Francis Lieber.

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February, 1859.

RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.

RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

IN

HISTORY AND IN SYSTEM:

AN INTRODUCTION TO A

LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL COURSE.

BY

ALEXANDER C. FRASER,

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς, διαλεκτικὸς.

PLATO.

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PREFATORY NOTE.

The Lecture read by me this winter, at the commencement of the Academical Course, is here expanded, in the form of a Tract on Philosophical Method, in which principles, then announced in a very general way, are more fully unfolded. A few references are also given to the literature of Philosophy. These are easily multiplied. Most of the books referred to are in the ordinary reading of a philosophical student. They are here introduced to bring the reader immediately under influences, more fitted than any words of mine, to awaken the condition of mind in which the theme of this little work should be weighed.

I was led to believe that the finger-posts which I have here tried to erect, on the confines of Rational or Intellectual Philosophy, might help one who is entering that region, in his search for answers to questions about the kind of study pursued there,—its past and present condition,—the aims and contents of Logic and Metaphysics, as philosophical sciences,—their internal relations,—as well as their connexion with one another, with the intellectual

history of man, and with an abatement of the error and ignorance by which that history is disfigured. These are questions which rise in the mind of the considerate student, and to which, in the present confused state of logical and metaphysical literature in this country, it is not easy for him to find answers. I place this Tract, accordingly, within the reach of my own students, as a provisional substitute for a syllabus or outline of the Course which I am endeavouring to mature, in a region where maturity must be long sought for, and late in its appearance.

A view of Logic and Metaphysics, as the philosophical theory of Understanding and Belief in the mutual relation of their first principles, though not, as far as I am aware, hitherto stated and systematically unfolded, seems to bring into harmony some of the best current doctrine regarding these studies. It must be remembered, however, that answers to the questions which I have, in the last paragraph, supposed,—far more full and satisfying than any I pretend to offer,—if merely placed on paper, to be lodged in the memory, are no provision for the wants of a reflecting mind. Philosophy cannot be taught or learned by rote. But something may perhaps be done, through a printed statement of this sort, to put or keep in motion, in the mind of a student, that train of meditative experiments, which is the essential part of a philosophical life.

It is not in the design of this little work to bring much into light, either the *proofs* on which its doctrines rest, or the *consequences* which may be deduced from them. In the class-room, such premises and conclusions should gradually make their appearance, in co-operation with those who study there; and that co-operation is heartily given by a large number of the students of this University. In case these pages happen to fall under the eye of a philosophical reader, already matured, he is well able (if he should care, as an experiment, to occupy their point of view thoughtfully for a little time) to draw out for himself the reasoning that is latent in them, by which their teaching may be confirmed, or its errors made more apparent; and in the stores of his own reflection and learning, a reader of that class has more than enough of resources for testing the assumed premises.

"Étant aussi persuadés," says Malebranche, "que nous le sommes que les hommes ne se peuvent enseigner les uns les autres, et que ceux qui nous écoutent n'apprennent point les vérités que nous disons à leurs oreilles, si en même temps celui qui les a découvertes ne les manifeste aussi à leur esprit, nous nous trouverons encore obligés d'avertir ceux qui voudront bien lire cet ouvrage de ne point nous croire sur notre parole par inclination, ni s'opposer à ce que nous disons par aversion; car, encore que

l'on pense n'avoir rien avancé de nouveau qu'on ne l'ait appris PAR LA MÉDITATION, on serait cependant bien fâché que les autres se contentassent de retenir et de croire nos sentiments sans les savoir ou qu'ils tombassent dans quelque erreur, ou faute de les entendre, ou par ce que nous nous serions trompés."

It is in this spirit that I seek to pursue my own philosophical studies, and to guide those of others.

I have placed in an Appendix some supplementary matter, in part relating to the past history of these studies in the University of Edinburgh. Certain disquisitions, more purely metaphysical, which, at one time, I thought of including in the Appendix, in the form of additional Notes, I now hold back. What follows, is already too much expanded, and perhaps already touches too many delicate questions, for the purpose it is meant to serve.

A section only of the course that is here partially unfolded, is all that can be really explored by a student, during the few months of a single College Session,—in a department where depth of reflection is so much more valuable than mere extension of knowledge, while each is often found in the inverse ratio of the other. Some parts, moreover, of what is here indicated in outline, if treated elaborately, are obviously more suited to persons

already advanced in logico-metaphysical studies, and who might constitute a Senior philosophical class. Other parts may be appropriately offered, in the second year of their curriculum, to a Junior class of students, intellectually developed and informed as men ought to be at that stage in their academical course.

I have not discussed any of the many interesting questions which rise, when we look, with a practical eye, for arrangements likely to engage the different members of a large and miscellaneous body of students, in the parts of logical and metaphysical science for which they are individually prepared. We want to unite an efficient logical discipline for the many, with encouragement and assistance to a few, who are able to pursue researches, in the profounder labyrinths of Philosophy, or the more recondite parts of its literature. Rational Philosophy, in these and other details of its Academical Discipline, well deserves a separate consideration, especially at a time when the elevation of the National Universities is in the front class of our social reforms.

College of Edinburgh,
January 1858.

HÆC STUDIA ADOLESCENTIAM ALUNT, SENECTUTEM OBLECTANT, SECUNDAS RES ORNANT, ADVERSIS PERFUGIUM ET SOLATIUM PREBENT; DELECTANT DOMI, NON IMPEDIUNT FORIS; PERNOCTANT NOBISCUM, PEREGRINANTUR, RUSTICANTUR.

Cicero.

RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.

THOSE who become thinking members of a class of Logic and Metaphysics, which performs what it nominally promises, are thereby devoted to the highest kind of academical culture and discipline. Their act implies that they want to discover, by reflection or mental experiment, the plan of thought, according to which our life, as men endowed with Reason, must be regulated. It places them on the ascent of the loftiest part of what Bacon calls "the intellectual globe," and on the first stage of a journey, in the course of which their old world of life is seen in new lights, and

with a fresh eye. It brings them within the range of doctrines and a discipline, with which the venerable name of PHILOSOPHY has for ages been, in a particular manner, associated, and which have been illustrated, in a variety of systems, during many generations.

It is the duty, on the one hand, of the Student in logical and metaphysical philosophy, to engage in a high discipline of intellectual sympathy and co-operation with his guide ;* and that discipline, when pursued on a foundation of sound philological training, proves that what is called a course in speculation, is really as practical as any in the curriculum of the University. It is the duty of the philo-

* Spoken or written words can convey philosophical truth, only when the state of mind that corresponds to them is excited *by reflection* in the mind of the hearer or reader. Men are not trained in *philosophy* by a mechanical drill of routine examinations and exercises. Philosophical discipline, as reflective, is a series of experiments, shared between the hearer or reader, and the speaker or author; and its oral or written exercises are valuable as far as they are organs of reflective sympathy.

sophical Professor, on the other hand, to introduce academical youth to studies which have long been recognised as the complement of every other study, which, when wisely directed, strengthen, by exercise, the highest faculties and best feelings of the human mind, and which, in their remoter ramifications, are the most advanced point in the liberal part of academical education.*

Rational Philosophy, as that term is used by me, is a search for Ultimate Truth, or that unity of Reason which is conceived to be the final reward of the philosophical impulse. It seeks its appropriate intellectual satisfaction through two studies, namely,

* The student and his guide may ponder the place in the hierarchy of the sciences and in education, assigned by Plato to διαλεκτική—which nearly corresponds to the metaphysical part of our Rational or Speculative Philosophy. "Ἆρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι," he asks, "ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐκετ' ἄλλο, τούτου μάθημα, ἀνωτερω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐχεῖν ἤδη τέλος τὰ τῶν μαθημάτων;" See *Republic*, B. vii., and compare B. vi. and the latter part of B. v. for an appreciation of the higher education, and as suggesting high ends of human life, to which all genuine philosophy appeals.

Logic, or the philosophical science of the Laws by which the Understanding or faculty of Thought must, as such, be ruled and restrained; and Metaphysics, or the philosophical science of Real Existence, as revealed to the understanding in Belief. Logic is the science of formal truth; Metaphysics is the science of real truth. In the one, we contemplate the harmony of thought with its own necessary conditions; in the other, the last relations of the real universe to the universal beliefs of Reason. The former contains the venerable science, long associated with the name of Aristotle; and now much elaborated, under the name of Formal Logic. In the latter study, in which also Aristotle takes a conspicuous place, we contemplate the phases of Being that are *apprehended* by the Understanding in space or time; with the view to learn whether the Real World can be *comprehended* in a mind that is logically ruled and restrained. In Logic, we study the

capacity of thought; in Metaphysics, the relation of finite thought to existence.

These two sciences, when regarded as thus philosophically correlative, may be termed Rational Philosophy, and I am justified by the example of my predecessors, as well as by the nature of the study, when I assume that *Rational Philosophy* and its *History* is the province intrusted to the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh.* The courses delivered from this Chair have, nearly all, I believe, nominally recognised Logic, Metaphysics, and the History of Philosophy, as the departments within their sphere. The History has been, as it may be, either treated as a separate department, or blended with the logical and metaphysical system, in the form of occasional quota-

* The only Chair in any British University, which formally recognises, by its title, Metaphysics as the correlative of Logic, and "Philosophy" as the two in correlation, while the History combines with both.

tions, with a criticism of philosophical literature. And variation of opinion has, of course, appeared regarding the lawful contents of logical and metaphysical science, and the prominence due to the *system*, as distinguished from a *history*, of philosophical doctrine.

Along with the seeming variation in the matter of instruction, there has also been variety in the terms used to designate it. Although the names of the two sciences, which, between them, constitute and complete this part of study, are now usually appropriated to the Chair, this has occasionally been called, what it still professes to be in fact—the class for Rational or Speculative Philosophy. In past periods of its history it has been designated the class of "Philosophy,"—"First Philosophy,"—"Rational" or "Intellectual Philosophy,"—"Speculative" or "Theoretical Philosophy,"—and "Instrumental Philosophy." It was thus distinguished, as a

philosophical Chair, from those appropriated to Moral and Natural Philosophy.*

I might refer in some detail to the useful labours of the representatives of the Chair, in the earlier part of its history, which have been commemorated by the grateful testimony of distinguished pupils.† I do not need to remind any of its later history, and the epoch in the history of Rational Philosophy in Scotland, which that later history marks. For more than twenty years it has been the centre of a great intellectual light, to which Europe and America were wont to turn for guidance. From this place have issued those profound and elaborate lessons in thought, and those curious and recondite discoveries in the history of opinion, which in these years aroused the spirit of reflection

* See Appendix, Note A. on "*Reason and Rational Philosophy.*"

† See Appendix, Note B. on "*The Chair of Logic and Metaphysics.*"

in this University, and among the men of the present generation at home and abroad.

We meet in a place that has been an arena for high philosophical discipline, as well as the scene of the promulgation of philosophical discoveries ; and in a University which bears a European name for distinction in those Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political speculations, in which Scotland and its academical institutions have gathered so much honour in the past. We perhaps feel, as we enter academical courts, once frequented by Fergusson and Stewart, by Brown and Hamilton, as Piso did in the well-known dialogue of Cicero, which records their visit to the academy of Plato. "Natura ne nobis," he asks, as they witnessed the scene, sacred to so great a name,—"natura ne nobis hoc datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos,

magis moveamur, quam si quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus, aut scriptum aliquod legamus? Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem; quem accepimus primum hic disputare solitum, cujus enim illi hortuli propinqui non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. Hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic ejus auditor Polemo." *

Philosophical study, in its higher forms, cultivates reverential communion with the Past; and it is in harmony with its spirit, that we should recollect our responsibility, as members of one of those Scottish Universities, which have derived their chief honour and influence in this very department. "Surely," says Bacon, "as nature createth brotherhood in families, and arts mechanical contract brotherhoods in commonalties; so, in like manner, there cannot but be a fraternity in learning and illumi-

* *De Finibus*, v. 1.

nation, relating to that fraternity which is attributed to God, who is called the Father of illuminations or lights."* In the present case, the recollection may well excite the painful feeling of inadequate performance, as, by small instalments and slow degrees, we try to meet our responsibility.

The organization for liberal education in the Scottish Universities has, at least in theory, derived its life from three fundamental studies :—

I. Roman and Greek Philology and Literature ;

II. The sciences, which may be called *Mathematico-physical* or *Physico-philosophical ;*

III. *Logico-metaphysical* or *reflective* philosophical studies.†

* *Advancement of Learning*, B. ii.

† According to Aristotle, Mathematics and Physics are, along with Theology (*i.e.*, Metaphysics), the three parts of Speculative Philosophy. See *Metaph.* v. 1, and x. 4. The theory of their equilibrium is the theory of a philosophical education. In various parts of his works, Aristotle discusses the relation of Mathematics to Metaphysical Philosophy.

The Languages and Literature which have proved their permanent adaptation to what is most refined in cultivated humanity ;—Science, with its firm intellectual training, and tranquillizing assurance of truth ;—and the arduous exercises of Reflex Speculation, concerning human knowledge and human destiny :—these three, are the permanent and universal heritage of mankind. As such, they are the three essential elements in the high education of a University ; and they have long formed the curriculum in the national colleges of Scotland.

The first, with the old national life which it reveals, is the basis of a broad human training, and an introduction to modern literature and modern polity. The second is the appropriate academical pathway into the vast and miscellaneous department of modern physical knowledge. Reflex speculation, and the insight into history which reflective studies, when rightly conducted,

induce, is the key, in particular, to scientific theology, and also to the theory of the higher or University education. But every department of science and opinion, as well as the general tone of feeling, is modified by the logico-metaphysical scheme, regarding the limits of Conception, and the meaning of Reality, that is (consciously or unconsciously) held by individuals and communities.

These, accordingly, are the three organs of universal study. It is professedly through these three universal studies—maintained in their relative equilibrium—that a University opens a safe path into those parts of knowledge which are popularly interesting, from the comparative ease with which they may be subdued, or their immediate and palpable utility.

The three fundamental studies themselves are mutually related, in and through philosophy, in which they find their consummation.

Classical philology, when used by a University as distinguished from a school, as an organ of education, may be expected to rise into the dignity of an applied philosophy,—a philosophy applied to *man*, or rather to the most memorable of man's literary productions, and to the most notable period in the intellectual history of our race. Moreover, as a large part of classical literature is itself philosophical, a course of reflex speculation may consist, and in some Universities does consist, in an interpretation of the books which contain this large deposit of philosophical doctrine.*

* A course of pure philosophical study may start either from Modern and prevailing forms of thought, or from the long revered records of Ancient speculation. The former plan invites the student to work backwards into the past; the latter to work onwards into the present. Each has its advantages. The one is, perhaps, best adapted to the *professorial* system, and a comprehensive course of doctrine; the other to the *tutorial* method, and a course of exact study. The current philosophy of Western Europe is the point of departure for the one; Aristotle and Greek thought is the usual point of departure for the other. The former plan is adopted by the Scottish Universities, and the latter by Oxford; and if Scotland has been deficient in philosophical learning, Oxford has not yet produced an independent school of philosophy.

The mathematico-physical sciences, when they are in the highest sense "progressive," become reflective philosophy applied to *nature*. It is then that their disciples speculate concerning the mode in which those sciences are formed, their relations to one another, and the theory of their classification. It is then that they begin to see the ocean of infinite ignorance, by which we find we are surrounded, when we reflect deeply on what are called "ultimate" laws of nature, or on the mysteries of Space and Time, in which Nature is revealed, and through which, as it were visibly, it merges in the Infinite.

Rational philosophy, in its turn, is attached to all human knowledge and human life. To it belongs the "Science," to which Bacon refers, as "the main and common way, before the sciences part and divide themselves," because, he adds, "the distributions and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one

angle, and so touch but in a point, but are like branches of a tree that meet in a stem." * In particular, this philosophy is connected with the History of man, and with the logico-metaphysical Systems and Controversies of the past, by which the course of opinion has been moulded. These Systems, as they lie imbedded in the books of the great nations of the world, form an appropriate reward to the labours of the philosophical student, as he opens a way for himself through the crust of an ancient or foreign language. And in the enjoyment of that reward, he is confirmed in the lesson of modesty and caution, which is blended with all true philosophy, as it is the primary element in the philosophical spirit.

"Those that have always lived at home," says an old writer, "and have never seen any other country, are confidently persuaded that their own is the best; whereas they that have travelled, and observed other

* *Advancement of Learning*, B. ii.

places, speak more coldly and indifferently of their native soils; and so those confined understandings that never looked beyond the opinions in which they were bred, are exceedingly assured of the truth, and comparative excellency of their own tenants; when as the larger minds, that have travelled the divers climates of opinions, and considered the various sentiments of inquiring men, are more cautious in their conclusions, and more sparing in positive affirmations."

A fresh academical course of instruction and discipline in Rational Philosophy has a relation to the philosophical systems, different from that which a new course in the mathematico-physical sciences has to existing mathematical or physical doctrine. The mathematico-physical course traverses a region of well-recognised truth; and an outline of the path to be followed can be predicted by the student. An excursion in speculative philosophy is felt by many

to resemble a voyage on a sea unknown, unless for the reported disasters of preceding voyagers, and on which every fresh expedition is expected to follow a different route. This singular feature in reflective study should be examined, that the student may appreciate the just relation between every new course of philosophical research, and the systems that have evolved themselves in the past. With this view, we shall take, as our first object of contemplation—

RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY.

The phenomena of the past philosophical experience of mankind are often read in a spirit which induces scepticism about Philosophy. I think they may be read differently. Let us look at both sides.

I. *The History and Scepticism.*

In the past, the present, and the future of Philosophy, are contained the intellectual struggles of mankind to solve one Eternal

Problem,—or to ascertain that it is insoluble. The CONSTANT EXPERIMENT that is needed for a philosophical determination of the alternative, has been pending since the dawn of civilisation. It cannot be performed by proxy. Every philosopher must repeat it for himself; and its actual performance, by the student, as distinguished from an assumption of its results upon trust, is the pure philosophical part of education. The History of Philosophy is the record of preceding experiments. A new course of Philosophy is an attempt to repeat the experiment. It seems to have been so often repeated, without success, or at least without terminating philosophical controversy, that men who measure "progress" in these logico-metaphysical studies by the standard of "progress" in mathematico-physical sciences, despair of Philosophy altogether.*

* See Appendix, Note C. on "*Mathematical and Philosophical Discipline.*"

The *constant* phenomenon of the *rise and decline of systems* is what induces this scepticism, when men review the philosophical past, or forecast the philosophical future. The phenomenon meets us in all ages and in all countries. In ancient Greece, one School appears to rise amid the ruins of another, to make way, in its turn, in like manner, for a successor. Even the strong bond of ecclesiastical unity, by which Europe was held together in the Middle Ages, failed really to restrain that interminable variety and discord in philosophical opinion, which it only rendered less obtrusive. And in modern Europe, systems have waxed and waned in more rapid succession than even in ancient Greece. Britain, France, and Germany have witnessed, in the three last centuries, the prevalence of every elementary phase of speculation; and each country in its turn has been under the sway of a series of dominant schools. Must those

who now propose to exercise themselves in reflection, either invent a *new* system, or select, ready made to their hand, the one orthodox system from among many mutually antagonistic competitors ;—or, failing, as may be expected, in both these enterprises, must they, in the last resort, forsake Philosophy as a hopeless aspiration?

Complaints of the chaotic state of opinion, and the incurable discord of sects in Philosophy, have accordingly become common, especially in modern books. The history of this part of study is reported to be a record of mutually destructive systems of thought, which have appeared and disappeared in endless succession, from the dawn of reflection in ancient India and Greece, until this nineteenth century of ours. The retrospect is said to discover, not a fertilizing stream of knowledge, widening and deepening as it advances, but the unprogressive undulations of innumerable waves on the ocean of opinion. After so

long a trial, it is concluded, that one must surely, in this late age of the world, enter a philosophical gymnasium, only to imitate the labours of Sisyphus, or at least having reason to listen with suspicion to the plausible promises of any modern gymnasiarch.

It must be conceded, that some eminent leaders in Philosophy have given their countenance to the opinion, that the past history of reflection is the history of an intellectual chaos, and that its guides may now hope to substitute a cosmos for the chaos. Two celebrated contemporaries, whose works have induced the greatest metaphysical movement in late times, Reid and Kant, may be quoted as instances.

There is a remarkable coincidence between the opening part of Reid's *Essays*, and the Prefaces to the first *Critique* of Kant. Both deplore variety and collision among preceding systems, as a scandal inconsistent with the unity of truth. Both contrast the oscillations of mental re-

search with the steady march of the physical and mathematical sciences. Both look with good hope into the future, in case of a change in the old and still fashionable method of constructing systems of Philosophy. Both confess that preceding philosophers have wandered from the path. Both indulge the expectation that a path may still be found. In the closing sentence of his memorable work, Kant thus expresses himself:—"If the reader has been sufficiently indulgent to accompany me thus far, he can judge whether, if he pleases to assist in making this bypath of mine the high road of thought, that which many ages have failed to accomplish may not be attained *before the end of the present century*, namely, the *complete satisfaction of human reason*, in regard to the problem which has always and ardently, but without *lasting results*, engaged its powers."*

* It is a *negative* "satisfaction" that Kant professes to

The language of Reid and Kant has been echoed, with exaggerations, by recent authorities in Philosophy, as it had been anticipated by not a few earlier ones. It is now a fashion to affirm that the philosophical world has been travelling in darkness for ages, and that unless, without longer delay, the full blaze of light descends upon the road, we and our successors may give up the journey in despair. We are taunted with the state of metaphysical doctrine—either stagnant or moving in a circle—and are challenged to emulate the *onward progress*, which the record of the physical sciences, during these last centuries, discloses.

From much in this representation of

supply; but, with men as they are, we cannot expect any professed solution, negative or positive, of the problem of Reason to *terminate* philosophical discussion. Even a true solution cannot be long retained in verbal symbols. As regards the critical philosophy, the *third* edition of Cousin's *Philosophie de Kant* has just appeared, to which the reader may refer, as also to the able expository criticism in the article *Kant*, in the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

the past and present in Philosophy, I must humbly but firmly express my dissent. It appears to be founded on an oversight of the essential nature of this kind of knowledge, and consequently of its history, which disables from a just estimate either of its past evolutions or its present condition. There is another side to the picture. A confession of metaphysical weakness and sterility in the past, and an acknowledgment of far surpassing success in the mathematical and physical sciences, are, I believe, both erroneous,—when success is measured by the highest standard, and when the education of the inner life is distinguished from the amelioration of our outward circumstances. Bacon himself acknowledges that the progress of all the sciences depends upon the cultivation of First Philosophy. He complains, in his comprehensive review of human knowledge, that "men have abandoned universality or Summary Philoso-

phy, *which cannot but cease and stop all progression.* For no perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or level; neither is it possible to discover *the more remote or deeper parts of any science*, if you stand long upon the level of that same science, and ascend not to a higher." *

It is proposed to show, in this academical course, that the reverse of what is alleged in the popular charge may be reasonably held. I hope to prove, in the end, that no sphere of mental labour can record a longer series of illustrious successes than Rational Philosophy; when a true interpretation is applied to the historical phenomena, and when success is judged by the highest intellectual standard.

The physical sciences, on the contrary, are for the most part only struggling in the infancy of what is doubtless destined to be a long and useful career. The victories of Reason in the world of nature are but of

* *Advancement of Learning*, B. ii.

yesterday. And even at the best, as Hume profoundly remarks, "the most perfect philosophy of the *natural* kind only staves off our IGNORANCE a little longer; as, perhaps, the most perfect philosophy of the *moral or metaphysical* kind serves only to discover larger portions of it." *

This sentence by Hume should be in our thoughts when we criticise the history of knowledge. A discovery, by means of reflection and mental experiment, of the *limits* of knowledge, is the highest and most universally applicable discovery of all; it is the one through which our intellectual life most strikingly blends with the moral and practical part of human nature. Progress in knowledge is often paradoxically indicated by a diminution in the *apparent bulk* of what we know. Whatever helps to work off the dregs of false opinion, and to purify the intellectual mass—whatever deepens our conviction of our infinite igno-

* *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Sec. iv.

rance—really adds to, although it sometimes seems to diminish, the rational possessions of man. This is the highest kind of merit that is claimed for Philosophy, by its earliest as well as by its latest representatives. It is by this standard that Socrates and Kant measure the chief results of their toil.

II. *Interpretation of the History.*

Let us, even in this Introduction, take one step, or perhaps two, towards what seems a just interpretation of the phenomenon of *a shifting succession of systems*, that is so obtrusive on the surface of the history of logico-metaphysical science.

What, in the first place, do these same SYSTEMS mean, whose rapid rise and fall has excited so much clamour against the studies to which this place is consecrated? What is a system in Philosophy, and what are Logic and Metaphysics, when they are treated as organic parts in the system?

The answer to this question is a step in the direction of the interpretation to which I have referred. I shall indicate the answer which, as it seems to me, a philosophical course may afterwards offer in detail,—by a criticism of the literary records of systematic speculation, that have descended from the past, or been developed in the present age. I shall also suggest the spirit in which it should consequently treat the (alleged) mutually destructive varieties of sect or school among philosophers.

Every genuine philosophical system is the result of an effort to represent the Universe, in its deepest and truest aspect, in relation to Reason. In Philosophy, the ultimate aim—through many apparently devious windings and mazes—is to determine, what is meant *at bottom* by the so-called Real Existence which appears in innumerable forms, which every human action assumes, and on which life reposes.

That is just saying, in other words, that philosophy tries to describe the true ultimate relation, between speculation and action—understanding and belief, and to determine whether belief and practice can be ultimately resolved into, or at least reconciled with understanding and speculation.

A system of logical and metaphysical Philosophy is thus an ultimate plan or scheme of thought, concerning the Real World that is perpetually presented and represented to us in daily life. It is, moreover, a plan of such a kind, that it must become, to any one by whom it is earnestly adopted, the *intellectual* measure of *all* his *ultimate* judgments about the Universe in which he is living; and consequently about the department of phenomena to which he is particularly attracted by taste or circumstances. Every philosophical system is, in one word, a type or phase of THEORETICAL REALISM.

Now, let us turn for a moment to the logico-metaphysical theories, which tradition has handed down, or the present age produced, and which, whatever the intention of their authors, may all be philosophically interpreted by us as modifications of Realism. They *seem* to be at variance. At the point of view taken by their promoters, many of them cannot be reconciled. But may not a point of view be found, at which they shall appear to us, not in conflict, but conspiring to one great issue? Do not some, for example,—at the expense often of a subtile insight into its separate elements, professedly recognise the mysterious *integrity* of the genuine nature of man; and do not others, by their paradoxical speculations, — even although in violation of that integrity, introduce fresh light upon the *parts* which they illegally assume to be the whole? Does not the drama that has been enacted in the philosophical past, exhibit the *partial* or

sectarian systems working out the development of ONE CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY, which, in its turn, at each stage in its advance,—at each great crisis in its development, absorbs or assimilates the systems by which that advance was occasioned ?

That a true Philosophy is somehow the result, and that, in its turn, it becomes the corrective of partial philosophical systems, is an opinion, the germ of which may be traced to an early period in the history of these studies. But it is naturally the issue of trials and experiments in reflection continued during long ages, rather than the fruit of man's first endeavours to discover the power and limits of Reason.

The learned and comprehensive review of the previous history of Greek Philosophy, by which Aristotle introduces and accompanies his own reasonings on these high questions, suggests to us that Philosophy and its History are, in some sense,

organically connected.* Struggles to adjust the relation between true Philosophy and previous systems, marked that instructive period in history—the decline of thought in the old world, in the schools of Alexandria. The idea has animated the growth of our modern European Philosophy, when a longer experience of the nature and results of philosophical activity has afforded to us "ancients," as Bacon calls the moderns, a larger induction of historical facts.

The theory of a Philosophy, broader than the dogmatic systems, but which, nevertheless, recognises in each system a jet, as it were, of individual insight and intelligence,—drawn forth through its own *partial* view of the objective universe,—this theory, which has always been in some (conscious or unconscious) form a gravitating principle of speculation, emerges into clearer light in the comprehensive

* *e.g.*, *Metaphysics*, B. I. 3-9, in which the opinions of Plato and the early Greek schools are criticised.

mind of Leibnitz,—the most comprehensive genius in modern history. This theory, which inspires reverence for the past, and checks a vain conceit in the present, while not the peculiar property of any, may be fitly associated with the name of Leibnitz. He contrasts the "one permitted sect of all,"—the "sect of searchers after truth," with the sectarians, who, by implicitly and finally yielding themselves to a single mind, however illustrious, are disqualified for the hopeful exercise of their own ;—as one who has for years travelled along a beaten track becomes unobservant of surrounding scenes, or as the imagination that has been long under the spell of a single melody cannot readily listen to another. "I have found," says Leibnitz, "that the greater number of philosophical sects are right in much which they affirm, but not in what they deny. I flatter myself that I have penetrated into the harmony of the different realms of

philosophy, and have discovered that both parties are right, if they only would not exclude each other."*

A more exact theory of history as a philosophical development, may be found in the later speculation of Germany, and especially in Hegel. But such history is a Constructive Philosophy. We are asked to breathe an unhealthy atmosphere, when we are invited to meet, within the corners of a modern speculative structure, all the liberal thinkers of two thousand years; and we long, when thus confined, for the bracing exercise of going in quest of them ourselves, beneath the free air of heaven. A larger spirit has inspired the works of the most celebrated philosopher now living, though perhaps not without a tendency, in his earlier writings, to modify history by constructive system. "There are," says Cousin, "no absolutely false, but many incomplete systems,

* *Opera Philosophica*, pp. 701-704, &c. (Erdmann's edition.)

—systems true in themselves, but vicious in their pretence, each to comprehend that absolute truth which recognises itself through them all. The incomplete, and therefore the exclusive, is the one fundamental vice of philosophy, or to speak more accurately, of the philosophers. . . . Each system reflects the real, but unhappily reflects it only under a single angle."*

Thus far we have presumptive evidence and authority against the superficial hypothesis, that the past history of reflection is the history of disorder and chaos. It is time to advance another step, and to consider what phases of Rational Philosophy are logically possible.

The ultimate problem concerning the Real must be either *soluble* or *insoluble* by

* *Fragmens Philosophiques*, Tom. I. "*Du Fait de Conscience.*" See also Cousin's Preface to the second edition of the *Fragmens*, and to his Translation of Tennemann's *Grundriss*, &c., &c., with Jouffroy's *Mélanges* (*Histoire de la Philosophie*, &c.)

Speculative Reason. Take the former of these alternatives. The solution must be either positive or negative—*i.e.*, the problem may be positively solved, or it may be negatively dissolved in contradictions. In the nature of the case, there is thus room for *three* elementary types of Theoretical Realism.

Now the actual philosophical creations of the present and past, may be analysed into three corresponding modifications of speculative doctrine,—or rather two modifications, in perpetual collision, ever supplying fresh material for a third. Of the two extremes, by which the third or mediate type is thus developed, the one may be called a Constructive, and the other a Destructive extreme. A Constructive Philosophy professes to be logically exhaustive, and is therefore dogmatic ; a Destructive Philosophy contains proof that the exhaustive system is self-contradictory, and that it logically issues in a sceptical despair of

Reason. The third type of Realism—intermediate between the Constructive and Destructive extremes—is the Catholic Philosophy, which accepts ultimate human beliefs in their incomprehensible integrity, and confesses the necessary exhaustion of Speculative Reason, in the presence of reality.

The whole history of Philosophy may be read by us—whatever was the meaning of the meditative men by whom its materials were created,—as the history of an apparent conflict and virtual co-operation of the three elements into which all thorough-going Realism is analysed.

The type of REALISM that corresponds with the first, may be called CONSTRUCTIVE or SECTARIAN. It includes the different dogmatic systems or sects, under the two heads of Idealistic and Naturalistic Realism, with their respective modifications. The various Constructive schemes of Idealistic Realism, are in general founded

on *à priori* Definitions, and developed deductively under the law of Reason and Consequent.* Naturalistic or Positivist Realism, in modern times, consists of inductive inferences, founded on the objective relation of Uniformity in the succession of phenomena, popularly called the relation of Cause and Effect. Both are partial and sectarian, if a logical treatment of Formal Definitions is no proper solution at all of problems concerning the Real; and if an ontological solution of the ultimate problem of Natural Causation is not, while a practical and moral solution is, within the compass of human Reason.† Nevertheless, these sectarian systems, as

* These *systems*, in all their ramifications, are only explications of what the *definitional axioms* hold by implication; and their trains of reasoning only bring out more fully, the *partial* view of our conscious experience that is assumed in the premises. Theoretical Realism is at its minimum, when it is merely Formal;—recognising the Principle of Contradiction as the *only* element in our conscious experience, or even rising on its ruin.

† Both forms of Sectarian Realism, rigorously interpreted, issue logically either in Speculative Egoism or Speculative Pantheism, and these at last in Speculative Scepticism.

well as the scepticism in which they issue, may be also read by us as paradoxical and partial representations of philosophical truth.

The second type of Rational Philosophy we may term the CONTRADICTORY or SCEPTICAL. It accepts, practically at least, the immediate realities of sense and worldly experience, while it delights in illustrating the contradictions that are latent in the whole intellectual life of man, when that life is interpreted through the professed solutions offered in the sectarian dogmatic systems. The sceptical interpretation of the real appears at a critical period in the great historical epochs—in Greece, Western Europe, and India. The so-called sceptical philosopher is often only a narrow and Empirical dogmatist—a sectarian Realist, with a low theory of life and duty, or a weak intellect.* "When the human mind,"

* This may be compared with passages in that receptacle of the arguments of ancient sceptics, the Πυῤῥώνειων Ὑποτυπώσεων of Sextus Empiricus—*e.g.*, B. i. 1, &c., where he adopts

says Bacon, "once despairs of discovering truth, all its faculties begin to languish." But I do not now discuss the *mental pathology* of scepticism in the individual—only its historical office in the perpetual *experiment* of reflection; and here, through scepticism, as Pascal says, "*la Raison confond les dogmatiques.*"

The intermediate theory, as I believe Realism proper, may be called CATHOLIC or INSOLUBLE REALISM. This form of philosophical belief acknowledges, on the ground of logical proof, the finitude of Understanding; and recognises, through our metaphysical experience, the counterpart incomprehensibility or infinity of Existence. On the foundation of a proof that the *ultimate* problem of reality is, and must be, insoluble, Catholic Realism accepts the irreducible faith, that constitutes and regulates human nature in its healthy state, and that guides

the classification of philosophers, as δογματικοί ἀκαδήμαικοί, and σκηπτικοί. See also Diog. Laer. IX. Arist. *Met.* III. 4, &c.

us in that ultimate weakness of Speculative Reason, which it is one chief office of the metaphysical part of Rational Philosophy to bring out into light.*

Of these three cardinal schemes of Philosophy, the two former are partial or imperfect; and the second is the organ by which the imperfection and one-sidedness of the first are displayed. The first and second, both separately and in combination, have induced the grand historical crises which mark the past course of the third. None of the three is the special birth of any age, or the native of any particular country; though in some generations, and in some of their types, they have attained ampler and more determined features than in others. Accordingly, nothing is easier than to trace all the great problems

* This must not be confounded with the ἀκαταληψια and ἀταραξια of the sceptics, which it exactly reverses. Yet our very intellectual *powers* illustrate our intellectual *impotence*, and a catholic Realist may place in the foreground either the former or the latter.

of reflection, and their solutions, through the whole course of philosophical literature. Their very nature accounts for their *persistency*, and for the startling fact that we find the latest forms of British and Continental speculation in the minds of Indian thinkers nearly three thousand years ago, and may not unreasonably anticipate their re-appearance as novelties three thousand years hence. Philosophy is always old, and yet always fresh.

Apart from the Constructive or Rationalistic systems and Scepticism, Catholic or Insoluble Realism tends to decline. It has been nourished by the struggles of Idealism and Materialism with one another, and of both with scepticism. This warfare is the most striking feature in the philosophical past ; and, so far as past experience, and the tendencies of the intellectual nature of man enable us to judge, it will form the most striking feature also in the future of Philosophy. The

world is likely long to need the twofold service of a Catholic Philosophy of Insoluble Realism, namely, to repel, from the various provinces of science, the invasion of Constructive metaphysical systems, and of the Scepticism which is latent in them, —and also to represent to those by whom it is itself studied and accepted, the confined "intellectual globe" of man, as in progress through illimitable darkness.

Whether we review the past or anticipate the future, we thus have before us, in all the genuine philosophical struggles of mankind, the combinations of a few elements, united in different proportions, and with a varied intensity. We see the collisions of Scepticism, with systems that profess to resolve the Universe about which we speculate into the unity of a single comprehensible principle. We see these systems destroyed by Scepticism in succession, as inadequate to the task—the various phases of sectarian

Realism thus proved to be partial and illogical. And, contemporaneously with this, we see, too, the growth and amendment of that type of meditative thought, which finds, in the collisions of Constructive with Destructive Realism, evidence to support a *rational* acknowledgment, that only a theory of the Universe, as essentially incomprehensible or mysterious—alike under the formal relation of Reason and Consequent, and the physical relation of Cause and Effect—is competent to the Understanding.

So it has been, and so we conclude it must continue to be. With men as they are, and with the Universe as it is presented in the conscious experience of this mortal life, probably no one of the three types of Realism can be discounted, consistently with the maintenance of reflection in full vigour. Scepticism, in successful collision with the sectarian systems, is needed to excite and

deepen our thought of the insoluble problem which pervades reality. And the manifold trials or experiments of the authors of the dogmatic systems — their subtile and ingenious paradoxes—disclose unexpected aspects of Reason, in its essential relations to the mystery of things, which the ordinary course of Catholic Philosophy might never have discovered. The sectarian systems help to carry reflection further down. Scepticism discovers, that notwithstanding they have *not* found the bottom.

The Sceptics, by this means, *test* the successive experiments of sectarian theorists, and prove them to be failures. They have, in the past, set aside, as illogical, in a finite intelligence, every proposed modification of Constructive Realism, and have thus opened a deeper and truer view of the mystery of that Natural or Catholic Realism which confesses its own incomprehensibility. They have once and again

carried Philosophy back, from partial and one-sided systems,—into which, through our love of unity and comprehensibility, it has ever been prone to degenerate,—towards the incomprehensible unity of catholic truth. And this their office is not likely to be soon an idle one. Men of inventive genius are ever ready to repeat the experiment of a logical theory of Existence. Through a struggle with the Scepticism, which is the issue of their experiment, materials are evolved for a fresh and more profound appreciation of the insoluble mystery, on which, in the Common Sense of mankind, all reality seems to repose. "Everything," as some one says, "has relation to all things, and he that talks of strict and perfect science pretends to omniscience." According to the sublime representation of Pascal, human reason is ever suspended, in a vast and mysterious medium, poised between Absolute Ignorance and Absolute Knowledge, neither

fully cognizant, nor in utter intellectual darkness. And when we endeavour to transgress these our bounds, the object we pursue escapes from our grasp, and seems to vanish in an eternal flight, which no power can for us control.

The History of Philosophy thus teaches one uniform and constant lesson. The same result issues from every trial reflection has made: yet every man who would learn the lesson aright must make the trial anew for himself, in a systematic course of philosophical discipline. He will then learn that knowledge must, at last, hang suspended, on the wings of Faith and Love, over a dark gulf, which the line of Reason cannot fathom.

In Modern Philosophy the sceptical Hume is a central figure. He takes that place chronologically; and it also belongs to him on account of the office of his philosophical Scepticism in the modern history of opinion.

Rather more than a hundred years after the rise of independent speculation in Western Europe, in the person of Descartes, Hume's *Treatise* and *Inquiry* were given to the world. Rather more than a hundred years have now elapsed since the philosophical world was roused from its "dogmatic slumber" by these celebrated books. The earlier century, from Descartes to Hume, was a century of *experiments* in Constructed Realism, in which speculative thinkers sought in vain to resolve the mysteries of Being by means of reasoning—in which a *relative* knowledge of existence was assumed to be a *representative* knowledge of existence — and in which an imperfect (or imperfectly understood) development of the Catholic Philosophy, by Locke* on the one side, and by Leib-

* The *Essay* of Locke is an attempt to *verify*, by induction, the Hypothesis, that human knowledge originates in *experience*, *i.e.*, that it is all a kind or modification of experience. This hypothesis is tested in the course of the *Essay*, by applying it to those intellectual phenomena which seem most remote from an experimental origin, *e.g.*, our notions of Space,

nitz* on the other, afforded no adequate corrective to the counter schemes of Idealism and Materialism, which were deduced from the commonly received principles of the time.

The second century, which dates from the age of Hume, and includes the present condition of philosophical opinion, is a century in which Catholic Realism has laboured to make good a broader foundation in the Common Reason; under

Time, Cause, Substance, Power, &c. The attempt has occasioned a century and a half of controversy—partly about Locke's meaning, and partly about its real truth. Is Locke's experience = *the contingent element only*, in our conscious experience; or does it contain experience *in its catholic integrity* —including logical and metaphysical, as well as empirical elements? But I am not here writing the history of particular systems, nor applying the foregoing principles to the actual speculations of Locke or any other individual. Locke, moreover, was rather a practical antagonist of prevailing error, than a speculative philosopher. Hence the laxity of his metaphysical language, which has added many valuable books to the philosophical library—the last not the least ingenious. See Mr. Webb's *Intellectualism of Locke.* Dublin, 1857.

* The *Opera Philosophica* of Leibnitz, by Erdmann (Berlin, 1840), are well known. An appreciation of his Philosophy is a subject for a volume. We are only beginning to understand its meaning.

the influence of the revolution inaugurated by Hume, and in part also through the deeper insight into the ultimate problems of knowledge, occasioned by the more recent idealistic and materialistic systems of Germany and France. Recent European philosophy is a disclosure of some fresh aspects of Insoluble Realism,—by means of collision with extreme Idealisms and Materialisms, which may be traced back in their principles to the subtile analysis of the Scottish sceptic, refined and increased in power, at the hands of Kant and Fichte.*

I have thus indicated what I mean, when I say that the History of Philosophy may

* On Hume, in addition to the works of the Scottish philosophers, and Kant, see Jacobi's Dialogue, *David Hume, über den Glauben oder Idealismus und Realismus* (Breslau, 1787); and other works of that time in Germany; Cousin's *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie Moderne*, tom. i., &c.; and the *Lettres Philosophiques* of the Baron Galluppi. In Fichte, the Nihilism of Hume appears in all, and more than all, its original force. See the *Bestimmung des Menschen*, with its counterpart theory of Belief (*Glaube*).

be interpreted by us as a history, not of conflicting but of conspiring systems. In the technical words and phrases of these systems, we seem to hear the race of man thinking aloud, and to see it recording a series either of partial and one-sided—or of sceptical—or of confessedly irreducible systems of knowledge, as the expression of its varied speculative experience. The systems are in conflict when contemplated at the respective points of view of their authors. They all conspire to the discovery of manifold phases, and to the circulation of fresh life in one Catholic Philosophy—the theory of reality as essentially incomprehensible, which is at once the undeveloped Philosophy of the unreflecting many, and that practically acknowledged by all.

To the formation of this Philosophy all the genuine movements of human thought, in the past and the present, and of every school, may be viewed as, directly or indi-

rectly, a comprehensive contribution. In some of these movements the torch of truth has been raised higher than in others, and its light has then extended further over the dark ocean on which we seem to float, ever surrounded by the Infinite. The prospect actually attained, through each system, depends on the genius and insight of the individual thinker by whom the system is originated—for every great theory is an expression of individual genius and insight. It is diffused through society, in proportion as men are able to occupy the point of view of its author, and to interpret reality in the light of his technical words and formulas.*

The possibility of this conflict and yet co-operation among the three phases of

* "Words and formulas," which no philosophy worthy of the name has been ever able to dispense with, nor indeed any of the physico-mathematical sciences, *in which exact language is less indispensable than in philosophy.* But the use, in high speculation, of these necessary tools, does not absolve those guilty of the common sin of displaying this sort of apparatus everywhere, and in all work.

genuine philosophical speculation ;—those evolutions of Catholic, through the collisions of Sectarian with Sceptical Realism—collisions into which the human mind is brought back for its advantage, in recoil from the decline of a high Catholic Philosophy induced by an abatement of reflection ;—this unrest which conducts to a high and serene repose, from which we are summoned back into the conflict, that, in its hour of languor, the lofty serenity of our repose may be recovered,—may remind us of language used by a poet-philosopher in a very different service, when he refers to "the subtile progress by which, both in the natural and moral world, qualities pass insensibly into their contraries, and things revolve upon each other. As in sailing upon the orb of this planet, a voyage towards the regions where the sun sets, conducts gradually to the quarter where we have been accustomed to behold it come forth at its rising ; and, in like manner, a

voyage towards the east, the birthplace, in our imagination, of the morning, leads finally to the quarter where the sun is last seen when he departs from our eyes,—so the contemplative soul, travelling in the direction of mortality, advances to the country of everlasting life; and in like manner may she continue to explore those cheerful tracts, till she is brought back for her advantage and benefit, to the land of transitory things—of sorrow and tears."

A retrospect of the Past in Philosophy suggests some interesting analogies, between the representative creations of art, and the great philosophical systems, which seek to represent the universe symbolically, in its deepest relations to our rational life. One poet does not build mechanically upon the poetical insight of another; and neither can one philosopher build upon the philosophical insight of another. The earliest philosophers, as the earliest poets, may be

the best, and perhaps no successors will ever rival either Homer or Aristotle. As all genuine poets have added to the common stock of human imagination, so every genuine metaphysician contributes to the philosophical experience of the human mind, as it vainly struggles through reflection to comprehend reality. A book of philosophical doctrine may be regarded as the symbol of a reflective insight into the scheme of things, more or less penetrating in different authors and readers. The insight is gone when living thought has subsided in the verbal signs. The rise of reflection in a new age is often indicated, by a resurrection, for the men of that age, of their old meaning, in classical books of Philosophy, produced by a long gone generation. Not a little philosophical activity, in each new time, may be advantageously expended in efforts to restore their original life to books of that class, which—as the symbols of past reflection—remind us that the conservation

of *such* words is no guarantee for the conservation of *such* creations of thought.*

It follows from the relation which Rational Philosophy bears to its History, that a new philosophical course may be constructed with a *primary* reference, either to a logical plan of thought, or to the chronological order of the development of logico-metaphysical doctrines. We may try to contemplate the universe and our intellectual life in it, afresh for ourselves, in and through one of the three elementary types of Realism to which I have already alluded; or we may study, in the philosophical library, the speculative experience of the thinking part of mankind, as we find it

* All meditative words in all books thus *lose their meaning*, when an unreflecting reader is concerned with them; and meaning is, in fact, preserved in books of thought, only through reflective sympathy between the author and the successive generations of his readers. Yet how many accept the symbols instead of their significance—the letter for the spirit—and expect to fatten on the husks of words! "The bark" is still there, but the "waters are gone."

gradually registered in books and past systems of philosophy. In the one case, we have in the foreground our individual conscious experience, as our organ for the interpretation of reality; and our theory may be dogmatical, sceptical, or critical in its method,—comprehensible, contradictory, or incomprehensible in its last issues. In the other case, we are studying the variously developed consciousness of others, as it appears in, or disappears from, the literary records of the world's philosophical experiments; and what is contained in these records may be subjected to criticism and generalization.

Either of these two points of view invites over to itself those who occupy the other. If we begin by working out a Realistic theory for ourselves, we are naturally led to trace historically those elements of all speculation about reality, that are latent in the past perennial collision of the sectarian systems of Constructive Realism with the Scepti-

cism which refutes them. If we ground a philosophical course upon a chronological study of these same struggles of the philosophical past, we are moved by their apparent discord to seek for a point at which we can see their harmonious explanation.

In Rational Philosophy, accordingly, individual reflection is reasonably associated with a study of the records of reflection in others, and a philosophical history of philosophy implies a speculative system. On the one hand, we may strive—in a reflex study of *our own* consciousness of presented reality, and the limits of thought concerning Real Existence—to read the intellectual riddle of the universe, by pondering its problems for ourselves. We may resolve in this way to see the mystery of things with our own eyes, and not on testimony through the insight of others. On the other hand, sympathy with the insight of *others*, in the manifold phases and trials of that insight

in the past, is necessary, that our own insight may be deepened and extended, and made more nearly co-extensive with the Common Reason of humanity. In this effort to understand the great thinkers of the past, we often learn the humbling lesson, that in our own most successful mental experiments, the tide of reflection falls far short of the point it had reached in some long past age, when it filled recesses and ramifications of language, from which the meaning has now subsided, because the tide has with us ebbed below its ancient level.

Philosophy, in a word, ought not, on the one hand, to be divorced from the study of its own history, and cannot, on the other hand, be analysed into a mere study of the past. History and System are here correlative. We pass, accordingly, from the contemplation of Rational Philosophy in its History, to contemplate Rational Philosophy in the CATHOLIC SYSTEM.

The following course professes to be a system of Catholic or Insoluble Realism.

It proposes to offer *proof* that Real Existence—which may, in some of its phenomena or phases, be, directly or indirectly, apprehended in consciousness—is ultimately incomprehensible by finite intelligence. It *concludes* that we are bound, both by our speculative and our moral faith,—as purely rational and also as responsible beings,—to believe what we cannot comprehend in thought; and that every thorough-going metaphysical analysis of the objects of belief—presented in the external or internal world—must, in its issue, awaken the feeling of this intellectual and moral obligation. It sees, in the various Constructive and Destructive schemes of Philosophy, unconscious contributions to this proof and suggestions of this inference.

According to the analogy of the method alike of Plato and Bacon, it may be

affirmed that Rational Philosophy is both PURE and MIXED. It is either a reflex analysis of the logical and metaphysical elements of Reason, as these are necessarily involved in the conscious experience of HUMANITY, *i.e.*, the theory of *ideal* Reason; or it is a reflex study of the imperfect products of rational activity in INDIVIDUALS, *i. e.*, the theory of *actual* Reason, as embodied in a corporeal organization, and subject to the illusions by which a human intellectual life is more or less clouded here on earth. In Plato, man struggles to escape from the imperfections of the illusive and transitory, to the quiet assurance of the Real and Eternal. "There is no small difference," reiterates Bacon, "between the Idola of the human mind, and the Ideas of the Divine mind."

Reason, in short, in its true relations to the Real, differs from much in the opinions of individuals and communities. Pure Philosophy is the ultimate science of specula-

tive TRUTH, as attained by abstract meditation. It is the contemplation of what even Bacon might call Ideas of the Divine mind. It may be described as the theory of Reason regarded as a Revelation. Applied Philosophy the theory of ERROR, and avoidable ignorance; with rules and a discipline for their removal or abatement.

(A.)—PURE OR SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

Two chief offices are indispensable on the part of a Speculative System of Rational Philosophy.

It must *first* concentrate reflection upon THOUGHT or UNDERSTANDING; especially in order that the student may determine, and become familiar with, the Laws by which consciousness must, in this relation, be governed, and the Limits by which it must be confined. The *philosophical* problem, in this first part, is, to determine the capacity of thought.

It should, in the *next* place, contemplate

REAL EXISTENCE; especially in order that reality may be reflectively contrasted with illusion, perception with conception, fact with fancy, in some of the subtile speculations which the contrast has called forth during the last two thousand years. It is thus that evidence of the essential incomprehensibility of the Real World of Existence, *presented to* the Understanding, as contrasted with the comprehensibility of the World of Formal Thought, *created by* the Understanding, may be brought out into light. The highest *philosophical* office of this second part is—to compare Real Existence with the Conditions which regulate the capacity of Thought.

These two duties, between them, exhaust what, in the speculative part of this enterprise, it is proposed to accomplish. Rational Philosophy discharges the one duty in the abstract *Science of Logic*, and the other in the abstract *Science of Metaphysics*. It discharges both, by means

of a reflex study of our conscious experience.

The study of each of these sciences separately, and of the two in correlation, by means of independent reflection, and of reflective sympathy with former philosophical "experiments," — dogmatical, sceptical, and critical, is the nucleus of all philosophical study. It is the systematic contemplation of finite knowledge or intelligence, and of the speculations which have sought to give the deepest and truest expression to that theory. It implies, moreover, a mental discipline, in clear, distinct, conclusive, and methodical thought, —corresponding to its *logical* part; and in the intellectual and moral virtues, which are naturally fostered by a *metaphysical* analysis, that conducts from Sectarian Rationalism to the Catholic Faith of Reason, and leads to an ultimate repose upon the common feelings of the human mind, instead of on pretended explanations or

demonstrations of transcendental speculation.

It remains to indicate in outline the system, which lies involved in this general description of the two great departments of Speculative Philosophy. That outline I shall now offer, commencing with

LOGIC,

which, in the order of thought, takes the first place,* and, in its own nature, is the easier of the two sciences that constitute Rational Philosophy.†

Logic, as I have said, is the Philosophical Science of the Necessary Conditions of UNDERSTANDING or THOUGHT.

* Leibnitz refers to Logic as "philosophiæ *vestibulum.*"—(*Diss. de Stilo Philos. Nizolii.*) This accords with the spirit, if not with the letter, of the best schemes of reflex speculation; and, in particular, with the opinion of Aristotle, who says that a course of discipline in the Analytics (Formal Logic) should precede the study of axioms and metaphysical philosophy, *e.g.*, *ἐστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτη. ὅσα δ' ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν· δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τουτῶν ἥκειν προσεπισταμένους.*—(*Met.* iii. 3.)

† Formal Logic is, in fact, the easiest of all the sciences.

This science implies (1.) a psychological analysis of the conscious Understanding, as finite, or limited and subject to law even in the creation of a Notional World, *i.e.*, a reflex study of our conscious experience as logical; (2.) a formal analysis of the notional creations of Understanding, especially as explicated in the Proposition and Syllogism, *i.e.*, Formal Logic, or the analytic of logical forms.

I. *The Logical Element in our Conscious experience, and the Analytic of Logical Consciousness.*

Logic, when it is described and developed in strict scientific language, seems to be a study that is remote from ordinary human life and action. But when we look below the surface of the words in which any exact definition must be contained, we see that the proper matter of the study is involved, directly or indirectly,

in every phase and product of our conscious life.

The reference in every sentence, for example, in any language,—conforms to—or violates—or transcends the necessary laws of Understanding. The words represent what is *conceivable*, or what is *contradictory*, or what is *inconceivable*. Their professed meaning may lie—

A. *Within the sphere of thought*, and may be either (*a*) positive or thinkable—the intelligible; (*b*) negative or (so to speak) *anti*-thinkable—the contradictory:

B. *Beyond the sphere of thought*, when it is transcendent, incomprehensible, *un*-thinkable—the *un*intelligible.*

The first of these three kinds of sentence obeys, and the second pretends to disobey, the logical conditions of thought. Of the third we can neither say that it is

* *i.e.*, *Un*intelligible by us, or in finite understanding. Divine Intelligence we can know only through its *finite* revelations, as in Providential order and Moral Government, including Christianity. We dare not apply further our conscious experience of Understanding.

obedient nor disobedient to these conditions. We can pronounce two propositions to be contradictory which relate to what is finite, *i.e.*, within the category of Quantity; the Understanding is paralysed when it pretends to judge the Infinite, which transcends the category of Quantity.*

Many words in familiar use signify obedience or disobedience to logical law. When we describe a series of spoken or written sentences, as *clear*, *distinct*, *conclusive*, *methodical*, *&c.*, we affirm that the thought or meaning contained in them is, so far, conformed to the universal conditions of thought or meaning *as such*. When we condemn a professed creation of Understanding, as *confused*, *indistinct*, *obscure*, *contradictory*, *inconclusive*, *immethodical*, *&c.*, we are charging it with the direct, or

* *i.e.*, which cannot be individualized or conceived as an *object*,—for objectivity, as we can understand it, implies finitude. An object of consciousness may be an indefinitely great Whole—may transcend *human* imagination; but it cannot absolutely transcend the relation of Whole and Parts—become Infinite.

indirect, violation of those conditions. The one class of words, in short, represents logical, and the other illogical, creations of Understanding.

It must be noted, that, as thought cannot produce what is known to contradict its own laws, "contradictory" or "illogical" thought is, properly speaking, not thought at all. A contradiction may no doubt be presented in words. *We may know also that the words represent the contradictory and not merely the incomprehensible.* But a contradiction cannot be realized in consciousness.

Every conscious act is either in agreement with, or in attempted resistance to, the ultimate conditions of Understanding; for every act of consciousness may be regarded as an act of Understanding. Now, as things may be illustrated by their contraries, logical, as distinguished from illogical thinking, is illustrated when we *try experimentally* to think illogically, *i.e.*, try

to produce thought in violation of the necessary conditions of thinking. A gymnastic exercise of this sort is a useful discipline in the early part of a course of philosophical logic. It helps to make the student familiar, through reflection, with the *kind* of intellectual vice against which logical rules are directed, and with the opposite virtues, which the fundamental principle of NON-CONTRADICTION * expresses in the most abstract form.

All logical study is at bottom psychological, when we mean by Psychology the reflex study of our *whole* conscious experience. It is true that when the science is presented only in the technical words and

* Aristotle refers once and again, in his *Metaphysics*, to the Principle of Non-Contradiction, as the fundamental principle of all, and thus the foundation of his *First* Philosophy or Theology, *e.g.*, B. III. 3, 4, 6, (and in chap. 7, the impossibility of a mean between contradictories,) B. V. 5, &c. He thus connects the theory on which his *Analytics* rest with his Ontology. It is in harmony with this (implied) arrangement, that we should pass through Metaphysics, on our way from pure logical science to Mixed and Applied Philosophy.

formulas of the ordinary logical manuals, it seems to be not more an appeal to reflection than is geometry or algebra. But when we approach the words and formulas, through a course of mental experiments of the sort already indicated, we find that to these they all appeal. They refer us to necessities in thought of which we are conscious and by which we must be governed, whether or not, as logical psychologists, we reflect upon them in abstraction from the other elements in conscious experience.

Logic is not described with enough of precision, when it is merely termed the study of our conscious experience. That experience involves three elements. It is necessary to distinguish Logic, as a psychological study, from Metaphysics, as a psychological study ; and both from what is sometimes called Empirical Psychology. Our conscious experience may be considered in a *logical*, a *metaphysical*, or an *empirical* point of view. A word on the

two first. The last belongs to Applied Philosophy.

Every act of Consciousness may be contemplated at either of two points of view. It involves two elements, which may be considered by the philosopher apart, although each, in our actual mental history, implies the other. Consciousness may be contemplated as pure *Thought*, *Understanding* or *Conception;* and also as *Belief in something Real.*

Consciousness, *as thought*, is discrimination of the object of which we are conscious, from other objects with which, expressly or by implication, it is compared. Thought is consciousness engaged in distinguishing or comparing; and every act of consciousness implies the abstraction of its object. Logical consciousness is thus cognisant of objects in and through notional quantities. It is a consciousness of them, as individually distinct, and thus mutually related by means of *notions;* although we

do not commonly speak of notions, until the productions of Understanding are ripe for the use of *language*—when the logical element is present in considerable intensity. Logic analyses the conditions to which consciousness, as discriminative, must conform, —apart from questions about the reality of what we are conscious of. Illusions of the Imagination, for instance, may be elaborated into a consistent system of thought; and External Perception, when its characteristic belief in the external reality of its object is eliminated by abstraction, may be contemplated as an act of purely logical consciousness.

But every conscious act may also be recognised, by the philosopher, *as a Belief*, and not merely as a Thought. It may be viewed in relation to the Real, and to our ultimate and essential Faith; and not merely as a Conception subject to necessary conditions.* Consciousness, as belief,

* In both cases it involves Understanding or Conception.

is measured by a reality independent of conception, and not merely by the laws of Understanding. When so regarded, consciousness is viewed metaphysically; for Metaphysics is an analysis of the objective or real universe, in its relation to the ultimate beliefs of consciousness.

In the logical, as thus distinguished from the metaphysical analysis of consciousness, we subordinate the element of Belief, and concentrate reflection upon Thought; in

Belief implies *discernment*—partial or total—of what is believed; though a totality of what is believed in may become, as such, ultimately indiscernible or incomprehensible. "Consciousness," says an ingenious writer, "is essentially, or in its nature *intellectual;* for a sense or knowledge of Being and Existence . . . is unquestionably Rational or Intellectual knowledge; and it follows hereupon, that consciousness and the understanding do mutually imply and infer one another; so that wherever there is consciousness, there must be an understanding, and so *vice versa*. . . . Now, if the Understanding be a conscious faculty, it must needs therefore, as such, perceive everything that is consciously perceived. . . . *Intellectus omnia percipit.* The Understanding, considered as a conscious faculty, is like an universal sense, which perceives and takes cognizance of all the mind's faculties and powers; and *consequently of their objects, there being no possibility of separating the object or thing from the act of perceiving.*"—(*Essay on Consciousness.* London, 1728.)

the metaphysical, as distinguished from the logical analysis of consciousness, we subordinate the element of Conception or Thought, and concentrate reflection upon Belief. Logic is Conceptualism or Nominalism; Metaphysics is Realism.* Logic is satisfied by the production of non-contradictory conception and reasoning;† and adjourns, as irrelevant to its province of inquiry, the element of the Real,—which, in and through ultimate Belief, is, in one phase or another, latent in all consciousness. Metaphysics is satisfied with the Real; though, as a part of Rational Philosophy, it contemplates the Real as an object of thought, and thus compares our logical with our metaphysical consciousness. The com-

* The famous Realist controversy of mediæval times, belongs to Metaphysics; that between Nominalism and Conceptualism may be treated in Psychological Logic. The old Realists may be viewed as occupying the Platonic or metaphysical, and the Nominalists the Aristotelean and formal point of view—apart from the question of the Realism or Nominalism of Aristotle himself.

† *i.e.*, a Notional World that, as a whole and in its parts, is a non-contradictory totality.

parison illustrates, in many ways, the difference between the NOTIONAL WORLD *created by* Understanding, and the REAL WORLD *presented to* Understanding. On the one hand, if the Real is ultimately Infinite, it must be ultimately inconceivable; for Conception is limitation. On the other hand, Conception is not necessarily confined to Real Existence as *originally* presented in our conscious experience, for that experience may be *arbitrarily* elaborated (*i.e.* represented or misrepresented) in the creations of logical and poetical consciousness.

The Analytic of logical consciousness treats, in short, of the characteristics of the Notional World of Understanding, produced through abstraction—either as represented by its verbal signs in language (*i.e.*, as *symbolical*), or as typified in an individual object—actual or ideal (*i.e.*, as *intuitive*). It recognises that world as subject to necessary laws, and resolves these laws into

their simplest expression. It studies the rationale of the *form* of discriminative consciousness as such, as distinguished from this or that discriminated *matter*.

This First Part of Logic is the preparation for the next. It is the link which connects logical formulas with the reflex study of consciousness ; and by its means the psychological, and thus the philosophical, character of the science is maintained. In most of the manuals of Logic in current use, this link is either left unformed, or else produced in a rude and unfinished state. The philosophical students of the science are at this point indebted to some distinguished psychologists in Germany and in Britain ;* but there is

* The late speculative renovation of Logic, still in progress in Germany and Britain, associates itself with the name of Kant, and was at first the fruit of the discussion which his logical theory occasioned in and beyond Germany. The Kantian speculation contained the germ of a demonstrative science of Logic, but overlooked the *psychological assumptions* which are its basis. Trendelenburg, Drobisch, Fries, Ritter, and others in Germany, have helped, by their discussions, to correct the oversight, or to induce a fresh re-

still a call for fresh labour, in the work of opening channels, through which reflective life may be conveyed into the technicalities and formulas of that "discursive" algebra, which constitutes the propositional and syllogistic doctrine.

II. *Formal Logic*, i.e., *the Analytic of Logical Forms—Propositional and Syllogistic.*

The Analytic of Logical Forms introduces us to that considerable part of philosophical literature, which, at least in

view of the speculative place of the science. I need hardly refer to the kindred labours of certain Oxford logicians, especially Mr. Mansel, whose *Prolegomena Logica*, and edition of the *Rudimenta* of Aldrich, must be well known to the student of Logic, and to whom the philosophical world is indebted for the admirable article on *Metaphysics*, in the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Mr. Spalding's excellent *Introduction to Logical Science*, may also be consulted with advantage in this connexion. The view indicated in the text proposes an advance in the same direction, along with an adjustment of the *philosophical* office of Logic, as one of the two sciences which constitute Rational Philosophy. Both these sciences are nourished and kept in growth by a reflex study of our conscious experience, purified by abstraction for their respective purposes—the one to determine the *formal essence* of Thought or Understanding, the other the *essential* Beliefs by which Reason is regulated.

Western Europe, is the offspring of a part of the *Organon** of Aristotle ; and which (more or less corrupted at different times from its scientific simplicity) has for ages taken a prominent place in liberal education. It is the Regulative Science of the Notional World, as that world is developed through *analytical* judgments and reasonings, in the forms of the PROPOSITION and SYLLOGISM, and under the rules of formal DEFINITION and DIVISION.†

* Trendelenburg's *Elementa Logices Aristotelæ*, and Reid's *Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic*, with Hamilton's Notes, may be mentioned as a preparative for the study of the *Organon*. To these might be added the contributions of Brandis and St. Hilaire, to the interpretation of Aristotle, and the history of Aristotelean logic.

† One cannot here enlarge without writing a book. The student can be at no loss for compendiums of Formal Logic,—in which the Proposition and Syllogism,—Definition and Division, are scientifically treated. The *Port-Royal Logic* (as translated by Mr. Baynes), the *Elements* of Whately, and the *Outlines* of Thomson, are known to all. The *Institutiones Logicæ* of Burgersdicius, and the *Logica* of Claubergius, ought to be generally known, as well as the works mentioned in the two previous notes. The theory of logical forms, and their proposed extension, as in the works of De Morgan and Boole, may be examined. I need not mention the logical writings of Sir William Hamilton.

This has long been recognised as a fixed or stable part of Rational Philosophy ; and it has, as such, been contrasted with the "oscillations" which are said to mark the history of Metaphysics. Logic has kept its place, as an exact science, from the earliest times. As Kant remarks, it has not needed to retrace a step since Aristotle —unless in the way of clearing off useless subtilties, or unfolding with more precision what had been previously suggested. It is by this sort of scientific elaboration that its beauty, if not its certainty, has been promoted. Its continued life, *as a philosophical study*, depends upon the maintenance, by logicians, of a free and constant communication with our logical consciousness, through reflection upon the laws and limits of Understanding,

The Analytic of Logical Consciousness, and the Analytic of Logical Forms, are the rational pathway into

METAPHYSICS,

which is the consummation of pure intellectual philosophy, and the region in which the most subtile and comprehensive speculations of mankind have been in course of formation since the dawn of civilisation.

Metaphysics, or the Philosophical Science of REAL EXISTENCE,* involves two problems. Real existence may either be actually present (or at least presentable) in conscious experience, or it may transcend our logical consciousness. We are either able to con-

* The definitions of Metaphysics that were current in ancient and medieval times, *appear* to differ essentially from discussions and investigations, commonly called "metaphysical," current in Europe since Descartes, and especially in Britain since Locke. With Aristotle it is *ἡ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄντος*, and this definition reappears in a long array of metaphysical treatises. See Suarez "De Natura Metaphysicæ," in his *Disputationes*, the *Metaphysica Generalis* of Baronius, the *Institutiones Metaphysicæ* of Burgersdicius, &c. With Locke, Kant, Reid, &c., it is the study of human reason. Kant's allusion to Copernicus is well known.

This apparent discordance may be reconciled—for all genuine Metaphysics is (consciously or unconsciously) a *psychological* or *relative* science of Real Existence—more or less catholic.

ceive it, or we are not. One fundamental problem in Metaphysics, accordingly, relates to the Real, as an object of finite consciousness. Another fundamental problem in Metaphysics relates to the Real, as inconceivable or incomprehensible, under the necessary conditions of such consciousness. In the former, we reflect upon what *is*, as an object of immediate or mediate Perception, and therefore as FINITE or CONCEIVABLE. In the latter, we reflect upon what *is*, as what cannot be, either immediately or mediately, presented to conditioned consciousness, because INFINITE or INCONCEIVABLE. An analysis of the metaphysical part of conscious experience should address itself to both problems; and, in so doing, exhibit the universal feelings and convictions of human nature, in which both originate, and by which both are *practically* solved.

I.—*The Finite in our Metaphysical expe-*

rience, i.e., *the Real presented or presentable as an object in Time.*

The Real World, as distinguished from the Notional, is originally presented to us as an object in Time, *i.e.*, as a temporal phenomenon or event of longer or shorter duration. The phases of Being known to us are, so to speak, *historical;* the forms of the notional world are *abstracted.* Real existence, when perceived, must be perceived as something which appears on the stream of Time; when merely conceived, it must be conceived as something manifested in Time.* It is another question whether a temporal object, however protracted, satisfies the deeper cravings of Reason; but the metaphysical consciousness is, at any rate, *aroused* by the appearance of THE REAL, as a visible or invisible EVENT in our conscious experience.†

* A logical *individual* must be conceived as a *temporal* object.

† The *metaphysical* problem regarding Time itself is wrapped

"Nothing," says Berkeley, "seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by Thing, Reality, Existence; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of these words."*

A preliminary exercise, at this first stage in Metaphysics, is a reflective study of SPECIMENS of *real events present to consciousness*, in contrast with the *mere creations of Understanding* to which logical

up in the *insolubility* of the problem of Existence; and the insolubility remains, whether Time is independent of, or a mere relation in finite knowledge.

* *Principles of Human Knowledge.* Things of *sense*, he remarks in another passage, "are said to have *more reality* in them than fancies; *by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct.*" In Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*, vol. i. part ii. § 6, "*Of the Idea of Existence and of External Existence*," we find the virtual assumption of all Constructive systems.

study has accustomed us.* External Perception and Self-consciousness are to be compared and contrasted with Conception. It is in mental experiments of this sort that we become familiar with the philosophical characteristics of *the Real* as distinguished from *the Notional.* We thus learn to separate the world of metaphysical from the world of merely logical philosophy; genuine perception from illusions which may be formally enough elaborated by thought.

Two celebrated illustrations of rational consciousness "face to face" with what is Real take the front place. Real EXTERNAL existence is believed to be present in *sense-consciousness;* and real INTERNAL existence is believed to be present in *self-conscious-*

* Of course, our notions, and the successive representations in the ideal world of fancy, *may* be regarded as a series of (real) *events* in our consciousness—as phases of the self-conscious being. But when we so regard them, we cease to contemplate them in the logical point of view. They are then treated as *real* objects of internal perception, and not merely as *potential* objects of conception.

*ness.** The most subtile speculation and controversy in literature has circulated round these two centres. One extreme party of philosophers, for instance, maintains that sense-consciousness is only a modification of self-consciousness; that "a self-conscious existence" is the *only* reality; and that the solid and extended world is merely an orderly series of the modifications of a conscious self. According to an opposite philosophical party, self-consciousness is only a phase of sense or world consciousness; and "what is solid and extended" is the *one* ultimate type of the Real.†

The one of these two extremes is essentially *Idealistic*, and the other is essentially *Materialistic* Realism. Each has struggled

* Here note the meaning of "external" and "internal," and of Space.

† If it be true that Philosophical Scepticism awakens the mind to the true scope of Philosophical Problems, the *Treatise of Human Nature*, vol. i. part iv. §§ 2 and 6, may discharge this office in reference to the two problems referred to in this paragraph; to which may be added the first and second books of Fichte's *Bestimmung des Menschen*. The speculative mind of India was conscious of them some three thousand years ago.

to exclude the partial truth that is implied in the teaching of the other; and both have been tested, once and again, by speculative scepticism, which accepts either in order to annihilate both. A deep study of this chapter in history may help to awaken reflection to phases of speculation, concerning the Real as presented and presentable to consciousness, which demand, for their adequate appreciation, years of patient thought.*

MATTER, as presented in *world*-consciousness, and SELF as presented in *all* our conscious experience, are to be reflected on in this part of Metaphysics. It is here that we contemplate the *phenomena* of Matter,

* Explore, as a beginning in this part of metaphysical study, the works of Scottish metaphysicians from Hume onwards. Vols. I. and II. of Baxter's *Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul* may also be consulted, of which the first edition appeared about 1735, when it was criticised by the Rev. John Jackson, in his *Dissertation on Matter and Spirit*. See likewise Cousin's *Histoire des Principaux Systèmes de la Philosophie Moderne sur la question de l'Existence Personnelle*, in the first volume of his *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie Moderne*.

and the *phenomena* of Self, in their relation (*a*) to ourselves as conscious—*i. e.*, to consciousness, and (*b*) to the Real Existence which, in and through them, is present in conscious experience. The personal act of knowing, (in its Qualities or phenomenal phases,) what exists really, is in some sort a relative or dependent knowledge. As Knowledge, *what appears* depends on the act of consciousness, which is transient; as Real, *what appears* is believed to be independent of transient consciousness, and to be ultimately dependent on what is Substantial and Eternal. The appearance in consciousness of the phases of Self, and the phases of Matter is, accordingly, a signal for speculations, which at last carry us beyond what is Finite and Conceivable.

But Finite Knowledge itself still suggests another problem. All *presentable* reality is not *actually presented.* It is

only a small part of the Material World, for instance, that, on any hypothesis, comes thus within the range of human consciousness ;—only, it may be alleged, our own bodily organism, and what is in contact with it. If our Belief, regarding the phases of Being, must be confined to the real objects of which we are *immediately* conscious, the limits of Belief must be narrow indeed, — much narrower than we know them to be. Presentable reality—past, distant, and future objects—may (so we find in our conscious experience) be *represented* through objects of which we are conscious ; and the representative is "interpreted" by means of Belief. The interpretation of presented representatives of absent objects is the chief business of life. It is founded on the universal Belief, that the Real of which we are conscious is under Physical Law—that its manifestations are stable, consistent, uniform.

The reflex study of what is Real, as

Finite and presentable to consciousness, may accordingly be a study of the Real, both as *actually present* to consciousness in external or internal PERCEPTION, and as *virtually present* to consciousness, in and through what we may call our INDUCTIVE BELIEF.*

Belief in the Universe, *as a stable and coherent objective system*, is an element in our ordinary belief in the Universe as something real. An abolition of all Natural Law or Order in the evolution of events,—in the manifestation of the *phases* of real existence,—would reduce to an inappreciable point our Common Faith in things as real. It would practically confound reality and illusion, perception and fancy, our waking life and our dreams,—even if human consciousness could be supposed to

* Hume's theory of this Belief—its nature, origin, and applications—is a hinge on which his Speculative Philosophy and Speculative Theology turns. See *Treatise of Human Nature*, vol. i. part iii., and *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*. (I here omit a Note regarding our Faith in *External intelligence and design*—human and Divine.)

maintain its life in such circumstances for an hour. Through the Inductive Belief, our knowledge of Existence, as a system of mutually related objects, is a *progressive* knowledge; nor, as it seems, is Belief in the *coherence* or *consistency* of the surrounding Universe different in kind from our practical faith in its *reality* as finite.*

The Finite or Conceivable Universe is thus in part actually presented, in part only presentable and possibly represented, in conscious experience. Its phenomena are either actually presented or presentable. In the former case, we apprehend the Real in the very object of which we are conscious. In the latter case, the Real may be brought within the sphere of intelligible Belief, by means of the Representative Faculty and an Inductive comparison of instances.†

* I do not now discuss the *origin* of the former Belief, or its relation to Mental Association—one of the minor problems of a past day.

† The Inductive Method, &c., belong to Applied Philosophy.

When we study the Real, especially as actually present to consciousness, we are attracted by the celebrated hypothesis of REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION, or more generally of the *representative* character of *all* our knowledge of what is independent of our successive states of consciousness. That hypothesis may be supposed to originate in this question :—Must not a Finite and relative knowledge of real things, be a Representative Knowledge of real things ?

Is it meant that *all* finite reality—external and internal—is unpresentable in consciousness—that real knowledge *as such* is essentially representative ? Are *all* our Beliefs respecting the real world. which exists in Time and Space, the issue of, *e.g.*, the logical treatment of a merely notional world ? Then every form of Realism proper must be illusory, and Scepticism is the last result of all high intellectual culture. Reality of some sort, and to a greater or less extent, *must* be

present to consciousness. We must come, as it were, into conscious contact with the uniform and coherent universe, *at some point*, or we are shut out from it altogether and for ever. On the opposite hypothesis, we have no basis on which to rear our scientific structures, or even to form the knowledge needed in common life.

This granted, however, it may be alleged that all Belief in, and knowledge of, the *external* Real, is the result of an "interpretation" of certain phases of Self, and of the Belief which such interpretation implies. It may be affirmed that we approach what is *not*-self, only through the medium of our "ideas"—that we are conscious of *ourselves as in a variety of consciousnesses*—and that we infer, from a certain series of those consciousnesses, the existence of an External World, by which they are caused, or with which they are connected in an established harmony, and of which they are virtually the representatives? On this

hypothesis, our knowledge of *ourselves as conscious* cannot be analysed; the object of which we are conscious is the very reality itself. On the other hand, on the same hypothesis, our knowledge of *matter in sense* can be analysed; and it is found by analysis to imply, (1.) the consciousness of a presented phase or modification of *self, i.e.*, a representative "idea," and (2.) an inference, immediate or mediate, concerning what is not-self, founded on that conscious modification. In a word, *self*-consciousness cannot, but so-called *sense*-consciousness can be analysed. The one is an irreducible fact; the result in the other is reached through an inference—*i.e.*, an interpretation of a particular dialect, as it were, in the language of self-consciousness.*

But why is the whole *external* world thus

* The prevalence, *in Western Europe, since Descartes*, of a subtile hypothesis of Representative Perception, seems to be connected with the revolution in the definitions of Metaphysics already alluded to. It was thus the herald of an approaching Truth.

relegated to the category of represented, as distinct from presented existence? If it be the common feeling of the human mind, in its healthy condition, that an external and extended, and not merely the internal or self-conscious world, is *actually present to consciousness* in External Perception, may that common feeling be arbitrarily set aside as irrational? If so, *all* our common feelings may be worn away by speculative reasoning.* The mass of irreducible beliefs, which constitutes our rational and moral nature in its integrity, may be dissolved in doubt, by reasoning founded on this sort of arbitrary logical assumption. Instead of doubtfully inferring that a real External world lies

* Some acute remarks on these topics may be found in one of the ablest English philosophical books of the eighteenth century—Price's *Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals*, ch. i. 2, and ch. v. "What pretence," he asks, "can there be for asserting that *figure*, *motion*, and *solid extension* are SENSATIONS, which cannot any more than pleasure and pain have a real existence out of the mind, that will not imply the same of *all* that is commonly thought to have a distinct and continued existence?"

behind our representative ideas, may we not rather recognise that very external world as *already within* the range of consciousness—as, in fact, the very object of which we are conscious,—and what philosophers erroneously suppose to be only a series of *representative* ideas ?

The abolition accordingly of *this* supposed world of REPRESENTATIVE IDEAS is the service which, in modern times, was proposed by Berkeley and Reid—each in his own fashion. With Berkeley the IDEAS *become* the reality ; and the hypothetical world behind them is swept away, as "a manifest contradiction." With Reid and other Scottish metaphysicians the EXTERNAL WORLD, which the ideas were reported to conceal and yet reveal, is as it were, *brought forward to consciousness ;* and the ideas are discarded as illusory, hypothetical, and containing the elements of a general spirit of scepticism. But for one essential point in which they differ,

it may seem that the disciple of Reid differs from the disciple of Berkeley, only about the meaning and use of words—that the same real object, to which the one gives the name of *idea*, receives the name of *external matter* from the other. Nevertheless the line which separates Sectarian Idealism from Catholic Realism, is found to run through that one narrow point. "The question between the materialists and me," says Berkeley, "is not whether things have a real existence *out of the mind of this or that person*, but whether they have an Absolute Existence *distinct from being perceived by God.*" This "absolute existence," out of all consciousness, Berkeley denies. With him Mind is necessarily of the essence of existence. It has still to be proved that either an affirmation or negation of this speculative assumption is within human knowledge.

II. *Our Metaphysical experience of the Real as Infinite. Transcendental Metaphysics and Conscious Faith.*

But is there not a deeper sense than that which has come within view in what goes before, in which we may affirm that a FINITE or RELATIVE knowledge of Existence is, as such, a REPRESENTATIVE knowledge of existence ?

A question of this sort has been pondered by philosophers of different schools, and in various forms. The cave of Plato —the *materia prima* of Aristotle and the Peripatetics—the *noumenon* of Kant, and the Absolute of recent philosophers, are images and words which dimly shadow forth our latent Belief, in the insufficiency of a universe of objects or events—limited and plural because intelligible. They give faltering expression to our inarticulate longing for the Infinite or Inconceivable.

But the Real—presented or presentable

to our consciousness—cannot, without a contradiction, in any conceivable meaning of representation, be a representative of INFINITE reality. One *finite* object may represent another *finite* object. It may do so either through the *resemblance* it is known to bear to it, or because it is known to be *invariably connected* with the object whose representative it thus virtually becomes. A human face is represented by a portrait; ashes represent a lately extinguished fire.

Now, in neither of these ways can the finite represent the Infinite. How can what is conceivable represent the inconceivable? An object cannot resemble what transcends objectivity.* It is only between objects that a relation of invariable connexion is conceivable. Accordingly, what is presented or represented in a conscious experience that must be regulated by the Laws of Thought, and that must be con-

* Hence the failure of all finite analogies to represent the Infinite or Inconceivable.

versant with what is within the category of number, cannot illustrate the Infinite, in which plurality and difference are lost.

Thus far the Infinite is the *not-conceivable*. But does the word mean no more than a mere negation of thought? Does it not express a part of our Metaphysical, as well as a part of our Logical experience? Does not the Real itself, in and through a BELIEF of which we are conscious, ultimately disappear as it were, as Infinite, Inconceivable, or Transcendental? Even in this high department of what has been called Transcendental Metaphysics, we must still hold fast by what we are conscious of.

We are drawn towards that experience, especially by the two following groups of questions :—

First, Are there any elements in metaphysical consciousness which makes us *intellectually dissatisfied* with the Real, immediately or mediately presentable in our conscious experience, as a merely tem-

poral object or event? Are we conscious of Beliefs by which the essential insolubility of the Real is illustrated? Does Reason, for example, contain elements which compel us to recognise, that Faith in what transcends Understanding is the only true rationalism; and that the so-called rationalism, which assumes that our intellectual life is essentially comprehensible, is really irrational? Does not the reflex study of consciousness disclose, as a matter of mental experience, more than one phase of a common Belief or Feeling, that Real Existence must necessarily be *inadequately* presented to finite intelligence—that what exists is what thought cannot absolutely take in—that *conception* (as far as our words can express its relation to unpresentable existence), is *the limitation of the illimitable?*

Secondly, By what elements in consciousness may we be *practically guided*, amid the intellectual darkness which—on an affirmative answer to the last series of

questions—covers the region of Transcendental Metaphysics? If the conscious Understanding, which can judge logically of Existence only as presented or represented, is paralysed by the discovery that the Real is *ultimately* Infinite, must the paralysis be communicated to all the functions of our practical life? Is the discovery that *for man* Truth ends in the inconceivable, a discovery that *all* truth is beyond the human faculties? Is a recognition of the ultimate insolubility of the Real existence that is presented in and around us, of the essence of Scepticism? or does the recognition not rather open room for the free action of all that is purest and noblest in human nature, as human nature ought to be? Does it not teach us, for example, that the most urgent practical conclusion, from reflection upon the logical and metaphysical experience of which we are conscious, is, the need and value of an education of the heart and character?

The answer to the *former* of these groups of questions must place in the foreground, our IRREDUCIBLE and TRANSCENDENTAL BELIEFS in general, and the CAUSAL BELIEF in particular.* The incomprehensibility of these Beliefs may be illustrated by a logical criticism of each, which issues in the conclusion, that the laws and limits of Thought ultimately forbid us to *understand*, what nevertheless we are conscious of being under an irresistible impulse to *believe*. We are thus impelled to the Infinite by Faith; we are repelled from the Infinite by Thought. Belief carries us beyond the finite or temporal: the logical conditions of consciousness forbid intelligence to follow.†

* "Tum demum *scimus* cum *causam* cognoscimus," is an old philosophical maxim. Philosophy proper, or the Transcendental Metaphysics, was thus the speculation of Causes, and in this view we may still maintain the thesis, "Logica non est Philosophiæ pars sed ejus Organum."

† This inability to *conceive*, in union with this necessity to *believe*, seems to express our state of mind when we, as it were, take our *last* view of Real Existence, for instance, as it disappears in endless Time. We cannot but *believe* that existence is Eternal, and yet we cannot (logically) *conceive* Eter-

The answer to the *latter* series of questions may offer, the spontaneous feelings and tendencies of human nature, regulated by our moral and religious trust, as an available substitute for an intelligible theory of Existence. Human nature in its normal integrity is the rational light of man. The Practical Revelation of the Common Sense is the last tribunal of Reason on these high questions. "Though the comprehension of our understandings," says Locke, "comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things, yet we shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our being, for that proportion and degree of knowledge he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of the inhabitants of this our mansion. . . .

nity. But the inability is surely different in kind from the belief. In scientific language, the former is logical and pertains to thought; the latter is metaphysical and (so far as I at present see) unaccountable. (I omit a Note on this Belief, in its relation to the logical limitation of Understanding; as well as on the possibility of the harmony of *Natural Law or Order* with *Moral Government and agency*—this last sometimes called *free* causation or *free* will—and of both with the Belief by which we are impelled to the Infinite or Inconceivable-real.)

How short soever men's knowledge may come of a universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties. The candle, that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all our purposes. The discoveries we can make with this, ought to satisfy us; and we shall then use our understanding right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion, that they are suited to our faculties. . . . If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do much-what as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly." *

The two following rules for the criticism of the Irreducible Faith on which human life reposes, may be defended as results of logico-metaphysical analysis.

* *Essay on Human Understanding*, B. i. *Introduction.*

(1.) A Common Belief may be presumed to be true until it is disproved. The presumption is in favour of the Spontaneous Belief of men, and against *metaphysical* paradoxes.* This is the germ of the Principle of METAPHYSICAL PRESUMPTION.

(2.) A Common Belief is not disproved merely by its incomprehensibility. Our ultimate Faith must be received in its radical mystery ; it is not to be modified and distorted, to gratify the Understanding, by the factitious symmetry of a logical system. The Revelation contained in the unwritten Book of Common Sense, must be accepted, even although the propositions, which the Revelation implies, may be collectively irreducible into a logical system of dogmatic metaphysics. This I may term the Principle of METAPHYSICAL INTEGRITY.

* Presumption is not necessarily against *all* paradoxes, *e.g.*, in contingent knowledge and the sphere of Applied Philosophy, where every great discovery is at first a paradox. And even in Metaphysics we learn so to see old beliefs with a fresh eye and in new lights, that they appear novel and paradoxical.

We seem to have no alternative, between the trust in our Regulative Tendencies, that is expressed in the rules to which I refer, and both speculative and practical Scepticism.

It should be added, that the Regulative forces of human nature may be manifested in *individuals* in greater or less vigour. The nobler may be actually subordinated to the lower and narrower,—as a Constructive, a Sceptical, or a Catholic philosophy happens to be in the ascendant. The due development of genuine human nature, in individuals and society, is not independent of the influence of canons and conclusions in Speculative Philosophy.

An adequate application of these rules to the transcendental part of our metaphysical experience would require a volume. Take one instance of a Belief, already alluded to, in and through which the Real transcends the Capacity of Thought.

All consciousness, and, therefore, at last, all thought, is of an object *more or less extended in Time.* Real Existence, although presented and presentable to consciousness as a series of external or internal events, *i.e.*, as more or less extended in Time, and, therefore, conceivable, is spontaneously believed by all to be *without* beginning or end—*i.e.*, absolutely unpresentable as an object. We are here in a mysterious medium, between our metaphysical Belief in the Real World, and the logical capacity of our Notional World. We cannot *believe*, on the one hand, that Time now occupied, was ever empty ; we must believe that Existence is without beginning or end. On the other hand, we cannot *conceive* endless (*i.e.*, illimitable or infinite) Existence. It is neither presented nor presentable to our consciousness ; for Conception or Understanding is confined to the category of Quantity. Existence, *intelligible* as presented in finite time, be-

comes—*through the irresistible belief that it is endless*—inconceivable and unpresentable,—in a word, Infinite.

Thus the limit of Understanding does not determine the limit of belief. A scientific reduction of the Transcendental Belief to which I have referred, is inconsistent with the capacity of thought. Here Conscious Faith takes the place which our *necessary* metaphysical ignorance has left vacant. Transcendental Metaphysics is of value, only as it discovers its own illegitimacy.

Ignorant as we *must* be of what is meant, for example, by Existence Infinite or Inconceivable in Time, we may reverentially confide, amid our ignorance, and even by the help of our ignorance, in the constant supremacy of goodness and a moral government; and, without any obstruction from Reason, we may yield to the Belief that we are responsible and under external law in what we do. Real existence is at last a great darkness to us. Yet we

may travel onwards for ever through the darkness, under the conviction, and in the feeling, that this real and incomprehensible Universe is a *morally governed* Universe, and that all things in the immortal life of the good man "work together" for his good. Our inability, *ultimately*, to understand the Universe—as a real series of conscious and unconscious events or objects of inconceivable duration—need not hinder us from understanding our duties, and meeting our responsibilities, in that Universe. The Real is at last unintelligible, but present Duty may be understood and acted on; while the ultimate inconceivability of the Universe disables the antagonists, and also the friends of morality and religion, from drawing positive force to their side from the Transcendental region in Metaphysics.

Modern Cosmology and Natural Theology teem with problems to which these principles may be applied. Do men not

often try to solve *speculatively* problems regarding Creation and its history in Providence, Free-Will and Necessity, which, as transcendental, are beyond Understanding; while our religious life, as immortal beings amid these mysteries, is not, therefore, incapable of *practical* solution? The question carries our thoughts far.

Through these mental trials of reflection we are conducted to the wisest and most widely applicable lesson of all,—that the Real, immediately and mediately presented in our conscious experience — in which the unending life of man with all its tremendous responsibilities must be passed,—involves in its heart an *intellectual* mystery that is beyond Understanding; and that faith in God—revealed and yet concealed—in whom Truth and Goodness are united, is the Divinely offered support in this ultimate darkness of Speculative Reason. At this point the logical or finite Understanding, which comprehends phases

of Being that, as temporal events, come within the sphere of consciousness, is at a stand, and we must be regulated by UNIVERSAL TENDENCIES to which *it* cannot give adequate expression—

> "Our little systems have their day;
> They have their day, and cease to be:
> They are but broken lights of Thee,
> *And Thou, O Lord, art more than they.*
>
> *We have but Faith: we cannot know;*
> *For Knowledge is of things we see.*"

We know only enough to justify our confidence, that the supremacy of a *moral* belief in the Good does not logically require a dissolution of our *speculative* belief in the True. We know enough to save us from the possibility of a conflict, in which every good man would seem to sacrifice his love for Truth to a love still more sacred. We know that the Real, ultimately incomprehensible in the Understanding, as an object presented in Time, may be comprehended for all the high purposes of responsible

life, through our Regulative Beliefs, which imply Faith in the immortality of man and of moral government.* In this knowledge we may leave the Speculative Problem of Real Existence unsolved for ever — the *present* trial of a Faith which, in a moral agent purified and elevated by Divine influence, is *at last* absorbed in Love.

In the Pure or Speculative part of Rational Philosophy, it is the highest office of Logic to display the necessary laws and limits of Understanding; as it is the highest office of Metaphysics to bring into light the Infinity of that which is, and can be, presented only in part† to Intelligence. It is their united office to

* "The constitution of the world," says Bishop Butler, "and God's *natural* government over it, is all *mystery*, as much as the Christian dispensation. Yet under the first, he has given men all things pertaining to life; and under the other, all things pertaining to godliness."—*Analogy*, ii. 5.

† *i.e.*, according to the relation of Whole and parts—as Finite. This refers to our metaphysical or necessary ignorance, and not merely to our physical ignorance or partial knowledge of the finite.

conduct the patient thinker along the winding mazes of a path of reflection, which, at its close, presents—as its last spectacle—*Thought or Understanding, held back by its own (logical) conditions, in the encounter with the (metaphysical) Infinity of Real existence.* Transcendental metaphysics offers, without being able to solve, the enigma of Reason in man. From the speculative consequences of this enigma Philosophy cannot deliver us; but all Philosophy that fairly recognises these consequences, leaves us free to accept the practical escape, which the Common Beliefs and Feelings of human nature, in a pure and healthy state, are always ready, as they are always logically at liberty, to afford.*

Reid and Kant in last century—Hamilton and Cousin in this—on a liberal inter-

* Thus the last question of Speculative Philosophy becomes a practical one: *How* may men be restored to, and kept in, a healthy state—intellectually and morally? Here Rational Philosophy, mixed as well as pure, points towards Moral, and that in its turn to the Christian life.

pretation, and with a due allowance for the individuality of each, have sown the seeds of that latest growth of the Catholic Philosophy of Insoluble Realism, which is now in progress to maturity. It is a Philosophy which recognises both the Mental Power and the Mental Impotence of man; and which professes to rear the fabric of philosophical doctrine on *the universal facts of our conscious experience*,—whether or not these can by us be reconciled in an *ultimate* theory of the Universe. It is in the genius of this Philosophy to decline, as beyond its scope, the Transcendental Problems which have brought sceptics and dogmatists into collision, in Metaphysics, Theology, and the other fields of intellectual labour, while it gathers wisdom and insight from those collisions. Catholic Realism is the preparation for a thoroughgoing application of the NOVUM ORGANUM to OUR WHOLE CONSCIOUS LIFE,—and not merely to the phenomena of the external

world, contingently presented to consciousness. It involves an application of the modern Method, to Metaphysics and Theology, and not merely to Physics and Social Science. It is human knowledge held and extended in the spirit of Socrates,* and Bacon, and Pascal.

Let us study what has been taught, by those to whom I have attributed the rise of the latest form of this Philosophy,—and also by their predecessors in the long line of what an old writer calls *philosophia perennis*,†—in that spirit of independence, which is a part of the homage due to those

* Cousin calls Reid the Socrates of his own age. "Le vrai Socrate n'a donc pas été Locke; ç'a été ce modeste et laborieux pasteur d'une pauvre paroisse d'Ecosse, qui, après avoir passé quinze ans dans une retraite profonde à s'étudier lui-même, à se bien rendre compte des opérations de son esprit, des sentiments et des convictions de son cœur, parvenu peu à peu à dissiper à cette pure lumière les fantômes mensongers de plus célèbres systèmes, sortit de sa solitude, alla porter les fruits de l'enseignement qu'il s'était donné à lui-même dans l'humble chaire de la petite université d'Aberdeen, et là, et un peu plus tard à Glasgow, accomplit dans l'ombre une grande et durable révolution."—*Philosophie Ecossaise*, Paris, 1857.

† Augustinus Steuchus *De Perenni Philosophia*.

who are illustrious in the world of mind. In the arduous exercises of personal reflection, through which alone we can be assured philosophically that transcendental theories of Real Existence are beyond Understanding, we seek for the legitimate resting-place of conscious beings, awakened into life amid a real and yet essentially incomprehensible Universe.* The expression of Catholic Realism which best describes and defends that resting-place is, I believe, the one most suited to the wants of this time.

The outlines of Speculative Philosophy, which I have sketched, are obviously grouped round four central points :—

I. An Analysis of Understanding, or of consciousness as logical.

II. The Formal and Regulative Science

* Is not the resting-place intermediate between systems of Idealistic Rationalism, like those of Spinoza or Hegel, and systems of Naturalistic Rationalism, like those of Hume or Comte?

of Analytic Thought, founded on the logical psychology of Understanding.

III. The Theory of Real Existence, as presented or presentable to the conscious Understanding in Time, *i.e.*, as Finite.

IV. The Theory of Real Existence as unpresentable (and, of course, unrepresentable) to the conscious Understanding in Time, *i.e.*, as Infinite or unintelligible; with the correlative theory of rational confidence in all the Regulative Beliefs and Feelings of genuine human nature.

At the two first of these points we are engaged in an analysis of consciousness in a *logical*, and at the two last in a *metaphysical* point of view; in the former as a complement of subjectively related conceptions, in the latter, as also a complement of objectively related beliefs.

Truth is either Formal or Real. Formal Truth is the harmony of intelligence with its own necessary laws. Real Truth involves the harmony of our representations

with presented reality—a harmony which ends in the incomprehensible. Rational Philosophy may therefore be described as the REFLEX THEORY of TRUTH;—in Logic, of Truth, *as formal;* in Metaphysics, of Truth, *as real.*

But Truth is the perfection of Reason, and of humanity as rational; individual men fall short of this perfection. Their intellectual lives abound in illustrations of aberration, from the standard alike of logical and metaphysical law,—in confused, indistinct, contradictory, and immethodical thinking,—in misrepresentations of the Real World, on the part of their respective Notional Worlds — in scepticism, when certainty is permitted, or in dogmatism when either doubt or conscious ignorance is a duty—and in illusions that the Infinite is somehow within the range of human consciousness, or, at least, of human science. Amid the imperfect conditions of the life

through which we are passing, on this strange planet of Earth, the Representative is often, in fact, a *mis*-representative faculty. It affords illustrations of Error, instead of illustrations of Truth; or else our faculties are dormant when we might be intelligent, and they thus offer the negation of Ignorance, instead of positive science. This difference between the *ideal* perfection of Reason, and our *actual* errors and ignorance, opens room for Rational Philosophy—

(B.)—MIXED AND APPLIED.*

Pure philosophy might perhaps suffice for a *disembodied* intelligence, undiverted by *passion*, and conscious of the phases of

* In connexion with this part of Philosophy, and the spirit in which it should be cultivated, the student may refer, among the moderns, to Bacon and Malebranche. The First Book of the *Novum Organum*, the *De Augmentis*, and the *Recherche de la Vérité* of Malebranche, should be often in his hands at this stage. To these, works like Bacon's *Essays*, some chapters in the *Port-Royal Logic*, Locke on the *Conduct of the Understanding*, and the *Logique* of Crousaz, might be added. See also Stewart's *Elements* and *Essays*,—the

real existence that are presented and represented in our experience. But the conscious experience of man is, in this mortal life, affected by more than the necessary and universal conditions, recognised in the speculative sciences of Logic and Metaphysics.

The modifying conditions, under which the conscious history of every human being involves error and ignorance, invite to a special study of *what* they are, and *how* their influence may, however slightly, be reduced. Rational Philosophy may, accordingly, comprehend, as two supplementary departments, the study of men and human life, as the source of error and ignorance; and the study of methods which Reason suggests for rendering our intellectual service, in the different fields of scien-

first and *third* volumes of the *Elements*, in connexion chiefly with Anthropology, and the *second* with Methodology.

The *Discours de la Méthode*, and other philosophical works of Descartes, now within reach of the English reader, through Mr. Veitch's excellent translations, may be studied here, as well as in connexion with Speculative Philosophy.

tific labour, more efficient and successful. The one department may be called ANTHROPOLOGY, and the other METHODOLOGY.

I. ANTHROPOLOGY.—The miscellaneous examples which immediately follow illustrate the scope of this department sufficiently for my present purpose.

1. Our consciousness in this life is an *embodied* consciousness. Human Understanding and Belief are related, in a variety of ways, to the original and successive states of the corporeal organism, from birth to death. Observation and experiment prove the important practical fact, that the conscious life on earth of every individual is dependent on his organism and its history. This condition of human consciousness affords room for a curious and interesting science, still in its infancy, but to which many eminent minds have applied themselves in ancient and modern times.*

* The relation of Body and Mind, in man, has engaged at-

2. Human consciousness is an *impassioned* consciousness. Reason is perpetually apt to be modified, by abnormal states of the Feelings, Desires, and Will in the individual, and these, moreover, may disturb the action of that Common Sense for which Speculative Reason ultimately makes way, and in which it disappears. "Intellectus humanus," says Bacon, "luminis sicci non est; sed recipit infusionem a voluntate et affectibus. Quod enim mavult homo verum esse, id potius credit."*

3. The successive states of consciousness, in the life of every individual, are *associated* in an orderly manner. One conscious state suggests and modifies another:

tention, and suggested hypotheses from the earliest times, alike among Heathen and Christian Philosophers. The student may turn to the *De Anima* of Aristotle, and in these times to a host of works, psychological, physiological, phrenological, and on animal magnetism, &c.,—British and Continental. Mr. Bain's book on "*The Senses and the Intellect*" may be here referred to, as an able and original work.

* *Novum Organum*, i. 49, &c. See also the *fourth* and *fifth* books of the *Recherche* of Malebranche, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, B. ii., &c.

Thus the present intellectual condition of every man is in part an issue from the states and circumstances of his own past mental history; and we are all inclined to exchange, in a greater or less degree, the real associations of the objects by which we are surrounded in the world, for the ideal associations of an internal world formed by ourselves. The Idola of a human mind take the place of the Ideas of the Divine mind; and on this ground, in particular, induce the meditative philosopher to study those phenomena of mental association, by which the exchange may so often be accounted for. The laws of our thoughts and feelings, *as regularly associated in time*, and, therefore, objects of inductive comparison, are obviously in manifold contrast with the Formal Laws of Thought, which are independent of, and implied in, the orderly successions of human consciousness.*

* Much under this, the two preceding, and the following paragraphs, belongs to what has been called Empirical Psychology. I may here mention Mr. Herbert Spencer's *Prin-*

4. The notions produced in the Understanding are in a manner *projected* into the external world, in the shape of significant symbols or Language. The use and abuse of words, especially in Philosophy, is a constant occasion of error and ignorance. "The consideration of words, as the instruments of knowledge, makes," according to Locke, "no despicable part of their contemplation, who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it." This study is recognised by Locke as the third branch, in his threefold division of knowledge,—under the name of σημειωτική, "the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs, the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others." The Market Idols of Bacon are all an occasion of error in all generations.

ciples of Psychology, in which philosophical questions are discussed with much vigour and ability—at his own point of view, as also Mr. Morell's well-known work on *Psychology*, and Mr. Isaac Taylor's ingenious and eloquent Essay on the *World of Mind*.

5. It must be added, that the individual is, as it were, *localized*, or surrounded by his own circumstantial hindrances and opportunities, in the interpretation of events. Every human being is, either unavoidably or by his own fault, more or less felicitously situated, with reference to the phases of Real Existence. Invention, ingenuity, and perseverance are the price paid, by those who are eminently successful in the *interpretation* of a world, whose *essential* relations are apt to conceal themselves, and seldom to appear on the surface.*

II. METHODOLOGY.—The study of men illustrates the need for supplementing, in any comprehensive course of Philosophy, the abstract theory of Truth, by rules and a discipline for the removal or abatement

* Hence the *contingent* finitude of our knowledge (which may be gradually diminished), as distinguished from its *essential* or *necessary* finitude (which remains the same). Man *may* be (and is) ignorant of much that is knowable; he *must* be ignorant of the Infinite or Inconceivable-real.

of Error. Sages in Greece and India have sought to escape, *through abstraction and philosophy,* into the regions of essential truth, and away from the errors and ignorance of the embodied state and its conditions. Sages of a different school, in Western Europe, strive to approach the essential relations or Laws of the world of appearances *by means of the precepts of Bacon and the practice of experiment.* It is the office of Catholic Philosophy to correct the Transcendental method of the one extreme, and the Descendental tendency of the other, by a discipline which borrows an element from each, and adds an element recognised by neither.

The abstract logical and metaphysical consciousness is practically modified, through life, by the body, the dispositions and conscious history, and the local circumstances or point of view of the individual, as well as by our need for employing the imperfect organ of language, in the consoli-

dation and expression of our notions. A large tribe of Errors is the consequence of what may be termed a *misapplication* of our INDUCTIVE BELIEF in the constancy of Nature. We assume that particular events are *invariably* connected which have only a *casual* relation; and we overlook Laws of Nature that lurk concealed amid a mass of accidental coincidences. The modern ART OF INDUCTIVE RESEARCH here invites our attention.*

Rational Philosophy, when mixed and applied, is accordingly the REFLEX THEORY OF ERROR and (unnecessary) IGNORANCE; with a METHOD for their abatement. It is the NOVUM ORGANUM, renovated by the speculative part of Rational Philosophy,

* Reference might here be made to many recent books, among which I need hardly name Mill's *System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive.* See also Apelt's *Theorie der Induction.* The *second* book of the *Novum Organum* is a text in scientific methodology. In connexion with Bacon, the reader may be referred to Remusat's valuable work, entitled *Bacon, sa Vie, son Temps, sa Philosophie, et son Influence.*

and applied to the whole conscious experience of man. Both divisions of Mixed and Applied Philosophy may follow, or accompany, a course in Speculative Philosophy. Indeed, some parts of Anthropology might be included in the General Introduction to Rational Philosophy. Anthropology is the indispensable introduction to an application of Speculative Philosophy, for the reduction of Errors, occasioned by the imperfection of human language; or which originate in the difficulty of interpreting the language of Nature, and of accepting the language of the Common Sense in its full meaning, with a philosophical recognition of our necessary ignorance.

I will only add, that the History and Classification of the Sciences * may be ap-

* The tentative efforts, to generalize human knowledge and classify the Sciences—from Bacon to Comte inclusive—might here be reviewed critically. They are for the most part taken from an empirical point of view, relate to the contingent element in knowledge, and are in their nature provisional. Am-

propriately blended with the *applied*, as the History of Philosophy is blended with the more purely *speculative* part of this system. An organization of the accumulating stock of human knowledge, is a task which presses with ever increasing urgency, as the race of man grows older, and the library of the world grows larger, and as each new generation modifies, by its own contributions, the deposit of science and opinion transmitted by its predecessors.

pere's *Exposition Analytique d'une Classification Naturelle des toutes les Connaissances Humaines*, may be consulted.

APPENDIX.

NOTE A.

Reason and Rational Philosophy.

I use the term Rational Philosophy, as, on the whole, most suited to express the Theory of Understanding and Belief in their First Principles—*i.e.*, the philosophical theory of *meaning as such*, and the philosophical theory of *really true meaning—i.e.*, the ultimate abstractions of consciousness *as Thought*, and the ultimate abstractions of consciousness *as Faith;* with the scientific structures which philosophers have sought to rear in each department—*i. e.*, Formal Logic, and Transcendental Metaphysics. The word Reason corresponds, I think, more nearly than any other familiar appellative that could be used, to Philosophy, regarded as the complement of these two philosophical sciences.

An analysis of the various meanings of Reason would be, in some sort, a treatise in Philosophy. In recent times, since Kant, it has been used to denote the (assumed) faculty that is conversant with the problem of Transcendental Metaphysics —the (pretended) power through which we know the "Absolute." It is thus used by Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and in England by Coleridge, whose struggles to illuminate a mystical distinction between (this) Reason and Understanding are well known. Others, as Locke occasionally, confound Reason with Reasoning. Locke, in one passage, remarks that "the word Reason, in the English language, has different significations; sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles; and sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final cause; but the consideration I shall have of it here is in a signification

different from all these, and that is, as it stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them."—(See also Stewart's *Elements*, vol. ii., *Preliminary Chapter*.)*

The employment of the term, "Rational Philosophy," to express the Philosophical theory of the Understanding or Thought strictly so called, and of Belief or Faith, *i.e.*, the theory of the Intelligible and of the Real, separately and as related, is not inconsistent, for example, with the suggestion of the following passages:—

"We ascribe to Reason," says Reid, "two offices. The first is, *to judge of things self-evident;* the second, *to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are.*"—*Essays*, vi. chap. 2.

Now of these offices the former is characteristically Ultimate Belief, and the latter, Discursive Thought; and accordingly (though not in the letter of Reid's statement), the former suggests a science of Metaphysics, and the latter (when purified by formal analysis), a science of Logic.

The combined *logical* and *metaphysical* application of Reason is also partly in analogy with the statement of Sir W. Hamilton, that

"It (Reason) has, both in ancient and modern times, been very commonly employed, like *understanding* and *intellect*, to denote our intelligent nature in general (λογικὸν μέρος); and this usually as distinguished from the lower cognitive faculties, as sense, imagination, memory; but always and emphatically as in contrast to the feelings and desires. In this signification, to follow the Aristotelic division, it comprehends—

"1*st*, *Conception* or *Simple Apprehension* (ἔννοια, νοήσις τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων, conceptus, conceptio, apprehensio simplex, das Begreigen).

"2*d*, The *Compositive and Divisive Process, Affirmation*

* I do not allude, in this Tract, to the supernatural, miraculous, &c., as distinguished from the natural, rational, &c.

and Negation, Judgment (*σύνθεσις καὶ διαίρεσις, ἀπόφανσις,* judicium).

"3*d, Reasoning* or the *Discursive Faculty* (*διάνοια, λόγος, λογισμὸς, τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι,* discursus, ratiocinatio).

"4*th, Intellect* or *Intelligence* proper, either as the Intuition, or as the place of self-evident truths (*νοῦς,* intellectus, intelligentia, mens)." *

Of these four elements, Logic is especially directed to the three first, and the fourth is more cognate to Metaphysics.

Intellectual Philosophy may, with some disadvantages, be used indifferently for Rational Philosophy. The term Mental Philosophy is too vague; and Moral Science, though sometimes carelessly applied to the reflective sciences in general, ought of course to be confined to Ethics in particular. Psychology, in its highest sense, is the common basis of all the philosophical sciences, and, indeed, of that kind of knowledge which is distinctively philosophical.

Rational Philosophy has also been termed First or Summary Philosophy, and Theology (*ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία,* Philosophia Prima); though with a more direct reference to the *metaphysical* than to the logical side of philosophy. Aristotle thus describes his First Philosophy (which nearly corresponds to the *Dialectic* of Plato), and the Threefold Division of Speculative knowledge—"*Εἰ δέ τί ἐστιν ἀΐδιον καὶ ἀκίνητον καὶ χωριστόν, φανερὸν ὅτι θεωρητικῆς τὸ γνῶναι. οὐ μέντοι φυσικῆς γε (περὶ κινητῶν γάρ τινων ἡ φυσική), οὐδὲ μαθηματικῆς, ἀλλὰ προτέρας ἀμφοῖν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ ἀχώριστα μὲν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἔνια περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δ' ἴσως, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ· ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα. ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα μὲν τὰ αἴτια ἀΐδια εἶναι, μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα· ταῦτα γὰρ αἴτια τοῖς φανεροῖς τῶν θείων. ὥστε τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν φιλοσοφίαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματική, φυσική, θεολογική. οὐ γὰρ ἄδηλον ὅτι εἴ που τὸ θεῖον ὑπάρχει, ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὴν τιμιωτάτην δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι. αἱ μὲν οὖν θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αἱρετώτεραι, αὕτη*

* *Collected Works of Reid*, p. 768.

δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν."—(*Metaph.*, B. v. 1.) In B. III. 1, he explains the place of the First Philosophy more fully :—"Ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὑτό. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν οὐδεμιᾷ τῶν ἐν μέρει λεγομένων ἡ αὐτή· οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμόμεναι περὶ τούτου θεωροῦσι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν."

To this science, Aristotle, as above and elsewhere, applies the name THEOLOGY. (In the *Metaph.*, B. XI., he enters more nearly on theological discussion.) Speculative Theology and Transcendental Metaphysics are one; and in every deep-thinking age, life and literature are viewed in their relation to the highest principles, thus falling back on their theological ground. "Ab omni sane Philosophia," says Wolfius, "perinde ac a mathesi, Scepticismum procul removet, PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA."

The First Philosophy of Bacon differs in some essential points from that of Aristotle.—(See *Advancement of Learning*, B. II., and *De Augmentis*, I. 1, &c.)

What has been sometimes called *Dianoetic Science* is, on the view taken in the preceding Tract, the germ of Logic, and *Noetic Science* is the germ of Metaphysics; but Logic is, with us, Dianoetic *on its formal side*, and treated philosophically—not merely as science; while Metaphysics absorbs within its own sphere the *real* element in Dianoetic as commonly understood. With this important modification of their doctrine, many passages from writers, ancient and modern, might be collected in illustration of the double function—logical and metaphysical—of Rational Philosophy, and of the importance of keeping each function distinct from, and yet in correlation with, the other.

NOTE B.

Chair of Logic and Metaphysics.

The traditional system of the Schools was shaken in Scotland, in the end of the sixteenth century, by the revolt of Ramus. The Ramist logic, soon after its promulgation in France, was introduced into more than one of the Scottish universities, by Andrew Melville—the father of Scottish University Reform. It seems to have been taught in Edinburgh, in the early years of the history of the College, but without superseding the *Organon*, and the compendiums of the school logic, which continued to regulate the academical exercises during the seventeenth century.

Our record of logical and metaphysical study in the University of Edinburgh, during that troubled century, is meagre. Some light is cast on its condition and tendency by the *Theses** appointed for disputation at Graduation. Many of these are still preserved in the College Library,—especially those from 1641 until 1704. From them I gather that the influence of Descartes and Locke was not unfelt, soon after the appearance of the chief works of these philosophers. Descartes is often mentioned. I find Locke's *Essay* referred to more than once as early as 1692—within three years after its publication, indicating that in the interval it had been treated of in the prelections of the Regent. Bacon, Hobbes, Glanvill, Gassendi, Claubergius, Spinoza, Leibnitz, &c., are occasionally alluded to.

The Parliamentary Commission for visiting the Scottish Universities, appointed in 1690, directed the Regents of the College of Edinburgh to prepare a system of Metaphysics, to be taught in all the Universities of Scotland. The order was given in 1695, and, in consequence, a small Latin compend

* *i. e.*, THESES, (a) *Logical*, (b) *Metaphysical*, (c) *Ethical*, (d) *Physical*.

was executed, a year or two later. I am indebted to the kindness of Principal Lee for a sight of the English translation of this curious little work, published in 1701, under the title of *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. It is more curious than scientifically valuable, and one cannot wonder at the neglect into which it fell, in common with many other similar manuals of metaphysical definitions. It had no effect on the philosophical studies of the time, which were soon moulded in a very different type of thought.

In the early period of the history of the University, the students in Arts were under the charge of the same Regent or tutor, during all the four years of the curriculum. This arrangement continued (except in Humanity and Mathematics), until the commencement of the eighteenth century. The plan of confining each instructor to a separate department, which he was appointed to profess, was introduced in Edinburgh in 1708.* With that year, the history of the three Chairs of Philosophy, viz., Logical and Metaphysical or Rational, Moral, and Natural—properly speaking, commences. In that year the present professorial system was substituted for a system of regent-tutors, in accommodation to the growth of modern knowledge.

(1708-30.)—The Chair of Logic and Metaphysics seems to have been occupied, during these years, by Mr. Colin Drummond. I have no account of his prelections.

(1730-75.)—To his successor, Dr. Stevenson, who was professor for nearly half a century, some of the most eminent persons, in the Augustan age of Scottish literature which followed, have owned their obligations.

The following interesting extract from "*A Short Account of the University of Edinburgh, the present Professors in it, and the several parts of learning taught by them*," contained

* This plan was introduced in the other Scottish Universities at a later period—in Glasgow, in 1727; in St. Andrews and Marischal College about the middle, and in King's College at the close, of the century.

in the *Scots Magazine* for August 1741, affords some indication of his course and class arrangements:—

"Mr. John Stevenson, *Professor of* RATIONAL *or* INSTRUMENTAL *Philosophy.*

"He gives lectures upon Heineccii *Elementa Philosophiæ Rationalis*, and the abridgment of Mr. Locke's *Essay on Human Understanding:* in which he explains all the different forms of reasoning, the nature of certainty, both mathematical and moral, with the different degrees of probability; and shows how the understanding is to be conducted in our inquiries after truth of all kinds. He likewise explains the fundamental rules to be observed in the interpretation of the texts of any ancient authors.

"He teaches the Metaphysics, in lectures upon De Vries's *Ontologia;* in which he explains the several terms and distinctions which frequently occur in the writings of the learned.

"He also gives lectures upon Longinus περὶ ΥΨΟΥΣ, in which he illustrates the several precepts of oratory given by Cicero and Quintilian; and also upon Aristotle περὶ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ, in which he illustrates his rules by examples from ancient and modern poets, &c., and explains the grounds of criticism in eloquence and poetry.

"He gives likewise a college upon Heineccii *Historia Philosophica;* in which he gives an account of the lives of the most famous philosophers, ancient and modern, and the several opinions by which the different sects were distinguished.

"Each of his students is required to make a discourse upon a subject assigned him; and to impugn and defend a thesis, for their improvement in the art of reasoning. These exercises are performed before the Principal and some of the Professors, with open doors.

"His college begins about the 10th of October, and rises about the end of May."

This curious extract throws some light on the condition of philosophical study in Edinburgh, in the early and middle part of last century,—that period of transition from the ex-

hausted movement of a previous age, to the sway of influences inaugurated by Bacon and Locke.

(1774-92.)—Dr. Stevenson's successor, Mr. Bruce, seems to have yielded still more to the anti-scholastic tendency of his time.*

The following account of his course is taken from the *first* edition of Arnot's *History of Edinburgh*:—

"The present professor, observing, that, while every branch of science had been new-modelled, his department retained all the pedantry of the schools, has formed his lectures on a new and enlarged plan. As this class is an elementary one, his general object is to prepare his students for a liberal cultivation of the sciences and arts, by means of a previous acquaintance with the human mind, and with the method of studying nature. His prelections are divided into two classes. The *first* course consists of five branches:—

"1. Pneumatology, or the history of the powers and faculties of the human mind, as the means employed in studying nature.

"2. Logic, or the method of directing and applying the faculties of the mind, in studying and arranging the different laws of nature. Under this article, the rise and influence of the synthetic method, and syllogism, the rise and spirit of analysis, and the philosophical induction of Lord Bacon, are explained. The natural progress of thinking is traced from language, the sign of thought, and universal grammar connected with the logic of nature. To this are subjoined rules for philosophising in physics and ethics, with an account of the sources of sophistry, and of the Aristotelian and school logics.

"3. Metaphysics, or an analysis of those general truths which are the foundation of all the sciences, with the evidence by which they are to be established. The subjects in this branch are considered under the titles of General Ontology;

* See "*First Principles of Philosophy, and their Application to the subjects of Taste, Science, and History.* By John Bruce, A.M., Professor of *Philosophy* in the University of Edinburgh. Edin. 1777."

Evidence and Truth; Error in Science; the Relation of the Sciences to the *Belles-Lettres*.

"4. A short view of the method of applying philosophical analysis and induction to the general study of nature.

"5. The elements of civil history, as connected with the history of philosophy. In this head are given a short view of the progress of mankind in the ancient and modern world; the state of letters and philosophy at the periods into which this progress is divided; the reciprocal influence of philosophy and subordination in their rise and decline, with the effects of both on the manners of mankind.

"The students in this class undergo frequent examination; and exercises are prescribed to them on the subjects of the lectures, which are occasionally recited before the Principal, or some of the professors.

"In the *second* class, the chief object is to apply the method of philosophical analysis and induction to the study of the sciences and arts. This course is introduced with a recapitulation of the first principles of philosophy taught in the first class, as they are to be applied to a general description of the proper subjects of philosophy. It is divided into three branches.

"1. The theory and prospectus of Lord Bacon are explained, as the first effort to re-establish genuine science; and the first display of the proper subjects of reasoning, with the effects which both have had on natural and moral philosophy.

"2. The theories and divisions of later philosophers, on his plan, are enumerated.

"3. A theory, founded on the natural progress of the mind in philosophising, from history to science and to art, is explained; the subjects of history, the sciences, and arts, are discussed; and an explanation given of the species of arrangement, evidence, induction, and theory, peculiar to each of these great branches. As this finishes the elementary course of philosophy, it is concluded with lectures on the branches of education necessary for each of the liberal professions, and on their relation to public economy."

(1786-1808.)—The following brief account of the lectures of the Rev. Dr. Finlayson (Mr. Bruce's colleague, and afterwards his successor), may be worth transcribing :—

"Logic, which has for its object to teach the best method of investigating and communicating truth, is divided into four great branches.

"1. The first is an inquiry into the Human Understanding, and contains an analysis of the different *faculties* employed in the search for truth, with a view of the errors to which each of them is exposed, and of the means by which it may be improved.

"2. The second is a description of the *objects* towards which our intellectual powers are directed. Under this head the principles of classification are explained; and an account is given of the most celebrated systems of arrangement that have hitherto been made. To this account is subjoined a general division of the sciences, with some observations on the turn of mind suited to the study of each, and on the means by which that turn may be discovered.

"3. The third is an inquiry into the best mode of *applying* the faculties of the understanding to the objects of nature, for the purpose of discovering truth. This is, perhaps, the most important part of the course; and in it are explained (1.) The nature of truth and of the evidence by which it is established; (2.) The means by which we are enabled to obtain that evidence in the different subjects of nature; (3.) The sources of error, and the means by which it may be avoided.

"4. When truth has been discovered, the fourth branch of the course teaches the proper method of *communicating* it to others with perspicuity and precision. This part suggests a train of observations on the origin and progress of language; according to which a conversation or debate, or a continued discourse, should be conducted for the purpose of imparting knowledge and conviction.

"To this course is prefixed a short History of Philosophy."

A Senior Course, for lectures on Metaphysics, was, I believe, occasionally given by Dr. Finlayson, on one or two days in each week.

To complete this short retrospect of these studies in the University of Edinburgh, I transfer, from the Appendix to the Evidence received by the University Commissioners (1826), the following outline of the Logical Lectures of Dr. Finlayson's successor—the Rev. Dr. Ritchie (1808-36.)

"The Lectures on Logic are divided into four parts:—

"The *first* part consists of a view of Intellectual Philosophy, or a description of the faculties by which we acquire the elements of our knowledge of the laws which regulate their operation, and the imperfections to which they are liable, with hints for their improvement.

"The *second* part comprehends the Theory of Evidence, and includes a view of Demonstrative Evidence, of the Evidence of Sense, Consciousness, Memory, Testimony, Experience, Analogy, Mixed Mathematics, and the Calculation of Chances.

"The *third* part includes Reasoning, and explains, 1*st*, Syllogistic Reasoning, with the various abridged modes of it in common use, and the sophisms or fallacious reasonings connected with it; and, 2*d*, Inductive Reasoning, and a view of the prejudices which are apt to mislead the mind.

"The *fourth* part explains the Analytical and Synthetical method of conducting our reasonings, as well as the Socratic and controversial method, and the principles of interpreting written documents.

"The Course concludes with a view of the Theory of Language, or Principles of Universal Grammar."

These memoranda, which are all I can lay my hands on at this moment, are not uninstructive to the student, as they mark the successive forms in which portions of Rational Philosophy have been discussed in this University, as well as the prevailing tendencies of successive generations.

The publication of the "Metaphysical and Logical Lectures" of Sir William Hamilton, now in the press, will place before the world one moving force in the revolution through which philosophical studies are in a stage of development unknown in the period to which the greater part of this Note relates.

NOTE C.

Mathematical and Philosophical Discipline.

A HIGH authority in mathematico-physical studies—in a passage which happens to meet my hand—writes thus :—

"*Mathematical* doctrines are fixed and permanent; no new system of geometry can supersede the old. The old truths will always be true, and always essential. Not only so, but even the old books remain in use. Euclid has never been superseded, and never will be so without great detriment to education. And if Archimedes had written a treatise on mechanics, in extent and form similar to that of Euclid on Geometry, such a work would probably have been one of our best instruments of education at the present day.

"In *philosophical* doctrines, on the contrary, a constant change is going on. The commentator supersedes the original author, or at least becomes equally important: the systematizer is preferred to him who first threw out the same thoughts in a less regular form. Or else a revolution takes place; the old system is refuted; a new one is erected, to last its little hour, and wait its certain doom like its predecessor. There is nothing old, nothing stable, nothing certain, in this kind of study. Change is constantly taking place; change is constantly looked for. Novelty is essential, in order to command attention or approbation. The car rolls on; old objects glide back; the point of view changes. The student knows, or at least cannot but suspect, that his teacher and his teacher's creed are but for a day; and that what is demonstrated to be true, will be found hereafter to be a truth so imperfect, that it is best put out of sight.

"Now, I conceive it cannot be doubted that the mind of a young man employed mainly in attending to teachers of this

latter kind, must fail to acquire any steady and unhesitating conviction of the immutable and fixed nature of truth, such as the study of mathematics gives. This constant change in the system of received doctrines must unsettle and enfeeble his apprehension of all truths. He has no time, he has no encouragement, to take up the doctrines that are placed before him, and to study them till he is firmly possessed of them, secure that their certainty and value can never alter. He lives among changes, and has not the heart to labour patiently for treasures that may be ravished from him by the next revolution. The state of Germany, for instance, has of late years been as unfavourable to the intellectual welfare of its students, as the condition of the most unstable government of the East is, to the material prosperity of its subjects. A great philosophical conquest is made by Kant, and a universal empire is supposed to be on the point of being established. But Fichte, who began with being a follower of Kant, ends by deposing him. Schelling carries away the allegiance of Germany from Fichte; and then Hegel becomes more powerful than any of his predecessors; and a younger Fichte raises the standard against all these rulers. And thus, with dire shedding of ink, revolution after revolution succeeds."

This extract, from a well-known work by Dr. Whewell, is, on its own account, worthy of attention, as a salutary warning against a possible abuse of philosophical discipline; while it may bring into relief, from another point of view, some of the statements in the preceding Tract. Truth has nothing to fear from free discussion.

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