

UC-NRLF



B 4 024 773

THEOLOGICAL TRANSLATION FUND LIBRARY.

LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

Class ~~BIOLOG.~~
~~LIBRARY~~
EDGE
PSYCH.
LIBRARY

- the Rev. E. JOHNSON, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. Each 10s 6d.
6. **EWALD (H.)** Commentary on the Book of Job, with Translation by Professor H. EWALD. Translated from the German by the Rev. J. FREDERICK SMITH. 1 vol. 8vo. 10s 6d.
 7. **HAUSRATH (Professor A.)** History of the New Testament Times. The Time of Jesus. By Dr. A. HAUSRATH, Professor of Theology, Heidelberg. Translated, with the Author's sanction, from the Second German Edition, by the Revs. C. T. POYNTING and P. QUENZER. 2 vols. 8vo. 21s.
 8. **KEIM (Th.)** History of Jesus of Nazara. Considered in its connection with the National Life of Israel, and related in detail. Translated by ARTHUR RANSOM and the Rev. E. M. GELDART. 6 vols. 8vo. Each 10s 6d.
 9. **KUENEN (A.)** The Religion of Israel to the Fall of the Jewish State. Translated by A. H. MAY. 2nd Ed. 3 vols. 8vo. 31s 6d.
 10. **PFLEIDERER (Professor O.)** The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History. Translated by the Rev. ALLAN MENZIES.
 - I. History of the Philosophy of Religion from Spinoza to the present day. 2 vols. 21s.
 - II. Genetic-Speculative Philosophy of Religion. 2 vols. 21s.— 4 vols. 8vo. Cloth. Each 10s 6d.
 11. **PFLEIDERER (Professor O.)** Paulinism: a Contribution to the History of Primitive Christian Theology. Translated by E. PETERS. 2 vols. 21s.
 12. **Protestant Commentary on the New Testament;** with General and Special Introductions to the Books, by Lipsius, Holsten, Lang, Pfeiderer, Holtzmann, Hilgenfeld, and others. Translated by the Rev. F. H. JONES. 3 vols. 8vo. 31s 6d.
 13. **REVILLE (Rev. Dr.)** Prolegomena of the History of Religion, with Introduction by Professor MAX MÜLLER. 10s 6d.
 14. **SCHRAEDER (Professor)** The Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament. By Dr. EBERH. SCHRADER, Professor of Oriental Languages, University of Berlin. Translated from the second Enlarged German Edition, with Additions by the Author, and an Introduction by the Rev. OWEN C. WHITEHOUSE, M.A., Professor of Hebrew Cheshunt College. 2 vols. Map. 8vo. Cloth. Each 10s 6d.
 15. **ZELLER (E.)** The Acts of the Apostles Critically Examined. To which is prefixed Overbeck's Introduction from De Wette's Handbook. Translated by JOSEPH DARE. 2 vols. 8vo. 21s.

A selection of six or more volumes may also be had at the Subscriber's price, or 7s per volume nett.

WILLIAMS & NORGATE, 14, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London
and 20, South Frederick Street, Edinburgh.

THE HIBBERT LECTURES.

- 1888.—Rev. Dr. Hatch. **On Greek Influence on Christianity** 8vo. Cloth. 10s 6d.
- 1887.—Professor Sayce. **Lectures on the Religion of Ancient Assyria and Babylonia.** 8vo. Cloth. 10s 6d.
- 1886.—Professor J. Rhys, M.A. **Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by Celtic Heathendom.** 8vo. Cloth. 10s 6d.
- 1885.—Professor Pfeleiderer. **Lectures on the Influence of the Apostle Paul on the Development of Christianity.** 8vo. Cloth. 10s 6d.
- 1884.—Professor Albert Reville. **Lectures on the Ancient Religions of Mexico and Peru.** 8vo. Cloth. 10s 6d.
- 1883.—The Rev. Charles Beard. **Lectures on the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century in its Relation to Modern Thought and Knowledge.** 8vo. Cloth. 10s 6d. (Cheap Edition, 4s 6d).
- 1882.—Professor Kuenen. **Lectures on National Religions and Universal Religions.** 8vo. Cloth. 10s 6d.
- 1881.—T.W. Rhys Davids. **Lectures on some Points in the History of Indian Buddhism.** 8vo. Cloth. 10s 6d.
- 1880.—M. Ernest Renan. **On the Influence of the Institutions, Thought and Culture of Rome on Christianity, and the Development of the Catholic Church.** 8vo. Cloth. 10s 6d. (Cheap Edition, 2s 6d).
- 1879.—P. Le Page Renouf. **Lectures on the Religion of Ancient Egypt.** 2nd Edition. 8vo. Cloth. 10s 6d.
- 1878.—Professor Max Müller. **Lectures on the Religions of India.** 8vo. Cloth. 10s 6d.
-

WORKS PUBLISHED BY THE HIBBERT TRUSTEES.

- Wallis.—**The Cosmology of the Rigveda: An Essay.** By H. W. WALLIS, M.A., Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. 8vo. Cloth. 5s.
- Poole.—**Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought, in the departments of Theology and Ecclesiastical Politics.** By REGINALD LANE POOLE, M.A., Balliol College, Oxford, PH.D. Leipzig. 8vo. Cloth. 10s 6d.
- Stokes.—**The Objectivity of Truth.** By GEORGE J. STOKES, B.A., Senior Moderator and Gold Medallist, Trinity College, Dublin, late Hibbert Travelling Scholar. 8vo. Cloth. 5s.
- Evans.—**An Essay on Assyriology.** By GEORGE EVANS, M.A., Hibbert Fellow. With an Assyriology Tablet in Cuneiform type. 8vo. Cloth. 5s.
- Seth.—**The Development from Kant to Hegel, with Chapters on the Philosophy of Religion.** By ANDREW SETH, Assistant to the Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, Edinburgh University. 8vo. Cloth. 5s.
- Schurman.—**Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution.** A Critical Study by J. GOULD SCHURMAN, M.A., D.S.C., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Acadia College, Nova Scotia. 8vo. Cloth. 5s.
- Macan.—**The Resurrection of Jesus Christ.** An Essay, in Three Chapters. By REGINALD W. MACAN, Christ Church, Oxford. 8vo. Cloth. 5s.
-

WILLIAMS & NORGATE, 14, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London
and 20, South Frederick Street, Edinburgh.

MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S WORKS.

THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION.

- FIRST PRINCIPLES.** 8th Thousand. 16s.
PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. 4th Thousand. 2 vols. 34s.
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 4th Thousand. 2 vols. 36s.
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY. Vol. I. 4th Thousand. 21s.
CEREMONIAL INSTITUTIONS. 2nd Thousand. 7s.
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. 2nd Thousand. 12s.
ECCLESIASTICAL INSTITUTIONS. 2nd Thousand. 8vo.
Cloth. 5s.
THE DATA OF ETHICS. 5th Thousand. 8s.

OTHER WORKS.

- THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.** Library Edition (the 9th). 8vo.
10s 6d.
EDUCATION. 6th Thousand. 6s. Also cheap Edition. 20th Thousand.
2s 6d.
ESSAYS. 2 vols. 4th Thousand. 16s.
ESSAYS. (Third Series.) 4th Thousand. 8s.
THE MAN *versus* THE STATE. In cloth, 10th Thousand. 2s 6d.
Also cheap Edition, 10th Thousand. 1s.
THE FACTORS OF EVOLUTION. Cloth. 2s 6d.

ALSO MR. SPENCER'S

DESCRIPTIVE SOCIOLOGY,

COMPILED AND ABSTRACTED BY

PROF. DUNCAN, DR. SCHEPPIG, AND MR. COLLIER.

FOLIO, BOARDS.

1. ENGLISH	18s
2. ANCIENT AMERICAN RACES	16s
3. LOWEST RACES, NEGRITOS, POLYNESIANS	18s
4. AFRICAN RACES	16s
5. ASIATIC RACES	18s
6. AMERICAN RACES	18s
7. HEBREWS AND PHENICIANS	21s
8. FRENCH	30s

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BELIEF

IN

OBJECTIVE EXISTENCE.

PART I.

OBJECTIVA CAPABLE OF PRESENTATION.

BY

JULIUS PIKLER,

DOCTOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCES; LECTURER ON PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN THE
ROYAL UNIVERSITY OF BUDAPEST;
ASSISTANT LIBRARIAN OF THE HUNGARIAN PARLIAMENT.



WILLIAMS AND NORGATE,

14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON;
AND 20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH.

1890.

BF233

P48

~~BIOL. LIBRARY~~

G
EDUC.
PSYCH.
LIBRARY

GENERAL

LONDON:
PRINTED BY C. GREEN AND SON,
178, STRAND.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	I
OBJECTIVA CAPABLE OF PRESENTATION.	
CHAPTER	
I.—THE OBJECTIVE ATTRIBUTES OF PRESENTATIONS	9
II.—THE OBJECTIVITY OF TIME AND SPACE	21
III.—THE OBJECTIVE EXISTENCE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD	39
Appendix A to Chapter III. On some Theories concern- ing Subject and Object	55
Appendix B to Chapter III. On Movement as Change of Place	58
IV.—J. S. MILL'S THEORY OF THE BELIEF IN AN EXTERNAL WORLD	62
V.—THE OBJECTIVE EXISTENCE OF COGNITIONS (BELIEFS, MEMORIES, IDEAS)	69
VI.—OBJECTIVE INTENSITY AND UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL STATES	74
VII.—A DOUBT AND ITS SOLUTION	77
VIII.—A FEW REMARKS ON VOLITION	85
IX.—THE GENETIC QUESTION	97
X.—ENUMERATION OF THE OBJECTIVA INCAPABLE OF PRE- SENTATION	108
POSTSCRIPT. MR. G. F. STOUT ON THE GENESIS OF THE COGNITION OF PHYSICAL REALITY	110



INTRODUCTION.

WITH the questionable exception of a few philosophers, all mankind entertains the belief in the objective existence of the external world. Any one who has the complex presentation he calls a dog, or the presentation of a dog, will believe himself justified in making two assertions: first, that a dog exists; secondly, that he perceives it: the presentation of a dog is regarded by him as that of a dog objectively existing. It is well known, however, that not every presentation would be interpreted by him in the same twofold manner. Thus if after his perceiving the dog to lie still for a while, a change in the presentation of the dog takes place, such as the dog opening its jaws, his account of this change will still be (1) that he perceives, (2) that the dog opens its jaws; but the change in his mind which may follow this last presentation, such as, for instance, the presentation of terror, or of the memory of a departed friend who had been bitten by a dog, or of a determination to procure a muzzle, will not be described by him as the perception of something objectively existing or happening, but simply as an emotion, a recollection, or a resolution, which arose in him. The presentation of the dog in this example stands for a whole class of presentations—namely, of presentations of external objects, which, in opposition to other classes of presentations, are invariably interpreted in the above twofold manner. Whenever an external object is presented to a man, he believes an external object to exist objectively. This is one of the constituent elements of the belief in the

objective existence of the external world. There is one more, and that is the following. We all believe that, besides the external objects which have been and will be presented to us in the course of our lives, there exist, have existed, and will exist objectively, an indefinite number of other objects, through indefinite time. These two beliefs I understood by the comprehensive term of the belief in the objective existence of the external world, when stating above that it is common to all men.

Three different questions, although none of them distinctly defined, but rather confounded, by their propounders, have arisen in course of time in relation to this belief, dividing philosophers into schools.

The first of these refers to the *meaning* of this belief. We are asked, What does mankind understand by asserting the objective existence of external things and of a world of them? In other words, How could this belief be circumscribed in simpler terms? What is the definition of objective existence (of the external world)? Now such a circumscription or definition is only possible if objective existence is found not to belong to our simplest and therefore unanalyzable conceptions. There are philosophers who maintain that such is the case, and that a circumscription or definition of the notion of objective existence is therefore impossible. They insist that it is as impossible to define the meaning of our belief that objects *are*, as it is impossible to define the meaning of our belief that some objects are *black*; and that in seeing a dog, our belief that the dog objectively exists is a deliverance of our consciousness as undecomposable, or, to speak more cautiously, as little decomposable, as our perception that its colour is black and not green. On the other hand, there were and are thinkers (and the by far greater majority of philosophers may be said to belong, at least for some time past, to this class) who consider the question to allow of an answer; who believe that there is a simpler notion

than that of objective existence, and that is the notion of presentation ; that therefore the notion of objective existence is resolvable into, or definable by, simpler terms, namely, subjective terms ; that the belief in the objective existence of the external world is but another expression for our belief in certain properties, or in a certain order of our presentations, or at least of some of them ; and that when we assert that a presentation is a presentation of something objectively existing, we only mean that it is one of the presentations which possess those properties or fall under this order. Various theories are also advanced as to the nature of these properties or of this order.

The second question deals with the *genesis* of that belief in the individual. Now philosophers must needs have agreed that it is through reflection (reasoning, inference) that every one arrives at the belief in the objective existence of things he never perceived, and the only difference of opinion as to that could arise with respect to the nature of his reflection. But this reflection rests on our belief in the objective existence of things which we *did* perceive ; and with regard to this belief, a greater divergence of views prevailed amongst thinkers. Some hold that we arrived at the belief that some of our presentations are perceptions of objectively existing things, in a no more indirect way than at our belief that some of our presentations are presentations of black objects ; that both beliefs rest on immediate sensation or perception ; that there is a sensation or perception of objective existence as original as is the sensation of pain and pleasure, or the perception of colour and sound. The by far greater majority of philosophers contend, on the other hand, that we regard some presentations as perceptions of objectively existing things upon reflection, viz. upon reflecting about some properties of, or a certain order in, our presentations, and various theories are advanced by the supporters of this view as to the nature of this reflection.

Although it seems impossible that we should entertain the opinion that a belief arose through reflection, which cannot be analyzed by us by reflection, it is quite conceivable that a belief found to be resolvable by reflection should not have its source in reflection. Nevertheless, the philosophers who affirm or deny the analyzability of the belief in the objective existence of perceived external things, are generally the same who affirm or deny its origin from reflection.

The third question with regard to this belief raises the question of its *truth*. There are some who believe it to be perfectly true, and even contend that it is impossible to doubt it; others, on the contrary, argue that it cannot be true, on the ground of its being inconsistent and self-contradictory.¹ As for the latter, the secondary questions arise: Wherein lies its error? Can it be corrected? And if so, what is the right view of the subject? On these questions, again, a very great divergence of opinions can be ascertained to exist.

It was not my purpose to give in the foregoing lines anything like an exhaustive summary of all answers given by the different philosophers to the above questions; indeed, I willingly admit, if I am desired to do so, that there are theories which do not fall within the boundary-lines of either of the alternatives stated under the head of each of the above questions. The opinions I quoted were only enumerated by me with the view to rendering clear the meaning and import of the questions, which I feared would otherwise not be made sufficiently perspicuous by the mere text of these questions. The questions alone were of interest to me. The first and second of these questions are psychological ones, and I should designate their solution as the psychology of the belief in the objective

¹ There is still a third class of philosophers, who, while they themselves affirm not to differ from the general belief of mankind, are nevertheless declared by others to do so.

existence of the external world ; the third question is one of philosophy proper, or metaphysics. At the same time, however, the first two are, as a matter of course, also of philosophical or metaphysical importance, because our opinion as to the truth of the general belief in the objective existence of the external world must depend upon our interpretation, and may even depend on our views of the genesis, of this belief.

Now I do not look upon the psychology of the belief in the objective existence of the external world as upon a part of psychology in which no just results at all have been achieved until now, and which therefore needed to be constructed anew ; on the contrary, I agree with many a conclusion arrived at by others dealing with this topic. Thus, in the first place, I accept as fully established the proposition that the belief in question is analyzable, and that into subjective terms, and that the conception of some of our presentations as perceptions of objective things has its source in reflection. I further think that the school of which Locke, Berkeley and Hume are the most distinguished names, has, in part, both correctly carried out the analysis and propounded the genesis of that belief. But in part only. Serious errors and important gaps are to be found in the doctrines of that school, errors and gaps which go far to explain why even what there was of truth in them met from many a quarter with so decided an opposition. To rectify these errors, to fill these gaps, and thus, while adopting the general scope of that school, to rebuild the psychology of the belief in the objective existence of the external world, is one of the purposes of this essay.

But this one object by no means exhausts the full scope of these pages, as is already shown by their title, which is not, "The Psychology of the Belief in the Objective Existence of the External World" only, but, "The Psychology of the Belief in Objective Existence" in general. In looking at the title, some of the readers

may have thought only of the first particular belief. In point of fact, however, men believe in other objective existences besides the things of the external world. To enumerate these existences here at the outset would not suit the purpose of my argument. But I may point out here that those writers who treated of the belief in the objective existence of the external world, as a rule dealt at the same time with the belief in the objective existence of mind also. The latter belief is as common to humanity as is the former, and for this reason alone I may insist that the belief in objective existence has a wider meaning than the belief in the objective existence of the external world, and that the latter forms only a species of the former. But I hold that there are other kinds of this belief besides the belief in the objective existence both of the external world and of mind; that men regard, besides the presentations of things, some of their other presentations also, as presentations of objective existences in the same sense as they regard their presentations of things; and that the origin of the belief is the same in one case as it is in the other. Hence I can conceive of a general psychology of the belief in objective existence, embracing other parts besides the psychology of the belief in the objective existence both of the external world and of mind, and it is this general psychology which I intend to lay before the reader.

Two additional remarks, however, are in place here. One refers to the ordering of the matter. A certain arrangement necessarily follows from what I said before. Having two questions before me, one analytical, the other genetical, I shall treat of them separately. But another important distribution of the matter must be noticed here. It will, namely, become clear in the course of my essay that the *objectiva* in which men believe are of two kinds, such as are capable of presentation, and such as are not. This again will require a separate treatment of the psychology of each of these

two groups, in the course of which I shall take up singly the *objectiva* belonging to the several groups as regards the analytical question, and as regards the genetic question I shall discuss it with reference to each entire group. In the present volume, however, I propose to treat only the former of these groups. The other remark relates to the manner of proving the analytical and by far larger part of my work. And it is this: that such an analysis as it is the purpose of this work to set forth, does not admit of being proved in the strict and scientific sense of the word, for, as I have pointed out before, this analysis is naught else but the determination of the actual meaning of a word. It is a case in which the mere appeal to general consciousness takes the place of proof.



OBJECTIVA CAPABLE OF PRESENTATION.

CHAPTER I.

THE OBJECTIVE ATTRIBUTES OF PRESENTATIONS.

PSYCHOLOGY, although dealing with the consciousnesses of individuals, states objective facts. One of the more recent and most valued contributions on psychology, Dr. J. Ward's article, "Psychology," in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, lays great stress on demonstrating the subjective or individualistic standpoint of psychology. "Of all the facts with which he deals," says Dr. Ward, "the psychologist truly can say that their *esse* is *percipi*, inasmuch as all his facts are facts of presentation, are ideas in Locke's sense, or objects which imply a subject." On the other hand, however, we are assured by the same author that psychology is nevertheless as objective "as the so-called object sciences, both being true for all, consisting of what Kant would call judgments of experience."¹

This semi-objective character of psychology can be rendered apparent in a simpler manner by dividing as follows that which is subjective from that which is objective in psychology.

Subjective is that in every psychological proposition, of which something is asserted by the proposition, it necessarily must be a presentation of a certain mind; objective, again, is that which is asserted by the pro-

¹ Encyclop. Brit. vol. xx. p. 38.

position concerning the former. Or to contrast two expressions employed by Dr. Ward as synonymous, the *objects* of which psychology speaks are such only as are presented to a certain individual or subject, but the *facts* themselves which are asserted of these objects, are facts without their necessarily being presented to some subject, or, to use the proper expression, are *objective facts*.

Let us suppose that a psychologist, instead of stating some general law of his science, confines himself to relating the mental history of one individual; in that case even he will tell us objective facts. He will tell us that one presentation of that individual followed the other. What does this mean? Does it mean a third presentation of the individual? It does not, for it is well known that a succession of presentations is not the same thing as a presentation of succession. Our psychologist will tell us that one presentation lasted a long time, and the other a short time. This may be true, although it may not have presented itself to the individual, for this may be so absorbed in the quality of the presentations as to take no note at all of the lapse of time. Our psychologist will tell us further that the subject had presentations which were similar to each other, and presentations which were different from each other, or especially presentations which were more or less intensive than others, without the subject's having instituted any of these comparisons. The psychologist can count the presentations which were not counted by the subject; and he will tell of several presentations there where but *one* tree or *one* person was seen by the subject.

All these facts are not subjective facts, presentations, ideas of the subject, and still less are they presentations or ideas of the psychologist or any observer¹ (at least

¹ For to them, at the most, is only presented a physical fact happening on the surface of the body of the subject.

they must not be necessarily that, in order to be facts) ; they are, in a word, objective facts.¹ They may happen without being presented to, or thought of by, anybody in the world.

The recognition of this semi-objective character of psychology leads up to another fact, which is the proper topic of the present chapter.

It is not the psychologist alone who knows of objective facts in the presentation-worlds of the individuals with whom he deals ; every individual himself knows also of such in his own. Every one believes concerning himself that his presentations may possess certain properties or stand in certain relations, such as are spoken of in the above instances, without those properties and relations being necessarily presented to him. Moreover, everybody entertains also a more general belief concerning this subject. For instance, everybody believes *all* of his presentations to be possessed of duration and intensity, and that of a certain duration and intensity ; *all* of his presentations to stand in certain relations, with regard to time, resemblance or difference, to all his other presentations ; and everybody believes in the existence of other kindred properties and relations of his presentations, whether these properties or relations present themselves or not. And if in some case there is presented to him such a property or relation, he conceives this presentation as a perception of a property or relation which would have existed or subsisted even though it had not been presented to him. This is a belief in objective existence, that is, in the objective existence of certain Attributes (by which term we shall henceforth designate both

¹ Indeed it is evident, for instance, that the time in which the presentations of an individual succeed each other, or which is occupied by them, is the same objective time in which the objects and events of the objective external world exist and happen ; and the best proof of this is, that any among these may, or may not, be simultaneous with subjective presentations.

the relations and the other properties of presentations) of our presentations,¹ and indeed a belief which does not in the least coincide with the belief in the objective existence of the external world; for we regard those attributes of our presentations as objective attributes of these presentations, without reference as to whether we conceive those presentations of which they are the attributes, to be or not to be presentations of objectively existing things of the external world. Moreover, it is a species of belief in objective existences the psychology of which has to my knowledge never been laid down, although its existence in men is implicitly recognized in almost every psychological argument, and although it is manifestly more fundamental than either the belief in the objective existence of the external world, or that in the objective existence of mind. It is with the analysis of this belief that I wish to begin my psychology of the belief in objective existence.

The following is my analysis :

If I believe that a presentation of mine has lasted a long or a short time, has followed or preceded another of my presentations, was more or less intensive than another of my presentations, and so forth, without these facts having been actually presented to me, then the meaning of this my belief is, that if it had been my

¹ The reader may be perhaps disinclined to allow that this is a belief in objective *existence*, and maintains that existence can be asserted only of things and their likes. I consider this view to be wrong, but do not think it necessary to refute it, mainly because it is of no importance whatever as regards the truth of my argument. If, indeed, the objective attributes of presentations and other subtle *objectiva*, which will be spoken of hereafter, do not objectively *exist*, it is at all events certain that they are objective, do in some way objectively occur; and in that case my work proposes to be not only the psychology of the belief in objective existence, but generally of the belief in objective facts, to which the objective existence of things also undoubtedly belongs. My work is not intended to deal with the conception of existence (as, for instance, opposed to occurrence), but with that of objectivity.

will, I could have had, or, to speak more correctly, I should have had, together with that presentation or those presentations, certain other presentations (viz. presentations of those facts); that is, if it had been my will to have presented to me, or, as it is commonly expressed, to observe the durations, intensities, time-relations, resemblances and differences of my respective presentations.¹ If I believe in general that all of my presentations have a certain duration and intensity, that every two of my presentations stand to each other in certain relation of time, resemblance or difference, and so forth, even in case these facts are not presented to me, then this belief means that if it is my will I can have certain attribute-presentations with every one of my presentations, respectively with every two of my presentations. Not as if I believed that these attribute-presentations never appeared spontaneously, that is, without my wanting to have them with regard to any of my presentations, but I know that if it is my will they unavoidably appear. Finally, if the spontaneous appearance of an attribute-presentation in a certain case is conceived by me as the perception of an attribute objectively possessed by my presentation, independently of my perceiving it, then the meaning of this is that this attribute-presentation belongs to that class

¹ In order to get presented through will the time-relation, the resemblance or difference, or any other relation of two of my presentations, it is not necessary that the two presentations should be adjacent to each other in time. On the contrary, when I have the presentation of A, the will may arise in me to have the presentation as to whether B is to follow at all, or whether another A which may eventually follow will be stronger or weaker, &c.; and if this my will is kept up continuously until B or the other A appears, the time-relation, and respectively the resemblance or difference between the two or that other relation, will unavoidably be presented to me. The resemblance or difference, however, will be only presented if the intervening time between the two A's is not excessively long. Otherwise this attribute is in this case one of those *Objectiva* Incapable of Presentation, in the existence of which mankind nevertheless believe, and the analysis of which will follow in Part II. of my essay.

of presentations which in the manner above stated obey my will, and hence could have been called up by my will if it had not appeared spontaneously. To sum up: Our belief in the objective existence of certain attributes of our presentations is but the expression, in other terms, of our belief in the possibility to obtain certain presentations through our volition.

To the reader no doubt it may seem that several objections might be urged against the above analysis, and to meet these possible objections will be now my task.

First of all, a criticism is likely to be advanced, conceived somewhat in the following form: "Admitting the above analysis to be quite correct, still it is not what it promised to be, namely, a definition or circumscription of objective existence by conceptions, among which there is no conception of objective existence. The fact that all our presentations possess objectively certain attributes, has the following meaning according to the above analysis: 'If simultaneously with any or certain of our presentations it is our will, certain attribute-presentations will follow our will.' But this simultaneity and this sequence are just such objective facts, the analysis of which it was intended to give. Since, however, the definition of this fact can again only be, that between my first volition and that presentation, the attribute of which it is my will to have presented, I can, by a second volition of mine simultaneous with them, obtain the presentation of simultaneity, and again between my volition and the presentation of the attribute, I can, through another volition of mine intervening between the two, obtain the presentation of sequence and so forth—a definition which likewise contains the notions of the above objective facts—the analysis is not an analysis into subjective terms, not to mention the circumstance that such a cumulation of simultaneous volitions is an impossibility. Of at least two of what the author called objective attributes of presentations, namely, of simultaneity and sequence, we have an unanalyzable and direct consciousness that they are objective, real relations, that is, relations which may subsist unperceived." Such subtle criticism, however plausible it may seem, is unwarranted. The reply to it must of necessity be even more abstruse than the criticism itself was. First of all, I must remark that it is *eo ipso* quite improbable that the time-relation alone should constitute an exception to the

general fact (which, indeed, apart from the pure subjectivity of my definition, was not questioned), that our belief in the objective existence of the objective attributes of our presentations is identical with a belief in the possibility to obtain certain presentations through will. But, independently of this, my reply is as follows: That criticism is upset by one of the points of my analysis itself, and by a fact to which I have paid no attention until now. As regards the former, according to my analysis, that belief of ours, that together with any of our presentations we may obtain through our will certain attribute-presentations, is of like meaning with our belief in the objective existence of certain attributes of our presentations, not only so far as this belief consists in this, that we believe that those presentations of ours possess also certain attributes, the attributes of which are not presented, but also in so far as this belief consists in this, that those attribute-presentations which were actually presented are conceived by us as perceptions of attributes existing, or facts subsisting, objectively, that is, independently of the fact of presentation. As I have said before, if we conceive the spontaneous presentation of an attribute-presentation as the perception of an attribute objectively existing, then this expression means that this attribute-presentation belongs to that class of presentations which in other cases are obtained by our will, which obey our will. The fact to which I referred above is the following. If it is our will to obtain, together with any of our presentations, any of its attribute-presentations, not only the latter will present itself, but there will be also invariably presented at the same time the time-relation which subsists between the first presentation and our volition, and which is simultaneity, and also the time-relation which subsists between our volition and the attribute-presentation, and which again is sequence.¹ Now if we could say that the belief of men in the objective existence of certain attributes of their presentations means that if the will to obtain an attribute of one of their presentations presents itself to them *as* being simultaneous

¹ This is precisely one of the cases in which certain attribute-presentations *do* appear spontaneously. Of this fact we can convince ourselves by observing our own consciousness; and the cause of it is, by the way (to express it in the current language of psychology), that the voluntary attention, together with the intensity of those attribute-presentations towards which it is directed, raises also the intensity of the adjacent presentations, brings them into the focus of consciousness.

with this presentation, the wished-for attribute will appear *as* succeeding the will, this would undoubtedly constitute a definition by conceptions entirely subjective, an analysis into subjective terms, because it would identify that belief with a belief in the dependence of certain presentations upon certain other presentations, or, in other words, with a belief in presented uniformities of the presented order of presentations. However, if my analysis is right, then that belief of men means a belief in objective uniformities of the order of presentations. At the same time, if the fact I referred to above is really a fact, then, according to the above-mentioned point of my analysis, the belief in those objective uniformities is identical with the other belief in the presented uniformities. The objective simultaneity and sequence embraced in my definition and referred to by my critic, so far from being, according to my analysis, incapable of having any other meaning but that of presentations obtainable through another volition, simply mean nothing else but the actual existence of presentations.¹ My analysis, therefore, is an analysis into subjective terms.

To ascertain this was all the more important, since the

¹ A brief anticipatory glance upon the genesis of the belief in question will render clearer the above argument. We will find it very probable, later on, that it is by processes of experience that the individual arrives at the belief in the objective existence of certain attributes of his presentations, and especially at the belief that every one of his presentations stands in objective time-relations to all his other presentations. The process of experience originating this latter belief may be partially described as follows. After some interesting cases of sequences have spontaneously struck the attention of the child, the desire arises in it on later occasions to get presented sequences (as, for instance, whether a certain actual presentation will be followed by a certain other presentation or not, &c.), without its believing that this desire will be fulfilled (cp. the next chapter, and chapters viii. and ix.). The child, however, experiences that as often as this desire arises in it, a succession of presentations to both the starting presentation and its volition becomes presented, and continues so as long as it keeps up its will. In this way the individual arrives at the belief in the universal objective relation of sequence between all his presentations (which are not simultaneous), and at the belief that sequence is something objective and independent from his perceiving it. He is led to form this belief by subjective or presented successions of certain presentations to his volition, but he understands by this belief the objective succession of these presentations to his volition, the conception of which objective succession he has actually reached.

object of this essay is to show that all of the species of belief in objective existence are so many beliefs in the possibility to obtain certain presentations through will. Hence should my analysis in this case have failed to be one into subjective terms, the same failure would attend all the other analyses that are to follow.

Another objection which may arise against my analysis is to the following effect: "Our belief in the objective existence of an exact, numerically measured attribute of a presentation, as, for instance, that the heat of one flame is twenty times more intense than that of another, cannot mean our belief in the possibility to obtain an attribute-presentation through will, for we have no presentations of such exact facts." This objection is reasonable, and the most that might perhaps be urged against it is, that of certain exact facts, viz. of the number of discrete presentations, we can have in reality presentations which we obtain by counting. But I am ready to admit that this statement of the case itself is not quite unassailable either. For this reason I am not disposed to adhere to it, but prefer declaring that the above analysis is not to be understood as extending to exactly or numerically measured existence, but only to that less precise comparison or measurement, the result of which is described by the following expressions: *little, much, more, much more, weak, strong, stronger, much stronger, not very strong*, and so forth. The belief in the existence of an exact degree of an attribute is indeed again a belief in an *Objectivum* Incapable of Presentation, of which I will treat in the second part of my essay.

A third objection likely to arise, which I cannot pass by, may come up in this form: "The above analysis describes consciousness as consisting of isolated presentations, between which relations are created by the will; in reality, however our presentations are from the first invested with what are designated attributes by the above theory, and thus there is no opportunity for exerting that will." In meeting this objection, I must remind the critic that not only did I not deny, but that I laid particular stress upon, the spontaneous appearance of the attributes; no doubt with every presentation there appear spontaneously one or another of the attributes, some of them with one presentation, some with another. But no one will say that with every presentation we also necessarily and invariably become conscious of its duration, its relations of time, of resemblance or difference to all our preceding presentations, or, indeed, that we are continually counting our

presentations. At this very moment, when the reader is busy with these presentations, his attention is so much engrossed by them that perhaps in thinking of a concrete example he will hardly be able to conceive that he should have presentations without there being presented to him (at least in some vague way) all their attributes of this kind. But in more closely investigating the train of his presentations, he will have to confess that in passing along a street with which he is not familiar, and stopping to look at different sights, it may escape his notice before which of them he stayed a longer or shorter time; that looking in turn at two ladies, and recognizing the colour of the dresses of both to be gray, he may fail to notice the difference in the intensity of the brightness of the colour; that in meeting in succession with two acquaintances, he has failed to take note of the sequence, and upon the matter being talked about the next day, he remembers having met both, but cannot recall which of them he had seen first, &c. &c. But if he steps into the street with the will of having presented to him facts of this kind, he accomplishes his will. In the same way, the order in which certain colours succeed each other in an optical experiment may also strike a person who witnesses it without taking any interest in it, but it will be inevitably noted by a person whose will it is to observe that order. Possibly, upon hearing these examples, it will be objected by some, that it is not "will," but "attention" which produces this effect. To this my answer is, first of all, that in a subsequent chapter I shall deal separately with the place of will in psychology, and with its relation to attention. Besides, there can be no question here but of voluntary attention, which is at all events one species of will. Finally, if it should be said that it is impossible for the will to call up the appearance of the attribute-presentations, because the *willer* had to know already of the existence of the attributes in order to will their presentation, or, in other words, that he had to have the presentations before the will presented itself, my answer to this naturally is, that all he had to have was merely an *idea* of such attribute-presentations. It is indeed the very characteristic of will that it realizes an idea.

Although I have already dwelt at considerable length upon the topic of this chapter, the reader will undoubtedly expect some additional information on the subject, namely, the precise enumeration of the objective attributes of presentations (some only of which I have mentioned heretofore, and those merely by way of exemplification), and likewise the more

accurate designation of that bare something which, with reference to its attributes, may be styled the substantive presentation, and upon which my exposition has shed but a very uncertain light. This, however, is no task of mine. For regarding the first point, it is a matter of indifference to my analysis as to how many or what objective attributes our presentations have, since the analysis is set up by me with regard to objective attributes in general; and regarding the second part, I can only say that if the belief in the objective existence of the attributes of our presentations, with which I dealt, is vague with reference to the point in question, my task did not require me to deal with it otherwise. I might add that these questions do not belong to the province of the objectivity-psychologist, but to that of the perception-psychologist, which is also shown by the circumstance that I have been able, as I hope, to make myself understood in the matter I dealt with without entering into those points. But apart from this, an exhaustive solution of this question would in itself require a treatise of considerable length, which it would be impossible for me to wedge into the exposition of my proper topic. I shall nevertheless attempt to give in a few words an outline of my views on these two questions. In my opinion, the following are all of the objective attributes of our presentations: 1, resemblance, respectively difference; 2, time-relation; 3, local (space-) relation to other presentations; 4, duration; 5, intensity; 6, extension; 7, position; and 8, number.¹ The reader will probably feel the want of a lengthy commentary on this enumeration, but it is just such a commentary as this which the space allotted to my own task does not allow of. And now what is that substantive presentation of which all these are the objective *predicabilia*? Quality, presented or represented, is the ready answer to this question. Only that on further thought we would have to retract this answer. For these attribute-presentations may figure again with regard to each other as substantive-presentations. Thus, for instance, our presentations of resemblance or difference have also duration, time-relation to other presentations, intensity, and so forth. Duration and extension, too, have intensity, and so has sequence, which may also be shorter or longer, which difference, in my opinion, constitutes difference of intensity.

¹ Of the attributes above enumerated, I have been careful to mention in the preceding examples those only, the objective attribute character of which I trusted would be admitted by every reader.

This being the case, we must say that all of our presentations have objective attributes, those likewise which are the attribute-presentations of others. Quality, nevertheless, occupies a different position, namely, it can never be the objective attribute of another presentation,¹ and might therefore be designated as the absolute substantive presentation.

I do not think the reader will be satisfied with the answer given to these self-suggested questions, and he may possibly even find them to be incorrect. Fortunately, such adverse criticism, even if merited, is, I repeat it, a matter of indifference as regards my own particular topic. Whatever the reader's opinion may be with regard to the *subjective nature* of the attributes, let him apply the above theory of their objectivity, and I am convinced he will find it to be applicable. I myself know of no psychologist whose opinion I should have adopted,² or whose opinion I should have been disposed to regard as the ruling one, prevailing with the majority of readers.

¹ For we never can have a presentation of duration, time-relation, resemblance and difference, &c., so that the quality which endures, or the qualities between which those relations subsist, should exist objectively only, without being presented. But it might be said, on the other hand, that sometimes we have a presentation, for instance, of some colour, without being able to tell at once *what colour* it is, and only find it out after thinking over it, that therefore in that case the quality exists only objectively for a while. But on such an occasion it is only the memory of the *name* which we recall. It might again be asked, Is not feeling as "tone" an objective attribute of presentations? No, it is not. Some hold that every presentation has feeling-tone, subjective or, in other words, presented; others, again, hold that some presentations are indifferent. According to the former, therefore, this tone is an invariably presented, subjective quality, and never an objective attribute; while the latter do not believe that it exists objectively when it is not presented.

² I cannot by any means approve of Mr. Herbert Spencer's doctrine, although this is not the place for criticising it. But it is yet of great interest to us on one point, namely, that he is continually confounding the objective existence of the relations with their presentation. This confusion becomes already visible in the very first words, to the effect that "the proximate components of Mind are of two broadly-contrasted kinds, Feelings and *Relations* between feelings;" and in the statement that "under an ultimate analysis (!) what we call relation proves to be itself a kind of feeling;" and this confusion clings to his entire psychology, constituting one of the fundamental weaknesses of this work of a great thinker.

CHAPTER II.

THE OBJECTIVITY OF TIME AND SPACE.

I SHALL now pass from the analysis of our belief in the objective existence of certain attributes of our presentations, to the analysis of our belief in the unitary, uninterrupted, objective flow of Time, and in the objective existence of a unitary Space, beliefs by reason of which we regard the portions of time and space which are presented to us in any presentation as fragments of that unitary objective Time and Space.

As to Time, the solution of this task is comparatively easy. The belief that through our will we can obtain presentations of duration in all our presentations, and that between these, again, we can obtain the presentation of uninterrupted sequence (or, in other words, the belief that, starting from any of our presentations, we can obtain through our will the presentation of an uninterrupted lapse of time¹), is nothing else but the belief that Time flows uninterruptedly *objectively*.

¹ I consider the second formula, stated above in parenthesis, to be the more correct one, for reasons which I cannot expatiate upon here at length. I shall, however, state these reasons briefly. There is a common element in the presentations both of duration and of sequence, and this is the Presentation of Lapse of Time, which is a pendant of the Presentation of Change of Place that accompanies our movements, and of which I shall speak later on. The so-called presentation of the simultaneity of two or more presentations is as little a primary presentation as, for instance, that of silence; it is simply two or more presentations between which *no* presentation of lapse of time appears, our notion of the simultaneity of these presentations being the result of our mentally contrasting this want with the presentation of lapse of time between presentations, with which presentation we are already familiar. The first formula corresponds with the current doctrines on time-presentations, doctrines which are opposed to the views just advanced by me.

The task with respect to Space is less simple ; but the belief in the objective existence of a unitary Space is not anything else either but a belief that through will we are able to obtain certain presentations. Our belief in the objective existence of the unitary Space is, namely, the consequence of the fact that through will we are able to produce movements, and that by these movements, again, we are able to obtain presentations of change of place ; otherwise, unless born in us, we should have no notion of the objective existence of a unitary Space. The truth of this will appear if we imagine to ourselves an individual altogether incapable of any motion. Even supposing all of the presentations of that individual to be invested, from the very beginning of his consciousness, with extension, to appear to him in certain positions and in local relations to each other,¹ these extensions, positions and relations, would nevertheless fail to strike him as parts and relations of an objectively existing unitary Space. How, indeed, could that individual arrive at the belief that, besides the extension or portion of space which is presented to him in a certain moment in a presentation, either in colour, in touch, in bodily pain or in sound, there objectively exists in the same time other parts of space, other space too ? Especially with regard to the visual space, two alternatives may be imagined. Either the visual field of the eyes is permanently presented to the individual, in this case this field is a permanent subjective presentation ; or, in spite of the immobility of his eyes, the visual field vanishes intermittingly from his consciousness whenever his mind is engrossed by another presentation, but vanishes in such a manner that the individual, without moving his eyes, may get it pre-

¹ This is a supposition used merely for the purpose of rendering the argument more clear. I am well aware that a great many psychologists hold that it is altogether impossible for a completely motionless being to have spatial presentations. I shall have occasion to recur to this subject again in the present chapter.

sented again at will;¹ this fact does not amount to more than that this portion of space thus presented to him has a permanent objective existence, but it will not lead him to a conception of an objective unitary Space of which that portion is a part.

It in nowise alters the matter that, according to our supposition, all his presentations are invested with extension, and appear in certain positions and local relations to each other. Every one of our presentations possesses intensity, and stands with regard to this intensity in relations of difference or resemblance to all presentations of its own kind, and, it might be perhaps said, to all presentations in general; but the belief in this is not identical with the belief that in some way there objectively and permanently exist intensity-continua of colours, sounds, and of all other kinds of presentations, or indeed a general intensity-continuum. Even if our presentations of colour, sound, &c., or our presentations in general, were to follow each other in a certain order of intensity—for instance, in a continually ascending scale, or ascending for some time and then descending again—the foundation would be wanting for our belief that when one degree of that scale is presented to us, the rest of them exist objectively. An individual incapable of motion would be in an analogous position with regard to the spatial attributes of his presentations.

But we are capable of motion; moreover, our movements are accompanied by that peculiar presentation which we call change of place, or the appearance of *another* place;² and, what is the main thing (for all this would not yet be sufficient to give rise to the belief in

¹ Another supposition might have been put in the place of the one made above, to wit, that the individual is capable of no other motion but that of closing and opening his eyes at his will.

² I shall recur to this presentation in an Appendix attached to the following chapter, treating of the belief in the objective existence of the external world. That Appendix will be complementary, in an essential manner, of the above argument.

the objective existence of Space), we know that, if it is our will, we can produce at any moment the movements of which we are capable, and thus are able to obtain the said presentation. We believe that besides or in the place of the extension or portion of space which is presented to us at any moment in any of our presentations, we may through will (namely, by the motion of our eyes, our heads, our extremities, or by the propulsion of our whole bodies) obtain the presentation of *another* portion of space, to the right, to the left, in front, in the rear, upwards or downwards, of the already presented portion of space, and then again of *other* portions of space in all the above directions from the former, and of other portions of space again, further and further on, without any limits. Hence, while there is present to us at any moment a portion of space, we believe that, had it been our will at a certain preceding period, any of these numberless *other* portions of space, standing in certain space-relations to the presented one, might be presented to us at the present moment; and we express this belief in this way, that numberless other portions of space exist, or that an indefinite Space exists at this moment, of which the portion of space happening to be presented forms part. Among the numberless "presentations of change of place," or "appearances of *other* places," which we are able to obtain through our will at any moment, there are some possessed of a certain direction and extension, which we call returns to, or re-appearances of, the same places which were presented to us on former occasions. The belief in the permanent possibility of obtaining these particular presentations finds its expression otherwise in these words: that the *same* places, positions or portions of space permanently exist—a belief which is an essential part of the belief in the objective existence of Space.¹ Our belief in the permanent objective exist-

¹ It may be thought perhaps that this is not a definition, by subjective conceptions, of our belief in the objective existence of space;

ence of Space is therefore nothing else but our belief, expressed in other words, that certain space-presentations are permanently capable of being presented to us through our volition, just as our belief in the momentary objective existence of some of the attributes of our presentations is nothing else but the expression, in other words, of our belief that certain attribute-presentations can be presented to us momentarily through volition. Objective existence, in both cases, is (to risk a newly-coined word) tantamount to presentability through will.

The reader may perhaps regard this sameness of result as merely a seeming one, for he will think inadmissible the identification of the volition which produces objective physical facts—such palpable things as our movements—with that volition which tends to bring to

for it might be argued that the notion of the otherness and sameness of a portion of space is already a notion of its objectively existing, or rather that the belief that the presentation of a certain portion of space is the presentation of the same portion of space or of a portion of space different from that which is or was present to us, already includes the belief that this is the presentation of an objectively existing portion of space. But this would be taking an erroneous view of the matter. That supposition of incapability of motion with which we set out in dealing with our present subject, has shown that we might have an idea of the sameness and otherness of portions of space without believing them to be objectively existing; in the same manner as we may possess a conception of the sameness and otherness of intensities without believing these intensities to be objectively existing. Even if we were capable of motion, and our movements would be attended with the presentation of change of place, yet if these movements were to happen independently of our will, accidentally or involuntarily, they would fail to impart to us the belief in the objective existence of Space. The pivotal point of the above definition is the continuous possibility of obtaining presentations of other portions of space through will. As to what the sameness or otherness of presented portions of space consists in, this to analyze is the task of the space- (perception-) psychologist, who deals with the space-presentations merely as presentations, while the objectivity-psychologist accepts this notion of sameness and otherness as one already existing, although as a subjective one. I shall nevertheless recur to this question in those points in which it more nearly affects my subject, in the Appendix mentioned above.

our consciousness such subtle things as the differences, sequences, &c., of our presentations. But such reasoning would not prove the reader to be a good psychologist. For he would then be looking upon the effect of the first volition from the point of view of an objective observer, and upon the effect of the second volition, reversely, from that of the *willing* subject, and thus the two effects appear to him to be totally different; but looking at both from the same point of view, the two appear to be perfectly analogous. Indeed, from the point of view of the objective observer, the wonderful fact happens also in the latter case, that changes in the objective physical world are produced by the will of the subject; for the change taking place in the consciousness of the subject in consequence of his volition, the perception of the difference, sequence, &c., does not occur without correlative changes in the body of the subject, which even embrace muscular movements. On the other hand, again (as will be shown hereafter in the chapter treating of volition), the subject is conscious on performing his first voluntary movements of no other effect of his volitions but the perception of a different place. He is only taught by subsequent experience that when his will brings up to his mind a place different from the one present, certain parts of his body undergo a change, just as he may be taught by still later experiences that the same thing happens in case time or difference are called to his mind by his will.

True, there is a great difference between those two species of objectives, the conceptions of which we arrive at by reflecting on the action of the two kinds of volition, which we have just now compared with each other. One is an all-embracing and continuously existing entity; the other is something as slight and transient as the attributes of presentations, as, for instance, intensity, difference, &c. But the fact that, in cases differing so much from each other, men have but one way of describing the possibility of obtaining cer-

tain presentations through volition, namely, that something exists objectively, is a strong proof in support of the definition of objectivity furnished by the above analysis. There is still another proof of the correctness of my definition worthy of notice. It will become self-evident to any one who cares to reflect on what I am going to state, that under certain circumstances there would arise in him, in analogy to Time and Space, the notions of other objective entities. It is well known that Time and Space are not the only orders or forms under which our presentations range themselves, and that their intensity constitutes likewise such an order. Let us suppose our heat-presentations not to be subject to the laws which actually govern them, but to laws in accordance with which, while presentation succeeds presentation in our consciousness, we have a continuous concurrent presentation of heat, ascending in scale with the progress of time. Under such circumstances we would know our presentations to be contained as much in a continuously flowing Heat, a Heat-entity, as they are in Time, and the degree of heat coinciding with any of our presentations would then constitute position, while the extent of its rising, coinciding with any of our presentations, would constitute duration, of the presentation in this Heat-entity. Still we would not conceive this Heat-entity as something objective which flows independently of the circumstance whether that flow is present to us or not. But let us further suppose the heat-presentations not to continually trouble our minds, but cease from time to time, as, for instance, when we are interested in some properties and relations of the presentations contained in that Heat other than their "positions" and "durations" in this entity; but that even in that case, if it were our will, there would appear to us, with regard to any such presentation, the flow of heat with which it coincides, or which divides two presentations. Heat, under such circumstances, would be to us an *objective* entity analogous to Time.

In the same way we are able to point out the circumstances under which the conception of a Heat-entity analogous to Space would arise in us. Let us leave the above suppositions and take up another. Suppose we had before us at all times a presentation of heat, of one degree or another, and through our will were able to get presented at our pleasure, seriatim, all the degrees above and below it; we should express this fact by saying that there exists an objective Heat, and then this Heat would be analogous to a Space of one dimension. Still more would this be the case if different presentations of touch, pressure, colour and sound, were permanently attached to the different degrees of heat, in such a way that if by our will the respective degrees were presented to us, these presentations would also appear at the same time; this would be the objective existence of a world in Heat, which would again be analogous to the objective existence of the external world in Space. But this last remark somewhat anticipates the topic of the next chapter, which will treat of the existence of the external world, and dispel the curious impression which may have been created by my dealing with space entirely abstracted from its contents.¹

But before passing to this chapter, there still remains the task of designating, as it were, the place occupied by the psychology of the objectivity of Time and Space in the psychology of Time and Space in general.

¹ Instead of the imaginary supposition of the heat-presentation continually attending the substantive presentations, assumed by me above, I might have assumed simply that the presentations follow each other with a continually increasing intensity, and shown that under certain circumstances this would have led to the notion of an objectively flowing, respectively existing, Intensity-entity. But I thought the reader would find it more difficult to conceive the latter supposition than the one used by me in the text, since it assumes that substantive presentations of the most different kinds stand in relations of intensity to each other, and because its elaboration would have raised certain difficult questions relating to the psychology of intensity which are here out of place.

I have said before that the psychology of our belief in the objective existence of certain attributes of our presentations has been hitherto utterly neglected, and I may now add that, to my knowledge, the same remark equally applies to the psychology of the belief in the unitary objective flow of Time, and of the belief in the objective existence of a unitary Space. Amongst all the psychologists who have attempted to analyze into subjective terms our belief in the objective existence of the matter, or the things, or the bodies, of the external world, and to derive its genesis from our presentations of matter, things or bodies, there has not been one to so much as propound the question, whether a similar analysis might not be applied to our beliefs in the objectivity of Time and Space (the existence of which beliefs surely not one of them would be disposed to deny), and the further question as to how those beliefs arose out of our time- and space-presentations. On the contrary, in dealing with the belief in the objective existence of the external world, they invariably assumed the beliefs in a unitary objective Time and Space as already existing, and treated them as if they stood in no need of any special explanation. It is no doubt true that in works purporting to give the whole system of psychology, there is never wanting an analysis of our conceptions of Time and of Space, *i.e.* of the unitary Time and of the unitary Space, and likewise an account of the genesis of these conceptions; but they invariably fail to notice that our conceptions of the unitary Time and of the unitary Space are conceptions of an objective Time and of an objective Space. In other words, the psychologists have treated of our conceptions of the unity of Space and Time, but without treating of our conceptions of their *objectivity*. This neglect, however, has vitiated their entire treatment of the subject, and has been the cause of their having arrived, even in the matter treated by them, merely at seeming results. For this reason alone, irrespectively of other possible errors, no complete analysis of our conceptions of Time and Space can be said to exist, no matter how many theories may profess to furnish it.

To begin with Time, I find all the writers dealing with this topic to be labouring under the mistake of assuming that the sum of all our presentations of succession is a presentation of a unitary flow of Time. Misled by this error, they all teach that the memory of the successions which had been presented to us at a preceding period of time, is a memory of that period, and all are of opinion that our conception of future time con-

sists in the conception of the presentations of succession which will be presented to us. Led astray by the same error, they further assert that our consciousness of the unitary flow of Time is given us directly by our presentations of succession, and requires no other explanation of its genesis.

The erroneousness of this opinion is evident. Our conception of Time is the conception of a chain of successions in which *every* link precedes or succeeds, that is, stands in relations of succession, to every other.¹ Now no such universal concatenation of our presentations is presented to us. The more thoroughly the nature of the presentation of succession is realized by the psychologist, the more fully he must be convinced of this fact. All psychologists agree, quite properly, that the inevitably necessary element of a presentation of succession from A to B, is the representation of the former simultaneously with the presentation of the latter. Now granted, what in reality I do not think to be true, that the succession from any of our presentations to the next immediately following it, or to some that are relatively near to it, in time, happens in no case without being presented, we surely do not receive in every case the presentation of the succession of presentations separated by an interval of an hour or more. Yet if this be so, the sum of our presentations of succession is not a presentation of the unitary flow of Time, but a bundle of presentations of successions which do not present themselves in the relation of succession to each other. Hence the *memory* of the whole day, as recalled in the evening, will exhibit the following features: All the experiences of the day which we remember will appear as preceding the evening; many successions which were presented may be also remembered; but all the experiences *which we remember* are not, nor can they be, *remembered as preceding or succeeding* all other remembered experiences of the day. However incredible this may sound to the reader who confounds *inferences* with *memories* of succession, it is, nevertheless, the inevitable conclusion drawn from the fact that only what was presented can be remembered.

¹ I subjoin a re-statement, in different words, of the above proposition, for the benefit of those readers who may be shocked at the figurative language of the above proposition, which was employed by me chiefly to render its meaning more obvious: "Our conception of Time includes the conception that every part of its contents is either simultaneous or stands in relations of succession to every other part."

It may be also admitted that different experiences of the day are remembered as preceding, at longer or shorter intervals, the evening ; but the shorter intervals are not remembered as being contained, as lying in, the longer ones. Since the unitary chain of succession was not presented, it cannot be remembered either. Hence our conception of a future period does not consist in the conception of presentations of succession which will be presented to us. Finally, our consciousness of the unitary Time is not given us simply through our presentations of successions ; it contains one more element requisite for its genesis.

This additional element is the conception of, and the belief in, objective succession.¹ We believe that, besides the successions of our presentations, which were and will be presented to us, there also happened and will happen unperceived successions of our presentations.² And we also believe that

¹ It may be perhaps said that psychologists have taken into account this element, since they all teach that our adult conception of Time includes the notion that, simultaneously with the succession of our presentations, there is proceeding a non-presented succession of non-presented events. This is in reality likewise a conception of "objective" succession, but it is not the one spoken of in the text, nor can it supply the latter in the analysis and genesis of our consciousness of the unitary Time. *Before* we can entertain a belief in a unitary succession, to each other, of objective events, we must possess a belief in the unitary succession of our presentations, which is already a conception of the unitary Time.

² The belief which we entertain in the evening with regard to the successions of the events of the day preceding it, goes yet further. We believe, or, as we are in the habit of saying, we know, that of two *particular* events of that day remembered by us, one preceded the other, at a long or short interval of time, without our having had a presentation of sequence to enable us to remember this sequence. This belief rests always on inference ; for instance, the inference from our having always experienced their order to be the same, or from our having had a presentation of one event preceding a third, and of this again preceding the other. Just as we infer from certain presentations of changes of things, that elsewhere certain other changes objectively happen or happened, so we infer from presentations of successions of our presentations, that certain other successions *of our own presentations* objectively happen or happened, an inference mentioned by no psychologist, as far as I know. But the drawing of such a peculiar inference implies already a conception of, and a belief in, objective succession.

every presentation we remember as preceding our presentation of memory by a short time, *did* succeed every one of those of our presentations which appear in memory as past long ago, although this relation is not presented to us in every case, and therefore cannot be remembered. We believe in these objective successions in this sense, that if it had been, were now or in the future, our will, we could have had, would have now or in the future, certain presentations of succession; we, namely, know that besides the spontaneous or accidental coincidence of the representation of A with the presentation of a succeeding B, required for a presentation of a succession from A to B, we can voluntarily obtain such a coincidence, if on the appearance of A we resolve to observe whether a B follows it, and steadily keep up our will until B presents itself. We finally believe that every one of our presentations is, was or will be, either simultaneous, or preceding, or succeeding every other, no matter whether this relation is, was or will be, presented to us or not; that is, we believe in a unitary, uninterrupted flow of Time. We believe it in this sense, that if on the occurrence of any presentation we resolve to observe successions in general (without waiting for a particular B to appear), the presentations of successions to the initial presentation, and of successions to the presentations that will follow it, will continue as long as our volition continues to that effect, and that we will thus obtain the presentation of an indefinite, uninterrupted chain of successions of presentations or flow of Time. Our conception of Time, even of one day's time, is a conception of something objective and only partially presented; it is indeed a sum or abstract of successions—not, however, of presented successions, but of objective ones, the presentations of which are obtainable through will.

The error of those psychologists who in their analysis of our conception of Time speak of it as if consisting in our actual presentations of successions, is thus rendered obvious. But their error in the exposition of the genesis of that conception is equally manifest. Instead of a simple reference to our presentations of successions as in themselves sufficiently explaining the existence of that conception, they should have explained, in the first place, in a general way, how the belief in objective successions of his presentations arises in every one of us; how, in particular, we arrive at the belief that two presentations, both of which we remember as past, but of different dates as to the present, stood likewise in relation of succession to each other, although we had no presentation of this

circumstance; how at the belief in other so-called time-axioms; and finally, how at the belief in that universal, unitary succession, which is the Time of which every presented succession is part. The present chapter, which deals only with the analytical problem, does not propose to answer these questions. The genetic problem I intend adverting to, as I originally proposed, in a chapter by itself. The reply, however, might be, either that these beliefs are innate, or that they have arisen from a generalization of our experiences, or their origin might be accounted for by taking some means between these two propositions. Whichever of these may be the correct answer, one thing ought not to have escaped the notice of the psychologists, namely, that these questions were included in the question of the genesis of our consciousness of Time. If this had not escaped their notice, these questions would have brought them back again to the necessity of solving the preliminary question, as to what we *understand* by an objective succession, which is not a presentation, and yet is designated by the same word by which we designate a certain kind of presentations. And had this question been properly solved by them, they would have discovered that—incredible though it may seem at the first blush—one of the elements which are found in the conception of unitary Time by its analysis into subjective terms, is the conception of volition, namely, of the volition to observe successions, and that that individual alone can arrive at the conception of the unitary Time who exerts such volitions, and who is not left to the caprice of successions spontaneously presenting themselves to him.¹

¹ However overstrained and wearisome the reader may find the sedulous care with which I anticipate possible objections, I must not pass over the following. Possibly some critic imagines that the somewhat lengthy argument I have just concluded might be utterly destroyed by an objection like this: "Your element of objective succession is quite superfluous. You stated above (p. 31) that concerning a number of presentations we remember, we can know that Z succeeded A, a succession which was not presented, from the circumstance that the successions from A to F, from F to M, and from M to Z, were presented to us. You said, however, that this is an inference, and that by the fact of Z's succession to B, we understand that we could have had a presentation of succession between them, if it had been our will to have it. I contend, on the contrary, that there is no inference here of one fact from another, but *what has been presented to us we already call* Z's succession to A; the fact that F succeeded A, M succeeded F, and Z succeeded A, we describe by

Now let us look at the shortcomings of the psychologists in their treatment of Space. It is well known that a great

saying that Z succeeded A. Now you admitted above (what I am sure cannot be denied) that the succession of two presentations immediately following each other never happens without being presented. I contend likewise that the simultaneity of two simultaneous presentations is invariably presented. Hence I assert that if in the evening we believe that many successions did happen during the day of which we had no presentations of the character described by psychologists, and even if we believe that all presentations which were not simultaneous stood in the relation of succession to each other, we nevertheless in doing so believe only what was presented to us, because the successions from our first presentation to the second, from the second to the third, and so on from the last but one to the last, *were* presented to us, and by the succession of the last to the first we understand nothing more than the happening of these presented successions."

This argument is untenable. My reply to the critic is this: That there is such a presentation of succession as is described by psychologists, and that the appearance of M and N in a certain manner is described by men, that they perceived N to follow M cannot be denied, and is indeed assumed in your argument. In the case of an immediate succession, at least, the consciousness of this succession consists in such a presentation. Now if F's succession to A, M's to F, and Z's to M, were likewise called by men Z's succession to A, already by themselves, and not as a matter or an occasion for, or as a possibility of, a presentation of this kind, they would call two different things succession, and no cause could be assigned for this double meaning. The first notion of succession can arise in us only in consequence of presented successions (for if we had an innate consciousness of objective or real succession, how could we arrive at recognizing a certain kind of presentations as presentations of succession); and if subsequently we conceive objective successions too, this can only happen by *identifying them in some way with presented successions*. If the mercury of a thermometer placed in a pot containing water reaches a certain height, we say the water is warm, but the belief in this is only one of inference; under the warmth of the water we do not understand the fact of the rising of the mercury, which we *did* experience, but the sensation we would experience if we were to put our hand into the water. I do not wish to argue here the question, whether our belief that if one event precedes another, that again a third, the third a fourth, and so on, then the first is likewise succeeded by the fourth, was arrived at in the same way, through experience, as our belief that heat expands the bodies. It is possible that this time-axiom, the contrary of which we are unable to conceive, is

variety of "Space-theories" have been advanced. Of these I shall consider two.

According to one of them, our presentations appear originally without any spatial attributes, and our presentations of extension and of space-relations are obtained solely through our motions. Our motions are, namely, accompanied by a sensation which changes with the extension and direction of the motion. That a thing is to the right or to the left, above or below, nearer or farther off, means only this, that the sight or touch of it is preceded by different kinds or quantities of the motor-sensations of the eye, the head, or of the extremities of the body. One single moving member which is provided with one point invested with the sense of touch, suffices to give the presentation of the space which that point runs over while moving, and of the space-relations of the things which are in that space. Experience teaches the equivalents of the movements of the different members. By touching the different points of our body with our moving members, we learn the spatial relations of the different points of the former, so that subsequently every tactual sensation, arising from any object and touching any part of our body, will be capable of being localized in relation to every other part. The motion of the whole body from one place to another affords a presentation of a larger space. The equivalents of the motor-sensations of the eye, the head, and of the remaining organs of motion, are likewise learned by experience. After a great number of motions we obtain the conception of Space as possessed by the adult.

Assuming this theory to be right in identifying space-presentations with motor-sensations, or with certain attributes of theirs, still it would not even then absolutely follow that a great number of motions are sufficient to give rise to the adult conception of Space. For what is it that tells an individual who obtains space-presentations through motion, that besides the direction and extent of space presented to him while in motion, there is at the same time space of longer extent and of other directions, and that there is space even if he does not move at all? Some writers believe the most primitive movements to be of a reflex character; others, again, consider them to be the spontaneous movements produced by pleasure

inborn with us; but I think it is manifest that this succession cannot be conceived by us otherwise than as an occasion for what we called a presentation of succession.

or pain. Let us then suppose an individual to make only such involuntary movements through all his life. Any number of such movements could not build up for him the conception of Space now possessed by us, nor could it carry the conviction to the individual that Space objectively exists. As will be seen in the next chapter, it would not even teach him that he himself exists as body, no matter how often he may have touched his own body with his moving members. One thing alone can convey to him the conception of objectively existing Space, and that is the consciousness of being able to procure unlimited motor-sensations at his will. Let us suppose our individual, after having had for a time none but involuntary motor-sensations—that is, according to the theory, space-presentations—to be actuated from time to time by the will of obtaining such presentations when they do not appear spontaneously. The result is, that as often as this is his will, his will is accomplished ; in reality we are unable to have the will of moving without it being followed up by actual movement. *This* conviction he will express by saying that “Space exists.” Now it is just this essential element which the exponents of the Space theory in question have left out. I do not find that either Mill, or Prof. Bain, or Mr. Spencer, have attributed any importance to the continuous and unlimited *producibleness of motion through will* in the genesis of our belief in the existence of Space. Not even by implication does it appear in their theories,¹ and hence the analysis of our belief in the existence of Space as given by them is, to say the least, defective.

¹ Mr. Spencer, indeed, feels this gap and the necessity of filling it up in some other way. But his attempt at it is a complete failure. After stating that from experiencing upon the repeated execution of a similar movement different objects to be in the same position, “it results that the *idea* of the particular position accompanying each one of these movements is *dissociated from* objects and *impressions*,” he continues: “It results, too, as there are endless such movements, there come to be endless such positions, conceived as *existing apart* from body. And it results, further, that as in the first and every subsequent act of perception, each position is known, *as co-existent with the subject*, there arises a consciousness of countless *such co-existent positions*, that is, of Space.” (*Pr. of Psychology*, vol. ii. p. 184. The italics are mine). These last two sentences are full of sophisms. We would have a very curious conception of the world if we were to hypostasize into entities really *existing*, apart from presentations, all those attributes which on different occasions were experienced by us to be common to different presentations, and the idea of which has therefore become dis-

The other theory I wish to sketch here starts from the proposition that, independently of all motions, certain, or, according to some, all of our presentations originally are of an extended character. Thus, they say, we feel already originally the pain from a larger swelling to be of greater extension than from a smaller one, and our sensation of extension to vary according to the larger or smaller size of a wet cloth applied to our skin; we experience extension in resting the palm of our hand on the table; and even the motionless eye originally perceives extension, and even depth or a third dimension. Discriminating attention without any motion discovers in extension, presented at any time, parts, and between these, again, spatial relations, and association—the circumstance, namely, that every presented position calls up the memory of positions presented at an earlier period—suggests, likewise

sociated from the idea of the particular presentations; and still more curious would it be if we were to believe that all those things which on different occasions we experienced to be co-existent with the subject, remain co-existing with each other to the end of time; every presentation, indeed, is known or can be recognized as co-existent with the subject. We might say, after the pattern of the above exposition: “By experiencing different kinds of impressions accompanied by a certain degree of pleasure, it results that the idea of this particular degree of pleasure is dissociated from qualities and impressions. It results, too, as there are an indefinite number of different degrees of pleasure, there come to be an indefinite number of such different degrees of pleasure conceived as existing apart from qualities pleasurable. And it results further that, as in the first and every subsequent act of sensation, each degree of pleasure is known as co-existent with the subject, there arises a consciousness of an indefinite number of such co-existent degrees of pleasure.” The truth, however, is as follows: From experiencing different objects to be in the same position, we only learn that the presentation of the same position is not invariably associated with the presentation of the *same* object. The conception of presentations of positions “existing” (being presented subjectively) apart from body in general, results only from our experiences of empty positions or empty space. But so far only subjectively presented positions are referred to. All these experiences still fail to establish our belief in positions existing permanently, objectively, independently of our presentations. This belief we derive only from the fact that, out of innumerable positions, any of them *can* be presented to us at any moment in conformity with our will. Or rather it is just this fact which we express by other words in saying that there exist objectively innumerable positions, or that there objectively exists an indefinite unitary Space.

without the aid of any motion, the spatial relations of these parts, or of the entire presented portion of space, to other positions. If all, or most, of our presentations are extended, and appear in local relations to each other, then, it is averred by this theory, the synthesis of these extensions and relations naturally furnishes our conception of the unitary Space.

As to this theory, it may be remarked that the conception of Space obtained by this means of association and synthesis, will be only a conception of a *continuum existing in thought*. The reason for this I have already explained at the beginning of this chapter, where, by implication, this theory has been investigated.

This theory of space-presentations, brought forward in opposition to the motion-theory commented upon by me above, has, in my opinion, truth on its side. We may look upon the theory propounded by Brown, Mill, Prof. Bain and Mr. Spencer, as having been confuted by the acute criticism of a distinguished group of more recent writers, Prof. Stumpf, Dr. Ward, Prof. W. James, and others. In one respect, however, the theory claiming the original nature of the extended quality cannot either do without motion, and that is in the explanation of our conception of the permanent objective existence of Space. Of course there is no need of accepting at the same time that the space-presenting capability of motions lies in those sensations to which the earlier school assigned it.

CHAPTER III.

THE OBJECTIVE EXISTENCE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD.

OUR belief in the objective existence of matter or things arises only in consequence of our belief in the objective existence of space, and is thus subject indirectly to the same conditions which attach to the latter.

Let us bring forward, once more, our imaginary individual, incapable of motion, and therefore devoid of the consciousness of the objective existence of space, although possessed of space-presentations. He could fully (or, at any rate, with but slight flaws) possess that conception of matter and of things which we possess, but could have no conception of their objective existence. Presentations of touch and pressure, possessing a certain extension and form, which appear from time to time on certain points of his body, or the coloured surfaces of a certain shape and size that appear before his immovable eyes, or both, may be called by him matter, just as they are called so by us. Experience may also teach him that certain species of tactual sensations (soft, hard, smooth, rough), or certain colours, are regularly attended by a certain shape and size, or even that some of them are attended by a certain degree of heat, by a certain sound and smell, and he may then call the different groups of concurrent presentations, different things, just as we do. But this matter and these things will to him be only subjective presentations or groups of presentations.

These presentations of touch and pressure, together with the other presentations accompanying them, come and go in the same way as his ideas, emotions or volitions. In what sense should he believe that they are

presentations of objectively existing things? If he knows that, simultaneously with his presentations of a certain moment, certain attributes (those treated of in Chapter i.) of these presentations objectively exist, it may perhaps occur to him that, besides the thing or things just happening to be presented to him, there are simultaneously other things objectively existing; but if he wants to ascertain whether it is so, he will find that he was mistaken. No matter how much it may be his will to obtain at a certain period of time the presentations of other things than of those that are presented to him, his will produces no results. For a time his shoulder was touched by something soft, pleasant to the touch, cool, and diffusing an agreeable odour; and some time after all these presentations have ceased. No matter how strenuously he may then exert his will to obtain anew this complex presentation of a flower wafted before on his shoulder by the breeze and again carried away by it, it will not present itself. Why and in what sense should he entertain the belief that that flower nevertheless still objectively exists at present? Nor is it otherwise with regard to the things which are presented to him in the portion of space continually presented before his eyes. These can be of two kinds. Either moving things, which appear and disappear again: with respect to these the same thing stands which I have said concerning things presented to his tactual sense. Or they are permanently presented; and then they are permanent subjective presentations.

Let us suppose our individual to have the experience that when the things he sees in the portion of space present before his eyes move towards him, the visual presentations disappear at a certain period of time, and presentations of touch and pressure arise to him; let him further experience that along with certain heat-, sound- and smell-presentations, to which, if they arise from the space before his eyes, colour, visual shape and visual extension are attached, there go together, in the

place of these, tactual and pressure-presentations, if they are felt by him on any point of his body ; let him express this experience by saying that the same things are visible as well as tangible ; let him even form an abstract notion of the permanent nexus, as it is called by Mr. Spencer, subsisting between the presentations appearing in groups, a notion of that which is visible as well as tangible, and possessed of heat, sound and odour, and let him style this "substance" just as any metaphysician would ; let him experience changes in the things presented to him, and uniformities in these changes ; let him get to know that certain things always produce certain effects upon other things, and let him describe this by saying that certain things contain and exert certain forces. Still, the objects of this experience are only presentations and groups of presentations ; the uniformities will all of them be uniformities in the march of his presentations only ; the substance will be the abstract conception merely of groups of presentations ; and the force will be the attribute but of presentations. The knowledge of all these properties of matter does not comprehend, as claimed by some psychologists, the knowledge of its objective existence. The representations which arise in us of all these facts, together with the primary presentation yielded by things—the ideal or intellectual elements of perception, as they are sometimes called—and which render those primary presentations presentations of things or objects, do not make them presentations of objective existences ; the notion of thing or of object to which they lead is a subjective notion.

Nor is, as might be thought, the permanent presence or presentation of our own body, or the permanent possibility of its presentation, of any greater effect in this respect. It is customary to say that our own body is always presented to us. Properly speaking, however, this is not quite true ; but even if our body were in reality permanently, uniformly, presented to us, this,

while it would be a permanent subjective presentation, would in nowise lead to the conception of the objective existence of the body, and to the notion that that presentation is the perception of an objectively existing body; and still less would it lead to the conception of the objective existence of other things. In reality, however, the matter stands thus: On the one hand, our body furnishes us continually with "organic sensations," with different ones at different times; and, on the other hand, we are able to obtain at any moment through our will the visual or tactual picture of most parts of our body (to wit, by turning our eyes upon them or by touching them).¹ Of these two facts, the first likewise fails to lead in any way to the conception of the objective existence of the body or of any other things; but the second fact is, in my opinion, in reality tantamount to what we express by saying that our bodies exist objectively. If our fictitious individual were capable of so much voluntary motion of his hands and eyes that he might, at his will, see and touch those parts of his body with which we are able to accomplish the same thing, then there would arise in him the belief that his body exists objectively, in this sense, that through his will he may obtain at any time certain visual and tactual presentations. But this belief will not by any means lead him who has no knowledge of the objective existence of space, to the belief that those presentations of things which appear to him from time to time are likewise presentations of objectively existing things, no matter how analogous these presentations may be to that of his body, the presentation of which is likewise that of a thing. On the contrary, since those presentations of things do not appear to him at his will, he ought to draw a distinction between the presentation

¹ Besides these, we can obtain at any moment certain other presentations,—for instance, sounds, motor-sensations, &c.,—all of which may be described as presentations of our bodies.

of his body, which is the presentation of an objectively existing thing, and between the other presentations of things, which are merely subjective presentations arising from time to time. His body is the only objective thing he has a knowledge of; *in what sense* should he believe that things corresponding with the other presentations of things exist objectively when they are not presented? It would be otherwise if he believed that they exist *elsewhere*.

In the same way the presentation of pressure which we obtain from things (contrary to the teachings of some), fails to give rise to the conception of the objective existence of things. Let us suppose our imaginary individual to be possessed of that limited capacity of voluntary moving which, as we have just seen, is necessary to enable him to arrive at the belief in the objective existence of his own body, and to press with his fingers the different parts of his body. Let us assume the truth of Spencer's doctrine, that when, after such experiences, the presentation of pressure is aroused in some part of his body by an external object, he must antecedently suppose such an energy to be in that thing as is akin to the exertion he makes or feels when he is pressing some parts of his body.¹ This anthropomorphic supposition is, according to Spencer, one germ of our belief in objective existence. Granted; but this supposition of the individual, if actually made by him, would be (as will be seen more extensively later on) one germ of the belief in the objective existence of mind (*viz.* of a mind other than his own), and not of matter. The energy which I suppose to inhere in my thing-presentations, and which is really something objective and only objectively existing to me, does not make these presentations presentations of objectively existing things; although not presented and objective to me, it is inherent in, and an attribute of, my *presentations*. If

¹ Pr. of Psychology, vol. ii. pp. 476, 477.

my presentations cease, I have no longer any grounds for believing either them or that energy to continue to exist.¹

But let us drop inquiring into what fails to lead to the belief in the objective existence of things, and rather ascertain what will lead up to that belief.²

Let us imagine our perfectly immovable individual to know one certain portion of space—if only so much as that small portion which forms his own visual space—to be objective, in such a sense that it “vanishes intermittingly from the consciousness whenever his mind is engrossed by another presentation, but vanishes in such a manner that the individual, without moving his eyes, may get it presented again at will” (vide *supra*, p. 22). If certain things always continue to be in that portion of space, in such a way as to enable our individual to obtain at all times, in conjunction with the portion of space, the presentations of those things, then he will say that those things objectively exist in that space.

Let us finally imagine the individual to have acquired full capacity of motion such as we possess, but in order to simplify matters let us for a moment suppose him to

¹ After this already protracted discussion of the subject, it is surely superfluous to specially argue the proposition that the presentation of resistance produced by active pressure, precisely like passive pressure, fails also to lead to the belief in the objective existence of matter. In general, the solution of the problem of objectivity is *ab initio* falsified if it gets confounded with the problem of object-perception.

² I trust my analysis has so far clearly shown, and will hereafter still more clearly demonstrate, the erroneousness of the theory of those who, enumerating all the differences between thing-presentations and subjective presentations, claim that by reason of these differences we range our presentations in two great classes, and consider those belonging to one class as presentations of objective existences, and those belonging to the other class as not being such. It is *one* certain property of some of our presentations which renders them presentations of objective existences, for to exist objectively has but *one* particular meaning.

be surrounded by an immovable and unchanging world. Whenever that individual turns his head or eyes to the right or left, upwards or downwards, and obtains the presentation of the corresponding portions of space, there appear to him in those spaces certain things, and invariably the same thing in the same portion of space. He has the same experience if he leaves his place and proceeds to move in any direction whatever. Through these experiences he obtains the conviction that his presentations of quality are not all of them such accidental things, appearing unaccountably and independently of his will, as he thought them to be until then, in opposition to the attribute-presentations. On the contrary, along with every particular portion of space, he is able to obtain, through will, certain presentations of colour, shape, touch, &c.,—in a word, of a certain thing; and just as he describes the possibility of his continually obtaining, through will, the presentations of those portions of space, by saying that “Space objectively exists,” he also expresses the possibility of his obtaining, through will, those groups of presentations which are incident to certain portions of the Space, by saying that “things objectively exist.” The moment he believes that Space objectively exists, he also conceives, as we have seen, the space casually presented to him to be a part of that objectively existing Space; and having obtained the conviction of the objective existence of things, he regards the thing being before his eyes at a certain moment, one of the endless number of objectively existing things which is presented to him, because that portion of space is presented to him which is occupied by it.

It is true that the above supposition does not agree with the reality. The world of space is neither immovable nor unchangeable. But if things were not to be at rest for a single moment, so that the very instant they appeared before our eyes they would, as soon as they were perceived, vanish again or change, in that

case the objective existence of things would not enter our consciousness at all ; for although casting our looks upon other and other places we would see other and other things, yet since the same thing would happen before our eyes, even if immovable, it would not enter our minds to associate the appearance of these other and other things with the appearance of those other places, and at last with our volition, and we would believe that different thing-presentations follow each other just as *capriciously* when we move as when we do not. The real world lies between these two extremes. A large portion of it is motionless, and remains unchanged during long periods of time. Besides, we can follow its moving objects with our eyes when they disappear from our view, and we can get convinced that through volition we can obtain them presented in other places ; that is, that they have not ceased to exist objectively when they disappear from our view. Moreover, as we shall hereafter see, the conception of objective change arises in us through the observation of the changes of the things that are presented to us, and in consequence of this we arrive at the conviction that in certain cases the things we fail to find in their accustomed places "have not ceased to exist, but have only changed." In spite of the motion and of the changes of the things, therefore, our imaginary individual persists in his belief that certain things, although not invariably incident to certain places, nevertheless objectively exist in space in general.

But our individual does not find all of his quality-presentations to be attached to a certain place in such a way as to enable him, in calling up or dismissing the presentation of that place, to obtain or to abandon them at his will. On the contrary, only certain classes of his presentations, appearing always in certain groups, are of this nature ; to wit, surfaces of a certain size, colour, shape and touch, sensations of heat, resistance, weight, sound, smell and taste, and, further, certain

sensations of pleasure and pain which go with these presentations and cease with them ; and for this very reason he regards all of them as presentations of objective existences, and their groups as presentations of objectively existing things.¹ He finds the other classes of his quality-presentations to be of a different nature, such as his bodily or organic sensations, his memories of past presentations, his ideas, his emotions, his desires and his volitions. At times his organic sensations seem to him to be connected with the places he is in, and with the vicinity of certain things ; but in most cases he finds them to be independent of these circumstances ; he may run in any direction he pleases, his headache accompanies him ; and on another occasion in the same place, surrounded by the same or similar things, it does not come back to him again. Neither are, as a rule, his recollections or his ideas invariably connected with places or things ; different recollections and ideas will arise on different occasions, in the same places and near the same things, and, what is the main thing, they neither gain nor lose in definiteness by his approaching or leaving the place or thing in question ; his recollections and ideas provoked by some thing may, on the contrary, remain with him long after the cessation of the presentation of this thing ; and indeed such presentations appear to him in the greatest abundance when, sitting with his eyes closed, he is oblivious of the surrounding things and takes no notice of them. Emotions of fear, anger, surprise and affection, of pleasure and pain, desires and volitions, seem at times to be permanently associated with certain things ; but further experience refutes this apparent impression, partly for the same reasons which

¹ Hence he likewise regards the attribute-presentations, duration, position, intensity, &c., of these presentations, as the presentations of the duration, position, intensity, &c., of the objectively existing things or of their properties.

have been brought forward with regard to recollections and ideas, partly because it teaches that these presentations, which are seemingly incident to things, are in reality associated with ideas provoked by these things, and partly and mostly for the reason that the memory and idea of the respective things are in themselves sufficient to excite those emotions, &c. His feelings of good and bad humour are not even associated invariably with ideas and memories ; they arise "without his knowing why." Hence he finds all these presentations to be the opposites of the presentations of colour, shape, size, sound, heat, smell, resistance and weight, and of the presentations of pleasure and pain with which they are associated. Whilst he holds the latter to be the presentations of things objectively existing in certain places, he calls the former "merely subjective presentations."¹ The latter, too, are of a local character ; they refer to some part of his body ; thus the memories and the ideas, to his head ; the emotions, desires and volitions, to his breast ; and the organic sensations, to any part of his body. This whole body occupies but a minute space within that large Space in which the different things exist. These constitute the *objective external* world ; whilst the subjective presentations are,

¹ If, in going from one place to another, or in fixing any of our senses in a certain direction, we were to find the same organic sensation, the same recollection, idea, &c., to be always associated with the same place (quite independently of the things existing in that place), or if we were taught by experience that in most cases where changes in this respect take place, it is because the possibility of that sensation, recollection, idea, &c., has moved to another place, we would say that not only things exist objectively in space, but also organic sensations, recollections, ideas, &c. (respectively their *objectiva*, for which we have no name now). Or if the world were so ordered that a certain kind or degree of organic sensation, of recollection, idea, &c., appertained to every thing, appearing as we approach a thing and ceasing when we leave it (in the same way as a certain temperature, colour or shape, belongs to them), these possibilities of presentations would then be accounted by us as properties of things.

according to the terminology of many, embraced under the term of the *subjective internal* world. According to the above analysis, the connection with the external world, with certain things or groups of things (events), through that with certain places, and through these again with our volition, is not entirely wanting either with regard to these subjective presentations; the dividing-line between the two species of presentations or worlds is not very clearly defined; and a philosophy generalizing with perfect consistency might perhaps cause it to disappear. But the ordinary consciousness recognizes this dividing-line, although vaguely and inconsistently; and my object here is the analysis, and not the criticism, of this consciousness.¹

But the conception of things and of the external world at which our individual arrived so far, is not yet the one we possess; there is missing in it the knowledge of the objectiveness of the changes and interactions of things. It is not difficult to indicate the way in which he might arrive at this knowledge. The experience that things presented to him change in the course of time, and his belief that if it were his will he could obtain in other places presentations of other things, give rise to the further belief that, if he actually had the presentations of these things, changes in these, too, would be presented to him in the course of time. This his belief he describes by saying that the things themselves change—namely, objectively, distinctly from the changes in his presentations, or from his presentations of changes; and in consequence of this he regards his presentations of changes in things as perceptions of changes which would objectively take place in them even if not perceived. Further, certain kinds of changes being invariably presented to him in certain kinds of things, which are presented to him standing in certain local relations with certain other kinds of things—in

¹ Vide Appendix A.

a word, after experiencing the things presented to him to act upon each other in accordance with uniform laws—he arrives at the conviction that if he could obtain in any other place the presentation of similar conditions, he would get there presentations of similar consequences, or, in a word, that between objective things, too, there exists interaction. In other words, he obtains that conception of the course of the objective world which consists in an objective series of objective changes of objective things, standing in causal nexus with each other and subject to uniform laws, in objective Time, in different places of objective Space.

Thus while the knowledge that certain kinds of our presentations occur in certain groups as things, and, further, that these things possess certain properties, produce certain effects, undergo certain changes, and change in conformity with certain laws, does not include yet (as some think) the belief that these things and these changes are objective,—the one fact that through volition we can obtain, besides the things that are presented and their changes, the presentations of other things and of the changes in them, is expressed by us in the terms of that belief.

We arrived at this result in the course of investigating the manner in which the belief in question might have arisen in an imaginary individual. Whether this is the *real* genesis of that belief, matters nothing as far as that result is concerned. In an analytical form this result would be summed up as follows: Our belief that an external world—in other words, a world in objective Space, or, in other words yet, matter—objectively exists, is the expression in different language of our belief that, through will, we can obtain, in conjunction with every part of the objective Space, the presentation of matter too. The above hypothetico-genetical exposition, however, was by no means superfluous; for

although the belief in question has no other meaning but that stated by me, there are certain conditions incident to the genesis of that belief (unless, indeed, that belief was born quite ready with us), which could only be brought out by an exposition of this kind, and which it was proper to bring out here already. Indeed, although organic sensations, memories, ideas, emotions, desires and volitions, too, are presented to us in conjunction with presentations of any portion of space, and, at that, different ones with different places, we nevertheless do not hold them to be presentations of objective existences. The reason for this is, as we have seen, that certain subjective presentations of this kind are not associated as permanently with a certain place as the thing-presentations are, organic sensations, &c., continually varying in one and the same place. Permanence, nevertheless, does not constitute another element of the notion of objective existence, as was believed by the most eminent English exponents of the psychology of the belief in objective existence (indeed, we believe the attributes of our presentations to be also objectively existing, if but for a moment); it only serves to lead us to connect the happening of the presentations with the changes of place, and through them with our volition, or, in other words, to teach us that thing-presentations are ready at our disposal, realizable at our will, or assured to us, in contrast to subjective presentations, which are independent of our will, not assured to us. We already know that if it were not in our power to choose at any moment, at our will, amongst presentations of different places, but that different places were presented to us independently of our will, in consequence of involuntary movements only, we would not arrive at the belief that different places exist simultaneously objectively at any given moment. *In that case the same thing-presentations would vainly appear permanently in the same places; we could not conceive them as presentations of objectively existing*

matter. At the same time, however, even if we believed in the objective existence of the unitary Space and had presentations of matter in every part of space, but all of them the same everywhere, this would not give rise either to a belief in the objective existence of matter ; because in this case neither would we connect the matter-presentations arising to us in a new place with the appearance of that place, and through it with our volition, for even in remaining motionless we should have continuously the same matter-presentations.¹

But this genetic exposition was useful for another reason too. It brought out, much more clearly than could have been done by an analytic exposition, that the belief of every one that there are besides himself other conscious beings who have at a certain time and in a certain place such thing-presentations as he would have then and there, does not constitute an essential element of the belief in the objective existence of the external world, as is taught by some psychologists. We have seen that a single individual, if endowed with sufficient intellectual power and blessed with a sufficiently long life, might arrive at this belief. The contrary view is indeed the most preposterous *hysteron-proteron*. For the belief in the existence of other conscious beings is in itself a belief in objective existence, and even in the objective existence of things ; for we believe those beings to have bodies, which belief cannot be interpreted by referring again to the consciousness of other conscious beings. The thought, the question, as to what happens there *where I am not*, but where other conscious beings *are*, or what would be if I did not exist, but other conscious beings *would exist*, could not so much as arise in me, if I lacked the belief in the objective existence of time, space and things, in the meaning pointed out above, which does not imply the conception of the existence of other conscious beings. The objective

¹ Vide Appendix B.

attributes of my presentations exist only for myself (with regard to others only in that indirect way in which, as we shall see in treating of the objective existence of mind, even my most subjective presentations exist with regard to others); yet I believe in their objective existence. Indeed, looked at from this point of view, those kinds of *objectiva* which have been dealt with hitherto may be divided in two classes: into such *objectiva* as (directly) exist for the individual only, the Objective Attributes of Presentations alone being of this class so far; and into *objectiva* which exist for all of us, Time, Space and the External World belonging to the latter class so far.¹ We shall meet again with this classification in treating of the other kinds of objective existences of which we shall have occasion to speak hereafter, when the question will arise as to which of these two classes they belong to.

One more matter remains to be made clear. In order to give a precise idea of the nature of my analysis, it will be quite proper to examine its relation to the views of certain metaphysical schools. Some idealists, while accepting the justness of my analysis, in conceding that what men call the objective existence of the external world has the meaning I claimed for it, would nevertheless deny that what men call so is in reality a belief in the objective existence of the external world, and would say that the very analysis itself makes it clear that this belief is an illusion; and that people who say that it is in this sense that they believe in the objective existence of an external world, believe in

¹ Speaking with precision, the matter stands thus: The objective attributes of our presentations belong likewise in part, namely, the objective attributes of the presentations of things, to the common objectives. Neither is, on the other hand, the external world entirely a common objective, for the same thing cannot be perceived by different individuals to be exactly alike ("relativity of perception").

reality only in the existence of their own presentations.¹

The common man does not understand such idealists ; he laughs at them. The answer he should give them from his own standpoint would be as follows : " I believe that a hundred miles from here there is a garden, on the trees of which birds are nibbling at the fruit, and that this will be followed there by further consequences, and so forth. It is true, I believe this only in the sense that if it were my will I could obtain certain presentations. *But this existence is independent of my will and my presentations. Whether it is my will or not, and consequently whether those presentations of mine appear or not, and whatever be the actual course of my presentations, I believe that that garden, &c., exists. In my view esse non est percipi.*"

The realists will not admit the correctness of my analysis ; some amongst them would be likely to say to the man who gave the above reply to the idealist : " You said you believe that a hundred miles from here *you would have* certain presentations if that were your will ; that is, you told us what *would be* there in a certain case. I, too, believe this ; but I believe besides that something *is actually* there. What do you believe to be *actually* there, if or while you are not exerting your will ?" Our man's reply to this would be : " It is strange that you should ask this question again. I have told you already that I believe the garden, the birds, the fruit, &c., to be actually there. *The 'would be' of presentation is the 'is' of objective existence.* Actual objective existence is conditional subjective existence ; it is 'presentableness through will.'"

I am not dealing in metaphysics ; I merely wish to present the metaphysics of an ordinary man. I will not say that the man who gave that reply got the better of either the idealist or the realist ; but I take his way of

¹ Such an idealist, for instance, was Hume, while Mill was not one.

thinking to be that of the ordinary man who reflects upon his own belief.

APPENDIX A TO CHAPTER III.

On some Theories concerning Subject and Object.

I cannot refrain from supplementarily making a few observations concerning two widely-spread errors.

One of these is the view entertained by many psychologists that certain classes of our presentations we regard as presentations of objective existences, or as purely subjective presentations, according as we feel or know them to be, or not to be, independent of ourselves or of our will. I trust that the erroneousness of this analysis has been made clear by the above argument. What is there more independent of us, of our will, than our feelings of good or bad humour, and what more dependent upon our will than the presentation of a place other than the present one, or of a mountain towards which we have our backs turned? Irrespective of our involuntary motions, these latter presentations depend exclusively upon our will.

The other error is committed by almost all the modern psychologists. They describe, almost without any exception, the rise of the distinction made by men between their subjective and their thing presentations, as the rise of a distinction between the Ego and Non-Ego, or between the Subject and the Object. They assert that every man is led by the same process of experience which teaches him the objective existence of the external world, to refer all those presentations of his which are also called subjective to the Ego or Subject, and those which are presentations of portions of the external world to the Non-Ego or Object, contrasting these two with each other. I deem this doctrine to be entirely incorrect, and I trust the following reflections will bear out the justice of my view. No one refers his subjective presentations alone to the Ego; everybody refers to it *all* of his presentations, including thing-presentations; and it is not his thing-presentations which he ranges under the Non-Ego, but the objectively existing things. Now in the process of experience or reflection which moves an individual to draw a distinction between his subjective and his thing-presentations, and leads him to conceive the latter as presentations of things objectively existing, there is nothing

that would induce him to comprise all of his presentations under Ego, and to contrast them with objectively existing things as Non-Ego, these two groups being far too heterogeneous to be placed in contrast with each other. On the other hand, it is very easy to point out the process which in reality leads up every individual to the conception of the Ego, of the Non-Ego, and of the Subject. This is the recognition or supposition that there exist other conscious beings besides himself, that other trains of consciousness go on besides his own. In contrast to these other trains of consciousness, which with respect to himself go on objectively, he designates as Ego that which occurs subjectively presented to him, and those others as Thou, He, Non-Ego; and becoming conscious of the existence of more conscious beings than himself, the general conception of the Subject arises in him, and he regards that subject which he calls Ego as a subject among several subjects. It is already apparent from the text, and will become more so as I proceed, that the rise of the belief in the objective existence of the external world, and the laying down of the distinction between subjective and thing-presentations, do not at all require the recognition or supposition of the existence of other conscious beings; but the recognition or supposition of the existence of other conscious beings is absolutely indispensable to the rise of the conception of the Ego or of the Subject. The individual may entertain the belief in the objective existence of the external world without the conception of Ego, or of a Subject or Subjects at all, and of presentations as *his* presentations.

The belief in the objective existence of the external world, and the conception of the Ego and of the Subject, accordingly owe their existence to two different processes of experience and thought. The opposite view, almost generally entertained by philosophers, finds its explanation in the following. As soon as the individual arrives at the belief in the objective existence of the external world, there arise in him really two twin correlative conceptions, *viz.* the objective *existence* of the things or objects of the external world and their presentation or *perception*; indeed, that belief consists in the separation of the thing-presentations into these two parts. On the other hand, as soon as the belief arises in the individual that besides his presentations there occur also presentations of other beings, he must necessarily distinguish *his own* thing-presentations from those of other subjects, and those of A from those of B and C, which he does

by saying: I perceive, or A or B or C perceives, a thing or object. It is in this way that the conception of the external world and its objects comes into correlation with the conception of the Subject; but this is no peculiar correlation, the subjective presentations partaking in it quite in the same manner as thing-presentations or perceptions, and both kinds of presentations being referred to a particular subject, only to be distinguished from the presentations of other subjects. *The original and proper correlative of the Objects of the external world is the Presentation or Perception of Objects; the original and proper correlatives of the Ego are other sorts of the Non-Ego than the external world, namely Thou and He; the proper correlative of the Subject is Presentations in general, subjective as well as thing-presentations—Objects in Locke's psychological sense.* For this reason it was not at all the purpose of the chapter to which this Appendix is written, to deal with the rise of the conception of the Ego or the Subject in connection with the question of the origin of the belief in the objective existence of the external world. It is reserved for the second part of my work, dealing with *Objectiva* Incapable of Presentation, to treat of the former topic, since that alone will treat of the true correlative of the conception of the Ego, the belief in the consciousness of others, which is a belief in *objectiva* never capable of presentation.

APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER III.

On Movement as Change of Place.

The opinion may be entertained with great plausibility that the origin of the belief in the objective existence of the unitary Space—nay, in part, of our conception of the sameness and otherness of positions—depends upon the same conditions as those ascertained by me in the text (pp. 51, 52) with regard to the belief in the objective existence of the external world, although that dependence did not manifest itself in the analytical treatment of that belief.

As regards our conceptions of the sameness and otherness of positions, there are various cases in which we ascertain the otherness of positions. Thus one of those cases arises when the simultaneously presented parts of a visually or tactually presented portion of space are recognized by us as different places; another case of this kind, when we distinguish a sound as coming from a different quarter than the preceding

sound we heard ; and still another case of this kind, when the portion of space presented to us in consequence of the motion of our eyes or of some other part of our body, or of the change of place of the entire body, is pronounced by us to be a portion of space different from the one that had been presented to us before. Here we are only concerned with this last distinction of positions, upon which, as we have seen, our belief in the objective existence of the unitary Space is mainly founded. A grown person—as was already stated by me in treating of the objective existence of the unitary Space—will pronounce two presentations of portions of space of the same size and shape, divided by a motion of this kind, *merely upon the ground of the subjective sensation of that motion*, either to be presentations of different places or presentations of the same place. That which in this respect is decisive in motor-sensation, and the nature of which I do not intend investigating here, has been called by me, in the passage above referred to, presentation of change of place. Two such presentations of portions of space, divided by a presentation of change of place, are to the consciousness of a grown person inevitably either presentations of different places or presentations of the same place. Two such presentations of portions of space can be distinguished from each other in one point only, namely in the thing-presentations embraced by them ; but whether there be such a distinction or not is a matter of indifference with an adult person in his statement of sameness or otherness.

Although this is the case, still it might be said that this conception of the sameness and otherness of space-presentations, divided from each other by motion, would not have arisen in us if the different portions of space did not ordinarily furnish different thing-presentations attached with tolerable permanence to those places. Somebody might say : “ If the same thing-presentations appeared in every portion of space, we would not state the presentation of the portion of space, consequent upon any motion, to be the presentation of a place different from that presented before, but we would say that during our motions the same or the like ‘ spaces ’ are presented us, or are capable of being presented through the touch or by opening our eyes. No matter to what extent the presentation of change of place were to partake of a spatial nature, we would not conceive it in the above-stated case as a presentation of change of place ; the fact that two presentations of portions of space are divided by a movement would not suffice to stamp them as being different from each other.

For this very reason there would be wanting also in this case the conception of the sameness of presentations of portions of space, divided in this way, or the corresponding conception of return. That conception would be wanting, too, if different thing-presentations did appear in the places designated to-day as different, but were not permanently attached to those places; and consequently there would be also wanting the corresponding conception of the otherness of places divided by motion. In a word, it is originally the sameness and otherness of the thing-presentations attached to places which give rise to the conception of the sameness and otherness of portions of space divided by movements; and it is only because that primary sameness and otherness is usually connected with certain motor-sensations, and having become familiar with the conception of objective change in things and of change of place of things, that we call those motor-sensations presentations of change of place in general, and judge of sameness and otherness of places irrespectively of their contents."

If this is true—namely, that the origin of the conception of the capacity of our motions to produce changes of place becomes only possible in consequence of the circumstance that different thing-presentations are attached, and this with tolerable permanence, to the different portions of space—then the same is a condition of the rise of our belief in the objective existence of Space, which, as we have seen, is nothing else but the belief that through our voluntary motions we may at any moment obtain the presentation of places different from those that happen to be presented to us just at that moment. But I wish to remark by the way (and this imaginary construction is not without its use in elucidating our real topic), that even if that condition were not fulfilled by the order of things, the fact that through our will we can continually obtain to an indefinite extent the presentation of the different qualities (namely, directions) of those presentations which we call presentations of change of place, would nevertheless be expressed, or at least might be expressed—according to the terminology usually adopted by mankind—as a belief in objective entity, only that this entity would not be a stationary one like Space, but, like Time, a continuously flowing and never returning, with this difference, that we would conceive it as flowing simultaneously in different directions.

This doctrine concerning the origin of the conception of our movements as producing changes of place, is given here only as a possible one. The reader knows that it is represented

in literature. But likewise represented in literature is the opposite doctrine that, quite independently of the contents of Space, our conception of the capacity of our movements to produce changes of place is already given to us from the very nature of the subjective sensation of our movements.

To decide which of these two theories is correct, falls to the task of those psychologists who treat of *space-perception*. This question has no bearing upon the truth of my theory concerning the belief in the objective existence of the unitary Space. For regarding the analysis of this conception, there is no doubt that at this day men attribute to their movements the capacity of producing changes of places, and likewise to certain of their motions the capacity of returning, independently of the contents of the places; and hence the possible truth of the first theory does not affect the merits of the analysis given by me in the preceding chapter. Again, as far as the genetic question is concerned, it is doubtless that the belief in the objective existence of unitary Space—unless innate—has arisen *simultaneously* with the belief in the objective existence of the external world, for both had to be arrived at in consequence of the same motions; and thus this question is in this respect, too, immaterial, as will appear when I come to treat of the genetical question.

This Appendix has only been written for the purpose of evolving this negative result.

CHAPTER IV.


J. S. MILL'S PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF THE BELIEF IN AN EXTERNAL WORLD.

IT is not within the scheme of my essay to criticise the analyses of the belief in objective existence as found in other writers ; and if I now and then dropped a critical remark, it was only when the elucidation of my own analysis called for it.

Upon one analysis of the belief in the objective existence of the external world, however, namely, J. S. Mill's well-known Psychological Theory, contained in his "Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy," I shall have to dwell at some greater length. This analysis resembles so much the one given by me in the preceding section, that possibly some may be disposed to identify the two. In spite of their resemblance, however, there are several so very essential differences between them, that I, for my own part, consider Mill's "Theory" merely as an approach towards truth. I wish to point out these differences, not only in order to clear myself of the charge of having been guilty of an unnecessary repetition, but because these differences constitute the very essence of my analysis.

The substance of Mill's Theory is contained in the following passages :

"This Theory postulates the following psychological truths. . . . It postulates, first, that the human mind is capable of Expectation. In other words, that after having had actual sensations, we are capable of forming the conception of Possible sensations ; *sensations which we are not feeling at the present moment, but which we might feel and should feel if certain conditions were present, the nature of which conditions we have, in many cases, learnt by experience.* It postulates, secondly, the laws of



the Association of Ideas. Setting out from these premises, the Psychological Theory maintains that there are associations naturally and even necessarily generated by the order of our sensations and of our reminiscences of sensation, which, supposing no intuition of an external world to have existed in consciousness, would inevitably generate the belief, and would cause it to be regarded as an intuition. . . .

“(The belief in matter) is but the form impressed by the known laws of association upon the conception or notion, obtained by experience, of Contingent Sensations ; by which are meant, sensations that are not in our present consciousness, and perhaps never were in our consciousness at all, but which in virtue of the laws to which we have learnt by experience that our sensations are subject, *we know that we should have felt under given supposable circumstances, and under these same circumstances might still feel.*

“I see a piece of white paper on a table. I go into another room, and though I have ceased to see it, I am persuaded that the paper is still there. I no longer have the sensations which it gave me ; but I believe that when I again place myself in the circumstances in which I had those sensations, that is, when I go again into the room, I shall again have them ; and further, that there has been no intervening moment at which this would not have been the case. Owing to this law of my mind, my conception of the world at any given instant consists in only a small proportion of present sensations. Of these I may at the time have none at all, and they are in any case a most insignificant portion of the whole which I apprehend. The conception I form of the world existing at any moment comprises, along with the sensations I am feeling, a countless variety of possibilities of sensation : namely, *the whole of those which past observation tells me that I could, under any supposable circumstances, experience at this moment, together with an indefinite and illimitable multitude of others which, though I do not know that I could, yet it is possible that I might, experience in circumstances not known to me.* These various possibilities are the important thing to me in the world. My present sensations are generally of little importance, and are moreover fugitive : the possibilities, on the contrary, are permanent, which is the character which mainly distinguishes our idea of substance or matter from our notion of sensation. These possibilities, which are conditional certainties, need a special name to distinguish them from mere vague possibilities, which experience gives no warrant for reckoning upon. Now, as even as a dis-

tinguishing name is given, though it be only to the same thing regarded in a different aspect, one of the most familiar experiences of our mental nature teaches us that the different name comes to be considered as the name of a different thing."

The defect of this analysis is that it defines in too wide a sense the certified, permanent possibilities of sensations with which it identifies matter. Possible sensations, as defined in the above italicised passages, do *not* mean in general objective existence. This becomes clear if we examine the definition of the "conception of the world existing at any moment" as given by Mill in the third of these passages. This definition may be reduced *ad absurdum* by the following illustration. I sit on the shore of a lake, in perfectly calm weather, and believe that if the wind blew there at this moment, the lake before me would rise high with surging waves. This is a conception of "sensations which past observation tells me that I could, or at least might under supposable circumstances, experience at this moment;" but is this a part of the conception I form of the world existing at that moment? Mill, indeed, perceived that but a part of all the possibilities of sensation in their widest sense, which we conceive at any moment, mean objective existence, and designated as such those which are in a certain manner certified and distinguished from more vague possibilities. But he did not point out properly what the certification consists in, by which a possibility of a sensation is rendered objective existence. His certified possibilities are in reality of a very vague sort. I can in no way regard a possibility of a sensation which experience taught me I might feel if certain conditions were present, as certified to me as such which I can reckon upon, if I do not know the appearance of the condition to be certified. True, I may have learned by experience the appearance of this condition to depend on the presence of another condition, and this again of another, and so on; but that does in no way render the former

more certain if the presence of all the latter is not certified.

The class of possibilities of presentations which men call objective existences is much more limited than that described by Mill ; it is not possibilities of presentations depending upon the presence of "any supposable circumstances," but of presentations *the appearance of which depends on no other circumstances but our will*—possibilities, indeed, which in ordinary life we are in the habit of calling unconditional possibilities. Possibilities of presentations otherwise conditioned may be mere *possibilities* of objective existence too ; but possibilities of presentation depending exclusively on our will are *actual* objective existences. No matter how much we may be taught by experience that under certain circumstances—that is, along with certain presentations—other presentations, too, appear, and notwithstanding any law of association, the belief that, while a certain series of presentations actually pass before us, something else objectively exists and happens, would never have arisen in us if we did not believe that, if it were or had been our will, something else might have been presented to us at the same moment. This last belief constitutes our belief in those permanent *objectiva* which we call Space and a world in Space, as well as in those fugitive *objectiva* which I called above objective attributes of presentations, and from two of which, namely duration and succession, the conception of the continuously flowing Time arises, and, finally, our belief in other *objectiva* of which I shall speak hereafter.

Confining our attention to Mill's definition of the conception of the external world existing at any moment, it becomes manifest that Mill ought to have said in his definition, "in another place," instead of, "under any supposable circumstances." The conception I form of the external world existing at any moment, comprises along with the presentations I am feeling, a

countless variety of possibilities of presentation, namely, the whole of those which I believe I could experience in other places. But this only stands because my being in another place is a condition the realization of which depends upon my will alone. If the happening of this condition were as independent of my will as the rising of the wind in the above example, the possibility of those presentations which are connected with that condition would to me be as little of permanently certified possibility, as is the possibility of the sensation of seeing the waves in said example, and would as little mean actual existence; nor would I then believe at all in the objective existence of an external world. The possibility of the presentation of change of place, of the presentation of places different from those which are present, this is the *primary* permanently certified possibility of presentation, which certifies to me, *secondarily*, a countless variety of presentations; the belief in that possibility of presentation is itself a part of the belief in the objective existence of the external world; it is the belief in the objective existence of Space, of which the belief in the objective existence of matter is the consequence. In spite of our believing matter or things to exist in Space, Mill has neglected to give an analysis and an exposition of the origin of our belief in the *objective existence* of Space.

I shall not enter into a more detailed criticism of Mill's theory. In my opinion, this theory, and even more its application to Mind in Chapter xii. of the Examination, is, of all of Mill's writings, least marked by the habitual lucidity characterizing him. But although I cannot admit my theory to be identified with that of Mill's, I have no objection to its being looked upon as an attempt at perfecting it; both theories, indeed, just as Hume's theory on the same subject,¹

¹ Treatise, part iv. sect. ii.

being but the development of the fundamental *psychological* thought of Berkeley's philosophy.

Berkeley made it clear that there is a possibility of defining objective existence in subjective terms. Hume attempted to give a definition of this character respecting the objective existence of the external world. He pointed out that property of some of our presentations by virtue of which we regard them as perceptions of objectively existing things, this property having been found by him in the subjection of those presentations to a certain uniform order. Mill accepted and systematized Hume's theory. I, too, maintain that our belief in objective existence is but an expression, in other words, of our belief in a certain uniform order of our presentations; but I think that neither Hume nor Mill have quite correctly described this uniform order. This order is the possibility of obtaining, through will, certain presentations, all other uniformities constituting only subjective uniformities of our presentations, and not amounting to objective existence. *If we were not endowed with will, we would not have our present belief in objective existence.*

Hume and Mill would have found out this if they had taken into account the fact (stated by me in Chapter i.) that, quite irrespectively of the objective existence of the external world, every one knows of objective facts already within his own presentation-world. They would have found it out because the latter belief is a simpler and therefore more easily analyzable species of belief in objective existence than the belief in the objective existence of the external world. Yet this species of belief would have been well worthy of their attention, especially Mill's, for still another reason, namely, that its existence constitutes the most powerful argument against those who hold that objective existence is not analyzable into subjective terms. For as long as the existence of matter is looked upon as the only objective existence, this view has still some chance

of appearing acceptable to the less reflecting view. But as soon as we consider that men believe in the objective, unrepresented existence of a difference between two pains which themselves cannot exist objectively, unrepresented, but are purely subjective presentations, and that when such a difference is presented to them, men say that they *perceive* the difference which *exists* between these two pains, then it is hard to believe that they conceive some unanalyzable *reale* to be hidden beneath this difference, such as is not hidden beneath the two pains.¹ A similar argument against this view is derivable from the existence of those other species of beliefs in objective existence which will supply the topic of the next two chapters. The psychology of the less developed, as it were, rudimentary kinds of the belief in objective existence, which in consequence of their lesser degree of development have not received due attention, is fitted to put an end to the exceptional and unpsychological manner of regarding the belief in the objective existence of the external world, which still prevails with some, in the same way as the study of the lower forms of life has given its proper place to the science of man,—without my intending by this analogy to suggest the equality of the merit of work in these two directions.

¹ This species of the belief in objective existence is for like reasons an argument in favour of the idealist against the realist.

CHAPTER V.

THE OBJECTIVE EXISTENCE OF COGNITIONS (BELIEFS, MEMORIES, IDEAS).

IN Chapter iii. I attempted to ascertain the meaning of the distinction made by men in saying of one part of their quality-presentations, such as colour-, sound-presentations, &c., that they are presentations of objective existences, and of the other part of the same, such as the organic sensations, memories, ideas, emotions, volitions, &c., that they are merely subjective presentations. We have seen that this distinction is based upon the circumstance of our being able to obtain through volition, in a certain uniform order, colour-, sound-presentations, &c., while organic sensations, memories, ideas, &c., are independent of our will, come and go without being influenced by it.

This statement, however, does not represent the exact truth as far as memories and ideas are concerned. Let us take up in the first place memories. It is unquestionable that volitions to obtain presentations of memories present themselves to us, our will mostly fulfilling here, too, our expectations, in bringing up such presentations. These volitions present themselves in cases when, along with the memory of a past presentation, there comes up the memory that this presentation was attended by a certain other species of presentation, without our remembering what particular presentation belonging to that species it was. We may, for instance, remember a man in such a way as to recall his appearance, and possibly also the words we exchanged with him; but the place in which we met does not occur to us. If we now make a strong effort of will to recall the place, we may possibly succeed

in recalling it. Now in this instance, too, the fact of our being able to obtain a presentation through volition is expressed by our saying that something objectively exists.

For the statement that a person remembers something has a twofold meaning. In one sense it means that the memory of that something is actually present to him, that it is actually in his consciousness. In another sense a person also remembers a thing, although it does not happen to be just then present to his consciousness. Thus we say of a certain person that he remembers the name of a certain street, without meaning to convey thereby that the person in question in that moment actually thinks of that name; nay, we may make this assertion *although we may believe that the name has never occurred to his mind* since he first heard or read of it. We remember at every moment numerous things which at that very instant we are not actually conscious of. The same fact is expressed otherwise by saying that men *have* certain memories, or that certain memories *are* or *exist* in their minds; that is, they have them not as memory-presentations, but outside their actual presentations, or the memories are or exist in their minds unrepresented, *objectively*. Now what is meant by saying that? The question is best answered by inquiring into the meaning of the negative of the above assertions. In the latter sense of remembering we say that we do *not* remember a thing, that *we have no* memory of it, that there *is* or *exists no* memory of it in our minds, that the memory of it *is lost* when our will fails to obtain for us the presentation of that memory, in the former subjective sense of this word. If, for instance, some one were to deny our assertion that a certain person remembers the name of a street, the question might be asked of him, Do you recollect the name of the street where we walked at such and such a time? And if he, making a strong effort of will at recalling the memory of that name, fails to do so, both parties would agree that he does

not remember the name, that he has not the memory of it, that the memory of it is lost to him. It follows from this, *a contrario*, that to remember, in this sense, means that memory presents itself to the rememberer when it is his will to obtain a presentation of it.

By reason of this our notion of, and general belief in, memories objectively existing within us, we conceive the particular presentations or appearances of memories rising up without the exertion of our will to obtain them, as presentations of one or the other of the memories objectively existing within us, in the same way as we have seen this to be the case with regard to the objective attributes of presentations, and with regard to Space, Time and things. This fact might easily induce the reader to think the above definition to be incorrect, and that to have the memory of a thing, or to remember it (objectively), simply means that the memory of it presents to us from time to time. As to this, we refer the critic to what we said above. How does he explain that of certain things we say we do *not* remember them?

Let us now pass from the consideration of memories to that of ideas. If it is our will to ascertain something by means of thought, and we accomplish this our will, we obtain the Presentation of Ideas through Volition. Whenever it is our will to know how much 745×3 is, our will will be satisfied. This fact we express by saying that we know, or *we possess* the knowledge of, how much 745×3 is, *even at moments when the question does not at all engage our attention*. On the other hand, we say that we do not know, or *we have no* knowledge, belief or idea concerning Homer's birthday, for, no matter how much we may exert our will, we can obtain no conviction in this respect.¹

¹ When, at the outset of his psychological studies, the writer of these lines came across the proposition, that it is impossible at one and the same time to believe and not to believe in a thing (as a psychological or subjective correlative of the logical or objective truth that a thing cannot be at the same time A and not A), he asked him-

Presentations of memories and of ideas are not obtained by means of the presentation through will of a variety of different places, but by means of our proceeding from one memory to another, from one idea to another — processes which we call recollection and thought or reflection. For this reason we do not believe that our memories and ideas, like the things, exist in some way in the external world, but we believe them to constitute a peculiar world of thoughts. This world of thoughts is not common to all men, like the external world; every individual has his own world of memories and beliefs.¹ But this individual objective world is in more than one respect of a like nature with the external world common to all of us. Thus the particular parts of it are just as well defined, and exist objectively as independently of our will, as the particular things of the external world. Just as in moving or directing our whole body or senses to a certain place, a certain thing is necessarily presented to us there, and not another, or an empty place, in the same way, in proceeding in certain directions in that world of memories which we possess, certain memories and no others are presented to us at certain points (that is, at the different points of time, the memory of which objectively exists within us); and progressing in the world of thoughts in a certain direction, necessarily certain convictions are presented to us and no others, or there are presented to us empty positions. This, then, is a real objective

self the hair-splitting question: "What is there of particular in this proposition? Of course it is impossible, in general, to believe in two things at the same time, for we cannot have two thoughts at one and the same time." The answer to my subtle question is simply this, that "to believe" in that proposition meant the objective, unrepresented existence of belief, while I used the word in its subjective sense.

¹ At least this is the common belief: a philosophical inquiry into the belief in the existence of a common external world would probably establish that the objective internal world of memories and thoughts is common to all men *in a like sense* as is the objective external world; but, as we remarked elsewhere, philosophical criticism does not fall within the scope of the present work.

internal world, and it was no play of thought when I stated the fact, treated in this section, to be one species of objective existence. Indeed, this similarity of their nature is still stronger. Both in the objective external world and in our objective inner worlds of memories and notions, there occur objective, unrepresented and only later perceived changes (we say our convictions have changed unperceivedly), and there subsists a connection and interaction, subject to laws between the several parts, the change in one part being uniformly followed by a corresponding change in another.

The meaning of the belief and expression that our memories and convictions dwell *in our minds*, can only be rendered clear when I come to analyze the belief in the objective existence of mind.¹

¹ With regard to this whole chapter, the following suggestions will no doubt obtrude themselves upon the reader: "We believe in the objective existence, within us, not only of memories and convictions, but likewise of emotions and volitions. Thus, for instance, some one may be stated (1) to love or hate a certain person, although that feeling is not actually present at the time to him; or (2) to be generally of a cheerful or serious disposition, although just then this habitual disposition is not actually present. These facts certainly do not mean the capability of obtaining a presentation through will." With respect to the cases represented by the first example, namely, concerning the objective existence within us of emotions connected with the presentation or the idea of a certain thing, my answer is, that *the reason for this belief is, that we believe in the objective existence of the things or ideas in the sense given to that belief by our analysis.* That belief possesses the same meaning as our belief in the objective existence of the properties of things connected with the things, namely, the meaning of possibilities of presentations connected with things, and therefore it constitutes no exception to my analysis. The reason for our nevertheless not looking upon those emotions as presentations of objective properties of the things and the ideas in connection with which they are presented, but as emotions objectively existing within us, is, as I have explained, that as a rule emotions and volitions are not attached to things and ideas with the same uniformity with which the objective properties of things are connected with the things, namely with each other. In relation to the class of emotions represented by the second example, namely, concerning those emotions which are not incident to things and ideas, my answer can be given

CHAPTER VI.

OBJECTIVE INTENSITY AND UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL STATES.

I. THROUGH volition we are able not only to obtain new presentations, but also to heighten the intensity of actually presented ones, the intensity of which does not exceed a certain degree. If we wish to hear a feeble sound more distinctly, perceive an indistinct point more clearly, scent some odour more fully, taste something more thoroughly, feel some pain more keenly, &c.,—if, as we are in the habit of saying, we voluntarily bestow greater attention upon these things, we accomplish our will in these several respects. This volition manifests itself, by the way, for the most part through corresponding external movements, such as the expansion or the contraction of the eyes, the distension of the nostrils, breathing harder through the nose, or bringing the tongue into closer contact with the palate, &c.

We may, on the other hand, weaken the force of our presentations through volition, viz. by exerting our will to obtain presentations of memories and thoughts; or, as we say, in withdrawing our attention from those presentations.

The possibility of obtaining presentations of heightened intensities through volition, is likewise described by men as a species of objective existence, by saying that their presentations possess another intensity differing from the one actually presented. In some cases they

only in connection with the discussion of the belief in the objective existence of mind. The reader may form an idea of what that answer will be from the closing remark which I still venture to make: that belief presupposes the belief in the existence of other conscious beings, a belief which is not presupposed by the belief in the objective existence of memories and ideas.

declare one or the other of these two kinds of intensity, namely, either the higher degree to which they can raise their presentations, or the lesser degree to which they can lower them, to be the true one ; and in other cases, again, the original intensity as it originally appeared is declared by them to be such. Thus we are in the habit of saying, respecting a presentation even of so subjective a nature as a sensation of pain, that it is not so intense as we feel it to be, only we must take no heed of it, or that the pain is in reality more violent than we feel it to be because our attention is drawn off from it.

2. In cases where some of the presentations which usually are presented together, or some of the elements normally entering into certain presentations, are missing, we usually attribute this to the circumstance that our attention is absorbed by another presentation or by another element. This we are all the more disposed to do, since we may have experienced that through the voluntary withdrawal of our attention we are able not only to lessen the intensity of our feebler presentations, but to entirely suppress them, and since in cases of this kind we obtain the appearance of the respective presentation or element if it is our will (if we concentrate our attention for that purpose). In this, too, men find a species of objective existence. They say that, besides actual presentations, there exist other presentations too, which do not enter into their consciousness, are suppressed, and lie outside of the centre of their consciousness.

The reader will perhaps say : "Why, the unperceived existence of attributes of presentations, treated of in the first chapter, is exactly a case where some of the presentations which usually are presented together, or some of the elements normally entering into certain presentations, are missing. In this case, however, men do not say that there exists *a presentation* of the attribute, but it does not enter into their consciousness and

lies outside of its centre, but they say that *the attribute* of the respective presentation exists or existed (the relation of the respective presentations subsists or subsisted) objectively, without being or having been presented to or perceived by them." Now this is true, and was one reason for treating of this case separately. The observation of this inconsistency of expression (in spite of which, however, objective existence is recognized by men in both cases) will assist the reader in perceiving another inconsistency of language, which I shall speak of in the following chapter.

Before entering upon that topic, however, I deem it necessary to make two more observations on the present subject. One refers to the question whether objective intensity and unconscious mental states belong to the class of individual or to that of common objective existences. The answer is, that in this regard they stand in the same position with the objective attributes of presentations.¹ The other remark is this: If the increase or decrease of attention were only involuntary (spontaneous, impulsive), then we would not entertain the notion, ascertained in this chapter, of the existence, along with the presented and felt intensity of our feeble presentations, of their objective intensity, and of presentations and elements of presentations which do not pass into consciousness. We would in this case describe the increase or decrease of the intensity of our presentations, and the passing of new presentations or elements of presentations into or out of our consciousness through the effect of (involuntary) attention, as simply changes in the presentations, or respectively in objective existences, if they are presentations of objective existences. After what I said on this subject in treating of the other kinds of objective existences, it is hardly necessary for me to enter now into a fuller explanation or argument concerning the meaning and justness of this remark.

¹ Vide above, page 53, text and note.

CHAPTER VII.

A DOUBT AND ITS SOLUTION.

ALREADY Chapter iii., treating of the analysis of our belief in the objective existence of external things, may have suggested to the reader a question conceived somewhat in this form: "According to the theory advanced in these pages, our belief in the objective existence of the external world simply means our belief that in the place of the colours, sounds, touch-presentations, odours, &c., which are actually presented to us at any time, others would be presented if it were, or respectively if it had been, our will that they should be presented, namely, regarded from an objective point of view, if it were or had been our will to move our bodies or certain of their parts. Yet we may obtain through volition the presentation of colours, sounds, touch-presentations, odours, differing from the actual ones not only by moving in the 'empty' space surrounding us, but also by the action of parts of our body, moving, or endeavouring to move, upon the things occupying the remaining portions of space. The volition to move, which, if unimpeded by matter, results in change of place, and, through the latter, in a succession of new presentations, turns, if impeded by matter, into action upon the latter, which likewise results in a succession of new presentations. If men describe their belief in the former kind of results of their volition by saying that they believe in certain objective facts, ought not the belief in the latter kind of the results of their volition possess likewise the meaning of the belief in objective facts? Truly," the reader would apostrophize the author, "you were quite right in your introductory remarks: before reading

your work it never occurred to my mind to understand by the belief in objective existence anything else but the belief in the objective existence of the external world, and at most in the objective existence of mind. You, however, as it appears, endeavour to show that whenever we believe that we could have a certain presentation if it were our will to obtain it, we express this by saying that we believe in an objective fact ; though, if this were the case, then the belief I am speaking of ought also in some way or other to possess the meaning of a belief in objective existence. But I do not find that humanity describes that belief as a belief in a species of objective existence, and this is the weak spot of your theory. In those kinds of belief in objective existence which you have analyzed, there must be something more than the mere belief that certain presentations can be obtained through volition."

My answer to this is as follows :

The belief to which you refer possesses not only in some way or other the meaning of a belief in objective existence, but may be fully described by the same terms of the belief in objective existence which in your opinion contains something more. The various possibilities of effects producible through our will upon the things surrounding us may be expressed by saying that these things possess certain objective properties. Nay, in certain cases we actually express them in that way. Some of the cases of objective existence admitted by you already belong to this class. In order to feel the resistance or hardness of a thing, it is not enough to come up close to it, but we must press it ; in order to feel its weight, we must lift it ; and in order to ascertain its taste, we must act upon it by resolving it in our saliva. That things are resistant, hard, heavy, or have a certain taste, means that by pressing or lifting them, or by resolving them by our saliva, we are able to obtain certain presentations. The motions, or the endeavours to move, which are required in some other

cases, are only more complicated. That a certain thing is inflammable (namely, if we scrape it) is just as much an objective property of that thing as its hardness. In general, the fact that we are able to obtain the presentation of C by means of the effect of the motion or endeavour to move A upon the thing or group of things B, may be in all cases expressed in this way, that the thing or group of things B possesses the objective property X.

The properties of things the presentations of which may be obtained by means of such an "action," are in all particulars of the same nature as those that may be obtained by means of "change of place." In the same way as the latter may appear to us without our moving, namely, if the things come to us, the former too may appear to us through the objective interaction of things which resembles the action which our body might produce upon them. Just as the presentations of properties which can be obtained by mere change of place exist even when they do not appear to us, and their existence then consists in their producing certain effects upon things, in the same way exist the properties the presentations of which can be obtained by our actions upon things. The former as well as the latter exist as common to all human, and indeed to all conscious creatures. I do not doubt that the statement that mere possibilities of presentation are objective facts will make a queer impression upon you; but as to this I will only ask you to reflect for one moment whether the case is different, when you say of a bottle that stands before you that it is hard, or of the butter before you that it is soft, without touching either, and in your saying that in Hindustan too the trees are green. The only reason why these last expressions do not sound strange to you is, that you have heard them used since your childhood; in other words, because the possibility of obtaining these presentations is actually expressed by the language of the millions in the terms of objective facts; while as regards the former it is only I who say that they can be described in that way.

I therefore not only accept, but most positively maintain, that the possibilities of our actions upon things fall under the formula, "that through our volition certain presentations can be obtained." I further acknowledge that those possibilities of action are not in general described by men as objective existences or events. But I cannot admit that from this the inference is legitimate, that the "expressed" cases of objective existence are anything more than possibilities of obtaining presentations through our volition. In the first place, I would ask what that "more" consists in. It is the business of the critic to point it out to me. Whatever may be the result of an analysis of the belief in objective existence, the analyzer will in no imaginable way be able to prove that general negative truth that it contains no more than what he finds in it. Let that "more" be particularly designated, and the contention about it may then begin. But, in the second place, let me suppose the critical reader to belong to a certain class of realistic philosophers, and to hold that, whether mankind does or does not conceive more by the "expressed" cases of objective existence than the possibility of obtaining presentations through volition, there is in point of fact more in them, namely, that back of the presentations there exists a certain real force or substance, or there exist certain real forces or substances, as realistic philosophers are in the habit of saying, or there take place certain atom-movements, which are the *realia* of physiologists wanting in philosophical sense—he will nevertheless be bound to concede that he must accept the same thing also with regard to the properties of things which can be expressed in the form of objective existence, although not so expressed; nay, also that beneath different properties of this kind are hidden different forces, substances, or different formations of that force, substance, or atom-motion.

Moreover, I cannot admit that the lack of these expressions proves anything against the truth of the

analysis as developed by me thus far. I have endeavoured to show that whenever men express a belief in something objectively existing or happening, they understand by it the belief that a presentation can be obtained through their volition; but I have advanced nothing from which the converse of my proposition might be inferred. Or is human language in general so perfect in the matter of philosophical consistency, that a psychological analysis which discloses the fact that at a certain point it does not go to the utmost verge of consistency, may for that reason alone be rejected? If this were the case, philosophy could never have arisen. With regard to the truth of my theory, it is enough if I have shown that the possibility of obtaining presentations in the manner spoken of *might* be also expressed in the form of a belief in objective existence.

But language which from one point of view may be charged with inconsistency for failing to express the species of possibilities of presentation in question by stating them to be objective properties of things, will from another point of view appear to pursue in this regard a perfectly consistent course. The mode of expression in question would, namely, require an infinite number of adjectives and verbs—nay, of nouns too, since that mode of expression would even presuppose that the different things through the interaction of which we obtain the presentations should be collectively designated by one comprehensive noun. The use of all these missing words would only afford the advantage of being somewhat shorter than the ordinary language actually employed, but it is not absolutely necessary. Language (with rare exceptions) possesses no more adjectives and verbs than are indispensably necessary. It has a special word for each particular *species* of presentations we can obtain in things, and this is *unavoidably necessary*; but it has no terms consisting of a single word, particular adjectives or verbs, in order to express

that the appearance of a certain presentation can be obtained by us *in a certain particular manner*. To make use again of the figure employed above, language is wanting in the words described there by X. Language is not integrated to so high a degree.

“But,” the reader might say, “by means of our actions upon things we can obtain not only new presentations of colours, of touch, &c., but also of organic sensations within us, of ideas, emotions, desires, volitions, nay of memories,” and ask, “Could this be likewise described by saying that things possess certain objective properties?” Most assuredly. Where could a *philosophical* classification hit the line between the objective properties of things and the “effects produced upon our minds by things”? Why could not the effects of liveliness, cheerfulness and drowsiness, producible by wine, be described as objective properties of wine, if the taste-presentation producible by its touching our tongue *is* described as such? Surely they might be, though ordinary language does not actually describe these effects by single adjectives. But here I must add another reflection. We have seen in Chapter iii., treating of the objective existence of the external world, that the reason why men do not regard organic sensations, memories, ideas, emotions and volitions, as presentations of properties of things, or generally as presentations of objective existences, is because certain presentations of this kind are not attached with the same regularity to certain things respectively to certain places, and thereby to our will as the thing-presentations. In the same way certain presentations of the above kind are not attached with unvarying regularity to certain actions exerted by us upon certain kinds of things, and thereby to our will. Hence if ordinary language were even to adopt that mode of expression, which in the present chapter was spoken

of as possible, namely, if it described the possibility of obtaining the presentations of certain colours, sounds, &c., through the effects produced by us upon certain things, as certain properties of these things, it could not do so with respect to organic sensations, to memories, ideas, emotions, desires and volitions, if it wished to adhere to the train of thought which gave rise to the designation of some kinds of our presentations as being merely subjective.

But, in addition to all this, it may occur to the reader that not only through our actions upon things, but without the accession of any thing, our volitions are able to procure us presentations through motion (besides the presentation of change of place). Thus we can obtain the presentation of sound whenever we wish to do so, by the motion of our lips and of the vocal chords, presentations of the so-called motor sensations by the motion of any part of our body, and many other presentations besides.

Now as to sound, I hold that in the same sense in which certain memories and cognitions exist within us, even when they are not presented, sounds too may be said to exist, even when not presented. Our belief that through volition we are able to obtain sound-presentations is as much a belief in an *objectivum*, individual, separately existing for every one of us, as the belief that through volition we are able to obtain presentations of memories or ideas. Indeed, we actually express the former belief, too, in terms of objective existence. We habitually say that *we have* a fine or powerful voice, whereby we understand that this voice exists even when it is not heard. We even state this voice to change objectively, like things of the external world. Our voices are affected besides by bodily and external circumstances also at moments when we are silent; and he who believes in the universal uniformity

of nature cannot possibly doubt but that the fact of somebody's having this or that kind of voice is invariably connected with some other circumstances, and, foremost of all, with certain other individual qualities of his own. The voice we possess exists when it is not presented, it changes objectively, and it stands in interdependence with other objective existences; and all these attributes of its objective existence are actually expressed by ordinary language in the same terms which are used in describing the like attributes of the *objectiva* of the external world.¹ The objection might be urged that this is only a figurative use of words; for while we are silent there "actually" exists no voice or sounds, or anything answering them, within us, but only a certain faculty, capability or power. This objection is readily met by the answer that neither do we know anything more of the actual existence of things when they are not before us, and that a standing dispute is kept up between metaphysicians as to what the "actual" existence of things consists in when they are not present to us, just as the dispute is ever going on between them as to whether presentations which have fallen under the "threshold of consciousness" but may still reappear exist as dispositions or traces, or whether there only remain faculties or capabilities for their resuscitations—barren disputes, which necessarily must remain unsettled for ever.

The same thing which holds good as to the possibility to obtain sound-presentations through voluntary movements equally holds good as to the possibilities of other organic sensations. These possibilities are not

¹ It is noticeable that we are in the habit of summing up our faculty of giving utterance to a variety of sounds in the comprehensive term that we possess *a* voice (of a certain volume), just as our capability of selecting at any moment a certain place-presentation out of a variety of places is expressed in the sentence that there exists a unitary Space.

expressed by men in terms of objective existence, for the reason that practical conversation does not involve the necessity of doing so, but they might be expressed in this manner.

CHAPTER VIII.

A FEW REMARKS ON VOLITION.

IN the foregoing chapters, I have concluded the analysis of all species of *objectiva* capable of presentation. Before entering upon the question of the genesis of our beliefs in these species of *objectiva*, it will be proper to elucidate from various points of view the sense in which the terms "volition" and "will" were employed by me in that analysis.

Presentations the contents of which are in the first place the idea of another presentation, and in the second place an endeavour to obtain or to have presented this presentation, were called by me in the foregoing chapters volitions.¹ It is in this sense of the word that I arrived at the conclusion that certain kinds of belief in objective existence mean but so many beliefs in our ability to obtain certain presentations through our volition. This use of the word is justified, on the one hand, by the fact that it agrees with ordinary language, which describes as volitions all presentations the contents of which are, firstly, an idea, and secondly, an endeavour to realize this idea; and, on the other, by the further fact that no useful purpose can be served by deviating in this case from ordinary language.

It was, however, by no means intended to disguise

¹ The only possible description of presentations is the designation of their elements (that of course being only possible if the presentations are composed of different elements). A description of this kind is attempted above with respect to the species of volitions in question; but the simple elements themselves do not admit of a more precise description, "endeavour" intending to be merely a synonym for "volition."

by the above analysis the differences existing between different species of volitions. The analysis, on the contrary, showed that the "other presentation" constituting the object of such volitions may be of different kinds, as follows. It may be :

1. The attribute-presentation of a presentation.
2. The presentation of change of place, respectively, of a place different from the one presented, and the presentation of the matter occupying that place.
3. The presentation of the heightened intensity of some presentation of slight intensity.¹
4. The presentation of touch and pressure proceeding from things present to us ; presentations of changes in these and new subjective presentations within us caused by these changes.
5. A primary presentation which does not belong to any of the classes above enumerated, as, for instance, the sounds produced by our own body, the motor image of some part of our body, or its image in a certain position, motor sensations, &c.

6. A memory.

7. An idea.

There intervenes in all these cases, between the volitions and the obtaining of the presentation constituting the object of the volition, a process which is not merely physical, but psychical too, being presented to or felt by the *willing* individual. This process, too, is of a different nature in the different cases just distinguished. In the first and third cases it is called attention ; in the second, fourth and fifth, motion ; in the sixth, remembrance or recollection ; in the seventh, thought or reflection ; terms the first two of which somewhat indefinitely designate both the physical and psychical aspects of the processes. But the difference

¹ The third of these classes may be contrasted with all the rest, as being only the heightening of the intensity of a presentation already existing, while the others are new presentations.

in these processes is no ground against designating the presentations which may initiate them, and which we have defined in the beginning of this chapter, in all cases by the term of volitions. The processes in question often go on, it is true, without being preceded by presentations of this kind ; but if preceded by them, they are generally called *voluntary* attention, movement, recollection, reflection. Ordinary speech is likewise familiar with volition to attend, to move, to recollect, to reflect. All these cases have one feature in common, namely, the obtaining of a presentation through volition.

In the foregoing seven chapters I think I have enumerated all sorts of *presentations* which may be objects of volition, but I am far from pretending that this enumeration embraces all the possible objects of volition. It seems to be clear at the first glance that the willer may have other purposes in view than realizing presentations to himself, namely, the realization of objective facts. Thus it seems evident that, in going through a voluntary motion, the purpose of the willer may be, not the presentation of a change in an object, but the change in itself ; not the presentation of a sound to himself, but the production of a sound ; not the image or sensation of a movement, but the movement itself. In the cases just cited as examples, the result may embrace the respective presentations, too ; in other cases, however, the objective result aimed at by the willer *cannot* even be presented to him. This is the case if it is his purpose to produce an effect at a distance or at a period of time when he will be no longer amongst the living, or upon the consciousness of another person. I say it seems to be clear that these cases do not belong to the species of volitions defined in the beginning of this chapter. Now if what appears to be so obvious be true, then we must say that the general definition of volition is, that it is a presentation the contents of which are, firstly, an idea, and secondly, an endeavour to realize that idea ; and that there are two species of

volitions, one with which this idea is an idea of a presentation of the willer, and another with which it is the idea of a fact objective with regard to the willer. Respecting the distinction thus made, it might, however, be said that with the latter species it is likewise a presentation by which the willer is satisfied, namely, his belief that the realization has taken place or will take place. It might be even said that in this species of volitions it is this presentation which figures in the mind of the willer as the object of volition, that the object of volition is thus in every case a presentation of the willer, and that consequently the definition of certain volitions given above is a general definition of volition. It is utterly impossible to decide which of these two views is the correct one; it is purely a verbal question whether by the species of volitions in question the objective result or the said belief should be *called* the object of volition; and the task of the psychologists is only to indicate the existence of this species of volitions, that is to describe it. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that there exist species of volitions the objects of which are presentations of the willer.

My special topic necessarily led up to the division of the objects of the Volitions Initiating Voluntary Movements, as classified by me under numbers 2, 4 and 5, at the head of the present chapter, and in the section just completed; for the fact that will is capable of realizing the ideas of so many different presentations is, or might be, expressed by men in the terms of so many different beliefs in objective existence.

This distinction between the objects of volition we do not, however, meet with in psychological works. On the contrary, they invariably speak of voluntary motion as being always preceded by a volition the ideal element of which is the idea of movement—in other words, of which motion is the conscious object, or, to express

it more tersely, by volition to move. In point of fact, however, we are performing voluntary movements where this is not the case. Let us ask of our non-psychologist acquaintances whether their heads and eyes are moving when they glance at a line in a book, and most of them will be either at a loss for an immediate answer, or they will give an incorrect reply. From this it is evident that in voluntarily moving their eyes, that motion is not the object of their volition. The object of the volition which precedes these their movements is merely a presentation of change of place; this volition is afterwards followed by the motion needed for the realization of the object. But the best warrant for the distinctions above laid down is the circumstance that our first voluntary movements are in all likelihood the consequences of volitions the objects of which are purely the indirect effects of these movements. The child, namely, anterior to its first voluntary movements, has in all probability no knowledge of the objective motor images of the different parts of its body; in other words, it does not know that some parts of its body move on certain occasions in the same way as the objects before him move at other times. For this knowledge is one that it can only acquire by feeling or seeing the moving parts of its body while in motion; and such a thing to happen through involuntary movements alone would require a happy combination of involuntary movements, which is not altogether impossible, but upon the occurrence of which we cannot imagine the first beginnings of its voluntary movements to depend. Does any one believe that the first voluntary motion of the eyes takes place with a child only after its having involuntarily felt or seen in a mirror its own eyes while they were moving? Surely not. Without this, however, the child cannot be said to possess an idea of these movements as such, and hence this idea cannot figure as initiating the first voluntary movement of its eyes. The presentation which precedes these movements when they first

voluntarily occur, consists in all likelihood of the following elements: (1) of the primary presentation of the place which its eyes see; (2) of the idea of the transition from this place to another, to the right, left, &c., as felt by it on the occasion of the earlier involuntary movements of its eyes; (3) of the desire of having this transition primarily presented, or as such as it was felt by it on former occasions. As soon as this desire is presented to it, the primary presentation of the transition will be also presented to the child. The reason for the child's desiring this presentation may be that on a former occasion such presentation was associated with pleasure, either in itself or in consequence of the colour-presentations which were presented after it, and which the child now looks for again. Similarly, we cannot doubt but that in the first voluntary movements of other parts of its body, it is likewise always the indirect effect of the movement which forms the object of its volition. We must suppose many *such voluntary* movements to be made by the child before we can suppose it to possess a notion of the objective images of its own movements. Hence there are volitions to obtain a presentation of change of place, or a presentation of touch, &c., which are not in the least volitions to move. The distinction between the objects of the volition initiating movements proper for the purposes of my analysis is therefore quite correct, although as a rule it has not been observed by psychologists.

Apart from the real expressed contents of doctrines, it is customary to distinguish their so-called tendency, that is, what other doctrines they silently imply. I think it probable that more than one reader will find that the present work, within its particular scope, shows up the weakness of the fundamental principles of the English Association Psychology, which it has been customary to emphasize of late, and that it makes it clear

that, even in accepting to a great extent the modes of thought and doctrines of that school, it is impossible to establish the meaning and to explain the origin of the belief in objective existence without the supposition of the existence of an active subject and of the individual's continuous feeling of its activity; in a word, that it once more renders evident the truth of those doctrines which in Germany are taught by Prof. Wundt under the name of Apperception, and in England by Dr. Ward under the name of Psychological Subject and Attention. I therefore find it proper to declare here that I myself do not deem these views to be implied in the preceding analysis, and, further still, that I for my part absolutely reject the doctrines in question of these distinguished writers. It is impossible for me to enter here in detail into a criticism of these views, since, owing to the obscurity of these doctrines, this would lead me too far away from my subject, and would require too much space. I shall speak more particularly of Dr. Ward's doctrine concerning the Subject, in that portion of the second part of my work where I shall treat of the belief in the objective existence of mind. Here I shall merely investigate one proposition of this doctrine which possesses greater interest in connection with my subject, and to which special prominence is given by Wundt.

According to Wundt, every presentation, or perhaps I should say every distinct presentation, owes its presence, its subjective existence, to will, to a special operation of the will upon an indistinct presentation-material. The will, or volition, in this operation is called by Wundt apperception, or attention. This act of willing is not presented in every case, nor can it be even presented or discovered in every case, through another exertion of will, through a second volition; but, although not being presented or presentable, it does take place in such cases too. Every link in a train of a *reverie* or of a remembrance, which seemingly flows

on without the intervention of the will, is in fact called up by a special action of will.¹

The first thing which this strange doctrine is apt to suggest is, that it asserts the happening of the alleged act of willing in a sense different from any used in speaking of the happening of a thing in general. Wundt, therefore, might be reasonably expected to explain in what sense the volition in question happens or takes place without being presented or perceivable. But this he fails to do. Hence his doctrine is simply unintelligible. Let us, nevertheless, see how he proves that doctrine, if for no other reason, in order that some light may be shed upon its meaning by inquiry into his method of proving.

His main argument is as follows: "That will is capable of influencing the course of our presentations is an observation of long standing. Observation, moreover, teaches us that through a voluntary effort we succeed in awakening, and by means of steady attention in strengthening, to a certain extent, images of memory and fancy. The capacity for doing this seems to differ greatly with different individuals. With some persons this capacity is so considerable that the image of fancy attains with them the vividness of a phantasm. It, however, invariably takes a considerable length of time for the innervation to grow to such an extent, and an increasing feeling of tension is distinctly observable in connection with it. These observations render it indubitable that the direction of attention to perceptions, as well as to images of memory, *generally* rests upon an innervation proceeding *from will*."²

This argument is based altogether on an erroneous

¹ Vide Wundt, *Logik*, Band i. pp. 23—26, and *Physiolog. Psychologie*, iii. Auflage, Band ii. pp. 463—472.

² Attention and apperception are synonymous expressions. Vide *loc. cit.*

inference. It merely asserts that because there is such a thing as voluntary attention, therefore attention of every description is volition, the operation of will. This, indeed, is Wundt's principal argument, the one which he advances in that part of the "Physiologische Psychologie" where the doctrine in question appears in its proper place,¹ and which recurs repeatedly in other parts of his works.

The phrasing of this argument indicates that with the author the doctrine in question derived its force also from certain physiological convictions of his. Wundt, namely, in another part of his said work, endeavours to show that the physiological correlative of attention or apperception is an innervation proceeding from the centre; consequently, a process which precedes also movements. And since our movements are preponderatingly voluntary, it seems to be proper to view also attention or apperception as the operation of will. This is a reflection which is frequently discoverable in Wundt's reasoning on the subject. But the propriety of this inference is only apparent. There also exist such a thing as involuntary innervation, and such a thing as involuntary motion; in the same way, there also exist involuntary attention or apperception, and likewise presentations arising without the action of will. The fact that innervation is the physiological correlative of attention, is no sufficient reason for attributing attention to an innervation proceeding from will. Involuntary attention is analogous to involuntary motion. To refer to the nature of the physiological process for the purpose of proving that in cases where volition as a psychical fact is out of question, volition has nevertheless taken place, is a proceeding entirely extra-psychological; it is, indeed, an instance of "that inveterate habit of confounding the psychical and the physical which," according to Dr. Ward, "is the bane

¹ Band ii. pp. 240, 241.

of modern psychology." Wundt himself says in one place, "Will is a fact of consciousness, and known only as such." Does not he perceive that his own doctrine is afflicted with the same fundamental error which is peculiar to Schopenhauer's metaphysics, namely, that he decrees will where there is not a trace of it?

Besides, this way of dealing with the matter is very bad physiology. Both voluntary and involuntary motion and attention have that in common that they are attended by innervation; but if this be the case, then *innervation is not the special physiological correlative of volition*, nor a *symptom of the action of the will*, as looked upon by Wundt, and *volition has its own special correlative*. If a certain voluntary movement, owing to practice, has become automatic with an individual, then its physiological correlative too has unavoidably undergone a change; and it would be highly improper in that case to rely upon that part of the physiological process which remained unchanged, and on that ground to assert that the movement remained voluntary. Consistently with his doctrine, Wundt ought to maintain that voluntary movement alone exists.

Besides this single positive argument, the only other argument advanced by Wundt in support of his doctrine is a criticism on the ordinary view, according to which only certain peculiar presentations are called volitions. He says: "For the most part, an internal effectiveness of the will in connection with attention has been assumed in those cases alone where the effort of will asserts itself in a remarkably (?) great measure, or where a choice between two disposable presentations distinctly takes place. Accordingly, attention was divided into a voluntary and an involuntary one."¹ In opposition to this, he states that "the will can be *unequivocally* determined."² The answer to this is, that this characterization of the ordinary view is entirely false, for by

¹ *Op. cit.* ii. p. 243.

² *Ibid.*

volition ordinary language means a presentation of a peculiar quality, without reference to its intensity, and it ascertains volition even when the presentation possessing that quality appears in that slightest intensity in which it still possesses psychological existence. A necessary element of this quality is an idea or an object of the will, but the mental state of choice is by no means its necessary element; that idea may be so attractive that the idea of an alternative does not even appear. Wundt's doctrine is in contradiction with the ordinary consciousness, and will never be generally accepted, not because he speaks of volition there, too, where there is no choice, but because he speaks of volition in those cases, too, where a presentation is not preceded by the peculiarly tinged idea of that presentation.

My theory does in no way insist upon the truth of that doctrine; on the contrary, it entirely stands upon the ground of current language, and is founded upon the proposition that presentations appear both involuntarily and voluntarily. In my analysis, will figures in reality only as a fact of consciousness; according to it, volitions are presentations similar to other presentations, only that, like all other species of presentations, they are connected with, and act upon, the remaining species of presentations, according to their own peculiar laws, which, however, are recognized by the individual in no other way than the modes of connection and action of other species of presentations are perceived by him.

In conclusion, let me make one more observation. Above I endeavoured to define the notion which in the ordinary use of language is designated by the word "volition." To my knowledge, one of the subordinate species of the notion thus defined is in ordinary language called *desire*. Namely, I find that this word is ordinarily employed to describe such volitions, taken in

the above sense, as are not accompanied by a belief in the possibility of their realization (which does not imply that a contrary belief is required by the notion of desire); while with respect to volitions that are accompanied by this belief, the term of volition is applied κατ' ἐξοχήν. This suggestion of mine, however, is intended to be merely introductory to my final remark that, independently of the question whether this my view of the ordinary use of language is right or wrong, it is in this sense that I intend employing the word *desire* in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IX.

THE GENETIC QUESTION.

UNDER this title, as the reader knows, I now intend dealing with the question, how every man arrives at those different kinds of belief in objective existence, the analysis of which was given before. If that analysis is correct, then this question is identical with the one, how every man arrives at the belief in the effects of his will. I may mention in parenthesis that if at the outset of this work the identity of these two questions was not manifest to the reader, it is a proof that I was not guilty of merely repeating trite truths, no matter how much it may have seemed to be so at some of the stages of the development of my argument.

The question thus suggested may be probably solved by means of direct observation also, a method which, if applicable, is obviously the surest. It consists in observing the conduct of children and young animals from the beginning of their lives until the period when it is manifest that they arrived at the species of the belief in objective existence in question. Some who have pursued this method succeeded in obtaining certain results; as for myself, I never engaged in investigations of this kind. Hence, in dealing with this question I shall employ the somewhat less safe method followed by the earlier analytical school in its attempts to solve similar genetic questions. This method starts from the hypothesis that the fundamental laws of the mind are the same in tender and ripe years; then it goes on investigating whether it is *possible* that the element of consciousness in question arises as an effect of the operation of those laws; and finally, it inquires whether

certain circumstances do not absolutely preclude this possibility. In the absence of such circumstances, it regards the possibility predicated upon those laws as the reality.

In pursuing this method, first of all I consider it as established that all those beliefs of ours, the rise of which we are in a position to observe, owing to its belonging to maturer age, have arisen through experience. In what follows I hope to be able to show that the beliefs in question may likewise be supposed to originate in a process of experience. I do not know of any fact in opposition to their arising in this manner.

However, before giving an account of this process of experience, I must say a few words concerning that possible opposite view, according to which the belief in question does not arise from experience, but is original. This view does not necessarily coincide with the one that the belief that through volition we can obtain certain presentations (either in all the particulars possessed by it in its more developed stages, or in a certain general way) is born with us; on the contrary, this belief would be original, and would not have arisen by way of experience, even if, after those presentations which are governed by our will in the manner set forth have appeared to us for a time without the exertion of our will, the will were to arise within us in certain cases to obtain such presentations, *along with* that belief of ours that they appear if we will it. This would be the case if, after the presentation of change of place has appeared to us for a time independently of our will, by means of the reflex movements of our eyes, or if, after, owing to involuntary attention, without any exertion of our will, the heightening of the intensity of feeble presentations has appeared to us, we should arrive at the belief that we may also obtain the same results through our will. The beliefs in question, namely, can in that case only be said to arise by means of a process of experience, if, after experiencing several times that our volitions are

attended by a certain effect, we arrive at the belief that our volitions will have the same effect in other similar cases. I maintain the origin of the belief in question by means of such a process of experience to be supposable.

This supposition starts, accordingly, from the proposition that at first volitions make their appearance without the belief that they will realize their objects, that is, volitions as were called by me desires at the end of the preceding chapter. The child experiences that of these desires some are followed by a complete, and some by a partial, realization of their respective objects. That is to say, it arrives at the knowledge of the laws or order governing the connection between the desires and the appearance of their objects, in the same way as the experience of the other connections of his presentations leads him to a knowledge of the laws of these presentations. And, as in all other cases, here too the belief arises within him that also in future he will invariably experience this connection.

In accordance with this hypothesis, our belief in the objective existence of the unitary Space, for instance, has arisen in the following manner. The child, in involuntarily moving once or oftener its head and eyes from left to right (the nature of these first involuntary movements, namely, the question whether these are or are not of a reflex character, does not concern us here), will obtain, in every instance, the presentation of the change of place from left to right, and after that the presentation of an object, M, which causes it pleasure. Consequently there arises in him later on the idea of this change of place and of M, and with it the desire of obtaining the appearance of these presentations. *The desire for the appearance of the presentation of a change of place cannot be entertained without being followed by the primary presentation of that change of place.* M, on the contrary, does not unavoidably appear; it does not when it has changed in itself, or changed its place, or when the child is not in the place in which it was on

the former occasions. After experiences of this kind made in various directions, the child arrives at the belief that it can obtain the presentation of change of place whenever it wills it, and that if a certain place is present to him at a certain time, it would be only necessary for it to will so in order that "another place" should be presented to it. That is to say, it at least arrives at the belief that space in general objectively exists. After having arrived at this general belief, the child will look upon the portion of space presented to him on any occasion as one of the objectively existing portions of space. How this belief develops in process of time into the belief that space of indefinite extent objectively exists, is clear enough. This process of experience would become even more simplified if the presentation of change of place in itself would be of sufficient interest to the child to be an object of its desire, a thing which is quite possible.

If the theory of the origin of our notion of the otherness of places divided by movements as laid down in the Appendix B to Ch. iii. is true, then it is a prerequisite condition to the child's arriving through desires and movements at the belief in the objective existence of Space, that it should meet with tolerable permanence with the same things in the same places on different occasions. However this may be, this at all events is a condition of the rise of the belief in the objective existence of the external world, and this belief (in accordance with the hypothesis of the present chapter) must be conceived by us in the same way as I assumed it to be possible in the analytical treatment of that belief. It is accordingly through experience that the child arrives also at those special beliefs, that in certain places there are certain things, and that in the proximity of certain things there are certain other things, and that things having certain properties possess also certain other properties. Thus in numbers of cases the child experiences that the things of which he sees or feels the one

side have also another, a reverse one. This discovery, for its novelty's sake alone, may be so delightful to the child, that in other cases too it will wish to pass through a similar experience. And whenever that desire arises in the child, it is satisfied. Expressed in other words, this experience amounts to this, that everything has objectively another surface besides the one visible from a certain point of view. The deceptions to which the child, and subsequently the grown man, are exposed in their desires and investigations, the fact that they are continually compelled to qualify their generalizations, are well known.

Through a substantially similar experimental process, the child may be led up to those more elementary kinds of belief in objective existence which I have analyzed, and the elementary quality of which is likely to render their origin in this wise improbable, although this impression may be different at this day, when the conviction is stronger than it has been in the past that the simplest thing is subject to the same process of evolution as the most complex one.

Let us consider a species of the belief in the objective existence of certain attributes of presentations; for instance, the belief that every one of our presentations stands objectively in time-relations to every other of our presentations. In several instances the child becomes aware that a presentation of B succeeds immediately another presentation, A. Hence on the appearance of A, it expects B. On one occasion the child may be disappointed in its expectation; B fails to appear; but owing to his expectant attitude, the child experiences that, instead of B, another presentation, C, follows *after* A, that is in the *same manner* or *relation* to it in which B came before; afterwards D, in the same relation to C *and* A, and so on indefinitely. It is by means of a number of expectations of this kind that he arrives at the consciousness of the universal sequence in which, with the exception of the simulta-

neous ones, all his presentations are objectively connected, and which is at the same time the notion of the objective unitary Time.¹ Once arrived at this general knowledge, he looks upon the duration or sequence presented to him on any occasion as a part of the objectively flowing Time.

The same thing may be also assumed with regard to our belief in the objective existence of memories. With an individual possessed of no active desire to recollect, the involuntarily intruding memories appear merely as capriciously occurring presentations—such as, for instance, good or bad humour—and not as pieces drawn from a permanent store of memories within him. It may perhaps be said by some, that the fact in itself that such involuntary memories arise at all times, drawn from every period of his past, and altogether in great numbers, causes the individual in question, even without the desire of recollection, to form the belief that the memory of his whole past is constantly accumulated in him. But those who hold this forget that the only possible meaning of this continual accumulation consists in the continual ability of recalling the memories by means of active recollection. Such involuntary and at the same time pleasant recollections, however, are apt to excite in the individual the desire of remembering such details of events involuntarily obtruding upon his memory, or such events connected with them, the memory of which does not appear of itself distinctly, but only as such a vague idea of them as every one is familiar with who ever made an effort to recall something. Now this desire as a rule is satisfied; if it is our will, we can roam through the entire breadth and length of our past, and, with but a few gaps between, one event leads to all the others. It is by means of this experience that the belief may arise that the memory of numerous details of our past continually exists (objec-

¹ Cp. *supra*, p. 32.

tively) in us, while that of others does not. Such a primitive desire of recollecting, which is not accompanied by the belief in its fulfilment, can be all the more easily imagined by the reader, since on any occasion when he is making an effort to recall something, he too is uncertain whether his wish will be accomplished, and is thus in a state of mind very much akin to that described by us as primitive, differing only in this, that it is tinged by the general belief that in a number of cases that desire is satisfied.

After what preceded, I trust it will become manifest that a similar process may be presumed with regard to the origin of the belief in the objective existence of convictions obtainable through reflection (and not through recollection). According to Wundt and his followers, there is no act of thinking without the operation of the active will of thinking. I do not share this view, sufficiently refuted by the fact that scientific truths of transcendent importance have in a manner flashed through the minds of their discoverers while their thoughts were busily engaged on entirely different matters. But if all the thoughts of an individual were of the nature of such involuntarily occurring ideas, he would have no means of learning that he has within himself a thought-world, strictly interdependent and defined, of which the occurring thoughts are but so many fragments brought to light. This involuntary ideation, however, being once started, there arise *questions*, that is *ideas* of convictions, of truths, or of ideas simultaneously with the desire to solve these questions, respectively to realize these ideas. The accomplishment or non-accomplishment of this desire teaches us that there is in us a definite world of *knowledge*, that we know or do not know some things. Our experiences of a more mature age may reconcile us to the thought that this desire arises at first without being accompanied by the conviction just pointed out. A desire of this nature, unattended by the belief in its gratification, is

felt by us when in the course of our studies problems arise concerning which we have a dim feeling that they demand a nicer reasoning than that exacted by the questions on which we were engaged until now, accompanied by an intense longing to solve these problems, and by anxious doubts as to our being equal to the task of accomplishing it. A similar state of mind is that of the schoolboy when first engaged in mental arithmetic. And such is also that of the metaphysician when, by investigating his own world of thought, he desires to determine whether the answer to a certain question belongs to the realm of the knowable or the unknowable, and when the last proof for him in this respect is the accomplishment or non-accomplishment of a supreme effort of his will to obtain the proper answer. I maintain it is in such a desire, utterly unattended by the belief in its gratification, that the volition to think for the first time manifests itself.

A similar process of experience may be further assumed to have originated those kinds of belief in objective existence which were treated under the head of "Objective Intensity and Unconscious Mental States." I very well remember the process of experience by which I found out in my childhood that the intensity of taste could be heightened by means of a peculiar movement of the tongue. While partaking of some liquid food, my tongue accidentally touched my palate in a certain way, and to my great surprise I discovered that the pleasant taste of the dish was greatly heightened by this operation. Actuated solely by the interest I felt in psychological phenomena of this kind, I tried to produce the same effect by voluntarily repeating the same movements on subsequent occasions; and having succeeded in this every time I made the attempt, I formulated to myself the generalization that to a certain extent it depends upon ourselves with what intensity we may feel the taste of the things we have in our mouths. That the intensity of feelings of pain

can be diminished by not allowing our mind to dwell upon it and thinking of something else, is an experience of a rather late date in life. Who has not passed through the various stages of the process of experience which begins with our intense surprise at the circumstance that painful reflections, which we thought we could never get rid of, were soothed amidst every-day occupations which, clinging to our dismal thoughts, we but reluctantly engaged in, perhaps at the suggestion of some thoughtful older mentor?—a process which continues in our purposely diving headlong into some absorbing work to find relief from similar painful reflections when they happen to recur, and finally terminates in our preaching to younger people that to the wise evils are never so great as to the less wise.

The doctrine that it is through experience we arrive at the knowledge as to what our will is capable or incapable of, and that the volitions, accompanied by the belief in their fulfilment, are preceded in all things by desires, unaccompanied by that belief, is also corroborated by other experiences of maturer years. Let us recall the mental state of doubt and longing we were in when we whipped out for the first time a high note played to us on the violin by our singing-master, or witnessed the leap performed in our presence by a stronger chum, or when we were called upon by a schoolmate to move our ears or the skin on the forehead in the way he does. All these mental states are such as I imagine the primitive desires to be in general.

Since the process of origin as advanced by this doctrine is possible, I consider it as the real one, in conformity with the postulate laid down by most of the psychologists, that such an element of consciousness as can be supposed to have originated in conformity with known laws *must* be thought to have originated in that way. This is my solution of the genetic question—as far as I am capable to solve it.

But the reader may ask, Whence arises the desire itself to observe, to move, to recollect, to think, of which the analyzed species of belief in objective existence are the consequences? I think that regarding this question we are not justified in giving any other answer at this day but this, that if anything in our mental life is original, it is this desire. The attempts hitherto made to derive volition from the other modes of consciousness, I look upon as failures quite as much as Wundt does. We must assume, on the contrary, that our conscious life is from the first accompanied by the will, every state of consciousness which does not answer the nature of the organism being accompanied by the desire of changing it.

But although, as to will, there is no history of its beginnings, there is a history of its development. In treating of the processes of experience by means of which I supposed the belief in the objective existence of the unitary Space and in the objective flow of the unitary Time to have originated, I saw fit to point out as the objects of the primitive desire spoken of there, not only the presentation of another place, or of sequence or duration, but also a certain quality-presentation in a certain place and at a certain time (M and B). This and what was said with regard to the deceptions to which our desires are subject, and with regard to the continual qualifications and modifications of our generalizations, may point to the result that I conceive the will in general as constantly differentiating in its objects, as being directed at first to ultimate ends, and as growing to be guided in course of time by a knowledge of the connection between means and aims. This process of development of the objects of will is, in truth, nothing else but the growth and development—in a word, the evolution—of the belief in objective existence. The will of conscious beings of a lower order differs from that of conscious beings of a higher order, in the same manner in which the primitive will of the child differs

from the will of the grown individual. The will of the lowest species is not guided by knowledge, and consequently not differentiated; it is the will to live, in general; the will of the higher species is accompanied by the knowledge as to what can be accomplished, and how, when and where, and this knowledge is what leads the will to differentiation in accordance with its objects. In proportion as the latter is the case, the will is accomplished in a greater measure, and life becomes longer and fuller.

CHAPTER X.

ENUMERATION OF THE OBJECTIVA INCAPABLE OF PRESENTATION.

WE have already met with one species of *objectiva* incapable of presentation which men believe in; such, namely, are the objective attributes of presentations in certain cases (*vide* note to p. 13), of which the case of the existence of exact qualities (degrees) is deserving of special attention (*vide* p. 17). In the Second Part of my analysis, I shall treat first of all of the belief in that species of objective existence.

But men believe also in other species of *objectiva* incapable of presentation. Such is the belief professed by a large portion of mankind in the existence of substances altogether imperceptible to our senses. Thus, for instance, heat was regarded until quite recently as a substance of this kind, and to this day many look upon electricity as such; while naturalists almost unani- mously declare the ether (through the vibrations of which they suppose the substances perceived by our senses to obtain their light) to be such a substance.

Such is the belief in certain conditions imperceptible to our senses, of very small portions of perceptible substances, as, for instance, in their movements.

Such is the belief in the existence of forces imper- ceptible to our senses, the most important species of which is the belief in the existence of an immaterial God or of immaterial gods.

Such is the belief that trains of consciousness are going on in connection with other bodies besides our own. This belief in the consciousnesses of others is a belief in objective existence, no matter whether those

consciousnesses are or are not ascribed to souls similar in nature to the immaterial gods mentioned above.

The Second Part of my work will, I trust, show that both the meaning or definition, by subjective terms, and the origin of these multifarious beliefs in *objectiva*, are the same as in the case of the beliefs treated of in its First Part.

POSTSCRIPT.

MR. G. F. STOUT ON THE GENESIS OF THE COGNITION OF PHYSICAL REALITY.

IN the January number of 1890 there appeared in *Mind* an article of Mr. G. F. Stout's "On the Genesis of the Cognition of Physical Reality." The theory contained in this article partakes of the character of most of the modern theories on objective existence in this, that it asserts the conception of objective existence to have originated as a correlative of the conception of the Self, and is thus liable to the criticism expressed by me above on pages 56 and 57. The critical remarks made by me above on page 43 equally apply to it. But whilst the theory of Possible Presentations is mostly passed over in silence—as a matter dead and buried—by the modern writers on the subject, Mr. Stout, before giving his own theory, discusses that of Mill, and indeed exerts himself to thoroughly refute it. If his criticism is right, then the above pages contain nothing but a heap of errors, not worth the waste of printing-ink. This is the reason that induced me to take up Mr. Stout's theory and to subject it to a detailed analysis. I had just forwarded for publication my work (the manuscript of which had been ready for the past two years), when Mr. Stout's paper appeared. This compelled me to assign the discussion of his article to a postscript, which appeared also in *Mind* in the July number of 1890.

Mr. Stout's Criticism on Mill.—I must begin with a brief survey of Mr. Stout's criticism on Mill's famous chapter, "The Psychological Theory of the Belief in an External World." The contents of half of his first paragraph may be summed up in the following sentence: "[Mill's] possibilities, so long as they are not realized, are nothing actual, i.e., nothing at all." But this objection amounts only to a bare denial of Mill's doctrine. It is merely asserting of a thing that it is *not* white, when some one else maintains that it *is*. There are, in fact, two sorts of actualities: actual presentations and actual objective existence (or occurrence). Possible presentations do not belong to the former class of actualities; the latter class of

actualities, on the other hand, are said by Mill to be nothing else but possible presentations. Mr. Stout's statement therefore is simply a contradiction of what was maintained by Mill, and, as such, proves nothing.

The same remark equally applies to his next objection. He says: "[Mill's] view may or may not be true; for our purpose it is sufficient to point out that it is diametrically opposed to the irresistible conviction of the ordinary mind. Mill's account of the material world may represent that world as it really is; but it certainly does not represent it as it normally appears to us." Now I, for my part, find nothing in my consciousness diametrically opposed to Mill's account. On the contrary, when, ignorant still of philosophy, I first heard these doctrines, they appeared to me as irresistibly true. No doubt, I had not arrived of myself at the formulation of the doctrines—just as my teachers anticipated me in the matter of the axioms of mathematics; but I no less firmly believe in the one than in the other. This conviction is shared by that larger portion of philosophers who are not realists. In their opinion as well as mine, men generally understand by the expression that a material thing somewhere exists, acts and changes, nothing else but that certain presentations are possible there.

But Mr. Stout, in the same paragraph, goes farther. He says: "I think we have good reason for saying that it did not so appear even to Mill; for he speaks of changes taking place in the grouped possibilities. . . . Now a change in a naked possibility is at the time when it is supposed to take place a change in nothing, and a change in nothing is no change at all. This could not be what Mill really meant, but only what he fancied himself to mean." If this were true, if Mill's formula did not cover the objective changes in things, if he contradicted himself, this might constitute a real argument against his theory. But, in point of fact, change occasions no greater difficulty to that theory than unchanged existence. By objective change, Mill understands only the possibility of a *presentation of change*. Mr. Stout will not deny that there are presentations of change, and if this is true, then there are also possible presentations of change, or possibilities of such presentations of change, quite as much as there are possibilities of presentations of things.

The second paragraph of the criticism is, again, a simple negation of Mill's theory, and may be passed over with that remark.

The third paragraph points the following quotation from Kant against Mill: "The apprehension of the manifold in the phenomenal appearance of a house that stands before me is successive. The question then arises whether the manifold of the house itself be successive, which, of course, no one would admit." This objection can be easily disposed of. That the different parts of the house are co-existent does not mean, according to Mill's theory, that there is a possibility of perceiving them simultaneously, but it means that there are a number of different simultaneous possibilities of presentations, from amongst which the individual may select any at will. Our belief that there is a world consisting of co-existing things means, according to this theory, nothing else but our belief that the possibility of selection from amongst many different presentations subsists for us at any moment.

All the arguments of Mr. Stout are therefore of no avail against Mill.

Mental Activity and Not-Self.—The following quotation gives what Mr. Stout regards as the most essential part of his own theory :

"Apart from operation of extraneous conditions, the redistribution of attention normally takes place in such a manner that the focussed presentation A gradually and continuously disappears and gives place to a nascent presentation B. . . . In all these changes . . . the transference of attention is orderly and continuous. . . . But this orderly redistribution of mental activity determined by interest and preformed associations, is perpetually modified and controlled by interfering conditions. . . . As I sit absorbed in study, I am rudely interrupted by the sounds from a barrel-organ in the street. . . . In so far as the mind becomes in this manner definitely aware of the limitations and interruption of its own activity, it finds itself confronted by a problem, which it can solve only by reference to an activity other than its own. . . . This seems to me to be an indispensable moment in the development of the perception of physical reality. The antithesis of mental activity and passivity, when it becomes sufficiently definite, enables and compels the individual to posit some agency separate from, and independent of, his own private experience."

To this theory there are opposed three facts, each of them sufficient, singly, to refute it.

The first is that, apart from exceptional efforts, the feeling, sensation or presentation of mental activity is but a very faint and indistinct presentation, at all events so faint and indistinct that the interruption of its orderly redistribution by the occurrence of "interfering conditions" cannot induce the individual

to attribute these external conditions to another activity which he would conceive to be modelled after the former. On this point I appeal to general consciousness. Some readers may have had a contrary individual experience with regard to the intensity and distinctness of that presentation. But that it holds good with the majority of mankind is proved by the circumstance that that presentation or feeling, as conceived by Mr. Stout's theory, is only a discovery of a few, more modern, psychologists. Earlier psychologists speak of activity of mind, but they know nothing of any such feelings of it. The belief in the objective existence of the external world is nearly fully developed in the child as soon as it begins to employ coherent sentences in speaking. According to Mr. Stout, the child at that age must have got beyond this observation, generalization and inference: "An agency operates within me in orderly and normal fashion. It is sometimes interrupted. When this happens it is the effect of an external agency." Mr. Stout thus supposes the child to be invested with a capacity for self-observation superior to, and more precise than, that actually betrayed (in Mr. Stout's opinion) by the large majority of the professional psychologists of all ages. This cannot be correct. In point of fact such observation and generalization cannot really be performed by the child.

The second fact is that the feeling of what Mr. Stout calls the interruption of activity, is likewise so indistinct that it cannot produce the result attributed to it. But this will be more apparent in establishing the third fact.

This third fact constitutes the strongest argument against Mr. Stout. It consists, on the one hand, in this, that the so-called interruptions take place not only in consequence of presentations of things and occurrences of the external world, but also through subjective presentations. There is no process of reflection so regular as to be exempt from being "interrupted" by sudden flashes of thought. Interruptions are likewise caused by sudden cravings, by unaccountable good-humour or depression, by impatience, by memories, by hunger, thirst, sleepiness, fatigue, or bodily ailments. On the other hand, presentations of external things and events appear and follow each other—oftener through our own activity and movements than of themselves—in just as regular succession as the thoughts during uninterrupted reflection. Our motor activity greatly resembles mental activity in its stricter sense. Every kind of presentation therefore may appear and disappear in both a gradual and orderly manner (as a consequence

of our own activity) and an interruptive manner. The pretended "fundamental and pervading incoherence within the sphere of individual experience" therefore, unfortunately for Mr. Stout's theory, does *not* coincide with the division between thing-presentations and subjective presentations, and hence cannot be identical with it. The objects that come into the way of mental activity and must be worked up by it, are presentations in general, subjective as well as presentations of things,—objects in Locke's sense and not only the objects of the external world.

Anthropomorphic conception of Thing-presentations.—But the above "indispensable moment," is, according to Mr. Stout, "only one step, although a most important one, towards the solution of the problem before us." Farther—

"It is necessary to show how the contents of tactile, visual and other presentations in all their concrete variety come to be apprehended as existing independently of individual thought and perception. . . . The mode in which this takes place is in general as follows. Certain changes within the field of consciousness are uniformly attendant upon our own motor activity. Similar changes also take place of themselves apart from any action of ours. In order to make our experience self-consistent, we are constrained . . . to regard these variations as due to something not ourselves exercising a motor activity analogous to our own."

Mr. Stout, throughout, describes the child as continually busy propounding anthropomorphic hypotheses concerning his thing-presentations. Although I know that not only Mr. Stout, but almost all of the more modern realists, would like to make us believe this fact, yet I decline to do so unless other proofs are adduced in its favour than the mere assertion that the child is "compelled," "impelled," or "constrained" to go through this sort of mental activity. Moreover, weighty proofs speak against it. When we are grown up we have no anthropomorphic conceptions of this kind. We do not conceive inanimate things as making efforts and possessing activity similar to our own (for it is precisely on this account that we distinguish them from animate beings), and not one of us can remember a change of his ideas in this respect. It is equally certain that one of the first distinctions we make is that between things animate and inanimate. We never see inanimate things moving towards us, unless they are carried by an animate being, or wind, or water. The primitive man anthropomorphizes the wind; whether he does water, too, I am not

aware. Animate beings are conceived by every individual, at a very early stage, as possessing internal activity similar to his own, but there is no necessity whatever—nay, everything speaks against it—for his also investing with such an activity things moved only by animate beings.

But granting the child's anthropomorphic mode of thinking, I fail still to perceive its bearing on the problem in hand. Even if Mr. Stout's description of the child's manner of thinking were entirely true, the only objectively existing thing which the child so far gets to know would be the agency supposed; for that behind which the child supposes the agency to be consists of his presentations, and so far the child had no reason whatever to suppose that these colours, sounds, &c., continue to remain after they have ceased to be present to him. The anthropomorphism of primitive man is, too, of such a nature that with every individual it must be unavoidably preceded by the belief in the objective existence of things.

Persistence.—How does it come that we believe things to persist when they are not before us? According to Hume and Mill, this is what is first developed, and furnishes the ground for believing that our actual thing-presentations are presentations of objectively existing things. According to Mr. Stout, the process of development is just the reverse: it is through the supposition of external agency that we first of all obtain the conception of our thing-presentations as independent presentations, and only by this means do we afterwards arrive at the belief in their persistence. The step (truly all-important and indispensable) takes place in the following manner:

“We saw in § 5 how the individual is constrained to posit some agency beyond the range of his own private experience There thus arises a well-marked division between self and its modes on the one hand, and the not-self and its modes on the other. The not-self must, by the conditions of its psychological genesis, be presented from the outset as that which changes or remains unchanged independently of this or that mode of motor activity on the part of the percipient. Hence variations in the content of perception, if and so far as they are traced to the motor activity of the percipient, are presented as changes in the self, *i.e.* in the body-complex, not in the external object. In the midst of such variations this object may remain unchanged So far as resisted effort is followed by change in the content of sense-perception, we are constrained to refer the change, as such, to our own exertion; on the other hand, so far as the change is only partial, *i.e.* so far as the resisting thing persists unchanged, we are constrained to interpret its persistence as uniformly connected

with the kind and degree of the counter-effort, which we represent as distinct from our own. The experience of resistance is also an experience of persistence All resistance is resistance to change and in the normal course of human experience, the individual percipient is constrained to apprehend it as such."

This process of inference, as described by Mr. Stout, must have surprised every reader. It is attributed by him to a child under three years of age! Surely it is not at all right to ascribe such reasoning to the child, when the origin of the belief in objective existence can be shown to have arisen by means of such simple induction as may be seen constantly practised by grown-up persons.

Let us place by the side of each other the two accounts of the process of thought of the child under three years of age, and of how it may be supposed to learn to speak—

According to Mr. Stout:

I feel a mental activity within me. It operates now regularly, now again it is interrupted by the appearance of certain presentations (coloured surfaces, sounds, smells). *These interruptions cannot be but consequences of another agency similar to mine.* These presentations move, resist, &c., like my body; these facts, too, necessarily must be preceded by efforts similar to those of the agency I am accustomed to feel within me.

These presentations are called by my parents, clock, dog, &c., or things. Pointing at these things, they are in the habit of telling one the other that they *are* there. *By this my parents mean that an agency, independent of the agency within me, operates within these things.*

Those presentations change in consequence of my activity. They resist my motor efforts. All resistance is resistance to change; it is persistence. Hence those presentations have not the tendency

According to Mill:

I am sitting. I see before me different coloured surfaces which are called by my parents walls, pictures, clock. If I put out my hand I touch a surface which is called a table by my parents. In a word, all these surfaces are called things by my parents. I hear sounds of which my parents speak in this way, 'The watch is ticking.' I see through the window sometimes a clear sky, and clouds at other times. My parents say, 'The weather changes.' If I take a piece of chalk between my fingers and draw it along the table, I see that there is a white spot left; if I pass over the table with my fingers alone, I see that there is no spot left. In the former case, my parents say that the chalk produces a spot.

If I turn my head away, I no longer see the same surfaces, but I see the wardrobe, &c.; if I turn my head back, I again see the former surfaces. I have similar experiences if I stretch out my

to change by themselves. Their changes belong to the history of my agency, and not to that of their agency. There is no reason for me to suppose that these presentations appear and disappear of themselves, as often as they appear before me or cease to be present. I therefore believe that they (the things) remain, persist, exist even after they cease to be present to me.

arm in another direction and place it again on the table. If I rise and go away out of the room into the next room, as they say, I see again other things, experience other changes and actions, and hear other sounds. I perceive yet other things, changes, actions, and hear other sounds, if I leave the room and go into the yard. I experience the same things when I return to the second room and then to the first which I experienced there before. Whenever I took this walk, the consequences were the same. *I believe that this will be always so.*

My parents when they sit near me in the first room always say that there are certain things in the next room and in the yard (namely, the same which I can see there). By this they mean that certain surfaces can be seen there, &c. They further say that certain events (changes) happen there (namely, those that can be perceived there); that one thing produces on another thing (namely, which I can observe being there near it) a change (namely, that which happens to the other thing, and which could not happen to it if the first thing were not there). *By this that something is there, that something happens there, my parents therefore mean that something can be perceived there, and by this that one thing produces a change (acts) on another thing, they mean that a change might be observed there on the latter thing which could not be observed if the first thing could not be perceived there..* What I therefore believe, I, too, must state briefly thus, *that there are certain things in the next room, and that certain changes and actions take place there.*

If we reflect that of these two processes of thought the one Mr. Stout ascribes to the child consists of a number of bold realistic hypotheses, capable of no proof, while that ascribed to it by Mill involves the most ordinary inductions necessary to life, we may well feel disposed to accept Mill's theory rather than that of Mr. Stout, and to express our conviction that after all we are more indebted for our belief in an external world to the regularity than to the irregularity of our sense-experience.



14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON;
20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH.

CATALOGUE OF SOME WORKS

PUBLISHED BY

WILLIAMS & NORGATE.

- Baur (F. C.) Church History of the First Three Centuries. Translated from the Third German Edition. Edited by the Rev. ALLAN MENZIES. 2 vols. 8vo. 21s.
— Vide Theological Translation Fund Library.
- Baur (F. C.) Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ, his Life and Work, his Epistles and his Doctrine. A Contribution to the Critical History of Primitive Christianity. Edited by E. ZELLER. Translated by Rev. ALLAN MENZIES. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 21s.
— Vide Theological Translation Fund Library.
- Beard (Rev. Dr. C.) Lectures on the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century in its Relation to Modern Thought and Knowledge. Hibbert Lectures, 1883. 8vo, cloth. (Cheap Edition, 4s. 6d.) 10s. 6d.
- Beard (Rev. Dr. C.) The Universal Christ, and other Sermons. Crown 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d.
- Beard (Rev. Dr. C.) Port Royal, a Contribution to the History of Religion and Literature in France. Cheaper Edition. 2 vols. Crown 8vo. 12s.
- Beard (Rev. Dr. J. R.) The Autobiography of Satan. Crown 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d.
- Bithell (Dr. R.) Agnostic Problems. Being an Examination of some Questions of the deepest Interest, as viewed from the Agnostic Standpoint. 8vo, cloth. 6s.
- Bleek (F.) Lectures on the Apocalypse. Edited by T. HOSSBACH. Edited by the Rev. Dr. S. DAVIDSON. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d.
— Vide Theological Translation Fund Library.
- Booth (C.) Life and Labour of the People of the East End of London. Large coloured Map. Second Edition. 600 pp. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d.
- Christ and the Fathers; or the Reformers of the Roman Empire. Being a Critical Analysis of the Religious Thoughts and Opinion derived from their Lives and Letters, as well as from the Latin and Greek Fathers of the Eastern and Western Empires until the Nicene Council. Crown 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d.

- Kuenen (Professor A.) Lectures on National Religions and Universal Religions. Delivered in Oxford and London. By A. KUENEN, LL.D., D.D., Professor of Theology at Leyden. Hibbert Lectures, 1882. 10s. 6d.
- Laurie (Professor Simon) *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta*: a Return to Dualism. Second Edition, extended and enlarged. Crown 8vo, cloth. 6s.
- Lubbock (Sir John, F.R.S.) Pre-historic Times, as illustrated by Ancient Remains and the Manners and Customs of Modern Savages. With Wood-cut Illustrations and Plates. Fifth Edition. 8vo, cloth. 18s.
- Macan (Reg. W.) The Resurrection of Jesus Christ. An Essay in Three Chapters. Published for the Hibbert Trustees. 8vo, cloth. 5s.
- Mackay (R. W.) Sketch of the Rise and Progress of Christianity. 8vo, cloth. (pub. at 10s. 6d.) 6s.
- Martineau (Rev. Dr. James) Religion as affected by Modern Materialism; and, Modern Materialism: its Attitude towards Theology. A Critique and Defence. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- The Relation between Ethics and Religion. 8vo. 1s.
- Ideal Substitutes for God considered. 8vo. 1s.
- Mind: a Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy. Contributions by Mr. Herbert Spencer, Professor Bain, Mr. Henry Sidgwick, Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, Professor Flint, Mr. James Sully, the Rev. John Venn, the Editor (Professor Croom Robertson), and others. Vols. I. to XIV., 1876 to 1889, each 12s.; cloth, 13s. 6d. 12s. per annum, post free.
- Müller (Professor Max) Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by the Religions of India. Hibbert Lectures, 1878. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d.
- Oldenberg (Prof. H.) Buddha: his Life, his Doctrine, his Order. Translated by WILLIAM HOEY, M.A., D.Lit., Member of the Royal Asiatic Society, Asiatic Society of Bengal, &c., of her Majesty's Bengal Civil Service. Cloth, gilt. 18s.
- Pfleiderer (O.) Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History. Translated by the Rev. ALAN MENZIES, and the Rev. ALEX. STEWART, of Dundee. Complete in 4 vols. 8vo. each 10s. 6d.
- Vide Theological Translation Fund Library:
- Pfleiderer (O.) Paulinism. An Essay towards the History of the Theology of Primitive Christianity. Translated by E. PETERS, Esq. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 21s.
- Vide Theological Translation Fund Library.
- Poole (Reg. Lane) Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought, in the Departments of Theology and Ecclesiastical Politics. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d.
- Prescott (Rev. Thos.) Christianity made Science; or a Life's Thoughts on Religion and Morals. 8vo, cloth. 6s.

Protestant Commentary, A Short, on the New Testament, with General and Special Introductions. From the German of Hilgenfeld, Holtzmann, Lang, Pfeleiderer, Lipsius, and others. Translated by the Rev. F. H. JONES. 3 vols. 8vo, cloth. each 10s. 6d.

— Vide Theological Translation Fund Library.

Renan (E.) On the Influence of the Institutions, Thought and Culture of Rome on Christianity, and the Development of the Catholic Church. Translated by the Rev. C. BEARD. Hibbert Lectures, 1880. 8vo, cloth. (Cheap Edition, 2s. 6d.) 10s. 6d.

Renouf (P. Le Page) Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by the Religion of Ancient Egypt. Hibbert Lectures, 1879. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d.

Reville (Prof. Albert) Prolegomena of the History of Religions. By ALBERT REVILLE, D.D., Professor in the Collège de France, and Hibbert Lecturer, 1884. Translated from the French. With an Introduction by Professor F. MAX MÜLLER. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d.

— Vide Theological Translation Fund Library.

Reville (Prof. Albert) Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by the Native Religions of Mexico and Peru. Translated by the Rev. P. H. WICKSTEED, M.A. Hibbert Lectures, 1884. 8vo, cl. 10s. 6d.

Reville (Rev. Dr. A.) The Song of Songs, commonly called the Song of Solomon, or the Canticle. Crown 8vo, cloth. 1s. 6d.

Rhys (Prof. J.) On the Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by Celtic Heathendom. Hibbert Lectures, 1886. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d.

Sadler (Rev. Dr.) Prayers for Christian Worship. Crown 8vo, cloth. 3s. 6d.

Sadler (Rev. Dr.) Closet Prayers, Original and Compiled. 18mo, cloth. 1s. 6d.

Samuelson (Jas.) Views of the Deity, Traditional and Scientific; a Contribution to the Study of Theological Science. By JAMES SAMUELSON, Esq., of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-law, Founder and former Editor of the Quarterly Journal of Science. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. 6d.

Savage (Rev. M. J.) Beliefs about the Bible. By the Rev. M. J. SAVAGE, of the Unity Church, Boston, Mass., Author of "Belief in God," "Beliefs about Man," &c. &c. 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d.

Sayce (Prof. A. H.) On the Religion of Ancient Assyria and Babylonia. Hibbert Lectures, 1887. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d.

Schrader (Prof. E.) The Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament. Translated from the second Enlarged Edition, with Additions by the Author, and an Introduction by the Rev. OWEN C. WHITEHOUSE, M.A. 2 vols. With a Map. 8vo, cloth. each 10s. 6d.

— Vide Theological Translation Fund Library.

- Schurman (J. G.) Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution. A Critical Study, by J. GOULD SCHURMAN, M.A. D.Sc., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Acadia College, Nova Scotia. Published by the Hibbert Trustees. 8vo, cloth. 5s.
- Schurman (J. G.) The Ethical Import of Darwinism. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s.
- Sharpe (S.) History of the Hebrew Nation and its Literature, with an Appendix on the Hebrew Chronology. Fourth Edition. 487 pp. 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d.
- Sharpe (S.) Bible. The Holy Bible, translated by SAMUEL SHARPE, being a Revision of the Authorized English Version. Fourth Edition of the Old Testament; Eighth Edition of the New Testament. 8vo, roan. 4s. 6d.
- Sharpe (S.) The New Testament. Translated from Griesbach's Text. 14th Thousand, fcap. 8vo, cloth. 1s. 6d.
- Smith (Rev. J. Fred.) Studies in Religion under German Masters. Essays on Herder, Goethe, Lessing, Franck, and Lang. By the Rev. J. FREDERICK SMITH, of Mansfield. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s.
- Spencer (Herbert) Works. The Doctrine of Evolution. 8vo, cloth.
- First Principles. Seventh Thousand. 16s.
 - Principles of Biology. 2 vols. 34s.
 - Principles of Psychology. Fourth Thousand. 2 vols. 36s.
 - Principles of Sociology. Vol. I. Third Thousand. 21s.
 - Ceremonial Institutions. Principles of Sociology. Vol. II. Part I. 7s.
 - Political Institutions. Principles of Sociology. Vol. II. Part II. 12s.
 - Ecclesiastical Institutions. 5s.
 - The Data of Ethics. Principles of Morality. Part I. Fourth Thousand. 8s.
- Spencer (Herbert) The Study of Sociology. Library Edition (being the Ninth), with a Postscript. 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d.
- Education. (Cheap Edition, Seventh Thousand, 2s. 6d.) 6s.
- Essays. 3 vols. Third Edition. 24s.
- Spencer (Herbert) The Man *versus* the State. 1s.; or on better paper, in cloth, 2s. 6d.
- Spencer's (Herbert) Theory of Religion and Morality. By SYLVAN DREY. 1s.
- Spinoza. Four Essays, by Professors J. LAND, KUNO FISCHER, and VAN VLOTEN, and ERNEST RENAN. Edited, with an Introduction, by Professor W. KNIGHT, of St. Andrews. 8vo, cloth. 5s.
- Stokes (G. J.) The Objectivity of Truth. By GEORGE J. STOKES, B.A., Senior Moderator and Gold Medallist, Trinity College, Dublin; late Hibbert Travelling Scholar. Published by the Hibbert Trustees. 8vo, cloth. 5s.
- Strauss (Dr. D. F.) New Life of Jesus, for the People. The Authorized English Edition. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 24s.

Stuart (Jas.) *Principles of Christianity: being an Essay towards a more correct Apprehension of Christian Doctrine, mainly Soteriological.* 636 pp. 8vo, cloth. 12s. 6d.

Taine (H.) *English Positivism. A Study of John Stuart Mill.* Translated by T. D. HAYE. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, cloth. 3s.

Taylor (Rev. J. J.) *An Attempt to ascertain the Character of the Fourth Gospel, especially in its Relation to the First Three.* New Edition, 8vo, cloth. 5s.

Ten Services of Public Prayer, taken in Substance from the "Common Prayer for Christian Worship," with a few additional Prayers for particular Days.

Ten Services alone, crown 8vo, cloth, 2s. 6d. ; with Special Collects. 3s.

Ten Services alone, 32mo, 1s. ; with Special Collects. 1s. 6d.

Psalms and Canticles. (To accompany the same.) Crown 8vo, 1s. 6d.

With Anthems. 2s.

Thoughts for Every Day in the Year. Selected from the Writings of Spiritually-minded Persons. By the Author of "Visiting my Relations." Printed within red lines. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d.

Theological Translation Fund. A Series of Translations, by which the best results of recent Theological investigations on the Continent, conducted without reference to doctrinal considerations, and with the sole purpose of arriving at truth, will be placed within reach of English readers. A literature which is represented by such works as those of Ewald, F. C. Baur, Zeller, Roth, Keim, Nöldeke, &c., in Germany, and by those of Kuenen, Scholten and others in Holland.

38 Volumes published (1873 to 1888) for £13. 4s. (*separately, 10s. 6d. per vol.*).

Baur's Church History of the First Three Centuries. 2 vols.

Baur's Paul, his Life and Work. 2 vols.

Bleek, on the Apocalypse.

Ewald. Prophets of the Old Testament. 5 vols.

Ewald's Commentary on the Psalms. 2 vols.

Ewald. Book of Job.

Hausrath's History of the New Testament Times. 2 vols.

Keim's History of Jesus of Nazara. 6 vols.

Kuenen. The Religion of Israel. 3 vols.

Pfleiderer's Paulinism. 2 vols.

Pfleiderer's Philosophy of Religion. 4 vols.

Protestant Commentary, a Short, on the New Testament. 3 vols.

Reville's Prolegomena of the History of Religions.

Schrader's The Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament. 2 vols.

Zeller, on the Acts of the Apostles. 2 vols.

A selection of six or more volumes from the list may be had at the Subscribers price, or 7s. per volume.


-
- Wallis (H. W.) *The Cosmology of the Rigveda: an Essay.* 8vo, cloth. 5s.
- What I have taught my Children. By a Member of the Theistic Church. 12mo, cloth. 2s. 6d.
- Williams (Dr. Rowland) *The Hebrew Prophets.* Translated afresh and illustrated for English Readers. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 22s. 6d.
- Zeller (Dr. E.) *The Contents and Origin of the Acts of the Apostles, critically investigated.* Preceded by Dr. FR. OVERBECK'S Introduction to the Acts of the Apostles from De Wette's Handbook. Translated by JOSEPH DARE. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 21s.
- Vide Theological Translation Fund Library.
-

PAMPHLETS.

- Athanasian Creed. Two Prize Essays. By C. Peabody and C. S. Kenny. 1s.
- Butler's Analogy : A Lay Argument. By a Lancashire Manufacturer. 1s.
- Jesus of Nazareth and his Contemporaries. 1s.
- Journey to Emmaus. By a Modern Traveller. 2s.
- Marriage of Cana, as read by a Layman. 6d.
- Martineau (Rev. Dr. James) *New Affinities of Faith ; a Plea for free Christian Union.* 12mo. 1s.
- Must God Annihilate the Wicked? A Reply to Dr. Jos. Parker. 1s.
- Reasonable Faith, A, the Want of our Age. 1s.
- Taylor (Rev. J. J.) *Christianity : What is it? and What has it done ?* 1s.
- Who was Jesus Christ? 8vo, sewed. 6d.



WILLIAMS AND NORSGATE,
 14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON ;
 AND 20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH.



17

14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON ;
20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH.

CATALOGUE OF SOME WORKS

PUBLISHED BY

WILLIAMS AND NORGATE.

- Beard (Rev. Chas., LL.D.) The Universal Christ, and other Sermons.
Crown 8vo. cloth 7s 6d
- Beard (Rev. Chas.) Port Royal, a Contribution to the History of
Religion and Literature in France. Cheaper Edition. 2 vols. Crown 8vo. 12s
- Booth (C.) Labour and Life of the People. Volume I: East London.
600 pp. 8vo. Cloth, 10s 6d. Edited by Charles Booth. With a large
Coloured Map. Contributors: Charles Booth, Beatrice Potter, David F.
Schloss, Ernest Aves, Stephen N. Fox, Jesse Argyle, Clara E. Collet, H.
Llewellyn Smith.
- Bopp's Comparative Grammar of the Sanscrit, Zend, Greek, Latin,
Lithuanian, Gothic, German, and Slavonic Languages. Translated by E. B.
Eastwick. Fourth Edition. 3 vols. 8vo. cloth 31s 6d
- Christ (The) and the Fathers, or the Reformers of the Roman
Empire; being a Critical Analysis of the religious thoughts and opinion
derived from their lives and letters, as well as from the Latin and Greek
Fathers of the Eastern and Western Empires until the Nicene Council, with
a Brief Sketch of the Continuation of Christianity until the Present Day in
accordance with the Comparative Method of Historical Science. By an His-
torical Scientist. 8vo. cloth 7s 6d
- Cobbe (Miss F. P.) The Hopes of the Human Race, Hereafter and
Here. Essays on the Life after Death. With a Preface having special
reference to Mr. Mill's Essay on Religion. Second Edition. Crown 8vo.
cloth 5s
- Cobbe (Miss F. P.) Darwinism in Morals, and (13) other Essays.
(Religion in Childhood, Unconscious Cerebration, Dreams, the Devil,
Auricular Confession, &c. &c.) 400 pp. 8vo. cloth (pub. at 10s) 5s
- Cobbe (Miss F. P.) The Duties of Women. A Course of Lectures
delivered in London and Clifton. Eighth Edition. Crown 8vo. cloth 3s 6d
- Cobbe (Miss F. P.) The Peak in Darien, and other Riddles of Life
and Death. Crown 8vo. cloth 7s 6d

14 DAY USE
RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED
EDUCATION-PSYCHOLOGY
LIBRARY

This book is due on the last date stamped below, or
on the date to which renewed.

Renewed books are subject to immediate recall.

	7 DAY USE	DURING	
	SUMMER	SESSIONS	
Cobbe (Miss) Condition 8vo. cloth			The Present ion. Crown 5s
Cobbe (Miss) Secular R			erning the 5s
Cobbe (Miss) several Co	APR 1 1964		Theists, by ges 5s
Collins (F. H.) With a pr	MAR 19 RECD		Philosophy. 15s
Drummond Philosoph Principal	MAY 15 1968		Alexandrian MOND, LL.D., cloth 21s
Echoes of I First Con THOM, o	MAY 1 REC'D - 6 PM		ons before a J. HAMILTON h 1s
Gould (S.) Toledo extant F Pauline C	NOV 11 2002		ount of the dle Ages, and of Petrine and cloth. 7s 6d
Jones (Rev.) arranged			selected and 3s 6d
Knighton () Esa., LI "The F an East			KNIGHTON, re, author of Private Life of cloth 5s
Lubbock () Remains and the Manners and Customs of Modern Savage xxviii and 637 pp. Many plates and Woodcuts. cloth	LD 21-50m-12,'61 (C4796s10)476	General Library University of California Berkeley	by Ancient Fifth Edition, 6th Edition, 8vo. 18s

Mackay (R. W.) Sketch of the Rise and Progress of Christianity.
8vo. cloth (pub. at 10s 6d) 6s

Mind: a Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy. Contri-
butions by Mr. Herbert Spencer, Professor Bain, Mr. Henry Sidgwick, Mr.
Shadworth H. Hodgson, Professor Flint, Mr. James Sully, the Rev. John
Venn, the Editor (Professor Croom Robertson), and others. Vols. I. to XIV.,
1876-89, each 12s. Cloth, 13s 12s per annum, post free

Published by Williams and

U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES



C030688192

- Oldenberg (Prof. H.) Buddha: his Life, his Doctrine, his Order.
Translated by WILLIAM HOEY, M.A., D.LIT., Member of the Royal Asiatic
Society, Asiatic Society of Bengal, &c., of Her Majesty's Bengal Civil Service.
Cloth, gilt 18s
- Schurman. The Ethical Import of Darwinism. By J. GOULD
SCHURMAN, M.A., D.SC., Hibbert Scholar. Crown 8vo. cloth 5s
- Samuelson (Jas.) Views of the Traditional and Scientific; a
Contribution to the Study of Science. By JAMES SAMUELSON,
Esq., of the Middle Temple Law, Founder and former Editor of
the Quarterly Journal of Science. 8vo. cloth 4s 6d
- Sharpe (S.) History of the Hebrew Nation and its Literature, with
an Appendix on the Hebrew Chronology. Fourth Edition. 487 pp. 8vo.
cloth 7s 6d
- Sharpe (S.) The Holy Bible, translated by SAMUEL SHARPE,
beir Authorized English Version. Fifth Edition of the
Edition of the New Testament. 8vo. roan 5s
- Sharpe (S.) The New Testament. Translated from Griesbach's
Text. 14th Thousand, fcap. 8vo. cloth 1s 6d
- Smith (Rev. J. Fred.) Studies in Religion under German Masters.
Essays on Herder, Goethe, Lessing, Franck, and Lang. By the Rev. J.
FREDERICK SMITH, of Mansfield. Crown 8vo. cloth 5s
- Spinoza. Four Essays, by Professors J. LAND, KUNO FISCHER,
VAN VLOTEN, and ERNEST RENAN. Edited, with an Introduction, by
Professor W. KNIGHT, of St. Andrews. 8vo. cloth 5s
- Strauss (Dr. D. F.) New Life of Jesus, for the People. The
Authorized English Edition. 2 vols. 8vo. cloth 24s
- Thoughts for Every Day in the Year. Selected from the Writings of
Spiritually-minded Persons. By the Author of "Visiting my Relations."
Printed within red lines. Crown 8vo. cloth 2s 6d
- Williams (Dr. Rowland) The Hebrew Prophets. Translated afresh
and illustrated for English Readers. 2 vols. 8vo. cloth 22s 6d

