on the increase : out of a total of 678 million marks, in the Argentine Germany commands 296·3 ; in Brazil, 158·2 ; in Chile, 128·4 [Sievers (1903), pp. 5 and 53] : and amounts to 30 per cent. of the total imports [Rouquette (1916), p. 15].

German liners control 56·7 of the shipping [*ibid.*, p. 54].

In the Argentine 25 per cent. of the population consists of immigrants, to the number of 1·7 millions, of which ·35 are English and German.

Yet Germany has the third rank in the commerce [*ibid.*, p. 63].

In Brazil, of the four million whites, 2·7 are foreign ; and of the 2·7, ·3 are German [*ibid.*, p. 67].

Germans are largely settled in Southern Brazil in São Paulo and Amazonas, and the trade is mainly German. So, too, in Chile [*ibid.*, pp. 70 . . .].

The Germans in South America, unlike the Italians or the English, do not return home [Vallentin (1908), p. 36], but fuse with the Spaniards ; unless segregated into separate villages and districts [*ibid.*, p. 36].

In Paraguay the Germans have been especially active [Vallentin (1908), p. 78], and this State may be Germanized in time.

There must be no attempt at forcible conquest [Sievers, p. 78]. ' If the German Empire is to regain the position it is fast losing as one of the Great Powers on the earth [1903], it must try to acquire influence, where there yet is room left : but not by forcible grabbing, which embitters the population, as in Kiao-chow, but by building up a financial, commercial, and industrial reserve, if necessary a military reserve as well for the

South American States, to secure them against the growing covetousness of the United States of America' [Sievers, p. 78].

To ensure this consummation, a sop should be thrown to Great Britain [Sievers, p. 89], and friendly relations cultivated with Russia, to whom Germany might abandon Asia.

The Chilean Government encourages German settlers [Vallentin, p. 63], but enforces the teaching of Spanish, which is a 'Chilean measure for denationalization' [Sievers, p. 89].

In the Argentine (unlike Paraguay and Brazil) Germany only has immigrants, not organized communities [Vallentin, p. 11]: only the organized emigration to Brazil has been successful in conserving German nationality [*v. GERMANY—Absorption*; Vallentin, pp. 39, 50, and 72].

There is no notion of conquest; only economic penetration, and evidently the deliquescent qualities of the Germans, as well as the nationalistic ambitions of the Spaniards and Portuguese, can be trusted to frustrate any political developments. And the commercial exploitation of those immensely wealthy wastes, even by Germans, will only operate to the advantage of the world at large.

But, be it observed, these remarks are based on these two books which antecede the war. Even in them there are signs of discontent at the absolute and irremediable loss of these efficient German colonists to the Fatherland. Many of these German-speaking colonists are refugees from the Russian Baltic provinces, and the settlements established on the Volga by Catherine II. These folk have no love or attachment to Prussia.

After the war, if we win, there will be an emigration to South America, and the new German colonists will be rapidly absorbed, when there is no German fleet to keep up German nationalism, by force of Krupps. If we lose, there will be attempts to turn the positive and honest economic advantage into definite political pressure; and the U.S.A. would have to face the music

unsupported : we should be, in that event, disinclined to render assistance, and enfeebled.

American diplomatic pressure on the Argentine and Chile and Brazil to insist on the German colonists being taught the language of their adoptive country—which would not need much persuasion, to judge by these two books—would secure these States from any German danger, as the German element would disappear ; and this would consolidate the South American republics into something more respectable and desirable ; would turn the Monroe Doctrine into a Latin as well as an ' Anglo-Saxon ' interest.

The Germans regard South America as their only free field. They do good work there, and merge. If they win against us they may want to conquer (*cf.* GERMANY AND A ' PLACE IN THE SUN ').

The present war on Prussian policy will destroy all the good work done by Germans for Germany in South America [*J'accuse*, p. 46].

The Germans have great influence over the South American Press. ' It requires to be better informed ' [*Jung*, p. 86].

But, in the Argentine, Hermann Tjarks, the editor of the *Deutsche La Plata-Zeitung*, has published a Spanish paper, *La Union*, by which, freed from official shackles, and appealing in native fashion to his readers, he has influenced Argentine thought [*Echo*, 25, v. 16]. German interests largely control the journalism in South America.

So, too, in Mexico, a part of the Press has been engineered by an enterprising German who understands his subject [*Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, May, 1915, p. 214].

STARVATION

The Germans declaim against the economic pressure on Germany as a barbarous attempt to starve out the civilian population (*v. also* SUBMARINES and MARINISM).

Pro : This policy is barbarous and unjustifiable [*Dieren*, p. 46]. Every German kitchen at home is

engaged therefore in the national service [Chotzky, p. 62 ; Sidler, p. 18]. The modern English fleet will not fight ; merely tries to starve the enemy [*Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, May, 1915, p. 259].

Con : For some of the figures *v.* Schmidt [*passim*] ; (RIGHT OF SEARCH).

Sweden will not pass war material through to Russia, though she will to Germany ; and Russia will collapse before Germany is starved out.

The English pressure rests most severely on Russia. With the Belgian and Polish resources Germany is better off economically than her enemies [Heinemann, pp. 70-72].

' We fear neither death, nor the devil, nor the starvation-fiend our enemies want to drive into our homes. The men round Verdun, the men under Hindenburg, our blue-jackets who have shown how rats can bite, can endure deprivation. These deprivations exist : I do not fear stating the fact to the world abroad. We shall last out. The harvest is good, and better than in 1915. Our enemies' speculations have gone wrong. The naval battle off the Skager-rak has proved Germany's readiness at sea. Germany has won the freedom of the seas for herself and the little nations ' [The German Chancellor, June 5, 1916 ; *Echo*, June 1, 1916].

THE STATE

' A State in its sphere is the highest and best. Society has merely to serve ' [Lasson].

' But the State cannot demand of any person to surrender his conscience, or his highest duties ' [*ibid.*].

' It is the wrong-headedness of Machiavellianism to overlook the fact that the ideal will of the State and the real will of the Government are two different things. That which may not be demanded of the State must be demanded of the Person, namely, to regulate action by

ethical principles. Thereon the relations between states are essentially founded' [*ibid.*].

'The will of the State and the ethical will can never conflict with each other. For the State does not pertain to the realm of ethics, but is comprehended, if it is to be comprehended in its true condition, as the means for absolute coercion, as the confirmatory foundation for everything ethical and all civilization' [*ibid.*].

'Through the State, man is humanized, *i.e.*, becomes an intellectual natural being: in this sense the State is older than Man [*i.e.*, Community and State are confused; also temporal and causal precedence].

'It is hardly justifiable to regard the State as Man in the Mass. The State only represents the intellectual will of men.

'Therefore the State is essentially entitled to the highest and absolute sovereignty. The whole of the external existence of man is subject to the power of the State' [*ibid.*].

'The State is Power, for that is Truth' [Treitschke, *Politik*, p. 91].

'The German only knows as law what the State for the time prescribes as such. . . . Thus the materialism arose which consists in rejecting concepts formerly accepted without any deeper investigation of their ethics. The State policy was formerly considered to have been of divine foundation. Since this doctrine is now unacceptable, and yet the existence of a State policy is undeniable, some other origin had to be sought for. This was the beginning of Treitschke's theory' [*Nog wat losse*, p. 16].

The difference between Lassonism and Bernhardtism is that Bernhardt applies to the Prussian Government the Hobbesian or Austinian arguments; Lasson theoretizes for the ideal State.

Thus, to Lasson, a Small State is a vassal; to Bernhardt it is non-existent.

To Lasson 'Kultur' means the national stamp of a particular community; to Bernhardt it is German civilization, and the only recipe for the world.

Or, in other words, when love of home is transformed into an idolatry of the administration, a point is reached at which patriotism becomes a demoniac devotion knowing no laws outside its own self-interests. Then willing service to the commonweal degenerates into will-less, conscienceless subservience to the autocratic bureaucracy which is the incarnation of the Motherland. And this is the essential vice of Germany. The Germans have set up an altar to patriotism on a high hill for all to see; but the graven image is that of Germania. The high priests are infallible and can do no wrong; the strong wine of the sanctuary has driven the worshippers mad; and no account is taken of the human sacrifice.

The Germans reduce Right to an identification of Deed and Law. 'Im Anfang war die That.' The State being the supreme, there can be no international comity [Poll, p. 63]. (Cf. GERMANY; PAN-GERMANISM; MIGHT AND RIGHT; MILITARISM; WAR.)

The idea of State is now superior to that of Race, and the object of this war is the supremacy of the German State [Potthoff, p. 7].

SUBMARINES

(*v.* LUSITANIA, MARINISM, AND RIGHT OF SEARCH)

For Bernhardi, *v.* MARINISM.

For the new German Submarine Code, *v.* RIGHT OF SEARCH [also *Who are the Huns?* pp. 341 and 345].

The whole German Press justifies the method of submarine war. An instance of the argument is: England started the war against women and children in the Boer War [for refutation *v.* BOERS], and this precedent justified Germany [Potthoff, p. 40].

No German pamphlet states that Germany, not having the command of the sea, and not being able to carry prizes home for legitimate adjudication, has therefore set

about terrorizing all shipping, whether hostile or neutral, and sinking vessels at sight. This is piracy.

At a meeting at San Francisco of German-Americans, the chairman, Henry Weismann, remarked that he had felt doubtful when he read in the official papers of an understanding between America and Germany [on submarine warfare]. He had been loth to believe it. He had on him a telegram confirming his fears. That telegram stated that the *Hesperian* had been sunk and 750 persons drowned.

At this point the assembly cheered. Another deputy, Patrick O'Donnell, got up and stated that the last news was that Germany had kept faith with the United States, for there had been no American lives sacrificed.

Loud applause followed this announcement [Sept. 6, 1915; Rouquette, p. 104].

THE SUEZ CANAL

De Lesseps started digging the Suez Canal in 1858; the formal concession was made in 1866; and it was opened in 1869.

Its international status was for a long time in doubt. In September, 1882, the International Peace Association at Geneva recommended a permanent neutralization. This was never adopted.

On Oct. 29, 1888, Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, and Turkey all signed the Suez Canal convention, 'that it should always be free and open in time of war, as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.' Great Britain made a reservation, that this should be valid in so far as it was applicable to the exceptional status of Egypt, and should not be construed so as to fetter the British occupation of Egypt, or the use of the Canal.

On April 8, 1904, Great Britain accepted the instrument of 1888 in full, only supplementing it to the effect that the signatories should meet once a year to take note as to the due execution of the treaty.

Neutralization, in general, can only be effected by treaty, *e.g.*, the Danube, by the Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856, and the Treaty of London, March 13, 1871, and of Berlin by that of July 13, 1878, forbidding war-vessels to pass up the Danube, and authorizing the Sultan to close the Dardanelles. No such provision was made as to the Suez Canal [*Encycl. Brit.*].

'The Suez Canal' [Fournier (1882), p. 101] 'is a strait made by the hand of man; it has the same character as the Sound. The Sound is guarded and surveyed by Denmark. It can be used at any time by merchant-vessels or men-of-war belonging to any people. The Suez Canal is under exactly the same conditions.'

Fournier refers to the Treaty of 1856 regarding the Danube, and that of Copenhagen, March 14, 1857, when the Sound and Belt dues were capitalized and abolished, and these channels freed.

Pro : The English have abused the neutrality of the Suez Canal [*Who are the Huns?* p. 61; Révai, p. 87].

Con : The treaty obligations stipulate not that belligerent vessels may not pass through, but that no fighting may take place in the Canal. The Germans are free to apply to enter at either end.

SVÉN HEDIN

Con : Svén Hedin's itinerary included Trèves, Longwy, Longuyon, Marville, Chauvency, Dun, Dannevoux, Septsarges, Eclisfontaine, Romagne, Varennes, Sténay, Montmédy, Sedan, Vouziers, Cernay, Rouvray, Condé, Challerange, Somme-Py, Namur, Waterloo, Brussels, Antwerp, Malines, Louvain, Bergen-op-Zoom, Ghent, Bruges, Ostend, Middelkerke, Bapaume, Valenciennes, Cambrai, Lille, Roubaix, in Sept. and Oct., 1914.

He was conducted everywhere in great comfort, and guided ; he was not taken to Andenne, Dinant, Aerschot, Termonde, Alost, Visé—in fact, to none of the districts specified [*British Atrocities Report*, p. 39: ‘a line drawn from the Belgian frontier to Liège and continued to Charleroi, and a second line drawn from Liège to Malines, a sort of irregular Y, along which most of the systematic, as opposed to the sporadic outrages occurred.’] The partiality of his evidence in the parts less brutalized by the Germans is obvious enough : at Malines and Namur much damage may have been caused by the Belgian artillery in the course of the fight ; as to Louvain, *v. p.* 132.

The falsity of his evidence is traceable in that his only reference to a prisoners’ camp is disproved ; and, though he was at Wittenberg, he never refers to the camp there established.

Pro : ‘We also visited the hospital at Döberitz, where the prisoners receive all the care that human charity can give to the sick. It is not charity that demands the greatest sacrifices in this respect ; for a concentration camp, where thousands of men live huddled together on one spot, may become a source of contagion if ill-managed. Hence skilled doctors, sick attendants, and nurses are engaged’ [*Svén Hedin*, p. 385 (Oct., 1914)].

Con : ‘I visited the camp at Döberitz the other day. . . . There are a number of wounded there, and these require medical supplies, such as crutches, wheeled chairs, etc., as well as extra food, such as chocolate, eggs, port wine. The prisoners have one blanket each, and are without overcoats, as when taken prisoner they are compelled to drop their overcoats and equipment. They therefore suffer from cold, as well as having no change of underwear. There are at Döberitz at present 3,000 British prisoners’ [Encl. in No. 15., Cd. 7815. *Report of American Ambassador*, Oct. 13, 1914].

Döberitz Camp in December, 1914. American report (Cd. 7817, No. 44) : ‘There are 9,000 very miserable men in the camp for prisoners of war at Döberitz.

No doubt the conditions under which they live are forced by a military necessity. Nevertheless, they are very miserable men. . . . These men are sleeping 200 to 500 to the tent in horse-tents which have been cast off by the German cavalry. These tents are very old. . . . The men are vermin-ridden. They have no way of keeping themselves clean. Some of them are not warmly clothed.

'When a man can stand the torture no longer, he is sent to the hospital. There he gets, not a bath, but a thorough daubing with a vermin-killing ointment. His clothes are disinfected. He is sent back to be re-inhabited. . . .

'The Germans have carefully scrambled the nationalities, so that Russians and French and English are mingled in the tents. . . . I saw that stew (of cabbage and carrots and potatoes) in the rough . . . it seemed to me a mighty unappetizing mess. I began to understand why so many of the Tommies looked so pale. . . . One Tommy stood near when the guard told of the stew. He said in an undertone: "I 'ad a sow and even she wouldn't eat skilly."

' . . . The dirty floor of the tents was a mass of mud. The stew gave off a sour and musty odour. . . .

'It may be true that nothing better can be done for them under the circumstances. Nevertheless these 9,000 are very miserable men.'

ADMISSIONS OF GERMAN GUILT.

'One of the [French] prisoners said he had seen quite fifty of his comrades being killed at the spot where he was taken prisoner. . . . The five prisoners from Southern France were calm, self-possessed, and sensible men. . . .' [Svén Hedin, p. 172].

French prisoners were forced to reconstruct the railway at Montmédy [*ibid.*, p. 60].

'General Bernhard stepped on to the road and ordered the convoy to halt. He then had the Frenchmen formed up before him. . . . Every man is carefully

cross-examined. Valuable information about the enemy is thus gained' [Svén Hedin, p. 89].

'Nothing is taken away off-hand. All will be made good to the owners after the war. The terms of peace will contain a provision to the effect that the *defeated side* shall pay the amount of every receipt or voucher (*bon*) representing the value of the things requisitioned during the military occupation. The individual is not to suffer direct, but only as a participant in the misfortune which falls on the country as a whole. *It is the duty of the State to make good the people's personal losses, when the State is incapable of protecting the property of the individual against the enemy.* And if the invading Power is defeated in the war, *its just punishment* is that it must make good the losses of the sufferers in the war' [*ibid.*, p. 147]. (Italics inserted by Editor.)

'If an aviator comes soaring over a fortified town [*i.e.*, within the German lines] at night-time, several searchlights are concentrated on him, he is blinded by the light, . . . whilst *from the nearest church-tower* [*italics Editor's*] he is pelted by the fire from machine-guns' [Svén Hedin, p. 166; also *v.* Review in the *Times*, May 6, 1915; and *v.* p. 96].

SWEDEN

[Authority, Cd. 8322.]

In December, 1915, the Swedish steamship *Stockholm* was arrested at Kirkwall, and her fifty-eight bags of parcel-mail, consigned from Chicago to Malmö, examined.

The Swedish Government protested against this and other similar seizures. On one ship, the *Hellig Olaf*, 109 bags containing rubber were found in the parcels-mail, which, it was certain, was being used by German agents in the States for purposes of contraband.

As a reprisal the Swedish Government detained all goods to and from England sent by the parcels-mail through Sweden (Dec. 18, 1915).

The Swedish Government claimed immunity for postal packets, as being more personal in character than merchandise, and because their delivery was under the guarantee of the Swedish Government. They invoked the Declaration of London (*v.* RIGHT OF SEARCH), under which rubber was on the free list—although Sweden was not a signatory to this instrument.

On Jan. 31 Sir Edward Grey protested against the seizure of the Russian transit mail as wholly and avowedly illegal, 'all the more regrettable, as it affects not only the acknowledged rights of Great Britain, but also the rights of Russia. Such action is a direct challenge, not only to the belligerent rights, but to the national sovereignty of Great Britain.'

On Feb. 11 the Swedish Government rejoined that Swedish sovereignty was equally affected by the seizure of her mails at sea. But they consented to release those mails, if the British Government would at once submit the legality of the measures taken against the Swedish mail to arbitration.

On Feb. 28 the British Government offered to let the decision of the British Prize Court be appealed against in arbitration, after the war; to which the Swedish Government consented, and, on this condition, would 'immediately release the parcels-mails now detained in Sweden, with a view to their being forwarded by the usual route. In case British action of the kind which led to this detention should continue, the King's Government must reserve the right to take such counter-measures as the circumstances may demand.'

On April 25 Sir Edward Grey repeated his offer to submit the specific decisions of the British Prize Courts with regard to those mails to a Court of Arbitration after the war, provided the Swedish Government released the parcels-mails in transit for Russia.

By June 19 these Russian mails had not been released, and Sir Edward Grey demanded that this should be done, and claimed damages for the delay.

On June 29 the Swedish Government replied: 'The repeal of the order which had brought about the

actual detention of certain postal parcels does not imply the resumption of the transmission of postal parcels in general, but only that the parcels so detained will be forwarded to their destination, provided that there is no obstacle in the general prohibitions as to the export and transit of certain commodities. So long as the British Government maintains the measures, of which the Swedish Government is entitled to complain, with regard to postal parcels and postal correspondence, the King's Government do not see their way to renew permission for this transit. . . .'

On this point of difference the documents available close. On Aug. 2 it was still undecided.

On Aug. 19, 1916, a Royal Proclamation was issued forbidding any exports to Sweden, save printed matter, empty receptacles, worn clothing and personal effects, and live animals, other than those ordinarily used for human food.

SWITZERLAND

Pro : The Swiss are Germans, unfortunately for themselves, in a little State [Tannenberg, p. 44]. France is eager to annex the 700,000 French Swiss [*ibid.*, p. 13]. Switzerland is to be annexed to the new Germany [*ibid.*, p. 141].

Con : They are also French and Italian.

Switzerland is neutral and will defend her neutrality as fiercely as Belgium : but, unlike Belgium, she is not anti-German and does not share in the German hatred of England [Wernle, p. 25].

Pro : The Allies have violated Swiss neutrality [*Who are the Huns?* p. 269].

Con : Now and then a French airman has by accident flown over Switzerland. But the constant complaints have been against German airmen in this respect.

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

(CLAUSES PUBLISHED IN THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN
RED BOOK II.)

‘ARTICLE I.—The Contracting Parties promise each other mutually peace and friendship, and will not enter into any alliance or treaty directed against any one of these States.

‘They engage to practice the habit of an exchange of thought on political and economic questions of a general nature, such as may arise, and, in addition, promise each other mutual support in the realm of their own interests.

‘ARTICLE III.—If one or two of the Contracting Parties be attacked without a direct provocation emanating from its own side, and should find itself or themselves at war with two or more Great Powers who are not parties to this Treaty, the *casus foederis* shall simultaneously spring into being for all the Contracting Parties at once.

‘ARTICLE IV.—In the event of a Great Power, which has not subscribed this present Treaty, threatening the safety of the States of one of the Contracting Parties, and the State thus menaced considering itself obliged therefore to declare war on such another Power, the two remaining allies pledge themselves to observe a benevolent neutrality towards their ally. Each of them reserves to itself the right to take part in the war, should it deem fit to make common cause with its ally.

‘ARTICLE VII.—With the intention of conserving, as far as possible, the *status quo* in the East, Austria-Hungary and Italy hereby engage to utilize their influence with the object of preventing any territorial alteration that might be prejudicial to one or the other of the Powers signatories to this present Treaty. For this purpose they will communicate to each other all items of news that might serve to enlighten each other mutually on their own objectives, as well as on those of other Powers. However, in the event of circumstances rendering impossible the conservation of the

status quo in the Balkans, or in the region of the Turkish coasts and islands in the Adriatic and Ægean Seas ; and in the event, whether resultant from the action of a third Power, or for any other cause, of either Austria-Hungary or Italy seeing itself obliged or forced to modify the *status quo* by an occupation temporary or permanent, in all such events such an occupation shall only take place after a preliminary agreement between these two Powers ; and such agreement shall be based on the principle of a mutual compensation for each and every advantage, territorial or otherwise, which either of these Powers might gain over and beyond the present *status quo* ; such previous agreement to give satisfaction to the authenticated interests and claims of both Parties.'

NOTIFICATION OF COUNT GUICCIARDINI TO DUKE AVARNA OF DEC. 15, 1909, AND DELIVERED BY THE LATTER TO COUNT ÄHRENTHAL ON DEC. 19, 1909.

'In the negotiations which you have been conducting recently with Count Ährenthal, in order to define and amplify Article VII. of the Treaty of Triple Alliance, you have already concurred in the view that, after Austria-Hungary had renounced the rights remitted to her by the Treaty of Berlin regarding the Sandjak of Novibazar, the dispositions of Article VII. of the Treaty of Triple Alliance shall have reference to the Sandjak, just as they have to all other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Should Austria-Hungary see herself obliged by the force of circumstances, in consequence of the impracticability of maintaining the *status quo* in the Balkans, to proceed to an occupation, temporary or permanent, of the Sandjak of Novibazar, any such occupation shall only take place after a previous agreement with Italy, based on the principle of a compensation.

'In compliance with the spirit on which the Triple Alliance is based, and to establish precisely and in common accord what shall be the step which the two Cabinets contemplate taking in certain eventualities,

you have further come to an understanding with Count Ahrenthal as follows :

' Each of the two Cabinets pledges itself not to enter into any sort of agreement touching the Balkans with any third Power, without letting the other Cabinet participate in it on a footing of full equality ; likewise both Cabinets pledge themselves to communicate to each other every proposition made to one or the other by any third Power, of such a nature as might infringe the principle of non-intervention, or relate to an alteration of the *status quo* in the regions of the Balkans, or the Turkish coasts and islands in the Adriatic Sea.

' Naturally, Article VII. of the Triple Alliance remains fully in force ; and the preceding decisions only define and amplify it.

' Regarding the duration of the pledges into which both Cabinets have entered in virtue of the preceding statements, it is understood that these pledges are to endure as long as the Triple Alliance itself, and to be construed to be prolonged automatically with every prolongation of the Triple Alliance.

' In conformity with similar settlements of this Treaty, both Cabinets jointly engage to keep secret the obligations into which they enter ; only the Berlin Cabinet is to be informed without delay, as being the ally of the two Governments.

' In order to confirm the agreement at which we have arrived through your intermediation with the Imperial and Royal Cabinet, I beg Your Excellency to communicate this Note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to leave him a copy of it.'

TURKEY

PRELIMINARY.—The British Blue Book on the outbreak of war with Turkey may be thus analyzed [Cd. 7628]. There is no enemy official source available.

On Aug. 3, 1914 [Nos. 1, 4 and 9], we explained that the British Government must take over the Turkish warships which were building in England,

Turkey promised to remain neutral [Nos. 4, 13, 18, 50]; and on Aug. 7 the British Government stated that, on this condition, it would not alter the status of Egypt, and all reports that the annexation of Egypt was in contemplation should be 'emphatically contradicted' [No. 5].

On Aug. 11 the *Breslau* and *Goeben* sailed up the Dardanelles, and we demanded that they be required to leave within twenty-four hours, or be interned [No. 8]. On that same day we were informed they had been purchased by Turkey.

On Aug. 11 [No. 10], the *Breslau* began perquisitioning and detaining British ships in Turkish waters. Tewfik Pasha, on Aug. 13 maintained that Turkey would be neutral [No. 13] and would hand over the *Goeben* and *Breslau* to the British commander, Admiral Limpus.

On Aug. 16 the *Breslau* and *Goeben* were lying outside Constantinople [No. 18], and the Grand Vizier admitted German pressure.

Meantime warlike preparations were going on in Turkey. From Aug. 16 mines were laid in the Dardanelles and elsewhere [Nos. 19, 25, 37, 135]; British ships were detained and searched [Nos. 23, 26, 62, etc.]; Egyptian camels were seized at Gaza [No. 35, Aug. 25] and other steps taken [Nos. 39, 92, Sept. 25; Nos. 44, 74, 100, 115, 139, 175, etc.]; German officers and marines were imported through Roumania [Nos. 31, Aug. 23; 40, 47, 131, 132, 133, Oct. 16; 156, 161, 162, Oct. 23].

On Aug. 16 France, Russia, and Great Britain collectively guaranteed the independence and integrity of Turkey, should she remain scrupulously neutral [No. 16].

On Aug. 20 [No. 24] Turkey proposed the abolition of the Capitulations; the restitution of the Turkish warships in England; the renunciation of the right of any foreign power to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey; the restoration of Western Thrace and the Greek Isles; and promised to open the Dardanelles, if the German ships did not leave,

In reply to this proffered bargain, the Allies consented to the abolition of the Capitulations, provided all German naval officers were dismissed and merchant vessels allowed to pass the Dardanelles; they repeated their guarantee of integrity and independence [No. 28, Aug. 22].

The Turkish ships requisitioned in England should be restored at the end of the war [No. 33, Aug. 25].

Although on Aug. 22 the Turkish crews had arrived to take over the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, the German crews were not displaced [Nos. 30 and 42]; and on Aug. 27 there were 162 German officers in Constantinople [No. 41]. On Sept. 1 [No. 49] it was promised that the German sailors should be sent away in a fortnight. By Sept. 20 between 4,000 and 5,000 had arrived [No. 84]. On Sept. 2 [No. 53], we notified Turkey that if the *Goeben* and *Breslau* sailed out they would be regarded as German ships [Nos. 57, 58].

Aug. 27 seems to have been the turning-point.

On Sept. 5 Turkish intrigues were reported in Persia, Afghanistan, and India [No. 69]; the German Embassy on Sept. 14 was spreading reports of a revolution in India, and stories that the Indian Government had had to appeal to Japan for assistance [No. 75]; measures for the protection of the Egyptian frontier were necessary by Sept. 21 [No. 85]; on Sept. 24 [No. 89] and on Oct. 29 [No. 173] the Egyptian frontier had been violated; and on that day the Grand Vizier knew nothing of such incidents, but admitted German pressure [No. 91]; on Sept. 25 the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were still manned by Germans [No. 94]; on Oct. 14 statements were being circulated that the German Emperor had embraced Islâm, and agents were being sent to stir up trouble in Arabia and Egypt; and large sums spent by the German Embassy to corrupt the Turkish Press [Nos. 124, 127, 128; cf. Nos. 129, 130, and 136].

On Oct. 4 the Capitulations were formally abolished and the foreign post-offices closed [Nos. 140 and 141];

the Allies refused their consent : ' The régime of the Capitulations being founded on synallagmatic instruments, the Porte cannot abrogate them by a unilateral Act.' Besides which, Turkey had not been neutral in the interval between Aug. 20 and Oct. 4 [No. 142].

On Oct. 22 it was known that the first half of the £4,000,000 to be provided by Germany had been sent ; the Turkish Press was virulently anti-British [No. 157].

On Oct. 7 we pointed out that our ships were not in Turkish waters [No. 111] ; they were watching outside Mohammerah [cf. No. 137]. We had not infringed Turkish neutrality.

On Oct. 29 [No. 177] the Turks bombarded Odessa and Theodosia ; and, on the 30th, the Ambassadors of the Allies demanded their passports.

On Nov. 4 [No. 44] we explained for the last time that, unless the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were interned, and all Germans dismissed, hostilities must ensue.

For a confirmation of this summary *v.* Belgian Grey Book II., No. 43 [Sept. 7, 1914], a despatch from the Belgian Minister at Constantinople. He says that England, France, and Russia must soon protest ; that Turkey is contemplating war with Greece to recover the islands, a scheme frustrated by our intimation that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* would be treated as German vessels.

It was hoped that such a war would break up the Triple Entente.

For German intrigue in Egypt, contemplated in 1913, *v.* ANTICIPATIONS, p. 2 . [French Yellow Book, No. 2, Encl. II.]

The story as told by the British White Book can be usefully supplemented with detail from the second Russian Orange Book. The story may be thus subdivided :

I.—From the very beginning Turkey, then governed by the Grand Vizier, wanted to keep strictly neutral : kept the Dardanelles open for merchant-traffic, whilst placing mines to guard against infraction [No. 8, Aug. 5] ; feared that Germany might force her hand [No. 59,

Sept. 22] and precipitate a conflict with Russia. From the very beginning [Aug. 1, Aug. 27, Sept. 2, Oct. 6, etc.] the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador was egging Turkey on to break the peace, urging that the moment had arrived. The Grand Vizier all through aimed at neutrality; the Sultan, when interviewed almost at the last by Sir Lucas Mallet on Oct. 5, still talked of sending the Germans away, of refraining from sending the Turkish fleet into the Black Sea, etc.

On Oct. 20 [No. 89] Russia knew that the die was cast, that an attack was imminent: since [No. 88] Enver Pasha (Oct. 18) required the Grand Vizier either to resign or to attack Russia, and the only objection offered by the Grand Vizier to Austria was lack of funds (Oct. 15) [No. 86]. The Turkish Minister of War at first had been willing to dismiss the Germans; but Liman von Sanders Pasha declined to go, alleging orders from Berlin [No. 6, Aug. 3]. The course of development is traced in the following sections [for this one read Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 25, 59, 68, 75, 79, 83, 86, 88, 89].

II.—From the very beginning there were hostile preparations. On Aug. 2 [No. 3] Turkey started mobilizing—200,000 men to guard Thrace against a Bulgarian assault, not concentrating any men on the Caucasus against Russia. On Aug. 14 [No. 24] she summarily ordered all merchant vessels in the Dardanelles to dismantle their wireless. On Sept. 10 the Dardanelles were being fortified under the supervision of the German Pasha, Weber, and a newly-arrived staff-officer and thirty German artillerists had been landed in the Dardanelles; whilst other soldiers had been sent disguised in Turkish uniforms into the fortresses commanding the Bosphorus. Munitions of war were sent by Germany, also artillery—seventy-five wagon-loads [No. 45]

On Oct. 3 the warlike preparations were yet more advanced. There was friction between Enver Pasha, who had almost convinced Talaat Bey and the other ministers. The country generally had been laid bare

to provide for war: probably Germany could force Turkey into a provocative act [No. 76].

On Oct. 5 there was a general mobilization and a state of siege proclaimed throughout the Turkish Empire: disorderly requisition proceedings against which foreigners had no redress, after the unilateral abrogation of the Capitulations (*v. postea*) [No. 80]: and on Oct. 9 the German *Etappenkommandos* were openly requisitioning foreign merchandize for the German Government, with a German marine officer at the head [No. 82].

On Oct. 16 Germany had ordered and received for the *Goeben* ten Russian and ten Roumanian flags [No. 85]. [Read Nos. 3, 24, 45, 76, 80, 82, 85.]

III.—At the beginning, the detention of the two Dreadnoughts building in England for Turkey caused great dissatisfaction [No. 10; Aug. 7], notwithstanding our promise to restore them at the end of the war [*e.g.*, on Oct. 5, No. 79; but the British White Book on Turkey states similar promises on Aug. 9, Aug. 25, etc.].

IV.—By Aug. 27, 80 German sailors and 20 technicians had arrived, despite the Grand Vizier's objection and ignorance, from Germany, disguised as workmen [No. 36]; as well as an admiral, and 27 German officers to take command in the forts on the Dardanelles [No. 37]; on Aug. 27 and 28, 950 soldiers, with their officers [No. 39]: whilst Enver Pasha sent bellicose messages to the army, and the Wolff Press Agency was active [No. 39].

Yet on Sept. 17 Djavid Bey was willing to demobilize, if the capitulations were to be abolished. On the 19th the Powers of the Entente assented in principle [Nos. 55 and 56]. [Read Nos. 6, 36, 37, 39, 45, 55, 56.]

V.—The Ministry, as has been seen, was divided: Djemal Pasha, Djavid Bey, and the Vizier were opposed to the war [No. 29, Aug. 20]; Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey were in favour of it.

It was evident there was some arrangement. This is stated to be an understanding on which Enver Pasha

insisted, binding Turkey down, but not fixing any date on which she must declare war [No. 46, Sept. 10]. On Sept. 10 Enver Pasha received a letter from the German Ambassador that the time was due for action [No. 47].

On Oct. 16, at a reception held at the German Embassy at Constantinople, Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey signed a convention for immediate action, as soon as the instalments of money had been paid [No. 87]. The first half had been paid; the second followed on the 18th [No. 88]. [Nos. 28, 46, 47, 87, 88.]

VI.—The treaty, or intrigue, had now been supported with money, and confirmed by signatures. Turkey had raised her army: Germany still had to contribute.

On Aug. 8 the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were announced as nearing the Dardanelles [No. 11]. The Ambassadors of the Entente raised protests, and on the same day the Grand Vizier declared that he would not let them pass the Dardanelles [No. 12]; they should be fired on, should they persist [No. 14, Aug. 9].

On the 11th they entered, unchallenged [No. 17]; on the 12th were anchored off Nagara [No. 20], where they raided ships belonging to the Allies and some neutrals as well [No. 23, Aug. 14], whilst still flying the German banner. They were rapturously welcomed at Nagara [No. 20].

Yet on Aug. 11 [Nos. 17 and 18] Russia was informed that they had been purchased by Turkey; against which she protested, on that day, as a breach of neutrality.

On Aug. 19 the Greek minister at Berlin protested to Herr von Jagow (the German Foreign Minister) against the purchase, and Herr von Jagow denied it [No. 27].

On Aug. 17 the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, M. Giers, was informed that the two ships had put in at Ismid, near Constantinople, because they were damaged, the *Goeben* being twice pierced in the starboard, and the *Breslau* once in the prow [No. 26]. The Grand Vizier, in reply to the remonstrances, stated on Aug. 13 that the two ships had just been

purchased on Germany's initiative, as a compensation for the two Dreadnoughts detained by Great Britain [No. 22].

All the Allies' Ambassadors insisted that the crews should be replaced [No. 22]; and on the 17th 38 wounded sailors were landed at Ismid, as well as 200 others [No. 26]. The Turkish crew was on the *Reshadieh*, which was in British waters [No. 26]. The 200 men were replaced by Turks (Aug. 19) [No. 28].

On Sept. 1 the Turkish Minister of Marine gave his word of honour that not one German sailor should remain in the Navy, and only asked for a fortnight's patience. Djemal Pasha was equally pacific [No. 40].

On Sept. 10 Russia solemnly warned the Grand Vizier that the appearance of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in the Black Sea would produce complications [No. 49]. The Grand Vizier knew nothing of any such intention; only the German officers on board were trying to intrigue Turkey into war [No. 50, Sept. 13].

Yet, on Sept. 21 and 22, both ships did sail into the Black Sea [Nos. 57 and 58]; and the Grand Vizier excused himself on the ground that two ships did not constitute a fleet. Evidently repairs had been effected [Nos. 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 40, 49, 50, 57, 58].

VII.—Those Turkish Ministers who did not desire war still sought some profit out of the troubled situation.

Turkey was under the Capitulations: economically and financially, she was administered by the Great Powers; and all foreigners were under the special jurisdiction of their own consuls. The post-offices, too, belonged to the European Powers, and were not under Turkish administration.

On Aug. 19 the Turkish Government began pressing for the abolition of the Capitulations. The Allies should offer some counter-inducement to the alluring promises of the Germans [No. 30].

On the 20th Djavid Bey asked for the abolition of the Capitulations and economic independence, to which the Allies agreed, and, further, guaranteed the integrity

and independence of Turkey, merely asking to have a satisfactory scheme put forward for a judicial system to replace the Capitulations, provided also that all the German officers and crew of the *Breslau* and *Goeben* were returned to Germany [Aug. 21-24, Nos. 32, 33, 34, 35].

On Sept. 8 it was known that Turkey was going to abolish the Capitulations for herself [No. 41]; to which [No. 42] Austria and Germany objected, and stated they would join in the protest with the Allies. It seemed rather late for such an action: they might have curbed Turkey sooner.

On Sept. 10 Turkey announced her scheme, with a full memorandum [No. 43].

The Russian Ambassador, M. Giers, objected that he could not accept such a unilateral act, to abolish arrangements made internationally; and the course of events was too precipitate [No. 44, Sept. 10].

A common formula of protest was drafted for the Allies [Sept. 10, No. 48], whereupon [Sept. 13, No. 51] Germany and Austria withdrew their adhesion to the common protest.

On Sept. 15 Talaat Bey and Hâilil Bey represented they had proceeded too fast, and pleaded merely for economic independence [No. 54]; which [No. 61, Sept. 24] was conceded by the Allies.

From this point forward the claims of Turkey were pitched higher and higher: the abolition of the extra-territorial post-offices [No. 64, Sept. 26] was carried out by Sept. 30 [No. 72], despite the protest of the Allies against a 'unilateral' breach of a synallagmatic obligation [No. 65, Sept. 25]. On Oct. 1 the Allies agreed to grant economic independence [No. 74].

Still Turkey was not satisfied. On Oct. 3 and 11 she demanded the abolition of the special privileges of the Lebanon, and the submission of all foreign schools to Turkish authority [Nos. 77 and 84], despite the protests of the Powers [Nos. 78 and 81].

The subject drops: the Allies had not been successfully provoked into war [Nos. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 51, 54, 61, 63, 64, 65, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 81, 84].

VIII.—It is worth noting how the Central Empires worked the Turkish Press. Germany contributed to five Turkish papers the sum of £19,000, and Austria to those same papers £14,000 [No. 53, Sept. 14].

IX.—On Sept 27 a Turkish torpedo-boat passed into the Ægean and was turned back by a British ship [No. 97, Brit.-Turk. Corr.; No. 67, Russian Orange Book II.]. This was taken as a declaration of war, and the Dardanelles were closed.

On a joint protest of the Allies [Sept. 27, No. 68], the Grand Vizier stated that the commander of the Turkish fleet merely had discretionary authority to close the Dardanelles, but that his action did not bind the Government.

On the 28th [No. 69] the Grand Vizier promised to reopen the Dardanelles, if the British fleet would remove farther, to Lemnos at least. The British authorities refused [Nos. 70 and 71]. [Nos. 67, 68, 69, 70, 71.]

X.—Not one of these provocations had induced the Allies to send an ultimatum, and so take the initiative of war, seemingly, on to themselves. The Turks, whilst willing to get themselves *de facto* new privileges, would not declare war and comply with the urgent requests of their protectors.

On Oct. 29 [No. 90] the Turkish fleet (which was officered and partly manned by Germans) bombarded Odessa and Theodosia.

The Powers of the Entente proposed sending an ultimatum [Nos. 91 and 93, Oct. 29 and 30]: the Grand Vizier was ill when the Russian Ambassador called, so the latter left his statement in writing.

Yet, on that same day (Oct. 30) the Grand Vizier saw the Russian Ambassador and apologized for the fleet, and once more promised to dismiss all the Germans, and prohibit the fleet from sailing into the Black Sea; and repeated this on Nov. 1 [Nos. 94 and 97].

But the conditions of the ultimatum were not fulfilled; rupture, or the dismissal of the German contingents—and war followed: thus brought about by German crews and German officers, despite the

reluctance of the Turks, and the firm resolve of the Allies not to be exacerbated by any of the previous irritants [Nos. 90, 91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98].

THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME OF THE PAMPHLETEERS' OPINIONS.

Pro : (1) At the Congress of Berlin, 1880, Germany was not concerned with the Eastern problems (Bismarck said it was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier) [Spahn, p. 34].

(2) Turkey took up arms in self-defence [Eduard Meyer, p. 203; Horten, p. 28].

(3) Germany has reintegrated Turkey, reformed her fleet and army.

'Every faithful Mussulman prays now for Germany's victory: for Germany is for us [Véla is a Magyar] the land of uprightness and honour; and the German Emperor is the natural protector of Islâm.'

The object of Germany, Austria, and Turkey is to injure England. But a *bonne presse* is essential in Turkey. Germany has a natural trend Eastwards [Véla, pp. 1, 16, 21, 45, and 47].

'The *Jibâd* (Sacred War) from an act of barbarism has become a deed of civilization (*Kulturtat*) of the first rank, a fight for freedom' [Horten, p. 28].

Germany in forwarding Pan-Islamism did a great '*Kulturtat*' and 'opened a new sheet of glory in her history' [*ibid.*, p. 31].

England and France have barbarously oppressed the Moslem world, which is longing to break its fetters [*ibid.*, p. 31].

Con : (1) *v.* KAISER. The Kaiser's policy was opposed to Bismarck's [Véla, p. 4].

(2) She promised neutrality; was solemnly guaranteed independence and neutrality by England, France, and Russia, and, after two months' preparation, attacked Russia and Egypt simultaneously [Turkish White Book, Nos. 17 and 18, etc., *v. antea.*]

(3) There is never a hint in these books as to Turkish massacres in Armenia and elsewhere.

The German interest in Turkey is purely political and strategic; not economic, nor commercial; the object is to get a road clear to the Indian Ocean [Wiedefeld, p. 5].

France is the greatest creditor of Turkey to the extent of 44 per cent.; Belgium holding 17.9 per cent., and Germany 12.1 per cent.; England 8.5 per cent. [*ibid.*, p. 18].

The Capitulations were abolished so as to be able to tax the foreigner [*ibid.*, p. 60].

Germans are thoroughly unpopular in Turkey, who does not want to be interfered with [*ibid.*, p. 77]; and a preferential tariff would not be any advantage to Turkey [*ibid.*, p. 78].

England stands highest in Turkish trade [*ibid.*, pp. 51 and 52].

Germany's object is to get cotton by some land-route [*ibid.*, p. 78]; she should try to secure some sub-tropical country [*ibid.*, p. 57].

Pro: Germany's alliance with Turkey is a 'moral victory of truth' [Chotzky, p. 17].

(4) England's first step was to annex Egypt, after which Turkey declared war [Révai, p. 40].

(5) Germany will not take anything of Turkey, but will hold all the Turkish dominions as a protectorate [Tannenberg, p. 285].

(6) Germany will take Asia Minor as her sphere for Protestant missionary effort [Hauck, p. 23].

(7) In 1895 a partition of Turkey was being considered by Germany and other powers [Schiemann, p. 8]. The same scheme was intended in 1908 [Heutsz, p. 76].

(8) The Bagdad railway is a frequent subject for expatiation.

The Bagdad railway has strategic objects, aiming at the Persian Gulf [Véla, p. 29]; and provoked Anglo-German antagonism from 1907-1908 [Heutsz, p. 22; Baumann, p. 23].

It is the continuation of the Austro-Turkish line and designed to protect Europe against the Slavs [Brüggemann, p. 33].

Con: German liners since 1884 have run regularly to Constantinople, and German trade was on the increase [*ibid.*, p. 8]. There can never be any real German colonies in Turkey [p. 6]; and, even after a successful war, Germany will have to proceed very gingerly [p. 80].

Is the kinship the association of Armenia and Belgium?

(4) *v.* Turkish White Book [No. 5]. We would leave the status of Egypt untouched if Turkey remained neutral.

(5) This programme she is trying to fulfil.

(8) The original concession was in 1888: the objects of the line are mainly strategic. England acquiesced in the Bagdad-Basra prolongation, without offering any opposition.

The Syrian railway is French [Wiedenfeld, pp. 22 and 46].

The German concession dates from 1899 [*Historians' History*, XV., p. 564].

ARMENIAN MASSACRES

Pro: If Turkey deem it necessary to use all imaginable means to suppress the risings and intrigues of the Armenians, so as to render them utterly impossible in the future, such actions do not constitute massacres or atrocities, but merely justifiable and necessary steps, all the more so as the Turkish Empire is fighting for its life and has enemies enough already.

To demand that she should foster an enemy at home, because the English and Americans so desire, is outrageous [Reventlow, *Tageszeitung*, *apud* Rouquette, p. 44; Bryce, *Armenian Atrocities*, pp. 6 to 9].

Con : The Armenians did not inhabit any war-zone. In Trebizond alone 8,000 to 10,000 were massacred. The survivors were enslaved [Bryce, *Armenian Atrocities*, *passim*.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

For the diplomatic relations *v.* SUBMARINES, LUSITANIA, and RIGHT OF SEARCH.

A few general remarks are collected under this heading.

Pro : (1) 'In 1885 Bismarck was an old man, and German policy was senile. Cuba and the Philippines (Germany bought the Carolines off Spain in 1885) were well worth a little trouble; and the Americans crumpled up the Spaniards very easily. From the German point of view Cuba was well worth a little war: its position . . . would have given us predominance in the Gulf of Mexico' [Tannenberg, p. 276].

Pro : (2) The American Press may be divided into the Conservative, Sensational, and the Yellow.

The German Press in America is superior to the native: but, to correct English tendencies, Germany ought to supply sensational details to tickle the American palate, systematically aiming at doing justice to Germany. It will not be difficult to find the man [Jung, p. 80].

Pro : (3) From 1832-1910 six million Germans have emigrated to America, and been absorbed. Ten million Germans are domiciled in America [Tannenberg, pp. 13 and 253].

Con : (3) *v.* p. 89 for figures showing diminution of emigration from Germany.

Pro : (4) America has been unneutral, *e.g.* :

(a) She has allowed the English to recruit in America [Eduard Meyer, p. 164].

Con : (a) This is untrue : we have had to refuse American volunteers in the Canadian and English forces.

Pro : (b) Her Press has been bribed by England [Eduard Meyer, p. 131].

Con : (b) What about the pro-German Press ?

The German Embassy at Washington supplies articles to the Press [Papen Papers, Cd. 8174, No. 8].

Pro : (c) America is 'contemptibly neutral' (*niederträchtig neutral*) ; she is the creation of Germany [Chotzky, p. 66].

Pro : (d) America supplies only the Allies with arms, not Germany [Schröer, p. 66]. ' . . . a country violates its neutrality when it permits a condition to arise, and in fact favours and supports it, in which as a matter of fact only one of the belligerents is able to receive war supplies from the neutral country in question, while it remains impossible, for practical reasons, for the other belligerent to take advantage of that "equality" according to which the United States is continually justifying itself on paper ' [*Who are the Huns ?* p. 301].

The author of *Who are the Huns ?* supposes we have a secret treaty with the U.S.A.

Con : (d) The condition is that we command the sea, and we import arms ; and it is open to the German fleet to secure the same rights for Germany.

Any prohibition by the U.S.A. would be tantamount to taking arms against us.

Pro : (e) True neutrality is shown by the German and Irish in the United States [Brandt, p. 159].

Con : (e) The German and Austrian Embassies have used their offices for the purpose of conspiracies for incendiarism at munition factories in the German interest. Dumba had to be requested to leave Washington ; and so, too, Boy-Ed, the German agent. Von Papen was accredited both to Mexico and the U.S.A. [Papen Papers, No. 4] and 'showed especial industry in

organizing the German colony for purposes of self-defence: and out of this shy and factious material, unwilling to undertake any military activity, he obtained what there was to be got.' He was plotting against the U.S.A., and was accredited military attaché to the German Embassy at Washington.

Con : (*f*) *v.* PACIFICISM, for the true relations of England and America: citations from Lintum.

Pro : (*g*) The British control of neutral trading is irritating and unfair [*passim*].

Con : (*g*) The following is a letter on the subject by an American [*Times*, June 10, 1916]:

TO THE EDITOR OF THE *TIMES*.

Sir,—I see in the *Times* of June 9 a letter, signed 'An American Citizen,' criticizing the British Government for their 'ruthless opening and delaying of mail correspondence to and from the United States,' which he calls 'a flagrant infraction of the Declaration of London.'

This 'American Citizen' exhibits astonishing ignorance of the situation, and claims to voice the sentiments of Americans in England. I beg to inform you that he by no means voices the sentiments of a great many Americans in England, including every one of my friends and myself.

Last February I wrote a letter to an American business man in Boston on this subject, from which I quote as follows:

'I judge from your remarks that you hardly understand the necessity for censorship of letters sent from England to neutral countries, which censorship I thoroughly approve from A to Z.

'The British nation is engaged in a great war. Enemy agents were spread throughout the world, and enemy spies infested friendly nations in the guise of merchants, business men, &c. It is only since this great war began that the rest of the world has begun to realize the extent of these machinations, and only within the last few months have the British really waked up to the fact that they had better open letters going to and from all neutral countries, including my own, America. Neutrals have been found in Great Britain in the possession of spurious passports. Some such false passports have been detected, but probably others have not. It is obvious that the enemies of the British would be only too glad of any opportunity to send military information out of the country by way of the post through neutral countries.

'In brief, if the authorities of Great Britain did not examine every letter going in and out of the country and delay any letters which might be suspicious, they would be neglecting a precaution which is so evidently necessary that they would deserve to be placed in a lunatic asylum.'

The last sentence in 'An American Citizen's' letter says, 'I desire to say as little as possible, hoping that your Government will realize—and speedily—the importance of the subject.' This presumptuous neutral does not seem

to appreciate his position. He should realize that every citizen of a neutral country who remains in Great Britain during this war is really a guest of the British nation. Every such neutral citizen should remember this fact, and neither by word nor deed embarrass his hosts. As to the 'Declaration of London,' it has long been a corpse. If any American citizen does not like it over here let him pack up his trunks and go back home: and I hope that this one will go as far into the interior of the backwoods as possible. The Americans whom I know in England (and there are many of them) are glad to put up with any business inconvenience which may be considered necessary by the British.

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD ABBOT TITCOMB.

Pro : (5) By §8, *Fundamental Laws of the United States*, anyone commencing, organizing, preparing, or favouring any measures calculated to assist a military expedition or enterprise directed against a foreign state or colony with which the U.S.A. are at peace, is guilty of an offence.

Therefore the financiers, organizing the loan to the Allies to pay for munitions, were guilty of an act of surreptitious war [A letter to the *San Francisco Examiner*, Rouquette, pp. 64 and 82].

Con : (5) The same paper advertised German and Austrian loans. Furthermore, the Austrian and German Embassies connived at German intrigues in the United States to invade Canada [Von der Goltz, Papen and Archibald Papers].

Con : (6) Germany entertains hostile designs against America: the Panama Canal has provided a weak spot which Germany can strike at easily [Valois, *apud* Rouquette, p. 13]. In this war Europe is really fighting to safeguard America from aggression [Rouquette, pp. 13 . . .]

Con : (7) In Mexico Germany publicly supported Huerta, provided money, arms, and munitions, so as to counter President Wilson's policy [*ibid.*, p. 14].

Con : (8) The announcement of the Allies' loan from America of 1,000 million dollars very much perturbed the pro-German Press.

The *San Francisco Examiner* (Sept. 14, 1915) said:

'The torpedoing of the *Arabic* may bring about the temporary suspension of the negotiations for the Allies'

loan. It is now thought that no definitive propositions should be accepted until all the details bearing on the torpedoing of the White Star liner have been received by the Ministry. . . .

' If relations between the United States and Germany become more strained, the Exchequer may think it necessary to issue bonds for National Defence. We must then safeguard the financial resources of the country. . . . ' [Rouquette, p. 58].

The loan was violently opposed in German centres, boycotted, etc. [*ibid.*, pp. 61 . . .].

Con : (9) The *San Francisco Examiner* (Sept. 9, 1915) suggested that the loan ought to be secured by a mortgage on Jamaica, the Bermudas, and Martinique; possibly, too, Canada.

Con : (10) It is unneutral of America to supply arms. Many firms refused (names given) [Rouquette on the German-American Press, pp. 69 . . .].

The principal agencies for German propaganda in America are :

(1) An Overseas Service (*Überseedienst*) from Berlin, supplying all sorts of news, *couleur de noir-blanc-rose*.

(2) A New York office, giving authentic information.

(3) The German Embassy at Washington.

(4) Special papers which have appeared since the war, such as the *Vital Issue*, the *Fatherland*.

(5) The numerous newspapers in German.

(6) Columns in ordinary newspapers hired for the purpose.

(7) Special lecturers and agents sent over from Germany. This organization falls into three sets: diplomatic or secret; propaganda; and political work; each of these presided over by Bernstorff (the Ambassador), Dernburg (with various professors to aid him), and Bartholdt (a member of Congress) respectively [Rouquette, pp. 27 and 28].

Yet all of these contrivances fail to convince the general American public [*ibid.*, p. 29], which sees the broad facts of the German perfidy with regard to Belgium, and the brutality on land and sea.

GERMAN ATROCITIES IN AMERICA

Incendiarism on board ships transporting horses to France ; on board grain-ships ; factories blown up ; the French Pavilion at the San Francisco Exhibition all but dynamited ; £80,000 received by the German consul at San Francisco (Von Bopp) for incendiary purposes at Seattle, Tacoma, and elsewhere ; boxes of dynamite despatched as dried-fruits to the Russian Red Cross : such are a few of the facts collected by Rouquette [pp. 146 . . .].

For official confirmation, *v. Papen Papers* [*passim*].

Between October and December, 1915, Fay, Scholtz, Breitung, Bronkhurst, Crowley, Brincken, Kinzele, Cornell, some officials of the Hamburg-American Line, and others, were arrested for plotting in America against the neutrality of America, and being involved in incendiary attempts. These conspiracies were directed by the Austrian and German Embassies [*Times* files].

(German incendiarism has also been traced at the burning of the Russian Ministry of Marine, and the Canadian Houses of Parliament.)

Moreover, the forgery of United States passports was proved from the correspondence of Baron Zwiedinck (of the Austrian Embassy), and Dr. von Nuber (the Austrian Consul at New York) [*Times*, Dec. 11, 1915].

In June Dr. Meyer-Gerhard was announced to be visiting the States as a Red Cross lecturer. His name was assumed by Dr. Alfred Meyer, in the Department for Army Supplies, who came to the States disguised and with false passports [*Times*, June 16, 1915].

VENEZUELA

The boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela was in dispute, and the matter was being peacefully negotiated. President Cleveland had an American Commission appointed in December, 1895, to determine

the difficulty. On Feb. 2, 1897, a treaty was signed between the U.S.A. and Great Britain to have the matter arbitrated. In 1899 the Commission met and decided the issue [*Historians' History*, XXIII., p. 485].

In October, 1901, President Castro of Venezuela involved his country in hostilities with the British colony; and also a mob in Puerto Cabello maltreated the crew of a German man-of-war. Castro's attitude was unyielding. In the course of 1901 Germany, to facilitate forcible collection of her claim in Venezuela, and to prevent American interference, officially recognised the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1902 Castro put down the rebellion. Meanwhile foreign claims for damages during the civil wars of the last five years had become insistent. France's claims were settled by a mixed commission. Germany and Great Britain united to enforce their claims by a 'pacific blockade' beginning on December 10. Italy joined the blockade on the 11th. By February the matter was settled: mixed commissions arbitrated under the presidency of the Tsar [*ibid.*, p. 601].

These incidents are occasionally discussed in German pamphlets. The German fleet alone of the blockading forces went so far as to shell Venezuelan towns [p. 601, *supra*].

(1) Since the Venezuelan crisis, Anglo-American friendship has been firmly established. England safeguards the Monroe Doctrine [Heutsz, pp. 14-15].

(2) At the time of the second Venezuelan crisis there was a German squadron waiting at Manila to cut off the American fleet under Dewey: in consequence the German Ambassador at Washington was recalled [Kiersch, p. 13].

(3) Cleveland, in 1895, insisted that it was only in the competence of the American Government to deal with any continental question in South America; this was an extension of the Monroe Doctrine [Lintum, p. 40].

WAR

(v. *also* STATE)

I. SOME MAXIMS

(1) 'We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilization to perform than the Great Asiatic Power. We, like the Japanese, can only fulfil it by the sword' [Bernhardi, p. 258].

'Neither France nor Russia nor England need to attack us in order to further their interests. . . . If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate an active policy, which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her interests or those of England that both these States would feel themselves compelled to attack us' [*ibid.*, p. 280].

(2) 'War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying-out of the same by other means.' 'All foreign policy is war' [Clausewitz].

'War is Politics *κατ' ἐξοχήν*' [Treitschke, p. 60].

'Two motives lead men to war: instinctive hostility and hostile intention. In our definition of war, we have chosen as its characteristic the latter of these elements, because it is the most general. It is impossible to concede the passion of hatred of the wildest description, bordering on mere instinct, without combining with it the idea of hostile intention' [Clausewitz]; (v. HATRED).

(3) 'The statesman who, seeing his instrument to be ready, and seeing war inevitable, hesitates to strike first, is guilty of a crime against his country' [von der Goltz].

(4) 'War arises through the conflict of two wills: those who will are not individuals, but the Governors, *i.e.*, those who are called upon to exercise the highest function in a State.

'State and Law are coincident notions.

'Between States there is only one form of law, the law of the stronger. Since every State merely seeks its own gain against its neighbour, war between States is the natural condition' [Lasson].

‘ Law consists in the delimitation of spheres of will, as determined by law : coercion is the distinguishing mark of law ’ [Lasson]

‘ Between States there can be no question of overwhelming force, therefore none of Law or Right ’ [*ibid.*].

‘ As long as States exist, there will be conflicts of States; and it is consonant with reason that States should go to war ’ [*ibid.*].

‘ The greatest obloquy to which a State can lay itself open is lack of circumspection and prudence [*ibid.*].

‘ Law amongst States is not a power over them, for States represent both the most mighty and the best substance that exists on earth.

‘ The military rank is one of absolute obedience.

‘ It is an ordinance of moral law that war should be avoided up to the moment of extreme necessity. But there may not be any detraction from the absolute sovereignty of the State ’ [*ibid.*].

(5) ‘ Nobody, I think, can deny that, on the general softening of human manners, there has ensued a humaner way of waging war. The introduction in our generation of universal service for the army has marked a long step in the direction of the desired aim, for it has also brought the educated classes into the army ’ [Moltke, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin), p. 195 (1892); Speech, Dec. 11, 1880].

‘ The war of 1866 was entered on, not because Prussia’s existence was menaced, but for an ideal end, the establishment of Power ’ [Moltke, *History of the Franco-German War* : Appendix].

(6) ‘ In the division of the non-European world amongst the European Powers, Germany, up to now, has had short commons ; and our very existence as a Great Power is involved in the question : are we to become a Power beyond the seas ? Otherwise the horrid prospect faces us that England and Russia will partition the world : and it is really hard to say which is the more immoral and disgusting alternative—the money-bags or the knout ’ [Treitschke, *Politik*, p. 42].

(7) ‘ Even victorious wars are only justifiable when they are imposed by others. One cannot read the cards

of Providence, so as to anticipate by one's own calculations any historical development' [Bismarck, *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* (1878), II., p. 93].

'War sets aside the assumptions of international settlement' [J. von Hartmann].

'Historical right reposes on power' [Wuttke].

'The rejection of every custom of war is not so much a sign of confidence in their own strength as *faith in their own attitude towards treachery* and a firm intention to take advantage of it. Regulated war represented progress compared with the shock of barbaric hordes, as the duel represented progress as compared with the ambush and affray. The German doctrines in war are, therefore, a true reversion to barbarism, whose gravity appears more manifest when we consider that the theories do not in some miraculous way beget the practices, but are only formulæ which at most serve to strengthen and perpetuate them, rendering them more vivid and definite to the consciousness' [Lugaro, pp. 70-71].

II. OPINIONS EXPRESSED BY THE PAMPHLETEERS

Pro : (1) 'The transition from peace to war is so slow and gradual that an exact line of demarcation can hardly be indicated' [Heutz, p. 1].

'Nothing is more foreign to German thought : there is nothing beyond which it feels itself more advanced, than when people talk of war as a senseless carnage. It is neither senseless nor a carnage. Not senseless, for war aims at the highest ideal of mankind, at communal interests. Therefore the Germans are a nation always prepared for war' [Fritz].

'War is terror with design.'

'And if the world were wholly Briton,
And tried to swallow us,
The biters still would be the bitten,
We the victorious.'

[Chotzky, pp. 1 and 2.]

Pro : (2) 'Any insult to a German student at Prague, any riot at Laibach is a slur cast upon the

honour of Germany, and justifies the occupation of the offending territory' [Tannenberg, p. 103].

'Greater Germany cannot be won but by a fight with Europe. Russia, France, and England will oppose the foundation of it. Austria, in her impotence, will not weigh much in the scales' [*ibid.*, p. 104].

'War diminishes all "cultural values"' [Verworn, p. 25].

Pro : (3) Every German war must be a holy war. No German serves because he must, but because he is free and convinced of justice [Chamberlain, p. 34].

Pro : (4) It is England who in the last forty years has waged most wars [Molenbroek, p. 17].

Con : (4) This is a half-truth. Our wars have been frontier fights in the colonies and dependencies. The Germans in their colonies, *e.g.*, S.W. Africa, have had long wars with the Hereros, etc.

Con : (5) Wars are the work of the governing classes. There is no popular consent to aggression. The peoples would never have declared war : and wars seldom concern the peoples [Potthoff, pp. 14-15].

Pro : (6) Germany has been turned into a united country of helpful brethren, purified from vice and luxury. The winners will be the sane and humane combatants [J. Müller, pp. 3 and 17].

Pro : (7) War is an evil : modern war involves greater destruction than former belligerency. Arbitration can never come into being without force at its back.

All the belligerents are waging necessary wars [Külpe, pp. 7-15].

Con : (7) For reply *v.* PACIFICISM.

Pro : (8) In 1807 it was internationally agreed that no hostilities should begin without a preliminary declaration. Between 1700-1871, 107 wars began without a declaration : and only ten with [Kraaijenhoff pp. 1 . . .].

Con : (8) Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria have conformed in this instance with the majority. German troops invaded France at 19 points before

declaration : [*v.* p. 70; No. 139, French Yellow Book]. Austria sent cannon into Belgium before the declaration of war between Austria and Belgium [Belgium Grey Book II., No. 104].

Bulgaria invaded Serbia without notice.

On the other hand, Great Britain declared war on Germany [British White Book, No. 159]; on Austria on Aug. 12, 1914 [Cd. 7445]; and on Turkey [Turkish White Book, No. 184]; also Bulgaria on Serbia on Oct. 14, 1915. Italy declared war on Austria on May 23, 1915 [Italian Green Book, App. III.]; Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia on Aug. 1, 1914 [German White Book, Exh. 26]; and to France on Aug. 3 [French Yellow Book, No. 146]; and Austria to Russia on Aug. 6.

WHO WILLED THE WAR ?

EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION

I. BRITAIN WILLED THE WAR

Pro : (1) In 1873 and 1888 Germany tried to secure an alliance with England; in 1902 the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded; and in 1904 the Entente Cordiale [Schiemann, pp. 8 . . .].

Con : (1) For refutation, *v.* p. 63.

Pro : (2) England and France were guilty, because they considered means of waging war, and co-operated over Belgium [Platzhoff, p. 25].

Con : (2) For refutation, *v.* p. 29.

Pro : (3) England had not any real motive of honour or conquest; would have intervened in any case. Her intervention was not merely for the sake of Belgium, and therefore England is responsible for Germany's breach of neutrality. She had no quarrel with Germany, and merely wanted to rob. She desires the possession of the French and Belgian coasts; and, had

England had a conscript army at the outset, she would have been safe from attack and could have remained neutral. The essential fault was Edward VII.'s anti-German whim [Ándrássy, pp. 53, 60, 62, 75, 80; Francken, p. 45].

Pro : (4) The Allies have no common ground of action ; and England is responsible because she amassed armaments [Chamberlain, pp. 8 and 18].

She is guilty, because she might have prevented war by blockading the French ports [*ibid.*, p. 57].

Pro : (5) Hungarians at first inclined to believe that Russia was the instigator of the war, but were soon undeceived and found it was England. England had been preparing for this war for a long time, and set up as pretexts the love of little nations, and German militarism, whereas her true reasons were envy of Germany's colonial policy and commercial prosperity [Révai, pp. 13, 19, 32].

Pro : (6) England sought war and utilized Germany and France [Sidler, p. 25].

Pro : (7) England disappointed Germany ; wanted war ; and Edward VII. exercised a fatal influence [Schröer, pp. 19 and 32 ; as to Edward VII., pp. 34, 37, 42, 57, 63, 69, 76, etc., etc.].

Pro : (8) England willed war as the only means of avoiding civil war in Ireland [Schröer, p. 38].

Con : (8) *Cf.* French Yellow Book, No. 5, as to classes in Germany desiring war ; quoted in this book on p. 4.

Pro : (9) England willed the war : because the desire of France for *revanche* was lukewarm merely, that of Russia a fanciful Pan-Slavism, but England's longing to destroy the potentiality of Germany was active [Verworn, p. 38].

Con : (9) There was no popular consent to the war in England and France, but only in Germany [Potthoff, p. 15].

Pro : (10) England willed the war by pushing France into the Morocco quag, and refusing a pacific promise to Germany.

At the Conference of Algeciras, Great Britain steadily refused to make concessions, and forced France in her path, so that Germany kept the peace.

Con : (10) *v.* MOROCCO.

Pro : (11) England was guilty of an aggressive policy, because, in reply to the German request, she would not abandon the Entente [Labberton, I., p. 44]. Also because she wanted to crush Germany [*ibid.*, p. 17].

Yet both sides wanted war [*ibid.*, p. 16 ; Molenbroek, p. 32].

Pro : (12) Russia and England caused the war : the former because she repelled Austria's just claims ; the latter because she merely made war without object, save to weaken neighbouring States [Labberton, II., pp. 113, 127].

Pro : (13) England willed the war : because she might have notified the Central Powers *before* the delivery of the Serbian note, *and* she might afterwards have told Russia she would not intervene if Russia insisted (unlike the year 1911) on her rights [Roggen, p. 164].

Con : (13) No Powers whatever were informed beforehand of the contents of the note ; and England intervened to save France and Belgium : in any case, why should she promise to help Germany to crush Russia ?

Pro : (14) England willed the war : because the Entente policy was the cause of the growth of the huge fleets, and because the expansion of any State is dangerous to England [Heutsz, p. 83].

Con : (14) On the contrary, the Entente arose after 1902, and the German Naval Law was passed in 1898.

On the contrary, we looked on whilst France, Germany, Italy, and the U.S.A. all expanded and colonized.

England has not been greedy at others' expense [Eduard Meyer, p. 128].

II. ENGLAND DID NOT WILL THE WAR

Pro : (1) England did *not* will the war, but Russia ; England could not have prevented war, and, for this reason, could not have remained neutral. She

feared war but never sought it; but she should have encouraged and not thwarted German expansion.

The cause was the disturbance produced by the Balkan wars [Landauer, pp. 63, 65, 67, 70].

Pro : (2) It is said that England would have joined in, in any case.

But England did all she could to maintain peace [*J'accuse*, p. 65]. Even after the violation of the Belgian frontier, she offered von Jagow time to consider whether he would not recall the German troops; and von Jagow refused [British Blue Book, No. 160].

What England might or might not have done has nothing to do with the question of who forced on a European war. Possibly she reserved independence of action, irrespective of Belgium or France [*J'accuse*, p. 201].

After Belgium had been invaded she was bound to protect Belgium: it was also her interest [*ibid.*, p. 204].

She intervened to guard Belgium and France. Germany need not have attacked either [*ibid.*, p. 211].

Pro : (3) For German Socialist proof of England's innocence, *v.* SOCIALISTS.

Pro : (4) According to the German Chancellor [Dec. 2, 1914] the responsibility for the outbreak falls on Russia for mobilizing, and on England for letting the Austro-Serbian dispute assume the proportions of a European war. England might have rendered war impossible by flatly declaring that the Austro-Serbian dispute must be localized.

Con : (4) But England expressly would not pledge herself to anything definite to France or to Russia. She expressly menaced any Power that broke the peace [*J'accuse*, pp. 180-193].

Pro : (5) It is said that England wanted war; that she was bellicose; that she caused the war, indirectly; that she was responsible for the outbreak by not remaining neutral; that Edward VII. was the direct instigator.

On the contrary, Edward VII.'s influence was legendary, and England could not have prevented war in any way [Landauer, pp. 54-60].

III. FRANCE WILLED THE WAR

Pro : (1) France: because in 1903 and 1911 Baron Greindl stated that European peace had never been disturbed save by French aspirations for *revanche*; and in 1914 in France a militarist and nationalist party shunned any reconciliation with Germany [Bertourieux, pp. 12 and 13].

The Entente was started by Edward VII. in order that Great Britain might direct the French Government; it was an offensive and defensive league against Germany [*ibid.*, pp. 43 and 44].

'Russia directs the Dual Alliance for her exclusive profit' [Baron Beyens in 1914; Bertourieux, p. 29].

France willed war by her aggressive policy and adhesion to the Entente, *e.g.*, in 1908 [*ibid.*, p. 77].

In June, 1914, Germany was apprehensive of an attack from France [*ibid.*, p. 81].

Pro : (2) The election of Poincaré to the presidency meant an aggressive policy on the part of France [Molenbroek, I., p. 39].

France is the general aggressor [Royen, p. 7].

Con : (2) The German contention that France contemplated an invasion of Germany through Belgium is not proved [Labberton, II., p. 99].

Pro : (3) France did not trust Germany's assurances; did not exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg; and made no step in the direction of peace.

Con : (3) As an answer, among many, *v.* French Yellow Book [No. 74], where the French Ambassador at Berlin tried to induce von Jagow not to follow Austria 'blindfold.' France worked continuously for peace [*J'accuse*, pp. 221 . . .].

IV. FRANCE DID NOT WILL THE WAR

Pro : (1) The German outposts were the first to cross the frontier [*v.* WAR; *J'accuse*, p. 147].

The German allegations as to French aviators flying over Germany before the declaration of war have never

been substantiated; whilst [No. 151, British Blue Book] Belgium on Aug. 3 declined the offer of French assistance in anticipation of an invasion.

Pro : (2) France did not will the war: because the Triple Entente followed the English lead, which was purely defensive [*J'accuse*, p. 90].

V. RUSSIA WILLED THE WAR

Pro : (1) Russia was responsible as the predestined enemy of Austria [Landauer, p. 6].

Russia was responsible, because she did not yield to Austria's demands [Chamberlain, p. 71].

(Chamberlain also states that Russia thwarted an investigation of the Sarajevo crime [p. 76].) (This is simply a fabrication.)

Con : (1) Russia was on friendly terms with Austria until 1880, when the Congress of Berlin robbed her of her conquests in the Balkans. Russia had aided Austria to subdue Hungary in 1848.

As to her action in the Serbian crisis of 1914, *v.* p. 250; as to the Ágrám trial, and crises of 1909 and 1913, *v.* p. 234.

Pro : (2) Russia had no reason to intervene on Serbia's behalf: there was a strong war-party at St. Petersburg, and, thirdly, she mobilized against Germany [*J'accuse*, pp. 215-220].

Russia willed the war; and the next culprit is England.

'We assert this, not according to diplomatic documents, but on the very words of high dignitaries at St. Petersburg, on the faith of a Czech of high standing, who about the beginning of 1911 was informed that war with Austria was inevitable' [From *Hlas*, a Czech paper, early in 1915, *apud* Bertourieux, p. 60].

Pro : (3) 'M. Sazonov feels his influence with the Tsar weakened by the Court Party and Pan-Slavists (April, 1913) . . . the Court Party which wants to drag Russia into war' (July 2, 1914) [Bertourieux, p. 62; Baron Beyens].

Con : (3) The extracts given are so selected that it is quite possible that with full context they read otherwise. The German official version states :

Pro : (4) The premature mobilization of Russia paralyzed German efforts for peace [Bertourieux, p. 69; German White Book, No. 19].

Con : (4) 'In this correspondence we have many assurances of mediation, but are we allowed to see the substance?' [Preface to *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. xiii.; *v.* also argument, pp. x-xij., thus summed up].

'If the charges as to the priority of Russian mobilization are examined in the light of these considerations, it will be admitted that the evidence for those charges is remarkably slight, and that, given the admitted extreme slowness of Russian, and the extreme rapidity of German mobilization, a fact which is frequently alluded to in the correspondence, there is no indication in favour of, and an overwhelming presumption against, the theory that the Russian measures were further advanced than the German when war was declared on Aug. 1.'

And No. 134, British Blue Book :

Paris,

'(Telegraphic.)

August 1, 1914.

'President of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilization had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilization; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilization, they are not so designated.'

Pro : (5) Russia was the cause of the war :

(a) Because she invaded Germany prematurely [Geerke, p. 58; Labberton, I., p. 11; so, too, Staal].

(b) She was aiming at war with Germany, to be followed by a subsequent war with England for Suez, in a second great coalition of Russia, Germany, and Austria against England [Heutsz, p. 66].

(c) Because a Russian protectorate over Serbia was intolerable [Ándrássy, p. 21]; and the Austrian proposals to Serbia were not accepted.

VI. RUSSIA DID NOT WILL THE WAR

Pro : (1) Russia allowed her Ambassador at Vienna to absent himself, who, before so doing, told the French Ambassador that Russia would raise no objection to the punishment of those guilty of the assassination and the dissolution of revolutionary associations, but would not consent to the humiliation of Serbia. Meanwhile the German Ambassador was ramping (*préconisait des résolutions violentes*) [Belgian Grey Book II., 20 (July 23, 1914)].

Russia did not will the war against Austria; but Austria was primarily and Germany ultimately responsible.

Because Austria five times refused to discuss her demands on Serbia, and declared war for a phrase, *i.e.*, her fifth requirement [*v. p.* 241]; [*J'accuse*, pp. 63, 239, 253; *e.g.*, Russian Orange Book, No. 63].

The English proposition (No. 88, British Blue Book) was said to have been laid by Germany before Austria. Of this there is no proof, except the assertion of the German Chancellor of the Exchequer (Helfferich). Austria had three days in which to reply, and no reply is extant [Fernau, p. 85].

Pro : (2) Austria mobilized two army corps against Russia, prior to Russia's taking any action [Bethmann-Hollweg, Aug. 4, 1914].

In 1908 and 1912 Austria had mobilized in the Serbian crises; and so had Russia; yet peace was maintained. In any case mobilization need not mean war [*cf.* No. 18, British Blue Book; *J'accuse*, p. 251].

In this instance, too, Austria yielded. What really happened, was:

Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you [Sir Edward Grey] on Aug. 1 [1914] by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on

compromise, nor cut off the conversations. . . . Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on July 31 by means of her double ultimata to St. Petersburg and Paris. These ultimata were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on Aug. 1, and on France on Aug. 3. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history' [Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. Cd. 7445. Refers to No. 137, British Blue Book]; (and *cf.* p. 23).

'It was pointed out to his Excellency [the Political Director at the German Embassy] that general mobilization in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilization, and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilize if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilization by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding' [British Blue Book, No. 126. Paris, Aug. 1, 1914].

Pro : (3) The course of the mobilizations seems to have been :

On July 28, 1914, Austria mobilized against Serbia, and declared war.

On July 29, 1914, Russia mobilized against Austria.

Whereupon Austria ordered a general mobilization, and Russia did the same on July 31.

On July 31 Germany ordained a condition of general menace (*drohende Kriegsgefahr*), and on the same day sent ultimata to Russia and France, unjustifiably requiring Russia in twelve hours to demobilize both against herself and Austria—a demand never preferred on her own behalf by Austria [*J'accuse*, pp. 116, 147].

Pro : (4) Yet war was declared by Austria on Russia only on Aug. 6. Germany had forced the pace on Aug. 1 [*J'accuse*, p. 88 ; cf. pp. 144 and 152].

Con : (4) ' If we [Germany] wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate an active policy, which, without attacking France, will prejudice her interests, and those of England, that both those States would feel themselves compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are offered both in Africa and Europe ' [Bernhardi, p. 280].

VII. GERMANY WILLED THE WAR

Pro : (1) ' Let us disregard all these miserable excuses for what Germany did. It is not against our will that we hurled ourselves into this gigantic venture ; we have willed it and we were bound to will it. Germany is waging this war, not in order to punish the guilty, or to free enslaved peoples ; Germany is waging this war in virtue of her unbreakable conviction that her works give her rights to a greater place in the world, for more room for her industries ' [Maximilian Harden, *Zukunft*, Nov. 22, 1914].

Pro : (2) Germany refused to intervene in the Russo-Austrian dispute, alleging German obligations towards Austria [French Yellow Book, No. 74].

Pro : (3) She decided on war on July 29, 1914, and sounded England so as to secure the neutrality of England [*J'accuse*, p. 137 ; British White Book, No. 85 (the English counter-offer, No. 101, never received an answer)].

Pro : (4) Germany's guilt consists in [*J'accuse*, p. 179] :

(i) Leaving Austria free to develop a war with Russia out of the Serbian conflict.

(ii) Letting Austria recall her Ambassador from Serbia, though Serbia had given way.

(iii) Trying to 'localize' a conflict, which in 1908, 1911, and 1913 had almost brought on European war.

(iv) Rejecting the notion of a Conference.

(v) Suggesting direct conversations between Austria and Russia, and letting Austria refuse.

(vi) Not suggesting any alternative means of reconciliation, after declining all of those set up by Sir Edward Grey.

(vii) Not replying to Grey's suggestions for conciliation.

(viii) Rejecting the Russian formulas for conciliation.

(ix) Never stating what Austria required, merely what Austria did not wish.

(x) Trying to make England neutral, when *all* the Powers were supposed to be working for peace.

(xi) Sending an ultimatum to Russia, when Austria had consented to parley with Russia.

(xii) Requiring in this ultimatum demobilization against both herself and Austria.

(xiii) Declaring war against Russia.

(xiv) Falsely alleging previous invasions by the other Powers.

(xv) Infringing the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg.

Pro : (5) Germany mobilized first [French Yellow Book, pp. 58, 59, 80, 88, 90, 106, 108; British Blue Book, pp. 105, 111].

Pro : (6) Her motives for war were political, *not* economic [Beyens, p. 208].

Note.—Many of these quotations have been taken from *J'accuse*. That the book deserves a high place is evident from the German Chancellor's diatribe against it [*Times*, June 7, 1916], in which his arguments are very nearly the same as the pro-German views expressed in this section. Thus the hostile policy of Envelopment

of the Triple Entente (*v.* ENVELOPMENT), the mobilizations of Russia and France, etc.

Pro: (7) 'The policy adopted by Germany, says Prince Bülow, has "enabled us to succeed, unmolested and uninfluenced by England, in creating a naval force which forms the real basis for our economic interests and our will in world politics, and which the strongest opponent cannot attack without serious risk to himself. What that means for us has been revealed in this war, for our battle fleet binds England's main force to the North Sea, and has thus prevented England developing her full power at the Straits." Prince Bülow observes that it is obvious that a resolute English policy could easily in the early years of German naval construction "have rendered us innocuous before our naval claws had grown," but although the demand for a preventive war against Germany was frequently made in England, he remarks, the opportunity was not taken when it offered. "By 1914," he adds, "we had grown so big that we could venture on a war with England in high spirits "' [*Westminster Gazette*, July 14, 1916. Review of Prince Bülow's new book, *Deutsche Politik*].

VIII. GERMANY DID NOT WILL THE WAR

Pro: (1) If Germany had willed the war, why did she strike so late? Why not in 1896 at Fashoda, during the Russian revolution after the Russo-Japanese war? [*Verrijn-Stuart*, p. 34; *Bertourieux*, p. 39].

Con: On all of these occasions (as also previously in 1875, etc.), when Germany was intending a war circumstances were too strong: thus the Kiel Canal was not ready; Italy would not agree; England threatened to take the part of the Power aggressed.

On this occasion, possibly, Germany had attained her maximum of strength.

Further, *v.* the ERRORS OF GERMANY.

Pro: Germany was not aggressive: as Greindl testifies in 1905 and 1908, Beyens in 1912 [*cf.* KAISER, p. 124]; she merely wanted to break the circle

of hostile Powers around her (*v.* ENVELOPMENT).
[Bertourieux, pp. 15, 17, 21.]

Had she been aggressive, she would have attacked sooner ; *e.g.*, after the Russo-Japanese war, or after the Boer War [*ibid.*, p. 39] ; (*v.* pp. 83, 234).

ZABERN

The Zabern or Saverne incident occurred in Nov., 1913. A Prussian officer, von Forstner, insulted the Alsatians, and was mobbed by them. In December he deliberately drew his sword and slashed a lame cobbler at Zabern.

The incident was only one of many, and produced a great uproar ; but, in the end, no effective punishment was awarded, nor any redress given.

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APPENDIX I

BALKAN STATES

In the following articles some account will be given of the five nations contained in the Balkans : Roumanians, Albanians, Serbians, Bulgarians, and Greeks ; how at various periods they were subdued, and how by various processes they freed themselves from the yoke of the Turks. It will certainly be impossible for Austria and Russia to deal with the Balkan States as their pawns, to be played with or to be sacrificed according to their own dynastic needs.

It is difficult for contemporaries to read their own history, but it is probable that the year 1912, the year that the Slavonic States awoke from their four hundred years' captivity, and asserted themselves as a power and as a nation, will, in the school-books of the future, rank in importance with the year 1453, the year that the Turks managed to perpetuate an Eastern State in the confines of Europe by securing the impregnable Dardanelles. It is no new problem, that of the Near East, but a radical solution would be a great innovation.

In 1914 the great war broke out. This time Sir Edward Grey could not reconcile interests, when the Central Powers were set upon gaining their ends at all costs.

Serbia was attacked, and, after the third invasion, was quelled. At this point Bulgaria intervened, in October, 1915.

Greece, faced with so many foes, governed by a German King and a Hohenzollern Queen, declined to acquit

herself of her obligations under her treaty of alliance with Serbia (the terms of it have not been published) : but Venezelos, who was then Premier, is understood to have invited the Allies to Salonica, in order that they might land a sufficiency of troops to protect Greece, when she fulfilled her treaty obligations. King Constantine dismissed him from office.

Since then the Bulgarians have occupied portions of Greek territory, including Kavala and the coastland of which they were deprived by the Treaty of Bucharest. The Greek forces are by order evacuating their own territory, and Greece is still neutral, though overrun by both belligerents. The Balkan boundaries are again unsettled.

TURKEY

When by 1356 the Turks had conquered Gallipoli on the Dardanelles, they had already established themselves in Europe ; and it was a mere question of time, in view of the blindness and ignorance of the rest of Europe, exactly when the city of Constantinople should fall, the last bulwark of civilization, the direct heir of Athenian culture.

From 1453, the date of the fall of Constantinople, Turkish arms were victorious. By 1459 she had definitely conquered the Balkan Peninsula, and the only State which put up a determined resistance was Serbia. From that time up to 1774 her principal enemy was Austria. At the battle of Mohács, 1526, she conquered Hungary, and held dominion almost up to the gates of Vienna for over two centuries, Austria paying a tribute up to the year 1606.

By the year 1739 Hungary had recovered her freedom, and in that year the Treaty of Belgrade gave Turkey her first set-back by bringing the frontier down to the Danube, the Save and Temesvár ; and this nominal frontier endured with some restrictions of autonomous states under Turkish sovereignty up to the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The situation up to 1911 arises directly

from the compromise effected under the influence of England and Germany at this Congress, when Russia and the insurgent States of the Balkans were despoiled of their fruits of victory.

After 1739 Russia steps in as the antagonist of Turkey, but the diplomacy of Austria and Russia is mainly a record of partitions mostly unrealized, territorial aggrandizements without any regard to the rights of nationality. There were continuous wars with Turkey, continuous treaties of eternal peace made one after the other. Schemes of division were brandished about in diplomatic protocols, but the only partition which was effected was that of Poland: but the selfish ambition of these two Powers neutralized any effort and frustrated any result. Turkey, at this time, subsisted, like the latter Byzantine Empire, by playing off the ambitions of her assailants against each other.

The French Revolution changed the entire complexion of things, even in the East. It burnt on the minds of men indelibly the idea of the rights of nationalities, of the right of the citizen to determine his fate against the ruler and in spite of him. And it is this liberal tendency which more than anything else accounts for the change of attitude which led in 1830 to the recognition of the autonomy of a minute Serbia under Turkish suzerainty, and an independent Greece in 1830.

This movement will be traced in rather more detail in the subsequent sections of this paper, but some explanation of what Turkish administration meant may be added. The Turks were military conquerors forming an Eastern empire of subject tributary populations. Until the Young Turkish Party attempted to bring in the Western ideas of nationality and to Osmanize the territories subject to Turkish dominions, the Turks had no conception of the European assimilative state, and consequently all the subject populations, provided that they paid the tribute, and were duly submissive, were left in comparative freedom to work out their own destinies and live their own thoughts, only under conditions of barbarism which did not tend for progress in

any direction. When the Turks began to force Turkish national ideals on the subject peoples, they united their foes against them; it was better for a Turkish Slav to be occasionally massacred than perpetually to lose national self-consciousness.

The Turkish Sovereign was in the first place called Khan, a Tatar designation. He later assumed the Arabic title of Emir, as being the Head of the Faithful, as also that of Sultan, an Arabic designation of dominion. As his Empire grew, he borrowed from the Persian the title of Padishah, King of Kings; and he has always borne the ecclesiastical appellation of Khalif, as the spiritual head of the Orthodox Moslem world, in virtue of being the dominant independent Mohametan State.

The Turkish territory was divided, a policy derived from the Byzantine government, into provinces or vilayets, these vilayets corresponding more or less with the *Θήματα*, or provinces, before 1453. These were governed by Pashas. Some vilayets might be agglomerated and such divisions would be governed by a Beglerbey. The vilayet was divided into sandjaks, literally flags, governed by Begs or Beys. The organization was strictly feudal, every one of these varying holders having to provide his quota of fighting men. Jurisdiction was entirely vested in these Turkish officials. Taxes were exacted under the Koran from all the subjects, but extra taxes levied on the infidel, and one institution, the *Devchurmé*, deserves a special note. Every five years every fifth child from every family was taken away to be incorporated in the *Yeni-Cheri* or Janissary Guards of Constantinople. These youths were taken to Asia, trained for military service in utter ignorance of their origin, and became fiery and indeed over-zealous supporters of the Turkish monarchy. This was an institution first heard of in 1326, possibly modelled on the very similar practice of the Tatars, who from 1220 to 1480 were the overlords of Russia.

In 1678 this odious poll tax was exercised for the last time, but the Janissaries had become as vast a power at Constantinople as the Prætorian Guards in the later

Roman Empire, and there was no security until at last this magnificent fighting corps was disbanded.

BULGARIA

Bulgaria took a most notable part in the war of 1911.

The modern Bulgarians are the descendants of the Turanian Bolgars, Slavized and speaking a language differing from all the other Slavonic tongues in its composition : the grammar has been simplified to such an extent as to be almost as easy as English.

The religion, as in all the Balkan States, is the Orthodox Church, but this Church, unlike the Catholic, has always been a national Church. There has been no Pope ; no age-long conflict of extra-territorial ecclesiastical authority with the pretensions of rising nationality. Now at last all the countries of the Orthodox faith have their own Patriarch, their own ritual, each in their own language ; and the last efforts of the Greeks to impose the Greek service, and to introduce Greek priests, has been defeated. The Bulgarian Exarch has indeed been excommunicated by the Greek patriarch ; but the Orthodox Church is now, as always, one in doctrine, but organized for complete national independence.

The original Bolgars insinuated their way into the Balkan Peninsula in the fifth and sixth centuries, ousting the Goths. They were a Turanian race, with all the savagery associated with the early history of the Tatars and the Magyars of Hungary. At the end of the sixth century they were overthrown by the Avars, but the rule of this savage horde was as brief as it was sudden ; and by the year 679 the first Bolgar Empire was founded by Isperikh (*Ἰσπερίχης*), and endured almost down to the fall of Constantinople. In the year 864 the Tsar of the Bolgars was converted to Christianity.

In the year 1393 the Bulgarian Empire fell to the arms of Bajazet. Its capital at this time was Tyrnovo. From this date onwards up to 1875 an extraordinary lethargy or even oblivion falls over the Bulgarians : whilst Greece was revolting in 1821, whilst Serbia was making her

heroic stand for four hundred years, whilst Roumania was enjoying autonomy and as much independence and nationality as any state could under the Turkish yoke, the Bulgarians vanished from history. In 1762 two monks, Païsi and Sofroni, compiled a history of early Bulgaria, and in the year 1844 the first paper appeared in Bulgarian, and the foundation was laid for the modern literature.

In 1875, after Serbia had become independent, Bosnia was rising against Turkish oppression, and the Bulgarians at last became roused to some national consciousness. This was followed and repressed by the terrible Bulgarian massacres of 1876; and Gladstone's fiery speeches led to the creation of the autonomous principality of Bulgaria under Alexander of Battenberg, who was expelled by a military cabal in 1886, to be succeeded by the present ruler, Ferdinand of Coburg. It would be profitless to follow the inner political history from 1876 to the present time. It has been a story of ordinary constitutional development in a country inexperienced in Western ideas of parliamentary democracy.

In 1885 Bulgaria formally annexed Eastern Roumelia, a province peopled by Bulgarians, which under the conditions of the Congress of Berlin had been instituted an autonomous State under Turkish rule. The Powers protested, but did not intervene to undo this bold step. Serbia was jealous of this sudden extension, and made war on Bulgaria, to be disastrously defeated at Slivnitsa. In 1908 Prince Ferdinand, in concert with Austria, declared himself independent from Turkish suzerainty, whilst Austria equally boldly annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been given to her to administer under the provisions of the Congress of Berlin of 1878.

The Bulgarian nation has risen, unlike the other Balkan States, seemingly out of nothing, and almost taken first rank; and to them it fell to do what the Powers have always been too jealous, too impotent, too hesitant to accomplish—to take the lead in overthrowing the Turk.

GREECE

The history of Greece from the time of Philip of Macedon is mainly that of change of foreign rule. She was the last, as well as the first, possession of the Eastern Empire, and very soon fell to the Turkish arms, the Duchy of Athens being taken in 1456, Thebes in 1460, Eubœa in 1470, and Nauplia in 1540. The Venetians who in their centuries of warfare with the Eastern Empire had taken not a few of the Ægean Islands, as well as stations in Greece in 1573, only retained a few coast-towns in Albania.

From 1684 to 1718 Venice, says Jebb, 'wrested Morea from Turkey and kept it for over thirty years: when the Venetians came into Morea it was a wilderness. The Turkish system had for two hundred years been making Greece a desert, and now war had finished the work. The Venetians restored commerce between the Levant and the west. But Venetian government in the Morea, carefully organized as it had been, was easily overthrown by the Turks as soon as their troubles elsewhere set their hands free to set about it in earnest.

'The chief cause of this was that the Venetians had not incorporated the Greek population with the ruling class by developing local institutions, and so Venetian sway in the Morea was in the end a dominion which could be maintained only by the power of arms. One lasting benefit, however, the Venetians conferred on Greece: they familiarized Greece with the almost forgotten influence of a higher civilization' [*Modern Greece*, p. 41; cf. *Le problème italo-slave*].

But the Greeks under Turkish rule, by virtue of their very ability, did not fare as badly as some of the other Balkan States. They were always a great mercantile and naval people and they came to monopolize trade in Turkey. As the founders of the original Orthodox Church they always had ecclesiastical independence, and, subject to the *devchurmé* or child tribute, and the Turkish capitation tax on infidels, they were allowed to retain much of their own local government. In North

Epirus they were even allowed to have their own police, so as to keep down Klephts or patriotic brigands. This force very soon worked in concert with the force they were supposed to oppress. But the Greeks also were allowed to have their own schools throughout the Turkish dominions. In 1770, when a Russian fleet under Alekséi Orlov was sailing in the Mediterranean, there was an insurrection in the Morea; but, in the later years of the eighteenth century, Greek faith in Russia as a liberator of the Orthodox Christians in the East paled.

In the Turkish Empire the Greeks had a great influence. The inhabitants of the quarter of Constantinople called Phanar were given offices of trust under the Sultan, and in especial were for a century and more the governors of Wallachia and Moldavia. The French Revolution excited the Greeks to independence. Throughout the Turkish Empire they formed *ἐταιρίαι* or secret societies. In 1821, when the Turks were weakened by the Servian and Wallachian risings, revolts broke out in the Morea and through all the islands, including Crete, with the exception of Chios. A regular government was organized, and in 1823 England recognised the independence of Greece. She could not have won her rights without foreign intervention; but the name of Hellas inspired all the romanticism of Europe; and Byron at Missolonghi did the rest. The Turks did not fare very well in this war. In 1824 they had to call in the aid of the Egyptian ruler, Mekhmed Ali, and by 1825 they had reconquered all of the Morea and Athens, leaving the country a desert. England, France, and Russia intervened and enforced the Peace of Adrianople on Turkey in 1827, leaving Greece a tributary state with frontiers reaching up to Arta and Volo and the Islands of Eubœa and the Cyclades; the Greek Prince to be invested at Constantinople.

But this did not last long: by the Convention of London, 1830, Greece was made independent, but was deprived of Acarnania (in the north). The history of the independent State of Greece has been stormy and

disorganized. Party conflicts are too virulent. In 1864 England surrendered to Greece the Ionian Islands, and in 1876 Greece was only held back from participating in the great Serbian war by Beaconsfield's threatening to occupy the Piræus. Greece was refused the right of session at the Congress of Berlin, where the slicing up of Turkey for the benefit of her subjects aroused delicate diplomatic situations. Waddington, the French Ambassador, suggested that she should be granted Thessaly and Epirus, which are Greek land. England, who was for the Turks, still disapproved. As a compromise Greece was given part of Thessaly and her frontiers extended to what may be seen on the map of to-day. Racially the Greek population extends up to Yanina, and includes Salonica as well as all of the islands. Crete, time after time, has risen in revolt in sympathy with every Greek insurrection, but has been curbed in her desire for union by the united efforts of the Powers.

In 1897 Greece fought her disastrous war, and was utterly defeated by Turkey. She learnt the lesson of the cost of disorganization; and the campaign of 1912, when she advanced triumphantly to the Macedonian mountains, into Salonica, cleared away the imputation from her name.

ROUMANIA

Roumania consists of two principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, which were never united until 1878 at the Congress of Berlin, but, in point of history, they have always run in couples. The Roumanian people belong to the Orthodox Church; they were converted to Christianity by the Bulgarians, and up to the sixteenth century (1646) made use of the Church Slavonic or Old-Bulgarian ritual, which is still used throughout Russia. Soon after, the Roumanian Church, like the other parts of the Orthodox Church, became autocephalous or independent, but with the exception of the native dynasties and the government of the country, the administration passed into the hands of the Phanariots and the

Greek Patriarch, the native clergy, as everywhere else, being suppressed in favour of the Greek, and the Roumanian ritual being disused.

The Roumanian language is a kind of Romance island in the midst of Slavdom; grammatically it is closely akin to Italian, but the vocabulary is largely Slavonic, and also influenced by Magyar and Turkish and modern Greek. Up to the sixteenth century the official language was the Church Slavonic, although Wallachia for some purposes used middle Bulgarian and Moldavia Southern Russian dialects. The literature proper of Roumania began in the sixteenth century.

The Roman colonization of Dacia, the last and latest won, was very effectual. The population was as effectually Romanized as Gaul, and the Latin speech has endured down to the present day. At the irruption of the Magyars the Romanized Moesians were forced into Transylvania on to the banks of the Danube and the shores of the Black Sea, and the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were founded, both as vassals of Hungary.

In 1377 Wallachia was still subject to Hungary, but Moldavia had become tributary to Poland; both had fallen under Slav influence. Both principalities were ruled by their native princes, and the Turks never extorted more than tribute and acknowledgment of suzerainty; and just as the two principalities were beginning to be independent, they were overthrown by the Ottomans. The rulers of the two principalities were energetic men; one Wallachian prince, Michael the Brave, 1592-1601, expelled the Turks to the right bank of the Danube, won Transylvania and subdued Moldavia; but this effort was only ephemeral, as he was soon crushed between the power of the Turks and the jealousy of the Holy Roman Empire. In the seventeenth century the Wallachian principality decayed, but Matthew the Bessarabian in 1652 published a code of customary law and established the first printing-press at Bucharest. Cantacuzin (1678-1688) founded the first Roumanian school, and Constantin Brâncovan was powerful enough

to plot for independence, and enter into treaty relations with Peter the Great.

By the year 1716 the native dynasty of Wallachia had become extinct, and the throne was successively occupied by nominees from amongst the Phanariots, the leading Greek families of Constantinople.

The history of Moldavia is very similar. In the fifteenth century Stephen the Great (1456-1504) won freedom for his country from the Turks, forfeited, however, by his son Bogdan, in 1511. The dynasty of Moldavia died out in 1552, and various pretenders arose.

In 1612 the peasants of Moldavia were unserfed, and in 1710 Dmitri Cantemir was, like his fellow-sovereign Constantin Brâncovan, powerful enough to be able to make a secret alliance with Peter the Great, and endeavoured to establish claims by marriage, so as to unite Little-Russia to his own principality. This, however, came to nothing; and, as in Wallachia, the Phanariots exercised government for the country. For over a century the Phanariots ruled the two provinces, largely to the profit of these states; for these rulers, who had come from outside, were on the whole preferred to the native rulers: they had no axe of their own to grind, and they had no dynastic hold save by good conduct. But their advent meant the employment of Greeks for every service, and the supersession of the native Church.

By the important treaty of Kuchuk Kanardji, 1774, the Russians obtained their first right of intervention to protect the Wallachian and Moldavian vassals of Constantinople; and the sovereigns of these provinces were allowed to have diplomatic agents at Stambul. In the year 1776 the first territorial loss was suffered by the Roumanian nation, when Bukovina was ceded to Austria (the district to the south-east of Galicia, bordered by the Dniestr on the north and the Pruth on the west). The succeeding years are mainly notable for constitutional changes, such as the term of office of the ruler, first fixed at two years and then at seven.

The next epoch in the history of Roumania is the Treaty of Bucharest, 1812, by which Bessarabia, an

entirely Roumanian country, was transferred to Russia. This transfer has done much to alienate Roumania from any sympathy she might have with her Slav neighbours—little as that is, as she prides herself on being a Latin and a Western country. Later on, however, under the Congress of Berlin, Roumania had to swallow a still more bitter pill, surrendering what portion of Bessarabia she still retained under the Treaty of Bucharest (*viz.*, the region from the Lake of Yalpukh to the west, bounded to the north by a line from Belgrade running east in a straight line so as to comprise the whole of the estuary of the Danube, as well as all the left bank of the Pruth).

The years succeeding the French Revolution aroused in Roumania the same feeling of revolt from Turkish sway as elsewhere, and the Phanariote rulers, who were delivering Greece, were by no means zealous servants of the Turks at such a time as this. In 1822 the dissensions amongst the Greek rulers became so great that a national delegation met and demanded the restoration of the native rulers. By the Treaty of Adrianople, 1829, Turkish rule had become so much a matter of the past that the Turks were forbidden to build any forts on the left bank of the Danube, and Moslems were forbidden by law to reside either in Wallachia or Moldavia. The two provinces were placed under the protectorate of Russia, a tribute still had to be paid, but there was no provision for enforcing it. In 1824, after a six years' occupation, the Russian forces quitted these provinces, and the history henceforth is a series of uneventful constitutional changes culminating in the union of the two provinces for the first time in 1858, under the suzerainty of the Sultan with separate rulers, whilst in the succeeding year Constantin Cuza, a native prince, was made the sole ruler of the two provinces, as Prince of Roumania, the first occasion on which that name was used for the country.

In 1867, in consequence of the defeat of Austria by Prussia at Sadowa (1866), Hungary regained independence, and Transylvania was transferred to

her and lost its antonomy. The Magyar domination has been tyrannous.

In 1877 the obligation of tribute ceased, and that great Russo-Turkish war is noted for the prowess of the Roumanian army and the heroic defence of Plevna. Roumania aided Russia in this campaign, but got little change for her services; for, by the Treaty of Berlin, Roumania had to cede to Russia her remainder of Bessarabia and the towns of Kilia, Bender, Akkerman, Ismail, Khotin, but was granted the swamps of the Dobrudja, at the mouth of the Danube.

In 1881 Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, who had been elected Prince in 1866, was given the title of King; he was succeeded in 1915 by his cousin Ferdinand.

Roumania thus stands altogether out of the scope of Balkan history. She was never seriously oppressed by the Turks. Her king belongs to the German Imperial House, and she has all the territory that is hers by right of race, with the exception of Austrian Transylvania and Bukovina, and Russian Bessarabia.

SERBIA

The Serbian people are one of the most ancient and widespread of the Slavonic races in the Balkans. The original racial frontier, according to Ráczic, the historian of modern Serbia, is bounded on the north by the Save and the Danube, on the west by the river Una, and down the Adriatic coast as far as the River Drin and the Montenegrin lakes, and on the east by the rivers Struma and Timok. A part of this territory comprises Bosnia and Herzegovina, which in 1878 were given into the hands of Austria for administration, and were annexed in 1908. A small portion of this original Serbian territory has fallen into Bulgarian hands, and Montenegro has become an independent State with a dynasty of its own, as its history since the Middle Ages became separated from that of the inland country.

Ráczic also gives, as the racial boundaries of Albania, the country south of the River Drin, down to Mounts

Pindus and Olympus ; Greece as bounded to the north by Albania ; and Bulgaria as extending down to the Rhodope range, between the Danube, Maritsa, and the Black Sea.

The Serbians, like the rest of the Balkans, belong to the Orthodox Church, and have their own ritual and Patriarch. Their language is perhaps the most ancient form of Slavonic speech in existence, and perhaps the purest. It is highly inflexional, and thus stands out in marked contrast to Bulgarian, which has been reduced to the utmost simplicity.

The Croatians are of the same race and speak the same language as the Serbs, but belong to the Latin Church, and therefore do not make use of the Cyrillic alphabet.

In about the ninth century A.D. Serbia was independent, and under its vigorous native dynasty maintained its freedom, whilst occasionally extending its conquests into the surrounding domains. It had four capitals : Racé (under Turkish rule called Novi Bazar), Skoplje (Uskub), Prishtina, and Prizren. The medieval history of Serbia is full of romance : a strong race full of native culture, a literature and language early developed, and a profound sense of nationality. Serbians look back with special pride to the Empire of Dushan, 1331-1345 (who took the title of Tsar of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Albania, and was the virtual master of all the Balkan Peninsula, short of Greece and the two Roumanian provinces). Dushan, if the Turkish terror had not supervened, might have founded a permanent civilized state. He ordained a code of law, and did much to develop town life and consolidate the country.

The Serbians have the great distinction of being the most unconquerable foes the Turks have had to meet. 1371 was the date of the vital battle, that of Maritsa, in which the Serbians were beaten by the Turks ; and in 1373 Bulgaria passed finally into the hands of the Turks. But the Serbians were obdurate ; in 1382-1387 they hit the Turks back again, only to be disastrously beaten at the battle of Kossovo, near Prishtina, 1389. This country to the south of Novi Bazar has been the Nether-

lands of the Near East, the frequent battlefield of the contending races. But, with all this, the fighting went on obstinately, and between the years 1404-1409 the Serbian dynasty again freed their country, fighting the Turks so hard that in 1444, by the Treaty of Szegedin, Serbia and Albania had to be restored to freedom under the hero, George Castriote—'Scanderbeg,' as the Turks knew him, who, had he received any support, not to say adequate assistance, from the neighbouring Christian Powers, would no doubt have beaten the Turks back to the shore of Marmora.

After 1453 the hands of the Turks were freer, and Mahomet II. finally conquered Serbia. Still insurrection went on continuously, and in 1454 the Turks were again beaten. George Castriote died in 1456, perhaps one of the greatest warriors and statesmen of Eastern Europe, and by 1459 Serbia had been once more subdued. It stands very much to her credit, as a sign of the stuff of which she was made, that it took the Turks one hundred and thirty years to conquer this small people. After 1459 Turkish progress advanced apace. 1463 saw the subjugation of Bosnia, 1466 that of Herzegovina, and 1468 witnessed the attempt on the Zeta, the coastland of Serbia (including Montenegro). This mountainous country was not ever conquered. Ráczic says: 'Voilà comment avec la fin du moyen âge fut conquise la Serbie, comme dernière conquête des Turcs dans la péninsule balkanique. En attendant qu'elle se relève la première. . . .' A prophecy which has come very true.

Serbia's hopes of freedom were now centred in the barren rocks of the Black Mountain, and in 1485 Ivan Tsrnojevats founded Tsetinje (the modern capital of Montenegro); and in 1499 the Turks, with the aid of Venice, captured the successor of George Castriote. But his family had to be established as the vassal dynasty of the region round Lake Skutari, in practical independence.

From this date until very modern times Serbia was unable to raise her head. She preserved her nationality, primarily because of its very vigour. Other adjutory

causes were: the maintenance of the Zadruga (the same as the Russian *mir*, the patriarchal village community, derived from the most ancient Aryan time); the national patriotic Church at first under the Patriarch of Pech (Ipek), (which was for a time incorporated into the Bulgarian Archbishopric of Okhrida); the amazing fecundity of the native ballad literature, with its vitalizing memories; and lastly owing to the Haiduks and Uskuks, the Serbian representatives of the Klefts of Greece, who throughout the centuries of Turkish domain upheld the standard of patriotic brigandage. Throughout the eighteenth century Austria and Russia played a cruel war game with projected schemes of dismemberment of Turkey, both too jealous of each other ever to effect their end; and, as the years wore on, the Balkan peoples became convinced that their only salvation lay in their own strong arms.

In 1795 the Serbians rose again in the First War of Independence under the leadership of Kara George (Black George), the founder of the present dynasty; and in 1804 held the first Skupchina or Parliament. He was aided in his first attempt because he officiously took the part of the rebel Janissaries, who were retaining Bosnia against the Sultan's wish; and with this governor's help he was able to conclude a treaty by which he got the government of the Pashalik of Belgrade, subject to a tribute, with a stipulation that Serbians were only to be judged by Serbians, and that there was to be no Turkish taxation. The Sultan rejected these conditions, and, the rebel Janissaries having been disposed of, regular war began between the Serbians of the Pashalik and Turkey. The Serbian fight can hardly be described in any less exaggerated term than heroic. In 1806 a Serbian army of seven thousand beat a Turkish host of thirty thousand; and so far had they succeeded that the Porte in the same year was on the point of confirming their autonomy, subject to tribute and the admission of suzerainty. Only European politics came in to disturb the result: the French, who were fighting the Russians, aided the Turks, and this treaty was not ratified.

War went on for many years still, and in 1809 Kara George achieved what the modern Serbians have done in the campaign of 1911: conquered Novi Bazar and reached the Montenegrin frontier. In 1811 the Sultan offered terms of peace, but Kara George, keeping faith with his Russian patrons, declined to accept. Russia played the Balkans false. By the Treaty of Bukarest the Tsar returned Moldavia and Wallachia to Turkey, keeping Bessarabia as a commission, compelled the Serbians to dismantle their fortresses, and only inserted a general article in the treaty that the Turks were to administer the country in a just and civilized fashion.

Kara George fled to Austria, and was imprisoned by that friendly Power; and the Turks kept their pledge by sending Suleiman Pasha, who for two years oppressed and massacred throughout Serbia with the utmost barbarity. The first War of Independence had succeeded, and had only been frustrated by the scanty justice of the diplomacy of the Great Powers.

The second War of Independence began in 1815; but, prior to this, in 1813, Montenegro had to surrender the mouth of the Cattaro, which she had won for herself, Austria receiving it without striking a blow. The Serbians, however, found a new champion to succeed Kara George, Milosh Fedorovich Obrenovich, a better statesman though not so great a warrior as Kara George. The dynasty ended with "the assassination" of King Alexander and Queen Draga. Milosh was able to consolidate his power in the country, and under him the Serbians rose against the barbarities of Suleiman Pasha, who was replaced at the instance of Milosh by Marashli Pasha, a gentler and juster ruler. Until 1821, when Marashli died, the country was administered jointly by the Turks and Serbians, with the further deliberations of the Skupchina, the national parliament instituted in the first War of Independence, and continuous since then. The Turks evidently had had enough of Serbian insurrection. The first War of Independence had indeed lasted from 1795 to 1812, and Milosh was able to send a series of deputations to Constantinople to stipulate with

the Sultan almost in the capacity of ambassadors. His power grew greater, and in 1817 he was offered the title of Gospodar and Knez (Ruler, Prince) by the Skupchina, with Kragojevats as his capital.

Between 1820 and 1830 Roumania and Greece were attaining freedom, so that at last, at the Peace of Adrianople, the independence of the Pashalik of Belgrade was confirmed, under Milosh as Prince, subject to a Turkish tribute, the Turks being allowed to occupy a few fortresses, but not to live elsewhere in the country: prisoners who could fire on their captors, but had no other intercourse. One letter of Milosh in 1822 may be quoted as perhaps having some relevance to the situation in 1912. It was after the death of Marshli Pasha, the just ruler Milosh had been able to install; he says: 'If you sum everything up, you will agree with me that it would be better for the Serbians to endure the tyranny of the Turks than to lie down under the yoke Austria is making ready for them. . . . If the Austrian Government, under any pretext whatsoever, marches its army into our territory, we shall join hands with the Turks.'

This Serbia did not include Nish, Pirot, or Leskovats, nor of course any part of the Serbian nationality which extended all over Bosnia and Montenegro to the very confines of Albania.

The prowess of Kara George and the statesmanship of Milosh had at last delivered a portion of Serbia from Turkish misrule.

The Skupchina at this time was an assembly of large landowners, the magistrates of what may be called the counties and districts of the country, but in 1835 a more formal constitution was drafted, and proved disastrous to Milosh. Milosh, if he served his own country well, certainly was not generous to others, and maintained obstinate neutrality, declining any assistance to the Greeks.

The Serbian throne all through the history of the last century seems to have been a thorny seat, and in 1839 Milosh had to resign through internal factions. His son Milan succeeded him. Milan, however, died three months later, and Michael, a cousin, was set on the throne, who in 1841 was supplanted by Alexander Kara-

Georgevich, whose reign also was very short, and Milosh had to be restored at the age of seventy-eight, in 1858.

By the Treaty of Paris (1856) the independence of Serbia was guaranteed by the Powers. Montenegro, as always, was independent, and, as always, was in constant broils with her Turkish and Albanian neighbours. The great victory of Grahovo aroused the interest of Europe: the utter defeat of a large Turkish host by a disproportionately small Montenegrin force. But a third War of Independence still had to come. King Milan Obrenovich was the Prince of Serbia in 1876, and, unlike his predecessor, did not go to Constantinople for any confirmation of his title. The Bosnians and Herzogovinians were at last all rising, as well as the Bulgarians. Serbia made war upon Turkey, but did not achieve very much this time. Austria and Russia had, however, made a secret convention, 1877, that if Russia went to war with Turkey, Austria, as the price of her neutrality, was to receive Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Roumania was to be made independent. It was on this occasion that Bismarck, being consulted, said that the Eastern Question was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier.

By the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, Serbia was made independent and was guaranteed some extension of territory, partly at the expense of Albania; and Montenegrin independence was formally confirmed. Montenegro received Antivari and Dulcigno in Albanian territory, and her present littoral, but had to surrender Spizza in the same fashion as, some years ago, she had won Cattaro, to release it to Austria. Austria was guaranteed the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the right of garrisoning Novi Bazar, so as to interpose a nice little wedge between the two unduly lively Serbian States. Serbia received an extension of territory, including Nish, Leskovatz, and Pirot, and was formally made an independent State, which in 1882 was converted into a Kingdom. Milan had to resign his crown: the brutal murder of his son Alexander in 1903 estranged Serbia from the esteem of Europe.

This is, in very barest outline, a sketch of Serbia's

story. The outstanding features are the determined notion of the people throughout all the ages to fight the Turks, and never to part with their nationality. As an independent State they alone of the Balkans were able to create Princes of their own blood, not having to accept German princelets. The administration of the country has not by any means gone smoothly; but, amongst all of the Balkan States, Serbia perhaps stands out as the most valiant, the one that has been most churlishly treated, the most arbitrarily severed from her co-nationalists by artificial frontiers. When Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia was aflame with passion at this inclusion of a large section of the Serbian race into the Empire of Austria; and nothing but the fact that Bulgaria had been bought off by the gift of the royal title and independence, and that Serbia was thus isolated, prevented war.

The first Balkan war might have been concluded by the Treaty of London, which divided Macedonia fairly between Bulgaria and Greece: the unexpected difficulties raised by the Great Powers (who erected an independent unpartitioned Albania) had been successfully compromised by Sir Edward Grey, who presided at the simultaneous conference of the Great Powers at London.

However, whatever may have been the cause—Austrian intrigue has been surmised—the Bulgarians treacherously attacked the Serbians, who entered into an alliance with the Greeks. Bulgaria was decisively defeated; Serbia and Greece annexed portions of Macedonia, which racially should not have been assigned to them; and Turkey recovered Adrianople—whereas, under the Treaty of London, the Enos-Midia line would probably have the Southern frontier.

Roumania intervened at the last: invaded Bulgaria, which was too exhausted to offer any resistance, occupied Sofia, and was ceded the triangle of territory roughly defined by Baltchik, Mangalia, and Silistria; she enforced a settlement known as the Treaty of Bucharest (1912). It was essentially impermanent and unfair.

APPENDIX II

SUGGESTIONS FOR A JUST SETTLEMENT ON RACIAL LINES

The series of compromises in the settlement of the problem of the Far East, culminating in the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, has been finally thrown into the dust-bin with all the other treaties and projects over which diplomats have exercised their ingenuity, since Turkey fell into decay after the loss of Hungary. The Turkish soldier throughout all his many campaigns has been a fanatic : with his back to the wall, no braver fighter can be found ; but given an orderly campaign, in which fanaticism and wild dash would be unavailing, he has almost uniformly failed, and has repeatedly, with all the odds in his favour, been beaten.

If the Turks had been able to defeat the Balkan Allies piecemeal, the international problem would in a sense have been much easier. It would only have been a matter of forcing Turkey to resign the fruits of victory, and of propitiating the subordinate States with an increase of territory, Turkey receiving a substantial indemnity. After 1912 there were three great problems to be solved. The first was : How would the Powers of Central Europe endure the rising of a new Slav Orthodox Power on the shores of the Mediterranean ; and incidentally, and in close connection, who was to have the Dardanelles, and how was that ill-defined country Albania to be disposed of ?

The Balkan States have had ample experience of the generosity of Russia and the cold-blooded selfishness of Berlin. They saw how, when Russia in 1878 had advanced her armies to San Stefano, within hail of Constantinople, Austria had managed to extract very great profit from a deal in which she had risked nothing, and the Slav ambitions were curtailed, Slav freedom refused. They also witnessed that significant mobilization of Germany on the Russian frontier in 1908 which deterred Russia from taking any part against Austria, when Bosnia was annexed without any pretext of justification. In 1911 Austria, following with seemingly undiplomatic candour her old policy of grudge to the Southern Slavs, scouted the French suggestion that the Powers should act with disinterestedness. Austria has inherited

from the Holy Roman Empire the idea of the Empire which has long been antiquated everywhere else in the world: a military domain over people of diverse origin, with no link of common nationality, simply a dynastic unity. Austria, shut off from her former German possessions, desires an outlet to the sea. She has annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina; has long coveted Salonica. If all had gone well, as was contemplated, Turkey would have decayed passively, with convenient tardiness, and an Austrian army of occupation would have come sailing down the great rivers Vardar and Štruma and administered Middle Serbia for the benefit of Austrian trade. Austria was bound to try to wrest the fruits of victory from the allied Balkans, and to assert an autocratic tutelage over them: she sowed dissension in the Balkan League and incited Bulgaria to attack Serbia.

On all these considerations it is the clear course of justice, as well as the clear interest of England (who is the main butt of German ambition) to insist that this matter shall be settled in a natural way, to provide that the Greeks shall at last possess all the Greek domains, the islands, and the extension of frontier that covers Salonica, all of which comes within the racial Hellenic area. Serbia should have the old Serbian country called the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, as well as Old Serbia, with the old capitals of Prishtina and Skoplje; she has a right to some outlet to the sea, possibly by Durazzo, or else nearer in to Lake Skutari. Montenegro, which desires to have some fertile land, should expand to the river Drin, which is more or less the limit of Serbian nationality. A just settlement from that point might be to give territory from beyond the River Drin, with a coastline up to Durazzo following a line of the Skar Dagh (Scardus) mountains up to Vrania by Ishtip and Kustendil up to Pirot and the existing Serbian eastern frontier, and to extend the Montenegrin frontier up to the Drin. Greece, who has racial claims to Yanina, might justly have the Grecian country from a point on the coast opposite to Corfu, the line of her frontier covering Veria and Vodena and including the crab-like promontory of Salonica: a harbour too powerful to be given with our sanction to any possible hostile Power of the Triple Alliance. The frontier of Bulgaria, following the same line of racial demarcation, would run by the Serbian and the Greek: and would necessarily include a certain amount of more or less Turkish country on the west coast of the Black Sea, below the border of Eastern Roumelia, and the Mediterranean coastline from about Orfani to the mouth of the Maritza. Racially, indeed, a great deal of the west coast of the Black Sea that is already included in Bulgaria or modern Roumania is Turkish in origin, but Turkish rule in Europe is dead. The possession of the Dardanelles and of the Holy City of Constantinople, the seat of the Moslem Caliphate, might possibly be left in the hands of the Turks, with a European fringe of territory on the south bank of the Maritsa and Ergene.

Any aggressive Power that holds Constantinople would have a

hold on the Mediterranean too dangerous for the other States. It is now in German hands: the final settlement must dispossess Germany. Any attempt to christianize Constantinople might cause general insurrection and discontent throughout all the Moslem countries of the world; and the Turks under some international guarantee of good government should perhaps be allowed to possess the Dardanelles with their frontier up to the Maritsa and Ergene, a small buffer State to guard it from the jealousies of the greater Powers. Probably this limited portion of European Turkey would have to be put under some international guarantee of good government. This solution, or a solution somewhat on these lines, would meet the just ambitions of a new Balkan federation, would admit them into the family of the European Concert as a new and powerful State; would, from the point of view of England, remove the possibility of a German foothold in the Mediterranean, and ensure us the friendship of the new Balkan League, for the very reason that we had admitted and forwarded its just claims. Russia would be the natural ally of a new Balkan League, and should, in the interests of humanity, take over the rest of Armenia. England cannot afford to give Austria and Germany a 'window' in the Mediterranean.


In any permanent adjustment, Bulgaria should be punished for her alliance with the Central Powers, but should not be mulcted of her national territory. She would thus be conciliated and, in time, be a loyal member of a new Balkan League.

Albania is a very debateable territory. It has been very largely invaded, as things are, by Serbia and by Greece. It is populated half by Moslems, to a certain extent by Catholics, and for the rest by Orthodox tribesmen, all of them inaccessible and wild. The division of the spoils suggested would leave an Albania which was racially a unit, and should be put under the administration of some great Power. It might indeed be very desirable to have the Turks as a Moslem Power to share in the protectorate of this peculiar country.

The Quadruple Alliance should insist on a final and equitable solution by assigning to each of the Balkan races, including Bulgaria, the territory that is racially their own; and constituting them as a new independent Southern European *bloc*.

AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONTIER

SCALE 1:100,000



SWITZERLAND

BRESCIA

VERONA

VICENZA

PADUA

TREVISA

VENICE

LIVIGNO

UDINE

GORIZIA

TRIESTE

VILLACH

SAFENITZ

OSTERNIG

PLEZZO

CIVIDALE

MONFALCONE

GRADISCA

KOMER

BOBBE

CAPODISTRIA

CARNIC ALPS

BRIXEN

KLAUSEN

SCHLERN

BOZEN

TRENTO

CLAVES

TAJOS

MEZZOLIBANO

LAVIS

TRENTO

ROVERETO

RIVA

SALÒ

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BRENTA

ADIGE

SOPILO

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RELSACH

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PROVEIS

CLAVES

TAJOS

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APPENDIX III

HOW ITALY AND AUSTRIA WENT TO WAR

[Authorities: the Second Austro-Hungarian Red Book, here referred to as "A. H.," and the Italian Green Book, here referred to as "I." "A. H." begins on July 20, 1914, and the two books only run together from A. H., No. 74 (December 12, 1914) to June 4, 1915, when A. H. again is the only authority up to the rupture of negotiations.]

CHAPTER I

On July 20, 1914, Count Berchtold (Foreign Secretary at Vienna) instructed von Mérey (then Austrian Ambassador at Rome) to approach the Marquis di San Giuliano (the Italian Premier), and inform him that Austria intended sending a note to Serbia, to clear up the situation, hoping that Italy would act as a loyal ally; Austria had no territorial ambitions, and, in particular, none on Mount Lovczen (in Montenegro) [A. H., 1].

Austria contemplated war as the result (July 20) [A. H., 2]: the outcome might be a temporary occupation of Serbian territory; but Art. VII.* of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance would be wrongly interpreted, if held to apply to such a contingency. Rather the phrase '*dans les régions des Balkans*' implied Turkish territory, as also in the special agreement of 1909.* This note [A. H., 2] is a confidential memoir.

At the interview (July 21, 1914) San Giuliano was 'pre-occupied' at the situation. Italy desired that Austria-Hungary should be strong, but not aggrandised: any intervention in Serbia should be confined to the Sarajevo outrage. These limitations were regarded by von Mérey as impracticable, and a proof of lack of confidence; evidently, in his opinion, San Giuliano had in mind, not war, but a curbing-in of Serbia [A. H., 3]. The demands themselves were not shown, until after they had been delivered to Serbia [A. H., 4 and 5].

On July 23 San Giuliano asked for time to consider these

* V. pp. 277-8.

demands [A. H., 7], and on the 24th, de Martino, acting for the Premier, expressed great surprise at them, concluding, on being asked to agree that these measures were merely defensive, 'Certainement, je n'aurais jamais cru que l'on puisse constater et prouver la culpabilité d'officiers et de fonctionnaires serbes dans le drame de Sarajévo' [A. H., 8]; and on the 25th the Italian Ambassador at Vienna gave formal notice that any action on the ultimatum would give rise to claims for compensation under Art. VII. [A. H., 9].

When relations with Serbia were broken off on July 26, Vienna anxiously instructed Rome with the full case for Austria [A. H., 10 and 11].

Italy [A. H., 12], raised another ground of protest, that she had not been informed in advance of the demands. The reply was that Germany was not informed; and, in any case, Italy had been equally uninformative when she launched her twenty-four-hour ultimatum to Turkey in 1911—a point on which Italy had much to say later on. Von Jagow's denial of knowledge is not quite convincing [*cf.* p. 285 on the *Goeben*].

Austria [A. H., 13] was apprehensive on this ground as well: Italy might argue that Austria had hampered Italy's freedom of action in the Libyan war; and von Mérey was supplied with a series of arguments and precedents to disprove that the restriction of hostilities to Turkey beyond the Ægean and Dalmatia was in any way unfriendly. Austria was to insist that the retention of the Dodecanese by Italy was purely provisional. [The Dodecanese is the archipelago including Rhodes, occupied by Italy in the Italo-Turkish war of 1911, to be returned to Turkey when the latter had complied with the obligations of the Treaty of Lausanne, which terminated the war, *viz.*, to withdraw all her forces from Libya: This has not been done up to the present.] From p. 19 it appears that it was Germany's insistence that overruled Austria's objections in that year, especially as Libya and these islands were not in the sphere of influence contemplated by Art. VII.

There was already some friction between Austria and Italy, and Berlin on the 28th apprised Vienna, that Berlin construed Article VII. in the same way as Italy. Austria would not give any binding declaration not to occupy Serbian territory (July 28th) [contrary to her promises, *v.* A. H., 15].

On July 29 [A. H., 16] Italy formally replied. On the precedent of the war of 1911 against Turkey, which concerned countries much remoter from Italy than the present war against Serbia, there must be some compensation for Austria's eventual gains in Serbia, and with these reservations Italy would be benevolently neutral.

On the 30th Italy was even more explicit: that the Triple Alliance was defensive; that Austria had provoked a European war, and Italy was therefore not pledged. But she might join in, if it were to her interest [A. H., 17].

Austria was suspicious. 'We might involve ourselves in far-reaching obligations in the matter of compensation, and yet not secure our object, the co-operation of Italy.' But she was willing to promise compensations, if the war resulted well [A. H., 18]. By July 31 Austria formally accepted the German and Italian reading of Art. VII., and admitted the necessity of compensation [A. H., 20].

The Italian construction is formulated in No. 26. 'Austria-Hungary aimed at a war she could easily have avoided, whilst we did all we could to spare Europe this terrible calamity.' 'Count Berchtold made the acceptance of our interpretation of Article VII. conditional on Italy's attitude in the present crisis. . . . Germany, logically, does not make her construction conditional : and hers conforms with ours.' [For the Austrian reply, *v. A. H.* 35.]

CHAPTER II

The situation now changed ; the Serbian quarrel had become the European War.

The Emperor of Austria sent a telegram to the King of Italy, to appeal for Italian co-operation [A. H., 21 ; Aug. 1, 1914]. The King of Italy in reply stated that Italy had done all she could to preserve peace, would endeavour to re-establish peace, and in the meantime would be friendly, in accordance with the Triple Alliance, the sentiments of honour, and the great interests at stake [A. H., 23]. But Italy made it clear that Austria, having provoked war with an ultimatum of which she had given no notice, had no claim on her allies. Herr von Mérey thought 'both in the localized and the general war Italy will demand her fee in advance' [A. H., 22 ; Aug. 1].

Count Berchtold cited Art. III. of the Triple Alliance, alleging that Russia mobilized without due cause [A. H., 24 ; Aug. 2].

On Aug. 3 Italy proclaimed her neutrality [A. H., 27] : and Austria (on the 4th) represented to Duke Avarna (Italian Ambassador at Vienna) that Italy might have taken Tunis and Savoy, and had missed the opportunity [A. H., 30].

But, on Aug. 4, Avarna informed Berchtold that Italy would maintain the decisions of the Treaty of London regarding Albania, and would not try to derive any advantage from Austria's attentions being elsewhere engaged. Berchtold was very much delighted [A. H., 29], though he regarded the act of neutrality as unfriendly [No. 30] ; and Cadorna stated that Italy would never attack Austria, provided that Austria made no attempt on Mount Lovcen [A. H., 31].

Herr von Mérey at Rome was more apprehensive ; he feared Italy would resuscitate the compensation claims, and finally demand the Trentino and Trieste. He was, on Aug. 11, replaced at Rome by Count Ambrózy, who was succeeded on the 16th by Freiherr von Macchio.

On Aug. 11 de Martino renewed the subject of compensation : even if Austria gained nothing territorially, she might be benefited otherwise, *e.g.*, in a railway through Serbia to the Adriatic : and on the 21st [A. H., 41] Macchio at Rome was instructed to evade any questions as to anything concrete in the way of compensations. Berchtold at Vienna remarks that San Giuliano had promised to make the Italian Press neutral, but had little influence, as few of the papers were subsidized [A. H., 39].

On Aug. 20 Giuliano also notified Macchio that any sharp measures against Italian-speaking Austrians would be resented [A. H., 39].

On Aug. 21 Giuliano represented to Macchio that Italy must remain neutral, despite the tempting offers of the Entente ; and, as so many Italian working-men were coming home from abroad, there was nothing for it but to relieve the labour market and train them in the army [A. H., 40].

These threats and inducements to Austria had some effect, and were capped by the express command of Prinz Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Berchtold, to accept without demur Art. VII. as interpreted, *viz.*, that any accretion to Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, even if Italy remain neutral, might only take place after previous consultation, and subject to an equal compensation, and this to hold good for the war, and for the whole period of validity of the Treaty [A. H., 42 ; Aug. 22].

Count Berchtold immediately complied [A. H., 43, 44, and 45 ; Aug. 23].

CHAPTER III

Italy was now maintaining conversations with Austria and Germany on three points : Albania, the Italian-speaking subjects of Austria, and the compensation question.

On Aug. 25 [A. H., 46] Salandra stated that Italy would remain neutral as long as the Italian-speaking subjects of Austria were not molested.

On Aug. 28 [A. H., 49] Avarna at Vienna informed the Austrian Government that England and France had decided not to occupy Valona, and had sounded Italy, whether Italy would abandon her neutrality.

As the result of this suggestion, on Sept. 5 [A. H., 50] Prince Hohenlohe at Berlin directed Berchtold at Vienna to allow Italy to occupy the island of Sasseno as a temporary and precautionary measure ; to which Berchtold agreed [A. H., 51]. The matter was to be discussed and settled at Berlin [A. H., 52, 53], and the Austrian Press published a *démenti* of any Italian intentions of aggression on Valona. Giuliano insisted any such steps were merely to make Greece respect the neutrality of Albania [A. H., 55] ; (the Greeks at this time were occupying the half of Epirus cut off and put into Albania by the Treaty of London,

1912). Italy was undertaking this work, for which Austria and Germany, being belligerents, were now incompetent [A. H., 55]: indeed, France had promised Tunis to Italy, so as to win her over [A. H., 58; Oct. 5].

On such urgent inducements, and to divert the Italian Irredentists, Austria approved of the occupation of Valona by Italy [A. H., 59; Oct. 6]: the neutrality of Albania was thus reinforced, and Austria inclined to favour such an occupation, as giving her a pretext, when Italy next harped upon Serbia [A. H., 61] to speak of the act as a *fait accompli* and an infraction of Art. VII., involving compensations [A. H., 62].

Moreover, the tentative and passive naval policy of the Allies in the Adriatic, according to San Giuliano, could only mean that they were waiting on Italy; and Italy would not join in with them [A. H., 63; Oct. 16].

On Oct. 18 San Giuliano died.

On Oct. 19 [A. H., 66] Italy drew the attention of the Austrians again to the progress of the Greeks to Argyrokastró; that they and Essad Pasha must be intending to infringe the neutrality of Albania [A. H., 66, 67], whilst Sir E. Grey was interesting the Italians in relief expeditions for the destitute Mohanmedans in Albania [A. H., 68; Oct. 22].

On Oct. 26 and 30 Italy sent a hospital-ship and a military force to Sasseno, whilst not as yet touching Valona. The Austrian Consul at Valona noticed and remarked 'that the provisionalness of the measures was not brought into great prominence' [A. H., 70-73 (Nov. 1, 1914)].

Between November and December there is an intermission in the correspondence as published. The Russians at this time were invading Eastern Prussia; they held Galicia, including Przemysl, and were threatening the Carpathians; Poland, save for a fringe of territory from where the Warta enters Russian Poland to the Vistula just east of Cracow, was in Russian hands.

In the West the position was much the same as now, *i.e.*, before the advances of June and July, 1916. Dixmude was still in the Allies' occupation.

Serbia was unoccupied, save for Belgrade and the Serbian banks of the Danube, which were retaken by the Serbians in mid-December, when they routed the Austrians.

In December the great German advance against Russia began; with the first of the attempts to take Warsaw after the Russian defeat at Tannenberg.

CHAPTER IV

On Dec. 9 [I., 1; A. H., 74] Avarna at Vienna was instructed to raise the question of compensation with regard to the Austrian invasion of Serbia. 'Italy is essentially interested in the conservation of Serbia's liberty and integrity in full and economic

and political independence. The Austro-Hungarian Government has often declared it has no intention of territorial gains at Serbia's expense, but such a declaration is not a binding pledge. Invasion, even temporary, disturbs the equilibrium of the Balkans, and gives rise to a claim for compensations.' (It will be remembered that Germany had directed Austria to accept the Italian understanding of Art. VII.) 'The interests of Italy were so great in this direction, that her neutrality was confirmed, merely because this policy could thus be adequately safeguarded' [I., 2].

By Dec. 12 Austrian troops had occupied Valjevo [I., 3].

Austria in reply [Dec. 12, 1914; A. H., 75] pointed out that these occupations in Serbia were not even 'provisional,' like those of the Dodecanese, or Bosnia-Herzegovina; but merely military; and that, during the Libyan war (1911-12) Italy had similarly bombarded the Turkish forts at Salonica and the Dardanelles. At any rate Italy had no right to take up the cudgels for Serbia with her anti-Austrian policy. Italy argued, 'Between the maintenance of the political liberty and integrity on one side, and the destruction of them on the other, there is a great gap, which can be the subject of negotiations' [I., 6 and 7].

Meanwhile [I., 5; A. H., 77 (Dec. 14.)] it appears that Berlin had convinced Austria that she must enter into these negotiations, or into an 'exchange of ideas' on the subject.

On Dec. 16 [I., 6], Italy pointed out that Libya was beyond the Balkans, and Italy in 1911 had been forbidden to attack European Turkey and had complied; and that any agreement must be made in advance, and not during an attack [I., 7].

On Dec. 20 [I., 8] Prince Bülow was sent as Ambassador to Italy for Germany, so as to be able to inform Berlin at first-hand how matters really stood. He had once said in the Reichstag that the Triple Alliance was the best means of keeping the peace between Italy and Austria, who, according to Count Nigra, must be either friends or foes. To which the Italian diplomat rejoined that, thus stated, it was an exaggeration; but the alliance could not be useful or fruitful in the absence of perfect cordiality. Italy wanted to remain neutral, but not at the sacrifice of some national aspirations. Prince Bülow thanked the Italian for his frankness, and recognised the need of working to secure this result.

On the 19th, Avarna had visited Count Berchtold and reported that Art. VII. did not distinguish between a military or temporary occupation, and in any case preliminary accord was essential. It was agreed at the end:

(1) That Austria could not dispute the Italian claims to compensation;

(2) And would enter into an exchange of thoughts on the subject [A. H., 78 and 79].

On this point Berlin and Italy had now convinced Austria. Meantime work was progressing in Albania.

On Dec. 26 [A. H., 82] Berchtold reported to Ambrózy at Rome that Avarna had visited him and stated that Albania was in anarchy, and there had been riots at Valona. Count Berchtold merely took note of the fact that Italy, as Avarna said, was only giving effect to the decisions of the Conference of London.

On Dec. 25 the Italians landed at Valona, to repress a riot [A. H., 80-83]; on the 28th occupied positions adjoining Valona [A. H., 84]; controlled the civic administration [A. H., 85 and 89]; landed further troops (Jan. 1, 1915) [A. H., 87]; on Jan. 11, 1915, appointed Customs Officers [A. H., 93]; set up an Italian Port Authority [A. H., 100, 101, 126 (Jan. 29, Feb. 1, March 22)].

On Jan. 7, 1915, Berchtold was of opinion that 'the frivolous reply of Baron Sonnino on Albania is, as I understand it, explicable on the theory that, with the occupation of Valona, the most important point is already in the hands of Italy; on the other hand, that the Italian Government is much concerned to give an outward impression of laying no great weight on Albania' [A. H., 91].

CHAPTER V

In Jan., 1915, negotiations in the matter of compensations were resumed.

The scene opens at Berlin, where Zimmermann, on behalf of von Jagow, was approached by the Italian Ambassador (Jan. 6, 1915) [I., 9]. Zimmermann said that he entirely realized the position of Italy; that he had always urged Austria to yield, pointing to the inevitable consequences. He had always been faced with a refusal, the grounds of which he could not justify, save in so far as they were practical politics. All the governing circles now understood that Austria must resign herself to some sacrifice to Italy, so as to escape greater disaster.

The German Ambassador at Vienna expressed himself to the same effect (Jan. 4, 1915) [A. H., 88]. The war of 1914 had been started without Italy's previous consent; she was unprepared: what was to be her compensation? The Trentino is here named specifically for the first time. But Austria doubted whether Italy would be satisfied with this concession.

At Rome, Sonnino [A. H., 90; Jan. 6] intimated much the same to von Macchio; explained that Italy was only acting preventively in Albania, and hinted at the Trentino, without naming it. Vienna insisted that the initiative must come from Rome, who must promise a benevolent neutrality [A. H., 92; Jan. 8].

But Sonnino [I., 10; Jan. 7] remarks that the retirement of the Austrian troops from Serbia made these discussions less

opportune, no longer cogent; he did not wish by undue insistence to seem to be seeking to fasten a quarrel on Austria. Sonnino could not accept a compensation in Albania; it was 'unattractive,' and Italy's interest was merely negative.

Macchio suggested there must be give and take; Italy's share must be commensurate with Austria's gain at the end of the war. He also pointed out that since 1859 the Italian element in Austria-Hungary had become insignificant before the other competing nationalities; in Trieste, Slav pressure had forced the Austrian authorities to act against Italian desire. The Italian element was dying out.

At another interview (Jan. 12 [A. H., 94]), Sonnino observed that the value of Albania was very largely exaggerated; it involved being drawn into Balkan squabbles, and he explained away any apparent concentration of troops on the Austrian frontier [*cf.* I., 11].

On the same day Avarna at Vienna explained that the compensation must be a cession of Austrian territory, since 'Italy, as a neutral power, could not enter into a discussion, touching other regions, in the possession of belligerents: this would be equivalent to taking part in the war.' Berchtold insisted on the occupation of Valona, as giving a ground for compensations [A. H., 95].

Meantime, von Bülow (German Ambassador at Rome), said that Germany had sent Count Wedel to Vienna to induce Austria to cede the Trentino. The difficulties were military—to abandon territory during the war—and dynastic, as the Austrian Emperor was the Count of the Tyrol. If the territory of the secularized episcopate of Trent (*v. p.* 121) could be accepted—it had only recently been attached to the Tyrol—that might solve the problem, if the boundaries could be ascertained [I., 11].

Prince Bülow advised Italy not to ask for anything more than the Trentino, for Austria would prefer war to the cession of Trieste. But he could answer for Austria's consent regarding the Trentino [I., 11 and 13].

Austria was still reluctant [A. H., 96; I., 16, Jan. 28]; and Baron Burián (who had succeeded Count Berchtold as Minister of Foreign Affairs) (Jan. 19 [A. H., 97]), insisted that Germany, in the event of war, would stand by Austria. On Jan. 18 there was a further conversation at Vienna, to the same effect. Baron Burián remarked that it did seem to him that what could not be demanded of other belligerents could be demanded from Austria (*viz.*, a cession of territory) [I., 12; A. H., 99].

Sonnino rejoins [I., 14] the difference is that Austria would cede what is her own, not what is at present her enemy's property. The new Austrian offensive against Serbia would disturb the situation (Jan. 23, 1915).

On Jan. 26, 1915, von Bülow insisted that Italy must name the cession she demanded, as Austria was in dread of an 'endless application of the screw' [I., 15].

To this Italy objected [A. H., 103 ; I., 17, Feb. 2 ; and I., 18, Feb. 4] ; she would only specify her demands when Austria consented to the basis of discussion being Austro-Hungarian territory ; and the longer the delay the harder would the requirements be.

On this essential point of Austria's consent no answer had been received by Feb. 7 [I., 19]. On Feb. 9 Baron Burián replied that there were grave objections to such a cession, raised by Count Stürgck and Count Tisza, and again tried to raise the question whether the Italian occupation of the Dodecanese and Valona did not set up similar claims.

Avarna rejoined that both of these occupations were negative ; to safeguard the decisions of the London Conference (of 1912), and to hold Rhodes and the other islands against Greece and on behalf of Turkey [I., 20]. To this point Burián recurred [A. H., 104 (Feb. 11) ; I., 21 (Feb. 12)], insisting that Italy should have evacuated the Dodecanese under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne ; that her occupation of Valona seemed permanent.

On Feb. 12 Italy replied that the islands occupied were Stampalia, Rhodes, Casos, Scarpanto, Calchi, and Simi, Piscopi, Nisero, Calymno, Lero, Lipsos, and Patmos. It was doubtful if these islands were in the Ægean, to which Art. VII. referred. For this reason Italy had refrained from occupying Chios and Mitylene. Moreover, Turkey had not yet withdrawn her troops from Libya, the condition precedent under the Treaty of Lausanne.

Valona was held merely to maintain the neutrality and existence of Albania.

Moreover, two months had gone by since the questions of compensations had been raised.

At this point Italy retracted her proposal to initiate any discussion, and under Art. VII. intimated that any military move in the Balkans would be illicit, without a preliminary agreement under Art. VII. Grave consequences might otherwise result: just as, when the Italian squadron stood off the mouth of the Dardanelles in 1912, and had been bombarded by the fortress of Kum Kalessi, the Austrian Government threatened Italy, that if Italy resumed liberty of action, the Imperial and Royal Government would do the same [I., 22 ; A. H., 106].

CHAPTER VI

This direct threat from Italy to Austria again changes the situation.

The quasi-ultimatum [I., 22] was duly presented at Vienna [I., 23 ; Feb. 14] ; and Prince Bülow, the German Ambassador at Rome, on the 18th sounded Sonnino, whether Italy could not accept any other territory instead of the Trentino, and was informed that that was Italy's national ambition ; and on the

21st was handed a formal declaration : ' The Italian Government has declared from the beginning that it cannot admit the usefulness of any discussion on compensation not bearing on territories now in the possession of Austria-Hungary ; as such discussions cannot satisfy the national sentiments of Italy, nor lead to any agreement.

' Up to now the two Governments have vaguely discussed events in the Balkans, past or future.

' Confining themselves to Art. VII. . . . and withdrawing every proposition previously put forward, the Italian Government wish to state concisely : that they will not allow any military action on the part of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans without a preliminary agreement as to compensation, in accordance with the terms of Art. VII. ; and this agreement cannot be concluded except on the basis of territories now occupied by Austria-Hungary. Should that Government not regard this declaration, the Italian Government will see a proof that Austria-Hungary has resumed her liberty of action, a fact which would justify the Italian Government in reassuming its liberty ' [I., 25 and 26]. This was telegraphed to Berlin, and Bethmann-Hollweg (Feb. 26) agreed that such a preliminary agreement was essential [I., 29 and 30].

Vienna (Feb. 22, 1915 [A. H., 109 ; I., 27]) still refused to acquiesce, and negotiations were still in abeyance.

On Feb. 25 Sonnino explained that the preliminary agreement, according to Art. VII., must be confirmed by all the parties, and the compensations fixed, before any action is taken. But they might agree to make the terms conditional. There can be no question of settling the compensations on the value of the actual acquisitions, otherwise the war might be over before one party had come to know whether there was a case for compensation.

On Feb. 26 Vienna [A. H., 111 ; I., 32] was more inclined to favour the propositions for an ' exchange of thoughts,' but still would not agree to the first condition, that the compensation must be from what Austria-Hungary could cede, namely, her own territory [I., 23 (Feb. 27)].

But Vienna welcomed the suggestion, that, since Austria and Serbia were at war, the agreement might be ' in conditional form and with a sliding scale ' [A. H., 111].

On March 2 Avarna again visited Count Burián at Vienna to demand an answer, and Burián still insisted that no compensations could be considered until Austria knew what she had gained [A. H., 113]. Burián recanted on the interpretation of Art. VII. that this agreement must be concluded before any action was taken [I., 34].

On March 6 Macchio reported from Rome to Vienna that matters looked very serious. The Italian Cabinet and Parliament were united ; and the attack on the Dardanelles was reviving the problems of the dissolution of Turkey [A. H., 114].

On March 4 Sonnino instructed Avarna to insist on the previous

quasi-ultimatum, drawn up in five articles, and not to allow any further discussion on the Dodecanese or Valona [I., 35].

At this point Berlin intervened. On March 9 Austria yielded to the Italian demand in principle, and notified Germany. The negotiations for the compensations were to be conducted between Austria and Italy [A. H., 115; I., 40 and 41 (March 9)].

The fact was [A. H., 116] that Berlin had spoken [I., 38 (March 8)]; Sonnino was to keep the fact of his diplomatic victory secret until the whole matter had been arranged (March 10).

The decision had been hastened and the position aggravated by the Austrian bombardment of the Montenegrin port Antivari, on March 4, 1915, against which Italy would protest [I., 36].

CHAPTER VII

Austria had now been brought to it by Berlin, to consent to negotiations for compensation out of her own territories; and war, which was imminent in March, had been staved off.

Prince Bülow received a despatch from Berlin: 'Baron Burián has asked us to notify the Italian Government that Austria-Hungary is willing to enter into negotiations with Italy in conformity with Baron Sonnino's proposals, on the basis of the cession of Austrian territory. The announcement to be made to the Italian Parliament is to be concerted with Vienna. Baron Burián will do his utmost to get it drafted accordingly in the briefest time possible' [I., 39].

Sonnino proposed (March 12):

(1) That the fact and the negotiations should be absolutely secret. Any indiscretion would make Italy break negotiations off.

(2) The agreement, when arrived at, should be put into execution at once. The Italian Government would not otherwise have the necessary political power to secure from the nation the essential moral ratification for the coming into force of the agreement.

(3) To meet any fresh question or quarrel, to avert any revival of irritant incidents, and to enable the Imperial and Royal Government to carry on the war with freedom, the agreement was to hold good for the duration of the war, and to acquit any possible demands under Article VII.

As soon as Austria had accepted these formal points, Sonnino would state his demands, which will be the minimum of compensation.

Austria still maintained her interpretation of the 'accord préalable,' and rejected the second proposal (of instant execution)

It was the one and, Burián hoped, transitory obstacle to a happy settlement of the problem [A. H., 117 and 118].

Italy insisted (March 13, 1915). 'The fixed proportion of compensation to countervail the beginning of operations of war, quite apart from the fruits of them, was not to be kept secret, but to be carried into effect at once; the territory to be ceded and occupied by Italy' [I., 43 and 44 (March 13); I., 45 (March 16)].

Italy stood firm on this article: it was a *sine qua non* [I., 45]; and the postponement of the fulfilment, until peace should be declared, was incongruous with the notion of a preventive agreement [I., 45].

Austria contended she must pay regard to her subjects' feelings: they were fighting for the integrity of Austria [A. H., 118]; but should Italy be anxious that, if things went well by her, she would not keep her word, she was willing to give guarantees; and further offered Italy a share of the eventual spoils from the Allies (March 17) [A. H., 119].

At this stage Prince Bülow again intervened. On March 17 he offered the guarantee of the Emperors of Austria and Germany for the eventual cession at the conclusion of peace. Any other course would mean revolution at Vienna: no Austrian Parliament would consent [I., 47 and 48].

Italy rejoined that the case of Nice and Savoy (which were ceded after the conclusion of peace) was not comparable. The men of Nice and Savoy were fighting the same enemy, quite apart from any cession.

Nor was the consent of the Austrian Parliament necessary: the Austrian Emperor had full powers. Unless he exercised them, Italy might be cheated [A. H., 121].

Bülow regarded this condition as fatal, and the one obstacle. It might lead to a rupture between Germany and Italy.

But, if Italy would join in the war in March, matters might be arranged [I., 46].

Italy rejoined that the settlement of the Austro-Italian dispute would relieve Austria of anxiety, and set her free elsewhere [I., 47 and 48; A. H., 121].

'Baron Burián's argument renders impossible what Baron Sonnino is aiming at, an agreement with the nature of a *forfait*: a cession of Austrian territory against a guarantee of neutrality for the duration of the war, whatever the issue of the war' [Cf. I., 51, March 21 (when Baron Burián begins to assent)].

Austria consented (March 19) that these cessions to Italy should be entirely irrespective of any gains or losses as the fruit of the war [A. H., 122 and 124].

The bait of relieving the Austrian troops had some effect, for on March 21 Burián writes: 'In any case the use we make of the free disposition of our troops will be our business; and the fulfilment of determinate contractual obligations will no longer be made to depend on the quality of our success' [A. H., 124];

and ' Like Baron Sonnino, I am rather doubtful of the opportuneness of the proposal contained in your telegram of the 19th, *viz.*, to leave the decision of the Italian demand for immediate execution in suspense, until the *pourparlers* are concluded. This procedure would render an understanding on all proper points for compromise of the matters reserved for the conclusion dependent on an important preliminary question of principle ' [A. H., 125].

As to the Austrian and Hungarian Parliaments, on March 21, Baron Burián apprehends no difficulty; they cannot reject a measure ratified by the prerogative of the Emperor [I., 51 and 54]. Yet on March 23 [I., 53] Macchio still professes anxiety on this point.

On March 23 Sonnino again insisted on immediate cession [A. H., 127 and 128]. This time Macchio did not decline to consider Sonnino's new proposal, to take the initiative in defining the subject of negotiation; but could not agree that the territory should be ceded at once.

On March 27 Burián consented to offer proposals for the consideration of Italy [I., 54]; and on the 27th, with the approval of the Emperor of Austria, Burián suggested the following conditions:

(1) Italy to pledge herself to a benevolent neutrality towards Austria-Hungary and her allies, both from a political and economic point of view.

(2) To leave Austria full liberty of action in the Balkans and renounce in anticipation any compensations in the Balkans.

(3) As to Albania, the Treaty of London shall still apply.

(4) Austria will cede Italy part of the Southern Tyrol and the city of Trent, the frontier to be delineated on strategic and national lines [A. H., 131; I., 54].

(5) Italy to take over a *pro rata* portion of the Austrian debt.

These proposals seemed insufficient to Sonnino [A. H., 132; March 31]; [I., 58].

English pressure would oblige him to be strictly neutral; not a benevolent neutral [A. H., 132].

The geographical position of Italy rendered this neutrality unavoidable [I., 58].

Italy could not consent to grant Austria liberty in the Balkans, unless she abdicated all interest in Albania.

The concession in the Trentino had not yet been defined. On about April 1 large bodies of Italian troops were sent to the frontier near Udine; and it was said that England had offered to reimburse Italy for the cost of war. ' The further behaviour of Baron Sonnino will show whether the Italian Government intends protracting, or drawing the long bow by extravagant counter-proposals, and so casting the obloquy of a rupture upon Austria-Hungary, or whether it intends the military preparations to be used as pressure in the *pourparlers* ' [A. H., 133].

On that same day an Austrian aeroplane dropped bombs on the royal palace at Cetigne. Italy protested [I., 59], and on the 8th Podgorica was similarly bombarded [I., 68].

On April 2 Austria made another proposal [I., 60; A. H., 134]. Austria had never intended Italy to expose herself to reprisals by benevolent neutrality; but 'a neutral country had thousands of lawful means by which she might do service to a belligerent who was a neighbour and ally' [in A. H., 134, *not* in I., 60].

Regarding Albania, Austria could not assent to disinterest herself absolutely; and Italy would not concede Austria the *liberté d'action illimitée* in Serbia that Austria asked for.

Austria offered Italy, on the conditions stated, 'the districts of Trent, Rovereto, Riva, Tione (excepting Madonna di Campiglio and the environs) and the district of Borgo. In the valley of the Adige the frontier was to be advanced to Lavis, which should be Italian.'

Italy required territory that should remove any motive for Irredentism [A. H., 134].

It is apposite to note that Macchio [A. H., 135 (April 2)] was of opinion that Italy was biding her time, watching how Russia fared in the Carpathians and the Allies in the Dardanelles; whilst, on the same day, it was reported to Sonnino from Berlin that Germany was seeking to make a separate peace with Russia; and from Nish and Sofia on April 10 and 13 [I., 66, 68, and 70] that Austria was on the point of concluding peace with Russia, in order to have her hands free against Italy.

On April 16 Burián has a *démenti* of these rumours published [A. H., 145].

Austria was in grave doubt as to what was really in the mind of the Italian Government [A. H., 136 (April 2)]; and Macchio replied (April 7 [A. H., 140]) that the Italian national vanity felt sore at being out of the great struggle; that the Entente was every day winning over Italy 'with its network of lies' (*Lügendewebe*); something must be done to countervail the distrust which the Ambassadors of the Entente were fostering [A. H. 139]; that the large majority were inclined to neutrality, and finally 'the ghost of Machiavelli may well be proud of his assiduous pupils. The question, however: Who will seek Italy's friendship after this episode? does not seem to enter into these gentlemen's heads' [A. H., 140].

Italy had now made Austria offer Austrian soil, the question of the date of effective cession being left in abeyance.

On April 6 no answer had been returned to the last requests preferred by Italy on April 2 [A. H., 138; I., 62]. Avarna was requested to telegraph to Rome, to ask Sonnino to make counter-proposals for himself.

On April 7 [A. H., 139] Sonnino promised to formulate definite counter-proposals.

On April 11 these were communicated in full [A. H., 141; I., 64].

CHAPTER VIII

On April 8 Sonnino formulated his proposals, which were presented at Vienna on the 10th [A. H., 141; I., 64]. These were :*

I. Austria-Hungary cedes to Italy the Trentino with the frontiers assigned to the Kingdom of Italy in 1811, by the Treaty of Paris of Feb. 28, 1810.

This new frontier quits the present at Monte Cevedale [Zufallspitze], follows for some distance the ridge between Valle Venosta [Wintschgau], and the Valle del Noce, then descends to the Adige [Etsch], down to Gargazone [Gargazon], between Méran and Bolzano [Bozen], climbs up again on the high plateau of the left bank, cuts Val Sorentino [Sarntal] in half; and the Eisack valley at Klausen, and rejoins the present frontier by the Dolomites on the right bank of the river Avisio, excluding the valleys of Garden [Gröden] and Badia [Abtei], but including the region of Ampezzo.

II. Austria-Hungary is to rectify the Eastern frontier of Italy in the latter's favour, by including in it Gradisca [Gradiska] and Gorizia [Görz].

On leaving Trogkofel, the new frontier departs from the present towards the east on to Osternig, whence it sinks from the Carnic Alps [Karnische Alpen] to Saifniz. It climbs up to the Wischberg by the ridge between Seisera [Seisser] and Schliza, then again follows the present frontier down to Sella di Nevea, down the Rombone heights to the Isonzo, passing to the east of Plezzo [Flitsch].

It then follows the line of the Isonzo up to Tolmino [Tolmein], where, quitting the Isonzo for a more easterly direction (which passes to the east of the high plateau of Pregona-Planina and follows the declivity (solco) of Chiappovano, thus descending to the east of Gorizia [Görz], and across the Carso di Comen [Karst von Komen]) it touches the sea between Monfalcone and Trieste near Nabresina.

III. The City of Trieste with its territory, which shall be extended so as to embrace Nabresina and be coterminous with the new Italian frontier, and including to the south the present judicial districts of Capodistria and Pirano, shall be constituted an autonomous and independent State, politically, internationally, militarily, legislatively, financially, and administratively. Austria-Hungary shall renounce all sovereignty over this State, which shall remain a free port. Neither Austro-Hungarian nor Italian troops may enter it. The new State shall take over a *quota* of the present Austrian Public Debt, proportioned to its population.

IV. The Curzolari archipelago, including Lissa (with the neighbouring islets of Sant' Andrea and Busi), Lesina (with the islands of Spalmadori and Torcola), Curzola, Lagosta (with the

* For convenience I give the names of places both in Italian and German.

neighbouring rocks and islets), Cazza and Meleda and Pelagosa, shall be ceded by Austria-Hungary to Italy.

V. The territories ceded by Austria-Hungary shall immediately be occupied by Italy. On their part the troops and authority of Austria-Hungary shall evacuate Trieste and its territory, and the forces by land and sea drawn from these territories shall be forthwith disbanded.

VI. Austria-Hungary acknowledges the full Italian sovereignty over Valona and the Bay of Valona, including Sasseno, with as much of the *hinterland* as is required for their defence.

VII. Austria-Hungary disinterests herself completely in Albania as comprised within the frontiers traced at the Conference of London.

VIII. Austria-Hungary shall give a full amnesty and immediate release to all the subjects in the ceded or evacuated territories, who are condemned or being tried on military or political grounds.

IX. In order to secure that the territories ceded shall be released from their *quota* of obligation in the Austrian and Austro-Hungarian Public Debt, as well as for the debt for pensions to superannuated Imperial and Royal officials, in exchange for an instant and entire transference of all State property movable and immovable to the Kingdom of Italy (except the arms which may be in the territories themselves); and to compensate for the necessary State rights in the territories in question in so far as they refer to them, both in the present and the future, the capital sum of two hundred million Italian *lire* in gold shall be paid by Italy to Austria-Hungary [about £8,000,000].

X. Italy pledges herself to maintain a perfect neutrality in the present war with regard to Austria-Hungary and Germany.

XI. Italy renounces for the whole duration of the present war any claim to invoke later on in her favour the provisions of Art. VII. of the Triple Alliance; and Austria-Hungary makes the same renunciation regarding the Italian occupation of the isles of the Dodecanese.

In presenting these demands [I., 64] Sonnino points out that Art. I. is based on historical precedent (*v. p. 121*), and military necessities; Art. II. on racial and strategic considerations; Art. III. is the only admissible compromise between the requirements of Austria and national principle; Art. IV. is intended to mitigate the inferiority of Italy in the Adriatic [where she has no harbours]; Art. V. is the *sine qua non* of the agreement, since no Italian Government could take the pledges of any Power seriously for the duration of the war: Arts. VI. and VII. remove all grounds of future friction, and Arts. VIII. and IX. explain themselves.

On April 12 Prince Hohenlohe at Berlin pronounced these proposals to be impossible [A. H., 142].

On April 14 Prince Bülow at Rome met Baron Sonnino. Bülow said that in the Trentino German districts were included in the

Italian demands, which were excessive ; as to Trieste, Sonnino's aims were not clear. Bülow would not admit a comparison with Hamburg, which is a Free State, but in the Germanic Federation.

The sharpest divergencies were over the demands in Dalmatia.

Sonnino was asked how he reconciled these exorbitant demands with a desire to remain in the Triple Alliance, and replied he wanted to uproot Irredentism by this means. [The German text adds an exclamation mark.]

He finally promised : ' Je vous promets, je sais discuter et je serai très raisonnable ' [A. H., 143.]

On April 16 Burián handed in to Avarna the Austrian reply [A. H., 144 ; I., 71]. The French text is in A. H. (which for most purposes is the completer of the two).

Austria, after a careful examination, found the propositions unacceptable, especially I. and III. and IV.

But Austria was willing to extend the concessions offered in her communication of April 1. She would grant a new frontier, starting from the old one at Monte Cevedale [Zufallspitze], to follow a line for a certain distance between the Cles district and the Schlanders and Méran districts, *i.e.*, the watershed between the Noce and the Adige up to the Illmenspitze. This line should pass to the west of Proveis, so as to leave this parish in the Tyrol, should rejoin the Pescara Torrent, and follow the valley-road of the Pescara up to the point where it flows into the Noce. It should follow the valley-road of the Noce, leave it to the south of Tajo, ascend the Corno di Tres, follow the northern border of the Mezzolombardo district and rejoin the Adige to the south of Salurno [Salurn].

It should ascend the Geiersberg, follow the watershed between the valleys of the Avisio and the Adige, passing by the Castione [Castion] and point towards the Hornspitze and Monte Comp.

Thence it should turn south, describe a semi-circle, so as to leave the commune of Altrei in the Tyrol and re-ascend to the Col di San Lugano. It should follow the frontier between the borders of the districts of Bolzano [Bozen] and Cavalese, *i.e.*, the watershed between the valleys of the Avisio and the Adige [Etsch] and pass by the Cima di Rocca and the Grimmjoch down to Latemar. From the Col Carmon it should descend to the Avisio, cut that river between the communes of Moena and Forno and rise again towards the watershed between the valley of San Pellegrino to the north, and the valley of Travignolo to the south, and rejoin the present frontier at the Cima di Bocche.

Regarding Art. V., the Italian proposals would be too abrupt for peace times, let alone now. Burián again recalled the precedents of Nice and Savoy in 1860.

He accepted Art. VIII.

As to Albania, this was a European question, and could not be thus adjusted between two Powers.

Art. XI. he accepted ; but wished to insert after ' present

war' 'et relativement aussi aux avantages territoriaux ou autres qui résulteraient pour l'Autriche-Hongrie du Traité de paix terminant cette guerre.'

CHAPTER IX

Italy regarded the modified Austrian concessions as insufficient; Austria considered her offers greatly exceeded what Italy used to treat as her principal national ambition [A. H., 146 (April 17, 1915)].

Austria insisted that the demand for Istria could not be granted; it was the only outlet to the sea for an inland State; and Trieste as a Free State would be a worse hotbed of Irredentism. Sonnino replied that strategically the present Isonzo frontier was too weak; and, as to Albania, the previous agreement might be modified [A. H., 147 (April 18)].

Austria was beginning to modify her recalcitrance as to the impossibility of immediate cession. A mixed commission might be appointed, and the purchase-sum left to be determined by the Hague [A. H., 148 (April 18)]. Austria considered that Italy's objects were merely a strategic frontier:

'Duke Avarna was surprised to see, from my explanations of the map, how little part in reality the catchword "national aspirations" played in the re-arrangement of the Isonzo frontier as suggested; to what a degree the desire for a frontier, strategically sound for Italy but impossible for Austria, had thrust the line forward into regions purely Slav and German' [A. H., 149 (April 19)].

On April 20 Macchio had a long conversation at Rome with Salandra, the Premier.

Salandra stated that it was because Austria could not yield Trieste, and the Italian majority must be protected, that they had proposed the erection of a Free State.

Macchio objected that Italy was merely acting selfishly; and that Italian aspirations, once set free in a Free State, would lead to annexation and the ruin of the city.

Salandra replied that this ambition was so national, that the dynasty might be overthrown, unless popular desire were given its vent.

Regarding the Adriatic islands, Salandra reaffirmed that Italy required a good harbour; and Macchio suggested an Austro-Italian *condominium* in the Adriatic.

Albania was considered by Salandra to be of secondary importance. In the Tyrol, Italy did not desire any German subjects [A. H., 150].

Sonnino in his despatch of April 21 [A. H., 153; I., 72], reiterated that Austria had yielded in the Tyrol and nowhere else; and, as to Albania, new arrangements might be made. He concludes: 'The disagreement seems irremediable with

regard to Art. V. on the date of execution. No Italian Government dare warrant the literal execution of a pledge, whilst the obligation of the other party is deferred to the end of the war.

Burián doubted whether Italy was really striving after an understanding, or marking time for her own convenience: either for subsequent decisions, or to join the Entente. In any event it was wiser to continue the conversations [A. H., 154 (April 22)].

According to Avarna, 'The surprising thing is the illusion under which Baron Burián still suffers, that the Italian Government might at last be convinced of the great sacrifice made by the Austrian Government, if it realizes the well-known cessions in the Southern Tyrol, and the impossibility of further concession. On the other hand, Baron Burián cannot imagine the situation in which the Italian Government might make war on Austria and Germany, unless its demands were accepted in their entirety' [(April 25) I., 74].

'It may be anticipated that, consequent on further firm pressure from the German Government, Baron Burián may be persuaded to enlarge the territorial concessions in the Southern Tyrol, and to yield something on our eastern frontier' [*ibid.*].

Still there would remain over the questions of the autonomy of Trieste, the Curzolari Islands, and time of cession. A settlement on the lines proposed seemed impossible [Avarna, *ibid.*].

Austria was also trying to meet Italian ambitions with grants in Albania, between the River Skumbi in the north and Vojussa in the south, to be coterminous with Greek Epirus [A. H., 155 (April 26)].

The situation was serious: the negotiations were again at a deadlock, and Austria proposed sending Count Goluchowski, an ex-Foreign Minister, to Rome as special envoy [A. H., 157 (April 27)].

On April 28 Sonnino was willing to receive Count Goluchowski, but surmised merely a pretext for delay [A. H., 159]. On April 29 and May 1 he considered it inopportune and useless, as the relations between the Ambassadors were quite friendly [A. H., 161 and 163].

On April 29 Burián sent a further long note to Rome [I., 75 (April 29); A. H., 158 (April 28)]. He affirmed that Trieste already had an autonomous municipality, in which the Italian element was generously represented. Any separation from Austria would spell economic downfall.

The Curzolari Islands were purely Slav, and the possession of them would give Italy predominance in the Adriatic.

If Austria insisted on retaining in the Tyrol part of the Noce, the Fassa and Ampezzo Valleys, it was because Italy had no national claim to them, and for strategic reasons.

The secrecy of these negotiations rendered any instant cession impossible; and he suggested the appointment of mixed

commissions to detail the proposals ; and so ' leave not a shadow of doubt as to the perfect and final execution of the cession.'

Any suggestions of this sort from Sonnino would be willingly considered.

As to Albania, with the exception of Valona, Austria suggested that Italy should also disinterest herself entirely [A. H., 158 ; I., 75].

It was surmised by Austria that France desired the co-operation of the Italian Army and was offering Italy Djibuti, part of Tunis, part of the *département des Alpes Maritimes*, and some foreign possessions as a bribe [(April 28) A. H., 160], and that England had offered a loan of £2,000,000 and satisfaction to Italy's aims in Asia Minor and elsewhere ; that Cadorna preferred war to a settlement, so as to preclude any notion of a *revanche* [(April 30) A. H., 162].

On May 1 Macchio again interviewed Sonnino, who expressed himself dissatisfied with Burián's reply [A. H., 158] ; they were no nearer any agreement, and the Italian Government was hard-pressed by the general crisis. He could not retract any of the Italian demands, as they were the least that could be asked [A. H., 164].

On May 2 Burián, in a despatch to Macchio, hoped that the conversations might continue ; he was willing to ratify absolutely the Italian occupation of Valona ; and furthermore, Italian sovereignty round the district of Valona.

Austria would not divest herself of all interest in Albania, but might be content with a sphere of influence.

If it would ease matters to yield a little with regard to the Isonzo frontier, he would not be unwilling [A. H., 166].

On May 2 and 3 Macchio telegraphed to Burián. In order to convince the Italian Parliament, three-quarters of which desired neutrality, the impression had been spread abroad that the Austrian offers were insignificant ; nothing but war would be effective ; and that Italy would select her own moment.

'The situation was very serious ; the point of decision was almost reached.' 'It would now be wholly useless to offer little concessions piecemeal. The attempt must be made, as soon as possible, to lay the foundations of some *fait accompli*.'

This might be done by a timely surrender on the Isonzo, and in Trieste. In Dalmatia the only serious question was the Islands.

As to the *mise en effet*, a governmental guarantee, the appointment of a mixed commission, and some other manifest guarantee might be suggested [A. H., 166, 167].

On May 4 Burián replied : Macchio might offer on the Isonzo, Sdobba (at the mouth of the Isonzo), the valley of the Isonzo up to and including Gradisca, and thence north-west to Medea, up to the River Judrio.

Regarding Trieste, the Austrian Government would establish a University, and issue a municipal charter, so as to secure the Italian element.

As to Albania, in the last resort, Austria would disinterest herself, provided no third Power should be established there.

As to the execution of these promises, there should be the German guarantee, a mixed commission and a public proclamation [A. H., 169].

At last Austria had yielded the substance of the Italian demands. In this period there is no evidence of Germany's voice since March 17 [I., 46] when Bülow spoke for the precedents for a cession postponed to the conclusion of peace.

CHAPTER X

But these grudging admissions had been too long delayed, and Macchio never had the opportunity of interviewing Sonnino in the sense of these last conciliatory proposals.

On May 3 Italy broke off the Triple Alliance and declared her freedom of action. The notice was telegraphed on May 3 at Rome ; delivered on May 4 at Vienna. The document is historic [I., 76 ; A. H., 170].

'The Alliance between Italy and Austria-Hungary was affirmed, from its beginning, as an element and a guarantee of peace, and, from the first, aimed at its principal object of mutual defence.

'In the face of subsequent developments, and the new situation resulting therefrom, the Governments of the two Powers had to set themselves another object, not less essential ; and, in the course of successive renewals of the Treaty, applied themselves to safeguard the continuity of their alliance, by stipulating for the principle of preliminary agreements with regard to the Balkans, so as to reconcile the conflicting interests and tendencies of both Powers.

'It is manifest that these stipulations, if loyally observed, would have sufficed to furnish the basis for common fruitful action.

'Yet Austria-Hungary in the course of the year 1914, without entering into any agreement with Italy, without even letting Italy have the least notice, and in total disregard of the counsels of moderation addressed to her by the Royal Government, despatched to Serbia the ultimatum of July 23, which was the cause and the starting-point of the present European conflagration.

'Austria-Hungary, by overlooking the obligations incident to the Treaty, profoundly disturbed the *status quo* in the Balkans, and created a situation out of which she alone was called upon to profit, to the detriment of interests of the highest import which her ally had many times asserted and proclaimed.

'So flagrant a violation of the letter and the spirit of the Treaty not only justified Italy in refusing to range herself beside her allies in a war provoked without her consent, but, at the same time, stripped the Alliance of its essential content, and its reason for existence.

' Even the pact of benevolent neutrality foreseen by the Treaty was compromised by this violation. Reason and sentiment are at one to exclude the possibility that benevolent neutrality can be upheld, when one ally takes up arms to realize a programme diametrically opposed to the vital interests of the other ally, interests the safeguarding of which constitutes the principal reason for the alliance itself.

' Nevertheless, Italy has for several months endeavoured to create a situation favourable for the re-establishment between the two Powers* of those friendly relations, which constitute the essential foundation of any co-operation in the domain of general politics.

' With this object and in this expectation, the Royal Government declared itself willing to enter into an arrangement that should have as its basis, in an equitable measure, the satisfaction of the lawful national aspirations of Italy : which should, at the same time, have served to reduce the disparity existent in the position of each of the two Powers * in the Adriatic.

' Yet these negotiations never culminated in any appreciable result.

' Every endeavour of the Royal Government was thwarted by the resistance of the Imperial and Royal Government, which, after several months, has only decided to admit the special interests of Italy at Valona, and to promise a scant concession of territory in the Trentino : a concession that carries with it in no wise the norm of a settlement of the situation, whether from an ethnic, political, or military point of view.

' Furthermore, this concession was not to be brought into effect, save after an indeterminate period, namely, at the end of the war.

' In this condition of things, the Italian Government must renounce any hope of arriving at an agreement, and sees itself constrained to withdraw all its proposals for an arrangement.

' It is equally useless to maintain a formal semblance of the Alliance, which would only be fated to cover up the reality of continual distrust and daily difference.

' This is why Italy, confident in her good right, affirms and proclaims that, from this moment, she resumes her entire liberty as of action, and declares annulled and henceforth void her Treaty of Alliance with Austria-Hungary.

' SONNINO.'

CHAPTER XI

This momentous decision did not mean immediate war. The forces which were driving Austria to concession were still as cogent and as real ; the difference was that both Powers were now acting as free agents.

* In the Italian Book, *Entre les deux états*.

It was not until May 23 that Austria replied to the Italian denunciation of the Treaty of Alliance [I., App. I. ; A. H., 200]. This document will be found stated in its place.

On May 4 Macchio had an interview with Sonnino. Macchio represented very strongly the fearful responsibility of war ; and that Austria would make further concessions, which, however, Sonnino regarded as being too indefinite and dilatory. Macchio expatiated on the new concessions on the Isonzo, and thought Sonnino might be satisfied with a municipal statute to safeguard Italian interests at Trieste.

Sonnino treated the abdication of Austria in Albania as the counterweight to her being given a free hand in the Balkans.

The question of the Dalmatian Islands was crucial, but ought not to lead to war, if agreement could be arrived at on all other points.

The great difficulty was still the *mise en effet*. Sonnino regarded the mixed commissions as deliberative bodies without executive authority. Moreover, the other Ministers must now be informed of the negotiations.

The withdrawal of the former propositions by Italy made matters more difficult, as Italy was now unfettered. [In A. H., 173 (May 5) Macchio says that Sonnino never informed him of the denunciation. It seems hard to reconcile these two passages.] [A. H., 171].

On May 5 Burián authorised Macchio to offer the limit of possible concession [A. H., 172].

1. In the Trentino an agreement might be reached.
2. On the Isonzo he confirmed his telegram of May 4 [A. H., 169].
3. As to Trieste, a revision of the Municipal Statute would suffice.
4. Austria would disinterest herself completely in Albania.
5. As to the *mise en effet*, Austria was still obdurate. The Mixed Commissions should be shown to be the beginning of the work, the two Empires should guarantee their word ; but it was to take effect only 'after the conclusion of peace' [A. H., 172].

On this day Macchio apparently heard for the first time of the denunciation of the Treaty of Alliance with Austria. He anticipated that Giolitti would be made Premier, and the time for decision had come [A. H., 173].

On May 6 Macchio visited Sonnino, the last interview until May 17, and the two final ones on the 18th.

Sonnino listened to the foregoing proposals, and in reply stated that in the Trentino the three valleys (of the Noce, Ampezzo and Fassa) were still refused, and, with regard to Trieste and the Isonzo, he saw no improvement. No reference was made by either to the Dalmatian Islands.

He referred the decision to the Cabinet, and Macchio offered to reformulate the text of the Austrian concessions.

At this point the German Embassy appears on the scene again, ready to take up the rôle of intermediary [A. H., 174].

From May 6 to 17, as already stated, there were no interviews; but Burián and Macchio exchanged views as to the possible concessions [A. H., 177 to 191]. The nature of them can be summarized by quoting in parallel columns the draft formulæ of Macchio [A. H., 185 (May 15)] with the comments and alterations.

Burián considered that Italy thought Austria was only yielding under pressure and was not sincere (May 9). This feeling might be met by a closer bond with Italy, under Germany's protection [A. H., 176].

Macchio suggested that the only way to avoid war was to admit all of Sonnino's requirements *in principle*, as the *basis* of negotiations [italics as in original German], and so to gain time [A. H., 175; May 6].

On May 10 Macchio and Bülow at Rome concerted the following formula:

- ' Austria-Hungary is willing to concede to Italy :
- ' 1. The whole of the Tyrol that is of Italian nationality.
 - ' 2. The whole of the western bank of the Isonzo, which is Italian in nationality, together with Gradisca.
 - ' 3. Full municipal autonomy, an Italian University, and a free port for Trieste, which shall be a Free City.
- [*Observe*: According to the declaration of April 20 [A. H., 150] this spelled ruin to Austria and Trieste; and Trieste was already autonomous (April 28) [A. H., 158].]
- ' 4. Valona.
 - ' 5. Entire disinterestment of Austria in Albania.
 - ' 6. Safeguards for the national interests of Italians in Austria-Hungary.
 - ' 7. Benevolent examination of any further desires of Italy, *e.g.*, Gorizia, and the islands.
 - ' 8. The German Empire to guarantee the faithful and loyal execution of the arrangement' [A. H., 178].

The comments of May 13 and 14 are noteworthy; *viz.*, that at the Cabinet Council of the 13th Sonnino pressed for war, and the Cabinet was divided; and Macchio was instructed to represent that 'After all, it did not beseem Sonnino, who had the incomparably easier part of the demandant, to reproach us for delay, when we had to make severe sacrifices. Sonnino contradicted himself when he accused us of dilatory tactics, whilst he, in the same breath, acknowledges that he has often let negotiations be broken off; a course which cannot lead to smooth and speedy results' [A. H., 182 and 183].

The Italian people were daily becoming more bellicose against Austria (May 14) [A. H., 184], and [(May 15) A. H., 186], [(May 17) A. H., 190].

The Cabinet handed in its resignation, which the King did not accept (May 14 and 16) [A. H., 184 and 189].

Macchio proposed not visiting Sonnino for the present; the Ministry was divided, and he had it in his power to reply to the former offers. Should he refuse, Macchio might still approach him with the original Italian demands, as suggested on May 10 [A. H., 177], [A. H., 180 (May 12)].

To this course Burián assented, provided Italy too gave the pledge specified in the agreement [A. H., 181; May 13].

On May 15 Macchio, in concert with von Bülow, drafted the following formula to be handed in to the new Cabinet, as soon as it was formed [A. H., 185].

MACCHIO'S DRAFT (May 15) [A. H., 185].

Inspired by the sincere desire to consolidate the mutual relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy, to base them on entire good faith, to eliminate any cause of friction between them and arrive at a definitive and durable understanding, the Imperial and Royal Government and the Royal Government of Italy have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I.

Austria-Hungary, conforming to the desire expressed by Italy to enter into possession of parts of the Tyrol, the inhabitants of which are of Italian nationality, accepts a new line of frontier to leave the present frontier near the Monte Cevedale [Zufallspitze]. . . .

[This article is identical with that suggested on April 16 [A. H., 144; I., 71 (p. 357)].

ARTICLE II.

Austria-Hungary further consents to surrender to Italy the territories on the western bank of the Isonzo, in so far as the inhabitants are of Italian nationality.

BURIÁN'S COMMENTS FROM VIENNA.

Approved by Burián [(May 16) A. H., 188].

On this point the Italian Government seem more or less at one with our offer (May 10) [A. H., 177].

Unless the Italian Government unconditionally insist on the extension of our concessions up to date, the Ampezzo, Fassa, and a part of the Noce Valley cannot be ceded. [They are not included in the clause.] (May 10) [A. H., 179].

The frontier-line is as directed previously by Burián. Should Sonnino insist on the mid-Noce Valley, the Fassa, or Ampezzo, Macchio should contest it [A. H., 185 (May 15)].

The clause approved by Burián [A. H., 188 (May 16)].

Austria would grant an extension to the linguistic boundary, and include, in the cessions, the city of Cormons (May 10) [A. H., 177].

'This might be conceded in the

MACCHIO'S DRAFT (*cont.*)

From Sdobba at the mouth of the Isonzo the new frontier should follow the valley of the river up to beyond Gradisca, which should be surrendered to Italy. Thence the frontier should leave the course of the river and proceed north-west towards Medea, up to the Judrio; the line should be traced so as to take into consideration the nationality of the inhabitants. The new frontier shall then follow the course of the Judrio.

[Identical with the proposition of May 4 [A. H., 169]].

ARTICLE III.

The title of Kaiserliche Freistadt (Imperial Free City) shall be conferred on the City of Trieste. It shall be given a university and a new Statute, which, whilst maintaining the full autonomy it enjoys at present, shall furnish full security that the predominance of the Italian element shall remain undisturbed.

The present zone of the Free Harbour shall be maintained, and if necessary extended.

ARTICLE IV.

Austria-Hungary acknowledges the full sovereignty of Italy over Valona and the Bay of Valona, as well as on the sphere of interest there centred.

BURIAN'S COMMENTS (*cont.*)

sense of my previous telegram of to-day.' [A. H., 177] (May 10) [A. H., 179].

'Preliminarily, this includes neither Cormons nor Gorizia' (Macchio) [A. H., 185 (May 15)].

After 'Isonzo' insert 'en tant que la population est purement de nationalité italienne' (Burián) (May 16) [A. H., 188].

'Some name, such as "Free City," might be considered' (May 10) [A. H., 177].

'Observe, we have no intention of making Trieste a free port: we are only concerned with giving it the name of a "free city." There can be no question of the reality of it' [italics as in original] (May 10) [A. H., 179].

'The title of Kaiserliche Freistadt is based on the analogy of Fiume, and is intended to whittle the question of the free port down to something reasonable' (Macchio) [A. H., 185 (May 15)].

'Substitute for "le titre Kaiserliche Freistadt" "le titre de ville libre Impériale."

'In second sentence, read after "actuellement" (at present), "assurera en plus le caractère italien de cette ville"' (Burián) [(May 16) A. H., 188].

Regarding the Dalmatian islands, Pelagosa might be ceded to Italy, in view of its proximity to the Italian coast (Macchio) (May 10) [A. H., 177].

'Italy not having proclaimed her sovereignty over Valona, read

MACCHIO'S DRAFT (*cont.*)

ARTICLE V.

Austria-Hungary disinterests herself entirely from the future fate of Albania, within the frontiers fixed by the Conference of London.

ARTICLE VI.

As the subjects who are of Italian nationality will be in a very small minority in Austria, it is self-evident that the Imperial and Royal Government will very carefully watch over their national interests.

ARTICLE VII.

A complete amnesty and an immediate release shall be given by Austria-Hungary to all natives of the territories ceded to Italy, and condemned or being tried for military or political reasons.

BURIÁN'S COMMENTS (*cont.*)

instead: "L'Autriche-Hongrie est prête, en ce qui le concerne de reconnaître, etc." (Burián) (May 16) [A. H., 188].

'The phrase *sort futur* accentuates the purely political character of our abdication' (Macchio) [A. H., 185 (May 15)].

'Substitute "L'Autriche-Hongrie déclare son désintéressement politique concernant l'Albanie comprise entre les frontières. . . ." Thus we recognize the European character of Albania, and avoid being economically extruded' (Burián) (May 16) [A. H., 188].

'This grant, which would be very doubtful [*bedenklich*] in the formal style of a definite agreement, must, in any circumstances, receive a very much modified character' (May 16) [A. H., 179].

'Something had to be put in on this point; and this is the least dangerous' (Macchio) (May 15) [A. H., 185].

'Substitute "Un certain nombre de sujets de nationalité italienne se trouvant encore en Autriche-Hongrie après la conclusion de cet accord, les Gouvernements autrichien et hongrois veilleront tout particulièrement à la sauve-garde de leurs intérêts nationaux"' (Burián) (May 15) [A. H., 188].

Approved by Burián (May 16) [A. H., 188].

MACCHIO'S DRAFT (*cont.*)

ARTICLE VIII.

Italy pledges herself to maintain a perfect neutrality during the whole of the present war with regard to Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey.

ARTICLE IX.

Italy renounces, for the whole duration of the war, and also touching the advantages, territorial or otherwise, that may fall to Austria-Hungary out of the Treaty of Peace terminating this war, any right of invoking in advance in her favour the stipulations formerly governing this matter, in relation to the Balkans, excepting as regards Albania.

ARTICLE X.

As regards the Italian occupation, already effected, of the islands of the Dodecanese, Austria-Hungary, for her part, renounces the right of invoking in her favour the stipulations formerly governing this matter in relation to the Balkans.

ARTICLE XI.

Italy declares herself ready to pay a round sum, as an indemnity for all incidents of the fact of the cession of the territories above-named to Italy: a mixed commission shall be appointed to fix the conditions and amount of this, and shall, in the event of disagreement, submit the question to the decision of the international tribunal of arbitration at the Hague.

BURIAN'S COMMENTS (*cont.*)

Approved by Burián (May 16) [A. H., 188].

'In view of the uncertainty, whether the new Cabinet will be pro-Triplice, or take a new departure, any reference to Art. VII. (of the Triple Alliance) has been avoided. The same applies to Art. X.' [A. H., 185 (May 15)] (Macchio).

There should be no reference to, or implication of the Triple Alliance Treaty.

And, to avoid further *chicanerie* from Italy, if Austria gained territory elsewhere, *e.g.*, in Russian Poland, this claim should read:

'L'Italie déclare son désintéressement au sujet de tout avantage territorial ou autre, résultant pour l'Autriche-Hongrie, soit du cours de la guerre actuelle, soit des traités de paix qui la termineront' (Burián) (May 16) [A. H., 188].

Substitute:

'L'Autriche - Hongrie renonce pour sa part à toute prétention, se basant sur le fait de l'occupation italienne des îles du Dodecanèse' (Burián) (May 16) [A. H., 188].

Approved by Burián. But take in Art. XV. at this point (May 16) [A. H., 188].

MACCHIO'S DRAFT (*cont.*)

ARTICLE XII.

Mixed Commissions shall be constituted at the localities and authorized to take decisions that shall be followed by the *mise en effet*, step by step, as the work progresses.

The detail of the appointment of these commissions shall be ascertained by a supplementary protocol.

BURIAN'S COMMENTS (*cont.*)

We might consent to immediate action, as to Albania, Trieste, and Pelagosa (May 10) [A. H., 177].

The commissions must be formed and set to work as soon as possible, in order to make evident our will to cede as soon as possible.

Also to avoid hostilities, a neutral zone should be established (Macchio) [A. H., 185 (May 15)].

Substitute for first sentence:

'Des Commissions mixtes seront instituées sur les lieux pour régler les détails relatifs à la cession des territoires en question. Ces commissions seront autorisées à prendre des décisions, qui seront soumises à la ratification des gouvernements' * (Burián) [A. H., 188] (May 16).

'Les commissions mixtes, dont il est question dans l'article précédent, commenceront leur travaux immédiatement après la conclusion de cet accord. La remise des territoires cédés aura lieu aussitôt après la ratification des dites commissions et devra être terminée dans le délai d'un mois.' * This new article was to be inserted after the original Art. XII. (Burián) [(May 18) A. H., 192].

ARTICLE XIII.

The soldiers drawn from the territories ceded to Italy shall be withdrawn from service at the front with the Austro-Hungarian Army, as soon as the treaty shall have been concluded.

To make this clearer, read:

'Dès que cet accord aura été conclu, les militaires originaires des territoires cédés à l'Italie seront retirés des lignes de combat de l'armée austro-hongroise' (Burián) (May 16) [A. H., 188].

ARTICLE XIV.

The German Empire assumes the guarantee for the faithful and loyal execution of this agreement.

Substitute:

'L'Autriche-Hongrie et l'Italie acceptent la garantie assumée par l'Allemagne pour l'exécution fidèle et loyale de cet accord' (Burián) (May 16) [A. H., 188].

ARTICLE XV.

A solemn proclamation of the Imperial and Royal Government shall immediately follow the signature of the agreement.

* Italics inserted by Editor.

CHAPTER XII

The new offer was now ready : the Italian Cabinet had been formed.

On May 17 Macchio obtained an interview with Sonnino, the first since May 6. He states that this time it is Sonnino who delays conversations: and that 'Public meetings are more and more assuming the artificial character of national and patriotic manifestoes, and are taking the most diverse forms both here and in the rest of Italy' [A. H., 191].

Parliament was summoned for May 20 [A. H. 193]. At the Session Salandra asked for extraordinary credits for the purpose of war, and was supported in a vote of urgency by 377 to 54. He stated that the ultimatum to Serbia had broken the Triple Alliance. The problem of Italian national unity had been re-opened. The Italian Government had patiently sought to obtain an agreement with Austria. Her patience was exhausted. The vote was carried by 407 to 74 [A. H., 198].

The interview of Macchio and Sonnino took place on May 18. Macchio read out the Austrian proposal, as modified by Burián. Sonnino remained silent all through and made no comments, refusing to be drawn into a discussion. 'The conversation remained a monologue.'

'At the conclusion of the reading he merely asked, was the boundary in the Trentino the same as that formerly proposed by Vienna ?

'I assented, and then mentioned that my Government was willing, as it had been before, to examine any new proposals from Italy, with the most kindly feelings.

'Sonnino would not express any opinion, but promised to lay the proposals before the Cabinet' [A. H., 194].

On the 19th Macchio communicated the last alteration, to the effect that the territories should be ceded one month after the ratification of the finding of the mixed commissions [A. H., 195].

This concession was published in the newspapers: but comment was adverse [A. H., 196 (May 19)].

On the 20th there was still no reply to this last offer of Austria's [A. H., 197].

On the 21st (after the Session of the Italian Parliament) Burián desired Macchio to visit Sonnino and request a reply to the offer made on the 18th, despite the nature of the Parliamentary vote [A. H., 199].

Yet, strangely enough, Burián, who was doing all he could to keep peace, on the 21st handed Avarna a belated rejoinder to the Italian Denunciation of the Treaty of Alliance (which he had received on the 4th) [A. H. 200 ; I., App. I. (May 21)].

'The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary has had the honour of receiving the communication, bearing on

the cancellation of the Treaty of Triple Alliance, which the Ambassador of Italy has handed in on the 4th May, on the order of his Government.

'It is with a feeling of painful surprise that the Imperial and Royal Government takes notice of the resolve of the Italian Government to terminate a treaty so abruptly which, based as it was on a community of vital political interests, has for so long assured security and peace to our States, and rendered Italy noteworthy service.

'The surprise is all the more justified, as the facts alleged in the first instance by the Royal Government to explain its decision date back more than nine months, and that, since that time, the Royal Government has frequently declared its desire to maintain and confirm the links of the Alliance between our two countries; a wish which has always found a welcome and a cordial echo in Austria-Hungary.

'The reasons that forced the Imperial and Royal Government in July to address an ultimatum to Serbia are too well known to render it necessary to repeat them here.

'The object which Austria set herself consisted merely in safeguarding the Monarchy from the subversive endeavours of Serbia, and to prevent the continuation of an agitation directly aimed at the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. This movement had already provoked numerous outrages, and, last of all, the tragedy of Sarajevo. Austria's object, thus defined, could not in any wise affect Italy's interests, for the Imperial and Royal Government has never supposed, and considers it impossible that the interests of Italy could be in any way identified with the criminal plots directed against the security and territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary: these movements having, unfortunately, been tolerated and encouraged by the Serbian Government.

'The Italian Government had, for the rest, been informed and knew that Austria-Hungary had no intentions of conquest in Serbia. It was expressly declared at Rome, that if the war were localized Austria-Hungary had no intention of infringing the national integrity and the sovereignty of Serbia.

'When, in consequence of Russia's intervention, the purely local conflict between Austria and Serbia took, against our desires, a European character, and Austria-Hungary and Germany saw themselves attacked by several Great Powers, the Royal Government declared the neutrality of Italy, but without making any allusion to the fact that this war, which had been long ahead provoked and prepared by Russia, was of a nature to strip the Treaty of Triple Alliance of its *raison d'être*.

'It is sufficient to recall the declarations made at this time by the late Marquis di San Giuliano, and the telegram addressed on Aug. 2, 1914, by His Majesty the King of Italy to His Majesty the Emperor-King, so as to prove that at this epoch the Royal

Government saw nothing in the action of Austria-Hungary contrary to the stipulations of our Treaty of Alliance.*

'Austria-Hungary and Germany, when attacked by the Powers of the Triple Entente, had to defend their territories; but this defensive was in no wise aimed at "the realization of a programme opposed to the vital interests of Italy." These vital interests, or such of them as we were permitted to know of, were not in any way menaced. Furthermore, had the Italian Government had apprehensions on this score, it could have made them effective, and would certainly have found, both at Vienna and at Rome, a more willing disposition to protect those interests.

'The Royal Government was then of opinion that in view of the question as it then appeared, its two allies could not invoke the *casus fœderis* with regard to Italy, but it never made any communication which might have given cause to believe that it considered the action undertaken by Austria-Hungary "a flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Alliance."

'Whilst regretting this decision with regard to the neutrality of Italy, which, in our opinion, was barely compatible with the spirit of the Treaty, the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin loyally accepted the point of view of the Italian Government; and the interchange of opinions which took place at this time proved the whole-hearted maintenance of the Triple Alliance.

'It was by virtue of invoking this Alliance, especially Art. VII., that the Royal Government presented to us its claims to obtain certain compensations in the event of Austria-Hungary gaining for her part advantages, territorial or otherwise, in the Balkan Peninsula, for herself, from the fact of war.

* These quotations are only half-truths. The telegram from the King of Italy pledged Italy to a friendly attitude 'in accordance with the Treaty of Triple Alliance and the great interests which it must preserve.' It expresses no opinion either way [A. H., 23].

San Giuliano on July 29, 1914, formulated a demand for compensations under Art. VII. of the Triple Alliance, and stated expressly: 'It is on the basis of Art. VII. and the agreements concerning the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, and on Albania that the cordial collaboration of the Italian and Austro-Hungarian diplomacy must be based; and without this basis, it is to be feared that this cordial diplomacy will not be possible.'

'As long as there subsists any doubt as to the interpretation by Austria-Hungary of Art. VII., Italy cannot follow a policy calculated, now or later on, to facilitate temporary or definite occupations by Austria-Hungary. Germany shares our interpretation of Art. VII.' [A. H., 16].

And *cf.* 'To the late King [Charles of Roumania] it appeared to be a repudiation of the Alliance Treaty to raise the objection that Roumania had not been informed of the Austro-Hungarian *démarche* against Serbia, and had not been consulted about it; but in the decisive Crown Council the aged King did not press his opinion against the Government, the head of which, ignoring all existing treaties, sympathized with the Entente' [Bethmann-Hollweg, Sept. 28, 1916].

'The Royal Government shared this point of view, as is clear from the declaration of late Marquis di San Giuliano on Aug. 25, 1914,* when he said: "It would now be premature to talk of compensations," and from the remark of Duke Avarna after our retreat from Serbia, "There is not at the present time any object for compensation."†

'Nevertheless, the Imperial and Royal Government has always been ready to enter into a conversation on the subject.

'Thus, when the Italian Government, whilst reiterating its desire to maintain and reaffirm our alliance, presented certain demands regarding the cession to Italy, on the score of compensation, of countries that form an integral part of the Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government, attaching the highest value to the maintenance of the best relations with Italy, even accepted this basis of negotiation, although, in its opinion, in Art. VII. there had never been contemplated any territories belonging to the High Contracting Parties, but only the Balkan Peninsula.

'In the negotiations on this topic, the Imperial and Royal Government has always shown itself animated with the sincere desire to arrive at an understanding with Italy; and if it, for racial, political, and military reasons (which have been abundantly expounded at Rome) found it impossible to comply with all the demands of the Royal Government, the sacrifices it was disposed to make are of such importance that only the wish to uphold an alliance that has existed so many years to the common advantage of both our countries, would have justified them.

'The Royal Government remarks that the concessions offered by Austria were only to come into effect at an indeterminate period, *i.e.*, only at the end of the war; and it seems to deduce from this fact that thereby these concessions lost all their value.

'The Imperial and Royal Government, in putting forward the impracticability of the immediate surrendering of the territories ceded, has always shown itself ready to offer all the guarantees necessary to prepare and assure this transfer in the least possible interval of time from the present.

'The evident good will and spirit of conciliation shown by the

* There is no trace of any such statement at this date in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. II.

† On Dec. 12 Avarna stated: 'The invasion of Serbia had created a new situation, which must be the subject of a conversation between Austria and Italy, within the meaning of Art. VII.' [A. H., 74; I., 1]. On Dec. 14 the Serbians recaptured Belgrade: for the whole month of December, in both the Italian and the Austro-Hungarian Book, there is no trace of such an abnegation on the part of Avarna.

The reference is to [I., 10], Jan. 7, when Sonnino said that on that date the discussion might be less opportune; but he at the same time insisted on compensation.

Imperial and Royal Government in the course of the negotiations does not seem anywise to justify the opinion of the Italian Government that it had to renounce any hope of arriving at a settlement.

'Such a settlement could only have been reached if on both sides there had been the same sincere desire for an understanding.

'The Imperial and Royal Government cannot take notice of the declaration of the Italian Government that it wishes to reassume its entire liberty of action, and to consider henceforth annulled and void the Treaty of Alliance with Austria-Hungary, since this announcement is directly contradictory with the solemn pledges entered into by Italy by the Treaty of Dec. 5, 1912, which determined the duration of our alliance up to July 8, 1920, with the option of denouncing it only at one year's notice; no prior denunciation or abolition of the Treaty was contemplated.

'The Royal Italian Government having arbitrarily cast off all its obligations, the Imperial and Royal Government decline responsibility for any consequences that may emanate from these proceedings.'

Possibly this rejoinder (which reads very much like an ultimatum) may have been intended as a threat to be accompanied with an extra inducement to continue negotiations; for on May 22 Burián directed Macchio to revisit Sonnino 'in order to save our countries from this senseless war,' and to request him, would he accept the agreement in full, as it stood, if Austria, without evacuating those districts, went one stage farther to meet the views of Italy in the matter of the *mise en effet*? Macchio did not mention Austria's note of the 21st [A. H., 202].

At that interview (May 23) Macchio made this last offer [there is no further detail available as to its more specific content, if any] but Sonnino answered it was too late; from the very beginning, the *mise en effet* had been the crucial question; yet even the last propositions, the point at which anything definitive might be expected, were postponed after an uncertain ratification. [This proviso, as a fact, had been deliberately added by Burián to Macchio's original draft (v. A. H., 188 and 192).] Sonnino would not make any further reply.

On May 23 Avarna handed in to Burián at Vienna the Declaration of War.

'Conformably with the Orders of His Majesty the King, My August Sovereign, the Ambassador of Italy has the honour to send to His Excellency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, the following communication:

'"Since the 4th of this month a declaration was made to the Imperial and Royal Government of the serious motives in consideration of which Italy, confident in her good right, proclaimed annulled and void henceforth her Treaty of Alliance with Austria-Hungary, and violated by the Imperial and Royal Government, and in virtue of which she re-assumed her entire liberty of action. The Royal Government, firmly resolved to

provide by all the means in its power for the safety of Italian rights and interests, could not fail to do its duty to take, against all present and future menaces, measures such as events enforce upon it to accomplish its national aspirations. His Majesty the King from to-morrow considers himself in a state of war with Austria-Hungary.”

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* *
*

War had been declared. One may safely disregard the official manifestoes subsequent ; such as the reply of the Italian Government to the Austrian Note of May 21, and the *Nota Circolare* of May 23 to the Powers.

Italy, from of old, had no reason to love Austria. Her alliance was the fruit of Bismarck's diplomacy at the Congress of Berlin, where he sowed the seeds of this war by depriving Russia of her gains in the Russo-Turkish war of 1878, and assigning to France Tunis, against the wishes of Italy.

The negotiations which led up to this war between Italy and Austria are only a fragment of history ; we are not here shown what influence was exerted by other Powers ; how far Italy, the people, may have been stirred by detestation of German methods in Belgium and elsewhere, and dragged the Italian Governmental machine out of the diplomatic rut.

There are many problems left over. These negotiations reveal a source of future conflict between Italy and Greece, and Italy and Serbia ; matters which it will not be difficult to adjust, when both parties legitimately desire national security, and national unity, and try to reconcile these ends.

The attitude of Germany, as shown in these negotiations, is hard to understand. She supported Italy in her pretensions against Austria, was willing to aid Italy to secure from Austria those Italian lands Austria still administers : she refrained and withdrew, whenever anything effective was to be done. Certainly, she did not desire war with Italy, and she had no interest to spoliat her own ally to satisfy or conciliate Italy.

Probably, had not German guarantees sunk in value since July, 1914, Italy might have accepted the German Imperial promise to stand by her and see Austria loyally keep her word.

It is also possible that Germany never thought that Italy would proceed to war ; and that it would be safe to promise what might be difficult to fulfil in the future. Indeed, as Germany's errors in this war have all been psychological, as she has never entered into the true minds of her neighbours, this explanation is the most likely : that Germany thought Italy was bluffing, and dare not stand to her honour.

But what of Italy ?

To us English, in our islands, without ill-defined frontiers, without memories of invasions, to us English, self-contained, it is hard to imagine the exigencies of a continental State, and,

above all, of Italy, whose aspirations for national unity date back to Dante's times, and in 1866 were partially achieved in the teeth of Austria.

Ahi serva Italia, di dolore ostello,
Nave senza nocchiero in gran tempesta,
Non donna di province, ma bordello !

PURG., VI.

[Ah, Italy enslaved, home of distress,
A vessel without steersman, tempest-tossed ;
Not Lady of thy lands, but procuress !]

She has passed through the furnace, and these papers prove how she has been steeled.

From the beginning of the war she stands by the letter of her contract with Austria, and insists on her rights under the contract. Step by step, she coerces Austria to admit her claims ; she is adroit enough to avail herself of German help ; but she never falters, never withdraws, nor prevaricates.

She brings Austria to the point of negotiating to surrender Italian territories (which were Italian before Napoleon created new boundaries, which the Holy Alliance preserved, wherever it seemed expedient). She acts in a conciliatory and firm manner ; had she wished for war, she could have chosen an earlier moment, in mid-February, 1915, when Austria's recalcitrance seemed incurable.

But she still trusted to persuasion, and it was not until May 4 that she cancelled her formal Alliance ; and, even then, she tried to negotiate ; but when she could not obtain the substance of her demands, she, with the same firmness, broke off useless chaffering.

In February and March the Russian armies were well advanced in the Carpathians, and their hold on Lemberg and Przemysl seemed unshakable, and Italian pressure might have been decisive ; in May the Germans were still ineffectually battering their way through to Warsaw.

But Italy was not making war for the sake of Europe ; she wanted, out of the turmoil, to win back the remainder of her Italian heritage, and, if possible, without the horrors of war. When she could not attain her end without entering the battle-line, she did not flinch.

Her diplomacy in those long months of waiting and preparation reflects her spirit : she is conscious of her objective ; with an unrelenting astuteness and a lofty concentration of purpose, she insists, and moves forward, step by step, without precipitancy, consequentially striving after her national destiny ; neither seeking war, nor shunning it. In the last resort, she stands by her resolve.

On Aug. 27, 1916, Italy declared war against Germany for continuous acts of unneutrality. She had already declared war on Turkey and Bulgaria on Aug. 20, and Oct. 19, 1915, respectively. She subscribed the Pact of London (not to make a separate peace) on Nov. 30, 1915.

DECLARATIONS OF WAR

1914. July 28. Austria against Serbia.
Aug. 1. Germany against Russia.
3. Germany against France.
4. Great Britain against Germany.
7. Montenegro against Austria.
10. France against Austria.
12. Great Britain against Austria.
23. Japan against Germany.
28. Austria against Belgium.
Nov. 5. Great Britain, France, and Russia against Turkey.
1915. May 23. Italy against Austria.
Aug. 20. Italy against Turkey.
Oct. 6. Ultimatum, Bulgaria to Serbia.
6. France breaks off relations with Bulgaria.
6. Russia breaks off relations with Bulgaria.
14. Bulgaria against Serbia. (She invaded Serbia on the 11th.)
15. Great Britain against Bulgaria.
19. Italy against Bulgaria.
1916. March 9. Germany against Portugal.
Aug. 27. Italy against Germany.
27. Roumania against Austria.
31. Turkey against Roumania.
Sept. 3. Bulgaria against Roumania.
27. Germany against Roumania.

A LIST OF USEFUL DATES

1856. Declaration of Paris.
1864. Treaty of Prague.
1866. Lombardy transferred to Italy.
Sleswig-Holstein acquired by Prussia.
Prussia conquered Southern Germany.
1869. Suez Canal opened.
1870. Alsace-Lorraine annexed to Prussia.
1871. Treaty of Frankfort.
1874. Imminence of a new Franco-German War.
1877-8. Russo-Turkish War.
1880. Congress of Berlin.
1883. Italy joins Triple Alliance.
1885. Serbo-Bulgarian War.
1890. Heligoland ceded to Germany.
1895. Jameson Raid.
Treaty of Shimoneseki.
Japan abandons Liao-Tung.
1898. Germany occupies Kiao-chow.
Kitchener and Marchand at Fashoda.
1899. Peace Conference at The Hague.
The Boer War.
1902. Anglo-French Entente.
Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
1904. Russo-Japanese War.
1905. Separation of Norway and Sweden.
1906. Morocco Crisis.
Algeciras Conference.
1907. Peace Conference at The Hague.
Turco-Greek War.
1911. Morocco Crisis.
Turco-Italian War.
Tripoli ceded to Italy.
1912. First Balkan War.
1913. Second Balkan War.
1914. Kiel Canal, completion of widening.
June 28. Assassination of Archduke Ferdinand.
Sept. 5. Great Britain, France, and Russia sign the
Pact of London.
1915. May 7. *Lusitania* torpedoed.
Oct. 5. Allies land at Salonica.
Oct. 5. Venezelos dismissed by King Constantine.
Oct. 13. Execution of Nurse Cavell.
Nov. 30. Italy signs the Pact of London.
1916. July 27. Captain Fryatt executed,

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
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