THE QUALITIES OF MEN

By Joseph Jastrow

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CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT (*In preparation*).

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AN ESSAY IN APPRECIATION

BY

JOSEPH JASTROW

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PREFACE

THIS essay must itself carry its message and justify its mission. An introductory word cannot illuminate its purpose; though it may facilitate the approach, as a sign-board points the way and avoids the disappointment of an unexpected destination.

A study of the qualities of men in which a psychological interest in humanity is prominent, may properly be expected to undertake an analysis of the fundamental factors in human nature; their transformation in human nurture; and their values in growth, education, and vocation. This is indeed the basal problem in the psychology of human traits. I have not slighted it, and am engaged in a modest attempt to interpret what modern psychology has to say on

the subject. To that interpretation I propose to give the title "Character and Temperament," a combination of terms, that by the consensus of recent writers has again become current with a richer and more scientific meaning.

In the preparation for that work, I found the more general bearings of the problems of human quality constantly growing in interest and insistently demanding formulation. I found, too, that their treatment made natural a more general form of statement and a wider appeal; while yet it could be reconciled to a seeming neglect of the psychological analysis at closer range. The present essay thus represents an expansion of the conclusions of a study, the preliminaries of which are not overlooked but merged in the composite contours of a generalizing interest.

The material has passed through the stages of a paper before a Literary Club, of a Commencement address, and the

concluding one of a course of eight lectures on "Character and Temperament," delivered at Columbia University in March and April 1910.

University of Wisconsin, Madison,
September, 1910.

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THE QUALITIES OF MEN

IN these enterprising days of journalistic ingenuity, problems may enter uninvited with the postman's visitations, and be entertained unawares. Though they fail in their inquisitive mission, they set up an irritation that seeks satisfaction in a formula. The momentary intruder presented the double mask of comedy or tragedy: "Why are you an optimist; and if not, why not?" it asked. On reflection, so much of optimism as seemed consistent in a vale of tears with an uncertain climate found its warrant in the manifest and profound error of that beneficent historical document which enlightened the world by informing it that all men are born free and equal. If that pronunciamento were in any real application

true, the chief prop to a sane optimism would become as a broken reed. If all humanity were of the quality of its average, we should be vacant of our glorious gains, and as successive heirs of all the ages have little to inherit. The inequalities of men furnish the material for nature and civilization alike and jointly to work upon. Clay makes the earthen pot and the finer vessel; but the texture of the raw material and the potter's art transform the finished product.

I

The purpose of my ambitious venture is to survey the varieties of human quality, and to do this dominantly in a practical vein; to gauge the measure and note the manner of distinctive inequalities, to distinguish and portray their several influences in the careers of men; then more critically, to appraise their worth, to observe the success which attends them,

and, if fortune favor, to reach some insight into the play of personal forces that shape our fate individually, collectively, nationally. Like much that is interesting in life, the situation finds its most direct illumination under the fitful torch which the psychologist hesitantly flourishes. In his vocabulary — which in this context may appear in simplified spelling — a term of largest meaning is *appreciation.* When encountered in his customary pedagogical mood, the psychologist will explain that the source and the enduring supply of the mental nourishment are to be sought in the environment, in a world so puzzlingly full of a number of things that we are kept endlessly busy discovering them, and variously happy and unhappy in bending them to our uses. One of the compensations of crying for the moon is the discovery of the moon itself. The most ardent and strenuous discoverer of all times and climes is the dauntless amateur adventurer who pene-

trates unattended and on all fours to the farthest corner of the nursery. Never again as in these infantile explorations will the zest of entering into the kingdom of knowledge and the joy of possession be so keen and so complete, so untroubled by the burden of ignorance that is far from blissful. The enjoyment of sense open to any or at least to many an appeal, the capacity to observe, the responsiveness to the passing show, the appetite for variety, the ingenuity to supply it, — in general, the scope and vigor of the receptive attitude by virtue of which we reach the kingdom of our earthly inheritance, mark a distinctive type, a significant variety of human trait. And early and late, our discoveries are determined by such alertness of sense, such sustaining curiosity, such organized interests as we bring to our occupations. Thus is spun the mental web, the spinner taking up his lodging at the centre of the system, and by his sensitiveness

to the currents of the atmosphere finding what he may devour. So each becomes the sum of his sensibilities, and his world bounded by the range of his appreciations.

Herein lies a fair starting point for the differentiation of human quality. Where the sensory dependence is strongest, the demarcation is clear. The ear for music is early revealed; without native endowment, incentive and enjoyment lag; and if persisted in, however assiduously, the effort to develop a tonal facility becomes an unwarranted intrusion upon an unwilling audience. The range of endowment is wide: between those to whom no other language is so eloquent, no other voice so commanding, and their antipodes, for whom music is but elaborate noise, there is to be found a considerable series of niches, in one or another of which each of us finds a modest place. The gift of the muses is typically the musical gift — the offering of an attend-

ant fairy in the older setting, a dower of heredity in the newer, yet each with more concealment than revelation of their devious ways. Such marked sensory dispositions as those of painter and musician lead to precocity of achievement; yet cultivation and the infinite capacity for taking pains do not find their occupations gone. But the bending of the twig, as the inclination of the tree, stands as a variation of nature, though matured by the vicissitudes of climate and our horticultural ideals.

So naturally do we look upon musical virtue, like beauty of person, as a dower of birth, that we withdraw it from the ethical phases of responsibility. We hold it not against a man that he is utterly unmusical, though we condole with him in his misfortune; we confess as freely to such a lack in our composite nature as to an illegible handwriting. In the field of the decorative arts, a like frankness of confession is a privilege equally avail-

able, but commonly declined. Our friends do not unconcernedly disclose — even though their domestic surroundings do — an immunity to the æsthetics of form and color, a defect presumably yet more common than tone-deafness. The unobserved blind-spot in the retina may be proposed as the symbol of æsthetic insensibility, as the mote in a neighbor's eye is of moral dimsightedness. Yet the reasons are many and sufficient why that estimable citizen Jones does not care to be told, what by the narrow ray of light that enters his confessional he must at times dimly discern: that he is decoratively purblind. Imprimis there enters the intrusion of pride: one's Lares and Penates, however assembled, become a badge of possession, an index of social position, a token of success and station; if they are properly costly, conform to the standards of the tribe, do not violate any of its taboos, they bring no detraction upon the qualities of their owner.

Of his offense to the muses he is ignorant; or if perchance vaguely suspicious, he finds ready solace in the goodly company of his tribal associates. He is not tempted to emulate the unreserve of that equally estimable citizen Smith, who long ago discovered and announced that to him music was a blank; and this because the pictures on the Jonesian walls, the trappings about his hearth — which presumably has been modernized to a hole in the floor or a cast-iron monument — along with explicit comfort bring to him some confused or distorted message. The pictures, though with little art, tell an intelligible story; and the conventional decoration on his china is still to him a recognizable primrose. Unlike the enviable Smith, he has not the refuge of silence; for he can hardly be expected to establish himself in a whitewashed lean-to, which alone would express the barrenness of his decorative sensibilities. An outer vestment and a fitted shelter he

and we must devise to hide our nakedness, wherein conventionally to display our primitive finery.

And though this fable teaches most directly that the qualities of our nature are subtly and complicatedly interwoven, it teaches as well how promptly the diabolical spell of display and possession is cast upon the innocence of our primeval virtue; how the melodeon in the farm-house or the grand piano in the suburbanite villa is installed not as a tribute to the muses, but as a libation to respectable success. For the most of us, neither artists nor musicians, yet not devoid of the sensibilities of their arts, the æsthetic ingredient in the ordinary leaven contributes something essential to the flavor of the daily bread. Yet despite the common element in our farinaceous diet, the varieties of sensibility, like the varieties of breakfast-food, are many. They all find support in a sensory basis, but in fulness of time stand free of their supporting

scaffolding. The status of our personal quality in respect of this or that variety of sensibility is probably little subject to our desires. We cannot by taking thought, and only moderately by taking lessons in art, add many a cubit to the height of our æsthetic stature. But we may observe how native endowments grow under favor of nurture, what influences of our making quicken the process, and how in the end achievement waits upon, as it reflects and embodies, innate quality.

"The eye," as Goethe psychologically observes, "sees only what it has in itself the power of seeing"; and the increased power of vision — "more light" were his dying words — is what he and we strive to attain. The illumination, though in part a matter of candle-power, or of telescope and microscope, is more essentially an inner enlightenment, a clear-sightedness and deep-sightedness, an expansion of sensibilities. Though dominant in the æsthetic arts that follow closely the clues

of sense, sensibility extends its subtle but decisive influence over all art, over the realm of knowledge pure and applied, over social intercourse, practical management, and the deftness of what human hands find to do. Most directly it expresses itself in pleasure and pain, and more unequivocally, as if to enforce its sovereignty, in the aspect of displeasure. Certainly in our most familiar environments, the æsthetically sensitive shudder more generally than they thrill. The discord grates; the garish clash of color incites an instinctive recoil; the vulgar riot of crude ornament invites, as it seems to embody, the spirit of profanity. And when these violations transgress the milder prohibitions of the civil, rather than the sterner ones of the criminal code, they disseminate a *malaise* only more easily endured, because the sensitive nature, so frequently shocked, has perforce developed an auto-anæsthetic for its wounds. Displeasure or dissatisfaction is the price

ever to be paid for the privilege of better things. The sources of unhappiness are themselves the keys to the joys of living. *Weltschmerz* finds its compensation in *Weltfreude*. And equally in the field of knowledge, the fruit of the tree is worth all the qualms its enjoyment entails. The nobler bliss of knowledge prevails above the bliss that lurks in ignorance. The keener satisfaction, the richer content, the fuller meaning — these make the deeper feeling in the man as in the poet, in so far as he is born thus to be made. The personal qualities of the artist are but the unfoldments of his sensibilities; and the higher pleasures and the deeper pains furnish the standards of worth that inspire his expression. For those who cannot create but can enjoy, the measure of their appreciation, as for the creative artist himself, becomes the index of their cultivated sensibilities.

The quality of sensibility reflects the class of its employment. Human inter-

course, notably in its social phases, and alike in its casual and its more enduring service, discloses its various and versatile composition. It is associated traditionally with the educative contact of city life. Civility and urbanity, speaking Romanwise, are qualities to be developed where most they are needed, — in the madding crowds of men; while boorishness, somewhat harshly, pertains to the peasant tiller of the soil. Yet class distinctions, though prone to become artificial and irrelevant, are founded upon sensibilities that are deep, and congeniality that is responsive. Inevitably quality — as in the ante-bellum use of the phrase — attaches to the favored of birth and circumstance; and "nature's noblemen" are not as plentiful as obituary notices suggest. However circumstanced, social and intellectual intercourse proceed upon inherent sensibilities. The frictional interchange of thought brings the quiet glow to an occasional spark; wit scintil-

lates; a phrase, a turn, flashes a new vista. In the minor give and take, the amenities, the manner, the ease and adaptability, all these and a larger kindred of qualities subtly and delicately yet effectively reflect the bearing of mind in the service of the social sensibilities. Much of it is conventional, some of it assumed; yet the best and deepest of it confirmatory of, if not contributory to the patent of one's antecedents. Breeding is at once the homely and the distinguished name for the quality; and aristocrat and democrat may share alike in the dignity and warrant thereof, in so far as they have the support of the proper sensibilities. How far this consummation is obtainable by effort and the shaping of education is a vexed issue. The conservative will agree with Professor James that the initiative for such prerogative must be laid in early life. "Hardly ever can a youth transferred to the society of his betters unlearn the nasality and other

vices of speech bred in him by the association of his growing years. Hardly ever indeed, however much money there be in his pocket, can he ever learn to *dress* like a gentleman-born. The merchants offer their wares as eagerly to him as to the veriest 'swell,' but he simply *cannot* buy the right things. An invisible law, as strong as gravitation, keeps him within his orbit, arrayed this year as he was last; and how his better-bred acquaintances contrive to get the things they wear will be for him a mystery till his dying day."

Sensibility equally touches and refines the field of morals. The tokens of personal consideration given and received, the lighter appeals to and recognition of the gentler feelings, the things emphasized and overlooked *sans dire*, — these reflect a moral coloring in one light, an æsthetic in another. Fastidiousness protects from vice as effectively as a colder ascetic conscience. And the proximity to holiness

of so homely a virtue as cleanliness is due to the underlying rectitude of the sensibilities. The daily bath is no more than clean linen a hygienic necessity. But to be uncomfortable without them indicates a proper sensibility. It is worth while to appreciate the temperament that can lunch upon spotless napery and a biscuit, even though a more robust appetite enables one to eat hungrily amid unsavory surroundings. Yet all things in moderation. That sensibilities may be over-refined, that the disdain that ignores may conceal a deeper rottenness, that the effeminate preclude the sterner qualities, needs no emphasis in a climate in which no one has as yet died of a rose in aromatic pain. What more needs to be regarded is the overstrain of sensibilities that leads to sensationalism, indicative of a spoiled appetite with insufficient ingredients of solid food. But the corrective is once more a truer quality of sensibility which is ever ready to affiliate with the

higher phases of virtue; for the virtues, though subject to complex sympathies and antipathies, have an underlying affinity for their kind.

Admittedly, manner may be skin-deep or even cosmetically achieved; and convention is the most disguising of all human expedients. Yet however democratically disposed, we must recognize the value of grandparents, and more or less agree with the "Autocrat" that a successful education does well to begin with them. Truly sensibilities and their early encouragement are significant, and the qualities which they endow and engender equally so; and the tendency that comes in the wake of a too intensive or uncritical faith in the equal privileges of democracy, or in the healing and levelling mission of education, or as a solace for personal deficiency, — the tendency to look upon the qualities thus conferred as incidental, unessential or superficial, is for most applications misleading, and

readily becomes a popular fallacy intolerant of its counterpart, the unpopular truth. The important and the practical emphasis, however, is upon the true appraisal of sensibility wherever found, however conditioned. Yet in thus holding, one does not question that there circulates, and often at par, a deceptive surface polish, a glitter that may be a thin plating or quite palpably brazen; does not suppose that the race of snobs and cads is disappearing; does not forget Lowell's pointed reminder that the "conceit of singularity" may be resorted to as a "natural recoil from our uneasy consciousness of being commonplace." The view finds a partial consolation in the conclusion that those who would assume the outer show of quality without honestly acquiring its warrant express a distorted appreciation thereof; and it finds a more real consolation in the conviction that the plating and the glitter somehow manage to disclose to the discerning the fabric of

their skeletons; that only good leather will permit of the taxing processes of cure and treatment that make possible an enduring and high-grade polish.

II

THE emphasis of sensibility commits one to an ideal. It bears against the vaunted glory of a triumphantly democratic education, that professes to manufacture wholesale ready-to-wear garments duly heralded (though as yet without those fascinating plates of the tailor-made youth and maiden) in the annual Fall college catalogues, and suited to all figures irrespective of sex, creed, endowment, or previous condition of servitude. Naturally the system selects and makes much of those generic contours in the human figure that lend themselves most readily to drapery; studies are chosen that are easily taught upon the basis of a slender stock of sensibilities, such as demand a certain aptness of acquisition, a modest application, and

a carrying power sufficient to meet a routine inspection. It glosses over the cultures that grow too directly out of sensibility, pins its faith to what may be tabulated and scaled, rather than upon what must be judged and appraised by an insight inhospitable to statistical standards; and eventually confers its "Bachelor of Arts," because the candidate presumably has some acquaintance with everything but the arts, and would look least appropriate or comfortable with laurel or bay about his brow.

It would seem to follow that so far as the significant qualities, which it is peculiarly the business of the higher education to develop in the selected youth of each generation, depend upon sensibilities, it becomes the educative function to further select rigorously, to weed out strenuously, to lead forward and upward by the inspiration of example, by the suggestiveness of precept that is itself the issue of the qualities it aims to ex-

pand. To discover sensibilities and deepen them, to discourage the inept, to separate the sheep from the goats, is a service to both; for it directs each to more suitable pasture. In so far as our educational procedure refuses to recognize this situation and to realize its responsibilities, it misleads; it takes the broader but not the wiser path. It seems to favor the impression that all stalks may bear roses, that some do so in spite of neglect or with judicious neglect, that others need only a higher temperature, more fertilizer, or a longer time to develop the buds; and only the incorrigible revert to cabbages. The two views lead to wide differences of emphasis despite a community of interest and a sympathy of motive. The one proceeds upon the direct capacities that respond to teaching; the other encourages what each may assimilate, under stimulus of guidance, or must teach himself. The one scatters over the paths of learning minutely la-

belled sign-posts, maintains a coddling chaperonage over the lost, strayed or stolen, admonishes the heedless to keep off the grass and away from the water's edge. The other sets the young idea to browse, to explore, to examine, to report, to take a wiser companion upon a stroll, to try an occasional plunge to quicken a hesitant courage; in brief to find himself in an environment stimulating to any worthy quality he may possess. Routine and determination will be enlisted and enforced when once the quest is earnestly on, the goal cherished, or the enjoyment of the pursuit aroused.

A more sympathetic recognition of the claims of sensibility stands out conspicuously in our higher education as a whimpering, if not a crying need. The urgency of its satisfaction is inherent in the conception of education as a selection and reënforcement of quality, — admittedly the test and issue alike of native though perfectible sensibility. It was as proper

as inevitable that with the glorious expansion of the intellectual horizon that is ours and was our fathers', we should feel the imperative obligation of shaping the newer education to the newer knowledge, boldly to venture new worlds for old. But with the vista of half a century, the lights and shadows have become fixed. The elective system, typical of, though by no means wholly responsible for, these untoward tendencies, might well stand as a form of rational liberty, not of unbridled license, and thus appeal to the sensibilities ; yet the privilege should not be used to discover by costly trial for how many and how various pursuits the student has no capabilities, but be enlisted to foster those which he has discovered within himself. And the greatest hindrance to such discovery lies in the otherwise directed set, the practical temper, the weakly educative influences of his environment. The loss of the older influence that sprang from the appreciа-

tion of quality, doubtless of a different range of quality, must somehow be reinstated, if we are to remain permanently satisfied with the exchange.

III

IT is indeed possible to acquire a certain expertness, a facility born of experience, founded, it may be, upon a fair executive and constructive talent, and it may be, upon a meagre one; and with this equipment to launch one's craft upon the open waters and amid keen competition of like vessels reach a snug harbor. These trainable facilities, with a slight ingredient of a limited imagination, and a larger portion of enthusiasm, produce the average and desirable citizen, — the available practitioner. Yet in so far as the profession involves it, feebleness of sensibility may prove and should prove the most serious handicap. Easily the best example of such a calling that makes composite demands upon human

quality is that of the architect. Yet architects of the quality described secure and deserve employment and build houses not devoid of merit, yet curiously tolerant of demerit; they respond imitatively to any improvement in vogue or in the increased sensibilities of patrons: they advance with time and tide, yet remain uncertain, mediocre, styleless and insignificant. While those of lesser endowment, though not markedly of lesser skill, who likewise build houses, suggest one or other of the familiar German refrains: "*Aber fragt mich nur nicht wie!*" or "*Ich weiss nicht was soll es bedeuten.*" But infuse into this composite of worthy qualities the leaven of appreciation, and it at once carries all talents enlisted in its service to a higher plane. One might cite photography as a peculiarly convincing example: for the transformation from the chamber of horrors — with inquisitional apparatus applied to delicate spots of one's anatomy, and the injunction

to assume a smirking superiority to the indignity — to the atmosphere of the studio and the wholly altered standards of purpose and technique, was due, in the main, to the heightened sensibilities of the amateur.

But enough of the pedagogical mood; and let the other side be heard. Life, the objector interposes, is not a studio nor a drawing-room. Admittedly not. It is real and earnest; and in many callings the æsthetic aspects are of all the most negligible. If I had to face the opulent necessity of a surgical operation, I should be looking only for the best surgeon. He might, if he chanced to be of that kidney, wear a purple and green necktie, use musk and double negatives, and still be the one chosen. And yet, when we examine into the qualities that make the great physician of bodies curiously entangled with souls, we begin to find that sensibilities count, giving expertness its finer edge, separating the very best

from the very good. I contend simply that there are few callings demanding any high order of quality in which sensibility is not a vital factor; few occupations that do not reflect for better or for worse, for richer or for poorer, the fundamental distinctions of human quality presented by depths and varieties of sensibility. Yet it is time to direct attention away from the supporting sensibilities and towards the achievements in terms of human quality which they support. In the psychological division, thinking — logical insight — and doing — coördinated energy — point to the distinctive varieties of quality; as in the practical world we seek intelligence and skill, heads and hands, judging the qualities of men by their deeds. Assuredly it will not endanger the dignity or the supremacy of the sensibilities to admit with the convincing irrelevancy of *The Mikado's* exalted factotum, that in many of the situations of life, "the flowers that

bloom in the Spring have nothing to do with the case."

For the moment, consider, not the lilies of the field, but the toilers and spinners. The craft of the tool and the fruit of the loom will yet reflect the quality of the artisan, and above all, his native intelligence. No quality is more difficult to define; and the psychologist, despite the refinements of his laboratory and his special interest in the solution of just such practical issues, has not solved to his own or any other's satisfaction the final method of disclosing or testing what with his fellowmen he is constantly appealing to, namely, general intelligence. He cannot doubt that in some real sense the faculty exists, despite his emphasis that so much of human activity as he investigates is made up of many and diverse special facilities. The quality, reflective of a world in which thistles grow thicker than figs, is most conspicuous in its negative fruition to which we apply unsparingly the epithet,

stupidity, — a rather democratic quality distributed with sufficient irregularity to permit the unexpected to happen and make the world interesting. For practical issues it is well to have in mind not the academic type of the quality: "He made an instrument to know if the moon shine at full or no," — nor the guilelessness of the wise men of Kampen, who, to save their precious town-bell when danger threatened, rowed it out to sea and cut a notch in the side of the boat to mark the place where they threw it overboard. Ignorance is not stupidity, though the two, like birds of a feather, fraternize in spontaneous sympathy. It is well to note that stupidity, though partly an absence of common sense, is as well a deficiency of common sensibility, — the inability to perceive a situation being but a part of the incapacity to meet it. The former as the less teachable becomes the more baffling; and the calm, imperturbable complacency of full-fledged stupid-

ity presents the most desperate of human situations, hopeless even to superhuman powers: "*Gegen Dummheit kämpfen selbst die Götter vergebens.*"

I urge then that in the composite quality of stupidity the failure to see and appreciate is yet more characteristic than the logical defect, the dearth of rational foresight; for it is the lack of penetration that makes dullness of quality. Such are the dull, hacking their way clumsily through difficulties, oblivious alike of anatomy and the fine art of dissection. The hand, the practical prehensile instrument, becomes as pertinent an embodiment of this faculty as does the instrument of our mental comprehension. Dexterity of hand or mind is the issue of sensibility; mental awkwardness and manual stupidity have a like basis. Indeed, touch lays claim to be the most personal of all sensibilities, and if we may credit so unique a witness as Miss Helen Keller, supplies a more reliable estimate of

human quality than the superficial allurements appealing to the eye. The tactile sensibility and its kindred in the motor mechanisms vitalize behavior, supply the springs of action, the tone of achievement, and therein find their worthy consummation. Yet the whole is supported upon a sensory basis of nicety of discrimination, which becomes the distinctive quality of the pianist's execution, as of the potter's thumb as it carries grace and texture to the product of his wheel; and the plying of that deft trade that interchanges the meum and tuum without so much as a disturbing appeal to the subconscious, appropriates with the directness of slang the tribute of a good "touch." And contrariwise in the homelier occupations, the marrers of furniture, the nickers of plates, the bangers of doors, the heavy-stepped, loud-voiced, the slatterns and shufflers, — what are these but the tokens of insensibility oozing out through bone and muscle? Let

us then take pride in our allegiance of speech and culture that makes delicacy the hall-mark of a gentleman, that still brings homage deep and articulate to the gentler sex.

It thus appears that each member of the psychological triumvirate, — feeling, thinking, doing, — the departments of inquiry, of the judiciary, and of the executive, — derives his warrant in some measure from the supporting quality of sensibility. An alert responsiveness to situations as they arise, the discerning insight that interprets them, are of a nature all compact with the resourcefulness in their handling, the tact that steadies judgment, the refinement that shapes conduct to its finer issues. Our sensibilities are, and the most cultivated desire them to be, complex, though in their many-sidedness compatible with a directness of manner and an ease of execution reflecting a proper self-respectful confidence and an accomplished adjust-

ment to our sphere and task. The forcibleness of our thinking and doing is resident in the cutting edge rather than in the mass and momentum of our expressions.

Yet in fairness let us take a parting glance backward at the qualities of the well-regulated, vigorous man, the man of brawn and muscle, if you like, modestly trained in their useful application. Sensibilities, we are admonished, unsupported by energies, are likely to spend themselves feebly. Most of the business of life consists in getting things done, not in fussing about the manner of doing them. It is obviously foolish to underestimate in any measure the workaday qualities demanded by workaday tasks. We are all ready to appreciate the position of the young suitor who met his prospective father-in-law's inquiries as to his assets in life with the assurance that he was "chuck full of days' work." On the whole it seems unnecessary to enforce this form

of virtue upon dogged John Bull or his hustling brother Jonathan. Yet mere energy, no more than unrestricted opportunity, will accomplish none of the greater and few of the lesser things desirable and worth while. Particularly as we rise from the barer routines, the lowlier tasks — nor need we emerge to more than the plains and lowlands of human occupations — does the support of sensibilities cease to be negligible, and as we ascend, become commanding. In parallel measure does the slight emphasis or callous disregard of sensibility cheapen the human product, lower standards and deaden the vitality of men. Yet whatever the industry, however delicate the machinery, motive power is indispensable. Man does not live by bread alone; but he does not live without it. The present plea sets forth only that the human output should not be measured in horse-power, nor human intelligence by horse-sense. To inherit, cultivate, and keep in good train-

ing a thinking machine that will run reliably for an eight-hour day, that will support an artisan intelligently and profitably at his task, is no despicable foundation for the business of a livelihood, nor for the joys and responsibilities of life. And though the circle of achievement has a limited circumference and the radius of capability does not expand materially with experience, yet its adequacy proves its worth. So also of endurance, patience, vigor, and best of all, determination. But is there any real danger that these profitable qualities, that, unlike virtue, which should do so, really bring their own reward, will fail to be rightly appraised in a world so busy in weighing, and measuring, and tabulating, so enthusiastically displaying its newly acquired statistical sensibilities? All this is indeed another story. We are considering humanity qualitatively, not quantitatively; or, speaking by the book, while recognizing the presence of the two variables in the

human equation, we are discussing the fluctuations of the one rather than the other. And the justification therefor will duly appear: for it is this aspect of the qualities of men that appeals for emphasis and protection. It is upon the esteem of the upper ranges of quality that the life of civilization depends; as it is the choicer qualities that become increasingly significant in the more directive and more distinctive service. Any neglect or feeble appreciation of the commanding worth of the finer human qualities obstructs human progress and endangers the fate of the humanities.

Thus recognizing how the progress and efficiency of sensibility requires the supporting arm of energy on the one side, of clear-sightedness on the other, — for obviously we look for leadership neither among the halt nor the blind, — we yet adhere to the essential worth of this formative quality in the distinctive make-up of *homo sapiens*. And resuming, we ask:

How shall we range the qualities of men: as students if we are studious, or like Antony, "wander through the streets and note the qualities of people"? Unquestionably the former, if we may choose: presumably the latter, if we must. Clearly it is through the variations of distribution and emphasis of the several formative qualities that man becomes composite, and men most unequal. Our most common term to indicate in the individual the result of such endowment and experience is *character;* and it is this which may be said to be the proper study of mankind. The study is largely empirical, partly academic, and but sporadically scientific; though John Stuart Mill, and he not alone, wished promptly to give it scientific standing, and proposed the name "Ethology." * He made a logical diagnosis of

* It is interesting to record that the term and the project still survive, or have been revived. There is in London an Ethological Society which since 1905 publishes *The Ethological Journal;* but the *tendenz* of the movement varies rather widely from that which inspired Mill's project. The group of

its mode of procedure, gave instructions for the interpretations of the records of ethological pulse and temperature, and of waste and expenditure, when once they were obtained, but was well aware that he could give no very explicit directions in regard to filling out the charts which his system supplied. This perhaps he regarded as more nearly the business of the trained nurse than of the diagnosing physician; and I shall so far agree with him as not to attempt it here.

investigations belonging to what is accepted as "Individual Psychology" represents the most specific advance; while a considerable range of suggestion and profitable analysis has been contributed in recent years, particularly by French and Italian writers, under the rubric of the Psychology of Character. These phases of the topic will be considered in a forthcoming volume on *Character and Temperament*. The pertinence of this note is to direct attention, as has been done in the preface, to the several aspects of the qualities of men, which stand in the background of this survey. For practical use the charting of the smaller area on a larger scale is indispensable to the more professionally motived traveller.

IV

Of the older solutions, — likewise the issue of a mingling of casual observation and studious insight — the doctrine of temperaments is notable; and this, if we examine it anew, will appear very differently in the focus of our modern illuminants than under the uncertain rush-lights of mediæval lore. Temperament means blending. The famous blades of Toledo — light, elastic, strong, durable, and effective — reached their perfection by careful refinement of crude ore, alloyed and annealed with expert skill, forged and hammered and ground to edge and fibre, the success depending upon the mutual support of the processes and the natural vein of the metal. Such is the temper of steel, and such the temper of man. Moreover one quality com-

bats another. Make the edge too light and thin, and though sharp, it nicks readily and lacks strength; thicken it, and it becomes strong but unwieldy, and loses elasticity; make it too elastic, and it will not bear the strain of a powerful thrust. It was the combination of all virtues that made wonderful the temper of the Toledo blade, which, bent in a circle, seemed to combine within itself the range of desirable qualities. While not with such versatility of talent or genius, it is the temper, the blending of composite qualities that makes all sorts and conditions of men; and for the most part makes them complex and diverse, and with that uncertainty of the *mutabile semper* that is not wholly the feminine prerogative. So far, we may safely proceed in analysis, whether from the academic or from the layman's approach: to recognize that the varieties of the qualities of men are in the one view few and fundamental, traceable, if our analyses were ade-

quate, to typical blendings of common factors of endowment, — later, widely differentiated by the moulding forces of experience and the patterns and media of expression; to recognize in a supplementary view, the compatibilities and incompatibilities of quality, — how the values of the factors in any one formula are mutually affected by one another and by their combination; and yet to recognize in a complementary view the transformation and involution of quality in the maze of circumstance, the stress of occupation, the encouragement of institutions, the favor of careers. Nearer we may not approach to the promised land; yet of the nature of its soil and climate and products, this traditional knowledge, confirmed by casual report, will prove of service for our survey.

It is without question a legitimate function of psychological study to set forth the essential varieties of character and trace them to their tap-roots, to deter-

mine their several sources and planes of differentiation. But as Bacon of old told us of all studies: "they teach not their own use and there is a wisdom without them and above them won by observation." In its practical phases character becomes the great common denominator of all human fractions. Artist, sculptor, poet, dramatist, novelist, have their several and suitable media for its delineation; preacher, orator, editor, publicist, lawyer, physician, teacher, parent, merchant, manufacturer, have their several and often discordant modes of appeal to its composite qualities, as each touches upon a phase of the whole. Life is but character in action; what we take from it, what we put into it; how we find ourselves in it; how we express our individualities, and respond in sympathy or in antipathy to the expressions of other fragments, measures for each his expertness as a practitioner in the humanities.

So what in this wide, wide world, and

in the present long-range survey is there for the psychologist to contribute, and that in brief numbers? Perhaps, first of all, this: the wisdom of the cathedra is one, and the wisdom of the agora is another. To hold them apart and yet to bring them together is the recurrent problem of theory and practice, the rendering to each of its own. Violate the spirit of the former, bending all to rash uses, and you emerge with fortune-telling, phrenology, astrology, palmistry, and all the historic and crass modern superstitions that read character in stars or entrails, in cranial punctuation-marks meaningless without the verbal context, and in lines of palm reminiscent of the arboreal habitat from which we sprang, — all of them irrelevant and disordered cryptograms. Neglect the allegiance of the other, and you encourage blind pedantry, self-indulgent scholasticism, sterility of dogma, and high impulse spending itself weakly, fanaticism without grace of compromise,

or what Mr. Wells calls the unmanageable wildness of the good. The wagon hitched to the stars must keep its wheels on earth and accommodate its motion to the vicissitudes of earthly highways.

Yet when all is said and done, the man-of-the-world type of psychologist, who seems to be coming to complement his academic counterpart, will have an authoritative voice in charting this engaging domain. From the one approach he will, as we have seen, trace qualities back to their supporting sensibilities, noting their type, their depth, their distribution; then to the relating powers of thought-sequence, the chief determinant being in how far the exercise thereof follows the clue of logical anticipation or of the freer imagination; and lastly, to the vigor, scope, and effectiveness of the expressions, the functions executive. Of such bearing is the academic formula of character: a blending of such sensibilities — strong or weak, coarse or fine, in-

tellectual or emotional, artistic or literary, social or commercial; of such manner of thinking, — quick or slow, deep or shallow, broad or narrow, poetic or prosaic, theoretical or practical; and of such powers of expression, — sustained or flighty, energetic or anæmic, concentrated or dissipated, determined or weak-kneed. And upon such basis he determines types of temperament, manners of blending, which, though not notably helpful in shaping careers nor in solving special perplexities, yet in their dominant contours, and again instructively in their exaggerations, even in their abnormal deviations, become deeply significant. Of such stamp is the science of character; quite differently motived and otherwise centred is the art of character, — analytic also, yet with an impressionistic bias, proceeding upon sympathetic insight, upon the discernment of a ready imagination and the corrective of a rich experience. With

this quality, sometimes supported by a keen interest in studies psychological and sometimes wholly unrelated to it, there develop the psychological novelist, painter, sculptor, dramatist, or musician, — a George Eliot, a Sargent, a Rodin, an Ibsen, a Wagner.

V

In this domain whose contours we are following but not traversing, there is yet another vista, a selective regard that yields an available picture. As we look from afar upon the landscape of human character, what features, we ask contemplatively, shall we regard, what formative traits select as most distinctive? But as we mingle at close range with all sorts and conditions of men, we are impressed with the complex and, what we are inclined to call, the unjust complications of our enterprise. Our difficulties are twofold: first to detect quality in achievement always conditioned by circumstance; and what is equally perplexing, to detect fundamental qualities in the different manners of their appearance. On the one hand the handicaps of

poverty, of discouragement, of the few against the many, of antagonistic aims, and untoward fortune; on the other a sheltered pampering, the open sesame of gold or privilege, popularity, and the subtler intrusions of influence. Amid such discrepancy of circumstance how can we gauge the measure of worth, distinguish the insignia of rank and of true quality, how detect the man under the ermine, the robe, the surplice, or the beggar's cloak? If honor waited steadily upon achievement, and achievement were the equally constant issue of quality, judgment would be simple, and secure; though a psychological discrimination would still find its *métier* in tracing different orders and applications of the qualities of men to their underlying sources. But combine and confuse qualities and achievements with circumstance, and the wisdom of the schools and of human institutions — though applied in the spirit of Solomon — prove wholly in-

adequate. The picture becomes too complex in motive, too baffling in detail; and after the manner of mortals, we dispose of its intricacies by substituting for it another — a simplified outline in diagram — of our own design, embodying a personal preference. We equalize or neutralize circumstance, and summon imagination to the rescue of analysis. The myth and the wish direct the adventure.

Back to Arcadia or on to Utopia seems the only way out. Let us divest ourselves of circumstance, disregard convention, and look upon merit face to face, not reflected darkly in the glass of fortune. With the outlook thus transformed, the vista may develop into a vision, the problem become a dream. Thus Plato fashioned his very Athenian republic; More his cumbersome Utopia; and their modern disciples — Morris, Howells, Bellamy, and Wells — dipped in the future and imaginatively "saw the vision of the

world, and all the wonder that would be," or should be. Yet whether or not, unrestrained by a distorted reality, we suit reward to merit and avail ourselves of the Utopian privilege of fondly constructing a world with more conveniences for being happy in it than are provided for by our distressful planet, the material for such constructions must ever be the same, — the enduring qualities of men. Yet despite the mingling of circumstance with disposition, there seems to be borne in upon the observer and student alike, the impression of a "great divide" — a two-class division of humanity, something more of leadership in the one, of following in the other; the imaginative and the imitative; the original and the conventional; the alert and the sluggish; the vibratory and the unresponsive; the digits and the ciphers in the curter and severer formulation. The distinction seems to extend through and beyond the limit of education, clearly so of learning;

seems like a natural stream to make its own way among the sorts and conditions of men, leaving them for the most part with approximate fitness and amid congenial surroundings on the one side or the other of the meandering boundary. The intellectuals of ancient Greece apparently enjoyed the same prospect; and not wholly in the spirit of the Hellenes and the Barbaroi (of Ourselves and the Other Kind in modern phrase), they classified the men of their time as Athenian and Bœotian. As we have expanded their intuitive demarcation, we gather in the one class the men of alert sensibility, imaginatively free, with pronounced character, shaping their lives by principle, and making of them what is worthy to be called a career; and in the other those who moderately or conspicuously lack these qualities. Divided at their widest span, they become plainly the gifted and the dull; but nearer their merging points the one towers above the other in that,

while he alike with his fellow man compromises with institutions and expresses his purposes through them, he yet affiliates himself with the worthier, more progressive aspects thereof, follows a larger expediency, is not submerged in the crowd whose impulses he shares.

Here and now, as of old, lie the two camps; and all that we have done since they were mustered in the plains and cities of Hellas is from time to time to change the names on their standards. Athenian has ever gathered with Athenian, Bœotian with Bœotian, and so will it ever be. True, the one never wholly loses sympathy for the other, — that is the saving grace of humanity, — and for practical crises they may be united in a common loyalty, an inclusive patriotism; whereby, in one generation or another great things are done. Yet in times of peaceful venture and in the freer choices of life, — social, intellectual, political, sentimental, æsthetic, practical, — each

will drift to his congenial *milieu*, will circulate in his regular or irregular orbit.

Yet the distinction is fundamentally one of endowment, of temperament, and mingles with the slighter rivulets as with the larger streams of life. Its modern phrasing is to be found in the key of pleasant banter; but wisdom in and out of Shakespeare often appears in cap and bells, and to light words hang weighty meanings. Let us take somewhat seriously the experiments of Mr. Gillett Burgess, who with the aid of kindred spirits has passed the Bœotian through the chemical laboratory and transmuted him into a modern Bromide, and has found a new value for the Athenian in the formula of the Sulphite. The terms reflect, almost expose too barely the features of their appropriate subjects. His calculability gives the Bromide a real equation; "his train of thought can never get off the track; . . . his mind keeps regular office hours"; and blandly and happily

he reflects his surroundings, and finds in the conventional maxims of Dame Grundy (revised version) the solutions of his ordinary perplexities. Though he grasps at the weather as at a life-preserver, as a salvation in time of conversational need, he is immune to the subtler meteorology of the intellectual climate. Storm and stress are to him wild oats and folly, and primroses primroses on all occasions; though curiously a spade is not a spade for the sufficient reason that in his circles a leg is a limb. For all of which he is affable, steady, thrifty, useful. His character is inevitably, and whatever streaks run through it, platitudinous. If he belongs to the emotional variety of his species, he effuses in a predictable and slenderly gushing stream. He may quite legitimately be an intellectual; in which case he takes his food with a bourgeois appetite, with no epicurean foibles, and emerges as a good collector, a middleman, an imitative exponent. As

an executive he becomes a steady practitioner, a compromising adviser, apt at routine, circumstantial, minute, orderly, — the safe pillar or pilaster or spindle of society.

The contrasting qualities of the Sulphite find their community in their very diversity; for fundamentally he is refractive, not reflective. "Every impression made upon him is split up into component rays of thought; he sees beauty, humor, pathos, horror, and sublimity"; and what he sees he orders anew through the medium of his own personality. He is not predictable, though logical; he is ever himself, though true to his class allegiance. He is decidedly a man of many types and many occupations. Raised to the *n*th power and transferred to a high-potential *milieu* he becomes, I assume, the superman. Even when casually encountered he reflects definitely, though it may be limitedly, the independence of leadership; he is a factor, small or

large, a digit within the ten-place, or the hundred, or the thousand, never a cipher. Yet he is this — so far as his Athenian blood is blue — by virtue, not of position but of inherent quality. He is unmistakeably to be recognized by his omissions. "He eliminates the obvious"; does not go back to Adam or the Flood to find a fulcrum for his advances; and carries a fitting perspective applicable though differently to forests and to trees. Yet more characteristically is the contrast æsthetic, a touch of gentility in the one, of vulgarity in the other. What separates one from the other is in Professor James's words, which though written with other reference seem peculiarly apt, "less a defect than an excess." "To ignore, to disdain, to consider, to overlook, are the essence of the 'gentleman' . . . It is not only that the gentleman ignores considerations relative to conduct, sordid suspicions, fears, calculations, etc., which the vulgarian is fated to entertain; it is that he is

silent where the vulgarian talks; that he gives nothing but results where the vulgarian is profuse of reasons; that he does not explain or apologize; that he uses one sentence instead of twenty; . . . All this suppression of the secondary leaves the field clear, — for higher flights, should they choose to come. But even if they never came, what thoughts there were would still manifest the aristocratic type and wear the well-bred form." The contrast persists: aristocrat and philistine, gentleman and vulgarian, Bromide and Sulphite, Athenian and Bœotian, are but different portrait titles for the same sitters, portrayed by different artists, with distinctive expressions and properties.

The Utopian atmosphere has the penetrative virtue of making things seem what they are. Rank, occupation, service become the fitting and invariable insignia of quality; virtue has an outer as well as an inner reward, and develops withal a prompt recognition of its prestige. Doubt-

less for most of us such clarity of atmosphere is too formidable; it threatens to dissolve our serviceable illusions along with our superstitions, to disclose the little tricks of our make-up, or to require us to justify our prejudices and predilections. We are dwellers in mist-land and have become used to it. Unquestionably by precept and manifesto we want no enveloping murkiness, no shielding fog for baseness or incompetency to find security; yet in less public moods we hold, in George Eliot's estimable phrase, to the inalienable right of private haziness. Though we cling to the sheltering imperfections of our terrestrial institutions, we are ready to follow, as tourists provided with a limited return-ticket, so accomplished a Utopian guide as Mr. H. G. Wells. In his sociological construction, the characteristic institution is the intellectual order of the elect, — the Samurai, — a voluntary nobility of merit united in service to the State, an aristocracy of

quality, reminiscent of the guardians of Plato's Republic. His more evolved state of human society tolerates no arbitrary restriction of privilege, only the natural cleavages: the leaders and the led; the class and the mass. For even in Utopia there seems no device to accomplish what has been attributed to the ambitions of the managers of ostentatious American hostelries: to provide exclusiveness for the masses.

By quality the Utopians appear as Poietic, Kinetic, Dull or Base. The Poietics form "the creative class of mental individuality" and "agree in possessing imaginations that range beyond the known and accepted, and that involve the desire to bring the discoveries made in such excursions into knowledge and recognition. . . . To the accumulated activities of the Poietic type reacted upon by circumstances, are due almost all the forms assumed by human thoughts and feeling. All religious ideas, all ideas of

what is good or beautiful, entered life through the poietic inspirations of men. . . . With one interest, one endowment, he is the artist, with another the man of science, with yet another of affairs." Clearly the Poietic is a high order of Athenian with an inevitably sulphitic temperament; and what is characteristic of Utopia and what contrasts it with Terrestria is the large responsibilities of leadership that devolve upon this favored class. Yet the affairs of any society demand energy and the talent of management. The intellectual order of Samurai, the trained leaders, includes large representations of the kinetic type of men. These in turn are various, are assimilated to the less distinctive blends of poietic men, but have more restricted imaginations and prefer very wisely to limit their endeavors to the experienced and accepted; within which limits they imagine and think clearly, and perform cleverly and capably.

The Kinetics form the upper middle

class of Utopians, a large and valuable aggregate, the bone and sinew of the nation. They keep the world going by getting things done. They span the great arch of the social structure from mediocrity to high and poietic excellence. Every realistic Utopian and practically-minded Terrestrian recognises their high worth. Their real place in the real modern world — for so much of which they are responsible — must not be judged by the pages of attention they secure in imaginary Utopias, nor in essays in defence of appreciation. Let them find honor in their description as the normal exemplars of the sterling qualities of men.

The Dull are manifestly inevitable; there would be no hills or mountains but for the lowlands and the plains. The great mass of ordinary work to be done demands a great mass of ordinary workers to do it. Utopian writers dismiss them curtly as stupid, incompetent, formal, imitative. "The Dull are persons

of altogether inadequate imagination, the people who never seem to learn thoroughly, or hear distinctly or think clearly." The Base put their qualities, which may be high as well as low, to perverted use. Like the poor and the dull, we always have them with us to furnish problems to society and sociologists alike.

VI

WITH a vocabulary thus extended and the experience — albeit in imaginary exploits — enriched, we may return earthward and consider human limitations both of quality and circumstance, in the end very practical worldly considerations. To each of us, of all the possible careers — not remotely or hypothetically possible, but reasonably available under realizable conditions — one alone becomes actual. Professor James writes piquantly: No man can be "a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a wit, *bon-vivant*, and a lady-killer, as well as a philosopher; a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as well as a tone-poet and saint"; not alone, as he proceeds to observe, that "the millionaire's work would run counter to the saint's"; that

"the *bon-vivant* and the philanthropist would trip each other up"; that "the philosopher and lady-killer could not well keep house in the same tenement of clay"; but still more fundamentally that the temperament, the endowment, the primitive fibre of human quality conditions the outer color — though this may be dyed with or reflect the pigments of experience — and the design, — though this is variously adapted to fashion and circumstance, — but as well the immutable texture of the available cloth to which perforce we must cut our garments.

The incompatibilities of quality lie on the surface and are readily discerned; their deeper analysis is involved in the same fundamental and as yet unattainable solutions that await us in the promised land. But with lesser or greater comprehension we note that the steel, if too light, becomes weak; if too heavy, unwieldy; if too elastic, it bends. The carrying power of the freighter does not

go with the fleetness of the ocean greyhound; pacer and dray-horse are bred quite differently. We have been reminded that philosophers are likely to possess one set of qualities and lady-killers another. But let us be very careful not to exaggerate these incompatibilities. It would not be difficult to find philosophers properly susceptible to feminine esteem, nor beaux with a taste for philosophy. We think at once of the camel contemplating the eye of the needle as a possible archway, and the rich man before the gates of paradise. But the camel, if we may trust Kipling, is a most awful example of combined incongruities: "he's a devil, and a ostrich, and a orphan-child in one"; and the rich man is subject to slander — and investigation. The liner, though "she's a lady," carries quite a cargo; and of the many cargo boats that ply the charted seas, the ones of largest burden are not the slowest.

The incompatibility of qualities must

be carefully reckoned with. It appears practically in the adjustment or maladjustment of quality to service, and conversely in the wise adjustments of the demands of positions and institutions to the compatibilities nurtured within our human psychology. Men may be versatile in this respect or specialists in that, by nature or by circumstance. The mastery that is denied to jacks-of-all-trades may be lacking through fault of training or through limitation of endowment. The individual aspects of the problem must seek illumination in the survey at closer range, and thus form the theme of another story. Yet the purpose sought is clear: to determine early for the youthful career in what class or harness the promising colt is likely to trot. To be a square peg in a round hole is about as unfortunate for the hole as for the peg. The adjustment, I shall presently contend, must be reciprocal; careers are compromises between qualities and circumstances.

Through social authority the shaping of the holes follows the somewhat conventional prescriptions of human institutions; the elasticity of the pegs is limited by natural patterns. The two have evolved together; the determination which shall be the qualities fittest to survive is partly in our own communal hands; and in this responsibility lies my text.

Practically regarded, the urgent desideratum, the vital need, is the diffusion of a proper appreciation of the poietic qualities, of high and low degree; and along with it a generous realization that sound originality is compatible with a very large efficiency. The chroniclers of the small talk of the great dwell solemnly upon the idiosyncrasies of genius. They find something mystically significant or damnatory in the report that Schiller derived inspiration from the odor of decaying apples; or that Wagner loved to pose in fancy dress. People who know little of Kant think of him as an absent-minded

beggar who lost the thread of his discourse when the button on a student's coat — his indispensable fixation point — lost its retaining thread; and those similarly conversant with the personality of Whistler think of him as a testy individual proud of a white lock in his shaggy hair. They know of Coleridge, as of a host of his kind, as those who were as babes in the woods in practical affairs; and they are convinced upon slight evidence that artists are a Bohemian and undependable lot; and that presumably men with unusual ideas pay for the privilege by a lack of common ones. The tendency to flaw in delicately cast natures is part of the hazard for the higher quality. The bow, to carry the arrow farthest, must be stretched to near the breaking point. It may be admitted for earthly "originals," as Mr. Wells does for Utopians, "that the very definition of a poietic class involves a certain abnormality"; that the most vigorous individuals of the

kinetic class "are the most teachable people in the world, and they are generally more moral and more trustworthy than the poietic types. They live, — while the Poietics are always something of experimentalists with life." Yet the admission should not unduly bias the sober social judgment against original or unconventional contributors to the values of life. There is ample reasonable ground between the self-satisfied arrogant scorn of uncommon gifts and the hysterical hero-worship of posing Bohemianism. Doubtless originality with poise is better than originality without it; yet the quality is so precious that we mortals should be grateful to accept it in any guise and on any terms the gods choose to impose. A patient sympathy with its methods, even its vagaries, is the only wise, the only civilized course. There is a note of sadness in the suspicion of so evenly tempered a Poietic as Mr. Howells, that by the great mass of Americans the poet

is regarded as "perhaps a little off, a little funny, a little soft"; and that Mr. Wells should comment: "Fools make researches and wise men exploit them — that is our earthly way of dealing with the subject, and we thank Heaven for an assumed abundance of financially impotent and sufficiently ingenious fools." Possibly Mr. Wendell suggests a true reason for this distorted view of things: "The faults of the upper classes, partly by reason of their very emergence, are often more conspicuous than the virtues; and the virtues of the lower classes, partly by reason of their submergence, often seem more instantly salient than their faults. The bottom of things above you is what meets the eye, whoever or wherever you are, and the top of things below."

Remembering as constantly as we care to, the frailty of genius and pronounced talent, it behooves us equally to remember the much larger class of constructive

intellects, free for the most part from the idiosyncrasies of unorganizable genius, who present in the blend of their qualities a more than ordinary measure of sound judgment, of wise management, of sustaining energy. Versatility is not so rare as this age of specialism is prone to consider it; the muses and graces and virtues form quite a goodly company. The poietics are born into the families of men somewhat like the rest of us, and are not as a rule so niggardly treated by the dispensers of qualities as to leave them with one small unsupported talent. They are willing to live and be judged as men among men. It is, moreover, well to remember that the distrust in question, the disparagement and weak encouragement of the poietic career may lie in the juries and judges and in the institutions which these represent, rather than in the delinquencies of the defendant.

It is instructive to recall that older social systems, regarded by our modern

standards as inherently unsound, yet in the saving graces of their *raison d'être* gave encouragement to qualities and to the arts that arise from them, that now languish or are overpowered by lustier contestants for the energies and the devotions of men; that the glories of cathedrals, the splendor of castles and town-halls, the magnificent appeal of the master's canvas and the sculptor's marble, and the uniform merit and sympathetic workmanship of minor craftsmen organized into powerful guilds, — that these and the institutions of the day, the ordering of life and of its appreciations, all stood in some vital relation to the feudal system, whose privileges and inequalities we are too prone to emphasize, whose achievements to value too slightly.

And again it is well to bear in mind that other commonwealths, with no less a modern spirit than our own, have found worthier honor for their worthier men,

have shown a wiser appreciation of the higher quality than have we.

In so far as the deficient appreciation of poietic qualities is indeed a national trait, it unquestionably has a reason in national conditions, — conditions which placed a special premium upon and peremptorily demanded antagonistic qualities. The insistent demands of new possessions, the vast and rapid transformations of new conditions, have emphasized kinetic qualities on a wholly unprecedented scale, and to the inevitable disparagement of every other quality or even virtue. Life has been lived so breathlessly that the contemplation has been reduced to mere glimpses; we have had to do our reading as we ran, and forsake the privilege of seeing life steadily and seeing it whole. But much of this apology for the unwisdom and the rashness of our esteems has outlived its warrant, outlived it with the receding of the frontier. Or to speak more critically, the

exaltation of more common-place, close-viewed, calculating qualities settled upon the inheritors and later occupants of the possessed land. Frontierdom possessed a romantic admiration of boldness, originality, individuality; it enjoyed an outlook, hewed its own way, permitted itself the luxuries as well as bore the hardships of freedom and adventure. The literature of this realm overflows with admiration of the poietic qualities — and that at times with a superb disdain of constraining proprieties — from Bret Harte to *The Virginian*. It is the complacent bourgeoisie of the plains and the micropolis, and then the purse-proud managerial next generation of the metropolis — and their following politically from henchman to boss, their following industrially from clerk to the captains or despots of industry; it is with them that the one-sided exaltation of narrow quality found its pernicious foothold.

Yet looking forward not backward, it

may be safely maintained that the intellectual conditions for our advance are for the most part equalized with those of the liberal cultures in the old world. The imminent danger, the internal yellow peril, is that the appreciations we have thus developed and trusted, the rewards we have encouraged or permitted under stress and strain of circumstance, the shallow glorification of the immediately practical, will have so warped our instinctive sensibilities and our acquired judging powers as to impede seriously the restoration of a more catholic, indeed a more spiritual perspective, now that the clearing of the promised land invites possession full, free, secure. The motto borne by the great kinetic metropolis, — the determination of Chicago's "I WILL," — at one time sufficient and unquestioned, is to a later generation but a preamble to the naming of the purpose to which the human will-power is to be applied. Whatever that may be, it in-

volves, and particularly so amid the uncharted and complex streams of modern life, the greatest utilization, the most sympathetic appreciation, as well as the devoted support of its poietic men: men who can plan, and foresee, and are not afraid to dream; men moved by principle as well as by practice; men cherishing their individuality, not cowed by convention nor awed by power; men in whom the very nobility and worth of their theories enables them to meet adequately the conditions that confront them.

VII

I FIND yet a word to be said in behalf of the poietic ingredients in the composite qualities of more than ordinary though less than extraordinary men and women, and their encouragement during the poietically favored period of growth. We know the situation familiarly from its favorite selection for the theme of story, drama, or novel. The youth — or, if you prefer, the maiden — of strange parts and vague longing, throbbing with imaginative romancing, finds little sympathy with family or friends, or appreciation by the matter-of-fact people of town or village. Less available and at times less tractable than his brethren, given to dreams and their interpretation, this modern Joseph, in the usual setting, neither reaches high place to the discom-

fiture of his brethren, nor on the other hand is he cast into the pit. He is compassionately looked upon as the weaker vessel, a sort of jug without a handle, to be pitied, endured, but not encouraged by advances, which quite possibly he would resent. Yet occasionally some Pharaoh, not perplexed or grief-stricken but deep-sighted, or some amiable Mecænas of the novelist's creation, or better still in real life, the saving insight of the small minority, eases the path of the poietic youth, and with favoring fortune eventually seats him among the honored.

It is part of the sports of the fates that here, there, and elsewhere, they deposit a sulphitic offspring amid a family brood of sturdy and unsuspecting bromides. In fiction retributive justice is common, possibly because the writers thereof, themselves touched with the poietic strain, use the opportunity to indulge their convictions. Likewise the

stage poietic, though not a matinée idol, makes a general and genuine appeal for the common reason, that the novel-reading and the play-going moods, in their recoil from the routine of a work-a-day world, are sympathetic with the imaginative play of poetic justice. But the actual shapers of fate, the judges on and off the bench, and the juries of the people, — the playgoers in their vocational and social influence — and, most of all, the spirit of the institutions which they have called into being and which they support: these are curiously unappreciative of the worth, the indispensable flame of poietic activity — a steady glow or a fitful spark — that illuminates every progressive calling and career.

To all this there attaches a lesson that may be plainly put: that the poietic callings demand favoring conditions of birth, nourishment and maturity; that to facilitate the growth of such conditions involves the ability to appreciate them;

that the most satisfactory mode of securing alike the inventive quality and its appreciation is that of selection, upon the basis of native sensibility matured by cultivation; that the intellectual and spiritual interests of the nation, equally with its natural resources of forest, mine, and stream, must be conserved and fostered; that in each realm must the interests be intrusted authoritatively to those by quality and fitness endowed to guide them. The gospel has as pertinent an application in academic as in political and commercial circles; it is because the institutions of the higher education may be looked upon as most complex instruments of selection of the higher qualities, that the slightest shortcoming of motive or wisdom in the guidance thereof is fraught with the most serious consequences. For by whatever reckoning of their worth, the Colleges and Universities of the land radiate the largest influence and set the most influ-

ential standards for the most highly selected youth of the land.

The purpose of a college education is by the inspiration of its environment to cultivate in the fittest, the most uplifting appraisal of the qualities of men. In that formative period, the susceptibility to just those influences that grow out of sensibilities and confer the poietic leadership, is at its ripest. The graduate, if the years have brought wisdom, differs most from the matriculate in that he has imbibed or achieved a wholly revised esteem of qualities. To direct that revision to a worthy and enduring consummation is the whole business of the higher education; though the means it creates and utilizes for the purpose engage a many-sided profession.

The unwholesome emphasis of boyish and youthful qualities fostered by the esprit-de-corps of the incidental diversions of college life, swollen by pampering favor and popularity to overshadow

the sterner devotion which they are designed to relieve, — this internal danger has properly engaged the concern of parents and educators alike. But this hypertrophy of a serviceable function is to be looked upon as a symptom of a more extended malady, — one that has invaded many of the vital tissues of the academic organism. The weak insistence on the part of those intrusted with the interests of academic leadership, upon the sound, stern, scholarly, and spiritual appraisal of human quality, is the critical fault; though this in turn may be referred to the complacent surrender of worthier purposes to the democratic insistence of practical demands, born of an impatient short-sightedness and an undisciplined insensibility. If one order of esteem of quality is weakened, another will inevitably take its place. The withdrawal of leadership from one allegiance transfers it to another. If educators shape their esteems to the demands

of those whose appraisals they are to fashion, what more natural than that the transferred leadership will follow its own preferences and grow by what it feeds upon! Nowhere is the tyranny of too conventional standards, the weak esteem of poietic originality, the over-emphasis of practical and narrow utility, a greater and a sadder misfortune than in the formative years of college life. Universities, if they realize their functions, will continue to regard themselves as citadels of resistance, not remote from the demands of a busy competitive life, but defending it against enemies from within as well as invaders from without; protecting it most of all by the higher esteem of the qualities of men which it cultivates, from the most serious internal peril, the shallow and misguided award of popularity and esteem to the qualities glorified in the marts and highways, where motives and measures too readily forsake their finer quality. Because of the inevitable

life-long exposure to the one order of esteem, the resistive value exercised by the conservators of the other is of unique significance. Disloyalty within the academic citadel becomes of profound consequence for the spiritual welfare of the entire community.

VIII

YET wherever human quality is worthily cherished — and no lantern of Diogenes is needed to find it where men most do congregate — the quality of leadership and the loyalty to the higher esteem shines forth as brilliantly as the atmosphere permits, and attracts a following. Such social community of purpose follows upon the sharing of similar ideals, without which the esteem of quality would be dissipated and lost. As we proceed in analysis or insight we appreciate the commanding influence of the collective social approval and ideal; and first of the latter. Life, as practice and precept alike inculcate, is character in action; and all action must be shaped to condition. In part are we masters of our fate, in part are we

creatures of circumstance. The mastery is expressed in the imperative of the ideals under whose standards we are enlisted; for it is our peculiarly human privilege, and our highest, to direct conduct through ideals. In that aspect ideals acquire a very real and practical bearing. They serve to determine in what esteem this quality or that shall be held, and equally what achievements shall occupy the foreground of endeavor; making one age dominantly artistic, another religious, one political and another commercial, one complacent and another revolutionary. Yet before proceeding, it is well in these pragmatic days not to ignore the fact that indirectly the place of ideals in shaping human events has been much questioned. It has been held that outward circumstance directs activity and that the purposes thus indicated, the satisfactions brought about by so much of their accomplishment as falls to one generation, in turn direct the

thoughts of another to the desirability of the extension of such achievement; to which again by this process some sort of ideal is attached, mainly to reinforce what is really practiced for other reasons.

With the pertinence of the pragmatic position within its own field, I should be not at all concerned, did not its temper encourage a jaunty leap from theory to practice with light unconcern. I have no immediate quarrel with the view that proclaims — so far as pragmatism does — that the thoughtless and the thoughtful alike may believe what they choose, naturally at their own risk; that up to a certain point truth is sanctioned by its practical utility, — proving in the long run and often in the short jump its own corrective, — and that beyond this point it is a landscape to be selected, contemplated and interpreted to satisfy our needs. The position is secure so long as the pragmatist contemplates and does not explore. But in the loftier excursions,

where locomotion is difficult and the foothold uncertain, he becomes to me a questionable guide. Ideals, I admit, shed a fitful gleam; but they momentarily dispel the despair of utter gloom and are wonderfully encouraging. I am inclined to agree with Mr. Chesterton, though I cite him with reluctance because of his own incessant quasi-pragmatic town-cry that nothing is true but what sounds untrue: "Pragmatism is a matter of human needs; and one of the first of human needs is to be something more than a pragmatist." I am keenly aware of the dis-service of ideals, of the part they have played in the history of fanaticism, of intolerance, of pseudo-science, as well as of their service in progress and reform. I appreciate more practically how readily in lesser concerns an ideal, like a conscience, may become a troublesome burden. Ideals are often made to work overtime and unseasonably; and ideals unwisely worn often restrict rather than

illuminate the outlook. But to achieve a worthy or serviceable foothold in this tumultuous and competitive world of ours, some decided singleness of purpose and some supporting ideals are alike indispensable. When thus assimilated by a liberal mind, ideals become not a burden to be borne, but part of the strength that carries. And equally should it be conceded that the pragmatic shaping of ideals by circumstance is real and vital; and that the actual incentive to conduct and the formulated grounds of conduct may differ appreciably. Though ready to admit that reasons may mislead and the motives for action remain hidden, I cannot at bottom question the real efficiency of ideals as motive forces: that ideals shape human ends, rough-hew them as experience will. Indeed in this larger sense they grow in the historical and the actual perspective until they take the form of great movements of thought, massive inspirations of action.

Though attached to experience and never effective when detached therefrom, though subject to vagary, they are vital sources of energy. They interpret experience; condition further belief and action; determine sympathies, allegiances, affiliations, careers, and even expenditures and votes; and shape, all unwittingly and imperceptibly, the grosser and the finer contours of our lives. The choice is not between having ideals and dispensing with them, but only towards which set of ideals our allegiance shall extend, with what degree of loyalty or enthusiasm one and another shall be cherished.

And here once more we come upon the great divide, the parting of the waters to east and west, though fed by a common moisture from cloud and hillside. We find the great enduring forces of gravitation that keep men and institutions in their orbit, and opposed thereto the finer energies acting centripetally, that pre-

vent history from repeating itself by shifting as well as by increasing the purposes of men. The one is definitely nameable, is looking securely backward, holding fast to that which is seemingly true; the other is various, experimental, tentatively groping, looking forward and outward, proving all promising things. The former is convention, perhaps not in itself an ideal, but modifying all realizable ideals, and by such condition giving rise to the recurrent problems of compromise; the latter is a progressive, it may be a prophetic ideal reached through invention, hypothesis, imagination, vision, faith, and enlisting in its campaign the budding and the full-blossomed enthusiasms of men. Conservative and liberal, stand-patter and radical, orthodox and heterodox, faithful and heretic, catholic and protestant; contrast them as we may, —these stand to us as tendencies, temperamental predilections in some part, yet potent to shape philosophies and to

leave as their crystallized products, intellectual, moral, æsthetic, religious, social, and political ideals.

The history of convention would be the most encyclopedic of human narratives; the balancing of its books not lightly to be contemplated by any lesser warrant than the combined qualities of Solomon, Job, and Isaiah. But to read the signs of the times as they point to an actual situation, to reach some opinion of its trend, and to throw one's influence on one side of the balance or the other, — this is within the privilege of all. Convention is said to be the fly-wheel society; and the simile is so far apt, that at all events a fly-wheel is about the least suitable object to make an idol of that could be mentioned. Far from being a safe subject for worship, it represents something of a force to be resisted. In the minor offices of life it may be viewed with complacency, even with gratitude; for it is far more important to

get certain things settled than to trouble minutely as to the last detail of correctness of their settlement. I am content that convention has determined in what cut of clothes I shall dine or lecture, and have but a modest interest in the rationale thereof, — and this though I should not choose the garb for portrait or bust. I am not content exactly, but am protestingly resigned to a very large range of other conventions, which I shall with pleasure denounce when occasion is favorable, and otherwise decently observe. And what is indefinitely more important, I avail myself of and submit to convention in the professional and all public attitudes of my work. For every reasonable man whose work is in the world must work through worldly institutions. He must become skillful, and should enjoy becoming so, in adjusting principle to practice, in utilizing the great conventions of civilization.

The danger and the protest come and

come emphatically, when convention too dominatingly, too interferingly tampers with ideals; and this all-inclusive danger is concisely set forth in the masterly handling of the problems of "Compromise" by Mr. John Morley (now Lord Morley). "We do not find out until too late," he admonishes, "that the intellect, too, at least where it is capable of being exercised on the higher objects, has its sensitiveness. It loses its color and potency and finer fragrance in an atmosphere of mean purpose and low conception of the sacredness of fact and reality." Admittedly, the great practical problem to be solved anew by each people, by each generation, by each individual, and almost for each situation, is this of reaching a working and efficient compromise between ideals and such modes of their partial realization as a due regard for convention, and a proper appraisal of the *status quo* make available.

The tendency of men and peoples to

lean upon principle to guide practice, or upon practice to yield its own wisdom, is itself a subtle issue of temperament, rather than logically determined. Emerson said of the English: "They are impious in their skepticism of a theory, but kiss the dust before a fact." Lord Morley accuses his countrymen of the same "profound distrust of all general principles," and of the "most pertinacious measurement of philosophic truths by political tests." Macaulay is reported to have said that he would not lift a hand to get rid of an anomaly that was not also a grievance. This is temperamental pragmatism with indulgence. Yet it saves from excess, and makes for a stolid sanity. It is well marked, though altered, in the devotees of Yankee shrewdness, given to bombastic proclamations, mushroom platforms, and sophomoric debates, yet keenly responsive to ballots and box-receipts and returns; upholding the unalterable sovereignty of constitutional policy, and

questioning its pertinency as between friends. A casual cosmopolitan observer sets down both Frenchmen and Americans as logical. In the pursuit of principles both go to the edge of a precipice; the Frenchman consistently jumps off; the American reflectively retraces his steps. For the moment the fitness to occasion of neither policy is at stake. At bottom the suspicion of principles that have no root in experience is sound, whether expressed in the impropriety of preaching without practicing, or in a personal distaste for the "thin, sour wine of theory," or in the more critical language of philosophy. But the danger of dealing only with grievances and not with anomalies is that the acclimatization to the atmosphere of unreason in which the one thrives, lessens the sensitiveness to the other. Once more it is a question of perspective and occasions, of considering conditions and theories appropriately.

Yet it is but natural that the arts of life

that depend upon constant compromise and the skillful pursuit of expediency tend to dominate and direct the ideals and energies of men. Of these the most widely appealing and persuasive is the art, or shall I say, the game of politics; the attitude of mind resulting from a too narrow absorption in such concerns may be called the political temper. Properly subordinated and coördinated with other interests and other aspects of current problems, the spirit is legitimate, helpful. But politics must not be held as all, and statesmanship as nought. The dominant fallacy of the day and generation, for which Lord Morley's classic essay is the complete refutal, the political idol of the market-place, in Bacon's phrase, is the short-sighted confusion between the sanctions of principle and the sanctions of practice. We carry modes of conduct applicable to the one most disastrously into the domain of the other, and in such misunderstanding "suppose that there

are the same grounds why we should in our own minds acquiesce in second best opinions; why we should mix a little alloy of conventional expression with the too fine ore of conviction; why we should adopt beliefs that we suspect in our hearts to be of more than equivocal authenticity, but into whose antecedents we do not greatly care to inquire, because they stand so well with the general public." The quality of mind that lends itself to this unworthy use is not exclusively an intellectual fault, prone to sophistry, not exclusively an æsthetic coarseness, leaning to Philistinism, but quite intrinsically a moral weakness, reflecting a cheap complacency and a shabby cowardice. The reflection that unfortunately comes only to the few, "counts the cost of keeping peace on earth and a superficial good will among men." It is the value of the larger foresight, of the firmer devotion to conviction, that we are tardily realizing in trying to conserve resources

outrageously wasted in a cruel service of narrow expediency, nursed, fostered, and abetted by the political spirit. It is precisely this higher wisdom, this loyalty to principle that is demanded in developing the intellectual resources of the nation.

Accordingly, while ideals do not create human qualities, they determine what kinds of quality shall develop freely and profusely; they give prominence and effectiveness to one set of qualities and not to their opposites; and thus by moulding public appreciation stamp with approval or neglect the selected qualities of men. In large measure is this accomplished through leadership and the conditions affecting a ready following; and this in turn through the temper of institutions that place in positions of leadership men of one endowment or another. Thus are communities to be judged: by the quality of men they choose for the highest places and the next high; by the encouragement they offer, the provisions

they make for the desirable and the highest ranges of human quality. By our faith in the wisdom of such judgment, whether confident of democracy or looking to a social order yet to be, is the sturdiness of our optimism brought to the test. For the point of consolation lies where Lowell has discerningly placed it. "Now amid all the turmoil and fruitless miscarriage of the world, if there be one thing steadfast and of favorable omen, one thing to make optimism distrust its own distrust, it is the rooted instinct in men to admire what is better and more beautiful than themselves."

IX

THE closer inspection through the analytic glasses of psychology, of the differentiating varieties of human quality and of their functional interplay, falls outside the range of this survey. But no essay in defense of appreciation can afford to omit from its composition some rendering of those larger waves of influence — organic in nature and, as here pertinent, psychological in form — that play upon the institutions of society and shape their finer contours; for to these the disposition of our appreciations is intimately subject. And first of all, the proper esteem of any group of qualities, and particularly of the poietic ones, requires a consideration of the shifting importance of the ranges of quality with the evolution of society. Civilization is artificial and by its artifices

demands and rewards such qualities as best satisfy its constituted and in large measure unnatural requirements. The qualities of greatest avail in one situation prove relatively profitless in another. The situations, though at once limited and fostered by the natural qualities of men, are dominantly imposed upon them, are artificial by reason of their reconstructed emphasis of quality. The inability to conform to that radical readjustment marks primitive races for extermination when overtaken and dispossessed by the relentless régime of civilization. Such transformation of quality and standard and employment is, rightly or wrongly, the inevitable, if self-imposed white man's burden. When confronted by its resistless advances, the heirs of primitive conditions, like our red-skinned Americans, retire displaced ; or in parallel situations, the new assimilation forms a serious race problem, in which the conflict of qualities and the standards they set is an

essential though not the exclusive difficulty.

In the further consideration of this selective influence of an artificial environment, two principles appeal to our practical interests. The first is the recognition of how largely we live on and by the upper ranges of our quality ; how largely this circumstance shapes careers and the awards of competition, and once more throws the emphasis upon the due appraisal of the higher quality. Stated in terms of vocations, it means that a higher differs from a lower vocation by its larger demands of a nicer fitness of quality to occupation. Stated in terms of standards, it means that a lowering of requirement or distorted distribution of award, will more intimately and more disastrously affect the highly differentiated orders of ability than those of simpler, less exacting employment. Specialization is itself an eloquent witness of this many-sided truth ; for it is but the direction of talents

pointedly to a group of interests, raised to importance by social needs, made attractive by social encouragement of service and reward. The talents in question, judged in terms of their value for a less evolved situation, might be quite incidental in import and most limited in application. The qualities thus made conspicuous by the social reconstruction are doubtless derivatives of qualities inherent in human nature, fostered in some simpler and different relation, in natural social environments. In this process of derivation, of overlaying primitive quality with an envelope of civilized accretion, lies the problem of analysis, — of detecting the earlier nature in the later growth, the seed in the fruit. Yet it is this expansion and specialized nurture of qualities — derivative, incidental, adventitious in terms of an older set of values — that gives them their high rating; in them rather than in their remote, closer-to-nature antecedents, do we live and move and have

our modern being. And this applies equally to our sensibilities, our morals, our intelligence, our social intercourse, and our commercial transactions. As we conform to more complex standards in any of these relations, we lean more heavily upon the higher, more specially derivative qualities; we come to live more and more on the finer issues, the latest evolved fruition of our endowment. Such is the transformation effected by civilization, to whose social dominion, while yet we reserve the privilege of individual protest, we must perforce conform and therein find our place. The dangers of the highly refined, highly specialized life are as real as its gains. They consist in the neglect or weak esteem of the underlying simpler virtues, of the homely, fundamental, supporting qualities, which are something more than the scaffolding to higher achievements, by the same token by which man and society are something more than an artificial construction: be-

cause the structure involved is organic and resents a too radical departure from its set patterns. Civilization may disguise vices as well as transform worthy qualities; such is ever the hazard of the higher endeavor. There is also a differently conditioned hazard, upon which from another approach attention was directed: that of pronounced and unyielding eccentricity. For all marked variation in a specific direction carries the resulting contours somewhat off their normal centre. In fixing the esteem of human qualities as in appraising human nature, it is indispensable to appreciate how effectively the demands of civilization transfer the emphasis to the upper ranges as well as to the transformed derivatives of quality, and away from their primitive significance. True, the motives of the earlier patterns remain and may in part be traced by the keen psychologist, though they have all but disappeared from the consciousness of their practitioners. It is

these relations that occupy the background and justify the perspective of the present essay.

The second principle follows as a corollary. With the more sensitive adjustment of quality to environment under the stress of the complexities of modern life, a slight change in standards affects the apportionment of success, brings to the foreground, to the high places and the next high, this or that group of qualities and the men who possess them. Stated bluntly and in terms of practical success, a man may be prone to fail because he is not quite good enough, or because he is just too good for his job; either because his proficiencies are not adequate to the standards set, or because they are adjusted to a more favorable setting than obtains, and cannot acquire the cruder momentum or adjust themselves to the coarser employment demanded.[1] It

[1] It is hardly pertinent to dwell upon nor yet wholly to overlook the ethical and æsthetic phrasing

would be futile and foolish, insincerely or uncritically to have recourse to this very real cause as an excuse for personal deficiency; and adaptability itself is a prized and practical quality of the type rightly and duly enforced by practical-minded communities. But the proper use of this principle is helpful; and that in slight contrasts of situation as well as in great ones. Consider the social, intellectual, commercial, and cultural contrasts of the cities of the Atlantic seaboard and those of the Great Lakes and the Mississippi Valley, as they present themselves to a cosmopolitan observer; how negligible they appear in every generous rating that confines itself to the larger factors,

of this alternative, which reads: that one may succeed because he is strong enough or weak enough for his job; because he is sensitively responsive or placidly callous to his environment; because he is steadfast and true to principle, or because he is complacent and temporizing. In these aspects as well, society is responsible for the adjustment of awards to qualities, and is in turn judged by the judicial standards it enforces.

to the essential determinants of the settings of life. And yet such admittedly minor differences may readily become decisive in according a moderate or a high or the highest favors, the fair or the fairest places and reputations; they are daily considered, affect the choice of residence, the careers and migrations of men. The very qualities most directly contributory to high success in the encouragement of the one sympathetic *milieu* may in the less hospitable disposition of the other retire to a career of meagre satisfaction. So decidedly do the creatures of man-made cities live and prosper on the upper ranges of their qualities; so naturally are they sensitive to and shaped by the favoring dispositions of their artificial environments.

Even with most imperfect knowledge of what may be the fundamental factors in human nature, we may quite definitely and practically appreciate their bearing upon the qualities of men which to-day

compete in the artificial arenas of society. In this view civilization becomes nothing else than a transformation of the perspective of human qualities; bringing some to high places, retiring others, yet ever building upon the motives and needs sanctioned by nature, shaping its products with the grain — not too brusquely, at all events, against the grain — of the natural ore. Though our civilization is thus carried along by evolutionary forces more massive and influential than human intervention, it yet remains true that in the strata in which we live, whose contours determine our outlook, the decisive forces are due in large measure to the preferential selection of collective and individual ideals; and the direction of these motives, I have tried particularly to enforce, places a peculiar value upon the higher ranges, the latest contributed contours of the social structure. It is in these characteristically that we live and move and have our being. Such is the law of

our social psychology as of our material economics.

Society indeed artificially encourages these finer differences to mark off the significant qualities of men, and supplies some outward indication of their presence, — inevitably introducing barriers along with accessible gradations in a consistent effort at once to secure the benefit and avoid the disservice of both democratic and aristocratic ideals. A conspicuous issue of this decisive status of the minor differentiations of men is the slight barrier that is sufficient to create misunderstanding and thwart useful assimilation. The fact that in spite of so much community of the fundamental, the accessory, and the yet more derivative traits, English and French, or English and German, or English and American, are so instantly and persistently impressed with their differences, demonstrates how markedly men live and judge by the finer shadings of their national

color-schemes. Indeed, Mr. Kipling regards the assimilation of a high-class American to high-grade English surroundings as so unattainable as to call the attempt the story of "An Experiment in the Fourth Dimension." And within our own vast and yet efficiently assimilated domain, Northerner and Southerner, Easterner and Westerner, profession and trade, urban and rustic, mass and class, are acutely conscious of their differentiations. The law of social specialization obtains; it presents the minor yet real danger of raising fences and promoting feuds; it performs the larger service of perfecting and developing the social value of the higher ranges of the qualities of men.

X

THE assignment of cause and effect in the larger movements of general ideas, particularly under the characteristic dominance of social forces in a concrete setting, can never be simple. The direction of progress is not in a straight line, but inclines to an ascending spiral; the encouragement of a partial achievement strengthens the favoring factors of circumstance; and their increased efficiency induces further achievement of the same order. Ideals guide achievement; but achievement equally vitalizes ideals; each grows in the sympathetic medium supplied by the other. Stated abstractly, it is not very clear how either gets a foothold or matures to independent stature. The dilemma recalls the Hibernian demonstration of the impossibility of

constructing an underground tunnel: the excavation requires the presence of the scaffold-arch which supports the opening until the masonry is set; and to find a place for this arch necessitates a prepared excavation for it. Yet by modest advances each step is accommodated to the exigencies of the other; and however paradoxically, tunnels are built, and however wanting in strict logical procedure, intellectual movements are advanced.

In its bearing upon the pertinence of the pragmatist's position, the relation has been touched upon; an indisputable fact of observation is involved. It may be illustrated in a concrete setting, which is indispensable to convey its practical meaning. As others see us, and as we can hardly avoid seeing ourselves, the characteristic of the American man's mechanical equation is its restless energy, its push or hustle. In so far as hustling brings results, it gives the incentive to

still more vigorous hustling. At the same time, those complex ingredients in the situation that made hustling successful to begin with are encouraged, and in turn reward more amply the strenuosity of its devotees. Presently, hustling is a standard, a social ideal ; and the man of sober pace is looked upon as a weaker or a wayward straggler. The neglect of this reciprocal relation is at once a psychological fault and a practical error. It is inherent in the psychology of advertising, which proceeds by an appeal to the varied qualities of men. That the qualities appealed to are but in small measure fixed by human nature is sufficiently clear ; custom, morals, prejudice, fashion, above all social and national standards enter into the composite appeal. The bid for commercial favor that attracts one class repels another, or that works well in the United States fails in England ; automobiles and biscuits ; pianos and stocks ; soaps and rifles, cannot

have their excellencies set forth in the same way. That is clear and recognized; but what is less clear is that the susceptibility to an advertising appeal is at once facilitated by the accepted achievements of publicity, and favors the extension of its service. This factor introduces a precarious element; the susceptibility concerned may be checked by a change of ideal. It might become bad form to have an advertised article in the household; and with a larger pride in independence of action, the too familiarly presuming advertisement to which our complacency surrenders, might offend our self-esteem. Public sentiment might be so aroused to the æsthetic outrage involved that the enterprise that disfigures places of natural beauty would bring about a boycott rather than an extension of custom.

The principle in question has other aspects. Employment follows the clue of quality. Individually each likes to do

what he can do well; the possession of skill leads to its exercise, and the exercise develops skill. Communities are similarly affected and introduce the most influential — and it may be the most disturbing — factor in the social sanction or approval. The economic determination is of an allied nature but more direct and commanding in action. Each productive area develops — though not free from accidental and artificial encouragement — the industries best suited to its resources. Yet once more, ideals enter to determine fashions and use, which affect the demand, that affects the supply, that affects the production, that affects the prosperity, that affects the ideals; and thus repeats, House-that-Jack-built-wise, the circle, or more accurately (because the modes of influence are so various), the irregularly advancing spiral of cause and effect. The favoring influence of the environment in intellectual affairs acts similarly though covertly. The satisfac-

tions sought are analogous, the modes of finding them distinct. In a decline of demand, the economic community turns to a changed output; in an unpromising environment, the possessor of a specialized quality seeks a more favorable *milieu*. The more highly specialized, the more marked the poietic dependence, the greater the sensitiveness to the help or hindrance of the environment. In this aspect what has been said of Boston — that it is not a city but a state of mind — is true of every environment; for the purposes of the census enumeration, it is a material collection of habitations and institutions for the shelter of the hives and homes of men; for the purposes of a cultural appraisal, it is a complex embodiment of thus encouraging, thus indifferent, and thus inhospitable appeals to the diverse qualities of the dwellers therein.

Incidentally, yet by no means negligibly, the warmth of the hospitality extended to one or another selected order

of human quality affects intimately the flavor and the yield of the output. Adjustment is the law of organic life whether lowly or complex. The sense of intellectual adjustment brings the contentment of coming to one's own, of finding one's place, which is again a distinctive achievement in life, directed by the sensibilities. The finding thereof is traditionally and socially, as well as temperamentally and vocationally directed. The national bent finds ready expression in idiomatic coloring: the German seeks an environment that is *gemüthlich;* the Italian, if you appreciate the setting that appeals to him, finds you *simpatico;* the French demands and responds to the *esprit* in every situation; the Anglo-Saxon retires to the snug and cosy privacy of his *home.* The adjusted organism finds positive contentment, and negatively — in obedience to the law of the acuter consciousness of displeasure — finds relief from the constant irritants of an uncon-

genial environment that sours dispositions and dissipates energy. The artist insists upon finding his *milieu* somewhere and somehow: theoretically, by virtue of inner quality and acquired skill, he should work as well in Chicago as in Paris; actually, the inspiration of Paris abides with him in Chicago; and the artistic migration between the two cities is as yet in the one direction only. In brief, the higher quality requires the nicer adjustment, remains more acutely sensitive to the meteorology of the social climate. You cannot command a man to write a poem as you would to dig a ditch.

The actual presence of irritations impedes activity more disastrously than the mere absence of mild encouragements suggests; and whatever does not make for adjustment makes against it. Naturally a reasonable vigor and self-confidence rise superior to circumstance; and the story of neglected genius in a garret has real pertinence quite apart from its

dramatic convenience. But in the affairs of men the average and the fair minority count; the cumulative force of environmental factors remains ever impressive. Untoward environments are unfair odds against any pursuit; and environments will ever be sought for their favoring nurture of cherished qualities, for their ability to supply the contented adjustment that brings inherently promising seed to fine flower and fruit. That, with changing emphasis under varying ideals and circumstances, is what Athens or Rome or Paris or London have meant or now mean; what New York or Boston, Chicago or San Francisco assert; what Oxford or Cambridge, Harvard or Yale cultivate; what democracy or aristocracy, science or religion, conservatism or socialism include within their distinctive, yet commonly inspired ideals.

Before dismissing this notable principle of interaction of purpose and condition, a beneficent aspect of the suscep-

tibility of ideal to bend to circumstance, and of circumstance to yield to the shaping nurture of ideals, may be touched upon. Nature supplies the varied qualities of men; nurture selects and develops their employment, giving prominence to favored groups, — in one setting to the artistic, in another to the mechanically inventive, in one to the philosophical, in another to the political; and so on in manifold combination. All the several factors are constantly present in every complex society; what varies is the prominence of one or the other. The quicker changes of fashion show the process at work more convincingly than the slower evolutions by which we measure the larger onward movements of culture. A peculiarly interesting illustration of such preferential selection is the effect of the ideals developed by men in regard to the desirable qualities of women. From the harem to collegiate coeducation seems an impossible contrast

to have been bridged by slow, irregular, and halting advances. What it really proves is the plasticity of quality — shared by women and men alike, though perhaps not equally — which permitted the opening of the buds when the climate softened and the gardener withdrew his nipping disfavor; what it still leaves in doubt are the intrinsic capacities of those powers when freed from restraining impediment, when equalized (so far as they may be) with the favoring encouragements of the masculine career. These slower, longer, deeper changes are too involved to yield a ready index of efficiency of any designated factor; but it is unmistakable that gradual reform of ideal has brought the qualities suited to each stage of growth to the foreground, selecting and strengthening at once. The unrest, suggestive of ill-adjustment, that inspired reform, gave it headway. The removal of social disfavor anent the higher education for women brings the

academically trained woman into prominence, encourages the qualities and aspirations needed for active participation in intellectual interests. The responsiveness of women to a shifting environment merits special consideration by virtue of their distinctive and restricted share in the shaping of the ideals which in turn they are to satisfy.

In the more capricious domain of fashion, the movement is brisker and more discernible. When men idealized a type, delicate, frail, prone to tears and swoons, shocked at the least invasion of propriety, sheltered from direct contact with worldly crudities, compromised in every innocent expression of candor, the type seems to have been prominent and popular. With the favoring of the robust, athletic, confident, even domineering young woman of the day, this type was in turn selected and developed. It is even reported that when society prefers its belles to be tall or dark, or in turn of

fashion, casts its favor upon the blondes or the petites, the prominent débutantes of the season complacently assume the preferred graces of complexion and stature. The significance of preferential selection remains; it does not create, but it gives prominence to selected qualities. The beneficent character of such plasticity is two-fold. It gives play to a range of quality, favors versatility, prevents too rigid a set of character, mitigates the fatality of misapplied favor, facilitates reform, and gives the needed touch of optimism to those with faith in the future of human nature and human institutions. Secondly it gives special value to those slighter advances which alone one generation, even one voice furthers. Though we consider forests, what we plant or help to mature are the individual trees in our modest and limited nurseries. Whether men of high inclination and rare quality will make good or yield to importunity, the drift of fav-

oring influence determines; or as the observant Mr. E. S. Martin observes: "Many men to whom high thinking might have been possible, have suffered an aversion to plain living to turn their intellectual energies into more commonplace channels." Particularly is this true of the direction of ideals by the leaders of men. Here, as Lord Morley contends, the matter of real importance "is the mind and attitude not of the ordinary man, but of those who should be extraordinary. The decisive sign of the elevation of a nation's life is to be sought amongst those who lead or ought to lead."

These comments suggest the yet more direct applications of the standards of award to the qualities of merit, which are to be the theme of the concluding considerations. Yet the pointedness at this juncture of the moral of the tale will excuse a slight anticipation and a modest repetition. Applying these conclusions to the distribution of ability, particularly

of its higher, more readily blighted varieties, it follows with fair presumption that for every case of marked success, there must be many more competitors of quite equal capacity whom the discouragement of circumstance, or the distraction of interests, or the ill-adjustment of appraisal, has deprived of a like measure of reward. In a later context I speak of this doctrine as the recognition of the "mute and inglorious Miltons"; and to forestall abuse, I have issued the warning that this principle is not to be used to console failure by assuming unrecognized merit; it may well be used to check self-esteem and prevent too ready assumption of high quality through the success of circumstance. But its chief pertinence consists in the plea, which it shelters, that the qualities of men have in one, though but one, aspect of their appraisal, the right to be judged in reasonable independence of the uncertain issues of achievement. This is what is meant by

being critical; not to disdain popular approval, but to value it at its true worth; not to confuse being conspicuous with being able. It follows that in every realizable social system, men of very unequal quality will hold like positions; and again, that men of very equal qualities will hold vastly different positions. So once more, we return to the consideration that is at once the conclusion and the plea of our premises: that the institutions of society are to be judged by their fitness to place the right men in the right places; that a decisive circumstance in this adjustment is the manner of exercise of the aristocratic wisdom that throws the largest reponsibility upon those most capable of critical judgment. The mute and inglorious Miltons will continue to be present in our midst, awaiting their discoverers or their patrons, or yet more favorably, the transforming social appreciation, that will relieve them of their muteness and modestly assign them recognition.

XI

It is only in Utopia that condition is so nicely fitted to merit that success becomes of itself significant. A mundane people must first itself be judged before approving the type of men to whom it awards success. It is not only conceivable but, I fear, demonstrable, that a people can legislate mediocrity into power, and make shallow expediency effective, while yet they ignore the wiser ones in their midst and place obstacles in the path of the more discerning. There is indeed no more abused word in all language than this fetich-monster, Success, unless it be the object of its prey, Human Nature. Surely for a psychologist to question the validity of human nature and its comprehensive law-abiding character would be to argue himself

out of a profession; but the notions, tendencies, and traits ascribed to it by press and people and Mother Grundy make of it not a principle nor a category but a waste-basket. It is the nature of some humans not to pay their debts; it is the nature of others not to feel comfortable so long as they have any debts. It is the nature of students to exhibit their legitimized follies where all the world and his sweetheart may hear and see; it is the nature of their contemporaries more soberly occupied to keep their indiscretions as private as possible. It is the nature of some portions of the amphibious public to eat and drink and buy what the didactic counsel of the street-cars advises; it is the nature of others to look with extreme suspicion upon any article that is extensively advertised. It is the nature of janitors, hotel clerks, and railway officials to be supercilious and superior; and it seems the nature of the perfect American to put up with it. I

have yet to learn of any wisdom or folly, virtue or foible, habit, usage, prejudice, or predilection, that is not ascribed by somebody to human nature. Assuredly, the underlying make-up, the basal temperaments, the primeval instincts and impulses are bred in the bone and show through the *tout ensemble.* But what we look upon in the flesh-and-blood-covered body, and still more significantly in the conventionally clothed, adorned, tailor-made, civilized man or woman is not an anatomical specimen. Indisputably potent as human nature is and will ever be, the variations played upon this primitive theme by civilizations, and the revolutionary as well as evolutionary transformations it effects, make impossible any ready determination or enumeration of the humanly natural traits. And for the most part the aspects of things which we observe about us, and then in turn those aspects thereof for which we have a considerable responsibility, are due far more

to what our complacency permits, our beliefs approve, our efforts support, our ideals sanction, than to the sheltered kernel of our common nature. The problem is again to render unto the earthly and temporal Cæsar what is Cæsar's, and not to ascribe to an inscrutable agency, what the temporal cannot account for or does not care to assume.

And similarly of success; there are as many varieties as of human nature, and some of them quite as superficially significant. Material success and tangible reward, and the tallies of crops, we may leave to the estimable if dismal science of statistics. But the adjustment of social approval to social forces and conditions must affect and be affected by just these variable, educable, appraisable qualities — this interplay of ideals, purposes, endowments, and fortunes — whose interactions we are setting before us. And to the reflective and responsible, the question is never narrowly what does

succeed, where the pomp and glitter, but critically what should succeed, where the laurel and the palm, from whom the stamp of approval. The French, with a nicer sense of the fitness of term and situation, have the redeeming phrase, *succès d'estime*, which hits a very pivotal nail precisely on the head. Loftiness of aim is in itself an inviolable factor of success, though vagueness, inconsequence, impracticability, lack of tact and poise quickly neutralize its worth. Lowness of aim is yet more reprehensible than absence of capacity, as a cause of common failure. Success as we witness or experience it should please and be cherished; but it should not dazzle and confuse. Homely thrift triumphant and prodigal wile baffled will do well enough for melodrama; but the complexity of actual relations at once commands circumspection and gives to esteem a deeper value. Life is not simple, and for us and those like us to come, will never be so. The

insistence that it is so, is but a mark of our insensitiveness or of our other limitations. For those who have faith in the worth of the higher ranges of human quality, the simple life and the life strenuous present the most misleading of all ideals. For such, neither the simplicity of the tread-mill nor the strenuosity of the pile-driver offers a worthy model for human endeavor.

It is probably not accidental that in the early days of this commonwealth — whose totem is the far-sighted eagle — we should have in our practical and proverbial philosophy focussed our vision at short range — penny wise and pound foolish. Poor Richard's Almanac scattered broadcast an amount of ostrich-like sapience, which even the transcendentalism of an Emerson failed to retire. To promise not wisdom alone but health and happiness in addition as the reward for so simple a device as setting an alarm clock upon unfinished slumbers, is a bit

of vapid sententiousness, which, along with a goodly company of similar saws, inculcates as a complete philosophy, industry, thrift, temperance, prudence, and the bourgeois virtues; all this sign-painter's appreciation of the arts of life produces a wholly misleading simplification of the world in which we live, indeed, of any endurable world in which life would be worth living. Yet in fairness and in gratitude let it be added that this "age of innocence" doctrine is rapidly disappearing. It survives in copy-book maxims, in the inconsequential hortatory appeals of the baccalaureate address, and in the confessions of genial plutocrats in the columns of the popular press.

And thus, however regretfully, let us discard any illusion of a golden age, and equally free ourselves from the dissembling atmosphere of convention. Let us view human nature understandingly, judge success critically, and appraise quality worthily, not superstitiously —

which in Lowell's definition is "the habit of respecting what we are told to respect rather than what is respectable in itself." When so judged, the common and constant standards prove once more to be the qualities of men, but qualities set in circumstance, and reflecting the varying approval of ideals. Without losing their logical perspective, cause and effect shift and interact, making success equally a measure of the efficiency of personal quality when adjusted to circumstance, and a criterion of the conditions under which quality must develop. As a society, as a nation, as a community, as members of institutions — all highly complex, elaborately artificial, deeply historical, and yet consistently human — we are not passive spectators of our own evolution, but active determining participants; we award even as we compete, — are judge, and jury, and contestants in turn. Out of this relation emerges, though at times uncertainly, the categorical im-

perative of the ideal, that checks the hand turning to grasp the prize of unworthy success, or inspires in protest or appeal the voice of the critic, the reformer, the poet, the philanthropist. More subtly, yet no less effectively, the same motive force, though much involved with other considerations, determines the trend of opinion, the balance of votes, the push of influence, that gives vitality to the better or to the worse cause. For it is not so much the sophistry of the intellect as it is the flabbiness of purpose and the callousness of the sensibilities, that interferes with the assertiveness of the higher aims and of the nobler qualities of men. It is as critics of our own success that we are best judged. In that judgment there is a failure that is worthy and a success that is base. The *succès d'estime* becomes the court of last appeal; and the traits which are selected to qualify for a place in that body, become the truest test of the purposes of a community. So long

as Utopia remains an ideal, we shall be wasteful, and what is worst and saddest, wasteful of just what is most precious, — the unusual, poietic qualities of men. It seems at times as though in our perversity or our ignorance, or in our immersion in other affairs, we set in operation a vast educational machinery, in the hope thus to foster qualities, which we then weakly encourage or forcibly retire in favor of others that maintain themselves apart from the very institutions to which we point as our contribution to ideals. And because of this it is necessary from time to time to review our status; for discussion, like confession, is said to be good for the soul. It will be so if the searching it involves sharpens insight, and quickens resolve. If in any measure the consideration of human quality will have aided the substitution of criticism for complacency, of weighing for counting; if it makes less easy the impressiveness of glitter, and more ac-

cessible the practice of discrimination, it will have practically furthered the worthier service of the qualities of men. It will also have inculcated the obligation of endeavor as well as of insight. Of cultural no less than of familiar practical concerns is it conspicuously true that things do not get better of themselves. "The improvement of the community depends not merely on the elevation of its maxims but on the quickening of its sensibility."

XII

By way of refrain, I propose to rehearse the themes of the several movements of this expansive opus. First, last, and throughout, runs the theme that sensibility makes the man. It is the hub of the wheel into which the several spokes of our capabilities and interests are set; together they make possible the encompassing conduct and achievement, the rim upon which we travel — child, youth and man — through our uncertain and irregular journey. Commanding in the æsthetic nature, the sensibilities are no less determinant in the intellectual, the moral, the social, and the practical phases of our activity. I set the theme dominantly in the æsthetic key, but expanded it by variations in the related ones of thought and conduct. I am persuaded

that the theme is appropriate to all its settings; that despite the possible confusion of outer show and inner worth, much of morality is alike æsthetic, and fastidiousness a helpful companion to virtue; that the finer edge of capacity and insight is acquired through the support of sensibilities.

While mindful of the dangers of over-refinement and the enfeebling of energy by hesitation of scruple or shock, the more immanent peril lies in a crude sensationalism, in the insensitiveness that takes to strong stimulants, and bully-like overrides what it cannot appreciate. Yet the common form of the difficulty is that of an unwise neglect of the gifts of sensibility in favor of the more tractable, the more tangible acquisitions, — of fashioning our educative principles and procedures upon the offsets and complements to sensibility, to the detriment of the social tone and ideals of the people. The issues of personality, reflected in the

manners, traditions, customs, and environment that jointly contribute to the standard of living, are the only means as yet discovered that will intimately educate; for they are education personally embodied and conducted. The arts that our college students need most to acquire in order to emerge as cultivated men and women are not altogether included in the curriculum; nor need they be so, if only the atmosphere to which the novitiates are exposed, while so much of the curriculum is administered as each is fitted to imbibe, gives the proper inspiration for right living. The admixture of sensibility with training and capacity makes a marvelous instrument, and by infusing mediocrity or patient drudgery with the power of appreciation, brings it within the range of invention, criticism, and the higher quality.

With this interlude, I repeated the theme in the intellectual key and illustrated how stupidity is not so character-

istically lack of logical capacity — of which despite democratic schooling there remains a sufficient supply — as it is deficiency of observation or responsiveness, combined with inertia. And I established the reasonableness of my plea by introducing into the concluding chord, the convincing admission that there were doggedly practical affairs in life demanding only practical qualities, — skill, training, poise, clear-sightedness. Thus the toilers and spinners were reconciled to the lilies of the field.

The second movement, *più allegro*, introduced the complexity of the temperaments, the blendings of traits ; and yet sought for unity, for some principles of composition whereby to separate the higher from the lower, or at least distantly to follow the natural boundaries of human quality. We found confusion, owing mostly to the disturbing masquerading bent of Dame Fortune, to the uncertainties of fate, the conventions of in-

stitutions, the distortions of circumstance. Executing a flourish of fancy, we drifted Utopia-ward, and with Mr. Wells as guide, found profit in our excursion upon return to earth. With the usual experience of travelers, we found near at home the analogues of our discoveries abroad; and in the distinctions approximated by such classic terms as Athenian and Bœotian, or such engaging parodies as Bromide and Sulphite, found food for thought. With these as stepping stones, we made our way to other aspects of human condition, and first to the incompatibilities of one order of quality with another. These are as likely to be overlooked as exaggerated. Versatility is itself a desirable and generously distributed quality. Yet the incompatibilities are real and to be reckoned with. They bring no ready consolation. The determining bases of quality seem so largely dowers of birth, as to make efforts to attain them proportionately futile. Hence,

incidentally, the tribute to quality in the outward assumption of its manner, and the confusion of sham and glitter and the penetration thereof by the discerning. But truth and consolation come with the response that while the sensibilities determine our ability to acquire taste, they do not determine what manner of taste we so acquire. Education and the influence of environment do not lack for occupation. Next in our path lay the special avenues of capacity, and most to be emphasized, the conventional and unconventional drifts of endeavor. I here indulged in an intermezzo, closely related to the main motif, a plea for a more appreciative rating of the poietic temperament, potent to save and redeem mankind. And thus pleading—a plea that is intended to haunt the memory when all other phrases have faded — I found myself anticipating and gliding into the theme of the succeeding movement, — which is, that life is charac-

ter in action: that however moulded by circumstance, we yet remain individually, and above all in our social solidarity, master-moulders of our fate.

Yet before yielding to the transition, I claimed attention in behalf of certain derivative issues of quality, which the psychology embodied in a complex and sophisticated world interestingly reflects. The values of the several qualities, set by nature and enforced by nurture, change with the favoring environment. Sensibility is retained, but is so overlaid with convention, so transformed by circumstance, so redirected by ideals, and so reconstructed by institutions, that the earlier interpretations require liberal transcription. The qualities are much the same, the modes of their excitation and expression notably different. As appears later, in this combined natural and nurtural situation, the determining status of one's quality is measured by the affiliation with the finer or the coarser, the one

type or the other of a common quality, and by the sturdiness of the temperament to withstand, while yet it is responsive to the social sanction. The most decisive change is the transformation of primitive traits in the altered perspective of civilization, the overlaying of the fundamental impulses by an envelope of acquired readjustment; and in this comprehensive evolution the change of emphasis is consistently upon the upper ranges, the refined differentia of human qualities. Slight though these differences of quality and circumstance are in a generous rating of values, they more consciously affect preferences and careers, because it is at the level at which they contribute their influence, that the efficient life of the day is lived.

Equally though differently pertinent is the more directive influence of quality or environment in cultural evolution, as in turn each becomes cause and effect; as each furnishes the favoring medium for

the other. The complexity of the advance suggests graphically an ascending spiral, in following which the sense of direction is easily confused. Concrete illustrations prove helpful; and such varied interests of the day and hour as push and advertising, supply and demand, vocations and the esprit of communities and peoples, the responsiveness of the qualities of women to the ideals of men, were drawn upon with impressionistic effect. A more serious refrain was added, pointing the moral of responsibility to the practical adornments of the tale,— then developed to meet its consummating phase.

The completing phase of the movement opened upon the sea of circumstance, with the human qualities in their frail bark tossing upon it. The ports however are of human construction and location; and we reach them through ideals. All depends upon the captain's sagacity and nobility of purpose as well as upon his practical seamanship. Once more we

lean upon the poietic qualities of the leaders of men. Convention persists as a fundamental limitation, in its embodiment in institutions at once a force to be utilized and to be resisted. Pilotage, though true to the compass, becomes an art of compromise. The captain yields to wind and weather if need be, yet is ever alert to make these serve his charted purpose. He does not drift, nor tack to every political gust; he has a plan, a purpose, and follows it; he is ready to face opposition, to quell mutiny if he must. His captaincy is the warrant for the qualities of leadership.

Nearing shore in quieter waters, we surveyed the human fleet contemplatively riding at anchor, and considered what forces make the captains of men. Human responsibility is great, and in the manner of its assumption are tested the qualities of nations. We may shirk it by ascribing, in ignorance or fatalism, our own deficiencies to human nature. We may show

ourselves unworthy of it by making an idol of success erected upon a pedestal of convention, and renounce the specifically human privilege of following the higher or the lower illumination, the deeper and larger experience or the narrower expediency; and by such following give effective sanction to the worthier or the less worthy qualities of men.

XIII

It may appear that the promise to carry the purpose of this essay dominantly in the practical vein has been too lightly or too liberally construed. If the argument of the work holds good, such is not the case. The bonds that join theory and practice are subject to the complications of the higher quality. As we leave the simpler situations, finer distinctions grow in significance. Longer-range skirmishes in the territory of theory are necessary to safeguard the advances of practice. Yet with the outlook secured, reconnoitring for occupation becomes a practical concern. It is peculiarly appropriate as the concluding procedure.

Leadership and a following are indispensable to practical steps, as likewise they have been found characteristic of

the two divergent orders of human quality. The practical problems of society radiate from the central purpose of human institutions, to secure the fairest favor for the worthiest qualities of men. In whatever measure or manner we fail to rest leadership with the more worthily responsible, we place it in the hands of the less responsible. At bottom there is no scrupled objection — only a Philistine protest — against privileged classes. We may confidently trust the democratic sentiment of Lowell that "the highest privilege to which the majority of mankind can aspire, is that of being governed by those wiser than they." It is the false warrant of privilege that has aroused the indignations and the revolutions of reformers and their following. The privileges which wise provisions aim to confer upon men of wisdom, if thwarted in purpose, will inevitably be assumed by men of another stamp. Thus every society finds its equation in the values it

assigns to the factors whose interactions have been surveyed; and expresses the result practically in its selection of leaders of men.

The consequences of the complex preferences thus exercised, though seemingly remote, are practical, even intimately so. Every society has its prejudices and its predilections. They are by no means unreasonable, and for the most part are consistently related to the more consciously entertained principles of its creeds and platforms. Certain idols of the times have supplied motives to the interludes of protest and appeal, which fell to a writer's privilege. They served as illustrations to adorn the tale. They are of yet greater service in pointing a moral.

Among the unexpected side-issues of democracy is complacency, on the whole an optimistically tempered, self-satisfied good-will, that goes far to justify itself by its solvent virtues. Its practical dis-

service lies in its undue tolerance of dissent, its too slighting regard for the reformer's part. It is true that the by no means gentle art of "muck-raking" has sprung quickly into favor; but with a more habitual, critical outlook and a less complacent tolerance of minor infringements, there would have been less occasion for this unsavory occupation. The refusal of the remedies offered by the small voice of sensibility has compelled resort to a harsh-toned sensationalism. In such an intellectual climate the reformer's lot is not a happy one. Peculiarly timely protests may chance to be well received; but the approval that goes out to the stickler for his rights — like the virtuous glow of duty nobly done that rewards the writers of protesting letters to the "London Times" — is decidedly paled on this side of the Atlantic. "Life is short; missionaries do not pass for a very agreeable class, nor martyrs for a very sensible class," as Lord Mor-

ley finds occasion to remark. To become a "kicker" or a "knocker" is to join the most unpopular of American orders. Quite apart from the silly boasting, and the ostrich-like disregard of danger and obstacles, and the Bœotian spread-eagleism that all recognize no wrong, and jointly warrant the occasional caricatures of our true qualities in foreign estimation, there is displayed on the part of those unaffected by these obvious foibles, a very unfair suspicion of the reformer; and this suspicion shelters a menace to the appreciation of quality. It is supported by an impatience that objects to stopping the machinery, even to oil it or to correct a defect. The infatuation of locomotion, of keeping a-going, distracts attention from the direction of movement. There is a too ready suspicion that the objector or would-be reformer is suffering from a soured disposition or is nursing a personal "grouch." There is an extreme reluctance to recog-

nize in the critical insight or in the reforming temper the qualities desired in our leaders. "The scold," as has been neatly said, "at his princeliest is but a poor leader; he rebukes with a trumpet, he leads with a penny whistle." Yet the clarion call, even though it arouse men to thought and not to action, is at times the most indispensable of alarums; and the cry in the wilderness in time penetrates to the crowded haunts of men. Doubtless for our greater happiness though not greater security, we shall avoid the Cassandras of either sex; but the wiser of their generation have given heed, commonly with impatience overcome, to the poietic counsels however ominous, from Jeremiah to Carlyle.

An essay in the appreciation of quality may indicate the practical incorporation of its principles in a plea for the high valuation of individuality, for a like encouragement of the social sentiment that makes for independence of opinion, for

freedom in its expression. The same attitude eases the path of worthy reform, is well-disposed to minorities. The fundamental privileges of free speech and free thought, and the toleration of beliefs and practices wherein men most naturally differ, are secure. But it is not at this level that timely reforms are propagated. The wrongs of society have moved upward with the elevation of its secured rights. The atmosphere that surrounds the militant or insurgent individualist is quite inhospitable enough to make him feel unwelcome; and what is more pertinent, it is quite sufficiently austere to turn those inclined to his standards away from the narrow rougher paths and into the smoothly paved highways. By this attitude a general intellectual habit of originality and independence is more tolerated than cherished; and thereby is society the loser by a relative loss of the uncultivated possibilities of the poietic men.

This loss is as difficult to demonstrate as is the saving power of the patron saints of seamen. "Where are the votive ships of those who went down at sea?" the skeptic asks, when the models of vessels rescued by saintly protection are displayed, suspended from the rafters of the church. "Where are your mute, inglorious Miltons?" Assuredly their silence and lack of fame effectively obscure them. None the less I have faith in their existence, at all events in their potentiality. Social encouragement and the favor of appreciation may loosen the vocal chords as well as the heart-strings; and the glory that comes only after the unrecognized singer's voice is hushed, is too common an incident to be without significance. The theory of the "mute, inglorious Miltons" is rich in speculative suggestion. Are comparable generations and peoples equally productive of great men? Do occasions breed them or find them? Is the power of the social environ-

ment to cultivate or neglect more potent than that of endowment to provide? Let the fact stand that the Athenians of Pericles supported his rule, and appreciated the dramas of Æschylus and the sculptures of Phidias, to prove the glory of that age. The rest is too large a question; yet the issue is practical; and as we follow the bent of our presumptions, we shall be confident or skeptical of the discovery of unrecognized talent.[1]

[1] Upon these issues Mr. Benson's comments are interesting and apposite. "Now there are two modes and methods of being great; one is by largeness, the other by intensity. . . . A great man may be cast in a big magnanimous mould, without any very special accomplishments or abilities; it may be very difficult to praise any of his faculties very highly, but he is there. . . . I do not, then, feel at all sure that we are lacking in great men, though it must be admitted that we are lacking in men whose supremacy is recognized. . . . What so many people admire is not greatness but the realisation of greatness and its tangible rewards. The result is that men who show any faculty for impressing the world are exploited and caressed, are played with as a toy and as a toy neglected. . . . The human race is, speaking generally, so anxious for any leading that it can get, that

But the practical emphasis bears not upon muteness, — for be it conceded that genius will assert itself even though it cries not lustily, — but upon the spontaneity of song; upon the issue that the lesser than Miltons deserve high consideration. Reduced from exalted to more ordinary setting, the charge against even a mildly distorted distribution of favor remains: that it brings into prominence a somewhat less worthy, intrinsically less capable order of men; that it favors the less distinctive or less worthy qualities of its best men. The principle from which issues this criticism may be stated in terms of individual as well as of social endeavor. As such it offers an ideal to measures of self-culture and education.

if a man or woman can persuade themselves that they have a mission to humanity, and maintain a pontifical air, they will generally be able to attract a band of devoted adherents, whose faith, rising superior to both intelligence and common-sense, will endorse almost any claim that the prophet or prophetess likes to advance."

For it sets forth that the purpose of individual culture is to discover and develop the best qualities of one's endowment; as it is the purpose of society to utilize and encourage the aristocracy of capacity which it commands. Educational measures are but means to facilitate this end. By coöperation society and the individual bring to fruitage the choicest products of their best exemplars.

The loss that follows upon a feeble appreciation of, or a negligent interest in, these influences may be pointedly if crudely put. Such a tendency makes it quite too easy to place second-rate men in first-rate places, and to give the second-best qualities of first-rate men a more favorable field than is provided for their first-best qualities. It may be differently put by saying that in the callings affected, it brings undue success to qualities conforming to a lower-grade rather than to the highest-grade standards prescribed, but not always lived up to, for

such callings. It may mean — let the examples stand without prejudice — that to join the select rank of the *most* successful merchants, or brokers, or lawyers, implies a selection by dint of a combination of qualities, some of which might well debar their possessor from membership in desirable clubs frequented by their somewhat less successful but more scrupulously loyal or refined colleagues. Indeed, if the esteem of qualities followed in election to such social privileges were more largely considered in business relations, it could hardly fail to affect favorably the distribution of the more notable awards. This shifting of esteem naturally affects the callings and men most sensitive to social encouragment, most dependent upon the congeniality of the atmosphere ; by kinship of quality, it affects conduct and ideas alike. Men of high inclination may yield to importunity and engage in morally questionable but not socially disqualifying trans-

actions. Men of no less high inclination, otherwise directed, may yield to necessity or popularity by sacrificing their best to their next-best impulses. And herein lies the saddest if not most disastrous consequence of ill-disposed social approbation. It leads to a double misfortune, from which the Poietics in American society suffer more or less acutely according to their temperament, their station, their fate. The one is the exposure to an uncongenial or at least uncertain intellectual climate; the other is that their service is inevitably judged by unsuitable, unsympathetic standards. These standards are derived from the callings richly rewarded by the institutions of the day, and are applied in terms of the qualities demanded for the lucrative careers. And thus does the contrast of station pervert the comparison of quality to the disparagement of the one and the glorification of the other.

Concrete statement is again desirable,

but inevitably touches upon debatable ground. But since I have maintained that the disposition of appreciation in the academic life is peculiarly significant, I must not shrink from at least stating the dangers incurred. They all threaten to dull the edge of high-grade qualities, and may be thus summarized: that the obstacles in the academic career make it needlessly uncertain that the fittest service will find fittest station or suitable provision; that second-best qualities lead to preferment more rapidly and more regularly than first-best ones; that the environment in which academic men are required to labor is not as stimulating as it might well be; that their activities are too much beset with uncongenial routine, too interferingly hampered by unappreciative control. Here or there the charges may or may not hold. Somewhere the shoe fits. Everywhere improvement must seek the illumination of guiding principles.

The remedy more sharply defines the indisposition. It is first directed to the most disturbing symptoms, and suggests as urgent the larger participation in the making of their own environment, on the part of those who live in it and by it. It suggests yet more emphatically the reduction to a minimum of administrative control unrelated to academic efficiency. It suggests most emphatically greater reserve in the exercise of that pressure from the outside, whether of the official guardianship of public interests or of public sentiment more popularly voiced, that compresses and represses the vital tissues of the academic organism to a stunted and misshapen growth. The situation is convincing because it shows so clearly how seemingly unlike impediments are of a nature all compact; for the uncertainties of academic fortune, the abuses of preferment, the languor of the enviroment, the dominance of external standards and control, the dictatorial

assertiveness of popular demands, are alike direct issues of the faulty perspective of appreciation. The ill-adjusted camera is responsible for all the faults of the distorted picture.

And so once more and finally, the reply is available to those who ask, not to challenge but to relieve: What can you do about it? Rest a larger directive authority in the hands of poietic men, particularly in callings that require special qualities of appreciation. The "safe" man may be safer; the larger prizes involve the larger risks. The larger wisdom determines when and how they shall be taken. Make more generous allowances for the differences of standards that vocations of distinctive temper and service require and develop; again especially, do not apply commercial standards to non-commercial pursuits. Business may be business; but there are other interests that are not. Deliver gifted men from the temptation

to use their gifts cheaply. The value of their talents depends appreciably upon the market which your appreciation creates. Avoid the penny-wise and pound-foolish expediency of permitting the immediate and often shallow demands of the following to shape the policy of the leaders. Be patient with genius, respectful to dissent, responsive to reform, attentive to criticism, grateful to leadership, considerate of principle, appreciative of quality.

The conservation of our intellectual resources must proceed upon the appreciation of their worth. Nothing is more unjust and unwise than the appraisal of the products of human quality by unsuitable standards. The all-embracing desideratum remains, and becomes the simple but commanding requirement. It is alike the lowliest and the highest wisdom, and is akin to the specialization approved by nature, which secures for each cherished growth the conditions best suited to its

nurture. If in difficult positions of honor and trust we want wise and conscientious men, we must see to it that these qualities have free play and ready reward in the manifold and minor relations of life. If in business competition we want only men of energy, shrewdness and thrift, combined with the ever commendable judgment, and care little for the restraints of fair dealing, humane treatment, economic policy, or honest representation, we shall develop as successful captains of industry the men who in heroic stature are energetic, shrewd, and thrifty, as well as more or less relentless, tyrannical, self-seeking, and unprincipled. If we have a concern for courtesy, good manners, refinement, we shall accord these graces some part in the esteem that leads to preferment. If we want high-grade artists or musicians, craftsmen or designers, statesmen or administrators, scientists or engineers, spiritual leaders or educational experts, we must

be willing to supply the conditions needed to stimulate and perfect these several pursuits. If above all we cherish the elevation of interest and delicacy of application that culture confers as its distinctive quality, we must give first place to the intangible and subtle, but no less real and practical provisions indispensable to the choicer consummation.

Qualities cost, and should willingly be paid for. To the practical vision it is sufficiently evident to what extent one virtue is obtained at the expense of another. The situation involves the homely lesson that we must not ask to eat our cake and have it too, nor complain that one kind of sweet has not all the plums and flavors of another, nor that bread for the common pilgrim is the more satisfactory staff of life. Yet there is more involved; for it is not so simple a task to distinguish between necessities and luxuries and to value each correctly. Luxuries in one situation become necessities

in another. Liberal generosity may be the truest economy. It is not even good policy to bully or sneer at such questionable "poor relations" of these influential social forces, as indulgences, hobbies, caprices, or affectations. A congenial indulgence of the environment is a redeeming fault. Yet at bottom the difficulty of valuation lies largely in the partial but real conflict between the values set by one group of methods and purposes and another, in the common life that envelops both. At bottom the practical interferences with progress and the dangers of disaster are due to simple homely traits: to the lack of finer feeling that tolerates lower standards, overrates cheap success, toadies to the gallery, and gains glory for the inglorious. The glare of a popular success is so regrettably apt to distort the perspective of values. The critical judgment and the loyalty to standards must ever be the defenses of society for the saner adjustment of social rewards.

The insensibility to this situation is as baffling as stupidity, and by assumption of authority ten times as disastrous. If hard work, long hours, attention to detail, reduction of wants, calm unconcern for remote consequences, stern discipline of dependents, bring desired results in one business, why should they not in another? Education is unfitting for business, says the self-made man with marked deference to his maker, quite oblivious that this may be a reflection on the character of an occupation for which education is a handicap, quite as well as upon the futility of the educative process attempted. Even a university, we have recently been informed, is to be judged as a plant for turning out at the least cost and waste a definite article of public demand; and the message has been enforced in the same spirit that would judge the merit of artists, not by the inspiration and skill of their canvases, but by their ingenuity in getting their effects with least ex-

penditure of materials, or by their reputation in keeping their contracts. It is not very clear what reply the business man would make to Mr. Howells, who in speaking of the poet says : " From a business point of view, he is also an artist ; and the very qualities that enable him to delight the public disable him from delighting it uninterruptedly." But that is precisely the wise business point of view even as applied to so uncommercial a product as poetry. If honesty is the best policy in business, the business man, whether influenced by or insensitive to other motives, endorses it for that reason at all events. If an eight-hour day brings greater efficiency in the long run than a ten-hour day, the business policy of the shorter day will carry. There is a further business aspect of the same principle ; it is that every worker works best under the conditions best adjusted to his pursuit. This is not a truism, or it would not be so commonly disregarded. It has a

profound psychological import. It means that every worker and above all the worker of higher quality — who may always be called an artist — must work with something of that spontaneity and loss of the sense of a crowding purpose, that characterizes play. It is the infusion of the play-interest that removes the curse of labor. It does so by an appeal to the freer play of unchained interests. The higher callings, it has been set forth, live more and more upon the upper ranges of human quality ; for like reason, every man working upon his top range is potentially a man of mark. To further the stimulation that lifts endeavor to within sighting distance of the next higher achievment is the policy of wisdom, solvent in its own right, but ready to accept the endorsement of business if its credit is thereby assured. In reflective moments as in self-forgetful ones, the business man becomes aware that he is *playing* a game, not doing chores. There

is nothing sordid about money-making except the sordidness with which much of it is made. It doubtless has readier affinity with low qualities, but has so large a clientèle that it takes on the manner of all sorts and conditions of men. The "inspired millionaire" is proposed by Mr. Gerald Stanley Lee as the prototype of the true servitor of civilization. The game of money-making takes on the quality of the players. The advice proffered by the plea in behalf of appreciation is to play with insight and an outlook. The presence of the stakes adds zest to the sport; but it may be played with very different stakes or without them. It is the small man who plays for points alone. Raise the underlying principle of this theorem to a higher power, complicate it with the larger values for quality and the smaller for quantity; and the principle gains in force. At whatever cost, every calling, if worth its pursuit, is worth providing for. The specialization

and complexity of these provisions are inherent in our complexly specialized lives. The wisest policy will furnish them, and proceed first and sympathetically to find out what they are. The unwisest policy is to impose upon one order of occupation the utterly unfit standards of another. Any measure of domineering control of the intellectual interests by business standards is a serious peril. In the actual situation it is far from being an imaginary one.

Every reasonable man will admit that the adjustment to their mutual support of the divergent standards growing out of the several orders of human vocation is among the legitimate arts of compromise. And here, once more, the temper in which it is carried out, becomes decisive. The service, in many situations, of the political temper and its disservice in usurping powers in domains subject to the dominion of principles, I have relied upon Lord Morley's essay to make

clear. The temperamental phases of the two divergent tendencies are in a practical discussion the most important. In general, and irrespective almost of special issue and circumstance, there is distinguishable a general bias towards a hand-to-mouth, temporizing, political mode of handling questions, impatient of delay, elated with bustle, indifferent to finer issues, not over-sensitive to moral restraint and logical caution; and opposed thereto, a loyalty to reasoned purpose, to sensitive conviction, to the commanding imperative of right and wise ideals. The contrast weakens in less pronounced personalities, with elements of both allegiances. Either may combine with a temperamental quality, near of kin: that of the analytic temper, the issue of schooling and logical bent; or of the impressionistic temper, that finds its compass in impulse and insight. As met with in the walks of life, these temperamental divergences illustrate how incom-

patibilities may yet associate by sympathy of purpose. In considering the uncertainty of relation between inclination and achievement, a contemporary observer announces that some men have morals and others principles. The simpler situations of life doubtless yield a prompter and a truer solution in the rectitude of the habits, — the issues of sensibility, — of "happy instructive choice and wholesome sentiment," as Professor Royce calls them. The complexities of intellectual interests and social institutions compel reasoned analysis, notably on the part of those who would lead or influence. The consoling consideration is that the affiliation of purpose, like the underlying sensibilities, is capable to join morals and principles in a mutual efficiency. The large-minded politician and the large-minded philosopher will understand one another and find common arts of compromise, despite differences of opinion, far more readily and worthily than represent-

atives of these interests with narrow outlook and more convergent views. On the larger ground of appreciation, those expert in determining the social encouragements most stimulating to the higher ranges of human quality, and those influential in promoting measures to secure them, may meet in sympathy of purpose, with the promise of the largest service to their common loyalty.

I began this essay by suggesting the difficulties as well as the grounds of a personal optimism. I conclude it by adding the assurances thereof. It has been duly set forth that the qualities of men are intimately conditioned by the organically ordained institutions of human nature; that these must be relied upon to furnish the motive force and the skill for all endeavors set by ideals of human desire. Viewed as a limitation, it would appear that human nature cannot change; it has usually been so construed and mis-

construed. Viewed as a fundamental resource, the expansion of qualities natural to men furnishes the commanding basis of faith in the progressive future of humanity. It is not so much that human nature is the one condition that we cannot change — which is true with the truth of the part; but that the changeability of human nature is all that we have to work upon — which is the rest of the truth. Both for the guidance of practice and the support of optimism the advantage is with the latter. I cited Mr. Kipling on his side of the Atlantic, as one skeptical of the ability of even a high-grade personality to grow beyond the limits of its inheritance. Let me cite Professor James on our side, for an opposite conviction. "Though it is no small thing to inoculate seventy millions of people with new standards, yet, if there is to be any relief, that will have to be done. We must change ourselves from a race that admires jerk and snap for

their own sakes, and looks down upon low voices and quiet ways as dull, to one that, on the contrary, has calm for its ideal, and for their own sakes loves harmony, dignity, and ease." As we are impressed by the limitations of nature, or by the possibilities of nurture under the guidance of ideals, we shall place our allegiances and shape our endeavors. The variability of human nature by gift of endowment and by stress of circumstance as well as by the stimulus of ideals, remains the consistent prop to optimism. With wholly altered and more grateful application, we may repeat Goneril's exclamation: "O, the difference of man and man!"

Large subjects, like small countries, have an advantage for the observant tourist. He obtains a variety of aspects of both nature and man, and retains the sense of homogeneity that makes for a singleness of impression. By successive excursions to outlying boundaries, he

appreciates without undue effort the traits that make all mankind kin, and the varieties of nature that make possible alike misunderstanding and the progress towards better things. He sees much or little, the vital things or the superficial, according to the depth and range of his vision. If of large mind and wholesome sympathies, his survey not only brings home the time-tested dictum of the Roman dramatist, that in the country of the humanities no true man is a foreigner, but supplements it with the increasing conviction that it is the deeper appreciation of human quality and its vicissitudes that makes the best of human achievements humane.

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