Publications

OF THE

American Sociological Society

Volume VII

THE CONCEPTION OF HUMAN INTER-RELATIONS AS A VARIANT OF SOCIAL THEORY

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Organized at Baltimore, December 1905

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NATURE AND PURPOSES OF THE SOCIETY

The American Sociological Society was organized at Baltimore in 1905 at conferences which were held there in conjunction with the annual meetings of the American Economic Association, the American Historical Association, and the American Political Science Association. Among those who attended these conferences there was an almost unanimous opinion that the interests of sociologists were sufficiently important and sufficiently distinct to warrant the creation of a new organization which would bring together at regular intervals those interested in the promotion of sociological studies.

Quite as much as the economists, who formed a national association twenty-one years ago, or as the political scientists, who formed the Political Science Association four years ago, American sociologists, like their European colleagues, have need of the stimulus and the mutual criticism which would come from an organization that is national, permanent, and scientific in character. Such an organization would, it was felt, bring historical, theoretical, and practical sociologists together in helpful co-operation and exalt sociology in the eyes of the general public.

It is the purpose of the society, therefore, to include in its membership all those who recognize the importance of the scientific aspects of sociology—scientific philanthropists as well as teachers of sociology, sociological workers as well as sociological writers. The membership fee is Three Dollars a year, or Fifty Dollars for Life Membership. Each member will receive a copy of the current publications of the Society. Application blanks, as well as further information concerning the Society, may be obtained of the Secretary, PROFESSOR SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO, ILL.

* Deceased.

PUBLICATIONS
OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

VOLUME VII

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Agents

THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY
NEW YORK

THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON AND EDINBURGH

Presented

PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS

SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

HELD AT BOSTON, MASS.

DECEMBER 28, 30, 31, 1912

VOLUME VII

1912

THE CONCEPTION OF HUMAN INTER-RELATIONS AS A VARIANT OF SOCIAL THEORY

PUBLISHED FOR THE
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY
BY
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Published June 1913

Composed and Printed By
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.

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THE PRESENT OUTLOOK OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

ALBION W. SMALL
University of Chicago

This paper is virtually a syllabus. It presents a conspectus of a piece of work which cannot be carried far by a single individual. Nevertheless the work is prompted by belief that the aim proposed, the method pursued, tentative results already obtained, and indications to which even these provisional conclusions point, are worth something as a contribution to knowledge, and to the formation of scientific and social purpose.

The study now to be indicated in outline is an inquiry into the methodology of the social sciences, not as it has been or might be developed abstractly, but as it has actually evolved in a single case, that case being regarded as to a certain degree necessarily typical of the logic of the social sciences in general. An important presupposition of the study is that we are far from having exhausted the instruction for present social theory which is to be obtained by study of the evolution of the social sciences.

The study concerns itself directly with the scientific experience of one people only—the Germans. It may be indicated by the question: "What does the evolution of the social sciences in Germany show about actual processes thus far experienced in gaining social sophistication?"

I will not defend, but I will explain, this choice of problem.

It is doubtless beyond question that, with the single exception of the ethical enlightenment contained in Christianity, the world has learned more in the field of social science since 1800 than it had learned before since Plato. This being the case, it is worth while to study the experience of the Germans in this field during the past century, in the first place, for the general reason that in their experience stages which everyone must somehow pass through

in reaching intellectual maturity are more distinctly in evidence than in any other national experience. This is not to assert that the knowledge to be credited to the work of the nineteenth century within the field of the social sciences was all gained by Germans, or that it has been confined to Germany. On the other hand, the intellectual and moral crises in which the limitations of knowledge have become conscious, in which determination to remove the limitations has become deliberate, and in which pursuit of the resolve has arrived at larger outlook and deeper penetration—all these processes have been more visible and in the aggregate more systematically correlated among the Germans than anywhere else.

It may be that scholars among the English, the French, the Italians, and perhaps some of the other nations have actually passed from the eighteenth- to the twentieth-century plane of social enlightenment, on the purely intellectual side, by steps which were quite as independent and which would therefore be quite as instructive as the experience of the Germans. I venture no opinion upon that problem. I simply point out that the way-marks of the German progress are more easily detected and more variously attested. They are not as well preserved as we might wish, but, as compared with the memorabilia of other nations, they are as an intimate daily diary in contrast with those details of an ordinary life which would find place in public annals.

In other words, the Germans have put on record a relatively complete intellectual autobiography. Not because it is German, but because it is human, because it records the experience through which all men's minds have to find their way in order to arrive at our present stage of social sophistication, this German autobiography is the most voluminous introduction in existence to the particular type of self-knowledge that is taking shape in the modern social sciences. It is a commonplace that we do not fully know what we know, until we know it as it was gradually discovered in the process of eliminating previous misconceptions or of filling gaps where there had been no conceptions. For this reason review of the thought-processes involved in the evolution of German social theories is invaluable.

More specifically, I find it worth while to study the progress

of German knowledge in social science since 1800, second, because of the literal exhibit which this experience contains of advance in awareness that supposed facts which had satisfied might not even be facts, and if they were, they would not be sufficient; in awareness that previous solutions did not solve; that previous explanations did not explain; and that previous valuations did not convince. I find it worth while to study the expansion and deepening of German social science, not as the only textbook in which social science may be learned, but as the textbook in which the pragmatic process of learning social science is more explicitly exhibited than in any other available. Otherwise expressed, this German experience presents to us the plainest instance extant on a large scale of social science knowledge in the making. If this were the whole story, it would be reason enough for studying this German experience.

But there is a third reason for studying the nineteenth-century evolution of German social science, and in my rating it is far more important than either of the two just stated, namely, the history either does or does not furnish a series of confirmations of a cardinal theorem in social psychology: *Every social theory, and every type of social science is a function of practical problems which contemporary men are attempting to solve.* In other words, the thinkers of a generation are tackling in more abstract form the problems with which their whole society at the same time is busy in the concrete. The theories of scholars reflect the personal interest and the class bias of one or other of the groups that clash in the practical competitions of the same period. As these classes arrive at adjustments of their interests, as social institutions settle into arrangements accordingly, the corresponding theories become respectively orthodox and authoritative, or discredited and rejected. Dominant dogmas in social science may accordingly be in effect the decrees of non-scientific men who have won social power by some kind of force not purely intellectual, and the dogmas may therefore have no better permanent right than that of might. The prevalent basic presumptions in the theory of economic distribution make a case in point, as I shall indicate later.

In other words, one of the reasons why social theories are not impartially objective is that in every age of the world social theory

has been one of the weapons of the class conflict then waging. Whether with conscious or unconscious class bias, the thinkers have been trying to solve the social problems of their time by assuming as self-evident more or less of one or another partisan conception of life then trying conclusions in the arena of social struggle. Social theory has been an ally now of one party, now of another, in the constant social conflict, instead of being an impartial observer in the white light of dispassionate science.

We discover this vitiation of knowledge better in the past than in its manifestations in our own time. More precisely, if we make out this inexactness in our own time, the very perception is discounted by the possibility that our discovery is merely our own partisanship, bringing suspicion of improper bias against other partisans. We are much less liable to that charge when we point out the partisan preconceptions of men in the past, since there is less common interest between ourselves and partisans on either side of past conflicts than there is between ourselves and some living actors. We may therefore more conveniently learn the workings of men's minds when engaged on social problems in general, by analyzing their mode of dealing with stages of social theory which are now closed incidents.

The Germans are neither sinners above all others, in the matters just pointed out, nor are they exceptions to the rule. They have very strikingly illustrated the rule. Their experience, therefore, which as I have said is more plainly recorded than any other of equal scope, is the most instructive available evidence as to this ever-present human factor in knowledge processes.

In the fourth place, the actual growth of social science in Germany presents a specific case of the interdependence of different phases of social theory, or, as it is more customary to express it, of the dependence of one social science upon all the others. In the United States the workers in the various social sciences have not yet very generally admitted this interdependence, and those who have admitted it have usually done so with such reserve that the perception has had much less than its full value as a working influence on their methods. The idea that no part of social science can progress very far at a time unless all parts of social science are ad-

vancing at the same time, and unless each part is keeping step with all the rest—this idea is still fighting for its life. Few scholars in the United States deny it outright, but few make it a part of their effective beliefs. A large part of the difference between dead scholarship and live scholarship in the social sciences of today consists in contrasted degrees of the vitality of this perception in different men's thinking. There is no clearer proof that objectivity and virility in social science depend upon actual evolution of social science as unified interpretation of a total human experience, than the nineteenth-century history of German social theory. I do not mean that many Germans made the generalization which I have stated, and acted consistently with it. I mean that the work which the narrowest German specialist did got its permanent rating in social science by serving or not serving to close some gap, or to improve some process, which had previously been defective throughout the range of the social sciences. This service as a subsidiary to social science in general is the final criterion of all presumed achievement in any division of social science.

The battle for the triumph of this perception is now on in the United States. The intellectual history of the next generation in our country will be a triumphal march or a disgraceful countermarch according as it succeeds or not in making this perception a commonplace in social science thinking. The line of advance in social science must follow a path to which this perception of the interconnection of all parts of human experience is one of the indexes. I am acquainted with no more immediately available equipment for this part of the impending struggle than familiarity with the facts in the case of German experience in the nineteenth century. That experience is all the more instructive because it was not thought out in advance. In spite of all the attempts at classification and organization of the sciences, of which the Germans were so prolific, German social scientists exercised a degree of freedom in proposing their own problems and in selecting their own methods of work upon them, which left scarcely anything for the most extreme individualist to desire. Not because they wanted to, but because they had to in doing their best on the problems they had attacked, those free lances leaned one upon another and

borrowed the one from the other, and co-operated with one another in proceeding from less to more knowledge of the social reality. We must, therefore, not make the mistake of treating this German experience as simply a solidarity, and therefore as only a single instance which could not serve as proof of a generalization. On the contrary, a multitude of independent German scholars, each following his own bent, sooner or later repeated, in some measure or other, the same experience. They found that each must be in turn historian, political philosopher, political scientist, political economist, moralist, etc., in order to satisfy his own conception of the procedure necessary to reach his results. This German experience then is not a single case, but hundreds of cumulative cases. Nineteenth-century German experience in the social sciences is a multitude of individual attempts to treat life analytically, resulting in as many conclusions that after all the last word about life must be synthetic.

I name a fifth reason for the importance of the study which I am reporting. Without assuming that the social science of the world is expressed at its best today in the social science of Germany, it is safe to say that elements of value in each of the social sciences which are also of value to every other social science are more vividly in evidence in Germany than anywhere else. If we are familiar, therefore, with the social sciences as they are at present developed in Germany, we are able greatly to abbreviate our necessary methodological inquiries. Instead of going over points of controversy which are necessary preliminaries to advanced thinking in social science, we are able to point to many concrete elements in the technique already adopted by German scholars which have only to be seen to be approved by everyone of sufficient training to be entitled to an opinion. At the same time, if we should attempt to justify these same factors by formal argument, the great majority of social scientists in the United States would meet us with active or passive opposition. A large part of the strategy of constructive social science in the next few generations in the United States must consist in conscious and deliberate practice of the composite methods of research which have achieved prestige in Germany in place of methods of unreal abstraction. These composite methods may be adopted in practice long before scholars are willing

to accept the general principles of social relations which are fundamental to the validity of these practices. To speak more concretely, no German scholar today of the first rank can be correctly represented by any label which designates a single one of the traditional academic divisions of knowledge. On the contrary, each of them practices the technique of each of the divisions of knowledge as it is demanded by the particular problem upon which he is engaged. More exactly, each one of them is psychologist, historian, political philosopher, political scientist, and sociologist, whenever his problems call for the technique or results of either of these divisions of labor. It would be invidious to select a few names in order to substantiate this proposition.

Assuming then this illustrative value of German experience, not because of specific doctrines which it has evolved, but because of inevitable tendencies in the logic of the social sciences which it has exemplified, it is first in order to make use of the work which has been done in reporting general German experience to get at the crises or problems in German society which German scholars, even the most abstract, were consciously or unconsciously attempting to control. It should go without saying that the minor crises incidental to these larger ones must be interpreted as the more immediate social environment of each particular theorist.

In the rough, then, I make out four cardinal problems which have presented the fundamental tests for German practical men and theorists alike since the middle of the eighteenth century. In a way each of them has been a factor in German life from the middle of the sixteenth century until the present moment. In another sense they have successively come into chief importance in the order in which I shall name them.

The first cardinal problem of the Germans was that of protecting the state against other states—the cameralistic problem. This task was more and more distinctly present to the German mind from 1555 to 1765, and we may say that it virtually dominated all other public problems until 1815.

The chronic condition of the European nations during the cameralistic period was war, and the primary task of government, especially in Germany, was creation of readiness for war. Under the circumstances, the most constant

and pressing need of states was ready money. The men who elaborated either the theory or the practice of government for these German states had virtually to answer this question: "What program must a wise government adopt, in order first and foremost to be adequately supplied with ready money, and thus able to discharge the duties of the state in their various orders of importance?"[1]

It came about that a big block of social theory was built up between 1555 and 1765, under stimulus of the distinct purpose to systematize programs of national conduct in such a way that the national governments might be as strong as possible in the military sense. Not only was there an extensive literature directly in the service of this purpose, but all the other literature within the field of social science in Germany was strongly affected by this dominating note of the military and incidentally the fiscal necessities of the German states. Involved in these cameralistic theories, and in the viewpoint of other types of social thinking not avowedly in the interest of this immediate civic purpose, were innumerable dogmas, presumptions, inferences, and impressions which were more than administrative in the technical sense. They were presuppositions in the fields of history, political philosophy, political science, political economy, ethics, and social philosophy. Accordingly, they were in some sort and degree attempts to occupy the ground later covered by each of those sciences. The point is that not merely those portions of cameralism which were direct attempts to formulate means to the fiscal and military end, and which were therefore rational adaptations of resources to that end, were shaped by consideration of that end; but that the same end was used as a criterion of other things, possibly more important than itself—things that might show it to be a very temporary, local, and untenable end—in short that something merely incidental in the whole human process was allowed to take the place of arbiter over more important phases of the process, and thus to prejudice thought and action about the whole range of the social process. This sort of methodological fallacy was in possession of the ground until 1765, and to a considerable extent until 1815. The next great steps in social theory could not be taken until the grip of this fallacy could be weakened.

[1] Small, *The Cameralists*, pp. 6–7.

Meanwhile, as a general proposition, all German thinking in social science was a more or less direct and conscious attempt to interpret and direct the conduct of the Germans, and to philosophize this interpretation and conduct, with reference to the dominating idea of strengthening the state for defense and aggression in conflict with other states. The point which I am now urging is that in principle this central fact of the cameralistic period is typical of all thinking. It is always a question, to be sure, in what degree the controlling public problem of a generation affects the specific thinking of a given scientist or school of scientists. The actuality of this relationship between the public problems and the specific scientific problem of all contemporaries is the main thing to be noted.

It is impossible in this paper to justify the conclusions which I have reached provisionally, about the controlling public problems in Germany after 1815. I venture, however, to indicate them in brief. It is probably unnecessary to mention that the mutterings of the French Revolution and then the Revolution itself set back the indicated course of German social science more than a generation. After the great problem of the cameralistic period had been temporarily solved, the problem next in order, and to a certain extent next in necessity, was how to protect the citizen against the state. As a rough general proposition, German public life and German social theory centered upon this problem from 1815 to 1850 as distinctly as it had revolved around the cameralistic problem during the previous period. Two special factors kept the citizen problem back and down for a length of time that would not have elapsed if the Germans had been a compact and detached group. These were, first, the local jealousies of the different quasi-sovereign German states. These frictions were in the aggregate a more debilitating drain upon the material and moral resources of the Germans than the hostilities of alien nations. They helped to prolong the necessity of keeping every state in the condition of martial preparation, and this amounted to suppression of the civic problem because of the paramount urgency of the military problem. In other words, it prolonged the life of autocracy or the absorption of the citizen by the government. In the second place, the oncoming of the French Revolution obscured and post-

poned the civic problem. It made almost everybody in the upper classes, and even the majority in the lower, believe that the essential problem was to insure the state not only against the old foreign enemies, but further, against a new phase of domestic danger, that is, revolutionists, who were held to be implacable enemies of all properly constituted government.

Added to these special factors, a third was the necessity of fighting against the Napoleonizing of all Europe. This accident in the situation kept the old problem of the cameralistic period to the fore to such an extent that, in the life-and-death struggle of nationalities against absorption in the Bonapartistic empire, absorption of the citizen by the government was made to seem a negligible evil so long as this more spectacular evil threatened. The orderly progress of social science in Germany was therefore arrested for a long time by necessary concentration upon the disturbing problems of revolution and Napoleonism.

The third period in nineteenth-century development in Germany was that dominated by the problem of protecting the majority of the citizens against the economically dominant class; namely from 1850 to 1871.

The fourth period, from 1871 to the present, has been occupied by the problem of committing Germany to a permanent policy of promoting human improvement.

Taking this general survey of public problems in Germany as its base of operations, the specific study which I am now sketching is an attempt to discover the most significant features in the course of the evolution of social science in Germany since the cameralistic period. I try to indicate the cardinal traits in this development, or as I may say its methodological outcome, under four main propositions.

I. *German social science in the nineteenth century has become historical.*

On the whole, we may describe the general mental attitude of scholars throughout the world, as well as of the multitude, up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, as in a vague way conscious of the past, and respectful toward the past. While the past simply as past, however, always constituted a certain background

in the consciousness of thinkers, they felt themselves on the other hand largely free to reconstruct this past, to give it a content and a meaning according as their own fancy or interest or a dominant authority might suggest. In other words, the rôle of the past in the thinking of men at the end of the eighteenth century was the rôle of the vicious circle: that is, men constructed a past to suit themselves, with little or no sense of liability to conform their construction to actual facts. Then having built up their fictitious past they used it as an authority to establish belief and control conduct. In this sense then they had hardly made the beginnings of finding themselves in the real world.[1]

This attitude of unreality, of ungenuineness, of non-objectivity, with reference to the portion of human experience that was in the past, was an effect of many things and a cause of many other things that are important variants in social science. Without attempting to schedule these causes or effects, we may note that this condition of imperfect connection with reality on the part of scholars indicated in a still higher degree a similar condition on the part of men in general. This amounted to a state of maladjustment with all the processes of life, which was in itself an arrested development. In order that the thinking process in particular and the life-processes in general might develop, the time had come for a notable extension of human ability to look straight at human experience as it had been, to recognize it in its actual character, and to learn from it just those things which were involved in the record as thus intelligently and dispassionately read. The pace-makers in this pursuit of reality within the social realm were undoubtedly the historians.[2]

[1] Illustrations of this attitude may be cited in the case of Schröder, Small, *The Cameralists*, pp. 137–39; and Justi, *ibid.*, pp. 294–95 and 310–11.

[2] The whole question of the interactions between the physical and the social sciences in this approach to reality may be waived here, not because it is irrelevant, if we were discussing all the factors of the early nineteenth-century movement in Germany or elsewhere; but because we are starting with the phenomena in the social sciences as we find them at a particular time. In pursuing the study it is of course necessary to investigate all the influences that shape the phenomena of social science from this time on. These factors have to be followed out into a detail which this paper cannot indicate.

In order to become responsible, reliable, and competent, in their part of the human process, it was necessary for scholars in the social sciences to detect all sorts of wishes-father-to-the-thought, all sorts of subjectively created substitutes for reality, all sorts of interested assignments of value to reality, and to recognize literal occurrences and actual connections between occurrences in the moral world. So far as discipline to this end was gained in and through the social sciences at all, work in the field of history was the most illuminating experience, and the historians consequently became for a time the most efficient preceptors of other social scientists. They thus indirectly contributed to increase of objectivity in social thinking in general. For reasons indicated above, historical study during the Napoleonic period was stimulated less by the purpose to grapple with the new problem of the enfranchisement of the citizen, than with the old problem of the security of the state. Nevertheless, the discipline of candid interrogation of the past, to find in the past its own reality rather than a reflection of the assumptions of the thinker, was the elementary thing, even though the lessons searched for in the past were applied more to a closed or closing incident than to the coming issue. Men could not form the habit of facing the past objectively without acquiring some increment of ability to face the present objectively. In this way the awakening of the critical historical spirit schoolmastered Europe in the realistic attitude toward all thought and conduct.

When I say that the work of vitalizing the social sciences was led by the historians, I mean at first no more than this: A few historians were the first of the German thinkers to descend from the clouds of confusion created by social upheavals in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, and to apply themselves profitably to a field of real knowledge of human affairs. As it turned out, this program of the historians amounted to the laying of a foundation course in the structure of social science. It was probably the most efficient preparation within the social sciences themselves for what we know now as the "process conception of life." It taught men to think human experience as growth, as a succession of consequences following by some sort of physical or moral necessity from particular antecedents. It taught men that they must find

a part at least of the explanation of every social situation or occurrence in the previous sequence of situations and occurrences in which the phenomenon to be explained is a late term. Merely for suggestive purposes, we may refer roughly to Savigny as illustrating this idea through use of Roman law; to Eichhorn as impressing the same lesson with growth of German legal institutions as the material, and as laying a stronger basis of historicity in relating German legal growth more vitally with the external experience of the Germans; to Niebuhr as setting a new pace in higher criticism of the archeological and literary remains of history; and to Ranke as enlarging conceptions of the sort of documentation necessary in order to make civic history authentic.

It is of course impossible in such a sketch as this to discuss the technique of any division of social science. We are concerned at present merely with cardinal factors in methodology. I must therefore emphasize a peculiar limitation in the method of the early nineteenth-century historians. In brief, while they contributed to realism in social science by emphasizing causal connections between chronologically earlier and later phenomena, they conspicuously lacked ability to interpret contemporary situations in terms of cause and effect, of means and end. Their attempts to do this ended with interpretation of the present as an effect of the past. They were panic-stricken when they found other men thinking of controlling the present with a view to causing the future.

Each of the historians whom I have named was a case in point. Let Eichhorn stand for all. He wanted to help solve the public problems of Germany at his own time, particularly to pave the way for reduction of the chaos of legal conditions into order, by resolving the nebulous past of German constitutional and legal history into an intelligible process; that is, he wanted to do just what the faculties of the leading American law schools today pride themselves upon doing. They pursue the method of explaining all law by going back to its genesis, and of trying to discover the occasions and processes of its growth. This is a deliberate and conscious substitute for the method of treating each particular rule of law as having an absolute value within a system of logical constructions abstracted from all concrete circumstances in which

parts or the whole of the system may have arisen. The thing which at last made this whole historical method revolutionary was utterly beyond the prevision of the so-called "historical school of jurists," Eichhorn and Savigny in particular. They rang the changes on the propositions "All law has its roots in the past"; "All law is a growth"; "All law is to be explained by the circumstances of its history." The initial effect of this attitude was a tremendous liberalizing of the minds of jurists who had to teach either public or private law. It made them treat it less as a rigidly formal affair, operating and to be operated with mechanical relentlessness. It taught them to consider law as in some measure elastic with the thrust and pull of circumstances. Compared with our present notions of the adaptability of law to changing conditions, the modifications in German legal conceptions at this time were microscopic. On the other hand, the change was considerable, when compared with the earlier attitude of German legalists. The same effect is easily traced in the minds of men dealing with other divisions of social science, and the effect has been cumulative up to the present time.

On the other hand, these men who did so much with the clue of historical growth were at their wits' end when the idea was carried over to the conditions of their own time with any thought of planning a continuance of the process of growth. Hard as it is for us to understand how it was possible so to handicap the idea at just the point where it promised to be most efficient, the truth is that these earlier interpreters of legal institutions in terms of growth seemed able to entertain the idea in full only with reference to the past. The moment they were asked to follow out the implications of the idea, in the way of making their own time an incubator of more growth, they were frightened. The same phenomenon occurred later in the case of the historical economists. But this is the important matter now to be noted: These historians builded better than they knew. Growth is not a mere historical category. It is also proleptic. The idea of social growth, whether derived from the experiences of everyday men, or from the reflections of scholars, is dynamic. As a general proposition, the academic men who were historically minded, whether with respect to law or eco-

nomics, wanted to use the past as a means of reconciling the world unto the present, or at most as a means of procuring a more orderly arrangement and smoother working of the institutions which the past had handed down to the present. But the dynamics in the idea of historical growth were not exhausted in that lame and impotent conclusion. The fashioning of the idea of historical growth into a tool of science set afoot the mischief of calculated social propagation. Men reasoned for a long time, more subconsciously than consciously: "If growth is the program of history what about the growth of our own moment? Every period of the past has been the present to the men who lived in it. Those men of the past had to be men of action in their own time and place, or growth would have halted with them. How should we act, in view of the circumstances of our own time, in such a way that the process of growth which we have discovered in the past may be continuous through us and beyond us?"

As a rule the men who have done most to develop the idea and to trace the actual processes of growth in the past have balked at this inference. They have taken refuge in some conception of impersonal forces producing change, even if they consented to entertain the idea that the institutions of their own time were eventually to undergo change in a series that should continue the changes involved in the growth of the past. These men have felt that the safety of society demanded stout resistance to any conceptions of past growth which would constitute sanctions for going about the improvement of social institutions in the same matter-of-fact manner in which one would plan to bring unimproved land under cultivation, or to remodel an old house, or to incorporate inventions into old machinery, or to introduce labor-saving methods into old industrial processes. In short, ever since the historical law of growth has been recognized, men in every generation who have made it the means of enlightening themselves and their neighbors about the past have fought with all their might against permitting this element of growth to do all it could toward enlightening themselves and their fellows about the present. This is among the constant exhibits in the psychology of transition. The past retains the balance of power in the minds of all but the irresponsibly

visionary advance agents of the future. This is one of the reasons why so much of the social progress of recent times has had to be stated, while it was going on, not in terms of the future, but in formulas reaffirming the past.

But this is growing into a digression. The point is that we find every one of these historical scholars presently setting himself against application of the very conclusions from their scholarship which, from our standpoint, it seems to have been unavoidable for them to draw. The psychology of their position, as of the cautious element in every passage of social transition, amounts to this: first, belief in a general principle, the continuous operation of which would produce readjustments of the contemporary situation—in this case, the universality of social growth; second, disbelief that the particular measures proposed by way of social modification are authentic operations of that principle. In the rough, every historian, and to a certain extent every other scholar who has had a place in the ranks of accredited social scientists in Germany during the past century has, sooner or later, and in a lesser or higher degree, illustrated both phases of this generalization.

In particular these path-breaking German historians reached strong convictions about that feature of human experience which they referred to in terms of "growth." To that extent they made splendid use of a category which has since been widened into the view which we now indicate by the phrase "the process conception of life." In their use of the concept "growth," however, they were relatively clear in their perception of the longitudinal phase of human experience, so to speak, and relatively dim in their vision of its lateral aspect. They thought of social growth chiefly as succession, as continuity, as persistence. Their attention rested much less on growth in its structural aspects, that is, upon stages of temporary equilibrium of forces, upon correlations of adjustments, upon interdependence of activities in process of adaptation. This "growth" concept of the early historians thus visualized human experience principally as a process of sequences within relatively narrow grooves of causation, and in a vague and uncertain degree, if at all, as a process of unfolding in all contents and dimensions.

How much the historians ever contributed at first hand to enlargement of the "growth" concept in these respects, I am not prepared to say. It is by no means certain that Droysen and Treitschke and Mommsen, for example, were in advance of Eichhorn, except in technique. It would be difficult to show that they were better acquainted than he with the whole range of factors co-operating in the social process. It is certain at all events that we can trace the reinforcement of the "growth" concept more easily through the work of other divisions of social science. This will appear under the next main proposition.

II. *German social science in the nineteenth century has become functional.*

Not to venture on detailed discussion of the functional concept at this point, it is enough to say that social science throughout the nineteenth century has on the whole tended away from methods which first divided the moral world up into blocks, then sorted those blocks of social stuff into categories, and finally separated the sheep from the goat categories by judgments of good and bad. On the other hand, the social sciences, of course including psychology, have tended to substitute methods which look after the work done by the different factors in the apparent social processes, and to pronounce that work good or bad according as it tends to promote or to retard the purposes which appeal to reflective criticism as on the whole in the line of the constructive movement first of the group primarily concerned and ultimately of humanity as a whole.

It would be rank falsification of the facts to make developments in the large outlook of German social science synchronous with the stages in the public problem which I have indicated. This clarification of scientific vision was a by-product of specialized experience in all the activities of life. Within this whole, the academic activities took on the effects of the common experience with their own particular variations in a tempo different from that in which German life at large evolved.

Thus it would be easy to support the special plea that German publicists in the eighteenth century and even later were accustomed

to think in terms of what was known a century afterward as the "organic concept." Passages galore might be cited in which German writers before 1900 expound human relations with variations of the category "organism." Eichhorn in 1834 explained more distinctly than he had expressed it in his first volume in 1808 that his purpose from the start had been to set forth German history as "organic."[1] The technical difference between the category "organism" previous to 1850, and indeed for the most part long after Schäffle's *Bau und Leben* began to appear in 1875, and the rôle of the same idea since that time is that in the former period it was used in the most obvious popular sense, while in the latter it was elaborated and criticized and deliberately employed for what it was worth as a tool of analysis. The phases of social science which centered around the "organic" concept two or three decades ago have in consequence been merged into results that came mostly from quite different antecedents. Men who were almost diametrically opposed to one another while the "organic" concept was under discussion are now of one mind in the essential matter of interpreting life functionally. For reasons which I will exhibit a little more specifically in a moment, the precise combinations of intellectual processes by which this result came about—whether in Germany or in other parts of the world—may never be conclusively demonstrated. It is certain, however, that three distinct scientific factors, each in its way stimulated by instinct of responsibility within the principal social problems of their time, co-operated among the Germans in developing that type of intelligence which has come to visualize life under the aspect of function. For convenience, we may call these cardinal factors (1) the economic, (2) the political, and (3) the sociological. Until very recently these factors, especially the first two, have ostensibly maintained most exclusively separate existence. The amusing reality is that there was always between them an unsystematized and unconfessed co-operation quite inconsistent with the presumption of separateness. It is only in recent times that the three factors have become so intelligently differentiated that they are aware of the

[1] *Deutsche Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte*, ed. 1834, Vol. IV, Preface.

necessity of co-operation, and that they are consciously moving toward consensus as to methods of co-operation.

Returning to the beginnings of this second phase of development, one of the naïve presuppositions of eighteenth-century German publicists, and one which was well-nigh universal and decisive, was the presumption that civic power, the state, sovereignty, was primordial in human experience, and that all other phases of community life were in some sort emanations from this "center and source." The spell of this superstition is by no means wholly broken yet, in Germany or elsewhere. Even men who use a thought-apparatus which in principle excludes such illusions still occasionally revert to it. The idea that the state was an instrument of control, invented by early types of interest, inherited and transformed to suit later types of interest, and always in principle a projection of human purposes and subsidiary to human purposes, had never for a moment held the respectful attention of orthodox scholars before the end of the Napoleonic period. On the contrary, until after the beginning of the nineteenth century, all the phases of social science which had been differentiated were virtually celebrants or acolites or parasites of a ritual of civic sovereignty to which all other human activities were supposed to be subordinate and tributary. At the same time, in spite of the fact which is among the elementary data of social science today, that social structure is chiefly functional in its origin, theorists as well as practical men have always tended to settle back into the belief that social structures of their own day are somehow predestined to permanency to such a degree that they may not be hailed before any tribunal to answer for their functional efficiency. Thus in the eighteenth century there was a state of mind which largely determined the thinking of the nineteenth, to the effect that economic as well as civic institutions were in principle as they must remain forever. Yet in the eighteenth century the physiocrats in France and the tendency culminating in Adam Smith in Scotland began to analyze the processes of life in a way which made for precisely opposite judgments so far as the state was concerned. That is, the tendency of the new publicistic philosophy was toward

the conclusion that the state and political activities in general not only depend upon economic activities, but that the former are likely to be interlopers and disturbers within the field of the latter. It was not observed at this time that, with the development of post-economic interests, the state ceases to be a tool of economic interests exclusively, and becomes the instrument of evolving purposes.[1] If here and there that aspect of the case had been noted, it did not become influential.

The idea of the autocracy of economic factors in life has taken many shapes. It has been more or less absolute in its claims. In each and all of its variations it has served during the nineteenth century as a counter-thesis, challenging the political interpretation of experience, and proposing alternative versions of what was, is, and is to be, in human affairs.

Between this immemorial illusion of the state as clue to human experience, on the one hand, and the later conceit of economic activity as master-key to human experience on the other, the nineteenth century is memorable for revival in peculiar form of a belief which has never, within recorded times, been wholly without its witnesses; namely, that the ultimate interpretation of human experience is human experience. Among men who have accepted the necessary implications of their finiteness, and are docile enough to confine their efforts after knowledge within the bounds of the knowable, the conviction has spread that the outmost reach of our knowledge of anything is knowledge of the way in which that particular aspect of experience merges into the whole of all men's experience.

What actually occurred in the social sciences in Germany, after the battle of Waterloo permitted resumption of the main course of life, was both practical and theoretical attention to the social situation which Germans confronted after the Napoleonic period. This situation presented itself to Germans of practice and theory alike under two chief aspects, namely, first the economic

[1] Oppenheimer is now attempting to correct the generalization known as the "economic interpretation of history," by finding the place which "political" interests have always had in social control.—*Jahrbuch des oeffentlichen Rechts*, Bd. VI (1912), pp. 128 f.

and second the political. Under each of these aspects specific problems of immediate importance pressed for solution. The thesis which does most to disclose the treasures of instruction to be uncovered in the period then beginning is this: *The theoretical and practical experience forced upon Germans by their situation compelled them to an inspection of social cause and effect which at last resulted in scientific and practical objectivity in a plane at right angles with the plane of historical objectivity.*

This result was slow and through intermediate steps which have not yet been distinctly traced; but certain groups of processes are evident. On the one hand, the economic element in cameralism was so prominent that tradition up to the present time has treated that element as paramount. In fact, as I have pointed out, the political element in cameralism was principal, and the economic factor tributary. During the cameralistic period, however, pragmatic treatment of economic activities was unconsciously paving the way for economic science as we now understand the phrase. In particular, those divisions of cameralistic technique which worked out inventories and population rolls and tax lists were precursors of statistical methods and statistical science. By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, under the preceptorship of Rau, the Germans were actually enrolled in the school of Adam Smith for generalized study of economic phenomena. In the minds of practical men and theorists alike, the immediately stimulating problem was: "How may the Germans become economically prosperous?" The big methodological fact about what followed was this: In the course of the century, German economic thought tried out in turn the classical, the historical, the "Austrian," and the socio-political ways of approaching economic generalizations. Whatever the specific conclusions, the universal result was uniformity of attempt to settle economic problems by valid reference of effects to their causes, by candid recognition that economic situations are reflections of contemporary as well as antecedent conditions. Translated into methodological terms, this means, as I have said, that all the German economists had come to think of economic cause and effect not only under the aspect of

before and after, but also under the aspect of coexisting action and reaction: or in a word *functionally*.

This common factor in German economic method is as general today, in spite of particular appearances to the contrary, as a certain common attitude among several million American voters who divided themselves among the parties in the recent national election. The members of this divided group voted in principle together; only in the application of the principle were they separate. Each subdivision of the group convinced itself that the man of its preference was the only candidate who was really born under the constellation of progress. There is much more unanimity among German economists today on the principle that economic relations must be judged at last by their workings than among the actually advancing element among American voters today as to who and what is progressive.

Meanwhile the second great factor in nineteenth-century German experience made its characteristic contribution to this functional preconception. I have designated it as the political factor. As I am now thinking of this influence it included all the activities of the plain people, of statesmen and their subordinates, and of academic theorists, with the status of public and private law as their center of attention. In some aspects it might better be called the juridical factor. Here the problem of interpretation on the practical side has to do with the whole process of social liberation along the lines foreshadowed in the Stein-Hardenberg reforms, in the struggles for constitutionalism, in the realization of imperial unity in 1871, and in the subsequent elaboration of the imperial code. On the theoretical side it has to do with a wide gamut of actors. They range from the brood of petifogging legalists, the men whose horizon was bounded by precedent and formula applied not even after the spirit but mechanically after the letter, through such intelligent systematizers of the law as Hugo, such historically minded searchers for the sources of the law as Savigny, to the abstract extreme of philosophy of law as represented by Hegel; and the scale then runs to the gradual development of an objective philosophy of law as typified by Jellinek.[1]

[1] *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, Vol. I, 1900.

The force of external events, much more than developments from within, inexorably transformed this juridical element in German social science. Little by little the more far-seeing theorists on the political side were compelled to think of political institutions as machineries devised by men to serve developing human purposes. Expressed from the other side, they were forced to give up the illusion that political institutions are unalterable reflections of absolute principles. The most vital idea associated with this incipient functional conception of civic institutions was again the implication that they must be judged by their works.

I do not assert that German political science today has explicitly adopted abstract formulas of the functional character of life in general, and of civic institutions in particular, which would satisfy the sociologists. My claim is that the current literature of German political science is cast in a mold which in a marked degree presupposes, and to a certain extent expresses, the functional conception. As a typical case, I would refer again to Jellinek's volume just cited, and particularly to chap. iv, "The Relationship between Civic Theory and the Totality of the Sciences."

We must glance now at the third theoretical factor effective in this period. For want of a better name I have called it the sociological factor. I mean by it the phase of social science particularly represented by this society. It has fought its way into academic recognition during the past twenty-five years, in spite of inveterate prejudice that it was unheard of, and not desirable to be heard of, in the scientific world. If the historical training of the present generation of social scientists had been more complete they could not have made the former claim; and if their methodological knowledge had been more broad they would have been ashamed to make the latter. In a word the sociological factor in social science is the effort to visualize all the phases of human experience in their functional relations with one another, and to promote inquiry into all divisions of human experience with adequate attention to the interdependence of their functions. Whether this factor in social science is desirable or not, it is irrepressible unless we set arbitrary bounds to the working of our minds. Instead of being a parvenue of recent date, the sociological approach to the interpretation of

experience was very pronounced in such men as Gerhard in 1713,[1] and Zincke in 1751.[2] At the middle of the nineteenth century a number of German scholars, who were sociologists in everything but name, projected reconsideration of human experience along lines which testified to relatively advanced insight into the functional nature of society.[3] That the sociological factor did not develop rapidly until later is not because it is a superfluity in science, but because it had to overcome the inertia of scientists.

Not all that is obvious, still less all that is discoverable, from the historical and functional centers of attention, was to be brought to light by casual and semiconscious reference. The task demanded someone's specialized labor until a new rendering of experience becomes possible in terms of the new elements verified from the changed points of view. With more or less consciousness of their task, men whose successors adopted the name "sociologist" enlisted to develop a method and a technique appropriate to these new emphases. Whether or not it is proper to speak of their work as a distinct science is a needless question. It is true that their work was as inevitable in the progress of the social sciences as the work of the evidence-collectors and critics who had gone before. It is a work which must necessarily revolutionize previous results in social science, and it is already revolutionizing them as visibly as the objective conception of historicity revolutionized the homiletical type of history which came over from the eighteenth century into the nineteenth. In particular, it is no longer possible for gentlemen who call themselves by some sectarian scientific name to be taken seriously by completely conscious scholars when they assume that the traditions of their scientific sect are authority enough for the selections of objects of attention which they please to make. We now know that the interests of a conventionalized type of workers cannot say the final word about the objects of attention which are worthy of scientific notice. The whole movement of human experience, in so far as that movement has revealed its meaning up to the present time, must be the arbiter of values when we choose to center

[1] Cf. Small, *The Cameralists*, pp. 175 f.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 250 f.

[3] Cf. *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, September, 1912, pp. 201 f.

our attention upon details within the movement. If we are to be veracious, we may not exercise an arbitrary choice about the items which we shall put in evidence when we are trying to reconstruct the processes that have actually occurred in human experience. In the long run the factors that function most meaningly in the objective processes of life must figure in corresponding proportion in scientific interpretation of life. If individuals elect to resign the work of serious interpretation, and to seek their own private amusement through dilettantish trifling with the materials or the technique of knowledge, or if they prefer to cater to the entertainment of the public by fanciful and arbitrary construction of some of those materials into forms detached from the whole reality, they are exercising the same legal rights which permit vaudeville performers to pursue their avocations. If they aim to have a part in the work of interpreting human experience as it actually has been, and is, and is to be, their own tastes may no more dictate their objects of attention than those of a biologist when he is attempting to run down the antecedents of a mysterious disease, or when he is attempting to devise means for promoting eugenics. The decision as to program in either case must be rendered finally not by types of acquired tastes, developed in the investigator by a conventional training, but regardless of the preferences of the individual or of his scientific caste, the problems which he must tackle are questions of the kind and degree of work done in the process in question by the several factors which have co-operated for its results. In short, human experience is growing more and more articulate, and it more distinctly utters its protest against misrepresentation through versions which dismember the whole and then present the dismembered parts as the reality.

The mid-century sociological movement in Germany was not independent of similar movements, those in France and England especially, but it will prove to be peculiarly significant when it is explained in its special relations to the economic and political factors in German experience of which I have spoken. It was a direct consequence of the economic and political discussions of the first half of the century, and of the insight which those discussions had given into the functional character of life. The questions "What is

the state?" "What is society?" were spontaneous testimonies that the traditional theories about government had ceased to be conclusive, and that men were demanding objective examination of human relations, in place of reasonings from conventionalities.

In short, this sociological phase in the development of German social science was a direct resultant of the interworkings of the economic and political factors in German theory and practice. There has been no adequate investigation of the interrelations between these factors. Von Mohl, in 1855, stereotyped a fashion of treating the economic and the political factors in social science as segregated things.[1] German economists, political scientists, and historians have thus far been content to let that tradition stand in the place of thorough examination of the actual interactions between the economic and juridical factors.[2] The almost insuperable difficulties in the way of interpreting the course of German social science from 1815 to 1871 will not be surmounted until intimate co-operation can be arranged between scholars with the necessary legal equipment on the one hand, and men with adequate economic apparatus on the other. All the problems of political reform in Germany during this period involve a maze of legal institutions, imperial, ecclesiastical, territorial, compared with which our American system of federal and state jurisdictions is simplicity itself. At the same time, the economic and cultural interests of the Germans clamored for relief from hampering institutions. The more the legal institutions on the one hand and the economic institutions on the other were taken for granted as divine ordinations by the vested interests and their spokesmen, the more immanent was the sociological alternative. The sociological factor in social science is merely objectivity become conscious and comprehensive.

Foremost among the traits of social science as we think of it today is accordingly its federal unity. It is already archaic to

[1] *Geschichte und Literatur der Staatswissenschaften.*

[2] The tradition is represented by the arbitrary and misleading division of territory between Roscher and Bluntschli in the two books, *National Oekonomik in Deutschland*, and *Geschichte des allgemeinen Staatsrechts und der Politik*. Cf. Small, *The Cameralists*, pp. xii f.

think of social science as represented in fact by the terms which are convenient indexes to its different divisions of labor. Social science is the whole extant body of approximate knowledge and the whole technical equipment for criticizing, increasing, and using knowledge of human experience. The most fundamental of the achievements of nineteenth-century scholarship is this perception, not yet very generally recognized of course, that valid social science cannot be many but it must be one. Obvious as the conclusion is to those who have reached it, other scholars see no meaning in it, and some still jealously deny it. We cannot justly evaluate even the specialization which signalized the last half of the nineteenth century until we survey and appraise it as correlated specialization. The chief synthetic achievement of social science may be formulated in the principle: *The last attainable interpretation of human experience is not to be found in abstractions from experience, but in composition of abstractions into a reflection of the totality of experience.*

In other words, we have behind us a century miscellaneous with attempts all over the world to find reality piecemeal. They have proved as futile as attempts would be to finance modern states by independent expeditions to find hidden treasure. In knowledge as in finance we have found it necessary to organize resources. We have learned that attempts to reach the last word in explanation of human relations in terms of abstracted fragments of human activity are foregone failures. The only interpretation that bears criticism, and that commends itself in the long run as a credible reflex of experience in its full meaning, is an interpretation in which every conceivable method of inquiry into parts or aspects of experience has been brought under requisition, and the results of all these segments or methods of investigation are assembled and co-ordinated so as to form a coherent report. Nineteenth-century scholarship gravitated toward this conclusion in spite of desperate resistance of specialists against the irresistible.

III. *German social science in the nineteenth century has become moral.*

By this I mean that German social science has deliberately and expressly repudiated that pseudo-science which virtually ended in impersonal treatment of institutions, or in a philosophy

of wealth as an end in itself, and it has passed into a philosophy of human obligation within a career which is assumed to be a task of promoting human well-being in all its dimensions. Here, in contrast with the case in England, the economists took the lead. The influences that were behind the change run back through all the public problems to which this paper has referred; but the adoption of a creed and a program was almost as dramatically abrupt as Saul's conversion on the road to Damascus. I am inclined to regard Adolph Wagner as the John the Baptist of this new dispensation. His address to the church congress in Berlin, October 12, 1871, was his wilderness call to repentance.[1] Within the inner court of the citadel of Prussian traditionalism, and in the assembly of its high priests, he sounded the signal for the new era. The keynote of his message was in the declaration: "The science of national economy is in the midst of a great crisis."[2] "Therefore, ethical principles must again come into force. In economic relationships between persons, the relation of man to man must come to its own."[3]

Wagner states the ultimate aim of "national reform" as follows:[4]

> Such elevation of the lower classes has in view immediately the improvement of their material or industrial situation. This properly counts as a prerequisite, as an intellectual and moral influence. Whoever wants these must want the conditions of them. Improvement of the material conditions means richer satisfaction of the industrial needs that are making themselves felt . . . . or in other words, command of a greater quantity, and, if possible, a better quality, of economic goods.

At a meeting which resulted in the organization of the Verein für Sozialpolitik the following year, Schmoller, as presiding officer, voiced the spirit of the movement in this way:

> The prevalent view in the present congress is the historical view that the state is a part of the stream of becoming. For that reason its functions will vary from narrow to broad according to the circumstances of civilization. The state must always rank, however, as the most tremendous institution for the education of the human race. It is desirable, therefore, that the state shall be strong enough to predominate over the different interests within its field. It must exercise just protection over the weak, and should elevate the lower classes.

[1] *Rede über die sociale Frage.*

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 3. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 8. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

Other propositions in Schmoller's address have since become familiar to all who have studied his writings of this period. For example:

> We do not propose a program of leveling downward in the socialistic sense but there should be social gradations up which every man is at liberty to climb. We should not preserve the present social ladder, from which the middle rungs have been knocked out. . . . . The ideal which should guide the individual, the state, and society, is the inclusion of a progressively enlarging ratio of the people in participation in all the higher goods of civilization. To realize this ideal, which is democratic in the best sense of the term, must be our present endeavor, as it seems to be the goal of human history in general.[1]

These last sentences were taken up by Treitschke, the self-appointed spokesman of conventionalism. With correct instinct he treated them as the symbol of the new movement, but he failed in his attempt to discredit the movement as a betrayal of the higher cultural interests of Germany to "materialism" and "socialism." The Verein has included among its members practically all the German economists of eminence in the last generation. More than any other private organization it has represented the social creed of German scholars, and the social policy of the German state.

Twenty years later (September 23, 1901) Professor Brentano, as chairman of the session, spoke as follows of the founding of the Verein:[2]

> The men whose meeting at Halle in the early summer of 1872 led to the formation of the Verein were all of the academic type. This fact was necessarily decisive both for their judgment about the contemporary economic tendencies in politics and life and for their aims, as well as for the ways and means by which they sought to reach the aims.
>
> Up to that time only two ways of considering the world of material goods had come into application. These were the standpoints, first of technique, and second of thrift [*Wirtschaftlichkeit*]. The aim of the first is to realize a thought as completely as possible in matter [*Stoff*]. The supreme aim of the second is to gain the largest possible surplus over the expended costs. The human being engaged in economic life was not wholly ignored, to be sure, but he was considered only incidentally. At the same time, the prevailing opinion saw

[1] *Verhandlungen der Eisenacher Versammlung*, Leipzig, 1877. Cf. *Aufruf zur Gründung eines Vereins für Sozialpolitik; Schriften*, II, Anlage II.

[2] *Schriften*, XCVIII, 2 f. Because the statement is such a significant historical document, it seems worth while to present a substantially complete translation.

in the state not an independent personality, with a life of its own, but merely a sum of individuals; and according to the conception of the majority the purpose of the state was accomplished when it established the conditions under which the individuals were in a position to realize the largest possible profit.

This conception was widely prevalent in theory, and it led theorists to a complete change of economic doctrine from the clue of the endeavor of the individual to secure the largest possible profits. This theory controlled the press and parliaments. That proposition in the celebrated petition of the Manchester Board of Trade, which completely identified the interests of the whole community with the interests of the great managers of business in getting the largest possible profits, that proposition which gave the meaning to the campaign slogan "Manchesterism," characterized also the decisive viewpoint in the public opinion of Germany.

We should have been bad professors if we had not protested against this conception. The whole spiritual tradition of Germany was in contradiction with it. It would have amounted to the abdication of the universities if we had kept silent. A theory which took as its point of departure the acquisitive egoism of mankind could not but lead to doctrines which only partially coincided with reality. A policy which aimed at the largest possible profits, and not at the welfare of the human beings engaged in human activities, disregarded the fact that wealth is not an end in itself, but that it merely has the function of providing the preconditions for the attainment of the moral purposes of mankind. In view of these moral ends, our vocation was, in the field of theory, direct observation of all the phenomena of life, and of all the forces engaged in it; in politics, assertion that the paramount aim is not the greatest profits of operation, but the highest possible physical and moral well-being of men. For that very reason, because we made the situation of men carrying on the economic processes, not the gaining of the greatest amount of profits, the focus of our reflections and efforts, we called our organization the "Union for *social* politics."[1] Not as though we were disposed to neglect increase of national wealth; on the contrary we took this for granted. The material well-being of Germany was quite as fundamental in our view as it was in that of the Manchesterites. It was in our opinion the necessary presupposition of the bodily and moral well-being of the German people, and especially of the power of the German Empire and of its component states. Nevertheless, in our perspective this factor fell into the secondary rank in the sense that we regarded as the paramount purpose the well-being of men, and the power of our Fatherland. In case of conflict between this supreme end and the accumulation of wealth, the latter must give way to the former. It was, however, a matter of course that such a view must assign to the state a different rôle in economic life from that which belonged to it under the then prevailing conception. We did not necessarily, as a matter of principle, demand the intervention of

[1] Verein für Sozialpolitik.

the state in economic matters wherever it had previously been excluded. Our very ethical viewpoint made state intervention seem as undesirable in many cases as it appeared to those whom we were at that time opposing. Yet not only our conception of the state as an independent personality above and beside the individuals that belong to it, but not less our subordination of the economic viewpoint to the ethical and the political, made us champions of state intervention where, without it, purely economic interests would have triumphed over more important ethical and political interests.

I see among you gentlemen many youthful faces, and it is doubtless not easy for those among you who were not in the struggles of that time to realize what a difficult position we had in confronting the opposing views which then controlled public opinion. At first, as is usually the case, we were despised and we were often fought by means that were anything but scientific. Yet presently the effects of our attitude began to appear. At first they impressed themselves more in a negative than a positive way. Conscious that a hostile critic was on the watch in its rear, the ruling opinion no longer betrayed its former arrogance. It was not a long time before the number of our associates began to grow. At last the whole society gave evidence of being controlled by our views. Even the familiar by-phenomena of all triumphant tendencies began to appear. Our views were reflected in a multitude of more or less dubious and distorted mirrors. Even those against whose undertow we had set ourselves tried in many ways to appropriate our views, and in the caricature of them with which they often fight us today our starting-point and our aims are often misrepresented beyond recognition.

This is particularly the case where those who formerly, for the sake of their special interests, disfavored every sort of state intervention, today demand state intervention for their special interest, and try to brand as a Manchesterist everyone who, in the interest of the whole, opposes this favoritism. As though the essence of Manchesterism consisted in ruling out state intervention, and not in the spirit in which state intervention was either opposed or demanded! The same Manchester Board of Trade whose petition for the elevation of its particular interests above the interests of the totality had in its time evoked the term "Manchesterism" acted later in quite as Manchesterian fashion when, in the interest of the exportation of its cotton products, it demanded that the state should introduce bimetalism; and you may be sure that, if it ever became expedient for its particular interests, it would appear pleading for re-introduction of protective tariffs. This would not, however, be a contradiction of its old Manchesterian temper, but simply a new exercise of the same. One does not prove that he is not a Manchesterist by demanding protecting tariffs, nor does he who rejects them give proof thereby of his Manchesterism. It is the *temper* which determines the moral value of the transaction, not the negative or positive measures in which, according to circumstances, the temper is expressed. He who demands state

intervention in his own interests, may for that reason be quite as Manchesteristic as the Manchester Board of Trade when it made its original protest against state intervention; and he who opposes state intervention may thereby demonstrate that he is *not* a Manchesterist.

But it was not in its adulterations alone that our conception suffered the fate of all triumphing tendencies. So long as the problem is to dislodge a common opponent from his controlling position, it is in the nature of the case that tendencies which have nothing else in common but antagonism to the prevailing tendency will march in step with one another. In the midst of the common struggle, that which differentiates these co-operating tendencies often does not rise into consciousness, or does so at most in a highly inarticulate expression. When once the victory is gained, that which divides the co-operating forces naturally makes itself more and more felt.

I have already said that social polity fixes its attention primarily upon the condition of the laboring human beings, and considers the largest possible accession of wealth only in so far as it is the precondition of the bodily and moral well-being of men. This permits two sorts of socio-political tendencies.

The one starts from the classes which at the time set the standards, and finds its vocation principally in assuring and increasing the well-being of those classes, because those classes see in the welfare of their own kind a vitalizing of the welfare of the whole. Consequently, this tendency shows itself in promotion of technical and economic progress only when the leading position of these classes would not thereby be threatened. The tendency tries to prevent all other progress, or at least to arrest it and to neutralize its effects.

The other tendency does not consider the prosperity of the whole as linked with the permanent preponderance of the temporarily ruling classes. It sees in the whole something vital which renews its youth incessantly, through the emergence of new classes and forces. In its view this whole has prospect of permanent prosperity only in so far as such constant outgrowth of new forces and assimilation of the same with the Fatherland occurs. It consequently welcomes all real technical and economic advances, and seeks to realize the greatest possible well-being of men and the prosperity of the whole, within the condition created by these advances. Not as though the tendency were unsympathetic toward the hardships which social and industrial changes bring to the previously ruling classes. The tendency attempts, however, to mitigate these ills, and to remove them, not by seeking artificially to maintain untenable conditions, but by trying to facilitate the transition into new and wholesome conditions; and it welcomes the elements newly coming to the front as the bearers of the future weal of the nation.

Both tendencies are represented within our organization, for the Verein für Sozialpolitik is not a political organization in the sense that it would exclude or suppress all those who have not taken oath to support a particular program. All shades among those who discern the task of social politics in promotion of

the well-being of men, and in assuring the greatest possible prosperity of the whole, are represented in our membership. Our union is a scientific organization, and its objective is not the triumph of some one partisan opinion, but the truth. The speaking proof of this is furnished by our publications and our proceedings. Up to date our Verein has published ninety-seven volumes, and in order to afford a firm basis of discussion of the questions to which it gave its attention, it has always tried in an unpartisan spirit to draw into co-operation the most competent representatives of every socio-political tendency. Upon the questions which we shall discuss in this session we have already published four volumes on the housing question, and four on commercial policy. Merely a glance at the table of contents will show that we have tried to get a fair representation of all views on the subjects. In like manner, it has always been our policy to secure similar diversity of representation in our oral discussions. The contrasts of views which will doubtless appear in the present proceedings should show that in this respect at least we have been successful.

Yet great as the contrasts are that prevail among us, one thing is common to us all. However we may differ in opinion about the policy that should be adopted, that is, about that which the interest of the whole indicates, each of us has as his standard the interest of the Fatherland. May our proceedings of this year be a blessing to the German Empire, and to all its inhabitants!

German social science is frankly and positively searching into the past, present, and future of men as moral beings; and it is unashamed.

IV. *German social science has always been socially instrumental.* Probably no one, from Herodotus to the war correspondents in the Balkans, has ever blocked out a piece of work on any level of social reporting, without some fragment of consciousness that there would be an element of social service in the enterprise. On the other hand, the motives of "knowledge for its own sake," at one extreme, and dilettantish desire to amuse or to be amused at the other, represent a gamut of essentially individualistic tempers in which reflection upon human affairs has often been pursued. These tempers are in contrast with the spirit of agency which gives tone to German social science. Largely perhaps because of the peculiar relation of most academic Germans to the state, the traditions and ideals of German scholarship have always been in a notable degree traditions and ideals of public service.

I tried to make it clear in the beginning that I find German experience worth studying not because of what I discover in it

that is peculiar to the Germans. If that were all, these German provincialisms would be worth studying merely as cases in social pathology. On the contrary I find historical study of German social science profitable because German experience so vividly exhibits some of the tendencies and results which are most vital in the social science of the world.

In connection with the last trait of German social science which I named, I venture to indulge in an old-fashioned hortatory conclusion.

When I think of the enormous aggregate of public service performed by American social scientists, in excess of the requirements of their positions, I am inclined to believe that, in spite of the absence of the same *esprit de corps* which stimulates German scholars, we compare favorably with them in our average tale of voluntary work.

On the other hand, I am impressed by the extent of our detachment from the biggest tasks which confront our nation. American social scientists are not making social science count as it might in shaping thought and action upon the most central problems of our life. When we look beneath superficial details in our latest presidential campaign, it is evident that two main questions are pressing for answers. The one is primarily political. The other is primarily economic. The former amounts to this: Shall we move in the direction toward more or less government of, for, and by the people? The other question may be reduced to its lowest terms in this form: To what extent is our industrial system rational? It is depressing to observe the degree in which exponents of the positive and the negative attitude alike support their position on both these questions upon grounds which belong essentially to the eighteenth century. The searchlight of social science, from the high outlook which our generation has gained, would dispel much of the haze which surrounds these problems, especially when they are treated with the thought-apparatus of a hundred years ago. Neither the conventional nor the revolutionary doctrines of the eighteenth century express the indications of the human lot which are visible from the present outlook of social science. No such monstrosity ever existed or can exist as the individual of eighteenth-

century theory. Governments have been oppressive, but government is as normal a function of human life as breathing. Government is rudimentary in the degree in which it is control of some by others, and it is evolved in the degree in which it is control of each by the justly correlated interests of all. Correlation of social interests is just in the degree in which each interest is as free as every other to exert its full functional value in settling the terms of control by the whole. Extension of the area of participation in social control is not anarchy, but advance in human realization. Representative government must at last represent not some of the interests but all the interests of the governed. If these rudiments of social science can have sufficient publicity, the only permanent cleavage that will remain on the political question is between self-seeking and unfaith in human destiny on the one hand, and normal human beings on the other.

But the economic question is not so simple. It is not a problem of ways and means. It calls in question the entire economic basis of modern society.

There is a crucial passage in *The Wealth of Nations* which apparently reduces to this sophism: *Land*, labor, and *capital* are the factors of production; the factors of production are the rightful parties in distribution; therefore: *landlord*, laborer, and *capitalist* are the rightful parties in distribution.[1] Opinions may always differ as to whether Adam Smith was actually guilty of this stultifying *non-sequitur*. At all events, the economic system of the civilized world rests upon presumptions fairly expressed by the false syllogism which Adam Smith's language seems to imply. The three terms in the major premise are economic; two of the three terms in the conclusion are not necessarily economic at all. They may be and in practice they often are legal and legal only. The title of many landlords and of many capitalists to an income rests, not upon their functioning as economic factors, but solely on their privileged status under our laws of property. In such cases the law turns out to have introduced a dual system of justice. Justice to the laborer consists in assigning him a share in the product

[1] Cf. Bax ed., I, chap. xi, pp. 262–63. I have discussed the passage: "Adam Smith and Modern Sociology," pp. 149 f.

of industry, provided he works. Justice to the absentee landlord or capitalist consists in assuring him a share in the produce of industry whether he works or not! With this dubious ethical sanction as our social premise, we adhere to derived economic judgments which impeach our intelligence if not our morals. For instance: in the *Boston Sunday Herald* of August 25, 1912, more than a page is occupied by an alleged interview with Mr. George W. Perkins, who expounds what he understands by "Progressivism." It is a strange medley of benevolent sentiments, timely opinions about industrial and political details, and archaic implications about social principles. Mr. Perkins is represented as saying:

> Take the Steel Corporation, for instance. Mr. Carnegie, as the head of the steel industry in his day, made millions a year for himself. Judge Gary, a leading man of the steel industry in his day, carries a far greater responsibility than Mr. Carnegie ever did, and does it for a profit to himself that probably amounts to only a fraction of what Mr. Carnegie realized. The difference is going to an ever-widening circle of stockholders.

Without holding Mr. Perkins responsible for the reporting, the paragraph and the context as they stand call upon the reader to believe that we should be well along on our way toward the millennium, after we had so reformed our industries that the active factors would receive proportionally less of the product, while the passive factors would receive proportionally more, provided only that these absentee elements were sufficiently dispersed. By parity of reasoning, the way to cure cancer would be to make it general!

Academic social scientists in the United States appear to have only a lanquid interest in probing the industrial situation below the level of distribution.[1] Our consciences and our intellects were anesthetized for a couple of decades by Herbert Spencer's assurance that the change from status to contract had achieved a permanent basis for human relations. Meanwhile we have seen that under present legal conditions the régime of contract not only establishes another régime of status, but it is status more repugnant to modern ideas of social function than earlier types of status were to the moral standards then accepted. Most of the recent demands

[1] Even Sombart, in Germany, hardly more than hints at inferences which might be drawn from the history of capitalism, about principles of reconstruction. Cf. *Der moderne Kapitalismus.*

by various types of agitators for economic reform have accordingly spent their strength in challenging the justice of our distributive system and in proposing substitutes. Beneath these relatively superficial matters, however, is the antecedent question which has scarcely been formulated, namely: Whether capitalism, as we now know it, is compatible with *social solvency*. With the actual labor capacity of human beings limited, and with cumulative charges upon the product of labor to satisfy the legal claims of capital, all the western nations have arrived at a "high cost of living" which should act as a block signal. This incidental "high cost of living" should turn attention to the problem: How fast and how far can our practice of accelerated capitalization go, before it will overtake the capacity of productive operations to carry the increasing burden? In other words, does our capitalism, after a ce[illegible] involve something analogous with the Malthusian form[illegible] lation, namely: increase of productivity with the c[illegible] increase of capital charges with the coefficient $x+y$?

The question challenges not economists alone. Our present knowledge that the *latifundia* system undermined the strength of Rome came through the combined work of our whole apparatus of social science. The most vital task of our period is confirmation or removal of the suspicion that the capitalism of our era is a social fallacy as patent and as fatal as the Roman *latifundia*. The task will not be finished without the co-operation of all our social sciences from the historical, functional, moral, and instrumental standpoints. The indicated function of social science is to be the chief organ of social self-examination. The changed outlook of the social sciences since the eighteenth century discredits the social science which is content to let eighteenth-century social interpretations stand unimpeached by twentieth-century conditions. We are in danger of mistaking capitalism mitigated by patriarchalism for capitalism corrected in principle. In no period of history has it been possible for social scientists to perform more fundamentally constructive public service than present conditions throughout the world demand. To seize the opportunity, we must learn how to relegate both surface phenomena and esoteric subtleties to their proportional place, and we must concentrate our forces upon radical problems.

SOCIAL PHASES OF PSYCHOLOGY

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Psychology and sociology have, I think, far more in common than either yet realizes. If, instead of being from the very first social and gregarious, man had been a solitary animal, his psychology would have been a very meager thing. Even individual psychology in the sense of Stern and the Würtzburg introspectionists studies personalities as society has shaped them. Again, you are interested, as we are, in philosophical systems like those of Plato, Fichte, and Kant, that were so largely shaped by social and political conditions, which it was their chief end to improve if not to reconstruct. You have a more or less speculative, logical section, as we have, which refines, defines, tabulates, makes schedules, claims everything possible for its own science, and another that gets down as close as possible to hard facts and actual concrete conditions. Both our sciences have passed through a stage of criticism, not to say suspicion, and have only rather lately reached general academic recognition and developed methods and results that are generally recognized as scientific. In the half-hour allotted to me I can do little more than enumerate a few psychological domains in which you also have an interest. The first of these is animal societies, beginning with higher insects which are evolved from the very first denizens of dry land and which are aeons older than man and so have had vastly more time to perfect and consolidate the organization of their institutions. Here we find castes—soldiers, workers, idlers, rulers, slaves—wars, migrations, elaborate and specialized industries, provisions of food, nuptial flights, care of larvae and young, periodic massacres of the useless classes, property, and, in some degree, specialization and marvelous cooperation and sense and feeling of kind. Some ants seem to clear ground, plant, and harvest. Architectural sense is highly developed. They know and fear their enemies and develop many

strategies to escape or overcome them. Some seem to have almost a moral code that it is death to violate. Each of the forty-five hundred species of wild bees, e.g., seem to have as many types of constitution as they have morphologic differences. In some cases, like the wasp and bumblebee, we can study the phyletic, developmental stages by which the state arose and know something of the way in which the rights and duties of citizenship evolved. Now if on the basis of the many scores of tediously painstaking empirical studies we could have for each species a free and frankly humanistic résumé of what is definitely known, such as, for instance, Maeterlinck has given us of the bee, we should find here a source of wisdom and insight into human social and even political conditions which is only just beginning to appear. In no society is the individual so completely incorporated in the larger group to which he belongs and which his every act from birth to death seems designed to serve. For one, I believe this field might be far more utilized than it has yet been by a sociologist who would put himself abreast of the latest studies here, some of which show not only the fixity of very complex relations but also amazing plasticity in adjusting to new conditions. Here, too, I should like if there were time to say a word in favor of clever biological analogies between far more rudimentary organisms, down to the parasitism, commensalism, and mutualism about which Espinas long ago made illuminating generalizations, and even between individuals in the community and cells, tissues and organs in the human body, which Lilienfeld and others since have stressed. In the social organizations of creatures too, articulates and certain species of fishes, birds, and mammals, we find countless suggestive and illuminating devices of mutual help, which show at least how much wiser as well as older and more varied animal instinct is in some respects than reason itself.

A second interest of genetic psychology which seems to me very illuminating for sociology is the organization of children, especially those which are spontaneous. Every large city has scores of gangs which reproduce most essential features of the savage tribe, in a composite portrait of which, indeed, almost no feature of the latter would be omitted. In a few striking cases boys left to them-

selves have, whether by the blind instinct of recapitulation or by more or less consciously parodied imitation of adult institutions in their plays and games or probably both, developed elaborate social organizations that show many of the traits of primitive society, which not only have great phyletic interest but have stimulated adults' intervention and attempted control or betterment, that has resulted in the scores of more or less controlled juvenile organizations, some of which, like the George Junior Republic and the school city, have embodied the most essential elementary features of the social life of grown-ups. Some believe that by a judicious use of this gregarious instinct it may be found strong enough almost to reconstruct our educational system on a new basis, fantastic and sentimental as some of these adult revisions now seem. In this connection I think should be mentioned, too, the remarkable new interest in childhood, which in many respects in this country had grown colder, more formal and oblivious than in any land or period in the world, but which has lately resulted in the formation of some hundred and eleven (as we classify them) organizations for child welfare and benefit, and in a renaissance of interest in work for children so great that some enthusiasts have even wanted to call this the century of the child. What does this recent awakening to the nature and needs of children, that is now pervading all civilized countries and has resulted in the institution of many academic chairs, laboratories, clinics, journals, and a vast and rapidly growing body of literature, really mean? It certainly marks an extension of our social consciousness, an enlargement of our interests, and a new awakening to our duties to the young.

Third, the anthropological section of psychology has a new interest in savage society. The more we know and understand it, the more we find good in it. Among a number of large tribes in the English dependencies in Africa, British criminal law has been deliberately set aside for a codification of tribal customs, as the latter have been found to be far more adequate and effective. In another African province a school system has been established which insists that for the first four years nothing but native languages and indigenous folklore and custom shall be cultivated, although half a dozen different native languages with small vocabu-

laries have to be given dictionaries and grammar, and learned by teachers, in order to accomplish this end, the idea being to make good Kaffirs instead of pinchbeck imitations of Englishmen. Only in the higher grades of the school and for the brighter students are English language, customs, rudiments of science, and civilization taught. With every race that becomes extinct like the Tasmanians and Boethuks, we are learning that something valuable or at least suggestive in the way of social organization passes out of the world and leaves no trace, perhaps not even an Ossian to record its ideals. It is now almost a commonplace that an administrator of affairs in savage lands should first of all make a careful and sympathetic study, of the kind that Cushing and Miss Fletcher made of the Indian tribes they know so well, of the way in which long and unwritten experience has caused the world to seem to those in their charge and how other ethnic stocks have solved the problems of life and social order rather than to assume that we are the *beati possidentes* and that our ways are always best. Thus they should always strive as far as possible to conserve and fulfil, destroying as little as possible, recognizing that progress is a matter not of years but of centuries, and that it is not impossible that ethnic stocks now obscure may at some time inherit the accumulated resources of the civilization we now represent and wield the resources of the world for good or evil, somewhat according as we now shape their plastic stages, as, indeed, has happened in the world before, as we realize when we think of the Germans in the days of Tacitus, or the Angles and Saxons in the days of the Roman dominion in England.

Fourth, imitation, a decade or more ago when it was most studied, seemed to some psychologists to account for about every psychic process. Beginning with memory and custom, it was by some given such an extent that there seemed hardly any room left in the world for originality or creativeness. We were all constantly setting or following copy. Our thoughts and inflections, as well as our manners and customs, were all borrowed. Conduct, too, if not merely conventional, was essentially initiative, while feelings, sentiments, imagination were most of all contagious. Imitation was conscious and unconscious, automatic and volitional. Even

in science we were imitating Nature or thinking God's thoughts after him. We had studies of school children which showed how scores of fads, like spit-curls, manners of wearing bows and ribbons, bookmarks, and expressions, spread like wild-fire through school communities, how every peculiarity of the teacher, even her lisp or her limp, was unconsciously imitated by pupils who admired her. This kind of psychic contagion was studied with illustrations galore which seemed to show that even children thought, acted, and felt in common to a far larger degree than had been realized, and that individual differences were small by comparison. So panics, crazes, great popular delusions and certain mental distempers are communicated by contagion and the larger the crowd the simpler and more elemental the emotions that they share with each other. One prominent philosopher wrote a very clever treatise explaining how all inventions were really imitations, until this theme itself became almost a fad which is now relegated to a comparatively modest place among psychological topics. Men are certainly prone to follow leaders and it is very hard to stand out from the mass, which is not infrequently prone to persecute those who go too far in declaring their independence. So deep is the instinct for feeling, thinking, and acting with others that it is sometimes simulated, even perhaps against better insight, although the opposite trend in human nature tends to assert itself by forms of originality that lack substance and are little more than poses or whimsies. The saving fact remains that there are those who are unhappy if there are those who agree, act, or feel with them, and who *wish* to be unique, although this instinct may never bear fruit. An old custom is often an iron one, and while an adequate knowledge of history does make havoc with our originalities, it also teaches the impressiveness of numbers and majorities, while individualities that cannot in Max Stirne's sense maximize themselves alone can always find some degree of satisfaction in joining schools, sects, or parties, so that all who portray their sentiments or beliefs still can have the consciousness of kind that goes by finding others who keep step with them. In its largest sense society would have little organic wholeness but would be a mere congeries of units but for imitation, and most of us may count ourselves fortunate

if after a large comparative acquaintance with many kinds of models we select those we wish to follow wisely and well, viz., those that fit and express our own personal *proprium*. Perhaps the great leaders in literature do their best when they are copying the folk-soul which is larger and loftier than they, and perhaps the great reformers are always imitating outwardly the more inward conceptions that they and those in their environment more deeply and inwardly feel. Perhaps science may be characterized as an attempt to make a perfect replica of Nature, and the best society may be an expression of the more intimate fellow-feeling of the people who constitute it. Perhaps in Deity man has only set himself an ideal to be copied, and in morals, standards to live up to. All these have been urged but this view seems to make little room for the *Zeitgeist*, spirit of progress or nisus or push-upward, which seems at every moment to be creating at least new variations of old themes which often grow later into specific originalities. Psychology finds an initial tendency indeed to imitate about anything or everything, as indeed is necessary to understand or even know it, as we see in extreme cases of imperative mimicry and even echolalia. But this tendency is prone to be checked, in some earlier and in some later, by an opposing inhibition which arrests and then enlightens, diverts, perhaps sublimates, and in morbid cases may take on the more pronounced aspects of negativism. Thus we have abundant motive power of revolt against almost every consensus concerning almost every human institution.

Fifth, crime is one ostensive instance of this. In its nature it is in a sense not only anti-social but solitary. Those who commit crime against person, property, or even good name thereby declare themselves enemies of the social order which they defy and step outside of, and hence must be restrained or perhaps eliminated in the interests of the community. What constitutes crime is for the law, instructed by sociology, to determine. The psychologist, on the other hand, is more interested in the heredity and the psychic diathesis of the criminal mind and how it is affected by confinement and other forms of punishment. He is not only on the way to find a pure thief, a pure murderer, a pure slanderer type, but is interested in personal psychoses and in all abnormal moral traits, as well as

in all kinds of aberrant traits which are really atypical. Modern criminology can hardly longer be said to hold with Lombroso that criminals are a unique species of man with their own particular physical traits and dimensions, to be determined by anthropological tests and measurements, but the later studies here are suggesting that some of the very greatest crimes have been committed by men in no way peculiar save in their temptation, opportunity, or provocation, with which perhaps any of us might have done as they did. Indeed a great German jurist has declared that every man has in him the possibilities of being a murderer, thief, or anything else, and may thank his stars if he is not, because he has not had sufficient provocation to overcome his various resistances. Psychoanalysis, which has already shown us something of the psychic processes that lead to crime, and which may at some time come to play a great rôle in its detection, has shown that criminals are far less abnormal and unique than was supposed but at worst have only different percentages of the same human ingredients found in the nature of all of us. The criminal insane, too, and even the raving maniac, the victim of delusions, and all the rest are found, when we know them thoroughly, to conform exactly to the laws of psychic action and to act as we should all act if our senses habitually went wrong or our motivations were differently compounded and constellated. In these days of psychic tests some are already dreaming of the time when they will take the place not only of every kind of examination in schools or for vocational guidance but will serve a preventive purpose by detection or morbid processes in a stage so early in their development that they can be rectified.

Sixth, and last, it seems hardly too much to say that justice is the cardinal virtue of social man. It has been called the very muse of legislation. Law has been called the technique of justice, the legislator its physician, called in to cure or prevent its distempers, the judge its high priest, the courts its temples, the prisons its hospitals, the reformatories its orthopedic institutions, the lawyer its clinician. Psychology differs as to whether justice had better be called an instinct, sentiment, or intuition, but it is as universal as the sense of fair play. At the bottom, analysis seems to trace it to the world-wide conviction in the bottom of every human soul that happiness should go with goodness, that

pleasure and duty ought to be one and inseparable, now and forever, and that on the other hand, there is the same association between sin and suffering. What drives society into a frenzy is to realize that this equation is upset, that the bad are happy and prosperous and the good miserable. Righteousness must be profitable and unrighteousness unprofitable. Virtue for its own pure sake, apart from all relations to Hedonism, is a ghastly thing in our pragmatic day, and the masterpieces of pathos, like the crucifixion, are those which attach the greatest pain to the highest goodness. With the ancient Hebrews and the Homeric world, in the Indian doctrine of Karma, we always find that in an ideal state of things no evil can befall a good man, living or dead, and heavens and hells are to balance accounts between good and evil that are left over in this life. One great cause of historic and social unrest, if not the chief, whether in industry, society, politics, or education, is a deep ingrowing sense of injustice, half-unconscious though it may be. If the innocent suffer and the guilty are happy and successful, man revolts at the cosmic order that permits such things on whatever authority, whether God, Nature, or society. Men do desperate deeds when hard up against misfits and vice and pain. They have physical symptoms that have been listed and such incentives are the psychic stuff out of which most of the reforms have been made that have swept away social abuses. Man is never so terrible as when roused to the sense that injustice has been done that must be righted though the heavens fall. To doubt the union of virtue and happiness means despair and pessimism and has meant so from Job to Huxley. Indeed, some psychologists are now teaching that it was the utter impossibility of believing that the cosmos was so made as a whole as to permit any permanent misfits between merit and demerit, and rewards and punishments, that first compelled the soul of man to conceive of a future state of rewards and punishments. Indeed it is the very point of Kant's philosophy that if justice had held perfect sway in this life man would never have wanted or conceived of another, because there would have been no discrepancies to rectify. The world and the inmost life of man demands, like the gallery gods in the theater, that the hero get his reward and the villain his. If this always occurred in fact as in the art world, what need of heaven and

hell? When this belief wanes, however, and man comes to believe that this life is all, then oppressors have to beware. If this comforting hope falls suddenly, the political and social danger is grave.

Again, both Cicero and Aristotle thought the orator and the lawyer should feel personal responsibility that no good deed should be unrecognized, and that both should cultivate the art of praising aright, and even courts of virtue have been suggested, where those who have done the community great service should be tried and given individual rewards, in the form of places in halls of fame or emoluments, that we should detect and reward virtue as certainly as we do vice. Thus indignation, when it becomes a great contagion and sweeps away thrones and privileges, is the minister of justice, for injustice is the chief inciter of anger in the world. Friedrich, the German jurist, declares that no man is so good that he might not kill if his sense of justice were sufficiently outraged, that he would become a minister of vengeance like the Greek furies or run amuck.

Finally comes the question whether we ever have any right to forgive as we often wish to, for we are now often told that to pardon is a violation of our social duty and that we should see that even our friends suffer for their misdeeds. Forgiveness is of course the easy way, especially for them, and it is very hard to inflict a fateful wound to a friend; love shields from punishment. Christianity has sometimes interpreted the Diety as longing to forgive and developing a tenderness and sentimentality in regard to crime and criminals which is a product partly of a misunderstood religion and partly of unstable nerves. The best psychotherapy for this moral distemper of the sense of justice is, instead of mitigating the deserts of those who should suffer for their own good and for that of society, to look about and find unrewarded and unrecognized merit, of which there is plenty all about us, and to see that it is brought to light and given its modicum of appreciation. Will and can the pleasure of the world ever be so distributed as to be rightly proportioned to the deserts of individuals? Until this can be done, justice will never have a complete triumph in the world and perhaps this is never to be expected. But of all the various elements of human nature, on which sociology is founded, is there any that is more all-determining than that of justice?

INFLUENCE OF THE GROWING PERCEPTION OF HUMAN INTERRELATIONSHIP ON EDUCATION

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The term education indicates both a science and an art. As a science, education is dependent upon the established generalizations of other sciences: psychology, physiology, ethics, politics, sociology; and the theory of education possesses scientific validity only in so far as these generalizations are valid. As an art, education is an application of such scientific generalizations, or of related ideas which have been tested empirically only and in a measure. As with logical method or with philosophies of conduct, the art of education was practiced long before any science of it was consciously formulated and long before the contributing sciences had formulated their conclusions. As an art, education has been determined largely by the opinion of the people as a whole, opinions often but vaguely formulated—never very scientifically determined. But it is theory or method in this sense that is the subject of this paper—theory as the working conception of a social art held by the people as a whole.

During the last two or three generations, education as a social art has become an entirely new process; it has become a tool or method of society of a very different character from the education of preceding centuries. This change in the character of education is due to the change in the way of thinking about society and social affairs—social processes, social progress, social aims. It cannot be said that this change is due to sociological thought, if by that is meant scientifically organized and tested ideas about society; it has been due to a growing perception of human relationships. This then is the subject under consideration—the influence of the perception of human interrelationships on the social method of

education. It is the dominating influence of the changing social thought upon education as a social procedure that is my subject, not the specific technical changes in the method of professional practitioners or in the conscious generalization of the few specialists interested in the methodology of the subject. To further delimit the subject, I would add that education is here used to indicate, not the vague general process by which the younger generation is raised to the fully developed adult stage, but the definite, conscious process of transference of a well-organized curriculum, through tried methods, and through a special institution usually called the school.

To realize the significance of the change brought about in education by this perception of human interrelationship, it is necessary to note briefly the general conception of education held previous to the early or middle nineteenth century. Throughout at least the entire modern period education was either considered as the means of perfecting or of disciplining the individual or it was held to be the best means of getting on in the world. If the ideal was that of some imagined perfection, religious or otherwise, the education was termed liberal, even though the institutional type was used quite as directly as any more modern types as a preparation for professions. If it was viewed frankly as a means for bettering one's social position, as it came to be in the earlier stages of popular education, it was termed the practical education; and this by way of reproach by those favored through the liberal education. An excellent definition of the first type is thus given by Sir William Hamilton: "An education in which the individual is cultivated, not as an instrument toward some ulterior end, but an end unto himself alone; in other words, an education in which his absolute perfection as a man, and not merely his relative dexterity as a professional man, is the scope immediately in view." The practical conception of education provides one of the clearest and earliest examples and strongest advocates in Benjamin Franklin.

Into the discussion of these two conceptions of education I will not enter, as it is the still unsurveyed though much-trodden field of discussion of the liberal vs. the practical education. This age-long dispute is now almost wholly an academic question, and one not even of much interest to the "academicians." It is not that educa-

tion has come to be either liberal or practical, but a different sort of thing. In so far as it aims to train even its highest product to use his knowledge and use it directly, it is all practical. In so far as it aims to give its lowliest product a broader view of life, of his relations and obligations to his fellows, and of the social significance of his learning and of his powers, it is all liberal. It is then this very process or influence which is the subject of my discussion which has eliminated the traditional and outstanding conflict in educational thought and practice and is making of education a different thing in kind.

The foundation for this modern conception of education was laid by the political and economic revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century in the broader political conception of human relationships, and the closer and more vital economic realities of that relationship. The truth of Aristotle's position that the character of education depends upon the character of the state was clearly realized by some of the political leaders, though it took more than one generation of political experience to reveal to the people the truth of Jefferson's statement that the continuance of the republican form of government hung absolutely upon popular education and the local government. So far as the pre-nineteenth-century conception of education had any conscious social significance it was in the training of leaders. Now, while unfortunately this phase of the social significance of education is undervalued, there are numerous ways in which education has undergone fundamental changes in response to this broadened conception.

1. The first of these is that formal education is now accepted by all advanced peoples as the means by which the normal members of society are prepared to perform their normal function in society. So essentially is this the dominant conception of education that it is necessary for us to recall that there are many nations which yet do not use this method; that it was not used generally in the past; and that our own experience with it has not extended through more than two or three generations. At times in the past, religion and the influence of the church was relied upon as the chief force for preparing the bulk of the people for normal membership in society;

at other times the apprenticeship system either as operated through the gild system or, as in England since the Elizabethan period, through governmental regulation without the gild system. At the present time much more than half of the population of the globe, even more than half of the civilized portion, is prepared for normal adult life by non-reflective participation in ordinary social activities as carried on by the adult population. The eighteenth century was almost universally opposed to schooling or formal education as a means to this end. Mandeville may be somewhat extreme in his expression of these views, but he is typical.

> To make the society happy, and people easy under the meanest circumstances, it is requisite that great numbers of them should be ignorant as well as poor. . . . . Few children make any progress at school, but at the same time they are capable of being employed in some business or other, so that every hour those of poor people spend at their books is so much time lost to the society. Going to school, in comparison to working, is idleness; and the longer boys continue in this easy sort of life, the more unfit they will be, when grown up, for downright labor, both as to strength and inclination. Men who are to remain and end their days in a laborious, tiresome, and painful station of life, the sooner they are put upon it at first, the more patiently they will submit to it forever after. Hard labor, and the coarsest diet, are a proper punishment to several kinds of malefactors; but to impose either on those that have not been used and brought up to both, is the greatest cruelty, when there is no crime you can charge them with.

It was not until 1870 that the English nation could be brought to accept this estimate of the social importance of education; and there are very many skeptics who yet hold to the traditional views. If the elimination of tuition charges be taken as the indication of the adoption of this social conception of education as opposed to the individualistic views, it has been reached by most European countries within one generation. It is even more difficult for us to realize that this stage was reached, since the Civil War, by a number of our own commonwealths, not only by practically all the southern states, but by such northern ones as New York, New Jersey, Michigan. Twice during the decade preceding the Civil War did New York state record its disapproval of the proposition that public education should be dominated by this conception; and a popular argument against this socialization of education was that

used now against almost every effort for a closer relationship or a broader responsibility in society; namely, that it was socialistic.

Two aspects of present-day education prove conclusively that the modern state has come to accept formal education as a means for preparing all its normal immature members for full adult membership. The first is the tremendous amount of public funds devoted to this subject, now in most states, larger than those for any other single purpose. In our own country it amounts to over $400,000,000 per annum. The second is its universality: for every advanced nation now attempts to apply uniform standards of schooling. In our own country this means an army of 20,000,000 school children. That our reach is greater than our grasp is indicated by the fact that there are 25,000,000 children of school age (five to eighteen) and an average daily attendance of only 14,000,000. As an illustration of the preparation of the child for normal membership in society through the school system, take the factor of normal physical condition. Medical inspection, dental care, proper selection and preparation of food for lunches, proper exercise, first aid for injured, sex instruction, adjustable desks, individual drinking cups or sanitary fountains, hygienic atmospheric conditions—all these things not only provide for his normal physical development, but give a wealth of instruction, which may be the more significant for after-life, through being indirect and considered simply as a part of a normal child environment.

In a similarly diversified way, the proper social, political, vocational, aesthetic, and moral adjustment of the child for normal participation in society is provided for—not that this is done for all school children as yet, or that it is done altogether successfully with the city child with whom it is tried. The point is that these elements enter, not simply into the ideal, but to a great extent into the reality of the best modern school systems. For one example, more than four hundred cities of the United States have some system of medical inspection embodying many of the above-mentioned features.

The results of this general use of education as the means of attaining full citizenship and full personality have been manifold. One or two of these only can be mentioned. In the earlier stage,

at least for the masses, public education was looked upon as a means of preparing the child for the lot in which he found himself. Now the purpose is to prepare the child for any lot to which he may aspire or may by nature be fitted. The problem of the school thus comes to be the discovery of native ability and its development to the highest capacity. This not only involves the broad general training which now characterizes the work of our schools, but should also involve the high degree of differentiation of schools attained in some European countries, but looked at so hesitantly through our hazy conception of democracy.

In a similar way this conception of education is evidenced by the fact that every extension of the franchise, every broadening movement in the participation of the masses in government and in the juster distribution of the privileges and the wealth of society as well as of the obligations of society has been followed by an expansion of educational privileges and a broadening of the concept of education. The French system of popular education followed the Revolution of the thirties by two or three years. England's first recognition, through financial contributions, of governmental responsibility for popular education was in 1833, the year following the passage of the Reform bill, and was not the least significant of the reform movements of that period. In our own country the first general movement for the democratization of education was in that same decade of the thirties, the period of the Jacksonian democracy.

The reverse of this proposition holds true: for every general reactionary movement in political and social relationship has been followed or accompanied by a similar reaction in education.

The most obvious illustration of the social use of education as the means of the preparation for normal membership in society is that of the education of women. When intelligence, developed through education, is substituted for military prowess as the chief qualification for full membership in politically organized society, the enfranchisement or at least the greater social freedom of women necessarily results. It took centuries with the old methods to raise the male element in society to full participation in social and governmental affairs. Scarcely a half-century of universal education has brought womankind to the threshhold if not into full

enjoyment of the political edifice. And it is obvious, even in such conservative centers as Germany, that the education of women, first recognized as of individual concern only, now has the broadest social significance.

2. The second of these fundamental changes is that education is now considered by advanced nations as a means of restoring the abnormal to normal relationship to society. This preparation was reached in general before the broader one of education as a means for preparing the normal. In fact, it was the demonstration of the value of new technique in teaching and of new ideas in education, applied to the deaf and dumb, to the blind, and to the destitute and neglected that in the early part of the nineteenth century aroused the intelligent classes to the realization of the importance of education to the masses of the people and of its significance to the modern state.

But this conception of education relates not only to defectives, who through education may be made self-supporting and contributory members of society; it relates to the delinquent as well. Through the attempt to educate certain types of delinquents, especially juveniles, a reaction upon education itself has been most valuable. The validity of new methods in education, especially those relating to manual activities, was here first demonstrated. And in fact such delinquents have often been provided with a more appropriate education than have normal children. Traditional methods are notoriously inefficient with these abnormally inclined, or traditional methods may be a prominent cause of the delinquency. But because of the opportunity for educational experiment and the fuller control of the child, more admirable results have here been obtained in the attempt to substitute, in the routine of the school curriculum, the actual industrial or social processes of society for the highly generalized intellectual residuum of them. The demonstration of the success of this substitution had led to a much wider use in the public schools of technical processes or activities of society for a too exclusive, highly artificial, reflective consideration of them. It may be that in education as in other respects the prodigal son got the fatted calf; but if so he has been generous to his elder brother.

In general the retributary theory of punishment has been replaced by a view that its purposes should be largely educative. Society is best protected by removing the antisocial habits and beliefs of the criminal. This can be done best by developing a social disposition which operates far more effectively, especially with the criminal type, than fear of retribution. The intermediate sentence is a recognition of the educative character of punishment; but it is only when prison life, for adult as well as for juvenile, has been organized so as to give a definite industrial and vocational training, to give the results of such activities to the prisoner and not to officers or favorite contractors, that adequate results follow. The educative significance of this conception of punishment for delinquents for society as a whole is recognized when it is revealed that punishment on almost any other basis is, to an extent, a lapse into barbarism, as readily seen when a social group takes vengeance into its own hands. In almost all advanced countries, prisons have been differentiated into types—the reformatory, being practically schools, and prisons. But even in the prison type, while not organized as a school, the educative character of punishment is definitely recognized, if not always embodied in its régime.

3. The third application of this new conception of education is its adoption as the means of raising backward nations to full membership in the family of nations.

The early and long-used method by which one nation dominated another was by war. War not only reduced an inferior race, but through further participation in war they might in time be raised to equality or to amalgamation with their earlier conqueror. In the past the process that has been most widely productive of the assimilation of one people by another has been that of slavery. Where the racial contrast has not been too great as with Negro and Caucasian, the amalgamation has usually taken place slowly but effectively. But slavery as a peaceful means has always followed war and not without many of its evils. Certainly if the cost to the individual is considered it is anything but an economic method. We have but the one outstanding case, that "when captive Greece took captive her proud conqueror," when the process was of marked advantage to the dominating race. Later through commerce and

industry the same results were partially obtained; but as through war, with enormous waste and but partial realization of equality or of attainment to the full status of culture; with trade came the missionary and through the greater part of the nineteenth century as during the early Middle Ages, religion was depended upon as the method by which one people sought to raise a backward one. But until the missionary turned schoolmaster, his work, at least with nations out of barbarism, was seldom more than slum work with the lower elements of the population. But when with the latter part of the nineteenth century the educational element became prominent, the centuries' influence of soldier, trade, and preacher was quickly surpassed by that of the schoolmaster. It was not by chance that King Ferdinand in his recent dispatch to the American people should ascribe to them a large part of the responsibility for the present war and of the regeneration of Bulgaria to Robert College. To this and similar institutions has been due the Young Turk movement which has done the little that could be done to put the government of that country on a sounder basis. The words of a leader of one of these countries where the modern movement has only begun, is to the same effect:

> At present, from north to south, and from east to west of Albania, all classes of people—Moslem and Christian alike—have a desire, which amounts to a passion, for national education. All of them understand that just as in the past the sword was the symbol of power, so today education is the goddess of power, and they are going to possess education in spite of persecution. . . . . Neither the bastinado, nor the gun, nor the cannon, nor exile, nor imprisonment, nor even death itself, will ever move them.

Whenever in the Orient there has been a striving of the people toward a full realization of their opportunities, there can be traced as the cause the modern ideas as introduced by the schoolmaster. Even in India, with educational traditions centuries old, and with its highly developed intellectual class, the ferment of modern education had been working. And if the ferment is producing the usual results of new wine, may it not be because the conquerors have but attempted to perpetuate the procedure of the old education which, as pointed out by Rousseau a century and a half ago, had the fundamental defect of any exclusively intellectual education

of developing new wants, without developing any adequate means of meeting those wants.

The most brilliant example of the significance of education as a means of raising a nation to full fellowship in the family of nations is Japan. It was fourteen years after Commodore Peary's memorable visit, before the native government seized upon education as the means of social advance. Meanwhile western educational ideas and practices had been introduced through missionaries. But in 1872, the year immediately following the abolition of the feudal system and of the monopolistic power of the military class, universal education was proclaimed, the obligation of compulsory education being placed on parents and elder brothers. American normal-school teachers were employed and the attempt made to transplant bodily a foreign and occidental educational system as a means of regenerating an ancient race. While this complete adoption of a foreign system was not possible, the results of this transfer, when duly naturalized, are self-evident. In forty years a nation has been produced that has as large a percentage of its population and of its children in school as in our own country, and by the arbitrament of the sword, as well as by the more peaceful one of the arts and sciences, has raised itself from an isolated stagnant culture, counted all but barbarism by the rest of the world, to a dignified and respected place among the great powers—in fact the great power, if the test be its substitutions for England by American statesmen as the great political bogey.

If Japan is the most brilliant example of this use of education, the Philippines form the most instructive and the creditable one. Here literally the pen was substituted for the sword, and soldiers in uniform stacked arms and taught the young idea how to shoot. One generation may see an entire people change its language and its culture. In less than twelve years, approximately one million recruits have been added to English-speaking peoples. And in their school, 400,000 are now receiving a practical industrial training, dignifying labor among a people where it has hitherto been despised. This is a far larger percentage than of our own children who have received such training. In many cases, the significance of this work is unique, for the children are literally paid to go to

school, since the product of their instruction is of a distinct commercial value.

But neither of these illustrations can compare in promise with that of the Chinese. Trained for centuries to consider the scholar as the proper leader in society, to look upon education as the proper means for securing stability and the raising of individuals to the highest degree of serviceability to the state, they need only the substitution of the content of western education, a substitution now rapidly going on. Centuries ahead of western nations in their attitude toward education, they are two or three centuries behind in their conception of content and method. And now, seeming to realize their retardation in this respect, they are devoting their energies to a national rejuvenation through education. Here again the missionary educators were pioneers. But a half-century of their endeavor had made it clear even to the old government that a modern education system was their one hope of national salvation. Since 1895 these changes have been going on, and since 1905 there have been definite governmental attempts to build up a modern system. Fifteen years of toleration, and half that of encouragement were sufficient to overthrow a government of several centuries and produce evidence of a new vitality in a culture the oldest in existence. A country that for centuries has looked upon all things foreign as worthy of contempt now borrows, bodily, a despised foreign educational system. Even now there are more than 50,000 schools of the new type; they have held an educational exhibit of 34,000 pieces; they have educational associations and conferences, and the book publishers and agents are in the field. A flood of Republican school readers is spreading over the land. The new national minister of education, in this current year, officially states the aim of education as follows: (1) industrial; (2) aesthetic; (3) moral, inculcating the ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity; (4) military, and (5) political, inculcating world-wide views and sympathies. A phonetic script is being introduced and the Central Education Conference, under the leadership of the director of education of one of the provinces, recommends the elimination of Confucian worship from the schools and even stamps with favor the denial of the recognition of Confucius as the patron saint of education. When

the nation can support at one time 15,000 students in a neighboring foreign country, and send almost two thousand to more or less hostile or contemptuous nations half around the globe, what may be expected in the course of a generation? This past summer, despite unfavorable financial conditions, one province sent sixty students abroad; eight to England to study moral affairs, six to Germany to study military affairs, twenty students of mineralogy to Belgium, ten to United States to study industry, eight to France to study law, eight to Italy to study mathematics, and eight to Japan to study politics. We may think the directing officials were ill advised, especially in the last of the selections, but we cannot but see that the recognition of the cosmopolitanism of learning will have tremendous influence in giving to nearly one-half of the human race a more appropriate place in modern culture. It may be, after all, that the white man's burden is to be borne by the humble pedagogue.

As a result of a century's broadening of the scope of human relationships, education is no longer merely the petty concern of the pedagogue; the problems of public-school work are not the trivial details of method or the dreary routine of classroom procedure; the problems of education are the focusing of all the great problems of society for the presentation to the coming generation with the hopes that when thus concentrated and defined they may be better understood and more nearly mastered.

4. A fourth aspect of this social significance of education, and closely related to the previous one of the conquest of one culture by another, is its use in the amalgamation of races as the means of assimilating new factors into the body politic. Here again the value of education stands out in strong contrast to the long-tedious and wasteful methods of former times. War eliminated many of the best and secured amalgamation only by destroying some of the most valuable mental and moral traits of the survivors. Trade and commerce leave the hostilities which have always followed the Jewish race. Religious conversion has seldom been able to work successfully on a large scale without the accompaniment of war. It took ten mediaeval centuries to produce the fusion and transfer of ancient culture, and the amalgamation of hostile races into a

stable society. But in this country we are attempting in a single generation a larger task of race amalgamation, and with certain elements of this new peoples almost as large a task of culture transference. For the decade from 1899–1910 almost 10,000,000 immigrants were absorbed into our social body. Of these 89.5 per cent came from lands where our language was not spoken and a very large part of these from culture surroundings very different from our own. In the last ten years, more than 25 per cent of the 1,000,000 immigrants each year, to use approximate figures, were unable to read or write any language. Remoteness in culture and total illiteracy became increasingly more pronounced each year. We are depending almost wholly upon education as the only formal means of bringing about the assimilation of these alien peoples. The informal education gained through industry does not affect very markedly the more fundamental aspects of approximation to new social, moral, and political standards; and such assimilation as comes through early participation in political affairs is necessarily of no more general character or on no higher plane than that gained through economic relationships. One of the sins of this generation that will return to plague future ones is the general corruption of these more recent additions to our body politic by the dominant political parties. On the other hand, one of the most cheering evidences of the success of public-school education is the results among the immigrants and their children. It is not simply the fact that the percentage of illiteracy among native children of the foreign born was less than the illiteracy of the country as a whole, or even of the native children of the native born, but it is the concrete evidence visible to everyone who comes in contact with school work with foreign children. The difficulties to be overcome are not those of language. The necessity of learning a second language has positive educational advantages. But it is the substitution of new moral ideals and cultural accomplishments for old ones that is crucial. For we are witnessing, especially in our cities, the evil result of this incomplete transition, where the process has been so rapid that the control of the parental culture and ideals, as well as authority, is lost and little but the superficial of the new obtained. But it is clear in this respect, if in no other, that the perpetuity and

improvement of our culture depends almost wholly upon formal educational means.

5. For the fifth phase of these fundamental changes we may turn next to a more inclusive aspect of the subject and consider education as a general means of social reform. This is so obvious that to the school teacher it would not need to be argued. Do we not have Arbor Days, Memorial Days, Boy Scout Days, International Peace Days, with local variants of Big Navy Days? Humane education has its place in the curriculum by law; so does scientific temperance, which too often is neither scientific nor temperate; moral prophylaxis has its numerous advocates. There are Mother's Days, Health Days, Municipal Days, Conservation Days, Flower Days, Fire Prevention Days. We "clean up the town" and fight tuberculosis through school children; they fight the hookworm, swat the flies, and after they have carried on all sorts of altruistic Christmas propagandas for generations they will now be "spugging" for us for a few years to come. The school becomes a savings bank, an insurance company, a self-governing political body, all in the cause of social reforms. Physicians are now proposing that the schools be made permanent centers of municipal health inspection.

Far more significant than these superficial and rather obvious aspects of the argument, is the fact that almost all important and fundamental social reform movements are now considered as educative in their nature and to a large degree use educational methods. Modern charity seeks not only to relieve the recipient but more especially to aid him to an independent position. With the juvenile this is practically always through schools; not the old-time workhouse school, but industrial schools of a far different type. Charity to adults so far as possible takes similar forms. The direction and supervision of philanthropy has become a profession or a business, to be prepared for by a long course of professional training.

It is now generally recognized that the best way to attack poverty, disease, and various forms of delinquency is by preventive measures, and that the chief preventive measure is education. Through adequate industrial training poverty will be avoided, through vocational guidance industrial misfits and blind alleys will

be avoided and a social stability favored. Modern hygiene finds a far wider exposition through the schools than it does through the medical profession. The suffrage movement, at least in most countries, finds its normal method of offense to be educational rather than militant. Socialism works definitely through its educational propaganda.

6. A sixth point can only be mentioned; for, in a somewhat more general way than as the method of social reform, education has come to be recognized as one, if not the prominent, method of stable political and economic advance. The first clear recognition of this function of education came in response to Fichte's addresses to the German nation in 1807–8, when he recommended this remedy as antidote to the Napoleonic subjugation. How successful the remedy was, 1870 demonstrated, and the prominent place of Germany in international politics and in industry yet illustrates. In our own history it has been repeatedly stated by leaders from Washington and Jefferson to the present and quite generally recognized by the people themselves that the stability and development of our political institutions depended on the education of the masses as well as that of leaders. Not only upon their general intelligence, but now more clearly seen upon definite political instruction. In no less degree does the same hold true of economic development. No clearer recognition of this has been given than by the deliberate adoption on the part of the British government of an extensive scheme of industrial education as a means for meeting German industrial competition. And there is no more outstanding illustration of the way in which national handicraft in natural resources can be overcome by industrial, technical, and commercial education. The astonishing advance of Germany during the last century is due in their own estimate as well as in that of others to this more than to any other one factor.

Advance in general economic intelligence as well as in technical skill and commercial ability is also dependent on education. Only by such general instruction can society destroy such doctrines of the wage-earner that there is general advantage in destruction of property or of luxurious waste in making work or as held by the employer that considerations other than legal ones have no place in competitive business.

7. Concerning the reciprocating influence of this broadening function of education on the technical theory and methodology of education much might be said, as a seventh count in the argument, but this is chiefly of interest to the professional student of education and to the educational administrator. Every expansion in political rights and powers is followed by an expansion of the curriculum by a further inclusion in the curriculum of the political and social sciences. A study of textbooks reveals this clearly. At times, as in the period immediately following the American Revolution, such changes have been very pronounced. In a similar way each increase of power over Nature has resulted in the wider inclusion of the sciences. And especially as the social as well as the intellectual significance of the sciences is realized has this been true. Undoubtedly the growing recognition of the significance of physiological chemistry and synthetic chemistry has been a powerful influence toward the inclusion of the so-called household arts in public schools and colleges and universities all over this land. It is a far deeper thing, and in hopes of a far greater result, that the introduction of some practical training will meet immediate needs of the masses of the people. It bears within it the possibility of fundamental industrial, social, and moral changes.

This reciprocal influence on the theory of education is nowhere more clearly seen than in the various phases of professional education. In so far as the social point of view is substituted for the individual one, any profession becomes liberal in exactly the same sense as the traditional liberal professions. The Hippocratic oath may have called the attention of generations of medical students to the social character of their profession, but more has been accomplished in one generation through the realization that disease to a very large extent is a social phenomena, due to social condition, to transmission through personal contact, and that its cure is quite as largely of social as of individual significance. Preventive medicine, conservation of health, and similar movements are the outcome of this newer point of view in professional education. How much might be done for our modern business and for economic conditions in general through the organization of a professional training on a similar basis remains to be seen, awaits even yet the men of vision

to lead the way. There was a time when more than 70 per cent of college graduates entered the ministry, and college education for them was liberalizing. Now more (30 per cent) enter business than enter any other single line. How much of a definite professional training, of this liberalizing, socializing character, does the prospective business man get in the present college curriculum? In general, this reciprocal influence on the theory of education is forcing not so much a rejection of the old as a restatement of it. The liberality of an education in any time is to be measured not in the old terms of criticism of life, to use Matthew Arnold's words, as in the new terms of contribution to life.

This developing view of human relationships and of contribution to social welfare as the test of formal, especially professional, education is forcing a greater differentiation in institutional education—one of our greatest educational needs, if not the greatest. We are yet under the incubus of the belief that democracy means uniformity. We believe in one public school for all, one high school for all, even one type of college course for all. The mania for standardization and organization leads us to forget, not only that variation is a prerequisite of selection and progress, but that variation is a necessity of stable life. Our greatest need on the side of organization to meet this developing view of society which posits a greater integration is a greater differentiation of schools. Not all children need the same kind of elementary education; in the secondary a greater diversity is needed than even in the higher fields, as it applies to a so much greater proportion of our population; and yet there is scarcely any diversification and that which is developing meets with great hostility.

8. Finally, we are coming to consider education as the means of progress, the method of social evolution. By it the present can determine or at least influence profoundly the future. By it one generation in turn hands on to the coming one that which it received from the past, modified by its own estimates of worth, added to by its own endeavors, passed through the medium of its own experiences. It is through education, as thus considered, that social evolution is raised to a higher plane than that of all pre-social evolution. Progress becomes cumulative in its effect, geometric

in its ratio. By education, the achievements or characteristics of one generation are handed on to the next. If it is the nontransmissibility of acquired characteristics that constitutes natural selection the chief method of organic evolution, it is this very feature that constitutes education the method of social evolution. It is because in very recent times this process has become a conscious one that the subject assigned for discussion in this paper has significance. Not but what this conception of education has been held in various times in the past by those with a vision. In the seventeenth century it was revealed to Francis Bacon, who commended to all devotees of science and philosophy the study of the process he termed "tradition," the process by which one generation hands on its inheritance and its achievements to the coming one; and commended the conscious control of this process in the service of progress. It is due to this conception that Aristotle, though with no definite idea of social progress, called education a practical, as opposed to the theoretical sciences, and made it subordinate to politics. It is due to the gradual realization of this conception of education during the last century by society as a whole that education has become the process outlined in this discussion.

Hence in conclusion, if I may speak for the largest group of professional men and women in our society, I would formulate this argument in terms of a plea of public education: a plea to the scientist, that he be interested not only in the new interpretation of phenomena, and in the new control of natural forces; but also in the dissemination of scientific knowledge and scientific methods of thought and procedure among the masses, and thus assist in the control of the greatest of all forces, public opinion and the social will; to the economist, that he be interested not only in the investigation and interpretation of the economic phenomena of society, but also in that institution which touches more lives and those lives more powerfully than any other save possibly the state itself, that it be not one of the most wasteful of institutions in the expenditure of human energy, and relatively one of the most inefficient in the expenditure of social wealth; to the historian, that he realize that the vital connection in the continuity of history is to be made in the transmission of the achievements and standards of the past to

the coming generation; that the really vital thing in history is the *teaching of history* to the end that historic forces and institutions be generally understood and conserved; to the sociologist that he also give attention to the problems of public education, a social process now so influenced by the general principles which are fundamental to his science that it has become the chief means by which society seeks to accomplish a great variety of its purposes—to assist its helpless; to correct its delinquents; to improve its dependents; to equalize its opportunities; to preserve its resources; to lift up the lowly races; to amalgamate alien races; to preserve its hard-won wealth of culture; to perpetuate the results of its age-long struggle with Nature; to render stable the trumphs over the limitations of human nature; the process by which it seeks to realize in coming generations those ideals which are promulgated by the present as an aspiration or as a vision of possible attainment.

DISCUSSION

Professor Small, Presiding.

EDWARD C. HAYES, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

If the topic before us were the psychic aspects of sociology, instead of the social aspects of psychology, I should feel better prepared to participate in its discussion.

The very interesting paper of President Hall, to which we have just listened, is devoted to noting points of contact between sociology and psychology; and it occurs to me that it may be helpful to observe, in the same connection, how clearly separated the centers of interest of the two studies are, in spite of their marginal contact and overlapping. There is all the more propriety in this, in view of the fact that in nearly all the sessions of this year's meeting, the society is to give its attention to contacts between sociology and related fields of study. It is well, on that account, in this very first session, to give a little emphasis to the fact that sociology is not all margins, but has a center of interest of its own. If this distinctness of central interests can be made clear with reference to sociology and psychology, it can thereafter be safely assumed in every other connection, for it is between sociology and psychology that the danger of confusion is greatest.

There are no lines of abrupt cleavage in the unity of Nature. That which comes nearest to it is the separation between material phenomena and the phenomena of consciousness. Now, sociology and psychology both lie on the

same side of that line; they are both studies of conscious life. Material phenomena require for their study a whole group of sciences, including chemistry, physics, biology, etc. These material sciences have centers of interest which are clearly distinct and widely separated, yet they overlap at their margins, so that there are some problems of which it is impossible to say whether they belong more to physics or to chemistry, and other problems of which it is impossible to say whether they belong more to chemistry or to physiology. It is also true that no single science can adequately investigate the phenomena of conscious life; here also a group of sciences is required. The two fundamental sciences that apply themselves to the study of conscious life are psychology and sociology, and they like the physical sciences, have common problems at their overlapping margins, but distinct and separate centers of interest.

Professor Münsterberg, in the beginning of his book on *Psychology and Life*, declares that psychology does not study life, but rather certain abstractions from life, which nowhere exist, but which nevertheless must be understood, if we are to understand life itself.[1] This means, I suppose that thought nowhere exists apart from the thoughts and opinions of men, nor volition apart from the deeds of men. Now sociology, guided by the necessary work of psychology in the study of the abstract methods and mechanism of conscious life[2] sets itself to study those conscious realities which are the substance of the actual life of individuals and societies. The craze for automobiles, the disapproval of lynching, methodism, republicanism, the "Bull Moose" movement, are as genuine concrete realities as the Charles River, or Mount Washington, or the Maine woods, or the lions of Central Africa, or any other natural phenomena, studied by any of the physical sciences.

Such social realities are complex in their composition. In any one of them psychic elements of every kind may be combined; even in the thought of the

[1] To this Professor Münsterberg replied in the discussion with which he followed me, that his book *Psychology and Life* represented a stage of thought "now somewhat behind us." However, this statement remains true of "general psychology," which still makes up the main bulk of the science; he would modify it by giving emphasis to the recent studies of individual variation, which are on the border between psychology and biology (neurology), and of reactions between the individual and his social environment—the "social psychology," which is on the border line between the psychology and sociology, just as physiological chemistry is on the border between physiology and chemistry. These serve to illustrate the marginal overlapping of sciences, above pointed out, which takes place, notwithstanding the separateness of their central interests.

[2] These references to its abstractness are by no means meant as a reproach to general psychology. Physics and chemistry are abstract. There is a sense in which a science is more abstract in proportion as it is more fundamental. Psychology is more abstract and fundamental than sociology, in the same sense in which physics and chemistry are more abstract and fundamental than biology.

participation of a single individual in any one of these social activities—the republicanism of John Jones or the methodism of Mary Smith—the psychological abstractions are not kept apart. What we call a "social sentiment," like the disapproval of lynching, the admiration of wealth-getting as a form of success, or abhorrence for violations of monogamy, include ideas, and express themselves in conduct; and what we call "social practices," like hanging holly wreaths in our windows and sending gifts to our friends at Christmas, or like trial by jury, contain sentiments, ideas, judgments, as well as overt acts. And all of these concrete social activities are realities as distinct from the psychic elements of which they are composed as bushes, flowers, birds, rabbits, and lions are from the chemical elements of which they are composed.

The characteristic objects of study of general psychology, as Wundt has declared, are universal. They are the same wherever men think and act, whether in Zululand, Calcutta, Leipzig, or Boston, whether in the sixteenth century or the twentieth. But the "Bull Moose" movement is a thing of here and now—social phenomena vary from place to place as do flora and fauna. The chemical elements are the same in all continents, and the physiology of all species must be interpreted by the same principles of chemistry and physics; likewise the same psychic elements and principles are everywhere essential to the explanation of social phenomena, but those phenomena are well-nigh as complex and diverse as biological varieties. They call for description which psychology does not attempt, they have had an evolution which psychology does not trace, they are molded by causes—in part geographic, as climate and topography; in part material and man-made, as railroads and housing; in part biological, as the degeneracy of populations through prevalent vices or unsanitary occupations—which psychology does not investigate. Customs, institutions, and all those concrete and complex realities which diversify human society, those tough and massive combinations of human thoughts, sentiment, and conduct, which constitute for the individual the most practically momentous part of his environment, require description, analysis, and genetic explanation, statement of the types of change to which they are subject, and of the forms of causation by which they are molded, none of which is afforded by any science but sociology.

Now let me turn for a moment to the aspect of the truth which the program of the morning is primarily intended to bring out: I believe that I was the first member of this society to declare, without needless qualifications, that social phenomena are psychic; and in the same breath in which I emphasize the distinctness of sociology from psychology I wish also to join in emphasizing the close relation between these two studies, and to reiterate the fact that their investigations fall both on the same side of the line which separates the facts of consciousness from material phenomena. Methodism, republicanism, monogamy, trial by jury, and all other social phenomena are, in their essence, psychic phenomena. Sociology has to do with physical phenomena only as the conditions or as the manifestations of psychic realities. We have our marriage

customs, very distinct from those of the Kaffirs of the Nairs, yet there is no wedding going on here this morning, our marriage customs are not visibly manifesting themselves, they are a part of our unseen psychic possessions, which we have as a part of our share in the life of American society. The Pilgrims in the "Mayflower" brought over to these shores English institutions; but were these institutions stored in the hold of the "Mayflower"? No; if the "Mayflower" had been wrecked and the Pilgrims had been compelled to swim to shore they would have carried the English institutions wherever they carried their round heads and their sound hearts. The particular established compounds of psychic activity, of beliefs and desires, judgments, sentiments, aims and acts, which the Pilgrims possessed by virtue of their membership in the society to which they belonged, these were the social realities. Such activities, massed into customs, institutions, religions, conscience-codes, and whatever else is included in the essence of the social constitution of the life of a people, are psychic realities. The study of these realities must rest back directly upon the teachings of psychology. And yet the description of these massive realities, in their concrete actuality is left for sociology. The task of interpreting the life of man as it is lived in society, in its concreteness and in its forms, elements, and mechanism, in its universality and in its particular variations, is too vast for any one science, or any one body of investigators, and requires the two distinct, but co-ordinate sciences of psychology and sociology.

HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

I feel in entire agreement with the essential points of President Hall's psychological analysis of social factors, but while his psychological interest is essentially one of explanation and clearer understanding of the social organization, I feel that the time has come when the work of the experimental psychologist might become practically serviceable to the social progress and the consolidation of the social structure. I think foremost of the aid which a psychological analysis with the methods of laboratory measurement may furnish for the best possible distribution of men in our highly differentiated society. The growing complication of our social life with its immense variety of demands for personal achievement has not yet been supported by corresponding care for the recognition of personal differences. Especially the choice of vocation has been left to trivial and superficial influences and from this lack of method an inexcusable waste of human energy has resulted. The recent efforts for vocational guidance and for scientific management have pointed in this direction, but have been unable to solve the central problem of adjustment between work and personal attitude, because they did not take sufficient notice of the progress of experimental psychology. The psychologist who measures the mental functions by systematic tests can recognize the underlying dispositions and traits. The first step ought probably to be to make use of this possibility for the purposes of manufacture, transportation, and commerce,

especially with reference to the choice of laborers. Some significant beginnings have been made in that direction and the relation of psychology to industrial efficiency has become an acknowledged problem in experimental psychology, but there is no reason why these efforts may not be extended far beyond these lower layers of the social structure and may become an important aid for the social distribution in general.

EDWARD D. PAGE, OAKLAND, N.J.

Professor Münsterberg's practical suggestion in his discussion of Dr. Stanley Hall's able paper, that efficiency might be increased by laboratory determination of the mental qualifications of employees engaged in business and industrial pursuits, affords an exceedingly interesting application of scientific method to practical affairs. It is not to be supposed however, that so far as concerns the executive conduct of business in the United States a process of this nature has been altogether overlooked, and there are some statistics bearing on the subject which may be of interest. The commercial agencies give credit ratings to something like 1,600,000 separate firms, corporations and individuals and their statistics have shown in the past year about 16,000 failures, a commercial death rate of about one per cent. As a matter of fact the average death rate in a series of years is smaller than indicated by the failures of 1912, averaging only about three-quarters of 1 per cent per annum. This it seems to me is evidence of a fairly high efficiency, and how has it been attained? Every business executive is aware of the fact that his business profits are increased by a sociological and psychological treatment of his affairs, as well as by attention to their purely economic side. Without being able to analyze the process in terms of sociology, he understands fully that business profits are the result of the differences in the folk-ways of different groups, and he studies those differences in order to avail himself of the opportunities thereby presented. He also realizes that good salesmanship, for instance, is a matter of psychological suggestion and by empirical methods, endeavors to study the aptitudes of his various employees, so that those whom he chooses to conduct important negotiations may be such as are best fitted to impress the minds of his customers with their self-interest in buying his wares. This process of selection is indeed crude, empirical and slow, covering months and years in the discovery of the aptitudes of his men. It is not too much to say that if a scientific predetermination of these aptitudes could be applied, business efficiency could be greatly increased both by greater celerity in arriving at results and by a lessened need for a large surplus of help, inefficiently employed while under the process of observation and selection. In this way a larger fund could be distributed from the gross profits of enterprise among the right men scientifically selected for the function for which they were best fitted; instead of, as at present dissipated among a larger number of learners, the minority of whom only succeed after a comparatively long apprenticship in finding their appropriate vocation, while

the majority never find it, and continue to the end of their economic lives, a monument to misplaced endeavor.

EDWIN L. EARP, DREW THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

I have been keenly interested in the excellent paper presented by Dr. Hall, and also in the discussion led by Professor Münsterberg. While it is true we can make certain psychological tests of mental ability and the power of attention, adjustment, or lack of adjustment to monotonous forms of labor, etc., yet from the viewpoint of functional psychology it occurs to me that without an actual experience in such tasks would such tests after all be conclusive? From the standpoint of the educator and that of the employer would it not be possible to incorporate in our system of education some plan of co-operation by the community or the state, through which the student could get such a laboratory experience that would enable us to make such tests by the modern psychologists practical and in many cases final in determining one's fitness for a given task?

I speak from the viewpoint of one interested in the training of students for the Christian ministry. While the majority of the students in our theological schools are from the rural sections of the country, yet few of them turn out to be successful country pastors, and one of the hardest fields the church has to work today is the country districts whence we draw most of our recruits for the ministry. The church is also losing in the industrial centers where she is seemingly out of closest sympathy with the working public.

It seems to me that we can profit by these suggestions and secure some such co-operation between the communities and the theological schools as we find between the state university and the public, as in Wisconsin, or the university and the city, as in Cincinnati, or as was outlined in the inaugural address of President Murlin of Boston University, so that we could get young men to actually function in service through actual field work and thus be better trained for these specific fields. In some cases at least, some such psychological test as has been suggested by Professor Münsterberg, applied to theological students, would not be without interesting results.

MEYER BLOOMFIELD, BOSTON VOCATION BUREAU

This being a gathering of those who are used to viewing present-day problems from a social standpoint, it is in place to call attention to the need of viewing the problem of adjusting the individual worker to his appropriate occupation from a social point of view too. To regard the maladjustment of the worker from the individual standpoint alone, or to believe that we need only find a method by which capacity may be connected with its opportunity, is to take a naïve view of present-day industry. In other words, to hold the individual responsible for what is called an industrial misfit is to hark back to the

thought of a generation or two back, a conception now discarded by those who think socially, when crime, intemperance, and poverty were looked upon as the product of individual misdoing and due wholly to individually controllable causes.

That the individual plays some part in a social problem we know, but this gathering knows that we look to conditions, methods of organization, and to other collective results for our solutions, and not so much to what we might accomplish with the individual, important though this be in its proper setting. It may be that we shall learn how to fit the monotony-enjoying mind to a monotonous task, but to the socially thinking such mind is a tragedy and a problem. The fact is that industry must undergo a new scrutiny, and that its reactions upon all workers must be understood before we too amiably undertake to settle the present unsatisfactory situation by dealing with the individual alone. In other words, the problem of vocational guidance is at bottom a community problem. The emphasis should always be on its social aspects. Only in this way shall we see this important movement bear legitimate fruit.

CECIL C. NORTH, DEPAUW UNIVERSITY

Professor Münsterberg's paper has raised an important point in sociological theory, namely, the possibility of determining the vocation of individuals on the basis of differences in the type of psychological reaction. I am not entirely aware of just what recent psychological investigations have uncovered and if possible I should like to hear from Professor Münsterberg something on this point. The question in my mind is this: Have we evidence that the range of variation in mental type is so wide as to furnish a sufficient foundation for vocational guidance on the basis of this natural difference? Must our vocational guidance be determined entirely by such natural variation or is it not possible that many individuals are capable of undertaking any one of the wide variety of occupations? My belief is that society may consciously direct people into different activities to some extent at least by simply determining the direction of their attention. Unless it can be established that the range of the variation in mental type is very wide, vocational guidance is not so much a matter that rests upon psychological investigation as upon conscious social direction. I suppose that the two must eventually work together but it seems to me entirely possible that Professor Münsterberg may overestimate the function of the psychological investigator by his assumption of the wide variety of aptitudes. For one I am very anxious to know just what the experimental psychologist has to tell us concerning this range of variation because it involves, it seems to me, a serious problem in social theory.

J. L. GILLIN, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

In spite of the protests of educators that sociology's influence upon educational theory and attitude is quite negligible, a paper is seldom read by them

touching any of the social aspects of modern education without unconsciously betraying their debt. The paper just read on the "Social Aspects of Education" is just one more case in point. The reader began by denying the influence of sociology in bringing education to an emphasis upon its social function and ends by admitting that education has greatly enlarged its field in the last twenty years, has become more distinctly social in its outlook and points out ways in which our educational system can still more adapt itself to the social needs of our times. I wish to point out that:

1. Education made very little of its social aspects until after sociologists and social workers pointed out how inadequately the schools were preparing their pupils for real life.

2. Education was dumb upon the subject of social betterment through the schools until the social betterment movement outside the schools had forced upon a reluctant pedagogy the necessity of devoting a part of the pupil's time in school to such subjects as interested him and fitted him in some degree to take a position in society where he could follow out the apostolic injunction to "provide things honest in the sight of all men." The penologists were the first to suggest that the kinds of studies which were found useful in "reforming" men might have some value in "forming" them, if such studies were introduced into the common schools.

3. The modern play movement, now adopted heartily by the pedagogues, originated with the sociologists and psychologists. One of the first to contribute to the theory of play was that sociologist and psychologist, Herbert Spencer.

4. Modern education has been touched by the same social spirit as the political philosophy and economics of a former day. Sociology itself is but an early development of that social spirit. However, avowedly, social in its spirit and emphasis from the first, it has not been hampered so much by old traditions as some of the older philosophies like education, political philosophy and political economy. It has therefore been busy insisting on the social factors in these other disciplines often much to the disgust of their devotees. Nevertheless such disagreeable work has resulted in some good. Education, like the rest, is beginning to take account of the new social outlook though very busy the while in denying that sociology has had anything to do with her changed attitude and that she has always been on the way to the present attitude, as if what she has become were involved in the essential nature of the creature, rather than that present developments have been caused by any outside influence whatsoever, least of all sociology.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND IDEAS UPON THE STUDY AND WRITING OF HISTORY

CARL BECKER
University of Kansas

History is so susceptible to every kind of influence that it is more difficult to define even than sociology. I shall not attempt to define it, further than to say that it is concerned with the life of man in the past. But the life of man in the past is an immense subject, and even with our limited sources of information it is quite impossible to fix the attention upon everything that man has done in the past. The historian has therefore to select, to devote himself to what interests him in the past, to emphasize those aspects of the past which he deems important. Undoubtedly one historian will differ from another in this respect. But in spite of individual differences, the historians of any age are likely to find those aspects of the past interesting or important which are in some way connected with the intellectual or social conditions of the age in which they live; so that the historical work that is most characteristic of any time may be regarded as embodying an interpretation of the past in terms of present social interests.

This manner of defining the function of history finds some support in the current trend of scientific thought. The latest fashion among psychologists and philosophers seems to be to regard the individual intelligence, not as an instrument suited to furnish an absolute test of objective truth, but rather as a tool pragmatically useful in enabling the individual to find his way about in a disordered objective world. In like manner, one may conveniently regard the general intellectual activity of any period—the common ideas and beliefs, the prepossessions and points of view—as having had its origin in practical interests, and as deriving its validity from the service it renders in solving the problems

that grow out of community life. Historical thinking is part of this intellectual activity, and like philosophy and science, literature or theology, it is a social instrument, helpful in getting the world's work more effectively done.

And if we turn to the history of history, we find always a pretty close connection between the characteristic historical work of any period and the fundamental prepossessions of the time in which it falls. In the Middle Ages, the study of the past reflected the religious and ecclesiastical interests of that age. Protestant and Catholic historians of the sixteenth century found interesting and important those aspects of the past which threw light on the theological and political quarrels of the Reformation. In the eighteenth century, Monarchy and Church found a certain justification in the *Acta Sanctorum* and the great documentary collections of the benedictines; while the practical value of charters inspired the work of Mabillon, who founded the science of diplomatics. But in the latter part of the century, when social needs ran counter to established authority, the reformers turned again to the past and found there arguments suited to revolution.

It is characteristic of every age to think that "we are the people"; and in our own day historians, with justifiable pride in their achievements, have sometimes supposed that a method of studying history has at last been discovered which owes nothing to time or place; a scientific method, which enables us to study the past definitively, if only it is applied in a thoroughgoing manner. But this attitude is less common today than it was fifteen or twenty years ago; and perhaps it is possible even now to indicate, in a general way, how the study and writing of history during the last half-century has been determined by the pressure of social problems and ideals.

I

The period from 1815 to about 1850 was one of immense activity in the study and writing of history; and the inspiration and determining influence of much of this work was the French Revolution and the problems it left unsettled. To the generation after 1815, it seemed, indeed, that all questions were unsettled; and as the disillusioned found refuge from the present in an ideal Middle Age,

or in the world of dreams, so philosophers and statesmen and politicians and historians, who were often politicians if not statesmen, turned to the past to rediscover the principles of ordered social life.

Of the questions which the Revolution left unsettled, perhaps the most pressing was political in its nature. In France and Germany, if not also in England, the Revolution destroyed all concensus of opinion as to the fundamental principles of government and public law. For two generations party divisions turned on this issue; and we might expect to find, as we do in fact find, that historians and statesmen, when they turned to the past, were primarily interested in its political and legal aspects: they wanted the past to tell them what law really was after all, and what kind of government would prove most stable. It was therefore an age of political historians, and each political party—Absolutist, Doctrinaire-Liberal, Historic-Rights, Whig, Republican, Radical—found support in history for its practical program.

But undoubtedly the strong trend of the period, in practical politics and in educated opinion, at least until about 1840, was toward moderation and compromise. The golden mean was found an excellent substitute for theories pressed to their logical conclusion. Few could deny, after 1815, that institutions are bound to change; and although Joseph De Maistre thought that the Revolution was an evidence of God's wrath which could be appeased only by a return to the Old Régime, even Louis XVIII, who had learned something, however little he had forgotten, knew that this was impossible. On the other hand, few were ready to maintain that the Revolution had ushered in that golden age which the philosophers dreamed of. To find the middle way between reaction and change, to reconcile liberty and authority—to "nationalize royalty and to royalize France," as Decazes formulated the problem—was therefore a principal motive.

And historians, for the most part, reflect this practical motive; even French historians, balancing the evils of the Revolution against its benefits; hitting upon this or that aspect of the Revolution as *the* Revolution, and regarding all else as a betrayal of it. The favorite method, among French historians, of reconciling liberty

and authority was embodied in the theory of the Frankish conquest, put into classical form by Augustin Thierry, and to be found in nearly every history written in France before 1830; a theory which appealed to the anti-Teutonic sentiment of the time, and yet justified both the Revolution and the Restoration; for the Revolution did well, according to this theory, in abolishing class distinctions which the meddling Germans had established in the fifth century, but it did ill in substituting for the historic monarchy borrowed republican institutions so unsuited to the kindly nature of Jacques Bonhomme.

In Germany, an even more effective "remedy for the eighteenth century and the malady of vain speculation" was discovered. To bind past and present in indissoluble union by grafting new institutions on old custom was the program of the moderate party; and German jurists and historians furnished a complete justification for this policy in the doctrine of historical continuity. Having no faith in the revolutionary doctrine of natural law and abstract rights, they searched for evidence of such law and rights precisely where it could by no means be found, that is to say, in history; and in history they found, providentially, no natural rights, but only historic rights; right, indeed, they identified with fact, and conceived of true progress in terms of race experience; an experience registered in that predestined succession of events which could never be either greatly accelerated or permanently retarded by conscious effort. This idea, applied to law by Savigny, and to politics by Ranke and his disciples, was the strongest bulwark of that generation against the opposite dangers of revolution and reaction. Jurist and historian, employing critical methods of research which could not be questioned, and basing their conclusions upon the most exhaustive investigation, united in announcing that the French Revolution was a necessary mistake—an event which had done a certain amount of good undoubtedly, but which, by virtue of having departed from approved German precedents, had done it in a very bad manner.

This conception of history found support in the prevailing idealism, which furnished just those basic principles that were necessary to a complete philosophy. For although history was

regarded as a necessary and gradual process, it was not, in the main, regarded as a natural process; not conceived as the result of forces inherent in society, but rather as the expression of God's will, or of the beneficent primal force, clearly manifested in some particular form—in the Church, according to De Maistre; in the State, according to the loyal supporters of the Prussian monarchy; in great men, according to Carlyle; in certain transcendent ideas, according to Ranke and Michelet. It was, therefore, quite legitimate to deal with history as St. Augustine and Bossuet had dealt with it, that is to say, representatively; to select, out of all the past, particular activities, such as political activities, or the acts of heroes, as summing up the whole of history's meaning; or, rather, as revealing that meaning progressively; for history was to be understood, also, as the realization of the "one increasing purpose," leading up to certain desired ends—to the Reform bill or the July Monarchy, to the mystical Liberty of Michelet or the Fraternity of Louis Blanc, to the blessings of American federal democracy, to the fostering care of the Hohenzollerns. The quintessence of the historical thinking of the age is in Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, in which the whole life of humanity is seen to be but the projection in time of the Absolute Idea, the *Weltgeist*, "whose works are always good and whose latest work is best."

II

Of the influences which contributed, during the third quarter of the century, to enlarged conception of the content of history, the work of the earlier sociologists was one. Toward the middle of the century, von Mohl and von Stein in Germany, Comte in France, and Spencer in England were defining "society" as something distinct from the state, and fundamental to it. The idea was at least as old as Harrington, but the discoveries of natural science gave it a new significance. Spencer, applying the biological analogy, conceived of society as an organism, in its origin and development conditioned by forces that were inherent, and capable of a purely natural explanation; of which the corollary was that great men, ideas, institutions—the state being one, and perhaps not the most important—were only the particular mani-

festations of history and not its substance. It is true that historians were not then, or ever after, carried away with the notion that society is an organism; but they found it increasingly difficult to maintain, in the old manner, that the sum and substance of history is past politics. Treitschke was in fact defending the doctrine against Lorenz von Stein in Germany before it was officially declared in England, and Freeman's famous epigram was already something of an anachronism when it was adopted as the motto of the *Johns Hopkins Studies*.

Practical conditions, however, had probably more to do with enriching the historian's conception of the content of history than speculative thought; and of these practical conditions, perhaps the most important was the growing complexity of social problems for which the older liberalism furnished no solution. Classical economists and liberal statesmen had hoped that if the state guaranteed individual freedom, of which free contract was an essential element, all would be well. "With the ever-greater realization of this principle," said Gavour, "there must follow a greater welfare for all, but especially for the least favored classes." But it was not to be. Even a "calico millennium," upon which Carlyle poured the vials of his wrath, was not ushered in. Free competition meant free exploitation. Chattel slavery might be abolished in the West Indies, but the existence of wage slavery at Manchester made it clear that the state had something more to do at home than to guarantee free contract. In England, indeed, the factory legislation antedated the free-trade budget; and in every country, from the middle of the century, problems of government became increasingly economic and social in their nature. Even the political historian, therefore, seeing with his own eyes how much industrial conditions had to do with present politics, could with difficulty avoid the conclusion that they might have had something to do with past politics as well.

The economists themselves proved to the historian that this was so. John Stuart Mill, the greatest of the classical school, pointed out the weakness of the *laissez-faire* theory. According to some, the remedy for false theory was more theory, and they

labored to found the new science of sociology. Others felt that less theory was the thing. Roscher, borrowing his method from history, founded the school of economic historians, whose fruitful researches made it clear, to them at least, that political history and the fate of governments were mainly determined by the material interests. The theory of the *Economic Interpretation of History* followed in due time. Without committing themselves to the theory, historians admitted, willingly enough, the importance of the results of economic research for the understanding of history.

The economists were not alone in borrowing the historical method. Everyone borrowed it. Disciples inspired by the enthusiasm of Jacob Grimm traced the history of language. Scherer and Sainte-Beuve, renouncing dogmatic canons, interpreted literature as the product of time and place. Baur and the Tübingen school of theology applied the principle of relativity to dogma. The great Hegel himself distilled the acid which dissolved his own absolutism; and philosophers who could not follow Schopenhauer into pessimism turned themselves into historians and wrote histories of philosophy instead of philosophies of history. What, then, was to become of history proper, every part of the past having been appropriated by some special discipline? In those days, many were favorably impressed with the splendid paradox of Seeley, that since everything was history there was no need of historians. But historians themselves, instead of surrendering their subject, enlarged it. Since every aspect of life and thought can be so profitably studied in the light of its past, it must be, they said, that every aspect of a people's past contributes to its history.

And after all, this conclusion was of undoubted orthodoxy. For Savigny had conceived of law as the expression of the whole life of a people, something to be discovered by jurists rather than imposed by statesmen. If so, then it was natural to suppose that the state, which declared the law, must itself be the product of the national life. But the logic of events was needed to prove this corollary. It was characteristic of the earlier liberalism to make a fetish of constitutions, to think of liberty as a recorded

definition rather than as a living fact.[1] The spirit of the generation of 1830 is revealed in Guizot, with solemn confidence battening down explosive social forces under a revised charter; in Macaulay, resting the edifice of human happiness upon the fragile foundation of a reform bill; in Webster and Calhoun, regarding the Union as the product of the Constitution, a union created by definition, existing, one might suppose, mainly for dialectical purposes. But the events of 1848 and after made it clear that the life of nations could not be run in the rigid mold of written law or formulated custom. Bismarck, Cavour, and Lincoln all held to a higher law than constitutions or resolutions of parliaments. This higher law, which determined states and constitutions, was seen to be the nation itself. The unification of Germany, Italy, and the United States, by triumphantly demonstrating the reality of national sentiment, made it difficult to deny that a state as John Richard Green said, "is accidental, it can be made or unmade; but a nation is something real which can be neither made nor destroyed."[2]

These conditions, which it has seemed worth while to present in a single view, were doubtless only the more general and obvious influences which have contributed during the last half-century to enlarge the historian's conception of the content of history. In this respect, their effects were not, it need hardly be said, precisely the same everywhere, or everywhere felt at the same time. The earliest marked revival of interest in what may be called culture history was in Germany, during the two decades after 1850—a revival mainly inspired by the social ferment of the revolutionary movement, but partly also by interest in classical studies. German enthusiasm for classical antiquity, especially on its aesthetic side, which dates from Winckelmann, and was so immensely stimulated by Goethe, led naturally to the study of classical and Renaissance

[1] The point of view is well expressed by Lieber, writing in 1853: "Our age is stamped by no characteristic more deeply than by a desire to establish and extend freedom in the political societies of mankind. . . . . The first half of our century has produced several hundred political constitutions, some few of substantial and stirling worth, ... but all of them testifying to the endeavors of our age, and plainly pointing to the high problem that must be solved."—*On Civil Liberty and Self-Government*, p. 2 (ed. 1859).

[2] Stephens, *Letters of John Richard Green*, p. 391.

history. Grote had his own reasons for being interested in political history; but German historians who came to the subject through art or archaeology could hardly miss the importance of other aspects of Greek or Roman society. Curtius,[1] who was associated with Brandis and Otfried Müller, was the first historian to deal adequately with the aesthetic side of Greek civilization; and it was Friedländer, a classical philologist, archaeologist, and Homeric critic, whose *Sittengeschichte*[2] made the empire something more than a list of good and bad emperors, and prepared the way for the later work of Marquardt[3] in Germany, and the less comprehensive but excellent work of Mr. Dill[4] and Ward Fowler[5] in England. Burckhardt was a pupil of Kugler, and came to history through the study of art history. In 1860 he published *Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien*, which Lord Acton pronounces "the most penetrating and subtle treatise on the history of civilization that exists in literature." It was followed, seven years later, by a second work on the same period, the *Geschichte der Renaissance in Italien*. In 1854 a lesser man than Burckhardt, Gregorovius, compounded of Goethe, Hegel, and the social ferment of 1848, was in Italy, already possessed of the idea for his history of the Roman city,[6] which was to reveal the persistence of classical influences through the Middle Ages.

During the same period the revolutionary movement was having its effects upon the study of national history. After the collapse of the Revolution, Riehl, who had been a member of the German National Assembly, began the publication of his *Naturgeschichte*,[7] a comprehensive and valuable study of German civiliza-

[1] *Griechische Geschichte* (3 vols.), 1857–67.

[2] *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms in der Zeit von August bis zum Ausgang der Antonine*, 1862.

[3] *Romische Staatsverwaltung* (3 vols.), 1873–78; *Das Privatleben der Romer*, 1879–82.

[4] *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, 1898; *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, 1905.

[5] *Social Life at Rome in the Age of Cicero*, 1909.

[6] *Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter*, 1859–72; English Translation in 13 vols., 1894–1900.

[7] *Die Naturgeschichte des Volkes als Grundlage einer deutschen Social-Politik*, 1851–69.

tion. Freytag, one of the editors of the liberal journal *Die Grenzboten*, and the author of comedies and novels which celebrate the virtues of the common people, published the brilliant *Ausbilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit* between the years 1859 and 1867. At the same time Janssen was preparing for his monumental work on the German Reformation.[1] It was in 1854 that he expressed to Böhmer his intention of studying the history of the German people in a broader way than had been done—"not to give marked preference to so-called leading state events, but to depict the German national life in all its varying conditions."[2] It need hardly be said that the work itself, supplemented by many others, has shown us how much more there was in the Reformation than is revealed in Banke's *Zeitalter*.

In France, the immediate effect of the failure of the Revolution was to destroy the prestige of the liberal historians: Thiers, "concealing his opinion of Napoleon in twenty volumes" in order to contrast the achievements of the Emperor with the failures of the Citizen King; Michelet, waving the mantle of Danton; Lamartine, alternately preaching Girondin republicanism and defending Robespierre against the Rolands; Louis Blanc, proving that Fraternity was destined to be the last happy state of humanity. During the Empire conservative historians turned to the eighteenth century to see if it was as bad as painted by these writers. But the good side of the Old Régime was to be found only if one left the beaten path of external political history, court intrigue, diplomacy, and wars; and its rehabilitation, begun by De Tocqueville[3] and Le Play[4] and continued later by Taine,[5] Sorel,[6] and many lesser men, such as Babeau,[7] involved, therefore, much attention to social history; to the condition of agriculture and industry,

[1] Not published, however, till many years later; *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters* (8 vols.), 1878–94.

[2] From the preface to the 15th German edition of the *Geschichte*.

[3] *L'ancien régime et la Révolution*, 1856.

[4] *La reform sociale*, 1864.

[5] *L'ancien régime*, 1876.

[6] *L'Europe et la Révolution francaise: les mœurs politiques et les traditions*, 1885.

[7] *Le village sous l'ancien régime*, 1878; *La ville sous l'ancien régime*, 1880; *La vie rurale dans l'ancienne France*, 1883; *Les artisans et les domestiques d'autrefois*, 1886; *Les bourgeois d'autrefois*, 1886.

popular education and religious life, the practical as well as the intellectual aspects of the humanitarian movement. The work of De Tocqueville, especially if we include the *Democracy in America*, was perhaps the most important influence, of a literary character, in directing the attention of French historians to those aspects of history which the admirers of the Revolution had neglected.

Religion, more especially, had been regarded by the earlier French historians as a negligible quantity—after the manner of Voltaire. Fustel de Coulanges, who renounced the liberal tradition in so many respects, aimed to show, in his brilliant *Cité Antique*, published in 1864, that religion, so far from being a negligible quantity, furnished the key which alone would unlock the secrets of history, at least so far as the classical world was concerned. The works of Renan,[1] who was less easily seduced by a neat hypothesis, were even more effective in revealing the intimate connection between religious belief and intellectual development, and the influence upon both of social conditions. And Taine's *History of English Literature*, published in 1863, was of similar import. Designed as an application of the author's scientific theories to the study of history, it was nevertheless far more successful in revealing the relation of literature and history than it was in propagating the philosophy which is exposed in the introduction. Indeed, the dogmatic manner in which Taine proclaimed his pseudo-scientific theories has somewhat obscured the wide and very real influence of his works. Historians repudiate his philosophy, and criticize his scholarship; but they have adopted the fundamental idea, which all his works enforce, that history is concerned, not merely with political history, but with the whole social life of nations.

And in this respect, his influence was perhaps not less in England than in France. His unblushing hostility to the Revolution, and his frank admiration for English institutions disposed Englishmen to a sympathetic interest in his works, which were in fact immediately translated. They appeared, moreover, at a time when

[1] *Vie de Jesus*, 1863; *Les apôtres*, 1866; *Saint Paul*, 1869; *Les evangiles et les seconde génération chrétienne*, 1877.

social and intellectual conditions in England were directing the attention of English historians to the social and intellectual aspects of the past—the period when public opinion was much occupied with suffrage extension; with social amelioration; with religious reform; with the bearing of scientific rationalism upon conduct and morality: Huxley was warring with bishops, bishops meddling with the higher criticism; Lecky was occupied with the history of rationalism and morals,[1] and Goldwin Smith beginning to be troubled by the riddle of existence in a way not to be suspected by those who had listened, in 1860, to his Oxford lectures; Ruskin, who had settled the question of free will at the age of ten by jumping up and down the nursery stairs, was arraigning English society in *Fors Clavigera*—the period between the publication of *Ecce Homo* and *Robert Elsmere*, when John Richard Green, so susceptible to all the influences of the time, discovered that one could not understand the history of the English bishops without understanding the whole life of the English people.

The influences which produced such works as Riehl's and Burckhardt's in Germany were without much effect upon English scholarship in the two decades after 1850; and in the seventies Green and Lecky were therefore pioneers in exploring the broader field of history. Green's friendly quarrel with Freeman over what he called "pragmatic and external history" may be followed in the correspondence. "The question between us," he says, "is a strictly historical one. It is simply whether history is to deal with only one set of facts and documents relating to a period, or with all the facts and documents it can find."[2] In the *Short History*, which appeared in 1874, he attempted to deal with all the facts—"to pass lightly over details of foreign wars and diplomacy, the personal adventures of kings and nobles, the pomp of courts, or the intrigue of favorites, and to dwell at length on the incidents of that constitutional, intellectual, and social advance in which we read the history of the nation itself." Three years later Lecky found it necessary, since "the history of a nation may

[1] *History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe*, 1865; *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne*, 1869.

[2] *Letters of John Richard Green*, p. 360.

be written in so many ways," to indicate the way in which h proposed to deal with the eighteenth century: "It has been my object to disengage from the great mass of facts those which relate to the permanent forces of the nation, or which indicate some of the more enduring forces of the national life."[1] How much the knowledge of English history has been enriched, since the days of Green and Lecky, by the study of its economic and social aspects, need not be detailed; the works of Seebohm and Maitland, of Gross and Vinogradóff, of Trevelyan, Mr. Rose, and Spencer Walpole, to mention no others, are known to everyone.

Historical scholarship in America, apart from the work of Bancroft, Motley, Prescott, and Hildreth, scarcely begins before 1870; and for a generation the influence of Ranke and Freeman was very considerable, so that the broader conception of the content of history began to make its way here later even than in England. And since the importance of intellectual and religious development has been comparatively slight, apparently at least, historians, in abandoning the purely political point of view, have limited themselves for the most part to exhibiting the influence of economic and social conditions upon political history. For this purpose, American history presented exceptional opportunities, especially in respect to the Colonial period and the period from 1815 to 1860. The result is that in the last twenty years the active study of the economic basis of the Colonial system has radically changed the interpretation of Colonial and Revolutionary history popularized by Bancroft; while the "high aerial route," by which von Holst formerly conveyed us through the middle period, has been abandoned, and innumerable students, inspired by such teachers as Turner and McMaster, are now opening a new way through the wilderness by minute and special investigations into the economic and social basis of national expansion.

After 1870, generally speaking, the main drift and tendency in Germany and France was rather toward special investigation than toward general works of a constructive character. For two decades the *Mark* controversy and the question of feudal origins was of central interest; but attention to every aspect of national

[1] *History of England in the Eighteenth Century* (1878–90,) I, Preface.

history has steadily increased, especially in recent years, as religious and social problems have become more prominent. German and French historians, indeed, have abandoned the political point of view rather more completely than English or American historians—a fact which may be illustrated by referring to certain comprehensive works which have appeared during the last twenty years.

Even Treitschke, who denied that society was more than the state, described every aspect of national life when he came, in his old age, to write the history of Germany in the nineteenth century.[1] Other conservative historians, untainted by Prussian chauvinism, have naturally departed much farther from the earlier ideal. Of these, the ablest is Alfred Stern, whose monumental *Geschichte Europas*[2] is now appearing, six volumes, covering the period from 1815 to 1848, having been published. Based upon the most exact investigation of a wide range of sources, it deals with literature and religion, the industrial revolution, and the rise of social theories, as well as with problems of government and diplomacy; and it deals with them in no perfunctory spirit, but as altogether necessary to an understanding of the history of Europe in the nineteenth century.

At the same time the subject of *Kulturgeschichte*, so successfully studied in the earlier period by Burckhardt and Riehl, has become the predominant interest in Germany. This has been due partly to the reconstruction of early Greek history, which has been made possible by the discovery of new archaeological material and the study of anthropology and comparative religion.[3] But it is due principally no doubt to the remarkable work of Lamprecht, whose *Deutsche Geschichte*[4] led to a pamphlet war,[5] unprecedented perhaps even in Germany. The work of Lamprecht is important from the point of view of method, as well as from the point of view of the

[1] *Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, 1879–89.

[2] *Geschichte Europas seit den Verträgen von 1815 bis zum Frankfurter Frieden von 1871* (6 vols.), 1894–1911.

[3] The most important work in this respect is Eduard Meyer's *Geschichte des Altertums* (5 vols.), 1894–1902.

[4] *Deutsche Geschichte*, 1891–1909.

[5] Pirenne, "Une polémique historique en Allemagne," *Revue historique*, LXIV, 50; Dow, "Features of the New History," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, III, 431.

content of history. Of Lamprecht's method, something will be said presently. Here it is only necessary to say that the *Deutsche Geschichte* assumes in the most thoroughgoing way that history has to do with every aspect of the social life of man in the past. The new school, without occupying the commanding position which the Berlin school held in the days of Droysen and Sybel, is no longer on the defensive in Germany,[1] where the publication of culture histories is now the order of the day.

In France, the establishment of the Third Republic was followed by a renewed study of the Revolution, which now receives more attention than any other phase of national history. To the Revolution, indeed, the French bring all their difficulties, hoping to find in it their original cause or their final solution. Recent religious and ecclesiastical problems have accordingly inspired, or have at least been accompanied by, many studies of the religious aspects of the Revolution, notably those of Bere,[2] Sicard,[3] Champion,[4] Gorce,[5] and, more especially, Mathiez.[6] But as the chief problems in France, as in other countries, are now economic and social, the economic and social side of the Revolution is the one which receives most attention. The comprehensive *Histoire socialiste*,[7] written mainly by Jaurès, and written for the working men of France, but for all that one of the best histories of the Revolution yet written, is significant of the main drift and tendency. It was Jaurès indeed who suggested the appointment of the commission, appointed in fact by the minister of public institution with Jaurès at its head, which now has in hand the publication of what will eventually be one of the most valuable collections of

[1] At present, the controversy rather centers in certain differences between different representatives of the new school. Meyer, for example, maintains against Lamprecht that the great man may be an original force in history.

[2] *Le clergé de France pendant la Révolution*, 1901.

[3] *L'ancien clergé de France* (2 vols.).

[4] *La separation de l'Eglise et de l'état en 1794*, 1903.

[5] *Histoire religieuse de la Révolution française*, 1909.

[6] *Les origines des cults révolutionnaire*, 1904; *La Theophilanthrope et le culte décadaire*, 1904; *Rome et le clergé français sous la Constituéant*, 1911; *Les conséquences religieuses de la journée du 10 août, 1792*, 1911.

[7] No date. First volume appeared in 1901.

documents for French history; a collection. that is to say, which is designed to furnish the completest understanding possible of the economic and social conditions of France at the opening of the Revolution, and of the changes that were effected between 1789 and 1800. Happily, the commission is not composed of politicians, or the editing intrusted to the "Chef du bureau des proces-verbaux" and the "Bibliothécaire-adjoint de la Chambre des Députés." That the commission is composed of some of the ablest and most prominent French historians is an indication of their interest in social and economic history.[1]

But the attitude which French historians are coming to take toward the content of history may be best indicated perhaps by referring to certain general histories published during the last twenty years. To this task they have not, indeed, brought the method of Lamprecht; they have not written culture histories, but they have written histories of civilization; the latter being, nevertheless, very much like the former with the theory omitted. One of the works I have in mind is the *Historie gênérale*, of which the first volume appeared in 1893. In the preface to this volume, the editors, Lavisse and Rambaud, acknowledge their obligation to Duruy, who, as early as 1863, asserted that "l'histoire-bataille n'est pas tout," and announce their intention to place "au premier rang les faits qui intéressant, comme disait Voltaire, 'les mœurs et l'esprit des nations.'" This ideal was undoubtedly more difficult to attain in a history of Europe than in a history of some particular country, such as France; and has in fact been attained much better in M. Rambaud's brief *Histoire de la civilisation française*, and in the more comprehensive *Histoire de France*,[2] recently completed under the editorship of M. Lavisse. In these works the whole history of France is divided into certain distinct periods, each possessing a certain unity in itself; at least each period is treated on that assumption; treated, therefore, descriptively,

[1] *Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire économique de la Révolution française, publié par le Ministere de l'Instruction publique.* The commission, which was appointed in 1903, includes such well-known historians as Aulard, Lavisse, Levasseur, Sagnac, Bloch, and Esmein. The publication of the *cahiers*, and of documents having to do with the acquisition and sale of the national lands, is being actively prosecuted.

[2] 9 vols., 1905–10.

from the point of view of its political, intellectual, religious, aesthetic, economic, and social characteristics. The aim has been, "not to relate how the battle of Bouvines was won or that of Poitiers lost, but to sketch the history of the nation itself, in all its elements: to show how our ancestors lived, and by what activities [*labeurs*] they prepared the happier life which we enjoy"—to write, that is to say, "the history of French civilization."[1]

To exhibit the growth of civilization, to trace the evolution of society—most historians today would probably agree that the ultimate aim of history is to do something of that sort. But it is doubtless true that historians, for the most part, have not defined very precisely the meaning of the term "society," or of the term "evolution" as applied to society. Certainly many difficulties lie hidden in this harmless looking phrase "evolution of society," difficulties which recent attempts to write comprehensive histories, such as those just mentioned, are beginning to reveal. What some of these difficulties are may be suggested by pointing out the influences which, since the middle of the last century, have transformed the earlier conception of history in respect to synthesis and interpretation.

III

That history became "scientific" in the third quarter of the nineteenth century was probably due as much to the influence of Ranke as to the influence of natural science. Ranke set forth his method of dealing with the sources in 1824.[2] His merit was straightway recognized by the Prussian government, but for some years his influence was confined mainly to his pupils, of whom Giesebrecht and Waitz were the most famous. Even in Germany his works were severely handled on all sides; he was too conservative to satisfy the liberals, while Droysen classed him with the romantics. Nevertheless, his history of the popes[3] gave him an international reputation, and the *Zeitalter der Reformation*[4] became

[1] Rambaud, *Histoire de la civilisation française*, I, Preface.

[2] *Zur Kritik neuerer Geschichtschreiber*, 1824.

[3] *Die römischen Päpste, ihre Kirche und ihr Staat im 16ten und 17ten Jahrhundert.*

[4] *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation* (6 vols.), 1839–49.

a German classic. Whatever might be thought of his interpretation, the value of his critical methods could not be denied, and before the middle of the century they became the basis of the exact and laborious scholarship of the most famous school of German historians.

The influence of German scholarship was felt in England from the time of Coleridge and Carlyle, who revealed to Englishmen the value of a language, the existence of which Dr. Johnson might have denied, and which Gibbon could not use and did not need to. In 1830 Niebuhr was enthroned at Oxford, where he remained till replaced by Mommsen twenty years later.[1] Ranke's *Popes* was translated into English and given the prestige of a review by Macaulay.[2] The admiration of mid-century Germans for English institutions found its complement in English appreciation for German scholarship and in loyalty to the German *Mark*. In the fifties, Lord Acton was laying the foundation, at Munich and Berlin, for his immense learning; Bishop Stubbs was preparing to apply the methods of Waitz to the study of the English constitution; and in 1860 Freeman retired to Somerleaze, there to instruct his countrymen in the great dogmas of unity and continuity, and to assure them, at some length, that in Germany Froude would scarcely be considered a historian, or Kingsley have been made a professor. About the same time, the first American pilgrims were coming home to establish seminars in the spirit of the master.

In France, the influence of German historical methods was slight until the collapse of the Revolution of 1848 drove the radicals to cover and exposed the vain prophesies of the liberal historians. Of those who had pinned their faith to the Revolution, many turned from it in fear or disgust, because, like Quinet, they felt that it had betrayed their hopes, or because, like Lamartine, they had seen the shade of Robespierre in the streets of Paris. The lyric note had already ceased in France when the siege of Paris proved past dispute that exact and critical scholarship, even when employed in the chauvinistic spirit of the later Berlin school, had

[1] Cf. Freeman, *Historical Essays*, 2d series, p. 318.

[2] *The Ecclesiastical and Political History of the Popes of Rome during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.* Translated by Sarah Austin. 3 vols. 1840. Macaulay's review appeared in October of the same year, *Edinburgh Review*, LXXII, 227.

surprised more of history's secret than the genius of Michelet. And already French scholars were crossing the Rhine to learn German methods. It was in 1867, when Duruy was reorganizing the schools of France, that the young Gabriel Monod, returning from Göttingen and Berlin, set himself to inspire two generations of French students with the ideals which Ranke had bequeathed to Giesebrecht and Waitz.

But undoubtedly the critical methods of Ranke would have less easily conquered the world of historians, had it not been for the rising influence of natural science. The work of Malthus, which acquired peculiar significance toward the middle of the century, the work of Comte, Quitelet, Buckle, and Marx, the work of Spencer and Darwin, all seemed to point to a positive and materialistic explanation of man and society. The possibility of a "science of history" was accordingly a much-mooted question about 1860; and historians found themselves between the devil and the sea: must they acknowledge themselves mere literary people, hoping for nothing better than to elevate history to the dignity of romance; or, renouncing their former ways, become sociologists in good earnest and set themselves, after the manner of Buckle, the task of reducing history to the rank of a science? They chose to do neither. Droysen[1] and Lord Acton,[2] Goldwin Smith,[3] even Charles Kingsley[4] in his way, undertook to refute the "science" of Comte and Buckle; and the first two were generally thought, by historians at least, to have succeeded. In this controversy it was Ranke, a most acceptable alternative to Buckle, who taught historians how to be scientific without ceasing to be historical.

Nevertheless, "scientific history," which became the watchword of historians from this time on, implied something more than the adoption of Ranke's critical methods of research; it implied

[1] Droysen's criticism of Buckle appeared originally in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1862. Translated by E. B. Andrews, and included with his translation of the *Grundriss der Historik* in *Outline of the Principles of History*, 1893.

[2] Two articles published in *The Rambler*, 1858; reprinted in *Historical Essays and Studies*, 1907.

[3] One of his Oxford lectures delivered in 1859–61, *On the Study of History*, p. 45.

[4] *The Limits of Exact Science as Applied to History*, 1864.

a particular point of view in respect to interpretation as well, a point of view which was not precisely that of Ranke. To be scientific was to assume, in respect to historical events, the objective and detached attitude of mind with which the scientist regarded natural phenomena. "The historian," said Taine, "may be permitted the privilege of the naturalist: I have observed my subject as one might observe the metamorphosis of an insect."[1] Doubtless many historians, like Taine himself, were more thoroughgoing in theory than in practice; but all agreed that the first duty was to avoid the warping effects of religious or party bias, the insidious influence of temperamental prepossessions, the alluring temptation to read into the facts any meaning suggested by a preconceived theory.

Undoubtedly Ranke's ideal of impartiality was a high one, and his freedom from religious and political bias sufficiently complete; but the "scientific historian" could no longer adhere, in the interpretation of history, to his favorite doctrine of ideas. Apart from any scientific theories about man, it was difficult, indeed, considering the marked success of Machiavellian politics in this period, not to think that Providence favored big battalions rather than ideas. An interpretation of history, on the biological analogy, as a conflict of forces in which the strongest prevailed, was therefore well suited to explain the fall of Louis Napoleon, or to justify the success of Bismarck and Cavour. Perhaps industrial exploitation and Machiavellian politics were after all only the natural and necessary results of the struggle for existence, leading to the survival of the fittest, the policy of "blood and iron" as beneficent in the end as the methods of Nature "red in tooth and claw.".

It was not indeed difficult for historians to adapt themselves to this point of view. The earlier conception was sufficiently fatalistic, and it needed only to put Nature in the place of God, to transform ideas into force, and the change was complete. Doubtless the germ of the later theory is in Savigny; and we are told that Droysen learned from Hegel how to justify success, and that Marx founded his materialistic interpretation upon a dialectic borrowed from the same high authority. Giesebrecht's attitude

[1] *L'ancien régime* (1876), Preface.

of aloofness implied that whatever got itself well established was doubtless right as long as it prevailed; and if you conceive of Carlyle's great man as the product of Nature instead of the agent of God, his philosophy is, what it was so often said to be, the assertion that might makes right, for it justifies equally Cromwell and Charles II, Henry IV in proclaiming the Edict of Nantes and Louis XIV in revoking it.

However that may be, scientific history, renouncing philosophy altogether, aimed to free itself from the taint of teleological explanation, and set about studying the past "as something worth knowing for itself and the truth's sake."[1] And to do this it was above all necessary to eliminate the present, its needs and desires, its passions, its hopes and fears—"Histories should be prepared with as much supreme indifference as if they were written in another planet," according to Renan.[2] Previous historians had not done this. They had studied the past from the point of view of the present, and on that rock they had split—"The way in which Macaulay and Forster regarded the past—that is to say, the constant avowed or unavowed comparison of it with the present—is altogether destructive of real historical knowledge," according to Samuel Rawson Gardiner.[3]

But after all, why study the dead past for its own sake? Precisely for the sake of the present! And this paradox concealed an initial prepossession and a philosophy. To study the past for its own sake, without prepossessions, was itself a prepossession. A splendid hypothesis, "avowed or unavowed," inspired confidence in the value of the fact for the truth's sake. This hypothesis was implicit in the doctrine of continuity. The doctrine of continuity was not new; but it had formerly been conceived mainly as the progressive realization of certain ideas; whereas scientific history, banishing ideas as a motive force, and concerning itself with the "fact," sought for the continuity of history in external action, and conceived of the present as the product of the past in the sense of being the last event in a connected series of events. History, thought of as a kind of objective reality, seemed a wonder-

[1] Stubbs, *Lectures on Mediaeval and Modern History*, p. 26.

[2] *The Apostles* (Trans. 1880), p. 44. [3] *History of England* (1884), Preface.

fully solid, almost material, thing; something needing only to be "reconstructed" to stand visible: much as if the facts of history were a number of blocks which had fallen down; which might be set up again; and which, once set them up in the order, precisely, in which they had originally stood, would spell out an intelligible word. Let the historian set up the blocks! Strictly speaking, it was not for him to interpret, but to reveal. "It is not I who speak, but history which speaks through me," was Fustel's reproof to applauding students. And again: "Il se peut sans doute qu'une certaine philosophie se dégage de cette histoire scientifique, mais il faut qu'elle dégage naturellement, d'elle même, presque en dehors de la volonté de l'historien"[1]—a splendid theory, doubtless naïve in the extreme, and impossible to be applied by any one, certainly not by Fustel de Coulanges; but amounting, in practice, to this, that everything which got itself established was judged to be necessary where it existed and so long as it lasted; so that the importance of a fact would be measured, speaking from the point of view of an ideal reconstruction, in terms of its extension in time and space. If, for example, certain facts, which for convenience we call the Catholic church, persisted throughout western Europe for several centuries, exerting an influence in some proportion to their extension and persistence, it must have been because they were adapted to the conditions there and during that period; they must have been fittest to survive; the reason for supposing that they were fittest to survive, and adapted to the conditions, being precisely the fact that they did persist throughout western Europe for several centuries. The presumption would of course be "in favor of the church against the sects because the sects came to unspeakable grief, and in favor of the Reformation against Rome because the reformers were successful." "I consider," said Albert Sorel, "that my work will not have been useless if I can achieve this result: to show that the French Revolution, which appeared to many as the subversion, and to others as the regeneration of the old European world, was the natural and necessary result of the history of Europe."[2]

[1] Quoted in *English Historical Review*, V, 1.

[2] *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, I, 8.

This attitude of objectivity—the thoroughgoing renunciation of the present, the disposition to reconstruct the past as a whole, to know it for itself alone, to "justify that which is just by the judgment of experience"—undoubtedly this attitude was well suited to the spirit of the two decades after 1870. The resplendent vision of Perfectibility, vouchsafed to the generous minds of the eighteenth century, was much dimmed after 1815, and again after 1848. In the sixties, the evolutionary philosophy fell like a cold douche upon the belief in progress through conscious effort. The theory that man is one with Nature was an old one, but the work of Darwin seemed to furnish a positive demonstration of theories which had hitherto rested on a purely speculative foundation. The biological law of evolution, especially as applied to society by Spencer, indicated that progress, if there was such a thing, could come only through the operation of mechanical forces. Man himself, at best hardly more than a speck of sentient dust, a chance deposit on the surface of the world, might observe the laws of development, but could neither modify nor control them. Materialism had its day in science, pessimism in philosophy, naturalism in literature; religion seemed a spent force. When all the old foundations were crumbling, historians held firmly to the belief that facts at least could not be denied; and in these days of acrid controversy, the past, studied for itself, as a record of facts which undoubtedly happened, was a kind of neutral ground, an excellent refuge for those who wished to sit tight and let the event decide.

But the mood of those years is definitely passing. During the last two decades there has been a revival of faith in the possibility of social regeneration, a revival, one might almost say, of the optimistic spirit of the eighteenth century. Out of the wreck of old creeds, there is arising a new faith, born of science and democracy, almost the only vital conviction left to us—the profound belief, namely, in progress; the belief that society can, by taking thought, modify the conditions of life, and thereby indefinitely improve the happiness and welfare of all men. As this faith strengthens, it finds expression in the imperative command that

knowledge shall serve purpose, and learning be applied to the solution of the "problem of human life." And so there comes, ever more insistently, this question: What light does the past throw on the present and the future? The answer to this question is what our age demands of the social sciences.

And to this question the social sciences are giving heed. Long ago Ihering broke with the Savigny tradition, and conceived of jurisprudence as a science of rights as well as a knowledge of law. Sociologists have emancipated themselves from Spencerian fatalism. Economics, having turned from theory to history, is returning, in some measure, to theory; but to a theory immensely enriched, flavored with ethics. In a recent book, I find the "new economics" defined as the science of human welfare rather than as the science of wealth. Philosophy, which natural science, in the heyday and flush of its tawdry intolerance, so carefully interred forty years ago, has come to life again; and its first conscious act has been to announce, in metaphysical and poetical form, a definition of time which frees the will from deterministic shackles, and a conception of history which liberates the present from slavish dependence on the past.

The study of history is bound to be, and has been already, influenced by this new faith in progress and the possibility of social regeneration. It is becoming clear that the past, regarded as an objective reality, is an abstraction; that the facts, simply restored to their original position, convey no intelligible meaning; that it profits us little to know that the present is what it is because the past was what it was. And so historians are coming, very slowly indeed, but certainly, to regard the past in a new way, or perhaps in an old way. It cannot indeed be said that they are growing either metaphysical or poetical in their conception of the past; but in the statement of Professor Robinson that the time has come when the present should "turn on the past and exploit it in the interest of advance," I see only a more militant assertion of Maeterlinck's idea that "past events do not control us except in so far as we have renounced our right to control them. Perhaps not many historians would subscribe to Professor Robinson's confession of faith; but many are ready to welcome new methods of

interpretation which promise to bring our knowledge of the past to bear more directly and more effectively on the present than the prevailing method has been able to do.

Now, if purpose is to direct knowledge, we must be aware of purpose. If we are to control events and not be controlled by them, it is first of all necessary to know to what end we would control them. If we are to exploit the past in the interest of advance, we need to know what is advance. And this means that the importance of the fact can no longer be measured by the fact itself; it must, on the contrary, be judged by some standard of value derived from a conception of what it is that constitutes social progress—some tentative hypothesis, or conception of moral quality, or present practical purpose. Let us see, then, if it is possible to find, in recent historical works, or in the expression of opinion by historians, any disposition to set up such standards for purposes of interpretation.

"History, in the higher sense of the word," says Mr. Chamberlain, "means only that past which still lives actively in the consciousness of man and helps to mold him." And in his *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* he has attempted to give, "not a history of the past, but merely of that past which is still living,"[1] Whatever historians may think of Mr. Chamberlain's performance, it cannot be denied that many are disposed to sympathize with his ideal; a disposition which finds practical expression in the tendency to emphasize only or principally those aspects of the past which have an obvious connection with the present, to deal more fully with the recent past than with the remote past, or to seek in the remote past situations analogous to those of the present. The latter method of interpretation, which is only a kind of recrudescence of the old theory of cycles, has been made much of by Ferrero.[2]

[1] *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, 1899; English translation by John Lees, 1911.

[2] "I hope that my book has enabled me to demonstrate that the Roman world conquest, ... was in reality the effect, remarkable, indeed, for its special conditions of time and place, of an internal transformation which is continually being re-enacted in the history of societies on a larger or a smaller scale, promoted by the same causes and with the same resultant confusion and suffering—the growth of a nationalist and industrial democracy on the ruins of a federation of agricultural aristocracies."—*The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, I, Preface.

A more direct method of bringing our knowledge of the past to bear on the present is represented by the recent work of Mr. Firth on *The House of Lords during the Civil War*, which appeared two years ago when the conflict between the Commons and the Lords was at its height. The bearing of the work on that controversy is obvious; but the author did not press the analogy, and it was only in its timeliness that the book departed from accepted principles of interpretation.

The case is somewhat different with many recent textbooks in mediaeval and modern history which consciously devote far more space to the recent past than to earlier periods, and in their treatment of the earlier periods neglect those movements which seem to us dead issues, however important they may have seemed to the people who were engaged in them. "In preparing the volume in hand," it is stated in the preface to Robinson and Beard's *Development of Modern Europe*, "the writers have consistently subordinated the past to the present. It has been their ever-conscious aim to enable the reader to catch up with his own times; to read intelligently the foreign news in the morning paper; to know what was the attitude of Leo XIII toward the Social Democrats even if he has forgotten that of Innocent III toward the Albigenses." It is true, as the authors maintain, that this does not involve any "distortion of the facts in order to bring them into relation to any particular conception of the present or its tendencies." Yet it quite clearly implies that the standard for judging the importance of historical facts is the present and its tendencies. Consistently applied, it is a method of interpretation which renounces the attempt to "reconstruct" the past as a whole for its own sake. Conceiving that the past is to be studied, not for itself, but for the present, it assumes that certain events, such, for example, as the Russian campaign, may have had immense importance for understanding the time in which they occurred but are dead for us and for the present, while other events, such as the invention of the steam engine, may have had little importance for understanding the time when they occurred, but have immense importance for us; and assuming this, it asserts that the historian, in telling the story of the past, may legitimately emphasize the

facts according to their importance for our time instead of their own—may legitimately, that is to say, interpret the past in terms of the present.

Two years ago, in an address before the American Historical Association, Professor Turner formulated this conception of the purpose of historical study much better than I can do. He said:

> In the observation of present conditions, we may find assistance in our study of the past. By the revelation of the present, what seemed to be side eddies have not seldom proven to be the concealed entrances to the main current; and the course which seemed the central one has led to blind channels and stagnant waters, important in their day, but cut off like ox-bow lakes from the mighty river of historical progress. . . . . [And therefore] it is important to study the present and the recent past . . . . as the source of new hypotheses, new criteria of the perspective of the remoter past. A just public opinion and a statesmanlike treatment of present problems demand that they be seen in their historical relations in order that history may hold the lamp for conservative reform.[1]

How remote is all this from the attitude of Gardiner—"The avowed or unavowed comparison of the past with the present is altogether destructive of real historical knowledge."

A quite different method of estimating the importance of historical facts is to bring them to the test of some conception of moral quality. The historian who claims the privilege of the naturalist cannot be concerned, strictly speaking, with the quality of actions or events. He may find of course that an action acquires special importance because those whom it concerned attributed to it a certain quality, and were influenced by it accordingly. But for the historian who observes his subject only "as one might observe the metamorphosis of an insect," the circumstance that the men whom he studies judged actions by their quality is itself only another fact to be observed and recorded; he judges none of these facts by their quality, as good or bad, harmful or beneficial, as contributing to progress or making for retrogression. So far as he is concerned, the facts of history have no ethical significance, no qualitative value.

Precisely the opposite of this was maintained by David J. Hill four years ago, before the Congress of Historical Sciences at Berlin,

[1] "Social Forces in American History," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XVI, 217.

in an address entitled "The Ethical Function of the Historian."[1] "The substance with which the history of man is concerned," he said, "is personal conduct, and the reaction of personal conduct upon human development." The function of the historian is, therefore, an "ethical function." Not, to be sure, that the historian should set himself up "as a moral judge"; but "the interest of history does not lie in the fact that so many painters and sculptors lived in a certain period of time and produced so many works, but in the quality of the pictures and statues they created; not in the fact that so many soldiers fought in so many battles and succeeded in killing so many of their number, but in the social purpose for which they fought and the effect of their victory upon human happiness." According to this view of the matter, the historian judges the importance of the fact, not by its extension, but by its quality; and not by the contemporary estimate of its quality, but by his own estimate; he "*explains* the action of a man," as Lord Acton says, "by the standards of the age in which he lived but *judges* it by those of his own." And this, obviously, implies a standard of value not furnished by the facts themselves. The historian must rouse up a brave philosophy of life before venturing to say what was the effect of the battle of Waterloo upon human happiness; he must provide himself with aesthetic canons if he is to estimate the quality of *Mona Lisa* or the *Sistine Madonna*—a difficult business, certainly, for Renan's supremely indifferent man, sitting calmly in Mars, or in the moon.

Perhaps Mr. Hill is not a representative historian. But let me quote, as an illustration of the disposition to interpret history according to the quality of its facts, the following from the preface of a recent book on the Middle Ages.[2] The historian's sympathy, says Mr. Taylor,

> cannot but reach out to those who lived up to their best understanding of life; for who can do more? Yet woe unto that man whose mind is closed, whose standards are material and base. Not only [thus saith the historian to those who make history] shalt thou do what seems well to thee; but thou shalt do right with wisdom. Thou shalt not only be sincere, but thou shalt

[1] *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XIV, 9.

[2] *The Mediaeval Mind* (1911), Preface.

be righteous, and not iniquitous; beneficent and not malignant; loving and lovable, and not hating and hateful. Thou shalt be a promoter of light and not of darkness; an illuminator and not an obscurer. Not only shalt thou seek to choose aright, but at thy peril thou shalt so choose. . . . . And so at *his* peril likewise, must the historian judge. He cannot state the facts and sit aloof, impartial between good and ill, between success and failure, progress and retrogression, the soul's health and loveliness, and spiritual foulness and disease. He must love and hate, and at his peril love aright and hate what is truly hateful.

This is clearly a new note. It might have pleased Lord Acton; but it would assuredly have sounded like sweet bells jangled, out of tune, and harsh, to Ranke, Samuel Rawson Gardiner, or Henry C. Lea. Yet it is the quite deliberate opinion of a professed historian, trained in all the excellent technique of his trade, and the author of books which few historians would deny to be scholarly in every sense of the term.

These are direct and practical methods of bringing our knowledge of the past to bear on the solution of present problems; they are not, however, altogether new methods; and certainly they are somewhat empirical methods, useful rather for dealing with particular aspects of history than with the whole of it. The uncompromisingly philosophic mind, resolutely seeking a complete historical synthesis, requires a more scientific method, and a more inclusive one. Such a method has been discovered in Germany—the method of Lamprecht; a method which I understand to aim at a complete synthesis, omitting nothing; and one which seeks to explain in a new manner, and in a severely scientific manner, exactly how the present is the product of the past. Of Lamprecht's method, I confess to speak with the greatest misgiving, for I am not at all sure that I understand it. But at least it is an attempt to solve the difficult problem of synthesis. One may therefore approach it from that point of view.

The growing interest, among historians, in synthetic problems is, indeed, a notable characteristic of the last two decades. During that period many constructive works, either by individuals or by associated scholars, have been begun or brought to completion. The *Revue de synthèse historique* was established in France in 1900.

Rickert,[1] Xenopol,[2] Berr,[3] and many others have concerned themselves with the theory and the logic of historical synthesis.[4] And it is significant that most of the historians who spoke before the Congress of Arts and Science at St. Louis took occasion to urge the necessity of giving more attention to constructive work, and to interpretation. They seemed also to agree, although differing in many other respects, that the ultimate purpose of the historical synthesis is to exhibit the development of society, or of national life, as a whole, to the end that the present organization of society may be better understood.

Now, one result of recent attempts at constructive work has been to reveal the difficulty of doing just what historians profess to be their ultimate task—the task, that is to say, of exhibiting the evolution of national life, or of society, as a whole. Such works, for example, as the *Histoire générale*,[5] the *American Nation*,[6] and Professor Channing's *History of the United States*[7] aim to deal with all aspects of the national life. But the truth is that these works, excellent as they undoubtedly are, are after all mainly political histories, with a good deal of attention throughout to the influence of economic conditions, and with chapters sandwiched in here and there dealing with literature and other odd ends. Except for the prefaces, one could not easily distinguish them

[1] *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, 1896–1902.

[2] *Les principes fondamentaux de l'histoire*, 1899.

[3] *La synthèse en histoire: essai critique et théorétique*, 1911. This is rather a review of recent discussion than a contribution to theory.

[4] For an excellent brief summary of Rickert, with mention of many other works, see Fling, "Historical Synthesis," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, IX (October, 1903), 1.

[5] "Nous nous garderons de faire entrer uniquement ou principalement ce que notre respecté maître, M. Duruy, appelait l'histoire-bataille: litanies de souverains, séries de combats ou de traités. Nous entendons mettre au premier rang les faits qui intéressant, comme disait Voltaire, 'les mœurs at l'esprit des nations nations'."—*Histoire Générale*, I, Preface.

[6] "Not intended to be simply a political or constitutional history: it must include the social life of the people, their religion, their literature, and their schools. It must include their economic life, occupations, labor systems, and organization of Capital."—*American Nation*, I, editor's introduction to the series.

[7] "The growth of the nation will be treated as one continuous development from the political, military, institutional, industrial, and social points of view."—*History of the United States*, I, Preface.

from histories which frankly profess to be political histories, such as Hunt and Poole's *Political History of England*,[1] or those which have taken to themselves unique titles, such as the *Cambridge Modern History*.

Nor is the difficulty due altogether to predilection for political history, or to ignorance of other things. For the problem is not solved by works which give as much space to social and intellectual conditions as they do to political conditions, such as Rambaud's *Histoire de la civilisation française*, or the *Histoire de France* of M. Lavisse. The problem is to exhibit at once the interaction of all the complex forces which make the nation what it is at any given time, and the process of change by which these forces, acting together, are transforming the nation. But the interaction of political, economic, religious, and intellectual conditions at any given time is not necessarily revealed by simply describing them in turn; and if, as in these works, the whole subject is divided into certain distinct periods, and each period is treated statistically, as it were, the process of growth or evolution is largely lost sight of. These works do not, therefore, trace the evolution of the French civilization or of the French nation. At best, they give us excellent descriptions of various aspects of national life in successive periods.

There is a most suggestive phrase in a letter to Freeman from Green, who was fully aware of this difficulty. He insists that he must deal with the "moral and intellectual facts" as well as with political facts. "And I must deal with them," he says, "much as I have dealt with them in Little Book; that is, I can't muddle them up in corners always."[2] To deal with moral and intellectual facts as well as with political facts was easy enough if one "muddled them up in corners"; but how to fuse them all together in one continuous narrative, revealing at every stage the unity and the

[1] "As the title imports, this history will deal primarily with politics, ... but as the history of a nation is complex, and its condition at any given time cannot be understood without taking into account the various forces acting upon it, notices of religious matters, and of intellectual, social, and economic progress will also find place in these volumes."—*Political History of England*, I, Preface.

[2] *Letters of John Richard Green*, p. 304. "Little Book" was Green's phrase for designating the Short History.

continuity of national life—that was Green's problem. With a wide knowledge of details, possessed of a constructive imagination denied to most men, employing a literary style which even in description always conveys a sense of movement, he solved the problem as well perhaps as it is likely to be solved by anyone who attempts to synthesize the facts of history in terms of their concrete relations.

For in truth this problem raises the question whether a synthesis of facts according to their concrete relations is altogether adequate if the business of the historian is to trace the evolution of society as a whole, or of distinct social groups, such as nations. If society, or a nation, is something more than its external manifestations, an adequate description of it must seek to relate those manifestations which, in their concrete setting, seem to have no connection with each other. It is possible, for example, that there is some underlying connection between the painting by Whistler of Carlyle's portrait and the introduction into Parliament of Gladstone's second Home Rule bill. But the connection, whatever it may be, is not external, and probably no amount of investigation, however accurate, of what actually happened, or any juxtaposition, however ingenious, of concrete descriptions of those events, will reveal it. The connection, if there be one, is not found in the documents. It may, however, be found, hypothetically at least, in the subjective basis of these events; and so the attempt to deal with all the complex activities of men in society, to exhibit at once their interaction and their evolution, leads naturally enough to the search for some ideal connection of the facts—to a method of synthesis which, without necessarily ignoring altogether their actual position in time and space, groups them fundamentally according to common qualities.

And this, to return to the method of Lamprecht, is what I suppose to be the significance of the *Deutsche Geschichte*, which has created such a stir in Germany. Lamprecht took his cue, I believe, from Burckhardt, and I understand that, like Burckhardt, he has attempted to disengage the soul of society, the *social-psyche* from the concrete events, the particular activities of men, in any given period; and this he does by discussing the concrete events,

the particular activities, as results of the psychological forces which are generated by social life: thus he finds, in the *social-psyche*, the underlying connection between the crude delineation of an eagle, the construction of a heroic song, and the Donation of Charlemagne. But Lamprecht goes farther than Burckhardt, for while Burckhardt limited himself to a single period, and was concerned, therefore, only with one problem, the problem of correlating the facts of a single period, Lamprecht surveys the whole of German history and is confronted with the further problem of explaining how the *mass-psyche* of one period is transformed into the *mass-psyche* of the next one: he seeks, that is to say, to exhibit the evolution of the social soul by discovering the "fundamental underlying psychic mechanism" which conditions it.

Those who are interested in guarding frontiers may determine whether Lamprecht is historian or sociologist. It is worth while noting, however, that he did not, like Ferrero, come to the study of history as a psychologist, but that, starting as a historian, it was the purely historical problem of synthesis and interpretation that led him to apply the principles of psychology to history. The success of the method obviously depends very largely upon psychology; it is for psychology to say whether there is a soul of society, to define the concept with as much precision as possible, to determine the process by which it operates, and to formulate methods for detecting and measuring its influence. Assuming that this can be done, it is clear that the method of Lamprecht furnishes at least one solution of the problem I have mentioned—the problem of dealing with society as a whole, of exhibiting at once the unity and the evolution of its varied manifestations.

But in doing this, it does something more; it erects a standard for determining the importance of past events which enables us to bring the past to bear on the present in a new way altogether. By interpreting the series of objective events in terms of psychic development, the present ceases to be the product of the past in the sense of being the last event in a time series of events, and becomes the product of the past in the sense that the actions of men now living are the results of past social experience psychologically transformed. The English Parliament, to take an

example, is, we say, the product of the past; and we try to show this by tracing its continuity in successive external acts from the thirteenth century down. But after all, Lamprecht might say, the English Parliament is an abstraction, and the continuity of the institution, in any external sense, a mere figure of speech. In what sense, then, is it the product of the past? Why, only in the sense that the social experience of the English people, gathered up, as it were, through the course of their history, and cumulatively transmitted from generation to generation, is now effectively producing those psychic reactions which impel Englishmen to act as they do act, at Westminster or elsewhere—impelling Gladstone to introduce a second Home Rule bill, and Whistler to paint the portrait of Carlyle. The continuity of history is thus subjective. Its real substance is social experience deposited in nerve centers. Civilization is understood not as action but as motive to action, and progress is measured by the growing intensity of psychic responses.

In connection with the method of Lamprecht, it is interesting to recall the earlier ideas of Fustel de Coulanges, and notably certain sentences in the preface of the *Cité antique*. "Happily, the past never dies completely for men. Man may forget it, but he keeps it with him always. For, such as he himself is in each epoch, he is the product and *résumé* of all anterior epochs. If he descends into his own soul, he can rediscover there these different epochs, and distinguish them according to the impress which each has made on him." Fustel seems here to have anticipated the fundamental idea of Lamprecht—an idea, however, which he afterward repudiated absolutely.

IV

These are, as it seems to me, some of the ways in which social problems and ideas are influencing the study and writing of history. I am not concerned to pronounce upon the legitimacy of any of the new methods, or to estimate the measure of success with which they have been applied. It is worth noting, however, that they are likely to be much used in the future. Differing in many respects, they seem all inspired by a common motive, the desire,

namely, to appropriate out of the past something which may serve that ideal of social progress which is the sum and substance of our modern faith; and in this respect they are part of the central intellectual movement of the age, of which the most striking feature, perhaps, is the reaction against scientific materialism. It is the philosophers, indeed, rather than the historians, who have popularized the new conception of the past. The past, according to Rudolph Eucken, is not a burden on the present but a power within it—which I understand to mean that knowledge of history is useless except in so far as we can transmute it into motives for effective social service. Maeterlinck has expressed the same idea much better:[1] "Our chief concern with the past is not what we have done or the adventures we have met with, but the moral reactions bygone events are producing within us at this very moment." The *Deutsche Geschichte* might be considered as an exposition of this thesis.

Perhaps it is the *social-psyche* that induces historians, against their will doubtless, to approach within hailing-distance of philosophers. At all events, if it be true that the boundaries which have hitherto set history off from philosophy and the social sciences are being effaced, I think we may regard it as a fortunate circumstance, an indication that historical studies are not destined to run into a barren scholasticism, a most happy augury, therefore, of their future usefulness.

DISCUSSION

Professor Hagerty, Presiding.

ULYSSES G. WEATHERLY, INDIANA UNIVERSITY

Professor Becker's suggestive paper reminds us afresh that history is no longer, as Freeman complained in his day, "the sport of the unlearned." There is a vital difference between history as popularly understood and historical scholarship, and this difference lies chiefly in the fact that historical scholarship takes as its task the interpretation of specific facts of past experience rather than the mere recording of them. The older philosophy of history, now practically bankrupt, did indeed undertake a sort of interpretation, for it sought comprehensive formulas and panoramic effects. Its materials were generalized after a fashion, but they were not wholly generalized. It has remained for sociology to attempt a complete generalization wherein not single

[1] *The Buried Temple*, p. 245.

phenomena or specific sets of phenomena are included, but recurrent phenomena from which laws and relations may be deduced. Ward has said that the philosophy of history bears the same relation to sociology as natural philosophy to physics or natural history to biology. After an era of minute research historical scholars are again turning toward generalization and valuation, as is evidenced by the extent to which they are becoming avowed political scientists. Professor Becker is unquestionably right in saying that history must judge and have ideals. Equally may it be said that the attempts of sociologists to interpret the values that lie in history are fruitful to the extent that they are able to correlate historical facts with the results of all the sciences dealing with human experience. The very emergence of sociology as a separate discipline is doubtless largely due to the growing tendency of all science to take the social point of view.

Sociology shares with history the danger of judging past experience by the more complex standards of the present, and thus of putting into the past the tone and color of the present. This is particularly true of some of the recent attempts at interpreting the psychic and social processes of primitive peoples. Somewhat similar also is the tacit assumption that the men of any previous age were as critical and self-analytical as men now are, that thinking was always subjective. To bridge the gap between the present age of subjectivity and the naïve mental life of the past is one of the most difficult of all feats. Herein lies the significance of Lamprecht's work. His insistence on the *Geistesleben* as the central subject-matter of the historian and his analysis of the social-psychic elements in history have at least made it clear that the historian must go deeper and work harder than has hitherto been imagined. It makes little difference at this point whether we say that the historian must collaborate with the sociologist or that he must actually be a sociologist rightly to perform his task. The chief fact is that the point of view which we are coming to call sociological is the one that is likely to prevail in historical work. Lamprecht's five periods of German social-psychic development doubtless have their parallels in other national histories and even in world-history. This kind of history is dynamic, for it occupies itself not only with the mere processes of social change but with the forces which produce social change. Our point of view with reference to the great-man theory, for instance, has been profoundly affected by this intensive historical study of social forces. The biographical element in history has thus changed focus with the growing insistence on the general and constant elements in the social process. But to the extent that the historian ceases to concern himself primarily with the unique and the specific and turns his thought to the realm of laws and relations he is actually taking the sociological viewpoint, whether he is willing to admit it or not. And the sociologist of the near future is likely to find himself in more sympathetic relation with the historian than has been the case in the past decade. The revulsion from biological sociology has, I believe, carried us as was to be expected far in the direction of a view which is too exclusively psychological. A proper amount of the his-

torical spirit in sociological work will have a wholesome effect in keeping sociology sound and balanced.

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The history of the influence of social problems and ideals upon the study and writing of history has been so ably presented by Mr. Becker that little remains to be said. The consciousness of social unity is coming to be so patent a fact that its multiform manifestations pass almost unnoticed, and yet it is often the obvious and the familar that needs to be enumerated, classified, and catalogued. It may be, therefore, not unreasonable to suggest some of these manifestations, even though the enumeration may in length and in character suggest the Homeric catalogue of ships.

A striking illustration of this consciousness is given in bibliography. In a recent list of American historical societies published by the American Historical Association[1] are included the names of societies dealing with the allied subjects of numismatics, ethnology, archaeology, genealogy, geography, biography, and literature. Guides to the literature of history show the same consciousness. Larned[2] includes sections on geography and physiography, geological and geographical surveys, anthropology, and economics, educational and church history. The special difference between the first and second edition of Channing and Hart's *Guide*[3] is that the recent edition "enlarges and increases the sections on social, economics, and industrial history." The enlargement in the scope of the work has come from the rise of a new school of historians "who followed the immigrant to the factory and the frontiersman to his farm; . . . . who treated the dress, food, and houses of the Americans as indications of their standards of life; who studied their educational systems, reviewed their literature, examined their labor systems, went into their religious life, and tried to present them as they actually lived, moved, quarreled, plowed, and prayed." It therefore follows as a corollary that the *Guide* gives suggestions for uniting the study of history with geography, drawing, debating, drama, pageants, art, literature, museums, political meetings, court sessions, and similar educational and civic activities.

A similar indication is seen in the exhaustive works on the history of history and the methodology of history that have treated the more abstract phases of the subject. Freeman, Bernheim, Langlois and Seignobos, Letelier, and Gross in his *Bibliography* have all attempted to classify the relationship between history and the other subjects, less in an abstract, philosophical sense

[1] *Annual Report*, 1905. Vol. II.

[2] J. N. Larned, ed., *The Literature of American History*, 1902.

[3] E. Channing and A. B. Hart, *Guide to the Study of American History*, 1896; E. Channing, A. B. Hart, and F. J. Turner, *Guide to the Study and Reading of American History*, 1912.

than in the effort to determine how far knowledge of other subjects is essential to the equipment of the historian.

A natural reflection of this attitude of the historian is found in recent works specially dealing with the teaching of history.[1] They emphasize the importance to the teacher of history of an understanding of social and economic conditions and the necessity of a large background of European history in any rational study of American history.

A necessary sequence of this enlargement of horizon has been the preparation for the first time of admirable textbooks in history for the use of both school and college. The textbook is no longer the work of the hack writer, but that of the most distinguished writers and teachers of history, and it not only deals with the political and military events, but it embraces in its survey the industrial, economic, and social phases of life.

This change in the point of view of the textbook is evident not only in the text but also in the illustrations. In the older textbooks, as well as histories, the illustrations were chosen for their picturesque or dramatic effect: they appealed, like the corresponding text, to the imagination and to the love of the novel, even of the sensational. The prospectus of a voluminous history that for many years has had a wide sale and is still much advertised states that, "with the exception of photographs of people and places, the pictures are entirely the work of masters of the modern schools of art." Among the "masterpieces" of these histories and textbooks, earlier in spirit if not in date, were Cleopatra and Caesar, Roland calling for succor, Columbus at the Court of Spain, and Balboa discovering the Pacific Ocean. In sharp contrast to illustrations of this imaginative character are those of recent years that give the actual conditions of life; they show no attempt to write history in pictorial form but rather a desire to furnish additional facts in the form of pictures. Thus S. R. Gardiner gives nearly four hundred illustrations of whatever has concerned the public and the private life of every class in English society, ranging from paleolithic implements, the Roman wall, and a Viking ship to St. George's Hall in Liverpool and the Victoria cross.

But bibliographies and guides to literature, abstract methodology and concrete methods of teaching, textbooks and illustrations of every class, are but the external evidences of the profound change that has come in the conception of the nature and the function of history. This change has in large part been made possible by the application of the principle of division of labor to the writing of history. Formerly the historian collected his own material, passed judgment on the authenticity of manuscripts and on the authoritativeness of all material used; and was compelled to be jack at all the historical trades. Today the trained archivist, the bibliographer, the librarian, the editor of

[1] American Historical Association, *Report of the Committee of Seven*, 1899; *Report of the Committee of Eight*, 1910; *Report of the Committee of Five*, 1910; New England History Teachers Association, *Report on Historical Equipment in Schools and Colleges*, 1913.

manuscripts, and the searcher for material, all place their expert knowledge at his disposal. Formerly, too, the historian was expected to write history that should teach lessons of patriotism or of ethics, that should glorify saints and vilify sinners, that should present a dramatic, even a sensational, picture of the past, that could indeed be made to serve almost any purpose demanded by readers. Today all of these needs, if so they may be considered, are met by other agencies, and the historian, released by division of labor from these tacit obligations to purvey material to others, is left free for his own legitimate task.

What is this task if it be not that of interpreting in terms of the present the meaning of the past in all its manifold activities? It may be indeed that "historians are against their will approaching within hailing-distance of the philosophers." If so, both history and philosophy will mutually be the gainers. If the historian deduces his conclusions from a study of facts while the philosopher assumes a hypothesis and studies facts in the light of this hypothesis, what have we, it may be said, if not the time-old struggle between induction and deduction? It is indeed the same, yet not the same, for a new element has entered in. Both history and philosophy have ever been influenced by that psychic force that has controlled mankind, at first setting every man's hand against every man, then leading him into desert places to save his own soul, again holding up before him a life of service to others as the highest and farthest goal, and when that has been reached showing him, still beyond, the great controlling principle that Kropotkin has elaborated in his *Mutual Aid*. History in its upward progress has ever doubled and redoubled on its own path and with each new level reached it has had a broader vision of the sweep of territory through which its course has passed. If philosophy approaches the goal by another path, it is not as an antagonist but as a friend and colleague. If history through the aid rendered by the social sciences has had this wider vision spread out before it, if through the aid of philosophy it has been able to derive a new meaning from the vision, it may in its turn render mutual aid to the social sciences by interpreting the past in terms of the present.

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The paper of Professor Becker, especially in its handling of new views in the concept and writing of history, raises the rather radical question whether on these terms we can have history, valid history, at all. That this is not a mere sociologist's quibble is perfectly evident from the remarks which Professor Becker and Professor Weatherly have devoted to Karl Lamprecht. The question, the doubt, lies implicit in the historian and his methods themselves. Lamprecht, in his attempt to make the reality with which history deals not the mere superficial comings and goings of the political, industrial, institutional life of mankind, but that underlying something, the *Volkspsyche*, *Weltgeist*, etc., has really gone in quest of the Absolute. He has left the objective world of science as we usually accept the term, and has plunged into subjectivism. But by

that very attempt to represent the absolute reality, an infinite moving complexity, in terms of historical categories which are necessarily static has he not committed the grave fallacy of trying to palm off a mosaic of more or less skilfully joined facts as a living copy of a living indivisible whole? M. Bergson has shown the utter impossibility of marrying mechanistic (i.e., scientific, objective) methods with living realities. And it makes no difference how many sorts of facts—from industry, art, religion, law, folk-ways, politics—the historian puts into his mosaic, if he still assumes some real substratum, *Volkspsyche*, of which these facts are mere particular manifestations, he is just as far from communicating that reality to us as though he wrote merely old-fashioned theological or political history and called it history. Such a process gives us a delusive philosophy of history which is neither sound philosophy nor trustworthy history. It is the historian's business to gather the widest range of social fact, and it is also his business to *interpret* his collection of fact, as Professor Becker rightly insisted. My only contention is that this interpretation, if it is to yield history worth consideration, must, like the facts, be objective in reference and expression. If the historian insists on the subjectivist attitude he must reject historical methods and adopt poetry or the delphic incoherencies of swoon and dream as his medium. How far then, and with what reservations, can the historian give us a convincing interpretative method? Is there any way of straddling objective method and some assumed *Volkspsyche*, the real stuff and driving force of history? The sociologist is deeply interested here, for the question and its answer apply not to history alone but to sociology and the other social sciences as well.

C. L. Becker

It has been asked how, admitting that society is something more than its particular manifestations, the historian is to deal with the underlying reality, with what Lamprecht calls the social-soul. Is the historian not after all bound to describe society in terms of particular activities? This is quite true. The historian can never get away from description of particular facts and events, and in my judgment he will necessarily deal with these particular facts and events more or less in their time and space relations. Yet it is quite possible to deal with the various sorts of particular activities in any period—the political, economic, religious, and intellectual activities—as illustrating, or as related to, certain mental or psychic characteristics common to the social group or nation. These common characteristics thus become a unifying principle round which facts or events, political or other, may be grouped. It is true that this method inevitably leads to the abandonment in some measure of the strictly chronological and narrative treatment.

OUTLOOK FOR SOCIAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES

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The term "social politics" is but little employed in this country. Other phrases, however, such as "welfare legislation," "social legislation," "labor legislation," "social reform," "legislation for social and industrial justice," have been employed to express this idea. Social politics, as I understand it, involves the conscious systematic control exercised by the government over the economic and social life of the given society or group. It is contrasted with a "police" system in which the government contents itself with merely preventing violence and fraud. No government has ever practically confined itself to this course, but some governments have come much nearer to it than others, and some have given the idea theoretical assent.

In our own country progress in the direction of a comprehensive social policy has been particularly slow for a variety of reasons which an analysis of the subject discloses.

In the first place, the eighteenth-century political philosophy, under the influence of which federal and state governments were formed, was favorable to a minimum of governmental organization and action. Thomas Paine, for example, regarded society as a blessing, government as an evil. "Society," he said, "is a patron and government a punisher." The structure and powers of government were organized at this time with a view of giving as little power as possible to those in positions of authority. This mechanism was primarily intended to prevent a possible lapse into hereditary aristocracy or monarchy. But the theorists of the time did not distinguish clearly between this specific purpose and the general limitation of the powers of government for all purposes, and in later times the doctrine and the machinery intended to prevent

monarchy were applied against all forms of governmental action or interference even in the interest of the community.

Further, the prevailing economic theory of the last hundred years has been unfavorable to the development of policies of social legislation. It would be superfluous to show that economic theory has been until recently of the distinctly *laissez-faire* type. Our political economists have set their faces against interference with the "natural laws" of trade on the ground that such intervention is more likely to hinder than to help social progress. They have magnified the difficulties of governmental action and minimized the advantages of action on the part of the state. It is only within the last few years that the attitude of leading economists in the United States has shifted. In our own day Mr. Walker referred to "those of us who discerned the coming of a storm and removed ourselves and our effects from the lower ground of an uncompromising individualism to positions somewhat more elevated and seemingly secure." Professor James also declared:

> We do not regard [the state] as a merely negative factor, the influence of which is most happy when it is smallest: but we recognize that some of the most necessary functions of a civilized society can be performed only by the state and some others most efficiently by the state, that the state in a word is a permanent category of economic life and not merely a temporary crutch which may be cast away when society becomes more perfect.[1]

Little by little the attitude of many of our leading economists, although by no means all of them, has materially changed.

The development of a system of social politics has further been made difficult in our country because of the strict constitutional limitations imposed upon state activities; and because of the narrow interpretation of these limitations by unfriendly courts. It is not necessary to cite at length the array of cases in which the judiciary has wrecked plans for social legislation. Opposition to laws limiting the hours of labor and to workmen's compensation are conspicuous illustrations familiar to everyone. Much the same attitude has been taken in regard to other cases involving conscious and systematic control over the economic and social life of the community by its organized government. The

[1] *Publications of American Economic Association*, I, 26.

political philosophy of the eighteenth century, the economics of the same period, together with narrow legal training and frequent ignorance of, or indifference to, social and industrial questions, has made the courts cold or even hostile to any broad policy which we might characterize by the term "social politics."

The organized system of political corruption has stood in the way of schemes for social betterment and improvement. The greatest loss inflicted upon the community by the genus grafter is not the millions he has stolen. We could almost afford to pension off our grafters and give them what they steal if they would leave us alone to work out plans of social and industrial improvement. The greatest damage they have inflicted upon the community has been their opposition, sometimes open and sometimes covert, to any program of social politics. Through their control of state legislatures, administrators, and sometimes, courts, they have been able to delay, obstruct, cripple, and hamper policies designed to promote the general welfare of the community. Social politics has been in the jackpot of more than one legislature. In this way, even where public sentiment has been aroused to such an extent that historic prejudice against governmental action has been overcome, its waves have been beaten back or driven into other channels. We may properly say that one of the largest single losses inflicted by our organized corruptionists has been the prevention of social and economic progress.

These combined influences of economic theory, political philosophy, constitutional limitation, judicial interpretation, and political corruption have made the practical advance of any policy or policies of social legislation extremely slow. Together they have been able to force the United States far in the rear of the procession of the great industrial states of the world. The remarkable progress made by Germany under Bismarck thirty years ago was almost unnoticed in this country for a quarter of a century, while measures adopted by other European states were ignored by our practical statesmen. English advance in the same direction also passed to a large extent unnoticed, although the recent experiments made under the Lloyd-George régime have attracted far more attention than the Continental undertakings. So it has happened

that our country blazed the trail of political liberty a century and a half ago but now lags far behind the other great industrial states of the world. Germany and England, our keenest competitors in the business world, have far outstripped us in practical measures for the protection of the community and for the promotion of the general welfare in the broad sense of the term. The so-called Manchester school of economics never had much vogue in Germany where the state has for many years been recognized as an agency for the promotion of community welfare. England, the home of the "let alone" policy, has long since abandoned it in theory and in practice.

Notwithstanding the many obstacles interposed and the long delay occasioned, substantial progress has been made in the United States in the direction of a comprehensive social policy during the last ten years. This is evident in city, in state, and in nation alike.

In our city government one of the most striking evidences of a community policy has been the development of city-planning schemes. In New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, and in practically all the large centers of the country, city plans so-called, have been outlined either by private societies or by public act. These plans involve a careful and comprehensive study of the needs of each local community, with respect to arrangement of streets, parks and public places, transportation, housing and recreation needs, and in short they constitute an attempt on the part of the city to regulate and control its own growth and development. While most of these plans have thus far been only imperfectly executed, yet they show a tendency toward conscious social control through governmental agencies. They have compelled the community to think of itself and of the possibility of regulating by common action at least the physical outlines of the city. In cases like the Pittsburgh Survey, under private auspices, the analysis has gone down more deeply and the remedies prescribed have been correspondingly more fundamental, for in this case we have a description and analysis of social, industrial, and living conditions of men and women.

Many other aspects of city government indicate the development of the social-political idea; as for example, the growth of

parks, playgrounds, opportunities for public recreation, the so-called neighborhood or social center, the educational system now developing, the activities of the health and building department for the protection of the community from unsafe and unsanitary conditions, all indicate the presence of the same general tendency to treat broadly the vital problems of a community. Kansas City has even established a "general welfare board." "Necessity" has been, from time immemorial, "the mother of invention," and the dire necessity of our cities has driven them to many constructive efforts. These, it is true, are not comparable either in breadth of design or in completeness of execution to the plans of Germany or even of English cities, but compared with our situation of twenty-five years ago they indicate a rapid advance in the conception of what the community should and may do for the welfare of its citizens. The treatment of the school problem, the park problem, the sanitary problem, the juvenile court, the city-plan question would all have been impossible under conditions as they existed twenty-five years back. It must be admitted that many of these advances have been made, not by straight frontal attack, but by flanking movements. Nevertheless they have been made step by step and the lines have been pushed forward year by year.

In our state governments the advance in the direction of a distinct system of social-political policy has been made in the field of labor legislation. The last bulletin of the American Association for the Advancement of Labor Legislation contains a summary of the legislation for the year 1912 which is extremely significant to any student of American politics or of American society.

This bulletin gives a review of laws covering the subjects of industrial accidents and diseases, child labor, employers' liability and workmen's compensation, detailed factory and workshop regulations, legislation regarding the hours of labor, old-age pensions, unemployment, and many regulations in regard to hours and conditions of labor for women, and in the case of Massachusetts includes the establishment of a minimum-wage commission. While these laws are in no sense and in no place complete and are not to be compared in completeness of scope or in vigor and efficiency of administration with much European legislation, yet they

constitute a striking advance. They are the forerunners of a general and comprehensive plan of social legislation. They are of significance, not only because of what they actually embody, but for what they foreshadow in the way of future accomplishment. This is particularly true of such acts as the Massachusetts law establishing minimum-wage commissions for women's work and authorizing the payment of old-age pensions for laborers employed by cities and towns; the investigation of the subject of unemployment and the adoption of employers' liability, workmen's compensation, and insurance acts.

In the federal field much less has been accomplished, although legislative activity in this direction is not wholly lacking. The policy of the federal government in regard to a protective tariff, in respect to internal improvements, in the wholesale distribution of land may all be classified under the broad term of "social politics." The avowed purpose of fostering manufacturing by governmental action, of settling a vast territory by practically free grants of government land, and of stimulating and developing industry and agriculture by governmental grant and bonus are all evidences of national welfare work on a gigantic scale. Curiously enough, however, the opposition to these movements, particularly in the case of tariff and internal improvements, has been based, not on theoretical grounds, but largely on the constitutional principle of state's rights. At the same time those who have been most active in promoting these policies have often been the theoretical opponents of the economic doctrine of *laissez faire*. The manufacturer who demanded at Washington governmental action to protect his industry was often found at the state capital denouncing state interference with the conditions of his employees. We have often seen men bitterly opposing social politics in the abstract while encouraging and practicing it in the concrete.

The conservation policy of the United States government stands upon a somewhat different basis. In this case we have a consciously designed policy of preserving the natural resources of the country. This was based partly upon the desire to avoid evident waste of assets and partly upon a desire to prevent control by special as opposed to general interest. The broad policy of pre-

serving and protecting of water-power, timber, minerals, and other similar resources of the country has been an illustration on a huge scale of what is properly known as social politics.

In other directions also the federal government has advanced. A conspicuous illustration of this has been the limitation of the hours of labor in public work or public contracts, and the regulations in regard to hours of labor on railroads; laws compelling the adoption of certain safety appliances on railroads, together with the employers' liability and workmen's compensation acts. The last Congress provided for the establishment of a children's bureau, and created a commission on industrial relations with broad powers of investigation, including an inquiry into the general condition of labor in the principal industries of the United States, into existing relations between employers and employees, into the effects of industrial conditions on public welfare and the rights and powers of the community to deal therewith, into conditions of sanitation and safety, into associations of employers and wage-earners, methods of collective bargaining, methods for maintaining satisfactory relations between employers and employees, bureaus of labor, and finally: "The commission shall seek to discover the underlying causes of dissatisfaction in the industrial situation and report its conclusions thereon." This inquiry may prove to be the beginning of a comprehensive social policy on the part of the United States, or of course it is possible that it will bear no fruit at all. It is significant in this connection that in his recent volume on *Social Reform and the Constitution* Professor Goodnow has stated that in general there is less constitutional difficulty in the way of a national policy of social reform than is found in the various states. For example, he has indicated that there are no constitutional objections, so far as the federal government is concerned, to the establishment of far-reaching plans of social insurance, while in the separate commonwealths these same measures might encounter fatal constitutional objections. Professor Goodnow says:

> Who, in view of the history of the public domain, will venture to say that the constitution limits the power of Congress to dispose of the public funds as it sees fit in order to promote what it considers to be the "public welfare of the United States," to provide for which the constitution specifically says the taxing power may be used.

When we consider, therefore, the development in our urban communities, the results obtained in the several states of the Union, and the legislation completed and in prospect in our federal government, it seems likely that we may expect a régime of social politics in the United States within our day and generation. It is a striking fact that in the year 1912 a political party was organized on a platform strongly emphasizing social and industrial justice. Some of these measures have been championed for many years by the Socialist party, which, however, because of its weakness in America, was unable to make a deep impression. The Progressive party, polling at the last election over four million votes, adopted a sweeping program of social legislation. They declared in terms, both in state and in national platforms, for effective legislation looking to the prevention of industrial accidents, occupational diseases, overwork, and involuntary unemployment, for the fixing of minimum safety and health standards for various occupations, for the prohibition of child labor, for minimum-wage standards for working women, for the establishment of an eight-hour day for women and young persons, for one day's rest in seven for all wage-earners, for an eight-hour day in continuous (twenty-four) industries, for publicity as to wages, hours, and conditions of labor, for standards of compensation for death by industrial accident and injury and trade disease, for "the protection of home life against the hazards of sickness, irregular employment and old age through the adoption of a system of social insurance adapted to American use." And in order to carry out this program the Progressive party pledged itself to use all powers of federal and state government, not only up to the limit of the Constitution, but later by amendment of the Constitution if found necessary.

The causes of this recent and rapid development in American political thought and in American political policy are numerous. Among them a few may be mentioned. The rapid growth of great cities has forced many of these problems to the attention of the community in a striking manner. In congested cities like New York and Chicago the "let alone" policy of government becomes untenable and impossible. The state or the city must regulate individual conduct for the protection of safety, health, and life.

When the fathers founded the Republic the United States was a rural nation. At that time only 3 per cent of the population lived in cities, while the census for 1910 showed 46.3 per cent of our people living in urban communities. In a number of states like Massachusetts, New York, and Illinois more than 50 per cent of the population is urban. This fact has operated powerfully to bring about the development of social policy within the city and to force the recognition of it in state and in nation.

Again, the rapid growth of great industries in the United States has tended to precipitate this problem. Large-scale industry has made it almost impossible for an individual workingman to protect h imself in respect to wages, hours, or other conditions of labor. He has therefore been driven into some form of organization, and to organized demand for state intervention to protect him. Organized labor has been an important factor throughout the land in the formulation of, and the agitation for, social legislation. Labor has never taken any effective form as an organized political party in this country but has carried on a vigorous propaganda for labor legislation.

The development of the doctrine of conservation during the last ten years, applied as it has been to forests, mines, and water-power, has strongly affected the general conception of the scope and purpose of government. The idea of conservation by the government of interests belonging to the whole society has been extended to the conservation of human resources as well. Having familiarized the public with the idea of conserving timber as a matter of national economy, it was an easy step to the idea of conserving human beings and human energy as a matter of practical economy as well as humanity.

Almost at the same time the so-called efficiency doctrine appeared and was widely heralded in industry. The accountants, the teachers of shop management like Taylor and Emerson, the industrial engineers and doctors have begun a study of the conservation and effective application of human energy which has had a pronounced effect upon social thinking. They have extended the study of organization and machinery to the human machine itself and endeavored to find out what possibilities lie in the human

being in the way of accomplishment and achievement. This has doubtless been a minor element in the general process, but approaching the subject from the side of private business, it has unquestionably been an influence which cannot be ignored.

Another reason for the development of these policies is the advance of science, whether in the form of public sanitation or of social science. Much of the advance made in the field of labor legislation has been made possible by a study of industrial hygiene. The effects of modern industrial methods and processes upon life, safety and health have been studied and made plain during the last ten years and in response to this there has come a flood of legislation. Detailed investigations like those of Miss Josephine Goldmark have contributed materially to the development of social policy. The argument presented to the Supreme Court of Illinois in defense of the ten-hour labor law for women was much more like a treatise on industrial hygiene than a legal argument. It dealt more with a discussion of medical facts than with precedents gleaned from the law books. Concrete studies of the effect of child labor upon later development, of the effects of bad working conditions for women upon the future of the race, of overstrain and overwork in all occupations have made much easier the pathway of social legislation. The clearer these studies have been and the more graphically the results have been presented, the more quickly and decisively have results been secured.

On the other hand, the study of the anatomy and physiology of society has helped to give not only detailed information but a point of view necessary to the formulation of a comprehensive policy. The scriptural phrase "We are all members of one body" has been translated into the language of social science by the studies of hundreds of observers and the analyses of trained minds. We now begin to know in a scientific sense how and why we are all members of one body.

Whatever may be our opinion as to the present status of the science of society or the possibilities of future development of that science, no impartial observer can fail to perceive that study of the structure and laws of society has been and will continue to be

of great value in helping the public to treat more broadly the great questions of social policy.

The chief objection to these policies of social legislation comes from two diametrically opposite groups. On the one hand, there are the "standpatters," and on the other, the extreme socialists and the group known as the syndicalists, industrial trade unionists, in our country best represented by the Industrial Workers of the World. The standpatter, so-called, opposes these measures because he does not consider that any material change in the industrial or political order of things is urgently necessary. He believes that on the whole satisfactory progress is being made in the increase of the social product and in its distribution. He invokes once more the economic theory of *laissez faire* and the political philosophy of the eighteenth century. In our country, unfortunately, honest conservatism is not unfrequently linked with crooked privilege and criminal politics. The alliance of conservatism with graft and privilege has made its position strong from one point of view and vulnerable from another. In so far as corrupt methods may be successfully employed, this alliance has strengthened conservatism, but in so far as the moral sense of the community has revolted against corrupt practices in the public service, and has tended to associate conservatism and corruption, its general position has been greatly weakened.

Certain socialistic writers have attacked the present plan of social reform in Germany, England, and the United States on the ground that they are not fundamental but superficial. They have declared, as Mr. Walling does in his volume on *Socialism as It Is*, that the purpose and effect of these measures will be to preserve capitalism as it is, to maintain the system in a better and more human form, but nevertheless to continue the so-called capitalistic scheme fundamentally undisturbed. They have argued that these plans as thus far worked out involve nothing more than a highly intelligent efficiency system on the patriarchal basis, and while they have not directly opposed these measures, they have not regarded them as fundamental or as final. Mr. Walling has been particularly bitter in his attacks upon this whole policy. He

denounces what he calls the "capitalistic reform program" and the activities of the so-called revisionists, reformers, and German Social Democrats of the Berger type. "The new reform programs," says he, "however radical, are aimed at regenerating capitalism, and the net result will be to establish another form of economic fedualism, patriarchism, or paternalism." Quoting another writer, he says: "The new feudalism will care for and conserve the powers of the human industrial tool as the lord of the manor looked after the human agricultural implement."

The so-called syndicalists, on the other hand, prefer "direct" methods to political methods. They repudiate parliamentary and political action and prefer such methods as the general strike and *sabotage*.[1]

Certain of their leaders denounce not only reform but state socialism and democracy itself. They regard as one of their chief objects the abolition of the state. The syndicalist distrusts the state and believes that political forms and institutions have outlived their usefulness and cannot be adapted to new social relations.

No one can of course predict what the final form or effect of these various measures of social policy will be. For our purposes it is sufficient to point out the enormous development of rational social legislation in the United States in recent times. It is adequate for this immediate purpose to show the pronounced change in economic and political theory and the altered attitude of the public mind as evidenced in party platform and in practical legislation as well. It is sufficient to show that during the last fifty years these great changes have been wrought. It is safe to assume that during the next generation the conscious rational treatment of social and industrial problems by society acting through its organized governmental agencies will continue in increasing measure. This is likely to develop most rapidly in cities, but will characterize both state and national activity, and it is not at all impossible that under our constitutional system the national government may lead the way in policies of this nature. The cramped consti-

[1] See W. E. Walling, *Socialism as It Is*, chap. v; Louis Levine, "The Standpoint of Syndicalism," *Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science*, XLIV, 114.

tutional situation of the state compared with the powerful situation of the nation may prove decisive. The practical question is whether these changes shall be made scientifically, wisely, and with sufficient deliberation to insure the maintenance of the social equilibrium, or whether they will be made ignorantly, rashly, and with the blind fury that characterizes revolutionary movements. The mutterings and rumblings of discontent are a warning that changes must come and that the real choice lies, not between change and no change, but between rational and gradual change on the one hand, and sudden and revolutionary change on the other.

THE BACKGROUND OF ECONOMIC THEORIES

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It is a weakness of economics that the social ideas upon which its theories rest have been neglected. Economic theories have been put forward as though they depended solely upon physical or objective conditions. This view obscures the relation between economic theory and the epochs in which it originated; it makes what really is of class origin appear as though it were a necessary element of human nature. To understand its development the history of economic thought must be divided into three epochs, which may be designated as the epoch of 1776, that of 1848, and that of 1912. The social thought of the first epoch brought out the elements in human nature and in objective conditions that contributed to the harmony of interest. The early economists thus emphasized general laws, and were optimistic in tone. This epoch ends in 1848 with the revolution by which it became well known.

To understand the new group of writers which now appears, the political and social development of the time must be reviewed. The group to which Adam Smith belonged had influenced public opinion in England and on the Continent; by it a radical, or at least a liberal, viewpoint had been created. As a result, however, of the Napoleonic wars, a definite reaction began in all Europe which has its basis in the thought that social progress had been too rapid, and that either a reaction was necessary or at least a considerable halt should be made before new progress was undertaken. This made the thought of 1848 either revolutionary or reactionary. One group of thinkers contended that progress had been too slow and hence should be accelerated by a revolution, while the other group regarded the forward movement as too rapid and hence thought that in some way it should be checked. A representative of this English reaction is Carlisle. In Germany the movement associated

with Bismarck had the same ideal and end. The best representative of the revolutionary movement is Karl Marx, since from his writings the revolutionary socialism of recent years has taken its origin.

It is not my purpose to discuss in full the views of either group of thinkers. The contrast, however, is definite and has constituted the basis for discussion during the last sixty years. The most influential representative of this epoch is John Stuart Mill, whose position therefore needs attention. Mill was as revolutionary in his ideas as was Karl Marx, and one of his essays of this epoch is a *Defense of the Revolution of 1848*. Mill, however, was not consistent in his position. When he wrote his *Political Economy* he was reactionary in production and revolutionary in distribution. To make this clear, the attitude of Adam Smith must be contrasted with that of Mill. Smith regarded production as varying with quantities of labor, and thought that improvements in production were connected with the improvements in the condition of the laboring class. Mill's emphasis in production is not on labor but on capital. Hence he views the progress of society, not in connection with the changes in the laboring class, but rather with the accumulation of wealth. From standards of labor to standards of capital there is an evident reaction, because capital appeals to many fewer motives than do the incentives to labor. It is also a class appeal. Relatively few are aroused by the motives for saving; the great mass of people contribute to production only through their labor.

It is equally clear that Mill expected a revolution to take place in the distribution of wealth. At the present time, most economists neglect the first ten chapters of Mill's *Theory of Distribution* and spend their time analyzing the next five. There is, however, a reason why Mill discussed the distribution of property and emphasized it more than he did the distribution of income. Whenever he speaks of the distribution of property, he always speaks of it with some limitation, as "under the present time conditions," or "for the time being." He anticipated that at no distant date radical legislation would alter materially the property distribution then prevailing in England. The theory of the distribution of income stated in his later chapters is presented not with the thought that

these laws would elevate the laboring population to a higher position, but rather with the view to showing that this transformation is so difficult that it is not likely to take place. His position, therefore, is as radical as that of Marx; Marx, however, relies more on the revolutionary methods as applied to the distribution of income, while Mill would effect the same end by a distribution of property. In either case, a radical reconstruction of society would take place. Both Mill and Marx were plainly of the opinion that this transformation was inevitable and desirable. The compromise which Mill effected between reactionary production and revolutionary distribution was accepted by the economists of the next generation, not as a compromise, but rather as a solution. Only after long, serious study did the inherent opposition in Mill's position become apparent. It was then recognized that between Mill's theories of production and distribution an irreconcilable gulf intervened.

In the epoch following the publication of Mill's *Political Economy* the economists were divided into two groups: one attempted to make economic theory consistent by making distribution reactionary; the other group attempted to acquire consistency by creating a revolutionary theory of production. Of the latter attempts, the work of Karl Marx is prominent. His book on *Capital* is an endeavor to give a revolutionary basis to theories of production. I shall not describe his efforts in this connection, but it is plain that they have failed. No revolutionary theory of production has been worked out in a way that would gain for it general recognition. The law of increasing misery, the iron law of wages, and similar doctrines have been either abandoned or discredited. The movement, therefore, to gain consistency in economic theory through revolutionary concepts in production must be regarded as a failure. In a like way, although it is not so generally recognized, the endeavors to create a reactionary theory of distribution have also failed. Writers with reactionary tendencies have not experienced many difficulties in restating production, but in the attempt to put the theory of distribution on a plane similar to that occupied by the theory of production the shortcomings of their theories are apparent. So many writers have attempted the task of creating a consistent

economic theory that it can now be regarded as something impossible to do. If consistency and harmony are to be attained, economists must find some new way of handling economic problems.

This brings us into the present epoch; 1912, at least for America, seems clearly the year in which the break from the old to the new has become apparent. The essential thing in the new epoch is the increased power of evolutionary ideas. Today, instead of having a sharp contrast between reaction and revolution, a third alternative is possible—progress through evolution. I shall therefore put the three groups in conscious contrast, so that the elements upon which each depends may be made clear. In order to do this, I shall give a table in which the elements for reactionary, revolutionary, and evolutionary reasoning are contrasted.

Reactionary	Revolutionary	Evolutionary
Retrospective	Large	Incremental
Hypothetical	Sudden	Persistent
Dogmatic	Militant	Voluntary
Undemocratic	Heroic	Material
Class-conscious	Epoch-making	Planless

Reactionary thought begins with a retrospective, or perhaps it is better to say a historical, attitude, since there is an emphasis on old conditions and old ideas, rather than on those of the present. With this basis, the reasoning becomes hypothetical, and as the class feeling that results develops, reactionary thought becomes dogmatic. It also changes into undemocratic forms, which end in the emphasis of the superiority of the capitalistic class over those who are engaged in manual labor. The reactionary thinker is also class-conscious, because he views the world from the standpoint of his particular group rather than the nation as a whole. In contrast with this, revolutionary thinkers expect large results to come suddenly by transformations that are epoch-making in their consequences. There is also a decided emphasis on militant action ending in or at least transforming itself into heroic action. All revolutionary thinkers look to some hero to make the transformations they hope for rather than to the small steady changes that lead to regular progress. A much-quoted statement from Mill represents this

view: "When the object is to raise the permanent condition of a people, small means do not merely produce small effects, they produce no effects at all." If this is true, then social progress depends upon those epoch-making changes that revolutions inaugurate, and must be brought about by the revolutionary measures that disturb the normal growth of society.

In contrast with this, evolution proceeds by small changes that are persistent in their action, and therefore create cumulative effects. There are also those which can be measured objectively. The changes that follow can usually be represented by some statistical curves. This gives to evolutionary concepts a material form and emphasizes the slow changes that progress is making. Such changes give but little place for heroic action. The man who makes small improvements is usually a commonplace individual, and yet it is the accumulation of these small changes that reorganizes society, and in the end improves its tone and character. The hero is out of place, except where militant action can create epoch-making changes.

DISCUSSION

Professor Weatherly, Presiding.

CLINTON ROGERS WOODRUFF, SECRETARY NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE

In discussing Professor Merriam's paper Mr. Woodruff pointed out that he had expected to discuss the question of politics rather than policies. There seemed to be little difference of opinion as to the general policies which should be advocated at this time by the social workers of the present day, but there was very considerable difference of opinion as how best to enact and enforce these policies. There were those who felt that active identification with a political party would be most effective. There were others who felt that the social worker should keep himself fairly clear of active partisan affiliation or activity, so that he might with equal facility and effect work with the party in power whatever its complexion. Mr. Woodruff expressed sympathy with the point of view outlined by Doctor Devine in *The Survey* during the recent session of the presidential campaign.

Mr. Woodruff was of the opinion that the most effective social worker was of necessity an opportunist, and therefore should hold himself in readiness to co-operate with whatsoever group of men were willing at the time to take up and press the measures in which he was interested. He cited his experience in Pennsylvania in connection with election reforms as illustrating the point he

had in mind. He called attention to the fact that the same legislature precisely, which had at its regular session rejected personal registration and civil service reform bills, and several other important forward progressive measures, at an extra session enacted them into law along exactly the lines advocated by the authors of the bills, the reason for the change of opinion being the election which had occurred between the two sessions.

HENRY W. FARNAM, YALE UNIVERSITY

With Professor Patten's general conclusion I quite agree. I too am an evolutionist. The only thing that surprises me in his statement is that he has apparently only just reached that point. I welcome him to our ranks. I extend to him the right hand of fellowship. The subject of evolution was very much in the air as long ago as my college days, and we are all familiar with the way in which it has since affected, not only natural science, but also history, sociology, and even theology. I too, believe in progress by slow stages, by the aggregate effort of many minds.

I confess that I was not quite prepared for Professor Patten's classification of the militant suffragette among the evolutionists. The idea is so new that I am not yet ready to say whether I should agree or disagree with his statement. But I recently heard a story, brought over from the other side by an English friend, which may possibly throw some light upon the classification of the stone-throwing suffragette. One of the militants set forth one morning with the firm intention of breaking a plate-glass window. She had 11 stones concealed in her muff. After finding a suitable window she began to fire her stones at it. When she had hurled 10 without hitting the glass, she became aware that a wicked man was standing on the sidewalk behind her, laughing at her futile efforts. She became so angry that she turned around and aimed her last stone at him, with the result that she broke the window. I give this story for what it may be worth, and let each one draw his own conclusions, as to whether it indicates that the stone-throwing suffragettes are evolutionists or revolutionists.

Professor Patten has spoken of the influence of German economics upon the science in the United States, and has said, if I have understood him rightly, that German political economy is of no use to us; the same view is expressed in his *Reconstruction of Economic Theory*, where he deplores the influence of German economic teaching on American economists. I cannot quite agree with his views in this respect. A few years ago I had occasion to make a contribution toward a volume prepared in honor of Professor Gustav von Schmoller by some of his former pupils on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. My subject was the relation between German and American economics, and I endeavored to get at the facts by sending around a questionnaire and asking my colleagues directly what kind of influence they were conscious of, and what their impressions of German political economy were. The answers showed quite clearly to my mind that, while many of those who went over to Germany

in the seventies and eighties gained a good deal of inspiration and were very much stimulated by what they there learned, they displayed a good deal of independence in their work after returning to this country. I specified in particular Professor Patten and Professor Clark as two conspicuous examples of American economists who, after having studied in Germany, had pursued methods and lines of thought quite different from those of their German teachers. What has actually happened seems to me this. We have not copied the Germans, but, just as the Germans have studied the history of their own country in order the better to frame a polity adapted to it, so we have studied the history of our own country, and we are finding that much of the social polity which is practiced in modern times has a very good precedent in our own history. Indeed the extreme *laissez-faire* policy which was popular for a time among economists was really an exotic. As an example I may mention that in the eighteenth century our federal government adopted what was virtually a system of compulsory sick insurance for seamen, quite similar to modern German compulsory sick insurance. All seamen were required to make contributions from their wages and these were used to provide hospitals and attendance for them in case of sickness. Remarkable as it may seem, this exercise of social politics by our federal government seems never to have been questioned on the ground of constitutionality. The system continued to operate for many years and finally developed into the Marine Hospital Service and the Department of Health of the government of the present day.

We may not agree in all respects with the Germans. They do not agree among themselves, and many of those who represented the extreme *historismus* a generation ago have changed their views since that time. But I am convinced that we have learned much from them in the past, and that we ought not to hesitate to profit by whatever they or the thinkers of any other country may have to offer us.

CHARLES H. COOLEY, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Professor Patten seems to imply that the three aspects of economic thought which he has set forth follow each other in distinct epochs of time. I should rather suggest that they are phases which may, and in fact do, exist contemporaneously. In general I would question whether it is the usual method of evolution, or practically desirable, that one ideal should entirely supplant another and have the field all to itself. Is not what we need an *organic idealism* brought about by co-operation of different ideals, each of which has a part to play in the progressive synthesis of thought? The answer has an important bearing, for instance, on our attitude towards socialism, which is certainly among the most potent forms of contemporary idealism and may have a worthy part to play even though its program may be largely mistaken. Let us not hold our ideals exclusively but as members of an organic whole, and be hospitable to those of others.

ROUND TABLE

Professor Lichtenberger, Presiding.

ERVILLE B. WOODS, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

Probably no one would presume to draft a statement of sociological principles with the hope that it would satisfy any other person than the draftsman himself, and it is pretty certain at this stage of the science that the draftsman is bound to be dissatisfied with his own work. However in a discussion of this sort, one may as well indicate what seems to him the general lay of the land, and then by a comparison of views, some notion of what is generally accepted or generally emphasized may be obtained.

It appears to me that there are two outstanding facts to be accounted for by a science of society. The first is humanity in its quantitative aspect and in its inheritable human nature. The second is the social tradition. These two resultants and the processes by which they have arisen constitute the principal subject-matter of sociology.

Inheritable human nature consists of the biological and psychic endowment with which each fresh generation commences its cycle, the equipment of naked vitality which it receives from the womb of the generation preceding. This initial fund of vitality is highly composite. It consists of a great mass of structural and functional characters, varying from bodily form to instincts, innate tendencies, temperament, and disposition.

The social tradition on the other hand consists of the web of psychic connections between individuals which the race in the whole course of its experience has spun. It is the total psychic product of those endless cycles of personal communication involving interstimulation and co-operation of many grades which seem to so large an extent to constitute living. It is built upon the foundation of innate tendency, and like innate tendency, it has developed in closest correspondence with the physical environment which everywhere and always determines the limits within which it takes form.

Now these two resultants of human evolution, population and the attributes of human nature, on the one hand, and the social tradition on the other, point to two principal processes. The first of these processes is central in the development of human nature, the second is central in the development of the social tradition.

The first process is the human phase of organic evolution. Among its incidents are (1) heredity, or the mechanism of vital repetitions, (2) variation, or the mechanism of vital innovations, (3) selection, or the mechanism of vital survivals or adjustments. For knowledge of this field the sociologist must in the main be content to learn at the hands of the biologist.

These three incidents or phases are equally apparent in the great process of psychic adjustment also. Perpetuations, vital or psychic; innovations, whether biological variations, or psychic inventions; readjustments, whether by the natural selection of variations on the biological side, or by the readjustment of customs to new situations on the psychological side, these are fundamental aspects of the human life process which we may well write into our platform.

Thus we find two great master processes working together to build society, the first, which is biological, registering its phases *in sanguine*, in the very germ-plasm of the individual, is like the movement of the hour hand of the clock, slow, where the psychic process is very swift; but the latter is conditioned by the phase reached by the former, somewhat as the minute-hand is conditioned in its functioning by the position reached by the hour-hand. The psychic process probably is registered only *extra sanguinem*, and apparently leaves the germ-plasm unaffected.

The psychic process with its subprocesses of tradition, invention, and compromise yields a wonderful complex of customs, institutions, forms of social organization of every sort. There is a considerable degree of agreement as to the interpretation of custom and the varying traditions of status, industry, politics, science, and the other branches of the social tradition. The determinants of social variation, the "factors of social change," are also generally regarded as playing their part in connection with crises in social experience connected with changes in the natural or social environment. Thus a doctrine of social innovation and readjustment is growing up. Are not these strands of biological and psychological tendency of central importance in answering the questions, What is society? and What is the social process?

ALBION W. SMALL, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

To tell the truth, I hate to talk on this subject. I volunteer only for the sake of inducing others to follow. Not that I want to conceal anything that I think, nor even my absence of ability to think at all on some phases of the question, but because I am inclined to the opinion that introspection has been overdone among us, as compared with the amount of objective work that we have accomplished. I say this the more freely because if the indictment holds of any of the sociologists I shall certainly be among the number and perhaps the hardest hit.

While I am about it I may as well divulge the fact that I have occasional spasms of self-examination in which I say to myself, "Now, old fellow, do you really know precisely what you are driving at after all?" Probably I should not be willing to make this confession if, after more or less protracted inward wrestlings I did not always reach some variation of the answer, "Yes, I do, but I am not sure that I can make it plain to anybody else, nor that

anybody else is aiming at quite the same thing." That doesn't tell the whole story, and I will try to piece it out in a moment.

It seems to me that the problems that puzzle us, and that give us uncertainty as to whether we are really at bottom reinforcing a single movement or using a common name to cover a number of heterogeneous programs, are more troublesome than they would be if we distinguished sharply between two phases of them which are logically quite separate. These are: first, What is the *content* of sociology? Second, How may we best present the content of sociology to students? It has been both our fortune and our misfortune that for two decades we have been obliged to furnish provisional answers to both these questions at once. The situation has undoubtedly been stimulating. It has probably resulted in a larger and more diversified output of theory than would have been produced if all the people who have contributed to sociology had been forced to do something else as their chief occupation until they had arrived at agreement about a body of conclusions which could be exhibited as a distinct addition to previous knowledge. But this very variety of material for use in teaching makes the problem of selection and organization confusing.

Speaking of this second or pedagogical phase of our problem, it seems to me that we have much to gain by admitting in the frankest way that we have not yet found out very much about the best program of sociological teaching. We may have the less hesitation about this, because the situation is not peculiar to sociology. It involves the whole family of social sciences. There are more firmly established conventions about when to begin teaching history and civics and economics, and what should be the subject-matter, and aims and methods of instruction from the beginning on, than in the case of sociology. When one is called upon to justify these conventions, however, uncertainties as to whether they are defensible begin to crop out at every step. Nobody is prepared to offer any conclusive reasons why a certain sequence of social science studies should be offered during the college years, rather than another sequence which might invert the order and vary the substance of the first. It is open to question whether any combination of social science courses which might be selected for the best might not be successfully impeached on psychological grounds, if adequate psychological studies should be made of the interests and suggestibility of students at different stages of their college career. Our sociological uncertainties turn out then to be part and parcel of a general situation within the social sciences. If our plight seems to be worse than that of our colleagues in the longer cultivated fields, it is not because our case is essentially worse than theirs, but because they are more satisfied than we are to treat a problematical situation as settled.

More than this; the longer we study the problem of instruction in sociology, the more evident it becomes that a large fraction of its difficulty arises from the mental situation created by sins of omission or commission or both committed by controllers of curricula upon whom sociologists have been able to exert

little or no influence. That is, we cannot give a general answer, that will be valid, to the question, What shall we teach, and how, in the name of sociology, to a class of Freshmen, or Sophomores, or Juniors, or Seniors? The question which we must really try to answer is, What shall we teach, and how, in the name of sociology, to *these particular* Freshmen, Sophomores, Juniors, Seniors, in view of their peculiar previous experience or inexperience with fragments of social science other than that of the sociological type? The possible answers to this question are probably as numerous as the titles in the pharmacoepia. The problem of sociological instruction varies therefore very considerably with each student public. It is not a mere question of what there is to teach. It is primarily a question of how little or much the students have already learned, of how much of that little or much must be unlearned, and then of the best approach under the circumstances to the sociological viewpoint. In short, the problem of instruction in sociology is very much a local issue.

Leaving the pedagogical aspect of the matter then, what may we agree about as to the *content* of sociology? I am less and less concerned about the particular terms or propositions which may be fixed upon as the leading symbols of our common interests, but I am more and more concerned about the development of consciousness among scholars who are actually in sympathy with the main impulse of sociology that they are acting with a common incentive, and that it is worth while to cultivate constant awareness of it. For myself I find the best expression of that impulse in the proposition that the sociologists are that type of social scientists who have made it their chief aim to interpret human experience as a matter of processes, rather than as a matter of mere assorting of occurrences. However we express ourselves individually, the thing which we have in common as sociologists is our conception of human experience as from beginning to end a correlation and continuity of processes. This common conception is a bond of union between those of us whose special attention is on historical phases of human experience, those who are interested more in valuation of contemporary institutions with reference to their more or less adequate conformity to what we make out to be the functional economy of life, and those of us whose focus of attention is on control of present life with a view to better adjustment and achievement. If we are doing either of these things with our eyes as wide open as they may be today, we are all alike training our vision with reference to this interminable process-perspective. We are trying to learn all we can about the forces, the forms, the combinations, and the indications of the processes of human experience in general, so that we may understand where our special objects of attention fit into the sweep of the processes of human experiences as a whole.

Now we have gone far enough in our search into the processes of human experience to be aware that we require a whole apparatus of categories with which to think the processes in accordance with the objective character of their occurrence. Some of us may be more concerned about the abstract task of making out these general categories, others about the task of using the cate-

gories most significant in given social situations in such a way as to interpret or control these situations. In either case we are interested in the earliest and completest possible assurance that the categories which we use reflect accurately the social procedures with which we are dealing. I make out that we are all interested in five divisions of social categories: first of *forms* of social relationships, second of their *motives*, third of their *methods*, fourth of their *evaluation*, fifth of their *control*. We used to call the first aspect of relationships "descriptive sociology" or "statical sociology." I am not mortgaged to any particular way of distinguishing this section of general sociology, but should be glad to join in any usage that seems to the majority of our gild most appropriate. The second and the third types of relationship fill the field which I should describe as social psychology. The fourth type constitutes the range of social ethics—or, to be more exact, of substantial ethics as distinguished from metaphysical ethics—and the fifth that of social technology. I do not see how any of us, whichever of these divisions of labor our special work falls in, can fail to be interested in the development of this whole group of divisions of labor. The categories in all these divisions are the necessary tools of our cognition, but cognition that does not merge into valuation and volition is abortion. We are all interested in organizing as much knowledge of past and present experience as possible by means of process categories that most veraciously reflect the actual social movement; and we are all interested in some degree in pressing toward that sort of control of social action which will insure progress toward the largest realization of the values which evolving social intelligence affirms as worth concerted human endeavor. I think we are pretty well united in the belief that the big task of social education is to initiate all men into this way of thinking. No type of scholars ever had a more defensible reason for existence than the sociologists. Our peculiar danger follows the number and complexity of the necessary divisions of labor within our common field. We have to resist the tendency to develop a galaxy of new provincialisms. Our greatest temptation is the lure toward disregard of the total human movement, in our several specialized concentrations upon selected phases of processes within the movement.

I have intentionally confined myself to those phases of our subject which are so to speak esoteric. It would be easy to discourse upon the manner in which we must relate strictly social phenomena with the environing physical phenomena, but I refrain.

J. E. Hagerty, Ohio State University

In the discussions which have preceded we find a greater unanimity of opinion than often characterizes sociological discussions of this class. We do not differ greatly on the subject-matter of sociology, on the methods of study, or methods of investigation. Our chief disagreements are on the theoretical basis of sociology.

Those of us who are now in the field of sociology have approached it from other departments of study—psychology, philosophy, biology, economics, history, etc.—and we bring to the study of sociology the bias of the particular science in which we were formerly interested. Whatever our approach to the subject we agree on the problems of sociology, and in the investigation of these various problems—immigration, races, the family, the school, charity, criminology, etc. We pursue practically the same methods and arrive at nearly the same conclusions. There is much more agreement among us than we usually think. We agree that the work of the sociologist is the study of social structure, and social progress, that is, the interpretation of social structure and social progress.

In the organization of our elementary courses some of us attempt to indicate our conception of the field of sociology and our attitude toward its subject-matter. In our elementary course at the Ohio State University we have kept these points of view in mind. We desire that our students shall have an historical perspective of the subject, consequently we give several lectures on the evolution of society. These are followed by several lectures on each of the following subjects: the economic basis of society, the biological factors of society, and the psychological factors of society. We believe that the student who begins the study of social phenomena should be able to interpret it from the different points of view above indicated. These introductory lectures are followed by a more extended treatment of the following topics: social organization and structure, social control, social institutions, social pathology, and social progress.

Our reasons for a broad fundamental course are not only to prevent students from getting a warped and one-sided view of what sociology really is, but to give tham an adequate point of view for the interpretation of social phenomena. When we use biological and psychological facts in our social interpretations, we should be certain that we are applying the latest data which these sciences have developed. Our agreements should be chiefly in an attitude of mind toward social phenomena and social investigation. We should approach social problems with the broadest kind of training and our agreements will consist in the conclusions we reach.

EDWARD C. HAYES, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

There are so many points that, it seems to me, should now command assent and agreement that I may fail to state any clearly by reason of mentioning too many of them in the few minutes that I shall occupy.

I believe that the most significant advance in sociological thought is the frank acceptance of the psychological point of view. The first tendency of sociologists, and of all who look at society, is to think of it as a *group of people*, without picking out the essential things that make such a group a society. If Mrs. Jones, Mrs. Smith, Mrs. Clark, and Mrs. Brown have a Browning Society,

the fact that Mrs. Jones is five feet and four inches tall, weighs one hundred and twenty pounds, and is a brunette, has nothing to do with her membership in the Browning Society. She might just as well be two inches taller, weigh twenty pounds more, and be a blonde, so far as membership in the Browning Society is concerned.[1] It is the fact that she engages in certain activities, in common with the other ladies mentioned, and that she continues these activities because they continue their corresponding activities, that constitutes her a member of the Browning Society. These activities are the essence of the life and existence of the society. When one of us speaks of his *life*, or writes the biography of an individual, he does not speak or write of osmosis, peristalsis, respiration, and the other *physical* functions, but of sentiments, opinions, practices—in one phrase, conscious activities. It is equally true that the life of a society is made up of interwoven and mutually conditioning psychic activities.

Although the acceptance of the psychic point of view has become general, it is true that it is not as consistently occupied as it soon may be. We are still told by some that the socius is the unity of investigation. That is a survival of the practice of regarding society as a group of people, without distinguishing what it is that makes a mere collocation of people into a society. Important as is the concept of the socius, still, a sociologist who takes the socius as his unit of investigation is like a botanist who should take the bouquet as his unit of investigation. It is not John Smith, but John's methodism, John's republicanism, etc., that is a unit of sociological investigation. Those particular activities, that recur and recur in society, that can be classified into varieties and species, and that are subject to general causal tendencies are the units of analysis that promise scientific mastery of social realities.

Even Professor Ross (and I am a hearty admirer of Professor Ross and mention him because of his importance) denies the psychological conception of social realities, in his formal statements as to the scope and method of sociology. But notwithstanding this formal denial, the value of his contributions is due to the fact that it is the prevalent and massed psychic activities which he actually studies.

A recent able monograph proposes that we measure the success of efforts at social control, not by their effect upon human joys and sorrows, but by an "objective standard," namely by their effect on "the social organization." But the social organization is as subjective as human joys and sorrows. The essential realities which compose social organization are as psychic as grief and satisfaction. The disapproval of private vengeance, the abhorrence of this or that vice, the personal ideal characteristic of a military or of an industrial civilization, all customs, institutions, and political arts, are psychic possessions. Professor Cooley set forth the true view when he chose, as subtitle of his book on *Social Organization*, "A Study of the Larger Mind."

[1] This of course is not denying the frequent importance of physical facts as conditions affecting—or manifestations of, though never as parts of—the essential social realities.

I believe that I have perpetrated only one technical term, in this respect doing much better than some members of the society. That one is the term *socio-physical*. It seems to me that we must have some term, more or less analogous to the psychologist's word "psychophysical," by which we may designate the physical manifestations of social activities: railroads, houses, books, and all those material realities which are the direct consequences and manifestations of social activities. Any amount of such realities would not constitute a society. They are external to the essential social realities, and sociology has no interest in them, or in any other material things, save as results, or conditions, of social activities (using the word activities in its broad sense, to include ideas and sentiments).

Sociologists have abused the biological analogy, yet analogy is helpful as a method of mere illustration, and I wish to use it for a moment. In a book of popular science published some years ago, there occurs a passage, as nearly as I recall it, like this: "There came a time when the botanist in his herbarium, the zoölogist among his dissections, and the paleontologist among his fossils, all looked up and whispered a word, it was the same word from the lips of them all, and that word was evolution." That is to say, the workers in the different fields of biological science discovered that there was an underlying principle which had been working itself out in all the subdivisions of biologic phenomena. They have now discovered that there are a number of such general principles of organic life: principles of evolution, of cellular structure, of physiological chemistry, and of oecology. It is the discovery of these principles that has transformed the old "natural history," which was chiefly a labeling of forms, into the modern science of organic life. It is in proportion as the specific biologic sciences have applied these principles of general biology that they have become illuminating and interpretative.

There are general principles of *social evolution*, as truly as of biological evolution. The principles of biological evolution not only apply to all divisions of organic life, but also are discovered by a study that is not confined to any division but common to all the range of organic life. For example, the investigator of Mendel's law works now with peas, and now with guinea-pigs or rabbits. Similarly the principles of social evolution apply throughout the range of social life, and must be worked out by a study equally comprehensive.

The principle of cellular structure, in biology, is paralleled by the social histology which shows how the ideas and sentiments of individuals, which the individuals owe to their membership in society, in turn build themselves up into customs, institutions, and all the different forms of essential social realities. As the principle of cellular structure applies equally to animal and to vegetable tissues, so does this principle of social histology apply equally, and play equally essential part in adequate explanation, throughout the range of economic, political, and cultural realities.

The application of chemico-physical principles to the explanation of every division of organic life is paralleled by the application of psychological principles

to the explanation of every division of social activity. Second in importance only to the doctrines of evolution, and perhaps not second even to them, are the teachings of general biology concerning the physics and chemistry of vital processes. Likewise, among the achievements already made by general sociology, none perhaps are of so much importance, and so explanatory of all the divisions of social life, as those general interpretative concepts that arise from the application of the psychological method to the study of society, which are symbolized by such phrases as "imitation," "social radiation," "prestige," "interference and accommodation between waves of imitation," etc.

Finally, general sociology has its homologue to that division of general biology which is termed oecology, in the study of the tendencies of environmental influence upon all the phases of social life. This includes the influences of climate, natural routes and barriers, natural resources, etc., and also of the man-made material environment.

Laying aside the comparison between general sociology and general biology, one may enumerate the following lines of research which, I think we may agree, lie open before the sociologist:

1. How does geographic environment condition the correlated activities that compose the life of society; especially what definite general causal tendencies of this nature are observable?

2. What are the tendencies to modification of the life of society that issue from the artificial physical environment? Here we are in the presence of problems of great practical as well as theoretical interest, such as the social effects of good or bad roads, and other means of transportation and communication, of good or bad housing, and of extreme contrasts in the distribution of wealth—I do not refer to the problem of distribution, but the problem of the social effects of distribution.

3. What physiological conditions affect the life of society, and what modifications do they produce? The causation of physiological peculiarities are not for us to trace, but for the student of physiology and hygiene; but the relation between physiological causes and social effects are for us or no one. These physiological conditions of populations are both hereditary and acquired. In so far as they are socially caused they involve problems of social practice, the importance of which is to be realized by a study of social effects, and even hereditary traits of a population are dependent in a considerable degree upon social practice, as the students of eugenics would have us realize. Unsanitary occupations, and prevalent vices are still more dependent on social practice as well as productive of social effects, which we are expected to trace, and so far as possible to measure.

4. What is the essential nature of social phenomena, and what definite varieties of tendency to change are observable in the social activities themselves —tendencies that appear in activities whether economic, political, ethical, or of whatever sort—tendencies that explain the molecular breaking up, shifting, or accretion of settled public opinions and sentiments, customs, and institutions?

5. How do social activities condition each other; how do activities of the several different kinds mold and limit each other; what are the conditions and the limitations of leadership; how do masses mold the ideas, sentiments, and practices of their members?

6. Many of these problems require, as one of the methods that contribute to their solution a widely comparative study of homologous social activities under the most varying conditions and in different stages of advancement. Such for example are the studies that have rendered impossible the intuitional theory of ethics, by showing how conscience codes grow out of the conditions of a society, and how the sentiment of society can make practically anything seem right to its individual members.

7. I add one statement that may not yet be a point of agreement. The time is not far off when ethics will no more be regarded as a part of speculative philosophy than chemistry, physics, or biology. They still tell us that it is philosophy that deals with what ought to be, and that science deals only with what is. Accept the statement. The good and evil that are realized in human experience are a part of what is. The ancient questions: "What is the nature of moral law?" "What is the good?" and "What is the right?" can be satisfactorily answered only by study of the actual facts of life, as it is lived by men in society (and men can become men only in society). The problems of ethics can be answered only by learning what are the conditions of fulfilling the good possibilities of human life, in the actual matter of fact experience of men. The "problem of conduct" is a matter of fact, not of speculation; the "problem of the good" is a matter of fact; the "nature of moral law" is the law of Nature applied to the production of results in actual experience.

The study of the essential nature of social realities, in their minute elements and their massive combinations, of social evolution, and of the modes of variation and causal tendencies to which all social realities are subject, are already yielding us—not agreement in matters of detail—but certain great and dominant points of view, from which there become visible the broad outlines of a theory of social progress, a basis for sound criticism of the various institutions, principles of interpretation applicable to social life, economic, political, ethical, and in all the forms of its manifestation.

J. L. Gillin, University of Wisconsin

Sociologists might well learn by taking a leaf out of the book of experience of the other scientists. Psychology became a science with a future only when it got back from mere logical analysis to a study of genetic psychology. We may construct as much as we please fine analytical schemes by which to classify all kinds of social facts, but we shall not get far either in understanding our problem ourselves or in making it of value to others unless we carefully ascer-

tain how this thing we call society has come to be what it is. That is fundamental.

I do not mean to say the genetic should precede the analytical in presenting the subject-matter of sociology to classes. That is a question which is yet under discussion. What I mean is that in the construction of a sociological platform the genetic point of view should prevail, instead of the merely analytical.

As for the sociological platform itself, I very much doubt that we are ready to adopt any formulation of the subject which might come to be looked on as "orthodox." We are very well agreed on what our subject-matter is, on the sociological point of view and on the general method of sociology. That is enough at this stage of development. To do more would be to fetter the free discussion which is so essential to the progress of our science. The "varieties of sociology" about which we hear is a good sign. While it shows youthfulness and immaturity, it also shows the vigor and exuberance of youth, the freshness of a new world-view and the inspiration of an attempt not yet completed to sum up that most interesting complex of phenomena in all the world, human life. Doubtless it is disconcerting to the novice to find no cut-and-dried formulas in this new study. Perhaps it is disquieting to him to find only the beginnings of a scientific lingo usually called a nomenclature. Doubtless the time will come when these infallible signs of the growing rigidity of the science, these holy symbols of scientific tradition so dear to some men will be found established in sociology. In the meantime, however, sociologists are busy enough doing something with the great field which lies before them to bring it under even a semblance of cultivation. What boots it if every worker does not use the same kind of machinery, or does not build his line fences of the same materials, or divide his farm into the same sized lots? Let the good work go on. The best will survive—the best modified by the others in ways which commend themselves to sociologists in general.

As to the suggestion made in this discussion that sociology is primarily psychological, I do not feel so sure. Some social institutions, for example, are psychological in their nature, but some are primarily biological and others, primarily economic. Rather it seems to me that sociology deals with phenomena some of which have their origins in the biological nature of man and some in the psychological nature of man. The things, however, with which the sociologist is concerned are neither biological nor psychological, but social. True the sociologist cannot ignore the psychical. No more, however, can he ignore the biological, if he is to understand social phenomena. They have their roots in man as an animal and man as a creature of emotions and thought. In their nature, however, they are social. With biology and psychology as such he is only incidentally concerned. But in order to understand his social phenomena he must understand the biological and psychological relations of his social phenomena. In short he must study them genetically.

EDWIN L. EARP, DREW THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

One point of agreement among sociologists today is, that society is a life process, and that sociology is the science that treats of that process. I think we are also agreed that sociology is both theoretical and practical, and that there is a growing interest in both phases of the subject in our time.

When it comes to the teaching of the subject-matter of sociology we need to remember that the questions of teaching a science are vastly different from the statement of the subject-matter itself. The one depends upon the time at the disposal of the professor, and upon the kind of students he is teaching, and many other contingencies of the program of work in the institution. But the other depends upon the principles and facts of the science, and the vast fields in which by social machinery and social engineering, the network of social organizations may apply them in achieving results.

One difficulty we have in coming to agreements as to the subject-matter of sociology is, it seems to me, the various terms we meet with by writers and speakers on the subject. I can perhaps illustrate this. While a student in college I used to attend a church prayer-meeting, and I remember a grocer who attended also, and who sometimes led in prayer. On one occasion he wished to pray thus: "O Father in Heaven, we are glad we are still living—and when we come to die take us gently home with Thee." That is what I assume he wished to say; but this is what he did say—I quote from memory—"Heavenly Parent, help us to be cognizant of the fact that we are mortal!" and after many diversions in which he exhausted his vocabulary, he closed with another petition: "And when it becomes our lot to quit the time-washed shores of this mundane sphere, transport us on wings sublime to the sunny banks of sweet deliverance."

Now I think we can state the general outline of the subject-matter in very simple and understandable terms, and I think they are scientific because they are true to the facts.

First, we know that certain needs, which are felt and later intelligently understood by some, lie at the basis of all social organization or social structure, from the smallest group to the largest conceived international grouping of peoples. You may call these instincts, stimuli, social forces, or what you will, they are always there.

Second, the intelligent understanding of these needs involves the awakening of the social consciousness or the development of the social mind; and thus we have the whole range of the psychological phases of sociology.

Third, there follows social organization which has been treated in a most excellent volume by one of our number here present. But social organization to get things achieved must invent modes of action, which leads us to another set of facts.

Fourth, social machinery, or what some have called the voluntary organizations, committees, bureaus, and communions, under the social constitution.

But machinery must be worked to get things done, so we come to the realm of practical sociology and name it perhaps social polity.

Fifth, social engineering, social technology, or social work. The social engineer conducts the social survey and works his machinery with the least social friction and with the greatest measure of social efficiency measured by achievement.

This simple outline gives us a working basis for social theory and social practice that will include all that is useful and true in the literature of sociology now available.

CHARLES H. COOLEY, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

I suppose that sociologists need a consensus only so far as is necessary to mutual understanding and wholesome interaction. I have noticed only two things that seriously interfere with this. One is what I call *particularism*—the attitude of a man, or group, who believes that his idea is of such fundamental and exclusive importance that others are negligible. The attitude of the old-style temperance reformer who believed that the abolition of the liquor traffic was the only and sufficient cure for the ills of society is typical of this. Many of the advocates of eugenics are particularists: they can see nothing of serious importance but race improvements. The same is true of many Marxian socialists, and of other sectarian thinkers. There is no healthy interchange of thought with a particularist, because he is committed to the view that you can have nothing worth while to tell him. Of course this attitude is unscientific, and, especially, unsociological, but it is not at all uncommon.

Another difficulty is that we frequently have not such possession of our ideas that we can give a perfectly full, clear and concrete expression of them. We have glimpses, but our objects of thought are not so grown into our minds and lives that we are familiar and at ease with them and can see them in all their relations. Accordingly our descriptions of them are partial and imperfectly intelligible. When every principle lives in our minds in perfect clearness of outline and relation and incarnate in facts of common experience we shall have less difficulty in satisfactory communication. Sociology will then be more sure-footed in progress than it is at present.

ROBERT A. WOODS, SOUTH END HOUSE, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

An essential secret of harmonious business organization is that of the establishment of accounting units. Would not agreement among sociologists be promoted by focussing attention upon certain units of investigation, experiment, and comparison?

Social workers are tending strongly to find the unit of social reconstruction in the neighborhood. This refers not merely to the settlements, to organized charity and to many forms of educational enterprise, but to the struggle against

the various forms of physical and moral degeneracy, including probation, follow-up work after institutional care, and specific preventive effort.

At every point where social work is being intelligently localized, the extraordinary, unending suggestiveness of neighborhood life becomes apparent.

As a matter of evolution, the neighborhood instinct goes back beyond the family. It seems to have created the protective network which makes the family possible. It includes in germ, at least, all the subjective and deliberate function as neighbors—but it expresses continuously all of those spontaneous forms of relationship that so deeply affect the great mass of human beings in the background.

The neighborhood provides almost the only real way of entrance into family life; while it, rather than the family, is the unit of all public social life. It is large enough to contain in essence all the problems of city, state, and nation—and in many cases all the international problems—while being small enough to be comprehensively observed, known, appropriated. The neighbors up and down the street are all conscious of their stake as its citizens, and even children may play the rôle of statesman directing some of its general interests.

The neighborhood can be intelligently approached only from within; but by definition it is always ready to welcome into its fellowship new adepts who come in a spirit to be assimilated.

If for nothing else than a sound psychological attack, a teacher of sociology ought to be in the simple sense a neighbor; and the neighbor experience which is a rich possession of his students should be systematically organized and treasured.

L. A. HALBERT, KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

I cannot speak from the viewpoint of a sociological professor or author, but in connection with my efforts to learn how to get things done in society as it exists today, I have read about twenty textbooks along the line of general sociology, most of which have been written by members of this society, and recently I have been comparing them and I find that on any given subject belonging to this field, some material is to be found in a majority of different textbooks in each case. In some cases, the material may be in one part of the book, and in some cases, it may be in another. Some may treat the subject more fully than others, but on the whole, I think I can say that I have found that there was a considerable consensus of opinion in regard to what constitutes the subject-matter to be considered under the general head of the science of sociology.

I have found, however, that the terms in which these matters are discussed vary a great deal. In one textbook you will find a discussion of social forces; in another, you will find a discussion of the same thing under the head of interests; in still another, you will find a reference to motives; and in another, you will find the same thing called by some other name. Some go so far as to invent a whole new set of terms with which to discuss simple matters

which are a part of the stock of common knowledge held by almost any observant person.

I can say that if you would agree on a common set of simple terms, you would reduce the intellectual labors of those of us who try to gather the necessary principles from your writings on which to base our understanding of society for practical purposes.

If you had common terms and discussed a common subject-matter and each of you meant the same things by each term, you would then be in a position to discover how much actual agreement in regard to theory there was among the sociologists.

LEGISLATION AS A SOCIAL FUNCTION

ROSCOE POUND
Harvard University Law School

Of the two agencies of law-making in our legal system, one is thoroughly conscious that it is making rules and imposing standards, while the other purports to be wholly unconscious of power to do anything of the sort. The legislator, holding that law is a conscious product of the human will, takes it for unquestioned that he has but to ascertain the will of the sovereign with respect to the civic conduct of individuals and put such will in the form of chapter and section of the written law. In his view the prefatory "be it enacted," so far as anything beyond political responsibility is concerned, justifies what follows. On the other hand, the judge, holding that law is something found, not made, that it is reason, not will, and believing that in the long run conscious law-making can achieve little beyond authoritative declaration of what has been discovered in the determination of controversies, proceeds haltingly. He persuades himself to overlook the law-making function which everyone who administers justice must necessarily wield. Hence the one is prone to attempt far too much and to be careless how he carries out the details of what he attempts. *Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem* may be the theory of popular as well as of imperial sovereignty. In either case, the feeling that a declaration of the sovereign will suffices to make law gives rise to a mass of arbitrary detail that cannot obtain the force of law in practice. The other agency of law-making, on the other hand, attempts much too little and carries out what is attempted too cautiously and too doubtingly. For the judge is hampered at every turn by the theory that he can only discover, that the principles of the unwritten law are invariable, and that application of a rule which has at least a potential logical pre-existence in the received system is his sole function. What he does attempt is of necessity limited

by the honest endeavor to make it appear that he is bringing in nothing new.

Theories of law are not theories of law-making. If they are to be so taken, certainly it is not expedient that judges, wielding the common-law power of making binding precedents, have before them consciously a theory that they make law rather than find and declare it. The judge in the Year Books who announced from the bench that law was the will of the justices did not give us a satisfactory theory of judicial law-making. Yet the analytical jurists have done a good service in insisting upon their imperative theory of the form of the law and in demonstrating that law is made and must be made by tribunals. The doctrine of separation of powers works mischief here in confirming the traditional notion that the law is always discovered, that decisions are only declaratory, and that when a precedent is overruled the law is not changed but instead a misinterpretation thereof is corrected. The theory which confines the judicial function to mere application of a rule formulated in advance by an extra-judicial agency proceeds upon an eighteenth-century conception of law and of law-making which we cannot accept today. Our first step in the endeavor to compel law-making to take more account and more intelligent account of the social facts upon which law must proceed and to which it is to be applied must be to make all the agencies of law-making completely conscious of what they are doing. The next step is to make plain the end and purpose of what they are doing.

Subject to the qualification which attaches to all such classifications, namely, that they are divisions of the historian's discourse rather than of the subject itself, we may recognize four stages of legal development. I shall call these stages (1) primitive law, or the beginning of law, (2) the strict law, (3) equity or natural law, and (4) the maturity of law. To these, I conceive, we shall have presently to add a fifth stage, one upon which the law is now definitely entering, which may be called the socialization of law. Ideas of the nature of law and of the end of law, and hence ideas of law-making, are relative to the circumstances of these several stages, and, in consequence, an understanding of the four first named and of their respective contributions to the law of the

present necessary to any thoroughgoing consideration of modern law-making.

In the beginnings of law the idea is simply to keep the peace. Self-help or the help of the gods through their ministers is resorted to in the majority of cases. The help of the politically organized community is invoked exceptionally. Hence public administration of justice is not an agency for remedying wrongs. Much less is the law an agency for delimiting interests so as to adjust the relations of individuals with each other. It is simply a body of rules by which controversies are adjusted peaceably. At first, therefore, it attempts nothing more affirmatively than to furnish the injured a substitute for revenge. Where the law today thinks of compensation for an injury, primitive law thinks of composition for the desire to be avenged. Where modern law seeks a rational mode of trial that will bring forth the exact truth, primitive law seeks an acceptable mechanical mode of trial which will yield a certain unambiguous result without opportunity for controversy. Accordingly, in its beginnings law is a means toward the peaceable ordering of society. Along with religion and morality it is a regulative agency by means of which men are restrained and the social interest in general security is protected. Indeed, it is the least of the three, since its chief function is to restrain and regulate self-help and self-redress. Law retains this character of a regulative agency and of a means the end whereof is a peaceable ordering, although other ends become manifest as it develops. The contribution of this first period of legal development to the idea of the end of law is the conception of a peaceable ordering of society through the peaceable adjustment of controversies.

In the second stage of legal development, the stage of the strict law, law has definitely prevailed as the regulative agency of society and the state has prevailed as the organ of social control. Self-help and self-redress have been superseded for all but exceptional causes. Normally men appeal only to the state to redress wrongs. Hence the rules which determine the cases where men may appeal to the state for help define indirectly the substance of rights and thus indirectly point out and limit the interests recognized and secured. But rights and interests as such are quite unknown.

The period is one of remedies, not of rights, for while the logical sequence is interest, right, remedy, the historical sequence is the reverse. And when remedies are known, but not rights, arbitrary and formal limitations must do what in modern times is done by a detailed logical system of rights and the conception that remedies are a means of giving them effect. Accordingly in this stage two causes operate to produce a system of strict law, namely, fear of arbitrary exercise of the power of state assistance to individual victims of wrong and a survival of ideas from the beginning of law, when legal interposition in controversies was not the regular course. Five characteristics of this stage of legal development result: (1) the law is formal in a high degree; (2) it is rigid and immutable; (3) it is extremely individualistic; (4) it is wholly indifferent to the moral aspects of conduct or of transactions which satisfy the letter of its rules, and (5) it restricts capacity to invoke the law and capacity for acts which may lead to legal consequences in ways that now appear utterly arbitrary. These characteristics of the strict law affect the whole course of development of legal justice. The permanent contributions of this stage are the ideas of certainty and uniformity and of rule and form as means thereto.

The next stage, which I have called the stage of equity or natural law, is one of liberalization. The watchword of the period of strict law was certainty, the watchword of this period is some word or phrase of ethical import—in the Roman law, *aequum et bonum*, with us, equity and good conscience, in the law of Continental Europe, natural law. In consequence the period of strict law relies upon rules and forms; this period relies upon moral ideas and reason. Four ideas of the first magnitude come into the law in this period. The first is that legal personality should extend to all human beings and that incapacities to produce legal consequences should be rejected except where a natural as distinguished from a historical reason can be found for them. The second is that the law should look to the substance and not the form, the spirit and not the letter. This is the most revolutionary change in legal history, for Jhering says truly that every history of a legal system might take for its motto "in the beginning was the word." Only the systems that went through this change and came to measure things by reason

rather than by arbitrary rule or arbitrary formula have become laws of the world.

The third idea is good faith, the idea that justice demands one should not disappoint well-founded expectations which he has created; in other words, that it is not so much that rules should be certain as that men's conduct should be certain.

The fourth idea is that one person should not be unjustly enriched at the expense of another. Insistence upon these ideas, as moral ideas, leads to a further development of the means by which the legal system secures its ends. In the period of strict law, the means are remedies; in this period they are duties, and remedies are thought of as given to make these duties effective.

But the attempt in this stage to make law coincide with morals leads to two difficulties. One is an attempt to enforce over-high ethical standards and to make legal duties out of moral duties—such as the duty of gratitude—which are not sufficiently tangible to be made effective by legal means. This gradually remedies itself. The other is that it gives too wide a scope for discretion, since, whereas legal rules are of general and absolute application, moral principles must be applied with reference to circumstances and individuals. Hence at first in this stage the administration of justice is too personal and therefore too uncertain. In time this fault is corrected by a gradual fixing of rules and a consequent stiffening of the legal system which leads to a fourth stage. The permanent contributions of the third stage are the conception of promoting and enforcing good faith and moral conduct through the law and reliance upon reason rather than upon rule and form.

In the fourth stage, which I have called the maturity of law, the watchwords are equality and security. The former involves equality in operation of legal rules and equality of opportunity to exercise one's faculties and employ one's substance. The latter involves the idea that everyone is to be secured in his interests against aggression by others and that others are to be permitted to acquire from him or to exact from him only through his will that they do so or because of his infringement of rules devised to secure others in like interests. To this end, the idea of individual rights is worked out thoroughly and is put as the basis of the legal system,

so that duties are regarded as correlative thereto and remedies as vindications thereof. Accordingly the all-important legal institutions of this period are property and contract. But the interest of the promisee in the contract is itself treated as property. Hence Mr. Choate had much justification for asserting as he did in his argument in the income tax cases, that "preservation of the rights of private property" was the fundamental object of the law.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century signs of the beginnings of a new stage of legal development begin to be manifest throughout the world. In the maturity of law, the legal system seeks to secure individuals in the advantages given them by nature or their station in the world and to enable them to use these advantages as freely as is compatible with a like free exercise of their faculties and use of their advantages by others. To accomplish these ends it reverts in some measure to the ideas of the strict law. In consequence a certain opposition between law and morals develops once more, and just as the neglect of the moral aspects of conduct in the stage of strict law required the legal revolution through infusion of lay moral ideas into the law, which in different legal systems we call equity or natural law, so the neglect of the moral worth of the individual and of his claim to a complete moral and social life involved in the insistence upon property and contract in the maturity of law are requiring a similar legal revolution through the absorption into the law of ideas developed in the social sciences. Juristically, this is beginning in the recognition of interests as the ultimate idea behind rights, duties, and remedies. It is seen that the so-called natural rights are something quite distinct in character from legal rights; that they are claims which human beings may reasonably make, whereas legal rights are means which the state employs in order to give effect to such claims. But when natural rights are put in this form it becomes evident that these individual interests are on no higher plane than social interests, and, indeed, for the most part get their significance from a social interest in giving effect to them. In consequence the emphasis comes to be transferred gradually from individual interests to social interests. Such a movement is taking

place palpably in the law of all countries today. Its watchword is satisfaction of human wants, and it seems to put as the end of law the satisfaction of as many human demands as we can with the least sacrifice of other demands. This new stage has been called the socialization of law.

Legislation, in the sense of a deliberate framing and establishing in advance of rules of decision or of rules and standards of conduct by which, therefore, decision is to be governed, is chiefly a phenomenon of the maturity of law. In the first stage of legal development, law-making is wholly subconscious. Historically the judge precedes the law and the court precedes the legislature. What we call legislation in the beginnings of law is wholly declaratory. It is not an authoritative making of new law, it is an authoritative publication of law already existing in the form of traditional modes of applying for judicial action, traditional rules of decision, and traditional limitations upon self-help. The first conscious making of law takes place when choice has to be made between conflicting traditions or where conflicting traditions must be harmonized through amendment. This necessity arises whenever an attempt is made to declare the common custom of a political unit formed by the union of heretofore distinct tribes or peoples with customs of their own. Alfred's laws are the classical example. He tells us in his prologue that he found it necessary to pick and choose and even amend, but, he adds, "I durst not set down much of my own." The first step in the direction of conscious constructive law-making comes when men perceive that by changing the written record of the law they can change the law. Usually when this is discovered a legislative ferment sets in, as in the case of the early republican legislation at Rome, the Frankish capitularies on the Roman imperial model, and perhaps the legislation of Edward I. But the idea of deliberate change in the law is uncongenial to the stage of the strict law. The law is a system of remedies. The idea of rights has not developed. There is no body of principles of substantive law. Hence there are no principles to govern change, and arbitrary change appears to be at war with the very idea of law. Accordingly this brief outburst of legislation is quickly superseded by a purely judicial or juristic development of the law, under the

theory that law is to be found rather than made. This is true even when the law is wholly made over in the stage of equity or natural law. Even then the idea is that principles of superior validity have been discovered and that these principles, which have an independent and intrinsic validity, are simply applied. It is not until the maturity of a legal system that we enter upon a real stage of legislation.

Legislative law-making first becomes conscious of what it is. As soon as conscious constructive law-making begins there comes to be in the legal system an imperative element, an element resting on the expressed will of the sovereign and deriving its authority from the power of the state. This leads one type of thinker to look upon all law as an emanation of the sovereign will. But the main body of the law continues to be traditional in form and continues to be developed along traditional lines by judges or jurists. Resting at first upon the usage and practice of tribunals or the usage and customary modes of advising litigants on the part of those upon whom tribunals rely for guidance, the basis of its authority comes to be reason and conformity to ideals of right. The latter commonly are conceived of as immutable and eternal. Hence the function of judge or jurist in developing the law is taken to be one of discovering in the traditional materials of the legal system the principles which accord with reason and conform to ideals of right and of drawing them out to their logical consequences. This view of judicial law-making accords with the demand of the maturity of law for certainty and uniformity and is furthered by the insistence in this stage upon the security of property and contract. What it may lead to is well illustrated by the jurisprudence of conceptions of which Continental jurists have been complaining so bitterly.

First, then, judicial law-making must know itself; it must know what it is. Next, both judicial law-making and legislative law-making must know the ends to which they are employed. For our trust is in the efficacy of intelligent effort; so far as we make law consciously, we are to make it intelligently. This was hardly possible until we had arrived at the conception of interests. Our hope of achieving it is in definition of the interests that may claim

to be secured and determination of the principles according to which they are to be selected and delimited for legal recognition.

A legal system attains its end by recognizing certain interests, individual, public, and social; by defining the limits within which these interests shall be recognized legally and be given effect through rules of law, and by endeavoring to secure the interests so recognized within the defined limits. It does not create these interests. There is so much truth in the old theories of a law of nature and of natural rights. These interests arise, apart from law, through the competition of individuals with each other, the competition of groups or societies with each other, and of individuals with such groups or societies. What the law-maker has to consider, therefore, is (1) the interests which the law may be called upon to recognize and secure, (2) the principles upon which such interests should be defined and limited for purposes of legal recognition, or, to put it in another way, the principles by which conflicting interests should be weighed or balanced in order to determine which are to be recognized and to what extent, (3) the means by which the law may secure the interests which it recognizes, and (4) the limitations upon effective legal action which may preclude a complete recognition or complete securing of all these interests to the full extent which ethical considerations may demand.

Strictly the concern of the law is with social interests, since it is the social interest in securing the individual interest that must determine the law to secure it. But using interest to mean a claim which a human being or a group of human beings may make, it is convenient to speak of individual interests, public interests, that is interests of the state as a juristic person, and social interests, that is interests of the community at large. This is the order in which they have been recognized in the development of juristic thought.

Although certain great social interests have determined the growth of law from the beginning, individual interests were the first to be worked out critically. For nearly two centuries now philosophical jurisprudence has devoted itself chiefly to this task. The more important of them have become well known to us under the name of natural rights, because of the old theory that the pres-

sure of these interests in a state of nature produced the state and hence that the state existed solely to secure them. Usually they have been deduced from the qualities of man in the abstract or from some formula of right or justice. But the practice of jurists has often been sounder than their theories have been. So far as individual interests go, the sociological jurist will find little to do beyond essaying to supply a better theoretical foundation.

With respect to public interests, the situation is very different. These were first thought of as individual interests of the personal sovereign and hence were worked out originally in jurisprudence on the analogy of individual interests. Moreover, since the sovereign is, as it were, the guardian of social interests, these also were at first treated as individual interests of the sovereign and were worked out on the same analogy of private rights. Hence there is much confused thinking in jurisprudence at this point. General social interests and interests of the state as a juristic person are not differentiated, and both are spoken of as "rights" of the state. By public interests, then, I mean here the interests of the state as a juristic person; interests of personality, i.e., the integrity, freedom of action and honor of the state personality, and interests of substance. The persistence in American public law of the royal prerogative of dishonesty and the resistance of lawyers to attempts to introduce ideas on this subject which are familiar to the rest of the world afford but another instance of the practical effect of theoretical confusion in retarding the growth of the law.

Turning to social interests, the sociological jurist has in a sense a clear field. As such, we have only begun to recognize them. Yet the social interest in general security was the first interest protected by the law. Primitive law arose and existed to maintain this interest. Unhappily in the nineteenth century legal history was written from an individualist standpoint and was interpreted as a development of restrictions on individual aggression in the interest of individual freedom of action. When we recognize that this was a mistake and that the social interest in general security dictated the very beginnings of law, so that individual rights were only a means gradually worked out for furthering this social interest, and rewrite our legal histories accordingly, we shall be

able to make historical jurisprudence more effective. In the same way much that has been written as to individual natural rights, when recast from the standpoint of a social interest in security of acquisitions and a social interest in the security of transactions, may be made useful. But the jurist cannot work alone here. In order to construct a scheme of social interests that will serve the jurisprudence of tomorrow as the thoroughly elaborated schemes of natural rights served the jurisprudence of yesterday, the social sciences must co-operate. This does not mean that any jurist shall take all the social sciences for his province. It does mean, however, that he shall know that they all have materials for him and shall be willing and able to go to them therefor.

With respect to the next step in a theory of law-making the principles seem to be clear. Having determined what the interests are which the law may be called upon to secure, as they cannot all be secured and as many of them are in positive conflict, questions arise which are fundamental for the law-maker. How are these interests to be balanced? What principle is to determine their relative weight? Which shall give way in case of conflict? Philosophical jurists have labored to reduce some method of getting at the intrinsic importance of various interests. They have sought for some absolute formula whereby we may be assured that the weightier interest intrinsically should prevail. I do not believe in such attempts for a moment. Yet perhaps I shall be accused of following in their footsteps when I venture to lay down two principles for the theory of law-making in this connection. The first is that individual interests are to be secured by law only because and to the extent that they are social interests. There is a social interest in securing individual interests so far as securing them conduces to general security, the security of social institutions, and the individual moral and social life. Hence while individual interests are one thing and social interests are another, the law, as I have said, secures individual interests because of a social interest in so doing. No individual, therefore, may claim to be secured in an interest that conflicts with any social interest unless he can show some countervailing social interest in so securing him—some social interest to outweigh that with which his individual

interest conflicts. The second principle is, secure at all times the greatest number of interests possible, with the least possible sacrifice of other interests. Interests change in their incidents, in their intensity, and even in their very nature. Hence such a principle recognizes that there can be no final word on any point of the law. The legal system must be kept flexible and law-making must accommodate itself perennially to shiftings in the quantity and quality of the interests it has to meet.

Next in a theory of law-making come the means of securing interests. Here jurisprudence is at its best. The conceptions of rights, duties, powers, and privileges, the notions of punishment, redress, specific and substitutional, and prevention and their respective provinces, require relatively little from the sociological jurist. The chief task will be to discover how far each has been used to secure the interests which the law has recognized, how far each has been effective for such purpose, and thus how each may be developed or curtailed in the future. Probably the most important task is the development of the idea of preventive justice.

A side where more is to be done is in ascertaining the limits of effective legal action. We must remember that law, as a practical matter, must deal largely with the outside and not the inside of men and things, and must keep in mind that the legal system is obliged to rely upon external agencies to put its machinery in motion. Even the best of laws do not enforce themselves. Hence it is of the first importance to study the social-psychological limitations upon enforcement of legal rules. It needs very little comparison of the law in the books with the law in action to demonstrate that both judge-made and statutory rules fail continually because they lack what has been called the social-psychological guaranty. A rule may run counter to the individual interests of a majority or of a militant minority or of a powerful class; or it may run counter to the moral ideas of individuals, as in the case of the Fugitive Slave law; or it may be that no immediate interests of individuals are involved and hence they are indifferent. In Anglo-American law, where individual initiative is the main reliance and the individual wields a sort of dispensing power through the power of the jury to render general verdicts, the latter is a

frequent situation. No work that can be done in jurisprudence is of more importance than this study of the application and enforcement of law. But here again the social sciences must co-operate. Judicial statistics—and we have yet to gather them—must be looked at from more than one point of view before the sociological jurist may lay down much beyond a few obvious principles which Bentham on one side and the historical jurists on another have already perceived.

So far I have barely sketched the progress of juristic thought as to law-making and the main heads of a theory of law-making as a social function. But this is less than half of the field. Before we can have sound theories here we need facts on which to build them. Even after we get sound theories, we shall need facts to enable us to apply them. Hard as it is for legislators to ascertain social facts, it is even more difficult for courts with the machinery which our judicial organization affords. As a general proposition, courts have no adequate machinery for getting at the facts required for the exercise of their necessary law-making function. As things are, our courts must decide on the basis of matters of general knowledge and on supposed accepted principles of uniform application. Except as counsel furnish material in their printed arguments, the court has no facilities for obtaining knowledge of social facts comparable to hearings before committees, testimony of specialists who have conducted detailed investigations, and other means of the sort available to the legislature. Yet judges must make law as well as apply it, and judicial reference bureaus not remotely unlike Dr. McCarthy's epoch-making contribution to practical legislative law-making are not unlikely to develop. The laboratories and staffs of experts which are coming to be attached to some Continental tribunals strongly suggest this. But before we can do anything in this direction, we must provide a more flexible judicial organization. We must give our courts power to organize such administrative agencies as the business before them may require. The present system, in which in many of our jurisdictions the judges are at the mercy of elective administrative officers over whom they have no control, is incompatible with effective handling of social facts in our tribunals. A judge

to whom I showed recently the last report of the Municipal Court of Chicago, when he saw that the court had a general superintendent, that it kept statistics, and devoted much attention to proper gathering of them, study of them, and embodying the lessons they had to teach in rules, objected that this was not a court at all but a sort of imperial ministry of justice. The excellent work done by the Municipal Court of Chicago shows us that we must abandon the hard-and-fast line between the judicial and the administrative involved in our legal tradition, must recognize that a great deal of the administrative is involved in and necessary to the effective working of the judicial, and must make each court within its proper scope a bureau of justice rather than as has been our theory in the past a sort of slot machine into which the facts of a controversy are put above and from which the decision is taken out below. After some seven centuries our legal system has not completely evolved a rational mode of trial which will ascertain the facts of particular controversies. There may be an analogy here. Starting with purely mechanical modes of ascertaining facts, the law has gradually developed rational methods. In the immediate past the social facts required for the exercise of the judicial function of law-making have been arrived at by means which may fairly be called mechanical. It is not one of the least problems of the sociological jurist to discover a rational mode of advising the court of facts of which it is supposed to take judicial notice.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF REMEDIAL AND PREVENTIVE LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES

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It has been said by Sir Courtenay Ilbert, with reference to English legislation, that

> the intervention of the legislature in the domain of private law, though sparing and unsystematic, has been continuous. When the development of common law rules has failed to keep pace with changes in social and economical conditions, when a too servile adherence to precedents has forced those rules into a wrong groove, the legislature has never shrunk from stepping in and bringing the rules into conformity with the national will and national requirements.[1]

It can also be said that the legislatures in the United States, unsystematically but none too sparingly, have not hesitated, particularly within the last twenty-five or thirty years, to attempt to make law conform to social desires and, to a degree, to meet social ends.

The purpose of this paper is to indicate, briefly and in general terms, some of the principal matters with which legislative activity has been busy, in order to find out, if we may, what principles, if there be any, are guiding social legislation in the United States. It cannot be contended that social legislation in this country has been enacted in conscious pursuance of any fundamental theory. The legislator has, as a rule, no fundamental conceptions, a priori, from which he deliberately proceeds. His legislation is more likely to be empirical, and none the less sound for that, and his desire, not always effectively or wisely carried out, is to meet practical conditions and not to develop a theoretically perfect body of law founded upon assumed fundamental conceptions or theories.

[1] *Legislative Methods and Forms*, p. 6.

I shall not concern myself with constitutional difficulties, nor with criticism of the wisdom or unwisdom of particular methods of accomplishing results, for my object is not so much to determine the validity of particular enactments as it is to indicate the lines along which legislatures are thinking and the matters to which they are directing their attention.

I

By far the largest part of the publications containing the legislation of the United States, revised statutes, session laws, and what not is taken up with political and governmental affairs and only a comparatively small portion is necessary to contain those statutes which relate to or affect the private law. There is, however, a great deal more of legislation relating to matters of private law than there used to be, though it is still relatively small in bulk.

Modern legislation, as it affects social reforms, is much more likely today to have more care and thought put upon it than was the case only a few years ago. The legislator is more inclined to make use of sociological investigations in the preparation of laws than he formerly was, when a great deal of legislation was based upon his general impressions as to social facts rather than upon the facts themselves, which were, and in many cases still are, impossible to obtain or inaccessible to the legislature. The modern statute is likely to show better draftsmanship than used to be the case, though there is still room for improvement. There is still a great deal to be done along this line and the official legislative draftsman, long an institution in England, is very little in evidence in America.

The success of the Legislative Reference Library in Wisconsin, both in the matter of assembling such information as there may be relating to projects of legislation and in the actual drafting of statutes by experts, indicates the probable introduction of this institution in many of the American states.[1] Something of this sort is necessary if we are to have social legislation that will adequately meet the conditions desired to be affected.

[1] McCarthy, *The Wisconsin Idea*, chaps. viii, ix.

Not only is there need of accurate knowledge of social conditions and proper drafting of legislation, if our statutes are to be adequate for the purpose desired by legislators, but there ought to be what there are not now, studies of the operation of new enactments and their effect upon the conditions they are intended to modify. There is material for such studies in existence in the reports of administrative boards and commissions and elsewhere, but it is scattered and not readily available for legislative use.

If we are to have social legislation, therefore, that is to be effective, the legislator must be provided with these three things; the facts as to the conditions to be changed and affected by the proposed legislation, proper draftsmanship, and a comprehensive and adequate study of the operation of the new law after its passage, in order that its effectiveness and adequacy may be determined.

II

Social legislation is a vague term, for the law itself, in its traditional as well as in its imperative element, is a social mechanism, and all legislation therefore, in one aspect at least, is social. But there are departments or branches of legislation which more intimately relate to and affect the individual in his social contacts than is the case in others, and I shall endeavor to consider some of these topics in this paper. I cannot hope to cover the whole field of legislative activity but shall endeavor to confine myself to those topics which have been, and are now, aside from political and governmental matters, occupying the attention of legislators and social thinkers, to the end that certain changes in social conditions, affecting intimately the lives of men, may be brought about.

A very cursory glance through the records of legislation will show that legislation of the kind referred to, judging simply from quantity, relates largely to matters concerning labor, protection of health and safety, and the regulation of certain callings and professions. Then in smaller quantity comes legislation relating to dependent classes, family relations, the prevention of fraud, the prevention of monopolies and discriminations, and the conservation of natural resources and the regulation of their use.

This is not all of the legislation which has for its object a definite

social purpose, but these are matters about which the present-day legislator seems to be most busy. Exemption and homestead laws have been upon American statute books from a very early day and their principle has become so imbedded in American legal thought and the operation of the older statutes apparently so satisfactory that very little of the new legislation relates to this subject. The same may also be said of the law relating to mechanics' liens.

The formulation of a satisfactory and scientific classification which will put each topic into its proper category is difficult and I shall not attempt it in this paper, but shall speak briefly of some of the topics, which I have mentioned without regard to any classification that might be called scientific, and shall endeavor simply to group together the laws which seem to be, from their subject-matter, more or less closely related.

1. *Labor.*—Labor legislation is nothing new in the history of Anglo-American law. The English parliaments have from early times legislated upon this subject and much of this early legislation has many resemblances to some of the projects which have been made the subject of present-day legislative activity; for example, the regulation of wages was attempted in England as early as 1349.[1]

In America labor legislation may be divided roughly into four classes; enactments relating to: employers' liability, factory conditions, terms of employment, strikes and lockouts and unemployment.

Employers' liability is one of the subjects which the common law has dealt with unsatisfactorily. Indeed, it may be said that the common law has broken down at this point and it was not long after the first announcement of the fellow-servant doctrine in *Priestly* v. *Fowler*[2] in England in 1837 and in *Murray* v. *South Carolina R.R. Co.*[3] in South Carolina in 1841 and the adoption of the doctrine of these two cases in *Farwell* v. *The Boston & Worcester R.R. Corporation*[4] in Massachusetts in 1842, that American legislatures and courts began to busy themselves with the limitation and restriction of its operation, so as to increase the number of cases of

[1] Stimson, *Popular Law-making*, p. 64.

[2] 3 Meeson and Welsby, 1.

[3] 1 McMullan's Law, 385.

[4] 4 Metcalf, 49.

employers' liability. The related questions of contributory negligence and assumption of risk have also been greatly affected by legislation. The tendency today is to abolish the common-law doctrine of assumption of risk and to modify that of contributory negligence and to put upon the employer, or a fund to which he is a contributor, the burden of all injuries to workmen except where there is the most culpable negligence. Workmen's compensation acts have apparently come into American law to stay and we may expect their adoption in some form or other in most, if not all, of the states. It is not possible within the limits of this paper to describe them at length or to do more than mention the principle, to a degree novel in Anglo-American law, upon which they are based, of liability for damage without fault.

Factory conditions have provided a fertile field for legislative activity and almost everywhere there is at least a minimum provision for the health, safety, and comfort of employees, particularly of women and minors. Sweatshops, wherever the conditions prevail which cause them, are the objects of legislative reprobation.

Factory inspection under the direction of a state officer is the means provided generally for the enforcement of such legislation and furnishes an example of the pronounced tendency to put matters of social welfare into the hands of administrative officials and boards and to take them as far as possible out of the hands of the courts.

Building laws, which influence factory conditions very greatly, are generally enforced by the municipality and sometimes by state officials as well, and so in some states a very unfortunate condition of conflict between city ordinances and state laws results which has handicapped materially the enforcement of either. The building inspector and the factory inspector and their respective chiefs and boards are usually supreme and from their decisions there is no appeal, a condition of affairs that shows how far we have traveled from *laissez faire*.

Many of the terms of employment, which, under common-law doctrines, employer and employee were left to settle for themselves, are now regulated by the state, and contracts contrary to the terms of the statutes are declared to be void. Wages must be paid in

money in many states, sometimes at least once a week. No employee can release his employer from liability. Membership in labor organizations may not be forbidden by employers. Hours of labor are regulated, though so far the tendency is, as to adult male employees, to provide nothing more than that a work day shall not exceed a certain number of hours. But as to women and minors, labor for more than a certain number of hours is prohibited and they are also prevented from engaging in certain employments which are taken to be detrimental to their physical and moral well-being.

Wages have also been made the subject of legislation and minimum-wage laws are being advocated in many states. The Massachusetts law applies only to women and minor employees, but in the projects advanced in other states no such limitation is made, and it is proposed to make the statute apply to employees of both sexes, raising interesting constitutional complications. The statutes applying to the wages of employees of the state and its subdivisions are numerous, and, of course, apply to men.

If Sir Henry Maine's interpretation of legal and political history is sound, from "status to contract,"[1] all of this means we are traveling backward, for legislation is putting disabilities upon employers and employees, as well as upon common carriers and others engaged in public employments, which are not imposed upon the rest of the community. But, even assuming that Maine's dictum is sound, status in former periods of legal history had the effect of creating disabilities with a very different end in view than that of the legislation just mentioned, and such legislation is probably not so much reversing the course of history as it is creating, or at least is intended to create, conditions of self-realization, more consonant with Maine's interpretation than would be likely to exist otherwise in our industrial age.

Compulsory arbitration is a principle which the American legislator has not adopted and the statutes generally provide merely a means for conciliation unless both sides consent to arbitrate. But the recent pronouncement of the board of arbitrators in the controversy between the eastern railroads and their engineers,

[1] *Ancient Law*, Pollock's ed., p. 165.

in favor of this doctrine, may give vigor to the otherwise rather feeble movement for such laws.

Black lists on the one hand, and intimidation on the other, have both been legislated against.

Aside from the authorization of temporary employment upon public work in times of critical unemployment, the legislative attempts to cope with this great problem have been confined largely to the establishment of free employment offices and to the provision of means for circulating information as to the condition of the labor market.

Bureaus of labor have been established and the collection of labor statistics and the reporting of accidents provided for.

2. *Public health and safety.*—The inadequacy of the classification adopted in this paper is shown more clearly, perhaps, in considering legislation affecting public health and safety than almost anywhere else, for a very great deal of the legislation considered under other heads in this paper might be included under that of public health and safety. Therefore, I shall consider at this point and under this head only a few of the laws which directly affect these matters and which cannot conveniently be made to fit into the other classes of legislation named at the beginning.

A characteristic of the legislation relating to matters of public health and safety is the wide discretionary power given to public boards and officers charged with the duty of enforcing these laws. Their authority is almost arbitrary, and they may cut off access to dwellings, condemn and destroy food, prohibit the carrying-on of offensive trades, protect the purity of the water supply, condemn buildings, and in general exercise the widest and most unquestioned authority for the protection of the health and safety of the community.

The sale of adulterated and impure foods, or of foods, such as milk, and of drugs which do not conform to established standards, is prohibited. Vaccination in many places is compulsory as a condition of admission of children to the public schools. Sewage systems are provided for and hospitals, generally for the treatment of the insane, are almost universal. The details of health and safety regulations are generally left to local authorities, upon whom is

also usually placed the burden of maintaining hospitals for the treatment of diseases other than insanity, and they may have this burden also.

Legislation against the smoke nuisance is becoming not uncommon, though this matter is also generally left to be dealt with by local authorities.

The inspection of buildings and of such things as elevators and steam boilers is general.

No individualistic theories are permitted to stand in the way of the protection of public health and safety and the benevolent despotism of the health officer and the building inspector is accepted as an ordinary fact of American existence.

3. *Regulation of callings and professions.*—There are very few businesses and professions which are not made to feel the regulating hand of the legislature. The laws on this subject may conveniently be grouped into three classes: (*a*) laws which require some qualification or special evidence of skill as a condition precedent to engaging in certain professions or callings; (*b*) laws which regulate certain public or quasi-public callings; (*c*) laws which are designed to secure public health, public morals, or public safety, or to protect the public from fraud or imposition.

In the first class we find examinations required in order to enter upon the practice of law, medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, and veterinary surgery, and the same is true as to barbers, plumbers, and stationary engineers. The tendency seems to be to subject more callings to this requirement than the contrary, and the legislator would seem to be skeptical of the existence of a natural right to enter upon the practice of a profession or of a calling, the qualifications of whose practitioners the public has no practicable means of determining, and evidently does not agree with the Supreme Court of Indiana, that "there is a law higher in this country, and one better suited to the rights and liberties of the American people—that law which accords to every citizen the natural right to gain a livelihood by intelligence, honesty, and industry in the arts, the sciences, the professions, or other vocations."[1]

[1] *In re Leach,* 134 Ind. 665.

In the second class we find not only those businesses regulated which the common law regards as public callings—railroads, hotels, warehouses, express companies, gas and electric companies—but also such private businesses as may be regarded in their actual relation to everyday affairs as practically public or quasi-public—banks, insurance companies, and auctioneers.

Here again we meet the phenomenon to which reference has already been made in the discussion of labor legislation, the imposition of an incapacity to enter into certain contracts contrary to the terms of the statutes. Particularly in the cases of common carriers and insurance companies, we find the very terms of the contracts prescribed for the parties by the statute, and it does not matter what the wills of the parties may be, their respective rights and obligations are fixed by the statute and their particular intentions overruled.

The purpose of much of the legislation regulating businesses and callings seems to be to secure the public health, morals, or safety or to prevent fraud or imposition. Many of the laws just referred to are directed to this end, but this seems particularly to be the case with laws affecting public exhibitions and amusements, dealing in rags and junk, the selling of intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs, dealing in certain essential commodities such as coal, the manufacture of explosives, intelligence offices, and lending money on the collateral security of personal property or the assignment of wages.

4. *Prevention of fraud.*—The determination by legislation of standard weights and measures is general and in some states special officers are charged with the duty of seizing and destroying all false measures and weighing devices. Articles must be correctly described in the labels which they bear, so that the public may not be deceived and defrauded. Gambling and bucketing are prohibited, and gambling devices may be seized and destroyed. In some states "blue sky" legislation has been adopted to prevent the issuing of fraudulent securities.

5. *Dependent classes.*—There are indications in American legislation that the idea of providing state pensions for certain dependent classes has found a firm lodgment and we may expect

the enactment of many varieties of pension legislation. Old-age pensions have made a start, though so far they have been confined only to superannuated public employees. Pensions to the blind are granted in many states and in some states soldiers and their dependent relatives are the recipients of state bounty. The maintenance of paupers by public agencies has existed for centuries, and new legislation only confirms and extends the practice. In many states the widow and children have a right to recover damages because of the death of the husband and father resulting from the sale to him of intoxicating liquor. There is also a vigorous movement to secure to the dependent family of a prisoner some share in his earnings while in prison, which has resulted in legislation in several states. Pensions to mothers with dependent children are upon the legislative program of some of the states, and it is not unlikely that statutes granting such pensions will be enacted.

6. *Family relations.*—Uniform marriage and divorce legislation has been adopted in some states and an effort is being made to provide by law that individuals defective mentally or physically may not marry, though I am not aware that such projects have been enacted into law in any state.

In at least one state, the common-law doctrine that a parent has no legal right to be supported by his children has been reversed and the duty of support made mutual.

Only a mention can be made of the existence of laws prohibiting monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade, and of the numerous laws for the conservation of natural resources and the regulation of their use.

Nor is it possible to do more than call attention to the tendencies in American penal legislation, which seem to modify very greatly the primitive theory of retribution. Separate courts with a procedure very different from that which prevails in the ordinary criminal courts have been established for juvenile offenders and some individualization of punishment by means of the indeterminate sentence and a probation system has in several states been provided for adults as well as minors.

In this hasty survey of legislation, which it would take at least a volume to consider adequately, it has not been possible to do

more than mention many things of the greatest importance, and, of necessity, many subjects of legislation have been passed over entirely, but perhaps enough has been said to indicate the general results of American legislation and to disclose whatever underlying tendencies there may be.

III

Perhaps the first thing that strikes one in considering the results of legislation in America is the very evident fact that there is present no evidence of a belief in that "juristic pessimism" which denies the "efficacy of effort," notwithstanding the objections of historical jurists which have been accepted as sound by some American lawyers of standing and influence.[1]

Nor is there much evidence that the American legislator is still clinging to the individualistic theories of the older schools of economics or jurisprudence. To him, apparently, law, at least so far as law consists of legislation, is a means to the accomplishment of social ends and not an instrumentality to promote the Spencerian dogma of "equal freedom,"[2] with all its individualistic implications. Nor does he believe, if we may determine what he believes from what he has done, that, "to leave each man to work out in freedom his own happiness or misery, to stand or fall by the consequences of his own conduct, is the true method of human discipline,"[3] at least so far as legislation is a method of discipline. The American legislator does not adopt the theory which has so profoundly influenced American judges, that there exist natural rights of the individual which derive their force from sources external to the law.[4] He puts restrictions upon the ownership of property, provides for its seizure and destruction, denies to those not qualified the exercise of professions and callings, limits the freedom of contract, interferes in multitudes of ways with the management of private businesses, all in supreme disregard of

[1] Pound, "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," *Harvard Law Rev.*, XXIV, 598–604.

[2] Spencer, *Justice*, Sec. 27.

[3] Carter, *Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Function*, p. 337.

[4] Pound, "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," *Harvard Law Rev.* XXIV, 609, note 62.

natural rights, whenever he conceives that social demands require it. He ventures to lay his impious hands upon the common law itself and changes it and makes it over to promote what he believes to be the course of social and economic progress. Something of what he has attempted to do has failed of its purpose. Many of his projects are unsound from every viewpoint. Sometimes the mark has been overshot, sometimes undershot, but the significant thing is that sometimes the mark has been hit very close to the center. The conception that legislation may be made a powerful agency in the promotion of social and economic development has been thoroughly grasped and the development of the law, through legislation, to meet the social and industrial problems of the present, will continue. There are inherent limitations upon the power of the legislature, growing out of the nature of law itself, which will frustrate many fondly cherished legislative schemes, but well within such limits is an immense field for sound, constructive legislation, which will be taken possession of, sooner or later, whenever it is demanded by a sufficiently developed public opinion by which the legislator, in the end, is always controlled and guided.

The older jurisprudence of the various schools of juristic thought, with its ultimate emphasis, no matter from what premises it starts, upon extreme individualism and *laissez faire*, is not adequate to provide a theory which will explain and qualify the legislative output of the past twenty-five or thirty years. Professor Pound, in his paper "The Need for a Sociological Jurisprudence,"[1] has declared the necessity for the development of a new school of juristic thinking, and this necessity is, indeed, evident to everyone who considers the trend and scope of the legislation referred to in this paper. The increasing dominance of social ideals in all departments of American thought is convincing evidence that there is to be no let-up in the demand for social legislation and the need for a new statement of juristic theories and for a new philosophy of law and legislation will become more and more urgent.

In speaking of the ideals back of the social legislation in England in the nineteenth century, Dr. Brown makes the remark:[2] "In

[1] *Green Bag*, XIX, 607.

[2] *The Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation*, p. 42.

the first place, the ideal is unconscious, rather than conscious. It is something whose nature is being slowly realized, something that finds expression in action long before it has been formulated in speech." The social ideals back of American legislation are easier to translate into legislative action than they are to express in deliberate speech, but that the realization of these ideals will ultimately find expression in a juristic philosophy very different from that of the old schools cannot be doubted. When this new philosophy does come, it must avoid the pitfall of the eighteenth-century postulate of the existence of fundamental a-priori principles, capable of being made the bases for the construction, by processes of pure deduction, of a complete code of law, valid for all time and in all places. It must not, in its desire to express the social ends of law, disregard what is valid in individualism and *laissez faire* nor reject that which is sound in the older philosophies. Nor must it ever lose touch with the facts of life and of the developing and ever-unfolding social process or forget that law is not an end but a means, and a means to the accomplishment of social justice.

No matter from what point of view we regard the legislation referred to in this paper, we see the most convincing proof possible of the development among the American people of a social conscience, which compels at least an attempt at the reconstruction of economic conditions, so that each may secure "a standard of living, and such a share in the values of civilization as shall make possible a full moral life."[1] As in all idealistic movements, this conception of the function of legislation has its dangers. Like new wine it has gone and will continue to go to the heads of some who have grasped it, but as the conception itself is sound, we may expect that, as it is no longer a new thing, the realization of practical difficulties and of the value of the experience of the past, together with a clarified vision of the problems of the present, will direct its application to the concrete condition so that the requirements of a social justice will be met and social justice itself firmly established.

When it is said that the underlying tendency of American legislation is the accomplishment of social justice, so far as that may be done through law, it is desirable to give some definiteness to this

[1] Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 496.

rather vague phrase. What is its meaning, as this meaning may be found in the legislation referred to?

"Justice," says Willoughby,[1] "consists in granting, so far as possible, to each individual the opportunity for a realization of his highest ethical self, and . . . . this involves, or rather is founded upon, the general duty of all, in the pursuit of their own ends, to recognize others as individuals who are striving for, and have a right to strive for, the realization of their own ends."

It cannot be said, for it would not be true, that all of the social legislation to which reference has been made satisfies to the fullest extent the requirements of this description, but taking it by and large, looking at it as a whole, its spirit and its purpose is to accomplish the greatest possible self-realization of the individual consistent with an opportunity on the part of others to strive for a like realization. Take the labor legislation, for instance, the abolition of the fellow-servant rule, the provision for workmen's compensation, the requirements as to factory conditions, the regulation of hours of labor, the protection of women and children—what are these but attempts to achieve by legislation the establishment of the principle that the laborer is an end in himself and not a means to the ends of another? What are they but endeavors to provide working men, women, and children with an opportunity for their highest and fullest self-realization?

Labor legislation does not stand apart from the rest of social legislation, and what is true of its purpose is, in a measure, true of the purpose of all the rest.

> The moral criterion by which to try social institutions and political measures may be summed up as follows: The test is whether a given custom or law sets free individual capacities in such a way as to make them available for the development of the general happiness or the common good. The formula states the test with the emphasis falling upon the side of the individual. It may be stated from the side of associated life, as follows: The test is whether the general, the public organization and order are promoted in such a way as to equalize opportunity for all.[2]

Does not American legislation react positively when these tests are applied? Does it not to a degree satisfy these moral criteria? I submit that it does.

[1] *Social Justice*, p. 24.

[2] Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 482.

The balancing of individual demands with social demands and with other individual demands, so as to promote the general order by the equalization of opportunity, and to provide for the greatest possible self-realization consistent with the common good; at once to satisfy and reconcile the justifiable claims of the individual and of society as well, is no easy task, but it is the task to which American legislatures have set themselves. In a manner, halting and feeble it may be, by enactments in many instances unwisely conceived, legislation is proceeding to accomplish this purpose. It never will be completely achieved, for a body of legislation made in the present never can satisfy the demands even of the time in which it is framed, much less those of the unforeseeable future. American legislatures have not and never will accomplish the impossible, but the fact remains that they are attempting, and with a considerable degree of success, to express in the imperative mood something of "that which has been demonstrated by the logic of association to be true" and to realize what Professor Small has said, that "law is a force of occupation whose business it is to see that the flag of the conqueror is never lowered upon territory once annexed by social conviction."[1]

[1] *General Sociology*, p. 359.

SOCIAL IDEALS IMPLIED IN PRESENT AMERICAN PROGRAMS OF VOLUNTARY PHILANTHROPY

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Programs of voluntary philanthropy deal with no exclusive or distinctive problems to which religion and statesmanship are strangers. If it has a distinct field, it is rather in the stage at which the problems are attacked than in their essential character. Speaking very generally it may be said that in America initiative and experiment and educational propaganda belong to voluntary philanthropy, while control, and the enforcement of standards, and the meeting of large elementary recognized social needs fall to the state. Even when the state inaugurates frankly experimental schemes, these have usually been devised and tried out to some extent as voluntary enterprises; and governmental bureaus of research and publicity are most easily developed in fields which are not experimental, controversial, or doubtful but rather obvious, fundamental, and thoroughly understood.

Programs of voluntary philanthropy are as numerous, diverse, and complex as are the minds of philanthropists and the needs of suffering humanity. Socialism itself might be claimed as such a program. Large sums of money are voluntarily contributed every year and an enormous amount of human energy expended for no other purpose than to propagate its ideas; to rescue the exploited from what are represented to be the hardships of the capitalistic régime. It is a strange commentary upon the materialistic interpretation of history that socialists conceive it to be necessary to make such sacrifices and to put forth such herculean efforts to achieve an end which the economic forces alone have any potency to achieve, an end which no conscious human planning can either insure or avert. By the policies which they pursue, socialists avow themselves not to be really fatalists, or materialists, or determinists,

but nothing else in effect than philanthropists, working according to their light, and certainly according to their strength, for changes which they conceive to be beneficial to mankind.

However, I presume that neither the socialists nor the sociologists who planned this program will thank me to give any such extension to the definition of philanthropy as to include revolutionary propaganda. What you have had in mind is rather the relief of the oppressed and suffering and the improvement of conditions within the existing industrial and social order. We encounter first, then, those programs which have to do with making governmental action more effective, or extending its sphere. Bureaus of municipal research, state charities, aid associations, associations for labor legislation, tenement house committees, child labor committees, public education associations, public health associations, and numerous other similar agencies are founded mainly for the purpose of influencing governmental action, either directly, or through the development of public opinion. Workers in enterprises of this kind are sometimes almost as keen as revolutionists themselves to dissociate their activities from philanthropy, or at least to discriminate sharply between their kind of philanthropy which aims to deal with 100 per cent of the problem, that is to say, with all citizens as such, and ordinary philanthropy, which is content to deal with a modest fraction of the problem, helping particular individuals, or modifying for the better particular local conditions. Undoubtedly these numerous national, state, and municipal associations which have governmental action in view are characteristic of modern American philanthropy and they do disclose a common social ideal, an ideal of the state and of human relations. We should not be warranted in describing that ideal as either socialistic or anti-socialistic, as Christian or pagan, as Hamiltonian or Jeffersonian. The distinguishing feature of modern American philanthropy is that it keeps clear of controversial theories of the state and reaches down to a substratum of social concepts, to a foundation of common instincts, traditions, and motives upon which sociological, theological, and political controversies become indifferent, to a provisional and evasive realm, if you like to call it so, where there is a truce to superficial differences, and a recognition of kinship and common purpose.

Perhaps when radical and conservative, Jew, and infidel, and Christian, work together to protect children, or to stamp out contagious disease, or to raise wages, or to secure the introduction of a modern accounting system, or to humanize the administration of the criminal law, they write themselves down as guilty of intellectual inconsistency, or as lacking in a clear perception of the theory of the state on which they should proceed. I prefer to think that they are exhibiting a higher kind of consistency and perception, that they are obeying a true social instinct, that they are helping to shape for themselves and for their, perhaps, more pugnacious contemporaries a more adequate ideal of the state, one more consonant with the social ideal which our conditions require.

What is implied in regard to the state in all these programs which look toward better government as a prime means of securing social welfare reform is not paternalism, but the deliberate intention to use the governmental machinery for the doing of those things for which experience shows it to be more efficient and more economical than any other means yet devised. Neither to be alarmed by the growth of state action, nor obsessed by the desire to increase it for its own sake, is the frame of mind of workers in modern philanthropy. The state is looked upon as a social institution, not as a friendly or as a hostile power with independent personality, but as a very vital part of ourselves, as an extension of our will, our conscience, and our strong right arm, as a tool to work with, but none the less as a subtle, delicate, and somewhat mysterious inheritance, stronger because no man can fully understand it and no small group of men long bend it to selfish or sinister purposes, less strong than it might be if we had more respect for it and understood better the laws of its operations. The ideal of the state implied in these programs to which I refer is that of adults and not of children; of equals and not of tyrants or slaves; of physically able-bodied men, sound of mind—not of neurasthenics; of educated men rather than of instructed men; of optimistic, good-humored, patient men, not of fatalists or blasé, disillusioned, end-of-the-nineteenth-century philosophers; of economists with a Golden Age ahead, and a present surplus at their disposal; of men with a historical point of view, appreciative of the high services of their

constitution-making, law-creating ancestors, and shrewdly suspecting that among the things which they have inherited is some capacity for taking part on their own account in that same kind of fundamental law-making when the occasion arises.

The ideal of the state implied in these programs involves what we may call the investment theory of taxation. The state is urged to spend money in preventing contagious disease, in strengthening and developing the educational system, in providing factory inspection on the ground that such expenditures will eventually save money now spent for the care of the sick, and for waste social products which would be saved by education for efficiency and by adequate inspection. This is of course not the only argument. Even if it cost more to keep people well, to prevent accidents, and to educate than to care for the sick, the injured, and the inefficient, the former would still be worth while in the economics of philanthropy. But in that case the amount of money available for the purpose might be limited by the financial ability of the taxpayer. In so far as the things to be done represent saving expense instead of increasing it, there is no such outside arbitrary limit. All that is done but opens the way to do more, for it increases resources at each step instead of depleting them. This corresponds, of course, to the genetic conception of capital, as resulting not from saving in the sense of deprivation, but as an incident of serial or capitalistic methods of industry.

These programs for the encouragement and support of state activity imply also a new sense of the close interdependence of the interests of all social classes. They take into account the social effects of the growth of cities, of the increase in congregate dwellings, of the new facilities for educational propaganda, of the advances of science and mechanical invention. They assume the public-school system and boards of health, and factory inspection systems, and the daily press. That all the world is one great neighborhood, and especially that America's hundred million people may learn at the same moment and may fairly well understand what a president is recommending to Congress, what a supreme court is deciding to be the law, what a scientist has discovered, what lives are lost in a factory fire and by what means the bereaved families

are relieved, if at all, from the financial loss attendant upon the disaster, or by some dramatic educational device, such as a great exhibit, or the Christmas seals, what graver losses there are from tuberculosis and how preventable such losses are, if the cost of prevention can be met—all such revolutionary facts have been incorporated into the philosophy of modern philanthropy in such a way as profoundly to modify its programs. Of course, for the sake of brevity, I somewhat exaggerate. There are many things which have not actually been incorporated but the tendency is, I think, clearly to be seen. The ideal is that of a society which is by no means entirely dependent upon the government for meeting its corporate needs, which uses the state increasingly, as I have already said, but uses increasingly also other instruments for executing the social will, which looks upon a voluntary association, a chamber of commerce, a political party, or a newspaper as equally appropriate, within its limits, sometimes very wide limits, for accomplishing any beneficent purpose. Modern voluntary philanthropy as a whole is free from prejudice for or against state action, for or against voluntary action. Herein lies its greatest strength and its unique character. Its social ideal transcends that of political socialism on the one hand and that of the old individualism on the other. The same agencies, the same active workers, and the same financial contributors are to be found at one moment eagerly working for a restrictive law, or for more efficient administration because state action promises good results, and at the next moment for a relief fund, or a voluntary educational propaganda, because that promises good results. They are pragmatists, asking not what is inherently and abstractly the right way of social reform, but what way will cash in. They are positivists, measuring social needs and social remedies on the same scale and refusing to be embarrassed by the thought that one appropriate remedy is unavailable because, requiring state action, it leads toward socialism; or another because, requiring voluntary co-operation, it does not deal at one stroke with 100 per cent of the problem. They examine historical precedents but decline to be discouraged because of historical failures. The social ideal implied in such programs as we have thus far considered is, then, comprehensive, free from that artificial simplicity which

is gained by ignoring some of the elements of the situation, but nevertheless definite in that it takes affirmatively into account all kinds of social resources. Religion, business, and government are all tributary to its campaigns. The appeal of social work is a religious appeal. Philanthropic investment, or, rather, ordinary business investment controlled by a social spirit, is one of its most constant resources for dealing with certain kinds of exploitation and hardship. Legislation and administration are in the forefront of its programs though they do not fill the whole horizon. Its watchwords are five: (1) *social responsibility*, (2) *the utilization of social surplus* to the common advantage, (3) the *removal of obstacles* to individual efficiency and prosperity, (4) the free and willing *assumption by society* of the whole financial burden heretofore imposed by progress upon the *weaker members of society*, and (5) reasonable social control of those who for either biological or economic reasons have to be eliminated from ordinary industrial competition and social relations.

A second phenomenon characteristic of modern American philanthropy is the establishment of foundations for the study and improvement of social conditions. These may be separately incorporated and endowed, as in the case of the Russell Sage Foundation and the General Education Board; or grouped under a single financial corporate management, as in the case of the various Carnegie endowments: or associated with some educational or religious or philanthropic institution, as in the case of the Croker bequest to Columbia University for research into the causes and cure of cancer. The task of the social psychologist who would undertake to say just what social ideals are implied in these foundations is a delicate and difficult one for the reason that in the comparatively small group of founders there is naturally a relatively large personal factor which it would perhaps be safer to analyze in the manner of the more conservative national biographies, after the heroes have passed from the stage of action.

Still the programs of these foundations do disclose some elements in common of a social ideal which we can perhaps keep distinct from questions of individual characteristics. They are, on the whole, not unnaturally, more conservative than the groups of associations,

committees, and bureaus of which we have been speaking. Both donors and trustees of such foundations have an average age considerably above that of the whole population, and even above that of the directors and active workers in the first group of agencies. Except, perhaps, as to the public schools, and with other occasional exceptions, these foundations concern themselves less with state activities, and affiliate more naturally with the established voluntary institutions, such as colleges and universities, hospitals and orphan asylums, churches and relief societies. They are sometimes experimental, explanatory, and occasionally strikingly original; but, as a rule, they support accepted ideas and traditional methods rather than untried theories and bold innovations. This is not said in any spirit of hostile criticism. It is very desirable that tried and accepted ideas should have support from those who believe in them. That great foundations which can come only from great wealth should represent the ideals of the previous generation rather than of the next generation is what must be expected; and that they should represent the ideals of mature age and of vested interests is equally inevitable. What this means at the present time in this country is that their natural attitude toward state action for the social welfare is one of distrust, or at least of hesitation about greatly enlarging its functions. The disposition would be and is to examine the constitution and court decisions and to consult our conservative political traditions in determining whether a particular result should be sought through state or voluntary action, rather than to decide the question exclusively upon its merits; and these tendencies are clearly enough reflected in the actual programs of the foundations. Scientific research, popular education in hygiene, in agricultural methods, etc., pensions to college teachers, endowments for approved colleges, the standardizing of the work of charity organization societies are typical and most praiseworthy features of the programs of foundations inspired by such ideals. There is implied in such programs a high sense of personal responsibility, a deep concern as to the stewardship which great wealth involves, sometimes even an obvious embarrassment in finding some way of using the accumulated wealth so as to be certain to help and not injure. Perhaps there may be some failure

to recognize the full value of democratic co-operation, some reluctance to trust the future to the extent to which on the whole the future has generally shown itself, when it becomes the present, and still more when it becomes the past, to have been worthy to be trusted. Perhaps there is some failure to realize the extent to which chaotic industry itself and social neglect are responsible for the evils with which the foundations would deal. Perhaps the foundations on the whole, as compared with the more informal, more spontaneous, and more precariously supported voluntary agencies, are open to the danger of seeking to exercise control beyond the legitimate boundaries implied in their benefactions, as when a foundation for pensioning college teachers seeks to eradicate sectarian control of colleges. Nevertheless the social ideal which they represent is one that we could ill afford to spare. They do represent the socialization of wealth in process. They are not intended to be merely, I am almost inclined to say not at all, a form of insurance against more radical social reforms. Founders and the trustees of foundations may have their views on current issues of "social and industrial justice," but there is no evidence which I can discover of an expectation that their gifts will greatly retard or deflect the onward movement for the destruction of privilege and exploitation. They do what they are doing, so far as I can see, from what Mrs. Harriman calls the spirit of charity and philanthropy, "loving one's neighbor as oneself," "doing one's utmost to insure equal opportunity for all to become efficient." True, Mrs. Harriman has not herself as yet endowed any such great foundation as those of which I have been speaking; but, as she has sanctioned the publication of a book on modern philanthropy, in which "valuable lessons and suggestions" are drawn by Dr. Allen with her approval and commendation, in the preface of which she asserts roundly that man's individual gifts must be used systematically as well as sympathetically to be successful in their mission of benefiting himself, his country, and his race, we may confidently count her among the prospective founders of benefactions proportionate to her "gifts material," and we may assume that the social ideal which she expresses is in some measure representative. In one respect, however, the brief preface from which I have quoted is

sharply differentiated from the tendencies which I have attributed to foundations in general, as it puts forth the distinct proposition that "united individual efforts should be concentrated upon making efficient government everywhere." We may therefore expect that any institutions which Mrs. Harriman may create or support will belong primarily to the Bureau of Municipal Research type of philanthropy, rather than, say, to the type of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.

We have third to consider these philanthropic agencies which our generation has inherited, such as hospitals, relief societies, orphan asylums, and the like. It might naturally be expected that these institutions, having come to us from Colonial times, from Europe, or even from the far-off cradle of the Aryan race, corresponding to some of the most fundamental and universal instincts of humanity, would exhibit comparatively little influence of modern social ideals. This, however, is not the case. No less than the foundations, and scarcely less than the committees for the prevention of tuberculosis or for the promotion of sex hygiene, these venerable philanthropic institutions are responding to the new influences, and expressing in brick and mortar, in location and management, in technique and in results, the prevailing social ideas.

We see first an extraordinary broadening of their program to include the social causes of poverty, sickness, and crime, in addition to their traditional task of caring for individuals. The charity organization society has its department for the improvement of social conditions. The hospital has its social service department. Even the prison has its parole system; and the voluntary agencies which deal with the criminal extend their interest to the school system, even to prenatal influences and the control of heredity, to the administration of the criminal law, to the sanitary conditions in prison, to the occupations of prisoners, and eventually to the whole industrial and social complex.

These established voluntary agencies, in the next place, have come largely into the hands of experts who have had more or less direct professional training for their several functions. The merit system of appointments and promotion in the public service has its analogy in the preference now given in voluntary agencies to those

who besides ordinary physical and moral qualifications can give some evidence of having studied the specific problems involved, of having had training for the work to be done. This extension of scope to include social aspects of the problem, this trained service, and a new and refreshing spirit of co-operation have together transformed the programs of voluntary philanthropy, even as embodied in the oldest agencies, almost beyond recognition. These newer programs of the old institutions imply social ideals similar to those already attributed to the newer associations which are more directly concerned with state activities. Not that they co-operate to any great extent necessarily directly with the state, although in fact many of them do. Their aim, however, at their best, is everywhere prevention rather than cure, or at least equally with cure; rehabilitation of the individual, and the co-ordination of social service. Their ideal is constantly more social; more democratic; more inclusive, freer from racial sectarian limitations; more scientific in that it conceives even the waste places of human society to be subject to moral order, even the philanthropic obligations of individuals to be capable of formulation.

If we look upon charity organization as the most familiar, the most highly developed, and most clearly formulated concept of voluntary philanthropy, we may profitably inquire, finally, what the ideal of organized charity precisely is—whether it is destructive, capable of differentiation from other current and perhaps more popular ideals. What charity organization stands for specifically is intensive, discriminating, thorough, and sympathetic consideration of the individual man, woman, or child, of the particular family which for any reason fails to be self-supporting and self-sufficient. Organized charity instinctively distrusts large general relief schemes, whether public or voluntary. Public outdoor relief, emergency relief funds, widows' pensions, minimum-wage boards, social insurance, old-age pensions, the feeding of school children at public expense, and all such wholesale handling of relief problems are foreign to its spirit. Organized charity may have to deal with such relief schemes as *de facto* resources for the relief of individuals in whom it is interested, as existing portions of the social environment which, not being able to eliminate, it must seek to modify so far as

possible in the direction of its own ideal; but this task is not undertaken *con amore*, and, left to itself, organized charity would depend, even in the complex conditions of modern urban society, as Thomas Chalmers depended in Glasgow upon the invisible relief fund, upon the natural and spontaneous resources which lie in ordinary family and neighborhood relationships, rather than upon artificially created devices. Like Chalmers, organized charity of today, when unadulterated, fears the gift-bearing types of social legislation, fears the pauperizing effects of precollected relief funds, and prefers to work on what is known as the case-by-case system, discovering first of all what is needed, and then getting the money, or the job, or the advice, or the discipline, or whatever it may be that will meet the need.

Organized charity has scarcely as yet formulated a comprehensive social program based upon this notion of concentrating attention upon the individual and the individual family, and bringing to bear all the resources of the community co-operating freely but intelligently on the basis of ascertained facts for the specific purpose of removing the handicaps, increasing efficiency, or as a last resource supplying adequate relief if there is found to be a permanent deficiency of earning power. Such a program will imply a survey of physical, educational, and ultimately of all social needs. It will require far larger resources than organized charity has ever had or possibly ever will have at its disposal—resources, financial and personal, resources of imagination, of constructive statesmanship, of persuasion, and of that persistence which Professor Patten named yesterday as the predominant characteristic of the evolutionary point of view.

And yet the charity organization idea does have extraordinary staying power. Not being dependent upon the outcome of a political campaign, or upon an endowed foundation, it defies unpopularity and misrepresentation, it makes its way by sheer force of its reasonableness, by its scientific quality. What it will mean when, with braver apostles and with ampler resources, organized charity makes bold to formulate its social program is that all who lag behind will be helped according to their needs by all according to their powers. No dependent classes will be compulsorily

created or officially recognized, whether pensioned classes, or insured classes, or relieved classes; but each man will stand on his own feet, a man made efficient by the application of rational, individualized remedies, a man in whom relatives and neighbors, employer and fellow-workman, inspector and teacher, and if necessary physician, and probation officer, and judge are interested—personally and professionally interested—to render such specific appropriate service as his needs may require. It is not true, in America at any rate, that the ideal of an independent citizen of an industrial democracy, earning his own living, providing for his own emergencies, and relying for support even in old age on the accumulated savings of his productive period, has wholly disappeared, as it is said to have disappeared in England. If the day comes when the farmer and the skilled mechanic lose this conception, organized charity will represent it still as the inspiration of its small, unheroic and commonplace, but persistent, evolutionary task.

Whether these varying ideals of the diverse programs of modern philanthropy can be reconciled, whether this ideal of organized charity can be superimposed upon an ideal of minimum compulsory standards—that is another problem, which even the most liberal interpretation of our present topic does not warrant one attempting at this time to solve.

THE SOCIALIZATION OF RELIGION

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The social idealism of the present age has deeply affected many sciences and professions, and its influence has been instructively traced during these meetings in its relation to the study of history, politics, and economics, and to the movements of legislation and philanthropy. All these indications of the new social conscience are of importance, but the region of human interest in which its profoundest effect may be observed is unquestionably that occupied by religion. When one contrasts the note of teaching and preaching, the activities of organizations and churches, and the very theory of redemption, which have prevailed for centuries in all communions, with the spirit of worship and work which is characteristic of religion at the present time, the change appears to be practically a revolution. In Protestant Christianity especially, where the philosophy of individualism has had almost complete control, this change in the center of gravity has created a new type of religious life. For many generations the conditions of personal salvation have been the burden of theological teaching, and the attainment of that salvation the sufficient end of religious aspiration.

The same extraordinary transition which has of late transformed modern politics and modern economics has also revolutionized the current conception of religion. Governmental non-interference and *laissez-faire* industrialism had their counterpart and parallel in self-centered theology and self-satisfied piety. The renaissance of the social conscience has brought with it a socialization of religion. It is a transition like that from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican conception of the world. It transfers one from the thought of oneself as the fixed point round which the universe revolves to the recognition of an orbit in which one moves round an infinitely larger center. The religion of the individual remains not less real, but is taken up into the larger unity

of social redemption. Round the problem of personal salvation sweeps the problem of a world to be saved. Organizations created for worship find themselves irresistibly summoned to become organizations for work. The world, as the title of Canon Fremantle's epoch-making book announced, has become the "subject of redemption." Communions of Christians publish their social programs. "By their fruits ye shall know them"; "I will show thee my faith by my works" might be the text of modern religion. Instead of an individual rescued from a perishing world, like a sailor from a sinking ship, the socialization of religion sets the sailor to the more heroic task of joining with his fellows to bring the world, like a battered but still seaworthy vessel, safe to its port.

What are the influences which have brought about this revolutionary transition? It must be at once confessed that they are not to be discovered in theological instruction or philosophical insight. On the contrary, theology has clung to its traditional formulae long after they lost reality, and philosophy has been content to repeat the teachings of the nineteenth century to the careless ears of the twentieth. The same confession which religion makes of tardy discernment of the signs of the times must, however, be made by economics and politics. There, also, the doctrines which interpreted a simple and provincial world have been stretched to cover a new complexity of civilization; and there, also, the sudden and tremendous expansion of social unity has compelled a corresponding expansion of economic theory and political action. Precisely as economics and politics, in the troubled years at the middle of the nineteenth century, were confronted by new circumstances of agitation and revolution, of industrial distress and national peril, and a new conception of social responsibility and organic unity was demanded to interpret a new world, so the same sense of strain and collision has been felt by religious teachers, and the same transition has become inevitable. Phrases, now familiar, but a generation ago novel and undefined—such as "The social organism," "The co-operative commonwealth," "Social legislation," "Social justice"—are taken up into the worship and work of the churches. A new significance is discovered in John

Wesley's famous saying: "There is no such thing as a solitary Christian." Religion is accepted as a social fact. No man, under the new conception of the social order, can live or die to himself. The Pauline doctrine of membership one of another becomes expanded from the limits of the church to the cosmopolitanism of a world. The isolated soul discovers its own place as it finds its part in the social whole.

It is interesting to recall how simultaneous has been this momentous transition in all the sciences which interpret human life. It is often said that religious teachers are apt to lag behind in the movement of thought as conservatives and reactionaries; and it is true that the habitual temper of other worldliness may induce indifference to the condition of the world that now is. Yet it is reassuring to observe that the sense of a new social era was felt quite as promptly and acutely by Christian teachers as by economists or industrialists. The modern era in economics may be said to begin with Mill's *Principles of Political Economy*, which appeared in the year 1848, and bore the very suggestive subtitle: "With some of their applications to social philosophy." It was in precisely the same year that Archbishop von Ketteler, accepting from Lassalle the scheme of co-operative workingmen's associations, substituted the Church for the State as the source of capital, and announced the doctrine that "The aphorism 'Property is robbery' is not a mere lie, but contains, with a great fallacy, a fruitful truth." "May God," he said in a sermon at Mayence, "in his goodness bring all good Catholics to adopt the idea of co-operative association on the basis of Christianity." Almost at the same moment, in 1849, Wichern, a Protestant pastor, established himself with his little family of homeless boys in the "Rauhe Haus" near Hamburg, and began the work of the "Innere Mission," which has reached such vast expansion. In the same year, 1849, Maurice and his friends adopted the title of Christian Socialists, and in 1850 Maurice wrote: "That is the only title which will define our object, and will commit us at once to the conflict we must engage in sooner or later with the un-social Christians and the un-Christian socialists." It was after conference with Maurice, and after studying the social movement thus begin-

ning in Great Britain, that the learned and devout German scholar Victor Huber established his "Associations for Christian order and liberty." Meantime the co-operative societies of Great Britain had begun their extraordinary history in 1844, when 28 poor weavers of Rochdale opened their modest shop in Toad Lane; the anti-corn law agitation had ended in the abolition of the tax on bread in 1846, and the Chartists, who had introduced their first petition in 1839 witnessed the pathetic end of their agitation in 1848. Thus, from many sides, Catholics and Protestants, academic teachers and uninstructed handworkers, social reformers and radical legislators, within a period of a half-dozen years, with an extraordinary convergence of thought and feeling, found themselves led to a social application of Christian ideals, unprecedented since the time when the first preaching of the gospel of Christ brought with it an efflorescence of philanthropy, and substituted for the *Prodigalitas* of Rome the *Caritas* of a new faith.

Orthodox economics and orthodox Christianity were, it is true, alike in being tardy to recognize that a new world had arrived. Protestantism as a whole persisted in the hopeless task of perpetuating its individualism; and Catholicism, with its great tradition of immovability, seemed preoccupied by its ecclesiasticism. But by degrees the sense of a new era, of which Maurice and von Ketteler were prophets, swept like a cleansing wind through all communions. The attitude of Protestantism may be defined by the resolution proposed in 1906 as a part of the basis of union for three American communions, comprising over a million members. "We believe that, according to Christ's law, men of the Christian faith exist for the service of man, not only in holding forth the word of life, but in the support of works and institutions of pity and charity, in the maintenance of human freedom, in the deliverance of all those that are oppressed, in the enforcement of civic justice, and in the rebuke of all unrighteousness." The position of the Catholic church is sufficiently indicated by the Encyclical of Leo XIII in 1891, a document which marked a new era in ecclesiastical responsibility, and stamped its author as one of the most discerning and broadminded of modern men. Never was an ecclesiastical deliverance more unexpected and unprecedented

than these weighty words: "The momentous seriousness of the present state of things fills every mind with painful apprehension; wise men discuss it; practical men propose schemes; popular meetings, legislators, and sovereign princes, all are occupied with it . . . . Therefore, Venerable Brethren, ... We have thought it useful to speak on the Condition of Labor." Thus the era of combination, association, and organization, which has witnessed the transformation of industrial action and more than half effaced the boundary between economics and social ethics, has seen a contemporaneous and not less dramatic change in religious action and theological thought, and has given to organized religion an expansion and enrichment which recognizes the world as the subject of redemption.

At this point, however, a further question opens, which is of grave importance to those who are concerned with the administration of religion. What is to be the effect of this socialization of religion on the organization of worship? Is worship to be crowded out by work? Is sociology to supplant theology? Are the churches to become social laboratories, and sermons to be indistinguishable from talks on current events, or tracts on socialism? These possibilities are greeted by different types of observers with very different emotions—on the one hand with grave apprehension, and on the other hand with confident expectancy. On the one hand are the timid defenders of religion, who see the landmarks of tradition and confession swept away, and who fear an approaching deluge. They distrust this tendency to the socialization of religion, and counsel a retreat to the ancient ways of personal piety and consolation. In the admirable book which Professor Rauschenbusch has just issued, and which is marked by even deeper insight than his earlier volume, he cites a Lutheran synod of Missouri as so uncompromisingly hostile to the new social spirit as to be almost cynical in its repudiation. "The real business of the church," announces this communion, "is to preach the gospel. It is not the mission of the church to abolish physical misery, or to help men to earthly happiness. Jesus says: 'If any man will follow me, let him deny himself and take up his cross daily.'" On the other hand are the defiant revolutionists,

who find in religion one characteristic product of the capitalistic system and anticipate that a world with no master will be a world with no God. "Religion," Bebel has said, "will not be abolished or God be dethroned without attack or force. Religion will naturally perish. It is a transcendent reflection of the existing social order." The language of less philosophical revolutionists is more embittered and undisguised. "Speaking for the proletariat," a correspondent of Professor Rauschenbusch writes, "I shall say that we all, who have gone far enough in the study of socialism to become revolutionary, regard the so-called Christian churches as our bitterest enemies. It is a maxim among us that any man who comes into our body must drop his religion. . . . . The hardest person to wake up is the workingman who has been chloroformed by the church in the interest of the master-class."

Is it, however, probable that a relation so intimate as obviously exists between social service and religion can be either avoided or outgrown? Is either the hesitancy of religionists or the bitterness of revolutionists likely to determine the effect of the socialization of religion? On the contrary, the probable adjustment of the two forces must be estimated, not by the temporary emotions of revolutionists or reactionaries, but by observation of the great tidal movement of modern life on the surface of which these waves of feeling rise and fall. What, one must ask himself, is the nature of the religious life which is thus undergoing the process of socialization; and what, on the other hand, is the nature of the social movement which, in its turn, is so profoundly modifying the religious life? What, in other words, have the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of the social movement to teach concerning their mutual relations and effects?

When one turns, in the first place, to the philosophy of religion, he is at once confronted by the world-old controversy between the rationalists and the mystics. Either, as with Hegel, the reason is regarded as the path to the Eternal; or, as with Schleiermacher, the emotions seem to open the way along which the reason may later go. Between these two alternatives the religious life, it has seemed, must choose. Is there not, however, a third factor of spiritual experience, of which neither the rationalists nor the

mystics have taken serious account, but which it is the special task of this generation to restore to its place in the philosophy of religion? Does not the will open a way of communion with the Eternal? Is there not a path which leads from morality to faith, and which is accessible to that great multitude who are neither sages nor visionaries, but whose religion must begin in the simple pledge to do their duty? Such was the way to reality which was first clearly explored by Kant, then followed by Fichte, and has now become familiar to the feet of modern men. "With surprising clearness," said Fichte, "does this thought which was hitherto veiled in obscurity now reveal itself to my soul—the thought that my will merely as such and through itself shall have results. It has results because it is immediately and infallibly perceived by another Will to which it is related, which is its own accomplishment and the only living principle of the spiritual world. . . . . The voice of conscience in my soul which teaches me in every situation of life what I have there to do, is the channel through which again His influence descends upon me."

The same teaching reappears in the most impressive spiritual philosophy of England during the nineteenth century. "If," says Martineau, "the moral consciousness be in every truth a communion between the Divine and the human mind . . . . a great redemption comes, ... and converts the life of duty into the life of love. . . . . The rule of right, the symmetries of character, the requirements of perfection, are no provincialisms of this planet: they are known among the stars." To the same effect is the conclusion of Paulsen: "The vocation and dignity of man is not ultimately rooted in knowledge, but in the volitional side of his nature. . . . . One's view of the world receives its most powerful and decided impetus from the understanding, but from the volitional side, from the practical reason." One of the greatest of English preachers, whose sermons indicate the profound influence of Fichte, translates these academic phrases into the language of homiletics. "Obedience," Robertson says, "is the organ of spiritual knowledge. In every department of knowledge there is an appropriate organ by which we gain a knowledge of that which cannot be seen or felt. . . . . By doing God's will we recognize what he is."

When one turns with these teachings of the philosophy of religion to the gospel of Jesus Christ he finds them strikingly anticipated and confirmed. Great disclosures of truth were indeed made by Jesus to the reason and high emotions stirred in those who heard him, but when we trace the way in which Jesus habitually drew men to himself nothing is more obvious than the fact that he appealed, first of all, not to their intellects or their feelings, but to their wills. What he first demanded was not theological accuracy or mystic ecstasy, but practical obedience and moral decision. "Follow me," he says, "take up thy cross and follow. He that willeth to do the will shall know the doctrine." The dedication of the will is the first step toward the religious life. It is not the whole of religion; it is perhaps not the best of religion; but it is the beginning of religion. Disclosures of truth and high moods of rapture or peace lie beyond this decision of the will; but the way to these heights lies up the steep path which obedience has to climb. The way of conscience and the vision of faith, ethics and religion, idealism and theism, are in the teachings of Jesus one continuous process which has its beginning in the appeal to the will.

> Our wills are ours we know not how,
> Our wills are ours, to make them thine.

From this conclusion concerning the nature of religion we turn to the other inquiry concerning the nature of the social movement, and with a certain sense of surprise discover an intimate, though often unsuspected, kinship of character and aim. By one of the most unfortunate of historical accidents the world-wide agitation for the transformation of industry has become associated with the philosophical materialism of a century ago. Both Marx and Lassalle were disciples of left-wing Hegelianism, and accepted its logical corollary of economic determinism. "The mode of production," said Marx in one of his most famous aphorisms, "determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life." "Here," Engels said, "is the fundamental proposition which belongs to Marx." "Every man," in Bebel's words, "is the product of his time and the instrument of circumstance." "Christianity, the prevailing spiritual expression of the

present social order, must pass away as a better social order arrives." To this economic fatalism the will of man can be little more than helpless in the cosmic movement of events, and the individual becomes a puppet in the hands of economic destiny. The great external process unfolds itself under an absolute law from thesis to antithesis until the final synthesis of collectivism arrives and the people come to their own.

Whether a movement which began in such an antipodal relation to religious initiative can free itself from this historical tradition is as yet by no means clear. "The socialist movement," Mr. Spargo hopefully writes, "has outgrown the influence of the early Utopians, which touched even Marx and Engels. . . . . It is obvious that we are in the presence of a new socialism, of a quality and temper undreamed of by Marx and Engels," and to the same effect Miss Scudder insists: "It is my steady contention that those of us who read history otherwise than the Marxians have an equal right in the socialist movement." Difficult as it may be to abandon the Marxian economics and at the same time to maintain the Marxian infallibilism, it is evident that these interpreters of the spirit of socialism estimate its real character more justly than Marx himself. Nothing could be more improbable than that a great popular movement of enthusiasm, fraternity, and sacrifice could flow from no richer source of inspiration than a mechanical, automatic, or in the favorite language of the movement, "scientific" view of life. The source of momentum must obviously be sought, not so much in an interpretation of history, as in an appeal to the will. It is not a movement of fate, but a movement of feeling, not an expression of economic determinism but an expression of human determination. In short, there met in Marx two great historical influences, that of the French Revolution and that of the classic philosophy of Germany; and while Fichte and Hegel reappear in Marx's doctrine of a solidaric state, Rousseau and Fourier touch his program with vitality, humanity, and passion.

The Marxian philosophy of history might in fact be in very large part abandoned without any serious retardation of the cause which still claims his authority. The social movement, of which social democracy is one illustration, has much deeper

and firmer foundations than the subtle materialism of two generations ago. It is the expression on the largest scale of the will to serve, the dedication of the individual to the social whole, the emergence of social morality. Nothing could be more obstructive to its progress than to identify it with a single philosophy of society, or a restricted definition of science, or an exclusive claim to orthodoxy. Precisely as the Christian church has suffered from these arbitrary definitions, so the social movement is passing through the same phase of extravagant claims to inspiration and arrogant demands for excommunication. The new social responsibility, like Christianity itself, is a much larger thing than any orthodoxy has been able to cover. It is not an economic or political phenomenon, but an ethical awakening. The characteristic feature of the present age is the emergence and quickening of a social conscience.

Here, then, meet these two expressions of the will in action—the conforming of the will to the universal order, and the transforming by the will of the social order. Must it be inferred that such operations of the will, varied as they are in their field of opportunity, are essentially hostile or even neutral to each other? Can their relation be regarded as either accidental or controversial? On the contrary, it becomes obvious that two enterprises so similar both in origin and form must be contributory, co-operative, and in certain aspects even identical, in intention and direction. Both are alike, at least, in their attitude toward the problem of life. Both propose a readjustment of the individual to the organic world of which he is a part, and both summon the will to this task of reconciliation and harmony. Both follow a path which leads from duty to insight. Both begin with the stirring of the will. One finds a new religion in the social movement; the other finds a new field for piety in the socialization of religion. Slowly perhaps, but surely, as the social movement comes to understand itself, it will perceive its essentially religious dynamic; and on the other hand, with equal susceptibility the work of religion will accept its appropriate socialization. The path which the social movement must follow if it would fulfil its own ideal is a path which naturally opens into the broader highway of a revival of faith.

If this conclusion, derived from a consideration of the nature

of religion and the nature of the social movement, is in any degree justified, it brings with it much reassurance, both for those who are concerned with religion, and for those who are advancing the cause of social regeneration. The theologians of the early church found in the condition of the world into which the new religion came, a way of divine leading, a *praeparatio evangelica*, for the Christian dispensation. May it not be that the social movement of the present age will open a way to the renaissance of rational religion, and may be a *praeparatio evangelica* of the twentieth century? The path thus followed may not be the straightest path to faith; it is certainly not the only path, but for many persons, under the conditions of the present time, it happens to be the path most clearly open; and it is not so important what way one takes, as it is that he shall start from the point where he happens to be and not stop till the end is reached. The spiritual desire of the present age takes the form of social service; and teachers of religion should be quick to recognize that this unfamiliar way may be the natural path for the religion of the time to take, and should welcome the doing of the will as the first step toward the knowing of the doctrine.

These suggestions may throw some light on a problem much considered of late by religious teachers—the supposed decline in the numbers of candidates for the ministry. It is commonly said that the call to this profession has grown unpersuasive, and that the future of religion is imperiled from lack of recruits to serve her cause; and the statistics of theological schools seem, in the main, to confirm this despondency. If, however, it be true that social science is stirred by the same motives which have been hitherto the peculiar property of the ministry, then the profession finds itself not depleted in numbers, but recruited by many new allies. When a young man, as now frequently happens, deliberates whether he shall enter the ministry or enlist in the calling of social service, he is in fact choosing, not between two vocations, but between two departments of one calling. Social service should be recognized as a religious work, precisely as religious service is recognized as a social work; and to draw a line between the two is to rob religion of its reality and social service of its sacredness.

If, then, this common origin and common tendency are recognized, the future, both of the social movement and of religion may be viewed with confidence and hope. What the social movement has most to fear is a controlling materialism, the anticipation that a change in economic method will automatically produce a change of the human heart. And, on the other hand, what religion has most to fear is a reversion to separatism, the isolation of consecration, the desocialization of piety, the satisfaction with emotional elevation or dogmatic formalism, instead of the dedication of the will to do the will of the Eternal. What the social movement, therefore, most imperatively needs is spiritualization, and what religion most needs is socialization. If the social movement be essentially a spiritual fact, then the way is open upward toward religious faith; and if religion be essentially a social fact, then the same way is open downward into human service. The socialization of religion meets the spiritualization of the social movement. The traveler by one road finds himself, as he proceeds, on the other. The Mount of Transfiguration and the healing of the boy on the plain below made, in the life of Jesus, not two conflicting incidents, but a normal and continuous experience. The vision led down to the task; the task was made possible by the vision. When, again, the same teacher cites the ancient law to describe his purpose: "Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with all thy heart and mind and soul, and thy neighbor as thyself," he announced, not two commandments, but one. A rational love of God utters itself in the effective service of one's afflicted neighbor. "If any man love not his neighbor whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen." An effective love of one's neighbor is the product of a rational and idealizing faith. "We walk by faith, not by sight." The spiritualization of social service is the secret of fidelity and hope. The socialization of religion is the emancipation from faithlessness and fear. The call of God to the heart is a summons to social duty; and the turning of the will to social duty is not only a call to man, but not less surely a call from God.

DISCUSSION

Professor Earp, Presiding.

JEFFREY R. BRACKETT, DIRECTOR OF THE SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL WORKERS, BOSTON

I rejoice that Dr. Devine, throughout his paper, laid much stress on the part of voluntary philanthropy in our programs. Our best private agencies, today, are laying stress on voluntary effort as one expression of a community life, just as official, governmental action is another expression of it. Recognition of that fact is important now, especially, because of the tendency toward more use of government. Both tools are to be used in doing the work—the increase of good habit, for community advance.

One matter raised by Dr. Devine will be amply discussed I hope. It is the use of foundations. Dr. Devine says that great foundations, which can come only from great wealth, must be expected to represent ideals of the previous generation rather than ideals of the next. To what extent does this statement apply to university professorships! As I look about the country, as I have been listening at these meetings, my feeling is that many university professors, at work on foundations from the wealthy, are leading in useful knowledge. Cannot foundations be used for progress? We often hear the criticism against government that its officials are not to be expected to lead; but for one I believe that officials in public office will more and more be effective students, judicious experts, in progress.

Dr. Devine's stirring paper shows truly a notable advance made in the last decade or two by private philanthropy. We see that advance registered in the increase in salaries paid for social workers, the pains taken to find real social workers. We see it notably in the conferences of charities, as in the national conference or the last state conference of Massachusetts, whose programs included spirited discussions on conditions of housing, labor, recreation, etc. Yet such expressions are the high-water mark, and I doubt if the great bulk of voluntary philanthropy throughout our land is setting forth definite programs with high social ideals. We cannot accept for a program anything less than the constant search beyond immediate conditions, to find the causes of need; and the relatedness of treatment to family, neighborhood, industry, community life, all with the aim of forming good habit. Taking Massachusetts, whose conference of charities I have just praised; while a majority of its incorporated charities may be classed as well managed, I feel sure that comparatively few are living such a program as is spoken of. "We are recognizing," said Dr. Devine, "that all the world is one great neighborhood"; but there are very few cities and towns in Massachusetts today in which there is really effective working-together of philanthropic persons for relief of need and community advance. The social ideals which he inspiringly sets forth are the aims and aspirations of the few leaders who are really wide awake, up and doing; while

most of the workers are merely sitting up in bed and rubbing their eyes. But they are hearing such calls as prevention, eugenics, social justice, and will doubtless be getting up and to work, with increasing speed.

The purpose of this topic is, I take it, not merely to register where we are, but to see how the onward movement can be hastened by students of sociology. On this I venture one definite suggestion. Workers in the ordinary philanthropy are dealing day by day with individuals, families, and groups. They should be working with such a program as we have outlined above. Their work often seems petty. Help them to feel the duty and the dignity of it. Tell them that more actual knowledge, of conditions and needs, of individuals, families, and groups, is absolutely necessary, if our laws are to be wise, if administration is to keep up with legislation. Help them to be just interpreters of our needy neighbors, for the common good; to give to inquiries, large or small, into conditions and needs, the spirit of service to the whole community.

ARTHUR J. TODD, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Only Dr. Brackett's urgent request could have prompted me to run the risk of blunting the impression that Dr. Devine's splendid paper has made on us all this morning. But there are two points that merit a little further attention. First, the question of endowments. Why do endowers look with suspicion upon state activity for social welfare? Perhaps because strengthening and multiplying state activities means limiting the field of benevolent feudalism and charity of the Lady Bountiful type; and further, because strengthening the state means increasing the state's supervision over the aims and methods of endowed charity. On the other hand, why do many of us look with suspicion if not genuine alarm at the popularity of endowments? If I might borrow Professor Patten's classification for a moment, it is because endowments as they have been hitherto conceived fall largely into the "reactionary" class. They may not aim overtly at deflecting more radical reform tendencies, they may not be sops to the socialistically inclined, but none the less surely they must tend to hinder the development of newer ideals of governmental supervision of business. So far as I know, endowments are more or less permanent investments. The endowed institution does not pay its way out of money in the stocking, but out of interest on investments. Now it is pretty certain that when we once begin serious attempts to regulate corporate industry, an indignant, reactionary protest will go up from the beneficiary institutions, whether hospitals or colleges. The little ventures we have already made in regulation of corporations have been greeted with hysterical cries about mythical widows and orphans whose scanty savings are invested in these corporations. In the sacred name of charity they must not be disturbed! The crocodile tears shed here are but a faint warning of the attempt to throw the mantle of "Charity" over Big Business which will confront us when we seriously

begin to socialize industry. The only reason the protest has not already gone up from endowed charities or professorships or colleges is that we have only made feints at the business and have not gone seriously to work.

The other point to which I would call your attention is that usually organized charity workers assume a fundamental difference in principle and practice between public and private charity. They assume that public charity is necessarily pauperizing, inflexible, impersonal, that it tends to graft and routine. Private charity, on the other hand, is flexible, enterprising, constructive, preventive, warm, personal. For my part I fail to see any such distinctions in either theory or practice. The only real distinction between good and bad charity is not that one is private and the other public, but that one is *planned* and the other *planless*. From experience in public relief work, and as director of a united charities and member of an advisory "case committee," I can only say that public relief is effective if planned and private charity is worthless if not planned. Of course it is easier to talk about a plan than it is to apply it to individual cases; but the difficulty is equally divided between public and private relieving agencies. It is this conviction that the state is developing an adequate technique for handling its charity problems that is partly responsible for the present tendency to review rather critically the question of endowments.

ROBERT J. SPRAGUE, MASSACHUSETTS AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE

Many topics are made possible for discussion by Professor Peabody's paper, and I should like to speak a moment regarding modern proletariat social movements in relation to religious beliefs and life.

It is, of course, a well-known fact that nearly all of the German socialists renounce the church and disclaim the regular religious expectations. Some years ago, I spent several months rambling among the German industrial socialists and came away with the distinct impression that this proletariat class believes emphatically that they are working out the only practical realization of Christianity which had yet been attempted. They are seeking to put into actual operation the ethical side of the Christian doctrine. They declare that the church is not Christian in the most essential sense, and justice must be established before religion can be enjoyed by the proletariat; but, that when the ethical principles of Christianity shall become realized and applied by means of some juster social and economic system, then religion in its truest and purest sense will spring up from the abundant life and thankful happiness of all the working people.

Can the proletariat, shut in by factory wheels and tenement cliffs, smothered with his family under what seems to him to be an unjust social system, see behind all of this a just and worshipful divinity? I think not. Behind the unjust world the reasoning and reading wage-earner will feel an unjust God that awakes within him neither thankfulness nor sacrifice.

Religion cannot much longer be forced down the proletariat throat in the form of traditions and superstitions. He is going to ask for moral realities and the old systems will have no significance to him unless they grapple with the vital ethical issues of the age.

How often in talking with the German proletariat have I heard them exclaim, "Damn charity, let us have justice and brotherhood." The government is the means by which these men would organize and make possible the Christian life, the brotherhood of man.

The kingdom of heaven must grow up within the individual life, but it must also be organized and enforced as a social system. The government is the greatest instrument for realizing the kingdom of heaven, in the world. Bear in mind, I say, an instrument, for the dynamics, the motive power, must come from the renewed moral and spiritual life of the individual. I am in thorough sympathy with the most of these charity association efforts, but I should like to see still more done for principles which may become incorporated into laws and which lead to permanent conditions out of which human happiness and eventually religion may arise. Can a man be religious in the best sense unless he has much to be thankful for, and will he be thankful unless he is getting something like a square deal and a fair share of the world's goods? The present tendency of the modern proletariat replies, No.

Let us organize and exercise charity but see to it that it mostly leads to the establishment of social justice and economic prosperity which will make charity no longer necessary in its present magnitude, and then religion will flower more beautiful than it does now in peasant ignorance, or proletariat discontent.

EMILY BALCH, WELLESLEY COLLEGE

We have, I think, little conscious sense of a philosophy, or of any comprehensive plan, to which we, as social workers, philanthropists, or advocates of social reform, subscribe. I was formerly eager to see efforts made to formulate a program of social advance but I have come to recognize that this course has also its dangers, for one thing the danger of alienating those who might cooperate toward some particular move forward taken by itself, but who would draw off if they regarded this as one plank in a program some parts of which they disapproved.

I have some of the characteristic Anglo-Saxon leaning toward the "Muddling through" method, the method of piecemeal experimentation.

Yet surely we should face and consider the philosophy implied in the charity organization policy as so ably and interestingly presented by Dr. Devine.

It rests on the assumption that normally a family can be wholly self-dependent and ask no help of those outside its circle. Is this true? Or is it, normally and indeed almost universally, *untrue?*

The case system, the policy of case-by-case treatment, invites social near-sightedness. Each family problem looks as if it might have been avoided—and as if it might now be solved—on individual lines.

This seems to me illusory. To cite only one out of many important considerations, the casual element in life, the element of misfortune, bad luck, and the accidental, is something that no family can fully provide against single-handed. In early days the tribe or the neighbors stood in some degree together. The family is too small a unit to spread the risk. The financial-social institution of non-compulsory insurance makes possible a measure of self-protection for a large class of society, but those who need it most either cannot or will not secure adequate insurance. Individual thrift cannot now, if it ever could, make a comprehensive provision for the risks of life.

This is only one instance of the inadequacy of the "C.O.S." philosophy if we should undertake to treat it as a complete theory and sufficient policy as regards poverty. This does not militate against a belief that its activities and methods are absolutely necessary and its services incalculably great. I believe that the citizen should support them as he supports his government, his church, his trade union if he be a working-man. But I think that he should not stop there.

Mrs. Townshend's very interesting Fabian tract, of July, 1911, *The Case against the Charity Organization Society*, is a challenge that deserves consideration even though at many points it does not apply to American conditions.

I wish that Mr. Devine would formulate for us the theory which he contrasts with the charity organization theory, the theory underlying and implied by the more radical social reform measures of which he spoke.

ROBERT A. WOODS, SOUTH END HOUSE, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

The key word of the two papers seems to be "ideals." I am inclined to think that they both point to the need in social thought and action of utopia. For a generation past utopia has been frowned down upon. The old religious utopia has disappeared, and the aggressive assertion of a crudely crystallized and harshly dogmatic social utopia has made the whole conception repellant to the great majority of thoughtful people.

But at no stage in human evolution has it seemed possible to organize the higher life of society without utopia. The huntsman had his happy hunting-ground; the shepherd, his land flowing with milk and honey; the husbandman, his garden of the Lord; and, as soon as there were merchants and townsmen, our traditional heaven began to be built out of the symbols of trade.

A striking characteristic of utopia is that the dogmatists have always sought, as at the present time, to reduce it to an orthodoxy; and have never been able, so far as it is concerned, to interfere much with the right of private interpretation. Everyone should be encouraged to have a great and personally

formulated hope for human society. Such a development would go far toward bringing that coherent and consecutive perspective in social work of which Dr. Devine has pointed out the need, and it would help to give form and substance to that renascent, humanized religion of which Dr. Peabody has so long been a prophet.

SIMON N. PATTEN, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

In the preceding discussion, there is a confusion regarding the word "Socialization." It has been emphasized by preceding speakers that the church or philanthropy becomes social by becoming useful. This, however, is not what I understand by the socialization of philanthropy or of the church. The second contrast is between the socialization of individuals and the socialization of institutions. When we speak of the socialization of an individual, we mean his subordination to the state or to some higher authority, so that his actions are brought in harmony with that of larger groups. This meaning has wide vogue; but again I must say this is not what I mean by the socialization of philanthropy and the church.

The socialization of an institution consists not in making it useful, not in subordinating it to some other power, but in finding a place for it under complex modern conditions. All old institutions exercised more functions than can be given to them under present arrangements. The activities of the church have been plainly reduced by institutions like the school. In a like way, philanthropy has had its field much narrowed by the increasing activities of the state. What, then, can we regard as the field for philanthropy and for church activity under these complex, modern conditions?

In regard to philanthropy, a division must be made between voluntary effort and that resulting from the coercive action of the state. The functions of the state have broadened, but it by no means follows that all social efforts should be under its control. Appeal to generosity is an element in character formation. The giver and the recipient should be put in such relations that both grow by the contact. Wherever restrictive regulations are needed, state action is more effective than voluntary action. The prohibition of child labor or the compensation for accidents come within the field of state action, and could not be provided for by philanthropic endeavor. On the other hand, in the improvement in individual character, private effort is more effective than public regulation. The end of modern philanthropy should be character-building. There is no substitute for the close relations that exist between persons who wish to elevate their neighbors and those who are to be elevated. It is therefore claiming too much for voluntary effort to call it philanthropy in the sense that a philanthropist is a lover of mankind. The believer in state action can equally claim to be a lover of mankind. The philanthropist would name himself better if he called his action philogenetic rather than philanthropic. He thus becomes a lover of growth, rather than of philanthropy. We

give to grow; we grow to help others in their character growth. If we define philanthropy in this way, it is not opposed to state action, but is a necessary supplement to it.

A like change is demanded in the case of the church. The new church should not be a group of parishes doing local work, but should be a missionary group extending to other localities, places, and classes, the benefits that civilization and progress have brought to us. This would mean a unification of the church and the separation of the material phases of church work from the unifying elements the new movement would bring out. The church should not environ us, it should super-environ us. It should thus become missionary in its zeal and not self-satisfying in its ends. Sentiments broader and higher than the state would then have a means of enforcing their claims.

EDWIN L. EARP, DREW THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Permit me to add a word to the discussion of Professor Peabody's excellent paper. Just as we have been shown so clearly by Dr. Devine the necessity of having social ideals in philanthropy, so it is necessary for us to socialize our ideals of religion. We need today a broader definition of the kingdom of God, not so much that the church may broaden its program of activities, though that is greatly needed in some quarters, but rather that the membership of the churches may have the consciousness that whenever they are doing a part of the necessary work of the world that has to do with human health and happiness, they are thus doing a part of the work of the kingdom. I can illustrate this as follows: When the great concrete stadium was being built at Syracuse University, the president of the engineering and construction company had pasted beside the pay-widow of the shack where the office was housed, a photograph of the structure as it would appear when completed, taken from the architect's drawings, so that every man on the pay-roll, from the lowest unskilled laborer pitching dirt from foundation excavations, to the highest-paid skilled mechanic or engineer, could see at a glance, every time he received his pay envelope, what kind of a structure he had a part in building. So I claim that our conception of religion and of the kingdom of God should become so socialized that every man, woman, and child who is doing a necessary part of good work of the world may be conscious that he has a part in establishing that kingdom.

MEMBERSHIP OF AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY FOR 1912

Members on roll per the report of Secretary Tenney, December 22, 1911		340
Members resigning, December 22, 1911, to December 27, 1912	18	
Members dropped for failure to pay dues for 1912	19	
Total subtractions		37
		303
Number of renewals for 1912 (including one life member, Mrs. Isabel C. Barrous)		303
Number of new members for 1912, reported by Secretary Tenney, December 22, 1911		16
Number of new members since Secretary Tenney's Report to December 27, 1912		85
Total membership for 1912		404
Actual number of new members for the year		101
Net increase in members for the year		64

FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY, DECEMBER 26, 1911 TO DECEMBER 27, 1912

RECEIPTS

a) Balance on hand, January 1, 1912, check from A. A. Tenney, treasurer	$ 342.28	
b) Sold to Columbia University, card index	5.50	
c) Royalty on sale of publications to June 30, 1912	98.25	
d) Payment by resigning members for part-year subscriptions to *A.J.S.*, less exchange	9.99	
e) Dues for 1912, less exchange	1,156.28	
f) Dues for 1913, less exchange	515.06	
Total		$2,127.36

EXPENDITURES

a) Secretary's expenses to Washington meeting, approved by Executive Committee, December 29, 1911	$ 23.95	
b) Stenographic services for Committee on Teaching, approved by Executive Committee, December 29, 1911	10.00	
c) University of Chicago Press for Preprints of the report of Committee on Teaching	8.00	
d) Office equipment, letter files, cards, etc.	14.12	
e) Postage, Secretary-Treasurer's report, regular correspondence, invitations to join society, etc.	71.76	
f) Printing, Secretary-Treasurer's report, statements due bill and receipts, blank recommendations for membership, folder used in soliciting new members, etc	96.80	
g) Printing programs for annual meeting	17.00	
h) Letterheads, envelopes	24.85	
i) Campaign for new members	145.81	
j) Printing Vol. VI of *Proceedings*	117.25	
k) Postage and addressing Proceedings	22.79	
l) Stenographic and clerical help	96.63	
m) University of Chicago Press for *A.J.S.* sent to members	556.75	
Total		$1,205.71
Balance on hand, December 27, 1912		$ 921.65

[Accounts audited by Jeffrey R. Brackett, Boston Mass.].

CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

ARTICLE I—NAME

This society shall be known as the American Sociological Society.

ARTICLE II—OBJECTS

The objects of this society shall be the encouragement of sociological research and discussion, and the promotion of intercourse between persons engaged in the scientific study of society.

ARTICLE III—MEMBERSHIP

Any person may become a member of this society upon payment of Three Dollars, and may continue such by paying thereafter annually a fee of Three Dollars.

By a single payment of Fifty Dollars any person may become a life member of the society.

Each member is entitled to a copy of the current publications of the society.

ARTICLE IV—OFFICERS

The officers of this society shall be a President, two Vice-Presidents, a Secretary, a Treasurer—elected at each annual meeting—and an Executive Committee consisting of the officers above mentioned *ex officio*, together with six elected members whose terms of office shall be three years; except that of those chosen at the first election two shall serve for but one year and two for two years.

The offices of Secretary and of Treasurer may be filled by the same person.

ARTICLE V—ELECTION OF OFFICERS

All officers shall be elected only after nomination by a special committee of the society appointed by the Executive Committee; except that the officers for the first year shall be nominated by a committee of three, to be appointed by the chairman of the meeting at which this constitution is adopted.

All officers shall be elected by a majority vote of the members of the society present at the annual meeting.

ARTICLE VI—DUTIES OF OFFICERS

The President of the society shall preside at all meetings of the society and of the Executive Committee, and shall perform such other duties as the Executive Committee may assign to him. In his absence his duties shall devolve, successively, upon the Vice-Presidents in the order of their election, upon the Secretary, and upon the Treasurer.

The Secretary shall keep the records of the society, and perform such other duties as the Executive Committee may assign to him.

The Treasurer shall receive and have the custody of the funds of the society, subject to the rules of the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee shall have charge of the general interests of the society, shall call regular and special meetings of the society, appropriate money, appoint committees and their chairman, with suitable powers, and in general possess the governing power in the society, except as otherwise specifically provided in this constitution. The Executive Committee shall have power to fill vacancies in its membership occasioned by death, resignation, or failure to elect, such appointees to hold office until the next annual election.

Five members shall constitute a quorum of the Executive Committee, and a majority vote of those members in attendance shall control its decisions.

ARTICLE VII—RESOLUTIONS

All resolutions to which objection is made shall be referred to the Executive Committee for its approval before submission to the vote of the society.

ARTICLE VIII—AMENDMENTS

Amendments to this constitution shall be proposed by the Executive Committee and adopted by a majority vote of the members present at any regular or special meeting of the society.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

MEMBERSHIP LIST FOR THE YEAR 1913

(Numbers in parentheses indicate date of joining)

Abels, Mrs. M., 110 Hancock St., Cambridge, Mass. (1912)
Adams, Charles Francis, 84 State St., Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Adams, Edward B., Social Law Library, Boston, Mass. (1913)
Addams, Jane, Hull House, 800 South Halsted St., Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Allaben, M. C., Room 710, 156 Fifth Ave., New York City, N.Y. (1910)
Alling, Mortimer H., 15 Westminster St., Providence, R.I. (1910)
Anderson, C. T., 619 Lake St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Angelbeck, R. C., 402 Murray St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Anthony, Alfred W., Lewiston, Me. (1913)
Arner, G. B. L., Jefferson, Ohio. (1911)
Arnold, Felix, 824 St. Nicholas Ave., New York City, N.Y. (1911)
Arnold, Sarah Louise, 9 Crescent Ave., Newton Center, Mass. (1911)
Aronovici, Carol, 50 Madison Ave., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Athey, Mrs. C. N., 100 S. Patterson Park Ave., Baltimore, Md. (1911)
Atwood, John Murray, St. Lawrence University, Canton, N.Y. (1912)
Austin, Ralph C., 610 Woodruff Bldg., Joliet, Ill. (1911)
Avery, Mrs. Rachel Foster, The Clark, Madison, Wis. (1913)
Baensch, Emil, Manitowoc, Wis. (1913)
Baer, Allen U., Glasgow, Mont., (1911)
Baker, Alfred L., 141 S. LaSalle St., Chicago Ill., (1913)
Baker, O. E., Tiffin, Ohio. (1912)
Balch, Emily, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass. (1911)
Baldwin, Simeon E., New Haven, Conn. (1913)
Ball, Samuel W., 6442 Bishop St., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Bard, Harry E., 63 Ridge Ave., Athol, Mass. (1911)
Barlow, Burt E., Coldwater, Mich. (1913)
Barnum, Charlotte C., 766 Main St., Stamford, Conn. (1913)
Barrett, Don C., Haverford College, Haverford, Pa. (1910)
Barrier, Thos. F., Henry Kendall College, Tulsa, Okla. (1913)
Barrows, Mrs. Isabel C., Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. (1910)
Bartholomew, E. F., 741 34th St., Rock Island, Ill. (1913)
Bartholomew, Virgil W., Michigan City, Ind. (1913)
Baskerville, Stella, 1806 Jefferson St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Batten, S. Z., 1701 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Beach, Walter G., University Station, Seattle, Wash. (Prior to 1910)
Beckwith, Lorania C., 72 Manning St., Providence, R.I., (1913)
Bedford, S. E. W., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (1912)
Beller, William F., 51 East 123d St., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Bemis, Edward W., City Hall, Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Bengtson, Caroline, 1201 East 60th St., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Benton, Andrew A., 79 Wall St., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Bernard, L. L., Gainesville, Fla. (Prior to 1910)
Bernheimer, Charles S., Hebrew Educational Society, Pitkin Ave. and Watkins St., Brooklyn, N.Y. (1910)
Best, Harry, 14 Livingstone Place, New York City, N.Y. (1910)

Bever, James, 614 Ivy St., Bellingham, Wash. (1911)
Binder, Rudolph M., 487 Central Ave., East Orange, N.J. (1910)
Bittner, W. S., care of Michigan Agricultural College, East Lansing, Mich. (1912)
Bizzel, William B., College of Industrial Arts, Denton, Tex. (1912)
Black, Paul W., 414 North Henry St., Madison, Wis. (1912)
Blackmar, F. W., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan. (Prior to 1910)
Blagden, Edwin S., 113 East 64th St., New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Blakey, Leonard S., care of Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Blaine, Anita McCormick, 101 East Erie St., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Blair, Mary Pierpont, 15 Ellery St., Cambridge, Mass. (1913)
Board, W. M., Southwestern University, Georgetown, Tex. (1913)
Boardman, John R., 90 West Broadway, New York City, N.Y. (1910)
Boisen, Anton T., Box 728, Station A. Ames, Ia. (1912)
Bossard, James H. S., Muhlenberg College, Allentown, Pa. (1913)
Bostwick, Arthur E., care of Public Library, St. Louis, Mo. (1912)
Boutelle, Mrs. C. M., University Farm, St. Paul, Minn. (1912)
Bowerman, George F., Public Library, Washington, D.C. (1911)
Bowman, C. A., Albright College, Myerstown, Pa. (1913)
Brackett, Jeffry R., 41 Marlborough St., Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Bridge, Norman, 10 Chester Place, Los Angeles, Cal. (1911)
Brooke, W. E., 1083 Yale Sta., New Haven, Conn. (1913)
Brooks, Mrs. Minerva K., 1598 E. 115th St., Cleveland, Ohio. (1913)
Brown, Warner, 2553 Benvenue Ave., Berkeley, Cal. (1911)
Brown, Herbert D., 3401 Newark St., Washington, D.C. (1913)
Brundage, Dean K., 1025 West Johnson St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Bullock, Charles E., Canton, Pa. (1911)
Burdette, Mrs. Robert J., 891 Orange Grove Blvd., Pasadena, Cal. (1913)
Burdick, Wm., 602 Continental Bldg., Baltimore, Md. (1913)
Burgess, E. W., Toledo University, Toledo, Ohio. (1912)
Bushee, Frederick A., University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo. (Prior to 1910)
Bushnell, C. J., Lawrence College, Appleton, Wis. (1910)
Butterfield, Kenyon L., Amherst Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Byrne, Mary G., 1127 Felicity St., New Orleans, La. (1913)
Byrnes, Clara, Normal College of City of New York, Park Ave. and 68th St. New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Cain, Jas. W., Washington College, Chestertown, Md. (1912)
Calhoun, Arthur W., Hopkinton, Ia. (1913)
Campbell, Peter F., 657 Broad St., Newark, N.J. (1910)
Canis, Edward N., 2221 Park Ave., Indianapolis, Ind. (1910)
Cape, Mrs. Emily P. Hotel Webster, 40 West 45th St., New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Capen, Edward W., 146 Sargeant St., Hartford, Conn. (Prior to 1910)
Capper, Arthur, Topeka, Kan. (1911)
Carpenter, M. L., 5622 Ingleside Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1912)
Carpenter, S. N., Carthage College, Carthage, Ill. (1910)
Carstens, C. C., 43 Mt. Vernon St., Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Carter, James, Lincoln University, Pa. (1910)
Carver, Thos. N., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Case, Mills E., 236 Sixth Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Chaddock, Robert E., Kent Hall, Columbia University, New York City, N.Y. (1911)
Chapin, F. Stuart, Smith College, Northampton, Mass. (1910)

Chapin, R. C., Beloit College, Beloit, Wis. (1911)
Chappell, Mrs. Fred L., 225 Stuart Ave., Kalamazoo, Mich. (1913)
Cheever, Helen, 557 Boylston St., Boston, Mass. (1913)
Childs, Richard S., 23 Fifth Ave., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Chu, C., 617 State St., Madison, Wis. (1912)
Clark, Edwin L., 501 West 123d St., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Clark, Earle, care of Russell Sage Foundation, 1 Madison Ave., New York City, N.Y. (1912)
Clark, Robert F., 93 Middle Divinity, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (1912)
Cleaveland, Agnes M., 2512 Cedar St., Berkeley, Cal. (1912)
Clopper, Edward N., 3286 Colerain Ave., Cincinnati, Ohio. (1913)
Clow, Frederick R., Oshkosh, Wis. (Prior to 1910)
Cochran, William F., Woodbrook, Md. (1913)
Cole, Katherine, 430 East 41st St., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Collier, Paul S., 119 West 111th St., New York City, N.Y. (1912)
Commander, Lydia K., Pine Hill, Ulster Co., N.Y. (1912)
Cooley, Chas. H., 703 Forest Ave., Ann Arbor, Mich. (1910)
Coolidge, Ellen H., 81 Marlboro St., Boston, Mass. (1913)
Coolidge, Mrs. Mary R., Dwight Way End, Berkeley, Cal. (1911)
Corbett, Gertrude M., National Home, Milwaukee County, Wis. (1913)
Corliss, George Henry, 42 Concord Square, Boston, Mass. (1913)
Cott, W. R., Orofino, Ida. (1912)
Coutant, R. B., Tarrytown, N.Y. (1911)
Crafer, T. W. B., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. (1913)
Craig, Wallace, University of Maine, Orono, Me. (1913)
Crampton, Henry E., Columbia University, New York City, N.Y. (1911)
Crane, Harry W., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. (1913)
Crane, Mrs. W. M., Dalton, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Croly, Herbert D., Windsor, Vt. (1913)
Crosby, Daniel, 1701 Fruitvale Ave., Oakland, Cal. (1913)
Cross, William T., care of State Board of Charities and Corrections, Columbia, Mo. (1911)
Cutler, J. Elbert, 11311 Hessler Road, Cleveland, Ohio. (Prior to 1910)
Cutler, U. Waldo, 63 Lancaster St., Worcester, Mass. (1911)
Davis, Edward H., Purdue University, Lafayette, Ind. (Prior to 1910)
Davis, Marjory, 1702 Madison St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Davis, Michael M. Jr., Boston Dispensary, Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Davis, Otto W., 1409 Como Ave., Minneapolis, Minn. (1913)
Davis, William Lloyd, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. (1913)
Dealey, James Q., Brown University, Providence, R.I. (Prior to 1910)
Deming, James L., Iowa State University, Iowa City, Ia. (1913)
Dennis, Herbert K., Hightstown, N.J. (1913)
Dennis, James Shepard, Box 175, Montclair, N.J. (1913)
Dennis, Laban, 49 Ridge St., Orange, N.J. (1913)
Devine, Edward T., Room 607, Kent Hall, 116th St. and Amsterdam Ave., New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Dewell, James S., Missouri Valley, Ia. (1913)
Dickman, J. W., Fayette, Ia. (1913)
Dike, Dr. S. W., 113 Hancock St., Auburndale, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Dimock, Geo. E., Elizabeth, N.J. (1913)
Dolan, Thos. E., Supt. Poor Commission, Detroit, Mich. (1913)
Dougherty, Rev. M. Angelo, Cambridge, Mass. (1911)

Dowd, Jerome, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla. (Prior to 1910)
Duel, M. M., 185 Fifth St., Fond du Lac, Wis. (1912)
Dummer, Mrs. W. F., 679 Lincoln Park Blvd., Chicago, Ill. (1910)
Dutton, Samuel T., 411 West 114th St., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Earp, E. L., Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, N.J. (Prior to 1910)
Eaves, Lucile, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb. (1910)
Eberle, Warren C., 731 Chamber of Commerce Bldg., Buffalo, N.Y. (1910)
Edmonds, Franklin S., 614 Franklin Bldg., Philadelphia, Pa. (1913)
Ellwood, Chas. A., 407 College Ave., Columbia, Mo. (Prior to 1910)
Elmer, M. C., 932 West Illinois St., Urbana, Ill. (1912)
Ely, Owen, 217 North Division St., Ann Arbor, Mich. (1912)
Emerson, Elliot S., 395 Broadway, Cambridge, Mass. (1913)
Estabrook, Arthur F., 15 State St., Boston, Mass. (1913)
Evans, Ira Hobart, Austin, Tex. (1913)
Ewing, Halle L., R.F.D. No. 8, Lincoln, Neb. (Prior to 1910)
Eyerly, Elmer Kendall, Massachusetts Agricultural College, Amherst, Mass. (1911)
Faber, Aaron D., 700 Church Lane, Philadelphia, Pa. (1913)
Fairchild, H. P., Herrick Hall., New Haven, Conn. (1911)
Farnam, H. W., 43 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven, Conn. (Prior to 1910)
Farquhar, A. B., York, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Faust, Allen K., 162 Higashi Sambancho, Sendai, Japan. (Prior to 1910)
Faust, Charles J., 107 Middle Divinity, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (1911)
Fedders, John F., 716 Park Ave., Racine, Wis. (1913)
Fehlandt, August F., Michigan, N.D. (1913)
Feis, Herbert, 745 Riverside Drive, New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Feutlicht, Morris M., 3034 Washington Blvd., Indianapolis, Ind. (1913)
Field, James A., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Fieser, James L., 120 East Broad St., Columbus, Ohio. (1913)
Finch, Earl Edward, Wilberforce, Ohio (1913)
Fischer, E. G., Kniprode Str. 8, Berlin, Germany. (1913)
Fisher, Irving, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. (Prior to 1913)
Fisher, William King, 1916 Park Ave., New York City, N.Y. (1910)
Fisk, D. M., 1516 College Ave., Topeka, Kan. (1911)
Fisk, Herbert F., Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. (1911)
Fiske, H., 1 Madison Ave., New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Flagg, Harriet G., 28 Allerton St., Brookline, Mass. (1913)
Fleisher, A., 2045 Green St., Philadelphia, Pa. (1911)
Fleming, Ralph D., 1732 West Oxford St., Philadelphia, Pa. (1911)
Foley, Roy William, 6042 Ellis Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1912)
Foote, Allen R., 315 Linwood Ave., Columbus, Ohio. (1913)
Forbes, C. B., 419 Sterling St., Madison, Wis. (1912)
Ford, James, 35 Walker St., Cambridge, Mass. (1913)
Forrest, J. D., 30 Audubon Place, Indianapolis, Ind. (1910)
Forrist, John Howard, 57 Stanwood St., Providence, R.I. (1913)
Foster, Rabbi Solomon, 90 Treacy Ave., Newark, N.J. (1911)
Foster, Warren Dunham, care of *The Youth's Companion*, Boston, Mass. (1913)
Fox, Hugh F., 109 East 15th St., New York City, N.Y. (1910)
Freeman, Fred B., 28 South Main St., Concord, N.H. (1912)
Freer, H. H., Cornell College, Mt. Vernon, Ia. (1912)
Fulkerson, Clarke B., Suite 610, Kalamazoo National Bank Bldg., Kalamazoo, Mich. (1913)

Fuller, Gertrude B., 823 Lyndale Ave., N.S. Pittsburgh, Pa. (1913)
Fuller, Paul, 2 Rector St., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Fulmer, Harriet, 5329 Lake Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Furth, Jacob, 3243 Waterman Ave., St. Louis, Mo. (1913)
Gardner, A. B., 618 East 3d St., Santa Ana, Cal. (1912)
Gardner, C. S., Norton Hall, Louisville, Ky. (1911)
Garland, F. D., 508 West 4th St., Dayton, Ohio. (1912)
Garst, Julius, Worcester, Mass. (1911)
Gasser, Almond P., 401 N. Murray St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Gehlke, C. E., Adelbert College, Cleveland, Ohio. (1912)
Geisse, W. F. G., R.F.D. No. 2, Great Barrington, Mass. (1911)
George, W. H., care of Geneva College, Beaver Falls, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Gerin, Leon, Coaticooke, Quebec, Canada. (1910)
Giddings, Franklin H., Columbia University, New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Gill, C. O., Hartland, Vt. (1913)
Gillard, Rev. J. L., 405 Beardsley Ave., Elkhart, Ind. (1911)
Gillette, John M., University, N.D. (1911)
Gillin, J. L., 206 Bernard Court, Madison, Wis. (1911)
Gilman, Charlotte P., 627 West 136th St., New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Giltner, Emmet E., 418 West 118th St., New York City, N.Y. (1911)
Glenn, John M., Russell Sage Foundation, 105 East 22d St., New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Goodman, N. N., 436 Seventh St., Milwaukee, Wis. (1913)
Gordon, Armistead C., 405 East Beverley St., Staunton, Va. (1913)
Gowin, E. B., Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn. (Prior to 1913)
Graham, Grover C. T., 2704 College Ave., Alton, Ill. (1913)
Gram, J. P., 215 West 129th St., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Grant, Rev. Percy, Church of the Ascension, Fifth Ave., New York City, N.Y. (1910)
Gray, R. S., 3535 Telegraph Ave., Oakland, Cal. (1911)
Grey, David L., 1320 Third National Bank Bldg., St. Louis, Mo. (1913)
Griffith, Harry B., Harlan, Ia. (1913)
Grimm, J. Hugo, Court House, St. Louis, Mo. (1913)
Grist, Frederick T., 60 A St., Ferdinand St., St. Henri, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. (1911)
Grossman, Louis, 2212 Park Ave., W.H., Cincinnati, Ohio. (1911)
Groves, E. R., New Hampshire College, Durham, N.H. (1912)
Hagerty, J. E., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. (Prior to 1910)
Halbert, L. A., 5 Water Works Bldg., Kansas City, Mo. (1911)
Hale, Mary Lee, 3 Charles River Square, Boston, Mass. (1913)
Hale, Robert L., 4 West 53d St., New York City, N.Y. (1912)
Hall, Agnes M., 823 Irving Place, Madison, Wis. (1913)
Hall, John Oscar, 423 West 118th St., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Halsey, John J., Lake Forest, Ill. (Prior to 1913)
Hammer, Lee F., 900 Summit Ave., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Hankins, F. H., Clark College, Worcester, Mass. (1910)
Harris, Abram W., 31 W. Lake St., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Harris, Thomas L., Dakota Wesleyan University, Mitchell, S.D. (1911)
Harris, W. A., 806 Neave Bldg., Cincinnati, Ohio. (1913)
Hart, Mrs. Harry, 4639 Drexel Blvd., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Hartman, Edward T., 3 Joy St., Boston, Mass. (1913)

Hatfield, Edna E., 3727 Grapevine St., Indiana Harbor, Ind. (1912)
Havemeyer, Loomis, 90 Wall St., New Haven, Conn. (1912)
Hayes, E. C., 906 W. California Ave., Urbana, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Heckaul, M. O., 5416 Wayne Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Heffner, W. C., 102 S. Wade Ave., Washington, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Helleberg, Victor E., 1732 Louisiana St., Lawrence, Kan. (1910)
Henderson, Charles R., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Hendricks, Geo. B., Logan, Utah. (1911)
Herndon, John G., Jr., 740 Langdon St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Herron, Stella, 1933 Elysian Fields, New Orleans, La. (1913)
Hershey, O. F., Mt. Washington, Md. (1913)
Hess, Mrs. R. H., 237 Langdon St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Hewes, Amy, Mt. Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass. (1910)
Hibbs, H. H., Jr., John Tarleton College, Stephenville, Tex. (1913)
Hiester, A. V., Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Higbie, J. L., Jenera, Ohio. (1911)
Hildreth, Philo C., Parsons College, Fairfield, Ia. (1912)
Hill, Mrs. Caroline M., Bethany College, Bethany, W.Va. (1913)
Hill, Robert T., 1801 Washington St., Lincoln, Neb. (1910)
Hirsch, Arthur H., care of Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pa. (1913)
Hitchcock, Charles C., Ware, Mass. (1913)
Hitchcock, U. E., Oberlin, Ohio. (Prior to 1910)
Hoag, F. Victor, 621 Lake St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Hockenberry, John C., 723 West Lovell St., Kalamazoo, Mich. (1911)
Hoffman, J. W., 49 Belvidere St., Crafton, Pa. (1912)
Holmes, Geo. K., 1323 Irving St., Washington, D.C. (Prior to 1910)
Holmes, Roy H., Hillsdale, Mich. (1913)
Holt, Lt. Col. L. H., West Point, N.Y. (1913)
Hoover, H. D., Carthage, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Hopkins, Louis J., Winnetka, Ill. (1913)
Hopkins, William Jay, 821 College Ave., Racine, Wis. (1913)
Horn, Frank L., Lindenwood College, St. Charles, Mo. (1913)
Hosford, Geo. Lewis, Box 615, Wichita, Kan. (1913)
Hourwich, Isaac A., 919 Massachusetts Ave. N.E., Washington, D.C. (1913)
House, J. T., State Normal School, Wayne, Neb. (1911)
Hoverstadt, T. A., Fargo, N.D. (1913)
Howard, Geo. E., 1910 E. St., Lincoln, Neb. (Prior to 1910)
Howard, John R., East Northfield, Mass. (1913)
Howard, Mayne S., 217 S. DeKalb Square, Philadelphia, Pa. (1913)
Howat, William F., 832 Hohman St., Hammond, Ind. (1911)
Howe, George, 527 Fifth Ave., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Howell, Wm. R., Chestertown, Md. (1912)
Howerth, I. W., 2401 Prospect Ave., Berkeley, Cal. (1911)
Hubbell, Geo. A., Lincoln Memorial University, Cumberland Gap, Tenn. (Prior to 1910)
Humphrey, Helen C., 613 North Francis St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Hunter, Robert, Highland Farm, Noroton Heights, Conn. (Prior to 1910)
Hurrey, Charles D., 124 East 28th St., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Hursh, E. M., Freetown, Sierra Leone, West Africa. (1912)
Huston, Charles A., 60 Crescent St., Cambridge, Mass. (1913)
Hutson, Andrew C., Box 125, Barbourville, Ky. (1913)
Ignatius, Milton B., care of Public Service Commission, Albany, N.Y. (1913)
Illman, Paul E., 159 Frank St., Syracuse, N.Y. (1913)

Inskeep, Annie Dolman, 2050 East 30th St., Oakland, Cal. (1912)
Israel, Henry, 124 East 28th St., New York City, N.Y. (1911)
Jacobs, Phil P., 13 De Hart St., Morristown, N.J. (1911)
James, Laura G., Lake Erie College, Painesville, Ohio. (1913)
James, Sara H., 415 N. Henry St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Jenks, Albert E., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. (1913)
Johnson, Axel, Alta Vista, Kan. (1911)
Johnson, Edgar H., Emory College Library, Oxford, Ga. (1913)
Johnson, Harriet E., 32 Chestnut St., Boston, Mass. (1913)
Johnson, Jos. French, School of Commerce Library, 32 Waverly Place, New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Jones, Thomas Jesse, U.S. Bureau of Education, Washington, D.C. (Prior to 1910)
Joseph, Isaac, 1827 East 82d St., Cleveland, Ohio. (1913)
Justis, Guy T., 1024 East 62d St., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Kaplan, Nathan D., 1105 Ashland Block, Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Kaupas, A., West 67th and Rockwell Sts., Chicago, Ill. (1911)
Kehew, Mrs. M. M., 29 A. Chestnut St., Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Keller, A. G., Yale University, New Haven, Conn. (Prior to 1910)
Kelley, Charles P., 155 West Elm St., Kinzie Sta., Chicago, Ill. (1912)
Kelsey, Carl, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Kennedy, James F., 7 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Kerby, Rev. Wm. J., Catholic University, Washington, D.C. (1912)
Kidder, Gordon E., Breckenridge, Minn. (1912)
Kiekhoefer, William H., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. (1913)
King, Delcevare, Box 1974, Boston, Mass. (1913)
Klee, Max, 1340 East 48th St., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Kopf, Edwin W., Statistical Bureau, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Koshab, Hedwig A. F., 9410 Holton Ave., Cleveland, Ohio. (1910)
Kuhn, Robert, 506 Prospect Place, Avondale, Cincinnati, Ohio. (1913)
Kursheedt, M. A., 302 Broadway, New York City. (1911)
Lahm, Mortimer, 238 West 106th St., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Lakey, Frank E., 26 Royal St., Allston, Mass. (1913)
Lamb, Edwin G., 1 Elm St., Norwalk, Conn. (1910)
Lappley, Gilbert F., 112 S. Brooks St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Lathrop, Mrs. H. L., 2414 W. Commerce St., San Antonio, Tex. (1913)
Lauck, W. Jett, 702 Southern Bldg., Washington, D.C. (1911)
Lauder, Frank, 403 Long Bldg., Kansas City, Mo. (1913)
Laufer, Berthold, Field Museum, Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Lawford, Jasper M., 718 N. Howard St., Baltimore, Md. (1911)
Lay, U. C., 307 N. Francis St., Madison, Wis. (1912)
Leach, Floyd S., St. Luke's Hospital, 113th St. and Amsterdam Ave., New York City, N.Y. (1911)
Lechtrecker, Henry M., Rockville Center, Long Island, N.Y. (1913)
Lee, Guy Carleton, 172 W. High St., Carlisle, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Lee, Mary H., Cincinnati Missionary Training School, Cincinnati, Ohio. (1912)
Lefavour, Henry, 3 Brimmer St., Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
LeLacheur, Bessie S., 561 Massachusetts Ave., Boston, Mass. (1913)
Lenroot, Katherine F., 512 N. Lake St., Madison, Wis. (1911)
Le Roy, Cornelis, care of Mr. Jos. F. Dean, 51 Hemenway St., Boston, Mass. (1910)
Lewis, Mrs. P. A., Bronxville, N.Y. (1910)

Lichtenberger, James P., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Lies, Eugene T., 167 N. LaSalle St., Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Light, John H., South Norwalk, Conn. (1913)
Lindsay, Samuel M., Columbia University, New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Lindsey, Howard, National Bank Bldg., Warren, Pa. (1911)
Lombardi, C., Dallas, Tex. (1910)
Lowber, J. W., 1706 Brazos St., Austin, Tex. (1911)
Lowe, Rosa, 707 Gould Bldg., Atlanta, Ga. (1913)
Lucas, Hardin, State Normal School, Valley City, N.D. (1911)
Luehring, F. W., Princeton, N.J. (Prior to 1910)
Lumley, F. E., College of Missions, Indianapolis, Ind. (1913)
Lynn, J. D., care of Business Men's League, 510 Locust St., St. Louis, Mo. (1913)
Lyon, F. Emory, Room 509 Monadnock Block, 312 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
MacClean, E. A., Room 401, 191 Broadway, New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Macfarland, Rev. Charles S., 215 Fourth Ave., New York City, N.Y. (1912)
MacLean, Annie M., care of M. H. MacLean, 5436 East End Ave., Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
MacVannel, John Angus, Teachers' College, Columbia University, New York City, N.Y. (1911)
MacVeagh, Franklin, 2829 16th St., Washington, D.C. (1913)
McBride, J. H., Pasadena, Cal. (1912)
McCaine, Mrs. Helen J., care of St. Paul Public Library, St. Paul, Minn. (1913)
McLean, Francis H., Box 152, South Jacksonville, Fla. (Prior to 1910)
McClean, L. D., 16 York Square, New Haven, Conn. (1913)
McConnell, F. J., 964 Logan St., Denver, Colo. (1910)
McCowen, Mary, 414 N. Normal Parkway, Chicago, Ill. (1913)
McDevitt, Rev. P. R., 21 S. 13th St., Philadelphia, Pa. (1911)
McDowell, Mary E., 4630 Gross Ave., Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
McElhannon, Joseph C., 1221 W. 3d Ave., Corsicana, Tex. (1913)
McGregor, Tracy W., 239 Brush St., Detroit, Mich. (1913)
McKenzie, F. A., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. (Prior to 1913)
McLane, Kate M., 211 W. Monument St., Baltimore, Md. (1912)
McLean, A., 2106 Linton Ave., Cincinnati, Ohio. (1912)
McLennan, William E., 404 Seneca St., Buffalo, N.Y. (1913)
Mackey, Ebenezer, 314 Hamilton Ave., Trenton, N.J. (1913)
Macy, V. Everit, 68 Broad St., New York City, N.Y. (1911)
Madeira, Lucy, 1330 19th St., Washington, D.C. (1911)
Mark, Mary Louis, Bureau of Labor, Washington, D.C. (1913)
Markoe, Mrs. John, 1630 Locust St., Philadelphia, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Martin, Anne H., 5009 Madison Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1912)
Matscheck, Walter, 211 N. Murray, Madison, Wis. (1913)
Matthews, Ellen N., 607 W. 116th St., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Matthews, Rev. M. A., First Presbyterian Church, Seattle, Wash. (Prior to 1910)
Melville, Andrew H., 175 Main St., Oshkosh, Wis. (1912)
Meyer, Mrs. Adolf, 1012 North Calvert St., Baltimore, Md. (1913)
Miller, G. R., State Teachers' College, Greeley, Colo. (1910)

Miller, H. A., Olivet College, Olivet, Mich. (Prior to 1910)
Miner, Rev. Frank N., Gladstone, Mich. (1913)
Mitchell, Harry Wallis, State Hospital, Warren, Pa. (1913)
Mohr, Lewis, 349 W. Illinois St., Chicago, Ill. (1911)
Moncrief, J. W., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Monroe, Paul, Teachers' College, Columbia University, New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Montgomery, Bell Woods, Industrial Institute and College, Columbus, Miss. (1913)
Morgan, J. W., 115 West Gillman St., Madison, Wis. (1911)
Mowery, H. H., 460 N. 7th St., Terre Haute, Ind. (1912)
Morrow, Louise, 1725 Van Hise Ave., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Morse, Anson Ely, 223 Fourth St., Marietta, Ohio. (1913)
Munroe, James P., 79 Sumner St., Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Munson, Myron A., 198 Exchange St., New Haven, Conn. (1913)
Muensterberg, Hugo, 7 Ware St., Cambridge, Mass. (1913)
Naumburg, Mrs. Elsa H., 261 W. 93d St., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Nealley, E. M., 2004 Bush St., Santa Ana, Cal. (1911)
Neill, Chas. P., Bureau of Labor, Washington, D.C. (Prior to 1910)
Newman, Stephen M., Howard University, Washington, D.C. (1910)
Newton, Henry G., 89 Sherman Ave., New Haven, Conn. (1913)
Neystrom, Paul H., 2108 Madison St., Madison, Wis. (Prior to 1910)
Nichols, C. A., Southwestern University, Georgetown, Tex. (Prior to 1910)
Nichols, J. C., 16 Chapel St., Seneca Falls, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Norbury, Frank P., care of Board of Administration, Springfield, Ill. (1913)
North, Cecil C., De Pauw University, Greencastle, Ind. (Prior to 1910)
Numford, Mrs. B. B., 503 E. Grace St., Richmond, Va. (1913)
O'Connor, J. J., Dept. of Industrial Research, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. (1912)
Odum, H. W., 4432 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pa. (1910)
Ogburn, W. F., Reed College, Portland, Ore. (1910)
Oglebay, Crispin, 3728 Prospect St., Cleveland, Ohio. (1913)
Ortiz, Fernando, Aquiar 68, Havana, Cuba. (1911)
Ovington, Mary W., 246 Fulton St., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Pagar, S. M., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. (1913)
Page, Edward D., Oakland, Bergen County, N.J. (1911)
Parker, Arthur C., Education Bldg., Albany, N.Y. (1913)
Parker, G. A., Sec. Juvenile Commission, 49 Pearl St., Hartford, Conn. (1913)
Parmelee, Maurice, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo. (Prior to 1910)
Parry, Carl E., 721 S. 12th St., Ann Arbor, Mich. (Prior to 1910)
Parsons, Mrs. Elsie C., 115 E. 72d St., New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Parsons, Philip A., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y. (1911)
Patten, Simon N., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Peixotto, Jessica B., Cloyne Court, Berkeley, Cal. (Prior to 1910)
Perry, Arthur R., Dept. of Commerce and Labor, Washington, D.C. (1912)
Perry, Clarence A., 400 Metropolitan Tower, New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Peskind, A., 13035 Euclid Ave., E. Cleveland, Ohio. (1913)
Phelps, Edward B., 141 Broadway, New York City, N.Y. (1910)
Platt, Laura W., 1831 Pine St., Philadelphia, Pa. (1913)
Poland, Earl W., R.F.D. No. 2, Hamilton, Ill. (1912)
Pound, Roscoe, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Powell, Hannah B. Clark, 5227 Washington Ave., Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)

Prang, Mrs. Louis, 45 Centre St., Roxbury, Mass. (1913)
Pratt, Anna B., Federation Bldg., Elmira, N.Y. (1913)
Pratt, D. Butler, Talladega College, Talladega, Ala. (1912)
Randall, J. Harvey, Bacone College, Bacone, Okla. (1913)
Randolph, E. F., 1654 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, Mass. (1911)
Ratcliffe, Emory, 634 French St., Santa Ana, Cal. (1912)
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Reep, Samuel N., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. (Prior to 1910)
Reider, Edith L., 608 Church St., Evanston, Ill. (1913)
Reilly, Lieut. Henry J., 15th U.S. Cavalry, Fort Sheridan, Ill. (1913)
Reinemund, J. A., Box 95, Muscatine, Ia. (1912)
Rhoades, Mabel C., care of Wells College, Aurora, N.Y. (1912)
Richards, Geo. B., 934 W. North St., Pittsburgh, Pa. (1912)
Richey, Mrs. S. O., 1719 I St., Washington, D.C. (Prior to 1910)
Richmond, T. C., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Richter, Erwin E., University Club, San Francisco, Cal. (1913)
Rieth, Pauline K., Valley City, N.D. (1912)
Riley, Morgan T., 125 W. 92d St., New York City, N.Y. (1912)
Riley, Thos. J., 69 Schermerhorn St., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Ring, Avis, 615 N. Henry St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Roberts, Frank H. H., New Mexico Normal University, Las Vegas, N.Mex. (1913)
Rockey, Carroll J., 1723 Western Ave., Minneapolis, Minn. (1913)
Rolf, A. A., Room 213, 9 S. LaSalle St., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Rond, Mrs. Sadie M., 71 Walnut Park, Roxbury, Mass. (1913)
Rosenwald, Julius, care of Sears, Roebuck & Co., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Ross, E. A., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. (Prior to 1910)
Routsahn, E. G., 31 Union Square, New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Rumsey, Mrs. Datie P., 742 Delaware Ave., Buffalo, N.Y. (1913)
Rustone, B. A. T., 1416 N. Dearborn St., Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Sachs, R. L., 28 West 22d St., New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Sagen, Carl W., 1528 11th Ave., Moline, Ill. (1911)
Salmon, Lucy M., Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (1913)
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Schattschneider, Elmer, De Forest, Wis.. (1912)
Schersten, Albert F., 505 E. Gorham St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Schoenfeld, Julia, 1 Madison Ave., Playground Assn. of America, New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Scroggs, Wm. O., Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, La. (1911)
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Seliskar, John, St. Paul Seminary, Groveland Park, St. Paul, Minn. (1911)
Seymour, Helen, Hubbard Woods, Ill. (1913)
Shalto, Ethel, 612 French St., Santa Ana, Cal. (1912)
Shaw, Frank L., 718 Bay State Bldg., Lawrence, Mass. (1913)
Sheldon, A. E., Director Nebraska Legislative Reference Bureau, Lincoln, Neb. (1913)
Shenton, H. W., 552 Riverside Drive, New York City, N.Y. (1912)
Sibley, Florence, 235 South 18th St., Philadelphia, Pa. (1913)
Siedenburg, Frederic, Hayes Ave. and Sheridan Road, Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Simmons, H. S., Webster, S.D. (1913)
Simons, Sarah E., 1528 Corcoran St., Washington, D.C. (Prior to 1910)
Simpson, Joshua Baker, Virginia Union University, Richmond, Va. (1913)

Sims, Newell L., Scarsdale, N.Y. (1910)
Sinclair, A. G., St. Andrews Manse, 429 Elgin Ave., Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. (1911)
Sites, C. M. Lacey, Anglo-Chinese College, Foochow, China. (1911)
Small, Albion W., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Smith, Alice M., 301 Warburton Bldg., 11th and C Sts., Tacoma, Wash. (1911)
Smith, Mrs. Eugene, 317 Washington St., Hoboken, N.J. (1913)
Smith, F. M., Osseo, Wis. (1913)
Smith, Frederick M., Box 255, Independence, Mo. (1913)
Smith, Luther E., 1718 Pierce Bldg., St. Louis, Mo. (1913)
Smith, Mildred Cromley, 219 East Market St., Warren, Ohio, (1913)
Smith, Sam Ferry, 409 Union Bldg., San Diego, Cal. (1913)
Smith, Samuel G., 300 The Aberdeen, St. Paul, Minn. (1913)
Smith, Walter Robinson, 1232 N. Market St., Emporia, Kan. (1913)
Smith, Wilberforce W., 151 N. Fairview Ave., Decatur, Ill. (1911)
Snedden, David, 500 Ford Bldg., Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Snow, Helen H., Welfare Manager, Curtis Publishing Co., Philadelphia, Pa. (1913)
Snyder, W. H., Madison, Kan. (1912)
Solensten, R. T., Y.M.C.A. Bldg., Jacksonville, Fla. (1913)
Sommerfeld, Rose, 225 E. 63d St., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Spalding, Rt. Rev. F. S., 444 East First South St., Salt Lake City, Utah. (1913)
Spencer, Mrs. Anna G., 7 High St., White Plains, N.Y. (1911)
Spicer, R. Barclay, 140 N. 15th St., Philadelphia, Pa. (1913)
Stebbins, Lucy Ward, University of California, Berkeley, Cal. (1913)
Steiner, Bernard C., care of Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore, Md. (1911)
Stelzle, Charles, 156 5th Ave., New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Sternheim, Rev. Emanuel, Greenville, Miss. (1913)
Sterns, Frederick H., Peabody Museum, Cambridge, Mass. (1911)
Stetson, George R., 1441 Massachusetts Ave., Washington, D.C. (1911)
Steven, Helen, Chicago Refuge for Girls, 5024 Indiana Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Stitt, Rev. Wilson, Piedmont, R.D., Ohio. (1913)
Stockstill, Webster T., 311 W. Butler St., Bryan, Ohio. (1913)
Stockton, Frank T., University of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y. (1912)
Stone, Alfred H., Dunleith, Miss. (Prior to 1910)
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Sumner, George S., Pomona College, Claremont, Cal. (Prior to 1910)
Sutherland, E. H., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (1911)
Suzzallo, Henry, Teachers' College, Columbia University, New York City, N.Y. (1910)
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Switzer, J. M., care of National Cash Register Co., Dayton, Ohio. (1913)
Taggart, Frederick S., Westfield, N.J. (1913)
Talbot, Marion, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Taussig, Frances, 4911 Washington Park Place, Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Taylor, Graham, Chicago Commons, Grand Ave. and Morgan St., Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Tenney, Alvan A., Columbia University, New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)

Terry, David John, Narbeth, Pa. (1913)
Thomas, Joseph J., Central High School, Washington, D.C. (Prior to 1910)
Thomas, W. I., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Thompson, Warren S., University Place, Neb. (1912)
Tinney, Mary C., 258 Willoughby Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y. (1912)
Todd, A. J., 1107 W. Oregon St., Urbana, Ill. (1912)
Tourtellot, Ida A., Hampton Institute, Hampton, Va. (Prior to 1910)
Trent, Rev. L. C., 203 S. Tremont St., Kewanee, Ill. (1911)
Tuckerman, Gustavus, care of City Club, 911 Locust St., St. Louis, Mo. (1913)
Tunicliffe, R. M., 424 W. Dayton St., Madison, Wis. (1913)
Tyson, Francis D., School of Philanthropy, 105 E. 22d St., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Unger, Mrs. J. O., 3344 Evanston Ave., Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Urmy, Rev. B., Morristown Methodist Episcopal Church, Morristown, N.J. (1910)
Vaile, Gertrude, 1610 Emerson St., Denver, Colo. (1913)
Valentine, Robert G., 27 State St., Boston, Mass. (1913)
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Varga, Huga E., 714 Rockefeller Bldg., Cleveland, Ohio. (1913)
Vassardakis, Cleanthes, 5420 Cornell Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1912)
Vedits, C. W. A., 3028 Newark St., Cleveland Park, Washington, D.C. (Prior to 1910)
Villaran, Manuel Vincente, Lima, Peru, South America. (1913)
Vincent, G. E., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. (Prior to 1910)
Vogt, Paul L., Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. (1912)

Wainwright, Rev. S. H., Okubo-Mura, Hyakunin-cho, No. 334, Tokyo, Japan. (1911)
Walker, Edwin C., 244 West 143d St., Manhattan, New York City, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Walker, Mrs. John G., Hamilton, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Walling, Wm. English, Cedarhurst, Long Island, N.Y. (1913)
Wallis, Louis, 55 Middle Divinity, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Warbassee, J. P., 386 Washington Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y. (1910)
Ward, Mrs. Lester F., The Kensington, Washington, D.C.
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Warren, Howard C., Princeton, N.J. (1913)
Waters, Chester C., 32 President Ave., Providence, R.I. (Prior to 1910)
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Watson, Mrs. Frank D., 825 W. 180th St., New York City, N.Y. (1910)
Weatherly, U. G., 527 E. 3d St., Bloomington, Ind. (Prior to 1910)
Webster, D. Hutton, Station A, Lincoln, Neb. (Prior to 1910)
Weinstock, H., 19 Presidio Terrace, San Francisco, Cal. (1913)
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White, Henry A., Leicester, Mass. (1913)
White, May Langdon, 105 E. 22d St., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
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Willcox, Walter F., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Williams, Mrs. C. D., 12 Hawthorn St., Cambridge, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Williams, Ellis D., 560 Drexel Bldg., Philadelphia, Pa. (1913)
Williams, G. H., 1605 Peirce Bldg., 112 N. 4th St., St. Louis, Mo. (1910)
Williams, J. M., 61 Cortland St., Geneva, N.Y. (1910)
Wilson, Agnes E., Secretary Associated Charities, Madison, Wis. (1912)
Wilson, Guy, 512 Chemical Bldg., St. Louis, Mo. (1913)
Wilson, Warren H., 156 5th Ave., New York City, N.Y. (1911)
Wing, David, L., Bureau of Corporations, Washington, D.C. (Prior to 1910)
Wissler, Clark, 77th and 8th Ave., New York City, N.Y. (1913)
Wolfe, A. B., Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio. (Prior to 1910)
Wood, E. E., Williamsburg Institute, Williamsburg, Ky. (1913)
Wood, Stuart, 400 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Woodhead, Howard, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (1911)
Woodruff, C. R., 703 N. American Bldg., Philadelphia, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Woods, E. B., 26 Ocean Ridge, Hanover, N.H. (Prior to 1910)
Woods, Frederick Adams, 1006 Beacon St., Brookline, Mass. (1911)
Woods, Mrs. Katherine, 1816 H St, Washington, D.C. (Prior to 1910)
Woods, Robert A., South End House, Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Woodworth, A. H., 6218 Lexington Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1911)
Woolley, Mrs. Helen T., 343 Bryant Ave., Clifton, Cincinnati, Ohio. (1913)
Woolston, H. B., 431 W. 121st St., New York City, N.Y. (1910)
Work, Monroe N., Tuskegee Institute, Ala. (1910)
Wright, Jonathan, Postgraduate Medical School, 2d Ave. and Twentieth St., New York City, N.Y. (1911)
Yockey, F. M., Knoxville, Ia. (1911)
Yoder, A. H., State Normal School, Whitewater, Wis. (1913)
Young, F. G., University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore. (Prior to 1910)
Zeller, J. C., University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, Wash. (Prior to 1910)
Zueblin, Charles, 8 Fairview Terrace, Winchester, Mass. (Prior to 1910)

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