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


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
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THE REFORM OF POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION

SOME SAYINGS ON REPRESENTATION

“Representative assemblies may be compared to maps. They ought to reproduce all the component parts of a country in their true proportions, and not permit the obliteration of the smaller elements by the larger.”—MIRABEAU.

“Is it necessary that the minority should not even be heard? Nothing but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless injustice. In a really equal democracy every or any section would be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately.”—J. S. MILL.

“It is infinitely to the advantage of the House of Commons, if it is to be a real reflection and mirror of the national mind, that there should be no strain of opinion honestly entertained by any substantial body of the King’s subjects which should not there find representation and speech.”—THE RT. HON. H. H. ASQUITH.

“The indispensable preliminary to democracy is the representation of every interest.”—G. BERNARD SHAW.

“The one pervading evil of democracy is the tyranny of the majority, or rather of that party, not always the majority, that succeeds, by force or fraud, in carrying elections. To break off that point is to avert the danger. The common system of representation perpetuates the danger. Unequal electorates afford no security to majorities. Equal electorates give none to minorities. Thirty-five years ago it was pointed out that the remedy is proportional representation. It is profoundly democratic, for it increases the influence of thousands who would otherwise have no voice in the Government; and it brings men more near an equality by so contriving that no vote shall be wasted, and that every voter shall contribute to bring into Parliament a member of his own opinion.”—LORD ACTON.

“The law of contests in single-member constituencies is the law of murder—‘Thou shalt kill thine adversary.’ . . . The law of contests in large constituencies with proportional representation is the law of justice—‘You and your adversaries shall each have your fair share.’ In this way the personal struggles which to-day so deplorably distort the conflicts of ideas would be greatly modified, if not abolished altogether.”—ÉMILE JAURÈS.

(On a scheme of proportional representation) “you would have great constituencies divided into great component parts; you would have each portion well represented; you would have freedom from expense, freedom from the irritation of political feeling, and from the curse of all elections—bribery.”—LORD CHANCELLOR CAIRNS.

THE
REFORM OF POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION

By J. FISCHER WILLIAMS, C.B.E.

SOMETIME FELLOW OF NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD, AND OF LINCOLN'S INN
BARRISTER-AT-LAW; HON. TREASURER OF THE PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION SOCIETY

BEING A SECOND AND REVISED EDITION OF
"PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND BRITISH POLITICS"
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1918

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1918

TO THE
APPROVED

PREFACE

THE first edition of this pamphlet was published in the late spring of 1914; proportional representation was then unfamiliar to the general public, and, in spite of its inclusion in the Liberal Government's Home Rule Bill, was hardly regarded as a live political issue in the House of Commons. Since that time, as a result of the recommendation of the Speaker's Conference on electoral questions which sat in 1917, proportional representation has been forced on the public attention by its inclusion, for about one-fourth of the House of Commons, in the Government Reform Bill of 1917-18; and although, to the lasting injury of that measure, it was tamely—and rather incomprehensibly—abandoned by the Government even before any serious public indication of opposition, it has nevertheless secured a small place in our political constitution by its application to the constituency of the Scottish Universities (returning three members), to the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and to Trinity College, Dublin (returning two members each), and to the group of the seven younger English Universities (other than London), also returning two members.

Although we have been temporarily unsuccessful, the struggle has been full of encouragement. Proportional representation has received the support of two former Prime Ministers—Mr Asquith and Mr Balfour. It has been approved by the great majority of the serious Press—including journals differing so widely in ordinary politics as *The Times*, *The Daily News*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Manchester Guardian*, *The Yorkshire Post*, *The Spectator*, *The Nation*, *The Observer*, and *The Labour Leader*; it has been supported

in critical divisions by majorities of the Liberal members and of the Labour members in the House of Commons, and its vital importance for the orderly and harmonious development of democratic institutions has been recognised by an overwhelming majority of the House of Lords. Indeed, the House of Lords found itself in disagreement with the strangely short-sighted view of the Unionist party organisers, who were able, with the assistance of some of the older-minded Liberals and members of the Labour party, to muster a majority of the House of Commons, and the disagreement of the Houses was composed only by setting up a Royal Commission to prepare a scheme of 100 seats to which proportional representation was to be applied. Unfortunately, the scheme so prepared was to become law only if it received the support of resolutions of the House of Commons and of the House of Lords; and, as the Government gave the House of Commons no guidance, the same influences which prevailed in that House in January 1918 not unnaturally were again sufficiently powerful in the same assembly four months later to procure the rejection of the scheme of the Commission. If we compare the course of this struggle with the history of the early struggles of the now victorious Women's movement we cannot mistake the omens of an ultimate victory not to be long deferred.

Reasons for good hope of our struggle in Great Britain are not to be found only in the fortunes of the Reform Act. In addition to the Speaker's Conference, we have recently had two gatherings of men of weight and authority to deal with constitutional questions—the Irish Convention and Lord Bryce's Conference on the Second Chamber question; both of them have recommended in varying forms the use of the principle of proportional representation towards the solution of the problems with which they had to deal.

In this great advance two personal losses fall to be recorded. In 1914 Earl Grey was the President, and Lord Courtney of Penwith the Chairman of the Executive Committee, of the Proportional Representation Society. Earl Grey's last contribution to public life was his eager and successful advocacy of the cause of just representation in the


Speaker's Conference; Lord Courtney's last speech in the House of Lords was a defence of that reform, the conviction of whose supreme importance led him in 1884 to resign his position in Mr Gladstone's Government. The example of these life-long devotions will not be lost upon those on whom it now falls to carry on the struggle to victory.

In these circumstances, I have ventured to republish this brief and elementary statement of some of the arguments for the reform, and of the actual electoral processes involved by the proportional representation system, together with a consideration of the main objections which public discussion has produced. The work has no pretence to be exhaustive—those who wish to make a fuller study of the subject should consult *Proportional Representation*¹ by J. H. Humphreys, Secretary of the Proportional Representation Society, to whose suggestions and friendly criticism this book owes much, and who has given devoted and unfailing labour to the cause of electoral justice and freedom.

J. F. W.


¹ Methuen & Co., London, 1911, 5s. net.

October 1918.



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THE REFORM OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

SWITZERLAND.

Since this book was printed, Switzerland has adopted Proportional Representation for Federal Elections by a vote of 297,000 against 147,000 on referendum. In 1900 Proportional Representation was defeated on referendum by 224,570 votes to 169,618, and in 1910 by 265,194 votes to 240,305.

ERRATUM.

Appendix II. pp. 117 & 120. The references to the **marking** of K's and F's papers on the 2nd and 5th transfers respectively should be deleted. It is only on the transfer of a surplus that papers are marked.

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of modern democracy, and that the question how representa-
tives are to be chosen is not a mere detail to be left to settle
itself, but one of the fundamentals of modern political
organisation. Too long have reformers allowed their

THE REFORM OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

INTRODUCTORY

THE war has made our people look at the foundations of institutions. It is on our side a war to make "the world safe for democracy." A telling phrase and true. For the Prussian system is a denial of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, a hierarchic constitution designed for the advantage of a single caste. But what is the thing that we call "democracy," for which the world is to be made safe? It is not what "democracy" meant in the age of Pericles—government by the assembly of citizens who could listen to rival orators and decide the gravest questions of policy by a popular vote. It is representative democracy—the thing that Rousseau said did not secure freedom—government by the people through the medium of representatives elected at intervals of a few years, and, in theory at any rate, supervising some smaller body, Council of Ministers or Cabinet, responsible for the preparation of legislation and for the business of executive government.

Had President Wilson varied his famous phrase—had he said that we were fighting to make the world safe for representative government—the language would have had perhaps less in it of popular appeal, but it might have served to point to the truth that representation is of the essence of modern democracy, and that the question how representatives are to be chosen is not a mere detail to be left to settle itself, but one of the fundamentals of modern political organisation. Too long have reformers allowed their

attention to be concentrated on the question of who is to have the vote—a question now substantially settled, though the full practical conclusions have not yet been drawn—to the exclusion of the question how the vote is to be made effective. Hence on many sides we have criticisms of democracy that are unjust, because democracy is still unequipped with its proper tools, and lamentations over the power of the caucus and machine politicians that are futile, because those who utter them are often too indolent to pursue a search for a remedy.

There has been during the course of the war a not unnatural impatience with the form and methods of our parliamentary government. In so far as this impatience was directed against parliamentary government as a war organisation, we are not concerned with it here. But it would be idle to dismiss the widespread feeling that the House of Commons was not during the war wholly worthy of the nation as nothing more than ill-considered dissatisfaction that will vanish with the declaration of peace. Indeed, the representative character of Parliament has never been challenged so successfully by any supporter of aristocratic or despotic theories of government as it was by Mr Lloyd George's action when he formed his Ministry in 1916, and went outside Parliament for a President of the Board of Education, for a President of the Board of Trade, for a Minister of National Service, for a Shipping Controller, and ultimately for a First Lord of the Admiralty. The representative body under a parliamentary government ought surely, if we had a tolerably good representative system, to have provided from itself the fittest candidates for these great offices. If our present method of creating a parliament had been really satisfactory, and had attracted into politics the best creative capacity, political life should have supplied from its own stores a chief Naval Administrator and a Minister of Education.

It was, perhaps, ominous of a general dissatisfaction with the constitution of Parliament that not much was said in criticism of what to our fathers would have seemed an alarming anomaly. But such dissatisfaction is, to a believer in demo-

cratic government, a serious thing, for modern democracy must work through a popular assembly or not at all. No doubt, allowance must be made for our present circumstances. A time of war is, naturally, a time when parliamentary institutions tend to sink in popular favour. Parliaments are not apt for the conduct of military operations. The House of Commons is not necessarily called on to do more than vote supplies. But the House of Commons during the war lost more in prestige and authority than might have been anticipated; in particular it receded in comparison with the House of Lords. It had in substance no control in what was once its exclusive province, finance; and, in concern for the liberty of the subject, the hereditary Chamber was the more solicitous. It had little influence on the course of the war, and it failed to develop the power of collective action which was necessary if it was to obtain any considerable influence. It did not keep in touch with the great Departments of State by any system of parliamentary committees, and the questions put by private members often reached a really alarming level of futility. The "mother of Parliaments" needs to be reinvigorated; unless she is invigorated she will cease to be the most powerful organ in the State—if, indeed, she has not so ceased already. How does the House of Commons compare, in point of effective power, at present with the Press, and how with the Civil Service?

Now, for reinvigoration there are two methods, which are by no means mutually exclusive, but still are distinct.

Reinvigoration Needed. We may attempt to call forth capacity by an increase of function. We may give the representative assembly more work to do, and we may insist on its organising itself and its business less absurdly than at present. That is one method. The other method is to look at the constitution of the assembly, see whether it is at present so formed as best to discharge its duties; and, if the answer is unsatisfactory, to amend its constitution. The House of Commons claims to be a representative body. Does it in fact represent all the citizens? Are all the main elements of the national life reproduced in it? Within the measure of its numbers does

it contain every man of capacity who aspires to political life and whom a reasonable number of citizens desire to see elected? If the answer to these questions is in the negative is there no way of reform? Is it right to go on choosing one man to represent a population of whom a large part—sometimes the larger part—do not agree with him? Have other countries nothing to teach us? The idea of representing separately the parts of the body politic that perform separate functions—the more and the less skilled wage-earners—professional persons—commercial classes, and so on—is probably impracticable. For it is not clear that it is possible thus to assume with certainty what is a man's chief function, and classify him accordingly to the neglect of all other sides of his personality. And it is certainly not easy to frame the boundaries of constituencies defined by functions and to determine how many members they are to return. But it does not follow that we are to insist that the best possible method of organisation for the purpose of choosing members of a representative body is the purely geographical method by which a local majority alone is represented—a local majority almost always heterogeneous in function and only mechanically unanimous in opinion. Must we always exclude from parliamentary representation opinions which are held by (say) four-ninths of the inhabitants of large tracts of country? And if these anomalies are not inherent in the nature of parliamentary representation, it is surely at least premature, as so many are now disposed to do, to disparage and despise parliaments altogether, and to look for short cuts to efficiency by reliance on the Press or the trade union or the guild or the bureaucracy.

It is commonly claimed for British political development that it has advanced slowly — “broadened down from precedent to precedent,” and not by violent action and reaction towards and away from opposing extremes. The claim may be not without truth, the national immunity from general ideas having thus its compensating advantages. But if our practical advances have been slow and orderly, in the realm of political theory the present generation has seen a violent

The Reaction
against Mill.

revolution. Now revolutions, being essentially emotional, are never just to individuals, and the revolution in our thought from individualism to collectivism has been conspicuously unjust to John Stuart Mill. For some twenty years in Socialist circles—though Mill was himself half a Socialist—his name has been thought to stand for nothing but the discredited individualism of 1860, and the mere fact that a project found favour with him has been enough gravely to discredit it. And thus the young lions of 1890 sought to bury without honour Mill's views on the machinery of representation in the grave of his political economy. In the future, these very views on political organisation (with which practically all Socialists on the Continent agree) may prove to be one of Mill's best titles to enduring fame.

It has been said that Mill attached too much importance to the question of electoral machinery; and advocates of **Importance of Machinery of Representation.** a change in methods of election are frequently reproached with making the mistake that a mere alteration of "machinery" can change the fundamental characteristics of a modern polity. But, putting aside the fact that, if only those reforms are to be accepted for which no exaggerated claim is ever made, we should never have any reform of any description, we may fairly answer that the reproach is shallow, in so far as it implies that the machinery of representation is unimportant. The modern representative assembly may be controlled, as in Switzerland, by the devices of the Referendum and the Initiative, but apart from those devices it is the one channel by which the ordinary citizen exercises a direct influence on public affairs. It is the modern substitute for the assembly of citizens that ruled the early democratic state. We can no longer assemble all citizens in person: they are present by proxy. The experience both of history and of contemporary life proves that the method of the choice of these proxies is of vital importance to political development: not to multiply illustrations, the ancient democratic city-states broke down and passed into autocracies largely because the ancient world never evolved the "machinery" of representative government; the different forms of comitia affected profoundly the politics of ancient

Rome; the electoral methods of the United States, of the first French Republic, and of modern Prussia have been of crucial importance in American and European history.

Further, on the effective participation of the citizen in government depends not merely the realisation of the

Reactions on popular will (when public opinion is really individual formed and decided as to some issue of politics)

Character. but also the utilisation for the public advantage of all such resources of knowledge and intelligence as exist in the community. In considering electoral "machinery" we have to take into account not only the character of the assembly elected and its efficiency as a governing machine, but also the effect of the machinery upon the elector himself: the extent to which it nerves and stimulates his mind, his imagination, and his character; the extent to which it interests him in government and makes him a conscious contributor to an organic whole. Representative machinery is not merely a method of getting things done more or less efficiently. It reacts on the individual citizen. It may depress the individual by treating him as an insignificant unit in a drilled army whose business is to vote at the word of command in a fever of temporary excitement following a long period of torpor. It may elevate and stimulate his interests by giving him a real choice as to the person who is to represent him, by securing to him, as far as may be, the privilege of having his own representative. And as the machinery produces one or other of these effects, so must it be judged as an efficient instrument of popular government. For the ultimate justification of popular government is not so much its efficiency for doing certain definite tasks—education, national defence, the care of streets and roads: these things may be and perhaps are done as well by an autocracy or bureaucracy. The ultimate value of popular government is that no other system offers the same possibilities of individual development. A governed man is *pro tanto* a poorer thing than a governing man. To take the people into partnership is not merely to increase the trading profits: it is to turn "hands" into men.

We have just lost a large number of our best men. We must make the best use of those who remain. We

must give them free opportunities of development. We must open to them political life. Many of our younger men have exchanged a dull existence without prospect for a life of high possibility. They have offered their own lives that our British Commonwealth and all it stands for may continue. We owe them a share in State direction, not the mere sham of the present parliamentary vote. And, for the women recently enfranchised, we must look to it that their participation in politics is real and effective: not a mere liberty at long intervals to choose between the two or three nominees of the political "machines."

There is a general agreement among all parties in this country that government must be with the consent of the **Co-operation** governed. But it is not enough that citizens **as well as** should consent; they should also co-operate, **Consent.** if we are to have a true democracy. The co-operation of all citizens will not only improve government; it will also enable the community to realise its own capacities. In an active-minded community and in the active-minded part of a torpid community there is a constant play and interchange of ideas. Now, though formative ideas are not like meteorites—single, detached phenomena descending unexpectedly from on high—but represent rather the necessary reaction of a certain mind in a given environment, yet they occur in the first instance to individuals, and for a long time are confined to minorities. All that is valuable in the intellectual and moral, as in the material, world, has been, and often still remains, the property of a minority. Prophets, Stoics, Christians, Reformers, Abolitionists have all been minorities. We govern by the will of the majority, and it is therefore all the more incumbent on us so to frame our government that the light which comes from minorities may be kept alive for the common good; the common council of the nation should include in itself, of right and not of favour, whatever the community has within it of vigour, of interest, and of life. If the majority¹ is to have,

¹ It is often assumed that, in the last resort, the will of the majority prevails over the minority because, in the event of a resort to force, the majority would presumably conquer on the field of battle. This seems unsatisfactory. The presumption that, at any given moment,

on behalf of the whole, the power of consent to legislative action, equally minorities, in the interest of the whole, should have free liberty of growth and expression. The representative system, the machinery by which majority and minorities alike take part in government, should, as far as may be, assure to majority and minorities, and even to individuals, their due share of constitutional influence and power.

We have outgrown the simple divisions which are supposed to have satisfied our forefathers: modern politics

Increased touch too many interests and invite too large
Complexity of a participation of men of intelligence and
Politics. capacity to be adequately conducted by the

method of a simple bisection of the community into Yellows and Blues. We have just had two successive governments on non-party lines. The separation between the main parties is not what it was. Their internal cohesion also has been weakened. It is obvious that, both in the Liberal and Labour parties, there are grave differences of temper and outlook. The same is true of the Unionists. The party system will not disappear. Without parties parliamentary government—whatever may be true of parliamentary legislation—is impossible, and popular elections in modern conditions almost inconceivable. Elections mean programmes, and programmes—if they are to be taken seriously—mean unions of persons prepared to carry them into effect. A Cabinet and its supporters must have some unity of purpose—a unity impracticable if the House of Commons consists of individuals elected all over the country on their own unco-ordinated initiatives. But, if parliament is to satisfy our modern needs, there must be more freedom within parties than there has been in the past. Parliament must not degenerate into a mere

the majority of voters could coerce a recalcitrant minority is very uncertain, and becomes even less certain than before with the enfranchisement of women. And the theory deprives the supremacy of the majority of all moral title. It is more true to say that one reason for allowing the will of the majority to prevail is that in this way we have the largest number of individuals in agreement with the government, *i.e.*, so far contented politically that they are in the condition most favourable for their own development.

machine for voting the decisions of the organisers of elections. Parties must adapt themselves to the intellectual growth of the community, and must learn to find room not only for the unquestioning worshipper who can assent to a simple creed, but for men of understanding who, now and again, reserve their assent to some one or more articles of the thirty-nine, or claim even to reconstruct some of the tenets that have hitherto been deemed essential by the congregation.

The questions of the immediate future will not concern our domestic politics only. The two gravest problems that confront us are not merely insular; they are **Imperial and International Reconstruction.** the construction, at any rate, of the foundations of a new international order and the modification of the political constitution of that one-fifth of the human race which, under the name of the British Empire, has already passed beyond the stage at which differences between its component communities are settled by a resort to war. Internationally the modern world must organise or perish. But for an international political assembly the time is not yet ripe, though some form of common action by way of League or otherwise is a necessity. And in the British Commonwealth organisation cannot mean the imposition of the will of one community on that of another. We have to know, to understand, to conciliate. The mere meetings of one or two leading men from each community are inadequate. And they are inadequate largely because one man—however eminent—cannot represent a community. In a sense the more eminent—or at any rate the more vivid—a personality the less is it likely to represent a whole community. There are obvious dangers in allowing, let us say, Australia to be represented by no one beyond Mr Hughes. When a relationship was in the old sense international a single ambassador was in place. But when several communities are to be connected not internationally in the old sense, but as constituent parts of a greater society, more is needed. The relationship must be so organised that each community may see and understand of what the others consist, and so each branch of each community

will find in the others something like-minded to and akin with itself. The task is one of infinite difficulty, and to hazard suggestions is perhaps gratuitous folly. But it is worth consideration whether the question of the constitution of any new central organ of the Empire is not equally important with that of its powers, and there will perhaps be a general agreement that it will be a wiser and safer line of advance to create a body truly representative which may at first—as our own Imperial Conferences now—be without executive or legislative authority, rather than to endow an untried central organ with compulsory powers. A truly representative body may in time win such a position by the respect that its constitution and its deliberations inspire, that almost imperceptibly it will come to wield an authority which no serious group of citizens will dispute, because they will feel that their views have been heard and represented there. Discussion, parley, parliament—these are the origins from which our British governments grew; and it rests for us to work out as best we may, with new machinery perhaps, but on the old and well-tried lines, a new organ of discussion of which no man can foresee the full development. But the organ of discussion must be fully representative of all considerable portions of the population whose affairs it is charged to discuss.¹

¹ Burke's phrase that "the virtue, the spirit, the essence of the House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the nation," is well known. It may be of interest to recall that a somewhat similar view of parliament was familiar in the seventeenth century. In 1645 Fairfax—no theorist but a man of action—writes, "The King in supreme acts is not to be advised by men of whom the law takes no notice but by his Parliament, the great Council of the Kingdom, *in whom—as much as man is capable of—he hears all his people, as it were, at once advising him.*" (Gardiner's *History of the Civil War*, vol. ii., p. 313; Longmans 1911.—The italics are not in the original.)

THE PRESENT REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM

IT is no part of our duty here to consider the question of the basis of representation. We do not now enquire who ought to be electors. We confine ourselves to the narrower question—given an actual electoral body, with its existing legal rights, how ought its representatives in parliament to be chosen? And the first question that naturally arises is whether our present system of election is satisfactory. For if it is satisfactory we need go no further.

In the first place, let us observe that our present system of parliamentary constituencies each returning one member is of no great antiquity. This system, now unhappily confirmed by the Representation of the People Act, 1918, resulted from an arrangement made between the leaders of the two great parties in the year 1885. That arrangement involved the abolition of the few then existing three-member constituencies (which admitted an imperfect form of minority representation), and the destruction, except in the cases of a few boroughs and of the older universities, of the two-membered constituency. The two-member boroughs¹ spared in 1885 have now for the

Arbitrary
Divisions.

¹ These two-member constituencies used in some cases to give illuminating examples of the possibilities, even in so small a field, of a varied representation. For example, at Leicester and Norwich one seat was held (in December 1910) by a Liberal and one by a Labour man, and thus separate parties, between whom there was at any rate some common ground, took advantage of the large constituency to give the two wings of the compound majority each a fair share of representation. In former years there were also certain cases in which the two seats in one constituency were divided by agreement between Conservative and Liberal. York, in 1910, had, after contest, a representation divided between the two parties.

most part disappeared, though, as some small compensation for their loss, the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge and Trinity College, Dublin, and the grouped Scottish Universities, return, Oxford, Cambridge, and Trinity, each two, and the Scottish Universities three, members by the Single Transferable Vote. With these exceptions the whole country is divided arbitrarily into electoral divisions, returning each one member of parliament to represent all the voters registered in the division: in the great majority of cases (the only exceptions being the smallest counties and the smaller boroughs) these divisions are not local government units, they have no civic cohesion, but exist merely for the purpose of parliamentary elections.

For parliamentary purposes our great provincial cities have no separate existence. It might, perhaps, have been intelligible, though it would be erroneous, to personify, as it were, a city or a county or other local unit, and to say, "this one thing shall speak with one voice, and that the voice of the majority"; but it is wholly unintelligible to force voters into arbitrary divisions constituted *ad hoc*, and to make the right of the citizen to representation—not, be it observed, to supremacy, but to representation—depend on the accident of his agreement with the majority of those resident in an arbitrary vicinity.

In each of these local divisions one member is returned. Where two candidates alone contest the seat, the member chosen represents the majority of those who vote, the minority go unrepresented. Where three candidates contest the seat, the member chosen is that candidate for whom more voters vote than for any one of the other two candidates. In this case two minorities which together often make a majority go unrepresented. But in both cases large numbers of citizens have no representative in parliament, for we need not take seriously the after-election platitudes by which a man elected to support a policy claims to represent those who dislike the policy and did their best not to have him for their member.

To some persons this refusal to a citizen of representation in parliament, though it violates the very purpose of

No Represent-
ation for
Minorities or
sometimes for
Majorities.

representative government, seems a trivial and a theoretical grievance. As often happens, long usage has hardened the

Violation of Right to Representation. mind and consecrated an obvious injustice. It is urged that if a man is not represented by his local member of parliament, still in other parts of the country members of parliament are returned whose views are more or less in accordance with his own. He must console himself for his personal disappointment by the success of his party elsewhere.

In Minority. Now, possibly to an active partisan who thinks of himself as a mere soldier in the ranks of a party this thought may bring some consolation. But even he should reflect that the vitality and activity of a party in a district depends largely on whether it has some tolerable prospect of securing representation. In what are reckoned "hopeless" districts from a party point of view, parties have usually to depend on eleventh-hour candidates of little distinction; the stimulus to political thought and activity which is given by a local member of parliament or strong candidate is wholly wanting. The local organisation falls into decay; the stagnant pool is ruffled only at the long intervals of general elections, and not always then. But to anyone who is not content thus to sink his individuality the grievance goes very deep. The right which is apparently conceded in theory to a citizen of a free state to take part in the management of the affairs of the community has become, in fact, illusory. There is no one in the National Council of whom he can say, "I sent him there," and so long as any considerable body of citizens cannot say that they have, in the House of Commons, representatives whom they sent there, the House of Commons loses in moral authority by the exclusion.¹

¹ Mr Asquith well expressed this thought in a speech at St Andrews, on 19th February 1906: see his words quoted on the frontispiece, and compare also his speech at Burnley, 5th December 1910: "It is an essential and integral feature of our policy that we shall go forward with the task of making the House of Commons not only the mouth-piece but the mirror of the national mind." It has been argued that the business of a parliament is to be an organ of will rather than a mirror of mind. But the human will and the human mind are not severable.

It might be thought that though those voters in the single-member constituency who do not vote for the elected candidates are unrepresented, those who do vote for the successful candidates have nothing to complain of. This, however, is far from being the case. One result of the single-member constituency is that each party almost invariably presents only one candidate; very few voters, usually only the inmost ring of the party organisation, are consulted in the choice of the candidate; and in many constituencies when no suitable local man is to be found as a candidate, the electors are asked to give their confidence to some unknown person sent down from London. (The organisation of the Labour Party is such that the local choice of the Labour man in a constituency has to be approved at Headquarters.) Thus the elector who, on the whole, prefers his own party to any other, but would like to see some modifications made in the party creed, has only the choice of voting for a man for whom he is at best lukewarm, or for a man whose policy he actively dislikes. In the end he probably votes for his party's candidate, and his vote contributes to the enactment of measures to some of which he is opposed. Thus his own view has no representative in parliament; he has no means of saying that he endorses nine-tenths, or three-fourths, or two-thirds of a programme. Why should he not have this liberty if it is possible that it should be given him? Surely in these matters there is a presumption in favour of freedom. Surely the onus of proof is on those who say that the curtailment of the elector's freedom is necessary, and it is for them to show cause against an electoral system, if such can be found, that would bring freedom to the elector and the representative. The result of the present system is plainly to increase, at the elector's expense, the powers of those who concern themselves more especially with the organisation of parties. It is in their power to force the elector to assent to policies of which he disapproves, on pain of greater evils which he seeks to prevent. Just as the House of Commons cannot accept nineteen Cabinet Ministers and reject the twentieth, so the elector cannot exercise any control over the items of the policy of his

own party. He must take or leave the party programme as a whole, and a successful party programme may thus contain measures of which the bulk of its supporters do not approve.

These rather general remarks may readily be illustrated by examples from contemporary politics. It is common knowledge that the pre-war Tariff policy of the Unionist party was a cause of much difficulty. But the Unionist elector was not, and in present conditions could not, be asked to decide what the policy was to be. The Unionist party could not allow two candidates, one more and one less Protectionist, in the same division. To do this might mean the certain loss of the seat. What, then, was a Unionist who so far dissented from the official policy that he either believed in agricultural Protection or complete Free Trade to do? He had the alternative of voting for the taxation of manufactured goods or supporting the social policy advocated by Mr Lloyd George. To his own view he could give no effective expression; yet surely this is a matter on which he ought to have been consulted, if possible. The dilemma of the Unionist voter might easily have been paralleled on the other side. A man might be an ardent Home Ruler and yet not be satisfied with the land policy of the Liberal Government. But he could not both support Home Rule and oppose the land policy. Is it to be wondered at if, in these conditions, some men whose co-operation in public affairs would be of high value abstain from politics? But the conditions are unnecessary.

A criticism on this argument may be conveniently considered here. It is objected that the elector has no

The right to have his opinion represented, but that
 "Common what is aimed at by a representative system is
 Will" an expression of the "common will." But the
 Theory. common will is a resultant of the opinions held
 in the community, and, until these opinions are represented
 with some approach to accuracy, the will expressed by the
 vote of the representative assembly is not, or may not be,
 the true common will. Further, it is fallacious to suppose
 that the expression of the common will in relation to some

definite action—the dismissal of a government or the fate of some one legislative measure—is the sole, or even the main, function of a General Election, the process by which we choose our parliaments. A definite action of that kind could be better performed by referendum without the interposition of a legislative and deliberative assembly. The elector at an election is not doing an executive act: he is choosing some one to represent him in an assembly which has at once duties of discussion, legislative functions, and the task of appointing and controlling the executive. That assembly will decide what comes before it by a majority vote; the majority will prevail as representing and expressing the common will of the assembly. But to say that, in the formation of the assembly, minorities are not to be regarded, is to insist that the “common will” is to declare itself without consideration of the opinion of the community. It is necessary to ignore minorities when a chief executive officer, President, Mayor or Speaker, has to be chosen, or again when one definite question has to be decided on referendum; but, when an assembly representative of a nation has to be elected which has itself in turn to perform acts of will, to insist, in the name of the “common will,” that a minority must be excluded unless it happen to be a local majority, is to mistake the whole purpose of representative government.

The single member system, however, has for minorities certain illegitimate compensations. In an evenly balanced contest between two candidates a determined body of enthusiasts may exercise an influence altogether out of proportion to their size. They may exact from an eager candidate as the price of their support pledges which, even if dishonest in origin, as not proceeding from a real conviction, may yet be honoured in observance, if only for fear of loss of the vital support; and these small minorities may succeed in imposing on the community what the great body of voters may regard as cranks or fads. The present electoral system is usually supposed to be a protection against the cranks and faddists whom a truly representative or “proportional” system would introduce; it is in fact their strongest ally.

Unfair
Advantage
of small
Sections at
Present.

For it gives them a fictitious strength, and it prevents the true paucity of their numbers from appearing.

The system is also open to criticism from the point of view of the member of parliament as a worker. We hear much to-day, and rightly, of the desirability of continuity in employment. A man is the better craftsman if he is not haunted by the fear of unemployment. This doctrine has its application in the political sphere. It is a good thing that if a man has given himself to public life he may be sure of remaining in it so long as he has the confidence of a body of electors entitled to representation. In such conditions he can pursue his career more firmly, he can do better work, he can accumulate more experience than if he is liable to be dismissed at any moment from public life by the few electors whose change determines the result of an election in a single-member constituency. A politician's seat and career should be safe so long as his own supporters are sufficiently large in number to be entitled to a representative and wish to be represented by him. Safe seats are at present, and must be, the exception; a proportional system would make them just so far the rule as they ought to be.

Unfairness to
Public Men.

This insecurity of the politician's employment has been praised as a merit of the present system. It has been claimed that it is an advantage that the electorate can at the present moment dismiss its representatives if it disagrees with them—that in fact the present system ensures "democratic control." But the trouble at present is that electors do not as a rule dismiss their own representatives when they change their minds, they dismiss other people's representatives. If five neighbouring constituencies return at a general election five Liberals¹ by majorities of 200 apiece on a 10,000 poll—

Democratic
Control.

SMITH (Liberal)	.	.	.	5100
JONES (Unionist)	.	.	.	4900

and then by the next general election 150 voters in each con-

¹ For the sake of simplicity an example from the old two-party system has been taken.

stituency have changed their minds so that the result in each case is—

JONES (Unionist)	.	.	.	5050
SMITH (Liberal)	.	.	.	4950

what the 150 in each constituency have done is to dismiss five men who represented (or over-represented) the Liberals of the five constituencies, and to leave the Liberals without representation. The highest right of the 150 (or, taking all the five constituencies together, 750) who changed their views was to change their own representatives. The five constituencies contained on the old division of opinion 25,500 Liberals and 24,500 Unionists, and ought to have been represented by three Liberals and two Unionists; on the new division of opinion they contain 25,250 Unionists and 24,750 Liberals, and ought to be represented by three Unionists and two Liberals; one Liberal ought to have been dismissed, not five. Only those in close touch with the inner world of politics (and not always they) know how often some promising career has been cut short by the loss of a seat by a man who had every claim to be in parliament, but for whom on his defeat no place in the House can be found. And no one can judge how our politics have suffered from the lack of security of employment which they threaten to an aspirant for a career.

Violent changes of representation not only damage politicians' careers and curtail their usefulness; they also bring on democratic electorates a reproach of instability which is generally undeserved. Democracy unfairly discredited. A party goes into an election, as the Unionists did in 1906, 372 strong in the House of Commons, and comes out 157. The newspapers are full of the "landslide." But the percentage of electors who changed their opinions between 1900 and 1906 was only about 18 per cent. Democracies are far less fickle than their critics would have us believe. True representation would make for stability of government, not, as is sometimes thought, for instability.¹

¹ The stability of the government in Belgium since the introduction of proportional representation has been made a ground of complaint against the system.

The system of single-member constituencies is not only politically vicious, as giving no true expression to the national will; it is also arithmetically unsound.¹ If one party has large majorities of votes concentrated in a few constituencies, and another has small majorities spread over many constituencies, the second party may well be in a majority in the assembly although it is in a minority in the electorate. That this is no imaginary fear the following figures will show:—

GENERAL ELECTION, 1886 (All Constituencies).		
Parties.	Votes obtained.	Seats obtained.
Home Rulers . . .	2,103,954	283
Unionists . . .	2,049,137	387
GENERAL ELECTION, 1895 (Contested Constituencies).		
Parties.	Votes obtained.	Seats obtained.
Unionists . . .	1,785,372	282
Home Rulers . . .	1,823,809	202
GENERAL ELECTION, December 1910 (Contested Constituencies in London, including Croydon and West Ham).		
Parties.	Votes obtained.	Seats obtained.
Unionists . . .	268,127	29
Ministerialists . . .	243,722	31

¹ The statements relating to single-member constituencies also hold good of constituencies returning several members where the block vote (*scrutin de liste*) is employed. Recent presidential elections in the United States afford illustrations of the uncertainty attaching to such elections. In 1912 Wilson was elected with 6,293,019 votes, whereas his two principal opponents had between them 7,604,463 votes (Roosevelt, 4,119,507 and Taft 3,484,956). In the electoral college, however, Wilson had an overwhelming majority—435 votes against Roosevelt's 88 and Taft's 8. In the election of 1916,

In all these cases the "common will" was directly falsified by the representatives elected. It is needless to add that this incurable defect of the single member constituency forms the strongest possible temptation to "gerrymandering."¹ For, on the way in which the boundaries of constituencies are drawn may depend the constitution of the parliamentary majority.

Wilson had a clear popular majority, his plurality over Hughes was no less than 581,941 votes, yet he was very nearly defeated. His majority in the electoral college was only twenty-three. The final decision turned upon the votes in California, a state which elected thirteen members of the electoral college, whose vote of course counted twenty-six on a division. Wilson carried California by the very small majority of 3773 votes and was elected president. If 2000 citizens in California had reversed their votes Wilson would have lost in spite of his large plurality in the country.


¹ That is, to arranging the electoral boundaries in such a way as to give one side an unfair advantage. Thus, in a district more or less circular in shape divided between the adherents of two parties—the Blacks and Whites—the Blacks may be a majority in the whole electorate taken together, but concentrated mainly at the centre. Then, if the district be divided into, say, five constituencies

thus



It will return four Whites
to one Black,

While if it is divided thus



Five Blacks will
be returned.

The figures in the one case being :

No. 1 Constituency.	No. 2' Constituency.	No. 3 Constituency.	No. 4 Constituency.	No. 5 Constituency.
Black 5000	White 3100	White 3100	White 3100	White 3100
White 1000	Black 2900	Black 2900	Black 2900	Black 2900

and in the other,

All Constituencies.
Black 3320
White 2680

the total figures being 16,600 Blacks and 13,400 Whites. A modern example will be found in the *Westminster Gazette* of the 29th April 1914 (I spare susceptibilities by omitting the political names used): "Ten years ago the town was so divided into three wards by 'White' influence as to have one with an overwhelmingly 'Black' and two with small 'White' majorities."

To these evil results of the single-member constituency must be added what to some minds is the most serious

No Independent Members. defect of the system—that there is practically no opportunity for the election of some man of eminence or originality who does not care to stand as the adherent of a party. The possibility of such an election has often been objected to a proportional system as an evil. A well-known politician¹ has spoken with horror of the possibility of a House of Commons consisting largely of independent members. He need not have been alarmed. The number of men who might be so elected is not great. Party organisations will always, under any system, have all, and perhaps more than all, their due. But the opportunity for an active-minded electorate to return to parliament a man not the tied adherent of a political party, whose right to be heard in the national council is beyond dispute, is an advantage of a rational system of election which alone seems to many minds a conclusive reason for its adoption:

These results followed from the single-member system when there were only two parties in the State. The arrival of a third party has made the system not only bad but absurd, as in constituencies where one party has not a clear majority over the other two, it becomes certain that the majority of the voters will not obtain a representative. We now have our three parties in Great Britain, and we are not likely to have less. How are they to be represented if the single-member constituency is adhered to? First let us look at the question from the point of view of the country as a whole. A young party, such as the Labour party, is in a minority in nearly all constituencies. The Labour party in the first thirteen three-cornered contests that took place after the General Election of December 1910 polled about twenty per cent. of the votes and returned not a single member. The single-member system cannot offer to a party of this size any representation so long as it relies only on its own

¹ Lord Harcourt, in giving evidence before the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems (see page 126, *Representation* (the Journal of the Proportional Representation Society), No. 14, September 1909).

strength.¹ Is it a good thing or a bad thing that a party of this kind should be represented adequately in parliament? No believer in parliamentary government can hesitate as to the answer. To exclude a young working-class party from parliamentary representation is to play straight into the hands of the supporters of "direct action" and to invite the working classes of this country to destroy a society in whose organisation they have no equal place. The House of Commons must be all-inclusive, if it is to continue to exist. The alternative, sooner or later, is a reaction of disillusion with parliamentary methods which may dissolve society into anarchy.

Next, see how the case looks in an individual constituency. We have three parties of more or less equal strength with distinct programmes and principles. Whichever candidate is chosen, the two parties to which he does not belong are treated unjustly. For this admitted evil the supporters of the present system can only suggest as a remedy either the second ballot, the left-off clothes of continental politics, or the alternative vote, which, though a great improvement in mechanism, is still in principle only the second ballot in a new disguise.

It may be necessary to describe the mechanism of these devices. The second ballot means that where in a three-
 Second Ballot cornered fight the man at the head of the poll has not the support of at least one more than half of the voters, a second election is to be held after an interval of a week or, it may be, a fortnight, at which second election only the two candidates who polled most votes at the first election are allowed—whether by law or political custom—to stand. At this second election supporters of the candidates who are at the bottom of the poll have to vote (if they vote at all), not for the man who would really represent them, but for that one of the two remaining candidates whom they dislike least.

On the other hand, the "alternative vote" is a system

¹ I leave this passage as it was written in the spring of 1914. The coming General Election may have lessons for other parties as well as, or more than, for the Labour party. Russian conditions illustrate what follows from proletarian disbelief in parliamentary government.

by which the elector at the first (and only) election, besides indicating his first choice on his voting paper, marks the order of his preferences amongst other candidates. That

is to say, he marks with a 1 the name of the candidate for whom he votes, and marks with a 2 the name of the candidate to whom his vote is to go if the candidate of his first choice is at the bottom of the poll. Thus a Liberal voter might be supposed to mark his paper thus:—

Or Alternative
Vote.

BROWN (Labour)	.	.	.	2
JONES (Unionist)
SMITH (Liberal)	.	.	.	1

Then if the poll results—

JONES	.	.	.	5000
BROWN	.	.	.	4000
SMITH	.	.	.	3000

the votes of those supporters of Smith (including our imaginary Liberal voter) who have marked Brown with a 2 are transferred to Brown; and the votes of those supporters of Smith who have marked Jones with a 2 are transferred to Jones. If a sufficient number have marked Brown 2 to give him (counting in the original votes given to each candidate) a clear majority over Jones, Brown is elected. Thus, in this case, if we assume that 2000 Liberal voters marked Brown 2, while 500 marked Jones 2, and 500 marked no 2 at all, the result would be the election of Brown.

	No. of Votes. (First Choices).	Transferred from Smith's 3000.	Result.
JONES . . .	5000	+ 500	5500
BROWN . . .	4000	+ 2000	6000 (<i>Elected</i>).
SMITH . . .	3000	- 3000	...
No further choices	+ 500	...

Now both these methods are mere devices by which the smallest of the three parties, being excluded from representation, is forced to vote for someone who does not represent it. No country which has tried the second ballot is content with it; its evils have

No Solution.

been one of the determining causes for the introduction and progress of proportional representation on the continent of Europe.¹ Australian experience seems likely to give the same result in the case of the alternative vote.² On either system the weakest party's vote is up at auction between the two larger parties. Both bid for its support. In one part of a country the vote of the Socialists will go to Conservatives, in another to Liberals. In either case the member elected is, in the French political phrase, "the prisoner of the minority": he is bound by pledges to voters who do not agree with his own views, but whose support he purchased by as much inconsistency as he can square with his political conscience. And the weakest party gets no true representation, but merely a choice of masters. On the next page a table is given that is perhaps more convincing than any

¹ In 1905 the Committee of the French Chamber, "Commission du Suffrage Universel," reported (1905, No. 2376) that "the abolition of the second ballots with the traffic in votes that they cause will not be the least of the advantages of the new system (proportional representation)." For a particular instance of the evil of the second ballot see the incident recorded by the Rome correspondent of the *Times* on 31st October 1913, when the retirement from the election on the second ballot of the distinguished Italian statesman, the Prince of Teano, was caused by the action of "a considerable party of Republican voters whose support was necessary to his success," and who put forward conditions "which the candidate with justice declared absolutely unacceptable." Observe that with proportional representation both sympathisers with the Prince of Teano and the dissatisfied Republicans would have had their due share of representation without any bargaining with each other or any other party. It may be added that the weakness and incoherence of German Parliamentary Liberalism and Radicalism is to be attributed, in part at least, to the fact that the Liberal and Radical Members of the Reichstag are, to a very large extent—more than any of the German party—elected on the second ballots. Hence they represent not only Liberal and Radical, but also, according to the varying circumstances of their constituencies, Socialist and Conservative voters, and in the result do not develop a policy of their own (see p. 69).

² For confirmation of this view I may refer to the statement by Mr Holman, the Premier of New South Wales, quoted from the *Sydney Daily Telegraph* of 20th August 1913 to the effect that "preferential voting (the Australian name for the alternative vote) is no better than the second ballot. My view is that there should be proportional representation."

*Three-cornered Contests from December 1910 to January 1914.
Probable Effect of Second Ballot or Alternative Vote.**

Constituency.	Poll.	Actual Result.	Result in case of Liberal-Labour combination against Unionist.	Result in case of Unionist-Labour combination against Liberal.
N.E. Lanark .	Lib. 7,976	Liberal	Liberal	Unionist
	Un. 6,776			
	Lab. 2,879			
Keighley .	Lib. 4,667	Liberal	Liberal	Unionist
	Un. 3,842			
	Lab. 3,452			
Kilmarnock Burghs .	Lib. 6,923	Liberal	Liberal	Unionist
	Un. 4,637			
	Lab. 2,761			
Oldham .	Un. 12,255	Unionist	Liberal	Unionist
	Lib. 10,623			
	Lab. 7,448			
Holmfirth .	Lib. 4,749	Liberal	Liberal	Unionist
	Un. 3,379			
	Lab. 3,195			
Hanley .	Lib. 6,647	Liberal	Liberal	Unionist
	Un. 5,993			
	Lab. 1,694			
Crewe .	Un. 6,260	Unionist	Liberal	Unionist
	Lib. 5,294			
	Lab. 2,485			
E. Carmarthen	Lib. 6,082	Liberal	Liberal	Liberal
	Un. 3,354			
	Lab. 1,089			
Midlothian .	Un. 6,021	Unionist	Liberal	Unionist
	Lib. 5,989			
	Lab. 2,413			
Houghton-le- Spring .	Lib. 6,930	Liberal	Liberal	Unionist
	Un. 4,807			
	Lab. 4,165			
Keighley .	Lib. 4,730	Liberal	Liberal	Unionist
	Un. 3,852			
	Lab. 3,646			
S. Lanark .	Un. 4,257	Unionist	Liberal	Unionist
	Lib. 4,006			
	Lab. 1,674			
N.W. Durham	Lib. 7,241	Liberal	Liberal	Unionist
	Un. 5,564			
	Lab. 5,026			
Leith Burghs .	Un. 5,159	Unionist	Liberal	Unionist
	Lib. 5,143			
	Lab. 3,346			

* Only those contests are here shown in which the Labour candidate was officially endorsed by the Executive Committee of the Labour party. There were, in addition three-cornered fights at Leicester, Reading, Bethnal Green, and Poplar, etc., in which unofficial Labour or Socialist candidates took part.

Summary of Results.

Party.	Votes.	Seats actually won.	Seats won with Second Ballot or Alternative Vote.	
			With Liberal-Labour combination against Unionist.	With Unionist-Labour combination against Liberal.
Liberal . . .	87,000	9	14	1
Unionist . . .	76,156	5	...	13
Labour . . .	45,273

elaborate argument. It compares the actual results in three-cornered contests under the present system with the probable and possible results of a system of second ballot or alternative vote. The results are remarkable. The second ballot or alternative vote produces a result further removed from a true representation of the electorate than the present system. The smallest of the three parties has it in its power in a three-cornered contest where it holds the balance (and it did hold the balance in thirteen out of the fourteen contests recorded) to annihilate either of the larger parties; when the Liberal and Labour parties are united they exclude the Unionists from representation, and when the Unionist and Labour men unite, they almost annihilate the Liberals, although the latter are the largest single party. But this power of the smallest party is purely a power of destruction. It remains a minority in parliament, and probably a smaller minority than on the present system. Sympathisers with Labour will observe that in the conditions of 1910-1914 it would have been very difficult to return a single member without the aid of Liberal votes, and that in any constituency where the Liberal poll is higher than the Labour (as is still the case even in many constituencies for which a Labour member now sits) the election of a Labour member would have been an impossibility. The alternative is to expect a 'bargain' between Liberal and Labour headquarters by which in certain constituencies no Liberal or no Labour candidate will be put forward. To those who are in touch with the extremer Labour views such a suggestion will appear difficult; and even if the bargain were made at

headquarters the local organisations could hardly be induced to observe it. With the alternative vote in force such a bargain would be more improbable than it is now. For the one advantage claimed for the alternative vote from the Liberal and Labour point of view is that Liberal and Labour candidatures could be started in the same constituency without one injuring the other. The exact reverse is the truth: the alternative vote would put the Labour party at the mercy of the Liberals.¹

Such is our actual electoral system. It does not secure the consent of the majority of the governed; it disfranchises minorities; it deadens political life; it does not set free those new forces and stimuli which, in whatever class of society they arise, are the real hope of the future.

¹ This was true in 1914. In 1919 it may be that the alternative vote would put the Liberals at the mercy of Labour. The support given to the alternative vote in both Liberal and Labour circles is a pathetic result of that superficiality in matters admitting of scientific study which is the curse of political England.

THE PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM

THE different systems of proportional representation need not here be discussed and analysed.¹ There are said to be some 300 systems in existence, and the ingenuity of inventors shows no sign of exhaustion. The unkindest thing that a proportionalist can do is to invent a system; unfortunately, the joys of paternity often outweigh the call of an ascetic devotion. It will be enough to give a brief account of the system known as that of the "single transferable vote," as being that which has obtained more support in this country and the British dominions than any of its rivals. If anyone prefer one of the many "list" systems which are in force or fashion on the continent of Europe he should first consider carefully whether there is any list system which secures the possibility of the return of the man of original force, and also the freedom of the elector to guide his vote as he pleases, as effectively as the system of the single transferable vote. But all systems of proportional representation agree in a denial of the shallow dogma that local majorities alone are entitled to the elementary privileges of citizenship, and in an assertion of the simple proposition that the just representation of 70,000 electors, of whom 40,000 are Whites, 20,000 are Reds, and 10,000 are Greens, is not by 7 White members of parliament, but by 4 White, 2 Red, and 1 Green member.

But the account of the system may be prefaced with

¹ For a full account and criticism of the principal systems, readers are referred to John H. Humphreys' *Proportional Representation*, Methuen & Co., London, June 1911 (5s. net), and the publications of the Proportional Representation Society, 82 Victoria Street, Westminster, London, S.W. 1.

a caution. No system can be perfect. No system can give representation which is exact to two places of decimals. No system is proof against every kind of abuse or folly. Every system has to be worked by human beings, and will reproduce their ignorance as well as their knowledge, their passions as well as their reason, their greed as well as their nobler aspirations, the pettiness of smaller as well as the greatness of wider minds. A representative system reproduces humanity: if it gives scope for finer brains and higher spirits, equally it will not hide or abolish the lower side of man. And when a reform and its results are judged, the true standard of comparison is not with some ideal and unattainable excellence, but with the conditions that obtained at its introduction. A proportional system must be compared not with the imagined possibilities of Utopia, but with the majority system that obtains to-day.

Practically all systems of proportional representation agree in this, that they require constituencies returning several—

Multi- membered Constit- uencies.	at the very least three—members. ¹ And this for the simple reason that when a constituency returns only one member, the representation cannot be divided. It necessarily falls to a single party or body of electors to the exclusion of all other parties and electors. In other words, it is not proportional.
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Thus, the first step in the introduction of a system of proportional representation—or at any rate of the system of the single transferable vote, or of any continental system of “lists”—is the creation of constituencies returning several members.² The number of members that each constituency should return would be governed either by the number of its electorate or of its population—whichever basis were

¹ In Appendix I. is printed the Scheme of Redistribution, suggested in January 1918 by the House of Lords, which meets the special circumstances of sparsely populated districts by retaining a few single-member constituencies.

² In Oregon an ingenious system has been devised by which single-member constituencies are in appearance retained, but this at the cost of the formal recognition of parties by the State authorities in such a manner that a candidate in one district can legally be identified as of the same party as a candidate in another district. The Danish system of supplementary members (see p. 83) also deserves study.

approved by parliament. The constituencies themselves should, whenever possible, be local government units—great cities or counties. This, no doubt, would not be possible in many cases, but, as far as may be, what may be called natural lines of division should be followed. The new constituencies once created, redistribution in the future would be simplified enormously. As population shifted or increased, no alteration of boundaries would be necessary. It would be enough to alter the number of members allotted to a constituency. The only case for alteration of boundaries would be where local government areas were altered by the expansion or creation of a city or county borough.

The constituency thus created, how are the different elements in the electorate to be represented? The constituency returning several members already exists with us; in municipal boroughs we have wards returning three, six, and sometimes nine members, but we do not thereby secure a just representation. We either have one member retiring every year, so that in each ward there is only one vacancy at each election—our provincial system; or, when all the members vacate office together, we elect their three, six, or nine successors by the block vote—our metropolitan system.

**The Block
Vote.**

Now the "block vote" is the negation of proportionality; it allows every elector as many votes as there are vacancies to be filled, but it forbids him to give more than one vote to any one candidate. Hence if there are nine seats vacant, and three parties in the constituency—901 Reds, 900 Pinks, and 899 Whites—and each party puts forward nine candidates and each elector votes his full party "ticket," the nine Red candidates head the poll with 901 votes apiece, and not a single Pink or White candidate is returned. Results very nearly as absurd as this extreme example have occurred before now in metropolitan borough elections.

The first obvious amendment to this block vote system is to limit each elector to one vote only; and this is the plan of the single vote in multi-member constituencies actually in force in Japan. But

this amendment taken by itself produces a system that is open to serious objection, for while it makes it certain that a compact minority of a certain size will secure a representative, it may do grave injustice as between the larger parties. An example will best illustrate the meaning. Suppose that a body of¹ 115 persons have to elect 5 representatives, and that there are in the body 70 Unionists, 25 Liberals, and 20 Labour men. The just representation is 3 Unionists, 1 Liberal, and 1 Labour man. Assume that there are 4 Unionist candidates, 3 Liberal, and 1 Labour. Now, the Labour candidate must be elected if all the Labour voters vote for him; because he will then poll 20 votes, and all the Unionists and Liberals added together can muster only 95 votes, and out of 95 you cannot get 5 candidates each with 20 votes. Therefore, the Labour candidate with 20 votes must be, at the lowest, fifth on the poll and so elected. But, as between the Unionists and the Liberals, the number of candidates elected will depend on the skilful drilling of the electors, and the exact knowledge by the party managers of the party's electoral strength. In the absence of organisation and exact foreknowledge we might easily get a result such as this (if the names of well-known politicians may be borrowed to illustrate the meaning) :

BONAR LAW (Unionist)	50	} Elected.
HENDERSON (Labour)	20	
ASQUITH (Liberal)	14	
ROBERT CECIL (Unionist)	11	
HERBERT SAMUEL (Liberal)	7	
CHAMBERLAIN (Unionist)	5	} Not elected.
BANBURY (Unionist)	4	
SIR THOMAS WHITTAKER (Liberal)	4	

The 5 men at the head of the poll, and therefore elected, include 2 Unionists and 2 Liberals, although the number of Unionist electors is about three times that of the Liberal electors. The system thus gives an almost unintelligibly unjust result—which is worse than the intelligible injustice

¹ I take these small figures for the sake of simplicity. The reader may readily imagine them multiplied, under modern conditions, by 1000. More elaborate elections—one actual (Tasmania) and one imaginary—will be found on pages 39 and 113 *et seq.*

of the block system pure and simple. A further improvement thus becomes imperative.

Now, the falsity of the result is caused by the excessive concentration of the Unionist votes on Mr Bonar Law. He

The Single Vote must be made Transferable. has many more votes than were necessary to elect him, and if the votes he did not need could have passed on to Mr Chamberlain, Mr Chamberlain would have been brought up above Mr Herbert Samuel, and even above Mr Asquith, and elected. The problem is thus to devise a means of making the votes of Mr Bonar Law, so far as not necessary for his election, available for the other candidates of the Unionist party—assuming always that the electors who vote for Mr Law would also wish to see the other Unionists elected, if this is possible. The problem is solved by adopting the same machinery as we have already seen used in the case of the alternative vote—that is, by allowing the elector to mark his preferences by the figures 1, 2, 3, and so on, set against the names of candidates on the ballot papers, and making the vote transferable accordingly. Now, if in our imaginary election Mr Law's 50 votes had been thus transferable, and if all his fifty voters had marked one or other of the remaining Unionist candidates with the figure 2, Mr Law could have been content to keep 20 votes and hand on 30 to the other Unionists; and the result might have been:

4.	LAW (50 - 30)	20	} Elected.
	HENDERSON	20	
	CHAMBERLAIN (5 + 15)	20	
	CECIL (11 + 9)	20	
	ASQUITH	14	
	BANBURY (4 + 6)	10	} Not elected.
	HERBERT SAMUEL	7	
	Sir THOMAS WHITTAKER	4	

which is a just result—three Unionists, one Labour candidate, and one Liberal being elected.

There has been much discussion as to the exact method of transferring the excess or surplus votes of an elected candidate; it is agreed on all hands that in making the transfer regard must be had to the rights of the

candidates who are to be the transferees, and the rules of the system of the "single transferable vote" have been carefully framed so as to give effect to these rights.¹ In the illustration Mr Law is supposed to have 50 votes, of which he only needs a quota² of 20 to make his own election secure. He can spare 30—that is, three-fifths of his total poll. To whom are the 30 votes to go? The answer is—the 30 votes are to go where the electors wish them to go. And the returning officer finds out where the electors wish them to go by examining the ballot papers on which Mr Law is marked 1, and seeing what names are marked 2 thereon. In this case let us suppose that on 10 of Mr Law's 50 voting papers Sir F. Banbury is marked 2, Lord Robert Cecil on 15, and Mr Chamberlain on 25. Mr Law can spare 30 out of his 50 votes—that is, three-fifths. And in justice Sir F. Banbury claims three-fifths of the 10 on which *he* is marked 2, *i.e.* 6; Lord Robert Cecil, three-fifths of the 15 on which *he* is marked 2, *i.e.* 9; Mr A. Chamberlain, three-fifths of the 25 on which *he* is marked 2, *i.e.* 15; 6, 9, and 15 votes are accordingly transferred to Sir F. Banbury, Lord Robert Cecil, and Mr Chamberlain respectively, as their proper shares in Mr Law's surplus.

But a provision for transferring the excess, or useless, votes of an elected candidate is not the only provision for transfer that is necessary. If a true result is to be reached

¹ These rules (as settled by the Government Draftsman for the working of the Representation of the People Act, 1918) are set out in full and illustrated by an imaginary election in Appendix II. For the Tasmanian solution, see p. 40, note.

² The "quota" is the smallest number of votes that makes the election of a candidate certain; any candidate who obtains the quota is at once declared elected. In a single-member constituency the quota would be one more than half the votes or $\frac{\text{number of votes}}{2} + 1$; in a two-membered constituency (*e.g.* Oxford or Cambridge University), $\frac{\text{number of votes}}{3} + 1$; thus the rule for ascertaining the quota is to divide the number of votes by one more than the number of seats, and (neglecting fractions) add one to the result. In this illustration the quota is $\left(\frac{115}{5} + 1\right)$ 20. See also Appendix II., pp. 107 and 113.

it is not enough to provide for excessive concentration. Excessive diffusion must also be guarded against. Otherwise

And of all a party may waste its votes by reason of having
 Votes miscalculated its strength and running too
 of hopeless many candidates.

Candidates. Thus the figures of our imaginary election, instead of those previously given, might have been :—

LAW	20	} Elected.
HENDERSON	20	
CHAMBERLAIN	20	
CECIL	19	
BANBURY	11	} Not elected.
ASQUITH	10	
SAMUEL	9	
WHITTAKER	6	

in which case the Liberals will have lost their solitary representative because they have unduly scattered their votes. To meet the difficulty the electors must be allowed, if they wish, to correct their error and concentrate their votes on fewer candidates. It is simple enough to find out whether the electors will consent to this process of concentration, and if they so consent to carry it through. The method adopted is to exclude from the poll the lowest candidate—in this case Whittaker—and make the votes that otherwise are wasted on him available (if the electors wish it) to put another candidate of the same party as Whittaker above Banbury, and give the Liberals their one seat. In other words, voters who have voted for Whittaker, whose election is hopeless, must be allowed to transfer their votes to candidates whose election is possible. The Liberals must be allowed to concentrate their strength on the candidate or candidates of their choice. They can do this if their votes are transferable, not otherwise.

In the case of the transfer of the votes of an excluded candidate it will be seen that no question of any proportional transfer arises. The excluded candidate has no quota: *all* his votes are transferred to the candidates indicated as next preferences by the electors. Thus, if we assume that of the six voters who voted for Whittaker as No. 1, five marked Asquith and one marked Herbert Samuel as No. 2, then, as a result of Whittaker's exclusion, 5 votes are transferred to

Asquith and 1 to Herbert Samuel, making Asquith's total 15 and Herbert Samuel's 10, and we have again as the result the election of three Unionists, one Labour man, and one Liberal.

LAW	20	} Elected.
HENDERSON	20	
CHAMBERLAIN	20	
CECIL	19	
ASQUITH (10 + 5)	15	
BANBURY	11	} Not elected.
HERBERT SAMUEL (9 + 1)	10	
WHITTAKER (6 - 6)	Excluded. ¹

It thus appears that the effect of the vote being made transferable is to ensure that all parties or divisions of opinion receive their fair share of the representation. The elector entering the polling booth does not know whether his favourite will receive more support than he requires or whether he will receive so little as to have no chance of election. A popular candidate may receive, say, 30,000 votes when he needs only 20,000. The votes given in excess would be lost to those who agree with him if they were not transferable. Or, again, a party may have scattered its votes over too many candidates and might (if the votes are not transferable) lose the representation which it otherwise would gain. In either case the elector's vote may be wasted.

The transferable vote provides against both these contingencies. It enables the elector, by marking² the names of candidates with the figures 1, 2, 3, and so on, to indicate the candidates of his second and further choice to whom his vote can be transferred—

- (1) When his first choice has more votes than he requires; or,
- (2) When, after all excess votes have been transferred, the elector's first choice is at the bottom of the poll.

The secrecy of the ballot is preserved, and yet the

¹ To work out the election completely Herbert Samuel's votes would have now to be transferred, but unless at least 4 of them go to Banbury and none to Asquith—a politically absurd possibility—this transfer will not alter the result.

² See p. 106.

electors are allowed to combine into groups of the necessary size or "quota." If any body of electors contains three such groups it will win three seats; if it contains two of these groups it will obtain two seats. And if it contains only one such group it obtains one member, and no combination of other parties, no bargain between headquarters, no skilful orders to electors can possibly prevent a number of electors in the constituency equal to the quota from obtaining the representative of their choice. This is the peculiar merit of the system. Let popular feeling run never so strong, a compact minority of reasonable size who have the courage and consistency to stand together will get into the House of Commons as many representatives of their own choice as their own numbers entitle them to have.

Some readers will find this statement of the procedure of an election under the single transferable vote complicated; all readers will, I fear, find it dull. Indeed, I feel that it is a little like trying to explain a game of cricket by an exposition of the text of the rules. The best advice to give to a student is to go and see the game played, and so I would refer readers to the account of an actual election in Tasmania given a little later on.¹ But those who have struggled through so far may be asked to see—or rather to visualise—the process somewhat in this way: let them imagine the voters as three crowds of people—Conservatives, about 20,000 strong; Liberals, about 20,000; and Socialists, about 10,000—who come to elect five persons from (say) eight candidates. They come to be numbered, like the barbarian armies of old, on a level space where are built eight enclosures, one for each of the eight candidates contesting the election, whom we may assume to be four Conservatives, three Liberals, and one Socialist; and each enclosure is so constructed as to be capable of containing, when full, a fixed number of voters—the fixed number being the "quota."² The candidates stand at the gates of their

¹ See p. 39.

² The quota for 50,000 electors and five seats is $\frac{50,000}{5} + 1 = 8334$.

enclosures, and the crowds as they come fill up first the enclosure of the most popular candidate.¹ As soon as an enclosure is filled the doors are shut: no more voters are wanted or can be admitted inside; and until the election is over no voter inside can be allowed to "multiply himself" by passing out and being counted in another enclosure. A voter who wishes to vote for a candidate whose enclosure is already filled is told that he cannot do so, but must make his choice among those candidates whose enclosures still have room for more voters.² At last the whole of the three crowds are distributed among the enclosures; it is found that the Conservatives have filled the enclosure of one of their four candidates completely and the enclosure of another very nearly, while to the two others they have sent only a handful of voters. The Liberals have not filled any one enclosure completely, but have distributed themselves fairly evenly over their three enclosures. The Socialists have filled their one enclosure, and those of their voters who could not obtain admission there have refused to enter any other enclosure.³ The candidates—one Conservative and one Socialist—whose enclosures are full, are at once declared elected, and then the occupants of the enclosure containing the smallest number of voters (a Conservative enclosure in this case) are told that, as there is apparently no prospect that their enclosure will ever be full, they are at liberty to come out and enter any other enclosure—not being that of an elected candidate.⁴ Most of the voters will take advantage of this liberty and move to the Conservative enclosure which is nearly full; some will not.⁵ There is no compulsion to enter an enclosure if you do not wish to do so. Suppose that this move fills the Conservative enclosure that was nearly full;⁵ thereupon that enclosure is shut and its

¹ That is, their votes are credited to the candidate they mark 1 on their ballot paper.

² *I.e.*, his vote is transferred to the candidate whom he has marked No. 2, or, where No. 2 is already elected, by a higher figure.

³ A voter need only mark a candidate with a 1; he is not bound to indicate a second preference.

⁴ This is the exclusion of the candidate lowest on the poll and the distribution of his ballot papers.

⁵ Conservative No. 2 obtains the quota.

candidate elected. The election proceeds by the emptying in the same way of the enclosure with the next smallest number of voters and the self-distribution of its occupants; we may expect that when the least-crowded of the three Liberal enclosures is emptied, its occupants will go and fill up the other two Liberal enclosures and two Liberal candidates be elected. The election may end in one of two ways: either (1) as many enclosures are filled as there were candidates to be elected; or (2), owing to the fact that many voters on being turned out of, or not allowed to enter, the enclosure of their first choice have refused to enter another, there may remain one or two enclosures only partially full but equal in number to the unfilled vacancies, and at this point, as all the electors not in an enclosure have declined to take any further part, the candidates to whom the remaining enclosures belong are elected whether their enclosures are full or not. In other words, each crowd elects as many candidates as it can fill enclosures, and if a number of enclosures equal to the number of vacancies is not completely filled by voters, the candidates who have the largest number of supporters are elected even if their enclosures are short of their full complement.

That this procedure would produce results which as between the parties are as fair as the conditions will allow, may be made to appear to readers who are doubtful of its practical effects, from the results of the Tasmanian elections for 1909, 1912, 1913 and 1916, of the Johannesburg municipal elections in 1911, and of the Christchurch (New Zealand) municipal elections of 1917 (see Table, p. 39).

The results of all these elections do not merely show that the new methods are fair, they also show that the ordinary elector finds no serious difficulty in the new procedure. The percentage of spoilt votes due to the proportional system in Tasmania is reported by the Tasmanian Chief Electoral Officer as 2.87.¹

¹ A full report of the General Election of 30th April 1909 has been published by the Tasmanian Government—Tasmania, 1909, No. 34. Reports on the subsequent elections of 1912, 1913, and 1916, have also been issued.

But, indeed, the objection that a proportional system is impracticable is now rarely heard.¹

TASMANIA.				
Year of Election.	Party.	Votes.	Seats in proportion to Votes.	Seats actually obtained.
1909	Labour . . .	19,067	11.69	12
	Liberal . . .	29,893	18.31	18
1912	Labour . . .	33,634	13.66	14
	Liberal . . .	40,252	16.34	16
1913	Labour . . .	31,633	13.79	14
	Liberal . . .	36,157	15.78	16
	Independent . .	977	0.43	...
1916*	Labour . . .	33,200	13.93	14
	Liberal . . .	35,398	15.27	15
	Independent . .	1,817	.80	1
JOHANNESBURG.				
1911	Labour . . .	7,457	10.6	11
	Non-Labour . .	13,680	19.4	19
CHRISTCHURCH (NEW ZEALAND).				
1917	Citizens' Association	9,791	9.4	9
	Labour . . .	4,792	4.6	5
	Independent . .	2,094	2	2
		16,677	16	16

* The figures given for this election are the effective votes recorded at the final stage of election. See Tasmanian Report on General Election, 1916. The figures for other elections in the tables above are figures of first choices.

The practical working of the single transferable vote may be illustrated by an account of the polling in one of the constituencies (Wilmot) at the 1912 General Election for the Tasmanian House of Assembly. The constituency

¹ The operation of marking two, three, or more candidates by the figures 1, 2, 3 and so on in the order of the voter's preference (or, if the voter wishes to be represented by one candidate only and not in any event by any other, simply marking by the figure 1 the name of that candidate), is the whole of the task imposed on the voter by the system of the single transferable vote (see p. 106). To say that this is too difficult a matter for the British elector is to say that he is unworthy of political rights.

returned six members. It was contested by six "Liberal" (in Australian politics all non-Labour parties were in 1912 fused under this name) and four Labour

**A Tasmanian
Election.**

candidates. The total number of votes cast was 13,013, and the quota was therefore $\frac{13,013}{6+1} + 1$, or 1860. The total number of Liberal voters (taking those voters who marked a Liberal candidate No. 1 as Liberals) was 8587, of Labour voters (reckoned on a similar basis) 4426. The result was the election of four Liberal and two Labour candidates.

The first step in the work of the returning officer was to count to each candidate the ballot papers on which he was marked No. 1. This gave the following result:—

LYONS (Labour)	2,326
LEE (Liberal)	1,823
MULCAHY (Liberal)	1,603
HAYS (Liberal)	1,336
CAMERON (Liberal)	1,385
BEST (Liberal)	1,184
FIELD (Liberal)	1,056
CURWEN (Labour)	775
SHACKCLOTH (Labour)	668
O'KEEFE (Labour)	657
Total	<u>13,013</u>

and therefore Lyons as having more than the "quota" (1860) was declared elected.

The returning officer then distributed¹ Lyons' surplus of

¹ The Tasmanian system of distributing the surplus votes is slightly different from that adopted in the British Rules (see p. 107). In the Tasmanian Rules *every* transferable paper is carried forward at the fractional value which represents the portion of the vote not required for building up the "quota" of the successful candidate, and there is not, as in the British Rules, a selection made of certain definite papers to be carried forward at the value of unity. The *number* of votes credited to the transferee is ascertained by multiplying the number of papers to be transferred to him by this "transfer value." The number thus ascertained usually contains a fraction which is disregarded, with the result that a few votes are lost in the process of transfer. In the British Rules no votes are lost; the largest fractional remainders, up to the number of the votes that otherwise would be split into fractions and lost, are treated as of the value of unity.

466 votes ($2326 - 1860 = 466$) to the candidates marked "2" on the papers on which Lyons was marked "1," and this surplus, as might have been expected, went mainly to the three other Labour candidates, O'Keefe receiving 181, Curwen 133, and Shackcloth 105 additional votes, and a few sporadic votes going to the Liberals. The poll then stood:

LYONS (Labour) ($2326 - 466$) . . .	1860	Elected
LEE (Liberal) ($1823 + 2$) . . .	1825	
MULCAHY (Liberal) ($1603 + 19$) . . .	1622	
HAYS (Liberal) ($1536 + 4$) . . .	1540	
CAMERON (Liberal) ($1385 + 12$) . . .	1397	
BEST (Liberal) ($1184 + 3$) . . .	1187	
FIELD (Liberal) ($1056 + 3$) . . .	1059	
CURWEN (Labour) ($775 + 133$) . . .	908	
O'KEEFE (Labour) ($657 + 181$) . . .	838	
SHACKCLOTH (Labour) ($668 + 105$) . . .	773	

It will be seen that the distribution of the Labour surplus altered the relative position of the Labour candidates, O'Keefe and Shackcloth, but gave no candidate the quota.

As no candidate had now any surplus, the next step was to start at the bottom of the poll and exclude the lowest candidate (Shackcloth) and distribute his 773 votes. The effect of this was largely to increase the votes of Shackcloth's fellow Labour candidates, Curwen and O'Keefe; votes which would otherwise have gone to Lyons (who was already elected) as next preference, being carried on to the next succeeding preference, *i.e.* to the candidates marked "3." The result was:

LYONS (Labour)	1860	Elected
LEE (Liberal) ($1825 + 6$)	1831	
MULCAHY (Liberal) ($1622 + 17$)	1639	
HAYS (Liberal) ($1540 + 1$)	1541	
CAMERON (Liberal) ($1397 + 21$)	1418	
O'KEEFE (Labour) ($838 + 508$)	1346	
BEST (Liberal) ($1187 + 2$)	1189	
CURWEN (Labour) ($908 + 213$)	1121	
FIELD (Liberal) ($1059 + 2$)	1061	
SHACKCLOTH (Labour) ($773 - 773$)	Excluded

O'Keefe had now a substantial majority over Curwen, and both had been advanced above the Liberal, Field, who, being at the bottom of the poll, and no candidate having a surplus, was next excluded. The result was the election of the two leading Liberal candidates, only a few sporadic votes going to the Labour men:—

LYONS (Labour)	1860	} Elected
LEE (Liberal) (1831 + 348)	2179	
MULCAHY (Liberal) (1639 + 305)	1944	
HAYS (Liberal) (1541 + 182)	1723	
CAMERON (Liberal) (1418 + 77)	1495	
O'KEEFE (Labour) (1346 + 27)	1373	} Excluded
BEST (Liberal) (1189 + 110)	1299	
CURWEN (Labour) (1121 + 9)	1130	
FIELD (Liberal) (1061 - 1061)	
SHACKCLOTH (Labour)	

The next steps of the returning officer were to transfer the two "secondary" surpluses of the two elected Liberals, Lee and Mulcahy, one after the other, both of them having more than the quota; a third Liberal, Hays, completed his quota by votes obtained from Lee, and his surplus was distributed in its turn, leaving the poll as follows:—

LYONS (Labour)	1860	} Elected
LEE (Liberal)	1860	
MULCAHY (Liberal)	1860	
HAYS (Liberal)	1860	
CAMERON (Liberal) (1495 + 32 + 12 + 2)	1541	
BEST (Liberal) (1299 + 89 + 61 + 17)	1466	} Excluded
O'KEEFE (Labour) (1373 + 5 + 1 + 0)	1379	
CURWEN (Labour) (1130 + 5 + 0 + 0)	1135	
FIELD (Liberal)	
SHACKCLOTH (Labour)	

Then followed the transfer of Curwen's votes. The largest portion of these fell to the share of O'Keefe, the only unelected Labour candidate not already excluded, securing his election, but 382 of Curwen's supporters had refused to vote for any of the unelected candidates, and their votes accordingly were non-transferable. O'Keefe's surplus of 145 votes was then dealt with. Of these, 131

were found to be non-transferable, there being no Labour candidate left in the running, so that this operation made no change in the relative position of the non-elected candidates, Cameron and Best, with 1634 and 1510 votes respectively. As only one place now remained to be filled, Cameron, as the higher on the poll, was declared elected, although he had not a full quota, and the final result of the poll was:

LYONS (Labour)	. . .	1860	} Elected
LEE (Liberal)	. . .	1860	
MULCAHY (Liberal)	. . .	1860	
HAYS (Liberal)	. . .	1860	
O'KEEFE (Labour)	. . .	1860	
CAMERON (Liberal)	. . .	1634	} Not elected
BEST (Liberal)	. . .	1510	
CURWEN (Labour)	
FIELD (Liberal)	
SHACKCLOTH (Labour)	

The whole process is shown in tabular form on p. 44.

The system of the single transferable vote is the direct descendant of the original Hare system, but in the process of development it has varied a little from the scheme of its author. We are, however, not now concerned with its history, but with its merits, here and now, as a working machine.¹ Two main criticisms² have been made on the single transferable vote as a working machine. They are: (1) that it attributes too high a value to the later preferences of a voter; and (2) that in its British form, at any rate, it contains an element of chance.

To take these points in order. It is said that the system gives in effect the same value—namely, unity—to a figure that may be as high as 8 or 9—according to the number of candidates—or even higher; and suggestions have been

¹ J. C. Meredith, of Trinity College, Dublin, has made an interesting suggestion for what he considers an improvement of detail (see his book on *Proportional Representation*, Dublin, Edward Ponsonby; London, Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., 1913, page 92).

² See Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, 1910, Cd. 5163, par. 127.

Tasmanian House of Assembly—General Election, 1912.

RESULT SHEET FOR DISTRICT OF WILMOT.

No. of Votes, 13,013. No. of Seats, 6.

$$\text{Quota} = \frac{13,013 + 1}{7} = 1,860.$$

Names of Candidates.	1st Count.	2nd Count.		3rd Count.		4th Count.		5th Count.		6th Count.		7th Count.		8th Count.		9th Count.		Elected.	
		Transfer of Lyons's Surpluses.	Result.	Transfer of Shacklecloth's Votes.	Result.	Transfer of Field's Votes.	Result.	Transfer of Lee's Surpluses.	Result.	Transfer of Mulcahy's Surpluses.	Result.	Transfer of Hays's Surpluses.	Result.	Transfer of Curwen's Votes.	Result.	Transfer of O'Keefe's Surpluses.	Result.		
Best (Lib.)	1,184	+ 3	1,187	+ 2	1,189	+ 110	1,299	+ 89	1,388	+ 61	1,449	+ 17	1,466	+ 44	1,510	...	1,510
Cameron (Lib.)	1,385	+ 12	1,397	+ 21	1,418	+ 77	1,495	+ 32	1,527	+ 12	1,539	+ 2	1,541	+ 81	1,622	+ 12	1,634	...	Cameron (Lib.)
Curwen (Lab.)	775	+ 133	908	+ 213	1,121	+ 9	1,130	+ 5	1,135	...	1,135	...	1,135	- 11,35
Field (Lib.)	1,056	+ 3	1,059	+ 2	1,061	- 1061
Hays (Lib.)	1,536	+ 4	1,540	+ 1	1,541	+ 182	1,723	+ 159	1,882	...	1,882	- 22	1,860	...	1,860	...	1,860	...	Hays (Lib.)
Lee (Lib.)	1,823	+ 2	1,825	+ 6	1,831	+ 348	2,179	- 319	1,860	...	1,860	...	1,860	...	1,860	...	1,860	...	Lee (Lib.)
Lyons (Lab.)	2,326	- 466	1,860	...	1,860	...	1,860	...	1,860	...	1,860	...	1,860	...	1,860	...	1,860	...	Lyons (Lab.)
Mulcahy (Lib.)	1,603	+ 19	1,622	+ 17	1,639	+ 395	1,944	...	1,944	- 84	1,860	...	1,860	...	1,860	...	1,860	...	Mulcahy (Lib.)
O'Keefe (Lab.)	657	+ 181	838	+ 508	1,346	+ 27	1,373	+ 5	1,378	+ 1	1,379	...	1,379	+ 626	2,005	- 145	1,860	...	O'Keefe (Lab.)
Shacklecloth (Lab.)	668	+ 105	773	- 773
*Votes lost by omitting fractional remainders	...	+ 4	4	+ 3	7	+ 2	9	+ 3	12	+ 3	15	+ 2	17	+ 2	19	+ 2	19	+ 2	...
Non-transferable papers	1	1	+ 26	27	+ 7	34	+ 1	35	+ 382	417	+ 131	548
Totals	13,013	...	13,013	...	13,013	...	13,013	...	13,013	...	13,013	...	13,013	...	13,013	...	13,013

* See note on p. 40.

made for counting the figure 1 as worth one vote, the figure 2 half a vote, and so on. The criticism and the suggestion both proceed from a misunderstanding of the theory of the system, and will occasion little difficulty to a reader who keeps in his mind the illustration of the "enclosures" given above. Each elector has one vote and one vote only. The preferences marked by him are not so many votes or parts of votes: they are indications as to the person to whom his vote—his one and only vote—is to go. Now, it is an unfounded assumption that in the voter's mind his preference as between candidates whom he marked 5 and 6 respectively is not as strong as his preference as between candidates marked 1 and 2. It may very well be far stronger.¹ For the candidate whom he marked 5 may be the last candidate of his own party, and the candidate he marked 6 may be a candidate of another party whom, as his own party has no further use for his vote, he prefers to other candidates on the list, but who in his mind is separated by a wide gulf from the man marked 5. A Unionist having to choose between a Labour enclosure and the enclosure of a Unionist will be in no difficulty. On the other hand, the men whom he marks 1 and 2 may be, in his judgment, both excellent candidates, two leaders of his own party between whom he finds it difficult to judge. These later preferences only come into play (and that in the case only of a very small percentage² of voters) at a late stage of the counting, when all the candidates higher in the preferences of the voter have either been elected or excluded from the poll; but, nevertheless, the vote of the particular voter who marked the voting paper in question has not been used. This voter is in the same position as he would have been in the days before the Ballot Act had he come to the poll in person

¹ A friend suggests the comparison of a menu. If I am offered salmon, oyster, whitebait, and plaice, I may have some difficulty in saying whether I will have salmon, oyster, or whitebait (if I am a fortunate person with a generous palate), and in arranging them as 1, 2, and 3, but there will be a wide difference for me between any of those fish and the unattractive plaice that I have marked 4.

² See the Report of the Tasmanian Committee quoted on p. 165 and foll. of *Proportional Representation* by John H. Humphreys, Methuen & Co., 1912, 5s. net.

and been told by the returning officer that the candidates whom he most desired to see elected were no longer available, but that, if he wished to vote at all, he must make his choice between the remaining candidates. Now, no one would suggest that a choice made openly under these conditions was not a perfectly good vote, an effective expression of the voter's choice, and to be counted as such. The preferences of the voter might well be—probably are—as well marked as between the remaining candidates as are a voter's preferences in a single-member constituency between the two or three candidates presented for his choice.

It may be added that the actual results of elections that have taken place under the system lend no support to the theory that the electors in giving their late preferences do not vote as "politically" as in giving their earlier preferences. The balance of parties in the Johannesburg municipal elections and in the Tasmanian elections corresponds well to the proportions of No. 1 votes given to each party. The theory that the elector cannot distinguish a Unionist from a Liberal when he gets to No. 5 or 6 on his list is an assumption of a hostile critic, and has no support in the facts. For be it remembered that the ordinary man votes for all the members of his own party first, and not until they are all elected or eliminated—that is, not until he is in the position of an elector in a single-member constituency with the alternative vote, whose own candidate is at the bottom of the poll in a three-cornered contest—does any preference that he may have indicated as between his opponents come into play.

The second objection to the mechanism of the single transferable vote, namely, the suggestion as to the element of chance present in the British Rules, is of little weight. The objection was first made against the original and very simple form of rules advocated in 1885. Those rules provided that, in transferring a surplus, the votes last credited to the successful candidate should be taken for transfer. It was then said that such a method might unduly favour one transferee as against another, as, though half the supporters of A—the elected candidate—might have marked

B with a 2 and the other half have marked C, the whole, or a large proportion of, the papers on which B was marked 2 might be taken for the quota, and C consequently benefit unfairly as between himself and B when the transfer was made. As a matter of fact, when large numbers of papers are dealt with and are thoroughly well mixed, the theory of chances makes it probable to the point of practical certainty, that no such unfairness will result, but, in order to meet this criticism, the rules as already explained¹ have been elaborated and the transfers of surplus votes are made to the candidates marked as next preferences in strict proportion to the number of papers on which they respectively are so marked. The element of chance that is said to remain consists in this that, theoretically, in the event of a further transfer *from* the transferee candidate—if he too is elected and has a surplus, or if he is excluded—although on that further transfer the same precautions are taken, it yet may be that the original choice of papers to be transferred from the candidate first elected did not contain the strictly mathematical proportion of the third and subsequent preferences expressed by all the supporters of that candidate.

Repeated experiment and the results of actual elections have, however, demonstrated that there is no substance in this possibility, which, indeed, is eliminated by the Tasmanian Rules, but with the result that Tasmanian expert opinion has adopted the view that, on this point, their rules are needlessly elaborate.² In fact, the objection is purely theoretical and was not urged seriously in the recent discussions as to the single transferable vote whether inside or outside parliament.

¹ See pp. 33 and 40, and consult also the rules in Appendix II.

² See p. 10 of *Report of Tasmanian General Election*, 23rd January 1913:—

“We are, therefore, justified in saying that in each district at each of the three elections—fifteen contests in all—the results would have been the same with the English Rules as with the Tasmanian Rules.

“We, therefore, recommend that if the form of the rules for securing proportional representation by the single transferable vote should again be considered by parliament the English Rules should be adopted.”

SOME APPLICATIONS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

THE FEDERAL SOLUTION, SECOND CHAMBERS, MUNICIPALITIES.

IT is highly probable that in some form or other the future constitution of these Islands will at an early date

become what is popularly called federal.¹
Federalism. Most Liberals believe it, though they may differ as to the stages and the rapidity of the coming change. Many, if not most, Unionists acquiesce in the belief, and even actively promote the spread of the federal idea. The Irish Nationalists have nothing to say against it, if their own share be adequate. Labour men would welcome a policy which would set free local parliaments for social legislation. Now, a federal solution is justified by two conditions: first, there must be sufficient difference between the component parts of the federation to entitle each to a special organ of legislation; and, second, there must be sufficient similarity of civilisation to make possible the federal union. But the general apprehension of those Unionists who are opponents of federalism for these Islands is that the federal tie may be too weak; that the difference between England on the one hand and Ireland on the other may be so pronounced as to lead to the total break-up of the federal state, with a resulting war of conquest as the only alternative to complete separation. And to allay these fears any reasonable step should be taken which

¹ I am well aware that the use of the term "federal" in this connection is, from the point of view of constitutional science, inelegant if not inaccurate. But here as elsewhere the public makes its own terminology.

may keep the political parties of each component state alive to the existence in the other states of men in sympathy with themselves. In this connection the lesson of the American Civil War should not be forgotten. A committee of the United States Senate reported in 1869 that the war might have been averted had the minorities in north and south been duly represented. "In the states of the south when rebellion was plotted, and when open steps were taken to break the Union . . . it (minority representation) would have held the Union men of those states together and have given them voice in the electoral colleges." Let Unionists, Liberals, and Labour men have in all the component states of the Federal Union their just and proportionate share of representation; there will then be no excuse for the idea that Ireland contains no sober and responsible citizens, or that Scotland and Wales have hardly any Unionists, but the federated communities will see, each in the other, similar parties dealing with similar problems.

It is to be hoped that in the work of preparing the new constitutions for the component states of the new Federation

Ireland and Proportional Representation. it may be possible, if a constituent convention¹ is impossible, to allow a wider latitude to, and invite a wider responsibility from, the Opposition (whichever party may be in opposition) than is usually the case in connection with a government bill. In any event the question of the electoral system should not be overlooked, and more care should be bestowed on it than was apparent in the preparation of the Home Rule Act. The bill, as introduced, contained no provision for proportional representation at all. The Irish Senate was to be nominated. There were some large constituencies prescribed for the Irish House of Commons—Belfast East, 5 members, Belfast North and Cork City, 4 members, Belfast South, Dublin (College Green), Dublin (Harbour), Dublin (St Patrick's), Dublin County North, and Dublin County South, each 3 members, giving a total of 31 out of 164 members of the Irish House of Commons. But there was not a word in the bill to indicate what method of election

¹ In fact the attempt has been made to deal with the Irish question by holding a Convention.

was to be applied. It seemed even possible that the un-repealed Reform Act of 1867 might apply in such a manner as to reintroduce the limited vote in the three-cornered constituencies. In these conditions the Irish Proportional Representation Society came into being. It is significant and hopeful that this is perhaps the only Irish political movement in which Irishmen of all religious and political opinions have taken part. The Society brought home to the attention of the Government the importance of the Irish electoral question, and their pressure succeeded in obtaining two notable concessions; first, the House of Commons, on the motion of the Government, passed unanimously an amendment providing that, subject to the nomination of the Senate for the first term of its existence, the Senate should be elected by the four provinces voting as four large constituencies and returning: Ulster 14, Leinster 11, Munster 9, and Connaught 6 members; and a little later in the history of the bill, the Government accepted an amendment which was carried in the House of Commons by 311 votes to 81, introducing proportional representation for the constituencies returning three or more members to the Irish House of Commons.¹ When just before the outbreak of war the bill to amend the Home Rule Act by the exclusion of parts of Ulster was before the House of Lords, that body unanimously adopted an amendment providing that all Irish constituencies should be so arranged as to apply proportional representation throughout the whole island. The war, however, stopped the further progress of the bill.

It may be that this chapter of our electoral history is not at an end. No country needs a just system of representation more than Ireland. To reconcile all Irishmen to their new institutions is the paramount object of statesmanship. To give freedom to every new aspiration, to allow every new idea to come freely to the light, to exile or proscribe no man, to make an Irish legislative assembly—or assemblies—that shall be open to all Irishmen, is at least a method that gives hope. It is of vital importance that in the future the

¹ This proposal finds a place in the recommendations of the Irish Convention. But the Convention's proposals for the Senate are of a wholly different character.

old divisions of Irishmen shall not be continued indefinitely and that a solid Protestant North East shall not for ever confront a solid Catholic Rest of Ireland. The old divisions, no longer corresponding to the real issues and conflicts of modern life, must disappear. In Belgium before proportional representation was introduced, solidly Catholic Flemish provinces confronted Walloon districts that were solidly Socialist or Liberal; when proportional representation came, it revealed to the Flemings the fact that there were Catholics in Liège, and to the Walloons that there were Liberals in Flanders; the lines of political division were found not to be the provincial frontiers, and the unity of the Belgian nation profited by the discovery. So should it be in Ireland. It is plain enough that Ireland under Home Rule will have her share of the economic struggle. The differences between the Catholic employer of Dublin and the Protestant employer of Belfast will tend to disappear—and they will disappear the more rapidly the less the electoral system perpetuates the idea that Protestant Belfast is all Orange and Catholic Dublin all Green. The country districts and the towns will have their separate interests. An Irish parliament should not be overwhelmingly rural in character if the towns are to have their interests fairly regarded. If the question is asked¹ why proportional representation is a good thing in Belfast, Dublin, and Cork, and the old majority system a good thing everywhere else, what answer can be given? or, rather, what answer that will satisfy an Irish Labour party which, on majority principles, would be strong enough to carry the greater part of the seats in the large towns (as the Social Democrats in Germany carry Berlin and Hamburg), but is told that while it must give justice to the urban minorities whom it could extinguish, yet, when its own supporters are themselves minorities, they deserve no consideration? A similar proposal in Belgium—to apply proportional representation in the town, and not in the country districts—was rejected with emphasis. If full justice is to be done, the application of proportional representation should be complete.

¹ Mr Larkin asked the question at the Albert Hall, in November 1913.

But if Ireland is to have proportional representation partly in order to meet the possibilities of the future, the conditions of the present impose proportional representation as a necessity for parliamentary assemblies in Scotland and Wales. In Scotland at the general election of December 1910 there were, roughly, four Ministerialist voters to three Unionist (372,313 to 277,183); but the Ministerialists got sixty-one seats and the Unionists eleven. A Scottish parliament cannot be made in this way. In Wales (including Monmouth) in 1906 not a single Unionist was returned—though 100,547 Unionist votes were cast. In December 1910 in all Wales and Monmouth there were 121,013 Unionist votes to 210,525 Ministerialist; 3 Unionists and 31 Ministerialists were returned to Parliament. To set up a Welsh parliament in these conditions would be a mockery.¹

But if Ireland, Scotland, and Wales all have their parliaments thus elected, England can hardly differ, and if the subordinate parliaments are elected by proportional representation, the central parliament elected on a majority system will be felt to be an anomaly.

The organisation of the popular chambers of a new federal union leads naturally to a consideration of the second chambers. Will the new federal constitution be bicameral? If the Irish precedent is followed—yes. And if yes, how will the second chamber differ from the first? If the precedent set by the Home Rule Act is followed, in being more truly representative of the electors. For on that system the same

¹ If any reader is inclined to believe that the evils of the present system, so far as the mathematical correctness of results is concerned, have been palliated by redistribution, he may be referred to the calculations of Mr J. Rooke Corbett, of the Manchester Statistical Society, republished in Mr John H. Humphrey's *Proportional Representation*, Methuen, London, 1911. Mr Corbett shows clearly that the actual results in the general elections from 1885 to 1910 would have been affected very slightly by a redistribution into equal constituencies. In 1886, 1906, and December 1910 the majorities would have been slightly smaller, and in the other cases slightly larger. But the differences are small.

electors elect both Houses, but the first chamber is constituted mainly on the majority system, and the second on the proportional. If there is a conflict will not the second chamber be the stronger morally, even though it be smaller in size? But in Scotland and Wales, as we have seen, the first chamber must be elected proportionally, if justice is to be done to the conservative classes. How then will their second chambers be chosen so as to be differentiated from the first? For if the second be not different from the first, what reason could be given for its existence?

There was until recently no doubt a widespread idea that proportional representation with a popular electorate was specially suitable for a second chamber. The Irish Home Rule Act strengthened this belief, and it has been acted upon in New Zealand, where in 1914 the system of the single transferable vote was adopted¹ for the election of the Legislative Council, each island being divided into two large constituencies. It is also likely to be acted upon in South Africa.² The same view was confirmed by the report of the majority of the Members of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, who, while unable to report that a case had been made out before them for the adoption of the single transferable vote "here and now" for the House of Commons, added that "there would be much to be said in its favour as a method for the constitution of a second chamber."³ Unfortunately, this latter observation

¹ The Act will not come into force until after the end of the war.

² A Parliamentary Select Committee in South Africa (South Africa, Senate S.C. 4) has recently (April 1918) recommended that the Senate of South Africa (which under the South African Act, 1909, might be reconstituted after the expiration of ten years) shall except for four nominated senators be elected directly on a proportional basis by the single transferable vote, the several provinces being multi-membered constituencies and the franchise the same as for the House of Assembly after eliminating voters aged less than thirty.

³ See the Report of the Royal Commission to enquire into Electoral Systems (Cd. 5163), 1910. On this point the majority of the Commission travelled beyond the terms of their reference. They were appointed "to examine the various schemes which have been adopted or proposed in order to secure a fully representative character for popularly elected legislative bodies, and to consider whether and how far they or any of them are *capable* of application in this

was not elaborated by the Commission. Hence, we do not know what in their view is the function of a second as distinct from a first chamber (both being popularly elected legislative bodies), and why, consequently, an accurate system of representation is appropriate to the one even if it be inappropriate to the other. Perhaps the Commissioners would draw a distinction between a body which has to maintain a government in power and one which, according to country in regard to the existing electorate." They were not asked to say whether politically proportional representation was desirable or not, but (a) to examine the mechanism of proportional representation schemes, and (b) to report on whether and how far application in this country was *possible*. The question whether proportional representation is politically desirable or not is one for Parliament and the electorate, not for a Royal Commission. In this connection the late Lord Lochee's (Mr Edmund Robertson) dissentient note is unanswerable. Lord Lochee said: "I regret to find myself unable to concur with my colleagues in their conclusions respecting the Transferable Vote. In my opinion it has been amply proved that this method of voting is a practicable scheme for securing to elected legislative bodies a more fully representative character. It is only one of various schemes, having that purpose, which we have examined. Many of these have merits of their own—I would refer more particularly to the Belgian system—but I think the Transferable Vote is the simplest and the best. I can see no reason for holding that it is not applicable to our existing electorate. I am constrained, therefore, by the terms of our reference, to report in its favour.

"The truth seems to be that the most formidable objections to the Transferable Vote would apply to any scheme of proportional representation. They are arguments against the whole idea of proportional representation. In my judgment they strike at the principle, which, for the purposes of this Commission, must be assumed, viz. : that elected legislatures should have as fully representative a character as possible.

"Under our present system a minority of electors may seat a majority of legislators. A small minority may elect a large minority. Considerable sections of the electorate may have no representation at all. It is impossible to say that such a system has a fully representative character, or to deny that the Transferable Vote would remove or greatly modify its defects.

"I am not concerned to dispute that the introduction of proportional representation might involve important changes in parliamentary government. That, in my view, is not a question for the Commission. I shall therefore only say that I do not believe that the cause of good government is bound up with the maintenance of a distorted representation, or that British statesmanship would be unable to cope with the problems which a better system might bring in its train."

to recent British practice, need not be in harmony with the government. But the lack of harmony between a second chamber and a government which may be negligible when the second chamber is hereditary, may soon become important when the second chamber is popularly elected. It is difficult to suppose that a second chamber popularly elected on a proportional principle will be in its constitutional effects the equivalent of the present House of Lords. Two legislative chambers of different origin are inevitably rivals for influence and power, and in a democratic community the chamber which is in most real and vital connection with popular feeling is likely in the long run to prove the stronger even if it be the smaller body. Before we can answer the question, how a second chamber ought to be elected, we must first ask, what the second chamber is wanted to do. An enquiry of this kind would take us beyond the limits of this pamphlet. But this, at any rate, we may say with safety—that a second chamber must be different from the first in its functions, and therefore it ought to be different in the method of its constitution. It is not a hopeful project to let the same body of electors choose two representative assemblies, one by imperfect methods and the other on more rational principles, and to expect the latter in the long run to be subordinate to the former.

Hence, those politicians who care for the predominance of the Commons should be careful lest they set up rival Houses either in the shape of a federal second chamber, or of second chambers in the component parts of the Federal Union, which naturally will be looked upon with some favour by the former partisans of the House of Lords, and which will have a far more plausible title to popular support. In the case of the old House of Lords, the appearance did not correspond to the reality. It appeared to be a mere assembly of magnates without popular support, but in reality it represented the whole Unionist party or very little less than one-half of the electorate of the United Kingdom. It was this that gave it its political strength—a strength that but for the action of the Unionist leaders would have made Liberal legislation impossible for the present generation; and yet

at the same time, this strength had in it the weakness that the House of Lords was involved in the electoral fortunes and misfortunes of the Unionists, and that it never could have the authority to which a body of a less uniform party colour might attain. If a new second chamber be set up that represents the whole people, its opposition to the Commons—if ever it does oppose—will be more formidable than that of the old House of Lords. And if it be answered that its opposition is unthinkable, as both Houses will proceed from the same electorate, the reply is that we have no security that the lower House if elected on present principles will represent the electorate accurately, and that assemblies have a habit of developing a corporate spirit of their own. A Liberal may, perhaps, be allowed to think that it would be a disaster to the continuity of our constitution if the Commons on the morrow of their victory should be defeated by another body with a higher claim to popular confidence. The true remedy is a fully representative House of Commons. With such a House in full control, another chamber could well be constituted in such a manner as to include elements which no popular election could supply, and to this chamber subordinate functions of discussion, of revision, and delay could be granted without impairing the supremacy of the Commons.¹

In any case, once the function of a second chamber is determined, and once it is granted that the second chamber is to be in some sense representative of different classes and

¹ As good a solution as any other of the problem would be probably the election of each second chamber on proportional principles by the House of Commons itself—English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, or Federal, as the case might be—not more than one-half of the Chamber being chosen at a time; the election to take place immediately after the election of a new House of Commons. The Upper House would then represent both the present and past mood of the national mind, while the House of Commons represented the present mood only. It would be the duty of the Cabinet to see that the claims of those elements of experienced State service, for whose presence politicians have usually been inclined to turn to nomination, should be adequately considered by their supporters in the Commons. The election of an upper chamber, even partially, by municipal and county councils is to be deprecated. It is no part of the functions of a local administrator to choose a senator, and if such a task is given to county councillors their

interests, there will be a general agreement that the representation should be as full and complete as possible, and that the various limiting considerations which have been thought to make a full representation inappropriate to a governing assembly have no place when a second chamber is under discussion.

MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS.

It will hardly be disputed in any quarter that the present system of electing local authorities is far from perfect. The Royal Commission on Electoral Systems has intimated that the municipal field is appropriate for proportional representation. The House of Commons¹ has resolved unanimously that under the present system grave anomalies and injustices result, and that it is expedient to empower municipal boroughs to apply the proportional system in the election of their councils. A bill (the Municipal Representation Bill) carrying this resolution into effect was before the war introduced and reintroduced into the House of Commons; was introduced into the House of Lords, and examined and favourably reported on by a select committee of that assembly; on two occasions it passed through all its stages in the House of Lords, and was sent down to the Commons. Unfortunately, being a private member's bill, it has got no further. The fortune of the ballot has not been with it, and up to now its main service has been to provide another example of the ill-contrived arrangements under which our Parliament does its work.²

own elections will be rendered even more political than they are at present. [The foregoing note is left as it was written in 1914. The report of the conference on the Reform of the Second Chamber, presided over by Lord Bryce, does not differ widely in its main outlines from the solution here suggested. I do not, of course, claim to have originated the suggestion.]

¹ Resolution of 30th March 1910.

² Similar Bills—more fortunate—became law in New Zealand in 1914 and in British Columbia in 1917 (see p. 86), and in the British Isles the Sligo Corporation Act of this year (1918) provides for the election of the municipal corporation of Sligo by proportional representation. Thus Sligo—thanks largely to the influence of Mr T. Scanlan, M.P. (a member of the Speaker's conference)—is the first municipality to follow the resolution of the House of Commons, and to show the way to all other local authorities in the United Kingdom.

The anomalies of the present system of constituting of municipal councils may be illustrated by the following results of the last (1912) elections to the metropolitan borough councils :—

Borough.	Total Seats.	Uncontested Seats.*	Contested Seats obtained by			
			Municipal Reform.	Pro-gressive	Labour and Socialist.	Independent.
Chelsea	36	15	36
Finsbury	54	21	48	5	1	...
Fulham	36	6	36
Hammersmith	36	...	31	5
Islington	60	...	53	6	1	...
Kensington	60	30	52	2	6	...
Lambeth	60	...	56	2	2	...
Lewisham	42	...	42
St Marylebone	60	15	53	7
Wandsworth	60	18	57	3
Westminster	60	42	60

* These uncontested seats, the numbers of which are eloquent to the apathy caused by the present electoral system, with the exception of three in Finsbury, are all held by the Municipal Reform party.

As examples of the details of the contests in particular wards, the following figures may be cited :—

St Pancras, No. 1 Ward.

Municipal Reform.		Progressive.		Labour and Socialist.	
Candidate.	Votes.	Candidate.	Votes.	Candidate.	Votes.
Solomon	1,670	M'Cormack	1,269	Jarrett	650
Coggan	1,667	Chamberlain	1,260	Carter	623
Mitchell	1,645	Collin	1,225	Holyoake	501
Fincham	1,643	Cussen	1,178	Watson	455
Caunt	1,617	Gilsen	1,172	Woodley	450
Hughes	1,609	Walker	1,170	Lewington	426
Liddelow	1,604	Younger	1,149	Redhouse	421
Matthews	1,554	Ramsden	1,134	Strong	421
Jennens	1,410	Perryman	1,131	Rose	410
Total Municipal Reform }	14,419	Total Progressive }	10,688	Total Labour and Socialist }	4,357

Result : Nine Municipal Reformers elected ; no Progressives and no Labour or Socialist candidate.

Lambeth, No. 3 Ward.

Municipal Reform.		Progressive.	
Candidate.	Votes.	Candidate.	Votes.
Budge	1,496	Brittain	1,345
Arter	1,473	Chesworth	1,298
Clancy	1,465	Blyton	1,282
Brown	1,435	Clark	1,233
Capon	1,424	Johnson	1,204
M'Keith	1,388	Jewell	1,196
Day	1,383	Heath	1,175
Hawes	1,381	Crowe	1,164
Dowdall	1,372	Crane	1,152
Total Municipal Reform	12,817	Total Progressive	11,049

Result : Nine Municipal Reformers elected and no Progressives.

These figures are given not so much to show the injustice as between parties that is caused by our present system—striking though it be—as to suggest some more general reflections. What these figures mean is that no man, whatever his character or abilities and fitness for municipal work, is allowed a seat on a municipal body unless his political opinions happen to agree with those of the majority of his neighbours. And, as men cannot usually take part in any municipal life except that of their own locality, a man who is not sure of a local majority is excluded from municipal life altogether. It is not always remembered by those who call for social service that one of the most useful social services (and to an honest man one of the most thankless) is barred to all those who are not willing to sign a formula of allegiance to a political creed.¹

¹ This exclusion was felt to be so serious a defect in the constitution of our local government bodies that when they were entrusted by Mr Balfour under the Education Act of 1902 with the control of education they were compelled to work through statutory committees on which representatives were introduced from outside by a system of nomination. A truly representative body would need no such adventitious aid before it was fit for its work. The present Government (July 1918) have so far recognised this that in the Scottish Education Bill just introduced they provide for the election of Local Education Authorities (the *ad hoc* authority being retained in Scotland) by proportional representation with the single transferable vote.

In many districts of London, the local borough council is to the Progressives what the universities before the Test Acts were to the Nonconformist. In other districts the same thing is true, with a change in the name of the party excluded. No sane person could justify this exclusion.

Thus, municipal service (which in any case is not as attractive as parliamentary service to a man of talent and ambition) is a close preserve, when the political majority on the one side or other is stable. When it is not stable, the evil is of another kind: a premium is put on inexperience. Now, municipal work, even more than parliamentary work, is largely a matter of experience and knowledge of detail. A knowledge of principles, breadth of mind, eloquence and skill in debate, are of less value comparatively in municipal than in parliamentary work. A good municipal councillor must know his work and know it thoroughly. If he does not so know it, he is a mere cypher, helpless in the hands of the permanent officials. To know municipal work takes time. A batch of newly elected councillors are of very little use. But our present system in a district where the balance of parties is nearly even gives a councillor no security of tenure; the metropolitan plan of total replacement every third year is worse in this respect than the provincial plan of the election of one-third of the council every year, but both are bad. Now, security of tenure apart from the will of the electors is not to be sought for or expected. All that is asked from an electoral system—and all that is secured by a proportional system—is that if a councillor's quota of electors remain faithful, he is assured of his place. A change of view on the part of the balancing electors entitles those electors who change to dismiss their own representative; it does not entitle them to do what the present system allows—to dismiss the representative of other electors.

Under present conditions, when so large a part of municipal work is the conduct of undertakings which have to be managed with some continuity of direction, the need for keeping the *personnel* of our municipal councils as stable as the electorate—neither more nor less—is specially urgent.

Excess in one direction, followed by reaction in another, is fatal in business management.¹

¹ The urgent need for proportional representation in municipal matters is a point to which the Fabian Society which, in its youth, did so much effective work in the municipal field, might, if a non-member may venture on a suggestion, profitably devote attention.

OBJECTIONS

MEN of eminence have made objections to the application of proportional representation in any form to a legislative body. They tell us that proportional representation will give such small majorities that under it no government could live or could command the respect of foreign nations in its foreign policy. They say that proportional representation will destroy the party system and give us a system of groups, and that immoral bargains will be transferred from the constituencies to the House of Commons. Some think that proportional representation will increase the grip of party, and give more power to party managers. Others fear that proportional representation will weaken the personal and human tie between a member and his constituents, and that it will destroy the democratic control of Parliament; further—and these are, perhaps, the two criticisms which had most weight in the recent discussions in the House of Commons—it is objected that the cost of elections under proportional representation will be prohibitive, and that no satisfactory solution has been proposed for the problem of by-elections. It is time to consider these objections.

As to small majorities, it is no doubt true that we shall have smaller majorities than those to which we are accustomed on the present system. The following table shows the actual majorities obtained in all British general elections since 1886, compared with the majorities that would have resulted on a perfectly proportional¹ basis:—

¹ It must be remembered that these are the figures of the absolutely proportional results that would follow if the whole kingdom were one constituency. It is possible that on the division into constituencies proposed in Appendix I. rather larger majorities would result.

GENERAL ELECTIONS.—1885-1910.

Results under Single-Member Constituencies, and under Proportional Representation.

Year of Election.	Majority under	Great Britain.	Ireland.	United Kingdom.
1885*	Present System	Lib. 91	Lib. 67	Lib. 158
	Proportional Representation .	Lib. 41	Lib. 51	Lib. 92
1886	Present System	Con. 169	Lib. 65	Con. 104
	Proportional Representation .	Con. 27	Lib. 45	Lib. 18
1892	Present System	Con. 13	Lib. 57	Lib. 44
	Proportional Representation .	Lib. 1	Lib. 39	Lib. 40
1895	Present System	Con. 211	Lib. 61	Con. 150
	Proportional Representation .	Con. 37	Lib. 35	Con. 2
1900	Present System	Con. 195	Lib. 61	Con. 134
	Proportional Representation .	Con. 41	Lib. 39	Con. 2
1906	Present System	Lib. 289	Lib. 67	Lib. 356
	Proportional Representation .	Lib. 77	Lib. 37	Lib. 114
1910 Jan.	Present System	Lib. 63	Lib. 61	Lib. 124
	Proportional Representation .	Lib. 28	Lib. 26	Lib. 54
1910 Dec.	Present System	Lib. 61	Lib. 65	Lib. 126
	Proportional Representation .	Lib. 14	Lib. 24	Lib. 38

* The figures in this table for elections prior to January 1910 were accepted by the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems as "probably representing the truth as nearly as circumstances will permit." All the figures are the work of Mr J. Rooke Corbett, of the Manchester Statistical Society. The old names of "Liberal," as representing the party in power at the outbreak of the war and its allies, and "Conservative," as representing its opponents, have been preserved.

It will be seen that in the case of 1886 a minority of votes actually returned a majority of members; it is surely one of the ironies of history that if Mr Gladstone had in 1885 accepted a system of election to which he was opposed, he might in 1886 have carried the Home Rule Bill on which he staked his career. But this is by the way. No doubt, of late years the practice of the House of Commons has come to require a good "working" majority. But the present system does not secure it. In 1892 it gave a smaller majority than the proportional representation system would have given in 1906 or in January 1910,¹ when the Ministerial majorities

¹ It is never quite satisfactory to argue from the figures of the present system to the probable majorities under proportional representation. The new conditions might produce a rather greater freedom in the elector, so that if there were a general feeling in favour of a party, the transfer of votes might be greater than in present conditions.

would have been 114 and 54. In other countries majority systems have often produced an evenly balanced assembly, as, for example, at the Australian Federal Elections of May 1913 when the result was:—

	Votes.			Seats.		
	Total.	Ministerial.	Opposition.	Independent.	Ministerial.	Opposition.
Contested Seats	928,419	930,076	41,874	35	37	...
Uncontested Seats	2	1	...
Total Seats	37	38	...

In fact there is always an element of pure chance in the result of any single-member majority system, and the country has no security that majorities in the House of Commons will either correspond to or exaggerate the majorities in the electorate. If we rely on the present system for large working majorities, we lean on a broken reed.

But are large majorities a real necessity for the House of Commons? They were not always thought so. In the middle of the nineteenth century governments thought themselves very comfortable with majorities of 50 and less. Indeed, it is clear that the size of a majority is not *by itself* any added advantage; what a government wants on a division is to carry its proposals; it wants therefore a majority, not a majority of any special size (we are not now considering the case of a great drop in a government's normal majority on an important division—a drop which may indicate that the confidence of the House is being withdrawn—but only, as a matter of parliamentary mechanics, what it is that a government wants). True it is that it is a great advantage to have as it were a reserve of power for an emergency; but what is *necessary* is to have enough power to climb the obstacles that have to be overcome. And the real solution is to diminish the number of occasions on which these

necessary calls for power have to be made. In other words, do not let every division in the House of Commons be a potential crisis. Let it be understood that a government will not consider the question of resignation after a hostile vote on a minor occasion, if it can rely on rallying to its support a majority in the House that is approximately the number of its known supporters on all important occasions—second and third readings, hostile amendments to the address, budget resolutions, serious amendments in committee, and, most of all, formal votes of confidence. And let the House of Commons so reform its procedure that decisions of minor importance can be reversed easily, if necessary. With these not very revolutionary changes the imagined necessity for a continuous large majority fades away. If “snap divisions” neither turn out nor seriously embarrass a government, their attractions will disappear to the no small advantage of the dignity of the House of Commons. We must not assume that the present conditions of parliamentary business are eternal, any more than that they are the best possible, nor will an assembly elected on a proportional system deem itself bound by all the conventions of a different body. “I do not believe,” said Lord Lochee,¹ “that the cause of good government is bound up with the maintenance of a distorted representation, or that British statesmanship would be unable to cope with the problems which a better system might bring in its train.”

The diminished importance of the snap division would not be the only change which a system of smaller majorities

Increase of Parliamentary Freedom. would bring about. There would be other changes that can be forecast at least in outline.

Freedom. The Cabinet would be less autocratic. It would have to ride the House more lightly. It would lose something of its solidarity. It could not afford to stake its existence on the defence of a minister who had lost the confidence of the House. The House could withdraw a confidence that it no longer felt without thereby destroying a government. And the unofficial member of parliament

¹ In his note to the Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, 1910, Cd. 5163, p. 37. See above, p. 54, note.

would be less amenable to pressure from the Whips. The consequences of independence on his part would not be so dire. A general election would not have the same terrors. A member of parliament firmly seated in a large constituency, with a solid quota of reliable voters behind him, would be a different man and a better representative than a man sitting by the favour of a few balancing voters, or possibly, if the alternative vote or second ballot be introduced, by the favour of political opponents.

It may, indeed, be doubted whether, apart from the mechanical question of the management of the business of the House of Commons, a majority in members largely in excess of the real majority in votes is a source of strength to the government. It is apt to produce over-confidence in the Cabinet and slackness in the House of Commons. Governments are not, as a rule, anxious to hear speeches from their unofficial supporters. Hence a large majority means the muzzling of a larger portion of the House. A large majority has no greater power of overcoming obstruction than a small majority: it was the tiny minorities of the Irish Nationalists and the Fourth Party that reduced the Liberal government of 1880 to 1885, with its three-figure majority, very nearly to impotence. It does not need 250 or 300 members to take advantage of all the opportunities of parliamentary procedure; 25 or 30 men will do quite as well as and better than a large number. And an exaggerated majority, once the first flush of victory is over, is apt to suffer from a consciousness of its exaggeration. The size of the Liberal majority of 1906 to 1910 was no advantage to Liberal policy.

The view that a large majority is an advantage to a Foreign Minister in dealing with foreign powers is, in reality, only a particular application of the assumption that a large majority on a single-member system is more stable than a smaller majority on a proportional system. But for this general assumption there is no warrant. And foreign powers—even if we so despair of humanity as to think that the international future is to be as sombre as the international past—may be trusted to form their own opinions of the stability of a ministry by other methods than mere counting

heads. European diplomatists will remember the very long tenure of power by the Belgian Catholics under proportional representation with parliamentary majorities that, judged by the present English standard, were alarmingly small.

The effect of a reformed method of representation on the British party system is very difficult to foresee; experi-

Effect on Party System. ence alone can decide the question. There is, however, no point on which both the friends and enemies of reform speak with greater confidence. The discussion is not assisted by the uncertainty of the terms used: for instance, the existing system is often called the Two-party system. We need not quarrel with the phrase, but, obviously, if we have only two parties, the Irish Nationalists and the Labour party are only "groups," and our present system is partly a group system already. Again, how does a "party" differ from a "group"? Is it a mere question of size? A possible distinction would be that a party is a body of politicians capable of forming a government from its own ranks, while a group is a body that can only support or oppose, or possibly contribute to the formation of, a government. But this definition would hardly agree with common usage. A better solution is perhaps to give the name of party to those political bodies which have a distinct extra-parliamentary organisation, while keeping the word "group" for bodies which exist only within parliament itself.

Again, the discussion has been obscured by the literal translation of the political terms of a foreign language, especially French. French supporters of proportional representation ask for and expect from the reform an increase of the *esprit de parti*, and a development of party organisation; but in so doing they are not asking for, or expecting, an increase of the strength of the machinery of party as known in Great Britain and in the United States. They are seeking a simplification of politics and the substitution of a conflict of principles and ideas for a barren struggle of personalities. But some of their expressions, if translated incautiously and transferred from French to British conditions, may easily mislead an enquirer. It should never be forgotten that no one word in one language (with the

destroys case -
need fusion for present

exception of a few modern scientific terms) is an exact equivalent for one word in another.¹

Now it is plain that in all parliaments there will in modern conditions be both parties and groups. Men naturally associate and co-operate with those whose main aims are the same as their own, and they have specially intimate relations with those who agree with their views on some one subject of importance. This is true of all parliaments, however they may have been elected. At the present time, the British, French, Italian, and German parliaments are all elected on the majority system. But they differ widely in their organisation of parties. In France, Italy, and Germany there are more parties than with us—so many that we are accustomed to consider that the French, Italian, and German Chambers are constituted rather on a system of groups than on parties as we understand them. But this is not the result of proportional representation.

It might be tempting to spin a theory that a two-party system, or something very near it, is the natural form of a parliament that has not only to legislate but also to supervise administration. It might be thought that the necessity for ensuring that "the King's Government be carried on" would be a reason why the parliamentary assembly should be divided into two divisions only, from either of which an administration could be formed at need with either the certainty or the hope of obtaining a majority in the assembly. On the other hand, in a body such as the Reichstag, whose control over the administration is not yet developed, the necessity for two parties might not be imperative. And if we look at Germany and England alone this difference of the function of the parliament seems an adequate explanation of the difference of organisation. Unluckily for the theory, we have in France a parliamentary assembly which controls administration as well as legislation, but yet is divided into groups. The suggestion has been made that the second ballot is not unconnected with the group system. It is certainly worth observing that in Germany the Liberal

¹ "The same things uttered in Hebrew and translated into another tongue have not the same force in them."

and Radical parties are almost entirely returned at the second ballot (of 90 Liberal and Radical members of the Reichstag, only 4 were elected at the first ballot in 1912), and owe their seats in some cases to Conservative, in some cases to "Centre," and in others to Socialist support. It is hard to see how a party can be homogeneous in such conditions, and the German Liberals and Radicals are in fact hopelessly disunited and therefore ineffective. A similar fate may await the British Liberal and Radical party if it succeeds in its demand for similar conditions of election.

But indeed it is plain that there is no one single cause for the difference between a two-party parliament and a group parliament. Differences of history and of national character have to be taken into account. The fact that in France until recently a large portion of the Chamber was formally to be reckoned as hostile to the existing form of government may have been not without importance. For the result was that one "party" alone—the Republican party—could furnish alternative ministries, and so the competition for office was rather within that "party" than between that "party" and rival parties, and the "party" split into groups.

It has been thought that the introduction of proportional representation will destroy parties because "a Prohibitionist candidate might well be elected on the Prohibitionist platform alone,"¹ and thus we should have "detached groups which have no mandate and which appeal to the country as though they were to be absolutely separate in their parliamentary action." This theory is based on the political Calvinism of the professional organiser who believes the nature of the elector to be corrupt, and assumes that, if once he is given a free choice of candidates, he will go wrong. A sufficient answer to such a theory is that in existing conditions it would be impossible for a candidate to appeal to an electorate at a general election without declaring his views on the main questions of the day. He might attach special importance to some special question, but he could not avoid questions of pressing political interest. It is

¹ J. Ramsay MacDonald, M.P., *The Labour Party and Electoral Reform*, Labour Party Office, 28 Victoria Street, London, W. S.

unthinkable that a temperance candidate could have stood in 1910 and not told his electors on which side he meant to vote in a division on the Parliament Bill.

Belgian experience is against the theory and, indeed, points rather to a consolidation of groups into parties under Belgian and proportional representation. The three great Tasmanian Belgian parties—Catholic, Liberal, and Socialist Experience. —seem to have strengthened themselves under proportional representation rather than disintegrated. And though it must be remembered that the Belgian system of proportional representation is a list system, still Tasmanian experience with the single transferable vote equally does not support the group theory. In Tasmania, as elsewhere in Australasia, a politician is either Labour or anti-Labour, and these capital divisions survive whatever the system of representation. But it may be admitted frankly that the Tasmanian House of Assembly is so small (30 members only) that too much stress must not be laid on inferences from Tasmania to Great Britain. From Sweden, Finland, and the Swiss proportionalist cantons we have no evidence that the party system as in force at the introduction of proportional representation has been destroyed by it.

It must, however, be said that sometimes advocates of proportional representation, who are also inclined to attribute Men of existing evils to the party system, have made National claims for proportional representation which Importance. have been almost revolutionary. The power which a constituency will have with the single transferable vote of electing men of national importance whose allegiance to any of the great parties may be comparatively loose, is an essential advantage of the system. We may hope that it will be exercised not too sparingly and that it will greatly strengthen the House of Commons and enhance its reputation. But the idea that we shall substitute for our present members of parliament—who, whatever their defects, or perhaps because of their defects, are strikingly like the rest of us—670 sublimely efficient supermen, is wholly illusory. The British party system is a natural (if that much-abused word may be permitted) growth of parliament in the sense that it was never imposed by any force external to parliament; it

is subject to the changes and development of a natural growth. Of late years party discipline has grown more rigid: an independent body like the Peelites¹ is an impossibility in present conditions; but, on the other hand, the arrival of a third party has at least offered a choice of three instead of two creeds.

The most striking defects of the existing party system as it functions in peace time are: (1) that, on any subject of importance, legislation is impossible which is not supported by one or other of the two great parties; and (2) that the wire-pullers of a party exact a strict conformity to every article of the creed of the party for the time being. On both these points proportional representation would tend to improve existing conditions. It would give voters the choice between candidates of their own party with different tendencies, *e.g.*, Unionist supporters of the State purchase of the drink trade and Unionists who are opposed to State purchase, and so in effect would at once produce a parliament which accurately represented public opinion on a subject of importance on which the great parties do not formally² adopt a policy and thus allow the electorate and not the wire-pullers to settle the party creed. Members of parliament being elected by quotas instead of uncertain majorities, would be better able to defy an attack on their seats by a member of their own party. The "split vote" would lose its terrors. They could thus more freely combine for special purposes outside party ties. Further, at election times the party organisers would be anxious to attract as much support as possible and would not ostracise the more independent-minded candidates. It would be better for two wings of a party to co-operate, and they would have every temptation to do so. A party would not have to struggle for a single seat in each constituency under the standard of a single man.

¹ Those who are inclined too readily to denounce "groups" should not forget the striking national services rendered by this the most talented group of parliamentarians of the nineteenth century.

² Possibly by the time these words are read parties will have taken sides on this particular question. But the statement in the text is true of many questions, *e.g.*, Free Trade from 1900 to 1905 and Women's Suffrage down to 1918.

If the general frame of the party system thus remains, the danger of "immoral bargains" between groups in the House of Commons need not detain us. Indeed, the prophecy of this evil result is founded on the fallacy that groups of faddists will be returned without a mandate on general questions of importance. If and when this happens, if and when the British people at a general election are so weak that they do not insist on knowing what line a candidate will take on a vital matter, we may safely say that the British people is unfit not merely for proportional representation, but for self-government in any form. At bottom, this distrust of the results of proportional representation as producing an incompetent House of Commons is a distrust of democracy. If democracy faithfully mirrored cannot produce a satisfactory representative assembly, we had better seek some other form of government.

The question of the referendum naturally occurs to the mind at this point, though it cannot be debated here. It may be enough to say that there is nothing incompatible between the referendum and proportional representation; in fact, both are often advocated together. The one is a method of checking the representative assembly, the other a method of reforming it. It is probable that with proportional representation the need of a referendum would be less felt; but the existence of proportional representation would be no obstacle to its application. But the referendum would certainly involve a violent, and even a revolutionary, change from our existing parliamentary practice—a far greater change than proportional representation; a House of Commons which had passed a bill subsequently defeated on referendum would have lost its claim to be representative of the people, and could hardly escape a dissolution.

The statement that proportional representation would strengthen the hands of the party managers is made as a rule by two classes of critics—first, those who are unwilling to take the pains to examine the details of the system, and have a general idea that advocates of proportional representation are amiable amateurs, whereas the "party

manager" is an expert; and, second, those who consider that the larger lists of candidates' names which must appear

**The Caucus
and
Proportional
Representation.**

on the ballot paper will give an advantage to the "yellow dog" or undesirable unknown candidate put forward by the party "machine." To the first class of critics it is perhaps enough to say—"come and see"; any serious study of the system of the single transferable vote must convince an enquirer that the position of the candidate who has a quota of voters behind him is absolutely secure from any manœuvre, short of "stuffing" the ballot boxes, that the most astute party manager could contrive. The second class of critics may be reminded that under proportional representation it will be the reverse of an advantage for party managers to run as candidates men with little or no talent or reputation; such men will be a mere tax on the voting strength of the party; passengers in the boat, they will not aid her speed. And, whereas under the single-member system, at the present time, the party manager can say, "vote for my yellow dog, or for the other side," under proportional representation the voter can always omit the yellow dog from the list of preferences that he makes. But perhaps a more convincing argument against the view that proportional representation will help the party manager is that the opinion of the "machine man" has always and everywhere been unfavourable to the reform.¹ We need not suppose that the instinctive liking for what promotes life and dislike for what injures it, which has aided the evolution of all forms of living organisms high and low, has no operation in the case of party managers. But perhaps we need not seek so deep for a cause of the ordinary antagonism of the

¹ This was made clear during the recent (1918) discussions in the House of Commons. The party machines worked hard—and for the moment successfully—to destroy the chance of independence of mind within a party. One of the chief Unionist organisers issued a three-line Whip against proportional representation, and was duly supported by the more docile of his rank and file. Mr Austen Chamberlain became, for a moment, a reincarnation of his father—the pre-1886 Joseph Chamberlain of the caucus; and the London Liberal Federation supplied a conclusive explanation of the little hold which Liberalism possesses on more thoughtful minds in the Metropolis.

“machine.” The trouble of having to learn new methods of business is always a cause of professional opposition to reform. If a man has learnt one system thoroughly, and makes his living by it, it is only human to resent having to master another. An observer of the learned professions can easily illustrate this truth from his own experience.

Another objection is that proportional representation, by creating large constituencies,¹ will destroy the human interest in politics, overwork the member, and weaken the personal touch between him and his constituents.

The Personal Tie.

The reverse is surely the truth. At present a member of parliament who seriously tries to carry into effect the principles he was elected to support, must be in a relation of political hostility to his opponents in his constituency. There can be no real personal touch between them. And all the time he has been working to conciliate the uncertain voter. On the other hand, on a proportional system a man represents those who elect him, and may be expected to be in far closer personal touch with those with whom he is in sympathy. The size of the constituency in this connection is of small importance; each member will have a very fair knowledge who his supporters are, and he will not be expected to exchange unmeaning civilities with opponents. And, at the same time, he will be more

Democratic Control.

truly under democratic control, for he will be liable to dismissal by his own electors, and not, as now, by a small percentage of those who voted for him and now transfer their support to an opponent. The system of the second ballot or the alternative vote, on the other hand, is really the negation of democratic control. For it involves the election of the representative by the support of those with whom his true relation is one of difference, if not of hostility, and who by withdrawing their support deprive another section of the democracy of representation, without, however, gaining for themselves a true representative in exchange.

The question of expense has exercised considerable influence in recent parliamentary and public discussions. Here again, critics of the proportional system fail to realise

¹ See the scheme of redistribution on p. 91.

the new conditions. No doubt it is true that on the British method of calculating election expenses, according to which a candidate is allowed to spend a certain sum per head of the electorate (fivepence in town and sevenpence in country constituencies), the larger the constituency the larger is the limit of the candidate's expenditure. And, no doubt, in the single-member constituency, the tendency is strong to spend up to the limit allowed: the election agent, naturally, spends as much as he can, and, as what is wanted is to catch the vote of the more or less indifferent and balancing elector, a large expenditure tends to be thought essential to success. But it is a fallacy to assume that these conditions will persist under proportional representation. On the reformed system, by which a candidate will require for success a quota of votes and not a majority, many candidates, and specially those whose party is well organised, will not need to cover the constituency with placards. The stalwarts of a party cost nothing to poll; the less valuable intellectually and morally is a vote, the more expensive it is to a candidate. In many constituencies a party or a candidate that is not rich but that can rely on polling one or two quotas of convinced supporters, will find that, under the new conditions, an election is sensibly cheaper than now. And it must not be forgotten that, under proportional representation, the number of joint candidatures will be largely increased, and that, on a joint candidature, the limit of expense for two candidates is not twice the limit for a single candidate, but only half as much again. But, while these considerations go to show that the cry of alarm at increased expenditure is based, to some extent, on misapprehensions, we may agree that, when proportional representation is introduced, our legislation as to election expenses will need remodelling, and the present limits might well be drastically reduced—a limit of twopence per elector with the concession of two free postages would not be unreasonable. The legitimate expenses of a candidate do not vary directly with the size of the electorate. It may be added that no evidence has been produced from any country that has adopted proportional representation to show that election expenses have

been increased by its introduction. If it were the fact that proportional representation strengthens the power of the rich parties, it would be strange that on the continent of Europe there is no Socialist party that does not support proportional representation.

Another objection—hardly of capital importance—on which the opponents of proportional representation recently laid great stress, is the difficulty as to by-elections. It seems to be generally agreed that by-elections form so vital a part of our political machinery that they must be maintained at any cost, and it may be at once admitted that a method of election which requires several vacancies before it can work satisfactorily is ill-adapted to a single vacancy.

Now by-elections serve two main purposes: they show the drift of public feeling—though the critics usually differ as to the interpretation to be put on any particular result—and they restore to an electorate the representation which it has lost. It is easy, with a proportional system, to accomplish one of these objects: the difficulty is to combine them.

Thus, to take first the second object—the restoration of the lost representation—the ballot papers on which the vacating member was elected could be re-examined, and the unelected candidate who appears as the next choice of the electors whose votes went to the vacating member could be declared elected.¹ This—the method now being adopted in Tasmania—is to restore their representation to the electors who have lost it, but is, of course, not a consultation of the constituency as it exists at the moment, and is no guide to the drift of political feeling.

If, on the other hand, the object is to ascertain how the electorate is moving, the most obvious method is to poll the whole constituency, using the single transferable vote, for the election of a single member, when a comparison of the result

¹ Most "list" systems solve the problem in what is in effect a similar way. Each party adds to its list of candidates proper a supplementary list of *suppléants*, men, that is, who are the party "reserves" and ready to fill a vacancy in the team of elected candidates.

with the result at the general election will show, on a large scale and in dramatic fashion, whether a government is losing popularity. This is the method formerly adopted in Tasmania, and also the method which, in default of any express legal provision as to by-elections, would necessarily be used. The method is, however, expensive, and also involves the certainty that when the vacating member represents the local minority that minority will, if the seat is fought, lose the seat, even though on proportional principles it is still entitled to it and may even be stronger than at the preceding general election.

A better solution is to provide that the constituencies are to be subdivided into wards, and that within some fixed time (say a week) after the result of the general election, the elected members are to be allowed to choose by agreement between themselves which ward each of them will choose for himself, with a provision that in default of agreement the wards are to be allotted by the returning officer in such a manner that, as nearly as may be, each member receives the ward in which he (or some candidate in alliance with whom he has stood) has received more support than in any other ward. The effect of this will be that members will ordinarily agree to take the wards to which, if they do not agree, they will be assigned by the returning officer, and which, therefore, contain a strong body of their supporters. If, owing to the death or retirement of a member, a by-election is necessary, it will be held in and for his ward alone. The value of the by-election as a measure of the drift of popular feeling can be retained by making it necessary for the returning officer to count separately at the general election the votes recorded in each ward and publish the figures. This would show what was the party strength at the general election in the ward. In the event of a by-election, the drift of public feeling could then be gauged by comparing the figures at that election with those of the general election. As the number of members in the House of Commons would remain the same as at present, a ward would be about the size of one of the constituencies fixed by the Reform Act of 1918.

It is true that, even on this system, it would occasionally

happen that a member would be sitting for a ward where his own supporters were not in a majority, and that, therefore, a by-election might—even in defiance of the trend of popular feeling—result in the loss of a seat which would be regained on a general election, and which ought, on proportional principles, to remain with the party, but such cases would be rare, and the political significance of the by-election would remain whatever the temporary result as to the seat.¹ It may be added that the abolition—long overdue—of the legal necessity for seeking re-election on taking office under the Crown should accompany the introduction of a proportional system, and make the occasions for by-elections rarer than at present.

Such are the objections commonly urged; some are largely conjectural, and must be answered to some extent from conjecture. Others, such as the allegation that a proportional system will increase the power of the “machine,” are demonstrably untrue. The objection of expense (based in part on a failure to grasp the new conditions) is easily removable by legislation, and the objection as to by-elections can be reduced to insignificance by a very simple piece of machinery. To some cautious minds, no doubt, the risk may appear too great; to them any change is worse than the evils that they know. To some fierce spirits, who profit by the actual system to impose their yokes on their followers, the prospect of changed conditions means nothing but a loss of power. To others, again, whose better hope is inspired by faith in the growing competence of a more political electorate, the danger seems trivial and the hesitation cowardly, before the promise of a parliament with which the people of this country will be in vital connection and which will recognise and express at once the will of the majority and the light and vigour of the few.

¹ It is not worth while discussing here the ingenious suggestion of polling the whole constituency, subtracting from the party totals as many quotas as each party already holds seats in the constituency, and deciding the election by the residue of the votes. The suggestion overlooks an opportunity for an ingenious counter-device of a party manager which I will leave it to the industrious reader to work out for himself.

THE MOVEMENT OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM

"FIRE," said a philosopher, "burns also among the Persians"; if it did not, we may add, it would not be fire. The reality of representation is not called for in this country only; if it were, we might conjecture that there was something artificial in the call.

The best answer to those who consciously or unconsciously affirm that the demand for a better system of representation, a more thorough co-operation of the nation in politics, is a mere whim of discontented "intellectuals," is the fact that in all countries with experience of parliamentary government the dissatisfaction with the majority system of election is growing, and the proportional system is steadily making way. To examine the different systems of proportional election adopted or proposed for adoption, whether in Europe or elsewhere, is no part of the scheme of this pamphlet, nor would it be useful to attempt to give a history of the growth and success of the foreign movements,¹ some of which (reported very scantily, if at all, in our British newspapers) are developing and changing every day. But, in order that readers may have no doubt that they are in the presence of a world-wide movement, it will be of interest to record in outline the not inconsiderable progress already made.

¹ Enquirers may be referred for the Belgian movement to Count Goblet d'Alviella's *la Représentation Proportionnelle en Belgique*, Brussels, Weissenbruch, 1900; *La Représentation Proportionnelle en Belgique*, by Paul Cameau, Paris, Rousseau, 1901; and *La Représentation Proportionnelle en France et en Belgique*, by Georges La Chapelle (Preface de H. Poincaré), Paris, Alcan, 1911; and for the Swiss movement to *Die Proportionalwahl in der Schweiz*, by Dr Emil Kloti, 1901.

On the continent of Europe a proportional system was in use as early as 1855 in Denmark in the election of the Upper House; but the cradle of the modern Switzerland. proportionalist movement was in Switzerland, in the canton of Ticino. It was there introduced in 1891 on the suggestion of the federal government in order to appease a situation in which acute electoral injustice had brought an intensely political and vivacious community over the brink of civil war. In the democratic air of self-governing Switzerland the plant thrived and grew. Its progress may be described in the words used by Dr Horace Micheli, of the *Journal de Genève*, at the International Dinner of Proportionalists held in London on 3rd December 1913:—

“Nine of our twenty-two cantons to-day employ proportional representation for the election of their cantonal councils. It is about to be introduced, or is, at least, under discussion in three others, including Zurich.¹ Further, it is applied by several towns at their municipal elections. The most important towns in Switzerland, Zurich, Bale, Geneva, Berne, Neuchâtel, and Fribourg, and many others of less importance, employ it in the election of their town councils. Everywhere, I can affirm, it has given entirely satisfactory results, and the number of persons who vote has been greatly increased. We have always found that proportional representation increases the percentage of electors who take part in an election.

“It was only to be expected that the Swiss proportionalists would try to extend their principles to the Confederation, and apply it to the election of the National Council. The Swiss constitution gives to 50,000 citizens the right—called the right of Initiative—to propose directly to the people any constitutional amendment to which parliament refuses to agree, as it has refused proportional representation. If this amendment is accepted by the majority of electors and cantons, it becomes a part—having the same standing as the other articles—of our constitution, and our government must submit to it. The Swiss proportionalists have made use of this right. Twice already they have put this idea

¹ The very important canton of Zurich has since (1916) adopted proportional representation.

directly before the people, and it will shortly be submitted to them again. In 1900 it was rejected by a majority of 75,000. In 1910 it was rejected again, but with a majority of 25,000 only out of 500,000 votes. Twelve cantons accepted it against ten only who refused it. All the cantons who possess proportional representation for their cantonal elections, all the towns who practise it for their municipal elections, showed a large popular majority in favour of its extension to federal elections. This proves that those who practise electoral justice are completely satisfied with it, and those who are still against it are those who do not or will not know it. For this reason we did not let ourselves be discouraged by the vote of 1910. After three years' interval we have this year (1913) issued a new initiative petition, which in a few weeks gained 122,000 signatures. We have a sure hope that we shall succeed this time."¹

From Switzerland proportional representation passed in 1900 to Belgium, a country where perhaps political feeling runs

Belgium. as deep and as swift as in any country in the world. The Belgians devised their own system—called the d'Hondt system after the distinguished professor of Ghent who invented it—and, in the words used at the same international gathering, shortly before Belgium's martyrdom, by M. Georges Lorand, the Radical leader:—

"We have used it for thirteen years, and we have had six general elections with the new system, and the result is that not a single party nor a fraction of a party is opposed to the reform; its extension is inscribed in the programme of all parties. The opposition parties, Liberal and Socialist, demand that it should be extended to the county councils, and should be applied completely to municipal elections. It is certain that the system of proportional representation in Belgium will never be changed, save for the purpose of rendering it more complete, more just, and more proportional."

We hear sometimes of the rivalry of the ports of Antwerp, Liverpool, London, and Hamburg. Let us turn our eyes for a moment away from statistics of their tonnage, and look

¹ When these words were used another referendum on proportional representation was expected. But the war caused the proposal to be temporarily laid aside.

at their civic and political life. How are these great ports represented in their national assemblies? Hamburg, the Hansa town, the typical city of the German middle-class merchant and trader, sends to the Reichstag only Social Democrats. In London a majority of those who voted at the last election favoured one party, and a majority of representatives was returned by the other.¹ In Liverpool not a single Liberal is returned; though there is a strong Liberal minority with a fine tradition of social service in the city, eight Unionists and one Irishman are sent by Liverpool to the House of Commons. Antwerp alone, before it passed into the hands of the Germans, with her varied representation of eight Catholics, five Liberals, and two Socialists, sent the strongest of her citizens of each political belief in their fair proportions to the national parliament, and taught her rivals the lesson of a justly organised democracy.

In Sweden proportional representation was introduced in 1909 with a system of considerable originality, which has worked with ease and success. The deputy speaker of the Lower Chamber of the Riksdag, Daniel Persson I. Tallberg, tells us:²—

“In all essentials the expectations entertained respecting proportional representation by its advocates have been fulfilled, while the apprehensions of its opponents have not been confirmed. The new mode of procedure to be followed when registering their votes has *not* proved to be beyond the comprehensions of the voters, nor has it aroused suspicion in their minds; on the contrary, the voters have learnt how to fall in with the new regulations with surprising ease and facility; it has *not* put a premium on men of only average intelligence and ability, but has distinctly raised the intellectual level of the representatives returned. . . . The change from representation by majority vote to proportional representation marks, in my judgment, a great step forward in Swedish political life.” And equally emphatic testimony was given by other distinguished Swedish statesmen, particularly interesting perhaps being the remarks of the Social

¹ See figures on page 19.

² In a message read at the International Proportional Representation Dinner, December 1913.

Democratic leader, Hjalmar Branting, that, "whenever a party has to fight its way to the front among others of older standing that are powerful and well organised, it can only come by its due by the aid of the proportional method of voting."

The introduction of proportional representation to Sweden was the result of a movement dating back as far as 1867; this movement had influence in Finland, where **Finland and Russia.** a highly elaborate system was established in 1906 shortly after the partial restoration of Finnish freedom. The system has worked without hitch on a basis of universal suffrage for men and women, and it was possibly the Finnish experience which induced the Russian Revolutionists to adopt proportional representation as the method for the election of their Constituent Assembly. The destruction of that assembly by external violence deprived the world of an example of proportional representation on the largest scale on which it has hitherto been attempted.

Denmark has had some experience of proportional representation for more than half a century, the Upper **Denmark.** House having been chosen on a transferable vote system by a college of electors. The recent revision of the constitution provides for the choice of the college of electors itself by a list system of proportional representation and for the actual election of the members of the "Landsting," or Upper House, by a method named after the Danish professor Andræ, which, as a result of recent modifications, is said to be practically identical with that of the single transferable vote. The principle of proportional representation is also introduced into the elections for the Lower House, but in a form which has been specially devised to meet the national political conditions. Copenhagen elects 24 members, apparently on a list system; the rest of the country is divided into 93 single-member constituencies; and, when the elections in these are complete, 23 further seats are allotted to parties who have obtained less than their proportional value of representation, so as, to a certain extent, to redress the balance against them.¹

¹ See a memorandum on the Danish Elections by the British Legation at Copenhagen (1918, Cd. 9104).

Similarly, Holland has, during the war, adopted a system of proportional representation based on the Belgian system and embodying the idea of a "national quota" for the election of the House of Representatives; it has made provision for proportional representation for provincial and municipal councils, and contemplates its extension to the Upper Chamber.

Within the British Empire we have several examples of a proportional system already at work: in Tasmania, in the Union of South Africa, in New Zealand, and in Canada. In Tasmania the system of the single transferable vote was introduced in 1896 for two urban districts, Hobart and Launceston, only; this partial application was found to be unfair, and in 1901 the old system was restored. But in 1907 the proportional system was reintroduced and applied this time to the whole country, which was divided into five constituencies returning each six members. Four general elections have now been held and the system has recently been confirmed after a thorough investigation by a parliamentary committee. The example of Tasmania is not without effect in the other Australian Colonies,¹ and there is a strong Australian movement for proportional representation, specially vigorous in New South Wales.

In South Africa proportional representation is established by the South Africa Act, 1909, for the election both of the Senate of the Union and of the Executive Committees of the Provincial Councils. The first draft of the scheme of Union, indeed, provided for the universal application of proportional representation to all parliamentary elections, and it was a bad day for South Africa when proportional representation was cut down to the Senate and to the Provincial Councils' Executive Committees. At the present time, the followers of General Hertzog fill every parliamentary seat (except one at Bloemfontein) in the Orange Free State, and the followers of General Botha—though they and their allies number

¹ This movement should gather strength from the actual position in the Commonwealth. The situation in the Australian Senate, where official Labour men, elected on a Block Vote in the several States practically monopolise representation, calls urgently for a remedy.

one-third of the electorate—do not hold, and seemingly have no prospect of holding, a single rural seat in the State! Surely a dangerous state of things, and not without parallel in Quebec, and provocative of the question whether the Mother Country is wise in not setting a better electoral example to her children.

But, as things are, the South African senatorial elections are interesting as illustrations of the employment of the system of the single transferable vote in a case where the number of electors is very much smaller in proportion to the number of persons to be elected than is the case in a parliamentary election. In the election of the first Senate of the Union the electors were the members of both Houses of Parliament, electing eight senators in each of the four colonies; in the case of the Transvaal there were 84 voters; in the case of the Cape 134 voters; in the case of the Orange River Colony 49 voters; and in the case of Natal 56 voters. In subsequent elections eight senators for each province will be elected by the members of the Provincial Council of such province, together with the members of the Union House of Assembly representing the province. The system of the single transferable vote is readily adaptable to these conditions, though certain technical modifications are necessary, the value of one vote being raised to 100 for purposes of counting.¹ Proportional representation in South Africa was also applied in 1909 to the municipal elections of Pretoria and Johannesburg; two elections were held, in 1909 and 1911, both with complete success. When in 1912 the Transvaal Provincial Council revised its municipal legislation, it made no provision for keeping alive the proportional system in Johannesburg and Pretoria; but, before this unfortunate omission took effect at any municipal election, the balance of parties in the Provincial Council itself was changed at a General Election and Labour obtained a majority. The first work of the new majority was to pass a new Municipal Ordinance applying proportional representation not merely to Pretoria and Johannesburg but to all municipalities throughout the Transvaal.

¹ The Senatorial Elections are likely in future to be direct popular elections on a proportional basis. See p. 53, note 2.

In New Zealand, under the adoptive legislation already noticed, proportional representation applies to the municipal elections of Christchurch¹ and Woolston, both New Zealand. of which towns successfully held their first election in April 1917,² and is to apply to the election of the Legislative Council.³

And now in Canada, where the influence of Earl Grey powerfully promoted the reform, the Legislature of British Columbia has passed (1917) an Act allowing Canada. municipalities the option of using the single transferable vote; four municipal bodies (including the cities of Nelson and New Westminster) had by January 1918 availed themselves of the option.⁴

In the United States a promising movement has now been started, and has worked in connection with the demand United States. for the reform of municipal government and of city charters. In this movement Ashtabula (Ohio) had the honour of being the pioneer. The second proportional representation municipal election was held there in November 1917, and the results have given general satisfaction. Ashtabula was followed, in December 1917, by the cities of Kalamazoo (Michigan)—with a population of 50,000—and of Boulder (Colorado), which, it is interesting to hear, carried through its first proportional representation election on the system of the single transferable vote without a hitch and without the assistance of any expert in proportional representation, simply with the aid of the printed rules of

¹ See p. 39.

² See Official Report Christchurch Municipal Election, New Zealand 1917, H 41.

³ See p. 53.

⁴ India would appear to an outsider to be in special need of some system of proportional representation, as all authorities agree that it is vital to the success of the political reforms now (1918) being introduced to prevent the less numerous religious or racial communities from being swamped by the employment of a crude scheme of majority representation (see a letter to *The Times* of 10th August 1918, by Sir Theodore Morison, advocating the use of the single transferable vote). A memorandum powerfully advocating proportional representation was submitted by the Hon. R. P. Paranjpye, Principal of Fergusson College, Poonah, to Lord Chelmsford and Mr Montagu in December 1917, and a proportional representation movement is on foot in Bombay.

the American Proportional Representation League. This incident furnishes a complete answer to the oft-repeated assertion that proportional representation rules are so complex that they can only be worked by a person of special skill, or understood by a person of extraordinary intelligence. Lastly, as a fourth example, the Chamber of Commerce of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania (of Steel Corporation fame), is now elected by proportional representation.

It has been objected that most of these examples are taken from small countries or small cities. But why refuse to follow the teaching of experience merely because the trial has been made in a small community? When a universal constitutional history is written it may well be found that communities have contributed to political science as to political martyrology almost in inverse proportion to their size. The example and experience of other countries is, however, not quoted here as having a direct and immediate validity for British conditions; caution must be exercised in arguing from the institutions of one country to those of another, though perhaps the least important element in forming a conclusion is the question of the relative size of the countries compared. But the cumulative effect of repeated successes is great, and the fact that not a single community that has adopted proportional representation has of its own will permanently gone back to a majority system, is evidence which can hardly be disregarded. It does not lie in the mouth of Englishmen whose legitimate pride it is that their parliamentary institutions have been copied, with more or less modification, throughout the civilised world, to argue that no inference can be drawn from the actual behaviour of men under a given form of political arrangement in one country to their probable behaviour under the same or a similar form in another. The small countries in modern Europe are more full of instruction for the student of politics, national and international, than the Great Powers, one reason being that in a small country the influence of a small group of men is proportionately larger. A small minority of advocates of real representation can do more in a population of three, four, or even seven millions than in a large and unified political mass of forty or fifty million minds.

But neither France nor Germany was unmoved by the example of their smaller neighbours. In France the government bill embodying the proportional principle was carried shortly before the war by crushing majorities in the Chamber, but like some other reforms it had not succeeded in passing the Senate. Its warmest supporters were to be found among the Socialists on the one hand, and on the Left Centre and Right on the other, but it also had a considerable body of support among the Radicals and Radical Socialists, of whom the "Bloc" that so long governed France was mainly composed. The French intellect has realised that to introduce a proportional system means in France to put politics on a higher plane; to direct political discussion more to matters of principle and less to conflicts of personalities; to enable parties to get representation in districts where they are in a minority is to make all parties national, and with a wider geographical range the tendency is for a party to rely more upon principles and less upon purely local appeals. Jaurès put the proportional case into eloquent language: "Celui-ci tuera celui-là. Voilà la formule du scrutin d'arrondissement. Ceux-ci tueront ceux-là. Voilà la formule du scrutin de liste sans la représentation proportionnelle. Ceux-ci et ceux-là auront leur juste part. Voilà la formule du scrutin de liste avec la représentation proportionnelle."

It is not for an Englishman to attempt to give an account of the French political situation, but he may perhaps be allowed two remarks.

First, the whole question of systems of representation has, both since the foundation of the Third Republic and earlier, been discussed far more thoroughly in France than with us; Frenchmen still have in their ears Mirabeau's phrase—"les États sont pour la nation ce qu'est une carte réduite pour son étendue physique; soit en partie, soit en grand, la copie doit toujours avoir les mêmes proportions que l'original"; and Gambetta's policy of the *scrutin de liste* has left behind it memories. The Boulanger elections for Paris and other departments showed to Frenchmen how important electoral machinery may be; what had been intended as a defence of democracy became the weapon of a Pretender.

In France the idea that electoral justice can be attained by a method of equally divided single-member constituencies would be met with a smile.

Second, the main cause why resistance was offered in France before the war was that politicians of the old Radical school, such as M. Clemenceau, were convinced that to allow the fair representation of parties other than their own was to introduce the enemy within the gates. Reactionary parties in their view were still at war with the Republic, and their spokesmen were to be repressed as far as possible. The prevalence of this view gave an intelligible reason for a resistance to a policy which assumes the loyalty of electors and elected to the parliamentary institutions of which they form part.

In Germany the prospect of the introduction of a proportional system for the Reichstag or the Prussian parliament was before the war far less promising, though Germany. the need for a better system was felt keenly enough, and the last (1912) elections for the Reichstag gave results that are indefensible.

Parties.	Votes	Seats obtained.	Seats in Proportion to Votes.
Social Democrats	4,250,329	110	138
Centre Party	2,035,290	93	66
National Liberals	1,701,767	45	56
Conservatives	1,855,946	72	61
Radical Parties	1,606,549	45	52
Nationalist Parties and Independents	747,072	32	24
Total	12,196,953	397	397

In April 1913, a resolution asking for the introduction of a Proportional Representation Bill was introduced into the Reichstag by the Social Democrats, and only defeated by a single vote (140 to 139). But Germany, as Europe knows to its cost, has not a parliamentary government; the Prussian electoral arrangements are the keystone of the present system, and it remains to be seen whether Germany will become democratic. If she does so, she must reform her electoral system. Proportional representation is well

known in Germany; it is in force in the elections to the parliaments of the Free City of Hamburg and of the Kingdom of Wurtemberg; its extension for parliamentary purposes to the Grand-Duchy of Baden seemed before the war almost certain; it was very largely employed in municipal areas in South Germany and in Oldenburg, and was well known in the election of insurance committees and in certain workmen's organisations.¹

It is worth while to notice that in all the European countries that have been mentioned, and especially in Germany and France, the Socialists have been among the supporters of the reform; in Italy the only party which has hitherto declared in its favour as a party is the Socialist party; the same thing is true of the United States, where the Socialists (who polled nearly 1,000,000 votes at the Federal Elections of 1913) have made the reform a plank in their platform, and support has been found mainly in the younger communities of the West. It would be short-sighted to dismiss this support as the merely adolescent enthusiasm of a party on whom existing conditions press hard. A wise man will welcome the desire of the enemies of the existing economic order to introduce into it a more just representation for all men, and will see in this attitude the promise that society may after all develop by orderly evolution and not by a series of revolutionary catastrophes. But if such an orderly evolution is to be possible, society on its political side—in other words, our representative assemblies both parliamentary and municipal—must embrace all citizens. We must have parliaments based on the models rather of those historic gatherings which founded the governments of the United States and of the larger units of the British Imperial Dominions, than of the Rumps and Conventions which have purchased the temporary triumphs of a parliamentary party at the price of the reintroduction of autocratic rule.

¹ The news arrives, as these pages go to press (Sept. 1918), that a new German Electoral Law has passed the Reichstag, introducing P.R. into large towns. This looks like a plan to give the Conservative elements a footing in the large towns without disturbing their hold on the country districts. But the recognition of P.R. is of importance.

APPENDIX I

A SCHEME OF REDISTRIBUTION FOR GREAT BRITAIN

THE following is the Redistribution Scheme for Great Britain adopted by the House of Lords in the discussions in January 1918, on the Reform Bill, and rejected by the House of Commons. One or two modifications proposed by the Royal Commission that prepared a scheme for 100 (approximately) proportional representation seats in April 1918, are included.

The Scheme was prepared unofficially and without the aid of Inquiries by a Boundary Commission. No doubt, when proportional representation is adopted for the country as a whole many modifications of detail will be needed. But it will serve to give a fair idea of the kind of electoral grouping necessary. It will be observed that, in every case, the larger proportional representation constituency has been created by combining the single-member constituencies (other than universities), as delimited by the Boundary Commission, and as now incorporated in the Reform Act of 1918. The names given in the fourth column to the districts combined to form the divisions of those constituencies which are too large to remain undivided—*e.g.*, Liverpool, Glasgow, Manchester—are the names of the present parliamentary divisions as fixed by the Reform Act. At the same time the scheme preserves some single-member constituencies in sparsely populated districts so as to meet any objection based on the fear that some constituencies might be so large in area as to be, according to British parliamentary ideas, unmanageable.

A glance at the Scheme will show how a proportional system simplifies the problem of redistribution. A scheme of single-member constituencies is in need of periodical revision. A proportional scheme makes all future redistributions easy, as, in all but exceptional cases, all that will be wanted is to alter the number of members allotted to a constituency, not to rearrange its boundaries.

PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES

(1) LONDON

Name of Constituency.	Contents of Constituency.	Total Number of Members for Constituency.
Battersea	Metropolitan borough of Battersea	Two
Bermondsey and Southwark	Metropolitan boroughs of Bermondsey and Southwark	Five
Bethnal Green and Shoreditch	Metropolitan boroughs of Bethnal Green and Shoreditch	Three
Camberwell	Metropolitan borough of Camberwell	Four
Chelsea and Kensington	Metropolitan boroughs of Chelsea and Kensington	Three
City of London	City of London	Two
Deptford and Lewisham	Metropolitan boroughs of Deptford and Lewisham	Three
Finsbury and Holborn	Metropolitan boroughs of Finsbury and Holborn	Two
Fulham and Hammersmith	Metropolitan boroughs of Fulham and Hammersmith	Four
Greenwich and Woolwich	Metropolitan boroughs of Greenwich and Woolwich	Three
Hackney and Stoke Newington	Metropolitan boroughs of Hackney and Stoke Newington	Four
Hampstead and St Pancras	Metropolitan boroughs of Hampstead and St Pancras	Four
Islington	Metropolitan borough of Islington	Four
Lambeth	Metropolitan borough of Lambeth	Four
Paddington and St Marylebone	Metropolitan boroughs of Paddington and St Marylebone	Three
Tower Hamlets	Metropolitan boroughs of Poplar and Stepney	Five
Wandsworth	Metropolitan borough of Wandsworth	Five
Westminster	Metropolitan borough of Westminster	Two

(2) ENGLAND, EXCLUDING LONDON AND MONMOUTHSHIRE

City and Town Constituencies.

Name of Constituency.	Contents of Constituency.	Total Number of Members for Constituency.	Divisions of Constituency (if any).	Number of Members for Divisions of Constituency.
Birkenhead and Wallasey.	The county boroughs of Birkenhead and Wallasey.	Three
Birmingham	The county borough of Birmingham	Twelve	North Birmingham—(Handsworth, Erdington, Aston, Duddeston). West Birmingham—(Ladywood, Edgbaston, King's Norton, West Birmingham). East Birmingham—(Deritend, Moseley, Sparkbrook, Yardley).	Four
Bradford	The county borough of Bradford	Four
Bristol	The county borough of Bristol	Five
Dewsbury, Batley and Wakefield.	County boroughs of Dewsbury and Wakefield and the municipal boroughs of Batley, Morley, and Ossett.	Three
Kingston-upon-Hull	The county borough of Kingston-upon-Hull	Four
Leeds*	The county borough of Leeds	Six
Leicester	The county borough of Leicester	Three
Liverpool*	The county borough of Liverpool	Eleven	North—(Everton, Kirkdale, Wallton, and West Derby). South—(East Toxteth, Edgehill, Fairfield, and Wavertree). West—(Scotland, Exchange, and West Toxteth).	Four

* As proposed in April 1918, by the Royal Commission for preparing a scheme for 100 proportional representation seats.

PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES—continued.

(2) ENGLAND, EXCLUDING LONDON AND MONMOUTHSHIRE—continued.

City and Town Constituencies—continued.

Name of Constituency.	Contents of Constituency.	Total Number of Members for Constituency.	Divisions of Constituency (if any).	Number of Members for Divisions of Constituency.
Manchester	County borough of Manchester	Ten	North-East—(Blackley, Platting, Clayton, Ardwick, Gorton). South-West—(Exchange, Hulme, Moss Side, Rusholme, Withington).	Five Five
Newcastle-upon-Tyne	County borough of Newcastle-upon-Tyne	Four
Nottingham	County borough of Nottingham	Four
Plymouth	County borough of Plymouth	Three
Portsmouth	County borough of Portsmouth	Three
The Potteries*	County borough of Stoke-on-Trent, municipal borough of Newcastle-under-Lyme and urban districts of Audley and Wolstanton United.	Four
Salford	County borough of Salford	Three
Sheffield †	County borough of Sheffield	Seven
Southampton	County borough of Southampton	Two
South Stafford boroughs	County borough of Dudley and the civil parish of Dudley Castle Hill, county borough of Smethwick, county borough of Walsall, municipal borough of Wednesbury, and urban districts of Darlaston and Tipton, county borough of West Bromwich.	Five
West Ham	The county borough of West Ham	Four

Wolverhampton . . .	The county borough of Wolverhampton, and urban districts of Bilston, Coseley, Heath Town or Wednesfield Heath, Sedgley, Short Heath, Wednesfield and Willenhall.	Three
York . . .	The county borough of York (with York Castle).	One

(3) WALES, INCLUDING MONMOUTHSHIRE

City and Town Constituencies.

Cardiff . . .	County borough of Cardiff and urban district of Penarth.	Three
The Merthyr boroughs . . .	County borough of Merthyr Tydfil and urban districts of Aberdare and Mountain Ash and the urban district of Rhondda.	Four
Newport . . .	County borough of Newport . . .	One

(4) SCOTLAND

City and Town Constituencies.

Dumbarton Burghs . . .	Burghs of Dumbarton and Clydebank . . .	One
Edinburgh . . .	County of the City of Edinburgh and burgh of Musselburgh.	Five
Glasgow † . . .	County of the City of Glasgow . . .	Fifteen	...	Five East — (Central, Springburn, Camlachie, Bridgeton, Shettleston). West — (Partick, Hillhead, Maryhill, St Rollox, Kelvingrove). South — (Govan, Tradeston, Gorbals, Pollok, Cathcart).
Leith . . .	The Burgh of Leith . . .	One	...	Five Five ...

* The Commissioners made Stoke a separate constituency with three members.
 † As proposed by the Commission.
 ‡ The same division of Glasgow was proposed by the Commission.

PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES—*continued.*
 (5) ENGLAND, EXCLUDING LONDON AND MONMOUTHSHIRE

Country Constituencies.

Name of Constituency.	Contents of Constituency.	Total Number of Members for Constituency.	Divisions of Constituency (if any).	Number of Members for Divisions of Constituency.
Bedford	The administrative county of Bedford	Three
Berks	The administrative county of Berks and the county borough of Reading.	Four
Bucks.	The administrative county of Bucks	Three
Cambridge and Huntingdon.	The administrative counties of Cambridge, Huntingdon, and the Isle of Ely.	Four
Chester	The administrative county of Chester and the county boroughs of Chester and Stockport.	Eleven	East—(Macclesfield, Stalybridge, Stockport, and Hyde). Mid—(Altrincham, Crewe, Knutsford, Northwich). West—(Chester, Eddisbury, Wirral).	Four Four Three
Cornwall	The administrative county of Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly.	Five
Cumberland	The administrative county of Cumberland and the county borough of Carlisle.	Five
Derby	The administrative county of Derby and the county borough of Derby.	Ten	North—(Chesterfield, Clay Cross, High Peak, North-Eastern, Western). South—(Belper, Derby City, Ilkeston, Southern). North—(Barnstaple, Exeter, Honiton, South Molton, Tiverton).	Five Five Five
Devon	The administrative county of Devon and the county borough of Exeter (including Exeter Castle Yard	Eight		

Dorset	and Devon County Prison and Constabulary Barracks).	Four	South—(Tavistock, Torquay, Totnes).	Three
Durham *	The administrative county of Dorset The administrative county of Durham and the county boroughs of Darlington, Gateshead, South Shields, Sunderland, and West Hartlepool.	Eighteen	Mid—(Barnard Castle, Bishop Auckland, Durham, Seaham, and Spennymoor). North-East—(Houghton-le-Spring, Jarrow, South Shields, and Sunderland). North-West—(Blaydon, Chester-le-Street, Consett, and Gateshead). South-East—(Darlington, Hartlepool, Sedgefield, and Stockton-on-Tees). North—(Colchester, Harwich, Maldon, Saffron Walden). South—(East Ham, Ilford, Romford). South-East—(Chelmsford, South-Eastern, Southend-on-Sea). West—(Epping, Leyton, Walthamstow). East—(Cirencester and Tewkesbury, Cheltenham, Stroud). West—(Forest of Dean, Gloucester, Thornbury). East—(Aldershot, Fareham, Petersfield). West—(Basingstoke, Bournemouth, New Forest, Winchester). Hereford Leominster	Five Five Four Four Four Four Three Five Three Three Three Four
Essex	The administrative county of Essex and the county boroughs of East Ham and Southend-on-Sea.	Sixteen		Four
Gloucester	The administrative county of Gloucester and the county borough of Gloucester.	Six		Three
Hants	The administrative county of Southampton and the county borough of Bournemouth.	Seven		Three
Hereford	The administrative county of Hereford	Two		Three Four One One

* The Commission adopted a different scheme for Durham, as they held it inadvisable, in preparing their partial scheme, to combine parliamentary boroughs with counties.

PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES—continued.

(5) ENGLAND, EXCLUDING LONDON AND MONMOUTHSHIRE—continued.

Country Constituencies—continued.

Name of Constituency.	Contents of Constituency.	Total Number of Members for Constituency.	Divisions of Constituency (if any).	Number of Members for Divisions of Constituency.
Hertford	The administrative county of Hertford	Five
Isle of Wight	The administrative county of the Isle of Wight	One
Kent	The administrative county of Kent and the county borough of Canterbury.	Fifteen	East—(Dover, Hythe, Isle of Thanet). North—(Gravesend, Rochester). North-West—(Bromley, Chislehurst, Dartford). South—(Maldstone, Tunbridge, and Sevenoaks). Mid—(Ashford, Canterbury, and Faversham). East—(Bury, Heywood and Radcliffe, Middleton and Prestwich, Rochdale, Royton). North—(Barrow, Lancaster, Lonsdale). North Central—(Accrington, Blackburn, Darwen, Rossendale).	Three Three Three Three Three Five Three Five Three Three
Lancaster	The administrative county of Lancaster, the county boroughs of Barrow-in-Furness, Blackburn, Blackpool, Bolton, Bootle, Burnley, Bury, Oldham, Preston, Rochdale, St Helen's, Southport, Warrington and Wigan.	Forty-two		

Leicester	The administrative county of Leicester	Four	South—(Eccles, Farnworth, Streetford).	Three
Lincoln and Rutland	The administrative county of the Parts of Lindsey and the county boroughs of Grimsby and Lincoln. The administrative county of the Parts of Holland. The administrative county of the Parts of Kesteven, and the administrative county of Rutland.	Nine	South Central—(Bolton, Leigh, Westthoughton, Wigan). South-East—(Ashton-under-Lyme, Mossley, Oldham). South-West—(Ince, Newton, St Helens, Warrington, Widnes). West—(Bootle, Ormskirk, Southport, Waterloo).	Five
Middlesex	The administrative county of Middlesex	Seventeen	North-East—(Grimsby, Horn-castle, Louth). North-West—(Brigg, Gainsborough, Lincoln). South—(Grantham, Holland with Boston, Rutland, and Stamford).	Three
Norfolk	The administrative county of Norfolk and the county boroughs of Great Yarmouth and Norwich.	Eight	East—(Edmonton, Enfield, Tottenham). North—(Finchley, Hornsey, Wood Green). North-West—(Harrow, Hendon, Willesden). South-West—(Acton, Brentford, Ealing). West—(Spelthorne, Twickenham, Uxbridge).	Four
Northampton,* with the Soke of Peterborough.	The administrative counties of Northampton and the Soke of Peterborough and the county borough of Northampton.	Five	East—(Eastern, Great Yarmouth, Norwich, Southern). West—(King's Lynn, Northern, South-Western).	Three

* The Commission did not combine the borough of Northampton with the county.

PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES—continued.

(5) ENGLAND, EXCLUDING LONDON AND MONMOUTHSHIRE—continued.

Country Constituencies—continued.

Name of Constituency.	Contents of Constituency.	Total Number of Members for Constituency.	Divisions of Constituency (if any).	Number of Members for Divisions of Constituency.
Northumberland . . .	The administrative county of Northumberland and the county borough of Tynemouth.	Six	Berwick-upon-Tweed . . .	One
Nottingham . . .	The administrative county of Nottingham . . .	Five	South-East—(Morpeth, Tyne-mouth, Wallsend, Wansbeck). . .	Four
Oxford . . .	The administrative county of Oxford and the county borough of Oxford.	Three	Hexham . . .	One
Salop . . .	The administrative county of Salop . . .	Four
Somerset* . . .	The administrative county of Somerset and the county borough of Bath.	Seven
Stafford . . .	The administrative county of Stafford (exclusive of the parts thereof comprised in the municipal borough of Wednesbury and the urban districts of Darlaston and Tipton) and the county borough of Burton-on-Trent.	Seven	North-East—(Bath, Frome, Wells, Weston-super-Mare). . .	Four
East Suffolk . . .	The administrative county of East Suffolk and the county borough of Ipswich.	Four	South-West—(Bridgwater, Taunton, Yeovil). . .	Three
West Suffolk . . .	The administrative county of West Suffolk . . .	Two	North—(Burton, Leek, Stafford, Stone). . .	Four
Surrey . . .	The administrative county of Surrey, and the county borough of Croydon.	Twelve	South—(Cannock, Kingswinford, Lichfield). . .	Three
		
			Bury St Edmunds . . .	One
			Sudbury . . .	One
			North—(Kingston-upon-Thames, Richmond, Wimbledon). . .	Three

East Sussex . . .	The administrative county of East Sussex and the county boroughs of Eastbourne, Hastings, and Brighton.	Seven	North-East — (Croydon, Mitcham). South-East — (Eastern, Epsom, Reigate). West — (Chertsey, Farnham, Guildford). East — (Eastbourne, Hastings, Rye). Mid — (Brighton, East Grinstead, Lewes). Chichester Horsham and Worthing	Three
West Sussex . . .	The administrative county of West Sussex . . .	Two	Chichester Horsham and Worthing	One One
Warwick . . .	The administrative county of Warwick and the county borough of Coventry.	Five
Westmoreland . . .	The administrative county of Westmoreland . . .	One
Wilts . . .	The administrative county of Wilts . . .	Five
Worcester . . .	The administrative county of Worcester and the county borough of Worcester.	Five
York, East Riding . . .	The administrative county of York, East Riding . . .	Three	Three
York, North Riding . . .	The administrative county of York, North Riding (exclusive of the part thereof comprised in the municipal boroughs of Stockton-on-Tees and Thornaby-on-Tees), and the county borough of Middlesbrough.	Six	Middlesbrough and Cleveland . . . North Riding — (Richmond, Scarborough and Whitby, Thirsk and Malton).	Three Three
York, West Riding . . .	The administrative county of York, West Riding (exclusive of the municipal boroughs of Batley, Morley, and Ossett), and the county boroughs of Barnsley, Halifax, Huddersfield, and Rotherham.	Twenty-three	Barkston Ash Barnsley — (Barnsley, Penistone, and Wentworth). Doncaster and Rotherham — (Don Valley, Rotherham). Halifax — (Elland, Halifax and Sowerby). Huddersfield — (Colne Valley, Huddersfield and Spen Valley).	One Three Four Three Three

* The Commission did not propose to combine Bath with Somerset; otherwise they proposed to divide the County, as in the Lords' scheme, into two divisions returning each three members.

PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES—*continued.*

(5) ENGLAND, EXCLUDING LONDON AND MONMOUTHSHIRE—*continued.*

Country Constituencies—continued.

Name of Constituency.	Contents of Constituency.	Total Number of Members for Constituency.	Divisions of Constituency (if any).	Number of Members for Divisions of Constituency.
York, West Riding— <i>continued.</i>	The administrative county of York, West Riding, etc.— <i>continued.</i>	Twenty-three	Keighley and Shipley—(Keighley, Shipley and Pudsey, and Otley). Pontefract—(Hemsworth, Northwell). Ripon Skipton	Three Four One One

(6) WALES, INCLUDING MONMOUTHSHIRE

Country Constituencies.

Anglesey and Carnarvon.	The administrative counties of Anglesey and Carnarvon inclusive of Bardsey Island.	Three
Brecon and Radnor	The administrative counties of Brecon and Radnor	One
Cardigan	The administrative county of Cardigan	One
Carmarthen and Pembroke.	The administrative counties of Carmarthen and Pembroke.	Three
Denbigh and Flint	The administrative counties of Denbigh and Flint	Three

Glamorgan . . .	The administrative county of Glamorgan, exclusive of the parts thereof comprised within the constituencies of Cardiff and Merthyr boroughs.	Nine	East—(Caerphilly, Pontypridd, Llandaff). Mid—(Neath, Aberavon, Ogmore). West—(Swansea, Gower) . . .	Three Three Three
Merioneth . . .	The administrative county of Merioneth . . .	One
Monmouth . . .	The administrative county of Monmouth . . .	Five
Montgomery . . .	The administrative county of Montgomery . . .	One
(7) SCOTLAND				
<i>Country Constituencies.</i>				
Aberdeen and Kincardine.	The counties of Aberdeen and Kincardine, inclusive of all burghs situated therein and including the county of the city of Aberdeen.	Five
Argyll . . .	The county of Argyll, inclusive of all burghs situated therein.	One
Ayr and Bute . . .	The counties of Ayr and Bute, inclusive of all burghs situated therein.	Four
Banff . . .	The county of Banff, inclusive of all burghs situated therein.	One
Berwick and Roxburgh burgh.	The counties of Berwick and Roxburgh, inclusive of all burghs situated therein.	One
Caithness and Sutherland.	The counties of Caithness and Sutherland, inclusive of all burghs situated therein.	One
Dumbarton . . .	The county of Dumbarton, inclusive of all burghs situated therein, except the burghs of Dumbarton and Clydebank.	One
Dumfries . . .	The county of Dumfries, inclusive of all burghs situated therein.	One
Fife . . .	The county of Fife, inclusive of all burghs situated therein.	Four

PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES—*continued*(7) SCOTLAND—*continued*.*Country Constituencies.*

Name of Constituency.	Contents of Constituency.	Total Number of Members for Constituency.	Divisions of Constituency (if any).	Number of Members for Divisions of Constituency.
Forfar	The county of Forfar, inclusive of all burghs situated therein, and inclusive of the county of the city of Dundee.	Four
Galloway	The counties of Kirkcudbright and Wigtown, inclusive of all burghs situated therein.	One
Inverness and Ross and Cromarty.	The counties of Inverness and Ross and Cromarty, inclusive of all burghs situated therein.	Three	Inverness Ross and Cromarty Western Isles	One One One
Lanark	The county of Lanark, inclusive of all burghs situated therein, except the county of the city of Glasgow and so much of the burgh of Renfrew as is contained within the parish of Govan.	Seven	North — (Northern Bothwell, Coatbridge, Motherwell). South — (Rutherglen, Hamilton, Lanark).	Four Three
Lothians	The counties of Linlithgow, Midlothian, and Haddington, inclusive of all burghs situated therein except the county of the city of Edinburgh and the burghs of Leith and Musselburgh.	Three
Moray and Nairn	The counties of Elgin and Nairn, inclusive of all burghs situated therein.	One
Orkney and Zetland	The counties of Orkney and Zetland, inclusive of all burghs situated therein.	One
Peebles and Selkirk	The counties of Peebles and Selkirk, inclusive of all burghs situated therein.	One

One
One
...
...

Perth—(The City and County of Perth, except the Central, Highland, and Western County Districts).
Kinross and Western Perth— (Being the Central, Highland, and Western County Districts).
...
...

Two
Four
Three

The counties of Perth and Kinross, inclusive of all burghs situated therein.
The county of Renfrew, inclusive of all burghs situated therein, together with so much of the burgh of Renfrew as is contained within the parish of Govan, in the county of Lanark.
The counties of Stirling and Clackmannan, inclusive of all burghs situated therein.

Perth and Kinross
Renfrew
Stirling and Clackmannan.

(8) UNIVERSITIES

Number of Members.

Description of University Constituency.

England and Wales :—			
The University of Oxford	.	.	2
The University of Cambridge	.	.	2
The University of London	.	.	1
The University of Wales	.	.	1
The University of Durham, the Victoria University of Manchester, the University of Liverpool, the University of Leeds, the University of Sheffield, the University of Birmingham, and the University of Bristol .	.	.	2
Scotland :—			
The University of St Andrews, the University of Glasgow, the University of Aberdeen, and the University of Edinburgh .	.	.	3

APPENDIX II

RULES

FOR THE CONDUCT OF A PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION ON THE SYSTEM OF THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE, WITH AN EXAMPLE.

Conduct of election.

1. At a parliamentary election, where there are two or more members to be elected, any election of the full number of members shall be conducted in accordance with the following rules, as illustrated in the First Schedule thereto.

Method of voting.

2.—(1) Every elector shall have one vote only.

(2) An elector in giving his vote—

(a) must place on his ballot paper the figure 1 in the square opposite the name of the candidate for whom he votes;

(b) may in addition place on his ballot paper the figure 2 or the figures 2 and 3, or 2, 3, and 4, and so on, in the squares opposite the names of other candidates in the order of his preference.

Forms.

3. The forms contained in the Second Schedule to these rules shall be substituted for the forms of front of ballot paper and of directions for the guidance of the voter contained in the Second Schedule to the Ballot Act, 1872.

35 & 36 Vict.
c. 33.

Invalid ballot papers.

4. A ballot paper shall be invalid on which—

(a) the figure 1 is not marked; or

(b) the figure 1 is set opposite the name of more than one candidate; or

Note.—These, with one or two small clerical alterations, are the draft rules as settled by the Government Draftsman when the Reform Act of 1918 was under consideration in the form of a Bill including provisions for the introduction of proportional representation in ordinary as well as university constituencies. If the suggestions as to by-elections made on page 77 are adopted, these rules may need some small modifications. (*White Paper Cd. 8768, 1917, H.M. Stationery Office and Agents for the sale of Government publications.*)

- (c) the figure 1 and some other figure is set opposite the name of the same candidate; or
- (d) any mark is made not authorised by the Ballot Act, 1872, as modified by this Act.

5. After the ballot papers have been mixed, in accordance with the rules contained in the First Schedule of the Ballot Act, 1872, the returning officer shall examine the ballot papers and, after rejecting any that are invalid, shall arrange the remainder in parcels according to the first preferences recorded for each candidate. Arrangement of ballot papers.

6. The returning officer shall then count the number of papers in each parcel, and credit each candidate with one vote in respect of each valid paper on which a first preference has been recorded for him, and he shall ascertain the total number of valid papers. Counting of votes.

7. The returning officer shall then divide the total number of valid papers by a number exceeding by one the number of vacancies to be filled, and the result increased by one, disregarding any fractional remainder, shall be the number of votes sufficient to secure the return of a candidate (hereinafter called the "quota"). Ascertainment of quota.

8. If at any time the number of votes credited to a candidate is equal to or greater than the quota, that candidate shall be declared elected. Candidates with quota elected.

9.—(1) If at any time the number of votes credited to a candidate is greater than the quota, the surplus shall be transferred in accordance with the provisions of this rule to the continuing candidates indicated on the ballot papers in the parcel of the elected candidate as being next in order of the voters' preference. Transfer of surplus.

(2)—(a) If the votes credited to an elected candidate consist of original votes only, the returning officer shall examine all the papers in the parcel of the elected candidate whose surplus is to be transferred and shall arrange the transferable papers in sub-parcels according to the next preferences recorded thereon.

(b) If the votes credited to an elected candidate consist of original and transferred votes, or of transferred votes only, the returning officer shall examine the papers contained in the

sub-parcel last received by the elected candidate and shall arrange the transferable papers therein in further sub-parcels according to the next preferences recorded thereon.

(c) In either case the returning officer shall make a separate sub-parcel of the non-transferable papers and shall ascertain the number of papers in each sub-parcel of transferable papers and in the sub-parcel of non-transferable papers.

(3) If the total number of papers in the sub-parcels of transferable papers is equal to or less than the surplus, the returning officer shall transfer each sub-parcel of transferable papers to the continuing candidate indicated thereon as the voters' next preference.

(4)—(a) If the total number of transferable papers is greater than the surplus, the returning officer shall transfer from each sub-parcel the number of papers which bears the same proportion to the number of papers in the sub-parcel as the surplus bears to the total number of transferable papers.

(b) The number of papers to be transferred from each sub-parcel shall be ascertained by multiplying the number of papers in the sub-parcel by the surplus and dividing the result by the total number of transferable papers. A note shall be made of the fractional parts, if any, of each number so ascertained.

(c) If, owing to the existence of such fractional parts, the number of papers to be transferred is less than the surplus, so many of these fractional parts taken in the order of their magnitude, beginning with the largest, as are necessary to make the total number of papers to be transferred equal to the surplus, shall be reckoned as of the value of unity, and the remaining fractional parts shall be ignored.

(d) The particular papers to be transferred from each sub-parcel shall be those last filed in the sub-parcel.

(e) Each paper transferred shall be marked in such a manner as to indicate the candidate from and to whom the transfer is made.

(5)—(a) If more than one candidate has a surplus, the largest surplus shall be first dealt with.

(b) If two or more candidates have each the same surplus, regard shall be had to the number of original votes obtained by each candidate, and the surplus of the candidate credited with the largest number of original votes shall be first dealt

with, and, if the numbers of the original votes are equal, the returning officer shall decide which surplus he will first deal with.

(c) The returning officer need not transfer the surplus of an elected candidate when that surplus together with any other surplus not transferred does not exceed the difference between the totals of the votes credited to the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll.

10.—(1) If at any time no candidate has a surplus (or when under the preceding rule any existing surplus need not be transferred), and one or more vacancies remain unfilled, the returning officer shall exclude from the poll the candidate credited with the lowest number of votes, and shall examine all the papers of that candidate, and shall arrange the transferable papers in sub-parcels according to the next preferences recorded thereon for continuing candidates, and shall transfer each sub-parcel to the candidate for whom that preference is recorded.

(Or Exclusion of candidates lowest on the poll.)

(2) If the total of the votes of the two or more candidates lowest on the poll, together with any surplus votes not transferred, is less than the votes credited to the next highest candidate, the returning officer may in one operation exclude those candidates from the poll and transfer their votes in accordance with the preceding regulation.

(3) If, when a candidate has to be excluded under this rule, two or more candidates have each the same number of votes and are lowest on the poll, regard shall be had to the number of original votes credited to each of those candidates, and the candidate with fewest original votes shall be excluded, and, where the numbers of the original votes are equal, regard shall be had to the total number of votes credited to those candidates at the first transfer at which they had an unequal number of votes, and the candidate with the lowest number of votes at that transfer shall be excluded, and, where the numbers of votes credited to those candidates were equal at all transfers, the returning officer shall decide which shall be excluded.

11.—(1) Whenever any transfer is made under any of the preceding rules, each sub-parcel of papers transferred shall be added to the parcel, if any, of papers of the candidate to

(Disposal of papers after any transfer.)

whom the transfer is made, and that candidate shall be credited with one vote in respect of each paper transferred. Such papers as are not transferred shall be set aside as finally dealt with, and the votes given thereon shall thenceforth not be taken into account.

(2) If after any transfer a candidate has a surplus, that surplus shall be dealt with in accordance with and subject to the provisions contained in Rule 9 before any other candidate is excluded.

12.—(1) When the number of continuing candidates is reduced to the number of vacancies remaining unfilled, the continuing candidates shall be declared elected.

(2) When only one vacancy remains unfilled, and the votes of some one continuing candidate exceed the total of all the votes of the other continuing candidates, together with any surplus not transferred, that candidate shall be declared elected.

(3) When the last vacancies can be filled under this rule, no further transfer of votes need be made.

13. The returning officer shall record and give public notice of any transfer of votes made under these rules, and of the total number of votes credited to each candidate after any such transfer, in addition to the particulars prescribed by Rule 45 to the First Schedule to the Ballot Act, 1872. Such public notice may be in accordance with the form given in the first schedule to these rules.

14.—(1) Any candidate or his agent may, at any time during the counting of the votes, either before the commencement or after the completion of any transfer of votes (whether surplus or otherwise), request the returning officer to re-examine and recount the papers of all or any candidates (not being papers set aside at any previous transfer as finally dealt with), and the returning officer shall forthwith re-examine and recount the same accordingly. The returning officer may also at his discretion recount votes either once or more often in any case in which he is not satisfied as to the accuracy of any previous count: Provided that nothing herein shall make it obligatory on the returning officer to recount the same votes more than once.

Filling the
last vacan-
cies.

Public notice
of the result
of the elec-
tion.

Provision for
recounts.

(2) If upon an election petition—

- (i) any ballot papers counted by the returning officer are rejected as invalid, or
- (ii) any ballot papers rejected by the returning officer are declared valid,

the court may direct the whole or any part of the ballot papers to be recounted and the result of the election ascertained in accordance with these rules.

(3) On any recount, subject to such modifications as may be necessary by reason of any error in the original count, each paper shall take the same course as at the original count.

15.—(1) If any question shall arise in relation to any transfer of votes, the decision of the returning officer, whether expressed or implied by his acts, shall be final unless an objection is made by any candidate or his agent before the declaration of the poll, and in that event the decision of the returning officer may be reversed upon an election petition.

Determination of questions arising from transfers of votes.

(2) If any decision of the returning officer is so reversed, the transfer in question and all operations subsequent thereto shall be void and the court shall direct what transfer is to be made in place of the transfer in question, and shall cause the subsequent operations to be carried out and the result of the election to be ascertained in accordance with these rules.

16. In these rules—

Definitions.

- (1) The expression “continuing candidate” means any candidate not elected and not excluded from the poll:
- (2) The expression “first preference” means the figure “1”; the expression “second preference” means the figure “2”; and the expression “third preference” means the figure “3,” set opposite the name of any candidate, and so on:
- (3) The expression “transferable paper” means a ballot paper on which a second or subsequent preference is recorded for a continuing candidate:
- (4) The expression “non-transferable paper” means a

ballot paper on which no second or subsequent preference is recorded for a continuing candidate :

Provided that a paper shall be deemed to be a non-transferable paper in any case in which—

(a) The names of two or more candidates (whether continuing or not) are marked with the same figure, and are next in order of preference ; or

(b) The name of the candidate next in order of preference (whether continuing or not) is marked—

(i) by a figure not following consecutively after some other figure on the ballot paper ; or

(ii) by two or more figures :

- (5) The expression “original vote” in regard to any candidate means a vote derived from a ballot paper on which a first preference is recorded for that candidate :
- (6) The expression “transferred vote” in regard to any candidate, means a vote derived from a ballot paper on which a second or subsequent preference is recorded for that candidate :
- (7) The expression “surplus” means the number of votes by which the total number of the votes, original and transferred, credited to any candidate, exceeds the quota.

Construction. 17. These rules shall be construed as one with the Ballot Act, 1872, and that Act shall, in cases to which these rules are applicable, have effect subject to these rules.

Short title. 18. These rules may be cited as the Parliamentary Elections (Single Transferable Vote) Rules, 1917.

SCHEDULES

FIRST SCHEDULE

EXAMPLE OF AN ELECTION CONDUCTED ON THE SYSTEM OF THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE SET OUT ABOVE.

Let it be assumed that there are five members to be elected, and that there are ten candidates, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K.

The ballot papers are examined, and the valid papers are arranged in separate parcels under the names of the candidates marked with the figure 1. Arrangement of ballot papers (Rule 5).

Each separate parcel is counted, and each candidate is credited with one vote in respect of each paper on which a first preference has been recorded for him. Counting the votes (Rule 6).

The result of the count may be supposed to be as follows:—

	Votes
A	2009
B	952
C	939
D	746
E	493
F	341
G	157
H	152
I	118
K	93
Total	6000

The Quota.

It is found that the total of all the valid votes is 6000. This total is divided by six (*i.e.*, the number which exceeds by one the number of vacancies to be filled), and 1001 (*i.e.*, the quotient 1000 increased by one) is the “quota,” or the number of votes sufficient to elect a member. Ascertainment of quota (Rule 7).

A’s votes exceed the quota, and he is declared elected.

Candidate with quota elected (Rule 8).

First Transfer.

A has 1008 surplus votes (*i.e.*, A’s total 2009, less the quota 1001), and it is necessary to transfer this surplus (Rule 8 (1)). Transfer of surplus votes of elected candidate (Rule 9).

All A’s 2009 papers are examined and arranged in separate sub-parcels according to the second preferences indicated thereon (Rule 9 (2) (a)).

A separate sub-parcel is also formed of those papers on which no further available preference, *i.e.*, no further preference for any continuing candidate, is shown, and which are therefore not transferable (Rule 9 (2) (c)).

The result is found to be as follows :—

A next available preference is shown for	D on	257	papers	
	„	„	E on	11 „
	„	„	F on	28 „
	„	„	G on	1708 „
Total of transferable papers	.	.	<u>2004</u>	„
Total of non-transferable papers	.	.	5	„
Total of A's papers	.	.	<u>2009</u>	

Proportion of papers to be transferred.
Rule 9 (4) (a).

Since the total number of transferable papers (2004) exceeds the surplus (1008), only a portion of each sub-parcel can be transferred, and the number of papers to be transferred from each sub-parcel must bear the same proportion to the total number of papers in the sub-parcel as that which the surplus bears to the total number of transferable papers.

How numbers to be transferred are ascertained.
Rule 9 (4) (b)

In other words, the number of papers to be transferred from each sub-parcel is ascertained by multiplying the number of papers in the sub-parcel by 1008 (the surplus), and dividing the result by 2004 (the total number of transferable papers).

The process is as follows :—

D's sub-parcel contains 257 papers, and his share of the surplus is, therefore :—

$$257 \times \frac{1008}{2004} \text{ or } 129 \frac{540}{2004}$$

E's sub-parcel contains 11 papers, and his share of the surplus is, therefore :—

$$11 \times \frac{1008}{2004} \text{ or } 5 \frac{1068}{2004}$$

F's sub-parcel contains 28 papers, and his share of the surplus is, therefore :—

$$28 \times \frac{1008}{2004} \text{ or } 14 \frac{168}{2004}$$

G's sub-parcel contains 1708 papers, and his share of the surplus is, therefore :—

$$1708 \times \frac{1008}{2004} \text{ or } 859 \frac{228}{2004}$$

Total	.	.	.	<u>1008</u>
-------	---	---	---	-------------

The numbers of papers to be transferred as determined by the preceding process contain fractions, and, since only whole papers can be transferred, so many of the largest of these fractions, taken in order of their magnitude, as will make the total number of papers to be transferred equal to the surplus are reckoned as of the value of unity.

Treatment of fractions in transferring surplus votes (Rule 9 (4) (c).)

Thus, as the *whole* numbers determined above amount to only 1007, viz., (129 + 5 + 14 + 859), or one short of the surplus 1008, the largest fraction $\frac{1068}{2004}$ is reckoned as unity, and the numbers of papers to be transferred are as follows:—

To D	129 papers
To E	6 „
To F	14 „
To G	859 „
Total, being A's surplus	<u>1008</u> „

The particular papers to be transferred to D, E, F, and G are those last filed in their respective sub-parcels, and, therefore, at the top of the sub-parcels. The papers to be transferred are to be marked so as to indicate the candidates from and to whom the transfer is made.

Selection and marking of papers to be transferred. (Rule 9 (4) (d) and (e).)

These papers are added in separate sub-parcels to the parcels of D, E, F, and G.

Disposal of papers after transfer.

The totals of the votes credited to these candidates then become:—

(Rule 11 (1).)

	Votes.
D	746 + 129 = 875
E	493 + 6 = 499
F	341 + 14 = 355
G	157 + 859 = 1016

The remainders of the papers in the sub-parcels (*i.e.*, those papers not transferred), together with the papers on which no further available preferences were marked, are collected together and formed into one parcel, representing A's quota of votes (1001), and these papers are set aside as finally dealt with. The parcel is made up as follows:—

Quota of papers of elected candidate set aside. (Rule 11 (1).)

The remainder of D's sub-parcel,	257 less 129 = 128
„ „ of E's „	11 less 6 = 5
„ „ of F's „	28 less 14 = 14
„ „ of G's „	1708 less 859 = 849
Non-transferable papers	5
Total, being A's quota	<u>1001</u>

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The operations involved in this transfer are summarised in the following table:—

Transfer of A's Surplus.

Surplus	1008
Number of transferable papers	2004
Proportion to be transferred . =	$\frac{\text{Surplus}}{\text{Number of transferable papers}} = \frac{1008}{2004}$

Names of Candidates marked as the next available preferences.	Number of Original Papers.	Number of Papers transferred.	Number of Papers retained for A's quota.
B
C
D	257	129	128
E	11	6	5
F	28	14	14
G	1708	859	849
H
I
K
Total number of transferable papers	2004	1008	996
Number of non-transferable papers .	5	...	5
Totals	2009	1008	1001

State of poll after first transfer.

The state of the poll on the conclusion of the transfer is as follows:—

	Votes.
A	1001 elected
G	1016
B	952
C	939
D	875
E	499
F	355
H	152
I	118
K	93
Total	<u>6000</u>

Election of candidate as a result of transfer. (Rule 8.)

G now has 1016 votes, a number which is more than the quota. He is accordingly declared elected.

Second Transfer.

G's surplus (1016 less 1001, or 15) would have to be transferred were it not for the provision of Rule 9 (5) (c). Under the latter rule the returning officer need not transfer a surplus which is less than the difference between the two lowest candidates on the poll, and where, therefore, the transfer could not alter the relative position of these two candidates, even if the whole surplus were transferred to the lowest candidate. In this case the difference between I and K, the two lowest candidates, is 25 (118 less 93), and therefore G's surplus need not be transferred.

Surplus not transferred in special case. (Rule 9 (5) (c).)

The returning officer proceeds to distribute the papers of the candidate with the smallest total of votes. K's parcel of 93 papers is therefore examined. It is found to contain 89 papers on which F is the next preference, and 4 on which C is the next preference.

Transfer of votes of candidate lowest on the poll. (Rule 10 (1).)

Therefore 89 papers are transferred to F and 4 to C, being marked so as to indicate the transfer (Rule 9 (4) (c)).

The poll now stands as follows:—

	Votes.
A	1001 elected
G	1016 elected
B	952
C	943
D	875
E	499
F	444
H	152
I	118
Total	<u>6000</u>

State of poll after second transfer.

Third Transfer.

The poll shows that as a result of the second transfer no further candidate obtained the quota which would entitle him to election, and the next operation has to be determined upon.

The difference between I and H (152 less 118, *i.e.*, 34) exceeds G's surplus (15), which, therefore, is still allowed to remain untransferred (Rule 9 (5) (c)).

Candidate I is lowest on the poll, and his papers have to be distributed in the same manner as K's (Rule 10 (1)). But as the combined totals of H and I together with G's surplus

Transfer in special case of the votes of the two lowest candidates in one operation. (Rule 10 (2).)

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($152 + 118 + 15 = 285$) are less than 444, the total of F, the next highest candidate, the returning officer avails himself of Rule 10 (2), and distributes the papers of both H and I in one operation.

The papers ($152 + 118$, or 270 in all) in the parcels of H and I are examined in one operation, and it is found that—

B is marked next preference on	119 papers
D "	107 "
Non-transferable papers . . .	44 "
Total . . .	<u>270</u> "

It should be stated that on some papers some or one of the candidates A, G, I, H, and K may have been marked as next in order of preference on the papers examined, but, as all these candidates are already either elected or excluded, any papers so marked pass to those of the other candidates for whom the next available preferences have been recorded.

The operation is completed by the transfer of 119 papers duly marked (Rule 9 (4) (e)) to B, and 107 to D, whilst the 44 non-transferable papers are set aside as finally dealt with (Rule 11 (1)).

The poll now stands as follows:—

	Votes.
A	1001 elected
G	1016 elected
B	1071
D	982
C	943
E	499
F	444
Non-transferable papers . . .	44
Total	<u>6000</u>

B now has 1071 votes, a number which exceeds the quota. He is accordingly declared elected.

Fourth Transfer.

B's surplus (70) exceeds the difference (55) between E and F, the two candidates lowest on the poll, and it is, therefore, necessary to distribute it.

Election of candidate as the result of a transfer. (Rule 8.)

Transfer of surplus votes arising from a previous transfer. (Rule 11 (2).)

For this purpose, only the sub-~~parcel~~ of papers last transferred, containing 119 papers, is taken into account. Sub-~~parcel~~ of votes last transferred examined. (Rule 9 (2) (b).)

These are examined and arranged in sub-parcels (in the same manner as A's papers were examined and arranged) with the following result:—

A next preference is shown for E on 84 papers.

No further preference is shown on 35 papers.

The total number of transferable papers (84) is thus greater than the surplus (70), and the proportion to be transferred is $\frac{70}{84}$. But there is only one candidate, E, entitled to participate in the transfer. E accordingly receives the whole of the surplus and the 70 papers last filed in E's sub-~~parcel~~ are, therefore, transferred to him, after being marked so as to indicate their transfer from B to E. (Rule 9 (4) (e).)

The remainder of the papers in E's sub-~~parcel~~, together with the non-transferable papers, are placed with B's original parcel. The whole constitutes B's quota and these papers are set aside as finally dealt with (Rule 11 (1)).

B's quota is made up as follows:—

Original parcel	952
Remainder of E's sub- parcel	14
Non-transferable papers	35
	<hr/>
Total	<u>1001</u>

The poll now stands as follows:—

	Votes.	State of poll after fourth transfer.
A	1001	elected
G	1016	elected
B	1001	elected
D	982	
C	943	
E	569	
F	444	
Non-transferable papers	44	
	<hr/>	
Total	<u>6000</u>	

Fifth Transfer.

No candidate is elected as the result of the transfer, and the next operation has to be determined upon.

G's surplus is still not distributable, being smaller than the difference between the totals of E and F, the two lowest candidates (Rule 9 (5) (c)).

F is lowest and his papers have to be distributed.

The votes
the lowest
candidate
distributed.
(Rule 10 (1).)

On examination it is found that of F's 444 papers, 353 show a next preference for C, and the remainder, 91, contain no further preference.

The operation is completed by the transfer of 353 papers duly marked (Rule 9 (4) (e)) to C, whilst the 91 non-transferable papers are set aside as finally dealt with (Rule 11 (1)).

The polls now stand as follows:—

State of poll after fifth transfer.	Votes.
A	1001 elected
G	1016 elected
B	1001 elected
C	1296
D	982
E	569
Non-transferable papers	135
Total	<u>6000</u>

Candidate
elected as a
result of
transfer.
(Rule 8.)

C has now 1296 votes, a number which exceeds the quota, and he is accordingly declared elected.

Filling the
last vacancy.
(Rule 12 (2).)

No further transfer is necessary, for, even if all C's surplus (295) and all G's surplus (15) were transferred to E, his total would only amount to 859.

But D's total (982) exceeds this number and he is therefore declared elected (Rule 12 (2)).

Final result.
Result sheet.
(Rule 13.)

The final result is that A, G, B, C and D are elected.

The details of the various operations in this election are shown in the subjoined form of public notice or "result sheet."

SECOND SCHEDULE

Form of Front of Ballot Paper

Counterfoil No.

Section 3.

Note.—The counterfoil is to have a number to correspond with that on the back of the ballot paper.

.....

Mark Order of Preference in Spaces below.	Names of Candidates.
	BROWN (John Brown, of 52 George Street, Bristol, Merchant).
	JONES (William David Jones, of 10 Charles Street, Bristol, Merchant).
	ROBERTSON (Henry Robertson, of 8 John Street, Bristol, Butcher).
	WILLIAMS (James Williams, of 5 William Street, Bristol, Dock Labourer).
	THOMAS (Walter Thomas, of 23 Ann Street, Bristol, Painter).
	MACINNES (Robert MacInnes, of 26 James Street, Bristol, Licensed Victualler).

N.B.—Vote by placing the figure 1 in the square opposite the name of the candidate for whom you vote. You may also place the figure 2, or the figures 2 and 3, or 2, 3, and 4, and so on, in the squares opposite the names of other candidates in the order of your preference for them.

Form of Directions for the guidance of the Voter in voting, which shall be printed in conspicuous characters and placarded outside every Polling Station and in every compartment of a Polling Station.

The voter will go into one of the compartments, and, with the pencil provided there, mark his ballot paper by writing the number 1 opposite the name of the candidate for whom he votes. He may also write the figures 2, 3, and so on, in accordance with the order of his choice or preference opposite the names of other candidates (that is to say):—

He must write 1 in the square space opposite to the name of the candidate for whom he votes.

He may also write 2 in the square space opposite to the name of the candidate he likes second best, and 3 in the square space opposite to the name of the candidate he likes third best.

And so on.

If the voter does not mark the figure 1 on his ballot paper, or marks the figure 1 opposite more than one name, or marks the figure 1 and some other figure opposite the same name, or places any mark on the paper by which he may be identified, his ballot paper will be invalid and will not be counted.

After marking the ballot paper, the voter will fold up the ballot paper so as to show the official mark on the back, and leaving the compartment will, without showing the front of the paper to any person, show the official mark on the back to the presiding officer, and then in the presence of the presiding officer put the paper into the ballot box and forthwith quit the polling station.

If the voter inadvertently spoils a ballot paper, he can return it to the officer, who will, if satisfied of such inadvertence, give him another paper.

If the voter takes the ballot paper out of the polling station or deposits in the ballot box any other paper than the one given him by the officer, he will be guilty of a misdemeanour, and be subject to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months, with or without hard labour.

Note.—These directions shall be illustrated by examples of valid ballot papers, such as the following:—

Examples of Ballot Papers validly marked.

A.

Mark Order of Preference in Spaces below.	Names of Candidates.
3	BROWN (John Brown, of 52 George Street, Bristol, Merchant).
4	JONES (William David Jones, of 10 Charles Street, Bristol, Engineer).
2	ROBERTSON (Henry Robertson, of 8 John Street, Bristol, Builder).
5	WILLIAMS (James Williams, of 5 William Street, Bristol, Dock Labourer).
1	THOMAS (Walter Thomas, of 23 Anne Street, Bristol, Painter).
6	MACINNES (Robert MacInnes, of 28 James Street, Bristol, Licensed Victualler).

B.

Mark Order of Preference in Spaces below.	Names of Candidates.
	<p>BROWN (John Brown, of 52 George Street, Bristol, Merchant).</p>
I	<p>JONES (William David Jones, of 10 Charles Street, Bristol, Engineer).</p>
	<p>ROBERTSON (Henry Robertson, of 8 John Street, Bristol, Builder).</p>
	<p>WILLIAMS (James Williams, of 5 William Street, Bristol, Dock Labourer).</p>
	<p>THOMAS (Walter Thomas, of 23 Anne Street, Bristol, Painter).</p>
	<p>MACINNES (Robert MacInnes, of 28 James Street, Bristol, Licensed Victualler).</p>

Mark Order of Preference in Spaces below.	Names of Candidates.
	<p>BROWN (John Brown, of 52 George Street, Bristol, Merchant).</p>
3	<p>JONES (William David Jones, of 10 Charles Street, Bristol, Engineer).</p>
	<p>ROBERTSON (Henry Robertson, of 8 John Street, Bristol, Builder).</p>
1	<p>WILLIAMS (James Williams, of 5 William Street, Bristol, Dock Labourer).</p>
	<p>THOMAS (Walter Thomas, of 23 Anne Street, Bristol, Painter).</p>
2	<p>MACINNES (Robert MacInnes, of 28 James Street, Bristol, Licensed Victualler).</p>

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