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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONDUCT

APPLIED TO THE PROBLEM OF
MORAL EDUCATION IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS

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TO THE
ANNALS

PSYCHOLOGY OF CONDUCT

272016



DEDICATED

IN THANKFULNESS AND LOVE TO THE MEMORY OF
MY DEPARTED FATHER

AND IN EQUAL GRATITUDE AND AFFECTION TO
MY BELOVED MOTHER



PREFACE

This book represents an attempt to draw on the best of ancient and modern thought for contributions to an effort toward the solution of the main problems of moral education. Its chief concern is to trace conduct to its sources, and to show briefly how the principles evolved may be applied to the actual work of teaching.

The book was not written for specialists. It is intended for the use of teachers and those preparing to teach, and contains material elaborated and tested in the author's classes during a period of ten years. The educational applications of the principles studied are worked out only in part, as the teacher will readily make his own applications to the varying situations and conditions he meets in the course of his work.

No great amount of originality is claimed for the book. Something of the historical development of certain phases of the problem of moral education has been given, and numerous quotations are made from Kant to show that to-day the problems of ethical theory and of moral education are practically what they were in the days of that great thinker.

I am under especial obligations to Dr. James H. Tufts, of the University of Chicago, for most valuable suggestions and criticisms. Other helpful suggestions

were given by Pres. Albert Salisbury, of the Whitewater Normal School, and by Prof. William T. Stephens, of the Milwaukee Normal School. I am also indebted to my colleague, Prof. J. R. Sherrick, for a careful reading of the manuscript, and to Mr. William Grenzow for assistance in reading proof. I wish also to express my appreciation for the courtesy of the *International Journal of Ethics* in extending permission to embody in this book my article on "Self-esteem and the Love of Recognition as Sources of Conduct," appearing in January, 1909; and to the *Educational Review* for permission to republish some of the material in my article on "The Religious Element in the Public Schools," which appeared in April, 1909.

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Whitewater, Wis., May, 1911.

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PSYCHOLOGY OF CONDUCT .

CHAPTER I

THE AIM OF EDUCATION

Function of education.—Education is a process organized by society for the purpose of fitting every child and youth for efficient and useful membership in the social organism. In this, as in other great life-interests, humanity is largely dominated by impulse and instinct. In primitive society, at least, this purpose is as much instinctive as it is rational, being only half-illuminated by deliberation and reflection. This fitting for useful membership in the social whole consists essentially in such preparation and training as will enable the individual to do what he can in the way of conserving and perpetuating the values of life according to the standard of values obtaining in the given society. Whatever a given race of people have thus far obtained in the way of knowledge or of skill in matters of industrial, military, artistic, or any other activity in their attempts to satisfy their wants, that they would pass

over to their children. Whatever a given generation derives most satisfaction from, that they wish the next generation to be able to enjoy. A training that really makes of the rising generation useful members of society will, however, fit them to do more than to safeguard the old values; it will actually prepare them to add to those values; in other words, to try to improve conditions for the social organism.

The function of education, then, is the fitting of the immature members of society to preserve and improve the values of life. On last analysis, that is equivalent to saying that the final purpose, or end, of education is to secure the welfare of society. Society simply strives for the same thing that the normal human being strives for. Ask any unsophisticated man what he gives his children an education for, and he will probably tell you, after some quizzing on your part, that he does it in order that they may "get the most out of life." Most what? Most happiness. Plain common sense, here as elsewhere, is in perfect agreement with the wisdom of sages and philosophers. In the minds of our most eminent thinkers, from Aristotle to Spencer, the end of human effort and activity has been that self-same happiness, that something so difficult of critical analysis, but with which we are yet so perfectly familiar. Even Kant, from whose rigoristic philosophy one would least expect such an admission, says: "To be happy is necessarily the desire of every rational, but finite being, and therefore an inevitable motive of his

conation.”¹ This happiness, to the securing of which we are driven by our own nature, whether we are conscious of any specific effort in that direction or not, would seem to be conditioned on the gratification of the various inclinations and propensities of our nature; and that gratification in turn on the natural activity of our various functions, that is, an activity in harmony with the laws of our being. Such activity can be permanently secured only by living in harmony with the forces at work in this wonderfully intricate and complex whole in which we live. That implies the ability to adapt ourselves to our environment and, in part, to adapt certain factors of such environment to our needs.

Happiness as the aim of education.—The purpose of life, the true end, toward which we are impelled by our very nature, being happiness, it necessarily follows that the real end, or function, of education is to help bring about that self-same happiness. However, to say that happiness is the ultimate *end* of education is not equivalent to saying that it can properly be taken as the *aim* of education. The objections that hold good against the seeking of happiness as a reliable and worthy basis for moral conduct, are equally cogent here. It is a philosophical commonplace that he that directly seeks after happiness is doomed to disappointment, while he who thinks of other things, and has his mind set on other objects, is more apt to be happy. Again, as is shown in later chapters, the seeking after happiness

furnishes no sufficient guarantee of such conduct as the interests of society demand. Furthermore, the idea of happiness is so general, and so variable in content, due to the individual bias, preference, disposition of the person holding it, that it can not well be made the immediate object of educative effort, any more than it can well be taken as our aim in life. "It is a misfortune that the notion of happiness is so indefinite a notion that, although every human being is desirous of attaining happiness, yet he can never say precisely and entirely in agreement with himself, what he really wishes or wants. The cause thereof is this: that the elements that belong to the notion of happiness are, one and all, empirical, i. e., have to be derived from experience; that, nevertheless, there is necessary for the idea of happiness an absolute whole, a maximum of well-being in my present and every future condition. Now it is impossible for the most intelligent and at the same time most capable, but yet finite, being to form a definite notion of what he really wants in this matter. If he wants wealth, how much trouble, envy, and persecution might he not thereby bring down upon himself? If he wants a great deal of understanding and discernment, possibly that might furnish him with so much the keener an eye to show him those evils the more frightfully, which are, for the present, still concealed from him and which can yet not be avoided; or it might add additional wants to the burden of his desires, which already cause him enough trouble. If

he wishes a long life, who will guarantee him that it will not be a long life of misery? If, at the least, he wants health, how often has bodily indisposition deterred from dissipation, into which boundless health would permit the individual to fall, etc. In short, it is not possible, according to any principle, to determine with absolute certainty, what would make him truly happy, because that would require omniscience.”²²

Adjustment as the aim of education.—For the same reason that educational effort can not profitably aim directly at the future happiness of the child, must we object to “adjustment to environment” as a statement of the aim of education. That phrase is too misleading, in that it is ordinarily apt to mean a mere adaptation to our immediate environment, a mere living in harmony with our immediate surroundings. True happiness is conditioned on our living in harmony with ultimate forces at work in this world of ours. In so far as that can be interpreted to be an adjustment to environment, it would be, by no means, merely a living in harmony with our immediate environment; in fact, it might mean the very opposite. To be truly adjusted to our total environment we must be in harmony with *ultimate* factors, in harmony with forces with which we do not ordinarily come in immediate contact, in harmony with what the philosopher calls the “moral world-order,” the “Absolute,” in theological language: with God. And that would frequently involve a falling out with our immediate environment. In fact, if

we use the phrase "adjustment to environment" as it is wont to be used, such a case would have to be looked upon as one of mal-adjustment, or mis-adjustment, to environment. On the other hand, if the objection be raised that such a use is an incorrect one, and that the phrase, when taken in its more philosophical force, means an adjustment to ultimate factors in our total environment, it may properly be urged that in that case it is synonymous with saying that we are to aim at a moral development of the individual. And then it would be better to state our aim in the latter way because it is simpler, therefore more intelligible and less misleading.

It remains true, however, that the realization of our purpose in life, the seeking after true happiness, involves a proper adjustment to our environment. Such adjustment is in turn conditioned on knowledge of the environment. Without that we should not be free to move about with safety. Without it we could not satisfy our wants. Fortunately the nature of our physical environment is such as to enable us to get such knowledge; for here we deal largely with factors of a relatively fixed, or stable nature, making it possible for us to depend on the impressions we gain after sufficiently careful study. Such reliable, or dependable, impressions of the appearance of nature and as to her ways of working, are, in short, what constitutes our knowledge of nature. But such knowledge is conditioned on the element of relative fixity, or stability, in

nature. It is true, there are other aspects of our physical environment, where the fleeting, transient phenomena produced by the more quickly changing and therefore seemingly unstable forces of nature are less easily gauged, and attempts to secure an adjustment to them the more hazardous. In spite of that, however, physical nature in the main presents the appearance of relative stability and permanence, making it easier for us to secure knowledge, and, through that, the satisfaction of our wants.

Character as the aim.—A large part of our environment is social, made up of human beings. Here our interests likewise demand the same element of dependableness in the inferences we make from appearance to reality. Here, as in the other case, appearance ought to bespeak reality, if our interests are to be secured. We readily see into what jeopardy we would be placed if what in one moment of time is wholesome food, should in the very next, without changing its appearance even in the slightest, be deadly poison. It is not difficult to see how we would be imperiled, if that which acts as a safe insulator now, should suddenly, without any perceptible change in appearance, be converted into a death-bringing conductor. Knowledge and resultant safety are, in short, dependent on a fixity of relation between appearance and reality. In the world of human nature it is not different. We necessarily assume, and ought to be able safely to assume, that a given external appearance assures a corresponding

inner reality. Where utterances, demeanor, actions, professions are not the manifestation of a corresponding inner nature, it may well happen that what appears as genuine and safe-guarding friendship may be most heinous and danger-bringing treachery. What our interests demand in our social environment, in the human beings with whom we come in contact, is, first of all, this very element of dependableness, calculability, trustworthiness, and that is given in that quality of personality which we call *character*.

Different uses of term "Character."—It is for this reason, then, that we must agree with Kant that "the first endeavor of moral education is to develop character."³ It is necessary, however, to distinguish between the two main uses of the term. In the *psychological* sense: "The character of a person is in sum that which characterizes him, that which makes him himself, not another."⁴ In this sense, every person has a particular character, or nature, distinguishing him from everybody else. In the *ethical* sense, however, not every person is possessed of character, for here the term means that quality of our nature that makes us dependable. Character, in this sense, furnishing an agreement between appearance and reality, means as much as inner consistency, or the unity of personality, precluding anything in the way of duplicity or unguineness in any form. It necessarily involves a marked element of constancy, steadfastness, or stability, and so implies a certain substantial resoluteness of will. To Goethe's

mind, this latter element was the essential element: "The main foundation of character is resolute willing, without reference to right or wrong, to good or bad, to truth or error." Herbart similarly defines character as "decision of will."⁵

It is evident that it would not do to say that the development of character would be a sufficient aim in education, even though it be a first consideration in deciding on an aim. A man might possess a unified personality and still not be what the interests of others would demand of him. His genuineness and resoluteness might be headed in a wrong direction. In the words of Kant: "In a bad man character is very pernicious; but here in reality, we are no longer dealing with character, but with obstinacy, although it affects us agreeably to see him steadfast in carrying out his purposes, even though it were better if he were to show himself thus in pursuit of the good."⁶ Kant would restrict the term character to mean not merely inner consistency, but inner consistency headed in the right direction; in fact, that is the sense in which he generally uses the term. Hegel took a similar view of the matter: "*Character*, however, remains something that will always differentiate men. It is not until he attains character, that the individual acquires his fixed determinateness. The first element in character is the formal one of energy with which a man pursues his ends and interests without allowing anything to disconcert him, and through which he is consistent with himself in all

his actions. Without character a person will not get beyond his indeterminateness, or he will fall from one line of action into its very opposite. Therefore it can be demanded of every one that he show character. The man of character commands the respect of others because they know what to expect of him. But besides this formal element of energy there belongs to character, in the second place, a substantial, universal content of the will. Only through the realization of great purposes does a man reveal a great character, making him a beacon light to others; and his purposes must be intrinsically right ones, if his character is to present the absolute unity of the content and the formal activity of the will, and thus be a perfectly true one. If, however, the will holds tenaciously to mere trifles and unimportant things, the same becomes *obstinacy*. The latter has only the form of character, not the content. Through obstinacy—this parody of character—the individuality of a person becomes emphasized to such an extent as to be destructive of the fellowship of others.”⁷ What Kant simply calls character, in the moral philosophy sense, and what Hegel calls *true* character, Herbart calls *moral* character, for he states the aim of education to be not merely character as such, but “morally strong character,” (*Charakterstaerke der Sittlichkeit*.)⁸ In one place he says: “One knows a man by his character; but one *ought* to know him by his *moral* character.”⁹

Importance of character.—The man lacking char-

acter is a constant source of danger to all through the fact that he is an unknown and unknowable quantity; on the other hand, the man with a character will also be a source of danger unless his character is headed in the right direction. In the case of the former, danger is ever present where we do not even suspect it. In the case of the man with bad character, danger is also present, but we know of its presence and can ordinarily, at least, prepare to meet it. It is only in the case of the man of good, or moral, character, that there is no need of preparing for danger, for danger is precluded. What education must aim at, therefore, is the building up of moral character, for it is only when those with whom we come in contact are possessed of such character that our interests are assured, as far as concerns our social environment. The objection might be raised that education ought to prepare us to meet such dangers by giving us a better knowledge of human nature, enabling us to distinguish between reality and sham appearance, in place of attempting to revolutionize human nature in others. Such an objector might urge that in the realm of physical nature, we likewise face danger where our knowledge is insufficient to detect the difference between perfectly safe factors of our environment and their dangerous copies in facsimile. He might suggest, for instance, that it is an easy matter to mistake a poisonous mushroom for an edible one. Now it is no doubt true that rational educational effort would take cognizance of such dangers

and attempt to secure adjustment through greater circumspection and foresight in the one case as in the other. At the same time it must be remembered that we can not change the nature of the poisonous mushroom, while we must assume that it is, to a large extent, at least, within our power to train the child into a social benefit rather than a social danger. Furthermore, it must be our endeavor to put the maximum of effort at this point on the improvement of human nature in others, rather than on the securing, for the individual, of a keener discernment and a greater astuteness in the detection of fraud in others. In fact, it will necessarily ever be the endeavor of society to improve the makeup of her members as much as possible, and to reduce the need of the latter factor to a minimum, for the simple reason that a wholesome community life is impossible in the absence of abiding trust and confidence, and that, on the other hand, one of the most disagreeable things in life is the need of a prudent caution that leans to any appreciable extent toward alert suspiciousness.

To say of a person that he possesses moral character is to say that he is in harmony with the ultimate things in this world of ours, in harmony with the "power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness." This is by no means the same as saying that he is adjusted to his immediate environment. To try to keep in harmony with the moral law will sometimes necessitate our getting out of joint with our immediate environment. It

is for this simple reason that our ideal man never has been and never can be the one who best adapts himself to his surroundings, whatever those surroundings may be, but rather the one who adapts himself to his surroundings if they are what they should be, and who refuses to adapt himself if they are not what they should be, and instead tries to adapt them. Montaigne says: "Often have I admired the remarkable nature of Alcibiades, which without injuring his health, could adapt itself to customs so different. Now he would outdo the Persians in pomp and luxury, now the Lacedaemonians in austerity and abstinence; in Sparta he was as severe with himself as he was voluptuous in Ionia." It is no doubt true that we can admire such ability, but it is very much to be doubted whether we could really respect, or even admire, the man himself, especially where adaptability is so readily accommodating and compliant in moral matters. If man were not a rational and moral being we could perhaps consider a maximum degree of adaptability as the ideal to be aimed at in his training. In that case the perfect prototype to copy after would be the chameleon. For this versatile reptile is fitted out with a wonderful protective device for securing adaptation to environment, enabling it to assume the color of any background on which it is ordinarily apt to appear, thus assuring it of safety. It is true we find human beings who manifest an equal facility in avoiding immediate danger, real or imaginary, by changing their colors as they

change their environment; but somehow the human family have stubbornly refused to look upon such persons as the ideals of manhood. Subtilize and sophisticate as we may, there is no denying the fact that it is an ineradicable instinct in our nature which makes us desire to see in man, above all things else, moral stamina and its inseparable stability, for without that we can not know what we are about in our association and contact with our fellows. A garden implement, bought for a spade, but changing to a rake the moment we attempt to use it as a spade, and later changing to a scythe after we have accustomed ourselves to the idea that it is a rake, would indeed be a sore annoyance to, and a useless and vexatious infliction on, the one who depended on its deceiving appearance. Yet, could there be such a thing, it would not differ very much from the person who is constantly changing while his appearance remains the same. In a sense, at least, we could say of such a thing that it is nothing, i. e., *no* thing; for *being* implies a certain continuity of existence, or constancy of nature. So also with such a man. Carlyle says somewhere: "I might say to many a man, yes, you are pure; pure enough; but you are chaff,—insincere hypothesis, hearsay, formality, you never were in contact with the great heart of the Universe at all; you are properly neither pure nor impure; you *are* nothing, Nature has no business with you."

Consideration of objections.—The objection has been raised that our statement of the moral aim of educa-

tion, the statement of Kant and Herbart as well as that of Aristotle, is faulty in that it is static rather than dynamic, structural rather than functional. A sufficient familiarity with the history of ethics would preclude such a misconception. The term, "moral character," as used historically, implies moral conduct, social service, and it can not be legitimately used in any other sense. We should have just as good reason for urging that a municipal administration which is planning for an electric subway, is deplorably deluded in its adoption of a static aim, and that it ought to plan, instead, to get "additional facilities for transportation," a "more efficient control of traffic and travel," a "better adjustment by securing a mastery of the present congestion." But it may well be doubted whether anything would be gained by the adoption of a seemingly more technical terminology in preference to the more simple language readily intelligible to common sense. A modern writer on moral philosophy says very pertinently: "Conduct and character are in reality identical. A good character can not exist except in its conduct, nor are there any actions approved by morality which do not proceed from a character which wills them."¹⁰

There would seem to be a more justifiable reason for taking the position that that permanency of moral conduct which is essentially and inherently implied in the ideal of moral character is not the same thing as the social service that we are emphasizing in ethical and pedagogical discussion nowadays. But if we use the

terms *moral* and *character* in their accepted, historical connotation, it will be impossible to take that position. A reasonable familiarity with the writings of Kant and Herbart will also show that their ideas of the moral aim in education involved as much of the idea of service to the social compact as did the specifically stated social aim of Schleiermacher, who has perhaps given that aim its most philosophical statement, or as does the same aim of our modern champions of social efficiency.* In fact, the terms: morals, morality, moral conduct, moral character, can not be construed by any manner of cavil or any effort of specious subtlety, not to include, and necessarily to include, social service.

We should have still more reason for raising the question as to whether the moral aim would necessarily provide for the desirable factor of efficiency. It could perhaps be argued that the concept morality does not include the idea of efficiency, but even that is doubtful. For the inefficient person who, through fault of his own, is a burden on society can hardly be conceived of as a person of true morals. In spite of that, however, it would ordinarily be more convenient to make the more or less arbitrary separation of the ideals of efficiency and morality, especially in view of the fact, that although efficiency may be secured without morality, yet morality can not be secured without also securing efficiency. Efficiency through education would

* Davidson, Dewey, Bagley in our own country, and Natorp and Bergemann in Germany, the classic land of educational philosophy.

demand a broad, general training for all, in so far as the duties and responsibilities of all are alike. On top of that there would need to be a special training, fitting each individual for his specific duties and responsibilities.

Working statement of the aim of education.—Another ideal of education that does not seem, on first analysis, to be provided for in the moral statement of the aim is that desirable development of the different sides of man's nature which is necessary to enable him to enjoy the fulness of life and which will also make him a more agreeable and enjoyable person to meet in our daily intercourse with others. For all these reasons it might be well to state the aim of education to be (the development of a well-rounded, efficient, moral character.) The purpose of our own investigation is a consideration of the ways and means of realizing the moral aspect of the complete aim. Hence, the practical phase, that of efficiency, and the cultural, that of an all round and symmetrical development, will be ignored excepting in so far as they are inextricably woven into the texture of the moral life. *aim*

If throughout the formative years of the child's life it be our effort to secure for the child a development, through which he himself will be led to the choice and pursuit of a worthy work in life, we may rest assured that this will be the best that education can do for society through each individual. Neither need we be troubled lest the individual might not then receive a

proper adjustment to his environment, and through that secure that happiness toward which he is urged by his inmost nature and which to the mind of Seneca comes "from a good conscience, from noble resolves, from righteous actions, from the contempt for all that is fortuitous, from the calm and steady course of a life ever pursuing one and the same road." On the other hand, the aim to secure adjustment to environment will be only too apt to lead him into the moral quagmire of an unthinking compliance and obsequious conformity to immediate surroundings; and the direct seeking after happiness too apt to result in a vain chase after an ever-receding *fata morgana*, or the disastrous pursuit of an elusive will-o'-the-wisp, betraying him unwittingly into the slough of disappointed pessimism, if not the morass of dissolute dissipation and moral stagnation.

CHAPTER II

THE SOURCES OF CONDUCT: INTRODUCTORY

It is perhaps needless to say that to-day there is no problem of greater immediate interest to educators than that of moral education. It is the problem that is receiving pre-eminent attention not only in America, but throughout the civilized world. Perhaps for this very reason, however, we ought to be on our guard, lest we arrive at the conclusion that it is a new problem, or again, that as a result of this widespread agitation some short-cut method of its solution may be found. Similarly, we would do well to disillusionize ourselves, from the start, of the view that by means of any system of "scientific child study" and "experimental didactics," of educational statistics and tabulation, we may suddenly discover some patent solution of the problem with which the giant intellects of the centuries have wrestled with indifferent success. Highly valuable as such experimental efforts are, it is best to leave them to the specialists who are qualified to pursue them and profit by them, and for the rest of us to act upon such educational theory as has stood the test of time.

Conduct traced to regard in various forms.—At the outset let us remember that we are not so much con-

cerned with the problem of moral instruction as we are with the larger problem of moral education, which includes the factor of moral training in addition to that of moral instruction. What we must aim at in education is not merely knowledge or sentiment, but conduct. It is readily seen, therefore, that the problem of moral education is essentially a problem of the education of the will, for conduct is voluntary *action* toward appropriate ends, whether it involves actual bodily movement or whether it be merely mental action in the form of inhibition, or refusal to perform a given physical action. When we attempt to trace voluntary action to its immediate source, we easily enough decide on desire, or conation. But what lies back of that? A careful analysis will show us that we never experience desire with reference to any object, either person or thing, unless it appeals to what we can legitimately call our "sense of values"; unless we have either a liking or a dislike for the object. "Interest" in the object, "regard" for the object, love of the object are phrases that mean practically the same thing and that show what we have in mind here. The whole problem of moral education, then, reduces itself to this: to create in the child proper likes and dislikes, or, as Aristotle put it, to get him to "love the good and hate the bad." Our whole conduct can, in fact, be traced back to certain groups of motives: regard for self, regard for others, regard for knowledge and truth, regard for the beautiful, regard for right and duty, and lastly, religious

regard. And so our solution lies here: to develop in the child a proper regard for self, a proper regard for others, and so on with the rest.

Sources of "Regard."—Simple as all that sounds, we can do nothing in a practical way, unless we see clearly what those "regards" grow out of. Regard for self is primary, and back of that we can not go without getting lost in metaphysical speculation. The important thing for consideration here is this: regard for any other object than self can be secured only by identifying the same with the self, that is, either making it part of the self, as it were, or making the self part of the object. The child will fight for its doll, for its apple, for its mother, or little brother, for its anything else in the way of plaything or anything giving it satisfaction, just as it would for part of its physical body, if that were in danger of being taken away. At first the babe likes its mother just as it likes its bottle; the mother has always supplied the child with food: she is to the babe simply a means of supplying its wants. And the things that satisfy the child's wants are the things that the child has a liking for. At first the liking is not for the object itself, but for the object as a means to the satisfaction of the child's wants, but by the strange workings of that psychological principle, the substitution of motives, this tends to change into a liking for the object as an end, or in other words, into a liking for the object itself. And, just as in the case of the child, so it is with the adult. No man will care for

anything and make sacrifices for the same excepting on this same basis of identification with the object. This identification of the self with the object may assume different forms. One is that of knowledge about or acquaintance with the object. The more we know about an object, other things equal, the more we care about it, or the more we are interested in it. The attachment becomes very much stronger where the activity on our part is more extensive or intensive than that involved in mere intellectual activity. Where, for instance, we have anything in common with the object, such as common associations, common experiences, our liking for the same, other things equal, will be greater. Again, where we have derived benefits or expect benefits, material or otherwise, from the object, the degree of identification is far greater, and as a result, our liking for the object proportionately greater, other things equal. In the same way, the more we have done for the object, or the greater the sacrifices we have made for it, the greater the attachment to it, other things equal. Where we have a co-operation of all these factors, the degree of identification, and therefore the degree of liking, is of course greatest.*

It is thus, for instance, that our love of home has developed; it is thus, and thus only, that love of native

* It is evident that where our identification with an object has been brought about by disagreeable experiences caused us by the object, dislike will arise instead of liking. Intentional injuries received from others, or even wrongs done them by us, for instance, will work out that way.

land can be developed in the child. It is thus that we begin with the restricted sphere of present interest, and widen it out until it includes the whole country, and finally, all kindred men. If we would develop in the child a proper regard for his fellow-men, how must we go about it? We can readily secure considerateness and helpfulness toward the members of his own family, toward his own kin and his own friends. We must gradually widen the sphere of fellow-feeling until it includes a greater and greater number, not only those of his own social set, his own class, his own community, and so on, but finally all others, even those of different views, and those belonging to different social strata, the rich and the poor, the ignorant as well as the learned, the rude as well as the refined. But this sphere of brotherly love can only be widened by increasing the individual's identification with all his fellows, and this can be done only by getting him to see our common interests, our common humanity, our common fears and aspirations, our common cares and tribulations, our common destinies. A stupendous task! But in so far as we can partly succeed, it will be only, it can be only, by proceeding on this basis. There is no other. And so with all the other "regards," or "interests," we have enumerated. We can succeed in the matter of moral education only so far as we can develop these desirable "regards" to such an extent as to secure their expression in conduct.

Need of expression.—For it must be borne in mind

that these "regards," considered as the potential source of conduct, are not by any means merely intellectual states, or even emotional attitudes receiving their only expression in an exercise of the imagination. Their natural expression is in real action, rather than in what might be called action through the exercise of imagination. Training must provide sufficient opportunity for exercise in actual expression. The supposed motives in the form of mere mental recognition of what constitutes proper conduct, and mere sentimental adoration of such conduct are no motives at all. Pious wishes, noble choices and good resolutions, stopping short of actual expression in corresponding and appropriate deeds, are indeed worthless. There must be actual execution, or performance, and furthermore, sufficient repetition in that direction. Over two thousand years ago Aristotle pronounced a dictum that can not even now be improved upon with all the results of modern investigation and research: "The virtues we acquire by previous practice of their acts, exactly as we acquire our knowledge of the various arts. For, in the case of the arts, that which we have to be taught to do, that we learn to do by doing it. We become masons, for instance, by building; and harpers, by playing upon the harp. And so, in like manner, we become just by doing what is just, temperate by doing what is temperate, and brave by doing what is brave. . . . For, accordingly as we bear ourselves in our transactions with other men, so do we become either just or

unjust; and, accordingly as we bear ourselves in dangers, and accustom ourselves to act as cowards or as brave, so do we become either cowards or brave. And of all lust, and of all anger, the same rule holds good. For men become either temperate and gentle, or intemperate and hasty, accordingly as they bear themselves in such matters either one way or the other. And, indeed, in a word, it is by acts of like nature with themselves that all habits are formed.'"¹

Knowledge that is essential in the teacher.—If the teacher's efforts to assist in realizing the aim of moral education are to accomplish much, he must have a clear notion of what that ideal manhood and womanhood is like toward which he is attempting to steer the child in its development. That will also mean that he must be able to discriminate between what is really desirable and what is sometimes taken to be so because of mere alluring, but deceiving appearance. He must have a reliable and workable knowledge of the sources of conduct found in the various phases of the sense of values. He must be able to recognize the indications of a healthy development. On the other hand, it is just as necessary that he be able to diagnose any diathesis toward moral aberration and to recognize the first symptoms of any acquired pathological development in the child's moral nature. It is perhaps unfortunate that this is necessary, for it is certainly disappointing, and at times even disheartening, to have the disagreeable and un-

pleasant features of human nature revealed to us where, perhaps, we never even suspected their presence.

In his "Life on the Mississippi," Mark Twain tells of the disappointment that came to him in his early days as a pilot, when the necessary study of the river took away all the contemplative joy at the sight of its beauty. "I stood like one bewitched. I drank it in, in a speechless rapture. The world was new to me, and I had never seen anything like this at home. But, as I have said, a day came when I began to cease from noting the glories and the charms which the moon and the sun and the twilight wrought upon the river's face; another day came when I ceased altogether to note them. Then, if that sunset scene had been repeated, I should have looked upon it without rapture and should have commented upon it inwardly in this fashion: This sun means that we are going to have wind tomorrow; that floating log means that the river is rising, small thanks to it; that slanting mark on the water refers to a bluff reef which is going to kill somebody's steamboat one of these nights, if it keeps on stretching out like that; those tumbling 'boils' show a dissolving bar and a changing channel there; the lines and circles in the slick water over yonder are a warning that that troublesome place is shoaling up dangerously; that silver streak in the shadow of the forest is the 'break' from a new snag, and he has located himself in the very best place he could have found to fish for steamboats; that tall dead tree, with a single living branch, is not

going to last long, and then how is a body ever going to get through this blind place at night without the friendly old landmark?

No, the romance and the beauty were all gone from the river. All the value any feature of it had for me now was the amount of usefulness it could furnish toward compassing the safe piloting of a steamboat. Since those days I have pitied doctors from my heart. What does the lovely flush in a beauty's cheek mean to a doctor but a 'break' that ripples above some deadly disease? Are not all her visible charms sown thick with what are to him the signs and symbols of hidden decay? Does he ever see her beauty at all, or doesn't he simply view her professionally and comment upon her unwholesome condition all to himself? And doesn't he sometimes wonder whether he has gained most or lost most by learning his trade?"

Just as it is with the pilot and the physician, so it is with the teacher, as it is to a greater or lesser extent with every one who does a useful work in life. For the business of life is not primarily that of esthetic enjoyment, nor enjoyment in any other form, for that matter. The passengers on the steamboat do not care very much whether the man at the wheel is enjoying himself contemplating the scenery or whether he is enjoying himself in any other way; in fact, while he is at his post, they have a right to demand that he concern himself with duty rather than with pleasure. Furthermore, the master pilot probably derives a greater

and more enduring happiness from the thought of the faithful performance of duty in steering his boat safely past danger, even though it be a more prosaic joy. Just as the physician must be fitted out with sufficient professional knowledge to enable him to see symptoms of grave physical and mental disorders in the glistening eye and the hectic flush that may please others as so many evidences of brilliancy and beauty; just so must the teacher have a sufficient knowledge of human nature to detect the first indications of moral dangers that sometimes lurk behind the garb of a pleasing exterior. And just as such knowledge will be the means of giving the true physician, with his heart in his work, a more genuine and permanent happiness from the thought of the misery and suffering he is relieving; so also will the true teacher, devoted to the work of ennobling character, derive more real satisfaction from the thought of the dangers and disasters he is averting, and the good he is helping to bring about. After all, it is not worthy of mature men and women to shut their eyes to painful sights because, forsooth, they would prefer to imagine this world of ours a fool's paradise devoid of all that is unpleasant and disagreeable.

CHAPTER III

REGARD FOR SELF

Does all conduct spring from self-regard?—The actual motive force that lies in self-regard as a source of conduct is so apparent that it has often been considered as the only source. In fact, an influential school of writers on psychology and ethics insists that such is the case. According to them every human being performs that particular action, in a given situation, that gives him most satisfaction, and this no doubt is true. To them that is equivalent to saying that therefore the action was prompted by a self-seeking motive, but that does not necessarily follow. Mr. Brown makes Mr. Jones his friend rather than Mr. Smith for the simple reason that he derives more satisfaction from his association with the former than from association with the latter. This is no doubt true. It may be objected, however, that Mr. Brown will make sacrifices for his friend, Mr. Jones. No doubt; but it is just as true that the little child will fight for that biggest apple that he selected when the apples were passed to him. The same facts are brought out in a critical examination of sympathy and love. Even in the case of the man who submits to martyrdom from a sense of loyalty or duty, it is

true that, being constituted as he is, he derives more satisfaction from the thought of doing his duty than he would from the thought of saving his life by turning traitor to the cause he has espoused. Another man, differently constituted, would derive more satisfaction from the latter course, and hence that is the course such a man would adopt. These are, no doubt, indisputable psychological facts. But ethics can not be satisfied with such an analysis. The question there is not: What satisfaction comes, or does not come, to the agent after the act? The ethical question is rather this: Is the agent, or is he not, aiming at satisfaction to be derived from the act? It is true that all of us do those things from which we would ordinarily derive most satisfaction, but this is by no means saying that we do all of those things *in order* to derive such satisfaction. Some of our actions are no doubt prompted by the thought of deriving satisfaction from them; but by no means all of them, or even a majority of them.

Different motives and impulses coöperate.—It must be borne in mind that our impulsions toward action may be furnished by instinctive, non-deliberative reactions, in which case they had better be termed impulses, in contradistinction from true motives, which prompt our acts of choice or deliberation. Furthermore, in place of thinking of every deliberative act as being prompted by just one motive or consideration, it would ordinarily be more in accord with the facts involved to think of the given impulsion toward action as being the resultant of

an admixture of different motives and impulses, even though some one of these is apt to be predominant. It is for the purpose of facilitating the analysis of the different groups of motives that they are artificially separated in this more or less arbitrary manner, which necessarily ignores their indissoluble blending or coalescing in actual conduct.

Importance of self-regard is self-evident.—With reference to this matter of self-regard, its importance as a source of action toward others is so self-evident that there is hardly any need of taking up its study in detail excepting in one of its more difficult phases: self-esteem and the inseparable love of recognition. Furthermore, the general conclusions arrived at with regard to the effect of the desirable and undesirable development of this particular aspect of self-regard on conduct will apply, in the main, to the other aspects. A proper self-love in the form of a prudent consideration of one's own real personal interests in the matter of health, recreation and physical wants generally is, of course, desirable, even though it is not ordinarily as difficult to secure as it is to develop a proper regard for the same interests of others. When Prof. Paulsen says that a little more of rational self-love would make the greatest share of human misery disappear, and that "to do away with drunkenness and debauchery would do away with nine-tenths of human wretchedness,"¹ he probably magnifies the proportions of these vices unduly; at the same time such an estimate, overdrawn as it may be, clearly indi-

icates the importance of a proper regard for self. In view of the fact that worldly wisdom consists, as Goethe says, in learning to get along with fools and knaves; the wise and the good offering no difficulty in the matter, it might not be unwise to let a child learn something definite about human nature, in place of our limiting the scope of "nature study" to the consideration of birds and bugs and beetles. As regards training in the care for health, the school itself must be no sinner. One particular in which we are perhaps most apt to err is that of making the fulfillment of school duties paramount to everything else, even the health of pupils. Frail and conscientious girls especially are only too apt to be induced thereby to ignore the imperative warnings of nature at times of physical indisposition and thus ultimately to undermine their health, for which all their learning and all their culture can never be an adequate compensation, either to them individually or to society at large.

SELF-ESTEEM AND THE LOVE OF RECOGNITION.

One of the most important sources of conduct is to be found in the feelings aroused by what we think of ourselves, and by what we care for what others think of us. The social environment in which we live approves of certain types of conduct, while it disapproves of others; it places a valuation on certain capacities and qualities, while there are other characteristics that it just as positively condemns. The thought that we are possessed of

qualities that have value in the eyes of our fellows, or that our conduct has been meritorious, is a source of pleasure to ourselves rather than of indifference or of displeasure, we have a "feeling of pride"; contrariwise, the thought that our conduct in any matter has been unworthy arouses a painful feeling, we are ashamed. The attitude of mind that is fostered by these particular pleasurable feelings at the thought of our worth constitutes the feeling-disposition which we call self-esteem, showing itself in a variety of forms such as vanity, pride, haughtiness.

Unfortunately there has ever been great laxity in the use of these various terms, so that a certain opprobrium has become attached to all of them.* This is to be regretted because it is liable to lead teachers into the error of attempting to eradicate an inherent proclivity of the child's nature, instead of utilizing this potent propensity to the end of securing desired results in conduct. A more nearly perfect analysis of the nature of self-esteem in its various forms certainly shows how the same may be made a most efficient means of securing proper development along moral lines. Adam Smith goes so far as to say that the "secret of education is to direct vanity to proper objects."²

Forms of self-esteem.—It is evident that the opinion

* Ruskin, for instance, says: "I have been more and more convinced, the more I think of it, that in general pride is at the bottom of all great mistakes." He really means haughtiness, for elsewhere he defines pride as a "looking down on others because of their true inferiority to us."

that an individual may form as to his ability or capacity, as to his worth or merit, need not necessarily be correct; in fact, it is more likely to be faulty. Furthermore, it is more apt to be too favorable than too unfavorable. The mistake in judgment may be due to the individual's imagining that he possesses meritorious qualities that he does not possess, or that he does not possess in the degree in which he thinks he does. This form of self-esteem we call *conceit*. Where the mistake in judgment is due to the actual possession of qualities of supposed merit or of only trifling merit, such as good looks, pretty clothes and the like, we have the form of self-esteem called *vanity*. Again, there may be an ascribing of merit, or worth, to ourselves because of qualities or possessions that have greater social value, such as energy, will power, intellectual ability, learning, money, family connections. This is the attitude that is properly called *false pride*, which is liable to be accompanied by a looking-down on others as inferiors, when it is called *haughtiness*. Where there is a just estimation of the true worth of the individual, we have *true pride*.

Self-esteem as a deterrent from unworthy conduct.—

From the fact that the pleasures of self-esteem are valued so highly by us, there is in our nature an inherent tendency to preserve intact our good opinion of self. Where our regard for self—really our concern to preserve intact the pleasures of self-esteem—keeps us from performing certain actions deemed unworthy of ourselves, we call the attitude *self-respect*. But what we

consider to be unworthy is, for most of us, determined by what our social environment considers to be unworthy. What is ordinarily called self-respect really is dependent, in the great majority of cases, on what people generally think regarding such matters.

On the other hand, an individual may care more for what some particular class, clique or social set thinks regarding these things, and under this head might be grouped such attitudes as the sense of honor and the sense of propriety. Similarly an individual may ignore what people generally, as well as what particular classes or groups, think concerning what is worthy and unworthy, and base his conduct on his own views concerning such matters. Such an attitude, which is essentially a lofty self-respect, we are apt to call *pride*.* If the standard that determines his opinion is a true one, society will be the gainer ultimately, even if in his individualistic attitude he has been nonconforming to her present standard.

Self-esteem in the child.—The very young child necessarily places his valuation upon what to the mature person might amount to nothing or to trifles. There are but few of his physical organs and mental capabilities that he has learned to use well as viewed by the adult. But it is just such exercise that calls forth words and signs of recognition, praise from his parents and other grown-up acquaintances. It is such recognition that

* * We call it pride because the individualistic, nonconformist attitude taken must strike us as presumptuous and overweening.



arouses in the little tot the flush of pleasure. So when he has mastered a new feat in the way of physical gymnastic or can pronounce a new "big" word or has learned a new fact, he must show it off to his elders, to receive the new pleasure due to the recognition of his new achievement. He is not content with the new achievement, nor even with the thought that this new achievement is the potential means of securing the pleasure due to recognition by others. He must actually receive that added pleasure. The mere consciousness of his own ability (to his mind, his own worth) does not furnish him with sufficient pleasure; it must be reinforced by actual recognition from others.

Later development.—By the time he comes to school, matters have not changed much, nor is there likely to be much of a change during school age unless he is here subjected to wise guidance. With advancing age he will gradually pride himself less upon these lesser things and more on the things that have greater social value, as physical strength, agility, endurance, keenness of perception, retentiveness of memory, accuracy of judgment, power of critical analysis; ability to excel in debate, oratory, music or other accomplishments; scholarship, wealth, family connections, ancestry. Such pride, false as it is, is not necessarily productive of great harm, provided that it mark only this transition period, and that the process be not arrested at this stage of the child's development. Should it, however, be brought to a stop at this point, it will result in some form of

that grievous distemper, haughtiness, such as the overweening and patronizing arrogance of the familiar "man of family," the pompous snobbishness of the wealthy upstart, the vulgar affectation of "cultuah" of the society-butterfly product of certain female seminaries, the supercilious self-sufficiency of the half-baked scholar who likes to dwell in thought, at least, on the fact of his belonging to the "aristocracy of learning"—all maladies symptomatic of a deeper-seated ailment: the lack of real intellectual or cultural development.

Shifting toward moral basis.—Under proper guidance he will learn to see that even though these things have value, or may have it, they do not reflect merit on the possessor, being in the main gifts of nature. When he sees that rugged physical constitution and perspicacity of intellect, desirable as they may be, rebound no more to his credit than he is blameworthy for being a cripple or being afflicted with an impediment of speech, there will be a new shifting of the basis of his self-esteem; for now he will begin to realize that the true worth of a man depends on the proper use of the powers with which he has been endowed. In other words, his pride will now gradually become a moral pride, i. e., a pride based on moral factors. His question will no longer be: "What exceptional qualities do I possess?" qualities which he realizes are accidents of birth, but instead: "What proper, i. e., what moral, use do I make of the capabilities bestowed upon me?" As a result it will be his endeavor to bring about a cor-

responding development in his own character. As he grows in the direction of truthfulness, fidelity to duty, faithfulness to friends, scrupulosity of conscience, adherence to principle, he is approximating toward the ideal development of self-esteem. But it is just at this stage that there is danger of developing the false moral pride of the "unco guid," the self-righteous attitude of the Pharisee who prides himself in his self-complacency on not being "as other men."* It still is false pride for the simple reason that it is exclusive.

Relation to modesty and humility.—True pride is always accompanied by true modesty and true humility. It is not puffed up or overweening like the false moral pride of the Pharisee. Lao-tse with pithy brevity says: "Inferior virtue never loses sight of virtue. Therefore it has no virtue." The true modesty and humility here mentioned are not to be confounded with that false modesty and false humility that are the characteristic guise of the self-seeking, canting hypocrite, that false modesty which shows itself in insincere and ostentatious self-disparagement, and that false humility observed in the fawning servility of that abomination of abomina-

* Jonathan Edwards, in speaking of this type of false pride, says: "Some, who think themselves quite emptied of themselves, confident that they are abased in the dust, are full as they can hold with the glory of their own humility, and lifted up to heaven with an high opinion of their own abasement. Their humility is a swelling, self-confident, showy, noisy, assuming humility. It seems to be the nature of spiritual pride to make men conceited and ostentatious of their humility."—Works, New York, 1829-1830, V. 197.

tions, the cringing, self-debasing, tuft-hunting toady. Neither are they found in the undue self-depreciation of those unfortunates who have been buffeted about by the calamitous vicissitudes of life until they have lost all confidence in self, if not faith in human nature. The modesty here spoken of is rather a dignified, tactful, unostentatious reserve due to the possessor's just appreciation of his real ability and true worth. He fully realizes that the recognition that ordinarily comes to men is not based on true worth, but instead on social value due to exceptional gift; that, therefore, in so far as recognition coming to him is due to his possession of unusual capabilities—the result of accident of birth or contingency of training—it is not due him; that, therefore, he is receiving a disproportionate share of that recognition which should be distributed on a more nearly just basis. Similarly, the humility here spoken of is the natural habiliment of the person who sufficiently recognizes the frailties, the foibles and the failings of human nature, and is fully imbued with the sense of his own incompetency in view of the exalted demands of the moral law that he is trying to take as his guide.*

* The contention of theologians in times past as well as of such and others of the present day, to the point that pride is always an undesirable attitude, cannot be well taken. If it be entirely proper to feel *shame* at the thought of having been guilty of unworthy conduct, why should it not be equally proper to feel its opposite, *i. e.*, pride, at the thought of having done something worthy? Calling the resultant feeling by another name will not change its nature either; for the gratification, satisfaction or pleasure one experiences under such circumstances is just the very

Ideal development.—When self-esteem has reached this point in the course of development, we have its desirable climax. In place of mere contemplation of one's powers, it has now secured their proper application. It is no longer exclusive. It now demands for self no more respect or recognition than it would see accorded to others. Its concern now is to preserve intact true human dignity not only in self, but equally so in others. Probably it is now less a respect for self than it is a respect for the human nature element in self, i. e., less a personal regard for self than it is an impersonal regard for human nature. It is only then that it can secure the adherence to such a maxim of conduct as Kant's: "So act that you will always treat mankind, not only in your own person but in the person of every other, not simply as a means, but at the same time as an end." It is only then that it can see that there is possible such a thing as unworthy treatment of even the basest of men. The question could well be debated whether regard for self has not been transformed into a regard for the moral law. In order to

feeling that we term pride. A great many writers call the desirable development of self-esteem self-respect, as, for instance, Fowler, "Principles of Morals," Part II, p. 64. To the present writer it seems more accurate to use the term self-respect in designation of that attitude *before* an action to be performed in which we think of the worthiness or unworthiness of the action to be performed; on the other hand, the pleasurable feeling and corresponding feeling-disposition coming as the result of an action considered worthy, is pride. Self-respect would be the *prospective* phase of self-esteem, pride its *retrospective* phase.

realize the *end*, the securing of true personal worthiness, attention and endeavor had to become focused on moral conduct as the *means* to this end; thus moral conduct became the *aim* of effort, until at last, by the strange workings of that interesting psychological phenomenon, the substitution of motives, it became the end or goal to which the individual was objectively driven, perhaps even without his realizing it.

THE LOVE OF RECOGNITION.

The pleasures of self-esteem, largely due to what we think of ourselves, are enhanced or reinforced by recognition on the part of others. We can very properly speak of an inherent love of the recognition of our own merit or supposed merit. It includes the pleasures due to any form of expressed appreciation by others. Where it is directed toward commendation or praise by individuals we have become accustomed to call it the *love of approbation*. Where it is directed toward public recognition, as, for instance, in the form of honors or popular demonstration of respect or esteem, we speak of it as the *love of honors*. From the fact that approbation and honors are pleasurable it would but follow that a love for these things would naturally be accompanied by a striving to secure them. And so the love of approbation frequently manifests itself as a striving to secure approbation, as, for instance, in vanity. Similarly, the

love of honors is apt to show itself in a striving to secure honors—*ambition*.

Importance.—In this regard for the good opinion of others we have one of the most potent means of securing moral conduct; in the eyes of some of our great thinkers, as, for instance, Locke, regard for the opinion of others is in fact the whole source of conduct. The most depraved approximate toward an entire disregard for the opinion of others; even there, however, we find left a concern for the good opinion of certain of their fellow-men, even if not for that of society at large, *e. g.*, “honor among thieves.” At the other extreme, in the great leaders of thought, we also find a seeming disregard for public opinion; but even here the thought that public opinion at some later day will approve of the stand now disapproved of no doubt is a partial source of the sustaining power and fortitude that enables the reformer to remain true to his ideals. And certainly in the case of the non-exceptional it is most clear that regard for the good opinion of others is a most potent means of securing conduct in conformity with the standards of the day. A proper regard for the esteem of others is therefore not only permissible, but desirable.

Danger of undesirable development.—But just as a proper regard for any other good may, by being too constantly entertained, become transformed into an inordinate desire in that direction, so here. Proper self-regard, or self-love, may be nursed until it becomes an undue self-regard, or self-love, namely, self-

ishness, or egoism. Now outside of our desire for the creature comforts, the love of recognition of our ability or merit, when inordinate, includes all the selfishness there is; for the greed for wealth and the love of power, when carefully analyzed, will be found to consist largely of this love of recognition, or, as Aristotle says: "Wealth and power are eligible because of the honor they confer."

Development.—The very young child, seeing the great disparity that exists between his own ability and that of his elders, would be crushed with the consciousness of this difference were it not for the recognition that he constantly receives for what ability he does possess, and what worth he is made to think he possesses. It is due to this principle that he is so much more in need of external reinforcement of his self-esteem than are older people; and it is due to the same cause that he naturally tends to "show off," manifesting the working of a power that Mother Nature has bestowed upon him to enable him to secure that recognition that he needs as much as he does his daily nourishment. When he needs bread, it will not do to give him a stone. Similarly, it will not do to pamper and overfeed him with seductive sweets in place of giving him a sane diet of wholesome recognition.

As he grows in ability and his consciousness of the same, he becomes more self-sustaining in his self-esteem; there is less need of reinforcement from without. Furthermore, with the increase of experience and intelli-

gent judgment, he becomes more discriminative as to the value of the recognition coming from various sources and in different forms. He learns to care more for the commendation that comes from those who to his mind possess superior judgment, or again for the approval that comes from those who to his mind have his interest at heart. It is apparent, of course, that he can be mistaken as to who has this superior judgment and as to who is his true friend. Similarly, he soon learns to see that there is a difference between recognition and recognition, and then it is that he will prefer the more precious praise, sparingly given, to the cheaper article spread broadcast, and still more to its base counterfeit, flattery. Again, when he has met with praise that was unlooked for, he learns to value unsolicited approval more highly than that which is brought home only by overt efforts to secure it; his vanity changes to pride—he is “too proud to be vain.” Furthermore, other things equal, the expression of esteem on the part of many will give him greater pleasure than that of a few; in short, the love of approbation expands into a love of honors; parallel to it, the striving to secure approbation, vanity, changes into striving to secure honors, ambition. Unfortunately, there are dangers ahead. Will he be able to avoid them?

Causes of undesirable development.—Recognition in any form, at least where it is genuine, is an expression of esteem or respect based on the real or supposed worth of the recipient. If this recognition could be bestowed,

or if it would be bestowed, only on true worth, then the love of recognition could not lead the individual astray. Unfortunately, however, those who have it to give may, in the first place, be ignorant as to what constitutes true worth, and may thus put it on a wrong basis just as the vain person or person of false pride is mistaken as to what constitutes true worth. Again, others are not always able to recognize true merit when they meet with it, and may be deceived into taking a counterfeit for the genuine. Furthermore, people sometimes bestow honors—supposed to be the token of esteem, honor or respect—on the basis of their individual likings, affections. As a result the individual is misled in his endeavor to secure the esteem of his fellows by conforming to their opinions with regard to what constitutes the basis on which the token of esteem is rendered. But the greatest peril is found in the fact that we can have a good name or reputation without really possessing a good character, can be respected without being really respectable, can secure honors without being truly honorable. In place of making ourselves truly worthy, we can deceive others into believing that we are worthy where we are not. True worth can be secured only as the result of patient, persevering, painstaking endeavor in the direction of self-mastery in the duties to ourselves and others. It is a laborious and tedious and long-drawn-out process, full of misgiving, disillusionment and disappointment. How seductive the temptation to secure the sweets of recognition by a less toilsome process! It does

not take us long to see that we can secure the tokens of recognition for worth, not only by offering true worth, but that we can purchase them by giving a counterfeit—mistaken for the genuine—or again, can get possession of them by bribery. We can, in short, gain preferment, rank, eminence, through the actual possession of true worth, but as well, if not better, through deception as to our worth, and through popularity rather than fitness or worthiness. Of course, the latter two are really one, being simply the obverse and the reverse sides of the same counterfeit.

INSINCERITY GROWING OUT OF LOVE OF RECOGNITION.

In what might be called the adolescence of inordinate love of recognition, the stage of conceit and vanity, the element of insincerity is hardly present. At best we could there speak of an innocent, unconscious disingenuousness, showing itself in an instinctive tendency to draw attention to self, or rather toward those qualities or characteristics that are held to be meritorious, while at the same time trying to conceal weaknesses. Of course, in cases of arrested development we still find the same thing in youth and even in maturity. But there, except in rare cases, the attention-soliciting efforts are no longer spontaneous or impulsive, but more largely the result of intentional design and purpose. We are all familiar with the parading pretensions and grandiloquent swagger of the shallow-pated coxcomb, and the loud guffaw and unseemly vociferousness of blatant, self-advertising mediocrity.

Gradually the individual comes to see that his overt fishing for compliments and manifest solicitation of publicity and resulting honors are offensive and defeat their own purpose. If because of a native disinclination to strenuous, especially long-continued effort, he still dislikes the "straight and narrow path," there is but one other course left: he must become more skillful in the art of interesting others in self, and so his mastery in the manipulation of covert and insidious devices of self-aggrandizement grows apace. These devices can be conveniently classed under two heads: those of dissimulation and hypocrisy, and those of ingratiation. But they are twin and inseparable.

Dissimulation and hypocrisy.—In the first place, then, he must feign those virtues highly valued by society. And, above all things else, he must convince others of his unselfishness. And so, just because he is so very *self-seeking*, he will, when arrived at perfection in his art, be, in his action at least, anything but *self-centered*, and that to the innocent and guileless observer is proof of his unselfishness. Because he is so very consistently selfish, or *egoistic*, at heart, his outer demeanor will be anything but *egotistic*, and if he be a man of exceptional gifts, he may for years be considered the very embodiment of the spirit of self-abnegation. However, the average mortal cannot ordinarily attain the acme of perfection in the wiles and arts of hypocrisy, although he can long baffle ordinary observers in their attempts to see through his villainy, and what is worse,

may keep those others under suspicion who really are what they appear to be. For, unfortunately, it is easier to deceive than it is to detect deception. The keen eye and ear of the practiced observer, however, are apt even so to detect an occasional gesture that betrays its source or note a word that does not ring true. For in his very endeavor to aim high in his efforts to attain perfection, the deceiver is liable to overshoot his mark. The very persistence with which he keeps his modesty, his virtue, his piety to the front betrays the presence of set purpose. This is especially manifest in the well-known, long-winded, introductory apology and painfully studious avoidance of reference to self noticed in the insincere speaker, standing in marked contrast to the unwitting use of the pronoun "I" by the perfectly genuine speaker who loses himself in his message. As a result the deceiver produces a copy not quite true to the original, even though it be difficult to detect the difference. And so in place of the easy, spontaneous reserve of true modesty we see the self-conscious, modesty-emphasizing obtrusiveness of its baser substitute; in place of the upright, self-respecting lowliness of true humility, the groveling, self-debasing servility of its fictitious counterpart; in place of the seemly and natural retirement of true and genuine piety, the vulgar, sanctimonious importunity of its canting, lip-serving, eye-rolling copy; and in a general way, in place of the simple, unassuming, straightforwardness of virtue, the artful, studied sinuosity of hypocrisy.

Ingratiation.—But deceiving others into the idea of our possessing real worth is not the only means to which inordinate love of recognition resorts. Preferment is secured not only on the basis of being esteemed, but as well on that of being liked; for where people like they unwittingly assume the presence of worth, whether justly so or not. And so, in seeking preferment, ambition needs but seek popularity by currying favor. Now what is the basis on which we favor or like others? Briefly, we like those who cause us pleasure rather than pain. So the self-seeking, ambitious man has an easy task of winning our good will: negatively, it means for him the need of being considerate of others, and positively, of rendering them agreeable service. Thus it is that he soon possesses himself of that tactful urbanity that never opposes, but always accedes to, the opinions of others and that leads him to become “all things to all men.” But here again inordinate self-regard debases the currency that circulates as the token of regard for others, and so, in place of the bland and genial affability of genuine cordiality and good will we have the smooth and oily unctuousness of its inferior counterfeit. And so far as regards the agreeable services rendered to others by self-seeking ambition, they consist in the main of agreeable attentions, for it must be remembered that inordinate, impatient, unworthy ambition is disinclined, on general principles, to over-strenuousness in the direction of real service anywhere. It is easier to secure the desired good will and resulting favor by the bribes of

wheedling* flattery, obsequious adulation and subservient truckling, especially to those in high places. The extreme ends to which misguided ambition can lead by this medium of ingratiating can be seen in the abject spectacle of the self-stultification of the lick-platter parasite, and in the still more loathsome sight of the self-prostitution of his bigger brother, the lick-spittle place hunter.

Negative attitude toward rivals.—This same inordinate desire for personal preferment is the source of envy, jealousy and maliciousness toward rivals. Wherever many men are active side by side, with chances for promotion, as in the army, in factories, working-crews, counting houses, the professions, this particular aspect of the workings of ambition can be readily observed. It is largely due to the fact that we have rivals that we are so anxious to let others know about our ability, as in the boastfulness of conceit, or to let them see it, as in self-advertising vanity. When we have advanced beyond this stage, we become more skillful in letting others see what we are doing without letting our efforts to do so become apparent. Where superior worth, lost in the work at hand, does not let "the left hand know what the right doeth," lesser worth, wrapt up in self, is ever thinking

* Wheedle, probably from the German *wedeln*, to wag with the tail. In the case of the dog we recognize the "wheedling" as the expression of joy in anticipation of the possession of the bone that *he* is to receive; but unfortunately for us, the wheedling of the fawning flatterer is interpreted by our vanity as a genuine interest in *ourselves*.

of the reward that is to come for what he is doing. So, also, where a man is not content with his present station, but aspires to one that calls for a greater range of ability in a broader field of activity, he is likely to be tempted to be forever trying to show his superiors his ability in those other directions, in place of concentrating his energies on his present tasks. A foreman, for instance, in order to convince his employers of his qualifications for a position calling for greater organizing and executive ability, might spend considerable time and energy in keeping himself posted on what others are doing, in place of confining himself to the particular work assigned to him, and showing his fitness for greater things by being faithful in those which are least.

Positive attitude toward rivals.—Where unworthy ambition is intense enough it is, of course, not content with this negative attitude toward rivals, but assumes the more positive attitude seen in the direction of back-biting, slander, traducement, defamation, detraction. Here again it is only the bungling apprentice in the arts and crafts of inordinate ambition who resorts to open under-rating, denunciation or calumny. Advancing in the hierarchy we find the covert disparaging, accusation, defamation of the more skillful fellowcraft; the infamous wiles of innuendo of the still more proficient master; the diabolical genius at insinuation of the adept past-master. It would be impossible to enumerate all the detestable artifices of these experts in their impious practices, but who is not familiar with the atrocious

“damning with faint praise”? Who has not been witness to that excessive lauding where praise is bound to injure and its accompanying professing of ignorance where the telling of the well-known truth would help? And who has not met with that maintaining of an eloquent silence that far more effectively undoes the object of its rancor than could any effort of more manly disparagement or arraignment, at the same time that it serves that other purpose of impressing the hearer with a consciousness of the exaltation of that virtue which will say nothing where it cannot speak approvingly?

Occasionally, however, even the adroit expert in the insidious arts of unworthy self-aggrandizement must find freer vent for the malice and envy he feels toward his rivals. But even then his pent-up feelings secure expression under the hypocritical guise of apparently innocent bantering or seemingly good-natured jest, thus securing the relief of easement on the one hand, and at the same time fortifying self against the possibility of deserved chastisement should the butt of the jest unexpectedly see through the real intent of the jester. It must have been this that Pascal had in mind when he said that the “jester is a bad character.” If there is anything the ambitious man of this type dreads it is an open fray, for well he realizes that there he might be worsted; he can fight successfully only by skulking in ambush and sending his poisoned shafts from the cover of his cowardly retreat. He stands in no need of the counsel of Lady Macbeth: “Bear welcome in your eye,

your hand, your tongue: look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under't." Full well has he heeded the admonition, "Be wise as the serpent," but in the innocent purity of his devout preoccupancy he has inadvertently overlooked its companion injunction to "be harmless as the dove." And if, in spite of herculean efforts to prevent it, he should be unwillingly forced into combat by an ungrateful and worldly rival, it is with a heavy heart that he finally takes the aggressive, and then, of course, under that banner which alone is worthy of such extreme measures: disinterested, lofty morality. Heine well says: "And it is always religion and always morality, and always patriotism, with which base villains palliate their attacks. They attack, not from sordid private interest, not from envy of their literary rivals, not from inborn servility, but only to rescue the good Lord, good morals and the fatherland."³

Attitude toward friends.—Unfortunately, the attitude of untoward ambition to friends presents just as unprepossessing a spectacle. In reality, self-seeking ambition knows no friendship, for friendship calls for an unselfish interest in another, and inordinate ambition sacrifices everything else to its own selfish ends. It helps others as long as that will help self. The author can give no better statement of the relation existing between selfish ambition and disinterested friendship than by quoting from Kuno Fischer's "Life of Bacon": "To-day Bacon still made every effort to save the man that had been his benefactor; but when he saw that the gra-

ciousness of the queen was at stake, he dropped the friend whose favor he had sought only because he was the favorite of the queen. . . . The collision was not between duty and inclination, but between selfishness and friendship. Essex had loved him with a passionate interest and had overwhelmed him with benefits, to which Bacon had responded with as much devotion as his dispassionate nature admitted of. What he loved in Essex was less the friend than the influential favorite, who was of use to him. The favorite fell, and Bacon's friendship was put to the test that it could not stand. . . . Bacon had to choose between him (Essex) and the queen. . . . At the request of the queen, he himself had to support the accusation, and publicly to vindicate the execution of Essex, after it had taken place. He supported the accusation, he wrote the vindication, he did both without sympathy, both in such a way as showed plainly that Bacon now had left but one consideration, only the one concern, to please the queen. When the latter made the request of him to vindicate the consummated execution by means of a pamphlet, Bacon answered that he was glad to know that the queen took a fancy to his pen."⁴

Attitude toward principle.—Just as disinterested faithfulness to a friend lies beyond the practical comprehension of selfish ambition, so also with unselfish fidelity to duty or adherence to principle, for everywhere selfish interest is paramount. When accompanying a low stage of intellectual development, it readily

betrays itself by its sordid narrowness, but in the more highly educated and cultured individual, it becomes more intelligently and coldly calculating, with a keen eye for the benefits and advantages that accrue to him that readily adapts himself to the ever-changing flux of contingencies in his immediate environment. Courage and conviction, to such a one, are impossible conceptions, for they call for stability instead of fickleness, devotion to duty and principle instead of devotion to self, manly resistance in place of knavish yielding. We are all familiar with the human weathercocks that veer with every shifting zephyr of public opinion, the two-faced people that blow hot and cold with the same breath. Much as honors are coveted by this amphibian breed, honor is to them nothing but a sound, as is so nicely expressed by Falstaff: "Can honor set to a leg? no: or an arm? no: or take away the grief of a wound? no. Honor hath no skill in surgery, then? No. What is honor? A word." And so it is that the very recognition we strive for may bring about in the place of manly adherence to exacting principle and unyielding rigorism, the convenient expediency and flabby opportunism of the time-serving trimmer.

Final evaluation.—It is most patent that the value of this disposition toward conduct depends on what a person aims at in his endeavor to secure the esteem of his fellows. The end with which all set out at this point is the same: to secure the satisfaction of self-esteem that lies in the recognition by others. But at

the very outset two different aims present themselves: either one can aim at the securing of true worth by the means of moral conduct, or one can aim directly at the securing of recognition by means of deception. In the former case every act about to be performed is first referred to the crucial touchstone of our own moral judgment; in the latter it is instead referred to the uncertain criterion of the incalculable changes in our unstable environment; in the first, the consideration is as to the rightness or wrongness of the act to be performed; in the second, the concern is as to its popularity or unpopularity. We can not as readily deceive ourselves as we can others, for we can see the selfish motive concealed from the outside observer. Where in exceptional cases a person succeeds in deceiving himself, it is always one who pursues the second course; as a result of his trying so long to convince others of his genuineness, he finally becomes deluded into that belief himself.* In a general way, the more the individual inclines toward the former course, the more salutary the results, and the more he tends in the other direction, the more mischievous the ultimate consequences.

Even in the case of intense ambition striving to real-

* Perhaps the best example of this kind in literature that the author is familiar with, is Fritz Nettenmair in Ludwig's novel, "Between Heaven and Earth," a novel which has probably never been excelled, if equaled, in the matter of keen psychological analysis.

ize itself by honest and honorable means, there are dangers: on the one hand, that of overwork, which cuts down so many of our ablest and worthiest men in their prime, and on the other, that of refraining from all the pleasing graces and the little kindnesses of social intercourse because of a just detestation of the infamous use to which they are so often degraded and because of the fear of being drawn into the same abominable practices, thus developing a serious gravity often mistaken for forbidding severity, if not cold indifference or even self-important haughtiness. But even in the case of the unprepossessing angularity and unapproachable austerity that unfortunately result in cases, what noble dignity there is to simple-minded sincerity compared to the abject beggarliness of adroit and subtle duplicity, and that in spite of the engaging blandness, the taking suavity and the captivating good-fellowship in which the latter is so apt to array itself!

Educational bearing.—In view of the potent influence toward socially desirable and undesirable conduct that lies in self-esteem and the love of recognition, it is of the utmost importance that teachers pay heed to these dispositions and bring proper influences to bear on them to the end of securing their coöperation in the work of education. The first concern must be to place respect or esteem on the right basis, and that not only by theoretical appeal to the intellect, but more especially by the practical appeal to the imitative nature of the child by the example of the teacher. Could every child be

sufficiently impressed with the thought that he will be esteemed because of the worthy use he makes of his abilities, even though they be mediocre or inferior, there would be no such strong desire on his part to attain by illegitimate means those heights that he cannot attain by an honorable use of the powers with which he has been endowed. Were our educational agencies to be controlled with this aim in view, it would not be so difficult to secure the thoroughness of the real worker in place of the superficiality of the ambitious eye-servant. Then we could consistently urge our pupils to take as their motto the words of Schiller:

Who something perfect would perform,
To something great give birth,
Must gather, quiet and unwearied e'er,
The greatest power in smallest sphere.

Just because the undesirable features of the love of recognition are brought out where it is inordinate and conscious of its own relative inability as compared to that of rivals, it is clear that in order to secure desirable results, ability must be improved, ambition curbed and judgment developed as to what is really worthy and therefore worth while. In the language of Lao-tse, we must "weaken ambition" and "strengthen backbone." If we do that we can have some assurance that our efforts will be instrumental in bringing about a life absorbed in service to those higher interests worthy of the dignity of man's estate, instead of a life devoted to a

fruitless chase after the elusive rainbow of evanescent fame.

For what are men, who grasp at praise sublime,
But bubbles on the rapid stream of time,
That rise and fall, that swell, and are no more,
Born and forgot, ten thousand in an hour.

—Young.

CHAPTER IV

REGARD FOR OTHERS

ATTITUDES OF ESTIMATION

Different forms of estimation.—Although an intelligent regard for self will frequently result in desirable conduct towards others, it does not follow that the same can ever furnish us with an absolute or even a sufficient guarantee of such conduct; for even the most intelligent self-interest may, under extraordinary circumstances, be tempted to wrong-doing where the fear of detection and therefore of punishment is absent. Society is assured of a better guarantee of desirable conduct where the individual is moved by a proper regard for others. Speaking from the standpoint of psychology, perhaps the simplest forms of the regard for others are found in the various attitudes of estimation, attitudes aroused in us at sight of anything impressing us as having real ability, power, or worth. Where our estimate is based mainly on mere ability, we might perhaps call the attitude mere *appreciation*. Where it is based in the main on the recognition of what we consider moral worth, we properly call it *respect*. The recognition of what to us is unusual ability arouses

the attitude of *admiration*, which undoubtedly includes an element of liking, or affection. Exceptional worth, accompanied by qualities or elements arousing affection, arouses *esteem*. The recognition of exceptional ability and worth, accompanied by affection, arouses the attitude we call *veneration*. Where, in addition to the various factors that produce veneration, there is present a peculiar fear of the object or for the object of our regard, we have *reverence*.

Estimation and liking.—These different mental attitudes are manifested on the physical side by a looking up to the object, while we look down upon the object that strikes us as valueless or worthless. In addition, the actual or assumed presence of ability or worth tends to attract us, or to inspire liking, for both ability and moral worth appeal to our sense of values, and what we value we would make our own. That this is the case is perhaps more readily seen in admiration than in respect. We naturally admire exceptional ability in whatsoever sphere of human activity it may appear. As our own powers are being applied in only a very restricted sphere, the exceptional ability we meet with in life is in most cases operative outside of our own sphere; in other words, it does not involve a comparison with our own ability, thus possibly reflecting unfavorably upon ourselves. As a result the primary tendency towards appreciative recognition can secure unhindered expression, and so we readily notice that we are attracted. The case of respect is different. For, while

we are not all called upon to be good speakers, good musicians, good debaters, good marksmen, good horsemen, good runners, good entertainers, good cooks, or good seamstresses, we are most certainly called upon to be honest and truthful, faithful in the performance of duty, brave, considerate, just, and so on. While all-round ability is expected of no one, true worth is justly expected of all. As a result, where we meet with exceptional development in any or all of the virtues enumerated, somehow we sense a contrast between the exceptional worth in the other and the lesser worth in ourselves. While on the one hand we feel a pleasure that draws us to the object of our regard, on the other we are apt to feel a strange depression that dampens our ardor and leaves us ill at ease in the presence of the object of respect. It is this latter factor that Emerson has in mind where he says: "Every genius is defended from approach by quantities of unavailability. They are very attractive, and seen at a distance our own: but we are hindered on all sides from approach. The more we are drawn, the more we are repelled."

Element of affection in veneration.—Although the presence of exceptional ability in another tends to arouse liking through the intermediacy of our admiration, it does not follow that our attitude toward such person will necessarily be that of admiration; we may admire his ability without admiring him. In fact, if the person of exceptional ability in any particular direction

be relatively crude and undeveloped, naively conceited, unreasonably vain, offensively proud and overweening, inconsiderate or unjust, the general attitude of an unprejudiced acquaintance toward him is very apt to be that of positive dislike. On the other hand, the man of even the widest range and greatest degree of ability will, if he be a man of true worth and that true worth be seen, affect the mature and unbiased spectator of average calibre with a positive liking, even where the latter is fully conscious of a something that keeps him at a distance. If a man of such ability has attained to anything like an ideal development, leaving him possessed of true pride, true modesty and true humility, a man considerate and kind, a fearless champion of the poor and friendless, of truth and justice, the attitude of all unprejudiced people who have come in intimate touch with his personality is necessarily that of veneration, which in addition to admiration and respect contains a very noticeable element of affection.

Element of fear in reverence.—In reverence there is present, in addition to these, the element of fear in some form or other, on the one hand, perhaps, fear of the object, but just as much, it seems, fear for the object. When the disparity between ourselves and the revered person is especially great, it is apt to make us stand in awe. The aged man with hoary locks and feeble step somehow reminds us, even in youth, of the inevitable though still distant end that we are slowly but just as surely approaching. His trembling voice,

dwelling on the misty and uncertain past, seems to us to come from, and to be about to return to, a realm strangely and uncannily different from the one in which we dwell and which is so cosily familiar. Evidently we are here dealing with a feeling that has crossed the border line of the religious sentiment. Reverence seems also, at times, to be called forth at sight of a rare goodness approaching absolute self-abnegation, arousing in us fear in the form of solicitude for the person whose goodness others are apt to take advantage of. Here also, in the presence of a lofty or exalted goodness transcending ordinary human nature, do we seem to come upon the super-personal, to come somehow in actual proximity with unapproachable Infinitude.

Liking displaced in case of rivalry.—Where instead of the unprejudiced spectator we have the man affected in his self-regard by exceptional ability and rare worth in another, the attitude aroused will naturally be different. The same ability and worth that, in a stranger, would arouse admiration and respect, and through them liking, is very apt, when seen in a competitor in our own sphere of action, to arouse dislike, unless there be a sufficient number of common interests to hold the two in bonds of friendship.* Unless such other factors be present, we are apt never to feel really cordial toward the other, if his superiority in either ability or worth, or both, outdistances us in the race after those things we are striving to secure. And even where the conduct

* See next chapter, pp. 93-96.

and manner of such person toward us is perfectly unobjectionable as viewed by the disinterested observer, we, his rivals, are necessarily differently affected, a point well brought out in the relation of Lincoln to his chief advisers. "It is absurd to speak of Lincoln as modest. No really great man ever was modest. It was just Lincoln's intellectual arrogance, his unconscious assumption of superiority, that Seward and Chase and Sumner could not forgive."* Men of smaller calibre than these would have been driven by their envy and resulting malice and hate beyond the point of mere coolness, to actual antagonism, perhaps cowardly treachery. An ignoble mind, steeped in insincerity through inordinate self-regard in any form, will feel only envy and hatred where a rival's qualities command respect. "Wisdom and goodness to the vile seem vile." It is this that in the main accounts for the fact that such great teachers as Socrates, Paracelsus, Fichte, revered by the students, became the victims of persecution on their fictitious charges of treason, disloyalty, and atheism, charges having their inception in the envy and hatred of colleagues and other rivals.

Unbiased view of immature.—The child or youth, on the other hand, still imbued with the desire for self-improvement, still striving to realize an ideal, and not as yet committed to ways of indirection, will, when

* Nicolay and Hay's Biography. The author evidently uses the term modesty in the sense of that false modesty characterized on p. 48.

coming under the influence of a noble character and inspiring personality, emulate the example. Seeing himself growing as a result, it is but natural that gratitude and therefore affection should be aroused. In the words of Goethe:

The man completed knows no being suited;
The immature will ever grateful be.

In the same way, the average adult whose education perhaps was faulty, who lacked the advantages and opportunities of his more fortunate brothers and sisters, but who is fully aware of his own shortage, will almost idolize the great and good wherever he is able to recognize the same as such. "What a testimony, full of grandeur, full of pity, is borne to the demands of his own nature, by the poor clansman, the poor partisan, who rejoices in the glory of his chief. The poor and the low find some amends to their immense moral capacity, for their acquiescence in a political and social inferiority. They are content to be brushed like flies from the path of a great person so that justice shall be done by him to that common nature which it is the dearest desire of all to see enlarged and glorified. They sun themselves in the great man's light, and feel it to be their own element. They cast the dignity of man from their downtrod selves upon the shoulders of a hero, and will perish to add one drop of blood to make the great heart beat, those giant sinews combat and conquer. He lives for us, and we live in him."¹ Ar

excellent illustration is furnished in the following extract from the memoirs of an admiring contemporary of Frederick the Great: "And yet nothing had happened. No pomp, no fireworks, no cannon-shot, no drumming and fifeing, no music, no event that had occurred! No, nothing but an old man of seventy-three, ill-dressed, all dusty, was returning from his day's work. But everybody knew that this old man was toiling also for him; that he had set his whole life on that labor, and for five-and-forty years had not given it the slip one day! Every one saw, moreover, the fruits of this old man's labor, far and near, and everywhere around; and to look on the old man himself awakened reverence, admiration, pride, confidence—in short, all the nobler feelings of man."

Wrong basis of estimation.—It is very evident that we may respect others on a wrong basis, just as we may esteem ourselves on insufficient grounds; it all goes back to our own judgment as to what constitutes moral worth. To the child ability is worth, and it seems as though most of us could never quite deliver ourselves from the same point of view. And even when we arrive at that stage of our development where we realize that "honor and shame from no condition rise," it seems that the long-formed habit of manifesting our respect and esteem on the old basis will, in large part, still dominate our conduct in this particular respect. We may endorse this proper sentiment in theory and ignore it in practice. We may innerly feel respect for the

worthy man of obscure station, and at the same time permit of no outward manifestation of the feeling, while we go through the form of homage to the man in the "higher" walk of life, even though we innerly despise him. "Fontenelle says: 'I bow down before a gentleman of rank, but my spirit does not bow down.' I can add: before a common man of lowly position, in whom I notice a rectitude of character that I am not cognizant of in myself, my spirit does bow down, whether I am willing or not, and even though I carry my head yet so high to make sure of his noticing my superiority. . . . Respect is a tribute that we can not deny to merit; it is true, we may outwardly withhold the same, yet we can not prevent our feeling it inwardly.'"²

Work of the school.—It is evident that the school must help to guard against the forming of false social standards due to basing respect and esteem on the possession of wealth, family connections, ancestry, scholarship, or what not, in place of putting them on their only correct basis, that of true worth: the doing well our part in the work of life, whether that part be great or small, conspicuous or obscure. And not only must we endeavor to make such a correct standard appeal theoretically to the intellect, but to have it appeal sufficiently to work out in conduct. The subject-matter of the various studies, the example of the teacher, and what he exacts of his pupils in their attitude toward one another, must all be brought to help out in this direc-

tion. The especially important dangers to guard against here are those of letting the child get the view that people of the so-called "upper" classes are better than others, that members of the mercantile and professional world are worthier than those belonging to the so-called "laboring" classes, that family connections or racial extraction confer merit and entitle to preference and privilege.

Disrespect for parents.—Unfortunately, it is only too true that the child sees respect shown on every hand, even by his teachers, it may be, to the more prominent, well-to-do, influential citizens, while those of the humbler walks of life, however honest and industrious, are barely noticed, if at all. How many an educated man, yes, how many a schoolman even, that would not think of raising his hat to a woman of lowly position, while he does salute the banker's wife or the merchant's wife in that particular manner? How often has not the city boy seen the average well-mannered man offer his seat in the street car to the well-dressed woman, while he vulgarly ignores the woman in a calico wrapper, even though every indication show the strain of fatigue or exhaustion? The child growing up in such an environment can not help being influenced in the direction of the acceptance of a false standard of estimation, and thus having his conduct toward others made different from what it should be. The child coming from the more favored home will thus, almost of necessity, be trained into the haughty attitude of contempt or at

least of unconcern or disregard with reference to the less favored of our population. On the other hand, what about the effect on the children coming from the homes of the other type? Is it surprising that many such children should grow up without a proper self-respect, as long as the very source of such an attitude has been withheld from them; as long, in other words, as they have never gained a true conception as to what is the proper basis for respect? Is it surprising, on the other hand, that so many of those who somehow learn to see that the common standard is incorrect, should grow up with a fixed dislike for those better situated members of society that reap rewards to which they are not justly entitled? Again, where the child coming from such a home finds that his parents are practically socially ostracized, or at least ignored as a negligible element, if not actually exposed to the open scorn and contempt of the "respectable" classes, how can he retain for his parents that respect that is the natural source of obedience to proper authority? And be it remembered, the home, after all, is ordinarily the main factor in the moral development of the child. Undermine the respect for the parents, and thus the authority of the home, and what will compensate for the loss?

Relation to crime.—Where to the above cause leading to disrespect for parents there is added any other, the results must necessarily be still more certain. One of the most interesting of our social phenomena is found

in the fact that the ratio of criminality among American-born children of foreign-born parents is greater, on the one hand, than that of the foreign-born parents, and on the other, than that of native-born children of native-born parents. This is even the case where the foreign-born parents of a given nationality show a markedly lower ratio of criminality than do our native-born citizens of native-born parentage. A corresponding condition is shown by the statistics of Germany and other European countries to be true of children born to such immigrants after their arrival in those respective countries. It is not the province of this investigation to attempt a complete explanation of this interesting phenomenon. But it seems very evident to anyone who has ever made a serious effort to analyze the problem, that a most important cause is found in the fact that the native-born children of such foreign-born parents are brought, in some way, to lack sufficient respect for their parents.

Attitude of society toward foreign-born.—The immigrants who come to us from foreign lands are as a usual thing men and women of lowly station, doing menial work—poor. Add to the handicap of their poverty the fact that they are “foreigners,” and we can readily see that their case is indeed prejudiced. For to us in our narrow Chauvinism and vainglorious self-sufficiency they are after all inferior, not being real Americans. It does not take long for the keen, alert mind of the child to notice that his parents and his

people are not accepted as being up to standard. The manners and customs as well as the point of view brought from distant shores, the very things, in short, that seem to be valued most by the parents, are met with idle curiosity, if not ridicule or scorn. It is not rarely that he sees the awkward attempts of the foreign-born to speak the language of their adopted country meet with the reward of flippant, taunting raillery. On every hand, he runs across caricatures of his people held up to ridicule and contempt in the "joke" columns of the daily press, the "comic" supplement of the Sunday papers, the inane dialect stories, not merely on the stage of the cheap vaudeville, but even interspersing the addresses of able politicians and dignified statesmen appealing on the hustings for the votes of their enlightened constituents, or introducing the after-dinner speeches of national dignitaries and famed men of letters.

Attitude of school.—And even in the public schools, instituted as an instrument for the training in intelligent and upright citizenship, beckoning to the children of rich and poor alike, native-born or foreign, and bidding their presence on equal terms and on equal footing, even there does he sometimes meet with the same subtle and insidious forces which, unbeknown to him, estrange him from his parents and teach him to look upon them with disrespect, ingratitude or scorn. What wonder, then, that we occasionally see a child of foreign-born parents actually manifesting shame

when appearing publicly in the company of his own father or mother? The writer remembers more than one occasion when, after a mother of alien birth had come to see a teacher to make some explanation or other in broken English, the teacher would mockingly imitate her broken speech in accounting the affair to her co-workers. On the more nearly matured child such incidents may produce the effect of arousing indignation and resentment, an attitude society is never wise in calling forth in any of her members towards any others. But what is the necessary, inevitable effect on the average younger child who sees that the speech, the mannerisms and other characteristics of his parents or others of his kin or race are made the subject of ridicule and raillery, and when even his teacher smiles in amusement at sight or sound or mention of such things? Do you see any connection between such "trivial" incidents and the action of that boy who leers in his father's or mother's face in response to commands given in broken English? And do you see any connection between such evident disrespect for parents, the natural guides and guardians of our young people, and the later disrespect and resulting disregard for that most cherished institution, the properly constituted authority of law, if not a criminal career?

Even where the teacher avoids all of the things named so far, there is still danger of unintentionally and unwittingly helping in this same direction in another way. The way in which we are apt to teach history and

geography, to select the nature of the subject-matter generally taken up and emphasized in language work, in the composition and rhetorical exercises, in the general, or opening, exercises, in the manner of conducting our national holiday programs, is such as gradually to impress upon the mind of the child the idea that his parents are not full-fledged Americans, that they are not entitled to full respect because they are not native-born, or perhaps because they are not of Puritan extraction. Emphasis being placed in our school work on the mention that is made of this one element of our population, while no mention is made of any other, necessarily results in placing a preferential valuation upon the one, and in depreciating all others.

Counteracting educational agencies.—The evident and real dangers of developing wrong social standards of estimation, and therefore of conduct toward our fellows, can be avoided only by specifically guarding against them. There must be conscious and intelligent effort, thoughtfully directed and persistently sustained, of permitting nothing in the presentation of subject-matter, in the attitude to pupils, in government and discipline, in the oversight of playground and students' organizations, that would tend in this wrong direction; but, more than this negative phase of our effort, there must be direct and specific attempts to make all these factors conduce in a positive way to build up right standards. Furthermore, this is not difficult. In fact, there are many ways in which we

can take up the study of any phase of our industrial life, and utilize the same to this very end. It is not by any means difficult to let the average child see how dependent we are on every man in any way connected with our intricate system of transportation, for instance. It is comparatively easy to get him to see how safety of travel for ourselves or those dear to us depends on the intelligence, and more so, the conscientious performance of duty, often in irksome and uninviting form, of the train-dispatcher, every operator on the line, the engineer and fireman on the locomotive, the conductor and brakeman, as well as every humble section "hand" and unnoticed track-walker. Inattentiveness in the dispatcher, yielding to the temptation of sleep on the part of the night-operator, carelessness in the engineer in reading his orders, slipshodness on the part of the section man in driving the spikes and fastening the bolts that hold the rails in place—in short, unfaithfulness or heedlessness on the part of any one of the numerous employes of a great railway system—and ruin, death and misery follow.

Respect on proper basis.—The reverse side is just as easily presented. Let the pupil see the importance and equal value of the work of all in any way connected with the transportation of human life and of all the material things conducing to human happiness and welfare. Let him see that every man and every woman who in any way is doing a useful work in life is needed and therefore of importance. Let him see

that every position, whatever it may be, furnishes us with the opportunity for either doing good or doing ill, and that a man or woman, is worthy of respect, not according to the prominence of his work, the rareness of his ability, the eminence of his station, good name or fame of ancestry, but only and solely according to the fidelity with which he earnestly strives to do his best in whatsoever work of life he may be engaged. "Man has no personal worth excepting this that he faithfully perform the duties of his vocation, whatever that vocation may be; and here, entirely independent of the nature of their vocations, all men can be equal."³

Reducing ambition.—It may also be possible to subdue, in some degree, the glamour that surrounds exceptional ability or eminent station. These things may lose something of their charm when the child sees that he who gains an appreciable degree of worldly success is ever exposed to envy and malice, of which the man of commonplace ability and less conspicuous position in life is perfectly free.

"The world doth love to blacken what is lustrous,
And in the dust to trample the sublime."

—Schiller.

To older pupils it may also mean something when we try to show them that unmerited honors, homage or esteem must after all be anything but satisfying to the recipient. He dare not even indulge himself in

the rare and precious moments of meditation or of self-communion. He can escape others, but not himself.

“O heart, let not it dupe you,
That earth’s reward doth not accord with merit.
Deservéd crowns adorn, while undeserved afflict,
However proud the airs the wearers are assuming.”
—Rückert.

Contact with labor.—Merely appealing through the intellect, however, will make the desirable conception pass over into flesh and blood but slowly. Where such appeal is preceded, accompanied, or followed by activity that stirs up the emotional nature, thus involving motor expression, the desired result is far more readily and surely obtained. Let the boy in his manual training work but find out through personal experience how difficult it is for him to perform a simple feat in carpentering, of working in brass or iron, at the same time bringing him frequently in contact with skilled mechanics who really are masters in their trades, and the matter of respect for labor will almost take care of itself. In the same way, sufficient personal familiarity with the elements of agriculture, perhaps through work in the school-garden, would soon overcome any tendency to look down upon the honest country boy and later, in the years of maturity, upon the plain and unsophisticated farmer. It is quite probable that we would not now be discussing a “servant problem,” if for a generation or two past our girls had been sufficiently engaged, in connection with their home duties and school

work, in sewing, in cooking, and the various departments of domestic science and the household arts, thus acquiring a sufficient knowledge of the real difficulties involved, and through that knowledge a respect for those who are by calling engaged in such work.

Overcoming race prejudice.—As regards the matter of race prejudice and resulting disrespect, that can readily be counteracted by showing the pupils what other races and nations have done in the cause of human progress, still more by showing them what part these various elements have played in the history and development of our own country, and most of all, by discouraging everything in the way of taunting flings, of dialect stories, the use of such puerile epithets as “sheeny” or “dago,” the tendency to disregard correct pronunciation or spelling of the names of children of foreign extraction, the temptation to treat lightly anything that savors of alien origin, anything and everything, in short, that betokens disrespect. Such activity on the part of the teacher is not only to be desired because of its effect on the majority of pupils, pupils of native extraction generally, but also in the interests of that minority whose parents are of foreign birth, in order that there may be no loss in the authority and influence of such parents over their children. It will serve the additional purpose of getting such children imbued with a more intense love of country through seeing what part their people played in the development of the common country.

The French-Canadian boy, for instance, will respect his parents more highly and will be made a better citizen by learning what the French people have done for the civilization and culture of the world; when he learns of the paramount influence of French philosophy on the development of that spirit that finally expressed itself in the Declaration of Independence and the Revolutionary struggle; when he learns of the unselfish devotion of Lafayette and other Frenchmen to the cause of the liberty of our own people. So also will that Polish boy be made a better citizen by being made to respect himself and his parents through learning that the Polish people have ever been distinguished by their ardent and zealous love of liberty, perhaps more still through learning in the public schools that Pulawski, who distinguished himself in the battles of Brandywine and Germantown, and finally fell at Savannah in the last brave charge that he made in the cause he had so devotedly espoused, was a countryman of his parents, as was also Kosciuszko, without whose engineering and strategical skill the victory of Bemis Heights would have been impossible. In view of these things it is gratifying to view the activity of various historical societies now engaged in the work of investigating the part that the various ethnic elements of our population have played in the development of our country. It is to be hoped that it will not be long before the results of such investigation will be available in reference works

for the use of teachers or even in text-books to be placed in the hands of pupils.

Lastly, let us teachers ever bear in mind that it is only when we ourselves take high vantage-ground, that we can lead our youth of every parentage and station to that lofty ideal of true democracy and true humanitarianism which consists in ascribing merit on the basis of true worth, and not on that of accident of birth or parentage; which respects a man neither because of aristocratic birth, nor because of his wealth, nor yet because his family has resided for so or so many generations on American soil, but simply and solely and only because of his own true worth as a man.

Then let us pray that come it may
As come it will for a' that;
That sense and worth, o'er a' the earth,
May bear the gree, and a' that.
For a' that, and a' that,
It's coming yet, for a' that,
That man to man, the world o'er,
Shall brothers be for a' that.

CHAPTER V

REGARD FOR OTHERS

PERSONAL ATTACHMENT

The source of protectorship.—Because of the fact that the various attitudes of estimation are due either to a sense of the social value or the moral worth of the persons toward whom we are moved to feel in those particular ways, the conduct prompted by such attitudes is primarily that of consideration, the avoidance of anything tending to do violence or other injury to the object. What we value we do not ourselves injure or destroy. Whether or not we will protect the same against injury from any other source, depends on another factor. In addition to the sense of the value of the object in itself, there must be either the sense of its value for ourselves, in other words, the feeling of personal possession or of personal interest in some other form; or, the feeling of personal responsibility with reference to the object, due to any other cause. The form of regard for others from which such protectorship most naturally springs is that of personal attachment in some form or other, for that implies possession or at least mutuality of interests. This is more readily seen

in the case of impersonal objects: things. We may be conscious of the objective value of a piece of property that is gradually going to ruin or that is threatened with impending danger, but we will not ordinarily do anything to forestall such ruin or guard against such danger, for we feel that it is the owner's place to do that; we will interfere only where we feel a sense of personal responsibility, as for instance in case of the owner's absence or physical incapacity. Our own valued property we are ever on the alert to protect. Merely objective value, in short, does not appeal to us in just the same way as does subjective value. This applies equally to our attitude toward persons. Those whom we consider as our own, the members of our own family, our own kin, our own friends, our own community, our own party, and so on, we are similarly inclined to safeguard or protect, according to the degree of their value to us or to the strength of our attachment to them.

Where the various attitudes of estimation secure considerateness toward the respective persons whenever we chance to come in contact with them, personal attachment does as much, and more. It seeks the presence of its object for the purpose of enjoyable intercourse and contact. In addition to the more nearly negative attitude of considerateness in word and action, it takes the more positive attitude of helpfulness and agreeable service. It desires the presence, the companionship of the object of love, for absence is painful. It seems to consist of a strange mixture of joy in the possession and

pain in the thought of possible loss, happiness in the consciousness of the safety of the object, and unhappiness in the form of solicitude because of possible danger. It not only refrains from personally injuring the object, as does respect, but in addition safeguards it against injury from other quarters. On its lower plane, love seems to be no more than a desire for possession and use, a using of the object as a means to one's personal ends, and so is in reality no love for the object, but rather self-love. Even though it will fight for the object, it does so from the same cause as does love in the child for its bag of sweets. True love implies surrender to the object; its natural attitude is that of devotion.

Natural affinity.—Personal attachment in its varying degrees of intensity seems to present itself either in the form of natural affinity, manifested by attraction or inclination to the object even at first contact, or to be only gradually acquired on the basis of some process of closer identification with the object. As to the first, it seems we are drawn to others in the degree in which we find, or seem to find, a community of common qualities, characteristics, interests. "Birds of a feather flock together." In view of the favorable regard in which we are apt to hold ourselves, it is but natural that we should like the same things in others which we value in ourselves, provided we be not made conscious of inferiority, or that there be no rivalry between us, either one of which factors might dampen our ardor. The etymology of the word "liking" is interesting; it proba-

bly involves the analysis that we like those that are like ourselves. This same thought is tersely put by Lincoln in these words: "The man I don't understand is the man I don't like." In the same way we seem to be drawn to those who differ from ourselves in some respect or other, especially if they possess those desirable characteristics or virtues which we prize ourselves but wherein we are relatively lacking. It is evident that we can not truly like where we do not respect, for we are not drawn to what to our mind is lacking in value. Disrespect would rather create dislike.

Sources of acquired liking.—If in addition to the factors that make for natural affinity, there be other causes that give us pleasure, our attachment is apt to become stronger. Appreciated services that have been rendered us by another will, to that extent, create a predilection, through gratitude, toward the person that has so served us. Even minor attentions that have been paid us will arouse a degree of liking, other things equal. Sometimes our heart will go out to another for no more reason than that he has taken a personal interest in us. We are thankful even for that, and gratitude not infrequently begets love. We may be brought to love others from the simple cause that they love us, or that we think they love us. The child's love for parent or teacher is largely accounted for by this fact. It goes without saying that injuries, especially intentional injuries, will create dislike, even if they be no more than slights in the form of the ignoring of our existence.

Attachment to others, however, is not acquired merely on the basis of our identification with them through what they have done for us; but as well through what we have done for them. The greater the services we have rendered another in the past, the greater the sacrifices we have made in his behalf, the more nearly, in other words, we have made his interests our own, the more nearly has he become part of our own selves as it were, in other words, the greater our attachment to him. The weak and sickly child, the very one that would least appeal to an outsider, may be more endeared to a fond mother's heart than any of her other children, due to the many hours of anxious solicitude, the weary nights of sleepless toil she has spent over it. The parent's attitude toward the proverbial "black sheep," the love with which we sometimes see a noble woman of lofty character cling to a worthless and dissolute husband who cruelly maltreats her, are to be accounted for on this basis. It would follow as a corollary that the intenser our love, the greater the pain where it is not reciprocated: "How sharper than a serpent's tooth it is to have a thankless child." In the same way the injuries we have done others in the past can only arouse dislike toward them.

Attachment to others is not merely brought about through what they have done for us or we have done for them. Any other experiences we have lived through in common, whether those experiences were pleasurable or painful, will have brought us closer together and

through this mutuality of association and resulting memories will have produced a degree of affinity or attachment, at least. Mere association may under favorable circumstances produce even strong affection. Of course, no one of these factors, taken alone, can produce the strength of attachment that is necessarily secured where there is a happy co-operation between several or all of them. It is through the extent to which we have a co-operation of these various factors, and the extent to which each is developed through a greater or lesser degree of identification in the way of longer acquaintance and companionship, that we secure attachment in varying degrees: mere inclination, or predilection, the more pronounced liking, the tenderer affection, or intense love.

Relation of respect to liking.—Real attachment, in any degree, can not exist in the absence of respect; that is to say, we can not feel attached to anything we do not value. In view of the fact that love implies, in a sense, surrender to the object, how could we thus give ourselves over to another we do not respect? On the other hand, as was seen above, where respect is present, to that extent there is also present a factor which inevitably tends to arouse a predilection towards the respected person. All that is needed to develop this into a more pronounced liking is the opportunity for getting better acquainted. The longer we know people who are justly respected the more we learn to like them.

On the other hand, a liking in the form of natural affinity based on other elements than respect, frequently wanes or even disappears as we get better acquainted, due to the fact that we find we can not respect where we thought we could. Where we find we dislike any one we must respect, it is time we were trying to find out what is wrong with ourselves.

Test of love.—It will not do to assume that the degree of liking is indicated by the degree of companionship. It is true, we like to associate with those whose company we enjoy. But such enjoyment and the seeking of such association may be prompted in the main by self-regard. The object of a true and abiding love, however, is not sought out as a means to our ends, but as an end in itself. The object of mere companionship may be merely an object of self-gratification or self-indulgence, while the object of a deeper love is an object of devotion. Again, it is true, we like to associate with those in whose company we are at ease. Our being at ease in the presence of another may not be very complimentary to the latter. Perhaps we are at ease because we feel no need of holding ourselves up to a high standard of conversation, or decorum, or what not. Perhaps we are at ease because we feel that in their company we can give ourselves over with perfect abandon to undignified lounging, slovenly thought and utterance, indecorous behavior or unseemly familiarity. The real test of love is not found in mere companionship,

but rather in the sacrifices we are willing to make for the object of love. It is significant that when several of our friends are in danger and we can aid but one, we may actually give our aid, not to the one whose company we sought most, but instead to the one in whose company we were never quite as much at ease.

Sexual love.—When to the factors aforementioned, making for attachment between individuals, there be added the racial instinct that makes for the preservation of the race, we secure that rare inheritance of man, that perhaps more than any other has inspired our poets to their greatest works of genius: love between man and woman. There is danger that young people get the impression that this love is merely made up of the aforementioned racial instinct, wherefore there is need of their learning that this merely animal passion or proclivity by no means constitutes that tender feeling that makes up so large a part of life itself. The more important constituent, perhaps, is found in those factors which form a strong attachment, in the absence of sex difference, in other words, the same factors that are the source of true and abiding friendship between man and man, or woman and woman: mutual respect and a community of important interests.

True love's the gift which God has given
To man alone beneath the heaven:

It is not fantasy's hot fire,

Whose wishes, soon as granted fly;

It liveth not in fierce desire,

With dead desire it doth not die;

It is the secret sympathy,
The silver link, the silken tie,
Which heart to heart and mind to mind,
In body and in soul can bind.

Here, as elsewhere, the degree of companionship is no criterion or index as to the presence or absence or the intensity of love, especially not in its incipient stages. When first it steals upon a young man it is very apt to make him uncomfortable and ill at ease in the presence of the adored. He is drawn with irresistible force, finds himself wandering about in unfamiliar paths, perhaps without even being conscious of the fact that they lead to her abode. And just as much as he is drawn, just as much is he kept at a distance. While perfectly at ease in the presence of young women that are practically indifferent to him, he is decidedly embarrassed in the company of one he is learning to love. And as to the young woman, the first indication to the practiced observer is frequently found in an attitude of apparent dislike toward the object of her unknown affection. She also is made uncomfortable, not so much embarrassed, perhaps, as annoyed. Remarks that, coming from indifferent persons, would be unnoticed, are the source of unmistakable vexation or irritation when coming from one in whom she is becoming interested. Strange anomaly! Is it the nature of woman's way thus instinctively to react against what purports to be an invasion or usurpation of her very self?

Love not mere passion.—However that may be, it is evident enough that in this as in its other forms, true love is necessarily a respectful love; that it is always accompanied by that intangible, mysterious something that safeguards, rather than exposes, the object of love to possible jeopardy or actual injury. It prevents undue intimacy or familiarity in its every form. The young man who so demeans himself as to take liberties with a young woman is not in love with her, in any true sense of that term. Furthermore, he never would voluntarily marry a young woman who permits any such familiarity. Where a young couple form an alliance for life solely on the basis of merely animal propensity, such alliance is almost doomed to failure; then, indeed, “marriage is a lottery” and married life too often a veritable hell on earth. Instead there should be present such a degree of community of interests and of mutual respect as would make possible, on the one hand, a firm and permanent attachment and, on the other, a deep and abiding confidence and trust. Where we do not feel free to confide to the other even our inmost thoughts and most cherished secrets, there is lacking that complete surrender of self which is the essence of love. It is this that Schiller has in mind where he gives us the advice:

Before for aye you are committed,
First see if heart to heart be fitted!
The dream is short, repentance long.

In the light of all these things it is evident that in many quarters there is manifested a deplorable unconcern on the part of parents with reference to the way in which they permit children in their teens a degree of liberty of intercourse with the opposite sex that inevitably creates temptations and dangers that even mature people are hardly prepared to face with assurance of safety or impunity. They permit the child of sixteen to play with fire more dangerous than the playing with safety matches and gunpowder that they forbid the child of six.

The canker galls the infants of the spring,
 Too oft before their buttons be disclosed,
 And in the morn and liquid dew of youth
 Contagious blastments are most imminent.

Relation of sympathy to love.—One of the ways in which personal affection in any form is apt to manifest itself is sympathy. Sympathy, however, is more than merely reflected feeling; it is not merely pain in ourselves at the sight of another's painful experience. Such a merely reflected feeling would arise where we see another meeting with a mishap or with misfortune that we can comprehend. We must have had similar experiences ourselves. Where we have such a basis for understanding the significance of that which we observe, we thereby are possessed of all that is needed to arouse emotion of this reflected type. True sympathy, or fellow-feeling, however, presupposes more than mere understanding. Where the mere presence of pain in

ourselves at sight of the painful experience of another can be got rid of by our turning away from the disagreeable sight, true sympathy turns to the relief of the one in distress, for true sympathy is conditioned not merely on understanding, but in addition, on personal attachment. Understanding plus love secures sympathy but where love is lacking, there can be no sympathy, however much of understanding there may be.

Function of sympathy.—The natural function of sympathy is that of relieving the distress by which it has been aroused. Merely as a pain we ourselves experience at the consciousness of the pain of another it has no actual value whatsoever; its value is at best a potential one. If our reaction stops there, it is merely a useless infliction of pain on ourselves added to the pain of the other. It is only when it moves us to action tending to relieve the pain of the other or otherwise to guard his interests that it has positive, actual value. Furthermore, the more we let the feeling work out in conduct, the less will we be painfully affected thereby, and that is as it should be, for when our whole energy is absorbed or even paralyzed in the throes of a powerful emotion, it is evident that there can be no such thing as clear and accurate perception or judgment as to what is best to do, or cool and steady nerve and hand to do it. The expert surgeon will not operate where he knows that personal love for the patient is so deep as to make impossible a steady hand. Perhaps this thought can not be better put than it is by Bishop Butler: "Perception

of distress in others is a natural excitement, passively to pity, and actively to relieve it; but let a man set himself to attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, and he can not but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various miseries of life, with which he must become acquainted; when yet, at the same time, benevolence, considered not as a passion, but as a practical principle of action, will strengthen; and, whilst he passively compassionates the distressed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them.'²¹ It is because of the last named phase of the phenomenon that we so frequently judge a person with a deeper and abiding love and resulting sympathy to be devoid of the same, while we credit an abundance of the same to the person of a weaker nature who the more readily manifests an overmastering sympathy as he himself is lacking in self-mastery. True love often seems heartless just because it is deep and therefore controlled. The fond and doting mother who can not bear the thought of inflicting pain on her beloved child, even where good judgment shows the need of so doing, is as much deterred by a self-complacent and self-indulgent love of self as by an intelligent, deep, and disinterested love of the child, even though she does not realize it. If she thought more about the child's real, lasting interests, she would act upon her better judgment in spite of her finding it disagreeable and therefore difficult to do so.

Self-regard in sympathy.—While true sympathy is a

feeling aroused by true love, the merely reflected feeling often passing for the same may have, and is apt to have in it, an element of self-regard. It is our own pain we sense, and our own pain that is relieved by the action that relieves the pain of the other. That one of the component elements is apt to be self-regard, is indicated by the fact that sympathy in the joys of others is far less common than sympathy in their pains. The consciousness of success in another is too apt perhaps to involve a contrast with our relative lack of success. On the other hand failure, discomfiture, defeat, misfortune coming to the other somehow force upon us the complacent sense of our better fortune, just as we can the better enjoy the cosy comforts of our sheltered nook in the midst of the blasts of the howling storm. Again, in lower natures, the desire to help others may really spring from the tendency to look out for self by looking out for others. A person of a higher nature may similarly, through the help he is rendering another, experience that sublimated and self-deceiving pleasure that is apt to arise at the thought of our disinterested philanthropy.

Attitude of pupil to teacher.—In view of the fact that a child will imitate only the model or example that appeals to him and that he will more readily submit to the guidance and discipline of one he likes, it is evidently by no means immaterial as to what attitude he takes toward his teacher. The teacher will be able to wield a more potent and far better influence over the

child if the latter feels a personal affection for the former. The ideal attitude evidently is that of a respectful love. Younger pupils are apt to like that teacher that pays them personal attentions, the teacher who manifests a personal interest in them. They may at the same time remain perfectly cool toward a really worthy, hard-working teacher of good character who is not particularly demonstrative in his intercourse with them, for as yet they are not able to see that the worthy teacher of this latter type may be doing them more real, permanent good than the more superficial teacher of the more engaging and attractive type. In time, it is true, they may be able to see things on their merits. They are apt, for instance, to see how they all receive the benefits of such a teacher's justice, discriminating against none. It is such qualities of real worth that will gradually become manifest to them, and make them look up to such a teacher as a worthy example. As they feel themselves growing in the same direction, the resulting pleasures of self-esteem will necessarily arouse in them gratitude toward the teacher whom they recognize to be the source of these pleasures. If, however, the teacher be a person who manifests pride because of what he considers his exceptional ability, or supposed superior worth, in other words, assumes an attitude of superiority toward others, including his pupils, the latter are apt to feel dislike for him, for even the average child feels that such an attitude is indicative of relative lack of development and worth.

On the other hand, if the teacher has outgrown this false view and the resulting false attitude toward others, and has arrived at the stage where besides maintaining a true self-respect, he has also acquired a proper respect for others, his pupils can not help looking up to him. And ordinarily at least, in so far as they respect him, they can not help liking him, for ordinarily there is no rivalry or competition between teacher and pupil, and hence no conflict between self-esteem and respect for the other. Such a conflict is apt to arise only in those exceptional cases, where a spoiled and petted child, so used to preferential and deferential treatment that he has learned to look upon the same as his just desert, resents it as an injustice to himself to be treated as the equal of others. Such a child can not help it that he feels wronged by his new teacher and that as a result he is filled with dislike for him. Sufficient tact and time, however, will in such a case change dislike to liking.

The inexperienced teacher, anxious to succeed in his work, impatient to secure the evidences of popularity as the tokens of success, may be tempted to resort to actual solicitation of such evidences. He does not realize the dangers involved. He does not see that the little folks may in time see through his efforts to curry favor, and despise him in consequence. The true teacher of maturity and experience is not so much troubled about the question as to whether his pupils of ten or twenty years ago disliked him at the time because of the needed punishment he administered or because of the

rigorous requirements or severe exactions he made of them; he is more concerned with the thought of what they think of him now that they themselves are in a position to judge of the value of his efforts in their behalf. Neither does such a teacher look for much in the way of positive demonstrations of the esteem in which he may stand, for he knows from experience that the absence or presence of such regard for him can best be judged by more nearly negative indications. He realizes that as long as there is a manifest willingness to comply with his requests and to respect his wishes, as long as there is a relative absence of attempts to annoy or irritate or vex him, his position in the affections of his pupils is secure. He furthermore knows full well that the strength of affection is not necessarily shown by the degree of companionship and intimacy, but sees instead that the latter rather indicates that there is no great disparity between the degree of development, and therefore the interests, of teacher and pupil. On the other hand, there is danger that the mature teacher will overlook the fact that the greater the disparity in ability and general development between teacher and pupil, the more apt the latter is to sense that disparity and be kept at a distance. To guard against such a contingency, it is highly desirable that the teacher learn to keep the pupil from becoming self-conscious in the teacher's presence. He furthermore ought to seek opportunities to come into a less formal and less official contact with his pupils; that can readily

be done by taking advantage of the opportunities furnished on the occasion of class excursions, outings, or the visitation of the homes. The latter would serve the additional purpose of coming into closer contact with the parents and securing the co-operation of the home.

School and child's later responsibilities.—In view of the exceeding importance of personal attachment as furnishing the basis for a proper family life, it is devoutly to be wished that educational agencies be utilized to the end of striving for better results in that direction than can be secured without their aid. If we wish to have the home remain the integral unit of society, it ought to be worth while to try to maintain it, and if possible, to improve it, by paying more heed even in our educational efforts to those things that make possible a true home life. There is every reason to believe that we could, even under existing conditions, do more to prepare our young people, at least those that are in the high school, for their later responsibilities as husbands and wives, as fathers and mothers. We certainly ought to be able to get the average boy and young man to learn that a woman's work in life is as real and important a work as is man's; boys who have had to help their mothers in the work about the house generally have learned this, and are the more apt to take a sympathetic attitude toward their wives, perhaps to share their incomes equally with them. The emphasis given at present to domestic science in the education of our girls ought in the same way to be utilized to develop

in the girls a due sense of their duties as home-makers. If we but try, we ought even to find a means of getting our young people to see, at least in part, what we owe our children: a proper regard for their right to be born well, to be kept well, to be bred well.

School and sex problem.—“If education is to fit for life, then it ought to safeguard us against some of the commonest pitfalls and greatest moral dangers. With that in mind we have for years been giving instruction with regard to the injurious effects of the immoderate use of alcohol and narcotics generally. Now every mature man and woman is aware of the fact that more lives are injured, unfitted and ruined, directly or indirectly, through aberrations and vicious expression of the instincts and propensities that make for the preservation of the race, and through ignorance along the lines of the physiology and psychology of sex than through any other cause. Sheer social self-defense demands that that situation be changed and, delicate as the matter is, and dread it as we may, educational philosophy and educational administration and practice must take cognizance of it and take the steps which will safeguard the interests of society, for the problem of sexual hygiene and morality can be solved only by means of education. With that in mind I have, for the last fifteen years, closely followed the history of the agitation and propaganda, the theory and practice along this line, but I am sorry to say that the problem is so difficult, that little can as yet be safely done in a prac-

X tical way. But there are some things that can be done, and done safely, and that ought to be done. Look to the appearance of outbuildings; if they are defaced and defiled with obscenities of word or picture, it will pay the board to institute a thoroughgoing renovation, painting and overhauling, and the principal to keep up a system of regular inspection in order to keep them in proper condition; that this can be done I know from personal experience and from observation. In the schoolroom insist on those boys down in the grades keeping their hands in full sight in place of keeping them hidden in their pockets. Maintain the vigilant eye of kindly and friendly supervision everywhere to put a stop to, or better still, to prevent undue familiarity towards one another on the part of boys and girls in the upper grades, especially the high school. Every mature, whole-souled, and tactful woman teaching in the high school can exercise a wholesome influence over her girl pupils to discourage the seemingly innocent familiarities, but really dangerous improprieties of what is commonly called "puppy love;" perhaps by means of heart-to-heart talks and the giving of a modicum, at least, of the necessary information and enlightenment, especially if given after conference with the mother. Similarly, every mature and genuine man in the teaching profession, especially if he have boys of his own, can do a great deal of good to those boys that are ignorantly and innocently being drawn into the ways of secret vice; he can do it by means of a little kindly and

fatherly advice individually administered. That this particular problem is the most difficult and delicate one the teacher has to face I know, not from theoretical speculation, but from practical observation and personal experience. Young teachers especially need to be warned against rushing blindly ahead, guided only by the feeble light of good intention. But it behooves even mature teachers to be particularly careful in their efforts in this direction. On the other hand, prim prudery or craven cowardice ought to deter no one from doing his duty.'*'

*From an address by the author.

CHAPTER VI

REGARD FOR OTHERS

BENEVOLENCE, OR GOOD WILL

Discrimination due to love.—It can not be doubted that true love, where guided by enlightened intelligence, will furnish the best possible guarantee of desirable, or proper, conduct toward those to whom it is directed. Were it possible to have every member of society attached in this way to all others, the problem of human conduct, and therefore of human welfare, would indeed be solved. No wonder that the wise and good of earth have ever cherished the ideal of a kingdom of God on earth, brought about by a spirit of universal brotherhood, of brotherly love directed to all without discrimination or respect of persons. Unfortunately, however, we are so constituted by our own nature that love can be extended at best to only a limited number in a restricted sphere. We can not help liking some people, and we find it just as impossible to like others. The matter of liking and disliking is a matter of feeling, and not of will, hence a matter not under our control to any extent to speak of. It is true, we can, by doing something for another whom we dislike, learn in time

to like him to an extent through this means of identifying ourselves with him, but even so there will of necessity always remain a difference in the degree or extent of liking for others. Furthermore we may be able to find something or other, even in the most depraved, that we can like where we dislike, or are indifferent to, the person as a whole; just as we may find something we dislike even in our beloved child or dearest friend. In spite of all that, however, love can never be directed indiscriminately, or equally to all, but will ever be directed with respect to persons for the simple reason that it is a matter of feeling and therefore only partly under our control.

Nature of a non-discriminating attitude.—Just because love does necessarily discriminate in favor of some while it remains indifferent to others, its inadequacy as a source of proper conduct toward all is manifest. Love draws us toward those to whom it is directed; our conduct toward such is apt to be of the right kind as a result of such inclination. We do the right by them because it is easy to do so. On the other hand, we remain indifferent toward, or even ignore or slight, perhaps even injure others, toward whom we are not drawn in love. What is needed to secure proper conduct toward all, is something that will produce a right attitude toward all, whether we are inclined toward them or not, a something that will urge or push us toward those to whom we are not inclined or drawn. That something is provided in the form of regard, or respect for the moral

law, our sense of duty, manifested in that attitude toward others that had perhaps best be called benevolence, or good will, formerly called charity, and ordinarily spoken of as brotherly love. This, it is readily seen, is an attitude of will, rather than of feeling. While we can not love all in the same degree, we can compel ourselves to treat all with equal respect for their rights and needs. Through the sense of duty we can compel ourselves to treat others with the same helpfulness and consideration that would ordinarily be prompted by love. That is the significance of Paracelsus's maxim: "Not out of love, but with love." However, although benevolence is primarily not prompted by a regard for others, but rather by a regard for duty, it is equally true that the more we exercise this attitude toward others, the more of a tendency there is to develop it as an attitude prompted by a regard for others. In other words, benevolence, or good will towards all tends more and more to change into brotherly love, or good, or kindly feeling, toward all.* Of course, the fact that there is such a tendency does not say that such a condition will ever be actually consummated; in fact, it may well be doubted whether any human being can ever get himself to the point where he will do right in all things to all men, solely

* For this reason, benevolence is discussed under the head of Regard for Others, although it might more logically be treated under the Regard for Right and Duty.

through pure love of humanity, or without any effort in the way of self-compulsion through the sense of duty.

Constituent elements of benevolence.—Such a sense of duty would prompt us to treat others as we would be treated ourselves. Where we are guided by sufficiently enlightened judgment, we would be prompted to treat others in the way that good judgment tells us we have a right to expect others to treat us. Hence the attitude of benevolence would include proper considerateness with reference to the feelings of others, justice with reference to their rights and helpfulness with reference to their needs. As to the first, it will readily be seen that considerateness prompted by a sense of duty is by no means equivalent to considerateness prompted by cold, calculating self-regard, on the one hand, or that considerateness which is prompted by personal attachment to others. The self-seeking individual who finds it good policy to be considerate of the feelings of others may under circumstances appear affable, genial, or even gracious to strangers, while he may be absolutely bearish at home. Similarly, a man who is most pleasant and agreeable in his demeanor toward favorite associates and friends, may be anything but considerate of those whom he dislikes, or even of those that are indifferent to him. On the other hand, true benevolence is considerate not only of those from whose favorable disposition toward us something might be gained, but as well of those from whom no benefit or favor can be expected; not only of friends, but of strangers and enemies as well.

Consideration.—In fact, genuine benevolence, or good will, manifests a due consideration toward all, even those who have sunk below the plane of human decency, for enlightened judgment sees even in such an individual the core or kernel of a human personality, however much the same may be hidden from the eye of the superficial observer by the vile and repulsive exterior in which it is en clothed. Hatred for the man's despicable or contemptible qualities or actions is not accompanied by hatred for the man. For true benevolence includes that charity which consists in making due allowance for our common predisposition toward fault and failing and shows itself in leniency and forbearance in passing judgment on the actions or character of others.

Then gently scan your brother Man,
 Still gentler sister Woman;
 Tho' they may gang a kennin wrang,
 To step aside is human:
 One point must still be greatly dark,
 The moving *Why* they do it;
 And just as lamely can ye mark,
 How far perhaps they rue it.

Who made the heart, 'tis He alone
 Decidedly can try us,
 He knows each chord its various tone,
 Each spring its various bias:
 Then at the balance let's be mute,
 We never can adjust it;
 What's *done* we partly may compute,
 But know not what's *resisted*.

It is right at this point that even the rare and lofty attitude of noble and high-minded charity may lead to

wrong, in that forbearance and liberality toward the offender may amount to toleration and condonation of the offence, thus encouraging wrong and so doing violence to the demands of that justice we owe to all our fellows. That same justice demands that sympathy for the offender shall not lead us to ignore the interests of others. To take an extreme case: where the governor of a state is petitioned to pardon a young man guilty of murdering a former sweetheart of whom he had tired, sympathy in the official, aroused at the thought of the offender's youth or by the pleading mother, might through his charity induce him to pardon; thus encouraging crime in others and thus exposing other young men to similar temptations, other innocent girls to similar dangers, and other loving mothers to similar anguish. Where unjust and flabby sympathy for those appealing to our humanity might move to pardon, the firmer benevolence, or sympathetic regard for all, would be more likely to refuse. Sympathy for the one that is present would not displace consideration for the many that are absent.

Justice.—Justice as an essential element of benevolence consists not merely of a respect for the rights of others as fixed by civil law, but rather of a respect for the rights of others as sanctioned by the moral law. Where this attitude toward others has to do with the rights of others as affected by civil law, it is furthermore not so much concerned by the letter of the law as it is by the spirit of the law. It heeds the spirit of the law

as much as is possible, and the letter only as much as is necessary. The attitude of justice, as a respect for others, seeks objective justice not so much in the sense of exact justice according to the letter, but rather justice according to the spirit; in other words, it strives for fairness, or what the legal fraternity call equity. A proper regard for the rights of others will include honesty, preventing anything like a violation of their property rights. It would include a respect for the good name of others, preventing any such thing as contumely or slander. It would include a proper regard for the personal liberty of others, preventing anything like an encroachment on, or infringement of, their right to follow their own bent or inclination in all things not interfering with the rights of others; thus including true tolerance with reference to all those matters of opinion, faith, or practice concerning which intelligent men necessarily differ.

Helpfulness.—Besides the more negative phases, namely, considerateness and justice with reference to the feelings and rights of others, benevolence includes the more positive aspect of beneficence, or helpfulness with reference to the needs and comforts of others. For benevolence, or good will, is not a matter of pious well-wishing, but essentially a matter of well-doing. The misfortune or suffering of others moves the benevolent person not so much to pity, which is always due in part to an illusive and elusive sense of superiority, but rather to that true sympathy of fellow-feeling that we call

compassion. However, benevolence, or brotherly love is not merely concerned with the relief of suffering. True helpfulness may largely be directed in the unpretentious channels of the pleasing graces and little kindnesses of social intercourse that help not a little to fill our lives with cheer and joy. On the other hand, it would not do to assume that deep and genuine beneficence is always clothed in the pleasing garb and engaging manner of benign and gracious affability. That garb and manner are more apt to be donned for the Sunday's rest or for the relaxation of the drawing-room, when off duty. For true helpfulness is more apt to be concerned with furnishing the essential necessities for our fellows, than with securing the lesser comforts, conveniences or luxuries they would enjoy. True goodness is by no means merely a matter of affability. Emerson truly says: "Your goodness must have some edge to it, or it is none." Real helpfulness often enough demands the sterner work of wielding the sword in the interests of our fellows, fighting injustice, oppression, treachery in every form, in short, in championing the cause of human welfare, whether the fight be fought on the battle-field, or in the office of Foreign Affairs, the legislative hall, the court-room, the press, or on the rostrum. True helpfulness is by no means confined to the philanthropy, or charity that gives to the poor and needy, or to the compassion of the good Samaritan who binds the wounds of those that have fallen among thieves; its more virile form is found in the more aggressive and strenuous

apostles of righteousness who prevent the infesting of the land by robbers and thieves, and who strive for juster laws, more equitable distribution of wealth, and more humane institutions generally, thus preventing the ills of society in place of trying to cure them.

Source of desirable development.—It is evident that if this desirable attitude of benevolence is to be developed to any appreciable extent it can be done only by securing in the pupil a reasonable degree of self-compulsion in the direction of obedience to the sense of duty. However, as will be shown more clearly in the next chapter, the regard for duty is largely assisted in its development by the tendency of personal attachment to reach out, under favorable conditions, to an ever widening circle by means of an ever-expanding identification with others. The teacher's problem at this point lies in utilizing this tendency to the end of extending the pupil's sympathies beyond the limits of the circle of his immediate friends, clique, group, or class. The more the pupil learns to extend his sympathies to others, the more of a tendency there will be to continue in that direction. The teacher needs simply to take advantage of this natural tendency, and his efforts will be materially assisted. His work will consist largely of so directing the attention of pupils that they will see the real life of people of different social strata, of different occupations, of different nationalities. Let them penetrate beneath the superficial externals in the way of soiled clothes, of calloused hands or grimy faces, of

simple speech and unsophisticated manners, of differences of language or of customs, and they can not fail to see that as regards the real, central realities, the actual internality of our lives, we are of a common stock, of a common nature. When once the young man or young woman is really imbued with that thought, there is no longer possible that unsympathetic attitude which is due essentially to ignorance. Real understanding of such things is necessarily an appreciative understanding, not understanding in the sense of cognitive familiarity with the sound of the respective words, but understanding in the sense of that conviction which rises from the deep-flowing wells of our primal instincts and emotions, the knowledge that comes from the warmth of personal experience with the realities of life, the knowledge involving the heart as well as the head.

Studies as socializing agencies.—Such understanding is necessarily a slow acquisition. It can not be secured on the basis of a single exposition or explanation. It will be secured only as a result of years of intelligent effort on the part of live, enthusiastic teachers who are themselves permeated with the essence of the same spirit. Only the cumulative effect of innumerable impressions, extending through all the years of the school course, can finally bring about an attitude sufficiently intense to function as a disposition to desirable conduct. To that end, all of the branches of the curriculum should, as far as practicable, furnish their share of aid in this direction. History and literature readily enough

dispose themselves to such treatment. Since the days of Kant, and more especially of Ritter, educators have also looked upon geography as a science dealing largely with human relations. It is only too evident, however, that in ordinary use in the schoolroom to-day, it is not yet sufficiently utilized as a means of helping to develop in the child a truly humanitarian point of view. "Nature study" also should be made use of to aid in this direction. It can do so when, in place of being conducted for the mere purpose of giving more or less valuable information, and developing more or less affected sympathy for worms and beetles and a more or less fantastic, perhaps ungenue, nature-worship, it ends in giving the child a real insight into nature—using the term in its broadest sense—showing him the absolute dependence of man on nature in spite of his seeming control over her. This universal fellow-feeling is perhaps most readily brought about through such a point of view; a real consciousness of our common exposure to the same dangers, and of our common fate and destiny will inevitably bring us all nearer together in a bond of common sympathy. In view of what an intelligent, even a limited, study of astronomy will accomplish in the way of impressing upon us a consciousness of the magnitude and infinitude of this world in which we live and thus counteracting the tendencies toward self-complacent conceit at the thought of the importance of man, it seems strange indeed to a reflective mind that it should be ignored as an integral part of

that nature study that we give to our children. Besides the practical value of the study of foreign languages, and the disciplinary value which is undoubtedly not as great as was formerly supposed, there is its value in helping to bring about a true insight into the manners and customs, the history, the point of view of other peoples, and thus aiding perhaps more than any other study in securing that true culture which consists not so much in breadth or depth of learning, nor in ease and elegance of manners, but most of all in the appreciative understanding of others and resulting conduct toward them.

Training in performance of duties to others.—The important thing for the teacher never to lose sight of, however, is that his chief work lies not so much in merely developing proper attitudes toward others, but in seeing to it that these attitudes, or emotional dispositions, will be transformed into habitudes of will, or volitional dispositions actually expressing themselves in desirable conduct. Let him keep in his own mind, and impress on the minds of his pupils, this thought of Lowell's: "For every man feels instinctively that all the beautiful sentiments in the world weigh less than a single bodily action; and that while tenderness of feeling and susceptibility to generous emotions are accidents of temperament, goodness is an achievement of the will and a quality of the life." It will not be so difficult either to get the pupil to see that our work in life is near at hand and ever present, in place of being

far away and only seldom beckoning to us. Neither will it be so difficult to let him see that each of us has duties and responsibilities in common with all his fellows, as well as other duties and responsibilities specifically his own. It is more important that in addition to such insight into these things he receive actual training in the performance of those duties. The school community ought to develop in every pupil a willingness to co-operate with others for the good of the whole, and such a spirit can be developed only through co-operation itself. The more he does in that way the readier he will be to do still more in the future. The teacher can assist him in finding out what is his proper sphere of usefulness in rendering his share of service to the general good.

Widening circle of respect.—It is furthermore essential that the pupil learn to respect the rights and needs of those with whom he does not come in personal contact. Of what good is it, for instance, if he respects the property rights merely of his friends, schoolmates, teachers, while he is permitted, or while he permits himself to deface, mutilate, or destroy school property, public property, the property of the state? It is a sad reflection indeed on our national civilization, and therefore in a way on our educational system, that the average American citizen or corporation can secure the erection, furnishing, or equipment of a building at a far more reasonable figure than can the community or commonwealth, the municipal or state government. Would it not be a

more inspiring and edifying spectacle to see a contractor taking pleasure in the opportunity for doing a service of love in the cause of the common weal in place of looking upon the situation as furnishing an opportunity to "feather his nest"? Such a spectacle, not uncommon in some of the older civilizations, it will not be ours to witness while we tolerate or even foster in the rising generation a spirit of disrespect and vandalism toward the things of the community or state.

At any given stage in our development, where personal attachment to others secures desirable conduct toward all within the sphere or circle of our affection, the gradually awakening sense of duty prompts us to extend the same conduct to others outside of such territory, thus making such conduct reach out farther and farther. The more impersonal benevolence precedes, bringing about desirable conduct toward others through a sense of duty; these services rendered to others endear the latter to us through our closer identification with them, thus bringing brotherly love in the train of duty. Good will precedes, and kindly feeling follows, reaching out from family and kin to outsiders and strangers, from home community to state, from state to nation, and from nation to the world at large; from stratum to stratum, from class to class, until all boundaries, distinctions, and discriminations have been effaced. That seems to be the ideal course of the development of this side of our nature, reaching its desirable fruition only as the result of long-continued and painstaking cultivation.

Patriotism as a restricted benevolence.—Although the love of home and native land includes elements of attachment to impersonal objects, or things, its main constituent after all is attachment to persons. At any rate this is so when we speak of patriotism, not as an emotion of self-indulgent pleasure and gratification, but as a feeling disposition, an emotional attitude having a social value because of the conduct that it is to bring about. What ordinarily passes for love of country is mainly a form of love extended far enough to include a consideration for people of our own country in so far as their interests are opposed to the interests of people of other countries. Such so-called love of country, or rather love for the people of our country, as opposed to the people of other countries, in reality is self-love. Were it true love of the people of our own country, it would be manifested toward them even where they are not set over against citizens of other countries. Yet we know as a matter of fact, that such “love of country” is perfectly compatible with injustice in every form toward many of our own fellow-citizens. This fact alone would indicate that it is not true brotherly love. Furthermore, if it were true brotherly love it could not discriminate in favor of some people against others, for true brotherly love is love of mankind. On the other hand, true brotherly love, or love of mankind, would necessarily include love of country.

“Patriotism” is perhaps too apt to take the form of such a consideration of our own interests as precludes

any consideration of the rights of other nations; just as a narrow parent will ignore the rights of other children where the latter's rights collide with the rights or supposed rights of his own children. Such "patriotism" is really nothing but a chauvinistic jingoism. True or genuine patriotism is not by any means incompatible with a spirit of fairness and consideration toward other nations. Love of country is not tested by the degree of willingness to ignore or violate the rights or claims of other nations, any more than parental love demands injustice to other people's children. True patriotism does not require blindness to the things of merit in other countries any more than loyalty to the home community demands the inability to see the good things in a rival neighborhood community. On the contrary, the true patriot would wish to see the adoption, at home, of those things of true merit that he has seen abroad. Love of country is but love for the people of our country, brotherly love restricted to a smaller sphere, where it should instead reach out till it included all mankind.

Benevolence and universal peace.—Not until we see that true humanitarianism is perfectly compatible with true patriotism can we hope for a cessation of the historic rivalry between nations settled by the stern arbitrament of war. Kant, who first formulated a really constructive plan to settle international difficulties by arbitration and secure international peace by means of a federation of the nations of the world, in contrasting the desirable ideal with the actual real, very fittingly

says: "At the close of a war, after the festivities of thanksgiving, at the conclusion of peace, it would be perfectly proper for a people to appoint a day of repentance in order to implore the mercy of heaven, in the name of the State, for the great transgression that the human race is still guilty of in refusing to submit to a constitution of law in their relations with other nations, and instead, proud of their independence, preferring to have recourse to the barbaric expedient of war (whereby that which is sought, namely, the rights of each state, is certainly not settled). The days of thanksgiving celebrated during the progress of a war because of the victories that have been won, the hymns that are sung to the Lord of hosts, stand in no less glaring contrast with the idea of the Father of the human race; because to the indifference toward the way in which nations endeavor to secure justice, they add joy because they have annihilated so many human beings or their happiness."¹

Test of patriotism.—Patriotism, or love of country, is tested the same as love in any other form, by the sacrifices we are willing to make for the object of love, not by mere profession. The test lies in what we are willing to do for our country, in other words, for the real and lasting good of our own people. Furthermore, the services of the true patriot are by no means confined to those rendered in time of war, to protect our people against a danger from without. The true patriot is he who is in reality a good citizen, the man or woman of

good character, the person, in short, whose attitude toward all is that of true and genuine good-will, the one who respects the rights and interests of all, primarily those with whom he comes in closest personal touch, but others as well.

ATTITUDE OF TEACHER TO PUPIL.

Sympathy in the teacher.—Much has been said in educational literature about the need of sympathy and love in the teacher for the pupil. Young teachers especially need to clear up their notions as to what is meant by these terms. Too much of the ubiquitous sympathy is nothing more nor less than an improper prying into the family affairs of the pupil and an unworthy familiarity toward him, largely springing from a desire to ingratiate ourselves. Real, genuine sympathy consists in the main of an appreciative understanding of the child's present interests, his present way of looking at things, and we can get it only by putting ourselves in his place, by constantly jogging our memories with reference to our own boyhood and girlhood days, by bringing to mind the realities of those past years, and by thus remembering how the world looked to us then. Again, real, genuine sympathy shows itself most where sympathy is most needed. It reaches out to those unlovable children that come from homes lacking those advantages that make children well-behaved and sweet-dispositioned, and therefore amiable. It sees in that "bad" boy with repellent mien and repulsive behavior

a human being just as near to some mother's heart as ever you could have been to your mother's heart. Where we are called upon to teach pupils of any foreign nationality we can hardly do our full duty by them or by society unless we have become reasonably familiar with the history, the characteristics, the customs, the points of view of the respective racial stocks, for it is only thus that we can acquire real sympathy for them, not that self-sufficient patronizing condescension sometimes passing for the same, but rather that true sympathy, or fellow-feeling, that springs from brotherly love, the only attitude sanctioning the relation of teacher to pupil.

The teacher's love for pupils.—We cannot like or love all our pupils in the same degree, for love is a matter of feeling, but we can be considerate, just, and helpful to all of them, for that is a matter of will. Of course it is easier to be considerate and helpful to the good-looking, bright, and well-behaved boys and girls, especially if they come from influential homes, than it is to be helpful and considerate to the rest, especially those that are particularly disagreeable and unprepossessing. That goes without saying. But we are not discussing the question of ease or difficulty in the matter; we are discussing the question of *ought* in the matter. True benevolence, or love of our pupils, is no respecter of persons; it knows no discrimination excepting perhaps in the way of special attentions to those that need them most. It inclines to speak the word of

cheerful kindness to those that come from unkind and cheerless surroundings, to those that yearn for a word of appreciative recognition; it extends the helpful hand of aid to those that hardly know the touch of a real helper's hand.

Sense of personal responsibility.—The ideal teacher is he who in a way takes the same attitude toward his pupils that a gardener does to his plants. He does not feel absolved of any further responsibility toward them merely because he has devoted a more or less superficial or perfunctory care or attention to them. If they turn out wrong, he does not merely blame the "fool" plants. He is more apt to take the position that the outcome would have been more satisfactory if he had been possessed of more insight and skill, or had been more patient and persevering in his endeavors. When first he sees the canker-galls of conceit, the rust of egotism, or the deadly blight of egoism, he is neither thrown into feeble despair nor impotent rage, but instead devotes even more solicitous care to his precious charge. Where the overflowing energies of the child develop superfluous growths and excrescences in the way of exuberant hilarity or heedless recklessness, he does not immediately pull up by the roots, or expel, but instead does the necessary pruning that will direct the flow of energies into the right channels of normal growth and development. Better still, in place of trying to cure the advance or even the incipient stages of disease, his

constant endeavor is to prevent their origin by proper attention to the causes.

Patient forbearance.—The attitude of the true teacher toward the faults of his pupils is necessarily that of kind and patient forbearance. “Love suffereth long and is kind.” Where censure and criticism are necessary, they make their appearance as disapproval in the form of kindly reproach or reproof, and never that of hateful denunciation. And even where pupils evidence an unmistakable disrespect toward the teacher, even where they are waspish, mean, and venomous, the teacher ought to be able to maintain himself above the same plane. Just how a really mature person can be offended or feel insulted by a child is a little difficult to see. The mother attending to the needs of the child knows well enough that the child will not always take kindly to the treatment; if while she is washing his head, or pulling his tooth, or giving him his medicine, he should, in the midst of his defensive movements, scratch her by accident or even design, she may administer punishment, it is true; but it will be punishment to reform him, and not retaliation or retribution. Nor will the true teacher take a different attitude toward the older child. He knows that some children must necessarily pass through attacks of selfishness, of peevishness, of sullenness, of hatefulness, just as they become subject to whooping-cough and measles. He will expect to see the evidences of imperfection even in their most exasperating and repulsive form, for he knows the child

is but a child. But he realizes that he is responsible for improving the child; that is what he is for. He also knows that hateful treatment will intensify the faults that can be overcome only by love.

True love not whimsical.—Teachers as well as parents, in short all who are engaged in the work of improving the rising generation should remember that “love beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.” It must be remembered, however, that true love looks out for the real interests of the object of affection. It must not be confounded with that dotage, or foolish affection, that the Germans call *Affenliebe*, a fondness dominated by mere whim or caprice, and therefore often bringing about the ruination of its object, where the function of true love is to safeguard and protect. It is not that so-called goodness of heart that consists essentially of a domination by fitful emotion, but rather that real goodness of heart that consists in the main of a domination by a rational and sensible consideration of the real good of those to whom it is directed. Fortunate indeed is the teacher who has made it his own, for it is the source of that respectful love on the part of pupils that assures his success. The hard-headed Schopenhauer, not given to effusive extravagance of speech, very pertinently contrasts its worth with mere intellect, learning, or good looks. “Just as torches and fireworks pale and lose lustre in the presence of the sun, so intellect, yea genius, and likewise beauty, are outshone and obscured by good-

ness of heart. Where the latter stands out pre-eminently, it can compensate for the lack of the former qualities to such an extent, that one feels shame for having missed them. Even the most restricted intelligence or grotesque ugliness are transfigured as it were, as soon as the rare goodness of heart accompanying them has been disclosed; seem radiant with a beauty of a higher order, since now they speak with a wisdom before which all learning and erudition are struck dumb. For goodness of heart is a transcendent quality, belonging to an order of things reaching out beyond this life, and is incommensurable with any other type of perfection.”²²

Dangers to be avoided.—There are two dangers in particular that beset the teacher due to the peculiar nature of his work. Kuno Fischer happily characterizes the one as follows: “Teaching has something in common with governing, and imperious inclinations, never lacking in men of strong individuality, are apt to find special satisfaction in the enjoyment of teaching and to seek it there. As a result there is apt to develop a certain passion for ‘school-mastering,’ which occasionally caricatures even a far-sighted and strong educational personality, makes its appearance unseasonably, too frequently attempts to improve others and to instruct them, and so deteriorates into that school-masterly, intolerant, pedantic manner, which imposes itself upon others as an intolerable constraint.”²³ The true teacher, sufficiently imbued with a sense of the serious responsibilities devolving upon him, is liable to become too sober or

solemn with the grind of routine and an ever-present sense of the earnestness of life. The dark and somber outlook of the teacher is only too apt to throw a gloom over his surroundings, and children especially need a clear atmosphere lit up with the sunshine of good cheer. Even more nearly mature students appreciate cheerfulness in the teacher. And will not considerateness for the comfort of others call for such an attitude? Every teacher may find a valuable suggestion lying in the following appreciative comment by Herder, concerning a revered teacher: "I have had the good fortune of knowing a philosopher and having him as a teacher. In the prime of life he possessed the joyous animation of a youth. . . . His open brow, designed for thinking, was the seat of an unconquerable cheerfulness and gladness; . . . pleasantry and wit and good humor were at his command, and his instructive lectures were the most entertaining intercourse He encouraged [his students] and in a pleasant manner forced them to do independent thinking; despotism was foreign to his soul. This man, whom I name with the greatest gratitude and esteem, is Immanuel Kant."

Compensations of the teacher.—The position of the true teacher is indeed no sinecure. It does truly call for sacrifices, whatever the view of the worldly cynic concerning the matter. And even though his pecuniary compensation can never be a sufficient remuneration, any more than the services springing from a devoted mother's love can be paid for in things that have an

economic value, there is after all a recompense: that pure joy that comes from the sense of a worthy work in life well done. It is true, sometimes even that does temporarily forsake a conscientious worker, especially when through his very zeal he has ignored the limits of physical capacity and depleted his energies to the point of exhaustion. Such a condition makes for an unwholesome introspection, tending as it does toward dissatisfaction and discouragement, perhaps toward a lowering of standards or a surrender of ideals. Recuperation of physical power and the accompanying restoration of spirit can come only from again turning the eye outward. There are no doubt moments in the life of every one when the present seems bare and drear and desolate, the past a series of disappointing failures, and the future a forbidding waste of ceaseless toil and unrequiting struggle. Yes, seems, but only seems, and largely so because we take the narrow view of self-regard. For when we turn our eye on others, and think of them, their cares and tribulations, and do the thing that brings them cheer and joy, the prospect changes: once more our world is one of hope and beauty, of sunshine and of love.

CHAPTER VII

REGARD FOR RIGHT AND DUTY

Need of a universally effective motive.—The interests of society demand such a make-up of the individual as will prompt right conduct not only towards a few favored individuals or occasionally toward all, but towards any and everybody under any and all circumstances. That, at any rate, is the ideal that the teacher must keep in mind. Such a permanent attitude towards all can be secured only through regard for the moral law, our sense of duty. For where that is sufficiently developed, it will urge or impel us to act in the absence of any other inclination prompting us to do so; it will even compel such action against our inclinations. It is for that reason that the great moral philosophers have ever insisted that true morality can be founded only on the sense of duty; that it consists in the doing right because it is right, not because it is easy to do so, or because of the fear of punishment or the hope of reward, or because of friendship, love or any other ulterior consideration. That nominal morality which has its source in such motives will induce right action only intermittently, fitfully, spasmodically, just as external circumstances are favorable, and will fail to act

in the absence of such extraneous circumstances. On the other hand, true morality, being conditioned on inner rather than outer factors, would secure right action whether the external factors changed or not. The man who is actuated in his conduct by self-regard will conform to the law while it is policy to do so, will do the right thing when he expects to be rewarded for it, or when he fears punishment for doing wrong. Such morality is no morality at all, for the moment such a man is put into a position where he feels convinced that he can do wrong without danger of detection, therefore of punishment, there is nothing to induce the right act. Every great earthquake, volcanic eruption, or devastating conflagration furnishes us with the opportunity for observing acts of lawlessness and immorality on the part of men who at other times lived—as far as known, at any rate—in conformity with both the civil and the moral law. Self-interest as a motive to conduct has a value only where the individual can be kept in fear of the eye and the arm of the law. In the same way, personal attachment to others can not be depended on as a satisfactory source of conduct for the simple reason that it will prompt right conduct only toward the favored few to whom it is directed, a moral status perfectly compatible with the ignoring of the rights of any or all others. Sympathy takes sides with the present against the absent. Love for others not infrequently prompts the individual to acts of immorality to which he could not even be induced by self-regard.

Unstable inclination insufficient.—In short, if a man's actions are the expression merely of self-regard or regard for others, society has no guarantee of true moral conduct; at best there is assurance of only an occasional or intermittent obedience to the moral law. Where our natural inclinations in some form or other fail to induce right conduct, they need to be supplemented by something that will urge or impel us to act even where we do not find it easy to do so. What is needed is a something kept in reserve that will guarantee right conduct, where these other sources fail to bring it about. That something can be found only in a high regard for duty, guided by sufficient intelligence as to what constitutes duty. Once that regard for duty is sufficiently developed, the problem is solved; for it is only when the individual does right simply because it is right, without any regard to other considerations, that we have anything like an approximation toward a guarantee of proper conduct under any and all circumstances.

Necessity of a fixed factor.—Although this point has at times been lost sight of in the history of philosophy, our greatest thinkers have ever insisted on it. Aristotle, in comparing actions in the practice of the arts and of morals, says: "Again, the case is not similar in the arts and in the virtues, for the productions of art have their excellence in themselves. It is enough, then, that these should themselves be of a certain character; but acts of virtue are done justly and temperately, not, if they have themselves a certain character, but if the

agent, being himself of a certain character, perform them: first, if he does them knowingly; then if with deliberate choice, and deliberate choice on their own account; and, thirdly, if he does them on a fixed and unchangeable principle."¹ That is, the excellence of art lies merely and solely in its results. Not so with "acts of virtue"; there the source must be considered as well as the nature, or character, of the act. Mere conformity to a standard of conduct is insufficient; an action is "just and temperate," that is, truly moral, only if the agent chooses it for its own sake and does so from a fixed principle, or habit of mind.

The greatest modern thinker, Kant, makes the same contention. Unfortunately his position has frequently been misinterpreted. That is mainly due to the unqualified and straightforward language in which he generally stated his rigoristic position, giving absolutely no quarter to the eudæmonistic, or happiness-seeking, ethics of the day. He vehemently insists that an act in conformity with the demands of the moral law merely possesses "legality," unless it be prompted by a sense of duty, the regard for the moral law, in which latter case it possesses "morality."² That is to say, an act prompted by self-regard or by regard for others, is merely "legal," that is, objectively right, or fit, and not "moral," that is, intrinsically good. A careful study of his various writings on ethics shows clearly that it was his purpose to find a motive which would, under any and all circumstances, secure desirable conduct; such a motive

could be called truly moral. Not so with other motives, which would only occasionally bring about such conduct. The term morality would mean much the same as moral character; in fact, Kant defines character as "consistent disposition toward action according to unchangeable maxims."³

Morality pertains to the agent.—Morality pertains, properly speaking, not to the act, but to the agent. In a sense, perhaps, we could say that something of the quality of the agent still inheres in the act, which is but an expression, or manifestation, of such quality in the agent. That is, if morality is a quality of the agent, his act will also be moral. Strictly speaking, therefore, the same kind of an act, springing from a different source or quality, could not have in it this particular quality: morality. Logically, Kant's position at this point is perfectly sound. Unfortunately, common usage is against him. If, to take a related concept, a man makes a statement in agreement with his knowledge or view of a given matter, we say the statement is true or truthful, because of that element of agreement. We do this whether the man spoke the truth from self-interest or the desire to protect a friend, or whether he did it from the spirit of truth. On the other hand, we would not consider the man truthful unless we believed him to speak the truth habitually; such habitual speaking of the truth would spring only from a sufficient regard for the truth itself. At the same time, looseness of language would permit us to speak of the truthful statement made by a

man devoid of the spirit of truth, or regard for truth. In the same way, we are permitted to speak of the moral act performed by a man devoid of the real spirit of morals, or regard for the moral law.

Steadfastness vs. fickleness.—Kant seems to have realized that he might not be understood when he insisted that the regard for duty, prompting to action at the mere thought of virtue, was the only dependable motive to moral conduct under any and all circumstances. One passage, which seems to have escaped some of his critics, and which perhaps best states his actual position, reads as follows: “It is our purpose, therefore, to prove . . . that this quality of our mind, this susceptibility of a pure moral interest and consequently the motive power of the pure notion of virtue, when sufficiently developed, is the most powerful, and when it comes to the permanence and promptness of obedience to moral maxims, the only motive to good conduct.”⁴ The only thing that can possibly move us to do right toward others where neither self-regard nor regard for others would do so, is the sense of duty. That this is the key to Kant’s position becomes still clearer from a significant and elucidating passage from one of his less well-known writings, in which he characterizes a steadfast person as contrasted with a fickle one: “For that reason he subordinates his feelings to principles. The more universal such a principle is, to which they are subordinated, and the more extensive therefore the range of the lofty feeling, which includes

the lower ones, the less are the latter subject to instability and variation. All the special sources [*Gründe*] of the inclinations are subject to many exceptions and changes unless they are derived from some such superior principle. The cheerful and friendly Alcest says: 'I love and esteem my wife, for she is beautiful, affectionate and clever.' But what if she should be disfigured by disease, crabbled with age, and, after the first charm has faded away, seem to you no more clever than any other? What can the inclination amount to when the source is gone? Take, on the other hand, the kindly disposed and staid Adrast, who thinks to himself: 'I will treat this person with love and consideration, for she is my wife.' This disposition is noble and generous. Now, even if the accidental charms depart, she is, for all that, still his wife. The noble motive [*Grund*] remains and is not subject, to so great an extent, to the instability of external things. Of such a nature are principles in comparison to emotional agitations that arise only on the prompting of special occasions, and such is the man of principle as contrasted with the one who is occasionally seized by a good-hearted and affectionate impulse. But what if even the secret language of his heart should run this way: 'I must help that man, for he is in distress; not because he might happen to be my friend or a companion, nor because I might consider him able some day to requite a good deed with gratitude. This is no time for subtilizing or asking and answering questions. He is a human being and

whatever happens to human beings may befall me also.' Then his practice rests on the highest principle of good will in human nature and is the noblest possible, not only because of its unchangeableness, but as well because of the universality of its application.'"⁵

Need of guidance by intelligence.—It is evident that where a man's conduct is governed by principle, there is need of the guidance of an enlightened intelligence. Dr. Dewey very pertinently says: "The moral fanatic does about as much evil in the world as the man of no moral principle. Religious wars, persecutions, intolerance, harsh judgment of others, obstinate persistence in a course of action once entered upon in spite of the testimony of experience to the harm that results; blind devotion to narrow and one-sided aims; deliberate opposition to art, culture, social amenities, recreations, or whatever the 'man of principle' happens to find obnoxious: pharisaical conviction of superiority, of being the peculiar, chosen instrument of the moral law;—these and the countless ills that follow in their wake are inevitable effects of erecting the isolated conviction of duty into a sufficient motive to action.'"⁶ At any rate, such are bound to be the effects where the conviction of duty is not guided by sufficient intelligence as to what constitutes duty. Kant recognized this danger. He says: "Of people who act on the basis of principles there are very few, which is, furthermore, an exceedingly good thing, as it is so easy to be in error in these principles, and further, as the harm that results there-

from will be the more extensive, the more general the principle and the more steadfast the person who has resolved upon it.”⁷

Universal principle of conduct.—It was because of his recognizing this danger that he attempted to explain the essential nature of duty; to his mind it consists in acting upon a principle, or maxim of conduct that we should be willing to see adopted as a universal rule of action. In one of his earliest essays he said that principles of action which make for true morality are not “speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human breast and which extends far beyond the particular sources of sympathy and the desire to please.” He calls this feeling a “feeling for the beauty and dignity of human nature,” and goes on to say: “If this feeling should be present in the greatest possible perfection in any human heart, the respective person would, it is true, love and respect himself, but only in so far as he is one of all mankind, toward whom his inclusive and noble feeling extends.”⁸ In one of his latest writings he gave the following wording to the “categorical imperative,” that is, a rule, or maxim of conduct, which is universally binding on all: “So act that you will always treat mankind, not only in your own person, but in the person of every other, not simply as a means, but at the same time as an end.”⁹

Human beings are ends, not mere means.—Every human being looks upon himself as an end in itself, not merely as a means to an end. A human being is not a

tool, or implement, for another's use, and can not properly be used merely for another's purposes, as can anything else. Because everyone of us looks upon himself as an end, it is duty to treat everybody else in the same way. This virtually amounts to giving a more concrete form to the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." A learned philosophical writer says: "Here the words 'as thyself' do not mean the *equality*, but the *similarity* of love. We should love our neighbor not in the same degree as ourselves, but in a similar manner to that in which we love ourselves."¹⁰ Now it is precisely as ends, and not as means to ends, that we love ourselves. Hence, when our principle of action is that sense of duty which requires us to treat all, both others and ourselves, as ends in themselves, the danger referred to is indeed insignificant. Given the desire to do one's duty, and in addition, the conception of duty interpreted as above, the individual is ordinarily not apt to be misled.

"A good man, through obscurest aspirations
Has still an instinct of the one true way."¹¹

Where, in exceptional cases, mistakes will happen anyhow, it will not be because of any inherent faultiness of such principle of action; in fact, where conduct is prompted by other motives, mistakes are necessarily far more probable.

Customs and morals.—How true that is of self-regard need not be repeated at this point. Regard for

others, in the form of love as a personal attitude directed to favored individuals, is apt to imply discrimination against those others to whom it is not extended. Furthermore, it will not even secure the interests of its own object unless guided by sufficient intelligence. The only conduct, in fact, that calls for no intelligence or reflection, and therefore the most convenient, is that primitive conduct based on a blind obedience to custom. It is from the same cause, however, that it is particularly faulty in failing to conserve the interests of society. "The fact that the morality of conscience requires reflection, progress, and a deeper meaning for its conception, makes it obvious why many fail to grasp any moral meaning at all. They fail to put forth the effort, or to break with habit. Under customary morality it was enough to 'observe' and to continue in the mores. It requires a higher degree of insight and a greater initiative to get any moral attitude at all when the forms have become mere forms and the habits mere habits. Hence, when a change in personal environment or in general social or economic conditions comes, many fail to see the principles involved. They remain completely satisfied with the 'old-fashioned' virtues or intrench themselves in the 'righteousness' and 'honesty' of a past generation. This habitual and 'painless' morality will often mean a 'virtue' or 'righteousness' which involves no conflict with present conditions. A man who feels honest because he does not break contracts or defraud in old-fashioned ways, may be quite at ease about watering stock or

adulterating goods. A society which abhors murder with iron and explosives in the form of daggers and bombs, may feel quite unconcerned about the preventable homicides by iron machinery, or by explosives used in coal mines."¹² Guidance by the sense of duty, as interpreted by Kant, would steer us clear of such dangers.

Value of other forms of regard.—A proper appreciation of the sense of duty as the most efficacious and reliable motive to proper conduct does not necessarily involve a discrediting of other motives. It would simply mean the aiming at that as our ideal, meanwhile taking advantage of all the other forms of regard as aids in that direction. Even Kant says: "But this *differentiation* of the principle of happiness from that of morality is not therefore a *setting over* of the one *against* the other, and pure practical reason does not require us to *give up* our claims to happiness, but only, that we *pay no heed* to them as soon as we are concerned with a matter of duty."¹³ Intelligent self-regard, especially in the form of self-esteem and the love of recognition, when trained aright, help powerfully in this direction. In fact, self-esteem in its ideal form of a lofty respect for self as a member of the human family is nothing more nor less than a respect for the moral law. As to the love of recognition, Dugald Stewart says very aptly: "And although our conduct can not be denominated virtuous, so long as a regard to the opinion of others is our sole motive, yet the habits we thus acquire in infancy and childhood render it more easy for us to

subject our passions to reason and conscience as we advance to maturity.’¹⁴ In fact, if, as was shown above (page 66), the child is trained to aim directly and with assiduity at true worth as the means of securing recognition, his efforts in this direction actually tend to merge into a positive training of conscience. Here, also, Kant makes place for self-regard as a means to develop regard for duty. ‘‘It is true, one can not deny that, to bring either an undeveloped or a neglected mind into the way of the morally good, there is need of some preparatory management in alluring it through the thought of its own advantage or of frightening it through the thought of injury; however, as soon as these leading strings, these make-shifts, have produced any effect to speak of, the pure moral motive must by all means be aroused in the soul.’¹⁵ Speaking of self-respect, he says: ‘‘One can graft every good disposition upon this respect for self when it is well founded, when a person fears nothing more than to find himself through self-examination, contemptible or detestable in his own eyes; because this is the best, yes, the only watchman that can prevent the intrusion of ignoble and pernicious impulses into the soul.’¹⁶

As to regard for others in its two principal forms, the attitudes of respect and personal attachment, its value as an aid in this direction is so apparent as to call for no argument. Respect, due primarily to the appreciation of the objective value of the moral qualities found in others, needs, on the one hand, to be directed

to the human nature element in all our fellows, thus securing consideration for all of them. On the other hand, in order that mere consideration may be accompanied by protectorship, this sense of objective value must be changed, as far as possible, into a sense of subjective value to ourselves. This can be done only by means of securing a more intimate identification with others, thus arousing a degree of personal attachment, at least. As to the latter itself, in its varying degrees of inclination, liking, love, what needs to be done is to make it reach out farther and farther, and furthermore, put it under the guidance of reason and the control of will, thus developing in time that highly valued attitude of benevolence, or good-will, which, as was shown in the preceding chapter, is an emanation or outgrowth of the sense of duty, or regard for the moral law, and is itself the potential source of brotherly love, or ideal fellow-feeling.

Reason or love?—In this connection it must be remembered, however, that it is not immaterial as to whether Reason or Love be left at the helm. The poet Schiller, who rebelled against the rigoristic doctrine of “legality” and “morality” in Kant’s philosophy, did not hesitate to give the following verdict on the pretensions of love as a guide to conduct: “The elevated affection [love], which has managed by deceptive means to arouse our respect, is no longer willing to be subordinated to reason, but would be co-ordinate with the latter. She is unwilling to be looked upon as a disloyal

subject rising in mutiny against her chief; she wants to be looked up to as a sovereign, and to treat with reason on a footing of equality as a moral law-giver. According to her profession, then, the scales are on a level, as far as the justice of the matter is concerned, and how great the danger, therefore, that self-interest will turn the scales.

“Among all the affections that are derived from the feeling of beauty and that are possessed by noble minds, there is no other that commends itself so highly to the moral feeling as the noble emotion of love, and none is more fruitful of sentiments in keeping with the true dignity of man. . . . Who, forsooth, would mistrust an emotion that so vigorously protects all that is excellent in human nature, and that so successfully combats the arch-enemy of all morality, egoism? But let us not on any account take our chances with this guide, unless we are already safeguarded by another. . . . This emotion manages very sophistically to discredit the voice of conscience as an incitement of self-love, when it is opposed to her interests, and to represent our moral dignity as a component part of our happiness, which we may dispose of at our discretion. If our character is not firmly protected by good principles, we shall act disgracefully in spite of the soaring flights of an exalted fancy, and believe that we are winning a glorious victory over our self-love, while on the contrary, we are her contemptible victim.”

Respect for civil law.—One of the ways in which a

regard for right and duty as the essence of good character manifests itself is in respect for civil law. It is true, in the case of a statutory provision that is unjust, in other words, in flagrant violation of the moral law, a lofty standard of morality will sometimes demand direct opposition to, and defiance of, such an unjust statute. Such an attitude, however, is in reality not lawlessness, or disrespect for law, but rather the highest respect for law, insisting that the statutory or civil law shall be in harmony with the moral law. Real lawlessness, or disrespect for civil law, on the other hand, is essentially a disrespect for the moral law. It is prompted by self-regard, in opposition to regard for the moral law. That is why it frequently manifests itself in the form of an absolute conformity to the letter of the civil law, while it is violating the spirit of the same as much as is possible with impunity. Such conformity to the law is in fact the worst kind of lawlessness.

The real cure for lawlessness in the form of disrespect for civil law will be found in developing regard for the moral law, for real lawlessness is lack of respect for the moral law, and its cause is found in inordinate regard for self. That proper regard for the moral law can, of course, be secured only through the intermediacy of a proper regard for others, as has just been shown. However, educational science and practice are not the only means of helping to overcome the prevalence of disregard for civil law. Political science, on the one hand, and practical politics, on the other, could do not

a little in that direction. For, after all, there are those things about our civic customs and civil institutions that aid materially in breeding disregard for civil law. A people can not be legislated into morality. It is hardly wise to enact in a statute those dictates of the moral law that are far beyond the standard of the community. Civil law can be effective only in so far as it incorporates within itself only so much of the moral law as meets with the approval of the social consciousness, so much, in other words, as is endorsed by custom. The chief cause of lawlessness, from the standpoint of practical politics, is the non-enforcement and the tardy enforcement of laws; for the lawless person will not violate the letter of the law if he be sufficiently impressed with the idea of the certainty of punishment. For this reason it is certainly poor policy to put upon the statutes provisions that can not be permanently and successfully enforced. Furthermore, society must make provision for protecting law-enforcing officials against that punishment which, under present conditions, we mete out to them in the form of defeat at the polls. As long as the average official knows that law-enforcement means political death, he will choose political life in view of the fact that he can do so by merely shutting his eyes occasionally.

Respect for school authority.—As regards the work of the teacher, it must be his constant endeavor to develop in the pupils an autonomous, self-directed respect for properly constituted authority, for rules and regu-

lations, the laws of the school. In a democracy obedience to constituted authority can best be secured by developing in the rising generation the attitude which sees in civil law the expression of our own will, rather than the expression of another's will imposed upon us. Law ought to be an expression of the will of a people when they are at their best, looking ahead to the general welfare, so that this resolution shall be paramount to the impulsive wishes or caprices of the same people when excited and urged by passion or thought of present gain to lose sight of their ultimate interests. School government ought largely to help develop in the pupils this point of view. That would demand on the part of teachers due deliberation and judicious foresight in formulating rules and regulations, and after that a proper respect for them, showing itself in their absolute enforcement, in place of offering the pupils a bad example in the way of full-chested proclamation of law and weak-kneed enforcement.

Habitual obedience to conscience.—Training with reference to the development of a high regard for duty would be concerned in the main with the matter of securing an habitual obedience to duty speaking to us through the voice of conscience. Every lapse in the way of disregarding duty means that much more of a tendency to sear or callous that same sense of duty. On the other hand, acts of obedience often enough repeated will make the individual more and more responsive to the dictates of his inner monitor. Long ago Aristotle

said: "It is with good reason, then, that we assert that the just man becomes such by doing just acts, and the temperate man by doing temperate acts, while that, if he refrain from such acts, a man will never have even a prospect of becoming virtuous."¹⁷ At first it will no doubt be necessary to resort to the intermediacy of more or less arbitrary and artificial incentives to secure the desirable response on the part of the child. Fortunately, however, the constitution of human nature is such that every repetition of an act makes it easier to secure the same sort of reaction later, thus calling for less and less in the amount of the pressure from without as the particular habit is growing. What is needed is a proper caution in the appeal to the various other motives, a judicious use of praise and encouragement in critical moments of danger when the undeveloped power of conscience is most in need of help, a wise discretion in the gradual withdrawing of these external incentives, as the actions are being taken care of more and more through inner pressure. It is only in this way that we can finally secure in the child a real appreciation and practical assent to the lofty sentiment:

What conscience dictates to be done,
Or warns me not to do;
This teach me more than hell to shun,
That more than heav'n pursue.

Unalloyed love of duty impossible.—An important factor in this connection is found in the pleasure derived from doing things that we have learned to do.

This resulting pleasure is not merely due to self-flattery at the thought of the good thing we have done; it is also in part a pleasure of achievement, due to the activity itself. But, whatever the source, such pleasure makes it easier to continue acting in the same direction: we learn to like to do our duty. It will not do, however, to assume that there can ever be developed a positive, unalloyed love of duty in all things; there will necessarily remain an admixture of the irksomeness that inheres in a suppression of natural inclination. "Could a rational creature ever get to the point of obeying all moral laws absolutely *with pleasure*, that would be equivalent to saying that there would be in him not even the possibility of a desire that could incite him to a deviation from them; for the overcoming of a desire always costs the person a sacrifice, consequently requires self-restraint, that is to say, an inner constraint to do that which one does not do absolutely with pleasure. However, a created being can never get to this stage of moral development."¹⁸

Danger of pharisaism.—There is one danger, especially, that we must be on the lookout for as we make progress in the way of moral development. We are always liable to dwell too much on the thought of our own improvement, perhaps in the way of contrast with the lack of moral advance on the part of others. Dugald Stewart, in speaking of the development of moral taste through poetry and other similar means, says: "When the standard of moral excellence we have been accus-

tomed to dwell upon in imagination is greatly elevated above the common attainments of humanity, we are apt to become too difficult and fastidious in our *moral taste*, or, in plain language, to become unreasonably censorious of the follies and vices of our contemporaries. . . . Such a disposition, when carried to an extreme, not only sours the temper, and dries up all the springs of innocent comfort which nature has so liberally provided for us in the common incidents of life, but, by withdrawing a man from active pursuits, renders all his talents and virtues useless to society.’¹⁹ Elsewhere the same thinker suggests the remedy: “Considered as a principle of action, a cultivated moral taste, while it provides an effectual security against the grossness necessarily connected with many vices, cherishes a temper of mind friendly to all that is amiable, or generous, or devoted in our nature. When separated, however, as it sometimes is, from a strong sense of duty, it can scarcely fail to prove a fallacious guide; the influence of fashion, and of other casual associations tending perpetually to lead it astray.’²⁰

Moral hypochondriasis.—Here, as elsewhere, safety lies in the development of an enlightened sense of duty expressing itself in corresponding conduct; not in an attitude of contemplation, but rather in a habitude of application. Kant tersely states that the “moral condition of man is *virtue*, i. e., moral disposition *engaged in struggle*, and not *holiness* in the imagined possession of an absolute *purity* of the disposition of the will.’²¹ A

few extracts from a work on moral pathology may not be out of place here, in view of the fact that they have a pertinent bearing on the work of the educator. Speaking of the moral hypochondriac, the writer says: "Owing to his incessant self-examination and self-contemplation, he is unfitted to perform his proper work in the world, in considering the wants of others, and in ministering to their needs. The active side of his moral nature atrophies from disuse. Moreover, hypochondriasis and pharisaism often go curiously hand in hand. While he is lamenting his own deficiency in grace, he has still leisure to contemplate the faults of others, and to find solace in the reflection that, at least, he is not so bad as 'yonder publican.'"²² In discussing treatment, the author says: "Moreover, the moral hypochondriac should be taught, if he is not too far diseased, that efforts to secure the well-being of others are of infinitely greater value and importance than doctoring one's own soul. . . . The risk, after serving others, of becoming one's self a 'castaway' is exceedingly small; and if he devotes himself to the service of the social, physical and moral health of those with whom he has to do, his own moral health may be safely allowed to take care of itself. This is the meaning of a phrase often misinterpreted, 'Be not righteous overmuch.' Of altruistic righteousness it is impossible to have too much; of egoistic righteousness it is quite possible."²³ As moral development progresses, there is less and less thought of self, and more and more thought of others. So true is

this that where our conception of morals was concerned at first mainly with our rights, our concern tends to become more and more a consideration of our duties. In the words of Lao-tse: "Therefore the sage keeps the obligations of his contracts and exacts not from others. Those who have virtue attend to their obligations; those who have no virtue attend to their claims." The more highly developed person dreads it more to wrong others than to be wronged by them. Thus there may be danger of encouraging wrong-doing. Such danger would likewise be warded off by loyalty to the stern voice of duty.

Guidance by reason essential.—In view of all that has been said it would be well for the teacher to remember that the thing to aim at is that real conduct under the guidance of rational principle and the control of will, in place of that nominal conduct prompted merely by the fortuitous inclinations of fickle impulse. Lecky gives us a truly comprehensive view of the whole matter in the following felicitous passage: "In the best of us evil tendencies are always strong and the path of duty is often distasteful. With the most favorable wind and tide the bark will never arrive at the harbor if it has ceased to obey the rudder. A weak nature which is naturally kindly affectionate and pure, which floats through life under the impulse of the feelings, with no real power of self-restraint, is indeed not without its charm, and in a well-organized society, with good surroundings and few temptations, it may attain a high

degree of beauty; but its besetting failings will steadily grow; without fortitude, perseverance and principle, it has no recuperative energy, and it will often end in a moral catastrophe which natures in other respects much less happily compounded would easily avoid. Nothing can permanently secure our moral being in the absence of a restraining will basing itself upon a strong sense of the difference between right and wrong, upon the firm groundwork of principle and honor.'²⁴

CHAPTER VIII

REGARD FOR KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

Function of knowledge.—Freedom to move about in this world in which we are placed is conditioned on a knowledge of that world; that is, there must be that in our mind which corresponds to external reality. The satisfaction of all our wants, high or low, is dependent on knowledge of some kind or other. The achievements of agriculture, of industry generally, of commerce, the practical arts, statesmanship, of anything and everything conducive to human welfare, would be impossible without a knowledge of the world in which we live, be it that of physical nature or of human nature. Such knowledge presents itself in the form of information about details, or facts, on the one hand, and of broad generalizations, or truths, on the other. In the very nature of things the individual can not independently gain possession of all these necessary facts and truths. On the one hand, where he can not gain information as to facts at first hand he is dependent on the utterances and, to a lesser extent, the actions of all those with whom he comes in daily contact. Here his interests demand the element of dependableness in his fellows, in the absence of which he is inevitably led into error. On the

other hand, he is equally dependent on those whose special task it is to add to the sum-total of human knowledge in particular fields: the scientific investigators. Here his interests demand disinterested devotion to truth and a due sense of responsibility manifested in proper caution, to furnish him with the greatest possible guarantee of security, so that what is only rash, or premature judgment, or mere conjecture, will not be proclaimed as accurate science, that is, established truth.

Forms of regard for knowledge and truth.—Nature has provided for these our needs. In every human being there is an inherent tendency urging him toward the securing and the conservation of knowledge. This innate regard for knowledge and truth has two phases: (1) the desire to increase our knowledge, that is, to get our thoughts in agreement with reality; (2) the inclination to live true to our knowledge, that is, to get our utterances and our actions in agreement with our thoughts. It is this intellectual regard which furnishes the natural source of that most desirable virtue that we call sincerity, or genuineness; for, reduced to its lowest terms, the regard for truth is the regard for consistency, that is, for agreement between things, or harmony of different parts of a whole. The first phase makes primarily for intellectual consistency, consistency between our different ideas, between the different elements of our knowledge and our beliefs. The second, based in part upon the first, makes for moral consistency, consistency between impression and expression, thought and action,

profession and conduct. It is true, sincerity may spring from other sources, mainly that of a regard for others, and from a sense of duty; but, after all, the greatest guarantee of its development is furnished by the regard for knowledge and truth. Where the showing of ourselves as we are is prompted by regard for others, there will occasionally be sincere utterances and actions, but no sincerity, or at best, only an intermittent or spasmodic sincerity, if that were not a contradiction of terms. Regard for others can ultimately produce sincerity only when it has become impersonal, that is, when it has changed over into a regard for the moral law, or, what amounts to the same, a sense of duty, and that does not come about until in mature life. Only where the very consciousness of disagreement, in and of itself, is painful do we have anything like an approximation toward a guarantee of sincerity.

THE DESIRE FOR FURTHER KNOWLEDGE.

Curiosity and love of truth.—Early in life the normal human being manifests an unflagging desire for knowledge in the form of the proverbial curiosity of the child, and even though he live to a ripe old age, this desire does not leave him while health lasts. There will always be some things that he cares to know more about. Wilhelm von Humboldt can well serve as a spokesman for all of us when he says: “I can hardly resist the desire to see, to know, to investigate as much as is ever possible; for it does seem as though man were designed to

convert everything with which he is surrounded into his property, the possession of his intellect, and life is short. When I have to go, I should like to leave behind as little as possible, that I have not brought into contact with me.”¹ Generally speaking, it is only in those who devote themselves specifically to intellectual pursuits that this attitude is apt to attain its highest development in that form that is very aptly termed the *love of truth*. Where at first knowledge is pursued as a means to some other end, here it is pursued as the end itself. Where knowledge is sought after for its practical value, or for prize or emolument, where it is pursued because of the artificial incentives held out by home, school, scientific body, or society at large, be they “reward of merit” cards, scholarships, badges, orders, or what not—yes, even where it is sought after to please or benefit our fellowmen, the intellectual sentiment has as yet not received that ideal development that we must wish for in the searcher after truth. That is secured only where the pursuit of knowledge as a means has, by substitution of motives, been elevated into the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, as an end in itself, or where the innate desire for knowledge has never been converted into a conscious pursuit of mere utility. The ideal investigator will ever be he whose natural prayer is that of Thomas à Kempis: “Grant me, O Lord, to know whatever is to be known!” Such an investigator has become so attached to the ideal of truth that he will

pursue it in total disregard of the pain it may temporarily cause him or others.

Truth for its own sake.—No doubt it was this point of view that obtained in Lessing's mind when he gave utterance to this famous and oft-quoted passage: "If God held all truth shut in his right hand, and in the left hand nothing but the ever-restless instinct for truth, though with the condition of forever and ever erring and should say to me, 'Choose!' I should humbly bow to his left hand and say: 'Father, give! Pure truth is for Thee alone.'" Such a point of view seems absurd to many eminently sane minds, who find more satisfaction in the opinion that knowledge should be pursued with the view of benefiting mankind, tersely expressed in the utilitarian dictum of Bacon to the effect that "knowledge is power." Incontrovertibly true as the sentiment is that the value of knowledge lies in its ultimate benefits to mankind, that sentiment can hardly be safely made the guide of the scientific investigator, for when consistently applied it could result only in the ignoring of all those phenomena that do not bode promise of adequate returns. Witness in the way of illustration the attitude of Newton in discouraging experiments with magnetism as mere child's play. A truly comprehensive and masterly view of the matter is taken by Lotze, who says: "If human investigation were concerned only with intellectually portraying the world as it exists, of what value would all this labor be, which would result in vain repetition, in a facsimile within the

soul of that which exists without the soul? Of what significance would this idle play of duplication be, under what obligation would the thinking mind be to be a mirror for that which does not think, if the discovery of truth anywhere and everywhere were not at the same time the production of a good, valuable enough to warrant the exertions necessary for its attainment? The individual, entrained in the division of intellectual labor that is unavoidably brought about by the increasing scope of science, may at times forget the relation of his narrowly restricted occupation to the great ends of human life; it may seem to him at times as though the advancement of knowledge for the sake of knowledge were in itself an intelligible and worthy aim of human endeavor. But in the end all of his efforts have, after all, only this significance, that, taken in connection with those of innumerable others, they are to delineate a picture of the world that indicates to us what we are to revere as the true meaning of life, what we are to do, and what we have to hope for. That strictly disinterested research, however, which co-operates in the building-up of knowledge without in any way considering these questions, is only a wise self-restraint which expects a subsequent but complete answer to them from the combined results of many lines of investigation, and prefers the latter to the premature and one-sided explanation with which inferior and accidental points of view only insufficiently appease our desire for knowledge.''²

Aim and end not necessarily identical.—Briefly put, even though the *end*, or function, of all knowledge is to secure benefits to mankind, those are not necessarily the things to *aim* at. For, in coming up to new and unsolved problems we are, in the very nature of things, in no position to divine which foretell the greater good to man. It is right there that the investigator who keeps his eye on the good to man may actually pass it by when he comes to it, for the simple reason that he can not recognize the good in the unpromising exterior; while the searcher after truth for its own sake will tarry by the way to solve the problem he has come upon, and will find the jewel that he did not seek. The utilitarian or humanitarian investigator naturally seeks those fields in which every new truth promises to conduce directly to the happiness of men and is therefore welcomed by them. He is likely to devote himself to research in the realm of natural science, the discoveries of which can be directly applied to the industries and the practical arts, there to be converted into dollars and cents, or utilized in medical science, directly relieving the manifold ills that flesh is heir to. The history of science is full of the noblest examples of men who in the cause of their fellows have made every sacrifice, even to life itself, to secure knowledge in these various fields. Medical science alone has had its score of martyrs within as many years past. It may, however, be rightly doubted whether such investigators are not in part at

least actuated by the fascination that lies in the pursuit itself.

Difference between aims.—Be that as it may, there certainly are those fields where even the most enlightened and most highly developed love of humanity, taken alone, is not apt to achieve as much for mankind as is an exalted love of truth. There are those realms of values, in which new ideas are not welcomed, where instead they are invariably met with opposition for the simple reason that they undo old and cherished ideals. When the humanitarian investigator comes upon light that he knows will be painful to the eyes of his fellows accustomed to the previous darkness, he is liable to ignore the light or shut it out, forgetting for the moment that the truth shall make us free. The idealist investigator, however, actuated by an unselfish and overpowering devotion to truth, will not retrace his steps when the vista opening before him blinds him with the new and unaccustomed light, but, disregarding the pain both to himself and others who are following his leadership, forges on to the source of light, feeling that it is not for him to shut out the light sent to him, but rather that he is as an instrument in the hands of Truth, and that through him the new light is to be transmitted to others. In short, he will not betray his trust.

Value of idealistic aim.—Were it not for this fascination which truth has for noble natures, making them her devoted servants, it may well be doubted whether the love of humanity alone could actuate men to pursue it in

those fields where its discovery is painful to themselves and to their fellows, and where their own reward is naught but obloquy, ostracism, and persecution. Professor Paulsen, in commenting on Bacon's somewhat cynical remark that "truth is a bride without a dowry," very pertinently says that in spite of that "she has never lacked for wooers."³ In every age and land there have been those self-renouncing investigators who have sought the truth and promulgated it as they saw it, in spite of the absence of ulterior reward and in the face of the most terrible punishment, just as there have been those others who sought after knowledge only in so far as their seeking justified preconceived opinions, and in so far as the search was compatible with personal safety. The story is told of Cremonini that when he heard of Galileo's discovery of the moons of Jupiter, he made a vow never to look through a telescope, because that would refute the Aristotelian cosmology so dear to him. Galileo himself, having been brought before the inquisition for favoring the Copernican, in place of the accepted Ptolemaic, conception of the universe, was induced by fear of punishment to abjure his own teaching. Another contemporary and countryman, Giordano Bruno, who was likewise a convert to the Copernican conception, was obliged to leave one university position after another, seeking refuge in country after country, but nowhere finding a welcome, until at last, returning to his native land, he was betrayed into the hands of the inquisition. After years of ceaseless but vain efforts to make him renounce

his teachings, he was sentenced to death. Knowing the nature of the punishment that was awaiting him, he yet said to the members of the tribunal: "You pronounce the sentence in far greater fear than that with which I receive it," and a few days later, after his tongue had been torn from his mouth, he was burned at the stake, never even uttering a sound. Such was the loyalty of the man who but a few years before had said: "But they that seek me [wisdom] merely for the sake of edifying themselves, are prudent; they that honor me to improve others, humane; they that seek me absolutely for my own sake, are eager for knowledge; they, however, that seek me out of love for the highest and uppermost truth, are wise and therefore happy."⁴ Whatever one may think of Bruno's teachings, he can not help admire the fortitude of this man with the courage of his convictions, or the loftiness of the sentiment that made that courage possible.

Supreme function of intellectual regard.—It is evident that the regard for knowledge and truth will not lead to or require such extreme sacrifices where it is directed to matters that are of trifling concern to us. Such demands are made upon it only where it has to do with those matters of knowledge and belief that are dearest to the hearts of men. In fact the supreme function of this sentiment is manifested only where it is directed to its ultimate goal: the securing of a point of view from which all things are seen in perspective, as it were, enabling us to see all things as to their relative values,

making it possible for us to discriminate between trifles and essentials, between the vanities of life and the things that are really worth while; in short: the construction of a philosophy of life. When this has been accomplished, the desire for knowledge and truth will have been largely instrumental in bringing all the other important inclinations of human nature to their desirable culmination. When once the individual sees all things in their proper relations, his regard for the creature comforts, his self-esteem and the love of recognition will no longer be paramount; a fitting valuation of material needs, proper self-respect, true modesty and a due humility, as well as an adequate regard for the respect of others will have displaced them. His regard for others will have become more a matter of good-will towards all, irrespective of personal sympathies or antipathies. The guide to his conduct in a general way will no longer be impulsive caprice, but instead, deliberate and unremitting subordination to the moral law. For he will have learned the truth of truths, that the wisdom of life consists in cheerfully placing ourselves into harmony with the ultimate factors of the universe in which we live.

Conflict with regard for others.—Just as the regard for knowledge and truth may lead to forgetfulness of self when it is directed to the chief concerns, the most cherished convictions of men, as in the causes of political and religious liberty, just so may it lead to a disregarding of others. In other words, this regard is apt to lead to an unavoidable conflict with both self-regard and the

regard for others. It goes almost without saying that its most highly developed form, the pure love of truth, necessarily demands self-abnegation, for which reason the man of ignoble or even average proportions never reaches to its full attainment. In fact, a stunted, undeveloped regard for knowledge and truth is perfectly compatible with selfishness. For that reason the characteristic attitude of some men towards new ideas tending to refute their old and cherished ones is liable to be that of a bigoted and narrow-minded fanaticism, violating the demands of a proper regard for both truth and his fellow-man. For the lover of truth is not a "lover of darkness"; nor does the man imbued with true brotherly love take offense at a brother man because of a difference in opinion.

Intolerance.—It is thus that it comes that the real benefactors of the race in matters of our real material welfare and spiritual uplift have ever been rewarded with ridicule and contempt, with hatred and abuse, with vilification and persecution. In the very nature of things the man who has thoroughly studied a given problem will be able to see things hidden from the rest, who have never examined into the same. When once he is sure that a new truth has been disclosed to him, he naturally gives it utterance. It is just as natural for his contemporaries, holding different views, to oppose and to attempt to suppress the new view. People with a restricted intellectual horizon especially—the very ones least qualified to pass on the merits of a new idea—

are apt under such circumstances to reveal a zealous bigotry that furnishes us with the least edifying spectacles of history. Demanding tolerance for their own views, they refuse to grant it to other views. The early Christians, whose ranks had been thinned by persecution, later, when come to power, became guilty of barbarous intolerance, among them the awful and atrocious murder of the lovable Hypatia. The Puritans, themselves seeking a refuge from religious persecution in the Old World, imprisoned, maimed and hanged other dissenters in the New, when they had full sway. The Radicals of the French Revolution, inveighing against the intolerance of the Church, themselves became the persecutors when the reins of government were in their hands.

Ideal development.—The enlightened man, familiar with the long and bitter search for truth in the history of thought, sees the absolute futility of all effort to suppress independent thinking.

Truth, crushed to earth, shall rise again:
 Th' eternal years of God are hers;
 But Error, wounded, writhes in pain,
 And dies among his worshipers.

His very familiarity with the history of thought on the one hand, and his own efforts toward the solution of baffling problems on the other, make him fully conscious of the limitations of human intelligence, force upon him the conviction that there may always be something that has escaped the closest scrutiny of even the ablest

investigators, and will gradually overcome that cocksureness that is the characteristic mark of intellectual immaturity or arrested development. Once he fully realizes that in those most intricate and difficult problems that lie nearest our hearts, and which are still unsolved mysteries even to the most powerful intellects, man's greatest efforts can at best accomplish little, his narrow-minded intolerance is a thing of the past. A sufficient personal familiarity with intellectual activity will likewise show him that the conclusions one arrives at through study are not at one's own election. Such insight will make him not only broader-minded, but also more open-minded. He will no longer be able to look with scorn or derision upon views appealing to him as unsound. Coleridge truly says: "There are errors which no wise man will treat with rudeness, while there is a probability that they may be the refraction of some great truth still below the horizon."

Being a lover of truth, he will try to gain access to all the light within reach, whatever its source. He will be guarded against a fossilized ultra-conservatism on the one hand, and an extreme radicalism on the other. He will reject nothing simply because it is new, and despise nothing simply because it bears the stamp of time. He will approach the old with a spirit of reverent gratitude, for in it he sees the slow conquests gained by the life and toil of co-workers long since gathered to their fathers. As to the new, even though it undermines his dearest preconceptions, he will welcome

it to the open arena of scientific debate, for well he realizes that if it be truth, it will prevail in the end in spite of all opposition; and that if it be error, it will soonest be found out as such and resulting danger averted, if it be given judicious and fair-minded examination and trial. As to himself and his own contribution to the sum-total of knowledge, he will follow the wise course of clinging to the tried and tested old, until he is convinced of the desirability and need of its displacement by the better new. He is fully conscious of his own responsibility as a leader, followed trustingly by others; he will advance with due circumspection, for he does not wish to mislead others into error, should he be unfortunate enough himself to lose his way. Out of a proper regard for his fellow-men he will shrink from inflicting pain except when it is necessary. Copernicus, who certainly was not actuated by self-regard in the matter, waited for thirty-six years before announcing to the world his epoch-making conception of the universe.

THE REGARD FOR KNOWN TRUTH.

Relation to the moral life.--While the need of an adequate knowledge of our environment demands in the scientific investigator a pure love of truth, it just as imperatively demands on the part of all those with whom we come in contact, another intellectual virtue, closely allied to the former: a sufficient regard for knowledge or belief already acquired. In fact, these

qualities are not distinct and separate virtues, but in reality only different phases of the same virtue; only the greater ease of analysis justifies the more or less arbitrary separation. A sufficient regard for truth will insure: (1) agreement between our speech, or utterances, and our views; (2) agreement between our present actions and our speech, and therefore our views; (3) agreement between future actions and present promises; in short, agreement between profession and conduct. For fidelity to truth is not by any means merely an intellectual matter, that of mere logical assent or acceptance, that of mere theoretical endorsement; where the truth has really become part of ourselves, it works out in action. It is not merely a matter of impression, but just as much of expression.

Veracity and sincerity.—The regard for known truth, where sufficiently developed, can not help producing that desirable quality of character we call sincerity or genuineness. Its most noticeable aspect, that of veracity, or truthfulness, manifested in speech, is easily taken for the whole; in fact, we sometimes find the terms used interchangeably. There is some ground for such a confusion, in that the presence of veracity, or sincerity of speech, is bound to be accompanied by sincerity in action and fidelity in keeping promises. Dissimulation and deceit, buncombe and cant, affectation and pretense, hypocrisy and ingratiating, intrigue and treachery, breach of faith and broken vows can not be grown on the seed-bed of veracity, but are instead the

natural products of the hot-bed of selfishness. He to whom truth is dear will find difficulty in hiding or suppressing it even where prudence demands it, and where no good can be accomplished by its publication; much less could he be induced to maim or distort it. And certainly only he can habitually and easily do violence to it, despoil, mutilate, or outrage it, who loves his own dear self above all things else. It is this attitude of mind that furnishes the explanation of so unprepossessing and deplorable a spectacle as the sight of men of rare intellectual ability in the learned professions, perhaps most noticeably those of law and journalism, prostituting themselves by selling out to the highest bidder, championing the interests of wealth and power, and turning traitor to their better convictions and nobler ideals.

Native truthfulness.—As was said above, genuineness may be developed through regard for others or through a sense of duty, but it is most naturally and easily secured through the proper development of the intellectual sentiment. A native horror at disagreement between word and fact is its natural source. Every normal child is painfully affected by untruthful statements when first he meets with them. Unfortunately, the influences of his social environment often are such as to overcome this original aversion for untruth.

Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
As, to be hated, needs but to be seen;
Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.

What was at first abhorred may thus in time be accepted as something perfectly meet and proper, and adopted for personal use, especially when found to meet with the condonation and even tacit approval of society, while transparent honesty meets with rebuff, if not even ridicule.

Imagination as source of untruthfulness.—This pristine dislike of untruth is the more apt to be vanquished because the aforementioned factor is usually aided by other agencies. Parallel with the progress of this first influence upon the child there is the encroachment of the world of make-believe upon him, finally taking him captive. This easy confusion of fact and fancy, in other words, is another factor tending to accustom him to intellectual inconsistency. This comes about partly through the unaided tendencies of his own mental life, and partly through suggestion from his elders and his playmates. As regards the first, recent investigations would indicate that to the child, especially the child of a vivacious temperament, memory images do not differ *per se* from those of the imagination; they are not differently labeled or tagged. When a whole troop of images rush into his mind, he does not stop to examine them, to see to what category they belong. Some very interesting experiments, recently conducted,⁵ demonstrate that in the case of such children, not all statements are accompanied by a consciousness of their truthfulness, untruthfulness, or doubtfulness. The consciousness of the truthfulness or the untruthfulness of the

statement may actually follow the statement itself. When a little boy of this type comes home, all excitement, to tell his mother about a big jump that he really did make, his mind is primarily impressed with the fact that he jumped higher than ever before, and he is naturally jubilant over his great achievement. His very agitation prevents calm utterance, and is hardly conducive to natural expression in conformity with the facts. When he comes to the point where he tries to convey to his mother an adequate idea of the height cleared, images of various objects of different height come to him, among them perhaps that of a neighbor's barn, and, what is more natural for him than to jump right over the barn? Such unpremeditated prevarications are of course perfectly innocent, but if not discouraged may likewise help to overcome the original, ingenuous tendency to adhere to the undistorted truth.

Admiration of well told lies.—He faces a more serious danger when the witnessing of a skilful and successful lie extorts from him admiration for the feat. That it does so, must be admitted by all close observers of children. Unusual ability and daring in the performing of a difficult feat of any kind primarily tend to arouse in the child wonder, admiration. And, as a result, when once he has yielded to the temptation to deceive others even in a spirit of play, and has experienced the resulting personal gratification that comes from the sense of power that he thus has over others, there is a positive danger that he will go farther in the same direction. It

is the sense of this power that one can wield over others by means of deception, coupled with the love of the contingent fame and notoriety, as well as the lucrative financial returns, that explains, in large part, the genesis of the adventurers, quacks and mountebanks of the Cagliostro type so familiar in the history of charlatan-ism and fraud. The conjurors and sorcerers of old, the fake ghosts of haunted houses, the "Poltergeists,"⁷⁶ much of the false accusation in the history of witchcraft, the mediumistic, "clairvoyance" and "telepathy" frauds of our own day show to what extremes this tendency will sometimes lead when unchecked.*

Types of lies.—Perhaps the most important cause of all causes that lead to downright lying in the child is the desire to avert or ward off threatening danger, generally in the form of punishment. An unexpected pouncing upon a child, suddenly taking him by surprise, gruffly asking him as to his guilt or innocence regarding some misdeed or mishap, is almost bound to force him into a lie of self-defense. Parents and teachers often mistakenly place implicit confidence in a given child for the simple reason that he has not been known to "tell stories," and are apt to doubt the child who is given to such an indulgence. This mistake is due to a serious misconception. The inventions of the fanciful child are an entirely

* It would not do to account for all such cases in this way, as other factors enter in, the most important of which, perhaps, is that of self-deception.

different phenomenon from the lies of self-defense, or denial. It does not at all follow that the "story-telling" child, given to extravagance of statement, is apt to resort to real untruthfulness, nor that the more prosaic, matter-of-fact child is more veracious. The child of vivid imagination may be perfectly truthful, while the other child of a more sluggish mentality may be quite mendacious. On the other hand, it will not do to conclude that every alert, animated, impulsive person is truthful, and that every deliberate, sluggish, phlegmatic person is untruthful. The truth would rather seem to be that the one is more liable to fall into the way of untruthfulness in the form of inventive exaggeration, largely, unpremeditated fiction—a sort of artistic, poetic lying. The other, not encumbered with a lively fancy, if resorting to untruthfulness at all, will be more apt to lie from selfishness; his lying will be of the coldly calculating, utilitarian type—realistic, prosaic lying. The man of a more inert, indolent disposition, disinclined to strenuous exertion and yet desirous of means, power, standing, is especially liable to drift into this highway of practical, calculating mendacity and unguineness. This cold-blooded, deliberate, premeditated lying is furthermore the more vicious and dangerous type, largely perhaps because it is more difficult of detection, keeping as it does to a close verisimilitude and a snug approximation to literal truthfulness.

Detection of lying.—We flatter ourselves with our ability to read character, assuming that we can detect

deception wherever we meet with it. Emerson says: "Human character does evermore publish itself. It will not be concealed. It hates darkness—it rushes into light. The most fugitive deed and word, the mere air of doing a thing, the intimated purpose, expresses character. If you act, you show character; if you sit still, you show it. . . . Dreadful limits are set in nature to the powers of dissimulation. Truth tyrannizes the unwilling members of the body. Faces never lie, it is said. No man need be deceived who will study the changes of expression. When a man speaks the truth in the spirit of truth, his eye is as clear as the heavens. When he has base ends, and speaks falsely, the eye is muddy and sometimes asquint." No doubt there is considerable truth in this sentiment. At the same time, were it absolutely and universally true that we can detect deception, there would soon be no deception to be detected. Extreme types can no doubt be recognized by most of us, but only very exceptional judges of human nature can as a rule correctly read the various gradations that lie between these extremes, and they can not always do it. The truthful person of an open and impulsive nature naturally gives unimpeded expression to whatever is on his mind, and when speaking under circumstances involving a conflict of motives, his truthful utterance usually bursts forth in one continuous stream of volubility. Where a person of this type lets go of the reins and indulges in extravagance of speech, his utterance is more apt to come forth in the form of occasional jerks

or spurts of energy, alternating with brief hitches and slackening of speed, enabling his fertile mind to muster the hurried constructions of his inventive imagination. The truthful person of sluggish temperament is marked naturally by a more deliberate and halting delivery; he seems to be searching about for his facts and to be fearful lest he omit some relevant, even though unimportant, detail; there is a laborious dragging and lagging while getting his facts together, seemingly proceeding without an objective goal. The untruthful person of the sluggish type also gives the appearance of searching about, but his searching more generally impresses one as a searching, not for facts or details, but for words—a searching to avoid rather than to find significant details; there is a marked hemming and hawing while finding his sinuous way to the objective point always in full view.

Considerateness as a source of untruthfulness.—Self-regard is not the only factor that may lead to a departure from the known truth. Regard for the feelings of others may often be brought into conflict with the regard for truth. Even a young child of sensitive nature will recoil at the thought of communicating a painful truth to another. Such a regard for the feelings of others is ordinarily more likely to be developed through training, however. Parents try to impress upon the minds of their children the need of being considerate of others. Some of them make the mistake of insisting that their children refrain from saying unpleasant things, fail-

ing to recognize that even children are occasionally placed into positions where it is necessary to speak the painful truth. But even where more sensible parents teach their children to refrain from saying unpleasant things that do not need saying, there is danger of sacrificing truth to the demands of considerateness. For after all, in place of developing that desirable harmonizing between the two demands, which can be secured only through a high degree of tactfulness, we are more apt to develop a factitious, make-shift reproduction, which aims at compromising between them. Which of the two rivals will ordinarily receive the worse end of the bargain in the resulting settlement is readily seen when we remember that Truth is an impersonal abstraction, with no human advocate present to plead her cause before us, while our brother of flesh and blood is there in concrete and tangible presence. Then, too, we must always reckon with self-regard, which in the very nature of things coöperates in such a situation with the regard for others, rather than with regard for truth.

Affectation and insincerity.—When in addition children find that the affable person of mild and gentle manners is welcomed everywhere, even where known to be somewhat unreliable, and that open frankness and undisguised plainness of speech are, at best, but tolerated, if they do not actually receive the cold shoulder, it is but natural that in case of conflict between the demands of considerateness, or even good form, and sincerity, they should yield to the former, to the detri-

ment of truth, as well as of their own truthfulness. In the same way they are helped along on the highway of insincerity when they are required to ape others in the manners and expressions of courtesy, antecedent to the partial development, at least, of its proper and natural source: true regard for others. A mere aping is likely to lead to a certain forced artificiality, or affectation, that is incompatible with sincerity. It is true, no doubt, that merely assuming the forms, merely going through the motions, merely performing the movements, as it were, of certain conventionalities, may bring in its wake a certain touch of the corresponding emotion, but, after all, it is but superficial, skin-deep; it does not come from the heart. On the other hand, where there is true courtesy, that is, a genuine considerateness, not a merely affected or assumed interest demanded by social usage, the expression will take care of itself.

As long as children grow up in an environment in which a higher premium is put on mere outward conformity to social conventions, and in which plain but nonconforming sincerity is depreciated and stigmatized, they are almost predestined to the adoption of cant and sham and duplicity generally. Where social intercourse deteriorates into what the philosopher Hartmann calls society, "an artificially organized mutual flattery insurance association," the child exposed to the baneful and stunting effect of such a vitiated atmosphere can hardly be expected to attain the full stature of an erect and lofty sincerity. And even though he may realize

with Lao-tse that "True words are not pleasant, pleasant words are not true," yet sheer force of habit will accustom him to the rather questionable and unseemly practice in the use of the false amenities common in the artificial medium in which he has been taught to feel at home. A still more serious danger threatening his native regard for truth will be faced if in addition to acquiring a mere outward compliance with prescribed social forms, he learns to think it perfectly proper to participate in functions and ceremonies not endorsed by his own reason, to take part in religious rites, for instance, in which he himself does not believe, to practice what to such a one would be mere mummery. A child growing up in a social environment in which a mere outward conformity, in the absence of inner approval, is taken as a matter of course and practiced without any compunction of conscience, is almost doomed to the deplorable delusion that such dissimulation and hypocrisy are in no wise blameworthy or reprehensible, a delusion that will sap the very root of his honesty and compromise the virgin purity of his character, one of the most exquisite things in human nature.

EDUCATIONAL.

Need of independent thinking.—In addition to those pedagogical applications that can be readily inferred from the above discussion, there are some that perhaps call for more specific treatment. That undesirable narrow-mindedness and illiberality that is the

natural outgrowth of a limited intellectual development can be avoided only by means of securing at least a reasonable independence of thought. Absolutely independent thinking is of course something impossible of attainment. On the other hand, too great a dependence on others predisposes the individual to gullibility in its various forms, making him an easy prey to the ubiquitous frauds in the commercial world, as well as to the medicaster physician, the shyster lawyer, the backstairs politician. In the same way, a mere smattering of knowledge accepted on mere hearsay or authority, and but half-assimilated, very frequently makes him the simple devotee of a fantastic and all too popular vaudeville science, and the ready dupe of the promoter, for lucre, of the fanciful tenets and enticing occultism of the sporadic and quasi-religious cults of the day. The same causes produce that over-regard for social usage that results in a senseless, slavish bondage to conventions that have outlived their usefulness. It is likewise evident that that element of social efficiency that we call good judgment can not be attained in the absence of independent thinking.

How to secure independent thinking.—For all these reasons there must be an unremitting training in independent thinking, the making of individual observations and the drawing of personal conclusions. Due to the rush of work, the amount of subject-matter that has to be covered, the teacher is apt to proceed in a way that will secure for the pupils merely a memory mas-

tery of the verbal content, in place of taking sufficient time to secure for him a rational mastery, or real assimilation, of the thought content of the subject. Objective teaching, on the one hand, and developmental teaching, on the other, deserve universal adoption in the spheres to which they are specifically adapted; they are the media through which the great teachers, from Socrates to Pestalozzi, gained their mastery of the art of instruction. And even where we do objective teaching there is danger of our directing the pupil unduly, in place of leaving him sufficiently to his own initiative; so also, where we try to do developmental teaching, we are liable to ask leading questions and unwittingly answer other questions by the facile and volatile expression of our countenance, expecting at the same time to develop independence of thought, initiative and self-reliance in the pupil, without which latter elements we never can develop either moral character or even mere efficiency in the pupil. It is natural, also, to credit the glib reciter with an understanding of the subject-matter that is really not his, and to assume that the less fluent recitation of a more hesitant pupil indicates lack of grasp, forgetting that, as Goethe puts it, it is "just where ideas are lacking, that words slip in at the proper moment to take their place." There is considerable truth to the analogy that Dean Swift draws between fluency and lack of fluency of speech, and the ease or difficulty with which a small and large congregation, respectively, make their exit from church. Lao-tse very

pertinently says: "Quick-wittedness is the mere flower of Reason, but of ignorance the beginning."

Attitude toward childish enthusiasm.—Where an enthusiastic pupil, in childish or youthful jubilation over a new intellectual achievement, expresses his exuberance in what to the maturer mind seems an over-ardent manner, it will hardly do to attempt to suppress or discourage his demonstrative joy. The very novelty of so unaccustomed a thing as the discovery of a new fact or truth of necessity produces an intense joy, expressing itself in a corresponding intensity of manner. Where we find this demonstrative eagerness to publish the discovery of a new fact or truth in a person of maturer years, we may fain be moved to smile at so childlike a demeanor in a person who would naturally be presumed to have become somewhat accustomed to the joys of intellectual achievement. But it is only a cynic who could see anything ludicrous in the same enthusiasm in the boy or youth, and a stupid, churlish cad who would make it the object of ridicule or scorn. The situation would rather call upon us to enter into a proper appreciation of his enthusiasm. These joys of achievement tend to spur him on in his intellectual efforts. It will not do to dampen his ardor. As he gradually becomes accustomed to new intellectual achievements with the advance he makes, he will learn soon enough to contain himself, we may rest assured.

True and feigned curiosity.—It is likewise a mistake to attempt to suppress the child's native curiosity. Of

course, it would not do to assume that all questioning is prompted by curiosity. Sometimes it will happen that pupils who have made but inadequate preparation will ask questions in class so as to use up valuable time, with the purpose of averting the danger of being called on by the teacher; for they realize very well that the teacher of only average power of observation will not be apt to call on a pupil who has been taking an active part in the recitation, even though that participation has been nothing but the asking of questions. Again, it will happen that a pupil who, because of lack of preparation has made a poor showing, when called upon to discuss a given topic, will wait until the matter has been cleared up by a classmate or by the teacher and then ask questions concerning the matter, trying to give the impression that even now he does not understand it, feeling that the teacher will be more apt to make allowance for inability to comprehend readily than for shirking in the matter of making his preparation. Again, it will happen, both in and out of the recitation, that pupils will ask questions concerning some hobby or other of the teacher, feigning an interest where they have no interest; or that they will ask questions to give the teacher an opportunity to display his imagined erudition, in both cases actuated mainly by the motive of ingratiating.

Guarding against utilitarianism.—Whatever course the teacher may resort to in order to put a stop to such deceitful simulation of true curiosity, it certainly will

not do to attempt to suppress the latter. At best, it needs guidance. Even where it takes a bias toward the morbid, the difficulty of directing it aright ought not to be great. Most of all would it be a grievous error to answer the pupil's questions in such a way as to force upon him a purely utilitarian point of view. Where, for instance, he asks about matters of no immediate practical concern to him, it would be a mistake to put him off by asking him what difference it makes whether the matter is so or so. It is very probable that in the case of many a child we change the native disinterested regard for truth for its own sake into a sordid regard for facts immediately convertible into dollars and cents. Much as education must look out for the material needs of the rising generation, preparing them for an efficient life in an economic sense, it will not do ever to let those material needs dominate over others. A curriculum that requires the pursuit of some studies that do not have an immediate, practical bearing on our economic wants, no doubt tends to develop a different attitude toward the ideals of life from the one developed by a curriculum that ignores everything but material needs. Pastorius, the learned founder of Germantown, Pennsylvania, finding himself unadapted to the exigent needs of the primitive environment obtaining in his new home, deplored the uselessness of a mere bookish culture, declaring: "Never have metaphysics and Aristotelian logic made a Christian of a savage, far less baked a loaf of bread." Yet it may well be doubted

whether a merely utilitarian training, with its eye ever kept on practical, material ends, would have furnished him with that disinterested love of mankind that prompted a protest against negro slavery as early as 1688.

Other dangers.—There is always danger that knowledge will be pursued for ulterior ends and from inferior motives. The youthful student, especially, is apt to look for immediate reward:

Know, not for knowing's sake,
But to become a star to men forever;
Know, for the gain it gets, the praise it brings,
The wonder it inspires, the love it breeds.

This natural tendency is no doubt materially reënforced by the prevalent system of marking and grading, the unreasonable attention and devotion to "tests" and examinations. Other dangers lurking on the road to learning and intellectual training generally are those that would seem almost to inhere in some of the school activities themselves, especially those of debate and oratory. It may well be doubted whether a prolonged endeavor in the building up of arguments on the side of a question not intellectually endorsed by the pupil will be entirely harmless in its results; and yet the common practice in the management of school debates entirely disregards the possibility of such a danger. It is gratifying indeed to hear of isolated cases like that of the governor of one of our states who, while a student, refused to defend a position in which he did not believe.

Would it not be well, in the management of debates, to arrange for a sufficient number of able assistants to help work up the arguments on the two sides, so that substitutes could be selected from these subalterns to take the place of such of the originally chosen debaters as find it necessary to withdraw for reasons of conscience? In training and in rehearsing the declamations and orations we should keep in our minds and in that of the pupil the thought of Quintilian that it "is the heart that makes the orator."

Seek but the honest recompense!
 Be not a jingling fool, I pray!
 Sound judgment coupled with good sense
 Themselves with little art convey;
 And if intent on earnest speaking,
 Why need you then for words be seeking?
 Your speeches, now, so glittering withal,
 In which for men you ornate scrolls are curling,
 Vexatious are, like misty winds in fall,
 That moan through seared leaves they set a-twirling!

It is very evident that an immature mind may readily come to foster the idea that the mere participation in a schooling, especially the absolving of a higher institution of learning, will preëempt for him the special privileges and favors of society. Such a delusion is liable to develop, on the one hand, a shallow affectation, manifesting itself in an inept parroting and stilted display of the mere external forms of true refinement and culture; on the other, that false pride of learning that is just as much to be deplored. How great the danger is of assuming an imaginary superiority because of

learning may be seen from this confession of Kant's: "I am myself an investigator by inclination. I feel the undivided thirst for knowledge and the eager impatience to make progress therein, as well as the satisfaction at every advance. There was a time when I believed that these things, taken together, could be all that was worthy of honor in mankind, and I despised the rabble who know nothing. Rousseau set me right. This deluded preference is fading away; I am learning to honor the common people and should consider myself of far less use than the common laborers, did I not believe that this thought may make all others more valuable to establish the rights of man."

Treatment of untruthfulness.—The dangers that beset us in the training of the intellectual sentiment are, however, not confined to those of the improper development of the desire for further knowledge. There is just as positive danger that the native regard for known truth will be violated by other innate tendencies making for insincerity. The teacher that is acquainted with the causes of untruthfulness can intelligently guard against them. The imaginative child accustomed to give free rein to his fancy when he sets out telling "stories," is helped by being brought to an occasional halt by his teacher, by being asked to reëxamine his data, by being asked whether what he is telling is a "true" story or a "make-believe" story. Judicious aid given with sufficient frequency will get even the most fanciful child to realize his failings and help him acquire the habit of

talking with greater deliberation and thus preventing the pranks of his over-fervid fancy. Unfortunately, however, there are parents and even teachers who encourage the story-telling proclivities of such children. The admiration they manifest for what they consider innocent "cuteness" may do not a little to develop an attitude of real untruthfulness, for to the child these two disparate things are essentially the same in kind. So, also, where the child naturally admires a skilfully told lie on the part of an older playmate, the teacher ought to feel it his duty to show him that such use of skill of whatsoever high a degree is worthy of contempt rather than of admiration, for the simple reason that it is an improper and unworthy use. When it comes to the lies of denial due to the desire to avoid impending punishment, it is evident that it must be the teacher's attempt to secure and retain the confidence of the pupil in the unimpassioned justice of the teacher; it will not do suddenly to pounce upon him when questioning him concerning any misdemeanor of which we suspect him to be guilty.

Need of high standard in school.—In view of the wide prevalence of tolerance and condonation of so-called "social" lies, it is highly desirable that in his school environment, at least, the child come in contact with a more rigoristic attitude. It would be deplorable indeed if here, where perhaps more than anywhere else he should come in contact with high ideals, he should also have the thought impressed upon his mind that

untruthfulness is perfectly proper under certain conditions and at times even necessary. Our speech ought to be such as to indicate that to our minds untruthfulness in any form is reprehensible, rather than innocent or only venial. Let us call lying by its right name in place of resorting to the use of such euphemisms as "white lies" or "fibbing," and thus encourage the young child in his unfortunate habit. Our whole attitude towards our pupils ought, in short, to be that of encouragement for genuineness and of discouragement for unguineness, even where the latter presents itself in the form of engaging smoothness. Even where straightforwardness manifests itself in the form of abrupt crudity and blunt tactlessness, our attitude must not be one of severe rebuke, but rather that of sympathetic criticism, so that the pupil may retain the sterling worth of his integrity and at the same time rid himself of the objectionable exterior with which the same is apt to be tarnished. Let us be sure to impress upon the child the social value of truth, as shown in our absolute dependence upon the word of others.

O what a dreary waste this world of ours becomes
When out our lives you banish trust and confidence,
When dire uncertainty and dread suspicion
Do haunt us with their fiendish presence!
O why should one so lightly speak the word
Infected sore with treacherous untruth,
Rob thus a brother of his faith in fellow man,
Shut out the stars, obscure the sun,
Envelop ev'ry trust and hope in clouds,
And send him down the years of life
A disillusioned, but a disappointed man?

The teacher's example.—The work of the teacher bears not merely on the matter of veracity, but as well on all other forms of sincerity. It ought to be every teacher's endeavor to guard against the fostering of unguineness in the form of affectation through nature study, picture posing, expressive reading, declamatory exercises, and all other school work that in any way tends to arouse the feelings of the child. It is self-evident that the teacher's own nature ought to be permeated with the spirit of truth. If that be the case he will have the courage to acknowledge his ignorance where he can not answer a question asked by a bright pupil; he will read test and examination papers before grading and returning them; when a supervisor or superintendent comes to inspect his work, he will show the average work of his class, as nearly so as that is possible. But more than that, even where he forgets self-interest and has in mind only the good of others, will he be loyal to the truth, and that not only where the duty of his position calls upon him to advise, admonish or rebuke an individual pupil, but as well where in the work of the classroom he attempts to arouse ideals and to raise his pupils to a higher level. He will thus avoid the mistake against which we are warned by an eminent British educator. "From the earliest recorded ages, the moral education of mankind has proceeded upon a system of habitual exaggeration, as if the naked truth of things would not answer the end . . .

The miseries of vice and the glorious prospects of virtue are always depicted in terms beyond the fact . . . In substituting the license of imagination for the restraints of truth, we incur serious liabilities . . . All that he [the teacher] can do is to keep well before him the sober facts of life, as a counterpoise to the poetic flights of the lesson-book.”⁸ A teacher who is sufficiently imbued with the spirit of truth will, in short, manifest the same simplicity of character in all things, even his speech. “An effort to speak for the mere sake of speaking—to speak finely for the sake of fine speaking, and that others may know of it—the disease of word-making—sounding words, in which nevertheless no idea is audible—is consistent with no man’s dignity, and least of all with that of the Academic Teacher, who represents the dignity of Knowledge to future generations.”⁹ The teacher, as perhaps no other, ought to keep before his mind the prayer of Socrates: “Grant, O gods, that I be beautiful within, and that what I possess in the way of an outer life be on friendly terms with the inner!”

CHAPTER IX

ESTHETIC REGARD

Philosophers have ever realized the necessity of taking advantage of every agency that could assist in the moral training of our youth. It is only recently, however, that our educational people and many of the laity seem to have come to the same point of view. At any rate, there has been of recent years a remarkable amount of activity to find ways of utilizing various phases of life to the end of a more efficient moral education. One side of our nature that seems to be considered by many as especially promising in this direction is our appreciation of the beautiful in nature and in art. The opinion actually seems to prevail in some minds, even in those of some of our prominent educators, that in order to solve the problem of moral education we need but develop in the child good taste in the appreciation of beauty. On the other hand, any one fairly familiar with the history of literature, of educational theory, and of philosophy knows that the problem of the relation of art to conduct is one that has come up perennially, not merely for a few generations or a few centuries, but for several thousand years. When Ruskin says: "Taste is not only a part and an index of morality; it is the *only*

morality," and when Goethe says: "No art can have any influence on morals," they are but taking the same opposite sides that were taken by different Chinese thinkers over four thousand years ago.

Relation of art to conduct.—The very fact that intelligent men in all the ages could have fought over this question of the relation of art to morals shows that that relation must be an intimate one, and the problem of determining its nature most difficult. The old Greek word *kalokagathia* stands as a monument to the analysis made by that classic race to the effect that there is an essential harmony between the beautiful and the good, an analysis accepted by her earlier thinkers. In the history of English philosophy we find the same view cropping out in the writings of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson where the practical identity between esthetics and ethics is emphasized. In like manner the great educational philosopher Herbart uses the term esthetics so as to include ethics. On the other hand, the mere fact that the sterner and more strenuous races have ever looked with concern upon the general dissemination of art appreciation, and that rigoristic theology has ever treated art with suspicion and apprehension, ought give us pause. For, is it at all likely that such an attitude had nothing more to justify it than mere superstitious prejudice? The Spartans punished Timotheus the Milesian for adding a twelfth string to the harp, fearing that luxury of sound would effeminate the people. The attitude towards music and painting taken by the Puritans

and Quakers in the history of our own country had a similar source. The Abbé Millot voices this fear about as well as any theological writer when he says: "How happy for mankind could a nation be distinguished at once for its virtue and its refinement, and become polished and enlightened while it retained a purity of morals"; and Rousseau says still more forcibly, "Luxury seldom appears without the sciences and arts, and never do the latter appear without the former." And even Plato and Schiller, two of the most eminent defenders of the idea of the moral value of art in its various forms, raise warning voices with regard to certain dangers in this connection.

The essential nature of esthetic experience.—It is evident that mere assertion or asseveration will not solve the problem, and that instead it is necessary to make an analysis of the essential nature of esthetic enjoyment, thus getting at a standard of esthetic valuation, or appreciation, and then seeing what that has in common with ethical or moral standards, and wherein they differ. A great variety of attempts have been made in the history of philosophy to interpret the real nature of the esthetic experience, but the one that seems to come nearest to solving the problem is the one that, for lack of a better term in our language, could be called the "semblance" or "esthetic illusion" theory, first suggested by the poet Schiller, elaborated by the philosopher Hartmann, endorsed more or less by Vischer, worked out in greater scientific detail by the psychologist Groos,

and having for its most consistent champion, perhaps, Dr. Konrad Lange, professor of esthetics in the University of Tübingen. Ever since the days of Kant and Schiller a close kinship between play and art has been recognized, a kinship emphasized by Spencer, Groos, von Stein, and others; but the real nature of that relationship is perhaps best brought out by what Lange calls the "conscious self-illusion" theory, according to which all esthetic enjoyment is due to our looking upon the object of esthetic contemplation as an affair of "make-believe." We play with our sense of reality, as it were. When contemplating the object of art the idea of reality would be forced upon us, were it not for the recognition of the fact that what we see or hear is not reality itself, but instead a representation of reality. It is this secondary mental activity, due to the constant reinstatement of the idea of reality and its constant successful displacement by the idea of the "make-believe" nature of the object, that gives rise to the series of pleasurable feelings that constitute the essential element of esthetic enjoyment. Where we perceive a real object there is but a primary mental activity incident to its recognition. Where we view its representation the sense stimulation is just about the same as in the former case, tending so far to give us a perceptual experience practically identical with the first; but there are other sensational elements accompanying these which antagonize the primary tendency, making it impossible for us to get exactly the same perceptual interpretation

that we would if only the first group of elements were present. Where the representation becomes an identical copy of the original, as is sometimes the case with wax figures, making it impossible for the observer to detect the representative nature of the object, actual deception or illusion is at first produced, and such an experience is never esthetically enjoyed, but rather resented. The primary and secondary sensational elements must blend as it were to produce a real esthetic pleasure, i. e., we must be able to recognize the object as one of "make-believe," or, as Lange puts it, the experience must be one of "conscious self-illusion."

Now, whether or not Lange's theory entirely accounts for the nature of esthetic pleasure, it is at any rate evident that this element of "conscious self-illusion" is present in every esthetic experience, as well as that it is a most important element. There is no difficulty whatsoever in seeing that this is true of our esthetic enjoyment of dramatic and epic poetry, of fiction, of painting, and of sculpture—in other words, of all forms of art that deal with imitation or representation. Its application to the other forms of art is not as readily seen as in lyric poetry, in music, the dance, architecture and decorative art. But when we learn that Lange calls to his aid for their interpretation what he calls feeling-illusions and illusions of movement and power, in addition to the perceptual illusions applied to imitative art, we can more readily see the application of his theory even here. The only application of the theory left to

consider would be its bearing on our esthetic appreciation of nature. This Lange accounts for by what he calls "inverted illusion," according to which "that is beautiful in nature which can be easily and characteristically reproduced in art," or which can be enjoyed esthetically if looked upon as though it were a work of art. His position at this point certainly seems secure. Long ago Kant had said: "Nature was beautiful when it had the appearance of art; and art can be called beautiful only when we recognize that it is art while it yet bears the appearance of nature."¹ This position is fortified by the fact that people who have not acquired any great degree of the esthetic appreciation of art, have no real esthetic appreciation of nature. The valuation of any aspect of nature that they experience seems in the main to be the practical one of utility. The pleasure of the farmer, who is viewing a field of waving grain while thinking of the market value of the crop, is evidently of a very different nature from that of another spectator who for the time being indulges himself in the fancy of seeing in it the incoming waves of the sea.

Art and play.—In summing up, then, esthetic enjoyment is seen to consist largely of our playing with the sense of reality. In comparing art with play it is readily seen that both have to do with the seeking of pleasure for the sake of that pleasure itself, without any other motive. Just as the enjoyment of play in the case of the animal and of the child is devoid of any practical interest, so also does the adult man or woman enjoy art

for the sake of that enjoyment itself. In fact, we could justly say that art is to the mature person what play is to the child. Of course, not all play includes the "make-believe" element, but any activity sought because of that element is play-activity; that is, all art is play. The fact that this is so in no way depreciates art, for play has an important social function, and is of value to society just as well as any other form of activity.

Means for substitutional exercise.—The human being is endowed with a great variety of organs, of instincts and impulses calling for activity or expression. Real life largely fails to furnish us with opportunities for natural expression or activity along these manifold lines. Yet nature demands the opportunities for such expression and so, where we do not find them naturally, we create them artificially. Where we can not get the natural exercise of a given function we do the next best thing: we secure a *substitutional* exercise. That is what children do in play and what we do in art. There is a felt need in the boy to exercise himself in the direction of the many activities he has heard about and read about, the many activities he has seen his elders engaged in. He can not put himself into those actual situations and there engage in the real activity itself. But he can artificially reproduce or copy the situation and the activity, and so he plays soldier, or fireman, or Indian, or seaman, or doctor, or what not. And so with the girl who plays along those lines that appeal to her. Just so with the adult, with one main

difference, perhaps: that in his case the variety of needs is greater. Through his greater familiarity with life, partly derived from personal contact or experience, and partly from reading, a greater number of needs for expression in a greater number of directions has been created. The more we know about the situations and experiences that human life brings with it under varying conditions, other things equal, the greater the need of activity or exercise in those particular respects. In other words, the richer and fuller our inner life, the greater the need of opportunities in the objective world or environment for exercise and activity in a great variety of ways. Now, most of us are so situated that in the very nature of things the life we are obliged to lead is one of activity in but a few directions or in a very restricted sphere. The humdrum routine of life in this work-a-day world, in other words, keeps us too active, perhaps, in one or a few directions, while it would stifle or suppress our impulses in other directions, thus bringing about an atrophying of our nature in those particular directions. But our own nature is such that it prevents such a calamity. It seeks an outlet. We artificially create fictitious situations in which we secure substitutional exercise in those spheres of activity in which the dull routine of our daily existence fails to furnish us with the real opportunities calling for actual, or real, or normal activity.

These forms of substitutional exercise can, however, approximate towards the real activity in varying de-

grees. For instance, where modern civilization does not ordinarily furnish an opportunity for the exercise of the fighting instinct in man, there are ways of securing an outlet for expression of this instinct in a great variety of activities approaching the original in varying degrees. Athletic contests, boxing bouts, wrestling matches, for instance, are a pretty good copy of the natural expression of this instinct. But, stepping down from this form of active substitutional exercise involving nearly the same amount of physical exertion as the real activity itself, we pass through various forms of activity involving less and less of actual physical effort until we come down to what might be called the contemplative type of substitutional exercise that we get in art. Young men who have not yet buckled to the real work of life, and mature men of good physique who lack the opportunity of fighting others physically, may fight beasts, go hunting, go fishing, "break" horses, "rough it," and in a general way gratify this instinct in various forms of activity requiring considerable physical exercise and exertion. They find enjoyment in it; nature thus provides for keeping them physically efficient and strong. Others are content with looking on at physical contests; in other words, that secures sufficient activity to satisfy the needs of their natures. Still others are content with dreaming about physical conflicts, reading about them, seeing them enacted on the stage; that is to say, the "make-believe" situations of art production furnish them with sufficient activity in this particular direction.

In short, while both play and art furnish substitutional exercise, play demands a degree of physical activity more closely approximating that of the real activity itself, while the "make-believe" enjoyment of art requires only imaginary physical activity.

What we enjoy esthetically.—What are we most apt to enjoy esthetically? From what has been said it follows that it must be those things that we enjoy otherwise, i. e., the things we care for, provided that real life does not already furnish us with sufficient exercise with respect to those particular things. The man whose life is calm and placid may thus enjoy what is stirring and agitating in art. The mature man or woman whose life has been full of sorrow and tribulation will be far more apt to enjoy wholesome comedy than the grandest tragedy, while the young man or woman not yet come in contact with the stern realities of life, yearning for a personal experience along the lines of life's fullness that he has read about, shows a preference for the sensational, the melodramatic or even the lugubrious. Goethe, the young man, writing the "*Abendlied*" on the wall of the little house on the top of the Kickelhahn, could enjoy the esthetic play with the imaginary prospect of death so far away, alluded to in the words, "Wait awhile, wait awhile, soon thou too shalt rest"; but Goethe at eighty-two, once more ascending the mountain and reading the lines written half a century ago, was moved to tears at the thought of what was now the stern proximity of imminent reality, in place of the comfort-

able distance of a remote "make-believe." A young man from the country, but confined for years in a dingy office in the city, is more apt to adorn the walls of his room with rural landscapes than with pictures showing the busy whirl of metropolitan life. In the same way, those things that are repulsive to us in real life are apt to be esthetically repulsive also. However, this tendency can be overcome to an extent, as will be seen later.

Esthetic and ethical valuation.—From the examination of the esthetic experience that has been made, it is evident that esthetic valuation has to do with approval or disapproval, and furthermore that it can apply to human conduct as well as to any other object. Now because ethical valuation also has to do with human conduct it is evident that we can easily make the mistake of taking them to be identical, just as esthetic valuation may be confounded with any other form of appreciation of the same object. A fond mother, for instance, may think very favorably of her favorite daughter's singing, not realizing that the pleasure she experiences is a pleasure of pride rather than an esthetic one. A skilled pianist may similarly make the mistake of ascribing the pleasure that comes to him from his playing of a musical composition to the esthetic value of the same as a musical production, whereas it may in reality be due to the fact that he has skilfully managed to perform the difficult grasps required—a pleasure of power rather than an esthetic one. As an actual fact the danger of confounding the esthetic pleasure with these other

pleasures is not as great as it is to confound the pleasure of ethical approval with that of esthetic approval when directed to the actions of men. But perhaps it is not a case of confounding two disparate things; perhaps they are identical, as has been so often maintained. To solve this problem, we have only to ask the questions: Does the fact that a given act wins the approval of good taste make it a good act, and does the fact that a given act offends good taste make it immoral? Perhaps an analogy will help. Comparing esthetic taste to gustatory taste, does the fact that something tastes good really make it good for us to eat? There is no question that many poisonous and injurious foods affect taste disagreeably, but could we take taste as a reliable guide? Sugar of lead, for instance, while most agreeable to taste, is one of our deadliest poisons. Similarly there is no doubt that esthetic taste and moral intuition frequently agree or coincide in judgment, but the question is: Does the mere fact that actions win esthetic approval justify them morally?

Esthetic valuation as a criterion of conduct.—A leading writer on esthetics, in touching on this problem, says: “The immoral (for us) act is therefore always painful, and hence always unesthetic—ugly. The good in action, while never *per se* unesthetic, may be connected so closely with painful association as to give a totality too painful to allow it to be grouped in the esthetic field. The ‘beauty of holiness’ is hence only occasionally marked when it is emphatic or when we restrict our thoughts

to it apart from all surroundings. Character may be esthetic, and special acts esthetically sublime; but, on the other hand, a right action may be lauded although at the same time it is recognized as distinctly non-esthetic, e. g., when a man enters a loathsome environment to save a life or a soul."² We may readily grant that where a given act is *known* (or believed) to be immoral, it offends good taste. But what about immorality under the guise of a fascinating beauty of appearance, an alluring blandishment of manner, and the captivating charm of a seductive bonhomie? Is it not rather true historically that the most successful mountebanks and the most dangerous imposters and intriguers were men whose conduct was such as to win the approval of refined society? The blunt, awkward, angular, but perfectly honest and honorable, man can never be adjudged quite acceptable in cultured circles. On the other hand, the adroit, smooth, oleaginous man, even if he be thoroughly unreliable and treacherous, is received with evident favor, welcomed with open arms by esthetic valuation even at the moment that he is feasting his eyes on his prey. Esthetic taste is about as competent to judge of the moral validity of human actions as is the innocent bird, fascinated by the glittering eyes of the reptile before him, to judge of the value of the experience that he is about to enjoy. In view of these things, it goes without saying that our esthetic judgment can not safely be taken as our moral guide in placing a valuation upon the conduct of others.

The same facts show clearly that when esthetic approval is made to govern our conduct it not infrequently becomes an ally to immorality, even if unwittingly. For, in demanding ease and urbanity in our manners, as well as polished address and tactful courtesy of speech, does it not become the source of insincerity and unguineness, by giving social preference to those most accomplished in these arts, while putting the ban of social disapproval upon the genuine and honest man not adept in the arts of reciprocating flattery and adulation? The same esthetic standard of passing judgment as to the moral validity of conduct favors such terms as "fibbing" and "prevaricating" to the simpler and homelier Anglo-Saxon equivalent, thus largely concealing our indignant disapproval of such an offense, and to that extent encouraging it in our young people. Instead of speaking of a man of a certain type as a bootlick or lickspittle and thus showing our abhorrence for such unmanly conduct and in this way arousing in our youth a similar degree of contempt for the same, we avoid such ungentle terms because they offend good taste, and instead speak of him as a parasite or a fawning flatterer or a sycophant, and thus help to increase the number of the breed. In short, where stern moral standards require that we "call a spade a spade," good taste would exhort us to speak "sub rosa."

Physical deterioration.—This brings us nearer to our problems of the relation of art to conduct. In thinking of the bearing of esthetic enjoyment on morals, it is

perhaps well for the purpose of analysis to think first of the effect on the individual himself, and then of the way in which the conduct of the individual towards others is affected thereby. The great value of esthetic pleasures to the individual lies in the relaxation and relief, the respite they offer him from the cares and strains of active life, reinvigorating him and filling him with new courage for the tasks of the morrow. The bow is unbent while not in use. Great as is the value of art to us, it is right here that hidden danger lurks. The characteristic thing about the attitude of esthetic enjoyment is that it is supinely contemplative, an attitude of passive indulgence in the main, the very opposite of the active, strenuous attitude required of us during the work of life. It is evident that such enjoyment might lead us to become too indulgent and thus incline us away from the dull and irksome routine of our prosaic duties, as well as to lead to a distaste of physical activity even in the form of exercise, in both ways helping to bring about physical deterioration. This danger of over-indulgence is certainly a positive one in the case of those people that have sufficient leisure. Historically the arts have flourished only after the advent of commercial and industrial prosperity. Wealth meant leisure, and leisure meant ease and indulgence, too often even to the point of emasculation and effeminacy. Over a century ago Schiller made this keen analysis of the matter: "And because the effect of tender beauty is to volatilize our feelings in the moral as well as in the physical realm,

it is just as apt to occur that the energy of the feelings will be stifled with the powerfulness of the appetites, and that the character will participate in a loss of vigor which only the passions were intended to suffer; in consequence the so-called periods of refinement in history do not infrequently present the sight of tenderness degenerating into flabbiness, evenness into shallowness, propriety into inanity, liberality into capriciousness, light-heartedness into frivolity, tranquillity into apathy, and the sight of the most abject caricature in closest proximity to the most magnificent humanity." Plato calls attention to the same tendency in these words: "And when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour into his soul through the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs of which we were just now speaking, and his whole life is passed in warbling and the delights of song; in the first stage of the process the passion or spirit which is in him is tempered like iron, and made useful, instead of brittle and useless. But, if he carries on the softening and soothing process, in the next stage he begins to melt and waste, until he has wasted away his spirit and cut out the sinews of his soul: and he becomes a feeble warrior." If we wish to receive only the benefits of art we must find some means of counteracting this tendency towards the discouragement of physical activity and the resulting deterioration of our people. The ancient Greeks devoted what might seem to us an extreme degree of attention to gymnastics, but in this way they counter-

acted the effeminizing tendency of esthetic refinement. The British predilection for sport is their national safeguard at this point. Germany, through her compulsory army service for all young men, and compulsory physical education for boys and girls, is likewise keeping up the physical efficiency of her people. What do we do? We take vacations to a greater extent than any other people, but such a spasmodic attempt to live a life of physical activity for a few weeks or at most a few months, every year, while the rest of the year is spent in sedentary occupation, is not sufficient. It goes almost without saying that in our day and age of relative physical inactivity, even in agricultural pursuits, brought on largely by use of labor-saving machinery and better means of transportation and communication, there is especial need of the universal adoption of a system of educational gymnastics that will secure for all our boys and girls a harmonious and all-round physical development, for there is no denying the truth of Prof. G. Stanley Hall's drastic statement: "Nations rise and fall as the body is well developed or neglected, and the stability of culture depends on the same condition."³

Morbid taste.—But it is not only physical harm that can come to the individual through the pleasures of art. It is to be remembered that we enjoy esthetically those things that serve as substitutes for activities that real life does not bring actually to us. The primary tendency is to enjoy those things in art that we should enjoy in real life. If, however, real life brings sufficient oppor-

tunity for exercise or activity in a given direction, we look for supplementary activity along other lines through the pleasures of art. Where what we call the "good things" are bountifully bestowed upon us, the same things portrayed in art would simply bore us. We need change. As a result, those of us who have enjoyed to the full the best that art can give are liable to come to the point where even the best becomes prosy and trite and dull. Yet the need for more esthetic enjoyment is there. Is it surprising that under the circumstances the artist will, driven by the necessity of finding something new, produce that which will really be contrary to normal, healthy taste? A great deal has been produced in the history of the various arts that is not wholesome, and which is, in spite of that, considered classical, because produced by great artists. Yet we are called upon to become "educated up" to the point where we can enjoy what can only lead us downward. It must be borne in mind that if we are really to enjoy a painting or a musical composition we must be in approximately the same mental attitude as that of the artist when producing the work of art. Has it occurred to us that a morally depraved person can find some things beautiful that to a person in normal condition are repulsive? Yet, if we are to enjoy those same things we must first constrain our own nature sufficiently to approximate towards the same condition. Now it is undeniable that many of our paintings, many of our musical masterpieces are the product of men in a temporarily, and in

some cases, permanently morbid condition. Over four thousand years ago the Chinese Emperor Tschun said: "Music is the expression of the condition of the soul—now if the soul of the musician is virtuous, his music will also be full of noble expression and will put the souls of men into relation with the spirits of heaven." If it is true that to enjoy a work of art we must first approximate mentally to the condition of the artist, then what is expected of us when we are called upon to be "educated up" to the point where we can really enjoy the work of a moral degenerate? The capacity that would enable us to derive real esthetic enjoyment from some of our classical musical compositions and some of the products of the painter's brush is an accomplishment that can be secured only by paying the price: the loss of a true mental balance, the price that more than one artist and art enthusiast has unfortunately had to pay for it.

Taste as a safeguard against temptation.—It is an old fallacy, hoary in fact with age, according to which a refined taste will safeguard young men and young women against the dangers of temptation. It is no doubt true that the refinement of taste incident to the cultivation of the esthetic sentiment well serves to guard the individual against immorality in vulgar garb, for the simple reason that anything that is crude or coarse will repel him. But it must be remembered that immorality and vice can conceal their hideous mien by means of the gold and tinsel of resplendent raiment bearing the

stamp of social respectability. What is more dangerous? Burke, in speaking of the polished and courtly manners of the higher orders as contrasted with the coarseness and vulgarity of the multitude, says: "Among the former vice loses half its malignity by losing all its grossness," to which Dugald Stewart replies: "The malignant contagiousness of vice is increased tenfold by every circumstance which draws a veil over, or disguises its native deformity."⁴

Through tatter'd clothes small vicés do appear;
 Robes and furr'd gowns hide all. Plate sin with gold,
 And the strong lance of justice hurtless breaks;
 Arm it in rags, a pigmy's straw does pierce it.

Schiller makes the following keen analysis of this interesting phenomenon: "The man or woman of refined taste is capable of a degree of moral perversity . . . against which the rude son of nature is insured by his very rudeness. In the case of the latter the disparity between what the senses demand and what duty prescribes is so marked and so striking, and his passions have so little of the spiritual about them, that they can never command his respect, even if they control him yet so despotically. So, when overwhelming sensuality incites him to an improper deed, he may, it is true, succumb to the temptation, but he will not conceal from himself the fact that he is doing wrong, and he will even pay homage to Reason at the very moment that he is acting contrary to her command. The refined devotee of art, however, refuses to own up to the fact that he is falling,

and in order to assuage his conscience he would rather belie it."

False sense of moral superiority.—This brings us to another effect on the character of the individual that is apt to come about through a high development of the esthetic side of our nature. The pleasures of art enjoyment are ordinarily in no wise associated with the things meeting with social disapproval; in fact, they are ordinarily associated only with such things as meet with social approbation. Their very disinterestedness would naturally give rise to a tendency to associate them with all those things that receive the appreciation of society as the good, the moral, the spiritual. So it need not surprise us that as we find ourselves growing in the direction of capacity for esthetic enjoyment of the classic in art and the sublime in nature we should be misled into the folly of ascribing merit to ourselves because of that capacity, as though the ability to enjoy a new form of self-indulgence in and of itself possessed a moral value. Adults smile at the naive mistake of "Little Jack Horner," who thought himself so good a boy because he could enjoy the plum of his Christmas pie, and yet there are among them those innocent devotees of art who take self-sufficient pride in the thought of their exceptional goodness for being able to enjoy the more sublimated pleasures of a more aristocratic type of self-indulgence. Such people are too apt to forget that pleasures are pleasures, whether they are higher or lower; that enjoyment, in and of itself, reflects no merit on the

one who indulges in it. Even though the so-called lower types of pleasure are more apt than the higher ones to do injury to the individual and to society, we must ever remember that the rude, coarse and boorish man or woman can be very useful and indispensable socially and therefore serve a moral purpose, and that the most refined man or woman can be socially useless and superfluous and morally indifferent or even dangerous and despicable. Alcibiades refused to learn to play the flute because that was an art unbecoming to a gentleman; it disorders the features. He was less concerned about doing things that involved an element of moral obliquity. It is not the kind of thing that we enjoy, but rather the practical attitude that we take towards our fellow-men that constitutes our morality. It is true, of course, that wholesome pleasure in any form makes us better disposed towards others; that is, when we are "feeling good" as we say, or after we have received the benefits of any wholesome enjoyment, be it esthetic or otherwise, we are more apt to be cheerful and therefore considerate and just. But after all, that has in the main only a potential effect on conduct, or at best, a positive effect for only a brief space of time, and then only where there are no conflicting interests. The value of esthetic enjoyment with reference to conduct would seem to be negative and potential then, rather than positive or actual. It would seem, at best, to make us well-disposed toward the world in a general way rather than to impel towards actual conduct in specific situations.

And morality consists not so much in an attitude of good feeling towards the world as it does in an attitude of good will expressing itself in action with reference to concrete situations.

Esthetic feelings and "feelings of reality."—The claim is common that as long as all will action ultimately grows out of feeling, then esthetic feeling, the same as any other, must have a direct value as a stimulus to will action. The moment, however, that we make a close analysis of the nature of esthetic feeling we confront an interesting situation in the study of our problem. We then notice that the feeling ordinarily aroused at sight of an art reproduction or representation of reality differs essentially from the feeling aroused at sight of that reality itself. In other words, "esthetic feelings" differ most positively from what may be called in distinction from them, "feelings of reality." The sight of misery in real life, for instance, is painful, and it is this very pain that is ordinarily the means of bringing about action to relieve those in distress. Misery portrayed on the stage, in painting, or in fiction, on the contrary, produces a different effect on us. If the effect on us were the same as in the first case, that is, painful, we should not make an effort to seek out the sight of such scenes. The mere fact that we do that would alone suffice to show that the experience is one we enjoy rather than one we dread. If we enjoyed the sight of real misery there would be nothing to prompt us to put an

end to that misery, in short, nothing to prompt us to action helpful to the one in need of help.

Esthetic feelings as motives in childhood.—Now it is no doubt true that the effect of an art production on the child is the same as that of reality itself; but that lasts only as long as he is unable to distinguish between the two. Gradually he acquires the ability to suppress the primary feeling reaction by keeping in mind the thought that this is not reality, but merely “make-believe.” To the extent in which he succeeds in doing that does he also succeed in deriving greater enjoyment from the art portrayal that was primarily painful. But what of the effect on factors of conduct? Where at first the presence of pain produced a tendency to *do* something, that tendency to help the one in distress is later on readily inhibited by the recognition of the fact that this is not a case of *real* distress at all. But even where this primary tendency to do something is very strong, what *can* be done? Where is there opportunity for doing anything? Can the child leap upon the stage and interfere? Can he help the hero in his story book or the unfortunate in the picture? At best all he can do is to find an outlet later on, and by that time his ardor will have cooled off somewhat, for children’s feelings are of short duration. But even so, it is evident that in the case of the child esthetic feelings are more nearly feelings of reality than in the case of the adult and for that reason they are apt to have a greater influence on his will, even though it be an influence securing a deferred expression.

Real life viewed as art.—A greater amount of exercise and practice in art enjoyment readily brings about the ability to yield less and less to the primary tendency and to give full sway to the secondary, or inhibitory, tendency. That all seems innocent and harmless enough, but a closer analysis will show the presence of a real danger. Where, through constant repetition, this inhibiting of the natural tendency becomes automatic, it creates a new tendency to inhibit expression where we are dealing with situations of reality. In people surfeited with the pleasures of art enjoyment there frequently develops an artificial attitude towards real life, in which they look upon reality as though it were art-portrayal. More and more have they acquired the ability to look upon things generally for the mere purpose of esthetic contemplation, and thus abstracting from them as things calling for will-application. There are people who can esthetically enjoy a devastating conflagration, entirely ignoring the unhappiness entailed. The very misfortunes and miseries of others are to such people but so many scenes played on the stage of life for their esthetic enjoyment, especially if those others are mere strangers or if they belong to a lower social stratum. Many of the investigations of homes in the slums of our cities are actuated not so much by real charity and genuine philanthropy as by a morbid desire for esthetic enjoyment, although the investigators pique and plume themselves not a little upon the nobility of their motives. Several years ago when a woman of

the Russian nobility, soliciting aid for the famine sufferers in her country, was giving an account, before the woman's federation of one of our large cities, of the suffering she had witnessed at home, she was repeatedly interrupted by the remark "How interesting," and after the talk one of the most prominent social leaders told the speaker how romantic the account had been and how she was to be envied because of the opportunity she had had of witnessing all those things with her own eyes. The same artificial attitude toward real life brought about by a disproportionate development of our esthetic sentiment is found in crude form in the maudlin sympathy manifested toward convicted criminals and the morbid curiosity sometimes displayed in connection with funerals, and is essentially the same attitude in kind, although not in degree, as that shown in the esthetic debauches of a Nero, a Caligula, or an Alexander Borgia.

Esthetic appreciation of nature.—A great deal has been made of the assumed value of an esthetic appreciation of nature as an aid in the moral development of the child. It can not be doubted that where a person's attitude toward nature is determined by a truly philosophical insight into man's relation to nature and nature's relation to man, a real appreciation of nature would be accompanied by a more humane attitude toward his fellow-creatures, including his fellow-men. However, it may well be debated whether such an attitude is not more largely religious than it is esthetic. The purely esthetic appreciation of nature, essentially

an attitude of enjoyment of a play of make-believe, is perfectly compatible with an unsympathetic and morally indifferent attitude toward others. Professor Wundt, in contrasting this attitude of the esthetic appreciation of nature with the more essentially religious attitude of the ancients, says: "So it comes about that we find grave moral defects existing today alongside of the profoundest appreciation of nature and the most delicate sense for the ethical bearing of certain aspects of human life. Petty egoism and self-sacrificing love, heartless cruelty and tender sensibility are combinations more often found in a single character now than they were in the ancient world. Many such unions, indeed, are comparatively common, owing to the constant tendency of opposite traits to offset each other: the intermixture of extravagant sentimentality and bloodthirsty misanthropy exhibited in the character of Robespierre, e. g., is a genuine product of the modern enthusiasm for nature,—of that enthusiasm which finds food in nature for the feelings it desires to foster, but outside of its special domain of esthetic enjoyment and one-sided development of the moral emotions has nothing of that awe of nature which in old days was the life-blood of a nature-feeling less intensive perhaps, but certainly purer and more innocent. Here too, therefore, the advantages of increased freedom and greater range of development are attended by their own dangers, from which a ruder age was free."²⁵

Non-esthetic appreciation of nature.—Again, the attitude of sympathy or personal attachment for some of

nature's objects must not be confounded with mere esthetic appreciation. But even such an attitude of sympathy for the lower creatures may be accompanied by an entirely different attitude toward our fellow-men. Prof. Paulsen truly says: "How many a sentimental woman, who because of her sympatheticism can not crush a caterpillar under foot, will manage without any difficulty to mortally grieve a neighbor by defamation, or to embitter her husband's life by daily disagreeableness and meanness."⁶ When it comes to the supposed educational value of the use of plants or animals as symbolic representations of the different virtues with the view of thus influencing the development of the child in a corresponding direction, critical judgment must also render an adverse verdict. At any rate, only the exceptional teacher could safely resort to a somewhat liberal use of this device; and such a teacher would not feel the need of it. The average healthy boy or girl is still too far removed from the ethereal or angelic state to make a general use in any way effective. Prof. Bain well says: "There is no record of any one being made industrious really by the example of the bee, and it may be reasonably doubted whether any animal was ever adapted as a model of any virtue or as a beacon against any vice. Such allusions should never be treated as serious; they are simply fanciful and amusing, and may become silly."⁷

The real moral value of the esthetic appreciation of nature would seem to be mainly negative, the same as

that of art, in that the capacity for such enjoyment is developed at the expense of lower types of pleasure. There is, however, a factor in the way of a positive aid to a better moral life lying in the inspiration and encouragement that we may derive, in moments of comparative disheartedness, from the contemplation of the calm serenity and unswerving immutability that is apt to be impressed upon us by the ordinary appearance of Nature; or even from her occasional bursts of Titanic force and raging fury, before which our own petty grievances and disappointments pale into insignificance and are forgotten. And such an attitude, esthetic only in part, can come only as the ripe fruition of a broad and deep culture of all sides of our nature.

The evidence of history.—So much for the light thrown on our problem by a psychological analysis of the nature of the esthetic sentiment and of esthetic pleasures. What about the evidence of history? Any one familiar with the history of science and art need not be reminded of the great disparity in the matter of moral fibre noticed between eminent men in these two lines of activity. If we were to make lists of, say, a hundred or two of the most eminent representatives of scientific investigation and of an equal number of the leading poets, painters, musicians, we would find that the second list includes a much larger number of men who were somewhat lax in their morals. While this does not prove that what is sometimes called the artistic temperament makes for loose morals, it does at any rate indicate that a high

degree of esthetic development by no means furnishes such a guarantee for a strengthening of the moral fibre as is too apt to be ascribed to it by art enthusiasts. Furthermore, in view of the fact that many men eminent in the history of science and philosophy were endowed with an impulsive or emotional disposition, just as much so as were the representatives of art, it would follow that the intellectual attitude furnishes a greater guarantee, than does the esthetic attitude, for securing that self-control which is so essential a factor in the moral life. In view of all these things it probably does not surprise us to hear Schiller say that "in nearly every epoch in history, where the arts flourished and taste ruled, mankind was found depraved or sunk to a low level, and that not a single instance can be shown where a high degree and a general distribution of esthetic culture in a people went hand in hand with political freedom and civic virtue, where fine manners accompanied good morals, or polish of behavior was accompanied by sincerity of behavior."

Esthetic enjoyment and moral conduct.—We can do well to listen to Eduard von Hartmann summing up his views on the esthetic sentiment as the arbiter of morals: "Where we are concerned in good earnest with the moral struggle of life, there the judgment of taste, smiling with an air of superiority, is far too cool and serene to leave the comfortable easy chair of the spectator, interested merely in an esthetic way, and to throw himself into the midst of the surging beat of the passions of life;

there, in place of esthetic approval and disapproval, it will take heartfelt liking and dislike, love and hate, passionate longing and intensive loathing. For *mere* taste the world-process necessarily becomes a theatrical performance, and one's own life a role sentimentally performed; true and real participation is secured only by means of putting heart and soul into it, thus bringing real, deep feeling to bear on the situation, in place of esthetic semblance of feeling."⁸ The relation of art to conduct is perhaps best seen in its true light when we remember that there is an inherent and essential difference between the attitude of esthetic enjoyment and that of moral conduct: the one is essentially an attitude of easy, convenient passivity, the other an attitude of effortful, strenuous activity. The one merely presupposes a letting go of oneself, the other calls for a getting hold of oneself. The one demands of us nothing but a giving way to natural inclination, while the other more generally requires the suppressing or overcoming of natural inclination.

In view of what has been said it would seem that the value of the esthetic sentiment as an aid to morality may be easily over-estimated. In spite of that, however, it must be admitted that when its training is intelligently conducted it can be utilized as an effective aid in the moral development of the individual, in the first place through the fact that where a person has learned to value the pleasures of esthetic enjoyment he will be in less danger of seeking his recreation and enjoyment along lines that

would tend to a greater extent to make him a slave to his appetites. In the second place, it is of value through the fact that in the case of the immature person esthetic feelings are more nearly feelings of reality, thus furnishing the potential germ for future conduct, provided, of course, that the dangers enumerated are not lost sight of. To make sure of this value, however, it is necessary that a wise discretion be used in selecting the art products to the influence of which our children are to be exposed. It is also essential that "we recognize that contemplation is not a substitute for action, but rather such a deeper emotional valuation as makes action stronger, and enables us to live for the moment in a more ideal world than that of every day,—not to stay there all the time, but to come back and invest the every day with new meaning."*

It is essential also to remember that the value of this side of our nature is not entirely, or even largely, dependent on its value as an aid to morality, any more than is our desire for food or shelter. Its presence as an integral constituent of our nature is its own justification. This, of course, is not giving endorsement to the fallacious and deplorable doctrine of "art for art's sake," for esthetic enjoyment must not conflict with morality. Esthetic enjoyment, the same as all enjoyment, can be justified only in so far as it is not subversive of ultimate social values. Professor Volkelt, perhaps the leading esthetician in the world today, in discussing this

* Dr. Tufts, in a letter to the author.

latter problem, says: "According to my conviction there is no sphere of human activity for which morals would not be the ultimate standard. . . . The promotion and realization of the good is the common object to which all lines of human activity are subject. . . . Nor is art an exception. Art also has for its highest purpose the furtherance of mankind on their way to the good. The artist also should be filled with the emotion that his work is to be fitted to the moral development of mankind."⁹ When kept in its proper province, not presuming to be above and beyond morality, then, in view of its value as a means of giving us occasional and temporary release and deliverance from the bitter and exhausting struggles, the sordid and grinding cares of everyday life, and the bleak and sombre vistas to which we all come occasionally, we can perhaps agree with Schiller in looking upon the capacity for esthetic enjoyment as the "greatest of all gifts, the gift that truly makes us human."

CHAPTER X

RELIGIOUS REGARD

The study of the various forms of regard so far considered has shown their close interrelation and interdependence. The study of each of them furthermore pointed toward still another, that we may properly call religious regard. Self-esteem, when highly developed, can not escape the inclusion of the attitude of humility. Respect for others, especially where it is most pronounced, as in reverence, necessarily arouses the same attitude. The regard for duty, for truth, and beauty, in the same way, when sufficiently developed, inevitably involve the consciousness of a mysterious something transcending human nature, a something that truly humbles us in the consciousness of our own relative insignificance and imperfection, but which also, in turn, arouses in us the aspiration, and the confidence in our ability, to rise above that insignificance and partially to overcome that imperfection, by putting ourselves into harmony with that same something. That we are dealing at this point with what is truly an essential element of the religious attitude is indisputable. But when it comes to the attempt of formulating a clear and definite statement as to just what constitutes the exact nature of such attitude, it is

not likely that a definition could be found that is not open to dispute.

The nature of religion.—What is religion? So eminent a theologian as Harnack expresses the opinion that this is a term impossible of definition, and many other theologians, as well as moral philosophers, ethnologists, psychologists, and sociologists refuse to attempt a definition. And the definitions that we do find are either too broad or too narrow, or again too broad at some points and too narrow at others. One of our latest writers insists that every man is religious. We could just as well say that every man is irreligious; it depends on what we put into the meaning of the term. We could with equal justice, perhaps, say that every man is good, for every man has something good about him; and that every man is bad, for every man has something bad about him. And so with any other quality. However, if we want to make practical use of any term, we must not dilute it too much.

As nearly satisfactory a definition, perhaps, as could be found is that of Dr. Leopold von Schroeder of the University of Vienna, who defines as follows: "Religion is the faith in spiritual beings or powers holding sway outside of and above the sphere of man, the feeling of dependence on them, and the felt need of placing ourselves in harmony with them."¹ Such a definition is broad enough to include the various types of primitive religion, not allowed for in most definitions by theologians and at the same time sufficiently narrow to ex-

clude the different types of quasi-religious cults that are apt to be included by the definitions of ethnologists. Perhaps this definition, also, is faulty in restricting religion to faith in spiritual beings or powers. Prof. James, at any rate, would not so restrict it. In his analysis of the nature of religious phenomena he speaks of how a man becomes conscious of "the higher part of himself" and tries to identify his real being with this higher part, how he then becomes conscious of a "More" of the same quality operative in the universe outside of him; and then continuing, James says that all the various theologies "agree that the 'more' really exists; though some of them hold it to exist in the shape of a personal god or gods, while others are satisfied to conceive it as a stream of ideal tendency embedded in the eternal structure of the world."²

Essential characteristics.—It would, perhaps, answer our purpose not to attempt a definition, and instead, to rest content with a characterization. It seems clear that the beginning of the truly religious attitude is secured when we come to realize how incapable we are to control our own personal destiny, how inefficient and insignificant we are, compared to the power or powers manifested everywhere in our environment, and this realization is inevitably accompanied by a feeling of dependence, showing itself primarily in fear, and in more highly developed stages in reverence, humility, admiration, love. Pain and misfortune, disillusionment and disappointment, the unavoidable and necessary shortcoming in our

efforts to attain our ambitions and realize our ideals, the going of strength with the coming of years, the thought of our inevitable end: these are the especial sources of this part of the religious life. It is this phase of the phenomenon of religion that makes man take life seriously. Certainly where this serious attitude towards life and the all of things is lacking there can be no religion in the true sense of the term, a point that has ever been insisted on by religious reformers and philosophers.

Two phases of the religious life.—Absolutely essential, it would seem, are the feeling of dependence on the power or powers reigning in this world of ours and the resulting desire to be in harmony with the same, with probably the confidence that we shall be upborne by this force or forces when we are in harmony with the same. But now comes a most essential consideration: religion has two fairly well-defined phases, on the one hand, the feeling-will side, and on the other, the intellectual side. The first could properly be considered the more important side in the sense of its being essentially the same in all forms of religion; while the other, dealing with our interpretation of the nature of the force or forces affecting our destinies, in other words, the belief side, shows the most striking differences in the various forms of religion. Man's conception as to the real nature of this force or power, his opinions as to the direction in which it ultimately tends, and therefore as to how he can come in harmony with it, his views as to the whence and whither of man, have been forever changing in the

past, and they will ever change in the future with the advance of knowledge. Think of the tremendous difference between primitive idolatry and the most intelligent modern viewpoint! On the other hand, no such change can be traced in the history of the other phase. The feelings inspired in the breast of the most primitive savage at the thought of his insufficiency are essentially the same as those that are experienced by the most intelligent thinker of today in contemplation of his equal incapacity and insignificance. These feelings and resulting conduct are what constitute the body and soul and essence of religion, truly its eternal verities, and those other elements but the ephemeral habiliments that will be discarded and replaced by others, as we gain more intelligent insight into the intricate phenomena by which we are surrounded in this world of mystery. In fact, Kant calls the one religion, the other faith. Perhaps it would be better to distinguish between them as piety and religious faith or religious views. It is the latter phase that is the source of formulas, of creed, of doctrine, and of dogma,—the changing side. If this latter were the all of religion, then we could truly say that religion, in large part at least, is false; for all opinion as to most of these intricate and difficult problems that religion deals with must, in the very nature of things, be inadequate and incorrect. But if we keep our eyes open to essentials and bear in mind that this is but the lesser side, the ever-changing side, we must conclude that religion is something bound to stay. Religions will go, but

religion will stay. Professor Paulsen truly says: "Life and death are the great preachers of religion; and so long as they will preach, religion will not perish from the earth."³

Religion and morals.—From the fact that the religious consciousness centers about the thought of the meaning of life, and of man's destiny, it follows that there must be a most intimate relation between it and the moral life. In the case of the man who devotes himself conscientiously, both consistently and persistently, to the attempt to find the ultimate direction of the moral world-process, in order that he may come into harmony with it, religion is one of the most potent means of bringing about a life of moral rectitude. In fact, if we use the term in its right sense, remembering what its essence is, we can safely say that, when guided by intelligence, religion is bound to be a most potent aid to morality. Kant actually defines religion as "cognition of all our duties as divine commands." Religious regard, when sufficiently developed, would tend to transform moral regard, the sense of duty, into a love of duty. Even Kant, who rightly insists that a love of duty, with reference to all things, can never be acquired in a human being, makes this concession: "Love, as the voluntary adoption of the will of another among our maxims [of conduct], is an indispensable supplement to the imperfection of human nature (which needs to be urged to do that which reason prescribes in the form of law), for what one does not like to do, that one does so spar-

ingly, perhaps even with sophistical subterfuges concerning the command of duty, that one can ordinarily, perhaps, not depend very much on the latter as a motive to action without the accession of the former.”⁴ On the other hand, where the essence of religion is thought to lie in the mere assent to certain religious tenets, whatever they may be, there such spurious substitute for religion is as apt as not to be an actual impediment to morality. The man who thinks that his religion is the sum-total of the religious dogmas he believes in, who thinks that to live in harmony with the allhood of things it requires only that one subscribe to certain prescribed religious dogmas, in whose mind the means of salvation is simply frequency and fervency of prayer, assiduity and fidelity of attendance on worship,—in the case of that man his so-called religion is just as apt as not to become an actual aid to immorality, for it is not religion at all, but purblind, self-righteous Pharisaism. It is this that Lessing has in mind where he asks: “Do you now comprehend how much easier it is to rave devoutly, than it is to do good deeds? How much the flabbiest man likes to indulge in devout day-dreams in order to evade the need of good performance?” An eminent writer on philosophical and theological subjects similarly says: “It is less burdensome to indulge in devout emotions than to do what is right. Hence there is no lack of those who are willing to cherish a dreamy, sentimental spirit of piety if only they may evade the obligations which piety imposes.” “Some esteem themselves pious

because they are cognizant of the many ways by which religion may be fostered in the soul, yet they make use of no single one of these means. To be truly pious thou needest, not to know much, but to do much.”⁵ “For not the hearers of a law are just before God, but the doers of a law shall be justified.”

The aforementioned writer, in his chapter on True Piety, also says: “Why do we find piety so frequently decried? Because misguided minds have brought it into ill-repute; losing sight of the essential, they have made religion to consist in that which is wholly secondary.” “There are many pious people who are far more anxious to make use of God than to serve Him. No piety is genuine which does not tend to make a man more conscientious and humble, and more faithful to his vocation. . . . Affected piety seeks to make the most of itself on the pretext of edifying others. True piety seeks to be hidden as far as possible, and reveals itself only in the degree called for by its zeal for the honor of God and the welfare of its fellow-men.” “How shall we define true piety? It consists in the effectual and fullest possible surrender of self to God, in inward cleaving to Him and joyous dependence upon Him, in perfect readiness to do His will, to anticipate His desires, and to sacrifice self wholly for His sake.”⁶ Paul similarly speaks of our “reasonable service” as consisting in presenting our bodies, i. e., our very selves, as a “living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God.”

A noted Protestant theologian, in discussing the rela-

tion between religion and morals, says: "In reality the only real divine service is moral conduct in so far as the devout man looks upon it as the fulfilment of the tasks imposed upon him by God, as a service in the cause of God, for the realization of the divine purpose in the world. But it must be remembered that this, our, distinction between . . . real and symbolic divine service is not yet clear to the naive religious consciousness; the latter, on the contrary, looks upon participation in religious ceremonies not as mere symbolism, but thinks that thereby a real service is directly rendered to Divinity, acceptable to, and desired by the same, that thereby the grace of Divinity can be won and an equivalent return can be purchased. Now as this direct ceremonial service to Divinity ignores the moral purposes of society, does not come in contact with them at all or only accidentally and incidentally, so it is very possible and happens often enough, that a schism will arise between the ceremonial divine service [worship] and the moral purposes of society. Then religion, in place of being the most potent motive to morality, becomes on the contrary, the greatest hindrance to morality." 7

It is evident that where such an unfortunate condition arises it is due to failure to realize the true end of religious endeavor. In such a case the motive prompting the activity is regard for self in place of true religious regard. Although the fear of punishment and the hope of reward are, in the beginning, a necessary adjunct to the means employed in our efforts

to direct the mind to spiritual interests, no real piety, or true religiousness, has been developed where the individual outwardly conforms to certain requirements merely through self-interest. Such hope of reward and fear of punishment, it is true, is only a natural prompting of a perfectly proper love of self. Yet, in spite of that, such a motive does not compare to that of true piety. There will always be left the danger of a relapse or deterioration into an improper self-love, as is evidenced even in some of the older theologies, not hesitating to teach that the elect "may enjoy their beatitude and the grace of God more richly"⁸ by witnessing the misery of the damned.* Furthermore, where a man's morals are based chiefly on such a hope and fear, society does not have a sufficient guarantee of moral conduct in him, for the simple reason that there is present the contingent danger of his losing faith in immortality, a phenomenon that must be reckoned with in these days of the disequilibrium and the unsettlement of religious convictions. On the other hand, where in

* The following passage from a sermon by Jonathan Edwards on "The End of the Wicked Contemplated by the Righteous" is equally illuminating: "When the saints in glory, therefore, shall see the doleful state of the damned, how will this heighten their sense of the blessedness of their own state, so exceedingly different from it! When they shall see how miserable others of their fellow-creatures are, who were naturally in the same circumstances with themselves; when they shall see the smoke of their torment, and the raging of the flames of their burning, and hear their dolorous shrieks and cries, and consider that they in the meantime are in the most blissful state, and shall surely be in it to all eternity; how will they rejoice?"⁹

place of mere lip-service prompted by self-regard, we have real service due to a proper self-renunciation prompted by true religious regard, it can not be doubted that religion is the greatest aid to morality.

The need of religious education.—Many of those interested in education have long felt that the traditional practise of the exclusion of religious instruction from the public school curriculum has been tested and found wanting. In many quarters the conviction has been growing that our civilization has failed to stand the test of morality and character in face of the temptation offered in industrial, commercial, and political fields in this land of natural resources and opportunity, and that this lack in our manhood is due to a defect in our educational system. From here it is but a short step to the conclusion that this defect is to be found in the absence of religious instruction in the public schools. There has also been the feeling that if our children are to receive an all-round development, the demands of the religious side of their nature must not be ignored. And so, either because many of our homes are thought to be no longer religious, or because the home and the church are assumed to be neglecting their duty in this direction, it is contended that the public schools should attend to this need. It is argued that religious training need not be of a sectarian nature, that there is a common ground on which all sects can stand in harmony, and that hence the traditional argument is null and void. Religious

training is demanded not only as an aid to morality, but for its own sake.

It was natural that due to the extensive and intensive exploitation of our tremendous natural resources our thoughts, our interests, and our efforts became disproportionately directed towards material things, and away from what can be truly called our higher interests. It was but one more illustration of the historic truth, that every age of commercial and industrial development is accompanied by a tendency towards laxity in morals and a weakening of religious supports. Again, the revelations of science, especially of the natural sciences, during the last fifty years or more have to a large extent undermined traditional religious views. Things cherished for centuries as absolutely true have come to be looked upon by an ever increasing number of our people as false. Due to the fact that to the average mind the term "religion" means religious belief, the undermining of some of the elements of such belief was equivalent to the undermining of the religious life. Because some of the cherished beliefs or opinions regarding religious matters could no longer be held fast to, religion itself came too frequently to be looked upon as a sham and a delusion. Again, too often the undermining of religious tenets meant the undermining of morality, partly because of the necessary intimacy existing between religion and morality, but due perhaps to a greater extent to another cause. In the case of the majority of men who had been taught that the only

foundation on which the moral life could be built was that of faith in certain religious doctrines, the knocking away of such props and supports of morality was followed by the collapse of the moral superstructure, for unfortunately their morals had been builded on no surer basis.

There is no denying the fact that these two great factors so prominent in our present-day stage of development, the intensity of economic activity and the equally intense search for truth, are productive of tendencies which, if left to themselves, are destructive of our interests elsewhere. We can uproot neither of these factors. As to the first, our characteristic economic activity, we can not stop that by decree, resolution, or legislation; we must, by means of education, strengthen other phases of the child's nature, that will prevent an overdevelopment along the line of purely material interests. That implies a refusal to yield too much to the prevalent tendency to put an extreme emphasis upon the industrial phase of education, crowding out other elements that are needed to maintain a salutary equilibrium. As to the second, the search after truth, and the resulting disclosures of science, we can no more stop that by excommunication and heresy trials than we can stop the flow of the Mississippi by a resolution of Congress. It is impossible to vanquish or subdue these two irresistible currents of modern civilization, but we can guide and direct the resulting tendencies, so as to

realize our own interests. Now what can be done in this direction by means of education?

In the first place, there is no question that national morality must be helped out by a more efficient moral education of our youth. The increased economic activity characteristic of our age, along with other factors, has decreased the efficiency of the home in this matter of moral education, throwing a greater burden on the school. This is truly deplorable, for the school can probably never fully compensate for what is lost in the home. So much the more reason, therefore, for the schools to do their utmost. In so far as is practicable, it is, of course, desirable that the public schools provide for moral instruction, and, what is more important, attend to moral training. Now what about the matter of providing for *religious* training in the public schools? That question can be answered only by referring it to that other question of the purpose of the public schools.

The public schools and religious education.—We who are engaged in school work are prone to look upon the schools and the aim of education as ends in themselves, whereas they are but means to an end, an end of the State. The whole end and purpose of the State is the securing of the common weal. There is no end that organized society, the State, can have beyond that. Even government is but a means to this one end—general well-being; and government, the same as any other means, must go when it becomes destructive of the end for which it was created. Similarly, the public school

system was expressly instituted as a means to realize the interests of the people. The public schools serve the end for which they were created as a *means*, by doing their part in trying to make of our children efficient, well-balanced men and women of moral character. Anything and everything which, without violating correct principles of the science and art of teaching, will help to secure such moral character is desirable, provided that it does not conflict with the interests of the people that the public schools were instituted to secure. In the minds of the founders of our republic that general well-being, which it is the aim and the purpose of the State to secure, could not be secured in the absence of the freedom of conscience. Religious freedom has ever since been one of the most cherished treasures of our national life. Now could the public schools, created for the purpose of fostering the interests of the people at one point, have the right to undermine those same interests at another point? That is, could the public schools, in giving religious or any other training, have the right to interfere with the freedom of conscience? If the giving of religious training in the public schools necessarily involved an infringement on a popular right, it would have to be excluded. In so far as religious training can be given in the public schools without interfering with the rights of conscience, well and good; on the other hand, anything and everything that conflicts with the same must be rigorously excluded.

Knowledge and belief.—In the first place, it is abso-

lutely necessary for the teacher to learn to distinguish between knowledge and opinion, perhaps better still, to recognize the truth that there is a difference between knowledge and opinion, or even belief. We see a dark object in a distant field; one of us thinks it is a cow, another a horse, and a third a stone. In the very nature of things we can not decide, from where we are, as to what the object really is. Neither would a majority vote, even if it were 99 to 1, determine the validity of an opinion or belief. There is but one way to decide, and that is to approach the object until near enough to enable the eye to discriminate. That, of course, takes effort, and effort we are averse to making. But, should we all go nearer, and get near enough, there will be agreement; then there will no longer be difference of opinion or belief, but agreement—agreement in knowledge. So everywhere; while men of equal intelligence and equally sincere devotion to search for truth differ we are dealing with opinion or belief, not with knowledge. And even where such men agree, such agreement may be based on false assumption, i. e., if they have not come near enough to the object, but it is not so likely to be.

Now the public schools are called upon to impart knowledge, at least along most lines. Can they ever be justified in teaching mere opinion, or even belief, as knowledge? It is possible that some of the universally accepted conclusions of science are erroneous. Should they be taught in the public schools, no particular harm

would be done; at any rate nobody's rights would be trampled on, because all would, in such case, be in agreement. On the other hand, what about views not agreed on? In some of the sciences it may do no particular harm if the teacher states his own view, after letting the pupils know that they are dealing with an open question. For instance, to take an illustration from biology: are plants sentient or not? Again, are crystals endowed with the germs of consciousness or not? Perhaps the teacher would not be treading on anyone's toes if he were to say "no" to each of these questions, even though eminent scientists differ here. When, however, it comes to questions nearer the hearts of men, it does most positively matter whether or not the teacher imparts his particular opinion as knowledge. In politics and religion, for instance, such matters of opinion ought to be avoided, or where it is entirely impossible to avoid them, the teacher has absolutely no right to favor any view, however absurd all other views may seem to him. Even in contested points in science he has no right to teach his opinion as knowledge.

The State and religious instruction.—In connection with his contention to the effect that the matter of religious and moral instruction is not properly the concern of the State, an eminent European writer on moral philosophy and political science says: "It also follows from this that the State has no right to compel children of *dissenting* parents (i. e., parents who are not members of any denomination recognized by the State) to attend

upon religious instruction in the public schools against the will of the parents. For, in the first place, the teaching of the Christian religion is the concern of the church, and the executive power of the State has a right to exercise coercion in this matter only in so far as the church has authorized her (at least, tacitly) to do so. But the church has a right to compel only baptized children or the children of baptized parents to attend upon religious instruction. Hence, much less has the State a right to exercise coercion with reference to children of dissenters. The contrary assertion would lead to an unbearable despotism in matters of conscience. . . . In the second place, such a coercive law is *futile, yes, harmful*; it will only be instrumental in imbuing the children with inclinations that are inimical to religion. Religious education can succeed only if school and family work together in harmony, but not if they are knowingly opposed to each other, and when the family intentionally pulls down what the school builds up. But that will be the case if the children are forced to attend on religious instruction that the parents detest and therefore attempt to undermine. In this way the child will be like a ball tossed back and forth between two contending sides, and in most cases will become irreligious or even filled with contempt for religion.”¹⁰

What religious views have the public schools a right to teach? Our analysis of the nature of religion shows what is common to all religion, and this it is that the

schools may take up: to show that man is dependent on the force or forces at work in this world of ours, and that it is wisdom therefore to try to come into harmony with such force or forces. That is all that the public schools have a moral right to do in the matter of religious instruction. It would be a grave error, however, to conclude from this that the influence of the public schools in the direction of religious training amounts to nothing more than that. For, what is more important than the imparting of knowledge or opinion is the developing of feeling-dispositions and resulting conduct, and here the schools can indeed do not a little. If due advantage is taken of the means now at disposal, the schools can do much to develop the really essential side of religion, namely, to develop a feeling of dependence and the resulting desire to live a true life.*

* A prominent member of the legal profession and holding a position of influence in the educational world, commenting on the above sentiment when it appeared in the article on "The Religious Element in the Public Schools," *Educational Review*, April, 1909, says in a letter to the author: "I unreservedly approve of what you say with regard to the extent and character of religious teaching in the public schools. There can be no more than the enforcing of the thought that man is dependent on the force, or forces, at work in this world of ours, and that it is wisdom to live in harmony with such forces. Students should be made to feel a deep reverence for the unseen powers, the unknowable forces that exist above man and on which with all his knowledge he is absolutely dependent. If a proper state of feeling in this regard is instilled into the minds of young people they are prepared to take on whatever of doctrinal teaching the home to which they belong, or the Church with which they may be connected, may have to give them. And even if they accept none of this doctrinal

The Bible in the public schools.—What about the Bible in the public schools? Theoretically considered, if the Bible could be read “purely as literature,” there would be no serious objection on the part of the State to its being so used. Practically, however, this could not or at any rate would not be done, and so there would be objections from different sides. Many teachers would select such passages as would serve an entirely different purpose from that of teaching it solely as literature. An unbelieving teacher could well make his manner and method of selection most objectionable to the believer. Similarly the latter would be very apt to select such passages as to his mind would be most likely to develop certain religious views, even if he read such passages without comment. And then the Bible would not be read purely as literature. The Rev. Joseph H. Crooker has this in mind when he has a parent say in his recent book on *Religious freedom in American education*, “I am willing that my boy read the Genesis account of creation freely as a bit of sublime Jewish cosmology; but I contend that the State has no right to force him to read it as an infallible revelation or as a part of a religious exercise. I am willing that he read the imprecatory psalm: ‘Let his children be fatherless, and

religion, their conduct through life can not help but be affected by this feeling of reverence and dependence. . . . A little more modesty, a little more of that reverence and feeling of dependence that you speak of is sorely needed, and nothing will help our public schools just at present, more than the inculcation of this spirit.’”

his wife a widow; let there be none to extend mercy to him; neither let there be any favor shown his fatherless children,'—I am willing that he read this as he reads in Homer about the wrath of Achilles; but I contend that the State has no right to force him to read these passages with the understanding that he must believe them divine or be damned." ¹¹ So much for that view. On the other hand, some of our most devout believers might object for entirely different reasons to reading the Bible purely as literature. Rev. Dr. J. Guinness Rogers, in a recent number of the *Nineteenth Century*, raises the following objection: "If the Bible is to be read in our schools simply as a great work of English literature, I would rather it would be excluded altogether. After all, bare secularism is better than an outward homage to the Bible, which involves the ignoring of its real character as the one revelation from God." ¹²

Whatever we may think of the practicability and advisability of having the Bible read in the public schools purely as literature, it is very much to be doubted whether it could be used in the public schools in such a way as to do much in the way of developing true religious regard in the form of that feeling-will attitude that we call true piety. In fact, it is questionable whether formal and regular attempts in the direction of the cultivation of any of the higher sentiments can accomplish much. We can not arouse a love of the beautiful in the child by everlastingly calling his atten-

tion to this, that, and the other element of beauty. We can not develop the moral sentiment in the child by talking to him about duty or having him recite to us about duty at certain set times every day. Feeling is spontaneous and arises only when its proper object is present to arouse it. We must ever be suspicious of attempts to arouse certain desired feelings at certain set times of day. Such practises are bound to end in mechanical, artificial formalism.

Religious influence of secular instruction.—On the other hand, there is hardly a subject of study in our public school courses but where at some point or other a recognition of man's insignificance and the resulting feeling of reverence will necessarily be forced upon both teacher and pupil, if the search of knowledge be but pursued in the right spirit; and where the feeling arises thus, it is genuine, and real, and lasting in its effects. If the teacher himself but have more than a superficial smattering of knowledge, he can not help letting the child see how in spite of our boasted knowledge we are yet surrounded with mystery, even as regards the commonest things of life. The growth of the blade of grass from its seed is still mysterious in spite of our having coined the words "geotropism" and "heliotropism"; as mysterious after all as it was to the primitive mind that saw in its growth the action of a "spirit" en clothed within the seed. So with every seemingly simple phenomenon of nature. Similarly, what about man's boasted "control of nature"? How easily the

teacher can show the pupil that this after all is but another phase of nature's control of man! If man wants to utilize water-power, wind-power, electricity, or what not, he must first go to nature, find out the manner of her processes, and then act according to her dictate. And how is it possible for the teacher to avoid the truth of truths as to man's destiny—the inevitable end of his ephemeral existence? The question as to his Whence and his Whither is one of conflicting opinion, on which earth's wisest have ever differed and will no doubt continue to differ, a question therefore that the public school must not attempt to answer. On the other hand, if the child after completing the common school course has not in some way learned to look upon life as serious and not as a thing to be played with, as well as to lead a better life in view of the fact that at its end we find solace and comfort only in the thought of having tried to live a right life and true, then the public school has been to that extent remiss.

And certainly something can be done, even without violating the rights of conscience of anyone, to bring the mind of the child into that proper state of receptivity, that will in time, as he approaches maturity, develop a proper valuation of the higher things as compared to the vanities and trifles of life. At any rate the teacher must keep such a goal in mind. "If men were accustomed to intermingle with the turmoil of business and diversion an occasional serious moment of instructive contemplation, to which they are exhorted by the daily

example of the vanity of our purposes as shown in the fates of our fellow-men, their joys would perhaps be less exuberant, but their place would be taken by a calm serenity of mind, to which no misfortunes would any longer be unexpected; and even that gentle sadness, that tender feeling that swells a noble heart when in the tranquillity of solitude it ponders the worthlessness of what we commonly consider great and important, would contain more real happiness than the boisterous merry-making of the frivolous and the loud laughing of the fool.”¹³

Attitude of the teacher.—What the public school can do in this matter, the same as in any other, depends mainly on the attitude of the teacher. Something that Rothe, one of the most eminent of German theologians, says, is in point here: “At the present stage of historical development it is very important that the tender plant of youthful piety be spared in its first development with truly religious caution, by means of a right judicious moderation in religious instruction. None but right genuinely pious teachers and right little religious instruction, that is . . . the problem.”¹⁴ But there is the difficulty: how distinguish genuine piety from sham piety? We assume that “from the fulness of the heart the mouth speaketh,” forgetting that our deepest feelings prevent utterance and are not presented to the vulgar stare of the public eye. Our religious feelings are deeply private, silent, sacred. How apt we are to forget that it is easy to ‘draw nigh with the

mouth and honor with the lips, while the heart is far away," and that we can "devour widows' houses and for a pretense make long prayers." It is well to bear in mind what Emerson said a good many years ago: "What is so odious as the polite bows to God, in our books and our newspapers? The popular press is flagitious in the exact measure of its sanctimony, and the religion of the day is a theatrical Sinai, where the thunders are supplied by the property man." It is not the teacher who can locate the greatest number of biblical passages by chapter and verse, not the one who dons his religion for state occasions or at set times, nor again the one who wears it on his coat-sleeve, that will be of best influence here, but rather the one possessed of that true, genuine piety that sits naturally and securely in permanent abode. It is the teacher who duly respects the religious views of all men, who finds nothing to scorn or scoff at or to ridicule in any of the solutions that any man or race of men has ever found to the great mystery of things; the teacher who sees in everything, even the most commonplace, a something which is worthy of our regard; the teacher who is genuinely imbued with the sentiment so eloquently expressed by Kant: "Two things fill the soul with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the oftener and more prolongedly one is busied with reflection upon them: the starry heavens above me, and the moral law within me."

Under such a teacher it will be impossible for our

children to grow up in the naïve and superficial view of the scoffer, or again, in that equally destructive and ruinous attitude of intimacy and familiarity towards the great mystery of the all of things, in contemplation of which the man of truly devout spirit and depth of religious feeling stands bowed and mute in true humility and reverence. Under such a teacher there is little danger of their developing the superficial attitude of that investigator who said, "I have searched the heavens with the telescope and could find no God," or again that equally harmful, self-sufficing, presuming, and presumptuous attitude of assuming to have penetrative insight and understanding where man can at best but weakly conjecture. Instead, they will grow up to that desirable condition in which they can enjoy what Goethe calls "the most beautiful happiness of thinking man," namely, "to have fathomed the fathomable and calmly to reverence the unfathomable."

Let the public schools forever rule out mere opinion, especially as to those interests that lie nearest the hearts of men; let them teach knowledge and truth, approaching them in the true spirit; let the teachers develop in the pupils respect for self, for parents, for the aged, for human nature, for constituted authority, for law, by being themselves truly respectful even to the least of things,—and, we may rest assured, the public schools will do their share to develop those desirable habitudes of mind.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION: GENERAL APPLICATIONS

Coöperation of educational agencies.—After this study of the sources of conduct and their specific bearing on special phases of the problem of moral education, it might be well to look at this matter from the side of the school curriculum and the other machinery of education, with the purpose of determining what can actually be done, in a general way, in the application of our knowledge of the principles studied. It is needless to say that if the greatest possible degree of success is ever to be obtained, there must be a coöperation of all those factors that can in any way influence the growing child. No doubt the time will come when society will make it impossible for the scandalous “yellow” newspaper or the inane, insipid “comic” supplement of the Sunday paper, or the abominable dime novel, or the degrading type of theater, or the loafer in the street, to pollute the minds of innocent children. For where society annually pays hundreds of millions to schools to do a useful work, and then permits these other social agencies to undo what she has so dearly paid for, she is as wise as a farmer would be who paid hard-earned money to his help for reaping and harvesting his crops and then

allowed his own boys or the boys of the neighborhood to burn the sheaves in the shock or to break into the granary and feed the garnered grain to the fowls of the air. For the present the school must attempt to secure the active co-operation of the home, and in its own particular sphere must endeavor to bring about a positive co-working of all the factors that can be of influence in moulding the inclinations and character of the child. Among these factors are the subjects taught; the school environment; discipline and management; play, athletics, contests, pupils' organizations; the life and example of the teacher; and lastly, the organization of the public school system.

Moral ideas and ideals.—In the first place, it is perhaps needless to say that in many of the subjects taught there are many opportunities calling for a discussion that will help not only to clear up the pupil's ideas of right and wrong, but as well to create in his mind ideals of noble character and desirable conduct. The stories in the grades, the language exercises, reading lessons, in a general way all the things under the head of literature and history in the broad sense of those terms, furnish these opportunities, and they are opportunities that ought to be utilized. Of course there are different ways of trying to do that. We are all familiar with the vapid, affected, sentimental way of telling stories about anaemic, "goody-goody" creatures of the imagination, mistakenly called men. And so also are we acquainted with that deplorable habit of some well-intentioned teachers,

who, after telling an otherwise good story find it necessary to "point out the moral." Have you ever been present when, toward the end of a story such a teacher was telling, you could see some of the boys nudging one another, grinning at the same time in a most expressive way that said plainly: "Now, here comes the moral"? It is needless to say that, well-intentioned as it is, such teaching is apt to callous the pupil to good influences which might otherwise be efficacious. Let our efforts at this point never lead to wooden, perfunctory routine. Let us bring real, living, manly and womanly characters before our pupils, men and women who struggled as men and women struggle today, in the face of baffling adversity and against strong temptation, and who came out victors in the struggle. Such characters the boys and girls can not help admiring. To admire anything is synonymous with being conscious of what is to us its exceptional value. And the things we value are the things we would make our own; the things we care about are the things we would place ourselves in possession of; they, and they only, are the things we would make an effort for. When the child really admires a given character, that means absolutely that now a force is liberated which will impel him to try to put himself into possession of the same qualities that he admires in this, his ideal. The problem is to so present those characters that they will really appeal to the child, and that they will, when we manage to get down to the child's present interests, shape his present way

of looking at things. We make a serious mistake when we attempt to arouse in the boy in what might be called the barbarian stage of his development an interest in the saint; if we give him Cooper's Leather Stocking Tales our efforts will meet with more satisfactory results than if we give him a dozen of the old-fashioned Sunday-school books.

The child's level.—It might be well, in this connection, to give brief consideration to certain rather prevalent misconceptions with regard to this matter of getting down to the child's level. In so far as that phrase means a coming in touch with the child by using language that appeals to his understanding and his present point of view, and thus furnishing us with the means of securing on his part a gradual ascent to a higher and broader level, common sense as well as scientific pedagogical insight would dictate such procedure. On the other hand, it can not be pedagogical precept to get down to the child's level for the child's entertainment or amusement. Kaestner fittingly lampoons such a practice:

In former days the man extended forth his hand,
The child reached up, assisted thus to firmly stand.
Today the manikins who teach
Get down on fours the child to reach.

Furthermore, it is only ignorance of the real meaning of the doctrine of "interest" preached by Herbart and his followers that can cause anyone to aver that such puerile pedagogical practice is involved in the applica-

tion of that doctrine. Herbart was too familiar with the thoroughgoing, but disappointing, experiments of the Philanthropinists in this particular direction to have any patience with such a practice. He says on this very point: "Educators are urged by all means to descend to the level of the child, and to compress themselves into the narrow sphere of the child, whatever the cost. And here we fail to see the manifold new incongruities that are produced by that very means. We fail to see that we demand what must not be, that we demand what nature inevitably punishes when we demand that the mature educator shall bow down in order to build up a children's world for the children! We fail to see how deformed, in the end, they are, as a rule, who have for a long time pursued such a practice; and how much ingenious people dislike to occupy themselves with it."¹

Correlation.—If we would develop that unity of personality which we call character, we must manage to establish such an inter-relation between the main essential ideas gained from different subjects as will enable the pupil to see the forest in spite of the multiplicity of trees, to see the whole in perspective, to secure, as it were, a bird's-eye view, thus seeing the totality of the varied phenomena of life as a unified whole, and seeing the relative significance and importance of the different groups, thus finally giving preëminent domain to the most essential group of ideas, putting that in supreme, that is, actual and constant, control. It

is thus and thus only that we can secure that inner consistency which it is a large part of our aim to develop. Without such a proper interrelating of all our knowledge, a condition is easily brought about in which a man's ideas of right and wrong are locked up in a hermetically sealed compartment regularly opened for examination at certain set times and then locked the moment we come in actual business or social contact with our fellows, when other ideas immediately assume control at the helm.

Training in right habits.—So far we have not touched upon what is perhaps the most efficient means of moral education with which actual teaching or instruction furnishes us, and that is this: the opportunity for developing in the child right habits. For, let us remember, what we are after is not merely to secure for the pupil a knowledge of right and wrong, nor yet the arousing of emotional dispositions tending in the direction toward right conduct, but the actual doing of the right, and, furthermore, habituation in right conduct through repetition, thus securing the greatest possible social guarantee of permanency of right conduct. Now, it is precisely through the way in which we handle the work of the school that we can develop habits of thoroughness, accuracy, punctuality, neatness, orderliness, by insisting on conscientious attention to all school duties, permitting nothing in the way of slipshod, slovenly work. We can get the children to learn to work, and once we have accomplished that we have accom-

plished a great deal in the way of moral education. The thing we must ever bear in mind is this: that it is not our purpose to get the pupil merely to give his theoretical, intellectual assent to the proposition that fidelity to duty, for instance, is an estimable quality in a man's character, nor yet that our purpose is to get him to admire fidelity to duty in an imaginary position into which in all probability he will never be placed. It is a comparatively easy matter to arouse in the pupil admiration for Marshal Massena, who, in the battle of Essling, on receiving orders from Napoleon to hold out for two hours more, hardly able to stand, replied: "Tell the Emperor that I will hold out for two hours more—six—twenty-four—as long as it is necessary for the safety of the army." It is easy to arouse the pupil's admiration for such a deed, and that is good as far as it goes. But to be really efficacious, the example of fidelity to duty must be brought nearer home. Get the pupil to admire the same virtue in the man and woman of average ability, with average duties and responsibilities, in a commonplace position. Take the case of the wireless telegrapher in a recent collision at sea. That would be bringing it nearer home to the boy. Call his attention to the action of the laborer down in the hold of the same vessel, who, standing shoulder-deep in water, opened the valve to prevent the blowing up of the ship. Bring it still nearer home to him. The train-dispatcher at his post, the operator at his key, the engineer at the throttle, the flagman at the switch, yes,

the "section hand" driving the spikes with his maul—every one of them has the life of railroad passengers in his hands, and so we can get that boy to see that we can have and do have the hero in every walk of life. So also must we try to get those girls to see that the humdrum duties and responsibilities of every and any woman in any position of life, however humble and obscure, are as necessary to society and their faithful performance as deserving of our esteem and respect as are the more spectacular or conspicuous deeds and lives of a Joan of Arc or a Queen Louise, a Florence Nightingale or an Alice Freeman Palmer. Let the boys and girls become imbued with that spirit by having it constitute part of the atmosphere of the school, and then it will be a comparatively easy task to develop in them a ready response to the so-called dull routine of their daily tasks. At any rate, we have not accomplished our purposes at this point until we have finally developed in our pupils this same fidelity to duty. And so with regard to all the other habits enumerated.

Desirable school environment.—Having now briefly discussed the school duties as a means of developing ideas of right and wrong, of arousing ideals, of securing unity of the intellectual life, and, finally, training in desirable habits, let us still more briefly consider the environment of the child while at school. The desirability and need of healthful and beautiful schoolrooms and school grounds needs but to be mentioned to be appreciated. Desirable as such features of the school

environment are, along with clean, tidy rooms, with beautiful pictures adorning the walls, this is far from justifying a certain modern educational theory to the effect that the mere cultivation in the child of good taste and the love of the beautiful will solve the problem of moral education. As has been said, the value of the esthetic sentiment in moral training is mainly negative. It is true, a highly developed regard for the beautiful in nature and in art leads to pursuits and pastime that will tend to keep the individual to that extent away from the pursuit of more sensuous, if not sensual, pleasures. Again, it is true that refinement of taste guards the individual against the temptation of immorality in vulgar garb; but it is equally true that it is no safeguard against immorality clothed in more attractive raiment. It will take sterner stuff than a refined taste to prepare the girl for the many distasteful duties of home-making and child-rearing, and that boy for the irksome tasks and duties of the bread-winner and the citizen. In fact, a refined taste is just as apt as not to unfit both for these very duties and responsibilities.

Influence of the teacher.—The chief factor in the school environment of the child is the teacher. When we think of the force of example in this connection it is well to think of an important point tersely stated by Guicciardini: "He who imitates what is evil always goes beyond the example that is set; on the contrary, he who imitates what is good always falls short." However, it will not do for teachers to pose as models. That

desire, in and of itself, inevitably brings in its train a certain degree of insincerity. What the teacher must be, above all things else, is himself. Let his constant thought be to do his duty; the matter of example will then take care of itself. If he thoroughly prepares himself for his daily work, if he examines all written work with scrupulous care, reads all test and examination papers thoroughly, marking them justly and returning them with promptitude, he will have some assurance that it will win the respect of his pupils, and that as a result his example will be of some influence in developing in them a corresponding attentiveness to their duties and the developing of desirable habits. On the other hand, the teacher whose constant thought is that of the example he sets, is apt to spend too much time and energy in devising new ways of impressing his pupils with a consciousness of the august virtues he is the possessor of, thus developing an attitude of constant posing, an attitude incompatible with that virtue of virtues in the teacher: genuineness. Do we always have the courage to acknowledge our ignorance when a bright pupil has given us a difficult question to answer, or do we put him off by saying that there won't be time to answer that to-day, that he must wait for the answer until to-morrow? Do we ever try to palm off review work when the superintendent comes on his tour of inspection, or do we call on only the bright pupils so as to make a better showing? Do we ever shut our eyes to the misdemeanor of the son of the banker or

of the member of the school board, while we punish the son of a poor washerwoman for committing the same offense?

Actual performance of duties.—It is important to bear in mind that subject-matter and school environment, including the example of the teacher, are only means of securing ideas of right and wrong, and of arousing sentiment, or feeling, toward right conduct, and these things are merely potential sources of possible conduct, but not actual conduct itself. Knowledge and feeling merely create mental dispositions which tend to express themselves in action where the opportunity for action presents itself; they merely give us tendencies toward right conduct, and what we are after is not merely tendency toward conduct, but conduct itself. To use an analogy: a teacher of gymnastics is setting out to teach the members of his class a certain exercise; his purpose is to secure in them the actual ability to perform the exercise. One means at his disposal would be to tell them how to execute it. Here we should have an appeal to the intellect. A more efficient means would be to show them the exercise; here we should have an appeal to the imitative side of the pupil's nature, through the example of the teacher. Now, would the teacher have a right to rest content with having told the pupils how to perform the exercise, and then having shown them how to perform it, as long as his purpose was to teach them to do it? Of course we should say immediately: "No. He must get them

at it themselves, must help them in their awkward efforts until they can perform it, and not only that, but he must keep them at it until by repetition they acquire ease and perfection in the execution." Now, so it is exactly in the matter of moral training. The mere appeal to the intellect and the arousing of feeling is not enough; our purpose is to secure right action, and, furthermore, habitual right action.

The whole matter of discipline, of punishment, of management, ought to be controlled with this in mind. Let us take for illustration the matter of orderliness. Take the case of a teacher who keeps complaining that his pupils are forever littering the floor with scraps of paper, and that, too, in spite of his telling them repeatedly that it is wrong to do so, in spite of his setting a good example, and in spite of his appealing in other ways to their love of order. He has done too much talking; what is needed to be done is to get the pupils into the habit of picking up paper whenever they see it on the floor, and to accomplish that he must see to it that each time he sees a piece of paper on the floor, the responsible pupil will pick it up. The less talking, and the more doing, the better. And so it is in all matters. There are many things that the pupils ought to do, and which they will not do of their own inclination. That is what you are there for; see to it that they will do it. Of course, appeal to the highest motive possible; if appeal to the highest is impracticable, appeal to the nearest lower one that will bring

about the desired result. The important thing is this: get them to do it. And then see to it that they will do it often enough. The first time it will take considerable pressure from without; the second time less pressure will be necessary; the third time still less, and so on, until finally the whole matter will be taken care of through inner pressure; that is, the pupils will do it of their own accord, because they themselves want to do it. Of course, the teacher must possess judgment and tact; he must approach the pupils in the right spirit, perhaps use suggestion rather than positive or direct command; encourage them by showing appreciative recognition of their past efforts; if he does that, he may rest assured that success will be his. The important thing is that we see to it that external pressure will be displaced by internal pressure, for as long as the individual performs a right action only through outer pressure, he is as yet no free and independent moral being. Merely getting pupils to conform to a required standard through compulsion, or fear of punishment, or hope of reward, has no particular value in the way of moral education, unless we see to it that by applying the principle of the substitution of motives we get the pupils to perform the desired actions for their own sake, through the pleasure they derive from performing the actions.

Laisser-faire in education.—However, this is not to be taken in the sense of an endorsement of the fashionable “soft” pedagogy, which would permit children to

do as they please, following their own sweet will, or rather, inclination, in everything. Accommodating as such a practice is to the selfish ease and comfort of indolent or pleasure-seeking parents or teachers, it is necessarily disastrous in its ultimate effects on the child, being as it is only another recrudescence of the *laissez-faire* doctrine inappropriately applied to the training of children. It is evidently this very thing that Emerson has in mind when he says: "I believe that our own experience instructs us that the secret of Education lies in respecting the pupil. . . . Would you verily throw up the reins of public and private discipline; would you leave the young child to the mad career of his own passions and whimsies, and call this anarchy a respect for the child's nature? I answer,—Respect the child, respect him to the end, but also respect yourself."

Games, athletics, pupils' organizations.—It is quite evident that one of the most potent means of moral education at our disposal is found in paying sufficient heed to those lines of activity that the pupils pursue of their own accord, such as plays and games, athletics, contests generally, pupils' organizations. In his activities here the pupil is primarily acting out his own nature, here he shows himself as he is. If we can get him spontaneously to live up to his ideas of right and wrong here, we are getting real, actual, positive moral conduct. A tactful, kindly supervision, a wise participation on the part of the teacher, will do a great deal to help those

ideas work out in corresponding conduct. And if once the pupil is fair and just here, you may rest assured he will be so elsewhere. School men sometimes make the mistake of believing that what pupils do here is of slight importance, that if they are unfair or inclined to play a clever trick in athletic contests, it matters little, for it is only a matter of play, anyhow. The fact of the matter is, there is probably nothing that those boys care more about than they do about those very things; there is nothing in later life that they will be more seriously interested in than they now are in their games. If they are unfair here, what can we expect of the future? If, on the other hand, they are fair in these games in which everything is at stake for them, their honesty and fairness in their later business life will take care of itself.

Appreciative understanding and breadth of views.—

In the whole matter of management and organization the teacher ought to be guided largely by the memory of his own way of looking at things when he himself was a child. That would prevent an austere, forbidding mien toward the innocent enjoyments and amusements of his pupils. So also, where it is necessary to deprive children and young people of forms of amusement that really are objectionable, such a teacher would furnish them with an equivalent substitute. In place of attempting to uproot ineradicable instincts, he would find a means of safe outlet for such impulses under wholesome conditions. Take dancing, for instance. As long as young people will dance anyhow, better have

them do so under proper chaperonage and supervision, say that of their teachers, and in proper surroundings, say the school gymnasium, than to have them do so clandestinely, in objectionable places, and under the sole tutelage of people of perhaps questionable standards, who do not have the interests of the young people at heart. Similarly, such an appreciative understanding of child nature, due to the vivid memory of our own childhood days, would be more apt to give us a proper perspective in discriminating between innocent amusement on the one hand, and vice and immorality on the other. Lecky says in this connection: "There is no greater mistake in education than to associate virtue in early youth with gloomy colors and constant restrictions, and few people do more mischief in the world than those who are perpetually inventing crimes. In circles where smoking, or field sports, or going to the play, or reading novels, or indulging in any boisterous games, or in the most harmless Sunday amusements, are treated as if they were grave moral offenses, young men constantly grow up who end by looking on grave offenses as not worse than these things. They lose all sense of proportion or perspective in morals, and those who are always straining at gnats are often peculiarly apt to swallow camels. It is quite right that men who have formed for themselves an ideal of life of the kind I have described should steadily pursue it, but it is another thing to impose it upon others, and to prescribe it as of general application. By teaching as absolutely wrong

things that are in reality only culpable in their abuse or in their excess, they destroy the habit of moderate and restrained enjoyment, and a period of absolute prohibition is often followed by a period of unrestrained license." 2

Fixing attention on ultimate aim.—Having now reviewed in the briefest sort of way the more important means for moral education at the disposal of the teacher, it remains to call attention to a certain thing that is absolutely essential if we would attain any degree of success, and that is the necessity of keeping the real or ultimate aim constantly in mind. The moment we lose sight of that aim, there is danger of our undermining the very things we have already erected with great pains and labor. Just a few illustrations. In a nature study class, perhaps, we are taking up the study of the horse-chestnut. We need a twig of the tree for use in our object lesson, and ask for a volunteer to bring us one. With our mind on the immediate aim of this lesson, it never occurs to us to take the precaution to ask the volunteer how or where he is going to get the twig. And he, having nothing but that twig in view, straightway makes for a neighbor's lawn, bends down a bough and breaks off a twig. What has been the effect of the teaching? A little more knowledge and a considerable training in vandalism. Again, we have a class exercise in the training of the senses. We have brought a variety of objects, say vegetables, into the classroom. The children are asked to

call them by name, through the aid of sight, of taste, of smell, and finally, being blindfolded, by touch. Most of them recognize but one or two, perhaps, but Johnny, skilfully looking down from under the imperfectly tied handkerchief, recognizes them all and receives the praise of the teacher. And the value of it all? At least an imaginary training of the senses, but certainly a very positive training in deception and dishonesty. Or again, we give an inane, puerile, silly parody on Paul Revere's Ride or some other selection of what ought to be sacred and venerated literature; tell funny dialect stories, just for the sake of keeping up the interest of the class, but really resulting in a lowering of respect for the caricatured race or nationality; listen with tolerant ear to the pupils' use of such epithets as "sheeny" or "dago," and the like. In the same way, perhaps because of the pressure of work or because of our native dislike of long-continued effort, we fail thoroughly to examine written work in the form of problems, compositions or other exercises, thus encouraging the pupils to do careless, slipshod work; or in the high school bookkeeping class we fail to check up the journal, ledger and balance sheet, thus encouraging pupils in dishonesty by giving them the opportunity to put into their trial balance or final statement results they did not get from their own ledger. And so every day furnishes many opportunities for unwittingly undoing the results of our own previous endeavor, if we do not keep our ultimate aim ever in mind.

Problem of securing good teachers.—A special problem left for consideration is that of getting more efficient, well-prepared teachers. A most essential thing in the normal school training is that of putting sufficient emphasis on the moral aim in education, and for that reason there ought to be a required course in elementary ethics in the normal school curriculum. Another thing we are greatly in need of is a larger percentage of men teachers in all of the higher grades. To get them, sufficient inducements must be offered. For one thing, the salaries of teachers ought to be increased. That would help greatly. But perhaps the greatest inducement that could be offered would lie in a system of appointment that would furnish a guarantee of permanency in position during the rendering of efficient service and good behavior. That is the very thing that our present system of appointment by Boards of Education elected by the voters of the community does not offer. In fact, under our present system the more efficient and progressive man at the head of a school system, especially if he be a young man lacking a sufficient knowledge of the ways of the world, is more liable to meet with opposition, and is in greater danger of losing his position than the less efficient, but more politic man who adapts himself to the caprices and whims of the political moguls of the community, and who is willing to run his school in the way in which schools were run in the good old days of yore. As long as the layman of the community has the implied right of dictating the policy of admin-

istration and management for our schools, so long teaching can be no profession; neither will it be possible to keep the strongest men in the work. The solution would lie in the adoption of a civil service system managed at such a distance from the disturbing influence of local clique and faction, and the demoralizing power of local pull and nepotism, as to make possible the selection and holding of teachers and principals on the basis of real fitness and true merit.

Moral instruction.—One important matter left to consider is that of moral instruction, or, more correctly speaking, that of instruction about morals. Sufficient familiarity with what has been done in this direction in the past, and with what is being now done in France and elsewhere, would lead us not to expect much from the introduction of formal moral instruction into our public school curriculum. When handled by a strong teacher in the high school, the results will probably justify the efforts made, especially if the teacher be imbued with what, for lack of a better term, might be called moral enthusiasm. But we have good reason for being rather skeptical with reference to any great benefits to be derived from its introduction into the grades, whether it be in the form of a sort of catechism on morals, or in that of daily set lessons in talking about morals. The ideas of younger children with reference to those questions of right and wrong that they really face in a practical way in their daily lives can be cleared up sufficiently by taking advantage of the studies taught,

the cases of wrong-doing that come up from day to day, and in various other ways. Such means are less liable to become perfunctory, mechanical, lifeless. The greatest danger in the adoption of a system of moral instruction would probably lie in giving to teachers lacking sufficient professional training the erroneous view that here, at last, we have found a simple and easy solution of the baffling problem of moral education, and in thus leading them to neglect the use of the more difficult, but more efficient, means of moral training.

We must ever remember that the more talk a man allows himself to indulge in concerning the duties of life, other things equal, the more apt he is to do nothing further. It was a shrewd observation of Lessing's when he said that people are apt to talk most about those virtues that they least possess. In the training of children it must be our constant endeavor to secure desirable conduct with the least amount of talk on their part, and to guard against the formation of that priggish, pharisaical habit of indulgence in canting, sanctimonious twaddle; for talking about the duty of doing a thing, making profession, especially where accompanied by emotional effusiveness, is actually apt to interfere with our doing our duty, for it relieves the inner tension, or pressure, and then there is nothing left to impel us towards action—we feel relieved and contented. In the same way we must be on our guard against indoctrinating the child with theoretical knowledge about, or arousing in him pious sentiment with reference to, the

future, distant duties of mature manhood and womanhood, while at the same time permitting him to neglect or ignore his immediate, present duties. For, let us bear in mind, the man who has developed the habit of indolently indulging himself in dreamland contemplation of the good and noble things that he would do under given, imaginary conditions, while at the same time he is oblivious to the common, prosaic, everyday duties of this workaday world, is a more hopeless case morally than the more ignorant, unsophisticated man living, in a cultural way, on a lower plane, but there performing the homely duties of his humble life.

In short, let us remember in conclusion that it must be our endeavor to develop correct moral ideas, and also to arouse potent moral ideals, but above all, to secure actual moral conduct, and furthermore, habitual moral conduct, thus finally bringing about that inner consistency headed in the right direction, that desirable unity of personality that we call moral character. The man or woman in the teaching profession who keeps that aim constantly in mind and does his best to bring about its realization, may rest assured that he is doing a life-work that is splendidly worth while.

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