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RECENT WORKS ON ETHICS.

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*Elements of Ethics.* NOAH K. DAVIS. Silver, Burdett & Co., New York. Pp. iv + 288.

*Introduction to Ethics.* FRANK THILLY. New York, Scribners. 1900. Pp. xi + 339.

*Ethics and Religion, A Collection of Essays,* Edited by the Society of Ethical Propagandists. London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Co. 1900. Pp. ix + 324.

*The Ethical Problem.* PAUL CARUS. Second edition enlarged. Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co. 1899. Pp. xxiv + 344.

*Problems in Ethics or Grounds for a Code of Rules for Moral Conduct.* JOHN STEINFORT KEDNEY. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1900. Pp. xx + 252.

Dr. Davis takes the notion of 'a right' as his point of departure for the construction of an ethical system. "The problem before us is: Given the simple idea or notion of a right; to find all forms of obligation." "These rights are grounded in the very constitution of human nature," which is accordingly assumed as the 'basis' of ethics. (pp. 38, 41, 209). Combining these two ideas, we have thus a return to the eighteenth-century theory of Natural Rights as the foundation of moral philosophy. Into a discussion of the doctrine of Natural Rights (obsolete save as advocated by Mr. Spencer) we do not propose to enter; it should be noted, however, that the strong individualism of this doctrine is inconsistent with what the author calls the 'modified altruism' of his own ethical theory. Why it is called *modified* altruism is not quite obvious, since he holds that 'all righteous conduct is disinterested, is unselfish' (p. 151), and that moral obligation wholly 'excludes self as an end' (p. 148); 'self is never, can never be, a moral end.' The moral law, however, "does not call for \* \* \* the extinction of the natural and healthful desire for one's own welfare." Nor does it "prohibit anyone from acting in a way that shall benefit himself, but only from thus acting in order that he may benefit him-



self" (p. 165). Thus it appears that one may desire one's own welfare, but may not seek it. Personal welfare is not prohibited by moral law provided it be unsought, *i. e.*, comes as an accident. It should indeed be sufficiently obvious that the accidental has no moral quality. It is less obvious why that which is a legitimate object of moral desire may not be sought. Nor is it clear how a doctrine based upon the 'claims' which I have upon others and they upon me—which claims compose our 'rights'—can forbid me, in whom certain claims vest, to regard myself as in any sense an end. Nor is this position consistently held. For Dr. Davis, in speaking of the 'right to service,' *i. e.*, to the beneficent action of others towards self, says that "if I myself be used as a mere tool \* \* \* I am indignant" (p. 165), which surely implies that I do regard 'myself' as an end worthy of consideration, and is virtually a falling back into the Kantian doctrine which Dr. Davis repudiates. Thus the claim to the service of others is made to rest upon an egoism which has been cast out naked and disgraced. And indeed it is difficult to see how a theory which is based upon the rights of individuals can completely ignore the individual who unfortunately happens to be myself. According to the atomistic conception of society, it would be more logical to say with Bentham that everybody is 'to count for one,' myself included. Kant, moreover, does not say that I am to 'make myself in mine own person an end' (p. 166), but that I am to 'regard *humanity*, whether in mine own person or in that of another, as an end withal'; which is a different matter.

It may be noticed in this connection that Dr. Davis seems to fail of understanding Kant. In commenting on the passage in which Kant says that "an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination," Dr. Davis says: "The implication is that love is not a duty; for this conception of obligation excludes all personal inclination, teaching that an action determined by love alone is not a moral action, and that one wherein love mingles is morally impure, being contaminated by inclination." "We heartily reject a scheme of ethics implying that a man is under no obligation to love his mother or his country, but should purify his character by eliminating all such inclinations; a scheme that clearly, distinctly enacts: Thou shalt not love thy neighbor." (pp. 169-171). Poor old Immanuel Kant must feel that the right to have humanity regarded as an end in his own person is a right which does not extend to immortals; but instead of turning in his grave, we can imagine him only smiling sadly on learning that Christ's parable of the good Samaritan, though

less abstruse than the critical philosophy, also lends itself to misinterpretation. (See note, p. 175.)

Dr. Davis not only misreads Kant, but apparently falls into several of the errors of which he accuses the latter. "An action conforming to moral law is a virtuous action. This qualification implies a contrary inclination overcome by will," etc. When, however, the virtuous desires prevail more and more uniformly until "all struggle, all conflict has ceased, the victor, because of his victory, is dubbed a perfectly virtuous person" (p. 139). That is, in other words, a virtuous action implies contrary inclination, but a virtuous person is one who experiences no such opposition of duty and inclination.

Again, while condemning any theory of morals which looks to self as an end, the author says that the doctrine of the present treatise is that of the Stoics, that 'whatever is natural is right' (p. 151 note). But "it is undeniable that selfishness generally prevails and is dominant" (p. 153). If selfishness is dominant it must be 'natural,' according to the common implication of that word; and if natural, then right. Yet all right conduct must be unselfish. Moreover, if whatever is natural—*i. e.*, native or constitutional—in human nature is right, how can we exclude those impulses and emotions which terminate upon self as the end, and constitute an important part of that 'life' which is regarded as a primary natural right? It is obvious that some deeper hidden meaning must lurk in the word 'natural' as used by our author. Yet even with the qualifying definitions presently introduced, human nature and the reciprocity between human beings prove to be an inadequate basis of ethics. True to his principle that obligation is based upon natural rights, which imply a relation between two or more persons, Dr. Davis holds that the isolated man "has no responsibility, is not a moral being." "With him nothing is either right or wrong" (p. 217). Robinson Crusoe then is not under moral law. Yet on the next page but one it is said: "But should he reasonably despair of a return among men, still he may not neglect his personal dignity, or ever, even under the greatest suffering, take his own life. \* \* \* He is bound by indissoluble obligation to his maker," etc. (p. 219). Thus it appears that human nature and human reciprocity do not after all furnish of themselves a sufficient basis of individual ethics. Nor, even with the help of the conception of the 'unity of mankind,' does Dr. Davis transcend his individualistic standpoint. Thus a curious limit (due to the author's individualistic point of view) is set to the sphere of moral action of the State, which he regards as a 'personality,' with 'a conscience of its own' (pp. 259,

270). Why, it may be asked, if we are to think of mankind as an 'organic unity,' and of the State as an ethical personality, is not the State bound to the same law of 'loving service' as other personalities?

There is a way of transcending eighteenth-century individualism; not that of Professor Davis, but a way foreshadowed by Kant, in whose day the conception of society as an organism and of the spiritual unity of mankind was not as familiar as it is to Dr. Davis. When Kant says that we are to treat humanity as an end, and when further he refuses to find this end in any existing community of personal relations, but in an ideal to be realized by humanity collectively and separately, we have altruism laid upon us as a moral obligation because we 'are members one of another,' while the rights of personality, or the worth of the individual, follow from the fact that 'ye are all of one blood.' We possess individual rights, and both egoistic and altruistic duties are incumbent upon us, not in virtue of our claims as individuals, but in virtue of our all partaking of that common higher life which we all potentially possess and which it is our duty severally and collectively to make actual. It is the presence of this ideal—which Dr. Davis also recognizes—which is not derived from the 'constituted order of nature,' but is imposed upon it by human thought as the norm to which nature should conform, the recognition by man of "an opposition between his desire for the realization of the ideal self and his desire for the gratification for the lower self, an opposition between the life of spirit and the life of nature,"<sup>1</sup> that constitutes the idea of duty. Whoever would preserve an obligatory morality must start with the recognition of this opposition.

It is obvious, therefore, that Professor Davis must in some way modify the doctrine already referred to, to the effect that whatever is natural is right and that the basis of ethics is 'the natural constitution of man.' The words 'nature' and 'natural' are in fact ambiguous. 'Nature' usually means what *is*; but 'natural,' as has frequently been pointed out, is often equivalent to 'normal,' and the latter word implies the notion of a rule or standard by which things are judged and to which they *ought* to conform (vid. Ritchie, 'Natural Rights,' Ch. IV.). It is in this, the ethical sense, that our author uses the word 'natural,' for which he ordinarily, though not invariably, substitutes the word 'normal.' By the 'natural' man he means the 'normal or rehabilitated man'—*i. e.*, 'not man as he is, but man as he should be' (pp. 38, 39). Dr. Davis in fact, in spite of a somewhat ambiguous way of expressing himself, really means to inculcate a sound idealistic

<sup>1</sup> Professor Watson, 'Introduction to Philosophy.'

imperative morality. Rights have their ultimate ground in the desires which motive action; and the primary principle of ethics is that man has a right to gratify his normal desires (p. 45, 46). When it is elsewhere said that "the normal is pleasurable, the abnormal painful" (p. 154); and again, "Normal desires, or such as have an instinctive rise and are in accord with the general order of nature, impel toward the fulfillment of the appropriate functions of the man in a world of persons and things" (p. 46), it is not to be imagined that Dr. Davis intends to make either pleasure or instinct the criterion of right conduct. Since, however, we are not told anything about 'the general order of nature,' nor what are 'the appropriate functions of the man,' we may as well fall back upon the conception of normal.

"A man's malevolent desires," we are told, "are in general abnormal in kind, since they do not conform to the normal principles of the human constitution." This does not help us. Duty consists in the gratification of normal desires. Normality is the standard of duty, but what is the criterion of normality? Benevolence is the primary duty; is benevolence, then, obligatory because it is normal, or is that normal, and hence duty, which is benevolent? Apparently the latter; for the end of moral conduct is welfare, and benevolence is the condition of welfare. It may be imagined that here then we have the ethical standard of which we are in search; and if so, why not forsake 'nature' and abandon the various ambiguous formulæ employed and follow the notion of welfare as our guide? We are attempting, be it remembered, to find some explication of those 'normal desires' in the gratification of which duty is said to consist, and have been led to the conception of welfare. "We are, then," in words of the author, "in great need to know, clearly and distinctly, the meaning of welfare." When, therefore, welfare is defined as 'the gratification of normal desires,' and is said to consist 'in the constant gratification of right desires' (pp. 188, 189), the reader may begin to suspect that he is the victim of some trick. Welfare is defined with reference to normal desires, and the latter in turn by the notion of welfare. Only such gratification of normal desires, however, is allowable as does not interfere with the rights of others. Hence the primary law receives this important modification: Do not trespass. Since a trespass, however, is any violation of the rights of others to gratify their normal desires, this brings us no nearer the definition we seek.

Whether 'the natural constitution of man' or the notion of welfare is to be taken as the ultimate criterion of morality, is not made as clear as might be. We incline to the latter view however, since,

although all desires are natural in the sense that they pertain to human nature (selfishness in this sense would appear to be the most natural, since it is dominant), only some are normal. When it is said that the 'affections (by which the author means the altruistic or 'giving' desires) are naturally paramount, this must mean that they are normally supreme, and they are manifestly normally supreme in view of the fact that they chiefly further welfare.

Briefly stated, Dr. Davis's ethical theory comes to this: that one should seek with no thought of self to promote the welfare of others and thus involuntarily secure one's own happiness. If happiness be set up as the direct personal end of conduct, it will prove unattainable. "The only possible way to it is through its condition welfare. Hence wisdom disregards happiness as an end, not looking beyond welfare, but seeking this as the end of all endeavor. This attained, happiness results by a benign law of human nature." But surely happiness may be the supreme end, though it be necessary to seek it indirectly. Welfare, which Professor Davis elsewhere (p. 210) defines as consisting 'of liberty and continuous success in the exercise of benevolence and beneficence,' might be the best means to the attainment of the end, and still not the *summum bonum*; and the mere fact that happiness cannot wisely be directly sought would not of itself prove that it is not the ultimate (though it may not be the proximate) end. Dr. Davis, however, clearly intends to make welfare and not happiness the moral end. And although welfare, the 'principal element' of which is virtue (p. 187), is apparently made to include happiness as part of its content, no stress is laid upon this synthetic conception of the end, the happiness element of which is persistently held to constitute an unlawful aim for the individual. Dr. Davis, in short, seems to fall back upon the old 'be good and you will be happy' theory. For theoretical purposes however it is impossible to identify virtue and happiness, and it is necessary to distinguish them as separate ethical ends. It is of course possible, and we think it is correct, to hold that the moral ideal is not simple, but complex, and includes both virtue and happiness, the best expression for this synthetic end probably being self-realization. But Dr. Davis apparently holds that virtue (which is summed up in benevolence or loving-service, in which the individual's welfare is said to consist) is the end for the individual agent and happiness the end for everybody else. This again seems a curious conclusion for a theory professedly based upon human nature, in which assuredly the individual partakes. Or, stated still more individualistically, society, though metaphorically spoken of as an organism, is

nevertheless constituted of individuals, and what is good for the greatest number, or for the whole, must surely be good for the individuals which make up that whole.

Professor Thilly is a pupil and follower of Paulsen. Not only is his ethical position fundamentally the same as Paulsen's, but he has caught much of the master's spirit, and his clearness of exposition, lucidity of diction, and simple and natural arrangement of material, have united to make an excellent introduction to ethics.

Having said this much by way of appreciation, a word of criticism growing out of our inability to agree with the author as to the nature of ethics must not be deemed ungracious. Two of the chief problems of ethics—Conscience and the Highest Good, psychologically considered—the author discusses with sufficient fullness for the purpose of his book. He holds the Spencerian or naturalistic view of Conscience, and the Aristotelian doctrine of the Highest Good. But the question of Obligation, the central problem of modern ethics, is less satisfactorily handled. This defect arises from the author's conception of his subject; for he (wrongly as we think) regards ethics not as a normative but as a descriptive science. "It is the business of a scientific ethics to study the moralities that is, to investigate the rules of conduct which men *feel* as moral, and discover the principle which gave rise to them. If we find that there is such a principle and that men tacitly assent to it, we shall understand the genesis of morals. We shall be able to see where men have bungled in their blind attempts to apply the principle, and we shall be able to distinguish more intelligently between the right and the wrong. After we have found the ideal which is vaguely guiding the destinies of mankind, we of the present time can ask ourselves whether we are realizing it in our own conduct." Morality is means to an end, and its rules are justified when they further this end. But we cannot justify the end itself. Man desires this end *absolutely*; "but why he should desire what he desires is a mystery which we cannot solve" (pp. 139-141).

In other words, ethics, as Professor Thilly consistently holds, is a branch of psychology. This psychology of morals is in itself an interesting and important study, to which Professor Thilly has a perfect right to confine his attention if he choose, but surely it is untrue to say that here (in the determination of the end actually desired) "we have reached the bed-rock of our science, here we have a true categorical imperative which commands absolutely and unconditionally" (p. 141).

For 'desired' end may mean either simply the direction our impulses and desires are consciously or unconsciously taking, or it may mean 'desirable' end, *i. e.*, the end which is to be rationally desired. In the former case, it is obviously absurd to say that man *ought* to desire what he does and *must* desire because the forces of nature have made him desire it. In the latter case this rationally desirable end can only be determined by our conception of the nature of man and his relation to the universe at large, *i. e.*, metaphysically. Suppose, however, this desirable or ideal end to have been determined; it is also commonly conceived of as something which men '*feel that they ought*' to realize. Our ideals change their content, but the changing ideal is accompanied by an ever-present consciousness of obligation to realize the existent ideal. In this sense obligation seems to us the ultimate conception in ethics. At any rate, we must hold on to obligation if we would conserve morality; at least until we reach that stage of 'absolute' morality of which Mr. Spencer speaks. We must also seek to justify the moral imperative, if we would be true to ourselves as rational beings. There is no need to deny the difficulty of this undertaking; nevertheless it would seem to be incumbent upon those who define ethics, even 'roughly,' as 'the science of duty,' as Professor Thilly does, to devote especial attention to this difficult problem.

Now it is obviously one thing to say that men desire pleasure, or the normal development of their powers, or that the end they seek to realize is perfection, and quite another thing to say that they ought to desire and seek any of these. It is one thing to say, if you desire a certain end you ought to observe certain rules of conduct; and another thing to say, you ought to desire and to strive to realize a certain end. It makes all the difference where you put the ought; how you formulate the ethical problem. Professor Thilly's imperative is purely hypothetical, as he elsewhere shows. As he conceives of the science of ethics, his treatment is fairly adequate. But if ethics deals not simply with the Is but with the Ought to Be, as we hold, then his theory is notably deficient. He does not indeed ignore the problem of obligation. He accounts psychologically for the Categorical Imperative by giving a genetic account of 'the feeling of obligation within us.' But even if we should grant the truth of this natural history of the feeling of Oughtness, it may well be asked whether this is sufficient. It is not true that "when we have explained this feeling [*i. e.*, shown how it has developed in us] we have explained the Categorical Imperative" (p. 133). "The mere observance of facts," as Mr. Thilly remarks, "will lead to nothing." Facts are not reasons, history is not philos-

ophy. The natural history of a process does not of itself furnish an explanation of the meaning of the process, either in the moral or the material world. If the moral law has a meaning as well as a history then we *must* justify the end which we say is obligatory, and we must further inquire into the ultimate meaning of obligation. An objective grounding of the consciousness of moral obligation may or may not be possible, but in our view this inquiry falls within the scope of ethics. This of course is one of those *ultimate* problems which Professor Thilly modestly hands over to the philosopher to solve (p. 20), and it may be thought that one should not take exception to this division of labor; but aside from the fact that in our view some of these ultimate problems constitute just the most important part of ethics, it may be added that in our experience the class of readers for whom an elementary text-book is intended are apt to be quite as much interested in the question what the moral law means and why man should obey it, as in the question how this law originated and developed in human consciousness. There is no doubt a plausible excuse for thus avoiding ultimate problems in an elementary text-book, owing to the recognized difficulty of treating philosophical questions in an elementary and popular manner; but the difficulty is inherent in the nature of the subject and cannot legitimately be evaded.

The history of ethics seems to teach that our choice must lie between the naturalistic ethics of evolution and some modified form of the Kantian position; but Professor Thilly does not seem to us to have gone far enough in working out the compromise he claims (p. 171). It is of course possible, in Spencer's words, quoted with approval by Professor Thilly, "to agree with moralists of the intuitive school respecting the existence of a moral sense, while differing with them respecting its origin." But this is not the important point at issue. The fundamentally important issue is: given the sense of obligation, what is its real significance, and how does the question of its origin affect this? In other words, the question of origin is not identical with the problem of validity. The evolutionary account of the origin of the feeling of obligation may or may not be true to fact; and if true, it may or may not destroy the authority of conscience. But the latter question is precisely the one which the theories of evolutionist moralists have made it most incumbent upon themselves and us to answer, and to which they have made but scant contribution. Professor Thilly appreciates the problem, and in a few words (p. 112) indicates what appears to us so true a view of it that it seems a pity he had not made it his own and worked it out more fully. But the

authority attributed to the moral sentiments according to the view hinted at on page 112 is very different from Spencer's view that "they have a coördinate authority with the inductions of utility" (p. 71). The 'inductions of utility' command conditionally, but Kant's imperative is categorical. Professor Thilly indeed says: "It cannot be proved that one *ought* to strive after some highest good; this is matter of feeling." If this be taken to mean that here is a Categorical Imperative which is an ultimate fact of human nature and beyond this we cannot go, we have a falling back into a type of intuitionism, which, while it conserves Oughtness, leaves it 'in the air.' On the other hand, the naturalistic (which is not identical with the genetic) account of the origin of the feeling of Oughtness, is in danger of robbing the latter of its sanctity and authority by reducing it to the level of a useful instinct; and for an ethic based upon this principle there can be no other logical 'end' than the utilitarian one of preservation and pleasure.

If it be denied that these are the supreme ends which all men do actually desire, it is still difficult to see how the psychological determination of what man desires (be it any end whatsoever), or the biogenico-psychological history of how he came to desire what he desires, can ever issue in the ethical proposition that he *ought to desire* a certain end (no matter how defined). The highest good is the ideal, and Professor Thilly identifies 'this ideal' with the categorical imperative (p. 145); that is, it is an obligatory ideal. But Professor Thilly elsewhere says (p. 252): "Different persons may have different ideals (meaning by ideals the direction which their impulses are taking, whether they are conscious of it or not)." Could animals, then, be said to have ideals? And if so, what is the difference between the instinctive actions of animals and the moral conduct of human beings? An ideal is surely an *idea* to be realized. But according to the above definition of an ideal, which is farther identified with the categorical imperative, animals would also be under a categorical imperative. If the ideal, the highest good, is what man actually desires and wills, and has no other meaning, it is absurd to say that 'he ought to strive after' it. But if the sense of obligation is an ultimate fact, as Professor Thilly would seem to hold in the sentence quoted, then the ideal cannot be identified with the direction which our conscious or unconscious impulses happen to be taking, for obligation implies the antithesis of the actual and the ideal. There seems to be a lack of clearness in Professor Thilly's thought as to the relation between obligation and man's actual impulses and desires, which prevents us from recognizing the reconciliation of Kant and Spencer as complete.

The fundamental point, however, is not as to the 'derived' or 'underived' character of the sense of moral obligation, but as to its significance; for the obligatory character of the moral ideal depends not upon the time-relation of its origin, but upon its *meaning*.

We reach the crux of the matter, therefore, in Professor Thilly's contention that intuitionism and teleology are not necessarily antagonistic (p. 151 seq.); and this is true. But intuitionism commonly seeks some more ultimate basis of the moral law than the feeling of obligation itself, and teleological morality must do the same. In order to this, teleology must be applied to the universe and not simply to rules of conduct. That is, teleological morality must mean not merely that rules of conduct are good or bad simply as they further or hinder the end actually desired by man, this desired end itself being the product of a natural or non-moral process, but that the universe is propulsive, and that the moral law is the subjective expression of a moral world-order, and the Highest Good assumes the form of a Categorical Imperative because grounded in the nature of the Absolute Good. If the moral ideal be regarded as 'prophetic' in character, *i. e.*, as indicating the real inner meaning of the whole evolutionary process and as pointing towards its final goal, then it is ultimately based upon the true inward nature of things, of which it is at present the most perfect manifestation. We may then recognize a certain opposition between the 'cosmical' and the ethical process, while still maintaining that they are both '*part and parcel* of the general process of evolution,' the real significance of which as a whole is to be interpreted not in terms of its earlier but of its later stages. From this point of view the whole world-process is at bottom a moral order, of which the physical and the ethical are simply higher and lower phases, less and more perfect manifestations. And if this be so, if the natural order is in the last analysis a moral order, if man at his highest and best is made in the image of God, and his Ideal is also the Real, if his 'true nature' is essentially identical with the essence of the All-Real, which cannot be otherwise conceived than as altogether Good, then the ultimate basis and authority of the moral law is not simply in his own nature, still less in external nature, but in the heart of the universe, in the divine Thinker, whose thought is progressively revealed in the whole sphere of phenomenal existence. The physical universe is an unconscious manifestation of this revelation. It is a mirror which reflects what is thrown upon it—it is passive, is acted upon, but not active, is bound fast in the causal chain of natural law, has power of itself neither to further nor to hinder moral ends of which it is not even conscious. Man, however, is both a part

of nature and superior to it. He sees the vision of the Good and may consciously follow it. The vision is a subjective experience, has no prototype in the external world; yet it is no vision merely, but the shadow of the Real. It is this vision, this ideal, which is not born of man's sentient being, but springs from his spiritual, rational nature, and is the image of the heavenly, that becomes a categorical imperative, the law of his life. Thus man is both autonomous and at the same time under law; autonomous in that his self-legislation is in accordance with the demands of his own moral nature; under law in that he reflects or reënacts the absolute law of God.

If it be objected that this is to found ethics upon metaphysics, the fact must be admitted. But we do not first start with a philosophy of the universe, and deduce our theory of morals therefrom. We start with the facts of the moral life. If we can reach no final interpretation of these without the aid of metaphysics, that is a misfortune which has often overtaken naturalistic moralists unawares. For it is not a question of having or not having any metaphysics, but it is a question of *what* theory of the universe one prefers.

We therefore agree with Dr. Paul Carus ('The Ethical Problem') in criticising the societies for ethical culture because they do not furnish any 'basis of ethics.' The book entitled 'Ethics and Religion' consists of twelve essays, the majority of them written ten years ago, by men who have been founders or influential friends of ethical societies. These essays are all as readable as one would expect from the distinguished names of their authors—J. R. Seeley, Felix Adler, W. M. Salter, Henry Sidgwick, G. von Gizycki, Bernard Bosanquet, Leslie Stephen, Stanton Coit, J. H. Muirhead. As stated in the preface: "They are unanimously insistent upon one point," viz., "that an ethical society should hold itself uncommitted to any theory of the universe, and should not be primarily interested in the metaphysic of ethics." "Coöperation for moral ends is the aim of the societies." "An ethical society is an institution not for the advancement of ethical theory only, but also, and preëminently, for the improvement of ethical practice" (Felix Adler, pp. 31, 38). "The aim of the ethical movement is moral regeneration" (*Ibid.*, p. 58).

With this aim everybody must surely be in profoundest sympathy; and for the greater efficiency of a society which claims this high function it is perhaps wise that the bond of its members should be not a common doctrine, but a common practice, a common enthusiasm for moral improvement (pp. 48, 49). Certainly it would be a bad outlook

for the material betterment and moral elevation of mankind if all those interested in any philanthropic enterprise or moralizing endeavor had to be first agreed in theoretical principles. But this is only one side of the shield; for it is commonly understood and often proclaimed by the leaders of the ethical movement that the *raison d'être* of the ethical societies is not simply the fact that the churches alone do not and cannot do all that ought to be done toward elevating the masses, but also the fact that the old supernatural sanctions of morality have broken down, and it is therefore incumbent to seek a new basis for morality. As one would expect, the attitude of the ethical societies as a body toward the churches is not defined, but varies with the opinions of the individual leaders and members. With some it is an attitude of frank hostility, while others, like J. R. Seeley, feel that there should be 'a friendly and hearty alliance' (p. 29). Which view is taken doubtless depends chiefly upon whether the theoretical or the practical aspect of their work is emphasized. With the ethical movement as an organized endeavor to promote the most important of all practical aims, and with its relation as such to the Church we are not now concerned. As preacher and exemplar of righteousness there should surely be room for both church and ethical society. *Moral predigen* is as important as, according to Schopenhauer, it is easy; but *Moral begründen ist schwer*. Still, the difficulty is one which the ethical societies should not shirk. If their *raison d'être* is the avowed failure of the churches, not only in the sphere of practice but even more in that of theory, if the old theological basis of morality has been condemned and may be expected soon to crumble into dust, must not a new foundation be laid for the ethical sanctuary? This is Dr. Carus's contention in the book already mentioned.

'The Ethical Problem' now before us in the form of a second edition is a reprint of Dr. Carus's three lectures on 'Ethics as a Science,' together with criticisms thereon, and the author's answers to these criticisms. To secure to the modern world the boon of moral unity despite intellectual diversity is a noble ambition, and to this end, to build upon the content of the 'common conscience' ('Ethics and Religion,' p. 43) in preaching righteousness of life, is to stand upon a sound enough practical platform, since it is quite true that men are better agreed as to the fact of moral obligation and as to what is right than they are to *why* they should do the right. But the fact that there is such wide diversity of opinion in regard to this latter question suggests that it is not as meaningless as Mr. Salter thinks it, nor as absurd as Dugald Stewart long ago asserted.

The discussion between Mr. Salter and Dr. Carus, which centers about this point, forms the best part of a book which contains some very inferior essays. Mr. Salter contends for the authority of conscience, the categorical character of obligation; but he has no 'basis' for this except the intuition itself of duty. By 'basis of ethics' Mr. Salter apparently means the 'motive' to do the right; and there can be, he very truly says, no other properly moral motive than reverence for the right and the desire to do it. Dr. Carus objects that this leaves the moral law 'in the air.' But the fact is that the statement of this question, Why should I do right?, which is surely a natural and rational question, seems to put us in an unpleasant dilemma. For we can either give no answer to the question, the consciousness of obligation is a part of our nature (whether it be 'original' or 'derived') carrying its own credentials, and beyond that we cannot go in search of any more ultimate moral motive; or, if we attempt to give any further reason for right conduct, this can only appear in the form of some appeal to self-interest, and this would be a non-moral motive which is at variance with the very idea of morality and would seem to undermine it altogether. Nevertheless the fact remains that there is no other alternative than this: either virtue for virtue's sake, doing the right out of reverence for the right; or virtue for the sake of something else, some reward, say, *e. g.*, happiness. Either view may receive a theological setting. But in the latter case the theological setting does not help us; it simply substitutes supernatural sanctions for natural. Nor do we mend matters by making universal happiness the end. Utilitarianism gives us a criterion of morality, and it points to a desirable, though not the highest end. But when we ask, Why, should I further this end of universal happiness? the answer is either, Because in so doing I best contribute to my own happiness, or, Because I ought, I feel it to be right to do so. But then, why should I do right? The former answer, which is that of early utilitarianism, is manifestly a falling back into egoistic Hedonism. The later and nobler form of utilitarianism says in substance: The highest rational end for every man is his own happiness; but what is good for me is good for others also; reason dictates, therefore, that what I would choose for myself I should promote for others likewise. To promote universal happiness is right because it is rational. One can seek no farther 'reason' for right conduct than its reasonableness. The motive of right conduct is its self-evidencing rationality. To ask why I should do what is rational is absurd. If then we ask, Why should I do right, meaning why promote the greatest happiness on the whole at

personal sacrifice, no final *rationale* can be given. We have here a 'dualism of the practical reason.' It is rational both to seek and to sacrifice my own happiness. Why then should I sacrifice it? Simply because I feel this to be right. I must do the right out of reverence for the right. We are thus thrown back on the moral motive as the ultimate  $\pi\omicron\tilde{\nu}$   $\sigma\tau\tilde{\omega}$ . Theological Hedonism, moreover, in either the individualistic or the universalistic form, seems to leave us worse off than we were before; since, though it provides powerful motives in the form of supernatural sanctions, it furnishes no criterion of morality. For if it be said: Be virtuous, do your duty here, that you may be happy hereafter, we have then to ask, What is my duty? And unless it be held that we know intuitively what duty demands, we must define duty or moral conduct with reference to some end which it is incumbent upon us to follow now as the condition of future happiness. But granting that we have established the mundane end which furnishes the criterion of morality, the content of duty, fulfillment of which brings happiness, we are just where non-theological hedonism left us. If I do the right now that I may be happy hereafter, this is to act from a prudential motive. If I do the right in order to increase the present or posthumous felicity of others, this is because I feel it to be right to promote their happiness. Duty for duty's sake is the ultimate moral motive. The only alternative to this is that the motive to right conduct consists in the sanctions which attach to it. Dr. Carus denies this dilemma, but he does not refute it, and his own answer is an appeal to the sanction of natural law. Sanctions, indeed, natural or supernatural, universally attach to moral conduct (if nature is a moral order this must be so), but they do not necessarily constitute its motive, and the higher the type of morality the less stress it lays upon sanctions of any sort. But if it is a low view to base morality upon the supernatural sanction of a good and just Moral Being, surely it must be a still more unworthy view to base it upon the natural sanctions of a universe which, as Dr. Carus holds, is neither good nor just, but entirely non-moral. Prudence may dictate obedience to natural law, but such action is only expedient, not moral. To obey natural laws because we thus escape painful consequences, is Hedonism, to which Dr. Carus objects. The theistic morality to which he likewise objects may also, it is true, enforce obedience to the moral law by the consequences attending our attitude toward it. But the law of obedience for theological moralists is not always, nor even generally, founded in the *will* of God, which decrees rewards and punishments, but in the Divine *Nature*. Many

who may be called theological moralists make no appeal to sanctions, and certainly do not hold that God's will is the source of right. Professor Thilly, therefore, speaks inaccurately when he applies the name *theological school* exclusively to those who hold that certain things are right or wrong simply 'because God has arbitrarily decreed them to be so' (p. 117).<sup>1</sup> Von Gizycki knew better, and though he heartily repudiated theological ethics, we commend his remarks on this subject ('Ethics and Religion,' pp. 162-164) to Dr. Carus, who regards the familiar distinction urged by Mr. Salter between 'basing the right on the will of God' and regarding 'God's will as identical with what is right' as irrelevant ('The Ethical Problem,' pp. 143, 144).

But by 'basis of ethics' Dr. Carus apparently means something more than the motive or the sanction of right conduct; though just what he does mean is not quite clear. We take it, however, that he means that the moral law must have something more than a merely subjective existence; it must be the subjective representation of an objective reality. We are to look for this objective reality in nature, and Dr. Carus scorns the idea that the source or basis of the moral law may be found in any supernatural or transcendental region. "An ethical man is he whose aspiration is to live in perfect harmony with the moral law" (p. 37); but "the moral law is simply a formulation of the lessons taught us by experience" (p. 98); "in case you want fire, produce it by friction"; "if you wish to live, obey reason." "All we can say about the ethical ought is to state the facts as they are: the man who does not care about being a useful member of society, or who does not care about his physical, mental and moral health, who does not care for going to the wall, and whose actions are expressions of this indifference, he will do harm to his fellow beings, and he will be doomed to perdition. \* \* \* These are the facts, and the moral ought is a statement of such and kindred facts for pastoral purposes, or as a help for self-education." There is no obligation beyond these facts (p. 148). "Morality is to be based upon the authority of natural laws" (p. 113). "The ought is a comprehension of the must"; it is conformity to the *is to be* (p. 154). "Morality is nothing but the intentional conformity to nature and to the order of nature." But since "nature is non-moral" (p. 312), it is difficult to see how we are here to discover the wished-for basis. Dr. Carus indeed is difficult to make out. Now he speaks of nature as non-moral (p. 312), and again of

<sup>1</sup>One other point of detail may be noted. Mr. Thilly's classification of ethical theories and writers is in the main good, but it is surely a mistake to define 'energism' in such a way as to make it necessary to place Hobbes among antihedonists (cf. pp. 127, 190).

'the moral law in the world' and 'the moral order of the world' (pp. 131, 132). Nor can he mean to distinguish between 'nature' and 'the moral order of the world' and to make the latter transcend the former; for he criticises Mr. Salter on the ground that there is a 'dualism' lurking in his ethics, "as if the moral order were something radically different from the order of this world" (p. 126).

But if nature is so moral that it furnishes the standard of morality, why are we told that the only ideal worthy of man's attention is "that which aims at creating a better state of things," and that "morality is based upon, it is creating a better state of things by conforming to the order of this very same world in which we live" ? (pp. 176, 306). How can we 'create a better state of things' by conforming to the present state of things ?

We are forced to the conclusion that Dr. Carus does not hold to a moral order of the world which furnishes the ethical standard. In logical accord with his monistic philosophy, he uses the words God and nature indifferently. Man can be said to be moral only if he conforms to the will of God; but God is non-moral. He is only 'an inflexible law, immutable, irrefragible, eternal' (pp. 192, 312). In what sense can we say that morality is based upon the existence of such an impersonal non-moral law ?

We repeat that Dr. Carus is not easy to follow. Morality is conformity to nature, yet "that which we should do must be regarded as the highest we can think of" (p. 145). Does this mean that we *ought* to realize our moral ideal ? If so, then we have that absolute obligation which Dr. Carus repudiates, and an end to realize which assuredly external or physical nature does not reveal; while if this end be sought not in the cosmic process without man, but in human nature, then we have a subjective basis of morality and not that objective basis which Dr. Carus seeks. Or does the sentence last quoted mean that 'the highest we can think of' is conformity to nature's must; do this or take the consequences ? In this case, we not only have no moral obligation; but furthermore we may well ask whether the imitation of a non-moral nature, or conformity to its laws, is 'the highest we can think of.' An ethical ought founded upon facts or laws which confessedly have no moral quality is assuredly meaningless and without basis.

Again: "An ethical teacher ought to appeal to the highest motives man is capable of" (p. 61). Is the highest motive, then, that man should seek to escape 'the doom of perdition' which waits upon the breaking of nature's laws ? Apparently not; for Dr. Carus at times

rises above his prudential morality, as when he says: "An ethical action is performed from a broader motive than self-interest, from the desire to be somehow of service to the development of humanity." But in what does this differ from Mr. Salter's 'moral motive' for which no farther reason can be given? As Dr. Carus here unconsciously falls back upon Mr. Salter's moral motive, so also by a virtuous inconsistency he seems to transcend the ethics based upon the facts of nature. We may then agree with Mr. Salter in saying that the moral motive is the only proper motive for morality, and at the same time go with Dr. Carus in search of a basis of ethics, an objective grounding of the moral ideal. It is here that theology, or metaphysics, legitimately comes in. Dr. Carus refuses to identify the useful and the good, he desires 'the health and nobility of our soul-life,' his ethics looks toward the perfection of character. But where do we get our idea, our criterion of this ethical end? Surely not from nature as a whole, but from nature in what all are agreed in calling its highest aspect, from man, from within ourselves. Aside from the fact that evolutionary moralists are by no means agreed as to the end to which nature points, it may be confidently asserted that the ideal for man's life cannot be derived from anything lower in the scale of being than himself. The fundamental postulate of evolution is that what is last in order of time is first in importance, is that for which what went before existed. Evolution is an unfolding of the less into the more perfect form. If then man cannot derive his ideal from nature nor seek his ethical standard in the cosmic process, but must find it in himself, he cannot find a basis of ethics in the laws of external nature. The ideal, Dr. Carus says, 'is rooted and must be rooted in the real,' and by 'the real' he means the 'nature' of science. But the ideal cannot be rooted in infra-human nature, since man as a part of nature is the highest part. The ideal must be rooted in something which corresponds with its own character or quality. If there is no 'real' to which the ideal corresponds, then the latter is a subjective phantasm without objective basis, a 'mirage' as Dr. Carus calls it. But if it is not a 'mirage,' then the ideal is the shadow of the real. The latter is greater, higher, more perfect than the ideal. Our ideals change and grow in fullness of form and content. With them grow our conceptions of the real. As we endeavor to realize our progressive ideals, we approach more and more to the similitude of the real. The form of the moral law, therefore, is obedience to the ideal within us; its justification and basis are in the fact that in obeying it we are not only realizing the end of our own nature, but are at the same time realizing

*a whole* by identifying our life with that in which we live and move and have our being. This whole, however, must be not less but greater and more perfect than the self we seek to realize. It must transcend external nature, it must transcend human nature; they are both manifestations of its inner reality, but together do not exhaust its content. The individual finds his fullness in the universal, the Many find their life in the One of whose fullness they have all received. To separate the Many from the One, the Infinite, would be to limit, and thus to deny the infinity of the One. While, on the other hand, completely to identify them, to make the content of the One consist of the sum of the Many, and completely to submerge finite beings in the Infinite, would be to deny that element of spontaneous activity which constitutes moral freedom and is of the essence of morality. The relation of the One to the Many carries us to the heights (or the depths) of metaphysical thought; but we hold that we may recognize, and for an idealistic obligatory ethic we must recognize, a pluralism of personality and at the same time a unity of spiritual nature between the One and the Many.

Dr. Carus would doubtless stigmatize so much of transcendentalism as this as supernaturalism or dualism. But there is, apparently at least, a moral dualism between nature and man which is not of our making. As regards ethics, there seems indeed to be but three possible positions—either (1) Nature, meaning by nature what Huxley calls the cosmic process, may be taken to furnish the standard or ideal of morality—which we cannot admit; or (2) There exists between nature, in this restricted sense, and man, an ethical dualism, so that man does not find the moral ideal in the *actual* course of nature—in which case the ideal is a purely subjective affair; or (3) Man is superior to nature, its course is not his moral law, the latter is self-enunciated and therefore subjective; but if his higher nature which rises superior to cosmical nature allies him to the real spiritual nature of the universe, of which both cosmical nature and his own human nature are less and more perfect expressions, then we seem to have transcended the subjective ethical standpoint and found the objective basis of ethics of which Dr. Carus is in search.

We have avoided the use of theological language; but the necessity which the 'religion of science' seems to be under to employ the formulas of religious thought, may not improperly be regarded as a notable tribute to the rational hold which religion has upon the human mind, and should make us hesitate the less to employ language which is after all best suited to convey our ideas clearly and concisely. In

seeking for an objective basis of ethics, then, let us say: Be a person, seek to realize the perfect fullness of your moral personality; do this from no unworthy motives, but from sheer love of goodness and right. You will find the objective basis of this, however, in the perfect moral nature of God, the All-Real. God did not create Goodness or Righteousness by an act of will, but he realizes them in His nature. They exist subjectively in us as ideals, and obligation consists in the duty of seeking to realize them. The moral law, therefore, is summed up in the injunction: Be ye therefore perfect, as God is perfect. The basis of ethics does not consist in the naturalistic or the supernaturalistic sanctions of the moral law, but in the objective existence of goodness and righteousness in the Divine Nature, conformity to which is the absolute obligation and the supreme end of human life. Morality thus issues in religion—but not the religion of science. The ‘religious motive’ of morality, however, does not consist in the fear, but in the love of God, *i. e.*, love of the good and the right. God is the personification of these; it is for this reason that we love and seek to imitate Him. But why personify these concepts? it may be asked. Because goodness, moral perfection, are attributes of personality, of character; they imply a thinker in whose consciousness they exist and whose moral character consists in their realization. Morality can not be predicated of the unconscious. “Neither moral relations nor the moral law can swing *in vacuo*. Their only habitat can be a mind which feels them.” In calling God a person we do not mean to limit His nature to our conception of finite personality. He may, nay must, be above, but cannot be beneath our conception of personality. By calling Him ‘personal,’ however, we mean in this connection to attribute to Him those attributes of thought and feeling which are the necessary implicates of moral being. If moral relations and the moral law exist only *in us*, they are subjective merely; but if they exist in the Divine Nature, they have objective and eternal reality. If such a divine thinker exist, ‘then actualized already in his thought must be that ethical philosophy which we seek as the pattern which our own must evermore approach’ (William James, in ‘The Will to Believe’). Here is our ‘basis of ethics.’

Objection may be made that the existence of such a Supreme Moral Being can not be proven, and that it is a mistake to base morality upon such a peradventure; or it may be contended that morality needs no such foundation; but nevertheless such an hypothesis seems necessary to satisfy Dr. Carus’s demand for an objective basis of ethics. Finally, it is often urged that the geocentric concep-

tion of the universe having become obsolete, we can no longer cling to the idea of man's supreme place in the cosmos. But to base ethics on the moral nature of man only, is this not as anthropocentric a view as that of any schoolman? And is not the true universal point of view to make man's ideal also the universally real?<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Kedney's theory of ethics differs radically from that of Dr. Carus. He agrees with the latter in finding both utilitarianism and intuitionism defective. They agree farther in that they both hold ethics to be impossible unless based upon a 'world-conception.' But here their agreement ceases; for if "the one question whose true answer makes a moral philosophy possible is, What is the *idea* of the universe?" ('Problems in Ethics,' p. 1) their ethics will differ as their respective 'ideas of the universe,' and of course the former must be true or false according as their answers to this question are true or false. Mr. Kedney is not only sure of the truth of his own view, but apparently takes a very optimistic attitude toward the possibility of general agreement. "If human thinking," he says, "is to be guided and corrected, and its results harmonized, the first and indispensable thing to be done is to make men, or those men who guide the others, agree as to their philosophy of the universe." One may be pardoned for thinking it a bad outlook if such guidance and correction are to begin only then, when it would surely no longer be necessary. Mr. Kedney is presumably a theologian, and he takes as his ethical '*primum*' or starting-point, belief in a personal Author of the universe, whose existence is taken to have been established in a former work entitled 'Christian Doctrine Harmonized.' Thus the present work in reality constitutes only a portion of a larger system of thought, and moreover is only a partial execution of the author's original intention to make this treatise on moral philosophy 'his main literary work' (Preface, p. iv). The result is naturally a somewhat fragmentary product, and this may in a measure excuse the fragmentary character of the slight criticism we intend to offer.

<sup>1</sup>If we hold that the possibility of knowledge is conditioned upon the existence of an eternal self-consciousness, we are led by another path—the epistemological—to the same goal. One who lays stress, as Dr. Carus does, upon the necessity of a philosophy of the universe as a basis for ethics, could not object to this cumulative method of proof. Mr. Salter holds that "in truth there is nothing on which to base morality" ('Ethical Religion,' p. 37). Dr. Carus's basis is inadequate. The view briefly sketched above seems to me to indicate the direction of the only lines along which the 'ethical problem' can be solved. Mr. Salter quotes with approval the saying of Channing that "to love God is to love morality in its most perfect form" (*Ibid.*, p. 22). May it not with equal truth be said that to love the moral ideal, as above interpreted, is to love God?

Mr. Kedney both omits and includes topics not ordinarily omitted or treated in ethical works. Why, *e. g.*, should he devote a chapter to the 'question of the existence of evil spirits'? This is a very proper question for the Christian theologian to deal with, since Scripture has something to say on the subject. But how does it concern the philosophical moralist? Since if evil spirits do not exist they may be left out of account; and if they do exist and exert an 'alien influence,' their *modus operandi* is so obscure that the less we reckon with it the better; while if they *control* the will of human beings this would seem to impair moral responsibility. We agree with Mr. Kedney that it is probably best for us that we are left (where his chapter leaves us) in ignorance as to their existence and influence.

Mr. Kedney adheres to the triplicate Kantian postulates of morality. God is treated of in the former work already mentioned. "The argument for human freedom" (Ch. X.) we do not profess to understand. The author's position is indeterministic. In support of the ethical implications of immortality much may be said and the arguments for it may be stated with some force in various ways. Thus it may be argued that the human consciousness demands the final identification of virtue and happiness, and since this is manifestly impossible in the present life, we necessarily look for it in a life beyond the grave. Or it may be urged that the moral life is the progressive endeavor to realize our moral ideal of perfection of character, and that since this realization is manifestly impossible in the present life, our efforts would be in vain, a following of a will-o'-the-wisp, an unsatisfactory and incomplete episode, a tragedy of ambition doomed to sudden disappointment, if there were not an eternal opportunity given to realize an infinite demand.

Nevertheless, it is surely too much to say that "there is no morality unless there be immortality," that "morality, otherwise, is mere expediency" (p. 104). "If this world's experiences and possibilities only are to be considered, morality is a mere question of expediency, which each individual must determine for himself. There is no higher authority than the individual will, no truer idea than the idiosyncratic subjective one; therefore no right but might—successful will" (p. 105). But surely the 'higher authority' of the Divine will, in which the author profoundly believes, would still exist, the true idea of moral perfection would be objectively realized in it, the moral law would still have significance, and obedience to it would bring its own reward; it would still be the law of life and the condition of human welfare; it would still make the universe a moral order and its laws moral laws, even if their sanctions were confined to this life.

We may hold to the Kantian idea that the moral life would be robbed of its supreme significance unless it were of infinite duration as well as worth, and yet not stake morality upon the doctrine of immortality. It is absurd to say that the universe without immortality 'is a soulless machine' (p. 119). Faith in God and a future life are coördinate aspects of the Christian conception of the world, and they are commonly associated in thought. Together they furnish the best, if not the only, rationale of an optimistic philosophy. But they do not necessarily stand or fall together. One may surely believe in God and in his wise providential ordering of the universe as a whole, including the race of man, and in the reign of moral law, while still expressing doubt about personal immortality. The eternal life being life in harmony with the nature of the Eternal, may begin here and now, and though it cannot reach its full fruition in our short finite existence, and for this we are led to look beyond, it would still not be true that 'without immortality might would be right and expediency morality.' Morality might be God's will for mortal as for immortal beings. It is at least thinkable that in three score years and ten man might so realize the blessedness of a life in harmony with the Eternal Righteous One as to make the moral life worth living. It may of course be objected that in order to justify the ways of God to man individually, in order to conceive of Him as a just and loving Father who cares for each one of us, we must postulate a sphere where the wrongs of this life may be righted and the crooked made straight. And this is true. Only thus can the demands of the religious consciousness be completely satisfied, and the providential order of the world be made to cover individual cases; but it does not follow that personal immortality is necessary to the existence of moral law or that without it the world is a soulless machine.

It is also true as a matter of fact that most of those who refuse to put faith in the doctrine of immortality do so on the basis of a materialistic philosophy. Nevertheless, the answer to the metaphysical question as to whether the universe is 'a soulless machine' surely sustains no logically necessary relation to the ethical demand for immortality. It is perfectly possible to believe in a God without believing in immortality—that is, to find the 'proofs' of God's existence stronger than those for immortality. Though here again, as a matter of fact, the moral consciousness which demands a future life also furnishes one of the strongest arguments for the existence of God. Mr. Kedney, however, is disposed to overwork a willing beast. He doubts "the alleged indifference with which it is said that some men of philosophic temper-

ament have met death"—a doubt which we do not share, but need not dwell upon, since the fact, whatever it be, would tend neither to prove nor to disprove anything of importance. Mr. Kedney continues: "The human soul clings to life as no animal does, which shows its instinct that life has meaning," *i. e.*, according to the context, that man must be immortal. The statement in regard to animals may be doubted. Even a fish may be said to 'cling' desperately to life when it struggles to regain its natural habitat; and cases of animal-suicide, if proven at all, are at least rare. We know too little about the feelings of animals to speak about them with any certainty. But if the facts be as Mr. Kedney asserts, may we not with equal justice argue precisely otherwise? We instinctively cling to what we fear to lose; but if we are to pass out of this life into a richer, fuller existence, why is it not our instinct that 'to depart is far better'? Mr. Kedney says the fact that man "cannot imagine his extinction as a self-consciousness may be taken as supplementary evidence that such extinction is impossible" (p. 116). If Mr. Kedney cannot 'imagine' this 'extinction,' it seems a curious limit to the imagination of one who lays so much stress upon the necessity of "taking the ideal out of the cold region of pure thought and bringing it within the warm one of imagination" (p. 27).

Again Mr. Kedney says: "The neglect to take into account the fact of continued conscious human existence after death as furnishing a set of relations affecting human conduct before death, is the fatal flaw of utilitarianism as a reasoned system." Mr. Kedney forgets that utilitarians like Mill and Sidgwick show that theological sanctions may be added by those who choose, in support of a morality which makes universal happiness the highest good; and in criticising Kant on this point he comes dangerously near the position of Paley.

Mr. Kedney's desire to avoid accepted philosophical phraseology (p. 23) is unobjectionable, though it may be asked wherein consists the advantage of avoiding terminology which would abbreviate expression without sacrificing lucidity. But if accepted terms are to be used at all, they should be used with proper discrimination. Thus Mr. Kedney lumps all utilitarians together and criticises them *en masse* (p. 43). He holds out as utilitarian doctrine the thesis that 'might determines right.' But what is right is duty, and just over the page our author teaches that for utilitarians the only *duty* is to promote the aggregate of happiness. There are, of course, utilitarians, like Sidgwick for example, who neither ignore the idea of duty, nor resolve it into might. On the other hand, Mr. Kedney himself appar-

ently falls into this identification of might with right. The origin of a nationality, he says, may not have been necessary or morally right; "but if the new state can maintain itself in its autonomy, it must be thought to be comprised in the providential plan, and therefore to have the divine sanction." That is, whatever is, is right, or might makes right. And if a state can *not* maintain itself, then presumably it has not the divine sanction. This reminds one of much of the pulpit and political sophistry at present current.

From what has been said, it may be surmised that Mr. Kedney's edifice is somewhat loosely joined together. With a single final glance we leave it. The author says: "Many animals are superstitious" (p. 198). "Superstition is simply the irrational." "Superstition implies a false philosophy" (p. 199). From this it would follow that many animals are irrational and have a false philosophy. The book is written in fine spirit, however, and in its definition of the good as "a community of loving souls," recognizes both the social and the ideal elements which are characteristic of the tendency of recent ethical thought.

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